Re-engaging the African Diasporas: Pan-Africanism in the Age of Globalization 1443894788, 9781443894784

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Re-engaging the African Diasporas

Re-engaging the African Diasporas: Pan-Africanism in the Age of Globalization Edited by

Charles Quist-Adade and Wendy Royal

Re-engaging the African Diasporas: Pan-Africanism in the Age of Globalization Edited by Charles Quist-Adade and Wendy Royal This book first published 2016 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2016 by Charles Quist-Adade, Wendy Royal and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-9478-8 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-9478-4

This book is dedicated to the heroes and heroines, the architects and foot soldiers of the Pan-Africanist Project: Sylvester Williams, Edward Blyden, Marcus Garvey, George Padmore, WEB Du Bois, Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere, Franz Fanon, Patrice Lumumba, Amilcar Cabral, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Sekou Toure, Modibo Keita, Nelson Mandela, Steve Biko, Rick Turner, Chris Hani, Robert Sobukwe, Sojourner Truth, Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X and the legions of other African sons and daughters who toiled, labored, and died in the struggle for the liberation and dignity of Africans everywhere.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Illustrations ...................................................................................... x List of Tables .............................................................................................. xi Acknowledgements ................................................................................... xii Preface ...................................................................................................... xiii Welcome Addresses at the Opening Ceremony ...................................... xxx Part One Keynote Address ......................................................................................... 2 Honoring Madiba’s Legacy: The Challenges Facing South Africa 20 Years Later Jay Naidoo Chapter One ................................................................................................. 8 Non-racialism and the South African Liberation Struggle Professor Kogila Moodley, Dr Jo Beall, Dr Dan O’Meara, and Khulu Eland Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 38 Beyond Shame: The Decline of the “Rainbow Nation” Professor Heribert Adam Part Two Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 44 Reflecting on Pan-African Liberated Zones: Designing a Dynamic Nkrumahist Evaluation Dr. Zizwe Poe

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Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 59 A Contextual Outline and Analysis of 21st Century Pan-Africanism Dr David O. Akombo, Baruti I. Katembo, and Dr Kmt G. Shockley Chapter Five ........................................................................................... 103 From Neo-Colonialism to Neoliberal Globalization: Lessons from Nkrumah’s Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism Dr Charles Quist-Adade Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 138 The Neo-Liberal Agenda versus the Pan-Africanist Agenda: Towards the Way Forward Dr Ama Biney Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 152 Integrating Aesthetics: Transforming Continuing Education through Africentric Practice Dr Auburn E. Ellis Chapter Eight .......................................................................................... 161 Challenges and Opportunities of Reinforcing the Pan-African Movement in the Advent of Globalization Collence Takaingenhamo Chisita and Alexander Rusero Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 179 Engaging the Diaspora for Homeland Development in Nigeria Dr Silk Ugwu Ogbu Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 196 African Leadership: Now and for the Future—Moving from the Lament Narrative of “Monumental Leadership Failure” to a Narrative of Hope for “Visionary Change Leadership” Dr Yabome Gilpin-Jackson Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 228 From Toussaint L’Ouverture to President Kwame Nkrumah: A Discourse on a Pan-African Vision Dr John Marah

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Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 265 A United States of Africa: Political Interests, Contestation and Africa’s Integration Agenda Dr Vladimir Antwi-Danso Chapter Thirteen ..................................................................................... 288 Are Five Senses Enough? Spirituality in/and Knowledge Production within Basic African Deep Thought: A Note Dr De-Valera N.Y.M. Botchway Chapter Fourteen ..................................................................................... 304 From Nkrumah to NEPAD and Beyond: Has Anything Changed? Dr Catherine Schittecatte Chapter Fifteen ........................................................................................ 330 Oil in Uganda: Lessons for Success Dr Arinze Ngwube and Dr Chuka Okoli Chapter Sixteen ....................................................................................... 349 Kwame Nkrumah: The Rise of a Pan-Africanist and the “Africanization” of Pan-Africanism Aziz Mostefaoui Contributors ............................................................................................. 367 Index ........................................................................................................ 372

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Fig. 12-1 The Barasa Model of Integration ............................................. 269 Fig. 12-2 The Proposed ESA ................................................................... 276 Fig. 12-3 The Continental Free Trade Area............................................. 281 Fig. 12-4 The Tripartite FTA (Countries)................................................ 282 Fig. 12-5 The Tripartite FTA “Spaghetti” ............................................... 283 Fig. 12-6 Treaty Effectiveness................................................................. 285 Fig. 12-7 Degree of Integration ............................................................... 286

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4-1 Africa’s Aid-Dependency ......................................................... 78 Table 5-1 Human Development Report 1999 .......................................... 125 Table 5-2 World Bank Development Indicators 2008 ............................. 126 Table 9-1 Location of Nigerian Diasporas ............................................. 183 Table 9-2 Specific Policies and Procedures to Harness African Diaspora Resources ........................................................................................... 189 Table 12-1 Features of Bloc .................................................................... 268

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Our special thanks go to the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), who not only funded this conference, but also the inaugural KNIC in 2010. In addition, we extend our sincere appreciation to Kwantlen Polytechnic University (KPU), the Faculty of Arts, the Sociology and English Language Studies Departments, the BC Teachers’ Federation (BCTF), the Coca-Cola Foundation and Nando’s Restaurants for their generous grants which supported our keynote and plenary speakers. KNIC3 would not have been possible without the Kwantlen Students’ Association (KSA), whose significant funding reflects their idealism and philosophical values. It is to their credit that they have chosen to broaden the cultural spectrum of the university by investing in and promoting a conference that showcases the ideas, academic discourse and community activism of a continent that is all too often underrepresented in the academy and in our communities. We are also grateful to Dr Diane Purvey, Dean of Arts, Dr Arthur Fallick, Leslee Birch, and Catherine Parlee, all of the Office of Research and Scholarship of KPU. Jabulile Dladla, as well as The Drum Café, enriched and enlivened the conference with their stirring South African singing, drumming and dancing. Thanks also go to our tireless videographer, Manon Boivin, African Breese Specialty Store for providing refreshments and Sodexo, for their delicious wine and cheese reception, farewell banquet and African-themed luncheon. Our sincere thanks go to the University of Cape Coast, and Lincoln University for their various contributions to the success of the KNIC. Last, but not least, we are particularly beholden to the KSA student volunteers, and our two exceptional KPU students—Nubwa Wathanafa and Emma Cleveland—without whose tireless efforts and superb work ethic this conference would not have been possible.

PREFACE

Re-engaging the African Diasporas: Pan-Africanism in the Age of Globalization is a collection of papers presented at Kwantlen Polytechnic University (KPU), Richmond, Canada, during the Third Biennial Kwame Nkrumah International Conference (KNIC) jointly organized by the Sociology Department, KPU, the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST), and Lincoln University (LU), Pennsylvania on August 20–22, 2014. It is the second major publication to come out of the Kwame Nkrumah International Conference series. The first volume, Africa's Many Divides and Africa's Future: Pursuing Nkrumah’s Vision of Pan-Africanism in an Era of Globalization, which was published by Cambridge Scholars Publishing, combined papers presented at the inaugural and the second Biennial Kwame Nkrumah International Conference (KNIC). On March 6, 1957, roughly 60 years ago, the visionary Pan-Africanist, Kwame Nkrumah declared on his country’s independence that, “the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with total liberation of Africa” (Nkrumah, 1957). Nkrumah’s dialectical proclamation is true for the African Diaspora. It can be said in the same vein that the emancipation of Africa from colonialism is meaningless unless it is linked with the total liberation of the African Diaspora. The reverse is also true; the emancipation of people of African descent from slavery is meaningless unless it is organically linked with the complete liberation of the continent. Contemporaneously, it is important to see the struggles for human dignity, economic justice, and against all forms of oppression by Africans in Global Africa as dialectically and organically linked. Thus, whatever gains or losses are made or suffered in any part of Greater Africa affect all people of African descent. Nkrumah had also observed, emphasizing the need for African unity, that: “if in the past the Sahara Desert divided us, today it must unite us” (as cited in Quist-Adade, 2015). Thus, “today if the ballast of European history, the ignominy of the slave trade and the Atlantic Ocean divided us, today these must bring us together” (Quist-Adade, 2015). In the “golden” years of the Pan-Africanist movement, Africans on the continent and their cousins in the Diaspora worked together to liberate the continent. Many of the pioneer Pan-Africanists from the Diaspora did not only work hand-in-

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hand with the leaders of the independence movement from the continent while they were on sojourn in the West; many of them followed their brethren to Africa to help build their newly liberated countries (QuistAdade, 2015). The Trinidadian George Padmore was Ghana’s Minister of African Affairs. The African-American W.E.B. Du Bois was Dr Kwame Nkrumah’s adviser and was working on the Encyclopedia Africana project until his death in 1963. Many Africans from the Diaspora moved to Ghana to work as teachers, engineers, and civil servants, including the late poet par excellence, Maya Angelou. If it was possible then for Continental Africans and Africans in the Diaspora to work together it is possible today also. Nkrumah admonishes us that the close links forged between Africans and peoples of African descent for nearly a century of common struggle must inspire and strengthen us. For, he continued, although the outward forms of our struggle may change, it remains, in essence, the same, a fight to the death against oppression, racism and exploitation (Nkrumah, 1967). Long before Nkrumah made this observation, W.E.B. Du Bois (1903) had written in his Souls of Black Folks that while there are differences in the specificity of the experiences of people of African descent on the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean, Continental Africans and Africans in the Diaspora “share certain aspects of history”. Du Bois enumerates the shared African experience as follows: (1) their affirmation of their African heritage; (2) their participation in the Diasporic aspects of Pan-African political struggles; (3) their continuing concern with the status of Africa and their effort to improve it, and (4) their relationship to the hyphenated Africans in the Diaspora. Two premises underpin the papers in this volume: (1) If the history of slavery and its vestiges divided and continue to divide the continent and its Diasporas, the inexorable march of globalization and modern technology should be harnessed to bridge that divide, and (2) the continent’s development is a boon to the development of what the African Union has dubbed Africa’s “Sixth Region”. The book weaves together papers that seek to give academic and intellectual impetus to tie the continent’s development to that of the African Diaspora. The goal is to end the inertia and inward-looking perspective on the part of scholars and academics in both Africa and “African International” or “Global Africa,” and to reengage one another in more productive and sustainable ways. By harnessing the enormous resources available in our Internet age and riding the cresting wave of globalization, the task of re-engagement will be vastly enhanced. The debates and discussions in this volume seek to facilitate this re-engagement.

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Re-engaging the African Diasporas: Pan-Africanism in the Age of Globalization brings together papers from multiple disciplines, which are authored by both seasoned and new scholars and researchers from across the globe. Some of the papers reflect debates and controversies in and outside academia about the causes, effects, and dynamics of the braindrain scourge that has bedeviled the African continent in the context of Pan-Africanism and globalization. The authors explore how the contemporary development trajectories in Africa and “Greater Africa” are being shaped and impacted by the seemingly inexorable process of globalization. As a controversial phenomenon, globalization is seen as a curse by its detractors and a nirvana by its proponents. Globalization has been conceptualized by some as “global corporatization” and a vehicle for the spread of the tentacles of neoliberal capitalism to the remotest nooks and crannies of the world. In this sense, the current phase of globalization is “no more than an ideology and practice of corporate expansion across borders and a structure of cross-border facilities and economic linkages, which focus on the imperialistic ambitions of nations, corporations, organizations…and their desire to impose themselves on various geographic areas” (Ritzer, 2003, p 21). While this description may sound cynical, and points to the dangers of the phenomenon, it is imperative to extend and expand the intellectual realm of globalization on the wave crest of the ever-evolving information revolution to the benefit of peoples of African descent, communities and countries worldwide (Quist-Adade, 2012).

Turning the Brain-Drain into Brain-Gain Nkrumah (1963) observed that the close links forged between Africans and peoples of African descent for nearly a century of common struggle must inspire and strengthen them (See Davidson, 1973, Mazrui, 2004, Quist-Adade, 2007, Biney, 2008). The conference speakers explored the factors that enabled Continental Africans and Africans in the Diaspora to work together during the heady years of independence and recommend similar strategies for the Pan-Africanist movement in the 21st century. KNIC3 provided an opportune platform to explore multiple ways of harnessing the “positives” of globalization, i.e. the virtual tools of information technology to promote better interaction in political, economic, cultural, and social integration of Continental Africa and its “Sixth Region”. It is pertinent to mention here that the conference demonstrated how modern technology can facilitate Pan-African

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collaborative work as several of the participants from South Africa and the United States presented their papers through Skype and Bluejeans. Some presenters demonstrated how they have collaborated with colleagues across continents using virtual media. For example, in their presentation, researchers from Kwantlen Polytechnic University in Canada and the University of Cape Coast in Ghana explained how they collaborated on their Canadian government-funded research project to study the sociocultural causes and impact of diabetic foot, using social media, including WhatsApp, Google Hangout, Skype, and others. They pointed out that over two-thirds of their collaboration were completed using the Internet. Co-editor of this volume and collaborator in the diabetic foot project, Charles Quist-Adade highlighted how African ex-patriates in Global North could undertake collaborative projects with the peers in the Global South to stem and mitigate the impact of one of Africa’s many pernicious scourges—the brain-drain. Using several collaborative projects that he and collaborators in Ghanaian institutions of higher learning have undertaken in Ghana and Canada over the past several years, including a webconference on global social justice, which linked Canadian students and the faculty with their peers in Ghana, Quist-Adade explained the prospects, challenges, and future trajectories of how Canadian scholars of African heritage could utilize the tools of modern technology (the web, social media, etc.) to undertake far-reaching mutually beneficial projects. In addition, KNIC3 provided a forum for scholars and researchers, as well as leaders of civic society organizations, to discuss and exchange ideas on solutions aimed at turning the brain-drain into the brain-gain for the mutual benefit of Continental Africans and people of African descent in the Diaspora. The participants exchanged ideas on how to pool resources and synergize knowledge, projects, and programs in Africa and throughout the African world community to develop the intellectual, social, economic, and cultural life opportunities of people of African heritage. Several of the papers presented at the KNIC reflect the need for joint transatlantic action in the political, economic, academic and technological realms for the mutual benefit of continental Africans and Africans in the Diaspora. It is the intention of the editors that these papers will not only rekindle the longstanding debate about African self-help and dependency on foreign assistance, but also offer new and diverse insights against the backdrop of our post-Cold War, “post-racial” and globalizing world. Furthermore, the papers address critical issues facing the African continent, running the gamut from conflict prevention, governance,

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international development, social justice, globalization and terrorism to human rights, gender equity and youth education and empowerment.

Nkrumah and Mandela A main highlight of the conference was a special tribute to Nelson Mandela. That Mandela should be celebrated at a conference named after Nkrumah is logical. Both leaders symbolize two different, yet interconnected, phases of African liberation and independence. While Nkrumah spearheaded the African independence struggle in the sixties, Mandela inspired the anti-Apartheid movement, which led to South Africa’s independence in 1994. Both were international statesmen who fought for human dignity, social justice, and equality for all, irrespective of color, ethnicity, religion, gender, or country. Both were Pan-Africanists who sought to unite the people of African descent in their struggle for political, social, economic, and cultural development and empowerment. It is, therefore, only proper and fitting that we the organizers honor and celebrate the life and achievements of Nelson Mandela at the Kwame Nkrumah International Conference. Nelson Mandela is regarded as one of the world’s most influential and inspirational leaders. His funeral in December 2013 attracted more world leaders than any other single event in history. His life as a freedom fighter, imprisoned for 27 years, and the first President of a free South Africa dominated the world media for days. His message of forgiveness and his commitment to social justice continues to reverberate and inspire the global community. Yet, today South Africa remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, plagued by corruption, crime and xenophobia. What happened to the idealistic vision of freedom, social justice, equality and diversity embodied in Mandela’s notion of a “Rainbow Nation”, which has served as a beacon of hope and a symbol of reconciliation for oppressed peoples everywhere? In these papers, South African scholars and community activists describe their personal struggles against the apartheid regime. They examine Mandela’s historical role in the transition from an oppressive and racist state to a democratic nation, guided by the principles enshrined in The Freedom Charter. They critically analyze Mandela’s greatness as well as the limitations and failures of some of the ANC policies; they discuss how these policies have impacted post-Apartheid South Africa and question what alternatives remain for the future.

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Why is this book necessary? This book is timely. The significance and currency of a paradigm shift and a new dynamism in the relationships between Africa and its Diasporas cannot be overemphasized (Gordon, 1998; Mbeki, 1999; AU, 2001). A confluence of events during the past decade has culminated in creating the conditions for a global push for a Pan-African and a Global African agenda to forge Africa Diaspora integration. The past four years saw the majority of African countries celebrating their Golden Jubilees, marking 50 years of independence from European colonial rule. Many of these countries saw themselves as having come of age and ready to take control of the commanding heights of their countries’ economies, notwithstanding the global economic recession. In spite of the outbreak of religious, ethnic and political strife, and military takeovers, populist uprisings occurred in some countries, notable among which is the so-called Arab Spring in North Africa. Africa’s economy has recorded a decent growth. Afropessimism is giving way to Afro-optimism (Bourenane, 1992; Ayittey, 1992; Kaplan, 1994). In fact, according to the 2012 Africa Development Report, Africa’s robust economic growth, averaging five per cent a year over the last ten years, has placed the continent among the fastest-growing regions in the world. During the past decade, poverty rates on the continent have declined and the attainment of other Millennium Development Goals is within sight. Prospects for an African economic take-off are, to many African observers, in the offing. Interestingly, the same continent The Economist described as “The Hopeless Continent” two decades ago, is now being called “The Hopeful Continent” (The Economist, 2014). Time Magazine has done a similar reversal, with its “Africa Rising” edition. (Time, 2012). While this reversal must be edifying, the fact still remains that Africa is rising without lifting the majority of Africans out of poverty and the question that begs to be answered is: Africa is rising, but for whom? Adding even greater significance and timeliness to the volume is the increasing urgency the African Union has placed on the issue of African Diaspora integration into the scheme of the continent’s development. According to the African Union (AU) Diaspora Africa Forum Mission website, the issue gained traction and prominence in June 2001 when the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) convened the first ever OAUCivil Society Conference. The framework that was generated from this conference was consequently adopted by the 74th Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001. At that meeting, it was further proposed to (OAU) member states that they

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develop strategies for utilizing the scientific and technological know-how and skills of Africans in the Diaspora for the development of Africa. The same year marked the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in Durban, South Africa in 2001. Following this “new order”, the first AU Western Hemisphere Diaspora Forum was held in Washington, D.C. USA, in December 2002, to discuss how the diaspora could establish meaningful roles to play in Africa’s new development. Its main objectives were to: (a) examine the enduring ties to Africa within the Western Hemisphere Diaspora Forum communities; (b) discuss possible capacity building projects by Diaspora Civil Society Organizations in the Western Hemisphere Diaspora; (c) devise a plan on ongoing collaboration with the African Union, including a Plan of Action and a hemisphere Steering Committee. (AU Diaspora Africa Forum Mission).The AU defines the African Diaspora as: “…peoples of African descent and heritage living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship, and who remain committed to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union” (AU, 2001, p.8). Geographically, this large population, variously estimated as between 150–350 million folk, is to be found in the USA, Canada, the Caribbean, Central and South America (including Brazil), and Europe, with Asian, Oceania and Asian-Pacific populations still to be determined. There is no better time for an academic and intellectual debate, analysis of, and engagement with, this theme. It is our hope that this volume will spur new and substantive discussions and sharing of praxis-oriented ways towards the Pan-Africanist project. Africa’s dubious distinction as potentially the richest and yet the poorest continent has been the concern of all Pan-Africanist scholars and activists. All Pan-Africanist conferences since 1900 have debated and crafted resolutions, churned out tomes of literature, chronicled the genesis of this dubious dilemma and devised roadmaps and strategies all aimed at addressing this mark of shame. From 4–7th March 2015, the 8th PanAfrican Congress was held in Ghana’s capital, Accra. The theme of the congress was “The Pan-African World We Want”, echoing the same theme of all previous Pan-African conferences since the first one held during July 23–25 1900 in London, U.K. Yet, sadly, Africa and Africans are very far from getting out of the continent’s horn of dilemma. Speaking at the All-African Students’ Conference (Peter Clark Hall, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada, May 27, 1994), Julius O. Ihonvbere lamented: Not only is Africa very far from unity on any front, it is today the most marginal, the most oppressed, the most exploited, the most poverty-

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The picture is no better today. From Casamance in the West to Nairobi in the East, from Cairo in the North to Cape Town in the South, in Egypt and Libya, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to the Central African Republic in the very heart of the continent, civil strife rages on, causing unspeakable pain and suffering, death and destruction. In South Sudan, the youngest nation in Africa, ethnic hatred has sparked civil war between the Lou Nuer and the Murle ethnic groups. In Egypt and Libya, the aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring, bankrolled, hailed and cheered on by the West, has left in its trail nothing but mayhem and murder, maiming and massacre. Al Shabaab is running riot in Somalia and Kenya. In Nigeria, Boko Haram is killing thousands and kidnapping women and girls with impunity. In South Africa, xenophobic attacks against fellow African nationals have left thousands killed or rendered homeless. Civil strife and lack of employment opportunities in African countries have forced thousands of Africans to take to the Mediterranean Sea to flee to Europe with many drowning in makeshift boats. While neo-colonial policies of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, as well as the actions and inaction of some Western countries have contributed to the dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty in Africa, Africans and their leaders are culpable for the sorry state of affairs throughout the continent. In our opinion, the solution to the seemingly intractable problems facing the continent can only be solved by Africans themselves through a Pan-Africanist informed plan executed by bold and visionary leaders infused with an inward-looking but pragmatic vision. Only a Pan-Africanist plan built on Kwame Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanist blueprint for an integrated, all-African continental development can salvage Africa and Africans. In other words, Africa’s development lies in the hands of Africans, particularly, Africa’s youth. In this, Africa’s Diasporas must play a more active role. The re-engaging of Africa’s Diasporas for mutual development must be much easier in our Internet

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age. Had the pioneer Pan-Africanists had a quarter of the technological “bells and whistle” we have now, they would have moved mountains in their quest to liberate Africans from the shackles of colonial and racial oppression in Africa and the Diaspora. The task of mobilizing both human and financial resources in the age of the information superhighway should be much easier. With dedicated and innovative leadership, the Internet can be used to mobilize multitudes of people of African descent to raise millions of dollars through crowd-sourcing and other innovative methods to undertake projects aimed at advancing the Pan-Africanist project.

References Biney, Ama. (2008). “The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect.” Journal of Pan-African Studies Vol.2, No.3, 129–159. Bourenane, N. (1992). “Prospects for Africa for an Alternative Approach to the Dominant Afro-Pessimism.” In Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o, ed., “30 Years of Independence in Africa: The Lost Decades” Nairobi: Academy Science Publishers. Du Bois, W. E. B. (1903). The Souls of Black Folks. Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co.; [Cambridge]: University Press John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A., 1903; Bartleby.com, 1999. Davidson, Basil. (1973). Black Star a View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah, London: Allen Lane. Kaplan, Robert G. (1994). “The Coming Anarchy.” Atlantic Monthly Vol.2, No.2, 44–76. Mazrui, A. (2001). Pan Africanism and the Origins of Globalization, W.E.B. DuBois Memorial Lectures, DuBois Centre, Accra, November. Mbeki, Thabo (1999). “On African Renaissance.” African Philosophy. Vol.12, No.1, 5–10. —. (1999). “I am an African.” In Africa—The Time has Come: Selected Speeches. Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers and Mafube Publishing, 215–223. Nkrumah, Kwame. (1961) I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology. London: William Heinemann Ltd. —. (1963) Africa Must Unite. London: Heinemann Publishers. —. (1964) Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for de-colonisation. New York: Monthly Review. —. (1965) Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism: New York: International Publishers. —. (1967) Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah. London: PANAF.

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Articles African Development Report 2012 “Africa Rising.” Time Magazine 2012 “The Hopeful Continent.” The Economist 2014 Quist-Adade, Charles. (2015). What African Liberation Day and Emancipation Day Have in Common. http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/what-african-liberation-day-andemancipation-day-have-in-common Retrieved on 27 May, 2015.

Speeches African Union Conference 2001 Durban, South Africa. Ihonvbere,Julius 1994 All-African Students’ Conference. Gulph, ONT. Canada. Nkrumah, Kwame 1957 Independence Speech. Ghana

Arrangement of the book The book contains the Welcome Speeches at the Opening Ceremony of the Third Biennial Kwame Nkrumah International Conference (KNIC), the Keynote Address and 16 chapters, divided into two parts, with Part One dedicated to Nelson Mandela. In his inaugural keynote speech, Jay Naidoo reflects on his experiences in the struggle against apartheid in the ‘70s and ‘80s and emphasizes the importance of building support from the grassroots. He pays homage to the greatness of Mandela, who could put aside personal bitterness and anger despite being imprisoned for 27 years, in the interests of creating a united, free and democratic South Africa for all people. Naidoo acknowledges the failures of the ANC to fully deliver on its promises to meet the needs of the people, but he remains optimistic that the future generation will continue the struggle in a post-apartheid world, aided by advanced technology and a commitment to working together across the African continent to create an “unstoppable” synergy. Chapter One discusses non-racialism and the South African liberation struggle. In her introduction, Kogila Moodley explains that resistance movements during the apartheid era were committed to non-racialism, reflected in the fact that the number of speakers at this conference who “actively opposed apartheid, facing arrest and imprisonment, came from the ranks of the racially privileged as well as the politically excluded”. Nevertheless, the legacy of apartheid was such that patterns of inequality

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remained after independence, necessitating affirmative action strategies and equity legislation for the historically disadvantaged, and thus perhaps triggering a new set of racial divisions. Jo Beall explores how the young radical Mandela evolved into the elder statesman who united a deeply divided country on the brink of a bloody civil war under the banner of a non-racial state in which everyone was equal before the law. However, in doing so, Beall explains that Mandela was forced to make “personal and political settlements” which had far-reaching consequences. Non-racialism within such a context thus became not so much a “description of reality” but rather an “ideal of a possible future”. Dan O’Meara explains that his greatest life lesson was to “unlearn” what it was to be “white” in order “to free oneself from the reflexes and instincts of dominance, pre-eminence, privilege and entitlement”. He argues that South Africa’s biggest challenge is to counter not only the effects of 50 years of apartheid, but also the legacy of over 300 years of colonialism and create a nation of citizens who have “a common sense of belonging”. He explains that the reason South Africa is still a long way from achieving this ideal of true non-racialism is due to the withdrawal of capital from the country after independence and the reversal of the ANC’s policy of economic emancipation for all South Africans. While emphasizing that Mandela was “the right man at the right time”, who averted a possible bloody civil war, O’Meara also discusses some of the policy errors made by Mandela and the ANC, which have contributed to the current “morass of corruption, decline and mass poverty”. Stanford Eland Khulu provides a poignant and personal account of his growing conscientization as a young student in South Africa during the mid-70s, which resulted in his enforced exile from his “beloved Motherland”. He gives us a glimpse of the pain of being away for over 30 years from one’s family, friends and country of birth, a place which he is still “deeply in love with”. He explains that race remains a divisive issue in South Africa and asks whether it will take more time to resolve since South Africa is still a very young democracy of 20 years while countries such as the USA, with a far longer democratic history, still confront deeply-rooted racism. In Chapter Two, Heribert Adam discusses the “moral turning points” in South Africa which have resulted in tarnishing the image of the “rainbow nation”, upheld for the past 20 years in the collective imagination of its people and promoted by the current government, which is struggling to retain a positive self-image in the face of some overwhelming failures. Adam focuses primarily on the outbreak of

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xenophobia in South Africa, reflecting on its causes and the government’s failure to deal with it effectively. Adam maintains that the government’s lack of appropriate action to stem the tide of xenophobia, consciously or unconsciously, feeds the ethnic divisions that “simmer under the surface”. He compares and contrasts xenophobia in South Africa with its counterpart in Western Europe, concluding that the hope for South Africa lies in the absence of religious differences and a historic coexistence with diversity. In Chapter Three, Zizwe Poe discusses Nkrumah as an exemplar of Pan-African Nationalism, presents a review of Nkrumah’s explanation of Liberated Zones and the Intelligentsia, updates the Nkrumahist analysis and applies it to the Pan-African Intelligentsia. In Chapter Four, David O. Akombo, Baruti I. Katembo, and Kmt G. Shockley argue that Africa is both the human homeland and Earth’s foremost resource-rich continent, yet remains the most impoverished. To redress this dilemma, the authors propose “a much-needed and provocative dialogue on optimal twenty-first-century Pan-African development”. The chapter highlights the pre-21st-century definition and ideology of PanAfricanism (Black pan-cultural appreciation and unity) and (as a recurring theme) posits the need and rationale for a 21st-century re-visioning to emphasize the pragmatism of developing strategies for Africa and its associated Diasporas (particularly the African-American component) to be reciprocal resources for each other; this two-way interface is advanced as a conduit for building empowerment leverage and multi-level advancement (socio-cultural, political and economic). In addition, selected impediments to Pan-African initiatives (e.g. “tribalism”; ideological squabbles; leadership short-sightedness) are outlined, and associated corrective tools and assets, such as transformative education, music, cultural festivals and sovereignty strategies, are proposed to foster new thinking, networking and linkages. In Chapter Five, Charles Quist-Adade assesses the main arguments in Kwame Nkrumah’s Neo-Colonialism the Last Stage of Imperialism within the context of neoliberal globalization, proceeding from Nkrumah’s central premise that the West, responding to the success of national liberation movements, first in Asia and then in Africa, shifted its tactics from colonialism to neo-colonialism. Neo-Colonialism, the last Stage of Imperialism was published when Kwame Nkrumah was the President of Ghana, the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa to achieve independence from colonial rule. He had come to the sad conclusion that his country had moved from colonial state to a neo-colonial country after the euphoria and optimism of the heady years of independence, and that he and his fellow

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independence leaders had become managers of a neo-colonial project in the grand neo-imperial scheme of things. Quist-Adade insists that neoliberal globalization is a continuation of 20th-century neo-colonialism and that Nkrumah’s analysis of neo-colonialism is not only relevant for understanding the dynamics and logics of Global Capitalism in our postCold War world, but it offers a lens and heuristic device for viewing and explicating neo-colonialism in the 21st century. Quist-Adade asserts that a new Pan-African nationalist realignment infused with a new and urgent praxis-oriented realism is needed to bring back ideological and philosophical muscle to the 21st-century Pan-Africanism. Such a new PanAfrican nationalist realignment, he suggests, will provide the ontological and epistemological tool to assess and provide an antidote to post-Cold War, neo-liberal situations in Africa and its Diasporas. Quist-Adade asserts that, while most of the tenets of Africanism continue to be relevant to the contemporary neo/postcolonial, globalizing world, there are several such tenets that need to be re-evaluated, re-conceptualized or recontextualized within the framework of current trends and changes. In Chapter Six, Ama Biney proposes a Pan-African political economy as an alternative, indeed an antidote, to neo-liberal economics, which she characterizes as the bane of African development. After dissecting neoliberalism and exposing the pernicious effects of neo-liberal economic programs, including the discredited Structural Adjustment Programmes and New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), Biney recommends that “…as opposed to capitalism, the Pan-Africanist socialist economy will be based on egalitarian workplaces in which workers democratically self-manage their productive activity in socially owned means of production”. She is careful to distance a Pan-Africanist socialist economy from the Stalinist Soviet Union or East European type. She contends that while there is a blueprint for a political economy of PanAfricanism, “It is ultimately for African people to devise new ways in which they control the means of production, how wealth is created and distributed in their societies in a decentralised manner rather than a stateled approach”. Taking her lead from Kwame Nkrumah and Thomas Sankara, Biney posits that the economic framework in a political economy of Pan-Africanism must be based on not only humanistic principles and values but collectivism, egalitarianism and freedom. In Chapter Seven, Auburn Ellis describes a study of three Africancentred institutions in Chicago. She argues that Afri-centric curricula are essential to adequately prepare students of the African Diaspora. The goals of her research project are to describe and analyze the content of these

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curricula so that they can be used as models in the traditional public school system. In Chapter Eight, Collence Takaingenhamo Chisita and Alexander Rusero propose that, at a time when globalization has engulfed the whole world, it is imperative that African scholars revisit and reinvigorate the Pan-African philosophy to reposition African identities to strengthen peace and solidarity. The chapter highlights the challenges and opportunities to strengthen Pan-Africanism in line with the teachings and philosophies of the African founding forefathers, from both Africa and the Diaspora. It explores praxis-oriented strategies and solutions for the strengthening of Pan-Africanism at a global level through technological innovation. Chisita and Rusero also examine how the brain drain can be turned into a brain gain, and the digital divide into a digital dividend, for the benefit of Africa and its Diasporas. In Chapter Nine, Silk Ugwu Ogbu analyzes the relevance of the Diaspora as a veritable tool for economic, social and political change in Nigeria. He critically examines the different ways the Diaspora can be engaged to participate more actively in the development of the country and specifically looks at how the government can encourage many who are willing, but afraid, to return. Ogbu notes that over forty million people of African descent (many of whom are highly skilled professionals) live in the Diaspora today. However, many countries in Africa have been unable to successfully connect to this resource base for the development of their homelands. Since Nigeria has the largest population of black people on earth, it is not surprising that the majority of Africans living in the Diaspora easily trace their origin to Nigeria. The significance of this relationship is perhaps most evident in the fact that, with over $10 billion in 2012, the country has emerged as one of the five highest destinations of remittances in the world. Beyond international remittances, what is equally relevant is that over 17 million Nigerians living abroad may have the latent potential to energize and facilitate socioeconomic and political transformation at home, especially since the regime change after the general election in 2015. In Chapter Ten, Yabome Gilpin-Jackson explores and highlights the need for scholarship, dialogue and action to facilitate what she calls “a new African Leadership”. She uses a narrative approach to reviewing the literature, “in order to uncover the existing stories of African Leadership”. Gilpin-Jackson defines leadership based on definitions of leadership in African contexts, where leaders are defined as those who selflessly serve their communities for a greater good. She asserts that leadership in Africa is a group phenomenon in which leadership and followership are

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negotiated by the leader’s ability to be embedded in and support followers in achieving their collective goals, thus significantly contributing to improving the life of the group, community, tribe or village. In addition, Gilpin-Jackson describes the narratives that inform the dialogue, research and praxis associated with African Leadership overall. She starts by further explaining the importance and significance of the orientations to the narrative approach for understanding African perspectives that she uses. Next, she reviews the currently dominant, as well as the possible alternative, narratives inherent in a selection of the African Leadership literature. She follows that with a proposed narrative model, which provides guidelines for thinking and acting to create the leadership needed and wanted for Africa, now and in the future. In Chapter Eleven, John Marah suggests that African people in the global village, now more than ever, need a nation of their own; this notion has had a long history, and a number of Pan-African nationalists have struggled to realize this vision in practical Pan-Africanism. This chapter critically examines and evaluates the contributions of Toussaint L’Ouverture of Haiti, Marcus Garvey of Jamaica, and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana in their attempts to establish a powerful and internationally respected united African nation. Marah demonstrates how the spirit of Toussaint L’Ouverture’s revolution matured in Marcus Garvey and was brought to Africa by President Kwame Nkrumah. The chapter closes with the observation that Garvey and Nkrumah’s concept of Pan-Africanism remains a mirage that needs to be realized by the next African generations with the establishment of Pan-African educational institutions for the total achievement of Nkrumah and Garvey’s PanAfricanism. In Chapter Twelve, Vladimir Antwi-Danso takes a broad view of integration in Africa and follows up with an analysis of the imperatives of a globalizing world that make economic integration an inevitable but difficult path to follow in Africa. He observes that globalization is driving all nations and regions toward regionalism and regional integration. Since the demise of colonialism, voluntary political and economic regional integration have been a high priority on the African development agenda. However, this aspiration remains largely unfulfilled, as progress has never really moved beyond the level of minimalist inter-governmentalism. Regional integration of the continent is hampered by many deficiencies, particularly the lack of clear leadership and direction, weak economies, and, most importantly, bad governance and instability. The pessimistic conclusion is that the prospect of real integration in Africa remains a remote aspiration. Antwi-Danso posits that the present largely African

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Union-led bureaucratically engineered top-down integration will remain an artificial exercise with little substance or longevity if not reinforced by a simultaneous interdisciplinary, bottom-up “organic” processes, involving civil society, the nation-state, the regional economic communities (RECs), micro or sub-regional formations, the market, and the African Diaspora. In Chapter Thirteen, De-Valera Botchway proposes a return to Indigenous African Knowledge as a way to combat the neoliberal globalization project and boost African competition, development and intellectual discourse. He, however, cautions that any meaningful quest to revive African IKs should “locate spirituality” in its core. He calls for a pedagogy informed by philosophies, visions, and goals fundamentally operating within and in the five interconnected pillars of the Afrocentric idea or Afrocentricity (Asante). These characteristics are (i) the establishment of a cultural (African) location through the use of symbols, ritual, signs and motifs (to express a once shattered African identity), (ii) the commitment to finding the subject place of Africans in any social, political, economic, architectural, literary, or religious phenomenon, (iii) the defense of African cultural elements as historically valid in the context of music, education, science, and literature, and (iv) the celebration of the notion of the centeredness and the agency of Africans. In Chapter Fourteen, Catherine Schittecatte assesses the ways in which the global context, foreign interests and related responses in Africa have changed since Kwame Nkrumah’s days in office. More specifically, the focus is on Sub-Saharan Africa, natural resource exploitation and foreign investments. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of some exogenous and endogenous factors of underdevelopment, and Nkrumah’s position relative to these. These highlights of Nkrumah’s responses and visions for the continent are then compared to the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD’s) process, objectives and aspirations in the context of potential “new partners” in African development. Schittecatte notes that Nkrumah’s foresight lay in his understanding that historical and global patterns of exploitation would not be easily broken in post-independence Africa. Given that understanding of Africa’s situation, many of his policies, from domestic development plans to Pan-Africanism, were intended to gain not only political but, most importantly, economic independence for Ghana and the continent. Since the New Partnership for Africa’s Development was launched in 2001, many have praised or criticized the extent to which this document would represent a break with the past. In response to such concerns, Schittecatte asks whether NEPAD enables Africa to address potential contemporary patterns of exploitation. She examines Nkrumah’s analysis and related policies against new global

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and continental conditions which play a role in Africa’s ability to address such patterns [of exploitation] in a preventative manner. In Chapter Fifteen, Arinze Ngwube and Chuka Okoli ask how recent oil discoveries and their attendant wealth can contribute to equitable and sustained development on the African continent. This paper investigates the political impacts that oil is likely to have on Uganda and offers the hope that the successful management of its oil production could leave a profound legacy for Uganda’s current leadership. In Chapter Sixteen, Aziz Mostefaoui provides a retrospect of PanAfricanism from its inception in the New World as a reaction to centuries of White exploitation and oppression. He points out that while the movement sought to unite Africans all over the world, it remained dominated by African-American and West Indian leaders, so focused more on the African Diaspora than on the African continent. However, the 1950s saw an emergence of young African leaders, notably Kwame Nkrumah, who brought the struggle back to continental Africa.

WELCOME ADDRESSES AT THE OPENING CEREMONY OF THE THIRD BIENNIAL KWAME NKRUMAH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE (KNIC 3)

From Dr Arthur Fallick, Associate Vice-President, Research, Kwantlen Polytechnic University I would like to welcome you all to Kwantlen Polytechnic University on behalf of our President, Dr. Alan Davis, and our Provost, Dr. Salvador Ferreras. As Associate VP of Research, I’m honoured to have been asked by Dr. Wendy Royal and Dr. Charles Quist-Adade to provide a few remarks to open the Kwame Nkrumah International Conference. It may be a surprise to you, but I was born in Scotland in 1955 and I can remember very vividly the names of key figures and events that were shaping the geopolitical relations between the UK and Africa, and that influenced how we in school, and through the media, were taught about Africa. From those wonderfully sonorous voices of BBC presenters, we learned names such as Nkrumah, Nkomo, Kaunda, Kenyatta, Nyerere, and Selassie. Their role was fundamental and transformative, and we had, at least, a basic knowledge of them. I would like to share the welcome with two of my colleagues, Dr. Diane Purvey, Dean of Arts, and Dr. Patrick Donahoe, Dean of Academic & Career Advancement. They share with me our thanks to you and our sincere hope that, as hosts, we can offer you a place for creative and constructive dialogue in an environment of hope and aspiration. We wish you well in your deliberations and thank you so much for being here.

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From Professor William Otoo Ellis Vice-Chancellor, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology Four years ago, the 1st Biennial Kwame Nkrumah International Conference (KNIC1) was successfully hosted by the Kwantlen Polytechnic University within the Metropolitan Vancouver area, in the shared traditional territories of the Kwantlen, Katzie, Semiahmoo and Tsawwassen First Nations. In September 2012, the mantle fell on Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) to host the 2nd Kwame Nkrumah International Conference (KNIC2) and we gladly accepted the opportunity which was given to us by the Planning Committee of Kwame Nkrumah International Conferences. We are very glad that the 3rd Conference (KNIC3) is returning to Vancouver and it is our wish to extend our sincere gratitude to the Committee for sustaining the light which was lit four years ago to revisit the life and thought of one of Africa’s great sons, Dr Kwame Nkrumah with the hope of achieving his dream of bringing Africans together for a better future. Our initial understanding was that the 3rd Conference would be held at Lincoln University where Kwame Nkrumah obtained his first degree. However, due to circumstances beyond the control of the coordinators at Lincoln University, the venue had to be moved to Kwantlen Polytechnic University. We are grateful to Kwantlen Polytechnic University for being so gracious to host the Kwame Nkrumah International Conference for the second time. May I now add my voice to welcome all participants to the 3rd Kwame Nkrumah International Conference. We wish you fruitful deliberations and an enjoyable Conference. Thank you.

PART ONE

KEYNOTE ADDRESS HONORING MADIBA’S LEGACY: THE CHALLENGES FACING SOUTH AFRICA 20 YEARS LATER JAY NAIDOO CHAIR OF THE GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR IMPROVED NUTRITION (GAIN). FORMER CABINET MINISTER UNDER NELSON MANDELA

I’m honored today to give the Kwame Nkrumah lecture in tribute to the legacy of Nelson Mandela. Nkrumah's Pan-African concept inspired me and millions of others of the 1976 generation of South Africans. His words echo wisdom as relevant today as it was in the past: “I’m not African just because I was born in Africa but because Africa is born in me”. I grew up in an era of another African legend, Steve Biko. As a teenager, I went to listen to him; I was angry because apartheid had stolen our human dignity. It was a hot, steamy, tropical afternoon in a crowded church hall where my anger found a political cause. I was beginning my journey and his words were forever etched as the pursuit of our collective human dignity. “The mind of the oppressed,” he spoke powerfully, “is the main weapon in the hands of the oppressor”. I knew, then and there, that the first step of my freedom was within me: I had to free my mind from the complex of inferiority I was schooled in. His refrain, “You have nothing to lose but your chains” sealed my covenant with the struggle for social justice. Biko never gave us a business plan, a log frame or donor funds. He gave us political direction and ignited a flame that turned into the passion and commitment to pursue it.

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So in 1976, in the historic aftermath of the Soweto Uprisings,1 millions of us went onto the streets to demand our freedom. We were triumphant. Victory was close. We could smell the fear of the racist white minority and their security apparatus. But we were smashed. As we retreated in shocked disarray, we asked ourselves ‘why’? The answer was deafening: when we looked behind our shoulders, we saw no one. We had left behind our parents and workers; we had left behind the women, the rural people and the villages. We were on our own. Only then, as we licked our wounds and pieced our dreams back together, only then did we understand that winning freedom is about organizing a revolution, a painstaking process of working from the grassroots. We learnt that the first lesson of organizing was learning to listen to our people without pre-empting the reply. We studied that we could learn much by listening and that together our struggle was about cocreating a shared vision, strategy, tools and building leadership from below. So, throughout the following decade we did exactly that. We organised our revolution, community by community, factory by factory, village by village. Mandela became the symbol of our resistance as part of the collective leadership of the past, tried-and-tested and committed to serving all people of South Africa. The Freedom Charter, the collective will of the People of a free and democratic, non-sexist, non-racial South Africa, became our rallying call. The Eighties saw this approach of mass struggles building the tsunami that politically paralysed the apartheid state. Combined with the tightening noose of international sanctions, person-to-person solidarity drove a process that made it impossible for the regime to rule South Africa in the way that they had ruled for generations. Those conditions created an extraordinary moment when extraordinary leaders, like our founding father Mandela, rose above the bitterness of conflict that had sent him to jail for 27 years to reach out across the gulf of mistrust and offer an olive branch to our enemy. I remember that fateful day on his release when, before the gathered crowds in Cape Town and to the billions of those who held their breath across the world, he spoke to us: “I stand here before you, as your humble servant, freed from prison by your struggles.”

1

Series of protests led by high school students against the introduction of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in local schools. Approximately 20,000 students took part across South Africa. The estimated number of deaths ranges from 176–700.

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Forever, the servant leader, characterized by the absence of arrogance and hatred, he repeated the famous words he had spoken from the dock of the Rivonia Trial, “During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die”. And so, eighteen years after the massacre of 1976, Mandela became our first democratically elected President. My chest heaved with pride. Alongside millions of people in our country, in Africa and in the world, we had achieved the political miracle of the 20th century, stepped back from the precipice of a racial civil war and negotiated a peaceful political settlement. In the end, we took the National Party away from its core demand of veto rights for whites and towards a shared interest of one person, one vote in a unitary, non-sexist, non-racial democratic South Africa. When we later asked Mandela how he felt about the loss of those 27 years, he replied softly, “I did not lose them. I learnt to love. I knew that if I walked out of that prison with hatred and bitterness in my heart, then it was I who would still be in prison.” Mandela had succeeded in conquering his ego and the arrogance of intellect. As his self-awareness grew, he managed to infect the world with his positive energy. All these years later, today we live in the world in which we are more connected than ever before. The Internet Revolution has had a bigger impact than the Industrial Revolution had in its time. It has changed the way we live, the way we organize our societies, the nature of work and production, education and health. We live in a world of social media, Facebook and Twitter, Instagram and American Idols. Wars play out on our TV screens, daily re-playing the violence and aggression we use to pursue our interests, political and economic. Our conversations are reduced to 30-second soundbites and 140-character tweets. Is the world better today? Or is Africa, and the world, that Nkrumah and Mandela fought for still a distant dream? We witness sectarian violence as it rages in the Central African Republic, north of Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and swathes of destruction across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. We ask: what have we learnt from the past?

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We experience the brutality of the post-apartheid state in Marikana2 and in the endless service delivery protests, the xenophobia that stains our social fabric and abuses the sacrifices our African brothers and sisters made for our freedom. Looking at the cruelty, selfishness and excess, I hang my head in shame. Mandela was the personification of a caring solidarity; he embodied the spirit of Ubuntu: “I am because we are”. Reconciliation was not a weakness for Mandela. He knew the consequences of war and cruelty. He knew the pursuit of peace would not only liberate us, the black majority, but that it would liberate the white minority too. And so, we built a rightsbased constitutional democracy which sought to redress the legacy of apartheid while building a new path to a shared future. Did we falter along the way? Absolutely! We demobilized our people and made them bystanders in the development process. We promised a developmental state that would deliver jobs, houses, clinics, schools and basic service. The people waited; millions are still waiting, 20 years later. We found that we did not have the management systems and capacity to deliver on our noble intentions. And the cancer of corruption reared its ugly head, tearing apart our unity and sabotaging our public institutions. We began to lose our way. Our leadership style morphed into the “big chief” syndrome, which alienated the people from shaping their own destiny. This is what has happened on our watch. We have no one to blame but ourselves. Mandela often said that “A good leader is someone who has a good head and good heart”. He would face the risks of leadership headlong, never faltering in the face of popular discontent, especially in our ranks on matters of principle. On his release, covert right-wing forces within and outside the state unleashed a wave of violence that was crudely labeled “black on black” violence. Thousands of people were slaughtered, thrown off trains, killed in their homes, and savaged on our streets. With our supporters baying for blood and demanding guns, he pushed for a unilateral declaration of a ceasefire of our armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, and in front of 200,000 angry people in Durban, the epicenter of violence, he demanded that our supporters throw their weapons into the Indian Ocean. Thousands streamed out of the stadium shouting him down but he stood firm. It was the right decision. We took the moral high ground. Working with the churches and the business community, we initiated the bold 2

Marikana: A miners’ strike in August–September, 2012 at the Marikana Mine in the North West Province of South Africa. It resulted in the deaths of an estimated 34 striking mineworkers by the South African Police.

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initiative of the National Peace Accord that committed all political parties to work within a framework committed to the principles of freedom of speech, assembly and association. But, it had to go beyond signing a document. Under the leadership of Mandela, we knew we needed a plan of action with joint structures that allowed us to co-govern the transition. A National Peace Secretariat was set up and we built an army of peace marshals drawn from all political parties who policed the peace between our warring factions and kept the security forces honest. An independent investigations unit, under the chairmanship of Judge Goldstone, ensured compliance from the police and army. Through this, Mandela had established trusteeship of the transition, and, through his integrity, he established trust with our enemy. But Mandela was unwavering and determined that human dignity, human rights and social justice were the flipside of reconciliation. His legacy stands bigger than that of the African National Congress or South Africa as a country. I spend a lot of my time these days in the villages and slums across the world, listening to conversations with people finding solutions to the challenges of hunger, poverty or unemployment. They have a steely determination to rise against this new apartheid of inequality that sees more and more wealth concentrated in the hands of the 1%. They rise up against this oppression and injustice, just as we did under apartheid. But they are smashed by their governments, who are often trapped in a nexus of corruption between political power and big money. They struggle to find support from a civil society that is as bureaucratic as their governments and are often disconnected from the growing anger on the ground. A new generation rises faced with little prospect of having a positive pathway to hope and opportunity. They are condemned by the dereliction of a state where an education crisis produces a “futureless youth” with few skills; they have no jobs and are unlikely to experience the dignity of work in their lifetime. Today, we face a set of interconnected crises that are both local and global. Mandela sacrificed much for his love of children: he believed it was their natural birthright to have a safe and healthy environment, to shelter, food, education and opportunity; that they deserve to love and be loved. And yet, our own greed is incubating an ecological disaster that could end the world as we know it. We are on a trajectory in which we desecrate the first rule of humanity, “That we should not kill our children or threaten their futures.”

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Having interacted with many young people around the world, I am an optimist that the next generation will find its voice, its struggle and fight for the world it wants. In a post-apartheid society, we have already seen remarkable victories when people mobilized and forced an imperial government steeped in HIV/AIDS denialism to change their position. Today, South Africa has one of the biggest rollouts of ARVs3 in the world. I have learnt that democracy has to be fought for every day of our lives. I look across Africa and see a continent rich and brimming with potential but our people are still poor. We act as 55 separate countries and do not leverage our strength and bargaining power as a continent. Our natural and mineral resources fuel the global economy; we have more than half the remaining arable land in the world. And yet — and yet — we remain poor. Our population will be over two billion by 2050 and 70% will be aged under 25. This youth dividend is our most important asset. The legacy of Mandela was about accountability in governance; that we serve the people and not our private interests. With an organized and active citizenry, we are the next big thing. If people of Africa take their own fate in their own hands, we will be unstoppable. As Mandela once remarked, “It always seems impossible until it is done”.

3

Antiretroviral drugs used to suppress the HIV virus.

CHAPTER ONE NON-RACIALISM AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LIBERATION STRUGGLE PROFESSOR KOGILA MOODLEY, PROFESSOR EMERITA, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

DR JO BEALL, DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION AND SOCIETY AT THE BRITISH COUNCIL

DR DAN O’MEARA, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, THE UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC, MONTRÉAL

AND KHULU ELAND MEMBER, SOUTH AFRICAN CULTURAL ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (SACABC)

Professor Kogila Moodley Introduction Many ethnically diverse countries, including the United States, practice informal racial segregation. In 1948, South Africa was the only country in the world to institutionalize a system of formal, legalized apartheid. Moreover, a minority of 20% of white people at the time used race to unify the ethnically diverse European settlers and ethnicize the majority black population for divide-and-rule purposes. The policy of “separate development” was aimed at legitimating the maintenance of differential privilege and power, and counteracting the demand for African selfdetermination in a decolonizing continent.

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In contrast, groups involved in resisting apartheid developed contrary and opposing discourses rejecting the use of racial categories as well as culture and ethnicity in favor of a common, united society. An inclusive state with equal rights for all its citizens regardless of origin evolved as the ideal. The resistance movements were committed to non-racialism. Up until the gradual erosion of segregation laws under economic pressure, people defying apartheid and involved in the struggle for freedom came from across the color spectrum. This is evident in this conference, as the speakers who actively opposed apartheid, who faced arrest and imprisonment, came from the ranks of the racially privileged as well as the politically excluded. The way in which this commitment to non-racialism unfolded is not without some contradictions. For a long time during the apartheid period, Whites, Blacks and Indians1 operated in racially separate organizations as “partners”, not in one common organization. Initially, “non-Africans” were not allowed to join the ANC. Some maintain that this was a politically strategic move, given the realities of apartheid society. Yet the Communist Party (SACP) and the Liberal Party incorporated members from all racial groups as full members. Despite this past, long before South Africa could rightly declare itself a democratic state in 1994, the ANC opened its doors to all as full members. The new Constitution stated as its goal the furtherance of human dignity, equality and “the advancement of human rights and freedoms; nonracialism and non-sexism”. Mandela’s cabinet and senior civil service appointments reflected the diversity of South African society along both racial and gender lines. The ANC and Mandela were uncompromising in their commitment to non-racialism, at least rhetorically. South Africa, the “rainbow nation”, they maintained, belonged to all who lived in it. These noble goals, however, unravel easily. When distinguishable difference coincides with continued inequality of opportunity in a fragile democratic culture, it poses a real threat to the ideal of a rainbow nation. Legal equality of opportunity did not coincide with equality of outcome. Structural patterns of inequality, such as residential segregation and educational differentials, reiterated historical formations along racial lines. The predicament arises as to how to address racially based past inequality under the banner of non-racialism?

1

The terms Whites, Blacks and Indians refer to the political system of racial classification as used under apartheid laws.

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The answer was affirmative action and equity legislation for the historically disadvantaged. However, this noble goal was measured by retaining the previous racial categories. This reinforced racial perceptions and pitted the four racial apartheid groups against each other. Moreover, the goal of social transformation was defined according to national representativity, rather than provincial or local circumstances. This would theoretically require people from an overrepresented group in one province to move to another region where they are underrepresented, according to their national percentage. This mechanical application of quotas proved absurd and unfeasible. In addition, quotas inevitably led to relatively underqualified people being appointed to the civil service or highly qualified students being rejected for university admission. In short, was South Africa regressing into a newly divided society along racial lines? Should class or educational background instead of race be used for preferential treatment? In the meantime, formerly predominantly white post-secondary institutions now accommodate an increasing number of black students and face demands for more recognition of racial difference to deliver equitable education. Colonial pasts embedded in institutional settings are challenged everywhere. These are all questions for our session to probe, culminating in what real transformation means and at what pace it can realistically proceed.

Dr Jo Beall Mandela, Non-Racialism and Personal and Political Settlements2 Introduction For Nelson Mandela, the elder statesman, non-racialism was a straightforward thing. It was a liberal demand for equality under the law and a form of citizenship that rendered race immaterial. The younger Mandela was not so sanguine and as a member of the Youth League of the 2 This chapter combines thinking developed in delivering the Tri-Institute (Institute for Development Policy and Management, the Brooks World Poverty Institute, and the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute) Mandela Memorial Lecture, University of Manchester, March 2014 and for the Colloquium on Non-racialism and the South African Liberation Struggle at the 3rd Biennial Kwame Nkrumah Conference dedicated to Nelson Mandela at Kwantlen Polytechnic University, Vancouver, August 2014.

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African National Congress (ANC) he held much more strident and uncompromising views. It is perhaps his earlier views that best chime with current trends in South Africa, where it is increasingly evident that rendering race immaterial is not something to which the country can imminently aspire. Nevertheless, it is his later posture that will hopefully be his more enduring legacy for the country and indeed the world and this paper explores the route by which he reached it. The older Mandela transcended what Gerhard Mare has called “racethinking”3 but at the cost of a number of personal and political settlements. I focus on the matter of personal settlements because Mandela was forced to make difficult personal choices and because I suspect there are few people who have not been personally touched by Mandela one way or another, either directly through his story and what he stood for, or indirectly by how they have projected their own hopes and aspirations onto the man, his convictions and his legacy. Inspirational leaders such as Mandela need to be understood not only in terms of the ideals for which they stood but also in relation to the political settlements which they made and of which they were a part. If, following Michael MacDonald,4 we think of non-racialism less as a description of reality and more as an ideal or promise about a possible future, it becomes easier to understand the political settlement that coalesced around non-racialism, with Nelson Mandela as its icon and at its helm. Political settlements are the informal power arrangements that underpin the social order that exists in any country. The key elements of a political settlement – usually comprising a coalition of powerful or elite groupings – are actors, interests and institutions. What tends to hold a coalition together is the alignment of interests among the actors engaged in a political settlement and their relationship with a broader array of interests. Political settlements are often a critical factor in determining the success or failure of transitions, for example from conflict to peace, colonialism to independence and, in the case of South Africa, from white minority rule under apartheid institutions to nonracial democratic state-building efforts. The notion of political settlements is useful in that it recognizes structural factors as explanatory variables – or put another way, institutions – while at the same time accommodating the notion of human agency – actors and their interests. 3

Gerhard Mare (2014) Unclassified, Moving Beyond the Dead-End of Race in South Africa, Johannesburg: Jacana Media 4 Michael MacDonald (2006) Why Race Matters in South Africa, Cambridge Mass. Harvard University Press.

12

Chapter One

In this chapter I first discuss the interests involved in negotiating the transition from apartheid. Second I reflect on the political actors involved and the role of Mandela and his leadership in the context of an organized movement that became an increasingly sophisticated party political machine. Third I consider the structural or institutional legacy of apartheid and how this served to inhibit the implementation of what were often quite exemplary post-apartheid policy changes and reforms, established by the new South African leadership. In doing so I question the conditions under which inclusive and developmental political settlements are reached and then turn to the issue of personal settlements. In conclusion, I question whether Mandela’s own personal settlements influenced broader political trajectories and discuss the enduring effect that Mandela’s life and example have had and explain why, despite his undoubted blind spots and inevitable shortcomings, his legacy of non-racialism may endure.

Interests in the Transition to a Post-Apartheid Political Settlement For much of the 20th century and up until the electoral victory of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994, multiple battles for the right to govern South Africa were layered one upon the other. The modern South African state and an integrated economy were only formed in 1910 and Africans were brought into Union under extremely disadvantaged circumstances with little political voice. Resistance was sporadic and fragmented so that a coordinated African nationalist politics remained elusive until the middle of the 20th century. The South African National Native Congress (SANNC) formed in 1912 (later to become the ANC) was an organization representing rural and urban African elites. It was only in the 1950s that it engaged in mass political process, taking the form of urban-based strikes, consumer boycotts and women’s marches, which culminated in the iconic anti-pass campaign in March 1960.5 The 1960s saw a major clamp down by the apartheid state, including the banning of all opposition organisations and culminating in the Treason Trial that decimated the internal leadership of the African National Congress and its allied movement. The minority white Nationalist Government embarked on what became known as the period of “high apartheid”, which included the creation of four “independent” states and six self-governing” territories, which in turn underpinned a visionary 5

William Beinart (2001) Twenty First Century South Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Non-racialism and the South African Liberation Struggle

13

politics of separate development that gave physical expression and political reality to this vision. The Bantustans, as these entities were known, included the heartlands of some of South Africa’s oldest chiefdoms. They were intended to form the basis of new nations for the nine ethno-linguistic groups, leaving the rest of South Africa largely in the hands of Afrikaans and English speaking white people. Hence layered on racial segregation and discrimination was an elevation of ethnicity as a significant social category in South Africa. The result was the creation of a broad coalition of customary leaders and Bantustan administrators who had a vested interest in the continuation of apartheid or some form of separate development.6 Externally and over several decades, the ANC in exile engaged in a dual strategy of waging an armed struggle, largely out of the subcontinent and with very limited success, and, in Europe and North America, embarked on an international campaign to win support for their cause and isolate South Africa economically and socially, through consumer, academic and sports boycotts. Internally, the 1970s saw a gradual resurrection of opposition politics, first through organized strike action by the revitalized labour movement and later through the student uprisings in the 1970s, precipitated by the rejection of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction by school children in Soweto. There were divisions between nationalists and “workerists” and between those subscribing to black consciousness and those supporting non-racialism. In the 1980s the country saw the formation of the United Democratic Front, a revival of internal opposition politics of a social democratic type, not dissimilar from the protest politics of the 1950s and the espousing of a non-racial democracy, broadly in line with the dominant narrative of the ANC in exile. Among the white population, Afrikaans-speaking officials dominated the government bureaucracy, while English-speaking white people mainly drove commerce and industry. By the 1980s, however, a large Afrikaansspeaking private sector had grown up and was becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the status quo. These strong economic interests in the country, including international investors and interest groups, were becoming increasingly vocal about the detrimental effects of apartheid policies and the growing political upheaval on South Africa’s economic performance. Their concerns found expression in the Progressive Party most famously associated with Helen Suzman and Frederik van Zyl

6

Ibid.

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Chapter One

Slabbert and among the white people who signed up to the United Democratic Front. Despite increased state repression during the late 1980s and early 1990s, political violence escalated as impatient young black South Africans took control of the townships during the 1985 – 1990 state of emergency. It was in this context that lobbying, protesting, behind-thescenes negotiations, and international pressure all contributed to a political shift that saw the gradual release of activists from prison and, ultimately in 1990, the unbanning of the ANC and the return of the exiles. This brought with it enormous hope but also set off a frantic competition for power and control over the country’s resources. What should be clear from this brief history is that by the time negotiations began it was not simply about white versus black interests. On the contrary, there was a wide range of interests that had to be factored in, often with quite ambivalent attitudes to the status quo and to the nature and extent of change. This was within the white population and among African interests as well, between rural and urban, young and old, traditional chieftaincies and aspirant modernizers, workerists and communists, social democrats and neoliberal reformers, exiled and internal activists, and political parties and loose social movements, all of whom had to be accommodated in or ousted from the resulting political settlement. The first non-racial democratic elections in South Africa were held in 1994 in the wake of a fairly protracted multi-party negotiating process. However, once an inevitable ANC victory in the 1994 elections was clearly on the horizon, South Africa’s social and economic elites, whether black or white, political or apolitical in disposition, whether captains of industry or customary chiefs, moved swiftly to make common cause with the new political victors.

Situating the Role of Mandela Where was Nelson Mandela in all of this? Mandela came from Qunu, a remote rural part of South Africa. He was from a relatively privileged royal or chiefly family, subsequently educated at Fort Hare University, making him part of a small, missionary educated elite imbued with strong values. He travelled to Johannesburg where he studied law at Witwatersrand University and began working in a law firm, although he never completed his degree. Instead he pursued politics. As a young man he was an African nationalist and ultimately an advocate of armed

Non-racialism and the South African Liberation Struggle

15

struggle, a route turned to in the absence of other alternative routes of protest or negotiation. How his early years have been interpreted largely depends on the political persuasion of the commentator. A recent article in the London Review of Books was highly critical of Mandela characterizing him as an unrepentant terrorist while others view him as Africa’s pre-eminent freedom fighter. There has also been much myth-making around the man and it has been difficult to discern reality through the dazzling light of his public and, to some degree, his manufactured image. He was a key figure in the African National Congress, very influential in the 1950s and early sixties. His speech from the dock in the Rivonia Trial in 1964 is one of the most famous in history. During my lifetime I have dedicated my life to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons will live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal for which I hope to live for and to see realised. But, My Lord, if it needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.7

His convictions and eloquence did not save him from incarceration and he was sentenced to life imprisonment on Robben Island. In 1982 Mandela was transferred to Pollsmoor Prison in Cape Town and it was from here in the late 1980s that he initiated talks between the apartheid government and the ANC. In 1988 he was transferred to Victor Verster Prison from which he was ultimately released in February 1990, nine days after the unbanning of the ANC. During this time he engaged in talks with representatives of the government, sometimes of his own volition, sometimes in consultation with the ANC and the national democratic movement. On his release he immersed himself in official talks to end white minority rule and in 1993 he and President F. W. de Klerk jointly won the Nobel Peace Prize. On the 27th April 1994 he voted for the first time in his life and on 10th May was inaugurated as South Africa’s first democratically elected president. True to his promise, in 1999 he stepped down after one term as President. That Nelson Mandela was a key figure able to prompt negotiations, and that he ultimately became president was not inevitable. He could have languished in obscurity were it not for the fact that the movement, internally and in exile, including his former wife Winnie Mandela, worked 7

http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=3430

16

Chapter One

hard to keep his profile alive, both inside and outside the country. The “Release Mandela” campaign, and his 70th birthday concert at Wembley Stadium were all part of a strategy from which he was very much removed.8 The campaign was a success and as a charismatic figurehead and leader, Mandela rose to the challenge. In his inaugural address as president on the 10th May, 1994 he said: The moment to bridge the chasm that divides us has come … we shall build a society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity – a rainbow nation which is at last at peace with itself and the world at large … never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will experience the oppression of one by 9 another.

Mandela went on to masterfully inspire crowds, capitalize on his reputation and cleverly seize political moments to repeatedly articulate messages of hope, dignity, rights, peace and forgiveness, and above all embed to the best of his ability the message of non-racialism. This inaugural speech represented a considerable advance on the rather dull speech he gave when he emerged from jail in February 1990, which was described rather cynically by R.W. Johnson as “a monumentally tedious ANC monologue”, in a scene he painted thus: The cameras of the world’s television stations desperately panned around for human interest but the point was clear: for Mandela, the ANC was his life. He would be the loyal servant of the party exiles and would recite the speeches they would put in front of him. Mandela was clearly too old to be more than an interim leader and he had little appetite for power. But the rest of the ANC elite were riveted by the prospect of power. Just ahead lay a division of the spoils on a scale never seen before in Africa.10

The political settlement that was reached within the ANC and the broader anti-apartheid movement was characterized by last-minute deals within the ANC and between the ANC and other interests and, although flawed from the perspective of each set of interests, it allowed the election 8 Anthony Sampson (2009) Mandela, the Authorised Biography, London: Harper Collins. 9 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PUThpjhgkWk 10 R.W. Johnson (2009) South Africa’s Brave New World: The Beloved Country since the end of Apartheid’ London: Penguin Books, p. 21.

Non-racialism and the South African Liberation Struggle

17

to go ahead, at which stage most were reconciled to its inevitability and the world witnessed those iconic election-day queues as white, black, Indian and Coloured people, together exercised their first real non-racial democratic vote. Was Mandela simply a pawn in this process, the manufactured icon of an ambitious ANC, as suggested by R.W. Johnson? If his moving autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom, is anything to go by, then the answer is absolutely not. In this volume he provides an invaluable record, documented with the assistance of his collaborator Richard Stengel, of his political development and personal choices. Yet at the same time his autobiography was a piece of theatre, albeit one designed to teach and inspire. And, publicly, there is no doubt that Mandela was a showman, always able to project himself well, relishing great occasions and rendering his own role in them as “grandly operatic”.11 His official biographer, Anthony Sampson, asks: How lasting and deep is Mandela’s achievement, behind his dazzling image? … It is easy to overestimate the importance of a living hero with a universal charisma, on a stage whose bright lights can fade soon afterwards. Africa has seen many short-lived saviours who have later been toppled from their pedestals, while Mandela’s stature is harder to assess at a time when the world feels a desperate need for great men to admire.12

He concludes that behind the scenes Mandela owed a lot to many modest colleagues. Indeed, Mandela himself pointed out that the liberation of his people happened when he himself was in jail, and most acknowledge that for much of his presidency Mandela was more of a ceremonial head of state rather than a chief executive, a constitutional monarch rather than a president. He allowed his deputy, Thabo Mbeki, to be chosen by the party leaders without revealing his own preference and allowed Mbeki to effectively run the country for most of his presidency. There were other actors of course who had an influence. Clearly F.W. de Klerk played a critical role in convincing the more enlightened members of the nationalist party of the need for change. While Thabo Mbeki came across as a remote intellectual with no local constituency and largely reliant on his reputation with the exiled movement, Cyril Ramaphosa was extremely popular with internal leaders of the ANC and 11

Anthony Sampson (2009) Mandela, the Authorised Biography, London: Harper Collins, p. 579. 12 Ibid.

18

Chapter One

the UDF. As a former General Secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers he was a master negotiator but was not internationally connected and was ultimately thwarted by the exiled leadership, quietly making his temporary exit from politics into the world of business where he made a lot of money before re-entering the ANC in the camp of President Jacob Zuma. Mandela provided the face of South Africa that the ANC wanted to project during the transition. There was an uneasy truce between exiles and internal activists and Mandela was an important figure in ensuring unity. However, when Mbeki took over the reins of power he prompted not only a growing trend towards tight centralized control, but also a shift from the discourse of a “rainbow nation” towards a more overtly African nationalist rhetoric. Thwarted by his own AIDS denialism, he ultimately failed to survive the populist politics of Jacob Zuma, an exile who had managed to find a significant homegrown constituency on his return among the largest ethnic group of isiZulu speakers. For some, the trade-offs and deals within the ANC, between the ANC and the trade unions and South African Communist Party, and between this broader democratic alliance on the one hand and traditional authorities, white and brown capital and international actors on the other, suggests that South Africa’s transitional political settlement was a “textbook” case of democratization via elite pacting. The elite pacting argument suggests that structural factors such as economic conditions, political patterns and social dynamics are trumped by the dynamics of negotiation, which depend in turn on the capacity of actors to establish a compromise largely predicated on elite advancement. To the extent that South Africa’s transition represents an example of elite pacting, Mandela played a critical role in brokering this and in advancing a theory of change informed by non-racialism and inclusiveness.

Post-Apartheid and Apartheid’s Institutional Legacies13 Elite pacts or political settlements occur as a result of the exercise of agency but it is also important not to ignore the structural factors framing South Africa’s transition and so an analysis of the institutional legacies of apartheid remains crucial. What were these institutional legacies? First, the post-apartheid 13

This section draws heavily on J. Beall, S. Gelb and S. Hassim (2005) ‘Fragile Stability: State and Society in Democratic South Africa’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 31 (4) pp. 681-700

Non-racialism and the South African Liberation Struggle

19

dispensation inherited a weak state. At the time of transition the apartheid state’s weakness was reflected in the difficulties it had in regulating the behavior of individual citizens and in carrying out many of its basic functions. It was unable to enforce its territorial authority by managing cross-border traffic, which contributed to marked increases of flows of illicit goods including drugs, arms and ivory as well as money laundering. During the 1980s, organized crime increased in South Africa: with policing resources increasingly diverted to controlling political opposition, gangs were able to mutate into crime syndicates. During the transitional period in the 1990s, organized crime became internationalized with the entry of foreign groups opening up opportunities for domestic gangs to form alliances. Those who administered and implemented apartheid policies were often corrupt and very violent. These weaknesses were inherited by many of their successors and filtered into the post-apartheid state. Successive ANC governments have passed an astonishing and impressive array of progressive policies and transformed public agencies and mechanisms for engaging with society. The justifiably celebrated founding documents of South African democracy – the Constitution and the Bill of Rights – promoted political and judicial rights, but also emphasized the social and economic rights of citizens to adequate access to goods and services for basic needs, such as housing, healthcare and education. These rights have proven harder to realize.14 A bloody civil war was avoided and the survival of the non-racial regime is no longer in question. Society is relatively stable: a non-racial democratic political regime has been firmly established and faces no imminent threat, and the state is accepted as the legitimate authority within the country’s territorial boundaries. Fairer policies have been formulated and public institutions have been established with the emphasis on establishing and maintaining political and economic stability. During the first post-apartheid decade, public agencies were transformed or established, enabling the state to enhance its management and regulatory capabilities so as to exercise its basic functions including policing, border control and taxation. The machinery of state has been substantially reformed since 1994 together with the establishment of many new state institutions. So this quick audit tells us that there is a strong case for calling the South African transition “a miracle”, as Mandela did in his inaugural address in 1994. On the other hand, the country faces immense social problems – poverty 14

Ibid.

20

Chapter One

and inequality, unemployment, HIV/AIDS and personal and property insecurity – which have only marginally improved since the apartheid era, or even deteriorated. Unemployment remains high and South Africa has one of the highest murder rates in the world. South Africa remains an extremely violent society with violence increasingly likely to be perpetrated by the state against its citizens. Poor race relations continue and the graft associated with black economic empowerment pertains. Gender relations, HIV/AIDS, land reform, militarism, corruption and state-society and community relations continue to be inadequately addressed. Another real problem is single-party dominance. Successful national elections since 1994 have established formal mechanisms of representation for citizens but of course all have been dominated by the ANC. In the comparative transitions literature, the consolidation of formal political democracy revolves around “real” political competition, in other words the presence of an alternative contender with a realistic chance of winning state power at the ballot box, an option excluded in authoritarian systems. For some analysts in this literature, two successful multi-party elections are sufficient to pronounce that “real” political competition exists and democracy is consolidated.15 On this criterion, South Africa certainly qualified by 2004. However, in Przeworski’s more sophisticated test, political competition must “institutionalise uncertainty” about the distribution of political power and the realisation of groups’ interests, so that one-party dominance raises doubts and complications regarding consolidation.16 In South Africa, oneparty dominance has reduced uncertainty about electoral outcomes rather than increasing it. Since the South African transition was not simply from an authoritarian regime to a democracy but also from a white minority regime to a non-racial one, the issue of political competition and the associated uncertainty of outcome were necessarily offset by the need to secure the new regime’s non-racial character against possible backlash from the white or black population. In this respect, one-party dominance in South Africa was a stabilizing force. It reduced uncertainty about the distribution of political power and prevented “effective” political contestation for state power on a racial or ethnic basis (including coalition formation) by those who felt excluded from the state. However, contestation amongst groups and individuals over 15

L. Diamond (1997) Prospects for Democratic Development in Africa, Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University. 16 A. Przeworski (1991) Democracy and the Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Non-racialism and the South African Liberation Struggle

21

access to the state’s power takes place within the ANC (or at least the ANC–COSATU–SACP alliance) rather than in the arena of multipartyism.17 Moreover, differences over policy have been muted by shared nationalist ideas and a shared history of struggle. Government leaders have relied heavily upon loyalty to the ANC and party discipline to secure support for, or at least compliance with, unpopular policies such as the shift from redistributive to growth dominated economic policies. The organization has a reputation for centralized internal control from its years as an exile organization, and several commentators argue that these tendencies have grown stronger the longer it has been in government. The ANC has been little concerned with political mobilization and participation of its mass membership outside the periodic election campaigns. The channels for social influence over state policy are restricted and the emergence of an explicit pro-poor “voice” in the policy process has been muted and when strident, has been met with repression and even violence. Even business’s ability to directly make representations to government is tightly structured, albeit within the context of a firmly pro-business policy framework. The government engages with economic interest groups individually through a set of bilateral “working groups” involving labor, big business, black business, agriculture and international investors respectively. In other words, the party political process as currently constituted does not offer socio-economic interest groups the prospects of influencing policy and winning state power.18 On the contrary, twenty years later, the miracle metaphor is evoked only infrequently. The recent socio-political landscape has been blighted by the killing of protesting miners at Marikana and the scandal of an over $23 million state-funded security upgrade to President Jacob Zuma’s home in Inkandla, which included a cattle enclosure and an amphitheatre. Public Protector Thuli Madonsela accused Zuma of conduct "inconsistent with his office" and said he should repay a reasonable part of the unnecessary renovations, which also included a chicken run and a swimming pool that had been justified under the rubric of "fire-fighting equipment". The legacy of politicians behaving with impunity and using state resources to advance their own ends is alive and well in South Africa today. In an article entitled “Requiem for a Dream”, published recently in South Africa’s Daily Maverick, Sisonke Msimang, a writer and activist

17 18

J. Beall, S. Gelb and S. Hassim (2005). Ibid.

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Chapter One

who works on race, gender, democracy and politics, said the following of her relationship with the ANC: I have felt on some days, as I have scanned the headlines, as though I am walking away from a dramatic love affair in order to save myself even as I am uncertain about what I am walking towards. So forgive me, but it does feel like I’m breaking up with the boy I love; the one who has loved me the most and for the longest, the one who has intoxicated me with his brilliance and his pathos. It’s hard to imagine life without him, even as it has become impossible to live with him. This contradictory impulse is most acutely apparent amongst those South Africans who feel both betrayed by and indebted to the African National Congress. I was born in exile and spent my earliest years as part of an ANC community. Maybe this is why it feels so raw. The ANC put food in my belly, a pen in my hand, and paper in my desk. The ANC gave me the tools I have used to make my way in this world. [Talking of the Inkandla scandal she goes on]… We are all standing on the edge of a pool of tears, fighting fiercely for what we love. Wondering when they are going to get it, wondering why we still try, wondering how it would be possible to ever stop trying. [Of the Public Prosecutor, Thuli Madonsela she says] I watch her and wish that the miners who were shot down at Marikana had her persistence on their side. I wish they had her savvy and her determination working for them. Instead the Commission happens somewhere in the middle distance. Cyril is the Deputy President of the party that oversaw their killing. He walks atop their corpses and we watch in quiet shame. Oscar and Reeva and Nkandla and the state of the nation bury the ghosts of dead miners under a pile of headlines. But the memory of the wailing of widows will not leave us. There are some crimes that demand justice.19

In her reference to Marikana Sisonke Msimang highlights how as the post-apartheid state struggles to impose itself on the populace, it is interacting with social forces in ways that are sadly reminiscent of the apartheid past. Does this mean that some bleak path dependency will simply persist leaving South Africa destined to live in some apartheidesque “groundhog day” characterized by corruption and violence for decades to come? Does it mean that racism and race-thinking will prevail for decades to come? 19 Sisonke Msimang (2014) ‘Requiem for a Dream’, The Daily Maverick, 19th March.

Non-racialism and the South African Liberation Struggle

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For the sake of optimism and hope I return to the issue of personal settlements.

Personal Settlements and Political Futures What were the personal settlements made by Nelson Mandela? In his official biography of Mandela, Anthony Sampson does not disguise his foibles or weaknesses and concludes that a somewhat naïve, egotistical and bombastic young Nelson Mandela matured in jail. With support from fellow prisoners and comrades, and with much time to muse and reflect, Sampson argues that his prison ordeal made him more considered and ultimately as a result, a more influential and better kind of leader: He was cut off from mass audiences, public images and television cameras, stripped down to man-to-man leadership and to the essentials of human relationships, away from the trappings of power. He learnt about human sensitivities and how to handle the fears and insecurities of others, including his Afrikaner warders. He was sensitized by his own sense of guilt, both about his family and about friends he had used during his political career …He saw his own icon being built up across the world, quite separately from himself. But he was not fooled by it …He talked less about ‘I’ and more about ‘we’ and was determined ‘to be looked at as an ordinary human being’.20

What Mandela learnt over his many years of captivity and through his close proximity to those who were ruthless and cruel, sometimes violent, was that they too were fearful. As Mandela confronted his own sadness and his own fears he recognized the same feelings and emotions in others. In the nation-building project which was at the heart of his presidency, Mandela promoted non-racialism, national unity and he personified forgiveness and reconciliation, refusing to condemn his jailers and making extravagant gestures such as when he donned the South African rugby strip at the 1995 World Cup, or when he had tea with the widow of Hendrik Verwoerd, apartheid’s architect. Mandela did this within a language of liberal human rights, as is evident in his first State of the Nation Address to the new South African Parliament in May 1994:

20

A. Sampson, 581.

24

Chapter One Our single most important challenge is to help establish a social order in which the freedom of the individual will truly mean the freedom of the individual. We must construct that people-centred society of freedom in such a manner that it guarantees the political liberties and the human rights of all our citizens.21

The overarching nation-building project, imbued with a discourse of reconciliation and rights and concerned with forging a non-racial South African national identity, has not gone to waste. Not only have those values and aims informed the work and writing of a younger generation of thinkers and doers, such as Sisonke Msimang but they are also what she continues to fight for, including in her poignant piece “Requiem for a Dream”, cited above. Her requiem is about her deep disappointment with the ANC not with the united, non-racial democratic South Africa to which the movement has been historically attached. She is a proud South African who continues to espouse equality, irrespective of race, ethnicity or gender. Sisonke Msimang has made public her personal settlement with the ANC but she continues to strive for an inclusive developmental political settlement for South Africa. As such, she remains a child of Mandela. Mandela accepted that political transition would be a protracted and negotiated business that resulted in political settlements that might disappoint and sometimes disappoint bitterly. Sisonke Msimang has confronted her disappointment but, like Mandela before her, lives with pragmatic compromise. I hope, like Mandela, she and her ilk never give up, for were they to do so, future political settlements in South Africa would be much the poorer for it.

Dr Dan O’Meara The conference organisers invited the members of this panel to reflect on the issues of non-racialism and the liberation struggle through the lens of personal biography. Rather than recounting my own experiences in the anti-apartheid struggle, in the brief period allotted to me, I want to comment on three things. The first is my own understanding of the meaning of non-racialism and the South African liberation struggle, while the second bears on how my understanding of these notions was forged through the lessons I learned from the South African who had the greatest influence on my own political development, and whose vision of our 21 http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/state-nation-address-president-south-africanelson-mandela

Non-racialism and the South African Liberation Struggle

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country remains highly relevant today. This leads thirdly to the question of political leadership and the overall theme of the conference, i.e. the legacy of Nelson Mandela. Non-racialism — as Jo Beall said — is an ideal; an objective to be attained rather than something that exists. As an objective, I understand non-racialism to mean the construction of a society in which, to paraphrase Bob Marley, the colour of a person's skin is of no more consequence than the colour of their eyes. Despite South Africa's significant progress since 1994, no one can dispute that race is still by far the most important determinant of the life chances of the vast majority of the much vaunted “rainbow nation”. The national question thus remains the central issue of South African economic, political and social life. However, over and above its status as an objective to be attained, from the 1950s onwards the concept of non-racialism also stood for one particular conception of the process of the struggle for national liberation. In this sense, the term non-racialism refers to a set of political, ideological, cultural and social practices, which explicitly sought both to negate those imposed by apartheid and to prefigure aspects of the desired pattern of social relations in a post-apartheid South Africa. Understood in these terms, non-racialism functioned as a reference point to guide the strategy and tactics of the struggle to end apartheid. Its principal achievement was the unquestionably democratic constitution, which replaced that of apartheid. But this is merely a starting point rather than the goal of nonracial politics. This leads me then to the question of what we understand by the expression “liberation struggle”, both in the period of apartheid and that following its formal end. Every South African who had the remotest involvement in anti-apartheid politics still carries the psychic scars of the titanic battles between 1948 and 1994 over what the liberation struggle was said to mean. These battles raged between and within the various movements and organisations which claimed to embody the liberation struggle. I do not want to rehash those old quarrels here, but it is important to insist that there was never unanimity on this question and that many of the issues remain unresolved or have simply been swept under the carpet. And, speaking as someone who was a disciplined member of the ANC for 20 years, it is important to acknowledge that the ANC was far from the only voice or the only organisation involved in the liberation struggle. This being said, I remain persuaded that the core of what many South Africans believed the liberation struggle to have been about is well summed up in two paragraphs of the key document Strategy and Tactics of

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the South African Revolution, adopted at the ANC's 1969 Morogoro Consultative Conference. I quote: It is inconceivable for liberation to have any meaning without the return of the wealth and the land to the people as a whole. It is therefore a fundamental feature of our strategy that victory must embrace more than formal political democracy. To allow existing economic forces to retain their interests intact is to feed the root of racial supremacy and does not represent even the shadow of liberation. Our drive towards national emancipation is therefore in a very real way bound up with economic emancipation. We have suffered more than just national humiliation. Our people are deprived of their due in the country's wealth; their skills have been suppressed and poverty and starvation has been their life experience. The correction of these centuries-old economic injustices lies at the very core of our national aspirations. We do not underestimate the complexities which will face a people's government during the transformation period nor the enormity of the problems of meeting economic needs of the mass of the oppressed people. But one thing is certain — in our land this cannot be effectively tackled unless the basic wealth and the basic resources are at the disposal of the people as a whole and are not manipulated by sections or individuals be they White or Black.

If that was the vision supposedly guiding one important force in the liberation struggle until 1994, what meaning can we give to the term liberation struggle today, 20 years after the end of formal apartheid? As Jay Naidoo so eloquently explained this morning, despite immense progress South Africa remains a heartbreakingly long way away from the kind of society that most of those of us who were engaged in that struggle fought for, and very far from the vision enunciated in the Strategy and Tactics. Moreover, all honest people must acknowledge that, once in power, the organisation which claims to have been the principal vehicle of the liberation struggle — the ANC — increasingly appears to have turned its back on much of what it so honourably stood for in “the struggle period”, and most particularly on the kind of society envisaged in its basic programme, the Freedom Charter. For me, the great tragedy of South Africa can be summed up in the statement that the ANC government which has been in office since 1994 is by far the best that our country has ever had. We all know that there is a great deal that is highly dubious about the government, especially its current administration. Yet, compared with what went before, even the Zuma government takes on a more positive hue. Every South African over the age of 25 knows just how obscene, vile, brutal and barbaric apartheid

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was, and we give thanks every day that its legal and political framework has been abolished. So what do we mean now, today, when we speak of non-racialism and the liberation struggle, and how does the way the liberation struggle was actually fought reflect on those questions? Here I want to present a partial answer to these questions by outlining what I learned from the person who most profoundly affected my own political development. I never had the honour of meeting Nelson Mandela, but I did have the immense fortune to work with several leading figures in the liberation struggle. The first and by far the most important of these was Steve Biko. At the tender age of 19 I had the incredible luck — it was pure chance — and the even greater privilege to spend four days in Steve Biko's company during the 1968 annual congress of the National Union of South African Students, NUSAS. This was the very moment when Biko and his comrades had decided to leave NUSAS and to form the South African Students' Organization, SASO — which was to become the core organisation of the Black Consciousness Movement. Steve Biko was by a very, very long shot the most extraordinary human being I have ever encountered and I learned a number of life-changing lessons during those four days working with him. The first of these touched directly on non-racialism. Biko cut through all of my then agonised white-liberal existential belly-gazing over how I could bear the terrible moral responsibility for everything that people like me were doing in SA and over what was “my role” in the anti-apartheid struggle. Faced with these naïve questions, he looked at me with great impatience and replied: “In this country everybody — White, Black, Coloured, Indian22 — has to answer just one question. Are you part of the solution or part of the problem?” South Africa and the world came into focus for me at that moment. Moreover, from Biko, I also learned that it was not just enough to proclaim the wish to be “part of the solution”. Becoming so required profound, deliberate, ongoing and uncomfortable personal transformation. In Biko's view, ending apartheid obliged every South African — whatever their position in the state-imposed racial hierarchy — to undergo and sustain a deeply unsettling process of psychological liberation from the racist categories, attitudes and modes of behaviour into which we had all been socialised and conditioned by over 300 years of colonialism. And, for those so-called white people who committed themselves to the liberation 22 The terms Whites, Blacks, Coloureds and Indians refer to the political system of racial classification as used under apartheid laws.

