Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Hierarchies, Markets and Networks (Public Sector Organizations) 3030968243, 9783030968243

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PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS

Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan Hierarchies, Markets and Networks Edited by Abiha Zahra Geert Bouckaert Muhammad Zafar Iqbal Jadoon Nasira Jabeen

Public Sector Organizations Series Editors B. Guy Peters Department of Political Science Pittsburgh University Pittsburgh, PA, USA Geert Bouckaert Public Management Institute Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Leuven, Vlaams Brabant, Belgium

Organizations are the building blocks of governments. The role of organizations, formal and informal, is most readily apparent in public bureaucracy, but all the institutions of the public sector are comprised of organizations, or have some organizational characteristics that affect their performance. Therefore, if scholars want to understand how governments work, a very good place to start is at the level of organizations involved in delivering services. Likewise, if practitioners want to understand how to be effective in the public sector, they would be well-advised to consider examining the role of organizations and how to make organizations more effective. This series publishes research-based books concerned with organizations in the public sector and covers such issues as: the autonomy of public sector organizations; networks and network analysis; bureaucratic politics; organizational change and leadership; and methodology for studying organizations. More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/14525

Abiha Zahra • Geert Bouckaert Muhammad Zafar Iqbal Jadoon Nasira Jabeen Editors

Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan Hierarchies, Markets and Networks

Editors Abiha Zahra Public Governance Institute KU Leuven Leuven, Belgium Department of Governance and Global Studies, Information Technology University, Lahore, Pakistan Muhammad Zafar Iqbal Jadoon Institute of Administrative Sciences University of the Punjab Lahore, Pakistan

Geert Bouckaert Public Governance Institute KU Leuven Leuven, Belgium Nasira Jabeen Institute of Administrative Sciences University of the Punjab Lahore, Pakistan

Public Sector Organizations ISBN 978-3-030-96824-3    ISBN 978-3-030-96825-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

Governments around the world are challenged to meet rising citizen expectations and address increasingly complex problems, and public sector reforms seek to improve how they do so. New reforms and strategies are now needed and public sector reforms matter as they ultimately seek to improve the life of citizens. Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Hierarchies, Markets or Networks makes an important contribution to our understanding. The experiences of Pakistan matter as it is one the world’s most populous countries and an example of other developing countries. It is a young democracy. People wish to raise their low-middle income and quality of life and, as in other countries, government plays a large, assisting and sometimes driving role. Yet, as elsewhere, citizen satisfaction with government is mixed at best. Public sector reform offers a mix of paradigms, strategies, and tools for improving public programs and policies, often by making them more agile, responsive, and effective for addressing ever-changing goals and standards of success. Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan examines reform trajectories, drivers and outcomes of these efforts. The focus of the book is on government agencies, rather than the political side, though the two are intertwined, of course. Government agencies are not easy to reform, to say the least, and not all efforts bear out quick results. Concern with public sector reform has a long history. Reforms address important issues of their time, and there is good deal of learning as reforms are implemented and adapted in subsequent years. What is thought to be difficult or radical and often criticized at the start becomes widely used and seen as beneficial in v

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subsequent years. Remember criticisms about treating citizens as customers in the 1980s and 1990s? That is now normal, and many citizens expect and enjoy being treated as such. Recall concerns about contracting out in the 1990s and 2000s? That now allows public agencies to attend other policy-making tasks and enjoy the capacities of the private in delivering frontline services. Recall privacy concerns around the use of digital government? It is now used to effectively reduce corruption and improve services and transparency. It is not a smooth road for sure and some concerns rightly endure, but even the most casual observer can see how governments have improved their service delivery in the past decades and also improved how they address major challenges such as crisis management and global pandemics, for example. Yet, progress has not occurred evenly in the world and new challenges loom. Developing countries in particular have not always seen the level of success using government reforms as other countries. Problems of a lack of capacity, rule-driven bureaucratic cultures, high levels of political and administrative corruption and clientelism, inherited legal systems, and absent top leadership are some of the frequent and chronic issues. Countries vary in their success in decentralization and building up new, strong subnational governments. They have varied in their ability to control corruption and cronyism and instead ensure dynamic, forward-­looking senior management for all its programs. Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan assesses these matters for Pakistan and details the lessons that come from it. The authors do this in context, with different chapters exploring roles of religion, military, the judiciary, and politics that, along with broad economic and societal trends that affect and shape reforms in many parts of the world. Beyond this, the efforts of the past now seem inadequate for addressing the challenges of today and tomorrow. New efforts are required in almost every area, from improving sustainability and addressing effect of global warming to ensuring increased economic progress and inclusion, and continued efforts in health, education, and public safety. The old reforms of yesterday need to be both further improved and disseminated, while new ones are developed, as well. We need progress in all the above areas. Countries need leaders who can critically assess the desirability and possibilities of global reforms in their contexts. Not all that can be adopted should be the main priority for any country. In doing so, we also need to

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rethink the balance of political and administrative leadership. Both are needed in democracies, and political leadership alone has proven incapable of providing all the needed leadership and results. Countries need senior public managers as well with vision and capabilities of changing the realities of their settings. In my view, future reforms are much needed and likely that strengthen senior administrative leadership and its accountability for performance. Public sector reform is a never-ending journey. It must learn the lessons from the past, disseminate effective improvements, and develop new reforms for current problems. Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Hierarchies, Markets or Networks is written by a range of young researchers, academicians, and practitioners. It truly brings together some of the best thinkers that Pakistan has to offer. It takes both a broad perspective as well as examines the drivers of specific applications. It analyzes the use of well-established tools such as public–private partnerships, as well as modern-­day issues of inclusion and sustainability. It reaches important conclusions that are stated as hypotheses in the concluding chapter. A most important conclusion is that broad and general reform efforts of the past that do not include important, powerful actors often get stalled. They find that decentralization “remained a distant dream” due to the absence of political power transfers at local governance. The lesson is to now more tightly link public sector reforms to “need-based reforms that aim to solve specific governance problems with clearly defined mechanisms.” I concur. I have seen in many developing countries outstanding and innovative improvements when capable, well-motivated administrative leaders, empowered by law and political leaders, address specific problems in specific policy domains. Broad reform ideas matter, but so do constellations of effective and united actors. The result may be quite uneven in the short term, but in time others may yet get on board when these are further institutionalized by law and incentive. Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Hierarchies, Markets or Networks makes a significant and essential contribution to our understanding of public sector reforms through such insights. Readers will find this an important book that strengthens conclusions about the direction of public sector reforms. São Paulo, Brazil November 2021

Evan Berman

Preface

This book is a dream-come-true for a growing community of public administration scholars who have been trying to claim an uncontested space for their field in higher education, research, and practice since the launch of first MPA program at University of the Punjab in 1962 under USAID project of technical assistance program to Pakistan. The American model of public administration education despite its incompatibility with Civil Service System of Pakistan grounded in British colonial traditions has not only survived but also got transformed as a field of study with strong emphasis on management transcending the typical boundaries of public sector. The book is appearing at a time when public administration in Pakistan is experiencing three converging trends, pushing the field toward its distinct identity. First, new programs of public administration under different nomenclatures are being launched in both public and private sector universities, which is an encouraging trend for the field; second, on the practice side, creating special task agencies at federal, provincial, and even local levels has been a dominant trend in the last two decades providing new opportunities for public administration graduates with business management skills; third, the launching of research degrees, MS and PhD, in public administration and management in the last 20 years has led to the emergence of a new research community deliberating on issues of public management. This book is a collaborative endeavor, the first of its kind, of this young and vibrant research community of public management scholars.

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This book is a success story of open and direct academic collaboration among academics across two continents without any international funding agencies. The project was initiated at the Public Governance Institute, KU Leuven, Belgium—in a routine meeting of Abiha Zahra with her PhD Supervisor, Professor Geert Bouckaert. Well, who knew the discussion in the KU Leuven Public Governance Institute that day would turn into a reality—taking the PhD project farther by looking at the topic from different angles with work from multiple young authors working across the globe. We connected with Abiha’s PhD project co-promoter, Professor Zafar Iqbal Jadoon, and with Professor Nasira Jabeen, director of a renowned and pioneer institution of Pakistan in the public management domain—Institute of Administrative Sciences, University of the Punjab for the book project. The call for chapter abstracts on public sector reforms was launched and ended up getting a splendid response. After several meetings—exploring relevance and quality of the abstracts—we invited some authors to submit their chapters. Once chapters were received, we had an initial editorial review after which authors were invited to peer-review the chapters of one another. We had a successful full-day seminar at the Institute of Administrative Sciences in Lahore where the authors discussed together, with some present online, to debate, discuss and review the work. Later, we had multiple online sessions with the authors and continuous engagement to reach what we have today. The role of reviewers from the publisher side has to be appreciated, which enabled us to connect the dots with theory in an effective manner. The joint project of Belgium and Pakistan is a milestone—with research from the developing world that examines the applicability of reform paradigms developed in the West. It further discusses the hybrid concepts that are specifically tailored to the context of Pakistan and other developing countries. We hope and wish that this initiative will inspire others to collaborate across borders. Pakistan is facing serious governance and development challenges that require adaptation rather than adoption through context-blind imitative reform initiatives. The conclusions and way forward presented in the book are based on unbiased and unsponsored scientific research conducted by young and bold researchers who have the capacity to bring sanity to the governance discourse which is so far

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partisan, rhetoric and tribal. Meanwhile, Professor Zafar Iqbal Jadoon is quite optimistic about the future of public administration as a field of study and the role of academia in governance discourse in Pakistan, provided individual initiative and collaborative spirit as reflected in the book continues. Lahore, Pakistan Leuven, Belgium  Lahore, Pakistan  Lahore, Pakistan 

Abiha Zahra Geert Bouckaert Muhammad Zafar Iqbal Jadoon Nasira Jabeen

Praise for Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan “The editors of this impressive volume have assembled highly insightful chapters on essential aspects of public sector reform in Pakistan. Drawing on an overarching analytical framework, the chapters analyse long-term trends from a macro-level perspective as well as reform trajectories in vital policy sectors including health, energy, and higher education. This book makes a significant contribution towards a theoretically and empirically rich understanding of how contextual factors shape public sector reforms in a developing context.” —Tobias Bach, Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway “This is an excellent book on the administrative reforms in Pakistan from an institutional building perspective. The editors not just walk the readers through the history of reforms in the country, but also utilize a multidimensional approach that combines political and market forces to analyze key sectors of healthcare, finance, education, energy, e-government and disaster management. The chapters showcase complexity of reforms in a non-Western setting. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in public administration in Pakistan.” —Meghna Sabharwal, Professor of Public and Nonprofit, Management School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, USA “The proposed book is an unusual and innovative collaborative research work. The title is enticing and opens up a spectrum of issues, challenges, images of nagging perceptions about Pakistan’s public sector. Yet, through cutting edge and evidence driven research, multiple chapters effectively convey possibilities and identify avenues of reform in various arenas of public sector. The eminent editors draw our attention on how a collaborative enterprise could lead to a paradigm shift and usher in ‘strategic decision making’ change in the public sector and thus reforming the functioning of the state. This is commendable research work on public sector reform in Pakistan.” —Dr. Saeed Shafqat, Professor & Director of the Centre for Public Policy and Governance, Forman Christian College, Lahore, Pakistan

Contents

 Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Hierarchies, Markets or Networks  1 Abiha Zahra and Geert Bouckaert

Part I Reforms in Public Sector Organizations  19  Interface of Actors and Positions: Implications for Reforms 21 Abiha Zahra and Geert Bouckaert  Reforming Structures and Procedures in Pakistan (1947–2018) 55 Abiha Zahra and Geert Bouckaert  Autonomy of Public Hospitals in Pakistan in the Time of Covid-19: A Policy Perspective 93 Muhammad Fayyaz Nazir  Energy Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Trends and Challenges111 Shabana Naveed, Madiha Rehman Farooqi, and Muhammad Zafar Iqbal Jadoon  Reforms in Federal Training Institutions in Pakistan—An Institutional Perspective133 Madiha Rehman Farooqi and Shabana Naveed xv

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 Interagency Collaboration/Coordination in the Context of Pakistan: Case of Polio Eradication Program153 Hasna Khan and Amani Moazzam

Part II Decentralization/Devolution 173  Trends in Local Government Reforms: Case of Environmental Protection Authority175 Zahra Ishtiaq Paul and Muhammad Adnan Sial  Decentralization Reforms in the Public Health Sector in Pakistan195 Aneeqa Suhail, Awais Gohar, and Trui Steen  Deregulation in Higher Education Institutions of Pakistan223 Hafsa Noor and Nasira Jabeen

Part III Involving the Market 249  Pakistan Post and the Creation of an Innovative Business Model to Enhance Financial Inclusion251 Naubahar Sharif and Athar Mansoor  Sustainable Public–Private Partnership Delivery in Pakistan; Evolution, Barriers, and Way Forward275 Beenish Bakhtawar, Muhammad Jamaluddin Thaheem, and Husnain Arshad

Part IV Adopting the New Trends 301  Digital Government: Transforming Sialkot into a Citizen-­ Friendly District303 Athar Mansoor and Syed Bilal Haider

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 Disaster Management Reforms in Pakistan329 Aisha Azhar  Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Concluding Reflections349 Muhammad Zafar Iqbal Jadoon, Nasira Jabeen, Geert Bouckaert, and Abiha Zahra Index363

Notes on Contributors

Husnain  Arshad is a PhD student at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, and has a background in engineering. He has experience in the sustainability assessment of large infrastructure projects, particularly for Pakistan. Previously, he has completed MS and BE studies at National University of Science and Technology (NUST), and also has been working in the infrastructure management domain, both in Pakistan and in Saudi Arabia, for more than two years. Aisha  Azhar is an assistant professor and director of the School of Governance and Society, University of Management and Technology, Lahore, Pakistan. She was a Fulbright Scholar from Pakistan for her doctoral studies at the Florida State University. Her research and teaching interests include emotional intelligence, pro-environmental behavior, disaster management (relief and recovery phases), public service motivation, and women empowerment. Beenish  Bakhtawar  is a PhD student at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, and has an MS degree in Construction Engineering and Management and a BE in Civil Engineering from the National University of Science and Technology, Pakistan. She works in the domain of water infrastructure management and explores computing applications for solving the water loss problem. Beenish also has in-depth research experience and knowledge related to public-private-­partnership (PPP) project delivery, risk assessment and sustainability of PPP projects. During her MS studies, she worked on a funded project related to PPP project delivery in Pakistan for around two years, which was supported by xix

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the Higher Education Commission (HEC), with Muhammad Jamaluddin Thaheem as principal investigator. Evan  Berman is Professor Titular of Public Management at Fundação Getúlio Vargas/EAESP, Brazil’s leading private university. He spent 15 years in Asia-Pacific and is the recipient of major awards such as the Fred Riggs Award for lifetime career achievements in International and Comparative Public Administration from the American Society for Public Administration. Evan’s research focuses include public performance and human resources in public administration, with current interests in strategic planning in national governments. He is the co-­author of Public Administration in South Asia: India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan (2013). He is an editor of book series and journals and is also an adjunct (chair) professor at Fudan University (Shanghai) and University of Indonesia (Jakarta). He received his PhD at George Washington University in Washington. Geert Bouckaert  is Professor of Public Management at the KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium. He is the past-president of the European Group for Public Administration (EGPA) and of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS). He was co-chair of the UN Committee of Experts on Public Administration (CEPA). Madiha  Rehman  Farooqi  holds Doctorate in Administrative Sciences from the University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. She is a lecturer in the University of Education, Lahore. She has diverse experience of teaching in conventional and virtual mode for eight years. Her areas of interest include organizational theory, administrative sciences and public sector management. She has been an active researcher and has presented her research in different national and international forums. Awais Gohar  has been a civil servant for 30 years in public sector organization dealing with general public and industrial workforce. He has remained engaged in human resource management for Health Care Services, development and improvement in Health Care System, establishment of Health Facilities for general public and industrial workforce and Health and Accident Insurance for the industrial workforce. He has also participated in policy development and system analysis. Syed Bilal Haider  is a career civil servant from the Pakistan Administrative Service. He has worked in various important public positions at the

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­ rovincial and federal levels in Pakistan. He holds a Master in Public p Management degree from the National University of Singapore and Harvard University and another master’s degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Nasira Jabeen  is a professor at the Institute of Administrative Sciences and Dean, Faculty of Economics and Management Sciences at the University of the Punjab, Pakistan. She holds a postdoctorate from the University of Texas, Austin (USA), and PhD from the University of Stirling, UK. She received a Master of Public Administration degree from the University of Southern California, USA, as well as from the University of the Punjab, Pakistan. Nasira has contributed as Professor to the Prince Claus Chair at the University of Utrecht, the Netherlands, in 2006–07. She has also served as a member of the Steering Committee of Association of Commonwealth Universities (ACU) for HR repositioning and modernization in public sector universities of Pakistan. Her research interests include governance, public management, gender, human resource management, and organizational change and development. Hasna Khan  has been a research scholar at the Institute of Administrative Sciences, University of the Punjab. Her primary research interest is in collaborative efforts of different agencies especially in the case of health-­ related emergencies. Athar  Mansoor  is a candidate for PhD in Public Policy at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. His research focuses on the Belt and Road Initiative and innovation and technology policy in developing countries. He holds an MS in Management from Michigan State University, Master of Public Policy from the University of Sydney, Master in Public Administration from National University of Singapore and Master of Business Administration from Lahore University of Management Sciences. His work has been published in Structural Change and Economic Dynamics and the British Medical Journal. Amani Moazzam  is an assistant professor at the Institute of Administrative Sciences, University of the Punjab. She has over ten years of research and teaching experience and has been presenting her work both at national and international conferences. Her areas of interest are Behavioral Public Management, Women in Management and Organizational Theory.

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Shabana  Naveed  is Assistant Professor of Management at Faculty of Management Studies, University of Central Punjab. Her research interests include public sector reforms, inter-organizational networks, and human resource management. She has worked extensively on governance and management of state-owned enterprises and presented her findings at national and international conferences. For her PhD study, she researched on the institutional complexity that public organizations encounter in network configurations. Muhammad Fayyaz Nazir  is a PhD scholar in the Department of Public Governance and Management, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium. His research interests include understanding public policy and its implementation. He has administrative and research experience. He received a scholarship for his PhD from Higher Education Commission of Pakistan. Hafsa Noor  holds a PhD in Public Administration from the Institute of Administrative Sciences, University of the Punjab, Pakistan. She has worked as a lecturer in the University of the Punjab and University of Lahore, Pakistan. Her areas of interest include governance of higher education in the public and private sector, organizational behavior and theory, organizational change and human resource management. She has been an active researcher and has presented her work in different national and international forums. Zahra  Ishtiaq  Paul is an assistant professor at the Institute of Administrative Sciences, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. She received her PhD in Administrative Sciences from the same institute. She has vast experience of teaching and research supervision. Her areas of interest are organizational behaviour and theory, human resource management and public administration, and she specializes in research on diversity and contextual performance. Naubahar Sharif  is the Acting Head of the Division of Public Policy at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. His area of specialization is science, technology and innovation policy. He received his PhD in Science and Technology Studies from Cornell University, USA.  His research work has been published in several top journals such as Research Policy, Science and Public Policy and Structural Change and Economic Dynamic.

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Muhammad  Adnan  Sial is an assistant professor at the University of Education, Lahore, Pakistan. He received his PhD in Administrative Sciences from the University of the Punjab, Lahore. His areas of interest are knowledge management, information and communication technology, organizational behaviour, public administration and human resource management. Sial is also a corporate trainer and conducts training for public and private sector organizations. He is at present conducting research in collaboration with the researchers of the Dundee University of UK. Trui Steen  is Professor of Public Governance at the KU Leuven, Public Governance Institute. She is Vice Dean of Faculty of Social Sciences at KU Leuven. She is co-chair of the IIAS study group on co-­production of public services. Her research interests include public sector professionalism, public service motivation, professional-citizen collaboration and co-­ production of public services, central-local government relations, and public sector innovation. Aneeqa  Suhail  is Lecturer in HRM in the Human Resource Studies Department at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. She holds a PhD in Social Sciences on an IRO Scholarship from Public Governance Institute, KU Leuven, Belgium. Her research interests include HR autonomy, strategic human resource management (HRM) in the public sector and public management. Muhammad  Jamaluddin  Thaheem is a senior lecturer at Deakin University, Australia. He previously worked as the Head of Department of Construction Engineering & Management at NUST, Pakistan. With a PhD from Politecnico di Torino, Italy, Thaheem has more than ten years of teaching and industry experience in the USA, Australia and Pakistan. He has more than 100 publications with above 1000 citations in many prestigious journals, and has supervised more than 100 undergraduate and graduate research studies in the domains of building and infrastructure management, risk management and sustainability in construction projects, use of information and communication technology in construction management, and public-private-partnership (PPP) projects. Muhammad  Zafar  Iqbal  Jadoon  holds a PhD from the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, USA. He has served the University of the Punjab as Professor of Administrative Sciences and Dean of Faculty of Economics and Management Sciences. He has also taught at the University

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of Houston, the University of Stirling, UK, and the University of Southern California. His research interest lies in governance and management of public organizations. He is based in the USA as an independent researcher. Abiha  Zahra is Assistant Professor of Public Administration in the Department of Governance and Global Studies, Information Technology University, and a research fellow at Public Governance Institute, KU Leuven, Belgium. She holds a PhD in Public Administration from KU Leuven, Belgium, as an IRO doctoral scholar. Her work revolves around public policy, reforms governance, performance and management with extensive research and teaching experience in the field.

Abbreviations

ABCDE Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics AC Assistant Commissioner ACR Annual Confidential Report ACU Association of Commonwealth Universities ADB Asian Development Bank ADHO Assistant District Health Officer AEDB Alternate Energy Development Board AEP Academy of Educational Planning AEPAM Academy of Educational Planning and Management AHKRC Akhter Hameed Khan Resource Centre ARE Alternate and Renewable Energy ATM Automated Teller Machine BD Basic Democracy BHUs Basic Heath Units BLGA Baluchistan Local Government Act BOD Board of Directors BOGs Board of Governors BOO Build-Own-Operate BPS Basic Pay Scale Structure BRI Belt and Road Initiative BSA Bulk Supply Agreement BTA Business Transfer Agreements C&W Communication and Works CBDRM Community Based Disaster Risk Management CBV Community-Based Vaccination CCB Citizen Community Board

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ABBREVIATIONS

CCB CCI CCOR CEDO CEO CFI CII CM CMLA COAS CPEC CPPA CPS CSA CSP CTBCM DC DCO DDHO DDMA DDO DG DHA DHO DHQ DISCO DO DPI DPO DRM DRR EBDO EDI EDO EDP EOC EOC EPA EPCO ERC ERP ERRA

Citizen Community Boards Council of Common Interests Cabinet Committee in Restructuring Chief Executive District Health Officer Chief Executive Officer Comprehensive Freight International Council of Islamic Ideology Chief Minister Chief Martial Law Administrator Chief of Army Staff China Pakistan Economic Corridor Central Power Purchasing Authority College of Physicians and Surgeons Civil Service Academy Civil Service of Pakistan Competitive Trading Bilateral Contracts Market Deputy Commissioner District Coordination Officer Deputy District Health Officer District Disaster Management Authority Deputy District Officer Director General District Health Authority District Health Officer District Headquarter Hospital Distribution Company District Officer Director Public Instruction District Police Officer Disaster Risk Management Disaster Risk Reduction Elective Bodies Disqualification Order Executive Development Institute Executive District Officer Environmental Protection Department Emergency Operation Centre Emergency Operations Center Environmental Protection Authority Environmental Planning & Coordination Organization Emergency Relief Cell Emergency Response Preparedness Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority

 ABBREVIATIONS 

ESA FATA FCC FCCU FCV FIFA FSA FSC FSF FSW FTI FTIP FWO GAVI GC GCU GCWUF GCWUS GDP GENCO GLC GPEI GRC HAS HEC HED HEI HFA HISDU HIT HMC HMIS HOD HR HTM ICS ICSID ICT IDPs IMF INGOs IoT

Electric Supply Agreement Federally Administered Tribal Areas Forman Christian College Forman Christian College and University Female Community Volunteer Federation International Football Association Foreign Service Academy Fuel Supply Company Federal Security Force Federal Skilled Worker Federal Training Institution Foreign Trade Institute of Pakistan Frontier Works Organization Global Alliance for Vaccination and Immunization Government College Government College University Government College Women University Faisalabad Government College Women University Sialkot Gross Domestic Product Generation Company Government Linked Company Global Polio Eradication Initiative Ghulam Rasool & Company Health Services Academy Higher Education Commission Higher Education Department Higher Education Institution Hyogo Framework for Action Health Information Service Delivery Unit Heavy Industries Taxila Heavy Mechanical Complex Health Management Information System Head of Department Human Resource Hierarchy Type Management Indian Civil Service International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Information and Communication Technology Internally Displaced Persons International Monetary Fund International Non-Governmental Organizations Internet of Things

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ABBREVIATIONS

IPC IPCC IPDF IPPs IPV IRMNCH JICA JV KESC KKH KPK LAFCO LCWU LFO LG LGO LHW LNG LSMIM M1 M2 M9 MBD MCB MDGs MHEWS MHSDP MO MOE MOH MoNHSRC MoU MOWP MPNR MRD MSN MTI MTM MW NAB NCC

Inter-Provincial Coordination Inter Provincial Coordination Committee Infrastructure Project Development Facility Individual Power Producers Inactivated Polio Vaccine Integrated, Reproductive, Maternal Neonatal and Child Health Japan International Cooperation Agency Joint Venture Karachi Electric Supply Company Karakoram Highway Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Lahore and Faisalabad Construction Company Lahore College for Women University Legal Framework Order Local Government Local Government Ordinance Lady Health Worker Liquefied Natural Gas Lahore-Sialkot Motorway Infrastructure Management Motorway 1 Motorway 2 Motorway 9 Multilateral Development Bank Muslim Commercial Bank Millennium Development Goals Multi Hazard Early Warning System Minimum Health Service Delivery Package Medical Officer Ministry of Energy Ministry of Health Ministry of National Health Services, Regulations and Coordination Memorandum of Understanding Ministry of Water and Power Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources Movement for Restoration of Democracy Multi Sectoral Nutrition Medical Teaching Institute Market Type Management Mega Watts National Accountability Bureau National Cadet Corps

 ABBREVIATIONS 

NCGR NDC NDMA NDMC NDMO NDMP NDRP NEAP NEC NEPRA NFIS NGO NHA NHV NIDM NIH NIM NIPA NIST NMC NOC NOPE NPG NPM NRB NSC NSPP NTDC NTM NTS NUMS NUST NWFP ODA OECD OGDCL OGRA OPD OPV P&D P&SHCD PAEC

National Commission of Government Reforms National Defense College National Disaster Management Authority National Disaster Management Commission National Disaster Management Ordinance Network of Disaster Management Practitioners National Disaster Risk Planning National Emergency Action Plan National economic Council National Electric Power Regulatory Authority National Financial Inclusion Strategy Non-Governmental Organization National Highway Authority National Health Vision National Institute of Disaster Management National Institute of Health National Institute of Management National Institute of Public Administration National Institute of Silicon Technology National Management College No Objection Certificate National Organization of Postal Employees New Public Governance New Public Management National Reconstruction Bureau National Security Council National School of Public Policy National Transmission and Dispatch Company Network Type Management National Testing Service National University of Medical Sciences National University of Science and Technology North-West Frontier Province Operations and Development Agreement Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Oil and Gas Development Company Limited Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Out Patients Department Oral Polio Vaccine Planning and Development Primary & Secondary Health Care Department Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission

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ABBREVIATIONS

PAITHOM PAK-EPA PARD PASC PATA PCAT PCO PCRET PDMA PDMC PEPA PEPC PEPCO PEPO PER PHCC PHEC PHED-HUD PIDC PIM PIMS PITAC PITB PITD PITHM PLGO PM PM&DC PMC PMHI PMI PML PML(N) PNA POS PPHI PPIB PPIB PPIB PPP PPP

Pakistan-Austrian Institute of Tourism and Hotel Management Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency Pakistan Academy for Rural Development Pakistan Administrative Staff College Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Pakistan Council for Appropriate Technology Provincial Constitution Order Pakistan Council of Renewable Energy Technologies Provincial Disaster Management Authority Provincial Disaster Management Commission Punjab Environmental Protection Act Pakistan Environmental Protection Council Pakistan Electric Power Company (Private) Limited Pakistan Environmental Protection Ordinance Performance Evaluation Report Punjab Healthcare Commission Provincial Higher Education Commission Public Health Engineering Department-Housing Urban Development Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation Pakistan Institute of Management Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences Pakistan Industrial Technical Assistance Centre Punjab Information Technology Board Pakistan Institute of Trade and Development Pakistan Institute of Tourism and Hotel Management Punjab Local Government Ordinance Prime Minister Pakistan Medical and Dental College Pakistan Medical Commission Punjab Medical and Health Institution Pakistan Manpower Institute Pakistan Muslim League Pakistan Muslim League(Nawaz) Pakistan National Alliance Point of Sales People’s Primary Healthcare Initiative Pakistan Power Infrastructure Board Private Power and Infrastructure Board Private Power Infrastructure Board Pakistan People’s Party Public Private Partnership

 ABBREVIATIONS 

PPSA PPSC PRSP PRSP PSC PSFD PTI PTP QEC R&D RCO RHCs RIA RPP SAP SBP SC SCORE SDGs SEO SH&MED SIA SIM SLGO SNGPL SOEs SOPs SPP SSGC STI STP SWMC THQ TMA TPA TTS UAE-PAP UC UCMD UGC UHC

Pakistan Provincial Services Academy Punjab Public Service Commission Provincial Rural Support Program Punjab Rural Support Program Public Safety Commission Pakistan School of Fashion Design Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf Permanent Transit Point Quality Enhancement Cell Research and Development Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order Rural Health Centers Routine Immunization Activities Rental Power Plant Structural Adjustment Program State Bank of Pakistan Supreme Court Superhighway Construction Operation & Rehabilitation Engineering Sustainable Development Goals Search Engine Optimization Specialized Healthcare and Medical Education Department Supplementary Immunization Activities Subscriber Identification Module Sindh Local Government Ordinance Sui Northern Gas Pipeline State Owned Enterprises Standard Operating Procedures Sheikhupura Pilot Project Sui Southern Gas Company Secretariat Training Institute Science and Technology Park Sialkot Waste Management Company Tehsil Headquarter Hospital Tehsil Municipal Administration Traditional Public Administration Tenure Track Statutes United Arab Emirates Pakistan Assistance Program Union Council Union Council Medical Officer University Grant Commission Universal Health Coverage

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UNDP UNF UNICEF VC VU WAPDA WHO WMO WPV

United Nations Development Program United Nations Foundation United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund Vice Chancellor Virtual University Water and Power Development Authority World Health Organization World Meteorological Organization Wild Polio Virus

List of Figures

Interface of Actors and Positions: Implications for Reforms Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4 Fig. 5 Fig. 6 Fig. 7

Interface of reform actors and positions 1947–1958 Interface of reform actors and positions 1958–1970 Interface of reform actors and positions 1970–1977 Interface of reform actors and positions 1977–1988 Interface of reform actors and positions 1988–1998 Interface of reform actors and positions 1999–2008 Interface of reform actors and positions 2008–2018

29 33 36 39 43 47 51

Reforming Structures and Procedures in Pakistan (1947–2018) Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4 Fig. 5 Fig. 6 Fig. 7 Fig. 8

Pakistan State Structure Restructuring in the government from 1947–1958 Restructuring in the government 1958–1970 Restructuring in the government 1970–1977 Restructuring in the government 1977–1988 Restructuring in the government 1988–1998 Restructuring in the government 1999–2008 Restructuring in the government 2008–2018

61 64 69 73 77 80 83 86

Autonomy of Public Hospitals in Pakistan in the Time of Covid-19: A Policy Perspective Fig. 1 Health infrastructure of Pakistan. (Source: Policy documents)

102

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List of Figures

Energy Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Trends and Challenges Fig. 1

Energy Sources in Power Generation. (Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2019–2020) 114

Deregulation in Higher Education Institutions of Pakistan Fig. 1 Adapted from Christensen et al. (2007)

230

Pakistan Post and the Creation of an Innovative Business Model to Enhance Financial Inclusion Fig. 1 Most Recent Trends in Mobile Money Transactions in Pakistan. (Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Branchless Banking Quarterly, Oct–Dec, 2018) 256 Fig. 2 Mobile Money Solution. (Source: Pakistan Post Records) 261

Sustainable Public Private Partnership Delivery in Pakistan; Evolution, Barriers, and Way Forward Fig. 1 Spectrum of P3 arrangements (State Bank of Pakistan) 276 Fig. 2 Private investment trends in Pakistan (Source: PPIAF database) 280 Fig. 3 Policy development timeline for P3  in public infrastructure in Pakistan283 Fig. 4 Typical P3 project structure (Source: IPDF) 285

