Rabbis, Reporters and the Public in the Digital Holyland [1 ed.] 9781138833845, 9781032608716, 9781315735184

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Rabbis, Reporters and the Public in the Digital Holyland

Focused on the triangular relationship between rabbis, journalists, and the public, this book analyses each group’s role in influencing the agenda around religion in Israel. The book draws upon the author’s original research, comprising an analysis of the coverage of religion on four Israeli news websites and a series of surveys of rabbis, journalists, and the public, as well as a large number of interviews conducted with a range of stakeholders: community rabbis, teacher-rabbis, and religious court judges; reporters, editors, and spokespersons; and the Israeli Jewish public. Key questions include the following: • • • • •

What are rabbis’ philosophical views of the media? How does the media define news about Judaism? What aspects of news about religion and spirituality interest the public? How do spokespersons and rabbis influence the news agenda? How is the triangular relationship between rabbis, journalists, and the public being altered by the digital age?

Despite a lack of understanding about mass media behaviour among many rabbis and, concurrently, a lack of knowledge about religion among many journalists, it is argued that there is shared interest between the two groups, both in support of mass media values, like the right to know and freedom of expression. It is further argued that the public’s attitude to news about religion is significant in determining what journalists should publish. The book will be of interest to those studying mass communications, the media, Judaism, and Israeli society, as well as researchers of media and religion. Yoel Cohen is Full Professor (Emeritus) in the School of Communication at Ariel University, Israel, as well as convenor of the religion and communication working group in the International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR). His research interests include media and religion in Israel and Judaism, the city of Jerusalem, and foreign news. His publications include God, Jews and the Media: Religion and Israel’s Media; Spiritual News: Reporting Religion Around the World; and The Handbook of Religion and Communication. Other book publications include Media Diplomacy: The Foreign Office in the Mass Communications Age and The Whistleblower of Dimona: Vanunu, Israel, & the Bomb.

Routledge Studies in Middle East Film and Media

This new series is for books that examine the development of film and media in the modern and contemporary eras. It includes works on cinema, television, and print and digital medias, and how these have impacted on society, politics, the economy and culture in the region. Women in the Cinemas of Iran and Turkey As Images and as Image-Makers Gönül Dönmez-Colin Israeli Television Global Contexts, Local Visions Miri Talmon and Yael Levy Resistance, Dissidence, Revolution Documentary Film Esthetics in the Middle East and North Africa Viola Shafik Contemporary Israeli Cinema Trauma, Ethics and Temporality Raz Yosef Arabic Media Coverage of Pandemics Discourse, Strategy and Impact El Mustapha Lahlali Middle Eastern Television Drama Politics, Aesthetics, Practices Christa Salamandra and Nour Halabi Rabbis, Reporters and the Public in the Digital Holyland Yoel Cohen For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ middleeaststudies/series/MEFILM

Rabbis, Reporters and the Public in the Digital Holyland Yoel Cohen

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Yoel Cohen The right of Yoel Cohen to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-138-83384-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-60871-6 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-73518-4 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781315735184 Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

List of tables Preface 1 The media setting

vi vii 1

2 The rabbinic setting

15

3 Is Judaism news?

29

4 Gathering the news

58

5 Religion and the Israeli journalist: a theological profile

92

6 The public and religion news

106

7 Rabbis’ exposure to media

146

8 Rabbis, Jewish values, and the media

179

9 Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community?

195

10 Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century

230

11 The unholy Jewish troika: rabbis, journalists, and the Israeli public

264

Appendix Index

280 282

Tables

3.1 5.1 6.1

Themes of religion broken down according to Israeli news websites Does my work as a journalist clash with Jewish teachings? Ratings of interest in religion among the Israeli Jewish public (with comparison to Israeli journalists’ ratings)

32 99 119

Preface

The Lubavitcher Rebbe – Rabbi Mendel Menachem Schneerson – headed the wellknown Hassidic branch of Judaism, Chabad, and was arguably the most famous rabbi in the Jewish world in the second half of the 20th century. Discussing with the author how the media impacted the Rebbe, Rabbi Yehuda Krinsky, who was the Rebbe’s spokesman for some 40 years, explains, “One of my fields of work was to spread Chassidus [or Chabad’s version of the beliefs of Hassidism], including their tome, the Tanya, to the wider public, through the media.” “In the 1980s we tried live satellite broadcasts of the Rebbe’s sermons (or “farbrengen”), and it worked. People were intrigued by the teachings. We were one of the first to use satellite broadcasts.” “But public relations is not just a cold press release. I have a relationship with the heads of the media companies. You create a relationship of mutual respect with heads of particular media companies.” But no, the Rebbe did not give interviews. “That was his choice. If reporters asked the Rebbe a question, the Rebbe did not make an issue of it. He said, ‘I’m not talking now.’ But sometimes reporters came with their wives to the Rebbe – to spend a few minutes or, say, 15–20 minutes to talk about their own lives, what ails them, and what did not.” His spokesman prepared a daily cuttings file for the Rebbe – “about all kinds of past events. No, not just about Chabad. Not at all. Not only about Judaism. Anything on sciences, medicine and astronomy. (The Rebbe himself was a graduate in engineering from the Sorbonne, Paris.) Particularly if there were research findings. The Rebbe was up-to-date in everything. He was very up to date with world news, and certainly on Jewish events, political and educational.” “Did the press have an impact on the Rebbe? The Rebbe had an impact on the media. It was the Rebbe who created the impact, not vice versa. There’s no tail wagging the dog.” For this Rebbe – and for many other rabbis as well – the media is a one-directional channel. But an academic treatment of the relationship requires seeing it as twodirectional. Indeed, the one-directional flow reflects more deeply what mass media is not rather than what it is: While in essence mass media constitute channels for the transfer of news, information, and entertainment to audiences, religion is about faith; it involves a moral code – that is, religious law – for example, the Jewish religion regulates behaviour between man and God and between man and man.

viii

Preface

Mass media is the opposite of faith and is based instead on verifiable information. Journalists are not very interested in religion as a news story. Even though many journalists are believers in God, religion is rarely at the forefront of the media. Much media content concerns politics and economics on the news side and romance and violence on the entertainment side. Theologians seek to influence the public ideologically and advance a moral agenda. Western media provide important and interesting information and, in the case of television, entertainment which not infrequently expresses values counter to those advanced by theologians. In God, Jews and the Media: Religion and Israel’s Media (Routledge 2012), this author sought to map out the manifold areas where media and religion in Israel, as well as the Jewish diaspora, interact, including Jewish theological viewpoints about mass media, the ultra-Orthodox Haredi sectoral media and the modern religious sectoral media, the challenge of new media technology, religious advertising, the media in the Jewish diaspora, and the foreign press coverage of the Holyland. In Israel, the central role which religion plays in public life raises the question of the role of mass communications channels in the life and work of rabbis. Rabbis, Reporters and the Public in the Digital Holyland focuses on the key relationship of rabbis and journalists, given their role in influencing the national agenda about religion inside Israel. This book argues that while there is a lack of understanding among many rabbis about mass media behaviour and, on the other side, a lack of knowledge about religion among many journalists, there is also a shared interest between the two, given that mass media values – the right to know and the freedom of expression, to name just two – are also shared to a considerable extent by rabbis. The Israeli media acts as a sub-actor in connecting the different religious segments of the Jewish population in Israel, both in informing one about the other and in constructing mutual images of different religious communities. Considerable tension exists in Israel between religious Jewry and the secular media, which are regarded by many in the former as anti-religious and anti-nationalist. Since rabbis play an important role as community leaders and role models among the religious population in Israel, criticism of the media by rabbis has contributed to the delegitimisation of the national media in the eyes of some of the religious population. Given their central role as community-builders, it is relevant to examine the questions of rabbis’ usage of mass media channels in community work, the extent of the rabbis’ exposure to mass media, and rabbis’ evaluations of media performance. But it is not enough to examine only the behaviour of rabbis and journalists, respectively. The public impact both journalists as their audience and the community to which rabbis minister. That public dimension has always existed but has gained added importance with citizen journalists. The role of new media, therefore, means that what may have appeared a two-directional study between rabbis and journalists is today a triangular relationship – or troika – in which the public interact both with rabbis and the media community. Audiences influence journalists and editors, with the latter necessarily in a competitive market for audiences. And

Preface ix rabbis in practice lead communities of persons who are also both exposed to, and themselves create, new media. Yet, while the Israeli media have entered the digital age, much of the reporting on religion is still done by professional journalists, albeit from news websites in the wired newsroom. And this justifies an investigation to produce a precise picture of the rabbi-reporter-public nexus against the background of a wired Holyland. The research draws upon surveys with rabbis about the role of mass media in their work, Israeli journalists and religion, and the Israeli public’s exposure to religion information carried out by the author, discussed later, and qualitative interviews with journalists, spokespersons, and rabbis from different religious streams. I am grateful to them for sharing their thoughts and insight with me. A detailed analysis of the religion content of four leading Israeli news websites was also carried out – a clue to present and future news patterns in the digital age. In addition, students from the School of Communication, Ariel University, acted as research assistants at different stages of the research – including Emuna Abel, Rachel Ankri, Reut Avrahami, Michael Barmatz, Michal Feuchtwanger, Yael Fish, Hodaya Gross, Ravit Hallel, Tal Kushner, Meir Leibowitz, Yona Lichtman, Amit Melnik, Lior Mozes, Hila Nus, Ahava Paz, Aviah Rish, Idit Sasson, and Adi Sednik. I am grateful to them for their input and research. Avishai Cohen and Pinhas Shatz of the Lifshitz Teachers College, Jerusalem, also helped. I am indebted to Tali Avishai, Elie Cohen, Miriam Greenstein, and Malka Hadar for statistical analysis on the survey data. The author is grateful to the Research Authority of Ariel University and the university’s publications committee, for their financial assistance, and to the Institute for the Study of New Media, Politics and Society, Ariel University, for their research assistance. Yoel Cohen Jerusalem, January, 2024

1

The media setting

Journalists play an important role in the construction of the public image of Judaism. In the pre-computer and pre-internet eras, a standard complaint about the coverage of religion news in print newspapers, radio, and television was its paucity. It was always fighting for space and airtime, perhaps a column in the weekend papers or airtime on the Sabbath or prior to or following it, at often an unseemly hour and attracting very low audiences. But by 2023, the quantity of religion news has been revolutionised with social media, which provide virtual spaces of endless proportions, and every guru is able to set up his or her own website to project a spiritual or religious agenda. Moreover, news websites run by professional journalists also have endless space. But if in quantitative terms a revolution in religion news has occurred, other problems in accuracy, balance, and quality – which characterised religion reporting in earlier years – remain. Indeed, the pressure of non-stop deadlines produced, if anything, a step back for accuracy, balance, and overall quality. But in addition to quantity, a revolution among audiences themselves also occurred, making the manifold sources of religion information available unrecognisable today in contrast to what they had been before Israel went digital. The Holyland goes digital By 2023, the Israeli population was well into the digital age. According to the Israeli telecommunications company Bezeq (2021), in 2021 the average Israeli household had 12 connections to the internet – whether through smartphone, computer, or tablet – and Israelis spent an average of 2.4 hours daily on the internet, 2.1 hours daily on computer games, and 2.8 hours daily on social networks. The change was characterised by the rise of the internet and the portable phone industry, with younger generations decidedly leaving print in favour of laptops, tablets, and smartphones. Ninety per cent of the Israeli population with internet were linked to WhatsApp. Among youth, after WhatsApp, 34% said YouTube was the most important application (or app), 33% said Instagram, and 23% said TikTok. There was an increase in 2021 over earlier years in youth using apps for public transport and apps for music. Israelis are also active economically and commercially. Ninety-one per cent of people carried out purchases on the internet in 2021 – 72% at least once a month DOI: 10.4324/9781315735184-1

2

The media setting

and 47% at least once a fortnight. Forty per cent purchased goods through Facebook and 18% through Instagram. In terms of medical services, 67% used digital media to order medication and 54% to consult with a doctor or nurse. Eighty-seven per cent got services from the government. Yet the extent to which Israelis maintain their friendships online remains much less than offline. A Central Bureau of Statistics (2020) social survey found that the Israeli population is inclined to maintain social ties through offline meetings (41%) or telephone conversations (25%), while 27% did so mainly through apps like WhatsApp. And the older the Israeli, the more he or she was inclined to use the telephone and the less inclined to use WhatsApp. Forty-six per cent of Israelis participate in social networks once a day, 11% once or twice a week, and 10% less than once a week. Thirty-two per cent do not participate in social networks at all. Notwithstanding that Israelis as a nation are wired up, the Central Bureau of Statistics (2020) social survey found that Israelis feel their privacy is threatened by the internet, and they support legislation to protect themselves. Sixty-two per cent of participants are concerned that information about them is not secure, and 53% use antivirus programs. Eighty-three per cent of the Israeli population favour legislation; those aged 60+ are incrementally less inclined than younger ones to favour legislation. Major sources of news for Israeli Jews

In 2020 38% and 37% said that internet news websites and television were their primary sources of information, respectively, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics’ social survey (7,249 responses). In contrast, all other sources (including radio, printed newspapers, social media, non-media sources like neighbours and friends) are each cited by less than 10% of respondents. Radio, which in the past was a primary source of news for Israelis, had declined in 2020 to only 6.6%. Printed newspapers – also once a primary source of news for Israelis – were the primary sources for only 3.5% of Israelis. But social media sources – like WhatsApp, Twitter, and Instagram – remained low despite the impression that social media would be much higher – partly due to its newness, as well as posing a challenge to the earlier monopoly of professional journalists in gathering the news. Non-media sources (friends and neighbours) were the primary source of news for 2.8% of Israelis. Yet 3.5% of Israelis were “uninterested” in the news. The age gap in the Holyland

There is a clear difference in age. Thus, 64% and 44% of those aged 65+ and 45–64, who respectively said television was their primary source of news, contrasted with only 24% of those aged 20–44. In contrast, only 15% and 36% of those aged 65+ and 45–64, respectively, said internet news websites were their main source of news. Forty-seven per cent of those aged 20–44 said so. This suggests that television in its present form may gradually lose the dominant position it currently holds for the older generation and that, as the age group 20–44 grows older, the trends for

The media setting 3 internet news websites as the dominant source will take hold for the broader Israeli population. Indeed, it was asked whether internet news websites could replace other sources of news, and only 30% of those aged 60+ agreed a “great deal” or “to an extent,” and 49% and 52% of those aged 45–64 and 20–44, respectively, said so. However, 40% of those aged 65 said “not at all,” and only 27% and 25% of those aged 45–64 and 20–44, respectively, said so. Notably, while 52% of male respondents said news websites could replace other channels of news, only 43% of women responded so. In understanding “digital Israel,” it is instructive to briefly sketch the historical growth of the Israeli media map from its origins to the digital media in today’s Israel (Schejter, 2009). It has a history of 150 years, from the 1860s when the first Hebrewlanguage newspapers – Halevanon and Havatzelet – were created, with the approval of the Ottoman authorities. These and later Hebrew newspapers contributed to the revival of Hebrew – the language of ancient Israel going back to the Bible – as a living language. By the first half of the 20th century, and the start of the British mandate of Palestine, Hebrew daily newspapers began appearing, like the quality liberal daily Haaretz established in 1919 bought out by the Schocken family, who own the paper to this day. So did the mass-circulated popular daily, Yediot Aharonot, which began in 1939, as did Maariv in 1947, the largest-selling daily until it was overtaken by Yediot Aharonot in the circulation wars in the mid-’70s. The ’30s saw the beginnings of the political party press, which became ideologically more active, against the background of the Second World War, Arab terrorism in the British mandate, and finally the declaration and establishment of the State of Israel, when the Israeli press became a source of political recruitment. The political party press continued to the end of the century, until the closure of Davar, the organ of the Histadrut trade union movement. But in 2007, a new free right-wing newspaper, Israel Hayom, was funded by the US Jewish billionaire Sheldon Adelson, which supported Benjamin Netanyahu. The paper overtook Yediot Aharonot as Israel’s biggest-circulation paper and played a role in Likud’s successive re-elections over the years. But after Adelson died, his widow, Miriam, moved the paper from the Likud to support other right-wing political factions. Parallel to the political party press was the growth of the foreign-language press – notably the languages of Eastern Europe, serving the many immigrants who reached Israel in the ’50s and ’60s. This had declined by the end of the century, with the exception of the English-language press, but it resuscitated a mostly commercially oriented Russian press to satisfy the needs of the wave of immigrants from Russia in the ’80s. Yet as the immigrants learnt the Hebrew language and their children grew up, the commercial Hebrew independent press became again the dominant press among immigrants and their offspring. Radio broadcasting in the wake of independence was structured on the British mandatory radio station, the Voice of Palestine. Under the authority of Israel’s Prime Minister’s Office, after state independence in 1948, Kol Israel subsequently became a public broadcasting body, modelled on the BBC. Television – which began in the US already in the late 1940s, began in Israel only in 1968. Ben Gurion opposed it

4

The media setting

because popular culture – as reflected in American commercial television – was regarded by him as unsuitable for the People of the Book. But after the 1967 war, and the need to counter Arab television broadcasts to Arab populations in areas captured in the war, Israel television began in 1968. For more than two decades, a single television channel dominated television news. A second television station, funded through television advertising, was founded in 1995, and through a more popular approach, it soon took over as Israel’s most-viewed channel. This was followed by cable television. With direct broadcasting by satellite, the skies were open for Israelis to access numerous TV stations from around the world. Internet and news websites produced as an adjunct to the printed newspaper, or separately, and social media networks by citizens transformed the media map in Israel by the beginning of the 21st century. Seeking not only to cash in on the digital revolution, but also looking in the long term to perhaps the inevitable age of the end of print, some news websites are an outgrowth of existing news organisations, including printed newspapers, which provide the financial and journalistic basis out of which news websites have developed. Some Israeli newspapers developed online news operations – including Yediot Aharonot and the Y-Net news site, Haaretz, Maariv’s NRG site, the Jerusalem Post website, Makor Rishon’s website, and Globus – some drawing on the print edition’s journalistic resources. Other news websites – including Walla and Times of Israel – are solely online operations. While there are many similarities between Israel’s experience in moving from offline to online and that of other Western countries, notable differences can also be detected between Israel and other countries. Thus, the United States has been hardest hit in the printed newspaper crisis – due in part to a rise in websites like Craigslist, a network of mostly free classified advertising. In contrast to the US, the dominant media giants in press and broadcasting in Israel are also dominant in the internet age. In Germany, by contrast, audiences are loyal; printed newspapers seem able to absorb the changes. In Japan, nearly all newspapers are sold by subscription. In Russia, with 60% of newspapers government controlled; these are cushioned from market forces. But in both Japan and Russia, younger audiences prefer the online news websites. India has the fastest-growing newspaper and television markets. Between 2005 and 2009, the number of paid-up daily newspapers increased by 44% to 2,700. More than 500 satellite television channels were launched in India in the past 20 years, 81 being news channels. And in China, a private media market was allowed to develop in the closing years of the 20th century (The Economist, 2011). By the second decade of the 21st century, printed newspapers in Israel, as shown at the beginning of the chapter, had declined so much in terms of medium (3.5% in circulation), which impacted advertising revenue severely and would in the longer term likely lead up to the closure of print editions, with the possible exception of the weekend edition. Yet the desire for religious and traditional Jews to read newspapers on the Sabbath day – when the usage of electricity, including computers, is forbidden – suggests that print newspapers have a future, albeit at weekends.

The media setting 5 On the internet, the space is limitless. Many institutions – including religious ones like synagogues and educational bodies like yeshivot (Talmudic colleges), which in the pre-internet era failed to get covered by the centrist secular media – now have their own sites and their own surfers from their community. In this sense, they are no longer dependent on the main news media for coverage. Yet many of those writing blogs are journalists. It is as if professional reporters have moved from one medium to another. All this suggests that news should be gathered by professionals according to well-worn standards of years gone by, among them objectivity. What has changed is the convergence in the news of voice and visual, with the written facts on computer lines instead of printed paper. These raise the question as to whether the old traditional media of press (including a political party press), public radio, and public television are making way for a citizenbased democracy, characterised by the blogosphere. It may be expected that news websites will be recognised and emerge over the years ahead to become key news sources – including for the coverage of religion. Yet by moving from paper to website, the news operation survived and even prospered, as also shown at the outset of the chapter (38% of the population rated news websites as their main news source). Moreover, social media by citizens – rather than professional journalists – did not replace news-gathering practices. This suggests that while the Holyland may have entered the digital age, much of the religion reporting would still be done by professional journalists, albeit from the wired newsroom. And this justifies an investigation of the rabbi-reporter-public nexus against the background of a wired Holyland. Profiling Israeli journalists in the second decade of the 21st century, Reich, Barnoy, and Herzog (2016) found that after interviewing 341 journalists, one-third were female and two-thirds were male. On average, Israeli journalists were aged 43, and half of the journalists were younger than 40. Israeli journalists were welleducated: 52% with a single degree and 21% with a second degree, but just over half studied something else, not communications or journalism. The researchers found the Israeli journalists to be quite experienced – with an average of 15 years in the occupation. A third of journalists worked on a specific specialist beat. Judaism and the media-public sphere in Israel Journalists play an important role in the construction of the public image of Judaism. The place of religion in Israeli public life raises the question of the role of mass communication channels in the uneasy relationship between secular and religious communities in the country. Information on religion appears in the media at a number of levels – first, coverage of religion in the mainstream press; second, religious programming in mainstream media; third, the mainly small-circulation religious media; fourth, internet news websites in Israel are key sources of news, including about religion; fifth, social media sites; and sixth, the sites of religious organisations themselves. With its limitless space of the World Wide Web, the internet has enabled even more to be written about religion than in the past.

6 The media setting In addition to its role in providing information about religion, the media also acts as a sub-actor in connecting the different religious segments of the Jewish population in Israel, both in informing one about the other and in constructing mutual images of different religious communities. In constructing images of the four main communities of the Israeli Jewish population – the secular, the traditional but not strictly observant, the modern Orthodox (dati leumi, or national religious), and the ultra-Orthodox (Haredim) – the mass media has a powerful impact on the way the communities perceive one another, with implications for the uneasy relationship between the communities. Indeed, Israeli Jewish society may be seen as a mosaic of different tribes as reflected by their own separate media. Rabbis, Reporters and the Public in the Digital Holyland focuses on the key relationship of rabbis and journalists in the contemporary age of new media, given the media’s role in influencing the national agenda about religion inside Israel. And given the role of the public impacting journalists and editors, and their raised status today as citizen-journalists, in the age of social media, they also fit the triangle, forming an uneasy troika. This book argues that while there is a lack of certain understanding among many rabbis about mass media behaviour and, on the other side, a lack of knowledge about religion among many journalists, there is nevertheless a shared interest between the two, given that mass media values – the right to know and the freedom of expression, to name just two – are also shared to a considerable extent by rabbis. Given that the religious public and, to some extent, the traditional public adhere or are exposed to the views on rabbis, and given that the public impacts editors, the public dimension cannot be ignored. After introductory chapters (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2), which present maps of the Israeli media and the Jewish religion in Israel, the content of the coverage of religion on Israeli news websites is analysed (Chapter 3). How do Israeli reporters gather news upon religion, including source-reporter relations (Chapter 4), and what is the background knowledge and religious experience which Israeli reporters bring to their work (Chapter 5)? The book examines patterns of exposure among the public (Chapter 6) and among rabbis (Chapter 7) to religion news. The book would be amiss were it to ignore rabbinical philosophical attitudes to media behaviour (Chapter 8), which underlie the media-religion debate, including the growth of alternative media like the Haredi media (Chapter 9). A key question in considering digitalisation is the changes offered for the offline synagogue and other aspects of modern Jewish life, including worship and education (Chapter 9). But how has the life of the Haredim who live behind cultural walls been challenged and altered by globalisation and the information age (Chapter 10)? Finally, how does the media and its coverage of religion impact the secularreligious divide in Israel (Chapter 11)? Journalism in Israel has been researched from a number of approaches. Caspi and Limor (1999) provided a historical approach; Roeh (1980) examined the newsgathering process through one Israeli news programme. A number of quantitative surveys were carried out with Israeli journalists. Reich, Barnoy, and Herzog (2016); Meyers and Cohen (2011); Tsfati, Meyers, and Peri (2006); and Tsfati and Livio (2008) each examined the work and values of Israeli journalists. Zandberg

The media setting 7 and Neiger (2005) examined the journalistic profession and collective memory. Tsfati and Meyers (2012) concluded that Israeli journalists tended to stress the importance of verification of facts and only to a lesser extent to stress journalistic neutrality. But religion content in the Israeli media has until recently been mostly ignored by researchers. To the extent that there is research about media reporting on religion in Israel (Cohen, 2006c, 2012), the focus concerns the Haredi press (Micolson, 1990). The Haredi sector is estranged from the general population, with their own separatist media, raising important anthropological and socio-psychological questions. Baumel (2002) examined the Haredi press through linguistic tools in order to generate a picture of the Haredi outlook on the social role of media. Lev-On and Neriya-Ben Shahar (2011) examined internet use by Haredim women, and Baumel-Schwartz (2009) studied Orthodox Jewish women’s internet forums. Religion content in different Israeli news media forms, religious and secular, was examined (Cohen, 2005), as was the coverage of Jewish religious holidays (Cohen, 2016, 2018). Cohen and Hetsroni compared television content between Judaism (Israel) and Christianity (the US) (Cohen and Hetsroni, 2018) and television content between Judaism (Israel), Christianity (the US), and Islam (Turkey) (Cohen & Hetsroni, 2019). Gabel examined the relationship of the modern religious community and the media (2006). Surveying journalists

In order to shed light on the role of journalists in constructing the media’s image of religion, a survey of Israeli journalists’ religious beliefs and behaviour was carried out by the author, which examines journalists’ views of some of the questions – already raised with rabbis in a similar survey by the author, including whether the media damages religious values and their evaluation of religion coverage. Other questions included journalists’ evaluations of the newsworthiness of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and the journalists’ own exposure to mass media, including new media in terms of their interest in religion information. Journalists’ religious identity both about existential questions of Jewish belief and religious behaviour like observance of religious customs and holydays was examined. Over 1,200 questionnaires were sent to all Israeli Jewish journalists who are accredited and possess a press card from the Israel Government Press Office; a total of 260 filled questionnaires were received back. Although there is no legal requirement for a journalist in Israel to receive accreditation, in accordance with the country’s democratic spirit and the principle of the freedom of the press, a journalist requires a press card in order to participate in official events like press conferences. Only Jewish journalists were sent the questionnaire (those with Arabsounding names were not included), given that the research question concerns the Jewish identity of Israeli journalists. The overwhelming number of journalists in Israel are Jewish; by definition, non-Jewish journalists did not respond to a questionnaire about Jewish religious identity. The questions are identical to surveys of the broader Israeli Jewish population carried out by such bodies as the Israel

8 The media setting Democracy Institute, the Gutman Institute for Applied Social Research, and the Israel Government’s Central Bureau of Statistics and enable comparisons between the journalistic community and the former to be made. It is not easy to obtain the cooperation of a target group. Even though the questionnaire was anonymous, some journalists may have been deterred by the need to discuss their religious beliefs, regarding these as private, or were sensitive to criticism by religious groups. Others may have been deterred by the length of the questionnaire, which extended to 143 different questions on media and religion. That a fifth of the group did respond is regarded as a reasonable response rate. In addition, a content analysis of two months’ content about religion on four different Israeli news websites was carried out. The results are discussed in Chapter 3. And in order to supplement the findings of surveys, qualitative interviews with journalists, including religion affairs specialist reporters and editors, from the general (or “secular” Israeli media) and the Haredi media, and reflecting different media forms – internet, television, radio, and print – were carried out. Qualitative interviews with spokespersons from the Chief Rabbinate, Ministry of Religious Services, and religious court system were also carried out. Israeli journalists’ assessment of media coverage of religion Findings for most journalists surveyed by the author do not suggest that in journalists’ eyes the media damages religious values. Slightly fewer journalists say so in the case of television and internet as opposed to press and radio. Among the journalists surveyed, 58% and 53% said that television and internet, respectively, do not damage religious values “at all” or “to a small extent,” and 67% and 73% were inclined to say that newspapers and radio, respectively, do not damage religious values “at all” or “to a small extent.” No less noteworthy is that 28% (same figures for television and internet) of journalists felt that television and internet damage religious values “to a large extent.” Eighteen per cent of Israeli journalists believed that the press damages religious values to “a very great extent” and “a great extent,” and 67% “disagree completely” or “agree only to a small degree.” Similar findings were found for radio, if incrementally less. But regarding television, journalists (like the rabbis) were more critical – 23% of journalists agreed that television damages religious values to “a very great extent” or “to a large extent.” Only 37% said TV does not damage religious values at all (as opposed to 59% in radio and 53% in newspapers). There is a correlation between the journalists’ position and religious beliefs. Only 28% of journalists said that the internet damages religious values to a “very great extent” or to “a large extent,” while 53% said the internet does not bring any damage at all or brings damage “to a small extent” only, and 15% said it brings damage somewhat. Eighteen per cent of journalists who defined themselves as secular said that the internet damages religion to “a very great extent” or “largely,” as did 29% of traditional journalists, compared to 56% of “religious” journalists. Only 34% religious journalists said the internet did not bring any damage at all or “only a bit” of damage to religious values, compared to 70% for secular journalists and 57% of traditional journalists.

The media setting 9 Of the journalists surveyed, 70% and 16% who defined themselves as “secular” did not agree “at all” or agreed “only to a limited degree” that newspapers damage religious values. So did 59% and 17% of traditional journalists. In contrast, only 16% and 4% of journalists who said that they were religious of the Orthodox wings of Judaism (mainstream modern Orthodox, Hardal [a sub-group of modern Orthodoxy], and Haredi) said so. Indeed, 22% and 33% of journalists who defined themselves as religious agreed that the press damage religious values “to a great extent” or “largely,” respectively, in contrast to 5% and 9% of secular journalists, respectively, and 3% and 3% of traditional journalists, respectively. Similar findings were found for radio, though the respondents were incrementally less critical (22% of religious journalists, 75% of secular journalists, and 66% of traditional journalists did not agree at all that radio damages religious values). In contrast, journalists were more critical of television. Only 52% of secular journalists, 31% of traditional journalists, and 11% of religious journalists said that TV “did not damage religious values.” There was a notable difference between those who had at some point reported on religion and those who had never reported on religion. Those who had reported on religion were more inclined to say the media damage religious values. For example, 22% of journalists who had reported on religion “very much agreed” or “much agreed” that the press damages religious values, in contrast to 15% who had not reported on religion. And 57% of journalists who had reported on religion disagreed or only slightly agreed that the press damages religion values, in contrast to 76% of those who had not ever covered religion and said so. All this suggests that those who covered religion know about it upfront. Quantity and quality of religion coverage in Israel

The level of satisfaction with the quantity of information on religion in the secular media was, according to the journalists surveyed, “not so good,” and this was most true when compared to the religious media. However, when compared to the question of accuracy and balance in the general media, the figure went up from the question of the quality of information. In contrast, in the case of the religious media, the figure for the quantity was higher than the quality. Thus, in the general Israeli daily newspapers, 21% of journalists surveyed said religion news was quantitatively “bad” and a further 22% “not good” (total 42.5%); 39% said it was “medium,” and only 11% said it was “good” and 1.8% “excellent.” Radio, TV, internet (non-religious), and weekly magazines were fairly similar. But in terms of accuracy and balance, while 22% of journalists on daily newspapers did say it was “bad,” 17% said it was “not good” (total 38.5%), 18% said it was good, and 3% said it was “excellent.” TV, radio, internet, and weekly press were not dissimilar in greater accuracy and balance over quantity. So when they covered religion, they did it with high professional standards of accuracy and balance. Among the religious Haredi daily newspapers – Hamodia (Agudat Yisrael political party), Yated Neeman (Degel Torah political party), Hamevaser (Shomrei Emunim, an Agudat Yisroel political faction), and Peles (Degel Torah – Jerusalem

10

The media setting

faction) – there was greater satisfaction, according to the journalists’ survey, for the quantity of information than for its accuracy and balance, which, being affiliated to Haredi political parties, necessarily had an agenda. Of all the journalists surveyed, 70% thought, in quantity terms, it was either “good” or “excellent” and 10% “medium.” Similar figures were found for religious weeklies, religious radio, and religious internet (there is no religious television in Israel). In addition to Haredi media, while there are no modern Orthodox daily papers today, religious weeklies and religious internet include those identified with the modern Orthodox or nationalist Zionist camp, notably the weekly papers BaSheva and Makor Rishon, the radio station Galei Israel, and the Arutz 7 website. There is satisfaction with the accuracy and balance in the independent Haredi media, as opposed to party-sponsored media, yet it appears still short of the high ratings earned for quantity. Similarly, religious internet sites were rated good (37%) and medium (8%) in terms of quantity. Similarly, religious internet sites were rated excellent (9%), good (23%), and medium (22%) for accuracy and balance, in contrast to excellent (36%), good (34%), and medium (6%) for quantity. Similarly, religious radio was rated excellent (11%), good (26%), and medium (21%) for accuracy and balance, compared to excellent (45%), good (26%), and medium (8%) for quantity. When compared to accuracy and balance for religious party-sponsored dailies, journalists rated them good (18%), excellent (3%), and medium (33%), in contrast to good (35%), excellent (35%), and medium (10%) for the quantity. However, the Haredi press, which are independent, rated higher for accuracy and balance than the daily Haredi press. Thus, for accuracy and balance, independent religious weeklies were rated by journalists as excellent (10%), good (23%), and medium (22%), higher than the religious dailies but not as high in terms of quantity: excellent (36%), good (37%), and medium (8%). Satisfaction with the quantity of coverage of religion in the secular daily press found that the more the journalist looks for religion news, the more critical he or she is regarding the quantity of coverage. Thus, 41% and 18% of those who read “all the time” about religious developments thought that coverage of religion in the general media was “bad” quantitatively or “not good” quantitatively. For those who read “some of the time,” 43% evaluated the coverage as quantitatively “medium.” Similarly, 33% and 21% of those journalists who read “much of the time” about religious developments said that coverage of religion was “bad” or “not bad” quantitatively. By comparison, 12% and 31% of those who said they did not at all follow religious developments through the press described coverage quantitatively as “bad” or “not good.” And 18% and 26% of those who did so “seldom” rated coverage quantitatively as “bad” or “not good.” A similar pattern was found with the general weeklies, general radio, television, and internet. A different trend was found regarding the religious media. However, those who did follow events in the religious world were less inclined to be as critical of the quantitative aspects of the religious media as they were of the general media. Thus, 38% and 50% of those who were very interested and read much about developments in the media replied that coverage in the religious media was “excellent” and “good.” And 25% and 38% of those who read consistently about what was going

The media setting 11 on thought coverage was “excellent” or “very good.” Similar trends were found for religious radio and religious internet. In looking at the breakdown of the journalistic occupation between internet, newspaper, and radio, there was no or little difference regarding the quantity of religion coverage. Thus, regarding the secular media, the more Israeli journalists followed developments, the more critical they were regarding quantity of coverage of religion by the secular media, whereas regarding coverage in the religious media, those who used the media to follow religious news were less critical. If the journalist specialised in covering religion, did this influence whether he or she thought that coverage of religion in general was satisfactory in qualitative terms? Forty-four per cent, as well as a further 16%, who were journalists who came from a religious workplace said that coverage of religion in daily papers was bad or not good, while 36% said it was medium. Eighteen per cent and 25% of those who did not work in a religious role or in a religious media workplace said it was “bad” or “not good.” Indeed, incrementally, those who did not work in a religion reporting function were slightly more inclined to see coverage positively – 41% rated the religion coverage “medium,” 14% “good,” and 2% “excellent,” compared to 36% “medium” and 4% “good” amongst those who had a religious function. So of those who had actively reported on religion, 33% and 15% said coverage of the daily papers was “bad” or “not good,” and 35% said it was “medium.” Accuracy and balance

Similarly, regarding the questions of accuracy and balance, the more a journalist followed the media in order to follow developments regarding religion, the less impressed the journalist was by the level of accuracy and balance in the general daily newspapers: 65% and 21% of reporters who followed the news “all the time” in order to follow religious developments said that the balance and accuracy in media reporting on religion were “bad” or “not good,” respectively. And 38% and 16% of those who followed the media “much of the time” said accuracy and balance was “bad” or “not good.” In contrast, 4% and 26% of reporters who never followed the news for religion developments said it was “bad” or “not good,” respectively. And 18% and 10% of reporters who seldom followed the media or religion news said that the balance and accuracy was “bad” or “not good,” respectively. With regard to the religious media, 0% and 29% who followed the media for religious developments, including the religious dailies, said that the accuracy and balance was “bad” or “not good,” and 76% and 29% said it was “excellent” or “good,” respectively. And 10% and 7% who followed the news “much of the time” said that the accuracy and balance in religious dailies was “bad” or “not good.” In contrast, 30% and 13% who never followed the news described accuracy and balance in religious dailies as “bad” or “not good,” and 17% and 17% said it was “excellent” or “good.” But regarding the independent religious weeklies (BaKehilla and Mishpacha), only 13% and 19% of journalists who followed the media described it as balanced

12

The media setting

and accurate, respectively – as did 13% and 19% of those who followed the media most of the time. In terms of religiosity, 61% and 23% of those journalists who defined themselves as religiously Orthodox said that accuracy and balance in the independent Haredi media was “biased” and “not bad”; only 0% and 5% said it was “excellent” or “good.” On the other hand, 11% and 14% of non-religious journalists described it as “bad” or “not good” and 5% as 28% as “excellent” or “good.” Journalists who defined themselves as traditional were incrementally more critical than the nonreligious: only 3% and 14% said it was “excellent” or “good,” and 10% and 24% said it was “bad” or “not good.” Conclusion The chances of improving the quality, accuracy, balance, and quantity of coverage of religion are limited. In contrast to rabbis, journalists view questions like the place of the media in Israeli society – including its coverage of religion – through purely Western lenses. While Judaism offers an ethical code, and the Jewish State, by definition, gives expression to Jewish life and culture, most journalists believe all this should take place within the framework of the democratic order and the rule of law – namely the democratically elected parliament, the Knesset, and the judiciary. Waving the banner of the separation of synagogue and state, journalists deflect criticism by rabbis about the media as clerical and anti-democratic. Nevertheless, journalists should attempt to enter into a dialogue with rabbis. Trends in Israel towards greater religiosity among the traditional non-strictly religious make the need for this consensus essential. Journalists – including editors and producers – should become more acquainted with Jewish institutions, including touring yeshivot. Meetings between journalistic personnel and rabbis would benefit both sides of the rabbinical-journalistic divide. While it is inevitable that the exotic, including the religiously exotic, will continue to be regarded as newsworthy, there are other interesting religion stories. Journalists need to see rabbis as potential commentators on more general issues (i.e. not narrowly religion-defined) of public policy. True, the politicians of the Haredi political parties are interviewed about narrow religion issues and the demands of the political parties. But journalists themselves face an uphill task here, given that Haredi rabbis themselves are inclined not to speak to secular journalists, missing out an important opportunity to explain themselves. Bibliography Baumel, S. D. (2002) Communication and Change: Newspapers, Periodicals and Acculturation Among Israeli Haredim. Jewish History, 16: 161–186. Baumel-Schwartz, J. T. (2009) From Surfing: Orthodox Jewish Women’s Internet Forums as a Historical and Cultural Phenomenon. Journal of Jewish Identities 2(10): 1–30. Bezeq (2021) Report on Internet in Israel. www.isoc.org.il/sts-datas/internet-statusin-israel-bezeq-report-2021

The media setting 13 Caspi, D., & Limor, Y. (1999) The In/Outsiders: The Media in Israel. Creskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Central Bureau of Statistics. (2020) Jerusalem: Social Survey [Hebrew]. Cohen, Y. (2005) Religion News in Israel. Journal of Media & Religion, 4(3). Cohen, Y. (2012) God, Jews & the Media: Religion & Israel’s Media. New York & London: Routledge. Cohen, Y. (2016) Media Events, Jewish Religious Holidays, and the Israeli Press. In Fox, A. (ed.), Global Perspectives on Media Events in Contemporary Society. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. Cohen, Y. (2018) Holy Days, News Media, and Religious Identity: A Case Study in Jewish Holydays and the Israeli Press and News Websites. In Cohen, Y. (ed.), Spiritual News: Reporting Religion Around the World. New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 303–322. Cohen, Y., & Hetsroni, A. (2018) Religious Practices and Conversations in American and Israeli Prime-Time Television Programming. Drustvena Istrazivanja, Croatia, 27(2). Cohen, Y., & Hetsroni, A. (2020) Monotheism and Television: A Comparative Content Analysis of Religion in Prime-Time Programming in the USA, Israel and Turkey. Atlantic Journal of Communication 28 (April): 103–114. Dart, J., & Allen, J. (1993) Bridging the Gap: Religion and the News Media. Vanderbilt: The Freedom Forum. The Economist. (2011) Back to the Coffee House: Report on the Future of News, 9–15 July. Gabel, I. (2006) Ha-tzibur ha-dati leumi v’hu-Tikshortet: YahaseiAhava-sinaa [Hebrew: The Modern Religious Community and the Media: A Love-Hate Relationship]. Tel Aviv: Hertzog Institute, Tel Aviv University. Hackett, R. (2003) Managing or Manipulating Religious Conflict in the Nigerian Media. In Mitchell, J., & Marriage, S. (eds.), Mediating Religion. London: Clark. Hoover, S., & Clark, L. (2002) Practicing Religion in the Age of the Media. New York: Columbia University Press. Lev-On, A., & Neriya-Ben Shahar, R. (2011) A Forum of Their Own: Views about the Internet among Ultra-Orthodox Women Who Browse Designated Closed Fora. First Monday, 16(4). Meyer, B., & Moors, A. (2006) Religion, Media and the Public Sphere. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Meyers, O., & Cohen, J. (2011) A Self-Portrait of Israeli Journalists: Characteristics, Values, & Attitudes (Research Paper No 4). The Joseph & Alma Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. Micolson, M. (1990) Itonut Haredit B’Yisroel’ [Hebrew: The Haredi Press in Israel], Tel Aviv. Kesher, 8: 11–21. Mitchell, J., & Marriage, S. (2003) Mediating Religion. New York: Y & T Clark. Reich, Z., Barnoy, A., & Herzog, L. (2016) Worlds of Journalism Study. Country Report: Journalists in Israel. WorldsofJournalism.org Roeh, I. (ed). (1980) Almost Midnight: Reforming the Late Night News (People & Communication). Thousand Oaks: Sage. Schejter, A. M. (2009) Muting Israeli Democracy: How Media and Cultural Policy Undermine Free Expression. Urbana & Chicago: Illinois University Press. Silk, M. (1995) Unsecular Media: Making News of Religion in America. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. Tsfati, Y., & Livio, O. (2008) Exploring Journalists’ Perspectives of Media Impact. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 81: 113–130.

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Tsfati, Y., & Meyers, O. (2012) Journalists in Israel. In Weaver, D. H., & Willnat, L. (ed.), The Global Journalists in the 21st Century. New York: Routledge. Tsfati, Y., Meyers, O., & Peri, Y. (2006) What Is Good Journalism? Comparing Israeli Public and Journalists’ Perspective. Journalism 7: 152–173. Underwood, D. (2001) Are Journalists Really Irreligious? A Multidimensional Analysis. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 78(4): 771–786. Winston, D., & Green, J. C. (2015) Most Americans Say Media Coverage of Religion Too Sensationalised. Los Angeles: USC Annenberg & The University of Akron. Zandberg, E., & Neiger, M. (2005) Between the Nation and the Profession: Journalists as Members of Contradicting Communities. Media, Culture & Society 27(1): 131–141.

2

The rabbinic setting

The rabbi is a figure not mentioned once in the Bible – which is the corpus of Judaism and the basis for all Jewish theological learning and rule-making. True, prayer is mentioned by the Patriarchs and by the Prophets. But nor is the synagogue (Jewish house of prayer; beit knesset) mentioned. Mentioned – in seemingly lurid detail – is the sacrificial order in “the tent of meeting,” in particular in the biblical books of Leviticus and Numbers, as a prototype to sacrificial order, which was the centrepiece of the First and Second Jewish Temples in Jerusalem (1000 BCE–70 CE). Yet even during the existence of the two temples, the Israelite people met in houses of worship throughout the land for prayer and learning, while the priestly and Levitical tribes were occupied in the temple sacrificial service. And prayers were secondary to sacrifices in Judaism. After the Second Jewish Temple in was destroyed 70 CE and Jews were exiled from Jerusalem to such other places as Yavne, the ancient rabbis came into their own as teachers of the Torah, with the task of interpreting the Torah – the ethical rules for man’s relationship with God and man’s relationship with his fellow man, respectively, including the rabbinical discussions and rulings in the tomes of the Mishna and Talmud. Rabbis draw their thinking and inspiration from the Bible. For them it is the first word and, in many cases, the final word and goes back to the very relationship itself between God and man and between God and his Chosen People. The evolution of the rabbi As the decades and centuries wore on, the role of the rabbi in Jewish life became central, with the role changed according to the political and social circumstances of the community of Jews he served. In the early years, the task of the rabbi was to establish a yeshiva (an institution for higher Talmudic studies) in the town where he lived. By the Middle Ages, the post of the rabbi became more institutionalised. The appointment of a rabbi was a decision of the community – which in so doing accepted and legitimised the decisions of the rabbi, including in determining the application of Jewish religious law (halakha) in the community. Yet Judaism stands not for desire but commitment and obligation to a higher being and set of values. The rabbis’ goal is not merely to put people in the synagogue but to build sustaining relationships that enrich synagogue life, notably on key days like the Sabbath and holydays. DOI: 10.4324/9781315735184-2

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The rabbinic setting

But as the post of rabbi became even more institutionalised, the rabbi took on additional tasks, including the reading of the Torah from the scrolls of the Law during the Sabbath and holyday services in the synagogue and representing the community to outside organs of the state. In doing the latter, the rabbi required general knowledge, far beyond Jewish religious learning, as well as interpersonal communication skills. The appointment itself was often for no more than two to three years. Yet equally the rabbi sought to avoid bringing politics to his job, which would have turned him into a divisive, instead of unifying, character (Ariel, 2011). The rabbi’s responsibilities also widened yet further to conduct and register marriages, conduct funerals, and manage the eruv (a system which enabled the observant Jew to overcome narrow Jewish law restrictions for walking and carrying objects in public areas on the holy Sabbath). Other responsibilities included supervising kosher food, as well as being the shochat responsible for slaughtering animals in accordance with Jewish dietary laws. The posts of the community rabbi and the dayan, or religious court judge, with responsibility for conversion and reconciling disputes became divided into two. Geographic limits implied by the word “community” came to be challenged through developments in communication from the telephone and telegram and the postal system to later faxes and e-mails: all this enabled the Jew to go outside the geographical limits to rabbinical authorities elsewhere, even to foreign countries – challenging the authority of the rabbi. The community rabbi in the 21st century Over hundreds of years the traditional framework for rabbis to address their flock has been the address from the pulpit. But like many Christian clergy (Biernatzki, 2006; Johnstone, 2009), rabbis today recognise the value of supplementing the synagogue pulpit by using mass media channels to communicate their messages. It also reflects the wider changes in the formation of religious identity today. If religion in traditional societies was based upon authority vested in religious bodies, in complex industrial societies there is increased emphasis upon personal choice in moral and religious matters, as reflected in the development of niche markets for religious outlets, including religious broadcasting, religious press, and internet. Mass media has in effect become a secondary causal agent of contemporary religious identity. David Bigman (2011), one Israeli rabbi who teaches in a yeshiva, argues that a major change in the relationship between the rabbi and his community has occurred over the last hundred years – as a result of aliya (Jewish immigration to Israel), the Holocaust, and the Zionist revival – each of which has changed the rabbi-community nexus beyond recognition. He argues that the cultural and social climate today does not make possible the existence of a community in a geographical frame that existed in the past; rather, it is based on members who did not by nature live in the same geographical area together. Second, graduates of the yeshiva who left their community for advanced religious studies maintain their relationships with the yeshiva rabbis even after they complete their studies and return “home.” This partly reflects the higher level of learning which

The rabbinic setting 17 many yeshiva rabbis have over the community rabbi – all of which weakens the community rabbi’s status. It leads Bigman to propose a different type of rabbicommunity relationship in Israel: the rabbi’s function as a legal rule maker is what still defines the legitimacy of the rabbi in the eyes of his community. He proposes that communities blessed with learned individuals should form a Halakha Committee (or Committee for Jewish Religious Law) to thrash out with the rabbi his halakhic position on a range of Jewish legal matters reflecting the continuity Jewish law rulings. But clearly, this is only possible where a community also includes lay scholars in Jewish law. Indeed, more individual Jews are studying Jewish studies than ever before – which in turn challenges the past rabbis’ monopoly on Jewish learning. The rabbi in the modern Israeli state If abroad the rabbi remains the centre of Jewish life, the rabbi in Israel never enjoyed such prestige. Inside Israel, religion is characterised by a multiplicity of choices, causing a revolution in decision-making patterns. The synagogue and rabbi in Israel have a limited impact on the majority of lives of Israeli Jews both in functional terms and in audience terms. The functions of the synagogue in Israel are narrower than synagogues in Jewish communities abroad and mostly comprise the holding of religious services and educational activities like religious lessons (shiurim) and lectures (Lowenthal, 2009, 2018). Apart from the strictly religious, the Jewish state itself and its official organs and other non-official institutions have replaced the synagogue to a considerable extent as foci of Jewish identity. The modern state of Israel has created alternative sources of influence and power replacing classical rabbinical duties of old: the Israeli religious court system has replaced the beth din, or rabbinical courts; the school system and higher education, with the exception of the Haredim, the Knesset or parliamentary system have replaced the leadership roles filled in the past by rabbis. Key points where the place of religion in statehood between non-Orthodox and the official Orthodox religious establishment has clashed include conversion, marriage, divorce, burial, non-Orthodox Jews at the Western Wall in Jerusalem, kashrut supervision, and non-Orthodox members in local religious councils (Dromi, 2005; Lewittes, 1977). Judaism is, therefore, one of a multitude of ideas waiting in the marketplace for “purchasers” who behave according to the desire for personal enrichment and enjoyment. The rest of the Israeli Jewish population has no regular daily or weekly interaction with the synagogue in Israel. Nevertheless, the traditional Israeli Jews (as distinct from the strictly observant in Orthodox Jewish communities), which account for 45% of the Israeli Jewish population – also have varying degrees of selective contact with the synagogue, comprising attendance at the Jewish holydays, including the New Year and participation in holydays like Passover, Sukkoth, Hanukah, and Purim and life-cycle events including the bar mitzvah, circumcision, or funeral. In contrast to community rabbis, teacher-rabbis play important roles in education, mostly in the state religious education systems, notably the modern Orthodox

18 The rabbinic setting (dati leumi, or national religious) stream and Haredi or ultra-Orthodox streams. In addition to schools, teacher-rabbis are also to be found at young adult yeshivot (or colleges of advanced Jewish education) for young adult and older men and midrashot and seminaries for young adult women. (In the women’s colleges, there are religious women instructors as well as rabbis.) They teach the broad span of religious Jewish studies, with a heavy emphasis in the case of yeshivot for adult men or the Talmudic literature – or the discussions among ancient rabbis on the intricacies of Jewish religious law-making (halakha) – and in the case of young adult women, Jewish thought, Bible commentaries, and Jewish legal teachings. Haredi colleges for women do not teach the Talmud itself, but some colleges for women in the modern Orthodox stream have introduced this. In addition, teacher-rabbis are also found in the Conservative-/Reform-affiliated “Tali” school network. Rabbis as a whole have little or no impact in the majority state secular education system. Religious court judges (dayan) include responsibility by the state rabbinical religious courts (batei din) for certain aspects of legislation concerning personal status, such as determining who is a Jew and matters of conversion, marriage, and divorce. Like the community rabbi, the teacher-rabbi, a dayan is a highly learned Jew in religious law who received rabbinical ordination, having studied sections of the Talmud and Jewish law codes. Moreover, religion – as distinct from the rabbi himself – enjoys a centrality in Israeli public life which does not exist in many other countries. This includes responsibility by the state rabbinical religious courts (batei din) for certain aspects of legislation concerning personal status, such as determining who is a Jew, conversion, marriage, and divorce. Nevertheless, the presence of rabbis is felt in the Israeli public sphere. Individual rabbis are not afraid to speak out and critique Israeli public bodies like the courts, the army, and the Knesset (Israeli Parliament), and politicians and businessmen consult rabbis on a host of public policy questions, such as foreign affairs, economics, and crime. Yet Yedidya Stern, co-editor of Rabbis and Rabbinate: The Challenge, is critical of the extent to which Israelis rabbis as a whole do not themselves feel competent to speak out about public issues. Living in a secular state complicates the standing and work of the rabbi. Secular Israelis are not seen by many Orthodox rabbis as immoral, and rabbis recognise that secular individuals hold respectable roles – in the Knesset, the universities, and the medical profession, for example – but they are nevertheless perceived by the latter as a threat for not observing the norms of halakha (Jewish religious law) and regarded as heretical. Orthodox rabbis feel uncomfortable with liberalism. Many rabbis are not at home with such contemporary values as human rights and freedom of expression. “The Israeli rabbi,” writes Stern, “often acts in a way which Judaism appears as having nothing today about contemporary affairs.” For example, what does Judaism have to say about use force against an enemy? How in Judaism’s eyes should a democracy rule? However, “while halakha does not have a law-making process, rabbinical rulings over the years offer clues to how Judaism view situations,” argues Stern (2011). And while it is true that Haredi rabbis have severe reservations about Zionism and the modern Zionist state, modern Orthodox rabbis, notwithstanding their own

The rabbinic setting 19 reservations about certain inconsistencies between Judaism and the modern state, do relate broadly to the modern Zionist state. So what do Israeli rabbis need to do? Arguing for the “democratisation of Torah knowledge,” Stern postulates a change professionally in the rabbi. There is a need for the Israeli rabbi to show leadership – which so far is limited to within the religious community. There is a need for the rabbi in becoming a true leader to deal with the intellectual challenges of the state, secularism, and liberalism in order to elucidate a “Jewish position” on these. Indeed, the synagogue has, for hundreds of years since the emancipation, been losing its monopoly on strengthening moral values. The clash of cultures depicted here is not surprising given that the rabbi emerges from a conservative culture representing established traditions and religious structures and is confronted with accelerated cultural change exemplified by, amongst others, the media. But this in no way diminishes the challenge and task for rabbis. The information age and the rabbi The media plays a number of passive and negative roles for the rabbi (Cohen, 2012). These include the media playing roles in constructing mutual perceptions between secular and religious Jews in Israel. As theologians, rabbis legitimise – and delegitimise – the media in the eyes of their communities; the media are additional channels to reach their community to that of the pulpit in the synagogue (Cohen, 2006b). In breaking down the rabbinical profession into three types – community rabbis, rabbis teaching in schools or at higher institutes of religious study (yeshivot), and religious court judges (dayanim), who are authorised by the state to adjudicate in personal status matters – synagogue rabbis play important roles inside their communities. The media is the most relevant to the first two types. The rabbi’s influence is felt within the religious population, such as through the Sabbath sermon from the pulpit to congregants, but the media is an additional channel for spreading the rabbi’s religious message even if this tends to occur much more in the religious media than in the secular Israeli media. Rabbis and communal leaders are discovering the value of the internet in circumventing the mainstream media and in building community websites. Moreover, the usage of telephones and e-mails changes the very nature of the question-and-answer dialogue about Jewish religious law between congregants and the community rabbi. There is no similarity between the internet answer and the halakhic literature. In the former, the rabbi is unable to take into account the specific circumstances of the questioner. Also, an internet answer is itself short and does not go into detail. The rabbi may not be able to understand the specific circumstances of the questioner – sometimes anonymously on the Net. The ruling will be more reactive than one given privately by the community rabbi to an individual in his own community given that Jewish law often has a number of options in practice. And another recent phenomenon of rabbis of answering questions put by readers in synagogal bulletins (alonei bet knesset) – pamphlets distributed free of charge, sometimes extending to many pages, which are distributed in synagogues on the

20 The rabbinic setting Sabbath and comprise light and popular discussions by rabbis of the weekly Bible reading in synagogues, and discussion of topical Jewish issues on the public agenda, including state-religion issues – has an inbuilt danger in rabbis tailoring answers to views held by the editors and sponsors of the specific bulletin. The teacher-rabbi in the religious state school system has an important pedagogic function in influencing the outlook of religious children and youth towards the wider society, including the media, and such values as freedom of speech and tolerance. These include taking positions on whether children and youth should be exposed to the media, particularly to television and internet. The relationship between rabbis and mass media may be broken down into a number of broad types: First, as moral leaders, rabbis legitimise – and delegitimise – mass media. The exposure of Haredi Jews to mass media has been heavily influenced by their spiritual leaders. The influence of religious hierarchies – notably rabbis – is paramount in the Haredi communities – whether in the Lithuanian Haredi stream where the rabbi’s role is to interpret halakha or in the Hassidic Haredi stream in which the admor fulfils a father figure role in the community and his influence is wider-ranging; he is also consulted on a range of social and other matters. Second, rabbis are themselves updated about events from the media both generally and regarding current religion-related developments. In order to be effective, rabbi-teachers and synagogue community rabbis need to be exposed to the media to which their own audiences, children or synagogue congregants, are exposed. Third, rabbinical court judges (or dayan), for example, in determining decisions (pesuk din), require not only mastery of Jewish religious law (halakha) but also awareness of contemporary affairs. Fourth, considerable tension exists in Israel between religious Jewry and the general media, which are regarded by many in the former as anti-religious, anti-nationalist, and secular. The media play an important role in building mutual perceptions between religious and secular communities. Much that gets defined as religion news is conflict-related, such as conflicts between religious institutions in Israel and the state. These include rabbinical control of matters of personal status like marriage, divorce, and conversion; government budgeting of Haredi yeshivot; governmental resources for settlement building in Judea and Samaria; and Haredi exemptions from national military service. Religious and secular communities become newsworthy by their very involvement in conflict. Religious streams and the public-media sphere The religious community in Israel comprises the modern Orthodox (dati leumi, or national religious) and the ultra-Orthodox Haredim, accounting for 12% and 10%, respectively, of the Israeli Jewish population (Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, 2020). The Orthodox, which make up the majority of Israeli Jews, may be divided into groups. The Haredim are the natural continuation of European Haredi Jewry. Haredim do not identify unqualifiably with the modern state of Israel, believing that Jewish statehood awaits the coming of the Jewish Messiah. They are single-minded in their devotion to Torah study and religious worship. The Haredim desire that Israeli public life possess a religious orientation – thus, Sabbath

The rabbinic setting 21 observance in the public sphere is a Haredi motif. Nor do they agree to participate in the national service in the Israeli Army. They decline to have any contact with secular society for fear that “impure” aspects of modern society will influence their ghetto style of life. Reflecting its philosophy of withdrawal from modernity and seeking to maintain religious values in a cultural ghetto framework, Haredi rabbis have, over the years, issued religious decrees (pesuk din) against mass media as being a threat to Torah family values. From the appearance of newspapers in the 19th century, through to the development of radio and television, and latterly video, computers, internet, and portable phones, Haredi rabbis have enacted decrees against media. In contrast, the rabbis of the modern Orthodox (dati leumi, in Hebrew, lit. “national religious”) stream seek to reach a synthesis between the Torah world and modernity, participating fully in modern society, including academia, as well as in the armed services. They believe that the divine salvation has already arrived, that Israel – having returned to the Jewish state in the biblical homeland, 1,900 years after being exiled from it – is today in the throes of the Messianic revolution (Sheleg, 2000; Ettinger, 2019). Given their raison d’etre of rejecting any inherent conflict with modernity, they, for example, employ techniques like media literacy to craft critical responses to the internet. Rabbis in the modern Orthodox have not issued official Jewish legal rulings regarding media use but instead have offered a thoughtful yet critical response towards the internet by advocating the need for media literacy in order to create a balanced and acceptable relationship between Torah world and world of modern media. Yet some of the modern Orthodox rabbis, notably those identified with the Haredi Leumi sub-stream (or Hardal for short), are characterised by a combination of a nationalist, or leumi, view towards nationalism and the Zionist state and, for example, participate in national service, even also seeing this as a religious obligation, unlike the Haredim, but they share with the Haredim a separatist view towards modern, non-Jewish culture (Sheleg, 2020; Lavie, 2019). The Hardal also erect “cultural walls” to distance themselves from perceived dangerous influences by, for example, having fewer secular studies in their schools; avoiding exposure to television, the internet, and the secular press; and not travelling outside the Holyland. While the modern Orthodox have long fine-tuned the tools over the debates to reconcile their Torah beliefs with modernity, for the Haredim this is an early instance in which the walls of the cultural ghetto which stand behind Haredim have been pierced. Nevertheless, while rabbis, particularly in the Haredi community, may have lost some of the singular authority they enjoyed in the past, the offline synagogue, yeshiva, and Jewish home remain the foundations of Jewish life no less than they were in the pre-computer era. Indeed, in some sense, the threats and losses have been outweighed by the multifarious benefits and opportunities which online technology offers for Jewish Torah education. Non-Orthodox comprises Reform Judaism and Conservative Judaism. Conservative Judaism, while also favouring the emancipation of the Jews and opposing ghettoisation, adheres to key tenets of Judaism, such as the observance of kashrut

22

The rabbinic setting

(dietary laws) and the Sabbath. In accepting the legal authority of Jewish religious law, Conservative Judaism necessarily becomes bound by laws in the Bible (although they are more flexible in interpreting post-biblical rulings by rabbis). Furthermore, Reform Judaism, which originated in Germany in the 19th century, legitimises change in Judaism and denies eternal validity to Jewish law. Reform Judaism, in asserting the right of interpretation, is not hamstrung by the halakhic tradition and has far freer access for negotiating mass media-related questions and dilemmas. Reform Judaism takes a more proactive interpretation of religion in regulating man’s relationship with his fellow man. This includes placing a moral Jewish value on mediarelated questions, such as, for example, sexploitation of women in the advertising sector. While the modern Orthodox streams, as well as non-Orthodox streams, like the Conservative and Reform, all seek to be full partners in modern society, in practice even the mainstream modern Orthodox are inclined to be more rigorous than the non-Orthodox, say, in controlling the exposure of children to the media. Yet even the non-Orthodox – who did not favour limiting earlier media forms like newspapers and television – do also favour some controls on the internet. In addition to the 22% religious (modern Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Haredim) population inside Israel, there are 45% traditional Jews who are selective in their religious adherence. Some of the traditional Jews belong to the Orthodox communities, and others belong to the non-Orthodox religious communities. There are small non-Orthodox communities representing Conservative and Reform Judaism – the dominant Jewish religious streams in the United States. Forty per cent of Israeli Jews define themselves as secular. This itself may be broken down between the secular who believe in the existence of God but refrain from any religious observance and the secular who are agnostic or atheist. The religious media Religious media developed for two reasons. In the case of the ultra-Orthodox Haredim, Haredi rabbis wish to separate from the wider culture, perceived as secular and alien to Jewish Torah values. Second, religious political parties, both Haredi and non-Orthodox, also use the media as a channel for political recruitment. Indeed, it is regarded as the last of the political presses in Israel. The first Haredi daily newspaper, Hamodia, was established in 1949, at the behest of the head of the largest Hassidic Haredi group, Gur, by the Gerrer Rebbe with the specific intent of ensuring that his followers in particular, as well as other Haredim, among them Lithuanian, or Litai, would not be exposed to the secular media. Until the mid-’80s, Hamodia was the only daily Haredi newspaper in Israel. But as a result of various disputes between Haredi political leaders and rabbis, a Lithuanian Haredi newspaper, Yated Neeman, was established in 1985. So was a Sephardi Haredi paper, Yom Le Yom, in 1993, but it soon changed to a weekly. Further disputes between Hamodia and other Hassidim led to the creation of Hamevaser in 2010, and those between Yated Neeman and the Jerusalem faction of the Lithuanian led to the creation of Peles. In all the papers, a rabbinical board supervises content, as well as a daily censor who ensures that undesirable content is excluded.

The rabbinic setting 23 But the Haredi media market has been characterised by considerable change. First, fetching graphics marked the growth of independent Haredi weeklies – Mishpacha and BaKehilla. Notwithstanding sensitivity to publishing or broadcasting matter inappropriate for Jewish values, rabbis began to lose their direct influence over the media. And sensitive issues ignored by the daily institutional press – like discrimination against yeshiva students from a Sephardic or Oriental background, the struggles between different Haredi rabbis on such bodies as the Council of Torah Sages, and medical problems like Down syndrome – began to be covered by the religious media. For Mishpacha, a bandwagon has been a felt need for Haredim to get a secular education and seek employment in the workforce. Secular radio was the sole radio in Israel until 1995. Until then there had been some pirate radio stations serving the Haredi community (mostly comprising religious lessons or inspiring religious music but not news coverage) and Arutz 7, a news station geared to the needs of the modern Orthodox in general and the residents of the Judea and Samaria areas (the West Bank). The Israeli government closed some of these illegal stations, including Arutz 7. Although Arutz 7 was an emphatically Zionist station run by the owners identified with the modern Orthodox, many Haredim listened due to the station’s sensitivity in not broadcasting matter regarded as against religious values. A new station, Radio Kol Chai, established in 1995, was a recognition by the Knesset that the needs of the religious were not met by the existing stations. A second Haredi station, Radio Kol Berama, was established in 2009 partly due to political pressure by a Sephardic Haredi political party. A TGI-Kantar survey in 2022 found that 5.4% of the Israeli population listened to Radio Kol Chai and 3.5% to Radio Kol Berama. One issue which aroused the attention of the Second Television and Radio Authority, a public supervisory body, was the absence of any women announcers from the station – and the matter was rectified following a court case and the Authority’s intervention (Cohen, 2019). A third – and most controversial – development concerned the creation of Haredi news websites – B’Hadrei Haredim, Kikar Shabbat, and Haredim 10 – given the existence of a rabbinical entire ban imposed by Haredi rabbis on the internet, due to the access internet affords to sexual content. Computers were banned at home and limited to businesses and only with programmes which filtered content. The values underlying the Haredi media vary less in the principle and more in the degree of their implementation. First, there is recognition both in the institutionalised Haredi dailies and the commercial Haredi media of the high value attached to the principle of “the right not to know” – all in order to safeguard Haredi cultural or “ghetto” walls. Second, Haredi media – in particular the institutionalised media – are a shophar (lit. a ram’s horn which is blown on Rosh Hashanah (the Jewish New Year)) or a stage for passing on rabbinical messages to the public. Third, journalistic talent is less a feature of Haredi journalism since a considerable number of journalists write under pseudonyms. Fourth, regarding the prohibition of special gossip, a distinction may be drawn between the daily institutionalised Haredi papers – which are much more cautious in this regard – and the commercial Haredi media, including the commercial weekly press and the Haredi websites (Greenboim, June 2020).

24

The rabbinic setting

Related to this is a Haredi rabbinical ban on smartphones, given they have access to the internet. Kosher mobile phones are internet free. While the Haredi media even showed signs of growth, owing to a high Haredi birth rate, an independent media for the modern religious did not develop, because by definition the “modern Orthodox” (dati leumi) sought to synthesise religion and modernity, including the mainstream media. Indeed, religious parties identified with the modern Orthodox, notably the defunct National Religious political party, maintained a daily newspaper, Hatzofe, founded in 1937 (until the latter’s closure in 2008). Yet even stricter sections of the modern Orthodox – identified as Haredi Leumi (Hardal) – limited media exposure, like the weekly freebie BaSheva. The upmarket and more liberal weekly Makor Rishon covered developments within and beyond the mainstream modern Orthodox community. And the former radio station Arutz 7 became an internet news website. Research literature

To the extent that there is research about rabbis and religious communities in Israel, attention has focused on official state-religion relationships, with much less attention given to non-official actors like mass media, notwithstanding popular streetlevel discussion inside Israel about the media’s coverage of religion. Most research on religion and media has been carried out in the US context (Abelman & Hoover, 1990; Buddenbaum, 1990; Ferre, 1990; Garrett-Medill, 1999; Hoover, 1998). But Israel provides a contrasting case from the US experience, given that religion and the Jewish state are, by nature, interwoven (Cohen, 2012). The question of Jewish theological attitudes concerning the social role of the media was discussed by Korngott (1993), Chwat (1995), Cohen (2001, 2006, 2014), and Cohen and Enayat (2023). Cohen (2015a, 2015b, 2016, and 2017), Feldman (2015), Ha-Levi (2014), and Warhaftig (2009) examined Jewish theological attitudes to new media, among these online prayer; Schwartz (2005) the computer from a Jewish religious law perspective; Horowitz (2000) early Haredi rabbinical attitudes to the internet; and Cohen updated the picture (2011, 2013a). Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai (2005) examined how the internet has been adapted to Haredi community needs, Cohen surveyed how new media was impacting Jews (2013a, 2013b, 2015c) and rabbis, and Tydor Baumel-Schwartz (2009) examined Orthodox Jewish women’s internet forums. In a rabbinical question-and-answer style, Cherlow (2016) provides modern Orthodox and Haredi Jewish legal responses to a range of internet-related questions. Survey of rabbis and the media

In order to throw light on rabbis’ attitudes to mass media, the author carried out a survey of Israeli rabbis. The results are intended to shed light on the extent to which ancient Jewish teachings concerning media-related questions get support among rabbis. Questions examined in the survey include rabbis’ evaluations of mass media and whether they damage religious values; other rabbis’ evaluations of religion coverage, including coverage by religion reporters; whether access to the mass media for children should be limited; whether sex and money scandals involving rabbis should be published; whether religion should appear in

The rabbinic setting 25 the media; whether media inaccuracy in covering religion was due to a lack of success in explaining themselves and whether rabbis saw being quoted in the media as “a positive thing”; and appearances by rabbis in the media to project religion. A total of 310 questionnaires were returned by rabbis. Completed questionnaires were received from 310 Israeli rabbis. The survey of rabbis covers rabbis of four main branches of Judaism (Haredi, modern Orthodox, Reform, and Conservative). In addition, a fifth grouping, Hardal (or Haredi Leumi), is a subsystem of the modern Orthodox. The vast majority of rabbis in Israel and their synagogue communities belong to the Orthodox group, with the first two categories being Haredi and modern Orthodox. In contrast to non-Orthodox Jewish communities in the US (the second biggest centre of Jews in the world after Israel), which account for 80% of the American Jewish community, the Conservative and Reform non-Orthodox communities in Israel are small and have not so far been recognised by the Israeli state. Although the focus of this study is Israel, given nevertheless the significant presence of Reform Judaism and Conservative Judaism in the Jewish people as a whole, and their struggle for recognition inside Israel – often with implications for a study examining the media, as well as themselves having nuanced differences in their exposure to modern culture, including the mass media – it is instructive to include these. The study also sought to examine the media-rabbi matrix according to differences between rabbis in terms of places of birth, age differences, and whether they had children at home. It is hypothesised that this will influence the rabbi’s attitudes to the question of limiting children’s exposure to media. Rabbis may be broken down according to whether the rabbi surveyed was a community rabbi (who leads a congregation and heads a synagogue (Jewish prayer house)) or a teacher either in schools or higher academic institutions like a yeshiva (Talmudic academy) or a women’s college – midrasha (in the modern Orthodox sector) or seminary (in the Haredi sector). A third occupation is the rabbi who is an avrech, who studies full-time (“sits and learns” in the Jewish parlance) in a yeshiva such as a kollel, an advanced studies programme in Judaism, mostly comprising study of Talmudic literature, for married persons. Places of birth were divided between those born in Israel, Western countries (North America, Western Europe, South America), and Eastern Europe, and Sephardi rabbis born in Arab or Middle Eastern countries. It is hypothesised that the state of the media in the countries where the rabbis grew up – whether the media was free – may be a factor which influences the rabbi’s general attitude to questions like the public’s right to know and the freedom of the press. As an immigrant, it is instructive to consider whether the place of the birth of the rabbi influences his or her attitude. Rabbis were also broken down according to age groupings – born 1961–1980, 1941–1960, 1921–1940, and 1901–1920 – in order to see whether there were any differences by age. It is postulated that rabbis who grew up in the computer age might have different attitudes towards the media than older rabbis. The surveys were supplemented by qualitative interviews in order to expand on the interaction of rabbis with the media. Qualitative interviews were carried out with community rabbis with a synagogue, teacher-rabbis, and religious court judges (dayan) from four religious streams: modern Orthodox (including Hardal), Haredi or ultra-Orthodox,

26

The rabbinic setting

Conservative, and Reform. A fourth – more recent – occupational role is the “public rabbi,” who is known by his or her appearances in the public arena and the media, notably religious media or websites that answer online religious questions. Conclusion Rabbis have a self-interest in entering into a dialogue with the journalistic world. For rabbis, the perceived distance between the media and Judaism – indeed media antagonism – exists because the media presents a selective and often negative image of religion and religious people. But the chances of dialogue are not high. For rabbis, the gap begins with the secular media itself being regarded as, if not illegitimate, at least wanting, given the media’s secular vulgarity and reflection of anti-religious values. Recognising, perhaps realistically, that the mainstream media is Western, commercial, and democratic, Haredi rabbis and, to some extent, the modern Orthodox-cum-Hardal have taken the path of escapism to create their own alternative frum (lit. “religious”) media, in accordance with what rabbis believe the media should and should not be. This deepens the secular-religious divide. But rabbis fail to act appropriately. First, they fail to acknowledge that religion reporting in the mainstream Israeli media is done by specialist religion reporters, who bring background knowledge to their day-by-day reporting. Second, rabbis fail to understand news dynamics and fail to distinguish between news values and agenda setting, on the one hand, and the individual journalist, on the other. They believe incorrectly that all reporters bring ideological baggage to their work and fail to recognise that the cardinal landmark in the journalistic profession of objectivity exists in religion reporting as well. Bibliography Abelman, R., & Hoover, S. (eds.). (1990) Religious Television: Controversies and Conclusions. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation. Ariel, Y. (2011) MaMamad shel HaRav b’Yisroel [Hebrew: The Status of the Rabbi in Israel and His Functions]. In Stern, Y. Z., & Friedman, S. (eds.), Rabbis & The Rabbinate: The Challenge. Jerusalem & Tel Aviv: The Israel Democracy Institute and Am Oved, 2 Volumes. [Hebrew] Barzilai-Nahon, K., & Barzilai, G. (2005) Cultured Technology: The Internet & Religious Fundamentalism. The Information Society, 21. Baumel-Schwartz, J. T. (2009) Frum Surfing; Orthodox Jewish Women’s Internet Forums as a Historical and Cultural Phenomenon. Journal of Jewish Identities, 2(1). Biernatzki, W. (2006) Some Twenty-First Century Challenges Facing Catholics in Communication Formation. In Srampickal, J., Mazza, G., & Baugh, L. (eds.), Cross Connections: Interdisciplinary Communication Studies at the Gregorian University. Rome: Editricia Universita Gregorana. Bigman, D. (2011) Tafkidei Ha-Rabanut HaKehilotit BaYameinu Umashmuteho [Hebrew: The Functions of the Community Rabbi Today and Its Implications]. In Stern, Y. Z., & Friedman, S. (eds.), Rabbis & The Rabbinate: The Challenge. Jerusalem & Tel Aviv: The Israel Democracy Institute and Am Oved, 2 Volumes. [Hebrew]

The rabbinic setting 27 Buddenbaum, J. (1990) Religion News Coverage in Commercial Network Newscasts. In Abelman, R., & Hoover, S. (eds.), Religious Television: Controversies and Conclusions. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation. Central Bureau of Statistics. (2020) Jerusalem: Social Survey [Hebrew]. Cherlow, Y. (2016) Reshut Ha-Dibur [Hebrew: The Right to Speak: Internet Responses to Questions about Speech, Truth, Falseness and Social Gossip]. Jerusalem: MaggidKoren. Chwat, A. (1995) Itonim V’Hadashot Mitzva O Isur [Hebrew: Newspapers & News: Religious Obligation or Prohibition]. Elkana: T’lalei Orot, 165–188. Cohen, Y. (2001) Mass Media in the Jewish Tradition. In Stout, D., & Buddenbaum, J. (eds.), Religion and Popular Culture. Ames: Iowa State University Press. Cohen, Y. (2006a) Communication in Jewish Perspective. In Eilers, F. J. (ed.), Social Communication in Religious Traditions of Asia. Manila: Logos. Cohen, Y. (2006b) Judaism. In Stout, D. (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Religion, Communication & Media. New York & London: Routledge. Cohen, Y. (2006c) Social Communication, Mass Media and the Jewish Tradition. Religion & Social Communication, Bangkok: Asian Research Center for Religion & Social Communication, St John’s University, 4(2). Cohen, Y. (2011) Haredim and the Internet: A Hate-Love Affair. In Bailey, M., & Redden, G. (eds.), Mediating Faiths: Religion & Socio-Cultural Change in the Twenty-First Century. Farnham, UK: Ashgate. Cohen, Y. (2012) God, Jews & the Media: Religion & Israel’s Media. New York & London: Routledge. Cohen, Y. (2013a) Awkward Encounters: Orthodox Jewry and the Internet. In Ahlback, T. (ed.), Digital Religion, The Donner Institute for Research in Religious and Cultural History. Abo/Turku, Finland: Abo Akademi University. Cohen, Y. (2013b) Edan HaMeda V’HaZehut Haharedit Hadatit [Hebrew: ‘Haredi Religious Identity in the Information Age’]. Kesher, The Shalom Rosenfeld Institute for Research of Jewish Media and Communication. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University (4) Winter [Hebrew]. Cohen, Y. (2014) Jewish Communication Theory: Biblical Law and Contemporary Media Practice. In Fortner, R., & Fackler, M. (eds.), International Handbook of Media and Mass Communication Theory. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. Cohen, Y. (2015a) The Israeli Rabbi and the Internet. In Campbell, H. (ed.), Digital Judaism: Jewish Negotiations with Digital Media and Culture. New York: Routledge Publishers. Cohen, Y. (2015c) Judaism in the Computer-mediated Era. In Agrawal, B. (ed.), Changing Cultures and Religious Practices in Asia. Manila: University of Santo Tomas. Cohen, Y. (2016) On-Line Judaism: Potential & Limits. In Bosch, M. D., Mico, J. L., & Carbonell, J. M. (eds.), Negotiating Religious Visibility in Digital Media. Barcelona: Blanquerna Observatory on Media, Religion and Culture, Universitat Ramon Llull. Cohen, Y. (2017) Jewish Law and Ethics in the Digital Era. In Price, M., & Stremlau, N. (eds.), Speech and Society in Turbulent Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cohen, Y. (2019) Israeli Haredi Media and the ‘Female Factor’: The Case of the Kol Barama Radio Station. Israel Affairs, 25(2). Cohen, Y., & Enayat, H. (2023) Communication in Judaism & Islam. In Cohen, Y., & Soukup, P. (eds.), The Handbook of Religion & Communication. London: John Wiley. Dromi, U. (ed.). (2005) Shevet Achim: Yahsei Hilonim-Datiim: Emdot, Hatzaot, Umanot [Hebrew: Brethren Dwelling Together: Orthodoxy & Non-Orthodoxy in Israel: Positions, Propositions and Accords]. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute.

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Ettinger, Y. (2019) Frumim: HaMachloketh Shemafatzelet Hatzionut Hadatit [Hebrew: Unravelled: The Disputes that redefine Religious Zionism]. Modiin, Israel: Kinneret, Zmora Dvir Publishing House [Hebrew]. Ettinger, Y. (2023) Frayed. Jerusalem: The Toby Press. Feldman, D. Z. (2015) False Facts and True Rumours: Lashon Hara in Contemporary Culture. Jerusalem: Maggid. Ferre, J. P. (ed.). (1990) Channels of Belief. Ames: Iowa State University Press. Garrett-Medill Center for Religion and the News Media. (1999) Media Coverage of Religion, Spirituality & Values. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University. Greenboim, D. (2020) Distributing Judaism. Liberal, No 74, June [Hebrew]. Ha-Levi, A. M. (2014) Derekh HaAtarim: Internet Beriah HaHalakha [Hebrew: By Way of the Websites: Internet in the Light of Halakha]. Jerusalem: No publisher stated. Hoover, S. (1998) Religion in the News. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Horowitz, N. (2000) Haredim, Vha-Internet [Hebrew: Haredim and the Internet]. Kivunim Hadashim 3. Johnstone, C. (2009) Marketing, God and Hell: Strategies, Tactics and Textual; Poaching. In Deacy, C., & Arweck, E. (eds.), Exploring Religion and the Sacred in a Media Age. Farnham: Ashgate. Korngott, E. M. H. (1993) Or Yehezkel [Hebrew: The Light of Ezekiel: Contemporary Issues in Jewish Law]. Petach Tiqva: Or Yehezkel Institute. Lavie, Y. (2019) Hi HaRav: Sugyot SheNogaat B’Hayim [Hebrew: Hi Rabbi: Conversations about Life]. Jerusalem: Divrei Shir. Lewittes, M. (1977) Religious Foundations of the Jewish State. New York: Ktav. Lowenthal, M. (2009, 2018). Sherarah Avodot: Sugyot B’Rabanut HaKehilla [Hebrew: Sovereignty that is Servitude: Aspects of the Community Rabbi]. Kiryat Arba: The Institute for Settlement Rabbis, Volumes 1 & 2. Schwartz, Y. (2005) Idan Hamakhshev Velekhav [Hebrew: The Computer Era and What we Can Learn From It]. Jerusalem: Yeshivat Dvarf Yerushalayim, Zichron Zvi. Sharansky, I. (2000) The Politics of Religion and the Religion of Politics: Looking at Israel. Lantham, MD: Lexington. Sheleg, Y. (2000) Ha-datiim HaHadashim: Mabat Achshavi al VaHevra Ha-Datit Be-Yisroel [Hebrew: The New Religious Jews: Recent Developments among Observant Jews in Israel]. Jerusalem: Keter [Hebrew]. Sheleg, Y. (2020) HaHardalim: Historia, Ideologia, Nohachut [Hebrew: The Zionist UltraOrthodox: History, Ideology, Presence]. Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute [Hebrew]. Stern, Y. (2011) Rabbis as Relevant Leaders. In Stern, Y. Z., & Friedman, S. (eds.), Rabanut Ha-Etgar [Hebrew: Rabbis & the Rabbinate: The Challenge]. Jerusalem & Tel Aviv: The Israel Democracy Institute and Am Oved, 2 volumes. [Hebrew] TGI-Kantar Survey, 2022. Warhaftig, I. (2009) Tzinat Adam: Hazhut l’prutiot l’or halakhah [Hebrew: The Right to Privacy in Jewish Law]. Ofra, Israel: Mishpetei Eretz.

3

Is Judaism news?

There is, to this day, no single all-embracing theory of religious news values. In examining religion news, an initial question is whether the media’s image reflects the reality of the event. For journalists, whether something is evaluated by them as news is a matter of osmosis – fresh, unpublished, interesting, or important – preferably all four. But for the academic researcher, there are innumerable happenings about religion in the world at any moment of the day, but only a very few will make it past a threshold and become defined as news. It is necessary to identify which news factors or news values underlie the journalist’s choice about an event and become news and which other events are rejected by the journalist and not defined as news. Richardson and Introvigne (2007) emphasised the role of ideology as a news factor in what interests the public audience. This must raise the question of the proximity of ideology to theology. Westerstahl and Johansson (1994) argued that ideologies are the main source of deviations in news reporting from objective criteria. Moreover, the media’s role of legitimising those in political power could be also translated as the media’s role in legitimising the power extended by religious organisations and their heads – and indeed religious doctrine itself. The extent to which religion is covered in the news depends on the assessment of reporters and editors about its newsworthiness. Given that, by definition, Israel is the Jewish state, the Jewish religion is a subject of the news. However, religion is limited to a handful of themes and is mostly subservient to other news categories like politics, defence, and economics. In the case of the US media, according to the Garrett-Medill survey (1999), 62%, 42%, 34%, and 16% of “religion stories” on US national TV, on US local TV, in US daily newspapers, and in US news magazines, respectively, were in fact about international conflicts in which religion was the secondary story. Of the religion coverage, 19%, 18%, 17%, and 8% were in fact primarily about politics in US daily newspapers, US news magazines, US national TV, and US local TV, respectively. And 13% of “religion stories” in US local TV were in fact about crime, in which religion was a secondary story. Among the criteria for religious news developments are new happenings or changes. Others involve conflict or social breakdown, news about elites, and news which is culturally proximate to an audience. Religious elites – whether defined as individuals (like leading clerics) or institutions – are more likely to be defined as DOI: 10.4324/9781315735184-3

30 Is Judaism news? newsworthy than lesser personalities or less significant institutions. Being one of the elites as a criterion of news is present in religion less in terms of interest in hierarchical figures in religious institutions but more in terms of scandals, such as sexual scandals involving religious clerics “falling from grace.” There is a certain glee and satisfaction among both audiences and reporters to see those who claim to be holier than thou failing to live up to their religious vows. Religion news about events which are closer – or more proximate – to the religion of the audience will have a greater chance of being defined as news than less proximate ones. For Jeremy Sharon, then religion reporter of The Jerusalem Post, religion news is something which is new. Thus, the first woman to be appointed an Orthodox rabbi in Israel – even though Orthodoxy allows only for male rabbis – is surely news. Yet what is new rather than the final determinant is only the beginning. The news business has its own logic and dynamics. If the news about the first woman Orthodox rabbi were already published, Sharon might even be persuaded to write about the second woman to be appointed an orthodox rabbi given that his editors might otherwise say why the Jerusalem Post’s competitors published the story first. The unusual in religion news also comes in the framework where religion news is made or located. Thus, the weekly shiur of former Sephardi Chief Ovadia Yosef at Jerusalem’s Bukharan synagogue on Motzei Shabbat (the termination of the Sabbath on Saturday night) was, unbeknown to the holy rabbi, a hunting ground for a journalist who is after embarrassing stories; the journalist may find the rabbi comparing black people to monkeys or rabbis asking whether a man may walk between two women in the street. PR has entered the world of religion reporting – like it has in other branches of journalism. “Because you see a fresh face or an e-mail from a source, or a PR man, you need to determine whether it is actually news, as whether it is interesting. PR people sometimes think that news is their advertising space,” remarked one religion reporter. But the religious world is also characterised by a partial absence of PR, requiring the reporter to do his own digging. With the Haredi communities an important subject, many key Haredi rabbis still do not have PR aides, as characterised in other branches of journalism. Yehuda Schlesinger, as the religion reporter for Israel Hayom, circulated in Haredi neighbourhoods like Bnei Beraq to read wall posters (used by Haredi organisations to, for example, excommunicate individuals or companies) and visited the synagogue and yeshiva (Talmudic college). Yet another reporter even visited the mikva (ritual bath) on Fridays (most visited for the Sabbath eve), communal bath houses used by many Haredim prior to the Sabbath – after all, “mikva news” was the term used for bath houses as sources of news about religious politics in Israel. “It’s difficult to get something onto the broadcasts without an agenda,” said Yair Sherki, religion affairs reporter of the Arutz 12 channel. Orthodox and nonOrthodox women come to the Kotel (Hebrew for the Western Wall) wearing tallitot (prayer shawl) and tefillin (phylacteries) every Rosh Hodesh (the first day of the Jewish month [regarded as a provocation by the Orthodox, where only men lead the services or don phylacteries and the tallitot]). “I cover the story each month. It

Is Judaism news?

