R. S. Peters 9781441158048, 9781472590510, 9781441135964

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R. S. Peters

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Titles in the Bloomsbury Library of Educational Thought Series: St Thomas Aquinas, Vivian Boland OP Aristotle, Alexander Moseley St Augustine, Ryan N. S. Topping Pierre Bourdieu, Michael James Grenfell Jerome Bruner, David R. Olson Confucius, Charlene Tan John Dewey, Richard Pring Michel Foucault, Lynn Fendler Paulo Freire, Daniel Schugurensky John Holt, Roland Meighan John Locke, Alexander Moseley Loris Malaguzzi and the Reggio Emilia Experience, Kathy Hall, Mary Horgan, Anna Ridgway, Rosaleen Murphy, Maura Cunneen and Denice Cunningham

Maria Montessori, Marion O’Donnell A. S. Neill, Richard Bailey John Henry Newman, James Arthur and Guy Nicholls Robert Owen, Robert A. Davis and Frank O’Hagan R. S. Peters, Stefaan E. Cuypers and Christopher Martin Jean Piaget, Richard Kohler Plato, Robin Barrow Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Jürgen Oelkers Rudolf Steiner, Heiner Ullrich Leo Tolstoy, Daniel Moulin Lev Vygotsky, René van der Veer E. G. West, James Tooley Mary Wollstonecraft, Susan Laird

Series Editor: Richard Bailey is a writer and researcher in education and sport. A former teacher in both primary and secondary schools and a teacher trainer, he has been Professor at a number of leading Universities in the UK. He now lives and works in Germany.

Members of the Advisory Board Robin Barrow, Professor of Philosophy, Simon Fraser University, Canada. Peter Gronn, Professor of Education, Head of Faculty, University of Cambridge, UK. Kathy Hall, Professor of Education and Head of the School of Education at University College Cork, Ireland. Stephen Heyneman, Professor of International Educational Policy at the College of Education and Human Development, Vanderbilt University, USA. Yung-Shi Lin, President Emeritus and Professor, Department of Education and Institute of Graduate Studies,Taipei Municipal University of Education, Republic of China, Taiwan.

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Gary McCulloch, Head of Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Institute of Education, University of London, UK. Jürgen Oelkers, Professor of Education at the University of Zurich, Switzerland. Richard Pring, Emeritus Professor at the Department of Education, and Emeritus Fellow of Green Templeton College, University of Oxford, UK. Harvey Siegel, Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, USA. Richard Smith, Professor of Education, University of Durham, UK. Zhou Zuoyu, Professor, Faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University, People’s Republic of China

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R. S. Peters STEFAAN E. CUYPERS AND CHRISTOPHER MARTIN

Continuum Library Bloomsbury Library of of Educational Educational Th Thought Series Editor: Richard Bailey Volume 18

LON DON • N E W DE L H I • N E W YOR K • SY DN EY

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Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

www.bloomsbury.com First published 2013 by Continuum International Publishing Group Paperback edition first published 2014 by Bloomsbury Academic © Stefaan E. Cuypers and Christopher Martin, 2013 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Stefaan E. Cuypers and Christopher Martin have asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Authors of this work. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: PB: 978-1-4725-1879-8 Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Cuypers, Stefaan E., 1958– R. S. Peters/Stefaan E. Cuypers and Christopher Martin. pages cm. – (Continuum library of educational thought; volume 18) (Continuum library of educational thought volume 18) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4411-5804-8 (hardback) – ISBN 978-1-4725-1879-8 (pbk.) – ISBN 978-1-4411-3596-4 (epdf) – ISBN 978-1-4411-0232-4 (epub) 1. Peters, R. S. (Richard Stanley), 1919–2011–Infl uence. 2. Peters, R. S. (Richard Stanley), 1919–2011–Criticism and interpretation. 3. Education–Philosophy. 4. Moral education. I. Title. LB880.P43C89 2013 370.1–dc23 2013012210

Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India Printed and bound in Great Britain

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Stefaan dedicates this book to David Carr (Edinburgh), John Haldane (St Andrews), and the memory of Terence McLaughlin. Christopher dedicates this book to Graham Haydon (London), Judith Suissa (London), and Vanessa.

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Contents

Series Editor’s Preface Foreword Acknowledgments

ix xi xiv

Part 1 Intellectual Biography 1 Peters’ Analytic Paradigm in the Philosophy of Education

3

Part 2 Critical Exposition of R. S. Peters’ Educational Thought 2 The Concept of Education, Aims, and Educational Processes 3 Initiation and the Educated Person 4 The Ethical Justification of Education 5 Liberal Education, the Quality of Life, and Teacher Training 6 Comprehensive Moral Education and Personal Autonomy 7 Educating the Emotions and the Life of Reason

29 48 74 104 136 171

Part 3 Reception and Relevance of R. S. Peters’ Work 8 The Impact and Importance of Peters’ Analytic Paradigm

209

Notes Bibliography Index

231 238 247

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Series Editor’s Preface

Most of the books in this series take the form of what might be called “philosophical biography ” in the area of educational studies. Their shared purpose, simply put, is to understand the thoughts and practices of certain educational philosophers. Straightaway, this project is confronted with some potential difficulties. As even a cursory reading of the list of thinkers whose names provide the titles within the series will testify, many are not ordinarily considered philosophers. Some can be more sensibly located in other areas of the academy—sociology, economics, psychology, and so on. Others seem unsuited to the label because their contribution to education is primarily in terms of its practice. In the narrow, disciplinary sense, then, many of the subjects of this series are clearly not philosophers. In another sense, however, and this is the sense employed by Jean-Paul Sartre in his own attempts in the genre, a philosophical biography can be written about anyone whose thought is important and interesting. In this sense, I suggest, each of the thinkers acknowledged in this series are philosophers. Implicit within the Bloomsbury Continuum Library Library of of Educational Educational Thought Thought is an assertion that theories and the practices that follow from them (and equally, practices and the theories that lie implicitly within them) are vitally important for education. By gathering the ideas of some of the most important and interesting educational thinkers, from the Ancient Greeks to contemporary scholars, the series has the ambitious task of providing an accessible yet authoritative resource for a generation of students and practitioners. It will always be possible to question the list of key thinkers that are represented in this series. Some may question the inclusion of

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certain thinkers; some may disagree with the exclusion of others. That is inevitably going to be the case. There is no suggestion that the list Bloomsbury Library Library of of Educational of thinkers represented within the Continuum Thought Th ought is in any way definitive. What is incontestable is that these thinkers have fascinating ideas about education, and that taken together, the Library can act as a powerful source of information and inspiration for those committed to the study of education. Richard Peters was not included in the original list of notable educational thinkers that informed the planning of this series. With the benefit of hindsight, and the case presented by Stefaan Cuypers and Christopher Martin, this was obviously an error. Peters was a hugely influential intellectual, whose magisterial presence can still be seen in both the approach and content adopted by many modern-day philosophers of education. In the absence of a comparable text, Stefaan Cuypers and Christopher Martin would have performed a valuable service by simply summarizing and explaining Peters’ key concepts for a new audience. In fact, they have done much more. Without doubt, this is the most authoritative, scholarly treatment of Peters, Hirst, and the analytical tradition in the philosophy of education ever written, and it is likely to remain as such for years to come. It will, I hope, introduce Peters to a new generation of educational students. But it should also be embraced by the most experienced scholars who are open to Cuypers’ and Martin’s invitation that they think again about quite fundamental issues. The intellectual biography introduced a barely known aspect to this work, and addresses an ahistorical tendency among writers in the field. Even those themes that have been discussed more fully in the past, such as the use of conceptual analysis and the characteristic ‘what is’ questions that sprung from it, are located so thoughtfully within wider philosophical debates that they take on renewed relevance and interest. Those of us introduced to Peters through his ‘Ethics and Education’ will now have to return to that book with our attention properly educated by these authors’ fascinating insights. This is a superb book, and I am delighted that it is a part of the Bloomsbury Library Library of of Educational Continuum Educational Thought Thought. Stefaan Cuypers and Christopher Martin have produced an exemplary volume that reflects the ambition and potential of this series.

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Foreword

Richard Peters was my first teacher of philosophy, when I was studying at Birkbeck College, University of London, in the early 1960s. He was also my longstanding friend and colleague, when we later taught philosophy of education at Birkbeck’s neighbor, the Institute of Education. I remember him from my first term at Birkbeck, leading discussions on chapters of Ryle’s The Concept of Mind. He led most typically by silence, puffing away at his pipe while we all inwardly wrestled with a question he had posed us, as he waited patiently until one of us broke the stillness. His interests were always in broad matters to do with human nature and human conduct. I don’t think that he would have embraced Dewey ’s notion that philosophy as a whole can be defined as the general theory of education, but certainly the areas and problems of philosophy in which he was interested always lay in the immediate hinterland of educational concerns. With his Institute colleague Paul Hirst, he was founder of the analytic style of philosophy of education that took root in Britain in the 1960s and later quickly spread across the English-speaking world. His work on the eastern side of the Atlantic was matched on the western by Israel Scheffler from Harvard, the person who first introduced Richard Peters to the new-style philosophy of education. They remained friends and colleagues throughout Peters’ life. One of the latter’s early objectives was to subject to conceptual analysis the concepts that are as central to this sub-branch of philosophy as God, sin and soul are to the philosophy of religion or cause, theory, and falsification are to the philosophy of science. But the work that he and others undertook on the concepts of education, teaching, indoctrination, learning, and others has proved less productive than

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another achievement. This was to bring the clarity, respect for cogency of argument, and historical rootedness of mid-twentieth-century AngloAmerican philosophy to the investigation of fundamental educational issues—about the purposes of education and their link with the pursuit of truth and with human well-being, a curriculum appropriate to these aims, moral education and education for democracy, the mind of the learner, the distribution of education, the freedom that pupils should have to determine what they should learn. While the former of these two enterprises was a perhaps misguided move to forge a new specialism within philosophy, the latter was more in accord with Peters’ fundamental philosophical orientation. More than most of his mid-century colleagues in philosophy, he was never content to restrict ethics to second-order enquiries, but, driven by a desire for human betterment emanating from his Quaker inclinations as well as from a wider postwar ethos, pursued ethical thinking into substantial issues of education like those just described, as well as into areas of public policy, as in his critical work on the 1967 Plowden Report on primary education. In this, in retrospect, he can be seen as an early pioneer of the normative and applied ethics since practiced more widely in philosophy. As well as giving shape to the new philosophy of education, Peters was the major force in creating the structures within which it was to flourish—the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain and the Journal of Philosophy of Education. He was a founding father of the large, globally widespread, community of scholars and teachers now working in the subject. He and his associates, being first in the field, set an agenda for later development of the area by their work on its fundamental issues. The foundations laid, more recent work in philosophy of education has sometimes become more fragmented, more attentive to what some would see as peripheral investigations. Peters’ groundbreaking work remains a continual reminder of the core preoccupations of the subject with which many, if not most, present-day philosophers of education remain engaged. This is why I welcome Stefaan Cuypers’ and Christopher Martin’s exposition and critical discussion of the main themes in Richard Peters’ work. Although there have been many smaller-scale writings on Peters’ work, this is the first full-length, comprehensive account of it and thus

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Foreword

xiii

enables us to see his oeuvre in all its interconnectedness. It provides a most helpful introduction to Peters’ thought for those unfamiliar with it, as well as reacquainting all of us with major themes underpinning philosophy of education as a whole. John White Institute of Education, University of London, UK

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Acknowledgments

Material from Chapter 4 originally appeared in Christopher Martin, ‘ The Good, the Worthwhile, and the Obligatory: On the Moral Universalism of R. S. Peters’ Conception of Education’ Journal of Philosophy of Education 43, S1 (2010): 143–160 and in his ‘R. S. Peters and Jürgen Habermas: Presuppositions of Practical Reason and Educational Justice’ Educational Theory 59 (2009): 1–15. We are grateful to both journals for permission to reprint these articles in the form they are offered here.

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Part 1

Intellectual Biography

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Chapter 1

Peters’ Analytic Paradigm in the Philosophy of Education

Introduction In the twentieth century, a single person had an enormous impact on one branch of philosophy in a short period of time: that person was Richard Stanley Peters and that branch was the philosophy of education. Paul Hirst ends his outline of Peters’ contribution to the philosophy of education with these words: Whether or not one agrees with his [Peters’] substantive conclusions on any particular issue it cannot but be recognised that he has introduced new methods and wholly new considerations into the philosophical discussion of educational issues. The result has been a new level of philosophical rigour and with that a new sense of the importance of philosophical considerations for educational decisions. Richard Peters has revolutionised philosophy of education and as the work of all others now engaged in that area bears witness, there can be no going back on the transformation he has brought about. (Hirst 1986, pp. 37–8) As Hirst rightly notes, while the specific details of his view are still matters of discussion, all agree on Peters’ status as one of the great founding fathers of contemporary philosophy of education. In the 1960s and 1970s, he undertook a uniquely ambitious philosophical project by introducing and developing, what might be called, a singular analytic paradigm for approaching problems and policy in education and perennial questions in the philosophy of education.1 During those 20 years, he developed a detailed and comprehensive philosophical view

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not only on the nature and the justification of education but also on the concepts of liberal education and moral education, as well as on the issue of teacher training in a modern society. In this book, we expound, contextualize, and critically discuss the basic lines of Peters’ project and the key ideas of his view. In this introductory chapter, after giving a sketch of Peters’ life, we explain why and how Peters introduced the analytic paradigm in the philosophy of education. Subsequently, we elucidate the nature of this paradigm and the methodology of conceptual analysis which is central to it. Next, we comment on Peters’ intellectual development and his major works. As the final point, we set out the plan of this book.

Peters’ life Richard Stanley Peters was born in Lucknow, the capital of the State of Uttar Pradesh in India on 31 October 1919, as the second of four children.2 His father served in the Indian Police and retired as Superintendent. His last assignment in India was looking after the education and affairs of the Maharaja of Benares, Vibhuti Narayan Singh, who was a minor when he acceded to the throne. Peters was sent home as an infant to his grandparents in England, due to ill health. At the age of 7, he was enrolled at the Downs School near Bristol, from where he gained entrance to Clifton College, the independent public school. He remained there from 1933 to 1938, going up to Queen’s College Oxford in 1938. Like most children with parents serving in the British Colonies, Peters went to boarding schools and spent the holidays with his brothers either with relatives or with his parents when they came home on leave.3 Peters’ elder brother, Maurice, went into the British Navy, and Peters won an “exhibition” or small scholarship to go to the University of Oxford. From 1938 to 1940, he read classics (as well as theology for one term) at Queen’s College. The outbreak of World War II interrupted his studies and the so-called “war degree” as Bachelor of Arts was conferred upon him in 1942. The period from 1938 until 1944 was very significant to Peters in three respects.4 First, by the time the war broke out, he became a Quaker—a

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member of the Society of Friends—which best answered to his religious beliefs and feelings. As Quakers are conscientious objectors, Peters was not conscripted and joined the Friends Ambulance Unit, which was seen as an acceptable alternative by the War Office. He served in the East End during the London Blitz of 1940 and did youth work when the Friends’ Relief Service began to establish youth centers in London to rebuild people’s lives. Secondly, Peters enrolled as a part-time student at Birkbeck College, University of London, to study philosophy and psychology, and thirdly, he married Margaret Duncan in 1942, with whom he had three children, two of which were adopted. For family and financial reasons, he resigned from the youth center and was appointed to Sidcot Quaker Grammar School in Somerset, to teach mainly classics. While teaching full time, he continued his studies at Birkbeck, traveling to London each weekend to attend lectures. On resigning (quite reluctantly) from Sidcot in 1946, to devote himself to his studies full time, he obtained his degree within 3 months and was granted a doctoral studentship to study philosophy and psychology at Birkbeck. He obtained a part-time lectureship at Birkbeck and from then on his professional career began. In 1949, Peters was awarded a PhD for his research on the logical status of psychological enquiry. In the same year and up until 1962, Peters had a full-time appointment and soon became a reader in the departments of philosophy and psychology at Birkbeck, where he was responsible for the development of a joint degree in both disciplines. By this time, Peters was the sole carer and financial provider for his sick parents in London and maintained two households, going back to his family in Essex at weekends. His wife ran a private nursery school with Mary Killick, and she later became a lecturer at the Institute of Education in Cambridge. Mary Killick came to London and pursued her career in psychology. She became Peters’ companion and later his carer when he was struck down with bipolar disorder following a physical breakdown due to overwork. Peters was highly ambitious with a mission to improve education and to put it on a solid theoretical basis. Apart from teaching full time at Birkbeck and part time at the London School of Economics as well as giving lectures for a wider audience, he regularly worked for the

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Times and the BBC. His BBC talks covered political, psychological, and educational topics, one of which was on the aims of education.5 In 1961, professor Israel Scheffler read the texts of some of these talks and invited Peters to Harvard as a visiting professor of education. In October 1962, Peters was appointed professor of philosophy of education at the Institute of Education, University of London, in succession to Louis Arnaud Reid, who was the first holder of the chair from its establishment in 1947. In December 1963, he delivered his inaugural lecture “Education as Initiation.” As the head of the department, he set himself ambitious goals and industriously tried to realize them (by often working an 18-hour day). His endeavors as a politician, administrator, teacher, and researcher to develop the discipline of philosophy of education and to expand the Institute of Education have to be situated against the background of the economic expansion and social experimentation in the 1960s. During the tenure of his chair, Peters was very successful both academically and institutionally. His department of philosophy of education became the largest in the English-speaking world with an outstanding international reputation and included by 1968 some 175 graduate students. The “London Line,” a term coined to refer to Peters’ group and their work, included at some time or other among others Paul Hirst, Robert Dearden, Ray K. Elliott, David Cooper, and John White. In 1964, Peters founded the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, of which he was the chair until 1975. He was not only the editor of this society ’s annual conference proceedings and the first editor of its successor, the Journal of Philosophy of Education, but also the founder and general editor of the book series International Library of the Philosophy of Education published by Routledge and Kegan Paul. He organized the Easter School of Philosophy annually on which occasions eminent philosophers, such as Alasdair MacIntyre, David Hamlyn, Peter Winch, and Bernard Williams, discussed topics relevant to education. By 1973, he had made philosophy of education a sufficiently respectable branch of applied philosophy, so that he could co-organize in the same year, the Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference in Exeter on Philosophers Discuss Education (Brown 1975). Testifying to his worldwide recognition, Peters received numerous invitations from all over the world to visit universities and was elected a member of the prestigious American

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National Academy of Education in 1966. In 1967, 1969, and 1971, he took part in the “Binghampton Circle,” a group of leading American psychologists and philosophers who discussed topics at the crossroad of both their disciplines, the outcome of which was edited by Theodore Mischel. Besides Peters’ devotion to his work, he was an ardent golfer with a reasonable handicap (normally well under ten) throughout his life. From 1971 to 1974, Peters took on the additional post of dean of the Faculty of Education at the Institute. In the early 1970s, the political and economical climate started changing drastically. While global economic recession was setting in, Margaret Thatcher was appointed as Secretary of State for Education and Science in 1970 under Edward Heath. The 1972, James Report on the reorganization of teacher training programs and the Government ’s 1972 White Paper on institutional rationalization became the central concern for the London Institute of Education. These political and administrative matters of first importance put a lot of pressure on Peters, who at the same time tried to run his busy department, to fulfill his extensive teaching duties and to keep up his prolific writing and publishing. He was looking forward to an extended period of study leave for reading, thought, and discussion after completing his term as dean of the faculty at the end of 1974. A dramatic event then happened in the beginning of 1975 upon his arrival in Australasia (New Zealand), where a great number of speaking engagements had been arranged. Peters fell victim to a mental breakdown and was later, in London, diagnosed as suffering from bipolar disorder. This condition in effect ended his industrious academic career. Although he intermittently regained some energy to do some work, the condition prevented him from writing substantially again. Peters remained head of the department until 1980, when he relinquished his position and was appointed as a research professor. In September 1983, he retired, whereupon the University of London honored him with the title of emeritus professor. In the name of the larger British philosophical community, Alasdair MacIntyre, Anthony Quinton, and Bernard Williams honored him in 1985 by delivering the Richard Peters Lectures at the London Institute of Education. As a further tribute to him, David Cooper edited in 1986 a collection of essays for Peters

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Education, Values and Mind in which, among others, Paul Hirst, Ray K. Elliott, and Robert Dearden testify of his monumental contribution to the philosophy of education as a branch of philosophy. Peters died suddenly in London on 30 December 2011, aged 92. He was predeceased by his wife, Margaret, and partner, Mary. He is survived by his two daughters and his son.

A new approach to the philosophy of education Peters introduced a new approach to the philosophy of education. The new look that the philosophy of education in the 1960s and 1970s developed is the outcome of the application of an analytic type of philosophy to educational issues. Analytic philosophy was itself a revolution in philosophy that took place during the first half of the twentieth century. In that sense, Peters revolutionized the philosophy of education by importing the revolution in philosophy as such in the study field of education. To bring out his revolutionary approach, we first outline the conceptions of philosophy of education before 1960 and then identify the general character of analytic philosophy.

Alternative approaches Peters’ new approach should be contrasted with three other approaches (Peters 1966b, pp. 62–9; 1983, pp. 30–2). First, the conception of philosophy of education as dealing with principles of education is directed at the ethical, religious, or spiritual foundations of education. Such a principled approach offers educational wisdom and recommends some values in response to the quest for the meaning of life. Alfred North Whitehead’s The Aims of Education (1929) exemplifies this type of approach par excellence. Educational principles are given as an answer to some important residual questions which are left over after all the relevant empirical questions are answered by the disciplines of psychology, sociology, and history. However, according to Peters, the philosopher, qua philosopher, is not the sole authority in formulating educational principles. Such principles are logical hybrids in that they

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blend empirical generalizations with value judgments. Because of the empirical element in them, the formulation of the principles cannot be left to the philosopher alone. To think otherwise is to overestimate the function of the philosopher and to blur the differentiated nature of educational theory: “ This omnibus conception of his task is partly a relic of the old conception of the philosopher as a kind of oracle and partly due to an undifferentiated conception of educational studies which dies hard in some educational circles” (Peters 1966b, p. 64). Although the principles of education in educational research and teacher training are important, their clarification and their modification in the light of advancing knowledge and changing conditions are joint tasks for the philosopher in cooperation with his colleagues of the humanities and the social sciences. Secondly, the conception of philosophy of education as dealing with the history of educational ideas concentrates on the past masters in educational thought. Such a historical approach takes students on a guided tour of “tales of the mighty dead” from Plato’s Republic to Dewey ’s Democracy and Education via Rousseau’s Emile. Although there is no question about the desirability of an initiation into the heritage of the great educators of the past, it can only function as a supplement but not as a substitute for philosophy of education proper. According to Peters, there are two major flaws in reducing the philosophy of education to the history of educational ideas. On the one hand, the ideas are presented rather superficially and dogmatically. This is so because they are extracted from texts without properly situating them in their original historical context and also without giving students any training in the necessary philosophical skills to critically evaluate them. On the other, when educational ideas are presented in such a way, their relevance for modern conditions and contemporary educational issues remains in the dark. Thirdly, the conception of philosophy of education as dealing with educational implications of pure philosophy focuses on the application of a certain philosophical position to educational issues in the context of fundamental philosophical problems. Such an applied approach draws the consequences of a particular philosophical theory, such as realism, idealism, or pragmatism, for educational matters. On this approach, one first presents traditional problems of pure philosophy to the students,

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after which one examines the implications for the educational field. According to Peters, there is one basic defect in this applied conception of the philosophy of education. Whereas the two other conceptions are not strictly philosophical or philosophically pure enough—the first is too oracular and the second too anecdotal—this conception is overly abstract and not concerned specifically enough with what is educational. For that reason, the applied approach is dubious not only as a teaching model but also in relation to the proper structure of philosophical inquiry. Teaching and learning in the philosophy of education are more effective when one starts from concrete problems in educational practice rather than from highly theoretical problems in logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. Moreover, philosophical inquiries in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics are only relevant insofar as they are connected to actual problems in education: “ The philosophy of education is a family of philosophical inquiries linked together both by their philosophical character and by their relevance to educational issues” (Peters 1966b, p. 68). Peters’ new approach—the conception of philosophy of education as dealing with the conceptual analysis of educational issues—differs from these three other approaches. First, the analytic approach is firmly anchored in the concrete problems and actual challenges with which educators are confronted in educational practice and policy. Time and again, Peters underscores that the philosophy of education should have obvious and immediate relevance for crucial issues in the practical field of education. Secondly, the analytic approach is ahistorical in that it occupies itself with structural themes instead of historical figures in the philosophy of education. Thirdly, the analytic approach is antisynthetic. That is to say, whereas “the older style” of philosophy (Peters 1974b, p. 413) is more speculative, constructive, and comprehensive in its search for wisdom and the meaning of life, the new analytic style of doing philosophy of education is more narrow, piecemeal, and neutral in accomplishing its task of conceptual analysis. So, Peters’ conception of philosophy of education as dealing with conceptual analysis consists of practical problems in education qua content and (ahistorical) analytic philosophy qua form or methodology. Peters did not invent this analytic approach but imported it from mainstream British philosophy after World War II. Peters’ revolution

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in the philosophy of education is therefore made possible by the revolution in philosophy at large during the first half of the twentieth century.

Analytic philosophy What is analytic philosophy? For our purposes, we can divide the history of analytic philosophy in the twentieth century into four periods (Soames 2003): 1. 1900–1930: the logical analysis of Bertrand Russell, George Edward Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein in Cambridge; 2. 1930–1945: the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and Alfred Jules Ayer in Great Britain; 3. 1945–1960: the ordinary language philosophy of Gilbert Ryle, John Langshaw Austin, and Peter Strawson in Oxford; and 4. 1960–2000: worldwide scientific philosophy.

Whereas analysis in the first two periods stands for logical and linguistic analysis in logic, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of science, its scope widens in the second period to also include conceptual analysis in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, and other philosophical domains. Below we explain further the distinction between concepts as parts of propositions and words as parts of sentences. For now, we can say that concepts are analyzed on the basis of words used in ordinary language and common sense. In the early 1960s, Peters entered the field of philosophy of education as a philosopher who was well-versed in the ordinary language philosophy of Ryle and Austin. The sort of analytic philosophy that attracted him was not the formalistic positivist type, but the British ordinary-language type. Consequently, philosophy for him is identical to “analytical philosophy of the usual sort relying on the analysis of ordinary language and common sense assumptions” (Peters 1983, p. 41). Analytic philosophy revolutionized philosophy as such. Common to all periods of its history is the guideline that philosophical activity should live up to the ideals of clarity, rigor, and argumentation. Analytic

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philosophy aims at truth and knowledge, as opposed to moral or spiritual improvement: “the goal in analytic philosophy is to discover what is true, not to provide a useful recipe for living one’s life” (Soames 2003, vol. 1, p. xiv). In that sense, the analytic approach is neutral and scientific. Relatedly, the task of philosophy is not to talk about the phenomena of the world but to talk about such first-order talk. An analytic philosopher investigates the meaning and the truth value of claims people make about the world. In this way, the analytic approach incorporates the typical spectatorial role of the philosopher: “ The main feature . . . of the recent ‘revolution in philosophy ’ has been the explicit recognition of this second-order character of philosophical inquiries” (Peters 1966b, p. 61). Questions like “ What do you mean?”and “How do you know?” exemplify this typical reflective attitude. However, such a second-order stance does not imply that the analytic approach is limited to a passive or inert role. Although it is primarily occupied with analysis and clarification, nothing prevents the analytic approach to also assume a critical and even a constructive role. Common-sense assumptions can be challenged by critical analysis and such a philosophical activity quite naturally “can pass over into attempts to reconstruct conceptual schemes and think out anew the basic categories necessary for describing the world” (Peters 1966b, p. 61). In the early 1960s, Peters stood at the crossroad of analytic philosophy and education. This unique position had a double effect: one in philosophy, the other in educational studies. To be more precise, the introduction of the analytic paradigm in the philosophy of education “did much to establish it as a branch both of philosophy and of educational theory ” (Peters 1983, p. 38). First, because the analytic approach has a much more neutral and scientific character than the other approaches reviewed above, analytic philosophy of education could establish itself as a respectable branch of genuine philosophy, as opposed to woolly wisdom or dull history of ideas. And, secondly, by thus placing the philosophy of education squarely within the analytic paradigm, it could be taken seriously as an integral part of educational theory, alongside the disciplines of psychology and sociology. Moreover, analytic philosophy of education could in that way not only become a part of educational theory but also itself contribute to the seriousness of education as an

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academic discipline (Peters 1973d). In Chapter 5, we come back to the nature of educational theory.

The nature of the analytic paradigm Education as a field of study is hybrid. Obviously, one needs experimental data and empirical evidence to draw general conclusions and to construct educational hypotheses on the basis of such generalizations. But one cannot limit educational research to the application of the empirical methodology of the social sciences. To adequately deal with educational problems, one has to acknowledge that conceptual analysis and value judgments are indispensable. It is in relation to these nonempirical aspects of the educational sciences that philosophy of education plays its vital role. It is important to realize that, on Peters’ view, philosophy of education should be concerned not only with questions about the analysis of concepts but also with questions about the grounds of belief, knowledge, actions, and activities. Peters’ analytic paradigm in the philosophy of education is, therefore, broader than the application of the methodology of conceptual analysis to problems in educational practice and policy. For him, the point of doing conceptual analysis is that it is a necessary preliminary to answering other, and, in his eyes, also more important philosophical questions regarding educational practice and policy, especially questions of justification. We take a closer look at these two components of the analytical paradigm (Peters and Hirst 1970, pp. 3–12).

Conceptual analysis What is conceptual analysis? Answering this question involves answering two subquestions. First: What is a concept? We already took note of the distinction between concepts as parts of propositions and words as parts of sentences. Although the relationship between thought and language is a controversial philosophical topic, the having of a concept cannot altogether be reduced to the ability of applying the corresponding word correctly. According to Peters, though animals and young children are not

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in the possession of language or the required words, it is evident that they can make discriminations on the basis of concepts since they can behave differentially toward objects in the world. Using a word correctly is thus a sufficient but not a necessary condition for having the matching concept. In addition, both the ability to apply words correctly and the ability to make accurate discriminations presuppose the grasping of principles which makes the exercise of these abilities possible. However, though the possession of a concept is not constituted by the exercise of a certain ability, such an exercise is a publicly observable criterion for having a concept. It is precisely because concepts are accessed via public speech (and behavior) that they can be analyzed on the basis of words used in ordinary language and common sense. But the real target of ordinary language philosophy is not the analysis of words but that of concepts. In that sense, ordinary language philosophy is conceptual analysis. To the second subquestion “ What is analysis?” Peters answers in general: As the concept in question is usually one the possession of which goes with the ability to use words appropriately, what we do is to examine the use of words in order to see what principle or principles govern their use. If we can make these explicit we have uncovered the concept (Peters and Hirst 1970, p. 4). More specifically, making explicit the underlying principles of a concept is done by defining it in terms of its logically necessary and/or sufficient conditions. Conceptual analysis can be interpreted in a weak or strong sense. Whereas in the analysis of a concept in the weak sense one only tries to uncover the logically necessary conditions for the application of the corresponding word, in the strong sense one tries to uncover the conditions which are logically both necessary and sufficient for such an application. One thus has the fullest possible analysis of a concept when one can lay bare all the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the use of the matching word. This analytic strategy functions straightforwardly for exact and strict concepts such as the mathematical concept of a triangle, analyzed as a closed geometrical figure with exactly three sides that meet to form three interior angles adding up to 180°. Yet, conceptual analysis can

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only be an ideal typical methodology for common-sense concepts and words in ordinary language in view of their vagueness and looseness.6 For that reason, Peters observes that in doing conceptual analysis “we usually settle for making explicit defining characteristics in the weak sense” (Peters and Hirst 1970, p. 5). One should also distinguish the logically necessary (and sufficient) conditions from the general empirical conditions for the use of a word expressing a concept. The empirical fact that human beings have a central nervous system is de facto an underlying condition of, for example, human knowledge but as such it does not belong to the logic of knowledge, according to which knowledge is necessarily conceived as justified true belief.7 It might be possible that computers or extraterrestrial beings possess knowledge despite the fact that they do not have a central nervous system.

Justification and moral development Although conceptual analysis is of central importance, it certainly is not an end in itself. We already remarked that Peters’ analytic paradigm is firmly anchored in problems that crop up in educational practice and policy. We also noted that education is a hybrid domain of study, which is Peters’ point of departure: “Logically speaking all questions of educational policy and practice are hybrid questions, a crossing of value judgements with different forms of empirical enquiry ” (Peters 1964, pp. 139–40). The practical domain of education is thus inevitably shot through with value judgments and moral questions, such as “For inclusion in the curriculum, theoretical activities are more worthwhile than Bingo or playing fruit machines” or “Ought we to have corporal punishment in a secondary school?” Philosophy as a second-order activity stands back and reflects on these normative issues which arise on the first-order level. Although such normative issues have the philosopher’s full attention, they cannot be dealt with in ethics or moral philosophy before the issues themselves are sufficiently analyzed and conceptually clear: “ We cannot tackle the question in ethics of whether there are any good reasons for punishing people until we are clear what we mean by ‘punishment.’ Questions of analysis in other words are often linked with questions of justification” (Peters and Hirst 1970, p. 9).

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On Peters’ account, conceptual analysis has two very important jobs: Firstly it enables us to see more clearly how a concept is connected not only with other concepts but with a form of social life that rests on a network of interlocking assumptions . . . Secondly, . . . by laying bare the structure of this concept we also show the extent to which it rests on certain moral assumptions which can be challenged. (Peters and Hirst 1970, p. 11). Analysis connects concepts to a conceptual scheme, places them in the context of a form of life, and unearths common-sense assumptions of their application. Yet the point of doing conceptual analysis is always to prepare the ground for tackling other philosophical questions. Peters considers these questions of explanation, justification, and practical action as the more important and central ones to the philosophy of education. Especially questions of justification, that is to say questions about the grounds of belief, knowledge, actions, and activities, are the core business of educational philosophy because philosophy is, according to Peters, primarily engaged in the business of giving reasons for what one thinks and does. Philosophy is above all the Western enterprise of rationality, that is, the attempt to realize as far as possible the project of a critical reflection on assumptions and a rational justification of underlying principles. Henceforward, we mean “analytic philosophy of education” by “philosophy of education.” Since educating is a very hybrid type of activity, philosophy of education cannot be an isolated domain of philosophy: “Philosophy of education, therefore, draws on established branches of philosophy and brings together those segments of them that are relevant to the solution of educational problems” (Peters and Hirst 1970, p. 13). On Peters’ view, the content of philosophy of education should be determined by the problems in educational practice and policy: “the course should be orientated to a core of practical problems which can be clarified by philosophical thinking” (Peters 1964, p. 147). Consequently, not all branches of philosophy are relevant for elucidating the field of education. Given that the anchorage of the philosophy of education lies in educational concerns, three branches of philosophy are of central

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importance to the philosopher of education: (1) philosophy of mind, (2) ethics and social philosophy, and (3) theory of knowledge or epistemology (Peters 1964, pp. 142–3). Obviously, educating is for the most part directed at the development of the mind and taking part in the process of education involves going through certain mental processes such as that of learning. The concept of education is thus logically connected to the concept of mind. As already noted, in order to deal with the questions of justification which arise in the practical domain, the philosopher of education has to enter into the field of moral philosophy. And, as we will see, since Peters partly but essentially analyzes the concept of education in terms of knowledge and understanding, epistemology is crucially relevant for the philosophy of education. Peters’ analytic paradigm in the philosophy of education should be extended to also include a more psychological component, next to the conceptual analysis and justificatory components. The development of the mind is the domain of study not only for philosophy of mind but also for empirical psychology, especially the subdiscipline of developmental psychology. Peters studied, therefore, not only philosophy but also psychology. This explains not only his strong interest in philosophical psychology—particularly in the analysis of the concepts of motivation and emotion (Peters 1958; 1962)—but also, and more pertinent to the field of educational philosophy, his lifelong involvement with the developmental psychology of Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, and Laurence Kohlberg. He approached these empirical, or quasi-empirical “genetic” psychological theories from the standpoint of moral theory. That is why Peters, during the whole of his carrier, had a deep interest in the moral development and moral education of children. Without much exaggeration, one can even say that these chief moral issues regarding children, their development and education, hold center stage in his philosophy of education. In the light of the above, we can conclude that three basic questions structure Peters’ analytic paradigm in the philosophy of education: 1. What do you mean by “education”?—a question of conceptual analysis; 2. How do you know that education is “worthwhile”?—a question of justification; and

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3. How do we adequately conceive of “moral development” and “moral education”?—a question of empirical (or quasi-empirical) psychology.

These three leading questions also serve as a natural structure for the contents of this book.

Peters’ intellectual development Against the backdrop of Peters’ biographical data and the origin as well as the nature of the analytic paradigm, we highlight the milestones in Peters’ intellectual development (Peters 1974c; 1983).8 In Clifton College, Peters received the classical education of a public school which immersed him in the history, literature, and philosophy of the Ancient World as represented by giants like Herodotus, Aristophanes, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Tacitus. This classical education appealed to his intellectual interests and he enjoyed his studies as well as excelled in them. What started to intellectually and emotionally occupy him was the religious question which remained significant whole of his life. For that reason, he read in Oxford not only classics but also theology, if only for one term. Religion and theology are important for Peters’ intellectual development because they led to his interest in philosophy: “preoccupations with religion . . . started me off on systematic philosophy ” (Peters 1974c, p. 17). His fascination with theology and spirituality led him in particular to a deep interest in philosophical questions about the nature of the mind. That is why he studied at Birkbeck College not only philosophy but also psychology. During his (doctoral) studies, Peters underwent three intellectual influences which were formative of his identity as a philosopher (Peters 1974c, p. 13). First, he adopted the methodology of postwar analytic philosophy which would later become his trademark in the philosophy of education. Although he did not particularly like the epistemic topics—such as the status of sense-data—which were discussed by the then famous logical positivist Ayer (at whose feet Peters sat in seminars), he took over the analytic mode of philosophizing. As to the content of his thinking, Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949) made

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a lasting impact. Secondly, given Peters’ interest in the nature of mind, professor of psychology Alec Mace, his PhD supervisor, stimulated him to develop his own views on psychological explanation, emotion, and motivation. This inspiration is apparent not only in Peters’ PhD thesis on the logic of psychological research but also in his later book The Concept of Motivation (1958) in which he defends a purposive, rule-following model of action-explanation and criticizes psychological theories of motivation. Thirdly, Karl Popper, then reader at the London School of Economics, whose postgraduate seminars Peters attended, not only introduced him to the central concepts of falsification and fallibility in the philosophy of science but also greatly influenced his conceptions of truth and rationality. He was under the spell of Popper in such a strong way that one can conjecture that Peters’ analytic paradigm in the philosophy of education is methodologically speaking as much the product of Popper’s view on science and reason in Western culture as it is a product of the conceptual analysis technique. As a lecturer and reader at Birbeck, he continued to work and teach on the borderline between, on the one hand, philosophy and, on the other, psychology and the social sciences. Yet, against the backdrop of his standing religious preoccupation and existential concerns, Peters explicitly begins to develop an additional research line in ethics, social philosophy, and political philosophy. This combination of his interests in the explanation of human behavior and the question of “how a man should live” brings him to the study of themes and figures in the psychology of morals and moral action, especially the moral psychologies of Sigmund Freud and Jean Piaget. With this motivational background in place, we can explain why Peters moved into the philosophy of education. Three main forces have driven him to become a philosopher of education (Hobson 1974, p. 458). First, Peters was attracted to educational philosophy because it draws together a number of branches of philosophy as well as psychology, in all of which he was interested. His mixed interests were best satisfied in the philosophy of education where everything comes together. Secondly: “He had begun to give a number of broadcast talks on topics such as authority and responsibility, and searching around for another subject to discuss he hit upon that of the aims of education. He was prompted to this by the fact that in [his early] youth work he

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was continually confronted with the question of what were his aims and goals” (Hobson 1974, p. 458). Thirdly, as already noted, professor of education and philosophy Israel Scheffler, whose attention had been attracted by these broadcast talks on education, invited Peters in 1961 to Harvard. One year after his appointment as professor of philosophy of education, Peters delivered his inaugural lecture “Education as initiation” (1963a), which was partly written under the inspiration of some ideas on education of Michael Oakeshott (1991; 2001). Even though Peters disagreed with many of Oakeshott ’s traditionalist theses, the latter’s vocabulary of “initiation” and “modes of experience” were very suggestive for him: Now the teacher, having himself been initiated, is on the inside of these activities and modes of thought and conduct. . . . To ask him what the aim or point of this form of life is, into which he has himself been initiated, seems an otiose question. . . . This sort of question, he senses, can only be asked by barbarians outside the gates. . . . Are these hard men indifferent to all that constitutes being civilised? Children, to a large extent, are. They start off in the position of the barbarian outside the gates. The problem is to get them inside the citadel of civilisation so that they will understand and love what they see when they get there. (Peters 1963a, p. 107) The inaugural address already contains in nucleus a lot of the major ideas Peters later develops and expands on. His view on topics such as the concept of education, the process of educating, the emotions, the ideal of liberal education, and the notion of public heritage gets its first outline in this address. In a way, there is a remarkable consistency between the initial statement of Peters’ view on education and his last one in the essay “Democratic values and educational aims” (1979), in which he again emphasizes the connection between education and leading a civilized and human life: the purpose of education is not to prepare people for jobs but to prepare them for life. This, however, is misleading if taken literally, for presumably [one means] something like a worthwhile life, not

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just keeping alive; . . . In so far, therefore, as education is concerned with learning how to live, [a man’s] beliefs, attitudes, desires and emotional reactions . . . will have to be developed and disciplined in various ways. (Peters 1979, p. 34)

Peters’ oeuvre In between these points of beginning and ending, Peters published five books which constitute the kernel of his oeuvre. We briefly introduce the contents of his major works in the philosophy of education.9 His much acclaimed book Ethics and Education (1966a) is a bit of a classic in this branch of philosophy. He develops further the answer given in his inaugural address to the first basic question of the analytic paradigm—concerning the conceptual analysis of education—and takes up the second one—concerning the justification of education— in detail. In connection to the normative issues coming to the fore in educational practice and policy, Peters constructs in this book an ethical theory and social philosophy from a liberal perspective. In relation to the philosophy of education, he offers an account of the fundamental democratic principles of freedom, equality, and fraternity and deals with the problems of authority and punishment in a liberal democracy. The book is meant as an introductory textbook written from a distinctive point of view to fill in the gap in the literature on the new analytic approach to educational philosophy. Since Peters was in the early 1960s under pressure to provide such new literature, the book “has been written too soon and too quickly ” and was published “somewhat prematurely ” (Peters 1966a, pp. 8–9). Although he was very aware of the need to revise it and to rework some of its key aspects, he never could find the time anymore to return to it and his mental breakdown definitely put an end to his hope. Peters collaborated with Paul Hirst to produce The Logic of Education (1970). As the title indicates, this book revolves around the conceptual analysis of education in terms of logically necessary and/or sufficient conditions and leaves aside the fundamental issues of justification and ethics. Both coauthors agree that education is conceptually connected

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to the development of knowledge and understanding. Hirst, who had developed his so-called “forms of knowledge” argument (Hirst 1965; 1974), had a special interest in the structure of the curriculum and the process of teaching. The book explores then the implications for these, as well as some other school-related issues of a cognitively orientated analysis of the concept of education. This book is meant as a more advanced introduction to the central concepts in the philosophy of education and as an initiation into its growing literature against the backdrop of the controversy between a traditional, subject-centered approach and a progressive, child-centered approach. Apart from his 1966 classic for which he is best known, Peters did not publish another single-authored book conceived as a monograph on a circumscribed subject following a specific research plan. Because of his ever-growing administrative responsibilities and thus limited time left for reading and writing, he had to confine himself to publishing collections of lectures or shorter articles that were first published elsewhere. Peters’ small book Reason and Compassion (1973a), composed of the Lindsay Memorial Lectures and the Swarthmore Lecture, comes closest to being his second monograph. In answering the third basic question of the analytic paradigm—How do we adequately conceive of moral development and moral education?—he outlines his definite ethical theory and distinctive approach to moral education. In the light of his comprehensive “principled” morality, Peters radically modifies Laurence Kohlberg’s cognitive theory of moral development so as to integrate the level of reason with that of the passions (the emotions) in moral life and moral education. At the end of this book, he also returns to the religious question, his original motivation to pursue an intellectual life, and develops a view on religious education within the boundaries of reason. What emerges here, surprisingly perhaps, is that Peters’ work on the analysis and justification of education as well as on moral education gets its ultimate inspiration from an anthropological and metaphysical background. Peters would later remark that this is his best book, far better than the one for which he is best known.10 Much of the background to this 1973 book of lectures can be found in the collection of scholarly articles Psychology and Ethical Development

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(1974). This book brings together not only Peters’ work on philosophical psychology but also his extensive writings on moral psychology and moral education in the 1960s and early 1970s. The collection of papers Education and the Education of Teachers (1977) represents Peters’ later, post-1966 reflections and second thoughts on the analysis and the justification of education on the one hand and his landmark view on teacher training on the other. In connection to the first themes, he also examines some ambiguities and dilemmas in the ideal of liberal education, while in relation to the second theme, he discusses the nature of educational theory in education as an academic discipline and the place of philosophy in the education of teachers at the university. As in the coauthored 1970 book, Peters investigates in the second part the implications for some problems in educational practice and policy—especially for the problem of the schooling and training of teachers—of his “ logic” of education. Mike Degenhardt (2010) calls Peters a “ liberal traditionalist ” for good reasons. After calling himself a “ liberal,” Peters explains his understanding of liberalism: And as I understand it, liberalism is based on respect for the individual, which entails encouraging people to take up their own moral stance. But this policy is vacuous, educationally speaking, unless people are introduced to the moral mode of experience and come to share a complex inheritance within which they can locate and make something of themselves. (Peters 1973a, p. 10) His reliance on the public heritage for education—his awe for what D. H. Lawrence calls “the holy ground”—makes Peters also a “traditionalist ” indeed. He zealously expounds and vigorously defends this liberal traditionalism throughout his prolific writings in an elegant style. Although the writing is, undoubtedly because of time pressure, sometimes a bit too hasty and somewhat unpolished, on the whole, Peters’ ideas are sufficiently clear and his views sufficiently precise to present a sophisticated and fascinating picture of education, which gives him a position of everlasting importance in the history of the philosophy of education since Plato.

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The plan of this book The basic structure of Peters’ analytic paradigm in the philosophy of education naturally forms the straightforward plan of this book. In Chapters 2–4, we critically expound Peters’ analysis of the concept of education (the first component of the analytic paradigm) and his project to rationally justify the specific sense in which he predominantly applies this concept (the second analytic component). We trace the evolution of his thinking about the aims of education and the nature of educational processes from the 1963 inaugural lecture to the 1979 essay “Democratic values and educational aims.” We take a look at Peters’ justificatory project, especially his so-called “transcendental argument,” for the justification of education. We also sketch the contours of the “principled morality ” he appeals to for dealing with concrete issues in educational practice and policy. In Chapter 5, we compare and contrast Peters’ analysis and justification of education with the classical ideal of liberal education in Western culture. In this context, we discuss the relationship Peters forges between the humanities and the quality of life as well as the role he reserves for liberal education, as an essential part of educational theory, in teacher training. In Chapters 6 and 7, we critically expound Peters’ view on moral development and moral education (the third analytic component). In the light of his pluralistic notion of morality, we show how he supplements Laurence Kohlberg’s cognitive theory of moral development in order to construct a comprehensive approach to moral education, which also includes the education of the emotions. We explore further Peters’ integrative view on the relationship between reason and passion, his anthropological view on the levels of life, and even his metaphysical view on religious education against the backdrop of his more synthetic picture of the nature and importance of education. In the final chapter, we discuss the impact on and the relevance for the philosophy of education of Peters’ analytic paradigm not only in the 1960s and 1970s but also in the present day. This book is coauthored. Although we both have a deep interest in the whole of Peters’ philosophy of education, each of us, working from

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different intellectual traditions, has special interests in distinct parts of it. We worked under the following division of labor. Stefaan took care of Chapters 1, 5–7, Christopher was engaged with Chapters 2–4, and we jointly brought about Chapter 8. We both believe that a “ back to Peters” movement in contemporary philosophy of education should be good for the seriousness of the discipline and its respectability as a branch of philosophy as well as a component of educational theory.11

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Part 2

Critical Exposition of R. S. Peters’ Educational Thought

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Chapter 2

The Concept of Education, Aims, and Educational Processes

Introduction As we discussed in the first chapter, Peters’ philosophical investigation into the nature and scope of the concept of education can be divided into two parts: 1. What do you mean by “education”?—a question of conceptual analysis; 2. How do you know that “education” is “worthwhile”?—a question of justification.

In this chapter, we will primarily focus on (1) the conceptual analysis of education that includes questions about the meaning (or possible meanings) underlying the aims, processes, and content that give direction to education as a distinct domain of value and practice. Simply put: what do we mean when we say that someone is educated? First, we will illustrate Peters’ analytic approach by detailing his treatment of “aims” in education—what function does the concept of an aim have in educational discourse? Second, we will look at his more general analysis of the concept of education by detailing the criteria that Peters’ argues are necessarily presupposed by any person who intends to apply the term in a meaningful way.