Digital Government: Transforming Sialkot into a CitizenFriendly District Fig. 1 Progression towards digital government. (Source: Adapted from OECD (2019)) 309 Fig. 2 Services introduced at Sialkot as part of digital government 313

Disaster Management Reforms in Pakistan Fig. 1 Adoption of new public management at various stages of disaster management342

List of Tables

Reforming Structures and Procedures in Pakistan (1947–2018) Table 1 Operationlization of reform paradigms

58

Autonomy of Public Hospitals in Pakistan in the Time of Covid-19: A Policy Perspective Table 1 List of autonomous hospitals in Pakistan Table 2 Hospital autonomy laws in different provinces of Pakistan Table 3 List of barriers in implementation of hospital autonomy

99 101 103

Energy Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Trends and Challenges Table 1 Major reform trajectories in the energy sector in Pakistan Table 2 Transmission and Distribution Losses

121 128

Reforms in Federal Training Institutions in Pakistan—An Institutional Perspective Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4

List of training institutions Changes in civil servants’ training programs Legal instruments for creation of FTIs Drivers of FTI’s reforms in Pakistan

139 141 142 146

Decentralization Reforms in the Public Health Sector in Pakistan Table 1 Key Reforms in the Health Sector in Pakistan 198 Table 2 Distribution of Federal and Provincial Roles and Responsibilities 200

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List of Tables

Table 3 Primary and Secondary Health Facilities in Four Provinces in Pakistan205 Table 4 District Health Management and Information Systems in Four Provinces206 Table 5 Domains of the health departments: Punjab 210 Table 6 Domains of the health departments: KPK 214

Deregulation in Higher Education Institutions of Pakistan Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6

Years of Establishment and Deregulation Facts and Figures about the Institutions Patterns of autonomy and control in case of HR Patterns of autonomy and control in case of Finance Patterns of autonomy and control in case of Academics Patterns of autonomy and control in case of Administration

231 232 240 242 243 245

Pakistan Post and the Creation of an Innovative Business Model to Enhance Financial Inclusion Table 1 Pakistan Post’s Service Offerings Table 2 Cellular and 3G/4G Subscribers in Pakistan

260 264

Sustainable Public Private Partnership Delivery in Pakistan; Evolution, Barriers, and Way Forward Table 1 Projects under different stages with IPDF/P3A 287 Table 2 Sector-wise breakdown for private investment in Pakistan from 1990–2018288 Table 3 Highway projects developed under P3 model in Pakistan (1990–2019)290 Table 4 Interviewee demographics 293 Table 5 Reform mechanisms summary for P3 projects 298

Digital Government: Transforming Sialkot into a Citizen-Friendly District Table 1 General information on the respondents Table 2 User experience Table 3 General perception

320 321 321

Disaster Management Reforms in Pakistan Table 1 List of natural disasters: losses and damages Table 2 Disaster management evolution

330 332

Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Hierarchies, Markets or Networks Abiha Zahra and Geert Bouckaert

The equation of reforms begins with the problems forcing the public sector administration seek for solutions (Bouckaert et al., 2010b). The understanding of reform, however, goes beyond a chronological sequence of a single ‘problem’ and a single ‘solution’ while taking into account the role of administration, other linked actors and their development over time (Pierre, 2010). In order to elaborate reforms, Kamensky (2018) used the simple metaphor of yard work where sometimes governments move quickly and plant sod while in other instances they take time and use seed. The approach often depends on the ‘season’ and on contextual realities. Reform as yard work, is a process and a constant state of effort, not a single event. A. Zahra (*) Public Governance Institute, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Department of Governance and Global Studies, Information Technology University, Lahore, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] G. Bouckaert Public Governance Institute, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_1

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Public sector around the world has always been adjusted and subject to reforms with augmented (academic) emphasis in the last four decades bringing in multiple frameworks to solve the governance problems, whilst the quest for both ‘best practices’ and ‘next practices’ continues to increase with the rising number of think tanks and other research-based organizations working at the interface of academia and public policy. Margetts and Dunleavy (2013) add that such steps have resulted in a more rapid selection process for what works in public management. In fact, according to Bouckaert and Jann (2020, p. 58), “the job of public administration is not to contribute to instant problem solving, but to show how and why institutions matters for problem solving, how institutions and organizations work, how they shape problem solving and decision making”. Meanwhile, this calls for the systematic analysis of the ways in which public sector reforms respond to growing governance problems which will enable the comprehensive understanding of convergences and divergences surfacing with different underlying frameworks/logics behind the reforms. Torfing et al. (2020) refer to the broader frameworks as “public governance paradigms that are relatively coherent and comprehensive norms and ideas about how to govern, organize and lead the public administration”. A reform analysis should recognize and not ignore the fact that the political institutions of a state, like any human artifact, continue to change over time through long-term processes of gradual transformation of shape, size and color (Trein & Maggetti, 2019). Similar is the case of governance paradigms that continue to change over time, bringing in new ways/recipes to solve the problems of the public sector around the world. There is surprisingly high susceptibility in the public sector to get influenced by the fashionable ideas about how to govern and be governed (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). A particular governance paradigm at a certain point in time may dominate the overall view of structuring and operating the public sector in a particular country, although, in reality the contours of a particular governance paradigm are often blurred (Torfing et al., 2020). Torfing et al. (2020) have used a comprehensive metaphor of a layered cake to explain how the reform paradigms work. It is essentially not  a complete shift from one paradigm to the other in pursuit of solutions for the governance problems. More often the competing paradigms stay together as layers of the cake, with the top layer often being the prevailing governance paradigm. In some instances, the layered cake is replaced with a marble cake where the competing paradigms co-exist and produce hybrid forms. The choices of layers, toppings and co-existence of paradigms with hybrid forms are most often context and environment specific. In retrospect, there are no perfect solutions for governing and reforming

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the public sector, neither is it easy to wipe out existing sets of solutions/ systems entirely to bring in the prevailing reform paradigms/solutions. The journey of every country happens to be different with their own flavors and levels of layer cake, or the patterns in their marble cake and those changing patterns are often attributed to the contextual realities. There are numerous other metaphors discussed in the literature; for instance, some believe that the selection of reform paradigms or shifts from one to another is more like pendulum swings where governments keep coming back to the old solutions as well while seeking the new ones. In a pendulum swing, one must leave the first position entirely to reach the other position (a country would switch completely from hierarchies to markets or to networks), while in case of layered cake, the state does not remove one paradigm to bring in a layer of another one which creates layers of reform paradigms build on one another. The marble cake presents a picture of hybrid versions in which the reform paradigms are all mixed and matched to create new versions depending on the context, time and choices of state actors leading the reform. The metaphors of layered and marble cake have been used in the federalism and multi-level governance literature (Morris, 2006; Entwistle et al., 2014); here, we deploy them for the study of reform mechanisms. Reforms in a state are often an interesting interplay between instrumental, cultural and environmental drivers (Christensen & Laegreid, 2013). According to Laegreid and Verhoest (2010), the institutional and cultural values of the state and their domestic choices have the capacity to modify the international reform doctrines and their implementation. The differences across countries trigger variation in the implementation of similar reform instruments across the globe. Context is worth analyzing according to Pollitt (2013) and it frequently enables better explanations and strengthens understanding of the reforms. The one size-fit-all, one-best-­ method, or best-practices approaches are being increasingly questioned and context-based thinking is gaining attention. Environments in which institutions of the state function have a clear influence in shaping their capacity (Peters, 2013). This points toward the clear difficulties in assuming that reform ideas considered appropriate in Western settings will also be appropriate in the non-Western setting (Ingraham & Pierre, 2010). The reforms of the Western world often serve as an impetus on developing economies to reform with additional focus on decentralization, social equity and empowerment (Sabharwal & Berman, 2013). Although, the reform paradigms that surfaced as a solution for the developed world might not be

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appropriate for a strict implementation in the public sector of developing world. Even within the developing and developed world, the chances of variations are high while adopting the reform solution considered as a fad or fashion at a certain point in time. Zahra and Bach (2021) also argue that the intensity of change events is usually context-specific and depends on the politics and government of a particular state. Based on their analysis, they did not see tremendous variation in the intensity of change events between the developed and the developing world using comparative metrics contrary to the expectations established by the literature. Moreover, in practice there is no one best solution or one model for solving the diverse problems of public sector (Hughes, 2017). Governments do pick the set of solutions following the dominant reform discourse/ paradigm, usually overlooking what works best in a given situation, as pointed out by Meuleman (2008), who sees this as a major problem in the public administration. Meanwhhile, Barzelay and Gallego (2006), Christensen and Laegreid (2013), Hammerschmid et al. (2016) agree that the study of administrative reform policies with shifting public governance paradigms is a relatively recent addition in the administrative reform literature. In her recent work, Zahra (2020) analyzed the choices of reform instruments and found the clear prevalence of HTM at the federal level. The governments brought in new instruments falling under the aegis of markets and networks, more frequently with a blend of hierarchies, however, that evidence was limited in terms of period and level of government and does not reflect on the variations across the policy sectors and levels of government. Here, this book will contribute by mapping the reform policies with the choices of reform paradigms at different levels of government, within different policy areas of the country. The empirical evidence of public sector reforms from a developing country, Pakistan, including its evolution and emergence in different policy areas over the years while analyzing the diffusion of reform paradigms, will be provided in the book. By understanding the history and current state of public administration reforms, the aim is to scrutinize, compare and discuss the shifts and co-existence of reform paradigms. The implications of analytically informed empirical mapping of reforms and the choice of reform paradigms will facilitate an informed political debate for the local public sector and future comparative studies with evidence from a developing country.

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The core question of this book is following: To what extent has Pakistan utilized dominant reform paradigms (markets and networks) in its hierarchical and centralized administrative system? We derive the following hypotheses, and all the chapters will be addressing them in one way or another for reaching the conclusions: H1. Frequent reform attempts are made at federal, provincial and local levels for better performance over the years. H2. Some state institutions that are not directly involved in reforms have been affecting the implementation of reforms in Pakistan. H3. Pakistan’s administrative system has a high tendency to maintain hierarchical settings even after multiple reform attempts. H4. Pakistan adopted market (MTM) and network (NTM) reform mechanisms post 1980s with the changing trends in the developed world. H5. The pattern of hierarchies, markets and networks is not linear in Pakistan since the dynamics vary across policy fields and government levels. H6. Reform choices in Pakistan have created more of a layered or marble cake instead of pendulum swings (shift from one reform paradigm to the other). We will take forward the recent work and debate of Torfing et  al. (2020) with the added analytically informed evidence from Pakistan. They have mentioned seven governance paradigms in their recent text while we tend to argue that most of these paradigms overlap and can easily be categorized under three key categories of hierarchies, markets and networks (Bouckaert et al., 2010b). The next section will discuss the operationalization of reform paradigms that will be the building block of all the chapters of this book.

1   Reform Paradigms Adjustments in the public sector have mostly followed an action–reaction pattern (Bouckaert et al., 2010a). Public sector services have to be altered along with new measures and operational actions for addressing the evolving situations (Wynen et al., 2017). Running the public sector changed over the years from public administration, to public management, to public governance. The hierarchical  model triumphed the world of public administration for the longest and is considered the most widespread and entrenched paradigm. The focus remained on strict hierarchical control

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and less autonomy, to be labelled as hierarchy type management (HTM) techniques for public sector administration. Post 1980s, New Public Management (NPM) hit the world, evolving from West bringing in the market type management techniques (MTM) to the public sector, with the impression that business management practices will improve the efficiency of the public sector. The structural models proposed by this paradigm pushed increased specialization and fragmentation, both vertically and horizontally (Christensen & Laegreid, 2010). The trend of reforms that earlier aimed at transforming hierarchies into markets, later on shifted the focus towards network type  arrangements. The new discourse that appeared as a solution talked about whole of government and coordination, which can be summarized under network type management (NTM), focused on improving the coordination in the public sector and different levels of government. The network approach placed a focus on control and coordination by the cabinet, improved financial as well as performance information for the ministers, and regulatory agencies for better integration (Osborne, 2006; Bouckaert et  al., 2010b). More recently, public values, innovation and digitalization are the talk of the town as prevailing reform paradigm; however, the key trends can possibly be categorized under three broad categories of reform paradigm: HTM, MTM and NTM. 1.1  Operationalizing the Reform Paradigms: HTM, MTM and NTM We have operationalized the three major reform paradigms following the widely accepted and tested methodology of Bouckaert et al. (2010a) while making some adjustments based on the local context of Pakistan and adding combination categories for three main paradigms (Zahra, 2020). The operationalization table is part of chapter “Reforming Structures and Procedures in Pakistan (1947–2018)” of this book. The instruments specified with the reform paradigms are specifically used to analyze the reforms in the coming chapters.

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2   The Case of Pakistan Public sector reforms offer no universal remedy and need to be matched with the realities of the system and its institutions (Christensen & Laegreid, 2013). Even the adoption of governance paradigms is usually partial where governments favor few instruments and then adapt them to the context where they are implemented. This book, therefore, will analyze the reform doctrines and their tools to elaborate the contextual variation offered by a developing country, Pakistan (based in South Asia). Although, the South Asian region has lot of variations to offer across the countries, there are various commonalities in terms of public administration. Since most of South-Asian countries are following the Westminster model of governance after British colonization leaving behind the ingredients of hierarchies with top-down and centralized administrative systems, formal standard operating procedures being overshadowed by the informal relations (Jamil et al., 2013) and the rigidness of the system towards adapting at the right time (Jamil et al., 2021). In their recent work, Jamil and his colleagues have provided an analysis of reforms from three South-Asian countries. This work from Pakistan will not only be a mere addition but will also add the theoretical perspective to reforms by systematically and empirically analyzing them. The study of public administration in the Pakistani context serves as a unique case with the complex nature of state and its relation with society that ultimately impacts the performance and working of state institutions (Mathew McCartney, 2019). This ambiguity about the actual role and functions of the state leads to problems and often failure to adapt with the needs of changing society (Zaidi, 2015). In fact, some of the scholars believe that the performance of public institutions in Pakistan cannot be analyzed while overlooking the state institutions that are more powerful both economically and politically, ultimately creating an uneven power distribution scenario in the state (Khan, 2019). This altogether affects the choice of reforms—the problems and the solutions and implementation pattern of reforms. Being a postcolonial state, Pakistan, since its independence, has been trying to emulate the Western model of governance and public management as a solution for the public administration problems. Furthermore, since the time of the Structural Adjustment Program by the IMF, public sector reform initiatives have been linked with international funding in the form of loans or grants from the international development institutions.

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In the last 20/30  years, under the narrative of marketization, every regime in place consistently pursued privatization of state-owned enterprises and totally neglected and ignored their governance and management. As a result, many State Owned Enterprises, which could not be privatized, have become a major burden on the public exchequer. A new breed of regulatory agencies was established but their performance is still questionable. The training institutions for civil servants were reorganized and merged under the National School of Public Policy with the intention of making it a degree awarding institution, which is still far away from its major goal even after 20 years. National Institutes of Public Administration (NIPAs) were made into National Management Colleges, but due to the lack of autonomy, they are underutilized institutions. There are numerous other examples of window dressing and copy-paste reform initiatives. There could be numerous explanations for the state of public management reform in Pakistan. However, to us, there are at least three intertwined reasons: (1) a lack of national and informed discourse on public sector reform, (2) a heavy reliance on international financial and development institutions both for ideas and money, (3) a missing long-term focus on reforms in public sector and the local problems. In the absence of a clear administrative policy, public reform initiatives risk becoming window dressing interventions without really addressing fundamental issues. Symbolism, rhetoric, copy-paste solutions, patchwork, isomorphism, rationalized myths and layering are some of the key words that can best describe the public management reform initiative without really addressing the inefficiency issues and public service improvement in Pakistan. Measures such as the double salary initiative for Income Tax Officers, Tenure Track in universities, Vice Chancellors selection through search committees, hospital autonomy, or Board of Directors for colleges in Punjab may be examples of this. This book is a step towards offering explanations for the status of public administration from macro and micro lenses with an attempt to theoretically analyze the reforms. This is also a small step towards analyzing the applicability of Western reform models in a developing country context. Much has been talked about the state of institutions while a little effort is visible for connecting the state-of-art reforms with the theory and begining an academically rich dialogue. This certainly will serve as the guiding step for policy analysts and the government while adding to the empirical evidence.

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3   Structure of the Book The book includes the empirical work from young researchers, academicians and practitioners from the public sector while bringing them together to systematically analyze the reforms choices and the emergence of new reform paradigms over the years. The editorial team initiated an open call for abstracts on public sector reforms in Pakistan. The selected chapters went through a rigorous relevance and quality check by the editors. The team conducted a book seminar bringing together the authors online and in-person to build a coherent and systematically analyzed reform narrative of Pakistan. The book is divided into four main parts. I. Reforms in Public Sector Organizations The first part takes a broader look at reforms at different levels of government including federal, provincial and local. The role of context-­ specific actors in affecting the choice of reform instruments is carefully taken into account in this longitudinal study since actors in the reform process keep on changing and new actors do emerge or evolve (Bouckaert, 2019). While chapter “Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Hierarchies, Markets or Networks” is the introduction and elaborates the state of art and operationalization of reform paradigms, Abiha Zahra & Geert Bouckaert explore the role of religion, military and judiciary along with politics and administration in the reform narrative of the state (chapter “Interface of Actors and Positions: Implications for Reforms”) that will serve as a foundation for the remaining chapters. Their chapter further elaborates how both political and non-political actors have been getting into one another’s space, leading to shifts in their interface over the period of more than seven decades. The role of actors in affecting the choices of reform mechanisms is discussed. The story of Pakistan fascinates the public administration literature with a substantial role of religion, military and judiciary in the reform process, which has been missing in the West. The authors refer to the context-specific nature of reforms that possibly made reform paradigms which are more successful abroad less relevant for Pakistan, making them appear in hybrid forms during the implementation phase. Abiha Zahra & Geert Bouckaert step forward to map the reforms in Pakistan mainly at the federal level (chapter “Reforming Structures and Procedures in Pakistan (1947–2018)”). The authors focus on providing a

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broader reform picture with systematic maps elaborating the shifts in the government of Pakistan and major structural reforms since 1947 until 2018. With the prevalent reform agendas around the globe and changed institutional arrangements, governments tend to adjust their reform mechanism for structuring and restructuring the state. The authors focus on mapping the reform history of Pakistan while deploying the systematic mapping methodology developed by Bouckaert et  al. (2010b). The authors used secondary data sources for their chapter. Muhammad Fayyaz Nazir focuses on the policy of hospital autonomy to increase the quality of healthcare services and resolve the problem of health financing. He brings in the case of Pakistan, which initiated the hospital autonomy in 1993 and implemented a pilot project in 1999 with the financial and technical support of World Bank. Chapter “Autonomy of Public Hospitals in Pakistan in the Time of Covid-­19: A Policy Perspective” addresses the contemporary situation of hospital autonomy implementation in Pakistan and the barriers in the successful implementation of hospital autonomy policy. The steps taken in this process were carefully categorized under the three reform paradigms and other hybrid categories, as defined in the operationalization section of this chapter. The author combined exploratory interviews with hospital managers and bureaucrats with document analysis. Shabana Naveed, Madiha Rehman Farooqi and Zafar Iqbal Jadoon discuss the federal level reforms in the energy sector of Pakistan. Despite progressive reform initiatives in the energy sector, Pakistan is still facing energy crises and no sustainable solution could be devised. Chapter “Energy Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Trends and Challenges” addresses this gap by providing major reform trajectories in energy sector and explains the drivers of these reforms in light of the popular global public sector reform paradigms in general and global energy reforms in particular. The authors provide a descriptive analysis based on secondary data available from relevant sources. Madiha Rehman and Shabana Naveed explore the drivers that led to the changes and the reforms in training institutions of Pakistan at the federal level. Chapter “Reforms in Federal Training Institutions in Pakistan— An Institutional Perspective” addresses the rationale behind the emergence of federal training institutions (FTIs) in Pakistan and goes further by exploring institutional reforms in FTIs in the light of relevant theories. The authors link coercive and memetic perspectives to the reforms in

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training institutions in an effort to elaborate the role of external factors in implementing reform prescriptions. The chapter is based on primary and secondary sources of data, including interviews and document analysis and provides theoretical explanations of the reforms for FTIs in Pakistan. The public administration models dominant in the evolutionary and current phases of FTI reforms have been discussed throughout the chapter to build a comprehensive academic analysis. Hasna Khan and Amani Moazzam engage with the issues in the health sector of Pakistan. Taking an inter-sectoral approach towards health, chapter “Interagency Collaboration/Coordination in the Context of Pakistan: Case of Polio Eradication Program” elaborates an interagency approach specific to the polio eradication program in Pakistan. The collaborative activity focused on in this chapter involves numerous government departments, private agencies and third-sector parties (National and International) that share knowledge and build on it as collaboration occurs horizontally across sectors. Their research is based on the provincial-level program in the province of Punjab. According to the National Emergency Action Plan (NEAP) 2018–2019 of Pakistan, ‘Effective Collaboration’ was to be one of the guiding principles of the plan to eradicate polio. Primary data through in-depth interviews was collected from employees working in World Health Organization, Rotary International, UNICEF and Directorate General Health. These employees were members of the fieldwork team, the divisional team and from the provincial teams based in Pakistan. II. Decentralization/Devolution Part II focuses on the devolution-related reforms in different policy areas. Zahra Paul & Adnan Sial focus on Local Government (LG) reforms (1947–2019) in Pakistan and take a deeper look into the scenario by exploring the devolution of Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) from 2000 to 2019 in the four provinces (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan) of Pakistan. Chapter “Trends in Local Government Reforms: Case of Environmental Protection Authority” highlights the implementation of administrative and financial powers devolved at a local level to bring democracy at grassroots levels by dividing the period into six eras while analyzing the reform mechanisms deployed during the reform process. The authors have used a mixed method approach for data. Secondary data was collected through newspaper articles, policy

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documents written by government of Pakistan, 18th amendment, LG Ordinances 2001, Local Government Acts 2010, 2013, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019. Meanwhile, in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted from the employees of EPD from all four provinces. Aneeqa Suhail, Awais Gohar & Trui Steen highlight the major administrative decentralization reforms and the current structure of the public health system in Pakistan. Specifically related to the public health sector, decentralization is widely practiced in both developed and developing countries. Similar reforms were also initiated in Pakistan to restructure the public health sector and improve service delivery and performance. Having outlined decentralization reforms at the provincial level, the authors critically assess the implementation of these reforms in two provinces (Punjab & KPK) and conclude with some recommendations for implementing decentralization reforms successfully. Chapter “Decentralization Reforms in the Public Health Sector in Pakistan” is based on secondary data sources, including research articles, government documents, WHO reports and website reviews. It provides a fresh way to analyze systematic decentralization reforms in public health sector in Pakistan and further highlights that hierarchy-type mechanisms have been the prominent with some flavor of market and network-type mechanisms in the public health sector of Pakistan. Hafsa Noor and Nasira Jabeen deliberate on the educational reforms relating to de-regulation in Pakistani Higher Education Institutions and aim to determine the effectiveness of these reforms in chapter “Deregulation in Higher Education Institutions of Pakistan”. The chapter  intends to explore the governance and management practices of Higher Education Institutions of Pakistan by studying examples of colleges, which were given university status under the de-regulation reform. The broad problem area of this chapter was to analyze the mechanism of decision making in universities regarding academic, financial, policy making and administrative matters while analyzing the reform mechanisms used in these processes. To understand the external governance, the chapter analyzes the role of Higher Education Commission (at federal level) as a regulatory body in this regard. The study has utilized both primary (interviews) and secondary data sources to find answers to the posed research questions.

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III. Involving the Market Part III reflects on the market-oriented reforms with steps to involve private sector for a better-governed public sector. Naubahar Sharif & Athar Mansoor aim to understand recent efforts led by the Pakistan Post to create a new business model characterized as a comprehensive public– private partnership (PPP) plan. This plan proposes combining Pakistan Post’s network of post offices that serve as savings banks—with mobile phone platforms, enabling people across Pakistan to access financial services either physically or virtually. This topic is important to investigate as Pakistan suffers from a very low financial inclusion since a large portion of the population does not have access to modern financial services. This is a national-level project in Pakistan. Chapter “Pakistan Post and the Creation of an Innovative Business Model to Enhance Financial Inclusion” explores the characteristics of the new ICT-driven PPP business model and the suitability of this model for Pakistan’s prevailing socio-economic context while looking at the choice of reform mechanisms. The authors go beyond to explore the applicability of this model in similar economies. Both interviews and document analysis were combined for this study. Beenish Bakhtawar, Husnain Arshad and Dr. Muhammad Jamaluddin Thaheem have reviewed infrastructure Public Private Partnership (PPP) project development. It covers both national- and provincial-level policy development for PPP project delivery in Pakistan until 2019. The aim of chapter “Sustainable Public Private Partnership Delivery in Pakistan; Evolution, Barriers, and Way Forward” is to analyze the key policy developments in this area in terms of reform instrument choices, identify key barriers for delivery of sustainable PPP projects and discuss measures for improvement in the present system. The authors adopted a mix-method approach with data collected from relevant literature and expert interviews. At first, a systematic review was carried out of all the government documents, bills presented in National/Provincial assemblies, international reports and other legislative documents to do a policy analysis for the case of PPP projects. Then, semi-structured interviews were carried out for identifying key impediments and a way forward for sustainable implementation of PPP projects in Pakistan. Identified structural reforms help guide readers about the nature of reforms suitable to create a balance of power for PPP projects.

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IV. Adopting the New Trends The fourth part is built on the adoption of more recent trends in the public sector in the areas of digitalization and disaster management. Athar Mansoor & Syed Bilal Haider aim to provide an account of how digitizing public services at a district level of a developing country influences the lives of citizens. Digital government is an interesting area to explore in a country like Pakistan where there has been a tremendous surge in cell phone usage and telecom companies during the last two decades. In the case of developing countries, there is a need to understand that digital government is more than creating electronic portals for public services. The state has to create new opportunities to uncover the needs of a society and individual citizens in a proactive manner. Chapter “Digital Government: Transforming Sialkot into a Citizen-­ Friendly District” examines the perceptions of the project among the citizens and its effectiveness in meeting the goals. The authors also explored the mobilization of resources for this project and the ways in which barriers were removed in the conception and implementation phases of the project. The process is systematically analyzed to assess the choices of reform mechanisms when adopting the new trends. Through surveys of citizens and focus group interviews of the relevant government agencies, authors have brought out various ex-ante and ex-post aspects of the entire project. Questions sequentially proceeded from general to specific to get insights about resource mobilization and removal of barriers. Aisha Azhar analyzes the disaster-related reform efforts undertaken by the Pakistani government since 2005. The results of these reforms are mixed, and many of them are still in progress. While revised disaster management policies and plans sound all-inclusive, the implementation has not been very effective. The author used content analysis in chapter “Disaster Management Reforms in Pakistan” to gather key facts about the progressive disaster management reforms in Pakistan. As a next step, the author then analyses those reforms along theoretical lines to observe the use of hierarchy, market- and network-type reform mechanisms. The content analysis  revealed the development of disaster management Acts, Statutes and Policies; creation of institutions and agencies taking care of the four phases of disaster management. The study also included the interviews conducted in the past from the key stakeholders in disaster-related organizations. The findings of interviews revealed the capacity building of citizens and public employees to handle emergencies effectively.

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Later, in the concluding chapter, the discussion is organized around the six hypotheses of the book that are all linked to the four main parts. While H1, H3, H5 and H6 involve almost all the chapters in four parts of the book, H2 is more specifically discussed in chapter “Interface of Actors and Positions: Implications for Reforms” with minor evidence in most of the other chapters as well. H4 is more relevant for Parts III and IV but is touched upon in other chapters too. This will provide a systematic overview of reforms in Pakistan whilst taking into account the convergences and divergences within the state in the different policy areas and at multiple levels of government. Some reflections on the way forward for public sector reforms in Pakistan are specified after the conclusions.

References Barzelay, M., & Gallego, R. (2006). From “new institutionalism” to “institutional processualism”: Advancing knowledge about public management policy change. Governance, 19(4), 531–557. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-­0491. 2006.00339.x Bouckaert, G. (2019). Dissemination of scientific knowledge on reforming public administration: Some changing mechanisms. Croatian and Comparative Public Administration, 19(1), 9–22. https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.19.1.1 Bouckaert, G., & Jann, W. (2020). European perspectives for public administration: The way forward. Leuven University Press. Bouckaert, G., Peters, B. G., & Verhoest, K. (2010a). The coordination of public sector organizations: Shifting patterns of public management (G.  Bouckaert, B. G. Peter, & K. Verhoest, Eds.). Palgrave Macmillan. Bouckaert, G., Peters, B. G., & Verhoest, K. (2010b). The coordination of public sector organizations. In The coordination of public sector organizations. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230275256 Christensen, T., & Laegreid, P. (2010). Increased complexity in public organizations-­the challenges of combining NPM and post-NPM. In P. Laegreid & K. Verhoest (Eds.), Governance of public sector organizations: Proliferation, autonomy & performance (pp. 255–276). Palgrave Macmillan. Christensen, T., & Laegreid, P. (2013). Contexts and administrative reforms: A transformative approach. In C. Pollitt (Ed.), Context in public policy and management: The missing link (pp. 131–157). Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147–160. Entwistle, T., Downe, J., Guarneros-Meza, V., & Martin, S. (2014). The multi-­ level governance of Wales: Layer cake or marble cake? The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 16, 310–325.

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Hammerschmid, G., Van de Walle, S., Andrews, R., & Bezes, P. (2016). Public administration reforms in Europe: The view from the top (G. Hammerschmid, S. Van de Walle, R. Andrews, & P. Bezes, Eds.). Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Hughes, O. (2017). Public management: 30 years on. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 30(6/7), 547–554. https://doi.org/10.1108/ IJPSM-­06-­2017-­0174 Ingraham, P., & Pierre, J. (2010). Ideas in action: Why the reality of the administrative reform grinder matters. In J. Pierre & P. Ingraham (Eds.), Comparitive administration change and reform: Lessons learned (pp. 3–15). McGill Queen’s University Press. Jamil, I., Askvik, S., & Hossain, F. (2013). Understanding administrative culture: Some theoretical and methodological remarks. International Journal of Public Administration, 36(13), 900–909. https://doi.org/10.1080/0190069 2.2013.837728 Jamil, I., Dhakal, T. N., Haque, M., Tawfique, S. K., Paudel, L. K., & Muhammad Baniaman, H. (2021). Policy response, local service delivery, and governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka (I.  Jamil, T.  N. Dhakal, S.  T. M Haque, L. K. Paudel, & H. Muhammad Baniaman, Eds.). Palgrave Macmillan. Kamensky, J.  M. (2018). Looking back over my 45 years of involvement with government reform efforts. Public Administration Review, 78(2), 305–310. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12921 Khan, D. (2019). The political economy of uneven state-spatiality in Pakistan: The interplay of space, class and institutions. In M. McCartney & S. A. Zaidi (Eds.), New perspectives on Pakistan’s political economy: State, class and social change (pp. 130–153). Cambridge University Press. Laegreid, P., & Verhoest, K. (2010). Governance of public sector organizations: Proliferation, autonomy and performance. Palgrave Macmillan. Margetts, H., & Dunleavy, P. (2013). The second wave of digital-era governance: A quasi-paradigm for government on the Web. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 371. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2012.0382 McCartney, M. (2019). In a desperate state: The social sciences and the overdeveloped state in Pakistan, 1950 to 1983. In M. McCartney & S. A. Zaidi (Eds.), New perspectives on Pakistan’s political economy: State, class and social change (pp. 25–56). Cambridge University Press. Meuleman, L. (2008). Public management and the metagovernance of hierarchies, networks and markets: The feasability of designing and managing governance style mechanisms. Physica-Verlag Gmbh and Co. Morris, M. H. (2006). Marble cake federalism. Center for the Study of Federalism. http://encyclopedia.federalism.org/index.php/Marble_Cake_Federalism Osborne, S. (2006). The new public governance? Public Management Review, 8(3), 377–387. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203861684

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Peters, B. G. (2013). Institutions in context, and as context. In C. Pollitt (Ed.), Context in public policy and management: The missing link (pp.  101–114). Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Pierre, J. (2010). The future of public administration. In J. Pierre & P. Ingraham (Eds.), Comparitive administrative change and reform: Lessons learned (pp. 278–287). McGill Queen’s University Press. Pollitt, C. (2013). Context: What kind of missing link? In C. Pollitt (Ed.), Context in public policy and management: The missing link (pp.  415–423). Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Sabharwal, M., & Berman, E.  M. (2013). Public administration in South Asia: India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan (M. Sabharwal & E. M. Berman, Eds.). Taylor & Francis Group. Torfing, J., Andersen, L. B., Greve, C., & Klausen, K. K. (2020). Introduction. In Public governance paradigms: Competing and co-existing (pp.  1–23). Edward Elgar. Trein, P., & Maggetti, M. (2019). Patterns of policy integration and administrative coordination reforms: A comparative empirical analysis. Public Administration Review, 80(Apr.), 198–208. https://doi.org/10.1111/ puar.13117 Wynen, J., Verhoest, K., & Kleizen, B. (2017). More reforms, less innovation? The impact of structural reform histories on innovation-oriented cultures in public organizations. Public Management Review, 19(8), 1142–1164. https://doi. org/10.1080/14719037.2016.1266021 Zahra, A. (2020). Structural reforms and performance management systems: An exploratory analysis of state organizations in Pakistan [KU Leuven]. https:// lirias.kuleuven.be/3172020?limo=0 Zahra, A., & Bach, T. (2021). The intensity of organizational transitions in government: Comparing patterns in developed and developing countries. Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 00(0), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.108 0/23276665.2021.1980069 Zaidi, S.  A. (2015). Issues in Pakistan’s economy: A political economy perspective. Oxford University Press.