31

is an event with political implications.” Moreover, the global discussion about the status of women strengthens the equality agenda. But confrontation is a major ingredient in religion news. Conflict, crisis, social breakdown, the “unusual” are present in religion news and of interest in theological disputes. “The story is often in the conflicts, or in the power leaders, or in the margin,” remarked a religion reporter. Theological disputes include those which are paralleled outside the religious framework and which exist in broader society. For example, disputes about the ordination of women or religious attitudes to sexuality mirror disputes in broader society about the status of women and alternative sexuality, respectively. Much that gets defined as religion news is conflict related. Conflicts between religious institutions in Israel and the state are news. These include religious control of matters of personal status like marriage, divorce, and conversion; government budgeting of Haredi yeshivot; governmental resources for settlement building in Judea and Samaria; and Haredi exemptions from national military service. Religious and secular communities become newsworthy by their very involvement in conflict. The political clout of the Haredim or ultra-Orthodox, which express their views through their own political parties, explains why even though Haredim account for only 10% of the Israeli Jewish population, they have an inflated amount of coverage – reaching nearly 50% of religion content. “We cover religion and state in the context of confrontation,” said Mendy Grunzman, then the religion reporter of Makor Rishon, the nationalist weekly. “The health affairs reporter is able to cover new research in medicine. But you rarely have news per se from inside the religious world.” Like research in other areas of mass communication, the sub-discipline of media and religion has generated research on internet, new media, and religion. There are some lengthy studies, including Bennett (2012), Campbell (2010), Dawson and Cowan (2004), and Eickelman and Anderson (2003). But while the broad range of questions has been touched upon, including, for example, uses and gratifications of digital media, the impact on religious authority, and online religion public relations, there is a surprising dearth of research on content analysis of the internet. Among the few content analysis studies of the internet is Swanson, who examined Christian apostasy on the internet (2004), and Hobbs’ study on feminism in online Reformed Church media (2015). The dearth of content analysis on online religion is particularly surprising, given the central role which the image constructed of reality on online news websites plays – no less than traditional media in the past. The absence of research about the image constructed on online websites is no less true in the Israeli Jewish case. In an attempt to fill the gap, a content analysis of four contrasting websites was carried out by this author and offers a picture of how religion is covered in the age of new media. Given that the media of the present and future are websites (as distinct from the traditional media), it behoves us to look at how Judaism is presented on the new media. It follows on from an earlier study of how traditional media – TV, radio, and print – cover religion (Cohen, 2005). The four websites comprised a secular elite website (Haaretz online), a secular popular website (Y-Net), and two religious websites – one reflecting the modern Orthodox (Arutz 7) and one reflecting the Haredi (B’Hadrei Haredim). An eight-week period – 27 July 2014–13 August 2014

32

Is Judaism news?

and 18 September 2014–21 October 2014 – was examined. The material was obtained from Yifat, a Tel Aviv–based company which provides media reports.1 The author’s research assistants sorted out the material because some keywords had identical non-religion meanings. After sorting out the religion-related reports and articles from others, the religion-related reports comprised 608 reports and articles from Y-Net on religion, 458 from Haaretz, 463 from B’Hadrei Haredim, and 617 from Arutz 7. Y-Net is a popular news website run by Yediot Aharonot, one of Israel’s largest-selling popular newspapers. Although secular, it also has content of a traditional Jewish nature. In contrast, the Haaretz online news website belongs to Haaretz, the country’s main quality daily, which is ideologically secular. B’Hadrei Haredim is one of the leading independent Haredi websites. Arutz 7 is ideologically identified with the modern Orthodox, or dati leumi, and with fostering Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria, beyond the international “green” line. The content may be divided into group themes. In order to draw an impression of the major themes covered, related categories were combined together under similar unified themes. For example, all the religious groups were combined together: Haredim (3.3%), modern Orthodox (3.6%), traditional (1.1%), Conservative (0.1%), Reform (0.4%), secular (3.8%), and atheist (0.3%) accounted for a total of 12.6% of all religious-related content. This chapter also draws upon the survey by the author of Israeli Journalists and Jewish Identity, referred to in Chapter 1, on the question of news interest in Judaism and religion. Among questions raised there, is there a similarity or a difference between how journalists as gatekeepers define religion’s newsworthiness and religion content itself? The most covered group category was the Sabbath (13.5%), followed by religion (11.8%), religious festivals (7.5%), synagogue (4.4%), God (3.9%), secular Israelis (3.8%), modern Orthodox Judaism (3.6%), prayer (3.4%), and Haredim (3.3%). All other categories amounted to less than 3% each.2 Table 3.1 Themes of religion broken down according to Israeli news websites

God Sabbath Festival Fast Religion Prayer Judaism Synagogue Sephardi chief rabbi Aguna Haredim Modern Orthodox Traditional

Haaretz online

Arutz 7

B’Hadrei Haredim

Y-Net

Total

9.9% 11.2% 3.3% 1.5% 17.2% 3.1% 2.0% 2.2% 0.2% 0.4% 4.1% 3.9% 0.7%

0.2% 11.6% 6.3% 2.3% 9.3% 1.9% 1.3% 6.2% 1.9% 0.5% 3.2% 5.0% 1.6%

0.4% 19.0% 8.5% 2.2% 8.7% 3.5% 0.4% 5.6% 0.6% 0.4% 3.2% 3.5% 1.1%

4.9% 12.0% 11.8% 2.3% 11.8% 4.9% 2.6% 3.6% 0.5% 0.5% 2.5% 2.0% 1.0%

3.9% 13.5% 7.5% 2.1% 11.8% 3.4% 1.6% 4.4% 0.8% 0.5% 3.3% 3.6% 1.1%

(Continued)

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Table 3.1 (Continued) Haaretz online Reform Conservative Secular Atheism Halakhic ruling Conversion Circumcision Yahrzeit Ritual bath Temple Mount Temple Yeshiva Bet din Torah Torah Scrolls Mezuza Gemara Phylacteries Hevra kadisha Western Wall Status quo Bible Ministry of Religious Services Admor Rabbi Chief Rabbinate Head of a yeshiva Dayan Christianity Church New Testament Pope Vatican Christian priest Islam Muezzin Mosque Wakf Koran Imam Khadi

Arutz 7

B’Hadrei Haredim

Y-Net

Total

0.4% 0.0% 6.6% 0.9% 0.2% 0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 2.2% 1.7% 0.4% 1.7% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 0.7% 0.2% 1.5% 1.7% 0.0%

1.1% 0.2% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 4.1% 0.2% 0.0% 1.1% 3.4% 0.2% 1.6% 0.8% 2.1% 1.8% 0.8% 1.8% 1.1% 0.2% 3.7% 2.6% 2.8% 1.5%

0.2% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 2.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 2.2% 0.4% 0.9% 0.4% 0.0% 1.5% 2.8% 0.2% 3.0% 1.9% 1.3% 1.1%

0.0% 0.3% 2.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.7% 0.3% 0.0% 0.8% 1.3% 0.3% 2.5% 0.8% 0.5% 0.5% 0.2% 0.3% 3.3% 0.2% 0.8% 1.6% 2.3% 0.2%

0.4% 0.1% 3.8% 0.3% 0.1% 1.5% 0.2% 0.7% 1.2% 1.8% 0.4% 2.0% 0.6% 1.0% 0.8% 0.3% 0.9% 2.1% 0.3% 1.9% 1.9% 2.0% 0.7%

0.2% 2.2% 2.0% 1.1% 0.2% 0.7% 1.5% 0.0% 0.7% 0.4% 1.1% 0.4% 0.4% 3.9% 0.0% 0.9% 0.9% 2.2%

0.8% 2.4% 2.4% 1.6% 1.5% 0.5% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.2% 1.8% 0.2% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0%

6.5% 2.6% 4.3% 2.6% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

0.0% 2.6% 1.6% 3.1% 0.7% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 0.3% 1.2% 0.2% 0.3% 3.8% 0.2% 3.5% 1.2% 0.3%

1.9% 2.5% 2.6% 2.1% 1.3% 0.3% 0.7% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.7% 0.2% 0.2% 2.5% 0.1% 1.5% 0.5% 0.6%

Religion is regarded as not so newsworthy – 38% of Israeli journalists surveyed said religion had an average news interest, and a further 32% gave it a low news value. Indeed, a further 8% said it had no news value at all. Only 14% and 9% gave religion a high news value or very high news value, respectively. It is instructive to contrast interest in religion as a news theme with other themes. How does journalists’ rating of religion as a news theme compare with such other

34 Is Judaism news? news themes as politics, defence and military, economics, news from the Arab world, the Jewish diaspora, social affairs, education, and culture? In terms of religiosity, the more religious the journalist, the more he is inclined to see religion as newsworthy. Thus, only 15% of journalists who described themselves as secular gave religion a high or very high news value, in contrast to 31% of traditional (non-strictly-religious) and 38% of journalists who described themselves as religious (Haredi or modern Orthodox). The number of journalists who described themselves as Reform or Conservative was too small to allow conclusions to be drawn. Journalists who described themselves as secular were more inclined to give religion an average news value (42%) than a high news value. Yet in terms of religion receiving a low news value, there was virtually no difference. Indeed, 11% of journalists who described themselves as religious said it had no news value at all, in contrast to 3% of the non-strictly-religious traditional and 8% of the secular. A further 32% of religious journalists said religion had a low news value, which was similar to the ratings of other groups: secular journalists (35%) and traditional journalists (28%) (an intermediate category between strictly religious and secular – believers in God and selectively observant). There was little difference in grading the news value of politics – with secular, traditional, and religious journalists all agreeing – between 82% and 90% – that the news value of politics was high or very high. It is noteworthy, though, that 58% of religious journalists were slightly more inclined to give politics the maximum “very high news value,” in contrast to 44% of secular journalists and 40% of traditional journalists. This is surprising since it is hypothesised to have a high moral value, drawing upon a Jewish motif of charity and community welfare. In contrast to the 23% combined who gave religion a high news rating or very high news rating, defence matters received 94%, Israeli politics 88%, economics 83%, and the Arab world 48%. Religion’s news value was also less than other similar subjects, education and culture; 66% and 34% thought that education and culture, respectively, were of very high or high news rating, in contrast to the 23% for religion. It is instructive to also examine whether the religiosity of the journalists is a factor in how the journalists grade other categories of news. Not only did the religiosity of the journalist influence the news value rating of religion itself, but it even influenced how they related to other categories of news. There was also little difference in grading the news value of defence and military. Traditional journalists (83%) were more inclined than religious journalists (75%) or secular journalists (74%) to give security and military a high or very high news rating combined. The same was true with economics. The three groups of Israeli journalists – secular, traditional, and religious – moved between 78% and 87%. Yet secular journalists (45%) were more inclined to give economics a very high news value, in contrast to 30% and 32% of religious and traditional journalists, respectively. Religious journalists were less inclined to give the Arab world a high news value; 20% of religious journalists gave it a low news value (low or none), in contrast to 7% of traditional and 14% of secular journalists.

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Religious journalists were also less inclined to give social welfare a high news value: 30% said it had a low news value or no newsworthiness at all, in contrast to 12% of secular and 4% of traditional journalists – which was surprising since, arguably, religion, including Judaism, has to some extent shared values with social welfare, which is also seen as positive Jewish value. More noteworthy was how religiosity influenced the news value of education and of culture; 53% of religious journalists gave culture a low or even no news value, in contrast to 14% of traditional and 19% of secular journalists. And 24% of religious journalists gave education a low or no news value, in contrast to 4% of secular and 0% traditional journalists. On the other hand, 27% of religious journalists gave culture a high or very high news value, in contrast to 40% of secular and 38% of traditional journalists. While religion as a category registered a low news rating, Judaism – and streams within Judaism – registered a higher news rating. Notwithstanding the relatively low placement which religion news had in contrast to other categories, Judaism was regarded as newsworthy with a high or very high standard by 53% of Israeli Jewish journalists, and a further 32% said it had an average news value. Only 11% said its news value was low and 3% not at all. One way to explain this is that when the question of religion’s news value is placed next to other categories, news reporters give it a low rating. But when the question is presented as the Jewish religion, it is much higher – even though, when “religion” is listed, it is surely understood as referring to Judaism! Religion and God The most-covered categories in the study were “religion” and “God.” How are the infinite and the spirit communicable? It reflects more generally a delayed recognition in the mass media discipline – itself characterised like all social sciences as purely scientific – indeed secular in orientation – which has taken time to incorporate such non-rational elements as belief and spirituality into their schema. When religion takes a prominent place in a country’s agenda, it is often perceived as an indication of a backward religion or society. So unlike other categories of news reporting, religion reporting is locked in an unresolved dilemma: news reporters require objectivity and rationality and therefore fail to broach the question of the fabric of belief. It is instructive in understanding how the four websites contrast and differ in relating to the two themes, religion and God. Ironically, the two categories combined received least coverage on the two religious-Orthodox websites – 9.5% on Arutz 7 and 9.1% on B’Hadrei Haredim, in contrast to 27.1% on Haaretz online and 16.7% on Y-Net – partly because the religious news websites have more to cover. Indeed, the high score for Haaretz online reflects the intellectual reflective approach it takes to questions about theological belief, in contrast to the two Orthodox websites, which are not inclined to question fundamentals about God and religion. Thus, Arutz 7 and B’Hadrei Haredim gave only 0.2% and 0.4% to God, in contrast to the secular elite Haaretz online (9.9%). And even though “religion” (as distinct from Judaism) as a general category received significant coverage on all websites, the two Orthodox

36 Is Judaism news? websites were less inclined to enter the potential minefield of examining critical questions of belief, which the two secular websites did – 9.3% for Arutz 7 and 8.7% B’Hadrei Haredim – in contrast to 17.2% for Haaretz online and 11.8% for Y-Net. Coverage of God on Haaretz online may be divided into a number of types. First, intellectual journalistic discussion on the essence of belief – for example, questions like “Where was God during the Holocaust?” But while Haaretz covers other faiths, even atheism, it is respectful towards traditional Jewish beliefs in God. For example, some inside Israel fail to acknowledge the close ties in Germany between Zalman Schocken, who bought the paper in 1939 and is the grandfather of the current publisher, Amos Schocken, and Reform Judaism. Rather a major theme in Haaretz’s coverage of religion concerns state attempts to impose religious beliefs rather than fostering religious freedom. There is both criticism of Haredim but also of the modern Orthodox partly because of the latter’s active support for building settlements in the Jewish homeland of Judea and Samaria (or the territories Israeli captured in the 1967 war). In contrast, Y-Net, though a secular website, has a wide following throughout the Israeli population, including national religious Jews, and is therefore cautious not to be seen as ideologically secular. Y-Net will therefore be cautious in ridiculing God or questioning His existence. Nor is Y-Net a setting for philosophical discussions about His existence. One clue to how the four websites relate to the subject of God concerns the very writing in print of God’s name. The biblical prohibition in the Ten Commandments of pronouncing the Holy Name of God, the Tetragrammaton, is an acknowledgement that no word can capture the awesome, infinite power of the Creator. The preferred means of the religious media, including B’Hadrei Haredim and Arutz 7, is to print God’s name in an abbreviated form (for example, G-d). Were journalists working in religious news media more inclined than journalists in secular media to rate religion as newsworthy? Journalists from religious media were incrementally inclined to give religion a higher news value than journalists from the secular media. Twenty-eight per cent and 16% of journalists who worked in religious media gave religion a very high or high news value, respectively, in contrast to 6% and 15% of journalists who worked in secular media who gave religion a very high or high news value. Thirty-six per cent of journalists in religious media gave it a low or no value, in contrast to 41% of journalists from secular media who gave it a low or no value. Similarly, journalists who in the past had covered religion were incrementally influenced to rate religion newsworthy than those who had not worked there. Jewish religious streams In terms of religious streams of Judaism, there was little difference in the news ratings between Haredim and modern Orthodox in their news ratings – 42% and 43% of journalists said Haredim and modern Orthodox, respectively, were of high or very high news value. A further 37% and 39%, respectively, gave Haredim and modern Orthodox an average news value. The non-Orthodox – in spite of their news rating, including their attempts to win official recognition by Israeli government

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with such news as appeals in the Supreme Court – received far lower news ratings. Only 12% of journalists said the Reform and Conservative news were of high or very high news value, and a further 29% said they were of average news value. There appears to be a correlation between the extent to which Orthodox religious streams are regarded as newsworthy and Judaism’s newsworthiness. This reflects how central the ultra-Orthodox theme is in coverage of religion in Israel. Is the ultra-Orthodox so newsworthy that it becomes a factor for Judaism’s very newsworthiness? Similarly, is the modern religious so newsworthy as itself to become a factor for Judaism’s newsworthiness? But is there a correlation between scoring on the general category of Judaism and religious streams? There was a pattern of similarity between the ratings of Judaism and the news rating of Haredim: 35% of those who gave Judaism a very high rating said that Haredim were very newsworthy; indeed, a further 33% said that the Haredim were of a high news value, and 24% said the Haredim were of average news value. Also, 49% of those who gave Judaism a high news value also gave the Haredim a high news value. Similarly, the highest score for the Haredim by those who gave Judaism an average rating was to give the Haredim an average score. Due to their political clout with Haredi political parties (Agudat Israel, United Torah Judaism, Shas) – often the kingmaker of Israel’s coalition government – the Haredim are newsworthy. Moreover, their otherness, including clashes with government structures, including their refusal in general to do national army service (three years for men), generates yet further interest. Another factor for the large amount of coverage is the Haredi’s visual prominence because of their clothing and lifestyle that are distinct from those of the mainstream population, which some non-Haredi audiences – even some secularists – find nostalgic, even fascinating, for the sense of old world, even mystique for people who are nevertheless not personally observant. Yet the correspondence between ratings for Judaism and ratings for Haredim was not as noteworthy in the case of ratings for Judaism and ratings for modern Orthodox. It is thus true that only 29% of those who rated Judaism with a very high news value gave the modern Orthodox a very high news value, in contrast to 38% who said the modern Orthodox were only of high news value. The highest rating for the modern Orthodox for those who rated Judaism with an average news rating was 53%. And the highest rating for the modern Orthodox for those who gave Judaism a low rating was to rate the modern religious with a low rating (40%). The modern Orthodox are part of the religious story in the Israeli media, but religion reporters in Israel appear focused on the Haredi story – some of reporters are even titled “Haredi affairs reporters” rather than “religious affairs reporters.” It is, therefore, nevertheless justified to ask how true it is the focus exists. “All the reporters are drawn to the Haredim because they are different whereas the modern religious are an integral part of Israeli society,” remarked Kobi Nachshoni, religious affairs reporter for the Y-Net website. But Yehuda Schlesinger of the Israel Hayom, a right-wing newspaper (which also has a news website), denied this. Indeed, his newspaper had two reporters covering the modern Orthodox. In addition to the paper’s religious affairs reporter, the reporter covering the

38 Is Judaism news? settlements movement in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank and Golan) also covers the modern Orthodox communities in the area – which is characterised by an undeniable overlap in the modern Orthodox population with the leadership of the settlements movement, who are motivated in part because of the biblical command to settle in the ancient territory of the land of Israel. The often daily clashes between the Jewish population of Judea and Samaria and Palestinian Arabs add to the news value of the modern Orthodox. Those who gave ultra-Orthodox a significant news value were also inclined to give Judaism itself a significant news value. Thus, 96% of those who gave Haredim a very high rating also said Judaism has a very high or high news rating. Similarly, 73% of those gave the ultra-Orthodox a high news value also gave Judaism high or very high news value. In contrast, only 34% of those who gave the Haredim a low rating gave Judaism a high or very high news value. The same was true with the modern Orthodox. So central is modern Orthodoxy in Judaism that interest in Judaism is itself a function of modern Orthodoxy. For example, 74% of those who gave a high news value to modern Orthodoxy also gave Judaism a very high or high rating. In contrast, only 10% of those who gave the modern Orthodox a low news value gave Judaism a high or very high news rating. This was less true in the case of Conservative and Reform. Even those who rated Judaism with a very high or high news rating did not give a high or very high rating as the largest value to Reform or Conservative. Even for those who gave Judaism a very high or high rating, the highest value for Conservative and Reform was a low rating for Reform (41%) and a medium rating for Conservative (24%). Broken down according to website, the modern Orthodox was, unsurprisingly, the community which received most on the Arutz 7 website (5.0%), which serves the community. (The modern Orthodox received 3.5% on the ultra-Orthodox B’Hadrei Haredim). On the Haaretz online secular website, the modern Orthodox received 3.9%, but only 2.0% on the secular popular Y-net website. Interestingly, of all the four websites, the modern Orthodox Arutz 7 – which, like B’Hadrei Haredim, favours an Orthodox monopoly in Israel as the only true form of Judaism – gave Reform most (1.3%). Atheists received no content on the two Orthodox websites, B’Hadrei Haredim and Arutz 7. Were religious journalists therefore inclined to give the Haredim and modern Orthodox greater news value rating than non-religious journalists? The picture is far from clear. This was true with ratings about Haredim. While 29% and 38% of religious journalists gave the Haredim a very high and high news value, only 4% and 27% of non-religious journalists did so. And traditional journalists were between 7% (very high) and 35% (high). But it was far from the case with the modern Orthodox. There was, however, much less difference between the ratings of the modern Orthodox between the religious, non-religious, or traditional. Thirtythree per cent of religious journalists gave the modern Orthodox very high or high news value, respectively, and the non-religious gave the modern Orthodox only 3% and 35%, respectively. Noteworthy is that the non-religious were inclined to

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give a slightly greater news value rating to the modern Orthodox (35% high and 3% very high) than to the Haredim (27% and 4%, respectively). The large number of items for secular Jews was accounted for by the fact that the secular elite news website Haaretz online had 6.6% on secularism. (This is in contrast to 3.6% for secular Jews in the modern Orthodox website Arutz 7, 2.6% for secular Jews on the Haredi website B’Hadrei Haredim, and 2.3% secular Jews on the Y-Net website. Atheists received no content on the two Orthodox websites, B’Hadrei Haredim and Arutz 7.) Traditional Jews – less characterised by a strict religious law adherence and more selective in following key customs – did not produce significant differences (from 1.6% and 1.1% on Arutz 7 and B’Hadrei Haredim, respectively, to 1.0% on Y-Net and only 0.7% on Haaretz online). Reform and Conservative receive very little coverage, 0.4% and 0.1%. This is despite the fact that the struggle for recognition of Reform and Conservative Judaism (the dominant streams in American Jewry) inside Israel is newsworthy, given the “conflictual” dimension with the Orthodox rabbinical establishment. These have generated significant news coverage on the secular websites (and supported editorially by Haaretz) and no less significantly have been ignored on B’Hadrei Haredim. Arutz 7 reports key developments in the two movements’ struggle for recognition. Noteworthy is that more liberal movements in modern Orthodox Judaism are theologically not as distant from Conservative Judaism (which acknowledges the law-binding status of Jewish commandments written in the Bible). The conflict is played out through appeals to the Supreme Court or the podium of the Israel Parliament (the Knesset) for budgeting, appeals to become members of the religious council in different municipalities inside Israel, and appeals for religious conversions carried out by the Reform and Conservative members to be recognised so that the converted may be registered in the Interior Ministry as Jewish, and to win prayer space at the Western Wall separate from the Orthodox – and foot-dragging by the government to recognise agreements on this has also been played out in the courts and Israel Parliament (the Knesset), all adding to the “conflict element” for reporters. Miracles Notwithstanding that the unusual is newsworthy, given the traditional rules in the working of newspaper journalism for verification, miracles earned a very low news value. Only 8% of secular journalists said that miracle stories had a high or very high news value. But 21% and 24% of traditional and religious journalists said so. Also, 2% who did not believe in God gave it a high news rating, and none gave it a very high news rating, in contrast to 9% and 17% of those who very much believed in God, who gave it a very high or high news value. There is no significant difference between different media forms in rating Judaism – that is, that Judaism is more fitting for one medium over another. Fifty per cent of journalists working in national newspapers rated Judaism with high or very high news interest. Fifty-four per cent of journalists in radio said so, and the figure was the same for internet journalists. Fifty-seven per cent of journalists working

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for local newspapers said so. But only 43% of journalists in magazines said so, suggesting that the subject comes up less for magazines as a whole. There was little difference between the type of news organisation a journalist worked in and his rating of news as newsworthy – with the exception of journalists on local papers being inclined to rate the news value of religion lower than the other categories of news organisations. Non-Jewish religions All the websites are clearly oriented to the Jewish faith. Thus, Judaism as a category received 1.6%. Least responsive was B’Hadrei Haredim (0.4%), in contrast to Haaretz (2.0%) and Y-Net (2.6%). This is in contrast to Christianity (0.3%) and Islam (0.2%). The 53% of high or very high news value for Judaism by journalists contrasted with 40% for Islam and 13% for Christianity. But a further 34% and 38% gave Islam and Christianity, respectively, average news values, while 48% and 24% said that Christianity and Islam, respectively, had low or no news value at all. While it is only natural for the focus in a country’s media to be on the dominant faith, the extent to which this was the case with Judaism and the Israeli media was surprising, particularly given that one million Muslims make up the Israeli population and that Israel is holy to Christians, who consider it the place where Jesus was born, lived, and was crucified. Also, key Christian churches of international significance are in the Holyland. It was surprising that Haaretz online gave only 0.7% and 0.4% to Christianity and Islam, respectively – in particular because the Holyland is of international significance. The New Testament received 0.0% in all four websites, in contrast to the Koran, which received 1.5%. Unsurprisingly, given they are religious websites in orientation and given their reservations and fears about exposing their audiences to other non-Jewish faiths, B’Hadrei Haredim gave Christianity and Islam each 0.0% and Arutz 7 gave 0.5% to Christianity and 0.0% in Islam. Yet the dominance of Judaism in the Israeli case is comparable to the US media. In the section of the Garrett-Medill survey on daily newspapers – which covered the New York Times and Chicago Tribune (both quality papers) and Chicago SunTimes and USA Today (both popular papers), the coverage was overwhelmingly towards monotheistic faiths: 59% of religion content in the daily newspapers dealt with Christianity, which may be expected given it is the dominant faith in America, but 20% did include Judaism; however, 14% included Islam (both New York and Chicago have Jewish and Muslim communities of significant sizes), and 2% Hinduism, 2% Buddhism, and 3% others. In terms of national television – the evening news on US network television, ABC, CBS, and NBC – 64% concerned Christianity, 27% Judaism, and 14% Islam (none for Buddhism, Hinduism, or others). As group categories, Islam-related categories (including the mosque, muezzin, wakf, Koran, imam, and khadi) received, in the author’s content analysis, far more (5.4%) than Christianity-related ones (including church, New Testament, pope,

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Vatican, and priest) (1.9%). Similarly, the Vatican and the pope were irrelevant, with 0.2% and 0.3%, respectively. Religious leaders were heavily skewed to Judaism. In contrast to rabbis, which received 2.5%, khadi and imam got 0.6% and 0.5%, respectively, and Christian priests 0.7%. It is hypothesised that Islam and Christianity got a higher rating where a website gave the Haredim a high or very high news rating. Thus, for example, 56% and 58% of those journalists who said Haredim had a high or very high new value said Islam had a high or very high news value combined. In contrast, only 22% and 24% said that the Haredim had no or low news value. Interest in Islam was high or very high. Fifty-five per cent and 22% of those who said that Haredim had no news value said Islam had no or low news value, respectively. Even with Christianity, the more the ultra-Orthodox regarded Haredim as having a high or very high news value, the greater the news value given to Christianity. Thus, 32% and 15% of those who said Haredim had a high or very high news value also said that Christianity had a very high or high news value, respectively. The same was true with those who gave the modern Orthodox a high or very high news value. The more the modern Orthodox was regarded as of high news value, so was Islam and to some degree Christianity. For example, 54% of those who gave the modern Orthodox a high value gave Islam a high or very high news value – in contrast to 20% of those who gave the modern religious a low value. In other words, 70% and 48% of those who gave the modern Orthodox no or low news ratings, respectively, gave Islam no or low news value. Also with Christianity, 42% and 15% of those who gave the modern Orthodox a very high news value or a high news value, respectively, also gave Christianity a high or very high news value. 72% who gave the modern Orthodox a low news rating also gave Christianity no or low news value. Partly, the overall lack of interest in religion reflected the almost complete lack of coverage which other religions received in the Israeli media; Cohen found that Islam and Christianity each received only 1% of religion news content in the Israeli press, radio, and television (Cohen, 2005). The Sabbath and holydays Religious holydays are a testing time for Israeli journalists. Much in religion is not newsworthy and does not involve such newsworthy elements as conflict or elite figures. Mediated religious festivals reduce certain aspects of the religious act and highlight others. After all, the media are not supposed to be conveyers of religion, distant religious stories, and events done in the past but are about the present. Religious belief – like miracles – often drawing upon the sub-conscious, does not fit such criteria of newsworthiness. The infinite, which cannot be felt by time or space, underlines this distance. What can journalists – who by nature discuss the present and the rational – do about events which happened hundreds and thousands of years ago? If past events in Jewish history – for example, the creation of the world (commemorated today by the Sabbath), the Exodus from Egypt, and the Ten Commandments at Mount Sinai – fulfil criteria for dramatic media interest, the event is not occurring today. And how does a journalist – who by training is critical

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and rational – write about miracles of God or “interventions” in the cycle of nature which a holyday commemorates? The three combined categories of the Sabbath, religious festivals, and fasts reached 23.1%, the largest category in the content analysis. The Sabbath was the most-covered category in the entire project (13.5%). What is the Jewish Sabbath? It is expressed in a biblical command in the Ten Commandments: “Keep the Sabbath day and keep it holy.” The Sabbath reflects the central place which the “seventh day of rest” holds in the Jewish religion – both a day of rest and a day of holiness and re-creation – but also that Sabbath observance in the public arena remains a “casualty” of the ongoing dispute about the place of religion in a democratic state. Three of the websites – Y-Net, Haaretz online, and Arutz 7 – gave the Sabbath a similar amount of coverage in the organisation’s overall content in the study: 12% on Y-Net, 11.6% on Arutz 7, and 11.2% on Haaretz online. B’Hadrei Haredim gave it as much as 19.0%, which reflects how important Haredim see Sabbath observance, including in the public arena. The four news websites present contrasting pictures of the Sabbath. Sabbath-related issues on the national agenda are inclined to be regarded as newsworthy by journalists. Haaretz, both in its news columns and opinion pages, is interested in and concerned about the intrusion of religion into the public space. It actively covers – and campaigns against – all attempts to impose Sabbath observance in the public arena, including arguing that public places of entertainment should remain open on the Sabbath and that public transport should be available. Y Net, in contrast to Haaretz, is divided; on the one hand, it is sympathetic to the public, including some who are traditional but not strictly religious who want public happenings on the Sabbath, yet on the other hand, it acknowledges the holiness attached to the Sabbath. Thus, Y-Net even lists the weekly times for the commencement and termination of the Sabbath. It reflects that Y-Net is less of an ideological media platform than the other three websites and also has many surfers who are Sabbath-observant in full or in part. As a religious website, Arutz 7 sees the Sabbath in positive terms and reports and describes how people celebrate and observe the day. It even publishes Sabbath sermons by rabbis identified with the modern religious stream, as well as reporting on rabbinical rulings regarding matters concerning Sabbath observance. For example, during the Covid-19 pandemic, the website published rulings by their rabbis on such questions as communal worship inside the synagogue. During military and security emergencies, it publishes relevant rabbinical rulings. Like the other websites, it does cover developments in the struggle for Sabbath observance in the public space. Both Arutz 7 and Y-Net will publish matters relating to the festive Sabbath table, including recipes. But noteworthy is the difference between the two religious websites, Arutz 7 and B’Hadrei Haredim. Both uncompromisingly strengthen Sabbath observance, yet the Haredi website reflects a sense of communal responsibility that the Jewish State as a whole should be characterised as Sabbath-observant in accordance with Jewish religious practice. Haredim perceive a responsibility for sinning Israelis,

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rejecting any right of the individual to decide for himself or herself how to spend the Sabbath day. All this reflects the policies of Haredi political parties in successive governments to, for example, ban public transportation on the Sabbath. B’Hadrei Haredim actively covers hilul hashem – literally, “desecration of the divine name” – or infringements of the Sabbath by official bodies or even private companies functioning on the Sabbath, which even has called for readers to boycott the companies. Concerning the struggle for public places of entertainment to be open on the Sabbath, 48% of secular journalists gave it a high interest or very high interest, in contrast to 34% of traditional journalists, who are less hostile to Sabbath observance in public places. Also, 23% of journalists who did not believe in God gave it a very high news value, in contrast to the 4% and 15% who said they believed in God or very much believed in God, respectively. In contrast, 40% of religious journalists – who are inclined to oppose the opening of public places on the Sabbath – gave the subject high news interest or very high news interest. Reflecting the central part which religious festivals and fasts have in Israeli Jewish culture, the two religious websites gave religious festivals and fast days 10.7% (B’Hadrei Haredim) and 8.6% (Arutz 7). Not unsurprisingly, Y-Net gave religious festivals and fasts a combined 14.1%; although Y-Net is described as secular, it might more accurately be described as secular-traditional in orientation, particularly on such popular themes as festivals. In contrast, Haaretz online – reflecting its singular secular posture as well as its opposition to any imposed religious observance – gave the least out of the four websites to religious festivals and fasts – 4.8%. There was a broad consensus between the religious and secular websites about the most newsworthy festivals in quantitative terms. The most newsworthy were the New Year (Rosh Hashanah), Passover (Pesach), Tabernacles (Sukkot), and the Festival of Lights (Hanukah). But religious festivals may also be divided qualitatively between secular websites and the religious websites. The latter focus on the religious significance of the holyday, whereas the secular websites focus on the festival atmosphere – like consumerist aspects, including food products associated with the holiday – as well as security aspects at sites associated with the festival, like the Western Wall or, in the case of Lag BaOmer at Mount Meron, the tomb of Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai (the place was the scene for a mad stampede in 2021, resulting in the death of 45 persons). The Arutz 7 site discuss newer styles in celebrating the holyday. In the ultra-Orthodox B’Hadrei Haredim – where there is stricter adherence not to introducing new styles – there are features including photographic content on rabbis and sages celebrating the holyday. While news websites, as distinct from traditional media, suggest the convergence of text, visuals, and sound – ideal for communicating religious experience news like holydays – in practice this was not the case. Internet websites showed less in religious experience, as was also true within festival stories and inspirational matters. Religious fasts, as distinct from joyous festivals, lacked such news elements like consumerism. This journalistic dichotomy was particularly true with the spirituality of the most elevated day in the Jewish life cycle, Yom Kippur, a 24-hour-long fast. Notwithstanding that both the religious media and Y-Net print

44 Is Judaism news? advice for fasting, overall Yom Kippur receives far less coverage quantitatively than even minor festivals like the Festival of Lights (Hanukah). On religious experiences involving holydays, 39% of all journalists surveyed gave them a low news value and 24% no value. A further 24% gave them an average news value, and only 8% and 5% gave them a high or very high news value. The journalistic community may be broken down into religious, traditional, and secular groups. Zero per cent of journalists who said they did not believe in God gave holydays a very high or high news value, 4% of journalists who believed in God gave them a high news value, and none gave them a very high news value, in contrast to 11% and 16% of journalists who much believed in God who gave them a very high or high news rating, respectively. Religious experiences such as religious holydays were regarded as having a very low news value; 5% of secular journalists gave religious experiences a high or very high news value. Slightly higher, 25% and 24% of religious and traditional journalists, respectively, gave religious experiences a high or very high news value. In contrast, 72% of secular journalists gave them low or no value. And even 45% and 52% of traditional and religious journalists also did so. The politics of religion News interest in the politics of religion received even higher percentages than Judaism as a general category when broken down to key issues received. In terms of what religion stories interest reporters, these included such specific issues on the national agenda as army recruitment of the Haredim, civil marriage, recreation in public places on the Sabbath and holydays, and non-Orthodox conversions, which were considered newsworthy. Respectively, 50%, 47%, 41%, 45%, and 39% of journalists said that the issues of forbidden marriages, army exemptions, Sabbath recreation on public places, conversions, and government budgeting for yeshivot were of high or very high news value. A further 39%, 29%, 33%, 33%, or 35%, respectively, said these were of average news interest. The question of journalists’ news values may also be examined in terms of the journalists’ attitudes to the question of whether they favour a separation of religion and state. Israel is characterised by government budgeting of religious institutions and by religion determining issues of personal status in the Israeli legal system. Is there a connection between journalists’ position on news values of religion and journalists’ view on the separation of synagogue and state? Twenty-three per cent of those who much favour the separation of synagogue and state gave a very high news value to civil marriage, in contrast to the 16% who disagreed with the separation of synagogue and state; 18% of those who much favoured separation of religion and state gave a very high value to conversion, in contrast to the 13% who disagreed with the separation of synagogue and state, and 25% of those who favoured separation of religion and state gave a very high news value rating to Sabbath public places, as opposed to the 8% who disagreed with the separation of religion and state. Yet only 7% of those who favoured the separation gave a very high news value to religious political parties – despite the implications of their

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existence – in contrast to the 15% who disagreed with the separation of synagogue and state. Further, no major significant difference between those who favour and those against the separation of synagogue and state could be found in rating the newsworthiness of Haredim and the modern Orthodox. In other questions, there was less consensus. On army exemptions for yeshiva students, there was a greater difference between the three groupings: secular, traditional, and religious journalists; 54% of secular journalists gave the subject high or very high interest, in contrast to 33% of religious journalists, who included Haredim, who favoured it, and 44% of journalists who described themselves as traditional. In the case of yeshiva budgeting, there was a consensus between secular and religious journalists (43% in both cases), but this did not reflect similar views of the two journalistic communities. The traditional group were neither in favour or as consistent as their secular colleagues; only 24% gave the subject of yeshiva budgeting a high or very high news value. When journalists’ religious beliefs influence their assessments of their stories, there was an inclination for journalists who do not believe in God to give a very high news value to issues on the public agenda, in contrast to high news value – a clue to how they saw the gravity of matter in relation to their values. Thus, on the question of civil marriage (and marriages prohibited by the religious authorities), 23% of journalists who did not believe in God gave the issue a very high news value, in contrast to 12% and 15% of journalists who believed or very much believed in God, respectively. Similarly, 19% of those who did not believe in God gave the question of army exemptions a very high news rating, in contrast to 12% and 16% of journalists who believed in the existence of God or very much believed in His existence, respectively. But yeshiva budgeting is a story of importance not only for the secular but also, in an opposite sense, for those who very much believe in God. Thus, 12% of those not believing in God and 16% of those who much believed in God gave yeshiva budgeting a very high news value, in contrast to the 8% of the average – who believed in God. The same was the case for religious conversion – those not believing in God were much more lenient than those believing, who were much more concerned that “the purity of the Jewish people” would be affected by non-Jews joining the tribe. Thus, 14% and 14% of those who did not believe in God or believed in Him very much gave the conversion issue a very high news value, in contrast to only 4% of those who said they believed in God. Rabbis’ positions on political questions were more newsworthy than halakhic rulings (Jewish religious law): 38% of journalists said that rabbis’ positions on political questions were of high or very high news interest, in contrast to only 17% who said that halakhic rulings were of high or very high news interest. Also, 54% of journalists said that halakhic rulings had low (30%) or no news interest (23%). Internal conflict and change within religious communities rated only 12% for high news value or very high news value, in contrast to new religious trends, which got 21%. Also, 39% of religious journalists rated rabbis’ public pronouncements on issues on the public agenda of high or very high news interest. Recognising the influence of rabbis in their communities 43% of traditional journalists and even 35% of secular journalists rated rabbis’ public positions as of high or very high news value.

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Thirteen per cent and 20% of secular and traditional journalists, respectively, rated these as having no news value, respectively, and a further 23% and 7% of the secular and traditional journalists gave it a low value. Even 40% of religious journalists gave these a low value (none said they had no news value). This was far more than religious law rulings (piskei halakha), with the exception of religious journalists: 39% of religious journalists gave religious law rulings a high or very high rating, in contrast to 6% of secular journalists and 17% of traditional journalists. What institutions were newsworthy? Thirty-three per cent of journalists religious political parties had a high or very high news value, and a further 43% gave them average news interest. Religious public figures were considerably less newsworthy than political parties: 16% said these were of high or very high news interest, and a further 38% considered them to have average news value. The most newsworthy of the institutions were yeshivot; 39% said that yeshivot were of high or very high news value. Religious political parties have a high news importance, given the nature of coalition politics in Israel and the fact that religious political parties have even been kingmakers – indeed breakers – in coalition governments. Each of the three journalistic communities recognised this: 32% of secular journalists, 30% of traditional journalists, and 36% of religious journalists gave religious political parties a high or very high news interest rating. This was similar to or slightly less than the ratings for the issue on the public agenda above. Religious public figures received far less, a recognition of their low influence outside their community. Only 11% and 10% of secular and traditional journalists gave these a high or very high news value. Sixty-three per cent of secular journalists and 52% of traditional journalists gave these a low or no news value rating (even 41% of religious journalists said so). Rabbis, admorim, dayanim, and poskei halakha A combined category of “office holders” composed of rabbis, admorim (Hassidic leaders), rosh yeshiva (rabbinical heads of a Talmudic academy of learning), dayanim (religious court judges), and religious law rulers (poskei halakha) received an average of 8.4% of coverage. These received varied responses on each of the four websites. Not surprisingly, the category of religious official and non-official officeholder received highest coverage on B’Hadrei Haredim (14.9%) and 7.1% on Arutz 7 in contrast to Haaretz online (4.3%). This reflects how religious authority remains central in these two religious Orthodox communities, in particular the Haredim. And this questions the generally held conclusion that new media has weakened religious authority (Campbell, 2010). Even the modern Orthodox Arutz 7 confirmed, albeit less (7.1%), that office holders were widely covered on this news website. The focus on the Haredi website B’Hadrei Haredim is almost entirely on Haredi rabbis. Content varies from formal announcements to diplomatic-type meetings between leading rabbinical rabbis like Eidat Haredi (Council of Torah Sages). One particular type of rabbi is the admor, who is head of a Hassidic court – Gur, Vishnitz, Satmar, Beltz, Chabad, and Stoylen, to name a few. A clear difference may be found between the other websites and the Haredi website and in covering the

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admorim because the actions of an admor are followed closely by their followers. This is particularly true of the Hassidic Haredi daily newspapers, Hamodia and Hamevaser. But it is also true of the B’Hadrei Haredim website, whose surfers include Hassidim. Yet in contrast to the “formal” reporting of the institutionally printed Haredi daily newspaper, B’Hadrei Haredim provides juicy information about internal rabbinical politics and divisions behind the scenes – there continuing a trend which began already in the 1980s by independent weekly magazines. B’Hadrei Haredim and Arutz 7 do cover criminal activities of rabbis. Yet there is little negative information about the rabbi on B’Hadrei Haredim and Arutz 7 about modern Orthodox rabbis. The Haredi media also cover Jewish diaspora outside Israel, but this is less covered on the modern Orthodox-leaning Arutz 7, given Zionism and the religious duty of Jews to live in the Promised Homeland in which modern Zionism as the age of redemption – as distinct from authentic Haredim who await the Jewish Messiah. The Haredi websites do not cover at all the nonOrthodox rabbis from the Reform and Conservative Jewry, who are seen as deviant. The latter are covered by Arutz 7. The Arutz 7 website is more descriptive about the individual projects and works of rabbis and halakhic issues than the Haredi website. Arutz 7 is the most ideologically motivated in seeing the rabbis as enriching the community religious life. But the overlap between politics and religion in Israel means the topic is the bread and butter of all the websites. Both religious websites are respectful of the rabbi – in contrast to the secular websites – and refer to the rabbi by his title. As a broader secular website, Haaretz online is mostly critical of Orthodox rabbis but upbeat in referring to the Conservative and Reform rabbis. This is both because Haaretz is critical of attempts by religious groups to enforce their will on Israeli society, as well as because the newspaper is by nature critical. Yet they are not averse to seeing the rabbi and rabbinical institution in a broader historical and cultural manner. Y-Net covers rabbis as another subject of sensational news, critical of breaches of law and of scandals – sexual or otherwise. Yet it also provides unbiased depth of religious issues – not necessarily sympathetic, and in many cases in an objective manner. One of the aspects in coverage of rabbis concerns halakhic (Jewish law) decisions and rulings, as noted earlier. An important role of the rabbi is to determine Jewish religious law and how to interpret it in response to questions from Jews. This is particularly true of the Orthodox – Haredim and modern Orthodox. Some of these rulings are of broad interest not only for the religiously observant surfer but even the traditional surfer. So Y-Net will cover this, including the more esoteric rulings. But Haaretz online, in encouraging secularism, has little patience for these rulings. In other questions, there was less consensus among journalists. On army exemptions for yeshiva students, there was a greater difference between the three groupings: secular, traditional, and religious journalists; 54% of secular journalists gave high or very high interest, in contrast to 33% of the religious, who included Haredim, who favoured it, and 44% of the traditional. In the case of yeshiva budgeting, there was a consensus between secular and religious journalists (43% in both

48 Is Judaism news? instances), but this did not reflect similar views of the two journalistic communities. In the traditional group, who were neither in favour nor as consistent as their secular colleagues, only 24% gave the subject of yeshiva budgeting a high or very high news value. Conversion is a controversial issue. With the Orthodox rabbinate controlling these and Orthodox stringencies, including stipulating religious observance for the convertee, it has become a problematic issue for the thousands of Russian Jewish immigrants to the country in recent years. So a civil marriage or a non-Orthodox conversion by the Conservative and Reform movements in Israel has added to the lack of clarity – and media interest. Further reflecting the difference between religious and non-religious websites is limmud Torah or Jewish study. The yeshiva, Torah, and Talmud combined (3.9%) were covered 5.5% and 4.6% on Arutz 7 and B’Hadrei Haredim, respectively (in contrast to 2.1% and 3.3% on Haaretz online and Y-Net, respectively). The category of “office holders” may be broken down between official state office holders, like the chief rabbi, and state-appointed officials, like city rabbis and town rabbis (2.5%), who are far less recognised among the Haredim than the “true Haredi spiritual leaders” – rabbinical heads of a Talmudic yeshiva or admorim, who received wide coverage by the Haredi website B’Hadrei Haredim (4.3%) and Arutz 7 (2.4%). The latter, Arutz 7, is closer ideologically to state religious institutions like the Chief Rabbinate; the state official holders received only 2.0% and 1.6% on the two secular websites, Haaretz online and Y-Net, respectively. Synagogue and prayer The combined category of “synagogue and prayer,” including Torah scrolls read at religious services and phylacteries (tefillin), accounted for 10.8%, which reflects the central place which the synagogue and prayer hold in Jewish life. The category reached 12.3% in the case B’Hadrei Haredim. Notwithstanding the lower rigidity of the secular elite Haaretz online, it received 7.0% there. Synagogue and prayer provide useful illustrations for understanding how the four different websites – of an elite, secular, popular, or religious stream – differed from each other. The Y-Net website, while not relating to the synagogue as a place of religious ceremonies, was nevertheless respectful of it as a place of prayer. YNet reported on cases of anti-Semitic attacks on synagogues abroad. In the period examined, the high prices for seats in the synagogue for the high holydays came up. Yet another story covered was the conflict over the ownership of a synagogue. In contrast, Haaretz – through its liberal and secular lenses – starts from a critical perspective, such as building a synagogue without a building permit and the struggle for the rights of non-Orthodox communities, like the Conservative and Reform sects, in Israel, where only Orthodox streams have formal recognition by the state. Though Haaretz online favours the separation of synagogue and state, it is not scornful of prayer and the prayer house. Indeed, the paper is interested in Jewish culture, including the past and the place of the synagogue then.

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To the other extreme lies B’Hadrei Haredim – which sees prayer as arguably the most important single focus in the Jew’s daily life, three times daily. In addition to the synagogue being a place of worship, life-cycle events – such as weddings and circumcision – occur there. The admor of a Hassidic court conducts a tish from there. And coverage of the synagogue outside Israel also means that anti-Semitism abroad, such as at a synagogue, is not ignored. The modern Orthodox site Arutz 7 appears to have wider pitch. Not only are synagogal ceremonies reported on Arutz 7, like selichot prayers at Rosh Hashanah and Simhat Torah (the Rejoicing of the Law), which celebrates the completion of the annual cycle of reading the Bible, but it also reports instances abroad of anti-Semitism involving synagogues, amongst others, and such political matters like the Israeli Ministry of Religious Services financing a synagogue – a clue to the historical role which the modern Orthodox community in Israel has played in advancing state involvement, including financing religious facilities – part of the vision of Israel being a Jewish state. Some of the dilemmas and pressures found in covering the synagogue are also found in media coverage or prayer. B’Hadrei Haredim is the more “purist” of the two. Special prayer meetings, such as to pray for the recovery of a sick rabbi, are reported. The nationalist Arutz 7 will discuss broader usage of prayer as intoned for, say, the recovery of injured soldiers. To the other extreme, Haaretz online relates to prayer in a more general sense as being generalised aspiration and good deeds. For example, prayers, including prayer services, of Muslims or Christians, say, the Sabbath fire ceremony in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Easter or in the Church of the Nativity at Christmas. Quotations from writers and artists intoning prayer words appear. In between is Y-Net, which, as a popular site, seeks to appeal to all, while secular, and will report prayer services but will also discuss the broader usage of prayer words intoned by politicians or icons like singers. Tefillin (phylacteries or boxes containing Bible texts), which are worn by men during morning daily prayers, exemplify the differences between the websites. On the one hand, they are symbols of Jewish belief. Secular Israelis may view it as anachronistic and personally uncomfortable in an age of rationalism and enlightenment. Indeed, it is identified with the Jewish diasporas of the past – the galut – rather than as part of the modern Israeli of today. But for traditional, not just religious, Jews, tefillin are regarded as holy; indeed, for some, it is required to be worn at prayer. In between, Y-Net does not involve itself with narrow halakhic issues. But if it does, it will be from a perspective of tradition and not a narrower sense of fulfilling a mitzva religious obligation. If the furthest point for Y-Net to Jewish observance is tradition – with some articles in the Judaism section touching on Jewish observance – the reverse is true for Arutz 7, with the latter seeing a secular Israeli laying tefillin as a symbol of Jewish unity. The Torah, or the Five Books of Moses, are the laws of Judaism – rather like the Koran and hadith are to Islam and the New Testament to Christianity. So it is relevant to ask how the Torah is covered by the four news websites. The two religious websites, Haredi Haredim and Arutz 7, relate to the Torah as the source of 613 commandments, which are a religious obligation. Moreover, the former

50 Is Judaism news? emphasises Torah not just as a religious obligation of being read on the Sabbath but as an objective of study all the time. Thus, an incident of women dancing with the Torah was regarded as a desecration. And for Arutz 7, the dedication of a Torah a scroll written on parchment for an Israeli soldier missing in action was reported. Study with religious Jews and secular Israelis together was a subject covered. In contrast, Y-Net, though popular, does not see Torah as a religious obligation. However, an incident in which women danced with the Torah on Simhat Torah, the religious holiday celebrating the completion of the Torah, was reported on Y-Net. Haaretz online likewise does not relate to the Torah as a religious obligation but rather as a historic and cultural event. Life-cycle events – male circumcision (brit milah), religious conversion, mikva, aguna (chained), hevra kadisha (a community institution which attends to the dead and brings them to burial), and yahrzeit (annual date of death of a close relative) – received a combined average of 4.4% for life-cycle events. There was some similarity to lifecycle events between the religious websites and Haaretz: 6.1% Arutz 7, 4.4% B’Hadrei Haredim, and 4.1% for Haaretz online. Inexplicably, notwithstanding that these are popular themes, they rated only 2.5% on Y-Net. Reflecting more the difference between religious and non-religious is studying Torah. Thus, the yeshiva, Torah, and Talmud combined (4.6%) was 6.2% and 5.6% on Arutz 7 and B’Hadrei Haredim, respectively, in contrast to 2.5% and 3.8% on Haaretz online and Y-Net, respectively. Western Wall and Temple Mount The tension between Muslims and Jews notwithstanding, none of the four websites, with the exception of Haaretz, legitimise Muslim rights on Haram el Sharif/ the Temple Mount. Coverage by the websites of the temple site and the Western Wall or Kotel reflect the religious and media differences between the four websites. Though a place of historic significance and pilgrimage, the Temple Mount and Kotel lack intrinsic newsworthiness characterised by a changing situation on the ground. Police and security developments on the Mount include closure of the area for Muslims or the question of Jews ascending (Cohen & Lev-On, 2022). These are reported on both Haaretz and Y-Net. The popularity of the Western Wall among many Israelis is recognised by the two secular websites. One concerns the compromise recognising the rights of Conservative and Reform Jews, as well as women, to hold separate prayer services, including gaining a spot further along the Western Wall. Haaretz, in particular, influencing the question of pluralistic religious rights in Israel for the non-Orthodox, covers day-by-day developments. The history of the Western Wall itself is not newsworthy. Day-byday news, including positive developments like the ceremony of the blessing of the priests at the religious festivals and the archaeological findings, is covered but also violence and conflictual matters, including Arabs throwing stones and other acts of violence. However, Arutz 7 had a wider news agenda regarding the Temple Mount, concerning the deeper question of Jewish rights to ascend the Mount, the question of Jewish

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prayer, and rabbinical discussions over whether Jewish religious laws allow Jews to ascend. The discrimination by the Israeli authorities against Jews over prayer on the mount, even though Israel possesses sovereignty, is a starting point. Arutz 7 perceives the site as part of the nationalist redemption – a further sign of the return of the Jews to their ancient homeland. So holiday-related events there are covered. In contrast to Arutz 7, B’Hadrei Haredim sees the Kotel as a strictly religious shrine – the remaining outer wall of the ancient Second Jewish Temple destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE – and attaches no modern Zionist tone to it. For B’Hadrei Haredim, its sole yet outstanding significance is as a prayer shrine, where the divine presence (the Shechinah) is experienced. So religious events, including at religious festivals, as well as folklore and photographs, are favoured topics in covering the Western Wall. B’Hadrei Haredim does not relate to the ongoing story of the closures on Muslims or the question of Jewish ascent due to reasons of ritual impurity – things that the Haredim see as inherently forbidden – but covers these issues only in a cursory and brief way that news developments warrant. Yet in terms of history, there are articles looking back to the First and Second Temple periods. This is notable at the time of the Tisha B’Av fast, commemorating the destruction of the two temples. Yet like the other websites, apart from Haaretz online, B’Hadrei Haredim does not legitimise Muslim rights to prayer. Religion and culture as factors in rating newsworthiness by journalists Educational background

Schooling was also a factor in journalists rating Judaism. Israeli schools may be divided into the secular state system, the state religious education system, and the Haredi school system. The more religious the school attended by somebody who became a journalist, the greater the inclination to rate Judaism as newsworthy. For example, 65% and 6% of those who studied in Haredi schools gave Judaism a very high or high news rating, in contrast to 40% and 33% in the state religious schools and 18% and 30% in the state secular school system. This was less true regarding rating news interest in Islam and Christianity, where there was little difference between the type of school. In terms of education, the more religious the education, the more the journalist was inclined to rate the news value of religion as high. Only 6% and 13% of journalists who had a secular elementary school education said religion was very high or high, in contrast to 15% and 23% of journalists from the state religious elementary education system or 28% and 22% of journalists who had an ultra-Orthodox elementary education. One interesting point was that the graduates of the school religious system – identified with the modern Orthodox – were much more inclined to rate Islam newsworthy than either those who studied in the school secular system or those who studied in the Haredi system: 20% and 40% of those who studied in the state (modern Orthodox) religious system gave Islam a very high or high news value, as

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well as 12% and 18% of those who studied in the state secular system, respectively, in contrast to 10% and 26% of those who studied in the Haredi school system. In terms of news interest in specific religious streams, was there any correlation between schooling and rating the news interest in a specific religious stream? There was only a small significant difference between the school background and rating the newsworthiness of the Haredim and of modern Orthodox. Those attending state religious schools – as distinct from state secular schools or Haredi schools – were most inclined to rate these two streams as high or very high. And there was little significant difference between those who studied in yeshiva and those who did not in rating the newsworthiness of Haredim or the modern Orthodox. Belief in God

How does belief in God influence the rating of Judaism? Only 12% and 26% of those journalists who do not believe in God rated Judaism very highly or highly. There was an inclination for religiously inclined to deem religion newsworthy more than did the secularly inclined. Only 12% and 26% of those who do not believe in God gave religion a high or very high news value, in contrast to 38% and 20% of those who very much believe in God and who gave religion a very high or high news value. One noteworthy exception was that those who believed in God to a certain extent were more inclined than those who believed in God to a great extent to give religion a greater news rating. There was no difference between this and other related questions. The more the journalist was inclined to believe that “a higher divine force directed the world,” that “there are rewards and punishments for respecting religious commands,” that “the Bible commands have divine origin,” and that “the Jews are the Chosen People,” the higher the rating given for the news value for religion. The only break in this trend concerned the question of whether a Jew not observing commands endangers the entire Jewish people: Those who believe to a certain extent that a Jew who does not observe commands endangers the Jewish people were more inclined incrementally more than those who believe to a considerable extent. For those who do not believe in God and those who do, the difference between those who said Judaism is of a very high or high news value and those who did not was quite small. Thus, 37% and 65% of those who do not believe in God or believe only a little, respectively, said Judaism was of a very high or high news value, in contrast to 29% and 41% of those who do not believe in God or believe only a little, respectively. In the case of Islam, there was only a marginal increase in those who rated Islam with a very high news interest or high news interest between those who did not believe in God (12% and 18%, respectively) and those who believed very much (14% and 29%, respectively). A similar pattern was found with Christianity. It is noteworthy that it was the very religious – despite a tendency for the Haredim at least not to read about other religions – who rated Islam and Christianity higher than secular non-believers. In terms of the religious journalists – those who believe a very great deal or a lot – it is noteworthy that they were inclined to give Islam a higher news rating

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than the secular-non-religious journalists; 14% and 30% of those who very much believe in God gave Islam a very high or high news value, respectively, in contrast to 35% of those who believe in God a little who gave Islam a high news rating. For all, Christianity was significantly less newsworthy than Islam. The highest news value rating for Christianity for all levels of Jewish religiosity was an average news value; 13% and 19% of those who very much believe in God or believe a lot, respectively, rated the news interest of Christianity as high or very high, in contrast to 8% and 18% of those who do not believe in God or do so only a little, respectively, in giving Christianity a high or very high news rating. The contrast between rating the news interest in Judaism ranking among those who believe in God or a little and those who very much believe in God or a lot is even truer with such other attributes as “there being a higher divine force that directs the world,” “there are rewards and punishments for respecting religious commandments,” “the Bible and mitzvot have divine origin,” or “the Jews are the Chosen People.” But while those with little or no belief in God are even less inclined to rate Judaism as newsworthy, there is also a slight decline among strong believers. There was a small incremental increase in rating Haredim or modern Orthodox with a very high news interest among those who kept Sabbath observance, kashrut, and such other observances like fasting on Yom Kippur and not eating chametz (leavened bread) on Passover, in contrast to those who never did or did so seldom. Cultural background

In terms of cultural background, those journalists of a Sephardi background were more inclined to give a higher news rating to Judaism than those of an Ashkenazi background; 32% and 34% of Sephardi journalists gave Judaism a very high or high news rating, respectively, in contrast to 25% and 29% of Ashkenazi journalists. A reverse trend was found in rating Islam: 15% and 27% of Ashkenazi journalists rated news interest in Islam as very high or high, respectively, in contrast to 9% and 32% of Sephardi journalists, respectively. This was surprising because some Sephardi journalists could trace their filial connections back to the Arab countries. Age

Age is a factor in rating the news value of the Haredim and modern Orthodox. The younger the journalist, the higher he or she rated the news interest in the Haredim or modern Orthodox. Thus, 18% and 39% of journalists aged 30 or less rated news interest in the Haredim as very high or high, respectively. This went up incrementally according to age – in contrast to 21% and 4% of those aged 60 or above. Similarly, 13% and 41% of journalists aged 30 or less said the modern Orthodox had a very high or high news interest.

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Gender

Female reporters were slightly more inclined to rate religion as newsworthy than male journalists; 23% of male journalists said religion was of very high or high news interest, in contrast to 27% of female reporters. Voting behaviour

There was a limited correlation between voting procedures and news interest. There was a slight increase, making those who voted for right-wing or centrist parties more inclined to give the Haredim a very high news rating. Those who voted right were more inclined to give the modern religious a very high news value. But there was no difference in both rating the Haredim and the modern Orthodox as high among all voting sectors. Consumption of religion as a factor in rating news value

Indeed, those who read religion news in the media on a regular or frequent basis were far more inclined to say that religion was of a high news value. Thus, 21% and 26% of journalists who follow religion news all the time said religion was of very high or high news value. In contrast, only 3% and 0% of journalists who do not read about religion at all said it was of very high or high news value, respectively. The more the journalist was exposed to religion news, the higher they rated religion’s news value. Thus, 9% and 18% of journalists who read about religion from time to time said it was of very high or high news value, respectively. Was there any difference between those who follow religion with interest in the news in terms of grading religion’s newsworthiness and the grading of religion by those who did not follow religion? The logic is that the more one follows news about religion, the higher the news value one would give to it. Thus, only 6% and 14% of journalists who never watch or listen to religion broadcasting rated religion with a very high or high news value. In contrast, 18% and 28% who watch or listen to religion broadcasting from time to time rated religion as very high value, respectively. Was this also true for those who surfed religion websites? Yes: 38% of those who surfed religious websites gave it a very high or high news value, in contrast to 19% of those who do not surf religious web sites. There was a similar trend regarding those journalists who followed, listened to, or watched religion programming. The more the journalist listened to or watched religion programming, the more they were inclined to rate religion as newsworthy. Jewish religious culture

The more they were exposed to religious music and received press releases, the greater they rated religion’s news value. The same was true regarding those who listened to Hassidic or religious Sephardic Oriental music.

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Is there a connection between possession of religious books and news value of religion? Among the journalists, 9% and 16% who had religious books or books on Jewish thought at home were inclined to give religion a very high or high news value, respectively, in contrast to 0% and 10% of journalists who did not have religious books or books on Jewish thought who gave religion a high or very high news rating, respectively. A further 10% and 45% who did not possess religious books or books on Jewish thought gave religion no value or low value; 10% and 33% of those who had religion books or books on Jewish thought rated religion as having no news value or low news value. Previous experience in religion reporting as a factor in news value of religion

There was a correlation between news interest in Judaism and whether the person had been engaged in religion reporting. Fifty-seven per cent and 71% of those who had ever reported on religion in the past rated religion as having very high news interest or high news interest, in contrast to 43% and 28%, respectively, among those who had never reported on religion. This was even truer in the case of minority religions, Islam and Christianity. Seventy per cent and 71% of those who had reported on religion gave Islam a very high or high news interest rating, in contrast to only 30% and 30%, respectively, for those who had no past reporting experience in religion. And 71% and 70% of those who had reported on religion gave Christianity a very high or high news rating, in contrast to only 29% and 29%, respectively, among those who had no previous reporting experience on religion. Editors and producers versus reporters

But what if what the reporter or journalist thinks of religion is not the sole factor? The reporter is only one part of the news process and, in particular, dependent on the subeditor (Tuchman, 1973). There was considerable interest among editors and gatekeepers; 46% of editors surveyed said there was a high or very high news interest, and 40% said editors showed average interest. Only 10% said editors’ interest was medium to low, and a further 4% said editors showed no interest. Of the 41% of editors who, according to reporters, gave Judaism an average news value, 30% and 25% gave religion a very high or high news value. And of the 33% of editors who gave Judaism a high news value, 25% and 25% rated religion with a very high or high news value. Conclusion Overall, some similarities between the two religious and the two secular websites may be identified. The religious websites B’Hadrei Haredim and Arutz 7 gave the most space to religious leaders and non-official leaders (like yeshiva heads) and official state and religious posts (like chief rabbis). Other key themes for the religious websites included the centrality of the synagogue and prayer; religious festivals and fasts; and broader existential theological matters about religion, the existence of God, and

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religious streams. For the non-religious, broader or existential and theological questions about God were even more singularly prominent. Also prominent was synagogue prayer, as were religious streams – reflecting to some extent the tribal characteristic of religious life. Both the religious and non-religious were single-mindedly oriented to Judaism, away from other faith groups. The research suggests that the new media news websites are little different from traditional media, like press and television, which are focused on the local religion – in the Israeli case, Judaism – with little or no attempt to cover other faith groups. Depth in theological questions appears irrelevant both for the blow-by-blow media clock of new media and in particular for the religious media. Therefore, the lively discourse occurs elsewhere, in social networks, rather than on news websites which are written and edited by professional journalists. Future patterns of rabbis and information will necessarily be influenced by patterns in media coverage of religion. Trends in Israel (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009) towards religiosity suggest an increase in religion news interest among Israelis. Unresolved tensions between the secular and ultra-Orthodox also suggest that religion will remain on the news agenda. Indeed, mutual perceptions between rabbis themselves and journalists will continue to be defined, in part, by how the respective media – secular and religious media – each define the issues: the secular media from a secular viewpoint of the separation of synagogue and state, and the religious media, particularly the Haredi media, seeing the Torah as the prime mover or criterion, whether in private or public life. Diplomatic and military issues concerning the as-yet-unresolved Arab Israeli conflict are likely to continue to dominate the media’s attention, turning attention away from such other subjects including religion. Yet the internet – characterised by unlimited virtual space – will ensure that the amount of space which religion receives in new media will no longer be determined by “bigger” stories like the Arab Israeli conflict. Notes 1 The author desires to acknowledge with thanks the data received from Ifat, Tel Aviv. 2 The Sabbath 283 report/articles on four websites combined: religion (248); festivals (165); synagogue (96); God (78); secular (78); modern Orthodoxy (dati leumi) (77); prayer (72); Haredim (69); Chief Rabbinate (54); mosque (54); rabbi (53);); tefillin (46); fast (45); Bible 45); Western Wall (43); rosh yeshiva (46); religious status quo (42); Temple Mount (40); admor (36); Judaism (35); conversion (34); Koran (34); dayan (27); mikva (25); traditional Jews (24); Torah (22); Gemara (20); Sephardi chief rabbi (Rishon Lezion) (19); Torah scrolls (18); Ministry of Religious Services (15); church (15); Christian priest (14); bet din (14); yahrzeit (12); khadi (12); imam (11); Reform Judaism (10); aguna (10); Temple (Bet Mikdash) (8); hevra kadisha (6); pope (6); mezuza (6); Christianity (6); atheists (5); Vatican (45); circumcision (5); muezzin (5); Islam (3); Conservative Judaism (3); wakf (2); p’sak halakha (Jewish legal ruling) (2); New Testament (0).

Bibliography Bennett, J. M. (2012) Aquinas on the Web: Doing Theology in an Internet Age. New York: T & T Clark.

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Campbell, H. (2010) When Religion Meets New Media. London & New York: Routledge Publishers. Central Bureau of Statistics. (2009) Jerusalem. Cohen, Y. (2005) Religion News in Israel. Journal of Media & Religion 4(3). Cohen, Y., & Lev-On, A. (2022) The Dormant Volcano: Social Media and the Temple Mount, Jerusalem. Social Media + Society, October–December: 1–9. Dawson, L., & Cowan, D. (2004) Religion Online. New York & London: Routledge. Eickelman, D. F., & Anderson, J. W. (2003) New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Garrett-Medill Survey. (1999) Garrett-Medill Center for Religion and the News Media. Media Coverage of Religion, Spirituality & Values. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University. Hobbs, V. (2015) Characterisations of Feminism in Reformed Christian Online Media. Journal of Media & Religion 14(4). Richardson, J. Y., & Introvigne, M. (2007) New Religious Movements, Countermovements, Moral Panics, and the Media. In Bromley, D. D. (ed.), Teaching New Religious Movements. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 91–112. Swanson, D. (2004) The Framing of Contemporary Christian Apostasy on the World Wide Web. Journal of Media & Religion 3(1). Tuchman, G. (1973) Making News by Doing Work: Routinising the Unexpected. American Journal of Sociology 79(1). Westerstahl, J., & Johansson, F. (1994) Foreign News: News Values and Ideologies. European Journal of Communication 9(1).

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Like other categories of news, religion information needs to be interesting – sensational and/or dramatic – or important in order to pass news gatekeepers and be defined as news (Galtung & Ruge, 1965). Given that, by definition, Israel is the Jewish state, the Jewish religion is a subject of the news. However, religion is limited to a handful of themes and is mostly secondary to other news categories like politics, defence, and economics. It presents a public image in Israel of religion which is distant from what rabbis would wish to construct. A focus on conflict and the image of extremism and fundamentalism within Judaism raises the ire of rabbis. It is far from the image they would like projected. But in part, this reflects the rabbis’ own lack of understanding of the market forces of news and a tendency to blame – sometimes unjustifiably – the news messenger for a negative image of religion in the Israeli public sphere. Rather than having a judgemental approach and suspecting reporters of possessing an ideological agenda, there is a need to understand the newsgathering process and in particular how religion reporters – who cover most of the religion news developments – function. The extent to which religion is covered in the news depends on the assessment of reporters and editors about its newsworthiness (Gans, 1980). News source–religion reporter relations One of the most important questions in specialised journalism is relations between news sources and the reporter, raising such questions as the motivations and perceived obligation of news sources towards reporters and the dependence of reporters upon news sources. Different news specialisms provide different answers to each of these issues and questions. For example, in political coverage, news sources are audience-oriented with an obligation and interest, in democracies, of elected leaders to inform the public, including through such public channels as the media. Or, for example, in fashion journalism, news sources have a profit motive. In religion, while news sources are audience-oriented and seek to spread the faith, there is no inbuilt felt obligation to inform or to give accountability. Rather, religious organisations are fiercely hierarchical, seemingly authoritative, and often secretive, even if engaging in persuasive communication. DOI: 10.4324/9781315735184-4

Gathering the news 59 Academic literature in media and religion is notably weak on religious public relations in general and news source–religion reporter relations in particular. Some religious organisations have acknowledged the need for PR and employ spokespeople, and religious clerics recognise the need to engage in pastoral theology beyond the prayer house. Ferre (2000) has described how in the US – in the face of the decline of the Protestant press, once dominant in the 19th century, which was superseded in the 20th century by the secular press as the main medium – Protestant churches in 1929 formed the Religious Publicity Council to provide a PR infrastructure. Initially, different Protestant churches joined the council, as done years later by the Roman Catholic Church – with the goal of projecting religious faith through mainstream secular media – all in the hope of drawing new believers and existing ones to church on Sunday. But the PR professionalisation in the Protestant Church in the US is by no means universal. Indeed, those religions which are less hierarchical in nature – such as Buddhism and Shintoism – engage in less PR. Public-relations activities are even more important for new religious movements, which are perceived by the public as cults and which even engage in unorthodox behaviour like violence and sexual freedom. An example of the failure to take the public dimension into account in religious public relations was a public lecture by Britain’s Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, in February 2008, in which he suggested that sharia might be reconcilable with British law. Interviewed by the BBC’s religion affairs reporter, following his lecture, on BBC Radio’s current affairs programme, The World at One, he was asked, “Is the application of sharia in certain circumstances unavoidable?” Archbishop Williams replied, “It seems unavoidable, and indeed as a matter of fact, certain provisions of sharia are already recognised in our society and under our law. We already have in this country a number of situations in which the law, the internal law of religious communities, is recognised by the law of the land as justifying objections in certain circumstances” (Woolley, 2012). But public reaction of outrage followed – with images of public hangings such as in Saudi Arabia filling the British psyche – as both government and opposition leaders sought to distance themselves from Lambeth Palace, the seat of the Anglican Church, and “Shariagate.” It illustrated a lack of awareness by the church cleric to envisage and manage public reactions. It was just one of many cases which reflected the low level of trust which journalists have in religious leaders. The Worlds of Journalism Project, in one survey of journalists from 21 countries, found that on a 1–5 rating, the level of trust in religious leaders in the journalist’s country rated only 2.59. But the level of trust varies from region to region. Thus, journalists’ level of trust in religious leaders was lower in Western countries – for example, 2.11 in Switzerland and 2.09 in Greece – compared to some traditionally religious, non-Western countries, including Muslim countries like Indonesia (3.32) and Egypt (2.85) and strongly religious ones like Uganda 3.65 and Chile 3.15 (Worlds of Journalism Project, 2019). The 2.59 level of overall trust in religious leaders in 21 countries surveyed in the Worlds of Journalism Project contrasted with a 3.26 level of trust among journalists in the media themselves, 3.11 in the judiciary, 3.5 in the military, 3.22 in voluntary or charitable institutions, 2.86 in Parliament, and 2.79 in the government.

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Religion reporters are little different from other journalistic specialists in their methods of newsgathering. One of the most important questions in specialised journalism are relations between news sources and the reporter, raising such questions as the motivations and perceived obligation of news sources towards reporters and the dependence of reporters upon news sources. In some Western countries, including the USA, for two centuries, specialised journalism has been a feature of the modern newsroom. In the Israeli media, like in other countries, a reporter who specialises in a specific theme – for example, the political reporter, economics reporter, or defence reporter – possesses an advantage over the general reporter because the former may draw upon background knowledge of the subject and a network of news sources. The religion reporter is an important person in a newsroom in providing the background and explanation for news developments involving religion. Where a news organisation has its own religion reporter, there is no absence of religious literacy in the newsroom. Religion reporting by the specialist religion reporter is written in an informative manner – and more so from a sympathetic view – given a tendency for religion reporters to be actively religious themselves. The specialist religion reporter, therefore, has a singular influence in covering much, if not most, of what his or her news outlet publishes about religion. In contrast to some other specialisms in news journalism, religious specialism has had an uncertain status in newsroom priorities. Where there is no religion specialist – the case with the vast majority of newsrooms worldwide – the danger of an absence of religious literacy is very real. But whether a news organisation has a religion specialist at all; whether it is a full-time position; the space which religion stories receive; whether religion stories are confined to, say, a religion section once a week or whether they are scattered throughout the organisation’s news coverage; and the autonomy enjoyed by the religion reporter – who decides which stories to and may assign religion-related stories to other reporters in the newsroom – are all clues to the status of the religion reporter in his or her news organisation (Cohen, 2018). Most key Israeli news organisations have a specialist reporter covering religion, at least on a part-time basis. This reflects acute concern among Israelis about state-religious questions and the existence of religious political parties. Buddenbaum (1988) found that two-thirds of all religion reporters in her US survey used press contacts inside religious organisations “a lot.” A problem of news sources in religion was more prevalent among the broad range of US journalists, not religion reporters. According to Winston and Green (2015), 31% of US journalists surveyed said that a major challenge was that they “do not know the sources” for covering religion. Press releases were used by religion reporters less. Threequarters of religion reporters at US newspapers with circulations above 50,000 used personal contacts inside religious organisations “a lot.” (It contrasted to only 50% of religion reporters at smaller-circulation US newspapers.) Denominational media are a useful source for following developments inside different faiths; Gustav Niebuhr, as the New York Times religion correspondent, for example, surfed denominational websites for background weekly.

Gathering the news 61 Like in other specialisms, a key question in examining source–reporter relations is the level of dependence which develops between the reporter and his or her source. The longer a specialist reporter is assigned to a specific beat, the greater the danger that news sources could win control of the reporter. For example, Ari Goldman, as The New York Times number two on the religion beat, developed initially a good relationship with Cardinal John J. O’Connor, Archbishop of New York, which even evolved for the latter into informal social ties with the Goldmans. But once Goldman wrote a long critique of O’Connor in The New York Times Magazine, the cardinal’s press secretary cut off lines of contact with the reporter. And for some six months the reporter was unable to reach the cardinal, rebuffed by the cardinal’s press secretary. Finally, the reporter did manage to persuade O’Connor to speak to him when the latter flew the New York air shuttle for a bishops’ conference to Washington. The peg for the interview was O’Connor’s first anniversary in the New York job. “I found him a lot more low key and pensive than when I first got to know him,” Goldman said. In a quiet moment, O’Connor reflected that he had tried to cooperate with “the liberal media” in New York – but had given up. “We just have a different agenda,” the cardinal remarked. “I said good-bye to him – and took the next shuttle back to New York” Goldman added (1991). Women who are religion reporters suffer particular problems with access to clergy. “Conservative Arab society greatly limits my ability to speak with the leaders of religious communities, since they are men,” according to Muna Abdelfattah, a Sudanese journalist working in Saudi Arabia (Folds, 2015). Judy Siegel, as the religion reporter of Israel’s Jerusalem Post, did not have an easy time being taken seriously by news sources. Some rabbis were aghast that a woman had come to interview them, partly because this meant sitting alone in the same room together, but gradually I won their confidence, partly because they sought me out when they wanted their views printed – forgetting that I was a woman. One of the more difficult assignments was attending an assembly of the ultraOrthodox Agudath Yisroel movement. The invitation sent to the Jerusalem Post was addressed to “Mr Judy Siegel.” “Sitting at the press table, I was the only female among over 2,000 mostly black-coated men” (Siegal-Itzkovitch, 1982). The source–reporter relationship is really a triangular relationship because, as in all specialised journalism, there is an additional dimension of competition among religion reporters themselves over access to news sources in order to be the first with the news and to write exclusive reports. Indeed, it may be defined as a competitor–colleague relationship: in addition to the mutual competition, relations between specialist reporters are also characterised by cooperation in selected areas. This includes religious information accessible to all such as at a press conference. But cooperation is required for two religion reporters not being in mutual competition for the same audiences – such as two reporters from the same news medium, for example, two newspapers or two broadcasting stations in the same town, or two websites with the same audience.

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After describing the relations between formal institutions like the Chief Rabbinate and journalists, the chapter will discuss other rabbis as news sources, the extent to which rabbis succeed in projecting their message, the question of journalists’ level of trust in rabbis as sources of information, the Haredi media as a sources of information to journalists in the secular media, and journalists’ attitudes to the role of the media in exposing scandals involving rabbis. News source–religion reporter relations in Israel

Reporters gather religion news actively such as by interviewing news sources, receiving news communiques, and following news media itself. However, most of the channels used by reporters in gathering information are informal. While reporters on other beats enjoy well-oiled frameworks for attending briefings – including those covering the Prime Minister’s Office, Foreign Ministry, IDF, and other areas such as police, economics, education, and health – the religion reporter is at a handicap. While the Chief Rabbinate is a news source, the major area of reporting – Haredim – has no formal briefing structure, with few major rabbinical figures – both Hassidic or Lithuanian – speaking to reporters. Religion reporters forge contacts with the shamash, or aide, who attends to the administrative needs of senior Haredi rabbis. Other news sources include the politicians of Haredi political parties, the variegated Haredi media, and individual Haredi journalists who may share news tips with their secular journalist colleagues. In contrast, rabbis identified with the modern Orthodox, political figures in the Knesset in the modern religious political parties, and those rabbis with smaller nonOrthodox communities, the Reform and Conservative movements, are accessible to the religion reporter. As discussed in the next chapter, the religion reporter brings to his or her work certain background knowledge about Judaism and about the politics of religion. Some reporters come from a religious background and benefit from knowledge gained in their religious education in high school or even in yeshiva. Others have become acquainted with the subject while covering the beat. One question raised concerns the reporter who is personally religious and whether the reporter can bring the required objectivity and distance to covering such controversial questions as the status and struggle of the Reform and Conservative movements for official recognition by the Israeli state. Yet another question to be discussed concerns the lack of knowledge among religion reporters about the non-Jewish religions. There has been wide discussion about reporting of religion, notably a perceived lack of religion knowledge among reporters – as distinct from specialised religion reporters – leading to superficiality and errors in reporting religionrelated developments. Winston and Green (2015) found that less one-fifth of all US journalists polled said they were “very knowledgeable” about religion. Fifty per cent of all journalists said that a major challenge was a lack of knowledge of religion. A lack of knowledge by a reporter writing about religion means he or she is unable to provide a nuanced picture of moral, ethical, and value-laden religious

Gathering the news 63 elements. As one journalist-turned-priest, formerly from the BBC, Christopher Landau (1993), put it, A lack of literacy that would be unacceptable in relation to politics or business is somehow tolerated when it comes to religion – which might make sense if religion news never made it onto mainstream outlets, but while it does, crass mistakes are potentially embarrassing. In evaluating religion reporters, the concern should be not only with the knowledge level of the reporter, but in the case of the reporter who is active religiously, more with how this knowledge impacts, even subconsciously, his or her professional work without damaging his or her neutrality. Surveying religion reporters in the US, Dart and Allen (1993) found that 76% of religion reporters agreed that religion studies were helpful in covering the religion beat, another 14% said these were essential to the job, and 60% of clergy polled said that religion reporters should be active religiously. But only 20% of journalists agreed that religion reporters should be active religiously. Buddenbaum (1988) found that only 25% of US religious reporters thought it preferable that a religious person should cover religion, 25% disagreed, and 50% were neutral. Yet there are limits to the extent that religiously active people are suitable for religion reporting. Asked whether a member of the clergy should cover it, no journalists were positive, 27% were neutral, and the remainder opposed the idea. Noteworthy is that more liberal movements in the modern Orthodox are theologically not as distant from Conservative Judaism, which, like Orthodox Judaism, acknowledges that Jewish religious law (halakha) in the Bible has a permanence even to this day. Historically, in the 19th century, the Conservative Jewish movement originated in Europe as a reaction against the excesses of the early founders of Reform Judaism in totally rejecting Jewish religious law. However, the Conservative movement in cooperating today fully with the so-called Religious Action Centre in their legal struggles has played against the Conservative moment’s interest since the latter has become muddled in the public eye with the Reform movement, notwithstanding the wide theological gaps between the two non-Orthodox movements. The struggle today is played out through appeals to the Supreme Court for budgeting or to become members of the religious council in different municipalities inside Israel. The struggle is also played out through the Supreme Court for religious conversions carried out by the Reform and Conservative communities to be recognised so that the converted may be registered in the Interior Ministry as Jewish. The struggle for the Conservative and Reform to win prayer space at the Western Wall separate from the Orthodox and foot-dragging by the government to recognise agreements on this has also reached the courts and the Israel Parliament (the Knesset). Official news sources for religion in Israel

There are three key official sources in Israel for journalists in covering religion: the spokesman of the Ministry of Religious Services, the spokesperson of the Chief Rabbinate, and the spokesperson of the Religious Courts Administration. In

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addition, there are the aides of Haredi rabbis, individual rabbis identified with the modern Orthodox sector, and spokespersons of non-Orthodox streams, notably the Reform and Conservative movements in Israel. Each of the three official spokespersons – the Ministry of Religious Services, the Chief Rabbinate, and the Religious Courts Administration – is responsible for relations with the media and with the public, as well as for maintaining their respective websites. Perhaps the most popular for the media is the Chief Rabbinate, the official entity comprising the Ashkenazi chief rabbi and the Rishon LeZion or Sephardi chief rabbi, given that it revolves around personalities, in contrast to, say, policy which characterises the work of the Religious Services Ministry, which is mostly (but not only) involved in budgeting. In addition, the chief rabbis themselves draw interest among religious and traditional audiences for comments and Jewish law rulings by the two rabbinical sages. In practice, in addition to the spokesman of the Chief Rabbinate, each chief rabbi has his own press aide, in his cortege. The Chief Rabbinate spokesman gets 10–15 requests a week from journalists. There are no group briefings – “I want to have a press briefing next week with the Chief Rabbi – in a matter the Chief wishes to generate awareness – but I am afraid that nobody will turn up,” said the spokesman of the Chief Rabbinate. So the spokesman sees journalists one on one. The Chief Rabbinate is more reactive, rather than initiating, but its influence extends beyond this, not only of the Rabbinate itself but also in the image of the religion and state itself. The more sympathetic media are the religious media – daily Haredi newspapers, Haredi news magazines, Haredi radio stations, and Haredi websites. “For me as a spokesman, the internet maximises the exposure because if I send it to the Net, within half an hour it can be on the front page of secular newspapers,” said the chief rabbi’s spokesman, but the most important is Y-Net, the popular secular website belonging to the masscirculated Yediot Aharonot, since this influences what the religious reporters of the secular press, radio, television, and other websites write. The spokeman said, A spokesman has to give an impression that, on the one hand, you are embracing the journalist, and that you are giving information that you are not giving others. On the other hand, there is an understanding that each side does his own thing with little manipulation. The impression by the journalists that you are working for him or her eases the flow of information from you afterwards. But the spokesman is sometimes able to arrange for a one-on-one meeting between a journalist and the chief rabbi. The chief rabbis – who are necessarily appointed for their learning – vary in the extent to which they are comfortable with journalists or not. Rabbis speak the language of the Torah and bring an elevated standing above a dialogue, to be addressed in the third person only: “Does the rabbi . . .” Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and the media

Perhaps one of the most illustrious chief rabbis – as measured by their learning – in the history of the State of Israel to be appointed chief rabbi (1973–1983), Rabbi

Gathering the news 65 Ovadia Yosef had a difficult time with the Israeli media. He “spoke” through his shiurim (religious lessons). Because he felt the media were against religion, as well as superficial by reporting briefly, but also because he personally suffered during elections for the post of chief rabbi, the general secular media did not favour the appointment, preferring other candidates – particularly because of the so-called Brother and Sister Controversy, in which Yosef had become embroiled. Siblings Hanoch and Miriam Langer were born to a woman who had left her first husband without a Jewish divorce. The children of such a union are mamzerim (lit. bastards) according to Jewish religious law and thus forbidden to marry Jews, but only another mamzer – a position confirmed years earlier by various state rabbinical courts. Finally, at the highest rabbinical court of appeals, Ovadia Yosef and other members of the rabbinical court of appeals upheld the ruling. Rabbi Shlomo Goren, then chief rabbi of Tel Aviv (and later himself elected to be the Ashkenazi chief rabbi) entered the fray by proposing a resolution: the mother’s first husband, a convert, was not really Jewish, so the first marriage is not recognised by halakha (Jewish religious law) and the children were not born out of wedlock. But his proposal did not result in a review of the case. Ovadia Yosef’s stance that it was against Jewish religious law did not win the applause of the general secular media, and he was regarded as extreme in his attitude. But Yosef’s public and media image improved when as chief rabbi he “released” hundreds of wives whose husbands had died or gone missing in the fighting in the 1973 Yom Kippur war from the status of “chained women,” which had meant that in the absence of certainty that they had lost their spouses, they were forbidden to remarry. Ovadia Yosef, as one of the most important rabbis of the time, had the standing to release the widow after going through each case, enabling her to marry. According to his son, Rabbi David Yosef, who heads a Jerusalem yeshiva, “Ovadia Yosef as chief rabbi did not like the media” (interview with the author). He saw journalism in a negative light – a race for gossip – an infringement of the Jewish law against loshon hara (social gossip) at his shiurim [religious lessons]. Reporters focused upon the sensational and blew it up out of context. As chief rabbi, he had a spokesman, but Yosef perceived media reactions as being too short for the task of explaining a religious point to the public. Ovadia Yosef contrasted with holders of the post like Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi Israel Meir Lau, who, like his son David Lau, who was also appointed to the post later, was far more comfortable with journalists. Ovadia Yosef read throughout his life the Haredi daily Hamodia. He did not see the secular media, with the exception of a daily cuttings file containing clippings of anything about himself in that day’s press. “He would look for a few minutes, and in many cases, he just ignored it. He did not want to necessarily react to a reporter even if it appeared to him as inaccurate.” Yet more generally, “as chief rabbi, he was up-to-date of political developments in the country and events surrounding these,” David Yosef remarked.

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Gathering the news The media had little impact upon Ovadia Yosef. David Yosef said, The rabbi’s way was that before addressing an issue, he would thoroughly research it, not via the media. For example, on his position favouring the Labour Party position of Israel “rescinding territory for peace,” he gave his religious ruling on favouring after he consulted with six senior politicians or persons in the defence community. I was there. He asked numerous questions, enquired and researched until he came to the position he came to. This was his way.

He did not believe in mass media. “From time to time, articles appeared in the religious press, including the Haredi media, or articles by others including rabbis for which he had been consulted. But these were not seen by the mass Israeli nonreligious public.” The religious courts

There is little sensitivity about the disclosure of religion-related official information which can be disclosed – like there is in, say, defence and policy matters – with the exception of the Religious Courts Administration. The religious courts are responsible for personal status matters, including conversion and divorce, and are subservient to the Ministry of Justice, like the civil courts. The Religious Courts spokesman responds to journalists’ questions, whether about a court decision, a dayan, or administrative decisions. “We cover the religious courts day to day – because it has a good spokesman who draws us to fascinating stories and publishes them,” said Yaacov Grudaka, editor of the B’Hadrei Haredim website. Court sessions are held in private – owing to the sensitivity of such matters as persons involved in religious conversions or the circumstances of. The protocols of court decisions are never published, but sometimes the court is interested in publishing court decisions without names or other identifying information about the persons involved in a case. The extent to which the spokesman can in practice brief journalists is limited. The spokesman has no contact with the judges; to the rare extent this is necessary “certainly not before a court decision, very occasionally afterwards,” said the spokesman; the director-general of the courts system is the conduit. But the spokesman may consult the legal department – essentially undefined territory. He is not supposed to have access to the files themselves, but this appears to be an unwritten rule. Thus, a journalist researching a story – having, for example, spoken to the lawyer of one of the parties, who might disclose what a dayan (religious court judge) said at the hearing – seeks a more a balanced version. Thus, in order to ensure a balanced picture emerges, the spokesman briefs himself via the legal department. So, formally, a journalist is not supposed to know about something deemed secret, but in practice, there is an informal relationship between the spokesman and key journalists. Like other areas of specialised journalism, there are disputes over turf. Thus, education reporters and legal reporters sometimes turn to the spokesman whether of the

Gathering the news 67 Chief Rabbinate, the religious court, or the Religious Service Ministry. “Religion affairs journalists do not like it when, say, educational reporters turn to the Chief Rabbinate because they think it is their turf,” said the Chief Rabbinate spokesman. There have been few women religion reporters, and only one woman, Efrat Urbach, has served as spokesperson of the Chief Rabbinate or Religious Affairs Ministry. In the survey of journalists by the author, reporters were satisfied by the level of contacts with news sources. In terms of contacts, of those who had to cover or had covered religion, 33% said the level of contact with religious news sources was very good, 53% good, 13% average, 1% not so good, and 0% not good. Information policy

The Chief Rabbinate spokesman is not only responsible for media relations but also for information policy. “The key is to initiate – not react. Reaction allows the media to frame. When I initiate, it allows me to frame,” said the Chief Rabbinate spokesman. Information policy is not to advance Judaism per se; after all, the chief rabbis are appointees of the state, which in many ways is not reflective of the true Judaism of religious people – including the chief rabbis themselves – but rather specific public information programmes which the state rabbinate seek to advance. For example, a campaign to unite all the different kosher food authorities in the Israel into a single certifying agency or an information programme against having private kashrut (kosher food) agencies. Yet another public information programme, against a severe shortage of burial grounds, was a programme to have above-ground burial chambers in a religion which by tradition “returns the deceased to the dust of the earth.” A former Chief Rabbinate spokesperson said, I had to explain that it was not disrespectful to bury above ground but necessary, even respectful. I produced a booklet with prayers at a funeral, the relevant Psalms, the telephone numbers of the burial societies, information for those without a religion, as well as some nice inspiring grave-related stories. But overall, information policy is on a losing wicket in a country which is mostly secular, and a considerable section of the population perceives religion as imposed upon them and feel no connection to rabbis. Moreover, given the secular public’s and secular media’s perceived hostility to the rabbinate, the spokesman’s initiatives for information campaigns are regarded as worthless when brought for approval before the Chief Rabbinate Council (a committee of city rabbis headed by the chief rabbis which decides policy), because given the seeming impossibility of compromise on matters of religion, there is a negative image from the outset. With many outside of the religious communities favouring the separation of synagogue and state, and many, for example, supporting civil marriage and not requiring a women to attend a ritual bath immersion prior to the marriage ceremony, the overall image is that of religion being anti-democratic or liberal. Yet as one

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member of the Chief Rabbinate Council put it, “our mandate is not to be nice but to defend the world of halakha [Jewish religious law].” The extent to which the target audience of the chief rabbis themselves is the broad Israeli public and the Jewish diaspora is unclear. Notwithstanding that the position of Israel chief rabbi is a state appointment for the country’s entire population, the real constituencies of the chief rabbis are the Haredi public opinion – even though the Haredim themselves do not formally recognise the Chief Rabbinate but have their own rabbis, who, for example, sit on the Council of Torah Sages. The chief rabbis do not see their key public channels as the media channels but rather the traditional channel of the shiur, or religious lesson, from the synagogue lectern providing them also with a framework in which to comment – through a Torah janner – on issues of the day. A second constituency is the modern Orthodox Jewry, which years earlier established the state rabbinate structure. Many of the religion reporters in the secular media are themselves religious, identifying with the Orthodox streams, and are also well informed on the ins and outs of religious tradition and therefore able to interpret matters to their audiences. Yet some critics will argue that the reporters feel a need to bend over backwards to be acceptable to their editors in the secular media. The three spokesmen – from the Chief Rabbinate, Ministry of Religious Services, and the Religious Courts – receive thrice daily a package of clippings comprising articles in the Israeli press about religion. In addition, as one of the spokesman added, “I go into the news websites four times a day to keep up with which is happening.” The two chief rabbis themselves do not see the Israeli press or the clippings apart from specific items which the spokesman might feel they should. Both subscribe to the Haredi daily Hamodia. Itzhak Yosef’s father, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, used to have a transistor on his table, which he used to turn on, on the hour, to follow the news when he was chief rabbi. The case of aguna

One of the most problematic image issues for the Chief Rabbinate is the socalled aguna subject. In Jewish religious law, a woman is free to remarry only if widowed or if her husband grants her a divorce. There are an estimated 150–200 recalcitrant husbands who decline to give their wife a divorce, so she cannot remarry. In October 2021, there were 146 cases of aguna pending (Makor Rishon). The rabbinate does use means to pressure recalcitrant husbands to agree to give a divorce. This pressure includes placing pressure on the husband who refuses or closing the man’s bank account. Over the years, the activism of the religious courts has been limited to, say, placing photographs of the recalcitrant husband on the website of the religious courts. Whatever the news interest, the standard rule that judges in the religious court system cannot be interviewed means that the spokesman cannot provide information except in a selective manner. In one case, one journalist of the Second TV channel interviewed a woman, Tzviya Gurdatski, whose husband refused to give her divorce, and then phoned the

Gathering the news 69 judge, a dayan, and interviewed him aggressively, for his “failure to free her.” The religious court spokesman registered a complaint with the Second Television and Radio Authority. The reporter was reprimanded, yet no monetary fine was imposed. Even if the public and media were instinctively supportive of the “chained” wife, at times the refusal originated from, say, a disagreement to divide up the estate, with the wife disagreeing about the conditions of the divorce; this necessitates the spokesman to ensure both sides were covered in the media and information about both sides was released. One spokesperson initiated an activist publicity campaign against such husbands. With the backing of the legal adviser of the religious court system – after receiving the agreement of the religious courts that an aguna was one who refused a divorce for two years – the spokesperson, selecting three cases, went to the press and informed journalists of the specific cases. Thus, the spokesperson made public shaming a legitimate tool. In one case, the spokesperson went to the mass-circulated paper Yediot Aharonot, which carried the article and a photograph of the man: after a week of publication, he relented and gave a divorce. In another case, the spokesperson gave the story to a French Jewish weekly, which published the story a week before Rosh Hashanah (the New Year). When the man turned up in the synagogue, crowded with worshippers for the holydays, he was so embarrassed that he gave her a divorce. (In the third case, the spokesperson was less successful in using media and public pressure.) So public shaming became one of the tools for dealing with aguna. The media had a good story. There was natural sympathy among the public for the women. With a fully fledged press conference and reporters and photographers in attendance, the religious court system was seen as being in the forefront in the war against “refuseniks” instead of being seen as ineffective. There was nothing new in the decision except that beforehand, the courts were inactive. But not all government ministers were supportive; one justice minister, Tzipi Livne – who supported civil marriage – was against the very principle of aguna or even fighting for the women in the name of halakha. Official communiques

Journalists receives communiques on religion such as from the Chief Rabbinate, Orthodox religious organisations such as yeshivot, and non-Orthodox groups like the Conservative and Reform movements. There was some evidence that journalists surveyed saw these – 21% said they saw them from time to time and 63% infrequently or not at all, in contrast to only 9% who said they saw them a lot or all the time. Whether the reporter received communiques about religion, such as from the Chief Rabbinate, was a determinant of such factors as if the media organisation itself was in the religious sector or the secular sector, whether the journalist had covered religion, and if the news organisation where he or she worked was interested or not.