“Aims” in education: A conceptual inquiry The conceptual analysis project is primarily one of clarification. From the analytic perspective, arriving at a cogent understanding of the often

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diffuse and contentious terrain of educational policy and practice, or determining just what education really is or ought to be, first requires that rigorous conceptual work be undertaken which maps out the limits and contours of any coherent and substantive discussion. In other words, we have to understand just what it is that we mean when we refer to education and its subsidiary concepts such as aims, quality, and processes. Otherwise, such discourse will lack coherence. What I might mean by education may differ radically from what you mean and as a result, debate about aims, policies, or content will not really get us anywhere as we will likely be disagreeing about largely different thing. As Peters (1970c, p. 19) puts it, conceptual analysis contributes very little to the answering of questions of content, but it does allow us to articulate questions about content in a more precise form. For Peters, haphazardly jumping jumping into intosubstantive substantiveissues educational only will only issues confusewill matters confuse further oneadoes a clear prior“logical sense further ifmatters one does not ifhave clearnot andhave prior senseand of the of the “ logical features” and “conceptual truths”any thatparticular foreground any features” and “conceptual truths” that foreground domain particular inquiry. we mean that a concept has certain of inquiry.domain By this,ofwe mean By thatthis, a concept has certain boundaries and boundaries written into it thatagent any must deliberating must rules writtenand intorules it that any deliberating have in agent mind when have in mind whenconcept. they use that same concept. they use that same Consider, for example, the concept of “justice.” Some may argue that justice means retribution, others fairness, while still others may see justice as karmatic or existential. Without proper clarification of the concept of justice, or the domain to which such a concept necessarily refers, these competing claims about the ends and means of justice become a mishmash of conflicting or half-formed views that will never become untangled. Only with a clear delimitation of what we must mean, minimally, when referring to the concept of justice can we begin to narrow down in more precise terms the kinds of substantive issues that need to be addressed in deciding what justice consists in. So, for example, the analytic philosopher might point out that it would be odd to say something like, “Have you treated her justly or have you treated her fairly?” But it would make sense to say, “ You treated her justly when you treated her fairly.” From this, the analytic philosopher might conclude that “fairness” must not be equivalent to justice but is one of the criteria to which the concept of justice could refer. Accordingly, disputes about the nature and scope of justice will require specification about the content of fairness and its relationship to other criteria contained in the

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concept. But we would at the very least be sure that fairness qua fairness is insufficient for resolving questions of justice. To put this in another way, the concept of justice suggests a set of clear problems to which we may then advance different conceptions designed to address those problems. Our conceptions may differ, but we will nonetheless work from a shared conceptual background that will at least allow us to make meaningful comparisons and perhaps arrive at an agreement about what is in fact a just act in particular cases.1 Peters applies this analytic approach to education more generally—a concept that in his view is highly diffuse and contestable. On this interpretation, we must first figure out what problem it is that the concept of education essentially addresses before we can decide what conception(s) of education (its values, policies, and practices) will solve the problem (Martin 2012, pp. 112–16). In order to get a real sense of this method, and its limits, it is worth taking a closer look at another concept that has become deeply associated with education— that of aims in education. The concept of “aims” serves as good fodder for the analytic philosopher. This is because disagreement about aims in education is legion at the policy level. Furthermore, philosophical discussion has complicated matters further by using the term “aim,” not as a reference to specific policies or practices but more like general principles of basic purpose, such as in Whitehead’s essay on “the aims of education” (1929). Accordingly, Peters begins his investigations by pointing out that he is not interested so much in the historical or sociological explanations behind the rise in discourse around the aims of education or the justification of aims, but is instead interested in the function that a call for “aims of education” has on educational discourse (Peters 1967a, p. 11). What is it that we mean when we say that education must have aims? So begins the project of analytic clarification. Peters begins by claiming that, contre John Dewey, the concept of an educational aim is not equivalent to the concept of a “purpose.” To be sure, the terms “purpose” and “aim,” like “intention” and “motive,” all belong to the conceptual domain of action and activity. However, there are important differences between them that must be specified if we are to be clear on what is meant by “aims of education” (p. 12). Peters uses the example of someone who is raising his hand. If we imagine that someone did

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so in an unusual context, such as at a dinner party, we may be unsure how the person raising his hand understands what he is doing. We therefore would naturally ask, “ What is your purpose in raising your hand?” We identify the action and then ask what his purpose was in doing it. Distinct from purpose, we could further inquire into the motive underlying that action. For example, someone may raise his hand for the purpose of asking a question, and we could further inquire as to his motivation in so doing: is he seeking better understanding of what a dinner companion said, or is he simply trying to complicate the flow of polite conversation? By comparison, asking what his “aim” was in raising his hand lacks a certain sense. One does not typically aim at raising a hand. Motive, purpose and aim are all distinct in the functional meanings they deploy via their usage. But just what is the distinct functional meaning of the term “aim”? First, the concept “aim” is argued to be distinct because of its associations with shooting and throwing. This further suggests fixed attention as well as some clear objective. As Peters (1967a, p. 13) puts it, it implies that “the desires of the agent are directed, as it were, towards some distant target, and there must be concentration of effort and attention in order to hit it.” Second, “aiming” is compared with the term “trying”—it suggests a difficult but not unattainable goal to which our direction is attended. This is why, for example, it would be unusual to say something like, “It is my aim to walk across the street,” that is, unless the task of crossing the street was made unusually difficult say, due to an increase in traffic. Note again that this is seen to be different from the term “purpose” which has no suggestion of failure built into it. Having undertaken a brief clarification of the use of the term as compared to terms and concepts within the same family, Peters (p. 14) summarizes the concept of “aim” as follows: 1. We tend to ask about aims in contexts where we think it important to get people to specify more precisely what they are trying to do. 2. Aims suggest the concentration on and the direction of effort towards an objective that is not too palpable or close at hand. 3. Aims suggest the possibility of failure or of falling short.

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Having undertaken the appropriate clarification of the concept of an aim, we are now better prepared to arrive at a preliminary answer to why discourses about the aims of education are so prominent: The demand for the aims of education is therefore a salutary request for teachers to survey what they are doing, get their priorities straight, concentrate their attention on them, and discard irrelevancies. Also, as tangible results are very difficult to come by in education, the constant possibility of falling short, or never quite bringing it off, is always present to the educator. Hence the appropriateness of all the talk about “aims.” (p. 14) On this view, the idea that discourse over the aims of education is equivalent to discourse over the purposes of education is the product of conceptual confusion. After all, such talk has yet to show that it is even appropriate to treat education as having a singular purpose from the start, let alone treating “purpose” and “aim” as equivalent concepts. Reference to aims is, typically speaking, a request for specification and reflection on aspects of the educational enterprise broadly conceived, not aa question questionofofthe fundamental rationale fundamental rationaleororjustifi justification. cation.Th Thisis isis not to say that education is exempt from such fundamental justificatory questions, a theme to be dealt with in Chapter 4. We can see how conceptual analysis plays an important role, here. By failing to distinguish “purpose” from “aim,” claims about the “aims of education,” which are properly understood as a way to focus attention on different aspects of an educational process, become transposed into totalizing prescriptions (and rival ones, at that) about what education is and ought to be. Disagreement about education’s essential mission presents itself as a kind of false problem when what really is in question is a much less fundamental issue regarding what we should be emphasizing in the educational process at any particular moment. Imprecision at the semantic level produces a pseudo philosophical problem to which conceptual analysis provides the right Wittgensteinian therapy. So we can see how the analytical approach undertakes a kind of logical and comparative mapping of language-use in order to clarify what agents should mean when they deploy concepts, if they really mean to use

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them appropriately. From this, minimal criteria that any agent using the concept is logically committed to are uncovered, even if they may disagree on matters of content or substance to which those criteria are to be applied. When we talk about aims, we may end up disagreeing about those aims; about what should be an emphasis for teachers in the classroom in a particular situation. However, we must agree that to speak of aims is to speak about what to emphasize, not to raise a question about the fundamental justification of or purpose for education.

The concept of education The educational domain overlaps with concepts like “aims” that have a particular functional use and applicability. Just what does the analysis of “aims” and other concepts such as “quality,” “discipline,” and “ learning” mean, however, for our understanding of education itself? After all, the analytic philosopher can clarify what we mean by “aims,” but nothing follows from this regarding what these aims should consist in, minimally, or just what it is we mean by “aims of education” as opposed opposed to to“aims “aim of schooling” or “aims of human development.” The analytic philosopher must further clarify just what it is that we mean by the use of the term “education” if any of these other clarifications are to add any value to our understanding of the educational domain. The signature statement of Peters’ analysis of education comes from his Inaugural Lecture as Professor of Philosophy of Education at the London Institute of Education, “Education as Initiation” (1963a). The central focus of this chapter will be on this essay. However, Peters’ views on the concept of education were further elaborated in other works such as ‘ What is an Educational Process?” (1967b), “Education and the Educated Man” (1970c), and “Democratic Values and Educational Aims” (1979), and we will therefore refer to those other works where necessary. In “Education as Initiation,” Peters begins by making a case for the role of conceptual analysis in philosophical inquiry. We have already identified the ways in which and the extent to which conceptual analysis plays a key role in facilitating, via clarification, mutual understanding between agents deliberating over issues of substance or content. But as a

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philosopher working within the applied tradition of philosophy, Peters is also aware that he is speaking against, as it were, the political and economic forces of his time that in his view further obfuscate education. Peters is writing in the midst of a rapidly expanding postwar political economy where mass training of an industrialized labor force is making education a significant matter of public interest (and government investment). Here education is being seen as a means to economic development and as a key supply for an increasingly rationalized labor market. For some, education just is preparation for a world of labor. Peters thinks that one of the more problematic consequences of this conceptualization is a kind of behaviorism or social utilitarianism about education that renders it unresponsive or insensitive to the reasons and perspectives of agents working within the educational domain: [T]hese economic and sociological descriptions of education can be misleading, if taken out of context [because] they are made from the point of view of a spectator pointing to the “function” or effects of education in a social or economic system. They are not descriptions of it from the point of view of someone engaged in that enterprise. (Peters 1963a, p. 89) Peters says that “everything is what it is and not some other thing” (p. 88). By this, he means that there are discrete intentions and reasons that separate first-person participants in the educational domain (teachers and learners) from other participants in other domains, and that these intentions and reasons cannot be reduced to political, social, or economic aims only. A teacher conceives of what he or she does differently than of a social worker, physician, or economist and has good reasons for doing so. We can distinguish education from other practices, and we fail to do so at the risk of leaving it to mechanistic or behaviorist treatments that overwrite the richness in self-understanding that educators have about their task: The teacher who hears that he is an agent of socialization may come to think of himself as a sort of social worker striving in a very general sort of way to help children to fit into society. He may get the impression that the teacher’s task is not to educate children, in the

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sense in which I will later define it, but to concentrate on helping them to get on with others and to settle down contentedly to a simple job, healthy hobbies, and a happy home life.(Peters 1963a, p. 90) In addition to overwriting the self-understanding of educators, behaviorism or functionalism about education also disconnects it from its own irreducibly ethical value. In other words, a dominant discourse about the function of school systems leads to education being mistreated as a mere means to other, noneducational ends, or simply as a cog in a more instrumental process (p. 90). Important then, for Peters, is to show how the term “education” has a specific and logically necessary first-person meaning for human agents that cannot be reduced to an objective, spectator, or third-person description. To be sure, we can describe what teachers do, and we can measure the consequences of their actions for the job market, but such a description does not uncover what education means for human agents engaged in it. In order to demonstrate the way in which education has a life that cannot be reduced to any of the above-described mechanistic processes, he develops his language-use argument as follows: the term to which Peters thinks education is best compared to reform. This is not to say that education can in any way be reduced to reform, or that to reform is to educate, but that they share some broadly similar logical features. For just as it would be a logical contradiction to say that someone had been reformed for the worse, so too would it be a contradiction to say that someone had been educated and that the change was not desirable (Peters 1963a, pp. 90–1;1967b, p. 4). To be sure, in both cases, we could refer to someone being worse off from reform or education in an ironic way: “he was ‘educated’ in the residential school system” or “this is a great ‘education system’ that you have.” But this irony is parasitic on the prior and sincere view that to reform, and to educate, is to have someone come out of that reformation or education somehow better off for it. As Peters (1963a, p. 91) puts it, “the central uses of the term [education] are confined to situations where we deliberately put ourselves or others in the way of something that is thought to be conducive to valuable states of mind.” The notion of betterment is central to Peters’ conception of education. For example, the term “reform” does not imply any specific aim, set

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of aims, objectives, or ideals. It suggests no particular set of means or processes (Peters 1967b, p. 1). We reform someone by taking them away from some state of privation, and this state can require multiple modes of intervention. Nor is education, like reform, a specific activity—one does not say “get on with education” as one would say “get on with teaching” (Peters 1967a, p. 15). Rather, education is a concept referring to criteria to which a variety of process, activities, and training must conform (Peters 1963a, p. 92; 1967a, p. 14; 1967b, p. 1). It is the criterial nature of the concept of education that allows us to distinguish, say, a purportedly educational process from a therapeutic or broadly developmental one. Just what are these criteria, however? For Peters, these educational criteria are uncovered through an analysis of the logical features of the use of the term. These criteria include the following:

Education as worthwhileness The first criterion is that in any educational activity something of value should be passed on (Peters 1963a, p. 92). Peters argues that this criterion can be evinced by the fact that to say that one has been educated, but that nothing desirable has happened to them, is a logical contradiction (Peters 1967a, p. 14). Accordingly, to say that an activity is educational one must mean that it is believed to be worthwhile (Peters 1963a, p. 92). We can coherently say that one was trained in political assassination, for example, but it would be wrong to say that one was educated in political assassination (assuming, of course, that assassination is not a worthwhile activity). In other words, education suggests a process that is intentional and directed, and to intentionally direct someone through a process that was not worthwhile or valuable seems to go against the very idea of what it means to educate or be educated. An educated person is on this view someone whose way of life and the activities to which he is committed, his “judgements and feelings” and the way he engages with various spheres of life are thought to be desirable or worthwhile (1967b, p. 9). Now, an important implication arises from this criterion, one that directly speaks against the kind of functionalism that Peters is seeking to distance us from. First, any worthwhile activities that adhere to the

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concept of education are themselves immanent to that same concept. By this, we mean that the values and outcomes served by an educational process are not contingently determined or are somehow a matter of fortunate happenstance. Educational processes are not a self-contained set of techniques and means that are simply harnessed in order to direct us toward certain other goods or outcomes. To say that an activity is educational just is to mean that it has value or worth. To educate is to involve someone in what is valuable or worthwhile, not to do something to that person such that it produces some external desired end. The distinction may seem subtle on the surface, but a failure to understand the immanent character of educational activities leads to confusion at the level of policy and practice. For example, it is formally valid to say that: P1. All educational activities are worthwhile. P2. Activity X was educational. Therefore, activity X was worthwhile. However, a focus on education as a means to extrinsic ends may tempt us to reason as follows: P1'. All activities that produce worthwhile or desired outcomes are good candidates for the educational process. P2'. Activity Y produces a worthwhile outcome. Therefore, activity Y is educationally worthwhile. In the latter example, failure to appropriately conceive of education as conforming to criteria leads to the formally valid conclusion that almost anything that produces or leads to a desired outcome in the student can potentially be viewed as educational. P1, if taken to be true, would mean that any process that leads to a desired outcome could belong to the family of educational activities. Consequently, the harnessing of educational processes as a means to desired social, economic, or political ends takes hold as the criterial nature of the concept of education fades from view. In other words, education should be limited to processes that are worthwhile, however, an activity being worthwhile does not make

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it educational. In the former example, the fact that something is educational is what makes it worthwhile. But in the latter, noncriterial account, that something is worthwhile or desirable is what makes it worthy as an external aim of an educational process. For example, if we want children to be obedient, we can term the process “educational” that coerces them to be obedient in just the way that we desire—but note that such a process makes no appeal, nor is held, to any kind of distinctly educational criteria. Of course, the worthwhileness criterion as developed so far is insufficient for elucidating the full meaning of the concept of education because it cannot tell us how to begin to distinguish between educationally worthwhile activities and activities that may be desirable but are noneducative. So while the first example above may be formally valid, we are as yet unclear on what truth-conditions would satisfy P2: activity X was educational. Accordingly, Peters needs to say more about the criteria of education.

Cognitive and affective commitment Peters derives the second criterion through a critical analysis of growth-centered theories of education. Again, typical of Peters’ analytic approach, he views the progressive focus of the child’s self-directedness as an inflation or overemphasis of one criterial aspect of the concept of education. It is not growth theory, qua growth theory, that is mistaken, here, but the crowding out of the other conceptual criteria that makes progressive education problematic. On the progressive view, as Peters interprets it, children are guided on a naturalistic and self-determined path through predetermined ontogenetic stages. What matters in education is not the so-called imposition of a pedagogy that forces children in one direction or another, rather, progressive education lays out an environment amenable to the “natural” progress that growth and experience will follow (Peters 1963a, pp. 93–4; 1966a, pp. 51–2). Peters puts his critique of this philosophy of education as follows: [C]oncepts such as “self-realization” and “growth” presuppose standards of value which determine both the sort of “self ” which

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is worth realising and the direction of growth. Human beings are not like flowers in having a predetermined end which serves as a final cause of their development. “Growing” or “realising oneself ” implies doing things which are thought to be worth-while rather than others. The standards by reference to which they are judged to be worth-while are grasped by men and handed on from generation to generation. (Peters 1963a, pp. 94–5) In other words, the progressive educator cannot get around the question of why the outcomes of a “natural growth” approach are more justifiable then a purportedly “artificial” and directed approach. The progressive educator has effectively presented a passion or preference about children’s development, not a reasoned conception of education. The progressive educator could argue that “growth” is the right and true end of education but in fact avoids the question by simply offering us a description of the growth process as metaphysically inevitable (albeit a description that has significant attraction because it is framed by an admirable moral condemnation of more restrictive and oppressive pedagogical approaches). But Peters rejects this “teleological” conception of the person proffered by more radical branches of progressive education. At the end of the day, says Peters, the responsible educator must pass to the child those traditions of thought and experience that are thought to be worth thinking of and experiencing. Such a process cannot be substituted by some preordained natural or metaphysical principle of development. We have to decide together what these experiences ought to be and why these experiences are more justifiable than the multitude of other experiences we could be supplying. We further elaborate on Peters’ critique of progressivism in Chapter 8. However, having reined in the progressivist ’s intuition, Peters is now able to uncover the logical truth underlying it—that while education suggests no specific processes or procedures through which education is to be undertaken, educational processes must satisfy certain criteria. There are indeed good and bad ways of going about educating people. So while education does entail that something valuable or worthwhile is being passed on, the processes and procedures that enable that transmission are also immanent in or connected to the meaning of what it is to be educated. There is no natural separation between what

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is transmitted and how it is transmitted. This is one of Dewey ’s great contributions—to remind the educator that the relationship between means and end is not monodirectional (Dewey 1916; McCowan 2009). Progressive educators rightly understand that these processes are to be respected if we are to go about the business of education, even if they emphasize such criteria at the expense of others (Peters 1963a, p. 97). Peters claims that when we consider the procedural “manner” of education more directly, we distinguish these criteria in the following way.

The educational process should engender an affective commitment to what is valuable The commitment criterion represents a fundamental attitudinal shift for the educated person with respect to knowledge and understanding. On the one hand, we can work diligently to ensure that our students have an understanding of valued activities such as a science, literature, poetry, or whatever. But Peters argues that such understanding is a necessary but insufficient feature of the educated life. As he puts it, “[w]e would not call a man ‘educated’ who knew about science but cared nothing for truth or who regarded it merely as a means to getting hot water and hot dogs” (p. 96). For such a person, knowledge and understanding is “inert ”—either failing to take sufficient hold on that person’s perspective on the world, or somehow only valued as a functional means to other instrumentally useful ends. For example, I may only value geometry because it helps me navigate the ocean; its value is limited to my own subjective wants and preferences, and once geometry is no longer useful for me in this way, I am happy to forget it altogether. A successful educational process, on the other hand, works to ensure that the learner develops a long-term and intrinsic appreciation for the principles and values that underline the worthwhile activity that he or she is participating in. This is a necessary attitudinal condition for understanding and is a key conceptual feature that progressive educators and “child-centerd” theorists rightly emphasize when they concern themselves with the idea that children ought to govern their learning on the basis of their own interests and motivations. For example, the

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learner cannot simply know that it is true that coherence is an important value in the philosophical tradition, rather, he or she must be moved by a sense of care for coherence in how he or she reasons.2 For the student to really understand what are are being beingpassed passedonto ontoher herare is both to understand the values and standards immanent to that kind of understanding and to care about such values and standards (Peters 1967b, p. 8). The learner undertakes the activity by virtue of the signature values exemplified by that activity and not for any other reason. Activities are not conditional upon any other premise than that of the distinctive value represented by and through engagement with that activity—the educated person is one who is capable of pursuing science, philosophy, or cooking for what there is within such an activity that is distinct from what it may bring about (Peters 1967a, p. 18). Any process that fails to engender such an understanding cannot rightly be said to be educational.

The educational process should engender an understanding of what is valuable Of course, care for the principles and standards intrinsic to a worthwhile activity would be insufficient for an educated life. For one can thoughtlessly care for something without really understanding the reasons why they should value what it is they in fact value. For Peters, the educated person must come to know the content of an activity, tradition, or form of understanding in a meaningful way. Peters (1963a, p. 96) uses the example of psychological behaviorism: we can condition someone to avoid dogs, quit smoking, or reduce bad habits, but it would be wrong to call this “education” if the person did not know what was being learned as they acquired these behaviors. The educated person must know the “reason why ” of things (Peters 1967a, p. 18). Peters often uses Spartan society as an instructive example: while the Spartans may have been highly trained in military strategy or rules of moral conduct, we could not really say that they received a military or moral education because they did not comprehend the warranting principles and derivative reasons underlying military or moral conduct. If asked, the Spartan is unable to justify why he acts in the way he does or fights as he does. He simply did what he was trained to do. He is unable to appeal to the

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principles that define the forms of thought and action that constitute what he does in battle or how he treats others in interpersonal conduct. As a consequence, rules of conduct and war are detached from their meaning: They had mastered the content of forms of thought and behaviour without ever grasping or being able to operate with the principles that could enable them to manage on their own. They were notorious for falling victim to potentates, priests and profligates on leaving their natural habitat where their code was part of the order of things. Failure to grasp underlying principles leads to unintelligent rule of thumb application of rules, to the inability to make exceptions on relevant grounds and to bewilderment when confronted with novel situations. (Peters 1967b, p. 6) On this view, learners must come to know worthwhile activities in a way that suggests both understanding and “voluntariness” on the part of the learner, that is, the child’s own developing reason should inform the educational experience. We cannot bypass a person’s capacity to reason, for example, to “educate” them in a more efficient manner. To sum up: the second major conceptual feature of education is that the outcome of any educational process should lead to (a) caring about what is worthwhile and (b) care for and knowledge about that worthwhile activity in a way that involves a minimum of understanding as well as an appeal to the learner’s own reason (Peters 1963a, p. 97). Growth theorists rightly recognized that children must come to care and understand what they learned, but they wrongly thought that in order to do so, children must always be presented with activities that immediately appeal to their self-directed interest (p. 96). To be sure, educational processes must lead to care and understanding and it may well be the case that authoritarian approaches to education are ineffective on empirical grounds (let alone being morally reprehensible), but Peters cautions the educator not to overstress the development of student motivation and choice to the extent that the teacher abdicates any sense of directness or authority in what they do (p. 97). The principles and standards of an activity do not arise “organically ” from the learning process but must be guided by the educator.

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Education and cognition Thus far, the vision of the educated person that Peters presents to us is of one who is (a) engaged in activities of value or worth, and who (b) has internalized that engagement through a caring and intrinsic concern for the values, standards, and principles that define those activities and who has an understanding of the meaning, nature, and scope of those same values, standards, and principles. In other words, the educated person is able to get “inside” a worthwhile activity in a way that allows him to meaningfully and committedly relate that understanding to his own experience of the world. It might be thought that this completely exhausts the basic meaning of what it is to be educated: to understand something of value and to be able to view that understanding as having value “for its own sake.” This seems to make sense if we compare someone who is trained in playing the guitar and someone who is educated in the art of stringed instruments. The trained musician may be able to play a song with unimpeachable virtuosity, but only the educated musician really understands the historic or aesthetic underpinnings of his practice. The trained guitarist may see his ability to play as a means to a further end, such as earning fame and fortune. The educated musician may see his training in that way for his own personal circumstances as well, but he at the same time sees the intrinsic value of musical understanding and the role that this understanding has for the human condition. In other words, the educated person can have practical interests but he or she does not view worthwhile activities under that practical or instrumental aspect alone (Peters 1970b, p. 14). However, Peters claims that a person who has participated in a process that satisfied these two criteria, such as our educated musician, would still not rightly be thought of as an educated person. He asks us to consider the example of the doctor or philosopher who has a high degree of understanding and expertise in their craft and who cares seriously about the standards intrinsic to it. We would not really see the person in question as “educated” insofar as this is the only form of activity to which he or she possesses such an education. Such a person has a “very limited conception of what he is doing,” for they fail to see the connection of their worthwhile activity to anything else in life. Such

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isolated understanding is “cognitively adrift ” and fails to be informed by or linked to other types of understanding (Peters 1963, p. 98). The focused physician of the example is unable to grasp how the medical tradition relates to other aspects of human experience. Similarly, the person who only has experienced, and sees the value of, a musical education and is unable to appreciate the contribution of knowledge and understanding in other spheres is similarly lacking. Again, language-use draws this out: We talk about a person as being trained as a philosopher, scientist or cook, when we wish to draw attention to his acquired competence in a specific discipline of thought or art which has its own intrinsic standards; we do not use the phrase “educated as a philosopher, scientist or cook.” (Peters 1963, p. 98) We can, however, ask if such experts are also educated persons regardless of their specialism. And failure to answer such a question in the affirmative leads to questions about how informed their training really is. After all, the philosopher who knows nothing about literature or poetry is clearly lacking in his or her understanding of the aesthetic, which raises further questions about their ability to apply their training to basic questions of human experience. Similarly, the physician who has mastered the technical aspects of her craft but knows nothing about the ways in which people negotiate, in a philosophical way, issues of life and death is certainly limited in the extent to which and ways in which she can engage with her patients.3 And the musician who lacks scientific understanding does not really understand how any particular musical instrument really works. But, for Peters, such a shortcoming is not merely a limitation regarding the applicability of any one sphere of intellectual expertise to any specific task, but more importantly a limitation on one’s perspective on the world as a person, generally speaking. The educated person is one who has been initiated into worthwhile activities having cognitive content so “wide-ranging” that its internalization by the learner changes their overall perspective; we cannot therefore be educated as a specialist. The internalization of one form of knowledge alone, no matter how wide-ranging its cognitive content, will not do. One is merely exposed to one particular “slice” of

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human experience—one whose value is greatly diminished through its very isolation. But just what activities consist of cognitive content wide enough to contribute to a fully developed cognitive perspective? Peters develops his account by contrasting specific activities from more general or constitutive forms of understanding: “ There is very little to know about riding bicycles, swimming or golf. It is largely a matter of ‘knowing how ’ rather than of ‘knowing that ’. Furthermore what there is to know throws very little light on much else” (Peters 1963a, p. 100). Compare this with intellectual traditions such as history, science, and literature where “there is an immense amount to know, and, if it is properly assimilated, it constantly throws light on, widens, and deepens one’s view of countless other things” (p. 100). It is important, however, not to assume that by referring to intellectual traditions such as history and science that Peters is somehow endorsing the directive and classroombased approaches to instruction that in many forms remain dominant in school systems today. He stresses that the “breadth of understanding” aspect is simply one criterion to which a truly educational process must conform and that this presupposes no particular pedagogical technique (Peters 1963a, p. 100). That we might assume that this criterion entails formal instruction is more due to the fact that the teaching of “subjects” has become such a rote feature of early modern school systems. But it is important to remember that Peters’ conceptual analysis requires much more than the “teaching of subjects.” After all, a teacher could “deliver” math curricula without the students ever coming to an understanding or caring concern about its form and content, nor may they appreciate how this form and content relate to any of the other things that they are tasked with learning. Nor does Peters accept that the “breadth” criterion can be equated with a liberal education. Peters’ views on liberal education and the liberal arts are more complex and are covered in detail in Chapter 5. However, in “Education as Initiation,” Peters argues that his concept of education is distinct from traditional or more conservative accounts of liberal education. For him, a liberal education is a more demanding project—in the liberal arts, the student is trained, rigorously, into the arts and sciences. This approach aims to develop a certain expertise and mastery of craft in the learner for each of the branches of knowledge.

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Peters, on the other hand, only wants to say that the educated person may be trained in one sphere or none at all—but that such a person is “sufficiently cognisant of other ways of looking at the world, so that he can grasp the historical perspective, social significance, or stylistic merit of his work and of much else besides” (Peters 1963a, p. 101). While in the liberal education tradition, the student is expected to acquire a technical mastery of several crafts (to be able to do the work of the science lab, to write poetry, to excise an historical document), for an educational process what is required is a conceptual understanding and care for these crafts and their value within a broader scheme of life and experience. Having set out these three conceptual criteria, however, one might reasonably ask how these relate to educational policy and practice. How exactly, for example, are we to implement these criteria in an educational process? Peters certainly wants us to make sure that we do not overemphasize say, breadth of understanding at the expense of the development of concern for standards. Because all three features are necessary, it would appear that we would want to preserve a kind of homeostatic balance between them as the situation requires. Nonetheless, the account offered so far is “formalistic,” meaning that it sets out minimal criteria underlying the meaning of “education” but it does not seem to offer much in terms of what, to put it crudely, education is about. Recall that Peters wants to reconstruct the meaning of education from the first-person perspective of teachers and learners. Having built up these meanings along formalistic lines, what better understanding of the educational domain should we take out of this reconstruction as we incorporate it back into our practice? What is the significance (societal, cultural, historical) of an education that meets these minimal criteria?

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Chapter 3

Initiation and the Educated Person

Introduction In the last chapter, we saw how Peters sought to identify the logically necessary features of the concept of education. By identifying those minimal criteria that anyone using the term “education” is linguistically committed to, we are better able to get a sense of what anyone must necessarily mean, if anything, when they say that they believe someone is an educated person, or what they must necessarily mean, if anything, when they say a process is educationally worthwhile. These meanings apply even if we remain in dispute over particularities such as the specific activities that we believe are worthwhile, or aims that we should be emphasizing at any particular time, or the style of pedagogy we should use in the classroom. Nonetheless, the identification of criteria to which educational activities must conform sharpens the discussion. Consider the cognitive criteria: we may disagree on the specific activities that are worthwhile for education, but we must agree that, insofar as what we really undertake is an educational enterprise, any such activity must have “wide-ranging ” cognitive content. Now, for Peters, those activities just happen to be traditions and forms of thought such as history, mathematics, philosophy, and so on. He has a story to tell us about why this is the case which will be the central focus of Chapter 4. However, the formal criteria entailed by the use of the concept of education suggest a somewhat more substantive vision for teaching and learning. Yes, the criteria, qua criteria, are fairly thin—they establish only the boundaries or basic rules of the proper usage of a concept, but they do not really tell us what this concept is about. When and why, for example, would we ever want to apply such a concept in our daily lives?

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Why would we want to lead an educated life in the way recommended by these criteria? This broaches the question of the justification of education that will also be taken up in detail in Chapter 4. However, if we look at each of these criteria taken up together in a more holistic sense, we begin to get a substantive view of what history or science or math or any other purportedly worthwhile activity could be for, or why we intuitively think that they have some value for learners. In other words, while the formal criteria of the concept of education detail the standards to which any educational activity must aspire, they also open up the possibility of inferring in a more positive sense of just what it is we are doing when we are educating. Peters is well aware of this potential and recognizes its importance. To identify the criteria behind the concept and to leave it at that would be anemic. After having detailed what is lacking in other accounts of education (such as behaviorism, growth theory, sociological accounts), after dedicating so much analysis to what education is not, further work needs to be done to show what kind of domain of human experience it is that these criteria together represent. Education as formal instruction, for example, is rightly understood to be the result of an overemphasis on the cognitive criteria. Growth-centered approaches, in contrast, overemphasize the process criteria (Peters 1966a, p. 46). We can look at any one educational project and critique it on the criterial grounds on offer. But this is only a negative reading of the concept. It does not really capture what education is about, fundamentally and in a positive sense. Accordingly, he attempts to bring these criteria together under one synthetic construction: “education as initiation”.

Education as initiation Peters develops his rationale for “education as initiation” by arguing that equating education with the term “training” or “instruction” is clearly too specific in order to serve as positive descriptors; we can train and instruct without meeting the three criteria and we may be able to meet the three criteria without training or instruction (Peters 1963a, p. 102). But “the term ‘initiation,’ on the other hand, is general enough to cover

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these different types of transactions if it is also stipulated that initiation must be into worth-while activities and modes of conduct” (1963a, p. 102; our emphasis). But why this term? How does it mark itself off, criterially speaking, from education as instruction and growth? As Peters himself readily admits, the term “initiation” is indebted to the educational philosophy of Michael Oakeshott. Oakeshott believed that learning was a necessary component of becoming human and that such learning requires engagement with and participation in “conversations,” or cultural traditions, through which the human condition comes to understand itself (2001). For Oakeshott, education is just that process of initiation through which the individual comes to join into this human conversation as a kind of common inheritance: He considers that genuine education, i.e. as conducted in schools, colleges and universities, consists in the initiation of young people into the metaphorical conversation made up of the languages of human understanding (including that of art) that are rigorously disjoined from the world of practical experience. (Williams 2009, p. 224) Peters’ critical views of Oakeshott ’s philosophy of liberal education are complex and seem to center on what Peters saw as an overemphasis on the intellectual over the vocational (Williams 2009). Nonetheless, he thinks that the idea of “initiation” is a well-suited synthetic concept that expresses, in a positive manner and in a meaningful way, the normative criteria underlying the concept of education. This positive account makes salient five features of education that arise through the application of those criteria to the human condition. Peters initially identifies these features in a more loose, discursive manner in the initiation essay (1963a) and elaborates on them in more systematic detail in Ethics and Education (1966a). We elucidate these five features.

The development of mind For Peters, “mind ” is not a transcendental or a priori ego that is simply dropped into the world, imposing rules or laws of experience on it. Nor is it a blank slate upon which knowledge begins to etch itself at

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the point of contact. The self must gradually enter into an ongoing stream of ideas, understandings, concepts, and languages that had a life prior to the self and will have a life after. In fact, the self cannot really become a self until it takes its rightful place within such an inheritance. “Mind ” is “the product of initiation into public traditions enshrined in a public language” (Peters 1963a, pp. 102–103). For Peters, the social development of mind or “socialized ” conception of the person has important implications, for it avoids both the constitutive individualism of the empiricist tradition and the collectivism of Hegelianism (Peters 1966a, pp. 47–50). On the former view, for example, the ideal learner introspectively searches the inner contents of the self for knowledge and understanding. On the latter, the learner must submit his or unique potential to the authority of the community. The concept of initiation, on the other hand, asks that the learner forms a mind dialectically, where “the learning of language and the discovery of a public world of objects in space and time proceed together. But the individual, as owner of experiences welded to each other in a unique life-history, represents a particular and unrepeatable viewpoint on this public world ” (1966a, p. 50). We can see here a kind of balance between the emphasis on intellectual authority signature to conservative traditions in education and the emphasis on inventive independence found in more progressive traditions. In Ethics and Education, for example, Peters describes the learning of science: the learner must acquires concepts like “gravity ” and “force,” the procedures necessary for verification such as experiment and observation—all accessible to individuals within a shared and authoritative public tradition or discourse. In coming to understand such a “mode of thought,” however, a new “slice” of public world opens up to the learner and the gestalt of the public world is transformed in light of this new understanding (1966a, pp. 50–1). This coheres nicely with the cognitive criteria of education—recall, for example, the learner needs to participate in activities that are worthwhile and this standard of worth is not up to the individual leaner alone—they represent procedures and values that have cognitive content whose value is independent of, or impersonal to, those who engage with it (Peters 1963a, p. 103). Yet, he or she must come to a witting awareness or voluntary understanding of the value of that activity on her own terms (and by appeal to her

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developing reason) and in so doing is enabled to make his or her own unique contribution to that same public world (Peters 1966a, p. 50).

The intersubjective content of education Initiation also pertains to the content of education, not simply the public form through which it must be conceived. The concept of initiation reminds us thethe impersonal standards that and servenonsubjective as the formal usthat thatdespite despite impersonal standards framework of any that public tradition, educational process must also cognitive content serve as the the formal framework of any public be accompanied by content. While these criteria are tradition, the educational process must also formal be accompanied by essential content. in orderthese to think critically, about any particular While formalcogently, criteria let are alone essential in order to think cogently, tradition, a real understanding of the value and aapplication of such let alone critically, about any particular tradition, real understanding criteria can only develop through engagement the content those of the value and application of such criteria caninonly develop of through traditions. Forinexample, Petersofstrenuously objects For to “critical thinking” engagement the content those traditions. example, Peters as an abstract or general skill thinking that can” be imported any sphere strenuously objects to “critical as an abstractinto or general skill of 1963a,into p. 104; 1966a,ofp.life 54). Familiarity with thatlife can(Peters be imported any sphere (Peters 1963a, p. 104;content 1966a, leads an increasingly erentiated language or set of diff concepts that p. 54).toFamiliarity with diff content leads to an increasingly erentiated opens up or theset world to the learner furtherupand p. 52). language of concepts that opens thefurther world (1966a, to the learner But engaging with (1966a, such content an engaging educationally further and further p. 52).inBut with worthwhile such contentway in requires the guidance of someone who already understands that content an educationally worthwhile way requires the guidance of someone who (1963a, p. 104). Content is ascertained at the same time that already understands that content (1963a,critically p. 104). Content is ascertained acritically sense of at critique formstime through with thatforms same content: the same that engagement a sense of critique through “content without criticism is blind,“content but criticism without content is engagement with that same content: without criticism is blind, empty” (1963a, p. 104). but criticism without content is empty ” (1963a, p. 104). Take, for example, a seemingly simple historical claim such as: Marconi received the first transatlantic signal in 1901 at Signal Hill, Newfoundland. To be sure, the learner can and should apply the public standards of the historical mode of thought in assessing the nature and veracity of such a claim. Is there documentation of such an event? Are there rival accounts? However, in order to meaningfully ask such critical questions, one must at the same time come to understand such a (public) claim as it has already come to form within a preexisting body of knowledge that is always-already bearing witness to public scrutiny. One cannot simply memorize the statement as a detached piece of information or as an isolated premise—a view Peters shares with Oakeshott. The

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critical stance presupposes an understanding of the content to which that stance is applied. The two intersubjective aspects (public form and public content) must work together and in tandem, otherwise education for understanding is impossible (Peters 1966a, p. 54.). The term “initiation” captures these two interdependent processes.

Education and the individual Education as initiation is also argued to mark off a crucial distinction between what we can loosely term “education for individual selfrealization” and “education through moral respect.” Peters clearly sees the educational climate of his day wrongly emphasizing the former performative attitude at the cost of the latter. After all, he says, an individual may well want to “self-realize” inclinations and desires that are unjust or unethical (1966a, p. 55). Again, the issue at hand is with an unbalanced emphasis on pedagogical intuitions derived from the logical features of education: when we stress the need for educational processes to recognize individual differences and draw out the potentialities unique to each learner, we mean to do so because we want to resist, rightly, an educational system that imposes conceptions of the good or well-lived life on the student (p. 55). However, the ultimate rational grounds of such an aim is not that of care or intimacy or friendship, but the moral principle that we must respect the learner: What is required of the teacher, in addition to the feeling of fraternity already mentioned, is respect for persons, not intimate relations with his pupils. In a teaching situation love must be of the type that is appropriate to the special type of relationship in which the teacher is placed, to his concept of them as pupils rather than as sons or brothers. The teacher must always remember that he is dealing with others who are distinctive centres of consciousness, with peculiar idiosyncratic purposes and feelings that criss-cross their institutional roles. Each one is bound up with and takes pride of some sort in his own achievements; each one mirrors the world from a distinctive point of view. (Peters 1963a, p. 105)

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What Peters is emphasizing here is derived from the by now familiar distinction in liberal democratic societies between the priority of the right over the good. The right refers to principles of justice that entail basic respect for the rights of the person, while the good refers to individual’s choice of how to live and flourish among reasonable options, that is, options that respect the rights of other persons (Rawls 1988). Why would such an abstract moral and political framework be relevant to teacher practice? First, education operates within this democratic context. In Peters’ later work, for example, he elaborates on this relationship in more detail: the concept of education is firmly situated within liberal democratic values and we have to be clear on such values. Furthermore, we must articulate how those values will influence the criteria of education as we apply them in developing specific educational aims (Peters 1979, p. 36). For example, in the postwar setting democracies have understandably wanted to emphasize development of the autonomy of the individual given that fascism was such a near miss—and so the aims of education have stressed its voluntary and individualistic aspect. However, we have to ensure that such emphasis does not crowd out other democratic values such as respect for other persons and fraternity and care and compassion for others (1979, pp. 42–3). Second, education, like other domains in the liberal democratic context, must ensue that basic moral rights are respected and this includes the right of the child to develop their own reasonable conception of the good or well-lived life. This requires an opportunity to learn. To be sure, the interface between democracy, education, the right, and the good is more complicated in Peters’ philosophy of education than an initial reading might suggest (Martin 2009). However, from the perspective of the concept of education, “education as initiation” captures the notion that we must recognize the perspective of the developing individual as a matter of moral respect and not on the basis of the sentimental views of the individual teacher, commitment to ideology or popular pedagogical trend. To put it in a loose way, the teacher’s conception of the educational good (what he or she may idiosyncratically believe is best for learners) should not trump his or her impersonal moral obligation to the student. While we may have strong beliefs about the importance, for example, of a nurturing attitude in the classroom setting, we must not lose hold

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of the idea that we ultimately value the students and their perspective because they are persons, just like us. Paternalism and friendship are not substitutes for moral respect. So, for Peters, the overemphasis on developing a friendly relationship with the student can fail to properly conceive of the need of the educated person to learn (Peters 1963a, p. 105). This does not mean that we should ignore the uniqueness of the individual learner. Especially in the early stages of initiation, this requires careful attention to the particular struggles of young learners as they make those tentative initial steps into a public world—Peters uses the example of basic skills such as literacy as one area where instruction must indeed be tailored to different persons. No student at this stage of development shares the standards and values of any form of thought that could serve as a common basis of instruction among students (p. 105). As the learner matures, however, the authority of tradition takes greater hold as the student becomes familiar with the standards internal to each activity and begins to apply them in the form of judgment to particular cases (1963a, p. 106; 1966a, pp. 56–7). At this stage, we move away from the idiosyncrasies of the individual and toward the authority of the tradition.

Education and personal relationships This theme is taken up in much greater detail in Ethics and Education and serves as a response to the concern that the emphasis on respect as opposed to intimacy will undermine the relationship between teacher and learner. Again, Peters reminds us that the question is one of emphasis. Indeed, good relationships are necessary for almost any social practice (Peters 1966a, p. 58). However, education as initiation suggests some special features about this relationship that distinguish it from other practices. Peters reminds the teacher that they are engaged with teaching developing centers of consciousness, which requires appreciation and care for those initial steps into a public world that will be rife with mistakes and failed attempts at understanding in that public domain. And yet the student cannot learn unless they come to see how they are mistaken in relation to public criteria. Accordingly,

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the teacher must care about the standards that define the activity into which the student is being initiated while at the same time recognizing the student ’s developing perspective on that form (p. 59). It would be wrong, for example, to callously dismiss a student ’s attempt at making a contribution to classroom discussion because that contribution was somehow mistaken or flawed. Critical feedback should be undertaken with sensitivity. Respect and care are mutually presupposed in the educational process.

Education and motivation In Ethics and Education, Peters noted that initiation into worthwhile activities is by its very nature a difficult task for the learner (1966a, pp. 60–2). Accordingly, the teacher is confronted with the practical task of motivating the student to engage in the process of initiation—of the hard work of learning. Yet, the teacher cannot force the student to learn. He has to do it himself. But this is where things get complicated quite quickly: do we appeal to extrinsic motivations such as reward or punishment to get the student to engage? Punishment may damage the personal relationship that Peters recognizes is so fundamental to learning. And yet, appealing to positive extrinsic features, such as the charisma of the teacher, introduces the danger that the student will slavishly follow the teacher and become dependent on her. In both cases, extrinsic motivation may be effective in getting the student to actually engage in a behavioral sense—the student shows up to class, completes the work. But the student here never really gets inside the activity in a way that satisfies the criteria of education. Seeing the reasons to come to to care foror orunderstand understand reasons to learn learnasasexternal externalonly, only,they theynever never come care the intrinsic value of the educational enterprise. Furthermore, he or she is encouraged to see that knowledge and understanding are primarily instrumental in value (Peters 1963a, p. 109). Yet, intrinsic motivation, such as (a) a general appeal to the desire to learn and (b) the goods intrinsic to specific activities, have their own dangers. First, how does one appeal to the intrinsic value of a specific activity, especially in the early stages when that student does not have an understanding of that value in a way that allows him or her to be responsive to such motivation?

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After all, if she has yet to be initiated, it is hard to see how the appeal to the intrinsic value of an activity is going to resonate with the learner.1 Yet, the general appeal to learning and mastery can, if overemphasized, lead to an obsession with achievement and success (Peters 1963a, p. 110; 1966a, p. 61). These psychological concerns play out at a more conceptual level when viewed through the initiation framework. Here Peters (in)famously draws on the following analogy: [Children] start off in the position of the barbarian outside the gates. The problem is to get them inside the citadel of civilisation so that they will understand and love what they see when they get there. It is no use concealing the fact that the activities and modes of thought and conduct which define a civilised form of life are difficult to master. That is why the educator has such an uphill task. . . (1963a, pp. 107–8) Initiation is not easy. The educator has many tools at his or her disposal (extrinsic, intrinsic) and the application of such techniques must conform to the criteria of education as well as involve careful judgment in specific situations, including empirical generalizations about learning. There is no magic formula for success. For Peters, the concept of initiation draws out, in a positive way, the extent to which and ways in which the normative criteria of education are to be developed and conceived. The two terms are almost the same but for one fundamental difference: education entails the notion that what one is initiated into is worthwhile (Peters 1966a, p. 55). Initiation, when taken in the barest sense, could be a process directed at almost any activity, be it something highly specific or something containing wide-ranging cognitive content or something simply pleasurable. To be sure, Oakshott does not view initiation in such bare terms. He would certainly defend the view that initiation must engage with conversations of human understanding that have value and are worthwhile. For Oakshott, however, these conversations do not have to conform to criteria in the highly specific way that Peters has conceived of them and this has implications for Peters’ appraisal of Oakshott ’s views on education, teaching, and learning (Williams 2009). What

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they share in common, however, is the view that the value of education lies in the standards, principles, and values implicit in it. But these values are not to be served by education. To be educated just is to be initiated along to to care for and and understand understand along the thediffi difficult cultpath pathofofcoming coming care what is worthwhile along the way, or as Peters puts it, “to be educated is not to have arrived at a destination; it is to travel with a different view ” (1963a, p. 110).

Aims of education revisited and educational processes Having clarified the normative criteria intrinsic to education and the concept of initiation that expresses it in a positive way, Peters is now able to further clarify extant problems in educational policy and practice. Two illustrative examples of the applicability of this account to such problems are the aims of education and the meansend distinction.

The aims of education revisited We have already seen the application of Peters conceptual analysis approach in Chapter 2 where specification of the meaning of the term “aim” clarifies the relevance of discussion around “the aims of education.” We saw already that the reference to an aim of education involves emphasis on a specific aspect of the educational process that we wish to single out, perhaps because it has become neglected. We can now see how this function has real value and importance; because the concept of education refers to multiple criteria, we will at times find it necessary to refer to “aims” of education in order to emphasize different aspects of what it means to be educated (Peters 1967a, p. 20). On this usage, aims are derivative of the concept of education, not an ultimate statement of what education is or ought to be. However, there is now also secondary usage of the term, “aims of education.” For we could mean the aim of education: the initiation of persons into worthwhile activities that lead to a more reflective perspective on the world. Yet, on this usage, the term “aim of education”

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is something of a redundancy for it would simply be to say something like “the criteria of education.”At most, such a phrase has a function when educational systems are shifting away from the criteria to which education processes ought to conform. Peters gives the example of the bureaucrat who wants to transform the school system into a means to technical or vocational training only. Here, the appeal to the aim of education is to reassert the connection between education and intrinsic values that the policy-maker may have forgotten in his zeal to transform the system (p. 21).

Education as a process Recall that Peters argues that education (like the concept of reform) does not entail any specific process or pedagogy but establishes the framework within which a family of processes must conform. This framework is determined by criteria that are logically necessary for anyone who meaningfully uses the term “education.” Accordingly, educational practices and policies cannot be easily broken down into “means” and “ends.” The ends of any educational activity are “ built in” as it were, within the very conception of what it is that we are doing. This is to a certain extent covered by the idea of education as initiation. However, while initiation does a good job of identifying those criteria as a positive process, it does not provide much in the way of an explanation of why a concept such as education requires us to bring means and ends together in the way that they are. How can it be that the criteria that define an educated person be synonymous with the processes that lead up to the formation of an educated person? Why should the means of education be so closely connected with its end? After all, if I want to be wealthy, there are certainly many things I can do in order to make money. None of them necessarily bears on the normative criteria of “ being wealthy.” I can win the lottery or I can rob a bank. Or maybe I can start a successful business. But there is no unambiguous family of tasks intrinsic to wealth acquisition. Peter’s clearly sees education differently. He therefore seeks to elaborate on this relationship in greater detail in his essay, “ What is an educational process?” (1967b).

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Here, he draws on Gilbert Ryle’s (1949) analysis of task verbs and achievement verbs. The distinction claims that we take a verb and use it either in an achievement sense or in a task sense. For example, when we say that we teach in the task sense, we mean that as a description of what are doing doingwhen we are butbut it does notnot follow we are weteaching, are teaching, it does followthat thatour ourstudents students have learned anything (1967b, p. 2). You could walk into a disruptive class and ask what we are doing and we can say, “ We are teaching” without implying that the student learns. On the other hand, when we use the term in an achievement sense, we mean that we have in fact been successful in what we have aimed to do: we can say that we have taught the class how to read Eliot ’s The Wasteland, despite their disruptive behavior. So too, theterm term““education” because we we can too,says saysPeters, Peters,with is the education” because work at educating people without assuming they will be successful in becoming educated and yet we can say someone is educated in a way that implies success (p. 2). On this view, educational processes are tasks that are relative to achievements. When the emphasis is placed on the achievement aspect of educational criteria, they translate as criteria of the educated person, which can be paraphrased as follows (compare Peters 1967b, p. 9): 1. An educated person leads a life defined by participation in activities that could plausibly be seen as worthwhile; 2. This participation is defined by knowledge of the activities’ underlying principles and a sense of the intrinsic value of them; 3. This knowledge and understanding make a difference to the educated person’s view of the world as well as establishes a concern for the principles and standards that define those activities.