PART I

Reforms in Public Sector Organizations

Interface of Actors and Positions: Implications for Reforms Abiha Zahra and Geert Bouckaert

1   Introduction Democratic governments around the world are  made up of organized components that have shifting relations to one another involving collective action coordinating multiple actors, organizations and resources (Olsen, 2010). This collective action of governing does not take place in vacuum. Since, certain factors exert an influence (facilitate vs prevent) on the contents of reform when they are properly positioned along time and scale dimensions (Pollitt & Dan, 2011). Reforms being part of governing are highly context-dependent and same policy instruments or techniques are conceived, received and played differently and could be differently A. Zahra (*) Public Governance Institute, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Department of Governance and Global Studies, Information Technology University, Lahore, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] G. Bouckaert Public Governance Institute, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_2

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successful according to the local culture, dominant frames of reference, patterns of institutions, proceeding histories, chance events and so on (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2009). Along with the government policies and decisions to reform, numerous social, economic, environmental, political factors affect the reform package and its implementation across the globe. This chapter explores how the changing interface of reform actors and positions has structural implications in the context of Pakistan.

2   Theoretical Background Government in one way is an institution, which in itself is made up of a number of other institutions. Organizations as institutions depend upon their contexts for resources as well as pressures for adaptation and this linkage among multiple systems and institutions produces an extremely complex environment (Peters, 2013). In the change process, the action could be intended or unintended, however in any institutional context certain strategies, actors and perceptions are favoured over the others. It can be debated that developments and change in institutions over time exhibit patterns (Pollitt, 2008). However, not everything will be the same in the social world when a similar problem arises again because many other factors will evolve/devolve. There is no single generally accepted empirical administrative theory specifying under which condition one set of factors have great explanatory power than the other factors or how their mutual influence could be understood in all situations, at all times and everywhere (Gullick, 1937; Pollitt & Talbot, 2004; Olsen, 2007). For this reason, transformative approach that states the importance of taking different factors into account while studying public decision-making process in general and specifically reform process, is used. Transformative perspective combines structuralinstrumental, historical-institutional and environmental perspectives (Christensen & Laegreid, 2001; Christensen et al., 2002), affecting the leeway of political leaders for implementing reforms. The ‘genetic soup’ of historically developed arrangements, standard procedures, rules, belief systems, identities, resources and capabilities altogether pressurize the process of reform (Olsen, 2010), as the set of relevant factors or drivers. In order to understand the reform process in a country, it is necessary to combine the instrumental features of national polities with the historical-­ institutional context of national cultural and environmental factors (Christensen & Laegreid, 2001; Christensen et al., 2002). Since different

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countries have different historical-institutional context, different constitutional and politico-administrative structures ultimately lead to national reforms with unique features (March & Olsen, 1998; Christensen & Laegreid, 2013). Administrative reforms, in general, offer no universal panacea; rather they are to be matched carefully with the traditions, needs and resources of that political system to reach the effective solutions (Christensen & Laegreid, 2013). Pierre (2013) argued that in order to explain the outcome of a political or administrative reform process means dealing with context and taking into account the decisions and actions by individual politicians or bureaucrats, the media’s attention of alleged administrative malfeasance, adhoc informal linkages between domestic and transnational institutions and so on. The clan of transformative and cultural perspective agrees on the fact that reform process is less likely to be in the form of pendulum shifts and complete substitutes; in-fact, there is more layering and hybridization after being influenced by the historical ties, traditions and established routines (Christensen & Laegreid, 2013). This chapter explores the role played by polity, contextual and environmental actors in driving the reforms in the context of Pakistan while bringing in reform actors not found relevant for the West. The chapter covers the period from 1947 to 2018 to comprehend the role of prominent actors and the interaction among these reform actors and their positions. The choice of prominent reform actors in the context of Pakistan was made based on the mapping of reform in the first two chapters that identified military, religion and judicial actors as significant players along with politics and bureaucracy. We explore the repetitions, learning over time the interaction of actors and positions in the reform process while looking for the explanation in theory. Frege’s (1980) rule will not be forgotten, that is, ‘never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition’ (Bouckaert, 2013) and answer the research question in the context where actors and position were functioning. This chapter narrates and analyzes the role of religion (Islam), politics and administration (executive, legislature and civil servants (bureaucracy)), economic conditions (internal economic condition and foreign funding / loans), military and judiciary in oscillating the reform trajectory of the country. The research addresses following question: How does the changing interface of reform actors and positions have structural implications?

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3   Methods and Data In this study, the role played by the identified reform drivers is revealed by narrating the reform history. Narrative synthesis is helpful in the initial stages of a review to build a synthetic understanding of the context (Popay et al., 2006). The secondary data that were used included related books, articles, government documents, ministry yearbooks, newspapers and other published material on the politics, governance and history of Pakistan. In order to improve the validity of our analysis, it was combined with in-depth interviews. The participants for the interviews were selected using purposive sampling. The participants had a rich experience and exposure in their fields, ranging from historians, practitioners to academicians. The transcriptions from the interviews were used for coding and analysis in NVivo software to enrich the evidence on the role of reform drivers. A narrative analysis was completed by combining and analyzing the data from the mentioned sources to explore the interaction of reform drivers and their positions. Respondents are referred to in the text according to a specific number assigned to each one of them. 3.1  Classification of Reform Drivers Politics and administration are discussed together under purview of political driver in the text; in politics, the role of elected actors, the executive and legislature is discussed while civil servants and bureaucracy make up the administration that works closely with the political institutions. Military in this study constitutes the top actors leading the position of Chief of Military Staff and other highest ranks directly or indirectly involved in the policy decision, mainly related to defense and foreign policy. Under religion, the religious actors including religious political parties, religious leaders and public exerting religious pressure are contained. The role of judicial actors is discussed in judiciary as reform driver, including the role of Supreme Court, other courts in the country and judges. 3.2  Operationalizing the Maps for Reform Drivers Graphs are also added for every period that present an overall picture of the role played by the reform actors taking different positions. The

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volume of the actors in the graphs depicts the proportionality of their influence, which is subjective. Bigger the size, wider the impact of it is in that period. The overlaps of the circles represent one actor taking over the role or position of the other actor or increased immersion in other’s jurisdiction. It shows how actors continue to change their positions and influence. The left or right positioning was arbitrary; the most relevant thing is the size of a particular reform actor in that period and in whose space are they getting in (displayed by the overlaps). The purpose of graphs is more didactic, and the idea behind them is to facilitate the reading. The period divisions were made based on the political regimes.

4   Data Analysis 4.1  First Period 1947–1958 Religion ‘Religion and its role in Pakistani society is very complex and that complexity has to be understood’ (R3). The role of religion has been significant in the context of Pakistan since the Independence struggle of the country. Islam was used to legitimize the movement of Pakistan for a diverse group of population, having different motivations and interests1 in having a separate state. Muslim Ulema opposed Pakistan movement on account of following nationalism, which is a western ideology, while having continuous issues with the leadership of the movement for not having Islamic mentality and habits. Meanwhile, the basis of Pakistan Movement was Two Nation theory, claiming that Hindus and Muslims are different and Muslims need a separate country to practice their religion. This makes it appropriate to say that ‘Pakistan was indeed created in the name of religion but the other things including economic and social life were also responsible for the movement’ (R5). While R1 and R3 agree that Pakistan was not meant to be a theocratic state, as was demanded very soon after by elements that opposed Pakistan movements, the Ulema. ‘Organizations like the Jamaat e Islami and the Jamiet e Ulma-Islam and all of these groups opposed Jinnah except Shabir 1  Three major Muslim groups from north central provinces, north west and north east region of India had their own motivations for supporting Pakistan movement from protection of rights as a minority in the area, to maintain their status quo as elites and the socially deprived group wanted better social and economic life in Pakistan (Sheikh, 2009).

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Usmani who left Jamiat e Ulma Islam Hind to join Jinnah’s movement’ (R1). Jinnah (the founder) after independence of Pakistan, claimed that Hindus and all other minorities will be equal citizens of the state despite their religion, and will be free to go their religious places, defying the very ideology used for the creation of Pakistan (Wilder, 1995; Jalal, 2011). ‘The forces behind the Islamic rule in Pakistan initially tried to prevail upon the civil servants, military and other major institutions’ (R5). The problem persisted and it took 9 years to reach a constitution for the country, based on Islamic principles, that was accepted by the majority with an ideology based on the religion (R2). A commission interviewed numerous Ulema to decide one version of Islam for the state but to the infinite regret, no agreement was reached among religious scholars for the Constitution (Wilder, 1995; Niaz, 2010), ultimately leading to vague statements in the Constitution related to religion and ideology. The excerpt from Munir Report states that the vague religious basis of national ideology of Pakistan gave strength to mullaism (religious leaders/actors) and their way of dealing with political principles. The state used religion to legitimize certain actions. Issues in the disputed territory of Kashmir started right after independence. Officers in the Pakistan army involved in the Kashmir operation of 1947–1948, invoked jihad, the government also asked religious scholars to give supportive religious decrees in this regard. In short, religion raised proxies were used for achieving political and territorial gains (Haider, 2011). Religious turmoil increased in the country as there was no consensus on one version of Islam to be followed. Issues of Ahmadis also arose in 1953, when protests started in the country calling for the resignation of foreign minister of Pakistan, Ahmadi (Wilder, 1995; Haider, 2011). The anti-Ahmadi movement and religious uproar turned violent, situation worsened and responding to the violence and the assembly’s efforts to curb the power of Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad declared a state of emergency and dissolved the Constituent Assembly. It resulted in the first ever imposition of martial law in Pakistan. Overall, in the Constitution of 1956, there were no significant ‘Islamic’ steps introduced, to the disappointment of the Islamic parties except naming Pakistan as an Islamic democracy. In addition, there was no religious ministry in Quaid-e-Azam’s cabinet nor was it established by any other prime minister during the early years. Politics:

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In Pakistan, the political structure is more complex with an imbalance of power within civilian institutions. ‘The relationship between politics and administration have to be understood in the context of our colonial experience, that the British created a bureaucracy which was based on merit and competition in undivided India and continued to be as we moved in Pakistan and as we see’ (R3). Bureaucracy dominated in the initial years of Pakistan (R1). However, Jinnah intended to retain the apolitical, neutral and independent civil service structure for the country that will work together with political institutions, each doing their lawful role (Husain, 2018a). Unfortunately, ‘Mr Jinnah died early and Parliament could not develop in to the institution which will have supremacy over bureaucracy’ (R3). Furthermore, it was mentioned by Niaz (2010) that Cabinet in 1947 considered Jinnah more than a governor general. He was suggested to get in touch with the secretary of any ministry at any time for getting required information which later created a culture of unnecessary meetings and interference of the governor general with the senior civil servant without informing the cabinet. This could be one reason that affected the work practices between politics and administration in later years. Moreover, ‘Political parties were not well developed at the time of independence of Pakistan making it difficult to establish a super ordinate subordinate relationship with the bureaucracy’. Furthermore, ‘Political stability in Pakistan remained at stake’ (R1). In between 1951 and 1958, Pakistan witnessed six different prime ministers and cabinets (Husain, 2018c). The wrangle between political and administration continued, even the governor general Iskandar Mirza (former civil servant) clarified that the people of Pakistan are not suitable for democracy and ensured more power stays with administration and not in political institutions. This affected the political and administrative journey of the country in a profound way and most of the reforms were run with the prominent actions from the administration. Institutions were established at state level actively while ensuring that most control of the industry stays with the state. Military Pakistan’s military had mostly British-trained staff at the time of independence. The marked role of military began from the ‘very first day when Pakistan propounded itself as an unsecure state having serious existential threats from India. True, false or real but you have to take it in that spirit;

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over a period of time security of state became more important than security of the citizens’ (R1). Liaquat Ali Khan (first prime minister) kept the defense portfolio under his office and the task of formulating defense policy was strictly in the hands of cabinet committees with the prime minister as the chairperson. Prime Minister Khan decided to nationalize the military, mainly the army by giving promotions to the local staff and by filling major positions (Niaz, 2010). Ayub Khan was appointed as the Chief of the army, who later became the defense minister and part of civilian cabinet, letting the direct entry of military in civilian affairs. It is interesting to note the Prime Minister Office kept the defense portfolio until General Ayub Khan (CMLA) was invited to lead the defense portfolio as a minister. In August 1955, Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad Ali again took the defense portfolio under Prime Minister Office, and defense later remained under the same office for the most duration during the early years. While political actors argued over the issues of identity, provincial autonomy and the role of religion in the state; constitution making was stumbled creating a political vacuum which encouraged the entry of military in the political system (Lodhi, 2011). ‘The direct role of military was from the very beginning of the country history, if you see during 1947–1958 military was not at the forefront but they were moving things from the background as they had access to the civil bureaucracy’ (R5). Interesting thing is during the time when Ayub Khan was appointed as the defense minister, the governor general of the country was a civil servant and worked closely with the senior officers of the army for patronage and future assistance (Niaz, 2010). The one unit scheme for West Pakistan and a unicameral legislature for the country were also proposed by Ayub Khan in the cabinet; both of the ideas were realized in coming years. Furthermore, Pakistan’s foreign policy has always been intertwined with its defense policy, with an increased input of military in foreign affairs. Judiciary The judicial actors approved the removal of the elected government by the Governor General, setting a precedent for future years. This in a way affected the capacity of executive to function, continue and implement reforms. Even in the beginning years, there was almost no political stability that affected the pace and choice of structural reforms.

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5   Summary The reform actors did not function in isolation and kept on changing positions, while in some cases positions dominated the actors. Religious actors did not back the creation of Pakistan and problems persisted, leading to a delay in the constitution of the state. Political actors used religion to gain political legitimacy. The religious turmoil created by religious actors contributed to political instability in the country with continuously changing governments. The religion’s position remained wider and prominent in these years with increased overlaps with political and military positions. Political instability strengthened the developed institution of civil service (administration) which functioned as a steel frame during the initial years of the country compared to the political actors, ultimately taking bigger portion in the diagram. Military actors got into political position and politicians affected the military promotions and placement during the nationalization process represented by the overlap of the two actors (Fig. 1). The problematic relation of politics and administration in Pakistan started with the power and capability imbalance, also rooting the political interference in administration affairs and military promotions/placements; meanwhile, wrong institutional ethos were developed by few early slip-ups of all the major actors in the state which lingered on in the coming years.

Religion

Judiciary

Military Politics

Administration

Fig. 1  Interface of reform actors and positions 1947–1958

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5.1  Second Period 1958–1970 Religion The regime headed by General Ayub Khan tried to de-emphasize the role of Islam in politics and in the Constitution of 1962. In the beginning years, ‘Ayub ruled with a liberal philosophy, even Pakistan was declared a republic instead of Islamic republic in the constitution of 1962’ (R5). Although numerous religion-related institutions were created, but the role of these institution was advisory and the members were appointed by the president, giving no real power to (religious leaders/actors) ulema (Blood, 1995; Ansari, 2011). A separate ministry of Auqaf was created to manage religious endowments and a number of Muslim Family laws were implemented, giving rights to women and family planning programs (Haider, 2016). For the sake of legitimacy among the masses, the new capital of the state was named Islamabad, ‘city of Islam’. All the efforts of Ayub Khan’s government were meant to set the country on a modern secular path without renouncing the teachings of Islam (Ansari, 2011). However, ‘in later part of Ayub Khan’s rule, he could not separate religion from politics, ultimately wilted under the right wing parties and had to resign in order to pacify the hue and cry raised by the religious people’ (R5). He transferred the power to his general, Yahya Khan. Yahya Khan used intelligence agencies to orchestrate attacks by Islamic parties against the major political parties who were accused of being un-­ Islamic and secular (Haider, 2011). The Islamic political parties nurtured during this period, Justice Munir, in his reform report also mentioned the multiplication of Islamic parties as one of the most serious threats to future political stability and well-being of Pakistan (Jalal, 2014). Politics After that, President Iskandar Mirza (a former civil servant) declared Martial Law in the country in 1958 and appointed Chief of the Military as Chief Martial Law Administrator. Military formally came forward by taking over the position of political actors to lead the country at the forefront. Niaz (2010) stated that between 1953 and 1969, those who ruled Pakistan drew bulk of intellectual and moral strength from civil services of Pakistan, high-ranked military and some elements within judiciary that were sympathetic to the two, which is obvious in the very first step when a president from (administration) civil service background handed over the power to military for heading the country. General Ayub Khan had

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very good terms with senior civil servants and the civilian bureaucracy adjusted rapidly to Ayub Khan’s leadership since they had worked closely with him during his tenure as army chief. High-ranked civilian bureaucrats who were serving as District Commissioners got increased powers since military government banned the political parties and initiated Basic Democracies Scheme at a local level. Cheema et al. (2006) indicated that local government reforms were used by military government as means for a non-representative center to gain legitimacy while bypassing the political agents at the provincial and national levels. Local government reforms restructured the state governance markedly. Khan kept his strong alliance with administration and used their expertise in all the policy decisions, but his message was clear that he is the one in control, not the civil servants (Blood, 1995). Military and civil service nexus ruled the country during this period and played excessive role in otherwise political positions. The Constitution of 1962 further embedded the presidential system of government by taking away the powers of prime minister. Military government was still not able to resolve the tensions between East and West Pakistan. West Pakistan stayed as one unit like East Pakistan in this duration. Husain (2018c) commented that Pakistan has been a highly centralized state rather than a truly federal state; it was visible in the idea of unification of four provinces of West Pakistan into one unit from 1956 to 1970, which was convenient for military governments to control. The economic reforms of this era emphasized growth rather than redistribution of wealth and resources that heightened the lines dividing the rich and the poor (Jalal, 2014; Husain, 2018b). Planning Commission was restructured as a full-fledged division which played a key role in the economic turnaround of Pakistan in 1960, and it made significant contribution as an institute (Husain, 2018b). Private sector was highly encouraged and agriculture saw a revival. Loans were taken from foreign institutions, including IMF, which were disbursed but the balance of payment issues could not be resolved (Zaidi, 2017). There was an evident increase in foreign aid flow to Pakistan from 1958 (Salman & Feng, 2009). After Ayub, Yahya Khan decided to rely less on civil servants, announced the general elections, ended the one unit scheme of West Pakistan and took a number of steps to ensure equitable distribution of resources in the two units.

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For most of the time in these years, political activities and political parties were banned. When the ban on political parties was lifted, Military General came up with his political party as well, welcoming the complete involvement of military in political activities. Military This was the time period when military actors formally took over the political position. After some time, Ayub Khan appointed another Commander in Chief of Military and only held the president position. He had to resign in 1969, after a lot of outcry from the masses; he gave the powers to another military journal Yahya Khan. General Yahya Khan on the other hand decided to lead the country like General Head Quarters of Army (GHQ) and established a military hierarchy running parallel to the civilian administration that effected the alliance of civil and military institutions, while enabling military actors to be in direct control administration (Niaz, 2010). Judiciary Judiciary as important civilian institution initially backed the idea of declaring emergency by President Iskandar Mirza, in words that in certain scenarios what is unlawful becomes lawful. Ayub Khan further took the powers of the judiciary to question any law passed by the legislature and justified the concentration of power in one hand by pronouncing the unfitness of the Westminster model for Pakistan (Jalal, 2014). Summary The coup of 1958 marked an institutional shift in the history of the country when non-elected institutions became dominant over the political system (Jalal, 2014). Military took over the political position and ran the country from the front for more than a decade. Bureaucracy (civil administration) and military were in strong alliance for the most part since military held the political positions. Judiciary supported the Martial Law regime and for the most part did not create any trouble for Ayub Khan’s government. Executive and Legislature were already headed by the military general, as one-man show, represented by an overlap on political positions (Fig.  2). The government successfully implemented structural reforms on the institutional and economic fronts, with power concentration in one position. The role of religion remained marginal, and

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Judiciary Military

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Religion

Politics/Administration

Fig. 2  Interface of reform actors and positions 1958–1970

numerous steps were taken for religious institutions under religious pressure but the hegemony stayed with military. 5.2  Third Period 1970–1977 Religion ‘Religion could not prove to be a cement that it was supposed to be’ (R1) between East and West Pakistan, leading to the breakup of East wing as Bangladesh in 1971. ‘Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan People’s Party, known to be a very liberal person, used Islamic socialism to get legitimacy’ (R4, R5). Although, major support of Pakistan People’s Party came from their social and economic promises, Islam still remained necessary. Three religious parties stood against Bhutto’s socialism and went to the extent of issuing a fatwa that whoever supports socialism is an infidel. Still religious parties could not perform any better in national or provincial elections and got very few seats (Jalal, 2014; Wilder, 1995). However, during Bhutto’s regime, numerous steps were taken that increased religiosity in the country. 2 ‘The distinctive increase in religiosity 2  Alcohol was prohibited and night clubs were closed. The teaching of the Quran was made compulsory in schools, Islamic studies and Pakistan history became the compulsory courses and Arabic language was made compulsory in school’s curriculum. Seerat Conferences on the life of Prophet (PBUH) were held annually and Ordinance was passed for the respect of Ramadan, closing all hotels and restaurants during day time in Ramadan. Pakistani radio and television stations increased the number of religious programs. Copies of Holy Quran were placed in all first-class hotels throughout Pakistan. The weekly holiday on Friday was announced instead of Sunday as Friday is the most sacred day for Muslims.

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in Pakistan is also a product of the mid 70s after the global insertion of Islam’ (R1). Middle-Eastern countries became new economic might and Bhutto worked on improved relations with the Muslim world (Husain, 2018b) while working on a nuclear bomb declared as ‘Islamic bomb’. Ministry of religious affairs was created for the first time in the history of Pakistan and non-Muslims were barred from holding the positions of prime minister and president. ‘The Constitution 1973 had more Islamic clauses as compared to another constitution of Pakistan’ (R3). ‘Council of Islamic Ideology of Pakistan was set up to ensure no law is repugnant to Islamic guidelines and provisions’ (R4). Most of the policies and reform agendas drove basis in the constitution on religious grounds (R2). Even land reforms were also not implemented by justifying that Islam guarantees rights for private property. The role of religion increased in intensity, impacting the structural changes in the state that were to be aligned with religious teachings. In 1977, religious parties joined together to form an alliance called PNA (Pakistan National Alliance) to protest against Bhutto while using the slogan ‘Islam in danger’, to evoke people’s emotions (Husain, 2018b). ‘People’s Party showed a soft corner to get the acceptance of religious groups. ‘Bhutto even went to personally meet the intellectual religious leader and leader of Jamat e Islami, Maulana Maududi to mention that he was standing with them, he will do whatever they want. This is real, and was published in the news. It shows that when you are in politics, you can compromise even if you may not agree to somethings but politically you want to’ (R4) for legitimacy. In spite of this, due to mass protest of PNA, situation worsened and military took over. Politics During Bhutto’s rule, since the very beginning, public servants were removed from their offices based on the allegation of being corrupt or inefficient (Niaz, 2010). ‘Bhutto was very assertive and he gave a serious blow to civil bureaucracy when he introduced civil service reforms in 1973 although they were not fully implemented’ (R4). The out-of-turn promotion policy introduced as a result of the civil service reforms affected the morale of ambitious civil servants and prompted them to align their interests with the ruling political elites (Husain, 2018b). Bhutto wanted to create a body of officials that were loyal to him and depended on his favor for their elevation (Niaz, 2010; Husain, 2018b). Even police services and district management group were not spared from Bhutto’s way of ruling

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the country. He worked closely with the Federal investigation agency, which mainly intended to control military and civil institutions. The Government pursued foreign assistance from IMF three times in these years, and also from World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Middle Eastern countries. Most of the assistance was sought for poverty alleviation and to improve the balance of payment situation. ‘Before 1970s, it was a very pragmatic approach that government would come forward in areas where the private sector is shy to invest. Then, when Bhutto came, there we see a disruption, 90-degree change as, he said, state should take over and under that nationalization was carried out which was completely different economic system’ (R1; R3). All the major industries were nationalized in order to control the wealthy families in the state, which shook the confidence of private investors for next 25 years (Husain, 2018b). Nationalization aimed at taking over the management rather than shareholding (Jalal, 2014) that restructured the way state organizations and public companies functioned. Economic Reform Order was passed to seize the private firms, end the monopolies to prevent hoarding and profiteering in essential commodities (Rabbani, 2005). Bhutto inspired fear in his subordinates that public servants went beyond his instruction to bring the favorable outcome for PPP in the elections (Niaz, 2010). Military Bhutto tried to gain effective control over the military by appointing people of his choice in army and navy by lateral hirings and out-of-the way promotions while punishing those who tried to conspire against him (Wynbrandt, 2009). General Zia ul Haq was appointed by Bhutto as Chief of military staff, thinking that he will not intervene in the state matters. Media was used for criticizing the role of military in politics; the role of intelligence agencies was also questioned in not keeping Bhutto informed about everything. Bhutto created an alternate security force called Federal Security Force (FSF) which was used to distant army form internal security issues (Rabbani, 2005). He encouraged the work on nuclear bomb to ensure that Pakistan relies less on armed forces (Cohen, 2004). The Constitution of 1973 further ensured civilian control over the armed forces. In his tenure, he kept defense under PM office. Allocation of resources to defense ministry was also done through prime minister and defense committee of cabinet was headed by Bhutto himself (Husain, 2018c). Still the Constitution was violated by Bhutto’s self-chosen CMLA General Zia ul Haq in 1977.

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Judiciary Religion Politics

Military Administration

Fig. 3  Interface of reform actors and positions 1970–1977

Summary In a nutshell, political actors worked in compliance with religious actors, the two positions closely touch each other without overlapping (Fig. 3). Massive structural reforms were implemented, be it nationalization, civil service reforms while reshuffling the hierarchies. The influence of political actors was clearly more in reforms compared to the administration, giving politics wider space (Fig. 3). The usual involvement of military in defense and foreign policy was also controlled by the political actors, bringing political position to the forefront and significantly in action. Judicial actors did not play any prominent role in driving or affecting structural reforms in these years. 5.3  Fourth Period 1977–1988 Religion General Zia ul Haq had a very Islamic orientation. When he was elevated to the status of Chief of Army, he changed the army slogans with focus on (Jihad) war for the sake of God (Haider, 2011). After the Martial Law, he became the head of state and initiated massive Islamization in the state. He cancelled elections in 1979 on grounds that Pakistan’s political system was not Islamic. Initially meant for 90 days, this argument was used for almost 11 years of him holding the office. According to him, he was on the mission of God and he will continue until God wants (Wilder, 1995).

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‘The counter argument was that since Zia was not widely loved among the people of Pakistan, he used a version of ostensible Islam to continue his rule. From the religious man he was, to the strict administrator he became by thriving the weaponized version of Islam’ (R6). Major steps included Hudood Ordinance,  alongside Federal Shariat Court (FSC) was also instituted in Supreme Court. It is also interesting to note that since the creation of Federal Sharia Court in 1980 until 1985, provisions relating to operations of the Court were changed 28 times under presidential ordinances (Kennedy, 1995), displaying lack of clarity on the reforms. Shariah Council and Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) were crafted, which announced that the presidential form of government is nearest to Islam and political parties are non-Islamic, justifying the ban on political parties by Zia. Zia’s regime empowered Islamic parties that largely remained apolitical. In 1981, university grants commission issued orders for inserting in textbooks that the ideology and basis of Pakistan is in nothing other than religion. The war against Soviet Union was characterized as Jihad; in alliance with US, Islamic militant groups were financed and provided arms. Saudi Arabia and United States provided grants to develop textbooks with violent images and militant Islamic teachings to inspire resistance against Soviet Union. He funded and supported mosques like Lal Masjids that were also involved in religious training and teaching. The number of religious institutes rose from 1000 in 1980 to 13000 in 2000 (Haider, 2011; Niaz, 2010). The large number of youngsters who studied in seminaries had chances of little or no employment, which led to increase in drugs trade, small arms proliferation and sectarian soldier. Moreover, sectarianism increased since Saudis funded Sunni Muslims and Iran funded Shias, which infused a war within the state that was actually between Saudi Arab and Iran, nurturing the Jihadi and sectarian cultures (Haider, 2011). Overall, the content of Islamization was rich in symbolism but poor in substance. Zia, not the Quran and Sunnah remained the supreme law of the land, and religious institutes were powerless (Wilder, 1995). Politics The political position was taken over by the military actors during these 10 years. General Zia ul Haq postponed the elections by talking about accountability first and election afterwards. Former Prime Minister Bhutto

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was hanged on murder charges and hierarchies were reshuffled in the favor of president. Zia retained Martial Law from 1977 to 1985 and created a consultative assembly of his choice at the center and toothless local bodies at the grassroots level (Niaz, 2010). Political parties were banned for most of the time, especially if their manifestos were against the ideology of Pakistan (Islam, 1989). Total flow of development assistance saw a massive rise (Husain, 2012). Easy loans and foreign aid from the Middle East was visible enough on terms of Muslim unity. Pakistan also received major loans from the World Bank and joined IMF’s structural adjustment program (SAP) in 1981. SAP focused on reducing the size of government, privatization and economic liberalization. Nationalization was halted and private investors were welcomed. Zia relied on the competencies of the civil servants and worked with them more at local government level. Military quota was set up against some vacancies in civil services but it was trivial (Husain, 2018b). Military Military actors were the guardians of not only the territorial but also the ideological frontiers of Pakistan during Zia’s regime (Jalal, 2014). The country remained under martial law for eight long years, Zia maintained his position as Chief of Army Staff while staying as the president. He relied more on the military during his rule and had powerful army officers along his side for handling the administration of the country (Mohiuddin, 2007). This was different from previous martial law regime of Ayub Khan that worked closely with civil administration. Nearly all of the Zia’s corps commanders held civilian positions, four were provincial governors and two were federal ministers, and by appointing military at top civilian as well as diplomat positions, he was trying to strengthen his main support (Jalal, 2014). During Zia’s regime, the military enjoyed a number of benefits and additional opportunities after retirement by creating welfare association. As Nawaz (2011) described, the army learnt to build the right relationships with bureaucracy and Islamists parties to fight internal leaders, to fuel the war in Kashmir and Afghanistan and to rule for long periods.

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Judiciary Judges were also made to take oath of loyalty to General Zia under PCO and if not, they were made to resign. There were no permanent appointments made for judges (Niaz, 2010). Zia even made judiciary to give a ruling by which he had power to amend the Constitution (Jalal, 2014). Moreover, the Constitution was amended in 1980; it barred the High Courts from reviewing Martial Law orders or challenging the judgements of military courts. Summary ‘These 10 years of Zia was the time where we got the culture of hatred, extremism and Kalashnikovs’ (R9). The principal achievement of this era was political stability since the government stayed for around 11 years and there was no obvious changes in terms of policies or reforms. Military actors ruled the country by taking over the political positions (Fig.  4). State administration was run mostly by military personnel. Religion had a prominent position in this long rule, although most structural changes were superficial rather than systematic. Political parties and the legislature were fully in control of the military with his self-chosen nonpolitical cabinet and powers to amend the constitution. Judiciary was in control of Zia by increasing the influence of military courts and controlling the strings of civilian courts. This is represented by the overlap of military and judiciary positions (Fig. 4).