70 Gathering the news In quantitative terms, reporters did not appear well supplied with press releases from religious organisations, such as the Ministry of Religious Services, the Chief Rabbinate, the Conservative and Reform movements, and Tzohar, Bet Hillel. Only 2% and 8% of journalists surveyed by the author said they received a very great deal or a lot of press releases, respectively, 22% received them seldom, and 46% not at all. Of those journalists working in a religious media organisation, 28% and 32% received religion handouts from time to time or all the time/most of the time, respectively, in contrast to 20% and 11%, respectively, of journalists in non-religious media organisations. Further, 32% and 15%, respectively, of those who had at some point reported on religion read the communiques from time to time or most of/all the time, respectively, in contrast to 17% and 7% who had not, respectively. And the longer the person reported on religion, the greater the likelihood that he or she would read them. A similar correlation was found between reading the communiques and relations with religion-related sources. Thus, 35% and 18% of reporters who reported very good relations with news sources read these communiques from time to time or all the time/most of the time, respectively. In contrast, those reporting not good or medium relations were less inclined to. Whether the reporter was inclined to read, hear, or view religion-related developments in the media was a clue to the reporter’s interest and perhaps action involving religion news. Overall, 35% of all reporters were inclined to follow the news from time to time and 24% most of or all the time, in contrast to 38% who followed them infrequently. Beyond the state rabbinate, there are individual modern Orthodox rabbis, as sources to journalists, less for information and more for their views or reactions. Almost all rabbis affiliated with the modern Orthodox sector are accessible to religion reporters. As Yair Sherki, the Haredi affairs reporter of Israel TV Second channel, remarked, The modern Orthodox rabbis are known to the broad Israeli public. I can call them. I can send a WhatsApp to Rabbi David Stav, who chairs the liberal Orthodox outreach movement Tzohar; his Tzohar colleague, Rabbi Yuval Cherlow, head of a yeshiva in Petach Tiqva and an expert on religious ethics and health issues; and Rabbi Shmuel Eliahu, rabbi of the northern city of Safed. Eliahu’s father, Rabbi Mordechai Eliahu, a former state chief rabbi, was inaccessible. But the younger generation of rabbis understand that the media are another channel to reach the community. Jeremy Sharon of the Jerusalem Post said, “Shlomo Aviner loves the media. So if you phone up and he can’t speak, he will call you back. I imagine he’s got my number saved.” Even the late veteran Rabbi Haim Druckman, added Sharon, felt, “Well, I suppose I should speak to the media. I like to get my message out. But I’d rather be teaching.” One of the very few rabbis from the sector who distances himself from the media light is Rabbi Zvi Tau, head of the Har Mor yeshiva, identified

Gathering the news 71 with the Hardal modern Orthodox stream. Hanan Greenwood, religion affairs reporter of Israel Hayom (2022), said, For years Yeshivat Har Mor refused to talk to journalists or be exposed in the media, and the only things available were the recorded shiurim. Rabbi Tau thinks that the media is the enemy, and that it is forbidden to cooperate with them. It was almost impossible even to obtain an up-to-date photograph of Rabbi Tau for articles since the rabbi does not appear in public gatherings. But the real areas in religion reporting which many reporters seek to reach are the Haredi rabbis – partly because the Haredi political parties are often kingmakers in Israel’s coalition system. There are no formal patterns, and it is for the incoming reporter to “map out” sources of information in the Haredi yeshiva world. Rabbis who head the yeshivot and admorim who lead Hassidic courts are mostly inaccessible to the secular media, which is deemed “unclean.” “The more the community is closed, the more it is difficult to penetrate them. And the more they don’t want material to reach the public,” said Kobi Nachshoni, religion reporter for the Y-Net website. The key decision-making body for Haredim is the Council of Torah Sages. The Council’s secretary briefs the media after each council meeting. Rabbi Yaakov Alter, the head of the large Gur Hassidic community, never speaks to the media. In contrast, the admorim who head Belz or Vishnitz are a little more open. Nachshoni said, “Among the senior rabbis, there is a senior ‘liaison’ to the wider public whom I can talk to. And if not, I will call a Haredi politician who is affiliated to them.” A contrasting case is Israel Meir Lau, a former state chief rabbi and chief rabbi of the city of Tel Aviv. Though a Haredi, as well as not regarded as liberal in Jewish legal decision-making (halakha), yet having spent his entire life in the state rabbinate, he has moulded for himself a positive image in Israeli public society. He is in demand and accessible to journalists. His traumatic experiences as a Holocaust refugee win the ready Jewish ear. Non-Orthodox rabbis of the Conservative and Reform movements are readily accessible, particularly given their ongoing struggles inside Israel to win recognition. Indeed, rabbis themselves are less important in the key story of the struggle for Israeli recognition of the non-Orthodox stream. But in terms of inviting rabbis to participate in programmes, secular broadcasting in the country has begun to recognise these rabbis as having an educated and enlightened message suitable for the broad Israeli public. A question is whether all religion reporters are interested in – or even inhibited from – non-Orthodox Judaism as a journalistic theme to explore, given many privately identity as Orthodox Jews. So while the religion reporter necessarily covers such ongoing day-by-day developments, such as the Supreme Court hearings of appeals by non-Orthodox groups denied holding prayer minyan services at the Western Wall, there appears to be little interest among some reporters to initiate and generate feature stories of new developments inside the two movements. “I claim to give attention to their community which is proportionate to their size in Israel,” said Yehuda Schlesinger, “which is small.” But this argument is spurious, given that news values are not generally determined by size. A clue to

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the failure of religion reporters to cover the non-Orthodox is that the Israeli public fail to distinguish between Reform and Conservative. Theologically, the Conservative are much closer to the Orthodox, given that the former also recognise and observe the fundamentals of the system of Jewish religious law (halakha) recognised also by the Orthodox. Partly, the two streams themselves are to blame because they campaign together in their legal struggles. But this does not justify the lack of understanding between the two held by most Israelis, for which the media must take some responsibility – and this reflects a wider knowledge gap. In an attempt to improve access to their news sources, the religion reporters have organised themselves into a guild to improve access to senior rabbis which they would otherwise not have, as well as to other senior officials like the police commissioner or even the chief of staff, meeting for off-the-record briefings, once every couple of months. “We begin with a religious lesson, in the case of a rabbi, then move on to religion-related issues of the day, and finally the rabbi’s outlook on life,” said Yehuda Schlesinger, who initiated the guild. The guild was also able to improve access to other forms of information, such as the protocols of the monthly meetings of the Chief Rabbinate Council, which are normally not published. The guild is characterised by a sense of collegiality, not characteristic of other specialisms of journalists. This includes, say, if one religion reporter is absent from an event, open to all, another reporter may brief him or her afterwards. Yet the guild comprises only the religion reporters of the secular media, and no attempt has been made to include the journalists of the religious media. The reasons for this are unclear – one of the reporters of the secular media remarked that reporters in the Haredi media are more competitive and aggressive than their colleagues in the secular media. Like press, radio, and television beforehand, new media have focused interest on the rabbinical personalities themselves. If in the past the religious press was in the main interested in these, such religion-related news is also seen more than in the past by the non-Haredi public in social networks and news websites. The internet has made rabbis more accessible – like public servants in other spheres. It pressures them to react quickly. Today there are fewer press conferences or briefings. “It is all in the e-mail and internet. If I have to release something,” said the chief rabbi’s spokesman, “I have to be much quicker today because later it will not be relevant for the media. I needed to whisper to the chief rabbi that this is a little urgent.” The social media and citizen journalists – with the expression of reactions – complicated this further. “Today, all sorts of idiots and jerks write on Facebook. I want to avoid legal discussions becoming a focus of debate in the social media. And yet it is unclear who actually surfs the social media and what influence this has or not,” a spokesperson remarked. Journalists’ ratings of news sources

How were news sources graded for those who reported on religion in the media whether the media were defined as religious and non-religious? Seventy-six per cent of journalists surveyed by the author reported that ties with

Gathering the news 73 news sources were very good, and a further 8% rated them good and 13% mediocre. A similar picture emerged with editors. In terms of types of news organisations, no differences were found between the different news organisations where the journalists worked – in television, radio, internet, magazines, and local newspapers. The longer they covered religion, the closer were the ties with news sources. But religiosity of journalists was also a factor in the rating of news sources. The reporters’ own religiosity may have broken barriers and strengthened ties: 56% of journalists who described themselves as religious (Orthodox) reported very good ties, and a further 25% good ties. In contrast, 29% of reporters who described themselves as non-religious described relations with news sources as very good. A further 58% said ties were good and 12% mediocre. While there were no differences for reporters defining themselves as traditional and non-religious of those who described the relations as very good, there was an incremental increase between traditional and non-religious journalists regarding the category of good relations: 71% of traditional journalists said relations were good, in contrast to 58% of non-religious journalists who described them as good. Rabbis and media channels to project Judaism

Are mass media an appropriate forum for the projection of religion? The question is pertinent, given the view that today many people draw their religious identity from the broader mass media and its coverage of religion (Hoover, 2006). When asked if religion should not appear in the media, rabbis surveyed by the author overwhelmingly disagreed: 59% disagreed completely, and a further 20% agreed to a small extent. Only 5% and 2% agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent, respectively, that religion should not appear in the mass media. Fifty-nine per cent and 25% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, 48% and 17% of Haredi rabbis, and 45% and 26% of Hardal rabbis said so, respectively. Haredi rabbis – 17% – were incrementally more inclined than the four other categories of rabbis (mainstream modern Orthodox 3%, Hardal 8%, Reform 0%, and Conservative 3%) to say that religion should not appear in the media to a very great extent and to a great extent, respectively. Non-Orthodox rabbis were inclined to disagree incrementally even more than the Orthodox. Eighty-one per cent and 12% of Reform rabbis did not agree at all or agreed only to a small extent, respectively. Similarly, 85% and 6% of Conservative rabbis said so, respectively. And when asked whether religion should be in the media, younger rabbis were more inclined to disagree: 63% and 22% of younger rabbis (born after 1980) did not agree at all or agreed only to a small extent, respectively, that it was wise not to have religious content in the media. In contrast, 60% and 9% of those born in 1940–1959 did not agree at all or agreed only to a small extent, respectively. Rabbis saw being quoted in the media as a positive thing: 28% and 28% saw it as a very good thing or a good thing to be quoted. A further 24% viewed it as a good thing to some extent. Only 14% and 6% saw being quoted in the media as not very desirable or not desirable at all. Similarly, to the related question of whether it was good and important for rabbis to be quoted in the media, the difference between the

74 Gathering the news Orthodox and non-Orthodox was also surprising: 34%, 32%, and 31% of Haredi, Hardal, and mainstream modern Orthodox replied that being quoted in the media was very important, in contrast to only 8% and 10% of Reform and Conservative rabbis, respectively. The Reform and Conservative rabbis were more inclined than the Orthodox to reply that being quoted in the media was good or important to some extent. But on the combined options of “not good at all” or “only to a small degree,” all five categories of rabbis listed here rated between 17% and 27%. Rabbis did not agree that media inaccuracy in covering religion was due to a lack of success of rabbis in explaining themselves: 26% and 22% believed so to a small degree only or not at all, respectively. A further 26% of rabbis agreed to a certain extent. Only a quarter of rabbis believed this was true to a great extent (19%) or to a very great extent (7%), respectively. But when asked how many times they had been interviewed or quoted over the preceding 12 months, 64% of rabbis had not been interviewed or quoted even once, 14% once or two times, and 8% seven to ten times. Similarly, 73% had not been interviewed once on secular radio stations in the previous 12 months, 10% had one to two times, and 7% three to six times. Regarding appearances by rabbis on television: 80% had not appeared on television, 10% one to two times on television, and 3% three to six times. Yet whether or not rabbis had actually appeared in the media, higher ratings were found among the non-Orthodox (Reform and Conservative) than among the Orthodox (Haredi, Hardal, mainstream modern Orthodox). Only 44% of Reform and 49% of Conservative replied that they had not been quoted in the secular Israeli press in the previous 12 months, in contrast to 74%, 69%, and 61% of Hardal, mainstream modern Orthodox, and Haredi rabbis, respectively. In the case of interviews or being quoted on public radio, however, non-Orthodox rabbis were less quoted or less interviewed than in the press. Sixty-seven per cent of both Reform and Conservative rabbis said they had not been interviewed once on radio in the previous 12 months. In the case of the Orthodox rabbis (Haredi, Hardal, and modern Orthodox), there were no differences between appearances on radio and appearances in the secular press. Notwithstanding that non-Orthodox rabbis are inclined to complain that they are mostly shunned by the mainstream media – including public broadcasting – this reflects the small number of non-Orthodox rabbis inside Israel and the much larger number of Orthodox rabbis. But statistically, with a limited number of media outlets in Israel, only a small number of the many Orthodox rabbis appear. In the case of television appearances, 81% of all categories of rabbis – apart from the Reform (63%) – reported not having been interviewed or quoted once on television over the previous 12 months. And in terms of their appearances in the secular press itself, older rabbis scored higher. Seventy-eight per cent of those born after 1980 had not been interviewed or quoted once in the previous 12 months, as opposed to 59% and 47% of those born in 1960–1979 and 1940–1959, respectively. The same was true for secular radio: 87% of those born after 1980 had not been quoted or interviewed on secular radio over the previous 12 months, in contrast to 70% born in 1940–1959 and 65% born in 1960–1979. Similarly, 88% of those born after 1980 reported that they had not been interviewed or quoted on television in the previous 12 months, in contrast to 76% and 70% of those born in 1960–1979 and 1940–1959, respectively.

Gathering the news 75 In the case of the religious media, one might have expected a greater interest in interviewing rabbis, but there was no significant increase in the number of times rabbis had appearances in the religious media compared to the secular media: 66% reported that they had not been quoted in the religious media even once in the previous 12 months, 13% had once, and 9% three to six times. This was even truer on religious radio: 85% had not been interviewed or quoted once, 14% once, and 8% three to six times. In the case of the religious media, there was a noteworthy difference between Haredi rabbis and the other four categories (Hardal, mainstream modern Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform). Religious media may be broken down between the religious press and the religious radio stations. Seventy-three per cent of Hardal and 66% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis had not been quoted or interviewed once in the previous 12 months in the religious press, in contrast to only 47% of Haredi rabbis. This reflected that much of the religious press was in fact Haredi-oriented – and comprised four daily Haredi papers, two Haredi weekly magazines, and a range of Haredi magazines – which seek by definition to distance themselves from secular Israeli mainstream society. Indeed, under the “religious media” category were also a few modern Orthodox- or Hardal-oriented publications. A similar trend was found with religious radio – which comprised two important Haredi radio stations, Radio Kol Chai and Radio Kol Berama. Sixty per cent of mainline modern Orthodox and 68% of Hardal rabbis reported not having been quoted or interviewed in the previous 12 months on religious radio. (Indeed, even 58% of Haredi rabbis also said so.) Eighty-nine per cent and 84% of Reform and Conservative rabbis said so. Given the delegitimisation of non-Orthodox Judaism by the Orthodox establishment inside Israel, it was not surprising that Conservative and Reform rabbis were not quoted or interviewed in the religious press. Seventy-eight per cent and 85% of Reform and Conservative rabbis, respectively, reported not being quoted or interviewed in the religious press over the previous 12 months. This was also true in the religious media: 81% of those rabbis born after 1980 said that they had not been interviewed or quoted in the religious press over the last 12 months, in contrast to 56% of those born in 1940–1959 (53%) or 1960–1979 (56%). Similarly, 85% of those born after 1980 had not been quoted or interviewed once on religious radio, in contrast to 55% of those born in 1960–1979 and 64% of those born in 1940–1959. While it is true that more older rabbis appearing or being quoted could well reflect their seniority and being longer in the business, it is difficult to say this about contributing articles – which is more the initiative of the rabbi himself than an editor. Yet another means of appearing in the press than being quoted or interviewed was to write a press article or op-ed blog, such as a comment on the weekly Bible reading or about a halakhic (Jewish religious law) issue. But 79% of rabbis had not written once in the previous 12 months in the secular press, 10% had done so once, and 4% had done so three to six times. This was surprisingly also true in the religious press, where otherwise one might have expected that the religious press would be open to rabbis’ appearances: 75% had not written once in the religious press in the previous 12 months, 11% had done so, and 5% more than once.

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Non-Orthodox rabbis were more inclined than Orthodox rabbis – Haredi, Hardal, and mainstream modern Orthodox – to appear in the secular press. Fifty-two per cent and 61% of Reform and Conservative rabbis, respectively, reported not having written once in the last 12 months. In part, the appearance of Orthodox rabbis in the secular press also reflected that the secular press were more inclined to turn to Orthodox rabbis than non-Orthodox rabbis for a “rabbinical view” of the news, given that the former is the dominant branch of Israeli Judaism. Yet Orthodox rabbis fared little better in the religious press: 70–74% of rabbis of all three Orthodox streams (Haredi, mainstream modern Orthodox, Hardal) reported not having an article in the religious press in the last 12 months. This suggests that rabbis, notwithstanding their aspirations to spread Torah, failed to try this media channel. Less surprising was that the non-Orthodox streams (94% Conservative and 74% Reform) reported not having once written for the religious press (which, with the exception of a few modern Orthodox media [including the Makor Rishon newspaper], has a closed-door approach to anybody not Orthodox). But there was no clear pattern to draw conclusions. It was hypothesised that Israeli-born rabbis might have benefitted from mastery of the Hebrew language over those who immigrated as adults to Israel. Indeed, 70% of Israel-born rabbis were less inclined to say that they had not written an article in the religious press than the other non-Israel-born groups of rabbis (78–87%). However, this was not the case with writing an article in the secular press: 57% of Eastern European rabbis, 61% of those born in Arab countries, and 63% of Israeli-born rabbis had not written an article in the secular press. Regarding being quoted in the secular press, Eastern European rabbis and rabbis born in Arab countries were more inclined to say they had not been quoted once in the last 12 months. Yet 22% of Eastern European rabbis were more inclined to have had three to six interviews than rabbis in the other three categories of rabbis (6–7%). But in secular radio, Eastern European rabbis (61%) were less inclined to report than the other three other groupings (Israeli, Anglo-Saxon, and Arab) (72–74%) that they had not been interviewed or quoted once in the media. How do journalists perceive the rabbis as source-participants?

While rabbis themselves by and large agreed that they should be quoted, a third of the reporters did not. While 14% and 16% of reporters surveyed by the author agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent, respectively, that it was desirable that rabbis be quoted in the media, and an additional 35% agreed to some extent, only 24% agreed to a limited extent and 10% did not agree at all. There was an incremental difference according to the type of medium. Journalists working in national newspapers and radio stations surveyed by the authors were incrementally inclined to give greater importance than those journalists working for internet websites and even more in TV for rabbis to be

Gathering the news 77 quoted. Fifteen per cent and 11% of newspaper journalists and 8% and 32% of radio journalists very much agreed or much agreed (and an additional 33% of newspaper journalists and 42% of radio journalists agreed to a certain extent). Eight per cent and 25% of journalists working on the internet and 5% and 19% of television journalists very much agreed or much agreed, respectively. Rather 45% of internet journalists and 40% of television journalists agreed to a certain extent. Personal religiosity influenced the reporter’s professional evaluation of rabbis to be quoted. The more religious the journalist, the more inclined he or she was to give greater importance to rabbis being quoted, and the more secular the journalist, the less inclined he or she was. Thirty-three per cent and 16% of journalists who said they were religious (Orthodox) very much agreed and much agreed that it was important for rabbis to be quoted, and 10% and 30% of reporters describing themselves as traditional did so, respectively. Only 8% and 10% of secular journalists said so. In contrast, 33% and 12% of secular journalists only slightly agreed or did not agree at all with the statement, in comparison to 13% and 7% of religious journalists, respectively (and 20% and 7% traditional journalists, respectively). And those who worked in a religious workplace were more inclined to agree: 44% and 16% of reporters who worked in religious media agreed to a very great extent or a great extent, more than those who did not work in a religious environment – 9% and 16%, respectively. There was no difference in terms of gender or Ashkenazi/ Sephardi affiliation. There is an incremental variance between the type of medium regarding whether religion coverage portrays rabbis and religious institutions in a positive light. For example, 23% and 37% of television reporters disagreed or slightly agreed (and a further 33% agreed to a certain degree). Only 5% and 2% agreed to a great extent or a very great extent. Nor was there a significant difference between how long the TV journalists had worked in the profession. There was a significant difference in terms of the professional religiosity of the journalist: 21% and 38% of secular journalists disagreed completely or agreed only a little that religion coverage portrays rabbis and religious institutions in a positive light, in contrast to religion journalists, 60% and 31% of whom disagreed completely or agreed only a little, respectively (traditional journalists, 17% and 40%, respectively). Similarly, 72% and 12% of journalists who worked in a religious workplace disagreed completely or agreed only a little, in contrast to 24% and 39%, respectively, of those who worked in a nonreligious workplace. There was no difference in terms of gender or Ashkenazi/ Sephardi affiliation. Correspondents who cover or covered religions were broadly satisfied with their contact with sources. There were no significant differences from type of news medium. In terms of religiosity, reporters who had reported on religion and were religious were more inclined to say contacts were very good, in contrast to

78 Gathering the news journalists who were secular. Fifty-six per cent and 25% of journalists who were religious described their contacts with religious news sources as very good or good, respectively, as well as 12.5% who rated their contacts as mediocre, in contrast to 29% and 58% of secular journalists who had covered religion, who said their contacts with religious news sources was very good and good, respectively, as well as 12.5% mediocre. In terms of journalists in a religious workplace, there was a major difference in assessing contacts: 27% and 56% of journalists not from a religious workplace said the contacts with religious sources were very good and good, respectively, and 15% said they were mediocre and 2% not so good. In contrast, 50% and 42% of those from a religious workplace said their contacts with religious news sources were very good and good, respectively, and a further 8% said these were mediocre. In assessing whether reporters were knowledgeable or not about religious matters, there were certain differences between those who received no or few press releases and those who said they received a lot. Those who also received a lot of press releases were not inclined to be critical of reporters’ knowledge of religion. Forty-two per cent and 42% of reporters who said they received a lot of press releases agreed only a little or to a certain extent that reporters’ knowledge of religion was good, whereas 20% and 7% of reporters who reported receiving no press releases seldom agreed or agreed only a little that reporters were knowledgeable about religion. There was little significant difference between how reporters gauged the newsworthiness of religion and whether they said that they received no, or a few, or a lot of press releases: 29% of those who gave religion a low news value irrespective of whether they received none or a lot of press releases, and 37% gave religion a high news value irrespective of whether they received no press releases or a lot. In conclusion, in attitudinal terms, there are differences between rabbis’ attitudes to public relations and actual practice. In attitudinal terms, Haredi rabbis scored highly in rating the importance of PR compared to rabbis from other streams, even though Haredi rabbis live in cultural ghettos and Jewish life for them is focused on the synagogue and Torah learning. Reaching beyond the pulpit was also important for the more intensive form of modern Orthodoxy, Hardal. In contrast, it was surprising that PR among the non-Orthodox rabbis – notwithstanding that their arena of religious outreach was towards secular Israel – was rated lower. But the actual appearance of rabbis in the media is less. Older rabbis were more successful in being quoted and interviewed than younger rabbis, even though the latter replied they gave more importance to PR. It reflected that the older, wellestablished rabbi was more senior and better known in the public eye. In part it also reflects more generally the public’s perception – whether true or false – that the authoritarian-type rabbinical personality is unsuitable for the one-on-one dialogue that characterises reporter–source relations in modern mass media. This is exacerbated by a lack of pastoral training for rabbis in Israel so far, which has failed to provide rabbis with experience in using modern means of communications, such as appearing on camera. In order to fill a gap, the Chief Rabbinate initiated in 2011 a series of workshops for rabbis on the state payroll under the heading of

Gathering the news 79 communication; amongst the topics were media technology, including responding to Jewish law questions via e-mail and Facebook. So do rabbis feel they are successful or not in conveying their message? Rabbis are not inclined to see themselves as to blame for the media covering religion inaccurately: 42% and 23% of Reform rabbis, 21% and 29% of Conservative rabbis, and 30% and 24% of Haredi rabbis do not agree at all or agreed only to a small degree that this is true. Modern Orthodox rabbis – both mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis and Hardal rabbis – were more inclined than other streams to agree that rabbis do not succeed in explaining their views. Thus, 27% and 24% of the Hardal and modern Orthodox mainstream agree to a great extent that rabbis failed to explain themselves, in contrast to 7% of the Reform, 17% of the Conservative, and 11% of the Haredi rabbis. In terms of places of birth of all rabbis, Western rabbis were not inclined to put the blame for any failure to explain themselves on rabbis themselves: 27% and 29% of Western-born rabbis disagreed completely or only agreed to a limited extent, and a further 29% agreed to some what extent that rabbis were to blame for their failure to explain themselves. In contrast, only 22% and 17% of Eastern European rabbis and 18% and 28% of Israeli-born rabbis did not agree at all or agreed to a small extent, respectively, that rabbis were to blame for failing to explain themselves. Older rabbis (born in 1940–1958) are slightly more inclined than younger rabbis to agree that rabbis are to blame for the media inaccuracies. Yet public relations is a two-way relationship, and rabbis are little sought after by the general media in Israel. This reflects the view that rabbis are not important sources of information for the media. Also, while in some countries, such as the United States, clergy are looked to for a comment on news developments of the day, this is less true in the Israeli case. But the relationship between the media and rabbis is complicated further because the journalistic community, in contrast to the hierarchical structure of the rabbi–community relationship, has a tradition of campaigning against those in power – under the banner of the public’s right to know – including the obligation of rabbis and religious structures to be accountable to the public. Religious authority and Israeli journalists

Israeli journalists’ trust in rabbis is at best average (Cohen, 2021). According to the Worlds of Journalism Project (2019), trust by Israeli journalists in religious leaders was inclined towards the low side of 2.13 (2 [little trust], 3 [some trust]). Compared to other countries in this study, for example, Israeli journalists are not dissimilar from Turkish journalists’ trust in religious authority (2.06). The extent to which Israeli journalists took into account religious considerations in their work was also 2.13 (3 [somewhat important], 2 [less important]), not dissimilar from journalists in South Korea (2.18) and Turkey (2.28) but much higher than journalists in Western Europe. By comparison, in Islamic countries, according to the Worlds of Journalism Project (2019), journalists’ trust in religious leaders is high – ranging between 3 (some trust) to 4 (a great deal of trust). Thus, journalists in the UAE rated their trust in

80 Gathering the news religious leaders as 3.65, Malaysia 3.50, Indonesia 3.20, and Oman 3.04. But Turkey was much less, 2.28 (2 [little influence], 3 [somewhat influential]). The extent to which religious considerations are important for journalists in Muslim countries is high. This ranges from a mean of 3.38 in the UAE to 3.72 in Malaysia and 3.02 in Indonesia. 79.4% of journalists in Bangladesh, 54.9% in Turkey and 52.4% in Malaysia reported being Muslim. In Indonesia 87.5% of journalists reported that their religious beliefs were extremely important and very important, as did 77% of journalists in Malaysia, 63.9% in the UAE, 54.6% in Bangladesh, and 42% in Turkey. In contrast to many Islamic countries, Israel appears to be in between religiosity and secularism. On the one hand, in the Jewish state, there is much Jewish symbolism. But as a secular democratic state which identifies with the West, individual religious Orthodox communities seek to preserve their own religious identity. The overall impact worldwide of religious clerics upon journalists, according to the Worlds of Journalism Project (2019), was nevertheless low: 1.92 on a rating of 1–5. It contrasted with journalists’ rating of the impact upon them from news sources (3.63); from media laws (3.12); from friends, acquaintances, and family (2.03); from government officials (2.22); from politicians (2.18); and from business people (2.11). Again, the impact of religious leaders was felt less upon religious reporters from Western countries. In Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the USA, Portugal, and Spain, it was as low as 1.33, 1.36, 1.42, 1.67, 1.72, and 1.73, respectively, in contrast to Indonesia (2.94), Pakistan (2.85), Egypt (2.73), Uganda (2.66), and Chile (2.39). In contrast to Western countries, the figures for Israel, however, were noticeably higher. Religion reporters – like some other specialisms that show less deference to authority – seek that religious leaders be held accountable. Thus, journalists’ level of trust in religious leaders was lower in Western countries – for example, 2.11 in Switzerland and 2.09 in Greece – compared to some traditionally religious, nonWestern countries, including Muslim countries like Indonesia (3.32) and Egypt (2.85) and strongly religious ones like Uganda (3.65) and Chile (3.15) (Worlds of Journalism Project, 2019). The religious media as a journalist’s information source In addition to maintaining sources of information, official and otherwise, and seeing communiques, another source of information is the media itself. Thus, the Haredi media is a source of information for the reporter from the general media. Like the media in a closed country – for example, the communist media – the official Haredi institutional media alludes to whoever is in or out, in the eyes of the institution of which publishes the media, but seeing the media is also a means for a reporter to see what else is being published which he or she has not reported – since editors will also see the media. In addition to gathering religion-related news from mainstream secular news, they also see news from the religion media – print, broadcast, and the internet. Thirty-two per cent of journalists surveyed by the author read a religious newspaper. Only 22% listen to religious radio, and a similar number, 23%, surf religious

Gathering the news 81 websites. Reading religious newspapers may be measured in terms of the type of medium journalists work in – daily newspaper, radio, TV, internet – and in terms of the journalists’ own religiosity. There is a greater inclination for journalists to see religious media of the same type of media they work in. Forty per cent of those who work for a national newspaper were inclined to read religious print media, as opposed to only 19% to listen to religious radio or 23% to surf websites. And of those who work on the internet, 36% surf religious internet websites, in contrast to 26% of those who work in religious print media and 24% in religious radio. Similarly, 41% of those who work in radio listened to religious radio, in contrast to 28% of those who work for religious websites. However, 50% of those working in radio did look at religious print media. There was no causal relationship between the level of following media and whether journalists were satisfied with the volume of religious coverage in the secular media. Thus, 40% of those who said the coverage of religion news, in quantitative terms, was bad or not good reported reading religion news a lot or all the time, as distinct from 30% and 29% of those who responded they never or only occasionally consume religion news. Nor was there a correlation between the level of following the media and what they thought about the religious dailies’ coverage quantitatively. Thus, 22% and 35% of those who said religion dailies’ coverage was quantitatively good or excellent, respectively, replied that they did not follow religion news, in contrast to 36% who consumed religion news all the time and who said that coverage was good or excellent. Religiosity is undoubtedly a factor. Journalists who defined themselves as modern Orthodox were more inclined to see religious media, irrespective of whether they themselves were necessarily working in a religious news organisation, than those who defined themselves as traditional, Reform or Conservative, or nonreligious, and those who defined themselves as traditional were more inclined to read religious media than those who defined themselves as either Reform or Conservative or non-religious. Eighty-two per cent of journalists who defined themselves as religious read religious newspapers, 52% listened to religious radio, and 61% surfed religious websites. In contrast, 33%, 10%, and 17% of reporters who defined themselves as traditional read religious newspapers, surfed religious websites, or listened to religious radio, respectively. And 16%, 12%, and 14% of journalists who described themselves as non-religious read religious newspapers, surfed religious websites, or listened to religious radio. In terms of belief in God, 56% of journalists who much believed in God read religious newspapers. This dropped significantly with a more qualified definition of the belief. Even among those who much believed in God, less than a quarter (24%) read religious newspapers, as did 23% who said they believed in God, and only 8% and 7% of those who did not believe in God or believed in God to a low degree read religious newspapers. In terms of education, those journalists who had a modern Orthodox (55%) or ultra-Orthodox (88%) elementary school education read religious newspapers, as

82 Gathering the news opposed to 23% of those educated in the state secular school system. Given Haredi reservations regarding the internet, an examination of websites was slightly different: 45% and 38% of those journalists educated in the state religious system or Haredi schools, respectively, surfed religious websites. And 64%, 47%, 51%, and 39% of journalists those who studied in yeshivot or had Jewish studies in university read religious newspapers or surfed Jewish religious websites, respectively. There are more “background” matters drawing journalists with a general Jewish identity to have an interest in Jewish matters, including viewing or listening to programmes on Judaism, possession of Jewish books, or even Jewish music. An overwhelming number of journalists – 75% – never or infrequently watch religious programmes, while 17% do so sometimes. Only 6% do so mostly or always. This is similar regarding listening to religious music: 74% never did or did so infrequently, 12% did listen, and only 12% did so much of or all the time. Finally, 37% possessed very many or many books on Judaism, 30% had none or a few, and 30% reported possessing Jewish books. Forty-six per cent of journalists who covered or had covered religion stories reported a very high or high interest in the subject, and 39% had mediocre interest. The longer they covered religion, the greater the interest they had, and the level of interest varied between if the news organisation was religious or not in a nuanced manner. Thus, 71% of journalists working in a religious workplace reported very high interest and 31% had high interest, whereas in non-religious workplaces, 7% reported very high interest, but 30% reported high interest and 46% reported medium interest. Exposure to the media is a way to follow events in the religious world. The media influence journalists’ understanding of religion. Yet this is clearly not overwhelming: 44% of journalists said this never happened or happened infrequently, and 19% reported this happened much or very much. However, a third said this happened to some extent. Yet the key question, whether consuming religious news influences understanding, remains qualified. Of the 34% who replied that they consume religion news to some extent, 46% replied it influenced their understanding of matters in the religious world and 20% said it even influenced their understanding to a great extent or very great extent. But 45% said they never did or did so infrequently, and even those who said they consumed a lot of religion news were overall not influenced greatly in understanding what was happening: 22% said they were influenced to some extent, and 53% said it had no influence ever or had influence infrequently. There was a high level of interest within news organisations in news about religion: 84% of journalists said they had very great interest or great interest, 13% had medium interest, and only 4% had no interest or little interest. When broken down between a news organisation’s editors and reporters, there was little difference: 43% of reporters said they had very high interest or high interest (editors 41%) in religion, and 40% of reporters said there was some interest (editors 47%). So despite the pressure for space felt at the editor/gathering level on the one hand, and the reporter’s natural interest in his or her story, this does not express itself

Gathering the news 83 in the data – and, as in the ideal theoretical model, there was a consensus between the reporter and editor roles. Rabbinical scandals The Galtung and Ruge (1965) criterion of “elites” being a criterion of news is present in religion news, less in terms of interest in hierarchical figures in religious institutions but more in terms of scandals, such as sexual scandals involving religious clerics fallen from grace. There is a certain glee and satisfaction among both audiences and reporters to see those who claim to be holier than thou failing to live up to their religious vows. Like in other countries and religions – including the Roman Catholic sexual scandals – there have been a number of sexual scandals in Israel involving rabbis or other religious figures and sexual impropriety which were broken by journalists. Yehuda Schlesinger disclosed the affair of Rabbi Eliezer Berlander, an Orthodox rabbi who heads a Breslev yeshiva, Shuvu Bonim, who was later convicted of sex- related offences; two months after the disclosure by the Israel Hayom newspaper, the police had opened an inquiry. Yair Sherki disclosed on the Second Television channel that that Rabbi Steinberg had been dismissed from his job following sexual harassment. The case of Rabbi Motti Elon, of Yeshivas Hakotel, whose charismatic personality attracted thousands to his shiurim (religious lessons), who sexually harassed some of his male students, was investigated by a closed forum opposite Rabbi Elon. But the proceedings were subsequently disclosed by an Israel television First TV channel reporter, Roi Sharon. Aaron Rabinowitz of Haaretz disclosed the case of Haim Walder, a well-known Haredi story writer who had sexually harassed others. Reporting sexual scandals in the Haredi world – the case of Haaretz and the Zahav and Walder affairs

In 2021 the quality Israeli daily Haaretz published two exposes about two figures in the Haredi community, Haim Walder and Yehuda Meshi Zahav, in March and December 2021, regarding sexually assaulting children and youth. Walder was a well-known writer of children’s books in the Haredi world, and Yehuda Meshi Zahav headed ZAKA, a search and rescue organisation. He was a candidate for the prestigious Israel Prize in 2022 – subsequently withdrawn after the Haaretz expose. The Haaretz exposes were led by Aaron Rabinowitz, Haaretz’s reporter for Haredi affairs, and which a freelance graphic artist, Shira Alek, who had been researching exposing sexual intimidation in the Haredi community, joined. Alek was formally a Haredi Jewess. Both of the exposes started on page 1 and ran inside to a couple of pages featuring interviews with victims. Following the expose, Walder committed suicide – causing a minor earthquake in the Haredi community. The novelist was widely read both within and even outside the Haredi community. After

84 Gathering the news Rabinowitz disclosed the news about him, Meshi Zahav tried to commit suicide – and died later in hospital. Both Rabinowitz and Alek had each heard about these rumours about Meshi Zahav independently, but it was impossible to prove because most people were not prepared to discuss the issue – partly out of fear of any violent reactions from Meshi Zahav, who was regarded as dangerous. For example, an earlier investigation into Meshi Zahav by the Israel police – with which Meshi Zahav had ties – was mysteriously shelved. When asked by Rabinowitz, people denied being victims but did say “they knew of others who had been attacked.” “I went from person to person until a man today in his sixties had the strength of heart to speak. We fixed a place to speak. I got there. There was a message to go to another place to meet. He was terrified that Meshi Zahav had sent me. He was the first person to speak,” said Rabinowitz. Finally, Rabinowitz got a clue, a women’s religious educational college in Jerusalem. When he located it, he began to speak to people. While Rabinowitz was researching the story, there was a real fear that Meshi Zahav might try to reach the victims, but in practice there were no threats. Alek had known of Haredi sexual victims, and when she and Rabinowitz got together to write the story, which each had been researching independently for many months, they had a solid database. “The story of the intimidation runs within me. There was a need to talk about it. I sat with friends who told me about the assaults. Until now people were committed from coming out and talking about being the target of these attacks. After all, this would hamper the shidduch [an arranged marriage – a feature of Haredi society]. But after the expose about Meshi Zahav, people began to come out to talk about it,” she said. The Walder case in particular caused an earthquake within the Haredi world. In contrast, Meshi Zahav was a person more known to the wider secular Israeli population. When the Walder expose was published, the shock was so intense, even rabbis who headed yeshivot did not have the public fallout which Walder’s news caused. Parents were asked about the case by their children. The case was discussed in synagogues. “Every Haredi home had to face the dilemma whether to throw Walder’s books out of the home or to leave them,” said Afek. But the Haredi media failed to cover it in any detail. The institutional dailies, beyond reporting the deaths, failed to discuss it, and there was even a sense of self-denial. This was mostly also true with among the independent Hebrew media – which might otherwise have given a sense of leadership among its readers. Indeed, while the Haredi news websites, like Kikar Shabbat and B’Hadrei Haredim, had in the past reported and discussed the subject of sexual intimidation in past years, these were now introspective on the subject. There was an attempt to persuade Rabinowitz with money not to publish the story. “Somebody offered me money if I dropped the story. Not the first time that I am offered money – in some cases going into hundreds of thousands of shekels. I updated my editors,” Rabinowitz said. “In the second case, the Walder case, I tried to reach Walder with the allegations. At first he agreed. And then changed his mind.

Gathering the news 85 Walder’s wife, whom I turned to, denied all and asked me to delay publication a little,” he said. Rabinowitz and Alek themselves were themselves in some state of shock in the hours following the Walder suicide. Did they feel any sense of guilt that their expose had been responsible for his death? “We sat together after the news came out. We would have preferred that the two be in gaol,” remarked Afek. “People came to us to comfort us, but for what? We were not responsible,” said Rabinowitz. “I am Haredi. I love Haredi society. My goal in my journalistic work is to repair, and I see this as a great merit – to repair.” Alek’s family, who are Haredi, blamed her for causing a hilul hashem (lit. a desecration of God’s name) for hanging the “dirty washing” out in public. “I am divorced but I use my married name. My ex-husband’s family asked me not to use the name any longer,” she said (TikTok, 2022). Should immoral deeds by rabbis be reported in the media?

Forty-nine per cent and 30% of journalists very much agreed or much agreed that scandals involving rabbis should be published in the general media. And a further 29% agreed. So only 4% and 5% disagreed completely or agreed only slightly, respectively. There appears to be some difference between news media regarding whether they think that unethical accounts of rabbis should be published. Sixty per cent and 29% of journalists working with the internet very much agreed or largely agreed that the publication should be done. Fifty-eight per cent and 30% of TV journalists said that they very much agreed or largely agreed that publication of a rabbi’s unethical behaviour should be done, in contrast to 50% and 27% of those working on a national non-religious newspaper, 46% and 32% of those working in radio, and 43% and 39% who work in a magazine. Most interesting was slightly higher support for such content to be published in religious media. One might assume religious media, as part of the community, would mostly avoid should avoid such exposure, unlike general media. Yet 63% of journalists very much agreed that rabbinical scandals should be published in religious media, compared to 49% of journalists who very much agreed that it should be published in secular media. And 21% largely agreed that it should be published in general media that it should be published in religious media in contrast to 30% who said so. There was a greater inclination of those working in religious media over non-religious media to favour publicity: 59% and 26% of those working in religious radio said they very much agreed or much agreed that unethical behaviour of rabbis should be published. Similarly, 62% and 18% of those working in religious national newspapers very much agreed or much agreed that they should be published. There was no significant difference among journalists who disagreed or a slightly disagreed whether it should be published in secular media and religious media. There was no consensus between rabbis whether such information should be published: Haredi rabbis opposed most and non-Orthodox rabbis favoured most. Within the modern Orthodoxy, the mainstream modern Orthodox favoured exposure incrementally more than the Hardal. All rabbis thought that it was less

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desirable that such disclosure be done in religious – or community – media than in general media. While rabbis feared that such information would cause a hilul hashem, they did acknowledge that it had a deterring effect on other rabbis. Only the non-Orthodox rabbis were proximate in the journalistic perception: 52% and 30% of non-Orthodox rabbis, in the author’s survey of rabbis, very much agreed or much agreed that information on unethical behaviour by rabbis should be published in the media. (A further 13% agreed to a certain extent.) Both modern Orthodox and Haredi rabbis were far from this view: 58% of Haredi rabbis did not agree at all that the information should be published in the media, and 14% agreed to a small degree. Yet 17% did agree to a certain extent. Only 9% and 7% of Haredi rabbis much agreed or very much agreed. While the modern Orthodox were at a distance from the journalists, they were equally at a distance from the Haredim: 12% and 22% of modern Orthodox rabbis very much agreed or much agreed, and 25% agreed that unethical behaviour by rabbis should be published – 25% agreed to a small degree, and 17% opposed it. Should rabbi-related immoral deeds be published or not be published in the religious media?

A distinction may be drawn by rabbis whether to publish scandals about rabbis in religious media – which by definition are published inside their communities – and the broader general media, given that families and children are exposed to the former. Indeed, no difference was shown among Haredi rabbis whether the information should be published in either the religious community media or in the wider general media. However, significant differences between the two media are drawn among modern Orthodox rabbis and non-Orthodox rabbis, Conservative and Reform. Both groups – Orthodox and non-Orthodox – drew a clear distinction between information about rabbinical scandals being published in secular media and in religious media. Seventeen per cent of modern Orthodox rabbis opposed it being published in general media; moreover, 33% of these rabbis opposed it being published in religious media. Furthermore, 50% of non-Orthodox rabbis opposed it being published in religious media, compared to 5% who opposed its publication in secular media, and a further 7% opposed to a small degree its publication in religious media. Hilul hashem

To what extent does the publication cast a hilul hashem (lit. “a desecration of God’s name”) or a stain on the religious community as a whole? Twenty-seven per cent and 22% of modern Orthodox rabbis very much agreed and much agreed, as did 31% and 17% of non-Orthodox rabbis, respectively. Haredi rabbis showed the opposing trend: 40% very much agreed, but 32% did not agree at all. Only 27% filled all three middle categories (agree to a small degree, agree, very much agree). Journalists were no less inclined to agree: 52% (33% and 19%) agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent, respectively, that it gives a bad name to the

Gathering the news 87 entire religious community, and a further 20% agreed. Only 27% (20% to a small degree and 14% to no degree) were inclined not to agree but prepared to pay the price for the publicity. The public also agreed, if less so: 46% agreed (26% to a very great degree and 22% to a great degree), and 19% agreed to a certain disagree. Only a third (17%) did not agree at all, and 17% agreed to a small degree. Did it cause a stain or reflect badly on the entire community? Fifty-three per cent of journalists also agreed to a very great degree or to a great degree. There is also a considerable difference. Only 7% and 21% of journalists working in television very much agreed or much agreed that this reflects badly on the religious community, 41% disagreed, and 14% only slightly disagreed. Among radio journalists, 25% and 34% very much agreed or much agreed, as opposed to 23% and 8% who disagreed or slightly disagreed, respectively. Twenty-five per cent and 24% of national newspaper journalists very much agreed or largely agreed, yet 24% and 11% disagreed or slightly disagreed. Twenty-five per cent and 24% of journalists on national newspapers which are religious very much agreed or much agreed, while 25% and 34% of those working in religious radio very much agreed or much agreed, in contrast to 23% and 8% who disagreed or slightly agreed. Does media publicity deter rabbis from such behaviour?

Sixty-two per cent of Haredi rabbis and 63% of modern Orthodox rabbis did say that publicity deters such behaviour. Forty-four per cent of Haredi rabbis agreed to a very great degree, and only 37% of modern Orthodox said so, while 27% of modern Orthodox rabbis agreed a great degree and only 18% of Haredi rabbis said so. (Similarly, 14% of modern Orthodox and 12% of Haredi rabbis agreed.) The big difference was with the non-Orthodox: only 16% agreed to a very great degree, while 26% and 22% of Haredi rabbis and modern Orthodox rabbis, respectively, did not agree at all or agreed only a little. Thirty-eight per cent of non-Orthodox rabbis did not agree at all or only agreed a little. Hardal versus mainstream modern Orthodox

Whereas 15% and 31% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis very much agreed or much agreed that general media should publish unethical behaviour by rabbis, only 6% and 8% of Hardal rabbis agreed. However, there was a greater consensus between the Hardal and the mainstream modern Orthodox in the question of religious media. Thus, 38% and 14% (a total of 52%) of mainstream modern Orthodox did not agree or agreed only a little with publishing in the religious media unethical behaviour of rabbis, as did 27% and 39% of Hardal rabbis. Hardal rabbis were less inclined than mainstream Orthodox rabbis to say that God’s name was desecrated. Thus, 58% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis very much agreed or much agreed that publishing unethical behaviour by rabbis desecrated God’s name, in contrast to only 24% and 11% of Hardal rabbis, respectively. Forty-two per cent of mainstream modern Orthodox said the same. This suggests that the mainstream modern Orthodox are part and parcel of the modern

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world and less withdrawn than the Hardal and thus more self-conscious about their image and more single-minded in not compromising their values. But on the question of whether publicity deters such behaviour, there is greater agreement between the two streams: 60% of Hardal and 66% of mainstream modern Orthodox agreed that publicity deters such behaviour to a very great extent or to a great extent. In contrast to non-Orthodox rabbis, 53% of journalists also agreed to a very great degree or to a great degree. A further 13% of journalists agreed to a certain extent. Fifty-two per cent of the Israeli Jewish public agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent, yet a further 21% of Israeli public agreed to a certain extent. Rabbinical scandals and the media Breakdown of rabbis by profession

In terms of breakdown of community rabbis or teaching rabbis in school or yeshivot, or avrech, who studies full-time, there is considerable difference: 81% of avrechim and 75% teaching rabbis very much agreed or agreed that unethical behaviour reported in the media causes a stain on the entire religious community, as opposed to 57% of community rabbis. And 31% of community rabbis did not agree at all or were not inclined to agree, in contrast to 8% of the avrechim and 18% of the teaching rabbis. Do fears of publicity deter the individual rabbi? Seventy-three per cent of community rabbis agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent. A further 13% had no opinion. In contrast, 61% of teaching rabbis agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent (a further 16% had no opinion), and 38% of avrechim agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent (13% had no view). Breakdown of rabbis by gender

Female non-Orthodox rabbis (22 respondents) were less inclined than male rabbis (311 respondents) to agree that a stain fell on the entire community from the publicity of a rabbi’s failings. Thus, 52% of female rabbis did not agree at all or were not inclined to agree that reporting of unethical behaviour of a rabbi stained the entire community, in contrast to 19% of male rabbis. And would the publicity deter such a behaviour, according to women rabbis? Slightly more women rabbis (80%) agreed or were inclined to agree, as opposed to 60% of male rabbis. Breakdown of rabbis by country of birth

In terms of breakdown between country of birth – between those born in Israel, in Western Europe (Anglo-Saxon), in Eastern Europe, and in Asian/Arab countries – there is a clear difference between these four groups and whether or not they favour publicity: the Israeli-born and Anglo-Saxon rabbis favour publicity much more than the Eastern European and Sephardi rabbis. Thus, 39% and 26%

Gathering the news 89 of Anglo-Saxon rabbis of all streams favoured publicising rabbinical scandals to a very great extent or to a great extent, as well as 11% and 19% of Israeli-born rabbis, in contrast to 10% and 19% of Eastern European rabbis and 0% and 6% Asian-Sephardi rabbis. Israeli rabbis are not very dissimilar in their approach to the question of publicity in the religious media, while the Anglo-Saxon rabbis are far more discriminating. Thus, 23% of Israeli rabbis opposed a very great deal or a great deal publicising in religious media, in contrast to 0% and 16% of Anglo-Saxon rabbis, respectively. But on the question of whether the publicity damages the religious community as a whole, there is greater consensus about the damage in the eyes of Israeli-born rabbis. But on the question of deterring the rabbis, the Arab-Sephardi rabbis were less inclined agree to a very great extent or to a great extent (35%), in contrast to 52% of Anglo-Saxon rabbis, 68% of Eastern European rabbis, and 66% of Israeli rabbis. Breakdown of rabbis by age group

In terms of age groupings – rabbis born post-1940, post-1960, and post-1980 – and whether there was broad consensus overall on the questions of whether unethical behaviour should or should not be published in general and religious media, there were clearer differences between the age groupings, as well as whether it causes desecration of God’s name and whether such publicity deters rabbis as a whole. Thus, to the question of whether it desecrates God’s name, younger rabbis were less inclined than older rabbis to downplay it: 39% of rabbis born after 1980 were inclined to see it causes very great damage or great damage, as opposed to 50% of those born after 1960 and 68% of those born past 1940. On the other hand, the older the rabbi, the less inclined he or she was to say that such publicity would be a deterrent, while the younger rabbis were more inclined to think so. Thus, 67% of rabbis born post-1980 agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent, in contrast to 52% of rabbis born post-1940 and 58% of rabbis born post-1960. So overall there is a degree of consensus between rabbis, journalists, and the public about whether unethical conduct by rabbis should be published, whether it causes damage to the image of the religious community, and whether it deters scandalous behaviour. All agree about the damage – but both journalists and the public agree that this is the price for being in a democratic society, while for rabbis it is a matter not to publish – particularly in religious media. Afterword

A clue to the need for journalists to verify, without a doubt, rumours and the damage which can be caused to the person and his family is the case of Rabbi David Harrisberg, a Jerusalem educator. After one of his former female students complained that Harrisberg sexually harassed her, he was arrested, spent a night in gaol, and was brought to court chained. He was placed under house arrest. The story got to the magazine editor of the Israel Hayom newspaper. The newspaper’s

90 Gathering the news Yehuda Schlesinger covered the story as a magazine feature, as did other Israeli media. But before the state prosecutor prepared an indictment, the female student withdrew her complaint – a year after the original allegations were published. Schlesinger said, “I called Harrisberg and told him that I was responsible for the original expose and apologised to him, and wrote up a follow-up magazine piece.” Harrisberg replied to the reporter, “It is nice you called, no other journalists did so. They smeared my name. If you can write an article to clear my name . . .” Schlesinger wrote a second magazine piece, describing the torment Harrisberg and his family hand undergone in that year and his attempt to clear his name. The Ministry of Education called Harrisberg, offering to reinstate him. With his name cleared, Harrisberg thanked Schlesinger for this – and even invited Schlesinger to his daughter’s wedding! Conclusion The supply and demand in newsgathering and source–reporter relations in Western democracies is characterised by journalists seeking information and by sources seeking to put the best light upon the information reaching the public and is also relevant in looking at the Israeli context. The supply and demand equation is often not equal. Sources are themselves dependent in projecting policy upon whether something is newsworthy, and journalists are dependent upon whether sources are willing to speak. In the Israeli case, it was shown here that Israeli reporters are broadly satisfied with their access to religion information. State sources like the Chief Rabbinate have formal channels. Communiques and press releases are treated by reporters as having limited value. But if news sources wish that religion affairs reporters, who are often au fait with Jewish religious doctrine, would project religion per se, as distinct from state-religion conflict issues, and if the reporters express views that counters those held by the sources, then there is disappointment. Religion per se mostly does not meet criteria of news interest. Indeed, the Israeli public, it was shown, are qualified by the extent they want, or do not want, rabbis – who themselves are recognising the changing reality for communicating to the broader public – culminating in new media – to use channels outside the synagogue, like public media channels, to advance faith and spirituality. If Haredi sources themselves are not accessible to secular media, religion affairs writers and reporters have such alternative sources as Haredi parliamentarians, a lively Haredi independent and institutional media, and Haredi journalists themselves with whom journalists exchange tips and information. (Access of reporters in the Haredi media to Haredi sources will be discussed in Chapter 10.) Yet the fact that space in traditional media – print, TV, and radio – is limited has changed with unlimited virtual space in the new media so that the coverage is no longer about religion-state tensions but broader coverage about religion per se, including debates over doctrine itself. And there is even spillover of this from the new media to the traditional media in this respect.

Gathering the news 91 Bibliography Buddenbaum, J. (1988) The Religion Beat at Daily Newspapers. Newspaper Research Journal 9(4), Summer. Cohen, Y. (2018) The Religion Reporter. In Cohen, Y. (ed.), Spiritual News: Reporting Religion Around the World. New York: Peter Lang Publishers. Cohen, Y. (2021) Asian Mass Media: A Pillar of Religious Authority? In Zeiler, X., & Radde-Antweiler, K. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Religion and Journalism. New York & London: Routledge Publishers. Dart, J., & Allen, J. (1993) Bridging the Gap: Religion and the News Media. Nashville, TN: The Freedom Forum, 54. Ferre, J. (2000) Protestant Press Relations, 1930–1970. In Sloan, W. D. (ed.), Media and Religion in American History. Northport, AL: Vision Press. Folds, A. (2015) Spotlight on Muna Abdelfattah. International Association of Religion Journalists. www.theiarj.org/blog/2015/10/13/spotlight-on-muna-abdelfattah/ (retrieved 15/1/2017). Galtung, J., & Ruge, M. (1965) The Structure of Foreign News. International Journal of Peace Research 1. Gans, H. (1980) Deciding What’s News (Chapter 3). New York: Vintage Books, 78–115. Goldman, A. L. (1991) The Search for God at Harvard. New York: Random House: Times Books, 126–127. Greenwood, H. (2022) B’Sadot Hardal [Hebrew: In the Fields of Hardal]. Israel Hayom 18 November 2022. Hoover, S. (2006) Religion in the Media Age. London & New York: Routledge. Landau, C. (2012) What the Media Thinks about Religion: A Broadcast Perspective. In Mitchell, J., & Gower, O. (eds.), Religion in the News. Farnham: Ashgate, 83–84. Makor Rishon. (2021, October 22) Talking Media. Tik Tok, 2 May 2022 [Hebrew]. Siegal-Itzkovitch, J. (1982) Spying Out the Land. The Jerusalem Post. Jubilee Supplement, 1 December 1982. Winston, D., & Green, J. C. (2015) Most Americans Say Media Coverage of Religion Too Sensationalised. Los Angeles: USC Annenberg & the University of Akron. Woolley, P. (2012) A Relationship Worth Getting Right. In Mitchell, J., & Gower, O. (eds.), Religion in the News. Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 73. Worlds of Journalism Project. (2019). www.worldsofjournalism.org

5

Religion and the Israeli journalist A theological profile

Journalists in Israel play an important role in influencing the construction of the image of Judaism. Like other categories of news, religion information needs to be interesting – sensational and/or dramatic – or important in order to pass the gatekeepers and be defined as news. This presents a public image of religion which is distant from what rabbis – indeed Judaism itself – would wish. The gap between what is reported and what rabbis would like to be reported about Judaism draws attention to the reporters themselves and their attitudes to religion. In order to better understand the gap between reporters and rabbis, it is instructive to look at journalists’ views of religion. It is true that much of the religion reporting is done by a handful of specialist religion reporters – less than a dozen in the secular, non-religious media – but there are nevertheless also journalists in various positions, whether as editors or general reporters, who influence the newsgathering process and may have an influence. This is not to argue that journalists actively influence the news process according to their religious outlook: the selection of religion news, discussed in Chapter 3, is done by criteria of news values rather than the reporter’s agenda. Nevertheless, the consciousness of reporters – including on matters related to belief, spirituality, and organised religion – provides an amorphous background against which journalists function. Some of the questions discussed here concerning journalists are identical to surveys of the broader Israeli Jewish population – enabling comparisons between the journalistic community and the latter to be made. Theological beliefs According to the Worlds of Journalism Project, 2019, 22.2% of Israeli journalists said that their religion or religious beliefs are extremely important, another 7.5% said that they were very important, and 18.3% said they were important. However, 33% of Israeli journalists said religion or religious beliefs were unimportant, and 10.8% of Israeli journalists reported that they had no religious beliefs (Worlds of Journalism Project, 2019). The 47% of Israeli journalists who said religious beliefs were extremely important or very important or important contrasted with a higher rating in the US. Underwood, surveying journalists in North America, found that of 422 journalists DOI: 10.4324/9781315735184-5

Religion and the Israeli journalist 93 surveyed, 73% said that religion or spirituality was important or very important in their life, 14% were indifferent, and 13% said religion was not important in their life. This led Underwood to conclude that “it is important to recognise that today’s journalists may reflect a strong religious orientation in their professional value system while not universally acknowledging their religiosity or even liking the idea that religious ideas might be operating in their work life.” One should recognise the complicated manner in which “religion comingles with professional principles in the day to day operations of modern journalism” (Underwood, page 134, 147). More specifically, in terms of religious belief, 25% of all Israel reporters surveyed by the author did not believe in the existence of God, a further 8% did so only to a small degree, 13% believed in the existence of God to a certain extent, and 54% believed to a great extent or very great extent. Marginally fewer Israeli reporters were found to the question of belief in a supernatural force which moves the world. Fewer believed either to a great degree or very great degree (50%) or to a little degree (10%) in reward and punishment. However, 15% believed so to a certain degree. Far fewer (12%) believed that a failure to keep commandments endangered the entire Jewish people, but 72% did not agree. The question had wider implications given that journalists by nature believe strongly in such values as freedom of speech and are suspicious of any attempts to impose limits on freedom, including religious beliefs. More believed in the ideas that the Jews are the Chosen People – even though this reflected a value of certain lack of equality between the nations of the world – 47% believed or believed a lot or a great deal, and 42% did not believe (11% did so). Beliefs broken down by religiosity Fifty-four per cent of reporters defined themselves as secular (46% secular and not anti-religious, 8% secular and anti-religious), 13% as traditional, and 20% as religious (14% modern Orthodox, 6% Haredi). In order to deepen an understanding of the outlook of journalists on questions about religious belief – like the existence of God and the divine origin of halakha (Jewish religious law) – three key groups (non-religious, traditional, and religious) may be delineated – reflecting their own self-definition. This enables us to get a greater understanding of how reporters view religion – which may impact their behaviour as news gatherers and news processors. The largest group are secular in questions regarding belief, a slightly smaller religious group believe in these key attributes associated with Judaism, and a much smaller centrist or traditional group believe. The traditional group are, broadly speaking, believers in God’s existence but selective in their religious behaviour. Whereas the past discussions about secular–religious relations were divided between secular and religious surveys – in particular more recently – they have recognised large centrist blocks (35–40%) of Israeli Jews, neither secular nor religious but traditional. Indeed, the surveys of the Central Bureau of Statistics today divide participants into traditional-religious and traditional-secular.

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Slightly more journalists define themselves as religious or secular. However, far fewer journalists defined themselves in the middle category of traditional, in contrast to the broader Israeli Jewish population. In terms of basic theological beliefs, 54% of reporters define themselves as secular (46% secular but not antireligious, 8% secular and anti-religious), in contrast to 48% of the broader Israeli Jewish population who define themselves as secular (43% secular but not antireligious, 5% secular and anti-religious). Thirteen per cent of Israeli journalists define themselves as traditional, in contrast to 35% of the broader Israeli Jewish population. Twenty per cent of journalists defined themselves as religious (14% modern Orthodox, 6% Haredi). This compares with 17% of the broader Israeli Jewish population who define themselves as religious. Only 2% of Israeli Jewish journalists define themselves as Conservative or Reform in spite of the two non-Orthodox streams appealing towards up-market believers, which does not enable us to compare. Broken down in terms of religiosity, the key question of belief in God found that 28% among those respondents who defined themselves as non-religious believe in God, a further 17% believed in God to a certain extent, and 52% did not believe or did so only to a small degree. More incrementally, the non-religious were prepared to agree to more generalised ideas of a higher divine force that directs the world: 37% agreed, and 12% agreed to a certain degree. Also, 31% of the non-religious believed in reward and punishment, 16% did so to a certain degree, and 43% did not believe or were not inclined to. In contrast, only 10% of the non-religious believed that the Torah and commandments were divinely inspired, 9% believed that the Jews are the Chosen People, and 2% believed that non-observance of commandments endangers the Jewish people as a whole. Among the religious, there was an overwhelming belief in all but one of these key attributes about belief. Thus, 98%, 96%, 93%, 98%, and 96% of the religious believed or much believed in God, in the existence of a divine force moving the world, in reward and punishment, in the Torah and mitzvot (religious commandments) being of divine origin, and in the Jews being the Chosen People, respectively. However, concerning whether non-observance of mitzvot endangers the Jewish people as a whole, only 48% of religious believed so or believed that to a great degree. The traditional group are those closer to the religious on questions of basic religious belief like the existence of God and the existence of a divine force in directing the world but appear incrementally closer to the non-religious on more detailed questions. Thus, 79% of traditional journalists believed or were inclined to believe in the existence of God, in contrast to 28% of the non-religious journalists and 98% of religious journalists. The same was true of questions of the existence of the primal moving force in the world. In contrast, 58%, 48%, and 56% of traditional journalists believed in reward and punishment, believed that the Torah and commandments are divinely inspired, and believed that the Jews are the Chosen People, in contrast to 93%, 98%, and 96% of religious journalists, respectively. It is instructive to widen and gain a comparative international perspective comparing Israeli journalists and journalists in other countries. To what extent are the

Religion and the Israeli journalist 95 levels of religious belief similar between the two journalist communities? According to the World of Journalism Project (2019), on the 1–5 scale, Israeli journalists had a mean of 2.7 in rating the importance of their religious beliefs. This was higher than in many Western countries – for example, Belgium (1.6), Switzerland (1.7), UK (1.8), Spain (2.0), Australia (2.0), and Portugal (2.3). With the exception of Ireland, in all Western European countries, for example, the majority of journalists in each country in Western Europe reported possessing no religion or denomination. For example, 74% of journalists in Spain, 70% in Belgium, 61% in the UK, and 51% in Switzerland reported no religion or denomination. Yet it was less than other countries. For example, journalists in Islamic countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, Bhutan, and Bangladesh – reported a mean of 4.5, 4.2, 4.1, 4.1, and 3.6, respectively, in rating the importance of religious beliefs. In asking journalists how important religion or religious belief was to them, the survey found that on a scale of 5 to 1 (5 – extremely important, 4 – very important, 3 – somewhat important, 2 – not very important, 1 – not important at all), it is possible to identify a pattern of journalists’ religious belief. The mean varied between the different world regions and countries from Asia (3.98), Africa (3.6), Latin America (3.14), the USA (3.06), Europe (2.26), and Australia (2.06). Religious observance A separate way of examining religious beliefs of journalists concern religious behaviour. Studies on religiosity and the Israeli Jewish population have focused on such questions as kashrut, Sabbath observance, and the life cycle of festivals. Twenty-seven per cent of male journalists surveyed by the author pray regularly, and 25% of female journalists do. The last is surprising given that there is no religious obligation to do so (in accord with the religious edict that women are not obligated to carry out positive commandments which have a fixed time period, like prayer). A further 2% of males and 10% of women pray from time to time. Twenty-four per cent of journalists defined themselves as religious. Broken down, 93% of the religious pray regularly, in contrast to 22% of the traditional who do so. Eighteen per cent of male journalists go with head covering. One hundred per cent of women journalists who define themselves as religious observe the laws of family purity, and 50% of women who define themselves as traditional do so (which involves abstinence from sexual relations for a couple while a woman is in her menstrual cycle, until she immerses in a ritual bath [mikva]). Reflecting that religious and traditional journalists also observe religious behaviour, if selectively: 74% of traditional Jews have the traditional Sabbath meal, and 69% make the traditional pronouncement of the kiddush benediction. An additional 12% (seudat Shabbat) and 10% (kiddush) sometimes do so. The same is true for kashrut. Far more traditional journalists observe this than journalists describing themselves as non-religious: 76% of traditional journalists refrain from eating nonkosher food, and a further 7% refrain from time to time. But incrementally fewer observe the kosher commandment of not mixing milk and meat: 57% refrain from doing so, and 4% do so some of the time. However, ‘regularly’ broken down into

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‘all the time’ and ‘most of the time’ gives a further clue what ‘traditional’ journalists are about: only about 15% of traditional journalists separate meat and milk all the time as distinct from 67% part of the time. (100% of the religious separate all the time). The rich cycle of religious holidays over the year in Judaism offers us a further clue to measuring the question of journalists’ religious identity. The religious holiday most observed by journalists is the Passover seder: 94% of all journalists participate in it, as opposed to 1% who did not (5% had no answer). In contrast, 57% of all journalists refrained from eating leavened bread (chametz) during the seven-day-long Passover, and a further 7% did so selectively, in contrast to 45% who did. These include 83% of traditional journalists who did not. Fifty-seven per cent of all journalists fast on Yom Kippur, 8% do so from time to time, and 33% do not do so or do not do so generally. These include 90% of journalists who define themselves as religious. Sabbath observance (drawing upon the biblical injunction in the book of Exodus to rest on the Seventh day) is particularly interesting in examining journalists and religiosity since the needs for covering the news and newspapers appear on Sunday and broadcasting. Working on internet sites seven days a week requires journalists to work on the Sabbath, violating the principle of not “creating” on the Sabbath day of rest: 26% of journalists do not turn on electricity on the Sabbath, and a further 2% sometimes do not – which suggests that journalists who define themselves as traditional are inclined to use electricity, including electronic media, as news developments require in contrast to those defined as religious. Ten per cent of traditional journalists do not turn on electricity on the Sabbath, and 40% of traditional journalists refrain from public work on the Sabbath, as do 3% of the non-religious. The level of religious observance of professional journalists offers useful data regarding the meaning of being Jewish from those defined as traditional – as distinct from religious or non-religious. Participation in such customs as the seudat Shabbat, kiddush, fasting on Yom Kippur, and Passover seder, as well as not eating chametz, are integral parts of day-to-day observance of the traditional journalists. But praying and refraining from using electricity or working on the Sabbath are not part of this profile. Religiously observant journalists A closer look by breaking down the survey sample of 250 journalists and focusing on the 51 journalists in the sample who defined themselves as religious shows to what degree religion is an obstacle or not in their functioning as journalists. When asked if there was a clash between the work as journalists and their religious identity, 43% of journalists who defined themselves as religious did not see any conflict at all, 26% saw conflict but only to a small degree, 26% saw conflict to some degree, and 16% saw a conflict to a great degree or a very great degree. The journalists were surveyed specifically on three questions: in addition to Sabbath observance, the reporters were questioned regarding qualifications in Judaism concerning Judaism’s requirement of modesty and the prohibition in Judaism on social gossip – surely a basic ingredient in news gathering.

Religion and the Israeli journalist 97 Exodus 20:8 prohibits working on the Sabbath, requiring rest on the Sabbath day. Seventy-three per cent of the religious journalists surveyed felt there was no clash with their work and Sabbath observance, 21% agreed but only to a small extent, 10% agreed to some extent, and only 8% agreed to a great degree or a very great degree. It is instructive to differentiate between journalists working in electronic media, which functions in Israel on the Sabbath day, and journalists writing in print media, which is not published on the Sabbath. Yet no difference was found. In Judaism there is a religious obligation of modesty. As Micah 6:8 states, “And walk humbly with your God.” But modesty is not clearly defined, and in addition to modesty in clothing (in the case of a religious woman, a head covering), it extends to modesty in speech and modesty in actions, such as refraining from physical contact between men and women. But modesty did not seem to be a major obstacle: 34% said it was no obstacle, 24% agreed only to some degree, 20% to some degree, and 22% to a great degree or very great degree. But broken down, one-thirds of those employing electronic media – radio, TV, and internet – however, did agree. Most problematic for the religious journalist is social gossip. “Do not become a gossiper among your people” (Leviticus 19:16) is an allusion to the prohibition on social gossip, which includes even information about something positive. The understanding of gossip in fact extends far beyond its meaning today. Indeed, it extends to new information about a person not known to the broad public. Sixteen per cent said it was no problem at all, and a further 22% said so only to a small degree, and 14% said so to some degree. Yet 49% saw it as a major problem (26% a major problem and 24% a very major problem). In contrast to Sabbath observance and the question of modesty, it is more difficult here to identify a single pattern. A final question regarding the religious journalists is whether they consult a rabbi on matters regarding religious law ruling. But there is very little tendency for them to do so: 56% said they do not consult rabbis at all, 22% consulted them only to a small degree, 2% to some extent, and 6% to a great extent. And to the extent rabbis are consulted, male religion journalists are more inclined than religious women journalists to do so. There was a difference in different areas of media to consult a rabbi, but religious journalists themselves use WhatsApp to consult their own colleagues. Entering the journalism profession

The last decade of the last century and the first decade of the 21st century saw a movement of religious people into journalism in Israel. Whereas religious journalists were less inclined to search for and find work in the mainstream journalism but worked in the sectoral media of the Haredi and modern Orthodox, there has been a greater movement to find work in the mainstream sector. This was partly due to political change and partly due to technological changes within the media. In the first, Israel moved to the political right since the ’80s. Journalism became a subject of study and training in the universities. The modern Orthodox, facing a perceived anti-religious bias, defined the problem – accurately or otherwise – as the absence of religious people in the journalistic corps and were encouraged to enter the profession. The Maaleh School for Film Arts was

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Religion and the Israeli journalist

established (under the presidency of a former chief rabbi) to train religious students in film production, including script writing content, which did not appear to clash with Orthodox Jewish values. Heads of the military radio station, Galei Zahal, which is manned by soldiers doing their national service, were sympathetic that religious soldiers should also serve there (in spite of it broadcasting seven days a week including the Sabbath and holydays – and the need for non-observant soldiers to man the broadcasts), and in 2002, 13 of the 37 reporters on the station were modern Orthodox. The director-general of the broadcasting authority and the editor-on-chief of Haaretz in the early part of the first decade were religious Jews. The media in Israel has expanded with three television channels, including a nationalist and religiously orientated station Arutz 14, and the proliferation of internet and news websites, as well as other areas of the communication world including advertising and public relations – led to more religious people entering the profession. Most religious people entering journalism do so primarily, if not solely, for professional reasons of advancement. Among the 51 religious journalists, in the author’s survey of Israeli journalists, asked whether they feel they represent their religious stream in their work, 28% replied not at all, 18% to a little extent, 22% to some extent, and 20% and 12% to a great extent or very great extent, respectively (See Table 5.1).1 In a related question to the statement “the fact that I am religious prevents me from advancing in my work as a journalist,” 72% and 12% of religious journalists did not agree at all or agreed only to a small degree, respectively. Indeed, the journalistic community are enthusiastic to absorb those who happened to be religious in their personal religious identity into the profession. When asked whether it was desirable not to employ religious people, in the survey of all Israeli journalists, 81% and 13% of secular journalists did not agree at all or only to a small extent. Similarly, 100% of journalists who defined themselves as traditional (not strictly religious) disagreed completely with the statement. Similarly, for respondents broken down between reporters and editors and editors in chief, it is instructive to examine the responses of editors as they are managers and controllers of content; 90% of editors disagreed completely with the statement, and so did 90% of chief editors. To a related statement, “the coverage of the religious journalist is influenced by religious motives,” most secular and traditional journalists did not agree: 32% and 42% of secular journalists disagreed completely or agreed only to a small degree, respectively; 45% of traditional (not strictly religious) journalists disagreed completely, as did 36% only to a small degree. Among editors, 39% and 41% did not agree at all or only to a small extent, respectively, and 44% and 39% of chief editors disagreed completely or agreed only a little, respectively. More specifically, journalists were asked whether religious journalists being unable to work on the Sabbath reduces his or her efficiency; there was wider disagreement, but also the majority of secular and traditional journalists did not agree with the statement: 45% and 32% of secular journalists do not agree with it at all or only to a small degree, and 81% and 19% of traditional journalists did not agree at all or only to a small degree, respectively. However, 16% of secular journalists agreed with the statement.

Religion and the Israeli journalist 99 Table 5.1 Does my work as a journalist clash with jewish teachings? Agrees to a very great degree My work as a journalist clashes with the fact that I am religious. In my work as a journalist, I encounter problems regarding Sabbath observance. In my work as a journalist, I encounter Jewish legal objections regarding reporting social gossip. My work as a journalist encounters Jewish legal problems regarding modesty. I consult rabbis regarding my work as a journalist.

Agrees to a great degree

Agrees to some extent

Agrees only to a small degree

Disagrees completely

Total

2

6

8

13

22

51

2

2

5

5

37

51

12

13

7

11

8

51

4

5

10

12

17

48

7

3

1

11

28

50

The public’s view

The Israeli public overwhelmingly support the presence of religious people as journalists. Sixty-two per cent and 16% of the Israeli public surveyed by the author disagreed completely or are inclined to disagree mostly, respectively, with the statement that they evaluate less the work of journalists who are believers over journalists who are not believers. Twelve per cent agreed, and 3% and 7% agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent, respectively. In terms of religiosity of respondents, two groups were inclined slightly more than others to be qualified about journalists who are religious. Thus, 9% and 6% of secular atheistic persons and 5% and 10% secular non-atheist persons, in the author’s survey of the Israeli public, very much agreed or much agreed, respectively, that they evaluated coverage by religious journalists as lower than they evaluated coverage by non-religious journalists. Yet even here, 59% and 24% of secular atheists and 53% and 20% of secular non-atheists did not agree at all or agreed only a little with the statement that they evaluated the work of the journalist who was religious as lower than the work of the non-religious journalist. A similar pattern to secular respondents was found among respondents who defined themselves as Reform and

100 Religion and the Israeli journalist Conservative Jews. A second group who was qualified about religious journalists as opposed to non-religious journalists was the Haredi respondents themselves: 10% of non-Hassidic Haredim and 10% of Hassidic Haredim very much agreed or much agreed, respectively, that they appreciated less the work of the religious journalist over the non-religious one. In contrast, 67% of non-Hassidic Haredim and 72% of Hassidic Haredim did not agree at all with the statement that they appreciated more the work of non-believing journalists over that of believing journalists. In age grouping, the younger the person, the more he disagreed with the statement that he appreciated the work of religious journalists less than the work of non-religious journalists: 70%, 61%, 44%, and 54% of the public aged 20–35, 36–50, 51–65, and 66+ did not agree at all with this statement. Religion affairs reporters A number of the religion affairs specialists in 2022 had a background in religious journalism before their present posts. Kobi Nachshoni is one of two religion affairs reporters on Y-Net, the popular news website affiliated with the popular mass-circulated newspaper Yediot Aharonot. Nachshoni covered the blow-by-blow religion news developments and another journalist the feature articles on religion. Eleven years on the religion desk, Nachshoni came there from a Haredi radio station Radio Kol Chai, where he had been editor of the main evening newsreel. Indeed, Nachshoni goes back two generations in Haredi journalism because his father, Itzhak Nachshoni, edited an independent Haredi weekly, Erev Shabbat and Yom Shishi, and his grandfather had edited the newspaper of a Haredi stream, Shearim. Yair Sherki, the religion affairs reporter of Arutz 2, did his three-year military service on the army radio station Galei Zahal, where he covered religion. There are almost no women on the religion beat. Galei Zahal, the Jerusalem Post, and Arutz 2 each had a woman. Notwithstanding that some Haredi sources might be uncomfortable being in contact with a woman, most Haredi rabbis today have assistants who maintain contact with the media on a daily basis. While all have been Jewish, arguably there is nothing stopping a Gentile from covering the beat if they are able to learn up on the subject – in the same way that some newspapers abroad, among them the New York Times, have had a non-Christian on the religion beat. Similarly, Yehuda Schlesinger covered religion on Israel Hayom, from the first days of the paper, which was founded in April 2007 (until 2019 when he was promoted to the paper’s political correspondent, in late 2021 he had also joined the TV station Arutz 14). Earlier he did his military service with the IDF Spokesman’s Unit on the so-called religious media desk. So did his successor in the post of religion affairs reporter, Hanan Greenwood. Each of these four – Greenwood, Nachshoni, Schlesinger, and Sherki – had a religious education both school and in the post-school yeshiva system of the modern Orthodox sector. Yet not all have this record, with some secular and even one anti-religious reporter, Shachar Ilan, on the religion beat in terms of exposing financial irregularities in the financing of Haredi educational institutions like yeshivot. In Channel TV ‘Kan’, Akiva Weiss, the religion affairs reporter, is Haredi. Even more surprising is Haaretz, which has a clear secular anti-clerical line, in appointing

Religion and the Israeli journalist 101 Aaron Rabinowitz, a Haredi, as their religion affairs reporter. In fact, Rabinowitz proved his mettle with the series of investigations on sexual provocation by Meshi Zahav and Haim Walder, a popular Haredi writer, discussed in the last chapter. Related to this, can a religion specialist who is religious be objective? One said, Religiosity does not influence my day-by-day work as a religion reporter. I have a story about a rabbi who threatened his secretary. He gets no bonuses from me because I appreciate rabbis as a whole. I don’t work because I identify with the modern religious sector. If anything, my agenda is to do good. In one sense it is not surprising that today many of the religion affairs reporters are religious because it is not normally a specialism which attracts secular people; indeed, there have been secular ones. Sometimes issues and people in the news are unrecognised by the broader public. If a learned rabbinical sage dies, but unknown to the broad Israeli public, religion affairs reporters are faced with the task of how to make him meaningful. When, for example, Rabbi Yehuda Leib Shteinman, the leader of Litai or Lithuanian Haredim, died in 2017, reporters presented Shteinman in terms of the debate of whether or not Haredim should perform national service. Yet another story to explain to their wider secular or non-Haredi audiences was the large number of Haredim – 100,000 – who turned out for Rabbi Shteinman’s funeral in 2017. That Shteinman left on his death a will instructing that there should be no eulogies at his funeral – a sign of the sage’s modesty – in fact became a trigger for covering the funeral. The religion affairs reporter who is himself or herself religious brings to the task background knowledge. The religion specialist who is himself religious is not only acquainted with the religious literature and the world because he grew up in it but also “speaks the language.” Said Y Net’s religion affairs reporter, Kobi Nachshoni, who is religious: Rabbi Eliyahu Knobil died this week. A colleague, not religious, called me. He had never heard of Rabbi Knobil but saw all the religion reporters writing about him, and asked me whether it was important for him to write about him. Schlesinger ran a fortnightly column in Yisroel Hayom – entitled Questions and Answers – a reference to the Hebrew “Sheiltot Uteshuvot” – was a list of halakhic (Jewish religious legal) rulings on popular questions and topics aimed for the paper’s mixed readership – secular, traditional, and religious. Schlesinger said, I have to adjust my materials to the secular reader. Therefore, I cannot go into too much religious details – even on matters of kashering (kosher food) I am limited. I bring new Jewish law rulings. In particular I like dealing with Medicine and Jewish law because there are many changes to this. The challenges of a popular television station in covering religious issues are sometimes daunting. As the religious affairs reporter of the television Arutz 2

102 Religion and the Israeli journalist station, Yair Sherki – who took the visually controversial step of donning payot, or refraining from cutting his sidelocks (based on an interpretation of the biblical injunction against shaving the sideburns) – was limited in covering religion by what was considered newsworthy. When, for example, a government-appointed committee, chaired by Moshe Nissim, was charged with finding a solution to religious conversions carried out by non-Orthodox rabbis to mostly non-Israeli Jews and who sought under the right of return to emigrate and seek Israeli Jewish status, Sherki was at a loss how to make the albeit important committee’s work meaningful for a popular TV station. It’s very suitable for the printed newspaper, but nobody understands it or can explain it for a TV – a two-minute broadcast about Moshe Nissim and his recommendations – is very difficult. If I had to, I would try to obtain some statistics and present it as graphics. In contrast, in another case – the aguna issue – and the Jewish law ruling under which if a husband refuses to grant a divorce to his wife, she cannot remarry, when Sherki managed to interview on TV a “a chained wife.” “It was good television. She speaks about her inner feelings.” Yet when Sherko wanted to profile a rabbi, the Israel Prize–winning Rabbi Adin Steinzaltz – who composed a commentary on the entire works of the Talmud – Sherki hit a stone wall because, while other public rabbis were well known to the broad population, Steinzaltz was not. Sherki wanted to profile Steinzaltz. “He was my rabbi,” Sherki said. But the rabbi was 80 and partly paralysed and could not be interviewed. “So I failed to persuade my station to run it.” The internet has changed matters. Its unlimited space means that whereas secular print newspapers are limited because of space considerations in the extent they can go into the nitty-gritty of the politics of religion are more exposed, rabbis and non-strictly news religion stories find their space on Y-Net and Yisroel Hayom’s website. As one spokesman put it, “Rabbis as carriers of religious positions are more exposed and what in the past was limited in religious sectoral media was now of interest to the wider public.” The chief rabbi’s spokesman said, “I am obligated to release immediately. If I wait another hour, it won’t be relevant. I need to tell the Chief Rabbi, “It’s a little urgent to send a release.’” Yet Judaism per se is neither necessarily suitable for new media. Kobi Nachshoni, the religion reporter for the YNet news website, said, “Eighty per cent of my coverage is not Jewish per se. The questions I cover are state-religious relations rather than in depth Judaism because that does not interest the media.” The religion reporter is required to explain the spiritual, the non-rational. A reporter who is religious and has journalistic experience is able to. Yet the reverse is also true. In order for the secular majority to understand religion, perhaps it takes a secular reporter to explain it in coherent terms meaningful to the secular. There are no religion affairs reporters who cover other religions beyond Judaism. Indeed, some focus on, if not exclusively, the Haredim rather than the entire Jewish fold. Islam is covered by the Arab affairs reporter. Indeed, the latter speaks Arabic, but whether he has a solid understanding of Islam may be

Religion and the Israeli journalist 103 questionable. Christianity remains uncovered. All this in spite of Israeli being the Holyland, with shrines of international significance to two other faiths beyond Judaism – Christianity and Islam. Knowledge of religion affairs reporters

Twenty-five per cent of journalists in the author’s survey agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent that religion affairs reporters had adequate knowledge, 39% agreed, 29% said it was not adequate or did not exist, 13% did not agree, and 17% agreed only a little. There was some difference when broken down whether the respondent was himself or herself religious or not – with religious journalists more discriminatory and knowledgeable than non-religious journalists. Thus, 42% and 2% of religious journalists disagreed completely or were inclined to disagree that religion affairs journalists were knowledgeable, in contrast to 5% and 0% of non-religious journalists and in contrast to 4% and 0% of traditional journalists. Similarly, while 8% and 29% of non-religious journalists very much agreed or much agreed that religion affairs reporters were knowledgeable, only 0% and 7% of religious journalists thought so (20% and 16% of traditional journalists said so). In terms of the type of medium, there was no difference in evaluating the knowledge level of religion affairs reporters. For example, 10% and 26% very much agreed or much agreed that religion affairs reporters were knowledgeable, and a further 41% agreed. Those working in national newspapers agreed incrementally less. Four per cent very much agreed. 23% largely agreed. (and 34% agreed). 4% and 21% working on the internet very much agreed or much agreed (41% agreed). But the trend for religious journalists to become specialist religion affairs journalists was not supported wholly by all the journalists in the author’s survey – despite the background knowledge and understanding of Judaism they bring. Thus, when asked whether a religious person should cover religion because he knows the subject, most journalists rejected this: 77% of journalists who defined themselves as secular and 55% of those who defined themselves as traditional (but not strictly religious) rejected this entirely. Moreover, even 64% of journalists who defined themselves as modern Orthodox rejected this entirely. (Yet 21% of modern Orthodox journalists agreed a great deal or a very great deal, and a further 10% agreed to some degree.) In terms of roles, 77% of journalists who were editors (who in one sense had an organising function of news coverage and media content) disagreed entirely, 8% agreed only to a small degree, 68% of chief editors disagreed entirely, and 11% agreed only to a small degree. Israeli journalists and the Israeli public Yet in addition to the question at the beginning of this chapter – to examine journalists’ religious identity in order to understand the gap between journalists and rabbis – it is also legitimate to compare journalists’ identity with that of the broad Israeli public. As discussed in the next chapter on how the Israeli public

104 Religion and the Israeli journalist rate news interest in religion and spirituality, it raises the question of whether journalists’ assessment of the news interest reflects the public’s assessment of whether religion interests them as the audience. Not only do public media, such as public broadcasting, serve the public, but – if only to survive and succeed – commercial media require to supply their audiences with religion and spiritual content of interest to them. Are Israeli journalists, therefore, representative of the broader Israeli Jewish population? While one-half to two-thirds of Israeli journalists share basic Jewish beliefs about the existence of God and about reward and punishment, no difference was found between the fundamental beliefs of journalists and the wider general Israeli Jewish population, as was expressed in the Gutman survey of behavioural patterns among the Israeli Jewish population, carried out in 2000. Journalists are almost as religious as the broader Israeli Jewish population. Indeed, in terms of beliefs, 60% of journalists surveyed by the author believe in the existence of God, in contrast to 65% of the Israeli Jewish population. Yet 61% of the Israeli Jewish population in the Gutman Survey believe in the supreme power that guides the world, in contrast to 62% of the Israeli Jewish population. And 61% of journalists believe that good deeds are rewarded and bad deeds are punished, in contrast to 62% and 55% of the Israeli Jewish public. However, 44% of journalists believe that Jews are the Chosen People among the nations in contrast to 50% of the Israeli Jewish population. And 17% of journalists believe that a non-observant Jew endangers the entire Jewish people in contrast to 24% of the Israeli Jewish population. In terms of religious ritual, there is certain evidence that journalists are as religiously observant as the general Israeli Jewish population and that differences between the journalistic community and the broader population are minor at best. More journalists (94%) participate in a seder than the general Israeli Jewish population (85%). But fewer journalists (57%) than Israeli Jews refrain from eating chametz (leavened bread) during the Passover festival. And fewer Israeli journalists (57%) fast on Yom Kippur than the broader Israeli Jewish population (67%). There is no difference in other matters. A similar number of journalists (59%) to the Israeli Jewish population (58%) refrain from eating treif (non-kosher food), and 45% of journalists recite kiddush (at the festive Sabbath meal) all or most of the time, as compared with 48% of the Israeli Jewish population. Even 26% of journalists do not use electricity on the Sabbath, in contrast to 24% of the Israeli Jewish population despite the fact that the very nature of news requires journalists to follow the news 24/7 (Levy, Levinson & Katz, 1993). In conclusion, reporters’ religious identity is a little different from the broader Israeli Jewish population. Reporters’ belief in God and existential questions like reward and punishment and Jewish messianic redemption, as well as reporters’ observance of life-cycle events like religious holydays, are similar to the rest of the Israeli Jewish population. This is not to argue that journalists actively influence the news process according to their religious outlook, but rather they behave according to criteria of news values rather than their own agenda. Moreover, a distinction has to be made between the views of the individual journalist in religion and the total effect of the media’s projection of religion. It is the focus in the news process itself

Religion and the Israeli journalist 105 to present what is interesting or important rather than a seemingly anti-religious agenda of an individual reporter. This explains the gap between what is reported about religion and the image which rabbis would like be projected. Nevertheless, the consciousness of reporters – including on matters related to belief, spirituality, and organised religion – provides an amorphous background against which journalists function. Conclusion The findings correct the popular misconception – held among religious communities in particular – that the journalistic community are not representative of the broader Israeli population. Given the role which journalists play as agenda-setters in communication patterns of Israel, this is an important clarification and finding. Despite hypotheses to the contrary, it was found that (1) journalists are not inclined to be anti-religious, including not believing in the existence of God; (2) journalists are inclined to participate in annual Jewish holydays or observe Jewish life-cycle rituals (such as marriages and funerals having a religious ceremony, the bar mitzvah, religious circumcision at birth, and observing or participating in holyday rituals); and (3) in broad terms, a gap does not exist between the broader Israeli Jewish public population and journalists regarding attitudes to religion. This, therefore, raises questions for critics of religion coverage: is it accurate to explain criticism of religion coverage as the result of journalists being anti-religious, or should the criticism be explained elsewhere? Note 1 The author is grateful to Ms Declai Barkai for her assistance in the statistical analysis in this section.

Bibliography Barkai, D. Modern Religious Journalists in the General Israeli Media: Professional & Social Perceptions of the Journalistic Profession, Religious People in Israeli Journalism, MA Thesis. Bar Ilan University. Levy, S., Levinson, H., & Katz, E. (1993) Beliefs, Observances, and Social Interaction among Israeli Jews. Jerusalem: Gutman Institute of Applied Social Research. Reich, Z., Barnoy, A., & Herzog, L. (2016) Worlds of Journalism Study. Country Report: Journalists in Israel. www.worldsofjournalism.org. Worlds of Journalism Project. (2019) www.worldsofjournalism.org.