However, these achievement criteria cannot be separated from means, for to educate someone in the task sense presupposes the criteria in the achievement sense. I have to initiate someone into a worthwhile perspective and this cannot be meaningfully separated from someone coming to have a worthwhile perspective. I cannot induce such a perspective, say, via brain implant, for coming to the perspective entails having learned it, not having it forced upon someone. This logical relationship serves as the rationale for the fusion of means and ends in education. For even when we use education in

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the task or the achievement sense alone, both uses must refer back to the criteria of education. We can see how this works by contrasting educational processes from processes that may be useful for teachers but which fall outside that relationship. Take, for example, what Peters (1967b, p. 10) calls “extrinsic aids.” We have already seen that such aids are a sometimes-necessary motivational tool. But such tools are aids to education, not part of the processes of education. And this is because their value is simply a contingent or empirical matter. Take, for example, the popular “token economy ” approach to classroom management. A token economy works because it rewards children for completing tasks and in this respect it can be a very useful strategy for facilitating learning. However, a token economy makes no reference to the necessary conditions of learning, that is, one does not have to appeal to a token economy in order to achieve success in the task of education. It is facilitative, not constitutive, of the educational process. A token economy does not fall within the task-achievement framework. Nobody, when asked what they are doing when they are using a token economy replies, “I am educating them.” On the other hand, there are processes that are very likely to be relevant to the task aspect of education and so too part of the achievement aspect. It might come as some surprise, for example, Peters includes training as one of them, given his emphasis on education as understanding the “reason why ” of things from a broader perspective. But Peters argues that training is an essential part of education. First, training refers to complex practices that require learning through instruction and example (Peters 1967b, p. 15). Furthermore, achievement of such complex practices cannot get around the acquisition and application of concepts. The connection between training and the acquisition of conceptual content means that training falls within the development of knowledge and understanding—to be trained falls within the achievements of the educated person. To be sure, training is not sufficient for education but there will be times, such as in the acquisition of literacy and numeracy skills, where training is a fundamental task for the learner (pp. 14–15). undertaking a aconceptual conceptualanalysis analysis term of “education”, By undertaking of of the the mapping the term is ”able toisclarify its meaning and and specify “Peters education, Peters able to clarify its meaning specifythe the criteria criteria immanentto to its application. Clarification of this immanent the application of that meaning. Clarification of thisvariety variety

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plays an important role in addressing confusion in educational policy and practice. Take for example the idea of “quality in education,” an area of much policy debate. Peters is able to show that, while economists may want to quantify the outcomes of a schooling process as a way of measuring its quality, any such project must first be clear on what “measureable outcomes” actually refer to. By “quality,” do we mean a school system that promotes the values intrinsic to any educational process, or do we mean a system that is effective at promoting extrinsic values such as efficiency, social cohesion, or employment? Insofar as we are really concerned with educational quality, we have to be mindful of the fact that education entails multiple necessary criteria that cannot be easily measured and compared. What we can be concerned with, however, is a school system in which none of these criteria are being met (Peters 1969a, p. 159). And so, Peters’ conceptual analysis encourages us to continually revisit a crucial question of policy and practice: Are schools actually educating, in both the task and achievement senses of the term?

Criticism of conceptual analysis Peters’ conceptual analysis is by no means immune to critique. In fact, his response to criticism requires significant clarification of his initial views, both on the role of conceptual analysis more generally and with respect to the concept of education specifically. In particular, questions raised by both William H. Dray and Peter Woods in their response to “Aims of education—a conceptual inquiry ” (Peters 1967a) seem to especially have caught Peters’ attention (Elliott 1986, p. 44). Peters responded to these criticisms in his reply in that same publication and elaborated on them in more systematic detail in “Education and the educated man” (1970c). In this section, we will expand on these criticisms and comments as a way of reinforcing Peters’ overall approach and to reconstruct how this leads to the second, justificatory part of his project. Objection 1: One of the cognitive conditions is that individuals be initiated into forms of knowledge and understanding that have wideranging cognitive content. The educated person has a certain breadth of understanding. However, we can talk about a person having a specialized

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education and this involves no obvious logical contradiction (Woods 1967, p. 33). Peters’ response to this objection is brief and straightforward. For him, the use of the term specialized is essentially parasitic on a prior understanding of the term “education.” We cannot add the qualification “specialized” education unless we already understand that education, typically speaking, is more general (Peters 1970c, p. 6). Otherwise, why would we specify that such an education is specialized in the first place? More problematic, however, is an elaborated version of this objection. Objection 2: One of the cognitive conditions is that what we are initiated into is worthwhile, Peters,this thisincludes includesforms forms of intowhat is worthwhile, andand forfor Peters, knowledge and understanding as philosophy, knowledge and understanding such asuch philosophy, history, andhistory, science science other cognitive traditions that and otherand cognitive traditions that are seen to are shedseen lighttoonshed our light on the However, what is isthought experience of world. the world. However, what thoughttotobe bevaluable valuable is relative to time and place. For example, we could live in a traditional society where hunting and gathering defines the scope of worthwhile or desirable activities. In fact, a person could come to take delight in, understand the principles of, have an outlook significantly shaped by, and engage in a broad range of specific activities contained within hunting and gathering. They could meet the formal criteria of education as, say, applied to that traditional society. For example, a person could come to understand the principles that underlie hunting and, while seeing hunting as having a practical value, also value it in an intrinsic way (Woods 1967, pp. 33–4). On this view, the value condition (that something worthwhile be passed on) is the only logically necessary condition and that anything thought to be worthwhile at a certain time and place could be used to fill it in. Recall that this possibility was raised in Chapter 2—Peters needs to identify a way to distinguish, in a clear manner, educationally worthwhile activities from activities that are worthwhile from the subjective standpoint of individuals with varying takes on what is desirable. In sum, the value condition (what is worthwhile) is necessary but the cognitive condition (knowledge and understanding) is simply a contingent condition that just happens to seem important at the time of Peters’ writing. What is educationally worthwhile is in fact wideranging and relative to time, culture, and place.

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Peters here needs to show how knowledge and understanding, as he sees them, are not contingent features of the concept of education but are in fact necessary in just the way that he thinks. But this opens up a more complicated analysis and a series of objections. For in his earlier analysis, Peters uncovers several criteria. But once the question of contingency enters the equation, the logical relationships between these individual criteria can quickly fall apart. For example, it may be the case that 1. Only the value condition is logically necessary, and the cognitive condition is contingent.

This objection has already been detailed above. But it may also be the case that 2. Neither the value condition nor the cognitive condition is necessary; all the criteria are contingent, making the concept of education itself contingent.

For example, we can talk about the educational system of other times and places without suggesting that what is transmitted in those systems is of any value (Peters 1970c, p. 9). Furthermore, many people refer to being educated as a “bad state to be in.” Peters uses as an example closed religious communities that would see the educational process as an attack on their beliefs (p. 9). Finally, we can turn the analysis around, and claim that 3. The cognitive condition is necessary and that the value condition is contingent.

On this view, knowledge and understanding are the only constitutive features of what it means to be an educated person. The society of Peters’ time is perhaps more aware of this constitutive feature than in other times. As a result, in modern industrial society, the scope of practical usage of knowledge and understanding is much greater. Our society, therefore, happens to value knowledge and understanding. So, it is true that to be educated is to have knowledge and understanding, but it just

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happens to be thought of as a valuable state to be in (p. 10). Such an approach would trump the objection leveled in (2). For example, the fact that some people do not value education is independent of the fact that education entails knowledge and understanding. To be sure, closed communities have a vested interest in undervaluing education, but this has no bearing on the cognitive condition—someone can undervalue education without it entailing that education does not involve a cognitive condition. In fact, we could argue that the reason why closed communities reject or undervalue education is just because knowledge and understanding is a necessary condition of education— this unassailable aspect of education risks threatening the narrowness of the closed community, which is the very reason why it is seen as “ bad” or “threatening.” Objection 3: Lingering in the background of this parsing out of the necessary conditions is is a more troubling objection, necessary conditionsofofananeducated educatedperson person a more troubling worry, leveled at Peters by Dray, who argued that Peters’ conceptual account of education is more a projection of his own values about what education should be (Dray 1967, pp. 38–9; Elliott 1986, pp. 43–4). On this view, Peters has chosen a particular usage of the term “education” that, while perhaps theoretically confused at times and in need of philosophical clarification, is generally favorable to his personal views about the educational process that happen to match his own perspective. In this respect, conceptual analysis is actually tautological, for it would suggest something along the following lines. (P1) The meaning of the term “education” is to initiate learners into worthwhile activities involving knowledge and understanding for its own sake. (P2) Anyone who uses the term “education” must appeal to criteria immanent to the use of that concept. (C) Therefore, to be educated is to have been initiated into worthwhile activities involving commitment to knowledge and understanding for its own sake.

Note that thatthis thisargumentative argumentative form is a case clearofcase of questionform is a clear question-begging. begging. Peters’ supposedly into the of defi nition of the the Peters’ supposedly writes intowrites the defi nition the meaning of term the term very criteria thatthat he he claims totouncover the very criteria claims uncoverthrough throughhis his own own conceptual

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analysis. On this view, the concept of education as Peters has presented it is not really a clarification so much as an assertion. For Dray (1967, pp. 36–9), the concept of education is not really governed by logical features in the same way that concepts like “knowledge” or “truth” might be. Rather, education is essentially a contingent term that suggests nothing more than an initiation into something, valuable or otherwise. According to Dray, then, any attempt to say what education must really be is guilty of an elaborate rationalization of one’s own cherished views on development and learning.

The “term” education versus the educated person Peters takes up this more focused criticism of the status of the concept of education as an opportunity to clarify his position. Just how is education a candidate for philosophical analysis of the analytic style? Peters begins by acknowledging the historical trajectory of the concept of education as it has developed to the time of his writing. Here the essential features of education begin to be “teased out,” as it were, in the nineteenth century in reaction to an older view of education which focused on elaborate training directed to specialized tasks. However, this “teased out ” concept, which struggled for broadness against the narrowness of specialized training, did not have the elaborated criterial features of the concept of education as it is implicitly used today (Peters 1970c, pp. 10, 11). This less refined, but nonetheless broadened term was used to refer to any kind of upbringing whatsoever: child-rearing, life experience, and so on. The concept had a large scope (it is general), but it had little in the way of clear criteria (it is indeterminate). Peters here acknowledges that people continue to use the term “education” in this more general sense in ways that are incompatible with Peters’ conception but are not really caught up in any kind of logical contradiction because of this usage. It is simply that the meaning of the use of the general term “education” is different from the more “tightened up” or criterial form that has seen increasing usage in his own time. We can cogently use the term “education” in the general or the special, criterial sense.

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Given this analysis, says Peters, we can distinguish between education in a very general and nondiscriminatory sense and in a more criterial form. But how does this impact on the logical and normative status of the concept of education? Does this mean that either the value condition or the cognitive condition is necessary for the term “education”? Or perhaps the general usage of the term shows us that there really are no necessary conditions and Dray is essentially right—education is initiation into pretty much anything? Peters is worth quoting at length on this point: “Education” was originally used to mark out any process of rearing, bringing up, instructing, etc. As those who engage in this would not have bothered had they not thought that some importance attached to what was being passed on, there must always have been some loose kind of connexion between these processes and conceptions of what was valuable. It is doubtful, however, whether at this stage, the connexion could be thought of as a conceptual one; for at a stage when “ bringing up” is just one of the functions of the family and not a function of special institutions it is unlikely that much thought is given to what is really worth passing on and what is not. Education, therefore, must have included passing on a lot of things that were thought valuable but probably included a lot of other things that were of little importance. With the coming of industrialism, however, an increased value came to be placed on literacy, numeracy, knowledge and skill; so, with the widespread development of special institutions to pass on this growing inheritance, education came to be associated very closely with the various processes of instruction which went on in such institutions. (Peters 1970c, p. 13) While hewing slightly closer to the concept of education as Peters conceives of it, however, this historical evolution of the use of the term does not suggest anything regarding conditions necessary for its meaningful application. Education is initiation, full stop. After all, says Peters, people can value this inheritance because it is useful in getting jobs or improving technology, values that have a more contingent relationship with educational criteria (pp. 12–13).

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However, the idea of education contained within the more narrow or “tightened up” account takes on greater conceptual weight when we emphasize its connection to the necessary conditions of the educated person: If, however, we start, as I did, from the analysis of what it means to be “educated” and view education as the family of processes which contribute to this outcome, then the association both with knowledge and with all round development takes over. The value condition is indissolubly connected with this; for the notion of an educated man functions as an ideal of those who view education as being concerned with development of such a person.This ideal emerged into prominence when the importance of specialised knowledge became manifest in the nineteenth century. . . Once, however, especially through the influence of the romantic protest, the practical became dissociated from the instrumental, it became possible to accord intrinsic value to a range of disinterested pursuits in addition to the pursuit of knowledge. Thus our concept of an educated person is of someone who is capable of delighting in a variety of pursuits and projects for their own sake and whose pursuit of them and general conduct of his life is transformed to some degree of all round understanding and sensitivity. (Peters 1970c, pp. 13–14) Peters thinks that by distinguishing between a more or less general concept of education, on the one hand, and the idea of the educated person, on the other, objections to the value and knowledge conditions can be addressed. Here is why: it becomes clear that the noninstrumental aspect of being educated provides the key to understanding the mutual necessity of the knowledge and value conditions. For while it is true that being educated must be a desirable state to be in, one of the asserted criteria— the value condition—is that it must be desirable because this condition is good in its own right and not as a means to anything else. Now, if the intrinsic value condition were to be shown to be connected to knowledge in some way, both conditions could be credibly argued to be necessary. In making such a case, Peters alludes to the Greek notion of techne. Techne refers to principles of knowledge that are intrinsic to, or bound

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to, the particular productive task at hand. This is in distinction to episteme, which refers to principles of knowledge that are not contextbound and are more theoretical (Dunne 1997). Consider knowledge of carpentry: episteme would refer to knowledge of the laws of physics. These laws could apply to building construction, but they apply in an a priori and general fashion. Our understanding of physics would surely come into play if we were to theorize how to construct a building. We can use knowledge of force and potential energy to predict how certain proposed building plans will hold up. But these laws have no uniquely constitutive connection to the craft of carpentry. Techne, however, refers to the context-specific features of the craft. For example, the carpenter knows the unique norms and values immanent to the practice of carpentry and further, these norms cannot be seen as a mere means to the completion of the task for they are constitutive of that task and a caring commitment to them is inseparable from the crafting itself. What Aristotle and Plato uncovered in the techne-episteme distinction, suggests Peters, is the idea that any sphere of understanding entails standards that are constitutive of theoretical perspectives or practical tasks. In other words, the learner is able to engage in things for their own sake by getting “inside them,” by coming to understand and care about the standards immanent to them (Peters 1970c, pp. 14, 15). Unlike unreflective activities such as eating (as opposed to food criticism), says Peters, the educated person has acquired an all-round knowledge of the good or well-lived life. This is not to say that the educated person is supposed to see only one kind of life as valuable, but rather that he or she has attained the knowledge necessary for being able to value things for themselves—to conceive of those things as unconditionally good. In other words, the educated person is in a valuable state of mind partly because he or she knows how to value. The value condition and the cognitive condition dovetail and we now have three ways in which knowledge connects with education: a. Depth of knowledge, b. Breadth of knowledge, and c. Knowledge of the good (noninstrumental attitude).

Here, the valued state of being educated is dependent on all three connections, and the noninstrumental aspect of this valued state rests

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on knowledge of the good or well-lived life. Knowledge of the good or well-lived life involves a capacity to see the intrinsic value of things “from the inside.” The criteria of education, insofar as we are thinking of education in the more narrow sense, are neither contingent, nor indebted to only knowledge or value as a condition of its own possibility. Both knowledge and value are mutually presupposed in the educated life. Second, the separation of “general” education and the educated person helps to address some of the more fine-grained conceptual objections. Take for example, objection 2—that education may be relative to the valued activities of a time and place. Here, the knowledge condition is not necessary but the value condition is. This is why we can talk about the idea of a Spartan education and not have it sound like much of a contradiction. A Spartan education, a huntergatherer education, and a political education—none of these terms presuppose theoretical activities nor do they entail the criterion of breadth and depth. Peters says that the ideal of the education person, however, properly connotes the concept of education in the more specific sense. Accordingly, he says, it would be a contradiction to refer to an educated Spartan (Peters 1970c, p. 16). The educated person is educated qua person and not in reference to a particular cultural tradition, theoretical perspective, or practical activity. Someone may have received a Spartan education but until he has met the criteria he is not an educated person. To say that a person has been educated in a more specific but also universal sense of the term means appealing to necessary cognitive and value conditions immanent to the use of that specific term. Similarly, says Peters, we could claim that a person has been educated and mean that she has gone through a process that involved, say, schooling. But when we can say that someone is an educated person, we mean that she has achieved the criteria represented by the value and cognitive conditions. We can think of this in another way—for Peters, the special use of the term “education” is one that keeps the task-achievement relationship clearly in view. This involves a commitment to the first-person perspective of teachers and learners who are engaged in a voluntary and directed set of tasks that lead up to an achievement by the learner (see Chapter 2). So, for example, we can say that someone is being educated

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and only mean this in the descriptive sense—he or she may be in an educational process of some sort but there is nothing criterially specific suggesting any kind of meaningful task or achievement going on. So we can say “Spartan education” without implying that value or knowledge conditions are being addressed. However, in the more specific and firstperson claim of, say, “I am educating them,” we suggest both a task and achievement usage connected to criteria. To be sure, such an attempt at clarification has not been received as decisive, nor is this argument easily interpreted. R. K. Elliott (1986, p. 44), for example, reads Peters’ distinction between general “education” and “educated person” to entail a more or less arbitrary hermeneutic clarification of what professional teachers understand about their work. In other words, Peters’ appeal to the “first-person” is the first-person perspective of the teacher. Elliott agrees that teachers may see their craft “from the inside” or as an end in itself, but so do many craftspeople. This is especially problematic because it is possible that professional bodies and craftspeople may understand their practices in ways that are unreasonable, impermissible, or misconceived in some way. Consider the physician that sees her work as a godlike power over life and death, or a teaching professional body that sees its craft as preserving specific religious beliefs. They may both be very clear on what they are doing from a noninstrumental point of view. While Elliott ’s critique is worth taking seriously, it is important to keep in mind the extent to which it is applicable as a definitive interpretation of Peters’ philosophy. To be sure, one could interpret Peters’ analysis here as a kind of fabrication of a concept of education, or a kind of reasoned preconception of his own views on educational value. On this view, the linguistic context serves as a kind of background resource from which he can draw conclusions about education that serve his own perspective. For example, perhaps people in the 1960s London just happen to talk about education in a more specialized and criterially rigorous way. To the Londoner’s ear, it may sound like a logical contradiction to say “educated Spartan,” but this is only so from the historical perspective or “interpretative horizon” of, say, the modern university professor. And yet, we could read this in a more sympathetic way by distinguishing between an account that imposes a context-transcending analysis of education as a universal concept,

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on the one hand, and a context-specific analysis of the necessary features of education as the term is used in modern society, on the other. Peters may appeal to “necessary conditions,” but these necessary conditions may only apply to those who wish to use the concept in the distinctly modern company of contemporary society. This sympathetic-contextual reading is observed in Paul Hirst ’s interpretation. Hirst defends Peters on the charge that he is imposing a particular view on education and passing it off as a kind of universal. As he says: [It] is manifestly the case that it is the complexity of the elements within contemporary educational thinking that interests him rather than any a priori linguistic necessities. Nowhere does he suggest that this is the way our concepts must be. . . . In one place he quite specifically raises the question of whether in his analysis of “education” he has set his foot on the path to “essentialism.” To this he replies, “Frankly I do not much mind if I have. What would be objectionable would be to suppose that certain characteristics could be regarded as essential irrespective of context and the questions under discussion.” . . . This, I take it, confirms the view that he is in no doctrinaire sense pursuing essentialist analysis but rather seeking to sort out the fundamental features of concepts from within the contexts in which they operate. (Hirst 1986, p. 13) However, we can read Peters’ conceptual analysis in a different way. Elliott himself, for example, adopts such a reading: “[W]e have his declaration that he would not mind being an essentialist, and that is probably the best clue to what the basis of his view was, namely as supposed insight into the nature of education” (Elliott 1986, p. 45). Elliott reads Peters as a philosopher of the “older style,” a far less modest philosophical style from that of the analytical style and one that offers substantive views on the nature of human existence and the good life (p. 45). Here we have a kind of unsympathetic-universalist reading. So we can see that Hirst and Elliott read Peters’ declaration of “essentialism” in different ways. However, while Hirst grasps onto the contextual, and Elliott the universal, there is another way to understand Peters’ conceptual analysis. For we could understand Peters as uncovering,

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through the process of analytic clarification, the normative criteria of the educated person as it has become disclosed through the historical process. Peters would surely not have put it in exactly those terms, but he does see his analysis as honing in on aspects of the educational process that have only become salient to us in light of certain historical developments, such as the rise of mass labor and training, which have encouraged us to speak in ways that resist specialized training and other forms of human development. Here, the nature and scope of education are themselves uncovered through a learning process that involves increasingly fine-grained insight into learning and development. On this view, while it is certainly possible for the Spartan to have become an educated person, at that particular moment in history, the conceptual, normative, and linguistic resources that are necessary for an intelligible understanding of the educated person did not exist. However, this does not mean that the narrower conception of education is “natural” or a priori but a conception that has developed or been constructed over historical time. We recognize that this is a more historicist (or perhaps Hegelian) reading of Peters’ declared essentialism, but it is not entirely alien to his thought. As we will see in the next chapter, Peters sees the development of modern morality, for example, as a differentiation between moral principles that involve the recognition of persons qua persons from culturally specific codes of conduct. This is a separation that is only made possible via processes of modernization. While moral principles became salient over time (the Spartans would not have recognized them), they are still valid and applicable regardless of time or place (we can say that the Spartans were wrong not to treat others with moral respect even if we cannot really hold them morally responsible for not doing so). For Peters, it is only through a modern existence that lays out many options ahead that the concept of moral respect for all persons clearly separate from a variety of ethical conceptions of the good or well-lived life. So too, it could be argued, does the concept of education separate from a plurality of conceptions of human upbringing and development (Martin 2009; 2012).

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Chapter 4

The Ethical Justification of Education

Introduction In the previous two chapters, we focused on the extent to which and ways in which Peters’ conceptual analysis can be used to clarify extant issues in educational policy and practice. While some clarification of the terms common to educational discourse can be helpful in this respect, such as with the terms “aims” and “quality,” clarification of the conceptual boundaries of “education” itself is necessary for any of these subsidiary clarifications to be at all meaningful or informative. This conceptual analysis leads to the uncovering of formal criteria that are necessarily presupposed by any agent who seeks to meaningfully use the concept “education.” For example, to say that one is educating someone is to mean, minimally, that one is seeking to promote knowledge and understanding of an activity or perspective deemed valuable or worthwhile. To say “I educated him by way of indoctrination” would therefore be a logical contradiction or misapplication of the concept. Furthermore, while these criteria are thought to be essentially formal, we can apply them in a way that makes salient the positive features of education, best embodied in the notion of “education as initiation.” We can also apply these criteria in a somewhat more substantive sense. For, as we have seen, the term “education” can be used in both a “task” and “achievement ” sense. On this view, we can identify the ways in which the educational processes conform confirm to the criteria of education— for example, learning must be an intrinsic aspect of the task. We can also identify the ways in which the criteria would manifest in a person who has been successfully educated—for example, the educated person is able to see what he or she does as having a noninstrumental aspect. However, clarification does not entail anything about the legitimacy, justifiability, or generalizability of this clarification or the substantive

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content that might be warranted through it. Conceptual analysis has uncovered criteria that are rightly understood to be normative: anyone who claims to be educating in the task sense or educated in the achievement sense ought to have their tasks and achievements governed under that criterial aspect. If you are educating, then you ought to promote understanding in the student. However, it is important to keep in mind that conceptual analysis is a mapping out or description of normative criteria, not a justification of those criteria. To be sure, if Peters’ analysis holds it would suggest that when we use the term “education,” we mean that one ought to promote understanding. However, it does not follow that we ought to promote understanding. There are, after all, norms and principles that are unjust, ineffective, or harmful which can take hold in the linguistic and cultural life in communities. Peters’ conceptual map, if accurate, is only internally valid—if you pick up the conceptual map, you must follow the criteria. But why should you? What reasons do we have for accepting the concept of education on offer? This refers to part two of Peters’ philosophical project: 2. How do you know that “education” is “worthwhile”?—a question of justification.

Accordingly, in this chapter, we will be focusing on the limits of Peters’ conceptual analysis and explore the extent to which Peters is able to provide a justification for the concept. After looking at Peters’ own views on the limits of conceptual analysis, we will look at two forms of value that Peters sees as playing a role in the justification of education: interpersonal moral principles and worthwhile activities.

Conceptual analysis versus the justification of criteria The problem of the generalizability, shareability, or justifiability of Peters’ conception of education after conceptual analysis has done its work becomes the second major feature of Peters’ philosophy of education. For, regardless of the debate over the status of the clarified concept of education—transcendent, contextual, or constructed—the criteria bound up in that concept need to be justified if they are to actually

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have weight in questions of policy and practice. Peters is quick to point out that addressing such a question requires philosophical methods of a different order from conceptual analysis1: [C]onceptual analysis leaves everything as it is. For the question remains whether it is desirable to lay stress on knowledge and understanding in this way, to be concerned about all round development and intrinsic motivation. To deal with issues of this sort we have to go into ethics and social philosophy as well as into an empirical analysis of the contemporary situation. (Peters 1970c, p. 19) Furthermore, in Ethics and Education, he says: “Education” has notions such as “improvement,” “ betterment,” and “the passing on of what is worthwhile” built into it. That education must involve something of ethical value is, therefore, a matter of logical necessity. There is, however, no logical necessity about the particular values ascribed in particular societies to the variable of “ being worthwhile.” The justification of such values, too, must go beyond the realm of conceptual analysis into that of ethical theory. (Peters 1966a, p. 91) What Peters here means is that the logical consistency of the meaningful application of a concept like “education” is distinct from questions of justification: Is the concept understood in this way worth having at all? Why should we take up such an education? Is education indispensible for the good life? Do we have a moral obligation to children to undertake education in this way, and not in some other way? Recall that the criteria of education are normative but these norms—the promotion of knowledge and understanding, a sense of the intrinsic value of an activity—are in need of rational justification. Peters (1970b, p. 19) refers to these questions as matters of “ live ethical discussion” and a subject of concern with the “content ” of what is valuable. One cannot overestimate the importance of such a justificatory question. For if we cannot come up with reasons why someone should value thecriteria criteria of of the the concept, concept, value being being educated educatedininways waysthat thatconform conformtothe the very issues raised through the project of clarification leave us at

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something of a loss. It would suggest that the linguistic clarification of the use of the concept of education is a matter of clarification and no more. Clarification can enhance mutual understanding over contested concepts, but it offers no window on the possibilities of a resolution, or no sense of reasoned standards or cognitive content regarding how that concept ’s meaning can and should take hold on our practical judgments, or how the judgments that appeal to such a concept are stronger than educational judgments deriving from rival conceptions. In other words, Peters may be able to offer a concept of education—he can offer one definition of the problems which education may be seen to address— but he is unable to justify that account, that is, he cannot tell us what the solutions are to these problems or why we would want to solve them in the first place. What one would be left with is clarification for clarification’s sake—a vindication of Dray ’s skeptical view that the philosopher of education can at most attempt “analyses only of specific educational theorists or schools, with little further ambition than to help us (and them) understand what they are saying, and perhaps to police it for internal consistency ” (Dray 1967, p. 39).

Two forms of ethical value in education At the end of “Education and the Educated Man,” Peters cites R. M. Hare’s invocation that to answer the question of how to raise one’s children is to answer many questions in the ethical domain (Hare 1952, pp. 74–5; Peters 1970c, p. 20). Furthermore, while Hare is referring specifically to the justification of basic moral principle (what we can refer to as “the right ”), Peters claims we can also be referring to the “the good.” Peters at times refers to this distinction as a matter of respect for persons, on the one hand, and worthwhileness, on the other. In fact, as we will see, he believes that questions about what is worthwhile just are questions about the good and further, that educational questions are primarily about how to initiate learners into a good or well-lived life. However, it is important to recognize that both forms of ethical value (the good/worthwhile and the right/moral) play a role in the justification of education.

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First, we must undertake the justification of interpersonal principles of respect or “morally legitimate procedures” that are to be recognized as part of any legitimate human practice (Peters 1967b, p. 3). We approach children with respect and more specifically as “developing centres of conscious.” We have a certain moral attitude toward them, a kind of translation of our general sense of moral respect for all people and an attitude that the progressive educators were right to emphasize. This moral attitude stands in need of justification because while educators may share superficially similar moral attitudes their reasons for holding those attitudes may differ and so too the actions warranted by those reasons will also differ. For example, teacher A may recognize the freedom of children because they are persons worthy of moral respect, full stop. Teacher B, however, may recognize the freedom of children because, fundamentally, such treatment leads to a more creative and fruitful educational environment. Of course, should freedom stop being an effective strategy, teacher B may feel justified in ignoring the freedom of his students. Teacher A, on the other, may have to make some changes to her practice, but respect for the child’s freedom must remain firmly in place. The justificatory question here, then, is just what reasons can we give for an attitude of moral respect for children (and all other persons for that matter). How do we justify such a code? Second, morally legitimate practices such as education must have a further justification in terms of the values that make an educational process worth undertaking. In other words, we also need to justify the content of education. This justification project is more closely associated with the concept of education, for it is here that we are directly engaged with questions about the reasons why we should value knowledge and understanding and so on. So, on the surface, it appears that we in a sense have a kind of “double justification” or “two-step” justificatory project. First, we must justify the basic principles of interpersonal morality and their application to the educational domain, what Peters (1966a, p. 92) in Ethics and Education calls “the manner of education.” Second, we must justify the forms of knowledge and understanding, as well as any other content that might be called for in recognizing the criteria of education. To be sure, the two forms of value interrelate in complex and important ways. In fact, the justification of each share a common approach, often referred to

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as a “transcendental argument ” or “transcendental justification.” This transcendental approach has important implications for both Peters’ philosophical project in general and his other views on aspects of personhood and moral development. Accordingly, we will trace out Peters’ justification of education in two distinct sections: (a) moral justification and (b) the justification of educational and worthwhile activities.

Moral justification Peters’ account of moral justification is universalistic, meaning that he believes that the ethical life is structured by moral principles of duty or obligation that every person must respect. This aspect of the moral life is deftly characterized in Paul Hirst ’s impressive overview of Peters’ work: Basic to [his] account is a notion of rational universalistic morality as this has emerged from the clash of codes of living and competing views of the world as a result of social change and economic expansion. Reflecting about which view of the world was true, which code was correct, men came to accept higher-order principles of a procedural sort for determining such questions. By these means matters of morals came to be distinguished from matters of custom or law, codes could be criticized and revised, and men gradually became able to stand on their own feet as autonomous moral beings. (Hirst 1986, p. 31) Key for Peters, however, is the justification of such a universalistic code, and this is just the challenge he takes up in Ethics and Education (1966a). This is by no means a modest task—skepticism that moral principles and moral judgments can be “right ” or “wrong,” “correct ” or “incorrect,” “understood” or “mistaken,” has long been a basic problem in the history of moral philosophy and moral epistemology. How do we know, for example, that a judgment we think is right, or the standards we use in deciding whether a moral decision in right are themselves correct? Without a verification test such as used in the natural sciences, one is left to wonder. This is compounded by the awareness that there are other cultures that hold onto standards of moral conduct that may differ

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substantively. Moral skepticism is often accompanied by, ironically, a moral concern that the justification schemes we use to decide what is right or wrong universally has been and will be used to impose specific values, beliefs, and practices on less powerful groups. Peters is aware of such concerns, and he accordingly looks to various theories of justification in the history of modern moral theory. He claims that all fail to account for one of two necessary requirements for the rational justification of moral principles. He refers to these requirements as the autonomy and the objectivity of moral knowledge. Autonomy refers to the idea that moral arguments are not dependent, fundamentally, on empirical claims or contingently acquired beliefs. Some moral theories, such as naturalism, rely upon empirical generalizations that make the “naturalistic” justifications immediately suspect. For example, we could claim that animals compete for resources. People are animals. Therefore, people ought to be competitive. It would be formally invalid, however, to infer that someone ought to be competitive just because animals are competitive. Why ought we do what animals do, unless we hold to the principle that we ought to act like other animals? Where would the justification of this principle come from? Peters (1966a, p. 97) describes justificatory autonomy as “the claim that no moral judgment can be deduced from any set of premisses which does not itself contain a moral judgment or principle.” Other moral theories preserve the autonomy of the moral point of view at the expense of its objectivity. Peters describes objectivity as: [T]he assumption that error is possible in moral matters and that whether or not a person is in error depends on facts independent of the opinions or attitudes of any particular person or group of persons. To claim objectivity is to deny that the adoption of moral values is merely a matter of personal taste or group allegiance. (Peters 1966a, p. 99) In other words, some moral theories presuppose that moral life does possess its own distinct domain, but are unable to account for the truth or rightness of claims made in the moral domain. On this view, moral life has no “cognitive content ”—we cannot know it or be mistaken about it. Moral life is simply what it is.

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Peters is, therefore, interested in developing a theory of moral justification that preserves both the autonomy and objectivity of the moral domain. With each aspect of moral justification held firmly in place, those justifying moral principles can potentially address skeptical questions regarding the validity and applicability of moral claims. Peters can show how the “moral attitude” and the principles contained therein apply to all persons, including children. However, skepticism can extend beyond moral justification in particular and apply to justification in general, where the substantive criteria of what it means to have justificatory “autonomy ” or “objectivity ” remain rooted in a particular culture or tradition. In other words, even if we agreed that the moral domain is in principle an autonomous one, and even if we admit the possible objectivity of moral judgments, the principles we appeal to in making a moral argument are themselves open to question. After all, the skeptical position would suggest that any moral principle we appeal to might simply represent a historically or culturally situated assumption about what is right or good. Utilitarianism, for example, which seeks to ground the rightness of moral judgments in the consequences of an action, could satisfy both the autonomy and objectivity criteria. The moral principle “act so to produce the greatest good for the greatest number” does not rely, fundamentally, on an empirical premise. We apply the principle to specific circumstances in order to see what we ought to do. Furthermore, the principle is objective because the moral judgment in such a framework is something that we can get right or wrong. We could choose to do X, but it may turn out that Y would have produced greater results. Yet, why should this principle be a fundamental moral principle? Perhaps this principle best reflects the industrial age that inspired it, with its obsession with rationalization, productive output, and control over the natural environment. How do we justify our justification?

Transcendental arguments Peters seeks to break the potential infinite regress in moral justification (where the principle I use to justify morality needs to be justified, which requires appeal to another principle, which in turn needs to be

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justified. . .) by appeal to transcendental argument.2 John Kleing’s critical review of Peters’ use of transcendental arguments summarizes the nature and scope of the transcendental argument rather well: We can understand by “transcendental argument ” any argument which justifies or purports to justify a principle by showing that it is logically presupposed by some speech-act or epistemic situation. This broad characterization allows for variation in both the generality and the nature of transcendental arguments. Those basing themselves on speech-acts (such as Aristotle’s defense of the principle of noncontradiction) are generally concerned to uncover the logical presuppositions either of making any assertion at all or of making particular assertions. Those basing themselves on epistemic situations are generally concerned to uncover the logical presuppositions either of experience or language in general or of particular knowledge claims, beliefs, concepts or forms of discourse. (Kleing 1973, pp. 150–1) We can see how the transcendental argument works through Peters’ own discursive justification of moral principles. He offers a transcendental argument regarding the necessary conditions for the employment of public reason: discourse about what one ought or ought not to do unavoidably presupposes the public character of justification in general. The principle of noncontradiction, for example, is a necessary presupposition for any public discourse that aims for truth. If participants readily contradicted themselves without rhyme or reason, any discourse oriented to a search for truth would not make much sense. These presuppositions, were they to be shown to be necessary and unavoidable, could stand as principles that anyone participating in the discourse must adopt: “if it could be shown that certain principles are necessary for a form of discourse to have meaning, to be applied to or to have point, then this would be a very strong argument for the justification of the principles in question” (Peters 1966a, p. 115). Peters goes on to develop a principle of justice that simply states that anyone who asks the question “ What ought I to do?” with respect to practical questions presupposes that there are principles that can be used to distinguish between good and bad reasons for doing something—that

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is, reasons for treating one person differently than another, for example (p. 122). Peters is worth quoting at length on this point: The situation postulated is one in which any individual, possessed of a public language, asks the question “ What ought I to do?” There are alternatives open to him and he is asking for reasons for adopting one alternative rather than another. . . . A person who uses the discourse of practical reason seriously is committed to choosing rather than plumping, the notion “ought ” being more or less equivalent to the notion of there being reasons for something. Basic, therefore, to the notion of acting with reason is the very formal principle of no distinctions without differences. . . . To use practical discourse seriously is to be committed to the search for such reasons. . . . Without this presupposition the discourse would lack point. (Peters 1966a, p. 121) Peters’ “principle of justice” very simply refers to “the principle that there should be principles” (p. 123). This does not entail an infinite regress, however. The unavoidability and necessity of presupposing that reasons are relevant as a part of any intelligible practical discourse transcendentally “ground” the principle of justice from which all subsidiary principles are derived. The principle of justice, for example, entails the further presupposition that there are additional criteria (that is, principles) that can be used to determine the relevance of competing reasons. Consequently, the necessary presupposition that there be principles for evaluating the epistemic force of reasons is supposed to absolve moral deliberation and justification of any charges of arbitrariness or infinite regress, “[f ]or it has been argued that it is a principle that must be accepted if practical reasoning is to have any point and application” (p. 125). Once the principle of justification has been established, Peters goes on to transcendentally derive several moral principles. Having demonstrated that anyone who asks “ What ought I to do?” is committed to public justification, all that remains is to determine the kinds of subsidiary principles that are necessary for the specific kind of “ought ”question being asked. Consider the question, “ Why ought I to consider

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the interests of others in pursuing my own ends?” How can we go about justifying why one ought to take the interests of others into account? For Peters, the answer is revealed through transcendental reflection upon the necessary presuppositions entailed in asking such a question: “ The answer is surely that consideration of the interests of others is a presupposition of asking the question ‘ Why do this rather than that?’ seriously. This question, . . . , is a question in public discourse” (1966a, p. 171). For example, even a purely selfish person engaged in a debate over interests must necessarily presuppose that everyone’s interests be considered in practical discourse. This is because anyone asking the willfully excluding the interest-claims public question of interests while wilfully of others is to advocate for his or her own exclusion: In entering into such a discussion any rational man must assume not only that there are worth-while things to do but also that he might want to engage in such worth-while things. If he thought that, having discussed such matters with his fellows, his stake in such a worth-while life was going to be completely ignored, it is difficult to conceive how he would ever take the step of engaging in such a public discussion. As a rational man he must see, too, that what applies to him applies to any other man engaging in such a discussion; for how could he think that he alone has any claims? (Peters 1966a, p. 171) On this basis, Peters claims to have justified a principle of consideration of interests (pp. 172–8). To the skeptic, Peters can refer to the unavoidability of such moral presuppositions as sufficient grounds for defending the impartiality of any moral principle at issue. This is because such presuppositions are necessary and unavoidable for all who engage in deliberation. Furthermore, the public nature of justification means that we are given a procedural framework by which necessary presuppositions can guide the deliberation of individuals across differing cultural or other such worldviews: “ These fundamental principles of fairness, liberty, the consideration of interests, and respect for persons . . . are all of a procedural rather than of a substantive character. They thus provide a procedural framework of principles within which substantive solutions can be sought to both moral and political problems” (Peters 1966a, pp. 298–9). In other words, justified moral principles set out a procedure

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for assessing the epistemic force of reasons offered in discourse about moral issues. In this way, Peters is able to offer something of a justification for the moral attitude of those engaged in education processes (or any practice, for that matter). Principles such as equal treatment or freedom do not take hold on the moral reasoning of the teacher for the reason that such principles make a more effective learning environment, nor do such principles reflect would-be “natural” growth process that draw out the proper developmental path of the learner. Rather, anyone who purports to act on reasons is committed to basic moral principles that contribute to our moral understanding of respect for persons.

Objections Is the transcendental argument sufficient for Peters’ purposes? John Kleing raises two related criticisms of Peters’ transcendental justification of moral principles. First, he argues that the transcendental argument seems only to apply to those with a practical interest in morality, or those that “seriously ” inquire as to what it is that they ought to do (Kleing 1973, p. 152). For example, we could imagine a skeptic who sees moral principles as fundamentally unsound and so refuses to ask the moral question—what ought I to do? This person is seemingly in no contradiction at all. The rules of discourse only apply to those who are willing to play the game of moral justification. But if you do not recognize the game, you should not have to play by those rules. The moral attitude is really a matter of preference, not necessity. Second, Kleing argues that Peters is guilty of a question-begging argument in order for his justification to work. He describes this as follows: The consequences of opting out of moral discourse are not nearly as unrealizable as Peters suggests. For not all questions of the form “ What ought I to do?” are moral in character. It is quite possible for a person to adopt non-moral, rational, action-guiding principles. One suspects that this often happens in politics and business, where moral principles are too soft for success. The choice is thus not

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between moral discourse and irrationality in action, but between the acceptance of moral principles and non-moral principles of conduct. (Kleing 1973, p. 152) On this view, Peters happens to emphasize the moral meaning of “ought ” in a way that favors his justification scheme. Peters essentially engages in a question-begging argument when, starting with the meaning of the question “ What ought I to do?” as a premise, he derives a substantive normative presupposition that is identical with the meaning that he attributes to the question itself. In asking “ What ought I to do?” the speaker postulates that “[t]here are alternatives open to him and he is asking for reasons for adopting one alternative rather than another” (Peters 1966a, p. 121). Peters takes the meaning of the word “ought ” in this context as “ being more or less equivalent to the notion of there being reasons for something” (p. 121). Peters then goes on to interpret “ought ” to mean that there cannot be differences of treatment without good reasons, thus securing the principle of equal treatment. Note, however, that the meaning of the word “ought ” is a premise used in Peters’ derivation of the principle. This principle states that we must necessarily justify any unequal treatment of others on the basis of relevant reasons. Yet, this principle is identical with the meaning that Peters attributes to the term “ought ” itself which is a question-begging fallacy and opens Peters’ position to attack, for there are potentially different interpretations of the meaning of the term “ought ” in this context, depending on the kinds of language games commonly used by the particular public asking the question. One could say, for example, that the term “ought ” means different things to different people depending on their conception of moral obligation and that Peters’ definition of “oughtness” is rather arbitrary for a moral theory of justification that claims universal validity on the basis of public presuppositions made by all who undertake moral discourse. Are these objections decisive? The philosopher and critical theorist Jürgen Habermas has drawn on features of Peters’ transcendental approach in illustrating his own justification of moral norms, known as “discourse morality.”3 As Habermas (1990, p. 85) notes, Peters can counter this question-begging objection by broadening the scope of the presuppositions themselves. Were Peters’ presuppositions to apply to

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argumentative discourse in general, there would be no requirement that one engages in the semantic deduction of “oughtness,” for the very act of arguing in general must presuppose the epistemic force of reasongiving. Habermas cites Peters as implicitly making use of this counterobjection from time to time, as in the case of his justification of the moral principle of liberty: The argument, however, need not be based simply on the manifest interest of anyone who seriously asks the question “ What ought I to do?” For the principle of liberty, at least in the sphere of opinion, is also surely a general presupposition of this form of discourse into which any rational being is initiated when he laboriously learns to reason. In matters where reason is paramount it is argument rather than force or inner illumination that is decisive. The conditions of argument include letting any rational being contribute to a public discussion. (Peters 1966a, p. 181) This expanded account of the transcendental argument can apply for Kleing’s first objection as well. The moral principles of public justification self-referentially reflect back even on the person who claims to refuse to play the game of moral justification, for he or she raises objections to moral justification through the use of public rules of justification. For Peters, the exercise of practical reason is a moral exercise, or moral practice and even the skeptic must engage in such reason at some point in time, and insofar as he or she does so, is tacitly endorsing (and making use of ) the interpersonal and discursive moral framework of justification.4

Moral life, fraternity, and moral community The reach and depth of Peters’ transcendental justification provide some early indications of just how fundamental the life of public reason plays in his philosophy and this will have further implications for his justification of education. We saw hints of this in the previous chapter, for example, where Peters describes education as, partly, initiation into a public world. Furthermore, Peters (1967b, pp. 21–2) sees the ideal of

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reasoned discussion as a kind of pinnacle, or purest manifestation of, the education ideal. The role of reason in Peters’ work, however, is not radically individualistic as some strains of modern liberal theory have been charged to be. These objections to rational morality come in at least two related forms. First, philosophical communitarians have often claimed that the formalism and universalism inherent in principled accounts of rational morality treat the individual as an abstract entity who has only a tentative connection to his or her emotional, political, or cultural bonds with others. On this view, the kind of conception of a person required for interpersonal morality to work is an “unencumbered” self who exists prior to his or her membership within a community. Consequently, such bonds can only have a derivative or secondary value for the rational agent. Interpersonal morality requires that my abstract self is prior to, or more important than, those other contingent attachments.5 The principled moral theory of the kind that Peters adopts could be open to the criticism that it imposes this very kind of rational individualism on persons. For example, I may be willing to consider the interests of others in accordance to the principle of consideration of interests, but I am able to do so only by viewing myself in the abstract and thus denying, or conceiving as conditional, the relationships, values, and perspectives that make me a member of a family, community, or other associations. After all, suggests the communitarian, how can I assess all these competing interests in an impartial manner without seeing them as revisable, rejectable, deniable, or “thin”? Communitarians, then, want to say that we are constituted through our lived relationships within the community and that the emphases on impersonal and universal rules of conduct undervalue these constitutive elements. Second, there is the concern that the idea that a principled morality only refers to the demands of an “atomistic” individual, standing alone, insisting upon what is owed to him or her as a matter of right.6 The received critique is of persons operating within their own spheres of subjective freedom who must regulate their actions, via principles, so that each individual’s freedom is preserved. Such an account makes it difficult to see how our own interests could relate to the larger community. If I regulate my actions simply so that I preserve my own interests in the long run, it is difficult to see how an interest could be held in common

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other than a common interest we have in securing our own particular interests. Republican political theorists often see this moral attitude as a consequence of our liberal democratic emphasis on subjective rights and freedoms. The republican tradition would argue that we ought to emphasis our shared obligations to participate in and contribute to the emphasize political life of the community. How would such a self-regarding moral attitude play out in the educational domain? These concerns about interpersonal morality have clear relevance for Peters’ educational philosophy. For Peters, the life of reason is a crucial component of what it is to become a person. Yet, an interpersonal morality that requires that one becomes abstracted from the many worthwhile aspects of life, such as loving relationships or valued practices, or requires an egocentric pursuit of individual interests, seems to jar with a conception of education that emphasizes intrinsic values and worthwhile activities as well as the entry into a shared or public life defined by traditions. Accordingly, Peters must show that the kind of moral life his transcendental argument justifies does not contradict these other ethical values. One way to counterbalance an individualistic account of interpersonal morality is to emphasize the ways in which the moral point of view plays out at a collective level. Once again, Peters has much of value to say on this: [F]ellow-feeling for another as a person is a more abstract sentiment than the fraternity felt by members of a cohesive face-to-face group. Moral agents do not form special societies for discussions of moral problems; . . . Neither is morality a code confined to a club, class, or state. . . . A “moral community ” is not therefore supported by those massive feelings of loyalty built up over years of constant association in common tasks . . . Indeed to confront another simply as a person is to conceive of him as detached from his status and roles and from his natural affinities and associations. . . . [A] “moral community ”, by definition, has no authority structure, no built-in appeal to consensus. By this is meant that the validity of moral rules is not determined by appeals to authority or to majority agreement as are the rules of states or clubs. . . . Their validity is determined by appeal to reasons . . . (Peters 1966a, p. 226)

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Notice that members of Peters’ moral community must encounter one another as equals, “simply as a person.” We should be careful, however, not to read Peters as saying that we encounter one another as abstract others. What he means is that our individual interests, though morally relevant, have no decisive authority. Interests can be reasons for action, but they are not reasons simply because they are interests. An interest can clearly be a poor reason for action; for example, someone may have an interest in harming another person. Clearly, one is socialized into and acquires interests in concrete, “face-to-face” communities that are more immediate than the kind of idealized moral community that Peters posits. However, the moral community is a kind of common and final court of appeal for when these specific interests appear to conflict between individuals. Regardless, the characterization of a moral community in these terms does not adequately explain how moral principles require a genuine consideration of the interests of others. Peters recognizes this concern. His moral community is made possible through genuine concern between its members. Peters sets out this form of solidarity (or “fraternity ” as he calls it) in the following terms: [T]here is one sort of kinship that must be appropriate for a rational being, whatever he feels about his loyalty to family, state, class or club, and that is his kinship with other rational beings as persons. In so far as he is a rational being, and joins with other rational beings in seeking to discover what ought to be done, his kinship to them as persons, with points of view to be considered, claims to be assessed impartially, and interests to pursue without unjustified interference must be considered important; for this minimal type of kinship is a precondition of the situation of practical reason. (Peters 1966a, p. 225; emphasis ours) This characterization of fraternity needs to be interpreted with some care. It could be tempting to read Peters as trying to pass off an ad hominem argument about the character of those that do not accept his rationalistic account of the moral community. But we think it would be a mistake to read Peters in this way. Peters’ account of moral fraternity must be evaluated within the context of what he takes to be required for

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practical discourse. For Peters, moral fraternity is a necessary condition for the possibility for moral discourse. True, individuals may experience this sentiment more or less than others. Nevertheless, at a formal or basic level, moral fraternity is transcendentally necessary for the persistence of any cooperative moral community. If individuals do not seriously consider the interests of other persons as persons, one cannot ever determine what ought to be done. This account of a fraternal or solidaristic interpersonal morality is able to accommodate other forms of ethical experience. This should not come as much of a surprise, for as we will see in Chapter 6, Peters is by no means monolithic in his approach to the moral life. He recognizes the contribution of both Aristotelian and Kantian moral perspectives, such as the import of both habit and critical reason, to a person’s moral development and experience. But where exactly does education figure into Peters’ conception of interpersonal morality? Recall, for example, that Peters argues that a basic feature of education involves initiation into a public world of concepts and traditions, standards, and principles. Clearly, the practices of public moral justification would be contained therein. Moral education and a capacity for moral reasoning must be key features of the educational process. However, such an education is not sufficient—education involves the initiation into something that is worthwhile. Peters’ transcendental justification for morality would surely apply here—initiation into moral reasoning is worthwhile because it is transcendentally necessary for any form of life. But Peters has more in mind for education than this.