Military Religion

Judiciary

Politics/Administration

Fig. 4  Interface of reform actors and positions 1977–1988

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5.4  Fifth Period 1988–1998 Religion After the death of Zia, people chose to vote for first female prime minister in the Muslim world. Later, Benazir Bhutto’s government faced a lot of opposition from religious conservatives who distrusted the degree of Benazir’s commitment to the state’s Islamic principles. She got two turns for holding the office of prime minister in almost 10 years period, but no further steps were taken for Islamization. She joined hands with a strict religious party, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), which was gaining power in the country, for political reasons and for her legitimacy in religious circles. She also used Islamic socialism and her inclination towards Islam in her political campaigns. Religious position clearly condensed in the reform story compared to the previous decade. Government continued to support the Islamic militants groups mainly for serving the purpose in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Militants received a lot of funding and military training during Soviet Union and US war in Afghanistan, which made them emerge strongly. This era marked the shift from political Islam to more of militant Islam. Nawaz Sharif in his elected terms used religion to infuriate religious conservatives against the rule of Benazir, a woman as prime minister. The Sharia Bill was passed in the assembly to ensure that Quran and Sunnah are the law of land. Islamic Banking was emphasized though interest was not abolished. Nawaz Sharif’s government gave greater latitude to Federal Sharia Court and introduced death penalty in case of blasphemy. Politics The decade of 1990s produced disappointingly feeble civilian rule, government changed in rapid succession with the country’s two principal political parties alternating in power. Both political parties headed by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif worked at undermining the other rather than for improved governance (Lodhi, 2011). After the 8th amendment in the constitution, the president had the power to overthrow the government and appoint military chief and judges of higher as well as supreme courts. It resulted in the removal of three consecutive prime ministers. Nawaz Sharif, the rather powerful prime minister, continued his tussle with the president during his two turns. In his second turn, Nawaz Sharif was successful in passing the 13th amendment, which returned the ceremonial role of president. The jostling among Pakistan’s power troika—the

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Army Chief, the president and the prime minister kept Pakistan at the brink of a political precipice (Haider, 2011) in these years, ultimately affecting the pace of structural reforms. Political instability also affected bureaucracy and its neutrality. Both parties chose their own set of civil servants at top positions who were replaced by the next party. Benazir Bhutto set up a placement bureau for making appointments to the bureaucracy. After demolishing Zia’s local government scheme, Nawaz Sharif’s government was also involved in large-scale posting and transfers of civil officials in the federal, provincial secretariats and at the local government level. Nawaz Sharif’s government did massive reforms on economic front in his first tenure by liberalizing, deregulating and privatizing the economy (Husain, 2018b). Pakistan government entered into eight different agreements with the IMF during 1988–1999, but none of them were fully implemented, and the external liquidity problem remained unsolved, for which loans were sought (Mohiuddin, 2007). During the period of 1990–1998, 188 public enterprises were identified for privatization; out of these 67 enterprises were privatized and transferred to the private sector under IMF’s SAP (Ali et al., 2017). Military Eleven years of Zia entrenched the military firmly in the national economy and in the overall picture of the state. A decade of political rule was spent in fear of another military take-over and almost every step was taken by the political governments to avoid that in any case. The agreement of Benazir Bhutto to not tinker with policies related to Afghanistan, defense and nuclear program and to not meddle in promotions in the army and civil administration or harass Zia’s family (Jalal, 2014), was one example. Her closest allies, the Chief of Staff at PM secretariat, defense advisor and defense minister were retired army personnel and three of the four provinces had retired army officers as governors. Later in Nawaz Sharif’s first tenure as prime minister, both president and prime minister stepped down from their offices voluntarily in the presence of the military as negotiator in order to avoid another take-over by the military (Blood, 1995). Although military actors were not directly visible in the political scenario, yet defense and foreign policy remained driven by General Head Quarters (GHQ) of military (Wynbrandt, 2009). Three political governments overthrown by the presidents in one decade was also seen by some as the involvement of military, using the face of

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president (Asia Report N°185, 2010). The lack of institutional coordination (politics and military) gave a blow to the image of Pakistan at the international level when army started operation in Kargil and prime minister refused that he was ever informed of the event (Jalal, 2014). Nawaz Sharif’s second tenure in the office also ended because of his clashes with the military. Last blow was when he announced the appointment of the director of the ISI, Pakistan’s Intelligence Service, as the military’s new Chief of Staff, which the military refused to accept. Nawaz government also did not allow the flight of Chief of army staff to land at the airport and do the new appointment sooner possible. The Chief of Military came forward and took over the control of the government, claiming the action as necessary. Judiciary The role of judiciary increased significantly during these years in the political arena. When the president removed Nawaz Sharif’s government, the judiciary supported Sharif’s case; this was unlike what it did before in the case of other prime ministers as ‘the judiciary was stuffed with preferred appointees’ (R3). Benazir appointed a judge of her choice as Chief Justice and used judiciary to implicate the Sharif family in more than a hundred cases. In his second term, Sharif made a bench of judges to pass an interim order against the Chief Justice since Benazir Bhutto appointed him out of turn, making the judiciary divided on political lines (Jalal, 2014). The Supreme Court under the new chief justice validated the amendments in the constitution giving the prime minister power over executive and legislature. The crisis continued and the president had to resign; it was a bad scenario of conflict between judicial, executive and legislative arms of the state. Summary Some restructuring efforts were made by the political actors in the name of religion, yet direct involvement was less so the religious position only touched the surface of political position. Military promised not to come in the forefront and let the democratic institutions function. However, the relationship of military and executive remained unpleasant, especially during the time of Nawaz Sharif. Political position in spite of being strong could not balance the relationship of state, center and the military, and even invited army to settle political differences, for instance in the case of president and prime minister. Military actors without getting into political

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Military Judiciary

Politics

Religion

Administration

Fig. 5  Interface of reform actors and positions 1988–1998

position played a prominent role, mainly in defense matters, foreign policy and some political matters, displayed with an overlap in Fig. 5. Judiciary grew prominent and was divided on political lines getting into the political position where it originally does not belong. 5.5  Sixth Period 1999–2008 Religion General Musharraf advocated the concept of ‘Enlightened Moderation’, to tell the world that Islam is not linked to fundamentalism and extremism and Muslims should adopt the path of socio-economic uplift (Ahmed & Khan Afridi, 2014; Haider, 2011). Although at that time ‘Pakistan was much more religious than it was before 1970’s’ (R1), the growing urban landscape was dotted with mosques and madrasas. The products of religious seminaries offering extreme and militant versions of Islam were either recruited to fight Jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir or convinced to become suicide bombers/killing machines on sectarian issues (Jalal, 2014). The 9/11 attacks worsened the situation in Pakistan as Islamic extremism increased significantly. The militant groups in Afghanistan, who were supported initially by the Pakistani government and military suddenly faced opposition from the government since Pakistan joined the US-led war on terror (Haqqani, 2005).

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Reforms such as banning a number of key militant groups, beginning the process of registering madrasahs and reforming their curricula were taken but they proved tentative. Militant groups sprung up with other names and the registration process of madrasah was not a success at large (Haider, 2011). Musharraf became the first Pakistani leader courageous enough to stand against militant and religious group and banned Lashkar-­ e-­Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, the two most radical organizations in Pakistan (Mohiuddin, 2007). Militant groups, because of this opposition from Pakistan turned their guns from outside the border to inside, and Pakistan suffered. There was a huge increase in suicide bombings and killings within the country. Strikes became part of everyday life when religious group demanded an end to all non-Islamic activities in the country. In July 2007, government forces surrounded the Lal Masjid, a hub of Islamic militants and made them surrender. Overall, numerous steps taken by Zia’s government for radical Islamization were amended, including Hadood ordinance alongside modern and independent media. It was the time of militant Islam and not the political Islam as it had been before since the creation of Pakistan (Lodhi, 2011). However, the sights of political Islam somehow persisted since Musharraf made an alliance with Islamic parties at the national level in order to fill the vacuum he created by banning the political parties. These Islamic parties mainly did not have much power but their presence at the top flourished conservatism, and enlightened moderation could not be achieved (Haider, 2011). Politics Once again, military actors took the driving seat to run the government. General Musharraf kept the portfolio of defense under him while holding the position of prime minister and retaining his Chief of Army Staff post. He later amended the constitution and reshuffled in favor of president, through a referendum he became the president of the country. All the military hegemonic systems in Pakistan were defined by three main processes, political control through executive orders, political exclusions through restrictions on parties and by building a strategic partnership with the US (Shafqat, 2011), the same happened in Musharraf’s time. Legal Framework order (LFO, 2002) and amendments in constitutions shifted authority in favor of military actors in the political position and to control political activities in the country. The two main political parties led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif faced the main opposition from the regime and were not allowed to participate in political activities.

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‘Every time military intervenes, it disrupts the chain of authority’ (R1) and always favors local government reforms (R4), so did General Musharraf. He moved the district administration to under local elected officials. Bureaucratic posts at local government level increased and coordination went wrong (Niaz, 2010). ‘Although there was a lot of rigor in that local government and devolution but even then full-fledged devolution was not made. Financial autonomy was kept with the federal government and inter government relations were not harnessed properly due to which reforms could not deliver as expected’ (R2). ‘These reforms were not able to supplement or replace the existing system with something that can really work’ (R1). ‘This restructuring and other steps affected the neutrality of civil administration even more’ (R4). The number of reforms was impressive in Musharraf’s period as compared to civilian rule ‘as for them process has to be slow; debate is required in the national assembly. However in military regime, there is more direct control and there is one person who can do it very quickly’ (R4). However, the arch tilted more against Musharraf with the increased issues with judicial actors and especially when Benazir after getting NRO from his government returned home for elections but was assassinated on her arrival. Military ‘In our society where disorganization is a way of life, who so ever is better organized is likely to dominate. Therefore, Military became a hegemonic force in Pakistan as compared to any other institution’ (R3). ‘According to the constitution military is to function for defense policy implementation and sometimes for giving input in defense policy making but during Musharraf’s and other military rulers tenure, military comes to the driving seat by direct involvement in policy making’ (R5). Musharraf made it obvious by appointing a National Security Council as supreme governing body for the country on matters of national security including the sovereignty, integrity, defense and security, ensuring the direct involvement of military in high-level policy making (Khan & Wazir, 2011). Almost all the state institution were in control of the military, including foreign policy, economic policy, intelligence agencies and civilian administration. The role of Inter-Services Intelligence Agency increased significantly after the intrusion of Pakistan in Afghan Jihad since ISI became a ‘state with in a state’, which was also involved in crafting and implementing policies (Nawaz, 2011). Reliance on military officers was visible in

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administrative as well as political tasks and military was everywhere in the country, seen ruling at the forefront. Military was also involved in local-­ level politics, although the rules of devolution plan 2001 did not apply to cantonments and they remained part of the federal government (Niaz, 2010). Judiciary Superior judiciary of the country was asked to take fresh oath under provisional constitutional order (PCO), making judiciary subservient to the army chief instead of the Constitution, Chief Justice of Supreme Court refused to take oath and lost his post (Jalal, 2014). Judges also unanimously justified the military coup under the constraints of PCO, and gave military regime 3 years to achieve its agenda. Regime continued even after 3 years by holding a referendum for presidential elections; however, the idea was refused by judiciary, which increased issues between judiciary and General Musharraf. The situation got worse when Musharraf asked the Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to leave his office; he refused, ultimately facing suspension by the president. Judiciary came on the roads to strike against Musharraf’s decision and was successful in the re-appointment of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. ‘One of the reasons for this populist movement to be popular and then succeed was an independent as well as strident media that previously was restricted to Pakistan Television Corporation and Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation’ (R9), bringing media in the picture too. The issues with judicial actors and massive protests became one of the major reasons for General Musharraf to step down from his position later. Summary The military actors holding political positions drove major reforms. Most of the structural reforms were influenced by IMF loans and alliance with US after 9/11 attacks. The country made progress on the economic front and religiosity was controlled by taking steps under General Musharraf’s enlightened moderation. In these years, the intensity of religion in driving structural changes reduced while the judiciary grew in its intensity. In practice, military covered the political position while giving some space to the less prominent political actors (Fig. 6).

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Military Religion Judiciary

Administration

Fig. 6  Interface of reform actors and positions 1999–2008

5.6  Seventh Period 2008–2018 Religion With the passing years, the militant Islam remained more discernable than the political Islam, with sentiments of the nation closely linked to the religion. Religious Militant lead parties pressured for Sharia imposition in the country and the government had to agree with them for imposition in certain parts of the country. The disruption and demands of these militants never ended, leading to worse law and order conditions in the country. Political (Government) and military actors joined hands against the militants and started operations in certain parts of the country, which invited a lot of opposition within the country and created millions of internally displaced persons. However, the government and military extended their operations to crush the Islamic militants. Government took no major step for Islamizing the country. The religious and sectoral intolerance remained high along with continuous operations against Islamic militants. Politics The outcome of the 2008 elections gave rise to a coalition government and a multi-party system; all the major political parties with different agendas sat together at the political position to lead the state. General Musharraf had to leave his position as president, but this did not entirely remove military from politics as the two entities worked on power-sharing terms rather than establishing the complete civilian supremacy (Shafqat, 2011).

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Coalition government could not work for a long time as PML (N) withdrew and sat as opposition. Still both major parties cooperated most of the time in order to avoid military takeover. The major success of Zardari’s government was the constitutional amendment that boosted the role of provinces and returned the powers to the prime minister instead of president along with number of other changes. ‘Moreover, in 18th constitutional amendment there was a consensus for decentralization’ (R4) as power were shared among federation and provinces and to the local governments. ‘Indirect financial cost due to religious terrorism and war with in country against religious militants increased that halted the investment trend in the country’ (R9). From 2013, there was Nawaz-led civilian government. The power asymmetry between political and nonpolitical institutions remained, which is attributed to the political parties and the way they function. Most of the political parties in Pakistan are not modern organizations and are built around traditional kinship groups and its more dynasty politics (Lodhi, 2011). Most of the policies by the civilian governments focused on saving themselves, on patronage and short-term political benefits. ‘In Punjab, PML (N) was ruling in a way that Chief Minister has a team of favorite boys from the administration, and he is getting his work done through them, which in a way does not facilitate the smooth running of the administration’ (R1, R4). The model was to have personalized sort of formal rules with a handful of favorites which is a problem; with that they also commission private organizations that they like’ (R1). ‘This type of too much interference of politics in administration and its working encourages or urges the bureaucrats to do things that are not part of their job or are not right’ (R2) ultimately affecting the performance of administration. ‘Even autonomy of the autonomous bodies is snatched by increased representation of political people in the board and sometimes even chairing the board instead of the experts doing this job’ (R2). This interference of political actors in administration continued in these years with the two civilian governments. Military After indispensable pressure from the coalition government and ‘governance scenario in the country’ (R5), General Musharraf had stepped back from his position as president, formally giving the political position to political actors. The new Military Chief realized the need for the military to revert to their professional roots, he began this by withdrawing some 300 serving army officers from civilian position, although many are still working mainly in the Ministry of Defence (Nawaz, 2011). ‘Military is trying to adapt itself

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that it does not have to really intervene in the process however it can extend its control and influence’ (R3). The involvement of military in foreign and defense policy does not end and civilian governments cooperated with the military in these areas. ‘Validating the assumption of the electoral dichotomy which says that decision makers would try to survive so is the case of politicians, for surviving in the political arena, they do make compromises’ (R5). The role of military actors remained instrumental in the political picture; even when there were issues in the coalition government, military played a role to resolve the issues. This was the time of co-governance by the military and the political actors in most areas of governance. Judiciary ‘When a nonpolitical institution seeks attention of the public, more than performing their duties, there is definitely something not right’ (R7), that happened in the case of judicial actors. Although judiciary has been playing a prominent role since beginning, it became obvious after the issues of judges with General Musharraf and deposition of some of them, which initiated strikes across the country. PML (N) made the restoration of judges as their priority and even called for a long march, which was joined by a number of other political parties. Although long march did not begin as judges were restored and Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was reappointed. This established a trend of increased judicial activism and intervention in state affairs, affecting political and economic conditions. The judges were more confident since with the new constitutional amendments, they had more powers. Even Parliament can only legislate within strict parameters set out by the constitution along with extensive checks by the Supreme Court. Judicial appointment committees had more representation of judges as compared to the case before. As mentioned by Jalal (2014), judicial activism was a welcome change but was threatening sign for authoritative executive (political actors) and also for a weak and fragile Parliament. This lead to the disqualification of electables by the courts and the most defining moment was the removal of elected prime minister on the orders of Supreme Court in 2012 and once again in 2017. ‘It was declared as judicial coup by many people and many considered military still playing from the behind the scene but in the fore front it was Supreme Court of Pakistan’ (R10). ‘This view of military holding the strings behind the Supreme Court decisions could be attributed to the fact that Supreme Court was hijacked in the previous military regimes by the military dictators so people kind of skeptically view the role of Supreme Court’(R5). While the counter argument is that ‘Supreme Court is acquiring the right path because political leadership

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at this point in time is confronting Supreme Court. If they were to seek accommodation, work differently, probably the results will be different’ (R3). Judicial interference was not just in political matters but also in other structural reforms: by halting the privatization of SOEs and other long projects in the government, and also by declaring business agreements null and not cooperating for a conducive business environment. Even National Accountability law excludes military and judiciary from the purview of the NAB on the plea that both institutions have their own internal accountability mechanisms (Husain, 2018b) and interestingly not even a single judge has been removed by the judiciary since 1973. Summary Finally, two civilian governments were able to complete their tenure and transfer the power to another democratic civilian government. This strengthened the political position in the reform picture (Fig.  7), ultimately enabling political actors to implement reforms. There were more reshuffles at the state level. Politicians led the country in the forefront but military co-governed in the matters of defense and national security, represented with a slight overlap of military and political position in Fig. 7. Judiciary grew stronger with increased intensity, affecting the reform decision and disqualification of two elected prime ministers in these years. Religion, as a driver in the reform picture, stayed at a side and did not play much role other than the fact that military operations were against Islamic militants, which was a huge step, and it was supported by the nation.

Military Politics Judiciary

Administration Religion

Fig. 7  Interface of reform actors and positions 2008–2018

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6   Discussion & Conclusions Olsen (2010) also added the significance of taking the belief system into consideration for understanding the reform process. The chapter dealt with the changing interface of prominent reform actors and positions in the reform narrative of Pakistan. These reform actors and positions continued to interact, and in that journey one dominated the other in the reform process, over time. Transformative perspective made sense for the role of religion, military and judiciary, which ultimately lead to the ‘national reforms with unique features’ (March & Olsen, 1998; Christensen & Laegreid, 2013) in Pakistan. These reform drivers including religion, military and judiciary have not been as noticeable in the Western literature. Usually the relation of reform actors in the Western context is rather stable, with least involvement from military and judicial actors in the structural reforms. However, in the case of Pakistan, these actors have been dominant and their relationship or interaction has not been static, as seen in the analysis of the 7 periods since independence. The turbulence created by the interaction of these reform actors had implications for structural reforms in the state, which was made explicit in the data analysis section. Politics, military, religion and judiciary demonstrated dynamic interactions with changing intensities and role affecting the choice of structural reforms. The discernible problem in the reform history of Pakistan is that the institutions barely act according to their defined rules or ethos. Constitution has clearly outlined the boundaries and functions of all the state institutions, but the real story is disorganized and messy. Neither the reform history nor the interaction among reform drivers have been a neat cycle offering patterns; the interplay of reform actors and positions continued to vary offering context and environment-specific patterns. Introspect; the changing interface of reform interactions and positions has clearly affected the selection and implementation of reforms. Moreover, the interface of these reform actors has not been cyclic although certain actors while holding prominent positions chose specific structural reforms; however, the variety with in those structural reforms kept on evolving with time. The application of transformative perspective in Pakistan’s context does apply but with some obvious variations. Contrary to Western application of transformative theory, different actors are observed in Pakistan, including religion, military and judiciary. Contrary to the West, regime changes (military led/civilian led) have impact over the restructuring patterns and reform pace. Political actors could barely restructure the state on their

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own without taking other actors into account. Hence, transformative theory gets additional explanation when regime changes are added to the reform process. Different actors, their interfaces with the positions, and regime changes add to transformative theory literature. Moreover, it was apparent that institutions and reform actors tend to evolve in their role and intensity, which is affected by other reform actors. Interestingly, developing countries like Pakistan tend to take environmental factors and prevailing reform solutions for the state into account while deciding on the structural reforms that could be attributed to international funding agencies too. This chapter will serve as a background for understanding macro-, meso- and micro-level cases of reforms in Pakistan.FundingThe data collection for this research was funded by Research Foundation Flanders (FWO). This chapter is part of Abiha Zahra’s PhD thesis available online at https://lirias.kuleuven.be/3172020?limo=0.

References Ahmed, Z., & Khan Afridi, M. (2014). Democratization, Institutionalization and Constitution in Pakistan: A Case Study of Musharraf Era. American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, 7(1), 59–68. http://www.iasir.net Ali, A., Syed, S. G., Anka, L. M., Asad, S., Abidi, R., & Shaikh, F. M. (2017). Privatisation and Reform Programme of Public Sector Enterprises in Pakistan 1960–2004, 8(12), 171–180. https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v8n12p171 Ansari, S. H. (2011). Forced Modernization and Public Policy: A Case Study of Ayub Khan Era (1958–69). Journal of Political Studies, 18(1), 45–60. Asia Report N°185. (2010). Reforming Pakistan’s Civil Service. https://www. files.ethz.ch/isn/112809/185_reforming_pakistans_civil_service.pdf Blood, P. R. (1995). Pakistan A Country Study (6th ed.). Library of Congress. Bouckaert, G. (2013). Numbers in Context: Applying Frege’s Principle to Public Administration. In C. Pollitt (Ed.), Context in Public Policy and Management: The Missing Link (pp. 74–88). Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Cheema, A., Khwaji, A., & Qadir, A. (2006). Local Government Reforms In Pakistan: Context, Content And Causes. Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries, 257–284. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781 107415324.004 Christensen, T., & Laegreid, P. (2001). The New Public Management: The Transformation of Ideas and Practice. Ashgate. Christensen, T., & Laegreid, P. (2013). Contexts and Administrative Reforms: A Transformative Approach. In C.  Pollitt (Ed.), Context in Public Policy and Management: The Missing Link (pp. 131–157). Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

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Christensen, T., Lægreid, P., & Wise, L. R. (2002). Transforming Administrative Policy. Public Administration, 80(1), 153–178. https://doi.org/10.1111/ 1467-­9299.00298 Cohen, S. P. (2004). The Idea of Pakistan. The Brookings Institution. Frege, G. (1980). The Foundations of Arithmetic: A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number. Northwestern University Press. Gullick, L. M. (1937). The Theory of Administration. New York: Institute of Public Administration. Haider, M. (2016). What They Never Tell Us About Ayub Khan’s regime— Pakistan—DAWN.COM. https://www.dawn.com/news/1293604 Haider, Z. (2011). Ideologically Adrift. In M. Lodhi (Ed.), Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State (pp. 113–131). Oxford University Press. Haqqani, H. (2005). Pakistan Between Mosque and Military (S. H. Panhwar, Ed.). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Husain, I. (2012). Economic Reforms in Pakistan: One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards. The Pakistan Development Review, 514(51), 7–22. http://www. pide.org.pk/pdf/PDR/2012/Volume4/7-­22.pdf Husain, I. (2018a). Conclusions. In Governing the Ungovernable: Institutional Reforms for Democratic Governance (pp. 488–511). Oxford University Press. Husain, I. (2018b). Governing the Ungovernable: Institutional Reforms for Democratic Governance. Oxford University Press. Husain, I. (2018c). The Military. In I. Husain (Ed.), Governing the Ungovernable: Institutional Reforms for Democratic Governance (pp.  287–322). Oxford University Press. Islam, N. (1989). Colonial Legacy, Administrative Reform and Politics: Pakistan 1947–1987. Public Administration and Development, 9(3), 271–285. Jalal, A. (2011). Why Jinnah Matters. In M. Lodhi (Ed.), Pakistan Beyond the Crisis State (pp. 7–20). Karachi: Oxford University Press. Jalal, A. (2014). The Struggle for Pakistan. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Kennedy, C. (1995). Islamization under Zia. In M.  A. Syed (Ed.), Islam & Democracy in Pakistan (pp.  135–147). National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research. Khan, J., & Wazir, A. U. (2011). Civil-Military Imbalance in the Administration of Pakistan: A Case Study of Musharraf Era. The Dialogue, VI(2), 147–160. http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/thedialogue/TheDialogue/6_2/Dialogue_ April_June2011_147-­160.pdf Legal Framework Order. (2002). Government of Pakistan. Lodhi, M. (2011). Beyond the Crisis State. In M. Lodhi (Ed.), Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State (pp. 45–78). Oxford University Press. March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1998). The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. International Organization, 52(4), 943–969. Mohiuddin, Y. N. (2007). Pakistan: A Global Studies Handbook. Asia.

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Nawaz, S. (2011). Army and Politics. In Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State (pp. 79–95). Oxford University Press. Niaz, I. (2010). The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan. Oxford University Press. Olsen, J. P. (2007). Understanding Institutions and Logics of Appropriateness: Introductory Essay. Olsen, J.  P. (2010). Change and Continuity: An Institutional Approach to Institutions of Democratic Government. In J. Pierre & P. W. Ingraham (Eds.), Comparitive Administration Change and Reform: Lessons Learned (pp. 15–50). McGill Queen’s University Press. Peters, B. G. (2013). Institutions in Context, and as Context. In C. Pollitt (Ed.), Context in Public Policy and Management: The Missing Link (pp.  101–114). Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Pierre, J. (2013). Context, Theory and Rationality: an Uneasy Relationship. In C. Pollitt (Ed.), Context in Public Policy and Management: The Missing Link (pp. 124–130). Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Pollitt, C. (2008). Time, Policy, Management: Governing with the Past. Oxford University Press. Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2009). In C.  Pollitt & G.  Bouckaert (Eds.), Continuity and Change in Public Policy and Management. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Pollitt, C., & Dan, S. (2011). The Impacts of New Public Management in Europe. A Meta-Analysis. Pollitt, C., & Talbot, C. (2004). Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation. Routledge. Popay, J., Roberts, H., Sowden, A., Petticrew, M., Arai, L., Rodgers, M., Britten, N., Roen, K., & Duffy, S. (2006). Guidance on the Conduct of Narrative Synthesis in Systematic Reviews. https://doi.org/10.13140/2.1.1018.4643 Rabbani, I. (2005). A Comprehensive Book of Pakistan Studies (3rd ed.). Carvan Book House. Salman, A., & Feng, H. X. (2009, November). Foreign Aid to Pakistan: Impact on GDP. EABR & TLC Conference Proceedings. Shafqat, S. (2011). Praetorians and the People. In M.  Lodhi (Ed.), Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State (pp. 95–113). Oxford University Press. Sheikh, F. (2009). Making Sense of Pakistan (F.  Shaikh, Ed.). Columbia University Press. Wilder, A. (1995). Islam and Political Legitimacy in Pakistan. In M. A. Syed (Ed.), Islam & Democracy in Pakistan (1st ed., pp.  31–89). National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research. Wynbrandt, J. (2009). A Brief History of Pakistan (F.  A.Gerges, ed.). Facts on File Inc. Zaidi, S.  A. (2017, September 6). A Reformer on Horseback. Dawn. https:// www.dawn.com/news/1355171

Reforming Structures and Procedures in Pakistan (1947–2018) Abiha Zahra and Geert Bouckaert

Governments all around the world face numerous external and internal challenges. In order to deal with them, governments and their institutions deliberately adopt structural and procedural changes (Christensen et al., 2018) including restructuring hierarchies, executive institutions, public organizations, or modifications of system. Public sector reforms contain a variety of changes from structures, procedures, finances, to functions implemented for restructuring the executive institutions. In structural This chapter is part of Abiha Zahra’s PhD thesis available online at https://lirias. kuleuven.be/3172020?limo=0. A. Zahra (*) Public Governance Institute, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Department of Governance and Global Studies, Information Technology University, Lahore, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] G. Bouckaert Public Governance Institute, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_3

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reforms, there is more reconfiguration of the state apparatus while revising the structures, functions and organization of state bodies, administrative units, and the way resources are managed (Garcea & LeSage, 2005). A new top management, functional adjustments, new agencies, change in the procedures and ways to manage performance are also included in the list of structural reforms (Pollitt, 2009). Structural reforms might cover the overall government, or could be directed more toward organizations in specific policy areas, with specific legal status or tasks (Wynen et  al., 2017). Whilst not ignoring the fact that these structural changes are often motivated on grounds such as political favors (Wynen et al., 2017). Hence, political shifts are taken along with structural reforms for the analysis. This chapter serves as the background for the recent public sector reform narrative of Pakistan by mapping the alternations in the structures from 1947—the year of independence of Pakistan—until 2018. Reforms in public sector are unremitting, and like developed countries, Pakistan, a developing country, has been no exception in using different mechanisms for structuring and restructuring, ranging from hierarchies and markets to networks. What makes Pakistan more interesting as a case is its continuous shifts between military and civilian government since 1947. The political system of Pakistan has been ruled by an alliance of civilian and military institutions (Islam, 1989). This significant role and dominance of nonpolitical institutions such as military, administration, and judiciary over the political institutions and the executive is not common in most of the Western literature with its implications for the choice of reform mechanisms.

1   Data and Methods The data for this chapter come from extensive document analyses including books, articles, government documents, newspapers, and government websites. Government documents included yearbooks, legal documents of organizations, reports compiled by government organizations available online and in person from the organizations visited by the researcher. The books and the articles used for this research were authored by top researchers from Pakistan in the fields of Public Administration and Political Sciences. By using the data sources mentioned, research maps reform trends and shifts at the state level of Pakistan. The framework of Bouckaert et al. (2010) has been used for mapping alterations in the structures along with prominent political shifts. The research explains the dynamics of change by adding the qualitative version of time series analysis. Using the comparative static methodology, seven periods are mapped from 1947 to

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2018. In the detailed era descriptions, focus remained on structural reforms along with snapshots depicting adjustments during that period; other events that were not found to be relevant for reforms under study were not discussed. The goal of the chapters is to provide an overview of trends in structural shifts at macro level (federal government of Pakistan). Table 1 includes the symbols with description and category of reform mechanisms that are used for demonstrating shift in the state machinery, adapted from the work of Bouckaert et al. (2010). Some adjustments are made based on requirement of the context that were taken from the work of Zahra (2020). The same operationalization presented in Table 1 will be used in all other chapters of this book for analyzing reform mechanisms. The next section briefly describes the context of the country, and later the period portrayals.

2   The Politico-Administrative Context of Pakistan and the Restructuring Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic with four provinces as federating units including Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Government follows the Constitution of 1973 for its working. The Government itself is composed of three branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. The prime minister heads the executive with power vested in cabinet that works along with bicameral parliament. The Parliament consists of the upper house (Senate) and the lower house (National Assembly), which constitutes elected members. Parliament itself is a legislating body of the country, while Federal Cabinet includes Prime Minister (PM) Secretariat, Cabinet Division, and Establishment Division. The latter two divisions report directly to the PM office while the organizations working under ministries report to their parent ministry who then reports to the PM’s office. The government in Pakistan is led by the prime minister and sitting majority in the National Assembly have ease of making changes in the state structure, unlike other continental regimes discussed by Pollitt (2009) and Presidential systems like the United States (James et al., 2016) where restructuring is not that easy or quick. Organizations working under ministries could be divided into various categories depending on their legal and functional status but more often they are categorized as attached departments, semi-autonomous bodies, and autonomous bodies (Jadoon et al., 2012). In this research, the categorization of agencies (state organizations) developed by Van Thiel (2012) is adapted for the context of Pakistan. Type 0 and 1 are categorized under

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Table 1  Operationlization of reform paradigms Reform paradigms

Instruments

HTM

I. Top-down strategic management

Symbols

H

II. Financial management systems focused more on inputs III. Reshuffling the competencies: organization mergers, splits; centralization or decentralization IV. Reshuffling the lines of control V. Authority VI. Creation of new entity

*

VII. Abolishing an entity/scheme MTM

I. Financial management systems focused on results II. Regulated markets III. Privatization/Denationalization

$$$

MTM/HTM I. Competition with in public sector II. Autonomy for public organizations

H M

NTM

I. Bottom-up strategic management

N

II. Financial management systems focused on results while being oriented toward information exchange across policy areas III. Information exchange Systems IV. Advisory and consultation bodies/organizations V. Units specifically for collective decision-making

VI. Chain-management structures (continued)

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  REFORMING STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES IN PAKISTAN (1947–2018) 

Table 1 (continued) Reform paradigms

Instruments

Symbols

NTM/HTM I. Management following procedures with mandatory consultation as well as review

N H

II. Increased authority/autonomy of units with a specific coordination function III. Common organizations

**

NTM/MTM I. Interorganizational learning via training and job rotation Temporary units are represented with similar shape but dotted lines

attached departments, while type 2 refers to autonomous bodies, type 3 includes companies and corporations and type 4 are foundations (for details see Chap. 3 of Zahra, 2020). Judiciary is the third major branch of government that constitutes Supreme Court, High Courts, Session Courts and other special courts or tribunals. Judiciary ensures law and order in the country while the executive works on implementation of policies and projects. Before proceeding with the structural shifts and political developments in different periods, the basic structure of the country is presented in the Fig. 1. 2.1  Restructuring in the Government (1947–1958) In undivided India, the Moghul Empire developed civil bureaucratic structure as well as the public institutions at levels of state, provinces, county, and villages. Later, the British colonized the Indian subcontinent through their commercial holdings of British East India Company until 1947. The policy formulation system and implementation was strict top-­ down system though civil bureaucracy stayed as strongest actor in the policy process during the British rule.