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struggle this meant, in effect, unlearning how to be a “White South African”. It obliged one to work ceaselessly to free oneself from the reflexes and instincts of dominance, pre-eminence, privilege and entitlement that all Whites had absorbed with their mother's milk. Working in a self-proclaimed non-racial organisation such as the ANC, this was an incredibly difficult thing for privileged Whites, and particularly for White intellectuals, to do. It meant, firstly, learning when to shut up. Given their privileged education, White ANC members had both access to skills and an ingrained self-confidence that were not readily available to our black comrades. While such skills could be used in the service of liberation, they could also do more harm than good. This was because most White activists instinctively used their privileged skills, selfconfidence and ingrained attitudes to dominate all discussions and decisions, and to impose their own minority view. And, by so doing, they ended up reproducing, this time within the liberation movement, exactly those behavioural patterns and hierarchies that sustained apartheid. So, it was vital that White activists kept their mouths shut and allowed our Black comrades to find their own solutions to their own problems. We were there to work, not to lead! So, this was the second lesson that I learned from Steve Biko: that, for people like me, psychological liberation was not just saying, “yes, I want to be part of a non-racial South Africa”, but also of learning how not to be a White person. I could never change the colour of my skin but I had to learn how not to behave like the people I loved around me. The third lesson I learned from Biko has immense resonance in SA today. This was that it is futile and counter-productive to expect to solve the problem of racial inequality in South Africa simply by proclaiming that social groups whose respective life situations have long been fundamentally unequal shall henceforth enjoy legal equality. Apartheid, and the centuries of colonialism which preceded it, had fashioned profoundly deep-rooted inequalities, which went way beyond the political and social exclusion of the vast majority of South Africans. These inequalities were rooted in cultural practices, in social psychology and in the most fundamental structures of the country's economy and of the place of that economy in the global economic system. This meant that the fight against apartheid sought not just to abolish its god-awful laws, to undo its political structure and forever bury official racist ideology. Even doing all of that would still not eradicate apartheid. Rather, as I absorbed Steve Biko's lessons, the liberation struggle for me — and for millions of other South Africans — became a battle to uproot and destroy the entire

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economic, political, cultural and psychosocial legacy of 342 years of colonialism. The fourth lesson I learned from Steve Biko was that the national question was not just about putting an end to apartheid and racism. The national question was about creating what we would today call a real rainbow nation. Doing so does not mean seeking somehow to abolish race, but creating a sense of common belonging to society in which race was no longer of any social, economic or political significance, one in which rather than dividing South Africans, their cultural differences are a source of common pride and common identity. Twenty years after the end of formal apartheid, few would disagree that “post-apartheid” South Africa remains a very long way away from that ideal. I would argue that this lamentable situation exists for two principal reasons. The first of those reasons, as Jay Naidoo alluded to this morning, is because when F.W. de Klerk finally unbanned the ANC and all those other organisations and freed Mandela in 1990, he did not do so because he had seen a non-racial light on some personal road to Damascus. Rather, as he told his own party at the time, this was a deliberate ploy to preserve White privilege in the face of mass resistance. De Klerk's initiative also corresponded to the interests of the vast majority of privileged Whites, and particularly White business. This is best summed up in a statement of the then chairman of the South African Breweries, Dick Goss, who at the time told a friend of mine that he would agree to anything the ANC wanted as long as he would be allowed to take his capital outside of the country. Here, in a nutshell, we have the essential compromise that gave rise to the first democratic election of 1994. The White powers-that-be effectively said to the ANC: “we will agree that you guys take control of the political system if you agree that we retain control of the economic system and most importantly of our capital”. Starting with the Anglo American Corporation, all the great SA conglomerates took their capital out of South Africa and are today listed on the London, Hong Kong, New York stock exchanges. I would argue that the second reason that South Africa today remains so far from the ideal of non-racialism is because the very political organisation that proudly inscribed this principle on its political banners — the ANC — appears to have turned its back on the vision outlined in its Strategy and Tactics, and on the claim in its own Freedom Charter that “The people shall share in the country's wealth”. I was a member of the ANC from 1976-1996. I left the organisation in 1996 when it did a 180degree turn and abandoned the economic programme on which it had been

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elected. The ANC leadership's new, neo-liberal and explicitly Thatcherite “Growth, Employment and Reconstruction” programme (known as the GEAR) was unilaterally imposed and approved by a very small group of people around Thabo Mbeki. This was done without consultation with the ANC cabinet, caucus, and membership or its allies in the so-called Tripartite Alliance. ANC Members of Parliament were simply informed that the GEAR was “non-negotiable”, that they were expected to vote for it or face “redeployment”. I left the ANC because it had turned its back on its own longstanding basic principle that economic emancipation of all South Africans stood at the core of the national question. Every socio-economic indicator shows that South African society today is more unequal that it was under apartheid. Despite the progress since 1994, the overwhelming majority of Black South Africans remain poor and the vast majority of White South Africans are either rich or very comfortably off. Race remains the overwhelmingly most significant determinant of any South African's life chances. The single biggest economic and social change since 1994 has been the effect of the ANC's Black Economic Empowerment initiative (known as BEE). This is, in fact, an egregious misnomer since BEE has not empowered Black South Africans. Rather, it has brought into being a highly privileged minority of between two or three million Blacks (or significantly less than 10% of the Black population) who now live extremely well. They do so thanks largely to their connections with the ANC political powers-that-be. Under Jacob Zuma, South African resembles the dystopia parodied in George Orwell's Animal Farm. The ANC political leadership fervently proclaim that all are equal, yet its policies and practices starkly reveal that some — and most particularly President Zuma, his clique and the crony capitalists they defend — are infinitely more “equal” than the majority of South Africans huddled in urban shacks and rural slums wondering when the roots of apartheid will be dug out and destroyed. How did this happen? Here I agree absolutely with Jay Naidoo: such was the balance of forces in 1993–1994 that the stark choice confronting all elements involved in the liberation struggle was between negotiation or a bloody racial civil war that could have gone on for centuries. I remain convinced that the ANC made the right choice to negotiate. Moreover, it was correct in recognising that while the apartheid regime had indeed suffered a political and ideological defeat, it had not suffered a military one. Over thirty years of armed struggle had not made the slightest dent in the military capacities of the apartheid state. The balance of forces in the

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period 1990–1994 was such that, as famously expressed by Joe Slovo, the ANC could not “win at the negotiating table what we have not won on the battlefield”. Painful concessions would be required. However, in their haste to take office, ANC negotiators conceded far too much to the demands of big business, the World Bank and the IMF. Even given the overwhelming pressure on the new ANC government from western powers, including Canada, to do away with its Reconstruction and Development Programme, nothing obliged the ANC to respond with the GEAR. This went way, way beyond what big business, the World Bank, the IMF and the major Western powers were demanding of the ANC. The GEAR undid at a stroke the vision of national liberation outlined in both the Strategy and Tactics and the Freedom Charter. The GEAR equally gave the ANC's sanction to the spurious, self-serving and purely ideological notion that “there is no alternative” to the form of robber-baron capitalism embodied in the Washington consensus. Moreover, the extraordinarily autocratic fashion through which the GEAR was forced upon the ANC cabinet, its caucus, its members, its allies and the South African population, and the virulence with which the ANC leadership cracked down on internal dissent, represented a depressing return to Stalinist “democratic centralism” and further frayed the organisation's democratic credentials. As the then Vice-President, architect and principal enforcer of the GEAR, the former leading communist, Thabo Mbeki, proudly proclaimed himself “a Thatcherite”, South Africa found itself the victim of a political marriage from hell — a Stalinist political culture, armin-arm with Thatcherite paleo-capitalism. Trying to understand why this happened — why the promise of the South African liberation struggle and the much vaunted “miracle” of 1994 has turned into the sordid reality of corruption, growing inequality, collapsing infrastructure, xenophobic violence and political disillusionment — obliges all who care about South Africa to undertake the difficult and disturbing task of questioning a series of sacred cows. While many will wince at some of these painful truths, I would argue that this baleful situation came to pass in large measure because of problematic elements in Nelson Mandela's leadership, and the way his leadership resonated with longstanding elements in the ANC's own political culture. I do not want to be misunderstood here. Nelson Mandela was a great man whose vision of South Africa and generosity of spirit played a vital role in rescuing the country from a looming racial cataclysm. But, as Mandela himself said on his first public speech on the day of his release from prison, he was neither saint nor saviour, just a man. And he was a man of his times: of the school of African nationalist leaders of the 1940s

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and 1950s, a man used to command and obedience. Moreover, particularly after its turn to armed struggle in 1961, the movement Mandela led was never known for its tolerance of internal dissent or for its internal democratic practices. And, as his memoirs make clear, even Mandela's decision in 1985 to begin talking to the apartheid regime was taken without consulting with, and over the direct opposition of, the collective ANC leadership on Robben Island. It is important to recognise these limitations because they help to explain what strike me as four crucial errors made by Mandela in the critical transition period between 1990 and 1994, errors which would significantly contribute to the situation in which South Africa finds itself today. This first of these errors occurred within months of Mandela's release when he unilaterally decreed that the highly innovative and strikingly democratic network of resistance organisations, which had grown up under the United Democratic Front, would be dissolved, and that all individuals involved should join the ANC. This decision was justified on the basis that in negotiating with the regime, the democratic resistance needed “to speak with one voice”. In doing so, Mandela undid at a stroke the democratic political cultures that had grown up in the internal resistance and reimposed both ANC “democratic centralism” and the stranglehold of the ANC's long-exiled leadership over the disparate strands of the democratic resistance. Henceforth, the scope for debate and dissent would be narrow, and those who did not toe the line imposed by the leadership risked being marginalised. Even when Mandela decreed the end of the ANC's armed struggle, he did so without consulting the leader of the ANC's armed wing, and probably the most popular political figure in the country, Chris Hani. Mandela's second error occurred on the eve of the 1994 election when he accepted the recommendations of the Margo commission of enquiry. This had been appointed by F.W. de Klerk to make recommendations on government salaries following the 1994 election. The Margo Commission recommended that the salaries of government ministers, of members of parliament and of senior civil servants all be pegged to those of equivalent posts in the private sector. The result was that, overnight, long-serving ANC activists who had never earned a salary suddenly found themselves amongst the highest-paid people in the country. This sowed the seeds of the form of corruption in which access to political office became the key to individual wealth. Today, Jacob Zuma's salary as South African President is higher than that of the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Japan, and of the President of France. There would be no problem with this if the people of South Africa had access to the levels of education,

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health services, housing and general living standards available to the British, the Japanese and the French. Mandela need not have made this choice in 1994. There existed at the time another, highly successful, African model for him to follow, one put in place by the long-serving leader of Tanzania and Mandela's contemporary, Julius Nyerere. When Nyerere came to power in Tanzania, he persuaded his political party (first TANU and then the CCM) to adopt a leadership code. This said, in effect, that nobody was forced to work in government, for the state, or to belong to the governing political party. However, those who decided to do so were legally obliged to live off their official salary. They were allowed one bank account and had to declare, and were taxed upon, all foreign earnings. Such people were allowed one home, not several, and all of their assets had to be declared in the public domain, so that every Tanzanian citizen had the right to know, at any time, how much any member of the ruling party, or government, even the State President earned and what that person's net worth was. If these two errors by Mandela prepared the ground for the unholy marriage between Stalinist political culture and Thatcherite economic policies, his third mistake was to choose as his Vice President the man who would come to sanctify this marriage, Thabo Mbeki. Again, there was an alternative. The vast majority of the ANC leadership and its allies preferred the founding General Secretary of the National Union of Mine Workers, Cyril Ramaphosa, to Mbeki. Mandela's choice of Mbeki both underscored the stranglehold of the former exiles over the ANC, and the lack of democratic consultation within the organisation. (However, it must be said that Ramaphosa's subsequent career which made him one of the richest men in Africa, perhaps leads one to conclude that he would not have been much better than Mbeki). Thabo Mbeki's presidency was a catastrophe for South Africa. Besides the disaster of the GEAR, his neargenocidal policies on the galloping AIDS crisis have been estimated to have cost over 300,000 lives. This points to Mandela's fourth error, one which he himself acknowledged — his failure to speak out or take any decisive action during his presidency, on the AIDS crisis. Even before Mandela's release in 1990, blood tests of pregnant women in Soweto maternity clinics were indicating rates of HIV infection of over 20%. Various people within the ANC and the democratic resistance raised warnings about the catastrophic effect of the looming crisis and its probable impact on the budget and policies of a future democratic government. These were simply turned away with the remark that the ANC had more pressing immediate problems to deal with.

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Conclusion Despite all the bright hopes of 1994 and the euphoria at the fact that, at 5 minutes to midnight, the country somehow managed to avoid a seemingly inevitable racial conflagration, South Africa's rocky road since the “miracle” of 1994 highlights the immense difficulties of undoing over 300 years of systemic injustice. Seen from the point of view of the transition strategy, a number of fundamental problems stand out. The first is that, since taking office, the ANC leadership seems to have forgotten the profound truth highlighted in the Strategy and Tactics; i.e. that the underlying roots and formidable power-base of White racism lay in the economy, and that mere control of the political system would be insufficient to destroy those roots. It did so partly because its own narrative of the collapse of the apartheid state falsely reduced the vast tide of popular struggle inside South Africa from the June 1976 Soweto uprising onwards to a coherent movement artfully controlled by the exiled ANC leadership. Here, it must also be acknowledged, many of the internal organisations, and most particularly the Congress of South African Trade Unions, ultimately allowed themselves to be swept along by this narrative and effectively surrendered their independence and strategic vision to the ANC. This meant that, by the time the GEAR was imposed, groups like COSATU were so tied to the “tripartite alliance” that they had destroyed their own ability to propagate an alternative vision and strategy of transformation. This brings me back to Steve Biko and the question of leadership. Biko's brutal murder in September 1977 deprived South Africa of one its most articulate, insightful, charismatic and courageous thinkers and leaders. By 1996, even some of Biko's most committed contemporaries in the struggle — both those from the Black Consciousness Movement and those aligned with other groups — had succumbed to the ANC's ideological hegemony and/or the GEAR- and BEE-cultivated cult of “liberation” via Western-style personal consumption. In Biko's terms, such people have become part of the problem rather than part of the solution. While we can never know what Biko himself would have done, I would argue that, adapted for contemporary conditions, two leitmotifs of Biko's political thought point to the only way in which South Africa might climb out of the morass of corruption, decline and mass poverty. The psychological liberation proposed by Biko involved more than the hugely difficult task of freeing oneself from racial socialisation. It also required, and continues to require, working towards a vision of a society liberated from all the overwhelming baggage of colonialism. Crucially,

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this includes both the cult of individualism and individual consumption and the notion that one political organisation could somehow embody the hopes of an entire people. Biko stressed community and communalism, and these are exactly the values that the ANC has abandoned in its embrace of western-style crony capitalism. Steve Biko's other consistent mantra was “Black man you are on your own”. Purged of its purely masculinist assumptions, an application of Biko's vision to current-day South Africa would imply that those who are now “on their own”, are the tens of millions of South Africans permanently excluded from the new structures of power and privilege that have taken root since 1994. These kinds of people are at the heart of the liberation struggle and non-racial politics today. And the very hard truth needs to be faced. They are “on their own” in searching for a solution to South Africa's myriad ills in the sense that the ANC and the newly privileged class it has created have now joined the structures of White power and entitlement as part of the problem. Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

Stanford (Khulu) Eland My political involvement started in the mid-70s, in Soweto, Johannesburg, South Africa. As some of you may recall, after the Rivonia Trial, which resulted in Nelson Mandela being sent to Robben Island, there was a political lull in South Africa. His imprisonment left a political vacuum that was finally filled by the South African Students' Organization (SASO) founded by Steve Biko, and it was SASO that conscientized Black South African students. It was through organizations like SASO that some of us became involved in politics. In 1976, South Africa had four education systems, one for Whites, one for Indians, one for Coloureds (South Africans of mixed race) and of course, one for Blacks23, who were at the bottom of the ladder. Black students received very little compared to what White students were subsidized for. That culminated in Black students deciding to revolt against the unequal education system, not to mention the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, a language that to us was the oppressors’ language, a language that could not guarantee any advancement beyond the borders of SA. Thus, we decided to stand up and fight against the imposition of Afrikaans as the 23

The terms Whites, Blacks, Coloureds and Indians refer to the political system of racial classification as used under apartheid laws.

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medium of instruction. And, when some of us met on June 13th, 1976 to organize what is now known as the June 16th Soweto Uprising, I'll venture to say that none of us were aware of what we were involving ourselves in. We were not aware that we were on the cusp of something big—naivety reigned. We thought we were just fighting against Afrikaans being imposed on us as a medium of instruction and as soon as that was resolved we would go back to our classes and continue with our education. But, as our struggle continued and gained momentum, we realised that we were doing something big, we were now getting the support of workers and that totally changed the dynamics of our struggle; that changed the face of our struggle and that’s when SA changed forever. Some of us were forced to go underground due to police harassment and subsequently leave the country. I left my beloved motherland in October 1976 under the wing of the Pan-African Congress (PAC) and fled to Swaziland, proceeded to Tanzania and then to the People’s Republic of China. I then came back to Africa at the end of 1977. As I said previously, due to naivety I thought I would be out of the country for three months, tops. However, three led to six months, then nine months, on and on it goes until today. It’s been 30 years that I’ve been in exile, although now it’s self-imposed exile if you like; I feel as though I’m still in exile, yet still deeply in love with the country of my birth. The panel discussed the issue of race and race relations in postapartheid South Africa. Now, whenever anyone speaks of race in South Africa, it is a subject that pits neighbour against neighbour, brother against brother, friend against friend, colleague against colleague. It is something that is very thorny and sensitive, it is an issue that can easily cause civil unrest. Indeed, in South Africa, there are still groups that are privileged, the wealth still remains in a few select families due to one thing—the race or color of their skin. Until that dynamic is changed the race question in South Africa will reign supreme. But this then begs the question: will South Africa ever rid itself of race politics given its background? Will South Africa ever join the Council of Nations where race is not an issue? We are talking about a young democracy; we are talking about a 20-yearold democracy. When one looks south of the border, at the US where democracy has been in place for decades, and one looks at what transpired in the race riots in Ferguson, Missouri, one realizes that it will take time to resolve this issue. It is an issue that makes a lot of people uncomfortable. Dr Jo Beall touched on something very, very important. She mentioned that almost all of us have asked ourselves whether our involvement and sacrifice was worth it? And I can emphatically say, “Yes, it was worth it!”

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I do ask myself at times whether the almost 20 years I spent without seeing my parents, without seeing my siblings and friends, was worth what I see going on in today's post-apartheid South Africa where corruption is on the rise. As I mentioned, I left in October 1976 and my first visit was not until March 1996, that’s almost 20 years later. Can you imagine how it is to stay that long without seeing your parents, without seeing your siblings and friends? Now, when we ask ourselves, “was it worth it to be involved in the struggle?”, I will say without any hesitation, “Yes, it was worth it”. If I was asked, with the benefit of hindsight, what have I learned from my exile experience? I'd say, I’ve learned quite a bit. I’ve learned quite a bit in as much as it was a tough experience and I have learned a lot from it. The experience made a man out of someone who was just about to turn 21, who was naïve but determined, determined to see his country of birth free from the shackles of apartheid. I would still do what I did again. I am prepared to share those experiences with whoever is prepared to listen, painful as those experiences were. I would like to thank the organizers of this beautiful conference and I hope to be a part of it again.

CHAPTER TWO BEYOND SHAME: THE DECLINE OF THE “RAINBOW NATION” PROFESSOR HERIBERT ADAM PROFESSOR EMERITUS AT SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY, VANCOUVER, BC

My conference presentation focused on the “moral turning points” which, together with widespread xenophobia, eroded the image of the reconciled “rainbow nation” in the Mandela tradition. This essay comprises an updated version of the topic, derived from our forthcoming book “Imagined Liberation” (Temple University Press, July 2015). The research was conducted as a Fellow of the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS). The responses to the January 2015 looting of foreign-owned shops in Soweto and the widespread attacks on foreign nationals in KwaZulu/Natal and elsewhere in April 2015 reveal more about the South African national consciousness than the events themselves. The ritual condemnations, the initial denial of xenophobia in preference to labeling it criminality, the blaming of victims and convoluted excuses of perpetrators are almost worse than the official silence and long-standing passivity about wellknown xenophobic attitudes. When the President insists that “South Africans in general are not xenophobic”, he ignores all surveys (Afrobarometer) showing that a vast majority distrusts (black) foreigners, wishes to restrict their residence rights, and prohibits the eventual acquisition of citizenship. On these scores, South African attitudes are not unique. Antiimmigrant hostility inflicts most European societies. Perhaps suspicion of strangers is even universal: preferential kin selection as an evolutionary advantage, as socio-biologists assert. What is uniquely South African is the ferocious mob violence against fellow Africans. But why? The

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structural violence of apartheid laws has continued in the post-apartheid era for many reasons: the breakdown of family cohesion in poor areas which no longer shames brutalized youngsters; the loss of moral legitimacy by government institutions, particularly a dysfunctional justice system; the violence that was glorified in the “armed struggle”; but, above all, the marginalized slum dwellers who have learned that they only receive attention when they act destructively. Despite a rule-bound constitution for conflict resolution, in a representative survey (Afrobarometer) 43 percent in the Western Cape agreed with the suggestion that “it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support for a just cause”. Only after two weeks of denial did the government acknowledge the emergency in response to business repercussions in the rest of Africa and the deteriorating image of the country abroad. In 2014, the former South African Ambassador to the US, Ebrahim Rasool, at the US-Africa Leaders Summit, declared South Africa “a moral superpower”, able to teach the world the way Nelson Mandela managed conflict resolution. In this view, liberated citizens cannot be xenophobic if the image of a glorified rainbow nation is to be salvaged. Admitting racism toward fellow Africans would deprive the ruling party of the moral high ground. The belated recognition of xenophobia, unanimous condemnations of violence, and noble solidarity marches reinvigorated civil society organizations, but will not change attitudes on their own. That South African political exiles were welcomed in African countries in the past hardly impacts a generation with a limited historical consciousness. Most media explanations of these hate-crimes are far too rational to grasp underlying psychological causes. The very presence of thriving Somali shops insults unsuccessful, impoverished township dwellers. They endure daily exposure as failures. Envy breeds resentment. Perceived humiliation fuels scapegoating. Low self-esteem searches for enhanced identity. Powerless people empower themselves by attacking those below them. While the ruling elite enriches itself by looting the state, the forgotten slum dwellers claim their share by collecting the crumbs from the vulnerable amakwerekwere. The derogatory label this time included not only other Africans, mainly Somalis, but Pakistani and Bangladeshi informal traders as well. Sensitive scholars like Francis Nyamnjoh already hint that the “bizarre nativity game of exclusionary violence” could easily expand from “outsiders within” to long-time insiders, such as Indian South

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Africans, Coloureds and lastly Whites1. Re-tribalization, relatively successfully contained by the ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP) in public discourse, nevertheless simmers under the surface. The more meager the pie in an economic downturn, the more a negative solidarity of ethnic nepotism comes to the fore. At an ANC conference about the nomination of the next president, delegates proudly wore Tshirts with the inscription “100% Zulu Boy” without being reprimanded. During apartheid, anybody in tribal clothing was ridiculed among the progressive movement. Nowadays, influential traditional leaders in leopard skin can incite xenophobia without officially being called to order. Hunger and poverty do not drive frenzied youngsters to rob stores or stab their owners. Drug addiction does. Most looters own cell phones and stealing vouchers for airtime was a priority. The breakdown of family cohesion in mostly fatherless township households has eliminated shame and neutralized moral inhibitions. Overburdened mothers, often without maintenance payments by the absentee fathers, are unable as sole breadwinners to provide the emotional intimacy and security needed by youngsters. Gangs function as family substitutes and identity enhancers. Underqualified township teachers have utterly failed to instill political literacy to comprehend global migration. South Africans of all hues cultivate an exceptionalism of being in Africa, but not of Africa. Newcomers from the alien, dark continent are not to be trusted. Wellqualified foreign science and mathematics teachers could function as role models, besides raising standards. However, the teachers union (SADTU) does not welcome cosmopolitan non-nationals in its ranks, let alone being lectured on political education. Competition for jobs by unemployed youth amounts to a cliché. Looting schoolchildren are not yet in the job market. Neither does alleged inequality between foreigners and locals explain the antagonism. Somali tenants mostly start from scratch with loans from relatives; they frequently employ locals; they extend credit to customers and pay rent on time. But they work longer, harder and sell cheaper, due to a small profit margin and “collective entrepreneurship”. Self-hate by the locals fuels envy of the successful foreigners. In economic terms, all immigrant societies around the world have benefitted from the skills and hard work of newcomers. However, such rational reasoning does not persuade losers in the competition for scarce resources, perceived as a zero-sum game.

1

The terms Whites, Blacks, Coloureds and Indians refer to the political system of racial classification as used under apartheid laws.

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Why can’t locals emulate the foreigners and learn from them? Why can’t they also buy wholesale and introduce smaller mark-ups? “We don’t trust each other”, answered many local respondents in our research. In an atomized space of marginalized people, the mutual trust of responsible citizens amounts to a delusion. The very notion of community is problematic. At the most, an exclusionary solidarity exempts local shops from being looted, but not equally poor blacks from outside being attacked. Some pundits have criticized the Home Affairs office for extending work permits to Zimbabweans when so many locals are unemployed. Not only are the foreigners preferred by employers, because they go the extra mile, but how else could they survive when they have to fend for themselves? Pretoria should be criticized for supporting a tyrannical regime in Harare, not for easing the burden of their escapees. In contrast to the migrants in Europe, most Zimbabwean refugees would return home if conditions were to improve. The height of hypocrisy is the Mugabe criticism of the South African government for failing to protect the two million Zimbabwean nationals who would not be in South Africa without the chaotic economic policies and violent rule of ZANU. A sad indictment in the xenophobic drama must be reserved for the police management. The commentator of City Press (01/02/2015), Justice Malala cites incontrovertible evidence: “The police, in large numbers, are aiding, abetting and even partaking in the looting”, but mostly looking away. Malala quotes a story about the police, who ordered people to queue up to “loot in an orderly manner” by entering a shop four at a time. However, the police merely reflect the attitudes of the population at large. Their training has not incorporated any lessons from the 2008 xenophobic outbreaks. While police attitudes should not be generalized, corruption and disrespectful behavior of cops on the street has been confirmed in many of our interviews and also established in an official inquiry in the Western Cape (O’Reagan/Pikoli Khayelitsha Police Commission, 2012-2014). Victim blame abounds. Ignoring the attacks against foreigners in January 2015, the Home Affairs office announced that their legal status would be investigated. However, not being harmed or treated inhumanely is an absolute right that does not depend on the person’s citizenship. Adding to the moral panic around outsiders, a ruling party leader blamed weak immigration laws and their potential to give rise to terror organizations, such as Boko Haram. A cabinet member insisted on foreigners “revealing their trade secrets” as a precondition for being allowed to operate. Barring groups from certain activities on the basis of their ethnic origin violates the South African constitution. The humiliating

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treatment of refugees by Home Affairs officials in the renewal of permits reinforces for an already suspicious population the need to guard against outsiders. Taxi drivers tell you a widely held belief that most crimes are committed by foreigners, yet the government has never published statistics about national and non-nationals convicted. Compared with the dramatic rise of xenophobia in Western Europe, South Africa originally differed in two respects: first, in Europe, antagonism against foreigners is mobilized from above by populist demagogues; in South Africa the resentment originates from below and is condemned by all political parties as “shameful”. Surprisingly, no antiimmigration party exists, but all politicians advocate stricter border controls. No Marine Le Pen has yet emerged in South Africa. However, the schizophrenia of feeling embarrassed by the xenophobic label and simultaneously playing to the xenophobic gallery, particularly at the local level, does not rule out a gradual nativist shift. The apartheid government restricted Indians from settling in the Orange Free State, Idi Amin expelled their counterparts from Uganda, and the African Union elected a nationalist Mugabe as their chair in 2015. Who can guarantee that the South African rainbow does not dissolve similarly? A second difference between South Africa and wealthy Western Europe is the absence of large-scale slums in which abandoned locals compete with foreigners for retail space. European xenophobia focuses mainly on identity issues, not on meager means of survival through spaza shops. Yes, German taxpayers resent that asylum claimants receive the same social benefits as citizens, but this does not affect their own secure livelihood. European state authorities would not passively tolerate the South African violence. However, given a prejudiced electorate in both Europe and South Africa, political parties would lose voters if they resolutely took the side of victimized outsiders. In both contexts, parties confront the choice between morality or pleasing their voters. A related difference to Europe allows more optimism. Islamophobia and anxiety about an incompatible religion play no role in South Africa. Whatever motivates the animosity toward Muslim Somalis, religion has never featured. Unlike Europe, Muslims are not attacked for undermining an entrenched homogeneous culture. The South African divided society has long learned to coexist with diversity. That is the main hope to overcome xenophobia.

PART TWO

CHAPTER THREE REFLECTING ON PAN-AFRICAN LIBERATED ZONES: DESIGNING A DYNAMIC NKRUMAHIST EVALUATION DR. ZIZWE POE PROFESSOR, LINCOLN UNIVERSITY, PENNSYLVANIA

Introduction and purpose of this presentation It was indeed an honor to have these concepts and symbols considered at the Third Kwame Nkrumah International Conference. The summary of the presentation coincided with its purpose and was therefore delivered at the outset. The author sought to encourage the Pan-African intelligentsia, at a minimum, to update and apply Nkrumah’s zonal analysis to the institutions they inhabit, and possibly to develop a strategy that could impact intellectual institutions favorably for the African masses, in particular, and humanity in general. The presentation was constructed to assist the active pursuit of victory for the “People’s Class” by assisting in the Pan-African revolution. Throughout this chapter, the reader is encouraged to do the following: (1) Know that the African Liberation War continues; (2) Continuously refine strategy and tactics; (3) Pay meticulous attention to the dialectical elements of “selfconsciousness”; (4) Remember that power begins with conception; (5) Be cognizant of the “zone” in which operations are taking place; (6) Understand and embrace the Pan-African Personality to fortify Pan-African Nationalism.

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Introduction and Dedications The author of this chapter has an intimate relationship with the PanAfrican revolution. As a student in New York City, he was first introduced to Kwame Nkrumah’s Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare in a class entitled the Black Revolution. Kwame Turé, then a cadre in the AllAfrican People’s Revolutionary Party (A-APRP), spoke at City College of New York and convinced many students to attend African Liberation Day (ALD) in Washington DC. Seeing thousands of Africans enthusiastically declaring themselves in favor of Pan-African nationalism at ALD encouraged a groundswell of students to be a part of that noble movement. The A-APRP was the brainchild of Kwame Nkrumah, and Kwame Turé, along with other members of the Pan-African Intelligentsia (PAI), was organizing globally with Nkrumah’s permission. That organization changed this author’s life and his perspective on the world. That was the 1970s – things were a lot different than they are now, and it is the current times that this chapter addresses. Nevertheless, the point made here is that this chapter owes a tremendous debt to the legacies of Kwame Nkrumah and Kwame Turé. It is an effort to initiate and improve upon the ideas that these Pan-African revolutionaries propagated. This chapter is also dedicated to the generations, yet unborn, that will pick up the baton and carry it to the finish line of Pan-African success. There is victory for the Pan-African nation controlled by the “People’s Class”!

Kwame Nkrumah (1909 – 1972) the Exemplar of the Pan-African Intelligentsia Kwame Nkrumah’s Pan-African nationalism was extraordinary and can easily be seen in his book, Africa Must Unite. The text was targeted specifically to African heads of states in an effort to convince them to unite politically and economically to become more effective. Nkrumah used the book to give clear and simple examples of how a Pan-African national formation would benefit all the independent states involved. He warned that resistance to functional unity would condemn all Africans to a fate worse than colonialism. The heads of states at that time, corrupted with their petty privileges, resisted Nkrumah’s efforts. They claimed that Nkrumah was trying to become the “president of Africa” . Some of them whined that they fought too hard for independence to give up this independence to some larger African nation. Sadly, in 1963, these shortsighted leaders of the African nation-states created an ineffective

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compromise called the Organization of African Unity (OAU). That organization died from ineffectiveness in the first decade of the 21st century. The sluggishness of Nkrumah’s peer statesmen did not stop his PanAfrican work. He fearlessly exposed the economic mechanisms of neocolonialism in his book, Neo-colonialism: The last stage of imperialism. That text illuminated the role of so-called religious and cultural nongovernmental organizations from Europe and America and their role in the weakening of African culture. He also revealed the strategy and tactics of finance capitalists that were continuing to extract the wealth of Africa from the African masses. More than any of his previously published works, Neo-colonialism made Nkrumah a target of imperialism. The text condemned the shenanigans of the imperialists in accessible language. The well-being of the African masses decreased as they were increasingly stricken with turmoil and grief due to military conflicts between African nation-states and within African nation-states. Nkrumah warned the African governmental leaders of the dark days ahead. Those dark days would visit Ghana in 1966, as imperialist intelligence agencies united with collaborators in Ghana to overthrow Nkrumah and the PAI. This did not stop Nkrumah, however, as he continued to publish and distribute ideological and strategic books designed to advance the PanAfrican revolution from another Pan-African Liberated State, Guinea (Conakry). That time, however, Nkrumah’s targeted audiences were the African intelligentsia and African freedom fighters. It was during that time that Nkrumah published the books Class Struggle in Africa and Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare. In these books, Nkrumah clarified the enemy opposition to African liberty and unity. He clearly warned Pan-Africanists about the collective unity formed among imperialist forces. Writing at a time when China and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics offered an alternative to the colonial and neocolonial states, Nkrumah warned the African leaders who stuck their heads in the sand and inked deals with the devil. The end result of those deals was an Africa infected by neocolonialism and suffering worse than from any parasite designed by nature. Nkrumah joined the realm of the ancestors in 1972, before the leadership of the Soviet Union abandoned their national model in 1988. Some scholars think that Nkrumah would have rejoiced when the USA elected its first African-American president in 2008. But Nkrumah, who attended a “Black” Lincoln University in the USA would not have been blinded by race alliances as he experienced the betrayal of an American of African descent while he was Ghana’s president. That betrayer, a “Black

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man,” was Mr. Franklin Williams, an alumnus of Nkrumah’s alma mater that was serving as the US ambassador to Ghana during the overthrow of Ghana’s Pan-African Liberated State in 1966. The Lyndon Johnson Papers revealed that Williams did the bidding of the neocolonialists. Nkrumah would probably not have been confused by Obama’s election, though it is doubtful that he could have imagined the damage the USA would do to Ghana in the form of AfriCom. How could things have become so rotten? That is a question for a different chapter. This chapter seeks solutions that build on these experiences.

Self-Consciousness and the Pan-African Intelligentsia (PAI) Nkrumah explained the origin and role of the African intelligentsia in a chapter from his text Class Struggle in Africa entitled “Intelligentsia and Intellectuals”’. That chapter explained that, under colonialism, education determined class membership. Most of the intellectuals educated with colonial curriculums developed an affinity for the systems of the colonial overlords. This was not the case, however, with all of the educated persons. Nkrumah stated on page 39 of that text that the “third section of the intelligentsia to emerge after independence consists of the revolutionary intellectuals —those who provide the impetus and leadership of the worker-peasant struggle for all-out socialism”. Nkrumah classified this last group of intellectuals as “revolutionary outsiders” because they consciously chose the African masses as their class of preference rather than their intended class membership, which in fact also described Nkrumah and other members of the PAI. Every intelligentsia serves a class and fortifies its identity as a unifying tether. Additionally, the intelligentsia investigates the obstacles challenging the well-being of the class it serves and recommends solutions to the challenges facing that class. These services are the charges of both the imperialist intelligentsias and the intelligentsias seeking to liberate populations from imperialism. The above is true especially for the PAI, itself an overlapping subset of intellectuals committed to the African Unity Movement, African Liberation Movement and the Black Consciousness Movement of the 19th through 21st centuries. The distinction of the Pan-African Intelligentsia is that it is dedicated to the Pan-African personality and identity, a personality and an identity forged in the struggle to construct optimal collective agency for the collective life enhancement of the African masses. While the PAI might be postulated as the cultural offspring of

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battles against African enslavement, Arab colonialism and European colonialism, its existence, however, is not merely a response to outside oppression. It also seeks to inoculate African culture from parasites of all kinds. The PAI, like other intelligentsias, assesses, rectifies, and fortifies the population it is charged to serve and protect. The PAI utilized the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress to formally resurrect the African Unity Movement from the time of the Garvey movement and give it the charge to launch the African Liberation Movement. George Padmore (1903–1959) born in Trinidad, W. E. B. Du Bois (1868–1963) born in the United States of America, Kwame Nkrumah (1909–1972) born in the Gold Coast colony of West Africa, and Amy Ashwood Garvey (1897–1969) born in Jamaica, all played instrumental roles at this gathering. Key members of this intelligentsia were sent to colonial areas in Africa to organize the masses into political organizations and movements with the purpose of uniting and shaking off European colonial control. Each geopolitical area that achieved success was to become a launching pad against imperial forces. PAI members that functioned outside of Africa were tasked with organizing support for the liberation efforts and to support Africans in their quest for justice against oppressive agencies. Nkrumah, a key exemplar of the PAI, went to the Gold Coast colony and recruited youth and the local intelligentsia to the Pan-African cause. Within a matter of a few years the Gold Coast colony was transformed into an independent nation-state with the character of a Pan-African Liberated State — the first one since the African liberation of Haiti from French colonialism in the beginning of the 19th century. Members of the PAI from throughout the world began to flock to the Pan-African Liberated State of Ghana to organize the continued liberation of Africa and the organization of the United States of Africa.

Power Begins With Conception — Thus, the Role of the Intelligentsia Aided by the PAI, the Pan-African Liberated State of Ghana sought to empower the Pan-African Personality. Nkrumah was keenly aware of the need to constantly regenerate the PAI in service of the African masses. The PAI’s primary work was to influence all instruments of media and education to ensure popular support of the Pan-African liberation zones and forces. This task was not an easy one for the local intelligentsia inherited a deeply embedded colonial mentality nurtured by the imperialists. By 1966, the intelligentsia of ill repute overthrew the Pan-

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African Liberated State of Ghana and removed the power of the PAI in that geopolitical area. Nkrumah relocated to operate out of the Pan-African Liberated State of Guinea, Conakry as Co-President until 1972. A smaller component of the PAI worked with him and continued to assist with the prosecution of the Pan-African revolution. While in Guinea, Conakry, Nkrumah authored two key texts to assist with the Pan-African revolution. Two terms need a short explanation so that the readership is on the same page as the author. The first of those terms is, “liberated zone”’. This is a term that is often used when describing competing areas of a War Theater. Nkrumah explains it best on page 43 in his book entitled Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: The African nation is at present split up among many separate states, it is in reality simply divided into two: our enemy and ourselves. The strategy of our struggle must be determined accordingly, and our continental territory considered as consisting of three categories of territories which correspond to the varying levels of popular organisation and to the precise measure of victory attained by the people's forces over the enemy.

Nkrumah described three zones: liberated, contested, and enemy-held. He stated in the Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A guide to the armed phase of the African Revolution that these zones were dynamic and not set once and forever. Haiti, Ghana, and Libya serve as Pan-African examples of how liberated zones could slip into contested and enemy-held zones. The following qualities of liberated zones are extracted from Nkrumah’s text Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A guide to the armed phase of the African Revolution (pp. 44–46): (a) Independence was secured through an armed struggle, or through a positive action movement representing the majority of the population under the leadership of an anti-imperialist and well-organized mass party. (b) A puppet regime was overthrown by a people’s movement. (c) A social revolution is taking place to consolidate political independence by: Ɣ promoting accelerated economic development Ɣ improving working conditions Ɣ establishing complete freedom from dependence on foreign economic interests. (d) Political growth is being achieved as a result of discussions and agreements concluded within the party. (e) There is steady progress to transform theory into practice along the ideological lines drawn by the party.

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Chapter Three (f) There is constant improvement, checking and rechecking of the development plans to be carried out by the party and at state level. (g) Political maturity among party members, who are no longer content to follow a vague and general line of action. Revolutionary political maturity is the prelude to the reorganization of the party structure along more radical lines. (h) Supporting actively the detachments of revolutionary liberation movements in the contested zones of Africa. (i) Contribute to the organization and revolutionary practice of the people’s forces in neo-colonialist states, i.e. in zones under enemy control or in contested areas. (j) Effect an organic liaison of its political and economic life with the other liberated zones of the African nation. (k) Stay ready to offer the use of territory to detachments of the liberation movements as their rear bases on friendly soil. (l) Make objective and up-to-date analyses of the enemy’s aggression. (m) Take action to recapture any base lost to the enemy, and to help correct the mistakes which enabled the enemy to gain temporary victory. (n) The main criterion for judging liberated zones is the actual direction in which they are moving since our assessment is of changing and not static phenomenon.

Added here, to Nkrumah’s designation of Liberated Zone characteristics are statements from two other Pan-Africanists that were contemporary with Nkrumah. The statements have been synthesized to update them. Influenced by Seku Ture, United States of Africa (pp. 112, 121): A) Establish a Pan-African Academic consortium that has a primary goal of supporting the working African masses. B) Establish a teacher’s college with the goal of empowering the weaker segments of African society and enamoring students to become the destroyers of imperialism. C) Curriculum is in the hands of the People’s Class. D) Higher education, organized for the acquisition of the mastery of politics, science, techniques and technology becomes the right and responsibility of common citizens in order that they become active forces in the rapid development of society. E) Sponsor technique and technology (communication and transportation) to enamor local revolutionary councils. C. A. Diop, Black Africa: The economic and cultural basis for a federated state (From 14 Steps to African Unity):

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(1) Restore the consciousness of our historic unity [by building it into every level of the curriculum]. (2) Work for linguistic unification on a continental scale, with a single [Pan-]African cultural and government language superseding all others; [local African languages, whichever they may be, would remain in use and relegated to the status of secondary languages taught in secondary schools.] European and Asian languages would be offered in higher educational institutions. (3) Raise the official Pan-African language to the language used in the Pan-African Parliament and in the writing of continental declarations. Require the language in Political Science instruction at the undergraduate and graduate school levels. (4) Work out an effective form of representation for the female sector of the nation. (5) Ensure that all curriculums oppose racism and racial entitlements. (6) Constitution must be written so that no industrial bourgeoisie can come into being. This would prove that we are truly socialist. (7) Create a powerful State industry, giving primacy to industrialization, development and mechanization of agriculture. (8) Create a powerful modern army, possessing an air force and endowed with a civic education that would make it unlikely to indulge in Latin American-type putsches. (9) Create technical institutes. (10) Reduce luxurious living standards and judiciously equalize salaries in such a way that political positions are comparable to workers’ jobs. (11) Organize production cooperatives, made up of volunteers owning adjacent fields, in order to mechanize and modernize agriculture and permit large-scale production. (12) Create schools of agronomy and agribusiness that generate State farms with a view to broadening the technical and social experience of still ungrouped individual farmers (peasants). (13) Enshrine and advocate the policy of the rapid repopulation of Africa in the social sciences. (14) Enshrine and advocate a policy of full employment and other noncapitalist approaches in political-economy policy that progressively eliminate the material dependence of down-trodden social categories.

21st-Century Recommendations for Assessing PAI Environments The separation of religion and state is not the only value seemingly adopted by the African people from the Euro-Christian experience. There also appears to be the obvious, if often refuted, separation between scholarly speculation and revolutionary struggle. The connection of these two similar categories is necessary here because their dichotomization is

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erroneous and dangerous to African social progress. There is a need to imbue revolutionary behavior with the clarity of self-consciousness that is enriched through careful and purposeful reflection. Simultaneously, there is a need to anchor and focus scholarly speculation in the needs of the African masses for collective self-control, security and peace. The opinion of the author is that Africa is not yet free. Old-fashioned colonialism, in which settler governments and settler work forces directly controlled the African motherland, are practically gone. What is not gone, however, is the control. Even the settler presence remains in some cases. African revolutionaries, especially the PAI, should view the 1960s and 1970s as an important nexus of imperial disorder and Pan-African unity. This nexus, however, was fleeting. The enemy empire has regrouped and attacked African unity in direct proportion to its renewed sense of collectivity. Thus, the struggle continues and the principal obstacle to PanAfricanism is identified clearly as “collective imperialism”. In order to win the struggle, the PAI must sharpen its strategic tools of analysis. The zonal analysis is an indispensable tool in this thrust for victory. Some African revolutionaries and scholars alike froze Nkrumah’s analysis in time and robbed it of its life.1 During Nkrumah’s presidency, the zonal analysis saw liberation as demarcated at the point of African prosocialist elites coming to state power. Nkrumah did modify his perspective on this premature assessment and realized that the African political independence movement was only the beginning of this phase of the African revolution. He recognized that imperial forces were consolidating their thrust to adjust to the awakened consciousness of the masses. What appeared to be capitulation and cooperation was clearly procrastination and co-optation. And now, half a century later, the African masses have had to finance and refinance their mortgage on their motherland through banks based in other parts of the world. In light of this tragedy, the African revolutionary must be able to distinguish between the degrees of strengths, weaknesses to determine 1

The elevation of the particulars of Nkrumah’s strategic thrust into a dogma has prevented all but a few courageous and creative revolutionaries from updating his 1968 analysis. From this erroneous standpoint, some have said that Africa is independent and there are no liberated zones in Africa. The accuracy in Nkrumah’s analysis is in its categorical identification and prioritization of action. The definition of zones and movements in time depend on the global reality of political-economics. A point should be made here that Nkrumah’s definitions are still generally valid. In the final analysis, the primary focus of revolutionaries must be the fortification of liberated zones so that they may act as springboards for future revolutionary activity.

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appropriate action for and within each zone and movement. What are the requirements for a liberated zone and a liberation movement in 2016? Can it be said that there are no enemy-held zones in Africa? How is this zone defined in the neocolonial era? Without updating Nkrumah’s zonal analysis, the entire African continent is reduced to contested zones. Thus, a required tool of analysis is rendered useless. What is required is the recasting of analytical tools. Nkrumah’s essential criterion for an area to be considered as a liberated zone was the organization of the masses for: a) social revolution and b) to support world revolutionary movements, especially those struggling in Africa. The demarcation at the time of his presidency was political independence whereas today it must be political-economic and cultural independence. Political-economic independence must be reflected by an area’s ability to cooperate and unite with those forces that will assist Africa’s greater political collaboration. Pan-African culture must be absorbed and accessible to the broad masses of Africans within those boundaries. Creative socialist economic strategies must be attempted so as not to mortgage away the populations’ natural resources and labor. Enemy-held zones must also be redefined in terms of form for their essence remains consistent. The driving essence of enemy-held zones, according to Nkrumah, was the interests of foreign capital. Foreign capital, therefore, seeks to ensure that the organization of the African masses, in particular, and the organization of the working masses, in general, is negligible. Today’s PAI must not be blinded by color or other anthropological straightjackets in the assessment that it needs to make. Liberated, enemy-held, and contested zones still need to be identified and the appropriate prioritization must take place. Nkrumah told the revolutionaries to guard and help the liberated zones because they were bases from which operations could be launched into other zones. Liberated zones often have the power and resources of a conscious organization and/or People’s Class and are eager to support the expansion of the African revolution. Liberation movements usually seek homage in liberated zones; thus, it is a good place to connect with future liberated zones as well as helping to create them. Likewise, self-conscious African revolutionary cadres are rejuvenated through the spirit of liberated zones and are attracted to them like magnets. This renewed strength and resource support is to be used to win the contest in contested zones and weaken the enemy in enemy-held zones. This is the basic strategy of the African revolutionary struggle. This brings the focus to the role of the PAI. One might ask: “Why the intelligentsia? Wasn’t Nkrumah a man of the masses? What about the

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workers and the peasants?” If the intelligentsia that Nkrumah described had qualified itself in the direction of Pan-African nation-building, the glorious years of the 1960s would have continued longer into more distant decades. An unqualified intelligentsia can no longer advance the push forward. The PAI is required as a minimum to renewing the forward thrusts of the African revolution. This assessment is crystal clear to neocolonial forces and that is why they continue to control the development of African intellectuals. It is this latter fact that beckons a renewed look at the liberation formula Nkrumah set out. Nkrumah stated that three vital segments of the African revolution were the workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia. Properly organized, these three segments were the dynamite of the African revolution. One of these segments, however, was to serve as the fuse. That was the intelligentsia. A fuse is but a small part of an explosive device. It is, however, a necessary component, without which the device will not go off. This simple fact is known not only by Pan-Africanists but also by imperialists. The Pan-African Intelligentsia is a small but significant component of the team that prosecutes the Pan-African revolution. Merely being part of the African Intelligentsia is insufficient at this time in history. A minimal Pan-African identity and consciousness are contemporary requirements to make adequate advances in servicing all African people. Consequently, one must be concerned with the institutions that are halting the advance of the Pan-African revolution by misdirecting African intellectuals. The imperialists are metaphorically urinating on the fuse of the Pan-African revolution. When the finance capitalists sought to roll back African liberation, they offered African governments “Structural Adjustment Programs”, SAPs for short. These programs sapped the strength of African nation-states by forcing them to do three things: (1) Remove trade protections that served their local businesses, (2) Devalue their currencies and thereby devalue the labor of their workers, and (3) Decrease their social spending – including spending on education. Later, however, the czars of finance capital realized that an education that imparted imperialist-approved curriculums and value systems was more effective than tanks and bombs in usurping the liberated states. The imperial plan was to kidnap African youth by modifying their cultural appetites. Educational plans became part of the so-called “capacity

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building” initiatives by funding agencies made up of former colonialists. It is devilishly brilliant and is still in play. As a result, many African intellectuals have ceased to be Pan-African or even African and are becoming increasingly anti-African. What follows is an initial application of a zonal analysis to those institutions where the African and Pan-African Intelligentsia find themselves and where they are engendered, developed and fortified, or, where it is neutered, mal-developed and made self-destructive. The utility of these organized institutions spans a “goal-affirmation” range. The categorical names within the range are inspired by Nkrumah’s zonal analysis but are adjusted to the specific context of the intelligentsia. As such, three additional zones are added in the tool kit of the PAI’s social environment assessment: (1) optimal zone, (2) forwarding zone, and (3) retarding zone. The overall goal of these zonal indicators is to create safe and nurturing spaces for the PAI in educational institutions. This should be done by locating: x x x x

Open supporters of developing Pan-African agency at all levels Educational institutions that celebrate Africanity Educational institutions that contribute to the African Renaissance Educational institutions that uphold and advocate the principles of Maat

Retarding Zone – Anti-African Academic Space 1. Administrative sponsorship of anti-Afrocentric activity 2. No institutional resources for instruction on Pan-African agency 3. Lethargic student and faculty around world and African affairs 4. An area where there is sanctioning of anti-African pedagogy and curriculum 5. Sustained absence of African presence in the faculty, administration, and student body 6. Prominent placement of open racists Contested Zone – Multinational-centered Zone 1. Encouragement of multicultural education 2. Growing diversity in a previously European social environment 3. Diversity of culture-based patriotisms 4. Administrative sponsorship of multicultural activity inclusive of Africanisms 5. Balanced allocation of resources reflecting multicultural “parity” approach

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6. Debate of student and faculty concerning social, political, and economic status quo Forwarding zone – African Liberation Zone 1. Celebrates diversity without coercion 2. Growing presence of Pro-African and indigenous personnel 3. Abandonment of imperialist patriotism 4. Administrative sponsorship of research in traditional Africa 5. Allocation of resources in a (non-Eurocentric) fair and transparent contest 6. Debate among student & faculty around the direction of the campus in terms of national policy, especially toward Africa Optimal Zone – Zone in support of Pan-African unity 1. Supports the transmission of Maatian ethics and the “African aesthetic” 2. Growing indigenization and Pan-Africanization 3. Support for Pan-African and anti-imperial patriotism 4. Administrative sponsorship of multicultural activity inclusive of Pan-Africanism 5. Allocation of resources for African nation-building 6. Debate among students and faculty concerning Pan-African Nationalism

Suggested Strategy Solutions Afrocentric scholars are needed to construct paradigmatic approaches in which African values, thoughts, agency, and experiences are considered the means and end of all inquiry. The best defense is an “intelligent, wise, and culturally inspired offense”. The “ground-level” is our campuses and in the educational institutions which the PAI are engendered. Policy recommendations for Afrocentric scholars: Bridge the divide (home and abroad) [agency types, geographical, application]. Impact all disciplines and support the establishment of space for our discipline (the physics of disciplines). Use the technique of “positive synthesis” to smelt truth from “knowledge-ore” to mold a golden consciousness.

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General Solutions Continue to generate location theories that map the terrain of human belief with the goal of defining and nurturing the well-being of Africans. Launch foundations to support research that evaluates and enhances African agency at the mass level, which would: Publish findings. Distribute findings. Establish new institutions. Redirect established institutions. Publish multilingual versions of keystone pieces while starting our own multi-platform publishing houses. Launch teacher training colleges to certify K–12 teachers globally while joining in on the “standards debate” and offering standards that produce responsible students as global citizens. Two disturbing trends to beware of: (1) Hyper-diasporization. (2) The Balkanization of social research in African Area studies. The Challenges in Black and Africa-American Studies (B&AAS) (1) Intense Diasporization (2) Detachment of the cultural importance attached to the African land base and its ancestral connection to African value dating back further than KMT. (3) Blurs vision. (4) Pan-African Agency rendered ineffective. (5) Micro-agency results at best. The Challenges in African Area Studies (AAS) The double malignancy: (1) Study of non-viable, micro-national entities (2) Assimilation of African cultural options into the European Empire. (3) Pan-African agency is weakened through research-neglect. (4) Life enhancing knowledge about African traditions is reduced. (5) Africans experience a devaluation in their labor, wellness and life in contradistinction to exploiting populations in imperial centers. (6) Stripped historicity generates stripped historical self-image. (7) Collective memory loss weakens will by reducing knowledge of

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past initiatives and possibilities. NK –-Cult-dynamics

References Diop, C.A. (1974/1987) Black Africa: The Economic Basis for a Federated State. Chicago. Lawrence Hill Books. Nkrumah, Kwame. (1963). Africa Must Unite. London: Heinemann Publishers. —. (1965). Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism: New York: International Publishers. —. (1968). Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare. New York. International Publishers. —. (1970). Class Struggle in Africa. Bedford, UK. Panaf Books Ltd. Seku Ture (1980) The United States of Africa. Conakry, Guinea. Press Office. The Lyndon Johnson Papers (1966)

CHAPTER FOUR A CONTEXTUAL OUTLINE AND ANALYSIS OF 21ST CENTURY PAN-AFRICANISM DAVID O.AKOMBO, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR (MUSIC), JACKSON STATE UNIVERSITY, JACKSON, MS, USA

BARUTI I.KATEMBO ADJUNCT PROFESSOR (MATHEMATICS), JONES COLLEGE, JACKSONVILLE, FL, USA

AND DR KMT G.SHOCKLEY ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, HOWARD UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND POLICY STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC Introduction: The African Diaspora Over the centuries, at least an estimated 30 million African slaves, mostly of wide-spanning Bantu cultures, were removed from the continent’s East and West coasts collectively for ocean vessel transport to the Americas, Middle East or Asia. The major objective of this forced exodus was to expropriate Africa’s resources (human and material), making the Caucasian world rich and creating a permanent, servile race. At this point in the twenty-first century, African people must rebuild a sense of self and culture and invest in resource-optimization and revitalization in order to reverse the ill effects of slavery, racism, colonialism and the resulting decline. To this end, it is worthwhile taking the journey back to the origins of the problem, before looking forward to solutions. Scientific literature generally acknowledges the vicinity of modern-day Tanzania as the birthplace of hominids (ancestors of homo sapiens) and thus, the homeland for modern humans, emergent about 200,000 years ago (Harmon, 2011; Rincon, 2003); however, some research posits the

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modern-day Cameroon area (Barras, 2013) or the Angola-Namibia borderland (Wade, 2009) as a likely site. However, regardless which of the aforementioned sites is opined to be the human homeland, research consensus (according to genetic studies and archeological data) validates the African continent as the place, and (by extension) confirms the earliest humans as being Black people. From whatever origination point (most likely Tanzania or some other relatively nearby East African location), humans eventually dispersed to all other parts of the continent. Researchers say that small bands of these early humans steadily migrated out of Africa at least 60,000 years ago to eventually populate Asia, Europe and the rest of the globe; some also point to an earlier exodus time at approximately 125,000 years ago (Harmon, 2011). Though all humans (irrespective of today’s racial and ethnic classifications) genetically descended from early Africans, the discussion focus in this work centers around the current networking and bonding efforts of the descendants of Africans who did not migrate out of the continent 125,000 years ago; these people represent Africa in the mind’s eye of most contemporary humans. Africa has a vast number of languages, estimated at approximately 2,000, with each tongue being connected to a particular and distinct people (Heine & Nurse, 2000, p.1). A major, historical weakness there was (and still is) tribalism (exacerbated by an overkill of languages), which led to mistrust, animosity, jealousies, endless squabbles amongst nations and eventually continual inter-ethnic friction; additionally, migrations— induced by wars and environmental changes (volcano explosions, drought, desertification, etc.)—over hundreds of centuries, pushed new peoples into the territorial spaces of others, leading to increased ethnic conflicts, hatred and violence over philosophies and resources (food, water, land, etc.). Prisoners of war and kidnap victims were taken captive and sold as slaves by rival (enemy) groups (Wilson & Ayerst, 1976, p. 71); some were eventually absorbed into rival ethnicities. A Pan-Africanist perspective and analysis, that is, a position and philosophy promoting cooperation and a common history/destiny amongst people of African descent, irrespective of ethnicity and geographical residence, attempts to network the stakeholders of Africa’s future. Actually, because of the enormity and scope of the African slave trade in dispersing millions of people over a 1000-plus year period, Black people, whether residing in Africa or somewhere in the associated Diaspora, have scattered bloodline relatives (who are unknown to them) living in various parts of the world. The term Diaspora (as applied to Africa) is used to collectively denote Black populations living outside of Africa, particularly those whose

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current geography is a resulting byproduct of the slave trade of centuries past. The historical African slave trade is the basic conduit that launched the perspective prism for the term “African Diaspora”; prior to the 1960s, the term was used largely to collectively group people currently living in the Americas, Caribbean, Middle East, and Europe who trace their ancestral entry there to enslaved people forcibly transported from Africa. Today, the context of discussing the African Diaspora has expanded to include Africans who voluntarily migrated to non-African nations a halfcentury ago, especially those taking up residence in the US, Canada and the EU (European Union). Unfortunately, in these ancient times, the spirit of Pan-Africanism (Black pan-cultural appreciation and unity) didn’t exist; thus, most groups could potentially be seen or perceived as the enemy of another. An important note here is the fact that in centuries past, ethnic groups (not just in Africa, but across the globe) did not generally see other ethnic groups who were of similar phenotype as necessarily being the same people; thus, a Mandingo was not a Maasai, though both are African, any more than a Frenchman was an Italian, though both are European. Therefore, regarding African participation in the capture and sale of slaves, most did not sell their own people into slavery but sold mainly foreigners, that is, their perceived enemies. Most languages, across continents and cultures, historically regarded words for “foreigner” as synonyms for “enemy”; hence, mgeni (mmm-gay-nee), KiSwahili for “visitor,” also means “stranger”. In the Biblical context, neighbor, near (neigh) + farmer (bor), was actually reserved for a familiar person or trusted friend, not just any fellow human encountered near one’s home, as is promoted today. Ironically, Arabs and Europeans, despite having internal squabbles between and amongst themselves, all agreed that Black people (Africans) were a slave race by divine edict, while African ethnicities generally saw each other as dissimilar strangers. John Speke, 19th-century British explorer of Africa and namesake for Speke’s Gazelle (a type of EastCentral African antelope), advocated the Curse of Ham Theory—the conjecture that Blacks, as progeny of the Biblical Noah’s son Ham (a Caucasian), are cursed as perpetual slaves by God— and also founded the Hamitic Hypothesis, the notion that all civilization and culture in Central Africa were introduced by offshoot, sharper-featured, Caucasian tribes from Ethiopia (descendants of one of Ham’s progeny), for example Tutsis and Wanyamwezi, thus denoting “a people who are deemed more intelligent and civilized than the surrounding, native Negroids” (Garrett, 1997; East African Girl, 2012).

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Fifteen hundred years ago Arabs came to Africa looking for material resources and business opportunities to supply their customer/clientele markets and needs, mainly in Arabic-speaking, Middle Eastern, and Asian nations; they sought: ivory (elephant tusks); male slaves as tusk “donkeys”; eunuchs to serve as harem guards, soldiers or homosexual toys (Levi, 2010); women as concubines (sex slaves); and children as pedophilic commodities and eventual plug-ins to aforementioned adult duties (Stuart-Mogg, 2010, pp. 24–25). Five hundred years ago Europeans also came for resources: natural materials such as ivory (for piano keys, combs, billiard balls, dominoes and other products), gold, spices, and timber, but mainly adult slaves to build new colonies (US, Brazil, Haiti, Jamaica, etc.) and maintain associated agricultural plantations, and children as future breeders of more laborers. Both groups warred and collaborated with each other in the process of acquiring Africa’s resources, mainly slaves and ivory (Conniff, 1987). Some African kingdoms (e.g., Wanyamwezi, Yao, Fulani, Ashanti, and Dahomey, just to name a few) secured ivory and slaves for sale to Arabs and Europeans in exchange for rum, guns, cloth, beads and other trinkets, thereby making Africa vulnerable to centuries of exploitation, civil collapse, and resource mismanagement. Caucasian literature and race theories denoting Africa and Africans as slaves by divine edict, and as evil, savage, ugly, and childlike, have worked in tandem with apartheid and other efforts to subjugate Blacks as inferiors vis-à-vis White society (Hood, 1994, pp. 9–10; Keane, 1995, pp. 13–14). For example, Leviticus 21:18 (KJV) points out that those with flat noses (common Black physical features) are unworthy and unwelcome in the sight and presence of God. The slave trade (European and Arab) transported millions of Blacks, primarily peoples of Bantu linguistic and cultural heritage, from Africa across the globe (via the Atlantic and Indian Oceans) to the Americas, the Caribbean, Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Famous Africa explorer David Livingstone estimated that only one in five persons (20 percent) survived the interior capture point-to-coast trek process due to horrendous conditions of squalor, hunger, disease, fatigue, beatings, and other maladies (Conniff, 1987). Whole territories had been significantly depopulated due to slave capture-and-removal operations without even a full population recovery today, as in present-day Chad and the Central African Republic; the ivory trade was a major factor in this decimation. Ivory and slaves were inseparable; for every tusk, there was to be the capture/purchase of one African slave as a transport “donkey”. Africans, chained by goree sticks (forked neck harnesses) in a caravan, would carry

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tusks (weighing 65 lbs. on average) along an interior-to-coast trek, a distance sometimes extending from 300 to 1000 miles. Most of the bearers died of malnutrition and exhaustion-related illnesses by journey’s end. Henry Morton Stanley, 19th-century Anglo-American explorer, once wrote that every pound of ivory “has cost the life of one man, woman, or child” in Africa (Conniff, 1987). The ivory trade’s toll on human life was massive. In the late 1890s, for example, Pratt, Read, & Co. (a major ivoryproduct manufacturer from Deep River, CT) alone was cutting 12,000 pounds of ivory monthly to supply what amounted to national piano mania in the United States (Conniff, 1987); using the above equation, 12,000 Africans would have perished each month to supply that company’s ivory cache. Many African leaders (e.g., Mwinyi Dugumbi; Bwana Nzige; Mirambo; Mtagamoyo) from varying groups and kingdoms, and their cronies (particularly African, mercenary slaving gangs known as ruga ruga) were happy to sell off lots of people to Arabs and Europeans in exchange for guns, worthless beads, new trade hook-ups, and the promise of special favors (Smith, 2009). These traded or enslaved persons included: 1) captured people from rival or militarily weaker ethnic groups; 2) community members who were disliked (uppity family members, dissidents, criminals, and the trifling); and 3) debt-payoff pawns. African involvement was intricate and very significant; this participation ranged in scope and took many forms: 1) capturing others; 2) providing canoes to slavers for transport through interior waterways (Farrant, 1975, p. 83); 3) allowing territorial passage of slave caravans; and 4) providing armed security details for caravans, just to name a few. However, not all African nations participated in the slave network. Some fought against the slavers; subsequently, non-participating groups always had to defend themselves against slavers. Conflict, chaos and vicious brutality always loomed around the corner as a common occurrence, making large spaces in Africa probable areas for one to be captured either by slavers or groups participating in the slaving network (Farrant, 1975, p. 125). Recall an 1882 encounter and conversation in the East African interior by British missionary, explorer and mariner Mr. Alfred Swann with one of the headmen for Hamed bin Muhammed’s slave caravan. Hamed bin Muhammed (a Black Arab), nicknamed and infamously known as Tippu Tip, was a ruthless slave trader, plunderer and mass murderer. This headman encountered by Swann could have been an Arab or a Black man—the text account does not say which, in this instance, though many in such a capacity were Islamic Blacks who identified themselves as Arabs and subscribed to the notion that Africans are naturally inferior and

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servile. At the time, Swann was on expedition and business, courtesy of the London Missionary Society; the conversation epitomizes a dialogue between two colonialists and businessmen—one, a Christian, and the other, a Muslim. In this quotation excerpt, the encounter went as follows: As they filed past, we noticed many chained by the neck. Others had their necks fastened at the forks of poles about six feet long, the ends of which were supported by the men who preceded them. The women, who were as numerous as the men, carried babies on their backs in addition to a tusk of ivory or other burden on their heads. They looked at us with suspicion and fear, having been told, as we subsequently ascertained, that white men always desired to release slaves in order to eat their flesh, like the Upper Congo cannibals. It is difficult adequately to describe the filthy state of their bodies; in many instances, not only scarred by the cut of a chikote (raw-hide whip) … but feet and shoulders were a mass of sores, made more painful by the swarms of flies which followed the march and lived on the flowing blood. They presented a moving picture of utter misery, and one could not help wondering how any of them had survived the long trek from the Upper Congo, at least a 1,000 miles distant … The headmen in charge were most polite to us, as they passed our camp … Addressing one, I pointed out that many of the slaves were unfit to carry loads. To this he smilingly replied: “They have no choice! They must go, or die!” “Are all these slaves destined for Zanzibar?” (says Swann) “Most of them, the remainder will stay at the coast.” (says the Arab) “Have you lost many on the road?” (says Swann) “Yes! Numbers have died of hunger!” (says the Arab) “Any run away?” (says Swann) “No, they are too well guarded. Only those who become possessed with the devil try to escape; there is nowhere they could run to if they should go.” (says the Arab) “What do you do when they become too ill to travel?” (says Swann) “Spear them at once! … For if we did not, others would pretend they were ill in order to avoid carrying their loads. No! We never leave them alive on the road; they all know our custom.” (says the Arab) “I see women carrying not only a child on their backs, but, in addition, a tusk of ivory or other burden on their heads. What do you do in their case when they become too weak to carry both child and ivory? Who carries the ivory?” (says Swann) “She does! We cannot leave valuable ivory on the road. We spear the child and make her burden lighter. (says the Arab) Ivory first, child afterwards!” Swann raged: “Ivory! Always ivory! What a curse the elephant has been to Africans. By himself, the slave did not pay to transport; but, plus ivory he was a paying game.” (Meredith, 2001, pp. 84–85)

The conversation (appearing in numerous books on the East African slave trade) underscores the fact that Africa was (and was viewed as) ripe for the taking by outsiders/interlopers having varied interests there. Arabs and Europeans warred and collaborated with each other in the process of

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acquiring ivory, slaves and other African resources. European enslavement of the African ended in the mid-19th century, while the majority of the Arab trade fizzled out during the early-20th century. Afterwards, legal African servitude was replaced with colonialism and/or apartheid until the 1960s; however, White-minority rule and associated, legal apartheid remained in Zimbabwe and South Africa until 1980 and the early 1990s, respectively. Resources, both human and material, were drained; vast, natural wealth and resources (diamonds, oil, coltan, uranium, just to name a few) position Africa to be deemed as ripe for siege and conquest, today no less than yesterday. As a consequence of colonial exploitation and administrative ineptness and resource abuse by indigenous leadership, the continent is in a state of rebuilding.

Pan-Africanism: Issues and Initiatives Long ago, Africa and its peoples created and introduced the world to the basic disciplines of human knowledge: mathematics, medicine, logic, ethics, advanced architecture, etc. (Katembo, B., 2012, p. 1); today, its associated civilizations have fallen in productivity (economic and technical), but can be retooled and rebuilt, as some bright spots like Rwanda, Botswana, and Namibia currently demonstrate. All civilizations reach levels of peaks and valleys, with Africa being no exception. There are, however, numerous bright spots taking place in Africa, with the following as examples: development of the East African Community (EAC), a geopolitical confederation of five nations (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi) sharing ideas, resources, language and culture; manufacture and testing of an electric car at Makerere University (Uganda) made from use of local/indigenous technology and materials in 2011 (Kavuma, 2011); continued research at Makerere University on using local Ugandan mosquito-eating plants as a tool to reduce malaria-infection levels (Womakuyu, 2010); good governance (resource management; administration) in Botswana; and positive economic growth and development in post-genocide Rwanda. In today’s integrated, global and postcolonial world, African people (on the continent and in the Diaspora) must explore new strategies for empowerment and rethink old ones. Slavery (1500 years prior to and through the early-20th century) and colonization (late-19th century–1960s) have socialized significant sectors of Black people toward victimization, poor self-image, and counterproductive views like Africa is a savage place, having contributed little to the progress of humanity and civilization. Treatment and therapy are needed as cures for these social maladies in parallel to the continued vigilance and

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push-back efforts against systemic racism, particularly as noted within the United States socio-cultural landscape. Some additional effects of these ailments on Continental Africans and African Americans are: poor management skills regarding the running of institutions, for example, HBCUs; repressive African governments; perpetual war, political/economic decay, chaos and famine in numerous African countries (e.g., Zimbabwe); slave mentality; lack of desire toward academics and self-drive in general; victimization mindset; destruction of root culture; inter-group hostility and curmudgeonly attitudes; dysfunctional family structures (absentee fathers; poor parenting); tension-filled male–female relationships; overall noncompetitiveness within a robust society except in the arenas of entertainment (music and sports); and self-rejection of African physical features (Fihlani, 2013; Moore, 2009), for example the international craze by Black women to buy and use skin-lightening creams (Msasanuri, 2009). Unless the aforementioned ailments are corrected, the global vulnerability of Black people to oppression, racism and social decay will intensify.

Resources: Management and Mismanagement Today, as a result of the damage done by the slave trade (European and Arab), colonialism and wars, and the self-infliction of poor leadership and resource mismanagement, Africa (though rich in natural resources) has fallen from its pinnacle and ancient greatness to a level of impoverishment, political fragility and economic instability … a continent gripped (and depicted in media) by war, famine, tribalism and corrupt brutal governments which egregiously abuse and squander human capital and physical materials. African people (and the African continent as a geopolitical entity) must harness, cultivate and wisely use resources for survival. Resources are tools which assist in the fruition and/or completion of any initiative. They may be categorized as hard (touchable, e.g., minerals, water, land, technological innovations, money, etc.) or soft (nontouchable, e.g., problem-solving/analysis, management skills, language, intuitive vision, culture, technology, etc.). In Africa’s case, resources are vast and abundant, particularly natural (hard) resources, though most must be better cultivated and better managed to optimize benefit to the Continent’s people (both in Africa and in the Diaspora). Africa, as a metaphor and as single, conceptual resource entity, basically represents the fabled King Solomon’s Mines; it is from this resource treasure that much of the world depends for development and sustenance. While Africa’s sociopolitical issues independently affect poverty and poverty reduction, it is easiest to see their impact when we speak about the resource dilemma.

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Resource endowments—such as coltan, diamonds, oil, gas, and hardwoods —can become a source for financial mismanagement in the face of the political incentives and policy failures they generate (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2004). In these circumstances, policy failure is the prime cause of the underperformance of the resource-abundant countries (Lal & Myint, 1996). Since these resources are commonly owned by the state, it is incumbent upon the government to decide the extraction level, timeframe and expenditure of the rents. This government monopoly gives the governments the privilege to maximize the profits at the expense of the proletariat. It is easy to see that some governments would wish to benefit economically and politically from the resource as quickly as possible, which leads to over-extraction and short-term policymaking. Furthermore, the wealth these resources produce for the state heightens political competition, and the ruling party may well be driven to use resource rents to maintain and expand its influence. Offering public-sector contracts and employment is one of the key patronage mechanisms available in such states, and there is evidence that resource-rich countries with stagnant economies have an over-expanded state (Auty, 1998). For instance, in copper-rich Zambia, between 1966 and 1980, the average yearly growth rate in public sector employment was 7.2 percent, while private employment on average contracted by 6.2 percent each year How the government chooses to invest and spend resource rents is often influenced by the quality of their state institutions. Institutions that are competent, transparent and accountable are able to manage resource rents in a manner that is separate from patrimonial practices, and they are allocated according to rational and independent criteria. Even as poverty increased, President Chiluba’s illicit earnings, for instance, were funneled through non-transparent, “secret” (security and presidential) accounts that profited from Zambia’s state-owned copper mines. On the other hand, Botswana’s success in managing its diamond wealth has been attributed to its “good governance” and, in particular, its stable institutions (Handley et al., 2009). In particular, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, market-friendly policies and regulatory frameworks, and effective anticorruption measures have had the most impact. Generally, then, poor governance, rights abuse, corruption, clientelism and other “informal” practices combine with structural constraints to generate and maintain poverty. They also make it difficult for people to initiate and carry through reforms that would improve their livelihoods. It is for this reason that Western development specialists tackle poverty on two levels: at one level by attempting to strengthen economic development and growth, and at the

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other by improving local and national governance. Both strategies focus on putting into place or reforming state and social institutions (Handley et al., 2009).

The Need for a Pan-Africanist Education Education is perhaps the single most important issue facing Africans in 2014 because true education, that is, education based on indigenous African practices and customs, breaks the current cycle of dependence and the lethal consumption of systematic white supremacy and hegemony for future generations. Evidence of the value of supporting education to achieve development is convincing. A more equitable distribution of education correlates with reduced economic poverty and inequality and faster economic growth (Birdsall & Londoño, 1997). Education for girls has positive impacts on women’s empowerment and lowers women’s risk of being poor. It also generates indirect benefits in terms of the health of their infants and children, family nutrition, immunization rates and educational attainment for their children (Bruns, Mingat & Rakotomalala, 2003). It has been found in Africa that education for boys and girls may be the single most effective weapon against HIV/AIDS (Bruns, Mingat & Rakotomalala, 2003). Primary education also contributes to improved natural resource management. Education, especially at the secondary and tertiary levels, is fundamental for the construction of democratic societies and globally competitive economies. In short, education is a powerful instrument for reducing inequality and poverty and for laying the foundations for sustained economic growth, effective institutions and sound governance (Bruns, Mingat & Rakotomalala, 2003). One problem with the global white supremacist educational system is that education itself does not seem to be its focal point. That is, learning the “3 R’s” does not seem to be its true aim. The U.S. educational system is based on a Prussian (German) model, and the aim of that system was to “instill social obedience in the citizens through indoctrination” (Melton, 1988). Evidence that the U.S. system is designed to create such citizens is so clear it is virtually invisible to the eye because minds trained the system are deaf and blind. The U.S. educational system uses a form of “schizophrenic chaos” to ensure it maintains the status quo. It operates under the ultimate control of legislators who are most often entrenched into the fabric of the American aristocracy. In one decade the aristocrats advocate for phonetic approaches in language learning and in another decade they advocate for whole-language approaches. The two approaches to learning oppose one another; the former focuses upon having children

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learn the technical aspects for language acquisition and mastery of concepts while the latter begets acquisition and mastery based on figuring out the meaning of things. It would make sense to teach both simultaneously, but employment maintenance for teachers will be predicated upon “mastery teaching” of one or the other at a given time. Hence, in the time a teacher would need to gain true mastery of either approach, the approach has become irrelevant and they have switched to some other thing. It is important to note that phonetic and whole-language approaches are merely examples of the reigning behavior within the educational system. To take another example, Owen (1985) unveils the duplicitous nature of the system in revealing that the SAT test is only effective when some students score well and others do not. In other words, some failure is mandatory for proper system functioning. Owen’s research reveals that the “correlation between SAT scores and college grades [is] lower than the correlation between weight and height; in other words you would have a better chance of predicting a person's height by looking at his weight than you would of predicting his freshman grades by looking only at his/her SAT scores” (p. 207). While many university admissions offices will claim that SAT’s are only one measure used among many, considering Owen’s findings, why are they still being used at all? Because using them ensures maintenance of the status quo—especially since the tests are periodically changed. Somehow the changes always reify the status quo— the “achievement gap”. Another example of the education system’s audaciously incorrigible behavior is that after decades of attempting to change basic curriculum misnomers, such as the notion that “Christopher Columbus discovered America”, these falsehoods are still being taught in classrooms every day in the US. In sum, maintenance of the status quo is ensured by using pseudo-novelty methods that are proven to be useless, and omissions and commissions that successfully bolster racist claims of white supremacy. The result of such a systematic malady is a schizophrenic system that appears evolutionary but is as regressive as it is guileful.

African Children in the System All children suffer in the so-called educational system. But in the US, African children suffer the most. Many African scholars (from the continent of Africa) are calling for an African-centered Pan-Africanist education that is reminiscent of indigenous African cultural practices and beliefs (Akoto, 1992; Hilliard, 1998). Over the past 20 years or so, there

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have been lively debates about whether or not indigenous African education existed (Howe, 1998; Lefkowitz, 1997). Often at the center of such debates was a dehumanizing “question” about whether or not Islam and the West brought the only “true education” to Africa. Dignifying such blatant ignorance and racism with a response is not the goal here. Suffice it to say that without education one cannot produce such productive humans as Kandake, Prempeh, Hannibal, Amenemhat, Imhotep, Nzingha, Shptabra (and countless others). Without education, one could not have built the University of IpetIsut, University at Sankore at Timbuktu (which was the world learning center of its time). Without education, it would not be possible to sustain and develop the world’s oldest people. Finally, there is a reason why famous philosophers such as Socrates believed it to be to his benefit to be taught by African teachers (Asante, 2000). The question of whether or not indigenous African education existed is not up for debate. It would be like trying to prove that most of the earth’s surface is water to someone who refuses to believe it regardless of evidence. Considering the vestiges of colonialism that remain in Africa, and the all-encompassing presence of worldwide white supremacy (Cress-Welsing, 1991), the education that most African children receive is under the ultimate control of Europeans. Europeans (as a composite group, and especially powerful Europeans) have both historically and in the present-day found it reasonable to question the true humanity of African people (Watkins, 2007). The highly respected European philosopher Hegel captures the essence of white supremacy in his famous 1831 quote: At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical movements in it—that is in its northern part—belong to the Asiatic or European World. Carthage displayed there an important transitionary phase of civilization; but, as a Phoenician colony, it belongs to Asia. Egypt will be considered in reference to the passage of the human mind from its Eastern to its Western phase, but it does not belong to the African Spirit. What we properly understand by Africa, is the Unhistorical, Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature, and which had to be presented here only as on the threshold of the World's History. (Hegel, 1956, p. 99)

While the boldness is sometimes lessened, the ideas have remained the same as represented in 2007 by Nobel Prize-winning scientist James Watson, who stated that “[I am] inherently gloomy about the prospect of Africa [because] all our social policies are based on the fact that their intelligence is the same as ours—whereas all the testing says not really”.

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African children worldwide are under the ultimate control of a system that has a Hegelian and “Watsonian” consciousness. In that system, African children learn virtually no positive things about themselves as a Pan-African group. As a result, many of them develop negative ideas about themselves (Wilson, 1993) and wish to be seen as being different from their group. Hence, the goals of Pan-Africanism are made extraordinarily more difficult. That is, African people themselves are being reared from the beginning of their lives to be in the first line of defense against Pan-Africanism.

The Critical Need for Recovery and Rescue: Precursors to Pan-Africanism Pan-Africanism refers to the fact that the connection Africans have to one another is both historically and culturally destined. That is, PanAfricanism argues that all people of African descent are, in fact, Africans. The educational system (informed by white supremacy) has positioned itself as a major competitor to Pan-Africanism by advocating instead that Black children are “Black Americans” or “Jamaican Americans” or “Black Brazilians”, they are the “Hip Hop Generation”, “Youth Culture,” and “Pop Culture”. The aforementioned nomenclatures represent small pieces of the content of white supremacist miseducation. Those small pieces represent larger ideas that relate to dislocated identity and misplaced allegiance. The African youth are miseducated to believe, for example, that they are Jamaican and they should be proud to be Jamaican for whatever reason. Or that they should be a proud Black Brazilian because of their accomplishments in Brazil. The same is true for Africans in the US, Europe, the Caribbean and so forth. A Pan-Africanist sentiment would mean that our youth are taught to have primary allegiance to Africa, not Jamaica, Brazil, and so on. What is required in order to get to the PanAfricanist sentiment is an African-centered education. Offering an African education (as opposed to an African-centered one) would mean using the tools, contents and techniques used by Africans prior to European/Arabic/ Islamic/Christian/Asian invasions to teach and reach African children. An African “centered” education takes those tools, contents and techniques into account, but also adds other critical elements such as Black Nationalist sentiment, re-Africanization (Sankofa), and culturally relevant pedagogy (Shockley, 2007; Shockley & Frederick, 2010). It makes sense that when Africans educated themselves prior to invasions, they did so without having to consider outsider/invader cultural influence. When Black Nationalism, the re-Africanization movement and

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culturally relevant pedagogy are attached to indigenous African cultural offerings, African-centered education is produced. African-centered education is the act of placing the needs and interests of the Black community at the center of the Black child’s education. More specifically, the practice of African-centered education requires the internalization of the “constructs” of African-centered education such as recognizing the African identity of the Black child, internalizing Pan-Africanism, adopting African culture into one’s life; it is also the “total use of method to effect the psychological, cultural, and economic conditions in the Black community” through education (Asante, 1998, p. 4) and it is the use of “culturally relevant pedagogy” in order to effectively teach and reach Black children (Ladson-Billings, 2001). Asante (1998) argues that: [African-centered education] seeks to understand [phenomena] by beginning all analysis from the African person as human agent. In classes, it means that the African American child must be connected, grounded to information presented in the same way White children are grounded when we discuss literature, history, mathematics, and science. Teachers who do not know this information with respect to Africans must seek it out from those who do know it. Afrocentrists do not take anything away from White history, except its aggressive urge to pose as universal. (p. 16)

As stated before, African-centered education consists of the (seven) constructs and is almost a “minimum prerequisite” for what many Africancentered educationists call “re-Africanization”.

Re-Africanization Re-Africanization is a conscious attempt to reconnect with the African past. Akoto and Akoto (1999) suggest that the African person (child) must rediscover his/her African self, redefine what it means to be a person within the African Diaspora, and participate in the revitalization of the African world (p. 8). Re-Africanization eventuates in nation-building—the literal attempt to build the Black community via the creation of functioning families. Added together, an African-centered education requires that educators consume the constructs of African-centered education, and understand that the approach affects the whole child. It is not just about academics, and within classrooms everything that is presented to children must be relevant to the needs of the community; that is, there is no knowledge for knowledge’s sake. Finally, the overall purpose of education (from an African-centered perspective) is to bring African children to the point of replacing colonial/enslaved ideas about

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identity with African-derived notions. Organic replacements would mark significant advancements in the mission to recover and rescue African people and their progeny. And again, such replacements are precursors to imbuing African children with a Pan-Africanist sentiment. In an education sense, Pan-Africanism is less a practice than it is a belief and/or a sentiment. From an African-centered perspective, a teacher teaches “who s/he is”. In other words, documents such as curricula and other pedagogical materials are almost unimportant compared to the schema of understandings already present within the teacher (Shockley, Bond & Rollins, 2008). In other words, what we have begun to understand in teacher education is that the kindergarten through baccalaureate degree experience, in addition to the other (white supremacist-based) learnings that a person undertakes in life, are the powerful forces that determine what the teacher will transmit to students in a classroom. So in that sense, a sentiment of “Pan-Europeanism” is transmitted to all students all day every day in virtually every place in the world (often under the euphemisms “the West”, “Capitalism”, “American”, “progressive”, “modern”, “English”, etc.). Since white supremacy operates via rhetorical ethics and dishonesty, Pan-Europeanist sentiment becomes ideological, for example, with statements such as “we are all the same”, or “race does not matter”. When such statements are made, the reality of difference and the fact that race does, in fact, matter become rhetoric which must not be spoken of, ever. Changing what students get in classrooms requires that the people teaching them change their mental schemata. Hence, PanAfricanist sentiment will only become normalized among a critical mass of Africans across the globe when the teachers of African children change their schemata from being Eurocentric to being African-centered. Africancenteredness among a critical mass of people resolves the identity crisis. Once that crisis is resolved, the oneness of who the African people are becomes apparent. For Black children worldwide, the critical element needing to be extracted from Pan-Africanism relates to culture. What has become necessary is that Africans reconnect with who we were the last time we were sovereign (unencumbered by outside influence). Pan-Africanist goals will not be reached until more intentional effort goes into changing what is happening in schools. Unfortunately, many people overlook the critical need for a deeper understanding of what education is. As Anwisye (2009) explains, Education is more than the 3Rs. Simply being employment- or entrepreneurship-ready, drug-free, gang-free, unpregnant out-of-wedlock, and “proud of our heritage”, is not enough. Education is a lifelong womb-

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Pan-Africanist sovereignty-based education would mean learning for a purpose. Breasted (1937) clarifies that African education has always been about learning with a purpose: Learning possessed but one aspect for the Egyptian, namely: its practical usefulness. An ideal pleasure in the search for truth, the pursuit of science for its own sake, were unknown to him. The learned equipment was an advantage which lifted a youth above all other classes … and for that reason, the boy must be early put into the school and diligently kept to his tasks. (pp. 98–99)

Hence, indigenously speaking, for Africans as a composite group, learning has been about preparing young people to “take control of the psychic and physical spaces that [Africans] call their own” (Akoto, 1999). In many cases, young people were taught to do things as they were in the midst of doing them and/or when they had a responsibility for doing something. Being taught was not an exercise in memorization, but instead planning for life lessons and learning how to do practical things. Chants, songs, dances, call-and-response, storytelling, plays (and the like) have (indigenously) been important methods for teaching and reaching the children. Enculturation is critical and happens systematically. One does not simply raise children. There are traditions (including chants, songs, etc.) that are important in the enculturation process. Fu-Kiau (2001) pointed out that many of the processes used to work with children even have names, such as “Kindezi”, which refers to the Bantu art of babysitting. A critical aspect of educating youth comes via rites of passage and initiation. Mbiti (1992) reveals how Africans enculturated youth: [The] initiates rehearse adult life: boys go hunting with miniature bows and arrows, and girls cut small twigs (which symbolize firewood for the home). Late the same day the original operators at the first ceremony spit beer over the candidates to bless them, and the children return to their “home” in the bush. Here they must overcome objects that are placed before them. Each boy is given a special stick, which he must retain; and that evening a dance for the initiates takes place. With their special sticks the boys perform symbolic sexual acts upon the girls; and on the following day, they are examined on the meaning of riddles and puzzles carved on the sticks or drawn on sand. Afterwards the boys fetch sugar-canes, this being

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a form of permitted “stealing” acceptable and necessary for that particular purpose; and with the sugar-cane they make beer for their incumbents. (p. 119)

What would be optimal is re-Africanization that leads to Africancentered education schools, which foster a sense of Pan-Africanism in African youth. It is telling that one of the first questions would be “how do we gain access to your youth?” Who does have access to African youth? The answer is whoever has been able to indoctrinate them away from PanAfricanism and African-centeredness. African people have a major predicament: the adults do not have ready access to the youth because in the US the system of white supremacy has intentionally created that circumstance. In places such as Africa and the Caribbean, the white supremacist system may not control the daily happenings so closely, but the daily happenings are indeed monitored and controlled financially. Because the so-called education system and the media have created (within the body of African youth) white supremacist Pan-Europeanists, efforts to engage the youth in African-centered/Pan-Africanist ways are quite difficult. If accessing them is difficult, imagine the difficulty of attempting to use the formal educational system to teach them in those ways. The system has responded to 1960’s types of efforts to engage African youth by upping its mental indoctrination campaign so much so that (as stated before) the first line of defense against Pan-Africanism is the youth (and many African adults) themselves. Considering the realities, perhaps the best course of action is the kind of steps that are being taken by African-centered school leaders across the country. They are implementing rites of passage programs and initiation rituals outside of formal school hours. Another solution that many Africans are now considering is African community home schools. Community home schools are established via understandings between parents within a given community. One or more of the parents (often with an education background) organizes educational experiences for the children. Those experiences are based upon African culture and organizing principles. The parents in the community pay fees to the teacher who is organizing the experiences for the children. Adults in such communities are continuously engaged in a process of re-Africanization. One of the reasons why African community schools are being established is because African-centered schools are quite difficult to maintain. In order to maintain a school that goes against the European world cultural thrust, the community must support it. It is difficult to imagine how a community under pressure from the system to assimilate would maintain its composure enough to support institutions/missions that

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every day they are being taught to separate from. Hence, African community home schools have become the best option in the quest to eventually get to Pan-Africanism.

Impediments to Pan-Africanism Tribalism A “tribe is thought of as a group of people who are descended from common ancestors and ruled by a hereditary ‘chief’, who share a single culture (including, in particular, language and religion), and who live in a well-defined geographical region” (Appiah, 1999, p. 703). Tribalism as the primary cause for lack of economic progress in Africa underestimates the complexity of African societies and politics and diverts policymakers’ attention from the real causes of underdevelopment. The African reality has been defined by the ideology of tribalism. However, European colonialism, like any epoch, is responsible for bringing the new order of reconstructing this African reality. Alas, literature shows that Arab and African ethnic groups were mixed since the 8th century. As Mafeje notes: In many instances the colonial authorities helped to create the things called “tribes,” in the sense of political communities; this process coincided with and was helped along by the anthropologists' preoccupation with “tribes.” This provided the material as well as the ideological base of what is now called “tribalism.” (Mafeje, 1971, p. 254).

The tradition of tribalism in Africa has been fostered by anthropologists as the tradition of anthropology is still “tribalistic”, and with it goes a tendency to make the tribe and the tribesman the startingpoint of analysis (Gluckman, 1961, p. 69). Tribalism has now become a means through which the African political leadership is conducted and a powerful tool for political mass mobilization (see Paglia, 2014). This is yet another instance of class formation among Africans, as has been illustrated by tribes such as the Baganda of Uganda, the Kikuyu of Kenya, and the Ibo of Nigeria. These are just a glimpse of the scenario. It is evident that the former colonial masters in Africa skillfully surrendered political power while maintaining economic control. Africa, therefore, became politically independent while still being economically in bondage (Deng, 1998, p. 8).

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Shortsightedness Current trends show Africa still struggles with food insecurity as a recurring challenge. African nations have fertile soil; and in spite of the global warming trends that make the climate unreliable, still many African leaders have been shortsighted in this regard. It would make more sense for African leaders to invest in agriculture to improve food security. The spending on military and armaments has been unprecedented in African politics for over four decades, creating a sort of African arms race. Uganda’s expenditure on arms was more than double that of Kenya’s in 2011, with a new global arms expert report showing that Uganda spent US$1.02 billion (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). This amount would have been adequate to upgrade all the research hospitals in the EAC, and supply all the schools with resources needed in Uganda and Burundi for a decade.

Poor Vision (Administration and Leadership) African administrative and leadership problems are as complex as they are multifaceted. Their resolution ultimately depends on the capacity of people who understand what kinds of leaders they should elect into office and what is happening around them, at all levels from the village chiefs to national prime ministers or presidents. The populace must possess an enhanced ability to be able to take appropriate steps towards electing leaders with great moral standards and economic discipline as well as inclusiveness that addresses the Pan-African ideology. But, especially at the higher levels of leadership, Africa must take a leaf out of the books of other nations (Damiba, 1998, p. 2). Africans have been governed by a set of ideologies including proverbs. For example, the proverb of the people of Lesotho, “A chief is a chief by the people” exemplifies the principles the people can apply in electing chiefs. The same principle should apply in electing the heads of states. Thus, all the people of the nation must agree, not one tribe. As Damiba notes: Unlike other parts of the world, Africa at present has no high-level think tank, no institute or a centre that engages in long-range studies, policy formulation and analysis. As a first step, therefore, the Forum should initiate action and extend assistance and collaborative efforts towards creating an African Centre or Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies. (Damiba, 1998, p. 2).