The justification of education and worthwhile activities For Peters, interpersonal morality is, for the most part, an external matter to education. The moral attitude applies to all walks of life. By this, we mean that while basic moral principles must apply to educational processes, just like to any other domain or context, these principles serve more of a regulatory or protective function for children or learners. It tells us what basic forms of moral respect we owe to “developing centers of consciousness.” For example, the principle of freedom tells us that it would be wrong or impermissible

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to unnecessarily constrain the freedom of the learner. However, such a principle is applicable to all persons both inside and outside of educational contexts. There is nothing distinctly educational about this principle as it is. Interpersonal morality does not inform, in a direct or positive way, our educational values or what is educationally worthwhile. They simply tell us what is morally permissible or impermissible. Accordingly, the transcendental theory of moral justification developed in Ethics and Education (1966a) is not made with any particular conception of education in view. Ethics and Education, for example, devotes large tracts to showing how principles such as the principle of freedom are appropriately applied to classroom practice. For example, one should curtail the immediate desires of children so that they can exercise greater freedom in a rich educational context (1966a, pp. 192–8). But freedom, like justice, is still “an independent principle,” autonomous from educational concern except as a matter of post hoc consideration. Why is education not simply treated as synonymous to the moral sphere? Why would a separate justification for the ethical value of education be required? Would it not be more straightforward to leave educational processes as a matter to be regulated by the moral domain? An important development in Peters’ thought can be found in an earlier paper, coauthored by A. Phillips Griffiths, called “ The Autonomy of Prudence” (1962). As the title suggests, the thrust of the paper is to show that judgments of prudence, or what is worthwhile or good, can be assessed from an objective and autonomous standpoint, just like judgments of interpersonal morality (pp. 162–3). The argument, briefly stated, is that assessments of the rational force of an action or judgment must be undertaken through an evaluation of the ends (as well as the means that are employed to achieve that end). This applies to both moral and prudential maxims. However, the kind of prudential judgments that Griffiths and Peters have in mind are claimed to be different from Kant ’s hypothetical imperative, where the rationality of actions directed to particular ends are assessed by the degree to which the action accords with the practical necessity entailed by the willing of that end. Between an autonomous interpersonal morality and such a technical kind of prudence is a practical reason of private prudence: “Such judgements of private prudence, it is clear,

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go beyond anything the agent seems himself to want, or actually does want, and concern what he ought to want for himself, and that a wiser person would find satisfaction in” (Peters and Griffiths 1962, p. 167). This goes squarely against Kant, for Kant sees objective principles of practical reasoning as having two forms alone: either by a hypothetical imperative where an action is good merely as a means to something else, or by a categorical imperative where an action is in itself good (Kant 1785, p. 25 [4:414–4:415]). Griffiths and Peters think that if there is a third, objective practical principle by which an individual’s ends can be assessed, they can secure the autonomy of prudence and “the most general procedural principles of technical prudence” (Griffiths and Peters 1962, p. 171). They then try to secure the autonomy of prudence by deriving its transcendental necessity: questions of prudence necessarily presuppose the rational assessment of certain wants (p. 175) and that such a rational assessment is possible only insofar as there must be certain activities which one must participate in for one to be able to engage in reasoning about the prudential, good, or worthwhile—activities they claim to be “formally analogous to itself ” (p. 177). Griffiths and Peters are here setting out the objective conditions through which a person can learn to rationally assess a plethora of subjective ends. For them, judgments of “private prudence” are objective, practical, autonomous, but outside the sphere of morality. This early version of the worthwhileness argument will have implications for Peters’ later work, for this line of argument comes to shape his view of what are supposed to be educationally worthwhile activities—activities such as literature and science that one ought to participate to be able to make judgments of “private prudence.” The reasons justifying these activities are autonomous from the moral sphere, and this autonomy perhaps goes some way to explaining why the interpersonal principles Peters identifies in Ethics and Education have no internal connection to the concept of education. Here, the transcendental argument derives an objective form of value that shows why one ought to choose end/activity A over end/activity B on “private” prudential grounds. However, rather than prescribing our ends in a way that would undermine the plurality of particular ends proffered by differing conceptions of the good, the formal character of the principle simply shows that in order to make a reasoned prudential judgment

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competing ends, necessary that one fifirst rst develops develops aa reasoned reasoned between competing ends, it is necessary understanding of objective standards of prudent judgment itself, and this requires understanding of the judgment itself, and this involves initiation into initiation into theoretical forms of knowledge. In other words, Peterssuggests suggests the theoretical forms of knowledge. In other words, Peters that there is an objective and autonomous form of value that is distinct from interpersonal morality. This objective and autonomous form of value, as we will see, serves as the primary location for Peters’ account of and justification of the normative criteria informing the educated life. Peters comes to understand education as an initiation into a form of educated life where one can make justifiable judgments about the good or well-lived life. We can see in specific terms how this early version of Peters’ transcendental argument comes into play when he turns his attention to the question of the justification of education, both in Ethics and Education (in the chapter called “ Worth-while activities”) and the essay “ The Justification of Education” (1973c). It is here that Peters, in distinction from the justification of general moral principles, aims to justify “the values which are specific to being educated ” (1973c, p. 239). In the “justification” essay, Peters is clear in stating that his focus here is on the values of education as understood in the conceptual/ criterial sense—he wants to make good on the normative standards that he presumes to have uncovered through his conceptual analysis. What justification is there for this modern conception of the educated person? First, Peters traces out the possibilities for an instrumental justification of the normative ideal that the educated person has engaged in (a) the acquisition of knowledge, (b) worthwhile activities that promote a breadth of understanding, and (c) the development of a noninstrumental attitude toward those same activities. The prospects for this instrumental justification initially appear to be quite strong. Peters, for instance, notes that knowledge and understanding have obvious instrumental value. For example, we need shared knowledge of basic truths in order to coordinate our actions with others. We can, for example, use our understanding of basic principles and rules to predict and have greater control over our efforts at construction and labor (Peters 1973c, pp. 243–4). Furthermore, breadth of understanding can help people become better citizens. After all, an informed citizen is often regarded as a better citizen. And we might also argue that

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professionals like physicians and teachers who appreciate the intrinsic value of their craft, who are able to get “inside” the form of knowledge that is fundamental to what they do, will approach their work with greater care and diligence. To be sure, if a strong justification for the instrumental value of education were decisive, much of Peters’ conceptual analysis would be imperiled. After all, the normative criteria of education are supposed to be valued because they are immanent to what it means to be an educated person. They are not simply a useful means to other ends. If it turns out that these norms are essentially instrumental in their value, the promise of an education directed at the development of persons, qua persons, loses much of it ethical force. In the final analysis, it would then seem that the promotion of knowledge, comprehensive understanding, and a noninstrumental worldview is fundamentally a beneficial attitude. Once this contingent relationship between ends and means in education is established, it then becomes quite easy to deny the good of education to some others. We could, for example, argue that some people are better served by narrow training and, therefore, should not develop a broad understanding when such an understanding imperils their focused pursuit of the tasks laid out before them. Peters, however, is able to identify the limitations of instrumental justifications from a by-now-familiar transcendental perspective. He argues that instrumental justifications take for granted the capacity of a person to assess the value of those things that they do see as valued ends. Such a capacity needs to be learned; it requires at the very least an ability to ascertain the intrinsic worth of something. For example, if I learn to play the guitar because I enjoy the sound of music, I have, at the very least, to appreciate those features of music that make it pleasurable for me (p. 247). We must learn how to value. However, Peters’ critique runs deeper than this. To say that knowledge can help us better access those features of a chosen end that gives that end value is one thing. But we can differ in what those ends are. For example, it is possible that none of the things I come to appreciate require much in the way of knowledge and understanding. Or perhaps all my pursuits are actually so specific that theoretical knowledge is a relative waste of time. The value of education would still be contingent on my subjective preferences and purposes. All I need to do is learn whatever

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it is I need in order to enrich or clarify my personal preferences. And of course, depending on the time and place within which I live, these preferences are going to differ and so too, the kind of education that will benefit me. This limitation harkens back to Peters’ earlier work on the autonomy and objectivity of prudential reason. There are some goods, Peters seems to think, that really are not up to us. These goods are just those things that are necessary for making informed judgments about what is valuable or worthwhile. In “ The Justification of Education,” for example, he describes the justificatory problem as follows: The question, therefore, is whether knowledge and understanding have strong claims to be included as one of the goods which are constitutive of a worth-while level of life and on what considerations their claims are based. . . . Also it has been claimed that the educated person is on who is capable, to a certain extent, of a noninstrumental outlook. This would suggest that he does not think of his knowledge purely in terms of the uses to which he can put it. (p. 247) What reasons, then, can Peters give to someone in order to convince him or her that an educated life is a universally good life for its own sake, and not for any other reason? Peters attempts to make a distinction between two general types of intrinsic justifications that one could appeal to in making such a case: 1. That the educated life enriches our experience of the world (education and pleasure); and 2. That the educated life embodies values of human reason that are immanent to discourse, judgment, and action (education and the demands of reason).

Education and pleasure Peters pursues both cases in his justification. He says that knowledge and understanding are necessary conditions for the learner to be able

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to participate in activities that have a “civilized complexity ” greater than more basic needs such as eating. Furthermore, the ordering and rational planning of one’s aims and activities, as well as the disclosure of previously unknown interests and pursuits, which capture the attention of the educated mind, alleviate boredom. Finally, and most importantly, says Peters, theoretical activities such as science, art, and philosophy are keyed into the pursuit of truth. Unlike the pursuit of physical objects or pleasurable ends, truth is a complex and many-faceted value that requires many different approaches and constant critical examination. The pursuit of truth is, in a sense, our greatest human pleasure. Accordingly, forms of knowledge open up a field of experience that promises to engage both deeply and consistently (Peters 1973c, pp. 249–50). While these features are surely part of the value of the educated life, however, they are insufficient as a complete justification of education. In other words, they are good reasons, but we cannot rely on such a justification exclusively (p. 251). Peters thinks that there is a kind of intellectualist bias written into this kind of account which seems to suggest that initiation into knowledge and understanding ignore the value of less-refined activities while at the same time placing too strong an expectation that adventurous intellectual pursuits define all of what we do. The “civilized complexity” justification places far too much emphasis on the visceral experience of intellectual life. While the educated life is in a sense a pleasurable one, the idea that an educated person is alwaysalready engaged in rigorous intellectual pursuits is far too demanding an expectation.

Education and the demands of reason Accordingly, Peters once again appeals to transcendental argument in order to define the distinct value of education. Peters begins by pointing out that knowing that X is true, and understanding the reasons why X is true, has a certain practical value. For example, I need to know that it is true that force has a specific relation to mass if I am building a house. I have a practical interest in knowing what is true because it meets my particular needs. However, Peters points out that we have an additional,

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more universal, and, in a sense, impersonal, practical interest in the value of truth: [This value] can be regarded as having a worth which is independent of its benefit. Indeed the state of mind of one who is determined to find out what is true and who is not obviously deluded or mistaken about how things are can be regarded as an ultimate value which provides one of the criteria of benefit. . . . Someone who values truth in this way may find the constant effort to free his mind from prejudices and error painful; he may sometimes find it wearisome and boring; but it matters to him supremely, even if he falls short of the ideal which he accepts. (Peters 1973c, p. 251) To be sure, the conception of truth at play here is meant to be more open than the positivist conception that was dominant in the public culture of Peters’ time. The ideal of “truth” he has in mind here is fallibilist (in that we can always revise what we think is true in the light of new information), pluralistic (in that the remit of what is true is not limited to statements that can be verified through scientific experiment but includes moral and other value-claims), and procedural (in that there are a number of “virtues,” such as truth-telling and sincerity, which are essential to the pursuit of truth) (pp. 251–2). The concern for truth understood in these terms is supposed to entail two necessary conditions for common human reason. These two conditions are supposed to disclose the value and worth of knowledge and understanding.7 First, (1) the concern for truth presupposes an intelligibility intelligibility condition condition necessary for or entailed by the act of discriminating between any set of activities. For example, if I want to become a fisherman instead of an artist, I must have acquired the “conceptual scheme” that allows me to distinguish between these two activities. Accordingly, says Peters, an “open ended” employment of wide-ranging forms of understanding is necessary if we want to be able to discriminate between the many and diverse activities laid out before us (p. 252). This kind of argument, of course, should ring familiar to Peters’ conceptual analysis wherein he appeals to the idea of an expanded cognitive perspective brought on by initiation into theoretical forms of knowledge and understanding.

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Second, (2) the concern for truth presupposes a justification condition necessary for or entailed by the act of choosing between any set of activities. This argument should be familiar to us from our discussion of Peters’ transcendental deduction of the principle of justice. Peters applies this form of argument to the educational context in the following form: [I]f a reason is to be given for choosing X rather than Y, X has to be shown to have some feature which Y lacks which is relevant to its worth or desirability. . . . Arbitrary assertions will have been rejected, irrelevant considerations avoided, and generalizations queried for their evidential basis. These procedures, which are constitutive of the search for truth, are not those for which some individual might have a private preference, they are those which he must observe in rational discussion. This would be unintelligible as a public practice without value being ascribed at least to the elimination of muddle and error. (Peters 1973c, pp. 252–3) This framework is then applied in order to show in just what ways the concern for truth discloses the distinct value of education. First, Peters claims that the value of justification is something that cannot be questioned without a tacit endorsement of that same value. For example, to ask the question “ Why should we justify our decisions?” involves a demand for justification. Only someone who valued justification would ever ask the question. No demand for or a reason given for justification can be undertaken without presupposing the values that are immanent to justification (p. 252). In this sense, the values of justification are not “values” in the contemporary sense, wherein we can choose or drop them at our leisure. They are normatively constitutive of, or operative in, the human condition: Man is thus a creature who lives under the demands of reason. He can, of course, be unreasonable or irrational; but these terms are only intelligible as fallings short in respect of reason. . . . Any man who emerges from infancy tries to perceive, to remember, to infer, to learn, and to regulate his wants. If he is able to do this he must have recourse to some procedures of assessment. For how else could he determine

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what to believe or do?. . . [H]uman life already bears witness to the demands of reason. Without some acceptance by men of such demand their life would be unintelligible. (Peters 1973c, pp. 254–5) This procedural value becomes a substantive educational value because the actualization of such values in the individual requires that they come to know certain truths in order to apply their reason in an effective way. Second, while knowing that certain propositions are true facilitates the exercise of reason, Peters also wants to claim that such exercise requires engagement with the breadth of knowledge that was described in his modern conception of the educated person. This is where the “conceptual truth” that the concept of education refers to theoretical activities comes into play. For if theoretical activities such as history, philosophy, and science do indeed have a “wide-ranging cognitive content ” such that they deeply transform and throw light on all the different judgments and choices that lie ahead of a person, it would be arbitrary to deny someone access to such activities (p. 256). Theoretical activities, unlike more narrow pursuits such as golf or swimming, “constantly throw[s] light on, widen[s], and deepen[s] one’s view of countless other things” (Peters 1966a, p. 159). Education, then, ensures that human reason can be filtered through traditions of comprehension and understanding, which ensure that its application is richly informed. Finally, the demands of reason also justify the promotion of a noninstrumental attitude as an educational value. Peters argues that such a value is already part and parcel of the exercise of human reason: [F]or the justification of it is implicit in what has already been said. It is presupposed by the determination to search for justification. Anyone who asks the question about his life “ Why do this rather than that?” has already reached the stage at which he sees that instrumental justifications must reach a stopping place in activities that must be regarded as providing end-points for such justifications. (Peters 1973c, p. 262)

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By “stopping-points,” Peters means that the instrumental perspective cannot exhaust human reason. After all, a person can ask if his wants and desires are meaningful or relevant. He will eventually be faced with the question of what it is about what he wants that makes it worth pursuing in the first place. For Peters, these are noninstrumental questions. Truth, after all, seeks answers to questions that extend beyond what is best “for me,” but includes moral, esthetic, and existential questions as well. The educated person is able to reflect on his or her actions under these various aspects. Such abilities are valuable for anyone, whatever else it is one may value in the context of a good and well-lived life.

Education justified To sum up, Peters argues that the justification of education lies in the conditions necessary for human agents to respond to the demands of reason. Such demands are universally necessary for any person who has even the most minimal practical interest in laboring under the truth. These demands include the value of justification, qua justification; acquisition of knowledge and understanding that facilitates judgment by “ knowing that ”; and initiation into theoretical forms of knowledge and understanding that have a breadth that comprehensively facilitates judgment. Education, on this view, “actualizes” or “ implements” these values in a form of an “educated life” that has worth for every person. To be sure, this justification coheres quite nicely with the concept of education as Peters originally develops it in his essay “Education as Initiation” (1963a). There is, however, one important shift in emphasis, rightly noted by Elliott (1986). As he points out, in his early work, Peters appears to have a more puritan view of the noninstrumental attitude. In his conceptual investigations, he tends to emphasize that theoretical activities should be undertaken more or less due to a concern for truth for its own sake (Elliott 1986, p. 52; Peters 1967a, p. 18). Elliott also notes that Peters’ early conceptual work sometimes took the pursuit of truth for its own sake within a discipline as meaning that we should have no instrumental reason for studying that discipline. However, Peters

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never explicitly argued that theoretical activities should be engaged with for the sake of decadent indulgence—they always were articulated in reference to broader human values and experiences that the educated person fosters through such engagement. This “fostering” becomes more specific and greatly sharpened when Peters undertakes the justification of the values exemplified by theoretical activities. As Elliott puts it: His interest is primarily in the development of practical reason, only secondarily in theoretical studies, which are necessary to illuminate practical choice and, in general, to assist us in determining what to do. Consequently, the strong emphasis on enquiry—the pursuit of truth—which is so characteristic in Dewey, is replaced, in Peters, by an emphasis on concern for truth. (Elliott 1986, p. 51) The key question, then, for anyone who wishes to undertake a critical assessment of Peters’ work will have to determine the extent to which and ways in which Peters’ conception of reason, and the relationship between this conception and its “implementation” in educational processes, is a valid and applicable one for human agents. Elliott, for example, is skeptical in this respect. He recognizes the cogency of Peters’ articulation of the demands of reason, more or less, but disagrees that such a demand can be translated into a concept of education that is credibly neutral to various conceptions of the good. As we will elaborate further in Chapter 7, he thinks that Peters is really appealing to a more Stoic or classical ideal of education than his conceptual analysis of the “modern usage” of the term “education” might suggest (Elliott 1986). He is equally skeptical about the legitimacy of deriving values of education that are meant to define the nature and scope of our experience as teachers and learners, from formal rules that are logically necessary for any rational enquiry (Elliott 1977, p. 15). There is a great difference between presupposing norms of practical reason versus institutionalizing those same norms in terms of an ethos, or curriculum, to be shared by all communities. To what extent does the former justify the latter? Our task in this book is not to provide and answer to such a question, but to point out that any engagement with Peters’ work requires an assessment, not only of the validity of conceptual analysis, but of the conception of reason underlying his justificatory

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project, as well as an epistemic, moral, and political assessment of how practical reason is to be promoted and fostered in liberal democratic societies. In this respect, Peters’ justification of education points not only in the direction of applied issues regarding practice and policy, but also back to fundamental questions in the tradition of moral, political, and social philosophy that have been historically under-conceptualized.

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Chapter 5

Liberal Education, the Quality of Life, and Teacher Training

Introduction The ideal of liberal education is constitutive of European civilization from classical antiquity until today. In this chapter, we compare and contrast Peters’ analysis and justification of education, as expounded in the three preceding chapters, with this classical ideal. After discussing the conceptual ambiguities inherent in liberal education and the dilemmas for its implementation in a modern liberal democracy, we elaborate on two of Peters’ fruitful suggestions in this context. First, that the humanities should play a central role in a liberal education curriculum. Second, that all education, inclusive liberal education, should be a search for a quality of life. We substantiate, furthermore, the important consequence Peters draws in this connection that liberal education should, as an essential part of educational theory, also be a core element in the training of teachers.

The ideal of liberal education What is liberal education? Before going into details about Peters’ discussion of liberal education, a short historical and etymological preliminary might be useful ( Jaeger 1934–1947; Lüth 1998; Löffler 1910; de Rijk 1965; Willmann 1907). Liberal education in Western culture originated in classical antiquity with the Greek ideal of paideia (from pais, paidos⫽child, and agein⫽to lead) and the Roman teaching of the artes liberales (ars⫽art and liber⫽free). Pythagoras and Plato advocated the so-called

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egkyklios paideia, from which the word “encyclopaedia” stems (en⫽in and kyklos⫽circle), as an all-round (in a circle) or nonspecific course to become an educated human being. Such a course prepares for the “science of ultimate causes” or philosophy which is the study of wisdom. To these general, encyclical studies belong, among others, not only mathematics and rhetoric, but also music and gymnastics. The paideia ideal is connected to the idea of human perfection. As an ideal of theoretical knowledge, it is distinct from technical skills training. Cicero and Quintilian basically continued this liberal arts tradition but they put more emphasis on rhetoric, including literature and poetry, as well as on ethics and politics. The liberal arts instruct the free man as opposed to the slave. As the cultivation of the free mind, they are the indispensable propaedeutic to become a philosopher, a statesman, or even an architect. During the Middle Ages, the liberal arts curriculum was regimented into two groups of studies: the trivium (tres⫽three and via⫽road) and the quadrivium (quattuor⫽four). The first group comprises the so-called artes sermocinales (from sermo⫽speech, discourse) or the linguistic disciplines: grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic (logic); the second one comprises the so-called artes reales or physicae (res⫽thing, phusis⫽nature) or the mathematico-physical disciplines: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. These seven liberal arts contrast with the artes illiberales or the artes serviles or vulgares (servus⫽slave, vulgus⫽common people). To these latter, also so-called artes mechanicae (mekhane⫽contrivance, device), belong agriculture, blacksmithing, weaving, warfare, and other vocations for which, in some cases, one had to train by apprenticeship under the guidance of a master craftsman in the context of guilds. As a preparation for superior cognition and contemplation, the seven liberal arts are the maidservants of philosophy and, in its turn, philosophy is the ancilla theologiae, that is, theology ’s maidservant. The lower trivium and the higher quadrivium pave the way to the highest stage of wisdom consisting of philosophy and theology. In medieval universities, the study in the facultas artium (the arts faculty), in which the teaching of the liberal arts and that of philosophy were combined, was propaedeutic for further studies in the faculties of theology, law, and medicine. The university does not

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only prepare for the contemplation of eternal truths but also for the professions of lawyer and physician. The system of the seven liberal arts declined in the Renaissance. During this period, a transcendental view of life, which focuses on God, was replaced by a mundane view, which focuses on nature and especially on human beings. Whereas the trivium was before a mere means of education, it now became an intrinsic educational aim in the light of the cultivation of humanity. Liberal education became exclusively associated with the studia humaniora (comparative of humanus⫽human), from which the label “the humanities” stems. These humanistic studies include the study of language, literature and poetry, history (particularly, of ancient Greek and Roman culture), philosophy, as well as the fine arts. Whereas Italian humanism had a more hedonistic and aesthetic character, German humanism had a more moral and educational character, as, for instance, exemplified by Erasmus (Huizinga 1924). In Germany, during the Enlightenment, liberal education became associated with Bildung (⫽formation, cultivation; from Bild⫽image, picture). Although originally it meant the cultivation of man in the image of God, Bildung became connected to the liberation of the mind from traditional dogma so that one can think for oneself to form oneself. In that sense, Bildung is Selbst-Bildung (Selbst⫽the self, the I), which involves imprinting a picture of oneself on oneself. Whereas Rousseau represents the most radical position in this turn toward the self-realization of the individual, von Humboldt represents a more moderate one. According to the latter position, the purpose of Bildung is the harmonious development of all human powers in a dialectic relationship with the surrounding culture. This ideal of liberal education as Bildung is not necessarily related anymore to the pursuit of knowledge by means of the liberal arts curriculum or even the humanities.

The ambiguities and dilemmas of liberal education From time to time, Peters himself asks whether he is equating the concept of education with that of liberal education. Sometimes, he deems the requirements for liberal education stronger than the basic normative and cognitive requirements he singles out for education

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simpliciter (Peters 1963a, p. 101; 1966, pp. 43–5). Yet at other times, he does not object to treating both concepts, as well as the concept of moral education, as fundamentally the same concept (Peters 1970b, pp. 81–2). Although the analysis of liberal education might thus be used as an effective and concentrated summary of his own educational criteria, Peters, in his later work, explicitly returns to the issue of the ambiguities and dilemmas surrounding liberal education. Not only because of its intrinsic interest, but also because Peters has something original to add to the discussion about liberal education, it is worthwhile to take up this issue. Moreover, Peters’ evaluation of liberal education elucidates further his own shift, we documented in Chapter 3, from a unitary concept of an educated person to two concepts of education, a more generalized concept and a more specific one. Peters commences his analysis of the concept of liberal education by relating it to the Hobbesian interpretation of the concept of liberty or freedom. Freedom is not interpreted “positively ” as possessing the capacity for having alternative possibilities in action (so that one could have done otherwise) but “negatively ” as the absence of impediments or constraints in doing what one wants to do. Correspondingly, the demand for liberal education is primarily not the positive one for a distinct, alternative form of education (whatever such a form may be) but the negative one for a removal of constraints that might hinder education. Since there are different types of constraints that liberal education wants to remove, its concept is inherently ambiguous or polysemic. Peters distinguishes between three meanings: liberal education as (1) knowledge for its own sake, (2) general education, and (3) nonauthoritarian education. The first interpretation wants to remove the constraint of instrumentalism and vocational training, the second that of narrow specialization and compartmentalization, and the third that of dogmatism and indoctrination. Still, the unifying idea behind these interpretations is the importance attached to knowledge and understanding as well as to the free development of the mind. Peters not only critically discusses the three conceptions of liberal education (Peters 1977a) but also points out the dilemmas that confront the liberal who tries to implement one or other conception in a contemporary democratic society (Peters 1977b). We review Peters’ discussion and evaluation.

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Knowledge for its own sake The conception of liberal education as knowledge for its own sake is, according to Peters, reminiscent of the classical Greek paideia ideal in that it is based on a distinction between theoretical knowledge pursued for its own sake and knowledge pursued for practical ends. Since human beings are rational animals whose perfection lies in the free development of their proper function, the value of the rational and theoretical overrides that of the practical and technical. There are two fundamental problems with this classical conception of liberal education (Peters 1977a, pp. 50–8). First, the dichotomy between “for its own sake” and “for practical ends” is too coarse and inadequate to understand the nature of the learning situation. Secondly, the classical conception has not so much application in the context of knowledge acquisition in schools as in that of the advancement of knowledge in the universities. As indicated in Chapter 2, Peters argues that the dichotomy between “for its own sake” and “for practical ends” is too coarse because practical ends can be either intrinsic or extrinsic to learning activities. (We also noted in Chapter 3 how Peters resists such a brute separation in his critique of Michael Oakeshott.) Consider the learning situation of a boy doing metalwork to become a skilled toolmaker, or that of a medical student swotting up on anatomy because she wants to cure people and to relieve suffering, or that of a pupil practicing violin fingering in order to play a sonata and to become a concert violinist. In these three cases, there might be no further or purely instrumental ends for the sake of which the learners are practicing. They do not necessarily carry out their learning activities to obtain (financial) rewards, approval, avoiding punishment, status, winning a prize, doing better than others, or passing examinations. Of course, these extrinsic practical ends usually also exert influence on the learning but they should be distinguished from the intrinsic practical ends “that are far removed in time but intrinsically related to the learning” (Peters 1977b, p. 79). One can become rich and famous in many different ways, but no one can cure people unless one has mastered anatomy. Likewise, the skill of metalworking or violin fingering is constitutive of attaining the end of being a toolmaker or being a concert musician and obtaining satisfaction in it. So, the use

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of the term “knowledge pursued for practical ends” in contrast to “knowledge for its own sake” in the dichotomy glosses over the crucial distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic practical ends and tends to reduce the practical to the purely instrumental. The dichotomy is inadequate because practical activities can also be pursued for their own sake on the one hand and purely instrumental, practical ends can also infect theoretical activities on the other hand. Pursuing knowledge for its own sake in theoretical studies at the faculties of arts and science implies learning out of sheer curiosity, interest, concern for truth, novelty, puzzlement, or the desire to master things. But these intrinsic motivations might also be present behind practical enquiries at the faculties of medicine and engineering: “Bridges can be built by engineers who take a delight in constructing an object of enduring worth; it is not only poems, mathematical theorems, and scientific theories that are the product of men with this sort of [noninstrumental] attitude” (Peters 1969a, p. 28). Moreover, pure research might also be infected by extrinsic motivation such as ambition, envy, and greed. Such self-regarding motives might equally well vitiate or replace the detached and disinterested attitude of the scholar toward the search for knowledge. The conception of liberal education as knowledge for its own sake principally reflects, according to Peters, the attitude toward knowledge of the learner or researcher who is engaged in the advancement of knowledge at the university. Although there is great value in this attitude, it is not the only legitimate attitude toward knowledge, and it cannot be used as a model for situations in which learners acquire knowledge without seriously distorting such learning situations. If one transferred the detached and disinterested attitude suitable for knowledgeadvancement to situations of knowledge-acquisition, then what would tend to be overlooked is the initiation of learners into, what Peters (1977a, p. 55) calls, a specific “human heritage.” The learning of this heritage is not motivated by the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, nor is it acquired by research activity, which characterizes the advancement of knowledge. Yet, the acquisition of this human heritage is, according to Peters (1977a, p. 55), “very much the hall-mark of an educated person.” Although such a human heritage is the product of specialized research, its acquisition is a matter of initiation. Time and again, Peters stresses the

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central importance of the initiation into a human heritage for education simpliciter. It is so important in his educational theory that he uses (lack of ) reference to it as a kind of criterion to evaluate the three conceptions of liberal education on their merits for offering quality in education. What does “human heritage” mean? According to Peters, there is a body of knowledge, entertained with varying degrees of understanding, that is extremely significant or “relevant ” to a person in so far as it determines his general beliefs, attitudes, and reactions to the general conditions of human life. This is not necessarily acquired for its own sake, as is a field that a person studies in depth out of interest or pure curiosity, or acquired because of its usefulness to particular ends. (Peters 1977a, pp. 55–6) The pertinent human heritage is a body of knowledge—a general framework of beliefs, attitudes, and reactions—in relation to the general conditions of human life. The human condition is not so much a problem to be solved as a predicament to be attended to. Human beings are confronted with predicaments like those of death, suffering, personal relationships, authority, violence, etc. Because such predicaments arouse universal emotions and trigger concern in everyone, the body of knowledge we inherit from our ancestors to deal with the human condition is very relevant for anyone’s life at some time. And because of its predictable significance, anyone should be encouraged to develop such a framework of beliefs and attitudes to cope with life’s predicaments. The learning of this human heritage is neither motivated by a desire for knowledge for its own sake, nor by a desire to instrumentally use it for achieving practical ends. We could say that the acquisition of this framework is based on an existential concern that cannot be reduced to either of these motivations. And although it is not “ useful”, this body of knowledge is not “ inert ” since it certainly has application to everyone’s experience with life’s predicaments. Below we will come back to the content of this human heritage, this “sphere of knowledge which seems essential to an educated person” (Peters 1977a, p. 58) or “the sort of knowledge which is relevant to anyone who has to face the general conditions of human life” (p. 60).

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The liberal who tries to implement the conception of liberal education as knowledge for its own sake faces difficulties and dilemmas (Peters 1977b, pp. 75–9). One important difficulty concerns the overridingness of the intrinsic value of theoretical activities. In our present-day technological and industrial society, it is highly controversial to claim that the values of rationality, enjoyment, and satisfaction intrinsic in theoretical contemplation and research outweigh those of practical ends intrinsic in practicing, for example, medicine or engineering, such as the relief of suffering or the improvement of human communication, as well as that the intrinsic, theoretical values outweigh all purely instrumental values. Dilemmas present themselves on both the institutional and the psychological level. On the one hand, the liberal’s plea for liberal education is intended as an antidote against the all-pervasive influence of extrinsic ends and extrinsic motivation in the consumer society but, on the other, his values of individual liberty and self-realization tend to promote purely instrumental ends and self-regarding motives. Schools and the public examination system, which reflect these liberal values, stimulate competition and individual attainment measured in terms of status and wealth. Ambition, envy, and greed, which are encouraged in an individualistic society, are the psychological auxiliaries in the rat race for success.

General education The conception of liberal education as general education harks back to the ideal of acquiring an all-round understanding on the basis of a classical liberal arts curriculum. Liberal education as general knowledgeacquisition aims at the comprehensive development of the mind by means of acquiring a whole spectrum of knowledge. This interpretation underscores, accordingly, breadth in education and the education of the whole person against narrow specialized training and the disintegration of knowledge in a set of pigeonholes. There are three major difficulties with this “encyclical” conception of liberal education (Peters 1977a, pp. 59–62). First, although the conception of liberal education as general education clearly excludes narrow specialization, it is not clear what it

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positively includes. How broad must a person’s spectrum of knowledge be in order for him to be called “ liberally educated ”? And how differentiated must it be? To answer these questions, Peters invokes Paul Hirst ’s “forms of knowledge” thesis (Hirst 1965; Peters and Hirst 1970, chap. 4). According to this thesis, nonarbitrary divisions within the knowledge domain can be made on the basis of distinctive types of conceptual schemes, truth-criteria, and testing procedures. The thesis differentiates between seven (or eight) distinct forms of knowledge: mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history, literature and the fine arts (as well as moral knowledge), religion, and philosophy. Yet, even if one accepts this thesis, there still remains the issue of how deeply immersed a person has to be in each of these forms of knowledge to be called “ liberally educated ”? One cannot expect from an educated person, as one does from the expert or researcher, that he does the tests himself and has access to all the evidence for his knowledge, but his merely possessing a collection of disconnected facts from the different disciplines is certainly insufficient. Is the acquisition of essential elements of the different conceptual schemes and/or the different truth-criteria and underlying principles then sufficient? Call this, for convenience’s sake, the “depth” problem. Secondly, given that the knowledge domain is enormously vast and that the homo universalis has become a psychological impossibility in the present-day knowledge society, which subdisciplines should be selected from the seven (or eight) different disciplines picked out by the “forms of knowledge” thesis? Which kinds of knowledge are of most worth for the liberally educated person? Within the natural sciences, for example, should biology be picked out rather than chemistry, astronomy rather than earth science? Within the human sciences, should economics be selected rather than psychology, pedagogy rather than sociology? At the crossroads of the two scientific cultures, should evolutionary theory be chosen above philosophy, history above logic? Call this the “selection” problem. Thirdly, liberal education as general education aims at all-round understanding not only in the sense of seeing the world under different aspects but also in the sense of having a single unified perspective. The distinct forms of knowledge should not be compartmentalized and remain insulated from each other, but they should be actively

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integrated. But which strategy of knowledge integration could one use in the liberal education of the whole person? Call this the “integration” problem. The liberal who tries to implement the conception of liberal education as general education faces the charge that his ideal of a liberally educated person is anachronistic and elitist (1977b, pp. 69–73). On the institutional level, from the standpoint of the governmental department for education, the development of all-round understanding seems to be sheer luxury. Too many would be excluded from such a liberal education and it would be irrelevant to the economic and social needs of our society (Pring 1993, pp. 57–60). In an industrialized society, pressure is high to use public funds primarily and sometimes even exclusively for the financing of technical education and vocational training which require early specialization. On the psychological level, how realistic is it to suppose that an average pupil at the secondary school level could study seven (or eight) distinct forms of knowledge in some depth? Moreover, the average pupil, and perhaps the gifted pupil even more so, will find at least one or two forms of knowledge tedious and boring. Trying to teach pupils a bit about everything works counterproductive in the attempt to trigger their enthusiasm and stimulate their motivation. This argument from boredom against liberal education as general education is, conversely, an argument for specialization and perhaps also for liberal education as knowledge for its own sake, as Mary Warnock (1973, pp. 115–20) points out: It is only if the imagination is alive and active that the pupil will be able to go on with a subject, beyond the point at which the teaching stops. . . . The only way to come near to satisfying this demand [going on with the subject on their own], as far as I can see, is not less specialization in the sixth form but more. There is, after all, nothing more inimical to the exercise of the imagination than boredom, . . . My main argument against the attempt to teach everyone a smattering of everything is the argument from boredom; . . . quality in education entails learning about something, as they say, “in depth” . . . if the range of subjects is too great, it is simply impossible for the student ’s imagination to be fired in such a way that he can go on . . . And the purpose of all education is to seek this freedom to go on.

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According to Peters, these psychological and institutional difficulties, as well as the problems of depth, selection, and integration mentioned earlier, have all to do with the issue of the content of liberal education. Although Peters does not define “some central core of allround understanding . . ., which it is not unrealistic for the average individual to attain by the end of the secondary stage of schooling ” (1977b, p. 70), he sketches in broad strokes the knowledge field that liberal education as general knowledge-acquisition should cover in order to escape from, or at least take the edge off, this set of criticisms. If one selected, as the central core of all-round understanding, that body of knowledge which is relevant for any person to cope with the human condition, then the charges could be dropped because such a body of knowledge represents a kind of “survival kit ” or “ life manual” not only for the elite few but for everyone. All persons would have an interest in this body of knowledge on the basis of their existential concern. When the liberal education of children came down to their initiation into this human heritage, the required depth and integration of the pertinent general knowledge could be determined in relation to that framework of beliefs and attitudes which anyone needs to deal with life’s predicaments. So, again, Peters emphasizes the significance of the initiation into a specific human heritage to make sense of the integration of forms of knowledge and the relative importance of (sub)disciplines.

Nonauthoritarian education The conception of liberal education as nonauthoritarian education is closely associated with the ideal of Selbst-Bildung. Liberal education in this sense aims at the development of personal autonomy and critical thinking in contrast to authoritarian indoctrination and illiberal conformity. Whereas both other conceptions relate the free development of the mind to man’s built-in rationality and the liberal arts curriculum, this conception conceives of self-realization as constituted by individual choice or decision. There are two liberalistic interpretations of liberal education in this sense, the one extreme and the other moderate (Peters 1977a, pp. 62–4). On the former one, the development of the

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independence of mind is necessarily impeded by the example of others, the instruction from them, and the initiation into public traditions, whereas on the latter, such “interferences” are deemed essential to liberal education as long as the capacities for rational reflection and critical thinking are not obstructed. For the extreme liberal, one’s own experiences and authentic decisions are sacrosanct, while for the moderate liberal, one’s individual choices, to be intelligible at all, must be informed by reason and a public form of life. It transpires that, by referring again to the importance of the initiation into a specific human heritage, Peters sides with the second liberalistic interpretation of liberal education as nonauthoritarian education. As we have seen in Chapters 2 and 3, and will elaborate further in Chapter 8, Peters tries to steer a middle course between extreme child-centered and authoritarian approaches to education: The progressives, . . . , stressed qualities of mind such as critical thought, creativeness and autonomy. But they did not sufficiently appreciate that these virtues are vacuous unless people are provided with the forms of knowledge and experience to be critical, creative and autonomous with. . . . It is pointless being critical without some content to be critical of; autonomy, . . . , is an unintelligible ideal without the mastery of a body of rules on which choice can be exercised. The romantic protest, in other words, presupposes some kind of a classical background. (Peters and Hirst 1970, pp. 31–2) The “classical background” in the context of liberal education is, according to Peters, that body of knowledge that bears relevantly on the human condition and life’s predicaments. Such a general framework of beliefs and attitudes in relation to the general conditions of human life is necessary for individuals to make something of themselves. The initiation into this human heritage is essential for their self-realization. Autonomous choice is only intelligible against the background of this heritage: “Individual inventiveness is always to be understood against such a background of a public inheritance” (Peters 1974b, p. 430). In the next chapter, we elaborate further on Peters’ analysis of the concept of personal autonomy.

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Both the extreme liberal and the moderate one are confronted with dilemmas and paradoxes when they tire to implement the conception of liberal education as nonauthoritarian education (Peters 1977b, pp. 80–4). The extreme liberal, who is against all interference with liberty, is necessarily also against compulsory schooling and in that sense a “de-schooler.” However, to free children from the influence of authoritative institutions would at the same time seriously limit their access to professions or vocations and their prospects to make something of themselves on the basis of the cultural heritage that schools transmit. Moreover, the romantic idea that children naturally discover things for themselves ignores the brute fact that the main psychological mechanism by means of which the human race has survived and the cultural heritage has been transmitted is that of imitation and identification—modeling oneself after the example of others. The moderate liberal accepts other values besides personal autonomy, such as those of justice, equality, and the welfare of others. Although compulsory schooling necessarily impairs children’s liberty, it provides all of them with the knowledge or skills needed for a fair distribution of opportunities on the job-market as well as for their personal welfare. Whether these other values outweigh the value of autonomy and whether paternalism can be justified remain, however, important issues for a liberal, even of the moderate type. Schooling, whether compulsory or voluntary, always infringes upon the development of autonomy and critical thinking. Since the initiation of children into a human heritage by authoritative institutions takes a long time, their beliefs and behavior are for a long period heteronomously determined. If one adds to this fact of life the institutional fact that the use of authoritative devices (e.g. punishment) and extrinsic motivation (e.g. praise and blame) are inevitable in schools, then one squarely faces the so-called paradox of education: “How can an individual be encouraged to think for himself when he is placed in a situation in which he has to learn from others and whose control and motivation structures have to cater for those who are reluctant to learn?” (Peters 1977b, p. 82) In the next chapter, we come back to this important paradox.

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The humanities and the quality of life Although Peters’ discussion of the three interpretations of liberal education remains inconclusive as to which one is justifiable, it is clear that he relies on the criterion of reference to the initiation into a specific human heritage to evaluate their respective cogency and quality. In the light of this criterion, one could conjecture that Peters, on balance, thinks that the second conception of liberal education as general education is the most adequate one. The first “for its own sake” conception does not seem to meet the criterion, while the third (moderate) nonauthoritarian conception seems to presuppose the second general conception, which can readily incorporate a reference to the initiation into the pertinent human heritage to solves its problem of content. Moreover, Peters associates himself with Hirst ’s general conception of liberal education and his “forms of knowledge” thesis in their important coauthored book The Logic of Education (1970). Be that as it may, Peters’ criterion remains hopelessly vague. What is the precise content of the pertinent human heritage? Which body of knowledge does it exactly contain? Which (sub)disciplines are included? As for the more determinate content of the specific human heritage he has in mind, Peters alludes to “a sphere of knowledge, sometimes referred to loosely as ‘the humanities,’ which is of central importance in any attempt to determine the type of knowledge which should form the content of liberal education” (Peters 1977a, p. 66). The content of that body of knowledge, which is relevant for any person to cope with the human condition and life’s predicaments, and thus the core content of liberal education, is constituted by the humanities. Although Peters never explicitly executed “the very difficult task of trying to delimit this type of knowledge more precisely, examine its relationships to traditional disciplines, to vocational studies, and so on” (p. 66), he wrote in a “more synthetic” style about “some more general attitudes to the human predicament which lie behind our approach to the humanities” in his paper “Subjectivity and standards” (1974b, p. 413) which implicitly deals with the status of the specific heritage of the humanities. Since Peters thinks that these underlying attitudes are profoundly important in education, we reconstruct his view on the

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status and the foundations of the humanities. Surprisingly perhaps, what emerges from this reconstruction is a kind of justification of liberal education as general education in the sense of initiation into the heritage of the humanities.

The status of the humanities Two themes are crucial in Peters’ thinking about the role of the humanities in (liberal) education: first, that the humanities represent a shared inheritance, and secondly, that this public inheritance explores “what it means to be human”. After some general comments on “the humanities,” we first deal with the second theme. Peters gives the following over-all description of “the human sciences”: The humanities . . . are a family of languages which men have developed to explain, describe and assess their behaviour, to take up stances towards the world and each other, to express how they feel and to reflect upon and try to justify what they think and do. They represent . . . various paths that men have taken in their exploration of what it means to be human. (Peters 1974b, p. 423) We will use the terms “the humanities” and “the human sciences” interchangeably and in their broad sense.1 According to Peters, the human “family of languages” consists of literature (and poetry), history, philosophy (and ethics), religious studies, psychology, sociology, and economics. He does not distinguish between the humanities in the narrow sense (the former four disciplines) and the social sciences (the latter three) because he defends a purposive, rule-following model of human action as against a causal, covering-law model in the social sciences (Peters 1958, chap. 1).2 Accordingly, in the social (or behavioral) sciences, there is “more overlaid with interpretation and bias than in the natural sciences” and “much less predictable responses to objects and to situations” (Peters 1974b, p. 425) so that social science explanations “are usually much more like fitting particulars into a pattern of low-level generalisations than deduction from high-level laws” (p. 422). There exists thus, according to Peters, much more affinity

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of the social sciences with the humanities in the narrow sense than with the natural sciences. In the humanities in the broad sense, “there is a search for concrete universals—for the forms of meaning and truth that are articulated in the various spheres of human action and belief ” (Peters 1974b, p. 423). Although Peters contrasts the human sciences with the natural sciences, he thinks that both groups of disciplines have the same basic form of rationality and that the human sciences function against the backdrop of the natural ones: “If we say . . . that ‘the humanities’ are concerned in various ways with men rather than with nature, we must bear in mind that much of man’s behaviour is only intelligible in terms of his thoughts about nature” (Peters 1974b, p. 421). For convenience’s sake, we will neglect the role of the natural sciences in liberal education. It remains, however, an open question what exactly the contribution of the natural sciences—as well as that of mathematics—to liberal education is supposed to be, according to Peters. What is the role of this other specific shared inheritance, that of the natural sciences, alongside the role of the specific heritage of the humanities in liberal education? On the one hand, mathematics and the physical sciences (physics, chemistry, biology) as basic forms of knowledge should obviously be included in the general knowledge package of liberal education. Yet, on the other hand, the (mathematical-)natural sciences do not immediately belong to that body of knowledge which is relevant for any person to cope with the human condition and, thus, fall outside Peters’ selection criterion for liberal education items. Although we do not want to settle this issue here, one can at least say that, for Peters, knowledge of the natural sciences functions as a kind of background condition for the “humanistic” content of liberal education: “Any account of the human world which ignored some of the natural sciences would, of course, be a frivolity. For the natural world is the main locus of the givenness with which we are confronted in our attempts to construct a view of our condition” (Peters 1974b, p. 421). With these general observations about “the humanities” or “the human sciences” in place, we turn to the first central theme in Peters’ thinking about the status of the human sciences in relation to (liberal) education. The humanities try to make sense of what it means to be human. They represent the elaborations of the endeavor to understand

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the human condition and to develop appropriate attitudes toward life’s predicaments. According to Peters, certain dimensions of life have to be taken as bedrock features with which every human being will be confronted at a particular point. Two dimensions stand out: first, there is the givenness of the (natural) world, social life, and human responses, and secondly, there is the temporality and contingency of human life. These “facts” of life constitute the basic framework of the human condition. Such facts present human beings no so much with problems they can solve as with predicaments toward which they need to take up a certain stance. The first dimension, of which Peters reminds us, is the fact that human beings, as social animals, are confronted with the phenomena of the natural and social world. These phenomena present themselves as the unshakeable truths (e.g. natural laws) and unpalatable realities (e.g. war) of man’s form of life. In contrast to the instinctive reactions of animals to their environment, human beings react to the natural and social phenomena in a specific and nonarbitrary kind of way. By the givenness of human responses, Peters means not only the agreement in judgments on the basis of a common perceptual apparatus but also, and more importantly: two other sorts of preconditions of human life. The first is the demands of reason which are at their most palpable in logical principles such as non-contradiction and universalisability to which we must conform if we are to string together any thoughts at all about our condition. The second is the shared response to situations such as those of danger, frustration and suffering which are features of our form of life as social animals, and which lie behind our acceptance or rejection of less deep-seated conventions demanded of us by society. (Peters 1974b, p. 417) We can refer to these two preconditions of human life with the terms “reason-responsiveness” and “emotion-responsiveness” respectively.3 As rational and social animals, human beings respond reasonably as well as emotionally to natural and social phenomena. The other dimension of the human condition, of which Peters reminds us, is that of time. The fact that we do not live forever is inherently

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connected with life’s contingency and vulnerability. Life presents humans with a mixture of life and death, joy and suffering, health and sickness, hope and despair, good and evil, etc. As these predicaments of life affect the well-being of humans, they profoundly influence the quality of life and trigger an existential concern for this quality. Since contingent events in the natural and social world have an effect on the welfare or happiness of human beings, these events determine life’s quality about which humans are permanently concerned. Human concerns about the quality of life, that is, the “more permanent and all-pervasive concerns in human life—communication, obtaining food from the earth, the relief of suffering and the pursuit of truth” (Peters 1974b, p. 420), are unavoidable because of man’s vulnerability. According to Peters, the fact of life’s contingency should also be connected with a proper sense of the continuity of life from the past to the present toward the future, as well as with a proper perspective on man’s limited lifespan. It becomes more and more difficult to defend the importance of historical awareness and to exhort people to try to make something out of themselves in their one and only short life in a society ruled by the ideologies of immediate satisfaction and consumer gratification. The two dimensions of the human condition—the givenness of the natural and social environment and that of the rational and emotional human responses to it, as well as the temporal and contingent nature of humans—constitute, according to Peters, the fundamental points of reference for any worthwhile educational enterprise: “If education, especially in the humanities, is not set squarely in these dimensions, it is an evasion. For education is not just, as is often said, for life. It is the search for a quality of living” (Peters 1974b, p. 416). Education in general as the transmission of knowledge (and understanding) and liberal education in particular as the free development of the mind are concerned with possibilities for the enhancement or at least the maintenance of life’s quality. It is especially the humanities that are concerned about the realization of these possibilities in the face of the givenness of the world and the contingency of human nature. Accordingly, the humanities play a central role in a liberal education curriculum precisely because they contain the knowledge most relevant for the free development of the mind. In as much as self-realization or making something of oneself is a crucial factor in determining the quality of life, liberal education as

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the initiation into the humanities contributes to individual well-being and happiness. In that sense, the humanities incorporate the existential concern for life’s quality. They take up this concern not so much by trying to technically control life’s problems as by trying to cope with life’s predicaments. The humanities form a body of knowledge that is relevant for safeguarding the quality of life against the pressures of life’s predicaments. As a human endeavor through time since antiquity and as an essential part of liberal education under different names (e.g. trivium), the humanities represent a shared inheritance. We briefly comment on this second central theme in Peters’ thinking about the role of the humanities in (liberal) education. Since the humanities are the sciences of human nature and culture, the initiation into this human heritage is an introduction into a critical tradition: Science is the supreme example of reason in action not just because of the opportunities for criticism which it provides, but also because of the agreement in judgements which it permits by means of its testing procedures. These guarantee objectivity and the escape from arbitrariness. (Peters 1974b, p. 424) These critical procedures are public procedures passed on through generations. According to Peters, not only the natural sciences but also the humanities (in the broad sense) operate and develop within a public tradition of critical rationalism.4 Take notice of, for example, the presence in the humanities of literary criticism and theory, historical (research) method and, of course, critical thinking in philosophy. As a rational endeavor, the humanities are a normative enterprise. Scientific activities within the critical tradition of the humanities have to respect several epistemic values. They have to comply with the standards in the humanities, which represent the various demands of reason in the different disciplines. These standards are constitutive of the scientific method as well as the goal of inquiry: . . . the aim is to increase sensitivity and understanding; but this is to be interpreted in terms of values such as clarity, coherence, consistency, truthfulness, sincerity, perceptiveness and so on. These

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intellectual virtues are definitive of the search for truth and exert a constant pressure on our struggles for understanding and insight. (Peters 1974b, p. 426) Apart from these overarching values and general standards, there are more specific substandards in the various humanities, which derive from preoccupations with, for instance, the ethical or the esthetical. The general demands of reason impregnate unreflective responses and give rise to specific principles such as the principle of respect and that of justice in morals, or they generate specific appraisals such as being expressive and beautiful in literature.