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President Parliament

Supreme Court Prime Minister

Cabinet Ministers

Ministries

Divisions

Auton omous bodies

Attached Departments

State Public corpor owneed ations enterprises

Provincial Government Local Government

Fig. 1  Pakistan State Structure

After a long  power struggle, the British announced  partition of the Indian sub-continent into two territories- India and Pakistan  in August 1947 (Cohen, 2004). Pakistan was a physically divided state with its East Wing (currently Bangladesh) and West Wing at a distance of more than 1000 miles (Wynbrandt, 2009c). Four days before Pakistan formally got its independent status, a Constituent Assembly met in order to work as the federal parliament of the state with Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the governor-general. The governor-­ general had full authority over civil and armed forces of Pakistan (1). The port of Karachi was selected as the nation’s capital and Liaquat Ali Khan was designated as first prime minister. The Indian Act of 1935 provided legal framework for Pakistan with parliamentary governments both at federal and provincial levels with powers divided between the two levels. The country had five provinces as federating units. (Wynbrandt, 2009c).

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Cabinet Secretariat was inherited from undivided India ruled by the British. Cabinet Secretariat was set up (2) in the capital to work under an Administrative Secretary at the Federal level. The main function of Cabinet Secretariat was to coordinate the work of ministries and was held accountable to the prime minister. From 1947 to 1951, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan led the cabinet. The portfolios of Defence and States & Frontier Regions were functional directly under Prime Minister Secretariat (Source: Cabinet Division website). The other 18 portfolio ministries were functional under different ministers. One minister was taking care of one or more portfolios (3) and all the ministries had one or more functional divisions working under them. Divisions had attached departments working on their behalf and some autonomous bodies (type 2) with managerial autonomy and less involvement from the ministries. The Indian Civil Service (ICS) was renamed the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) after independence. In 1948, civil services rules were developed and first pay commission was set up (4). The government at that time was less effective with constant reshuffles; meanwhile, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) continued most of the business of state and acted as its backbone (Wynbrandt, 2009c). In 1948, the founder of Pakistan, Jinnah died of bad health and nation had to manage in his absence. Khawaja Nazimuddin was selected as second governor-general for the state. There were continuous efforts to draft the constitution for Pakistan. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan prepared the Objectives Resolution in 1949, which became a founding stone for the constitution. According to the Objectives Resolution, Pakistan will be a federal, democratic, and Islamic country (Cohen, 2004). It stated Pakistan as a sovereign independent state where power is exercised with tolerance and equality for the non-Muslim minorities by the people, and not the guardians of religion (Jalal, 2014). After the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan on October 16, 1951, Governor-General Khawaja Nazimuddin was declared Prime Minister. While the Finance Minister of that time, Malik Ghulam Muhammad was appointed Governor-General. Moreover, in 1951, Cabinet Secretariat was divided into two functional divisions (5), Cabinet Secretariat (main) and Establishment Division. The role of Establishment division belongs in the area of human resource management to employ modern management tools for improving service delivery in government.

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Meanwhile, the Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad made work on constitution a priority. However, due to increased violence and chaos in the state on religious and political issues, Governor-General dismissed the Constituent Assembly while declaring a state of emergency (6) in October 1953. This act of dismissing an elected government by the Governor-­ General later became an accepted trend for the next half-century in Pakistan. Since, the Supreme Court sustained that governor-general (president) can dissolve the assembly or veto any of the passed legislation. After the dissolution of assemblies, state was brought under federal control. Most of the civil bureaucrats working at that time were trained for such system under colonial viceroys pre-independence, which proved instrumental in ensuring the federal control and later strengthened roots of bureaucracy in the country (Bashir, 2013). Muhammad Ali Bogra joined the office of Prime Minister by forming a cabinet called “Ministry of Talents.” He developed the Bogra Formula to resolve an imbalance between the East and West Wings of Pakistan, since people in the East wing felt left out. Equal number of seats were allocated in the two houses of Parliament for both wings while requiring that either Prime Minister or President (Governor-General at that time) had to be from the Eastern Wing of Pakistan. Prime Minister Bogra appointed the then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Muhammad Ayub Khan as the Minister of Defense (7). This was the first step toward directly bringing the military into political positions. (Wynbrandt, 2009c). While in August, 1955 Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad resigned due to his worsening health and Syed Iskander Ali Mirza the then Minister of the Interior was appointed as new Governor-General. Iskander Mirza favored more autonomy for civil servants (administration) because of unpreparedness of Pakistanis for true democracy. His next step was to dissolve the National Assembly and PM Muhammad Ali Bogra’s government (8). The Supreme Court approved the assembly dissolution stating that which is otherwise unlawful, necessity makes lawful (Raza, 1999). Chaudhry Muhammad Ali then held the office of Prime Minister. Moreover, the four provinces of the Western Wing were merged as one province—West Pakistan (9); the purpose was to balance the power between the two wings of Pakistan. Lahore was selected as the new provincial capital for West Pakistan whereas the East wing became the province of East Pakistan with Dhaka as the provincial capital (Wynbrandt, 2009c). Yet again, Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad Ali resigned and Suhrawardy replaced him.

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Assembly took nine years to prepare a constitution, which was approved on March 23, 1956. The constitution recognized Pakistan as an Islamic republic with a parliamentary government and a unicameral legislature (10). The Constitution of 1956 replaced the position of governor-general with president (11), and Iskander Mirza became the first president of the state. Under the constitution, the members of National and provincial assemblies will elect a president who was to be the head of the state. The president had to appoint the prime minister and to approve provincial governors, Judges of the Supreme Court, Auditor General, and Advisory General, and was also vested the authority to dismiss the National Assembly. While prime minister with the majority party in federal parliament was recognized as the head of cabinet and his or her cabinet was made responsible before National Assembly (12). National Assembly (NA) was composed of president and NA members with equal distribution of seats between East and West Pakistan. NA had complete control over state finances. Judicial structure was composed of Supreme Court headed by a Chief Justice and High Courts. In terms of structure, the constitution of 1956 continued with most parts of the British Indian constitution (Cohen, 2004). Things were yet not going right for the government so in October 1957, PM Suhrawardy was asked to resign and the then President chose Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar to serve as interim Prime Minister. Later, Mr Chundrigar left the post and Malik Feroz Khan Noon replaced him in December 1957. PM Feroz Khan had a large number of parties in his coalition government and was successful in forming a unwavering government, eventually bringing stability to the political chaos in the state (Wynbrandt, 2009c). In the early years after independence a number of institutions were set up, some of which were Accounts Department, Foreign Services Department, Agricultural Corporation, and Development Board (13) for industrial development planning. The planning and control of the industry dealing in iron, steel, heavy machinery, cement, mineral oil, sugar, and tobacco were taken over by the government. Electrical, telephone, and wireless equipment industries were also nationalized (14), and it was emphasized to use raw material available in the country. Major concession in taxes and lenient policy in credits were announced. Meanwhile, the headquarters of Army, Navy, and Air Force were set up. The government passed an Inquiry Commission Act in 1956 through which a commission was established for an investigation of mass interest

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issues (15). It had power equal to civil court but the functions were restricted to special matters; however, it could not receive complaints from  the general public (Fig. 2). (1) Governor-general with full authority over civil and armed forces of Pakistan (2) Cabinet Secretariat established (3) Eighteen portfolio ministries functional under different Ministers (4) First Pay Commission set up (5) Cabinet Secretariat divided into two functional divisions (6) Governor-general dissolved the Constituent Assembly (7) Commander-in-Chief of the Army made the Minister of Defense (8) Governor-general dissolved the National Assembly (9) The four provinces of West Pakistan were merged into one province (10) Parliamentary form of government in the country with a unicameral legislature (11) Constitution replaced the governor-general with a president (12) Prime minister’s cabinet made responsible before National Assembly *Governor General (6) (8) Parliament (10)

(12)

(11)

President

Prime Minister (5)

(1)

Supreme Court

(2) Cabinet Ministers

(3)

(7) Ministries Divisions

(4)

Attached Departments

(15)

Autonomous bodies

West Pakistan Punjab (9)

Balochistan

Sindh

One provience

(13)

East Pakistan NWFP

(14)

Market

Fig. 2  Restructuring in the government from 1947–1958

Military

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65

(13) A number of institutions set up (14) The planning and control of the industry was with the government (15) Inquiry Commission set up

2.2  Restructuring in the Government (1958–1970) Amidst the unstable political governments, corruption, and food crisis, the government was unable to function; so on October 7, 1958, President Iskandar Mirza declared Martial Law by appointing Field Marshal General Muhammad Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator. In the wake of Martial Law, Khan abrogated the Constitution of 1956 and dissolved the central and provincial assemblies (16) (Wynbrandt, 2009c). Ayub Khan sent President Iskandar Mirza to comfortable exile in London and on October 27, 1958 the military formally took control of all strategic and legislative matters in the assistance of civil bureaucracy (17). Ayub Khan, as a president undertook major reforms including Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO). Under EBDO, the special tribunals were given authority to hold former politicians responsible for their misconducts, while the term misconduct was not clearly defined. In order to avoid prosecution, the accused person had to agree on not participating or being part of any elective body for seven years. About 7000 individuals were “EBDOed” and faced prosecution (Blood, 1995). Ayub Khan initiated various reform commissions including the creation of the Administrative Reorganization Committee (18) in December 1958 for reviewing the organizational structure, functions, and procedures of federal government to bring recommendations for improved performance and efficiency. The committee was also assigned to include steps for developing close cooperation between the Central and Provincial Government administrations, particularly for development-related work. Administrative Reorganization Committee produced the first ever reform document of the country and continued to function later through its seceding unit, the Standing Organization Committee (19) (Gorvine, 1965). All reforms recommended by the commission were successfully implemented and the key was granting financial autonomy to ministries by removing the complex steps of approval (20). Another reform commission was set up in 1959 under the Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Pakistan to make reform suggestions for the structures, and procedures of the ministries, departments, and their subordinate offices. He submitted two reports to government

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and second report came in 1961. In 1962, the standing organization committee headed by M. Shoaib presented the report on the revival of functional and structural reorganization at federal level. Screening committees (21) were established by the Martial Law government, both at the center and provincial level for assessing integrity and efficiency of the government officers. One of the major institutions, that is, the Planning Commission was set up (22) by the government in 1958 for entrenching institutionalization in the state planning process (Source: Government of Pakistan website). The Planning Commission in the 1960s enjoyed the stature with the competence to initiate and monitor the implementation of various reforms (Husain, 2012). Additionally, in 1959, the state set up the Ministry of Auqaf (23) and promulgated West Pakistan Auqaf Properties Ordinance, in order to supervise the religious endowments at shrines and tombs of Sufis (religious and spiritual scholars) (Ansari, 2011). Khan introduced ‘Basic Democracies’ system in 1959, as a key reform of his era. The system created 80,000 elective councilors who had to elect members of the National Assembly (Wynbrandt, 2009c) (24). The public had to vote for the 80,000 representatives, for village and town councils, establishing a multi-tiered system of institutions (Blood, 1995). The elected and appointed nonpolitical basic democrats had to elect the president through referendum in the presidential elections of 1960. Later, these basic democrats had to choose the members of the National Assembly. However, power mainly stayed at the top in the hands of the president. A new capital was chosen for the country and was named Islamabad while Dhaka from East Pakistan was nominated as legislative capital of the country. As the constitution of 1956 was abrogated with Martial Law, Ayub’s government kept working on the new constitution. In 1962, the government approved a new constitution, with the president as head of state and head of the government who reveled in most power (25). The federal ministers and department heads, provincial governors, chief justices and judges of the Supreme and High Courts were to be appointed by the president (Rabbani, 2005). The constitution of 1962 divided legislative powers between the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies with equal representation of both East and West Pakistan (while holding with the One Unit idea for West Pakistan).1 1

 Four provinces combined as one in West Wing.

  REFORMING STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES IN PAKISTAN (1947–2018) 

67

The significant number of reforms implemented in Ayub Khan’s rule also included land reforms in West Pakistan. The Export Bonus Vouchers Scheme (1959) and tax incentives enthused the new industrial entrepreneurs and exporters in the state. Bonus vouchers providing access to foreign exchange expedited the imports of industrial machinery and raw materials. For the investments in less-developed areas, tax concessions were offered. The Press and Publications Ordinance was amended in 1960 with specific guidelines and conditions for newspapers and other publications. During this period, a number of significant institutions were set up to improve the working of the government. In February 1960, the government established Administrative Training Council (26) to formulate a training structure for the public officers. Academy of Rural Development was intended to train administrative staff for village development programs. A Secretariat Training Institute was set up for training the ministerial staff and newly appointed Section Officers (Gorvine, 1965). The government created an Ulema Academy (27) for modernizing the religious scholars and leaders. Furthermore, the religious leaders linked to the Academy were exclusively chosen by the government for extending support to the regime in the hour of need (Ansari, 2011). The Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology and the Islamic Research Institute (28) were also established with advisory function to assist the government for the reconciliation of all legislation with the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah. Population planning program was expanded into a full-fledged ministry by the Ayub government (29) and a National Research Institute of Family Planning (30) was created (Ansari, 2011). Ayub Khan put his country on a modern path without violating any fundamental principles of Islam. Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) was established (31) during this epoch for financing the industrial growth. Between 1962 and 1969, 25 large-scale industrial projects in the private sector were financed by PIDC from 1962–1969 (Cohen, 2004). Presidential elections were organized in 1965 that reelected Ayub Khan through Basic Democrats (Rabbani, 2005). Meanwhile, Indo-Pak war was fought between September 6 and 22, 1965 over the Kashmir Issue, which contributed to unrest in the country, along with the issues with the East Wing of Pakistan on account of bad treatment. The mass movement for democratic government ended Ayub’s rule in 1969.

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With his resignation, Ayub khan transferred the power to another military dictator General Muhamad Yahya Khan on 25th March 1969, because he believed that civilians do not have the political caliber to run the country. General Yahya Khan revoked the 1962 constitution, dismissed the National and Provincial Assemblies while banning political activities and declared Martial Law in the state (32). On assuming power, he declared himself president on 31st March, 1969. Yahya Khan’s administration made a committee of deputy and provincial martial law administrators that worked above the civil administration (33). This step considerably shattered the alliance of bureaucracy and military, which had remained the pillar of efficiency and stability in the state (Blood, 1995). Later, Yahya Khan restored political activities to a certain extent and announced general elections for October 1970. His government also dissolved One Unit scheme of 1955 for West Pakistan (33). Moreover, the representation in the national and provincial assemblies was based on population2 instead of simple equal distribution formula. Yahya Khan took steps for guaranteeing an equitable distribution of economic benefits by setting up a financial institution called Equity Participation Fund (34). Industrial Development Bank managed the fund to increase investment and resources of small and medium-sized enterprises belonging to the private sector in both East and West Pakistan (Fig. 3). (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 2

Martial Law in the country Army took control of all the strategic and legislative matters Administrative Reorganization Committee set up Standing Organization Committee as successor of Administrative Reorganization Committee Financial powers given to ministries Screening committees established at the center and in the provinces Planning Commission was set up Ministry of Auqaf established ‘Basic Democracies’ system introduced for local government President enjoyed absolute power Administrative Training Council was set up

 East Wing had majority of population.

  REFORMING STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES IN PAKISTAN (1947–2018) 

(33)

President*

(32) Parliament

69

(25)

(16)

MLA Supreme Court

Prime Minister Cabinet Ministers (20)

*Ministries

*Military (17)

(23) (29)

Divisions (18) (19)

Attached Department

21

22

26

27

28

30

31

35

(19)

Autono mous bodies East Pakistan

West Pakistan Punjab (34)

Balochistan

Sindh

NWFP

One Province *Local Government (24)

(31) Market

Fig. 3  Restructuring in the government 1958–1970

(27) Ulema Academy established (28) The Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology and the Islamic Research Institute were established (29) Population planning program turned into a full-fledged ministry (30) A National Research Institute of Family Planning started working (31) PIDC established (32) Another Martial Law (33) A committee of martial law administrators to function above the civil administration (34) Dissolved one unit scheme for West Pakistan (35) Equity Participation Fund was set up

2.3  Restructuring in the Government (1970–1977) The general elections of 1970s held under Yahya Khan’s rule were the first in Pakistan that were based on one person, one vote method. In the West wing, Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won with large majority but got no

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seats in the East Wing (Blood, 1995), while Mujib-ur-Rehman won a majority in the East wing of Pakistan. Yahya Khan worked for a mutual consensus between the leaders in East and West Pakistan but that did not work and it led to an armed rebellion in East Pakistan (Hussain, 2014). Later in December 1971, Pakistani forces requested a cease-fire and a new state of Bangladesh appeared in the Eastern part of Pakistan (36). After separation of East Pakistan and violent demonstrations against the military, Yahya Khan resigned on December 20, 1971 and Bhutto from PPP assumed the role of President and Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). Bhutto became the first civilian to assume the role of CMLA in the history of Pakistan. On April, 1972, Bhutto withdrew Martial Law by forming an alliance with PML (Qayum). The majority parties in NWFP and Baluchistan also joined hands with him to form governments in NWFP and Baluchistan; however, later in February, 1973, he dismissed the government of Baluchistan on account of being inefficient and in protest provincial government of NWFP also resigned. Bhutto started nationalization in the country as his main agenda. He nationalized the major industrial units in three waves (Gustafson, 1976) (37). A board of Industrial management was set up to manage the nationalized industries (38). Bhutto’s economic program removed export subsidies and added fiscal incentives for large-scale industry while introducing price controls to preclude hoarding (Rabbani, 2005). The Life insurance business was also nationalized on March 19, 1972 taking over 43 insurance companies. Later in November 1972, the government set up State Life Insurance company (39) to look after the insurance business (Rabbani, 2005). Private commercial banks were nationalized in order to regulate resource allocation. Education was also nationalized, and from 1972 education was made compulsory and free till the eighth class while in 1974 the decision was extended till class 10th. New schools and other educational institution were constructed. All private institutions were nationalized and teachers were promised better services with allowances for unemployed college graduates. New universities and five new boards of intermediate and secondary education, and University Grant Commission UCG were set up (Rabbani, 2005). NCC National Cadet Corps was established (40) for training youth for military. Under the leadership of Bhutto, a third indigenous constitution of Pakistan was announced in 1973 (Blood, 1995). The country was declared a federal republic with four provinces—Punjab, Sind, NWFP, and Baluchistan (41). Legislature (Parliament) was bicameral consisting of the

  REFORMING STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES IN PAKISTAN (1947–2018) 

71

National Assembly (lower house) and the Senate (upper house) (42). All provinces had equal representation in the Senate; however, this house did not hold any constitutional powers for initiating or taking decisions on the money bills (Amjad, 2013). Members of these two houses of Parliament choose the president for a period of five years, as head of the State. The prime minister chooses the federal ministers from the members of Parliament. Unlike the previous constitution, key powers belonged to the prime minister (43). The military was placed under civilian government to avoiding martial laws in the future (44), which had been responsible for bringing military leadership to the office of president (Wynbrandt, 2009c). There was ministerial form of government in Pakistan with 48 ministries at that time and each ministry had one or more administrative divisions under it (Jabeen & Jadoon, 2013). The administrative divisions consist of central secretariat, subordinate offices, attached departments, and autonomous or semi-autonomous bodies. An elected parliamentarian leads the ministry, whereas a senior civil servant holds the rank of administrative secretary to work under the minister. The secretariat system has different duties for staff working in the central secretariat who are policy-­ makers and set policy directions, while the line officers work in attached departments or autonomous organizations (Jabeen & Jadoon, 2013) responsible for policy implementation. The Constitution provided two lists of functional areas: a federal legislative list and a concurrent list (45). The concurrent list gave the idea of shared rule among federation and provinces in vital areas of legislation. In the previous Constitution, there was only a federal legislative list and had very few functions left to provinces. The Constitution created Council of Common Interests (CCI)3 for formulating as well as regulating policies in the areas of shared rule between the federation and the provinces (46). Inter-provincial Coordination Committee also started functioning as an ad hoc body under the Constitution of 1973 (47). National Economic Commission was created in 1973 as a constitutional intergovernmental body for analyzing the economic condition of the state (48) and for advising both federal and provincial governments to ascertain balanced development and equity across the regions (Amjad, 2013). Other reforms introduced by Bhutto’s Populist Government include civil service reforms aimed at instituting supremacy of the political 3  CCI functions to coordinate and increase the cooperation between feral government and provinces for formulation and execution of appropriate public policies.

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institutions over the administration, particularly the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP). Civil Servants Act 1973 detailed the selection and conditions of service for government employees working at federal level (Ahmad, 2013). The prime minister was given voice in all the matters of national security and with this authority, PM Bhutto appointed a War Inquiry Commission to investigate the defeat of 1971 (49). Land reforms were announced in 1972 that fixed a low ceiling, promoted cooperative farming, and ensured abolition of landlordism in the country. Government also announced a credit policy in 1972 to ensure abundant loans for small businessmen, landlords with small holdings, and peasants (Rabbani, 2005). Under Labor Law Ordinance of 1975, the government introduced measures to check undue proliferation of trade unions; minimum wages were fixed; one child’s education was to be borne by industrialists, along with new policies regarding bonus, gratuity, leave, and retirement. Health policy was designed, which ensured easy access for the common man to healthcare facilities. Hospitals were launched with qualified staff and medicines, along with new hospitals and dispensaries (Rabbani, 2005). Dowry and Bridal Gifts Restriction Act, 1976 resulted in ending the public display of dowry and placed limits on the expenditures for marriage ceremonies (Hussain, 2014). Bhutto worked on reducing the power of the military, along with significant other steps. He began an alternative military force, the Federal Security Force (50), with an aim to distance the military from internal security matters of the state (Rabbani, 2005). Government created Council of Islamic Ideology (51) for ensuring that laws of the country are aligned with the main doctrines of Islam. Non-Muslims were banned from becoming the president or prime minister of the country. Bhutto’s government established the Ministry of Religious Affairs (52)—this was the first time in the history of Pakistan that a separate ministry was set up for the religious matters. The list of religious steps taken by the government was very long along with a great economic alliance with the Middle Eastern Muslim countries that topped the charts, bringing in huge benefits (Husain, 2018b). However, there was lot of agitation among the religious political parties, which formed a huge alliance called the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) against PPP for the next elections. Elections were held in 1977 and Bhutto’s PPP had a huge victory but the grand opposition, PNA, disagreed with the results of elections on account of rigging. PNA demanded

  REFORMING STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES IN PAKISTAN (1947–2018) 

73

President (44) (43)

Parliament (42)

MLA

Prime Minister*

Senate

Supreme Court

Cabinet

NA

Ministers Ministries

49

(50) FSF

(52)

Military

Divisions CCI Attached Department

(46)

47

51

38

39

Autonomous bodies

40

(48) (45) Province 1

Province 2

Province 3

West Pakistan

Local Government

East Pakistan

Province 4

(36)

(41)

(37)

Market

Fig. 4  Restructuring in the government 1970–1977

a new election but Bhutto did not agree and mass protests began. This led to a military intervention on July 5 that took all the political leaders of that time including Bhutto into custody (Fig. 4). (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47)

A new state of Bangladesh emerged Massive nationalization A board of industrial management set up State Life Insurance established Number of educational institutions created Ended one unit scheme of West Pakistan Bicameral parliamentary system consisting of the National Assembly and the Senate Absolute power for the prime minister Placed the military under civilian authority Shared rule between federation and provinces Created Council of Common Interests (CCI) Inter-provincial Coordination Committee started functioning

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(48) (49) (50) (51) (52)

NEC, a constitutional intergovernmental body created War Inquiry Commission to look into the defeat of 1971 war Federal Security Force (FSF) was created Government created the Council of Islamic Ideology Ministry of Religious Affairs established

2.4  Restructuring in the Government (1977–1988) Another Martial Law was enforced on July 5, 1977 with Zia ul Haq as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). Elected Prime Minister Bhutto and members of his cabinet were detained by the martial law led government while suspending the constitution and dissolving the assembly (53) (Wynbrandt, 2009b). Zia ul Haq held the position of president in 1978 and provinces were led by the martial law administrators holding the position of governors (Wynbrandt, 2009b). Zia relied more on the army during his rule for handling administration of the country (Mohiuddin, 2007). Although, right after removing the elected government of Bhutto, Zia promised elections soon but that did not happen. Bhutto was arrested on allegations of malpractices in elections and the murder of a political opponent. He was hanged in April 1979 on the verdict of the Supreme Court. Zia disbanded political parties in 1979 and disfranchised a number of politicians. He also ended the Federal Security Force (FSF) (54). A Majlisi-­ Shoora (Parliament) was created in 1980, comprising intellectuals, religious scholars, and professionals as chosen advisors. The judiciary was marginalized and Pakistanis were subject to military courts. Military courts got a position above judiciary and legislature (55). The Constitution was amended in 1980, after which High Courts were not allowed to review Martial Law orders or challenge any judgments of the military courts. Zia’s government attached Shariat Appellate Benches4 with the provincial High Courts that were meant to hear appeals related to religious matters mainly Hudood law while enjoying original jurisdiction (Hussain, 2014). Later in 1980, a Federal Shariat Council, a religious law court with

4  “Shariat Appellate Bench” was made part of Supreme Court and decisions of Federal Shariat Court were subject to appeal before the Shariat Appellate Bench of Supreme court. So, basically the creation of a separate court did not restrict the powers of civil or military courts (Hussain, 2014; Kennedy, 1990).

  REFORMING STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES IN PAKISTAN (1947–2018) 

75

original appellate jurisdiction was created to deal with the matters related to Quran and Sunnah (56). During this period, private sector and GDP experienced a significant boom (Wynbrandt, 2009b). Private investors were assured regarding limited nationalization under exceptional circumstances. The rice and flour units were denationalized, three steel mills were returned to their previous owners (57) and all the industries were made open to the private sector investors (Mohiuddin, 2007). New public enterprises were not created alongside investments in the  existing public sector projects.  The main vehicle for economic and industrial progress was the private sector (Ali et al., 2017). The corporatization process formally began with declaration of the Companies Ordinance 1984 that permitted a variety of formations in mixed economy under the law (58). A number of state departments were converted into public companies and it was seen as halfway to privatization (Hussain Raja, 2016). Pakistan joined the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of IMF in 1981 with focus on reduction of the size of government; however, less attention was paid to improvement in public sector management (Jadoon & Jabeen, 2013). The overall imposition of privatization and involvement of private sector on the development agenda by Zia’s government was mostly because of external pressure from the donor agencies (Ali et al., 2017). In February 1981, the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) was founded that called for ending Martial Law and organizing elections under the suspended Constitution of 1973. However, Zia did not listen to their demands and replaced the Constitution of 1973 with a provisional constitution order (PCO) introduced on March 23, 1981. The changes in constitution by Zia ensured that most power stayed in the hands of the president and if needed, the president could remove the prime minister and his or her elected cabinet (59). This 8th Amendment in the Constitution allowed the president to dismiss the National Assembly while holding the position of head of state and an elected prime minister was given the status as head of the government (Blood, 1995). Later in 1984, Zia held a referendum allowing people to either choose Zia’s policy of Islamization or otherwise. Zia won the referendum and became president for another five years but the situation against Zia started to get worse. Anti-Zia riots broke out in Sindh; many people were killed and arrested. Zia held local (municipal) elections on a non-party basis and lifted Martial Law in 1985 after eight years. However, Zia maintained his

76 

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position as Chief of Army Staff while remaining president (Talbot, 1998). He selected Muhammad Khan Junejo for the position of prime minister and reinstated an amended version of the Constitution of 1973 (RCO) while lifting the ban on political parties. Overall, during Zia’s regime, the military enjoyed numerous perks and additional opportunities after retirement. He hired army officers to a number of civil administrative positions by the introduction of military preference in the federal quota and gave them assignments in autonomous corporations (60). The provincial governors also belonged to the military till 1985 before the appointment of PM Muhammad Khan Junejo (Talbot, 1998). PM Junejo set a five-point program for the progress of the government and society in 1985 with a focus on education, and economic, judicial, and societal reforms while controlling corruption. The villages received electricity and rural areas got roads. During this time, Indo-Pak tensions increased and also the ethnic violence within Sindh. In this scenario, Zia terminated PM Junejo’s government and the national as well as provincial assemblies in May 1988 (61). A caretaker government was arranged under Zia as president and elections were planned sooner. The military-led government adapted Ayub Khan’s ‘Basic Democracies’ structure to lay the foundation of a new local government system. The focus of this system was on local development in areas like agriculture, health, education, roads, and supply of water. The local and district councils began the imposition of taxes and mobilization of resources for the first time in Pakistan (62) (Islam, 1989). The office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Federal Ombudsman) was established (63) in his regime to ensure that nothing wrong is done to citizens. Zia undertook a number of Islamic reforms, as he aimed to lead the country according to Islamic principles. A Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) was formed (64) to institute Islam in the state and its matters. Religious scholars’ representation in CII was quite considerable (Hussain, 2014), which announced that presidential form of government is more close to Islam and political parties are non-Islamic. Central Zakat Administration was established under the Ministry of Finance to oversee distribution and collection of zakat (65). Provincial Zakat Councils were created along with numerous other Islamic steps. In August 1988, Zia went on an official visit in Bhawalpur with the US ambassador and some other people. On the way the plane crashed and all 30 people onboard. During Zia’s regime, Pakistan remained politically an authoritarian state and also an ideological state (Talbot, 1998). After his

77

  REFORMING STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES IN PAKISTAN (1947–2018) 

President*

(61) Parliament

(53)

Military Courts

(59)

Prime Minister

Senate

Federal Shariat (56) Court

Cabinet Ministers

NA

Ministries

FSF (54)

Divisions

Province 1

Province 2

Province 3

63 64

Military

(60)

CCI Attached Department

(55)

Supreme Court

Autono mous bodies

65

Public compan (58) ies

Province 4

(62) *Local Government

(57) Market

Fig. 5  Restructuring in the government 1977–1988

death, the Chairman of Senate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan took the position of president on August 17, 1988 (Fig. 5). (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65)

Constitution suspended and legislative bodies dissolved Federal Security Force (FSF) disbanded Military courts got a position above judiciary and legislature Federal Sharia Court created Denationalization and industries opened to the private sector investors Corporatization process formally initiated Increased power for the president Army in bureaucratic positions Dismissal of government by the president Increased autonomy for local government Federal Ombudsman established Islamic Ideology Council formed Central Zakat Administration established

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A. ZAHRA AND G. BOUCKAERT

2.5  Restructuring in the Government (1988–1999) After the death of military ruler General Zia ul Haq, elections were held and Benazir Bhutto from the Pakistan People’s Party became the PM by forming a coalition cabinet. The economic and social conditions were worsening and there were numerous socioeconomic scandals. In 1990, the president dismissed the government and dissolved the assembly. In the next elections, Nawaz Sharif from Pakistan Muslim League became the PM and set up a working group to monitor and make recommendations for enforcing Islamic laws in the country (66). His government passed the Shariat Bill, which made the Quran and the Sunna the law of the country (Wynbrandt, 2009c). Sharif’s government gave preeminence to denationalization, deregulation, and promoting the private sector. A number of public sector industrial enterprises and financial institutions were denationalized/privatized (67) and new public sector companies were also set up (68). The government’s economic strategy rested on a new framework for industrialization by starting a partnership with the private sector in order to promote common objectives (69). Government approval was no longer required for the establishment of new industrial enterprises (with some exceptions, particularly in relation to arms and explosives) and government monopolies almost ended. Large development projects were initiated and the stock market opened for foreign capital. IMF loans continued, and during the 1990s, their Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) included privatization of state-owned enterprises, which explains why nearly 67 SOEs were privatized (Ali et al., 2017). Government decomposed the local government scheme of the previous military regime, and local bodies were dissolved (70). In the wake of increased tensions between the president and PM Nawaz Sharif, both stepped down from their offices in 1993 in order to avoid another military intervention. The caretaker government did major reforms in the country including the abolition of 15 ministries (71), giving an autonomous status to a number of government bodies including State Bank, Pakistan Television, and Radio Pakistan (72). Elections were held and again Benazir Bhutto became PM in a coalition government in 1993. She set up the Placement Bureau (73), although the bureau was later abolished. Due to various issues, her government could not work and was dismissed by the president. The caretaker government of 1996 decided to reduce the number of

  REFORMING STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES IN PAKISTAN (1947–2018) 