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Poverty It is not disputable that Africa is the poorest continent in the world (Ebegbulem, 2012, p. 221). The food and nutrition situation in Africa calls for immediate new and practical policy initiatives. Some of the issues African leaders would engage in would include setting up of farms at various agro-ecological locations concentrating on a few major crops: staples, roots/tubers, fruits/vegetables, medicinal plants, animals and cash crops. On average, less than 60 percent of African adults can read and write with understanding. Despite improvements in universal primary education enrollments, countries in Africa still face numerous education challenges. There are a number of reasons why educational levels are low; for instance, Africa has many under-15-year-olds and governments are therefore faced with the challenge of educating increasing numbers of school-aged children within tightly constrained budgets. In poorer households, education is not a priority since the families are preoccupied with searching for food and shelter for survival. In such situations, child labor is rife and children are kept out of school to work; in cases of extreme poverty, children may contribute up to 40 percent of the family income. These and other constraints mean families cannot afford, or do not prioritize, schooling. In addition, foreign aid contributes heavily to various economic indicators in numerous nations as illustrated in Table 1. Table 1. Africa’s Aid-Dependency Selected Country

GNI Capital Imports (Gross National Formation Income) Ethiopia 23 108 48 Ghana 15 55 24 Mauritania 11 55 … Mozambique 21 101 45 Sierra Leone 34 211 87 Tanzania 16 84 53 Uganda 17 75 49 Note: Above figures in millions of USD. Source: World Bank, 2006, database; data cited in Killick and Foster (2006).

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Inept Conflict Management Strategies A pervasive atmosphere of domestic unrest, tensions and conflicts have been the greatest political challenge to Africa. The conflicts, which have often led to civil wars, have always resulted from border problems or the activities of dissidents or rebel groups across the colonial boundaries. Modern African leaders have ignored their fundamental obligation to resolve conflicts peacefully. A chronic state of instability resulting from these internal and regional tensions and conflicts has increasingly marginalized Africa’s position in the geopolitical dynamics of the global scene. This marginalization has caused African states to be labeled as “Failed States”. Revisiting her own proverbs, Africa can make use of the proverb from the people of Lesotho which states that “a bull gets over-powered by a multitude”, emphasizing the importance of unity.

Weak States and Economic Institutions African nations are considered to be weak in economic institutions. This condition has led to the dilemma of weak states. African national boundaries are largely a result of colonial heritage, laid down with little regard for the local residents’ identities. This history has resulted in countries that are marked by ethnic and religious diversity, which has been transformed into ethnic and religious conflict (at local or national level) by unscrupulous politicians, resource constraints, and discrimination (Handley et al., 2009). Politics is not all that matters. This equilibrium is further reinforced by systemic dysfunctions that may not be the consequence of any strategic design or the outcome of elite preferences (they might be termed “dysfunctions by default”). This is why it is important to harness the musical heritage so that these peoples can share their cultural arts and help promote cohesion among them and thereby reduce conflicts. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 makes a good point of departure. Other areas with similar conflicts include South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur and northern Nigeria. In many countries, large territories are outside the control of the central government, and warlords rule through force of arms, which they often acquire by selling “blood” resources (diamonds, timber, etc.). This is the case today in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in the previous decade in several West African countries. In other words, in many African states, the process of nation-building is incomplete. Moreover, legalrational state institutions are weak in countries where they compete with

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vibrant informal institutions or where they are deliberately emasculated to serve a political or economic agenda (Medard, 1982, pp. 162–192). There are in fact few political or economic incentives for the elites to relinquish control to formal state structures and institutions, and this, in turn, stalls economic development.

Throwing Off the Chains Aesthetics and Technology The dismal state of Africa and the overall condition of its children globally are direct testaments to our “paying the price” for Black involvement in the slave trade, corrupt leadership, and horrendous mismanagement of resources. But today (despite the past), African people have a moral obligation to work diligently at throwing off the mental chains of white supremacy that paralyze Africa and keep its offspring from unleashing their optimal potential amongst the family of humanity. Modern technology intertwined with culture must be used to reposition and optimize the continent’s leverage in the 21st century; additionally, amongst itself and the general populace, national leadership must encourage resourcefulness, integrity, innovation, and management acumen as complements to cultural appreciation in fostering societal progress. As all progressive societies and peoples do, culture, associated outlook and applications are modernized and updated, thus retaining the good aspects from past eras and discarding outdated/unproductive beliefs and concepts. The transition of the Norse lands, home to the Vikings (legendary, seafaring marauders), into modern, Scandinavian nations like Finland and Norway, considered to be peaceful, industrial democracies and experts in high-tech cruise ship-building, offer instructive examples. The visual aesthetic (fractal geometry, use of colors, etc.) of traditional culture can and should be incorporated into the framework of modern African imagery, artwork (such as sculptures, carvings and textiles) and architecture. Of particular note, fractal geometry (the repetition of similar patterns at ever-diminishing scales), featured in such traditional crafts/art as the Agaseke baskets made in Rwanda and Burundi, gives shape to myriad forms of human expression in African culture (Moraga, 2011, p. 119); for instance, much of African woven/textile art, such as Kente, Kitenge or Kuba, symbolically conveys proverbs, moral/spiritual precepts and/or other aspects of philosophy. The notion among some that “modern (technologically advanced) = European” and “primitive (technologically retarded) = African” must be eradicated. Modernization has no racial or

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ethnic overtone but is a concept that is incorporated into any culture. Technology (product or technique improvement measures) and its uses and applications are not race-specific and can be used by all humans for progress; to think otherwise is conceptually errant. Kenyan post-colonial literature theorist Ngugi wa Thiong’o notes in his novel The River Between that Africans who saw themselves as more Western believe that the geometry of misonge (circular houses in KiSwahili), an indigenous concept, is primitive in comparison to rectangular designs which they associate with Europeans (Zaslavsky, 1999, pp. 161–162). Perhaps the Black Diaspora, in working with Africa and helping to optimize its potential, may do so in part out of cultural ties, common ancestry and pride, but also because we may want to return some day or visit regularly to a well-kept home, the land of our ancestry. The Black Diaspora is Africa in the far corners of its soul, for it is only a collective representation of peoples removed from Africa by time and distance. Black people must rediscover their African selves and use/engage their ancient homeland and a reconnection to it as a resource for themselves. Africa’s labor and the ingenuity of its children permeate the fabric of US society in numerous areas: language/lexicon (e.g. jumbo; safari); crafts (e.g. handcrafted Gullah sweetgrass baskets made and sold across South Carolina and Georgia, or Rwandan Agaseke baskets sold as Macy’s items); food/cooking (e.g. yams, fritters, gumbo, coffee, rice cultivation); music (e.g. conga drum; marimba; jazz); and technology (e.g. mpingo, the primary wood for clarinets and oboes; variolation, the method of smallpox inoculation; coltan, the Congo mineral used to optimize energy-storage via capacitors in electronic devices), to name just a few. In light of this, since life and culture in the land of their birth has been shaped and molded in part by Black hands, African Americans have a duty and responsibility to showcase, cultivate and visibly articulate their heritage (Africa’s presence and essence) in the US and to the world, for example by wearing African (or African-inspired) clothes as part of professional dress (at work, church, and/or business confabs); legal adoption of traditional (indigenous) African names; giving African names to institutions, organizations and initiatives; and promotion of research, seminars and information to facilitate and encourage the use, discovery and mass awareness of Africanisms that exist in the Americas (Katembo, B., 2012, pp. 9–10). African Americans must insist upon and advocate for their cultural equality to be a pillar of a multicultural, multiracial modern US—a virtual country of nations. Essentially, they must use and acknowledge Africa as a present-tense resource for themselves and for the soil on which they

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reside. Branches are an important part of a tree; in parallel, peoples of the African continent and its Diaspora are a key resource whose energies must be interfaced and robustly channeled toward rebuilding their ancestral soul and home, Africa.

Introspection and Cultural Exploration In the United States particularly, Black people have been historically under constant siege, ranging from physical brutality to (socioeconomic) marginalization and discrimination across all aspects of society. Even though significant social progress and civil rights gains, such as voting and public accommodations, have been made over the last half-century through the removal of apartheid laws and numerous efforts to promote multicultural inclusion and democracy, Blacks still face widespread subtle (and not-so-subtle) racial discrimination and inequities in housing, employment, education, capital access (loans; grants), and the judicial system as examples. Long-term disenfranchisement affects the behavior, perspectives, and outlook of the victimized. For the masses of Blacks, socioeconomic marginalization and a poor quality of life overall — extensions (in large part) of the effects of slavery, apartheid, and other forms of systemic racism — are a fact, a seemingly ongoing punishment of varying degrees; in essence, citizenship has not been full despite noted progress. The chronic lingering of these conditions hardens perceptions that Blacks are a downtrodden footstool people who are unable to craft and pursue options and strategies which will curtail group abuse. These described circumstances can be remedied if group efforts were commenced to utilize Africa as a leverage tool and resource. As peoples who were stolen from Africa in the slave trade and then exploited by slave labor to build the Americas’ colonial economies, African Americans (and other Diaspora Africans) have earned the right to simultaneously reside, communicate and participate (in political and economic affairs) between the lands of their birth and current citizenship, and those of their ancestry (Africa); thus, the Diaspora never forfeited being African nor its right to fully participate in that ancestry and in the development of the associated nations. There are numerous ways that the contemporary AfricanAmerican community, the most technologically and economically potent branch of the Diaspora, may heal itself from the shackles of mental colonialism, participate in Africa’s development as a resource and, in turn, enhance its political and economic leverage within the United States. This repair and progress should include two thrusts: introspection and cultural exploration.

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Regarding introspection, the Black community must work hard to change its image (internal and external), views and values, and behavior in areas of deficit and/or negative perceptions (e.g. crime-ridden neighborhoods, low-performing [public] schools, slack work ethic, criminal tendencies, low character and violent behavior [especially among males]). In terms of collective, African American cultural emphasis and cognizance, serious attention has to be devoted to appearance (dress), speech, behavior, and personal/civic responsibility. The negative elements in the Black community, i.e. those characterized by the thug culture label, are unfairly used as an ethos projection for the entire race; hence, being a model citizen is seen as an exception to the rule. As a psychological tactic and tool, image makeover has aims and benefits: to facilitate civility and conflict resolution amongst Black people; to disarm and reduce heightened White aggression against Blacks, particularly in reference to public opinion, law enforcement (police), and armed (White) citizens; to increase confidence within Black circles that African American communities and activities are worthy of residence, resource investment and/or participation; and to minimize negative media assault and portrayal. It should not be viewed as a manifestation of weakness or a surrendering of dignity, but merely as a survival and protection tool. The dominant culture, i.e. the White collective, stereotypes Blacks as a group instead of assessment based on individual action; also, in White-controlled employment sectors, African Americans are positioned to exhibit greater competence than White people to get hired or attain job advancement – a hark back to an old expression, “You have to be twice as good”. All groups should strive to exhibit and encourage model citizenship as a matter of principle, but African Americans must be especially mindful of this aspiration, given the intensity of anti-Black societal bias and resentment. Such assertions seem unfair and are a double standard; however, they are pragmatic responses to current/existing conditions and to the cards that have been dealt. In reality, Blacks are a fraction of the United States’ population (perhaps about 15% as a conservative estimate), so there are associated, inherent disadvantages (power differentials) in not being the majority, particularly in legal justice, physical defense and economic prowess. Not proactively getting a handle on reducing severe negative stereotypical perceptions and media projections, such as being prone to welfare dependence, freeloading, theft, and violent crime, can potentially agitate a genocidal climate against African Americans, particularly Black males. Signs of this morphing siege are manifest in the fact that Black males quickly become the poster kids for home invasion, rape, animal cruelty, domestic abuse, and a host of other social ills as

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White tolerance and support grows for more “tough on crime” legislation, expanded “Stand Your Ground” laws, resource divestment from public schools, racial profiling and “Whitopias” (author Rich Benjamin’s coined term for purposefully-emergent, 21st-century Caucasian towns, cities and communities in the United States) as examples – all of which underscore an open fear, rebuff and dislike of Blacks. Perceptions and (media) portrayals about “supposed” Black dysfunctions (e.g. high crime rates; dismal academic achievement levels) and complaints/grievances (e.g. employment discrimination; an unfair criminal justice system) tend to galvanize and intensify existing White anger toward African Americans; seething escalation (and potentially violent consequences) of this anger may not be as far beneath the surface of the social landscape as some may believe, but merely in remission until the right release-catalyst occurs. The 1994 Hutu slaughter of Tutsis (commonly known as the Rwandan Genocide) and the Nazi German massacre of Jews (World War II era) are grim reminders of horrific, genocide campaigns resulting from group demonization. As a point of emphasis, no image makeover will cure racial discrimination and hatred; however, attitudes and actions toward any specific people or community (whether sourced externally or internally) are significantly shaped by media, i.e. television, radio, Internet and printed literature. Thus, every little bit helps in the efforts to prevent undue backlash and to facilitate positive development, upliftment, and sociocultural parity. The prudent and customized use of Africa as a resource (a key and often overlooked development component) will also enhance group progress in the country (United States). Africa must be a source of spiritual energy, cultural reference and geopolitical leverage for its Diaspora—that is, a re-investment in the collective self. There is a psychological and spiritual upliftment for African Americans to see Africa positively (and thus view themselves and their heritage in a respectful light); therefore, a new consciousness eradicates the notion that their origins started on a slave ship or a plantation. New focuses will emphasize the repair of culture, the synthesis of thoughts and the practices of a civilization; in a customized manner, identity (who they are in the world and how they relate to others), purpose (what a people need to be about), and direction (a way to go about living their lives) are provided for any nation or ethnic-specific people. In addition to cultural appreciation, basic social values (those embedded from cradle to grave), must be emphasized: be of good character; be law-abiding; have integrity; show humanity and kindness to others; develop your spiritual self, path and journey; and be a good steward of the Earth.

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The second aforementioned level of repair (cultural exploration) requires activities and practical do-ables in the context of our current living environment. Here are some initiatives that may, upon reflection and circumstances, prove useful: investigate the use of African fabrics (e.g. Kente) as outfits or clothing accessories for varying occasions; explore African history and art (e.g. carvings, literature); visit African countries; and share African-American culture (e.g. foods and holidays such as Kwanzaa, etc.) with other ethnic groups. Diaspora participation in the life of African nations is important, particularly from the perspective of shaping US–Africa trade relations, so could take the form of African– American political lobby groups that champion African causes on Capitol Hill. Essentially, an expansion of the perspective of one’s current self can come from exploring one’s origin and ancestry. All of these things will widen the perspective and cultural richness of being an African American and inevitably improve overall group leverage and self-concept; thus, positive self-concept and the sharing of positive culture are conduits for bettering relations with others, in that what the Black community brings to the table is elevated. The poisonous effects of slavery have encouraged the US populace, in general, to envision Africa as a place of darkness and incivility, thus contributing to a negative subconscious self-view amongst African Americans. Since America has never respected Africa as a place of civilization, African Americans are not afforded respect in a parallel way as would Japanese-Americans as extensions of Japan, a country known for high culture, development (industrial and economic), and technology. Through the work of the African Diaspora in positively promoting Africa (particularly in reference to African-American actions/initiatives), US citizens of all races and ethnicities are provided with a better appreciation of Africa and its contribution to the country’s growth and emergence; reciprocally, respect for African Americans will grow. Diversity is a strength for the United States in terms of the talent, perspectives, ideas and niche positioning of its ethnic and racial composition. African-American upliftment via Africa (as a unique resource) helps build cultural parity and helps to optimize the US’s human and economic capital, and thus the strength of the country. Black cultural equality is a win-win for all.

Resource Strategies for 21st-Century Africa Africa’s stakeholders must find a way to influence the continent’s future, advocating for its best interests and safeguarding against the forces of evil intent. The empowerment and security of Africa will upgrade the

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leverage (economic and political) of all African people whether they are in the Diaspora or on the continent. Perhaps, the aforementioned (classical) definition of Pan-Africanism, largely crafted in the early-20th century, needs to be tweaked/expanded in application to 21st-century dynamics: Africa must be utilized and envisioned as a multi-level resource amongst its Diaspora peoples. Thus, Pan-Africanism becomes operational and actualized when Africa is harnessed as a resource.

The Competition for Hard Resources Africa was the target prize for European and Arab resource conquest (gold, slaves and ivory) via the respective slave trades in centuries past. The scramble for Africa’s resources continues today with expanded players like the United States, China, Japan and India which quest for modern resources contributing to techno-industrial maintenance, development and growth (e.g. uranium, farmland, coltan, oil and many other products). The United States and China, two titans, competitors and quasi-adversaries, seek to either maintain the status of global superpowers or emerge as one by using the acquisition of Africa’s resources as a catapult. They represent two versions of capitalism (corporate-oriented and state-oriented, respectively) in their race to the top among other ferocious competitors. The scenario is reminiscent of the Old Testament story of Job in which the allegory depicts God and Satan having a conversation (and a contest/game of sorts) over Job, a good man and a mere pawn, to test and sway his loyalty to each, challenging him with a choice of allegiance; their conversation metaphorically represents a dialogue among the powerful regarding the fate and destiny of weak underlings: in the Bible, Job; in the current geopolitical context, Africa. The contest, centering around Job’s endurance level of cruel afflictions induced or allowed by God or Satan, would settle their bet of superiority and one-upmanship. Ironically (according to the story), Job didn’t know from where (or whom) these ordeals had been unleashed, from God or Satan—one good, the other evil—or maybe just two sides of the same coin. In real life, Africa, is the pawn between two giant foes/adversaries (colluding when necessary), each seeking to appear as an angel, while depicting the other as the devil. United States engagement in Africa mainly revolves around conflict management efforts and security issues such as ending violence in the eastern Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan, and combating al-Qaeda; oil and gas, however, are currently the primary trade imports received by the United States from Africa. China’s interests there

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concentrate on the extraction of natural resources. More than 85 percent of China’s imports from Africa consist of petroleum, copper, iron, and other raw materials needed to build the Asian giant’s growing domestic infrastructure and fuel its continued economic growth (Hanauer & Morris, 2014). Vast differences in the China and United States trade figures with Africa also underscore the countries’ divergent priorities. China–Africa trade volumes hit $198.5 billion in 2012; by comparison, the United States–Africa trade in the same year was half that, reaching roughly $100 billion. The United States has made robust strides in 2014 to up its economic game in Africa, showcased by United States President Barack Obama’s two signature Africa initiatives: Power Africa (a $7 billion United States project which aims to improve electric generation in African nations) and Trade Africa (an effort to increase United States exports to five East African countries by 40 percent) (Hanauer & Morris, 2014). China’s two-way trade with Africa has grown by 30 percent annually over the last decade; thus, in 2014, it is now Africa’s largest trading partner, importing largely natural resources. Some of China’s financial and infrastructure interests in Africa seem beneficial (and even necessary) if African nations themselves have a well-crafted strategic plan for using these acquisitions; for example, transport infrastructure (airports, railways, roads, and bridges, etc.), university buildings, and hospitals, to name just a few (Al Jazeera Staff Writer, 2014; Smith, 2012); even the United States’ peacekeeping and security-oriented involvement have merit. However, no matter whether nations come to aid or trade, the resulting interactions must position Africa’s nations to be on the pathway to jumpstart their economies, create Africa-based industries (capable of providing jobs and producing finished-product goods), improve quality of life for the populace, engage in scientific resource management, and organize cities and territories around the optimal use of clean/renewable energy sources. African nations should reprioritize (and focus upon) trade efforts with nations that offer self-sufficiency technologies in vital areas like water management, food security and renewable fuels as exchangeables for replenishable African exports. The use of self-sufficiency technologies, like renewable energy and advanced irrigation techniques, facilitate reduction on fossil fuels and boost food productivity from indigenous sources. Basically, non-replenishable raw materials like gold, diamonds, and other hard/precious minerals need to stay in the ground (as much as possible) to serve as long-term economic cushion assets; once these minerals are drained and depleted, there is no replacement. In this regard, increased trade efforts with nations like the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland), Germany and Israel

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(along the lines/parameters that have been mentioned) may prove prudent; African nations can lessen food imports, strengthen food security capabilities and minimize food shortages due to drought or failed rains by prioritizing significant use of resource management techniques and renewable energy as imperative initiatives. The Scandinavian countries and Germany are the most ardent and visible proponents of clean and green technologies. Germany’s energy supply from green sources is at the 25 percent level according to 2013 figures; the country has a goal of 35 percent green energy reliance by 2020 (Charig, 2012). Norway aims to have 67.5 percent of its energy consumption from renewable sources by 2020 (Holter, 2013). The country is a pioneer in renewable energy and environmental technology, with hydro and wind as research emphases and solar as an increasing interest; nearly all the electric energy generated there derives from hydroelectric power (Invest in Norway, 2014), given its vast water resources. In contrast, Israel, a small country with a dry/arid climate, 60 percent sand coverage and a nation positioned in a desert ecosystem, is a food exporter and the leading source of effective irrigation across the globe (e.g. for production of desert-grown tomatoes and peaches); additionally, this desert nation has made notable strides and innovations in resource management, particularly fish farming and water technology (desalinization, drip irrigation), agro-genetic engineering (e.g. geneticallymodified seeds), dry-land agriculture and usage of multiple water types (salty, recycled, rain, brackish, fresh, bilge) (Blum, 2014; Schuster, 1999). Israel’s signature water technology innovation is drip irrigation, which saves/conserves water and fertilizer by allowing water to drip slowly to the roots of plants through a network of valves, pipes, tubing and emitters (East Africa Agribusiness Staff Writer, 2014; Sales, 2014); it basically facilitates the use of minimal water to produce optimum crop yield. Over the last decade (starting in the early 2000s), Israeli farmers have used 30 percent less water while doubling crop output, leaving the country with a 150 percent food surplus (Reuters Staff Writer, 2010). Israel’s resource management expertise, particularly as related to water technology and desert-farming know-how, are vital to Africa’s arid growing regions, which risk becoming increasingly vulnerable to climate change. Collectively, Africa’s diverse soils, topography, climatic conditions, and natural resources (like waterways, the wind and abundant sunlight) make it an ideal place where all the aforementioned technologies can be strategically harnessed for optimum crop and energy production. Africa has much to offer others in trade, commerce and resources besides raw minerals; however, fresh paradigms must be envisioned and actualized in

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order to design, advance and promote new resources and rethink how old ones can be properly managed. Africa’s indigenous biofuel infrastructure and production can be ramped up, via commercial farming and refinement, to sell oil derived from plants like Jatropha as biodiesel fuel to countries such as Israel, Germany and Norway in exchange for technical assistance. As with the nature of trade, there is a two-way flow of exchange goods; therefore, African nations must envision what resources can be provided to the trading partner, emphasizing abundant replenishable goods. As one practical step, a proposed relationship between Israel and South Sudan (the world’s newest nation) can be examined. South Sudan, a nation with a dry/arid climate and unpredictable rainfall, exclusively depends on oil sales for budget funding and revenue; development of other resource sectors (such as eco/conference tourism) could lessen this dependence. Other major resources include timber, abundant sunlight, gold, diamonds, and part of the River Nile as a topographical feature (Farhat, 2012; Guardian Staff Writer, 2014); additionally, the country has large, uncultivated regions containing significant quantities of elephants, giraffe, buffalo, gazelle, hippos and rare birds like shoebills—an ideal resource for developing a game park tourism industry (Wildlife Conservation Society Writer, 2013). To be properly launched, this potential industry needs logistical planning (conservation/land-use analysis), vision, and funding. The Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) identifies the 200,000-squarekilometer Boma–Jonglei landscape in South Sudan as the largest, substantially intact wildlife habitat in East Africa. In addition to animals, the region includes high-altitude plateaus, wooded and grassland savannas, and wetlands. Its potential is thought to rival the famed Serengeti of East Africa (Rucker, 2011). South Sudan can provide Israel with access to specified quantities of Nile water (a current negotiation effort), limited timber, and allowance of joint Israel–South Sudanese security-force cooperation in protecting South Sudan’s borders and interiors from potential infestations by anti-Israeli/anti-Jewish terrorist groups like alQaeda and al-Shabaab. In exchange, Israel can provide South Sudan with technology expertise (for water or clean energy, particularly solar) and security-force assistance, i.e. training, advisors, surveillance technology, (in repelling ivory poachers, the Lord’s Resistance Army and other aforementioned terrorist entities), which are vital respectively to nutrition (food production; clean water access) and electrical power, and the emergence/maintenance of a positive business climate. In a peaceful and safe (nonviolent) environment, eco/conference tourism can flourish and develop; tourism and the complementary hospitality and retail industries will facilitate and generate employment opportunities and revenue dollars

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for the local economy. The outlined Israel–South Sudan trade scenario can be a core model for how African nations engage the globe with respect to commerce; that is, with the acquisition of self-sufficiency technologies and primary emphasis on exporting replenishable goods.

Soft Resource Strategy As an African resource, music is the vortex of religious ritual. Africa traditionally provides an avenue for musicians to naturally engage in artistic creations throughout their livelihood. The problem with these activities is that they have hardly ever been harnessed as an economygeneration endeavor. In Africa, people generally engage in their cultural musical activities with group roles through vocal music. In addition to these roles, Africans also perform these songs for entertaining themselves on musical instruments. When the community is in favor of the music, the community joins in and develops other tones to create naturally blended harmonies. Great examples can be realized in the music of chimurenga by Thomas Mapfumo of the Shona people of Zimbabwe, in which he mixes both European and Zimbabwe Mbira instruments to inspire both the contemporary and neo-traditional African music lovers. These songs use interesting ostinatos or repetitive patterns and musical timbres that are culturally aesthetic and can be used to generate economy in the music market. While African musical instruments have a complex socio-cultural significance, they can also be used for generating economy by providing the instrument makers with an avenue to export their products. The djembe drum, for example, has become a significant addition of a musical aesthetic within the instrumental music genre. In keeping with their intricate musical system, the African musicians have used every known type of portable instrument. The four categories of instruments are chordophones, idiophones, membranophones and aerophones. For this reason, it is important to examine the African society in the cultural contexts in which portable instruments can be archived in Museums of African History, both in Africa and in the industrialized nations, to generate income for the African musicians who make them. Establishments such as the Smithsonian Institute and Museums of Art can provide an economic base market outlet for the African instrument makers.

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The Future of Pan-Africanism The time has come for Pan-Africanism to evolve from ideas into practical use and development. African leaders need to embrace the African Diaspora and utilize its people as resources to enhance social and economic development both in Africa and among the Diaspora. There are many African Americans and other Diaspora Africans (particularly Canadian, EU or Caribbean citizens) who simultaneously recognize the gamut of African regions/nations as their ancestral home and a resource; however, a workable (non-complicated) plan and opportunity conduit has to be worked out to actualize the concepts. The collective African Diaspora, coupled with continental Africans, should be provided with the opportunity to participate in the growth, development, and life of African nations on multiple levels (economic, political, and socio-cultural). This type of networking can be referenced by an emphasis on common themes and ideas which facilitate cooperation and relationship-building; some identifiable anchor themes and constructs on which to build unity are: common human source region (East-Central Africa); common cultural root (Bantu); and recognition of a Pan-African language (KiSwahili). Some scientific research points to East-Central Africa as the birthplace of humanity (and thus, the African); the specific region generally posited by researchers to contain the initial footprint of humans lies within the landscape between eastern Congo, the southern area of South Sudan, and the western areas of Uganda and Tanzania. The present-day boundaries of Africa, all of which are relatively new and artificially/arbitrarily configured, should be leapfrogged to hone-in on this origin as a unity pillar. Regarding a common culture root, Bantu is a unifying ethnic/ sociolinguistic term for people who identify themselves as being of African descent/heritage. The term mainly denotes a large family of related African languages in vocabulary and syntax, all having some form of the root word ntu in denoting a person (human being). In ancient times, the proto-Bantu language was spread by successive human migrations over many centuries from East Africa to and across other Continent areas (west, central, north and south). Over time, it subdivided into many offshoots which now dominate the (indigenous) linguistic landscape of Africa, particularly the sub-Saharan region; some noted Bantu languages are KiSwahili, IsiZulu, LiNgala, and KiShona, to name just a few (Biddulph, 2001). Bantu captures the essence, ethos, and cultural heritage of Africa in a nutshell; it is a simple but accurate term to define Black people and their associated cultural ancestry irrespective of current geography, nationality, and language (Saidykhan, 2010; Kenny, 2014). In

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the United States, the term Bantu being added to the census and to race category option boxes (alongside Black and African-American) is comprehensive/ancestrally valid and elevates cultural dignity. Linguistically-speaking, the promotion, recognition, and use of KiSwahili as an African common language is an additional, core thrust in strengthening Pan-Africanism. Julius Nyerere (former Tanzanian president), Nelson Mandela (former South African president) and Wole Soyinka (Nigerian poet and playwright), all of whom are noted and distinguished voices from across Africa, have embraced the idea of KiSwahili as a common language; they saw the march toward unity and common understanding actualized in this effort. As a Bantu tongue and a synthesis of many African languages (at least ten), it operates as the cultural lingua franca of both East and Central Africa and is the African continent’s largest language by both geography (about ten countries) and the number of speakers (about 120 million) (Katembo, B., 2012, pp. 35– 36); because of its unique history and positioning, ethnocentrism as an associated consequence is not evoked. KiSwahili has also been used as a communication tool within the African/anti-colonial liberation struggles of Angola, South Africa and the United States (Black Power Movement) and currently serves as one of the African Union’s working languages. Thus, there is an underlying cohesion when a people have a recognized, common language—a much-needed component for Africa and its Diaspora. As a reference example, Kiswahili is a linkage conduit between the EAC and African Americans via Kwanzaa (a Kiswahili-articulated, annual 7-day Pan-African holiday celebrated in the United States). The goals and objectives of the EAC represent both a multi-ethnic initiative and a harambee spirit that should be emulated and customized by other African regions. EAC leaders should endeavor to establish Kiswahili as the lingua franca for the EAC. If African leaders find this plausible, they can engage themselves with the EAC policies that enhance linguistic integration for Africans in Africa and Africans in the Diaspora. Outreach efforts are useful to facilitate networking and foster understanding; to this end, in promoting a synthesis of fun and social interaction, perhaps organizations can arrange the simultaneous celebration of events in Africa and in the Diaspora; for example, the celebration of East African Community (EAC) festivals, like JAMAFest, in North America (Opobo, 2013), and the coordination of Kwanzaa activities in South Africa and in various EAC sites. Another small, but significant, measure to promote connectedness is African Diaspora dual citizenship in African nations; this provision will be a win-win situation for all parties involved: for Africa, a boost in overseas investment, tourism, and skills transfer, and for the

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Diaspora, increased political/commerce-oriented leverage in countries of residence, and facilitation of Africa as a cultural resource conduit. From a regional perspective, the EAC is probably a great starting place from which to include interested Diasporans as a development resource and asset, for a variety of reasons. The EAC has a Pan-African flavor already in its effort to integrate multicultural African populations (In2EastAfrica, 2013); therefore, African-American inclusion in the EAC as a scenario reference would simply be just another group of Africans being added to the mix. Effective citizenship requires a commitment to and knowledge of the country with which one identifies. This includes the knowledge of government, social structures, and the specific challenges the society faces. Many members of the African Diaspora have expressed a need to be granted the opportunity for dual citizenship with the nations of Africa. Significant measures to facilitate such an effort are a worthwhile endeavor. The inclusion of the African Diaspora, particularly African-Americans, will, in the long run, benefit the continent of Africa by enabling investment, tourism, and the transfer of skills. Several African economic blocs, such as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and SADC (Southern African Development Community), have been developed in the past five decades; unfortunately, they have not met the expectations of the Diaspora in terms of outreach, resource optimization, development goals and other issues of concern. However, the EAC, a regional intergovernmental organization based in Arusha (Tanzania), is an interesting case in point regarding a bloc with great potential; it oversees and facilitates the cultural, economic and eventually political integration of the confederated, multicultural region comprised of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and soon-to-be South Sudan. Its leaders should expand the opportunity of inclusion (dual-citizenship; multi-level participation) to include interested African-Americans (United States) and Africans living in other Diaspora locations. Relationships take time to cultivate and also come with challenges. Building them is a process and has to be anchored on strong foundations for success. Pan-Africanism, as an extension of networking, relationships and cooperation, is a conduit for endless benefits and higher heights in African development. Planning and strategy are paramount to linking the talents, skills and resources of Continental and Diasporan Africans in facilitating Africa’s rebirth. This evolution will be facilitated by new thinking, new paradigm conceptualizations, new African-oriented educational content models and an emphasis on similarities as opposed to differences amongst African peoples.

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Musewe, V. (2014). The Black man’s burden. The African Executive. Retrieved from http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?articl e=7645 Ndaba, O. (2012). Why China will not solve Africa’s problems. The African Executive. Retrieved from http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?articl e=6753 Newscast Media Staff Writer. (2014). Israel and South Sudan sign treaty over rights of River Nile. Newscast Media. Retrieved from http://newscastmedia.com/blog/2012/07/30/israel-and-south-sudansign-treaty-over-rights-of-river-nile/ Ngatia, A. (2012). Why Africa lags behind. The African Executive. Retrieved from http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?articl e=6818 Opobo, M. (2013). Rwanda hosts first-ever EAC arts and culture fest. The New Times. Retrieved from http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=15263&a=63739 Owen, D. (1985). None of the above: The truth behind the SATs. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Paglia, P. (2014). African conflicts and the role of ethnicity: A case study of Sudan. Retrieved from http://www.africaeconomicanalysis.org/articles/pdf/sudan0807.pdf Reuters Staff Writer. (2010). Israel to share agricultural know-how with struggling African farmers. Haaretz. Retrieved from http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-to-shareagricultural-know-how-with-struggling-african-farmers-1.284919 Reynolds, J. (2007). China in Africa: Developing ties. BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6264476.stm Rincon,P.(2003).Tanzania Ethiopia origin of humans. BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/2909803.stm Rucker, A. (2011). Sudan’s wildlife migration miracle. Frontlines. Retrieved from http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/frontlines/sudan-southsudaneducation/sudan%E2%80%99s-wildlife-migration-miracle Saidykhan, S. (2010). Founding a new African “tribe.” Sahara Reporters. Retrieved from http://saharareporters.com/article/founding-new-african -%E2%80%9Ctribe%E2%80%9D Saka, H. (2012). Internal conflict: Africa’s undoing. The African Executive. Retrieved from

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http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?articl e=6958 Sales, B. (2014). With Israeli tech, Amiran Kenya looks to boost East Africa’s farmers. JTA. Retrieved from http://www.jta.org/2014/02/18/news-opinion/world/with-israeli-techamiran-kenya-looks-to-boost-east-africas-farmers Schuster, J. (1999). Israelis harness sun, saline water to transform desert. Jweekly.com. Retrieved from http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/9981/israelis-harness-sun-salinewater-to-transform-desert/ Shahadah, O. (2014). Cultural footprints: How does Africa fare? The African Executive. Retrieved from http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?articl e=7676 Shikwati, J. (2009). Africa must probe the invented wheel. The African Executive. Retrieved from http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/article_print.php? article=4801 Shockley, K. (2007). Literatures and definitions: Toward understanding Africentric education. Journal of Negro Education, 76(2). Shockley, K., Bond, H., & Rollins, J. (2008). Singing in my own voice: Teachers’ journey toward self-knowledge. Journal of Transformative Education, 6(3). Shockley, K., & Frederick, R. (2010). Constructs and dimensions of Afrocentric education. Journal of Black Studies, 40(6). Smith, D. (2009). African chiefs urged to apologise for slave trade. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/18/africans-apologiseslave-trade Smith, D. (2012). China's booming trade with Africa helps tone its diplomatic muscle. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/22/chinas-boomingtrade-africa-diplomatic Srivastava, V., & Larizza, M. (2012). Working with the grain for reforming the public service: A live example from Sierra Leone. Washington, DC: World Bank. Stuart-Mogg, D. (2010). Mlozi of Central Africa, trader, slaver and selfstyled sultan: The end of the slaver. Blantyre, Malawi: Central Africana Limited. Thiong’o, N. (2009). Something torn and new: An African renaissance. New York, NY: Basic Civitas Books.

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Thome, W. (2014). South Sudan creates Ministry for Tourism and Wildlife Conservation. e-Turbo News. Retrieved from http://www.eturbonews.com/43797/south-sudan-creates-ministrytourism-and-wildlife-conservation United Nations Development Programme (2013). The MDG Report 2013: Assessing Progress in Africa Toward the Millennium Development Goals. Retrieved from http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/mdg/mdgreports/africa-collection/ Vass, W. (1979). The Bantu speaking heritage of the United States. Los Angeles, CA: UCLA Center for Afro-American Studies. Wade, N. (2009). Eden? Maybe. But where’s the apple tree? The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/science/01eden.html?_r=0 Watson, J. (2007). Speech: Nobel Prize Lecture. Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Watson Wekesa, B. (2012). Soft power: Novel ideas for East Africa. The African Executive. Retrieved from http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?articl e=6909 Wildlife Conservation Society Staff Writer. (2013). South Sudan expands efforts to protect remaining elephants. Wildlife Conservation Society. Retrieved from http://www.wcs.org/press/press-releases/south-sudanprotects-elephants.aspx Wilson, A. (1993). Falsification of African consciousness. Brooklyn, NY: African World Info Systems. Wilson, D., & Ayerst, P. (1976). White gold: The story of African ivory. New York, NY: Taplinger Publishing Co. Womakuyu, F. (2010). Ugandans fight malaria with mosquito eating plants. New Vision. Retrieved from http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/719940 Zaslavsky, C. (1999). Africa counts: Number and pattern in African cultures. Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill Books.

CHAPTER FIVE FROM NEO-COLONIALISM TO NEO-LIBERAL GLOBALIZATION: LESSONS FROM NKRUMAH’S NEO-COLONIALISM: THE LAST STAGE OF IMPERIALISM DR CHARLES QUIST-ADADE KWANTLEN POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY

Abstract In this paper, I assess the main arguments in Kwame Nkrumah’s NeoColonialism the Last Stage of Imperialism within the context of neoliberal globalization, proceeding from Nkrumah’s central premise that the West, responding to the success of national liberation movements first in Asia and then in Africa, shifted its tactics from colonialism to neocolonialism. Neo-Colonialism, the last Stage of Imperialism was published when Kwame Nkrumah was the President of Ghana, the first country in SubSaharan Africa to achieve independence from colonial rule. He had come to the sad conclusion that his country had moved from a colonial state to a neocolonial country after the euphoria and optimism of the heady years of independence. Like the rest of the countries in the tri-continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America, now known as the Global South, Ghana was a neocolonial state instead of the full-blooded independent country the independence leaders had envisioned. The exciting years of independence were imbued with bold ideas and projects to break away entirely from the colonial yoke. But, as Nkrumah would explain in his book and post-coup writings, this was not to be. In fact, one would say that Nkrumah and his fellow independence leaders became managers of a neocolonial project in the neo-imperial grand scheme of things.

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Nkrumah posited that “[w]ithout a qualm it dispenses with its flags” and “claims that it is ‘giving’ independence to its former subjects, to be followed by ‘aid’ for their development”. Behind the façade of such rhetoric, however, the West “devises innumerable ways to accomplish objectives formerly achieved by naked colonialism”. Quist-Adade insists that neoliberal globalization is a continuation of 20th-century neocolonialism. “Neo-Liberal globalization is simply old wine in a new bottle. Thus, Nkrumah’s analysis of neocolonialism is classic; it is not only relevant for understanding the dynamics and logics of Global Capitalism in our post-Cold War world; it offers a lens and heuristic device for viewing and explicating neocolonialism in the 21st century. I assert that the continued relevance to Nkrumah’s ideas is uncontested. Nkrumah, he avers, attempted to put his African liberation agenda into practice but was thwarted by both internal and external forces. Since his demise, there is yet to emerge a coherent and unified movement to carry on his mantle both in the political and academic realm. The Pan-Africanist movement after Nkrumah seems to have lost steam. But all is not lost; it is never too late. A new Pan-African nationalist realignment infused with a new and urgent praxis-oriented realism is needed to bring back ideological and philosophical muscle to the 21st-century Pan-Africanism. Such a new Pan-African nationalist realignment, he suggests, will provide the ontological and epistemological tool to assess and provide an antidote to post-Cold War, neoliberal situations in Global Africa, i.e. Africa and its Diasporas. I assert that, while most of the tenets of Africanism continue to be relevant to the contemporary neo/postcolonial, globalizing world, there are several such tenets that need to be reevaluated, re-conceptualized or recontextualized within the framework of the current trends and changes. Kwame Nkrumah was a prolific writer, having to his credit more than a dozen books. Of his books, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism offered the most incisive indictment of the Euro-American Grand Imperialist Project. It’s no wonder that the then US President, Lyndon B. Johnson was reported to have been infuriated by the book and issued a warning to Nkrumah. One year later, Nkrumah was deposed by a CIA tele-guided military coup in 1966 (See Stockwell, 1978, p. 201n). Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism was published when Kwame Nkrumah was the President of Ghana, the first country in SubSaharan Africa to achieve independence from colonial rule. He had come to the sad conclusion that his country had moved from a colonial state to neocolonial country after the euphoria and optimism of the exhilarating years of independence. Like the rest of the countries in the tri-continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America, now known as the Global South,

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Ghana was a neocolonial state instead of the full-blooded independent country the independence leaders had envisioned. Nkrumah lays out the central premise of his book thus: The Neo-Colonialism of today represents imperialism in its final and perhaps its most dangerous stage. In the past it was possible to convert a country upon which a neo-colonial regime had been imposed — Egypt in the nineteenth century is an example — into a colonial territory. Today this process is no longer feasible. Old-fashioned colonialism is by no means entirely abolished. It still constitutes an African problem, but it is everywhere on the retreat. Once a territory has become nominally independent it is no longer possible, as it was in the last century, to reverse the process. Existing colonies may linger on, but no new colonies will be created. In place of colonialism as the main instrument of imperialism we have today Neo-Colonialism. (p.1)

He describes the Neo-Colonialism as follows: “The essence of NeoColonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside” (Nkrumah, 1965, p.1). To him, a neocolonial state is one that, while being nominally independent, is still remotely controlled by its former colonial master. In essence, the colonial umbilical cord that tied the former colony to the former colonizing country was not severed after independence, as it were. Nkrumah asserts that in a neocolonial situation foreign capital or what he called Monopoly Capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the ex-colonies, and foreign direct investment (FDI) is used to develop the former colonial power while under developing the excolony, leading to an ever widening gap between the two. He insists that the fight against neocolonialism is not aimed at ending or pushing out FDI of the advanced industrialized capitalist world in the Global South, but to prevent the use of such investment and capital to impoverish the developing world. The title of Nkrumah’s book is a variation on Vladimir Illych Lenin’s (the main architect of the Russian Revolution) own study of imperialism written 50 years earlier entitled Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Nkrumah’s contribution has been described as one of the best updates on imperialism since Lenin. Nkrumah characterizes neocolonialism as “the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. In the days of old-fashioned colonialism, the imperial

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power had at least to explain and justify at home the actions it was taking abroad. In the colony those who served the ruling imperial power could at least look to its protection against any violent move by their opponents. With Neo-Colonialism neither is the case” (xi). Nkrumah identified the following specific features of neocolonialism in 1965: x x x

x

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It continues to actively control the affairs of the newly independent state. In most cases, neocolonialism is manifested through economic and monetary measures. For example, the neocolonial territories become the target markets for imports from the imperial center(s). While neocolonialism may be a form of continuing control by a state's previous formal colonial master, these states may also become subjected to imperial power by new actors. These new actors include the United States or may be international financial and monetary organizations. Because of the nuclear parity between the superpowers, the conflict between the two takes place in the form of “limited wars”. Neocolonial territories are often the places where these “limited wars” are waged. As the ruling elites pay constant deference to the neocolonial masters, the needs of the population are often ignored, leaving issues of living conditions, such as education, development, and poverty unresolved. (Leong, 2015)

Proceeding from his central premise that the West, responding to the success of national liberation movements first in Asia and then in Africa shifted its tactics from colonialism to neocolonialism, Nkrumah posited that “[w]ithout a qualm it dispenses with its flags,” and “claims that it is ‘giving’ independence to its former subjects, to be followed by ‘aid’ for their development”. Behind the façade of such rhetoric, however, the West “devises innumerable ways to accomplish objectives formerly achieved by naked colonialism”. The neocolonial powers pursue their grand imperial scheme under the aegis of the United Nations by using its Bretton Woods’ agencies: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These agencies, set up after World War II, were controlled undemocratically by the EuroAmerican West. Nkrumah described the actions of the West as a “neo-colonialist trap on the economic front”, and observed that these actions were couched as multilateral aid which is dispensed through international organizations including the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (known as the World Bank), the

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International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association. Significantly, all these international agencies are backed by US capital. These agencies impose various offensive conditions on wouldbe borrowers, such as supplying information about their economies, submitting their policy and plans to review by the World Bank and accepting agency supervision of their use of loans. Neocolonialism, Nkrumah suggests, is as profitable, if not more than, colonialism before it. He describes how Western monopolies controlled the prices of commodities by lowering the prices they pay. Western monopolies extracted some $41 billion in profits from 1951 to 1961 in the tri-continents of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. They also profited from high rates of interest. He notes: “While capital worth $30,000 million was exported to some 56 [African, Asian and Latin American] countries between 1956 and 1962, it is estimated that interest and profit alone extracted on this sum from the debtor countries amounted to more than £15,000 million”. Among the innumerable means of neocolonialist exploitation, Nkrumah delineates and emphasizes the following: (1) the conclusion of commerce and navigation treaties; (2) agreements for economic cooperation; (3) the right to meddle in internal finances, including currency and foreign exchange, to lower trade barriers in favor of the donor country’s goods and capital; (4) to protect the interests of private investments; (5) determination of how the funds are to be used; (6) forcing the recipient to set up counterpart funds; (7) to supply raw materials to the donor; and (8) use of such funds, a majority of it in fact, to buy goods from the donor nation. Nkrumah avers that these conditions apply to wide-ranging entities from agriculture to shipping and insurance, to the political-militaryindustrial complex and to the knowledge industry. Nkrumah (1965) describes invisible trade as what “furnishes the Western monopolies with yet another means of economic penetration and exploitation. Over 90 percent of World Ocean shipping is controlled by the imperialist countries. As for insurance payments, in 1961 alone these amounted to an unfavorable balance in Asia, Africa and Latin America of some additional $370 million” (p.26). As Poe (2015) notes, Nkrumah would deploy the terms ‘shamindependence’ and ‘Neo-Colonialism as heuristic devices to enable an understanding of the conditions and exigencies of post-liberation realities in his later books. Nkrumah describes ‘sham-independence’ and ‘NeoColonialism’ in his work Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare (1968) as a territory experiencing ‘sham-independence’ one that continued to be

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exploited economically by alien interests “intrinsic to the world capitalist sector” (as cited in Poe, page 8). Poe (2015) notes that Nkrumah used the synonym, ‘client state’, an early-20th-century term for states subordinate to more powerful states when referring to these pseudo-independent territories. “Sham-independence was the artifact generated by the process of Neo-Colonialism. It was the ‘empire striking back’ with a lick that negated the final ingredient required for any meaningful movement of African independence” (Poe, 2015, p. 2). Nkrumah is worried by Africa’s age-old dilemma: the richest, yet the poorest of the contents. Africa is impoverished because her wealth is siphoned away to enrich the West. He writes: Our continent certainly exceeds all the others in potential hydroelectric power, which some experts assess as 42% of the world's total. What need is there for us to remain hewers of wood and drawers of water for the industrialised areas of the world? It is said, of course, that we have no capital, no industrial skill, no communications, and no internal markets, and that we cannot even agree among ourselves how best to utilise our resources for our own social needs. Yet all stock exchanges in the world are preoccupied with Africa's gold, diamonds, uranium, platinum, copper and iron ore. Our capital flows out in streams to irrigate the whole system of Western economy. Fifty-two per cent of the gold in Fort Knox at this moment, where the USA stores its bullion, is believed to have originated from our shores. Africa provides more than 60% of the world's gold. A great deal of the uranium for nuclear power, of copper for electronics, of titanium for supersonic projectiles, of iron and steel for heavy industries, of other minerals and raw materials for lighter industries - the basic economic might of the foreign powers - come from our continent. (Nkrumah, 1963)

Leong (2015) observes that, while Nkrumah does not proffer explicit ways to slay the neocolonialism beast in Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, “he makes a number of tacit suggestions, including the need for pan-African unity in making the task more difficult for NeoColonialism”. Instead, using Marxist analysis, Nkrumah posits that the neocolonialist project is a potentially self-defeating one (Leong, 2015). “In some sense this would come through postcolonial resistance and revolt when Neo-Colonialism reaches a culmination in the peripheries, but more indirectly destabilizes the neo-colonial centre that practices it” (Leong, 2015, p. 1).

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Proposed Solutions Nkrumah notes that the Balkanization of Africa by the European Imperial Powers at the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference was the most important factor that facilitated the perpetuation of neocolonialism in Africa. At the Berlin Conference, the colonial powers—Britain, Belgium, France, Germany and Portugal— divided the African continent among themselves, slicing it into dozens of administrative units in order to govern it more effectively, and the colonial boundaries had become the lines within which African countries had been given independence. The Balkanization of Africa, also called The Scramble of Africa, Nkrumah stressed, proved to be an enduring pernicious legacy of European colonialism, wreaking havoc long after African countries gained independence. Divided into virtually nonviable and weak states with mono cash crop economies, each newly independent country had to fend for itself (Falola & Heaton, 2015). For instance, the fact that each produced and exported its cocoa crop independently was what resulted in lower prices (Falola & Heaton, 2015, p. 1). It is for this reason that Nkrumah proposed African unity and cooperation as an antidote to neocolonialism. While Nkrumah believed the best way to break the neocolonial stranglehold and vestiges of capitalism was a socialist economy, he pushed for a policy of nonalignment during the Cold War. Africa, Nkrumah strongly argued, had in abundance all the resources, particularly natural resources, it needed to achieve true economic independence. But this could only be achieved through inter-African trade (an African Common Market). Such a platform would enable the continent to wean itself off Western imports (Falola & Heaton, 2015). According to Falola & Heaton (2015): [Nkrumah]…believed that African unity would help to strengthen African countries' bargaining power on the world market, as well as in international politics. If Africans aligned with each other, rather than with the various Western countries that wished to exploit them, the future could be safeguarded. Nkrumah also believed that concerted efforts toward industrialization should complement agricultural and mineral exports in order that African countries become able to produce their own finished goods and reduce their reliance on European and American manufactured products. By enacting such policies, the spell of Neo-Colonialism could be broken, ushering in an era of distinctly African “socialism”.

Articulating the rationale for a pan-African solution to continental development, Nkrumah asserts: “The foreign firms who exploited our resources long ago saw the strength to be gained from acting on a Pan-

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African scale. By means of interlocking directorships, cross-shareholdings and other devices, groups of apparently different companies have formed, in fact, one enormous capitalist monopoly. The only effective way to challenge this economic empire and to recover possession of our heritage, is for us also to act on a Pan-African basis, through a Union Government” (p. 259). And Nkrumah outlined concrete steps to be taken towards the panAfricanist objective in a letter he wrote to the presidents of independent states, proposing the Union of African States in January 1963 ahead of the summit of African Heads of State that inaugurated the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May of the same year. He proposed that the economic and social well-being of Africa depended “upon our ability to create a Pan-African Political union”. Nkrumah proposed a four-point blueprint for a continental union government: 1. Common foreign policy and diplomacy...we need a process of political socialization that would “enable us to speak with one voice” in the fora of the world. 2. Common continental planning for economic and industrial development...“building up a common market of a united Africa” that would bring about the material conditions we need to improve our collective quality of life in the global economy. 3. Common currency a monetary zone and a central bank of issue...that we “need to orientate the economy of Africa and place it beyond the reach of foreign control” to be able to implement our social economy. 4. Common defense system...“one over-all (land, sea and air) Defense Command for Africa” is needed to defend the social economy we create.

To implement the blueprint, he called for the creation of a Central Political Organization with its own constitution. He suggested that the Union of African States should consist of an Upper House and Lower House. The overriding concern of the Union of African States would be to give political direction in regard to the implementation of the proposals mentioned above. Nkrumah had expressed the rationale for a Pan-African approach to the continent’s future development earlier in his autobiography, I Speak of Freedom: Divided we are weak; united, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world. I believe strongly and sincerely that with the deep-rooted wisdom and dignity, the innate respect for human lives, the

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intense humanity that is our heritage, the African race, united under one federal government, will emerge not as just another world bloc to flaunt its wealth and strength, but as a Great Power whose greatness is indestructible because it is built not on fear, envy and suspicion, nor won at the expense of others, but founded on hope, trust, friendship and directed to the good of all mankind.

Nkrumah’s concept of neocolonialism has been deployed to analyze other contexts. Robert Young (2001), for instance, envisages neocolonialism as being advanced first through “development and dependency theory” and then through “critical development theory” (Young, 49–56, as cited in Leong, 2015). The crux of development and dependency theory is the difficulty for the Third World states in escaping from the Western notion of development. The dependency theory explained global inequality in terms of historical exploitation of “Third World” countries by Western countries. Mirfakharie and Quist-Adade (2013) have observed that the dependency theory used the economic failures in Latin American societies as its starting point (Webster, 1984, p. 84). The theory critically evaluated the role of Western imperialism in dominating non-Western countries and regions. Theorists, such as Andre Gunder Frank, debunked the modernization theory, which claimed that the road to modernization was through emulation of Western societies (Webster, 1984, p. 84). They countered that poverty was caused by the economic and political influences of Western countries in the ‘Third World”. They argued that as long as “Third World’ countries are subjected to the control of their economies and political systems by imperialist societies, poverty will persist in these societies (Webster, 1984, p. 85). Thus, Frank insists that “poverty in the Third World is a reflection of its dependency” on Western societies (Webster, 1984, p. 85). The dependency theory posits that the exploitation of the “Third World” countries was implemented via the mechanisms of merchant capitalism, colonialism, and Neo-Colonialism. More specifically, Frank maintained that the Western industrialized countries and the former colonial countries turned the so-called Third World into their mines and plantations, forcing them to specialize in primary export oriented economies, which requires unskilled cheap labour (Mirfakharie & Quist-Adade, 2013; Webster, 1984). The end results were manifold: the creation of elite groups in various parts of the world that were no longer connected to the masses of people in their countries and their political and economic interests were dependent on commerce with Europe; introduction of European currencies that undermine local currencies; and making various parts of the world

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Merchant capitalism—the economic system of the accumulation of capital through trade and plunder during the 16th to late-18th centuries (Webster, 1984, p. 70)—led to the underdevelopment of the tri-continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America (Mirfakharie & Quist-Adade, 2013). For example, the merchants purchased slaves in Africa, sold them to plantation owners in various parts of the world, bought the agricultural goods produced in these plantations and sold them in Europe for profits, which were refined in Europe, thus, contributing to the process of industrialization in Europe, and bought goods produced by the industries in Europe and traded them with African chiefs for slaves. The main effect of merchant capitalism in the context of colonial rule was the establishing of a pattern of economic development in non-Western parts of the world that revolved around the export of natural resources and raw materials (Webster, 1984, p. 73). The economic activities in the colonies, in terms of production of sugar, cocoa, or coffee, that were not suitable for the climates in Europe, did not compete with the industrial and agricultural production in the colonial empires. The emphasis on such activities in the colonies had the negative consequence of not developing other industries, such as manufacturing (Kubow & Fossum, 2007, p. 51). Frank also argued that the elites of the “Third World” have been incorporated into the world capitalist system with little power to affect change in the system (Webster, 1984, p. 85). Dependency theory also accounted for the role of the “Third World” elites in the exploitation of resources and “underdevelopment” of these countries. The activities of these elite groups (comprador, interpreter) and their lifestyles have become more and more intertwined with the economic policies of the elite groups in Western countries (metropolitan countries). According to Frank, the solution to “underdevelopment” in the “Third World” is for the working classes to unite and change their conditions through socialist revolutions (Webster, 1984). Mirfakharie & Quist-Adade (2013) have summarized the main assumptions of the dependency theory: (1) Colonial relations and patterns of domination are also reflected in post-colonial interactions and relations between the North and the South. Neo-colonial relations and imperialism are viewed as inimical to industrial development (Kamrava, 1993, p. 36). (2) The colonies were too important to the colonial powers and their economies to become truly and one hundred percent independent from colonial powers. That is, they were too dependent on the economies of their colonial “masters” for them to be able to completely eliminate or

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relinquish such ingrained and exploitive relations (Kamrava, 1993, p. 37). (3) New methods and means of domination were applied by Western governments to continue the exploitive nature of the colonial relations. (4) As Nkrumah (1973) had noted earlier, these new methods included international loans and assistance programs that aimed at achieving capital exportation and exploitation of resources in non-Western parts of the world. Western countries provided agricultural loans, food loans, technical (industrial) equipment, knowledge and expert systems as ways to influence development projects and enforce their power (Kamrava, 1993, p. 37–38). (5) The aims of these programs were not to increase the availability of the infrastructure, such as roads, railroads, dams, bridges, hospitals, and schools, necessary for industrial development in these countries. Rather, the goal of these programs was to provide a market for the manufactured goods in the West and importation of expert knowledge into these countries. These policies were due to the effects of the rise of monopoly capitalism that required the creation of new markets in order to “mitigate problems arising from over production [in Western industrialized countries] (Kamrava, 1993, p. 38). (6) No real development could be achieved if the main export of the majority of “Third World” countries remained to be raw materials and agricultural goods. (7) Specialization in the export of raw materials has had a negative consequence for the development of industrial growth since the demand for these products and their prices are determined by fluctuations in the international market that are decided by Western governments, banks, and investors (Kamrava, 1993, p. 38). The economic inequalities between Western countries (the core) and “Third World” countries (the periphery) have also resulted in the creation and manifestation of class structures in the periphery (Mirfakharie and Quist-Adade, 2013). Dependency results in class inequality within and between nations (Kamrava, 1993, p. 38). The economic growth of nonWestern parts of the world has only benefitted a small proportion of the population, mainly the elite capitalist class. The existing power relations have created a small group of international elite made of big corporatefinancial interests that exist above the mass of poor, disenfranchised, and marginalized people (Kamrava, 1993, p. 39). Marxist analysis of class privileges of the bourgeoisie and the exploitation of the working class is supplanted “by a parallel [analysis that looks at] globalized pattern[s] of exploitation and oppression” between have/core and have-not/periphery nations (Kubow & Fossum, 2007, p. 51). The domestic elite groups within “Third World” countries—“Lumpenbourgeoisie”—function to benefit themselves as well as the Western capitalist class.

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In his Marxist rendition of the neo-colonial/postcolonial perspective, Immanuel Wallerstein suggests that the so-called Third World countries have become so deeply entrenched in the World Capitalist System that neocolonized states have no other recourse but to be part of that system. Like Nkrumah’s Neo-Colonialism theory and the Dependency theory that emerged from it, Wallerstein depicts a world made up of developmental inequities where metropolitan centers, or core countries seeking to be even more developed, “under develop” the peripheries through trade exploitation. (Leong, 2015) Leong (2015) notes that the Neo-Colonialism/Dependency theory has taken a critical turn to account for the uneven development in the Global South thanks to the economic success of the so-called South East Asian Tigers in the Eighties and the rise of China and India as economic powerhouses. “[T]he notion of neo-colonial actions in the periphery cannot be so easily explained, especially with the economic successes of Asia. In this regard ‘development’ can no longer be theorized in purely economic terms but has to incorporate other dimensions like culture, gender, society and politics as well” (Leong, 2015, p. 2). While one agrees with the critical development theorists, such as Young (2001), who assert that there has been a movement towards “popular development”, and the need to account for the empowerment of usually non-governmental, civil actors to address fundamental human needs and an emphasis on sustainable development, “self-reliance”, and “cultural pluralism and rights”, (p.55) it should be noted the so-called “development miracle” of the SE Asian Tigers were exceptions rather than the rule in the Global South. Even so, the economic meltdown in the 1990s saw how fragile and vulnerable these economies really were in the Global Capitalist system. Neocolonial exploitation, Nkrumah notes, “operates not only in the economic field, but also in the political, religious, ideological and cultural spheres”. In his political economic analysis, he describes in detail how Western countries, particularly the USA, infiltrate and manipulate citizens of the newly-independent nations through the propaganda arm of the Western governments: mass media. Nkrumah argues that Hollywood plays a leading role: “Even the cinema stories of fabulous Hollywood are loaded. One has only to listen to the cheers of an African audience as Hollywood’s heroes slaughter red Indians or Asiatics to understand the effectiveness of this weapon. For, in the developing continents, where the colonialist heritage has left a vast majority still illiterate, even the smallest child gets the message contained in the blood and thunder stories emanating from California. And along with murder and the Wild West goes an incessant barrage of anti-socialist

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propaganda, in which the trade union man, the revolutionary, or the man of dark skin is generally cast as the villain, while the policeman, the gumshoe, the Federal agent — in a word, the CIA — type spy is ever the hero. Here, truly, is the ideological under-belly of those political murders which so often use local people as their instruments.” Nkrumah notes that such messages and images peddled through the mass media are aimed at reinforcing the West’s hegemonic position vis-àvis Africa: (1) to drive home the message that Africans cannot govern themselves, that the continent “is still stuck in its primitive, bloodthirsty past”, that African nations squandered their “golden opportunity” to build civilized states after they attained political independence; and (2) to demonstrate the salvation inherent in Western cultural superiority. Nkrumah offers a penetrating analysis of the joint role civil society and governments in the West play in maintaining the lopsided global status quo. He observes that when, after centuries of exploitation, the colonial masters were forced to grant political independence to African countries, the masters were unwilling to cut the umbilical cords. To ensure that the old relationships remained intact, they propagated the myth (with the help of the mass media) of an affluent capitalist world promising abundance and prosperity for all. The aim, however, was the establishment within former colonies of a “welfare state as the only safeguard against the threat of Communism”. The mass media, both private and government, participated and continues to participate in the propaganda war. Massive brainwashing occurs through broadcasting stations like the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), Voice of Germany, Voice of America, and more recently various satellite television stations like CNN (Cable News Network). This war of words and images is supplemented by written propaganda, embassy bulletins, and newspapers distributed by so-called independent and liberal publishers. “The war of words penetrates into every town and village, and into the remotest parts of the bush. It spreads in the form of freely distributed propaganda films praising the qualities of Western civilization and culture”. Thus, hegemony over truth and knowledge ultimately replaces troops and guns as the relevant tool of re-colonization. In this way, the “psychological terrain” is prepared and the whole continent “is besieged without a single marine in sight”. According to Nkrumah, “the most pernicious aspect of this psychological warfare” is the campaign to convince Africans and the Western public that Africans cannot govern themselves, that they are unworthy of real independence, and that foreign rule is the only cure for their wild, war-like and primitive way of life.

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Nkrumah contends that “imperialism has done its utmost to brainwash Africans into thinking that they need the straightjacket of colonialism if they are to be saved from their retrogressive instincts”. Nkrumah adds that such was the age-old racist justification for the economic exploitation of our continent. The post-independence coups— many of which were engineered by the United States government and some of its allies (see Stockwell, 1984)—and their concomitant cycle of crises termed as the coup-drought-famine syndrome are being used to corroborate “imperialism’s pet theory that Africans have shamelessly squandered the ‘golden opportunities’ of independence, and that they have plunged their political kingdoms into blood and barbarism. Therefore the imperialist mission: we must save them anew; the press, films and radio are fast spreading the myth of post-independence violence and chaos. Everywhere, the more or less covert implication is: Africa needs to be recolonized”. This requires a clear understanding of the issues involved, for which Nkrumah's contribution is essential. As he observes, “With the utmost speed, Neo-Colonialism must be analyzed in clear and simple terms for the full mass understanding by the surging organizations of the African peoples. For, when all is said and done, it is the so-called little man, the bent-backed, exploited, malnourished, blood-covered fighter for independence who decides. And he invariably decides for freedom”. Neoliberal globalization is a continuation of 20th century neocolonialism.

Neo-Liberal Discourse as a Defense Global Corporatization Before we proceed further, it is pertinent to define the terms neoliberalism and globalization and to provide a brief historical excursus of both concepts. What is globalization? Globalization is a transnational, planetary process of expanding and intensifying economic, political, social and cultural links between nation-states, and peoples. Is globalization a new phenomenon? No! Globalization is as old as time. It has been going on since our ancestors first began their outward journey from Africa more than ten thousand years ago. However, while globalization has been going on throughout human history, it has been a very slow movement indeed. But, the past thirty years or so has witnessed an unprecedented speed in the development of the process, thanks to the new scientific and technological revolution. It is thus a truism that globalization is old wine in a new bottle. It has progressed for centuries through migration, travel,

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trade and the spread of knowledge including science and technology. Around 1000AD, Europe was importing Chinese science and technology as well as Indian and Arabic mathematics. Thus, globalization cannot be equated with Westernisation or Americanisation, as some globalization writers have suggested. Globalization involves many non-western contributions. It expanded during the 15–16th centuries with the emergence of European mercantilism. Yet, globalization today has assumed a different form due to the scientific and technological revolution. Transatlantic communication has evolved from sail power to steam, to the telegraph, telephone, commercial aircraft and now to the Internet. Riding the cresting wave of the scientific and technological revolution, globalization has compressed both time and space. This has led to the growth of ties/connections, compression of the world, a reduction of international barriers and a growing irrelevance of geographical distance. This has led to what McMichael describes as growing flows across national borders of people, capital, information, goods and services, including a greater share of the world and leading to increasing integration across spaces (McMichael, 2008). Neoliberalism is an off-shoot of liberalism. According to Giroux (1994, p. 158), liberalism views individuals from the perspective of humanism, which asserts, “there is a unified subject” and this subject is the source of all action. As such, the government must maintain social structures that enable individuals to achieve their goals. According to liberalism, the market is a self-regulating mechanism that is based on the most efficient way of allocating goods and services. The market is deemed to be naturally moving towards equilibrium and any interference with the “natural efficiency of competition” is assumed to lead to social stagnation (Steger, 2003, p. 40). In other words, according to liberalism, a free economy that is unimpeded by the regulative laws of the government “is as important as political freedom to the well-being of individuals and the community” (Perry, 2001, p. 362). In contrast to liberalism, conservatism assumes that individuals have been assigned economic, political, and social roles in the hierarchy of the social structure. From this perspective, culture is considered to be unified and stable. In other words, culture is viewed from the perspective of elites. Conservatism also promotes the view that society is a unified entity. The role of the state and the government is to reproduce the existing social order and preserve the hierarchal nature of social relations and structures. Neoconservatism promotes moral and political agenda. It is critical of excessive individualism and focuses on family, legal and sexual issues and criminal activities. According to Giroux (1994, p. 157), neoconservatism

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functions from the perspective of structural functionalism. It, for example, assumes that the role of the education system is to develop certain capacities in students that fit into the existing social order and forms such as schools, the workplace and the state (Giroux, 1994, p. 158). Neoliberalism is premised on the notion of unfettered individual liberty and is antithetical to any form of state interference in the lives of individuals. The individual is presumed to be rational and imbued with the power of agency who, basically, should be left to his or own devices. As a rational being, the individual will naturally choose to do the right thing when confronted with good and evil. Government or state interference is seen as inimical to the creative potentials of the person and an anathema to his inherent spirit of freedom. Neoliberalism was first practiced in the economic realm in 1973 in Chile. According to von Werlhof (2015), neoliberalism made its presence on the international economic scene in the aftermath of the US-organized coup that ousted the democratically elected socialist president and the installment of the bloody Pinochet military dictatorship. “This was the only way to turn the neoliberal model of the socalled “Chicago Boys” under the leadership of Milton Friedman—a student of Friedrich von Hayek—into reality” (p.1). As von Werlhof (2015, p.1) asserts, The predecessor of the neoliberal model is the economic liberalism of the 18th and 19th centuries and its notion of “free trade”. Goethe’s assessment at the time was: “Free trade, piracy, war – an inseparable three!” (Goethe, 1999) At the center of both old and new economic liberalism lies: selfinterest and individualism; segregation of ethical principles and economic affairs, in other words: a process of ‘de-bedding’ economy from society; economic rationality as a mere cost-benefit calculation and profit maximization; competition as the essential driving force for growth and progress; specialization and the replacement of a subsistence economy with profit-oriented foreign trade (‘comparative cost advantage’); and the proscription of public (state) interference with market forces. (Miles, 2005, p. 134)

Neoliberalism promotes: “privatization of public enterprises; deregulation of the economy; liberalization of trade and industry; massive tax cuts; ‘monetarist’ measures to keep inflation in check, even at the risk of increasing unemployment; strict control on organized labour; the reduction of public expenditures, particularly social spending; the downsizing of the government; the expansion of international markets; and the removal of controls on global financial flows” (Steger, 2003, p. 41). In general, neoliberalism is characterized by the following traits: 1) deregulation (i.e. getting rid of laws protecting the environment and

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workers’ rights); 2) liberalization (i.e. opening up the nation-state to investment by foreign capital, which results in the free movement of capital and investment and an increase in foreign ownership of national corporations and natural resources); 3) government fiscal responsibility (i.e. cutting government expenditures to reduce the deficit); 4) a free market without regulations and government interventions; and 5) privatization of public assets (Leicht & Fitzgerald, 2007, p. 42). Under neoliberal policies, everything must become privatized: land, education, health, welfare, prisons, water, and state-owned industries and, in the case of Canada, crown corporations. Mirfakhraie and Quist-Adade (2013) assert that neoliberalism as an ideology grafts free market principles onto all spheres of human activity. It emphasizes “contracts of short duration, including employment contracts [i.e. part-time work]; constant assessment and the continual production of performance information (i.e. how teachers’ performance and their employment is gauged and determined by how well their students do on standardized tests); the growth of financial services sector and the expansion of financial exchanges divorced from the production of actual goods and services; and the relentless outsourcing [of jobs] . . . goods and services (i.e. relocating call centres to countries such as India due to the availability of new communication forms)” (Leicht & Fitzgerald, 2007, p. 43). The aim of neoliberalism is to “‘harmonize’ the world of national capitals and nation-states, creating a global system of internationalized capital and supranational institutions” (Teeple, 1995, p. 2). For example, the deregulation of industries in the United States since the 1980s has also been fully or partially implemented in other parts of the world. In the United States, limitations in interest rates were eliminated for banks and financial institutions (they can now give the lowest interest rates and returns to their customers). Such harmonizations across regions and nations are enforced by supra-national entities such as WTO (World Trade Organization), the World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that have partly replaced the power of national states and whose unelected leaders, yet determine destinies of the citizens of the world though the control and manipulation of the global economy. Thanks to neoliberal policies, TNCs engaging in a maddening race to the bottom freely move around the world in search of cheap labor, tax breaks and incentives, lower regulations, and rudimentary labor and environmental laws. Their aim is to reduce labor and other costs in order to maximize profits for their shareholders. National governments compete with one another to attract these corporations to invest in their respective countries

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by limiting the power of the unions to organize and deregulating their economies. In this system, we tend to work more hours for less pay and benefits while there are many ways for the investors to make money in ways that “do not involve making anything, providing any services, or employing anyone” (Leicht & Fitzgerald, 2007, p. 43). Neoliberalism informed Ronald Reagan’s and Margaret Thatcher’s economic policies in the United States and Great Britain, also known as Reaganism and Thatcherism, respectively beginning in the early Eighties. Dubbed Reaganomics in the US, these market-driven policies directed government incentives towards individuals and corporations who purportedly have a higher propensity to invest and save. Also termed “Trickle-Down-Economics”, it was presumed that tax cuts for the wealthy and big corporations would trickle down in the form of investment in the economy translating into jobs for the unemployed. Corporate welfare (as it is now called) for the rich and big corporations, it was argued, would increase and inflation would decrease, unemployment would be reduced and “tax revenues [would] rise” (Leicht & Fitzgerald, 2007, p. 41). The policies, it was trumpeted, would drive up productivity and productive capacities, while lowering wages and inflation. The rise in international competition would also result in keeping prices down. Government revenues would, moreover, rise because of the new taxes accruing from increased economic activities. In the West and many increasingly liberalizing parts of the world, especially after the demise of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, neoliberalism continued to attract politicians across the political spectrum through the Nineties. In the US, Bill Clinton promulgated the Democratic Party’s version of center-left neoliberal economic reform and Tony Blair embarked upon the Labour Party’s own. Arguing that economic growth was hindered by “bloated” government bureaucracy and unbearable social welfare programmes for the poor, governments on both the left and right of the political spectrum initiated and began to implement what came to be called “Leaner and Meaner” policies. Like right wing parties, the left-leaning parties, such as the Democratic Party in the USA and the Labour Party in the UK, engaged in the politics of slash and burn, cutting social welfare programs, which were designed to provide a safety net for the impoverished and deprived.

The Philosophical and Ideological Wellspring of NeoLiberalism Neo-Liberalism draws from the wellspring of Social Darwinism: a racist, sexist, and classist theory based on the premise of ‘survival of the

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fittest’. The term ‘survival of the fittest’, coined by the English sociologist Herbert Spencer, was a vulgarization of a more complex theory by his compatriot Charles Darwin, the theory of evolution by natural selection. Herbert Spencer (1857) perverted Darwinism in such a way that it eventually sought to explain the origin and evolution of the plant and animal species through natural selection and struggle. The assumption of Social Darwinism is that some races are endowed with superior genes while others inherit inferior genes. Those with superior genes are better able to survive, thrive and control their social environments, which include those with inferior genes. Social Darwinists drew on the idea of struggle and survival as natural mechanisms for improving human genetic characteristics. In fact, inferior races and societies, it was hypothesized, would ‘naturally’ wither away. Attempts to save them were in defiance of the laws of nature. Subsequently, Adam Smith’s laissez-faire economic theory (Smith, 1999), which proposed non-governmental intervention in the economic affairs of individuals and the promotion of a free-market economy based on the ‘invisible hands’ of the market, was incorporated into Social Darwinism. The aim was to let the ‘natural laws’ of the market take their due course, during which the ‘economically deficient’ peoples would be weeded out and the ‘economically progressive’ would thrive. According to Mills (2006), in the 19th century, Europeans increasingly became preoccupied, even obsessed, with the concept of race. White European military superiority was attributed to racial superiority while at the same time advances in the biological sciences heavily influenced the social sciences where there was an attempt to perceive of human beings as members of different subspecies or species. This racist thinking contributed to exclusionist ideas of nationalism in which a ‘nation’ constituted a ‘race’ (e.g. British race, German race, etc.). Mills (2006) suggested that many of the homogeneous characteristics (not only physical characteristics but also moral, intellectual and spiritual characteristics) were transmitted genetically, and were thus racial. Mills (2006) outlines several consequences of Social Darwinism and ultimately, white supremacy. These include: x

x

Races could be ranked, primarily according to proficiency in subjugating or even exterminating one’s opponents; someone who kills with a spear or bow and arrow is more primitive than someone who kills with machine guns and artillery. Morality was rejected as a criterion for survivability as nature was considered amoral. Strength became the rationalization for colonization.

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Social Darwinists saw competition and struggle as separating the efficient and able from those less evolved. The economic survival of the fittest was called for.

Mills (2006) contends that Social Darwinists often blamed the government, including policies that relieved unemployment and destitution, as the reason for the contrary outcome. They argued that social welfare measures preserved inferior racial stock and encouraged their reproduction, eventually arguing that society and the government should ensure, by biological engineering and selective breeding, that the superior human species thrived. Eugenics was born, applying to humans practices developed for the breeding of domestic animals. In North America, eugenicists and Social Darwinists tended to focus on immigration policies focusing on passing anti-Asian legislation. Southern, Eastern and Central European immigrants were also held to be inferior, threatening to reduce the quality of the racial stock in Canada.

The Global Tentacles of Colonialism, Neocolonialism and Neoliberal Globalization Nkrumah (1973) asserted that both colonialism and neocolonialism are global in their orientation and reach. Both thrive on the cresting wave of globalization. Globalization translates into global hegemony of capitalist relations. A more apt description of globalization is post-Cold War global corporatization. Global corporatization is a neoliberal discourse in defense of global capitalism. Its intent is to advance and legitimize the spread of the tentacles of mainly Western-owned Transnational Corporations (TNCs) to every corner of the globe. Under the guise of promoting international trade, competitiveness, and cost-effectiveness, these TNCs pursue profit at all costs with little regard for social justice. Global corporatization has been conceptualized as a neoliberal discourse and ideology that has come to shape power relations in the contemporary world (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 19). In fact, it has risen to the level of a doctrine and it informs the perspective of the policymakers and stewards of the global capitalist economy. Apostles of this doctrine contend that allocations of goods and services are managed better in a market free of regulations. But, as we shall soon see, this contention is undercut by the seemingly unending crises of global capitalism from the Great Depression of the 1930s to the Great Recession of the first decade of the New Millennium. Like neocolonialism, neoliberal globalization or global corporatization is the handmaiden of managers of the global

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economy in the West. And, as Nkrumah says of neocolonialism, neoliberal globalization is fertilized by an expansionist ideology of internationalization of public policy. Abu-Laban and Gabriel (2002, p. 23) refer to the internationalization of public policy as “the extent to which national policies are influenced by outside factors in other parts of the world”. Increasingly, national policies in the Global South are more than ever influenced by Western socio-political-economic institutions. Neoliberal globalization privileges the role of the market and minimizes the role of government in economic decision-making. It pushes for a transnational decentralization of production and services in order to integrate disparate national economies into one global economy. Neoliberal policies promote and lead to the increasing economic specialization of nations in exporting food, natural resources, or industrial manufactured goods, perpetuating a tertiary division of economic development. Investment in local economies by multinational corporations has had devastating effects, namely the rise in unemployment and the movement of rural people into urban centers. This is especially the case since local firms and business cannot compete with multinational companies (Mirfakhraie & Quist-Adade, 2013).

Global Corporatization and Global (In)Justice Addressing delegates in 1999, UN Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette argued that, like almost everything in life, the phenomenon of globalization “brings up many opportunities to learn from each other, and to benefit from a wider range of choices, but it can also seem very threatening”. One especially disturbing trend is that “[P]arents find their children attracted by products and role models from alien cultures,” just as workers find their jobs rendered obsolete by imported technology and foreign competition, according to Frechette, and “Instead of widening our choices, globalization seems to be forcing us all into the same shallow, consumerist culture—giving us the same appetites but leaving us more than ever unequal in our ability to satisfy them. Many millions of people have yet to feel its benefits at all”. The UN study contends that, “What is needed is support for indigenous and national cultures—to let them flourish alongside foreign cultures” (As cited in Okeke, 2011, p. 31). Year after year, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reports an ever-widening inequality between the Global North and the Global South. In its 1999 report, for example, it made a number startling revelations. Europeans spent $11 billion a year on ice cream. This accounts for $2 billion more than the estimated annual total needed to provide clean water and safe sewers for the world's population. Americans

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and Europeans spent $17 billion a year on pet food. This accounts for $4 billion more than the estimated annual additional total needed to provide basic health and nutrition for everyone in the world. The fortunes of the world's three richest people exceeded the gross national product of the poorest countries and their 600 million inhabitants. The three were: Bill Gates of Microsoft, financier Warren Buffett and Paul Allen, also of Microsoft, who have total assets of 156 billion dollars. The richest fifth of the world's people consumed 86 percent of all goods and services while the poorest fifth consumes just 1.3 percent. Indeed, the richest fifth consumed 45 percent of all meat and fish, 58 percent of all energy used, 84 percent of all paper, has 74 percent of all telephone lines and owns 87 percent of all vehicles ( UN World Report: http://www.un.org/ Pubs/CyberSchoolBus/dailyfax/df99ix.htm). The report’s main findings are summarized below. The picture has changed much since then. In fact, the gap between the rich and poor, domestically and globally, has widened over the years. According to Chen & Ravallion (2008), the Global South is poorer than previously thought. They reported that 95% of the Global South population lived on less than $10 a day. The developing world is poorer than we thought but no less successful in the fight against poverty (World Bank, August 2008). Inequality is not only deepening within countries, it is also increasing between nations (See Box.)

Table 1 (following page):

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THE HAVES TThe fortune of thee world’s three richest people excceeds the gross national • p product of the poorest countries and a their 600 milllion inhabitants. • TThe richest fifth of the world’s peo ople consume 86 percent of all goods and services while thee poorest fifth con nsume just 1.3 peercent. • In ndeed, the richesst fifth consume 45 4 percent of all meat and fish, 58 8 percent of all energy used an nd 84 percent of all a paper, has 74 percent of all telephone 7 percent of all ve ehicles. lines and owns 87 RICH THE ULTRA R • TThe three richest people in the wo orld have assets t hat exceed the co ombined ggross domestic prroduct of the 48 least -developed countries. THE SUPER R RICH • TThe world's 225 riichest individualss, of whom 60 aree Americans with h total assets o of $311 billion, haave a combined wealth w of over $1 trillion— equal to t the annual income of the poorest 47 percent p of the woorld's entire popu ulation. N COSMETICS AND EDUCATION • A Americans spend $8 billion a year on cosmetics—$ 2 billion more than the eestimated annual total needed to provide basic eduucation for everyyone in the w world. ICE CREAM AND WATER • EEuropeans spend $11 billion a year on ice cream—$$2 billion more than the eestimated annual total needed to provide clean waater and safe sew wers for the w world's population. PET FOOD A AND HEALTH • A Americans and Eu uropeans spend $17 $ billion a year on pet food—$4 4 billion m more than the esttimated annual additional total neeeded to provide basic h health and nutrition for everyone in the world. $40 BILLION N A YEAR • Itt is estimated thaat the additional cost c of achieving and maintainingg universal access to basic ed ducation for all, basic health care ffor all, reproductive health d for all and cleann water and safe sewers for care for all women, adequate food all is roughly $40 billion a year. Thiis is less than fouur percent of the combined w wealth of the 225 richest people in n the world. Source: Hum man Developmentt Report 1999

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Table 2

In some Global Soutth countries, half of the aannual deaths occur in children undder the age off 10 years. Ev very ten minuttes, 300 people around the world ddie of hungerr! More than 40,000 persoons a day; 15 5 million persons a yeear starve to death. d In the world as a w whole, 15% or 1 billion people suffeer from chronnic hunger. About A 100 miillion children n in poor countries aree forced to woork the streetss (e.g, beg, steeal, sell sex). Over 100 million chilldren have deserted d their families andd live off th he streets (Source: Gloobal Inequalitty “A world where w some livve in ...”). Women,, Slavery and Poverty: In n all societie s, a woman’ss work is unrecognizeed, undervalueed, and underrpaid. In the G Global South, workers in sweatshopps are mostly women. Seveenty percent oof the world’ss 1 billion people living near absoluute poverty aree women (Souurce: Global Inequality I “A world whhere some livee in ...”).

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Health: Every year 10.9 million children under the age of five die; 60 percent of those deaths are a result of hunger. Every year another 17 million children are born with low birth weight stemming from the inadequate nutrition of their mothers (United Nations World Food Programme [UN WFP] 2004). Infants are 11 times more likely to die at birth in low-income countries than in high-income countries. Children often die from illnesses readily treated in wealthier countries (Global Inequality, 2016) Hunger, Malnutrition and Famine: More than three-quarters of all malnourished children under the age of five in the world’s low- and middle-income countries live in countries that actually produce a food surplus. Most hunger and famine are the result of natural and social forces. Their malnutrition isn’t directly related to their country’s wealth. Markets in the highly developed region states have been allowed to dominate the process, and the benefits and opportunities have not been shared equally, resulting in global inequalities in income and living standards reaching significant proportions. It is argued that the new rules of globalization (and the players writing them) focus on integrating global markets, neglecting the needs of people that markets cannot meet. The process of concentrating power can be argued to be a principal factor in the marginalizing OF the poor. He debunks several myths woven around globalization. Here are a few of them (Source: Global Inequality “A world where some live in ...”). Globalization has been described as neoliberal capitalism, and rightly so. Neoliberal policies were designed and promoted by the Washington consensus from the 1980s to the 1990s. The concept and name of the Washington Consensus were first presented in 1989 by John Williamson, an economist from an economic think-tank in Washington DC. The term Washington Consensus was used to summarize the commonly shared themes among policy advice by Washington-based institutions at the time such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the United States Treasury Department. It was a set of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs)/economic policies which countries must follow in order to qualify for new World Bank and IMF loans to help them make debt repayments on the older debts owed to commercial banks, governments and the World Bank. The Washington Consensus was believed to be necessary for the recovery of Latin America from the financial crisis of the 1980s. The following are its 10 broad sets of recommendations: 1. Fiscal policy discipline (this often result in deep cuts in programs like education, health and social care).

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To summarize, the Washington Consensus’ neoliberal policies called for (i) promotion of free markets, (ii) relaxation of trade barriers, (iii) reduction of subsidies for the poor, and (iv) the privatization of public assets. The Washington Consensus promoted policies based on growth (priority) through deregulation, free markets, supply side economics, minimalist governments, and residual social policies. Cuts in public expenditures, avoiding fiscal deficits, privatization of public assets services, and a minimalist government; the state was portrayed as predatory, crowding out the private sector. The implementation of the

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policies, not surprisingly, weakened the role of Global South governments and led to a growing dominance of Western-based transnational capital. As the weakened governments became increasingly insecure, they spent a sizeable chunk of the national kitty on military hardware from the West and other industrialized countries to crack down on ‘enemies of the state’.

The Global Economy These policies have resulted in crushing debt burdens on poor countries. In the early 1980s, the conservative governments of Ronald Reagan in the USA and Margaret Thatcher in the UK began to promote the neoliberal policies and elevated the ‘free trade’ theory to a dogma. This led to diminished aid from rich countries to poor countries, accelerated capital flows and increased influence of privatization of public assets in the Global South. This period saw the expansion of the role of transnational corporations in the Global South countries, many influencing the policies of governments in poorer countries (Quist-Adade, 2012).

Debt Crisis (1982 to present) Under the neoliberal policies, commercial banks loaned vast amounts of capital to developing nations at high interest rates. The expanded bank lending fueled by oil prices in the late 70s led to drastic changes in the international economy. To stave off the crisis, Global South governments borrowed more money from commercial banks. Many countries were stretched to the max. In July 1982, Mexico defaulted on its debt payments, heralding the beginning of a global financial crisis. The majority of Global South countries faced a crippling burden of debt (Shah, 2014). The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa spent an average of $12 billion annually on debt repayments from 1990-1995, while their total debt increased by $33 billion. For the 27 highly-indebted nations, their debt was greater than their Gross National Product (GNP). For example, Tanzania’s debt service payments were nine times what it spent on primary healthcare and four times what it spent on primary education. Mozambique had a debt burden nine times the value of its exports (Barry, 2015).

Neoliberal Diagnosis Neoliberal scholars and “experts” from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank claimed that the root cause of the crisis was attributable the bloated bureaucracy and state control in Global South

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countries. The State, they charged, was playing too large a role in the economy, markets were being inhibited and state intervention was preventing markets from being efficient. They insisted that government should stick only to property rights and enforcing contracts (Quist-Adade, 2012).

Neoliberal Prescription The experts made a number of recommendations to ‘Third World’ governments to: x Reduce the role of the state relative to the market x Allow floating currency rates and wages to be determined by market forces and interest rates x Lift all barriers to trade and investment (opposite of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”—free movement of labor but not capital) x Reorient economies toward export production, away from self sufficiency x Remove restrictions on foreign investment x Reduce wages x Cut tariffs x Impose consumption taxes (value added tax/VAT) x Eliminate price subsidies on essentials like food and housing x Devalue local currency x Privatize state enterprises x Deregulate government oversight of economic activity The prescriptions came to be known collectively as structural adjustment programs (SAPs).

Failed Growth Policies Seventy-five countries had received loans by 1991. Thirty of the 52 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and 18 in Latin America were compelled to accept SAPs. What were the consequences of SAPs for these countries? SAPs were deemed to be a failure. It did not reduce debt, poverty or increase economic growth as the experts and political leaders promised; it did the exact opposite and more. In fact, there was an overall increase in debt, both of official debt and commercial debt. It created even more heavily indebted poor countries: HIPCs, including Bolivia, Burkina, Ivory

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Coast, Guyana, Mozambique, and Uganda. Under SAPs, only 33 countries achieved sustained three percent annual growth in gross national product (GNP) per capita during 1980–1996. For 59 countries, mainly in subSaharan Africa and the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, GNP per capita declined from 1980 to 1996.

Revised Poverty Agenda – 1990 The tragic failure of SAPs led to calls to abandon the neoliberal “medicine”. Beginning in the 1990s, a whole sleuth of revisions was introduced to the poverty agenda. Here are some of them: x Labor-intensive growth, invest in human capital, promote social safety nets x Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) x Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) led by the Group of Eight (G8) x Reduction of tariffs, elimination of state support for industry, privatization of infrastructure to foreigners, removal of capital controls, opening up of service sector to foreign investors x The goal was to bring debt burden to a “sustainable level”, although HIPC failed to achieve the goals either. In fact, progress has still not been attained, as many sub-Saharan African countries’ growth has been static for the past 15 years

Alternative Global Equity Agenda – 2005 In 2005, several Civic Society Organizations (CSO) and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) came under an umbrella organization, Jubilee 500 to launch a campaign calling for the complete and unconditional cancelation of all multilateral debt owned by all sovereign Global South countries. In addition, several other recommendations were made from different quarters, including the following: cap on debt servicing level; fair trade justice; end of conditions on trade and tariffs; end of agricultural subsidies; adequate aid (> 0.7% to meet need) (See Priorities for research to take forward the health equity policy ... www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/83/12/948.pdf).

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The Role of Transnational Corporation in Globalization and the Social Justice Agenda Transnational Corporations (TNCs), also called Multinational Corporations (MNCs), are described as “Non-state actors”. They wield enormous economic power and political clout; of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations. The top 200 corporations’ sales are growing at a faster rate than global economic activity. The top 200’s combined sales are 18 times the size of the combined annual income of 1.2 billion people living in severe poverty. US firms dominate the top 200 (82), while Japanese firms are second with 41.The sales of the Top 200 are the equivalent of 28% of world economic activity, but they only employ 0.8% of the world’s workforce. Between 1983 and 1999, the top 200 profits grew by 362% but employment grew by only 14%. Forty-four of 82 US corporations in the top 200 did not pay full taxes. The top corporations earn 40-50% of their yearly profits from sales overseas. Increasing numbers of individual factories and entire industries are moving overseas (outsourced) to benefit from reduced wages, lower standards and higher profit margins. I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me and causes me to tremble for the safety of my country. Corporations have been enthroned and an era of corruption in high places will follow, and the money power of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands and the Republic is destroyed. – President Abraham Lincoln, November 21, 1864, letter to Colonel William F. Elkins.