The justification of liberal education In the light of the two crucial themes, outlined above, regarding the role of the humanities in (liberal) education, Peters suggests a distinctive view on the foundations of the humanities. He connects the humanities as a shared inheritance and the observance of the standards of the humanities with the meaning of the human condition and the search for a quality of life. The heritage of the humanities as a critical tradition in which one submits oneself to the demands of reason is grafted upon “the situation in which we are all placed ” (Peters 1974b, p. 427) and the existential concern for life’s quality. Peters starts from the givenness of human emotion-responsiveness and reason-responsiveness toward the world, together with the full acknowledgment of the contingency and vulnerability of human nature. The pressures of their situation and their attendant concern for life’s quality force human beings to transform their more immediate emotional responses by making systematic use of their capacity for reasoning. By placing themselves under the demands of reason, they try to rationally impregnate and elaborate their reactions to life’s predicaments in order to enhance the quality of life. Peters’ central line of thought as regards the foundations of the humanities is that he conceives of the humanities as the historical and systematic development of this initial effort to rationally cope with man’s situation: “ What we call ‘the humanities’ are the elaborations of our attempts both to understand our human world, to create and re-create it, and to take

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up various stances towards it ” (Peters 1974b, pp. 420–1). The humanities represent “our attempts to construct a view of our condition” (p. 421). The activities in the human sciences observe the rational standards of the humanities precisely with the purpose of enhancing the quality of life. In that sense, the observance of these standards is intimately connected with the existential concern for life’s quality: “For a quality of life is intimately connected with the standards which are internally connected with these concerns. The humanities and the sciences represent the main locus of these concerns” (p. 420). The humanities take the concerns about life’s predicaments seriously and try to construct, by making use of reason, a global picture of man’s place in the world to make a civilized life of quality possible. In Chapter 7, we comment further on, what Peters calls, “the life of reason” as the means par excellence for realizing a humane and civilized life. Unexpectedly perhaps, what emerges from Peters’ considerations in his paper “Subjectivity and standards” about the status of the humanities is a kind of justification of liberal education, although he himself never explicitly made an attempt to do this. In the light of Peters’ discussion of the three interpretations of liberal education, it is plausible to assume, as we have indicated, that the second conception of liberal education as general education is the most adequate one. This assumption rests on the criterion of the initiation into a specific human heritage that Peters uses for the evaluation of the different conceptions. To solve its problem of content, liberal education as general education can easily include a reference to this criterion. Given that the pertinent human heritage is identified as the humanities, the core of all-round understanding is the field of the human sciences. At this point, the justificatory question arises: Why is liberal education as general education in the sense of initiation into the humanities worthwhile? Why is the criterion of the initiation into this heritage cogent? As an answer, one can withdraw from Peters’ paper “Subjectivity and standards” the following rough sketch of a justification for the importance of the humanities. 1. Every human being is (a) confronted with the predicaments of life, (b) emotion- and reason-responsive to them, and (c) concerned about the quality of life.

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2. The humanities rationally clarify the (emotional) meaning of the human condition and the standards of the humanities articulate the search for the quality of life. 3. Therefore, the humanities are existentially important or relevant for every human being, given that each one wants to make something out of him- or herself.

The initiation into the humanities, as the central task of liberal education as general education, is justified because such an initiation is indispensable for leading a humane and civilized life of quality. This constitutes a justification because of the universality of its basic premise, namely the fact that every human being is placed in the same situation. The human condition is the lot of all mankind. Moreover, the sketch offers a noninstrumental justification because, as we remarked above, the humanities, as the body of knowledge that is relevant for any person to cope with life’s predicaments, are not “useful” in the sense of being pursued for the sake of some practical or extrinsic end. The heritage of the humanities is constitutive of a worthwhile life. Although a general structure of the justification of liberal education can be given along these lines, considerable debate remains about the specific details. For one thing, it is not clear what the precise content of the humanities should be. Peters certainly does not identify the humanities with the renaissance ideal of the studia humaniora. Not only is less emphasis placed on grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, but also literature is not limited to Greek and Roman classics as it includes other edifying literature such as George Eliot ’s novels and Tolstoy ’s Anna Karenina (Peters 1974b, p. 422). Moreover, Peters incorporates the social sciences into the humanities in the broad sense. Arguably, there are important differences between the model of rationality in, for example, economics (e.g. rational choice theory) and that of the humanities in the narrow sense. For another thing, the exact relationship between the human sciences and the natural sciences in liberal education remains in the dark. As noted above, it remains unclear whether or not, on Peters’ view, mathematics and the physical sciences belong to the general knowledge package of liberal education. Is a humane and civilized life of quality possible without having knowledge of the second law of thermodynamics?

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The role of liberal education in teacher training Accepting the conjecture that Peters, all things considered, conceives of liberal education as general education in the sense of initiation into the heritage of the humanities, it becomes clear that liberal education, or at least an essential part of a liberal educational curriculum also plays a vital role in the preparation and training of teachers. Let us explain. The education of teachers is a special case of the education of human beings in general. As shown in Chapter 3, Peters’ specific concept of “the educated man,” as contrasted with the more generalized concept of education, comprises the value condition, the cognitive condition, and the intrinsic condition: Thus our concept of an educated person is of someone who is capable of delighting in a variety of pursuits and projects for their own sake and whose pursuit of them and general conduct of his life is transformed by some degree of all round understanding and sensitivity. (Peters 1970c, p. 13) We remarked earlier that Peters sometimes implicitly, and sometimes even explicitly, identifies education as such with liberal education. Notwithstanding a remainder of ambiguity, we have such a case of identification in the quote here because this specific concept amounts to the concept of liberal education in a certain sense. Although the specific concept stays rather formal, it can be taken—especially when it speaks about “all round understanding and sensitivity ”—as making an implicit reference to liberal education as general education in the sense of initiation into the heritage of the humanities. Consequently, when Peters applies his view on education in general to the education of teachers, he is, at least implicitly, applying his view on liberal education as well to this special case.5 However, the relationship between liberal education and the preparation of teachers is indirect. Liberal education plays a pivotal role in the training of teachers by means of the role that educational theory plays in teacher training. This is so because an essential ingredient of a liberal educational curriculum is, according to Peters, part and parcel of

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educational theory. We elaborate on this highly interesting consequence of Peters’ view on liberal education for teacher training. What is the role of educational theory in teacher training? This is in itself a complex question, the answer to which presupposes answers to three other ones: (1) What is educational theory? (2) How does educational theory influence educational practice, if at all? (3) Why introduce educational theory in teacher training at all? Remarkably, in all his three answers to these questions, Peters refers to liberal education as general education in the specified sense. Henceforward, we mean by “ liberal education” this specific conception, unless said otherwise.

Educational theory As to the first question, Peters in the beginning of the 1960s took a so-called “differentiated approach” to the nature of educational theory. To understand what this involves, some background is in order. According to Peters, the preparation of teachers “requires a two-tiered type of academic study. For there is always a variable content which itself constitutes an academic study as well as forms and conditions of learning and teaching which also require foundation studies of an academic type” (Peters 1973d, pp. 172–3). That is to say, there are two necessary conditions of good teaching, which teacher training tries to realize in teachers for guaranteeing the quality of their teaching in the future: the mastery of content and the professional use of methods. On its own, neither of these conditions is sufficient. In teachers’ preparation, the curriculum courses—such as mathematics, natural sciences, English language and literature—take care of the first condition, while the educational courses are concerned with the second. Yet, the educational component is multifaceted. It is, therefore, useful to make a distinction between special and general educational theory. In its turn, special educational theory comprises two central domains: first, the learning and teaching of the basic skills of reading, spelling and writing, and secondly, the logical and psychological aspects of teaching the different curriculum subjects.6 It goes without saying that the language skills belong to the basic needs of any child in a modern culture. Against the backdrop of his view on good teaching, Peters strongly recommends

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to have in curriculum courses and teaching practice a collaboration of educationists specialized in the logical and psychological aspects of teaching a subject with subject specialists: “curriculum courses, together with teaching practice, provide a fine opportunity for fruitful collaboration between education and subject specialists which would do much to provide a more thorough grounding for students in the content and methods of the various curriculum subjects” (Peters 1967c, p. 155). General educational theory (or educational studies) is, then, concerned with general problems of education and learning in educational institutions. When philosophers discuss the nature of educational theory, the debate is predominantly about general educational theory.7 For that reason, we mean henceforth by “educational theory ” or “education” this general type of theory. Peters contrasted his own differentiated approach to educational theory with “the undifferentiated mush that is often perpetrated under the heading of educational theory ” (Peters 1964, p. 140) in the 1950s. For the most part this “mushy ” educational theory was “a rather woolly sort of wisdom” (Peters 1973d, p. 169), which was not much respected as a domain of knowledge in an academic institution or a university. By contrast, education is, according to Peters, a subject in its own right next to the other curriculum subjects, though it is not a distinct academic discipline in the sense of having a single type of truth-criterion and one determinate methodology. Educational theory is not a separate discipline, but a field of study where a group of disciplines meet in order to tackle practical problems of an educational sort. Consequently, the subject of educational studies has both a problem-centered and an interdisciplinary character. The logic of this subject is such that it starts with concrete educational problems such as “Does learning improve as a result of an integrated curriculum?” or “Ought we to use corporal punishment in a secondary school?” These questions are hybrid as to the choice of which approach one should take to do research on them: “Logically speaking all questions of educational policy and practice are hybrid questions, a crossing of value judgments with different forms of empirical enquiry ” (Peters, 1964, pp. 139–40). Any attempt to solve educational problems involves, thus, the contribution of different types of expertise and various styles of methodology, namely conceptual and historical analysis, philosophical justification, and also empirical evidence from the social sciences

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(Peters 1973d, p. 167; 1966b, p. 83). Therefore, educational theory by its very nature differentiates into several disciplines. According to Peters, educational studies differentiate into four contributing foundational disciplines8: philosophy, psychology, sociology, and history. Educational problems cannot be tackled, like mathematical problems, by reliance on just one research approach; they require a division of labor between different disciplines. Educational theory is, therefore, “ logically speaking, . . . a mess and necessarily a mess” (Peters 1972, p. 183). For that reason, it cannot be equated with “the product of ‘educational research’ conceived of narrowly as the building up of a body of empirical knowledge in the spheres of psychology, sociology, and economics” (Peters 1966b, p. 82). Philosophy and history are as necessary parts of educational theory as psychology and sociology. To question their “use” is really to question the “use” of educational theory as a whole of which philosophy and history form essential parts (Peters 1966b, p. 80). In the light of this differentiated approach to the nature of educational theory, Peters structures the form and the content of the education course in teacher training. According to him, there are three general principles determining the selection and presentation of educational theory: 1. Though it must be presented in a differentiated way, the different disciplines must also mesh in with and be seen to mesh in with each other in relation to matters of educational policy and practice. 2. Selection from the content of the basic disciplines must, in the main, be determined by what is relevant to the practical problems and interests of teachers in training. 3. The differentiated modes of thought about education, though harnessed to practical issues, must also be presented in a way that they intimate, and are seen to intimate, problems at a more fundamental level in the disciplines themselves, and the forms of inquiry necessary for their solution. (Peters 1964, p. 140)

These general principles should be applied to the specific foundational disciplines individually and collectively. The first principle makes the logical point that “integration” is inseparable from “differentiation”. Actually, the combination of a differentiated approach with an

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integrative, truly interdisciplinary approach to educational theory has been a permanent concern for Peters. In the early 1970s, he hoped that the development of curriculum theory would function as a kind of paradigm for this integrative phase in the development of educational theory as such. In order to establish a kind of collective identity as researchers in educational theory, the cooperation between them could be modeled after that in curriculum studies because such studies “have in fact proved to be an area in which there has been co-operation between representatives of foundation disciplines and between them and specialists in school-subjects and age ranges” (Peters 1973d, pp. 171–2). The desirability of keeping together the philosophical, psychological, and sociological components of educational theory led Peters also to considering a return to a more historical approach, since “our great precursors in educational theory . . . such as Herbart, William James, Durkheim and Plato . . . wove together different strands of educational theory in their systems in relation to problems—ethics, psychology, theory of knowledge, sociology and so on” (Peters 1973d, p. 180). In relation to the second principle, Peters devises a program especially as regards the role of philosophy and philosophy of education in educational theory and, thus, in teacher training (Peters 1974, pp. 141–7; 1966b, 85–7). We already explained Peters’ analytic strategy to upgrade philosophy of education as well as educational theory. As described in Chapter 1, the new analytic approach to philosophy of education contributed significantly to the academic respectability of the subject of education or the education course in teacher training. It is in connection with the third principle for the organization of educational theory that we at last come to the explicit role of liberal education, or at least that of an essential part of a liberal educational curriculum in the preparation and training of teachers. The four contributing foundational disciplines of educational theory—philosophy, psychology, sociology, and history—actually constitute an essential part of a liberal educational curriculum: “Philosophy, psychology, history and the social sciences play a vital role in what may be called a liberal education under modern conditions” (Peters 1964, p. 137). These essential parts of the humanities are, even at the level of initial teacher training, not only instrumentally applied to tackle problems of educational practice and policy but also further explored in their own

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right as autonomous “modes of thought ”. Of course, there is, at least at the initial level, “a constant tension between attempting to illuminate and clarify concrete issues so that teachers can go about their business in a more clear-headed way, and drawing them deeper into the discipline so that they can begin to develop a distinctive form of thought which will entail a more rigorous overhaul of their fundamental beliefs and ideals” (Peters 1964, p. 145). Yet, the “usefulness” of the educational course in teacher training is not limited to its instrumental value. According to Peters, the development of the distinctive forms of thought in the study of the foundational disciplines of educational theory has intrinsic value because such a development is directed toward the quality of life: Philosophy, art, and science are forms of activity which are worthwhile in themselves; they are part and parcel of a form of life which we think desirable. It is absurd, therefore, to expect the same sort of justification of them as is to be given for activities like boarding buses or building banks. This then is the most radical way of dealing with the question “ What is the use?” when asked about philosophy—or about psychology, sociology, history, or any other form of inquiry. It should not be thought, however, that studying such “subjects” is a means to the good life; it is more aptly described as an initiation into it. Such forms of thought involve the explanation, evaluation, and imaginative explorations of forms of life. As a result of them what is called “ life” develops different dimensions. (Peters 1966b, p. 79) By initiating teachers into these four central disciplines of the humanities in the context of their educational course, they are at the same time initiated into the forms of thought necessary to lead a life of quality. It is in this sense that an essential part of a liberal education curriculum plays a vital role in the preparation of teachers not only for their future teaching but also for conducting their own humane and civilized lives.

Theory and practice How does educational theory influence educational practice, if at all? Also in answering this second subquestion, Peters reserves a place for

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liberal education. Although there are reasons to be skeptical about a direct and short-term effect, there exists, according to Peters, an indirect and long-term effect of general educational theory on the practice of teaching. Even though students develop adequate affective responses and a supporting cognitive structure with regard to central ideas in educational theory, “there is little evidence to suggest that these ideas become translated into action-systems through which the results of teacher training may be manifested in the class-room” (Peters 1967c, p. 161). Moreover, it is depressing to find that the immediate “effect of training programs on the practice of teachers in class-rooms is nugatory compared with the influence of models in their past with whom they identify and of demands springing from their own personalities” (p. 162). However, the fact that there is little evidence for the immediate effect of theory on practice should neither depress nor surprise us. We should not even expect such an effect because educational theory by its very nature “is not a technology in which theoretical findings can be immediately fed in to practice and applied in any simple straightforward way ” (p. 163; our italics). In that sense, education is unlike medicine and engineering, which are branches of technology in a straightforward sense (Peters 1964, p. 139). Education is more like politics in that it always involves controversial ends and personal interrelationships, which cannot be approached purely instrumentally. According to Peters, the effect of educational theory on teaching practice is indirect and long-term. In the course of teacher training, we should not expect any sudden transformation but only a gradual transformation of an aspirant teacher’s view of his subject, of the children, of himself, and of the educational situation in which he is acting. Educational theory should remove certain naiveties in the candidates and sensitize their awareness of what they are doing. Accordingly, the main effect of the education course is to liberate students from hidden assumptions and sterile dogmas. Aspirant teachers should be exposed to educational theory in such a way that they “develop a critical, empirical, adaptable attitude to methods of teaching, and . . . learn to think on their feet and experiment with different ways of teaching different types of subjects to different types of children” (Peters 1967c, p. 165). The effectiveness of the education course will be revealed “both in the autonomy, and critical experimental attitude which teachers begin to

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show in the latter stages of teaching practice” (Peters 1964, p. 146). In other words, as to the looseness of the connection between educational theory and teaching practice, the conception of liberal education as nonauthoritarian education—in which the development of personal autonomy and critical thinking are central—takes up the slack. For Peters, the relevance of theory to practice has everything to do with the “ liberal education mindedness” of teachers, which educational studies gradually engender in them. That is also why he explicitly contrasts education and training in the preparation of teachers: “ The development of a critical, independent, experimental approach to problems of teaching is a lengthy business. It is an exercise in education, not in any narrowly conceived system of training” (Peters 1967c, p. 166). As an exercise in education, it aims at bringing about an autonomous, critical attitude in candidate teachers via their course in educational theory. Clearly, Peters identifies here “education” with liberal education in its third sense, which presupposes its second sense, as we conjectured. It is against a background of general knowledge acquired through an initiation into the four “humanistic” disciplines of educational theory—philosophy, psychology, sociology, and history—that the autonomous, critical attitude is developed in aspirant teachers.

Liberal teacher training Finally, let us turn to the third subquestion: Why introduce educational theory in teacher training at all? In his answer to this question, Peters (1964, pp. 135–7) first observes that theory is needed because the educational and social conditions that presently obtain in the society (of the 1960s) do not allow anymore for the old apprenticeship system in which teachers were gradually initiated into the tradition of teaching. To deal with his complex task in a highly differentiated community, the modern teacher can no longer rely on an established tradition. A modern teacher cannot just rely on personal experience, common sense, and the example of older colleagues to cope with educational problems and policy in an industrialized society. A working knowledge about the psychology of children and about the social and historical conditions of schools, as well as philosophical reflection about the educational

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situation, is indispensable in a modern pluralist society. Moreover, educational theory is needed in teacher training to establish the expertise of teachers and the prestige of their profession so that they can have sufficient authority in the community on educational matters. Secondly, educational theory is needed in the training of teachers because “we cannot altogether neglect our duty as educators to educate them as persons” (Peters 1964, p. 137; our italics). The general and thus liberal educational component of educational theory is indispensible as part of the education of teachers as human beings. As we noted, the education of teachers is a special case of the education of human beings in general. So, in the preparation of teachers, one should be concerned not only about their quality as teachers but also about the quality of their own lives. As broached in Chapter 4, as members of a pluralist, modern society teachers cannot fall back on overarching religious or political ideals to give meaning to their lives or their educational practice. To make something of themselves under these modern conditions, they need at least an essential part of a liberal education curriculum. It is precisely the initiation into the four disciplines of the humanities which are foundational for educational theory—philosophy, psychology, sociology, and history—that will provide the aspirant teachers with the necessary cultural heritage for their self-realization and the development of their autonomy: A liberal education is of central importance in a society whose members can no longer accept some unitary ideal of life, whether provided by the church or by a political party. For its function is not just to present to the individual a cultural heritage in which he can try to make something of himself, but to introduce him to those studies, especially in the area of the humanities, which are likely to stimulate his capacity for choice, to make it more imaginative and better informed. For in a society like ours the individual has a wide area of discretion. It is not laid down what sort of man he should become. The onus is on him to find meaning in his life within an accepted framework of principles, such as freedom, fairness and the consideration of people’s interests, without which such individual discretion would degenerate into anarchy. (Peters 1972, p. 189–90)

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Two conceptions of liberal education are noticeably at work here. Although Peters puts the main emphasis on the conception of liberal education as nonauthoritarian education or education for autonomy and critical thinking, this conception asymmetrically depends upon that of liberal education as general education or initiation into a cultural heritage, especially into the humanities: Education in our society is not unified by any particular religious or political ideal. The nearest approach which is made to such a unifying ideal is the demand for autonomy, that each individual should develop the capacity for authentic choice and learn to make something of himself within a developing cultural heritage. (Peters 1972, p. 192) We briefly summarize the role of liberal education in the preparation of teachers. Teacher training is primarily vocational in its emphasis. The preparation of teachers should in that sense be guided by the needs of the teaching profession and the requirements of good educational practice. Yet, according to Peters, “one could describe a vocational training as liberally or illiberally conceived and implemented” (Peters 1964, p. 139). On a liberal conception of teacher training, the four contributing disciplines of educational theory—philosophy, psychology, sociology, and history—are taught not only under a vocational or practical aspect but also under a humanistic and existential aspect. For Peters, teacher training should be motivated by both a concern for the quality of teaching and a concern for the quality of life.

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Chapter 6

Comprehensive Moral Education and Personal Autonomy

Introduction In this chapter and in the next, we reconstruct Peters’ answer to the third question of his analytic paradigm: 3. How do we adequately conceive of moral development and moral education?

Because “. . . a determinate notion of ‘morality’ is an essential precondition for any serious approach to moral education” (Peters 1974a, p. 541), we start with an outline of Peters’ moral theory. Peters elaborates his approach to moral education in a critical dialectic with Laurence Kohlberg’s cognitive theory of moral development. In the light of his pluralistic notion of morality, we then show how he supplements Kohlberg’s cognitivism in order to construct a comprehensive approach that covers the form as well as the content of morality. Since moral development culminates, on Kohlberg’s view, in rational autonomy, we subsequently delineate the place of personal autonomy in Peters’ theory of moral education.

Principled morality and ethical pluralism An essential precondition for developing any serious approach to moral education is the having of an explicit and specific conception of morality. What is Peters’ underlying moral theory? Peters’ conception of morality, understood as involving two distinct but related forms of ethical value

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(the good/worthwhile and the right/moral respect), was reconstructed in Chapter 4 in the context of the justification of education. Two other but closely related crucial elements, the complexity of moral life on the one hand and the emergence of a principled morality on the other, are developed in this chapter in the context of moral education and development. For Peters, the developmental problems of moral education render more sharply the intricate interrelation between the two forms of ethical value—the good and the right. First, a principled morality gradually emerged in Western civilization. It took a long time, until the Enlightenment of the seventeenth and the eighteenth century, before a rational, universalistic type of morality became distinct from religion, law, and customary codes of conduct. The hallmark of such a morality is its appeal to fundamental principles, which are presupposed in all practical reasoning in a democratic society, to adjudicate on particular codes and their conflicts. There are a limited number of these higher-order principles of a procedural kind, namely impartiality, the consideration of interests, freedom, respect for persons, and perhaps truth-telling. As expounded in Chapter 4, Peters takes up the task of justifying them in his Ethics and Education (1966a). Secondly, the moral life is complex in an open democratic society. Phenomenologically astute, Peters (1970b, pp. 69–70; 1973a, pp. 16–17) distinguishes between five aspects of our moral life. In describing them, he uses in different contexts different vocabularies. Sometimes, he uses the vocabulary of principles, rules, and duties, at other times, that of character-traits or virtues (and vices) and motives. Given that charactertraits and motives are internalized or personalized principles and rules, there is no harm in using these vocabularies interchangeably. There are (1) the principles and rules which govern the conduct between members of a democratic society. Two types of virtues are important in this interpersonal realm. On the one hand, we have the highly specific virtues, such as honesty, punctuality, tidiness, and politeness; on the other, we have the more “artificial” virtues, such as justice, fairness, the impartial consideration of interests, and respect for people.1 To this sphere of morality also belong basic rules, “e.g. concerning contracts, [non-injury,] property and the care of the young, which any rational man can see to be necessary to any continuing of social life, man being what he is and

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the conditions of life on earth being what they are” (Peters 1970b, p. 65; also 1973a, p. 13; 1974a, p. 546; 1978, p. 124). There are (2) motives which personalize purposes, or even goals of life, that are based on appraisals of a situation. This facet of our moral life includes, among others, the virtues of benevolence, compassion and gratitude, the vices of ambition, envy, and greed.2 These “natural” virtues contain within themselves reasons for action, whereas the “artificial’ and highly specific virtues just mentioned lack built-in reasons for action. The exercise of such action-related virtues typically arouse feelings and emotions. Motives and emotions are more at home in the sphere of personal relationships than in the public sphere of civic virtues. There are (3) qualities of the will “that are both content-free and which do not, like motives, introduce teleological considerations. . . . They are of a higher order and relate to the ways in which rules are followed or purposes pursued” (Peters 1971b, p. 247). To this element of our moral life pertain virtues such as determination, persistence, courage, consistency, integrity, and autonomy.3 It is essential to these so-called virtues of “self-control” that counter-inclinations must be present when such virtues are exercised. One needs only to exercise self-control in a situation when one threatens to be overcome by inclinations that go against one’s will. Peters casts his moral net very wide. Not only principles and rules, motives, and volitional qualities are morally relevant, but also (4) worthwhile activities are included in the moral sphere. As detailed in Chapters 2 and 3, these “good” or “desirable” activities are deemed to be so valuable that children ought to be initiated into them. To this range of activities belong, among others, the ones already identified in Ethics and Education such as science, history, poetry, and engineering, and possibly also a variety of games and pastimes. These activities, on the basis of which individuals can make something of themselves if they freely engage in them, supply not only for their occupations and professional lives but also for their vocations and ideals of life. Finally, there are particular (5) role-responsibilities—a person’s station and its duties. These are specific obligations that go together with the occupation of a social role in the society. Role-responsibilities involve what is socially required of a person as, for example, a husband, father, citizen, and member of an occupation or profession.

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The form and content of morality To do justice to the phenomenological complexity of moral life, Peters operates with a very broad conception of morality. How does he combine this ethical pluralism with his emphasis on a principled morality? To bring the two central elements of his moral theory together, he makes the important distinction between the form and the content of moral consciousness. Peters describes the structure of consciousness by making use of Michael Oakeshott ’s “experience and its modes” terminology (Oakeshott 1933). “Experience” functions as a wide and generic term. It also includes knowledge and understanding, and it is further qualified in different specific “modes” of experience such as the historical, scientific, practical, or moral. So, moral consciousness is, in this terminology, called “the moral mode of experience.” The emergence of a principled morality in Western civilization amounts then to the emergence of a rational form of the moral mode of experience. A principled morality is a universalistic type of morality constituted by fundamental principles that are presupposed in the exercise of practical reason. These higher-order principles of a procedural kind—impartiality, the consideration of interests, freedom, respect for persons—supply a rational form for the moral mode of experience. They provide a form of thought that structures the more culture-bound and concrete content of the moral mode of experience. Below, we abbreviate the phrase “the moral mode of experience” just by the term “morality.” Against the backdrop of this form-content distinction, Peters is able to distinguish between the more procedural and the more substantive elements of morality: principles, basic rules, and the qualities of will belong to the form of morality, whereas highly specific rules, worthwhile activities, and the role-responsibilities belong to morality ’s content. (We will address below the way in which certain “universalistic” motives, such as benevolence, also might be taken to concern the form of morality.) So, Peters’ ethical pluralism can be rationally reconstructed by distinguishing between the form and the content of morality. Yet, although both moral form and content are integral parts of his moral theory, he is first and foremost interested in its form, or what he calls “rational morality ” (Peters 1973a, p. 15).

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The nature and function of principles Peters’ emphasis on a (formal) rational morality makes his theory vulnerable to the criticism that a principled morality is abstract and cannot, therefore, give any specific guidance to our moral life. Aspects of this critique were addressed in Chapter 4 and are taken up further here in the context of moral education. Alasdair MacIntyre (1967), for example, voices this criticism, which he (1981) later expands to a general critique of the Enlightenment project of justifying morality. In response, Peters elucidates his view on the nature and function of principles (Peters 1970b, pp. 63–7; 70–3). First, what are principles? The emergence of a rational form of morality, in the context of conflicting particular codes (and religions), goes hand in hand with an appeal to general criteria of relevance to decide conflicts or to criticize and revise codes. In the light of many and competing ideas about what is good and right, such criteria or principles help to determine which considerations are morally relevant; they prescribe which considerations are to count as reasons. For example, according to the principle of considering people’s interests, sex and skin color are morally irrelevant, whereas alleviating their needs counts as a reason. It is true that in the context of justification one has to able to grasp the content of principles. Yet, the possession of a principle does not necessarily imply the ability to consciously and explicitly formulate or defend it. Moral principles have first and foremost to be applied appropriately. And their application only depends upon a sensibility to discriminate some considerations—the morally relevant ones—from others. Also, the acceptance of principles does not imply moral rigidity. Nothing in the nature of principles precludes their adaptability to different contexts, nor do they need to be affectively neutral. As these principles are presupposed in all our practical reasoning, we do neither choose nor decide on them. Fundamental principles and, to a large extent, also basic rules belong to the stable ground level of our moral life. Stability and consensus at this level are, however, quite compatible with development and disagreement at the level of specific social rules which are more dependent on local natural and cultural circumstances.

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So, although we do not always agree about moral content, we share the same form of morality. Second, how do principles function? Although principles are abstract criteria that can be appealed to in contexts of moral conflict and uncertainty, they have to be interpreted in terms of concrete traditions, and they enter into our moral life in a concrete way. We must rely on tradition to determine what exactly moral relevance is. The principle of impartiality, for example, demands the exclusion of arbitrary differences. Only morally relevant differences count as reasons. But in order to determine moral relevance, we must make some further evaluative judgment which is embedded in a concrete tradition. In our Stoic-Christian Western tradition, for instance, the principles of freedom and respect for persons are themselves pivotal criteria of relevance. Furthermore, principles concretely enter into our social roles and the rules of society. The principle of the consideration of interests, for example, always functions in relation to specific role-responsibilities (e.g. those of a teacher) and to the exertion of specific virtues (e.g. honesty). So, adherence to principles is not self-contained but always connected with more concrete content. Yet, although principles are not abstract, inert entities, it remains true that they cannot prescribe precisely what an individual ought to do in this or that particular circumstance. Would the fact that principles do not give any specific guidance in daily life situations be objectionable? In response, one might ask: Why should a moral theory—particularly, a rational morality—be able to give such specific guidance? It is not the task of morality to exactly determine what specifically ought to be done in every particular situation. Since morality is not casuistry which is exclusively directed to individual cases, Peters, therefore, concludes that “[principles] function more as signpost than as guidebooks” (Peters 1970b, p. 65).

The unity of morality It is fair to say that Peters only partly subscribes to the Enlightenment project of justifying morality because a rational morality is only one

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part of his ethical pluralism. Although Peters puts emphasis on a principled morality, he defends, very much like David Hume (1777), a comprehensive conception of morality, according to which all the different aspects of our moral life should be taken into account. Such an ethical pluralism raises questions about the unity of our moral life and possible structures of priority or rational ordering among different normative claims. “Of course,” Peters (1971b, p. 363) admits, “an attempt might be made to introduce some kind of unity into the moral life either by attempting to show that all such considerations were derived from one type of consideration, as did the Utilitarians, or by arbitrarily demarcating the sphere of the moral, as did Kant.” However, such an enterprise would not only be very difficult (if not impossible), but also misleadingly suggest a limited and simple-minded view of moral education. It would intimate that educating children only concerns the domain of the good (e.g. utilitarian happiness) or, alternatively, that of the right (e.g. Kantian duties), whereas it emphatically does not exclusively concern either domain. According to Peters, for example, initiating children in worthwhile activities is no less part of moral education than trying to get them to grasp principles. But although Peters rejects ethical unitarianism, he himself forges “a loose type of unity ” between the different facets of our moral life (Peters 1973a, pp. 26–32). As indicated above, the several moral elements can partly be unified in terms of the distinction between the form and content of morality. Moreover, the specific contents of social rules, worthwhile practices, role-responsibilities, and even some motives and “self-transcending” emotions, however heterogeneous they may be, possess a unity insofar as they comply with the general form of a rational morality. In as much as these elements have a rational content or are reason-based, they participate in rational morality ’s form. In addition, since the “rational” qualities of the will, such as consistency and autonomy, are higher-order elements on a par with fundamental principles, they are also readily incorporated into the form of a rational morality. What is perhaps more implausible is Peters’ proposal to include certain “universalistic” motives, such as concern for others, into the form

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of morality as well. For example, as regards reason and compassion (or love), he observes a similarity as well as a tension between them: They share a certain disinterestedness and concern for what is ‘out there’. . . . But [in the case of reason] this disinterestedness is generalised; for in the use of reason, particularities of time, place and identity are irrelevant. In concern for others, on the other hand, the concentration is away from the self, but it may be directed towards the particular features of the person who is its object. (Peters 1973a, pp. 29–30) Although Peters admits that “the generalized demands of reason” and “the particularized promptings of compassion,” which he associates respectively with our Stoic and Christian moral legacies, can pull individuals in divergent directions, he stresses that “[t]hese are both elements in the form of the moral mode of experience which we have inherited” (Peters 1973a, p. 32). In the next chapter, we come back to this complex relationship between reason and (com)passion.

Cognitive moral development and comprehensive moral education With Peters’ pluralistic conception of morality and his emphasis on a rational morality in place, we can turn to his approach to moral development and moral education. Given that a moral theory is an essential preliminary for such an approach, Peters’ ethical pluralism precludes any simple-minded or one-dimensional view of moral education. According to Peters (1973a, pp. 23; 46), the gradual emergence of a rational morality in Western history is paralleled by the gradual emergence of an autonomous stage in the moral development of children. Whatever one thinks about this sweeping hypothesis, the cognitive-developmental psychology of Jean Piaget and Laurence Kohlberg is undeniably the point of reference from which Peters builds up his own view of moral education.4 Before going into details about the way in which he articulates his approach in a critical dialectic with

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the Piaget-Kohlberg theory, we locate this theory on the map of the many possible theories of moral development and moral education.

The educational assumption and the acquisition question Parents (and teachers) face the task of turning nonresponsible youngsters into morally responsible agents. One significant assumption of educating children for—and teaching them—morally responsible agency is that their becoming moral agents is not just a matter of maturation on the basis of an innate genetic program. Educators can only meaningfully take on this task if the educational environment plays a constitutive, or at least a contributory, role in the process of children’s becoming such agents. Accepting this “educational” assumption implies taking a substantial position on the acquisition question as regards moral competence. Given that young children are not morally responsible, it follows that they only can be morally responsible in their later life if they acquire the necessary moral competence during their upbringing. Provided that children should acquire the moral competence for being morally responsible as adults, how could or, more empirically, how do they in the course of their development and education come to acquire this competence? Which mechanism explains how children acquire their moral competence? Three views on the nature of moral competence acquisition can be distinguished: (a) social-learning theory, (b) nativism, and (c) constructivism.

Social-learning theory According to the social-learning theory, morality is learned in a social environment (Wren 1982). Moral competence acquisition is based on the combined mechanisms of empirical observation and explicit instruction. Given that moral behavior is a type of rule-following behavior, children observe moral actions of other people—especially, their parents’ moral actions—after which they inductively generalize and eventually internalize the moral rules governing those actions. In addition, children are explicitly instructed in the difference between

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right and wrong; saying “telling the truth is right ” and “ lying is wrong” belongs to the basic moral instruction parents give their children. Morality is thus a product of socialization and internalization. Although social-learning theory grew out of behaviorism, it does not limit the mechanisms for moral competence formation to Skinnerian operant conditioning by reinforcement.

Nativism At the other extreme, according to nativism (or maturation theories), morality is innate (Dwyer 1999; 2003). Becoming morally competent is not a matter of perceptually acquiring a novel capacity in a social context, but a matter of the gradual activation of a genetically preformed module of the mind. Impressed by the striking parallels between the development of moral competence and that of linguistic competence, theorists exploit the so-called “ linguistic analogy ” for making plausible a nativist approach to the psychology of moral development. Provided that language and morality are both normative systems, in the sense that they involve constraints on utterances or judgments, a Universal Moral Grammar constrains how a child acquires its morality, just as a Chomskian Universal Grammar constrains how it acquires its language. Independently of whether or not children are exposed to many instances of moral situations of different types, or to lots of explicit moral instruction, their full-blown moral competence emerges across the globe. As in the language case, the poverty of the moral stimulus in moral development is claimed to lend credibility to the postulate of the innateness of moral competence.

Constructivism Whereas the social-learning theory conceives of the mind as a blank slate (tabula rasa), nativism theorizes that the mind’s architecture is an evolutionary designed constellation of mental modules, among which is the domain-specific module of morality. On the former view, the mind remains entirely passive; on the latter, the mind automatically

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executes its innate genetic program. According to constructivism, the mind itself plays an active role, but only in cooperation with its social environment. Not only the mind, but also the environment essentially contributes to the construction of morality. Moral competence is neither the internalized product of socialization, nor the effect of genetically guided maturation, but has to be actively constructed by the mind in a dialectical relationship with its social environment. This midway position has a respectable research tradition since Piaget (1932) and later Kohlberg (1981). To provide a plausible account of the mechanism that constructs moral competence in the midst of interpersonal interactions, constructivists built further on Piaget ’s notion of (moral) equilibration (l ’équilibration) as the fundamental factor of moral development, as well as on Kohlberg’s notion of reversibility in moral judgments.

Peters’ educational assumption In the light of these three views on the nature of moral competence acquisition, we return to the “educational” assumption regarding the meaningfulness of the educational task. The character of the process of moral education (and teaching), in particular, that of educating for becoming morally competent, mirrors the character of the process of moral development, in particular, that of the acquisition of moral competence. That is to say, the way in which educators can possibly, if at all, inculcate moral competence in youngsters correlates with or is constrained by the way in which those youngsters can possibly acquire such a competence. For this reason, the structure and degree of the impact of parents (and teachers) on the emergence of moral competence in children vary along the spectrum of the three views. Accordingly, the educational environment functions as either: a. a constitutive cause in social-learning theory, b. a triggering cause in nativism, or c. a contributory cause in constructivism.

At the core of the nativist approach is the claim that in the course of biological maturation, governed by an innate genetic program,

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moral competence emerges essentially independent from the social environment. The educational environment only triggers the acquisition process but does add neither form nor content to children’s innate moral competence. On the nativist view, educators are, therefore, discharged from their task to educate for morally competent, and thus, responsible agency. Endorsing the “educational” assumption, as both social-learning theory and constructivism do, implies for that reason taking a substantial stance with regard to the acquisition question. On both views, moral competence acquisition essentially relates to the educational environment, which plays either a constitutive or, at least, a contributory role. However, the structure and degree of the influence of the social context differ between these two views as to the role of innateness and that of children’s active participation in the acquisition process. According to the constructivist view, there is still a partial role for innateness as well as an active role for the child’s psychology to play in moral competence acquisition. According to the social-learning theory, these two other contributory roles—the genetic and the individual mind—are excluded because they are incompatible with its presupposition that the mind is a blank slate. Here, we do not further pursue the extensive and complex debate between social-learning theory, nativism, and constructivism about the moral competence acquisition question.5 For our purposes, it suffices to have identified the place of the cognitive-developmental psychology of Piaget and Kohlberg in relation to its contenders as to the theory of moral education. In line with his ethical pluralism, Peters does not interpret social-learning theory (or behaviorism) and constructionism as competing theories between which an exclusive choice has to be made. Although Peters accepts the “educational” assumption and takes the constructivist view as his point of reference, he repeatedly emphasizes that the Piaget-Kohlberg theory needs supplementation with other theories of moral education, among which even Skinnerian behaviorism. Moreover, the cognitive-developmental psychology is, according to Peters, too one-dimensional in its narrow focus on the cognitive aspect of moral education. It needs, therefore, to be supplemented by an account of the affective aspect of moral development. So, the overall picture that comes to light is that Peters offers us, not another competing theory,

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but an original comprehensive theory of moral education that tries to do justice to the several facets of our moral life. Next, we commence the exploration of this comprehensive picture with a brief outline of Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental psychology because this theory is Peters’ basic point of reference.

Kohlberg’s stage theory What is, according to Kohlberg, moral development? He takes over from Piaget, who adopts a Kantian framework, the constructivist conception of intellectual and moral development outlined above. Constructivists claim that parallel to the biological development of the body, there exists a psychological development of the mind through time. The mind is conceived as a system of mental structures (or schemata) that changes from infancy through childhood and adolescence to adulthood. The mind receives and operates on experiential input; it transforms the experiential input into behavioral output by making use of (hidden) mental structures. These structures are neither copied from the outside nor programmed by the inside, but constructed in the dialectical relation between the child and its environment. Mental structures change through time in an orderly pattern, which is conceptualized in terms of stage succession and progression. The mind develops intellectually as well as morally through such temporally and hierarchically ordered stages. From his experimental research, Kohlberg identified a sequence of six stages of moral development proceeding through three levels6: A. Preconventional or Egocentric; B. Conventional or Heteronomous; and C. Postconventional (Principled) or Autonomous.

He claims this sequence to be invariant and universal, that is to say, all (biologically normal) children go through all the stages successively without stage-skipping and all the stages are found in all cultures. This claim is not implausible because Kohlberg explicitly makes the distinction between the form and the content of moral development,

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and the cultural invariant claim only pertains to the form (or structure) of moral development. Although there can be considerable differences between cultures as to the content of moral rules, the development of their form is culturally invariant. Obviously, Kohlberg’s form-content distinction as to moral development mirrors that of Peters as to moral life and history; the “ontogenetic” emergence of an autonomous stage in the moral development of children parallels the “phylogenetic” emergence of a rational morality in Western history. It is precisely because Kohlberg’s stage theory is so greatly significant for the development of a rational or principled morality in childhood that this theory functions as the point of reference in Peters’ approach to moral education. Kohlberg is not interested in the teaching and learning of variable moral codes or specific moral rules, which he derides as “a bag of virtues” approach. They are context-dependent and instable character-traits, whereas fundamental principles, especially the principle of justice, which constitute a rational morality, are stable and cross-culturally uniform. Kohlberg’s stage theory as a theory about the development of a rational morality in childhood is, therefore, a theory about the development of children’s way of grasping principles. Corresponding to the changes children’s form of thought concerning rules undergo, their moral judgment at each stage has a specific character. Children, Kohlberg claims, start by seeing rules as dependent upon power and external compulsion; they then see them as instrumental to rewards and to the satisfaction of their needs [in the egocentric stage]; then as ways of obtaining social approval and esteem; then as upholding some ideal order [in the heteronomous stage]; and finally as articulations of social principles necessary to living together with others—especially justice [in the autonomous stage]. (Peters 1971b, pp. 238–9) The way in which rules can be conceived is analogous to the style in which beliefs can be held. One can, for example, “egocentrically ” believe in the existence of God because it fulfils one’s need for comfort. But one can also “heteronomously ” hold this belief on the authority of a priest, whom one trusts. Alternatively, one can “autonomously ” believe in God’s existence on the basis of rational proofs for the existence of God. In the case of empirical beliefs, one can justifiably hold them on sufficiently

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supporting evidence. This rational style of believing is comparable to the critically reflective way in which one conceives rules and principles in the autonomous stage. Peters’ supplementation of Kohlberg According to Kohlberg, the culturally invariant sequence in levels of conceiving moral rules—from egocentric through heteronomous to autonomous—is constitutive of moral development (Peters 1973a, p. 24). The process of moral development involves, however, according to Peters, more than Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental psychology covers. An adequate theory of moral development and moral education needs to cover not only the form but also the content of morality. Moreover, Kohlberg’s restriction of the form of morality to the cognitive aspect is too limited. Against the background of his ethical pluralism, Peters supplements Kohlberg’s stage theory with three fundamental elements, which are, in addition, constitutive of moral development and/or moral education. First, against Kohlberg’s dismissive attitude toward instilling “a bag of virtues,” Peters argues for the central importance of the content of morality in moral teaching. As a corollary, he defends the view that not only reason but also habit is crucial in moral education. Secondly, the development of moral competence essentially comprises an affective aspect in addition to a cognitive aspect. Besides reason, we also need compassion in educated people, and even reason cannot function on its own without rational passions. Thirdly, and this is an important preliminary point, Kohlberg’s very narrow conception of teaching (conceived primarily as direct instruction) should be supplanted by a more broad one to make plausible the claim that moral development essentially involves some process of teaching. We elaborate upon these points in the reverse order. Can virtue be taught? Kohlberg’s answer to this classical Socratic question is, surprisingly at first sight for a constructivist, negative. If moral development is constituted by

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the development of a rational form of morality through stages, then the transitions between the stages cannot be an effect of teaching. Concrete content can be learned by instruction and other explicit teaching methods, as well as by example-imitation or identification. Yet, changes in the way in which rules are conceived do not depend upon teaching, but upon the interaction between the child and its social environment, aided by what Kohlberg calls “cognitive stimulation.” Moral stage progression is neither the product of socialization nor of maturation, but the effect of the child’s experience of moral conflicts and active thought about moral dilemmas (e.g. the famous “Heinz dilemma”) motivated by the desire to take the most “reversible” or universal perspective. Although the child itself has the experiences and has to actively think for itself, the social environment can stimulate such experience and active thought. Parents, teachers, and other educators can confront the child with problematic moral situations and provide feedback that confirms or disconfirms its current moral problem-solving. So, virtue can be cognitively stimulated, but not taught. In this sense, Kohlberg’s stage theory is only a theory about moral development and not about moral education at all. However, in opposing cognitive stimulation so starkly to teaching, Kohlberg runs the risk of diminishing the contributory cause of the educational environment in moral development to almost zero and eliminating the “educational” assumption altogether. As Peters (1974a, p. 548) critically observes: “But in contrasting the interaction with the environment, which stimulates the development of a rational form of morality [cognitive stimulation], with ‘teaching,’ which he thinks is singularly ineffective in this sphere, he makes it look too much as if the child, as it were, does it himself.” Cognitive stimulation only seems to trigger the stage transitions but does add neither content nor form to the child’s internally developing moral competence. If external influences do not or only minimally contribute to moral development, then the rational form of morality is not co-constructed in the child-environment interaction but self-constructed by the child alone. Kohlberg’s stage theory is, as a consequence, in danger of collapsing into a kind of maturation theory, either biological nativism or a somewhat mysterious Rousseauian (or Deweyan) type of self-discovery theory. Since constructivism subscribes to the “educational” assumption and the contributory causal impact of the social environment, it has to defend

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the claim that moral development involves partially but essentially some process of teaching. That is the reason why Peters corrects Kohlberg’s sharp contrast between cognitive stimulation and teaching by making a crucial distinction between teaching in the restricted and teaching in the unrestricted sense (Peters 1971b, pp. 243–5; 1973a, pp. 37–8). In making his contrast, Kohlberg unduly restricts the concept of teaching to the specific notion of teaching as direct instruction. So restricted, the concept of teaching has indeed no application in the case of learning to grasp (moral) principles and to conceive of (moral) rules in an adequate way. Explicit instruction is appropriate in cases of information transfer and training skills but not in the case of learning principles, rules, and the adequate attitudes toward them.7 Learning a principle does not come down to learning an explicit content. Although the teacher has to exhibit a number of concrete items to the learner, the unifying principle under which these items are organized is itself not a further item for direct instruction. In bringing a child to an adequate grasp of a principle, all the teacher can do is present instances and draw attention to their common features until hopefully, “the penny drops”—until, that is, the learner catches on to the principle that is being instantiated. Therefore, on Kohlberg’s restricted notion of specific teaching, (moral) principles cannot be taught. However, the unrestricted or “normal” concept of teaching is also applicable in the case of learning principles and rules. In accordance with this concept, central cases of teaching activities have to fulfill three necessary conditions: i. they must be conducted with the intention of bringing about learning, ii. they must indicate or exhibit what is to be learnt, iii. they must do this in a way which is intelligible to, and within the capacities of, the learners. (Peters and Hirst 1970, p. 81)8

Even if Socrates was not explicitly telling Meno’s slave that the resultant square is twice the size of the original square, he taught him this ratio all the same by appropriate exemplifications and questions. Teaching methods depend upon the nature of what has to be learned. Direct instruction is suitable in the case of the acquisition of information and

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skills, whereas indirect indication is suitable in the case of learning principles, as it is in the case of, for example, learning the grammatical rules of a language. In the latter case, a principle or rule is indicated by way of presenting several of its concrete instances. Even if one did not accept such an indirect case as a central case of teaching, it still would be a case of teaching in the derivative sense, because “[i]t is . . . possible that there are cases of ‘teaching’ that disregard any one or even two of these [necessary] conditions, and yet are understood derivatively as cases of ‘teaching’ ” (Peters and Hirst 1970, p. 81). So, given the unrestricted concept of teaching, Kohlberg’s method of cognitive stimulation is a bona fide teaching method, and in accord with this concept, there is no problem for a constructivist to claim that teaching essentially contributes to moral development.9

The passions Kohlberg’s stage theory is exclusively a theory about the development of children’s form of thought concerning the principles of a rational morality, especially the principle of justice. However, besides the development of this cognitive aspect there is, according to Peters, the equally important development of the affective aspect, about which Kohlberg’s cognitivism is silent. The formal principle of justice—no distinctions or exceptions should be made without relevant differences or grounds—will readily lead to the more material principle of the impartial consideration of people’s interests, but not in and of itself to caring about the interests of others. Concern for others in Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental psychology only functions as a rational principle, but is not based on feeling concern for them. Yet, although young children are not capable of adequately grasping such a principle, empirically speaking, they seem capable of such a sentiment, perhaps deriving from innate sympathy, very early on (Peters 1973a, p. 42). As a matter of fact, empathically caring about others appears to come much earlier in child development than grasping other-directed principles. Parallel to the development of children’s form of thought concerning the principles of a rational morality apparently runs the development of their form of feeling concerning such principles,