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The public and religion news

The main sources of information about religion news come from mass media – press, radio, and television – and from social media – news websites, blogs, and WhatsApp groups. A key question is to what extent the Israeli Jewish public gather religion-related information from these sources. How satisfied are they with religion content? When the subject of religion is broken down into different sub-headings, what is the level of audience interest among different communities in religion information? What is the audience interest in such sub-topics as your group and other groups, such as about the status of non-Orthodox Jewish communities abroad and other religions? What is the audience interest in religion-state issues, like Sabbath observance in the public arena and religion-related issues regarding the Israel Army? Much of the tension between the religious and the secular centres around the question of whether the State of Israel should be a state based on Jewish religious law (halakha) or be a secular democracy. Rather than just a theoretical question, it reflects both deep ideological differences between secular and religious Jewish groups and differences within Jewish religious communities, notably the Haredim (or ultra-Orthodox Jews) and modern Orthodoxy. What is the level of audience interest in Judaica themes – like information about the weekly Bible reading, reports of miraculous events, stories about rabbis, and reports about Jewish law rulings? Much that gets defined as religion news is conflict related, such as conflicts between religious institutions in Israel and the Jewish state. Considerable tension exists in Israel between religious Jewry and the general media, which are regarded by many in the former as anti-religious, anti-nationalist, and secular. After reporting on the public evaluation of the quality, accuracy, balance, and quantity of information, the chapter will discuss patterns of public exposure to the media content on religion. The chapter will analyse the following questions: What do Israeli Jews think about the usage by religious organisations and rabbis of the media as platforms? Should scandals involving rabbis be reported or not? What impact does the religion content have on the views of the Israeli Jewish public? DOI: 10.4324/9781315735184-6

The public and religion news 107 What do Israelis consume in the media on religion and spirituality? The 2020 CBS survey

The annual 2020 social survey of the Central Bureau of Statistics (2020), the government’s arm for collecting social data in Israel (referred to in Chapter 1), gathered data about patterns of media consumption among the Israeli Jewish population. The overall pattern (drawing upon 7,249 responses), showed that internet news websites and television were main news sources for the Israeli Jewish population – 38% and 37%, respectively. In contrast, radio was less than 7% and printed newspapers even lower: 3.5%. Despite the impression, social media, like WhatsApp, Twitter, and Instagram, scored low as major news sources: 7%. Non-media sources – friends and neighbours and relatives – were less than 3%. But broken down, the data made available to the author by the CBS shows there were wide differences between the five religious streams. The data will be broken down further according to five different religion streams: secular, secular-cum-traditional, traditional-cum-religious, modern Orthodox, Haredi (or ultra-Orthodox). Thus, while television was a dominant source of news for the traditional-religious (53%), traditional-secular (48%), and secular (37%), it went down to 26% for the modern religious. The Haredim do not use television – yet today some Haredim, notably more modern Haredim, see it on the computer via YouTube. Internet news websites showed certain differences with TV: Thus, 46% of secular Israelis used news websites (in contrast to 37% for TV). But the traditional were more inclined to prefer TV over news websites. Only 34% of secular-traditional used news websites as their primary news source (distinct from 48% for TV), and only 30% of the religious-traditional used news websites as their primary news source (in contrast to 53% for TV). But the modern religious much preferred news websites (49%) over TV (26%). Noteworthy was that despite the ban by Haredi rabbis on their followers from using the internet at all, 22% of the Haredim used it in 2020. But the Haredim proved to be the biggest consumers of radio as primary news source, 20% – in contrast to 6%, 5%, and 5% the religious-traditional, seculartraditional, and secular, respectively. It reflected the rabbinical ban on TV and the internet. Yet even among the modern religious, far more (11%) used radio as the primary news source rather than the secular-traditional, despite their access to TV and the internet. In part it reflected that TV was qualified because its entertainment was done in a manner regarded as reflecting anti-religious values. Printed newspapers at 2–3% only as the primary news source for all other groupings was over 23% for the Haredim, suggesting a healthy picture for the Haredi printed media. There was little difference regarding social networks as a low source of news for all groups (4%). (For the Haredim, it was even lower, 2%, reflecting the Haredi ban on new media.) Regarding conversations with neighbours and friends as the primary source of news, it was significantly very high with Haredim, nearly 16%, in contrast to the secular, secular-traditional, and modern Orthodox (2–3%). In a striking manner, it

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reflects both the communal nature of Haredim and surprisingly how this is not true of other streams, even for the modern Orthodox, who also meet people around the synagogue and the community. Yet there is an acute difference between Haredi and modern Orthodox men regarding lifestyle: while many Haredi males are in daily contact with their colleagues through learning in the yeshiva during the day, this is much less true in the case of modern Orthodox men, who mostly meet their counterparts only once a week in the framework of Shabbat and holyday prayer services in the synagogue. And it also reflects that facing bans on certain electronic media, Haredim do fall back on alternative sources of information. Yet underlying all this, there was a fundamental difference between the very suggestion of Haredi attitudes to follow the news and other groups. While only 2–3% of the secular, secular-traditional, and modern Orthodox (including Hardal) in the CBS survey were uninterested in the news, nearly 13% of the Haredim said so – reflecting the cultural ghetto walls behind which they live, itself reflecting both the social isolation as well as perceiving Torah study as the singular uppermost value in life above other activities. Yet the figure of only 13% will be surprising to some – confirming that despite the cultural walls, most Haredim overwhelmingly are also interested in following the news. By age group

There were considerable differences in age groupings, which was striking in the electronic media – accessing news websites and social networks. This may be divided into three age groupings. Indeed, there were significant differences between 20–44 and 45–64, with the former higher, the real major difference was between these two groups, on the one hand, and 65+, many of whom are not computersavvy, on the other hand. Thus, 57% of those secular Israelis aged 20–44 used news websites, as distinct from 47% aged 45–64. Only 19% of secular Israelis aged 65+ used news websites. Similarly of those aged 20–44, 60% of modern Orthodox, 52% of the seculartraditional, and 42% of the religious-traditional used news websites, as opposed to 46%, 27%, and 27% aged 45–64, respectively, who used news websites as their primary news source. And 8%, 12%, and 8%, respectively, of those aged 65+ used websites. Eight per cent and 10% of secular Israelis and secular-traditional, respectively, aged 20–44, used social networks, as distinct from 2% and 3%, respectively, of those aged 45–64. In contrast, those in 65+ were more inclined to use traditional media, like TV, radio, and newspapers. Seven per cent of the secular, 10% of the secular-traditional, 11% of the traditional-religious, 21% of the modern Orthodox, and 37% of the Haredim aged 65+ listened to radio as their primary news sources. In contrast, of those aged 20–44, 3% of the secular, 3% of the secular-traditional, 8% of the religious, and 16% of the Haredim listened to the radio. And 65% of the secular, 70% of the secular-traditional, and 73% of the religious listen to radio. And 50% of the Haredim, 70% of the secular-traditional, and 48% of the religious aged 65+ watched TV for news, as opposed to 24%, 30%, 38%, and 15%, respectively, aged 20–44, who watched TV. Far more Haredim (45–64%) read a print newspaper than secular Israelis aged 45–64: 21% as opposed to 6%. More religious modern

The public and religion news 109 Orthodox and Haredim listened to the radio than the secular, secular-traditional, and religious traditional. By gender

While men were more inclined more than women to use news websites for those defined as secular, secular-traditional, and modern religious, the opposite was true for the Haredim: 24% of Haredim women use news websites as opposed to only less than 20%. * To get a more detailed picture of the Israeli public and variegated religion information – their sources and level of interest in information about religion and their evaluation of the media’s coverage of religion – 550 Israeli Jews were surveyed by the author. Findings are discussed at length in the chapter. The public’s attitudes to religion news are significant, given the central role which the public plays as audiences in determining what journalists and editors should do, but more so given the role of the Israeli public as citizen journalists today. The author’s survey of the Israeli public was carried out to examine the public’s views of some of the questions (raised with rabbis and with journalists), including whether they thought media damaged religious values and their evaluation of religion coverage. Other questions included the public’s evaluations of the newsworthiness of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The public’s own exposure to mass media, including new media, in terms of their interest in religion information, was also considered. Other questions examined in the survey include the public’s evaluations of religion coverage and of religion reporters, whether access to mass media for children should be limited, whether sex and money scandals involving rabbis should be published or not, and what the public thought about appearances by rabbis in media to project religion. According to this author’s survey of the Israeli public regarding information about religion, ultra-Orthodox religious people (as distinct from modern Orthodox people) are inclined to read religious papers: 93% and 92% of non-Hassidic and Hassidic Haredim read one. Reader interest in reading content which is linked to religion goes beyond the Haredim – who are inclined to read the religious press itself – to the modern Orthodox, as well as to the Reform and Conservative people. Thus, 35% and 35% of Conservative and Reform people, respectively, read religion content to a very great extent or to a great extent in the daily press. In contrast, only 11%, 6%, and 5% of the traditional, secular atheist, and secular non-atheist said so. Yet even these were subject to change, showing more interest in religion content: 30%, 30%, and 14% of the traditional, secular non-atheist, and secular atheist read about it from time to time. Websites in general are surfed, including for religion and Judaism. But there are wide differences from group to group: 48% of Hardal and 42% of mainstream modern Orthodox (i.e excluding Hardal, a stricter form of modern Orthodox Judaism) look for religious content when surfing to a very great extent or to a great extent, respectively. A further 32% and 30% of Hardal or mainstream modern

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Orthodox, respectively, do so from time to time. So do 26% of Reform, 15% of Conservative, and 9% of traditional, to a very great extent or to a great extent. And 47% and 25% of Reform and Conservative, respectively, do so from from time to time. The secular are absent here: 0% and 2% of secular atheists and secular nonatheists, respectively, surf to a very great extent or a great extent. And a further 9% and 15%, respectively, do so from time to time. Thirty-two per cent of nonHassidic Haredim and 14% of Hassidic Haredim do so to a very great extent or a great extent, respectively, and a further 30% and 19% of non-Hassidic Haredim and Hassidic Haredim do so from time to time, respectively. Are Israeli Jews exposed to religion content in social networks? Thirty-two per cent, 25%, and 27% of the mainstream modern Orthodox, Reform, and Conservative, respectively, are to a very great extent or to a great extent. So are 12% and 11% of Hardal and traditional. Moreover, 33%, 33%, and 25% of the mainstream modern Orthodox, Reform, and Conservative are from time to time. So are 11%, 5%, and 8% of traditional, secular non-atheists, and secular atheists, respectively, to a very great extent or a great extent. And so are 13%, 25%, and 33% of the traditional, secular non-atheists, and secular atheists from time to time. More specifically, are Israeli Jews acquainted with websites which reflect their religious stream – Arutz 7, Kippa and Soragim for mainstream modern Orthodox and Hardal, and B’Hadrei Haredim, Kikar Shabbat, and Haredim 10 for the Haredim? Twenty-nine per cent, 28%, and 15% of Conservative, mainstream modern Orthodox, and Hardal were very greatly acquainted and greatly acquainted with their respective websites, and 18%, 24%, and 34% also visited them from time to time. But only 5% and 2% of non-Hassidic Haredim and Hassidic Haredim reported being very greatly acquainted and greatly acquainted. Only 9% and 3% of Hassidic Haredim and non-Hassidic Haredim were to some extent. Far fewer of the Haredim listen to religious radio stations (like Radio Kol Berama and Radio Kol Chai) than those who read religious papers: 60% and 41% of non-Hassidic and Hassidic Haredim listen to religious radio. Listening to religious content on national radio was less frequent than reading religion content in the secular press: 10%, 8%, and 7% of Conservative, Reform, and Traditional listen a very great deal or a great deal to religious content in national radio, and 16% of mainstream Modern Orthodox and 27% of Hardal do so too. But in terms of listening from time to time, this increased: 30%, 16%, and 22% of Conservative, Reform, and traditional – who identify as religious – listen from time to time to religion content on national radio. In contrast to the national press, only 8% and 3% of secular non-atheists and secular atheists listen from time to time. In the case of television – with the exception of mainstream modern Orthodox, who sometimes look at religion content on television – overall, religion content on TV is rarely watched by any group. And if they do, they do so at best from time to time for all groups – with the exception of those who do not even possess a television, like the Haredim or Hardal. Thus, 50% and 28% of Conservative, 40% and 38% of traditional, and 37% and 45% of Reform Jews view religion content on TV from time to time or occasionally, respectively. The secular communities – 30%

The public and religion news 111 and 45% of secular non-atheists and 17% and 31% of secular atheists – watch religion from time to time or occasionally, respectively. What does the Israeli public think of the media’s religion and spirituality coverage? How satisfied is the Israeli public with religion coverage by the Israeli media? The impact of religion news upon audiences is an important question because editors determine what news to publish in part according to the level of interest among their audiences. Thus, in a competitive media market, religion news developments which editors evaluate as not interesting – or not important – are unlikely to pass the news threshold. Yet it is difficult to gauge precisely audience interest in religion news. In Western countries, emptying church pews – not only in Europe but also in the USA – are a clue to a decline in the interest in religion. In contrast, the growth of different branches of Christianity, including Roman Catholicism, and Pentecostalism, in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, are clues to greater audience interest in religion. Fifty-two per cent of the US public polled in 2010 said they enjoyed keeping up a lot with religious news, and a further 35% with some of the religious news. Only 4% and 10% of the public said they did not keep up at all or not much, respectively (Winston & Green, 2015). When asked in the UK about when a religious programme comes on television, only 3% of viewers who had high religiosity switched off the TV when a religious programme appears, as compared to 48% of viewers who had very low religiosity. Seventy-nine per cent of viewers with very high religiosity paid attention when it came on, in contrast to 15% only of those with very low religiosity who paid attention (Svennevig, Haldane, & Gunter, 1988). In considering the Israeli case, the question may be examined in terms of the quantity of religion content, the quality of religion content, and its accuracy. In terms of the quality of coverage with religion content, of all respondents in the author’s survey of the Israeli public, 21% said religion content on internet websites was good, 4% excellent, 18% bad, and 11% even terrible, but 46% said it was average. Social networks and blogs were slightly worse than the internet. Overall, 22% described the quality of religion coverage in the newspapers as good, 6% as excellent, 23% as bad, and 8% as terrible. Slightly less positive findings were found for radio and television: 38% said it was average. Regarding the quality of religion coverage on new media, there were similar or lower ratings. Regarding the question of the accuracy of religion coverage, only 12% and 3% said that accuracy in religious coverage on the internet was good and excellent, respectively. In contrast, 24% and 17% said that it was bad or terrible, respectively, and 44% said it was average. Ratings for social networks and blogs were less. In blogging, accuracy was clearly not standard: 11% and 2% said accuracy in blogs was good or excellent, whereas 30% and 17% said it was bad or even terrible, respectively. Only 17% of the Israeli public said accuracy of religion coverage in newspapers was good, and only 2% said it was excellent, 26% bad, 13% terrible, and 42% average. Radio was similar. However, accuracy of religion on TV was considerably less: Only 9%

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and 1% said the accuracy of religion coverage on TV was good or excellent, respectively, while 27% said TV was bad, 33% terrible, and 27% average. A major criticism of reporting is that there is bias in religion reporting and stereotyping religious people. But a distinction must to be made between intentional bias and unintentional bias. The former refers to a journalist attaching his or her own views. The latter refers to the reality that in free societies characterised by freedom of the press, news coverage is not determined by an intentional desire to be balanced and produce an overall image about something, but rather it is a product of covering interesting and important news within limited space or time. The basic standard in professional journalism of adhering to the basic principles of objectivity and accuracy and avoiding intentional bias are cardinal – if only because a journalist’s superiors – editors and the proprietor – demand it of the journalist. Much of the bias in religion reporting is of the second latter type. The most frequent case of bias in religion reporting – and most researched – concerns the coverage in the West of Islam (for example, Allen, 2010; Pearson, 2017; Pintak & Franklin, 2013; and Poole, 2002). Against the background of terrorism by Muslims, in the name of jihad, in particular the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers, a frequent theme in coverage of Islam has been the question of the suitability of Islam for Western society. Questions regarding asylum and refugees enter the public agenda in the West. But if the themes themselves are negative, the overall image of the Muslim is demonic. Beyond the standards of objectivity and balance, including reporting both sides of an issue, there is little which the editors can do because the overall image constructed appears negative. Regarding the question of the quantity of newspaper religion coverage, 26% and 8% of the Israeli public said that the quantity of religion content on the internet was good or excellent, while 18% and 4% said it was small or very small. Blogging and social networks were lower than the internet: 25% and 8% of the Israeli public thought that it was good or excellent, respectively, whereas 18% and 5% also said it was small or very small (41% average). Radio was slightly less. Regarding TV, 20% and 9% said that religion coverage quantitatively was good or excellent, respectively, while 24% and 11% said it was small or very small, respectively, and 31% said it was average. What differences are there when audience ratings regarding the quality, quantity, and accuracy of religion coverage are broken down according to stream? Nine streams may be delineated: secular atheist, secular non-atheist, Reform, Conservative, traditional, mainstream modern Orthodox, Hardal, non-Hassidic Haredi, and Hassidic Haredi. Quality

In assessing the quality of newspaper coverage of religion, the level of satisfaction among the Israeli public who define their religious identity as Orthodox – modern Orthodox, Hardal, and Haredi – are slightly closer to an excellent rating in comparison to the non-Orthodox to Reform and Conservative, as well as to traditional. Only 5% and 16% of mainstream modern Orthodox said that the coverage of religion was excellent or of good quality. Moreover, only 3% and 8% of Hardal said so, respectively, and 44% and 8% of Hardal described the coverage of religion as not good or terrible, in contrast to 26% and 6% of mainstream modern Orthodox. In the case of those among the Israeli public who defined themselves as Conservative,

The public and religion news 113 only 8% and 0% said the quality of coverage was bad or terrible, in contrast to 12% and 0% of Reform. Also noteworthy was that while 41% of non-Hassidic Haredim described the quality of religion coverage as average, only 28% of Hassidic Haredim thought so. Hassidic Haredim were more spread out evenly, saying that the quality was excellent (12%), terrible (18%), good (20%), and not good (22%). Secular non-atheists were incrementally more inclined to be critical of religion coverage of media than secular atheists. But in assessing the quality of internet coverage of religion, some differences may be noted: 17% of non-Hassidic and 31% of Hassidic Haredim said coverage of religion in internet was terrible. And a further 23% (Hassidic Haredi) and 25% (non-Hassidic Haredi) said coverage was bad. Conservative respondents were incrementally more inclined than Reform respondents to rate the coverage of religion on the internet as average: 64% of Conservative respondents said that religion coverage on the internet was average and 18% good, as opposed to 50% of Reform (who rated it average). And 32% of Reform respondents also said the quality of religious coverage was good and 50% average, respectively, while 31% and 41% of secular atheists said that the quality of religious coverage was good or average. Rating the quality of religion content on social networks and blogs produced not dissimilar findings from newspapers and internet. Yet noteworthy was that 40% and 26% of Hassidic Haredim said that the quality of religion content in blogs was terrible or bad. Also very critical – but much less than the Hassidic Haredim – were non-Hassidic Haredim: 10% and 36% said that the quality of religion content on social networks and blogs was terrible or bad. Also noteworthy was that 11% and 26% of Hardal Jews said that the quality of religion content in blogs was terrible or bad. In contrast, Reform saw religion content in blogs as good: 3%, 27%, and 47% said religion on blogs was excellent, good, or mediocre, respectively. And 4%, 19%, and 49% of mainstream modern Orthodox said that religion in blogging was excellent, good, or mediocre, respectively. No single pattern for rating the quality of religion on social networks was found. Thirty-nine per cent and 28% of Hassidic Haredim said that religion content on social networks was terrible or bad, respectively. And 19% and 34% of non-Hassidic Haredim said so, as did 5% and 26% of Hardalim. In contrast, 7%, 37%, and 40% of Reform said that the quality of religion content on social networks was excellent, good, or mediocre, as did 6%, 34%, and 34% of mainstream modern Orthodox, respectively. In terms of age, there was no significant differences when blogging or social networks were broken down into age groups: 20–35, 36–50, 51–65, and 66+, with a slight inclination for 20–35 to be more critical. Overall, the quality of religion coverage on radio received lower ratings than newspapers or the internet. For example, 0% of Conservative, Hardal, and nonHassidic Haredim rated the quality of religion content on radio as excellent, and 30% of Hassidic Haredim said radio was terrible – in addition to 27%, who said it was bad. In addition, 18% and 21% of non-Hassidic Haredim said that the quality of religion content on radio was terrible and bad, and 11% and 16% of traditional Israelis said religion content on radio was terrible and bad.

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Accuracy

Public attitudes to the accuracy of religion reporting in coverage may broken down by newspapers, television, radio, internet, and blogs. In terms of gender, some differences could be seen, with women less critical of the accuracy of religion reporting in newspapers than men: 17% and 24% of men described the accuracy of religion coverage in newspapers as terrible or bad, respectively, in contrast to 10% and 27% of women, respectively. In terms of ethnicity, Sephardim were incrementally more critical: 3%, 18%, and 41% of Ashkenazim described religion coverage in newspapers as excellent, good, or mediocre, in contrast to 1%, 13%, and 45% of Sephardim, respectively. In contrast to journalists, the more the public read about religion in the media, the less they were inclined to be critical of the accuracy of religion coverage. Thus, 19% and 19% of the Israeli public, in the author’s survey, who continually read about religion and 12% and 22% who read most of the time said that the accuracy of religion coverage in newspapers was terrible or not good. In contrast, 21% and 24% of those who never read on religion said that coverage was terrible or not good, respectively. The same was even truer for accuracy of religion coverage on television. Accuracy was seen as terrible or bad, and only 5%, 15%, and 30% of the Israeli public said that it was excellent, good, or mediocre. Similar findings were found for those who viewed TV programming on religion from time to time. In contrast, 53% and 26% of those who never viewed religious programming responded that accuracy was terrible or bad. There were wide differences in the extent that different religious streams viewed the accuracy of the coverage of religion in the newspapers. Only 3% and 9% of secular atheists and 10% and 13% of secular non-atheists said that accuracy was terrible or bad, respectively. So did 0% and 26% of Reform Jews and 0% and 16% of Conservative Jews. In contrast, 26% and 27% of Hassidic Haredim and 22% and 24% of nonHassidic Haredim said accuracy of religion coverage in newspapers was terrible or bad, respectively. So did 13% and 55% of Hardal. In contrast to Hardal, only 13% and 23% mainstream modern Orthodox said that accuracy was terrible or bad. Men were less critical than women of the accuracy of coverage of religion on the internet. Five per cent and 15% of men described the accuracy as excellent or good, in contrast to 1% and 11% of women. Ashkenazim were less critical than Sephardim regarding the accuracy of coverage: 3% and 12% of Ashkenazim said accuracy was excellent or good, in contrast to 1% and 14% of Sephardim. The more people surfed for information about religion on the internet, the less critical they were of the accuracy of religion reporting – in contrast to the trend regarding accuracy of religion reporting in newspapers. Three per cent and 36% who surf religion content on the internet on a continual basis said that accuracy was excellent or good, and 2% and 15% who look for religion content on internet much of the time said it was excellent or good. In contrast, 3% and 8% of those

The public and religion news 115 who never looked at religion content and 2% and 9% of those who do so seldom replied that the accuracy was excellent and good, respectively. This was also true with social networks: 14% and 14% of those who looked at social networks for religion content all the time and 4% and 19% who do so most of the time said that the accuracy of religion reporting in social networks was excellent or good, in contrast to 2% and 5% who never look at social networks or 0% and 5% who do so seldom who replied that accuracy of religious coverage on social networks was excellent or good. A similar pattern was found for blogging. There was a clear pattern regarding age differences and whether this is reflected in respondents to the question of accuracy in internet content on religion. Haredim – both non-Hassidic and Hassidic – were very critical regarding accuracy in religion coverage in internet: 47% and 23% of Hassidic Haredim and 25% and 26% of non-Hassidic Haredim said that accuracy was terrible or bad. So did 13% and 45% of Hardal. In contrast, 6% and 9% of secular atheists, 0% and 29% secular non-atheists, 5% and 19% of traditional, 0% and 24% of Reform, 0% and 19% of Conservative, and 12% and 25% of mainstream modern Orthodox each said that the level of accuracy in religion coverage on the internet was terrible or good, respectively. Most uncritical were secular atheists: 9% and 19% said that accuracy of religion content on the internet was excellent or good. All religious streams were inclined to be critical of accuracy in blogs and social networks. Criticism of social networks was even greater than on blogs or on the internet sites. Quantity

There is considerable dissatisfaction among the American public with the news coverage of religion. Only 28%, 32%, and 36% rated the quantity of religion coverage in the US media in radio, newspapers, and TV, respectively, as good (Winston & Green, 2015). Similarly, the BBC survey found that while two-thirds (or 74%) said that the quantity of coverage of religion coverage in Britain was just right, 19% and 2% said it was too little or far too little, in contrast to 4% and 1% who said it was too much or far too much. Nor was there a difference in terms of blogging. However, there was a difference in social networks, with women respondents more inclined to grade the quantity of religion content higher in social networks. Nor was there significant difference between Ashkenazim and Sephardim regarding internet sites or social networks, but there was significant difference for blogs: 56% and 19% of Ashkenazim, in the author’s survey of the Israeli public, replied that the quantity of religion content in blogs was very high or high, in contrast to 4% and 11% of Sephardim. There was an incremental trend that those who surfed all the time or much of the time were more inclined to say the quantity of religion coverage on the internet was very large or large, in contrast to those who never or seldom surf the internet for religion. With regard to the question of whether they thought that the religious affairs reporter on news websites had suitable background in religion, there were no differences between responses.

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This was even truer regarding social networks. Thus, 21% and 39% of those involved in social networks and forums all the time or 12% and 37% much of the time responded that the quantity of religion content in social networks was very large or large, in contrast to 8% and 18% of those who said they never went into social networks or 6% and 16% who occasionally did. In the case of blogging sites which are religious, there was overall less inclination to say that the quantity of religion content on the internet forums or social networks was very large or large than the response to other internet and social networks. Nor was there significant difference in the quantity of religion content in blogs that cover religion and those that did not. In terms of religious streams, there was little difference in grading the quantity of religion content, with the exception of Hassidim Haredim, who gave lower ratings for quantity. In the case of social networks, with the exception of Hardal, who gave lower grading, there was little difference between religious streams. In the case of blogging, Haredim (Hassidic and non-Hassidic) and Hardal were inclined to give lower ratings for quantity than other streams. It was noteworthy that in social networks, internet sites, and blogs, the highest ratings for the quantity of religion content came from Reform, secular atheists, and secular non-atheists. Overall, blogging got lower ratings from all streams than social networks or internet. In terms of quantity of religion content in the media, how satisfied are the Israeli Jewish public with the quantity of coverage on religion on newspapers? Women rated the quantity of coverage higher than men: 9% and 29% of women said the quantity was very high or high, respectively, in contrast to 6% and 19% of men. This was also true for radio and television. There was little overall difference in rating the quantity of coverage of religion content in newspapers and radio between Ashkenazim and Sephardim. In television, however, Ashkenazim were more dissatisfied with the quantity in television than Sephardim: 13% and 21% of Sephardim said that TV was very good or good, respectively, in contrast to 7% and 19% of Ashkenazim. In terms of rating the quantity of religion content, there was little difference between those who read everything or much on religion and those who seldom or never read. There was a trend that the more people listened to religion content on radio, the more inclined they were to be critical of the quantity of religion content on radio, in contrast to those who seldom or never listened to religion content on radio. Nor was there much difference between those who thought highly or thought lowly of whether the religious affairs reporter had adequate knowledge of the beat. There was little significant difference between the public’s ratings of the religion affairs specialist reporter and the question of the quantity of coverage on radio. In terms of rating whether coverage was great or good, there was little difference between those who were much inclined to watch religion coverage on television and those who seldom did so. However, in terms of those who said that quantitatively it was inadequate or poor (i.e. very inadequate), those who watched religion content continually or did so much were less critical of any lack of religion reporting quantity. In terms of knowledge of religion affairs reporters on TV, there

The public and religion news 117 was a trend that those who were unsatisfied with the knowledge background of the religion affairs reporter were more critical of the quantity of coverage than those who were less critical of the reporters. In terms of religious stream, there was greater similarity between the various religious and non-religious streams than was found in the earlier questions of quantity and accuracy of coverage in newspapers. Thus, the Haredim – non-Hassidic and Hassidic – were less critical regarding the quantity of religion coverage than they were regarding the quality and accuracy of religion content. There was little difference regarding radio; the Haredim – non-Hassidic and Hassidic – were incrementally a little higher in criticism. There was greater satisfaction with the quantity religion content on TV and in newspapers than on radio. Indeed, it is difficult to understand the criticism of Hassidic Haredim or the Hardal in this given that they do not even watch television. How satisfied are the Israeli public with the quantity of religion coverage in new media? On websites, there was little difference in opinion between men and women. Overall, the Israeli public gave average ratings to the quantity, quality, and accuracy of religion coverage in mass media and social media. It is particularly true in the case of accuracy. So while only a small number rated these as bad or terrible, most ratings were average – which suggests a need for improving the product. In the case of social media, while internet and news websites were regarded as average in accuracy, this was less so in related sectors like blogging and social networks, which are manned by citizen journalists rather than professional media personnel. In terms of the ratings of different streams, those belonging to the mainstream modern Orthodox were less critical, whereas Haredi, Conservative, and Reform respondents were less satisfied. The religion affairs journalist The public were more critical of the religion affairs reporters than other journalists. While 25% of journalists in the author’s survey agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent that religion affairs reporters had adequate knowledge, and a further 39% agreed, while 29% said it was either adequate or non-existent, 13% did not agree, and 17% agreed only a little. The public thought otherwise: 16% of the public, in the author’s survey, agreed to a very great extent or a great extent that religion affairs specialists had adequate knowledge, a further 29% agreed, but 32% and 23% did not agree at all or agreed only a little. There was a clear pattern that the more the public thought that the religion affairs specialist did not have adequate information, the more the public was inclined to say that accuracy of religion coverage in newspapers was poor. Thus, 25% and 34% of the Israeli public who entirely disagreed that religion reporters had adequate knowledge of religion said that accuracy of religion was terrible or bad. So did 12% and 25% of those who were inclined to agree that accuracy was terrible. In contrast, only 6% and 6% of those who agreed completely that religion affairs reporters had enough background knowledge of religion said that the accuracy of coverage was terrible or bad.

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In terms of ethnic background, Sephardim were more inclined than Ashkenazim to evaluate the religion affairs specialist positively: 19% of Sephardim much agreed, 39% agreed, 3% very much agreed, in contrast to 12%, 26%, and 3% of Ashkenazim who agreed, much agreed, or very much agreed, respectively. There was little difference between men and women in evaluating more highly the background of religion affairs specialists: 4% and 10% of men very much agreed and much agreed, and a further 32% agreed, in contrast to 4% and 10% of women also very much agreed or much agreed (26% agreed). In terms of age, the younger the person, the more critical he or she was of the knowledge level, and the older he or she was, the higher the respondent rated the knowledge level. Thus, 9%, 15%, 17%, and 25% of the public aged 20–35, 36-50, 51–65, and 66+ agreed that the religion affairs specialists were knowledgeable. Similarly, 22%, 31%, 41% , and 44% were inclined to agree. What subjects under religion and spirituality interest Israeli Jews? There is wide audience interest in some themes of religion news and less interest in other religion themes: 39% of respondents in a 2010 US survey (Winston & Green, 2015), for example, said they were interested a great deal in spirituality as a topic of religion coverage, 37% in religion and American politics, and 31% in local church news. In contrast, only 27% were interested a great deal in religion, economy, and business news; 16% in religion, arts, and entertainment; and 13% in religion and sport. In the case of Israel, the most popular subject was events happening inside one’s own religious stream. It does show how much Israel is broken down by tribe – people identify with their own. While this scored 46% of wide interest, it is instructive to contrast this with such other news categories as interest in other Jewish streams and non-Jewish religions. And those two received far lower interest – only 18% and 7% had great interest in other Jewish religious streams or other religions, respectively. In a 1988 BBC study of viewing habits, overwhelmingly the British public favoured that all religions be covered by the media, not just Christianity: 62% agreed and 28% disagreed (Svennevig, Haldane, & Gunter, 1988, p. 56). However, when broken down by faith, Christian respondents were less inclined to agree (59%), in contrast to some of the minority religions in the UK (Hindus 67%, Muslims 76%, and Black Pentecostals 80%) (Gunter & Viney, 1994, p. 93). The next subject, after news about one’s own religious stream, was religion and state, of which 39% of the Israeli public surveyed by the author said it was of great interest. Related to religion and state were various sub-themes reflecting points of conflict under Judaism and democracy and the politics of religion. These include religious political parties (35% wide interest), Israeli army and religion-related issues (23% wide interest), and religious status of the non-Orthodox inside Israel (as a general rule, only the Orthodox is recognised by the state; 17% wide interest). Features of Jewish life drew varied interest. News about the annual events and life cycles of Jewish life drew 29% wide interest, the weekly Bible reading in synagogues on the Sabbath 28%, prayer (tefilla) 23%, kashrut (permitted food according to Jewish dietary laws) 21%, synagogue 16%, new rabbinical law decisions

The public and religion news 119 21%, returnees to Judaism (hozrei b’teshuva) 15%, those who are leaving religion (hozrei b’shealah) 15%, and miraculous happenings of a religious nature 13%. News of other elements of religious life that the public is widely interested in include charity (hesed) (29%); studying Judaism (25%); religious education (23%); legends about rabbis (23%); religious institutions (22%); Jerusalem, the Western Wall (Kotel), and the Temple Mount (25%); Jews living in the diaspora (21%); archaeology (8%); Jewish popular entertainment (5%); Jews and sport (5%); trends in Judaism, including women and Judaism (26%); and demographic patterns among the Jewish population (including data on Jewish observance) (23%). Broken down, each of the themes may be examined according to how they are seen by each group religiously, according to age group, according to gender, and according to Ashkenazi/Sephardi affiliation (the breakdown between Jews or their ancestors coming from European and from Oriental [North African and Arab countries] countries, with the respective Jewish traditions), as reflected in the author’s survey of the Israeli public.

Table 6.1 Ratings of interest in religion among the Israeli Jewish public (with comparison to Israeli journalists’ ratings) Public

My religious stream Religion and state Sabbath in the public arena Charity Life cycles of Judaism Religious political parties Weekly Bible readings and inspirational talks Women and Judaism Jerusalem, Temple Mount and Western Wall Jewish studies Trends in Judaism Religious education Religion and the Israeli army Inspirational stories about rabbis Prayer Religious institutions Kashrut Diaspora Jewry

Journalists

High Interest

Medium Interest

Low Interest

No Interest at All

46.0% 39.0% 35.0%

27.0% 27.0% 32.0%

18.0% 27.0% 26.0%

9.0% 7.0% 7.0%

29.0% 28.7% 34.6% 27.7%

30.0% 30.1% 39.5% 22.8%

25.0% 31.2% 9.9% 27.8%

16.0% 10.0% 16.0% 21.8%

26.0% 25.4%

30.0% 32.8%

34.0% 31.8%

10.0% 9.9%

24.8% 23.4% 23.3% 23.2%

26.1% 29.9% 24.9% 30.9%

28.1% 28.9% 29.9% 30.9%

21.0% 17.9% 21.9% 15.0%

23.2%

24.0%

27.9%

25.0%

22.9% 21.7% 21.2% 20.9%

23.0% 31.1% 25.9% 37.0%

28.0% 31.1% 28.9% 32.0%

26.0% 16.1% 23.9% 10.0%

High

41.0%

24.0% 47.0%

(Continued)

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Table 6.1 (Continued) Public

New Jewish law rulings Jewish religious streams not mine Status of the nonOrthodox in Israel Synagogue Formerly observant Returnees to Judaism Jewish food recipes Secularism Miraculous tales Archaeology Other religions Religion and entertainment Sport and Judaism

1.

Journalists

High Interest

Medium Interest

Low Interest

No Interest at All

High

20.8% 17.4%

20.0% 33.8%

30.1% 34.8%

29.1% 13.9%

21.0%

16.6%

16.9%

32.8%

33.8%

16.2% 15.2% 15.0% 14.4% 14.4% 13.3% 8.4% 6.6% 5.2%

23.0% 22.2% 30.0% 21.9% 34.2% 20.9% 17.4% 20.1% 17.0%

33.9% 37.3% 38.0% 29.9% 37.3% 23.9% 24.2% 39.2% 31.9%

26.9% 25.2% 17.0% 33.8% 14.1% 41.8% 50.0% 34.1% 45.9%

4.8%

7.9%

27.8%

59.5%

14.0%

News about my own religious stream

News about one’s own religious stream was the most newsworthy theme and drew widest interest in the author’s survey of the Israeli public among Jews defining themselves as Reform (72%), Conservative (59%), Hassidic Haredi (58%), non-Hassidic Haredi (or Lithuanian Haredi) (54%), mainstream modern Orthodox (or dati leumi) (48%), or Hardal (or Haredi Leumi) (45%). Registering the lowest rating for wide interest are secular (hiloni) atheists (13%), secular (hiloni) non-atheists (25%), and traditional Jews (or Masorati) (23%). These last three categories are neither organised structurally or psychologically. They are at best movements or ways an individual defines himself or herself religiously. The traditional Jew, or Masorati, is somebody who defines himself as neither religious but also not secular. It should not be confused with the name of the Conservative movement in Israel, the Masorati movement. The traditional movement itself comprises two groupings: those closer to the strictly religiously observant and who, for example, will mostly pray in an Orthodox synagogue and those closer to secularism. (Indeed, in answering “to my religious grouping” relates to the question whether news about the groups was of interest, 55% of secular atheists, 27% of traditional Jews, and 15% of secular non-atheists said no interest at all.) In terms of age groupings – 20–35, 36–50, 51–65, and 66+ – there was not a great deal of difference between streams: 55% of those 66+ said news from the community was of widest interest, and 49% of 20–35, 39% of 36–50, and 38% of

The public and religion news 121 51–65 said the same thing. Overall, the 51–65 age group were lowest in saying their own religious group were of news interest to them. Sephardim were less inclined than Ashkenazim to agree that their own religious group was of news interest: 48%, 27%, 17%, and 8% of Ashkenazim said that their own religious stream was of wide news interest, average news interest, low news interest, or no news interest, respectively, in contrast to 39%, 27%, 24%, and 11% of Sephardim. There were small differences between males and females, but no singular pattern emerges. 2.

Jewish religious streams that are not one’s own

In contrast to the previous category, Jewish religious streams that are not one’s own generated only 17% for those reporting wide interest. Those identifying as Reform scored highest, being interested in religious streams that were not theirs (42%), followed by Conservative (29%). Yet the Hassidic Haredim showed wide interest also – 26%. However, only 8% of non-Hassidic Haredim said so. Moreover, only 9% of traditional Jews gave it wide interest. Even the modern Orthodox – although more interested than Haredim in general education (i.e. non-Jewish or secular studies) and therefore know more about “the other” – were only interested to a limited degree: 13% of modern Orthodox and only 13% of Hardal expressed wide interest. In the age groups, those 36–50 were less likely to say they were widely interested. Among Ashkenazim there was wider interest than among Sephardim (19.2% of Ashkenazim reported wide interest compared to 12% of Sephardim). Women (22%) were more likely to be very interested in other Jewish religious streams than men (14%). 3.

Interest in other religions

Only 7% were widely interested in news about other religions. But there was a clear line between the Orthodox and other groupings on this, with those respondents identifying as Orthodox opposing such a trend. Thus, 18% of Reform, 17% of traditional, 12% of secular atheists, 8% of secular non-atheists, and 8% of Conservative were widely interested in non-Jewish religions, in contrast to 0% of Hardal, 1% of non-Hassidic Haredim, 4% of Hassidic Haredim, and 5% of mainstream modern Orthodox. Those 66+ were incrementally inclined to be interested in other religions than younger age groups. Ashkenazim (19%) were more inclined than Sephardim (12%) to have wide interest in other faiths, and 22% of females expressed wide interest, in contrast to 14% only of males. 4.

Religion and state

As a news category, religion and state was overall in second place in highest news interest – 43% expressed wide interest in news about religion and state issues.

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There was no significant difference between the actual policy position a person agreed with, for example, a separation of synagogue and state – or whether they saw the subject as newsworthy. In terms of religiosity, the subject of religion and state is of wide interest to many different groupings for different and, sometimes, opposing reasons. Thus, 82% of Reform Jews thought it of wide interest. It reflects the Reform’s struggle for recognition in Israel. So did 47% of Conservative Jews. Fifty-nine per cent of secular atheists – perhaps feeling threatened by the Orthodox rather than seeking recognition like the Reform and Conservative – also said that news about religion and state issues was of wide interest. Yet only 30% of secular non-atheists, 51% of non-Hassidic Haredim, and 37% of Hassidim Haredim said such news was of wide interest. There was a tendency for older age groups (66+, 71%) to see religion and state with wide interest, in contrast to 40% and 33% of those aged 20–35 and 36–50. There was an overall tendency for Ashkenazim to say news about religion and state was of wider interest than Sephardim: 45% of Ashkenazim said it was of wide interest, compared to 35% of Sephardim. And men (52%) were more inclined than women (35%) to express wide interest. 5.

Sabbath observance in the public arena

The status of the Sabbath in the public arena is the third most interesting news item (35%). It is a matter of controversy for those who consider it important for individuals to be free to choose between observing the Sabbath or not. Thus, 64% of Reform said the Sabbath status quo theme was of wide interest. They were followed by 43% of secular atheists and 38% of secular non-atheists. Least interested were the mainstream modern Orthodox (23%) and Hardal (24%). There was no clear relationship between those who conducted the kiddush benediction at the festive Sabbath meal and interest in the public status for Shabbat. Nor was there any clear relationship between those who agreed that a Jew who does not fulfil religious commandments endangers the Jewish people as a whole and news interest in the status quo concerning the Sabbath. There was a tendency for the older age groups to say that the question of Sabbath observance was of wide interest: 53% of those who were aged 66+ and 42% of those aged 51–65, as opposed to 34% of those aged 20–35 and 23% of those 36–50. Thirty-eight per cent of Ashkenazim had wide interest in the Sabbath and its public observance, as opposed to 26% of Sephardim – which is surprising given that the Sephardim are more traditional and therefore more Sabbath-observant. Women were incrementally more inclined than men to see Sabbath observance with wide interest. 6.

The Jewish annual life cycle

News about the Jewish annual life cycle was in overall 5th place as most popular item – earned 29%. This includes life-cycle events like the Sabbath, religious festivals and fasts, circumcision, bar mitzvah (confirmation)(boys)/bat mitzvah (girls),

The public and religion news 123 marriage, and death. The religious groups which gave it widest interest were the Hassidic Haredim (43%), Non-Hassidic Haredim (39%), Reform (36%), and Conservative (33%). Lowest – they do not observe it – are secular atheists (11%) and secular non-atheists (16%). In age groups, the oldest age group 66+ see it as widest interest, at 38%. Ashkenazim are more inclined (30%) than Sephardim (24%). Women (31%) are more inclined than men (26%) to define this as widest interest. 7.

The Israeli army and religion

News about the Israeli army and religion includes questions like provision for religious soldiers in the IDF; Haredi exemptions from army service; women in the Israeli army, including training of men by female commanders; Sabbath observance on military bases and military actions; the question of army service for religious women; death and burial rituals for soldiers dying in action; and identification of missing soldiers who die in action. It received 23% for wide interest. In one sense, this is not surprising because with the exception of Haredim, many of whom seek exemptions from army service, the subject concerns all. But the subject most concerns Sabbath-observant soldiers or those identified with mainstream modern Orthodox and Hardal (the latter perceiving national service as a religious obligation of defending the biblical homeland). The responses would vary from Hardal and mainstream modern Orthodox who see service in the IDF as an ideological cum religious commitment to a secular Zionist commitment to Haredim who rejected it. Thirty-two per cent of Hardal, 32% of secular atheists, 31% of traditional, 31% of Reform, 31% secular non-atheists, and 27% of mainstream modern Orthodox expressed wide interest. Lowest was from Hassidic Haredim (11%) and non-Hassidic Haredim (14%). In another sense, in the issue of Haredi exemptions from the army, one would have expected interest also from Haredi respondents. There was a trend from the lowest of 16% in expressing wide interest from the age group 20–35 – which is the age for national service – and then the interest goes up to 21% (36–50), 37% (51–65), and 39% (66+). This is one of the few categories of news interest where the Sephardim (27%) scored higher than the Ashkenazim (22%) in showing wide interest. Men (29%) were more interested than women (17%). 8.

Religious political parties

News about religious political parties generated overall 35% wide interest. This was widest among the non-Hassidic Haredim (45%). This is not surprising given that Haredim have their own political parties. So were Hassidic Haredim but less so (27%), as well as mainstream modern Orthodox (34%) and Hardal (28%). Least interested were those who are not religiously affiliated: secular nonatheists (8%), secular atheists (23%), and traditional (17%). There were overall similarities in age groups: notwithstanding this, the 51–65 age group were slightly less inclined to see it as newsworthy. Ashkenazim were more inclined than Sephardim. Men were significantly more likely than women to

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see it as newsworthy: 38% of men said religious political parties were of wide interest in contrast to 19% of women – arguably reflecting the superior involvement of the Haredi male in politics. 9.

Jerusalem, holy places, Temple Mount, and Kotel (Western Wall)

News about Jerusalem, holy places, Temple Mount, and Kotel (Western Wall) generates wide interest among 25% of respondents, given their centrality in Jewish history, being the sites of the ancient First and Second Jewish Temples. In one sense, it was surprising that 60% of Reform reported wide interest because Reform Jews do not envisage a rebuilt temple like Orthodox Jews do, reintroducing the temple sacrificial service of the ancient period. In second place were Conservative respondents at 38%. In another sense, this was less surprising since the non-Orthodox have made a cardinal issue in their struggle for recognition of a place to conduct their services at the Western Wall. This was followed by traditional (29%), Hardal (27%), mainstream modern Orthodox (26%), Hassidic Haredim (23%), non-Hassidic Haredim (16%), and secular non-atheists (13%). The older the age group, the more widely they regarded Jerusalem with news interest. Thus, 20% of those aged 20–35 said that Jerusalem was of wide interest, compared to 48% of those aged 66+. Only slightly more Ashkenazim (26%) said Jerusalem was newsworthy than Sephardim (23%). More men (28%) said so than women (23%). 10.

Judaica: Bible readings, legends about rabbis, stories of miraculous happenings, new Jewish legal rulings, and Jewish study

A number of themes, each separate but related to Jewish belief and Jewish study, throw light on the audience’s interest in non-hard news on religion. News reports which touch on the weekly Bible reading

The weekly Bible reading draws on the custom that the five books of Moses are read in the synagogue on the Sabbath and holydays from the Torah scrolls week by week during the Jewish yearly cycle. Many observant but also non-strictly observant Jews read it, some adding some of the Jewish commentators on the Bible, notably the French medieval commentator, Rashi. In addition, this category adds short inspirational Torah-based talks. As a category, news about the weekly Bible reading earned an overall 28% for those expressing wide interest. Overall, the Bible reading and the subject was of interest both to Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews. Most widely interested were Hassidic Haredim (40%) and Reform (39%), followed by non-Hassidic Haredim (37%), Hardal (27%), mainstream modern Orthodox (26%), Conservative (23%), traditional (22%, yet 29% said they had no interest), secular atheists (3%), and secular non-atheists (13%).

The public and religion news 125 Tales of miraculous events of a religious orientation

Miraculous tales with a religious angle may hold a central place in other faiths, but it is also instructive to see to what extent the subject is addressed by the Jewish news consumer. Compared to the weekly Bible reading, interest in news about miraculous happenings earned much less interest, only 13%. Some of the religious groups that were widely interested were Hassidic Haredim (31%), non-Hassidic Haredim (20%), and Reform (17%). However, interest went down very considerably in other groups: mainstream modern Orthodox (7%), traditional (7%), Hardal (6%), secular atheists (6%), Conservative (5%), secular non-atheists (3%). It is instructive to examine those uninterested in miraculous events. In addition to 80% and 74% of secular atheists and secular non-atheists, 54% of Reform and Conservative, 53% of traditional, 45% of mainstream modern Orthodox, 37% of Hardal, 23% of non-Hassidic Haredim, and 12% of Hassidic Haredim had no interest at all. This reveals a wider hesitancy, which suggests that miraculous events may not be a key to reach out to Judaism. Legendary stories of rabbis

As role models, rabbis are figures to emulate and identify with. Interest in reports about legendary stories about rabbis, which generated an overall average of 23%, had similarities but also differences with the previous two (the weekly biblical reading and miraculous stories with a religious orientation). And these were much higher than reports about miraculous events: again, the Hassidic Haredim led, with 49% wide interest, followed by non-Hassidic Haredim (37%) and Hardal (32%), but also traditional 17% – which, it may be noted, also responded highly for weekly Bible readings (22%) – and which was higher than mainstream modern Orthodox (13%) or Conservative (10%). Reform was 11% (less than the weekly Bible reading or tales about miracles.) Those who had no interest in stories about rabbis, in addition to secular atheists (68%) and secular non-atheists (47%), included Reform (19%), Conservative (39%), and mainstream modern Orthodox (39%). New Jewish legal (halakhic) rulings

But news about new halakhic (Jewish legal) rulings (p’suk din) generates certain interest among the curious, particularly if they are unusual, seemingly eccentric, or appear as primitive rulings. Most interested in new halakhic rulings are the Orthodox, who follow Rabbinic Judaism. Non-Hassidic Haredim, who focus on the study of rabbinical law texts (namely the Talmud), registered widest interest (34%), followed by Hassidic Haredim 32%, as well as Hardal (24%), who, while also in the modern Orthodox tradition, are more particular both in practice and in religious learning and Jewish law. The mainstream Modern Orthodox registered (18%). The exception – or non-Orthodox – which registered highly here was Conservative at 25%. Indeed, this is less surprising given that Conservative Judaism also

126 The public and religion news follows religious law, or “continuous halakha” – notably those commands listed in the Bible itself, but are less restrictive and more amenable to change as rabbinic rulings to fit modern times. The Reform, while having progressive halakha, only registered 11%. The secular atheists (6%) and secular non-atheists (3%) are necessarily uninterested in new rabbinical rulings. Jewish study

The study of Judaism is regarded as a virtuous task and encouraged. So news about Jewish study showed general interest. The group which rated highest for wide interest was Reform (46%), followed by non-Hassidic Haredim (32%), Hardal (31%), Hassidic Haredim (28%, Conservative (27%), mainstream modern Orthodox (23%), traditional (12%), secular atheists (6%), and secular nonatheists (13%). Overall – comparing all the above categories (the weekly Bible reading, tales of miraculous events, legends of rabbis, new Jewish religious rulings, and Jewish study) – Hassidic Haredim were in the lead, with the biggest number in miracles with a religious orientation, legendary stories about rabbis, and the weekly Bible reading. Reform led on news about Jewish religious studies and shared a spot with Hassidic Haredim in the weekly biblical reading and with non-Hassidic Haredim in new Jewish law rulings. The eldest age group (66+) expressed widest interest for the inspirational weekly Bible reading, new Jewish religious law rulings, and Jewish study. People in this age group are retired and have more time. But the youngest age group (20–35) had the top place for stories about rabbis (30%) followed by the 36–50 age group (22%) and 66+ age group (15%). Miraculous happenings had similar patterns for three of the four age groups (20–35, 16%; 66+, 15%; 36–50, 12%). The 51–65 age group were overall inclined to rate this lower than the other three groups. In all five headings, Ashkenazim were more interested than Sephardim in the weekly Bible reading and Jewish religious studies by only 2%. In the case of the weekly Bible readings, the Sephardim are just as interested. In the case of legendary stories about rabbis and miraculous happenings with a religious orientation, the gap between Ashkenazim and Sephardim was insignificant (6% and 5%, respectively). The widest gap was the 10% gap regarding new and interesting halakhic rulings (Ashkenazim [23%] versus Sephardim [13%]). In terms of gender, women had the highest and widest interest over men in stories about rabbis (27% [women] versus 19% [men]; weekly Bible readings 30% versus 25%) and miraculous happenings with a religious background (14% versus 13%). And men had wide interest over women in new halakhic (Jewish religious law) rulings (24% versus 18%) and Jewish religious studies (25% versus 24%) – which may be explained by the fact that in the Haredi world, there are more opportunities to learn.

The public and religion news 127 11.

Synagogue

News reports about synagogues, Jewish houses of prayer, generated overall an average of 16% wide interest. These include reports of building licenses for synagogues under construction, incidents of violence involving synagogues, stories about architectural designs of synagogues, and the status of synagogues of nonOrthodox communities. While Hassidic Haredim led with 33% and non-Hassidic Haredim with 25%, this was very far from the Hardal (6%) and mainstream modern Orthodox (12%). Reform was ahead (16%) of all the non-Haredi streams. Conservative was 12%. Understandably, secular non-atheists were at 0.6%, and secular atheists were at 3%. There was a correlation between attendance at synagogue and prayer in a synagogue as a subject of wide interest. It ranged from 24% of those who prayed daily, 14% of those who prayed frequently, 18% of those who prayed sometimes, 4% of those who prayed occasionally, and 3% of those who never prayed. There was no age correlation – 22% of those aged 66+ and 19% of those aged 20–35 each said that news about the synagogue was of wide interest. Ashkenazim (16%) led Sephardim (14%). Men (19%) led women 14%; in part this may reflect that men attend synagogues more than women because the former are required to pray under Jewish law, whereas the Jewish woman is not required because she is exempt from commandments with a fixed time period given her family obligations. 12. Tefilla (Jewish prayer)

News concerning Jewish prayer (tefilla) had an average of 23% of wide interest. Broken down, Haredim and Hardal were easily the highest, showing interest in news about tefilla: 38%, 35%, 33%, and 29% of Hassidic Haredim, non-Hassidic Haredim, Reform, and Hardal said that Jewish prayer was of wide interest. Noteworthy was the contrast between mainstream modern Orthodox (18%) and Hardal (29%) – even though ideologically they are very similar and both pray. Also noteworthy was the difference between the Reform (33%) and Conservative (only 13%) The traditional, at 16%, confirm the wide sense of Jewish identity, including religious practices like prayer, even though they are not formally religious or wholly observant. Unsurprising was the secular: 0% and 3% for secular atheists, who by definition do not pray, and secular non-atheists, respectively. There was a clear relationship between those who pray and those who define news about prayer as widely interesting: 36% and 25% of those who pray daily or frequently, respectively, defined news reports about Jewish prayer as of wide interest. So did 17% who pray sometimes, 6% occasionally, and 4% never.

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There was no clear picture in terms of age breakdown: 31% and 27% of 66+ and 20–35, respectively, gave tefilla (prayer) wide interest in contrast to 12% aged 51–65 and 16% aged 36–50 gave tefilla wide interest. Ashkenazim (24%) were more inclined than Sephardim 21% to say tefilla was of wide interest. Men and women shared the same value for wide interest 23%. 13. Hozrei b’teshuva (returnees to Judaism) and hozrei b’shealah (formerly observant)

News about people changing their religious belief – whether it is about a person who was secular or traditional becoming religious, the reverse, or about somebody who was formally religious, including, for example, somebody who grew up in closed communities like Haredim and shedding all – make interesting news copy regarding their motivations. Hozrei b’shealah (formally observant) and hozrei b’teshuva (returnees to Orthodox Judaism) each scored 15% for wide interest. News about hozrei b’teshuva scored greatest among the Hardal. Hardal (33%) was ahead of nonHassidic Haredim (23%) and Hassidic Haredim (19%). It seemed a confirmation of their own beliefs. Greatest interest in news about hozrei b’shealah (formally observant) was found among the non-Orthodox and secular – 22% of secular non-atheist, 21% of Reform, 16% of secular atheist, 16% of Conservative, and 14% of traditional. Unsurprisingly, interest in news about hozrei b’teshuva (returnees to Orthodox Judaism) was lowest among the secular atheists (0%), Conservative (3%), traditional (7%), secular non-atheists (8%), and Reform (9%). Interest in news about hozrei b’shealah was lowest among the Haredim and modern Orthodox: Hassidic Haredim (11%), non-Hassidic Haredim (14%), mainstream modern Orthodox (14%), and Hardal (18%). In age groupings, the two contrasting subjects, hozrei b’teshuva and hozrei b’shealah produced opposing patterns. The highest interest in hozrei b’teshuva was in the youngest age group, 20–35 (20%), and the highest interest in hozrei b’shealah was in the oldest age group 66+ (28%). The lowest interest in hozrei b’teshuva was in the 66+ age group (70%), and the lowest of interest in hozrei b’shealah was in the 36–50 (12%) and 20–35 (13%) age groups. Sephardim (16%) were incrementally more interested than Ashkenazim (14%) in hozrei b’teshuva, and Ashkenazim (15%) were incrementally more interested than Sephardim (14|%) in hozrei b’shealah. 14.

Secularism (hiloni)

To what extent is there interest in news reports about secular individuals (hiloni in Hebrew) and secularism as an idea? The category of the secular Israel may be broken down between those who do not believe in the existence of God and those who believe in His existence but follow a purely secular lifestyle: 24% and 22% of secular atheists and secular non-atheists, respectively, were most interested in news about secular Israeli and secularism. The nearest were traditional (18%) and Reform (19%). Yet also 16% of modern Orthodox had wide interest in news about secular Israel and secularism.

The public and religion news 129 Among the age groups, 19% of those aged 66+ and 17% of those aged 51–65 scored highest for interest in news about secular people and secularism (as opposed to 10% of those aged 36–50 and 14% of those aged 20–35). Ashkenazim and Sephardim scored equally, 14% each. Males (15%) incrementally showed wider interest than females (14%). 15.

The status of the non-Orthodox (Reform and Conservative) Jews in Israel

Given the uncertain status of non-Orthodox groups in Israel – notably the Conservative and Reform Judaism – it is fitting to ask whether protagonists and antagonists to these two communities have interest in the status of the non-Orthodox in Israel. Overall, there was an average of 23% showing wide interest. But it generated very wide interest among Jews defining themselves as Reform or Conservative: 76% and 56% of Reform and Conservative, respectively, expressed wide interest in news about the non-Orthodox communities. Yet, it generated low interest among secular Israelis. Twenty-one per cent of secular atheists and 14% of secular non-atheists showed wide interest. Partly, this was due to secular Israelis not being fully cognizant of Conservative and Reform Judaism, which are far more prominent in the US than Israel. It also generated very low interest among the Orthodox. Only 3% of Hardal, only 5% of Hassidic Haredim, 10% of non-Hassidic Haredim, and 10% of mainstream modern Orthodox expressed wide interest. One might have thought that the Orthodox, who are concerned with any perceived threat to the Orthodox monopoly in religious matters in Israel, ought to have followed news about the status of the non-Orthodox. In terms of age breakdown, there was steady increase in interest in the nonOrthodox from only 8% of the 20–35 age group, to 17% of 36–50, 34% of 51–65, and 37% of 66+. The Ashkenazim (19%) led the Sephardim (11%). Men (21%) led women (14%). 16.

News about kashrus (or kosher food)

The Bible lists food, notably animals, which are forbidden to eat and instructs in ways for slaughtering animals, as well as requiring that meat and milk products foods to be eaten separately. The overall title kashrut – or kosher food – fits these categories. Also, in ancient times (1000 BCE–70 CE), animals and agricultural produce was subject to being tithed – some of which laws are still applicable today. Orthodox Jews strictly observe these even today, but to a lesser extent so do traditional Jews and Conservative Jews. At Passover, leavened food products such as yeast are forbidden. A supervisory body to ensure that kashrus is respected at food factories and restaurants has evolved with a network of inspectors. Under the influence of the Haredi community, it has at times become a subject of controversy as, for example, the modern Orthodox sought to replace it. This and such stories, including failure in kashrut inspection and even corruption, such as bribing kashrut inspectors, generate some media interest in the subject. Overall, wide interest in kashrut as a news

130 The public and religion news story scored 21%. The Orthodox scored greatest: 36% of Hassidic Haredim had wide interest in kashrut, as did 34% of Hardal and 32% of non-Hassidic Haredim. There is a correlation between those who are widely interested in news about kashrut and those who observed kashrut: 26% of those who observed kashrut regarded news about kashrut as of wide interest, in contrast to 7% who observed kashrut frequently, those who observed kashrut from time to time (0%), occasionally (8%), and never (4%). Eighteen per cent of mainstream modern Orthodox, 16% of traditional, and 15% of Conservative (who are also inclined to observe kashrut) expressed wide interest. Other groups were considerably less – only 11% of Reform, 3% of secular atheists, and 0% of secular non-atheists showed wide interest in news about kashrut. There was no clear pattern in terms of age groupings: 25% of the youngest age group (20–35) and 23% of the oldest age group (66+) expressed widest interest in kashrut as a news subject – in contrast to the 36–50 age group (15%) and the 51–65 age group (16%). Ashkenazi were slightly more widely interested in kashrut (22%) than Sephardim (20%). Males (24%) were more interested than women (19%), which may be surprising since even today many women fulfil the premier role in the family kitchen. 17.

The Jewish diaspora

News about the Jewish diaspora or Jewish communities outside Israel generates sympathy for the far-flung Jewish communities. Half of world Jewry lives outside Israel, most in the US, and far smaller numbers are in communities in Europe, Latin America, and Anglo-Saxon countries. To what extent is there interest in the other Jews, the non-Israelis? There were wide gaps. First, given the close ties between the non-Orthodox people in the USA and the non-Orthodox communities inside Israel, it was not surprising that the 63% of respondents identifying themselves as Reform and 39% as Conservative had wide interest in news about the diaspora. Haredim have a long tradition of following the fate of Jewish communities abroad, as well as concern about anti-Semitism. So it was not surprising that 22% of non-Hassidic Haredim and 17% of Hassidic Haredim expressed wide interest in Jewish diaspora news. In contrast, the groups which showed least interest were Hardal (5%) and the mainstream Modern Orthodox (15%) – which reflects the importance Orthodox Jews give to living in the State of Israel, aliya (emigration to Israel), and settling the biblical land. Also, 20% of traditional, 19% of secular nonatheists, and 12% of secular atheists expressed wide interest. In age breakdown, there was a trend for older persons to be more interested in news about the Jewish diaspora than younger people: 44% of the 66+ age group expressed wide interest, in contrast to only 16% of the 20–35 age group. The low level of interest among younger Israelis should raise concern among those responsible for strengthening Israeli-diaspora relations. Ashkenazim (23%) were more widely interested than Sephardim (16%), partly reflecting the fact that there are no longer Jews in Arab lands. Men (24%) were more interested than women (19%).

The public and religion news 131 18.

News about biblical archaeology

Eight per cent of all respondents expressed wide interest in biblical archaeology. Broken down according to religious sectors, biblical archaeology news drew much less interest among those defining themselves as Orthodox – both Haredim and modern Orthodox. Among those expressing wide interest in news about biblical archaeology are those defining themselves as Reform (22%), secular non-atheist (19%), and Conservative (13%). Lowest interest in news about archaeology was shown by non-Hassidic Haredim (4%), Hassidic Haredim (7%), Hardal (10%), mainstream Modern Orthodox (11%), and secular atheist (10%). The low level of interest by the mainstream modern Orthodox and Hardal was surprising given the ideological emphasis the groups give to living in the Promised Land. Broken down by age groups, news about archaeology was of interest to the older age groups: 38% of the 66+ age group and 18% of the 51–65 age group expressed wide interest, in contrast to 7% of the 36–50 age group and 4% of the 25–35 age group. There was little difference between Ashkenazim (11%) and Sephardim (13%). But more men (14%) expressed wide interest in news about archaeology than women (8%). 19. Jewish food

Fourteen per cent expressed wide interest in Jewish food recipes. This was notable among the Orthodox – Haredim and modern Orthodox – streams: 26%, 24%, 13%, and 10% of Hassidic Haredim, non-Hassidic Haredim, mainstream modern Orthodox, and Hardal gave wide interest to Jewish food recipes. This was much less with non-Orthodox streams – traditional (9%), Conservative (8%), secular non-atheists (8%), Reform (6%), and secular atheists (6%). Given that the Orthodox are inclined to eat only kosher food, it is only natural for them to be interested in Jewish food, in contrast to the non-Orthodox, who enjoy an international palate. In age breakdown, 17% of those aged 20–35 said they were widely interested in news about Jewish food, in comparison to those aged 35–50 (13%), 66+ (12%), and 51–65 (11%). Ashkenazim (16%) expressed more widest interest than Sephardim (10%). Women (19%) not surprisingly reported wide interest to a greater degree than men (10%). 20. Jewish entertainment

To what extent is there interest in news about the world of Jewish entertainment? Interest in news about Jewish entertainment is small, perhaps surprisingly – only 5% overall expressed wide interest. There was a consensus of a lack of interest in Jewish entertainment. It ranged from 8% of secular non-atheists, 4% of Conservative and non-Hassidic Haredim, and 3% of Hassidic Haredim. The low Haredi figure is surprising since Haredim, in

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living behind cultural walls, are exposed to certain areas of Jewish entertainment, including traditional Jewish music, like Jewish cantorial music (hazanut). There was no significant difference between the age groups – ranging from 4% for those aged 36–50 to 8% for 66+, – even though it was hypothesised that younger people would like it. Only 6% of Ashkenazim and 4% of Sephardim were interested, and both men and women each got 5%. 21.

Sport and Judaism

News about sport and Judaism includes such questions as sporting events on the Sabbath, religious women engaged in sport, and foreign sportsmen who are Jewish. But despite popular interest in sport per se, interest in news about Judaism and sport was very low among all groups: The highest is 11% of mainstream modern Orthodox, and the lowest is 0% each for secular atheists, Reform, Hassidic Haredim, and Hardal. Non-Hassidic Haredim got 6%. Given that the questions here are not relevant except to mostly Orthodox persons, who observe the Sabbath, it is not surprising that the nonOrthodox show little interest. Sport is of no interest to Haredim, who perceive competitive sport (as distinct from physical exercise) as anathema to Judaism because it seemingly embraces the Greek physique by idealising physical strength rather than focusing on the spiritual. Noteworthy is that Haredi media do not cover sporting events. In terms of age groups, one might have hypothesised that younger persons would be more interested in the subject of sport and Judaism. But the reverse was true: the 66+ age group expressed the widest interest in sport news, and the 20–35 age group expressed the lowest (4%). Sephardim (7%) were slightly ahead of Ashkenazim (4%). Men (7%) were ahead of women (3%). In conclusion, news categories scoring highest for “no interest at all” is also revelatory. These were archaeology (66%), sport and religion (60%), entertainment and religion (46%), Jewish miraculous happenings (42%), other religions/recipes/status quo/non-Orthodox (34%), new halakhic rules (29%), synagogues (27%), prayer (26%), stories about rabbis (25%), hozrei b’shealah (25%), kashrut (24%), religious education (22%), weekly Bible readings (22%), and Jewish education (21%). Journalists and the public’s evaluation of religion news interest compared There are necessarily differences between the public and the journalists in the perception of what is religion news. While in a competitive media market, journalists want the ratings and thus want to give the public what they want to see, but journalists also wish to provide material which is of importance even though it may not necessarily be of interest to the public. The public themselves may also have their own ideas of what is important because news interest is also influenced by what the public itself sees as important.

The public and religion news 133 A clue to the differences in the public’s and journalists’ perceptions is when journalists and the public were asked to evaluate news interest in five categories: the Israeli army and religion, the status quo on Sabbath observance in the public arena, social trends in Jewish identity, halakhic rulings, and miracles with a religious angle. The first two concern the public dimension of religion, the third concerns sociological patterns, and the third and fourth reflect inherently religious and spiritual dimensions of Judaism itself. The politically contentious issues which concern the public arena were the IDF and religion and the status quo on the Sabbath in the public arena, which were regarded as far more newsworthy by the journalists than by the audience: 47% of journalists considered the IDF and religion having wide news interest, in contrast to 23% of the public, and 41% of journalists gave the status quo on the Sabbath issue in the public arena a far greater rating of wide news interest than the public (29%). On the other hand, the public found sociological trends in religion to be slightly more newsworthy than the journalists: 24% of the public said this was of wide interest, in contrast to 21% of the journalists. In the case of Jewish law rulings, the public (21%) found them far more interesting than the journalists (16%). This partly reflects the dynamics of news values and that Jewish religious law was not regarded as so newsworthy, perhaps because it did not have a conflictual element. However, miraculous happenings were regarded as of wide interest not just for the public but also by journalists, despite the absence of rational elements – but rather based on belief. A key question is whether Israeli journalists are representative or not of the broader Israeli population as shown in the last chapter. There was little significant difference between the number of journalists who defined themselves as secular or religious and the broader Israeli Jewish population. Rabbis’ communication through the media channels – the public’s view Should rabbis communicate through the media by being interviewed in the media or themselves writing articles or blogs? How do the public – their audience – view such steps by the rabbis? Given that religious leaders, not just Jewish ones, recognise that in the 21st century, religious messages may be communicated not only from the synagogue lectern but also through other channels like the media, the question is pertinent. The public are inclined to oppose rabbis being quoted in the media: 19% and 32% of the Israeli public opposed it completely or opposed it to a large extent. Only 6% and 14% favoured it completely or to a large extent (28% favoured it to some extent). In a breakdown between males and females, female respondents were inclined a little more than men to oppose rabbis being quoted in the media: 20% and 34% of women opposed it completely or to a large degree, as opposed to 18% and 31% of men, respectively. Moreover, 19% of men were inclined to agree considerably that rabbis should be quoted, as opposed to only 12% of women. Sephardim were

134 The public and religion news inclined to agree more than Ashkenazim that rabbis should be quoted: 16% and 26% of Sephardim did not agree completely or to a large extent, in contrast to 20% and 34% of Ashkenazim, respectively; 9% and 17% of Sephardim agreed completely or to a large extent, in contrast to only 5% and 15% of Ashkenazi, respectively. There was little difference in age breakdown, with the exception that those aged 66+ were even more opposed than the younger people to the usage by rabbis of the media. Moreover, most of the public disagree that inaccurate reporting about religion originates from rabbis not being successful in explaining themselves; there was considerable difference between men and women: 51% and 25% of men did not agree at all or disagreed a lot, in contrast to 32% and 31% of women. Sephardim were more inclined to agree than Ashkenazim: 46% and 27% of Ashkenazim did not agree at all or disagreed a lot, respectively, that inaccurate coverage of religion was due to rabbis failing to explain themselves. In age breakdown, there was no significant difference beyond an incremental trend that the youngest group (20–35) were more inclined than the older groups (above 36+) to disagree that inaccurate coverage was due to a failure of rabbis to explain their views. In terms of religious groups, the public’s view on whether rabbis should use media channels to explain their views showed some surprises but also confirmed expectations. In the latter, it was no surprise that 16% and 26% of the public who defined themselves as modern Orthodox agreed entirely or mostly that rabbis should use media channels to explain their views. A further 35% agreed. This was even truer of the Hardal – who are proactive in Judaism being promoted and spread to other Jews: 17% and 32% favoured entirely or mostly that rabbis should be quoted. In contrast, Haredim opposed this. Only 8% and 4% of non-Hassidic Haredim favoured entirely or almost entirely that rabbis use media channels. Or 50% and 27% of Hassidic Haredim and 32% and 28% of non-Hassidic Haredim did not agree at all or agreed only a little, respectively, that rabbis should explain their views through the media. This is very difficult to understand since Haredim want to turn Israel into a Torah-observant community. Perhaps they do not see achieving this through media channels – since they see the media as treif. Unsurprisingly, secular Israelis also opposed all this: 74% and 12% of secular atheists opposed the usage completely or to a great extent (14% to a certain degree). There was a noticeable difference between secular non-atheists and secular atheists. Thus, in contrast to secular atheists, 28% and 33% of secular non-atheists opposed completely or to a great degree rabbis using the media. (Five per cent and 21% of secular non-atheists were even inclined to agree completely or to a large extent that rabbis should use the media to communicate.) Reform and Conservative Jews were overall inclined to oppose the usage: 31% and 37% of Reform Jews opposed completely or a lot (26% agreed to some degree), as did 33% and 15% Conservative Jews, respectively (25% agreed to some degree). A related way of examining the Israeli public’s view of whether they think that rabbis should be able to use the media channels are the public’s beliefs in religious

The public and religion news 135 fundamentals. Thus, the more a person believed, the more he was inclined to favour rabbis using the media. Thus, 67% and 12% of those who did not believe in God at all and 45% and 21% of those who believed so to a small degree opposed completely or opposed to a large degree rabbis using the media. In contrast, 11% and 17% of those who believed a very great deal and 2% and 12% of those who believed to a large extent favoured rabbis using media channels. Or 27% and 21% of those who believe to a very great degree or 17% and 33% who believed to a large degree opposed completely or opposed to a large degree such usage by rabbis. To the question if Jews who do not obey mitzvot were a danger to the Jewish people, 36% and 22% of Jews who do not believe in this at all and 8% and 27% of Jews who believe a little did not agree at all or agreed only a little that rabbis should present their views in media channels. In contrast, 36% and 27% of those who believe completely or 13% and 13% of Jews who believe a lot said that rabbis should present their views in media channels. Interestingly, there was no difference between Jews who did not believe or did so a little and Jews who believed completely or a lot in agreeing that rabbis should use media channels. To the question whether there was correlation between those who agreed that inaccurate coverage of religion was due to rabbis failing to explain themselves and the question of whether they favoured rabbis using media channels to explain their views – the more they agreed with the former, the more they indeed agreed with the latter. The media and rabbinical scandals – the public’s view Should rabbinical scandals be published? It is an important question both in itself but also in terms of the wider question of the media’s image of rabbis and religion per se. In explaining the wider question of why the media have a negative image of rabbis, is the bad image due to rabbis failing to explain themselves, due to inaccurate reporting, or due to scandals involving rabbis themselves? As remarked in Chapter 3, the public were inclined to agree – not as much as the journalists but much more than the modern Orthodox rabbis – to favour that information about rabbinical scandals be published. The public were in the middle of the two. Thus, 33% and 19% of the Israeli Jewish public very much agreed or much agreed that the information about rabbinical scandals should be published in the general media – compared to 49% and 30% of journalists and 12% and 22% of modern Orthodox rabbis. The Israeli Jewish public were only slightly more inclined to favour its publication in the community – within the community media – rather than the general media. And to what extent does the publication cast a stain on the religious community as a whole, or hilul hashem? Forty-six per cent of the public agreed (26% to a very great degree, 22% to a great degree, and 19% to a certain disagree). Only a third (17%) did not agree at all and 17% to a small degree. And to what extent does publicity deter rabbis to behave ethically? Fifty-two per cent of the Israeli Jewish public agreed to very great extent or to a great extent

136 The public and religion news that publicity deters such behaviour. And a further 21% of Israeli public agreed to a certain extent. Does the media influence the public on religious matters? Does the media influence on religion? Two-thirds of the public said they are not influenced at all or influenced only to a small degree on religious matters by the media. Those who were influenced said so only to some extent. Regarding the internet’s influence on religion, 10% were influenced to a very great extent or to a great extent and 17% to some extent. Regarding social media’s influence, 10% were influenced to a very great extent or to a great extent and 12% to some extent. TV and radio were fairly similar: 7% said they were influenced by TV to a very great extent or to a great extent and 11% to some extent, and 12% said radio influenced them to a very great extent or to a great extent and 11% to some extent. Newspapers outdid internet: 12% were influenced by newspapers to a very great extent or to a great extent and 19% to some extent. Rather the effect of the media was incrementally more in understanding public events than in influencing their opinions about the events themselves. In publishing content about religion, the media is an agenda setter, pointing the public’s attention to religious developments and issues of contention. Nineteen per cent of newspaper readers were assisted to a very great extent or to a great extent in their understanding and a further 17% to some extent. Fifteen per cent of internet surfers were assisted to a very great extent or to a great extent in their understanding and a further 24% to some extent. Ten per cent of social network users were assisted to a great extent or to some extent and a further 12% to some extent. Eight per cent of radio listeners were assisted in understanding in the event to a very great extent or to a great extent and 18% to some extent. Ten per cent of TV viewers were assisted in their understanding to a very great extent or to a great extent and 14% to some extent. Broken down by religion persons, non-Orthodox (Conservative and Reform) and secular were influenced by the internet on religious matters more than other streams. The highest stream was the traditional (20%, to a very great extent or to a great extent), followed by secular atheists (18%). The least was non-Hassidic Haredim (0%). Mainstream modern Orthodox and Hardal had 15% and 12%, respectively, and Reform had 45% (to some extent). In terms of the influence of the press upon the public on religious matters, secular and Reform were most influenced: 23% and 22%, respectively, of secular and Reform are influenced to a very great extent or to a great extent. The least influenced were Hardal – 5% to a very great extent or to a great extent and 12% to some extent. In terms of the effect of the internet on understanding an event, the highest influence was among traditional – 26% were influenced to a very great extent or to a great extent – followed by Hardal (20%). Least for understanding the event was non-Hassidic Haredi 10%. There was no major significance in age breakdown in the effect of the influence of new media. Those aged 51–65 were most influenced by the internet: 11%

The public and religion news 137 to a very great extent or a great extent, a further 32% to some extent, and 12% to a little extent. Similar results were found for understanding the event. In contrast, the lowest was the 20–35 age group: 9% were influenced to a very great extent or great extent and 12% to some extent. Similar results were found for understanding the event. In terms of understanding the extent, the religious group which rated highest impact was traditional (26%), were influenced to very great extent or to a great extent, followed by Hardal (20%). The least influenced were the non-Hassidic Haredim (10%). There was no difference in the impact of the press between Ashkenazim (3%) and Sephardim (3%) or of the internet (Ashkenazim and Sephardi, 2% each). Nor was there a difference between gender regarding the influence of the press (male 3%, female 3%) or the internet (male 3%, female 1%). Does the Israeli public think that media damage religious values?

For the religious and traditional Jewish public in Israel, two key religious prohibitions cause upset and generate criticism of the media by the public – the prohibition against social gossip and the requirement of sexual modesty, drawing upon the biblical commands in Leviticus (Vayikra) 19:16, “You shall not be a talebearer among your people,” and in Deuteronomy (D’varim) 23:15, “The camp shall be holy, that God sees nothing unseemly and turn away from you.” Loshon hara (social gossip)

Forty-six per cent of the Israeli public agreed to a very great deal and a further 29% agreed considerably that social networks cause loshon hara. So, the Israeli public identified a major problem with the social media. In terms of religiosity of the public, there was little difference between Haredi (non-Hassidic and Hassidic) and modern Orthodox and Hardal regarding loshon hara in the media: 93%, 91%, 85%, and 85% of Haredi non-Hassidic, Haredi Hassidic, Hardal, and modern Orthodox Jews, respectively, said so to a very great degree or a great degree. Younger people were more inclined than older people to say there was a problem of loshon hara in the media: 85% of people aged 20–35 and 72% of those aged 36–50, respectively, agreed to a very great degree or a great degree, in contrast to 64% and 55% of those aged 51–65 or 66+, respectively. Women (49%) were more inclined than men (42%) to say so to a very great extent. There was no overall difference between Ashkenazi and Sephardi respondents. Sexual modesty

Forty-two per cent of the Israeli public agreed there was a very serious problem of sexual modesty (tzniut) with the media, and a further 19% agreed there was a lot. Only 25% said there was no problem or only to a small degree. In terms of religiosity, there was broad agreement between the three orthodox streams in the

138 The public and religion news public – Haredi Non-Hassidic (67%), Haredi Hassidic (78%), and Hardal (71%). The streams saw a very serious problem with tzniut and the media, but only 46% of mainstream modern Orthodox said so. Only 8%, 3%, and 13% of persons who defined themselves as Conservative, Reform, or traditional said so, respectively, while 0% and 5% of secular atheists and secular non-atheists said so, respectively. In terms of age group, younger groups saw a more serious problem than older age groups with modesty: 78% and 54% of those aged 20–35 and 36–50, respectively, said there was a very serious problem or a serious problem with modesty in media, in contrast to 37% and 33% of those age 51–65 and 66+, respectively. Filters on computers are a means to controlling access to sexual content. This is particularly popular among families with children and youth at home. There was a difference between those who had a filter on their computer and those who did not possess a filter on their computer: 92% of the Israeli public who had a filter agreed to a very great extent or to a large extent that there was a problem with tzniut and the media, in contrast to only 37% who did not possess a filter on their computer. There was little overall difference between Sephardim and Ashkenazim. Women (46%) were more inclined than men (39%) to agree that there was a very serious problem. Yet 17% of women thought there was not a problem at all compared to 15% of men. Complaints to the ombudsman of the Israel Broadcasting Authority A further clue to what the public wants in religion coverage and content are the complaints received by the public ombudsman in the broadcasting authorities from the public. Today, Kan is responsible for the first television channel and radio channels. As organisations established in the BBC public broadcasting model, Kan and its predecessor, the Israel Broadcasting Authority (IBA), have a mandate of a public function and, therefore, are responsive to the public. Kan replaced the Israel Broadcasting Authority in 2017, to which the author was afforded access to correspondence about the complaints, any action taken, and the response of the ombudsman. Kan continues in the tradition of being a public broadcaster. According to Section 7 of the Israeli broadcasting law in 2014, which led to the creation of Kan, the content provided by the Israel Broadcasting Corporation shall be independent and directed to all residents and citizens of the State of Israel, shall reflect and document the State for Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, its values and the heritage of Israel and give fair, equal and balanced expressed to the diversity of views and opinion prevalent in the Israeli public . . . The Israeli Broadcasting Corporation shall provide news content and content in day-to-day matters in a professional, fair, responsible, independent, critical, impartial and reliable manner, with transparency and with the exercise of

The public and religion news 139 journalistic judgement and loyalty to the truth and the obligation to report to the public. Indeed, in addition to their ethical-professional role, the Kan and IBA ethics, respectively, also reflects organisational and political realities. The IBA was itself established in 1965, after Israel Radio – which had, since the state’s independence in 1948, been a section of the Prime Minister’s Office – became independent. And after its foundation in 1968, Israel Television became part of the IBA. However, while the government gave the IBA an independent structure, the Israeli broadcasting authority also reflects the hesitancy of Israel to accord institutional independence – as exists, for example, in the USA – and is in fact an attempt to use political pressure (Limor & Gabel, 2002). Drawing on access to the files of the IBA ombudsman, granted to the author, offers a picture of the issues of a religion-related nature which generate public reactions. It reflects the emotion, indeed the distress, which accompanies complainers about the coverage. It shows how the ombudsman seeks to negotiate between the news organisation’s mandate as a public broadcaster and complaints from the public. In the January–December 2012 period, a total of 40 religion-related issues reached the attention of the ombudsman. The most covered religion-related issue in the period under discussion concerning Sabbath observance and broadcasting, which generated 23% of complaints. For the rest, 18% complained of bias in religion-related coverage, 15% complained of provocative or unsuitable advertisements, 5% complained of programmes featuring non-kosher food (in contrast to 2.5% who complained of the reverse, of an absence of an international palate), and 17% complained of a lack of pro-religion content in coverage (in contrast to 5% of complaints of having too much religion content). Alleged bias or inaccuracy

A most basic concern – and arguably most important – were journalist errors – for example, a physical attack by yeshiva students on two policemen who were speaking Arabic one with the other. In June 2013, Israel Radio reported that two policemen had been attacked by students belonging to the prestigious Yeshivat Merkaz Harav Kook, the flagship yeshiva of the Hardal wing of the modern religious movement, named after the legendary Rabbi Abraham Kook, who served as the chief rabbi during Mandatory Palestine. In fact, the students, including one who was under arrest, were from the Jerusalem Yeshiva of Tzeirim (lit. Young Men, or Youngsters), The latter was a high school yeshiva, whereas Yeshivat Merkaz Harav Kook catered for older students, such as those who already served the national armed service. Notwithstanding that some of the students in the Yeshiva Merkaz Harav Kook graduated from the Jerusalem Yeshiva for Tzeirim, that there is an ideological similarity between the two yeshivot, some of the teacher-rabbis taught in both, and indeed, that the two schools are close to each other – these two yeshivot were institutionally independent. As soon as Israel Radio broadcast

140 The public and religion news its initial report that students of Yeshivat Merkaz Harav Kook were involved in the affair, a lawyer representing Yeshivat Merkaz Harav Kook demanded from the IBA a correction and apology. The reporter himself updated the newsroom so that by the next hourly programme, it did not state any Yeshivat Merkaz Harav Kook connection but that the attackers were students of Jerusalem Yeshiva for Tzeirim. So did the reporter’s on-air report. The ombudsman rejected the complaint, arguing that under the IBA’s code of ethics, “an error of fact needs to be corrected as soon as possible,” which was done. But complaints to the ombudsman of a religion-related nature were less about factual accuracy and more about descriptions used, notably complaints by ultra-Orthodox Haredi listeners of the usage of the “Haredi” adjective in cases of stories concerning crime. It puts a stain on the entire community – which itself is not only sensitive about their public image but also sought to live to a high moral standard, as reflected in the Torah. Thus, reporting in a story in February about an attempt to rape Haredi women, the broadcaster identified the attacker as Haredi. “D.P.” complained that reporting that the attacker was a “Haredi” added nothing to the report. Moreover, “it stained the community.” But upholding the complaint, the ombudsman noted the IBA rules that one “should not identify the race, extraction, religion or political identity of a person unless it is central to the story.” The ombudsman wrote to the newsroom to underlining this. The sensitivity of Haredim regarding their public image in the public space was reflected in successive cases in the period under study. In another story, in March 2012, in which a store was set on fire which sold non-kosher food, the report identified the attackers as Haredim, but the ombudsman rejected the complaint. “Arguing since the shop was set on fire against the background of Haredi complaints that the store sold non-kosher food, was vital and relevant,” the ombudsman wrote. In a news story, in February 2012, that gravestones bearing pictures of the dead were damaged in the city of Beersheba, the reporter identified the attackers as “Haredi” even though the reporter himself said that no one was arrested and that the police did not know who did it. “M.P,” in the complaint, said the inclusion of the word “Haredi” about the attacker stained the entire community. The reporter, asked by the ombudsman, explained that the Haredim questioned by him in the cemetery said that pictures on gravestones were regarded as idol worship. Indeed, the family of the deceased whose grave had been damaged said they had seen Haredim in the cemetery recording information about gravestones. And the police told the reporter that they suspected Haredim. When asked by the reporter, who saw Haredim at the cemetery, whether they knew about the damage to the gravestone, the Haredim, according to the reporter, “made a face,” saying that “pictures on a gravestone was not a Jewish custom.” Rejecting the complaint, the ombudsman said that the suspicion that Haredim were responsible was not against the entire community but against an isolated individual in the community. During a weekly post-Sabbath programme, Melava Malka, a talk-in targeting Haredi listeners, one of its regular panellists, Rabbi Israel Gillis, attacked a journalist on the Haredi newspaper Yated Neeman. The newspaper’s lawyer demanded

The public and religion news 141 an apology – which Gillis gave – and even prepared the text of the apology as demanded, which included that there was no basis to the attacks to many of those in the Haredi community. The ombudsman declined, saying it was not possible that the complaining party here “should write an apology about things in the programme which were accurate and credible.” Again, in another Melava Malka programme, a woman listener, “D.Z,” complained about Gillis’s comments about the Women of the Wall group – women demanding prayer rights at the Western Wall – normally limited to men – charging they were overstepping “accepted boundaries.” Indeed, Avi Schmidt, head of the Moreshet radio channel dealing with Jewish tradition in the IBA, as well as the editor of this programme, said that it was necessary to both maintain a style of discourse as well as reflect the facts themselves. The ombudsman upheld the complaint, and Gillis apologised on air. In a not dissimilar case, one rabbi, Yaacov Yosef (son of Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef), in a shiur (religious lesson) which was broadcast on radio, on the eve of the Passover festival, about preparing, or “koshering,” the kitchen before the Passover holiday, when leavened bread is forbidden, had derisive comments about women, distinguishing between those women who clean their kitchen thoroughly and those who do less, describing the former as those women who “are sick to clean” – and may therefore be relied on to understand and respect the strictures of Passover cleaning – in contrast to women who just don’t know how to “make tasty cakes” and cannot be relied upon. The ombudsman upheld the complaint and accused the rabbi of chauvinism, and using language unsuitable for a rabbi, indeed might even encourage some husbands to treat their wives badly. A not untypical complaint concerns the requirement of balance among participating interviewees in a programme. The morning daily programme Daily Agenda, with Keren Neubach, discussed whether male soldiers may walk out in the middle of a performance by female soldier singers – given a religious prohibition for men against hearing women singers. While the programme interviewed those disagreeing with the walk-out – including a religious army general and a rabbi – it failed to invite a rabbi representing the so-called Hardal view, justifying such a walk-out. The ombudsman turned to Neubach, writing, “there is more than one person who can express this alternative view and explain why it is not regarded as an extreme act.” But Neubach replied curtly, “I have no desire to compete with the complainer (The Association for the Right to Know) who”, she said, “are gunning for me. The interviews were conducted in a moderate style. . . . The term ‘Haredization’ – I did not invent.” But the ombudsman sided with the complainer, writing, “In accord with IBA rules, programme editors and presenters in Israel Radio are required to give expression to all viewpoints among the public [the ombudsman’s underlining] . . . Clearly, when only one view is given, does not answer to this. . . . ” (Neubach, 2011). A different kind of complaint concerned the very lack of coverage about the Haredim. For the Haredim, coverage of the rabbis, and in particular upon their death, is important. So when one, Rabbi Lefkowitz, died and an estimated 150,000–300,000 Jews attended his funeral, “M.G.” complained that Israel radio or television did not

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see it appropriate to cover the event or the funeral of other rabbis, including Rabbi Pinhas Steinberg, regarded as the elder of the heads of Haredi yeshivot, when he died at the age 101. “Not a word on the nightly television news,” one complained. In a note to the ombudsman, a senior editor of the radio news, “regretted the lapse,” adding that he was looking into the possibility of appointing a reporter to cover the Haredim. But part of the difficulty for the Israeli media in covering funerals in news and other programmes was the Jewish custom of burial the same day of death – or returning the deceased to the dust the same day of the soul departing. “The news system is built on gathering information, updating about likely news developments, and since nobody but God knows when the rabbi is about to die, sometimes we just don’t receive the update,” the editor argued. The ombudsman upheld the complaint. Content

Another theme in the complaints is when content appears to clash with Jewish religious values. “Y.M.” complained that a promo to one film – which showed a picture of a topless actress – was unsuitable content, particularly given that it was broadcast in the middle of the day when children watch. “It was an infringement of ethical standards and was quite unnecessary.” The ombudsman did not, on balance, think it was unethical or that it was bad taste since it was a picture of a doll. He did, though, apologise for Y.M. being hurt by this. Advertisements are particularly problematic since the broadcaster is not involved in their production. Yet the IBA had a legal right to pull the advert if it produced complaints from viewers. For example, an advertisement on radio providing medical assistance for sexual impotence was about a woman being sexually satisfied and the man complaining about his own sexual inadequacy. A.R said that “the advert was insulting to those who have sexual shortcomings. It descends to animalism – which is inappropriate to public radio.” “M.C.” complained that this advert “is inappropriate for hearing by children, who will ask what the ‘doctor’ in the advert is saying.” The ombudsman replied that in light of these and other complaints that the IBA’s director-general ordered that the advert be immediately withdrawn from broadcast. Advertisements by Efrat – which encouraged women not to have abortions – upset one viewer – as a means to advancing the Jewish population. This was, however, complicated by the fact that earlier bans on Efrat’s advertising had led the organisation to appeal to the Supreme Court, which found a compromising text, so the IBA had no choice but to broadcast the approved text. Another case concerned an advertisement by the Religious Services Ministry to promote burial above ground – a solution to the crowding in cemeteries. “L.R.” complained that the advertisement was inappropriate for mainstream television, and likely to generate fear among children in particular, given that the advert was aired when children watched. But the ombudsman disagreed, asking rhetorically, “Does a biology teacher hide from school children that the end of life is death?”

The public and religion news 143 Should content about food in programmes comprise only kosher food prepared in accordance with Jewish dietary laws, which stipulate permitted and forbidden animals and rules for preparation of food? There were complaints on both sides of the matrix. “We were shocked that a programme on cooking, produced abroad, included ingredients which were not kosher,” said one complainer, signed only “a family in Israel.” “Is it possible that we educate our viewers to prepare – or eat – food forbidden by Jewish dietary law? It is scandalous. You should be ashamed.” The ombudsman replied, “I am obligated to remark that many Israelis do not observe the laws of kashrut – and they have rights, like those who respect the kashrut laws.” So when later, in reporting the death of the Israeli gastronomer Saul Evron – who owned two restaurants in Israel, wrote a food column, and encouraged non-kosher food – died, a news report about him led one viewer to complain, “The State of Israel is a Jewish state, with a law against pork [which is also forbidden to Muslims who make part of the Israeli population]. The prohibition on pork over the year became a Jewish symbol – even for non-observant Israelis. And now Israel TV praised eating pork. This clashes with public broadcasting which is supposed to reflect shared social values. We demand that the editor of the programme be removed from his post for making the decision to broadcast report.” But the ombudsman replied that the TV report was not to praise non-kosher food but rather about a pioneer in Israeli gastronomy – and a model copied by other chefs. Jewish cultural questions emerged regarding the broadcasting on non-Israeli or non-Jewish music. “Shame on you,” one letter wrote on December 23. “The whole world is playing Christmas music. That is not why we tuned into Israeli radio. You ought to be ashamed not to stand proudly by the Jewish state.” Indeed, one Christian Israeli found it lacking not to broadcast the Christmas mass. “Christians amount to 1.7% of the population and participate and contribute to Israeli society. One should at least, on a Christian holiday, project the faith on TV screens,” he wrote. “Instead of the live coverage of the Christmas Mass, video was retrieved from the archives.” The ombudsman acknowledged in replying the significance of Christmas Day. He added that the IBA was the only Israeli channel to do so. The issue on non-Jewish music was yet more complicated because naturally Arab listeners enjoy Arabic music. Apart from the IBA’s Arab Radio Shames or an Arab television channel, was there place for Arabic music in the main television and radio channels? When “E.K.” complained that he “turns on the radio on the Sabbath only to hear Arabic music,” this generated a reply from the Ombudsman: “Radio has songs in many languages, not just Hebrew. Your complaint rings of racism and is unacceptable, and I utterly reject it” – which produced a rejoinder from the writer: “Don’t draw me to racism . . .” The IBA also has an obligation to Israel’s Muslim population; during the month of Ramadan, the times for the commencement and termination of the daily fast are broadcast on the main radio channel. Sabbath observance

But the largest single complaint concerns broadcasting and the Sabbath. Some of the Sabbath-observing public are informed of the times of the commencement and

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termination on the Sabbath, which lasts for 24 hours from dusk on Friday eve and is broadcast at the end of the news bulletins each Friday afternoon. “Z-R” complained that the broadcasters that week erred in the times of the Sabbath. “The times announcement on Friday afternoon gave the times for the previous week,” she wrote. “The error caused me mental distress. Please ensure that this doesn’t happen again. For my part, instead of listening to radio, I will look at the calendar.” The ombudsman, taking up the complaint, asked the News Department, “How did something like this occur? Who checks the times for the Sabbath?” The head of the news desk replied, “I regret of course the mental distress caused. The news announcers themselves are responsible for the times – and they generally draw it from the newspapers.” Replying to the complainer, the ombudsman wrote that “the head of news promised me to revise the system, and the announcers are instructed to be careful.” For Sabbath-observant Jews, a major issue was that some of the best programming were scheduled for transmission on Saturday. As a celebration of God’s creation of the world in six days, as described in the opening chapter of Genesis, the fourth of the Ten Commandments requires the Jew to rest on the Sabbath day. In effect, this limits the use of electronic media on the Sabbath, like radio and television, because electricity is regarded by halakha in Orthodox and Conservative Judaism as an act of creation. In summertime, when the Sabbath terminates relatively later in Israel, after 8:00 p.m., it results in many observant Jews missing the television news, which is broadcast at 8:00 p.m. nightly. One solution for the IBA was to broadcast a fiveminute news summary at the next programme at 9:00 p.m. One of the common complaints to the ombudsman concern rebroadcasting of programmes broadcast first on the Sabbath. “I am Sabbath observant,” wrote ZB. “Like every citizen I pay the license fee. Since the series on . . . is broadcast on Friday evening I am unable to watch and benefit from it. I’d be grateful of it to be broadcast again.” The ombudsman replied, “The majority of TV viewers watch TV during the week and on Sabbath. Reruns are tantamount to damaging those who watch both on weekdays and the Sabbath. Notwithstanding this, and taking into account Sabbath observers, the series will be re-run on . . .” (Cohen, 2012). Yet another question, addressed in correspondence to the ombudsman, concerned Sabbath-observant Jews who were filmed in pre-recorded programmes and even sought to prevent the programme being broadcast on the Sabbath. One solution used was to broadcast the programme with the by-line that the programme was pre-recorded on the weekday. The Jewish tradition department of the IBA was staffed by Orthodox Sabbathobservant staff. As a result, they ensured that programmes about religion itself were not broadcast on the Sabbath itself but on Friday afternoon prior to the onset of the Sabbath or after its termination. Yet this weakened the rights of traditional but not fully Sabbath-observant Jews who want programmes about religion on the Sabbath. After all, what more appropriate time in the week to draw audiences about religion than on the Sabbath itself? It was a dilemma that the ombudsman did not relate to in the period examined.