Conclusion: A Pan-African Antidote to Neoliberal Globalization “Thought without practice is blind; practice without thought is blind” (Nkrumah, 1964, p. 354).

As mentioned above, Nkrumah proposed Pan-Africanism as an antidote to neocolonialism. Before I conclude this chapter, it is pertinent to provide a brief account of Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism is an idea (ideology), a movement and a long-term project. It emerged as a response to Euro-American oppression in the form of the slave trade, colonialism and racism. The European trade in Africans resulted in centuries-long enforced separation between the continent and its Diasporas. During the period of the European Slave Trade when African slaves, taken to North

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and South America, were unable to maintain contact with their home, areas in Africa. However, after slavery was abolished in the Americas, many ex-slaves attempted to re-establish contact with Africa or people of Africans heritage in other communities in the Americas. This interest in Africa led some freed Africans to return to Africa (Exploring Africa (Exploring Africa, 2015): The severed link between Africa and its Diasporas was gradually restored as many ex-slaves attempted to reestablish contact with Africa or people of African heritage in other communities in the Americas. This interest in Africa led some freed Africans to return to Africa. Other Africans in Europe and the Americas sought ways in which they could learn more about Africa and assist Africa in its struggle against colonialism (ibid.). Pan-Africanism as an idea is based on the premise of unity in diversity. That is to say, that, although there is great diversity in Africa, Africans in Africa and in the Diaspora share a common heritage of exploitation and oppression by slavery and colonialism, neocolonialism and internal colonialism. As a movement, Pan-Africanism revolves around the magnetic pole of unity and solidarity of people of African heritage in the struggle to end all forms of racism, prejudice, and discrimination against racialized minorities (“people of color”) and in the work for the liberation of African colonies. Pan-Africanism was led by illustrious sons and daughters of Global Africa. To name but a few: Edward Blyden, Sylvester Williams, W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, and Nnamdi Azikiwe. The continued relevance to Nkrumah’s ideas is uncontested. He attempted to put his African liberation agenda into practice but was thwarted by both internal and external forces. The way out of this was to be found in his blueprint for African unity as spelled out in his speech on the eve of the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa on May 24, 1963: (1) A commission to frame a constitution for a Union Government of African States. (2) A commission to work out a continent-wide plan for a unified or common economic and industrial programme for Africa; this should include proposals for setting up: a common market for Africa; an African currency; an African monetary zone; an African central bank; a continental communication system; a commission to draw up details for a common foreign policy and diplomacy; a commission to produce plans for a common system of defense; a commission to make proposals for a common African citizenship. While the African Union, the successor of the OAU, has begun to implement some aspects of Nkrumah’s blueprint for a continental union

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government, there is yet to emerge a coherent and unified movement armed with what Nkrumah called ‘Pan-African Nationalism’ to carry on his mantle both in the political and academic realm. The Pan-Africanist movement after Nkrumah’s departure seems to have lost steam and ideological focus. But all is not lost; it is never too late. A new PanAfrican nationalist realignment infused with a new and urgent praxisoriented realism is needed to bring back ideological and philosophical muscle to 21st-century Pan-Africanism. Such a new Pan-African nationalist realignment will provide the ontological and epistemological tool to assess and provide an antidote to post-Cold War, neoliberal situations in Global Africa, i.e. Africa and is Diasporas. In other words, while most of the tenets of Africanism continue to be relevant to the contemporary neo/postcolonial, globalizing world, there are several such tenets that need to be reevaluated, re-conceptualized or re-contextualized within the framework of current trends and changes. For example, while its integrationist and socialist focus are still needed, a new discourse that appeals to the so-called average African, particularly the youth, is needed. Such a discourse must aim at three simple objectives: simplicity, accessibility, and relevance. For example, it is estimated that, by 2025, there will be one billion working-age people in Africa, surpassing China and India put together. And, as Winnie Byanyimah, Executive Director of Oxfam International, put it, this is a huge asset. Nevertheless, “it must be skilled, productive and innovative” to be any of any use in Africa’s development scheme of things (BBC, 2015). The New Pan-African discourse/ language must be simplified for broader comprehension and acceptance. It must be accessible to all people of Global Africa and it must address the immediate needs of the masses of the African people. To be successful, 21st-century Pan-African nationalism must be pragmatic and nimble, changing and adapting to the contours and exigencies of the times. Any theory that does not lend itself to intension through precision and extension/expansion to accommodate new ideas, risks atrophying and becoming a stale doctrine. The aim, therefore, is to breathe new life into Pan-Africanism in such a way that it becomes more relevant and praxis-oriented, people-oriented, youth-oriented, and technologically-oriented, making maximum use of 21st-century methods of communication, mobilization, and consciousness-raising. The challenge to scholars interested in the African liberation project, therefore, is to reevaluate and situate Pan-Africanism as a counter-discourse and discursive practice in the context of the globalizing neo-liberalizing, postcolonial and postmodern 21st century and beyond.

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References Abu-Laban, Y., & Gabriel, C. (2002). Selling Diversity: Immigration, multiculturalism, employment equity, and globalization. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press. Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. Key Concepts in PostColonial Studies. London and New York: Routledge, 1998. Barry, Christian. (2015). “Sovereign Debt, Human Rights, and Policy Conditionality”. https://www.academia.edu/909284/Sovereign_Debt_Human_Rights_a nd_Policy_Conditionality_ Retrieved on June 3, 2015. Corporate Power Facts and Stats — Global Issues. http://www.globalissues.org/article/59/corporate-power-facts-and-stats. Retrieved on May 25, 2015. Exploring Africa, 2015): http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu//teachers/curriculum/m15/activit y7.php retrieved May 18, 2015) Falola, Toyin; Heaton, Matthew. "Neo-Colonialism." New Dictionary of the History of Ideas. 2005. Encyclopedia.com. (May 25, 2015). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3424300540.html Global Inequality (2016).A world where some live in. Retrieved on 18 June, 2016. Giroux, H. A. (1994). Disturbing Pleasures: Learning Popular Cultures. New York: Routledge. Ihonvbere, Julius O. (1994). Pan-Africanism: Agenda for African Unity in the 1990s. Keynote address at The All-African Student's Conference, Peter Clark Hall, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada, May 27, 1994. Kamrava, M. (1993). Politics and Society in the Third World. New York: Routledge. Kubow, P. K., & Fossum, P. R. (2007). Comparative Education: Exploring issues in international context (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc.Leicht, Kevin T. and Scott T. Fitzgerald. 2014. The Real Reason 60 Is the New 30: Consumer Debt and ... The Sociological Quarterly. 55(2):236-260. Lee, Paul (2002). “Documents Expose U.S. Role in Nkrumah Overthrow”. http://www.seeingblack.com/x060702/nkrumah.shtml Lenin, Vladimir Illyich. (1917). Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism. Moscow: Zhizn' i znanie Leong Yew, “Political Discourse – Theories of Colonialism and Post colonialism,” Postcolonial Web,

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http://www.postcolonialweb.org/poldiscourse/Neo-Colonialism1.html. Retrieved on 25 May, 2015 McMichael, Philip. (2008) Development and Social Change. New York: Pine Forge. Mirfakharie, Amir and Quist-Adade, Charles. (2013). An Introduction to Critical Sociology: From Modernity to Postmodernity. Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt. Poe, Zizwe. (2015). “Perspectives on African Independence—Perennial Challenges to African Independence and the Nagging Essentials of African Liberation.” In Africa's Many Divides and Africa's Future: Pursuing Nkrumah’s Vision of Pan-Africanism in an Era of Globalization. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing Priorities for research to take forward the health equity policy. http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/83/12/948.pdf. Retrieved on May 25, 2015. Mills, W.G. (2006). Racism and Social Darwinism. Retrieved September 30, 2006. http://stmarys.ca/~wmills/course203/8Racism.html Nkrumah, Kwame. (1965). Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism: New York: International Publishers. —. (1963). Africa Must Unite. London: Heinemann Publishers. —. (1967). Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah. London: PANAF. —. (1961). I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology. London: William Heinemann Ltd. —. Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for de-colonisation. New York: Monthly Review. Perry, M. (2001). Western Civilization: A brief history. Volume II: From the 1400s. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. Quist-Adade, Charles. (2001). In the Shadows of the Kremlin and the White House: Africa’s Media Image From Communism to Post-Communism. Lanham: University Press of America. —. (2012). Social Justice Issues in Local and Global Contexts. Ste Sault Marie: London Ellesmere Publishing. Shah, Anup (2014). “Foreign Aid for Development Assistance.” http://www.globalissues.org/article/35/foreign-aid-developmentassistance. Retrieved on June 3, 2015 Smith, Adam. (1999). The Wealth of Nations. London: Penguin Books. Spencer, H. (1857, April). Progress: Its Law and Causes, The Westminster Review, 67. Steger, M. B. (2003). Globalization: A very short introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Stockwell, John (1978). In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Teeple, Gary. (1995). Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform. Toronto: Garamond Press. United Nations World Food Programme [UN WFP] 2004 Wallerstein, I. (1998). Utopistics. New York: The New Press. Washington Consensus - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Webster, A. (1984). Introduction to the Sociology of Development. Houndmills: Macmillan. Young, Robert. Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001.

CHAPTER SIX THE NEO-LIBERAL AGENDA VERSUS THE PAN-AFRICANIST AGENDA: TOWARDS THE WAY FORWARD DR AMA BINEY INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

The Pan-Africanist movement has historically failed to define the economics of a future Pan-Africanist Africa or the political economy of Pan-Africanism. There are those such as Marcus Garvey who called for industrialisation of Africa without any commitment to an egalitarian economic system for people of African descent, whilst the Nation of Islam (NOI) are equally uncritical of capitalism and seem to embrace black capitalism in the same way that the African National Congress of South Africa embraced the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme since the negotiated political transition of 1994. Similarly, the African Union (AU) has, since July 2001, advocated the New Economic Partnership for Africa (NEPAD), which promotes a free market economy that accommodates neoliberal economic policies (Adesina, 2006; Taylor, 2006; Bond, 2005). The current “Agenda 2063” under the auspices of the African Development Bank and the AU appears to advocate the unquestioning acceptance of market-driven strategies and solutions. For example, the African Union Commission calls for “improved flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)” which largely underpins the neoliberal paradigm that has bedevilled the African continent in the last 30 years (See ‘About Agenda 2063’). Foreign direct investment is a core tenet of neoliberal policies and is often considered a panacea to African economic development. This is illusory and undermines a genuine attempt to envision an egalitarian African political economy that is not dependent on foreign assistance and extractive exploitation. By political economy, I refer to an examination of the production, exchange and distribution of goods and services in a society with their corresponding social relations

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and political ideology. Shivji (2009, p. 20) contends that, “who produces, who appropriates, and how surplus product is disposed of are the big questions of political economy”. Fundamental to developing a new political economy of Africa must be issues of the extent to which the needs of ordinary people are met, and the extent to which they are involved in questions relating to the production and distribution of wealth in society. In other words, placing people before the maximisation of profits must be the central focus of a Pan-Africanist agenda and a new political economy of Africa. Pan-Africanism as a movement and a vision needs to devise a PanAfrican economic agenda or political economy for the 21st-century (Rodney, 1976 p. 27). For the purposes of this chapter, I will confine my focus to the political and economic aspects of the Pan-African agenda. This chapter will address the following questions: x What is neo-liberalism? x Whose interests does neo-liberalism serve? x Can neoliberal economic policy prescriptions coexist with PanAfricanism? x Whose interests should a Pan-Africanist agenda serve? x What does a Pan-Africanist agenda look like?

What is neo-liberalism and whose interests does it serve? Historical contextualisation of Africa’s embrace of neo-liberal ideology is necessary. In brief, Africa has been critical to the globalising mission of capitalism that was fuelled by the onslaught of the transatlantic slave trade that occurred over four centuries and was followed by the globalization of colonialism. As Ndikumana (2015, p. 1) contends, “King Leopold’s conquest of the Congo is the most popularized and blatant illustration of … ‘exploitative integration’ or ‘extractive integration’ of Africa in the global economy”. Moreover, he argues, “not only that Africa is indeed integrated into the global economy, but also that this integration is not new, and its main features have not changed significantly. Rather, they have become more complex and more damaging” (ibid.). The last four decades of Africa’s “development” were initiated in the 1960s and 1970s by “the ages of developmentalism”, followed by the 1980s that were characterised as “Africa’s lost decade” and the 1990s have been referred to as “the ages of globalization” (Shivji, 2009, p. 1). Therefore, neoliberalism needs to be seen as part of the mission of globalization, but in a

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new context. For Shivji (2009, p. 13), “globalization expresses itself in Africa as neo-liberalism”. Volumes have been written on the history of neo-liberalism that need not detain us here (Harvey 2005; Bobo & Sintim-Aboagye 2012; Harrison, 2010). Suffice it to say that Africa has been subjugated to this economic doctrine since the decades of the 1980s and 1990s when it was termed Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), otherwise known as Suffering African People or the Washington Consensus. This “one size fits all” economic policy prescription was founded on the ideological belief that the African state had overgrown in size and needed to be trimmed down and eventually removed from its negatively perceived role in the economy, whilst the market would correct distortions and be a fair arbiter and engine of growth, job creation and, ultimately, development (Mkandawire 2001, p. 293). Consequently, health and education budgets were cut massively; workers retrenched in a number of state enterprises that were sold off to the private sector; and there was a massive promotion of foreign direct investment, which is integral to the neo-liberal dogma. It is important to stress that proponents of SAPs and neo-liberalism deny the ideological content of such policies. In other words, they will deny that SAPs and neoliberalism envision society in a particular model; seek to reshape society, government, and the economy towards specific values; and regulate social relations between groups of peoples or classes in a particular way. Ultimately, such advocates propound the neutrality of states and markets. Equally, as Sahle (2014) correctly argues, neither are state structures and markets “gender neutral”. She contends: “both the patriarchal ideology that has marked the evolution of African states has contributed to the marginalization of the majority of African women, and highlights how the promotion of market-led accumulation strategies by the transnational lending community and the governing institutions of this community, leading among them, the World Bank, is deepening this process”. Put differently, neo-liberalism, of which SAPs were a variant during the 1980s and 1990s, operates both at the level of the economy and politics and also adversely affects culture. Hence, there is a political economy of neo-liberalism that propounds a political system founded on competing multi-parties; a free press and independent judiciary; paramount respect for private property and the rules of the market; stabilisation of monetary and fiscal policies; privatisation of public and private assets; marketization of the economy and regulation by the state for the free movement of capital and labour.

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In the following lengthy citation, Harvey (2005, p. 119) articulates the seductive ideology of neo-liberalism and the extent to which it has penetrated the world: The incredible concentrations of wealth and power that now exist in the upper echelons of capitalism have not been seen since the 1920s. The flows of tribute into the world’s major financial centres have been astonishing. What, however, is even more astonishing is the habit of treating all of this as a mere and in some instances even unfortunate byproduct of neo-liberalization. The very idea that this might be – just might be – the fundamental core of what neo-liberalization has been about all along appears unthinkable. It has been part of the genius of neoliberal theory to provide a benevolent mask full of wonderful-sounding words like freedom, liberty, choice and rights, to hide the grim realities of the restoration or reconstitution of naked class power, locally as well as transnationally, but most particularly in the main financial centres of global capitalism. (Italics mine)

It is a myth and a delusion that neoliberal economic policies and “market fundamentalism” will create “trickle down growth”. The reality is that neoliberalism serves a particular class interest: the global/transnational capitalist elite of which those who are proponents of NEPAD and the AU’s “agenda 2063” subscribe to (Adesina, 2006).

Can neoliberal economic policy prescriptions coexist with Pan-Africanism? For well over 30 years, African countries have subscribed to neoliberal policy prescriptions. In the latter part of the 1990s, a new emphasis was demanded by the international donor community with the fall of the Eastern bloc nations and dissolution of the Soviet Union. Aid was made conditional on the prescriptions of “good governance”. Therefore, African regimes had to reform themselves on the political level in terms of adopting multi-partyism, respecting human rights and a free press in order to gain aid to resolve budget deficits and attain debt cancelation. Yet, accountability has invariably been to outsiders, i.e. international donors, rather than to the African peoples who elected such governments into power. The economic paradise that was promised by various African governments on the eve of independence has not only been inimical to genuine people-led socio-economic development and improvement in the living standards of the masses of African people, but it has ultimately failed to liberate African economies from external exploitation.

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Neo-liberalism is rigged against African economies. As the economist Ha-Joon Chang (2002, p. 19) argues, the economic policies Britain, the USA, Germany, France, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Japan, Korea and Taiwan adopted, “are almost the opposite of what the present orthodoxy says they employed ‘and currently recommends that the currently developing countries should also use’”. Robust industrial, trade and technology policies were adopted by these states which protected domestic industries. Furthermore, whilst the USA and Britain provide huge subsidies to their farmers, these countries, along with the IMF and World Bank, in which they retain veto rights, dictate to African farmers and African states the removal of subsidies to assist African farmers. Therefore, how can African farmers who fail to get support from the African state, compete in a system that is wholly unfair and unfree that is supported by the IMF, World Bank and WTO? As Chang (2002, pp. 127128) contends, such policies as advocated by the developed countries of the North and the international donor community, are about “kicking away the ladder” by which they climbed to the top in order that African countries can never catch up. Equally integral to the crisis of the political economy of Africa since independence is the bankrupt and corrupt mind-set of the incumbent neocolonial African elite. Ake correctly points out that the post-independent African elite were confronted with the problem of development that inculcated a sense of common cause and allowed it “to reproduce its domination, criminalise political dissent, and for institutionalizing the single-party structure”. Furthermore, he claims: The elite responded to this dilemma by making token gestures to development while trying to pass on the responsibility for development to foreign patrons. Thus while African leaders talked about the fragility of political independence and the need to buttress it by self-reliant development they eagerly embraced economic dependence. In time, this frame of mind led to the conception of development as something to be achieved through changes in the vertical relations between Africa and the wealthy countries: a greater flow of technical assistance to Africa, more loans on better terms, more foreign investments in Africa, accelerated transfer of technology, better prices for primary commodities, greater access to Western markets, and so forth. (Ake ,1996, p. 7-8; italics mine).

This frame of thinking continues to prevail among African leaders, state officials and policymakers. In addition, such a mind-set exists alongside what Shivji (2009, pp.59-85) refers to as disarticulated African economies that have led to economic growth without development. Among the features of this disarticulation is “the structure of production

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and the structure of consumption” (p. 59) in which what is produced is not consumed and what is consumed is not produced. In short, the raw materials of Africa, such as coffee, cocoa, cotton, tea, oil, gold, diamonds, iron, manganese, coltan, etc. fail to produce internal markets and to generate integrated industries. Other features of this disarticulation include a lack of linkages between the agricultural and industrial sector and consequently “industries exit as enclaves bearing little relation to agriculture, while both are integrated in the global circuits” (p. 61). More importantly, there is a need to define what we mean by “development” itself. It is an overused term and means different things to the international donor community, Western governments, NGO advocates and intellectuals in Africa and the West. For the last 50 years, that is since African countries attained independence, “development” has meant for many in the West and many African neo-colonial leaders that Africa would imitate the West according to Walt Rostow’s 1960 The Stages of Economic Growth in which he outlined five stages of growth that societies should undergo in order to become like the US. As Davidson (1975, p. 322) aptly contends: “All such linear concepts of development ignore the facts of history”. In short, in redefining Africa’s future, Africans must debate and redefine the meaning of “development”, for too often Western models and paradigms of development have been imposed on African societies and economies by the international donor community, NGOs, and Northern governments in collaboration with a neo-colonial African elite who have subscribed to such Eurocentric notions of development (Tandon, 2009). Neither must the concept of “development” be limited to simply economic processes for it also occurs on a social, cultural, political and technological level. Integral to any notion of “development” must be the participation of ordinary people. Development cannot be done on behalf of one group of people for another. Neither is it a top down process but rather a bottom up process. Tandon (2008, p. 13) claims that development “aims at leading lives of dignity, which include gainful employment that helps individuals to meet basic needs, security, equity and participation. These lead to self-fulfilment”. In addition, it is “the continuous struggle for the right and access to decision making that affects the life and livelihood of the individual, the community, the nation and the region”. Prevailing neo-liberal economic orthodoxy in Africa advocates that foreign direct investment in addition to aid is the panacea to Africa’s economic development. Tandon (2014) cogently argues that we need to “rethink the role of global investment in Africa’s development” as well as the role of aid. As Tandon (2014) contends: “Aid is corruption. Why?

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Because it corrupts government policy. In return for ‘aid’ governments in Africa are obliged to surrender policy space to the ‘donors’ and the IMF. Aid does something else besides corrupting democratic good governance. It creates space for foreign direct investments (FDIs)” which can take years to negotiate, but they integrate African economies into further exploitative and unequal relations and the capitalist status quo dominated by finance capital and global corporations. In February 2015, the African Union (AU) and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) High Level Panel (HLP) on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa was published stating that the continent annually loses $50 billion in revenues (See UNECA 2015). Neoliberal economic policies support illicit financial flows that are unrecorded and consist of both “illegal” capital due to corruption, theft and criminality, as well as “legal” capital driven by tax avoidance that exploits international trade and fiscal loopholes. Every year Africa loses $35. 3 billion to illicit outflows such as tax dodging and, mostly in the extractive sectors, by transnational companies. Neither do neo-liberal economic policies sanction against “trade mispricing” in which there is a deliberate distortion of the cost of goods to reduce tax. Mis-invoicing, transfer pricing, tax avoidance, evasion of royalties, bribery, use of tax havens and other trading fiddles have haemorrhaged resources from Africa on a grand scale (See Honest Accounts? 2014, p. 14; Bracking and Sharife, May 2014). A crucial question in defining and implementing a Pan-Africanist political economy will be how to reverse the process of wealth-transfer and how African economies “delink” (Amin, 1985, p. 62) or “selectively disengage from Western economies” (Tandon, 2009, p. 29) that have entrapped Africa as a provider of raw materials for capitalist exploitation at the expense of her people? The neo-liberal agenda is not in the interests of African states and, more importantly, it is not in the interests of the vast majority of African people. It is irreconcilable with a genuine Pan-Africanist agenda that is diametrically opposed to capitalism. Neo-liberalism and its African manifestations in the form of NEPAD and the 2063 agenda serve a minority African middle class who, as Fanon proclaimed, are incapable of fulfilling their historic role of the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, as Fanon (1961, p. 122) points out, this class maintains its role as “the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the mask of neo-colonialism. The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie’s business agent, and it will play its part without any complexes in a most dignified manner”.

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Whose interests should a Pan-Africanist agenda serve? There is a responsibility for Pan-Africanists to educate and inform women’s organisations, trade unions, progressive faith-based organisations, youth groups, farmers, etc. of the necessity for African unity. PanAfricanist groups, organisations and movements must be directly involved in educating and the formulation of a Pan-Africanist agenda across the African continent and within the Diaspora. The Pan-Africanist agenda must be linked not only to an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist global movement, it must be in solidarity with other struggling peoples in other parts of the globe such as the Palestinians in the occupied territories. As the authors Mbah and Igariwey (1997, p. 108) argue: “What is required for now is a long-term program of class consciousness building, relevant education, and increased participation in social struggles”. Therefore, the current popular struggles unfolding across the continent in recent years – from the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings to protest against “service delivery” in the townships of South Africa, as well the struggles against the cost of living and political autocracy in countries such as Malawi, Uganda, Burkina Faso and Burundi must be connected to a Pan-Africanist vision (Ballard et al., 2006; Dawson & Sinwell, 2012; Sylla, 2014; Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012). As Abdul-Raheem (2005, p. 8–9) contends: “The collective African experience is that we can only be ourselves and we need each other to counter the threat of marginalisation, rapacious globalization and the consolidation of whatever little gains may have been accomplished in a number of African countries. No one [African] country can be a sustainable miracle if its neighbours are in hell”.

What does a Pan-Africanist agenda look like? A Pan-Africanist agenda cannot be a top-down creation but one that has the active engagement and participation of grassroots organisations and progressive Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) from across the African continent. In other words, in defining a Pan-Africanist society and continent, it must be ordinary people who are involved in its construction. For too long Pan-Africanism has been as Rodney (1976) points out, the preserve of states. Hitherto, it has tended to subscribe to a top-down and statist conception of organising society. Integral to the creation of such a society will be the unfolding of the class struggle, for, as Rodney (1976, p. 39) observes, “the principal enemies of the African people are the capitalist class in the USA, Western Europe and Japan” in collusion with

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an African neo-colonial elite. These classes remain an obstacle to the genuine liberation of Africa. As Rodney (1976, p. 39) remarks: “African liberation and unity will be realised only through struggle against the allies of international capital”. Furthermore, “that African freedom and development requires disengagement from international monopoly capital” and ultimately the creation of a socialist society. However, within the Pan-Africanist movement, there are capitalist bedfellows who envision Africa as a thriving capitalist superpower, alongside those that delude themselves in the belief that there is a human face to capitalism. Additionally, within the struggle for a Pan-Africanism that is socialist-orientated and anti-imperialist in its principles, there are those that “often talk anti-imperialist but walk sub-imperialist” (Bond, 2013). Therefore, not only will future decades of struggle in Africa see a heightening of struggle between those forces or classes who seek to ally themselves with international capital, as Rodney points out, but as Bond contends, the BRICS will continue to pursue their agenda of “relegitimising neo-liberalism” that will reinforce North American power (Bond, 2013). For example, the position of the BRICS on land grabs will be a future site of struggle in which their adherence to “accumulation by dispossession”, that is integral to the logic of the market, will come up against counter-hegemonic anti-land grab movements within Africa and globally. Under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008), his government was a keen advocate of NEPAD. His successor, President Jacob Zuma proudly announced to the World Economic Forum in 2013 that his country was not only “open for business” but was also “open to provide entry into the African continent” (Bond, 2013). The penetration of South African finance capital within the southern African region and beyond, in terms of De Beers mining capital, MTN, Shoprite, Makro and other huge investments, predicts a South Africa that the arch-robber baron, Cecil Rhodes once envisioned as a capitalist oasis of super-exploitation, from Cape Town to Cairo, benefitting a tiny minority (both Black and White people) at the expense of the majority. Other characteristics of South Africa’s sub-imperialist role continues to be its super-exploitative extractive migrant economy of male workers subsidized by Black rural women’s reproduction of children, the sick and workers. The collusion of the state, police and the multi-national company, Lonmin in the killings of African miners, is illustrative of the extent to which the conglomeration of such interests will go to preserve white dominated capital (Saul & Bond, 2014). In addition, such extraction pillages and plunders the environment,

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not to mention the irreversible damage to health that mining often causes through the toxic levels of fumes inhaled by miners (Bassey, 2011). Other characteristics of South Africa’s sub-imperialist role are demonstrated in the 2011 NATO bombing of Libya which saw South Africa toeing the US and Western line within the UN, in spite of enormous opposition within the AU to the bombing and South Africa’s role in the DRC and CAR (Bond, 2013). In East Africa, we may perhaps consider the proxy role of Ethiopia and Kenya in operating as client states to US interests in the justification of waging a “global war on terror” by invading Somalia in 2006 in order to allegedly halt the operations of Al-Shabaab. The operations of Uganda and Rwanda in looting the DRC for its mineral wealth under the pretext of pursuing genocidists in the Eastern Congo suggests sub-imperialist characteristics, for these two countries have been applauded by the West whilst their authoritarian and undemocratic leaders remain in power with Western largesse (See South African Foreign Policy Initiative, 2012; Reyntjens, 2015). In short, the unfolding of the struggle for Pan-Africanism will force a confrontation with those forces who serve imperialist and neo-liberal interests in furthering Africa’s subordination and exploitation for minority class interests—both foreign and domestic— at the expense of the majority. These policies are antithetical to PanAfricanism. In our present era, we are led to believe there is no alternative to neoliberal capitalism that is in crisis and continues to seek to fix and re-fix a very broken system. Rather, it is at this juncture that progressive forces must dare to invent the future, find an alternative to the mantra of austerity and growing poverty produced by the capitalist system and break with imperialism and neo-colonialism.

The way forward The alternative to capitalism lies in socialism (but not of the variant of the Stalinist Soviet Union or East European type). It is for African people to devise a political economy of Pan-Africanism that is based on the construction of a socialist and egalitarian society. It is ultimately for African people to devise new ways in which they control the means of production, how wealth is created and distributed in their societies in a decentralised manner rather than a state-led approach. There is no blueprint for a political economy of Pan-Africanism and, therefore, it is for Africans to heed Thomas Sankara’s call and “dare to invent the future” of new frameworks of economic cooperation, distribution of goods, and services that meet the needs of ordinary people.

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The economic framework in a political economy of Pan-Africanism must be based on not only humanistic principles and values but collectivism, egalitarianism and freedom. Also integral to such a framework must be decentralisation of economic decision-making as well as the socialisation of common goods such as land and water. A Pan-Africanist political economy cannot be built overnight. As global capitalism has taken centuries to reach its present sophisticated stage and continues to be rampantly destructive and exploitative, the construction of a socialist economy in Africa, which has no guiding blueprint, will take centuries to emerge, but will not be through the continued destruction of the environment and dehumanisation of human beings. A communalised Africa would adopt an ecological approach to the production of goods and services with key decisions, such as whether minerals like tungsten, coltan, manganese, or fossil fuels such as oil, should remain in the earth or whether a portion should be mined or not. Such an economy necessitates the need for a holistic approach to Africa’s development. With the uneven development of capitalism on the African continent, with richer and poorer African countries existing within the 54 nations that comprise the continent, a Pan-Africanist agenda will need to address issues of inequitable and uneven regional development. Such issues have underlined conflicts in the Central African Republic and in Nigeria, to name but a couple of examples. A Pan-Africanist political economy must be centred on the principle and practice of democratisation of the workplace through workers’ selfmanagement, whether in the mines, industrial workplaces, universities, or hospitals, or for those working on the land. Put differently, as opposed to capitalism, the Pan-Africanist socialist economy will be based on egalitarian workplaces in which workers democratically self-manage their productive activity in socially owned means of production. Such an economy must start from below, and not from above. It must take as its starting pointing the calculation of the needs of a community and that community must be involved in the organisation of how to go about satisfying such needs. At this base level, the economic approach must move to the regional level and then societal level in a more complex structure of creating a socialist economic mode of production of wealth and its distribution. In such production entities, the creativity and efficiency of human beings will be unleashed and harnessed for the good of the greater society. A Pan-Africanist political economy must seek to abolish hierarchies in the workplace and exploitative wage labour practices. It is only by democratising and collectivising the means of production by giving

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workers control of the products they produce, by workers forming units, cooperatives, syndicates (or whatever name they decide to call themselves), that people will not only feel in control of their work or labor, but seek to perceive themselves as joint equals. The conceptual framework for a PanAfricanist political economy cannot be centred around reforms “but a different outlook which calls for a decisive change of direction, a change from the primitive colonial structure of the economy”, essentially “a change in the structure of production” (Babu, 2002, p. 304). Furthermore, as Babu (2002, p. 304) emphasizes, “this entails a change from an outward-motivated to an inward-motivated development strategy”. It requires the necessity for African economies to significantly increase intra-African trade and lessen dependence on foreign imports or exportoriented extractive economies. An essential question in such an economy is one of management of the economy; not in terms of “managers” in the capitalist sense of the word, but as to whether the workers have control over their labour and the product of their labour. Do they make decisions about the work process? What I have sought to provide is some questions and issues in the formulation of an agenda for a political economy of Pan-Africanism that is the antithesis of neo-liberalism that has been wholly destructive to the African continent over the last 50 years. I have by no means provided all the answers or issues. However, the way forward must surely lie in PanAfricanists engaging in serious political education work with the masses of African people, thereby arriving at answers and Pan-African solutions to Africa’s myriad problems.

References “About Agenda 2063” in http://agenda2063.au.int/en/about (accessed 14 May 2014). Adesina, J. (2006). ‘Development and the Challenge of Poverty: NEPAD, post-Washington Consensus and Beyond’ in Africa & Development Challenges in the New Millennium, edited by J. O. Adesina, Yao Graham and A. Olukoshi, CODESIRA, Zed Books, UNISA Press. Ake, C. (1996). Democracy and Development. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Amin, S. (2005). Delinking. London: Zed Books. Babu, A. M. (2002). The Future That Works Selected Writings of A. M. Babu. Edited by S. Babu & A. Wilson. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc.

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Ballard, R., Habib, A., Valodia, I. (2006). Editors. Voices of Protest. KwaZulu-Natal: KwaZulu-Natal Press Bassey, N. (2011) To Cook a Continent. London: Pambazuka Press. Bobo, B. F and Sintim-Aboagye, H. (2012). Editors. Neo-liberalism, Interventions and the Developmental State: Implementing the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. Africa World Press. Bond, P. (2005). Editor. Fanon’s Warning: A Civil Society Reader on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. Africa World Press. —. (2013). ‘Are BRICS ‘subimperialists?’ http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category.php/features/86650 accessed 24 August 2015. Bracking, S. & Sharife, K. (May 2014). ‘Rough and Polished: A Case Study of the diamond pricing and valuation system.’ http://thestudyofvalue.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/WP4Bracking-Sharife-Rough-and-polished-15May.pdf (accessed 12 August 2015) published by the Leverhulme Centre for the Study of Value. Chang, H. (2002). Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. London: Anthem Press. Davidson, B. (1975). In the Eye of the Storm Angola’s People. London: Penguin. Dawson, C. & Sinwell, L. (2012). Editors. Contesting Transformation Popular Resistance in Twenty-First-Century South Africa. London: Pluto Press. Dwyer, P. & Zeilig, L. (2012). African Struggles Today Social Movements Since Independence by Paul Dwyer and Leo Zeilig. Chicago: Haymarket Books. Fanon, F. (1961). The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books. Harvey, D. (2005). A Brief History of Neo-liberalism. London: Oxford University Press. Mbah, S. & Igariwey I. E. (1997) African Anarchism: the History of a Movement. Tucson, Ariz: Sharp Press. Ndikumana, L. (June 2015). ‘Integrated Yet Marginalized: Implications of Globalization for African Development.” Working Papers Series, Number 318. Political Economy Research Institute. http://www.peri.umass.edu/236/hash/b3af64ea1d53b2a932a8b6cd57e4 5e6d/publication/653/ accessed 12 August 2015. Reyntjens, F. (July 2015). ‘Rwanda: Progress or Powder Keg?’ in Journal of Democracy, July 2015, Vol. 26. No. 3. Rodney, W. See: “Towards the Sixth Pan-African Congress Aspects of the International Class Struggle in Africa, the Caribbean and America” in Pan-Africanism: The Struggle Against Imperialism and Neo-

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colonialism Documents of the Sixth PAC with an assessment by H. Campbell, 1976. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House. Sahle, E. (2014). Editor. Africa in a Globalizing System edited by E. Sahle. Palgrave Macmillan and Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Saul, J. & Bond, P. (2014). See: chapter 6. ‘Uneven and Combined Resistance: Marikana and the Trail to ‘Tunisia Day’ 2020’ by P. Bond, in South Africa: The Present as History From Mrs Ples to Mandela and Marikana. London: James Currey, pp. 213-242. Sharples, N., Jones, T. & Martin, C. (2014). Honest Accounts? The true story of Africa’s billion dollar losses. http://www.francophonie.org Shivji, I. (2009). Accumulation in an African Periphery A Theoretical Framework. Mkuki Publishers. South African Foreign Policy Initiative http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2012/rwanda-uganda-arming-congorebels-providing-troops-un-panel (accessed 24 August 2015. Sylla, N. (2014). Editor. Liberalism and its Discontents: Social Movements in West Africa. Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. Tandon, Y. (2008). Ending Aid Dependence. London: Fahamu Books. —. (2009). Development and Globalisation Daring to Think Differently. London: Fahamu Books. Taylor, I. (2006). ‘NEPAD and the Global Political Economy: Towards the African Century or Another False Start?” in Africa & Development Challenges in the New Millennium, edited by J. O. Adesina, Yao Graham and A. Olukoshi, CODESIRA, Zed Books, UNISA Press. United Nations Economic Commission in Africa (UNECA) http://www.uneca.org/pages/iff-background accessed 19 August 2015)

CHAPTER SEVEN INTEGRATING AESTHETICS: TRANSFORMING CONTINUING EDUCATION THROUGH AFRICENTRIC PRACTICE DR. AUBURN E. ELLIS SCHOOL OF THE ART INSTITUTE OF CHICAGO

Overview of the Research K-12 practitioners in urban areas are faced with unique circumstances while serving racially marginalized students in public schools. As a response to this issue, the purpose of this study was to review and describe curricula used in three African-centered institutions in Chicago, analyzing their content and instructional strategies. African-centered schools are uniquely different in terms of the mission, educational philosophy, and vision; thus, the need for research emerges in order to explore new ways to identify, describe, and disseminate knowledge for the traditional public school practitioners. Expanding the use of Africentric Culturally Grounded Community Based Programming (Colin 1999) is essential in the field of continuing and professional education, to adequately prepare practitioners to instruct students of the African Diaspora. The goals of the research were to analyze and describe their content and process in order to design a continuing and professional education model based on their experiences for traditional public school practitioners. The research design was an Africentric qualitative single case study that focused on the experiences of six educators in African-centered schools. The Africentric Paradigm was utilized as the theoretical framework. Research questions that guided the study were as follows: 1) how are conceptual and theoretical elements of the Africentric Paradigm reflected in educational environments and incorporated into curriculum and instruction at an African-centered institution, 2) how are the problems that result from sociocultural and intellectual racism addressed both

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cognitively and affectively through curriculum content, 3) what are the designs and objectives of continuing education programs implemented in African-centered institutions, and 4) what culturally grounded strategies can be transferred to a traditional continuing education model for K-12 practitioners? Data collection instruments included interviews as the primary source, as well as document analysis, site visits (observations), and photography. While visiting each institution, I witnessed a considerable amount of artwork in the hallways and classrooms representing Kemet, Ma’at and other African-centered concepts and symbolism. Photographs taken during site visits were reflective of interview dialogue with participants. The focus on African Centered aesthetic (aesthetic being defined as a concern with beauty or the appreciation of beauty) visually reinforced positive selfethnic identity (Colin 1989) in these communities. The images were demonstrative of how curriculum and instruction at African-centered schools integrate cognitive skills with creative efforts. Practitioners were using Kuumba (creativity) as a tool to facilitate culturally grounded dialogue and activities based on Imani (faith) and Nia (purpose). To analyze data in this case study, I have used conceptual elements from the Africentric Paradigm including the Seven Principles of the Nguzo Saba (Colin 1989), Virtues of Ma’at (Karenga 2004), and the concepts of twinness and complementarity (Tolliver 2010). To interpret field notes that emerged from observations during site visits, I completed a series of paintings to create a meaning context, which expressed the cognitive and affective impacts of instructional activities. In addition to visually enhancing the study, artwork expands the knowledge base to nonacademic audiences and serves as a more creative place to begin discourse in academia. Several important findings and conclusions emerged from the analysis. Each site had similar missions and the shared goal of building a positive self-ethnic image (Colin 1989). This was reflected in both curricula and artistic instructional strategies. African-centered practice is grounded in the cognitive and affective domains. In addition to K-12 curriculum content, what makes African-centered schools different is the focus on building positive self-ethnic identity and the importance of community empowerment. Academic rigor and affective growth were developed through a consciousness of African-centered ideas and a positive selfethnic image (Colin 1989). These culturally grounded strategies were reflected in the continuing education model that emerged from the analysis. If we look at how traditional public schools are affecting our communities, it is clear that our students are being cognitively and

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affectively marginalized. By employing an Africentric framework, continuing and professional education can play a role in adequately preparing traditional public school educators for success with students of this Diaspora. The Seven Principles of the Nguzo Saba were incorporated into school culture and instructional strategies in unique ways. During the document analysis phase, it became apparent that Imani (faith) and Kujichagulia (self-determination) were reflected in the mission statement of each institution. The other principles (in Swahili followed by English translation), which include Umoja (unity), Ujima (collective work and responsibility), Ujamaa (cooperative economics), Nia (purpose), and Kuumba (creativity) (Colin 1989), were integrated into every subject area. Furthermore, curriculum and instruction integrate cognitive skills with creative efforts; Kuumba (creativity) was used as a tool to facilitate culturally grounded dialogue and activities based on Imani (faith) and Nia (purpose). This approach to teaching reinforces a culturally grounded mindset and outlook based on accurate historical perspectives. The Seven Principles of the Nguzo Saba work in tandem to reinforce Ma’at (Deep Wisdom) while reflecting a true understanding of classical African culture. Ujima (collective work and responsibility) was an important component of African-centered practice. During the analysis, community empowerment recurred as an important theme relative to the philosophy and purpose of each institution. In addition to the importance of community, building positive self-ethnic image is also encouraged. Africentric communities foster students’ cognitive abilities while developing creative spirits. Since before Ancient Kemet, artistic practice has been a way of knowing, understanding, and doing for people of this Diaspora. At each institution, culturally grounded instructional strategies are embedded in every program, ranging from Kwanzaa celebrations and ceremonious drumming, to jewelry and mask-making. Each activity has a critical impact, not only on school culture but also on the development of a positive self-ethnic image (Colin 1989). Adult education, more specifically continuing and professional education, can play a large part in preparing practitioners for success with students of this Diaspora. By changing the way we look at classroom instruction, we can increase social justice and equity in the field of adult education.

Employing an Africentric Lens to Address Oppression As a member of this Diaspora, the attainment of my professional and personal goals are impacted by racial oppression. Most thoughts, beliefs,

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and assumptions relative to education have been shaped by dominant culture; the Africentric Paradigm helps me reconceptualize my experiences and move toward more liberatory practice. We cannot be hesitant to address racial differences in our formal and informal learning experiences. Relative to mainstream education, “many are uncomfortable acknowledging any student differences and particularly racial differences … however, these attempts at colorblindness mask a ‘dysconscious racism,’ an ‘uncritical habit of mind that justifies inequality and exploitation’” (Ladson-Billings, 1994, p. 31). Viewing education through the Africentric Paradigm can help the field move toward a reconceptualization of dominant culture. As a global citizen, educator, avid lover of the arts and member of the African Diaspora, I find it impossible not to explore ways to facilitate social justice and equity in the field of adult and continuing education. Unfortunately, the education I received prior to my Masters studies failed to mention oppression, unfairly advantaged persons, or the fact that we are all participants in a damaged culture. By damaged, I mean a society where inequalities keep certain groups of people oppressed; the status quo, supported by many institutions in America, shows no signs of being eliminated. Practitioners are affected by failed education systems in many different ways. At times, the negative impact of racial and economic oppression is reflected in traditional classrooms. Curriculum and instruction are rooted in a Western body of knowledge, lacking culturally grounded strategies. The African-centered continuing education model that emerged from analysis can assist K-12 practitioners with unique issues that urban students face as a result of intellectual racism. In Western culture, racial marginalization often affects our experiences. Economic oppression relative to this group is a direct result of racial group membership. Issues like generational illiteracy, institutional oppression, and economic depression have created unique circumstances for marginalized communities. K-12 educators in traditional public schools often utilize instructional strategies that encourage diversity and inclusion as opposed to researching and addressing specific cultural needs of this Diaspora. With this approach, there is no consideration of the historical impact of socio-cultural racism. To combat internalized oppression, there must be discourse relative to our formal and informal learning experiences. The African-centered paradigm is a more appropriate lens for reflecting on our authentic lived experiences. It is important to create a framework for dialogue to rationalize our experiences, helping restore order and balance.

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Exploring the Educational Utility of Africentrism in Continuing and Professional Education Completing an Undergraduate degree is not enough; whether tenured or first-year, continuing and professional education needs to be required annually for K-12 practitioners. Programs should be available for adult learners to engage in African-centered discourse to meet the needs of racially marginalized students. Educators in urban areas are affected a by lack of empathy for their preconceived notions regarding communities of color, which heavily impacts on student success. In the fight for social justice and equity in the field, Africentric Culturally Grounded Community Based Programming (Colin 1999) can be a key to saving our schools one at a time. Using an Africentric framework is critical to helping adult learners create more meaningful educational experiences through continuing and professional education. Schools sometimes serve as a refuge from neighborhood perils for a lot of urban students. African-centered institutions are places where students are educated relative to their cultural identity. Traditional K-12 educators without an understanding of appropriate culturally grounded strategies and content do more harm than good in the classroom, continuing to disempower students. Mainstream education tends to ignore issues of socio-cultural and intellectual racism in education, therefore reinforcing the subtlest forms of racism. The continuing and professional education workshop I developed starts with an overview of conceptual and theoretical elements of the Africentric Paradigm. It also includes a demonstration of classroom curriculum models for any grade level and discipline. There are simple strategies that can assist with establishing an open-minded culture and improving classroom management in addition to building self-ethnic identity (Colin 1989) for students of this Diaspora. Employing these methods is critical to creating safe learning habitats and just distribution of resources in urban areas. My research was focused on teaching K-12 educators to look at problems in new ways while practicing critical thinking skills to learn collaboration, cooperation and innovative solutions. Visual arts, dance and music should not be absent from learning, but valued as tools for success in communities of color. Data analysis reflected and indicated the benefits of multiple ways of knowing and doing; creative play, by definition, nurtures different aspects of child development. From a cultural center, these activities allow students to approach tasks visually and kinesthetically, coming up with new questions, and more innovative answers. Fostering cognitive as well as affective experiences for students

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is essential in African-centered communities. The Africentric Paradigm and its conceptual elements are critical to helping educators understand ways we can uplift communities through creativity and positive self-ethnic imagery (Colin 1989). By applying an Africentric lens to continuing and professional education practice, we can positively impact K-12 public education. The culturally grounded curriculum is African-centered, and as Veharen points out, “The African origin of civilization is important because it relates to the development of human approaches to culture and the survival of the human species” (Verharen, 2002, p. 70); it is critical to incorporate this knowledge base into mainstream education. If practitioners were equipped with culturally grounded curriculum, they could help students build positive self-ethnic identity (Colin 1989). There are a few instructional strategies that can be taken from Africentric schools and used in traditional public school classrooms to help students be more successful. We must integrate African-centered practice in adult education and community programs. Communities cannot heal themselves; teaching the importance of building character, integrity, and centrism can start with creative-based, culturally grounded instruction.

Aesthetic Meets Rhetoric: Exploring Cultural Artifacts of the Diaspora Since the goals of my research included expanding the knowledge base of Africentrism, and developing a workshop to facilitate its educational utility in CPE, it was critical to look at the historical impact that the Seven Principles of the Nguzo Saba have had on this Diaspora, in order to develop pedagogical practice for the future. Kuumba (creativity) has played a salient role in adult education since our displacement in America; it is used to convey Nia (purpose) and Imani (faith) through various forms of visual and creative arts. As Kelly Miller (1926) writes, “The Negro must learn to know his own story and to love it” (Miller, 1926, p. 5) and passing these stories to the next generation is a pivotal role of liberatory practice. Even during slavery, there was an inherent aesthetic developing in the United States. Artists like Henry Ossawa Tanner and Edmonia Lewis depicted authentic lived experiences of the past, present and future. By integrating conceptual elements of the Africentric Paradigm, they cultivated a rich history of creativity rooted in Africa. Art is a pivotal mode of instruction for people of the African Diaspora, literature being one of the most important forms of Kuumba (creativity). Alain Locke, adult educator and father of the Harlem Renaissance, wrote many essays

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relative to the importance of creative practice. Goals of this movement were the transmission of culture and history within the community; it also helped the world appreciate the consummate talent of the African Diaspora. Artistic movements like the Harlem Renaissance and the Black Arts Movement played a salient role in creating safe habitats for people of this Diaspora, in addition to advocating for equitable distribution of resources. Edmonia Lewis, born on the Canadian border, was a sculptor and painter in the late-nineteenth century. Bearden confirms, “Lewis was the first African American artist to advertise herself by name as a ‘colored artist’. In doing this, she took the slaveholders’ contention that black people were incapable of art and turned it on its head to her advantage, making it a reason to see her work” (Bearden, 1993, p. 69). This confrontation of racism was one of the earliest examples of Kujichagulia (self-determination), claiming the responsibility to define oneself, occurring even before the twentieth century. Powerful statements like these provided some of the first critiques of race and equity in a written form. From the work of Phyllis Wheatley in the eighteenth century to the contemporary work of Fred Wilson, the Harlem Renaissance and the Black Arts Movement, the inherent inclusion of the Seven Principles of the Nguzo Saba is clear. Relative to my analysis, examining these historical figures and events proves we can only move forward in pedagogical practice by building a foundation on innovations of the past. Creativity and artistry can play a salient role in the re-education of our communities. We must confront change in a holistic fashion, addressing not only cognitive needs but spiritual and mental well-being. Art-based learning is a critical part of identity and community development; we must continue to advocate for art and Africentrism as modes of anti-racist pedagogy.

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Queen Hatsheepsut: The Firsst of Humanity © 2012 auburnnaesthetic.com.. To view the artwork coompleted durinng the course off research, visit auburnaesthetic.com

Refereences Bearden, R.. (1993). A History H of Afriican Americann Artists from m 1972 to the Preseent. New Yorkk: Pantheon Press. P Colin, S. A. J., III. (19899). Voices from m Beyond the Weil: Marcuss Garvey, the Univversal Negro Improvementt Association, and the Edu ucation of African A American Aduults. Unpublisshed doctoral dissertation, Northern Illinois. Colin, S. A.. J., III. (19999). “It’s not what w you call m me, but what I answer to.” In Through the Eyes of Ethiopia: Africenntrism and Culturally C Groundeed Research. Unpublished U Manuscript, M R Revised 2007. Karenga, M M. (2004). Ma’at: M the mo oral ideal inn ancient Eg gypt. Los Angeles:: University of Sankore Preess. Ladson-Billings, G. (19994). The Drea amkeepers: SSuccessful Tea achers of African A American Chiildren. San Francisco: Josseey-Bass. Miller, K. ((1926). An Esstimate of Ca arter G. Wooddson and his Work in Connection with the Association for the Studdy of Negro Life and History. Washington DC: D The Asso ociation for thhe Study of Negro N Life and Histtory.

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Tolliver, D. (2010). Using an African Centered Paradigm for Understanding Race and Racism in Adult Education. In Sheared, V., Johnson-Bailey, J., Colin. A.J., Peterson, E., Brookfield, S. (Eds), The Handbook of Race and Adult Education (pp. 317-328) San Francisco, CA. Jossey-Bass. Verharen, C. (2002). In and Out of Africa: Misreading Afrocentricity. In Asante, M. K. and Mazama, A. (Eds), Egypt vs. Greece and the American Academy (p. 67-90) Chicago, IL. African American Images.

CHAPTER EIGHT CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF REINFORCING THE PAN-AFRICAN MOVEMENT IN THE ADVENT OF GLOBALIZATION COLLENCE TAKAINGENHAMO CHISITA AND ALEXANDER RUSERO HARARE POLYTECHNIC'S SCHOOL OF INFORMATION SCIENCES, ZIMBABWE

At a time when globalization has engulfed the whole world, it is imperative that African scholars revisit and reinvigorate the Pan-African philosophy to reposition African identities to strengthen peace and solidarity. This paper will highlight the challenges and opportunities to strengthen Pan-Africanism in line with the teachings and philosophies of the African founding forefathers from both Africa and the Diaspora. It will highlight the praxis of Pan-Africanism amidst a growing interest to incorporate African values into the socio-economic development agenda across the globe. The authors will also explore strategies in place to strengthen Pan-Africanism at a global level. It will also highlight how Pan-Africanism can counter global homogenization using technology. Furthermore, it will also seek to find out how Pan-Africanism can utilize modern technology to facilitate intergenerational dialogue. The authors will also examine how the brain drain can be turned into a brain gain and digital divide into a digital dividend for the benefit of Africa and the Caribbean. In addition, it will seek to explore strategies to reposition Africa in the growing global knowledge economy, through knowledgesharing, knowledge-exchange and knowledge-mobilization. The paper will seek to discover strategies to canonize theoretical and pragmatic aspects of Pan-Africanism for the well-being of humanity.

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1. Introduction The thrust of this chapter is to unveil the need to reframe the PanAfrican ideals whose insights have survived extinction vis-a-vis certain philosophies whose existence and relevance are now only visible thanks to the work of researchers and memory workers, including information managers and archivists whose mammoth task is to ensure that such philosophies will not become legendary philosophical dinosaurs spared only through fairy tales but withstand the test of time. If the truth be told, Pan-Africanism has asserted itself through the entirety of literature and its perennial perpetuity in history is a constant reminder that Africa is indeed the cradle of civilization and thus, Pan-Africanism is the highest stage of civilization.

2. Pan-African values The paper subscribes to the thesis that given the socio-political and economic ills bedeviling the contemporary world, from the Third Wave of Democracy in 1974 right to the Arab Spring revolutions that started in 2011, from the atrocious bombardment of the World Trade Center in 2001 up to the Crimean amalgamation with Russia and the Middle East Crisis in 2014, in Pan-Africanism lies the unforeseen solutions to all these quagmires. Yet in the debates of fostering a reframing of Pan-Africanism lie various sacrilegious and cynical schools of thought that such an ideal is a euphemism. It is true that Africa has for centuries been divided and that cultural diversity should be strengthened to morph into a properly structured and unified Pan-Africanism trajectory. The unique values of Pan-Africanism, the spirit of Pan-African optimism and its drive to foster international peace, human dignity and equality far outweigh pessimistic sentiments. Such values go beyond the African continent. They were captured in the League of Nations and later modified into the United Nations Charter. The essence of existence amongst states is premised on the notion that all nations, big or small, are equal. This is indeed a reflection of the high values of Pan-Africanism. The world continues to benefit from traits borrowed from Africa’s array of proverbial wisdom which emphasizes harmony, equality, justice and equity. However, in Pan-Africanism lies the ‘Genesis of History’; for example, Africa has the longest incomparable progression of human occupation as evidenced by archeological and paleontological findings. It is time! And Pan-Africanism is indeed in sight.

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3. Pan-Africanism going strong In 1989, one of the contemporary scholars of political thought, Francis Fukuyama postulated a thesis on the End of History. Fukuyama (1992) was convinced that with the coming down of the curtain of Communism following the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), “history had come to an end” because there was not going to be any conflict premised on ideological differences and that neo-liberalism had scored a pyrrhic victory. The world found itself trapped in post-Cold War unipolar and multipolar politics characterized by the unprecedented escalation of global conflicts as evidenced by the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine. Africa is a continent that gave birth to human species, a place where the greatest civilizations flourished as evidenced by ancient Egyptian, Ethiopian, Malian and other great empires in Southern and Central African History. It is a continent so critical to the understanding of human history, whose first eight to ten million years are anchored in Africa, according to UNESCO (2012). It is a place where multifaceted and original cultures have confronted, grappled with and triumphed over a variety of social, political, and environmental challenges. Africa is indeed the cradle of civilization and thus, Pan-Africanism is the highest stage of civilization as evidenced by Pyramids in Egypt, Great Empires of Timbuktu, Zulu, Ndongo, Asante, Mandingo, Luba-Lunda, Fulani, Sokoto, Ashanti and Great Stone Monuments of Zimbabwe according to Williams (2000). Ancient Egypt was the greatest education center of the ancient world frequented by foreigners to learn a myriad of subjects according to Williams (1987) and James (1999). It boasted great libraries like the famous Royal Library of Thebes and Library of Alexandria, according to James (2009). These facts should not be misinterpreted as a blind romanticization of a nostalgic past, but rather as a solid foundation for those keen to delve deeper and wider into Pan- Africanism and the future. The African Union’s (AU) resolve to strengthen peace and security will rely on the commitment of members and a willingness to engage in dialogue and reach consensus through genuine attempts to work in unison for a better Africa. This is typical of Pan-Africanism where elders gather under a tree (“African circle”) to share and cross-pollinate ideas proffering solutions to a village or kraal problem that requires the services of wisdom and rationality as symbolized by the concept of the African circle or “dare”. The willingness to first seek to overcome challenges through dialogue reflects some of the values that Pan-Africanism cherishes. Any attempts

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made towards rectifying challenges haunting the earth are somewhere and somehow rooted in Pan-Africanism. The world has increasingly witnessed genuine attempts by member states to solve problems in unison. Africa is credited for introducing the concept of Globalization. It was Africa and Africans who were the first ‘globalizers’ of the world. These are some of the values that Pan-Africanism should cherish: that every attempt made during the present towards rectifying certain problems haunting the earth are rooted in Pan-Africanism.

4. Pan-Africanism and the reclamation of the 21st century: A brief introspection Wamba (1996) views Pan- Africanism as a form of global consciousness that emerged precisely to confront the old race-based global consciousness which underlined capitalist and imperialist expansionism. The author further states that Pan-Africanism is focused on defending human equality, human rights against racial discrimination and at organizing the process of liberation of Black people from subordination worldwide. Maimela (2013) states that if Africa is going to reclaim the 21st century, it needs: firstly, clear intent; secondly, the reassertion of Pan-Africanism as a liberating concept and agenda; and thirdly, a serious leadership renewal program. Pan-Africanism is an ideology and movement premised on the notion that unity is central to the economic, social and political progress of Africa according to Maimela (2013). The ideology asserts that the fate of all African peoples and countries are intertwined. It unites African peoples, both on the continent and in the Diaspora, on the basis of a common history and a common destiny and common aspirations. Africa can survive globalization through a Pan-African philosophy that aligns itself with the interests of the downtrodden and seeks to empower them in all aspects of life. Through the African renaissance, Africa can claim its place in the 21st century by entrenching democracy and propeople programs in socio-economic and political development. Maimela (2013) further argues that the advancement of a Pan-African agenda will depend on two cardinal realisations; firstly, the need to reclaim, revive and reassert Pan-Africanism and defeat neo-colonialism; and secondly, selfsufficiency, because no society has ever made history or progress without relying on its own resources – financial, human, technological, ideational or leadership. Globalization presents Africa with challenges and opportunities that require a Pan-African approach. Furthermore, the very history of Africa should inform the African Renaissance in so far as it seeks to reawaken

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and re-energize Africa and reposition the continent in the global world. Africa’s place and role in the world cannot be divorced from its historicity and desire to change its dialectical relationship with its erstwhile colonizers, who are bent on perpetuating hegemonic control for selfaggrandizement.

5. Founding Principles Muchie (2000) argues that any honest theorization and practice of PanAfrican integration has to revisit the thinking of its most courageous and intellectually far-sighted exponents, for example, Kwame Nkrumah (1909–1972), Emperor Haile Selassie (1892–1975), Modibo Keita (1915– 1977) and Marcus Garvey (1887–1940). Furthermore, the author states that without bringing Nkrumah’s thoughts and his sacrifice, any revisiting of Pan-Africanism will be futile and incomplete. The founding fathers sought to reconcile Pan-Africanism and African nationalism. It is against this background that the African renaissance should be premised on PanAfricanism as it seeks to deepen and entrench democracy, socio-economic equality, and sustainable development. African nationalism should align itself with an authentic Pan-Africanist philosophy to ensure relevance in the advent of globalization: “African nationalism is meaningless, is anachronistic, and is dangerous, if it is not at the same time Pan-Africanism” (Nyerere 1967). Museveni (2000) bemoaned the adoption of a private sector growth-led strategy considering that the interests of the sector are driven by the primitive and capitalist accumulation of capital motives. The author further states that an understanding of the role of the private sector by the African elite is sine qua non with regards to the continent’s quest to reclaim the 21st century. Mahomva (2014) states that once the grasp of the pivotal role of the private sector is thorough and consolidated, it will be time for the continent to deal with ending Balkanization, securing access to lucrative foreign markets and adding value to the continent’s raw materials. Mahomva (2014) also states that African leaders need to create a central economic pool and this implies breaking away from a Balkanized economic structure. The author argues that economic fragmentation and dependency robs African countries’ economic sovereignty, thus benefitting developed countries.

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6. United States of Africa – the panacea to Africa’s marginalization Museveni (2003) argues that the answer to Africa’s marginalization is dependent upon the amalgamation of the continent into a unified continent. Muchie (2000) argues that Afro-pessimists should not continue to oppress and dampen African imagination and drive towards a united Africa as espoused by Afro-optimists who strongly cherish the belief that there is much to unite and forge a shared destiny within Africa, despite the numerous economic, social and political crises. Museveni (2003) also notes that, when a country exports a kilogram of lint cotton without turning it into garments, the benefit translates to one tenth of the value and an export of 2.5 kilograms of unprocessed coffee will bring one-twentieth of the value. Museveni (2003) further notes that if the continent is to reclaim the 21st century, it should think of exports rather than imports, Pan-Africanism instead of parochialism, and value addition or beneficiation rather than exporting raw materials. Azikiwe (2014) posits that Africa can untangle itself from under-development by coming up with strategies to effectively exploit its tremendous reservoir of oil, natural gas and numerous strategic minerals for its own benefit rather than the metropolis and the comprador class. I have often been accused of pursuing a ‘policy of the impossible’. But I cannot believe in the impossibility of achieving African union any more than I could ever have thought of the impossibility of attaining African freedom... Africa must unite. We have before us not only an opportunity but a historic duty (Nkrumah 1963).

7. Knowledge transfer Nabudare (2002) posits that the African Renaissance and rebirth’s thrust to reawaken and reactivate prodigy and creativity to enhance selftransformation and development is underpinned by the establishment of a Pan-African University which can provide an alternative to Western ontologies and epistemologies of knowledge. Furthermore, such institutions of Higher Education should be supported by robust information and communication technology systems (ICT’s) to enable coordinated transfer, generation, processing, recording and digital preservation of the continent’s rich intellectual heritage. The desire to promote African knowledge systems is a serious challenge that requires critical thinking

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among key players in the knowledge link, for example, intellectuals, governments and industry, as well as those who will use the knowledge. It is important to note that an African Renaissance is only possible through fostering an education system that combines positive and progressive aspects of African and Western civilization, thus dressing Africans in new mental costumes. It should be more eclectic, as opined by Patrice Lumumba (1962) “[it] should be an amalgamation of Western and African civilizations, without any of their decadent elements. The decadent elements of Western culture that the educated Africans ‘imbibed’ included the aping of Europeans and the emphasis put on the outward elements of Western materialism, individualism, and the so-called ‘correct behaviour’”. Africa should rethink strategies to harness the human and social capital of the African Diaspora for the benefit of the continent, through knowledge-transfer, leveraging research and diffusion, and helping to develop Higher and Tertiary Education. The current global dispensation is accelerating the mobility of human capital from developing to developed countries, thus robbing the continent of much-needed expertise. Knowledge transfer is possible if there are formalized systems of communication and trust. It is in this context that those in the African Diaspora can play a special role in knowledge transfer in their home countries. Maimela (2013) argues that global power and knowledge production is anchored on definite socio-economic and political systems and power structures. The colonial onslaught led to the relegation of African culture through a deliberate vituperative and cantankerous policy of total denigration. Decolonization did not automatically translate into the end of Africa’s marginalization in knowledge production but instead accelerated relegation through covetous means through control of publishing by multinational and transnational companies. Durrani (2006) states that the colonial mass media and education system were mobilized to prove that culture was homogeneous, thus inculcating a single world outlook and one correct way of life representing colonialism and imperialism. The author further states that universalization of colonial value systems was achieved through controlling the process of social communication and content of information disseminated to the people; for example, education, media, publishing and memory institutions were organized to give a one-sided colonial worldview. Maimela (2013) notes that colonial legacy points to the fact that the African space is not seen as a knowledge space and most of the knowledge produced on the continent, especially indigenous

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knowledge, does not fit the universalizing Eurocentric criteria of knowledge, yet cooperates secretively to pillage traditional African knowledge in medicine without giving regard to intellectual property issues. Development is also underpinned by access to information, and memory institutions play a critical role in this endeavor. However, due to globalization, there is a growing trend towards “McDonaldization”, whereby services and products are homogenized, according to Durrani (2008). The author states that even though such a trend is important in ensuring standards, if not properly checked it will undermine the ability of memory institutions to root themselves in the ambience of their communities and culture. Memory institutions and memory workers should forge an alliance cutting across Africa and the Diaspora to spearhead the liberation of humanity from a foreseeable privatized future whereby everything is “commoditized” and “McDonaldized” in line with global culture, according to Durrani (2008).

8. Africa on the rise The May 2000 edition of the Economist depicted Africa as “a hopeless continent”, but a decade later there was a volte face as evidenced by a 2011 edition’s more effusive optimistic narrative, which designated the continent as “a rising star” with such headings as “Africa’s hopeful economies”. This is a reflection of the puzzling inconsistency of Western media whose interpretation of African realities is determined by hidden interests. The Economist designated Africa as the hopeful continent considering an increase in the growth rate (6.5-7%) by 2011 and high growth projected in the next coming decade, according to the Economist issue of December, 2011: “From Ghana in the west to Mozambique in the south, Africa’s economies are consistently growing faster than those of almost any other region of the world...” This narrative of optimism is a sign of the great things that are beginning to take shape in Africa for the benefit of Africans. The onus is on Africans to take a lead in the struggle to lift the continent to a higher level of socio-economic progress for the benefit of its citizens.

9. Engaging the African Diaspora The desire to reengage the African Diaspora is critical in the quest to turn brain drain into a brain gain. Engagement should start with the self before it is extended outwards. It is critical to view the African Diaspora as

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an unexploited potential. The history of Africa and African Diaspora is intertwined because the search for freedom and emancipation is common to all, according to the African Union Executive report (2003). The complexities of the African Diaspora are reflected by the diverse range of mobility experiences and generations. The African Diaspora are quite diverse or heterogeneous, for example, victims of the past and modern slave trade, descendants of slaves, political exiles, experts and intellectuals seeking greener pastures. The relationship between Africa and its Diaspora has been compounded by a lack of communication and perceptual barriers, hence the need for perception management to correct such perceptions and strengthen communication. Kornegay (2008) states that the African Diaspora is as diverse as it is dispersed; firstly, diversity in terms of its differential generational origins and dispersal in terms of its nearly global spread, in continental Europe, the Americas, Asia and the Middle East. This dispersal has meant the loss of human capital for Africa. Ramin (1995) described brain drain as the migration of human capital as a strategic resource from countries where it can make the greatest contribution to national output to countries already well supplied: “The African Diaspora consists of peoples of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union” (AU, Report, 2005). African countries continue to benefit immensely from the Diaspora through monetary remittances. Zimbabweans in the Diaspora remitted more than US$14 billion from 2012 and 2013, according to Mataire (2014). Diaspora remittances benefit many countries including African countries. There is a need for Africa to harness the Diaspora market for the benefit of the continent and this can only be achieved through a proper strategy based on serious engagement encapsulated in National and regional policies and institutions. A World Bank Report (2013) notes how the African Diaspora remittances reached US $60.4 billion, becoming the largest external financial source for the continent. Gomo (2014) posits that dialogue on the Diaspora should transcend narrative of remittances into a meaningful engagement for the social, economic and political development of the continent. The history of Africa and Pan-Africanism should be the basis for the African Renaissance’s trajectory to reawaken, re-energize and reposition the continent in the global world. Africa’s place and role in the global world cannot be divorced from its historicity, desire and aspirations to change its dialectical relationship with its erstwhile colonizers desperate to perpetuate their hegemonic control on resources. Africa can exploit the

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global opportunities to network and strengthen genuine partnerships with other progressive forces. Globalization provides numerous opportunities to enable engagement between Africa and its Diaspora. There are various strategies that can be utilized to ensure effective and sustainable engagement of the African Diaspora, for example, permanent constructive dialogue, enhancing consular services and making them more accessible, revisiting immigration laws, lessening the high cost of remitting money through adapting etransactions, incentivizing the Diaspora to participate actively in development programs, creating a human capital database and enhancing the use of information and communication technology to improve communication and knowledge sharing. The African Diaspora should be viewed as a resource for development. Information and communication technologies in the form of social media and institutional repositories can be useful as tools for knowledge sharing and exchange. Furthermore, there is a need to set up structures at local, regional and international levels to engage the African Diaspora through dialogue and debate. Such engagement should be centered on critical issues of human survival, for example, citizenship, enfranchisement and development of Africa. The idea of engaging Diaspora to actively participate in socioeconomic activities of Africa is crucial and noble as it incorporates a new dimension of inclusivity

10. How Pan Africanism may remain relevant in the contemporary globalized world Mahomva (2014) calls for the incorporation of Pan-Africanism into the educational curriculum and to give it an equal rating with other cocurricular activities. There appears to be a gap between Pan-African nationalists and the new generation of young people caught up in an ideological dichotomy of Pan-Africanism and neo-liberalism. Physical and virtual platforms for intergenerational dialogue should help to bridge the gap between the older generation of nationalists and the younger generations, or millennials. Mahomva (2014) envisages an educational reconfiguration as a feat towards Pan-Africanism graduation from mere movement to an instrumental academic precedent in the study of politics in the continent, and thus informing the political culture of all Africans. The African academy, therefore, remains marginalized and impoverished, and yet it is critical for the African renaissance.

Challenges and Opportunities of Reinforcing the Pan-African Movement 171 …It must be strongly underlined that Pan-Africanism (or “Negritude”) most fortunately has never had any racist connotations…it is part of the aims of Pan-Africanism to rehabilitate it and give it rights, equality and dignity to the same extent as other ‘races’ (Glele 1991:191).

The relevance of Pan-Africanism should be reflected in the contemporary struggles to end poverty, inequality and to foster development and create a better world for humanity. Furthermore, the creation of linkages between the continent and its Diaspora requires a Pan African diplomacy. Niikando (2005) emphasizes a future vision for PanAfricanism as it “....remains an essential democratic vision, to deconstruct and uproot the inequalities of racism; to challenge the unpopular capitalism; the New World Order represented by the IMF, the World Bank. In the face of all these, Pan-Africanism remains vital as PanAfricanism and the African Diaspora are a political framework that brings together the collective perspectives of people of African descent in our eternal struggle”.

11. Role of language and memory Language is critical in enhancing and strengthening Pan-Africanism because it is a special vehicle in the socio-economic and political transformation of Africa. Wa Thiong’o (2008) views language as a material force of the highest order underpinning African renaissance. The author further argues that an African renaissance will not be possible if the keepers of memory are not working outside their linguistic memory but instead working as prisoners of alien linguistic memory. Memory institutions consisting of galleries, libraries, archives and museums should thus be strengthened to create shared information gateways that facilitate access to knowledge to uplift humanity to play its part in the new scheme of things in the global world. Language should be used as a tool or an enabler in facilitating access to ideas at all levels. Wa Thiong’o (2008) argues that African renaissance is reinforced by increased magnitude of production of intellectual capital and hence the need for keepers of memory to contribute towards the strengthening of African renaissance just as the European renaissance was stimulated by the exploration of new frontiers of thought and a reconnection with memory characterized by intense inter-language translations. There are more than 2000 languages that are spoken in Africa despite the fact that indigenous languages struggle to get official recognition, according to Lodhi (1993). Colonial languages have remained dominant

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because they are perceived as useful for development, international mobility, unlocking development opportunities and accessing information and status symbols. Africa’s multilingualism has also helped to broaden the continent’s cultural diversity and cultural tolerance, according to Lodhi (1993). The new Zimbabwean Constitution Section 6 (1-4) obliges the government to promote and advance the usage of all languages and create an environment for their development. This is a significant development that has given the locals confidence to think, dream, work, learn, exchange ideas and do anything under the sun in their mother language: “…no language has a monopoly of beauty… all memories have a place at the rendezvous of human history” Wa Thiong’o (2008). Africa requires a shift from exoglossic to endoglossic national language policies to enhance socio-economic inclusion of all people. The idea of giving indigenous languages due consideration within the constitution is a progressive step towards the empowerment and unlocking of great potential encapsulated within such languages. It is important for African governments to critically consider harmonization of indigenous and colonial languages for developmental purposes. Such a development will result in the elevation of indigenous knowledge and the promotion of the African art of conversation reflecting the beauty and value of language as a special vehicle for communication and development: “Inspired by the noble ideals which guided the founding fathers of our Continental Organisation and generations of Pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and co-operation among the peoples of Africa and African States... Determined to take up the multifaceted challenges that confront our continent and peoples in the light of the social, economic and political changes taking place in the world” (Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000/2001). Negash (2011) argues that Africans need to view the usefulness of foreign languages without undermining indigenous languages and this requires the formulation of inclusive language policies. Most governments tend to hide their heads in the sand and pretend that African languages do not exist or else try to force a retrograde policy of monolingualism. Governments can help by policies that make African languages part of the languages of social mobility and power, currently a monopoly of European languages. But renaissance, as rebirth and flowering, can only spring from the wealth of imagination of the people, and above all, from its keepers of memory. wa Thiongo (2003).

Wamba (1996) foresaw Pan-Africanism morphing into internationalism and emancipatory politics beginning with the conviction that things are not

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static but need to be challenged to usher in a new paradigm based on egalitarianism and the desire to live differently than before. Furthermore, the author posits that such a development would involve a break from submissive consciousness in favour of a political consciousness which is an active, prescriptive attitude to reality, politics and a prescriptive invention. The reinvention of Pan-Africanism in the 21st century requires that the African Union moves towards the creation of a United States of Africa in fulfillment of the aspirations and wishes of the founding fathers and African people: …my plea to the new generation of African leaders and African peoples: work for unity … that, without unity there is no future for Africa. … We still want to have a place in the sun. I reject the glorification of the nationstate, which we have inherited from colonialism, and the artificial nations we are trying to forge from that inheritance… Nyerere (1997).

Muchie (2000) states that there is a need to rethink Pan-Africanism beyond a union of governments, but more as a shared goal, potentiality and ideal to generate the political resources to bring peoples, economies, cultures and communities together. It is encouraging that significant progress is being registered in the area of regional integration within the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) drive to foster intratrade, a customs union and a common regional currency. It is through such integration that socio-economic development can be realized. Such programs aimed at achieving regional integration should be driven by the interests of the people to break free from the limitations of a Balkanized Africa to the opportunities that emanate from unity in diversity: “A genuine state depends on the multiplicity and diversity of its people…” (Wamba dia Wamba, 1998). Pan-Africanism has a history of promoting world peace, for example, Haile Selassie (1936) called on the League of Nations to invoke its doctrine of collective security to protect developing countries from aggressive fascist colonisers during the Second World War. Such a spirit and global solidarity is felt during the post-Second World War era when most African countries created the Non-Alignment movement (NAM) to fight global nuclear proliferation, encourage disarmament efforts and the trappings of ideological dichotomies characterizing the post-Second World War era. Such initiatives brought results in the form of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Sale of Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Similarly, Nkrumah (1963), addressing Positive Action Conference for Peace and Security in Africa (AAPC) steering committee in Accra,

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demanded an end to nuclear war: “stop all nuclear tests, stop research on, and manufacturing of nuclear weapons, destroy all existing stocks of atomic and hydrogen bombs and dismantle all rocket bases. …[N]uclear weapons … constituted the ‘sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of mankind . . . which we must remove by positive action.”

12. Bretton Woods – a retrogressive façade of Pan-Africanism Mahomva (2014) states that many African countries have been forced by circumstances to cede their sovereignty to Bretton Woods institutions by agreeing to implement Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS). Kanu (2013) notes that the implementation of the SAPs in Africa has robbed the continent of economic sovereignty because decisions for implementation of such policies are taken outside without giving due consideration to the interest of the downtrodden. However, such programs have led to the pauperization of ordinary citizens who lose their jobs and find themselves homeless and financially incapacitated to access social services, for example, health, education, and other social benefits. African states have found themselves in a dilemma when dealing with neo-liberal institutions obsessed with development models that alienate workers from their labor, lives and destinies by robbing them of the right to conceive of themselves as truly liberated in all aspects of life.

13. Pan-Africanism – the way forward Mahomva (2014) lambasts the bipolar geopolitical structure whereby everything must either sway to the east or west as a sign of dependence: “we face neither East nor West: we face forward” Nkrumah (1963). Africa’s ability to stand on its own and chart its own development independently will reflect its capacity to rise above intellectual imbecility or ineptitude by breaking free from foreign domination. Pan-Africanism in the 21st century should aim to give African people pride, identity and confidence to realize their full potential as equal citizens of the world. The continent needs to reassert its position and chart its development strategy for the benefit of its marginalized people and in a true spirit of independence and freedom. Pan-African humanism must lead to “enlarge humanities” and recapture that original meaning of humanity which western scholars abandoned in search of material progress, according to Williams (2002). The author further states that Pan-Africanism, with its spiritual thrust and

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belief in the good will of humanity, can rescue the world from the destructive path of a greedy materialist, consumerist culture-based “reason”. Ubuntuism is a clearer manifestation of the radiation of cosmic energy that binds an individual’s existence to the totality of all that matters or through the integration of the individual with the community: “I am because we are, since we are, therefore I am” (Mbiti, 1970). Mbiti (1970) states that African models of traditional African religion are the strong belief in the idea that to exist is to live in harmony with nature and realize spiritual fulfillment through cooperation with significant others. The concept of democracy and rule of law can make more sense if fused with Ubuntu. It is a concept that will add life to the hollowness of the materialistic and greedy consumerist trappings of modern civilization, according to Viriri and Mungwini (2010). The authors further note that Pan-Africanism as ideology and movement has bestowed to the world a gift that will keep on illuminating in the form of a humanistic approach to human social existence, “Ubuntuism”.

14. Conclusion Pan-Africanism should be inward and outward driven and be able to foster grounds with the deprived to end socio-economic deprivation. Such an approach will lead to the development of mutually beneficial ties for the benefit of Africa and the African Diaspora. Parabiotic relations in the spirit of Pan-Africanism should leverage Africa and the African Diaspora to turn brain drain into “brain gain” and digital divide into “digital dividend”. Networks between Africa and the African Diaspora should be viewed as critical social and structural capital to engender sustainable development, peace and progress for the benefit of humankind. Engagement should be viewed as a two-way process resulting in mutually beneficial results for key interlocutors, mainly the African continent and the African Diaspora. The African continent needs the Diaspora, just as the Diaspora needs Africa, so the onus is on both to meet each other through dialogue to realize mutual reciprocity for the betterment of Africa.

References Abdul-Raheem, T. (1996). "Introduction: Reclaiming Africa for Africans" IN: Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem (ed) Pan-Africanism: Politics, Economy and Social Change in the Twenty-First Century, London: Pluto Press. Adefisan, K. and Babarinde, O. A. (2013). African Universities’ Stake in Integration and Knowledge Acquisition of Pan – Africanism in the

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Lumumba, P. (1962). Congo, My Country. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Maimela, D. (2013). The Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation. Issue E 71, November 2013. Mataire, L. (2014). Zim Diaspora remits $1,4 billion. IN:The herald, 14 , July, 2014. Mohaumad, A.A. (2005). Reversing the Brain Drain in Africa: Harnessing the Intellectual Capital of the Diaspora for Knowledge Development in Africa. Available from http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/Reversingthebraind.pdf Mokate, L.F. (2014). Panel discussion: Aligning political leverage, knowledge and social mobilization: strategies to promote the new agenda. Pan-African conference on inequalities in the context of structural transformation 28th - 30th April, 2014, Accra, Ghana. Nabudere, D. and Mandaza, I. (eds) (2002). Pan Africanism and Integration in Africa. Harare: Sapes Books. Nabudere, D.W. (2002). “How new information technologies can be used for learning in pastoral communities in Africa”, Paper presented at the world social summit, Porto Alegre, Brazil, February 2002. Niikando, A. (2005). Pan Africanism and the African Diaspora: A Weak Cooperation in the Current International Arena. IN: All African Students’ Conference (17th: 2005 Windhoek, Namibia) PanAfricanism/African nationalism: strengthening the unity of Africa and its diaspora. 2nd ed. Bankie, B.F. and Mchombu, K.(ed). Asmara: Red Sea Press. Prah, K.K. (2006). The African Nation, Cape Town: CASAS. The Economist. “Africa’s hopeful economies”, 3 December 2011. The Steve Biko Memorial Lectures 200-2008. Johannesburg: Pan MacMillan. Viriri, A. and Mungwini, P. (2010). African Cosmology and the Duality of Western Hegemony: The Search for an African Identity. IN: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.3, no.6, March, 2010. Wa Thiongo, N. (2008). Recovering our Memory:South Africa in the Black Imagination.IN: The Steve Biko Memorial Lectures. Wamba dia Wamba, E. (1998). “Protracted Political Crisis, Wars and Militarism in the Regions of Central Africa and the Great Lakes” Mimeo, 1998. Williams, C. (1993). The Rebirth of African Civilization. Chicago: Africa World Press. —. (1988). The Destruction of Black Civilization: Great Issues of a Race Between 4500 B.C. and 2000 A.D. Chicago: Third World Press, 1987.

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CHAPTER NINE ENGAGING THE DIASPORA FOR HOMELAND DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA DR SILK UGWU OGBU SCHOOL OF MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION, PAN-ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY, LAGOS, NIGERIA

Introduction The migration of people from their homelands to other places of residence has been an essential part of human history and civilization. For Africa, the natural process of outward migrations was distorted and accelerated by certain compelling circumstances such as the slave trade, colonialism, conflicts, bad governance and the failure or weakness of socio-economic and political institutions. For years, this unguarded movement of people out of Africa, starting from the slave trade era, was seen as a depletion of the human resource base of the continent and a great impediment to its development. However, this impression has since changed. The magnitude of the contributions and assistance from Africans living in the Diaspora to the development of their homeland has influenced the new conception of the outward migrations as “brain gain” rather than “brain drain”. Over time, the concept of Diaspora has been a subject of great intellectual debate. Migrants over the years have given birth to several generations of descendants, some of whom have no more interests, ties or psychological identification with their homelands. Thus, the description of the Diaspora has become complex and controversial given the fluidity of relationships, identities, and interests that exists between homelands and their various offspring living abroad. This paper interrogates the basis for the definition of Diaspora and examines the relevance of these arguments within the context of functionality.

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Although African migrants contribute significantly to the alleviation of poverty at the level of households through their remittances, this paper believes that Africa can benefit so much more from its Diaspora if mechanisms for their constructive engagement are built around the critical pillars of development. Asian countries like China, South Korea and India have demonstrated clearly how much Diaspora assistance can facilitate technological advancement, wealth creation and national growth. Unfortunately, many countries in Africa, including Nigeria, are yet to create the necessary framework for Diaspora engagement, in spite of unquestionable statistical data that point to the magnitude of this resource and its capacity to transform economies. In Nigeria, Diaspora remittances were in excess of $21 billion in 2013 alone notwithstanding (http://tv360nigeria.com/remittances-by-nigerians-indiaspora-to-hit-21bn-in-2013-world-bank/), it appears that the government is yet to take the matter of Diaspora engagement seriously. This paper contends that the institutional frameworks in Nigeria for partnering with the Diaspora such as the Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO) are so inadequate, inappropriate and dysfunctional that they cannot anchor meaningful relationships or facilitate serious engagement of the Diaspora towards the development of the homeland. The paper argues that government commitment to this essential relationship is weak and must be invigorated through incentives and policy directives that will stimulate interest and inspire confidence towards investments in the country by Nigerians living abroad. The recent rebasing of the country’s GDP may have confirmed that Nigeria is the biggest economy in Africa and one of the fastest growing economies in the world, but it has not changed the fact that more than 70% of the population still live on less than two dollars a day! As it is, rapid economic growth has not translated to a better life for the majority of the people and is unlikely to do so in the near future unless serious efforts are made to develop technology, skilled manpower, basic infrastructure, Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) and strengthen weak institutions. Apart from sending billions of dollars home, the Diaspora also contribute to the development of the vital sectors of the economy and to national growth through other forms of social remittances such as technological transfers, expertise, investments, entrepreneurship and corporate affiliations. This paper examines the various ways that the Nigerian Diaspora can support the development of the country and offers recommendations on how the government can better engage them towards the achievement of this goal.

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Who are the Diasporas? Originally derived from Greek, Diaspora connotes a spreading or scattering of seeds. In a broad sense, however, it refers to communities of individuals residing and working outside their country of origin (Merz, Chen, Geithner, and Gross Ebinger, 2007. p 18), or to the movement of a population from its original homeland to a foreign land whether voluntarily or involuntarily. Although, in recent times, a lot of people have voluntarily moved from their homelands in search of a better life, most cases of mass dispersion have often been forced or induced by one form of conflict or another. In general, the term Diaspora carries a sense of displacement, the population so described finds itself for whatever reason separated from its national territory, and usually its people have a hope, or at least a desire, to return to their homeland at some point, if the ‘homeland’ still exists in any meaningful sense (http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Diaspora). Examples of involuntary movements of people include the exile of the Messenians under Spartan rule, the southern Chinese during the coolie trade, the expulsion of Jews from Judea, and the forced movement of Africans during the Transatlantic Slave Trade. A Diaspora can be defined as people who have migrated and their descendants who maintain a connection to their homeland (Plaza and Ratha, 2011. p 3). According to the U.S. State Department, Diasporas are migrants groups who share the following features: x Dispersion, whether voluntary or involuntary, across socio-cultural boundaries and at least one political border x A collective memory and myth about the homeland x A commitment to keeping the homeland alive through symbolic and direct action x The presence of the issue of return, though not necessarily a commitment to do so x A Diasporic consciousness and associated identity expressed in Diaspora community media, creation of Diaspora associations or organizations, and online participation (Department telegraph 86401, U.S. State Department). Similarly, the African Union defines the African Diaspora as consisting of people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to assist in the development of the continent and the building of the African Union (African Union, 2005). The essential emphasis of these definitions

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is that, irrespective of the circumstances behind the movement of people away from their homeland, they can be referred to as Diaspora only if they maintain a connection to their ancestral home and are willing to either support or be identified with the development of that homeland. In other words, the fact that a person is of African descent, for example, is not sufficient for him to be described as a Diaspora. He/she must have an interest and willingness to identify with his/her homeland or to assist its development in a meaningful way. Thus, Nigerian Diasporas can be defined as Nigerians and their descendants who live outside of the country but still maintain a connection with the homeland, not just in terms of identity or social and psychological affinity but also through the demonstration of significant interest and commitment towards the growth and enhancement of the nation. Mohan (2002) examines the relevance of the Diasporas to development from three critical perspectives: development in the Diaspora; development through the Diaspora and development by the Diaspora. Development in the Diaspora or development in place refers to efforts made by the Diaspora to promote the economic and social well-being of their host countries or localities. In various ways, the Diasporas contribute immensely to the socioeconomic growth of their host communities through the deployment of their specialized skills and professional experience. Indeed, many technological breakthroughs and significant advancement in the application of scientific knowledge in our world today are easily traceable to the tenacity and diligence of many individuals living in the Diaspora. Development through the Diaspora or development through space refers to how the Diaspora uses their immense contacts and social capital to facilitate development beyond their host countries to other regions, nations and continents. A good example of development through the Diaspora is perhaps the global fight against the apartheid regime in South Africa, which was spearheaded and galvanized by the persistence of many Africans in the Diaspora. The development by the Diaspora or development across space describes the efforts of the Diaspora to enhance the development of their homelands through the use of their diffuse global connections and various forms of financial and social transfers. Many countries in Africa, including Nigeria, have benefited immensely from the developmental initiatives of the Diaspora, especially in the area of poverty alleviation, community development, infrastructural transformation, capacity building, and so on. The linkage between the Diaspora and the development of their homelands over the years has become increasingly stronger and indispensable. It is estimated that over 30 million people of African descent live outside of the continent and contribute over $40 billion annually to the development of their homeland (Plaza and Ratha, 2011. p

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27). The remittance from the Africans living in the Diaspora has been growing annually since 2005 and is now believed to have surpassed even the Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). These remittances are significant because they incorporate cash and other forms of social transfers like technological, medical and educational assistance that facilitate the development of the various sectors of the African economy. Although Europe, America and Asia are popular destinations for African migrants, it is pertinent to point out here that the bulk of Africans living in the Diaspora actually reside within the continent and not in the west, as many erroneously believe. In fact, it is estimated that over 60% of Nigerian emigrants, for instance, reside in Africa and that nearly 56% of them are located in ten African countries, namely Sudan, Cameroon, Ghana, Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Kenya, Togo and Gabon (Olatuyi, Awoyinka & Adeniyi, 2013). This means that Africans are playing a pivotal role in the development of the continent and could do even more if properly engaged or encouraged with the right incentives. Table 1: Location of Nigerian Diasporas Global migrant origin database Number 2,176

Global migrant origin database Percentage 0.2

Orozco and Mills, 2007

Orozco and Mills, 2007

Number Percentage East Asia and 37,879 0.7 Pacific Europe and 191,999 18.4 954,155 18.5 Central Asia Latin 2,257 0.2 10,951 0.2 America and Caribbean Middle East 26,992 2.6 145,703 2.8 and North Africa North 153,706 14.8 763,401 14.8 America South Asia 17,890 1.7 61,777 1.2 Sub-Saharan 646,264 62.1 3,197,540 61.8 Africa 100 100 Grand total 1,041,284 5,171,405 Sources: Global Migrant Origin Database (http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_migrant_origin_ database.html) and Orozco, M. and B. Mills, 2007.

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Irrespective of where they reside, however, Nigerians in the Diaspora contribute immensely to the development of their homeland. These contributions range from cash transfers to other forms of social remittances that directly or indirectly facilitate economic and social transformations at home. According to the World Bank, remittances sent to Nigeria rose from only USD 10 million in 1990 to USD 3.3 billion in 2005 and to USD 10.6 billion in 2011 and USD 21 billion in 2013, respectively (http://tv360nigeria.com/remittances-by-nigerians-in-diasporato-hit-21bn-in-2013-world-bank/). Unarguably, Nigeria has emerged as the largest receiver of remittances in Africa and one of the top ten destinations of international remittances in the world today. These remittances, which have been steady and growing in the past 25 years, constitute a massive resource base that can be easily harnessed towards national growth and transformation by the simple act of engaging the Diasporas in a constructive and meaningful way.