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from a particularistic through to a more universalistic sentiment to what David Hume (1777) called “the sentiment for humanity.” In line with his proposal to include certain universalistic motives, such as benevolence, in the form of morality as well, Peters argues for the supplementation of Kohlberg’s stage theory with an ontogenetic account of affective concern for others. As a way of conceptualizing this affective supplement in a way consistent with Kohlberg’s cognitivism, he suggests a combination of Martin Hoffman’s development theory of altruism with Peevers’ and Secord’s theory of personal understanding (Peters 1978, pp. 119–21). According to Peters, moral education comprises the education both of reason and compassion, rational principles as well as the moral sentiments: . . . moral education is centrally concerned with the development of certain types of motives, especially what I have called the rational passions. When looked at in a justificatory context, some of these, e.g. benevolence, respect for persons and the sense of justice, function as fundamental principles. But if such principles are to be operative in a person’s conduct, they must become his principles. That means that they must come to function as motives, as considerations of a farranging sort that actually move him to act. (Peters 1970b, p. 75) Without a sense of justice, the principle of justice stays inert. Without benevolence, the principle of the impartial consideration of interests remains external. To get children “inside” the form of morality, we need the moral motivation of, what Peters calls, “the rational passions.” By themselves principles and rules—“artificial” and highly specific virtues—are inert or external in that they lack built-in reasons for action, whereas motives—“natural” virtues—have reasons for action built into them and, accordingly, they lead a person all the way to action. In their connection to motives, moral principles are not affectively neutral and, thus connected, provide the moral motivation for authentic action. It is only by means of the moral sentiments that children get at the inside of the form of morality. However, the affective aspect is not just an ad hoc addition to the cognitive aspect of moral development. According to Peters, reason and (com)passion are intrinsically connected in the development of the form of morality because reason itself cannot

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properly function without the operation of the rational passions. In the next chapter, while discussing the education of the emotions, we come back to this type of passions that are indispensable to the use of reason. It is worth noting here that Peters takes motives and rational passions as philosophically primitive concepts, which can further be empirically elucidated by psychologists: “It is not for a philosopher to pronounce on how children can be got on the inside of this more rational form of life, or on how the rational passions, which personalise fundamental principles, can best be awakened and developed. That is a matter for psychologists.” (Peters 1970b, p. 78)

Morality’s content and habituation Kohlberg’s stage theory is first and foremost a psychological theory about the form of morality, not about its content and, correspondingly, a theory about moral development, not about moral learning and teaching. Kohlberg does not occupy himself with the teaching and learning of “a bag of virtues,” but with the ontogenetic development of a principled morality. Peters admits that “the level of conception [of principles and rules],” especially the conventional or postconventional level, “determines both the type of content that can be assimilated and the aids which are available for this assimilation” (Peters 1973a, p. 35). However, as against Kohlberg, Peters argues for the following two supplementary theses: (1) the interactionistic development of the form of morality is compatible with the behavioristic learning of the content of morality by means of habit-formation (the weak claim) and (2) the learning by habituation of morality ’s content—a code-encased morality—is logically and practically necessary for the development of morality ’s form (the strong claim). Although habituation is, thus, necessary, it is not sufficient for moral development. Before we start expounding these claims, it is important to see why Peters defends them. This involves a return to Peters’ general views on the concept of education (see Chapters 2 and 3). Recall that education is an initiation into different modes of experience and knowledge, among which are worthwhile activities and modes of conduct (Peters 1963a, pp. 102–10). This amounts to an initiation into a shared inheritance

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and public traditions (Peters 1974b, pp. 423–4). Of vital importance in the educational transmission are the impersonal content and procedures which are enshrined in this traditional heritage. In the light of Peters’ ethical pluralism, initiation into concrete worthwhile activities and specific codes of conduct is part and parcel of moral education: “In this more specific sense of education, . . ., all education is, therefore, moral education, . . .” (Peters 1970b, p. 73). Initiating children into morality ’s content is, therefore, essential for their moral education. They cannot simply develop the form of morality and work out its content for themselves. Educating children into the form of morality without its content is empty. The way in which children conceive of moral rules determines without a doubt what they can assimilate of the moral life and how they can assimilate it. There are crucial differences between the (Kohlbergian) conventional and postconventional levels as to the place of learning morality ’s content and the role of teaching methods at each level. We already commented on Kohlberg’s claims that virtue cannot be taught, though it can be cognitively stimulated and that learning a principle is not the same as learning an explicit content. These claims are primarily made in the light of the postconventional or autonomous level of moral development. At the conventional or heteronomous level, children’s conception of moral rules is, however, conformity-based and authoritybased. Such a conventional form of thought correlates not only with the initiation into a code-encased morality but also with the fact that its specific content is learned by imitation and identification as well as by a behavioristic process of operant conditioning, primarily by positive and negative reinforcement. At this level of “good boy ” or “nice girl” morality, concrete moral content and specific moral codes are instilled in children by means of habit-formation or habituation. Since Peters holds that the instilment of morality ’s content in the conventional stages is essential for the moral life and, as a matter of historical and social fact, moral development beyond these stages is rather an exceptional phenomenon, his supplementation of Kohlberg’s stage theory faces the charges of “second-handedness” and indoctrination. We come back to these criticisms below. As against Kohlberg’s neglect of the importance of inculcating highly specific virtues and role-responsibilities in children, Peters makes the

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strong claim that the learning of morality ’s content—a code-encased morality—is logically and practically necessary for the development of morality ’s form. (We deal with the weak claim in the next section.) Given that children at the conventional level cannot adequately grasp moral rules, the learning of a moral code cannot proceed by means of instruction and explanation. Since young children cannot see the rationale of moral principles, they are impervious to concept-clarification and reason-giving. If, at the conventional level, cognitive moral learning is impossible, then only behavioral moral learning or moral habit-formation seems to be possible as a path to postconventional moral understanding. At the conventional level, educators have to resort to habit-training by means of behavioristic reinforcement. Peters loosely connects the Aristotelian idea of moral education by habituation with the Skinnerian idea of moral training by operant conditioning. Although Peters is not a Skinnerian, and even criticizes behaviorism, he recognizes the value of the behavioristic insight that there is no other way to meaningfully implant moral rules in young children except as backed up by reward or punishment, praise or blame (Peters 1978, p. 125). Consequently, the educational environment in the moral development of children functions, according to Peters, not so much as a contributory cause, in line with Kohlberg’s constructivism, but as a constitutive cause, in accord with social-learning theory. Why is learning a code of conduct by habituation so important? (Peters 1973a, pp. 58–60; 1974a pp. 560–1; 1978, pp. 123–4). Learning morality ’s content is logically necessary for the development of morality ’s form for two reasons. First, without such learning a direct development from the egocentric attitude toward moral rules at the preconventional level to the autonomous attitude toward them at the postconventional level would be impossible. The postconventional, rationally reflective attitude toward rules presupposes the normative conception of a rule as based on conformity and authority. Children acquire this necessary basis to reflect on the validity of rules by picking up and internalizing specific rules of a code-encased morality. How could a child come to follow a rule autonomously, if it had not learned—in, what Piaget calls, the “transcendental” stage of moral realism—what it is to follow a rule as a rule? The child needs to conceive of a rule as something authoritative and not just as something one egocentrically complies with in order to avoid

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punishment or to get rewards. Secondly, the exertion of morality ’s form by applying moral principles would be inconceivable without morality ’s content. We already remarked that abstract principles could not function without concrete content. What moral principles such as justice and the consideration of interests mean is only intelligible in relation to highly specific virtues (like that of honesty), role-responsibilities (like those of being a parent), and other specific normative notions (like that of need). In other words, Kohlberg’s thinking about principles is top-down, whereas Peters’ is bottom-up. This bottom-up approach to principles allows for the immanent presence of them in social practices and roles. Moral principles only come explicitly into play when the justification or criticism of some determinate moral content at the lower-level is in order; they are only appealed to in cases of moral conflict and uncertainty at the ground floor of the moral life. Moreover, learning morality ’s content is practically (or instrumentally) necessary for the development of morality ’s form for two reasons. First, peaceful social life would degenerate to the state of nature where “the life of man, [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short ” (Hobbes 1651, part I, chap. 13), if children as well as adults were not to observe a basic code of conduct. Given that only a very small minority of the population reaches the autonomous level of principled morality, it is vital that the vast majority follows the basic moral rules such as contract-keeping and property-preserving. Secondly, the moral life would be psychologically exhausting if on all occasions we had to rationally reflect upon the validity of moral principles and rules before making decisions and acting accordingly. In order to avoid moral paralysis, it is essential that we can rely on the direct operation of a fair stock of moral habits, among which are highly specific virtues, internalized basic rules, and roleresponsibilities. If the learning of morality ’s content is necessary for the development of morality ’s form, then the adoption of the learning method of habituation, assisted by Aristotelian-Skinnerian teaching devices, seems inevitable: “ Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes its birth and its growth to teaching . . ., while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, . . .” (Aristotle 2009, 1103a, 14–17). Aristotle contrasts here teaching by explicit instruction as the method for the intellectual virtues, such as

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scientific knowledge and theoretical wisdom, with teaching by habitformation as the one for the moral virtues.10 What exactly is habituation? Aristotle gives the canonical formulation of this concept: . . . , it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. . . . This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and by being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. (Aristotle 2009, 1103b, 7–26) Repetitious activity, in the sense of going through the same motions many times, produces settled dispositions or habits, good and bad. One acquires virtues (or vices) by repeatedly doing virtuous (or vicious) acts in appropriate circumstances. In line with this account of habituation, Peters (1971b, pp. 250; 255) delivers the following conceptual analysis. In the moral education of children habituation is a learning process in which they familiarize themselves with and repeat certain action patterns so that specific dispositions to act get instilled. This process might, but need not involve, drill. During habit-training the action patterns are stabilized by means of behavioristic reinforcement in terms of reward or punishment, praise or blame. Once inculcated, habits meet two conditions in particular: they are characterized by a settled dispositional structure which implies (a) repetition in the future and (b) a certain automatism in routine situations. Since one does not have to rationally reflect and deliberately take decisions about habitual action, one can habitually act more or less automatically. Yet on a particular occasion, mostly when routine breaks down, one may review one’s habits and, for example, resolve against them.

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According to Peters, learning morality ’s content—that is, acquiring highly specific virtues as well as internalizing basic rules and roleresponsibilities—by habituation is necessary, but not sufficient for the development of the moral life for three reasons (Peters 1971b, pp. 251–3). First, and this is an immediate consequence of Peters’ ethical pluralism, the different aspects of our moral life relate differently to habit-formation. The method of habituation works well in the cases of learning highly specific virtues, internalizing basic rules, and adopting role-responsibilities. However, in the cases of learning principles, strengthening motivations, and exercising will-qualities, the effect of this method is very limited or at most only indirect. As we already explained, learning a moral principle is not the same as learning explicit moral content. To grasp a moral principle, for instance, that of the impartial consideration of interests, a child needs to grasp the presupposed concepts, such as that of “interest,” and the development of these cognitive prerequisites seems inconceivable on the basis of some process of behavioral conditioning alone. Moreover, the openendedness involved in the application of principles is orthogonal with the condition of repetition in the future for habitual action. As to the other moral aspects, the process of habit-formation cannot directly reach both strengthening motivations, which depend on the arousal of emotions, and exercising will-qualities, which presuppose the presence of counter-inclinations. The active participation of the mind in motivation and willpower goes against the condition of automatism in habituation. Secondly, in nonroutine situations, habits can no longer serve as guides for conducting a moral life. In addition, when the reinforcing sanctions are withdrawn, there is no guarantee that habits will remain operative in controlling behavior. As soon as one cannot rely anymore on the automatism of habitual dispositions, other considerations have to come in to guide the decisions and actions taken in the moral life. Thirdly, and connectedly, moral habits have an essential incompleteness about them in that they exclusively operate on extrinsic reasons. Highly specific virtues, basic rules, and role-responsibilities lack built-in reasons for action. Given that intrinsic reasons are absent, they strongly depend on contextual factors, such as the presence of reinforcing sanctions, for their continuation. Exactly these two latter points constitute the

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kernel of Kohlberg’s criticism that “a bag of virtues” is situation-specific, short-term, and reconvertible. This critique does, however, no damage to Peters’ strong claim that the learning of a code-encased morality by habituation is (indeed) not sufficient but only necessary for the development of the moral life.

The paradox of education Peters accepts Kohlberg’s view that the ultimate goal of moral education is the acquisition of a rational, principled morality, be it in a suitably supplemented form. Peters’ defense of the inevitability of immersion in moral content and habituation as the learning process for initiation into moral life raises, however, the question whether this necessity does not bring the development of morality ’s rational form in jeopardy. The difficulty can, more formally, be structured as follows: 1. Adolescents (an adults) do posses a rational, principled morality, that is, a morality based on the cognitive grasp of principles. 2. Therefore, children, during their development into adolescents, can acquire a rational, principled morality. 3. Given the facts of early childhood, young children cannot be taught principles by rational processes, that is, by means of conceptual instruction and reason-giving explanation. 4. Given these facts, they can only acquire a code-encased morality by nonrational processes, that is, by means of imitation and habituation. 5. How, then, is the acquisition of a rational, principled morality possible? Given (1) and (2), the acquisition of a rational, principled morality is possible, but given (3) and (4), such an acquisition is impossible.

In the light of Peters’ view of education as an initiation to become an educated person who rationally conducts his life, “. . . the paradox of moral education . . . is really the paradox of all education” (Peters 1973a, p. 33). Peters, who therefore, time and again, revisited this difficulty

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during the whole of his carrier, originally formulated this worry as the paradox and problem of moral education: given that it is desirable to develop people who conduct themselves rationally, intelligently and with a fair degree of spontaneity, the brute facts of child development reveal that at the most formative years of a child ’s development he is incapable of this form of life and impervious to the proper manner of passing it on. . . . Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that a rational code of behaviour . . . is beyond the grasp of young children, they can and must enter the palace of Reason through the courtyard of Habit and Tradition. . . . The problem of moral education is that of how the necessary habits of behaviour . . . can be acquired in a way which does not stultify the development of a rational code . . . at a later stage. (Peters 1963b, pp. 271–2) From this paradox, Kohlberg draws the conclusion that the acquisition of a code-encased morality by nonrational teachingprocesses is incompatible with the development of a rational, principled morality. Interactionistic moral development, proceeding for the most part endogenously, can only be assisted by cognitive stimulation and, accordingly, (principled) virtue cannot be taught. Yet, in defending the necessity of morality ’s content and habituation—children must enter the palace of Reason through the courtyard of Habit and Tradition— Peters makes also the weak claim that the interactionistic development of the form of morality is compatible with the behavioristic learning of the content of morality by means of habit-formation—they can enter the palace of Reason through the courtyard of Habit and Tradition. The problem of moral education is that of the apparent incompatibility between Reason—“a rationally held and intelligently applied moral code” (p. 268)—as the end, on the one hand, and Habit and Tradition as the necessary means, on the other: Is it the case that we have to use [such] irrelevant “extrinsic” techniques [Habit and Tradition] to get children going so that eventually they can take over for themselves, without needing any longer such extrinsic

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incentives or goads? Or does the use of such extrinsic techniques militate against intelligent, spontaneous, and intrinsically directed behaviour [Reason] later on? (p. 274). What is Peters’ solution to this problem? He agrees with point (3) that, given the brute developmental facts, the acquisition of a rational, principled morality cannot depend upon rational teaching-processes and cognitive learning-processes. Yet, Peters disagrees with point (4) in that he holds that not only a code-encased morality but also a rational, principled morality can be acquired by means of habituation. Peters’ resolution of the paradox of moral education, point (5), essentially consists, then, in distinguishing between two different applications of the concept of habit. Although the inculcation of moral habits is a necessary condition for acquiring a rational code of conduct, “the formation of some types of habit may not necessarily militate against adaptability and spontaneous enjoyment ” (p. 274)—habits usually associated with reason and intelligence.11 The type of habit we have in mind when we use phrases like “out of habit,” “through force of habit,” or “that is a matter of sheer habit ” is modeled after bodily reflexes, autoregulative processes, and other rigid stimulus-response mechanisms. On this conception— habits as “pretty stereotyped and narrowly conceived things, which are usually fired off by familiar stimuli” (p. 278)—habits evidently exclude intelligent adaptability and spontaneity as they resist rational molding. Yet, on Peters’ alternative conception, habits are tendencies to act which have a fair degree of plasticity or open-endedness, and whose ensuing actions are variable with the situation and adaptable to the purpose at hand. Habits, in this sense, are rationally permeated dispositions to act; in principle, they have reasons behind them and, although they usually operate automatically, we are at liberty to stop them. On this second conception, there is no problem in conceiving of habits as involving reasoning in addition to intelligence in the sense of adaptability and, consequently, as conducive to acquiring a rational code of conduct. Peters (1963b, p. 277) further articulates the contrast between intelligent habits with respect to moral rules and unintelligent ones as follows. An open-ended, moral habit is a tendency to act on a moral rule, whereas a “conformist ” moral habit is a capacity to act in accordance

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with a moral rule.12 This conformist capacity—“e.g. to inhibit actions of which authority figures disapprove, or to inhibit a narrowly conceived range of movements” (p. 277)—does not presuppose that the child who so acts grasps the moral rules and possesses the moral concepts under which its actions fall. It is, however, not necessarily the case that habits have to be formed in a conformist fashion by nonrational processes, like those of drill and coercion, backed up by reinforcing sanctions. They can be formed in an educational context that is receptive to reasons, transpires intelligence, and prefigures the later stage of a rational, principled morality, even though the child is not as yet fully capable of understanding the rationale of what is going on. In such a reason-friendly environment, educators can use, for example, a kind of elementary moral instruction, called “induction,” which involves explaining the child’s rule following behavior in the context to which the rule applies, drawing attention to similarities with other situations, and pointing out the consequences of the behavior (Peters 1973a, p. 65; 1978, p. 125). Hence, in learning to act on moral rules action patterns can be repeated in a nonarbitrary way, so that the resulting moral dispositions are forerunners of reason’s justificatory stance: “My argument is that learning habits in an intelligent way can be regarded as providing an appropriate basis, in the moral case, for the later stage when rules are followed or rejected because of the justification that they are seen to have or lack” (Peters 1971b, p. 258). So, it is by an appeal to the second type of habit as a tendency to act over which we have, to a considerable extent, rational control, that Peters closes the gap between the necessary formation of moral habits and the acquisition of a rational or authentic code of conduct: “For there is no necessary contradiction between the use of intelligence and the formation of habits” (Peters 1963b, p. 277).13

The postconventional level and personal autonomy Against the backdrop of his ethical pluralism, Peters develops a comprehensive approach to moral education, supplementing Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental psychology with a conception of teaching in

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the unrestricted sense, an affective aspect of moral development, and a contribution of a code-encased morality inculcated by habituation. In Kohlberg’s stage theory, moral development culminates in an autonomous stage at the postconventional level.14 In this highest stage, when the child acquires a full-fledged rational form of morality, moral principles are autonomously followed on the basis of their universal validity and applicability. Although Peters agrees with Kohlberg’s view that the culmination point of the moral development and education of the child is the rational autonomous person acting on a principled morality, his supplementary emphasis on such heteronomous elements as the affective aspect of moral education and the necessity of concrete moral content sits badly with the autonomous character of this highest point of moral development. If passions also are allowed to rule, then autonomy seems impossible; and, if conformism with a particular moral code and habituation are required, then indoctrination seems inevitable. At first sight, Peters’ comprehensive approach faces, therefore, the charges of inauthenticity and indoctrination (Peters 1973a, pp. 68–72; 1974a, pp. 566–7). To counter these charges, Peters gives first an analysis of the concept of autonomy and closely related concepts such as that of authenticity.

The concept of personal autonomy What is “autonomy ” in Peters’ philosophy of education? Peters formally classifies autonomy, together with other qualities of the will such as determination and courage, under the category of executive virtues.15 As a virtue of self-control, autonomy is typically exercised in the face of counter-inclinations such as ridicule, ostracism, and bribes. To introduce his more contentful characterization of autonomy, we turn to Joel Feinberg, who usefully distinguishes between four interconnected conceptions of autonomy: When applied to individuals the word “autonomy ” has four closely related meanings. It can refer either to the capacity to govern oneself, which of course is a matter of degree; or to the actual condition of

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self-government and its associated virtues; or to an ideal of character derived from that conception; . . . and the sense, applied mainly to political states, of de jure sovereignty and the right of self-determination. (Feinberg 1986, p. 28) Arguably, the conception of autonomy as a de facto condition is the one central core underlying applications of the autonomy concept in moral education. It only becomes clear that a person has a capacity for or a right to autonomy when it is clear that the person is in the condition of actually exercising such a capacity or right. Moreover, the content of autonomy as an (educational) ideal—something worthwhile to which persons can aspire—is directly derived from the characteristics of this actual condition of self-government. What is it, then, for a person to be in the actual psychological condition of autonomy? Peters focuses on the person as a chooser. According to him, autonomy is a component of the analysis of “freedom” in the wide sense. He writes: The lynch-pin of the analysis is the notion of man as a chooser, a rational being placed in what I have called the situation of practical reason. . . . In education, however, we are usually concerned with more than just preserving the capacity for choice; we are also concerned with the ideal of personal autonomy, which is a development of some of the potentialities inherent in the notion of man as a chooser. (Peters 1973b, pp. 16–17) As for the notion of personal autonomy, he explains: There is . . . a gradation of conditions implicit in the idea of autonomy. The first basic condition is that of authenticity, of adopting a code or way of life that is one’s own as distinct from one dictated by others. The second condition of rational reflection on rules is one espoused by most believers in autonomy. (p. 16) An autonomous choice is, at least, a free choice. The notion of man as a free chooser in the narrow sense is that of an agent without external and internal constraints. Neither chains nor compulsion hinders him.

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A free choice is, then, a choice over which the agent has control. A free agent is an agent who has options open to him and who controls his actions by having control over his will. However, “[t]o be a chooser is not enough for autonomy,” Benn (1976, p. 123) remarks, “for a competent chooser may still be a slave to convention, choosing by standards he has accepted quite uncritically from his milieu.” For that reason, the “autonomous man” is not only a free chooser but also an agent who possesses an authentic code of conduct in the light of which he reflectively makes rational choices. Peters details his authenticity-condition of autonomy further: Etymologically, “autonomy ” suggests that a person accepts or makes rules for himself. . . . It denies that the individual’s code of conduct is simply one that he has picked up from others or adopted in any second-hand way. The rules which he lives by are not just those that are laid down by custom or authority. . . . this is represented as what the individual really wants as distinct from what conformity dictates. (Peters 1973b, p. 15) Peters’ second condition of autonomy—associated with assessment and criticism—is a rationality-condition: “ The individual is conceived of as being aware of rules as alterable conventions which structure his social life. He subjects them to reflection and criticism in the light of principles and gradually emerges with his own code of conduct ” (pp. 15–16). This condition forges a connection between autonomy, on the one hand, and deliberative reflection and critical thinking, on the other. According to Peters, then, a person’s choices are in the de facto condition of autonomy when they fulfill the following requirements.16 A choice of an agent is autonomous, if and only if, 1. the choice is under his control, 2. it is authentic, and 3. he has rationally reflected upon (the rules behind) it. At the postconventional level, the child has the capacity to make choices that fulfill these requirements. Although the exercising of this capacity is a matter of degree, there is some minimal threshold level below which a

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person would fail to qualify as a genuine autonomous chooser. Arguably, Peters’ conception of an autonomous chooser also expresses Kohlberg’s idea of a child’s (or adult ’s) rational form of thought operating with a principled morality.

The educational ideal of autonomy Armed with this analysis of autonomy, Peters straightforwardly counters the allegations of second-handedness and indoctrination. From the moment onward, and as long as the child can adopt a rational authentic attitude toward a specific moral code, even if it consists of an evaluative scheme rooted in tradition and habituation, the child ’s choices and ensuing actions deriving from that code are autonomous. As remarked earlier, acting on a moral rule can be learned in an educational context that is receptive to reasons and that prefigures the later stage of autonomy, although the child lacks as yet the justifying reasons for its conduct. In a reason-friendly environment, authority can be exercised without being authoritarian. Habituation does not, in and of itself, constitute indoctrination. There is a big difference between authoritarian indoctrination and authoritative education. In the first process, that of indoctrination, moral rules are inculcated in such a way that the child is subsequently never encouraged to demand reasons and justification for them, and that, as a consequence, his critical capacity might not ever develop and be permanently suppressed. In the second, educational process, moral rules are inculcated with an eye to actualize the sooner the better the child ’s capacity for critical reflection so that the child at the earliest possible time can start with questioning rules and demanding reasons for them. Stimulating the child to focus upon the validity of the rules is something completely different from preventing the child to inquire into the rationale, if any, behind a fixed set of rules. Moreover, as we will see in the next chapter, the rational passions, lying behind authenticity and reasoning, also stimulate the transition to and maintenance of the autonomous stage. So, as long as a codeencased morality, specifying concrete moral rules, remains under the child ’s (or adult ’s) own rational control, or is instilled in such a way

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as to bring it under such control as soon as possible, indoctrination is warded off and autonomy is not jeopardized.17 To underscore the plausibility and pertinence of his countercharge against the allegation of inauthenticity, Peters observes that: . . . the autonomous man is not a person who operates only at the level of a principled morality. . . . He has, . . ., a rational attitude both to tradition and to authority. My guess is, however, that much of the conduct of autonomous people is governed by a secondlevel [conventional] type of morality. . . . they carry with them a solid precipitate from the conventional stage of morality whose motivation sustains the more mundane levels of their conduct. (Peters 1973b, p. 26) Autonomy is, according to Peters, not an absolute stronghold, even when the child has reached the autonomous stage at the postconventional level. Autonomy is relative not only with regard to a code-encased morality but also with regard to worthwhile activities. As explained in Chapters 3 and 5, autonomy as an ideal of character cannot be realized unless the child has first been initiated into the framework of worthwhile activities, which constitutes our shared inheritance. Autonomous choice only makes sense on the condition that a perspective on the human condition, canonically enshrined in the humanities, informs it. Authenticity is unintelligible except against a background of “good” and “desirable” activities on the basis of which individuals can imaginatively develop themselves: “In the development of autonomy, first-hand experiment is essential. But it must be informed and sensitized by initiation into those imaginative explorations which are part of our cultural heritage as civilized men” (Peters 1973a, p. 54). We remarked in the previous chapter that Peters, as a moderate liberal, keeps at bay extreme and less intelligible versions of individualism. Accordingly, and in line with the above, his conception of autonomy can never be an absolute one, not even at the postconventional level. How exactly does Peters conceive of autonomy then? He elucidates: The liberal ideal of autonomy is to be understood in contrast to unthinking conformity and rigid adherence to dogma. It does not

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demand making explicit everything which has been picked up from various sources and subjecting it all to constant criticism. What it does require is a willingness to learn and to revise opinions and assumptions when confronted with situations that challenge them. (Peters 1977a, p. 64) There are three important features that further characterize this moderate conception of autonomy. First, autonomy is an attitude of mind rather than an achieved state of mind. We cannot but take a great deal of beliefs and (moral) action-patterns on trust. Yet, we can take a stance toward these heteronomously acquired elements. We cannot and need not bring everything to light for critical scrutiny, and so a lot remains in the dark. Autonomy is, therefore, not a matter of allor-nothing, but one of more-or-less or degree. Secondly, autonomy as “approaching what one is told critically and attempting to organize and synthesize what one hears or reads in one’s own way ” (Peters 1977b, p. 65) is an attitude between the two extremes of slavishly reproducing authorities and originally creating oneself. The properties of being autonomous, being critical, being authentic, and being imaginative “are to be distinguished from more mundane qualities such as being well informed and showing understanding on the one hand and more exalted qualities such as being original, creative, and inventive on the other” (Peters 1977a, p. 66). Autonomy reaches beyond the exemplification of the former qualities but does not require that of the latter ones. Thirdly, and connectedly, although nobody has expert knowledge in all domains, after being sufficiently initiated into the human heritage, one does not have to rely on specialists and authorities in the moral and existential domains to work out some view of one’s own. At least with regard to the human condition and life’s predicaments, basic features of any moral life, one can develop an autonomous perspective.

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Chapter 7

Educating the Emotions and the Life of Reason

Introduction In the preceding chapter, we pointed out that Peters supplements Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental psychology with an affective aspect. Both reason and compassion, rational principles as well as the moral sentiments, belong to the form of morality, and both need to be taken care of in an adequate theory of moral education and development. According to Peters, the education of the passions or emotions is, therefore, part and parcel of moral education. At first glance, it is surprising that Peters, in the light of his emphasis on moral education as an initiation into a rational, principled morality, addresses the education of the emotions as a separate category. Yet, his comprehensive approach to moral education forces him to take a closer look at the role of the passions and the relationship between the cognitive and affective aspects of moral development. Moreover, as a psychologist, Peters always had a special interest in the concept of emotion in the context of his purposive, rule-following model of action-explanation and theory of motivation. Against the commonly accepted antithesis between reason and passion, Peters defends an integrative view. According to him, given the correct view on human nature, the life of reason is not opposed to the life of passion. In his opinion, reason can be passionate and the emotions can be reasonable. As a result, his integrative view of reason and passion, together with his comprehensive approach to moral education, form the basis for a rich and multidimensional conception of education and its aims as such. It eventually transpires that Peters envisions a still more broader, “synthetic” view, according to which education for life is to be

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identified with educating for the life of reason in the context of the human condition. Before exploring Peters’ view on the relation between rationality and the emotions, we take a look at what Peters believes emotions are and how they are educable. We also evaluate some criticisms of Peters’ theory of the nature of and education of the emotions.

The nature of the emotions What is an emotion? This is, of course, a large topic on its own in the philosophy of mind (Goldie 2009; de Sousa 2010). We limit ourselves to some background information that is necessary in order to understand Peters’ view on the nature of the emotions. In general, mental states and events are categorized into two categories: sensations and propositional attitudes. Sensations, like visual impressions and pains, are conscious mental happenings, while propositional attitudes, like beliefs and desires, are intentional mental dispositions. Sensations belong to the sensory part, and propositional attitudes to the cognitive part of the mind. In contrast to sensations, propositional attitudes are mental states directed to an intentional object. These cognitive states exhibit the property of intentionality (or aboutness). Correspondingly, the linguistic expression of a propositional attitude consists of two parts: an attitudinal part and a propositional one. Take, for example, Peter’s belief about the rain and its expression in the sentence “Peter believes that it rains.” The attitudinal part “Peter believes” expresses Peter’s mental attitude of believing; and the propositional that-clause “that it rains” expresses the intentional object of Peter’s believing—the rain upon which Peter’s belief is directed. Emotions are hybrid mental phenomena: they are partly like sensations, partly like propositional attitudes. Emotions, such as “ being angry about unfair treatment ” and “being proud of my achievement,” have thus two components: feeling and judgment. A feeling is a kind of sensation with a specific, experienced or felt quality; and a judgment is a kind of propositional attitude with a certain, intentional object or content. The object of an emotion might not be its cause, as when the cause of my being angry about my wife’s negligence might be too little

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sleep and too much coffee. Different views on the nature of emotions put emphasis on either of these components or reduce emotions to one or the other. David Hume (1739–1740), for example, assimilates emotions to feelings, whereas Robert Solomon (1973) identifies them with judgments.

Peters’ appraisal view Following the proposals of Errol Bedford and Magda Arnold, Peters (1962a) argues against the prevailing assumption that emotions are nothing but feelings, and for the thesis that emotions essentially involve appraisals, whether or not they also involve feelings. Appraisals are a particular class of cognitions: they are evaluative judgments. When we commonly ascribe the different emotions to each other and ourselves, ascribing appraisals is a logically necessary (but not sufficient) condition for ascribing emotions: If we ask ourselves what we might naturally call “emotions” we would give quite a long list which would include fear, anger, sorrow, grief, envy, jealousy, pity, remorse, guilt, shame, pride, wonder and the like. What sort of criterion underlies this selection? Surely, the connection between emotions and the class of cognitions that are conveniently called “appraisals.” These are constituted by seeing situations under aspects which are agreeable or disagreeable, beneficial or harmful in a variety of dimensions. (Peters 1970a, p. 175) According to Peters, appraisals or evaluative judgments constitute the cognitive core of the emotions. That is to say, emotions essentially involve seeing or judging situations or objects as “good” (agreeable, beneficial), or as “bad” (disagreeable, harmful). Fear, for example, is conceptually connected with seeing a situation as threatening; anger with seeing a situation as thwarting; pride with a pleasurable judgment that something is mine (or that I have had a hand in bringing it about); envy with a painful judgment that someone possesses what we want. Different appraisals are constitutive of the different emotions. Because emotions comprise evaluative judgments, they presuppose beliefs about

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what is good and bad, and thus a conceptual scheme necessary for one to coherently articulate such beliefs. In the light of the priority of this cognitive dimension, emotions cannot be reduced to feelings, which are, like sensations, impervious to either reason or will. Also, because of this conceptual presupposition, most emotions, such as pride, shame, regret, and grief, can only be experienced by human beings and not by animals. Peters’ own theory of the emotions consists of two main tenets: (1) the concept of emotion falls under the category of passivity, and (2) there is a conceptual connection between emotion and wish. As a consequence, he denies that there exists a conceptual relationship between emotion and action and also denies that there is one between emotion and want or desire. Given that “the primitive sign of wanting is trying to get,” as Elizabeth Anscombe (1957, p. 68) claims, these two denials are internally connected. If one desires something, then one takes the necessary action to get it or at least to try to get it. What is distinctive about fear, jealousy, pride, etc., as emotions has, according to Peters, nothing to do with wanting and activity but has everything to do with wishing and passive phenomena. Peters takes his first tenet to be a point of ordinary language use: The term “emotion” . . . is typically used in ordinary language to pick out our passivity. We speak of judgements being disturbed, warped, heightened, sharpened and clouded by emotions, of people being in command or not being properly in control of their emotions, being emotionally perturbed, upset, involved, excited and exhausted. In a similar vein we speak of emotional states, upheavals, outbursts and reactions. The suggestion in such cases is that something comes over people or happens to them, when they consider a situation in a certain light, when they appraise it in the dimension suggested by terms such as jealousy, envy and fear. (Peters 1970a, p. 178; our italics) By relying on this piece of common-sense knowledge, Peters goes against philosophers, like Gilbert Ryle (1949, chap. 5), who classify emotions in the same general family as wanting and motives, as well as against psychologists, like the behaviorists, who establish a necessary

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connection between emotions and behavior or tendencies to act. He is not denying that our behavior can be motivated by anger, or that we can act out of fear as well as in fear. Acting out of fear is a motivated action, while acting in fear is an emotional (re)action. What he is denying is not only that the distinctive concept of emotion and the distinctive concept of motive (or motivated behavior) can be lumped together, but also that the terms “emotion” and “motive” refer to substantially different mental states. These denials are not in conflict with each other. In his theory, Peters starts from the common element between emotion and motive and then gives a functional definition of how they conceptually differ. The same mental state, namely an act of appraisal of a situation, can be related to two different frameworks or contexts, those of passivity and activity. If the judgmental state functions in the context of passively being affected or acted on, then we apply the concept of emotion. Alternatively, if it functions in the context of actively doing something, then we apply the concept of motive. In the case that, for instance, someone acts in anger who is also acting out of love, emotion and motive clearly come apart. But in other cases, for example, when someone acts in fear and out of fear, the appraisal of the situation as dangerous functions both as an emotion and as a motive at the same time. Although they might contingently function together, emotion and motive are conceptually distinct and the distinctiveness of emotion lies in its passive character. Peters takes his second tenet to be a point suggested by Sigmund Freud. It is noteworthy that Peters had a deep interest in Freud’s theory during the whole of his career.1 It is a sign of his open-mindedness that he drew not only on experimental psychology but also on psychoanalysis. According to Peters, undergoing emotions is internally connected with wishing rather than with wanting. Both are teleological concepts, but the concept of wish is the weaker one. The stronger concept of want (or desire) is conceptually connected with the concept of action, which Peters (1958, chap. 1) analyzes in terms of his purposive, rule-following model. In contrast to the desired end of action, the end wished for is much less determinately conceived. Wants are directed to determinate, intelligible goals pursued and eventually realized by appropriate action, whereas wishes are (only) directed to indeterminately conceived ends with no implication as to their intelligibility or practicality.

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Emotion-appraisals, that is, appraisals of situations functioning in the context of passivity, typically have some aspects of this indeterminate character of wishes. First, emotion-appraisals often include the optative mood of wishes—“would that X were the case”—as when an angry man thinks “would that she were dead ” and a grieving women “would that he were alive.” Secondly, emotion-appraisals characteristically are of an intuitive and undiscriminating, even blind and wild kind. Emotion-appraisals are “urgent ” or “hasty ” judgments in response to difficult situations (Solomon 1973, pp. 264–5). If we consider Othello’s appraisals of his wife’s, Desdemona’s, relationship with Cassio as emotions, thus focusing on the jealous moor’s passivity, then his appraisals appear as (too) immediate and indiscriminate, on the verge of irrationality. In contrast, motive-appraisals, that is, appraisals of situations functioning in the context of activity, are “cool” judgments, which give rise to mental states with determinate goals, as when Iago’s calculations lead to wants or desires issuing in rational deliberate action of a manipulative type. Peters’ denial of a conceptual connection between, on the one hand, emotions and on the other, bodily movements and actions (and related mental states motivating behavior, such as wants) is not, however, a denial of contingent or de facto connections between them (Peters 1962a, pp. 121–2; 1970a, pp. 179–80). Emotion-appraisals are biologically accompanied by bodily changes in the autonomic nervous system (metaphorically spoken of as, for instance, “boiling and fuming” with anger and “swelling and glowing” with pride) and the motor system (“knees knocking” with fear). These involuntary happenings should be distinguished from what we call “emotional reactions,” such as when a person lashes out in anger or runs off in fear. These reactions belong to an intermediary class between reactions to stimuli (or impulsive behavior) and actions in a full-blown sense. On the one hand, since emotional reactions include emotion-appraisals, they have a cognitive core that is absent in reactions to stimuli, such as jumping when one receives an electric shock. On the other, as they are based on hasty emotionappraisals that lack clear means-end structures, emotional reactions are not purposive, rule-following actions. In cases where the appraisals of the situation function both as emotions and as motives at the same time—as, for instance, when

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we act in fear as well as out of fear—emotions are contingently either disrupting or facilitating motor performances, depending on their strength. Too much fear paralyzes, whereas a certain amount of fear accelerates the flight. In general, actions done out of a variety of motives can be contingently related to emotions, which have the tendency to disrupt, facilitate, heighten, or intensify these actions. In some cases, the connection between emotion-appraisals and action is still even weaker. In these cases, although there is no contingent tendency to specific bodily movements or no contingent influence on determined actions, the emotions express themselves in symbolic behavior. A wife, grieving for her dead husband, for example, may express her feelings in some kind of mourning actions. These expressions of emotions in some sort of ritualistic actions, which often discharge the pertinent emotions, are culture relative.

The education of the emotions How are emotions educable? This question presupposes another: Are they educable? If emotions were feelings, like sensations impervious to either will or reason, then they would be uneducable. If emotions were simply innate reactions, then they also would be uneducable. It is because emotions are basically, according to Peters, forms of cognition that he thinks that “there is any amount of scope for educating the emotions” (Peters 1970a, p. 175). Emotion-appraisals can thus be influenced by reason and will.2 The education of the emotions is an essential part of moral education: “Most emotions and motives are, as a matter of fact, regarded also as virtues and vices—for instance, envy, benevolence, lust, pity ” (Peters 1970a, p. 182). Educating the emotions is normative not only because most emotions are commonly regarded as virtues and vices, but also because education itself is a normative enterprise. Emotional education is, like all other education, according to Peters, an initiation of children into a worthwhile form of life, in which knowledge and understanding play an important part. Accordingly, Peters also assumes the value of truth, without which the central part played by knowledge and understanding would be unintelligible, in educating the emotions.3

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From this standpoint, Peters approaches the education of the emotions normatively by asking which ones belong to a worthwhile form of life. Which emotions are worthwhile or appropriate in the light of a concern for truth and the ideal of reasonableness? On this view, educating the emotions amounts to the fostering of appropriate or “good” emotions and the eradication of inappropriate or “bad” ones. That is why Peters contrasts positive “self-transcending” emotions with negative “selfreferential” ones, and why he coins the term “rational passions.” We come back to these types of emotions below. Before exploring Peters’ assumptions about the relation between reason and passion further, we take a look at the task of educating the emotions as one of rationalizing and moralizing emotion-appraisals. Corresponding to his view on the nature of the emotions, Peters discerns two interconnected aspects of the task of educating the emotions: (1) the development of appropriate emotion-appraisals and (2) the control and canalization of their passivity.

Developing appropriate emotion-appraisals With regard to the first aspect, emotion-appraisals can be appropriate in two ways, namely rationally and morally. In the first instance, rational criticism can have an impact on emotional education. This is so because emotions essentially involve appraisals, which as cognitive judgments presuppose (empirical) beliefs. Educating the emotions partly consists then in getting these beliefs right: “An obvious element . . . in the education of the emotions is the attempt to ensure that people’s appraisals are not based on false beliefs” (Peters 1970a, p. 184). Our beliefs tend to follow the lines of our moods and to be founded on hasty judgments. Emotion-appraisals based on these beliefs are liable to be mistaken: we might get the facts wrong and misinterpret the situation accordingly. Othello’s jealous appraisals of Desdemona’s relationship with Cassio, for instance, are based on false beliefs, which are induced by Iago’s manipulations. Since we do not have a natural disposition to base our appraisals on well-grounded beliefs, “one of the main tasks of the education of the emotions,” according to Peters, “must therefore consist in fostering the capacity for objectivity ” (Peters 1970a, p. 185).

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For the accomplishment of this task, educators need the assistance of a distinctive type of passions that are indispensable to the use of reason. Reason cannot develop unless it is supported by various passions, which Peters calls the “rational passions.” These passions not only give structure to theoretical enquiries, but also guide practical activities, judgments, and appraisals, at least in so far as they are conducted rationally. In line with his overall educational approach, Peters (1971a, p. 170; our italics) claims that “[t]he obvious overriding [passion] is the concern about truth, without which reasoning in general would be unintelligible.” This concern for truth, and its further ramifications such as caring about getting the facts right, abhorring arbitrariness, and valuing sincerity, crucially assists the development of the capacity for objectivity in the education of the emotions. According to Peters, then, not only can reason influence passion but passion must also influence reason. In the second instance, moral criticism can have an impact on emotional education. Emotion-appraisals are also evaluated from the standpoint of a moral position. To criticize an emotion as unreasonable or irrational because it is based on false beliefs is different from condemning it because it is vicious or immoral.4 From the moral standpoint, inappropriate emotion-appraisals exhibit a lack of concern for other people and an undue preoccupation with the self. Against the backdrop of this normative position, Peters makes a distinction between “self-referential” emotions and “self-transcending” ones. To the first, negative class belong, among others, vanity, lust, jealousy, envy, hatred, and ambition; to the second, positive one love, respect for others, and the sense of justice. Educating the emotions partly consists then in eradicating the “ bad” emotions and promoting the “good” ones. Our emotion-appraisals tend to be self-referential: blinded by our egocentric prejudices, we tend to misperceive the situation accordingly. We are, even in our own case, often victims of insincerity, and we do regularly deceive ourselves. Since we do not have a natural disposition to fully recognize our own and other people’s emotional states, the development of the imaginative ability to enter into “one’s own and other people’s more recondite emotions, for which we use the term ‘insight,’ ” is therefore, according to Peters, “of crucial importance in the education of emotions” (Peters 1970a, p. 178).

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Although the empirical details require further investigation, this capacity for imagination and insight most likely can be cultivated by means of reading literature and playing drama. Precisely because emotionappraisals as cognitive judgments presuppose conceptual and linguistic resources, one’s capacity for making appropriate emotion-appraisals can be extended and enhanced by engaging with the imaginative art of great literature and drama. In line with his overall educational approach, the task of fostering an imaginative ability for recognizing other people’s and one’s own emotions, to support the inculcation of self-transcending emotions in the education of the emotions, is part of the general undertaking to transcend the here and now of the ego in order to enter into the realm of reason’s universality. A criterion of being educated emotionally is, correspondingly, that one can make, out of respect for others, insightful emotion-appraisals of their situation and that one can truthfully and sincerely appraise one’s own situation.

Controlling emotional passivity The second aspect of the task of educating the emotions, the control and canalization of their passivity, is complementary to the first. The rationalization and moralization of emotion-appraisals are assisted by the management of emotional passivity, because it is by controlling and canalizing intuitive, hasty emotion-appraisals that room will be made for appropriately appraising the situation as agreeable or disagreeable. Such appraisals, free from distortion, are then implicated in the “good” emotions. Why do we need to control and canalize emotional passivity? Emotion-appraisals are contingently connected not only with bodily movements and actions but also with perception, memory, and other judgments. Since emotion-appraisals, as intuitive, hasty responses to difficult situations, are more “primitive,” “wild” judgments, they tend to cloud the perception of the relevant features of the situations and to warp the formation of other (rational) judgments. Emotion-appraisals distort not only these other judgments but also the judgments involved in (other) emotion-appraisals themselves. In that sense, emotion-appraisals countervail against their own rationalization and moralization, and so

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some of them should be controlled and canalized or channeled. Peters’ assumption is that emotion-appraisals which are inappropriate in one way or another should be eradicated and be replaced by rationally or morally appropriate ones, or at least that the “ bad” emotions should be neutralized. Apart from noneducational techniques, such as conditioning and administering drugs, Peters mentions the technique of re-education in the domain of the emotions, modeled after Freud’s psychoanalytic technique for treating neurotic behavior. This technique of re-education consists in “ bringing a person to have some kind of insight into the sources of his irrationalities” (Peters 1970a, p. 188). Some emotionappraisals are based on false beliefs and by getting the person to understand and to acknowledge this condition his self-deception might be “cured.” However, much more important than this rational method is the method of controlling an emotion by another emotion and the development of a stable sensibility. Peters invokes the “self-transcending” emotions to counteract the ever-present influence of the “selfreferential” ones. “ To become effective,” these positive emotions—love, respect for others, the sense of justice, and the rational passions—“must become stabilised in sentiments, . . . the term ‘sentiment ’ indicating a settled disposition to make appraisals of a certain sort ” (Peters 1970a, p. 189). The implantation and further development of such a sensibility, a disposition to make “reasonable” evaluative judgments that are involved in the emotions, are fundamental components of educating the emotions. The development of a stable sensibility is intimately connected with the development of a general moral disposition (or habit) to appropriately appraise situations and act accordingly. To make this connection, Peters applies his overall view on the importance of habituation in moral development, as detailed in the preceding chapter, to the specific issue of educating the emotions. What is the right strategy for building a habitual emotional sensibility? We remarked that most emotions are regarded also as either virtues or vices. Peters makes use of the contingent connection between emotions and wishes on the one hand and motives and desires on the other to associate emotion with virtuous (and vicious) action. By relying on appropriate action patterns and their corresponding motive-appraisals, one can try to control the passivity

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of emotion-appraisals and instill appropriate emotional dispositions: “Habituation is important both in familiarizing children with the features of such situations and in developing the relevant action patterns that will enable them to deal practically with the emotions that may be aroused instead of being overcome by them” (Peters 1971b, p. 260). As a result, for example, “a man who is subject to fear will have a settled disposition to act in an appropriate way. His chance of being overcome by passive phenomena is thereby lessened” (Peters 1970a, p. 189). By letting children go through the motions externally, educators try to internally induce associated appropriate appraisals that can function as either motives or emotions. This direction from action to emotion can also be reversed into a direction from emotion to action. Because appraisals can function in the context of passivity as well as that of activity, one can conversely try to transform a vague wish, tied to an appropriate emotion-appraisal, into a determinate want, joined with a motive-appraisal, and thereby transforming emotion into appropriate action. Positive emotionappraisals, involved, for instance, in benevolence and respect for others, should not stay idle as “good intentions” but find their way into concrete action. To be effective, emotion-appraisals should therefore also function as motives for doing whatever is appropriate. Peters’ two-way technique of transforming emotion into action and action into emotion is, of course, Aristotelian: “states of character [emotional dispositions] arise out of like activities” (Aristotle 2009, 1103b, 22).5 Of crucial educational importance is the building of “good” emotional dispositions by means of the routines of appropriate action patterns. During this habituation process, children have to internalize the appraisals implicated in the positive, self-transcending emotions. Such an internalization process can take place, because, as indicated in the preceding chapter, some habits are rationally permeated dispositions that are formed in a reason-friendly educational environment. Consequently, children should be taught not only the pertinent action pattern and the appropriate appraisal as such but also the reason why a situation is judged as beneficial or harmful, as “good” or “ bad.” Educating the emotions is not just controlling “brutal” passivity but more importantly constituting a positive sensibility and corresponding dispositional action patterns. Emotional education is in that sense part and parcel of moral

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education: “ The development of such concrete first-hand appraisals, and linking them by on-the-spot training with patterns of action is one of the most important tasks of moral education” (Peters 1970a, p. 190). Apart from the chief strategy of using habituation in order to get control over the emotions in educating them, Peters also mentions the expression of the emotions as a method to canalize their passivity. We already remarked that emotions come to the surface in bodily movements and can express themselves in symbolic behavior. These contingent connections can also be exploited in the education of the emotions. The symbolization of the emotions offers children an imaginative way to cope with their emotions without the need to act them out: “ The control and canalisation of emotions through speech and symbolic gesture is an extremely important intermediary in the sphere of emotion, which lies between extreme forms of passivity and appropriate action” (Peters 1970a, p. 190). As civilized people, we can rely on the mechanism of “sublimation” to deal with too extreme emotional passivity in situations where direct emotional responses would be socially disruptive. Art and etiquette protect us from emotional barbarism. Whether (Western) culture is overprotecting us, or whether it would not be better to publicly display even “violent passions,” is a matter for further speculation on which Peters does not take a definitive standpoint.