The public and religion news 145 Conclusion While it was shown that the media’s influence upon the public regarding religion news was meagre, equally it was shown that the public accorded the media an important role in understanding religion news developments. Indeed, after news about one’s own religious stream, such themes under “synagogue and state,” like the tensions between Judaism and Israel as a democratic country, as well as religious political parties, were among the subjects that draw much public interest. This makes the quality of news reporting a highly important issue. Yet the average-only ratings for such factors as the quantity, quality, and accuracy of the reporting and the qualifications about the specialist religion reporter should switch on a red light, given that “synagogue and state” triggers the tensions and conflicts between different religious streams and communities. Whether the public’s criticism is valid and whether they even understand the news-gathering process, one cannot ignore the mediocre ratings which audiences give the media, necessitating – within the media profession in general and among editors and religion specialists in particular – a need for reassessment and self-examination. Bibliography Allen, C. (2010) Islamaphobia. Farnham, UK: Ashgate. Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. (2020) Statistical Analysis Made Available to the Author. Cohen, Y. (2012) God, Jews & the Media: Religion & Israel’s Media. New York: Routledge Publishers, Chapter 4. Gunter, B., & Viney, R. (1994) Seeing Is Believing: Religion TV in the 1990s. London: John Libbey. Letter of Karen Neubach 15 September 2011 to Elisha Spiegelman, the IBA Ombudsman; Reply of the Ombudsman 20 September 2011 to the Association for the Right to Know. Levy, S., Levinson, H., & Katz, E. (1993) Beliefs, Observances, and Social Interaction among Israeli Jews. Jerusalem: Gutman Institute of Applied Social Research. Limor, Y., & Gabel, I. (2002) Five Versions of One Code of Ethics: The Case Study of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 17(20): 155–173. Pearson, M. (2017) Lessons from Reporting Islam: An Australian Newspaper’s Coverage of Radicalisation. Australian Journalism Review 39(1): 47–62. Pintak, L., & Franklin, S. (2013) Islam for Journalists: A Primer on Covering Muslim Communities in America. Columbia, MO: Reynolds Institute/Newsbooks. Poole, E. (2002) Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims. London: Tauris. Sharansky, I. (2000) The Politics of Religion and the Religion of Politics: Looking at Israel. Lantham, MD: Lexington Smith Poll, Haredi Image in the Media, April 1995. Svennevig, M., Haldane, I., & Gunter, B. (1988) Godwatching: Viewers, Religion and Television. London: John Libbey. Winston, D., & Green, J. C. (2015) Most Americans Say Media Coverage of Religion Too Sensationalized (Report). USC Annenberg School of Communication and Journalism and the University of Akron.

7

Rabbis’ exposure to media

Rabbis use news media sources to gather information about general national and world affairs and about developments inside their religious communities. The media’s role as a source of information to the rabbi is two-fold: (1) computers and (2) traditional media, such as newspapers, television, radio, and news websites. The former, computers and notably Torah databases, have brought a revolution in the day-by-day work of the rabbi as a tool to advise congregants and students, prepare religious classes, and seek routine information required in the work of a rabbi. The latter – newspapers, TV, radio, and news websites – continue to be a source of general information for an informed rabbi, whether a community rabbi or teacher-rabbi in the yeshiva and school. For example, synagogue rabbis themselves are required to be up-to-date in their pastoral work to know about what their own congregants are exposed to in media terms. This is also true with rabbi-teachers in religious high schools and yeshivot (colleges of higher religious study). Also, rabbinical court judges in Israel (who are mandated to adjudicate in matters of personal status like marriage, divorce, and religious conversion) are required not only to master Jewish religious law (halakha) but also to be aware of contemporary affairs, including lifestyles. Cantoni and Zyga (2007) examined the use of internet communication by Catholic congregations. Armfield and Holbert (2003) examined religiosity as a factor in internet use. The question of the role of information among religious clergy was addressed quantitatively by Brown and Smidt (2003), who examined Reformed clergy, and by Cantoni, Rapetti, Tardini, Vannini, and Arasa (2012), who examined Catholic priests worldwide in new media sources. Opening with a look at the usage of media technology by rabbis, this chapter proceeds to detail more closely the various roles which the technology has today in the life and work of different rabbis – community rabbis, rabbis in education like schools and advanced institutions, and religious court judges – ranging from technology comprising databases which rabbis use in preparing shiurim (religious lessons), notably in educational institutions, and community rabbis seeking practical information day-by-day for their congregants and communities, and secret forums for rabbis to discuss issues, away from the attention of their community. The chapter then looks at the impact and influence of the media – both religion news and non-religion news – upon the rabbi. DOI: 10.4324/9781315735184-7

Rabbis’ exposure to media 147 Rabbis’ possession and usage of media technology Rabbis are well equipped with media technology – notably computers and mobile phones – even if there are wide differences among rabbis, such as whether the devices are connected to the internet, the type of phone, and whether the rabbi uses a computer for his or her work as a rabbi. Thus, of the rabbis surveyed (310 responses received), 90% of mainstream modern Orthodox and Hardal rabbis and 74% of Haredi rabbis had computers by 2021. Of rabbis without a computer at home, 73% of all Haredi rabbis cited religious reasons, as opposed to 51% of all modern Orthodox (combined modern Orthodox mainstream and Hardal) rabbis. It was noted that many Haredi rabbis who owned a computer came from a Sephardi (or Oriental) background. Within the modern Orthodox (including mainstream modern Orthodox and Hardal), 87% of rabbis had computers. Israeli-born (86%) and Western-born (92%) rabbis were more inclined to have computers than Eastern European–born (65%) or rabbis born in Arab lands (72%). There was no significant difference according to age groupings. Eighty per cent of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis and 67% of Hardal rabbis had the internet, in contrast to only 38% of Haredi rabbis. The internet is banned in Haredi homes. It was therefore just as noteworthy that 33% of Haredi rabbis said they had it (80% and 67% of modern Orthodox rabbis and Hardal rabbis had it, respectively). There was a major difference between Hardal rabbis and mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis regarding being connected to the internet; for example, 68% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis were connected to the internet, in contrast to only 37% of all Hardal rabbis. Also 73% of all Haredi rabbi respondents who were not connected to the internet cited religion as the reason. Many Haredi and Hardal rabbis who were connected to the internet also had a filter to screen inappropriate content. There was only a marginal difference between rabbis connected to the internet who had children at home (55%) and those who did not have children at home (63%). Yet of those who did not have internet and cited religion as the factor, 78% had children at home, in contrast to 22% who did not. Of those who did not have the internet, Israeli-born and Middle Eastern–born rabbis were more inclined to cite religious reasons. In age breakdown, older rabbis, born in 1921–1940, were much less inclined to cite religion (25%), in contrast to middle-aged and younger rabbis: 73% each for those born in 1941–1960 and 1961–1980. The major differences, therefore, both between Haredi rabbis and modern Orthodox rabbis and between the mainline modern Orthodox and the Hardal was less in possession of the computer but rather more in using the internet. Rabbis of all religious streams claimed that internet sites, by providing access to certain sites, like sex- and porn-related sites, damage religious values. In contrast to leaders of some other faiths, rabbis over the years have been less concerned about media portrayal of violence. Yet a distinction was found between the Orthodox (Haredim, mainline modern Orthodox, and Hardal), on the one hand, and the non-Orthodox (Reform and Conservative) rabbis, on the other hand, regarding the

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damage to religious values: 87% of Haredi rabbis, 75% of modern Orthodox rabbis, and 92% of Hardal rabbis said that the internet, by providing access to sex and porn sites, damaged religious values to a very great extent, a great extent, or a considerable extent, respectively – with the mainstream modern Orthodox more inclined than the other two to perceive the internet as damaging religious values to a considerable extent rather than to a great extent or very great extent. In contrast, 33% of Reform rabbis and 59% of Conservative rabbis surveyed said that the internet damaged religious values to a very great extent, a great extent, or a considerable extent. Of all the forms of media – press, radio, television, cinema, theatre, and internet – rabbis identified with the non-Orthodox streams (Conservative and Reform) were most critical of internet. There were wide gaps between rabbi-respondents of all streams (Haredi, mainline modern Orthodox, Hardal, Conservative, Reform). For example, Israeli rabbis and rabbis born in Arab lands were more inclined than Western and Eastern European rabbis to view internet as damaging religious values. The difference between the Orthodox and non-Orthodox is less in outlook about internet dangers and more in the practical measures to be taken to deal with the perceived danger. The mainstream modern Orthodox, as well as non-Orthodox, disagree with the Haredi worldview of cutting oneself off from the wider society. The mainstream modern Orthodox and non-Orthodox seek to be fully integrated into modern society, including the use of advanced media technology and oppose the construction of cultural barriers. Haredim have nevertheless found in the growing sub-section of Hardal natural allies in limiting exposure to these various websites. It confirms Armfield and Holbert (2003), who found that the more religious the person, the less likely he is to use the internet. Mobile phones were notably more prevalent than the internet. Even 95% of Haredi rabbis had one. Notwithstanding this, there was wide variation among the different rabbinical streams regarding the type of phone. While 88% of modern Orthodox rabbis possessed a smartphone, 90% of Haredi rabbis had a “kosher” phone – which by definition is without internet. Who surfs the Net? There were wide differences between the three Orthodox Jewish streams regarding surfing the internet. They ranged from 76% of Haredi rabbis replying they did not surf at all and 31% surfing to a small extent and 21% to a certain extent to 70% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis who replied that they surfed the internet to a very great extent (30%) or to a great extent (40%). And Hardal rabbis were in the middle – if inclined towards the mainstream modern Orthodox – with 43% of Hardal rabbis saying they surfed the internet to a very great extent (24%) or to a great extent (19%). In the other direction, only 13% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis surfed to only a small extent, while 38% and 10% Haredi rabbis surfed the internet to a small extent or did not surf at all, respectively. New media in Jewish pastoral theology The technological information highway is affecting the Israeli religious world no less than other non-Jewish religious communities, particularly given the high priority which religious study has in the religious community. Torah databases contain

Rabbis’ exposure to media 149 computerised collections of traditional texts, like Bible commentaries, the Talmud, and Jewish law codes. What is the place of computers in the work of the rabbi? Lerner surveyed the manifold types of resources available digitally about Orthodox Judaism, emanating from institutions, organisations and individuals, covering historical, theological, institutional, and communal information (2009). These developments provide access which had beforehand been limited to a few in libraries or private manuscript collections to the entire Jewish learning world. The extent to which rabbis had incorporated information technology into their pastoral theological work varies among all three groups of Orthodox rabbis – Haredi, Hardal, and mainstream modern Orthodox. This was even true of the mainstream modern Orthodox and Hardal rabbis notwithstanding their usage of websites for their personal Torah study and preparation of their shiurim (religious lessons) and for preparing religious legal rulings (piskei halakha). The internet offers timely information like daily times for Jewish religious prayer (tefilla), times for the commencement and termination of the Sabbath and holydays, and functional information required by community rabbis, such as contact information of burial societies, batei din (religious courts), and religious councils in different towns which are responsible for religious matters. With the Haredi ban on internet use, Haredi rabbis have yet to benefit fully from these Torah websites despite their single-minded goal of Torah study. Indeed, that the threat from the internet occurred at the same time as the parallel proliferation of Jewish-related websites made it more difficult for rabbis imposing their antiinternet position. But some Haredi rabbis today recognise the technological value of these websites, and this trend may be expected to increase. This section focuses on the uses by rabbis of Torah databases. After surveying general patterns among rabbis of the use of the computer, this section discusses how rabbis seek to solve Jewish legal questions addressed to them, the computerisation of the Jewish religious court system, how relations among rabbis have been made more efficient through forums, and how the work of the rabbi, in particular, the community rabbi, has improved through websites comprising information about Jewish institutions of one sort or another. Non-Orthodox rabbis were most inclined to use databases: 40%, 22%, and 15% of non-Orthodox rabbis, modern Orthodox rabbis, and Haredi rabbis, respectively, use these websites a lot or even all the time, while 67%, 49%, and 30% of Haredim, modern Orthodox, and non-Orthodox rabbis, respectively, do not use these at all. The weekly religious calendar

Eighteen per cent of all rabbis use new media all the time or most of the time for basic prayer and related religious information such as prayer times, the commencement and termination of the Sabbath and holydays, weekly Bible readings, and the daily study of Mishnaic and Talmudic texts. Fourteen per cent use it some of the time. Broken down according to religion, two patterns could be identified – nonOrthodox rabbis (Conservative and Reform) and modern Orthodox rabbis (mainstream modern Orthodox and Hardal) and Haredi rabbis. Thus, 79%, 54%, 48%,

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and 38% of Conservative, Reform, mainstream modern Orthodox, and Hardal rabbis, respectively, use new media to a very great extent, a great extent, and to some extent, while 49%, 40%, and 5% said so to some extent. Those born in 1940–1959 (36%) and 1960–79 (39%) were more inclined than those born after 1980 (24%) to use the new media for this basic prayer information. Those who said they knew how to use internet websites were necessarily more inclined than those who did not: 66% and 53% who knew how to to a very large extent or to a large extent were more inclined to use it to a very great extent or a least extent, in contrast to 6% and 11% of those who did not at all or knew only a little and reported using the internet to a very great extent or to a great extent. Sephardi rabbis were more inclined to use internet websites than Ashkenazi rabbis: 22% of Sephardi rabbis did so to a very great extent or to a great extent, and a further 17% did so to some degree, in contrast to 16% and 13%, respectively, of Ashkenazi. The role of the computer as a source of information in the work of the rabbi varies according to the rabbi’s specific occupation and according to the religious stream he or she is associated with. The occupation of the rabbi may be broken down broadly into the community rabbi; the teacher-rabbi in schools, yeshivot, midrashot and ulpanot (religious girls colleges), and seminaries and the dayan, or religious court judge. Each has different advantages in using computer programs. Different usages may also be found between the rabbis of the different streams – Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform. The community rabbi, as the spiritual head of a synagogue, is consulted by congregants regarding Jewish religious law. Jewish religious law, drawing upon 613 positive and negative laws in the Bible, which regulates the conduct of the individual. The 613 laws have been the basis for long discussions by the rabbis over the centuries, collected in the Babylonian and Jerusalemite Talmud and law codes like the Shulkhan Arukh and by Maimonides. In particular, biblical law does not relate to the modern era with its manifold new features in society and life. It is, therefore, for the observant Jew to consult the rabbi when he or she has a particular question. The teaching rabbi is found in the religious school systems – Haredi and modern Orthodox and the Tali (Conservative/Reform) religious schools, as well in higher institutes of learning – in a yeshiva or, for women, a seminary (Haredi) and ulpana (modern Orthodox). These prepare shiurim, or lessons, on Judaism and religious law in particular. Indeed, there are lessons in how to learn Jewish law – the Talmud (Gemara). Students use the computers to prepare their lessons, and rabbis themselves use the computer to prepare their classes. Community rabbis also give religious lessons (or shiurim), notably on the Sabbath, to their congregants in the framework of the synagogue, and they use computers before the Sabbath in order to prepare the shiurim. Differences may be identified among different streams: Haredi, modern Orthodox (including Hardal), Conservative, and Reform rabbis. Those serving communities may be divided between the ultra-Orthodox where congregants themselves know how to study but attend many religious lessons as an integral part of their life, as well asking rabbis to pasken, or legislate, in response to their

Rabbis’ exposure to media 151 queries. Modern Orthodox congregants are also inclined to observe strictly but are often less equipped themselves to find answers for which they require the rabbi. Conservative Judaism considers the 613 laws as valid today as when they were given, by tradition, to Moses on Mount Sinai 4,000 years ago, but some of their congregants are not only unable to study themselves in the main but are often individually less observant, requiring the community rabbi to answer. And this is even less the case for the Reform rabbi. But in both Conservative and Reform, key points in the annual Jewish calendar, with their laws, observances, and customs – notably festivals and holydays, including the 24-hour Yom Kippur fast and the Passover holiday with its strictures on not eating leavened bread – also generate questions from non-Orthodox congregants. So do life-cycle events like circumcision, the bar mitzvah/bat mitzvah, marriage, and death – with the range of traditions and rules. But websites provide biblical and Jewish philosophical insights, as well halakha (Jewish law) information. Of all the streams, Conservative rabbis noted the usefulness of the websites. The websites have revolutionised the work of the community and teaching rabbi. Both contain innumerable Jewish law sources – which even the best community synagogue library would never be able to store. And yeshiva libraries are far bigger; for example, the Har Etzion modern Orthodox yeshiva, situated in Alon Shvut, an Israeli town south of Jerusalem, houses 60,000 volumes. One Haredi rabbi said, It saves infinite time. Within a second – at a press of a couple of keys on the keyboard, you get a book instead of going to the bookshelf. Copying from each book takes time, and sometimes one makes an error in copying. I am looking into a subject. I don’t know who talks about it. The computer has turned out to be an extremely important tool. Or, as a modern Orthodox rabbi from a Jerusalem community put it, Before we had access to a PC home computer, it would mean taking out say 6 or 7 books from my library – the Bible, Midrash, Maimonides, and such secondary sources like the Encyclopaedia Talmudica. Then I never really prepared a page of sources for my shiurim (religious lessons) on the Sabbath, except key shiurim (such as those at the New Year and preceding the Passover festival). Then I would have to run to a xerox machine, get the source, cut it with scissors and paste it. It looked very choppy. Life has changed dramatically because of access to the websites – such as the Bar-Ilan University Responsa Project. I can take any source that I want, have it chopped to size, the amount of wording I want, and it looks very nice – for every shiur each Sabbath, enabling those attending to follow the sources as I lecture. An American-born Haredi rabbi of the town of Hashmonaim said, “I do have 40,000 volumes in my personal library. But when I don’t have a source – websites come in handy for questions and answers, for accessing earlier ages when a rabbi

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discussed a comparative point.” A Conservative woman rabbi found websites like Midreshet and Sefaria useful to get ideas about what to teach. Yet the current age is transitory, depending much on a rabbi’s own mastery, or not, of the computer. A Reform rabbi in his 60s said, “I just feel it’s too late for me.” One Israeli-born modern Orthodox rabbi in a Jerusalem yeshiva said, I have no computer skills. I don’t have knowledge of how to search, or search engines. Nothing in principle or ideological against it; I just don’t have the time. The yeshiva’s library has 100,000 books, and if something is missing, I go to the next yeshiva a walk away, or to the Jewish National Library. Some even see a pedagogic value in still teaching from books. A rabbi who was the class teacher in a modern Orthodox high school teacher in Gush Etzion said, As the years go by, kids expect more computer fonts than handwriting. But I insist that my students know there is such a thing as books. I still photostat some sources from books. I even minimize the cover page so that students understand who wrote the book, and when it came out. One Haredi community rabbi in Jerusalem remarked, “I love books, just love books.” In logistical terms, most yeshivot can afford only one or a handful of computer terminals. “So one student out of hundreds cannot sit on the computers for a long time; at best there is access to enable one to print out,” remarked a rabbi teaching in a yeshiva. What are the websites which rabbis use? For the Orthodox rabbi, the two most known are the Bar-Ilan University Responsa Project and the Otzar Hochmah. These are most used by Orthodox rabbis, but also by the non-Orthodox. Such other websites like Daat and Sefaria and websites affiliated to a yeshiva – like Yeshivat Bet E-l, Yeshivat Har Etzion, and Yeshivat Petach Tiqva – are used by all. Regarding accessing religious websites – like Kippa and Moreshet – the nonOrthodox are more inclined to surf: 40%, 22%, and 15% of non-Orthodox, modern Orthodox, and Haredi rabbis surveyed by the author accessed religious websites all the time or much of the time, while 70% of non-Orthodox, 51% of modern Orthodox, and 33% of Haredim only sometimes did. It is not surprising that Haredi rabbis access religious websites much less because this is all on the internet, which is forbidden among Haredim. But noteworthy is the gap between modern Orthodox and non-Orthodox. One of the earliest attempts to computerise Jewish sources was the Bar-Ilan sheiltot project – which stored in a computerised form 100,000 rabbinical sheiltot – or rabbis’ answers – from the Geonic period in the sixth century to the present day to a range of questions concerning the application of Jewish law to particular situations. There are an estimated half million sheiltot contained in 300 books. In the project, which was begun in 1963 by Professors Aviezer Frankel and Jacob Shoika, 100,000 sheiltot, comprising 160 million words, were fed into a computer retrieval

Rabbis’ exposure to media 153 system at Bar-Ilan University. Its significance was that it was one of the first computer systems in the world, and the first in the Hebrew language, which was based on full text – enabling the inquirer to determine the keywords rather than the conventional classification system of categories and sub-categories. Indeed, there was scepticism, in the academic world and in the computer science industry, about the alternative to the hierarchical classification system. The Bar-Ilan project also had to “teach” the computer Hebrew and Aramaic, the language of the Babylonian Talmud, and the Hebrew script used by Rashi, the French-born Jewish Bible commentator. The Haredi world supported the keyword system from the beginning even though Bar-Ilan University, Israel’s religious university, is affiliated with the modern Orthodox community. Much larger today is the Otzar Hochmah, founded at the turn of this century, which contained in 2021 over 110,000 books on Judaica and Jewish history. These include rare books, manuscripts, and single editions. For the rabbi, there is literature from the Tanaitic Mishnaic period preceding the Talmud, the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds and Geonic literature, and responsa literature to the present day. “The Otzar Hochmah gives the surfer access to many more books which you could normally have access to,” one Haredi rabbi with a community who also taught in a yeshiva remarked. In addition to halakha (Jewish religious law), there are Jewish philosophical works and Hassidic and kabbalistic literature (mystical interpretations of God’s relationship with the universe). A search engine enables users to search for single words in thousands of books. A third new media source is the Torah Communication Network, created by Rabbi Eli Teitelbaum in New York, which provides access to any desired page in the 63 tractates of the Babylonian Talmud. The network has expanded beyond the Talmud to include the five books of Moses, books of the Prophets, Midrash, Jewish legal codes like those of Maimonides, and books on Jewish thought. Notwithstanding the central place the first two resources have for the professional rabbi, both have their weaknesses and critics. The focus of responsa literature reflects Orthodox Judaism, notwithstanding that Conservative and Reform Judaism also have responsa. Some well-known Orthodox rabbis appeared not to be included in the Bar-Ilan project. The PDF option does create difficulties for the rabbi preparing, say, a page of sources for his students or congregants. The large amount of material, in particular in Otzar Hochmah, makes it difficult to navigate – which led some rabbis to prefer to initially surf on Google and the welter of data on the internet. One rabbi commented, The problem is that you need to know the precise words because if one searches with the written word you won’t be able to locate the books on the programme, and in Otzar Hochmah one can drown in a welter of sources. So you need to know how not to drown. Another modern Orthodox rabbi remarked, “When I prepare my shiurim, I do research on internet, Google. But when I get specific Jewish law questions, the computer is not helpful. Rather I go to the Bar-Ilan project.”

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New developments in Jewish law

The new media also offers the rabbi information for following developments in Jewish doctrine, such as halakhic rulings. But when asked whether they follow media to keep up-to-date, only 23% of all rabbis surveyed said they did so to a large extent or to a very great extent. But 22% used it to some extent, and 56% did not use at all or used it to a small degree. Broken down, there was considerable difference between Reform and Conservative, with the latter more inclined than the former to follow news about developments in Judaism itself: 52% of Conservative rabbis expressed great interest or a large interest in developments in Jewish legal doctrine, in contrast to 21% of Reform rabbis. Only 46% of Haredi rabbis were interested: the more rabbis said they had the ability to stay in touch with people on social networks, the more they were inclined to follow news about developments in halakhic websites. Fifty-five per cent and 50% of rabbis who said they were able to use social networks to a very great extent or to a great or average extent did follow websites regarding new halakhic developments to a great extent or very great extent. Community rabbis were more inclined than rabbi-teachers or avrechim (Haredi students, many with rabbinical ordination or studying to become rabbis who receive a stipend for full-time study in the yeshiva) to follow developments related to halakha as reported in new media: 70% of community rabbis, 49% of rabbiteachers, and 6% of avrechim did so to a very great extent or great extent or some extent. In terms of age group, those rabbis born 1940–59 were more inclined than those born later, and those born 1960–79 were more inclined than those born from 1980 to date to use new media for halakha (Jewish legal) developments. Jewish legal problem-solving

In searching specifically for solutions and answers to Jewish legal questions, 17% of rabbis turned to the websites to a very great extent or a large extent and 18% to some extent. The highest were Conservative rabbis – 46% to a very great extent or a great extent and 21% to some extent. Reform rabbis (8% and 13%), mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis (25% and 41%), Hardal rabbis (30% and 24%), and Haredi rabbis (3% and 3%), respectively, did so too. Thirty-one per cent of community rabbis did so to a very large extent and to a large extent, as well as 23% to some extent. In contrast, only 20% of rabbi-teachers did so to a very large extent and to a large extent, as well as 23% to some extent. Avrechim 0% and 23%. This is surprising because rabbi-teachers and avrechim are involved in finding halakhic solutions. Sephardi rabbis are more inclined than Ashkenazi rabbis to websites for making Jewish legal rulings: 21% of Sephardim use websites to a very great extent and a great extent and 23% to some extent, in contrast to 16% and 17% of Ashkenazim, respectively. Computers in the religious court system

A separate grouping are the religious law courts. The dayan (the religious court judge) who is a member of a bet din (a religious law court) adjudicates on matters

Rabbis’ exposure to media 155 of personal status in Israel, notably conversions, divorces, and marriages. The functioning of Israel’s religious court system is, by the second decade of this century, still somewhat limited in terms of its computerisation. While younger dayanim are au fait with computers, many elderly dayanim, while highly learned in Jewish texts, are heavily reliant on books. As Michal Goldstein, a senior official in the religious court system, remarked, “there is a huge gap – to use an understatement – between the digitalised world and the administrative side. We invested to digitalise the system, and amongst other measures, held courses in computer training for the dayanim” (Yifrach, 2021). Some dayanim did not even have computers at home – partly given the reservations of Haredim regarding the internet. When Covid-19 struck and some of the work of judges – like writing divorce agreements – could be done from home, the religious court administration distributed computers to the home of judges lacking them. A computer program within the religious law courts, Shirah, enables the dayanim to communicate with each other. Coordination among dayanim is essential given that the bet din comprises three dayanim working together. An internal program in the court administration, Shiput Rabani (or rabbinical adjudication), stores all previous decisions by the religious court system. A collective memory is essential for example in storing names given the importance in, say, a divorce document (get) to be precise with exact name spellings. Contact information for rabbis

Websites also provide a plethora of basic information, including contact details with such institutions as religious affairs councils, yeshivot, cemeteries, and batei din (religious courts). To what extent do rabbis use these? Twenty-two per cent of all rabbis do so to a very large extent or to a large extent and a further 41% to some extent. Broken down according to religious stream, there was little difference between Reform, Conservative, mainstream modern Orthodox, and Hardal rabbis. Haredim were less inclined: 96% of Haredi rabbis never did or did so only to a small degree. Seventy-five per cent and 82% of Reform and Conservative rabbis, respectively, never did so or only to a small degree. Sixty-five per cent and 66% of Hardal and mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, respectively, never did so or only to a small degree. The highest were mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis: 15% did to a very great extent or to a large extent, and Hardal rabbis 7%. And 19% and 28% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis and Hardal rabbis did to some extent – as did 25% of Reform rabbis. Thirteen per cent of community rabbis did so to a very great extent and a further 14% to some extent. Only 2% of avrechim did so to a very large extent or a large extent, and 5% to some extent. There were only incremental differences when rabbis were broken down by age. Computer savvy

The level of computer literacy among rabbis varied and is particularly low among Haredi rabbis. Ten per cent and 33% of modern Orthodox rabbis felt

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computer-competent to a very great degree or a great degree, respectively, and a further 37% to a certain degree. In contrast, only 7%, 2%, and 19% of Haredi rabbis said so, respectively. Rather, 38% and 24% of Haredi rabbis felt completely computer-illiterate or illiterate to a great degree, respectively. There was a clear correlation between surfing websites in their work and the general ability of rabbis to use social media. Those rabbis who answered about their abilities to use internet to reach decisions to a very great extent or a great extent were much more inclined to use it for making contact with religious institutions than those who could not use it to reach decisions or only knew a little about how to. Thus, 8% and 12% of rabbis who had very good knowledge or good knowledge of using social media, respectively, did so to a very great extent or a great extent. And a further 24% and 17% of rabbis did so to some extent. In contrast, 2% and 1% of those who knew only a little or not at all about social media did so to a large extent, and a further 3% and 7% did so to some extent. Sephardi rabbis were more inclined to possess computer abilities for surfing the internet than Ashkenazi rabbis: 12% of Sephardi rabbis had mastered the computer for their work to a great extent or to a large extent, as did 15% to some extent, as compared to 5% and 11% of Ashkenazi rabbis, respectively. Some rabbinical organisations have arranged workshops to train their members. The Chief Rabbinate arranged a workshop. So did Beth Hillel, a liberal Orthodox group of rabbis. Its then president, Rabbi Ronen Neuwirth (himself a graduate in information technology), said, “We once had a day’s conference on new media. Was it effective? It was OK, but we need more. The problem with such initiatives is that participants are all at different levels.” Both the Conservative and Reform movements in Israel maintain in-house computer staff to advise communities and their rabbis. E-mailing a rabbinical colleague

Rabbis are in touch with rabbinical sages and rabbinical colleagues to consult regarding Jewish legal matters, as well as consulting on broader issues not necessarily tied narrowly to Jewish law. The way these contacts are carried out is in part a matter of etiquette and respect-cum-protocol reflecting the learning of, respect for, and prestige of the one being consulted. SMS or Twitter are in many cases not the accepted form of rabbinic communication. In the pre-computer age, the telephone and even “snail mail” (or postal letters) were used or even visiting a rabbi in person. Fourteen per cent of all rabbis e-mailed other rabbis to a very large extent or to a large extent, 13% to some extent, but 72% never did or did so to a small degree. Most prominent were the non-Orthodox: 46% and 33% of Reform rabbis and Conservative rabbis, respectively, did so to a very large extent or to a large extent, in contrast to 19% and 15% of modern Orthodox and Hardal. Yet to some extent, an additional 25%, 22%, and 18% of modern Orthodox, Hardal, and Conservative did so. So did another 4% of Reform. Ninety-five per cent of Haredi rabbis do not use e-mail at all (90%) and or use it a little (5%), while 1% of Haredi rabbis do. While e-mail is distinct from the

Rabbis’ exposure to media 157 internet and is not banned in Haredi circles, not all Haredi rabbis are equipped with computer technology – with the result that other forms of communication like the telephone would be used, or personally visiting a rabbi would be done instead. According to occupation, community rabbis were more inclined to use e-mail: 27% of community rabbis did so to a very large extent or a large extent and a further 21% some of the time, in contrast to 12% of rabbi-teachers who did so to a very large extent or a large extent, and a further 15% to some extent. There was little difference between Ashkenazim and Sephardim. Sephardi rabbis are more inclined than Ashkenazi rabbis to do so: 17% do so to a great extent or a large extent as do 15% to some extent, compared to 14% and 12% of Ashkenazi rabbis who do so to some extent. Forums

Closed forums are today a feature of the rabbinical landscape (with the exception of the Haredi rabbis). Characterised by secrecy, the forums enable rabbis – away from the attention of the congregants – to discuss and thrash out controversial matters. Melekh Hakodesh (lit. “King of the Holy”), for example, had in 2022 some 420 modern Orthodox rabbis. If a rabbi wants to talk outside the forum about something he learnt within, he has to ask the relevant rabbi for his consent. One member of the forum said, I must not mention any names from the forum. The power of the forum is its secrecy. Among issues discussed include the use of electricity on the Sabbath when the power stations are staffed by Jews (and the religious prohibition of a Jew working for another Jew on the Sabbath); the legal limits of the state recognised Chief Rabbinate in terms of the civil courts; a discussion about young married couples who want to defer having children; or the question of burial chambers above ground – due to lack of space in cemetaries – and the religious dictum as of the deceased “returning to the dust.” As a Reform community rabbi put it, “We are constantly posting articles on our Reform forum, Maram, so that we can keep up to date.” Or, as a dayan in a Reform bet din remarked, “I receive many questions from rabbinical colleagues. I both have experience with rabbinical students, but also much information regarding conversions.” A Conservative woman rabbi found it useful for issues of halakha with social implications; for example, whether a person may be called to the Torah with the name of (non-Jewish parents) or whether, say, a boy can set his bar mitzvah ceremony earlier than his 13th Hebrew birthdate. But not all are computer-literate to participate in the forums. As one middle-aged rabbi who taught in a modern Orthodox yeshiva put it, “I have no experience of calling other rabbis on the computer. I call rabbis on the phone.” Forums have added a revolutionary feature to inter-rabbinical consultations, which began to use Zoom, particularly after the outbreak of Covid-19 in 2020.

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Although he answered numerous questions daily regarding Jewish law on email and encourages the usage of new media, Rabbi Yuval Cherlow, a leading modern Orthodox rabbi and head, or rosh yeshiva, of the Yeshivat Amit Orot Shaul, which has a developed website, prefers to learn the Talmud from books. Two leading educationalists from opposite sides of the religious spectrum discourage the usage of websites to their rabbinic students. Both a rabbi who was a teacher at Jerusalem’s illustrious Mirrer yeshiva – which has 8,500 students – and has innumerable trained rabbis abroad and inside Israel and a professor-rabbi at the Conservative movement’s Schechter Institute in Jerusalem (which trains rabbis for the movement) see the danger of “shortcutting” to find Jewish law sources on the Net rather than toiling through the classical sources and law codes because it means rabbinical students do not learn the didactic tools of Talmudic study – “how to learn” – a requirement of a successful rabbi. “If you learn from Wikipedia and the Net, you get a very vulgarised version of whatever it is you’re studying,” the latter said. Moreover, the usage of websites has highlighted a problem – which existed earlier – in solving Jewish legal problems by comparing to earlier precedents. In the didactic principle “dimuy meyta dementa,” there could be a small but significant change between a current problem and a seemingly similar situation in, say, an earlier case in the website. “To pasken” (lit. to make a Jewish legal decision), “it is cardinal for me to keep in touch with at least the poskim – (rabbis who make legal decisions). I’m on the phone with them all the time,” said one Hardal-leaning community rabbi. What rabbis surf, view, listen to, and read No less significant is the role which the media play for rabbis as providers of information. Rabbis are themselves updated about events from the media both generally and regarding current religion-related developments. Rabbis use news media sources to gather information about general national and world affairs and about developments inside their religious communities. In order to be effective rabbiteachers in yeshivot and synagogues, rabbis need to be exposed to the media to which their own audiences, children, or synagogue congregants are exposed. Religious court judges, for example, in determining decisions (pesuk din), require not only mastery of Jewish religious law (halakha) but also awareness of contemporary affairs and the circumstances in which the questioner turned to the rabbi. Given that the rabbi has a leadership and guidance function in his or her community – indeed, they are key decision-makers in the world of religion – it needs to be questioned whether, and if so to what extent, is the rabbi in touch with the wider environment and to what extent rabbis are exposed to the same media to which their community is. This section examines the information-gathering practices of Israeli rabbis. A subsequent section addresses the question of the impact of the information sources upon rabbis. No research has been carried out examining the role of information among rabbis. Although the discipline of media and religion has existed for 30 years,

Rabbis’ exposure to media 159 the specific subject of the role of information sources has received little attention, in particular among religious clergy. Cannon (2007) examines church newspaper readership as a factor in the functioning of a faith community. Golan (2002) takes the research further to address the question of the influence of the media and the extent to which religiosity impacts this. The question of the role of information among religious clergy is addressed quantitatively by Brown and Smidt (2003), who examined Reformed clergy, and by Cantoni, Rapetti, Tardini, Vannini, and Arasa (2012), who examined Catholic priests worldwide and new media sources. Lambert (2010) discusses information tools among Baptist ministers. Rabbis’ exposure to the news media Do rabbis surf for news and current affairs? Seventy-three per cent of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis surfed for news and current affairs a very great deal (40%) or a great deal (33%) and a further 17% part of the time, in contrast to 81% of Haredi rabbis who surfed news and current affairs not at all (67%) or to a small degree (14%). Hardal rabbis were in the middle: 33% of Hardal rabbis surfed to some degree, 33% to a large degree, and 33% to a small degree. News and current affairs were considerably more sought after than religionrelated news: 46% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis surfed religion-related news to a very great degree (40% to a great degree, 24% to a certain degree). Twenty-nine per cent of Hardal rabbis surfed even more in the case of religionrelated news and current affairs: 52% of Hardal surfed to a very great degree (29%) or a large degree (19%). Newspapers were less widely read than could be expected for persons who hold key posts in Jewish communities: 58%, 50%, and 28% of modern Orthodox rabbis, Haredi rabbis, and non-Orthodox rabbis do not read a daily newspaper. Given the role of rabbis as community leaders, the relatively low figure for newspaper readership raises concern. Israeli rabbis are less exposed to the media than, for example, their Christian colleagues in the Church in the US (Finnegan & Viswanath 2001); Brown and Smidt found that 97% of Reformed Christian ministers read secular newspapers, in contrast to 42%, 50%, and 72% of modern Orthodox, Haredi, and non-Orthodox rabbis. This was also true of television: 93% and 80% of Reformed ministers watch network TV and public TV, in contrast to 47% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, 53% of the Hardal rabbis, and 19% of Haredi rabbis. There was a greater inclination for Western rabbis (67%) to read a daily newspaper and a lesser inclination of Sephardi rabbis or those born in Arab countries (39%). In terms of age, a difference in reading daily newspapers was found: younger rabbis were less inclined to do so, as 74% of rabbis born in 1967–1980 do not read a daily newspaper, in contrast to 44% of those born in 1941–1960 and 28% of those born in 1921–1940. Of those who do not read a daily newspaper, 39%, 27%, and 12% of Haredi rabbis, Hardal rabbis, and modern Orthodox rabbis cited religious reasons for not doing so. Of those who

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do not read newspapers, the most given factor was time: 93%, 78%, and 48% of non-Orthodox, modern Orthodox, Haredi rabbis said that time was a factor. All rabbis require time in order to prepare shiurim. In Israel, the relatively low remuneration given to rabbis means that community rabbis may also need to hold additional part-time teaching positions. The reverse is true with rabbi-teachers – some are required to teach in more than one institution. This – together with attending synagogue prayers three times daily, as well as family obligations – limits the time available for the media. Television is little watched, and in a number of cases – notably Haredim – a television set is not possessed. Eighty-one per cent of Haredi rabbis and 63% of Hardal rabbis said they do not view TV for religious reasons, as opposed to 47% of modern Orthodox. Television was regarded as having content unsuitable for religiously observant adults and children. Fifteen per cent of Haredim cited time. Forty-six per cent of modern Orthodox (mainstream modern Orthodox and Hardal combined), and 65% of non-Orthodox (Conservative and Reform) also did so. To some extent, reservations in the past about television have mellowed in the case of ultra-Orthodox rabbis because television is in practice carried on the computer. Of those rabbis who do not have television, 58% of those who have children at home gave religious reasons, as opposed to 31% of rabbis who do not have children at home. Similar figures were given for those who replied they do not listen to radio, which is surprising since it is not a visual medium. It confirms that the Orthodox Jewish outlook also has reservations regarding sound – including gossip – as well as listening to women singers. Of those who do not listen to radio regularly, 50% and 20% of Haredi and modern Orthodox rabbis cited religious reasons. In the case of the quality of the internet, the more the rabbi surfed the internet, the more the rabbi was inclined to rate its quality higher. Only 13% and 31% of all rabbis who surfed the internet to a very great extent and 23% and 40% who surfed to a large extent replied that its quality was very bad or bad, respectively (in contrast to 64% and 19% of rabbis who did not surf at all and to 37% and 34% who surfed to a small degree). There are wide variations in the exposure of rabbis to news media and what interests them. Community rabbis seek to be in touch with their community and what their community itself is exposed to. So dayanim feel a need to be in touch with the environment in which people appearing before the bet din experience are exposed to. But teaching rabbis vary a great deal. There is clearly a difference between the different religious streams, in particular between Haredim and non-Haredim, in keeping in touch. Haredim rely entirely on one of the daily institutional papers only – Yated Neeman, Hamodia, Hamevaser, or Peles. Some of their wives read the Haredi weekly magazines. Among the modern Orthodox rabbis and non-Orthodox rabbis, the secular Israeli daily newspapers Haaretz, Yediot Aharonot, and Israel Hayom are seen to a certain extent but only by a minority. Some follow events by Y-Net, the leading secular website. Other rabbis, in particular from the Hardal sub-stream, follow events on

Rabbis’ exposure to media 161 modern religious news websites like Arutz 7, Kippa, and Soragim. Haredi rabbis follow but much less via news websites because Haredi rabbis remain principled opponents against computers with internet connections. Haredi rabbis are much more inclined than other rabbis to read a daily Haredi newspaper, notably Yated Neeman – notwithstanding the 24-hour delay between an event and the publication of news about it – than be updated from other Haredi media forms, like news websites and radio. Radio is listened to by Orthodox rabbis, albeit selectively, such as while travelling. Yet some do listen to current affairs programmes on radio. In the words of the rabbi

In examining the question of rabbis’ media exposure to news for following the news, these may be broken down into five categories: (1) rabbis who actively follow the news, (2) what rabbis are interested in, (3) rabbis who say they have no time to follow the news, (4) rabbis who feel the media are unsuitable for covering the news, and (5) rabbis who have no interest in following the media. 1.

Rabbis who are active media consumers

Those who do follow the news are first and foremost looking for religion-related news, such as new legislation on state-religion matters. For example, non-Orthodox rabbis follow closely religion conversion-related news. But rabbis have a wide range of sources other than the media for religion news – including internal reports from their institutions and word-of-mouth from rabbinical colleagues and Israeli domestic political news. The next news category is political parties. Some follow international news, if only in a cursory fashion. No rabbis reported interest in culture or sport. Books and religious matter not tied to the news, such as profiles of rabbis and Jewish communities, generate interest. Overall, few follow the media very widely. Others have each developed their style for keeping up-todate. So overall, there is only an ‘average to less average’ exposure to news even for active news consumers. An American-born modern Orthodox community rabbi in Jerusalem said, Every morning I take an avid peek at the sites of Y-Net, Arutz 7, Maariv, and the Jerusalem Post. I listen to the news at 6 am and 7 am. About half an hour a day – once in the morning and one in the evening I look at media. I get the weekly Makor Rishon on subscription. I don’t read the Haredi media – they have an agenda that they are always right and everyone else is wrong. It’s important for me to be involved, to feel the pulse of the country – for myself but also for my Sabbath sermons. You want to feel connected. I want to feel the mindset of the people. Even those rabbis who are active and say it as important to stay in touch do so in their own respective way, and some prefer a specific medium. Thus, a teaching

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rabbi in a modern Orthodox advanced yeshiva in the old city of Jerusalem is exposed mostly to the radio medium. “I listen to radio at least once a day if not twice or three times – also in the evening and at lunch time. I do not have a TV in the house – it is important to me to listen.” The late rabbi of a modern Orthodox community in Caesarea and former president of an organisation of liberal modern Orthodox rabbis, Ronen Neuwirth, looked at two media sources, internet and radio. I listen a lot to radio both at home and in the car. I don’t have a subscription to newspapers. When I possessed a TV, I didn’t see the news on TV. In surfing the Internet I purposely view secular news websites like Y-Net, and religious websites like Soragin in order to receive a different perspective – a balance. I do this three or four times a day – no more than a minute each time – to update, what’s new. For Dayan A (a religious court judge), his main source is the secular website Y-Net, which he spends an hour a day surfing – broken up, say, into 15 minutes in the morning, 15 minutes in the evening, and 30 minutes during the rest of the daytime. He reads newspapers ad hoc when he picks them up at the petrol station, but he has nothing on subscription. At work at the courtroom, he sees Haredi daily newspapers. “I don’t get the bumper weekend papers [published in Israel on Friday the Sabbath eve] because I am busy preparing my shiurim which I give on the Sabbath.” The only newspaper he takes is Makor Rishon, the upmarket nationalist-cum-modern Orthodox weekly published on Friday. I took it for a number of years but they began to have too liberal an agenda, and I did not want my children to read it because this was not educational for them. But as a dayan, I am interested in laws on Israel, I prefer books. A modern Orthodox town rabbi who heads a rabbinical body said, I go onto the Internet and secular Y-Net as well as the sites of the modern Orthodox – Kippa and Arutz 7 – three or four times a daily to see what is happening within the sector. The more I go onto the Internet, the less I listen to the radio. The PR adviser of the rabbinical body to which I am affiliated prepares a package of headlines in the media, which he gives to the body’s senior ranks. An American-born rabbi who is a class teacher at a sleepaway or boarding yeshiva high school identified with the modern Orthodox sector: Most of my exposure to the news is through the newspapers. I read the secular-elite Haaretz – both Hebrew and English editions – and Makor Rishon. The radio I see as a waste of time interviewing politicians – you know what they say about any particular issue before you put it on – I don’t have a TV –

Rabbis’ exposure to media 163 I did have a TV but threw it out one night. I was disappointed with certain things the kids in the house were doing which were not necessarily connected with the television itself – in my view what is going on religiously and culturally with the kids today is connected to the TV. I asked permission from my wife and threw it in the garbage. 2.

What are rabbis interested in?

The most popular topics are religion and Israeli politics. It is natural that religion is popular since it is related to the work of the rabbi. Indeed, there is no clear distinction between “religion” and the “rabbinical occupation” and the “rabbinical outlook” or vocation concerning informational needs because the “rabbinical occupation” is a vocation or mission. Politics may be the stuff of news, but it is even truer because religion and state are intermingled. This is true in particular with non-Orthodox, which are in the midst of a struggle for recognition in Israel. Beyond religion, there are a variety of factors and reasons that rabbis look for. A Haredi dayan sees the media as a window of Israel which he is little acquainted with and but which he has to know for his work as a religious court judge. A female teacher in a liberal modern Orthodox girls’ high school enjoys TV for reasons not connected with their work – for example, music. “In the main I want religious politics and state politics,” said one rabbi. A Haredi community rabbi said, “Naturally I am interested in religion-related news in Israel but I am interested also in other subjects, and abroad in the Jewish world – the case of anti-Semitism interests me.” The principal of a Haredi girls’ high school or seminary in the northern city of Haifa counts three things he looks for in reading the daily Haaretz newspaper: “(1) I read the engagements’ announcements which are listed daily on page 1 of the daily Haredi papers. I have children of marriageable age – a clue to the fact that in Haredi circles there are shidduchim or arranged marriages. (2) The daily news highlights. (3) Background long features of news. Also, the Friday, Sabbath eve, weekend issues of the Haredi papers have the religion section – or kadosh [literally ‘holy’] section – which includes reflections by rabbis on the weekly reading of the Bible and Prophets (the haphtarah). As a rabbi I follow religion news in general term and want the rough lines. We are not cut off!” he remarked. But the practical value of following the news is for some rabbis limited. Thus, a rabbi who teaches education and politics in a Haredi elementary school is of interest to him, “but there is little information of practical relevance for say budgeting my school. Also, news from the Jewish diaspora is fascinating. Anti-Semitism or, say, damage to cemeteries draws me.” “The issue of politics and religion is of paramount importance to me given our struggle for recognition,” said a Reform community rabbi. He was glued to the news. A friend sent him the weekly Arts and Leisure section of the New York Times. “I increasingly made a point of reading the obituary – just to make sure that I’m not there.”

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And then there are informational needs and interests. A rabbi who is headmaster of a large modern Orthodox high school in Jerusalem said, “The school [of 900 current boys] has hundreds of graduates in the Army” (which requires him, he says, to follow day-by-day military issues). Are rabbis interested in news about other, non-Jewish religions? Seldom. AReform community minister was involved in a number of interfaith groups. An Americanborn modern Orthodox community rabbi in Jerusalem said, “I don’t follow them but if I see something about Ramadan or like that, I’ll notice it.” Yet all is not work. The class teacher at the liberal modern Orthodox high school said that watching TV was determined by what her children were watching at that moment. The provost of a Reform Jewish seminary looked to music and foreign TV like the BBC. 3.

Rabbis who have no time to follow the news

A rabbi who leads a Haredi Sephardi community and is also a yeshiva teacher said, I get updated by members of my community. To all intents and purposes I don’t see the media. No time. The newspapers distributed free notably the Tuesday issue of Yated Neeman, I might glance at. Occasionally I listen to radio in my car. The news on radio infringes on social gossip or loshon hara – but at times you nevertheless need to know. His cousin, also a Haredi community rabbi, said, I don’t read newspapers. No time. Occasionally I listen to the radio in the car. People sometimes come to me and speak about things about which I am not up-to-date. And sometimes I don’t understand what they are talking about. My son, who studies in the yeshiva, sometimes updates me. The Hardal leaning community rabbi of a small town who leads a modern Orthodox community in the country said, “I have very little time. I go to the Arutz 7 website. I rarely listen to radio except when I am travelling.” Another Hardal community rabbi of a settlement said, “The mission of being a rabbi does not leave time to read the media. The mission completely engages the body, the soul, and the spirit seven days in the week.” A woman class teacher from the liberal Orthodox girls’ high school said: “I have no time for papers. A little more on the Sabbath. I have no time. I have no time.” 4.

Rabbis who consider the media not suitable for them

An American-born rabbi-headmaster of a boys’ modern Orthodox high school: “I read the New York Times and Washington Post online – first page only. At home we read on the Sabbath Makor Rishon. We used to bring Haaretz home, but there were some very, very pornographic pieces which were too much. I thought it was inappropriate to bring home.”

Rabbis’ exposure to media 165 The professor-rabbi of the Conservative movement’s Schechter Institute said, The Hebrew press, other than Makor Rishon, has nothing to say about any Jewish topic. Haaretz is not interested in any Jewish topic. It is an anti-religious newspaper. The only time they talk about Judaism is to make fun of it. Maariv is not uninterested. If you care to know what’s going in the Jewish world, you have to read the Jerusalem Post. I read The Economist on subscription: it’s unbelievable how much information is in it. A female teacher in an elementary Haredi school in Jerusalem said, “I read Yated Neeman daily. I don’t feel that I am cut off.” A rabbinical teacher at the Mirrer Yeshiva – which has thousands of yeshiva students (including many avrechim, who are highly learned and, with stipends, learn Torah all day) spread over 25 halls, said, We don’t listen to radio because there is no great value. All my children read Hamodia. We moved to Hamodia from Yated Neeman for educational reasons: the split within the Lithuanian community – between the Bnei Beraq wing led by Rabbi Shteinmann – whose paper was Yated Neeman – and the Jerusalem faction by Rabbi Auerbach – whose paper was Peles – was played out on the pages of Yated Neeman. We did not want our children exposed to this, so we moved to Hamodia. 5.

Rabbis who are uninterested in following the news

The dayan from the Reform bet din said, I am not a person closely tied to the news – I read the press – mainly Haaretz – at the weekend and learn what has been happening. I surf the Net very little and have no TV. As the senior dayan (or judge) in the Reform movement, my main preoccupation is conversion. A female Conservative community rabbi said, I hardly ever take a newspaper into the house – unless it is a freebie. I do listen to the radio: Israel Radio’s Reshet Bet (current affairs) is on whenever I’m driving, which is fairly often – at least a couple of times day. I do watch TV, but never listen to the news on TV. It would be beneficial for someone doing my job. There are two things – I’m the kind of person who takes on more than my job allows. So I never really make time for this. But it’s not just a time issue because you make time for things you want to do. It is avoiding an unpleasant feeling when I read something – either because whatever happened is annoying and the way it is covered is annoying.

166 Rabbis’ exposure to media A Hardal rabbi of a settlement said, In the past I read more than three papers. The Maariv newspaper was regarded as the Ten Commandments – but I was a soldier in the 1973 Yom Kippur war and saw what happened in practice and saw what was written, so we dropped the paper. We get two weekend papers, the BaSheva weekly freebie and Makor Rishon for my wife. Today I have no time, at least I glance at the headlines. I listen to the radio in the car at times – if I have time – in driving or when walking. In particular, radio is the main source of information for me. A Reform rabbi teaching at a non-Orthodox Tali school said, “I don’t read papers, Haaretz is too ‘left’ and Makor Rishon is too ‘right.’ I don’t have a TV. I hear about things. I surf Y-Net – because it is very accessible.” The provost of a Reform rabbinic training seminary said, I read papers sporadically but not on subscription. I find Haaretz to be particularly poor for getting a sense of the news. It’s about opinions on the news. So I’ll often go to Y-Net just to see the headlines. When you have a flood of papers, one doesn’t catch up with them. You don’t read it systematically enough every day to justify all that waste. A Haredi yeshiva teacher who heads a kollel (a centre of advanced Talmudic learning) said, “I really don’t read anything. I don’t have the internet, nor a computer. Occasionally I read the Yated Neeman newspaper distributed free on Tuesdays. I don’t buy newspapers. I can’t handle the press.” Religion news and general (non-religion) news Religion-related news

Religion news in the media was followed by rabbis less than general news developments. It was followed at a high frequency by only 20% of rabbis surveyed by the author, and 8% all the time. Thirty-seven per cent of rabbis of all streams in following news about religion-related developments did so from time to time. (No difference between different streams was found.) Noteworthy was the number of rabbis who were inclined not to follow religion news: 33%, 39%, and 28% of Haredim. Modern Orthodox and Haredi rabbis did not follow religion news at all or to a small degree only. Thirty-three per cent and 39% of Haredi and modern Orthodox rabbis, respectively, did not follow religion news at all or did so only to a small degree. Eastern European rabbis were less inclined to follow religion news. Those born in 1921–1940 were more inclined to read everything on religion or to do so with great frequency (48%) compared to those born in 1941–1960 (26%) and in 1961– 1980 (21%).

Rabbis’ exposure to media 167 All were inclined to follow national religious developments, albeit Haredim did so a little less. In terms of religion news broken down, 33% of all rabbis followed national religious developments a lot. Rabbis of different streams had different reasons to follow national religious news: the Haredim felt that Torah values were attacked by state and court decisions. The modern Orthodox saw in state-religious institutions the fulfilment of the religious Zionist dream. The non-Orthodox sought legitimacy from the Israeli state. In contrast, local religious community news was less followed: 14% followed a lot, 31% at times, and 33% occasionally. The Haredim were slightly less inclined to follow local community news. In gathering religion news, rabbis were preoccupied with news about their own religious stream. News about the rabbi’s stream (Haredi, mainstream modern Orthodox, Hardal, Conservative, Reform) was followed incrementally more than those of other streams: 13% of all rabbis did so all the time, 28% most of the time, and 37% at times, compared to 6% of rabbis who follow news about other Jewish religious streams all the time, 24% most of time, 36% at times, and 22% on isolated occasions. Rabbis followed news about other, non-Jewish religions even less: 33% did so occasionally and 37% never. Non-Orthodox rabbis were much more inclined to follow news about non-Jewish religions than Orthodox rabbis: 33% and 40% of non-Orthodox rabbis were more inclined to read about it most of the time or from time to time, respectively, in contrast to 4% and 12% of Orthodox rabbis. Partly, this lack of interest reflects the lack of coverage other religions receive in the Israeli media. Examining content in Israeli newspapers, radio, and television, Cohen found that Islam and Christianity each received only 1% of all religion news content (2005). This is even though there are one million Israeli Arabs and key Christian churches of international significance to Christianity are situated in the Holyland. Religious programmes are also rarely viewed. 66%, 55%, and 48% of nonOrthodox rabbis, modern Orthodox rabbis, and Haredi rabbis never do or rarely view religion programming. Nineteen per cent, 12% and 12% of Haredi rabbis, modern Orthodox, non-Orthodox do all the time or often. Yet a third – 33%, 35% and 29% of Haredi, modern Orthodox, and non-Orthodox – do so some of the time. General (non-religion-related) news

Rabbis were surveyed for their interest in non-religion news. In order to compare and place the level of interest in a wider perspective, interest in other categories of news – politics, defence and economics, family and education, and sport – were examined. Regarding politics, defence, and economics news, there was considerable interest to great interest: 76%, 59%, and 42% of non-Orthodox, modern Orthodox (combined, including Hardal), and Haredi rabbis, respectively, read everything or much on this, but 27% of Haredi rabbis expressed no interest at all or little interest,

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and 11% and 10% of modern Orthodox and non-Orthodox rabbis, respectively, said the same. It reflects the fact that Haredi rabbis are inclined to distance themselves from non-Torah matters. Regarding news about education and family, where there was very limited interest, there was a slight indication for Haredi rabbis to be less interested than non-Orthodox: 65%, 60%, and 48% of Haredi rabbis, modern Orthodox rabbis, and non-Orthodox rabbis, respectively, expressed no interest at all or little interest. Regarding news about sport, there was no interest among any rabbis: 95%, 88%, and 75% of Haredi rabbis, modern Orthodox rabbis, and non-Orthodox rabbis had no interest at all or (in a few cases for all streams) had little interest. Other, non-informational functions of the media

It is instructive to survey the interest in non-news matters – including entertainment, religious music, and charity donations – on the Net. Ninety-six per cent and 94% of Haredi rabbis and modern Orthodox rabbis had no interest or had little interest only in entertainment, and even 55% of non-Orthodox rabbis said the same thing. Religious music is not listened to by many. Modern Orthodox rabbis do so more than others – 27% of modern Orthodox rabbis listen to music all the time or much of the time, but only 16% of Haredi rabbis and 10% of non-Orthodox rabbis do so. Seventy-three per cent, 49%, and 40% of non-Orthodox rabbis, Haredi rabbis, and modern Orthodox rabbis never listen or occasionally listen to music, 35% and 33% of Haredim and modern Orthodox listen to music sometimes, and only 16% of non-Orthodox do. Interest in charity via the internet remains very small: 2% of rabbis give charity via the Net to a very great extent or a large extent, and a further 5% to some extent. Conservative rabbis were slightly more inclined to use new media for donations more than other religious streams: 3% to a large extent or a very great extent and 15% to some extent. Community rabbis are more inclined to than teaching rabbis: 4% to a very great extent and a greater extent and 7% to some extent, in contrast to teaching rabbis (2% and 6%, respectively). Ashkenazi rabbis are more inclined than Sephardi rabbis: 3% all the time or most of the time and 5% some of the time, in contrast to Sephardim (1% and 4%, respectively). What do rabbis think of the media? Considerable tension exists in Israel between Orthodox Jew and the secular media, which are regarded by many in the former as anti-religious and anti-nationalist. A considerable amount of information that gets defined as religion news is – like other subjects of the news is – conflict-oriented. Conflicts between religious institutions in Israel and the Jewish state are often considered news. Much of the tension between the religious and secular focuses upon the question of whether the State of Israel should be a state based upon Jewish religious law (halakha) or be a secular democracy. Rather than just a theoretical question, it reflects deep

Rabbis’ exposure to media 169 ideological differences between secular and Jewish religious groups and differences within Jewish religious communities, notably Haredim (or ultra-Orthodox Jews) and modern Orthodoxy. A clue to the challenges facing a rabbi in communicating his or her messages through the media is whether the media is seen as pro- or anti-religion. Haredi rabbis were more inclined (64%) than modern Orthodox (32%) to say that the press damages religion to a very great extent. Yet even 39% of modern Orthodox rabbis agreed that the press damages religious values to a large extent. In the case of television, there was a significant increase in modern Orthodox rabbis (56%) saying that television damaged religious values to a very great extent. Similar findings were found with the other media forms – radio, television, and internet. In contrast to the Orthodox rabbis, 31% of non-Orthodox rabbis said that press damages religious values to some extent, to a large extent, or to a very great extent. Similar findings were found for press, radio, television. In the case of non-Orthodox rabbis, there was a noticeable increase in rabbinical criticism regarding internet over other media forms: 47% of non-Orthodox rabbis said that internet damages religious values. Among the non-Orthodox, there was a greater inclination for Conservative rabbis than Reform rabbis to agree that the media damages religious values to some extent, to a great extent, or to a very great extent. But most noteworthy was the gap in attitudes between Conservative rabbis and Reform rabbis over cinema: 40% of Conservative rabbis said so, as opposed to 22% of Reform rabbis. When asked more specifically whether the Orthodox rabbinate and religious institutions in Israel were presented in a positive light in the media, 29% of all rabbis did not agree, but 44% of all rabbis agreed to a small extent. Only marginal differences could be detected between streams. The image of Haredim in the general media was regarded as excellent by only 13% of Orthodox rabbis, compared to 42% of non-Orthodox rabbis. Similarly, only 9% of Orthodox rabbis rated the image of the modern Orthodox sector as good, in contrast to 26% of non-Orthodox rabbis. Modern Orthodox rabbis were more inclined than Haredi rabbis to rate the image of the modern Orthodox sector as positive. Rabbis from all streams (63%) agreed that the image of the Conservative stream was bad. The trend was even true regarding the image of the Reform movement: 91% of non-Orthodox rabbis said this was bad, and 76% of Orthodox rabbis also said so. The Israeli case of journalists being perceived as anti-religious is comparable to other countries. Surveying American clergymen, Dart and Allen (1993) found that between 58% and 91% of clergymen from different Christian streams agreed that US religion coverage was biased against ministers and organised religion. The clergy – themselves a key section of the public – are critical of media coverage as encouraging secularism and anti-religion. In 1993 a large survey of clergy was carried out by Vanderbilt University’s Freedom Forum, comprising 988 Christian clergy, broken down into six Christian denominations in the US: 58% of mainline Christian ministers, 70% of Catholic priests, and 91% conservative Christians agreed that religion coverage today is biased against ministers and organised religion. (Of

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the 58% mainline ministers, 23% were undecided and only 19% disagreed.) Twothirds of the clergy said that news on religion gave an unfairly negative picture of clergy. Three-quarters of the clergy agreed with the statement that most journalists introduce their own selective perspective in religion studies rather than reporting objectively. (More than half of the 701 journalists also surveyed here disagreed, though 29% of journalists did agree.) The distance between what is reported about religion and the image which media critics like rabbis would want constructed may be explained as resulting from the news process itself rather than a seemingly anti-religious agenda of an individual reporter. Nevertheless, the moral conscience of reporters – including on matters related to belief, spirituality, and organised religion – provides an amorphous background against which journalists function. It suggests that critics of the media fail to distinguish between the broader dynamics of the market forces of news and the views of the individual journalist. Reflecting inadequate media education in the school system, critics, including rabbis, require a more sophisticated understanding of the news process. Despite the gloomy impressions about religion coverage, when asked whether tension between religion and media was inevitable, 30% of rabbis from all streams did not agree, 22% agreed a little, 23% agreed, 18% agreed a lot, and only 8% agreed entirely. There was little difference between the different religious streams. Rabbis and the Israeli media coverage of religion and spirituality

How satisfied are Israeli rabbis with religion coverage by the Israeli media? In addition to the quality, the question may be examined in terms of the religion content, balance in reporting, the quantity of religion content, and its accuracy. Quality

There was limited criticism by rabbis of the quality of religion reporting in the mainstream secular press: 5% and 11% of the modern Orthodox (including Hardal) rabbis surveyed said that coverage of religion in the daily secular press was very bad or not good, while 44% and 5% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis said it was medium or good. Non-Orthodox rabbis incrementally were more positive than the modern Orthodox media. Non-Orthodox were very critical of the quality: 24% and 11% said it was very bad or bad. Only 30% and 8% – the same as Haredi rabbis – of non-Orthodox rabbis described the quality as good or excellent. Haredi rabbis who do not read the general secular press at all were even more critical – 5% said religion coverage was very bad and a further 23% said it was bad. There was little difference among rabbis broken down by age. There was a slight trend for younger rabbis to be less critical of the quality of general newspaper coverage of religion. Thus, 6% and 47% of rabbis born after 1980 said religion coverage was excellent or good in contrast to 6% and 34% born after 1960 and 8% and 37% born after 1940.

Rabbis’ exposure to media 171 When asked to evaluate the quality of religion coverage on internet websites, 28% of all rabbis replied coverage was very bad, 33% bad, and 30% average. Only 1% and 8% said it was excellent or good on religion. Non-Orthodox rabbis were more inclined to evaluate positively the quality of internet websites: 0% and 34% of non-Orthodox rabbis said it was very bad or bad, compared to 35% and 33% of Orthodox rabbis, while 48% of non-Orthodox rabbis said it was mediocre, compared to 25% of Orthodox. Reform rabbis were least critical, and Haredi rabbis were most critical: only 0% and 29% of Reform rabbis said it was very bad or bad, compared to 51% and 23% of Haredi rabbis. Yet even among Reform rabbis, only 4% and 13% said the quality of religion coverage on internet websites was excellent or good (54% of Reform rabbis said it was average). Among the Orthodox rabbis, there were interesting differences between Haredim and mainstream modern Orthodox and Hardal rabbis. Among the mainstream modern Orthodox, 36% said the quality of religion on websites was average, and 19% and 40% said it was very bad and average, respectively. In contrast, among the Hardal rabbis, only 19% said it was average, and 31% said it was very bad (40% said it was bad). Five per cent and 13% of non-Orthodox said the quality of religion coverage was excellent or good, compared to 7% and 0% Orthodox. Among all streams, by rabbinical occupation – between community rabbis, rabbi-teachers, and avrechim rabbis – community rabbis were least critical and avrechim rabbis were most critical. Six per cent and 32% of community rabbis said it was very bad or bad, compared to 31% and 35% of teaching rabbis, and 53% and 22% of all avrechim rabbis, and 46% of community rabbis said it was average, in contrast to 28% of teacher-rabbis and 18% of avrechim rabbis. When asked to evaluate the quality of coverage of religion on social networks, there were similar findings to those for the internet – for all rabbis and for rabbis broken down in Orthodox rabbis versus non-Orthodox rabbis. Broken down by religious stream, Reform rabbis, followed by Conservative rabbis, were least inclined to be critical of religion on social networks. Haredi rabbis followed by Hardal rabbis were most critical of the quality. In occupational terms, community rabbis were least inclined to be critical as compared to avrechim rabbis. In between stood rabbi-teachers. The more they surfed for religion developments, the higher rabbis rated the quality of internet websites. There was even criticism of the religious media. When asked to evaluate religion news and the quality of coverage, 7% and 30% of Haredi rabbis described the quality as very bad or bad (28% said it was average). A further 28% said it was good and 7% excellent. Balance

In terms of balance in reporting religion in the traditional media, 75% and 15% of Haredi rabbis, 66% and 16% of modern Orthodox (including Hardal) rabbis, and 23% and 37% of non-Orthodox rabbis described it as very bad or bad. In the religious press, findings were, surprisingly, worse: 77% and 11% of Haredi rabbis said

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it was very bad or bad, 68% and 22% of modern Orthodox rabbis also said so, but only 23% and 36% of non-Orthodox thought so, respectively. Accuracy

In terms of accuracy, in the secular daily press, 6% and 17% of Haredi rabbis and 7% and 12% of modern Orthodox rabbis (including Hardal rabbis) said accuracy was very bad or bad. Yet 17% and 52% of modern Othodox rabbis said accuracy was excellent or good, and 11% and 38% of Haredi rabbis also said so, respectively. Regarding the daily religious press, 9% and 22% of Haredi rabbis said accuracy was excellent or good, respectively. A further 41% of Haredi rabbis rated accuracy as average, and 6% and 40% of modern Orthodox rabbis said it was excellent or good. A further 30% of modern Orthodox rabbis said it was average, but 32% and 21% of non-Orthodox rabbis said accuracy was very bad or bad, respectively. Quantity

Regarding the question of the quantity of religious coverage in the daily general press, all rabbis were dissatisfied – 93% and 5% of Haredi rabbis said it was very bad or bad, and 74% and 14% of modern Orthodox rabbis (including Hardal) said so. Less so, 17% and 42% of non-Orthodox rabbis said so. The Haredi rabbis said the quantity was excellent or good, but only 1% and 1% of modern Orthodox rabbis said so, and 0% and 10% of non-Orthodox rabbis said so, respectively. Knowledge of religion affairs reporters – the view of the rabbis

A very major role in the coverage of religion is done by the specialist religion affairs correspondents. It is therefore appropriate, in assessing rabbis’ views about religion coverage, for rabbis to evaluate the work of the religion affairs reporter. Rabbis were diametrically opposed to what journalists thought of their colleagues, the religion affairs specialists. Rabbis were very critical of the level of knowledge of religion affairs reporters – this was particularly the case with Haredi rabbis and modern Orthodox rabbis: 32% and 42% of Haredi rabbis did not agree at all or were inclined not to agree that religion affairs reporters were knowledgeable, and so did 19% and 43% of modern Orthodox. Non-Orthodox rabbis were incrementally less inclined than other rabbis; 11% and 29% did not agree at all or were not inclined to agree, and 45% of non-Orthodox, 31% of modern Orthodox, and 20% of Haredi rabbis agreed that religious affairs reporters were knowledgeable. No Haredi or modern Orthodox rabbis very much agreed, only 7% and 7% of Haredi and modern Orthodox respectively agreed, and 4% and 16% non-Orthodox rabbis very highly rated or highly rated the knowledge level of religion affairs reporters. In terms of country background of the rabbi – Israeli, Anglo-Saxon, Eastern European, or Arab – there was little difference, with the exception of Anglo-Saxon rabbis, who were incrementally less critical. This could be explained by this group having a disproportionally higher number of non-Orthodox rabbis – who, as shown

Rabbis’ exposure to media 173 earlier, though also critical like their Orthodox colleagues, were nevertheless a little less critical. In terms of age – in contrast to the public – there was no significant age difference between rabbis born after 1940, after 1960, and after 1980. Influence of mass media upon rabbis In discussing the impact on rabbis of the media, a distinction should be drawn between religion-related information and news or background features about general news developments. Non-religion content

Regarding news about non-religious matters like politics, the influence of the media’s coverage of the secular environment was considerable: 26% of rabbis agreed to a very great extent, 31% a lot, and 22% at times. This was particularly true with non-Orthodox rabbis: 44% of non-Orthodox rabbis agreed to a great extent and a further 31% of non-Orthodox rabbis from time to time. This contrasted with only 24% of Haredi rabbis (modern Orthodox: 32%). The exposure to the media changed the outlook about the general secular environment a lot for 8% of all rabbis, and at times for 27% of rabbis; however, 35% of rabbis said it changed only a little and 28% not at all. Thirty-five per cent, 36%, 29%, 28%, and 21% of Reform, Conservative, Hardal, mainstream modern Orthodox, and Haredi rabbis, respectively, said it influenced their understanding to some degree. Moreover, 31%, 42%, 24%, 32%, and 16% of Reform, Conservative, Hardal, modern Orthodox, and Haredi rabbis said it influenced them to a very great extent or a large extent. The nonOrthodox rabbis showed greatest likelihood towards being influenced. Sixtyfour per cent, 47%, 40%, 35% and 23% of mainstream modern Orthodox, Haredi, Hardal, Reform, and Conservative rabbis, respectively, were inclined to say that the traditional media (printed, press, radio, and TV) did not influence their understanding of events in the secular world – with the non-Orthodox rabbis less inclined than the Orthodox to say that it never influenced, in contrast to saying that it influenced them a little. There was no significant difference in terms of age. It is crucial for a community rabbi to be in touch with what his congregants are experiencing and by what they are influenced. Dayan C is a learned scholar in Jewish law and defines himself as Haredi. He studied in a kollel but lacks a college degree. A judge has to be enlightened and know what goes on among the Israeli public. The public helps you understand the different types of people who come before you in the religious court, so the media exposure helps me to understand what is going on.

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Dayan A elaborated, “It certainly tells rabbis what are the issues of the day, and what it is necessary to relate to.” A liberal modern Orthodox rabbi said, “I take on information from the media, but not more or much more than this. I don’t feel that this can move me from here to there in terms of opinions.” Dayan B said, Yet the media is a means for measuring the atmosphere; I get a case, for example, in a divorce: the father wants possession of the daughter, and the mother wants possession of the daughter. I want to know what is acceptable. To get this from the lawyer – it is a legal view, the lawyer’s opinion. But I want to assess what is accepted, how is the court perceived in the street? This interests me – and to know the distance between the halakha and the reality. A Haredi rabbi schoolteacher said, “There are writers who speak to me, very logical, they speak to one’s feelings, one’s heart, and write well. For example, Judaism in the world at large.” Yet many rabbis were qualified even on non-religious matters. A more qualified view was offered by a modern Orthodox rabbi: “I have my own opinions. I read to see what is happening and react. Certainly, somebody is trying to influence you, but mainly as a community rabbi, I want to know what is happening and react.” This could influence the rabbi’s sermon or what the rabbi-teacher conveys to students. The opposite can also be true. A female Conservative rabbi said, The synagogue has a policy of not talking about politics. But what is politics? Politics affects everything in life. You talk about racism. Things always get tied up on politics somehow. And so – there are certain synagogue policies on what you can say and what you cannot say. In recent years, I am talking to the community less and less about it and more and more about personal struggles, things that are meaningful, questions about life, and so on. Yet the reality for most is that issues of the day are part and parcel of – but not key ingredients of – the synagogue pulpits. As part of his role as headmaster (of a modern Orthodox boys’ high school), one sought to keep out the media influence out of the school: There is so much irresponsible discussion and talk and information and policy changes – we are going to do this differently and that differently. Most things evolve to no change at all. There is so much noise outside. Part of my job is to put a barrier from all the noise and let the school function in the way that it understands that it is needed. Modern society is living with too much noise. I want to know what people are thinking, but I want to make sure that this institution creates its own value system based on what the people think is important rather than what is fed from the media.

Rabbis’ exposure to media 175 “The media influences. We are only human and everything that we are exposed to around us influences us. But ultimately it depends on what the dynamics of the situation are,” the woman class teacher at a liberal modern Orthodox girls’ high school in Jerusalem said. “Basically, it’s telling students their beliefs may not be correct. And I’m not sure that is what you want to hear from a class teacher.” Religion content

The media has little impact on rabbis’ knowledge of religious news developments: 52% of rabbis said the media had no impact at all, 29% a little, and 14% at times. Haredi rabbis were less inclined than non-Orthodox rabbis to be influenced. The influence of the media on the rabbis’ understanding of the religious environment was low: 37% replied that the media had no influence at all on their understanding of the religious environment, 38% a little, and 20% at times. Rabbis had other, non-mass-media channels for learning about changes on the religious scene. And regarding the extent to which the media altered the rabbis’ outlook towards the religious world, it was even less, given that the rabbi, by virtue of identifying with and belonging to a religious stream, had a definite view on the subject: 49% said not at all and 34% a little. That rabbis are not influenced about their very work may sadden some – and suggests that the media are much less influential for the rabbis. But it is not surprising. In measuring the impact of the media, in the formative years of mass communications research – up to the mid-20th century – the media influence was assumed to change opinion. Later, a more sophisticated view claimed that the media’s influence sets the public agenda, and confirms pre-existing opinions. After all, every rabbi brings ideological baggage to his or her work. Eighty-six per cent, 88%, 79%, 69%, and 74% of Haredim, modern Orthodox, Hardal, Reform, and Conservative rabbis, respectively, said that the media never influenced them or only to a little extent. Non-Orthodox rabbis were more inclined than the Orthodox rabbis to say that the media influenced them to a little extent rather than never. Moreover, 23% of Reform and 19% of Conservative rabbis were more inclined to say that the media influenced them sometimes, in contrast to 8% and 13% of mainstream modern Orthodox (19% Hardal) and Haredi rabbis, respectively. In new media like the internet, similar findings were found: 99%, 82%, 80%, 35%, and 55% of Haredi, mainstream modern Orthodox, Hardal, Reform, and Conservative rabbis, respectively, said new media had little or no influence upon their views on religious issues, and 44%, 30%, 12%, 14%, and 2% of Reform, Conservative, modern Orthodox, Hardal, and Haredi rabbis said it had some influence, and 17% of Reform rabbis said it had influence to a large extent. So, like traditional media, the new media showed that non-Orthodox streams were inclined to say that it had some influence. In terms of occupation, community rabbis were more inclined than rabbi-teachers to admit that the new media influenced them to a very great extent or a great extent, and a further 24% to some degree. In contrast, 6% and 11% of rabbi-teachers said

176 Rabbis’ exposure to media so (0% of avrechim said so), to a very great extent/great extent or to some extent, respectively. There was no significant difference between Ashkenazi and Sephardi rabbis. There was no difference according to age. The head of a Haredi girls’ high school in Haifa said, I don’t draw “ideology” from the newspaper – but from other places. Occasionally, I draw ideas from somebody if I read an article in the weekend papers – for example, somebody writing about the week’s Bible reading. Sometimes one starts reading an article and one realises there is not much and that the person is simply filling space. A modern Orthodox community rabbi from Jerusalem said, On religious issues there is much less media influence. If it’s a non-religious matter, say a political issue, I might be more open to the point of being persuading and accepting because these are general issues and not religious issue. On religious issues I am little more sceptical – so I listen rather than immediately accepting what I hear. Rather than attempting to identify the non-existent influence of media on religious matters on rabbis directly, it is the impact on the broader public regarding religion matters, which, in turn, boomerangs and crystallises into an issue on the public agenda and which may congeal into broad public opinion. If, parallel to the media reaction, it also generates, say, opposing political support, all this sets limits for option policymakers in making religion-related decisions. And for rabbis, the dictum not to pasken (make a Jewish legal decision) in a way not acceptable to congregants is a clue to how actors like the media may influence religion. For example, a rabbi-member of the Chief Rabbinate Council said of the media’s coverage of religion that on state-religious issues, the Chief Rabbinate is under acute criticism by the very fact that they are state appointments, as well as subject to appeal to the Israel Supreme Court, which increasingly, over the years, has an interventionist approach. The Chief Rabbinate Council (which includes chief rabbis of cities in Israel) has a legal adviser who advises the council of what they can do and cannot do. As one rabbi member of the Chief Rabbinate Council put it, The media’s environment has a definite impact upon the council’s actions. For example, we have a discussion on issuing kashrut hechsharim [permits] only to restaurants which are not open on the Sabbath. Someone is going to the Supreme Court: “Why cannot we get a kosher certificate that the food served satisfies Jewish religious dietary laws if we are open on the Sabbath?” The Supreme Court is nothing. It’s the media that builds up stories or puts pressure on the Supreme Court. But the council has to stand up for what they

Rabbis’ exposure to media 177 believe. They do not alter halakha [Jewish religious law]. But they are aware that they cannot go beyond their authority. Conclusion In contrast to information-gathering about religion by the public and by journalists, it is perhaps ironic that the professionals do not draw information about religion from the media, or at least not as their primary source. Perhaps, like professionals in other sectors, rabbis get updated with internal information from their own rabbinical organisations or from interpersonal communication with rabbinical colleagues, and they are themselves knowledgeable about religion – often more than journalists. Indeed, rabbis are very critical of the quality, accuracy, and balance in religion reporting by the media. Equally ironic, it is other, non-religion-related categories of news – such as news about politics, economics, and defence – which have more media impact upon the rabbi. But the question of day-to-day exposure to the press and television is influenced by time considerations, albeit with the significant exception today that rabbis surf news websites and listen to the radio, with the exception of Haredi rabbis, who refrain from surfing non-Haredi news websites. Rather, digitalisation impacts strongly – like it impacts in other professional sectors – the work of rabbis because websites are rich databases for drawing upon a welter of religion sources about halakha (Jewish religious law) and beyond, such as writings about the Bible and Jewish philosophical thought, providing rich matter for shiurim (religious lessons) and sermons. In addition, digitalisation offers the rabbi day-by-day administrative information, such as about religious law courts (bet din), religious affairs local councils, calendar information of religion dates, burial societies, schools and kosher eateries, and so on. No less important are forums which enable rabbis to discuss common problems and issues and form religious positions. Bibliography Armfield, G., & Holbert, R. L. (2003) The Relation Between Religiousity and Internet Use. Journal of Media & Religion 2(3). Brown, D. W., & Smidt, C. E. (2003) Media and Clergy: Influencing the Influential? Journal of Media & Religion 2(2). Cannon, D. (2007) Church Newspaper Readership and Faith Community Integration. Journal of Media & Religion 6(1). Cantoni, L., Rapetti, E., Tardini, S., Vannini, S., & Arasa, F. (2010) The Adoption of ICT within the Ministrants of the Catholic Church. In Cheong, P. H., Fischer-Nielsen, P., Gelfgren, S., & Ess, C. (eds.), Digital Religion, Social Media and Culture: Perspectives, Practices and Futures. New York: Peter Lang. Cantoni, L., & Zyga, S. (2007) The Use of Internet Communication by Catholic Congregations: A Quantitative Study. Journal of Media & Religion 6(4). Cohen, Y. (2005) Religion News in Israel. Journal of Media & Religion 4(3).

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Dart, J., & Allen, J. (1993) Bridging the Gap: Religion and the News Media. Vanderbilt: The Freedom Forum. Finnegan, J., & Viswanath, V. (2001) Community Ties and the Use of Cable Television and Newspapers in a Midwest Suburb. Journalism Quarterly 65. Galtung, J., & Ruge, M. (1965) The Structure of Foreign News. International Journal of Peace Research 1. Golan, G. (2002) Religiousity and the Third-Person Effect. Journal of Media & Religion 1(2). Lambert, J. (2010) The Information-Seeking Habits of Baptist Ministers. Journal of Religious & Theologicial Information 9. Lerner, H. G. (2009) Internet Resources for Researching Orthodox Judaism. Journal of Religious & Theological Information 7. Roman, A. (2008) Religion Online: Religious Information and Practices in Cyberspace Christianity in the Web. Religion and Social Communication 6(1&2). Smith, M. M. (2007) Non-Profit Religious Organisation Web Sites: An Underutilized Avenue of Communicating with Group Members. Journal of Media & Religion 6(4). Sturgill, A. (2004) Scope and Purposes of Church Web Sites. Journal of Media & Religion 3(3). Yifrach, Y. (2021) That a Women Does This Job Is Itself an Achievement: Interview with Michal Goldstein, Religious Courts System. Makor Rishon 22 October 2021.

8

Rabbis, Jewish values, and the media

Rabbis have a difficult encounter with the mass media. With the Western commercial media not generally encouraging religious ideology, including Jewish ideology, but instead catering to popular taste in search of ratings, rabbis see in mass media threats to their value system. Exploitation of sex and permissiveness, political and social gossip, and portrayals of violence are among areas of conflict between rabbis and the media (Cohen, 2012a, Chapter 2; Cohen & Hetsroni, 2018). Drawing upon divine revelation, the Torah is the basis of halakha, the body of Judaism’s religious laws. These laws are the product of rabbinical discussions in such works as the Mishna, Talmud, and law codes such as those of Maimonides. They provide a normative code of behaviour, regulating man’s conduct with God and man’s conduct with his fellow man. The root of the Hebrew word halakha (lit. “Jewish law”) is the same as that of “to walk.” That is because halakha is a dynamic code of law. This is why – notwithstanding the gap of thousands of years between the Bible and the development of the first newspapers in Europe at the beginning of the 17th century – these same laws have been applied to mass communication platforms like print, radio, television, and the internet. It is here that the practical relevance of Judaism for the study of mass communication and ethics may be clearly identified. A clash of cultures depicted here is not surprising given that the rabbi emerges from a conservative culture representing established traditions and religious structures and is confronted with accelerated cultural change exemplified by the media. Among the many questions which Judaism has something to offer regarding mass media conduct and which rabbis have thought and written about, and discuss to the present day, are situated in the intellectual space between the principle of the right to know and the principle of the right to privacy. These include such issues as social gossip and sexual modesty. Rabbinical Evaluations of Mass Media

How do rabbis perceive the new media, television, radio, and print? In new media, tension exists between religion and the internet and social networks (Cohen, 2011) according the Orthodox rabbis: 57% and 21% of Haredi rabbis and 43% and 33% DOI: 10.4324/9781315735184-8

180 Rabbis, Jewish values, and the media of Hardal rabbis agreed to a great extent or were inclined to agree, respectively, that tension exists. Even 70% of modern Orthodox rabbis agreed to a great extent (37%) or were inclined to agree (37%). Forty-nine per cent and 19% of rabbis said that secular websites damage religious values to a very great extent or to a great extent, and 17% and 19% said so regarding religious websites. Forty-one per cent said religious websites do not damage religious values or only to a small degree, compared to only 18% of those who said the same regarding religious websites. Broken down, 74% and 17% of Haredi rabbis said that secular internet damages religious values to a very great extent or a great extent, as compared to 31% and 28% of modern Orthodox rabbis, and 57% and 30% of Hardal rabbis have taken a far stricter position on accessing internet – as they do to non-Jewish culture as a whole – than the mainstream modern Orthodox, who do not see an inbuilt contradiction between Jewish Torah values and modern culture (Cohen, 2013). In contrast, far fewer rabbis were critical of religious websites. Thus, only 1% and 12% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis said that religious websites damage religious values. So did 5% and 20% of Hardal. However, 33% and 25% of Haredi rabbis said that religious websites damage religious values to a very great extent or to a large extent, respectively. It reflects the Haredi ban on the internet. Also, 33% and 29% of Reform rabbis and Conservative rabbis, respectively, said that religious websites damage religious values to a very great extent or to a large extent. Indeed, only 5% and 7% of Reform rabbis and Conservative rabbis, respectively, said that secular websites damage religious values to a very great extent or to a great extent. This needs to be explained by the fact that religious websites inside Israel in part – but not fully – reflect an Orthodox view and may alienate non-Orthodox rabbis. Yet this is only partly true – as evidenced by the fact that 50% and 54% of Reform rabbis and Conservative rabbis said that religious websites did not damage religious values at all or only a little, and 82% and 75% of Reform and Conservative rabbis said that secular websites do not damage religious values at all or only to a small degree. In occupational breakdown, 50% of teacher-rabbis, 45% of community rabbis with a synagogue, and 93% of avrechim said that secular internet websites damage religious values to a very great extent or to a large extent. A further 17%, 14%, and 2% of teacher-rabbis, community rabbis with a synagogue, and avrechim said so to some extent, respectively. The data may also be examined in terms of whether the rabbi has a filter for the internet: 83% of rabbis with some sort of filter said secular websites damaged religious values to a very great extent or to a great extent, and a further 11% to some extent. In contrast, 19% of rabbis without a filter said so to a great extent or a large extent, but a further 24% said so to some extent. Younger rabbis were more inclined to say secular websites damage religious values: 79% of rabbis born beyond 1980 said they damage religious values to a very great extent or a great extent, compared to 65% of rabbis born in 1960–1979 and 56% born in 1949–1959.