The Diaspora and National Development in Nigeria Although remittances to Nigeria generate a lot of interest and attention, the contributions of the Diaspora to the development of the country goes far deeper and wider than mere cash transfers. Diaspora groups from within and outside the continent have been instrumental to the growth of the national economy and the various transformations across the land. The Diasporas initiate and undertake a wide range of developmental projects which align closely with both the Millennium Developmental Goals (MDGs) and Nigeria’s development priorities. Chikezie (2011) identifies multiple forms of Diaspora capital with implications for development: x Financial Capital: This refers to the cash transfers which help to provide food, clothing, housing, health and education for millions of households who otherwise would not have been able to make it from one day to the next. Recipients put remittances to a variety of uses which include the creation of small businesses and the development of various income-generating opportunities. x Intellectual Capital: The Diaspora also contributes to the development of Nigeria through the transfer of intellectual capital. In recent times, the lamentations over “brain drain” have become less audible because advancements in information and communication technologies have created a platform that enables Nigerians to tap into the know-how and skills of the Diaspora in many flexible ways that do not even require them to return home.

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x Political Capital: Members of the Diaspora deploy their connections and influence towards the support of political transformations at home. They also support the growth of civil society movements and protests against political marginalization or discrimination. For example, the resistances against the repressive regime of General Sanni Abacha, as well as the attempt to elongate the tenure of President Olusegun Obasanjo after 2007, were led by Nigerians living in the Diaspora. x Cultural Capital: Through their exposure to foreign cultures, values and norms, members of the Diaspora are able to bring fresh perspectives and global insights that drive innovation and transformations at home. In a way, they serve as a bridge between their host countries and Nigeria by synthesizing and integrating the best values from both cultures into a unique “insider–outsider” approach to development x Social Capital: This refers to the resource inherent in the social ties, networks, channels obligations, trust, feedback and satisfaction that Nigerian Diasporas deploy towards the development of their homeland. It is the net worth of relationships or the “glue that binds” people in a way that promotes wealth creation through obligations and reciprocity. In general, the Nigerian Diasporas engage in many activities which directly or indirectly promote development at home, some of which include: x Poverty Alleviation: The Nigerian Diaspora injects much-needed financial resources to alleviate poverty at the levels of households where donor agencies and official government assistance are always unable to reach. In this way, the Diaspora stands in the gap for families who otherwise would not have been able to make it, thereby providing basic social nets that the government is unable to. x Health and Education: Diaspora remittances facilitate the provision of healthcare and education and have been instrumental in reducing both infant and maternal mortality in many Nigerian communities. Diaspora groups provide scholarships to needy students and free medication to the poor as well as building classrooms, health centers, dispensaries and many other facilities required to enhance primary healthcare and basic education in their home communities.

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x Small Businesses Development: Nigerian Diasporas support the creation of small and medium businesses through their remittances which helps in creating jobs and reducing unemployment in the country. Such small businesses, such as hairdressing, carpentry, car washing, masonry, mechanics, restaurants, etc., constitute the real sector of the economy with multiplier effects that are quite humongous in various critical dimensions. x Agriculture: Apart from contributing directly towards the development of agriculture and mechanized farming at home, Nigerian migrants also promote the growth of agricultural businesses through their increasing demand for ethnic food in their host countries. This has led to better storage, packaging and processing of local foods and also to the growth of various businesses along the entire supply value chain. x Community Development: Perhaps the greatest impact of Diaspora remittances is evident at the level of community development where the resources of the government are usually inadequate to provide roads, electricity, schools, hospitals and several other amenities required for decent living. Diaspora groups also facilitate community-driven development by promoting collective decision-making, capacity enhancement, networking and social capital formation. x Real Estate and Housing Development: A significant percentage of lands and real estate developments, especially in the urban areas, belong to Nigerians living abroad. Their investments in the purchase of lands and houses as well as in the construction of new homes and rentable properties not only reduce the deficiency in the housing sector but also encourage the growth of ancillary businesses such as masonry, painting, roofing, doors and windows manufacturing, brick-making, etc. x Transportation: Through their ownership of many commercial vehicles and transportation businesses operating in Nigeria, the Diaspora contributes to the expansion and sustenance of various transportation networks which facilitates the easier movement of people and goods across the country. For example, their investment in the transportation sector makes it easier for farmers to move their produce to desired destinations at a reduced cost, which gives them more profit and makes their products even more affordable for the people. x Technology Transfer: Apart from cash remittances, Diaspora groups facilitate the transfer of knowledge and technology from

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their host countries to their homeland. Many Nigerian experts living abroad contribute to the growth and development of research and technology at home through their technical and logistic support to various institutions and agencies. Some have built ICT networks and collaborative channels of exchange through which knowledge and information are transferred to Nigerian institutions, leading to breakthroughs in medicine, genetic agriculture, computer science and knowledge-based economic transformations. x Promotion of Good Governance: With the improvement in information and communication technology, Nigerians living abroad are now more informed about the activities of the government at home. They have become sometimes even more vocal and critical than the ones living within the country and they now participate in various debates, chats, comments and online networks that discuss issues of governance, politics and sociocultural change. Interestingly, many Nigerians living abroad not only criticize government policies or bad government officials but are now coming back to run for elective offices at home. Some Diaspora groups support or sponsor selected candidates to win elections while some throw their weight behind political parties in an attempt to play a more active role in the politics of their homeland. There are, of course, many more ways through which the Diasporas facilitate development at home. The magnitude of the resources available to Nigeria through Diaspora engagement may never be correctly estimated, but if the experiences of China, South Korea, Israel, India, etc. are anything to go by, it is obvious that Nigeria needs to wake up from its slumber and smell the coffee before it turns stale. As they say in native Nigerian parlance: “what we are looking for in Sokoto is apparently in our shokoto”, so there is no need for Nigeria to be begging for alms and FDI from the west when she can actually source the same funds from her citizens who live abroad at a very negligible cost. If the World Bank estimates that $21 billion was remitted by the Diaspora to Nigeria in 2013 alone from official sources, the accurate amount, including unofficial transfers, may be somewhere in the region of $50 to $60 billion and may surpass $100 billion by the year 2020. This is not the kind of money that any government in the world, especially in Africa, can afford to ignore or joke about. Therefore, it is imperative for the present administration to sit up and do what is necessary.

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Engaging the Diaspora in Nigeria In light of the fact that the Diaspora can play a very significant role in stimulating development at home, as has been discussed in the preceding section, it is important for an enabling environment to be created to properly engage or involve them in pursuing the developmental agenda of the state. Chikezie (2011) suggests that the starting point of this engagement strategy must incorporate an understanding of the motivation behind Diaspora investments and how they can be correctly aligned with the drivers of productivity (skills, innovation, investment, enterprise and competition). He identifies the 3Ps of Diaspora Motivation as: x Pecuniary Interest: Many people living in the Diaspora, especially those without legal documents intend to return home one day and are therefore motivated towards investing at home as a way of creating remunerative ventures for sustainability upon their return. Others invest to reduce the dependency of their families on them or to create multiple streams of income to support themselves and their families. x Private Interest: Beyond immediate pecuniary gain, the Diasporas also direct their resources towards other private causes, usually involving their families or community. Such investments may be aimed at enhancing their economic, social or political influence at home. x Public Philanthropic Interest: Members of the Diaspora sometimes deploy their resources towards the pursuit of public good or certain philanthropic goals in which they may not have any tangible financial or personal gain. In other words, altruism can be identified as a major motivating factor behind several Diaspora activities and transfers. Without a doubt, understanding the motivation behind Diaspora transfers is a fundamental step in planning a strategy of successful engagement because it enables the government to inculcate within its policy initiatives with viable ideas that will satisfy the Diaspora need for financial, social and emotional rewards. Chikezie (2011) opines that African governments that are desirous of engaging their Diasporas must articulate policies that not only consider Diaspora needs but essentially marry Diaspora capital with the productive drivers of homeland economies:

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Table 2: Specific Policies and Initiatives to Harness African Diaspora Resources Productivity driver Skills

Diaspora capital Intellectual

Innovation

Intellectual, financial

Investment

Financial

Policy initiatives

Programs/projects

• Improve linkages among business; vocational, educational, and training providers; and employers to produce workforce with more marketable skills • Revise educational curricula to incorporate critical thinking skills, innovation, and entrepreneurship to help nurture a culture of entrepreneurialism Systematize the purposeful search for innovation in firms and organizations and society at large; create incentives to encourage and reward innovation; send strong message to diaspora that the country is open for innovation • Pursue investment climate reforms to encourage domestic investment; foreign direct investment; and diaspora direct investment (all investors share similar core concerns). Those issues of specific concern to diaspora investors include land reform; dual nationality (or other means to guarantee property rights for diaspora investors who may now hold foreign citizenship) • Encourage greater financial literacy and inclusion (bank the unbanked) • Develop closer linkages

Develop schemes to build the capacity of small and medium enterprises nationwide using diaspora skills and know-how

Establish a competition for innovation and entrepreneurship that includes diaspora innovators and entrepreneurs

• Restructure investment promotion agencies to attract diaspora direct investment and foreign direct investment • Encourage local chambers of commerce to develop relationships with diaspora chambers of commerce for information exchange, business partnerships, and two-way trading relationships • Launch products such as diaspora bonds to attract diaspora direct investment • Support innovative products to enable remittances recipients to gain access to financial

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Enterprise

Financial, intellectual

Competition

Political

between the remittances economy (e.g. housing and construction) and the local economy to enhance beneficial multiplier effects of remittances • Encourage and regulate innovative financial products and services attractive to diaspora investors • Reduce administrative barriers to doing business; reduce registration costs for new businesses; implement tax incentives to encourage enterprise • Amend banking regulations to enable “portable” credit histories to allow diaspora entrepreneurs to access credit in local capital markets • Amend employment laws to facilitate easier hiring of African diaspora employees, even when they are not nationals of the country Encourage competition in remittances service provision: reduce entry barriers to enable more players to reduce transfer fees; allow other financial institutions (e.g., monetary financial institutions) to provide money transfer services; apply competition policy frameworks to exclusive agreements involving money transfer operators and their distributors

services and business support where the intention is to use remittances for enterprise endeavors

Encourage value chain initiatives to promote export of goods and services that target diaspora consumers, particularly where products have the potential to gain wider market access via diaspora channels (e.g. in the same way that “Nollywood” Nigerian movies now enjoy widespread appeal thanks to Nigerian diaspora consumers)

Use public-private dialogue structures to incorporate the views of diaspora investors and entrepreneurs on necessary reforms

Source: Chikezie, Chukwu- Emeka (2011). Reinforcing the Contributions of African Diasporas to Development in Plaza, Sonia and Ratha, Dillip (Editors) Diaspora for Development in Africa. Washington DC, World Bank. p. 275

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As interesting as the above prescriptions may seem, they appear somewhat focused on economic and financial targets alone and do not seem to have a comprehensive view on how the Diaspora can be engaged to also facilitate social and political transformations in Africa. Considering the fact that leadership is a major problem for most African nations, this void is very significant and cannot be ignored. Indeed, a viable engagement strategy of the Diaspora needs to address the essential interests of the Diasporas and that of the nation in a way that builds a comprehensive and sustainable partnership, trust and reciprocity over the long term. Unfortunately, it appears that the ruling elite in most African countries, including Nigeria are reluctant to engage the Diaspora in political leadership for obvious selfish reasons. The spate of corruption and flagrant abuse of power that is common in most developing polities provides unusual privileges and benefits for political leaders which they are often unwilling to give up or share. Thus, it is convenient for them to continue to ignore the fact that engaging the experts in the Diasporas who have been exposed to a culture of service, productivity, accountability and discipline towards leadership may provide a turning point in the social and political transformations of the respective states. The common practice, especially in Nigeria, of appointing professionals from the Diaspora as ministers or heads of agencies has been, at most, random and inconsistent. What is required now is a comprehensive policy of engagement that opens the door to the best brains in the Diaspora to participate in the political process on a level playing field with other citizens of the country. To this end, this paper argues that there is a need to reform the electoral laws and processes in order to give Nigerians living in the Diaspora the right “to vote and be voted for” and also ensure that the “votes count and are counted” in general elections. The controversy surrounding the dual citizenship must be laid to rest and the government should go beyond the appointment of ministers from the Diaspora to the creation of a ministry to handle Diaspora engagement and even the allocation of seats in the national assembly to the Diasporas. No doubt, these suggestions may sound farfetched to many Nigerians, but they are quite possible to achieve if the political will is available. Several countries in Africa, such as Ghana, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Tunisia and Liberia, are already working on these ideas. The common challenge, however, is to obtain and maintain the altruistic commitment of the political elite to a revolutionary change that may lead to their loss of privileges or even a class suicide.

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Conclusion The astronomical growth of remittances to Nigeria over the years has continued to attract wide attention internationally and the keen interest of both the government and the organized private sector. However, while the interest in the cash transfers is clearly understandable, it is worrisome to observe that little or no attention has been paid to the prospect of harnessing other forms of Diaspora resource, such as technological expertise, professional/technical know-how, global connections etc. for the purpose of accelerating national growth and transformation. Under the regime of President Olusegun Obasanjo, the drive to engage with the Diaspora received an interesting boost. The formations of NIDO and the Linkage with Experts and Academics in the Diaspora (LEAD) by his administration as platforms of partnering with the Diaspora are indeed commendable. The LEAD program opened the door for qualified Nigerian Diasporas to contribute to the development of the country’s university system through a 3-12 month contract that was designed to engage them in the training of students at the universities in some selected disciplines e.g. medicine, ICT, dentistry, mathematics, mining, engineering, and so on. However, these initiatives have long fizzled out and government support for Diaspora engagement has lost its steam. The offices of NIDO established within the Nigerian embassies have become mere data collection centers for the statistics of Nigerians living abroad. The inability of the government to develop a good partnership with the Diasporas or create incentives to align fund transfers with national developmental priorities is the reason the growth in remittances over the years has not translated to visible changes in national wealth. Although the remittances are quite helpful at the level of households through the provision of social nets for families, this paper believes that they can be better deployed to fund infrastructural and developmental projects through the use of Diaspora bonds or other more rewarding investment incentives. There is the need also for the government to simplify the money transfer processes and reduce the cost of transfers in order to encourage more investments from the Diasporas who patronize the informal transfer windows. Likewise, Diaspora investment in real estate and properties can be enhanced if necessary reforms are introduced in land and property acquisition procedures or if tax incentives on property are offered to members of the Diaspora. Beyond cash transfers, engagement of the Diasporas should also be focused on leveraging other forms of social remittances, such as transfer of skills, expertise, technology and social capital, which can stimulate the

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development of the core sectors of the economy. The government should provide good incentives for professionals and experts from the Diaspora to come in and train both students and artisans at home as a way of developing human capital and building further capacity. The provision of USD 1,250-1,750 (Olatuyi, Awoyinka & Adeniyi, 2013) in the LEAD program as monthly allowances for professionals who earn more than ten times that amount of money abroad to come and teach in Nigerian universities is hardly attractive and may not encourage many to come. The government must be prepared to invest in the training of its abundant manpower if it wants to achieve meaningful transformational goals. It is obvious that members of the Diaspora can play a pivotal role in changing the culture of corruption in Nigeria if given the opportunity to provide political leadership. Their exposure to other cultures presents them with a clear advantage and an alternative vision that may be required to drive the process of change and social transformation. This is not to say that the Diaspora is the knight in shining armour or that the people at home are less qualified. The point being made here is that the government needs to unlock the opportunities for participation in the political process to the Diasporas, so that the kind of leadership that the country needs can be sourced from wherever it exists. Without a doubt, the majority of Nigerians living in the Diaspora are willing to return and contribute their quota to national development. Unfortunately, this intention is always hampered by a series of factors, some of which include unfavorable political, social and economic environment; absence of an enabling Diaspora policy; internal resentment by public officers and institutions; lack of employment opportunities; insecurity and inefficiency of the judiciary and other law enforcement mechanisms. To harness the enormous resources in the Diaspora, the government must address these concerns in order to build better trust and investor confidence as well as encourage those who are willing to return to do so.

References Achebe, Chinua (1983). The Trouble with Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension publishing Co. Ltd. ADB (2011). http:/ /Documents/Project-and-Operations/2011 The role of the Diaspora in Nation-building - lessons for fragile and post- conflict countries in Africa.pdf

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African Union (2005). Expert Meeting from Member States on the Definition of the African diaspora, 11th-12th April. Addis-Ababa Ethiopia: s.n. Agba, A. Ikoh, M, Ushie, E and Agba, S (2008). “Bureaucratic Corruption in Nigeria: The need for Institutional Reforms”. Journal of International Politics and Development Studies, Vol.4 Nos.1&2, January/June & July/December 2008, pp.187-204. Agweda, T.O. (2007). “The Imperative of Leadership in Governance: The Nigerian Experience”. Akpotor, A.S. Afolabi, S. Aigbokhaevbolo, M. Iganiga, B. and Odiagbe, S. eds. 2007. Cost of Governance in Nigeria: An Evaluative Analysis. Ekpoma: Faculty of Social Sciences, Ambrose Alli University Publishing House, pp.176-187. Chemers, M. M. (2002). Cognitive, Social, and Emotional Intelligence of Transformational Leadership: Efficacy and Effectiveness. In R.E. Riggio, S. E. Murphy, F.J. Pirozzolo (eds.), Multiple Intelligences and Leadership. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Chikezie, Chukwu-Emeka (2011). Reinforcing the Contributions of African Diasporas to Development in Plaza, Sonia and Ratha, Dillip (Editors) Diaspora for Development in Africa. Washington DC, World Bank. Chun, Seung-Hun (2010). Diaspora Contributions to Industrialization in South Korea. Paper delivered at the Conference on Mobilizing the African Diaspora for Capacity Building and Development: Focus on Fragile States during the 2010 ADB Annual Meetings in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. Diatta, M.A. & M. Bow (1999). Releasing the Development Potential of Return Migration: The Case of Senegal, International Migration, Vol.37 No.1. Gubert, F. (2005). Migrant Remittances and their Impact on Development in the Home Economies: The Case of Africa. Migration, Remittances and Development. Paris. OECD http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diaspora. Retrieved 7th August 2014 http://tv360nigeria.com/remittances-by-nigerians-in-diaspora-to-hit-21bnin-2013-world-bank/Retrieved 6th August 2014 IFAD (2009). Sending Money Home to Africa: Remittance markets, enabling environment and prospects, International Fund for Agricultural Development. http://www.ifad.org/remittances/pub/money_africa.pdf Iheke, O.R. (2012). The Effect of Remittances on the Nigerian Economy. International Journal of Development and Sustainability Online ISSN:

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2168-8662 – www.isdsnet.com/ijds Volume 1 Number 2 (2012): Pages 614-621 Merz, B, Chen, L, Geithner, P & Ebinger, C (2007). Diasporas and Development. Harvard University Press. Mohan, G (2002) Diaspora and development. In: Displacement and Development (J. Robinson ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press in association with the Open University, 77-139. Newland, K., and E. Patrick (2004). Beyond Remittances: the Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reductions in their Countries of Origin. Washington D. C: Migration Policy Institute. Newland, Kathleen, Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, and Aaron Terrazas. (2008). “Learning by Doing: Experiences of Circular Migration.” Migration Policy Institute Insight. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Insight-IGC-Sept08.pdf. Nigeria Draft National Policy on Migration 2007 (NCFR 2009). Olatuyi, Akinjide, Awoyinka, Yisa & Adeniyi Abiodun (2013). Nigerian Diasporas in The South: Harnessing the Potential For National Development. ACP Observatory on Migration. ACPOBS/2013/PUB06. Orozco, M. and B. Mills (2007). Remittances, Competition and Fair Financial Access Opportunities in Nigeria. Washington DC: USAID www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/NigeriaAMAP%20FSKG%20%20Nigeria%20Remittances-%20FINAL.pdf. Plaza, S. & Ratha, D. (2011). Diaspora for Development in Africa. Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Tesfamichael, Gebreselassie Y. (2005). “In Africa, Just Help Us To Help Ourselves.” Washington Post, July 24. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/07/22/AR 2005072202226.html U.S. Department of State. Telegraph 86401. Washington, DC. UNDP (2009). Trends in International Migrant Stock. UNPD United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Population Division. World Bank (2010) World Development Indicators 2009 – 2010. Country Statistics for Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. Zan, Samuel (2004). “One Nation, One People, One Destiny? The Ghanaian Diaspora’s Contribution to National Development Using Diverse Channels.” London: African Foundation for Development. http://www.afforduk.org/resources/download/one_nation.pdf

CHAPTER TEN AFRICAN LEADERSHIP: NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE— MOVING FROM THE LAMENT NARRATIVE OF “MONUMENTAL LEADERSHIP FAILURE” TO A NARRATIVE OF HOPE FOR “VISIONARY CHANGE LEADERSHIP” DR YABOME GILPIN-JACKSON INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER

Introduction and Overview I want to flip the channel but I am inexorably drawn into watching the story unfolding. It is another dismal tale from Africa – something about another leader changing the constitution so that he can remain President. At the end, I watch with fascination as the news anchor delivers the message that the leader is an unpopular dictator – her expression remains flawlessly expressionless and deadpan as she transitions on. I wonder what she is actually thinking behind the deadpan mask as she hears herself broadcasting the narrative that is so commonplace, it’s beginning to feel worn… What is your story of African leadership? What is our collective story? How do these stories influence the leadership we have now? Is your current story of African leadership the same, or different than the story you’d like to see in the future? Literature and research on African Leadership has focused on exposing the current pitfalls and perils of post-colonial African political leadership. The ‘corruption’, ‘nepotism’, ‘resource grabbing’ and ‘violence’ of African political leaders have been named and attributed to widespread armed conflicts, the economic demise and current status of underdevelopment

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across the continent. However, apart from Ayittey’s (2005) look at the Cheetah generation – the young up and coming class of progressive African leaders – there has not been a lot of scholarly focus on the kind of African leadership required to move the continent forward. In this chapter, I highlight the need for scholarship, dialogue and action to facilitate a new African leadership required now and for the future. I use a narrative approach to reviewing the literature, in order to uncover the existing stories of African leadership. I define leadership based on definitions of leadership in African contexts, where leaders are defined as those who selflessly serve their communities for a greater good. Leadership in Africa is a group phenomenon in which leadership and followership are negotiated by the leader’s ability to be embedded in and support followers in achieving their collective goals, thus significantly contributing to improving the life of the group, community, tribe or village. Followers will honor and respect leaders within formal hierarchical structures of kings, ruling councils and leaders, with respect and acceptance earned by the most effective servant leaders (Hotep, 2010; Masango, 2003). As Masango (2003) concludes: In my view, an effective leader is a person who is always caring, supportive and not controlling. As he or she leads, threats diminish, and the leader becomes accepted as a member of the village/community. The leader is seen as a resource for the group and a co-worker in building up the community or village. In Africa, leadership was traditionally a function to be shared by all villagers or community members, rather than invested in one person. The whole aim of an effective or life-giving leader is to uplift the villagers/community in such a way that they progress. This will help people to express their own gifts within the village/community. As leaders share their gift of leadership, in return the people will honour them. As they continue to share in African religious ceremonies, an essential part of the way of life of each person, the villagers/community will join in celebration. (p. 315).

Thus, “traditionally, African Leadership is built on participation, responsibility and spiritual authority” (van der Colff, 2003, p.258). In addition, leadership in Africa means for me leadership that is inclusive of, but beyond, the political class of postcolonial leaders. When I refer to African leadership or leadership in Africa, I mean leadership in every industry and from African grassroots leaders through leadership in and from the diaspora. Therefore, I take a metanarrative view of leadership across the continent, particularly sub-Saharan Africa and its dispersed peoples. I do not include a review of individual country-specific leadership opportunities. The intent is to understand the narratives that inform the

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dialogue, research and praxis associated with African leadership overall. I acknowledge, therefore, that there will be varying applications of the dialogue raised through this narrative review and analysis for the 55 recognized nation-states of Africa. I start by further explaining the importance and significance of the orientations to the narrative approach for understanding African perspectives that I use. Next, I review the currently dominant, as well as the possible alternative, narratives inherent in a selection of the African leadership literature. I follow that with a proposed narrative model, which occurs as guidelines for thinking about scholarship and praxis on African leadership. The intent of this proposal is to start a dialogue, not make a declaration or provide a prescription of what must be. It provides guidelines for thinking and acting to create the leadership each of us needs and wants for Africa, now and into the future.

Why a Narrative Approach Africa is diverse and complex with varying colonial heritages, and thousands of ethnic and linguistic groups (Nsamenang, 2003, 2005, 2007). However, it is possible from a universalist orientation of human development to see a common thread within which unique variations and experiences can live and be uncovered. It is these common threads, from Africa’s shared history of slavery, colonization, and ecological adaptations, which Nsamenang refers to in concluding that there is a common psychological frame of reference that represents a unique African worldview (Nsamenang, 2007, pp. 1-2). This aligns with theoretical perspectives to human development that assume underlying psychological processes are universal while adaptations evident in behavior will be differentiated across cultures. In African worldview, Nsamenang argued that African epistemologies and indigenous education favor what can be called holistic knowing, in which “knowledge is interwoven into a common tapestry…which is learned in a participatory curriculum” (Nsamenang, 2005, p. 2). He argued that this epistemology is a means through which the diverse ethno-cultural realities of Africa can be integrated and can conceptually be understood as social ontogenesis, a worldview which situates personhood and identity within the social and the collective. The sociogenic worldview of Africans, in general, is confirmed by others. Through a summary of the work of Gabo Nteseane, African forms of learning and knowing are described as learning to live in the collective, such that being human represents being in community, inclusive of ancestors. As such, all forms of learning and knowledge systems are embedded in relational methods, such as

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participatory education, oral traditions and storytelling, and community ceremonies and rituals (Merriam, Caffarella, & Baumgartner, 2007). As such, narrative is fundamental to African ways of knowing, healing traditions, governance, and expression of social change and justice. In attempting to understand the philosophies, ways of knowing, and being of Africans, attention must be given to such factors that are expressive of African’s ordinary forms of life, i.e., through their orature, their traditional forms of governance, their fictional literature, and their arts. These are all forms of the narrative [original author’s emphasis] self-expression of Africans. (Bell, 2002, p. xi)

Bell (2002, p. 15) explained that Africans have a long tradition of story and narrative in literary and iconic forms, as a basis for critical reflection and expression and social change. Bell explained for example, that oral narrative practices, such as the rational dialogue of the village palaver, represent a philosophical orientation and reflect “a real critical effort on the part of [Africans] to resolve its common dilemmas…it is from such local, human narrative situations…that the narrative aspects of philosophy arise” (Bell, 2002, pp. 116-117). Bell further showed that the tradition of engaging in issues of social change and justice carried forward into written narratives and literary fiction of Africans. Renowned African literary writers such as Wole Soyinka, Camara Laye, Ousmane Sembene, Chinua Achebe, Cheikh Hamidou Kane, all used African literature as a forum to raise consciousness of the African postcolonial context, problematize social norms and precolonial/traditional values and express African identities, socio-cultural and moral contexts for change and social transformation (Bell, 2002, pp. 117-129). Other scholars have analyzed a variety of African narrative forms to show how Africans understand, negotiate and problematize issues of identity, agency, communication, social change and development (Ansu-Kyeremeh, 2005; Hai, 2009; Karp & Masolo, 2000). Solinger et al. (2008) explain that narrative becomes a forum for social justice by giving voice and finding listeners, in order to break coercive silences and the isolation of the narrators. It is an optimistic perspective that the accurate telling of stories will highlight issues of social justice, promote human rights, and propel people and communities to activism in that direction. They summarize it this way: Telling stories of indignity, tragedy, hope involves the teller in acts of transformation: experience and identity become mutable. The story can have a different ending from the one we already know. You can “hear” the story differently from me. We can compare. We can rewrite/reenact/redraw and retell it again. The story becomes a way of remaking the

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In the narrative tradition, therefore, issues of social change and activism are highlighted through the metanarratives that are uncovered in analyzing narratives in their social context (Chase, 2005, p.668). Therefore, a narrative review and understanding of African phenomena – in this case leadership – is crucial for understanding and development of the phenomena because of what I call contextual congruence. Contextual congruence is for me the principle that a phenomenon cannot be understood and developed outside of the form and context within which it emerges. In addition, not only does an African worldview favour collective narrative understandings, Couto (2004) summarizes the work of historical philosophers, social psychologists, sociologists and contemporary leadership scholars to show that narrative is significant for the study of leadership including leadership communication and leadership for social change. Dominant narratives told through ordinary stories are fundamental to human nature and give people access to their shared history, possible futures and, therefore, agency to enact changes. It is reasonable to conclude, given this rich narrative tradition and history for both leadership theory and African understandings, that a narrative approach was ideal to understanding and uncovering the possible directions for African leadership going forward.

Narrative Analysis and Interpretation The philosopher Alasdair McIntryre, as cited in Couto (2004), wrote that: I can only answer the question “What am I to do?” if I can answer the prior question “Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?” We enter human society, that is, with one or more imputed characters—roles into which we have been drafted—and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be construed. (pp. 3-4)

Couto (2004, p.4) builds on McIntyre to say the following: The questions “What am I to do?” and “Of what story am I a part?” capture the essence of leadership—to take action, which may exceed one's authority, in the face of doubt. However, these questions miss the essence of leadership because they focus on the individual. Leaders ask and answer, “What are we to do?” Effective leadership asks implicitly or

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explicitly, “Of what story are we a part?” Leadership imparts an immediacy of the shared past of many people and a possible future that influences people to build a link of action between the shared past and a possible future.

Therefore, the approach I have taken to this paper is to first ask the questions: Of what leadership story are we a part of now? What leadership story do we want? What are we to do? To respond to these questions, I have selectively reviewed African leadership literature from the orientation of narrative analysis, informed by the interpretative reading into a whole narrative to understand the macrozoom perspectives (Pamphilon, 1999; Riessman, 2008; Swart, 2013). A narrative lens and analysis is about moving beyond the surface of what is narrated to delve into the essence and underlying meaning of stories. A narrative interpretation allows inquirers to locate stories in context and look beyond what is told to understand the taken-for granted beliefs, underlying intention and how, why and what purpose the content of stories serve (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Clandinin & Rosiek, 2007; Swart, 2013). Narrative analysis requires “close reading” and attention to the narrative choices made as well as the gaps and inconsistencies that point to the cultural, social, and other influences on those choices. Such reading also uncovers understandings of the dominant, alternative, and counternarratives inherent in what is storied (Riessman, 2008, p. 11). The macrozoom perspective is a narrative thematic approach that focuses on uncovering dominant discourses, narrative forms, and cohort effects that are inherent in and frame narratives. Dominant discourses refer to sociocultural influences that the narrators refer to. Narrative forms refer to the type of story that narrators signify, and cohort effects refer to the subsequent influence of external and historical events on the groups of people affected (Pamphilon, 1999). Furthermore, I especially use the lens of re-authoring narratives, which is informed by an African worldview, to conclude the analysis and respond to the question: What are we to do? As already shown, the intent of understanding narratives is to shift and re-author them (Swart, 2013). Understanding the leadership narratives we live in and by allows us to ‘restory’ our futures by taking back our storytelling rights as African leaders.

Locating the Paper…Locating Myself In summary, I necessarily located this paper within a social constructive epistemology, with a narrative approach to understanding. My

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fundamental premise is that we – human beings and Africans as a collective – are storytelling beings. We make meaning of and live our lives consistent with the stories we tell. We embody our stories. I believe fundamentally that narrative disclosure and restorying of lives leads to transformation. I align with the evidence from literature on positive psychology, transformative learning, neuroscience, bio-psychosocial, narrative therapy and the constructive development arenas that attention to the positive, even in the direst and most traumatic circumstances, leads to transformation (e.gs. Calhoun, Cann, & Tedeschi, 2010; Christopher, 2004; Cooperider, 2007; Meichenbaum, 2006; Mezirow, 2000; Rock & Schwartz, 2006; Swart, 2013; Taylor, Cranton & Associates, 2012; Whitney, Trosten-Bloom & Rader, 2010). In keeping with these worldviews, I make explicit here my perspectives and standpoints to position myself in relation to this scholarly dialogue. The ‘theoretical lenses’ I bring to this study are inclusive of my background in human and organization development, leadership, organizational and social change, and transformational learning. I am on the boundaries and liminal spaces of many of the social identities related to the African leadership dialogue. I am the daughter of Sierra Leonean parents who together held numerous leadership roles in an African context, including: university professor and scholar, diplomat, political leader, community activist, local council leadership, leadership of women’s rights organizations, and many more. I enjoyed the best and worst of my parents’ careers. I have the example of a father who resigned his cabinet position in the ruling political Party in Sierra Leone in 1992 in personal protest, with the hope of fighting for political and social change. He and the whole family lived in the consequences of that decision including living through his subsequent detention and then house arrest for just over two years, followed by his acquittal and exoneration of wrongdoing and corruption. He and my mother were both recipients of numerous national and international awards as a result of their exemplary leadership. I grew up and watched Sierra Leone go from democratic multiparty rule to autocratic rule to rebel warfare. Given this background, I am sure the readers and audience will not be surprised by my joining this particular dialogue. I wish to disclose, however, that this for me is part of my act of leadership in shifting and shaping a new future for the African leadership narrative. I have stated elsewhere that I was tainted by my father’s experiences, I was stoically uninterested in anything that had to do with social change, politics, leadership and advocacy and I was fatigued with my father’s selfless giving to extended family and community that had meant so many

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sacrifices for us. However, my passion for leadership and a deep desire to contribute coupled with the tensions of observing missed leadership opportunities in and from the diaspora compel me to action. I am acutely aware that in the world of social change and transformation, however, it is collective leadership that is required. My hope through this paper is to activate and accelerate that collective leadership.

The Current Narrative: Of What Leadership Story are we a Part Now? Of what leadership story are we a part now? It is likely no surprise that the popular metanarrative of African leadership in scholarship and in the media is a negative one, centered on the shortfalls of African political leadership. The evidence for this narrative in the context of postcolonial Africa is overwhelming. In short, Africa’s political leadership class, who Ayittey (2005) calls the hippo generation, have been accused of and have demonstrated a stoic adherence to a colonized mentality and Western policies inappropriate for African development, therefore colluding in the economic, socio-cultural and political demise and instability of the continent (Ayittey, 2005; Memmi, 1965). The current narrative, as Ayittey (2005, p.402) puts it, is one of “monumental leadership failure”. In this section, I will apply the macro-zoom lens to a selection of the most frequently occurring literature in scholarly databases and journals on African leadership to highlight the dominant discourses and narrative forms inherent in the Narrative of Monumental Leadership Failure. I demonstrate the narrative through the qualitative practice of using thick descriptions; that is, providing actual excerpts that convey the context and discourse in as much detail as possible, to illustrate the discourse of the narrative (Ponterotto, 2006). I follow this with a discussion of the likely cohort effects and impacts resulting from the storyline of African leadership we are living in. However, I wish to note that the Narrative of Monumental Leadership Failure has been uncovered, named and outlined by renowned and wellintentioned scholars, journalists and others, who, from a critical perspective, have been able to shine a light on the current reality of African leadership. Their breaking the silence has served an important role in the realm of transformation, in that without naming a current reality, a possible future can remain hidden. Their naming of the current realities of leadership in Africa is in itself an act of courageous leadership. In highlighting the framing of the current narrative, my intent is not to make those who have uncovered the narrative wrong, but to highlight the

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language and dominant discourses, narrative forms and cohort effects of living in the narrative of Monumental Leadership Failure. Indeed, many who have contributed to uncovering the narrative of Monumental Leadership Failure have also called for and indicated a new future is required. You will notice throughout that there are illustrative quotes from the same author appearing both in the rendering of the current narrative and the alternative narrative that already exists. My unique contribution, therefore, lies in bringing to our conscious awareness the impact of the current leadership narrative, in order to influence a shift in the overall metanarrative of African leadership. A final caution, as Brookfield (2000, p.145) notes, is that “critical reflection’s focus on illuminating power relationships and hegemonic assumptions can be the death of the transformative impulse, inducing an energy-sapping, radical pessimism concerning the possibility of structural change”. This is the premise on which Freire (1970) describes the need for faith, hope and belief in mankind’s ability to change the situations that limit their freedom as premises for dialogical action: for hopelessness only brings with it the crippling dehumanizing effect that causes the oppressed to fatalistically accept their situation. The narrative re-authoring lens curbs this crippling effect. From a narrative perspective, the intent of acknowledging the current narratives that may not serve is to re-author the narrative to one that does.

Language of the Narrative of “Monumental Leadership Failure” The following illustrative quotes provide thick descriptions of the storyline and language associated with the current discourse on African leadership. These first quotes show the descriptors and descriptions predominantly associated with African leaders: Africa has long been saddled with poor, even malevolent, leadership: predatory kleptocrats, military-installed autocrats, economic illiterates, and puffed-up posturers. By far the most gregarious examples come from Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zimbabwe—countries that have been run into the ground despite their abundant natural resources. But these cases are by no means unrepresentative: by some measures, 90 percent of sub-Saharan African nations have experienced despotic rule in the last three decades. Such leaders use power as an end in itself, rather than for the public good; they are indifferent to the progress of their citizens (although anxious to receive their adulation); they are unswayed by reason and employ poisonous social or racial ideologies; and they are

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hypocrites, always shifting blame for their countries' distress. (Rotberg, 2004, p.1) Corruption and state robbery is endemic in almost all countries on the continent and is a serious flaw in African leadership. In addition to corruption, kleptocracy and the unjustified amassing of state resources by greedy and irresponsible leaders have stunted development and heightened the level of impoverishment. According to an African Union study of 2002, corruption cost the continent up to 150 billion Dollars yearly. (Blunt, 2002) (Alemazung, 2010)

The African political and socio-economic results associated with the current leadership are described in language illustrated in the following: In 2006, the famous artist and songwriter Simon Longuè Longuè released a song titled “50 ans au pouvoir c’est la maladie de l’afrique/Fifty years in power, that’s the African disease”. As a de jure (Freedom House, 2007) and a de facto (events on the ground) “not-free” country, the Cameroon government slammed a ban on this song in the public and private media (Musa, 2008). The song text by Longuè Longuè lists amongst other problems, constitutional change, as it suited the power greed of African leaders, election rigging, embezzlement of state funds, succession by their offspring, and the use of state security forces to oppress the people as “la maladie de l’Afrique/the African disease” (Longue, 2006). All the diseases that Longue Longue criticized in his song which include amongst others: ethnic divisions, clientelism and institutionalized and widespread corruption, are not only common (also present in successful industrialised nations) in African political systems but have become a canker worm to political leadership in Africa, with overwhelmingly devastating consequences (Alemazung, 2011, p. 31) The problems identified to be vitiating the quality and effectiveness of leadership in Africa include massive corruption, public mistrust of leaders due to a poor sense of accountability by these leaders, and a paralyzing cynicism among the people about government intentions and efforts. (Aka, 1997, p.220)

In general, scholars acknowledge that many African leaders set out with positive intent after gaining independence from colonialism. However, they state that Africa’s leaders were either unable to institute policies that would further African development or the original Statesmen were forcibly removed from power while subsequent well-intentioned leadership contenders do not hold up to their ideals as follows:

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Chapter Ten Post independent Africa produced statesmen … Nevertheless, these leaders suffered serious set-backs in their countries due to their leadership approach and measures, many of which are blamed on their leadership flaws (inability): that is, lack of leadership skills in managing their new nations (Meredith, 2005: 8; Tordorff, 1993: 68, 129). Unskillful leadership by founding fathers of the new African nations and their inability to build strong institutions that would serve the people and not the leaders, continue to play a big role in the agony of today’s Africa (Tordorff, 1993: 70) … However, and unfortunately for Africa, most of its statesmen were killed or chased out of power before they realized the “common good” visions for their countries. Instead, the caliber of sophists, kleptocrates and tyrants such as late Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, late Gnassimgbe Eyadema of Togo, Jean Bedel Bokassa of Central African Republic (CAR) and their counterparts who transformed their once independent multiparty states into centralized military or authoritarian states “flourished”. These tyrants flourished through oppression, co-optation and the practice of sophism, turning the continent into one whose government was/is founded upon greed and the struggle over state wealth. (Almazung, 2011, pp. 35-36) For Africa in particular, there was a certain urgency, even desperateness, to this crave for development. Thus, following independence, many “African leaders were determined to drag, push, bully, or borrow their new nations into the modern world. (Aka, 1997, p. 224) At the risk of blatant generalisation, African leaders seek office as patriots but soon upon assuming the mantle of leadership, cocoon themselves in ethnic cabals, abhorring technocrats, and not minding competence. And even when they succeed in recruiting technocrats to serve in their regimes, they all including the most idealistic of them balk under the weight and pressure of corruption and in their smear, join the powers to lord it over the people, in compromise of all the ideals for which they were known. (“Wither African Leadership, 2013, p.2)

The narrative of failed African states and leaders is also attributed to external historical causes, related to Africa’s pre-independence history of slavery and colonialism: …European countries have continued their systems of dominating and exploiting African peoples through the forms of leadership they created for Africa. As V. G. Kiernan (1982: 230) puts, “There are, after all, good reasons for prying into the past with the historian’s telescope, and trying to see more clearly what happened, instead of being content with legend or fantasy. Of all reasons for an interest in the colonial wars [and terrorism] of modern times the best is that they are still going on, openly and disguised.” Despite the fact that most African peoples have achieved flag

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independence since the mid-twentieth century, almost all Africans are still exposed to many forms of violence, absolute poverty, and disease. We cannot critically understand all these problems without fully and critically understanding the impacts of racial slavery and European colonial terrorism and war on various African peoples. Almost all of the African leaders of neocolonial states have followed the footsteps of their mentors, and they have engaged in dictatorship, violence, theft and robbery of the public resources; another predicament is “a soldiery trained by the foreigner, dragons’ teeth with harvest of wars and army coups”. (K. G. Kiernan 1985: 227) (Jalata, 2013)

Based on this history, Alemazung (2010) corroborated with the scholarship of others and documents the story of African leaders’ role in ongoing neocolonialism, furthered in the context of cold war politics: Post-colonial colonialism: that is, the political and economic relationship between post-colonial Africa and the West have the same underpinnings and meet the same objective like the relationship of the colonial period: which was based on absolute control over Africa and its human and material resources and the nourishment Western industries and economic with Africa’s produce and markets. The exploitative and asymmetric character of this relationship has far-reaching effects which weigh down the development on the continent negatively. (p.63) However, colonialism could not be completely to blame for “creating” multi-ethnic states in Africa but, instead, for encouraging hatred based upon ethnic differences and for forging differences amongst African peoples and nations in order to facilitate its rule, thereby destroying the foundation for potential state building in Africa (see Nnoli 2000). Unfortunately for the African people, post-colonial governments continued with the manipulation and disintegration of ethnic identities and groups. This placed the ruling elites and the state at the centre of the complexities and dimensions of the ethnic rivalry phenomenon on the continent (see Nnoli 2000) … The ruling structure, which was based on the control by a few, through oppression and the use of force, laid a basis for patron-client rulership after colonialism. Neo-patrimonial leadership as practiced in many African countries is an extension of the kind of autocratic and alien tyrant rule that the colonial master’s had initiated. Following the disruption of the African pre-colonial leadership form and the corresponding political culture, colonialism can be said to have set up structures and ruptured the dynamics and patterns which curtailed different and contradicting interethnic relations and interests. According to John Lonsdale (1986: 145), the instrument of political control and economic allocation in African states had been violently constructed by outsiders, that is, the colonizers. Consequently, the new “bandwagons” of rulers, as Lonsdale describe them, did not see the need for discipline and responsibility in the constitution of

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Chapter Ten political power but simply applied the principle of rewarding and absorbing the recruitment of supporters and civil servants: neopatrimonialism. (pp.66–67) Ndirangu Mwaura (2005: 6) maintains that nothing in Africa changed after the colonizers left. According to Mwaura, the only change that occurred was the replacement of colonial governors with colonial ambassadors. The administrative structures were maintained as well as the economic structures to preserve the flow of wealth from the continent to the West which began in the colonial time (Mwaura, 2005: 6). National leaders who took over after the colonizers left, Mwuara concludes, “were traitors, with a pretend and false patriotism”, who upheld a political network that exploited the African people to the benefit of the ruling elites and their western patrons. In the words of William Easterly (2006: 273), “colonial administration re-enforced autocracy in Africa” and neo-colonialism continued to sustain and consolidate tyrant autocratic rule, the result of which are bad governance and extremely selfish and cruel governors in the likes of Mobutu in Zaire, Idi Amin in Uganda and Bokassa in CAR (Meredith, 2005). (p.67) The rulership practice of dictating to the African people by an alien rule established a culture of autocracy inherited by Africa’s founding “fathers” which today has become a cankerworm difficult to get rid of by many African nations. This leadership culture of coercion, oppression, arbitrary use of power including usurpation was inherited in the new states after independence. Rule by decree continued and colonial non-democratic rules officially became national laws in some of the new colonies as seen in the cases of Nigeria (Amadi, 2007) and French African colonies with loi cadre and censored media (Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, 1967; Eko, 2003). Colonialism also had a “discontinuity-effect” on the continent. Precolonial states which were people centered with consensual and powersharing leadership dimensions were interrupted and destroyed by colonialism (Herbst, 2000). By so doing, colonialism replaced the political culture of leadership for the people based on accountability, power-sharing and consensus with a culture of oppression and autocracy which has persisted since independence. (p.78) The West worked through the support of dictators to sustain their economic control, prevent the influence of the Eastern bloc and maintain relations with African dictators, while the Eastern bloc continually fought to gain influence. In the end, the African people became victims of a political struggle among world powers with their elite leaders as accomplice and instruments of the game in the hands of world powers. The result was the upholding and consolidation of dictatorial regimes and the implantation of the culture of autocracy and repugnance towards opposing opinions and parties by the ruling nationalists’ autocrats. Nevertheless,

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support for dictators has continued in Africa in different forms even after the end of the cold war. Cold War or not, economic dominance and control continues on the part of the west and with democratically elected leaders who work towards the superordinate goal of the common good of his people, it is more likely that the setting the nations interest could “oppose” the economic benefits of the Western nations. (p75)

Alemazung (2010) further told the story of ongoing neocolonialism through illustrations of the ‘curse’ of foreign aid, resulting in a ‘looting’ of the continent: …the good intentions of the West (de jure purpose of aid) have resulted to a de facto “looting” of the resources of the Africa people by the West through the accomplice of African leaders who analogically represent the corrupt police forces in their countries…Besides the need for funds to build the new and crumbled nations that emerged after colonialism, the new nationalist governments were very often responsible for economic failures due to mismanagement and leadership flaws…The bad governance of tyrants and autocrats led to a continual economic decadence and increasing growth in poverty level until, “by the mid-1980s most Africans were as poor or poorer than they had been at the time of independence” (Meredith,2005: 368). These bad governments, after crumbling their countries, turned to their excolonial masters and international organizations like the European Union, the IMF and the World Bank for funds. (p.72) Just as oil and democracy makes a good government less likely—the “natural-resource curse”—Easterly (2006: 135) writes that “more recent studies have found that there is also an ‘aid curse’”. Most often, corrupt leaders receiving huge aid revenues vigorously oppose democracy to prevent more equal distribution of aid resources—the “aid curse” effect (Easterly, 2006: 135). According to Steve Knack of the World Bank, increased aid “worsens bureaucratic quality and leads to violation of the rule of law with more impunity and to more corruption” (as quoted by Easterly 2006: 136). While Western nations continue to support tyrants and dictators in Africa, because their leadership does not pose any threat to the resource and commodity base economy of Africa which supplies the Western world and their markets, Easterly concludes that “bad governments attract aid providers just as sinners attract evangelists”, thus if one carries out a thorough control, it is certain that, “donors make government worse”. (p.73) According to Bates (1999: 88), if these governments were forced to borrow funds at home, they would be ready to grant concession too at home, but torn between begging from their citizens and begging from abroad, they settle for the latter. By so doing they bypass the people and thus avoid any political debate between them and their citizens. As noted by Stephen

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Ayittey (2005) had similarly chronicled the foreign aid dependence story: At the next crisis, African leaders mount their high horses and appeal incessantly to the international community to save the continent, globetrotting with a bowl in their hands, begging, begging for aid. They cannot see that Africa’s begging bowl is punched with holes. What comes in as foreign aid and investment ultimately leaks out. Total foreign aid and investment into Africa from all sources amounts to $18 billion annually. But capital flight out of Africa exceeds $20 billion annually. Destructive wars cost more than $10 billion annually in weapon purchases, damage to infrastructure, and social carnage. According to a UN estimate, in 1991 alone, more than $200 billion in capital was siphoned out of Africa by the ruling gangsters and briefcase bandits…Note that this amount was more than half of Africa’s foreign debt of $320 billion. (Ayittey, 2005, p. 49)

It is notable that even a western response to Africa’s foreign aid dependence, even though it was written to question the allocation of aid, was titled: “Shame on African Leadership” (Gwyther, 2006). Alemazung (2011, p.31) acknowledged that all the issues covered here have also happened elsewhere, but that the African situation remains stuck. As the political writings of John Locke after the 1688 Glorious Revolution in England and sub-sequent revolutions in Europe suggest, tyrant and selfish leadership is primordial in all societies including Africa. However, Western politics learning from the negative experience of tyrant leadership were able to establish constitutionalism founded upon political arrangements and institutional orders that could curb man’s greed and abuse of power, thereby directing leadership toward serving the common good. Unfortunately, this process of “steering leadership” toward serving the common good has not been successful in Africa. The result is political tyranny, selfish and abusive leadership in excessive forms which are peculiar and persistent in Africa.

The contemporary narrative of Africa and her leaders in the context of globalization isn’t much more uplifting as scholars point to the ongoing vulnerability of the continent in the world economic system:

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On the whole, the poor showing of Africa in the global economy is a result of the ongoing processes of globalisation (Larsen and Fold, 2008:9). KiZerbo (2007:4) laments the situation of the African continent but argues that if Africa is in crisis, it is simply part of a world crisis to which the continent is structurally subjected sometimes with the complicity of its leaders. Several sporadic attempts have been made to reverse the trend of things but these have been far too little and from a disjointed perspective. What Africa needs in this global age is to take a bold step forward by uniting all the economies and leadership for common good. (Kah, 2012) Africa is the most vulnerable and the ultimate frontier of wealth to continue empowering white supremacy in the world. The current crop of Africa’s corrupt, cowardly and compliant leaders are working against their own self-interests and have almost sealed the deal for Africa’s conquest by foreigners. (Zulu, 2013)

The storyline of leadership in Africa, as outlined here, is clearly one dominated by the discourse of African “leadership flaws and fallibilities”, (Alemazung, 2011), colonial and neocolonial domination, aid dependency and generally a vulnerable Africa at the mercy of her leaders and any selfinterested third parties. The overall narrative form is one of despondency and victimhood – a lament narrative. The narrative of African leadership is characterized by themes of kleptocracy, corruption and theft, autocracy and violence – a disease and cankerworm narrative. I cannot and will not argue with the reasons for the development of these discourses and narratives. I ask, however, from a stance of humble inquiry: what is the impact of this narrative that we, the current cohort of Africans are all a part of? What purpose do these narratives continue to serve? Who benefits? Whose voices are privileged when it comes to this narrative? As stated earlier, the impact of unveiling dominant structures and narratives can be an energy-sapping, radical pessimism filled with hopelessness. As a negative dominant narrative persists, the experience it leaves is of being stuck (Swart, 2013). The portrait of African leadership painted through the literature leaves me drained…in my mind’s eye, the descriptors leave me with a predator-like, animalistic image of our leaders – in effect dehumanizing them. The other impact for me is the automatic human response to that which is presented as a threat. As evidence from neuroscience shows, we human beings respond physiologically to a social threat in the same way as a physical threat (Rock, 2008). Since the narrative of Africa’s leaders represents both threats, the natural reaction is fight or flight. For those that fly, the vicious cycle continues – African leaders can continue on with no impetus to respond any differently. The narrative, in fact, excuses them from agency, by holding explanatory

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power for their behaviours. For those who fight, the position taken is oppositional, in effect warfare, and therefore a matching of the measure meted out. The only passionate and emotional response possible is anger. As Ayittey (2005, pp. 404 - 405) acknowledged: “The leadership in Africa is a despicable disgrace to black people. I won’t back down from these ‘harsh words’ because I am angry–very angry–and I am not alone in feeling this way”. As a native Sierra Leonean, when I think of Charles Taylor and all the havoc that resulted under his rebel leadership, I too, feel anger rise. There is a time and place for passionate, righteous anger. I believe, however, that in the life cycle of social change and development, the initial points of pain and passion that fuel the need to name and uncover oppressive structures are needed but become counterproductive at a tipping point where transformation and development are possible. I, therefore, believe that the road to transformation lies in moving away from anger to shared understanding, compassion and love. We all, contribute to, participate in, and in some form exemplify the current leadership narrative because in the African context, indeed in any context, leadership cannot be separated from followership as we each take on either or both roles in different situations. Anger puts us in opposition to the role of leaders. Shifting the narrative and, therefore, the outcomes of leadership contests require restoring the relationships and connections necessary to lead and to follow in service of transformation. I cannot see you, understand you and have the opportunity to transform our shared context, unless I can relate to you – this requires humanizing the ‘other’. As we honor Nelson Mandela’s legacy here today, let us remember his example and call for unity that required relinquishing his own anger in favor of the greater call to unity, freedom and democracy. The other impact of the African leadership lament, is that it reinforces the narrative of Africa as the dark and doomed continent with no future. The reasons for Africa’s problems are generally oversimplified, misunderstood and sensationalized outside African contexts, which creates a crippling and helpless effect, as well as desensitization in the global consciousness of Africa and African problems (Hawkins, 2008; Shah, 2010). From my perspective, a major impact of this despondency narrative of Africa lies in what Chimamanda Adichie has called “The danger of a single story” of Africa (TED Talks, 2009). As is evident from the narrative re-authoring approach, disrupting dominant narratives requires unveiling alternative narratives and the multiple stories that already exist, and that are possible.

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The Alternative & Possible Narrative: What Leadership Story do we Want? What leadership story do we want? A principle of change from the leadership and transformational change approach of appreciative leadership holds that whatever you want more of already exists. Inspiring people to change and action then requires moving from criticism to: illuminating what you want more of, including all actors in co-creating the future, and practicing integrity by modeling what you want more of and bringing “competing, conflicting, and/or contradicting forces into awareness and harmony through inquiry, dialogue, and collective reflection” (Whitney et al., 2010, p.163). Shifting the current narrative requires, therefore, illuminating the best of what already exists in order to build on those positive narratives. So, I ask: What leadership stories do we have on the African continent that takes us towards the common good? What African Leader – inclusive of historical, contemporary and everyday leaders – inspires you? What is the story of why they inspire you? What did they do and say? These questions are easily answered even in the context of the dominant narrative of Monumental Leadership Failure. Exemplars of African Leaders have already been with us and have provided alternative narratives to the dominant one. These positive examples are acknowledged within the current scholarship and discourse, albeit within the context and framing of the failure and lament narrative, as illustrated with these quotes: This depressing picture is brought into even sharper relief by the few but striking examples of effective African leadership in recent decades. These leaders stand out because of their strength of character, their adherence to the principles of participatory democracy, and their ability to overcome deep-rooted challenges. The government of Mozambique, for example, brought about economic growth rates of more than ten percent between 1996 and 2003, following the economic catastrophe wrought by that country's civil war (which ended in 1992). And in Kenya, President Mwai Kibaki has strengthened civil society, invested in education, and removed barriers to economic entrepreneurship instated during the repressive rule of Daniel arap Moi…The best example of good leadership in Africa is Botswana. Long before diamonds were discovered there, this former desert protectorate, which was neglected by the British under colonialism, demonstrated a knack for participatory democracy, integrity, tolerance, entrepreneurship, and the rule of law. The country has remained democratic in spirit as well as form continuously since its independence in 1966 – an unmatched record in Africa. It has also defended human rights,

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Post-independent Africa produced statesmen such as Patrice Lumumba of Zaire, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Nkwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso who arguably might have put their countries’ interest at the top of their priority list. In their various countries and in the entire African continent, these men are considered as statesmen due to the “common-good” plan and efforts they had to build their nations for the good of their people (“The Assassination of Patrice Lumumba” by Ludo de Witte 2001; “Africa Unbound: Reflections of an African Statesman” by Alex, 1965; and “Thomas Sankara: L'espoir assassine” by Valere D. Some 1990). (Alemazung, 2011, p. 35) Leaders like Ghana’s Nkrumah and Guinea’s Sekou Toure openly opposed neo-colonialism because of the nefarious economic and political outcome it had on African states. Peter Schwab (2004) thus classifies these two men as belonging to the radical group of African post-independent leaders. (Alemazung, 2010, p.70) If a leader were effective or good, he or she would be remembered, especially when other leaders are known for following wrong values. The community will continue teaching their children through conversation, proverbs and myths, as well as through practice. Hence leaders like King Moshoeshoe, King Chaka, President Nyerere, President Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, to name a few, are commemorated by African communities or villagers. (Masango, 2003, p.315)

The Encyclopedia of Leadership by Goethals, Sorenson and Burns (2004) also lists and acknowledges the following sub-Saharan African political and activist leaders: Haile Selassie, Jomo Kenyatta, Patrice Lumumba, Nelson Mandela, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Shaka Zulu and Desmond Tutu. The issue here isn’t to question the merits of their leadership but to acknowledge that in spite of any controversies and contradictions surrounding them, they (overall) demonstrated and enacted leadership. As defined in the African context, these leaders supported the advancement of their communities, countries and oftentimes, the continent and the world. The dominant discourse in these cases is of positivity, forward-movement and change leadership. So what made these leaders different and why is their narrative different? Rotberg (2004, pp. 1-2) provides some answers as illustrated in the following narrative:

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What has enabled Botswana to succeed where so many other African nations have failed? Some observers point to the relative linguistic homogeneity of the country. But Somalia, which remains unstable despite a similar uniformity, shows that this factor is far from sufficient … It is Botswana's history of visionary leadership, especially in the years following independence that best explains its success. Sir Seretse Khama, Botswana's founding president, came from a family of Bamangwato chiefs well regarded for their benevolence and integrity. When Khama founded the Botswana Democratic Party in 1961 and led his country to independence, he was already dedicated to the principles of deliberative democracy and market economy that would allow his young country to flourish. Modest, unostentatious as a leader, and a genuine believer in popular rule, Khama forged a participatory and law-respecting political culture that has endured under his successors, Sir Ketumile Masire and Festus Mogae … Although operating in very different circumstances, Mauritius' first leader, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, held to the same leadership codes as Khama. Ramgoolam gave Mauritius a robust democratic beginning, which has been sustained by a series of wise successors from different backgrounds and parties. Both Khama and Ramgoolam could have emulated many of their contemporaries by establishing strong, single-man, kleptocratic regimes. But they refused to do so. Effective leadership has proved the decisive factor in South Africa, too: without Nelson Mandela's inclusive and visionary leadership, his adherence to the rule of law, his insistence on broadening the delivery of essential services, and his emphasis on moving from a command economy toward a market-driven one, South Africa would probably have emerged from apartheid as a far more fractured and autocratic state than it did. Too few African leaders have followed the examples of Mandela, Khama, and Ramgoolam. Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, and Senegal are all showing promise. But in many other African countries, leaders have begun their presidential careers as democrats only to end up, a term or two later, as corrupt autocrats: Bakili Muluzi of Malawi, Moi of Kenya, and, most dramatically of all, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Other leaders, such as Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, may be heading in the same direction.

The narrative form of this discourse is the Narrative of the Great Leader – the narrative of charismatic, idolized and often martyred leadership status. It is a great starting point and shows that a different, alternative narrative to the dominant one is possible. As Aka (1997) urges, however, we need not only “rare talents” of charismatic and martyred leaders for Africa now, but leadership from the grassroots to the global arenas, in every sector and industry across the public and private sectors (Aka, 1997). Shifting to enhance, enrich and expand the possibility of

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alternative narratives requires the choice and invitation to each of us to participate in creating our own narratives as well as our collective narrative and future. It has been pointed out that only 10% of Africa, if not less, has experienced effective leadership (Ayittey, 2005; Rotberg, 2004). This represents a 90% opportunity and possibility for a new narrative. The possibility is already taking hold. Whereas scholarship and popular media paint a despondent picture, a google search on “African leadership” shows an encouraging trend. That trend is of search page after search page of a growing number of African leadership training programs, institutes, academic programs and academies, foundations, scholarships, leadership awards, and so on. The current generation who wish for an alternative narrative are in action for change, as Masango (2003, p.20) concludes: In conclusion, African leaders have rediscovered the power of unity and dialogue, which has opened a door to the careful examination of African problems. Secondly, this discovery led to a further building of the need for an infrastructure of new leaders, through which older leaders may share their wisdom and pass on positive African values to the next generation. Good leadership in Africa always shares life with others...

Ayittey’s Cheetah generation, the new generation of African leaders, is being developed and is in action. It is the: New breed of young African professionals … they are not into the blame game. Blaming colonialists and imperialists does not cut it with them. These young Africans do not just sit there, expecting Western colonialists to come and fix Africa’s problems. Nor do they call upon government to come and fix Africa’s problems. Nor do they call upon government to do everything for them. (Ayittey, 2005, p. xxi)

Toward the leadership story we want So again, I ask: What leadership story do we want? The examples illustrated above have shown that there are alternative narratives to the dominant Narrative of Monumental Leadership Failure, already operating to move us forward. The literature again provides clear indications and guideposts of the leadership and forward movement being called for as follows: Where ever we ultimately found ourselves after 50 years is a moot point. The issue I am trying to raise is that – at least and within their limitations, our Founding fathers took cognizance of the necessity of looking forward and tried to mobilize us to getting there. I am afraid, at a certain juncture of

African Leadership: Now and for the Future the past few decades; we seem to have lost that compass, with all its attendant implications …What are the valuable assets, particularly in terms of trajectories, that we should harness, deploy, sustain and carry forward? … With the independence of our countries it is pertinent to ask ourselves whether the Aims and Objectives articulated by the pioneers of our independence movements have been achieved or for that matter anywhere near fulfillment? With few exceptions, the answer is conspicuously NO. The struggle for freedom was not merely that of regime change. It was intended to ensure larger freedoms including the right to decide how we are governed, by whom and for what period. It was to remove injustice and ensure that the country’s resources are utilized for the betterment of our peoples. It was to fight disease, ignorance and abject poverty … there are some soul searching questions which we as Africans need to ask ourselves. Why the continent which is one of the richest, if not the richest in terms of resources both human and material, continues to have the poorest people? How do we overcome this blatant contradiction? How can we rationally explain the continued and in some cases escalating internal conflicts in some parts of our continent with attendant loss of millions of lives, human misery and destruction. How can we overcome the unenviable record of a Continent where millions of our people are forced to vote with their feet and thus languishing in refugee or internally displaced camps? How do we erase the image of a continent where corruption is considered endemic? (Salim, 2010, pp. 1 -2) A conscience call for leadership for the people and not the self, seeking the common goal and not the personal goal must be the sole desire of Africa leaders if they mean good for their countries and if they want to share in the suffering of their people: which of course every leader must do. Thus leadership for the common good, personal leadership character of magnanimity is most needed now in Africa to ensure successful transitions and enforce functional and good governance, without which, international or no international “support,” Africa will continue to fail. (Alemazung, 2010, p. 80) Now is the time for the new African leadership to rise above pettiness and individualism to build the Africa of today and tomorrow for their citizens … If these leaders fail to learn from the failure of their peers to unite the continent, then history would have repeated itself again and Africa will stagnate while other regions of the world make great leaps forward through united action ... In a general sense, Africa must take its destiny into its hands and ensure economic and political autonomy in the face of all opposition as long as Africans know that this is the sure but hard way to success. Africans must take the lead in charting their future because no other people will do it for them. Experience since colonialism shows that this will never be done by other people except Africans who should be able

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Chapter Ten to shun individualism for unity and survival of the continent. Integration as Bond (2002) recommends cannot be the only answer for Africa’s problems but unity will best serve their interest. African leaders should go beyond thinking afresh (Mkapa 2005) to act afresh for its unit. (Kah 2012, pp.3536) With the new leadership that is emerging, we hope we will experience leaders who are sensitive to the needs of the people. We need leaders who will help Africa to become innovative. The only way African leaders can be effective is by addressing the problems that are affecting their followers. (Masango, 2003, p.314) Until the present leadership becomes visionary like Nkrumah or even more visionary than him by uniting the continent and embarking on projects that can reverse the image of Africa, the continent is literally on its way to a slaughter house. The time to act is here and now. The leaders of a giant need to surprise the world and, for decades, embarrass and baffle those who think that they have found a fool of a continent which they will drain dry. If no concerted action is taken now, posterity will have nothing to feed on because all the wealth and resources of the continent would have gone for good. (Kah, 2012)

This is a call for an overall metanarrative of Visionary Change Leadership with a focus on advancing the common good and collective advancement of African peoples. It is noteworthy, however, that in moving toward what we want, the exemplars of African leadership and alternative possibilities are positioned as counter-narratives, contrasted against the leadership examples and aspirations we do not want. This places what we do want in opposition to the dominant narrative, evidenced in descriptors of leadership exemplars as “radical” and “revolutionary” and the journey to change as one of resistance and struggle. I propose that thinking, talking and writing about a new leadership narrative simply as an alternative and a possibility that is already there, and anchored in what we do want, generates the creative tension that propels to action. The actions of the African Leadership Council struck in 2004 serves as an example that the intention and move to creative action do indeed already exist. Regardless of whether and how it has been implemented, this example shows creative forward moving actions are possible as depicted below: To build on the positive leadership examples, a select group of prominent past and present African leaders who met over the last year decided to confront the continent's pathology of poor leadership with deeds as well as words. At the conclusion of a series of private meetings (the final one of which was held in Mombasa, Kenya), they established the African

African Leadership: Now and for the Future Leadership Council, promulgated a Code of African Leadership with 23 commandments, issued a Mombasa Declaration promoting better leadership, and proposed a series of courses to train their political successors in the art of good government. Members of the council believe that absolute standards of leadership are both appropriate and attainable. Good leaders deliver security of the state and of the person, the rule of law, good education and health services, and a framework conducive to economic growth. They ensure effective arteries of commerce and enshrine personal and human freedoms. They empower civil society and protect the environmental commons. Crucially, good leaders also provide their citizens with a sense of belonging to a national enterprise. Conscious that Africa's poor are getting poorer and that good governance is essential for successful economic development, the council sees itself at the vanguard of fundamental reform in the continent. Its approach certainly goes far beyond the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and proposals for the African Union. The Code of African Leadership, for example, says in its first commandment that leaders should “offer a coherent vision of individual growth and national advancement with justice and dignity for all”, implying that most leaders today do not. Other commandments demand that African leaders encourage “broad participation”, adhere to the letter and spirit of their national constitutions (especially term limits), encourage dissent and disagreement, respect human rights and civil liberties, strengthen the rule of law, promote policies that eradicate poverty and improve the well-being of their citizens, ensure a strong code of ethics, refuse to use their offices for personal gain, oppose corruption, and bolster essential personal freedoms … The council is chaired by former President Sir Ketumile Masire of Botswana and includes former Nigerian head of state General Yakubu Gowon, Vice President Moody Awori of Kenya, former Prime Minister Hage Geingob of Namibia, and a dozen other present and former prime ministers and cabinet ministers from Sierra Leone to Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda. All are regarded throughout Africa as men of unusual personal probity and esteem and as accomplished proponents of good governance. The council intends to recruit additional members from the ranks of Africa's outstanding democratic leaders, Francophone and Anglophone, female and male. Together they will serve the continent by advising international organizations, individual countries, and donor agencies on how to improve leadership. The group stands ready to assist civil societies in countries undergoing serious leadership crises. It will also urge greedy national leaders to attack corrupt practices and adhere to term limits (the current presidents of Gabon, Malawi, Namibia, Uganda, and Zambia, for example, have all had pangs of desire for illegal third terms). Next year, it expects to begin holding special seminars for cabinet ministers and others. The council's curriculum emphasizes constitutionalism, the rule of law, ethics, accountability, diversity, good fiscal management, coalition building, and

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Chapter Ten the fundamentals of modern micro- and macroeconomics. (Rotberg, 2004, p. 3)

Footprints to Reauthoring the African Leadership Narrative: What are we to do? Some of our leaders in Africa including the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki have characterized the 21st Century as Africa’s century. I believe that this is possible, achievable and most of all necessary. This should be our clarion call. The clarion of the new generation of young people who unlike in our times, has more privileges of global interconnectivity including advance communication technology, to use for fulfilling its generational mission. (Salim, 2010, p.3)

My proposal is my dream of amplifying the alternative narratives of Visionary Change Leadership in Africa, built on the exemplars that already exist. The invitation is for us to come alongside these alternative narratives and participate in them, and as we do, we will re-author not only African leadership but also the story of the African continent. I envisage for the future, leaders of all generations, starting right where they are, to lead and to follow, taking creative action to improve their own lives and the lives of those around them. Through consistent, dedicated and collective leadership action, Africa is transformed. National and international political and other leaders are surprised by the transformation and drawn to find out how it happened. They’ll find that the footprints to getting there were really ways of thinking and a process model for change. Leaders everywhere were guided by some of what has been named that needs to be done, such as: governance and rule of law reforms, economic policy reforms, social and cultural development, education, agricultural development, private sector investment, grassroots and community development (Aka, 1997; Ayittey, 2005; Salim, 2010). However, they focused primarily on talking together about what they wanted and taking collective action to make it so. Scholars and other actors are guided into further research and praxis by the empirical evidence and knowledge systems of leadership in Africa which show: (1) leadership in Africa requires a focus on the values of the community, the empowerment and inclusion of followers, and followers’ assuming active responsibility for change (April & Ephraim, 2006; Masango, 2003); (2) leadership requires narrative constructive shifts such as from inaccessible to achievable, exclusion to inclusion, individualism/self-interest to community relating, dictating to connecting, disengagement to engagement in local concerns, problems to possibilities.

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As a result, people act on the knowledge that anyone can be a leader, leadership begins with self-awareness, is relational and is in service to community (Bolden & Kirk, 2009); (3) leaders take seriously the philosophies inherent in African’s sociogenic ways of knowing, being and relating, and our irrevocable commitment to human interconnectedness. This is exemplified in the Southern African Bantu term ‘Ubuntu’: ‘I am, because we are’(April & Ephraim, 2006; Masango, 2003, Nsamenang, 2003, 2005, 2007; van der Colff, 2003). As a result, we restore the act of relating to each other through respect and dignity, collectivism and solidarity, continuous integrated development, value sharing, leadership legitimacy and communal enterprises (van der Colff, 2003). Against this backdrop, we re-authored the lament narrative of the narrative of Monumental Leadership Failure to one of “Visionary Change Leadership” by participating in and amplifying the alternative narratives that we want more of. We re-authored the African narrative of leadership by following in the footprints of our elders who have worked for the common good, to create and expand on:

Distributed, accountable leadership…in every sector, every industry…in and out of the diaspora Indeed this is the number one issue. All those who lead, at whatever level BUT especially as National Leaders, must be held accountable and act in a manner, which makes them truly servants of the people … It is significant to observe in this context that practical experience has already demonstrated that where there is a responsible, accountable and incorruptible leadership abiding by the principles of good governance, their countries have made enormous progress in socio-economic development. (Salim, 2010, p.3)

Dialogic action Leaders everywhere seek out understanding of each other’s perspectives and needs, understanding that desired futures are co-created. They actively assess the dominant leadership narratives to uncover and understand beliefs that are taken for granted and that do not serve the common good, and choose to re-author alternate narratives. They engage in dialogue to ensure shared understanding before taking action. As Freire (1970) is clear to explain, conscientization (becoming critically aware of oppressive situations) requires action for it to hold any transformational power. They practice the elements of Freire’s theory of dialogical cultural action including genuine cooperation, unity for liberation, organization and

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cultural synthesis. As research based on the lives of transformational leaders for social change, including Nelson Mandela, has shown, the presence of a diverse community that involves mentors and a forum for reflective dialogue, seem to be the necessary conditions for commitment to social action and change (Daloz, 2000). We tell the story of how we came to be models of leadership in the world. We tell the story in oral and literary forms, so that our children know never to return to our leadership past and starting point.

Collective, Collaborative Action Leaders everywhere in Africa seek the interests of each other, their nations and the continent. Ubuntu applies internally as well as externally within and beyond the continent: As Kah (2012) puts it: “no single part of Africa can be safe, or free to develop fully and independently, while any part remains un-liberated”. The continent is viewed as united in purpose and collaboration and cooperation happens in a myriad of ways to account for the variety of complexities on the continent.

Alternative Narratives for the Vulnerable, Underprivileged, Underserved Leaders everywhere on the continent are intentional about caring for the vulnerable in society, including women, children and the atinga or peasant majority (Ayittey, 2005). All agree with Salim (2010, p.4) that women have a significant role to play: The women of Africa have been the most resilient and dynamic force. They constitute more than 50% of the entire population. They have played a crucial role in the struggle for independence and liberation wars. In conflict situations they bear a disproportionate burden of suffering. They have played and continue to play a pivotal role in all facets of economic and social development. But their full potential has yet to be utilized. And their role in decision making continues to be, by and large, sadly marginal. Currently African countries are taking significant steps aimed at empowering women. This vital process needs to be encouraged and intensified. This powerful force, when properly empowered and allowed to make full use of their potential will unleash an irreversible movement towards the political, social and economic emancipation of the continent.

All are equally attentive to the needs and rights of children, the elderly and the peasant majority.

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Bridging All Divides Leaders everywhere in Africa speak, act and live from a place of unity. All have let go of ethnic and tribal prejudices and tensions and transformed all difference into platforms for unity. We promote equality for all regardless of ethnic and racial differences. We treat our diversities from a place of celebrating and honoring our differences. We resolve all conflict by approaching them with curiosity and inquiry with the intention of attaining shared understanding and moving forward. We have fulfilled Nelson Mandela’s ideals and live in a ‘rainbow continent’ “where all are able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity – a rainbow [continent.”]… Let there be justice for all. Let there be peace for all. Let there be work, bread, water and salt for all. Let each know that for each the body, the mind and the soul have been freed to fulfill themselves. (Mandela, 1994, p.1)

Courage African leaders everywhere agree with Maya Angelou that: “Courage is the most important of all the virtues, because without courage you can't practice any other virtue consistently. You can practice any virtue erratically, but nothing consistently without courage.” All have the courage to take action and make a difference, in service of others. All say ‘yes!’ when it is required. Everyone has the courage to lead…now.

Unity We remember the wise words of a Sierra Leonean parable that says “when brothers fight, a stranger will inherit their father’s property”…we believe we CAN do this…together!

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CHAPTER ELEVEN FROM TOUSSAINT L’OUVERTURE TO PRESIDENT KWAME NKRUMAH: A DISCOURSE ON A PAN-AFRICAN VISION DR JOHN MARAH PROFESSOR OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDIES, COLLEGE AT BROCKPORT, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, NY, USA

To be truly visionary we have to root our imagination in our concrete reality while simultaneously imagining possibilities beyond that reality. —bell hooks. Feminism is for Everybody: Passionate Politics. Boston, MA. South End Press, p.110.

Introduction African people in our contemporary global village, those abroad as well as those at home, need a nation they can call their own, from which they can confront the rest of the world politically, economically, and mentally free. For more than a thousand years and more, African people have experienced Arabic and European enslavement, European colonialism, neocolonialism, and are today experiencing much of the ongoing ugly aspects (negative statistics) of globalization, “dominated by Western Europe, North America and Japan” (Huntington, 1993). The Arabs were the first major group of modern people to lord it over Black Africa; the East and North African slave trades (through the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean [why not the African Ocean?] and the Sahara) were dominated by Arabs; though the Chinese had been in eastern Africa, they did not take part in the large-scale buying and selling of Africans; the Chinese did not build ships to bring Africans and sell them to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Iran. Perhaps the Chinese saw themselves as too far advanced to engage in trading in human beings. Thus, today, the Chinese can “. . . understandably, emphasize(s) the fact that Zheng He’s voyages to

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East Africa in the early fifteenth century sought no territory and took no slaves, in contrast to Europeans” (Jacques, 2012: 431) and Arabs who, up till now, continue to look down and ‘enslave’ Blacks without remorse or fear of retaliation. In his book Islam’s Black Slaves: The Other Diaspora (2001), Ronald Segal documents the so-called ‘lenient’ type of slavery the Arabs claim they engaged in when they worked black African slaves in their mines, estates, military, and private households. But, despite their claims of decent treatment of all Muslims, Black African Muslims and slaves were castrated to the most extreme; they kept Sudanese women in their harems; African slaves that rebelled against their servitude were eliminated with abandon. In Iraq, for example, African slaves were identified as: Consisting principally of slaves from East Africa, and numbering some tens of thousands, they lived and worked in conditions of extreme misery. They were fed, we are told, on ‘a few handful’ of flour, semolina, and dates. They rose in several successive rebellions, the most important of which lasted fifteen years, from 868 to 883, and for a while offered a serious threat to the Baghdad Caliphate. The leader of these black rebels was a white man. Even religious groups with what some would nowadays call radical and progressive ideals seem to have accepted the slavery of the black man as natural. Thus in the eleventh century we are told that the Carmathians established a kind of republic in Bahrain, abolished many of the prescriptions regarding persons and property which conventional Islam imposed – and had a force of thirty thousand black slaves to do the rough work. (Lewis, 1971:66)

Though the Africans themselves had practiced slavery, as had the world’s other major peoples, it was the Arabs and the Europeans that travelled long distances in their caravans and ships to obtain Africans for racial enslavement and specific dehumanization and holocaust; there were no African-owned ships that called at European ports asking Europeans or Arabs to buy African slaves and brutalize them; that infamous credit rests with Arabs and Europeans, who thought of themselves as superior to Africans, and continue to do so today, in more refined ways, of course. African peoples enslaved abroad, and the rest colonized at home, did not sit down and fold their arms; some valiantly resisted their condition within the ships in which they were carried, and in the societies in which they found themselves. The Mau Mau in Kenya, the Maroon societies in the West Indies, South America, and even in the United States, were all attempts by African people to have and maintain communities of their own. Some insisted on having all the civil rights offered in their host

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countries; others agitated for the creation of their own Pan-African nation that would no longer be subjected to slavery, colonization, inferiorization, or even the threat of extermination (Tanko, 1988: 30). This chapter concentrates on the examination of the contributions of Toussaint L’Ouverture of Haiti, Marcus Garvey of Jamaica, and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, to the efforts made towards the global development of African people and their attempts at establishing a powerful united African nation that the other major world powers would have to reckon with. The focus of this foregoing discussion then is the socio-historical examination of an important aspect of the history of Pan-Africanism. In doing so, I wish to demonstrate that the spirit of Toussaint L’Ouverture’s revolution matured in Marcus Garvey and was brought to Africa by President Kwame Nkrumah. In dealing with Garvey and Nkrumah, I substantiate that the obstacles Garvey encountered in the West and in Liberia were similar to those that confronted Kwame Nkrumah on the African continent. Finally, the chapter closes with the observation that Garvey’s and Nkrumah’s concept of Pan-Africanism remains a mirage that needs to be brought about by the next African generations with the ineluctable establishment of Pan-African educational institutions for the total achievement of Nkrumah’s and Garvey’s Pan-Africanism. Indeed, if Europe is for the Europeans (African aliens in Europe know this very well), Asia for the Asians, why shouldn’t Africa be for the Africans? In our contemporary global village, it is only the European that has Europe, the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and a large part of continental Africa, under his hegemony. In fact, in his fat book, 1493: Uncovering the World Columbus Created (2011: XIV), Charles C. Mann tells us that, Most Africans are in Africa, most Asians in Asia, and most Native Americans in the Americas. People of European descent, by contrast, are thick on the ground in Australia, the Americas, and Southern Africa. Successful transplants, they form the majority in many of these places – an obvious feat, but one I had never really thought about before.

Prolific writer Charles C. Mann (2011) “had never thought about” such a global village “before”, but the offspring of the natives of those places cannot help but constantly think about why they should not have powerful states of their own, so they too will not have to be again subjected to exploitation, colonization, (inferiorization and ghettoization, if you will), and even suffer the threat of elimination or extinction in certain areas of the world, such as the Native Americans and the aborigines of Australia.

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In the Americas and Australia, just to take these two examples, the natives have practically disappeared; in Southwest Africa, African natives were hunted and killed like wild animals (by the Germans); in East Africa, European settlers were encouraged by their mother countries to alienate African land and work the Africans as cheap laborers; and they, the native Africans, had to carry Kipande or pass cards in their own mother country. In the Congo, Adam Hochschild’s King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa tells of forced labor and the chopping off of hands of Africans that did not produce enough rubber for King Leopold of the Belgians thousands of miles away, and, for a king who never even set foot on his personal African possession. Africans Abroad, on the plantations in the Americas, resisted their enslavement in overt and covert ways; there were numerous insurrections, rebellions, runaway maroons, and several acts of sabotage that were all aimed at hurting the plantation tradition and reclaiming their African personalities. Frederick Douglass, Sojourner Truth, Gabriel Prosser, Nat Turner, David Walker, Harriet Tubman, and many others made it known to their European racial enslavers that they were not going to take their dehumanization lying down. On board the ships through the Middle Passage, some Africans ‘sacrificed’ themselves to the sharks. On the African continent, Shaka Zulu, The Mad Mullah of Somalia, Samori Toure of Guinea, Queen Nzinga of Angola, and many others attempted to keep their territories free from European domination and dehumanization.

Toussaint L’Ouverture The most successful rebellion by Africans abroad freed Haiti from French domination in 1804; even though “one could trap them like animals, transport them in pens, work them alongside an ass or a horse and beat both with the same stick, stable them and starve them”, writes C.L. R. James (1963: 12), “they remained, despite their black skin and curly hair, quite invincible human beings with the intelligence and resentments of human beings” (13). Indeed, how could have France proclaimed ‘Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality’ and keep a French-speaking African people in bondage? How could the United States go to war for their freedom from Great Britain and expect African people to be content and even ask Frederick Douglass for a July 4th U.S. liberation day oration? (Andrews, 108-130). C. L. R. James, in his book The Black Jacobins, previously cited, says that Toussaint L’Ouverture was no fool; James tells us that, while L’Ouverture was conducting the Haitian Revolution, he was also planning

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to liberate the African continent; allow me to quote here at length from James’ seminal work: Firm as was his grasp of reality, old Toussaint looked beyond San Domingo with boldness and imagination surpassed by no contemporary. In the constitution he authorized the slave-trade because the island needed people to cultivate it. When the Africans landed, however, they would be free men. But while loaded with the cares of government, he cherished a project of sailing to Africa with arms, ammunition and a thousand of his best soldiers, and there conquering vast tracks of country, putting an end to the slave trade, and making millions of blacks ‘free and French,’ as his Constitution had made the blacks of San Domingo. It was no dream. He had sent millions of francs to America to wait for the day when he would be ready. He was only 55. What spirit was it that moved him? Ideas do not sail from heaven. The great revolution had propelled him out of his humble joys and obscure destiny, and the trumpets of his heroic period rang ever in his ears. In him, born a slave and the leader of slaves, the concrete realization of liberty, equality and fraternity was the womb of ideas and the springs of power, which overflowed their narrow environment and embraced the whole of the world. But for the revolution, this extraordinary man and his band of gifted associates would have lived their lives as slaves, serving the common place creatures who owned them, standing barefooted and in rags to watch inflated little governors and mediocre officials from Europe pass by, as many a talented African stands in Africa today. (p. 265)

This desire, vision, or ‘dream’ to have a free and powerful African nation did not die with Toussaint L’Ouverture; it continues to flow with the river of freedom and the quest for a Pan-African statehood. The quest for a United African people has already gone through numerous conferences and other intermittent steps, including the 1963 Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the current African Union (AU). Though Haiti remains the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, Toussaint’s impact on African peoples’ imagination concerning the creation of a powerful African nation and an unmitigated freedom and development of African peoples globally reverberates at the lower frequencies in African peoples’ psychology; for why should Europeans and Arabs be the rulers in Africa? Why should Africans be French in all but the color of their skin? And, why should “Africans learn to be French?” (Mumford, 1970) Of no less importance, why should Black people continue to worship a God that does not even look like them, or kill each other over Islam and Christian religions that do not really care too much about them?

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It is often taken for granted that, “when you are in Rome, do as the Romans do”, but how about when the ‘Romans’ are in Africa? And how about when the Americans, English, French, Portuguese, Spanish, Italians and the other Europeans are in Africa? It has been taken for granted, on the other hand, that Africans in Africa and abroad are to be told, and have been constantly told, what to do, or what not to do and when, for their own good, even about their own African villages and hamlets, educations and national developments, and the rest. We submit that this global perception and maltreatment of African people gave birth to the ideology of Pan-Africanism, that African people themselves should craft a powerful nation of their own so that Ethiopia shall once again stretch out her hands unto her own God. The miseducation of African people by their European colonial masters and their European and Arabic enslavers compelled them to look into their ancient pasts, if only to substantiate that they too had not been without their own contributions to the arts, letters and the sciences, as they had been misinformed by the Arabs and Europeans that enslaved, colonized, and educated them. In their search into their ancient pasts, African peoples discovered that these Europeans that enslaved them had themselves once lived in primitive conditions, while the Africans (as Ethiopians and Egyptians) had built monuments to monotheism, as advocated by Akhenaten; that their European enslavers were once a pagan people that sold “their wives and children, kidnap the children of their neighbors, and do the same thing. They even sell their own children, their wives, and their mothers,” and in Britain, “groups of ten or twelve men share their wives in common, particularly between brothers or fathers and sons. Any offspring are held to be the children of him to whom the maiden was brought first” (Painter, 2010: 25; 46). And yet, these were the same Europeans that referred to Africans as barbarians, and needed Europeans to civilize them; and enslaving Africans was justified as one of the means of getting Africans away from their cannibalistic tendencies before they annihilated each other. The White Man’s Burden was to see to it that they (Europeans), the chosen ones, should be lords over the weaker races of mankind. But after Toussaint L’Ouverture’s revolution in Haiti, groups of African people in the western hemisphere were inspired to emulate the Haitian example, even at great costs to the African Diaspora; the Denmark Vesey and Gabriel Prosser rebellions were defeated and strategies were crafted to prevent other such challenges to Euro-American power –but the bird had already been let out of the bag (Fordham, 1975: 115-126). Freed

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Northern U.S. Blacks were already informed about the freed Black nation in their western hemisphere. Their newspapers, orators, and preachers publicized the audacity of the successful Haitian revolution as a proof that Blacks were indeed capable of ‘creating’ a nation of their own, and, without interference from Europeans, they could again build a mighty nation on the African continent, their ancestral homeland. By the 1850s, there were heated debates amongst the AfricanAmerican Diaspora on the merits of Black emigration to the African continent. The call for emigration to Africa had multifaceted motives: there was the desire for the spiritual regeneration of the African natives; there were some who were about going back to Africa, to evade the inhumanities heaped on African people in the western hemisphere; there were still others who felt that African people in the whole global village should craft their own powerful nation in Africa that the other world regions will have to reckon with. Such a powerful African nation would be able to protect African people wherever they are on earth, including those that wished to remain in the United States of America, even as they continue to fight for their own Civil Rights within the U.S. Monroe Fordham (1975:123) tells us that “Martin Delany … believed that through emigration blacks could become ‘a united and powerful body of freemen, mighty in politics, and terrible in any conflict which might ensue’”. Thus, while some Black Christians advocated for the spiritual regeneration of the African continent, materialistic nationalists advocated for the militaristic, political and economic development of their ancestral homeland. As it should already have been suspected, the spirit that moved Toussaint L’Ouverture to plan to liberate and develop Africa did not die with him; this spirit was massively rekindled in another West Indian African Diasporan, by the name of Marcus Garvey (1877-1940), from Jamaica. In this way, the river of liberation and African development did not stop with the Haitian liberator, and it continues in various streams in the minds of African people all over the world.