79

Divisions, attached departments, and other organizations in the Federal Government. About 21 organizations were proposed for abolition, liquidation, and privatization, while 22 were required to merge into other existing organization (74). However, in fact these decisions were not fully implemented. Nawaz Sharif from PML won a majority in the elections of 1997. The government did the division of assets between federal and provincial governments in the Council of Common Interests (CCI). Revenue-sharing arrangements were made between the provinces and the federal government (75), whereby all federally collected taxes are included in the divisible pool at the ratio of 62.5 percent and 37.5 percent of the net taxes (Hussain, 2008). The agenda in the 1990s included privatization, liberalization, and restructuring of the government organizations (Jabeen & Jadoon, 2013). Some constitutional amendments were introduced by the Nawaz Sharif government, which provided for the further jurisdictional authority of Speedy Trial Courts (76) to dispense summary justice (Blood, 1995; Wynbrandt, 2009a). Major 13th Amendment was passed in the constitution that gave the prime minister authority to repeal Article 58 (2)(b), the Eighth Amendment article that allowed the president to dismiss the prime minister and the National Assembly, thus restoring the original powers of the prime minister and returning the presidency to its ceremonial role (77). He also set up the Ehtesab Cell to deal with anyone involved in corruption (78). In this period, the competencies for key areas like Defense and Foreign Office remained predominately with the military (79). Bureaucratic neutrality was eroded during this period through large-scale postings and transfers of civil officials (Asia Report N°185, 2010). Sharif tried to control all the state institutions in which he was quite successful, but when he tried to control the military, he had to face the results with another military takeover that overthrew his government (Fig. 6). (66) (67) (68) (69)

Working group for the implementation of Islamic laws Public sector enterprises denationalized/privatized New public sector companies were also set up New framework for industrialization by starting partnership with the private sector (70) Local government scheme decomposed (71) Abolition of ministries

80 

A. ZAHRA AND G. BOUCKAERT

Fig. 6  Restructuring in the government 1988–1998

(72) Autonomous status for a number of government bodies (73) Placement Bureau was set up (74) Abolition, mergers, liquidation, and privatization for existing organization (75) Revenue sharing between the provinces and the federal government (76) Increased jurisdictional authority of Speedy Trial Courts (77) Original powers of the prime minister restored (78) Set up Ehtesab Cell (79) Military kept competencies for key areas like Defense and Foreign Office

2.6  Restructuring in the Government (1999–2008) Pakistan faced another coup d’état on October 12, 1999 (80).Chief of Army (COAS) General Pervez Musharraf became the prime minister of the country while holding his post as COAS. National Security Council (NSC) comprising of eight members was appointed to act as supreme governing body of the country (81). The creation of NSC included the

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81

military. Musharraf focused on accountability processes to punish those involved in corruption. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) was established under the NAB Ordinance 1999 that replaced the existing Ehtesab Bureau (82). This accountability process mainly targeted politicians. Some significant reforms were introduced including the structural changes in the Ministry of Women Development (83) and setting up of the National Commission on the Status of Women in 2000 (84). Like every other military government, Musharraf also introduced local government reforms with the plan to delineate powers at the local government level. Government established the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) to implement a plan of devolving the powers under the Local Government Ordinance (LGO). Provincial governments installed an integrated three-­ layered local government from 2001 (85) with only one line of authority at district level and the district bureaucracy was made answerable to the elected representatives (DPADM & DESA, 2004). This Local Government System envisaged fiscal transfers to the district governments through Provincial Finance Awards using a defined formula. The power of police was curtailed significantly at the district level with the Police Ordinance 2002, which made the Police subordinate to elected representatives (Khan & Wazir, 2011). Musharraf also announced Legal Frame Work Order (LFO) and the Political Parties Ordinance in 2002 for keeping strong political parties away from the government (Ahmed & Khan Afridi, 2014). Further, Musharraf amended the constitution once again to return the authority of the president to dismiss the elected prime minister and National and Provincial Assemblies (86), while he held the position of president. Pakistan embarked on far-reaching structural reforms during this regime that led to GDP growth. Several public sector enterprises were privatized by the government (87), which strengthened the corporate governance, liberalized trade, and led to the reformed banking sector. More than 20 public sector companies were also created in this period (88). The economic stabilization mode of the IMF was followed, which kept the economy from expanding at a fast pace. Among other reforms, a major one was giving more autonomy to media and other institutions (89). Private sector was allowed to broadcast news and to establish television and FM radio channels, which resulted in evident growth of media. Planning commission was made more autonomous by placing it under the Prime Minister Cabinet from the oversight

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of Ministry of Finance. Regulatory bodies in different policy areas were established including media and higher education (90), these bodies were more autonomous and were supposed to keep a check on the activities of other government bodies in that area. Twenty-six public sector organizations were created that directly dealt with regulation, control, and scrutiny, which is the highest number as compared to other period. The Supreme Court emerged as the one impending check on the power of General Musharraf (91) in addition to the military itself (Wynbrandt, 2009a). Musharraf was supposed to leave his position as president after completion of his tenure, but he did not. Issues with the judiciary increased when Musharraf deposed the Chief Justice, and there were strikes against him by lawyers and judges. Military staff itself enjoyed numerous perks and important positions in the government including the position of provincial governors (92) during this period. Later, due to the assassination of ex-prime minister Benazir Bhutto, and some wrong decisions regarding judiciary, Musharraf had to conduct general elections and later give up his position as president (Fig. 7). (80) Another Martial Law on October 12, 1999 (81) National Security Council (NSC) appointed to act as supreme governing body (82) National Accountability Bureau (NAB) established (83) Structural changes in the Ministry of Women Development (84) National Commission on the Status of Women set up (85) Established the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) (86) Authority reversed from Prime Minister position to President (87) Several public sector enterprises privatized (88) Several public sector companies created (89) Increased autonomy for state institutions (90) Regulatory bodies established in different policy areas under PM cabinet (91) Increased influence of The Supreme Court (92) Military staff held important positions in the government

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Fig. 7  Restructuring in the government 1999–2008

2.7  Restructuring in the Government (2008–2018) The general election of 2008 were held under General Musharraf and led to a coalition government with Pakistan People’s Party’s (PPP) Asif Ali Zardari heading the government. General Musharraf had to leave the position of president amidst protests by the public and opposition parties. With the opposition’s support, the judges that were deposed by the previous government were restored. In 2009, the military started operation against religious militants within the country to fight terrorism. In the post 2008 period, military co-governed in the areas of defense and foreign policy (Husain, 2017). (93) The government worked on constitutional reforms and presented the historic 18th Amendment to the constitution on 30 March 2010. The changes that were part of this constitutional amendment were curbing the powers of the president (94), and giving the federal executive authority to appoint president and federal ministers and a judicial commission for the appointment of superior judiciary (95). More autonomy was granted to the provinces (96) and 17 Federal Ministries were abolished (97),

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devolving major areas to the provincial governments. A new division (Capital Administration and Development Division) was created (98) to entrust all functions of terminated ministries that were kept by the federal government and retained functions were distributed among other federal ministries (99). The role of Council of Common Interests (CCI) was increased, with authority to resolve federation provinces and inter-province issues (100). Assets were divided among provincial governments by including indicators other than just population. Inter-Provincial Coordination Committee (IPCC) was positioned under the Ministry of Inter-Provincial Coordination, which was created in 2008 (101), since the coordination among provinces and between federation/provinces became a concern after the decentralization. IPCC assumed considerable importance especially after the 18th Amendment with the main task of maintaining coordination between federal and the provinces governments in all the necessary matters in order to promote uniformity in the policy formulation and their implementation. IPCC was chosen as the secretariat of CCI (Amjad, 2013). The seventh NFC award shared resources among federation and provinces on the basis of factors other than population and significantly increased the share of provincial governments in the budget. The 18th Amendment clarified that the country is a federal government with full control and command of armed forces (102). Additionally, parliamentary committee headed by the PM was assigned the selection of the Chief Election Commissioner and the Election Commission (103) with members from both the ruling party and the opposition. After devolving the major responsibilities to the provincial governments, vertical financing was provided by the federal government in health and other areas (104). Zardari abolished local government of Musharraf (105) in 2008 again for political reasons, making it the fourth time when local government system was discarded. Provinces were autonomous to adapt their local governments but even after the 18th Amendment, there is less decentralization as there is reversion toward centralization of powers in the provinces (Husain, 2018b). Some of the provinces retook control of the departments that were transferred to the local government in the previous regime. For example, Punjab Civil Administration Ordinance 2016 vested administrative and financial authority in District commissioners, making elected local governments useless debating clubs. During PPP’s government a number of scandals gained momentum, among which was the ‘Fake Degrees Scandal’ that received much publicity

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in 2010, when a number of legislators were found holding fake degrees to qualify for elections. Another major scandal was the ‘Memo Scandal’, regarding a leaked memo by a government servant, which ultimately led to the disqualification of Prime Minister Gillani by the Supreme Court (106). The issue revolved around leaking military information to Washington. The change and restructuring process continued during this period. The performance of state-owned enterprises remained poor with an increased trend of political hiring. Major enterprises were proposed for privatization, but the pace remained very slow. The government focused more on public–private partnerships and divestment of government shares by contracting out some part of the organizations in order to increase involvement of the private sector in the functioning of the public sector (107). Pakistan reached a historic milestone in March, 2013, when the National Assembly completed its elected term for the first time in history since its independence. In the General elections of 2013, Nawaz Sharif’s party PML(N) won a massive majority, and Sharif became the prime minister for the third time. The law and order situation improved due to the operations of the military against militants within the country. Military operations continued with the support of elected civilian government. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) unlocked new prospects for the Pakistani economy and continued to serve the purpose; the project began in Zardari’s regime. Sharif’s government announced a privatization policy in 2009, which laid emphasis on public–private partnership (108), stock options for workers, and management transfers in public sector enterprises (Ministry of Privatisation, 2017). Around 70 public sector enterprises were approved for privatization. The action plan of governments remained partial privatization of companies through initial or secondary public offering (Kiani, 2013). A three-year Extended Fund Facility was signed with the IMF for structural reforms, focused on reduction of government’s stake in state-­ owned enterprises (Tahir, 2014). Sharif faced clashes with the military for his relations with rival India that effected the cooperation between executive and military. After the deposed judges were reposed by the previous government and removal of an elected prime minister by the Supreme Court (SC), the judiciary grew in significance. Judicial activism, and proactive decisions of SC in economic policy, for example, Chagai hills exploration joint venture

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agreement, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project, privatizations of Steel Mills, meddling in the operation of civil services (I. Husain, 2018a), all affected the political scenario more than expected. After Panama Leaks and a number of other corruption cases, the Supreme Court (109) removed Nawaz Sharif in his third term and another candidate from his party held the executive office. This was the second time when the Supreme Court removed an elected prime minister and later in 2018, Sharif was banned from political office for life, and blamed the military for his removal. Institutional arrangements changed after the devolution of major areas from federation to provinces. The government completed its term and after general elections in 2018, Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf’s (PTI) civilian government started its political tenure (Fig. 8).

Fig. 8  Restructuring in the government 2008–2018

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(93) Co-governance by military and civilian government in the areas of defense and foreign policy (94) The powers of president curbed (95) Judicial commission for the appointment of superior judiciary (96) Increased autonomy for provincial government (97) Seventeen federal ministries abolished (98) Capital Administration and Development Division was created (99) Retained functions of devolved and abolished ministries distributed among other federal ministries (100) Increased role of Council of Common Interests (CCI) in federal and provincial matters (101) Inter Provincial Coordination Committee (IPCC) positioned under Ministry of Interprovincial Coordination (102) Federal government given full control and command of armed forces (103) Parliamentary committee for the selection of Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commission (104) Vertical financing by the federal government for the provinces (105) Local government scheme of previous government abolished (106) Disqualification of Prime Minister Gillani by the Supreme Court (107) Divestment of government shares by contracting out (108) New privatization policy in 2009 with greater emphasis on public–private partnership (109) Supreme Court removed PM Nawaz Sharif’s

3   Discussion and Conclusions In this chapter, focus was on providing the overview of reforms in Pakistan mainly at the federal level. Major changes in structure and procedures by different government since independence in 1947 until 2018 have been elicited. The reform trajectory of Pakistan demonstrates changing dynamics over time in the structure and components of government. Throughout Pakistan’s history political stability has been endemic, as the country has shuttled between ineffectual civilian government and military rule in an unbroken cycle interrupted by outbreaks of public protests demanding change and better governance (Lodhi, 2011). No matter it was civilian government or military rule, every one promised improved governance, and for which numerous reforms were implemented in the structure and

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procedures. A total of 109 major changes were identified in the country’s journey until 2018, which is quite a number as compared to other countries reviewed by Bouckaert et al. (2010). The chapter serves as a first step toward identifying the overall trends in the structural reforms along with political shifts. The power shuttled between the position of president and prime minister, depending on the type of government depicting the inclination of ruling governments toward strengthening their political office. Local governments were given autonomy in all the military-led governments while the civilian government focused on strengthening the center. The economic policies shifted continuously from increased state control over the industry to encouraging private sector in Ayubs’s period. Bhutto then chose massive nationalization, which was minimalized by the next government and in the later years, privatization and public–private partnerships have been encouraged. The government remained involved in privatization and liberalization, following the structural adjustment program of IMF post 1980s. Governments experimented with privatization, public–private partnerships and bottom-up strategic management in autonomous bodies but in combination with hierarchical control. Political hierarchical control was discernable since there were attempts by politicians to rule and control the way government works by political hiring and by politicizing the nonpolitical institutions including judiciary and bureaucracy. The elected governments lacked stability and ensured command and control in their favour. Post 2008, state reforms were oriented toward transferring competencies from federation to the provincial level. The movement of public organizations and ministries at federal and provincial level remained continuous. There were more mergers and reshuffles, while dealing with coordination issues across tiers of government. Longitudinal study lends insight that some reform choices seem to be cyclic in military and civilian governments; however, when the cycle starts again, it is not entirely the same policy unlike the results from European and English reform stories analyzed by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2009). The reforms narrative in the case of Pakistan exhibited fewer pendulum swings. Infact, the reforms snapshots appeared often as a hybrid of the earlier versions even in the similar kinds of regimes. The reform choices continue to evolve and shift with the political and power precedence; economic, social and prevailing environmental factors also played a tremendous role ultimately creating hybrids instead of analogous pendulum shifts. The manifestation of patterns resembles layers with forms that are hard to categorize as entirely new or old, making it closer to the marble cake version. Donor

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agencies brought agendas for the structural reforms, but the ruling party and their agendas influenced pace and choice of reforms with prominence given to strict command and control at the top. Hierarchy-type mechanisms were more frequently used in the reform process, while bringing in some aspects of markets and networks (Zahra, 2020). The prevalence of hierarchies can also be attributed to the overall power dynamics in the country that have been discussed in the chapter. Unpredictable political environment inclines the ruling government to focus more on authority and power reshuffles compared to the long-term strategic reforms that led to frequent U-turns of reform programs in almost every period. This chapter fills the gap in the literature by strategically demonstrating the changes in the government machinery over the years along with snapshots of changes to observe the variations. Mapping the structuring and restructuring is the beginning to find answers behind the reforms in different policy areas and at various government levels.

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Autonomy of Public Hospitals in Pakistan in the Time of Covid-19: A Policy Perspective Muhammad Fayyaz Nazir

1   Introduction By keeping in view the importance of the policy implementation aspects in the health sector, this chapter explores the emergence (under the management mechanisms) and current state (in Covid-19 era) of hospital autonomy reforms in Pakistan. Developing countries were utilizing a significant segment of their health budget on providing tertiary healthcare and ultimately were facing the problems of healthcare financing for primary and preventive healthcare facilities. These countries initiated the governance reforms such as hospital autonomy reforms and made the autonomous hospitals responsible for generating some part of their budget. Pakistan initiated the autonomy reforms in the health sector under the social action

M. F. Nazir (*) Department of Public Governance and Management, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Gent, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_4

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program of 1993 on a report prepared by Makinen et al. (1993), but the policy was instigated in later years by the federal ministry of health regulations. For this study, we consider autonomy, decision-­making right vested to the hospital board to augment efficient service delivery and cost-efficiency. Both the federation and the provinces were involved in implementing the autonomy reforms, but after the provincial autonomy in 2010, every province got specific rights to develop and implement its policies in some sectors, and health was one of them. Therefore, provinces redesigned their policies in the wake of provincial autonomy. Another specific element that augmented the need to comprehend autonomy is the emergence of Covid-19 and the role of autonomous hospitals in implementing Covid-19 policy, such as the National Action Plan to combat Covid-19, in the case of Pakistan. Much literature regarding autonomy reforms in developing countries is available, but these studies focused on a few hospitals. However, no study is available describing the overall picture of the policy reforms in Pakistan. Hence, this chapter aims to document hospital autonomy in the policy perspectives and in critical times such as the Covid-19 era. 1.1  Background Developing countries are spending 50 to 80 percent of their health budget on secondary and tertiary healthcare, ultimately making it difficult to operate the primary and preventive healthcare and developmental healthcare expenditures (Chawla et al., 1996). In recent years, developing countries have been paying particular attention to achieving target No. 3.8 of Univeral Health Coverage1 Bongaarts (2016) and it becomes crucial to evaluate any reforms in the health sector (Fox & Reich, 2015). Every country applies the concept of autonomy in their respective hospitals differently and gets different results (London, 2013) based on socio-­ economic conditions. Pakistan initiated the hospital autonomy reforms in 1993 and is still trying to implement these reforms with the real spirit.

1  Achieving universal health coverage, including financial risk protection and access to quality essential healthcare services.

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1.2  Need and Objective of the Study Autonomy reforms in Pakistan failed to achieve their objectives because, in the overall process, public problems, issues, and rights were not given due preference (Saeed, 2013). There is a need to advance the policymaking process in healthcare through its evaluation (Collins et  al., 2002). Although the reforms failed to achieve their objectives in Pakistan, no study was conducted to give an in-depth understanding of hospital autonomy in the wake of contemporary research trends such as coordination and policy issues such as Covid-19. Hence, to give the overall picture of the hospital autonomy, this chapter aims at the detailed documentation and situational analysis of hospital autonomy in the local context of Pakistan and inquire its history, origin, the part of provincial autonomy, and barriers in the implementation of hospital autonomy. 1.3  Research Question Pakistan is a developing economy with the fifth highest population rate globally, with a total population of 207,824,520 (survey conducted in 2017 by Pakistan Bureau of Statistics), with complex health infrastructure and worst health indicators. Despite working on several public health policies, such as the hospital autonomy reforms, the obstacles in Pakistan regarding healthcare are not being overcome (Akram, 2018). Although many efforts were made to grant autonomy to public hospitals, the results still seem unsatisfactory. After more than twenty-five years of the first step towards granting hospital autonomy, the policy is still not entirely implemented as described in pilot project documents. The situation raises the question—why could we not implement the policy as it was planned? Autonomy is a mode of decentralization and has its roots in some reforming concepts (McPake, 1996), the scope of Public–Private Partnership, New Public Management (Chawla et al., 1996), the notion of organizational change (Collins & Green, 1993) and the coordination. Metcalfe (2004) illustrates the element of independent decision-making by the organizations as one of the vital constituents of the concept of coordination. The management mechanisms such as hierarchy-type mechanism (HTM), market-type mechanism (MTM), and network-type mechanism (NTM) are used for creating greater coordination within the organizations (Alexander, 1998). Public organizations’ capacity to regulate their preferences and interpret those choices into firm activities is an

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essence of organizational autonomy (Maggetti & Verhoest, 2014). It is pertinent to refer that the success or failure of a specific policy may be associated with a particular situation (Brynard, 2009), such as the obstacles that prevent a specific policy or policy instrument from being implemented or limit how a policy can be implemented. In the light of the above discussion, we divide our core research question as: What is the contemporary situation of hospital autonomy implementation in Pakistan in the time of Covid-19? How do management mechanisms explain hospital autonomy? Are there some barriers involved in the implementation of hospital autonomy in Pakistan? Furthermore, the question can be answered if we know the status. Thus, we explored the current state of affairs of hospital autonomy in Pakistan during the outbreak of Covid-19 and tried to get its history and some other vital domains and relate them with some other developing countries, where we deemed it necessary.

2   Literature Support The policy sciences are concerned with problems and are characteristically multidisciplinary in their logical and applied approaches. Policy implementation is a vital phase of the policy cycle that turns policy intentions into actions. Analysis of policy implementation can disclose challenges and opportunities. The substantive policy areas are constitutions and rights, education, environment, culture, tax, industry, agriculture, food, transportation, infrastructure, criminal justice, privatization, and health (Peters & Pierre, 2006). Till the first half of the twentieth century, the policymakers gave specific importance to providing primary health services (Reerink & Sauerborn, 1996). In the second half of the twentieth century, a wave of health sector reforms, including hospital autonomy, was triggered by developed countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, New Zealand, South Korea, and developing countries like India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Uganda, Tanzania, and Nigeria (Cassels, 1995). Many researchers from various countries focus on different aspects of hospital autonomy in their publications. They describe organizational autonomy in different ways. Autonomy has a legal perspective (Kuiper et  al., 1992), is a modification of deeds inside the organization (Mol, 1988), has more economic and managerial aspects and has organizational control dimensions, which are Management Autonomy, Policy Autonomy,

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Structural Autonomy, Financial Autonomy, Legal Autonomy, and Interventional Autonomy (Wynen et al., 2014). Political, administrative, vertical, and horizontal decentralization are existing decentralization models (Kuhlmann & Wayenberg, 2016). Conversely, such outright measures are minute assistance in describing hospital autonomy, as any hospital in any country cannot be entirely self-­ governed or sovereign. Although hospitals, either under Government or a commercial business body, are all subject to specific rules (Chawla et al., 1996), another notion that accepts the rule of law is the hierarchy type mechanism (Hood, 1991) which is power/autonomy dependent within various state institutions (Bouckaert et al., 2010). Sometimes it is necessary to set aside the authority/monopoly of state institutions for increasing the element of competition to make the management more result-oriented. It is the real essence of the market-type mechanism. Government cannot be the sole actor in any policy. So the cooperation and involvement of other policy actors are as important as the previous elements. That gave the idea of network-type management. Governments always select the diverse patterns of management mechanisms (Meuleman, 2008). The autonomy in this context means increased decision-making power at the hospital level, including financial and administrative decisions (Mitchell & Bossert, 2005). The autonomous hospitals will have to generate at least a part of their funds to maintain their operations, and the Government will grant them some annual subsidies. The hospital management committee headed by the chief executive and members from the Government and corporate sectors is made responsible for the overall administration of the hospitals. Autonomy enables the hospital administrators to curtail costs and raise the quality of healthcare. Government-­ affiliated autonomous hospitals would maintain their societal assignment; they would not refuse to deliver healthcare to those incapable of paying (Makinen et al., 1993).

3   Theoretical Lens For this research study, we opt the theoretical integrative approach by utilizing the Harold Lasswell policy cycle model and the typology of reform mechanisms presented by Bouckaert et  al. (2010), which was adapted for the context of Pakistan by Zahra (2020). The policy cycle model informs us about the various stages of the policymaking process

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while we will discuss reform mechanisms such as hierarchy-based mechanisms, market-based mechanisms, and network-based mechanisms at various stages of policy cycle. In the hierarchy-based mechanisms, the politicians are more involved in the processes, while the element of competition is involved in the market-based mechanisms along with the essence of new public management, and the network-based management is coordination oriented (Bouckaert et al., 2010). This operationalization will be used to discuss the hospital autonomy-related reforms.

4   Data Collection and Analysis For this research study, researchers adopted the research methods that support the qualitative research design. Data was collected through exploratory interviews in two phases and document analysis and examined thematically. For interviews, operational implementors N  =  15, which includes political-­administrative bodies, implementation authorities, and monitoring agencies. 4.1  Agenda Setting A number of developing countries are spending a significant part of their health budget on tertiary healthcare and are left with a minute part for preventive and primary health care, resulting in below-average health indicators and a lack of quality healthcare services. In order to resolve the issue of healthcare financing, developing countries following the developed countries, initiated hospital autonomy reforms for granting financial autonomy to their tertiary healthcare units. The project initiated in Pakistan wanted to test a hypothesis—the grant of autonomy to public sector hospitals in Punjab province would enhance the quantity and quality of their services (Table 1). The purpose of the policy, according to the pilot project documents was to grant managerial and financial autonomy to the hospitals for the sake of: . Improving the quantity and quality of their services 1 2. Giving a due share from these services to the poor masses of the society 3. Moreover, this should not result in a massive increase in the fiscal aspect.

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Table 1  List of autonomous hospitals in Pakistan Province/region

No. of hospitals

Autonomous regions FATA/PATA Baluchistan Capital Islamabad Khyber Paktunkhwa Punjab Sindh

0 0 3 10 19 11

Source: Pakistan Medical Commission

4.2  Policy Formation In Pakistan, the grant of autonomy to public hospitals was initiated under the Social Action program of 1993 (Abdullah & Shaw, 2007) and fueled by the Government and policy benches in the later years. A project titled: Pakistan-Punjab pilot hospital autonomy project initiated with the World Bank South Asia chapter’s financial and technical support in 1999 (Project ID: PKPE58461), in which initially three major teaching hospitals of Punjab were supposed to give autonomy within the timeframe of four years. It is mentioned in the project document that if the pilot project is successful, then the scope of the project will be enhanced to enlist all the teaching hospitals and district headquarter hospitals of the province. 4.3  Decision Making In Pakistan, before developing the first National Health Policy2 in 1990, health was a component of every five-year economic development plan.3 Hildebrand and Newbrander prepared a report for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1993 to initiate health sector reforms in Pakistan. The report became the basis of hospital autonomy initiatives in Pakistan. One of the chief concerns of the healthcare 2  In response to the Alma Atta Declaration, Pakistan drafted its very first National Public Health Policy in 1990. 3  Five-year plans for economic development were a series of nationwide centralised economic plans; first adopted in 1955.

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professionals and institutions is that they were not involved in the decision-­ making part of the policy. 4.4  Policy Implementation The autonomy of the public sector hospitals was also adopted in the National Health Vision of Pakistan 2016–20254 to augment the healthcare service delivery and support sustainable development goals (SDGs) of the United Nations Organization. After the 18th Amendment5 in the constitution of Pakistan (in 2010), every province was authorized to draft and implement its public health policy. Pakistan has a capital territory: Islamabad; four provinces: Baluchistan, Khyber-­ Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Punjab, and Sindh; two Autonomous regions: Gilgit Baltistan and Kashmir; and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas of Punjab (PATA). Resultantly, every province implemented its hospital autonomy laws. So, the policy was implemented on a provincial basis. Thematic analysis of policy documents gave a descriptive comparison of provincial laws, given in Table 2. 4.5  Policy Evaluation Currently, the health sector of Pakistan has been divided into a complex system of regulatory bodies, implementation agencies, autonomous organizations, semi-government entities, public sector companies, public–private partnerships, trust organizations, and the corporate/business sector, as described in Fig. 1. Such agencies are operating on federal, provincial, and local levels. The role of the private sector as a trust, Non-Government Organization (NGO), and business organization is also a vital aspect of the health sector in Pakistan. Recently Punjab was experiencing a public–private partnership in the health sector and designed some public sector companies, that is, Punjab Health Facilities Management Company, Punjab Health Initiative Management Company, Punjab Social Security Health Management Company. Some hospitals are owned by other civil and 4  The Federal Government of Pakistan has launched the National Health Vision 2016–2025 to improve health service delivery across the country. 5  The national assembly of the Government of Pakistan passed the 18th amendment to its constitution of 1973 on 8 April 2010.

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Table 2  Hospital autonomy laws in different provinces of Pakistan Specification

Province wise description Punjab

KPK

Sindh

Title of act/ Ordinance

Punjab Medical and Health Institutions Act 2003 (Amended in 2013)

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act 2015

Act/Ord. No. Came into Force Administrative Head

Act IX of 2003 9th June 2003

Act IV of 2015 15th January 2015

Sindh Health Institutions (Establishment and Management) Ordinance 2007 Ordinance 1 of 2008 24th October 2007

Chairperson of BOG (Selected from private members) Academic Head V.C./Principal Board Four members from the Members Government and six non-official members Board Secretary Medical Superintendent Committees or Sub-­ Committees Board Powers

Can be constituted as it may deem necessary A partially transparent description of board powers is given in the Act, and the board has partial financial, H.R., and administrative powers

Chairperson of BOG (Selected from private members) Dean of College Three members from the Government and seven from the private sector From the Private sector Can be constituted as it may deem necessary More explicit description of power is given in Act, and the board has financial, H.R., and administrative powers

Chairperson of BOG (Selection procedure not straightforward) V.C./Principal Four members from the Government and four non-official members Medical Superintendent Can be constituted as it may deem necessary No clear description of board powers is given in the Act

security organizations like hospitals under Pakistan Railways and Employees Social Security Institutions. Some of them are teaching hospitals like Combined Military Hospitals and are attached to the National University of Medical Sciences (NUMS) under the Pakistan Army’s management control. Punjab Public Health Agency, Health Services Academy, and Directorate General of Monitoring and Evaluation all are performing specific functions ranging from assessing healthcare quality to implementing and evaluating several clinical and managerial functions, ultimately overlapping the organizational jurisdiction. Policy document analysis informed

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Health Sector

Ministry of National Health Regulations

Government

Provicial

Federation

Ministry of Hea;th Specialized Healthcare

Tertiarycare, Teaching and Specialized Hospitals

Primary and Secondary

District Headquarter, Tehsil Headquarter, Rural Health Center, Basic Health Unit

Under Local / District Other Govt. Allied Setups: Railway, Social Security, Population Welfare, etc

Research or Development Institutions: Health Services Academy, Punjab Health Foundation, Punjab Public Health Agency, Punjab Healthcare Commission, Punjab Pharmacy Council, Punjab Nursing Council, Punjab Medical Faculty, Pakistan Medical Commission, etc

Private Semi Government Under Public Private Partnersho p Punjab Social Security Health Manageme nt Company

Town Hospital

Mini Hospitals

Punjab Health Facilities Manageme nt Company

Dispenseries

Trust Organizations, NGO's, Business Entities

(Source: Policy documents)

Fig. 1  Health infrastructure of Pakistan. (Source: Policy documents)

us that no such agency is available for the monitoring and evaluation or impact assessment of the hospital autonomy policy despite extensive health infrastructure.

5   Identification of Barriers As far as hospital autonomy is concerned, abundant literature is available, but there is limited literature available regarding the identification of barriers in its implementation. We found a few studies in this perspective. In order to fill the literature gap, this study identified the barriers to implementing hospital autonomy in Pakistan, in current healthcare crisis such as Covid-19. Hence, we first enlisted the implementation barriers identified by other researchers in the relevant literature, and then inquired about the barriers in implementing hospital autonomy, specifically in Pakistan (Table 3). Barriers to implementation or challenges of implementation can be entrenched in various reasons like opposition from relevant stakeholders,

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Table 3  List of barriers in implementation of hospital autonomy No. Country

Author and year

Identified barriers

1

Iran

Missing stakeholder’s consent, rigid centralized structure of health sector, and rigid Human Resource policies

2

Tunisia

Markazi-­ Moghaddam & Aryankhesal, 2014 De Geyndt, 2017

3 4

Dominican Republic Kenya

5

India

6

Pakistan

Powerless Board of Directors, Undue involvement of Health Ministry into Human Resource & Purchase matters Smith & Hanson, Involvement of Health Ministry into hospital 2012 internal affairs De Geyndt, 2017 Lack of Standard Operating Procedures and Lack of decision-making skills in Hospital Managers Sharma & Non availability of guidelines, Divergence from Hotchkiss, 2001 the plan and Infrequent Meetings Saeed, 2013 Missing stake-holders involvement, Non availability of Human Resource, Purchase, Finance & Administration rules for autonomous units, undue involvement of Health Ministry into hospital affair and powerless board

inadequate financial and human resources, absence of clarity to operational guidelines and responsibilities, deficiency of coordination among the actors responsible for implementation, conflict of interests with other policies, and absence of a political will. O’Toole (1986) presented a brief list of implementation barriers. The list is quite comprehensive, but no one can claim that the list is complete and contains all the determinants.

6   Discussion, Summary of Findings, and Conclusion 6.1  Discussion The discussion is divided into three sequential sections to answer sub-­ questions in the quest for the answer to the core research question, as given below: 1. What is the current state of hospital autonomy implementation in Pakistan?