Rabbis, Jewish values, and the media 181 Sephardi rabbis were more critical than Ashkenazi rabbis – 80% of Sephardi rabbis said secular websites damage religious values to a very great extent or a great extent, as compared to 66% of Ashkenazi rabbis. Traditional media – Press

Sixty-four per cent of Haredi rabbis agreed and a further 22% agreed that the press damages religion to a great extent or to a large extent, respectively. In contrast, only 25% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis agree to a very great extent that the media damage religious values – 39% did agree to a large extent, 22% to some degree, and 22% to a small degree. In contrast to modern Orthodox rabbis, 43% of Hardal rabbis said so to a very great degree and 38% to a large degree. Six per cent of Conservative rabbis agreed to a very great degree that the press damages religious values, 16% to a large degree, 50% to a certain degree, 13% not at all, 16% to a limited degree. In contrast to Conservative rabbis, 59% of Reform rabbis said the media does not damage religious values at all, and 19% said that it does damage religious values to a limited degree, 15% to some degree, and only 7% to a large degree. Radio

Broadly, there was little difference between ratings for damage to religious values by radio than the press. Rabbis thought that radio was less damaging than the press. Thus, only 13% of modern Orthodox said that radio causes damage to religious values to a very great degree (in contrast to 22% for the press). Television

Television received much more criticism by rabbis than either the press or radio for damaging religious values: 75% of Haredi rabbis said that television damages religious values to a very great extent, and so did 69% of Hardal rabbis and 47% of modern Orthodox rabbis. Even Reform rabbis saw a difference between television and other media: 44% of Reform rabbis said television does not cause any damage at all, in contrast to 59% for the press and 52% for the radio. Freedom of the press The Torah not only praises its heroes but also criticises them – reflecting the long tradition of freedom of expression by the prophets speaking out against wrongdoings of the leadership and the people – suggesting that the media today, in one sense, are latter day rabbis. But indeed, in Judaism, one only has the right to know, first, Jewish knowledge – that is, the Torah and national laws – and, second, information which if kept secret would cause damage to the society or to an individual. That Leviticus 19:16 prohibits the disclosure of secret information

182 Rabbis, Jewish values, and the media continues – “do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbour” – suggests that if somebody, including a journalist hears of information, such as corruption committed by a government minister or an official, he or she has an obligation to take steps to rectify the situation. The Bible, therefore, acknowledges the fourth estate role, or societal watchdog, fulfilled by the media (Falk, 1999). If the matter can be dealt with by other means than press disclosure, this is preferred. Moreover, much depends on the motives of the journalist in disclosing the information. Did the journalist do it for the watchdog function or his own professional need to publish exclusive information? In order not to infringe loshon hora, a 19th-century rabbi, Israel Meir Kohen, in 1873, known as the Chofez Hayim, developed no less than the Jewish theory of communication (Kagan, 1873: Pliskin, 1975). The Hofetz Hayim says that such information should be published only if the information is entirely accurate and on condition that in disclosing it, the reporter has the public good as his goal and that there is no other way to achieve that goal other than by going public. Information that a public official cannot function, if passed to the official privately, might persuade him to stand down. Sixty-six per cent of all rabbis saw freedom of expression as positive – 36% said it was very positive, 30% were inclined to agree, 15% did not agree at all, and 11% were inclined to disagree (8%). Fifty-eight per cent of all rabbis saw freedom of the press as positive – 27% agreed a lot, 31% were inclined to agree, 20% did not agree at all, and 14% were inclined to agree. Sixty-two per cent of Haredi rabbis did not agree – 44% did not agree at all and 18% were inclined to disagree, but 29% agreed a lot or were inclined to agree. In contrast, in freedom of speech, 40% of Haredi rabbis agreed a lot or were inclined to agree a lot. Among modern Orthodox rabbis, a difference could be drawn between the mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis – 27% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis agreed a lot and 47% were inclined to agree, in contrast to 16% of Hardal rabbis who agreed a lot (and 49% who were inclined to agree). It reflects the Hardal qualification of not being open to the wider culture. Similarly, 16% of Hardal rabbis did not agree at all, and 49% were inclined to agree (47% mainstream modern Orthodox). Also noteworthy is that even the mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis had reservations about freedom of the press. Thus, while, as noted, 40% of mainstream modern Orthodox agreed a lot with freedom of expression, only 27% of mainstream modern Orthodox said so with freedom of the media. While both Reform and Conservative rabbis are totally committed to freedom of expression and freedom of the press, the same concerns regarding freedom of the press, as distinct from freedom of speech, raised by all Orthodox rabbis, were also found with the Reform rabbis and Conservative rabbis. Thus, 92% of Reform rabbis agreed a lot with freedom of expression, but 84% agreed a lot with freedom of the press, while 82% of Conservative rabbis agreed a lot with freedom of expression, but 70% agreed a lot with freedom of the press. In occupational terms, differences may be noted between teacher-rabbis and community rabbis. While only 16% of community rabbis did not agree at all or

Rabbis, Jewish values, and the media 183 were only inclined to disagree with freedom of the press, 35% of teacher-rabbis said so. And while 48% of community rabbis agreed a lot with freedom of the press, only 23% of teacher-rabbis did. This pattern was also found in comparing the two types of rabbis in the question of freedom of expression. There was a marked difference between Ashkenazi rabbis and Sephardi rabbis on the question of freedom of the press: 30% of Ashkenazi rabbis agreed a lot with the freedom of the media, in contrast with 18% of Sephardi rabbis. And 42% of Sephardi rabbis did not agree at all or were inclined to disagree, compared to 32% of Ashkenazi rabbis. In examining key fundamental questions like the freedom of the press, it is also instructive to examine the background of rabbis – where he or she comes from. Thus, breaking down whether the rabbis were born in Israel, Western countries, Eastern Europe, or Arab countries, the rabbi was influenced by whether and to what extent the freedom of the press was upheld in practice in the country where the rabbi grew up. Reference may be made to the extremities of the question (which had five possibilities): “agreed a lot” on the one hand with freedom of the press and “did not agree at all” on the other. Only 16% of Israeli rabbis agreed a lot with the principle of freedom of the press, as compared with 43% of those born in Western countries, 29% born in Eastern European countries (formerly communist countries), and 26% born in Arab countries (for example, North Africa or Yemen). Similarly, 30% of Israeli-born rabbis did not agree at all with the principle of the freedom of the press, as compared with 8% of rabbis born in Western countries, 24% of those born in Arab countries, and 19% of those born in Eastern European countries. Accuracy Information reported in the media has to be accurate to avoid the audience being deceived. The question of complete and honest reporting is related to the Bible. For example, the sin of the biblical spies was that they coloured with their own opinions the report of their mission to spy in the Promised Land (Liebes, 1994). Reflecting that truth is regarded as a foundation of the world, Proverbs 12:19 states, “Truthful lips shall be established forever, but a lying tongue is only for a moment.” So important is truth that lying is tantamount to idol worship. The requirement for accuracy is problematic when a news organisation, under tight deadlines, faces news sources who do not wish to give their account of events. The provision of information about events and societies, which contributes to understanding and reduces conflict – while not generally identified as a peculiarly religious goal – is endorsed by Judaism. One of the sins of the 10 out of the 12 spies about the Promised Land was that they added their own ideological views to their factual report. In terms of accuracy in the secular daily press, 6% and 17% of Haredi rabbis and 7% and 12% of modern Orthodox rabbis (including Hardal rabbis) said accuracy was very bad or bad. Yet 17% and 52% of modern Orthodox rabbis said accuracy was excellent or good, and 11% and 38% of Haredi rabbis also said so. In terms of accuracy in the daily religious press, 9% and 22% of Haredi rabbis said accuracy was excellent or good. A further 41% of Haredi rabbis rated accuracy

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as average. Six per cent and 40% of modern Orthodox rabbis said it was excellent or good. A further 30% of modern Orthodox rabbis said it was average. But 32% and 21% of non-Orthodox rabbis said accuracy was very bad or bad. Advertising

The problem of deception is acute in advertising, where a customer is persuaded to buy a product which he or she would not otherwise do if they knew all the facts. Judaism, therefore, places limitations on modern advertising. While advertising plays a positive role in providing customers with information regarding different brands of products, there are moral limits to what may be done. Drawing upon the biblical verse “in selling . . . do not be disproportionate” (Leviticus 25:17), Judaism prohibits the trader, in promoting his products, from creating a false impression (genevat daat). Showing the defects of the opponent’s products is forbidden – as distinct from pointing out the positive aspects of one’s own products – and is tantamount to slander and falsehood (Levine, 1981; Cohen, 2012b). Rabbis are inclined to agree that commercial advertising damages religious values. Reform Judaism, for example, campaigns against the sexploitation of women in advertising. Fifty-seven per cent of all rabbis agree that advertising damages religious values to a very great extent or largely. Only 24% of all rabbis disagree completely or are inclined to disagree (19% agree to some extent). Journalists by comparison are more divided on whether commercial advertising damages religious values: 31% of journalists agreed to a very great extent or largely, compared to 53% who do not agree at all or only to a small degree (15% agreed somewhat). Social gossip versus privacy Judaism does not acknowledge an automatic right to information which is not either of vital importance to know or of a public danger. Indeed, scholars have differed regarding a middle category of information. Maimonides, one of the most significant codifiers of halakha, distinguished between information about distant events, such as events associated with the elite, and information about individuals nearer to the discloser of the information, the latter of which it is forbidden to publish. While also not favouring the former, Maimonides says that this category is not forbidden by Jewish law. The stringent approach represented by the Hofetz Hayim, discussed here also in the context of the freedom of the press, contrasts with Rabbi Abraham Kook, the chief rabbi of Palestine during the British mandatory period, who recognised that the press had an integral part to play in modern nation-building, and notwithstanding that Kook did favour that media behaviour should be more attuned to Jewish values. With the growth of print, the laws of speech became transformed from oral speech to written text, with the same regulations. What began in loshon hara as rules of interpersonal communication became applied to mass communication channels like publishing. Notwithstanding the importance which Judaism gives to privacy, there is no Jewish law of privacy per

Rabbis, Jewish values, and the media 185 se. Some scholars claim that such a concept exists in Judaism. Nahum Rakover (a former Israeli government Jewish law adviser) and some other scholars identified with the Jewish law movement – which seeks to imprint modern Israeli law with features of ancient Jewish law – argue that various religious laws allude to an underlying theme in Judaism for the right to privacy (Rakover, 2006). However, others argue that Judaism lacks a fully fledged principle of human dignity, from which a rule of privacy might be detected. In contrast to Western society and media, which is characterised by the right to privacy as subservient to the right to know, rabbis regard the right to know as subservient to the right to privacy. Invasion of privacy is regarded as sinful; published information and photos obtained from inside a neighbour’s private territory is tantamount to an invasion of privacy and to gossip. (Babylonian Talmud Tractate Babba Bathra 60a). Leviticus 19:16 warns against not being “a talebearer among your people,” which imposes substantial limits on the passage of information. The rabbis have divided types of information into a number of categories. Most severe is divulging secret information to the wider public which is intended to lead to or has the effect of damaging somebody’s reputation (loshon hara). When Miriam spoke ill of Moses for the Kushan woman he married, she was smitten with leprosy (Numbers 12:1). Also forbidden, but with lesser severity, is the disclosure of even positive information about somebody if it will indirectly lead others to voice negative opinions about that individual (rehilut) (Pliskin, 1975; Israel Meir Kohen, 1873). These restrictions in Judaism profoundly affect the work of the professional journalist in disclosing previously unpublished information. The journalist draws much of his information from sources who disclose information selectively, often in order to weaken a political opponent. However, once the information is known to three people, it is no longer forbidden but becomes permitted to be heard. As the Babylonian Talmud Tractate Erachin (16a) notes, once the information is known to three people, “it is tantamount to announcing it to the world.” Yet if information about a candidate which could raise serious questions about his suitability is not available, it may result in someone not suited to the public office being elected. Thus, the laws of evil gossip (lashon hara) have a particular relevance at times of elections and the disclosure as a tactic in electioneering. When a person has information incriminating someone who is a publicly elected or appointed official, how can he bring it to public attention? (Ariel, 2001; Chwat, 1995). The Talmud, as noted earlier, has decided that once the information is known to three people, it is no longer forbidden. Information, therefore, takes on a relative value. The journalist and his informant have carried out a most heinous act in making the information public, but that same information may be heard by other people. Jewish speech ethics has heightened relevance with the arrival of social media. In one sense, social networking has the potential to build relationships between individuals by contributing to communication and peace and harmony, including dialogue, as well as being a channel for strengthening family ties, notably between children and parents and friends. While these rules were no less relevant to earlier

186 Rabbis, Jewish values, and the media media forms, such as newspapers, radio, and television, they take on added meaning in the age of social media. However, social networks, such as Facebook, revisit Jewish legal questions concerning free speech, the right to know, and modesty, as well as raising important Jewish educational and pedagogic issues. In encouraging the free passage of information about people who are networked, it involves the exposure of details about an individual to numerous, indeed innumerable, “friends,” with the individual having little or no control over the reach of that information. Facebook encourages exposure, a sense of competition and social ambition, and a need for selfaggrandizement, such as placing photographs of oneself on the internet. The ethical questions raised take on added relevance given the phenomenon of shaming. It contrasts with such valued Jewish goals as righteousness and modesty. Social networking challenges the Haredi rules of conduct, partly by facilitating informal relationships between men and women. Until the growth of social media sites, mass media were assumed to be operated by journalists who are generally aware of the limitations of writing, including the laws of libel and slander. With the broader public less skilled in the dos and don’ts of communication, social media has altered the expectation of professionalism regarding the standard of communication, leading to abuse or the infraction of norms. The digital era raises questions of whether the internet and smartphones protect one’s privacy or not; this revisits the question of privacy and Judaism. To the question of whether the internet and smartphones protect one’s privacy, 73% of all rabbis said not at all or only to a small extent. Only 8% agreed a lot or to a large extent. This is one of the questions which draws consensus from the rabbis. Notwithstanding this, Reform rabbis were incrementally inclined to report a little less. Seventy-two per cent, 77%, 73%, 73%, and 58% of Haredi rabbis, mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, Hardal rabbis, Conservative rabbis, and Reform rabbis, respectively, did not agree at all or only a little that internet and smartphones protect one’s privacy. Similarly, in the occupational breakdown, there was little difference between community rabbis and rabbi-teachers: 67% of community rabbis and 75% teacher-rabbis did not agree at all or only to a small degree that they were protected (avrechim: 74%). (Rabbis’ concern about lack of protection reflected the opinion of the broad Israeli public surveyed: 71% of the public did not agree at all or agreed only a little that the internet and smartphones are safe and protected. Only 9% of the public agreed to a great extent or largely.) When asked whether social networks cause social gossip (loshon hara), 68% of all rabbis agreed a lot and a further 20% were inclined to agree. Only 7% of all rabbis did not agree at all or were inclined not to agree. But there was a clear difference when broken down according to religious stream: 90%, 79%, 54%, 29%, and 27% of Haredi rabbis, Hardal rabbis, mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, Reform rabbis, and Conservative rabbis, respectively, agreed a lot. Yet

Rabbis, Jewish values, and the media 187 when those who were inclined to agree were added, then 95%, 95%, 88%, 77%, and 67% of Haredim rabbis, Hardal rabbis, mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, Conservative rabbis, and Reform rabbis, respectively, agreed. Only 21%, 17%, 5%, 4%, and 4% of Conservative rabbis, Reform rabbis, mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, Hardal rabbis, and Haredi rabbis, respectively, did not agree at all or were inclined to disagree that social networks do not produce social gossip (loshon hara). So social gossip (loshon hara) appears to the rabbis to be inbuilt into social networks. Sixty-four per cent of teacher-rabbis and 51% of community rabbis also agreed a lot. Notwithstanding the gap between the two, when added to it also inclined to agree the gap incrementally closed: 80% of community rabbis and 88% of teacherrabbis agreed a lot or were inclined to agree. Forty-eight per cent of rabbis who agreed a lot that social networks cause loshon hara did not agree at all that the internet and smartphones are secure and protect one’s privacy. A further 27% who agreed a lot were inclined to disagree that the internet and smartphones are secure and protect one’s privacy. There were very similar findings between the broad Israeli public and the rabbis on this question of privacy, security, and internet and smartphones. Loshon hara involves the rabbi at two levels – theologically and in the rabbi’s day-to-day pastoral work. First, how does the rabbi educate his or her congregants and students about the problems of loshon hara? Second, how does he or she deal – if at all – with loshon hara as a rabbi? In the first, the rabbi does address the issue in sermons in the synagogue and in shiurim, including through sermonising on such biblical episodes as when Miriam spoke badly about her brother Moses for marrying a Kushite, as well in newsletters like synagogal pamphlets (alonei bet knesset), which are distributed most on Friday eve in the synagogue at the service on the outset of the Sabbath. In dealing with the matter, one rabbi, Yuval Cherlow, seeks to differentiate to audiences between social gossip, as defined in Judaism, and libel and its place in Western culture. In the latter, social gossip ceases once its validity is proven, whereas in Judaism, a religious transgression occurs even after this. As a rabbi I seek two things: To religious audiences I seek them not to cease to speak out in favour of social action and correction – for fear that in doing so they are disclosing yet secret information and are afraid of committing a sin of loshon hora. Towards the general public, my message is to be more sensitive, and moderate in their human relations with their fellow person. Moreover, in the pre-social-media age, professional journalists were acquainted with “red lines” over how to communicate without incurring libel or slander. But in the current age, the problem is far more widespread because all are, in practice, citizen journalists who do not necessarily have these communication skills.

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For example, in the townlet of Hashmonayim, which is a strongly Anglo-Saxon Haredi townlet, its rabbi, Rabbi Zeev Leff, has made loshon hara a feature of the town: We have rules of what can be discussed and what not in the town’s forum. We limit what people can place on the forum to family celebrations, and related notices – but not to discuss political issues or personal gripes or whatever. The forum has an administrator who basically accepts things that are put on, and rejects things that don’t fit in to the guidelines. The late Rabbi Ronen Neuwirth said, I speak a lot about loshon hara. There is a lot to do. I speak and educate inside my community and on the community’s Facebook page. But first there is a need to deal with Israel’s rabbis themselves where the language among today’s rabbis is very violent. Personally I don’t want to get involved because the game is very violent. One rabbi of a modern Orthodox settlement said, People speak behind my back. That’s the name of the game with rabbis. When I deliver a sermon in the synagogue, people take it home with them. Some are for, some are against. One person might say the sermon was too long, for another it’s so boring, but the truth is that not everyone understands the sermon, and other people might say it’s flack. If people want to be critical – so be it! When the rabbi here was a candidate for the post, during the election some tried to bring through the Internet something the candidates had signed on. Rabbi Neuwirth said, “I try to ensure not to discuss matters to do with the family. I keep it all within the family. No Facebook. Nothing.” One rabbi who identified as non-Hassidic moved from reading Israel’s leading non-Hassidic Litai (or Lithuanian) daily newspaper Yated Neeman to a Hassidic paper because he was upset that “there was so much political infighting within the non-Hassidic Haredi stream on Yated Neeman’s pages.” Sexual modesty Against the fact that sex is a popular theme in the Western media and culture, rabbis have been among leading critics of the mass media’s portrayal and, in their view, exploitation of the sexual theme. One focus of the media-Judaism matrix for rabbis is the value of sexual modesty (tzniut). The Israelite camp in the wilderness in “which God walked shall be holy . . . that God should not see anything unseemly and turn Himself away from you” (Deuteronomy 23:15) is an allusion to nudity

Rabbis, Jewish values, and the media 189 being looked on negatively. Moreover, according to the Jewish tradition, the unseemliness results in the withdrawal of the divine presence (Shekhinah). Different branches of Judaism interpret sexual modesty differently. Orthodox Judaism forbids a man to look on a female immodestly attired; in the Haredi community, this includes the uncovered hair of a married woman, and a man is forbidden to listen to a female singer, lest he be sexually aroused; the Hardal wing of the modern Orthodox is particularly stringent in sex-related matters. Conservative rabbis and Reform rabbis are critical of sexual freedom as expressed on internet websites. But if there is a consensus among all rabbis about loshon hara and privacy, there are differences in how sexual modesty and the media are evaluated between nonOrthodox rabbis, mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, Hardal rabbis, and Haredi rabbis. Notable was the proximity between Hardal (as a sub-stream of the mainstream modern Orthodox) and Haredim: 84% of Haredi rabbis and 83% of Hardal rabbis agreed a lot that tzniut was damaged a lot by the media, in contrast to 54% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis and 3% and 4% of Conservative rabbis and Reform rabbis, respectively. Yet a further 39% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis and 33% of Conservative rabbis were inclined to agree, as did 17% of Reform rabbis. The question of modesty (tzniut) is largely interpreted today in terms of electronic media, notably computers and mobile technology. But there is considerable difference between the religious streams. Reform rabbis are generally not consulted on such questions as children’s access to computers and leave the matter to educators and parents to decide. Conservative rabbis, while disagreeing with Haredi and Hardal excesses on the subject of children’s access, are actively concerned. Thus, one Conservative rabbi in south Jerusalem said, People don’t ask me to advise them on what is permitted or not in TV or Internet. But in teaching children for their bar mitzvah [lit. “religious confirmation”], I teach them how to use [computers and the Internet] with great responsibility. I also address the need for great responsibility in sermons in the synagogue. In contrast, the Haredi rabbis are far more involved in the pedagogic question. In the case of the Haredi town of Hashmonaim, its rabbi explained, Our basic guidelines are that if you have a computer and you need it for general use and you have children, then it has to have some kind of filter. We discourage people from using anything like smartphones or iPhones unless they need it for business purposes. And surely not to give it over to the children in an unsupervised way. But since the guidelines are so nebulous because people have different claims regarding what they need, they’re almost impossible to enforce. . . . Also I speak to families on the matter who tell me that they are having problems with their children. We have brought organisations to the town to speak about the dangers.

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According to one Haredi Sephardi community rabbi in Jerusalem, Some 60% of my community have computers. We have spoken in the community of the need to set up boundaries. Computers at work, OK. But over the years one has changed as a rabbi because the community are unable to accept a blanket prohibition on new media. In occupational terms, there was a major difference: 67% of teacher-rabbis teachers agreed a lot that the media damages tzniut, in contrast to only 38% of community rabbis who agreed a lot. A further 24% of teacher-rabbis were inclined to agree. So community rabbis appeared less rigid and restrictive than teacher-rabbis, the latter rigidly seeing the matter in educational terms. Internet and the computer filter

A clue to how different rabbis relate to the question of matters of modesty is the type of filters they propose for computers to block unsuitable content. Whether rabbis think that internet sites cause damage, 62% agreed a lot, and a further 20% were inclined to agree. Those rabbis who had a filter on their internet were much inclined to agree that there was a problem of tzniut. Thus, 75% of rabbis with a filter agreed a lot, and a further 20% were inclined to agree about a problem of tzniut, in contrast to only 27% and 30% of rabbis who did not have a filter on their internet and who agreed a lot or were inclined to agree that the media damaged modesty (tzniut), respectively. As shown in Chapter 6, the rabbis had similar views to the Israeli public. Forty-four per cent of all rabbis had a filter on their internet, 33% did not (24% had no answer). Of Haredi rabbis who had internet, 84% had a filter and 16% did not. Of the mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, 63% had a filter and 37% did not. Of Hardal rabbis, 75% had a filter and 25% did not. Of Conservative rabbis, 3% had a filter and 97% did not. No Reform rabbis had a filter. In occupational terms, 75% of teacher-rabbis had a filter, and 25% did not. In contrast, only 69% of community rabbis had a filter and 31% did not. In age terms, younger rabbis were more inclined than older rabbis to have a filter. Of those rabbis born after 1980, 78% had a filter and 22% did not. In contrast, of those rabbis born in 1960–79, 57% had a filter and 43% did not, and of those rabbis born in 1940–59, 28% had a filter and 72% did not. Of those with a filter on their internet connection, when asked whether their filter strength was average, basic, hermetic, or high, 49% of Haredim had a high filter, 42% hermetic, 6% basic, and 3% average; 57% of mainstream modern Orthodox had a high-level filter, 31% basic level, and 12% hermetic; 57% of Hardal rabbis had a high filter, 30% hermetic, and 13% basic; of the few Conservative rabbis who had filters, nearly all had the basic one. In occupational terms, of teacher-rabbis who had a filter on their internet, 56% had a high-level filter, 25% hermetic, and 19% basic. By comparison, 62% of community rabbis who had a filter had a high-level filter, 31% basic, and 8%

Rabbis, Jewish values, and the media 191 hermetic. In comparing the two types of rabbis, many more community rabbis than teacher-rabbis had only the basic filter. Yet slightly more community rabbis had the high-grade filter more than the teacher-rabbis. Of those who agreed a lot to the question of whether the internet damages modesty, 54% of respondents had a high-level filter, 34% hermetic, 12% basic, and 1% average. Of those who were inclined to agree to this question, 52% had a high-level filter, 14% hermetic, and 34% basic. Of the few respondents who were inclined not to agree to this question, 10% had the basic filter. Of those who did not agree at all, 100% had a basic filter. Of the few without any opinion to the question, 75% had the basic filter. Supervision of the media? Supervision of the media is controversial in any democracy. But in Israel, which is characterised by the public broadcasting pattern, which characterises the early years of TV and radio in Western Europe, dissatisfaction among many rabbis with the media raises the question of the attitude of rabbis to the question of the supervision of the media. All Orthodox rabbis – including the mainstream modern Orthodox – favour some form of supervision: 68% of Haredi rabbis favour this to a great extent or largely, 15% to a considerable degree, and only 5% of Haredi rabbis opposed it completely or were inclined to. Even more rabbis in the mainstream modern Orthodox stream (67%) support this: 33% to a very great extent and 34% to a large extent. This is even more noticeable among the Hardal rabbis given its outlook of suspicions of non-Jewish culture – 59% of Hardal rabbis support this to a very great extent and 19% to some degree. Among Reform rabbis, 59% opposed it wholly or were inclined to oppose it, as did 46% of Conservative rabbis. Nineteen per cent of Reform rabbis largely agreed, 18% of Conservative rabbis agreed, and a further 12% of Conservative rabbis did so to a very great extent. There was little difference in terms of age between older and younger rabbis. Regarding supervision of the printing press, this is much less a trend in Western societies – since this is one of the cardinal dividing lines between a society which is democratic, indeed enlightened, and one which is not. Yet within Israeli Haredi society, the daily print media is under rabbinical supervision: 82% of Haredi rabbis favoured supervision of print media to a very great extent or largely. Even 26% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis favoured this to a very great extent and a further 28% largely. And among Hardal rabbis, 39% and 32% said so, respectively. This must raise questions about how Orthodox rabbis see their place in a democratic society. In one sense, in the case of Haredi rabbis, supervision of Haredi daily newspapers remains under close rabbinical supervision, but overall this has weakened with the independent Haredi media – weekly magazines, Haredi internet, and Haredi radio – which has grown up in the last 40 years, which, while consulting rabbis on specific questions, do not subject themselves to day-by-day supervision.

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But the trend is even more surprising in the case of modern Orthodox given the underlying theme of being part of modernity and not seeing fundamental contradictions between religiosity and being part of modern society. It suggests that the modern Orthodox Jewish rabbi is confused about applying theory to practice. The non-Orthodox rabbi has a clearer perspective on this delicate subject: 67% of Reform rabbis and 56% of Conservative rabbis oppose wholly or are inclined to agree only a little to supervision of the press. Only 4% and 25% of Reform rabbis and Conservative rabbis, respectively, favour supervision of the press to a great extent or largely. The media and Sabbath observance The subject of Sabbath observance in the modern technological age is one that occupies the minds of rabbis today. The prohibition of work on the Sabbath day, as commanded by the fourth of the Ten Commandments (Exodus [Shemoth] 20:8), has implications for the exposure of Jews (Orthodox and Conservative) to electronic media on the Sabbath and other holydays. The production of electricity is seen by these rabbis as an infringement of the commandment to rest on the Sabbath day because the creation of electricity has been interpreted alternately as producing fire or creating – and therefore constructing – an electronic circuit. (Reform Jews interpret the obligation to rest on the Sabbath in a more progressive and less restrictive manner.) Given the prohibition on activating electricity on the Sabbath, television, radio (Auerbach, 1996), and internet may not, therefore, be used. The Jewish religious prohibition of work on the Sabbath day – as enjoined by the fourth of the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20:8) – has implications given both that the internet operates simultaneously across time zones and that the Sabbath – the period commencing at sunset on Friday and continuing for 24 hours to Saturday night – falls at different times in different parts of the globe. Questions raised by rabbis include the following: Is an observant Jew permitted to receive e-mail in their mail box when it is the Sabbath, or sent from a country where it is the Sabbath? May one send e-mail to an address in a country where it is currently the Sabbath? Is it permitted for a Jew to enter a website in a foreign country where it is currently the Sabbath? According to some rabbis, the obligation to observe the Sabbath is for the surfer himself, and therefore, one can send mail to a site even where it may be the Sabbath. Illustrating the lack of consensus among rabbis about internet-related matters, some rabbis have even recommended that an observant Jew should refrain from checking a website in a time zone where it is currently the Sabbath even if it is not specifically resulting as from an e-mail sent to him or her. A separate Jewish legal question is whether the prohibition on using electronic media could be circumvented by a time-clock device, pre-programmed, on the eve of the Sabbath. Indeed, the Sabbath day is not only characterised by restrictions on work but also as a spiritual experience of prayer, study, and rest on the holyday. Arguably, if a computer program is of a religious nature, shiurim, religious music, or other Jewish cultural content, it could even enhance the spiritual quality of the Sabbath.

Rabbis, Jewish values, and the media 193 Copyright

Another little-known area discussed by rabbis where Jewish law impacts the media concerns copyright. Artistic materials such as a book or song, which is the exclusive property of one person, may not, therefore, be copied without the permission of the artist or author, which may be tantamount to stealing. While copyright protection is not new to Judaism, the question of copyright has received renewed attention in the computer age, particularly given that the downloading and copying texts is regarded as by some rabbis as acceptable practice. There is a basic principle in Jewish law that once an owner has given up possession of an object which has gone missing, somebody in whose possession it falls does not have to return to him. Precisely because of the doubts surrounding this, many rabbis are inclined to emphasise that copyright and ownership also apply to the computer age. E-commerce

Yet another subject addressed by rabbis is e-commerce, because this has important implications for the Jewish law of acquisition – a subject which receives wide discussion in Jewish legal literature like the Talmud. In Jewish law, an acquisition (kinyan) of a moveable object (as distinct from land property) occurs when someone performs some sort of physical action that demonstrates his or her ownership, such as lifting up the object. In e-commerce, the item advertised on the screen exists only virtually. Does an acquisition take place if it has not yet come into the possession of the seller? Can something be acquired which is still at the supplier and has not reached the retailer on the website? According to one rabbi, Shlomo Dickovsky, virtual acquisition is not regarded as an obstacle to a sale, even if at that point in time it is not in the physical possession of the seller (2002). Conclusion Perhaps the most significant contribution of Jewish thought to the role of mass media concerns regulating the transfer of information among people. A complete Jewish schema of what information may be shared among people and what may not has been constructed. Contemporary rabbis have nevertheless sought to reconcile the Jewish strictures on social gossip with modern ideas of public information in a democracy and the principle of the right to know. Indeed, the provision of information about events and societies, which contribute to understanding and reduces conflict – while not generally identified as a peculiarly religious goal – is endorsed by Judaism. Yet privacy appears to have a privileged status in Jewish thought. One’s property, therefore, includes information about oneself, and the right to privacy includes what information is not publicly known about a person. Yet notwithstanding the importance which Judaism gives to privacy, there is no Jewish law of privacy per se. One solution is to redefine the very discussion about the freedom of the press versus privacy to refocus contemporary debate about the threat to privacy upon the individual.

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Bibliography Ariel, A. (2001) Evil Gossip in the Public Democratic Framework. Tzohar, 6, Lod [Hebrew]. Auerbach, S. Z. (1996) Shidurei Radio B’Sghabbat’ [Hebreew: Radio Broadcasts on Thre Sabbath]. Alonj Shevut: Tzomet Institute, Tehumin, 16. Chwat, A. I. (1995) Newspapers & News: Religious Obligation or Prohibition. Elkana: T’lalei Orot 16 [Hebrew]. Cohen, Y. (2011) Haredim and the Internet: A Hate-Love Affair. In Bailey, M., & Redden, G. (eds.), Mediating Faiths: Religion and Socio-Cultural Change in the Twenty-First Century. Aldershot: Ashgate. Cohen, Y. (2012a) God, Jews & the Media: Religion & Israel’s Media. New York & London: Routledge. Cohen, Y. (2012b) God, Religion, and Advertising: A Hard Sell. In Hetsroni, A. (ed.), Advertising & Reality: A Global Study of Representation and Content. New York: Continuum. Cohen, Y. (2013) Awkward Encounters: Orthodox Jewry and the Internet. In Ahlback, T. (ed.), Digital Religion, The Donner Institute for Research in Religious and Cultural History. Abo/Turku, Finland: Abo Akademi University. Cohen, Y., & Hetsroni, A. (2018) When the Most Popular Format Reaches the Most ATypical Country: Reality TV and Religion in Israel. In Winston, D., Einstein, M., & Madden, K. (eds.), Religion & Reality TV: Faith in Late Capitalism. London & New York: Routledge. Dickovsky, S. (2002) Internet B’Halakha [Hebrew: Internet and Jewish Law] Alon Shevut. Tehumin 23: 325–333. Falk, E. (1999) Jewish Laws of Speech: Toward Multicultural Rhetoric. The Howard Journal of Communications 10. Kagan, I. M. (1873) Chofez Hayim. Vilna [Hebrew]. For an English edition: Z. Pliskin (1975) Guard Your Tongue: A Practical Guide to the Laws of Loshon Hara Based on the Chofez Hayim. Jerusalem: Aish HaTorah. Levine, A. (1981) Advertising and Promotional Activities as Regulated in Jewish Law. Journal of Halakha and Contemporary Society, 1(1), Spring. Lev-On, A., & Neriah Ben-Shahar, R. (2011) A Forum of Their Own: Views about the Internet among Ultra-Orthodox Women Who Browse Designated Closed Fora. First Monday (4). Liebes, T. (1994) Crimes of Reporting: The Unhappy End of a Fact-finding Mission in the Bible. Journal of Narrative and Life History 4. Meir, A. (2014) Internet Privacy in Halachah. Jewish Action, Winter. Pliskin. (1975) Guard Your Tongue: A Practical Guide to the Laws of Loshon Hara Based on Chofez Hayim [English edition of Ha-Cohen, I M (1873) Chofez Hayim, Vilna]. Jerusalem: Aish ha-Torah Rakover, N. (2006) Protection of Privacy in Jewish Law. Jerusalem: Jewish Legal Heritage Society, Chapter 2 [Hebrew].

9

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community?

The information age opens new vistas among religious clerics for marketing faith, which did not exist in the pre-computer and pre-internet era. In one sense, rabbis share a not dissimilar role to news reporters: Both are involved in the business of disseminating information. The traditional frameworks – the synagogue and yeshiva lectern – are still the major frameworks for rabbis. But there is also a growing, if unarticulated, recognition by rabbis in Israel that the broader culture, including the media, are channels both for reaching the religiously affiliated, as well as for reaching out to the unaffiliated or the traditional but not strictly observant population. The extent to which rabbis appear in the media, or to which journalists and editors see rabbis as potential media personalities, remains limited. They are seen by the broad secular public as anti-progressive. While some rabbis are comfortable appearing in the media – drawing upon their pedagogic abilities – few have received any professional training in appearing in front of the camera or microphone. The modern religious rabbis are invited to appear in the electronic media but only to discuss narrow religious matters or matters with wider connotations to Judaism, like religion–state relations. Even when broader questions that have a moral component come up in the Israeli public arena, the media rarely turns to the rabbis for their opinions. For reaching religious targeted audiences, the channels include shiurim (religion lessons) given by key rabbis over satellite and over Zoom. Computers and the internet have widened the potential. Torah websites provide access to ancient works, including Bible commentaries, the Talmud, law codes, and latter-day commentaries. The so-called Web Yeshiva is an alternative to the conventional offline yeshiva and enables individuals in far-flung places to study simultaneously Talmudic texts. For the broader non-strictly religious and those living in areas without a local Jewish community, rabbis are accessible through text messaging and e-mail – offering the sender an anonymity which an inquiry to an offline rabbi in one’s own community does not give. But there is only a very low usage by the non-strictly religious of the internet for religion-related information – which suggests that the potential for mass media channels as alternatives to traditional ones like the synagogue and yeshiva still lies mostly in the realm of theory. Nor do social media have a role to play yet. DOI: 10.4324/9781315735184-9

196 Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? The physical walls of the traditional Jewish community give the appearance of resisting the tide of technological developments, notably computers and mobile technology. Indeed, some physical boundaries in Judaism are being replaced by virtual boundaries. Thus, with shiurim available online, the traditional structures – offline physical yeshivot and synagogue – are being added to but not replaced by online study options. Indeed, Covid-19 made the synagogue online, but even more so significantly, Jewish adult education such as shiurim and questions to rabbis continued a pre-Covid-19 trend of going online. Yet this chapter paints a very mixed picture of the extent to which new media has taken on a central role in Judaism. But there is a sense of limbo, with rabbis failing to grasp their changing role in the information age. While they are right in concluding that the pulpit is under threat today, the truth is that the synagogue has, for hundreds of years since the emancipation, been losing its monopoly of strengthening moral values. If religion in traditional societies was based upon authority vested in religious bodies, in complex industrial societies there is increased emphasis upon personal choice in moral and religious matters as reflected in the development of niche markets for religion outlets, including religious broadcasting, religious press, and internet. Religious and spiritual issues are increasingly mediated through print and electronic technologies, with mass media in effect a sub-agent itself of contemporary religious identity. Mass media helps to popularise religion at the grassroots level where institutionalised religious forms have become weak. While some people unaffiliated with a community might use these means, the extent to which media channels have become an “alternative pulpit” for reaching secular Jews should not be exaggerated. Moreover, the extent to which mass media, including social media, is an agent for religious identity and practice for religiously active and traditional Jews requires examination. Rokeach found that only 2% and 3% of secular Israelis surveyed listened all the time or frequently to shiurim on the radio and programmes on religion and tradition, respectively, (in contrast to 21% and 17% of traditional Israelis, 44% and 37% of modern Orthodox Jews, and 55% and 51% of Haredi Jews, respectively) (Rokeach, 1997). So, like clerics in other faiths, including, for example, Christianity and Islam, some rabbis are beginning to recognise the value of using mass media channels to communicate their messages, as supplementing the synagogue pulpit, even if in practice they have had mixed successes. Haredi rabbis have long used the wall poster (pashkevil) pinned in religious neighbourhoods to attack or excommunicate those individuals or companies which they regard as behaving inappropriately. Rabbis appear on religious radio and in religious newspapers. The more recent phenomena of weekly newsletters or bulletins (alonei bet knesset) distributed in synagogues on the Sabbath eve contain essays by rabbis on the weekly Bible reading, on Jewish law questions and topical issues. Former chief rabbis Mordechai Eliahu and Ovadia Yosef gave weekly shiurim via the satellite to their followers in Israel and abroad, as did the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Mendel Menachem Schneersohn. There are community virtual rabbis – rabbis based, for example, in Israel, preaching to distant communities such as via e-mail or television broadcasts.

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 197 To the question of whether the media has a role in contributing to religious identity, Haredi rabbis surveyed by the author rated the highest: 55% of Haredi rabbis agreed to a very great extent, and a further 21% agreed to a great extent. Hardal rabbis were the next highest: 43% and 20% of Hardal rabbis agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent, respectively. In one sense, it reflected the activist approach to spreading Judaism which Haredim and Hardal in general held (43%). (Hardal was slightly higher than the 36% of mainstream modern Orthodox; a further 37% of Hardal rabbis agreed to some extent.) Yet the high figure for Haredi rabbis was nevertheless surprising since Haredim tend to be conservative and see Judaism very much focused on the synagogue or yeshivot rather than in the wider society. More surprising was the relatively low figures for Reform and Conservative rabbis. In contrast to the Haredi and Hardal rabbis, only 23% and 31% of Reform rabbis said the media had a role in religious identity formation to a very great extent or to a great extent, respectively. Twenty-five per cent and 19% of Conservative rabbis said so, respectively. Twenty-five per cent of Reform rabbis and 28% of Conservative rabbis said so to some extent. The lower figures for the Conservative rabbis and Reform rabbis were surprising, given that these two groups identify with mainstream Israeli society of which mass media is featured. Does the background from where the rabbi was born influence the rabbi’s views on and his or her practice in public relations? Rabbis of all four backgrounds – Israeli, Western, Eastern European, Sephardic (Oriental) born in Arab countries – were inclined to agree about the importance of the mass media in strengthening religious identity. Between 60% and 70% of all four categories of background of where rabbis were born agreed that mass media was important in strengthening religious identity to a very great extent or to a great extent. Thirtynine per cent and 27% of rabbis said that the media was a very good means or good means, respectively, for spreading religion. A further 17% said so to a certain extent. Only 10% and 8% said this was true to a little extent or to no extent, respectively. The media’s role as an agent of religious identity has become acute with the internet, by enabling the Jewish surfer both to gather information relating to his own beliefs, thereby strengthening his belief system. Basic information like listings of synagogues, Jewish schools, religious courts (batei din), cemeteries, and kosher eateries are listed on the internet. Jewish dating has moved online (Cohen & Tsuria, 2019). The virtual synagogue has not evolved – until Covid-19 – because, with the exception of the Reform movement, these are not regarded as fulfilling Jewish law criteria for communal prayer (the minyan). While virtual synagogues, people assembling for prayer, have not been accepted by the Orthodox, the Reform use it, and the Conservative allow it if the Jew has a link to a physical minyan of ten. In practice, people prefer the physical sense of a prayer building; similarly, in Christianity, many Christians prefer the physical intimacy and participation in the offline church.

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Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community?

Notwithstanding this, the internet fulfils other, supplementary, roles in strengthening religious identity. The virtual rabbi replies to sheiltot (questions from congregants) and offer counselling. A large number of questions deal with marriage, relationships, and sexuality. The virtual rabbi offers anonymity where questions put by a person to the local community rabbi do not and thus possesses the potential to reach beyond the committed. Participation in forum and chat questions of religious belief, and participation in shiurim conducted on the web, contribute to creating virtual communities. There are today alternative channels for Jewish identification, including websites by fringe communities like Chabad and yeshivot for returnees to Judaism. The internet’s impact upon Jewish identity is in making religious information much more accessible to those accessing it. The formal ban by Haredi sages upon the use of the internet necessarily limit its impact in Haredi communities. But even this began to change by the latter part of the second decade of the 21st century. The internet also has the potential of reaching Jewish communities in closed countries. There is an absence of data regarding the usage of new media by rabbis and synagogues. This is surprising given the central role which the rabbi and the synagogue fulfil in Jewish religious life. Frost and Youngblood (2014) examined online communications among Reform Jewish communities in North America. But little research has been carried out inside Israel – the Jewish state – or on a comparative level to identify commonalities and differences between different Jewish religious streams (Cohen, 2012, 2019). The role of new media within religious organisations has been little researched in the media and religion field. Sturgill (2004) examined the content of the websites of 303 Baptist churches in the US, Smith (2007) surveyed ten Christian churches in the US, and Cantoni and Zyga (2007) studied Catholic congregations worldwide for the church’s usage of new media. Cantoni, Rapetti, Tardini, Vannini, and Arasa (2012) found 36% of Catholic priests pray online daily or weekly, Roman (2008) created a typology of online churches, Cantoni and Zyga (2007) examined the use of internet communication by Catholic congregations, and Lee (2009) examined the use of blogs by Buddhist priests. Smith (2007) noted that most religious organisations with a website lack data about usage of the website. This chapter opens with the question of whether new media has a role in constructing and strengthening Jewish identity in the eyes of rabbis and in the eyes of the public. One early illustrative example of the new media’s potential is the website of the offline synagogue. Another example of this is the role of the rabbi who has a new media site in answering questions – which raises the question of whether rabbinical authority is being challenged by new media. This is all particularly relevant in assessing how far the synagogue, as the benchmark of the Jewish religion, is required to be offline or not. Moreover, to what extent is the synagogue itself still a central peg in Jewish identity? Are there virtual cultural walls? Would this be the only basis for thrilling religious experiences such as media events of a religious nature? The chapter also addresses certain offline questions, including synagogue newspaper bulletins.

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 199 Is new media a tool for advancing Judaism? The diverse media – including social media – offer manifold opportunities to spread religion today, in addition to opportunities which existed and continue today in the traditional media. In the Jewish case, participation in forum and chat questions regarding religious belief and participation in shiurim conducted on the Web contribute to creating virtual communities. The internet’s impact upon Jewish identity is, therefore, in making religious information much more accessible. For the modern Orthodox and non-Orthodox today, the internet enables synagogue communities to keep in touch with their members and strengthen ties with congregants. In the past, the Sabbath and holiday services were the only opportunity to inform congregants about these, but now the synagogues, website provides an ongoing week-long contact, including providing an online weekly schedule of religious services, Torah lectures, and other synagogal events. Against the need for social distancing, Covid-19 closed offline synagogues, and yeshivot, with online connections, including on-line synagogal services, fulfil a vacuum left at a time of spiritual need. Is the internet a useful channel to advance religious values?

Forty-six per cent of all rabbis agreed a lot or were inclined to agree that the internet is a useful channel to advance religious values and a further 11% to some degree. There was a wide difference between non-Orthodox rabbis and Haredi rabbis, and in the middle was the modern Orthodox combined (mainstream and Hardal), in agreeing that the internet is a useful tool to advance religious values: 79% and 71% of Conservative rabbis and Reform rabbis, respectively, agreed a lot or were inclined to agree, while 64% and 61% of mainstream modern Orthodox and Hardal rabbis, respectively, said so. In contrast, only 28% of Haredi rabbis said so, and 62% of Haredi rabbis did not agree at all or were inclined to disagree. There was a noticeable difference in occupational terms – community rabbis agreeing more and teacher-rabbis less. Thus, 74% of community rabbis who lead synagogues agreed a lot or were inclined to agree, in contrast to only 55% of teacher-rabbis saying so, while 12% of community rabbis did not agree at all or agreed a little, in contrast 39% of rabbi-teachers. There is little significant difference between age groups of rabbis: 44%, 58%, and 53% of rabbis born after 1980, in 1960–1979, and in 1940–1959, respectively, agreed a lot or were inclined to agree that the internet is a useful tool to advance religious values. Among the Israeli Jewish public, 33% agreed a very great deal or a great deal – and a further 30% agreed to some degree. And 24% of the Israeli Jewish public agreed a very great deal or a great deal and a further 25% to some degree. Yet 52% wholly disagreed or were inclined to disagree.

200 Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? Regarding the role of blogs as channels for spreading religion, there was no difference between Israeli Jews who defined themselves as mainstream modern Orthodox (46%) or Hardal (46%) who said blogs were useful channels for this to a very great extent or a great extent. However, 28% of Hardal Israelis did not agree at all or only to a small extent, in contrast to only 18% of mainstream modern Orthodox. Seventy-five per cent of community rabbis surveyed thought that social networks were an efficient means to distribute religion to a very great extent or to a great extent, in contrast to only 41% of teacher-rabbis. Rabbis were much more inclined than even the religious public regarding the potential. Rather, Jews who are already religious are using the internet as a supplementary tool of education. Twenty-six per cent of modern Orthodox Jews surfed the internet for Jewish religious content a lot or considerably. The biggest group was the Hardal, the more intense form of modern Orthodoxy: 41% of Hardal did so a great deal or considerably. This is particularly noteworthy given the general reservations which Hardal rabbis have about the internet. The same is true with the Haredim or ultra-Orthodox Jews, despite their rabbis’ general ban on the internet; it was surfed for Jewish religious content by 20% of Haredim a lot or considerably. Studying the Torah online for religious Israeli Jews is prevalent. A survey of mainstream religious Orthodox Jews in Israel by the Israeli pollster Rafi Smith for the educational organisation Tzurba Mirabanenu (2016), comprising a sample of 500 respondents, found that in learning Torah, 22% said that they generally read Jewish Torah materials on the internet, and a further 11% listened to tapes and discs, while 50% said they participated in offline shiurim. But equally significant is that there was a clear preference for offline shiurim over online. Thus, to the question of their preference in learning the Torah, 72% replied that they prefer to participate in offline shiurim. Only 12% replied they prefer to look at materials on the internet and 8% to listen to discs and recordings. Yet according to the Gutman Survey (A Portrait of Israeli Jews Beliefs, 2009), only 17% of Israeli Jews (2,571 respondents) polled surfed the internet for material on the Bible, the Talmud, and other Jewish sources. This shows not only that there is no basis to arguing that non-religious draw their religious identity from the social environment. In the Gutman survey, only 5% of non-religious but not anti-religious surf the Net a lot or considerably for Jewish religion information. Moreover, 0% of non-religious and anti-religious said so. Just 12% of traditional Jews (i.e. nonstrictly religious but observing varying degrees of religious rituals) said so. There was a connection between computer abilities and whether rabbis thought that social networks were an efficient channel of distributing religion: 93% of those rabbis surveyed by the author reported that they possessed an understanding of social networks to a very great extent and agreed a lot or were inclined to agree that social networks were an efficient form to distribute religion. In contrast, only 22% of those rabbis who had no understanding of social networks and 51% of those who had limited understanding of social networks agreed a lot or were inclined to agree with this. And 49% of rabbis who reported no experience at all with social networks did not agree at all or only a little that social networks were efficient means. So did 28% of rabbis who only had a little experience.

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 201 It is still too early to evaluate whether social networks are used for Jewish knowledge. But discussion about Judaism does not occur on social networks. Only 5% of the Israeli public, surveyed by the author, agreed to a very great deal or a great deal that there is discussion about Judaism on social networks. A further 14% agreed to some extent. Fifty-nine per cent said it did not occur at all, and 22% said it did to a little extent. A similar pattern was found to the question of whether social networks help to construct his or her Jewish identity: 4% said they did to a very great deal or a lot, 9% from time to time, 73% not at all, and 14% occasionally. When asked whether social networks give a person a place to express his belief, 6% agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent, 11% from time to time, 67% not at all, and 16% a very little. Broken down among the Israeli Jewish public, 49% and 42% of Hardal Jews and mainstream modern Orthodox Jews, respectively, surveyed by the author agreed a very great deal or a great deal that rabbis should use the media to distribute their faith in contrast to 12% and 9% of non-Hassidic Haredim and Hassidic Haredim, respectively. But while 27% of Conservative-identifying Israeli Jews and 28% of traditional Jews said so, only 6% of Reform Jews said so. Noteworthy was that 26% of secular non-atheist Israelis did say so (but 0% of secular atheistic Israelis said so). It was interesting to ask Israeli Jews whether social networks were an effective channel for spreading religion. It was difficult to delineate a difference between high belief (13%), average belief (17%), and low belief (17%). In terms of age, there was no difference among those in the Israeli public who agreed a very great deal or a great deal between those aged 20–35 (23%), 36–50 (23%), or 51–65 (23%). The only incremental difference was among those aged 66+: 27%. Sephardim (38%) were more inclined than Ashkenazim (19%) to say they agreed to a great extent or very great extent. And 28% of men were more inclined than women (19%) to say so. In practice, little use is made by the Israeli Jewish public of applications on the mobile phone to learn about Jewish law: 58% not at all and 22% infrequently. Similarly, 63% and 19% do not use them at all or use them to a small extent to solve their own halakhic problems. And 48% and 25% do not use them at all or use them infrequently for daily prayer. They are even less used for dialogue and discussing/ sharing one’s own religiosity: 57% and 21% said not at all or infrequently. On whether Judaism occurs on social networks, mainstream modern Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Israeli Jews agreed most. Yet even 68%, 63%, and 68% of mainstream modern Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Israeli Jews answered “not at all” and “infrequently.” In contrast, 71%, 90%, 87%, and 96% of traditional, Hardal, non-Hassidic Haredim, and Hassidic Haredim said this. There was no significant difference in age group or gender. Sephardim overall were incrementally more inclined than Ashkenazim to answer positively. On whether social networks help people to construct their religious identity, findings were even more negative. Even 73%, 83%, and 78% of mainstream modern Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jews answered “not at all” and “infrequently.”

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Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community?

There were no significant differences between age groups or genders. But Sephardim overall were more inclined than Ashkenazim to answer positively. On whether one’s activity on social networks give one an opportunity to express one’s beliefs, 78%, 80%, and 64% of mainstream modern Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jews agreed, as did 81%, 88%, 90%, and 95% of traditional, Hardal, non-Hassidic Haredim, and Hassidic Haredim. The age groups 36–50 and 51–65 were incrementally more inclined than the age groups 20–35 and 66+ to answer positively. There was no difference in terms of gender. Sephardim were more inclined to agree than Ashkenazim. On whether applications to study Jewish law were used to solve problems, Conservative Jews (23%) were most inclined to answer very much or much. This was followed by Hardal (15%), mainstream modern Orthodox (12%), and non-Hassidic Haredim (12%). There was a correlation between this and those who prayed daily: among the 74% and 83% of Jews who prayed every day or mostly, they never or rarely used social networks to solve questions of Jewish law – in contrast to 62% and 34% from those who never prayed. Men (14%) were more inclined than women (5%) to answer very much or much. On whether Jews used applications containing the prayers or basic Jewish information, like times of prayer, most prominent were the mainstream modern Orthodox Jews (40% to a very great extent or to a great extent) and Conservative Jews (23%), and 20% of Hardal said so. Of those Jews who prayed daily, most of the time, or sometimes, 18%, 17%, and 15%, respectively, said they used applications for prayer or to calculate daily times of prayer all the time or most of the time. In contrast, 4% and 12% of those who never prayed or prayed very occasionally said so. Younger persons were more inclined than older persons to agree: 16% of those aged 20–35 used these apps very much or much, compared to 12% and 7% of those aged 51–65 and 66+, respectively. Sephardim (22% all the time or much of the time and 16% some of the time) said so, in contrast to 12% and 13% of Ashkenazim, respectively. There was no significant difference between males and females. Is the internet a valuable tool for advancing religious values? Thirty-six per cent of all rabbis surveyed were inclined to agree, and a further 15% even agreed a lot. Yet 38% were inclined to disagree and not agree at all. Considerable difference was discovered between non-Orthodox and Orthodox rabbis, with the latter being more open to the application of new technology for advancing pastoral theology: 75% of non-Orthodox rabbis (Reform and Conservative) were inclined to agree (49%) or agreed a lot (26%), in contrast to only 46% of Orthodox rabbis; 45% of Orthodox rabbis did not agree at all (29%) or were only inclined to agree (16%). Even more than the internet, social blogs were regarded as efficient means of religious education: 80% of all non-Orthodox rabbis were inclined to agree or agreed a lot that blogs are efficient means for religious education, in contrast to 32% of all Orthodox rabbis. Among the Orthodox rabbis, 64% of mainstream modern Orthodox and 61% of Hardal rabbis were inclined to agree or agreed a lot in contrast to only 28% of Haredi rabbis. Thirty-six per cent of Orthodox rabbis did not agree at all or were inclined not to agree, against 0% and 4% of non-Orthodox rabbis.

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 203 Sixty-two per cent of Haredi rabbis did not agree at all or were inclined to disagree, in contrast to only 26% of mainstream modern Orthodox and 32% of Hardal rabbis. Is religious content in blogs and social networks taken seriously by rabbis? Again, non-Orthodox rabbis said so far more than Orthodox rabbis: 65% of nonOrthodox were inclined to agree or agreed a lot, in contrast to only 26% of Orthodox. Within the Orthodox, while only 17% of Haredi rabbis were inclined to agree or agreed a lot, 38% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis and 32% of Hardal rabbis did. In practice, do rabbis use the internet to upload religious programming? Seventy-nine per cent of non-Orthodox rabbis were inclined to do so or did so a lot, in contrast to 27% of Orthodox rabbis. This may be broken down significantly between Haredi rabbis (13%), on the one hand, and mainstream modern Orthodox (44%) and Hardal (35%) rabbis, on the other hand. Sixty-six per cent of Orthodox rabbis did agree not at all or were inclined not to, in contrast to only 15% of nonOrthodox. While 79% of Haredi rabbis did not agree not at all or were inclined not to, this went down to 54% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis and 50% of Hardal rabbis. Undoubtedly, part of the gap between Orthodox and non-Orthodox rabbis reflects the rabbi’s own computer skills: 46% and 12% of non-Orthodox rabbis evaluated their computer skills as good and a further 12% even very good – with Reform rabbis responding incrementally higher than Conservative rabbis – in contrast to 22% and 9% of Orthodox rabbis, respectively. Forty-five per cent of Orthodox rabbis said that their computer skills were nonexistent or poor, in contrast to only 5% of non-Orthodox rabbis. Broken down, 65% of Haredi rabbis said so, in contrast to 22% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis and 31% Hardal rabbis. Fifty-five per cent of Orthodox rabbis described their computer ability as nonexistent or poor, in contrast to only 5% of non-Orthodox rabbis. Broken down, 42% of Haredi rabbis said so, in contrast to 5% for modern Orthodox rabbis and 6% Hardal rabbis. In terms of being able to connect with other people through blogging and social networks, 32% and 70% of non-Orthodox rabbis did so to a large extent or a very great extent, respectively, in contrast to 8% and 10% of Orthodox rabbis. There was little significant difference between the various Orthodox branches. A difference among them was identified regarding those answering “not at all” or “to a small degree”: 87% of Haredi rabbis did not connect with people at all, and a further 6% did not so to a small degree, in contrast to only 44% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis who did not at all, and a further 23% did so to a small degree. A similar pattern was found regarding rabbis and connecting with their religious flock through social networks: 84% and 82% Orthodox rabbis said they did not interact through blogs or social networking at all or did so only to a small degree, respectively, in contrast to 35% of non-Orthodox rabbis. Yet overall, non-Orthodox rabbis (49%) were more inclined than Orthodox rabbis (20%) to agree that the internet and social networks could help in religious– secular relations. Some noteworthy findings were found here both among Orthodox and non-Orthodox rabbis. In the case of the non-Orthodox, Conservative rabbis

204 Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? were more inclined to agree than Reform rabbis that internet and social networks could help in religious–secular relations: 54% of the former and 42% of the latter. And in the case of the Orthodox, only 16% of Haredim said so, in contrast to 27% of the mainstream modern Orthodox. Whereas in other questions there was a close proximity between mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis and Hardal rabbis, the traditional hesitancy among the Hardal regarding the secular society was also found here: only 20% of Hardal rabbis said so. As the data shows, it is still too early to evaluate the full implications of the internet upon Jewish religious identity. Rabbis and Jewish educators are beginning to come to terms with the implications of the information age and with their own changing role. Rabbi, I have a question! Given that the performance of religious commandments (mitzvot) are means of giving expression to a Jew’s relationship with God, observant Jews have for hundreds of years sought instruction from rabbis. Instruction includes the interpretation and application of Jewish legal principles of halakha to modern life, as well as comprising broader questions of Jewish religious law. In the past, the religious counselling occurred mostly with the local synagogue rabbi or rabbis in educational institutions like yeshivot and schools. This has altered for many today. The use of electronic software, SMS, WhatsApp, e-mail, the telephone, and the internet have become important parts of contemporary Jewish communal life. The five communities – Haredi, mainstream modern Orthodox, Hardal, Conservative, and Reform – each relate differently to the use of new media in answering Jewish law questions. The Haredim themselves may be divided – the modern Haredim use new media, whereas the non-Hassidic Haredim and Hassidic Haredim remain glued to their rabbi in the synagogue. Yet another grouping is the public rabbi – identified with the mainstream modern Orthodox – who is a rabbi who speaks publicly and hold public positions. These may well be affiliated with a yeshiva in the stream and answer questions both on radio and in the new media. After the telephone itself, the earlier applications of technology for religious counselling were radio phone-ins on religious radio stations. These were panels of rabbis on programmes on Haredi radio stations like Radio Kol Berama and Radio Kol Chai. A rabbi sits in the studio and responds to questions put to him on air – requiring the rabbi to be au fait with all matters at his fingertips. There are also telephone lines with access to the rabbi – Halakhah Line and HaLashon Line – each rabbi is on the line for an hour to answer halakhic questions. Radio phone-in shows may be less relevant today for, say, the modern Orthodox because contacting the rabbi has moved into social media and internet, but this is less true even today for the Haredim – both questioners and the rabbis answering – many of whom do not have internet connections. But while radio/phone religious counselling remains part of the Haredi scene, most Haredim still prefer to consult with their own community rabbi, reflecting a strict adherence to rabbinic authority, and the face-to-face offline

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 205 interaction in the synagogue or yeshiva hall is therefore still strong. But telephone calls are used increasingly. Online rabbinic counselling is a growing trend, particularly in the modern Orthodox community. Rabbi panels – each composed of some 10–20 rabbis – exist on modern Orthodox websites. For example, Kipa and Moreshet started their panels in 2001. Two Haredi-leaning institutions, the Chabad of the Hassidic Haredi substream and the American-oriented Aish HaTorah Yeshiva for returnees to Judaism, started their “ask the rabbi” section in 1999. Chabad’s Askmoses.com comprises a panel of some 40 rabbis and women teachers who provide round-the-clock responses to religion-related questions from inquirers. Most active in asking questions through new media technology are those identified with the Hardal and the mainstream modern Orthodox. Yet even many modern Orthodox Jews do not consult online either: 42% of observant Jews had never used the internet to ask a rabbi a question, and a further 47% asked less than five questions, according to a 2006 Kipa survey based on surfers (Kipa, 2006). Moreover, of those who do ask an internet rabbi, only 55% see the answer as obligatory and binding. Yet of all five religious streams, Hardal rabbis were least supportive of e-mail consulting: only 28% of Hardal rabbis supported e-mail questions to a very great extent or to a great extent. In contrast, 52% of Haredi rabbis and 47% of Conservative rabbis supported e-mail questions to a very great extent or to a great extent. The figure for Haredi rabbis was also ironic given that the group internet panels, apart from Chabad, did not serve the Haredi population. Conservative rabbis are less active than the Orthodox (mainstream modern Orthodox and Hardal) in e-mail consultations because some of their members are less actively observant. Yet they do ask during religious festivals questions concerning observance of rituals. In addition to the Bar-Ilan project, the rabbi might refer to other databases like Sefarfia or Daat. This is even truer with Reform rabbis, who are less strict in matters of Jewish religious law. Questions regarding life-cycle events and religious holydays also generate some questions. “It’s around Passover that people get most focused on ritual,” said a Reform rabbi in south Jerusalem. Reform Jews, who are more interested in ethical and spiritual dimensions and are not strictly bound by halakha (Jewish religious law), have little need for media technology – preferring the offline consultation with rabbi. In terms of occupational breakdown, this was one of the few issues where there was equality between teacher-rabbis and community rabbis surveyed. Thirty-seven per cent of community rabbis and teacher-rabbis agreed that e-mail questions to a very great extent or to a great extent are good. The same was true of those critical of the phenomenon: 47% of community rabbis and 48% of rabbi-teachers did not agree at all or only to a small extent that it was a good phenomenon. Yet, in practice, this comprised mostly community rabbis. Schools and yeshivot do not produce such high ratings. Yet teacher-rabbis are asked practical non-halakhic matters, more on philosophical outlook rather than practical religious law. Notwithstanding this, there is a distinction because present and past students of a yeshiva still turn to the yeshiva rabbi if they have a question – and who is more

206 Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? often learned than the community rabbi. Yet while the yeshiva rabbi may well be au fait with the medieval sources like the Talmud and medieval Jewish law codes like those of Maimonides and the Shulhan Arukh, the community rabbi remains dominant in practical halakha and day-to-day problems and issues. Nor does the dayan (religion court judge) deal with enquiries from the public per se. But “public rabbis,” who are sometimes not affiliated to an offline community but are teacher-rabbis, are active in answering questions. Indeed, one of the very characteristics of the public rabbi is that the rabbi is found beyond the geographical locality of the offline community to answer online. The number of questions rabbis receive varies very greatly. When asked how many Jewish law inquiries they receive a day via email, 27% of all rabbis receive 1–4 mails, 18% receive 5–9 e-mails, 21% receive 10–14 e-mails, 15% receive 15– 19 e-mails, and 19% receive 20–30 emails. Broken down by religious stream, of those who received 20–30 e-mails a day were 46% Reform rabbis, 35% Conservative rabbis, 17% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, and 10% of Haredi rabbis (Hardal rabbis: 0). Individually, rabbis vary. Yuval Cherlow, who is both a yeshiva head and a public rabbi, gets 50 questions a day. He has answered 13,000 questions on the Moreshet site and 9,000 questions in Kipa. The rabbi of the town of Shoham gets tens each day. A community rabbi of the Ginat Shomron townlet gets an average of ten a week. The rabbi of the Ohel Nehama modern Orthodox community in downtown Jerusalem receives two a week. The rabbi of the Haredi-Hardal settlement of Hashonaim gets 15–20 a week from inside my community. He said, “I get questions from all over the world.” Ronen Neuwirth used to minister to a large and relatively religious community in Raanana with 350 families. He later moved to Caesarea: “When I moved to Caesarea, there were far less questions for the rabbi, and with only 80 families, in contrast to 350 families in Raanana. Caesarea is not the place where people are inclined to ask questions – ten a month.” Chabad.org has some 73,000 visitors a day, the number rising at times of religious holidays and reaching a peak on Hanukah, with some 500,000 hits, and with a little less on Passover, Rosh Hashana, and Yom Kippur (Fishkoff, 2003). Askmoses.com, a panel of some 40 rabbis and women teachers, gets an average of 200 a day. Yeshivat Bet El, for example, had in 2022 400,000 subscribers to their Hebrew website and 20,000 to their English one. In addition, 2,500 were part of the WhatsApp of the yeshiva. Broken into 10 groups of 250 each, the rabbi answered questions. The questions and answers are kept on the website. Thus, by 2020, the Yeshiva Bet El website had over 87,000 questions and answers available later. The rabbis represent an assortment of Orthodox views, but veering notably to the Hardal. The stricter Haredi Chabad has its Ask Moses site, which comprises both male rabbis and women responding. Some sites list the rabbis on their website and allow a person to direct the question to a specific rabbi. Some of the rabbis, notably elder ones, may not necessarily be computer capable and have an assistant to type their answer onto the computer. Some of the rabbis are very well known, and this gives the questioner an opportunity to reach a leading rabbi they might not otherwise have access to. Among

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 207 their rabbis, the Yeshivot Bet El had rabbis of a very high learning and calibre – including the retired chief rabbi of the city of Ramat Gan, the rabbinical head of the Puah fertility organisation, the former chief rabbi of the city of Kiryat Arba, and the rabbi of the Old City of Jerusalem. “We try to go for rabbis who are also well-known to the public – including even the Chief Rabbi,” said Rabbi Ezra Cohen, who manages new media at Yeshivot Bet-El, including its website. The rabbis are not given payment. “They have a feeling that one is helping people, but it also brings prestige. It gives one a feeling of power, of influence,” said one rabbi. “It’s good training for a developing rabbi,” said another. Some questions are suitable for answering through technological communications, others less. One way of distinguishing between this is to divide into two groups – those of a halakhic (Jewish religious law) nature or non-strictly halakhic issue. For example, of the latter, what time are Sabbath prayers, or what is the earliest and latest times for saying daily morning prayers? Will women be allowed to pronounce the kaddish prayer in memory of the deceased at the funeral of family relative in an Orthodox cemetery? One Haredi community rabbi said, “I get a lot of questions having to do with monetary matters. It’s not good for the rabbi to get involved in disputes between people. I send them to other rabbis.” Another category of questions often asked with rabbis are matters of family purity. Whether the woman is ritually clean from her menstrual monthly cycle (a woman is ritually unclean to her husband during her menstrual cycle and frequently requires consultation with a rabbi such as concerning the monthly visit to a ritual bath at the termination of the cycle) can only be examined by the rabbi if the cloth she used to check herself is taken to a rabbi offline. The necessity for precision in colours does not enable checking on the e-mail. “Colours cannot be checked on the computer,” one rabbi remarked. Technological communication is unsuitable for non-strictly halakhic or ethical questions. An example of this is Yuval Cherlow, who specialises in health and religious ethics: “Our father is on dialysis and has high blood pressure, the doctors tell us. Should we decide to keep him on a breathing machine or not?” the rabbi gave as an example. Questions to rabbis in the Reform movement in particular fall into this category. Given that online channels are unsuitable, these need to be dealt with offline. A father who died in New York left instructions. He wanted to be cremated – which is forbidden in Jewish religious law. His son was very distressed by his father’s instruction. “Did he have to follow his father’s wishes? Or was it OK for him to bury his father?” said Levi Weiman-Kelman, a community Reform rabbi. “Just seemed to me not so much a ritual question but more of a question what did he owe his father. And so we more talked through about how he would feel knowing that he violated his father’s stated wishes. He felt very strongly against cremation.” A Reform rabbi said, A woman comes to me and relates that her father had made her take a vow not to have sexual relations until she was married. A couple of married persons

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come to me and are in love. He is pressuring her to have sex. She loves him a lot. We look at the halakha of the Talmudic Tractate Nedarim (Oaths) together in an attempt to find a solution. A senior female Reform rabbi and dayan said, To my surprise, though as Reform rabbis we do not pasken halakha [make Jewish legal decisions], people do turn to the rabbi on a host of matters – not because they need a religious ruling, yes or no, but because they are looking for a spiritual dimension. How does a couple relate to adultery? A couple, well-off financially, could turn to a psychologist but prefer to turn to me. We discuss how they repair the damage and build each other’s confidence. I have no training in psychology but nevertheless ask about forgiveness, so since we are near the high holydays of Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur, I use the festival motif of repentance. Or the case, of the pidyan haben [a religious ceremony reserved for the firstborn son on his thirtieth day of birth, where the boy is “redeemed”]. And the mother comes to me, “I had an abortion at 16 years old [and therefore the pidyan haben ceremony is irrelevant], which my husband does not know about.” She asks me, “Should I tell my husband that we cannot have a pidyan haben and risk destroying the relationship, or should we got ahead with the ceremony, ensure shalom bayit [harmony between husband and wife]. After all what damage can be done? Clearly all these are matters which require offline consultation. When asked whether they thought that answering Jewish law questions by email was in principle a good thing, 41% of all rabbis surveyed agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent, and a further 21% to some extent. In terms of occupational breakdown, this was one of the few issues where there was equality between rabbi-teachers and community rabbis. Thirty-seven per cent of community rabbis and rabbi-teachers supported e-mail questions to a very great extent or to a great extent. The same was true of those critical of the phenomenon: 47% of community rabbis and 48% of rabbi-teachers did not agree at all or only to a small extent that it was a good phenomenon. Online rabbinical counselling has generated a debate among rabbis about the pluses and minuses of the phenomenon. Supporters of the new trend argue that non-affiliated Jews now have access to rabbis which they would not otherwise have. Online counselling offers an anonymity which the local community rabbi does not. On the one hand, however, it enables people to raise questions they would not otherwise feel comfortable doing. On the other hand, it stops the rabbi from taking into account the personal circumstances of each case, which can be crucial in particular instances. Do rabbis see receiving a question anonymously as a problem, or do they think it is good, encouraging people to seek the rabbi’s guidance response and not be inhibited or scared of this? Seventeen per cent and 19% of all rabbis agreed with the phenomenon of anonymity to a very great extent or to a great extent, 37% agreed,

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 209 and 28% did not agree at all or only to a small degree. Thirty-nine per cent of Conservative rabbis and 37% of Hardal rabbis also agreed wholly or were inclined to say that it was not a problem at all. But only 25% of Reform rabbis did. However, 38% of mainline modern Orthodox rabbis, 30% of Reform rabbis, 24% of Haredi rabbis, 23% of Hardal rabbis, and 22% of Conservative rabbis did not agree at all or were inclined to disagree. Thirty-four per cent of community rabbis and 30% of rabbi-teachers did not agree at all or were inclined not to. There were no significant differences in age breakdown. Questions about ritual purity (but not involving checking a woman’s menstrual cycle) were more likely sent through SMS because it gives the questioner a level of anonymity. “Ninety per cent of the questions I receive on family purity are anonymous,” a rabbi of the Shaarei Tiqva townlet said. Critics of online rabbinic counselling also say that online answers proffered by rabbis are too short (Tsuria & Campbell, 2021). The major criticism of electronic consultancy concerns the brevity of answers by SMS. When asked whether Jewish law enquiries by SMS was a good thing, 46% of all rabbis agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent, and a further 28% to some extent. When asked more specifically if rabbis think that the brevity of an advice regarding Jewish law was a problem, most rabbis do not think so. Only 21% of all rabbis agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent. A further 32% agreed to some degree. However, 27% of all rabbis did not see this as a problem at all, and a further 21% of rabbis agreed but to only a small degree. Broken down, over half of Haredi rabbis (56%), Reform rabbis (52%), and Hardal rabbis (51%) said that brevity was not a problem at all, or only to a small degree. So did 41% of mainstream modern Orthodox. However, only 23% of Conservative rabbis said so. Only 16% Haredi rabbis, 10% of Reform rabbis, and 8% of Hardal rabbis agreed very much or agreed much that brevity was a problem. However, 40% of Conservative rabbis and 30% of mainline modern Orthodox did think so. A further 41% of Hardal rabbis, 38% of Reform rabbis, 37% of Conservative rabbis, 29% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, and 28% of Haredi rabbis agreed that brevity in answering was a problem to some extent. In occupational terms, only 19% and 26% of community rabbis and rabbi-teachers respectively agreed to a very great extent or a great extent that brevity was a problem. “I answer in any way – email, WhatsApp, or SMS,” said Neuwirth. But he was not typical. Few rabbis are prepared to answer questions via SMS because of the very anonymity but many, yet not all, do so in WhatsApp and prefer the telephone. “It is very important to listen to how a person asks a question. You can have two people asking the identical question but the answer is not the same,” Neuwirth said. “I have no problem with writing an SMS but it is better to talk on the phone because the interaction is better.” A former rabbi of the Kfar Haroeh settlement and member of the Chief Rabbinate Council remarked, If you reply on WhatsApp, you don’t know who you are speaking to. It can be very problematic and misleading. Yesterday I wrote a long e-mail to

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somebody in Caracas (Ecuador). I got a long message back. I said “Phone me. The situation behind the original enquiry was much more tenuous. I didn’t know who I was speaking to until I actually spoke to him.” One modern Orthodox rabbi in Jerusalem said, “Sometimes the matter involves a sensitive intimate problem like marital issue or shalom bayit [marital harmony]. These are not questions that you can answer over the SMS.” A yeshiva-teacher at Yeshiva Har Etzion, Alon Shvut – who, amongst others, does answer questions concerning ritual purity – said, Giving a real halakhic answer on a subject requires you know the person. There are more factors and more possibilities when you know the person, because you know where to be strict and where to be lenient. A returnee to Judaism requires a different type of answer. Since in the rabbi’s eye he or she should not necessarily be taking all on board straightaway, there is room particularly in matters where may be a lenient ruling. Rabbi Yuval Cherlow said, I do not answer on WhatsApp – except for yes-or-no questions. I am an educator. I want to answer questions which give me the chance to explain, if not the sources, at least the direction – to explain why I pasken [make the Jewish legal decision] like this rather than decide in another direction. I think SMS and WhatsApp cheapen halakha [Jewish religious law]. Sometimes I prefer to give the answer in a live conversation – because the particular matter is nuanced. But at times it is black-and-white. Then I answer in a text message. But a number of rabbis draw a distinction between SMS and WhatsApp. A Conservative community rabbi in south Jerusalem – who gets about two questions a month – insists on the questioner identifying himself or herself. In addition to meetings at the synagogue and on the Sabbath, he answers by WhatsApp “but never by SMS. SMS is very short. WhatsApp is an upgrade – it enables me to say more.” Cherlow, a modern Orthodox rabbi, publishes a tenth of his responses either in book form or on the yeshiva’s website. “But some questions are not suitable to be published. For example, a frequently asked question is whether a homosexual may practice oral sex. I will not publish my answer for all and sundry – partly because a journalist seeing it on a website may blow it up in news reporting.” Yet another criticism of online rabbinic counselling is, quoting the dictum “Make for Yourself a Rabbi,” of the Mishnaic tome Ethics of the Fathers, former Israeli Chief Rabbi Yonah Metzger characterised the rabbi not only as being a functionary but also being a role model to emulate and identify with. One would not make oneself a rabbi if one already has a virtual rabbi. Moreover, instead of accepting the decision of the rabbi, people might be inclined to “shop around” to different online rabbis to find the reply most acceptable and comfortable to them.

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 211 Furthermore, the ease of online counselling discourages the Jew from studying the original sources in the halakhic (or Jewish law) literature. The new technology is a double-edged sword. It also enables the public – including members of a close-knit community in a synagogue – to discuss their rabbi and his comments. Thus, since I am very strict about the sanctity of the synagogue – do you allow an evening of women’s songs? Somebody came and said that another rabbi does allow it. I contended on in my first years as a rabbi here that one is not alone. There are many rabbis around. So you have to pick your “jihadism.” If it’s important enough that you will say that this is the p’sak halakha [the Jewish law ruling], but if you do that in everything you will lose your effect on your community. In the Jewish case, participation in forum and chat questions of religious belief, and participation in shiurim conducted on the Web, contribute to creating virtual communities. One recent development is online shiurim. For example, in the Web Yeshiva, established in 2007, students study in a live online shiur – as well as learning online with a chavruta (a study partner). Transcending geographical limitations, classes are available from 4:00 a.m. to midnight in Hebrew, English, and Russian. But the pedagogic benefits of shiurim transmitted through technological means have been questioned. Indeed, the traditional one-on-one student (chavuruta) enabled interactive learning which has become a basic ingredient of study in yeshivot over hundreds of years. “Each interaction that relates to those lines – with a study partner, another student, a teacher – probes that much deeper. However, the solitary and usually shallow world of the net surfer rarely offers this kind of rigorous inquiry,” remarked one critic, Rabbi Mark Bleiweiss (1999). Habad has become one of the most active Jewish movements involved in outreach work. Already in the 1960s, Chabad’s Lubavitcher Rebbe had a regular weekly program on a New York radio station, WEVD. With the first international telephone hook-up in 1970 and later by satellite, the Lubavitcher Rebbe preceded Israeli rabbis in getting his message – through broadcasting his farbrengen (or gatherings where the Rebbe expounded on Torah and Hassidism) – to audiences in other countries. Chabad.org provides a mix of content: about Chabad itself, including the biography of the Lubavitcher Rebbe; Tanya (Chabad’s main philosophic work) and general Torah-oriented matter including the weekly Bible reading; and matters about Jewish festivals and about Jewish law codes like those of Maimonides. In addition, there is also contact information, such as for Chabad houses around the world. The internet’s impact upon Jewish identity is, therefore, in making religious information much more accessible. Cyber-synagogue or the virtual minyan Judaism has mostly failed to benefit or incorporate the internet and new media into the religion. Given the centrality of prayer and the synagogue in Judaism, this may

212 Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? be seen most clearly in terms of online prayer. Most branches of Judaism have rejected the possibility of online religion and online prayer services. The dictum in the law code Shulkhan Arukh says that a minyan – a quorum for communal prayer – must have ten persons to be in the same room physically – an offline, or physical, room rather than virtual room. This is the view of Orthodox and Conservative Judaism. It does not recognise the possibility that persons could be distributed from different places to link up through, say, the telephone to form a minyan. By Jewish tradition the Divine Presence is said to be “stronger” at communal prayer than in private prayer. But the roots that communal prayer or a minyan comprises ten males in the same room is far from clear. While there is reference in the Bible to prayer by, say, the patriarchs, there is no reference to the minyan. Even the synagogue does not appear, in contrast to the very present discussion of the temple sacrificial order in Leviticus. Some rabbis say the idea of the minyan is alluded in biblical references to the Israeli community – the edah. But matters are not so clear-cut. Could the edah (community) also imply virtual communities, not just physical communities? That the Shulkhan Arukh does not relate to the virtual community could theoretically be explained away by the fact they did not exist when the code was written by Joseph Caro and first printed in the 16th century – well before the invention of technology like the telephone. The possibility of overtaking geographical distance was not discovered when the law code was completed. One early rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi is quoted in a minority opinion, in the Babylonian Talmud Tractate Pesachim (85b), that the relationship between God and His people is indivisible and can traverse any physical barrier – which might be interpreted as permitting a virtual minyan. In contrast, certain non-Orthodox communities – notably communities affiliated with the Reform movement – do broadcast prayer services from the offline synagogue or temple through the synagogue’s website, enabling persons who are unable to attend the service such as for reasons of ill-health to nevertheless participate in the service from afar. Indeed, this was preceded for years with the broadcasting of on the Purim holyday, the Biblical Book of Esther, on radio stations like that used by Temple Emanuel, the leading Reform community in New York. In streaming their services also to their website live, individual Reform Jewish temples show the potential which the Jewish information superhighway offers. Yet, the Reform’s Jewish law-making body itself, the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR), have rejected the possibility of online prayer services – arguing that people today live in the real physical world, not the virtual world – even though many individual Reform temples have adopted online prayer services. In the Reform movement, individual temples are given considerable leeway in decision-making. Most technologically advanced is a humanist congregation, Beth Adam, located at Loveland, Ohio, USA, which also has a sophisticated online community – BethAdam.org. In addition to broadcasting Sabbath and holiday services either from the sanctuary or from a studio adjacent to it, the website offers access to rabbis, education materials, resources about Jewish religious holidays and life-cycle events, audio files of sermons and Torah readings, and social networking.

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 213 But communal prayer on the Net does not meet the theological standards of other Jewish religious streams. Like the CCAR, the Orthodox and Conservative streams in Judaism argue that Jewish law is focused upon the physical reality, not the virtual reality that humans have succeeded in creating. Information technology has, therefore, failed to impact the synagogue service. These branches of Judaism are inclined to reject the possibility that Jews at another location – whether for reasons like bad weather, or ill health, or physical danger such as wartime – may fulfil one’s prayer obligations by going online to an existing minyan prayer service. But while a minyan formed on the internet is ruled out by the Orthodox and Conservative Jewish streams, the possibility of linking up to an existing physical minyan for one who cannot reach the synagogue has been raised by some Conservative rabbis and a few Orthodox rabbis, but which would albeit be limited to “passive” participation of reciting the prayers with the cantor. The possibility for “active” participation, such as the recitation of the mourner’s kaddish prayer by a Jew – recited by the children of the deceased for an 11-month period after death – not at the service itself, has been ruled out by Orthodox rabbis and been allowed by the Conservative movement’s Jewish Law Committee on the condition that at the very least another mourner is reciting the kaddish at the offline minyan itself (Reisner, 2001). The rejection of the Orthodox and Conservative traditions to allow synagogue worship services to be online limits the contribution of internet to the educational software level. A separate question concerns the question of online prayer services on the Sabbath and Jewish festivals when the synagogue is most attended like Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, Passover, Shavuot, and Sukkot. The prohibition of activating electricity – regarded by Jewish law as an act of creation and, therefore, prohibited on the Sabbath by different religious streams – suggests that even if a solution in halakha to an online connection to a physical minyan on weekdays were found, it would be even more difficult regarding one on the Sabbath. An exception in Reform Judaism which allows electricity use on the Sabbath is if it enhances the religious atmosphere (such as travelling to temple services on Shabbat and festivals). Yet it may be suggested that in the future if the electrical connect-up of time clock device is pre-programmed prior to the Sabbath, which observant Jews have used for many years for heating and lighting during the 24-hour Sabbath period, it could be extended to online prayer services for all streams, including the Orthodox. Participating in prayer services or hearing shiurim (religious lessons) online would undoubtedly be a creative way of enhancing the spiritual quality of the holyday. Even for Orthodox and Conservative Jews, the ‘Sabbath clock’ – pre-programmed prior to the commencement of the Sabbath – serves as a means theoretically to overcoming the religious obstacle of, say, a computer terminal on the Sabbath as a means to follow online services, or for allowing videos on the Sabbath comprising lectures of a religious theme, shiurim, religious music such as a chazanut (cantorial) concert, and so on which enhance the Sabbath atmosphere. Can a ‘Sabbath computer mouse’ be developed which satisfies the Jewish law restrictions?

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Notwithstanding the theological qualifications regarding fully fledged prayer services, other features of prayer have been adapted to the online arena and the spiritual and religious life of Jews have benefited from the technological era. Owing to the internet, tehillim campaigns (the recitation of chapters of the Book of Psalms) have become cross-border, embracing Jewish communities worldwide. Charity giving is done on internet, making e-charity – or e-tzedaka – into a growing area of Jewish philanthropy. The moral and religious obligation of returning lost objects to its owner has also taken on internet dimensions – with an informal website or noticeboard for announcing “lost and found.” Prayer services at the Western Wall, Jerusalem, may be seen on the Net. Jews have been leaving prayers messages in the Western Wall, for hundreds of years. But since the internet, people have been sending their prayers by e-mail or by fax to the Western Wall Heritage Foundation, which downloads and prints the message and places them in the crevices of the Wall. Mourning rituals have also benefited from the internet era. Burial societies have erected recording devices at Jewish cemeteries so that funeral services at cemeteries may be streamed on the internet. This enables those who are unable to attend a funeral (due partly to the Jewish custom of burial close to the time of death) to be nevertheless present virtually, including those from abroad, at the funeral. And the custom of comforting mourners during the seven-day shivah, or mourning period following the funeral, has used internet connection, with some people sending condolences via e-mail. Jewish organisations should examine long-term trends and advancements in media technology to incorporate into their planning, rather than be left at the gates of their cultural ghettos. The mass media revolution should generate soul-searching among religious leaders to exploit mass media techniques and channels in pastoral work. The hesitancy of rabbis to exploit the potential which digital media offers raises the question whether the bureaucratic need for self-preservation of the rabbi – whether the rabbi of a synagogue or the rabbi in an educational institution like the yeshiva – is also a motivating factor not to fully incorporate the digital media in Judaism rather than a purely and singly halakhic consideration. Perhaps it is the very threat to the community structure which holds not a few rabbis back. Covid-19: a prototype for the virtual minyan

Judaism appeared in the throes of a revolution generated by the covid (known in Israel as ‘Corona’) virus crisis, which began in Israel in March 2020. The dangers of leaving one’s house during the Covid-19 pandemic raised questions regarding the potential of using online media for religious worship. What were the implications for the Haredim regarding the Covid-19 crisis? As the pandemic was the first international disaster (apart from terrorism) since the invention of the internet and the growth of social media, it is useful to examine how the digital media has affected Jewish spiritual life. In terms of the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 215 Jewish communities, attention has been focused on the question of its impact on synagogue life. The closure of synagogues in Israel raised questions about alternative strategies, including online prayer services. The dangers of leaving one’s house have raised questions regarding the potential of the online media in religious worship. The Covid-19 crisis raises wider questions like what are the consequences, if any, of the internet on Jewish prayer worship and even what ethical message Judaism may offer for the internet era. It is at times of concern and death that people most want to reach out and pray to God for divine help, and people in isolation at home also need psychological sympathy and to be able to remain in touch with other people. Therefore, the Jewish legal reservation regarding streaming religious services proved costly (nonOrthodox streaming services overcame the religious limits [Ben Lulu, 2021]). In reality, there were outdoor prayer services which replaced the sheltered synagogue, such as the “balcony minyanim,” where participants living on the same street joined from their balconies – with limited numbers of up to 20 male participants. It was a recognition by the authorities that it was better to allow some, albeit limited, communal prayer because otherwise individuals would form their own services under more dangerous conditions. The New Year (Rosh Hashanah), when the ram’s horn (shophar) is blown in synagogues, and the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur) in autumn are peak times for communal prayer. Religious holydays are occasions for gathering together, and the Israeli authorities, in advancing their guidelines of social distancing, were concerned about the dangers of that these festivals had in spreading Covid-19. One of the most potent festivals was a minor annual festival, Lag Ba-Omer, which occurred in the late spring, when thousands of Haredi Jews paid homage to Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai by visiting his grave at Mount Meron in northern Israel. A very small area, it was a breeding ground for Covid-19. Another springtime festival is Passover, which celebrates the biblical exodus from Egypt. On this occasion, families usually gather together for the traditional seder meal at the onset of the festival to celebrate and re-enact and relate the story of the biblical Exodus to one another. Against the background of governmental guidelines not to gather together, a group of senior Orthodox Sephardic rabbis in April 2020 suggested that the seder service at the beginning of the seven-day Passover festival could be held through a Zoom connection, enabling individuals staying alone to link up to their families. It was a revolutionary ruling since Orthodox Judaism prohibits activating electricity on holydays. A survey conducted by Maariv newspaper on the eve of Passover in 2020 found that 33% of respondents said that they planned to hold their seder via Zoom (Rosner, 2020). Life-cycle events, such as marriages and burials, and religious celebrations, such as the bar mitzvah (entry into Jewish law for boys at 13) and the circumcision on the eighth day after a boy is born, are all occasions where people usually come together. Some funerals during Covid-19 were held via Zoom to enable relatives and friends to “attend” the funeral and hear the eulogies. The custom of visitation

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to comfort mourners in the week following the death of a blood relative had to be limited to improvisation, such as via the telephone. In the early months after the outbreak of Covid-19, there was concern about the hygiene of using communal ritual baths (mikva) by men and women, respectively. The Western Wall at the ancient Jewish temple site in Jerusalem, a popular site of prayer, was divided into capsules in order to regulate and limit overcrowding. Supervisors of kosher food, whose responsibility was to inspect that foods manufactured in factories, were prepared in accordance with kosher ritual standards, notably without any ingredients prohibited by Jewish laws, had difficulty to reach factories, especially those situated in far-flung parts of the world, to carry out on-site inspection. In the yeshivot and ulpanot or midrashot (religious colleges for adult girls) and religious schools, there were no halakhic, or Jewish legal, objections for going online – as we have seen with synagogal communal prayer but rather pedagogic and technological reservations. In the immediate period after the outbreak of Covid-19 in spring 2020, the Israel Health Ministry’s instructions required that yeshivot go online. The closure of yeshivot threatened religious learning. Some Haredi rabbis sought nevertheless not to close, arguing that learning Torah would “save them” (Gering & Cohen, 2022) Overall, heads of yeshivot found that going on Zoom or via telephone was not as successful as the offline nature which had characterised the yeshivot for decades. Partly, it concerned that studying the Talmud is done in the framework of students learning as partners (havruta). It demanded a huge level of motivation to alter the participatory havruta from online where two students sit together, opposite one another, to online. The motivation factor was particularly problematic for lowerlevel students. Yeshiva heads recognised the advantages that Zoom offered – to reach bigger audiences than the offline yeshiva enabled. Yet this required preparation of visual aids to accompany the rabbi’s shiur. Yet, overall, yeshiva heads saw the Zoom-type study as second best or necessarily for the preferred, long-tested over decades, indeed centuries, of offline yeshiva study. So as the yeshivot and ulpanot were able to reorganise to study in “capsules,” most heads of yeshivot moved back later from online to offline (Gross & Kapach-Warszawer, 2021). Media events – the daf yomi case Media events are media religious events with to the media playing a role in projecting the event, and in becoming such a single major event that it interrupts the daily schedule the individual. Indeed, as Katz and Dayan (1992) emphasise, the event is not essentially initiated by the media. But it is a legitimately born event – in this case a religious event. But the media serves to export and enable people to participate. One limitation in the case of Judaism is that the prohibition of using electricity, including television, satellites, computers, and radio, in the Sabbath and holydays – the traditional days for religion – means that mega-media events in the Jewish religion are limited somewhat. An example is that

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 217 the funeral of a major rabbi, like that of a chief rabbi, is giving expression to group calamity. Indeed, media events in Judaism go back to the pre-modern era: the giving of the Ten Commandments at Mount Sinai – in which 600,000 Israelites gathered at Mount Sinai when Moses, after the exodus from Egypt, by tradition, ascended the mount for 40 days and was given the plethora of Jewish laws from Almighty God – was so impactful that the event got its place in Jewish history. Indeed, according to the French Jewish Bible commentator, Rashi, the Ten Commandments given at Mount Sinai were presented in 70 languages – a clue that its intended audience was worldwide, to entire humanity, not just Jews. Every seven years, Jews observe the “completion” of studying the Babylonian Talmud. The study of one page a day of the Talmud was born at the Congress of the Haredi movement, Agudat Israel, in Vienna, in 1923 by Meir Shapiro, a rabbi from Lublin. Anxious to find ways to strengthen Jewish religious identity, Rabbi Shapiro initiated a project to encourage Jewish study of learning one page of the Talmud daily. The project took on an added importance in the wake of the Holocaust when thousands of yeshiva students were murdered in Nazi concentration camps. There was no better way to memorialise the Holocaust (Heilman, 1995). A measure of its success are the increasing numbers attending the siyum – the ceremony celebrating the completion of the sevenyear cycle: In 1945, at the completion of the third cycle, some 3,000 attended the siyum in Tel Aviv. In 1953, 10,000 attended the siyum in Jerusalem’s Mea Shearim neighbourhood. So what had previously been the recluse of learned rabbis studying in the yeshivas, suddenly became a hobby for Jews worldwide (overwhelmingly religiously observant ones) to learn one page of the Talmud daily. Moreover, the style of Talmud literature, with its elongated, seemingly esoteric unpunctuated text – almost shorthand notes or verbal statements of the ancient rabbis – made the intellectual stimulus – indeed the thrill of – daf yomi (lit. “a page a day”) a fulfilling experience when the Talmudic deliberation and argument was understood. Indeed, the Talmud itself did not provide the final version of Jewish religious law (halakha); that had to wait for leading codifiers, like Maimonides, to draw upon these disputes to determine what the “final” Jewish religious view was. Some participated in the shiurim given by the rabbi to a large gathering. Other individuals learnt it by themselves. The shiurim (religious lesson) lasted an hour daily. A clue to a media technological role of the daf yomi is that over the years, it became possible to “dial a daf.” In 1982 the Torah Communication Network, created in New York by Rabbi Eli Teitelbaum, enabled people to listen to shiurim about the Talmud on the telephone or on audio cassettes. Originally planned to comprise lessons on the Talmud by radio, the network abandoned this in favour of a dedicated Torah telephone system, coined “dial a daf” with tape recorders that would restart the shiur every hour, enabling a person to telephone on the hour. It was considered a marvel of technology, with hundreds of people simultaneously listening to a shiur on audio cassette in English, Yiddish, or Hebrew. Later, the tape recorders were replaced with computers, enabling the user to fast-forward to any place on

218 Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? the page, to rewind to review any point which required clarification, as well as to pause during a shiur and return later. By the end of 2008, the entire Talmud was available on an iPod. Once reviled by Haredim, the MP3 enables the Haredi Jew to listen to shiurim at every place, including while travelling. Israel’s two Haredi radio stations, Radio Kol Berama and Radio Kol Chai, broadcast the daily daf yomi shiur. And more, recently, it became available on the so-called Web Yeshiva, the virtual yeshiva. New editions of the Talmud were produced to meet the demand. Thus, Rabbi Adin Steinzaltz wrote a text which was punctuated and included a commentary. And the Schottenstein Talmud, while respecting the original layout in the Vilna edition of the Talmud, has a useful commentary. Indeed, answering the needs of diaspora Jewry, the Schottenstein Talmud also appeared in English (the first English translation was the Soncino one in the 1930s in Europe). Other languages have followed. But most popular was for two persons to learn together; the so-called havruta comprises two individuals learning together to hammer out the truth of the legal disputes, one asking and challenging his learning partner. As one rabbi, Mark Bleiweiss (1999), put it, The discourse of Jewish study comprises partners breaking their teeth for hours trying to understand sometimes just two lines of ambiguous and deliciously profound text. Each interaction that relates to those lines – with a study partner, another student, a teacher – probes that much deeper. The completion of the Talmud, at a page a day, would take thousands of days to complete, or seven years. Since Rabbi Shapiro’s initiative in the 1930s, 13 cycles of the Talmud have been completed. The completion of the Talmud was celebrated by the siyum, entailing reading of the final lines of the last tractate of the Talmud and reading of the first lines of the first tractate of the Talmud from afresh. The Talmud – both the Babylonian version and the so-called Jerusalem Talmud, compiled by rabbis who were living in the area of ancient Israel – store the many disputes and arguments of medieval rabbis – known as Tannaim and Amoraim – in which the ancient rabbis argued over the application of verses of the Bible to be Jewish religious law. The 13th siyum of the daf yomi was held on January 2, 2020, with its primary event, in the Yad Eliahu sports stadium, Tel Aviv drawing some 14,000 participants, and another event in the large conference centre, Binyanei Haoma (“Founders of the Nation” Hall) in Jerusalem. A similar event in New York attracted 30,000 participants. The siyum comprised the completion of the old cycle and beginning of the new cycle, an accompanying band, and speeches from leading rabbis. As a media event, the focus of the 2020 siyum was the Haredi media. Gross and Feuchtwanger found that examining the seven-week period (December 27, 2019– February 2, 2020), the daily Hamodia’s 210 articles compared to Yated Neeman’s 110 reports. In the case of the modern Orthodox media, there are only weekly

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 219 papers, BaSheva and Makor Rishon. The former, with its Hardal orientation, had eight articles – one a week – and Makor Rishon had seven articles for the same period. The daily secular papers for the same period had a total of four articles, three in Haaretz and one in Yediot Aharonot. It shows that if it was a mega-media event for Haredim, as well as a media event for the modern Orthodox, it was irrelevant for the secular and traditional Israelis. It was also covered elsewhere in the Haredi media, like Mishpacha and BaKehilla magazines. The Haredi dailies indicated the festive nature by printing the montage of Daf Yomi 13 above each report. It reported on how different towns and settlements in Israel celebrated the completion of the learning. There was less coverage in the Yated Neeman – which focuses almost entirely on the Lithuanian Haredim who study all day – compared to the coverage of Hassidim, such as in the Hassidic orientated dailies Hamodia and Hamevaser, which reported how each and every Hassidic court, from larger Hassidic courts like Gur and Vishnitz to smaller courts like Stoylen and Nevadna celebrated completion of the Talmud. The Hassidim celebrated the completion of the cycle, even more significant for a population who mostly do work but set aside time everyday for Torah learning – as expressed the dafi yomi. The many news reports included historical throwbacks to learning the daf yomi during the Nazi period, including in areas under Nazi occupation, and such stories as a printing press in a detention camp or how Jews were beaten by Nazi police. The Haredi press published interviews with rabbis encouraging the learning of daf yomi as an important educational yardstick. This confirms the pedagogic, or paternalistic, function of the Haredi media. One story, for example, described one family of three generations, each of whom learns daf yomi. Organisers who sought to publicize the event did prepare press kits for journalists. For the secular media, including the international media’s coverage of the siyum, a new news angle for the 2020 13th siyum of the daf yomi was that women have also taken up learning the daf, albeit in the modern Orthodox sector only so far. The role of women was a dominant theme in non-Haredi media covering the event. The daf yomi showed the potential for media technology projecting a religious event to become a media event for those involved. Yet hamstrung from Katz and Dayan (1992) is the role of television here because live broadcasting (of history), per the author’s thesis, is a centrepiece in their thesis. The Haredim ban television, and thus as a media event, it failed to achieve its full potential. Arguably, this is less true today, with many Haredim benefitting from YouTube, and links to live broadcasts, notwithstanding filters on their computers, benefit from these. But more generally, undoubtedly, the siyum celebration of the completion of the daf yomi certainly fits the wider perimeters of how a Jewish virtual community gives expression to Judaism today. The synagogue website The noticeboard of the synagogue does not appear at first appearances as an important subject of discussion for researchers of media and religion. After

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all, the website of a synagogue is to all intents and purposes a simple noticeboard. While a broad range of Jewish websites have been examined (e.g. Golan & Campbell, 2015), this section focuses entirely upon websites set up by the synagogue community. Yet a closer look at the website revisits questions whether of a narrow religious nature (like being a noticeboard for the distribution of religious texts), or the value of a website in community building, or technical questions of the periodic maintenance of website for a voluntarybased organisation like a synagogue community. And given that the overall state of the synagogue may be at the juncture of change as it encounters the age of new media, it is instructive to see the different lines of thinking among community leaders whether or not to build a website. This is yet one example of how technology is impacting upon religious communities – through the community website (Horsfall, 2000). A poll of synagogues in Israel carried out in 2019 by the author is instructive for our understanding of attitudes to the synagogue website. Forty-seven per cent of communities polled had a website, and 46% did not (7% had no answer). Eightysix per cent of non-Orthodox communities had a website, but 39% of Orthodox ones also had one. Twenty per cent of Haredi communities had a website – which arguably is higher than was postulated. This nevertheless contrasts poorly with 61% of mainstream modern Orthodox communities and 54% of Hardal. In contrast, 52% of Orthodox ones did not have a website. The reasons given for having a website were maintaining a connection with the community (98 responses received from the site’s web manager), followed by supplying communiques and announcements (84 responses), strengthening the community (56 responses), and passing on religion-related matter (54 responses). (Some synagogues answered more than one option.) In measuring the impact of the website, the most-cited impact was strengthening the community (45 responses), followed by strengthening Judaism (25 responses), increasing Jewish materials reaching site users (22 responses), sending questions and receiving answers from the rabbi (18 responses), and holding religious services and other events in the community online (11 responses). For all five streams – Reform, Conservative, mainline modern Orthodox, Hardal, Haredi communities – the most-cited function of the website was maintaining a connection with the community. For those synagogues which did have a website, there was a broad consensus among the Orthodox and nonOrthodox synagogues that it assisted in helping connect with the community (35% and 31% Orthodox and non-Orthodox rabbis, respectively), or it simply strengthened the community (19% and 18% Orthodox and non-Orthodox, respectively). Among the Reform and Conservative communities, broken down, the impact of the website was primarily strengthening the community, followed by strengthening Judaism (12 responses), then increasing Jewish materials reaching site users (7 responses), then holding services and other events in the community online (5 responses), and finally sending questions and receiving answers from rabbis (3 answers).