Marcus Garvey A careful reading of the speeches, sermons, comments, and axioms of Mosiah Marcus Garvey cannot but reveal the greatest global PanAfricanist from amongst his contemporaries. His religious, commercial, educational, political, economic, and scientific philosophies and opinions were then the most singularly Pan-Africanistic and globalistic; he was unrepentant about his laser-focused belief in African peoples’ abilities

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that, with organization based on Pan-Africanism, African people will be able to craft a powerful African nation that will be second to none in our global village. He was keenly aware, however, of his detractors’ desires to see him defeated; the U.S. government, the multinational shipping industry, Du Bois of the NAACP, other envious Black elites, miseducated African people in Africa and abroad, European colonial powers, incompetent Blacks in his employ, etc. all presented formidable opposition and obstacles to Garvey’s African vision. Despite these conservative and reactionary obfuscations, Garvey aimed to craft a political super-state in Africa, for African people in Africa and abroad. According to Garvey, Africa’s progress will positively change the world’s opinion of African people wherever they are in our global village. Marcus Garvey advocated the most radical brand of politics for African emancipation and development: Pan-African politics, economics, military, diplomacy, education, religion, culture, agriculture, media, science, concept of beauty (somatic norm preference), international politics and relations, women, commerce, history, etc., as these relate to African people in Africa and abroad. To Marcus Garvey, the globe was his village; in anything that had to do with African peoples’ progress, Garvey was up to the task, and he knew that, even after his death, his Pan-African spirit, like that of Toussaint L’Ouverture of Haiti, would not die. Born in the West Indian nation of Jamaica in 1877, Marcus Garvey grew up in a society dominated by an Anglo-Saxon minority (2%), with a colored buffer-zone (18%), and the Black majority (78 %) at the bottom (Cronon, 1972: 9). In this Pigmentocracy (Europeans are not oppressed or ruled by anyone else anywhere in the world, but they are the rulers even where they are the small minority), the Anglo-Saxon language, history, education, economics, law, etc. were used to lord it over the black majority; this was the Jamaica that had produced the Maroons that claimed descent from the now West African nation of Ghana, the Ghana of President Kwame Nkrumah. The Maroons had wanted a community of their own, and they fought the British colonialists to protect their families and the community of their own; in this Jamaican Maroon society, Black women were highly valued and respected; they produced, reproduced, transmitted African, Creole, Maroon cultures to their children, and were legendary in their defense of their new homeland; towns were named after them and they were the stable element of their society, as the men were often transient (Bilby and Steady, 1985: 451-467). In contrast, in the Southern U.S. plantations, Black women were brutalized as breeders, bed wenches, field hands, domestic servants, and objects of any White man’s

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pleasure (Davis, 1971: 1- 15); they thereby increased the mixed blooded Black-White population. W. E. B. Du Bois, an example of that mixed Black-White population, described Marcus Garvey as a “little, fat, black man; ugly, but with intelligent eyes and a big head” (Jacques-Garvey, 1973: 310); but Marcus Garvey was already proud of his blackness, perhaps too proud for Du Bois’ liking. By the age of fifteen, Marcus Garvey was already well read, fastidiously studious, observant, clear-thinking , a promising leader of his people, and had a clear-cut understanding of European attitudes towards African people. In colonial Jamaica, a White classmate of his had made it plain to him that Blacks were pigeon-holed at the lower levels of any society (Cronon, 1972: 8); regardless of one’s individual talent and qualifications, even in a society in which African people were in the clear majority, Whites always remained on top. To add to his intellectual repertoire, Garvey travelled extensively in South America, Europe, and in the United States, only to substantiate that African people were a global subordinate class; Europe had already carved out the African continent and some Africans had become British, French, Portuguese, or Spanish; apartheid in South Africa had really begun in 1652, with the establishment of a fence of demarcation between the European colonialists and the African natives (Fredrickson, 1981: 30). In this global social, political, educational, religious, and economic structure, where was the Black man’s nation, military, industries, educational institutions, embassies, ambassadors, organizations, etc. that worked on behalf of the African constituent of the global village? These were some of the issues that burned in Garvey’s mind, as he continued to observe and educate himself wherever he went. There had been other Pan-Africanists before Mosiah Marcus Garvey: Martin R. Delany (shipbuilder and advocate of Africa for the Africans), Chief Sam, Edward Wilmot Blyden, Henry Sylvester Williams, Henry McNeal Turner, and even W. E. B. Du Bois, but none was as radical as Mosiah Marcus Garvey, and none had been predicted as Marcus Garvey and Kwame Nkrumah (Lynch, 1967: 121, 122). Next to Garvey and Nkrumah, however, these other Pan-Africanists weren’t timid and conservative. As he travelled and studied in the West Indies, South America, the United States and Europe, Garvey expanded his historical and contemporary knowledge of African peoples’ conditions in Africa and those in the Diaspora in England, the United States, Latin America, Canada, and ancient Egypt. His reading of Booker T. Washington’s Up From Slavery, in which self-help is emphasized, confirmed his interest in

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African people doing things for themselves. He came to believe, as in Samuel Smiles’ Self-Help, that “a man’s future is in his hands” (p. ix); that “an easy and luxurious existence does not train men to effort or encounter with difficulty; nor does it awaken that consciousness of power which is so necessary for energetic and effective action in life” (31). In Garvey and Garveyism, however, we are made critically aware that Mr. Garvey would not have gone along with Booker T. Washington’s accommodation strategy in Tuskegee, Alabama, even as B. T.’s autobiography is recorded as one of the sources that inflamed Garvey’s ideas of helping the African race; Garvey, nonetheless, rejected dependency on European people and their chosen leaders for African people (Martin, 1974: p. 430). In Amy Jacques-Garvey’s edition of Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey, a book that was to later inspire President Kwame Nkrumah’s Pan-African sentiments and actions, we are introduced to an unapologetic Pan-Africanist, whose likeness we might never see again. Though most Pan-Africanists are mostly narrowly focused on only one aspect of the African condition, Mosiah Marcus Garvey comes out the most comprehensive Pan-Africanist; he leaves no stones unturned, as long as they have anything to add to African peoples’ economic, political, religious, educational, industrial, and scientific freedom and betterment. Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) was founded in 1914 and held several international conventions in the Western Hemisphere, and advocated that Africa should be for the Africans; ‘Africa for the Africans’ became four dreaded words European colonizers in Africa and the oppressors of Black people in America, Europe, and in the West Indies did not want to hear. Common sense should have dictated that, if Europe was for Europeans, Asia for the Asians, why shouldn’t Africa be for the Africans? But European interests in Africa dictated that Africa should be divided between the interested European powers, which had been accomplished by the 1930s. Marcus Garvey’s object was to build a continental Africa for the betterment of the African natives. His so-called back-to-Africa movement did not mean a massive movement of African Americans into Africa; most African Americans wished to remain in the United States and some did not even want to go back to Africa since, they claimed, they had not left anything in Africa. The African Diaspora that Marcus Garvey wanted in Africa were the ones with the U.N.I.A. mentality, those that were willing to work purposely for the creation of an independent African nation that the world would have no other choice but deal with on equal terms.

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In this Pan-African nation, “universities, colleges, academies and schools for racial education and culture of the people will be primary and work will be done to improve the general conditions of Negroes everywhere” (p. 11); “…technical missionaries will be sent to the mother country-Africa” (p.13); and “trade schools and black cultural center(s)” will be established (p.13). In Garvey’s mind, “the Negro must have a country and a nation of its own; the race cannot continue to be dependent on the goodwill of their oppressors, in Africa and Abroad” (p.20). Marcus Garvey’s emphasis on education, science, and technology as necessary ingredients in African development remains undiminished. He stated that, “whether our freedom is obtained by political upheavals or gradually, we must be prepared scientifically and technologically to cooperate in Africa for the common good” (270); he urged African Americans “to take better advantage of the cause of higher education. We could make ourselves better mechanics and scientists … the western Negro will have to make valuable contributions along the scientific and technical lines” (59). At the end of Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey, under the title “African Fundamentalism,” Garvey exhorts his African brethren thus: There is no height to which we cannot climb by using the active intelligence of our own minds. Mind creates, and as much as we desire in nature we can have through the creation of our own minds. Being at present the scientifically weaker race, you shall treat others only as they treat you; but in your homes and everywhere possible you must teach the higher development of science to your children; and be sure to develop a race of scientists par excellence for in science and religion lie our only hope to withstand the evil designs of modern materialism. Never forget your God. Remember, we live, work and pray for the establishment of a great and binding racial hierarchy, the founding of racial empire whose only natural, spiritual and political limits shall be God and Africa, at home and abroad.

In addition to science and technology, Marcus Garvey’s scheme was to have organizations, such as the UNIA, whose goals should steadfastly be for the betterment of the African masses, at home and abroad; Garvey’s experience was that miseducated Black leaders were often used by the adversaries of African people to bolster their own material conditions in life. These miseducated African people were often easily manipulated into siding with the oppressors of the African masses, in Africa and abroad, as we shall see in the cases of not only Marcus Garvey himself but also in the experiences of some of the African nationalists of the 1960s and the

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1970s, especially those of President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo. The organizations that effectively challenged Mr. Garvey in the Western Hemisphere were numerous, including Black churches, newspapers, government agencies, individual Blacks and the leadership of the NAACP; elsewhere, South African Whites and the European colonial masters that had parceled Africa out to themselves did not want to see Garveyism infecting their colonial subjects with the U.N.I.A. organ, The Negro World in which Garvey advocated “the establishment of a Negro Commonwealth in Africa” (Cronon, 1972: 88). “In certain places,” we are told, “the punishment to be seen with The Negro World was imprisonment for five years, some life imprisonment and in French Dahomey the penalty was death” (Jacques-Garvey, 1973: 358). If Garvey’s UNIA threw fear into the hearts and minds of European colonialists in Africa, traditional Christians could not have been too happy with Garvey’s insistence that African people view the religion of Jesus Christ from their own vantage point of view. “We Negroes,” he states, should “believe in the God of Ethiopia … We shall worship Him through the spectacles of Ethiopia” (p. 44). “I am a Negro,” Garvey goes on to say, and “I make absolutely no apology for being a Negro because my God created me to be what I am, and as I am so will I return to my God, for he knows best why he created me as he did” (pp. 212-213). To traditional or westernized Black Christians in Black churches, worshiping through a whitened Jesus Christ was not to be questioned or challenged; Garvey’s refutation of the mores and practices of Western Christianity relative to African people was extended to the Western concept of beauty, that excluded African peoples’ features, black skin color and body type. He lectured African people to be proud of their own skin color and body type, and to value their own somatic norms. Thus, he referred to Dr. Du Bois, a contemporary that had called him ‘black and ugly’, as a colored man who hated the “drop of Negro blood in his veins” (306); Garvey pursued Dr. DuBois by asserting that, “… if there is any ugliness in the Negro race it would be reflected more through Du Bois than Marcus Garvey, in that he himself tells us that he is a little Dutch, a little French, and a little Negro; in fact the man is a monstrosity” (310). These two men represented two totally different organizations (the NAACP and the UNIA) that appealed to two different sets of Blacks: the so-called Blacks (Negroes) and the so-called coloreds (light-skinned African people, mixed with non-African people). The N.A.A.C.P. talked on behalf of the then four million Blacks in the United States; the U.N.I.A.

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boasted about the then estimated four-hundred million African people in Africa and abroad. The two men even went into battle over who was more educated and successful than the other; who was more of a dangerous Black man than the other, and even who was more of a liar than the other. Ideologically, Du Bois was an integrationist; Garvey was a practical Pan-Africanist, who wanted to create a supra-national African state that the world would have to deal with. This new Negro state and its concomitant character would defend and represent African people, and make them proud of themselves everywhere they are; they would not have to ‘bleach’ themselves to approximate European somatic normative standards, or other outlandish standards of beauty. For Marcus Garvey, nothing was left untouched; with regards to the creation of an African super state, in all its dimensions, Garvey was willing to place his life on the line. But, to have been talking as he did, in the early 1900s, when White supremacy was unrelenting, when African people in Africa and abroad were colonized internally as well as externally, was seen as a frontal attack on African people’s oppressors. Therefore, European colonialists, White American authorities and individuals, a good number of the so-called ‘Respectable Coloreds’ that benefited from the status-quo, as well as other opportunistic Blacks, were against Marcus Garvey’s ‘Machine’ or vision that had attracted aspirant Black people tri-continentally – from Europe, Africa, and the Americas – and even beyond. Marcus Garvey’s UNIA, Black Star Line, and his other business ventures failed, in part, due to his lack of experience in business and the incompetence of some of his employees: “the men were lazy, incompetent, treacherous and visionless …” (Philosophy and Opinions... (p. 279); “some of the heads of the departments were more interested in taking out the young ladies that worked in their departments than giving proper attention to the organization’s business” (281). Some former members of the UNIA even sued the organization for back salaries, even though their claims were fraudulent. A group of ‘Respectable Coloreds’ and their newspapers wanted Garvey gone; Garvey, the foreigner, had outshone them in attracting the largest number of African people, and had been bold enough to publicly exhort them to be proud of their African-ness, and to envision a mighty African State that ever was created. In that state or nation, they would have their own African Orthodox Church, scientists, military men, diplomats, educational systems, and political ideologies that would not depreciate African people’s blackness.

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To Marcus Garvey, the Marxists and Communists were mostly interested in the UNIA to increase the number of their followers; they had no answers concerning the conditions of Black workers that were not being accepted by their White coworkers, due to racism. Where there were Black and White workers, White workers formed their own labor unions that excluded Black workers; what for them was the slogan, ‘Workers of the World Unite’? Since Garvey had such a large following of Black working men and women, International Communism would have been greatly enhanced, had it gotten its hands on UNIA members, but Garvey was not fooled by their supposedly non-racial ideology. On that score, the European Communists had to prove themselves; for, in the final analysis, the supposedly ‘nonracialism’ of the White working classes could not be taken for granted, especially when it came to competition for scarce resources: wages, social, economic, political, and workplace equality under the law. All things being equal, Garvey was decidedly a humanist, collectiveCapitalist, industrialist, scientist, organizer, and a Pan-African patriotvisionary. In this aspect, Marcus Garvey could have taught most of the African leaders of the 1960s who misconstrued Marxist Communism as a type of traditional African communalism; it was not even “liberal democracy, but collective democracy” (Osabu-Kle, 1985: 228-229) that Mr. Garvey was interested in. To Marcus Garvey, the question was not between Pan-Africanism or Communism (George Padmore, 1972); it was Pan-Africanism in global capitalism, in which nations with the best scientists dominated the global village.I It was Garvey’s vision that African people should have a powerful nation of their own with ineluctable contributions from the best science and scientists; scientists are the ones that will accelerate African development, and they were of primary concern in Marcus Garvey’s vision for the African continent. In Garvey’s Pan-African project, he emphasized African independence and economic expansion, as these would attract added value to the African personality and the concomitant political power that would accrue to a continental political unit. Reading the documents provided in Jacques-Garvey’s Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey, one should come out unconvinced that Garvey was a criminal that needed to be imprisoned and deported to his Jamaican homeland (184-350); the alleged mail fraud case and his supposed non-payment of income taxes appear bogus and frivolous, yet, so was Garvey charged, convicted, imprisoned and deported. As Garvey Jr. correctly evaluates his father’s political ideology (376, 379), the senior Garvey was unambiguously pro-Black and exhorted

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African people to be aware of themselves, to know their history before their Western enslavement, to have pride in the Black race, to internalize that black is naturally beautiful, and to believe in race purity, “as far as that was possible”, and was “against rich blacks marrying poor whites” (378). The elder Garvey wanted the Black man’s God or religion to reflect the Black man: “We cannot have a religion which tells us that we are inferior” (381); we have “to see our God through our own spectacles … through the spectacles of Ethiopia” (382). Garvey believed that Black Power requires an African super-state with modern weapons and a massive military force, for “A race without power is a race without respect” (383). His betrayal by the Americo-Liberian leadership was the last straw that defeated Garvey’s lifetime scheme for the political, technical, educational, agricultural and industrial development of Africans in Africa and abroad. Unlike the Americo-Liberians (former American slaves that migrated to Liberia in West Africa), UNIA was not going to “enslave” the natives, but to help bring about an enlightened Black nation that would “stretch her hands unto God”. But, instead, the Americo-Liberians in Monrovia, the capital city, rejected UNIA representatives that had been sent to negotiate a settlement for a nucleus of Garvey’s Pan-African nationalism. The then president Charles Dunbar King of Liberia was said to have been jealous and fearful that he would be overshadowed by the more dynamic UNIA philosophy of Pan-African Nationalism and scientism; the UNIA representatives included a mining and civil engineer, an electrical engineer, a shipwright and builder, a mechanical engineer, a paymaster, and a commissioner. UNIA’s objective was to make Liberia “a first rate nation” (p. 392); instead, the UNIA colonists were seized and their work tools were sold off (Clarke, 424). W. E. B. Du Bois’ conflict with Marcus Garvey was even extended into Liberia; the former was said to have played a part in seeing to it that UNIA representatives were not allowed to ‘plant’ UNIA in Liberia. In the place of UNIA’s proposed project in Liberia, the Firestone Rubber Company of Akron, Ohio was permitted to plant rubber “for 99 years, (on) the tracts of land to be occupied by the association” (UNIA) (p. 384). The President of Liberia “immediately conscripted natives to build roads for the convenience of the concession” (p. 384). We think that James Weldon Johnson’s evaluation of Marcus Garvey in terms of what Mr. Garvey could have done is misplaced. “Garvey,” according to Johnson (1969: 257), “made several vital blunders, which, with any intelligent advice, he might have avoided”. But Marcus Garvey, we are told,

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Proceeded upon the assumption of a triple race scheme in the United States; whereas the facts are that the whites in the United States, unlike the whites of the West Indies make no distinction between people of color and blacks nor do the Negroes. There may be places where a very flexible social line exists, but Negroes in the United Sates of every complexion have always maintained a solid front on the rights of the race. This policy of Garvey, going to the logical limit of calling upon his followers to conceive of God as black, did arouse a latent pride of the Negro in his blackness, but it wrought an overbalancing damage by the effort to drive a wedge between the blacks and the mixed bloods, an effort that might have brought on disaster had it been more successful. He made the mistake of ignoring or looking with disdain upon the technique of the American Negro in dealing with problems of race, a technique acquired through three hundred years of such experience as the West Indian has not had and never can have. If he had availed himself of the counsel and advice of an able and honest American Negro, he would have avoided many of the barbed wires against which he ran and many of the pits into which he fell. But the main reason for Garvey’s failure with thoughtful American Negroes was his African scheme. It was recognized at once by them to be impracticable. (257-258)

Johnson’s notion that “…whites of the United States, unlike the whites of the West Indies, make no distinction between people of color and blacks, nor do Negroes” is mendacious. The counterfactual is that Whites in the United States, Europe, Brazil, South Africa, and everywhere else they have produced the so-called coloreds, they’ve always created a buffer zone for their offspring and relegated the unmixed ones to the bottom of society, and kept them as field hands on the southern plantations .The mulattoes, quadroons, and octoroons have always felt superior to the unmixed ones, including Afro-Asians in Egypt (Williams, 1974). In the early 1900s, it was not out of the ordinary to find organizations of Blue Vein Societies in the United States. In fact, the reality is that where there is racism there is intra-racism. In the literature of Black America, including some of James Weldon Johnson’s contemporaries of the Harlem Renaissance period (Wallace Thurman’s The Blacker the Berry and Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were Watching God, etc.) being too dark was an abomination. Nonetheless, Toni Martin (1974: 432) opines that: For Garvey a race (and particularly an oppressed race) was more than just a race. It was a political unit. (These were his words). It was larger for this reason, and not for any of the ridiculous reasons advanced by some commentators, that Garvey hated the divisions introduced into the race by some elements among those of lighter hue. It was no case, as has been alleged, of a simplistic transference of attitudes developed in the West

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When Garvey himself visited NAACP offices in New York City in the early 1900s, he could not find any one that looked like him, for they were all light-skinned; in those offices, people of color did not mean Black or dark-skinned African people. In both Haiti and Jamaica, the Toussaint and Garvey movements were frustrated by their colonizers and their middle class coloreds and browns. In Haiti, there were 20,000 French men, 50,000 mulattoes and 2,000,000 Blacks (Clarke, 1974: 25); in Garvey’s Jamaica in the 1880s, as we have seen, the Blacks were 78% of the population, 18% colored, and 2% AngloSaxon, but blacks were at the bottom; a similar observation could easily be made for the South African case under apartheid. In all of these cases, the Europeans ruled and were closely aligned with the coloreds, at the expense of the unmixed Black majority. Garvey’s radicalism was in part ignited by being rejected by the Anglo-Saxons, the coloreds and the browns of Jamaica (Clarke, 1974: 65-70). Richard A. More (1974: 227) writes that: This brown middle class syndrome was developed more highly in Jamaica than in any other Caribbean areas, except perhaps Haiti. The ‘brown man’ or ‘the colored man’ was encouraged by the ruling ‘white man’ to look down upon the ‘black man’ who was thus kept down, being the most exploited of the toilers on the plantations and workers in the towns. The true nature and specific source of this race prejudice, which utilized shades of color, is clearly to be seen in the secret instructions which Napoleon sent to Le Clerc in Haiti … : ‘You should give particular attention to the castes of colored people. Put them in a position to develop their natural prejudices on a wide scale and give them the opportunity to rule over the blacks, and by these means you will secure the submission of both. Place full confidence, at any rate upon the surface, in mulattoes, Creoles, and colored people. Treat them, at any rate on the surface, the same as the whites; encourage marriages between colored people and white or mulatto women, but organize an absolutely contrary system in your relations with the black leaders.

When Johnson, one of the bitterest critics of Garvey (Clarke, 1974: 248), talks of “thoughtful American Negroes” who had recognized the Garvey ‘scheme’ as “impracticable and fantastic” (258), he is talking about himself and other thoughtful coloreds like W. E. B. Du Bois, who

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ended up in Ghana and, ironically, under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, a Boswell of Mosiah Marcus Garvey! Some of the thoughtful Negroes Mr. Garvey had to deal with, Johnson himself and Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois included were very light-skinned, and could not have been oblivious to the prestige and privileges associated with being light-skinned in American society. Professor James Weldon Johnson was himself bold enough to pen The Autobiography of an ExColored Man, in which the light-skinned protagonist abandoned his mother’s (African) people just to become an ordinary White man ‘for a mess of pottage’ (211); this was a protagonist that so regretted the drop of African blood in him that he abandoned his mother’s Black people to pass for White, for all the privileges he felt were associated with whiteness in our global village. The famous W. E. B. Du Bois himself stated in his Souls of Black Folk that: After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world, – a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this doubleconsciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness, – an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two un-reconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. (p. 5)

Marcus Garvey was, on the other hand, never ambiguous about his blackness or African-ness; he could not have imagined a marginal ExColored Man or a divided loyalty between America and Africa, as depicted in Du Bois’ “two souls, two thoughts” theory. To Marcus Garvey, Africa came first. He did not suffer from being torn asunder by two “un-reconciled strivings”, as in the above Du Boisian paradigm; he was too much of an Africa-centrist to feel a divided loyalty. For persons like Professor James Weldon Johnson, however, whenever the L’Ouvertures, the Garveys, and the Nkrumahs unabashedly challenged European hegemony, they should be imprisoned (Toussaint, Garvey, and Nkrumah were all imprisoned), demonized in Western media, killed, deported, or forced out of office, often, with the help of some of the very people for whom they were fighting. And for Toussaint L’Ouverture, Marcus Garvey, and Kwame Nkrumah to work for the creation of a powerful Black state was just simply too much for the European enslavers and colonizers of African people to

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handle; they would rather deal with “thoughtful” coloreds and other westernized African people that benefited from the status-quo. Thus, Garvey’s failures were not so much that he was too egoistical, recalcitrant, misinformed, or under-educated; he was defeated by the powers that were bent on silencing a global Pan-Africanist, with the help of some of his ‘own’ people; those who refused to believe that African people are indeed capable of crafting out for themselves a powerful, united African nation. As we shall see, some of the problems Kwame Nkrumah encountered from the 1940s to the 1960s are similar to those that Marcus Garvey had experienced a couple of decades earlier. At this point, we can submit that Garvey’s desires to go to Africa were different from that of the American Colonization Society sending Black colonists to Liberia; he would have developed that Americo-Liberian nation in West Africa, and not on the backs of the Natives. The Firestone Rubber Company would have been African owned; Garvey would have promoted Liberation Theology, and built schools and colleges with an emphasis on science, technology and industrialization; color privilege wouldn’t have been automatic, and the natives would not have been ‘enslaved’ by UNIA colonists; UNIA immigrants would not have been Black colonialists that left the United States for the love of freedom, but turned around and ‘enslaved’ the African natives they found there; in Garvey’s frame of reference, Liberia would have been Africa-centric and a nucleus for Pan-African institutions and activities. His handling of his own case was said to have contributed to his imprisonment, but this point of view downplayed the fact that his fate had already been decided by the powers-that-be – a Jewish Judge that believed Garvey was in cahoots with the KKK. That judge was affiliated with NAACP, the then arch enemy of the UNIA. There were also Black church leaders that feared Garvey’s popularity with some members of their congregations; there were the so-called “thoughtful Negroes” who felt that Garvey was an ‘illiterate’ alien; in no small measure also was the fact that France, Great Britain, and South Africa feared Pan-African Nationalism, and they saw to it that ‘The Negro World’ was banned in their colonies. Death, heavy fines, and imprisonments were imposed on colonial subjects found in possession of this journal that purported to speak on behalf of 400,000,000 Negroes in Africa and Abroad. After all, Belgium, France, Portugal, and Great Britain were not going to let all of Africa’s extensive mineral and agricultural wealth be controlled by a sworn Pan-African nationalist bent on scientifically developing a people on an Africa-centric basis. This was too much for the beneficiaries of Western-dominated

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Africa, including a good number of miseducated Africans, bent on protecting their own economic interests. European colonizers were interested in promoting African leaders that would work on their behalf, in the sense of the plantation tradition, in which dedicated overseers were chosen by their masters. This was fully manifested in continental African politics from the late 1800s to the 1960s. For example, as soon as African countries became so-called ‘politically independent’, a lot of the new African leaders literally became overseers for absentee European (former) colonialists. The real rulers of African nations were in Europe, America, and in the offices of World Bank and International Monetary Fund. As long as the former European African colonies continued to supply raw materials to the Western World, direct colonialism (the presence of Europeans on the ground) was unnecessary. With overseers, such as Mr. Mobutu Sese Sekou, the Americo-Liberians, Emperor Haile Selassie, and other such African leaders, the French, Belgians, the British, and the Americans need not to be on the ground. Firestone in Liberia, mining concessions in the Congo Republic, oil-rich Nigeria, and strategically located Ethiopia and Egypt could be used to contain continental Africa, away from Communism. There were, and there are still, no powerful African media to counteract the images of Africa the Western World would have the global village consume about continental African people. Those African leaders that did not abide by the rules set for them were routinely deposed and maligned in Western newspapers, magazines and other publications; sometimes Western agents were used to ‘do in’ the so-called ‘recalcitrant’ African leaders, especially those who blatantly refused to play ball according to Western rules. Some of the colonial agents against Marcus Garvey were African people who saw themselves as members of the ruling elite, a buffer zone between the African masses and their European and Euro-American global leaders. Thus, while Marcus Garvey was talking of building a Pan-African nation as early as the 1920s, he had oppositions from some of the so-called ‘cultured’ African Americans and other Blacks in the Diaspora, reporting on Garvey’s ‘dangerous intentions and activities’ to the European colonizers in Africa, including the then apartheid rulers of South Africa. Indeed, when Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea refused to be an ‘overseer’ of Guinea for France in 1958, he was denounced and punished as a non-conformist, for refusing to be an agent of French colonialism; when President Kwame Nkrumah refused to play ball Western-style, his own army and police forces usurped him out of office in 1966. As long as Africa remained Balkanized and under developed, Western colonial masters were happy in their notions about the White man’s superiority.

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Garvey, Nkrumah, Lumumba and others that wanted to change that paradigm were deemed trouble-makers and, as in the days of Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner of the United States of America, these new rebellious Africans were to be made examples of how not to play ball with Africa’s Western rulers; those that remained good ‘overseers’ in Balkanized African countries became ‘Presidents-for-life’. President Mobutu Sese Sekou of the mineral wealthy Congo was selected to preside over that central African nation for 32 years, for European and American interests, at the expense of his own people. He became such a good overseer for western mining companies and other multinational corporations that he was allowed to own fabulous buildings in Europe and live an epicurean lifestyle. Osabu-Kle (2000: 271; 271) writes that, at his life’s end, Mobutu, the first Sub-Saharan African to intervene militarily in the political arena of independent Africa, the man who sent thousands of his countrymen into exile or into flight as refugees in various countries, was now on the run, seeking a place of exile. His plane landed in Togo but, faced with popular resentment, President Gnassingbe Eyadema was not able to let him stay there. Mobutu left for Morocco, presumably as a stepping stone to France, where he had one of his exotic mansions; but there was a great danger that he might be a liability in France as well. Having been abandoned by the West, he died later in Morocco … The Swiss government announced a freeze on the U. S. $2.2 million villa he had in that country. After initially denying that Switzerland was harbouring (sic) some of Mobutu’s millions, the Swiss government suspiciously admitted to only U. S. $ 3.4 million of his estimated U. S. $9 billion in Swiss banks …Mobutu’s wealth was left in the Swiss and other banks in Europe … ‘Loans that France extended to Zaire stayed in France when Mobutu used it to buy himself chateaux here and there’.

In contrast, both Marcus Garvey and President Kwame Nkrumah were dedicated Pan-Africanists, not kleptomaniacs, even though some of the people that surrounded them got their hands dirty. Yet, it was good overseers like Mobutu that were handsomely rewarded by the West as leaders of African people. Marcus Garvey refused to be a puppet of the West; he wanted an African supra-nation to rival the West, have its own scientists, industrialists, educational and religious institutions, military, symbols, and an African personality. For Mr. Garvey, it was “Africa for the Africans, at home and abroad”, as proclaimed by him in 1916 when there were only two independent nations in Africa. To Garvey, this was not a dream, but a vision that would come to be realized. Unlike some of the African leaders

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of the 1960s and the 1970s, Mr. Garvey was not fooled by the slogans of Communism; to him there was not such a thing as Afro-Marxism, AfroLeninism, or Maoism, for that matter. His preoccupation was with the material, scientific, cultural, religious, economic, etc. development of the African people from an Africa-centric frame of reference. He did not scorn capitalism, but advocated for a democratic-capitalist development of the African people in which naked capitalism did not oppress the masses of African people. In Garvey’s frame of mind, scientists would hold a special position, based on their ineluctable contributions to the material betterment of the new African nation. In his proposed African nation, religion would be Africanized; it would not overemphasize the hereafter-paradise, or downplay the examination of the here-and-now material conditions of African people, after all, God helped those who helped themselves, as the Europeans had been doing in Africa since the 1400s, and the Arabs since the 700s. ‘The kernel of Garveyism’, writes Garvey, Jr., ‘consisted of his unyielding belief that the salvation of the race demanded the creation of a great nation in Africa capable of spreading its protective umbrella over all the African peoples scattered across the world in the great black Diaspora. Marcus Garvey always . . . maintained until his death that the black man’s only salvation was to create his own great nation by dint of his own efforts in his motherland of Africa’. (p. 379)

Because he insisted on African peoples’ God-given right to have a nation of their own, several of his detractors, both African and non-African peoples, were quick to label him as “unreasonable, unsophisticated, uneducated, egoistic, bombastic, a foreign agitator, and a leader of the socalled uneducated masses of African people”.(259). James Weldon Johnson, referred to above, will want us to believe that, with Marcus Garvey’s demise, Garveyism was finished; he opined that Garvey’s “tragedy (was) that to this man came an opportunity such as comes to few men, and he clutched greedily at the glitter and let the substance slide from his fingers” (259), even as Garvey plainly stated in his Philosophy and Opinions… that his “work is just begun, and as I lay down my life for the cause of my people, so do I feel that succeeding generations shall be inspired by the sacrifice that I made for the rehabilitation of our race … I shall die to give courage and inspiration to my race” (218).

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Kwame Nkrumah True to Marcus Garvey’s foresight and predictions, several African people, in Africa and the Diaspora, have been inspired by his “sacrifice and dedication to the African cause”; and one of the most outstanding PanAfricanists to be inspired by Mosiah Marcus Garvey was President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, West Africa. As Garvey had been influenced by B. T. Washington’s Up From Slavery, so also was Kwame Nkrumah inspired by Marcus Garvey’s Philosophy and Opinions: Indeed, it is Nkrumah who has paid the greatest tribute to Garvey; in his autobiography, first published in 1957, he wrote: ‘. . . of all the literature I studied, the book that did more than any other to fire my enthusiasm was Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey’, an independent Ghana, led by Kwame Nkrumah, which adopted Black Star line as the name of its shipping company, and on the Red, Green and White National Flag is imposed a black star. (Preface, Philosophy and Opinions . . . .)

But prior to reading Garvey’s Philosophy and Opinions, Kwame Nkrumah, on his way to Lincoln University in Pennsylvania in 1935, had been greatly affected by the Italian Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia; to an already Balkanized Africa, not even an independent African nation of historic importance was sacrosanct to European colonizers. This was the ‘first’ straw that ‘compelled’ Kwame Nkrumah into the stance that he must fight for African liberation. Professor John Henrik Clarke (1974: 326) writes that: This attack on Ethiopia, the last remaining independent African nation, awakened Black people around the world. It also gave a rebirth to Garveyism. In the midst of this war and in the Depression years many conservative blacks became radical and nationalists and a new political consciousness (were) born. A young Ghana student, Kwame Nkrumah, came to the United States and began his studies in this atmosphere. During those years he came under the influence of Garveyism. Black Americans were becoming more Africa-conscious. The ItalianEthiopian War was responsible for the new interest and anger about Africa. A number of study groups showed interest in African history. The best known of these groups was the Blyden Society, named after the great nationalist and benefactor of West Africa, Edward Wilmot Blyden. I personally remember Kwame Nkrumah attending several meetings of this society.

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Kwame Nkrumah, therefore, followed the footsteps of Blyden and Garvey, and as Garvey had extended B. T. Washington’s self-help philosophy, so did Kwame Nkrumah bring into Africa Marcus Garvey’s ideas about creating a powerful African nation, with a new African personality; but, if Booker T. Washington was a micro-nationalist, Garvey and Nkrumah were continental and global Pan-Africanists. Furthermore, while Garvey was an arch enemy of W. E. B. Du Bois, Kwame Nkrumah highly valued Du Bois’ academic expositions and Pan-African conferences on behalf of African people; at the same time, Kwame Nkrumah embraced and put to practice the salient aspects of Marcus Garvey’s continental and global Pan-Africanism, including the emphasis on science, technology, industrialization, acceptance of blackness, Afro-centric frame of reference, a high military command, and the Africa-centric study of African cultures and peoples. While Garvey himself never set foot on African soil, W. E. B. Du Bois became a Ghanaian citizen, died and was buried in Nkrumah’s independent Ghana. At the popular level, Marcus Garvey’s ideas were embraced by the African masses; in Nkrumah’s hands, Garvey’s “the New Negro” became “the New African”. This New Negro and this New African were no longer ‘boys’ but men, determined to be among men on their own terms: they will have a supra-national government of their own, that will have to be reckoned with, feared, and respected by the global community; and they will establish diplomatic relationships with other constituents of the global village in which their people will be given all the rights and privileges due to all men, women, and children all over the world. In Kwame Nkrumah’s hands, Garveyism meant Africa Must Unite and, “the independence of Ghana was meaningless, if it was not at the same time linked up with the total liberation of the entire African continent”; there should be one, common, African citizenship, a high military command, a single African currency, one foreign policy, a common industrial plan, universities of sciences and technologies, and other educational institutions in which African cultures are studied up to the Ph.D level. In a united Africa he saw the sciences as ineluctable tools for continental African development. President Kwame Nkrumah submitted that, In the area of education, in a united Africa, ‘. . . we should nurture our own culture and history, if we are to develop that African personality which must provide the educational and intellectual foundations of our panAfrican future.’ Colonial education had taught Africans that ‘. . . our culture and traditions (were) barbarous and primitive. Our textbooks were English, telling us about English history, English geography, English ways of living, English customs, English ideas, English weather.’ Kwame Nkrumah formalized the study of African history, literature, and other

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In Consciencism . . ., Nkrumah was eclectic and dialectical; he theorized that, African society has one segment which comprises our traditional way of life; it has a second segment which is filled by the presence of Islamic tradition in Africa; it has a final segment which represents the infiltration of Christian tradition and culture of Western Europe into Africa using colonialism as its primary vehicle. These different segments are animated by competing ideologies. But since society implies a certain dynamic unity, there needs to emerge an ideology which, genuinely catering for the needs of all, will take the place of competing ideologies, and so reflect the dynamic unity of society, and be the guide to society’s continual progress. . . . Philosophical Consciencism . . . will enable African society to digest the Western and the Islamic and the Euro-Christian elements in Africa, and develop them in such a way that they fit into the African personality. The African personality itself is defined by the cluster of humanist principles which underlie the traditional African society. Philosophical consciencism is that philosophical standpoint which, taking its start from the present content of African conscience, indicates the way in which progress is forged out of the conflict in that conscience. (68, 79)

Like Marcus Garvey before him, Kwame Nkrumah believed that Africa’s enormous resources should be exploited and used for the benefit of the African masses; instead, Nkrumah observed in his 1965 NeoColonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism that Africa’s natural resources were being used to enrich non-African people in Europe and elsewhere; but, as soon as this work was published, Nkrumah was viewed as a mortal enemy of the United States and the Western world in general. Agyeman (1992: 49) tells us that Nkrumah’s “excellent book, Neo-Colonialism. . . . was not well received by the United States government, which viewed it as an “unacceptable affront to American interests”; the Western world was not going to sit down, and let Kwame Nkrumah accomplish what Marcus Garvey had talked about from the early 1900s to 1940. Kwame Nkrumah’s ‘United Africa’, like that of Marcus Garvey’s, should not be allowed to have exclusive ownership of the mineral wealth and other natural resources of the African continent that the West wanted cheaply. The West was not going to allow Kwame Nkrumah ‘talk’ about a continentally united Africa, that will be in a better position to manage its own affairs,

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and do politics from its own perspectives, led especially by one adamant about a single currency, a common citizenship, and a high military command. According to Gassama (2008: 347-348), Nkrumah’s approach to the study of Neo-Colonialism has to be considered impressive in scope and texture. His documentation of the penetration of monopoly capitalism and cartels into the continent, especially in extractive industries, was prescient. He saw the penetration as the heart of the process of dominating Africa in the post-independence era. As he wrote in 1965, ‘from the south to north, financial and industrial consortia have spread across Africa, busily staking out claims to mineral, metal, and fuel resources, to forest and land produce.’. . . Since Nkrumah’s time, the relationship has only deepened … Very little about Nkrumah’s analysis could be found outdated today.

We could look at neocolonialism in both simple and complex terms. In simple terms, neocolonialism is basically the control over African resources after they had gained their ‘political independence’; this is easily understood, in that Africa’s ‘former’ colonial masters continued to ‘extract’ economic resources from their ‘former’ colonial territories, and even beyond. The complex aspect of neocolonialism is in neocolonialism’s use of the ‘non-economic’ means that facilitated the continued exploitation of Africa: education, media, hand-picked scholars to study abroad, bribery, and other means. Gassama (348-349) explains: Nkrumah further described the well-integrated relationship among economic, cultural, and political interests with private capital and governmental power working symbiotically to maintain the status quo. Nkrumah emphasized the central role of the United States in expanding the breadth of neocolonialist responses to the challenges posed by insurgent African nationalism. Military bases and advisers, the Peace Corps, the U. S. Information Agency, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the African-American Labor Center, Hollywood, and American Evangelism were all, in his view, part of a comprehensive and multilayered process to entrench domination. He also identified what he saw as the crucial role played by transnational entities such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the process. In his view, these institutions extended the neocolonialist trap, locking their victims into permanent unequal relationships.

The West used its media to negatively frame African leaders that didn’t ‘play football’ according to British or western standards, laws, formal and

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informal rules, and regulations. If politics were to be played, it had to be played Western-style and not in a way which was based on African people’s aspirations for the political and economic consolidation of the African continent. With Hollywood on the West’s side, what was Africa to do? To a certain extent, India, China, and Brazil, at least, have their own media; in addition, they have their large sizes and their ‘integrated’ selves. They are not divided into fifty-nine Balkanized entities like the continental African economies that Kwame Nkrumah aspired to integrate. Apologists for neocolonialism would argue that continental Africa is too diverse a place and, therefore, they should allow each individual state, community, or nation to develop on its own, while the European Union, Greater China, North America (NAFTA), Australia, and India, all of which are comprised of many states, consolidate their own economies. If larger and larger economic units are good for those other world regions, Africa would be foolish to keep maintaining Balkanization. If Marcus Garvey was not allowed to sow UNIA seeds in Liberia, so also should Kwame Nkrumah not be allowed to plant Garveyism in Africa; as long as Africa’s wealth continued to flow northwards, like the River Nile, there will be no problems with North American and European political leaders and heads of Western multinational corporations. President Nkrumah would have remained a darling of the West had he not persisted in his vision for a continentally integrated Africa; and, the more he remained adamant about building a mega-African state, the more he gained oppositions from both within and without Africa. Similarly, the more Marcus Garvey had been adamant about founding a supra-national African state, boasting of 400, 000, 000 African people, the more he had been hounded, caged and finally deported. Had Garvey been as ‘reasonable’ as some of the ‘respectable American colored’ churchmen, journalists, intellectuals, and college-educated middle class Blacks, he would not have faced half of the problems he encountered; the more he spoke about his African-ness and what African people needed to do for themselves, that no one else would do for them, the more virulently was he denounced as an unlikely Moses of his people. What Marcus Garvey and Kwame Nkrumah were asking for, in the eyes of Euro-Americans, Europeans and Europeanized African people, was too much, too soon, for African people in Africa and abroad. It is now clear that Kwame Nkrumah brought the radical aspects of Garveyist Pan-Africanism into continental Africa. The Pan-Africanist ideas of W. E. B. Du Bois, Sylvester Williams and others were just too mild for Marcus Garvey and Kwame Nkrumah; those other PanAfricanists had been elitists and more conservative in their appeals to

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Africans’ European masters to treat African people a little more decently, like the human beings that they were. But after the death of Marcus Garvey in 1940, the 1945 Pan-African Conference in Manchester, England brought native-born Africans firmly into the Pan-African political movement. After ten years of study at Lincoln University and the University of Pennsylvania, in the United States, where he had studied in extreme poverty but was a voracious reader, Nkrumah found himself and a number of continental African students bent on the notion that African colonies must be freed. It was in England that Kwame Nkrumah published his first book, Towards Colonial Freedom (1945); this was when Pan-Africanism was ‘wrestled’ out of the hands of the African Diaspora, as an intellectual and practical movement, and was moved from conservatism to radicalism, into the hands of a younger generation of Western-educated African people. Generally, Kwame Nkrumah’s first major challenge came from the intellectual elites of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) party that had invited him from England to be their Publicity Secretary in 1947. Within a couple of years, the Garveyist Nkrumah saw the leaders of UGCC lawyers, merchants, British-educated academics, such as Kofi Busia, and other high class African colonial administrators as too gradualist for his ‘colonial freedom’ scheme; these were the respectable coloreds against Marcus Garvey’s UNIA in the United States and the Caribbean, who had referred to Garvey as rustic, unsophisticated, and appealing to mostly the uncouth members of the Black race. To most members of the UGCC of the then Gold Coast, Nkrumah was an upstart from the village of Nkroful, not a British trained lawyer or academic, who appealed mostly to the so-called veranda boys (the black masses on the streets) agitators, demanding higher wages, better living conditions, more African participation in the government that ruled them, and who were interested in immediate independence. African veterans of World War Two were now aware that Great Britain and Western Europe, in general, were no longer as powerful as they once were; these ex-military men had returned with new attitudes and frames of reference. Furthermore, the Atlantic Charter of the United Nations had clearly stated in 1941 that people were free to elect the sort of government under which they wished to live. In Eastern Europe, the Russian Revolution of 1917 had, by the 1940s, built a powerful nation; certainly, the Western model of development was not the only path. Indian independence in 1947 left little doubt that Western hegemony was not as powerful as before the big war; in fact, Western Europe had needed the U.S. Marshall Plan to reconstruct its

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infrastructure. In this weakened state, natives in European colonial possessions began to look at their relationships with the West with a different frame of mind. On the African side of the Atlantic, Nkrumah used British law against the British; he utilized ‘Positive Action’ by legally employing the media, strikes, rallies, and public education to weaken Britain’s grip on one of its ‘best’ colonies in Africa. In 1957, Ghana became the first African nation south of the Sahara to gain political independence from Great Britain. In 1958, Nkrumah called two Pan-African conferences in Accra, the Ghanaian capital, to speed up the process of African independence; in 1960 alone, seventeen additional African countries became politically independent. But President Nkrumah was not fooled by the euphoria of African independence in the 1950s and the 1960s; in his view, as soon as African nations obtained their freedoms, they must consolidate their independence in an integrated Pan-African nation, the type of supra-African nation Marcus Garvey had envisioned. Kwame Nkrumah was a founding member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital. At that conference, he compromised, but reiterated his visions on African unity in submitting that, Until we in Africa are able to establish our own independent currency and financial institutions, we shall continue to be at the mercy of the financial arrangements imposed by foreign governments in their own, and not in our, interest. As long as the states of Africa remain divided, as long as we are forced to compete for foreign capital and to accept economic ties to foreign powers because in our separate entities we are too small, weak and unviable to ‘go it alone,’ we will be unable to break the economic pattern of exploitation established in the days of outright colonialism. My colleagues may have other proposals. (Nonetheless), a Committee of Foreign Ministers, officials and experts should be empowered to establish: . . . a Common Market for Africa; an African Currency; African Monetary Zone; an African Central Bank; a Continental Communication system . . . a Commission to make proposals for a Common African Citizenship. (Nkrumaist Review, 11- 09: 33)

But, like Marcus Garvey before him, the more Kwame Nkrumah was persistent about his ‘United States of Africa’, the more his detractors put obstacles in his path and attacked him. A group of conservative African leaders advocated for a loose federation of states, in which each state’s sovereignty would be sacrosanct. To most of the African leaders in the Pan-African movement of the 1960s, their newly acquired status was too precious to give up for a larger continental unity, where they might be out-

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done and not be president-for-life. Some African nations saw themselves as big enough to stand on their own might; a few ‘wealthy’ African nations were not about to share their natural resources with the smaller and lesser endowed ones. There were a few other African leaders who must have been, at the lower frequencies, envious of President Nkrumah, but justified their oppositions to him by accusing him of being too ambitious, in a hurry, and wanting to be the first President of his proposed united Africa; others were simply too micro-nationalistic to embrace a continental African political unit. Some of the other “Nkrumah(’s) critics and detractors such as Peter Omari accused Nkrumah of ‘sacrificing Ghana on the altar of Pan-Africanism’ in squandering the country’s economic riches on Pan-Africanist projects” (Biney, 2008: 135). Another Ghanaian critic of Nkrumah, Colonel A. A. Afrifa, one of the men that couped Nkrumah in 1966, asserted that ‘the real motive . . . to quickly and artificially bring this Union (government) about (was) so as to make himself (Nkrumah) the President of the (Pan-African) union government . . . could not we see it in the gigantic state house he erected, at the cost of over eight-million pounds of Ghana tax payers’ money, for an eight-day conference of the OAU?’ (Marah, 1998: 103)

Mwalimu Julius Nyerere of Tanzania was also a critic of Kwame Nkrumah at the 1964 OAU Summit, where he laid his gradualist approach against that of Nkrumah’s fast-paced agenda; President Nyerere asserted that he was ‘becoming increasingly convinced that we are divided between those who genuinely want a continental government and will patiently work for its realization, removing obstacles, one by one; and those who simply use the phrase ‘Union Government’ for the purpose of propaganda … To rule out a step by step progress towards African Unity is to hope that the Almighty one day will say, ‘let there be unity in Africa, and there shall be unity’”. (Biney, p. 138)

When Kwame Nkrumah married a non-Black Egyptian, “Miss Fathia Helen Ritzk”, (Ray, 2000:18; 19) the Western world speculated about his political intentions; “Numerous conspiracy theories abounded about their marriage, particularly amongst British and American officials” (p.18): The US State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were remoured (sic) to be primarily concerned with whether the marriage was intended to create a political union between Egypt and Ghana.

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Chapter Eleven British officials sought to alleviate American fears by highlighting the fact that Fathia did not come from a political family in Egypt and that her inability to speak English would make it quite difficult for her to be used as an instrument for ‘the promotion of Egyptian views.’ … (George) Padmore was believed to have ‘suggested to (Nkrumah) that a symbolic marriage of this type with an Egyptian girl would be an indication of a unity of interests between East and West Africa’. (18-19)

Even the ‘famed’ African academic, Professor Ali Mazrui (1966: 8-17) wrote an ‘unfair’ essay on Kwame Nkrumah; he titled it ‘Nkrumah: The Leninist Czar’. In this ‘unjust’ essay (Karioki, 1974: 55-63), Professor Mazrui literally denounced and ridiculed President Kwame Nkrumah, distorting the latter’s efforts to integrate and develop continental Africa. In the second paragraph of Mazrui’s essay, the author did an impossible thing; he went into Nkrumah’s mind: There is little doubt that, quite consciously, Nkrumah saw himself as an African Lenin. He wanted to go down in history as a major political theorist-and he wanted a particular stream of thought to bear his name. Hence the term ‘Nkrumahism’ – a name for an ideology he hoped will assume the same historic and revolutionary status as ‘Leninism’. The fountainhead of both Nkrumahism and Leninism was to remain Marxism – but these two streams that flowed from Marx were to have a historic significance in their own right. (p. 9)

In another frame of mind, different than that of Professor Mazrui’s, Kwame Nkrumah could have also ‘wanted’ to be a Garveyite, because Mr. Marcus Garvey was also one of the salient influences on the first President of Ghana. While Kwame Nkrumah was studying in the United States, he was also influenced by Edward Wylmot Blyden, W. E. B. Du Bois and even some pre-Colonial African nationalists or empire builders, but Professor Mazrui was not going to go there, except in the negative. Kwame Nkrumah’s interests in bettering the conditions of the African working classes could have also made him a Boswell of Friedrich Engels (Engels, 2009); we wonder what would have President Kwame Nkrumah’s desires for a continental African currency, institutionalizing Swahili as a Pan-African language, the building of the Akosombo Damn, the Institute of African Studies at the University of Ghana at Legon, the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, the provision of mass education to Ghanaians, and emphasizing the necessity for an African High Military Command, etc. made him into, in Professor Ali Mazrui’s view; in addition to Nkrumah being a Leninist, and Marxist, could he have also been a Garveyite?

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At least Professor Ibrahim J. Gassama (2008: 340) has attempted to account for the Garveyite aspect of Kwame Nkrumah’s Pan-African project, suggesting that the Ghanaian President’s “…political program could be seen as an amalgam or synthesis of Leninist and Garveyite influences”. Professor Mazrui took the Leninist ‘influences’ and ran away with them, concluding that President “…Nkrumah was a great African. But … fell short of becoming a great Ghanaian” (p. 17). On the contrary, Kwame Nkrumah’s legacy in both Ghana and Africa-at-large has proven Professor Mazrui stupendously wrong. Compared to Dr. K. A. Busia’s tribalism, corruption, intellectual arrogance, irrational anti-Kwame Nkrumahism and his political inabilities, plus the state of Ghanaian politics for a long time after Kwame Nkrumah, Ghanaians know that the first President of Ghana was a great Ghanaian; those that came after him have not been able to approximate his stature, in any degree, in Ghanaian and Pan-African affairs. It should even be needless to say that the late Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the current African Union (AU) are more closely linked to Kwame Nkrumah’s visions of continental Africa than any of his contemporaries. Nonetheless, these obfuscations above are just a few examples of the “many formidable impediments” (Agyeman, 1992: 183) that challenged Kwame Nkrumah’s brand of PanAfricanism. We are now too well aware of what Kwame Nkrumah and Marcus Garvey wanted for continental Africa and what remains to be done in order to achieve complete African unity. In the meanwhile, because of the rejections of Garveyism and Nkrumahism, millions of African people have lost their lives in military coups, civil wars, ethnic cleansings, starvation, malnutrition, hunger, famine, poverty, the development of underdevelopment, and the continued depreciation of African peoples’ image in our global village (Marah, 2006). In a United Africa, the Nigerian Civil War would not have escalated to the extent that it did; it would have even in fact been unnecessary. With an African High Military Command, the numerous coups and counter coups that proliferated in Africa in the 1960s would have been prevented; with a planned industrial development, Africa would have been much further ahead in producing most of the items that she continues to purchase from abroad; and with infrastructural development throughout the continent, African produce and products would be more easily distributed, even to the most remote villages. Why should Somalis, Ethiopians, and other Africans continue to die of starvation even as fishes die of old age in other African countries? Why can’t the hydro-electrical power potential in Central Africa be harnessed for the larger benefit of continental Africa?

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Indeed, when Africans speak with one voice on global political and economic matters, backed by one citizenship, a common currency, and a Pan-African frame of reference, they will then stop being charity cases in the good offices of The World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and be taken more seriously by the currently more powerful world regions in our global village. The rejection of Garveyism from the 1920s to the early 1940s entrenched colonialism in Africa; the rejection of President Kwame Nkrumah’s vision of Pan-Africanism institutionalized neocolonialism on the African continent. As Agyeman (1980: p. 186) has argued, Nkrumah’s efforts to move Africa forward … met with many formidable impediments … In the larger African world, the other newly independent states were, but for one or two exceptions, immersed in a suffocating neocolonial order that made a virtue of Africa’s continued servile attachment to the purposes of the West. In the broader global environment, the historic antithesis between Africa’s underdevelopment and Europe’s development continue to play itself out in Western policy of sustained hostility to, and outright sabotage of the Nkrumah (project).

Thus, if the colonialists and their respectable colored representatives were not going to allow Marcus Garvey to build a supra-nation in Africa, for Africans in Africa and those abroad, so also were the neocolonialists and their new African ‘agents’, as well as their trained military and police men, intellectuals and other such men, not going to allow Kwame Nkrumah in Africa to construct a continentally united powerful Africa.

Conclusions As it could be already deduced, the enslaved Toussaint L’Ouverture’s Haitian vision to “conquer vast tracks of land in Africa, and make it ‘free and French” remained on ‘paper’ while he died in a French prison; the colonialists and neocolonialists in Africa and abroad were too not going to allow Mr. Marcus Garvey’s and President Kwame Nkrumah’s visions of a free, united, and developed Africa to materialize. These three men were imprisoned and their visions were temporally obfuscated. Even though the visions of these three Pan-African advocates have been approximated by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Organization of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), and other such trans-African national organizations, the real meanings of Toussaint, Garvey, and Nkrumah remain a mirage. The realization of the visions of Toussaint L’Ouverture, Marcus Garvey, and

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President Kwame Nkrumah will be the maximum stage of global PanAfricanism. At that stage of Pan-African development, we will not have France, Britain, or any other nation choosing African leaders for Africans, especially those that have zero interest in developing Africa; there will be maximum ease of movement of African people within Africa without fear of being viewed and treated as foreigners from other African countries; there will be maximum intra-Africa trade and ease of movement of goods, services, people, and ideas; a Pan-African frame of reference will be globally appreciated in our global village; with a powerful Africa in the global system, the global system will have no choice but make a privileged place for Africa to sit, in any global hall of decision-making on world affairs. At that table, Africa will project its own personality, not that of France, the United States of America, Britain, China, or Canada. In the global marketplace, continental African currency will not be the most valueless, or the only ‘phony’ money. In a united Africa, African Muslims will not go to ‘war’ against their African Christian or Animist brothers and sisters; they will be able to marry each other and practice their separate religions in marriage. Tribalism will not be tolerated, ethnic cleansings will be anachronistic, and social, political, economic, and cultural integration and development of Africans in Africa and abroad will be the fundamentals. And, I suspect that the reader of this text already has an inkling as to where all this is leading: an Africa will be born that is as good as any other world region in our global village. For Toussaint L’Ouverture, Marcus Garvey, and President Kwame Nkrumah’s visions to materialize, however, a Pan-African educational system is ineluctable (Marah, 1989). In this, I reiterate that Pan-African education is the education of African people for a continental African citizenship, as opposed to the tribal, Islamic, colonial, and micronationalistic educational systems that have Balkanized Africa. The education for continental African citizenship requires common educational experiences, frames of references, aphorisms, knowledge base and a critical knowledge of the self in the contexts of the prevailing global political economy and African peoples’ dealings with other peoples of this, and in this, global village of ours, and not in the world hereafter. Luckily, the African Union (AU) has begun a type of Pan-African educational process that needs to be further refined and advanced, including the institutionalization of Pan-African Teachers’ Colleges and Universities. In the chapter that follows, I reflect on Pan-African Education and some of the major issues related to this crucial stage in the education of African people for continental African citizenship.

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References African University College of Communications (AUCC). 2009. PanAfrican Perspectives on African Affairs. Vol.V. Accra, Ghana. Afrifa, A. A. 1966. The Ghana Coup, 24th February 1966. Connecticut. Fawcett Publications, Inc. Agyemann, Opoku. 1992. Nkrumah’s Ghana and East Africa: PanAfricanism and African Interstate Relations. London and Toronto. Associated University Presses. Biney, Ama. 2008. “The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect.” The Journal of Pan-African Studies. Vol.2, No.3, 3: 129-159. Billingsley, Andrew. 1968. Black Families in White America. PrenticeHall, Inc. Clarke, John Henrik (ed.) 1974. Marcus Garvey and the Vision of Africa. New York. Vintage Books. Cronon, E. David. 1969. Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association. Madison, Wisconsin. The University of Wisconsin Press. Davis, Angela. 1971. “Reflections on the Black Woman’s Role in the Community of Slaves.” The Black Scholar. 12: 1-15. Douglass, Frederick. 1968. Narratives of the Life of Frederick Douglass. New York. American Library, Inc. Du Bois, W. E. B. The Souls of Black Folk. New York Penguin Books, Inc. Engels, Friedrich. 2009. The Condition of the Working Class in England. Oxford University Press. Fordham, Monroe. 1975. “Nineteenth Century Black Thought in the United States: Some Influences of the Santo Domingo Revolution.” Journal of Black Studies. Vol.6, No.2, 12: 115-125. Fredrickson, George M. White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History. Oxford University Press. Garvey, Amy Jacques. 1970. Garvey and Garveyism. New York. The McMillan Company. Gassama, Ibrahim J. 2008. “Africa and the Politics of Destruction: A Critical Examination of Neocolonialism and Its Consequences.” Oregon Review of International Law. Vol.10, No. 2: 327-360. Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. 1999. Wonders of the African World. New York. Alfred A, Knopf. Huntington, Samuel L. 1993. The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate. New York. Foreign Affairs.

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—. 1973. Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey. New York. Atheneum. Jacques, Martin. 2012. When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New World Order. Penguin Books. James, C. L. R. 1963. The Black Jacobins. New York. Vintage Press. Johnson, James Weldon. 1969. Black Manhattan. New York. Atheneum. Huntington, Samuel L. 1960. The Autobiography of an Ex-colored Man. New York. Hill and Wang Karioki, James N. 1974. “African Scholars Versus Ali Mazrui.” Transition. No. 45: 55-63. Lewis, Bernard. 1971. Race and Color in Islam. New York. Harper and Row, Publishers. Lind, Michael. 1995. The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution. New York. The Free Press. Lynch, Hollis. 1970. Edward Wilmot Blyden: 1832- Pan-African Patriot1912. New York. Oxford University Press. Mann, Charles C. 2011. 1493: Uncovering the World that Columbus Created. New York. Alfred A Knopf. Marah, John K. 1989. Pan-African Education: The Last Stage of Educational Developments in Africa. Lewiston, New York Edwin Mellen Press. —. 1998. African People in the Global Village. Lanham, MD. University Press of America. —. 2006. “Kwame Nkrumah’s Continental Africa: A Dream Deferred but not Forgotten,” Pp. 17-31. In Ama Mazama (ed.), Africa in the 21st Century: Toward a New Future. New York. Routledge. —. 2006. Famine, Starvation and Hunger in Africa: A Challenge to African and World Leaders. Bloomington, Indiana. Author House. Martin, Tony. 1974. “Some Aspects of the Political Ideas of Marcus Garvey.” Pp.428-439. In John Henrik Clarke (ed.) Marcus Garvey and the Vision of Africa. New York Vintage Press. Mazrui, Ali. 1986. The Africans: A Triple Heritage. Boston, Mass. Little Brown and Company. —. 1980. The African Condition. Cambridge University Press. —. 1966. “Nkrumah: The Leninist Czar.” Transition. No. 26: 8-17. —. 1971. “On the Concept of ‘we are All Africans,” pp.42-58, Towards a Pax-Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition. Chicago, Illinois. The University of Chicago Press. More, Richard B. 1974. “The Critics and Opponents of Marcus Garvey.” Pp. 210-235. In John Henrik Clarke (ed.) Marcus Garvey and the Vision of Africa. New York. Vintage Press.

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Mumford, Bryant. 1970. Africans Learn to be French. New York. Negro University Press. Nkrumah, Kwame. 1962. Towards Colonial Freedom: Africa in the Struggle Against World Imperialism. London. PANAF. —. 1963. Africa Must Unite. London. Heinemann. —. 1965. Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. New York. International Publishers. —. 1970. Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization. New York. Monthly Review Press. Omari, T. Peter. 1970. Nkrumah: The Anatomy of an African Dictator. Accra, Ghana. Moxon Paperbacks, Ltd. Osabu-kle, Daniel T. 2000. Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key to African Development. Broadview Press, Ltd. Padmore, George. 1972. Pan-Africanism or Communism. New York. Doubleday and Company, Inc. Painter, Neil Irvin. 2010. History of White People. New York. W. W. Norton and Company. Ray, Carina. 2006. “The Marriage that Sent the West into Panic.” New African. 2-26: 18-19. Russell, Kathy, Wilson, and Hall. 1993. The Color Complex: The Politics of Skin Color Among African Americans. New York. Doubleday. Segal, Ronald. 2001. Islam’s Black Slaves: The Other Black Diaspora. New York. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Smiles, Samuel 2002. Self-Help. Oxford University Press. Tanko, Alhaji. 1998. “A Bloodstained Birthday.” African Concord. 2-19: 30. Washington, Booker T. 1963. Up From Slavery. New York. Bantam. Williams, Chancellor. 1974. The Destruction of Black Civilizations: Great Issues of a Race From 4500 B. C. to 2000 A. D. Chicago, Illinois. Third World Press.

CHAPTER TWELVE A UNITED STATES OF AFRICA: POLITICAL INTERESTS, CONTESTATION AND AFRICA’S INTEGRATION AGENDA DR VLADIMIR ANTWI-DANSO CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, ACCRA Introduction There is an ever-growing tendency for countries to enter into regional arrangements as a response to the pressures of operating in a global marketplace. And this response is equally a direct reaction to the unfettered, yet unpredictable nature of globalization. Globalization is trade-induced, specifically driven by advances in science and technology and wheeled by international finance and information communication technology (ICT). The inadequacies in the functioning structures of the global architecture (put in place after WW II), in the face of growing interconnectivity, as well as the intensity in the activism of non-state actors, have combined to unleash an onslaught on the Westphalian statecentric approach to global affairs. Indeed, on the one hand, states are increasingly finding it difficult to face the challenges of globalization. On the other, the global collectivist, institutionalist system hems the state in, by diminishing policy space. The on-going trend towards regionalism must, therefore, be understood as a transformation with two main drivers: one is the diminishing capability and/or capacity of states in the global age to deliver development and good local governance. The other is the growing limitations of global multilateral organizations to ensure equity in the global division of labor or deliver good global governance in dealing with global threats. Indeed, Asante (1997) contends that the impetus for regionalism was given by the uncertainties surrounding the conclusions of the Uruguay Round of Trade Talks. Indeed, the 1980s saw a new surge of trading arrangements followed by a much stronger surge in the 1990s. One

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can, therefore, understand the desire for regionalism. The creation of global sub-groups is gradually becoming the accepted norm, with the belief that they would become the building blocks of a new global architecture that would support better global governance, development, peace, and security.1 This global setting has had an impact on Africa’s choices. There is a strong tendency in both policy and academia to acknowledge the importance of regions and regionalism.2 From the dawn of the independence era, virtually all African countries have embraced regionalism. Today, there are more regional organizations in Africa than in any other continent and most African countries are members of more than one regional integration initiative. Africa’s integration agenda has thus had a very tortuous path with warped contours, amid contestations and parochial leadership.

Regionalism – A Conceptual Framework The diversity of regional arrangements makes broad generalizations and overarching theories or explanations of regionalism impossible (Gilpin 2001:344). In some instances, the literature states that generalizations about regional integration are fictitious precisely due to the institutional variation among Regional Integration Arrangements (RIAs). Others have doubted whether an overall logic of regional integration can be attained (Mattli 1999). And yet others have specified the conditions under which deeper institutional levels of RIAs occur (Feng and Genna 2003). Clearly, the theoretical disagreement over whether or not there can be a specified contouring of an integration map continues to distract research and policy on the form and content of regionalism. The debate notwithstanding, regional integration studies owe a debt of intellectual gratitude to David Mitrany, whose reflections on the European integration enterprise after the Second World War laid the foundation for 1

Luk Van Langenhove had hinted at the possibility of a UN reform, in which regional organizations would be given seats in the Security Council along with states, suggesting thereby that the future of global governance would be in a system of representation of regions and states. See UN Chronicle 2004; see also his article ‘Power to the Regions, but not yet Farewell to the State’ in Europe’s World, Spring 2008. 2 For wide-ranging discussions on regionalism see Andrew Hurrell, Regionalism in theoretical perspective, in Louis Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds) Regionalism in World Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; Hurrell, ‘Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics’, Review of International Studies, 21, 4, October 1995.

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theorizing in integration studies. The central thesis of Mitrany is that the increasing number of technical issues that formed the canvas of the 20thcentury political economy could be resolved by cooperation action across state borders outside the politicized context of ideology or nationalism. Disciples of Mitrany (notably Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg, Joseph Nye, and Robert Keohane) moved the discussion further by systematizing the debate into a framework of analysis – functionalism. Extremely representative of Mitrany’s thinking is Leon Lindberg’s definition of integration as ‘the process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to a new central organ’ (Lindberg, 1963, p.1). The functionalist position and its derivative form (neo-functionalism), which heavily relied on happenings within the European Economic Community, has come to represent what is commonly called the ‘market approach’ to integration. By the functionalist approach, which sees integration as a tradeinduced phenomenon, regionalism and/or regional integration may just be defined as the “Commercial policy of discriminatively reducing or eliminating trade barriers only among the nations joining together” (Pfaltzgraff R and James Dougherty, 2001). Regional integration, therefore, entails the coming together of two or more states, normally through reciprocal preferential agreements, based on one or more of the following successively deeper integrating cooperation arrangements. The degree of economic integration thus varies.

Degree (Types) of Integration i. Preferential Trade Area (PTA) or Agreement, where member states charge lower tariffs to imports produced by fellow member countries than they do for non-members; ii. A Free Trade Area (FTA), in which members remove trade barriers among themselves, but keep their separate national barriers against trade with the outside world. In such a setting, customs inspectors must still police the borders between members in order to tax or prohibit trade that might otherwise avoid some members’ higher barriers by entering (or leaving) the area through low-barrier countries. One example of FTA, true to its name, is the European Free Trade Area, formed in 1960. Another is the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), which was formally incepted in 1994.

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iii. A Customs Union, in which again members remove all barriers to trade among themselves and adopt a common set of external barriers. By so doing, the need for customs inspection at internal borders is eliminated. The European Economic Community (EEC) from 1957 to 1992 had included a customs union along with some other agreements. iv. A Common Market, where members allow full freedom of factor flows (migration of labor or capital) among themselves in addition to having a customs union. It should be noted that, despite its name, the European Common Market (or EEC, then EC or EU) was not a common market through the 1980s, because it still had substantial barriers to the international movement of labor and capital. The EU became a common market and more, in reality, at the end of 1992 (after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty). v. Full Economic Union (Community), in which member countries unify all their economic policies, including monetary, fiscal, and welfare. Policies toward trade and factor migration are also harmonized. The EU has approached full unity, though governments keep much of their tax autonomy. Monetary union has been achieved, even though some members (Great Britain for instance) are still outside of the total monetary integration. Table 1 Features of Bloc Type of Bloc

Lower Tariffs Among Members

Free Trade Among Members

Common External Tariffs

_

Free Movement of Factors of Production _

Preferential Trade Area (PTA) Free Trade Area (FTA) Customs Union Common Market Economic Union

+

_

_

+

+

_

_

_

+

+

+

_

_

+

+

+

+

_

+

+

+

+

+

Harmonization of Economic Policies (fiscal, Monetary, etc.)

Source: Author’s own3 3

See: Antwi-Danso, V. Regionalism and Economic Integration in Africa: Challenges and Prospects, in LECIA, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No 2, Nov. 2006 pp.135 – 157.

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Others have developed a matrix which does not recognize PTA as a model or stage in an effort to integrate. Meanwhile, they believe that economic integration can, and should, lead to political union (Barasa). We may not contest the idea that a PTA may not necessarily lead to regional integration, but it is difficult to comprehend the transition from a full economic union to a political union as a reality (and not just an ideal), since the obsolescence of the state is still a debatable issue. Fig. 1 The Barasa Model of Integration

Source: Rodrigue Tremblay, a renowned Canadian Economist, who first proposed a Free Trade Area for the Americas in the 1970s, using the Barassa Model.

The underlying objectives in the pursuit of regional integration are to merge economies, i.e. integrate them, and, as a derivative, thus form a monetary union, the basic assumption being that integration is tradeinduced. This requires a harmonization of economic policies, to pave way for a merger, hence convergence. This, as already indicated, is what is normally known as the market approach to regional integration. Other derivatives of integration objectives are the enlargement and diversification of market size, and tapping of related opportunities and the promotion of intra-regional trade and free movement of the factors of production, which also results in stronger member states’ bargaining position in relation to other regional and international blocs and the fostering of socio-economic progress, political stability, as well as peace and security. Regional

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integration can, therefore, foster competition, subsidiarity, access to a wider market (via trade), larger and diversified investment and production, socio-economic and political stability and bargaining power for the countries involved. It can be multidimensional, as indicated by Mitrany, to cover the movement of goods and services (i.e. trade), capital and labor, socio-economic policy coordination and harmonization, infrastructure development, environmental management, and reforms in other public goods such as governance, peace, defense and security. However, integration can be complicated by perceived or real gains or losses among the members. This may lead to disputes and a sense of “loss” of national sovereignty. For success, integration thus requires a strong commitment in implementing the agreed arrangements, fair mechanisms to arbitrate disputes and equitable distribution of the gains and costs of integration.

Framing Regionalism in Africa Since the 1960s, Africa has confronted a crisis of regionalism that is rooted in the tension between continentalism and sub-regionalism. This tension resulted inevitably from Africa’s geographical vastness, but more importantly, from the distinction between the political logic that drove and continues to drive impulses for continentalism and the realism of the promise of economic integration that informs sub-regionalism. Beyond the novelty of independence, the contest between political and economic imperatives has shaped diverse debates about the modalities and institutions for regionalism. Indeed, African states seemed to have resolved the divisive debates about continentalism and sub-regionalism by creating the grand compromise captured in the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Since the mid-1970s, however, several subregional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern Africa Development Cooperation (SADC), East African Community (EAC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), etc., have emerged to articulate the economic component of regionalism that mostly and invariably drew on geographical proximities and shared values. The African Economic Community (AEC) project, affectionately dubbed the Abuja Treaty (1991), seemed to have resolved the debate in favor of economic sub-regionalism as building blocks for the erection of a continental union. Indeed, there was a new momentum to construct a continental African Economic Community via the Abuja Treaty. On paper,

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the treaty came into force in May 1994, with protocols specifying a gradual process that would be achieved by coordination, harmonization, and progressive integration of the activities of existing and future Regional Economic Communities (RECs) over 34 years (i.e. achieving continental union by 2025).4 Over the years beyond the signing of the Abuja Treaty, however, African regionalism experienced an uneasy but tolerable division of labor between continentalism and sub-regionalism, exemplified in the coexistence of the OAU and sub-regional economic schemes. Yet this tension was never adequately resolved, precisely because of attempts to foist an economically undefined agenda on the continental political architecture. The situation was exacerbated by global systemic hiccups that forced African countries to mortgage the management of their economies to external managers, notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The end of the commodity boom in the late 1960s, the contractionary economic policies of the North (coupled with extensive use of synthetics), and the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973/74 (and again in 1979) created a siege situation for African countries. Shortfalls in export receipts, excess spending on oil, and general imprudence in economic management meant that Africa had to borrow extensively, thereby creating a huge balance of payments deficits, debt, and socio-economic dislocations. No doubt, the decade 1970-80 was dubbed ‘the lost decade’. The external managers had to impose remedies in the form of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and later the Highly Indebted and Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative. These initiatives, with their attendant imperatives, meant that each economy was trying to get healthy. As such, while the continental cry for unity was earnest and summits and other meetings were taking place, the stark reality was that integration was relegated to the background in most domestic thinking and practice. 4

Although purportedly seeking to build the AEC on the existing structures of subregionalism, the stark reality was that these institutions were in themselves still relatively young and too inchoate to fulfil what was essentially a political mandate by 2025. Besides, the mushrooming of sub-regional groupings, with several countries belonging to different groupings (the Spaghetti Bowl Syndrome), compounded the problem. Thirdly, most of the sub-regional groupings found themselves more in collective security matters than economic integration. The ECOMOG experiment in Liberia and Sierra Leone set the stage for regional economic institutions becoming fire brigades, roles for which they were clearly unprepared. It was just difficult to create viable and sustainable supra-national institutions, so crucial in attaining a sense of community.

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Problems of Integration in Africa African economic integration suffers from a litany of problems, ranging from overlapping memberships (Dinka and Kennes, 2007; Drapper et al, 2007; UNECA 2006 and 2008), through unfulfilled commitments, to unrealistic goals. Drapper has suggested a re-thinking of Africa’s integration model, away from the European track onto a path that ensures a “more limited approach … one that prioritises trade facilitation and regulatory cooperation in areas related primarily to the conduct of business; underpinned by a security regime emphasising the good governance agenda at the domestic level”.5 While agreeing that Africa may have to find a way that takes into account its own peculiarities, it is unthinkable how trade facilitation and regulatory cooperation, “underpinned by a security regime emphasizing the good governance agenda at the domestic level”, as suggested by Drapper, could be effected without ensuring viable supra-national institutional props. A sense of community derives from effective supra-national organs, which come into being only from the level of common external tariffs through a common market to full economic union (full harmonization of fiscal and monetary policies). Using the functionalist tapes, Africa’s stagnation in integration stems from the following: x Weak, stagnant, and decaying economies and the negative impacts on government policies. A growing and active economy creates a more conducive environment for economic cooperation and integration. In periods of economic non-performance, liberalizing national markets and gearing policies towards sub-regional harmonization become a difficult enterprise. Even though, of late, there is the ‘Africa Rising’ mantra, showcasing the high growth of some seventeen African countries, the majority of countries are still too poor to consider long-term planning towards integrating their economies. x Most African countries fail to incorporate agreements reached at integration fora into national plans. Popularizing integration and making it part of the national psyche is not the norm. In this sense, the socio-economic partners (for whom integration is needed) are 5

For a more comprehensive analysis of this position see: Peter Drapper, (2010), Rethinking the (European) Foundations of Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Economic Integration: A Political Economy Essay. OECD Development Centre, Working Paper N0 293.

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not part of the integration processes. Integration thus becomes elitist, when it should be about people and their socio-economic activities. x Integration is trade-induced. It is rather sad that Africa does not trade much laterally; most trade is vertical (to northern countries). Intra-African trade hovers around 14%. The non-diversified nature of African economies may have been to blame, but it is also true that the private sector’s role in integration has been peripheral. The inter-governmentalist approach to integration in Africa seems to have relegated one of the important drivers of integration – the private sector – to a secondary role. Unless intra-regional trade is enhanced, the efforts towards integration would not yield the necessary benefits. This may be done through production diversification, the removal of the bottlenecks that strangulate the free movement of factors, harmonization of macro-economic policies within the RECs, and the acceleration of intra-African infrastructure and communication development. This would help to integrate national markets into sub-regional markets and lead to increasing intra-regional trade within Africa. x Furthermore, there is no adequate transport infrastructure for intraAfrican trade. Even when tariffs have been reduced and intracountry transport links are open, the costs of transport between countries forming a cooperation bloc tend to be high.6 There are also problems of operational and institutional nature, which make intra-African cooperation difficult. These relate to information, banking, language, costs of promotion, prices of research, etc. x Every integration scheme aims at fostering the free movement of factors. In Africa, however, the problem is the reluctance and inability of the members of economic blocs to create the facilities and mechanisms necessary to expedite the movement of goods and services. In almost all the RECs, procedures governing the free movement of goods and services are lengthy and cumbersome and often lead to delays and unnecessary bureaucratic work. To this may be added the exorbitant fees transporters are required to pay in other to cross borders.

6

Under the NEPAD, the African Development Bank is tasked to fund quite a substantial number of infrastructural projects. Much has been achieved in this direction.

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x A particular weakness and a special feature of economic arrangements in African regional integration is that African countries have chosen to create and belong to several regional integration initiatives to pursue their integration on multiple tracks. This multiple and/or overlapping membership has come to be known as the ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ of African integration – the duplication of economic blocs essentially created to achieve the same objectives. Indeed, the multiplicity and overlapping memberships have entangled Africa’s integration process in a complex web.7 x Instability, the result of bad governance in Africa, has been a great bane to the integration process. Most integrative schemes, in their toddling years, had to contend with security issues. In almost all the sub-regional groupings pockets of instability exist; sub-national groups rise against their governments and the ensuing civil wars have spillover effects and put spokes in the wheels of integration. Sudan (IGAD); Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi (EAC); D.R Congo (ECCAS, COMESA, SADC); Liberia, Sierra Leone (ECOWAS) are examples. Instability continues to be a bogey to sub-regional groups (of recent recall are Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria). x Externally imposed economic programs constitute a serious brake on the wheels of integration in Africa. Such programs as Structural Adjustment and the Highly Indebted and Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative contract policy space for African governments. In such a setting, the fulfilment of the requirements and/or conditionalities of the said programs relegates action on integration schemes to the background. A recent addition to the brakes to regional integration in Africa is the manner in which the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are being negotiated and/or signed. Europe seems to want to Balkanize Africa through the EPAs by wanting to create its own convenient groupings (e.g. Eastern and Southern Africa –ESA) or signing with individual countries (e.g. Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire). This is detrimental to the already wobbling groupings. Meanwhile, the essence of Art. XXIV is to strengthen integration and enhance development. 7

For a more comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon see: Mohammed Sheriff Iddrisu (2012), The Spaghetti Bowl of Africa’s Economic Integration: A Critique of the African Union’s Rationalization Process, Saarbrucken (Germany): LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing.

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x The most worrisome of the hurdles facing integration in Africa is the pervasive contestation between continentalism and subregionalism (i.e. between the political-economy/continental union approach and the market [European Union] approach, with the building blocks being the sub-regional integrative groupings). Africa seems to want to have both. But, for as long as a definitive choice is not made, the governance of regionalism in Africa will continue to be mired in crisis because of the inevitable clash of managing the relations between continental and sub-regional institutions. As long as the bulk of the continental agenda is framed largely in the context of subduing and submerging sub-regions, these tensions will not be resolved.

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Fig. 2 The Proposed ESA

Source: UNICEF: Eastern and Southern Africa

Historically, the study of regions and regional integration has focused heavily on sovereignty transfer and political unification within inter-state and/or regional organizations. The choice of sovereignty transfer for political unification in Africa had a sentimental journey, beginning from Pan-Africanism through colonialism. The establishment of the Organization of African States (OAS),8 the OAU, the Lagos Plan of

8

This is more popularly known as the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, an idea of Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of the Republic of Ghana, which held that a political union of the continent is intrinsically linked with, and a sine-qua-non to, economic freedom and rapid development of the continent, and that each country that became independent would cede sovereignty and join the Union. At the time of its inception in 1958 only eight African countries had obtained independence.

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Action (LPA),9 and later the African Union (AU) is indicative of the hybrid approach to integration in Africa. The 1990s added a new layer of complexity to the continentalism versus sub-regionalism debates that are still resonating today. With the growth of failed states, sub-regional institutions began to assume new security and intervention roles as peacekeepers and peace-builders. Starting with the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) experiment in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the stage was set for regional economic institutions to become fire brigades, roles that they were clearly unprepared for. The accent on security and political matters of the sub-regional organizations inevitably watered down their principal priorities (economic integration). There was thus the real need to sequence security and economic priorities. But this concentration on politico-security issues also coincided with profound debates about the future of the OAU, debates that reflected questions of managing state weaknesses and sub-regional/regional insecurities. The debate arose as to whether a full-fledged continental union would not be more appropriate to deal with such situations or rather a concentration on sub-regionalism (as demonstrated by ECOMOG) was not the way to go. Meanwhile, the hybrid approach continued. By the close of the 1990s, the hybrid approach had yielded no results and the debate between continentalism and sub-regionalism was reinvigorated through the messianic leadership of Muammar Gaddafi. For Gaddafi, a continental vision of a united Africa must be ready to defy the constraints of resources, culture, colonial legacies, and geography. If in the past Nkrumah’s similarly radical continentalist approach was confronted by sub-regional leadership (introspective, modest, gradualist, and pragmatic) and represented then by the likes of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, then the role of checkmating Gaddafi’s continental scheme, this time around, came from South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. From Sirte (1999) through Lome (2000) to Lusaka (2001) the debates at the respective OAU Summits centered around a search for a continental architecture that at once unites Africa totally and rapidly and at the same time strengthens regional economic communities. As with the OAU, the African Union (AU) was incepted with a structure that left the contestation between continentalism and sub-regionalism unresolved. If anything, the AU structure, which incorporates inspirations

9

The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) was an African self-initiative that never saw the light of day; it was usurped by Structural Adjustment. It, however, gained further elaboration in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, the Abuja Treaty of 1991.

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from the Abuja 1991 Treaty, seems to lean more towards sub-regionalism pivoted on, and supported by, continental institutions.

The Grand Debate From Sirte (1999) to Lusaka ((2001) and Durban (2002), the stage was set for a definitive choice – between continentalism and sub-regionalism. At the 8th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 2007, a proposal for the inception of a Union Government for Africa was discussed. The growing recognition among African countries of the need to provide the AU with stronger continental machinery was made manifest at the this Summit, when the Assembly of the AU set up two ad hoc committees which came up with the following conclusions: (i) That there was a great “necessity for eventual Union Government”, (ii) The Union Government must be a “Union of the African people and not merely a Union of states and governments”, (iii) The proposed Union Government must have “identifiable goals, based on a set of clearly identifiable shared values, commonality of interest – and on the principle of strict adherence”, (iv) That “the formation of the Union Government must be based on a multi-layered approach” and “gradual incrementalism”, and (v) That the RECs “must be made more effective as the building blocks for the continental framework”. It is clear from the above that the committee’s conclusions were confusing. They still sought to mix the inter-governmentalist, radically sentimentalist feeling with ‘gradualist incrementalism’, using the existing sub-regional groupings as building blocks. Ghana hosted the 9th Ordinary Session in July 2007. The main item on the agenda was the Union of African States (Union Government) proposal. But before the Summit in Ghana, three positions had emerged: ‰

A United States of Africa: This is a radical view held and led by Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. The proposal merely “plagiarizes” Nkrumah’s ideas that formed the basis of the Union of African States (the erstwhile Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union). For this model, there must be an African government now!

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An African Union Government: This was the baby of former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. It advocates the taking of the 15 continental institutions created under the African Union and transforming them into supra-national organs, to which all the rest of Africa should cede some sovereignty; a kind of continental scheme, pleading for new African institutions that dovetailed with the realities of Africa’s diversities and levels of economic development. For President Obasanjo, this should happen by 2015 with a President of Africa serving for a three-year renewable term. A Union of African States: This is the position held by South African President, Thabo Mbeki. It advocates for a route that would be gradual in turning Africa into a kind of union of states subscribing to common goals and values. With gradualism in mind, this model proposes the strengthening of three sets of institutions: Executive; Judicial; and Financial/Technical Institutions. It also advocates the strengthening of existing sub-regional blocs to serve as basic props for the future continental union.

Rethinking Regional Space in Africa The debates surrounding the construction of the African Union (AU) from Sirte, Libya, in 1999, to Lome, Togo, in 2000, until the Constitutive Act in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, demonstrate the resurrection of the tensions between continentalism and sub-regionalism. Unfortunately, the AU as structured is unable to make a definitive choice. This has led to unproductive contestations, among both academics and policymakers, about the meaning of regionalism, its causes and effects, how it should be studied and practiced, and what to compare and how. It has also led to a contestation between sub-regional institutional structures and AU’s. At times, the AU seemed to be leaning towards the sub-regional market approach (e.g. the attempt at rationalizing the RECs);10 at others, the AU seems to be pandering to the whims of continentalism (as exemplified in the 8th and 9th Ordinary summits held in Addis Ababa and Accra, respectively). What is most lacking in all these is the question of region and regionalism. To take Africa as a region and aspire to have a continental 10 In order to avoid the ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ syndrome and to help effect the AEC, the AU tried to rationalize the RECs. Unfortunately, under pressure from some African powerful leaders, the AU ended up compounding the situation. At its Summit in Banjul, Gambia, in 2006, three more sub-regional groups were recognized – CENSAD, IGAD, and COMESA.

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union based on only one criterion – geography – is problematic and constitutes the main problem in deciding which way to go. Creating a regional space for 54 diverse countries, lacking commonality in socioeconomic development (different colonial experiences, diverse impacts of the Cold War patronage system, and different development trajectories) without any cohesion in interconnectivity (trade and infrastructure), at a time when the state-centric system is still in battle with the dictates of globalization, is a task that may never be fulfilled. More plausible would be a choice that understands Africa as a region in terms of being a continent but takes regionalism to mean a trade-induced phenomenon which would rely on geographical proximity and trade facilitation (removing barriers to trade, enhancement of infrastructure, free movement of factors, harmonization of policies, etc.), to build an integrated region. It must be noted that, where there are functional states, economic integration and markets have provided the modicum for flourishing cross-border and multilateral discourses on integration. In this sense, the wisdom in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja 1991), where five main regional groupings were noted, must be applauded.

The Tripartite FTA Unable to make a choice between continentalism and sub-regionalism, especially as the spaghetti bowl syndrome persists, the AU has adopted the idea of a continental Free Trade Area, with the Tripartite FTA (SADC, COMESA and EAC) as the building block. It is envisaged that a continental union is easier to build through inter-RECs cooperation. The plausibility of this choice can be measured only against the backdrop of the hurdles earlier discussed above, including low intra-RECs trade and overlapping membership.

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Fig. 3 The Continental Free Trade Area

See: AfDB, Africa Economic Brief vol.2 Issue 11 September 2011 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/AEB%20VO L%202%20Issue%2011_AEB%20VOL%202%20Issue%2011.pdf, Accessed 28, July 2015

Notice that the supposed Tripartite FTA still has the problem of overlapping membership unresolved. Inter-RECs cooperation is easier, neater and smoother when differing FTAs have known boundaries and common external tariffs. Harmonizing such FTAs (in this sense, the Tripartite) would be reassuring and smooth. In effect, trying to realize the continental dream through lumping undefined RECS together has its own attendant problems.

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Fig. 4 The Tripartite FTA (countries)

Source: Pharmaafrica http://www.pharmaafrica.com/further-regional-integration-will-drive-egyptianpharmaceutical-exports-to-africa/ Accessed June 15, 2014

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Fig. 5 The Tripartite FTA ‘Spaghetti’

Source: See Paul Kalenga, The Grand Tripartite FTA: Is Namibia Ready to Engage?, at http://slideplayer.com/slide/4410360/ Accessed on July 27, 2014

Concluding Remarks Africa's unique physical, economic and political geography poses many challenges to economic development and management of shared public goods. Political borders are often not aligned with economic and natural resources and many countries are landlocked. National economies and populations are generally quite small but cover large geographic expanses with poor connective infrastructure. Given the fragmented and small sizes of its low-income economies, Africa needs to competitively participate in multilateralism from a regionalized standpoint, to negotiate more effectively for international market access and ward off marginalization and unfair competition in the global arena. Regional integration and cooperation offer the means to overcome these obstacles and to be competitive in the global marketplace. Elsewhere increasingly, leadership on economic integration is passing from political leaders to diverse actors in business and civil society, who are best able to define the parameters of integration that are enduring. This

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is unfortunately not happening in Africa, where regionalism is of more elite (political) designs. The governance of regionalism in Africa is mired in crisis because of the pervasive contestation between continentalist inclinations and subregionalism, and its attendant unresolved questions of managing the relations between continental and sub-regional institutions. As long as the bulk of the continental agenda is framed largely in the context of subduing and submerging sub-regions, these tensions will not be resolved any time soon. Protective of sub-regional identities and comparative advantages within the logic of regional economic integration, Africa’s sub-regions will continue to contest the terms of engagement with the continent. More than ever before, these conflicts will determine the contours of Africa’s international relations in the near future, with uncertain outcomes. One way to resolve these conflicts is to return to the essential building blocks of regionalism in Africa. Where there are functional states, economic integration and markets have provided the modicum for flourishing cross-border and multilateral discourses on integration. Elsewhere, continental treaties will often continue to be in contrast with sub-regional logic. Treaty effectiveness depends largely on the degree (level) of integration and the homogeneity of institutions. The degree of integration, on the other hand, depends, on the demand side, on economic and trade imperatives, and, on the supply side, on the political engineering (elite complementarity, political will, etc.) and propped by ability and willingness of individual states.

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Fig. 6 Treaty Effectiveness

Treaty Effectiveness RIA Treaty

Domestic Institutional Homogeneity Source: Author

Degree of Regional Integration

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Fig. 7 Degreee of Integration

Source: Author

It is heaart-warming to t note that regional r integgration remain ns one of African govvernments’ moost trusted and d well-articulaated policy op ptions for dealing withh the development traged dy of the conntinent. In th he era of globalizationn, Africa is the t continent that cannot aafford not to integrate. Integration iis a sine qua non n to Africa’ss developmennt.

Refereences Acharya, A Amitav, “Thee Emerging Regional Arrchitecture of o World Politics,”” World Politiics 59, no. 4 (JJuly 2007): 6229-652. Asante, S.K.B, (1997)), Regionaliism and Affrica’s Deveelopment: Expectattions, Reality, and Challenges [New Yoork: St. Martin n’s Press, Inc.] Buzan, Barrry and Ole Weeaver. (2003). Regions and Powers: The Structure of Internnational Securrity (Cambridg ge: Cambridgee University Press. P Dinka, T. and W. Kennes. (2007 7). Africa’s Regional In ntegration Arrangem ments: Historry and Challenges‚ ECDP PM Discussio on Paper No. 74, S September.

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Dougherty, J & Pfaltzgraff, R. (2001). Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, [New York: Longman]. Draper, P., D. Halleson and P. Alves. (2007). SACU, ‘Regional Integration, and the Overlap Issue in Southern Africa: From Spaghetti to Cannelloni?’, South African Institute of International Affairs, SAIIA Trade Policy Report No. 15. Feng, Yi, and Gaspare M. Genna. (2003). Regional Integration and Domestic Institutional Homogeneity: A Comparative Analysis of Regional Integration in the Americas, Pacific Asia and Western Europe. Review of International Political Economy 10(2):278-309. Fawn, Rick, “Regions and Their Study: Where from, What for and Where to?” Review of International Studies Vol. 35 (2009): 5-35. Gilpin, Robert. (2001). Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Katzenstein, Peter J.A. (2005). World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Lindberg, Leon N. (1963), The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Mansfield, Edward D., and Helen V. Milner. (1999). The New Wave of Regionalism. International Organization 53(3):589-627. Mattli, Walter. (1999). The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond. New York: Cambridge University Press. UNECA (2008). Assessing Regional Integration in Africa 2008: Towards Monetary and Financial Integration in Africa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa. http://www.uneca.org/aria

CHAPTER THIRTEEN ARE FIVE SENSES ENOUGH? SPIRITUALITY IN/AND KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION WITHIN BASIC AFRICAN DEEP THOUGHT: A NOTE DR DE-VALERA N.Y.M. BOTCHWAY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST, GHANA

Introductory Musings In addressing the National Assembly in Accra in 1965, Kwame Nkrumah, a noted preacher of philosophical materialism, but also a champion of African renaissance and African genius, divulged his belief in a holistic progress for postcolonial Africa based on an amalgamation of materiality and spirituality paradigms. He iterated, “We [Africa] are doing everything to revive our culture, but if this revival is to endure it must be based on strong moral and spiritual foundations. Our moral and spiritual qualities should not lag behind the progress we are making in the economic field”.1 Can the displacing of the current “illiteracy” about the universe of spirituality of indigenous Africa assist an acceleration of African scientific imagination and technology birthed from African Indigenous Knowledge (I.K.) systems? Can African I.K. be redeemed and sustained without a quickening and resurgence of African spirituality? Does the notion of spirituality, in fact, impede ‘scientific’ and ‘scientistic’ imagination, conception, understanding and technology? Were the celebrated scientific successes and technological manifestations of the 1

Kwame Nkrumah, Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah, London: Nelson, 1967, p. 4.