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Hospital autonomy reforms were triggered in the second half of the twentieth century in some developed countries. Many developing countries initiated hospital autonomy policies to solve problems like service delivery and healthcare financing. Pakistan initiated hospital autonomy in the last decade of the twentieth century by following other developing countries, and the World Bank played a constructive role in implementing this policy. Some other developing countries like Iran and Tunisia attempted to grant autonomy to their public health institutions (De Geyndt, 2017). The Government of Iran started the decentralization of public health institutions in the 1990s. The concerned ministry vested autonomy to 54 public university-owned hospitals in 2006. The board of trustees for every autonomous unit, headed by the chancellor of the medical institution, was created (Doshmangir et  al., 2015). In Tunisia, the ministry of health initiated the same process in 23 university hospitals in 1991 by creating a legal entity, “Etablissements Publics de Sante,” administered by the President, Board of Directors and Members appointed by the Minister of Health (Ismail, 2015). As per the pilot project document of hospital autonomy in Pakistan, we found that managerial and financial autonomy was initially granted in Pakistan. However, the situational analysis and document analysis describe that there is a mix of autonomy in some provinces. In Punjab, some teaching hospitals implement management information systems packages such as a biomatric attendance system, inventory management system, and file management system. Hospitals can perform some procurement functions and can procure inventory with some financial limits. In KPK, partial human resources autonomy is given to the hospitals, as described in the KPK Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act 2015. As the first step towards the hospital, autonomy was taken in 1993, and after more than twenty-five years, the policy was still not implemented with its real essence. 2. How are management mechanisms explain the hospital autonomy? Autonomy was introduced in the health sector of Punjab through Punjab Medical and Health Institutions Ordinance 1998, promulgated on 23 May 1998 and supported by the World Bank in which certain teaching hospitals and their medical colleges were given semi-autonomous status in two phases. As the project was initiated by the political Government but implemented by the military Government, MTM/HTM was involved. In the first phase, five hospitals and in the second phase, six hospitals were

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granted autonomy. After that Punjab Medical Teaching Institutions Act, 2003 was introduced by the Government of Punjab with some amendments in the management structure of the hospitals concerning the previous ordinance. That act was amended in 2013. The Government of Punjab is working on Punjab Medical and Teaching Institutions Reforms Act 2019. The Government is facing strong resistance from various segments of society against this act. The autonomy was given in 1999 to four teaching hospitals of province KPK, and management councils were created to operate the functions of hospitals. In 2015, all the remaining teaching hospitals of KPK were given autonomy under the Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act 2015 by following the MTM. As with other provinces, the Government of Sind introduced autonomy under the ordinance: The Sindh health institutions (Establishment and Management) Ordinance 2007 as HTM reform. The Government of Balochistan tried to create grounds for the introduction of autonomy by introducing a Social Action Program in 2003 in which the Government introduced management committees for the hospitals. However, no autonomous hospitals are found in province Balochistan and the autonomous regions of Pakistan, that is, Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu & Kasmir and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas of Punjab. Comparative analysis of policy documents informs us that every province drafted and implemented requisite laws in different years, and some provinces give a more explicit description of board powers in their laws. It is pertinent to mention that some provinces never tried to amend the laws after the provincial autonomy. Such as the province of Sindh, the hospital autonomy policy was implemented under an ordinance issued by a dictator of that time (President General Pervaiz Musharaf). So, the upcoming provincial Governments label that policy with the dictator mindset under the concept of HTM. 3. Are there some barriers involved in the implementation of hospital autonomy in Pakistan? The analysis of policy documents and respondents’ information demonstrate that the complexity of healthcare infrastructure, bureaucratic involvement, and missing policy guidelines are significant implementation barriers in the case of hospital autonomy in Pakistan. In the quest of implementation barriers in recent case, we found that the large-scale organizational reforms were introduced under the Medicare Relief Societies in

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sixty-nine public hospitals in the Rajasthan province of India in 1990. The results show that non-availability of guidelines, divergence from the implementation plan, and infrequent meetings among society members were the chief barriers in that case (Sharma & Hotchkiss, 2001). The objectives of autonomy to six public hospitals in the Dominican Republic were not achieved. Smith and Hanson (2012) reported the ministry and center’s involvement in hospital affairs, especially in human resource matters, as a chief barrier in that failure. Saeed (2013) identified the missing stakeholder’s consent, non-availability of human resource, purchase, finance, and administration rules, undue involvement of the health ministry into hospital affairs as chief barriers in implementing hospital autonomy in Pakistan. Iran’s autonomy initiative to the public hospitals was unsuccessful because of the health sector’s rigid centralized structure, missing stakeholders’ consent, and rigid human resource policies (Markazi-­Moghaddam & Aryankhesal, 2014). In Tunisia, the hospital autonomy policy could not yield the required results because of the powerless Board of Directors and undue involvement of the health ministry in hospital human resource and purchase matters (De Geyndt, 2017). The results of autonomy to Kenyata National hospital in Kenya under the State Corporations Act of 1986 was not fruitful because of delay in the appointment of Board of Governors with fair competition, lack of standard operating procedures, and lack of decision-making skills in the hospital managers and staff (De Geyndt, 2017). 6.2  Summary of Findings The policy’s objective was to augment the quality and quantity of service delivery without a significant burden on fiscal policy. Initially, some elements of MTM were involved; however, creating administrative posts of Director Medical, Finance, Human Resource, Planning, and Procurement for every autonomous hospital with a competitive salary and perks exerted a considerable burden on the government treasury. Hospitals are not generating a portion of their funds required to manage hospital functions, which ultimately make such hospitals financially dependent on the provincial Government. The element of the policy objective, that is, health financing or fiscal burden, has not given the required importance during the implementation. Initially, the Federal Ministry of National Health Regulations triggered the policy, and later on, every province was supposed to draft and implement the requisite laws in the wake of provincial autonomy. The autonomy acts/laws are available in some provinces like

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Punjab, Sindh and KPK, but no such laws are available in Baluchistan, two autonomous regions (Gilgit Baltistan and Kashmir) and the tribal areas. There is no such agency on the federal or provincial level responsible for the implementation and monitoring aspect of the policy. The study analyzed that the above-stated factors contribute to the current passive condition of implementation of hospital autonomy in Pakistan. The failure of market mechanisms emanates room for state intervention resulting in the hierarchy-type mechanisms. So the introduction of bureaucrats and politicians into the hospital boards resulted from a failure of the MTM that ultimately resulted in the HTM. Since, two vital mechanisms in coordinating collective actions into specific policy objectives are market and hierarchy mechanisms (Vining & Weimer, 2005). We observed the primary elements of reform mechanisms in case of hospital autonomy in the local context of Pakistan converting from the trigger point, a shift from more MTM to the contemporary status quo such as the HTM and a combination of the two MTM/HTM. 6.3  Conclusion The health infrastructure of Pakistan has been segregated into a complex system. The complex system created by the teaching and specialized hospitals managed by civilian and security institutions other than the core federal or provincial health departments/ministries, distorted the health infrastructure. There are many agencies that have no clear segregation of their jurisdiction. Initially, in Pakistan, financial and managerial autonomy was granted to the hospitals as per the pilot project documents in various provinces and was envisioned with the management mechanisms. Later on other elements were adopted, such as human resources and procurement. However, specific bylaws required to make these autonomy areas operational were never drafted. The study identifies and document the barriers to implementing hospital autonomy, such as the complexity of healthcare infrastructure, bureaucratic involvement, and lack of policy guidelines. Currently, every autonomous hospital follows the provincial laws for human resource, purchase, finance, and administration as other non-­ autonomous hospitals are following. Over time, the politicians and bureaucrats became the permanent members of the autonomous hospitals’ management committees and resumed all the significant powers. This phenomenon gave more space to HTM.

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Conclusively, after approximately three decades of policy initiation, the Government of Pakistan is still struggling to implement the policy on provincial grounds. The failure of the triggering phenomenon such as more MTM to more HTM or HTM/MTM contributed to the decline of the real essence of autonomy within the hospitals. It is owing to the contributing barriers (complexity of healthcare infrastructure, bureaucratic involvement, and missing policy bylaws/guidelines) that the policy is still not implemented as it was planned, initially.

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Energy Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Trends and Challenges Shabana Naveed, Madiha Rehman Farooqi, and Muhammad Zafar Iqbal Jadoon

1   Introduction The paramount significance of energy sector, in the economy of any country, is well established. Both developed and emerging economies have great reliance on the energy resources for the prosperity of economic This chapter is derived in part from Shabana’s PhD thesis: Sultana, S. (2019). Managing Complexity in Governance Networks: The case of Energy Sector in Pakistan. University of the Punjab. published by Higher Education Commission, Pakistan http://prr.hec.gov.pk/jspui/handle/123456789/11582 S. Naveed (*) UCP Business School, University of Central Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] M. R. Farooqi Division of Management and Administrative Sciences, UE Business School, University of Education, Lahore, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_5

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stability of the country and Pakistan is no exception. Energy sector is the backbone of all economic and social activities in Pakistan. Fortunately, Pakistan is blessed with abundance of natural resources for energy production. In particular, Pakistan has high potential to produce hydro energy, solar energy and wind energy, which are both cheap and sustainable sources (Aized et  al., 2018; Rafique & Rehman, 2017). Paradoxically, Pakistan is faced with critical energy crises and a large part of the population is surviving with severe shortage and load-shedding of electricity and gas supply along with frequent disruptions (ADB, 2019; Bhatti et al., 2012). In order to overcome energy crises, the Government of Pakistan initiated various reforms in the energy sector, particularly after 1980s when energy crises were heightened. Various energy reforms included privatization of public utilities, involvement of private sector for power generation, restructuring of large bureaucracies, independent regulators and creation of numerous coordination and integrating bodies. With these reforms initiatives, the coordination mechanism also greatly changed. However, despite progressive reforms, the energy crisis persists in Pakistan, which is calling for researcher’s attention. In particular, researchers have rarely addressed the analysis of energy sector reforms, their evaluation in light of underlying coordination mechanism in the sector, and the impacts of these reforms. Addressing this critical domain, the chapter aims to answer following questions: • What are the major reform trajectories in the Energy Sector Reforms in Pakistan? • How can energy sector reforms in Pakistan, be theoretically explained? • What are the current challenges faced by energy sector in Pakistan? Bouckaert et al. (2010) provided three dominant mechanisms of coordination in public sector including hierarchy-type mechanisms (HTM), market-type mechanisms (MTM) and network-type mechanisms (NTM).. HTM was based on use of hierarchy, top-down decision-making and control-based coordination. Bureaucratic rules, regulations, input and

M. Z. I. Jadoon Institute of Administrative Sciences, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan

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processes were the major tools of policy implementation (Pfiffner, 2004). Such hierarchy-type mechanism of controls were most prominent in the traditional public administration model that remained dominant till 1980s. In the 1980s, NPM was popularized; this placed a greater emphasis on results, performance orientation, competitive environment and business practices in public management (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1990). In this model, a large-scale structural transformation took place in the public sector with the creation of specialized and autonomous agencies (Christensen & Laegreid, 2010) and the coordination mechanism shifted towards market-type mechanism. NPM reforms resulted in fragmentation and coordination issues in public management that gave popularity to the NPG model (Sultana, 2019) that was largely based on network-type mechanisms. NTM presents an entirely different mechanism of coordination based on cooperation, inter-organizational collaboration and consensus building among diverse stake holders (Bouckaert et  al., 2010). This chapter aims to interpret the energy sector reforms in Pakistan in light of Bouckaert et al.’s (2010) framework of HTM, MTM and NTM. The chapter proceeds with seven sections. After introduction, the chapter briefly discusses the historic context of energy base in Pakistan and the institutional and policy context in Sects. 2 and 3 respectively. Section 4 captures major reform trajectories in the energy sector of Pakistan. Section 5 explains reform trajectories in light of Bouckaert et al.’s (2010) typology of hierarchy-type, market-type and network-type mechanisms for coordination and inter-organizational relations in public sector. Sections 6 and 7 provide current challenges and a way forward followed by conclusions. The chapter is based on secondary data that is collected from government reports, companies’ websites and public documents.

2   Historic Context and Current State of Energy Sector in Pakistan With a rich agricultural sector, a semi-industrialized economy and a growing service sector, Pakistan is the 26th largest country in the world in terms of purchasing power and 45th largest in terms of nominal GDP (IMF, 2018) and is considered as an emerging and growing economy in the world (Lagarde, 2016). Energy sector is the backbone of the economy of Pakistan but unfortunately, the energy sector is faced with serious crises and intense shortfall of electricity (NEPRA, 2019; Nicholas & Buckley, 2018).

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At the time of independence, from British Raj in 1947, the energy base of Pakistan was very small with the installed capacity of 50  MW (Asif, 2011) for a total population of 33 million. Hydropower was the most critical, reliable and less costly source of energy generation. After independence, the development of hydropower capacity remained quite slow due to lack of financial resources to build large-scale dams to generate hydroelectricity. The energy base was gradually developed through exploration of various sources of energy including thermal power, nuclear power and renewable energy. Despite the exploration of various energy sources, Pakistan’s energy sector history has been characterized by consistent supply deficits, massive load shedding, resource constraints and heavy dependence on weather conditions for hydel power (HDIP, 2017). Serious energy crises of Pakistan were started in 1990s and almost after three decades, no sustainable solution could be devised to handle it (ADB, 2019; Javaid et al., 2011). The situation is becoming more critical with increased load-­shedding hours and increased per unit cost of electricity (Khalid & Ifthhar-­ul-­Husnain, 2016). Dawn (2016) reported that more than 140 million Pakistanis either have no access to electricity or suffer long hours of load shedding. The power supply shortage was heightened to 6000 MW in the year 2015 (Khan, 2016) which was reduced in later years but demand and supply gap still persists in the country (GOP, 2020). The extended and frequent load shedding has negative impact on industry as well as the living of citizens. Major reason for the supply deficit is heavy reliance on expensive and unreliable energy sources, including thermal, hydel and nuclear power. Figure 1 presents the current share of energy sources in power generation in Pakistan. 80

2019 (Jul-Apr) 63.0

60 40 25.8

58.4

2020 (Jul-Apr)

30.9

20 3.0

8.2

8.2

2.4

0 Hydroelectric

Thermal

Nuclear

Renewable

Fig. 1  Energy Sources in Power Generation. (Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2019–2020)

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Currently, thermal has the largest share in power generation. Thermal power is mainly produced through imported oil and coal, which are quite expensive. Local natural gas is also being utilized but its share is decreasing due to its shortage. Pakistan has naturally favored sites suited for hydro generation but hydro projects require huge investments and are vulnerable to seasonal changes. Hence, they received less priority in energy policies and their share is reduced over the period. Nuclear projects are contributing 8.2% and they require huge investment. On the other hand, renewable and clean energy is less expensive and more sustainable and Pakistan has high potential for it (Rafique & Rehman, 2017). At present, wind and solar are the cheapest sources of energy for Pakistan (Nicholas & Buckley, 2018), whereas, renewable energy projects have always received less attention in energy policies.

3   Institutional Framework and Policy Context of Pakistan The colonial legacy of Pakistan includes weak political institutions, strong military and entrenched civil bureaucracy (Rizwan & Jadoon, 2010). The post-independence history of Pakistan has been dominated by military rule and political instability (Jadoon & Jabeen, 2013). Due to weak political institutions, democratic values could not flourish in the system (Cohen, 2002). Rather, military got the opportunity to rule over the country for more than three decades. Even at the times of elected governments, military and civil bureaucracy remained dominant in public policy making and implementation (Aziz, 2007). Hierarchical relations, centralized decision-making and authoritarian style of government remained the key features of public sector in Pakistan (Farooq et  al., 2018). Both military and democratic governments acted in an authoritarian manner due to which democratic values and even bureaucratic norms of behaviors were compromised. The times of elected governments are marked by poor policy making, corruption and political interference in public bureaucracies (Cohen, 2002). Civil society remained largely fragmented and media got voice only in recent decades. The country continued to faced challenging problems, including overpopulation, terrorism, poverty, illiteracy, energy crises and corruption and so on.

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Regarding policy context, state-led economic development was the most prominent feature of government policies after independence (Naveed et al., 2018). Initially, the state played its role in the free market economy and the private sector was encouraged and supported for investment in various industries to boost the economy (López-Cálix et al., 2012). In 1971, the democratic government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto adopted nationalization policy that resulted in dramatic increase in the number of state-owned enterprises (Bokhari, 1998). In 1977, the military government of General Zia-Ul-Haq came with major policy shifts towards liberalization, disinvestment and denationalization (Raja, 2015). In 1980s, Pakistan adopted various public reforms under structural adjustment programs backed by international donor institutions including IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank (Anwar & Iqbal, 1996). Since 1980s, liberalization, privatization and deregulation continued as the three main principles of public sector reforms in Pakistan (Rizwan & Jadoon, 2010). Despite great political instability and frequent changes in government, these three principles remained intact irrespective of military and democratic governments. Moreover, the narrow objective of economic growth was replaced with wider slogans of poverty reduction and sustainable development under good governance reforms (Israr & Islam, 2006).

4   Reforms in Energy Sector in Pakistan The energy sector of Pakistan has gone through various reform trajectories at different periods, including involvement of private sector; restructuring of public monopolies into autonomous public companies; creation of independent regulatory agencies; involvement of private sector; creation of integrating and coordinating agencies; capacity-building authorities and international collaborations. A common feature, of various reform agendas, is the increase in the number and task of public sector companies, which has drastically changed the coordination mechanisms, and inter-­ organizational relations in the sector. Following sub-sections provide a detailed account of various reform trends in energy sector of Pakistan. 4.1  State-Led Development Through State Monopolies Pakistan’s public sector inherited the colonial bureaucratic structure of administration after its independence. The state played a major role in

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economic development through vertically integrated state agencies with monopolistic approach. The energy sector comprised of few state monopolies including Sui Sothern Gas Company (SSGC), Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL), Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and Karachi Electric Supply Company (KESC). SSGC was established in 1955 for provision of gas in Sothern Pakistan including Karachi, Sindh and Baluchistan, whereas SNGPL was established in 1964 for gas supply in Northern areas of Pakistan. WAPDA was established in 1958 for the control and management of water and power resources throughout the country except Karachi. For Karachi, KESC was already established before the independence of Pakistan as a private company. In 1952, the government of Pakistan took control of the company by acquiring major shareholding of KESC (Chaudhry, 2004). In 1956, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was established for research and development of nuclear power. These state monopolies managed the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity and gas in vertically integrated large bureaucratic systems (Kessides, 2013). Until 1980s, the private sector had less involvement in energy sector and public authorities were majorly responsible for provision of gas and electricity to public (Khalid & Ifthhar-­ ul-­Husnain, 2016). WAPDA was responsible for power generation through two major resources: hydropower and thermal power. Hydropower was the most reliable and cost-efficient energy resource of Pakistan. However, hydro projects needed huge investment. Parallel to hydropower resources, WAPDA also developed thermal power bases in 1960s, which was continuously enhanced in the next two decades (Kessides, 2013). 4.2  Liberalization and Privatization In early 1980s, government adopted the policy of power generation through individual power producers (IPPs) under the influence of international donor agencies (Dawood et  al., 2013). Government introduced incentives for private sector power generation (GOP, 1994). Moreover, Private Power Infrastructure Board (PPIB) was created to facilitate private sector’s participation in power generation. PPIB provided the platform for a one-window facility for private investment in energy sector. Through this policy, individual power producers (IPPs) were provided contracts for power generation. This initiative opened the energy

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sector of Pakistan to private sector. Due to the politicization of water resources, new hydropower projects were not initiated and power generation was largely shifted towards thermal projects. Another major reform agenda was the privatization of public utilities. In 1996, partial privatization of Kot Addu Power Plant was achieved. Later, in 2005, KESC was privatized. 4.3  Restructuring Public Bureaucracies In 1992, the government approved the strategic plan for restructuring WAPDA.  This plan sought to meet three critical goals: enhance capital formation, improve efficiency and improve the role of private sector through privatization (Siddiqui, 2011). This major decision was taken to improve the viability of Pakistan’s electric power sector which was characterized by extensive government involvement in management, political interference, and a tariff plagued by cross-subsidies (Parish, 2006). However, the plan remained shelved till 1998 until Cabinet Committee on Privatization approved strategic plan for restructuring of WAPDA’s thermal power wing (PEPCO, 2010). WAPDA had two wings: Water Wing and Power Wing. Water wing remained with WAPDA, whereas, Power wing was unbundled into 15 independent public limited companies with following arrangement: • National Transmission & Dispatch Company (NTDC) • Four Thermal Power Generation Companies (GENCOs) • Ten Distribution Companies (DISCOs) 4.4  Creation of Regulatory Agencies Creation of autonomous regulatory bodies was among the critical reforms in the energy sector. It had to serve multiple purposes including transparent and judicious economic regulation, fair competition and protection of various stakeholders (Malik, 2007). In the power sector, National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) was created to regulate power generation, transmission and distribution, whereas, Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) was created to regulate oil, gas and fuel development and distribution network. Regulatory bodies ensured quality, price and entry in the market. In this regard, regulatory instruments like Grid Code,

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Distribution Codes, Performance Standard for Distribution Companies and Transmission Companies were drafted and got approval from regulatory bodies. 4.5   Coordination, Collaboration and Integration Restructuring reforms and involvement of private sector resulted in fragmentation in the energy sector. To handle this fragmentation, energy sector has gone through a gradual increase in the number of coordination and integration bodies to facilitate the involvement and coordination of various organizations in the sector. In 1992, Pakistan Power Infrastructure Board (PPIB) was created to provide one-window facility to private sector for investment in power generation projects. PPIB is facilitating investors in establishing private power projects and related infrastructure. In December 1998, Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO) was established to oversee the process of unbundling of WAPDA and smooth transition from vertically integrated system to horizontal system of autonomous public enterprises. PEPCO developed Man Power Transition Plan in 1998 for the distribution of manpower among unbundled companies. PEPCO’s progress for the implementation of restructuring of WAPDA remained unsatisfactory. Therefore, in 2000, Cabinet Committee on Restructuring (CCOR) expedited the process of restructuring reforms. It appointed Board of Directors in all newly established state enterprises unbundled from WAPDA for the better governance of the companies. In 2005, Central Power Purchasing Agency (CPPA) was created to integrate all financial transactions among power companies. A key feature of energy sector reforms, is the creation of energy market in the sector. For this purpose, there is movement from the single-buyer model towards buyer plus and ultimately an energy exchange market. Earlier, NTDC (a sole public authority) was performing as the major mediator between power producers and power suppliers. As first step of the transition, an agent for the power sector entities and a clearing house was established by the operationalization of CPPA. CPPA is working on the development of self-sustainable power market with least intervention and subsidy support from the government of Pakistan. In 2017, Ministry of Water and Power (MOWP) was converted into Power Division, whereas, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources (MPNR) was converted into Petroleum Division and both divisions were merged in Ministry of Energy (MOE) for integration of the sector.

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4.6  Capacity Building: Clean and Renewable Energy Reforms Pakistan realized the need for exploration of alternative and renewable energy resources as early as the creation of National Institute of Silicon Technology (NIST) in 1981. NIST was established to conduct research on solar energy. Later, in 1985, Pakistan Council for Appropriate Technology (PCAT) was established with the aim to coordinate research and development activities for the promotion and enhancement of renewable energy resources. These two entities were merged into Pakistan Council of Renewable Energy Technologies (PCRET) in 2001. In 2003, Alternate Energy Development Board (AEDB) was established as the central agency for development, promotion and facilitation of alternative energy resources such as solar, wind and bio-mass energy. In 2006, first policy was formulated for development of renewable energy. However, this policy had limited success and faced various challenges (Javaid et al., 2011). In 2012, provincial energy departments were created so that provinces could explore and exploit their indigenous renewable energy resources. A new Alternative & Renewable Energy Policy has been formulated for the creation of conducive environment for the sustainable growth of ARE Sector in Pakistan although Pakistan has introduced several reforms for the utilization of indigenous and environmentally clean energy and it has high potential, especially for wind energy and solar energy production. Despite this, Pakistan lags behind many nations in the utilization of its renewable energy resources. Table  1 presents major reform trajectories in energy sector in Pakistan.

5   Reflection from Hierarchy, Market Approaches of Coordination

and Network

An analysis of energy sector reforms in Pakistan highlights that the mechanisms of coordination were transformed from hierarchy-type management to market-type management, and to network-type management. Table 1 depicts various reforms and the underlying coordination mechanisms in the energy sector reforms in Pakistan. State-led development through vertically integrated public bureaucracies remained the dominant model in the energy sector until 1980s. In this period, HTM was the prominent model of coordination whereby the energy sector of Pakistan was managed through few highly centralized and integrated state monopolies. WAPDA was the largest bureaucracy that

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Table 1  Major reform trajectories in the energy sector in Pakistan Reform trajectories

Year Events

State-led development through 1952 Nationalization of Karachi electricity Supply public sector monopolies Company (KESC) 1955 Sui Sothern Gas Company (SSGC) 1956 Creation of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) 1958 Creation of Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) 1961 Creation of Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) 1964 Incorporation of Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) Liberalization and privatization 1992 Strategic Plan of Restructuring of WAPDA 1994 Contractual agreements with 17 private Individual Power Producers (IPPs) under Power Policy 1994 1996 Partial privatization of Kot Addu Power Plan 2002 Contractual agreements with 13 IPPs under Power policy 2002 2005 Privatization of KESC Restructuring reforms 1998 Unbundling of WAPDA into hydro and thermal power units. 1998 Creation of National Transmission and Despatch Company) NTDC 1998 Creation of ten power distribution companies (DISCOs) 1998 Creation of four power generation companies (GENCOs) Independent regulators 1997 Creation of National Power regulatory Authority (NEPRA) 2002 Creation of Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) Coordination, collaboration 1992 Pakistan Power Infrastructure Board (PPIB) and integration reforms 1998 Creation of Pakistan Electric Power Company (Private) Limited (PEPCO) 2005 Central Power Purchasing Authority (CPPA) 2017 Ministry of Energy (continued)

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Table 1 (continued) Reform trajectories

Year Events

Capacity building and renewable energy reforms

1981 National Institute of Silicon Technology (NIST) 1985 Pakistan Council for Appropriate Technology (PCAT) 2001 Pakistan Council of Renewable Energy Technology (PCRET) 2003 Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB) 2006 Alternative Renewable Energy (ARE) Policy 2010 Provincial Energy Departments 2019 New ARE policy

majorly managed energy generation, transmission and distribution all over the country. Hierarchical controls, rules, regulations and internal authority were the major tools of policy implementation. The second major phase, of energy sector reforms in Pakistan, started in 1990s with multiple directions such as liberalization, privatization, restructuring and deregulation associated with the popular NPM trend. Under the influence of NPM, many reforms were aimed at generating market competition in energy sector. The government involved the private sector through contractual agreements to enhance competition in power generation. Large bureaucracies were unbundled into various specialized autonomous public companies. These companies were expected to compete with each other in terms of performance targets. The independent regulatory bodies were established to monitor the sector and generate performance competition among the autonomous companies. Through these events, government made efforts towards MTM. However, the government controls remained dominant whereby the government introduced controlled market conditions in the sector. The standard NPM reform model was majorly transferred to developing countries under structural adjustment programs (SAP) linked with multilateral financial agreements (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Williams & Ghanadan, 2006; Sen et al., 2016). International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) played a major role in introducing SAP in developing countries and the reform model was presented as a condition to the borrowing countries. Pakistan adopted most of these NPM reforms under coercive pressures from international donor agencies. Pakistan remained one of ADB’s largest borrowers in the

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energy sector with $7.76 billion loan approved in 2005–2017 (ADB, 2019). For the same time period, World Bank provided $4.9 billion loan, whereas IMF provided budget support to Pakistan with a total of $17.9 billion loan, part of which was associated to the energy sector (ADB, 2019). These loans were provided under various conditions in SAP that majorly shaped the energy policies to bring NPM trends in Pakistan. In the slogan of liberalization, private sector was heavily involved for power generation projects, whereas restructuring and deregulation reforms resulted in fragmentation in the sector by creating large number of specialized public sector companies. In terms of power generation, the policies were shifted from hydro energy generation to thermal energy projects involving private sector. Another dominant trend in energy sector reforms was integration, collaboration and capacity-building reforms. NPM-based reforms created much fragmentation in the sector. A reaction to this fragmentation was witnessed in the form of coordination and integrating bodies. Various initiatives pointed towards network-type-management in the energy sector. For example, PPIB acted as one-window facility for private investment in power generation projects. PEPCO was established to act as collaborating body among various autonomous public companies that were unbundled from WAPDA. These companies needed to collaborate with each other for common resource pools and other inter-dependencies. Likewise, all financial transactions in the sector take place through CPPA that is working as single-buyer model. These mechanisms correspond to the NTM in energy sector. However, the inter-organizational relations are not completely based on voluntary interaction rather government is majorly managing the coordination through federal integrating agencies. Therefore, the model of coordination is more towards HTM/NTM. It is well established in literature that the global energy reforms were initiated under the slogan of liberalization and market-led competition in energy markets (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). A reform “textbook” model was prepared and initiated by the major developed OECD countries to improve operational efficiency and cost-effectivity of utilities (Sen et al., 2016, p.02). International donor agencies transferred this model to developing countries through loan conditions. This standard energy reform model was then globally practiced irrespective of developed and developing countries. However, there was a recognizable difference between the institutional conditions of developed and developing countries (Sen et  al., 2016). Nepal and Jamasb (2013) noted that developed

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countries (with stable institutions and surplus capacity) implemented these reforms to improve the sector performance, which was expected to result in lower consumer prices. On the other hand, developing countries were marked by weak institutional conditions, acute energy crises and complex political environment. In case of Pakistan, although governments tried to incorporate the global energy reforms model (particularly loan agreements under structural adjustment programs), however, the mode of coordination remained predominantly hierarchical. Although some events of network-­ type mechanisms are visible in the third phase of reforms, those were also practiced with centralized controls indicating the combination of hierarchy and network (HTM/NTM).

6   Current Challenges Energy crises started in 1980s and even after four decades of progressive reforms initiatives, the energy crises in Pakistan could not resolved. Under various energy trajectories, numerous public organizations are established and assigned specific tasks but the issues persist, which indicates that the creation of further organizations may not enhance the efficiency of the sector. Rather, major issues and their root causes need the attention of the policy makers. It is worth mentioning here that creation of numerous agencies has also resulted in complex structure, coordination issues and integration challenges for the government. This section will provide details of various issues and challenges in energy sector. 6.1  Emergence of Governance Networks Gas utilities are still working with the same vertically integrated system of two state monopolies, whereas power utilities have gone through various restructuring reforms (ICCI, 2013). Unbundling of WAPDA shifted the vertically integrated system of two large bureaucracies (WAPDA and KESC) to a web of horizontally spread autonomous organizations in form of network. Consequently, the sector has witnessed complex and hybrid arrangements such as highlighted by (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011). Working in network not only requires different capacities (in terms of network management strategies) but also different mindsets towards institutional enablement (Zia et  al., 2014). Centralized controlling mechanisms and traditional top-down approach cannot bring effective results in network (Naveed & Salman, 2020). The Government of Pakistan

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is managing energy sector with few central agencies (including Ministry, NEPRA, NTDC and PEPCO) who control both strategic and operational decisions in the network (Sultana, 2019). The unbundled companies are deprived of autonomy even with the status of autonomous agencies. NEPRA (2019) reported that centralized control of unbundled public sector companies is a main reasons for the substandard performance of these entities. 6.2  Interdependencies and Centralized Arrangements With the emergence of network arrangement, the sector is exposed to newer challenges in inter-company collaboration due to several interdependency relations among the unbundled companies (Naveed & Salman, 2020). Despite acquiring independent legal status, several shared mechanisms still exist among unbundled companies, including centralized tariff determination; inter-company human resource transfer through centralized mechanism of PEPCO; centralized training program of employees; centralized seniority list for the promotion of executives and unified compensation and procurement practices (Sultana, 2019). These centralized mechanisms and unified practices are centrally controlled and coordinated by public administrative authorities including Power Division, PEPCO, CPPA and NEPRA.  The obvious result, of these centralized mechanisms, is reduced companies’ strategic and operational autonomy. 6.3  Complexity and Fragmentation An obvious result of multiple and numerous public entities is multiple channels of communication and multiple controlling authorities. There are multiple and uncoordinated authorities in the energy sector, including Ministry, PEPCO, NEPRA and CPPA. Ministry is overall responsible for the implementation of the policies in the sector. PEPCO is appointed for coordination of companies in the shared mechanisms such as centralized employee training, combined seniority list for executive promotion and unified policies in DISCOs. NEPRA is the regulatory body whereas CPPA is managing all financial transactions in the sector through centralized system. Sultana (2019) found that these multiple central authorities, in the energy sector, can separately put demands on the companies and at time these demands are contradictory. Multiple generations of progressive reforms have resulted in the fragmentation in structural arrangement and

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complexity in relations which is well recognized in literature. (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012; Morçöl, 2014; Vakkuri & Johanson, 2018). 6.4   High Cost of Production with Imbalanced Energy Mix According to the location and geographical conditions of Pakistan, hydro-­ power is the most cheap source to produce electricity. Moreover, Pakistan has high potential for the cheap solar and wind energy generation. However, instead of utilizing local natural resources, power is mainly generated through costly thermal resources including gas and oil which the country has to import. Moreover, alternative renewable sources of energy also received less attention. Until 1960s, hydropower was the major source of power generation in Pakistan. In 1970s, WAPDA started thermal power projects also. Thermal power was expensive compared with hydro; however, it was important to manage seasonal fluctuations in hydro-power base of country. Still, hydro power remained the main source of energy in the country keeping the unit price of electricity at an economical rate. In 1994, the Government of Pakistan involved private sector to produce thermal power. At that time, the ratio of hydro to thermal was 60:40, which got reversed in 1998 with 60% thermal and 40% hydro power. This decrease in the generation of hydropower continued due to decrease in water reserves. Moreover, the governments paid less attention to build dams and water reserves. More attention was paid towards attracting private sector in energy production. For this purpose, the Government also signed costly projects with IPPs, which involved higher import of oil at the part of government. Thus, the Government impeded the development of cheap and abundant domestic energy sources over the cost of very inefficient fuel-mix choices (Dawood et al., 2013). Such imprudent and reckless government policies resulted in decrease in hydropower and increase in costly thermal power generation. It moved the country towards imbalanced energy mix. Now, the Government is promoting and incentivizing alternative and renewable sources of energy to reduce its reliance on thermal electricity and import of oil. However, due to the high cost of thermal projects, fewer resources are devoted towards renewable energy project (Rafique & Rehman, 2017).