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 221 The mainstream modern Orthodox communities also listed first strengthening the community (10 responses); in second place was sending questions and receiving answers from the rabbi (5 responses). Strengthening the community spirit includes uploading pictures of celebrations inside the community like a wedding or bar mitzvah, as well as a community event. This was followed by strengthening Judaism, increasing Jewish materials reaching site users, and holding services and other events in the community online. In contrast to the mainstream modern Orthodox, the dominant theme of the impact of the website in the Hardal community was strengthening Judaism, followed in second place by sending questions and receiving answers from the rabbi and increasing Jewish materials reaching site users. Strengthening the community, which was in first place for the mainstream modern Orthodox and Conservative and Reform communities, was in fourth place for the Hardal stream. Last, holding services and other events in the community online was last. Strengthening Judaism was jointly in first place for the Haredi and for the Hardal communities, together with sending questions and receiving answers from the rabbi. In fourth and fifth places jointly were strengthening the community and increasing Jewish materials reaching site users. In measuring the success of synagogue websites, 40% and 30% non-Orthodox rabbis and Orthodox rabbis said it strengthened the community. The slight reduction for the Orthodox may reflect a regular attendance among Orthodox Jews at prayer services or other synagogue events like shiurim (religious lessons) – enabling attendees to update ‘offline’.Yet in terms of seeking religious advice via the websites – sheilltot hilhachtiot (lit. “Jewish legal questions”) – this was much more prevalent for Orthodox rabbis (24%), in contrast to 8% of non-Orthodox. When asked about problems in having a website, the most serious problems listed were that it required a lot of resources and, in the case of the Orthodox streams, that it did not serve the institution’s needs, and halakhic problems. Apart from Haredi communities, another weakness was that members of the community did not did not know how to use it. Haredi (57 responses) communities overwhelmingly replied that it did not serve the institution’s needs. Hardal (7 responses) and modern Orthodox (6 responses) communities also listed this jointly with halakhic (Jewish legal) problems. Hardal listed halakhic problems in second place (7 responses), followed by the website requiring a lot of resources (6 responses). For the Reform (5 responses) and Conservative (6 responses), the major problem was that the website requires a lot of resources. Conservative (3 responses) and Reform (1 response) communities said that the community did not how to use it. Those rabbis whose synagogues did not have a website said that the main reason was the lack of personnel to set up and maintain the website. Orthodox respondents listed economic costs and religious reasons. When asked about the weaknesses of a synagogue website, most website managers did not answer. Some said it was difficult to keep the website up-to-date because it was managed by a volunteer. When asked to explain to what use the website could be put, a variety of answers were given. These include managing

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donations and contributions, such as a donation when an individual is called up to the Torah reading. But synagogues with a website, when asked how the community would be if the website would be shut down, were divided between saying it would not make a difference or it would be less good. Thirty-six per cent of Orthodox communities without a website said it did not serve the synagogue needs or even there were “halakhic [Jewish law] problems” to run a website. Yet, broken down, 99% of Haredi communities without a website cited religious reasons, in contrast to only 3% of mainstream modern Orthodox and 8% Hardal communities. Haredi rabbis, as noted earlier, have placed a rabbinical ban on the internet. Lack of personnel was cited as the reason for not having a website by 35% of mainstream modern Orthodox communities, 25% of Hardal communities, and 15% each of the Reform and Conservative communities. Economic constraints were cited by 45% of Haredi communities, 36% of Hardal communities, and 27% of mainstream modern Orthodox communities. Conservative and Reform communities did not cite economic constraints as a factor for not having a website. Of synagogues without a website, there was no uniform way regarding other offline channels used for informing members. Most synagogues without a website referred to a synagogue official delivering announcements at the end of the service on the Sabbath on the synagogue. Many mentioned e-mail. Other channels cited were Facebook and telephones. Much less cited was an offline synagogue noticeboard or SMS. “At my old pulpit,” said one community rabbi, “there is no website, just an e-mail sent out once a week – or sometimes urgent messages such as a funeral, no Torah material, or blogger or personal column of a rabbi.” “There is a controversy and tension among synagogue members between the younger generation and the older generation about what type of communication to use,” said Haya Becker, the rabbi of a Conservative community in North Jerusalem. “The older generation communicate through e-mail, and the younger generation does not read e-mail. At a recent synagogue board meeting, we had half the people complaining that they do not know what is happening: ‘Why don’t you send it out by WhatsApp?’ So the synagogue secretary sends out say a mazaltov decorative message of congratulations or, say, bereavement condolences to mourners, on Facebook,” said Baker. Overall, a clear difference was found between the non-Orthodox rabbis and Orthodox rabbis regarding the wider question of absorption of new media in their pastoral work. There was little or no difference between the Conservative and Reform rabbis and communities. No less significant was the wide gap within the Orthodox between, on the one hand, the modern Orthodox and the Hardal rabbis and communities and, on the other hand, the Haredi synagogues. It suggests that Orthodox rabbis in general and Haredi rabbis in particular require both to recognise the value of new media in the current era, as well as receive the appropriate computer training.

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 223 Synagogue bulletins Another new addition to the Israeli synagogue is the so-called synagogue bulletin or pamphlet (Hebrew: alonei bet knesset). These are printed pamphlets distributed in synagogues throughout Israel on the Sabbath eve. It provides rabbis with an important controlled mouthpieces. Though some have online editions, these are printed, thereby allowing readers access on the Sabbath. The bulletin evolved in part over the years because the mainstream Israeli media failed to give expression to the views of the religious communities. The synagogue bulletin provides the rabbi with a free rein uncensored stage for the rabbi’s messages. They comprise interpretations of current events from a religious Jewish perspective. So the bulletin today fulfils a unique role in providing the rabbis with a podium, which has not existed in the past. It supplements the rabbi’s sermon (derasha) from the pulpit in the synagogue itself. Indeed, since the age of print began with Gutenberg in 1450, rabbis have enjoyed little control over the transmission of their message through mass media as they do today. It is difficult to delineate when the synagogue bulletin first appeared. In 1984 Dr Yizthak Alfasi, drawing upon a financial subsidy from the National Religious Party, began Shabbat V’Shabato. However, the renowned female Bible scholar Nehama Leibowitz had already begun distributing printed versions of her commentary on the weekly Bible reading. Not a few synagogue bulletins were local initiatives. Already in 1996 one estimate said that a million copies comprising 100 different bulletins were distributed in synagogues weekly. A 2004 survey on the modern Orthodox community – published in the 1,000th issue of Shabbat V Shabato (2004) – found that 69% of respondents read synagogue bulletins each week, and a further 10% almost every week. Only 3% had never read them, and only 6% did not take them home from the synagogue to home. Some were also perused by 41% of spouses and by 26% of children. Synagogue bulletins are in an evolving stage today. While the goal in, say, the broad media for creating a newspaper may be broadly divided into earning a profit or advancing a political message, the motives for creating synagogue bulletins are broader. There are synagogue bulletins produced for different target groups by a broad range of institutions, including many religious educational institutions like yeshivot, reflecting a range of theological outlooks. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, it had almost become de rigueur for a religious educational institution in Israel identified with the modern religious sector to produce a bulletin. But not a few today are produced by other institutions or interested bodies, often to project their agenda. For example, Shabbaton is an independent bulletin begun in 2000 in the modern Orthodox sector and has sought to tread a middle of the road among the modern Orthodox. Starting with a circulation of 30,000, this has climbed to 60,000. It is not afraid to explore sometimes controversial issues like Jewish feminism, homosexuality, aguna, kashrut supervision, Orthodox contacts with non-Orthodox streams, and so on.

224 Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? Olam Katan (“A Small World”), a folio-size multi-coloured weekly, is directed at the youth. Its editors have a knack for identifying issues of concern to the youth. For example, among subjects it has covered are homosexuality, the existence of God, masturbation, and the controversial question of Jewish ascent to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Most bulletins are written in a popular vein, intended for the broadest population. Given that the Sabbath should create an elevated spiritual atmosphere, free of commercial vulgarism, and that the distribution of the bulletins at the Friday night service takes away from the somber spiritual characteristic of communal prayer, rabbis have pondered the place of the synagogual bulletins. For some readers they are even an attractive alternative to seemingly unappealing prayers – making some synagogue managements decide to only distribute the synagogual bulletins after the termination of the Friday night synagogue service. But one exception is the bulletin produced by Bar-Ilan University and its intellectual scope. All rabbis are inclined to think that synagogual bulletins are a good thing: 58%, 54%, and 50% of non-Orthodox, Haredi, and modern Orthodox (combined: Hardal with mainstream modern Orthodox) surveyed by the author thought that synagogual bulletins were a very good thing or a good thing, and a further 25%, 23%, and 24% of non-Orthodox, Haredim, and modern Orthodox (combined) were neutral. Nevertheless, 23%, 23%, and 18% of Haredim, modern Orthodox, and non-Orthodox, respectively, do not agree at all or only to some extent. But whether the Israeli public sees the synagogue bulletin as something good is far more qualified. The Israeli public surveyed by the author were broken down into whether they were religious or not. But it was difficult to draw any conclusion whether the level of religious belief was significant among those who said that the synagogue bulletin was a good thing: a difference between high religious belief (13%), average religious belief (17%), and low religious belief (17%). In terms of age, there was little difference among those in the Israeli Jewish public who agreed that the synagogue bulletin is something good, a very great deal or a great deal: aged 20–35 (13%), 36–50 (23%), 51–65 (23%), and the 66+ group (27%). Sephardim (38%) were more inclined than Ashkenazi Jews (19%) to agree to a very great extent or a great extent that synagogual bulletins were a good thing. And men (28%) were more inclined than women (19%) – which could be explained by the fact that more men than women frequent the synagogue, in particular on Friday nights when the bulletins are distributed at synagogue services. Some synagogue bulletins need to generate their own budget, resulting in them being replete with full-colour glossy advertisements, such as travel and holiday, housing construction projects, to events geared toward the modern religious public. Advertising can bring in 1,000 dollars for a page for the larger circulation bulletins, bringing up the dilemma that the bulletin – an educational tool – could not function without this. Yet one bulletin, Alim Terufat of the Belze Hassidic community,

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 225 created an imaginative way for generating funds by selling space in memory of deceased relatives on the week of the anniversary of the person’s death (yahrzeit). Some rabbis see advertising in bulletins distributed in the synagogue on the Sabbath as problematic given that halakha forbids the Jew from making even a mental economic decision on the Sabbath. In a survey of rabbis carried out by the author, 73% of modern Orthodox rabbis oppose the appearance of advertisements in the bulletin. However, 73%, and 81% of Haredi, modern Orthodox (combined with Hardal), and non-Orthodox rabbis (Conservative and Reform rabbis combined), respectively, do not agree that it is desirable that there be no advertising in the bulletins. Only 16%, 13% and 4%, of Haredi, modern Orthodox (combined), and non-Orthodox rabbis agree to a very great extent or a great extent that there may be advertising. A further 11%, 13%, and 16% of Haredi, modern Orthodox (combined with Hardal), and non-Orthodox rabbis, respectively, agree to some extent. Yet the agenda of the synagogue bulletin remains questionable. Many do not aspire to such basic journalistic virtues as separating fact from opinion, objective reporting, or indicating what is journalistic free content and what is sponsored PR and paid advertising. Indeed, these basic questions themselves remain off the radar screen of many editors, proprietors, and writers of the bulletins – as well as of readers. Some bulletins have been published with the support or sponsorship of a political parties, raising the question of whether the synagogue bulletin serves as an agent of political recruitment among their readers. Rabbis criticise that some bulletins are used as a stage for advancing a political view. Forty-three per cent, 51%, and 56% of Haredi, modern Orthodox (combined with Hardal), and non-Orthodox rabbis confirm that the bulletin is a political stage to advance views. And a further 31%, 30%, and 31% agree. Thus, the synagogue bulletin and its role in the communications networks inside the religious communities raise yet unanswered ethical and democratic questions. The rabbi and the alternative Jewish community In the religion-oriented society does the rabbi peer outside to the secular environment? How does the rabbi speak directly to the public itself? In addition to the lectern in the synagogue and religious lesson in the yeshiva, some rabbis who are more adept with the wider environment are available and appear in the secular media. Thus, the public rabbi, who is PR proactive, is clearly using this. But some community rabbis and teacher-rabbis do not necessarily have a natural ability. The complaints vary from a perceived in-built hostility towards the media or, say, a secular interviewer who attempts to steer the interview in a specific direction. And the limitation in time may not enable the rabbi to articulate his or her message in a way which is not foreign to many listeners and viewers. “It’s very important for me to keep under the media’s radar screen. I try not to be exposed in areas like the media,” remarked one Hardal rabbi. “I shy away when

226 Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? asked. I don’t know why. I’ll have to go to a psychologist for that. But I’m not a good media person. The question is Why? I definitely think that the media is important. But this does not affect my communications within my community,” said a female Conservative community rabbi in Jerusalem. One Hardal community rabbi to a settlement said, “I have had a real encounter with the media, maybe ten times in my life. And then it wasn’t very successful. One of our rabbis’ organisation did organise a workshop for rabbis to appear on the media. But I didn’t go. I had no time. I think young rabbis should go to such things because they could be more challenged in the future.” In one sense, these remarks are surprising since it appears just a step away to appear before the camera from appearing on the lectern in the synagogue. Yet for the public rabbi in particular, the lectern is the screen. Kelman, a Reform community rabbi in Jerusalem, appears on television five to six times a year. Neuwirth, president of Beit Hillel, an organisation of liberal-inclined modern Orthodox, said, “I do 25–30 interviews a year. The media agendas had become aggressive – black or white – it’s difficult to speak with nuance. I am generally not there.” David Stav, president of Tzohar, an association of modern Orthodox rabbis, said, “I do two to three interviews a week. I am selective. First, I refuse to be interviewed if the interview is broadcast on the Sabbath (when electronic media is religiously forbidden). But the main consideration is whether Judaism will come out positive or negative. In the past we in Tzohar agreed to be interviewed on everything. Some subjects by nature generate a negative image. Today, we are more selective – things we want to advance – Jewish identity, the Sabbath, kashrut. But if it is about something which Tzohar itself is not directly involved in advancing, then I will not go in.” Conservative and Reform rabbis are interviewed mostly on political matters – like their struggle for official recognition. They are not interviewed generally about the theological views of their respective stream. But this rejects the reality that inside Israel, most Jews, whether strictly observant, selectively observant, or even non-observant, identify with the Orthodox and not with theology of the other branch. In one sense, it would be more helpful in widening the recognition if its theology could be explained and win the understanding of the secular and the traditional. The Reform and Conservative streams in Israel have PR committees to project themselves in the media. A separate problem is that if Conservative and Reform Jews cooperate together to fight a single struggle for recognition of the non-Orthodox, the Conservative Jews benefits from the work of the Reform Action Centre in appealing to the Israel Supreme Court. But the downside is that the broader Israeli public are confused about the significant theological differences between the Conservative and Reform and that the Conservative are mixed in together by Jews in Israel with the Reform, even though the Conservative Jewish theology is considerably closer to the modern Orthodox one than the Reform one because Conservative theology recognises the current relevance of biblical Jewish law.

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 227 Conclusion It is no coincidence that the title of the chapter has a question mark because a closer look suggests that the jury is still out on the extent to which the Jewish religion has been transformed by media technology in general and by new media in particular. As a monotheistic faith, the central feature of Judaism in Israel remains prayer. Indeed, Covid-19 made the need for online prayer more important. It was not only Reform Judaism which sanctioned the usage of electricity on the Sabbath for, say, broadcasting or streaming services, but even Conservative Judaism in the US sanctioned it in the Covid-19 case. Even if Orthodox Judaism came up with inventive arrangements for services during Covid-19, like having the Passover seder on Zoom or having outdoor religious services, Jews, like in other faiths, would still prefer to pray together offline in communities, including communal singing, and view having a physical spiritual space as a necessity. As distinct from Jewish prayer, the adage that the study of Torah is equivalent to everything (Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Shabbat, p. 127) does emphasise that study of Torah is nevertheless a primary component in Judaism. Indeed, features of adult Jewish education, such as databases, online shiurim, and asking the rabbi questions online, are evidence of the inroads which media technology has made here. Yet activities offline still remain very relevant. But this is mostly limited to the Orthodox, both modern Orthodox and Haredi. Yet, to some extent, media technology had resulted in Judaism itself becoming popularised among traditional, or non-strictly observant, Israeli Jews. Indeed, religious rabbinical hierarchies are under threat in some cases, both for teacher-rabbis as a result of online teaching and for community rabbis in terms of answering questions from their congregants, and perhaps also for community rabbis, such as in the Reform communities, where streaming is used. Computer access to Jewish organisation listings (concerning synagogues, Jewish schools, kosher eateries, cemeteries, etc.) online, as well as synagogue websites, are peripheral in the overall picture of the extent to which media technology has impacted the Jewish religion when compared to such key features of Judaism, such as prayer and physical synagogues, which will remain offline in the long term, as well as, to a great extent, adult Jewish education for the religiously observant desiring it. Bibliography Arian, A., & Keissar-Sugarmen, A. A Portrait of Israeli Jews’ Beliefs, Observance, and Values of Israeli Jews. (2009) Jerusalem: Gutman Center for Surveys at the Israel Democracy Institute. Ben Lulu, E. (2021) Zooming in and Out of Virtual Jewish Prayer Services during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 60(4). Bleiweiss, M. (1999) In Defence of the Inaccessible. Sh’ma, November. Cantoni, L., Rapetti, E., Tardini, S., Vannini, S., Arasa, F. (2010) The Adoption of ICT within the Ministrants of the Catholic Church. In Cheong, P. H., Fischer-Nielsen, P., Gelfgren,

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S., & Ess, C. (eds.), Digital Religion, Social Media and Culture: Perspectives, Practices and Futures. New York: Peter Lang. Cantoni, L., & Zyga, S. (2007) The Use of Internet Communication by Catholic Congregations: A Quantitative Study. Journal of Media & Religion 6(4). Cohen, Y. (2012) Jewish Cyber-Theology. Communication Research Trends, Centre for the Study of Communication & Culture. California. Spring. Cohen, Y. (2019) Orthodox Jewry. In Grant, A. E., Sturgill, A. F. C., Hwang Chen, C., & Stout, D. A. (eds.), Religion Online: How Digital Technology is Changing the Way We Worship and Pray. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Press, Volume 2. Cohen, Y., & Tsuria, R. (2019) A Match Made in the Cloud: Jews, Rabbis, and Online Dating Sites. In Hetsroni, A., & Tunzec, M. (eds.), Internet-Infused Romantic Interactions and Dating Practices. Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures, Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences. Fishkoff, S. (2003) The Rebbe’s Army: Inside the World of Chabad-Lubavitch. New York: Schocken. Frost, J. K., & Youngblood, N. E. (2014) Online Religion and Religion Online: Reform Judaism and Web-Based Communication. Journal of Media & Religion 13(2). Gering, T., & Cohen, Y. (2022) “The Torah Shelters and Saves”: Covid-19 Pandemic and the Framing of Health Risks in Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Religious Media. Journal of Religion, Media & Digital Culture, 11: 2. Golan, O., & Campbell, H. (2015) Strategic Management of Religious Websites: The Case of Israel’s Orthodox Communities. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 20: 467–486. Gross, H., & Feuchtwanger, M. (2020) The Nature of Media Coverage of the 13th Siyum for Completion of the Babylonian Talmud Cycle. Seminar Paper. School of Communication, Ariel University. Unpublished. Gross, H., & Kapach-Warszawer, Y. (2021) How Heads of Yeshivot and Midrashot [religious female colleges] Relate to the Information Age. Seminar Paper. School of Communication, Ariel University [Hebrew], Unpublished. Heilman, S. (1995) The Ninth Siyum Ha-Shas: A Case Study in Orthodox Contra-Acculturation. In Seltzer, R., & Cohen, N. (eds.), The Americanisation of the Jews. New York & London: New York Press. Horsfall, S. (2000) How Religious Organisations Use the Internet: A Preliminary Inquiry. In Hadden, J. K., & Cowan, D. E. (eds.), Religion on the Internet: Prospects & Promises. New York: Elsevier. Katz, E., & Dayan, D. (1992) Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kippa. (2006) A Survey of 1,000 Religious Surfers of the Kipa Religious Website. Lee, J. (2009) Cultivating the Self in Cyberspace: The Use of Personal Blogs among Buddhist Priests. Journal of Media & Religion 8(2). Reisner, A. I. (2001) Wired to the Kadosh Barukh Hu: Minyan via the Internet. New York: Rabbinical Assembly [OH 55:15 2001]. Rokeach, E. (1997) Israeli Governmental Enquiry into Strengthening Jewish Values through Radio [Hebrew], Unpublished. Roman, A. (2008) Religion Online: Religious Information and Practices in Cyberspace Christianity in the Web. Religion and Social Communication 6(1&2). Rosner, S. (2020) What Makes the Difference (Hebrew). Maariv 8 April 2020. Shabbat V’Shabato. (2004, 14 February) No 1000, Alon Shvut: Tzomet Institute.

Rabbi Google, or the virtual Jewish community? 229 Smith, M. M. (2007) Non-Profit Religious Organisation Web Sites: An Underutilized Avenue of Communicating with Group Members. Journal of Media & Religion 6(4). Sturgill, A. (2004) Scope and Purposes of Church Web Sites. Journal of Media & Religion 3(3). Tsuria, R., & Campbell, H. (2021) ‘In My Opinion’: Negotiation of Rabbinical Authority Online in Responsa Within Kipa.co.il. Journal of Communication Inquiry 45(1). Tzurba Mirabanenu. (2016) Poll on Jewish Education, Conducted by Rafi Smith.

10 Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century

Rabbis fear that their community will be morally polluted by exposure to the media. As part of their general mandate of raising the moral and spiritual fibre of the community, rabbis are acutely aware of the potential impact – negative and positive – of media exposure by their members. The ultra-Orthodox and modern Orthodox have dealt with the problem in different ways (Zicherman, 2014; Sivan & Caplan, 2003). The response of each reflects the group’s broader theology. Haredim or ultra-Orthodox, as noted in Chapter 2, have for hundreds of years been erecting their own cultural ghettoes – banning secular newspapers, TV, and the internet – and creating their own alternative media. The modern Orthodox (or dati leumi, lit. “national religious”) are characterised by a search, indeed a struggle, to synthesise the Torah and the modern world, or modernity and Orthodoxy. Among the questions facing the community are Judaism’s view on freedom of expression in mass media and in art and the right to know. For example, some rabbis within the modern Orthodox community have not issued legal rulings limiting the Jew’s exposure to modern media – reflecting an intellectual commitment to the search for a synthesis. Yet in practice, their performance is muddled. Indeed, the Hardal are stricter and construct cultural walls to keep dangerous influences out of their communities. How will a traditional Jewish community – exemplified in the extreme by Haredim who live behind cultural ghetto walls – but true of any Jewish community – maintain its identity if the cultural walls are threatened and if rabbinical authority is no longer offline? Are there virtual cultural walls? Special-interest religious media After mapping out the Haredi media marketplace, the chapter discusses public exposure and the Orthodox relationship to mass media, news values in the Haredi media, how Haredi journalists gather news inside their community, rabbinical supervision of the media, educational policy among Orthodox populations to new media, and the challenge to Haredi rabbis within their community regarding media censorship. Special-interest magazines and press for the religious populations – Haredim and modern Orthodox – have long been features of Israel’s media scene, as described in DOI: 10.4324/9781315735184-10

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 231 Chapter 1, and to these have been added religious radio stations and more recently religious news websites in digital media. These are most present in the Haredi community, who by definition live in a cultural ghetto, and therefore, this chapter will focus on the cultural ghetto phenomenon in the Haredi community. The first Haredi daily newspaper, Hamodia, was established by the Hassidic Gerrer Rebbe in 1950 so that Haredim would not read the secular papers. It was a recognition that Haredim also wish to follow the news and that, unless they had their own version, they would be exposed to the secular press. Yated Neeman was established in 1985 – after Hamodia refused to publish letters of Rabbi Eliezer Shach and his Haredi Lithuanian flock. Today, there are two more daily papers, Hamevaser, a breakaway from the Hassidic Hamodia paper, and Peles, published by the Jerusalem faction of the Lithuanian faction based in Bnei Beraq, and a stricter paper on state-religion issues, including national military service, than Yated Neeman. Apart from Peles, the other three newspapers, Hamodia, Yated Neeman, and Hamevaser, each have a daily circulation of about 20,000, with the Friday weekend edition going up to, in some cases, beyond 30,000 copies. The first independent weeklies were founded in the ’80s, Erev Shabbat and Yom Shishi. Today, independent media include weekly magazines like Mishpacha and BaKehilla. These deploy the modern standards of production, both in newsgathering and in graphic presentation. Like the institutional dailies, they censor news copy in accordance with Haredi standards, but they are unaffiliated to political parties. For rabbis, all the Haredi media – not only but in particular the daily institutional Haredi daily press – offers a useful and sympathetic platform on which to transmit their messages, in a usually undiluted fashion. An editor at the daily Hamodia said, “We are not broadcasting on the same wavelength as the independent weeklies. The coverage of Mishpacha is ‘modern.’ We aren’t ‘modern’: we are loyal to our rabbis. We have, for example, a policy of covering the funerals of admorim and rabbis.” “The weeklies have greater freedom, they do not belong to a political party close to rabbis,” said a senior Mishpacha editor. “It is clear that those who buy us know that they are getting something more open than the readers of the daily papers. Young married Haredim are inclined to take us, but when their children are born and get to the age of 8–10, some parents said they are no longer able to have the magazine in the house.” The next important change in the Haredi media marketplace was the creation of a radio station, Radio Kol Chai, in 1996. It was established after the Knesset, the Israel parliament, approved it together with seven local radio stations, arguing that the religious population were not catered for. Originally intended for both Haredim and the modern Orthodox, it was taken over a year after its founding to become an exclusively Haredi radio station, with all the strictures in news coverage implied. And in 2009, a second Haredi station, Radio Kol Berama, was approved. The two radio stations are independently owned but, like all broadcasting, subject to supervision of the country’s radio authority. But while the stations do consult rabbis – like the independent Haredi press – they are not formally subject to a rabbinical board like the institutional daily Haredi newspapers are.

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A handful of Haredi news websites – Kikar Shabbat, B’Hadrei Haredim, and Haredim 10 – began to appear in the first decade of the 21st century and operate independently from rabbinic supervision. The news sites print uncensored information about the political infighting within different sections of the Haredi world, such as between rival Hassidic courts. They report criticism, sometimes vehemently, of the positions and behaviour of Haredi leaders. The names of those sponsoring the sites, and editing them, have been mostly hidden from public light due to the Haredi ban on internet, and some Haredi leaders refuse to be interviewed by the sites. But this is tantamount to rabbis spitting in their own faces and rejecting a key channel to present rabbis’ views. A difference may be delineated between the independent weeklies, on the one hand, and the Haredi websites, on the other. Thus, the website provides 24/6 dayby-day, hour-by-hour coverage of news developments in the Haredi world in particular and the Jewish religious world as a whole. And, by contrast, magazines appear once a week. “The website has not taken over the weeklies but compliments it. Firstly, the articles are much longer than a news website. Moreover, the magazine may be read on the Sabbath,” the Mishpacha editor remarked. In contrast, the internet, radio, and television may not be used because turning on electricity during the Sabbath is regarded by halakha (Jewish religious law) in Orthodox and Conservative Judaism as an act of “creation” and infringes on what is in essence the Jewish day of rest. Do religious media have a role to play in community building?

Religious media are useful means for rabbis who favour social withdrawal for their communities from “dangerous,” anti-religious influences. Overall, all Orthodox rabbis thought that religious media were appropriate for distributing religion to a very great extent or a great extent. Broken down, 77% of Haredi rabbis surveyed said there was a need for religious papers. So did 81% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis. Hardal rabbis were a little stricter because of their view to distance themselves from foreign culture – 86%. Similar findings were found for religious radio. Orthodox rabbis surveyed by the author agreed that the media was a good way to distribute religion. Seventy-six per cent of Haredi rabbis, 73% of mainstream modern Orthodox, and 63% of Hardal rabbis said so – to a very great extent or a great extent: non-Orthodox rabbis were less inclined to but nevertheless were evident. Fifty-four per cent and 44% of Conservative and Reform rabbis said so. But while rabbis favoured religious media, when asked if religious programmes encourage people to be better Jews and if religious programmes are a good tool for Jewish education, there was less support. So if the first question was too general, the second question was more specific and focused on special programmes to advance Jewish education. Fifty per cent and 58% of Haredi rabbis agreed to the first question and the second question to a very great extent or a great extent, respectively; the same goes, respectively, for 25% and 58% for mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis; 45% and 53% for Hardal rabbis; 3% and 53% for Reform rabbis; and 27% and 50% of Conservative rabbis.

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 233 If there is a case for separatist religious media, how separate should they be? Should it cover only the specific religious stream, and should it cover only Judaism and not other religions, or should it cover all? In the former, 45% of all rabbis agreed a lot or were inclined to agree that religious media should only cover the particular stream. But 34% of rabbis were inclined to disagree or not agree at all. A further 21% had no view on their subject. Broken down, while 42% and 24% of Haredi rabbis agreed a lot or were inclined to agree, respectively, to focus in their media only on their own religious stream, so did, respectively, 6% and 23% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, 21% and 30% of the Hardal (reflecting their closed culture), 6% and 12% of Conservative rabbis, and 4% and 4% of Reform rabbis. Yet in occupational terms, 52% of teacher-rabbis said so in contrast to only 8% of community rabbis – whose audience is adults. It is instructive here to compare the findings for rabbis with the findings for journalists. Eighty-four per cent of all journalists disagreed completely that a religious media outlet should focus only on the community’s own religious stream. Only 2% and 3% agreed a very great deal or greatly. Sixty-eight per cent of Orthodox religious journalists disagreed, and a further 20% were inclined to (94% of secular journalists and 76% of traditional journalists disagreed completely). When the category of religious Orthodox journalists was broken down between those themselves working for a religious news organisation and those working in the secular media, 64% of those working in a religious news organisation disagreed that a religious media outlet should focus only on the community’s own religious stream, and a further 20% were inclined to disagree by comparison with 89% and 5%, respectively, of religious journalists working in the secular media. Regarding publishing matter about other, non-Jewish religions, 41% of all rabbis agreed to a great extent or were inclined not to publish matter about other religions, and 24% had no opinion on the matter. The issue is sensitive given, among many rabbis, notably Orthodox, the perceived danger that becoming acquainted with other traditions may generate questions about one’s own Jewish faith, not to mention possible rejection of Jewish religious beliefs. This could also, rabbis fear, contribute to assimilation and intermarriage with non-Jews or even religious conversion. Broken down, 60% of Haredi rabbis agreed to a great extent or were inclined to agree that there should be no matter about other religions. A further 27% of Haredi rabbis had no opinion. Learning about other religions goes against the very essence of a Haredi living within a cultural ghetto. Also, 54% of Hardal rabbis agreed to a great extent or were inclined to. Twenty per cent had no opinion. All this contrasted with 21% and 31% of mainstream modern Orthodox. For the modern Orthodox philosophy of being acquainted and full partner of the wider world, this would theoretically also include other religious traditions. But in practice, modern Orthodox rabbis, not just Hardal, are sensitive of the perceived dangers in practice. Eighteen per cent and 15% of Conservative rabbis said so, and 9% and 4% of Reform rabbis respectively agree that there should be no matter about other religions. This reflects the outlook of both non-Orthodox traditions to be fully integrated in the wider world and allow Judaism to finds its place among the other faiths.

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Eighty-seven per cent of Reform rabbis did not agree at all or agreed only a little that there should be no content about other religions – as did 67% of Conservative rabbis, 48% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, 26% of Hardal rabbis, and 14% of Haredi rabbis. In occupational terms, a clear difference is noted between teacher-rabbis and community rabbis since the former are dealing with children and students, whereas the latter are dealing with families. Thus, 45% of rabbi-teachers agreed a very lot or a lot about the danger of reading about other religions in the religious media, in contrast to 17% of community rabbis. And while 59% of community rabbis did not agree at all, only 31% if rabbi-teachers said so. Ashkenazi rabbis were inclined to agree a lot or inclined to agree more than Sephardi rabbis. How do Israeli journalists perceive a separatist religious media?

In broad terms, journalists saw religious media as playing an important role: 72% of all journalists saw religious newspapers as important to a great extent or very great extent. Only 12% of journalists did not agree or only agreed to a small extent that religious newspapers were important. Religious radio and religious TV were also regarded by journalists as important if slightly less than religious newspapers: 65% and 48% of journalists saw religious radio and religious TV as important. Journalists’ attitudes to religious media may also be examined in terms of whether they are themselves religious or work in the religious media: 64%, 62%, and 44% of journalists who defined themselves as religious very much agreed with the existence of religious newspapers, religious radio, and religious TV, respectively, as opposed to 30% and 34% of traditional and non-religious journalists, respectively, on the question of religious newspapers; 30% and 17%, respectively, on religious radio; and 23% and 20%, respectively, on religious TV. In terms of journalists working in a religious media organisation, 84%, 80%, and 52% very much agreed that religious newspapers, religious radio, and religious TV, respectively, were important, in contrast to 34%, 30%, and 25%, respectively, who did not work in a religious media organisation. Similarly, 52% and 51% of journalists who read religious newspapers or listened to religious radio, respectively, saw these religious media as having an important role in contrast to 34% and 33%, respectively, of journalists who did not read religious newspapers and did not listen to religious radio. Has the Haredi Holyland gone digital? While the rest of the Israeli population have gone digital, there is a general trend that the Haredi populations – in 2023, some 10% of Israel’s Jewish population – to be far behind the rest of the country’s population in terms of digitalisation. The major media development which threatened the rabbinical hegemony are computers and the internet (Cohen, 2011, 2013, 2017). In 2000, just a few years after the internet entered Western life, the Haredi rabbinical leadership imposed a prohibition on the internet as a moral threat to the sanctity of Israel. The internet threatened

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 235 the high walls which Haredi rabbis had set up to resist secular cultural influences. The ban followed up on a special Haredi rabbinical court (bet din) established to deal with the spread of computers. In part the ban was directed at children whose religious studies had been distracted with computers, both internet and databases. Gatherings and conferences were held in different Haredi communities in Israel, and abroad, to generate consciousness over the internet “danger.” Elsewhere, there have been instances of so-called modesty squads which demonstrated outside Net cafes used by Haredim to surf. Haredi rabbis have used different tools to deter internet usage and engender fear of its consequences. Haredi anti-internet posters included a cartoon with the snake of the Garden of Eden, which caused Adam to sin, exploding within the computer screen and bringing down the Haredi child. In the Haredi city of Betar, south of Jerusalem, for example, the local rabbinate in 2009 declared that Betar would become the first internet-free city. “The Internet is like a tsunami that threatens to envelop and endanger the entire Haredi community”, the local Betar rabbinate declared (Yerushalayim, 2009; Ba-Kehilla, 2009). Residents who required the internet for business purposes would need to install an internet-restricted connection with a filtering device. Schools in Betar were instructed not to accept children who had unlimited access to the internet. But today even the Betar authorities have not succeeded in practice to fully impose their line. Yet equally, despite rabbinical bans, organised rallies, and other forms of mass persuasion and pressure against computers and the internet – spanning 20 years in a community which generally regards rulings by their rabbis as unquestionable – there is an undoubted trend in an incremental Haredi move towards digitalisation. By 2021, a survey by the Askaria research company, specialising in Haredi society, and itself based in the Haredi town of Bnei Beraq, found that 66% of Haredim were using internet, but only 44% used the internet from their home. Or 22% were doing so outside their house, such a places of work or at Net cafes – all in order not to bring internet into the house (Askaria, 2021). So a third (34%) of Haredim polled did not use internet at all. A 2018 survey of the Israel Internet Society (Israel Internet Survey, 2020) found that 90% of Haredim who did not have an internet connection said this was due to religious reasons. Of the 66% using the internet in the 2021 survey, 81% of these used it for mail, 57% for essential services like banking and health matters (such as sickness funds), 34% for radio and music, 16% for studies, 19% for Torah studies, and 18% for purchases online. The 2021 survey found that of the 66% using the internet, 53% of Haredim used it for news and general information (Askaria, 2021). A 2018 survey broke this down, with news less than a quarter. And news was low in the priorities of Haredim: of those who surfed the Net, 24% visited Haredi websites (like Kikar Shabbat, B’Hadrei Haredim, or Haredim 10) and 17% visited secular news websites (15% used social networks). According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, the 2008–2020 period shows an increase from 28% to 49% of those using the internet. Yet this was far smaller than the non-Haredi population, of which 89% were connected to the internet in 2018. But overall, a massive increase had occurred in the last 15 years. A survey in Israel in 2005 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005) of those without computer or internet found the Haredim to be the largest sector in the population:

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42% of Haredim had no computer at home, in contrast to 29% of the general Israeli population. Of those who possessed computers but were not connected to the internet, 27% were Haredi Jews. Haredim were also less inclined to be heavy internet users. By 2015, 55% of Haredi households in Israel possessed at least one computer (compared to 82% of all Israeli households; 14% of Haredi households had a touchscreen computer/tablet [compared to 41% of all Israeli households], and 1.4% had a videogame console [compared to 15% of all Israeli households]). But an internet connection was far less spread: 31% of Haredi households in Israel were connected to internet in 2015 as compared to 79% of all Israeli households (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015; Cohen, 2021). Haredi women were more inclined to use the computer than Haredi men. A 2016 Central Bureau of Statistics survey found that 56% of Haredi women had used the computer at least once in the past three months compared to 48% of Haredi men. Women (42%) were also more inclined to have surfed the internet at least once in the last three months than men (38%) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Age is also a factor in Haredi usage of the computer and the internet. According to the 2016 survey, 58% of those aged 20–39 had used a computer at least once in the previous three months as compared to 48% of those aged 40–59 and 28% of those aged 60+. In terms of internet usage, a difference may be drawn between those less than 60 and those over 60 in age. Whereas only 23% of 60+ had surfed the internet at least once in the last three months, there was little difference between the 40–59 age group (40%) and the 20–39 age group (43%) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Education and income were also important variables for computer use and internet surfing. In education there was a wide gap between those Haredim who were highly educated and those not. According to the 2016 survey, while 57% of those with 16 years or more of education and 53% of those with 13–15 years of education had used the computer in the last three months, only 29% of those with 1–12 years of education had. There was a similar pattern with internet usage. While 45% of those who had 16+ years of education and 40% with 13–15 years of education had surfed the internet at least once in previous three months, only 24% of those with 1–12 years of education had (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016). In socio-economic terms, there were smaller gaps between high-income and low-income brackets. According to the 2016 survey, 69% of Haredim earning 7,500–10,000 shekels every month, 66% of those earning 4,000–7,500 shekels, and 62% of those earning less than 4000 shekels had used a computer in previous three months. In the 10,000-to-14,000-shekel salary range, 69% of Haredim had surfed the internet at least once in previous three months. A similar pattern was found with internet usage: 48%, 54%, and 50% of those earning less than 4,000 shekels, 4,000–7,500 shekels, and 7,500–10,000 shekels every month, respectively, compared to 69% of those earning 10,000–14,000 shekels monthly, had used the internet at least once in the previous three months (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016) (Cohen, 2017). A useful source for shedding light on this question is the Cahaner 2018 survey of Haredi society in Israel (2020). In addition to surveying Haredi exposure

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 237 to the internet, the same survey examined Haredi exposure to print media and Haredi exposure to radio. The Cahaner survey found that 7% of Haredim surveyed were exposed to secular newspapers or magazines. A comparison is instructive in showing that digitalisation among the Haredim has already far exceeded exposure to the printed and broadcast secular media. This was incrementally less than one of the first surveys of Haredi exposure to mass media carried out in 1995 by the Israeli Advertisers Association, in which 11% of Haredim said they read secular newspapers (Israel Advertisers Association, 1995). Given the need to be informed of changing developments of political or security nature, more Haredim listened to secular radio than read secular newspapers, and 16% listened to secular radio (in addition to Haredi radio). Yet the other side of the penumbra shows that Haredi print media holds a high place in Haredi media patterns: 82% of Haredim read some form of print media, which, therefore, suggests that while Israel’s non-Haredi population have mostly moved into the digital era, that this is not true of the Haredi population. In 2020 the CBS survey found that 32% of Haredim used social networks as opposed to 89% of the nonHaredi population. Fifty-six per cent in the 1995 survey said they did not listen to any radio, and 56% in the 2018 survey said they did not listen to any radio programmes apart from the news. Yet a major difference in the Israeli media market between 1995 and 2018 is that there are today two Haredi radio stations, Radio Kol Chai and Radio Kol Berama. Twenty-six per cent of Haredim in 2018 said they listened to Haredi radio stations. While there was a change in radio listening between those who listen and those who do not, there was considerable change in the case of newspapers. Thus, while in 1995 39% of Haredim said they do not read any newspapers (Israel Advertisers Association, op. cit.), only 18% in 2018 said that they did not have newspapers and magazines in their home. So the internet is used by a considerable body of Haredi Jews today. Yet the cultural walls are healthy: only 12% of those surveyed by the Israel Internet Survey (2020) had internet without filters to control, namely unsupervised. Only 7% were exposed to the secular press, and only 16% were exposed to listen to secular radio. Rather, the inertia and creativity of Haredim in producing news media – Haredi news magazines, Haredi radio stations, and Haredi news websites – all producing copy in accord with halakhic principles, some slightly more restrictive than others – have contributed to maintaining the cultural walls – even if Haredi rabbis themselves are critical of the non-institutional Haredi media. One of the benefits of the Cahaner survey is that this researcher broke down Haredim into four categories: ultra-conservative Haredim, conservative Haredim, near-modern Haredim, and modern Haredim. The last is a recognition of the relatively new modern Haredim, who seek to be closer to modernity, including in academic training, and raise their economic level from sometimes close to poverty (with the wife as the breadwinner and the husband in yeshiva study, for which he is given a stipend) (Brown, 2021; Zicherman & Cahaner, 2012; Zoldan, 2019). Thus Cahaner found that while 7% of ultra-conservative Haredim only follow news

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on Haredi websites, 20%, 28%, and 35% of conservative Haredim, near-modern Haredim, and modern Haredim read news on Haredi websites. And, while only 3% of ultra-Conservative Haredim followed news on non-Haredi news websites, 7%, 22% and 38% of Conservative Haredim, near modern Haredim, and modern Haredim do so. A clue to the changes occurring in the Haredi world was the number of Haredim who were seeking out modernity. Noteworthy is that 28% of Haredim who defined themselves as modern Haredim see secular newspapers, according to the Cahaner survey. This contrasts to 11% of near-modern, 2% of conservative, and 0% of ultraconservative Haredim. A precise picture on the extent of Haredi digitalisation in 2023 remains difficult to obtain because Covid-19 resulted in a further jump of Haredim becoming digitalised because of the difficulties of remaining offline. In the case of the Haredim, the closure of offline synagogue and educational institutions like schools and the yeshiva created an overall needs for information about the disease (Cohen & Spitz, 2022), as well as the value of being linked to computer and in particular the internet. Covid-19 found a considerable increase among Haredim in the use of technology. The Bezeq telecommunications company carried out a survey (Bezeq, 2020) showing an increase in usage of internet during the medical crisis, but the survey is spurious since the survey itself was conducted on the internet, when over 50% of Haredim were not linked up to the internet! A separate survey by this author (Adini, Cohen, & Spitz, 2022) surveyed by telephone Haredim in the city of Bnei Beraq (which is populated entirely by Haredim) and qualified the question to those Haredim who were connected to the internet. It found that of those connected to the internet, 45% of Haredim in the Bnei Beraq survey increased their surfing very considerably, 33% increased theirs a little, and 22% had no change. Also, 22% of Haredi men were more inclined than women (15%) to use Haredi websites, while nearly twice as many Haredi women as men reported the use of secular internet websites as a source of information (13% versus 7%). There are also some interesting and surprising conclusions when the different media channels used by the Haredim in Bnei Beraq Covid-19 study are broken down: the most popular source were the daily institutional Haredi newspapers (32%). This was followed by the Haredi news websites (19%), the Haredi radio stations, Kol Chai and Kol Berama (17%), and independent Haredi weeklies like Mishpacha and BaKehilla (13%). Secular websites were 10% and secular newspapers were 9%. The last two figures show that in a major crisis where the Haredi media failed to have expertise in the former in experience and well-informed medical reporters, readers went over to the secular media for reliable and comprehensive information in the crisis. The overall dominating position of the daily institutional Haredi papers confirms that despite the competition for the independent Haredi media since the 1980s, the institutional daily press remains dominant (Cohen, Adini, & Spitz, 2021). What will the Haredi media map show in years to come? The question has importance given that the Haredim have an important influence in Israeli life – both demographically (today, they account for 10% of the population) and in terms of influence. The question is less about how improved and advanced the mass media map can become but more about to what extent the change threatens the Haredi concept of cultural ghettos as a means of spiritual and cultural self-preservation.

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 239 The Haredi population has been disciplined in controlling their use of the internet. In addition, a third of those connected to the internet, in the Asparia 2021 survey, did not have internet at home but only at work or elsewhere outside the home – more evidence of a disciplined population. Of the 66% of Haredim who, according to the 2021 Asparia survey, had internet connections, 81% had filters which blocked sites problematic to observant Jews, 45% had a high level of control which gave access only to vital sites, 13% had a low level of control, and 12% had regular internet access without a control. All this is also shown in the sites surfed: of the 81% of Haredi internet users with filters, 13% surfed sites suitable for children, 34% for music and radio, and only 6% of the 81% with filters surfed it for films and other forms of entertainment – leading Asparia to conclude Haredi “usage is overall low with a high level of suspect” (Askaria, 2021). Cultural walls and the modern Orthodox

The modern Orthodox community, in seeking to reconcile the religious life and modernity, nevertheless also recognise the value of cultural walls of sorts. Surveyed far less than the Haredi population, an Israel Democracy Institute survey in 2014, comprising 1,000 respondents who defined themselves as modern Orthodox, found that many in this population appeared to impose their own standards regarding media exposure (2014). Nineteen per cent of those questioned had no internet at all. And of the remainder, 17% had a high-level filter, another 9% an average filter, and 9% a low filter. Less than a third – 30% – had unfiltered internet. The community is more introspective regarding television: 31% did not possess even a TV set, 40% watched mostly the news, and 17% watched current affairs. In practice, two-thirds of the modern Orthodox found that television in its various manifestations – mostly entertainment – failed to provide their needs. In addition to 31% not possessing a television, 18% of the population did not read any newspapers (including the Makor Rishon or BaSheva weekly newspapers) and 16% did not listen to the radio. Some may hypothesise that the enstrangement of the modern Orthodox from the media reflects the Hardal substream. Indeed, according to the poll, only 41% of those who defined themselves as Hardal were exposed to the secular media newspapers, radio, and TV, in contrast to 64% who defined themselves as modern Orthodox and 70% who defined themselves as liberal modern Orthodox. But the survey itself found that those who defined themselves as Hardal were much less: only 6% of the community, much smaller than might have been first thought. The low exposure of the modern Orthodox community overall reflects that in practice the modern Orthodox are less fully modern and integrated than their philosophical outlook suggests. It reflects not only the cultural walls à la modernity but also an alienation which some of the modern Orthodox feel towards some state and political institutions for other reasons like the withdrawal from Gush Katif-Gaza in 2014, for example. At the same time, the survey found the two newspapers identified with the community – Makor Rishon and BaSheva – were read only by 9% and

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5% of respondents. In one sense, it confirms that the community see themselves as integral parts of the wider Israeli population. Equally, those seeking to erect cultural walls might look with envy upon the rich variety of media on the Haredi sector – institutional daily newspapers, weekly news magazine, news websites, and radio stations – satisfying the needs of the Haredi population which are characterised by erecting cultural ghetto walls against the influence of the wider society. Gathering the news – Haredi style The right not to know

The function and goal of publishing information – according to the Hofetz Hayim – is to repair the world (tikkun olam). Thus, Leviticus 19:17 reads, “You shall admonish your fellow and do not bear a sin because of him. Do not stand by corruption. Expose it.” But Leviticus 19:16 says, “Don’t be a gossiper among thy people.” It emphasises the religious transgression of social gossip (or loshon hara) discussed in Chapter 8. It equates the spreading of gossip as character assassination. All this raises the following journalistic dilemma: What is a journalist’s motivation in revealing information? Is it to “repair” the world because they believe in the right to know and in the need to, say, expose corruption? Or is it obtaining a scoop: impressing the audience, the editors, and the proprietor? According to Israel Cohen, a political commentator of the Haredi website Kikar Shabbat, All the time I wrestle with myself if what I say about the Hofetz Hayim is not loshon hara, if the publicity will be helpful, if I should say “Beware he is a robber,” “he is a rapist . . .” It is difficult to know what influences you at any moment – a person is motivated from different directions: self-interest, a desire to improve the world, ideology, financial interest, an interest to be the first in the news, respect, status, his boss’s satisfaction. Everything is difficult to separate at any one moment. “Sexual matters or if a person beats his wife, we want to print it – in particular somebody known in public. But there is a hesitation that this should not enter the Jewish home. It was not known to everybody,” added the columnist Israel Cohen. The transgression of loshon hara clashes with the raison d’etre of the modern media because according to its very definition the publication of any new information not generally known is a transgression (Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Erakhin page 16a), but anything old is not news. Moreover, as one Hamodia editor put it, This week the mayor of the Israeli city of Hadera was arrested. We did not publish a word, not because he was Haredi. He was not Haredi. He was secular. Why? Because Hamodia educates about religious law, including the prohibition of social gossip, or loshon hora. And because most people already knew about it, therefore, there was no possibility of loshon hora if

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 241 we published it, according to the narrow definition in Jewish law: if three or more people knew about a certain information, it was no longer loshon hara. But our role as Jewish educators in educating about the law of loshon hara suggested this would serve as a useful means. So the overwhelming criterion in defining “news” being new was achieved – not of loshon hara – but simply teaching about it! This is the difference between the institutional Haredi dailies, on the one hand, and the independent commercial Haredi magazines and websites and radio stations, on the other hand, where loshon hara is obeyed according to the law but not beyond. “Indeed, as an editor of an independent news magazine, I sometimes receive permission from the rabbis as it won’t be constructive if we decide not to publish even if a public figure has erred, as he needs to know that he cannot do anything he wants. But already there is a need to know how to write it.” In understanding the concept of “the right not to know,” what are the lines? It is simplistic to draw a line between the daily institutional newspapers and the independent Haredi media because there is also a difference between the Haredi websites and, say, magazines, with the latter more centrist and conservative than the websites. Following the biblical command to “remove the evil from your midst” (Deuteronomy 21:21), the institutional Haredi dailies do not as a rule report murder or suicide. “It is not our lifestyle. It is not educational. We don’t see bad or negative news as a key category in news selection. If it is such a major news event like murder or terrorism like that of the murder of the Prime Minister (Itzhak Rabin, in 1995) then we cannot ignore it,” said the editor of an institutional Haredi daily newspaper. “We are the only ones who do not write about transgressions of rabbis at all. After all, they are figureheads for the child to look to and imitate. We don’t feel pressure that because the names of the arrested or of criminals are published or known in the secular websites, that we also need to publish it,” the editor added. The Haredi news websites refer to trials but will not give names of those on trial until they are sentenced, in accordance with the rules of loshon hora. Moreover, things which are considered inappropriate are not called by their names in some of the institutional dailies. In Hamodia, a forbidden thing is not called by its name – pork, internet, suicide, murder – but referred to as “another thing.” “If I do need to refer to something, I would prefer not to even point at it or give it legitimacy. We try to use ‘clean language.’ Thus, we don’t use terms like ‘rape’ or ‘sexual abuse.’ Rather ‘abuse’ is sometimes prefaced with the words from the Bible,” said a Hamodia editor. An overwhelming issue concerns pictures of women for reasons of modesty. The Haredi media do not publish these; indeed, a Haredi paper or magazine which crosses the line would find itself estranged from its readers. The Haredi internet, however, has been the first of all the Haredi media to begin to reconsider. Thus, one Haredi website does publish portraits of women photos but places beforehand a warning label to inform the uninterested surfer not to read further unless they are willing to be exposed to women’s photos. Indeed, the principle of modesty in the

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Haredi media is not limited to the absence of photos in print media, but even inside the newsroom, there is separation – few reporters are women, but some feature magazine writers are, and in the case of institutional daily newspapers, they do not sign their first names in order to avoid “over-acquaintance.” Related to this are women’s voices. Haredim do not listen to women singers, not even recordings. Furthermore, one Haredi radio station, Radio Kol Berama, did not even have women announcers. But the matter was taken up by the station’s supervising public body, the Second Television and Radio Authority, and by the courts, which found that the station discriminated against women and fined the radio station one million shekels. This was despite that Haredi women listeners themselves are inclined to favour the non-appearance of women (Cohen, 2019), in accordance with Haredi strictures, in the name of modesty. Photos in institutional Haredi daily newspapers are subject to editorial criteria in Haredi daily newspapers. Some rabbis view publicity itself, expressed in one’s photo in a paper, as undesirable. Indeed, the ethical motive of modesty would confirm this. Haredi dailies are inclined to allow the spiritual standing of the person to determine the size his picture receives in print; thus, a picture of important rabbis would justify a bigger picture, while photos of a politician would be reduced in size. The censor

Nearly all Haredi media have censors to check copy – both editorial and advertising. In editorial terms, there are certain “messages” which a Haredi newspaper prefers not to give out. For example, differences and disagreements between rabbis challenge the rabbi’s public stature. The usage of certain motifs – for example, a yeshiva student who goes to work instead of Torah learning in a yeshiva. Hamodia’s Haim Gestetner, said, Our newspaper should be clean not just in terms of narrow Jewish law but also not provocative. The speech of a politician may require to have some changes in the news report, e.g. because is not suitable for us. We are critical of what we print. Readers want the paper that comes to their house to be clean. Rabbi Eliahu Gut of Mishpacha magazine said, In advertisements, an internet address should be excluded – because internet is forbidden, and advertising copy with it is subject to change by our editors. A shop open during the intermediate days of a religious festival – when except for food needs should be closed according to a strict religious legal interpretation. After negotiations between the news organisation and the shop the furniture store extended the discount a couple of days before and after the religious holiday, so the advert was not specifically a sale during the religious holiday.

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 243 The existence of the censorship system is intentionally transparent for readers – and features on the editorial masthead – including an address for readers to address complaints. It is important for the average Haredi who chooses this sheltered way of life to know that the medium has been censored. Above the censors who read the copy daily is an editor whose functions including coordinating with a committee of rabbis. Rabbi Gut, who is coordinator of Mishpacha magazine’s rabbinical advisory board said, “I am the link man to the rabbis.” Gut, who himself has rabbinical ordination, also said, “From my experience I know what to do, who to speak to. I know how to speak to advertisers when necessary.” When there is a problem, I go to rabbis – rabbis of a high calibre such as heads of yeshivot, and known to the public – who sit on our rabbinical advisory board. These include three rabbis who represent different Haredi substreams – Rabbi Naftali Nusbaum, rosh yeshiva and dayan, representing Hassidic Gur, a sensitive person; Rabbi Aryeh Dvir Dayan in the beth din (religious law court) of Rav Nissim Karlitz, who heads the Haredi Beth Din of Bnei Beraq (until his death in 2019); and Rabbi Michael Stern, of Habad (and brother-in-law of the venerated sage Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). An American-born rabbi, Rabbi Asher Weiss, is de facto head of the magazine’s spiritual committee. I meet with him every couple of months with a list of questions. He added, I met even with the late Rav Yehuda Shteinman, who was the leader of the Lithuanian wing of Haredim – even telephoned him. You need to present the question in the proper way, “a religious way” – to possess wise judgement to give the pluses and minuses to a question. And then you receive the answer. The censorship criteria are attuned. There are different nuances for different Haredim. Thus, non-Hassidic Haredim, or Lithuanians, who emphasise religious study above all else, are more sensitive to work employment messages than, say, the Hassidim and Haredi Sephardim. As a result, a Haredi news organisation not identified with a particular strand will necessarily have on its advisory board rabbis from each strand. “Every news organisation has its cultural languages, its rabbis. So if not writing about something for online Haredi audiences but writing with another requires a balancing act to suit all,” Gut said. “In Mishpacha – which goes to the houses of all branches of Haredim – Hassidim, Lithuanians – there is sometimes a need to do a balancing trick,” he added. There are subjects which cannot be avoided, like the religious question of ascending the Temple Mount which are subject to different opinions. “To attack or not to attack those who ascend? So Rav Weiss: Don’t ask me. I rely on you. You have experience how to,” said Gut. A glaring example of the difference within the Haredi sector is sexual harassment of children within the family. Some Haredi papers will not touch the subject.

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Other papers do not simply rely on parents but see it as a mission to write on it. But on the other hand, children see it, and we do not want parents to say that you cannot bring the magazine with the house. A lot has to do with timing. If something has been in the news, this is not the time to publish, but to publish later as an educational lesson. There is a need to take care how to write it. What is news for Haredim?

News for the Haredi community is different from the general or secular Israeli media. News is not something “new.” “We are not ‘modern,’” said one Haredi newspaper editor. “We are committed to our rabbis, and there is a particular style for covering events. What does interest in the Haredim – anything to do the Haredim. Many questions involve Haredi relations with the state, such as governmental policy on conversion to Judaism and army recruitment of the Haredim and public demonstrations by gays,” said a Haredi website columnist. “What I cover is what people see as a problem. Bad news is breaching Judaism: lack of public Sabbath observance, public transport on the holy day, and issues of kashrut observance. These are notable problems for Jews abroad in the diaspora.” Rabbis

One of the most popular items are articles and profiles of rabbis – who are regarded as role models, renowned for their religious learning. The opportunity for the reader to hear directly the views of admorim on a subject in the Haredi public agenda – there is no other opportunity than say a magazine interview or profile. Interest in rabbis is not broken down by religious stream; for example, a nonHassidic or Lithuanian Haredi would be interested to read about an admor (head of a Hassidic court), and a Hassid would be interested to read about a Lithuanian rosh yeshiva (head of a yeshiva). And a Sephardi Haredi would be interested to read about an Ashkenazi rabbi, and vice versa. One Haredi editor remarked, Most interest is in the admorim, who generate a certain mystique, and after them is the rosh yeshiva (rabbinical head of a yeshiva), and then the leading religious sages, and then the state chief rabbis, and finally rabbis in key institutions or holding important posts. For the institutional Haredi dailies, interest is in the rabbis who hold formal posts in the Haredi stream, which the newspaper presents. In the independent Haredi weeklies, there is a genuine reader interest and curiosity in the lives of the heads of Hassidic courts, the admorim. but profiles of rabbis are not easy to produce since admorim and some yeshiva heads (roshei yeshivot) do not as a rule give interviews. It is possible to interview members of their families or attendants in the court. A journalist who is affiliated with a certain group, such as one who is also a Ger Hassid, would be able to share memories. There is interest in new admorim and in new

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 245 rabbis, including about their background and their history, and other key rabbis, about where they live, where they were born, and their virtues and values for which they are known. Photos of rabbis carrying our religious ceremonies like shaking the palm branch on the Sukkot festival or lighting the candelabra of Hanukah. Death of rabbis

Readers are interested in rabbis who have died, including how they died. People are very interested in a rabbi’s death – as well as his life and biography, arousing feelings of loss and collective mourning. “We don’t prepare anything – no obituary files – about the rabbi until he has died, even if he is very sick, in order not to add to it.” The death itself is covered by the Haredi daily, so is the day after the funeral, with reporting of the funeral and the hespedim (memorial addresses delivered at the cemetery prior to the burial ceremony). If a very important Haredi rabbi died, then on the 30th day after death, 12 months later on yahrzeit, or the anniversary of the day of a person’s passing, reports and features are published. The reporter assigned to cover a rabbi’s death will not spend valuable time in going to the funeral itself but will rely on others at the funeral, to enable him to use the time to prepare a long and detailed report and appreciation. “If it is a rabbi who is a member of the umbrella Council of Torah Sages, the death will have a page 1 headline. If he is important, like a rosh yeshiva, a head of a yeshiva, we will write about him with honour and respect,” said an editor. Religious holydays

Another story with a high level of news interest is the rich cycle of religious festivals and fasts in Judaism, an opportunity for the Haredi media to project the spiritual significance of the day. The religious media gives a considerable attention to the religious aspects of a holyday. Religious ritual – including the symbols associated with religious holydays as central elements of collective memory – is a basic feature of contemporary religious identity. While it is true that religious people draw their fundamental religious identity through formal frameworks – such as religious schools, higher academic religious seminaries, and places of worship – nevertheless, mass media serves as a secondary factor or religious experience even for these. A content analysis of holyday coverage October 2009–September 2010 in the religious press (Haredi press and modern religious press combined), comprising 2,525 items on holydays, was carried out (Cohen, 2018). Passover (Pesach) and Tabernacles (Sukkoth) festivals each have the biggest allotments. In contrast, the space for the Yom Kippur 24-hour fast is smallest – reflecting that people are at prayer and the synagogue the entire daytime – with little time for recreational newspaper reading. In the coverage of religious holydays, the Haredi press provides a more ideologically oriented coverage with a self-defined mandate to educate rather than simply inform. For the high holydays, there are feature articles about synagogue cantors or different versions of penitential prayers in different

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Jewish communities – reminders for the faithful about devotion in prayers. There may be details of the admor, or Hasidic spiritual head; or of a holyday prayer book, the mahzor, written on packet paper; or of the cruel conditions of the concentration camps; or of high holyday services at, say, a secular kibbutz – a hint of the Haredi view of bearing a social responsibility for the spiritual well-being of the broader secular population. The Passover (Pesach) issue has a charity dimension, like a story of distributing parcels to orphans and widows, the historical background of the slavery of Israelites in Egypt, or a timely article on relations between employers and employees. Marking the giving of the Decalogue, or Ten Commandments, at Mount Sinai, Pentecost or the Feast of Weeks (Shavuot) is a time for Torah study – offering the Haredi media time to reflect on religious education, educational institutions like the yeshiva, and ways of study. The book of Ruth – the story of Ruth the Moabite – is read on the holyday, so there may be an article on converts to Judaism. Hanukah is associated with education for children: that the real strength, bravery, and valour of the Maccabees was that they withstood the “evil inclination” or temptation of Western culture and materialism. Hanukah – celebrating the miracle of oil – is also time for reflection about the meaning of miracles. Purim may be a holyday of rejoicing with fancy dress – but there is also a moral message: to rejoice in a manner which accordance with religious standards like modesty – and a lesson about how not to celebrate. In the period examined, an article on the places of burial of Mordechai and Esther in the city of Madras in Iran drew readers’ interest. The New Year of Trees, Tu B’Shvat, has a hidden message for teaching about kashrut and ensuring, for example, that there are no forbidden substances, such as bugs and insects in fruits and vegetables. The Haredi media and other Jewish religious streams and non-Jewish religions

Although the focus of the Haredi media is upon their own community, there is interest, particularly in the independent Haredi media, about the modern Orthodox stream of Judaism. All this despite the ideological differences which separate the two branches of Orthodoxy – the modern Jews acknowledge, first, that the modern state of Israel reflects a belief that the age of the Jewish Messianic era has begun and, second, that there is no implicit conflict between Torah and modernity. “We have many surfers who are modern Orthodox and they want to read news about their community,” said a Haredi website journalist (interview, BHadrei Haredim, 2019). Yet this is not to say that the Haredi media are not critical of the modern Orthodox or that modern Orthodoxy’s proximity to modernity, including the army and academia, works. The rabbis of the modern Orthodox movement are no less accessible than Haredi rabbis to Haredi reporters, if not even more given the overall tendency of many Haredi rabbis themselves not to maintain regular ties even with Haredi journalists. There is also coverage of the Chief Rabbinate, comprising two chief rabbis – one for the Ashkenazi, or European Jewish community, and one for the Sephardi, or Oriental Jewish community. All this – the intimate world with Haredi rabbis

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 247 and the Council of Torah Sages – contrasts with relations between reporters of the Haredi media and the Chief Rabbinate. The Chief Rabbinate, like the Ministry of Religious Services and the religious court system, has a formal PR structure comprising a spokesperson, who is accessible and responds to any questions from Haredim. This is despite the fact that the Chief Rabbinate was originally a creation of the modern Orthodox leadership. More recently, Haredim have sought to influence the appointees – even though Haredim have their own rabbinical leaders. The chief rabbi often shares similar positions to those held by Haredi rabbis and therefore also get reported. But this is mostly limited to issues of common interest, like struggles against governmental actions which are perceived as anathema to ultra-Orthodoxy. “We have no interest in our paper to ask what the views of the Chief Rabbinate are. But we do have an interest where the chief rabbi has spoken out on issues important to us,” remarked a Haredi newspaper editor. The non-Orthodox Jews – Conservative and Reform Jews – are beyond the coverage of the Haredi media. They are covered more by a Haredi news organisation’s political reporter than, say, a religion reporter, and the focus is exclusively on the non-Orthodox’s battle to obtain such rights as recognition of their conversion, and Haredi reactions to the demands for prayer rights at the Western Wall, in accordance with their prayer traditions, as well as state budgeting, which is given to the Orthodox. The Haredi, media to all intents and purposes, mostly ignore the non-Jewish religions. Exceptions may be very spontaneous reports like Vatican-Israeli relations. News sources

The Haredi rabbinic leadership are increasingly receptive today to speak to the Haredi media than they were before. A newspaper editor said, They understand that if they do not cooperate, the media will write and report about them without them, and the result will be that the Haredi view does not get out. The rabbis understood that if they need something to reach their public that it has to come via the ultra-Orthodox media, they today see the newspaper as their mouthpiece. We know that this is our role. For this reason we exist. A rabbi who wants to publish something about halakha must add his name. We will not publish it anonymously or only with an initial. Also, some of wall poster announcements (pashkeviliim), which for decades hung in Haredi streets, are platforms for announcing council decisions. Rabbi Leib Yehuda Shteinman, leader of Lithuanian Jewry, was adamant that it was not the role of the rabbi to leave the world of Torah and Torah learning in order to meet journalists as a matter of honour. But this varies in practice. So while the Gur rebbe, an admor, or the Vishnitz rebbe, also an admor, have never given a press interview, some rabbis, like the head of Chabad, do. Chabad are increasingly accessible. Rather rabbis speak their minds at public assemblies or prayer rallies with their followers, and their comments are reported. At best, an admor or rosh yeshiva will be interviewed for a magazine or the newspaper’s magazine, not on

248 Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century political matters but about matters of education or even issues about synagogue and state or about the internet or unkosher phones (phones which have internet connection, which are forbidden by their rabbis). On a day-to-day basis, a key contact for Haredi journalists are the Knesset members of Haredi political parties, like Degel Hatorah, Agudat Israel, and Shas, who are in touch with the rabbinical heads or their assistants and vote or give expression to rabbinical thinking and reactions to events. Most senior rabbis have a press aide – like the journalist Shlomo Kook, today editor of the BaKehilla magazine, who spoke for Rabbi Elyashiv, or Benny Rabinowitz, a journalist from Yated Neeman, the Lithuanian Haredi daily newspaper, who spoke for Rabbi Shteinman. One of the sources for reporters in the Haredi media are three councils of rabbis which dominate Haredi society in Israel: the Council of Torah Sages of Degel Torah (Lithuanian), the Council of Torah Sages of Agudat Israel (Hassidic), the Council of Torah Sages of Shas (Sephardi). The first comprises the most senior rabbis in the European Jewry identified with the Lithuanian branch of Haredim, the second comprises those identified with European Hassidic leaders, and the third comprises those identified with the Sephardic or Oriental Haredi Jewry. Each council discusses issues which come up regarding governmental decisions and policies affecting the Haredi community. They include, for example, the question of recruitment of yeshiva students to the armed forces, government budgeting for the yeshivot, and Sabbath observance in the public sector. “The council meetings are completely closed. Nobody knows what goes on,” remarked a reporter. Very rarely there may be a joint meeting of the three councils together, such as to develop a common line or strengthen their case by speaking as a united body. The secretary of each of the three councils, himself a rabbi, is responsible for drawing up the itinerary of council meetings and responsible for bringing council members together. “Formally,” said one Haredi newspaper editor, “the council’s secretary does not deal with the media per se but deals with internal matters in the council, coordinates between the various admorim or rabbis, organises the meetings, stylises the decisions of the meeting, and advises them what to publish and what not to publish.” But in practice, he is also the individual who briefs reporters after a council meeting. They are like a press briefing, with both-on-the record statements but also background off record. As a Hamodia editor said, “Nobody participates in the meeting except those [rabbis] invited.” After all, this is not a government meeting in which each minister has an agenda to advance against the other. All the rabbis or admorim have one common goal – to strengthen Torah and religion. As the Hofetz Hayim said, “It is forbidden for somebody to leave the meeting and say ‘I supported you.’” Formally, the council member rabbis do not grant interviews or speak to journalists because their life is full of Torah. According to a Hamevaser daily reporter who covers religion, “It is not accepted to ask one of the admorim or roshei yeshivot what was said in the closed doors meeting. “If he does not say something to me, the sage has the channels to reach me.” “But”, said one editor, “this almost never happens,” said one journalist. In practice, from time to time, a senior rabbinical figure in a committee will “conveniently” still be in the hall well after the meeting itself closes, when journalists are congregating and as the council’s secretary briefs the media.

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 249 Ruling the Haredi PR highway – the case of Rabbi Aaron Yehuda Leib Shteinman

In understanding the central role which a Haredi rabbi fulfils in the flow of information to his flock, it is instructive to examine the case of Rabbi Shteinman. Until his death in 2017, Aaron Yehuda Leib Shteinman was a very senior figure in Lithuanian Haredi Jewry, and since the turn of the century, he had been regarded as its head, following the death of his predecessor Rabbi Shalom Elyashiv. A member of the Council of Torah Sages, Shteinman, an educationalist, was also head of a branch of the Ponevezh yeshiva. The Lithuanian Jews, non-Hassidic Haredim, are arguably more single focused on study of the Talmud. Like other Haredi branches, Haredi Lithuanians have their own newspaper, Yated Neeman. It was established in 1985 after one of Shteinman’s predecessors argued that Hamodia, then the only Haredi daily, failed to give adequate coverage to the Lithuanian view but instead gave preference to the Hassidic view. Yated’s editor, Rabbi Israel Friedman, was a daily visitor to Shteinman’s house, where he was exposed to the thinking and utterances of Shteinman and ensured these got expression in the paper. Individual reporters on the paper working on, say, a major or controversial piece sometimes consulted with Shteinman. Like other Haredi rabbis, Shteinman never gave a formal interview to a journalist – even to the party organ Yated Neeman. This style in the flow of information from the Haredi rabbinical leadership to their flock was not so different from the post-independent 1948 period when one Rabbi Moshe Shinfeld an ideologue, met key non Hassidic Haredi or Lithuanian sages like the Hazon Ish, the Brisker Rebbe, and others, and conveyed their thinking through his columns in Hamodia. But Shteinman was equally aware of the reality that the independent Haredi media could not be ignored as the Haredi media map changed – by 2023, there was the growth of independent news weeklies, two independent radio stations, and the news websites, which by definition infringed the Haredi ban on internet. To ensure that others who may have sought to speak in the name of Shteinman and the Lithuanian leadership, Benny Rabinowitz – a former spokesman of the Haredi political party, Degel Hatorah, identified with Lithuanian Jewry, as well as a Yated Neeman journalist – was appointed in 2013 to be Shteinman’s spokesman. In addition to press releases, he also gave briefings both to the Haredi media but also beyond – to the secular Israeli media including the religion affairs reporters. In one unique case, Rabinowitz bowed to a request from the country’s Second TV channel in Israel to allow a cameraman to film a day in the life of Shteinman. This certainly contradicted the Haredi ban on watching television, which was regarded as anathema. After weighing the pluses and minuses of the request, Rabinowitz agreed to the Channel 2 request, seeing it as an opportunity to improve the problematic image in which Haredim were held among the Israeli public and humanise Shteinman’s image. The film was far less relevant for his own flock, given they do not watch television. Thus, it showed Shteinman waking up in the morning, washing hands (a religious mitzva, or command, after sleep), beginning his day,

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including putting on the phylacteries (or tefillin) required for males at the daily morning prayer service, and later on greeting Haredi school children who had come to his house to greet the sage and be blessed. The logistical problems of television cameras invading the rabbi’s privacy was overcome when the spokesman himself took some of the pictures. A ground-shaking event occurred inside the Lithuanian Haredi community when the community split in 2012 and the so-called Jerusalem action under Rabbi Shmuel Auerbach broke away, partly over Shteinman’s stance regarding whether Haredi men should do national service or not, which is compulsory in Israel. Shteinman hailed from the so-called Brisk school of Lithuanian Haredim – known for their strictness in matters of Jewish religious law. Highly principled, he nevertheless recognised that sitting in yeshivas for, say, 12 hours a day learning the Talmud was not suitable for every Haredi man, and he suggested that those unable to should do national service. In contrast, Auerbach was against army service in principle. The army life was unsuitable for the strict religious Haredi style of life characterised by social withdrawal. While he did not say so formally, Shteinman was understood to favour Haredi men serving in the special so-called Haredi Nahal army battalion where stricter religious rules were obeyed – like having no female commanders or having more time for prayer – and there was even time set aside for Jewish religious study, as well the stricter kashrut food standards identified with the Haredim. As the division between the Shteinman camp and Auerbach’s Jerusalem faction widened, there was a need for active public relations work. Indeed, against the background of sometimes violent demonstrations by the Jerusalem faction – on the national service issue but also spreading out to other issues like public transportation on the Sabbath – Shteinman saw a need to correct this image and thus initiated, for example, a mass peaceful prayer meeting. Over half a million Lithuanian Haredim participated in a sports stadium. Indeed, the media image of Shteinman is “moderate” – as constructed in the secular media in the context. Shteinman’s own exposure to media was limited to his daily reading of Yated Neeman and Hamodia. Not only did he not watch television, but he also did not listen to radio. Yet Shteinman was up-to-date and knew about such religion-state issues important to the Haredi agenda – like religion conversions, the problems of immigration of Russians whose Jewishness was questionable, Haredi educational institutions, kashrut, and Haredi demands for a higher level of kashrut than the state kashrut bodies offered, and even such wider questions as housing policy for the ever-expanding Haredi populations characterised by large families. But aides and family members around him followed the independent Haredi media. Yet whether this exposure had any impact on Shteinman is questionable because by nature, as a senior rabbi, he was au fait with these matters even before they were printed. In addition to being kept up-to-date by those around him, he was also regularly briefed by Haredi Knesset members, from the Degel Torah political party, who sought Shteinman’s instruction on how to vote in the Knesset on key legislation.

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 251 B’Hadrei Haredim: a case study in a Haredi news website

In contrast to the institutional Haredi daily newspapers, it is instructive to take the case of B’Hadrei Haredim. When B’Hadrei Haredim was established as a forum, Hyde Park, it later, in 2007, developed into a news website, becoming one of Israel’s two main Haredi news websites, together with Kikar Shabbat. Moreover, it is an example of what digital Haredi news websites will be like in the future. The structure of B’Hadrei Haredim’s newsroom, there are some dozen reporters – a political reporter, a reporter on rabbis and admorim, a municipality reporter for Jerusalem and for Bnei Beraq, a justice or legal affairs reporter, a crime reporter, a foreign affairs reporter (covering also Jewish communities abroad), a music reporter, a woman reporter covering female-related matters. The website has three desk reporters who carry out three shifts: 7:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m. What is the interest for B’Hadrei Haredim of having a full-time reporter covering Haredi rabbis? Rabbinical figures and admorim are centrepieces for most Haredi households – the stars of the Haredi, the symbol, and the image. So, his death is a major news event – Who was he? Where was the rabbi born? Where he lived? His attributes? B’Hadrei Haredim is the only Haredi news organisation with a crime reporter. This is surprising since the institutional Haredi dailies, for example, deliberately ignore crime reports. But the Haredi Haredim editors argued that people need to know – if only for their personal safety – about a criminal. Yet even the website is cautious not to publish the name of a person arrested until he is found guilty in order not to commit the transgression of loshon hara. The website also decided to report on sex criminals – something not done elsewhere in the Haredi media marketplace, if only to protect the community. “Our editor-in-chief consulted a rabbi, who said that in the age of internet Haredi people will be hurt. We warn our surfers in order to know. The rabbi gave specific instructions how to report, and how to cover. No need to go into details of how somebody was sexually attacked, and not to use the word ‘rape.’” What characterises the content of B’Hadrei Haredim’s operation as distinct from other websites? The analysis of B’Hadrei Haredim (in Chapter 3), together with the three other websites – Haaretz online, Arutz 7, and Y-Net – found a significant difference between the four websites in covering the group category of rabbi, admor, dayan (religious court judge), rosh yeshiva (rabbi who heads a yeshiva), bet din (religious court), and posek in halakha (a rabbi who makes Jewish legal decisions) accounted for 14.9% of B’Hadrei Haredim’s total coverage. It contrasted with only 7.4% (Y-Net), 7.1% (Arutz 7), and 4.3% (Haaretz online). In other categories there was less significant difference between B’Hadrei Haredim and the other three websites. The other categories where B’Hadrei Haredim outshone the other three websites (Haaretz online, Arutz 7, and Y-Net) were chief rabbis and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, at 6.00% in contrast to 5.8%, 2.3%, and 2.3% for Arutz 7, Y-Net , and Haaretz online, respectively. In other areas, including Jewish

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life-cycle events, conversion, synagogue, religious holydays, and fasts and Jerusalem, Western Wall, and Temple Mount, and B’Hadrei Haredim were not dissimilar from the other three websites. B’Hadrei Haredim has had a string of owners over the years. The website’s reputation soured and has been tarnished since 2010. One owner, Guy Cohen, was found guilty of corruption in which leading figures in the Haredi world were blackmailed and threatened with receiving bad publicity if they did not pay the website protection money. Individuals were asked to buy “an all embracing advertising deal, in which the person would get permanent cover from any reporters which are negative to them” (Tucker, 2017). Thus, the website’s forum wrote that a member of the Haredi community met a girl in his room at a weekend family celebration. For example, a Haredi businessman, Yanki Berger, was invited to a meeting with the website director in which he was told of a “VIP club” and “if I want to enter it, the payment would be 10,000 dollars a month. He promised that I ‘could sleep well that my name would not appear’ (Globus 5 April 2012). He even promised to publish positive items about me.” Other Haredi personalities threatened included Dubi Zilberschlag, a former journalist, who was set up with an escort girl going to her room, and Rabbi Isaiah Pinto. The Israeli police recommended to close the website. In another instance, one Shas Haredi MK, Eli Yishai, was given positive publicity in contrast to another Shas MK, Aryeh Deri. The site was even the subject of a court case, when the site’s political reporter, Sari Roth, unsuccessfully took the website’s owner to court for unfair dismissal and charged the website of un-journalistic interests to support or to attack politicians. (After also being fired from the website, David Rottenberg, who had been chief editor of the website, and his wife, Sari Roth, set up a rival news website, Haredim 10.) Educational policy Limiting media access for children and youth – indeed also for adults – is an integral element of the Haredi “cultural walls” strategy. Haredi and Hardalim have favoured it for both religious and educational reasons, and to a lesser extent mainstream modern Orthodox and Conservative, and less the Reform. But traditional and secular also favour it for educational reasons. But whether it is appropriate and implementable in an age characterised by intensive media flows is questionable: 47% and 34% of all rabbis did favour a great deal or a very great deal special magazines and religious programmes for children. And Orthodox rabbis were inclined to favour them a very great extent – 52% of Haredi, 57% of Hardal, and 49% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis – as compared to 23% of Reform and 36% of Conservative rabbis. Yet even 58% of Reform and 44% of Conservative rabbis favoured to a great extent. In terms of countries of birth – Israel, Anglo-Saxon, Eastern European, and Arab Middle East – there was little difference in those who favoured special media for children to a great deal or to a very great deal. Thirty-five per cent of Eastern European rabbis favour them a very great deal the most and Arab rabbis

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 253 the least (35%). The last was more inclined than the other three country groupings to respond “not at all.” Little significant difference was found between older and younger rabbis on children’s media. Sixty-seven per cent of all rabbis saw the need to limit children’s access to the internet as very important (20% to some degree), 77% for television (11% to some extent), 60% for newspapers, and 38% for radio. The need to control children’s access to television was higher than that for radio. Internet

Regarding limiting children’s access to the internet, it is instructive to both examine rabbi’s attitudes and those of the Israeli public. Orthodox rabbis overwhelmingly favoured limiting access. Eighty-four per cent of Haredi rabbis agreed to a very great extent, and 2% were inclined to agree. Eighty-eight per cent of Hardal rabbis agreed to a very great extent (and 7% were inclined to). Seventy-six per cent of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis agreed to a very great extent (and 17% were inclined to). Forty-six per cent of Conservative rabbis agreed to a very great extent and 21% were inclined to. Twenty-nine per cent of Reform rabbis agreed to a very great extent (and 54% were inclined to). Broken down by occupation, 89% of teacher-rabbis agreed to a very great extent on the need to control children’s access to the internet, and 83% of community rabbis did so. In terms of where the rabbi was born, there were differences: 82% of rabbis born in Israel agreed to a very great extent, and 9% were inclined to, in contrast to 60% and 19% of rabbis born in Western countries, respectively; 46% and 39% of rabbis born in Eastern European countries, respectively; and 73% and 9% of rabbis born in Arab countries, respectively. No significant difference was found in terms of age. But what did the Israeli Jewish public think about controlling access for children to the internet? Eighty-nine per cent of the Jewish public thought so to a great extent or were inclined to, 4% had no view, and 10% did not agree at all or only to a small extent. There was a clear difference between those in the Jewish public who had a filter on the computer or not. Of those who had a filter, 88% much agreed, and 7% were inclined, whereas of those without a filter, 45% much agreed and 35% were inclined to. Broken down by religious stream, the Haredi public were most insistent in controlling children’s access to the internet, and the modern Orthodox public (combined) were close to them. The non-Orthodox (Reform and Conservative) public, traditional public, and secular public also agreed very much or much but a little less than the modern Orthodox. Ninety-nine per cent, 94%, 95%, and 91% of non-Hassidic Haredim, Hassidic Haredim, Hardal, and mainstream modern Orthodox Jews agreed very much or much of the need to control access to the internet. So did all other sections of the religious public: 83%, 68%, and 60% of traditional, Reform, and Conservative, respectively, said so. Indeed, the secular public favoured it even more: 80% of the secular non-atheists and 70% of the secular atheists, respectively, said so.