The appraisal view: Some criticisms Peters’ theory of the nature and the education of the emotions—his “appraisal” view, for short—is based on two premises: one about the nature of the emotions, the other about the nature of education. Additionally, it rests on an important background assumption about human nature. Peters’ appraisal view has been attacked on all three fronts. Although the topic is vast, complicated, and sometimes technical, we will briefly evaluate some of these criticisms. On Peters’ appraisal view, emotions are forms of cognition. In opposition, Mary Warnock (1986) defends an alternative, “feeling” view, according to which emotions are to be classified as inner experiences with a certain felt quality. The center of educating the emotions becomes, correspondingly, learning children how they ought to feel by teaching

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them how to behave. Such an education of the feelings might involve a certain degree of pretence in that children are educated to show feelings they do not (as yet) have and, conversely, to conceal feelings they do have. However, aside from the dangers of insincerity and sentimentality with this alternative view, there is a great deal of controversy as to whether emotions are educable at all if they are conceived as inner feelings. As remarked earlier, if emotions were feelings, like sensations impervious to either will or reason, they would be uneducable. So, arguably, on the nature of the emotions, Peters holds the superior view: “ We talk more naturally of ‘educating the emotions,’ than we do of training them. This is surely because the distinct emotions are differentiated by their cognitive core, by the different beliefs that go with them” (Peters 1963a, p. 98). On Peters’ appraisal view, emotions are passive states of mind. Emotions are contrasted with and distinguished from motives, which are active states of mind in that they are conceptually connected to actions and their explanation. John White takes issue with this conception of the emotions: “Emotions and motives do not fall under two mutually exclusive categories—passivity and activity—so that emotions cannot be motives and vice-versa. On the alternative account we are considering, emotions can be and often are motives” (White 1984, p. 198). As a consequence of Peters’ sharp emotion-motivation distinction and his specific conception of education as essentially involving the development of knowledge and understanding—defined by the pursuit of truth and the demands of reason—emotions, as Peters conceives of them, can have hardly any positive role in education. Emotions cannot have an active, that is, motivating role in the formation of children’s character. Educating the emotions basically consists then in bringing such passive states of mind under the sway of truth and reason, so as to prevent emotions from interfering with the rational development of children. Notwithstanding the technicality of the issue, at least the following observations are in order. First, the meaning of Peters’ conception of motivation has shifted at some point in his writings on philosophical psychology. In earlier writings, the term “motive” marks off a certain sort of reason in a specific type of context. Motives are reasons given, not when actions are descriptively explained, but when they are held up for normative assessment and where there is a breakdown in expectations about

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conventional action patterns (Peters 1958, pp. 27–38). In later writings, however, the term “motive” comes on a par with the explanatory terms “want ” and “desire”; it then just means a state of mind with a built-in reason of action as a factor in action explanation. Sometimes, Peters even uses the term “motive” to refer to the emotions, especially the selftranscending emotions such as benevolence and respect (Peters 1970b, p. 69; 1973a, p. 17). Secondly, although Peters emphasizes the passive character of the emotions, he leaves indirectly room for their motivational force. One can, at the same time, for example, act in fear (fear as an emotion) and act out of fear (fear as a motive). This is possible because one and the same appraisal—that the present situation is dangerous—can function as an emotion-appraisal in the context of passivity and as a motiveappraisal in the context of activity (Peters 1971a, p. 157). By means of this common element, passive emotions can thus be transformed in active motives. Although emotions are not motives, they can be translated in them. Thirdly, as White (1984, p. 206) also admits, some emotions have in Peters’ theory a distinctively positive role to play in education. Not only the self-transcending emotions but also the “rational passions,” which are indispensable to the use of reason, belong to this class of emotions. We elaborate this point further below. As to the nature of education, White criticizes Peters’ conception of education as “an initiation into the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake” (1984, pp. 197–8) for being too narrow and contrasts it with his own broader, Aristotelian conception of education as the formation of character, that is, “the shaping of one’s whole repertoire of emotions to form the virtues and attachments which make up one’s character” (p. 207). In addition, he alleges that Peters’ conceptual framework is incapable of giving the concepts of virtue, attachment, and character their due places. However, in view of Peters’ ethical pluralism and his comprehensive approach to moral education, detailed in the preceding chapter, it is fair to say that Peters’ conception of education, at least as expounded in his later writings, is not limited to the cognitive aspect and in actual fact incorporates, as our discussion of Elliott ’s critique of Peters in Chapter 3 also shows, substantial Aristotelian elements. Moreover, on a broad conception of character, Peters’ conception of education

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does include not only initiation into the pursuit of truth but also the formation of character (Peters 1962b). Character-formation consists in the development of virtues and attachments. Virtues or character-traits are personalized principles and rules, while attachments, although not explicitly mentioned by Peters, can be construed as commitments to worthwhile activities. Like all other views on the nature and the education of the emotions, Peters’ appraisal view is built upon a theory of human nature. White identifies this underlying theory as Kantian. He singles out two main tenets. One tenet is a bifurcation of human nature: Peters’ attitude towards the emotions is irresistibly reminiscent of Kant. He shares the views that human beings ought to realise their rational natures and that they are often impeded in this task by nonrational influences, their passions and inclinations. Kant ’s rationale for his view depends on his “two-world” view of man as consisting of a noumenal self and a phenomenal self. Peters does not use this distinction, but for him there is still something of a bifurcation in our nature: on the one hand the area of convention and reason, and on the other that of emotions and motives. Generally speaking, as with Kant, he holds that it is the job of the first part of our nature to keep the second part from sullying it or diverting it from its proper tasks. (White 1984, pp. 205–6; our italics) The other tenet is the concept of rationality: As with Kant, problems arise over the most central concept of Peters’ philosophical psychology and ethics, the concept of rationality. Acting rationally is not to be understood in terms of satisfying one’s wants: Peters’ rich concept of wanting . . . incorporates within it the idea of having reasons for acting. Detached from desire, the concept of reason in both Kant and Peters becomes obscure, the transcendental arguments of Ethics and Education leaving the reader as unenlightened as Kant ’s delineation of the noumenal self in the Critique of Practical Reason and the Groundwork. (White 1984, p. 208; first italics ours)

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White offers an interesting description of Peters’ background assumptions about human nature. But are these tenets in themselves really objectionable? Are they indefensible? Yet, more important for our purposes are the following questions. Does Peters really subscribe to these two tenets? Is Peters really a Kantian? In the following section, we throw some doubt on the standard interpretation—and perhaps even on Peters’ self-interpretation—of Peters as a Kantian philosopher. To that end, we explore his integrative view on rationality and its relation to the emotions.

The integrative view: Reason and passion As to the relation between reason and passion, two opposite views can be discerned in the history of philosophy. According to the “dominating reason” view, reason, as the essence of human nature, dominates and ought to dominate passion, whereas according to the “ruling passions” view, conversely, the passions rule the waves of life, inclusively the life of reason. In modern philosophy, the first view is typically exemplified by the practical philosophy of Kant, while the second by that of Hume, who famously claims that “[r]eason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (Hume 1739–1740, p. 415).6 Peters does not side with either view and criticizes an assumption they both have in common: the antithesis between reason and passion. As against this common assumption, he defends the integrative view that reason and passion not only mutually influence each other but also intrinsically form a partnership.

Rational passions As a first step toward this reconciliation of rationality with the emotions, he asks whether the traditional dichotomy between emotions as passive states of mind and cognitive mental states is in any way necessary? Would it, always and everywhere, be unreasonable

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to be overcome with passion? Would it, necessarily, be irrational to be subject to strong emotions? In contrast to the terms “stupid ” and “dumb,” the use of the terms “ irrational” and “ unreasonable” presupposes a background of reasoning. We do not assume, for example, that nonhuman, “dumb” animals reason, although they might be intelligent. According to Peters (Peters 1971a, p. 159), we speak of irrational behavior in cases where there is an obvious deviation from the purposive, rule-following model of action-rationalization, while we speak of unreasonable behavior in cases where there plainly are reasons for action but they are very weak and not made objective by the considerations of other people. Given this terminology and the fact that in ordinary language the term “passion” suggests some kind of turbulence or passivity, do the emotions necessarily exclude rationality? Although Peters admits, very plausibly, that some emotions tend to be irrational or unreasonable, he claims that in general they do not necessarily exclude rationality and that we can speak of (at least some of ) them as reasonable and perhaps even rational: . . . there is the obvious point that what we call emotions are good examples of passive states; but we can speak of them as being both unreasonable and irrational. This suggests that, on certain occasions, we can at least speak of them as reasonable, if not as rational. . . . It does not seem, therefore, that the passive states, which we call emotions, are necessarily either irrational or unreasonable. Nevertheless there is a tendency for them to be. (Peters 1971a, pp. 160–1) Some emotions, such as indignation and jealousy, might be perfectly reasonable in that they can be based on true beliefs about and appropriate appraisals of the pertinent situation. Yet, the rationality of these emotions still depends upon standards of appropriateness that are upheld in a specific cultural context or against the backdrop of a particular worldview. Although it is not necessarily unreasonable or irrational to be overcome by emotion, the contingent fact remains that the emotions as passive and turbulent mental states contain the potential for unreasonableness and irrationality in them. As already explained above, emotions possess this

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tendency to irrationality because they are based on hasty appraisals and they also warp or cloud other judgments: For as the appraisals, which are intimately connected with them, are of situations which are very important to us, they are often made rather intuitively and urgently, with little careful analysis of the grounds for making them. They are also the most potent source of irrationality in that attention to features which are relevant to making other sorts of judgements is often deflected by irrelevant appraisals which are conceptually connected with our emotions. (Peters 1971a, p. 161) However, even if the emotions are liable to unreasonableness and irrationality, they are not impervious to reason and will. As Peters’ appraisal view makes clear, reason is not the slave of the passions but is capable of exercising a marked influence on them by the rationalization of emotion-appraisals and the rational control over emotional passivity. Conversely, the passions also have a distinct influence on the use of reason. According to Kant, (pure) reason is independent from our emotional inclinations, while according to Hume, reason is merely the ability to make inductive and deductive inferences cut off from the discrete existence of the passions. As against both of these views, Peters argues for the conceptual connection between the operation of reason and a specific type of passions, which he calls “the rational passions.” To understand this connection, one first has to grasp the meaning of “reason.” While Peters’ conception of reason was already reconstructed in the context of the justification of education in Chapter 4, in what follows we offer an account of this conception with a specific view to the education of the emotions. In this context, just what is Peters’ conception of reason (Peters 1971a, pp. 152–6)? Although higher animals and young children display intelligent behavior, they do not possess the ability to reason, in the sense of making universal generalizations, in the formation of beliefs and the planning of actions in the future on the basis of the past. The most general characteristic of reason is, therefore, the transcendence of the particular, that is, the “this,” the “here,” and the “now.” The particularities of identity, place, and time do not play any role at all in

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the rational determination of truth, correctness, and appropriateness. The universal generalization of reason is intrinsically directed toward truth and objectivity. Since authority, revelation, and tradition are forms of the appeal to the particular, they are not necessarily so directed. The features of universality, truth, and objectivity as engendered by reason’s transcending movement sharply contrast with those of particularity, arbitrariness, and egocentricity. This capacity for transcending the particular and taking an impartial point of view is, according to Peters, not just an inner potentiality or an innate tendency to curiosity. For its exertion such a capacity depends upon public procedures of criticism and testing articulated in a public language. Reason is, in this sense, the internalized, Western critical tradition: “Rationality, of which science is the supreme example, is itself a tradition. Rational men are brought up in the tradition that traditions are not immune from criticism” (Peters 1970b, p. 68).7 In the light of this transcendent conception, Peters claims that reason cannot properly function unless it is supported by rational passions. The operation of reason as a transcending movement is unintelligible without these specific emotions in the service of reason: There is a level of conduct connected with the use of reason which is only intelligible on the supposition that we postulate certain distinctive passions as well as the ability to infer, demonstrate, etc. The obvious overriding one is the concern about truth, without which reasoning in general would be unintelligible. . . . anyone who is concerned about truth must be concerned about correctness—about getting his facts right; he must care about consistency and clarity; he must abhor irrelevance and other forms of arbitrariness; he must value sincerity. And so on. (Peters 1971a, pp. 169–70) The love of truth is also connected with not only the love of order and system but also the aversion to contradictions and confusions. The use of reason requires suitable emotional dispositions, such as the determination to find out what really is the case in combination with the feeling of humility and the sense of givenness necessary for accepting the possibility that one may be in error. A person who is influenced by passions of this specific type is a reasonable man, whereas the

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unreasonable man “is a victim of prejudice and egocentricity . . . biased and short-sighted . . . obtuse, wilful, arbitrary and pigheaded” (Peters 1973a, p. 79). The rational passions are, therefore, “of cardinal importance in high-grade experience. They act as monitors maintaining rational thought and action” (Peters 1971a, p. 166).8 The rational passions sustain not only the operation of theoretical reason but also that of practical reason: These passions . . . are internalisations of principles which give structure and point to theoretical enquiries; but they are also involved in practical activities and judgements in so far as these are conducted in a rational manner. (Peters 1971a, p. 170) The concept of rational passions is primarily connected with that of different passions surrounding the concepts of truth and objectivity. Reason is universally at work in theoretical enquiries as well as in practical activities and judgments. The universality of reason in the theoretical domain corresponds with its impartiality in the practical domain. So, the concept of rational passions is secondarily connected with that of different passions surrounding the concepts of truthfulness and fairness. As internalized rational principles, the rational passions in the service of practical reason function, therefore, as universalistic motives and self-transcending emotions. Rational passions understood as stable moral sentiments, such as the sense of justice, respect for persons, and benevolence, provide the moral motivation to apply the otherwise inert principles of justice and impartial consideration.

The levels of life To briefly summarize the line of thought upto this point: Reason has a passionate dimension and passions have a reasonable dimension. The life of reason is not inconsistent with a life of passion. So, against the antithesis between reason and passion, Peters defends the integrative view that reason and passion mesh with each other. In the light of this view, he subsequently reinterprets Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral development. In the preceding chapter, we showed how

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Peters supplements Kohlberg’s cognitivism with an affective aspect. Against the backdrop of the integrative view, he further develops this supplementation into a sketchy but suggestive theory of the levels of life. Given that the antithetic contrast between reason and passion is untenable, Peters proposes, as an alternative, the contrast between different levels of life, with at each level a specific interconnection of rationality and the emotions. Roughly parallel with Kohlberg’s theory, he distinguishes between three levels (Peters 1971a, pp. 162–71; 1973a, pp. 91–101): A. Arational or Irrational; B. Unreasonable; and C. Reasonable or Autonomous.

These levels of life should not only be interpreted diachronically, as the Kohlbergian sequence of stages, but also synchronically, in the sense that even reasonable and autonomous adults are still liable to irrational and unreasonable thinking and acting. In fact, Peters adds a novel, basic level to the Piagetian-Kohlbergian levels of moral development under the inspiration of Freud, namely the arational or irrational level (A). In addition, he compresses two of these levels—namely, the egocentric (premoral) and heteronomous (moral realistic) ones—into a single level: the unreasonable one (B). The three different levels of life specify different levels of reasoning each with its own type of passions. Accordingly, Peters distinguishes a high(er)-grade type of experience from a low(er)-grade type of experience in his hierarchy of levels. We briefly describe each level. First, there is a basic level of life below the absolute minimum level of rationality and conceptuality: There is a level of thinking and affect which precedes the development of the conceptual apparatus necessary for life as a purposive, rulefollowing agent, and which persists after the development of this apparatus which we associate with “reason.” The individual thus retains this capacity to react much more “intuitively ” to affectively significant stimuli that are fragmentary and may be well below the threshold of conscious discrimination. (Peters 1971a, pp. 164–5)

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Very young children at this level are called “arational” or “nonrational” because there is not yet a rational background present, while adults relapsing to this level are called “ irrational”—that is, contrary to rationality—precisely because they relapse from such a background. Freud characterizes this level negatively in terms of the lack of the rational categories of noncontradiction and causality, as well as that of the reality principle, and positively in terms of the vicissitudes of (unconscious) wishes and aversions (Peters 1965, pp. 376–9). At this level, a primitive, magical form of thinking based on affectively loaded similarity is intertwined with emotions and motives that are based on wild, intuitive appraisals of the situation. Consequently, there occurs, not rational action, but only impulsive emotional reaction (based on fear and anger), not rational will-control, but only instant gratification of wishes and (sexual) desires at this basic level of life. This “palaeologic ” layer of a person’s psychology stays with him during his whole life, occasionally interfering with his high-grade experiences and warping or clouding his judgments. Although man is a rational animal, he continues to be susceptible to “ low-grade forms of experiences, in which behaviour is influenced by wishes and aversions linked with primitive classification and thinking structured by some unconstrained thrust towards affinity of feeling ” (Peters 1973a, p. 94). Obviously, in Peters’ theory, the basic level of life represents the animality of man. Secondly, there is the unreasonable level of life, at which beliefs tend to be infected with particularity or arbitrariness and emotions tend to be of a “gusty ” type, such as lust and envy, which are dominated by the pleasures and pains of the moment. While at this level, there is a rational background present and persons are responsive to reasons, the reasons they have are very weak and not susceptible to the more objective reasons of other people: Being unreasonable . . . is not connected, like being irrational, with a level on which reason gets no grip. Rather it is connected with a level of life when there are reasons, but the reasons are of a pretty low-grade sort. It is a level of life in which notions such as “ bias,” “prejudice,” “short-sighted,” “obtuse,” “wilful,” “ bigoted” and “pigheaded” have a natural home. (Peters 1971a, p. 168)

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Since these “unreasonable” reasons are largely self-referential in that they are considerations without giving due weight to the reasons of others, it is readily understandable that Peters includes the PiagetianKohlbergian egocentric (premoral) level in his unreasonable level. But also their heteronomous (moral realistic) level is added in this level of life, because persons who blindly conform themselves with one or other established framework are “unreasonable” in the sense of having no insight into the framework’s rationale. At this level, persons have not made the reasons or evidence for upholding one or other framework of beliefs their own. The conformist can be dogmatic and loyal, but “there is something second-hand about his conduct and emotional life, a lack of authenticity. For he has not really made his roles, rules and reactions his own” (Peter 1973a, p. 98). So, both the egoist and the conformist are, each in his own way, unreasonable and inauthentic. Thirdly, and finally, there is the reasonable or autonomous level of life—the point of culmination of the life of reason. Also at this level, the specific cognitive and affective aspects are bound together. Against the backdrop of Peters’ transcendent conception of rationality, the person’s capacity for rational reflection and critical thinking in the service of truth and objectivity takes front stage. Yet, the exertion of this capacity is impossible without the motivating role of the rational passions, in particular the concern for truth. By exercising the capacity for reflection and criticism, weak prima facie reasons are eliminated, whereas strong ones are transformed into all-things-considered reasons. By the same use of reason, transient emotions are either canalized in innocuous directions or transformed into stable sentiments. As indicated in the preceding chapter, the effective adoption, under the influence of the rational passions, of such a rational attitude toward life transforms it not only into a reasonable life but also into an autonomous or authentic life. The life of reason is, however, precarious as it is vulnerable to relapses from rationality into unreasonableness or irrationality, in the case of which “one level of conduct at which perception of the situation is structured in terms of one group of passions [i.e. the rational passions] [is] being replaced by another level of reaction which also has its own cognitive and affective components” (Peters 1971a, p. 165). Demonstrably, then, Peters’ integrative view of reason intermeshing with passion develops into a theory of human nature and an attendant

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conception of rationality. In the light of his theory of the levels of life, it is arguable that Peters does not subscribe to the two main tenets White singles out for criticism: the bifurcation of human nature and the Kantian conception of rationality. Peters’ theory of human nature is much more holistic than White suggests and there exists a striking cohabitation of reason and passion at each level of life that is orthogonal to the Kantian isolation of rationality from the emotions. What is more, Peters’ integrative view widens still more into, what we call, his “synthetic view ” of the world and human life. While expounding this view, we also take a look at its consequences for Peters’ conception of education and its aims.

The synthetic view: Educating for life Against the backdrop of Peters’ later writings, answering the question “How do we adequately conceive of moral development and moral education?”amounts to answering the question “How do we adequately conceive of education and its aims as such?” In his earlier writings, as we exposed in Chapters 2 and 3, Peters starts off with an analytic view to answer this question about the nature of education. The concept of education is analyzed in terms of the conditions of desirability, knowledge conjoined with understanding, and intrinsicness in relation to an initiation into a form of life. This conception of education as an initiation into the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake has been criticized, among others by White, for being (too) narrowly rationalistic as it focuses one-dimensionally on the development of the child’s cognitive faculties. However, in the light of what has been shown in the preceding chapter and the present one, it transpires that Peters eventually does not hold such a narrow conception of education. In his later writings, Peters’ thinking develops toward a far more broad conception that places education in the context of his overarching metaphysical worldview and philosophy of life, that is, his synthetic view. Peters identifies education not only with moral education—“all education is . . . moral education” (Peters 1970b, p. 73)—but also, by the transitivity of identity, with liberal education: “my conception of moral education is indistinguishable from the ideal of a liberal education”

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(p. 81). At first sight, this might be surprising, but on a closer look, in the light of several of Peters’ assumptions, it is fully understandable. Given the more specific concept of education that Peters contrasts with the more generalized one (see Chapters 2 and 3) and his broad ethical pluralism which includes worthwhile activities on the list of essential moral features (see Chapter 6), the identification of education as such with moral education is readily comprehensible. And in view of, once more, that specific concept of “the educated man” and Peters’ conception of liberal education as a general education for a “humane” and “civilized” life (see Chapter 5), the further identification of education with liberal education plausibly follows. Of course, one cannot deny that reason plays a pivotal role in moral as well as liberal education, and thus in education as such. Educating for life is, according to Peters, educating for the life of reason, in which the ideal of reasonableness and the concern about truth take central stage. But is this objectionable? Is this indefensible? We think not. Peters’ educational theory is evidently erected on the ancient ideas that mature human beings are rational animals and that the unexamined life is not worth living. Yet, although reason plays a leading part in this venerable tradition, theories in that tradition are not necessarily rationalistic. Whatever the interpretation of these ancient ideas may have been in the history of philosophy, Peters does not identify reason as the highest good in his educational theory: I do not wish . . . to hold up reasonableness as the summum bonum or anything as pretentious as that. . . . Reasonableness, rather, is to be understood as a way of going about life which is compatible with all sorts of different emphases, with the pursuit of a variety of excellences. . . . Reasonableness surely requires only a manner of travelling, not any particular destination. (Peters 1973a, pp. 101–2) We can sum up this line of thought by going back to the thesis that reasonableness or reason does not so much pertain to the content as to the form of conscious life. Education for the life of reason is, then, the sustained attempt to elicit and build up the rational form of the moral mode of experience in the broad sense. Educating children to become reasonable beings is educating them into a principled, rational morality in

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the broad sense. Reason is thus not a concrete aim, but only a formal one of moral and liberal education.9 The aim of education is the attainment of the reasonable or autonomous level of life. As demonstrated in the preceding and the present chapter, this rational form of conscious life also includes an affective aspect, besides a cognitive one. The education of the rational passions is as central to the formation of the rational form of life as that of the rational principles: “. . . moral education is centrally concerned with the development of certain types of motives, especially with what I have called the rational passions” (Peters 1970b, p. 75). If there exists an intrinsic unity between reason and passion at all the different levels of life, then the education of the emotions is essential to education as such.

Religious rationality Peters’ conception of education is not narrowly rationalistic in the sense that education for life incorporates education for leading a passionate life in so far as this is compatible with leading a humane and civilized life. Yet, there is more to what Peters envisions as leading a life of reason. Surprisingly perhaps, being a truly reasonable man also involves being aware of the limits of reason. Accordingly, educating for the life of reason is certainly not rationalistic because it implies educating for the appreciation of the boundaries of reason. It is highly remarkable that Peters (1973a, pp. 103–28) relates these limitations of reason to the religious dimension of a principled, rational morality. Religion, in a sense to be specified below, is not opposed to the life of reason. Even for a reasonable man, there is a specific religious dimension to life precisely because it is his aspiration to lead a life of reason. Paradoxically perhaps, the appreciation of reason’s boundaries engenders a transforming experience, which constitutes, according to Peters, the possibility of religious experience for a reasonable man. The awareness of reason’s limits has then further a positively transforming impact on the status of a rational morality and other aspects of the moral life. This religious dimension of a rational morality has nothing to do with religious education understood as educating into one or other concrete religious denomination, such as a Christian or an Islamic one.

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What Peters calls “religious experience” for a reasonable man—the transforming experience provoked by the awareness of reason’s limits—has to be understood as an additional dimension of the rational form of consciousness against the background of Peters’ synthetic view on world and life. We briefly sketch this ultimate dimension of his educational theory. Although Peters has no worked-out philosophy of religion, he gives an answer to this key question: “In virtue of what kinds of shared experiences do human beings come to agree about religious judgments?” (Peters 1973a, p. 106). According to Peters, religious judgments are neither based on revelation nor on religious facts, but on emotional experiences of awe: Religion . . . originates in experiences of awe, an emotion to which human beings are subject when they are confronted with events, objects, or people which are of overwhelming significance to them but which seem, in some important respect or other, inexplicable or shot through with contingency. (p. 106) When significant events cannot be placed in the orderly system of ordinary events and explanations of them come to an end, these contingent events are prone to provoke feelings of awe in human beings. As an appropriate response to such impressive events, human beings engage in symbolic practices, such as worship and other rituals, to express these strong feelings, comparable with the method, we touched upon earlier, to canalize the passivity of emotions by expressing them in symbolic behavior. Peters applies then this general idea about the origins of religion in the phenomena of inexplicability and contingency to the specific case of the reasonable man. Whereas for primitive people, the powers of nature are the primary objects of awe, for enlightened people, more universal objects for such feelings of awe are made available by the development of Western civilization. Two specific objects engender awe in the reasonable man, namely the universe and the human condition. This is, of course, reminiscent of Kant ’s selection: “ Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me” (Kant 1788, p. 169 [162]).

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Why do “the starry heavens above me” and “the moral law within me” incite feelings of awe—“religious feelings” in Peters’ sense—in a reasonable man? First, in trying to explain rationally the creation and continuation of the universe human beings reach the limits of reason, because in this special case, they try to explain the spatiotemporal framework that is presupposed in all other causal explanation. “And to grasp this is to open up the possibility of a new level of awe which is possible only for a rational being who appreciates the limits of reason” (Peters 1973a, p. 108). A reasonable man can realize the inexplicability of the explanatory framework itself and appreciate in awe the ultimate contingency of the universe. He might in so experiencing also express his feeling with the use of the word “God.” Secondly, in reflecting rationally on their unique position in the natural world, human beings again stumble on the boundaries of reason. It is perplexing how they, as free persons worthy of respect and, as it were, destined for eternity, relate to their temporary predicament in this world. Human life, inclusive the life of reason, appears as a mystery impenetrable for rational explanation. This baffling predicament that “we have to make something of the brief span of years that is our lot, with the variable and partly alterable equipment with which we are blessed” (p. 110) provokes feelings of awe in those reflecting on it. A reasonable man can recognize this finite predicament of any man trying to make something of his life and appreciate in awe the existential contingency of “the inescapable cycle of the human condition, birth, youth, reproduction, bringing up children and death, together with its contrasts such as joy and suffering, hope and despair, good and evil” (p. 112). These feelings of awe with regard to the universe and the human condition are emotions to which a reasonable man is prone when rationally thinking about these two more universal objects. These emotions are, therefore, supplementary “rational passions” and as such they also belong to the affective aspect of the rational form of conscious life, much in the same way as benevolence and the concern about truth do. Yet, in contrast to the other rational passions, the feelings of awe represent the deeper dimension of the affective aspect included in the rational form of the moral mode of experience. So, as “religious feelings” in Peters’ sense, they form the religious dimension of the principled, rational morality of a reasonable person. Since these feelings of awe are intimately

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connected to this rational morality, they can also profoundly influence it. The deeper, religious dimension has a positively transforming impact on the fundamental principles and ultimate values of a rational morality as well as on the other facets of the moral life. The religious awareness of a reasonable man is derived from his background awareness of the predicament of human beings in the universe that triggers his feelings of awe. Such background awareness has transforming power in that it opens up “a different level of experience made possible by concepts which enable us to understand the facts of a more mundane level of experience in a new light ” (Peters 1973a, p. 111). Given that “all seeing is seeing as” (p. 111), religious seeing is seeing the world as a new place different from its ordinary or mundane contours.

Peters’ Stoic attitude In what way does the deeper, religious dimension of the rational form of a reasonable man transform the principles of a rational morality and the other facets of the moral life?10 Before elucidating the transforming impact of the religious dimension on moral principles, Peters’ basic philosophical attitude toward life should be made clear. Ray Elliott (1986, p. 46) writes that Peters’ “philosophy of life is founded on the Stoic precept that one should remedy such ills as can be remedied and accept without complaint those which cannot. . . . his work is pervaded by Stoic moods, attitudes and values.” Peters’ Stoic attitude as the most reasonable and appropriate attitude toward life comprises two major tendencies which should keep each other in balance: the alterability as well as the acceptance of the human condition. The tendency to alter the human condition when it is bad is connected to the belief in perfectibility and progress, whereas the tendency to accept the human condition when it is irreparable to the belief in truth and reason. The former tendency is activated by compassion or love, while the latter by the concern for truth. On these two ultimate values, the principles of a rational morality are based. We articulate these values when we alter for the best in the name of justice and respect and when we accept the givenness of the human condition in the name of truth and honesty.

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According to Peters,the religious background awareness of a reasonable man transforms, then, a rational morality by making its underpinning values and operative principles more objective and prominent: “Religious experience, . . . by widening the context in which human life is viewed, has the function of enhancing our conviction of their objectivity and of providing emphasis for some of these values [and moral principles]” (Peters 1973a, p. 114). By placing the operation of moral principles and values in a setting which awakens awe, these principles and values are endorsed and emphasized. By concentrating religious attention on certain features of the human predicament—specifically, on human pain, suffering, and death—and thereby investing them with universal significance, the moral principles and values are more strongly and objectively related to the existential contingency of human beings. In this way, the religious dimension also exhorts or invigorates our moral response on the basis of a principled, rational morality to the human predicament, especially to human suffering. As for our appropriate moral response to this predicament, Peters recommends the Stoic attitude as the attitude that keeps a balance between utopianism and fatalism. On the one hand, he warns both progressives and romantics against the perils of human pride and vanity in their attempt to realize heaven on earth: There is, after all, the givenness of the human condition and of certain facts of human nature. In the light of this any form of human perfectibilism is a dangerous delusion. . . . To dream of utopias on earth is vain; for they are not possible. And it is dangerous; for men will do dreadful things to other men in order to make their dreams come true. (Peters 1973a, pp. 117–18) On the other hand, Peters, of course, shows, like every other civilized man, indignation at the plight of the poor and the oppressed and acknowledges that many evils are alterable by human effort: “ The elimination of misery is incumbent on anyone who cares about the human condition; the promotion of happiness is, in moderation, a harmless hope” (p. 118). Also with regard to the culmination point of moral development and education, Peters takes the same Stoic attitude. The rational autonomous

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person acting on a principled morality is not an individual striving for perfection and self-sufficiency in isolation from the social context into which he is born. As already indicated in the preceding chapter, Peters holds the view that “the autonomy of the individual . . . can be endorsed in a way which is compatible both with a shared background of experience and with openness to love” (p. 122). Certainly, the religious dimension of a rational morality transforms the principle of respect for persons into that of the sacredness of personhood: “And respect passes into reverence and a belief in the sacredness of human personality when the perspective and purpose of a particular man are viewed in the broader context of human life on earth” (p. 122). Yet, although the belief in personal autonomy is thereby endorsed and emphasized, the belief in the social nature of persons should, precisely out of respect for the givenness of the human condition, equally be endorsed and emphasized. Mature human beings are in essence not only rational animals but also social animals. So, as to the Stoic aspect of alterability, autonomy involves the potentiality for determining one’s own destiny by individual choices, while, as to the aspect of acceptance, autonomy equally requires the potentiality for grasping a public predicament in terms of shared concepts. The religious background awareness of a person capable of a reasonable level of life positively transforms not only the form of morality but also its content, specifically the ethical domain of the worthwhile activities. As noted in the previous chapter, engagement in these “desirable” activities is the primary means by which individuals can make something of their temporary lives on earth. Worthwhile activities are thus of special importance to the existential contingency of human beings. At the reasonable level of life, these activities are already singled out by reason because they permit plenty of scope for understanding and sensitivity (“wide-ranging cognitive content ”), as well as for enhancing the quality of life. If taking up a rational attitude toward human activities transforms them into something worthwhile, how then does taking up a religious attitude, in Peters’ sense, toward these worthwhile activities transform them further? This question can, given the connection between worthwhile activities and the existential contingency of humans, be put otherwise: How does “religion” in Peters’ sense affect a reasonable person’s view of what he is going to do with his

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one and only life? Both versions of the question about the transforming power of religion come down to Peters’ version of the classical question of the meaning of life: Religion affects the individual’s choice of activities and the manner in which he conducts them by enlarging the context in which these activities are placed, by pressing the question whether this is all that a man can do with the brief flicker of consciousness that is his life. (Peters 1973a, p. 128) To this question, Peters offers the suggestive answer that taking up the religious attitude makes a rational person aware of the immanence of life’s meaning and the heteronomy of value: First, . . . [a rational person] must grasp the ultimate pointlessness of life, that it cannot, as a whole, be given meaning in the way in which meaning is given to events and actions within life; but he must also strive to discern point within it. For life, like works of art, can exhibit values that are self-contained, that define a quality of life. Second, he will not feel that, in facing this issue, he is “choosing” his values . . . Rather, he will feel drawn towards them and, in so far as he lets them work through him, he will feel a sense of humility and of awe. (Peters 1973a, p. 125) From the religious standpoint, the worthwhile activities which constitute the life of reason derive their worthwhileness not from a transcendent source, traditionally identified as “God” in monotheistic religions. The meaning of life is immanent to life itself. Worthwhile activities contain their worthwhileness in themselves.11 Yet, although the values realized in these activities are internal, they are not autonomously chosen by the people who are engaged in them. Since values are not of our own making, we have to acknowledge their givenness. Furthermore, since values as such are exercising an appeal, we have to respond to their appeal. We should let them work through us. Against the backdrop of his Stoic attitude, Peters especially draws our attention to truth, love and the relief of suffering as the central values to which we must respond in the context of the human predicament.

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In trying to make something of our lives, we can respond to the demands of truth, love, and pain-relief directly or indirectly. We can straight away devote our lives, for instance, to the pursuit of truth or the cause of justice in taking up an academic job or becoming a social worker. Alternatively, and more commonly, activities and professional occupations can be transformed and enriched by the manner in which they are conceived and carried out in the light of these central values. Either way of responding to their call gives focus to the attempt to make something of one’s own finite life. In so responding and realizing these values in worthwhile activities, a reasonable person who is also “religious” in Peters’ sense gives a definite direction to what he is going to do with his temporary life. Consequently, by taking up a religious attitude toward his life, he relates himself at the same time to his own mortality, to the fact that his life on earth covers only a brief span of time. In this perspective of the existential contingency of human beings, Peters aptly reminds us of the Platonic wisdom that “to learn how to live [in philosophizing] is also to learn how to die” (Peters 1973a, p. 128).

“Religious” education What is the consequence of Peters’ synthetic view for his conception of education? Although demonstrably his integrative view on reason and passion widens into a metaphysical worldview and philosophy of life, he himself never makes explicitly the connection between this synthetic view and the conception of education. Nevertheless, it is possible to bring to light the way in which his “religious” view implicitly determines how he conceives of education in his later writings. We already made the point that, for Peters, moral, liberal, and education as such are, in the senses explained, identical to one another and that reason is the formal aim of education. This extended conception of education gets a new expression in the last paper Peters wrote on educational aims: Education surely develops a person’s awareness by enlarging, deepening and extending it. Its impact is cognitive, but it also transforms and regulates a person’s attitudes, emotions, wants and actions because all of these presuppose awareness and are impregnated with

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beliefs. . . . the purpose of education is . . . to prepare people . . . for life. . . . a worthwhile life, not just keeping alive; . . . Towards what situations, then, is the development of awareness [education] to be directed . . . ? The answer can only be “the human condition”. (Peters 1979, pp. 33–4) Here, a still more broad conception of education, inspired by Peters’ synthetic view, is implicitly at work. Educating children is learning these children how to live by initiating them into not only a cognitive framework of knowledge and understanding but also into moral, emotional, and existential perspectives on the human condition. Education for life is education for the life of reason in Peters’ highly complex sense of “reason,” including the reasonableness of appreciating the limits of reason. As for the form of reason’s life, educating involves developing a principled morality and a rational affective sensibility in children, while, as for the content of reason’s life, educating involves bringing them to engage with worthwhile activities. Since the deeper, religious awareness has a positively transforming impact on the form as well as the content of the life of reason, “religion” in Peters’ sense has a distinct influence on education and its aims as well. In the best of all possible worlds, an education for leading a humane and civilized life implies, therefore, a religious education of sorts: . . . they will be scarcely human if they have not reflected on the place of man in the natural and historical orders. In many the contingency, creation and continuance of the world, which are beyond the power of man to comprehend, give rise to awe and wonder. The human condition is viewed in a wider perspective, under “a certain aspect of eternity,” and ways of life are generated that transcend and transform what is demanded by morality and truth. (Peters 1979, p. 41)

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Part 3

Reception and Relevance of R. S. Peters’ Work

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Chapter 8

The Impact and Importance of Peters’ Analytic Paradigm

Introduction During the 1960s, Peters revolutionized the philosophy of education in Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, in the British Commonwealth. By introducing the analytic paradigm, he made a formidable impact not only on philosophy but also on educational studies. He achieved what is rather unusual for a philosopher to establish: his influence did not remain purely theoretical but was also practical and concretely tangible. Peters’ intellectual revolution had institutional as well as political effects in the socio-economic context of the 1960s. In this final chapter, we first review this immediate impact of Peters’ analytic paradigm. In particular, we concentrate in more detail on the consequences of the “London line” for child-centered education as politically expressed in the 1967 Plowden report. We subsequently explain why Peters’ influence started to wane in the late 1970s and why his analytic approach came under pressure. Finally, we give reasons for thinking that Peters’ analytic paradigm still remains crucially important for the philosophy of education today.

The power of Peters As explicated in Chapter 1, Peters introduced a new approach to the philosophy of education. He directed educational philosophy away from offering general wisdom of life as well as from going over the great educators of the past. His conception of educational philosophy as dealing with the conceptual analysis of education combined a focus

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on specific practical issues in education with the methodology of ahistorical analytic philosophy. As a result, Peters’ new philosophy of education not only had practical relevance to schools and educational policy but also became rigorous and academically reputable. His analytic paradigm complied with the requirements of rationality and scientific forms of study: “ The prevailing view was that any enquiry which is to establish sound answers must be: (i) detached, impersonal, unemotional; (ii) precise, methodical, orderly; and (iii) small-scale, piecemeal, cautious” (Darling 1994, p. 88). By adopting the framework of analytic philosophy, the then accepted orthodoxy, Peters succeeded in presenting the new philosophy of education “as conducting a dispassionate clearsighted enquiry from a viewpoint distanced from (if not elevated above) the partisan wranglings of competing and contentious approaches to education” (Darling 1994, p. 89). Consequently, in the light of the prestige of the scientific paradigm taken as a whole, the rigor and objectivity of the analytic paradigm decisively contributed to the seriousness and academic acceptability of philosophy of education: “On the question of its philosophical standing, I think it can be said that it has established itself as a respectable, if lowly, branch of philosophy ” (Peters 1983, p. 35). As noted in Chapter 1 as well, Peters’ introduction of the analytic paradigm did much to establish the philosophy of education not only as a respectable branch of philosophy but also as a foundational component of educational theory. In Chapter 5, we made clear how Peters replaced the undifferentiated mush that was often perpetrated under the heading of educational theory in the 1950s with his own differentiated approach to the nature of (general) educational theory. According to him, educational theory by its very nature differentiates into a group of four foundational disciplines—philosophy, psychology, sociology, and history—each having its distinctive bearing on educational principles and practice. Philosophy, precisely for the reason that it is based on the analytic paradigm, could establish itself as an equal partner to the social sciences of psychology and sociology (as well as to the science of history). In this way, the new analytic approach to philosophy of education could itself contribute considerably to the academic respectability of educational theory. In contrast to the low academic standing of the old “mushy ” educational studies, the partnership of the analytic methodology of philosophy with

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the empirical methodology of the social sciences did much to establish the credibility of education as an academic discipline in the light of the acknowledged prestige of the scientific paradigm at large. The remarkable thing is that the impact of Peters, as a philosopher, was not confined to the theoretical field of philosophy and educational studies but extended itself to the practical field of educational institutions and governmental policy in Great Britain. This practical impact has, in general, to be situated against the background of social experimentation and economic expansion in the 1960s. The concrete implementation of Peters’ agenda was, in particular, facilitated by the political climate at that time, which was for the most part labour after 13 years of opposition, and by specific developments in teacher training policy. In such a socioeconomic and political context, his career and the position he occupied made it possible for Peters to seize the opportunity: The opportunity came in the early 1960s. The teacher training colleges were [in 1960] extending their certificate courses from two to three years, while the [1963] Robbins Report [on Higher Education] was recommending that the colleges themselves be redesignated “colleges of education” and that, for some students, there should be a new education degree, the B.Ed. These changes combined to require more and academically better qualified lecturers and new courses which would be of rigour deserving the award of a degree. (Dearden 1982, p. 57) He was the right man in the right place at the right time. In response to these changes and challenges, Peters, as a professor and head of department, infused the London Institute of Education with the analytic paradigm to such an extent that he actually established a recognizable unified “London line” in the philosophy of education. From there his influence propagated to other institutions all over Britain and the British Commonwealth: “at least during the 1965–1975 decade philosophy of education was dominated by the ‘London line’ described somewhat whimsically by Bernard Williams as the ‘khaki regulars from Malet Street ’ ” (Peters 1983, p. 36). Moreover, in 1964, at a conference in Hull, called by the Department of Education and Science (DES) and the Association of Teachers in

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Colleges and Departments of Education (ATCDE) to discuss the future of educational studies, Peters got the opportunity to outline the new approach to the philosophy of education in the light of his differentiated approach to the nature of educational theory. One effect of his address “ The place of philosophy in the training of teachers” (Peters 1964) at that historical occasion was the restructuring of the form of teacher education as well as the renovation of the content of teacher training curricula in colleges and departments of education. Another effect was that the DES shortly afterward took the decision “to second lecturers from Colleges of Education to do a special one-year course in philosophy of education at the University of London Institute” (Peters 1966b, p. 88). Without exaggeration, one can say that in combination with the explosion of publications in educational philosophy and the founding of a Philosophy of Education Society, remarked upon both in Chapter 1, Peters turned the philosophy of education in the 1960s academically, institutionally, and politically into a prospering business as never before in Great Britain: Courses in philosophy of education at all levels and in all teacher education institutions (save the Open University) were offered and were even mandatory. Many new specialist appointments had to be made to cope with the demand. Philosophers began to occupy chairs in education in addition to Peters’ own at the London Institute, first Perry and Hirst, and rather later Elliott, Dearden, Sockett, Pring and Aspin. Pure philosophers, such as Professors Hamlyn, Hare, Oakeshott, O’Connor, Passmore, D. Z. Phillips, A. Phillips Griffiths and Ryle also took an interest, which was greatly facilitated by Peters’ established reputation amongst general philosophers. (Dearden 1982, p. 59) Note also that in addition to having a strictly philosophical influence, Peters’ engagement with concrete issues of politics, policy, and practice arguably established a precedent that exerted a cultural influence on the UK philosophy of education community that continues today, for example, in initiatives such as the IMPACT series of public lectures and publications, launched in 1999 as an initiative of the Philosophy of

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Education Society of Great Britain (PESGB), which explicitly aims to address a policy-making audience.1

The Plowden report and child-centered education As a noteworthy example of Peters’ impact on British educational policy, we select the response of the “London line” to the so-called “Plowden report.” Arguably the best known of all educational reports in the 1960s is the 1967 Plowden report on Children and their Primary Schools, which politically consolidated the growing influence of childcentered education in the British educational system.2 The document, named after the chairman of the then responsible Central Advisory Council of Education (England), Lady Bridget Plowden, is not only of purely historical interest but also of importance for the philosophy of education and educational theory. The document is an important one because of the unusual amount of educational theorizing that it contains. The Plowden report represents “a recognisable philosophy of education, and . . . a view of society ” (§504)—often identified as “educational progressivism”—against which Peters and his “London line” formulated a detailed critique that made a serious impact on the world of education: There is no doubt that, during the progressive hey-day of the 1960s, culminating in the Plowden Report, it [analytic philosophy of education] made an impact, if an adverse one, in many quarters. For the analytic approach was brought to bear on some of the slogans of progressivism such as “growth,” “the needs and interests” of the child, and “ learning by discovery.”Perspectives on Plowden, which I edited, created quite a furore, . . . (Peters 1983, pp. 35–6) The philosophical attack on the report had a profound influence on subsequent attitudes toward that report and toward the progressive conception of (primary) education that it embodied. After briefly outlining the main tenets of progressivism, we review Peters’ constructive critique.

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What is educational progressivism? Child-centered education is to be contrasted with the traditional, subject-centered, teacher-directed approach to education. Following such educators of the past as JeanJacques Rousseau and John Dewey, educational progressivism holds a distinctive view on the following central issues in the philosophy of education: the status of childhood, the nature of the child, the curriculum, and the role of the teacher (Archard 1993, part 1; Darling 1994, pp. 1–5). First, whereas the traditionalist conceives of childhood as a stage on the way to adulthood, the progressive sees it as a state on its own. On the first view, the stage of childhood in human life is a teleological process, that is, it presupposes the telos or end of adulthood to be reached. Childhood is not yet adulthood, whereby the latter is understood as the culmination of development. The child is thus conceived as a premature or unfinished adult. On the second view, childhood is an intrinsic condition, that is, it is not the absence of adult qualities but the presence of qualities which have intrinsic worth or value of their own. The child is seen as the child. This involves a respect for children as individuals and for their differences. Secondly, the traditionalist conceives of the child’s mental nature as a tabula rasa, a blank and empty nature that is shaped by the environment, whereas the progressive sees it as a specific nature or self with its own characteristic needs and interests, and with individual talents. The first conception implies that the child’s mind becomes an adult one by means of an exogenous progression: the child’s mind is formed “from without ” by the influences of others, as a lump of clay is molded. The second conception implies that the child’s psychism undergoes a natural growth or endogenous development: the child’s psychism unfolds “from within” an innate potentiality, as an acorn growing into an oak. The difference between these conceptions is clearly connected to the contrast between respectively heteronomy or otherdependence (passivity) and autonomy or self-realization (activity). These first two points about the status and nature of the child have logical consequences for the subsequent two points about the curriculum and the role of the teacher. First, “in terms of curriculum content ” the traditional approach to education “is taken to involve first the systematic imparting of basic skills in language and numerical calculation,

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followed by instruction in a range (usually broad at first and narrow later) of established school subjects” (Darling 1994, p. 2). A subjectbased curriculum represents, by and large, the compartmentalization of what has to be known (to a certain extent) in Western civilization into different forms of knowledge. As against such a traditional curriculum, the progressive defends an integrated curriculum, with curriculum units of a topic or project type based on the child’s needs and interests. Secondly, “in pedagogical terms the traditional approach involves the teacher expounding the subject and instructing the whole class at once. . . . Gritty application and memory work are regarded as unavoidable and perhaps as constituting beneficial preparation for adult life” (Darling 1994, p. 2). Traditionally, the teacher is seen as an instructor of a group of children who learn the imparted body of knowledge by heart. The teacher teaches and the pupil learns by being taught. According to the progressive, however, the learning should not stand under the control of an external authority but proceed vom Kinde aus in harmony with the child’s own nature. The child is a natural enquirer and learns by experience or discovery. The role of the teacher should, therefore, be limited to that of a facilitator. When learning comes down to finding out for oneself, the teacher’s task shrinks to setting up the environment so that the pupil can discover the world at his own tempo when he is “ready.” As remarked in Chapter 2, the educational aims of child-centered education—such as autonomy, critical thinking, and creativeness—are at variance with Peters’ analysis of education as an initiation into public modes of experience, knowledge, and understanding. Before going into details about Peters’ critique of the Plowden report, it is worthwhile to spell out the basic philosophical assumptions from which his educational thinking starts. With this framework in place, it will transpire that the theoretical foundations of child-centered education cannot be sound from Peters’ perspective. In his educational thinking, Peters assumes three theoretical points of departure to be valid: 1. the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM); 2. Wittgenstein’s anti-private language argument; and 3. Hirst ’s forms of knowledge thesis.