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African people of Khmet (ancient pharaonic Egyptians),2 who were known to be very spiritual in their cosmovision or worldview, produced by and in a social space devoid of spirituality? They engaged their rationalisations in the context of a way of life and frame of spirituality which, as reported in the Papyrus of Hunifer an ancient Khmet document, evolved “from the beginning of the Nile where the God Hapi dwells, at the foothills of the Mountain of the Moon”3 in East Africa.

Contemplating I.K.s.: Africa as an Entry The original way a people understand reality and relate to the universe and the originator of the universe could be understood as a form of knowledge of, by, and for the people. Such could be deemed a type of I.K. Indigenous religio-spiritual ethos, beliefs and practices in Africa, and those that found space and expression in the African Diaspora, are diverse. Despite the extreme heterogeneity in the physical praxis, there is homogeneity within the deeper spiritual concepts and philosophical ideas that commonly undergird these seemingly heterogeneous constructs. Idowu sums up this dilemma of unity in diversity thus, “When we look at Africa with reference to beliefs . . . there is a common factor which the coined word negritude will express aptly. There is a common Africanness about the total culture and religious beliefs and practices of Africa . . . whatever outsiders may say, it is in fact this one factor of the of the concept, with particular reference to the ‘character’ of Deity which makes it possible to speak of a religion of Africa”.4 This common connection makes it possible for a body of practices and concepts of spirituality to be called African. This can be understood from the concept of the “cultural 2

Khmet (or Kemet/Kemit/Kmt) is the ancient name for the ancient people and country of the territory that we now call Egypt, Africa. See: Cheikh Anta Diop, “Origin of the Ancient Egyptians” in G. Mokhtar (ed.), General History of Africa II: Ancient Civilisation of Africa, Berkeley: UNESCO, 1981, pp. 27-57. See also Yosef A.A. ben-Jochannan, Black Man of the Nile and His Family, Black Classic Press, 1989. 3 Yosef A.A. ben-Jochannan, African Origins of the Major “Western Religions”, Black Classic Press, 1991; Yosef A.A. ben-Jochannan “The Nile Valley Civilisation and the Spread of African Culture”, A lecture for the Minority Ethnic Unit of the Greater London Council, London, England, March 6-8, 1986, on www.nbufront.org/MasterMuseums/DocBen/SpreadOfAfricanCulture.html. Retrieved on 13.01.2014. 4 E. B. Idowu, African Traditional Religion: A Definition, S.C.M. Press Ltd, 1973, p. 103.

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unity of Africa”, which scholars like Diop5 and Obenga6 have already explained and confirmed with Egyptology, linguistics, history and philosophy. This study discusses the relevance and place of spirituality in the deep thought of “basic Africa” for knowledge production/acquisition, transmission and application. It examines the spaces and sites of knowledge production and learning. It examines the continuing relevance of spirituality infused educational and pedagogical practices in the African search for a sustainable and appropriate scientific, technological and cultural advancement in this so-called modernity or modern moment. The term spirit is a mysterious word. Its meanings creep through every level of existence. Is it the air we breathe? Life? Speech? It is invisible, powerful and eternal. Is spirituality the apprehension of this sacred, holy, and divine entity? The term spirituality has different conceptualisations in the literature.7 Reed describes and deems it broad than religion/religiosity. The characteristics of it include the belief in the potency of the spoken word (prayer), sense of meaning in life, reading and reflection, a conviction in the closeness of a higher being/intelligence, interaction and harmonising with other people and natural entities, and other experiences which reflect divine awareness and connection. W. Roof sees it as not just the unwavering belief in and on transcendental powers but the acknowledgement of the human character in the quest for meanings and experiential wholeness.8 It is the ability to see unity and interconnectedness between all things in the universe because of an understanding that they all have the same animating essence – vital force energy, the Primal Spirit – and each component depends on the other for sustenance, understanding and answers to questions. We in the so-called “modern” moment see a dichotomy between matter and spirit. But this is 5 Cheikh Anta Diop, The Cultural Unity of Africa, Chicago: Third World Press, 1959. 6 Theophile Obenga, African Philosophy: The Pharaonic Period: 2780-330 BC, Popenguine: Per Ankh, 2004. 7 See for example: J.K. Olupona, “Sacred Ambiguity: Global African Spirituality, Religious Tradition, Social Capital and Self-Reliance” in T. Babawale and A. Alao (eds.), Global African Spirituality Social Capital and Self-Reliance in Africa, p. xviii-xix, Lagos: Malthouse, 2008; P. Reed, “Spirituality and well-being in Terminally Ill Hospitalised Patients”, Research in Nursing and Health, 10, p. 33544, 1987, David Suzuki, The Sacred Balance, Vancouver: Greystone Books, 2007, p. 270-271; B.J. Zinnbauer and K.I. Pargament, “Religiousness and Spirituality”, in R.F. Paloutzian and C.L. Park (eds.), Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, (pp. 21-42), New York: Guilford Press, 2005, see p. 21-22. 8 Olupona, op.cit. p. xviii.

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not the view of African spirituality. The universe is a sacred space of matter and essence-ideal reality. Because “the whole myriad of things which constitute the universe are mystically one and constitute one thing; one reality; everything is a part of the other that makes up reality, the entire cosmos or universe”,9 spirituality is the appreciation of these and the quest of the human to ensure a harmonious working relationship between these spheres for the continuation of life and humanity’s acquisition of full understanding (knowledge) about phenomena in the human, natural and super-natural universe. Since their genesis, human communities have reflected and yielded cosmogonic and cosmological ideas, employed intellect and instinct to make and use hand tools, built shelter, made fire, developed agriculture and pottery, used iron, built urban settlements, and established religious, legal, social and political institutions and concepts in an endeavour to make life liveable by understanding and benefiting from the environment. The organic/primary sources of these concepts, know-how and creations were Indigenous Knowledges (I.Ks.). These ‘knowledges’10 generally advanced the principle that all that existed were organic and had physical and spiritual (metaphysical) essences/dimensions. They upheld the interconnectedness of things – unity of the physical and spiritual by a common vital energy; none existed in isolation. Human ways of living, including epistemology and technological creativity, therefore, had to be inspired by and operate within the harmonised frame of those dimensions of reality. Europe’s imperialist dominance in the world, starting c. 15th century, and the use of her colonialism enterprise to internationalise ideas from her so-called Age of Enlightenment, facilitated a grave imposition of the socalled European/Western scientific, cognitive superior, and universally applicable reason-based ways of living, knowing and technology on nonEuropean cultural and demographic spaces. It suppressed and/or obliterated experiential knowing (knowledge derived from direct experience), and intuition- and spirituality-inclusive schemes of knowing, which produced indigenous African deep thought and understanding (philosophy) and technology. Thus, Africa, the genesis of human existence, the first towns and states, and the great civilisations of Nubia,

9

C.A. Dime, African Traditional Medicine: Peculiarities, Ekpoma: Edo State University Press, 1995, p. 28. 10 The deliberate use of the expression ‘knowledges’ has been done to indicate that knowledge does not have only one way of expressing itself, but manifests itself in a variety of ways.

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Ethiopia and Khmet, which nurtured the Greek and Roman civilisations,11 fell victim to Europe’s cultural dominance and colonialism. African indigenous deep thought “about the structure of reality, the name and origin of things [and] problems of justice”12 was antagonised. Scientific imagination and technological know-how, needed for experiments and sustainable developments, were arrested and weakened.13 This contributed in ill-preparing Africa and limiting its capacity in economic competition, development planning and intellectual discourse in both the colonial and postcolonial moments. This so-called “modern”, reason-based epistemic view claimed to support a knowledge system grounded on verified theories and propositions, also called proposition knowing. It was materialistic and sought scientific, philosophical and technological ideas and structures for development through only the mechanistic and mathematical study of aspects of nature that can be quantified by shape, movement, number, weight, and rationality. This “scientific” way of knowing was not and cannot be unlimited. This fact has been confirmed by one of the great minds of science of the 20th century, Albert Einstein: “Albert Einstein was asked one day by a friend ‘Do you believe that absolutely everything can be expressed scientifically?’ ‘Yes, it would be possible,’ he replied, ‘but it would make no sense. It would be description without meaning – as if you described Beethoven symphony as a variation in wave pressure.’”.14 Coerced by the colonial order and the lingering neocolonial intellectual tradition, what Ngugi Wa Thiong’O calls “European Metaphysical Empires”,15 African societies were caught up in the hold of a mindset called modernism, which perceived the recent “modern” as best and the ancient and indigenous as primitive and less desirable. This mentality erroneously promulgated that humans of the present were different from 11 See: Cheikh Anta Diop, The African Origin of Civilisation, New York: Lawrence Hill, 1971; Yosef Ben Jochannon, Black Man of the Nile, New York: Alkebu-Lan, 1970 12 See Henry Olela, The African Foundation of Greek Philosophy” in Richard A. Wright (ed.), African Philosophy, Lanham: University Press of America, pp. 7792. 13 See: Gloria Emeagwali “Colonialism and Science in Africa,” in H. Selin, (ed.), Encyclopedia of the History of Science, Technology and Medicine in Non-Western Cultures, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, pp. 220-221. 14 Ronald W. Clark, Einstein: The Life and Time, New York: Avon Books, 1971. 15 Ngugi Wa Thiong’O, “The Future of African Scholarship: Resistance to European Metaphysical Empires”, Keynote Lecture, International Conference on African Studies Banquet and Awards Night, 50th Anniversary Celebration of the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, 26th October 2013.

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those of the past, and that ideas of ancestors were not effective and sophisticated in the present and should be discarded. But this view is flawed because for a continent and people that are still going through a prolonged season of anomie, despite the trend for the “modern”, connecting with ideas from the past may yet prove to be useful lifelines. A “study of our [spirituality], myths . . . is a path to self-knowledge”. In these times of crises [post-colonial moment] “that is a way leading to our [African] social [and psychic] healing”.16 Ayi Kwei Armah invokes Wole Soyinka’s antidote to such anomie: “the retrieval of unhindered connections with the society’s own past, the locus of [spirituality] of positive values required for continued self realization”,17 one that would liberate the genius of creation in the African mind. This requires coming “into intimate contact with, our own best spirits”, which Soyinka, whose demiurge is Ogun,18 “calls our essence ideals. Religious people call them their gods”. These gods/spirits are “our human self idealizations, projections of the best selves we can imagine, which we throw outward into the surrounding universe . . . to help us move up, [engage in creativity] and live up, to the best qualities we have in ourselves.” We apotheosise our idealizations and by acknowledging that they exist and can help us, “we create our gods; we imagine our ideals and live up to them”.19 “That is how human beings grow. That is how societies make themselves in their own best image”.20 This is how we can understand ourselves best and find solutions to the questions in life that confronts us. This is how we can develop knowledge and disseminate and apply it to serve our material, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual needs. Knowledge is what is known and can be known (understood). There are different ways of knowing. It has been argued elsewhere that all knowledge ways – Western, African, Indigenous American, Pacific, and Asian – should be respected. Aspects of each knowledge should be applied, where ethically appropriate, to solve specific human problems. This process of relating the so-called “global” with the “local” is 16 Ayi Kwei Armah, The Eloquence of the Scribes, Popenguine, Senegal: Per Ankh, 2006, p. 251. 17 Armah. p. 255. 18 See: “Wole Soyinka – Banquet Speech”. Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2004. Web. 13 Aug. 2014. Ogun is the Yoruba deity of creativity and destruction, of the lyric and metallurgy. 19 Armah, p. 257 20 Armah, p. 257

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“paradigmatic complementarity”.21 The arrogant posturing of one as superior and other(s) as inferior is not necessary because one cannot remedy all of humankind’s problems. Positivists have their way(s), and knowledge(s) for the naturalists-cum-metaphysicians come(s) through the combination of natural/material and spiritual means. The latter is fundamental in most I.K.s including Africa’s. African I.K.s evolve from the deep thoughts (philosophical reflections), experiences and experiments of communities over time, which aim to guide, organise, and regulate their African ways of living and to serve as the basis for their livelihood including agriculture, food preparations, educational curriculum, healthcare, environmental conservation, law, nation-building, and political administration.22 This study, therefore, defines as “African” those I.K.s authored by people who not only resided on the African continent but who had “basic Africa”23 as their roots and were also members of ethnic groups indigenous to Africa. For example, the Dutch-descended Afrikaners of South Africa cannot be included in this category. Arabian migrants, whose ancestors Arabised North Africa, are also distinguished from it. I.K.s is/are, therefore, not and should not be imported from outside. All imported I.K.s that joined with autochthonous ones and, for generations, found traditional uses and prevalence in any given community should be deemed Traditional Knowledges (T.K.s). Thus, Arabo-Islamic cultural practices, know-how and beliefs that have over time continued and become traditions in African societies fall under T.K.s.

Knowledge Production: Sites and Spaces of Teaching and Learning All the components of African I.K.s are teachable and/or learnable, and creators of I.K.s should be aware of their ownership in order to bequeath them to posterity to ensure continuity. What are the spaces and sites and nature of teaching and/or learning of the ideas, concepts, and attitudes that constitute I.K.s, and shape the psyche, character, creativity, and scientific 21

See: “Introduction” to D.D. Kuupole and De-Valera N.Y.M. Botchway (eds) Polishing the Pearls of Ancient Wisdom: Exploring the Relevance of Endogenous African Knowledge Systems for Sustainable Development in Postcolonial Africa, Cape Coast, Ghana: Faculty of Arts, University of Cape Coast, and Centre for Indigenous Knowledge and Organizational Development, 2010. 22 Kuupole and Botchway (eds.), op.cit. 23 Amadou H. Bâ, “The Living Tradition”, in J. Ki-Zerbo (ed.), General History of Africa Vol. 1: Methodology and African Prehistory, California: UNESCO, p. 201. (pp. 166-205).

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and technological orientations of the individual and society? How do the dissemination/deployment and assimilation/employment of aspects of I.K.s take place? The primary site for teaching and learning is the home/household featuring the family, mostly the extended type. Catering for all ages, this starts with the person right after birth. Naturally, teaching takes the forms of informal oral instructions and non-verbal lifestyles/social ways, and learning takes the forms of informal and/or unconscious observation of and participation in practices, and internalisation of ideas about life, provided by the instructions. This give-and-take pattern and intercourse happens in horizontal and vertical forms of relationships between family members. They learn from the experiences of all members. The aged orally instruct the young to observe and emulate positive social ways and certain technical skills of the experienced. Age peers are expected to counsel and learn from the mistakes and successes of each other. Parents educate their children and normally the men instruct and coach their biological sons and mothers do same for uterine daughters. Through the home, the individual becomes conscious that their personhood is possible because they have and are members of a family, and by extension the community, a notion which is known as Ubuntu in Swahili. The household gives and illuminates a person about their identity as a human. This site and education therein prepares the individual to understand and practically live, and not to comprehend specific or a group of subjects like maths, biology, and chemistry. Basic concepts of cosmology and cosmogenesis and ideas about ethics, the absolute, and logic are explained there. It is there that families trade secrets, fundamental food production techniques, basic spoken language techniques and numeracy, some family history and rituals, certain life skills, basic medical therapies, and the responsibility that each family member has to the family and the extended society are disseminated through theoretical and practical instructions, and observation and emulation, to family members. Any learning that is induced from outside the home (secondary learning) is refined in the home. The secondary site is the surrounding active environment comprising of the physical environment and human community, and their interactive activities and institutions. The processes of knowledge production and knowledge consumption, within the surrounding active environment, are for all age groups, and are formed and operated in either organised or unorganised and formal or informal modes and settings. The unorganised situations include open social spaces like playgrounds, natural world spaces like forests, farms, and animal sanctuaries, and social events such as funerals, durbars, festivals and entertainment venues such as drinking

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pubs, and markets. These spaces facilitate informal collective interactions between peer and peer, and peers and non-peers. Within such interactions, oral instructions are given and taken, actions are performed and copied, experiences/technical concepts are shared and absorbed, and successes and mistakes are committed and lessons drawn from them. In fact, fauna of the natural world, which is intrinsically linked to the human world, also gives education. Humans are able, through long-term observation, to copy and humanise certain survival techniques of the instinct- and discernment-driven ways of living of animals. The mass movements/migrations of certain birds or fishes are used to forecast and prepare for imminent natural occurrences such as rainfall, drought or earthquakes. The sighting of certain fishes in water bodies helps fishermen to predict either a boom or lean season of fishing in aquatic areas. The dietary habits of some animals are able to inform humans about edible and therapeutic items from the world of plants. In fact, many indigenous African oral traditions recount how animals, some totemised, gave humans certain knowledges and social lifeways. The Akan of Ghana and Bambara of Mali assert that the spider and antelope taught their ancestors how to weave the kente cloth and farm respectively. The informal teaching and learning within the context of the surrounding active environment span an unlimited period of time. The organised situation, which largely defines the teaching and learning processes in a formal way, within the surrounding active environment, normally and consciously generates the process to last within limited periods. Participants are aware that they constitute parties that are supporting and advancing a dissemination and assimilation process. Here, there is/are specialist(s) or authoritative person(s) who, endowed with expertise, skills and experience, give(s) special and specific ideas and performs specific actions for the assimilation and emulation of a learner. The learners may be from different age, sex and social status backgrounds, or may come from specific age, sex, and social status groups. The spaces which accommodate such processes include shrines of priests and priestesses, nurseries of healers and herbalists, workshops of artisans and craft persons, such as dancers, musician, griots, and metallurgists, shelter of the trees of the society’s storyteller and historian, lodges of societies with secrets (secret societies), farms, and palaces of chiefs. For example, formal teaching and learning, governed by rules, laws and within a specified time frame, goes on between a priest and neophyte for a period. The neophyte is trained to become adept in histories, rituals, symbols, the potency of the spoken word (prayers and incantations), codification and

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deciphering of ideas in proverbs, preparation of therapies, clairvoyance and clairaudience. Lodges of societies with secrets and special training camps, catered for by some experts, accept initiates and trainees, pass them through some arcane rites, and train them to acquire theoretical understanding and practical competence about different know-how, ideas, trade methods and social skills. These include the Dipo of the Krobo of Ghana, Bragoro of the Akan of Ghana, Sande and Poro of the Mande of Sierra Leone, and Egungun of the Yoruba of Nigeria. Such organised situations are more like institutionalised schools. Apparently, an indigenous idea and system of institutionalised formal education have always been part of the indigenous African society. As argued elsewhere, the idea and institutions of higher education, prototypes of the present university education, which the High Middle Ages of Europe promoted, existed in Africa in Khmet (ancient African Pharaonic Egypt) and sustained the renowned material and intellectual civilisation of Khmet.24 The unique aspect about the higher learning in Khmet’s I.K.s, grounded in an African worldview, was that it explained reality in empirical/physiological and spiritual terms. It accepted that reality and all constellation of knowledge were domiciled in two realms: the physical (material) and spiritual/metaphysical (immaterial). It, therefore, used indigenous physiological/scientific and metaphysical ideas and practices to explain human existence and natural phenomenon, and develop material culture and technology, such as the marvellous pyramids, to make life liveable for the Khmet (African) society. Clearly, the household and active surrounding environments, being sites of African I.K.s, facilitated the teaching and learning of ideas and practices, and enhance human creativity, and comprehension of the nature of reality. What, in African worldview, are the general methods or conventional rules for the pursuit of understanding or knowing reality (nature) in all its aspects and phenomena – patent and hidden, visible and invisible? In what contexts of reality do phenomena occur and can be known? Finally, what contexts provide knowledge and understanding about reality and phenomena, which help humans to manipulate objects, and start social relations, intellectual ideas, and technological creativity to meet the practical needs of life?

24

De-Valera N.Y.M. Botchway, “Descending the Ivory Tower”: Unveiling Khmet’s Legacy in Africa’s Quest for an Afromorphous University”, in Kuupole and Botchway, (eds.), op.cit. (pp. 17-52), see p. 19-37.

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Contrary to the view of the Wittgenstein school,25 worldviews are relative or differ. The systems and orientations of reasoning, thinking, and knowing which underpin African I.K.s differ in many ways from the dominant Western approach. The model uses experiential and metaphysical approaches. Presently, the Western (so-called modern) model cohabits with the indigenous in most African societies. The former, which is based on the physiological function of the brain, as a data-processing master organic machine, avers that knowledge comes only through the organ’s reaction to the sensory data from outside, which are and should only be transmitted through the five physical sense organs. Conversely, the African concept, which also accommodates a physiological definition of the knowing process, additionally approaches the issue of knowing from a multi-sense method – the reliance on common sense (deduction and induction), intuition, and application of spiritual techniques. While the latter is used to establish a divine, universal, intergenerational communication between humans, on the one hand, and spiritual and natural forces in the spiritual and natural worlds, on the other, intuition helps scientific imagination and application to be more holistic. To this end, the biologist Brian Goodwin avers that “[The intuitive way of knowing is] not something that’s vaguely subjective and artistic, it’s a definite way of knowing the world. In fact, it’s absolutely essential to creative science. All the great scientists, Einstein, Feynman, you name them, would say intuition is the way they arrived at their basic insights, their new ways of putting parts together into coherent wholes. The famous guys are allowed to say this. The rest of us have to pretend we’re basing everything on hard fact, proceeding to generalize by indication . . . not seeing a new whole intuitively”.26 Common sense and the dialogue between humans and the Creator of everything, cosmic forces, nature, and creatures of the animal and mineral worlds, provide insight, epiphanies and discernment to humans. Africa’s I.K.s are informed by some main categories of understanding about the composition of the world. There is a self-creating Creator, who is the genesis of and ultimate explanation for everything; spirits and spirits of ancestors; human beings; animals and plants; and minerals without biological life. These live in three dimensions or worlds of reality – spiritual, human, and natural. All these entities and dimensions contain the 25

This school of thought, subscribing to the idea of one worldview, opines that “[T]he world is everything that is the case”. See page 11 of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1922. http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext04/tloph10.txt. Retrieved on 20 June 2012. 26 Brian Goodwin, quoted in John Brockman, “A New Science of Qualities: A talk with Brian Goodwin”, Edge 15, April 29, 1997, quoted in Suzuki, op.cit. p. 36.

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Creator’s divine spiritual energy. These classifications define and give comprehension about the genesis and meaning of life, multiple dimensions of reality, formulation and transformation of ideas into physical creations and actions, and the nature of the economic and technological relationships that humans should have with their environment. This perception, which can be called [African] cosmovision, informs the way that indigenous Africans perceive and relate to the cosmos. It is made up of assumed relationships between the human, natural, and spiritual worlds. The spiritual world provides guidance, bounties, and punishment to the human world and the human world has to respect the spiritual world and ask for support. The natural world, created by the Creator spirit, provides habitat and sustenance for humans and provides communication channels, such as sacred trees and animals, between the human and spiritual worlds. Humans, in turn, are to protect and respect the natural world otherwise there would be repercussions from the other two worlds. These interactive worlds give humans physiological and spiritual insights both about what to do (correct thought and action) and what not to do (wrong thought and action), and understanding and explanation for phenomena. Moreover, cosmovision embodies and determines the moral basis for human intervention in nature and the root of technology. It dictates the way humans should behave, relate to and use nature’s land, water, plants and animals, and how humans should take decisions, solve problems, undertake experiments and organise themselves.27 Realities and comprehension of them are based in the interaction between the human, spiritual and natural worlds and the survival of man depends on the harmonisation of these worlds. The permutations of the various interactions which produce knowledge patterns for human consumption are as follows: (i) human (social) only, (ii) social + natural, (iii) social + spiritual, (iv) natural only, (v) natural + spiritual, (vi) spiritual only, and (vii) interaction between social, spiritual and natural. The latter, the perfect state of balance/harmony, is where all understanding and answers to all questions reside. Because holistic knowledges emerge from and are explained within these three realms, a physiological definition of the knowing process does not and cannot stand alone in the African world. The definitions must complement each other. Humans, therefore, must be aware and understand the workings of these worlds. The Khmet maxim, “man know thyself”,28 when contextualised in 27

See: B. Haverskort and W. Hiemstra, (eds.), Food for Thought; Ancient Vision And New Experiments of Rural People, London: Zed Books / Bangalore: Books for Change, 1999. 28 This saying is commonly associated with the Delphic oracle.

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indigenous African deep thought becomes an admonishing to humans to pursue understanding about the physical self and environment, and all realities – visible and invisible, spiritual, human, and natural worlds – and phenomena that sustains life and can give knowledges to man. Familiarity with the workings of these worlds varies among persons since, by virtue of special trainings and experiences, some do have deeper comprehension and higher capacity than others,to tap, manipulate and use the knowledge forces for different actions and creations in fields like medicine, witchcraft, priesthood, iron technology, and rainmaking. They become skilled aspects of deep thought (philosophy), intuitive and discerning use of the mind, the art of the potency of speech and prayer, and rituals such as those for fertility, crops, birth, marriage, planting and harvesting. Some people, guided by five principal values of African I.K.s, which are spirituality, harmony with nature, humanness, rhythm,29 justice30 and respect for the environment, use such knowledges for good, others for the ill of their communities. Regardless of the intrusion and assault on I.K.s, by non-African ways, particularly Western procedures, and the postcolonial pressures of globalization, alias Westernisation,31 vestiges of I.K. persist. I.K.s can make valuable contributions to African sustainable development. Western scientific methods are fallible and limited. These “scientific” knowledge systems suggest a rational explanation in terms of specific empirical cause and effect categories; causation must be viewed as natural/biological/ physical in contrast to supernatural and metaphysical suppositions. Furthermore, substantiations in the system of belief must be reached through the observation of empirical data and information. Through the sketching and organisation of phenomena, analytical classificatory systems can be obtained and through the process of induction, hypotheses are framed and attained. Within these deductive processes, predictions are made about relationships between events and occurrences. Such calculations and ideas are confirmed or dismissed through further scrutiny and experimentation. This methodology simultaneously accepts that the 29

See: Janheinz Jahn, Muntu: The New African Culture, New York: Grove Press, 1961. 30 By Justice, we, drawing on the Pharaonic multilayered concept of Ma’at and the clarification given to it by Théophile Obenga, mean, “[Human thought and actions/behaviors/lifeways/rules that promotes rational thinking], Order, universal balance, cosmic regulation, justice, truth-in-justice, rectitude and moral uprightness”. See: Théophile Obenga, African Philosophy: The Pharaonic Period: 2780-330 BC, Popenguine, Senegal: Per Ankh, 2004, p. 189. 31 Kuupole and Botchway (eds.), op.cit. p. 5.

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outcomes of new experimentation can change the basic models and values. Therefore, if on the basis of specific empirical evidence ideas and procedures are subject to modification and rectification in the face of the new facts to meet people’s life demands, then the trajectories of knowledge within the terrain of Western “scientific” paradigms cannot be absolute. Conversely, the I.K.s of many indigenous societies promote other paradigms which utilise the people’s socio-cultural orientations, including the spiritual and metaphysical concepts, to meet the practical needs of life. In light of the above argument, no society has a monopoly over the method and understanding of knowledge and animation of development and modernisation.

Way Forward: Conclusion Today, our instructional narrative in the classrooms (and even in many of our homes) does not accommodate these spirit-centred ideas, beliefs and practices, so our experience of the unity between the natural and supernatural is painfully stunted and truncated. “Modern” science and our classrooms have cut most of us loose from the spirit and living web of the earth. Applying our minds to the matter around us we have produced an extraordinary material culture. But this has alienated us – we have become strangers in a matter-spirit world. It has become alien – the other. Yet our souls continue to thirst for wholeness and purpose on Earth, ideals which the so-called modern science has still not been able to provide us. There is a way forward for African I.K. Indeed, the idea of revitalising and overhauling I.K. as a key to boost African capacity in economic competition, development planning and intellectual discourse during the era after direct colonial rule has regained increased attention among academics and policymakers. However, any meaningful quest to revive an interest in and practical applicability of African I.K.s should locate spirituality in such an enterprise. A revitalisation of I.K. should be done alongside an equal revitalisation of its original seat of local spirituality and cosmology. We cannot divorce the two. Impossible it will be, like disliking mango sap but enjoying eating the fruit. We can initiate a pedagogy that will have it philosophies, visions, and goals fundamentally operating within and in the five interconnected pillars of the Afrocentric idea or Afrocentricity as given by Molefi Kete Asante.32 These characteristics 32 Molefi Asante, The Afrocentric Idea, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999.

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are (i) the firm establishment of a cultural (African) location through the use of symbols, ritual, signs and motifs (to express a once shattered African identity), (ii) the commitment to finding the subject place of Africans in any social, political, economic, architectural, literary, or religious phenomenon, (iii) the defence of African cultural elements as historically valid in the context of music, education, science, and literature, (iv) the celebration of the notion of the centredness and the agency of Africans as well as a commitment to the lexical refinement that eliminates any pejoratives about Africans, and (v) the powerful imperative to revise the collective text of Africans.33 Such pedagogy should function with the cosmological, epistemological, axiological and aesthetic dimensions of the Afrocentric paradigms as given by Asante. For example, the cosmological dimension involves “myths, folklore, legends, and oral storytelling traditions, encapsulated by a metaphysical perspective on life that emphasises living in harmony with nature and the cosmos.”34 The epistemological dimension is concerned with the quest for and production of knowledge in general. Language, mythology, ancestral memory, dance, music, art and the physical sciences provide the basis for knowledge production.35 Presently, we mainly find ourselves in classrooms instead of the open schools of the family/society, lodges and craft shops, but as teachers, parents, schools we can commence ethical pedagogies that will clarify to learners (i) the real focus of Afrocentric education and means of production; (ii) explain the pragmatic significance of the spirituality that undergird it, i.e. explaining it not as a religion but a system that seeks to assist humankind to live, explain phenomena, and undertake actions in harmony with the cosmic, natural and environmental order; (iii) inculcate (indoctrinate) in them the idea that their creativity36 should first and foremost be aimed at the issues of their immediate African society and environment; (iv) put learners in touch with (a) the principle of Ubuntu, (b) understanding of the meaning and processes of colonisation, (c) importance of proverbs, myths and symbols to the comprehension of life, 33

Michael Barnett and Adwoa Ntozake Onuora, “Rastafari as an Afrocentrically Based Discourse and Spiritual Expression”, in Michael Barnett (ed.), Rastafari in the New Millennium. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2012, p. 163-164. 34 Ibid., p. 162. 35 Ibid. 36 Creativity here connotes a way of thinking that yields new innovative, relevant and useful ideas which will generate acts, attitudes, and products for living and solutions to our (individual and collective/social) everyday challenges.

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and (d) the roles of rituals in African society and politics; (v) schools should contact and incorporate the humans who are repositories of I.K., often found in the rural local milieu/environment, in the teaching and learning processes of students; (vi) inter and intra cultural dialogues must be initiated, by academics/schools and local experts and communities to (a) streamline the similarities and differences in the various African philosophies and employ them in the development processes in Africa, (b) endeavour to document and publish African I.K.s, and (c) develop systems of investigation to provide a better understanding about the aspects which are supposedly shrouded in “secrecy” and “mystery”. The principles of harmony with nature, humanness, rhythm, justice, and respect for the environment and dependence on it for insights because it is divinely alive, which all saturate spirituality, must undergird any social development processes engineered by African I.K.s, even in this so-called modern era.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN FROM NKRUMAH TO NEPAD AND BEYOND: HAS ANYTHING CHANGED? DR CATHERINE SCHITTECATTE VANCOUVER ISLAND UNIVERSITY, BRITISH COLUMBIA

A. The dichotomy in explanations of (under)development: Nkrumah’s foresight and dilemma Over the decades since the wave of independence swept the Global South, two schools of thought have influenced development studies and related policies. One is the historical structuralist school, associated with dependency, world system and Gramscian theories (Cohn, 2008), and the other is the liberal school associated with the 1950s and 1960s modernization theory of development. Since the end of the Cold War and the increased globalization of the world economy, the former has lost much credence, as its policy prescriptions and understanding of problems have increasingly been replaced by today’s version of the latter – that is, an economic development model that advocates prescriptions of liberalization of markets and deregulation of national economies as the best path towards economic growth and development. Among the numerous disagreements between the structuralist and liberal theories of development is the impact of colonialism on the economic development of colonized societies. Generally, theories lumped in the broad structuralist category take into account history and the way in which countries have been integrated into the global economy; colonialism is seen as one factor that resulted in North-South inequalities due mainly to the initial dependency of the Southern “periphery” on the Northern “core”. Unlike the liberal school of thought, which focuses upon domestic impediments to development such as “irrational or inefficient” policies, and which sees North-South relations as a “positive sum game” (Cohn,

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2008: 85-86), historical structuralist theories take into account the long shadow of colonialism and its successor, neocolonialism. Nkrumah’s understanding of Ghana’s need to gain not only political independence but also economic emancipation brings his analysis of the challenges faced at independence and beyond closer to the structuralist school of thought. Nevertheless, as explained in this section, his analysis and attendant development policies were not limited to those espoused by early structuralists. His analysis of the African situation at the outset of African independence led him to call for a cautious but realistic approach that included policy prescriptions related to both categories of development theories – that is, one that included welcoming foreign capital needed to modernize the economy while at the same time shedding colonial and neocolonial ties. Not only was this approach applied to Ghana’s economic development, but Nkrumah also advocated that similar policies should be applied simultaneously continent-wide. As will be explained later, that objective could only take place through continental unity. While some have argued that his downfall lay in his efforts to attempt too much (Beckman, 1976: 18), a more pressing question is whether a more restrained approach, limited to domestic considerations and less ambitious political and economic objectives, was and is indeed realistic for Africa.1 Could African leaders then and now afford to dissociate domestic political and economic goals from those of Africa as a whole by ignoring the nature of global/external forces and interests in Africa? What is the best way out of reliance on a single cash crop export? Furthermore, analyses of decades of failed policies show that Nkrumah’s warnings materialized on many levels, regardless of the claimed merits of attempted alternatives.2 1 While Beckman and others (Berg, 1971) refer to the financial aspects related to the number of economic development projects and the government’s over-reliance on cocoa revenues for these, others refer to the drain on Ghana’s finances related to the growth of Nkrumah’s executive office and related Pan-African matters, such as supporting groups in other countries (Guyer, 1970), or Nkrumah’s foreign preoccupations and consequential inattention to urgent budgetary matters (Kraus, 1970). 2 In Kwame Boafo-Arthur’s (2007: 1) own words: “Since attaining political freedom in 1957, Ghana has tried varied modes of governance, some have been imposed with scant regard to the wishes of the generality of the people and others were the result of democratic elections. Liberal economic and social policies, and varying degrees of authoritarianism, command economics and redistributive policies, policies aimed at minimizing external dependence and so on have all been pursued at various junctures. These tendencies – a combination or succession of

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The complexity, wealth and foresight of Nkrumah’s analysis of Africa’s needs may have burdened him with a weight that rendered his perceived task doomed, but it still leaves us a valuable framework with which to understand the challenges and related solutions for Africa. The following seeks to link existing theories and debates of International Political Economy to Nkrumah’s views with the objective of assessing the latter’s ongoing validity. These concern Africa’s position in the global economy and, in particular, its economic ties to the West; a second factor was the ability of the continent and its future leaders to de-link themselves from past colonial masters and new neocolonial ones; and, third but not least, is the strength and feasibility of a unified continent. (i) Economic ties to the West and Development: A catch-22 situation/enigma As Beckman (1976: 15) observed: “Few African leaders have emphasized as strongly as Nkrumah the limitations of political independence and the necessity to struggle for economic independence if one kind of colonialism is not merely to be substituted for another”. Addressing challenges related to this structural understanding of the integration of Ghana and Africa in the world economy was central to Nkrumah’s vision and objectives not only for Ghana but also for Africa as a whole. As he wrote in Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism (1965): “The result of neo-colonialism is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world. Investment under neo-colonialism increases rather than decreases the gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world”. This, Nkrumah learned from direct experience, in spite of his awareness and efforts to avoid such outcomes. Nkrumah’s dilemma regarding his understanding of the dangers of economic colonial and neocolonial ties, on the one hand, and his objectives of modernizing and industrializing Ghana, on the other, can be observed in the apparent contradiction between his writings and policies. While welcoming foreign investments to modernize and industrialize Ghana, he also expressed caution regarding the potential negative impact of foreign capital on Ghana and Africa. While he wrote that “A democratic Ghana should not develop a propensity for the consumption of foreign capital except what is absolutely necessary if Ghana wants to safeguard its independence, dignity, and reduce the forces of neocolonialism and their state control, freedom of the market and welfare policies – were evident even when the military was in control of the state, as it was for the greater part of the nation’s independent existence”.

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interests” (Nkrumah, 1961:53) almost half of the capital for his 1964 7year plan was expected to come from foreign investors (Howell and Rajasooria, 1972: 110; Owusu, 2006: 125). Lest we think that Nkrumah lacked clarity in his thinking, this contradiction appears in development theories as well. Indeed, as many have observed, while modernization and dependency theories disagreed on many causes and solutions of underdevelopment, proponents of both schools saw modernization and industrialization as a desired long-term objective. How this was going to take place was and still is the subject of much debate. Many structuralists advocated and applied importsubstitution policies and Nkrumah did as well. Nevertheless, the capital was still needed. For liberal thinkers, the solution to Africa’s underdevelopment lies in the opening up of African resources to foreign investors who have the capital and know-how for efficient extraction, processing and marketing of such resources. Critiques of this approach, the contemporary structuralists, warn against such policies as simply resulting in the ongoing exploitation of Africa. The following discussion shows Nkrumah’s experience with the dilemma he faced. In hindsight, it was perhaps naively that Nkrumah expressed his hopes that some foreign investments would yield wealth that would benefit all Ghanaians. As he stated when commenting on that 1964 economic plan: “We welcome foreign investors in a spirit of partnership (emphasis added). They can earn profits here, provided they leave us an agreed portion for promoting the welfare and happiness of our people as a whole ... We expect, however, that such investments will not be operated so as to exploit our people. On the contrary, we expect such enterprises to assist in the expansion of the economy of the country in line with our general objectives” (quoted in Howell and Rajasooria, 1972: 111). However, even a controlled injection of foreign investments that would contribute to the economic development of Ghana was not going to yield expected results. The most illustrative example of this reality, and the related political consequences, was the Volta dam project. As Boahen (1987: 101) pointed out, “one of the typical features of the colonial political economy was the total neglect of industrialization and of the processing of locally produced raw materials ... Africans were driven out of the mining industry as it became an exclusive preserve of Europeans”. Among Nkrumah’s development objectives for Ghana was the reversal of this trend. This would have allowed Ghanaians to obtain direct benefit from their own natural resources through jobs and the financial rewards from value-added products.

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As Mikell (1989: 186) explained, in order to diminish Ghana’s dependence on cocoa exports, the Volta Dam project, which was proposed as early as 1952, was meant to increase hydroelectric energy sources that could be used to increase metal processing. Not only would the dam provide cheap hydroelectric power to Ghanaians, thereby raising standards of living and fostering industrialization, but it was also intended “to smelt bauxite located in the eastern, western and Ashanti regions”. However, this was not to be as foreign investors “only wanted cheap power to turn their own semi-processed aluminium into refined bars in a way that would bring minimum cost and maximum profit to North American industries and offered the leanest possible margin for Africa” (Birmingham, 1995: 29). The first difficulty encountered was the lack of good commercial terms for loans to Ghana. In the end, the agreement through which Ghana obtained loans from the US, Kaiser Aluminium and the UK, with “enormous debt-servicing costs” also undermined African entrepreneurs’ access to the power produced by the dam (Mikell, 1989: 186). Indeed, as Mikell explains, not only was much of the expected supply of energy committed to Kaiser’s VALCO aluminum processing plant prior to the completion of the dam, but also VALCO's reliance on “imported bauxite, and local ore deposits were never developed”. Most significant in this “partnership” deal was the fact that Ghana’s loan from the UK, US and the World Bank was dependent upon the government reaching a satisfactory agreement with the private Western investors. We will never know what might have been had Ghanaian mining interests been able to develop as planned. One thing we do know is that the cost of the Volta River Project and the lack of return were partly responsible for development failures and debt, which led to political unrest with cocoa farmers and the Ashanti in particular. As Mikell (1989: 186) pointed out, “while Ghana dipped heavily into its cocoa revenues and delayed other development projects to pay for the building of the Volta River Project, it received little in return”. This paper is not about an in-depth assessment of Nkrumah’s development policies, nor is this example intended to exonerate his government’s errors.3 Rather, the story of the Volta Dam points out a

3

Many valuable analyses of the failed economic planning from independence to Nkrumah’s fall have been undertaken over the years that point to unheeded warning signs. Among these studies are David Guyer’s 1970 comparative analysis of Ghana and the Ivory Coast, entitled Ghana and The Ivory Coast: The Impact of Colonialism in an African Setting; Björn Beckman’s in-depth analysis of the reliance of Nkrumah’s economic plans of cocoa farmers and its political relevance;

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typical example of the ways in which Ghanaians and Africans have been excluded from the exploitation of their own natural resources over time. As many have commented, this project was a remarkable feat for a young country that was looked upon by others who were seeking or gaining independence: “Ghana thereupon became one of the world’s few developing countries with more electricity than it could use” (Howell and Rajasooria, 1972: 112). Yet, it was not going to reap the rewards of such a feat, an example not lost on others.4 As Birmingham (1995:29) pointed out: “In so doing the [Ghanaian] government discovered just how little international influence a small decolonized nation could wield and how strong were the financial and engineering forces controlled by the ‘neocolonial’ powers”. It is both sad and surprising that given his awareness of the risks of neocolonialism, Nkrumah allowed such a deal to be struck. Either Nkrumah’s expectations from foreign investments reveal a blindness due to his own humanism, or it was due to a certain naive expectation that, given history, Western agents would feel a level of responsibility in rectifying the past by creating long-lasting partnerships beneficial to Africans. However, as Jeffrey Sachs pointed out in his 2005 work entitled The End of Poverty: “Little surpasses the Western world in the cruelty and depredation that it has long imposed on Africa” (quoted in Bond, 2006: 3). Perhaps Ghana’s early experience benefited others. In terms of development approaches, a policy known as “performance requirements” was implemented by Asian Tigers, as development requirements were attached to targeted foreign investments. The latter practice was relied upon in many parts of the world but is, today, frowned upon under globalization pressures.5 Philip Foster and Aristide R. Zolberg’s edited volume titled Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernization. 4 As Nugent (1995: 10) pointed out: “Ghana has always exerted a greater influence over African affairs ... than its limited size and population ... might lead one to expect. The reason is that the country has repeatedly served as a social laboratory for the continent as a whole. During the 1950s, Ghana was the testing ground for British strategies of decolonization. After 1960, Nkrumah’s efforts to break the links of external dependency were regarded as significant for other African countries similarly afflicted by the colonial legacy”. 5 See for example, Martin Khor’s (2001: 109-110), the Malaysian economist and Director of the Third World Network explanation regarding the use of foreign investment towards development: “Although developing countries may exert great efforts to attract the investors they desire, their right to request that foreign investors fulfill certain obligations and thus follow some conditions should be recognized. These may include the transfer of technology; the training and

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As this brief discussion highlights, Nkrumah’s dilemma was that in attempting to move Ghana’s economy away from reliance on mono cash crop exports, so as to distance his country from colonial patterns of economic development, he encountered the new mechanisms of neocolonialism and the beginnings of debt dependence on the West. The example also shows that African wealth in natural resources was not going to be easily wrenched from Western interests. A vicious cycle of lack of capital that would enable Africans to benefit from their own natural resources remains an important issue today. That does not mean, however, that some Africans did not benefit personally from these resources. That eventuality was not lost on Nkrumah either. (ii) Endogenous challenges: elites vs. “the masses” Although the previous section associates some of Nkrumah’s analysis and policies to structuralist schools of underdevelopment, looking essentially at exogenous causes of African underdevelopment, Nkrumah also looked at domestic dynamics. He warned against the potential for elites’ collusion with external interests and the importance of listening to the African masses. As Mbonjo (1998: 34) explains, the importance of the masses in gaining national liberation was at the forefront of Nkrumah’s thought in his call for the “organization of the colonial masses”. Not only were the masses the ones that suffered mostly from colonial injustices but they were also the ones who, contrary to the domestic bourgeoisie who strived through colonialism, would prevent future neocolonial exploitation. Nkrumah expressed this clearly in a speech he made at the May 1965 Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference that took place in Ghana when he said: “the mass of the people can never become the agents or partners of neocolonialism. The function of neocolonialism is to exploit ... It is the people, therefore, and only the people, who can save an African or Asian State from neo-colonialism and imperialism” (quoted in Mbonjo, 1998: 39). In that understanding of the post-colonial situation, Nkrumah expressed his distrust of elites in the post-independence struggle against ongoing exploitation. In this, he revealed his structuralist understanding of capitalism and the role of international finance acting through local elites.6 employment of local workers, professionals and executives; the development of linkages to the domestic sectors; and providing local participation or partnership in equity ownerships”. 6 As Mbonjo (1998:40) explains: “...the bourgeoisie who benefited from colonialism strives desperately to retain its advantages through neo-colonialism. Its interests, as a class, reside in the maintenance of capitalist socio-economic

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For Nkrumah then, the role of elites was one whereby the ongoing foreign exploitation of the continent’s wealth at the expense of its masses would continue. As Owusu (2006: 12) explains: “[Nkrumah] was critical of the African bourgeoisies, who were not only opportunistic and exploitative ... The elite frowned upon any solidarity with the African poor masses in their quest for life and dignity”. This indeed, has taken place over the decades since independence, albeit in diverse guises. From wealthy and corrupt dictators put in place by foreign governments, to transnational corporations and clandestine trade networks, a variety of exploitative dynamics has emerged, whereby ordinary citizens are left strapped with debts while lucrative resources such as oil, diamonds, cobalt, coltan, precious woods and gold are extracted from the continent to enrich the few. In these processes, a variety of domestic/local actors has colluded with outside interests to enrich themselves at the expense of ordinary Africans. Although these individuals may not all have been originally “colonial bourgeois”, per se, a pattern emerged over the decades, which has resulted in a similar exploitative dynamic with the outside as that predicted by Nkrumah. What is relevant to point out in these domestic destructive dynamics of the past five decades, is the significant role played by outsiders – a factor often omitted in liberal explanations of underdevelopment, poverty and inequality (Caplan, 2008; Bond, 2006). Without documenting and listing the numerous examples of such collusions, suffice it to say that ample studies have demonstrated that, in Caplan’s (2008: 69) words: “In almost every case of egregious African governance, you can be sure to find Western influence playing a central role ... For decades the continent was seen by the West, above all by the US, as a major battleground where Cold War rivalries were played out, though the USSR played only a comparatively modest role”. Europe for its part “was particularly anxious to call in all the imperial resources” to rebuild itself after World War II, and, subsequently, its relations with Africa through the 1975 Lomé convention “aimed to protect European industry from shortages of tropical produce ... It was hardly an equal bargain” (Birmingham, 1995: 89). The latter, was followed by the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) under the Cotonou Agreement, whereby an “even harsher regime of ‘reciprocal liberalization’ [is] to replace the preferential agreements that tied so many African countries to their former colonial masters via cash-crop exports” (Bond, 2006: 68).

structures. Its alliance with the international finance capital puts it in conflict with the masses...”.

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While these state-to-state neocolonial relations, that Nkrumah had predicted, materialized in post-independence Africa, so did the collusion between domestic elites and foreign interests. Caplan (2008: 76-82) provides a good summary of the collusion between African government officials and elites, transnational corporations and Western elites that enabled the exploitative extraction of African wealth and resources. He concludes his overview of these mechanisms by stating: “the collective complicity of Western governments and banks, multinational corporations and African business and political leader in this massive fraud is a perfect example of the great conspiracy against the people of the continent” (ibid., p. 82).7 Even the more “legitimate” types of resource extraction raise concerns regarding the lack of transparency and involvement of local populations, let alone the displacement of local miners and lack of “trickle-down” benefits, be it local or national. A most recent example found online involves the Anglo Gold Ashanti consortium in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.8 Bond’s (2006:1) contrast of explanations between liberal and structuralist explanations provide a good illustration of the lack of recognition, by some, regarding the shared responsibility of decades of collusion between internal and external actors. The first quote reflects a “neoliberal” (or orthodox liberal) perspective and was extracted from Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa 2005 report: “Africa is poor, ultimately, because its economy has not grown. The public and private sectors need to work together to create a climate which unleashes the entrepreneurship of the peoples of Africa ...”.9 The second one reflects a 7 One of these examples concerns the smuggling of gold out of the Congo that implicates Ugandan officials and multinational corporations using local rebel militias. “The Western companies that were cited [in the 2005 Human Rights Report titled ‘The Curse of Gold”] included high-profile giant mining corporations based in South Africa and Sweden, which in turn are partnered with other resource extraction companies based in the UK and Canada. The boards of these companies are chock-a-block with the Western world’s political elites and retired politicians who are household names” (Caplan, 2008: 76). 8 Ashanti Goldfields Company (AGC) was established in London in 1897. AGC started underground mining in Ghana, Obuasi in 1907. The planned DRC gold mine project is undertaken in partnership with OKIMO the DRC state-owned mining company under the joint venture called Ashanti Goldfield Kilo (AGK) in Ituri a town recently ravaged by civil conflict. AGA holds 86.22 per cent shares while OKIMO holds 13.78 per cent. For a critical report of this project see the CAFOD report at http://www.cafod.org.uk/news/anglogol 9 Other recent publications in that vein include Martin Meredith’s 2005 publication of The Fate of Africa; John Schram, “Where Ghana Went Right”, in

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contemporary view closer to the dependency school of thought, which takes into account history and exogenous factors: “Africa is poor, ultimately, because its economy and society have been ravaged by international capital as well as by local elites who are often propped by foreign powers. The public and private sectors have worked together to drain the continent of resources which otherwise – if harnessed and shared fairly – should meet the needs of the peoples of Africa”. (iii) De-linking from the West? The implementation of policies that reflected Nkrumah’s objective of economic independence was related to his analysis of colonialism, the relationship of colonialism to capitalism and the role of the West in responding to “the crises of capitalism”. As the following interpretation of Nkrumah’s thinking by Mbonjo (1998: 93-94) illustrates: It is for their exclusive benefit that Europeans had occupied Africa during the 19th century. They were not concerned with the welfare of the African people. To illustrate this historical fact, Nkrumah quotes [in his autobiography] Jules Ferry, Prime Minister of France in 1885, who gave the dominant reasons for the European quest for colonies in Africa, when he spoke in the French Chamber of Deputies in defence of the colonial policy of the French Government... “Colonial policy is the offspring of industrial policy for rich states in which capital is abundant and is rapidly accumulating”.

Given this analysis, it follows that, for Nkrumah, economic independence also meant that: A diversification of economic links is consequently of great necessity for, apart from being in accordance with the politics of non-alignment strongly advocated by Nkrumah, it provides a young nation’s economy with a full range of new possibilities. An emerging country can choose her commercial partners to her own interests... Her purchases and her sales are not dictated by an outside power. Her imports and exports are decided by herself. Being the master of her external trade, she can achieve her economic independence and, subsequently, her national sovereignty (Mbonjo, 1998: 95).

the July/August 2010 edition of The Walrus; The Trouble with Africa by Robert Calderisi published in 2006.

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These choices/options required de-linking from colonial institutions, diversifying trade relations and blocking some corporate relations through which neocolonial ties might continue past patterns of exploitation. At the level of colonial institutions, one of the clearest examples of this distrust of the old Western colonial ties was the Nkrumah government’s withdrawal from the West African Currency Board. The Currency Board was identified as a neocolonial institution “through which the British Treasury would continue to control the economies of British West Africa” including providing Britain the ability to conduct economic sabotage, “should Ghana elect to pursue independent policies” (Dumor, 1991: 75).10 According to Dumor (1991), Ghana also broke up the West African Frontier Force, disintegrated the West African Cocoa Research Institute and the West African Court of Appeal, all seen as neocolonial structures. Likewise, the Ghanaian government announced September 3, 1960 that its own state agency would ensure cocoa buying, a plan that included selling cocoa in both Accra and London rather than London alone (Howell and Rajasooria, 1972: 64). In the area of trade, the Nkrumah government also acted on its intention to avoid neocolonial ties on several levels. Not only were direct country-to-country ties altered, such as cutting back trade ties with Britain while increasing ties with Eastern Europe, but indirect neocolonial ties through private business interests were also identified and cut. As Dumor (1991: 89-90) observed, “Ghana progressively reduced its concentration on Britain as a trading partner ... by 1962, the United States had become the largest importer of Ghana’s cocoa, superseding West Germany and Britain ...During the early part of the 1960s, Ghana had simultaneously increased bilateral relations with USSR and China”. In addition, the Nkrumah government implemented a deliberate economic boycott of Britain in protest of Britain’s lack of response to Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Dumor, 1991: 78). Nkrumah also identified “interlocking networks of ... companies [that] gave Britain and South Africa extensive political and economic power by proxy” (Dumor, 1991: 76). An example he gives is that of the link between Union Minière in Zaire and Tanganyika (Tanzania) Concessions Limited. While the latter was registered in London, it had “its nerve centre in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) under the chairmanship of Charles Waterhouse, Leader 10 This kind of distrust is further understandable given that, in the immediate postwar period, “large bank reserves of colonial Ghana were not used to pipe water to African villages but for metropolitan reconstruction, and the groundnut plantations of colonial Tanzania were not aimed at enriching the farming poor in Africa but at providing margarine rations in the British welfare state” (Birmingham, 1995: 89).

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of the English House of Commons”. Similarly, the government began denouncing and blocking businesses that used front names in order to hide their South African origins (Dumor, 1991:76). These policies, along with Nkrumah’s announcements regarding a proposed socialist economy, his support of Patrice Lumumba in the exBelgian Congo, his ties with Moscow, his writings on socialism and his 1960 speech at the UN drew growing antagonism from the West. Christian A. Herter, US State Secretary at the time, is quoted as stating that Nkrumah in his UN address had “marked himself as very definitely leaning toward the Soviet bloc” and that he sounded as though he was “making a bid for the leadership of ... a left-leaning group of African states” (Howell and Rajasooria, 1972: 66). Further exasperating the West was Ghana’s actions in support of Lumumba, whereby Nkrumah joined other non-aligned countries in asking the Soviet Union to approach the US, breaking diplomatic ties with the Congolese military junta of Col. Joseph Mobutu (who enjoyed American support) as well as Belgium and, along with five other African countries, withdrawing Ghanaian troops from the UN Force in the Congo. Nkrumah's growing influence in the Third World, given his positions and actions and the context of the Cold War, proved detrimental to his political survival. As some have pointed out, economic retaliation from the West contributed to undermining Nkrumah’s political future. The best evidence of such Western manipulation is found in quotes from the then American Ambassador to Ghana, William Mahoney: “Western pressures were having their intended effect, exacerbating, if not causing, deteriorating conditions [in Ghana]. Popular opinion was running strongly against Nkrumah and the economy of the country was in a precarious state”. Mahoney is quoted by the same source as saying that he had “supported the recommendation to deny Ghana’s forthcoming aid request ‘in the interests of further weakening Nkrumah ... and the British would continue to adopt a hard nose attitude toward providing further assistance to Ghana” (quoted in Owusu, 2006: 127). Others have suggested that the disastrous cocoa prices which exacerbated the Ghanaian economic situation and development plans in the 1960s might have been due “to real as well as engineered (emphasis added) declines in commodity prices within the international market place” (Mikell, 1989: 250). Thus, as democratically elected leaders, such as Nkrumah and Lumumba, in newly independent African countries sought to redistribute wealth generated from natural resources to all citizens, they ignited concerns in the West that had more to do with great power Cold War competition than whether the newly independent countries were

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democratic, well-governed and fair to their citizens. In the same way that the slave trade and the 19th century scramble for Africa had more to do with European power struggles and competition, the neocolonial period of the 20th century was also about ways in which the African continent and its resources could provide either some geostrategic and/or economic advantages in the global power struggles. To sum up in the words of Nkunzimana (2002: 135), Africa is (and has been) quite often “transformed into the theatre of fights for geostrategic influences or a safe haven for outside opportunists who, in complicity with some greedy African leaders, operate their ‘cynical pursuit of private interests’. Nkrumah saw the real potential for such outcomes on the continent early on and tried to address this by, among others, de-linking from Western institutional ties as well as private business linkages. Not only did he do so for Ghana but in solidarity for struggles taking place elsewhere on the continent. Whether this was wise and realistic at the time, given the context of the Cold War, is questionable. Nevertheless, today’s situation relative to such concerns, changes in African policies, and the changing global context need to be re-examined.

B. NEPAD and global politics in Africa The issues and policies mentioned in the previous sections came together in Nkrumah’s belief in the necessity of African Unity, another example of his foresight and long-lasting intellectual impact. As he wrote in his 1961 paper entitled I speak of freedom: “It is clear that we must find an African solution to our problems, and that this can only be found in African unity. Divided we are weak; united, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world”. Today, this sentence and related questions resonate even more loudly given the launching of NEPAD and its relationship the new organization of African Unity (AU).11 As such, 11

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is the product of a series of processes and meetings among African leaders. NEPAD is the result of a merger of two different plans. The Millennium Action Plan (MAP), launched in February 2001 by South Africa’s President Mbeki, Nigeria’s President Obasanjo and Algeria’s President Bouteflika, was merged with the Senegalese President Wade’s OMEGA plan. This merger was named the New African Initiative (NAI) and endorsed at the July 2001 African Summit in Lusaka, Zambia (Abegunrin, 2009). Shortly after, on July 9, 2002 in Durban (South Africa), the leaders of 43 African countries met to replace the OAU with the AU. As Biswas (2004:793) and Bond (2006: 126) explained, NEPAD is the new AU’s pragmatic counterpart and official development plan. Although not yet fully under AU wing, a recent meeting

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this section examines the purpose and feasibility of this objective, and ways in which African unity today, and particularly NEPAD, reflect such potential as well as some other aspects of Nkrumah’s recommendations. As Cheru and Calais (2010: 222) remind us: “From the early days of decolonization to the present moment, the aim of African unity and integration has been the same: to end Africa’s marginalization in the world economy and to chart an independent development path through collective self-reliance”. Even those who criticize Nkrumah’s attempt at African unity, both in terms of the project itself and Nkrumah’s obsession with it, recognize the ongoing relevance of this question: “By evoking Nkrumah’s failed, yet noble and remarkable, attempt and juxtaposing it with the intractable heterogeneity of Africa, my intention is to remind readers that the question of how to foster African unity and reinforce Africa’s own development capabilities and resources remains tremendously important and unresolved” (Nkunzimana, 2002: 129). Given that the topics covered earlier in this paper relate to the theme of African unity, a summary of the points made in earlier sections will enable a comparative analysis of NEPAD and the continent’s situation today with that of Nkrumah’s days. In terms of obtaining economic independence, we have looked at three issues: the legacy of colonialism in terms of the type of economic dependence on one cash crop and the lack of sufficient domestic investments that would enable an African-controlled exploitation of the continent’s natural resources; the necessity to de-link from institutions that perpetuate a controlling, and at times corrupt, influence on the policy choices of African countries; the importance of the role of the masses in fostering economic independence and the related distrust of elites’ linkages with foreigners. These are interrelated and, as such, the discussion of NEPAD will address them concurrently. Three questions are examined: does NEPAD provide alternatives that address Nkrumah’s concerns regarding the ability of Africa to gain economic independence from power centers and lead to development that benefits all Africans; has NEPAD addressed Nkrumah’s concern for involvement of the masses in African political and economic development; and, in what way does NEPAD reflect true African unity?

of the Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC) in Kampala (Uganda) at the end of July 2010 was to produce the document through which NEPAD would cease to exist independently and would become an African Union entity (O’kademeri, 2010).

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(i) NEPAD and Financial Dependence on the West vs. Others One of the first aspects of NEPAD that does not diverge from Nkrumah’s understanding of development is that it also espouses the objective of modernizing the economy. In fact, some have identified NEPAD’s theoretical framework as representing a combination of dependency and modernization theories of development (Matthews, 2004) – an approach not dissimilar to Nkrumah’s, as stated earlier. Thus, NEPAD seeks to alleviate poverty and improve health and education through wealth generated from the modernization of African economies. As an example of modernization projects cited in NEPAD, Abegunrin (2009: 179) mentions: “building a hydroelectric dam at Inga on the Congo River, and the introduction of new farming techniques, especially mechanized systems”. Although such an understanding of development has been criticized with some merit, the present analysis will take such development goals as a given. As already mentioned, the debate between these theories is how one gets there. Therefore, the question of relevance remains, as with Nkrumah’s Volta project, where is the financing going to be coming from for such projects, and at what cost? Unfortunately, NEPAD does not offer much redress for this weakness. The first and most evident aspect is that the document makes it clear that the “partners” to the renewed African development plans are the industrialized West and multilateral organizations (Matthew, 2004:503; Abegunrin, 2009: 175; Biswas, 2004; Caplan, 2008; Bond, 2006). These are jointly described as Africa’s development “partners” in Section VI, entitled “A New Global Partnership” (Matthew, 2004: 503). Interestingly, as illustrated earlier in this paper, the understanding of foreign financiers as “partners” was also used by Nkrumah in his announcement regarding the role of foreign investors in Ghana’s development. Given the nature of this partnership, many question the likelihood of an equal relationship when one partner is dependent upon the other’s resources to achieve her/his objectives. As reported by Matthew (2004: 505) and others, one of the critiques of NEPAD “is that it is the latest version of the ‘age-old begging bowl’, since its focus is about asking wealthy nations for generous financial assistance”. As Schmidt’s (2002: 6) early assessment of NEPAD pointed out: “The NEPAD envisages a bargain, whereby, Africa delivers peace and good governance and adopts appropriate policies of its own choosing, and the developed world delivers more resources, including aid, trade, investment, debt relief and aid reform”. Included in the resources requested/expected as part of the partnership, is the need of US$ 64 billion additional investment per year.

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Furthermore, the way in which NEPAD was presented to the “partners” has also raised doubts regarding the notion of “partnership”. While Western leaders embraced the concept of partnership wholeheartedly others doubt NEPAD reflects a true partnership. When the four main African initiators of NEPAD, Presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo, Wade and Bouteflika, presented their strategy for African renewal to the G8 leaders at the July 2001 G8 Genoa summit, the G8 leaders agreed to come up with an African Action Plan (AAP) as a response that indicated support and enthusiasm for the African initiative (Abegunrin, 2009: 175). By all accounts, the AAP was considered one of the “most ambitious development plan for Africa in decades” (York, 2010: A11). Likewise, Mbeki’s attendance at the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he addressed the world’s most powerful group of business and political leaders, left little doubt as to who NEPAD’s success was reliant upon and who would benefit from its implementation (Bond, 2006: 125). However, this African subservience to the West was not lost on African civil society and some African leaders. Thus, the Gambian President Yahya Jammeh is quoted by Lokongo (2002: 18) as saying: “You come up with a program and depend on nothing but begging ... If NEPAD is an African project, why take it to the Westerners to approve it? ... Did G8 bring their agenda to Africa for us to approve it?” Perhaps not surprisingly, NEPAD has yielded little relative to the expectations it had raised. The 2001 G8 promises seemed to have gained momentum and were repeated at the July 2002 meeting in Kananaskis (Canada). However, eight years later on the occasion of the G8 and G20 meetings, hosted once again by Canada, the change in rhetoric was clear. Mbeki, now retired from the presidency of South Africa, expressed his disappointment at the lack of progress: “... in Canada in 2010, as opposed to Canada in 2002, the rich of the world conveyed the message that Africa had once again drifted to the periphery of the global development agenda” (quoted in York, 2010). In this, unfortunately, Africa’s situation is very similar to that of the early days of independence – its lack of financial resources which might give it the ability to use its own capital for the ends it sees fit render it vulnerable to outsiders’ exploitation. This ongoing hope in receiving outsiders’ respect is not only challenging given past experiences, but it is also problematic given the multilateral organizations’ neoliberal approach to development, particularly their neoliberal approach and the imposition of Structural Adjustment Policies since the 1980s, which have been widely acknowledged as having undermined African development. Thus, critics of NEPAD have warned that this document is “merely a homegrown

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version of the Washington Consensus” (Bond, 2006: 124). Thus, in terms of its reliance on the West and the similarity between these policies and past ones imposed by the West, NEPAD appears to offer little in terms of alternatives that might offer a departure from past relations. Nevertheless, a number of changes in the global context might bring some long-awaited opportunities for Africa. Given the changes taking place in Global Political Economic Relations, some new actors might present a departure from the past and new opportunities for Africa. China and India are now possible new partners for African development. Taylor (2009: 2) reports that since the turn of the new century, Chinese-African trade began to accelerate with a 40 percent increase between 2001 and 2006, “from US$4.8 billion in 2001 to US$28.8 billion in 2006”, and that the exponential growth in this economic relation can be expected to continue given the early stage of this trend. Not only has trade increased but, according to Martyn Davies, director of the China Africa Network at the University of Pretoria, the Chinese are also the biggest builders of infrastructure in Africa and the biggest lenders (French 2010: 60). Other indicators of increased relations between Africa and these two emerging powers can be seen in diplomatic relations such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in November 2006, the January 2006 Chinese “Africa Policy Paper”, and the China-Africa Business Council. In addition to hosting African heads of state, the Chinese have built sports facilities in Africa such as the 60,000-seat national sports stadium in Tanzania, which was opened in February 2009 by President Hu Jintao (French, 2010: 60). For their part, the Indians have, among others, held the April 2008 IndiaAfrica Forum in Delhi, issued a US$200 million line of credit to NEPAD aimed at promoting African economic integration and a US$1 billion investment in a joint venture with the African Union to build a PanAfrican e-Network for telemedicine and tele-education (Naidu, 2010: 41). Not only have investment amounts from China increased significantly, but also the diplomatic language and exchanges seem to reflect a tone more reminiscent of partnership than that of the West. As Cheru and Obi (2010: 4) point out, the warm African welcome extended to the Chinese and Indians has to do with more than economics and finance. Not only is there a growing number of Africans disenchanted with the West, but China and India refer to Africa as an equal partner and as a dynamic continent “on the threshold of a development take-off, with unlimited business opportunities that would serve Chinese, Indian and African interests” (ibid.). There is no doubt that such language and positive images of Africa will please those who have criticized Western images of Africa. Furthermore, the shared status of being a “developing country” and the

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success of these Asian countries provide potential models of development and hope for Africa. However, as Cheru and Obi (ibid) warn, such positive language of engagement may be more rhetorical than evidence of genuine respect. As such, Africans will have to be cautious and alert to the root/motivation of their responses to Asian engagements. Thus, the question is raised as to whether Africa’s relations with Chinese and Indian interests in the continent will be any different from past Western interests and patterns of exploitation. The evident growth of Chinese investments in Africa, particularly since the beginning of the 21st century, has generated a flurry of debates. At issue is whether China may be regarded as a South-South equal partner who will benefit Africa, or whether it is yet another greedy outsider only concerned about its relative power in the world and poised to be the next exploiter of Africa. A similar discussion concerns India, as that country has also increased its investments and relations with Africa, albeit at a more modest rate than China. On one side of the debate are those, both in the West and Africa, who warn against a repeat of history and point to Chinese strategic interests that do not simply include greed for resources to fuel its economic growth, but the related competition with the West. This includes its desire to “circumvent the regional economic powerhouse, South Africa, and ultimately control the markets for key African minerals” (French, 2010: 64). Not surprisingly, South African former President Thabo Mbeki was quoted as saying in 2006: “China can not only just come here and dig for raw materials [but] then go away and sell us manufactured products” (quoted in Taylor, 2009: 2). Or, as formulated differently by a Congolese lawyer: “We remain under the same old schema: our cobalt goes off to China in the form of dusty ore and returns here in the form of expensive batteries” (quoted in French, 2010: 69). As Taylor (2009: 1) summed it up, “the accusation that China is a new colonizing power, exploiting Africa’s natural resources and flooding the continent with low-priced manufactured products while turning a blind eye to its autocracies is at the core of most critiques”. From this perspective, engagements with Asia as an opposition/reaction to the West have their own potential dangers In other words, does Asian engagement move beyond “lecturing African history” (Samasuwo, 2007:83) towards beneficiary economic partnerships? On the other side of the debate are those who see the growing relations with Asia as a promising departure from the continent’s reliance on the West. One African who sees the growing presence of China in Africa in a positive light is Dambisa Moyo, the London-based Zambian economist who wrote the book Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There is

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a Better Way for Africa. From an economic development perspective, Moyo believes that “China offers a way out of the mess the West has made”, particularly through its “subsidized lending” (French, 2010: 60). From a diplomatic perspective, others see the emerging relationships with the Asian countries as part of a global power shift termed “the rise of the un-West” and Africa as a player who is accumulating “asymmetric power” that is “aimed at changing old exploitative relationships” (Samasuwo, 2007). The contrast between the two latter views, however, is that one sees the positive aspects of China in Africa through a neoliberal lens whereby the global market forces and the increased opening up of African economies will result in benefits to all whereas the other sees the benefits of African-Asian relations through the “Beijing Consensus” model whereby “resource nationalism” and a more state-led form of development will result. (ii) Does NEPAD Represent/Foster African Unity? As others have pointed out, Nkrumah’s vision of African unity covered three areas: economic, military and defense strategy, and foreign policy and diplomacy (Owusu, 2006; Mbonjo, 1998). Given NEPAD’s relationship to the newly created African Unity, its ability to provide a common African response to the challenges mentioned above through common economic, foreign policy and diplomatic relations needs to be examined. The above begs the question as to whether NEPAD can provide the kind of African consensus/unity in terms of common economic policies that will prevent past patterns from re-emerging. Thus, two questions related to NEPAD’s future role emerge: does it enable Africa to negotiate from a common position of strength and does its development model allow national economies to accumulate wealth and be protected from external forces? Several paradoxes, contradictions and fissures emerge when we look at NEPAD as a policy guide for Africa and the reality of what is happening on the continent. Regarding Africa’s relations/dependence on the West and others, many have pointed out the evident difficulties related to NEPAD as the promise of “good governance” and the “peer review mechanism” that have already created divisions within Africa and difficulties in terms of delivering on Western expectations. Among these are the concerns related to Zimbabwe and Sudan in particular. Not only are there divisions related to the implementation of these objectives, but also the Chinese partnership with these countries has further undermined African unity. As Taylor (2009: 98) pointed out: “The PRC’s [People’s Republic of China] policies arguably jar with Africa’s increasing attempts to promote human rights

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and good governance, as crystallized in NEPAD”. Taylor’s (ibid. 99) quote from the African Research Bulletin reveals African concerns regarding this issue: “in some countries China’s involvement appears benign, in others its approach undercuts the efforts by the African Union ... and Western partners to make government and business more transparent and accountable”. The division between “the old guard”, such as Gaddafi, Mugabe and the initiators of NEPAD, has been observed. As Cheru and Calais (2010: 98) point out, the multiplicity of agreements and multiplicity of partners are “hardly a sign that an authentic and unified African development agenda is on the horizon”. Once again, Africa seems caught between two polar sides while trying to secure capital for its development. How to navigate this dilemma without undermining African Unity is a delicate matter that reminds us of the original stumbling blocks Nkrumah faced: state sovereignty, vested interests and the Balkanization of Africa. Thus, on the one hand, the new global context provides Africa with choices in partners, thereby diminishing its vulnerability in terms of the sources and associated costs of capital, but on the other, this new context also puts pressures on its ability to remain united. While the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has recommended that NEPAD should become the umbrella organization under which these multiple agreements should be renegotiated as regional ones, Cheru and Calais (2010) argue that, at the moment, the organization is too weak, both in terms of capacity and authority to provide such a service to Africa. These authors explain that NEPAD does not have the ability to harmonize national policies at the regional level. In terms of capacity, they compare the European Union’s bureaucracy of 13,000 civil servants with that of 750 for the African Union and NEPAD. Thus, Cheru and Calais (2010: 227-236) argue that while it is not too late for Africa to engage the multiplicity of external actors “on an equal footing” through NEPAD, the organization will have to be transformed. Not only does NEPAD not provide the mechanisms for a strong African economic policy but also the philosophy that underlies the program further erodes Africa’s ability to prevent a repeat of past patterns. For critics of neoliberal policies, NEPAD provides nothing new from the Washington Consensus. As such, they have dubbed the project as “neocolonialism by invitation” (Chantu and Calais, 2010: 237). The critique once again relates to Nkrumah’s policies in terms of seeking to develop a strong autonomous domestic economy that would be able to compete on global markets. The solution, in this case, would be a stronger

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developmental state under the label of “strategic integration”, which is modeled after the example of East Asian developmentalism and Latin American neostructuralism (ibid.). According to such critiques, by minimizing the role of the state in the economy, NEPAD further undermines African development. Whether and how NEPAD could/would be transformed in that manner is questionable. More importantly, the ideological debates that surround NEPAD polarize rather than unite Africa. Related to the latter, although the governance aspect can mean a more inclusive role for “the masses”, the neoliberal approach to development espoused by NEPAD has raised doubts regarding the inclusion of civil society. Many African civil society groups have not only expressed concerns regarding the top-down process through which NEPAD was arrived at, but they also argue that the type of economic policies proposed leaves little room for public debates in terms of issues related to the environment, distributive justice, intellectual property rights, healthcare and other issues of public interest. These critiques are related to concerns regarding globalization policies. Nevertheless, in terms of such debates, Samasuwo’s (2007: 75-86) optimistic understanding of the new African diplomacy offers some hope. His analysis of African collective and/or individual accumulation of “tools of asymmetric power aimed at changing old exploitative relationship” deserves further examination. As he sees it: “increasingly, a number of African countries, sometimes with the help of civil society or prompted by internal resistance against the International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) are starting to question the ‘received wisdom’ of prevailing neo-liberal orthodoxy”. Others see in the new Southern partners the possibility of undermining NEPAD’s neoliberal model as many of these countries take a state-led development approach. The reality on the ground, however, is contradictory and challenging. While Asian state-led economic development is hailed as the answer for Africa and while China’s partnership is praised as a model to follow, China relies upon neoliberal policies to penetrate African economies. On the other hand, its association with authoritarian regimes has contributed to support politically, coercively or illegally its own business enterprises at the expense of African ones. Thus, Taylor (2009: 103) explains how in Zimbabwe, the Mugabe regime has forcibly removed African shopkeepers from their market, thereby enabling the Chinese competition to secure its own share of that market. Even without coercive policies, African entrepreneurs have been displaced thanks to neoliberal policies adopted by their state. Some have documented the Chinese takeover of the textile industry in Togo and

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Ghana as a direct result of the implementation of neoliberal policies, albeit at times with the help of illegal channels (Axelsson and Sylvanus, 2010; Taylor, 2009).

Conclusion As Kwame Nkrumah feared, in spite of achieving political independence, Africa’s aspirations have been impeded due to external/global interests and ongoing neocolonial patterns of exploitation. This paper has focused on the issues related to Africa’s challenges as it has had to rely on foreign capital to exploit its resources. The challenge has been how to respond to this reality “from a position of strength”, to use Cheru and Calais’s expression (2010: 221). From independence onwards, the legacy of colonialism – in terms of the lack of African capital necessary to extract continental resources – has rendered its interests and aspirations secondary to those of foreigners. The paper looked at some of the related challenges Nkrumah had identified and some solutions he sought to solve this riddle of post-independence Africa. The argument made is that the challenges are still present. Nevertheless, global changes and new policy formulations for Africa have been added to this initial issue. These changes need to be examined in order to assess the conditions that may repeat past patterns or provide opportunities to break new ground. Among the new policy tools that have been initiated in Africa, the paper questioned whether NEPAD provided the appropriate tools to deal with the new conditions in a manner that would break past patterns and achieve African visions for its future. On the one hand, the ongoing patterns of global power relations that vie for African resources could supersede, once again, Africans’ interests and goals. While the multiplicity of new partners from the Global South may be used to Africa’s advantage, they also represent challenges. One such challenge has been identified as “the new scramble for Africa” – will the need for crucial African natural resources, such as oil and cobalt, mean that Africa and its resources are once again pawns in a new global power game? Another challenge resides in the disagreements that exist regarding policies of political liberalization and economic liberalization both within the continent and among Africa’s multiple partners. The diversity of views among African leaders and civil society in terms of desirable types of governance and appropriate economic policies renders a united economic and foreign policy challenging. As it is, NEPAD seems too weak and too biased to be the bridge necessary to reconcile the multiple new economic partnerships and approaches to African development.

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The ideological policy shift that has taken place globally and in Africa – in terms of fostering market forces at the expense of the role of the state in the economy – are currently contested. The tensions between styles of governance and the role of the state in the economy in official circles are compounded domestically by the new expectations on the part of African civil society, particularly in terms of issues such as human rights, distributive justice, environmental sustainability and transparency. These render Nkrumah’s desires of African unity and reliance on the masses as challenging today as in post-independence. Not only has NEPAD started on shaky grounds regarding the inclusion of civil society and its clear neoliberal ideological position, but its capacities in terms of organizational authority and bureaucratic capacity have also been questioned. Some, such as Samasuwo (2007), see more of an African unity through other diplomatic fora such as the United Nations. As such, Africa’s new Southern partners may not only be better than the old in providing a true development partnership through beneficial investments in African economies, but also in being allies in multilateral fora that seek changes in the international system. Nevertheless, this potential is far from being realized. Nkrumah’s identification of challenges in terms of creating a continent that is not only politically independent but also economically independent, given the lack of domestic capital, is still present. The wealth of African resources and outsiders’ thirst has not waned. One thing that changed is the relative weakening of the West. But is that sufficient to transform African problems? While optimism in terms of displacing past exploiters is completely warranted, caution should nevertheless be exercised in terms of expecting newcomers to behave differently given global conditions and, in particular, the need for oil and other minerals. Due to its wealth-poverty complex, Africa needs to assess on a constant basis the benefit costs of unity/disunity relative to the global structural and historical patterns. As French (2010: 69) recently observed in the Atlantic issue of May 2010: “the question remains: How does [Africa] overcome a pattern of extractive foreign engagement ... that is still discernible today?” NEPAD has been promoted as the African renaissance, an Africanmade solution for African problems that comes under the new African Union. On the surface then, Nkrumah’s beliefs in and aspirations for a united Africa are still alive, at least rhetorically. Those who disagree with its orientation reject it as the answer to African unity and development. If not NEPAD, then what? The discussion that followed the presentation of this paper at the Kwame Nkrumah International Conference opened the door for more research and discussion on these issues. How might Africa

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develop an investment regime that fosters cross-border investments by its own investors? Would such a continental regime be less exploitative? Related to the latter were observations of unique African values and the need to tailor such policies to these values. Are there indeed such common values that can bring about a unified African vision and attendant policies?

References Abegunrin, Olayiwola. (2009)Africa in Global Politics in the Twenty-First Century New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Arthur, Peter. “The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative: Framework for Economic Development in Africa” in Sandra J. MacLean, H. John Harker and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.) Advancing Human Security and Development in Africa: Reflections on NEPAD (Halifax: Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2002: 155-181). Axelsson, Linn and Nina Sylvanus. “Navigating Chinese textile networks: women traders in Accra and Lomé,” in Cheru, Fantu and Cyril Obi (eds.). The Rise of China & India in Africa. (London: Zed Books, 2010), pp.132-141. Beckman, Björn. (1976) Organising the Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Berg, Elliot J. (1971) “Structural Transformation versus Gradualism: Recent Economic Development in Ghana and the Ivory Coast,” in Philip Foster and Aristide R. Zolberg (eds.) Ghana and the Ivory Coast Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 187-230. Birmingham, David. (1995). The decolonization of Africa. Athens: Ohio University Press. Biswas, Aparajita.(2003) “NEPAD: Forum for Growth and Unity,” in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No.8, 2004:793-796 Boafo-Arthur, Kwame (ed.). Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State. (Dakar: CODESRIA Books, 2007). Boahen, A. Adu. (1987) African Perspectives on Colonialism Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Bond, Patrick. (2006). Looting Africa (London and New York: Zed Books. Calderisi, Robert. (2006) The Trouble with Africa. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Caplan, Gerald. (2008). The Betrayal of Africa (Toronto: Groundwood Books.

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Cheru, Fantu and Cyril Obi (eds.). The Rise of China & India in Africa. (London: Zed Books, 2010). Cheru, Fantu and Magnus Calais. “Countering ‘new imperialisms’: What role for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development?” in Cheru, Fantu and Cyril Obi (eds.) The Rise of China & India in Africa. (London: Zed Books, 2010), pp. 221-242. Cohn, Theodore H. (2007) Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice (4th ed.). Toronto: Pearson Education Inc. Dumor, E.K. (1991). Ghana, OAU and Southern Africa: An African Response to Apartheid Accra: Ghana Universities Press. Foster, Philip and Aristide R. Zolberg (eds.). (1971) Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernization. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. French, Howard W. “The Next Empire,” in The Atlantic (Boston), May 2010: 59-69. Guyer, David. (1970) Ghana and the Ivory Coast New York: Exposition Press. Howell, Thomas A. And Jeffrey P. Rajasooria (eds.) Ghana and Nkrumah (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1972). Khor, Martin. (2001) Rethinking Globalization London and New York: Zed Books. Kraus, Jon. (1971) “Political Change, Conflict, and Development in Ghana,” in Philip Foster and Aristide R. Zolberg (eds.) Ghana and the Ivory Coast (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press), pp. 33-72. Lokongo, Bafalikike. “Jammeh: NEPAD Will Never Work,” New Africa (London), September 2002. Matthews, Sally. “Investigating NEPAD’s Development Assumptions,” in Review of African Political Economy, 2004 (No. 101:497-511). Mbonjo, Pierre Moukoko. (1998) The Political Thought of Kwame Nkrumah Lagos: University of Lagos Press. Meredith, Martin. (2005). The Fate of Africa. New York: Public Affairs. Mikell, Gwendolyn. (1989). Cocoa and Chaos in Ghana New York: Paragon House. Naidu, Sanusha. “India’s African relations: in the shadow of China?” in Cheru, Fantu and Cyril Obi (eds.) The Rise of China & India in Africa. (London: Zed Books, 2010), pp. 34-62. Nkrumah, Kwame. (1961) I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology pp. xi-xiv. London: William Heinemann Nkrumah, Kwame. (1963) Africa Must Unite London: Panaf Books Ltd.

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Nkrumah, Kwame. (1965) Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism London: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd. Nkunzimana, Obed. “Damaging Re-Presentations, Multiple Divides and Other Manoeuvres: Threats to African Development,” in Sandra J. MacLean, H. John Harker and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.) Advancing Human Security and Development in Africa: Reflections on NEPAD (Halifax: Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2002: 127-153). Nugent, Paul. (1995). Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana: Power, Ideology and the Burden of History 1982-1994 London; New York: Pinter. O’kadameri, Billie. “African Union Swallows NEPAD At Kampala Meeting,” in allAfrica.com, at allAfrica.com/stories retrieved August 7, 2010. Owusu, Robert Yaw. (2006). Kwame Nkrumah’s Liberation Thought: A Paradigm for Religious Advocacy in Contemporary Ghana Trenton: Africa World Press Inc., 2006. Samasuwo, Nhamo. “The Insurrection of Subjugated Knowledge’: Towards and Emerging ‘Post-Western; Asymmetric Africa” in Bhekinkosi Moyo (ed.) Africa in the Global Power Play: Debates, Challenges and Potential Reforms (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd., 2007). Schmidt, Rodney. “Introduction: Ownership and Partnership in Africa’s Development Strategy,” in Africa Report: Assessing the New Partnership (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 2003). Schram, John. “Where Ghana Went Right,” in The Walrus (July/August 2010: 26-35). Taylor, Ian. (2009). China’s New Role in Africa Boulder: Lynne Rienner Thomas, Caroline. “The international financial institutions’ relations with Africa: insights from the issue of representation and voice,” in Ian Taylor and Paul Williams (eds.) Africa in International Politics: External involvement on the continent (London and New York: Routledge, 2004: 174-194). York, Geoffrey. “West’s leaders ignoring Africa, Mbeki says,” in The Globe and Mail, July 2, 2010, p. A11.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN OIL IN UGANDA: LESSONS FOR SUCCESS DR ARINZE NGWUBE GENERAL STUDIES UNIT, FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OYE-EKITI, EKITI STATE, NIGERIA

AND DR CHUKA OKOLI GENERAL STUDIES UNIT, FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OYE-EKITI, EKITI STATE NIGERIA

Abstract Oil has been discovered in Uganda. Its discovery has the prospect to accelerate development and drive the country’s transformation into a regional and even global economic player. However, oil comes with its risks between people and government. At the same time, if poorly managed or utilised, the oil wealth could easily reverse the gains made in the last two decades, especially in the areas of governance, export diversification, macroeconomic stability and structural transformation. Recent discoveries in many African states beg the question, ‘how can oil contribute to the equitable and sustained development on the continent?’ Uganda is yet to produce a single barrel of oil, but with three senior ministers accused of accepting bribes from oil companies and the government seemingly ill-prepared for imminent large-scale oil production, the phrase ‘resource curse’ is already being bandied about. This paper investigates the political impacts that oil is likely to have on Uganda. Uganda has bigger problems when it comes to its nascent oil industry. Oil production started in 2013, but the country has not put in place a regulatory framework for the oil industry; the existing legislation on oil and gas exploration was passed in 1993. The debate over the management of Uganda’s oil is already intense in the country. It is

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expected that Uganda should rise above the politics of today and look to the long term. Oil will be a central feature of Uganda for decades and decisions made now will shape the lives of future generations. The successful steering of the challenges of oil would leave a glowing legacy for Uganda’s current generation of leaders. This chapter shall adopt lessons from two countries which have motivated the writing of this chapter.

Introduction In the world’s poorest countries, natural resources are often the key potential drivers of wealth creation. These countries could use the money earned from the exploitation or conservation of their resources to reduce poverty. Unfortunately, stories of successful natural resource use are hard to find in the developing world. Poor governance and widespread corruption mean that too often the wealth generated from natural assets seldom reaches government accounts. Instead, the extra money corrodes governance and encourages high-level state-looting. When billions of oil reserves were found seven years ago, the discovery seemed like a gift from heaven to many in Uganda. The income that will flow from oil has the potential to drive domestic development and transform the country into a significant economic actor, both regionally and globally. What impact will oil exploration and production activities have on Uganda’s internal sociopolitical conditions, and on its international political, economic or regional standing and behaviour? The achievement could secure a glowing legacy for the current generation of leaders. However, there are growing worries that oil may prove to be more of a curse than a gift, taking a cue from other countries that joined the petroleum bonanza. “A lot has gone on in the oil industry without the knowledge of the Ugandan public, and a lot is still going on”, Tony Otoa, a researcher with Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE), a public policy think-tank, told IRIN. “This sort of secrecy – which covered up patronage, corruption – is what preceded the problems Nigeria had in the early stages of its industry.” There is the danger that oil instead undermines progress, as the symptoms of the ‘resource curse’ take hold. Uganda stands at a crossroads. Debates on resource governance focus primarily on two sets of actors that play a role in and shape processes of resource extraction. The first is corporate actors related to exploration and the development of specific extractive operations, whose activities are scrutinised or criticised. The second actor that features largely in analyses of extractive operations is the state. In terms of state actors, questions are asked about policy and legal frameworks, transparency, institutional capacity to manage and monitor

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extractive industries, and the manner in which the state manages revenues from resources. The voice of communities, and the negative social and environmental impacts experienced by people who live in the vicinity of major extractive operations, are often drowned out by the overbearing financial muscle of corporations, or by the power a state wields to impose policy and development plans. There is thus an obvious imperative to improve governance conditions, from oversight to anti-corruption, ideally in advance of large-scale production. Yet it is precisely in those states that are most at risk – where governance is weakest – that these vital steps towards reinforcing governance capacity are least likely to be taken. In short, comprehensive lesson-learning and the best designed management framework will not be effective in avoiding the resource curse in the absence of sufficient political or social will to make sure that action is taken and the rules are adhered to. It is, therefore, not sufficient simply to list the technical steps that new oil- or resource-producing states need to take, notably on governance. This paper is split into four sections: the first provides clarification of concepts; the second examines lessons from the experience of other resource-producing states such as Chad and Norway; the third examines the conclusion; while part four offers recommendations.