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In terms of age groups of the Israeli Jewish public, younger persons were more inclined to favour limiting children’s access: 80% of those aged 20–35 agreed very much and 14% were inclined to, 57% of those aged 35–50 agreed very much and 22% were inclined to, 37% of those aged 51–65 much agreed and 40% were inclined to, and 39% of those aged 66+ agreed very much and 37% inclined to. Females were more inclined to agree than males: 69% of females much agreed and 20% were inclined to, but 57% of males very much agreed to and 26% were inclined to. There was, therefore, overall agreement between the rabbis and the Israeli public regarding a need to limit children’s access to the internet. Schools and yeshivot and new media technology

What is the policy of religious schools regarding laptops and mobile phones in educational institutions? A clear distinction may be drawn between schools, on the one hand, and the yeshivot or higher Torah academic institutions of learning, on the other. The former ranges from Haredi schools to modern Orthodox schools. Haredi schools seek to influence beyond the school the mere possession by school children of mobile technology whereas modern Orthodox schools are focused upon whether mobile technology should be brought to school or not. The Haredi outlook ranges from Haredi high schools, which do not currently allow any children to own a mobile phone – except with the permission of parents – to others which prohibit school children from possessing one and bringing it to school. One Haredi girls’ school in the port city of Haifa, for example, which used to require their girls not to have mobile phones, has since relented to accept the reality that this is a goal no longer implementable today. Instead, the Haredi school insists that it should not be brought into school; if it is brought, the child is required to bring a note from her parents, and the phone must be left with the school secretary until the child leaves at the end of the day. The child cannot be fully immersed in their studies if she knows there are other things going on. Among the modern Orthodox, the policies extend from the Hardal stricter form to a liberal Orthodox school approach. Policy at the Pelech School for Girls in Jerusalem, a broadly liberal school, is made by the school, but attempts to win the understanding of parents – including installing filtering programmes like Rimon or Etrog – are undertaken. The former distinguishes between the smartphone which a child at home ought not to possess and the simplest “kosher mobile phone,” which has no internet connection. “I tell students there is nothing for them to search on Facebook. You cannot advance spiritually,” said one teacher. According to a 2018 digital survey by the Israeli telecommunications company, Bezek, 43% of all parents do not limit the time for children in front of the computers, 8% to 3–5 hours, and 36% to 2 hours. Thirteen per cent of parents do not allow their children to go on the computer (Bezeq, 2018). A 2011 survey of modern Orthodox families had filters. Forty-eight per cent of parents controlled this, and 35% controlled access of the sites themselves. A difference was found in regard to possessing a filter between Hardal and mainline modern Orthodox. Seventy-two

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 255 per cent of Hardal homes had filters, in contrast to only 28% of mainstream modern Orthodox. There was much less difference between the two groups regarding parental control on either times for accessing or sites being accessed (Maaleh, 2011). Seventy-six per cent of Haredi rabbis agreed to a very great extent or a great extent, 67% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, 78% of Hardal rabbis, 8% of Reform rabbis, and 10% of Conservative rabbis said so. In the Pelech school, a distinction was drawn between the 11–15 and 16–18 age groups. In the younger age group, smartphones may not be used in school; some teachers will impose their will if a girl uses it and confiscate the phone to the end of the day. But in the latter group, it is less imposed. “In liberal Orthodox school like ours, there is less emphasis on discipline and more on trust and relationship,” Dr Yemima Hovav, a class teacher said. Hovav added, The Pelech’s school administration are discussing it all the time. We explain to students the problem. Some students even ask us for to help their children They are hooked on it. They are missing out. Most do not have a filtering device on the smartphone. We bring into the school experts to address students, including that they should not be in touch with people they do not know. In another modern Orthodox school, the sleepaway Mekor Hayim boys’ dormitory high school, in the Kfar Etzion settlement (south of Jerusalem), boys with smartphones are required to register with Netspark – to control a computer or a smartphone by, first, not allowing access to pornography, entertainment, or adverts; second, not allowing the child to control it; and third, limiting time access to the cell phone or computer. In a third school, the Himelfarb modern Orthodox boys’ high school, one of the largest schools in Jerusalem – which has a middle-of-the road cum liberal-inclined outlook – the veteran headmaster of the school, Rabbi Yirmiyahu Stavitsky, was adamantly against social media. The education my boys are getting on the social media is not the education which I think is appropriate. The speed on which interactions is occurring is too fast for a lot of human beings: our minds work differently than our social interactions. I believe that most of my students use the smartphone for basic social relations – in an addictive form. The students need to be constantly responsive in order to be within the social framework. All this gives a false sense of what friendship means and what community means. Education is about people and growing in human terms. Stavitsky added Of course, as a religious school, there are certain issues of modesty and pornography. Modern technology has much more to do with parents. We strongly recommend a filter on computers. Most of our students do not have a filter on their cell phones – which I think is irresponsible on the part of

256 Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century parents. But I don’t see it as such a catastrophe if a kid sees some kind of pornography a couple of times. But when it becomes an obsession, I find it problematic, not on the Jewish religious side but on a human level. Should access for children to other media forms like radio be controlled? Seventy-seven per cent of Haredi rabbis very much agreed or much agreed, in contrast to 26% of mainstream modern Orthodox. In contrast to mainline modern Orthodox rabbis, 45% of Hardal rabbis, 22% of Conservative rabbis, and 0% of Reform rabbis said so. Should access to television be controlled? Eighty-five per cent of Haredi rabbis agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent, as did 94% of Hardal rabbis and even 85% of mainstream modern Orthodox. This reflects that visual media in particular show pictures which may be considered inappropriate. Even non-Orthodox rabbis – who are ideologically committed to such values as freedom of the press – have reservations. Thus, 6% and 42% of Conservative rabbis very much agreed or much agreed to controlling children’s access to TV, and 8% and 15% of Reform rabbis very much agreed or much agreed to the need to control children’s access to television. In higher institutes of Jewish religious learning (yeshivot, midrasha, and seminaries), where many of the students are married, the focus is less on smartphones and more on using a laptop. The policies of different institutions vary more widely than at the high school level. The issue of access to pornography appears to be vastly different in the yeshivot because most of the students are already married and therefore have outlets for sexual release for their drives, whereas in the high school – an age of developing puberty – this is not the case. Clearly, the laptop has its value for writing down details of the shiur. “The laptop is even encouraged to avoid misunderstanding of the shiur – as long as it’s protected from forbidden sites,” said the Haredi head of a Sephardi kollel. And a teacher at Yeshivat Bet-El, a Hardal institution, noted that whereas the Yeshivat Bet-El’s high school bans anybody from possessing a smartphone, apart from the most basic kosher phone, the head of the yeshiva, Rabbi Eliezer Melamad, encourages those who are in the higher yeshiva to use a laptop in order to write up the shiur. Yet the head of one yeshiva for training dayanim (religious court judges), a programme of study spanning over eight years, said, “We do not allow the laptop into the yeshiva because it takes away from havruta – the unique form of studying the Talmud comprising two persons in which the dialogue comprises one person says one thing and the other counters with . . . No. This is the way to develop and think.” “For 95% of people the havruta is the basic to develop in learning – to be on top of the text, to solve problems and difficulties, or to raise questions themselves,” added another rabbi. And at Mirrer Yeshiva (the Mir), in the Mea Shearim quarter of Jerusalem – one of the biggest and prestigious yeshivot in the world, with over 8,000 students (mostly married) – Rabbi Israel Deutsch, one of the teachers at Mirrer, said, “Ten years ago, in 2010, there was a discussion between the rosh yeshivas, Rabbi

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 257 Abraham Finkel, and other yeshiva teachers. It was clear to everybody that new media was not a good idea. A person who has a mobile phone is engaged with himself, and there is no way to develop in studies characterised by the havruta – of two learning together.” A discussion led to a decision to distinguish between the main studies in the morning, when the rabbi gives a shiur in Talmud to all those present, and the evening when two students in a havruta go over that morning’s shiur, and prepare for the following day’s shiur. Thus, in the morning, a laptop is not allowed, but in the evening, it is and it is used – whether in the Mir itself or when students return to their neighbourhood synagogue near their residence. (Physically, so overcrowded is the yeshiva – which sprawls over a number of buildings in the Bet Yisroel neighbourhood of Mea Shearim – that there would be little room for tables on which to place laptops, so instead, portable stands are used on which to place the book.) The pedagogic issues also come into discussion in the Reform movement’s Hebrew Union College (HUC). Rabbi Michael Marmur, a former provost of the Jerusalem campus, said, Have there been pedagogical discussions about this question? Yes. Is there a policy that is set across the institution? No. There are preferences. There are some in our faculty who are more open to the blessings and advantages that the new media has to offer, and there are others who say there are no shortcuts and you have to smell the book and work with the book and learn the ropes. We had a virtual discussion at HUC’s Academic Advisory Council among the faculty of our three campuses – Jerusalem, Cincinnati, and New York. For everybody it was matter for the discretion of the teacher. “Most teachers here do not object bringing laptops to classes but some do say it creates a barrier – a barrier between the student and the teacher – and you never know what is going on,” Marmur added. Different religious streams and media controls

It is instructive to break down and examine how individual Jewish religious streams relate to different types of media. The mainstream modern Orthodox were less rigorous in limiting success to internet than Haredi or Hardal. Seventy-six per cent and 69% of Haredi rabbis and Hardal rabbis surveyed thought it very important to limit children’s access to internet in contrast to 51% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis. Yet 27% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis thought this important, as did a further 5% of Haredi rabbis and 19% of Hardal rabbis. A similar picture was found with television and newspapers. In the case of newspapers, given Haredi trends in controlling content in religious papers, 48% of Haredi rabbis thought it very important to limit access to newspapers (and a further 29% of Haredi rabbis thought it important), in contrast to 32% of mainstream modern Orthodox who thought it very important and 34% important. The differences between different religious streams were much more pronounced in case of radio:

258 Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 46% of Haredi rabbis thought it very important (and another 32% important), in contrast to 9% of mainstream modern Orthodox who thought it very important and 17% important. (Even Hardal rabbis were less identified with the Haredim in the case of radio than other media forms: 22% Hardal rabbis said so.) Broken down, non-Orthodox rabbis were much more inclined to favour limiting children’s access to internet and TV over print and radio media: 45% of Reform rabbis and 35% of Conservative rabbis favoured limiting internet, as important or very important (29% and 42% of Reform and Conservative thought it important to a certain extent, respectively). And 47% of Reform and 23% of Conservative thought it important or very important to limit children’s access to TV (25% and 50% of Reform and Conservative thought it important to some extent, respectively). In contrast, only 10% of Reform rabbis and 8% of Conservative rabbis thought it important or very important to control children’s access to newspapers. And only 0% and 22% of Conservative and Reform rabbis, respectively, thought it important or very important to limit children’s exposure to radio. A challenge to rabbinic authority In creating an alternative to the offline traditional Jewish community, what is the community’s identity if the physical offline cultural walls – including rabbinical authority – no longer exist or have been weakened? Do virtual cultural walls exist? Has new media weakened rabbinic authority because it encourages the participation of everyone? Hierarchy and structure are key features of the religion itself. With God as the supreme head, on earth the role of the rabbi and synagogue replaced the temple destroyed in 70 CE, in which a structure not dissimilar from the former caste system – with the three-tier group structure of the Cohen (priest), the Levite, and the Israelite. Forty-eight per cent of all rabbis agreed a lot that rabbinic authority or were inclined to agree that rabbinic authority had weakened, 21% had no view, and 31% did not agree at all or were inclined to disagree that rabbinic authority was threatened. But broken down, 51% of Haredi rabbis agreed a lot or were inclined to agree. For Haredim, the cultural ghetto is a benchmark of their identity. Modern Orthodoxy is divided on the question between two different philosophical outlooks on the cultural ghetto question. The Hardal, like the Haredim, favour the cultural ghetto: 48% of Hardal rabbis agreed a lot or were inclined to agree that rabbinic authority has been weakened. In contrast, the mainstream modern Orthodox wish to be integrated into the modern world and seek to overcome the cultural ghetto complex: 48% of mainstream modern Orthodox agreed a lot or were inclined to agree. And even 54% of Reform rabbis and 27% of Conservative rabbis also agreed a lot or were inclined to agree that the cultural ghetto had been weakened. Broken down in terms of occupation, there was a difference on this question between community rabbis and teacher-rabbis. Fifty-five per cent of teacher-rabbis agreed a lot or were inclined to agree that rabbinical authority had been weakened in contrast to 42% of community rabbis. Ashkenazi rabbis were more inclined to agree than Sephardi rabbis that rabbinic authority was threatened.

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 259 Like the rabbis, the Israeli public were also qualified answering in whether rabbinical authority had been weakened as cultural walls disappeared or weakened. Only 21% of the Israeli public agreed a lot or were inclined to agree that rabbinical authority was threatened, 56% did not agree at all or were inclined to disagree, and 23% agreed to some extent. Broken down according to religious background, there is nevertheless considerable agreement on the question of whether rabbinical authority had been weakened. Fifty-eight per cent, 62%, 59%, and 49% of nonHassidic Haredi Israeli Jews, Hassidic Haredi Jews, mainstream modern Orthodox Jews, and Hardal Jews surveyed, respectively, did not agree at all or were inclined to disagree that rabbinic authority had weakened; 63%, 54%, and 46% of traditional, Conservative, and Reform Jews did not agree or agreed only slightly, but many agreed to some extent – 36%, 26%, 26%, 22%, and 30% of Hardal, mainstream modern Orthodox, Reform, Conservative, or traditional Jews, respectively. Even 34% of secular atheistic Jews and 33% of secular non-atheistic Jews agreed to some extent that rabbinical authority had reduced particularly among Orthodox Jews, and much less among non-Orthodox Jews. In the age breakdown, all Jews surveyed agreed that rabbinical authority had declined, with those aged 51–65 incrementally a little less. There was no difference between Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews. This could be explained by the fact that older Israelis were used to rabbis of a past generation. Arguably, this is not so surprising because males were more inclined than females to say that rabbinic authority has weakened; males were relatively more seen in the synagogue and exposed to the rabbi than females. But the role of the rabbi has not disappeared but rather changed because the rabbi cannot “sit back” and rely on the very standing which comes with being a rabbi but rather has to provide a meaningful message. “Today you have to be an interesting rabbi, not one who speaks too long in sermons, more stories what people like,” said the rabbi of a townlet from the modern Orthodox sector. Rabbis are required to be computer-savvy, receive pedagogic training to be able to spread theological and spiritual values, negotiate through a marketplace of media values, and be competitively attractive – without compromising basic theological norms in the process. According to one Jerusalem-based community rabbi, Rabbis are not friendly. They don’t smile at you. But those who do manage to succeed. The rabbi today does have a very powerful tool. If he writes well, if he speaks well, he can touch upon the feelings, the will, indeed the conscience of his community member. A community has the emotional intelligence to understand what the rabbi is. And then the trust goes up. Nearly all rabbis are dedicated spiritual people who spend their time teaching Torah and doing acts of kindness. Rabbi Yuval Cherlow said, If you ask me, has the stability of the rabbi as obligatory, dropped? The answer is definitely. But in all fields, not just rabbinics, this has occurred. Thus,

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in medicine, a doctor is obligated to tell you about all types of medicine, partly diagnosis. So also the rabbi has to explain, perhaps persuade. His words to have value, to give a personal example. People want a guide though the various options. The rabbi who can speak the language of the generation will be the one succeeds. The one question is can the rabbi express empathy, and be able to reach out? A Reform rabbi-teacher was even more certain that the rabbi still has a role today, even without being friendly. “If you ask people in the street if they ever look for a rabbinical authority, they will deny it. But I feel when they come to me, they are looking for some sort of guidance. And they want a face, something that speaks to people – not just an e-mail.” Rabbi David Stav, head of the modern Orthodox organisation of rabbis Tzohar, claims – not dissimilar from the Reform rabbi-teacher – “the institution of the community rabbi is not in decline. The reverse is true. More and more communities understand the significance of having a rabbi – and not just to adjudicate halakhically” (on Jewish religious law), he said. People want spiritualism today and look for a rabbi who can guide them also through the “flood” of seemingly contradictory messages. The danger is that some people do not feel the need for this second role of the rabbi and are ill equipped in their own learning to navigate. Indeed, they mine halakhic data and are not able to decide cases. As the head of a Haredi girls’ high school in Haifa put it, “I insist and tell my team of teachers, while we are not demanding respect as an end goal, students have to stand when the teacher comes, and still only when are told so. There is a certain hierarchy, what is a student and what is a teacher.” But Neuwirth, from the modern Orthodox stream, argues that in schools, education has to be less about instruction and more about conversation in which children may express themselves. A school teacher at a sleepaway modern Orthodox school saw that the rabbi in the school was a mentor – indeed had been for over, say, 30 years – who was supposed to come close to his students, teaching Torah rather than imposing religious demands. They want to learn how to learn by themselves. The students see the teachers and the yeshiva teachers as people with whom they can discuss things in their lives and not just learn from. As the teacher-rabbi who heads Israel’s leading boys’ modern Orthodox high school put it, “The rabbi is less of a p’sek halakha (Jewish law interpreter) and more of a moral leader, somebody who can help a kid deal with his or her personal issues.” Some liberal Orthodox Jews turn to a rabbi only when they cannot find information from Google. People decide the answer they want and then look for the rabbi who gives their chosen teaching. Many people observe halakha but prefer to get halakhic information of their own. Many today get halakhic answers not from rabbis but from friends and social media. Rabbi Ezra Bick of the modern Orthodox yeshiva Har-Etzion said, “There is one common line on women’s issues that you see on the women’s website: today rabbis don’t tell women what to do.” The Haredi and Hardal are still inclined to ask the rabbi.

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 261 A criterion in Jewish law-making is that law pronouncements are required to be acceptable to the community; otherwise, this will bring into question the very legitimacy of the law-making body itself. Haredim have come – belatedly – to recognise that internet even has a positive role in Jewish religious education and provide Torah online resources. In so doing, Haredim have sought to create their own online cultural ghettos by isolating internet to “kosher sites” – in a not dissimilar way to the self-censorship imposed earlier within the independent Haredi weeklies and independent Haredi radio stations. But the basic feature of the cultural ghetto exists. The traditional offline frameworks of Jewish life – the synagogue, the yeshiva, and the Jewish home – remain paramount for Haredi Jews no less today. Should rabbis take a public position regarding the new media?

How should rabbis respond to the challenge to their authority? Sixty-eight per cent of all rabbis agreed a lot or were inclined to agree and 10% agreed to a certain degree that they should take a public position regarding the media. Only 22% did not agree at all or were inclined to disagree. Broken down, there was wide disagreement: 0% and 12% of Reform rabbis and Conservative rabbis agreed to a very great extent, in contrast to 68% of Haredim. There was also a significant difference within rabbis in the modern Orthodox sector on the question of whether rabbis should take a public position on new media. Thus, while only 24% of mainstream modern Orthodox agreed that rabbis should take a public position on new media, 56% of Hardal rabbis thought so. There was a wide gap between those who disagreed completely and were inclined towards rabbis not taking a public position on the new media: 63% of Reform rabbis, 52% of Conservative rabbis, 5% of Hardal rabbis, and 10% of Haredi rabbis disagreed completely or were inclined not to agree that rabbis should take a position. Seventy-two per cent of teacher-rabbis agreed that rabbis should take a public position, in contrast to 47% of community rabbis. There was no difference between Ashkenazi and Sephardi. On new media and traditional media, the public did not mostly agree that rabbis should take a public position: 29% of the public agreed very much or agreed much and 21% agreed, but 44% disagreed wholly or were inclined to. Broken down religiously, there were wide gaps among the Israeli public. But even among those who favoured rabbis taking public stands on the media, the most supportive number was half: 54% of Hassidim, 45% of non-Hassidic Haredim, and 6% of Hardal agreed to a very great extent or to a great extent. In contrast, only 11% of Reform, 12% of traditional, 6% of secular atheists, and 15% secular nonatheists agreed very much or were inclined to. Seventy-three per cent of secular atheists, 69% of Conservative, 69% of Reform, 59% secular non-atheists, and 56% of traditional disagreed entirely or agreed only a little. Even 44% of mainstream modern Orthodox did so. Yet only 25% of Hassidic Haredim, 29% of non-Hassidic Haredim, and 36% of did so.

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In the age breakdown, the youngest group of rabbis (aged 20–35; 34%) and the oldest (aged 66+; 32%) were more inclined to agree to a very great extent or a great extent, in contrast to 20% of those aged 51–65 and 23% of those aged 36–50. Conclusion Haredim lived – and still live today – physically in their own quarter. Indeed, the Haredi cultural ghetto has always been virtual in the sense that it limits the exposure of its people to ideas, which by very nature are abstract. The so-called cultural ghetto is a flexible mechanism. Inevitably there are tensions both from inside and outside. Haredim inside have developed their own equivalents to technological developments outside and professional equivalents to weekly magazines, radio broadcasting, and new media including news websites. Indeed, Haredi rabbis have not been able to hold back the groundswell of new initiatives. Yet if many Haredim are exposed to new Haredi initiatives and beyond, surveys brought here confirm that they use these for legitimate purposes. Indeed, the media open up a plethora of opportunities to access Jewish religious literature which up to now was accessible in libraries – as well as providing the creative Haredi rabbi with additional podiums for spreading the holy Jewish word. Indeed, within the Haredi community, there are pressures, such as the new Haredi stream, the so-called New Haredim, and Haredi women going to work, using high tech, and wanting to advance academically. Attempts by Haredi rabbinical communication committees of one sort or another to limit technology may have slowed but have not halted the new mediatisation of the Haredi world. And rabbis – whatever their Orthodox badge – are under pressure to lessen talking “from above” and instead speak with students and exploit their powers of persuasion. The number of ex-Haredim who leave the fold are relatively small – suggesting that cultural walls of sorts are not only in place but desired by those who grow in the community or have chosen it as a way of life. By definition, modern Orthodox seek to be full partners with modernity and reject cultural walls as an ideal. Yet many modern Orthodox, particularly but not only Hardal, see it also as such, albeit in a more selective way. Or if there is any debate about cultural walls and challenges to rabbinical hierarchy, it is surely here in negotiating the inbuilt dilemmas that the real challenges lie. Bibliography Adini, B., Cohen, Y., & Spitz, A. (2022, March) The Relationship between Religious Beliefs and Attitudes towards Public Health Infection Prevention Measures among an UltraOrthodox Jewish Population during the Covid-19 Pandemic. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19(5): 1–10. Askaria. (2021, January 3) How the Closures Influenced the Push for Internet. Bnei Beraq: Askaria Research Company [Hebrew]. Babylonian Talmud. Tractate Erachin 16a. Ba-Kehilla, 24 September 2009. Bezeq (Israeli telecommunications company) Survey. Israel (2018).

Religio-cultural walls in the 21st century 263 Bezeq (Israeli telecommunications company) Survey of Haredim. (2020) Jerusalem [Hebrew]. Brown, B. (2021) Hevra B’temurah [Hebrew: A Society in Motion: Structures & Processes in Ultra-Orthodox Judaism]. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute. Cahaner, L. (2020) Hahevra Ha-Haredit Ul Tzir Shebein Shamranut Le-Moderniut [Hebrew: Ultra-Orthodox Society on the Axis between Conservatism and Modernity]. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute. Central Bureau of Statistics. (2005) Jerusalem [Hebrew]. Central Bureau of Statistics. (2015) Ownership of Household Items among Israeli Jewish Households, Broken Down According to Religiosity, Table 22, Jerusalem [Hebrew]. Central Bureau of Statistics. (2016) Jerusalem [Hebrew]. Cohen, Y. (2011) Haredim and the Internet: A Hate-Love Affair. In Bailey, M., & Redden, G. (eds.), Mediating Faiths: Religion and Socio-Cultural Change in the Twenty-First Century. Farnham, Britain: Ashgate, 63–74. Cohen, Y. (2013) Awkward Encounters: Orthodox Judaism and the Internet. Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis. Donner Institute, Turku, Finland: Abu Akedemie Universitsat. No 25, 42–54 Cohen, Y. (2017) The Media Challenge to Haredi Rabbinic Authority in Israel. Essachess: Journal for Communication Studies 10(2). Cohen, Y. (2018) Holy Days, News Media, & Religious Identity: A Case Study in Jewish Holy Days and the Israeli Press & News Websites. In Cohen, Y. (ed.), Spiritual News: Reporting Religion Around the World. New York: Peter Lang. Cohen, Y. (2019) Israeli Haredi Media and the ‘Female Factor’: The Case of the Kol Barama Radio Station. Israel Affairs 25(2). Cohen, Y., Adini, B. and Spitz, A. (2021) The Haredi Media, Religious Identity, and the COVID 19 Crisis. Israel Affairs 27(5). Cohen, Y., & Spitz, A. (2022) Israeli Information Policy, Covid-19, and the Ultra-Orthodox Haredim. Religion & Social Communication 20(1), Asian Research Center for Religion & Communication (St John’s University, Bangkok). Israel Advertisers Association. (1995) Survey of Exposure to Mass Media: Haredim. Tel Aviv: Israel Advertisers Association. Israel Democracy Institute. (2014) Survey of Modern Orthodoxy in Israel. Jerusalem Israel Internet Society. (2020) Survey. Press Release, 11 January 2020. Maaleh, Center for Religious Zionism. (2011) Jerusalem, February 2011. Sivan, E., & Caplan, K. (eds.). (2003) Haredim Yisroelim: Hishtalvuth Blo Temiah? [Hebrew: Israeli Haredim: Integration Without Assimilation]. Jerusalem & Tel Aviv: Van Leer Institute; Kibbhutz Hameuchad. Tucker, N. (2017) The Marker (Haaretz) 7 August 2017. Yerushalayim 25 September 2009. Zicherman, H. (2014) Shachor K’Hol Lavan: Masa el-Toch Hahevra HaHaredit B’Yisroel [Hebrew: Black Blue-White: A Journey into the Haredi Society in Israel]. Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot: Sifrei Hemed. Zicherman, H., & Cahaner, L. (2012) HaHaredit Modernit: Maamad Benayim Haredi B’Yisroel [Hebrew; the Emergence of a Haredi Middle Class in Israel]. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute. Zoldan, D. (2019) Haharedim Ha-Hadashim [Hebrew: The New Ultra-Orthodox]. Modiin: Kinneret, Zmora, Dvir.

11 The unholy Jewish troika Rabbis, journalists, and the Israeli public

In Israel, the central role which religion plays in public life raises the question of the role of mass communications channels in religious identity. In evaluating the media’s image of religion, it is first necessary to discuss how the public, rabbis, and journalists themselves evaluate the media’s coverage. All this is vital for examining the impact upon religious-secular relations and tensions themselves. Given the question of the media’s impact on the secularreligious divide inside Israel, the evaluations of the public, rabbis and journalists both about the role of the media and about the media’s image constructed of different communities will contribute to producing an accurate picture. The Public

In assessing the media’s image of religious communities, the media will be broken down by the secular media seen by the broader and traditional public, and the religious media is Orthodox-oriented and may be broken down between the Haredi media and modern Orthodox media. The former, described earlier, include four Haredi daily newspapers, a range of weekly magazines, two radio stations, and three news websites. The latter, identified with modern Orthodoxy, include the websites Arutz 7, Kippa, Soragim, and the weekly newspapers Makor Rishon and BaSheva. (Makor Rishon is as much a national paper as one oriented towards the liberal wing of modern religious Jewry in Israel, even though most of its readers fall into the latter.) The modern Orthodox community in Israel itself may be divided between those who only read religious media and those who read both religious and secular media, like Yediot Aharonot, Y-Net, and Israel Hayom. By definition, the modern religious are exposed to modernity, but the Hardal only see modern religious media, not the secular media. But all this should not be exaggerated because only some 4% read the modern religious newspapers Makor Rishon and BaSheva. The image of Haredim in the secular media was rated as very bad by 39% of the broad Israeli public surveyed by the author and as not good by 43%. Only 3% rated it as very good or good. Regarding the image of the modern Orthodox in the secular media, 4% of the public rated it as very bad and 24% as not good, but 23% rated it as very good. DOI: 10.4324/9781315735184-11

The unholy Jewish troika 265 Overwhelmingly, Haredim did not consume secular media, and most did not consume modern Orthodox media. The image of the secular community in the religious media (which is mostly but not entirely Haredi) was rated by the Israeli public as very bad by 14% of the public and not good by 19%. But only 25% of the public rated it as very good or good. The image of non-Orthodox Jewry and the secular community in the religious media was particularly bad in the eyes of the public. The image of Conservative Jews and Reform Jews in the secular media was rated by 22% and 27% of the Israeli public as either very bad or not good. Sixtyfive per cent of the religious Orthodox public rated the image of Conservative Jewry in religious media as very bad or not good, and 79% of the religious Orthodox public rated the image of the Reform in religious media as very bad or not good. Only 10% and 6% of readers of Orthodox media rated the image of Conservative Jews and Reform Jews, respectively, as excellent or good. In the secular media, only 3% rated the image of the secular in the secular media as very bad or not good. Eighty-three per cent regarded it, in the eyes of the secular media, as excellent or good. What is clear are two things: (1) The media’s image of the secular are regarded as considerably better than the media’s image of Reform or Conservative even though the Conservative and Reform Jews are religious and believe in God, in accordance with their respective religious traditions, and the former include secular atheists. (2) It is unclear how – if at all – readers of Orthodox religious media distinguish between Conservative and Reform. The former is far closer theologically to Orthodox than Reform, such as by accepting the 613 commandments in the Torah. There was an element of self-deprivation among different communities, particularly among the Haredim. In contrast, only 26% and 18% of Lithuanian Haredim and Haredi Hassidic consumers of religious media said that the image of the secular communities in the religious media was very bad or not good. Also, the modern Orthodox are inclined to give the image of the secular communities a higher rating than secular give themselves. And only 12% and 7% of mainstream modern Orthodox and Hardal, respectively, said the image of secular people in religious media was very bad or not good. Fifty-one per cent, 75% and 55% of traditional, Reform, and Conservative said that the image of the secular communities was very bad or not good. In contrast, other non-Orthodox streams were less critical regarding the modern Orthodox image: 6%, 13%, 13%, 10%, and 26% of Reform, traditional, secular non-atheists, Conservative, and secular atheists said so, respectively. This shows a trend that the stream itself was inclined to be more self-critical its own media image than other streams. In the age breakdown, the youngest group (20–35) was more inclined (90%) to say the Haredi image in secular media was very bad or not good, in contrast to those aged 36–50, 51–65, or 66+ (76%, 74%, and 73%). Again, youngest age grouping 20–35 (37%) was more critical (“not so good”) of the image of modern Orthodox in secular media compared to those aged 36–50 (28%), 51–65 (17%), and 66+

266 The unholy Jewish troika (18%). The least critical of the secular image in religious media was the youngest age group (20–35, 26%; 36–50, 32%; 51–65, 45%; 66+, 56%). There were no significant differences in the age group regarding the religious media image of Reform; the least critical of the Conservative image was the 36–50 group – 58%. (20–35, 66%; 51–65, 75%; 66+, 77%). In terms of gender, women were more inclined than men to say the Haredi image was very bad or not good. Rabbis

Rabbis had an important role in influencing the media-related attitudes of their followers in the case of religiously observant and traditional Jews. With the exception of Reform, rabbis of other streams rated the media image of Haredim in the secular media likewise as very bad. Thus, 96%, 95%, and 93% of mainstream modern Orthodox, Hardal, and Conservative rabbis, respectively, said that the media image of Haredim was bad. But only 50% of Reform rabbis said so. In contrast to the image of Haredi in the secular media, where few (apart from Reform) agreed only to some extent that the image of Haredim was very bad, many in the secular media saw it as very bad, many discussing the modern Orthodox saw it as neither bad nor good but average. (Thirty-nine per cent of Haredi rabbis, 28% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis, 26% of Hardal rabbis, 21% of Reform rabbis, and 38% of Conservative rabbis gave modern Orthodoxy’s image in the secular media an average rating.) (The image of the Orthodox-Haredim and modern Orthodox each in their own religious media was necessarily much better. Only 29% of Haredi rabbis and 26% of modern Orthodox rabbis said that the Haredi image and modern Orthodox image, respectively, was very bad or not good. Forty-nine per cent of Haredi rabbis and 58% of modern Orthodox said the image of Haredim and modern Orthodox, respectively, was good or excellent in religious Orthodox media.) Both Reform rabbis and Conservative rabbis were more inclined not to say that the image of modern Orthodox in the secular media was very bad but only not good. Four per cent and 54% of Conservative rabbis said that the image of modern Orthodox in secular media was very bad or only not good, respectively. Similarly, only 7% and 41% of Reform rabbis were inclined to say that the image of the modern Orthodox religion was very bad and not good, respectively. Moreover, rabbis were less critical of the image of Conservative and Reform. Yet in secular media, 50% of all rabbis said the image of the Reform was not good (none said it was very bad), and 21% and 7% of all rabbis said that the Conservative image was very bad or not good, respectively. But 17% of all rabbis said that the image of Reform was inclined to be good, as was also the case with 18% of all rabbis regarding the image of the Conservatives. A further 33% and 54% of Reform rabbis and Conservative rabbis, respectively, were inclined to agree. The image of Reform and Conservative Jews was more problematic. Sixty-two per cent of all rabbis and a further 19% said the image of Reform in the Orthodox

The unholy Jewish troika 267 religious media was very bad or not good, respectively. Similarly, 84% of all rabbis and 4% said the image of Conservative in the religious (Orthodox) media was very bad or not good, respectively. Twenty-eight per cent and 35% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis described the image of all modern Orthodox (mainstream and Hardal combined) as very bad or not bad, respectively. And 24% and 47% of Hardal said the image of modern Orthodox (combined with Hardal) was not good, respectively. Regarding the image of different streams in the internet and social networks, 61% of all rabbis said that the Haredi image was very bad, 28% said it was bad, and only 4% of all rabbis said that the Haredi image on the internet and social networks was good and excellent (combined). Yet the modern Orthodox image on the internet was little better. Journalists

Journalists were much more qualified than either rabbis of the public in agreeing that the image of Haredim and the modern Orthodox was bad. Six per cent of journalists surveyed by the author said that the Haredi image in secular media was bad, and 13% of journalists said the modern Orthodox image in secular media was bad. Regarding the Conservative and Reform image in secular media, 5% and 25% of journalists said that the image of Conservative in secular media was very good or not bad, respectively, and 9% and 30% of journalists said that the Reform image in secular media was very good and not bad, respectively. However, regarding the image of the modern Orthodox and the Haredim in the religious press, journalists agreed with rabbis and the public. Fifty-two per cent of journalists evaluated that the Conservative image in religious media (Orthodox) was bad, and 16% said that it was not good. And 72% and 8% of journalists said that the Reform image in Orthodox religious media was bad or not good, respectively. (In contrast, the Haredi and modern Orthodox image in the religious press was overwhelmingly good also in the eyes of journalists: 31% and 42% of journalists said that the Haredi image in Orthodox press was very good or not bad. And 33% and 37% of journalists said that the modern Orthodox image was very good or quite good, respectively.) Regarding the Conservative and Reform image in secular media, 5% and 25% of journalists said that the image of Conservative in secular media was very good or not bad, respectively, and 9% and 30% of journalists said that the Reform image in secular media was very good and not bad, respectively. The secular-religious divide Given the gaps between different communities inside Israel and negative media images, it is instructive to consider the media’s image in this. After all, as has been argued in the book, there is little or no difference between journalists and the public. Rather than conclude that a negative image is an intentional, ideological outcome

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of journalists – notwithstanding individual cases – a negative image is more the common outcome of the news value itself. The media acts as a sub-actor in connecting the different religious segments of the Jewish population in Israel – secular, modern Orthodox, and ultra-Orthodox – both in informing one about the other and in constructing mutual images of different religious communities (Stern, Yaffe, Malach, & Malchi, 2021). The mass media has a powerful impact on the way the communities perceives one another (Liebman, 1990). In Israel the secular-religious divide has resulted in the media being seen as one of the factors contributing to the perceived negative image which religious communities, in particular the Haredim, enjoy (Shukrun-Nagar, 2013). Even though Haredim account for only 8% of the Israeli Jewish population, they receive an inflated amount of coverage – reaching nearly 50% of religion content (Cohen, 2005). Much that gets defined as religion news is conflict related, such as conflicts between religious institutions in Israel and the state. Religious and secular communities become newsworthy by their very involvement in conflict. These include religious control of matters of personal status, like marriage, divorce, and religious conversion; government budgeting of Haredi yeshivot (colleges of Jewish education); governmental resources for settlement building in Judea and Samaria; and Haredi exemptions from national military service (Ben-Porat, 2013). Much of the tension between the religious and secular centres around the question of whether the State of Israel should be a state based upon Jewish religious law (halakha) or be a secular democracy. Rather than just a theoretical question, it reflects both deep ideological differences between secular and Jewish religious groups and differences within Jewish religious communities, notably Haredim (or ultra-Orthodox Jews) and modern Orthodoxy. And the demands of modern Orthodox religious groups (who account for 15% of the Israeli Jewish population) for governmental budgeting for settlements in Judea and Samaria create resentment since it diverts resources from other social and economic issues. Fifty-three per cent of the Israeli public surveyed by the author agreed that the media have a role to play in improving secular–religious relations to a very great extent or great extent. A further 21% agreed to some extent. Secular atheists were least likely to agree that the media has a role to improve secular–religious relations. Only 33% of secular atheists thought so, in contrast to 60% of Conservative, 66% of Reform, 69% of traditional, 54% of modern Orthodox, 59% of Hardal, 55% of secular non-atheists, 46% of Lithuanian Haredi, 43% of Haredi Hassidic. Incrementally less so were the Haredim (who were lower than the modern Orthodox combined [mainstream modern Orthodox and Hardal]). There was no significant pattern in age grouping. Sephardim were more inclined incrementally than Ashkenazim to believe that the media had a role to play in religious–secular relations. Women were more inclined than men to recognise a role for the media in improving relations. Rabbis of all branches of Judaism – Haredi, modern Orthodox, and Hardal – are far more sceptical than the public about a media role in bridge-building

The unholy Jewish troika 269 between the secular and the religious. They see matters from their end, but nonOrthodox rabbis (Conservative and Reform) partly saw matters more from the secular side, even though the Conservative rabbis and Reform rabbis are by definition religious, not secular. Sixty-nine per cent of Haredi rabbis, 73% of modern Orthodox rabbis, and 42% of non-Orthodox rabbis disagreed completely or only agreed a little (combined) that the media could help in bridge building between secular and religious. Thirty-two per cent of non-Orthodox rabbis agreed somewhat that the media could help, in contrast to 14% and 11% modern Orthodox and Haredi rabbis, respectively. Only 19%, 13%, and 13% of Haredi rabbis, modern Orthodox rabbis, and nonOrthodox rabbis agreed that the media could help. Journalists are as sceptical as the rabbis. Sixty-eight per cent of journalists did not agree at all or only to a small extent that the media could help. Only 12% very much agreed or largely agreed that media can advance secular–religious understanding. Broken down religiously, 32% and 35% of non-religious journalists disagreed wholly or were inclined to disagree, respectively, and 21% and 31% of traditional journalists (between religious and secular) did so, in contrast to 64% and 27% of religious Orthodox journalists. It is instructive to discuss this in the context of journalists’ views on the separation of synagogue and state. Twenty-four per cent and 37% of those who agreed very much or mostly agreed with the principle of the separation of synagogue and state disagreed or slightly agreed that the media could help in religious–secular relations, whereas 49% and 33% who disagreed with the separation of religion and state disagreed or only slightly agreed that the media could help to improve religious–secular relations. Similarly, 67% and 21% of those journalists working in religious news organisations disagreed only slightly that the media could help to improve relations, in contrast to 33% and 35% of those not working in religious media who disagreed or only slightly agreed that the media may help in relations. On the specific question of whether social networks advance secular–religious relations, 30% of all rabbis agreed a great deal or considerably. Fourteen per cent of journalists did not agree at all or only a little. Thirty-seven per cent of modern Orthodox (modern Orthodox and Hardal combined) and 41% of Haredim said so. This reflected that social networks are a forum for dialogue and presentation of views. There was no significant difference between rabbi-teachers and community rabbis on those who thought social media had a very great role or greater role to play in advancing religious–secular ties, but community rabbis were less inclined to dismiss this. Role of media in ingratiating hostility

Journalists were asked about tension. Does the media cause the hostility? The question was broken down between the media and the modern Orthodox community and between the media and the Haredi community. It was clear that journalists

270 The unholy Jewish troika saw the tension with the Haredi community as stronger than the tension with the modern Orthodox community. While 26% of journalists said that the tension with the modern Orthodox community was unavoidable, 50% said so regarding the Haredi population. And while 50% of journalists did not agree at all or only to a small extent, only 30% said so regarding Haredim – that they did not agree at all or only to a small degree. So was tension between religious and secular communities as reflected in internet and social networks unavoidable? When asked this question, overall, 70% of all rabbis were inclined to agree that it was unavoidable, and an additional 10% had no opinion. At least 50% of all rabbis were inclined to agree or agreed a lot. Fifty-three per cent of non-Orthodox were inclined to agree or agreed a lot. Seventy per cent and 77% of Haredi rabbis and modern Orthodox rabbis respectively were inclined to agree or agreed a lot. Yet a closer look shows that nonOrthodox were inclined to agree much more than agree a lot, whereas the Haredi and Hardal wings of modern Orthodox agreed a lot, more than they were inclined to agree. Fifty-two per cent of Haredi rabbis agreed a lot, and 19% were inclined to agree that tension between religious and secular communities was unavoidable. And mainstream modern Orthodox were inclined to agree (42%) rather agree than a lot (29%). Of community rabbis, 44% were inclined to agree, but only 21% agreed a lot, whereas of the 48% of rabbis who were teachers, only 22% were inclined to agree. With its emphasis on verbal discussion the radio medium – as distinct from television and pictures or print worlds – 26% and 15% of those who worked in radio disagreed or slightly agreed that tension between the media and the modern Orthodox was unavoidable, whereas 20% and 13% of these disagreed or slightly agreed that tension with the Haredim is unavoidable. Similarly, 31% and 14% of journalists who work in internet news websites disagreed slightly or agreed that tension between the media and the modern Orthodox was unavoidable, in contrast to 12% and 12% who did not work in internet news thinking so regarding the Haredim. There was little correlation to veterancy – how long a person has been a journalist. Broken down by religiosity, 34% and 16% of non-religious journalists wholly disagreed or slightly agreed that tension between the media and the modern religious was unavoidable. But regarding the Haredim, only 15% and 11% of the nonreligious disagreed that tension between the media and Haredi is inevitable. Of journalists who were observant in a traditional way (between strictly observant religious and secular): 15% and 19% disagreed only slightly that tension with the modern religious was inevitable, in contrast to 13% and 31% of journalists who disagreed or only slightly agreed that tension with Haredim was inevitable. In contrast to non-religious and traditional journalists, 31% and 20% of religious Orthodox journalists disagreed or only slightly agreed, respectively, that tension with the modern Orthodox was inevitable, in contrast to 22% and 11% who disagreed or only slightly agreed that tension with Haredim was inevitable.

The unholy Jewish troika 271 Separation of synagogue and state

Thirty-seven per cent and 10% of journalists who very much agreed with separation of synagogue and state disagreed or only slightly agreed that tension between media and modern Orthodox is inevitable, in contrast to 13% and 18% who disagreed with separation of synagogue and state. And 16% and 12% of journalists who much agreed or very much agreed with the separation of synagogue and state disagreed or only slightly agreed that tension between media and Haredim was inevitable, in contrast to 17% and 10% who disagreed with the separation of synagogue and state. Israelis were inclined to view journalists as anti-religious. According to the Israeli pollster Hanoch Smith (1995), 22% of Israeli Jews polled in 1995 said that journalists were anti-religious, 32% said some of the journalists were anti-religious, but 27% said that just a few were anti-religious. The negative coverage of religious groups raises questions about the religious identity of Jewish journalists in Israel. It was hypothesised that (1) journalists are inclined to be anti-religious, including not believing in the existence of God; (2) journalists are not inclined to participate in annual Jewish holydays or observe Jewish life-cycle rituals (such as marriages and funerals having a religious ceremony, the bar mitzvah, religious circumcision at birth, and observing or participating in holyday rituals); and (3) a gap exists between the broader Israeli Jewish public population and journalists regarding attitudes to religion. But, as shown in Chapter 5, the author’s survey of Israeli journalists about journalists and Jewish religious identity, there was little or no difference between the positions of Israeli Jewish journalists and those of the broader Israeli Jewish population on existential questions like belief in God. Nor were there any significant differences regarding religious activity like observance of religious holidays or Jewish life-cycle events between the journalistic community and the rest of the Israeli Jewish population. In Pakistan, religion is a powerful factor shaping journalists’ personal identity. Surveying Pakistani journalists, Pintak and Nazir (2013) found that, when asked “Above all, I am a . . . ,” over half of the journalists replied “Muslim” and just 17% replied “Pakistani.” Yet even so, when asked to which geographic group they most belonged, only 26% identified the Muslim world. Yet there was a difference between journalists and the broader Israeli public over the question of whether Israeli journalists favour the separation of synagogue and state. Rather, it is the very curiosity and news interest among the public which journalists necessarily have to satisfy, particularly given the competitive and commercial nature of mass media today, which may serve to explain the misperception that journalists are anti-religious and intentionally provoke divisions. As argued in Chapter 6, it is the focus in the news process itself upon what is interesting or important rather than a seemingly anti-religious agenda of an individual reporter that explains the distance between what is reported about religion and the image which rabbis would like constructed. Nevertheless, the consciousness of reporters – including on matters related to belief, spirituality, and organised religion – provides an amorphous background against which journalists function.

272 The unholy Jewish troika Future patterns of rabbis and information will necessarily be influenced by patterns in media coverage of religion coverage. Trends in Israel (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009) towards religiosity suggest an increase in religion news interest among Israelis. Unresolved tensions between the secular and ultra-Orthodox also suggest that religion will remain on the news agenda. The inclusion in the coalition government in Israel after the 2022 general elections, for example, of Haredi political parties and Hardal parties is a clue that neo-theocracy values will remain on the news agenda for the foreseeable future. Indeed, mutual perceptions between rabbis themselves and journalists will continue to be defined, in part, by how the respective media – secular media and religious media – each define the issues: the secular media from a secular viewpoint of the separation of synagogue and state and the religious media, particularly the Haredi media, seeing the Torah as the prime mover or criterion, whether in private or public life. Rabbis, reporters, and the Israeli public at bay Finally, the concluding chapter seeks to examine whether there is agreement or disagreement regarding the key roles in which journalists, rabbis, and the public interact – such as suppliers and consumers of religion news, the specific role played here by religion affairs reporters, the role of the media in covering rabbinic scandals, and the role which mass media – in particular new media – play in projecting Judaism and raising religious identity. The manifold roles played by them and interactions between them suggest that there is no common ground between rabbis, reporters, and the public in the digital Holyland. There is no consensus between rabbis and journalists and the general public about whether the mass media should be “Jewish” or “Western” in character. Rabbis and the public use the mass media differently as a source of religion information. All three – rabbis, the public, and journalists – differ about the quality of religion reporting in Israel. There are wide differences regarding full disclosure or not about rabbis and religious institutions. Nor is there even agreement about whether the media should have a role as a trigger of religious identity-building. The troika comprises, first, the rabbis, who are in effect the statesmen and politicians with a theological message that they are ideologically committed to convey through, second, media channels, beyond the lectern of the synagogue and yeshiva hall. But the message is filtered through the prism of media channels – subject to the media timetable, the media’s genre, and the values determining what is news and what is not. Thus, the original message of rabbis already gets distorted at the initial stage, persuading journalists to the rightness of their case. The third element is the public – the target audience of rabbis – who are cognitively selective in what to be exposed and what not to. Moreover, the media is required to work within the confines of what interests their audience. The challenge for the rabbi is, therefore, that he or she has to work within the confines of what interests the journalist but also the confines of another communication network, the journalists’ audience.

The unholy Jewish troika 273 News websites play an important role in religion news developments. After news about one’s own religious stream, such themes under “synagogue and state,” like the tensions between Judaism and Israel as a democratic country, as well as religious political parties, are high up the list of subjects drawing public interest in religion news. This makes the quality of news reporting a highly important issue. Yet the “average only” ratings which such factors as the quality of religion reporting received should switch on a red light, given that the “synagogue and state” topic directly impinges on tensions and conflict between different religious stream and communities. The dominance of the internet as a source of information was shared to some extent by rabbis, the public, and journalists themselves. The internet has made rabbis, with the exception of Haredi rabbis, follow the news more than in the past. While 58%, 50%, and 28% of modern Orthodox rabbis, Haredi rabbis, and nonOrthodox rabbis did not read a daily newspaper, 73% of mainstream modern Orthodox rabbis surf a very great deal or great deal. (In contrast, 81% of Haredi rabbis never surfed or did so to a small degree.) But rabbis get updated with internal information from their own rabbinical organisations – albeit not necessarily receiving an objective view of religion or from interpersonal communication with rabbinical colleagues, as well as themselves being knowledgeable about religion – often more than journalists. Only 20% and 8% followed religion news in the media with high frequency or most of the time. It was found that rabbis turn to the media for other, non–religion-related categories of news – such as news about politics, economics, and defence. Journalists in following religion developments also follow the media. Eightyfour per cent of journalists said they had very great interest or great interest, 13% said they had medium interest, and only 4% said they had no interest in religion news. To the extent they use religion media, 23% of journalists surfed religion websites, 32% read a religion newspaper, and 22% listened to religious radio. Thus, there is limited commonality between the public, journalists, and rabbis about the media’s role as a provider of religious information for the public and for journalists themselves. Indeed, there is today on news websites more space for information about religion than there was in the past era of traditional media like print, radio, and TV – when religion took a secondary spot to such other categories of information as politics and defence. There were wide differences between rabbis, the public, and journalists themselves in rating the religion affairs reporters who do the overwhelming amount of the religion reporting in a news organisation. There were wide differences between how rabbis, the public, and their journalistic colleagues rated the knowledge level of religion reporters. Rabbis were very critical of religion affairs reporters: 74% of Haredi rabbis and 62% of modern Orthodox rabbis did not agree at all or were inclined not to agree that religion affairs reporters were knowledgeable. That three-quarters to two-thirds of Orthodox rabbis also thought so is less surprising given that by definition the professionals – rabbis – are not only

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knowledgeable but also have their own agendas and beliefs, often not identical with the media or with the broad non-strictly religious and secular public. More surprising was that 55% of the public did not agree at all or only a little that religion affairs reporters were knowledgeable. In contrast, journalistic colleagues thought otherwise about the religion reporter: only 30% did not agree at all or only a little that religion affairs reporters were knowledgeable – particularly since religion affairs reporters, many of whom came from a religious background and were, therefore, not only knowledgeable of the subject but also had access to information and news network. There is no consensus between rabbis, the public, and journalists regarding the quality of coverage. Rabbis were very critical of the quality of religion coverage. Journalists and the public together were far less critical. Among journalists, 28% said that the internet damaged religious values to a very great extent or to a great extent, and 53% said that the internet did not damage at all or damaged only to a small extent. Twenty-one per cent of the public said religion content on the internet was good and 4% excellent (or 25% together), and 29% of the public said that the image of religion on the internet was bad or even terrible. Forty-nine per cent and 19% of all rabbis said that secular websites damage religious values to a very great extent or to a high extent. Seventeen per cent and 19% said so regarding religious websites. In contrast, rabbis were even more critical; only 1% and 8% said that the quality of religion content on the internet was excellent. Journalists as a whole are perceived by many rabbis – and by many in the religious public – as broadly anti-religious. This book found that, first, journalists are not inclined to be anti-religious, nor do they not believe in the existence of God; second, journalists are inclined to participate in annual Jewish holydays or observe Jewish life-cycle rituals (such as marriages and funerals having a religious ceremony, the bar mitzvah, religious circumcision at birth, and observing or participating in holyday rituals); and third, in broad terms, a gap does not exist between the broader Israeli Jewish public population and journalists regarding attitudes to religion. It raises questions about critics of religion coverage. It is the focus in the news process itself upon what is interesting or important rather than a seemingly anti-religious agenda of an individual reporter that explains the distance between what is reported about religion and the image which rabbis would like constructed. Despite such courses as citizenship, sociology, and mass communication in schools, there remains an abject lack of understanding about how the media functions and the limits under which journalists gather information. There is little reason to expect change. This led Orthodox rabbis to favour supervision of the media: 68% of Haredi rabbis and even 67% of modern Orthodox rabbis favour this. Sixty-seven per cent of all rabbis saw a need to limit children’s exposure to internet as very important (20% to some extent). But the public agreed with the rabbis: 89% of the Israeli public agreed about the need to control access for children to the internet to a great extent or were inclined to agree. But all – rabbis, journalists, and the public – agreed that religion coverage was worse on the internet than in other media, notably print and radio, but not dissimilar from television.

The unholy Jewish troika 275 But the gap between rabbis on the one hand and the public and journalists on the other is more fundamental. It concerns the dilemma of whether the media should be conceptualised in a Jewish manner or a Western manner. For rabbis, the gap begins with the secular media itself being regarded as, if not illegitimate, at least wanting, given the media’s secular vulgarity and its reflecting anti-religious values. True, rabbis fail to understand news dynamics and fail to distinguish between news values and agenda setting, on the one hand, and the individual journalist, on the other; they believe incorrectly that all reporters bring ideological agendas to their work. Nevertheless, many contemporary rabbis have sought to reconcile the Jewish strictures on social gossip with modern ideas of public information in a democracy and the principle of the right to know. Indeed, the provision of information about events and societies, which contributes to understanding and reduces conflict – while not generally identified as a particularly religious goal – is endorsed by Judaism. Journalists should attempt to enter into a dialogue with rabbis. Meetings between journalistic personnel and rabbis would benefit both sides of the rabbinical–journalistic divide. Journalists – including editors and producers – should become more acquainted with Jewish institutions, including touring yeshivot. Journalists need to see rabbis as potential commentators on more general – nonnarrowly religion-defined – issues of public policy. But journalists themselves do face an uphill task here, given that Haredi rabbis themselves are inclined not to speak to secular journalists, missing an important opportunity to explain themselves. To be true, the politicians of the Haredi political parties are interviewed about narrow religion issues and the demands of the political parties. Trends in Israel towards greater religiosity among the traditional non-strictly religious make dialogue essential. Recognising, perhaps realistically, that the mainstream media is Western, commercial, and democratic, Haredi rabbis and, to some extent, the modern Orthodoxcum-Hardal have taken the path of escapism to create their own alternative, religious media, in accordance with what rabbis believe the media should and should not be. Haredim have developed their own equivalents to media technological developments outside and professional equivalents to weekly magazines, radio broadcasting, and new media, including news websites. So while there was shared satisfaction between the public and journalists themselves on religion news, and also consensus about information gathering patterns about religion between the public, journalists, and even rabbis, 61% of rabbis as a whole were very critical of internet coverage of religion (as distinct from 28–29% of journalists and the public). Indeed, the very immediacy of a news website heralds poorly for accuracy and quality of reporting but bodes well for the quantity of religion coverage. Indeed, new media ensures an unlimited virtual space for religion. One of the questions about religion reporting concerns sexual intimidation by rabbis, on which there is no consensus between rabbis, the public, and journalists about whether the media should publish. Seventy-nine per cent of journalists very much agreed or much agreed that scandals involving rabbis be published in the

276 The unholy Jewish troika secular media. This contrasted very much with rabbis: Only 34% of modern Orthodox very much agreed or much agreed. Haredi rabbis were even less: 16%. Only non-Orthodox rabbis were proximate: 82% of non-Orthodox rabbis very much agreed or agreed that matters should be published. The public were in the middle at 52%, between journalists and modern Orthodox. Did it cause a desecration of God’s name? Fifty-five per cent of journalists agreed to a very great degree or a great degree, and so did 46% of the Israeli public. Forty per cent of Haredi rabbis said so, as did 49% of modern Orthodox rabbis. Sixty-three per cent and 62% of modern Orthodox rabbis, and 62% of Hardal rabbis agreed that it deterred, 66% of journalists also said so, and 67% of the public said so. While there is some consensus between the public and journalists, but Orthodox rabbis and non-Orthodox rabbis were qualified even though they also saw value that the publicity of such deeds deters rabbis as a whole. There is wide consensus among the public, journalists, and rabbis that the influence of religion coverage is low – in spite of such key questions on the public agenda as synagogue-state relations. Does the media’s coverage of religion influence? Only 10% of the public said they were influenced to a very great extent or to a great extent and a further 17% to some extent by what internet reported about religion. Similarly with rabbis, 52% of all rabbis said that the media’s coverage of religion had no impact upon them at all, and 29% a little (a total of 81%). The same was true with new media – notably with all Orthodox rabbis. It has been shown that advances in media technology impact not only mass media in general and religion reporting in particular but also in Jewish spiritual life itself – suggesting that today there are alternative channels beyond the synagogue pulpit for rabbis to spread their religious beliefs and messages, and the media environment is one of these channels. True, the traditional offline frameworks – the synagogue and yeshiva lectern – are still the major frameworks for rabbis. But there is also a growing, if unarticulated, recognition by rabbis in Israel that the broader culture, including the media, has channels both for reaching the religiously affiliated as well as for reaching out to the unaffiliated or the traditional but not strictly observant population. For reaching religious targeted audiences, the channels include shiurim given by key rabbis over satellite and Zoom. Computers and the internet have widened the potential. Torah websites provide access to ancient works, including Bible commentaries, the Talmud, law codes, and latter-day commentaries. The so-called Web Yeshiva is an alternative to the conventional “offline” yeshiva and enables individuals in far-flung places to study Talmudic texts simultaneously. Fifty-seven per cent of all rabbis agreed or were inclined to agree that the internet is a useful channel to advance religious issues. Indeed, 63% of the Israeli public agreed. For many religiously observant, but also for the broader nonstrictly religious, and those living in areas without a local Jewish community, the accessibility of rabbis through text messaging and e-mail has altered the relationship between the community rabbi and his or her congregants – even providing the sender anonymity, which an inquiry to an offline rabbi in one’s own community

The unholy Jewish troika 277 does not give. Adult Jewish education is mostly (though not all) found among the Orthodox, both modern Orthodox and Haredi. Surveys do not show that media technology had resulted in Judaism itself becoming popularised among secular or many traditional Jews. And surveys suggest that the potential for mass media channels as alternatives to traditional ones like the synagogue and yeshiva still lay mostly in the realm of theory. As a monotheistic faith, the central feature of Judaism in Israel is prayer and the synagogue. Jews prefer to pray together offline, in communities, including communal singing, and view offline services as a necessity – a casualty of Covid-19. So while technological features of adult Jewish education, such as databases, online shiurim, and asking the rabbi questions online are clues to the inroads which media technology has made here, these same activities offline also remain much in use today. AI. Artificial intelligence (AI) – the simulation of intelligent behaviour in computers, enabling the computer to extrapolate or deduce – has a potential to advance information technology yet further. It opens a Pandora’s box of questions not only about religion news reporting but about the role of the rabbi, indeed the Jewish faith itself. May AI be a rabbi? AI may provide speedy access to masses of religious information in a way unimaginable in the past. Indeed, there are some features of Judaism which may be affected by a machine alone. For example, the supervision of the production of kosher foods in accord with biblical dietary laws may be done simply by camera eyes. But Jewish law is subject to much interpretation. One of the roles of oral Jewish law is to guide the interpretation of Biblical written law – suggesting that a rabbi, steeped in years of learning to navigate between the rabbinical disputes in Jewish legal sources but also drawing upon experience, would be preferable over AI. Against the background of AI such developments as brain computer interfaces – enabling actions, simply by thinking, to be performed – may seem less relevant in a religion characterised by 613 deeds themselves rather than mere intent. To be true, intent in prayer and ritual (‘kavanah’) has an honoured place in Jewish doctrine, producing mileage for discussions in Jewish legal texts like the Talmud. May an entity like AI, lacking a soul, reach spiritual heights? Indeed, some positive commands in Jewish law – in particular prayer – may only be done with intent, or even in certain cases an enhanced intent. All this must raise doubts about AI because though it possesses knowledge, it lacks understanding or daat. True, AI provides a massive dimension in the quantity and speed with which information may be accessed – a superior value for a faith emphasising the value of education. And with so much contradictory information – such as on the Web – the need for accuracy by a journalist and editor covering the religion beat has raised alarm bells. And journalists in particular, in emphasising the paramount value of accuracy, may use AI but judiciously. In journalism, AI appears to offer news organisations tools for transcription, proofreading, fact-checking, and even social network analysis. But the many errors which artificial intelligence brings here have

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raised questions in a profession for which factual accuracy is fundamental. The need in religion news reporting, which is mostly text-based, to explain religious background – which may draw upon doctrinal or theological dispute – in a truly balanced manner has proven challenging. Moreover, in videos and images, the ease of recreating unreal images raises profound ethical questions. How efficient is a conversation with a rabbinical chatbot? A rabbi is a moral creature who has a message, to raise the moral stature of the human being – created in God’s image – to a higher moral level. It cannot be denied that a rabbi robot could not fulfil this. Yet essentially, the challenge for a human being is drawing on the principle of religious freewill to distinguish between good and bad. Artificial intelligence might be programmed with persuasive powers, but it may be argued that the human rabbi remains dominant in articulating the moral message of God – leaving for media channels a role for the rabbi even in the 21st century. Should rabbis also use media channels to project religion and their theological message? The extent to which in practice rabbis appear in the media, or to which journalists and editors see rabbis as potential media personalities, remains limited. Even when broader questions that have a moral component come up in the Israeli public arena, the media rarely turns to the rabbis for their opinions. Haredi and Hardal rabbis in particular are seen by the broad secular public as anti-progressive. While some rabbis are comfortable appearing in the media – drawing upon their pedagogic abilities – few have received any professional training in appearing in front of the camera or microphone. The modern religious rabbis are invited to appear in the electronic media but only to discuss narrow religious matters or political matters with religion dimensions, including matters of territory in the biblical areas of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Thus, rabbis thought it correct that they should appear in the media. Eighty per cent of rabbis thought it a good thing to be interviewed or quoted in the media – even to in practice rabbis said it was seldom in practice. Sixty-four per cent of rabbis had not been interviewed in previous year. When asked whether the Orthodox rabbinate and religious organisations were seen in a positive light, 29% of all rabbis did not agree and 44% agreed only to a small extent. Journalists are more divided about quoting rabbis: 30% agreed a lot that rabbis must be quoted in the media, and 35% said so to some extent – even though in practice rabbis said it rarely happened. Moreover, the public were clearly against this: 51% of the Israeli public agreed to a large extent. Only 20% favoured it unqualifiably or to a great extent. So while rabbis have identified a role of the media in dispensing religious values, these are ahead of their times since the public look negatively upon public channels of communication becoming mouthpieces of theologians and fear a democracy being replaced by a theocracy. Yet against the background of considerably rising Haredi birthrates and modern Orthodox birth rates, a revisit in future Israel may find a digital Holyland where rabbis may yet take the centre stage.

The unholy Jewish troika 279 Bibliography Ben-Porat, G. (2013) Between State & Synagogue: The Secularisation of Contemporary Israel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Central Bureau of Statistics. (2009). Jerusalem [Hebrew]. Cohen, Y. (2005) Religion News in Israel. Journal of Media & Religion 4(3). Liebman, C. (ed.). (1990) Conflict & Accommodation between Jews in Israel. Keter: Avi Chai. Pintak, L., & Nazir, S. J. (2013) Pakistani Journalism: At the Crossroads of Muslim Identity, National Priorities and Journalistic Culture. Media, Culture & Society 35(5). Shukrun-Nagar, P. (2013) The Construction of Paradoxes in News Discourse: The Coverage of the Israeli Haredi Community as a Case in Point. Discourse Studies 15(4). Smith, H. (1995) Haredi Image in Media. Poll, April. Stern, Y. Z., Yaffe, N., Malach, G., & Malchi, A. (2021) Hebrew: Jewish, Haredi, & Democratic: The State of Israel through Haredi Eyes. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute [Hebrew].

Appendix

Selected list of persons interviewed Rabbi Dr Aaron Adler, formerly Ohel Nehama Synagogue, Talbieh, Jerusalem, and the Neve Orot Synagogue, Ramot, Jerusalem Kobi Alter, spokesman, Chief Rabbinate Rabbi Ehud Bandel, former president, the Conservative Movement, Israel; former spokesman of the Conservative Movement Rabah Haya Becker, the Conservative Ramot Zion Synagogue, French Hill, Jerusalem Rabbi Ezra Bick, rabbi-teacher, Yeshiva Har-Etzion, Alon Shevut (responsible for the yeshiva’s computerisation, including the yeshiva website) Rabbi Yuval Cherlow, rosh yeshiva, Amit Orot Shaul; head, Ethics Committee, Tzohar, Tel Aviv Rabbi Ezra Cohen, rabbi-teacher, Yeshivat Bet-El, responsible for the computerisation of the yeshiva Rabbi Yossi Cohen, rabbi-teacher, Yeshiva Homoth Yerushalayim, Old City of Jerusalem Israel Cohen, political commentator, Kikar Shabbat news website Rabbi Elad Darshan, head, Kollel, Jerusalem *“Dayan A” *“Dayan B” *“Dayan C” Rabbi Moshe Deutsch, rabbi, Mirrer Yeshiva, Jerusalem Shai Doron, spokesman, religious law courts Rabbi Samuel Feurstein, town rabbi, Shaarei Tiqva Haim Gestetner, senior editor, Hamodia newspaper Rabbi Professor David Golinkin, former dean, the Schechter Institute (the Conservative Movement), Jerusalem Yaakov Grudaka, editor, B’Hadrei Haredim news website Mendy Grunzman, religion affairs reporter, Makor Rishon newspaper Rabbi Eliahu Gut, Coordinator Rabbinical Advisory Board, Mishpacha magazine Rabbi Dr Daniel Gutenmacher, class teacher, Mekor Hayim Religious High School, Kfar Etzion

Appendix 281 Dr Yemima Hovav, class teacher, the Pelech Girls High School, Jerusalem Rabbi Ezra Inde, rabbi-school teacher, the Tali School, Kiryat Yovel, Jerusalem Rabbi Raphael Kassler, rabbi, Haredi High School Mrs Kassler, teacher, Haredi Girls’ School Rabbi Jacob Kleiner, the Conservative Moreshet Avraham Synagogue, East Talpiot, Jerusalem Binyamin Klugman, editor, Hamodia newspaper Rabbi Yehuda Krinsky, former spokesman of the Lubavitcher Rebbe Habad, Rabbi Menahem Mendel Schneersohn Rabbi Zev Leff, Rabbi, Matityahu settlement Asher Lemel, religion affairs reporter, Hamevaser newspaper Rabbi Moshe Leventhal, community rabbi, Ginot Shomron (author of Rabbinical Issues in the Community [Hebrew]) Ziv Maor, former spokesman, Chief Rabbinate Rabbi Dow Marmor, provost, Hebrew Union College, Jerusalem Kobi Nachshoni, religion affairs reporter, Y-Net Rabbi Ronen Neuwirth, synagogue rabbi, Caesarea Rabbi Yisroel Ostry, headmaster, Ulpana Beth Yaacov (Haredi girls’ high school), Haifa Rabbi Moshe Pinhasi, rabbi, Mitzpe Jericho Synagogue, Jerusalem Rabbi Raphael Pinhasi, rabbi, HaShem Roii Synagogue, Jerusalem Benny Rabinowitz, who served as Haredi leader Rabbi Yehuda Leib Steineman’s media liaison Avi Rosen, spokesman, Ministry of Religious Services Dayan Rabbi Peretz Rudman, chair, bet din (religious law court), the Conservative movement Dayan Galia Saadon, chair, bet din (religious law court), the Reform movement in Israel, Rabbah, Temple Bet Daniel, Tel Aviv Yehuda Schlesinger, religion affairs reporter, Israel Hayom newspaper Yair Shirki, religion affairs reporter, Second Television Channel Jeremy Sharon, religion affairs reporter, Jerusalem Post newspaper Eli Schlesinger, police affairs reporter, B’Hadrei Haredim news website Rabbi Ari Abraham Smadja, town rabbi, Ramot Shlomo, Jerusalem Rabbi David Stav, town rabbi, Shoham Rabbi Yirmiyahu Stavitzky, headmaster, the Himelfarb High School, Jerusalem Mrs Efrat Urbach, former spokeswoman, Chief Rabbinate Rabbi Levi Weiman-Kelman, former rabbi, the Reform Kol Neshama Synagogue, Beka, Jerusalem Moshe Weisberg, reporter covering rabbis, B’Hadrei Haredim news website Rabbi Simcha Weiss, former rabbi, Kfar Haroeh; member of the Chief Rabbinate Council Rabbi David Yosef, rosh yeshiva (son of Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef ) * The names of Orthodox religious court judges are not listed since it is forbidden for judges (including religious court judges [dayan]) to give interviews.

Index

Note: page numbers in bold indicate a table on the corresponding page. abortion 142–143 accuracy of religious reporting 114–115, 172, 183–184; inaccuracy, allegations of 139–142 Adelson, M. 3 Adelson, S. 3 admorim (Hassidic leaders) 46, 49 advertising 184; in synagogue bulletins 225; see also PR (public relations) Agudat Yisrael political party 9–10, 37, 61, 217, 248 aguna (chained wives) 68–69, 102 Aish HaTorah Yeshiva 205 Alek, S. 83–85 Alfasi, Y. 223 Alim Terufat (bulletin) 225 Allen, J. 63, 169 Alter, Y. 71 anti-Semitism 48–49, 130 Arabic music 143 Arab-Israeli conflict 56 Arab world, perceived newsworthiness of 34 Arasa, F. 159, 198 archaeology 119, 132; biblical archaeology 131 artificial intelligence (AI) 277–278 Arutz 2 television station 100, 101–102 Arutz 7 news website: background and overview 10, 23, 24, 32; contrasted with other news websites 251–252; coverage of God and religion 35–36; coverage of non-Jewish religions 40–41; coverage of rabbis and office holders 46–48; coverage of religious streams 36–39; coverage of Sabbath and holydays 41–44; coverage of synagogue and

prayer 48–50; coverage of Western Wall and Temple Mount 50–51; and Orthodox Judaism 38–39 Arutz 14 television station 98 Askmoses.com 206 Asparia survey 239 atheism 99, 109–110, 134, 265; see also secularism (hiloni) audience interest 106, 111, 118 Auerbach, S. 250 Aviner, S. 70 avrechim (Haredi students) 154 BaKehilla (magazine) 11–12, 23, 219, 231 Bar-Ilan sheiltot database 152–153, 205 Barnoy, A. 5, 6 Barzilai, G. 24 Barzilai-Nahon, K. 24 BaSheva (newspaper) 10, 24, 219, 239–240 batei din see religious courts Baumel, S. D. 7 Baumel-Schwartz, J. T. 7, 24 Baumel-Schwartz, T. 24 BBC Radio 59 Becker, H. 223 Ben-Gurion, D. 3–4 Ben Levi, Y. 212 Bennett, J. M. 31 Berger, Y. 252 Berlander, E. 83 Bezek (telecommunications company) 1, 238, 254 B’Hadrei Haredim online news website 232, 251–252; background and overview 23, 32; in contrast to other news websites 251–252; coverage of God and religion 35–36; coverage of non-Jewish

Index religions 40–41; coverage of rabbis and office holders 46–48; coverage of religious streams 36–39; coverage of Sabbath and holydays 41–44; coverage of synagogue and prayer 48–50; coverage of Western Wall and Temple Mount 50–51; and newsworthiness of Haredim 38–39; and Orthodox Judaism 38–39; on sexual scandals 84 bias: in religious reporting 112, 139–142, 169 Bible: Bible readings 124; and role of media 182 biblical archaeology 131 Bick, E. 260 Bigman, D. 16 Bleiweiss, M. 211, 218 blogs and social networks 5, 111, 113, 115–116, 200, 202–203 Bnei Beraq survey 238 books and libraries, contrasted with online sources 151–152 Brother and Sister Controversy 65 Brown, D. W. 159 Buddenbaum, J. 60, 63 Cahaner, L. 236–238 Campbell, H. 31 Cannon, D. 159 Cantoni, L. 146, 159, 198 Caro, J. 212 Caspi, D. 6 censorship: Haredi media censors 242–244; right not to know 241 Central Bureau of Statistics social survey (2020) 107–109, 237 Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR) 212 Chabad branch of Judaism vii, 205, 247 Chabad.org 206, 211 chametz (leavened bread), avoidance of during Passover 53, 96, 104, 129 charity: and philanthropy 214, 246 Cherlow, Y. 24, 158, 187, 206, 210, 259–260 Chicago Sun-Times 40 Chicago Tribune 40 Chief Rabbinate, Israel 63–64, 78–79, 176, 247; case of aguna 68–69; information policy 67–68 Christianity: Israeli Christians 143; denominational streams 169–170; media coverage of 40–41, 52–53, 55, 103, 167; ministers and media

283

influences 159; US denominations surveyed on media use 198 Chwat, A. 24 civil marriage 44, 45, 48, 67, 69 Cohen, E. 207 Cohen, G. 252 Cohen, I. 240 Cohen, J. 6 Cohen, Y. 7, 24, 41, 167 computer filtering programmes 254–255 conflict/confrontation and newsworthiness of stories 31 congregational/community websites 19, 199, 212, 219–222; other religious groups 198 Conservative Judaism 21–22, 25, 38, 39, 63; accessibility of rabbis 71–72; religious press, articles and interviews 75–76; status in Israel 129 content, inappropriate 142–143 conversion (Giur) 18, 44, 45, 48, 102 copyright 193 Council of Torah Sages 23, 46, 68, 71, 248 counseling, online 205–211 Covid-19 42, 155, 196, 214–216, 227, 238 Cowan, D. 31 cremation 207 cyber-synagogues 211–217 Daat website 152, 205 daf yomi (daily study of theTalmud) 217–220 Dart, J. 63, 169 Davar (trade union newspaper) 3 Dawson, L. 31 Dayan, D. 216, 219 dayanim (religious court judges) 18, 46, 66, 154–155 deception 184; see also accuracy Degel Torah political party 9–10, 248, 249, 250 Deri, A. 252 Deutsch, I. 256–257 Dickovsky, S. 193 divorce 18, 65, 66, 68–69, 155 Druckman, H. 70 e-commerce 193 economics, perceived newsworthiness of 34 editors and producers 55 education 17–18, 20, 150; see also yeshiva education/culture, perceived newsworthiness of 35

284

Index

Efrat (non-profit organisation) 142 Eickelman, D. F. 31 Eidat Haredi 46; see also Council of Torah Sages electricity use on Sabbath 4, 96, 192, 213 Eliahu, M. 196 Elon, M. 83 Elyashiv, S. 249 e-mail consultations and rabbis 205–211 entertainment: as function of media 168; Jewish entertainment 119, 131–132; operation on Sabbath 42, 43 Erev Shabbat (weekly newspaper) 100, 231 Ethics of the Fathers 210 Evron, S. 143 fasting 43–44; see also Yom Kippur Feldman, D. Z. 24 Ferre, J. 59 Feuchtwanger, M. 218 filtering programmes 254–255 Finkel, A. 257 Finnegan, J. 159 food traditions, Jewish 131 Frankel, A. 152 freedom of the press 181–183 Friedman, I. 249 Frost, J. K. 198 Gabel, I. 7 Galei Israel (radio station) 10 Galei Zahal (radio station) 98, 100 Garrett-Medill survey 29, 40 genevat daat (false impression) 184 Gestetner, H. 242 Gillis, Israel 140–141 Globus website 4 God: desecration of name 36, 86, 276; Divine Presence in communal prayer 212; perceived newsworthiness of 35–36 God, Jews and the Media (Cohen) viii Golan, G. 159 Goldman, A. 61 Goren, S. 65 gossip (loshon hara) 97, 137, 182, 184–188, 240–241 Green, J. C. 60, 62 Greenwood, H. 71, 100 Gross, H. 218 Grudaka, Y. 66 Grunzman, M. 31 Gurdatski, T. 68

Gut, E. 242–243 Gutman Institute for Applied Social Research, survey 8, 104, 200 Haaretz (newspaper) 3, 4, 161, 164, 165, 166, 219; on rabbinical scandals 83–84 Haaretz news website: background and overview 32; contrasted with other news websites 251–252; coverage of God and religion 35–36; coverage of non-Jewish religions 40–41; coverage of rabbis and office holders 46–48; coverage of religious streams 36–39; coverage of Sabbath and holydays 41–44; coverage of synagogue and prayer 48–50; coverage of Western Wall and Temple Mount 50–51; and newsworthiness of Haredim 38–39; and Orthodox Judaism 38–39 halakha (Jewish religious law) 63; Conservative vs. Orthodox approaches 72; Halakha Committees 17; halakhic questions and technological communication 207–208; halakhic rulings 45–46, 47, 125–126, 154; information on websites 151; root of Hebrew word 179; Torah as basis of 179 HaLashon Line 204 Halevanon (Hebrew language newspaper) 3 Ha-Levi, A. M. 24 Halakhah Line 204 Hamevaser (newspaper) 9–10, 22, 47, 160, 231, 248 Hamishpacha see Mishpacha (weekly magazine) Hamodia (newspaper) 9, 22, 47, 65, 68, 160, 219, 231, 248 Hanukah 43, 246 Harav Kook Yeshiva see Yeshivat Merkaz Harav Kook Hardal Orthodoxy 21, 25, 87–88; attitudes regarding public relations 78; Hardal views 141 Haredi Judaism: attitudes regarding public relations 78; avrechim (Haredi students) 154; background 7; ban on internet use 149; CBS survey of preferred news sources 107; and digital media 234–240; educational policies 252–253, 254–257; interest in Jewish diaspora 130; Israel as

Index Torah-observant 134; journalistic and publishing standards 240–252; journalists’ perceptions of 267; Lithuanian vs. Hassidic 20; and mass media sources 20, 23, 25, 80–82; in modern Israel 20–21; newsworthiness of 37, 38–39; perceptions of accuracy in news media 115; political power 37; press 9–10; public image 140–141; public perceptions of 264–267; radio stations 75; and religion content in media 31; sexual scandals 83–85; special interest media 230–234; status of women 140, 216, 236, 238, 242, 262; women reporters, comfort with 100; see also Litai (Lithuanian) Haredi: Haredi Leumi see Hardal Orthodoxy Haredim 10 news website 23, 232 Harrisberg, D. 89–90 Hassidic Judaism 204; Gur Hassidic community 71; Hassidic court 46 Hatzofe (newspaper) 24 Havatzelet (Hebrew language newspaper) 3 Hebrew language: computer sources 153; media 3; rabbis’ mastery of 76 Hebrew Union College (HUC) 257 Herzog, L. 5, 6 Hetsroni, A. 7 hiloni (secularism) see secularism (hiloni) hilul hashem 43, 85, 86–87, 135; see also scandals Hobbs, V. 31 Hofetz Hayim; Kohen, Israel Meir; loshon hara 182, 184, 240, 248 Holocaust 217 Horowitz, N. 24 Hovav, Y. 255 hozrei b’shealah 128 hozrei b’teshuva 128 Ilan, S. 100 immigrant media in Israel 3 immoral deeds 86; see also scandals Instagram 1 internet: dangers of 147–148; filters 190–191; Haredi policies 234–240, 253–257; news websites 2–5; and rabbinical roles 19–20; religious internet 10–11 Introvigne, M. 29 Islam: media coverage of 40–41, 52–53, 55

285

Israel: Central Bureau of Statistics social survey (2020) 107–109; digital connectivity statistics 1–2; foreign language press 3; Israeli army (IDF Israel Defense Forces) 123; journalists and public perceptions of 103–104; journalists’ interactions with news sources 62–63; media coverage of religion 169–173; modern rabbinic roles 17–19; national service requirements 250; news sources 2–5, 63–66; political parties 123–124; religion and state as news category 121–122; religious communities in surveys 6; religious courts 18, 20; religious education systems 17–18, 20; religious media 10–11, 22–26; religious streams 20–22, 120–121, 150–151, 155, 257–258; religious topics of interest to public 118–120; research literature on state-religion relationships 24; school systems 51–52, 150; secularism 18, 134; secularism vs. religiosity 80, 106, 169; secular media 10, 264–267; separation of synagogue and state 272–273; supervision of media 191–192; television broadcasting 3–4 Israel Broadcasting Authority (IBA) 138–144 Israel Democracy Institute 7–8, 239 Israel Hayom (newspaper) 3, 30, 71, 89–90, 100, 160 Israeli Advertisers Association 237 Israel Radio 139–140 Jerusalem 124 Jerusalem Post 30, 61, 100; website 4 Jerusalem Yeshiva of Tzeirim 140 Jewish diaspora 47, 49, 68, 130, 163 Johansson, F. 29 journalists: r news sources 61–62; coverage of religion in Israel 9–11; crime reporters 251; cultural factors in rating newsworthiness 51–55; editor-journalist relationships 55; entrance into profession 97–98; ideology and selection of stories 29–31; intimidation of 84; Jewish vs. secular roles 274–278; perceptions of effects of media coverage 8–9;

286

Index

perceptions of rabbis 76–79; and public image of Judaism 5; rating of news sources 72–73; religious media as information source 80–83; religious observance of 95–100; role and functions 5–6; theological beliefs 92–95; trust in religious authority 79–80; views on newsworthiness of religious topics 33–34; see also religious affairs reporters Judaism: accuracy of religious reporting 114–115, 139–142, 172, 183–184; alternative Jewish community 226–227; Jewish annual life cycle 122–123; Jewish law 154, 158; Jewish pastoral theology 148–158; Jewish studies 126; Jewish theory of communication 182; journalism and image of 92; media coverage of Sabbath and holydays 41–44; protection of by media 73–76; public image of 5; religious holiday observance 96; religious identity formation and media 199–204; religious streams 20–22, 25, 36–39, 73–76; settlement movement 32, 36, 38; weekly religious calendar 149–153; Zionism 47; see also Conservative Judaism; Haredi Judaism; Modern Orthodox (dati leumi) Judaism; Reform Judaism kaddish prayers 207, 213 Kan (Israel Broadcasting Authority) 138–144 kashrut (dietary laws) 21–22, 67, 95, 129–130, 143 Katz, E. 6, 216, 119 Kikar Shabbat (news website) 23, 84, 232, 251 Kippa website 152, 205, 206 Knesset Watch 227 Kohen, Israel Meir see Hofetz Hayyim Kol Israel 3 Kook, A. 140, 184 Kook, S. 248 Korngott, E. M. H. 24 kosher food see kashrut (dietary laws) Kotel see Western Wall Krinsky, Y. vii Lambert, J. 159 Landau, C. 63

Langer, H. 65 Langer, M. 65 Lau, D. 65 Lau, I.M. 65, 71 Lee, J. 198 Leff, Z. 188 Leibowitz, N. 223 Lerner, H. G. 149 Lev-On, A. 7 life-cycle events 50, 151, 215–216 Limor, Y. 6 Litai (Lithuanian) Haredi 20, 22, 101, 243, 247, 248, 249–250 Livio, O. 6 Livne, Tzipi 69 loshon hara (negative speech or gossip) 137, 182, 184–188, 240–241 Lubavitcher Rebbe (Rabbi Mendel Menachem Schneerson) vii, 196, 211 Maaleh School for Film Arts 97–98 Maariv (newspaper) 3, 215; NRG news site 4 Maimonides 150, 179, 184, 206, 211 Makor Rishon (newspaper) 10, 24, 31, 161, 162, 166, 219, 239–240; website 4 Mandatory Palestine 139 Marmur, M. 257 marriage, civil 44, 45, 48, 67, 69 media: accuracy and balance 11–12; editors and producers, influence of 55; influence on public 136–137; influence on rabbis 173–177; rabbinical evaluations of 179–181; religious separatist media 232–234; secular media as “unclean” 71 media events 216–219 media studies: content analysis 31–32; content analysis, author’s methodology 31–35, 32–33 Melava Malka 141 Melekh Hakodesh forum 157 Meshi Zahav, Y. 83–84, 101 Metzger, Y. 210 Meyers, O. 6, 7 mikva (ritual baths) 30, 216 Ministry of Religious Services, Israel 8, 49, 63–64, 68, 70, 247, 251 minyan (public worship), virtual 211–217 miracles: miracle tales 125; news value of 39–40 Mirrer Yeshiva, Jerusalem 158, 256–257

Index Mishpacha (weekly magazine) 11–12, 23, 219, 231, 232, 243 mitzvot 53, 94, 135, 204 Modern Orthodox (dati leumi) Judaism: background and overview 9, 10, 17–18, 20–24, 221, 230; and community building 232–233; contrasted with Hardal 182; cultural walls 239; and media controls 257–258; and newsworthiness of stories 37–39, 41; and online rabbinic counseling 205; perceptions of media 264–267; rabbis’ accessibility to reporters 70–71; rabbis’ exposure to news media 159–160, 267; rabbis’ possession of technology 147–148; scandals 85–88; and school religious systems 51–52; and sexual modesty 189 modesty 97, 138, 188–191; pictures of women 241–242 Moreshet website/panel 152, 205, 206 mourning rituals 214; see also kaddish prayers music: non-Jewish 143; religious 168; women’s voices 242 Nachshoni, I. 100 Nachshoni, K. 37, 71, 100, 101, 102 Nazir, S. J. 271 Neiger, M. 7 Neriya-Ben Shahar, R. 7 Netanyahu, B. 3 Neubach, K. 141 Neuwirth, R. 156, 162, 188, 206, 209, 226, 260 news values: journalists’ perceptions of Judaism 33–35, 44–46; public perceptions of Judaism 36–39, 41 news websites see Arutz 7 news website; B’Hadrei Haredim online news website; Haaretz news website; Y-Net news website New York Times 40, 164 Nissim, M. 102 O’Connor, J. J. 61 Olam Katan (weekly bulletin) 224 online counseling 205–211 online prayer 211–217 Orthodox Judaism 38; cultural walls 239–240; Hardal vs. mainstream 87–88; Jewish populations 20–21,

287

25; Maaleh School for Film Arts 97–98; religious press, articles and interviews 75–76; see also Modern Orthodox (dati leumi) Judaism Otzar Hochmah website 152, 153 OurJewishCommunity.org 212 Passover (Pesach) 43, 212, 215–216, 245; Passover seder 96, 141 payot (sidelocks) 102 Peles (newspaper) 9–10, 22, 160, 231 Peri, Y. 6 philanthropy and charity 214 phones: lines for access to rabbis 204; mobile 24, 254 Pintak, L. 271 Pinto, I. 252 politics: political parties, religious 12, 22–24, 31, 37, 44–46, 62, 123–124, 275; political party press 3, 9–10; and religion 44–46 pornography 147–148, 164 poskei halakha (religious law rulers) 46 PR (public relations): and journalistic story selection 30; press releases and official communiques 60, 69–72; professionalism for religious bodies 59; see also advertising prayer, media coverage of 48–50; see also tefilla (Jewish prayer) privacy: and security concerns on Internet 2; and social gossip 184–188 public agenda and religion 20, 45, 112, 175, 244, 276 public exposure: to new media 199–201, 253–254, 274–278; to news websites 42–43; to religion news 5–6, 18, 20–21, 111–117, 132–133, 136–138, 264–266; to television 159 public views of journalism 99–100, 103–105, 109 Purim, 17 246 purity, ritual 209 rabbis: in 21st century 16–17; and alternative Jewish community 226–227; changing roles of 15–16, 196; communication with colleagues/forums 156–158; computer skills 155–156, 203; coverage in media 46–48, 267–268; death of rabbis 142–143, 245; evaluation of mass media 179–181; Hebrew language mastery 76;

288

Index

information technology and pastoral theology 148–158; interest in religion news 166–168, 169–172, 175–177; interest in secular news 159–166, 168–169, 173–175; internet access 147–148; and Israeli media coverage of religion 169–173; and Jewish religious law 150; Jewish vs. secular roles for media 272–278; journalists’ perceptions of 76–79; in modern Israel 17–19; new media, use of 19–20, 147–148, 156–158; news media exposure 158–166, 173–177; newsworthiness of stories concerning 244–245; online counseling 205–211; “public rabbis” 26; rabbi as teacher 204–211; rabbinical scandals 83–90, 135–136, 276; rabbinic authority 258–262; rabbis’ communication through media 133–135; rabbis quoted in media 73–76, 77; as role models 125; rosh yeshiva 46; shiurim preparation 149; teacherrabbis 17–18, 20; teacher-rabbis vs. community rabbis 205–206; views on the media 168–173 Rabbis and Rabbinate (Stern) 18 Rabin, I. 241 Rabinowitz, A. 83–85, 101 Rabinowitz, B. 248, 249 radio: broadcasting in Israel 3, 23; phone-in programs 204; use by Haredim 107 Radio Kol Berama 23, 75, 204, 218, 231, 237, 242 Radio Kol Chai 23, 75, 100, 204, 218, 231, 237 Rakover, N. 185 rape 251 Rapetti, E. 159, 198 Rashi (commentator) 124, 153 Reform Action Centre 227 Reform Judaism 21–22, 25, 36, 38, 39, 63; accessibility of rabbis 71–72; religious press, articles and interviews 75–76; and Sabbath observance 213; status in Israel 129 Reich, Z. 5, 6 religion: intersection with politics 44–46; journalists’ trust in religious authority 79–80; media coverage of services 48–50; media influence on 136–138; miracles 39–40, 125; newsworthiness of 29–31,

33–34; non-Jewish religion 167; perceptions of effects of media coverage 8–9; religion-related news 166–168; religious authority 46, 79–80, 258–259; religious internet 10–11; religious media in Israel 22–26 Religious Action Centre 63 religious affairs reporters 58–63, 100–103; knowledge of 62–63, 103,172–173; official communiques 69–72; public perceptions of 117–118; role of 60; women as 61, 100; see also journalists religious courts 66–67; use of computers 154–155 Religious Courts Administration 63–64, 66 religious holydays and festivals 245–248 religious media 80–83, 114–115 religious political parties 12, 22–24, 31, 37, 44–46, 62, 123–124, 275 Religious Publicity Council 59 reporters see journalists Richardson, J. Y. 29 Roeh, I. 6 Rokeach, E. 196 Roman, A. 198 Rosh Hashanah 43, 49, 213, 215 Roth, S. 252 Rottenberg, D. 252 Sabbath and holydays 41–44, 96–97, 122, 143–144, 192–193, 213 scandals 83–90, 135–136, 275–276 Schechter Institute 158, 165 Schlesinger, Y. 30, 37, 71–72, 83, 90, 100, 101 Schmidt, A. 141 Schneersohn, M.M. see Lubavitcher Rebbe Schocken, A. 36 Schocken, Z. 36 Schottenstein Talmud 218 Schwartz, Y. 24 secularism (hiloni) 128–129; secular Jews 226–227; secular-religious divide 267–272; tension with Orthodox Jewry 169 Sefaria website 152, 205 separation of synagogue and state 44–45, 121–122, 270–271, 272–273 sexual assault 251 sexual modesty 137–138 sexual scandals 83–90 Shabbaton (independent bulletin) 224

Index Shabbat V’Shabato 223–224 Shach, E. 231 Shapiro, M. 218 sharia law 59 Sharon, J. 30, 70 Sharon, R. 83 Shas political party 37, 248 sheiltot 152–153, 198 Sherki, Yair 30, 70, 83, 100, 102 Shinfeld, M. 249 shiurim (religion lessons) 149, 150, 195, 196, 200; on MP3 218; online shiurim 211, 218 Shoika, J. 152 Shomrei Emunim faction 9–10 Shteinman, A. Y. M. 101, 247, 249–250 Shulkhan Arukh (law code) 150, 206, 212 Shuvu Bonim yeshiva 83 sidelocks (payot) 102 Siegel, J. 61 Simhat Torah 49, 50 Smidt, C. E. 159 Smith, H. 271 Smith, M. M. 198 Smith, R. 200 SMS (short message service)/texting 156, 209–210 social network participation 1–2, 110, 111–112, 116, 186; and accuracy of news 115; and Jewish knowledge 201; loshon hara (negative speech or gossip) 137 social welfare, perceived newsworthiness of 35 sport and Judaism 132 Stav, D. 226, 260 Stavitsky, Y. 255–256 Steinberg, P. 142 Steinzaltz, A. 102, 218 stereotypes of religious people, 112 Stern, Y. 18 Sturgill, A. 198 Sukkot (Feast of Tabernacles) 43, 245 Swanson, D. 31 synagogues: media coverage of 48–50, 127; in modern Israel 17; synagogue websites 219–222 synagogue bulletins (alonei bet knesset) 19–20, 223–226 tallitot (prayer shawl) 30 Talmud 153; a page a day (daf yomi) 217–219; and social gossip 185 Tardini, S. 159, 198

289

Tau, Z. 70–71 tefillin (phylacteries) 30, 48, 49 tefilla (Jewish prayer) 127–128, 149 Teitelbaum, E. 153, 217 telephones see phones television: Haredi ban on 249–250; Israel TV Second channel 70; as news source, age gap in use 2–3; television broadcasting in Israel 3–4; use by rabbis 160 Temple Emanuel, New York 212 Temple Mount: media coverage of 50–51; public interest in 124; see also Western Wall (Kotel) Ten Commandments 36, 41, 42, 144, 192, 217 terefah (non-kosher food) 104; see also kashrut (dietary laws) Tetragrammaton 36 texting/SMS (short message service) 156, 209–210 Tik Tok 1 Times of Israel news website 4 Torah: as basis of halakha 179; media coverage of 49–50; Torah-based values 20–21; Torah scrolls 124 Torah Communication Network 153, 217 Tsfati, Y. 6, 7 tzniut (sexual modesty) 138, 188–191 Tzohar (Orthodox association) 70, 226, 260 Tzurba Mirabanenu (educational organisation) 200 ultra-Orthodox Jewish population see Haredi Orthodoxy Underwood, D. 92–93 United States: Christianity and media coverage of religion 169–170; journalists’ religiosity 92–93; Protestant press 59; religious coverage in media 29 Urbach, E. 67 USA Today 40 Vanderbilt University Freedom Forum 169 Vannini, S. 159, 198 Viswanath, V. 159 Voice of Palestine 3 Walder, H. 83–85, 101 Walla news website 4 Warhaftig, I. 24 Washington Post 164 Web Yeshiva 195

290

Index

Weiss, A. 100 Western Wall (Kotel), 214; media coverage of, 30, 43, 50–51; online prayer services 216; public interest in 124; Women of the Wall 141 Westerstahl, J. 29 WEVD radio station 211 WhatsApp 1, 206, 210 Williams, R. 59 Winston, D. 60, 62 women: Haredi women 140, 217, 236, 238, 242, 262; as journalists 61, 100; menstrual cycles and ritual purity 207, 209; pictures of 241–242; sexual assault of Haredi women 140; status of 30–31; women’s voices 242 Women of the Wall 141 World at One, The (BBC radio programme) 59 Worlds of Journalism Project 59, 79–80, 92–93, 95 Yated Neeman (newspaper) 9, 22, 140–141, 160, 161, 164, 164, 166, 188, 219, 231, 249 Yediot Aharonot (newspaper) 3, 32, 64, 69, 100, 160, 219; Y-Net news site 4 yeshiva: internet and new media technology 254–257; role and functions 16–17; yeshiva budgeting 45, 47–48; yeshiva libraries 151–152; yeshiva websites 152

Yeshivat Merkaz Harav Kook 139–140 Yishai, E. 252 Yisroel Hayom see Israel Hayom (newspaper) Y-Net news website: background and overview 32; contrasted with other news websites 251–252; coverage of God and religion 35–36; coverage of non-Jewish religions 40–41; coverage of rabbis and office holders 46–48; coverage of religious streams 36–39; coverage of Sabbath and holydays 41–44; coverage of synagogue and prayer 48–50; coverage of Western Wall and Temple Mount 50–51; and newsworthiness of Haredim 38–39; and Orthodox Judaism 38–39 Yom Kippur 43–44, 213, 215, 245–246 Yom Le Yom (newspaper) 22 Yom Shishi (weekly magazine) 100, 231 Yosef, D. 65–66 Yosef, I. 68 Yosef, O. 30, 64–66, 68, 141, 196 Yosef, Y. 141 Youngblood, N. E. 198 YouTube 1 ZAKA (search and rescue organisation) 83 Zandberg, E. 6–7 Zeliger, B. 6 Zilberschlag, D. 252 Zyga, S. 146, 198