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He assumes these points without ever arguing himself for their validity and without even mentioning them except the last one. Apparently, there is for him also a “division of labour” in intellectual projects so that he can rely on the work of others—of Wittgenstein and Hirst, among others—who have shown the validity or at least the plausibility of these points. Although Peters accepts all of these three points, it goes without saying that each of them is highly controversial. First, what Tooby and Cosmides (1992) call “the SSSM” is a set of assumptions concerning the relative influence of nature or innateness and nurture or acquisition upon the constitution of the human mind and the institution of human societies, which are in favor of the latter type of influence—that of the social environment: Humans everywhere show striking patterns of local within-group similarity in their behavior and thought, accompanied by profound intergroup differences. The Standard Social Science Model . . . then focuses on one salient causal and temporal sequence: how individuals change over their development from “unformed” infants into complexly competent adult members of their local social group, and how they do so in response to their local human environment. (Tooby and Cosmides 1992, p. 25) For our purposes, it suffices to concentrate on the social formation of the human mind. Although infants are everywhere born the same (the principle of the psychic unity of humankind), adults everywhere differ profoundly in their behavioral and mental organization. Since invariable infant nature cannot explain the variable mental organization of adults, adult mental organization must be acquired from some source outside individuals in the course of their development. That source can only be the social environment which precedes the individual and is external to it: “ The individual is the acted upon (the effect or the outcome) and the sociocultural world is the actor (the cause or the prior state that determines the subsequent state)” (Tooby and Cosmides 1992, p. 26). Correspondingly, the SSSM interprets whatever innate equipment infants are born with as highly rudimentary, such as an unorganized set of crude urges or drives, in addition to the capacity to be socialized

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and the ability to learn. So, the life of the mind is acquired from culture through learning and education. Secondly, and connectedly, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) famously argued against the possibility of a private language.3 Given that thought presupposes language, one can then conclude on the basis of this argument that all thought has a social nature. That is why the development of a differentiated mind cannot be an individual affair, but must be a public business: The ideas and expectations of an individual centre of consciousness, however, do not develop as deposits out of an atomic individual experience. . . . On the contrary they are the product of the initiation of an individual into public traditions enshrined in the language, concepts, beliefs, and rules of a society. (Peters 1966a, pp. 48–9) Since the individual considered in isolation is powerless, the community is needed for the constitution of the mind. Note that Elliott (1986, p. 46) asserts that Peters demonstrates no close awareness of, or engagement with, Wittgenstein’s private-language critique. He therefore has to lean so heavily on the publicity condition of knowledge and understanding that it acts almost like “a metaphysical system.” Yet, regardless of the extent of Peters’ own engagement with Wittgenstein’s oeuvre, it remains clear that he shares in the Wittgensteinian presupposition that mindedness is a constitutively public phenomenon enshrined in a public language and that, therefore, learners must acquire their minds through initiation by a linguistic community into concepts and meanings that are not owned, defined, or applied by the individual learner alone. Thirdly, Hirst, Peters’ closest collaborator, introduced the so-called “forms of knowledge” thesis in his 1965 landmark paper “Liberal education and the nature of knowledge.” As noted in Chapter 5, the thesis says that the domain of human knowledge can be differentiated into a number of logically distinct forms of knowledge none of which can be reduced to any other. This nonarbitrary differentiation into forms of knowledge is to be contrasted with the unifying ideals of mythology, religion, and ideology which involve forms of awareness

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that are comparatively undifferentiated. The compartmentalization of knowledge is argued to be one of the great achievements of Western civilization. Against the backdrop of Peters’ basic philosophical framework, his critique of the Plowden report becomes readily understandable. The Plowden philosophy is the philosophy of child-centered education which is, according to Peters (1969b, p. ix), “theoretically not satisfactory and . . . far from appropriate to the practical needs of our time.” As his fundamental line of critique, Peters points out, in the light of the SSSM (and Wittgenstein’s argument), that the notions of “growth,” “development,” “nature,” and “self ” on a progressive, individualistic interpretation, as well as the notion of “teacher-facilitator” are highly problematic up to the point of becoming unintelligible: Most of what is wrong with it [the progressive approach] can be summed up by saying that it systematically ignores the inescapably social character of thought and language, of processes of transmission, and of motivation. The notion that children can peel concepts off the world without sensitization to selected aspects of it incorporated in a public language, that most of their interests are self-originated rather than caught from others, that children become “ready” by some kind of internal ripening without imitation, identification, and instruction— all such notions are highly suspect. (Peters 1969c, p. 16) As to the status and nature of the child, he consequently wonders “whether there is any field of study called ‘child development ’ which can be clearly distinguished from ‘education’ ” (p. 8), whereby “child development ” means mental development. If education is, generally speaking, cultural initiation, then the SSSM implies that mental development necessarily depends upon education (and learning). Child development or growth, and relatedly the nature or self of the child, cannot be separated from the constitutive power of education as initiation. Moreover, “[t]he plea for the development of selves is always to be understood within a framework of shared valuations” (Peters 1969c, p. 8). The notion of “development ” or that of “need” always already presupposes a value-judgment about what man ought to be. Once one

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passes from the realm of the physical into that of the mental, a type of norm different from a purely statistical one takes over. Progressive aims of education can, therefore, not just be taken for granted or have an “obvious” precedence over other educational aims because they look more scientifically based. The progressive unavoidably enters into a debate about the justification for thinking that his educational aims are more worthwhile than others. Similarly, the central progressive value of autonomy, “ like any other value, must surely be asserted not absolutely but with an ‘other things being equal’ clause” (p. 10). As we remarked at the end of Chapter 6, autonomy is not an absolute value but a relative one with regard to the framework of worthwhile activities. The notion of “autonomy,” and connectedly that of “creativeness” or “originality,” make very little sense unless the child has first been initiated into a body of knowledge and skills, which are part of our public heritage. And if we accept the value of autonomy in our pluralist society, then we must equip our children effectively to stand on their own feet and doing it their own way. As we explained in Chapter 5, such an equipment should at least include that part of our shared inheritance with which children in the future as adults will be able to face the human condition and to cope with life’s predicaments—namely, the humanities: It is not enough, therefore, to say that children should learn to be themselves at school; we must give them the equipment to find out properly what sort of selves they want to be. In my view the forms of awareness grouped roughly together under the title of “the humanities” are particularly important in this. (Peters 1969c, p. 12) As to the structure of the curriculum, it is clear that the Plowden insistence “that knowledge does not fall into neatly separate compartments” (§505) is orthogonal to Hirst ’s (and Peters’) forms of knowledge thesis. We comment on the analytic reaction to progressive curriculum integration below. As to the role of the teacher, Peters strongly objects to the Plowden image of the teacher’s task because his minimal role as a facilitating bystander does not fit the SSSM. There is a lot about learning by experience and firsthand discovery in the Plowden report, but almost nothing about teaching.4 However, in the light of the SSSM, the role of the teacher is pivotal and can in no

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way be minimalized. If culture precedes the individual and is external to it, and if education is initiation into culture, then the educational process is fundamentally driven by an initiator already in possession of culture. Teachers are, therefore, “experienced persons turning the eye of others outwards to what is essentially independent of persons” (Peters 1966a, p. 54). In accordance with the SSSM, education is a process of authoritative transmission of a shared heritage from “masters” to “novices.” In this complex process, the effective cause is the teacher who antecedently possesses a body of knowledge and who is thereby authoritatively qualified with respect to it. The teacher’s ineliminable task, and even “sacred mission,” is to bring the barbarian children outside the gates inside the citadel of civilization: Now the teacher, having himself been initiated, is on the inside of these activities and modes of thought and conduct. . . . To ask him what the aim or point of this form of life is, into which he has himself been initiated, seems an otiose question. . . . This sort of question, he senses, can only be asked by barbarians outside the gates. . . . Are these hard men indifferent to all that constitutes being civilised? Children, to a large extent, are. They start off in the position of the barbarian outside the gates. The problem is to get them inside the citadel of civilisation so that they will understand and love what they see when they get there. (Peters 1963a, p. 107) In view of the central role of the teacher in the SSSM, it also becomes clear why Peters thinks that the Plowden philosophy is not only theoretically unsatisfactory, but also inappropriate to the practical needs of our time: does not the Plowden image of the teacher tend to down-grade the role of the teacher at a time when the teacher should be occupying an increasingly important role? For in a pluralistic society, when there is no unified ideal that can be handed on by the priests, who else is there to stand between the generations and to initiate others into the various aspects of a culture within which the individual has eventually to determine where he stands? (Peters 1969c, pp. 16–17)

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Peters’ serious misgivings about the Plowden philosophy are meant, however, as a constructive critique of child-centered education. Although this intention is not altogether apparent in Perspectives on Plowden (1969b), where the criticisms are often harsh and one-dimensional, it is eventually fulfilled in The Logic of Education (1970), which is coauthored with Hirst. Peters (and Hirst) admit that the progressive revolt represents a great advance on the traditional, subject-centered, teacherdirected approach to education, which is identified, if not caricatured, as authoritarian instruction in and rote-learning of facts, nothing but facts. Yet, he also considers the child-centered approach to education too extreme a reaction: “ The romantic protest . . . presupposes some kind of a classical background” (Peters and Hirst 1970, p. 32). In a dialectical fashion Peters then reconciles the thesis of traditionalism with the antithesis of progressivism in his synthesis of “ liberal traditionalism”: These . . . are two rather extreme polarized conceptions of how content and method can be related for the implementing of educational aims. . . . When comparing authoritarian with childcentred approaches to education it is often said that the former were strong on aims and content but weak on methods, whereas the latter are strong on methods but weak on aims and content. . . . but . . . they both shared a common weakness—they paid too little attention to public forms of experience which . . . are absolutely central to the development of knowledge and understanding. And an emphasis on forms of experience can provide a much needed synthesis between these two approaches to education . . . For content [experience] is necessary for modes of experience to be acquired, as well as being important in its own right. And without training in public modes of experience the progressive ideals of autonomy, creativeness, and critical thought are empty uplift. (Peters and Hirst 1970, p. 32) In his synthesis, Peters uses the Kantian scheme of “concepts without content are empty, while impressions without concepts are blind” to bring the opposite poles closer together: forms of knowledge (public heritage) without experiential content are empty, while experience without forms of knowledge is blind. In its application to key progressive educational

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aims this scheme issues that factual knowledge without critical thinking is empty, while autonomy without public heritage is blind. In view of this synthesis, the polarization of the debate on curriculum and teaching method into an opposition between traditional devotees of subjects and formal methods on the one hand, and the progressive devotees of integration and informal methods on the other, is most unfortunate. As detailed in Chapter 2, Peters does not object as such to progressive curriculum integration or learning by discovery. What he objects to is that a curriculum structure or a method for learning something becomes puffed up into the curriculum structure without exceptions or the method for learning anything. Whether curriculum units of a topic or project type are appropriate cannot be settled once and for all because the appropriateness of such a curriculum structure depends upon what is being taught and other empirical criteria. And, whether experiential methods for learning are adequate cannot be decided for all time because the adequacy of such methods depends not only on what is being learned but also on the capacities of the children who have to learn it. What Peters objects to most about the Plowden philosophy is its tendency to become an ideology, which holds that there is some overall recipe for learning and teaching: My contention is that no such overall recipe is possible. What is needed is a down-to-earth, clear-headed, experimental approach which takes due account not only of general criteria but of the differences in what is taught and the children to whom it is taught. (Peters 1969c, p. 15)

The analytic paradigm under pressure In that same year, 1969, when Peters’ Perspectives on Plowden was published, two so-called “Black Papers” appeared.5 These papers predominantly written from the political right attacked the liberal progress in education carried forward in Great Britain in the 1950s and 1960s.Their appearance marked the onset of another period less favorable for the standing of educational studies and the philosophy of education. In the early 1970s, not only the political climate but also the economical

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climate started changing drastically. With the global economic recession setting in, the British world of education was confronted with the 1972 James Report on the reorganization of teacher training programs and the Government ’s 1972 White Paper on institutional rationalization in education. It is readily understandable that such an overall changing climate in the post-1968 period in combination with Peters’ mental breakdown in 1975 contributed to the weakening of Peters’ impact on educational philosophy. However, Peters’ influence slowly started to wane at the end of the 1970s not only for external reasons but also for internal ones, which have to do with the status of the analytic paradigm itself in the philosophy of education 10 years or more after its incipience. Abraham Edel already in 1972 concludes his stock-taking paper “Analytic philosophy of education at the cross-roads” with this sobering diagnosis: There is dissatisfaction in the philosophy of education with the current form of the analytic approach. Some of the analysts are themselves unhappy, professors as well as students. The source of the trouble lies in a weakness in current analytic method itself, which purports to exclude empirical and valuational and socio-historical components. These cannot be added successfully after the analysis is over—this yields an unsatisfactory half-house. (Edel 1972, p. 148) Surprisingly perhaps, Peters himself became in a certain way dissatisfied with the analytic approach: “ When, in 1975, I resigned the chairmanship of the Society [PESGB] after ten years of office, I argued that the subject was at rather a scholastic stage, tidying up minutiae of previous analyses and arguments” (Peters 1983, p. 35). His complaint was that analytic philosophy of education had degenerated into analytic scholasticism: “It settled down to a rather pedestrian period of tidying up and trying to improve on existing analyses and arguments. Few fresh ideas came in from philosophy or from elsewhere. . . . Perhaps, too, the analytic emphasis brought with it a rather narrow, piecemeal approach” (Peters 1983, p. 33). In a way such a normalization of a paradigm is inevitable because, in general, we always have a long, somewhat boring period of “normal science” after a short, exiting “scientific revolution” in a discipline (Kuhn 1962). But Peters felt the need to loosen up the analytic approach:

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“ We should not be too wedded to the paradigm of trying to analyse a concept by examining verbal usage. . . . The important thing is to have a problem. Without this conceptual analysis, or phenomenology, or any other approach, is scholastic” (Peters 1983, p. 53). This need was framed within in a more general recognition that the philosophy of education would be better served by engaging with more substantive issues in moral, social, and political philosophy, albeit through an identifiable, coherent, and explicit philosophical position (Peters 1983, pp. 48–55). For example, Peters notes that while his conception of moral respect has been subject to a great amount of scrutiny, the moral and political implications of his views on moral fraternity and moral education have been undertheorized and could be better served by an analysis of the social conception of the person that underlies his own philosophical perspective. In a certain way, therefore, Peters’ analytic approach in the philosophy of education cannot be identified with the narrow linguistic approach of ordinary language philosophy. It is true that “Peters’ paradigmatic example of the analysis of education was in a linguistic style, with appropriate references to what we would say, what the term suggests, what the dictionary records, and so on” (Dearden 1982, p. 61). Yet, for one thing, as pointed out in Chapter 1 and detailed in Chapters 4 and 6, Peters’ analytic paradigm includes questions of justification and empirical (or moral) psychology besides the question of conceptual (or linguistic) analysis. For another, though conceptual analysis is of central importance to the analytic paradigm, it is for Peters never an end in itself. The point of doing conceptual analysis is always to prepare the ground for tackling other philosophical and practical questions. According to Peters, conceptual analysis is only meaningful if it is done at the service of problems that crop up in educational practice and policy. For still another thing, as emerged from our exploration in Chapter 7, Peters’ work on the conceptual analysis (and justification) of education gets its ultimate inspiration from an anthropological and metaphysical background—his Stoic philosophy of life. In that way, Peters never was a narrow linguistic philosopher but an adherent of the analytic paradigm in the broad sense. Whatever Peters’ own attitude toward analytic philosophy of education was, in the early 1980s, the analytic paradigm obviously was

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under pressure and the analytic approach lost its predominance in Great Britain and elsewhere. The decline of the “analytic movement ” made, as a consequence, the emergence of new perspectives in the philosophy of education possible. We briefly review this postanalytic period in educational philosophy.6 The scene of (British) philosophy of education has transformed considerably since Peters’ heydays in the 1960s and early 1970s. With the advent of Thatcherism (1979–1990) and the increase of bureaucratic control by the government as well as the rising influence of managerial conceptions of educational administration, the political and institutional circumstances changed radically. Within the more utilitarian and instrumentalist climate of the 1980s and 1990s, the philosophy of education took a more “practical turn” and was more concerned with the “political implications.” It is remarkable that Peters never really worked out the political implications of his educational theory, although he wrote quite extensively on political philosophy in his earlier carrier (Peters 1956; Peters and Benn 1959). At the same time, many educational philosophers resisted an unquestioning acceptance of the market and consumer conceptions of narrowly neoliberalistic education. Both for their critique and their alternatives, they drew not only on postempiricist Anglo-American philosophy but also on Continental intellectual traditions such as Phenomenology, Existentialism, (Neo)Marxism, Structuralism, Critical Theory, and Postmodernism. “ Thus,” David Carr (1994, p. 6) observes, “one is as likely to encounter such names as Habermas, Adorno, Horkheimer, Lyotard, Gadamer, Foucault, Derrida, Ricoeur, Althusser or Lacan in a contemporary article on philosophy of education as those of McIntyre, Taylor or Rorty.” As of today, the situation has not altered much. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, philosophy of education is still meritoriously eclectic and cross-cultural in character. Noticeably, to the list of names quoted above, one would have to add Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Arendt, Levinas, Benjamin, Nietzsche, Cavell, and McDowell. In addition, recent social changes have, of course, engendered new challenges to be dealt with in educational philosophy. The present-day scene features philosophical reflection (and empirical research) on the ways in which educational systems try to cope with, for example, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, globalization, changing notions of citizenship

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(such as digital citizenship) and the family, environmentalism, as well as with, for example, new conceptions of vocational education, the rise of information and communication technology (ICT), and the restructuring of higher education in both European and North American contexts. All these current issues are approached from different theoretical viewpoints and explored in diverse styles of reflection and research: “For philosophy of education in the post-analytic period, the contents of leading journals and conference publications (such as those sponsored by PES, PESGB and PESA) became increasingly eclectic, interdisciplinary and iconoclastic towards traditional conceptions of the ‘field ’ ” (Burbules 2000, p. 12). So, with hindsight the answer to Peters’ “. . . question . . . whether its declining ascendancy has left a vacuum. . . . no new ‘paradigm’ has displaced it ” (Peters 1983, p. 39) is that although no new paradigm has displaced the analytic one, its decline has not left a vacuum either, because a plurality of paradigms has filled this vacuum. In short, the lay of the field is that contemporary philosophy of education is multiparadigmatic.7 Perhaps the mistake here was to think that, having “gotten over” the analytic paradigm, something equally monolithic and definitive was to replace it. In this respect, Peters’ prophecy was slightly too orthodox a Kuhnian line to take and that, instead, we observe numerous paradigms that have proliferated among the fields cultivated through the labors of the analytic view. This (albeit slight) continuity of philosophical work into the present has implications for the value of the analytic paradigm for contemporary scholarship, which we will outline next.

The importance of the analytic paradigm today Far from considering Peters’ analytic paradigm being somewhat outdated, we are of the opinion that it still has an important, if not essential role to play on the scene of philosophy of education today. Although one could agree that educational philosophy does not stand in need of a single paradigm, we think that in the context of the heterogeneous and multifaceted present-day scene, the analytic paradigm is not just one of the alternatives to choose from among the different paradigms that are available. In our view, within the multiparadigmatic structure

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of contemporary educational philosophy, the analytic paradigm is primus inter pares—the first among equals. All other paradigms—such as Phenomenology, Marxism, or Postmodernism—asymmetrically depend upon the basic, analytic paradigm. That is to say, whereas all other paradigms, in a sense to be explained immediately, depend upon the analytic one, the latter does not depend upon any of the others. In that way, one cannot avoid engaging with the analytic methods and claims of analytic philosophers such as Peters, Hirst, and Dearden. In the light of this asymmetrical dependency thesis, Peters’ analytic paradigm is, in a specific sense, foundational. The sense in which the term “foundational” is used here should not be misunderstood. The paradigm is not epistemologically foundational in the sense of trying to establish a set of infallible axioms for educational theory. It is, moreover, neutral as to the ontological commitments one holds at the foundations of one’s metaphysical worldview. Peters’ analytic paradigm is conceptually foundational in the sense that it deals with basic concepts that are constitutive of the discipline—the philosophy of education—itself. In that sense, too, all other paradigms depend upon the analytic one for the demarcation of their discipline and the identification of their basic issues. In order to substantiate our view on the importance of the analytic paradigm today, we take up the main components of Peters’ analytic project, as introduced in Chapter 1, conceptual analysis, justification, and moral development and briefly point out their foundational character. As to the analysis component, the paradigm involves an inquiry into the very concepts of education, learning, teaching, knowledge, curriculum, etc. Arguably, the treatment of all other educationally relevant concepts and issues asymmetrically depend upon the analysis of these key concepts.8 How can one adequately deal with the issue of multicultural education in the school if one has no clear view of education? How can one responsibly apply the concept of ICT in the classroom if one lacks an analysis of knowledge? How can one address issues of distributive justice in educational systems if one has no sense of what makes education and knowledge worth distributing in the first place? Unless one has such key concepts in one’s theoretical toolbox, talking philosophy of education quickly degenerates into “edu-babble.” While one can dispute whether the particular view of education developed by

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Peters is entirely cogent or sufficiently worked-out, engaging with these foundational concepts of Peters’ analytic paradigm remains necessary for every philosopher of education who wants to elucidate his or her personal concerns in the domain of education. As to the justificatory component, although Peters’ analytic paradigm engages unsuccessfully with a specific Kantian transcendental approach, as explicated in Chapter 4, the generic justificatory project has to be taken up and dealt with in any serious philosophy of education. Arguably, education is goal-directed, or as some say, “teleological.” In addition, when it comes to educating our children, we believe that some goals are worthy of pursuit whereas others are not and that some goals are more worthy of pursuit than others. Education is, thus, also value-directed, or as some say, “normative.” In the light of this teleological-normative structure of education, the issue of the justification of educational goals or aims is inescapable and thus foundational for doing educational philosophy. Identifying, selecting, and justifying bedrock as well as subsidiary educational aims invariably demands that we tread into the deep waters of axiology or theory of value. The justification for a candidate educational aim can be sought in an instrumental or noninstrumental style; it can be given in terms of extrinsic or intrinsic value or goodness; it can be grounded in terms of aspirational conceptions of the good life or obligatory conceptions of moral rightness. Whatever justificatory strategy one takes, the justification of educational aims as inherently associated with the debate concerning alternative life-ranking and world-ranking axiologies is an issue that no philosopher of education can neglect.9 As to the moral development component, although Peters’ analytic paradigm is connected to the perhaps outdated framework of the Piaget-Kohlberg developmental moral psychology,10 an account of the structure of moral development should be part of any serious philosophy of education whatever particular moral psychology is espoused. Arguably, taking a position with regard to the educational assumption and the acquisition question in the debate between social-learning theory, nativism, and constructivism, as charted in Chapter 6, lies at the heart of the matter in philosophy of education. Peters’ particular position regarding this foundational issue is highly significant even in the contemporary debate because it consists in being a counterbalance

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against too radical versions of nativism, individualism, and child-centered progressivism. His insistence on initiation into public modes of experience, knowledge, and understanding of the human predicament in order to become an educated and morally responsible person remains particularly important for present-day educational theory. Peters’ comprehensive theory of moral education against the backdrop of the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) is an everlasting contribution to the philosophy of education and a permanent source of inspiration for its future advancement. Peters himself concludes his own 1983 state of the art—his philosophical testament in a way—with these words: Certainly this more low-level, down to earth, type of work [on practical issues] is as important to the future of philosophy of education as higher-level theorising. . . . I do not think [however] that down to earth problems . . . can be adequately or imaginatively dealt with unless the treatment springs from a coherent and explicit philosophical position. . . . But maybe there will be a “paradigm shift ” and something very different will take its [the analytic paradigm’s] place. But I have simply no idea what this might be. I would hope, however, that the emphasis on clarity, the producing of arguments, and keeping closely in touch with practice remain. (Peters 1983, p. 55) As indicated earlier, no paradigm shift has taken place in the meanwhile. What has come to the surface today is the multiparadigmatic configuration of the philosophy of education. Yet, Peters’ rumination about the future reminds us of the foundational place of the analytic paradigm in this present-day configuration. On this view, the analytic paradigm in a postanalytic era belongs to a kind of asymmetric federate of philosophical paradigms where each has the same formal status but where the analytic perspective is an indispensible and constitutive component. As such, it should play an essential role on the scene of philosophy of education today. Because Peters’ paradigm is philosophical, analytical, and foundational, it contributes not only to the clarity and argumentative structure but also to the seriousness of the discipline. It is Peters’ reminder that we must reflect on what it is we are actually

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claiming when we talk about education. Only by way of such a reflexion can we ensure that an inclusive, federated, multiparadigmatic philosophy of education, in its attempts to be responsive to the concerns of the moment, does not lose sight of what makes it a valuable and distinctive contribution to the philosophical enterprise at large.

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Notes

Chapter 1 1 The term “paradigm” was originally introduced by Thomas Kuhn (1962) in the history and philosophy of science to refer to an accepted example of actual scientific practice which provides a model from which springs a particular tradition of doing scientific research. Instances of such paradigms are Aristotle’s Physica and Newton’s Principia in physics. Analogously, we mean by Peters’ “analytic paradigm” the unprecedented example Peters set in the philosophy of education that was sufficiently powerful to attract followers away from competing models of doing philosophy of education. In a loose sense, it refers to a set of educational problems which occupied Peters and his preferred analytic methodology for resolving them. 2 Peters’ general biographical data are gathered from Archives in London and the M25 area (AIM25), the Institute of Education (University of London), and The Times ( January 27, 2012). The specific details are taken over from Collits’ RS Peters: A Man and His Work (1992), which provides the most extensive biographical information publicly available. We are most grateful to Helen Killick, who sagaciously edited our brief account of Peters’ life. 3 One holiday tutor Eric Blair, better known as George Orwell, the later author of the allegorical novel Animal Farm and the dystopian novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, made a lasting impression on Peters; see Peters (1974d). 4 For Peters’ own recollections of this period, see Peters (1974e). 5 Most of Peters’ talks were first printed in The Listener, a weekly magazine established by the BBC in 1929, which ceased publication in 1991, and they later appeared together in Peters’ short book Authority, Responsibility, and Education (Peters 1959). 6 For possible objections to the analytic methodology and subtle responses to them in defense of it, see Peters and Hirst (1970), pp. 6–8. 7 For convenience’s sake, we neglect here the so-called “Gettier paradox” of knowledge (Gettier 1963). 8 For the data about Peters’ intellectual development, we are also indebted to Collits (1992). 9 For Peters’ full bibliography, see Cooper (1986), pp. 215–18.

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10 At the occasion of the opening of the RS Peters Book Collection, June 18, 2006, Peters said this in response to the question “ Which of your books do you like most?” posed by Ruth Cigman (Senior Research Fellow in the philosophy of education, London Institute of Education) to find out which of his own books he most admired or felt proud of (personal communication). 11 This was also our motivation for recently editing together Reading R. S. Peters Today (Cuypers and Martin 2011).

Chapter 2 1 For more on the concept/conception distinction as a method of analysis, see Rawls (1999). 2 For an example of this epistemic/attitudinal dichotomy in the context of critical thinking, see Siegel (1999). 3 For more on the connections between physician expertise and the broadening of cognitive perspective, see Zelenka (2008).

Chapter 3 1 For an excellent analysis of this paradox, see Luntley (2009).

Chapter 4 1 This awareness was not a late development for Peters. He is keenly aware of it from the beginning of his project. See also the following from “Aims of education—a conceptual analysis” (1967a): “ The analysis of ‘aims of education’ would not, of course, settle the substantive issue; for moral decisions can never be extracted from conceptual analysis” (p. 17). 2 As Kleing points out in his critical review of Peters’ application of transcendental arguments, the transcendental approach is not simply one among a plethora of theories of moral justification but an attempt to determine the rational basis of morality in a way that is necessary for its justification to be at all possible: “ Thus Kant (1781, B. xxxv) distinguished only two general kinds of approach to justification—dogmatic and transcendental or critical. The former, into which he implicitly gathers all the classical theories of justification, are dogmatic because their presuppositions have not been examined and justified—‘the dogmatic

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4

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procedure of pure reason, without previous criticism of its own powers’. The latter, on the other hand, are designed to provide a nonquestion-begging ‘critique of the organ, that is, of pure reason itself ’” (Kleing 1973, p. 150). However, Habermas himself would not describe his project of discourse morality as “transcendental” but “quasi-transcendental” or “transcendental pragmatic.” For more on the distinction, see Habermas (1990; 2008). There are, of course, further objections. Habermas, for example, thinks that Peters fuses action and discourse in a way that inappropriately “moralized” public justification. For more on the limits of Peters’ approach, see Habermas (1990) and Martin (2012). See Sandel (1982) and Walzer (1984) for founding examples of this critique. For a critique of Peters’ transcendental argument on such egocentric grounds, see Montefiore (1981). Note that this two-tiered argumentative strategy represents a more detailed articulation of, but perhaps not too much of a move away from, the “private prudence” argument that Peters develops with Griffiths (1962).

Chapter 5 1 Peters seems to follow here Wilhelm Dilthey, the writer of Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Introduction to the Human Sciences, 1883), according to whom the human sciences encompass both the humanities (in the narrow sense) and the social sciences. They range from disciplines like philology, literary and cultural studies, religion and psychology, to political science and economics. On Dilthey, see further, for example, Makkreel (2012). 2 For a good example of the covering-law model in the social sciences, see Hempel (2001, part. IV). 3 An alternative term for the latter would be Peter Strawson’s “reactive attitudes and feelings” (Strawson 1962). 4 Peters aligns himself here with Karl Popper’s critical rationalism. For Popper’s view, which had a strong influence on Peters, see Magee (1973) and O’Hear (1980). 5 For further reflections on Peters’ equation of education as such with liberal education in the context of teacher training, see Dearden (1986). 6 For this second domain of special educational theory, see, for example, Hamlyn (1967) and Hirst (1967). 7 For this debate, see, for example, O’Connor (1957, chap. 5) and Hirst (1966).

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8 Whereas Peters uses the noun “foundation,” we systematically use the adjective “foundational” for grammatical convenience. The disciplines found or lay the base of educational studies.

Chapter 6 1 Peters (1971b, pp. 247–8) calls the former “type a virtues” and the latter “type c virtues.” 2 Peters (1971b, p. 247) calls them “type b virtues.” 3 Peters (1971b, p. 248) calls them “type d virtues.” 4 For a general philosophical treatment of the Piaget-Kohlberg theory, see Flanagan (1991, chap. 5). 5 For further information about this fascinating debate, see Nucci and Narvaez (2008); Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). 6 The first level more or less corresponds to, what Piaget called, the “premoral” stage, the second to the “moral realism” stage, and the third to the “moral relativity ” stage. To Kohlberg’s first level belong stage 1 “Punishment and Obedience” and stage 2 “Individual Instrumental Purpose and Exchange,” to the second level stage 3 “Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Conformity ” and stage 4 “Social System and Conscience Maintenance,” and to the third level stage 5 “Prior Rights and Social Contract or Utility ” and stage 6 “Universal Ethical Principles”. For our purposes, the details of these Kohlbergian stages can be neglected, as well as his speculations about the existence of stage 7. See Kohlberg (1981). 7 Here, we skip over the ambiguity between learning principles and learning the adequate attitudes toward them. Peters writes: “If one takes . . . the forms of conception that are features of the different developmental stages, it is not obvious what can be done about these—for example, coming to see a rule as connected with approval rather than with rewards.” (Peters 1971b, p. 244) This is actually not about two types of principles, but about the difference between a principle itself and a cognitive attitude toward a principle. See also Peters (1978, p. 117). 8 See also Hirst (1971). 9 There are, of course, other contributory factors. Both internal conditions, psychological as well as biological, and external social conditions have a marked influence on moral development, see Peters (1973a, pp. 38–41). 10 Compare this with the unrestricted concept of teaching, introduced above. 11 Peters (1971b, pp. 250–1 and 253) distinguishes between the use of “habit ” as a descriptive term from its use as an explanatory term. In its

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14

15

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first use, “Habitual forms of behavior can involve reasoning as well as intelligence in the sense of adaptability ” (p. 251), whereas in its second use it suggests “routine types of situations to which the concept of ‘intelligence’ is not applicable” (p. 253). Compare this contrast with Kant ’s between “acting from duty (aus Pflicht)” and “acting in accordance with duty.” Peters’ analysis of moral habit in terms of intelligent adaptability and openness to reason to resolve the paradox of moral education faces, however, an important remaining problem. For this remaining problem of educational authenticity and a proposal for its solution, see Cuypers (2009). Here, we do not give further details about the fact that the achievement of autonomy—reaching the highest stage at the postconventional level—presupposes both social conditions, such as living in an open, democratic society, and psychological conditions, such as the possession of a sophisticated conceptual apparatus and an appropriate emotional environment. See note 3, this chapter. Also Feinberg, in the quote immediately below, speaks about “the actual condition of self-government and its associated virtues,” that is, the willpower virtues or, what Peters calls, “type d virtues.” See Cuypers (2009; 2011) for more about the authenticity condition and the rationality-condition. Cuypers and Haji (2006) give further details about the structure of this solution to the problem of indoctrination.

Chapter 7 1 See, in particular, Peters (1958, chap. 3; 1960; 1965). 2 For a general treatment of the educability of the emotions, see White (2002, chap. 9). 3 Peters further assumes that truth is the primary epistemic goal. This is, however, controversial. See, for example, the Kvanvig-David debate in Steup and Sosa (2005, chap. 10). 4 Moral criticism of emotion-appraisals is limited by the “ought implies can” principle (Peters 1970a, p. 183; 1973, pp. 84–5). If human beings cannot avoid being subject to certain emotions (e.g. fear, anger, jealousy, pride), then it is inappropriate to morally criticize them for having these emotions. If they biologically or psychologically cannot feel otherwise, then it is pointless to claim that they morally ought to feel otherwise or nothing at all. Human nature sets limits to the extent of moral criticism of the emotions. Perhaps the same is also true for some forms of cultural

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9

10

11

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relativism: it seems equally inappropriate to morally criticize people for experiencing guilt in a guilt-culture. If they culturally cannot experience otherwise, then this sets again a limit to the extent to which moral criticism of the emotions is possible. For Peters’ account of Aristotelian habituation, see the preceding chapter. For more about these opposing views, see Rawls (2000). Peters’ conception of reason is clearly Popperian. See, for instance, Popper (1949). For further reflections on the rational passions congenial to Peters view, see Scheffler (1977). See also Harvey Siegel’s (1988, pp. 34–42) distinction between the “reason assessment component ” and the “critical spirit ” component of critical thinking. Peters already defends the thought that education does not have a concrete aim, but only a formal one, that is, a principle of procedure, in his “Must an educator have an aim?” (1959). Apart from the moral principles, we limit ourselves to the religious transformation of the worthwhile activities in life. For the relation between the religious dimension and the three other moral facets— motives and emotions, qualities of the will and role-responsibilities—see Peters (1973a, pp. 118–20). Here Peters rearticulates a theme that goes back to his (early) work with Griffiths on the autonomy of prudence. See Peters and Griffiths (1962).

Chapter 8 1 For this series, see http://www.philosophy-of-education.org/impact/ impact.asp. 2 For the report ’s full text on line, see http://www.educationengland.org. uk/documents/plowden/. For assessments of “Plowdenism” 20 years later, see Halsey and Sylva (1987) and Dearden (1987). 3 For a clear but controversial account of Wittgenstein’s argument, see Kripke (1982). 4 Compare the B. F. Skinner’s quote on the frontispiece of Perspectives on Plowden: “ The school of experience is no school at all, not because no one learns in it but because no one teaches. Teaching is the expedition of learning; a person who is taught learns more quickly than one who is not ” (Peters 1996b, p. iii). 5 “Five such collections were published, the first three being edited by Brian Cox and A. E. Dyson, the last two by Cox and Rhodes Boysen” (Darling 1994, p. 97).

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6 We rely on the “state of the art ” accounts by Carr (1994) and Burbules (2000) as reports on the fortunes of educational philosophy in this post1980 and contemporary period. 7 The recent guidebooks to the field, such as A Companion to the Philosophy of Education (Curren 2003), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education (Blake et al. 2003), and The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Education (Siegel 2009), amply testify to this multiparadigmatic condition of present-day philosophy of education. 8 For a nearly complete list of these fundamental notions, see Winch and Gingell (1999). 9 See further Cuypers (2012), who brings out the permanent importance of Peters’ justificatory project on a generic level and suggests some possible strategies for its successful execution today. See also Martin (2012), who argues that any project of justification at the generic level must contend with the educational domain for completeness and further, self-reflexively determine how the normative structure of this domain speaks back to the generic level. 10 Let it be clear, however, that the Piaget-Kohlberg constructivist view has not lost its appeal. For supporting arguments for a coherent contemporary constructivism, see, for example, Rest et al. (1999).

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Peters’ texts Peters, R. S. (1956), Hobbes. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books. — (1958), The Concept of Motivation. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. — (1959), ‘Must an educator have an aim?’, in R. S. Peters, Authority, Responsibility, and Education, 3rd edn. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1973, pp. 122–31. — (1960), ‘Freud’s theory of moral development in relation to that of Piaget ’, in R. S. Peters, Moral Development and Moral Education. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1981, pp. 11–23. — (1962a), ‘Emotions and the category of passivity ’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 62, 117–34. — (1962b), ‘Moral education and the psychology of character’, in R. S. Peters, Moral Development and Moral Education. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1981, pp. 24–44. — (1963a), ‘Education as initiation’, in R. D. Archambault (ed.), Philosophical Analysis and Education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 87–111. — (1963b), ‘Reason and habit: The paradox of moral education’, in R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development. A collection of articles on psychological theories, ethical development and human understanding. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1974, pp. 174–92. — (1964), ‘ The place of philosophy in the training of teachers’, in R. S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 135–50. — (1965), ‘Emotions, passivity, and the place of Freud’s theory in psychology ’, in B. B. Wolman (ed.), Scientific Psychology. Principles and Approaches. New York: Basic Books, pp. 365–83. — (1966a), Ethics and Education. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. — (1966b), ‘ The philosophy of education’, in J. W. Tibble (ed.), The Study of Education. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 59–89. — (1967a), ‘Aims of education—A conceptual inquiry ’, in R. S. Peters (ed.), The Philosophy of Education. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 11–29. — (1967b), ‘ What is an educational process?’, in R. S. Peters (ed.), The Concept of Education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 1–23.

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— (1967c), ‘ “Education” as a specific preparation for teaching’, in R. S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 151–66. — (1969a), ‘ The meaning of quality in education’, in R. S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 22–45. — (ed.) (1969b), Perspectives on Plowden. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. — (1969c), ‘ “A recognizable philosophy of education”: A constructive critique’, in R. S. Peters (ed.), Perspectives on Plowdon. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 1–20. — (1970a), ‘ The education of the emotions’, in R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development. A collection of articles on psychological theories, ethical development and human understanding. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1974, pp. 174–92. — (1970b), ‘Conrete principles and the rational passions’, in R. S. Peters, Moral Development and Moral Education. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1981, pp. 61–82. — (1970c), ‘Education and the educated man’, in R. S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 3–21. — (1971a), ‘Reason and passion’, in R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development. A collection of articles on psychological theories, ethical development and human understanding. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1974, pp. 151–73. — (1971b), ‘Moral development: A plea for pluralism’, in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive Development and Epistemology. New York: Academic Press, pp. 237–67. — (1972), ‘ The role and responsibilities of the university in teacher education’, in R. S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, pp. 181–92. — (1973a), Reason and Compassion. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. — (1973b), ‘Freedom and the Development of the Free Man’, in P. H. Hirst and P. White (eds), Philosophy of Education. Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition. Volume II: Education and Human Being. London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 11–31. — (1973c), ‘ The justification of education’, in R. S. Peters (ed.), The Philosophy of Education. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 239–67. — (1973d), ‘Education as an academic discipline’, in R. S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 167–80. — (1974a), ‘Moral development and moral learning’, Monist, 58, 541–67. — (1974b), ‘Subjectivity and standards’, in R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development. A collection of articles on psychological theories, ethical development and human understanding. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1974, pp. 413–32.

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— (1974c), ‘Preface’, in R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development. A collection of articles on psychological theories, ethical development and human understanding. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1974, pp. 13–21. — (1974d), ‘A boy ’s view of George Orwell’, in R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development. A collection of articles on psychological theories, ethical development and human understanding. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1974, pp. 460–3. — (1974e), ‘I was twenty then’, in R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development. A collection of articles on psychological theories, ethical development and human understanding. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1974, pp. 464–8. — (1977a), ‘Ambiguities in liberal education and the problem of its content ’, in R. S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 46–67. — (1977b), ‘Dilemmas in liberal education’, in R. S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 68–85. — (1978), ‘ The place of Kohlberg’s theory in moral education’, in R. S. Peters, Essays on Educators. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1981. — (1979), ‘Democratic values and educational aims’, in R. S. Peters, Essays on Educators. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1981, pp. 32–50. — (1983), ‘Philosophy of education’, in P. H. Hirst (ed.), Educational Theory and Its Foundaton Disciplines. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 30–61. Peters, R. S. and Benn, S. I. (1959), Social Principles and the Democratic State. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Peters, R. S. and Griffiths, A. P. (1962), ‘ The autonomy of prudence’, Mind, 71, 161–80. Peters, R. S. and Hirst, P. H. (1970), The Logic of Education. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

Other works Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957), Intention. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Archard, D. (1993), Children. Rights and Childhood. London: Routledge. Aristotle (2009), The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Benn, S. I. (1976), ‘Freedom, autonomy and the concept of a person’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 76, 109–30. Blake, N., Smeyers, P., Smith, R., and Standish, P. (eds) (2003), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Brown, S. D. (ed.) (1975), Philosophers Discuss Education. London: Macmillan. Burbules, N. C. (2000), ‘Philosophy of education’, in B. Moon, M. Ben-Peretz, and S. Brown (eds), Routledge International Companion to Education. London: Routledge, pp. 3–18.

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Carr, D. (1994), ‘ The philosophy of education’, Philosophical Books, 35, 1–9. Collits, M. (1992), R. S. Peters: A man and his work. An historical and philosophical appraisal of the man synonymous with philosophy of education in Great Britain from 1960–1980. Armidale: University of New England (unpublished PhD thesis). Cooper, D. E. (ed.) (1986), Education, Values and Mind. Essays for R. S. Peters. London: Routledge & Kegan. Curren, R. (ed.) (2003), A Companion to the Philosophy of Education. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Cuypers, S. E. (2009), ‘Educating for authenticity: The paradox of moral education revisited’, in H. Siegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education. New York: Oxford University Press. — (2012), ‘R. S. Peters’ “justification of education” Revisited’, Ethics and Education, 7, 3–17. Cuypers, S. E., and Haji, I. (2006), ‘Education for critical thinking: can it be non-indoctrinative?’, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 38, 723–43. Cuypers, S. E. and Martin, C. (eds) (2011), Reading R. S. Peters Today. Analysis, Ethics, and the Aims of Education. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Darling, J. (1994), Child-Centred Education and Its Critics. London: Paul Chapman Publishing. Dearden, R. F. (1982), ‘Philosophy of education, 1952–82’, British Journal of Educational Studies, 30, 57–71. — (1986), ‘Education, training and the preparation of teachers’, in D. E. Cooper (ed.), Education, Values and Mind. Essays for R.S. Peters. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 69–88. — (1987), ‘ The Plowden philosophy in retrospect ’, in R. Lowe (ed.), The Changing Primary School. London: The Falmer Press, pp. 68–85. Degenhardt, M. A. B. (2010), ‘R. S. Peters: Liberal traditionalist ’, in R. Bailey, R. Barrow, D. Carr, and C. McCarthy (eds), The Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Education. London: Sage, pp. 125–38. de Rijk, L. M. (1965), ‘Enkyklios paideia. A study of its original meaning’, Vivarium, 3, 24–93. de Sousa, R. (2010), ‘Emotion’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2010/entries/emotion/. Dewey, J. (1916), Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. New York: The Free Press. Dray, W. H. (1967), ‘Commentary ’, in R. S. Peters (ed.), The Philosophy of Education. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 34–9. Dunne, J. (1997), Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘ Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Dwyer, S. (1999), ‘Moral competence’, in K. Murasugi and R. Stainton (eds), Philosophy and Linguistics. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 169–90.

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Index

action-explanation, purposive, rule-following model 19, 118, 171, 175, 188 aim, conceptual analysis of 29–34, 58–9 aims of education see education, aims of analytic paradigm 3, 13–9, 24, 29–34, 39, 66, 72–3, 136, 209–10, 222–30 analytic philosophy 8, 11–13, 34 Anscombe, E. 174 Arendt, H. 225 Aristophanes 18 Aristotle 18, 69, 82, 91, 157–9 Arnold, M. 173 artes liberales (liberal arts) 46, 104–6, 111, 114 Austin, J. L. 11 autonomy, personal 54, 114–16, 133, 135, 138, 164–70, 201–2, 215, 219 Ayer, A. J. 11, 18 barbarians metaphor 20, 57, 220 Bedford, E. 173 Behaviorism 35–6, 42, 49, 145, 157 Benjamin, W. 225 Benn, S. I. 167 Bildung (Selbst-Bildung) 106, 114 Cavell, S. 225 child-centred education 22, 39–42, 115, 209, 213–22 Cicero 18, 104 cognitive-developmental psychology see moral education and development, cognitive theory of communitarianism 88 conceptual analysis 10–11, 13–15, 29–36, 75–7, 223–4, 227 criticism of and defence 62–73

R. S. Peters.indb 247

constructivism see moral education and development, cognitive theory of Cooper, D. 6–7 critical thinking 52, 114, 133, 135, 215 critieria of education 37–47 curriculum 102, 104–6, 111, 114, 121, 126–8, 130–1, 134, 214–15, 219, 222 Dearden, R. 6, 8 Degenhardt, M. 23 Dewey, J. 9, 31, 41, 102, 214 Dray, W. H. 62, 65–7, 77 Dunne, J. 69 Durkheim, E. 130 Edel, A. 223 education aims of 6, 19, 25, 29–34, 54, 58–9, 171, 195, 204–5, 215, 219, 221–2, 228 as a process 33, 37–47, 52–3, 56, 59–62, 74, 91, 102 general 107, 111–14 justification of 15–16, 49, 75–9, 91–103, 228 nonauthoritarian 107, 114–16 paradox of 116, 161–4 educational assumption 144, 146–7, 151 educational theory 12–13, 126–35, 210–2 Eliot, G. 125, 200 Elliot, R. 6, 8, 71–73, 101–2, 185 emotions 142, 150, 153–5 education of 177–87 nature of 172–7, 183–7 and passions see rational passions Peters’ appraisal view of 173–7, 183–7

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Index

248

Erasmus 106 ethical pluralism

136–43

Feinberg, J. 165 forms of knowledge thesis 43, 46, 62–3, 78, 94–8, 101, 112, 117, 215, 217–18 foundational disciplines 129–31, 133–5, 210 fraternity 53–4, 87–91, 224 Freud, S. 17, 19, 181, 192 functionalism 36 Griffiths, A. P. 92–3, 212, 233n. 7, 236n. 11 growth (as an aim of education) see child-centred education Habermas, J. 86–7 habit (habituation) 150, 155–61, 163–4, 181–3 Hamlyn, D. 6 Hare, R. M. 77 Heath, E. 7 Hegel, G. W. F. 51 Heidegger, M. 225 Herbart, J. F. 130 Herodotus 18 Hirst, P. 3, 6, 8, 21–2, 72, 79, 112, 117, 216, 221 Hobbes, T. 158 Hoffman, M. 154 humanities (human sciences) 118 and the quality of life 117–25 status of 118–23 Hume, D. 142, 154, 173, 187, 189 indoctrination 114, 165, 168 industrialization 35, 67, 81, 111, 113, 133 initiation 48–62, 66–7, 91, 94, 97–8, 101, 109, 114–18, 122, 124–6, 133–5, 155–6, 161, 171, 177, 185–6, 195, 215, 217–18, 220, 229 as synthetic concept 49 Institute of Education, London 6–7, 211–12 integrative view of reason and passion 187–95, 204

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James, W. 130 justification of education see education, justification of Kant, I. 91–3, 142, 186–7, 189 Kleing, J. 82, 85–7 knowledge and pleasure 96–7 and understanding 41, 45, 51, 56, 60–6, 76, 78, 94–101, 107 for its own sake, intrinsically worthwhile 41–2, 44–5, 56–8, 60, 63, 65, 108–11 general 111–14 Kohlberg, L. 17, 22, 24, 143, 146–58, 162 Lawrence, D. H. 23 levels of life 191–5 Levinas, E. 225 liberal education 20, 24, 46–7, 50, 104, 195 ambiguities and dilemmas of 106–16 and teacher training 126–35 and the humanities see humanities ideal of 104–6 justification of 123–5 Mace, A. 19 MacIntyre, A. 6–7, 140 McDowell, J. 225 meaning of life 203–4 Mischel, T. 6 Moore, G. E. 11 moral community 87–91 moral education and development 17–18, 22–3, 42, 91, 107, 136, 142–70, 195, 228–9 cognitive theory of (Kohlberg’s stage theory) 22, 24, 143–50, 145–6,148–50, 164–5, 171, 192, 228 comprehensive approach to 147–8, 150–61, 165 moral principles 73, 79–87, 95, 137, 140–1, 201

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Index

morality comprehensive conception of see ethical pluralism justification of 78–80, 81, 85 principled (interpersonal, rational) 73, 78, 88–94, 136–43, 153, 155, 161, 196–7 motives (motivation) 19, 32, 41, 43, 56–8, 61, 109, 138–9, 142–3, 174–7, 181–2, 184–5 nativism 145, 151 naturalism 80 Nietzsche, F. W. 225 Oakeshott, M. 20, 50–2, 108, 139 ordinary language philosophy 11, 224 paideia 104–5, 108 paradox of education see education, paradox of Peevers’ and Secord’s theory of personal understanding 154 Peters, R. S. intellectual development of 18–21 life of 4–8 oeuvre of 21–3 texts of 238–40 philosophy of education 8–11, 13, 16, 24, 39–40, 54, 75, 130, 209–10, 225–6, 227, 229–30 Piaget, J. 17, 19, 143, 146–8 Plato 9, 18, 23, 69, 104, 130, 204 Plowden, B. 213 Plowden report 209, 213–22 Popper, K. 19 progressivism see child-centred education prudence 92–3 public discourse 82–5 Pythagoras 104 Quakers 4–5 quality (educational) 62, 110, 113, 127 Quintilian 104 Quinton, A. 7

R. S. Peters.indb 249

249

rational passions 150, 154, 168, 178–9, 181, 185, 187–91, 199 Rawls, J. 88, (232f1) reason (rationality) 43, 52, 195–7 and passion 191–5 limits of 197 Peters’ conception of 97–101, 189–90, 194 Reid, L. A. 6 religion 5, 18–19, 197 religious experience (feelings) 197–204 religious education 204–5 respect for persons 53, 84–5, 141, 202 (children) as developing centres of consciousness 78 Rousseau, J. J. 9, 106, 214 Russell, B. 11 Ryle, G. 11, 18, 60, 174 Scheffler, I. 6, 20 Skinner, B. 157–8 social-learning theory 144–5 Socrates 152 solidarity see fraternity Solomon, R. 173 Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) 215–20 Stoic attitude 200–4 Strawson, P. 11 synthetic view of world and life 195–205 Tacitus 18 teacher training (education of teachers) 126–35, 212 teaching 214–15, 219–20 of virtues 150–3 techne 68–9 Thatcher, M. (Thatcherism) 7, 225 Tolstoy, L. 125 Tooby and Comides 216 transcendental argument (justification) 24, 81–101 and morality see morality, justification of and education see education, justification of

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Index

250

utilitarianism

81, 225

vocational training 50, 59, 101, 113, 135, 226 von Humboldt, W. 106 Warnock, M. 113, 183 White, J. 6, 184, 195 Whitehead, A. N. 8, 31

R. S. Peters.indb 250

Williams, B. 6–7, 211 Winch, P. 6 Wittgenstein, L. 11, 216, 225 anti-private language argument of 215, 217 worthwhile activities (worthwhileness) 37–9, 42–3, 45, 63–5, 77, 91–101, 138, 155, 196, 202–4, 219 and cognitive content 45–6, 100

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