Conceptual Clarification Resource Curse The symptoms of the ‘resource curse’ have been forensically detailed (Heinrich 2011). They include the erosion of politics and increased popular alienation from the state, more income and GDP growth, the development of non-oil sectors slow or is reversed by the overvaluation of currencies, worsening social outcomes and rampant unemployment. Environmental damage can also harm livelihoods and social structures alike, notably in resource-producing areas themselves. The cumulative impact can be deepening social and political divisions that may lead to conflict. These effects are widely recognized. An array of policy responses has been elaborated to deal with them, with an industry dedicated to absorbing hard-learned lessons into best practice guidelines. Above all, it is the governance conditions in any given country at the time exploitation begins that determine whether resources will be a blessing or a burden (Yates 2009). The “resource curse” (Gelb 1988; Auty 1993) or “paradox of plenty” (Karl 1997) thesis basically says that countries rich in natural

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resources are less well off in terms of economic growth and development more generally than countries without such an abundance of natural resources. Both terms have since become catch-all phrases for the bundle of negative developments in resource-rich countries such as persisting poverty, lack of economic diversification, rising inequality, growing corruption and violent conflict. Although resource wealth is often simply assumed to have caused these outcomes, empirical evidence supports the links between resource wealth and relatively slower economic growth (Sachs and Warner 2001), civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and authoritarian rule (Ross 2001; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004). Another important connection that will not be dealt with further in this book but is essential enough to be mentioned is the one between oil export-based growth and the persistence of patriarchal norms and greater gender inequality (Ross 2008). Three particular mechanisms through which the resource curse is supposedly working are often distinguished: the ‘Dutch Disease’ mechanism, the expansive spending mechanism, and finally the ‘rentier state’ mechanism. The Dutch Disease mechanism refers to the massive inflow of resource-based state income driving the real exchange rate and wage levels up. Productive and trading sectors, especially manufacturing and agriculture, thus become less competitive on the world market. Through this mechanism, the resource-rich country’s economic structure is fundamentally transformed from being a manufacture- or agriculture-led economy (if it was one before) to a resource extraction-led economy. This leaves the country less productive, more exposed to sudden commodity price changes and with a significantly lower number of jobs than before. The second mechanism refers to expansive spending often accompanied by excessive borrowing against expected future oil income. With oil rents suddenly flooding in like manna from heaven, the elites of the newly resource-rich states often go on a spending spree. Whether the money is invested in infrastructure or public services or wasted on luxurious prestige projects, money is being spent on a large scale where this has not been the case before. This sudden increase in spending may increase inflation and have an impact on the exchange rate. It may also lead to a massive accumulation of debts as soon as the terms for the repayment of the loans turn less favourable. These are the two classic economic mechanisms through which the resource curse works. They have been studied extensively and approaches have been developed to deal with them effectively. The third mechanism, here called ‘rentier state’ mechanism, is of a different nature. It is not economic but political and refers to the effects of the income from natural resources on politics and political institutions. We agree with George Soros when he writes that it is

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this political factor “that needs to be better understood, especially as its impact is far greater than that of the other two [economic factors; M.R.]” (2007: xi). That is why this book focuses on these political challenges rather than on the macroeconomic side. The ‘rentier state’ approach claims that countries which derive a high proportion of their revenue from rents, that is unearned income, differ from those who have to ‘earn’ their revenue, for example by taxing citizens. The massive inflow of unearned income has several effects. First of all, it makes the governing elite more autonomous from their citizens. It also allows them to strengthen the state and security apparatus which may result in a more authoritarian political system. Perhaps most importantly, it turns the state apparatus, including both politics and the bureaucracy into a rent-distribution bazaar. The focus of state action shifts from service delivery to allocation tussles and consumerism. Conflict, corruption and other symptoms of bad governance often thrive in such an environment. While the resource curse thesis and the three particular mechanisms described seem plausible and are frequently referred to in the resource governance debate, they are problematic and have come under increasing criticism lately. Economists and political scientists have argued that the methodological approaches used for testing – and largely confirming – the resource curse thesis, have not paid sufficient attention to important details and country differences. Using more elaborate statistical cross-country analyses and other methods, they arrive at results which modify and sometimes contradict outright the resource curse thesis. Looking at the resource wealth-growth nexus, for example, Cavalcanti et al. (2011) conclude that oil wealth often has a positive effect on short-run economic growth and long-run income levels. On the link between resource wealth and regime type, Haber and Menaldo (2011) find that “oil and mineral reliance does not promote dictatorship over the long run. If anything, the opposite is true” (Haber and Menaldo 2011: 25). Based on both quantitative and qualitative methodology, Thad Dunning arrives at a more cautious yet also surprising assessment by claiming that “[r]esource rents can promote authoritarianism or democracy, but they do so through different mechanisms” (Dunning 2008: 4). An older argument challenging the natural resource thesis is the observation that some resource-rich and formerly poor countries exist which have actually grown or have indeed become more democratic or better governed – or have at least not regressed significantly. Responding to this empirical challenge and explaining why the likes of Norway do actually exist, researchers have argued that a number of more detailed distinctions have been made and context conditions taken into account when assessing the impact of

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resource wealth on growth and governance (Basedau 2005; de Soysa 2006). The important details include the particular type of natural resource the country possesses, the costs of extracting them and the country’s degree of resource dependence. Some of the most crucial context conditions include the quality of institutions of a country before oil wealth arrives, the involvement and response of international actors, the degree of social fragmentation along ethnic, religious or other lines, the vulnerable or rather consolidated position of the ruling elite, and socioeconomic conditions more generally. These modifications of the original resource curse thesis have enhanced our understanding of the impact of resource wealth. However, at least implicitly, many of them tend to be somewhat deterministic and retain a path dependency or ‘lock-in’ notion. Based on this discussion, our own modified theoretical understanding of the resource curse is as follows. Resource wealth does not have an independent impact on a country’s polity and economy. It is not destiny and it is certainly neither an automatic blessing nor a curse. Instead, depending on the particular type of natural resource, two mediating factors are crucial: the quality of institutions before the natural resources are discovered, and political coalitions. While the important role of the first factor is by now widely acknowledged, the impact of the second factor is less well understood. The pre-resource extraction quality of institutions is both an enabling and a constraining factor. It enables the particular government to develop a resource governance framework with some degree of legitimacy and to implement this framework, drawing on a minimum level of administrative capacity. However, ‘enabling’ does not mean that they will actually make use of this potential. At the same time, high-quality institutions may also constrain government. They can do so by actively contributing to the development of a resource governance framework, by criticizing and legally challenging government’s plans or by refusing to subordinate administrative procedure to political influence (Poteete 2009). The second mediating factor is political coalitions (ibid.), especially those in and around government. It is within these coalitions where the decisive incentives play out and eventually shape the decisions. In this process, the coalitions are constrained by the existing institutions. But it is they who decide to what extent they make use of institutions or attempt to pass over the constraints erected by them. Moreover, these coalitions can change and erode existing institutions or – although this is much more difficult – establish and strengthen them. In short: while institutions set the stage when resource wealth arrives, political coalitions can eventually alter that very stage. We conclude that no such thing as an automatic resource curse

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exists. The impact of resource wealth on growth and governance as mediated primarily through institutions, politics and policies vary with context, conditions and can even change direction over time.

Good Governance and Natural Resources Governance is important. Reflecting this much the ‘resource curse’ literature offers guidelines on how to build an effective management framework for natural resources, insulating governance from the damage that resource revenues can bring. Economic distortions can be avoided through the careful control of spending, notably through the establishment of sovereign wealth funds or imposition of binding rules for saving. Independent oversight bodies, a clear role for civil society and enlightening the public can help achieve transparency in accounting for financial flows. The list is long. There is a great deal of value that can be drawn from this accumulated analysis and experience, particularly for stakeholders in countries such as Uganda facing newly discovered reserves and hopes and challenges these bring. What this might actually mean in practice, what the consequences would be for any given country, is not often spelled out. Different social, political and historical contexts mean that there can be no one-size-fits-all answer. The differences between states such as Norway and Chad, for instance, are obvious and extreme, meaning that a specific policy that worked in one country may be ineffective in another. Policy options need to reflect local context and be communicated in a way that speaks to local realities. The literature is largely silent on what might be called the governance catch 22 –namely that those countries with weak governance structures most in need of learning from the experiences and mistakes from others are the very ones that are least likely to heed that advice. In other words, if the fundamental problem is not the existence of the resources themselves but weak institutions, a divided or corrupt national politics or an entrenched oligarchy, then lessons that confine themselves to issues of technical management are not likely to save countries and their populations. From the deprivations of the ‘oil curse’. As Revenue Watch put it in reference to financial management, “The difference between success and failure in the implementation of fiscal rules is oversight. Many countries have failed to benefit from these rules, not because they do not have the right ones, but because they were not followed.”

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Lessons from Norway Seeking policy proposals to deal with the problem of the resource curse not taking place in Uganda would be incomplete without a consideration of the experiences of Norway. Here, reference will be made to a country (or countries) with a similar resource endowment but who have not been infected with the paradox of ‘poverty in the midst of plenty’ (as in Chad). Norway presents a classical example of a country whose transparent and forward-looking management of its petroleum resources provides a good example for other countries. So, for our purposes, we shall consider the Norwegian experience, while also making reference to the experiences of other countries where necessary. Recently, the Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund said of Norway: “Conditions often summed up as ‘the resource curse’ can, in fact, be avoided. And there is no better place to talk about this than in Norway, a country that has given the world a model showing how to exploit finite natural resources in the long-term interests of all its citizens”. ‘Norway, one of the world's richest economies, is a model of the prudent economic Management of resource wealth’ – so states the IMF 2000 Article IV consultation with Norway. Norway is the top non-OPEC oil exporter, the world's third largest exporter of Oil, and brings up about 3.2 million barrels per day; its oil and gas industry underpins the economy, providing up to 25% of the country's gross domestic product. This Country, of nearly four and one half million people, has a steady growth rate, almost no poverty and negligible amounts of unemployment. Norway has a diverse economy based on agriculture, forestry, fishing and manufacturing, among other things – and its oil industry has developed amid much planning, bargaining, and public debate. The most recent U.N. Human Development Report ranks Norway as the number one place in the world to live, based on a cocktail of indicators relating to health, wealth and social outlook. Nearly 1% of GDP is spent each year fighting global poverty and enhancing peace. Oslo often plays a mediating role in foreign conflicts, from efforts to reconcile North and South Korea to being engaged in the (now foundering) Middle East peace process. Norway has created an economy that has retained its progressive tax structure, reinvested its oil profits throughout the economy, and it has saved money to cushion itself against future market shocks. Norway struck oil in the North Sea in the 1960s. Norwegians' best defence against the decline of the industry – which has made it the world's fourth wealthiest country – is the State Petroleum Fund, which is managed by the national Norges Bank. Parliament created the oil fund in 1990, but the state had its first budget surplus only in 1995. Up until then, the oil income was used to pay off Norway's staggering foreign debt from the tough years before North Sea

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Chapter Fifteen riches could be exploited. A substantial amount of the profits from the exploitation of a resource that is viewed as belonging to all Norwegians, and not just the current generation, is invested in foreign stocks and bonds. The state-owned fund guards against spending too freely on public sector services in boom years so as not to lay off droves of state workers when the economy goes into a downturn.” (Kato 2006). The Petroleum Fund is an instrument designed to prevent Norway's substantial oil profits from being taken too rapidly into the economy. State bank officials and government leaders believe that dispersing oil revenues directly would overheat the Norwegian economy and suppress private sector growth. Their view is that the resource rent collected from the sale of their natural wealth of oil should be conserved. Norway has extracted only about 30% of its known oil resources in three decades,and reserves are expected to last for 40 more years. But the oil that is left is mostly deep down, at a greater distance, and in quantities that make its extraction less likely to produce profits of the magnitude to which the country has become accustomed. From the perspective of some, Norway is now focusing more on how to administerand distribute the assets already acquired than on how new value might be created. There are generous benefits for both men and women: persons get eight weeks vacation, liberal sick leave and day care, all of which are reliable and inexpensive. Three-year maternity leaves, broad part-time opportunities and the creative application of telecommuting help keep women in the work force. State assistance to single mothers are so generous that there is no need for a father's income. Norway's State Petroleum Fund is now worth about $60 billion. Many of Norway's citizens fail to see why they should pay some of Europe's highest tax rates when Norway's crude output is worth about $7,000 a year for each citizen, about one quarter of the per capita GDP of $28,433. If the $60 billion is invested for a 10% return rate, then each Norwegian citizen could receive $1333 as an annual payment. The state's priority, instead, is to conserve and build the Fund and funnel fund revenues into social benefits (Hartzok 2004).

Chad In July 2003, Chad, a poor and land-locked state, joined the league of oil-exporting nations. There reached a point when it was required that several consortiums of international oil companies should extend analysis and consultation with environmentalists, anthropologists and activists. This resulted in the passage of a law detailing how the government could spend oil revenue, the creation of overseeing bodies at national and international levels, and the construction of a 1,070 kilometer pipeline terminating at the port of kribi Cameroon (Gould et al. 2012).

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The World Bank was at the centre of this effort. As the gatekeeper for international investment, the bank hoped to make Chad into a model of responsible resource extraction among countries beset by conflict and weak governance. Petro dollars will profoundly transform Chad, one of the poorest countries on earth. However, Chad’s petroleum project has faced a number of controversies. International observers were concerned with the potential creation of a ‘rentier state’ and its negative impact on governance when the fragile state began oil development in 2003 (The fund for peace 2010). In response to the international community’s call for sustainable development and alleviation of poverty with oil revenues, the government of Chad agreed to prioritise these objectives and worked with the two main international donors, the World Bank and the European Union, and oil companies to enact strict mechanisms for managing future oil revenues. The World Bank and the European Union were delegated the task of supervising implementation and adherence to the mechanisms. Chadian civil society was also expected to check that the use of the oil revenues was strictly for the alleviation of poverty. Due to the apparent consensus on the management of oil revenues, the various participants in the Chadian oil project tried to comply with the mechanisms based on the Norwegian model in a Sahelian country. After a public show of accepting the oil revenue management mechanisms, however, the Chadian government radically veered away from compliance. The Chadian government's noncompliance was made possible through the complicity of the oil companies who feared replacement by Chinese competitors. The Chadian government easily and strategically dismantled the agreed-upon governance system to take complete control of oil revenues. The World Bank and the European Union’s financial involvement (via the European Investment Bank) was initially seen, not just as a guarantee, but also as a mandatory moral caution to dispel doubts about the nature of the partnership between the Chadian government and the oil consortium that was to exploit the Doba oilfield (ExxonMobil represented by its Esso filial, Petronas Malaysia and Chevron Texaco). In return for their investments, particularly in pipeline construction, the two international organisations required good governance of oil revenues. An oil governance law inspired by the Norwegian model was adopted on 11 January 1999 by the Chadian parliament stipulating the principle of fair and transparent allocation of oil revenues. A part would be saved for future generations, a part would go to an effective fight against poverty, and five per cent of the oil revenues would go to the state’s budget. A financial agreement between the World Bank and the Chadian government

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required the transfer of the revenues to a Citibank account in London to ensure that the money would be spent for the benefit of the impoverished population and future generations. The European Union lent around €150 million for pipeline construction. It imposed clauses to prevent the Chadian government from directly selling its petrol on the international market and tasked the oil consortium with preventing the Chadian government from bypassing them as a control on the oil revenues. The European Union feared public moral censure if Chadian crude oil profits were used for purposes other than fighting poverty. Confronted with a growing armed opposition supported by Sudan, the Chadian government suddenly brandished the principle of national sovereignty to challenge the agreed-upon control system. Chadian authorities invoked “the current threats on future generations” (referring to the Eastern rebellion) and demanded the immediate use of oil revenues that were to be reserved for future generations and the addition of defence to the priority sectors originally listed. After amending the oil governance law, the shifting of oil money to the military effort had the expected outcome of defeating the rebellion in 2009. In reaction to the changes in the original system for oil revenue management, on 12 January 2006, the World Bank announced the suspension of all its aid programmes in the country and a freeze on oil revenue payments to Chad. Far from forcing the Chadian government to backtrack, the World Bank’s action motivated the government to threaten the oil consortium. Immediately after the World Bank’s decision, the Chadian government ordered the oil companies to directly pay oil revenues to the state or face suspension of their activities. The government also issued an ultimatum to the World Bank that it would close Doba oil production if the sanctions were not revoked. Concurrently, Chad restored diplomatic relations with Beijing and brought Chinese players into the oil game. In January 2007, the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) bought the assets of Encana, a Canadian company, which allowed it to obtain exploration permits in the Bongor region of south eastern Chad. Capitalising on this opportunity, Chadian authorities gave the CNPC a building permit for a second pipeline to link the Mougo oil site to the future Djemaya oil refinery. Using nationalist rhetoric, Chadian authorities removed the international institutions’ control over the management of oil revenues. The Chadian Minister of Economy and Planning declared on 7 January 2006: “The World Bank talks about the originality of this law … , as if Chadian people were ‘cobaye’ for its experimentation of a new type of management or governance” (Press Release 2006). After taking back

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control over oil revenues, Chadian authorities now had total control over the resources to carry out their own policies. They ended their partnership with the international institutions and offered to pay in full before the due date the loans for the pipeline construction. Faced with either accepting full repayment for a long and uncertain dispute with the Chadian state, the World Bank accepted the loan repayment in 2008 and thus withdrew from a contentious and potentially reputation-damaging investment. The World Bank reactivated its aid programmes in 2009. After unsuccessfully trying to leverage political pressure on Chad and given the lack of cooperation from the oil consortium, the European Union, in 2010, abandoned further attempts to convince Chad not to make a deal on crude oil commercialisation. Unlike the European Union, the oil consortium quickly accepted Chad’s commercialisation of part of its crude oil. Meanwhile, the Chadian government initiated arbitration against the European Union. Following the example of the World Bank, the European Union accepted the repayment of the loans and ended the quarrel. Since then, the World Bank has been an unwanted guest in the oil sector. In April 2010, the Chadian government prevented a civil society workshop in Doba in the south of Chad, to which the World Bank’s representatives had been invited. The authorities didn’t appreciate this initiative and Doba’s governor justified the decision by saying that the World Bank “is not anymore a Chad partner in the oil sector” (Press Release 2010). The initial transparent management of oil revenues requires that the Comité de contrôle et de suivi des resources pétrolières (CCSRP) endorse the expenditure of oil revenues. The CCSRP was created as a Chadian independent entity composed of state representatives, civil society members and representative bodies. Before authorising the expenditures, the CCSRP has to check if the requests submitted by the government were in conformity with the priority sectors listed by the oil governance law. The committee is composed of a Supreme Court magistrate, a member of parliament, a senator, the National Treasury Director, the National Director of the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), and four civil society representatives. They were appointed for three-year terms and are eligible for a second term. They were all appointed by their peers, except for the National Treasury Director and the BEAC national director who were appointed by presidential decree. In 2007, invoking the periodic rotation within the CCSRP, the Chadian government removed the Chadian labour representative and two of the civil society representatives, and substituted them with more compliant peers. Other modifications were brought to the CCSRP’s mechanism

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through decree. Initially, the Chadian government had 15 days to examine the CCSRP’s reports before their publication. Now, the report examination period was extended to 30 days without any official explanation. The government now has plenty of time to modify the reports to make them conform to its interests. These changes in the CCSRP composition and functioning have neutralised all rigorous internal control and rendered the CCSRP’s reports and recommendations a simple matter of formality.

Conclusion Uganda has got time on her hands. It is unlikely that production will commence before 2016, with full capacity not reached until 2020 or later. Oil has already started to influence politics and society, but the stress that production and revenue flow will bring with them will not be fully felt for a decade. The debate on oil must stretch beyond the politics of the present. Transparency matters if Uganda’s social cohesion is going to be maintained. The need to protect technical advice from political influence is vital in Uganda as it is for all governments. However, a population that understands how revenues are being spent is more likely to work with the government rather than against it, building a positive feedback mechanism between the people and the state that acts as a bulwark against future abuses.

Recommendation The challenge is not just to ensure that oil does not undermine governance; it is also to identify ways in which oil could become a catalyst for strengthening it. There are important lessons that can be learned from around the world.

Maintaining Social Cohesion: the importance of transparency Transparency is a watchword of much literature on the resource curse. The question one will ask is: why transparency? It is all too frequently seen as a goal in itself or as a mechanism to discipline government. Of course, transparency of budgeting and resource flows is a vital aspect of preventing corruption, which will be made all the more important by the influx of money that comes from oil production. It is key to preventing illinformed public opinion from driving the government to use resources unwisely. As two analysts noted, “in many cases, the discovery of oil and

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other resources create unrealistic expectations about future income, leading to increase in current expenditure, often on large and impractical projects” (Bryan et al. 2007). However, transparency is important in maintaining social cohesion. Rumour flourishes in the absence of accurate, timely information. And the rumour of advantage given to certain sections of society or resources unfairly distributed fuels social division, particularly in a country with the latent social cleavages of Uganda. As the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI) noted, “Affected Communities and ordinary citizens often assume that the government and companies are trying to keep the resource wealth for themselves and are undermining the economic development of the country through corruption and mismanagement” (EITI 2010). While Uganda is currently unified by the imperative of avoiding conflict, and the shared goal of economic growth, there are real risks that this consensus will put under considerable strain by oil revenues, particularly if communities feel that others are gaining more benefit.

Construction of Strong Constituency The second key aspect of resource governance to be considered is the need for a group in society able to effectively offer a considered, longterm and politically neutral balance to the short-term imperatives of politics. It is not immediately obvious where this is to be found in Uganda. The country’s ethnic variety and history of conflict mean that traditional authorities are controversial (in contrast to Botswana or Ghana, for instance, where traditional rulers are integrated into existing governance structures). As a result, they are unlikely to be able to act as a meaningful check on central politics. Media, civil society and professional bodies are well established, but are of mixed capacity and frequently politicised. Within this context, the answer for Uganda should be the development of a strong private sector. As one analyst has put it, oil has had a positive long-term impact on the development of robust political systems “in societies in which strong, independent commercial classes had emerged as powerful political actors either before oil based development began” (Smith 2005). Unlike Chile, Indonesia or Norway, Uganda does not yet have a well-developed commercial class able to advocate prudent government regulation of oil. Private sector development is important. It is a difficult challenge for resource-producing countries, and only a few have succeeded. Some, including Malaysia, Chile, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, have diversified towards manufactured exports or, as in Chile, have widened their range of resource-based exports to include new and more

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sophisticated products. The imperative of economic diversification is reflected in the priorities for use of oil revenues set out in President Museveni’s address on oil to the Ugandan parliament in early 2012, which underlined that electrification, transport infrastructure and innovation would be the three key areas of investment (Museveni 2012).

Engage the Population in Spending Decisions Making the right decisions on how to spend or save oil revenues is important. But this is only half the picture. With the stakes involved, the manner in which decisions are taken is also important; notably, to ensure that a majority of ordinary Ugandans feel involved in political decisionmaking, particular around oil. However, a recent survey has highlighted some issues of concern. Even though a majority of Ugandans say they trust President Museveni, as well as their MP and local officials, 74% also said that politics and government were too complicated for them to understand (Ugandan Survey result 2012). As noted above, more than 50% of Ugandans say that none of the oil revenues will be used for the benefit of all (ibid.) unless steps are taken to bring the population on board with a collective vision for the spending of these revenues, meaning divisions between the political elite and the majority of the population may widen. In technical terms, the most persuasive reason for this is the breakdown of the relationship between citizen and state government access to resource revenue, which lessens the need to rely on tax receipts, progressively eroding the connection between people and state. Tax is currently estimated to make just 13% of GDP, a low rate even in comparison with the rest of Africa, making Uganda particularly vulnerable to these effects. As one commentator has written about oil producing states: An unusual combination of dependence, passivity and entitlement marks the political culture of petroleum exporters … with basic needs met by an often generous welfare state, with the absence of taxation, … populations tend to be politically inactive at least as long as the oil state can deliver (Karl 2007).

Empowering Experts Uganda has experienced and capable technocrats both in the specialist oil and energy ministries, notably the petroleum Exploration and Production Department and in finance-related bodies. There are also impressive individuals in Ugandan civil societies who are able to make positive contributions to oil management. Despite the steep learning curve,

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the slow pace of oil development will allow expertise to develop in Uganda, which has a relatively strong base and is moving in the right direction. The more important question is whether their voices will be heard. The structure that has governed Uganda’s oil sector to date, run largely by the ministry of Energy, has proved relatively effective. As Uganda moves towards production, this will be replaced by a new and much extensive structure to complement the ministry’s role. And, of course, increased revenues resulting from oil production, signing bonuses and related payments will pose an additional challenge to finance-related structures. However, some of the relevant legislation being debated is the Petroleum Exploration Development and Production Bill, passed in December 2012 which gives a clear indication of the direction that Uganda’s leaders are likely to take. The 2012 legislation foresees the establishment of an independent Petroleum Authority charged with overseeing the sector in exploration, development and production phases, and a National Oil Company (NATOIL). The legislation proposes that NATOIL should “handle the state’s commercial interests” and manage the business aspects of state participation in oil. But the government retains clear overall control. The energy minister is seen as having the final say on policy related to production issues, including the issuing of licences and the minister of finance on decisions relating to spending of resulting revenues. These will first flow into a holding account before being separated into a Petroleum Investment Reserve managed by the Bank of Uganda.

References Afro barometer Round 5 Uganda Survey Results 2012. Auty, Richard M. (1993). Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis, London: Routledge Basedau, M. (2005). Resource politics in Sub-Saharan Africa beyond the resource curse Towards a Future Research Agenda in: Matthias Basedau et al. (eds.): Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, Hamburg: Institutfur Afrika-Kunde: 325-348. Bell, Joseph C. and Teresa Maurea Faria (2007). “Critical Issue for a Revenue Management Law” In Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.). Escaping the Resource Curse (Columbia: Columbia University Press) :. 2007. Cavalcanti, T. et al. (2011). “Does Oil abundance harm growth? Applied Economics Letters

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Collier, P. et al. (2004). ‘Green and Grievance in Civil War’ Oxford Economic papers. 56(4):563-595. De Soysa, Indra. (2006). ‘The Resource Curse: An Empirical Overview’, in: Michael Dauder Stadt and Anne Schildbery (eds.): Dead Ends of Transition: Rentier Economics and protectorates, Frankfurt Main: Campus Verlag: 48-58 Department of Energy (2000). Norway looking beyond the oil boom. Accessed on 25th October 2014 from www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/nte01744.htm Directorate for Public Governance and Territorial Development (2002). Further Regulatory Reforms Would Safeguard Norway's Prosperity. Accessed on 25th October 2014 from www.oecd.org/document/59/0,2340,en_2649_33735_2514299_1_1_1_ 1,00.html Doyle, A. (2001). Norway’s Labour party aims to stay on. Accessed on 25th October 2014 from www.japantoday.com/gidx/news75407.html Dunning, Thad (2008). Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes, New York: Cambridge University. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, ‘Impact of EITI in Africa: Stories from the ground 2010. Gary. I et al. (2005). Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Washington D.C: Catholic Relief Services/Bank information Center Gelb, A. (1988). Oil windfalls: Blessing or Curse, New York: Oxford University Press. Gelb, Alan. ‘Economic Diversification in Rich Countries Seminar paper Accessed on 13th June 2012 from www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2010/afrfin/pdf/Gelb2pdf Gelb, Alan and Sina Grassman. ‘How Should Oil Exporters spend their Rents? ‘Centre for Global Development Working paper 221, August 2010. Gould, J. et al. (2012). Petroleum Blues: The Political Economy of resources and conflict in Chad. In High-Value Natural Resources and Peace building, ed. P. Lujala et al. London: Earthscan. Haber, S. et al. (2011). Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse ‘American Political Science Review 105:1-26. Hartzoki, A. (2014). Citizen Dividends and Oil Resource Rents – A Focus on Alaska, Norway and Nigeria. A paper Presented in the U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network (USBIG) track of the Eastern Economic Association 30th Annual Conference held February 20-22 2004 in Washington DC.

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Heinrich, A. ‘Challenges of a Resource Boom: Review of the Literature Working Papers of the Research Centre for Eastern European Studies, University of Bremen N0114 2011. ICG. 2009. Chad: Escaping From the Oil trap. African briefing 65 (26th August) IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Norway. Accessed on 25th October 2014 www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2001/pn0110.htm Jason Hickel ‘Saving Uganda from its Oil’ June 2011 Accessed on 13th June 2012 from http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/jasonhickel/2011/06/16/saving-ugandafrom-its-oil/ Jensen, M. (2004). ‘Resource Wealth and political Regimes in Africa’, Comparative Political Studies 37 (7):816-841. Karl, Terry Lynn (1997). The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro states, Berkeley: University of California Press Karl, Terry Lynn (2007) ‘Oil –Led Development Social Political and Economic Consequences CDDRL Working paper No.80 Centre on Democracy Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, January 2007 Accessed on 13th June 2012 from http://cddrl.stanford.edu Lewis, P. (2007). Growing Apart: Oil Politics and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. May, R. et al. (2000). Two Steps Forward one Step back: Chad’s Protracted “transition to democracy”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 18 (1):108-132. Massey, S. et al. (2005). Dallas to Doba: Oil and Chad, External Controls and Internal politics. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 23 (2):253-276. Mekay, E. (2006). Chad gets World Bank over a barrel. Inter Press Service. May 4. Mika Minio-Paluello. The Uganda Upstream Oil Law: A search in vain for Accountability and Democratic Oversight Platform 2012. Poteete, A. (2009). Is Development Path Dependent or Political? A Reinterpretation of Mineral Dependent Development in Botswana Journal of Development Studies 45 (4):544-571. Takatoshi Kato, Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund at the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 2006 High Level Conference Oslo, Norway (October 17, 2006). Runyan, C. (2000). Chad/Cameroon Oil pipeline Moving Forward. World Watch 13(4); 10.

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Revenue Watch Institute. ‘Comments on petroleum revenue Management in the Draft Uganda Public Finance Bill 2012 March 2012. P.15. Sachs, Jeffrey D. et al. (2001). ‘The Curse of natural resources ‘European Economic Review 45 (4.6):827-838. Ross, M. (2001). Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics 53 (3):325361. Ross, M. (2008). ‘Oil Islam and Women’ American Political Science Review 102 (1):107-123. Shari Bryan and Barrie Hofman. Transparency and Accountability in Africa’s Extractive industries: The Role of the Executive: National Democratic Institute 2007. Shaxson, N. (2007). ‘Oil, Corruption and the Resource Curse’, International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 6. Smith, Benjamin (2005). ‘Oil Wealth and Regime Change In Michael Dauderstadi and Arne Shildberg (eds.), Dauderstädt, Michael, and Arne Schildberg. Dead Ends of Transition: Rentier Economies and Protectorates. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2006 UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa ‘Managing Natural Resources for Human Development in Low-Income Countries Wp 2011-02, December 2011. White, D. (2006). Chad-Cameroon pipeline: A leap into the unknown? Financial Times, March 1. William, C. (2001). So This is Heaven: Norway. Los Angeles Times, 8 November 2001 p.1. Yates, D. (2009). ‘Enhancing the Governance of Africa’s Oil Sector ‘South African Institute of International Affairs Occasional Paper No.51. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. ‘Address to Parliament by the President of the Republic of Uganda on Oil’ 10th February 2012.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN KWAME NKRUMAH: THE RISE OF A PAN-AFRICANIST AND THE “AFRICANIZATION” OF PAN-AFRICANISM AZIZ MOSTEFAOUI UNIVERSITY OF ADRAR, ALGERIA

Introduction Pan-Africanism is a twentieth-century movement of African racial consciousness which was born in the New World as a reaction to centuries of injustice and exploitation perpetrated by the Whites upon Africans. While it appealed to self-pride and glorified the African past, it sought to unify Africans all over the world to form a bulwark against the Whites’ domination and to promote the African race to the higher ranks of modern civilization. However, since its inception at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Pan-African movement had been dominated by AfricanAmerican and West Indian leaders. Consequently, for a long time, the PanAfricanists’ main concern was the African Diaspora rather than the African continent. Though some continental African leaders were either involved in PanAfricanism or closely followed its evolution throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, the movement remained largely a New World issue. Nevertheless, after the end of World War II the appearance of young African leaders on the Pan-African scene led to deep changes with regard to the main objectives of the movement. Particularly outstanding was Kwame Nkrumah’s role in these changes which consisted in focusing the Pan-African struggle on continental Africans rather than the diaspora, taking over Pan-African leadership from New World Africans, and

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transplanting the centers of Pan-African activities from western capitals to the African soil by the late 1950s, especially Ghana.

A Brief Account of Nkrumah’s Life to 1945 Francis Nwia Kofi Kwame Nkrumah was born on Saturday 18 September 1909 (Nkrumah 3)1 in Nkroful, a small village in Nzima near the coast in the extreme South-Western part of the Gold Coast, to the north-west of Axim. Nkrumah’s family belonged to the Nzima people who, according to Imanuel Geiss, constituted the most westerly and the least respected tribe of the Fanti (1974,368). Unlike many Gold Coast leaders then, Nkrumah was a villager who originated from the traditional tribal society. His mother told him that he was the descendent of the first settler chief on what would later constitute the Nzima land. This meant that Nkrumah was entitled to claim the stools of Nsuaem and Dadeeso in the western region of the Gold Coast (Owusu 2006, 97). Nkrumah had a happy and peaceful childhood in his village where he shared his time between the other members of the family, the sea, the lagoon, and the bush (Rooney 2010, 22). He, however, displayed a great sense of observation which made his mother decide to send him to the local elementary school. Accordingly, in 1915 Nkrumah entered the Roman Catholic Elementary School at Half-Assini. There, Nkrumah did so well that he soon caught the attention of the headmaster, Rev. Pater George Fischer, who made him a “pupil teacher” after he completed the Middle School Leaving Certificate examination (Botwe-Asamoah 2005, 2).2 In 1926, the school was visited by Rev. Alexander Gordon Fraser who was impressed by young Nkrumah’s potential and insisted on sending him to the Government Training College in Accra to train as a teacher (Rooney 2010, 23). In 1927, this school took the name of Achimota College and offered an instruction ranging from kindergarten to teacher’s training.3 Nkrumah’s training years at Achimota College had a deep impact on his personality, especially his acquaintance with one of the greatest Gold 1

Though some historical sources disagree on the exact date of Nkrumah’s birth, others (such as Addo 1997, 50; Biney 2011, 12) mention the same date given by Nkrumah. According to local custom, Nkrumah was named after the day he was born on: Saturday. 2 Nkrumah completed his elementary education in eight years instead of ten (Nkrumah 1957, 13). His talents and intelligence were certainly behind this fact. 3 For a brief history of Achimota College, see, for instance, T. Walter Wallbank. “Achimota College and Educational Objectives in Africa.” The Journal of Negro Education 4.2 (April 1935): 230-45. Print.

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Coast intellectuals: James Emman Kwegyir Aggrey. Indeed, Aggrey’s influence on him was such that Nkrumah credited Aggrey with arousing his nationalism (Nkrumah 1957, 14). To understand Nkrumah’s great admiration for Aggrey it is important to give a brief account of the latter’s life. J. E. K. Aggrey, more popularly known as “Aggrey of Africa”, was born on 18 October 1875 at Anomabu in the central region of the Gold Coast. He attended the Wesleyan School in Cape Coast where he was soon noticed for his great passion for learning. Due to his educational attainments, Aggrey was chosen to travel to the United States in 1898 to further his studies. He settled in Salisbury, North Carolina, and studied at Livingstone College which was run by the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church (A.M.E.Z.). He graduated in 1902 with three academic degrees and, besides English, he was able to speak French, German, Ancient and Modern Greek, and Latin (“James Emman Kwegyir Aggrey”). In 1905, Aggrey started teaching at the A.M.E.Z. Livingstone College, and a few years later he obtained a doctorate in theology and another in osteopathy (with honors), in 1912 and 1914 respectively. Far from satisfying his quest for knowledge, Aggrey attended summer courses in sociology, psychology, education, and the Japanese language at the renowned Columbia University in New York City between 1915 and 1917 (James Emman Kwegyir Aggrey). Aggrey strongly believed in racial cooperation, especially between the Black and Whites races. He frequently likened this cooperation to the harmony and beautiful music produced by using both black and white keys of a piano. He was convinced that the White race was necessary for the progress of the Black one, and that problems which might arise between the two races, either in Africa or in the United States, should be resolved through politics by interpreting the races to each other (King 1969, 521). Aggrey’s charisma and educational talents attracted the attention of Paul Monroe, a Professor at Columbia University and a member of Board of Trustees of the Phelps-Stokes Fund (an American charitable institution), who appointed him as the only African member of the Phelps-Stokes Commission on Education in Africa in 1920. The objective of this Commission was to determine the requirements for an improvement of education in Africa.4 When the Commissioners visited the Gold Coast, Governor Frederick G. Guggisberg was so impressed by Aggrey’s 4

- For the membership, activities, and recommendations of the Phelps-Stokes Commission on Education in Africa see, for example, Brown, Godfrey N. “British Educational Policy in West and Central Africa.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 2.3 (November 1964): 365-77. Print.

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personality that he appointed him as the deputy vice-principal of Achimota College in 1924 and a friendship soon developed between the two men. It is not surprising, therefore, that this African figure who had impressed White scholars and politicians would deeply mark young Kwame Nkrumah and generations of Africans. To pay homage to his teacher and honor his memory after his death in New York on 30 July 1927, Nkrumah founded Aggrey Students’ Society which was also meant to serve as a platform for debates (Geiss 1974, 368). After graduating in 1930, Nkrumah taught at Elmina Catholic Junior School as an elementary teacher, and the next year he was appointed as head teacher in a Catholic school in Axim. There, he undertook research into the history of his tribe, the Nzima, and contributed to the formation of Nzima Literature Society, which was founded in 1933 to unite educated Nzimas everywhere and revive the Nzima language (Newell 2006, 225). It was also through this Society that Nkrumah met Samuel R. Wood who was then secretary of the rump National Congress of British West Africa (N.C.B.W.A.) and the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (A.R.P.S.), and from whom Nkrumah learned about the history and politics of the Gold Coast. In 1934, Nkrumah failed in the entrance examination to the University of London, so he decided to follow the advice of his former teacher Aggrey and carry on his studies in the United States. Under the encouragement of the Nigerian journalist and political activist Nnamdi Azikiwe, at that time the editor of The African Morning Post, and with a letter of recommendation from S.R. Wood, Nkrumah applied for an admission to the African American University of Lincoln, Pennsylvania. He received a letter of admission to Lincoln University dated 22 April 1935, and on 31 October of that year he arrived in New York after a short stay in London where British colonial subjects were delivered American visas (Smertin 1987, 11).5 With this voyage began a new phase of Nkrumah’s life, and the ten years he spent in the United States would constitute the cornerstone of his future career as a fervent Pan-Africanist and a radical anti-colonialist. Like Aggrey, during his studies in the United States Nkrumah acquired many skills and developed an interest in various subjects such as sociology, economics, theology, education, and philosophy. In 1939, he obtained a B.A. degree with honors in economics and sociology from 5

- Nkrumah’s passage through England coincided with the Italian attack on Ethiopia. In his autobiography, he narrated his reaction when he saw a poster stating ‘Mussolini Invades Ethiopia’. He wrote: “At that time, it was almost as if the whole of London had suddenly declared war on me personally” (1957, 22).

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Lincoln and was later employed as assistant lecturer in philosophy at his alma mater. Between 1939 and 1942 Nkrumah studied theology at Lincoln University and undertook research in philosophy and pedagogy at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. In 1942, he received a Bachelor of Theology degree at Lincoln and a Master of Science in education from the University of Pennsylvania from which he again obtained the Master of Arts degree in Philosophy in February 1943 and started work on a Ph.D. (Botwe-Asamoah 2005, 8). It should be noted, however, that these achievements were realized in very difficult conditions for Nkrumah. He had noticed racism which frustrated African-Americans in the U.S.A. and even experienced it himself,6 but above all he had been plagued with pecuniary difficulties since his arrival to the United States, especially during the first years. To meet his financial needs, Nkrumah took on several casual jobs. For example, he had a part-time job at the university library; he wrote other students’ papers for them for a dollar a paper; he sold fish in New York City; he worked as a dishwasher and then as a waiter on an ocean liner between New York and Vera Cruz in Mexico during the university vacations until the outbreak of WWII; he preached in African-American churches in the East of the United States; and he taught a variety of subjects including Greek, Black history, and philosophy (Smertin 1987, 14-15; Geiss 1974, 370). Nkrumah’s interests in politics led him to get in touch with a variety of organizations, currents of thought, and politicians in the U.S.A. from whom he acquired organizational skills and widened his outlook. Nkrumah undertook his academic studies and research in parallel with intense political activities. He was involved in student organizations, attended conferences and meetings, and wrote articles in which he expressed, inter alia, his views about colonialism in Africa (Geiss 1974, 372). He became familiar with the Pan-African philosophies of W. E. B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey, but he was more influenced by the latter’s radicalism. Though he admired Aggrey’s example of the necessity of using both black and white keys of a piano to produce harmony, Nkrumah, like Garvey, believed that this harmony would be achieved only when the Black race was regarded as equal to the White, and pointed out that only freedom and independence would allow a people to claim such equality (Addo 1997, 54). Furthermore, Nkrumah reiterated his strong opposition to British colonialism and white imperialism in general, and he frequently delivered open-air lectures about the sufferings of Africans under European 6 For instance, Nkrumah recounts in his autobiography how he was refused a glass of water by a white waiter in a cafe in Baltimore because of his color (1957, 42).

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colonization. In an article published in 1943 in the United States, Nkrumah urged Africans, especially the youth, to contribute to the defeat of fascism and to the building of a post-war world based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter, while he prophesied that there would be risings on the part of colonial peoples if the colonial powers persisted in their control of the former’s destinies after the end of the Second World War (Geiss 1974, 373). By the early years of the 1940s, the number of African students in North American universities, mainly in the United States, had substantially increased, so they decided to found their own student organization to represent their interests. In January 1941, the African Students’ Service (A.S.S.) was formed at Lincoln University largely thanks to the efforts of two West African students, namely A. A. Nwafor Orizu from Nigeria and John K. Smart from Sierra Leone. In its first annual meeting, which was held in September of the same year, the A.S.S. became the African Students’ Association (A.S.A.). Though in his autobiography Nkrumah asserted that he had played an important role in the foundation of the A.S.A. (1957, 35), Geiss raised doubts about this claim because in the first issue of the African Interpreter, the A.S.A. journal, Nkrumah’s name was not mentioned at all in the sections dealing with the association’s history (Geiss 1974, 375-76). However, Geiss did not completely exclude Nkrumah’s contribution to the foundation of the A.S.A., since Lincoln University was referred to as the most important center of such an event and Nkrumah was known as one of the most active students at this University. On the other hand, during the second annual meeting of the A.S.A. in September 1942, Kwame Nkrumah was elected as its president, a position he held until he left the United States in 1945, according to him (1957, 35).7 According to Geiss, Nkrumah’s first real appearance on the PanAfrican scene was during the Conference on Africa which was held in New York in April 1944 (1974, 367). The Conference was held under the aegis of the Council on African Affairs (C.A.A.), which had been founded in 1937 by Paul Leroy Robeson, an African-American singer, actor, and politician, and Max Yergan, an African-American official of the Young Men’s Christian Association and political activist. The main aim of the C.A.A. was to provide “... pertinent and up-to-date information about Africa across the United States, particularly to African Americans” (Paul Robeson). The C.A.A. played a major role in the organization of the 7

Here again Geiss refuted this statement, claiming that in the fifth issue of the African Interpreter, dated spring 1944, Nkrumah was identified as ‘former president’ (1974, 377).

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Conference on Africa, which was attended by more than a hundred delegates with an active interest in Africa. However, Nkrumah’s preparatory work was very significant, since at that time he was already a leading figure in student circles in the United States. Besides African-American and white American organizations and groups, the Conference on Africa was also attended by some African and West Indian delegates, thus giving it a Pan-African character. Besides the C.A.A. and the A.S.A., the hundred and twelve delegates present at the Conference represented the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.), the Urban League, the First Abyssinian Baptist Church, the Ethiopian School of Research History, the Ethiopian World Federation, the International African Goodwill Society, Pioneer Negroes of the World, the World Federation of African Peoples, the West Indies National Council, and the Farmers’ Committee of British West Africa (Geiss 1974, 382).8 The main resolution passed at the Conference on Africa was an appeal to the American government to promote every effort in the direction of the achievement of development and selfgovernment in the African continent, according to the right of selfdetermination as stated in the Atlantic Charter. Moreover, this conference introduced Nkrumah to the Pan-African movement and gave him the opportunity to meet leaders of African descent who had a common interest in the motherland and the welfare of the Black race the world over. But it would be in Britain that Nkrumah would really make his full entry onto the Pan-African stage to become an influential figure and even undertake radical changes in Pan-African thought.

Nkrumah’s Years in Britain (1945-1947) To complete his Ph.D. dissertation and supposedly study law, Nkrumah traveled to London in May 1945. Soon after he entered the London School of Economics, Nkrumah gave up his studies and never completed his dissertation because of financial difficulties and his total immersion in political activities (Owusu 2006, 99). When he arrived in London, which was at that time a center of Pan-African activities, Nkrumah was received by Malcolm Ivan Meredith Nurse, better known in history as George Padmore, a brilliant West Indian personality and a late theorist of the Pan-African ideology. Nkrumah handed him a letter of recommendation from C.L.R. James – the famous Trinidadian writer, 8 This list, provided by Geiss, is not exhaustive, and there seems to be no information about most of these groups.

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journalist, and Pan-African activist – whom Nkrumah had first met when he was a student at Lincoln. Padmore, who had been involved in politics, journalism, and the Pan-African and anti-colonial struggle, would soon become Nkrumah’s mentor. Shortly after his arrival to London, Nkrumah was introduced to the West African Students’ Union (W.A.S.U.) by one of his A.S.A. colleagues who was in London, Ako Adjei, and very soon Nkrumah became its deputy president (Geiss 1974,397). The W.A.S.U. was founded on 7 August 1925 by Ladipo Solanke, a Nigerian law student with a Pan-West African vision, together with a number of West African students in London and with the support of the prominent Gold Coast nationalist leader, Casely Hayford. Membership of the W.A.S.U. was at the beginning limited to students from British West Africa but then acquired a PanAfrican dimension when African-Americans and West Indians were also admitted. In fact, what characterized this organization was that it was neither West African nor exclusively student as might be deduced from its name. Its membership was not restricted to West Africans only but was open to all African students. Besides, some of its members were not students. The W.A.S.U. established branches in the major towns of the Gold Coast (the first branch was in Accra) and Casely Hayford had been its patron from 1927 until his death in 1930.9 Nkrumah was thus an element of continuity of the Pan-West African project initiated by Hayford in the 1920s through the foundation of the N.C.B.W.A. and which was regarded as a first step towards African unity. In this respect, Nkrumah wrote: “The political and economic predicament of Liberia demonstrates the fact that unless there is a complete national unity of all the West African colonies it will be practically impossible for any one West African colony to throw off her foreign yoke” (1973, 33).10 He further continued: “The West African colonies, for example, must first unite and become a national entity, absolutely free from the encumbrances of foreign rule, before they can assume the aspect of international co-operation on a grand scale...” (1973,33).

9

For a brief history of the W.A.S.U., see, for instance, Garigue, Philip. “The West African Students’ Union: A Study in Culture Contact.” Journal of the International African Institute 23.1 (January 1953): 55-69; and Mostefaoui, Aziz. “The West African Students’ Union: An African Pressure Group in Britain (1920s-1950s).” Al-Hakika 8 (May 2006): pp. 229-40. 10 Nkrumah had started writing this booklet in 1942 when he was a student in the U.S.A., but because of his studies he could not complete it until he moved to London in 1945. However, it was first published only in 1962.

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When Nkrumah reached London, preparations for the Fifth PanAfrican Congress were already underway. The bulk of the organizational effort was undertaken by the newly formed Pan-African Federation (P.A.F.) and George Padmore, who played a key role, according to Geiss (1974,388).11 Preparations for the Fifth Pan-African Congress consisted in a series of meetings and conferences between various colored anti-colonial groups and individuals in Britain to discuss matters relating to the date and place of the Congress, representation, and issues to be debated. There was also constant correspondence between Padmore and Du Bois who was apparently overtaken by events and thus played a minor role in the preparatory steps.12 During this time, Nkrumah seems to have been very influential since, within a short time after his arrival to London, he was appointed as political co-secretary of a special international conference secretariat which was entrusted with the task of organizing the future PanAfrican Congress. The secretariat included also Dr. Peter Milliard (President of the P.A.F.) from British Guiana as chairman, T. R. Makonnen (General Secretary of the P.A.F.) also from British Guiana as treasurer, Peter Abrahams from South Africa as publicity secretary, and Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya as assistant secretary (Padmore 1956, 155). For the first time, then, most of the organizational work for the PanAfrican Congress was carried out by a new generation of West Indian and African Pan-Africanists, while the African-American element was almost absent, except for Du Bois, who acted more as an adviser (and sometimes as a critic) than as a real organizer. In addition to this, signs of a change in Pan-African outlook had appeared a few months before the holding of the Fifth Pan-African Congress. On 10 June 1945, an All Colonial People’s Conference was convened by the P.A.F., the W.A.S.U., the Federation of Indian Associations in Britain, the Ceylon Students’ Association, and the Burma Association. During this Conference, Padmore – who was then the 11

The P.A.F. was founded in Manchester in 1944 after the fusion of a number of Black and colonial organizations, and student and labor unions in Britain and Africa. These were: the International African Service Bureau, the Negro Welfare Centre, the Negro Association (Manchester), the Coloured Workers’ Association (London), the Coloured People’s Association (Edinburgh), the United Committee of Coloured and Colonial People’s Association (Cardiff), the African Union (Glasgow), the Association of Students of African Descent (Dublin), the W.A.S.U. (Great Britain and Ireland), the Kikuyu Central Association (Kenya), the African Progressive Association (London), African Youth League (Sierra Leone Section), and the Friends of African Freedom Society (the Gold Coast) (Thompson 1969,338; Padmore1956, 149). 12 For a detailed account of the preparations for the Fifth Pan-African Congress, see Geiss (1974,387-98).

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most prominent exponent of Pan-Africanism – displayed an increasing interest in and focus on the African continent rather than other places where people of African descent lived, a tendency that would continue during the Fifth Pan-African Congress (Geiss 1974, 397). The Fifth Pan-African Congress assembled from 15 to 19 October 1945 at Charlton Town Hall, Manchester. During this Congress, the PanAfrican movement took a new direction and an important change took place in the main objective of the ideology. Henceforward, stress was no longer laid on a racial unity, but rather on a continental one. The ultimate objective of Pan-Africanism was now to achieve the political unity of the African countries into one strong territory that would ultimately form the ‘United States of Africa’, and the Pan-Africanists focalized their efforts more and more on the African continent. Geiss pointed out that “… the fifth Pan-African Congress was the last demonstration of African and Afro-American solidarity” (1974, 397). Furthermore, a shift in the vanguard of the movement occurred when the young African leaders who attended the Congress took over the leadership through their dynamism and determination to eradicate colonialism from Africa. W.E.B. Du Bois, the ‘Grand Old Man’ as he was then called (he was almost seventy-eight years old in 1945), had hitherto represented the living symbol of the PanAfrican movement. He, however, still clung to his moderate claims for the improvement of the Blacks’ conditions and had no intention of deviating from the path he had followed since the First Pan-African Congress in 1919. On the other hand, the young generation of African leaders, among whom Nkrumah was the most outspoken figure, affirmed their political radicalism by using a revolutionary tone. They were no longer satisfied with piecemeal concessions and gradual political reforms. They now aspired to self-government and independence. Some of the African leaders who attended the Congress, such as the Kenyan Jomo Kenyatta, the Sierra Leonean T. Wallace-Johnson, and the South African novelist and poet Peter Abrahams, would later play an important role in their countries’ nationalist struggle for freedom (Legum 1969, 31). According to Padmore, what characterized this Pan-African Congress in comparison to the previous ones was its plebeian aspect due to the fact that the delegates represented political organizations, farmers’ movements, and trade and student unions. This represented another change in the PanAfrican Congress movement which had been elitist in nature since its creation but now turned towards a mobilization of the masses to gain further momentum. “Earlier Congresses,” Padmore wrote, “had centred around a small intellectual élite. Now there was expression of a mass

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movement intimately identified with the underprivileged sections of the coloured colonial populations” (1956, 161). More than two hundred delegates from Africa, the West Indies, and Great Britain were present at the Fifth Pan-African Congress. However, apart from Du Bois who came at his own expense and did not represent any organization, no African-American attended this congress. According to Geiss, this was due to the difficulty of obtaining permits from the American government at the end of the Second World War and to the African-Americans’ waning interest in Africa (399). Six delegates from the Gold Coast attended the Congress representing the historic A.R.P.S., the Gold Coast Railway Civil Servants’ and Technical Workers’ Union, and the Gold Coast Farmers’ Association, whereas Nkrumah attended on behalf of the I.A.S.B. Other African countries (these were Uganda, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, Kenya, and the Union of South Africa) sent their delegates (about six in all), but West African representatives were more numerous – about 19 delegates representing the Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria (Geiss 1974, 400). However, the West Indies enjoyed the largest representation, with 33 delegates appearing on behalf of different organizations, including the Universal Negro Improvement Association (U.N.I.A.). At that time, Marcus Garvey’s organization existed mainly in Jamaica and was led by his second widow, Mrs. Amy Jacques Garvey, who did not attend the Congress but could send representatives (Geiss 1974, 401). Nkrumah and Padmore were appointed as chief secretaries acting jointly. The two sessions of the first day of the Congress were held under the chairmanship of Mrs. Amy Ashwood Garvey (Garvey’s first wife) who was living in London and represented the I.A.S.B. The delegates discussed the problem of racial discrimination in Britain and drew attention to the gap which existed between Black workers and students. They demanded, inter alia, that discrimination on account of race, creed, or color be made a criminal offence by law (Padmore 1956, 162). The third and fourth sessions of the Congress were devoted to the situation in British and French African colonies. Nkrumah, who acted as principal rapporteur, was one of the main speakers and attacked imperialism in these parts of Africa. He argued that the outbreak of World War II was in large a consequence of European imperialism (Geiss 1974,405). There was also a collective condemnation of the oppressive system of apartheid in South Africa, and the Congressmen displayed great solidarity with the Africans of the country. During the first session of the third day of the proceedings, Padmore broke the tradition according to which each session was to be held under a

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different chairman and recommended the appointment of Du Bois as permanent president of the Congress as a sign of gratitude for his role in the development of the Pan-African ideology. The delegates acquiesced to the motion, and Du Bois held this position until the end of the Congress (Geiss 1974, 406). Wallace-Johnson was appointed deputy chairman, and discussions centered on the conditions in East Africa and the importance of the three Black free-states of Ethiopia, Haiti and Liberia, which represented the evidence of the Blacks’ capacity to rule themselves. The main speakers were Kenyatta and Padmore. Matters relating to the West Indies were dealt with on 18 October through the reports of Padmore, who presented a brief historical survey of this region, and other West Indian delegates. The last day of the Congress was held under the chairmanship of Peter Milliard, and the main speakers were Mrs. A.A. Garvey and another U.N.I.A. representative who tackled the problems facing women in the West Indies (Geiss 1974,406-07). The resolutions passed at the Fifth Pan-African Congress differed from those of the previous Pan-African Congresses in substance and style. They concerned different regions of Africa, the West Indies, and the color bar in Britain. They demanded the ending of colonialism and racism, and they called for unity of the Africans under the banner of “the United States of Africa” (Thompson 1969, 58). The delegates, especially the Africans, did not ask for constitutional reforms, but for the first time they explicitly demanded complete independence from European powers. This very point marks the change which occurred in the Africans’ outlook after the Second World War and reflects the colonial peoples’ impatience with the dominating power’s reluctance regarding their aspirations. Furthermore, the delegates made it clear that would the colonial powers disregard their colonies’ aspirations, they might have recourse to violence to achieve independence if need be. Part of the most important resolutions passed at the Fifth Pan-African Congress under the heading of ‘The Challenge to the Colonial Powers’ read: The delegates of the fifth Pan-African Congress believe in peace ... Yet, if the Western World is still determined to rule mankind by force, then Africans, as a last resort, may have to appeal to force in effect to achieve freedom, even if force destroys them and the world. We are determined to be free. We want education. We want the right to earn a decent living; the right to express our thoughts and emotions, to adopt and create forms of beauty. We demand for Black Africa autonomy and independence; so far and no further than it is possible in this ‘One

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World’ for groups and peoples to rule themselves subject to inevitable world unity and federation.13

The Africans’ great desire for and impatience with independence was further emphasized through Nkrumah’s famous ‘Declaration to the Colonial Peoples of the World’ which was approved and adopted by the Congress, and in which he severely attacked colonialism and stressed the importance of unity among the colonized. Influenced by Gandhi’s technique of nonviolence and non-cooperation, Nkrumah appealed to the workers and farmers to use strikes, economic boycott, and civil disobedience to fight against imperialism (Nkrumah 1965, 134-35). He also urged the intellectuals to play their role in the nationalist movements by awakening and organizing the masses: We affirm the right of the colonial peoples to control their own destiny. All colonies must be free from foreign imperialist control, whether political or economic. The peoples of the colonies must have the right to elect their own Government, without restrictions from foreign Powers. We say to the peoples of the colonies that they must fight for these ends by all means at their disposal. We also call upon the intellectuals and professional classes of the colonies to awaken to their responsibilities. By fighting for trade union rights, the right to form co-operatives, freedom of the Press, assembly, demonstration and strike ... you will be using the only means by which your liberties will be won and maintained ...14

With regard to the resolutions passed at the Fifth Pan-African Congress and Nkrumah’s Declaration, it is clear that despite the West Indians’ numerical superiority, the African leaders dominated politically and greatly influenced the course of the proceedings. By the end of the Congress, Africans were at the forefront of Pan-Africanism thanks to the great dynamism and strength of personality displayed by Nkrumah and other African leaders. Henceforward, Pan-Africanism became more African-oriented and the process of its ‘appropriation’ by the Africans began. The old belief that the struggle for African freedom could be conducted from Europe or the New World was abandoned, and the young

13

For full text see Thompson 1969, 58-59; Legum 1962, 137; and Padmore 1956,170. 14 See full text in Legum 1962, 137; Nkrumah 1973, 44-45); and Padmore 1956, 171-72.

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African Pan-Africanists understood that the battle for independence should be fought by Africans in Africa itself. After the end of the Fifth Pan-African Congress, Nkrumah carried on his Pan-African activities in London. He was appointed as general secretary of a working committee of the Pan-African Congress movement with Du Bois as chairman. To put the resolutions of the Pan-African Congress into practice in West Africa, Nkrumah and some West African leaders, like Wallace-Johnson, took the initiative of founding the West African National Secretariat (W.A.N.S.). Encouraged by Padmore, the W.A.N.S. was founded in London on 14 December 1945 and was meant “… to serve as a coordinating body for nationalist movements in West Africa and as a regional organization of the Pan-African Federation” (Langley 1973, 357). Nkrumah took up the position of general secretary and Wallace-Johnson assumed the chairmanship. The aims of the W.A.N.S. reflected Nkrumah’s Pan-African ideals and his political convictions, for the main objective of this body was the achievement of independence through the organization of the masses for a more effective struggle. It also aimed at the unification of the West African territories, transcending personal and tribal differences (Esedebe 1982, 174). The ultimate objective which had led Casely Hayford to the creation of the N.C.B.W.A. in the 1920s was now resuscitated by Nkrumah but with a further extension of the geographical map of West Africa. Langley wrote: “By the united West Africa the W.A.N.S. meant British, French, Spanish, and Portuguese West Africa, as well as the Belgian Congo and Liberia” (1973,360-61). Nkrumah and his radical associates regarded the independence of a united West Africa as a prelude to the collapse of European rule in Africa. As such, they appealed to all Africans to join and support the W.A.N.S. The latter’s monthly official organ, The New African, was launched in March 1946 by Nkrumah, with the subtitle ‘The Voice of the Awakened African’ and the motto ‘For Unity and Absolute Independence’. It was a short-lived journal, for its publication stopped about eight months later because of the financial difficulties faced by the W.A.N.S. (Esedebe 1982, 174-75). By this time Nkrumah was fully engaged in Pan-African activism and sought to exploit the organizational skills he had acquired in the United States and during the Fifth Pan-African Congress. His Pan-African ambitions were such that, in May 1946, he thought about organizing an all-West African Conference. For this purpose, he travelled to Paris to meet some French West African deputies in the French National Assembly – such as Sourou-Migan Apithy, a future president of Benin (formerly Dahomey); Leopold Sédar Senghor, the first president of Senegal; Lamine

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Guèye, a Senegalese politician; and Félix Houphouet-Boigny, the first president of Côte d’Ivoire – to discuss the idea of West African unity and independence and secure their support for his projected Conference (Geiss 414). He tried to set a dialogue between French-speaking and Englishspeaking Africans, on the one hand, and involve the former in the PanAfrican struggle, on the other. Through the joint effort of the W.A.N.S. and the W.A.S.U., the Conference was eventually held in London from 30 August to 1 September 1946 and was followed by another one in April 1947. Some African deputies from the French territories were present at both conferences, but apparently they supported neither Nkrumah’s PanWest African project, nor his demand for independence because of their adherence to the French policy of assimilation and integration (Geiss 1974, 414). Convinced that he had to lead the battle for independence in his country, Nkrumah finally returned to the Gold Coast by the end of 1947 to take up his position as general secretary of J.B. Danquah’s United Gold Coast Convention (U.G.C.C.). Nkrumah’s return was followed by a lull in Pan-African activities, but the idea of unity did not die out. Though he concentrated all his efforts on his country’s political freedom at the beginning, Nkrumah remained a staunch exponent of Pan-Africanism as he himself pointed out: “When I returned to West Africa in 1947, it was with the intention of using the Gold Coast as a starting-off point for African independence and unity” (Africa Must Unite 136). His devotion to the political situation in the Gold Coast at the beginning of his nationalist career in the country was, Nkrumah believed, an obligatory first step towards the achievement of the Pan-African ideal in Africa. After a long political struggle, in which Nkrumah played a leading part, the Gold Coast finally gained its independence on 6 March 1957 under the new name of Ghana, thereby becoming the first African colony to win its sovereignty. With this historic achievement, Nkrumah realized the first step of his Pan-African project which consisted in regional and then continental unity. This could, however, be reached only if political freedom of all African countries was fulfilled, thus Nkrumah stated in a Pan-African rhetoric that Ghana’s independence would remain meaningless as long as there were African countries under European colonization. Nonetheless, he was determined to pave the way for the future unity of the African continent because he believed that the days of European colonialism were numbered. To put his plan into practice, Nkrumah invited George Padmore to Ghana in 1958 and made him his adviser on African questions.

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Padmore’s first initiative was to contribute to the organization of the Conference of Independent African States which took place from 15 to 22 April 1958 in Accra with the participation of eight countries: Ethiopia, Liberia, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, and Ghana. The main aims of the Conference were to exchange views on matters of common interest, consolidate economic and cultural ties between the participating African countries, and devise ways to help the other African countries which were still under colonization.15 However, this conference had a more historical significance with regard to the Pan-African movement. Nkrumah stated: “When, on 15 April 1958, I welcomed the representatives to the conference, I felt that at last Pan-Africanism had moved to the African continent where it really belonged” (1965, 136). For the first time, African leaders met on the African soil to discuss matters relating to the present and future of their own continent, an event which had hitherto been possible only in the United States or Britain.

Conclusion Kwame Nkrumah’s encounter with Pan-African trends and leaders in the United States and Britain during the 1930s and 1940s had a deep impact on his political vision and orientation. His involvement in PanAfrican activism by the side of brilliant figures turned him into an ardent exponent of Pan-Africanism. He was determined to give life to the idea of continental unity though he was well aware of the difficulties which stood in the way of this ideal. Despite this, Nkrumah is to be credited with settling Pan-Africanism on the African continent. He turned Ghana into a center for propagating Pan-African views and pledged himself to giving diplomatic and material support to different nationalist movements of liberation throughout Africa. Nkrumah believed that Ghana’s independence would remain meaningless as long as there was an African country under European domination. He considered Africa’s liberation and unity as the most important prerequisites for African progress in all walks of life. His famous message was clear: “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added onto you”.

15 For the resolutions passed at this Conference, see, for example, Quaison-Sackey 1963, 72-73.

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References Books Addo, Ebenezer Obiri. 1997. Kwame Nkrumah: A Case Study of Religion and Politics in Ghana. Lanham, MD: University Press of America,. Biney, Ama. 2011. The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Botwe-Asamoah, Kwame. 2005. Kwame Nkrumah’s Politico-cultural Thought and Policies: An African-centered Paradigm for the Second Phase of the African Revolution. New York: Routledge. Esedebe, P. Olisanwuche. 1982. Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776-1963. Washington, D.C.: Howard UP. Geiss, Imanuel. 1974. The Pan-African Movement: A History of PanAfricanism in America, Europe and Africa. Trans. Ann Keep. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd. Langley, J. Ayodele. 1973. Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa, 1900-1945: A Study in Ideology and Social Classes. Oxford: Clarendon. Legum, Colin. 1962. Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide. New York: Praeger. Newell, Stephanie. 2006. 211-235. “Entering the Territory of Elites: Literary Activity in Colonial Ghana.” Africa’s Hidden Histories: Everyday Literacy and Making the Self. Ed. Karin Barber. Bloomington: Indiana UP. Nkrumah, Kwame. 1957. The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons. Nkrumah, Kwame. 1965. Africa Must Unite. London: Mercury Books. —. 1973. Towards Colonial Freedom. London: Panaf Books Ltd. Owusu, Robert Yaw. , 2006. Kwame Nkrumah’s Liberation Thought: A Paradigm for Religious Advocacy in Contemporary Ghana. Trenton, NJ: Africa World. Padmore, George. 1956. Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle for Africa. London: D. Dobson. Quaison-Sackey, Alex. 1963. Africa Unbound: Reflections of an African Statesman. New York: Praeger. Rooney, David. 2010. Kwame Nkrumah: Vision and Tragedy. Second ed. Accra, Ghana: Sub-Saharan. Smertin, Yuri. 1987. Kwame Nkrumah. New York: International Publishers. Thompson, Vincent Bakpetu. 1969. Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism. London: Longman.

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Article King, Kenneth. 1969 “James E. K. Aggrey: Collaborator, Nationalist, PanAfrican.” The Canadian Journal of African Studies. Autumn 3.3: 51130.

Websites “James Emman Kwegyir Aggrey.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 16 Mar. 2014. Web. 22 June 2014. . “Paul Robeson.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 19 June 2014. Web. 24 June 2014. .

CONTRIBUTORS

David O. Akombo is Associate Professor of Music at Jackson State University, Jackson, MS, USA. He has authored and co-authored two books respectively, Music and Healing Across Cultures (2006) and The Anthology of African Band Music (2013). His selected research interests are in ethnomusicology and music-biomedical science interface. Contact info: [email protected] Dr Vladimir Antwi-Danso is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for International Affairs, University of Ghana, Legon. His research interests are in the area of international political economy, regional integration, and issues in international relations, conflict, violence and peace building. He is the author of several conference papers, monographs and articles in scholarly journals. Contact: [email protected] Dr. Herbert Adam, FRSC, is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Simon Fraser University. His most recent book, co-published with Dr. Kogila Moodley, is Imagined Liberation: Xenophobia, Identity and Citizenship in South Africa, Germany and Canada (Stellenbosch: SUN Press). An expanded edition is forthcoming with Temple University Press, Philadelphia. Contact: [email protected] Dr Jo Beall is Director of Education and Society at the British Council. She was formerly Professor of Development Studies at the London School of Economics and Deputy Vice Chancellor of the University of Cape Town. She has written numerous books and articles on governance and civil society, women and development and fragile cities and states. During the ‘80s, Jo was involved in anti-apartheid activities in South Africa, imprisoned and put in solitary confinement. On release, she fled to Britain where she remained in exile until 1994. Contact: [email protected] Dr Ama Biney has worked as a freelance journalist and lecturer. She has over 20 years teaching experience in the UK and has taught courses in African and Caribbean History, post-independence African political history, the history of Pan-Africanism and the history of black people in Britain. Among her recent publications are: The Political and Social

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Contributors

Thought of Kwame Nkrumah (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); “The Intellectual and Political Legacies of Kwame Nkrumah” in From Colonization to Globalization: The Intellectual and Political Legacies of Kwame Nkrumah and Africa’s Future edited by C. Quist-Adade and C. Frances (Dayspring, 2011); Speaking Truth to Power: Selected Pan-African Postcards of Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem compiled by A. Biney & A. Olukoshi (Pambazuka Press, African Women’s Development Fund, CODESIRA, 2010). Contact: [email protected] Dr De-Valera N.Y.M. Botchway. Department of History, University of Cape Coast, Ghana. Contact: [email protected] Collence Takaingenhamo Chisita is a Principal Lecturer and Researcher based at Harare Polytechnic's School of Information Sciences, Zimbabwe. Contact: [email protected] Stanford (Khulu) Eland During the Soweto student uprising of 1976, Stanford was among the first group of Soweto students to leave South Africa for exile in Swaziland and Tanzania under the auspices of the PanAfricanist Congress of Azania (PAC). In 1986, he resettled in Canada, where he was involved in the movement that called for economic sanctions against the Apartheid regime and boycott(s) of South African products. In 2010, he was elected as the first Secretary of the South African Cultural Association of BC (SACABC), of which he is still a member. Contact: [email protected] Dr. Auburn Ellis is a freelance artist and lecturer at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago. She received her Ed.D. in Adult and Continuing Education from the National Louis University in Chicago in 2013. She has developed workshops and curricula for practitioners in urban areas serving minority students. [email protected] Yabome Gilpin-Jackson is a scholar-practitioner in the areas of leadership and organization development and learning. She has provided consulting support, subject matter expertise and thought leadership for corporate, non-profit and public-sector companies. Yabome’s work is currently focused in leadership and organization development in the Canadian healthcare system. She holds a doctorate in Human and Organization Systems and conducts research on human development needs in the developing world. She was named an Institute for Social Innovation

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Scholar at Fielding Graduate University, CA for her research into the growth and development needs of war-affected people. Contact: [email protected] Baruti I. Katembo is an Adjunct Mathematics Professor at Jones College, Jacksonville, FL, USA. His publications include ‘Africa, Seeds, and Biofuel’ (2007; co-authored article) and two books, Elephants in a Bamboo Cage (2001) and Scattered Assets (2012). His selected research interests are in resource usage and socio-technology. Contact: [email protected] Dr. John Marah is Professor of African-American Studies, College at Brockport, State University of New York, NY, USA. He is the author of Pan-African Education: The Last Stage of Educational Developments in Africa (1989); African People in the Global Village (1998); and co-editor of The Africana Human Condition and Global Dimensions (2002). Dr. Marah is currently working on a book entitled The African Union Needs a Pan-African Educational System: Essays on Pan-African Education and Pan-Africanism. Contact: [email protected] Dr. Kogila Moodley is a Professor Emerita at the University of British Columbia, where she was the first holder of the David Lam Chair of Multicultural Studies. She has co-authored with Dr. Heribert Adam numerous books on South Africa including: Imagined Liberation: Xenophobia, Citizenship and Identity in South Africa, Germany and Canada (2014); Seeking Mandela: Peacemaking Between Israelis and Palestinians (2005); The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New South Africa (1993); and South Africa Without Apartheid: Dismantling Racial Domination (1986). Raised in the Indian community of apartheid South Africa, her expertise includes multiculturalism, antiracism, ethnic and race relations. Contact: [email protected] Aziz Mostefaoui is a lecturer, with a specialization in History, Africa and Methodology, in the Faculty of Letters and Languages at the University of Adrar, Algeria. [email protected] Jay Naidoo was recently voted one of the top 100 most influential Africans. He was at the forefront of the struggle against apartheid, leading the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the largest trade union federation in South Africa. After Independence in 1994, he held

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Contributors

ministerial positions in Mandela’s Cabinet. He is currently Chair of the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN). Contact: [email protected] Silk Ugwu Ogbu teaches at the School of Media and Communication, Pan-Atlantic University, Lagos. His research interests include conflict resolution, electoral and institutional reforms, and alternative community development strategies. He is a public relations and customer service consultant, a political analyst and a communication strategist. Contact: [email protected] Chuka Okoli is with the General Studies Unit, Federal University Oye Ekiti, Ekiti State, Nigeria. Prior to coming to the University, Okoli worked for Anambra State Government of Nigeria in various roles. His research interests are peace-building, African politics, conflict resolution, public policy, natural resources and peacekeeping. Contact: [email protected] Arinze Ngwube is with the General Studies Unit, Federal University OyeEkiti, Ekiti State Nigeria. Contact: [email protected] Dr. Dan O’Meara is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at the Université du Québec (UQAM) à Montréal, Director of the MA program in Political Science, and Research Director of UQAM’s Centre d’études pluridisciplianaires de la sécurité et la société. A graduate of the University of the Witwatersrand (South Africa) and Sussex University (UK), and a member of the African National Congress of South Africa from 1976 to 1996, he is the author or co-author of eight books and over sixty articles on the politics of Southern Africa, Great Britain and the USA. Contact: [email protected] Professor D. Zizwe Poe is a professor at Lincoln University, Pennsylvania, Nkrumah’s Alma Mater. Poe has published articles on Nkrumah and PanAfricanism and written seven chapters in scholarly books, 14 encyclopedia entries, and six articles in scholarly journals. He currently sits on the board of two scholarly journals and has served as an on-screen consultant for the History Channel’s The Spanish American War: First Intervention. Dr. Poe also worked for Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s brainchild, the All-African People’s Revolutionary Party, for over 25 years. Poe has also participated in a number of African Union conferences and other Pan-African

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conferences organized by the Diopian Institute for Scholarly Advancement. Contact: [email protected] Alexander Rusero is a Principal Lecturer and Researcher based at Harare Polytechnic's School of Information Sciences, Zimbabwe. Contact: [email protected] Dr Catherine Schittecatte is Chair of the Global Studies Program and Global Studies Internship Coordinator in the Department of Political Science at Vancouver Island University, British Columbia. Contact: [email protected] Kmt G. Shockley is an Associate Professor in the Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies at Howard University, Washington, DC. His publications include a co-authored article entitled Perceptions of Teacher Transformation on Issues of Racial and Cultural Bias (2012) and the book, The Miseducation of Black Children (2008). Dr. Shockley has selected research interests in African-centered education and educational transformation. Contact: [email protected]

INDEX Abuja, 270, 271, 277, 278, 280 Abuja Treaty, 270, 271, 277 Adam, 38, 121, 130, 136, 231, 367, 369 Addis Ababa, 133, 256, 278, 279, 287 AEC, 270, 271, 279 Africa, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 115, 116, 129, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 157, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 182, 183, 184, 187, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 242, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 268, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 281,

283, 284, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 294, 297, 298, 303, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 311, 312, 313, 314, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 362, 363, 364, 365, 367, 368, 369, 370 Africa Must Unite, 45, 58, 136, 251, 264, 328, 363, 365 African Americans, 66, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 91, 92, 237, 238, 247, 264, 354 African Diaspora, 59, 61, 72, 85, 91, 92, 93, 152, 155, 157, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 175, 177, 181, 189, 194, 233, 237, 255, 289, 349 African Economic Community, 270, 277, 280 African Indigenous Knowledge, 288 African Liberation, 8, 10, 44, 45, 47, 48, 56, 136, 176 African slaves, 59, 132, 229 African spirituality, 288, 291 African Union, 42, 92, 133, 138, 144, 163, 169, 172, 173, 176, 181, 194, 205, 219, 232, 259, 260, 261, 274, 277, 279, 317, 320, 323, 326, 329, 357, 368, 370 African worldview, 198, 200, 201, 297 Africanization, 56, 71, 72, 75, 349 Africentric, 101, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157 AfriCom, 47 Aggrey, 351, 352, 353, 366

Re-engaging the African Diasporas Akombo, 59, 94, 366 Algeria, 316, 349, 369 al-Qaeda, 86, 89 AMU, 270 ANC, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 40 and South African Communist Party, 18, 40 Angola, 60, 92, 150, 231 anti-apartheid, 16, 24, 25, 27, 367 Antwi-Danso, 265, 268, 366 Apartheid, 16, 18, 28, 328, 368, 369 Arab Maghreb Union, 270 Arabs, 61, 62, 63, 64, 99, 228, 229, 232, 233, 249 Ashanti, 62, 163, 308, 312 Asia, 59, 60, 62, 70, 103, 104, 106, 107, 112, 114, 169, 183, 230, 237, 287, 321 Azikiwe, 133, 166, 176, 352 Balkanization, 57, 109, 165, 254, 323 Bantu, 59, 62, 74, 91, 92, 95, 97, 99, 102, 221 Beall, 8, 10, 18, 21, 25, 36, 367 Berlin Conference, 109 Biko, 2, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, 177 Biney, 138, 257, 262, 350, 365, 367 Black Americans, 71, 96, 250 Black Arts Movement, 158 Black Consciousness Movement, 27, 34, 47 Black Nationalism, 71 Blacks, 9, 27, 35, 40, 61, 62, 63, 82, 83, 98, 229, 234, 235, 236, 239, 240, 244, 247, 254, 358, 360 Blyden, 133, 236, 250, 251, 258, 263 Boko Haram, 41 Botchway, 288, 294, 297, 300, 367 brain drain, 161, 168, 169, 175, 179, 184 brain gain, 161, 168, 175, 179 BRICS, 146, 150

373

Canada, 31, 61, 119, 122, 135, 236, 261, 312, 319, 367, 368, 369 capitalism, 31, 35, 86, 109, 111, 112, 122, 127, 138, 139, 141, 144, 146, 147, 148, 171, 176, 225, 241, 249, 310, 313 Capitalism, 73, 104, 105, 135 Caribbean, 61, 62, 71, 75, 91, 150, 161, 183, 244, 255, 367 Caucasian, 59, 61, 62, 84 Chad, 62, 332, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 346, 347, 348 China, 36, 46, 86, 87, 94, 97, 100, 101, 114, 134, 180, 187, 254, 261, 263, 314, 320, 321, 322, 324, 327, 328, 329, 340 Chisita, 161, 367 Christian, 51, 64, 71, 94, 98, 99, 135, 232, 252, 261, 315, 354 CIA, 104, 115, 137, 257 Cold War, 104, 109, 122, 134, 163, 209, 280, 304, 311, 315, 316 colonial, 46, 47, 48, 54, 65, 72, 76, 79, 81, 82, 92, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115, 142, 143, 146, 149, 167, 172, 196, 198, 206, 207, 208, 211, 223, 225, 233, 235, 236, 239, 246, 247, 253, 255, 256, 261, 277, 280, 292, 301, 305, 306, 307, 309, 310, 311, 313, 314, 352, 354, 356, 357, 359, 360, 361 Coloureds, 27, 35, 40 COMESA, 270, 274, 279, 280 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 270 Communism, 115, 136, 163, 241, 247, 249, 264, 365 Conservatism, 117, 255 Continentalism, 270, 271, 275, 277, 278, 279, 280 Corruption, 5, 6, 20, 22, 31, 32, 34, 37, 41, 67, 132, 143, 144, 191, 193, 196, 202, 205, 206, 209,

374 211, 217, 219, 259, 331, 333, 342 Cotonou Agreement, 311 Coup, 103, 104, 116, 118 Cultural pluralism, 114 Curriculum, 50, 155 de Klerk, 15, 17, 29, 32 Democratic Republic of the Congo, 79, 204, 312 Dependency theory, 111, 112 Diaspora, 60, 65, 66, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 91, 92, 93, 133, 145, 154, 155, 156, 157, 161, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 229, 234, 236, 247, 249, 250, 264 Digital divide, 161, 175 Diop, 50, 58, 289, 290, 292 Discourse, 116, 135, 228, 302 Du Bois, 48, 133, 235, 236, 239, 240, 242, 244, 245, 251, 254, 258, 262, 353, 357, 358, 359, 360, 362 ECOWAS, 93, 260, 270, 274, 277 Egypt, 70, 95, 98, 105, 159, 160, 163, 236, 243, 247, 257, 258, 274, 289, 297, 364 Eland, 8, 35, 368 Ellis, 152, 368 Ethiopia, 61, 78, 100, 147, 159, 194, 233, 239, 242, 247, 250, 278, 292, 352, 360, 364 Eurocentric, 56, 73, 143, 168 Europe, 13, 41, 42, 46, 60, 61, 62, 71, 111, 112, 117, 120, 133, 145, 169, 183, 210, 228, 230, 232, 236, 237, 240, 243, 247, 248, 252, 255, 260, 266, 274, 287, 291, 297, 311, 314, 338, 361, 365 European, 8, 38, 42, 48, 51, 55, 57, 61, 62, 65, 66, 70, 71, 75, 76, 80, 86, 90, 109, 111, 117, 121, 122, 132, 147, 171, 172, 206,

Index 209, 228, 229, 230, 231, 233, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 245, 247, 248, 250, 254, 255, 256, 266, 267, 268, 272, 275, 287, 291, 292, 311, 313, 316, 323, 339, 340, 341, 347, 348, 353, 359, 360, 362, 363, 364 Fifth Pan-African Congress, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362 Frederick Douglass, 231, 262 Free market, 119, 138 Free Trade Area, 267, 268, 269, 280, 281 French, 33, 48, 97, 208, 231, 232, 233, 236, 239, 244, 247, 260, 264, 313, 320, 321, 322, 326, 328, 351, 359, 362 Gaddafi, 277, 278, 323 Garvey, 48, 133, 138, 159, 165, 230, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 353, 359, 360 Ghana, 46, 48, 49, 78, 103, 104, 168, 177, 183, 191, 195, 214, 215, 224, 230, 235, 239, 245, 250, 251, 252, 256, 257, 258, 259, 262, 264, 265, 274, 276, 278, 288, 292, 294, 296, 297, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 312, 314, 315, 316, 318, 325, 327, 328, 329, 343, 350, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367 Gilpin-Jackson, 196, 368 Global South, 103, 104, 105, 114, 123, 126, 129, 131, 304, 325 Globalization, 103, 104, 116, 122, 123, 127, 135, 139, 145, 161, 164, 165, 168, 210, 228, 265, 280, 286, 300, 304, 309, 324 Good Governance, 187, 336 Great Britain, 32, 120, 231, 246, 255, 256, 268, 357, 359, 370

Re-engaging the African Diasporas Guinea, 46, 49, 58, 183, 214, 231, 247, 276, 278 Harlem Renaissance, 157, 158, 243 Harriet Tubman, 231 Hegemony, 34, 68, 115, 122, 230, 245, 255 Imperialism, 46, 47, 50, 52, 105, 111, 112, 116, 147, 167, 310, 353, 359, 361 Imperialist, 46, 47, 49, 54, 56, 107, 111, 116, 145, 146, 147, 164, 291, 361 Integration, 175, 177, 218, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 272, 273, 274, 286, 287 Intellectual Capital, 177, 184 intelligentsia, 44, 46, 47, 48, 53, 54, 55 International Monetary Fund, 106, 119, 127, 129, 247, 253, 260, 271, 324, 337, 347 Islam, 70, 138, 229, 232, 263, 264, 348 Islamic, 63, 71, 252, 261, 294 Islamophobia, 42 Israel, 87, 88, 89, 94, 96, 100, 187 Katembo, 59, 65, 81, 92, 98, 99, 368 Kemet, 153, 154 Kwame Turé, 45 Lagos Plan of Action, 277 Latin America, 95, 103, 104, 107, 112, 127, 130, 183, 236 Leadership, 59, 77, 96, 194, 196, 197, 201, 203, 204, 206, 210, 213, 214, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 370 Lenin, 105, 135, 258 liberalism, 117, 118, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 146, 149, 150, 163, 170 Lomé convention, 311 Lumumba, 167, 177, 214, 239, 248, 315 Ma’at, 153, 154, 159, 300 Maasai, 61

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Mali, 215, 274, 276, 278, 296 Mandela., 2, 25 Mandingo, 61, 163 Marxist, 108, 113, 114, 176, 241, 258 Mbeki, 17, 18, 30, 31, 33, 146, 220, 277, 279, 316, 319, 321, 329 Mirfakharie, 111, 112, 113, 136 monopoly capitalism, 113, 253 Moodley, 8, 367, 369 Mostefaoui, 349, 356, 369 Mugabe, 41, 42, 215, 323, 324 Muslims, 42, 229, 261 Naidoo, 2, 26, 29, 30, 369 Narrative Approach, 198 Nat Turner, 231, 248 Neo-colonialism, 46, 151 Neoconservatism, 117 Neo-liberal Globalization, 103 Neoliberalism, 117, 118, 120 NEPAD, 138, 141, 144, 146, 149, 151, 219, 273, 304, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329 Ngwube, 330, 370 Nigeria, 4, 76, 79, 96, 148, 179, 180, 182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 204, 208, 247, 274, 277, 279, 297, 316, 330, 331, 346, 347, 354, 359, 369, 370 Nkrumah, 2, 4, 10, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 122, 132, 133, 135, 136, 165, 166, 173, 174, 176, 214, 218, 225, 228, 230, 235, 236, 237, 239, 245, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 276, 277, 278, 288, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 322, 323, 325, 326, 328, 329, 349, 350,

376 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 367, 370 Non-racialism, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 241 Norway, 80, 87, 88, 89, 98, 332, 334, 336, 337, 338, 343, 346, 347, 348 O’Meara, 8, 24, 370 OAU, 46, 110, 133, 232, 256, 257, 259, 260, 270, 271, 276, 277, 316, 328 Obama, 47, 87 Ogbu, 179, 369 Oil, 330, 337, 342, 345, 346, 347, 348 Okoli, 330, 369 Organization of African Unity, 46, 110, 133, 232, 256, 259, 260, 270 Padmore, 48, 133, 241, 258, 264, 355, 357, 358, 359, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365 Pan-African, 2, 36, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 71, 77, 91, 92, 93, 104, 110, 132, 134, 139, 149, 150, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 170, 174, 177, 228, 230, 232, 235, 237, 238, 241, 242, 246, 247, 251, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 305, 320, 349, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 370 Pan-African Liberated State, 46, 47, 48 Pan-Africanist, 60, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 75, 104, 134, 138, 139, 144, 145, 146, 148, 165, 234, 237, 240, 246, 254, 257, 349, 352, 368 Paradigm, 93, 138, 155, 173, 245, 248 Poe, 44, 107, 136, 370 Political Capital, 185

Index Political economy, 99, 138, 139, 140, 142, 144, 147, 148, 149, 261, 267, 307, 366 Post-apartheid, 5, 7, 12, 18, 19, 22, 25, 29, 36, 37, 39 Post-Apartheid, 12, 18 Postcolonial perspective, 114 Preferential Trade Area, 267, 268 Privatization, 118, 119, 128, 129, 131 Queen Nzinga, 231 Quist-Adade, 103, 104, 111, 112, 113, 119, 123, 128, 129, 130, 136, 367 racism, 22, 29, 34, 39, 51, 59, 66, 70, 82, 132, 152, 155, 156, 158, 171, 241, 243, 353, 360, 369 Rainbow Nation, 38 Ramaphosa, 17, 33 Regionalism, 266, 268, 270, 286, 287 Resource Curse, 332, 345, 346, 348 Rusero, 161, 370 SACP, 9, 21, 40 SADC), 173, 270, 274 SAPs, 54, 127, 128, 130, 131, 140, 174, 271, 324 Schittecatte, 304, 370 Shockley, 59, 71, 73, 101, 370 Slavery, 59, 61, 82, 85, 95, 133, 157, 198, 206, 207, 229, 230 Social Capital, 185, 290 Sojourner Truth, 231 South Africa, 3, 4, 9, 13, 14, 20, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 42, 92, 138, 146, 147, 215, 220, 247, 277, 294, 316, 321, 359, 369, 370 South Sudan, 79, 86, 89, 91, 93, 97, 100, 102 Southern Africa Development Cooperation, 270 Soviet Union, 46, 120, 141, 147, 315 Spirituality, 288, 290 Structural Adjustment Policies, 127, 140, 319, 324

Re-engaging the African Diasporas Sub-Saharan Africa, 345 Sudan, 89, 100, 183, 274, 322, 340, 364 Sylvester Williams, 133, 236, 254 Technology, 80, 81, 186, 252, 258, 292 Technology Transfer, 186 Terrorism, 206, 225 the African National Congress, 6, 11, 12, 15, 22, 138, 370 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 316 Third World, 95, 111, 112, 113, 114, 130, 135, 177, 223, 264, 290, 309, 315 Toussaint L’Ouverture, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 245, 260, 261 Tribalism, 76, 261 Uganda, 42, 65, 76, 77, 78, 91, 93, 98, 131, 145, 147, 208, 215, 219, 274, 317, 330, 331, 336, 337, 342, 343, 344, 345, 347, 348, 359 UK, 58, 99, 120, 129, 224, 308, 312, 367, 370 Union of African States, 110, 278, 279 United Nations, 77, 102, 106, 123, 127, 137, 144, 151, 162, 195, 255, 287, 323, 326 United States, 8, 48, 50, 58, 63, 66, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 92, 93, 102, 106, 116, 119, 120, 127, 157, 166, 173, 229, 231, 234, 236, 237, 239, 243, 244, 246, 248, 250, 252, 253, 255, 256, 258, 261, 262, 265, 278, 314, 351, 352, 354, 358, 360, 362, 364 United States of Africa, 48, 360

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Unity, 5, 18, 23, 45, 46, 51, 52, 56, 61, 79, 91, 92, 108, 109, 133, 145, 146, 154, 164, 172, 173, 177, 212, 216, 218, 221, 223, 252, 256, 257, 258, 259, 268, 271, 289, 290, 291, 301, 305, 316, 317, 322, 326, 356, 358, 360, 361, 363, 364 USA, 46, 59, 108, 114, 120, 129, 142, 145, 228, 366, 368, 370 USSR, 163, 311, 314 Victor Verster Prison, 15 Wallerstein, 114, 137 West, 5, 48, 59, 70, 73, 79, 93, 103, 104, 106, 108, 113, 114, 115, 120, 123, 129, 143, 147, 151, 174, 207, 208, 209, 229, 230, 234, 235, 236, 237, 242, 243, 246, 248, 250, 252, 253, 254, 256, 258, 260, 264, 270, 306, 310, 311, 313, 314, 315, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 326, 329, 349, 351, 352, 354, 355, 356, 357, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 365 West African States, 93, 260, 270 Whites, 9, 27, 28, 35, 40, 236, 239, 243, 349, 351 World Bank, 31, 78, 95, 101, 106, 119, 124, 127, 128, 129, 140, 142, 169, 171, 178, 184, 187, 190, 194, 195, 209, 247, 253, 260, 271, 308, 339, 340, 341, 347 xenophobia, 5, 38, 39, 40, 42 Zimbabwe, 65, 66, 90, 161, 163, 204, 215, 314, 322, 324, 367, 370 Zulu, 40, 163, 211, 214, 227, 231 Zuma., 18