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6.5  Complex Tariff Determination Tariff determination has also remained controversial in Pakistan. Various factors are involved in this phenomenon. Over the period of time, Pakistan’s energy mix moved towards thermal power as the major source which was a costly way to produce electricity as compared to hydel power. But, the increase in the cost of power generation was not realized timely in tariff. This was the main factor which aggravated the circular debt problem due to the inability of the power distribution companies to pass on the cost of electricity to consumers. The cost of providing electricity to consumers could not fully recover as no real increase in tariff was notified by the Government from 2003 to 2007. Given the fact that 68 percent of electricity generation was thermal based (where 99.8 percent relied on imported oil and gas), the impact of almost frozen tariffs was so huge that increase in tariffs in the coming years could not make up for the cost price deficit. Even after 2007, Government-notified tariffs always remained below the NEPRA-determined (on the basis of cost) tariffs, inadequate to cover the average costs of the power companies Malik (2012). As a result, the companies started to incur losses which continued to build up to unmanageable limits. Thus, tariff determination is a major issue of the energy sector. The current mechanism of determining tariff is on the basis of minimum cost of generation since the government-determined tariff is always lower than the tariff determined by the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA). The difference between the actual cost of energy and the domestic charge ends up as a direct subsidy to the DISCOs. This practice serves as disincentive to DISCOs and they continue with their inefficient practices. To avoid political reaction in the smaller provinces, the government is following the uniform tariff principle (despite the fact that some DISCOs have line losses above 30 percent). If the different tariff is charged in different DISCOs, the profitable DISCOs will be in a position to buy more power for its consumers. 6.6  Circular Debt Energy sector of Pakistan is critically facing the issue of circular debt, which is created by inter-corporate debt. Such debt is created when the power generation companies fail to clear their dues to fuel supplier. The fuel suppliers in turn default on their payment commitments towards

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Table 2  Transmission and Distribution Losses Transmission and Distribution losses (%)

Transmission losses Distribution losses

2013–14

2014–15

2015–16

2016–17

2017–18

2.70 19.80

2.70 19.9–0

2.5 18.14

2.31 17.93

2.43 18.32

2018–19 2.83 16.86

Source: State of the Industry Report (NEPRA, 2019)

refineries and international fuel suppliers. The failure in clearing dues towards fuel suppliers is due to the inefficiency of electricity distribution companies (DISCOs) in the collection of revenues, transmission and distribution losses and below cost power tariffs. Table 2 shows the trend of transmission and distribution losses. The steady losses are creating an alarming situation for the country. The amount of circular debt has kept on fluctuating from Rs. 100 billion to more than Rs. 400 billion owing to reduction in recovery (NEPRA, 2018). The Ministry and NEPRA took various steps to overcome this issue including timely tariff determination, provision of subsidies to reduce debt, reduction in transmission and distribution losses and increase in bill recoveries by DISCOs. NEPRA (2019) reported the accumulated amount of around Rs 1600 billion, for which government needs to come up with sustainable policies instead of injecting money in the system through partial payment from commercial banks.

7   Conclusions Energy sector is the backbone of the economy of Pakistan. Despite tremendous public sector reforms to revamp the energy sector, the energy crises still persist in Pakistan and the situation is getting worse. More than half of the rural population has no access to electricity and those having electricity are faced with frequent load shedding and power interruptions. There had been great involvement of international powers in the energy policies that did not allow attention to indigenous solutions. Various reform interventions took place, including involvement of private sector power producers for power generation; restructuring of public monopolies into autonomous public companies; independent regulatory agencies; integrating and coordinating agencies; capacity building authorities and international collaborations. With these reforms, the mechanism of coordination was transformed

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from HTM to MTM and to NTM. Whilst, HTM remained the most prominent mode of coordination in various reform initiatives, few initiatives introduced MTM (such as involvement of private sector, competitive environment, independent regulator) and NTM (advisory bodies, onewindow facilities and collaborating agencies) in the sector. However, HTM is still the dominant mechanism of coordination in the sector. There is extensive government involvement in the finance and management of the public companies through federal coordinating agencies, whereas inter-organizational relations are drastically changed from vertically integrated system to the network of horizontally spread autonomous companies. With these developments, the mode of coordination is shifting towards the combination of hierarchy and network mechanisms (HTM/NTM). This structural change has enhanced complexity, fragmentation and governance challenges in the sector. Working in network needs not only different capacities (such as consensus building and network management techniques) but also different mindsets (collaborative orientation). Moreover, currently Pakistan heavily relies on expensive thermal power, which is quite an expensive source of energy generation. Exploration of cheaper and sustainable renewable energy sources is critical for diversified and balanced energy mix. A balanced energy mix can provide solution to most of the current challenges, including circular debt, expensive production and supply deficit.

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Reforms in Federal Training Institutions in Pakistan—An Institutional Perspective Madiha Rehman Farooqi and Shabana Naveed

1   Introduction Despite several reform initiatives, Pakistan’s Civil Services, which it inherited from India, have become ineffective over the last seventy years. Multiple areas of reform were targeted, including selection and cadre systems, training and development, compensation, and more result-oriented performance management. One of the important areas of these reforms is capacity building (Cohen, 1995; Wafa, 2015; Waheed, 1999), in which training institutions play a critical role. Several reforms under different models are introduced in the training institutions to deal with problems associated with public sector motivation, capacity building, recruitment

M. R. Farooqi (*) Division of Management and Administrative Sciences, UE Business School, University of Education, Lahore, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] S. Naveed UCP Business School, University of Central Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_6

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practices, performance reward link, and transparent talent-management practices. This chapter explores the emergence and restructuring of different federal training institutions (FTIs) in Pakistan and explains the difference in the various statuses of these FTIs from an institutional perspective. Moreover, various reforms of the training institutions in Pakistan are analysed and categorized in light of Bouckaert et al.’s (2010) framework of three typologies: hierarchy-type mechanism (HTM), market-type mechanism (MTM) and network-type mechanism (NTM). These typologies represent the three dominant management mechanisms in public sector that gained global popularity. This chapter explores the adoption of these famous trends in Pakistan and explains the motives behind these reforms in light of institutional perspective. The major reforms in the civil services are related to changing the legal status of training institutes and revamping their tasks. The dominant features of civil service structure is attached departments, that Pakistan inherited after independence. Attached departments are the public organizations that are under the direct control of the ministry. They do not have a separate legal entity and all the financial and HR matters are dealt with in the ministry. The budget is allocated from the federal government and such agencies are staffed by federal employees. It clearly represents hierarchy-­ type mechanism of coordination that remained dominant in the public sector before the famous trend of NPM. Since 1980s, there is an increase in number of autonomous agencies in Pakistan. Autonomous agencies are structurally disaggregated from the parent ministry through the presence of board and grant of strategic and operational autonomy with performance contracts. They are considered a popular tool of governance after NPM reforms have taken their root in developing countries also. Autonomous agencies and their assumed capacity to deliver more efficiently have been widely acknowledged in the literature. According to mimetic institutional pressures, these trends spread enormously and affected the shape of government structure to a great extent. The mechanism of coordination was also drastically changed from hierarchy to market-type mechanisms. However, in Pakistan, the practice demonstrates the combination of hierarchy-type and market-type management. National Commission of Government Reforms (NCGR) has proposed different structural and institutional reforms that have introduced market mechanisms and increased federal controls at the same time. The complete value chain of the civil services is targeted to ensure the strong role of the federation.

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The reforms are introduced in recruitment and induction, training, career planning, retirement benefits, severance, and cadres and composition. The size of the ministries is also revised and overburdened ministries have been disaggregated. Some of the important institutions have regained the status of attached departments due to their crucial role in the policy area. These areas are indicated towards the hierarchy-type management model. The attached institutions being under the direct control of the government become more subordinate and carrying out functions become easier and uninterrupted. On the other hand, several autonomous agencies, coordinating bodies and advisory agencies are created that correspond to market-­ type and network-type mechanisms. In nutshell, we can observe some combinations of hierarchy, market and network-type mechanisms in Pakistan. This chapter analyses and categorizes various reform events in light of the three typologies (HTM, MTM, and NTM) and explains the reforms process through institutional theories. Following are the two broad questions addressed by this chapter: • What is the rationale for the emergence of federal training institutions (FTIs) in Pakistan? • How institutional reforms in FTIs in Pakistan can theoretically be explained? This chapter is organized into five sections. This section presents an introduction followed by Sect. 2 that reviews the literature on the theoretical perspective of reforming the civil services. Especially, the reforms introduced in training institutions, on a particular template, are investigated and the section provides four major patterns in these reforms. Section 3 discusses the methodology of the study and the fourth section discusses the findings of the study in the light of institutional perspective. This chapter signifies how the public sector responds to international pressures to incorporate a particular reform model and what contextual variables restrict their responses. Section 5 presents the conclusions of the study.

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2   Literature Review 2.1  Public Sector Reform Models Administrative reform, which deals with the core public sector, the administrative side of government, and public management, is one of the most dynamic parts of modern states (Minogue, Hulme & Polidano, 1998). Administrative reform has been a popular technique for bringing big changes to entrenched bureaucracies since its inception in 1960. The New Public Management (NPM) concept drove the wave of public administration reforms that occurred in Western European countries between 1980 and 1990, aiming for a more flexible and efficient societal organization. Even while complete public policy changes were attempted practically everywhere, only a few countries have been able to overcome all governance challenges at the same time. Some technical aspects of government change, such as e-governance, have proven to be more successful than others. The majority of states, however, faced significant challenges in addressing issues such as poor performance management, the politicization of the public service, and corruption. In many ways, agencification in South Asian countries is similar to that in Western Europe (Polidano & Hume, 1998). This can be linked to both the most developing countries’ colonial past and the crucial role of international (western) donor agencies like the World Bank. Public administration in Pakistan experiences different reform models justifying their particular improvement notion. These trajectories of reforms can be categorized as having a particular motive under various political and institutional eras. These reforms can be categorized according to the management type and the instruments involved to manage. This study is based on the theoretical approach presented by Bouckaert et al. (2010). Public administration reforms include: hierarchy-type management; market-type management (MTM); network-type management (NTM) and a combination of these. These models differ based on the basic assumption like policy direction, personnel management, and accountability. 2.2  Theoretical Understanding of Agencification The use of agencies has increasingly become popular in first-world countries and international agencies like IMF and World Bank have been

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validating the relationship between autonomous agencies to improve public sector performance (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006; Overman & van Thiel, 2016; Pratama, 2017). This convergence agenda has gained considerable attention in third-world countries; however, the implications of this reform agenda did not turn out to be positive. The term agencification became a buzz word and it refers to the process of creating autonomous agencies which are structurally disaggregated and are bound by the performance contracts. The creation of public agencies is a popular them of New Public Management (NPM) Reforms, which emphasized outcomebased performance evaluation of the public sector (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006; Pollitt et al., 2001). Particularly, NPM reforms aim at implementing private sector practices to improve the overall service delivery of the public sector. The linkage between NPM reforms and public sector performance has been the center of attention of academic researches for the past decade. It has been believed that creating distance organizations and granting managerial autonomy increase the performance of the organization. The empirical shreds of evidence are mixed and hence no definite relationship can be guaranteed. An agency is an organization that is structurally disaggregated and has managerial autonomy and performance contracts (Pollitt et al., 2001). 2.3  Public Sector Reforms and Institutional Isomorphism The new institutional theory considers public organizations as embedded units in a larger environment. This theory counters the ideas presented by the rational theories like rational choice theory and transaction cost theory (Chen & Chi, 2017; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004), which assume that actors function rationally. Contrary to this argument, the new institutional theory highlights one of the significant behavioral patterns of organizations (Chen & Chi, 2017; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Ministry of Planning Development & Special Initiatives, 2014; Peters, 1992). To survive in an environment, organizations (particularly public organizations) choose to respond in a non-rational way to gain acceptance from the institutional actors which they consider important. Organizations do not generally embrace the reform strategies and structures to maximize efficiency, they rather accommodate the regulation and external acceptance. Public organizations more prone to such pressures are embracing change not for improved performance but for the need for survival in an institutional environment.

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3   Methods The basic purpose of this chapter is descriptive, which is achieved through qualitative data analysis. For this purpose, document analysis is the major source of data analysis. For corroboration of the analysis, the researcher has conducted 5 interviews with the civil servants working at administrative positions in these FTIs. These interviews helped the researcher validate the interpretations drawn from the document analysis. Document analysis is a social research method that demands a proper protocol. Therefore, the researcher has adopted a proper protocol to select the type and number of documents to be analysed and which describe the emergence of autonomous agencies in the training of civil services. The details of reports and documents selected are provided in Appendix 1. The emergence of FTIs and the trends have been analysed through the year of establishment and the reforms introduced in the respective institutions. The explanation of these attempts has been sought from the institutional perspective. Apart from the above-mentioned documents, official websites of institutions, their organogram, board composition, and management structures have also been analysed. Table 1 provides a list of federal training institutions, their tasks and (any)structural changes. All of the training institutions have been studied through their websites, organogram, and management structure. Any reform attempts have been identified from the NCGR reports and analysed.

4   Findings and Discussion In Pakistan, Federal Government consists of Secretariat, ministries, and divisions along with attached departments, autonomous departments, and subordinate offices which conduct the administrative business of the Federal Government. The findings of the study are organized into three main parts. First, the tasks and legal categorization of the training institutions are discussed. The administrative reforms related to these institutions are then analysed and categorized into hierarchy-type, market-type, and network-type mechanisms. Third, institutional perspectives on the emergence of the autonomous bodies and rationality of the reforms are discussed.

Foreign Affairs Information & Broadcasting Division Industries, Prod. & Special Initiatives Industries, Prod. & Special Initiatives Industries, Prod. & Special Initiatives Railways

1994 1981 1982

1967

Institute of Regional Studies

Pakistan Industrial Technical Assistance Centre (PITAC) Institute of Engineering and Technological Training, Multan Pakistan Institute of Management (PIM) Pakistan Railways Academy, Walton, Lahore Social Welfare Training Institute 1971

1925

1954

Social Welfare & Special Education

Establishment division Commerce

2002

National School of Public Policy (NSPP), Lahore Pakistan School of Fashion Design (PSFD), Lahore Foreign Service Academy (FSA)

1985

Federal Judicial Academy Act, 1997 NSPP Ordinance, 2002 Companies ordinance 1984 Notification dated 12.5.1985 Presidential Directive 1981

Law Justice Division

1988

Federal Judicial Academy

Inherited from India Other instruments

Companies Ordinance, 1984 Societies Act 1860

Societies Act 1860

Legal instrument

Established Parent ministry

Training institutions

Table 1  List of training institutions

Education/ Training Education/ Training Education/ Training Education/ Training Education/ Training

Education/ Training Education/ Training Education/ Training Education/ Training

Social protection

Policy field

(continued)

Policy Implementation Policy Implementation Policy Implementation Policy Implementation Policy Implementation

Policy Implementation Policy Implementation Policy Implementation Policy Evaluation

Policy Implementation

Primary task in the policy cycle

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Societies Act 1860 Societies Act 1860

Tourism Division

Legal instrument

Tourism Division

Established Parent ministry

Pakistan Institute of Tourism and Hotel 1967 Management (PITHM), Karachi Pakistan–Austrian Institute of Tourism 2006 and Hotel Management, Gulibagh, Swat (PAITHOM)

Training institutions

Table 1 (continued)

Education/ Training Education/ Training

Policy field

Policy Implementation Policy Implementation

Primary task in the policy cycle

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4.1  FTIs: Tasks and Categorizations  .1.1 Tasks of FTIs 4 The task of agencies is an important concern in the agencification literature. NPM reforms also emphasized the role and tasks division of the ministries and major restructuring in the public sector in Pakistan is done to create and place the particular agency in the relevant ministry to harmonize the task among the various ministries and reduce the burden of government. As presented in Table 1, the majority of the FTIs offer specialized training programs for a specific group of cadres. These specialized institutions are developed during the nationalization phase where the size of the public sector increased to a great extent. The rationale for the emergence of these institutions has been given to the specialized agencies catering to the specific need to deal with the service delivery problems effectively. Table 2 indicates the different stages in the training of civil servants and the changes proposed in each of these stages. Also, the changes are categorized according to the management type based on the instrument used.  .1.2 Legal Categorization of FTIs 4 In Pakistan, there are various statuses of FTIs. Some of them are working as an attached institution while some are autonomous, with an independent governing board. The legal instruments under which different FTIs are Table 2  Changes in civil servants’ training programs Trainings

Pre-service Training 1. Common Training Programs 2. Specialized Training Programs In-Service Training 1. Secretariat Training Institute (STI) 2. Pakistan Provincial Services Academy (PPSA) 3. National Institute of Public Administration (NIPAs) 4. Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (PARD), Peshawar 5. National Defence College (NDC) 6. Pakistan Administrative Staff College (PASC)

Changes done Name changed

Status changed

Newly created

No

Yes (HTM)

No

No

Yes (3) (HTM) Yes (2) (HTM) Yes Yes No Yes

Yes

No No Yes No No Yes

No — — — —

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Table 3  Legal instruments for creation of FTIs

Legal instrument Notification Ordinance Resolution Societies Act 1913 Others instrument

Number 3 3 3 2 4

established are presented in Table 3. There is no dominant pattern in the legal instruments of the FTIs. However, most of the FTIs are attached to departments of various ministries. Some of the important autonomous institutes having a significant role in public sector training are: NSPP which is established under NSPP Ordinance 2002 and HSA established under HSA Ordinance 2002. These institutions are autonomous and are governed by their board. Table  2 shows that hierarchy-type management is more explicit in this dimension where specialized institutions were established. 4.2  Administrative Reforms in FTIs The period is divided among different eras according to the important themes. Formative Years (1947–1973) relate to the post-independence period where public sector performance is not up to the standards and government institutions have started to strengthen their major areas. During this time, the country has moved through many complex and ambiguous situations. Two major constitutions were also passed during this time. The second era, which changed the role of bureaucracy and politics (1973–1999) has been an important era in which the role of the state is dominant and the size of the public sector increased. This era has seen major changes in the administrative structure of civil services. The third era is divided according to the number of reform attempts in the training area of civil services. The administrative reforms in civil services related to training during each period are discussed as follows: 4.2.1 Formative Years (1947–1973) After independence, bureaucracy, inherited from the colonial heritage, plays an important role in strengthening the administrative machinery of the Government. However, the political arm was the weakest at that time.

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There were different provisions in the Constitution of Pakistan 1956 and 1962 in which civil service neutrality is assured. In the First Five Year Plan (1955–1960), the necessity for major reforms in Pakistan’s administrative machinery was stated clearly. The inevitability for pre-entry and in-service training for civil officials, as well as public administration education at the university level, was recognized in this five-year plan. There were a very few training institutions at the federal level during this time most of them were attached departments. The need to build the capacity of the civil servants to ensure a strong durable bureaucratic structure was felt too soon. Special training programmes and institutes are not emphasized during this time. This administration of training was more complex and there were ambiguous rules and regulations for the training and capacity building of the FTIs. Under its technical aid programme, the US provided extensive assistance to Pakistan in the establishment of numerous Public Administration education and training institutes. The following Public Administration educational and training institutions were fully functioning by the mid-1960s: 1. Department of Public Administration, University of Punjab, Lahore. 2. Administrative Staff College (Senior officers) 3. The Civil Service Academy of Pakistan. 4. Finance Officers Training Academy. 5. The Academies for Village Development. 6. National Institutes of Public Administration in Lahore and Dacca (Mid-career civil servants)

Pakistan has been experiencing adversities in the form of inadequate delivery of public services such as education, health, and water supply and sanitation, for many years. Questions about the quality of education and training institutes for the executives and lower cadres offering these services have also been raised in search for answers for this untenable state of affairs. One of the fundamental reasons for low-quality public service delivery was the lack of quality training institutions. Hierarchy-type management mechanism is more evident here where the establishment of institutions and settling of institutional forces are dominant trends.  .2.2 Changing Roles and Status of Bureaucracy and Politics 4 (1973–1999) During this time, there were significant administrative reforms introduced in civil services. The majority of the FTIs were established during this era

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and most of them were specialized training institutions catering to a particular training area, previously lacking in the government. Most of these FTIs are again attached departments or subordinate offices which are under the direct administrative control of the government, which indicates hierarchy-­type management. The 1973 Constitution politicized the bureaucracy, which not only changes the cadre system to the common service groups but also leads to fragmentation of the civil service. Later governments also had their team of loyal civil servants and political affiliation became a more important dimension of the civil servant as compared to professionalism and neutrality. The number of FTIs has increased significantly during this time when the government has a major agenda of expanding state enterprises. During this time, it was realized that economic development cannot be solely done by the private sector and the state has to play a dominant role in shaping public policies and delivering service. The development administration era dominated this time and nationalization was a leading trend in Pakistan. The state led the economic development and most of the important state institutions were strengthened during this time. The size of the public sector become enormously large, which created problems for future times. These events point towards a more hierarchy-type model. The new role of PARD is an important indication towards coordination and research and depicts network-type management to a greater extent. International funds are also one of the important features in this time for the up-gradation and restructuring of the state institutions to build their capacity to perform effectively.  .2.3 Major Structural Changes in FTIs (1999–2008) 4 During this time, there were no additional federal-level training institutions. However, the restructuring of the existing training institutions is seen as a dominant pattern of this time. Devolution during the Musharraf regime in 2000 also subsumed the powers of civil service at the federal level. Most of the FTIs working autonomously were merged into a single institution or transferred under the direct control of the respective ministry as an attached department. The most important restructuring initiative was the establishment of NSPP in 2002. CSA, all four NIPAs, and PASC have been merged into an umbrella organization called NSPP which was assumed to revamp the training practices of the civil services. This denotes the hybrid of network-type and hierarchy managements. Moreover, an advisory body and executive center have been established to facilitate

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coordination among the institutions. The government received almost 61 million US dollars to establish NSPP and revamp the existing institutions. This was the time when huge loans were received by the government as a step towards capacity building. The change of names of the institutions has also been seen as an important indicator of reforms in the training sector.  .2.4 Good Governance and Donor Driven Efforts (2013 onwards) 4 After 2013, there was a major change in reform trajectories in terms of coordination, collaboration, and integration reforms. The 18th Amendment also brought about many changes in the training domain of the civil servants which became more active from 2013. NSPP became functional during this era and the specialized design of courses and collaboration with Virtual University of Pakistan was done to enhance the pedagogical effectiveness of the institute. Some of the agencies were subsumed in the respective ministry by not giving the special task to the autonomous agencies to strengthen the control of the government by eliminating their autonomous status. The control of the government was revived to manage the increased number of autonomous agencies. This event indicates that hierarchy-type management includes the establishment of the agencies with political representation in the boards to increase the political legitimacy. 4.3  FTI Reforms and Institutional Isomorphism This section addresses the second research question which focuses on trajectories of reform in civil service that are influenced by their interdependent and complementary institutional components. Because it is assumed that autonomous bodies are the most appropriate organizational form, they have become popular tools in the reform process. The agency structure is in place simply because it has become commonplace in the contemporary public management. As a result, regardless of its ability to solve problems, this organizational form has spread as a global trend because people have a proclivity to follow fads, fashions, and dominant ideas, therefore, copying and diffusion are important techniques. Table 4 depicts major trajectories in FTI reforms and their drivers. The table also categorizes the type of mechanism used in each event of the reform process. It has been argued in the literature that civil services are naturally ‘path dependent’ owing to institutional arrangements at the time of

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Table 4  Drivers of FTI’s reforms in Pakistan Administrative reforms Formative years (1947–1973)

Drivers of reforms

Need to create the capacity of the public officials and increase their morale Changing roles and Normative factors-building an status of bureaucracy and experienced civil service force politics (1973–1980) to improve the public service delivery Restructuring of public Coercive factors, Mimetic sector (1980–2008) factors, pressures from international agencies, need for donor-driven efforts Reviving the Coercive factors, Donor Government Control Driven initiatives, Punjab through coordination growth strategy, Pakistan Vision 2025

Key focus areas Normative role of the state to train civil servants, general training programs (HTM) Additional roles of the training institute to train in missing areas (HTM/NTM) Delegation, creating task-specific agencies in service structure, unbundling of Ministries (HTM/MTM) Strengthen the state role, control of the Central Government (HTM)

independence. The colonial legacy has been embedded in the institutional arrangements that cannot be easily reversed. The evolution of the public agencies can be explained through the institutional perspective of an organizational theory which counters the instrumental perspective that public sector reforms and particular agency forms are the apparatus for the organizational leaders (Ministry of Planning Development & Special Initiatives, 2014; Peters, 1992). Institutional perspective places greater emphasis on the cultural norms, values, and beliefs of the public sector organizations that guide their institutional makeup. The willingness of leadership, scope, and strategy of reforms are important variables that explain the reform drivers and the change in the number of FTIs. The increase in the number of FTIs during 1947–1980 indicates the international agenda of development administration. During this time, the role of the public sector has been realized and most of the training institutions are established this time. The pressures to create and reform some of the training institutions can be attributed to the normative pressures. It implicates that there was an indigenous need to establish the civil services so that the service delivery at the initial stage of state formation can be facilitated. During this time hierarchy-type mechanism remained dominant in the operations of training institutes in Pakistan. Since 1980, NPM reforms have started taking their roots in developing countries through donor agencies. Several coercive and mimetic pressures

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can explain the dependence of state institutions on international agencies. Several projects funded by the World Bank and IMF related to capacity building of the public sector have been introduced in Pakistan to resolve issues related to public sector problems. During this time, most of the training institutions established were autonomous institutions governed by the board. The autonomous agencies became a popular tool to improve the performance of public service through the grant of autonomy and accountability (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006). The trend of creating autonomous agencies to improve performance relates to coercive isomorphic pressures in which organizations change the structure and strategies to remain relevant in the international environment. The provision of autonomy is seen to be the only practical solution to deal with the inconsistencies of the training institutions at time. The international grants and funds to establish the institutions and develop the existing ones relate to the coercive isomorphic pressures (Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004). It has been argued in the literature that the convergence trend of isomorphic pressures is based on institutional factors that compel organizations to comply with the ongoing trends of restructuring and reforms (Li & Chung, 2018). Theoretically, it has been explained that institutional isomorphism relates to the compliance of organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Glynn & Abzug, 2002; Li & Chung, 2018) but further studies explore the extent of compliance of the organizations (A.-C.  Pache & Santos, 2010; A. Pache & Santos, 2013). The reforms of NPM in Pakistan, more particularly the establishment of task-specific and autonomous agencies, can be best explained through these perspectives. Through international pressures, these organizations embraced the trends but did not comply with the actual model. This created an ambiguous situation called institutional complexity, which is another important theoretical explanation of this change (Greenwood et  al., 2011; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013). It can be explained that organizations face coercive pressures because of their dependence on strong organizations or to fulfill cultural and social expectations. These drivers led the organizations to follow international trends. The restructuring was done in the training sector after 2000 to depict a clear coercive pressure to establish task-specific agencies separated from the direct control of the Government. Ideally, it needed to bring the market-type mechanisms in the training institutions. However, in practice, it was more of changing the names of the institutes and reshuffling of authorities that continued the existence of hierarchy-­ type mechanisms of coordination in training institutions. Data from

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interviews also reveal that the drivers that led to the creation of institutions and proposed changes are donor-driven. One of the respondents said: The results are not there… we need to cater the needs of the training…changing names of the institutes and altering the authority layers will not deliver results…

Another senior civil servant asserted: NSPP is a prestigious institution… the results are yet to be delivered… a huge amount of grant is received… the revamping of the whole training structure is not possible… however, the changes in hierarchal orders have affected the motivation level of the officers

Nevertheless, after 2015, some of the agencies are subsumed in the respective ministry by not giving the special task to the autonomous agencies to strengthen the control of the government by eliminating their autonomous status. The NSPP staff’s retaliation against the government’s obligation to comply with the altering hierarchical layers and subsuming authority to the rector is a strong indicator of the coercive pressure. This trend is also associated with the international trend of Whole of Government (Christensen & Laegreid, 2011), which implies that the significant tasks of the government which affect service delivery should remain in the control of the government. Most of these trends in the reforms of training institutions can be attributed to the isomorphic pressures sustained by the public organizations in Pakistan. It needs to be noted that although Pakistan responded to the global trends of market-­ type and network-type mechanisms, hierarchy-type mechanisms remained dominant in the reforms. Very few events indicated towards market-type management and network-type management and instruments like creating competition among public organizations or using output-based control mechanisms are rarely found in the data.

5   Conclusions The chapter discussed the salient reforms in federal training institutions in Pakistan and highlighted the major reform trajectories in the training institutions in Pakistan. The key events that occurred during various reform periods were categorized in the three typologies of coordination: HTM, MTM, and NTM. Most of the reforms pointed to a hierarchy-type

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management as most of the initiatives were based on changing lines of authority, establishing new agencies and merging the existing ones. However, there were few developments towards market-type management and network-type management. For example, EDI emerged as a think tank and advisory body which indicated a network-type management mechanism. The creation of autonomous task-specific agencies corresponded to market-type management. The chapter also explained the reform process through institutional isomorphism. The study concluded that public sector organizations were prone to multiple and diverse pressures from the external environment. These pressures could not be ignored and hence organizations had to respond to these pressures. The study found that coercive pressures were the strongest in the training sector of Pakistan at the federal level with some of the pieces of evidence of the mimetic pressures. Overall, the findings supported the prime hypothesis, implying that the content of public administrative reforms in terms of scope, instrument, and communication strategy influenced the outcomes of the civil service reform process. The overly broad approach to these reforms, as well as the policy instruments chosen, were not acceptable. They both relied on a path-dependent paradigm of thinking about public policy change, and their choice of policy tools was not appropriate inside the existing policy-­ making process. The conclusion can be summed up in three major issues: First, there is the issue of leadership, or the national political elite’s commitment to enhance the public administration system. Second, there is the issue of path dependence and institutional change. Finally, there is the issue of reform strategy, which includes the scope of reform, tactical, and strategic decisions made during policy formation and policy execution.

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Interagency Collaboration/Coordination in the Context of Pakistan: Case of Polio Eradication Program Hasna Khan and Amani Moazzam

1   Introduction The traditional governance style focused on the hierarchies within the public sector, which has been identified as the root of ineffective and inefficient services being performed by the public sector organizations. Collaboration has been portrayed as an inception of a partnership (Valentijn et al., 2015) illustration of a strong and long-term relationship (McMurtry et al., 2016) motivated by coexistence for the purpose of common benefits and interdependence (Ning, 2017; Kaltenbrunner & Renzl, 2019). Formal and informal bonds are formed for this purpose as well (Terman et al., 2019). Most definitions vary according to the degree of change and adaption, structural readjustment and surrender of power that

H. Khan • A. Moazzam (*) Institute of Administrative Sciences, Quaid-e-Azam Campus, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_7

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is required of an agency to collaborate. Some level of shared resources and structures is a must for a collaboration to achieve integration. Collaboration can take place at any level of the organizational structure be it service level involving frontline employees or at the administrative level (Anrig, 2015). Numerous studies have attempted to explain inter-agency collaboration and portrayed it in many ways: as a structure as well as a technique (Gibelman, 1995); as both process and perspective (Swan & Morgan, 1993); and as an association consisting of formal and informal elements with alternating emphases on either angle (Swan & Morgan, 1993; Shane, 2005). It has been rightly stated by Swan and Morgan (1993) that the interpretations of the terms are constantly being reanalyzed and researched and there are some themes that reoccur throughout the text. In support of the above view, Abramson and Rosenthal (1995) in the Encyclopedia of Social Work, talk about interagency collaboration as a smooth process involving a combined effort among individual actors for a joint purpose. A number of explanations and definitions have been provided in recent literature for interagency collaboration. The Latin roots of ‘collaboration’ merely translate into ‘working together’ (Kagan, 1991; Urwin & Haynes, 1998; Walter & Petr, 2000). Interagency collaboration would also require coordination, which is of utmost importance to ensure the smooth running and processing for which collaboration is established. Networks are considered as an alternative form of governance and coordination and depend more on voluntary collaborative actions by and solidarity between relevant organizations (Kooiman, 1993; Börzel, 1998; Powell, 1991 as cited in Bouckaert et al., 2010). Several studies have interchanged various terms for interagency collaboration, which include intergovernmental cooperation, inter-sectoral cooperation, inter-organizational relations, inter-sectoral collaboration and intra-governmental cooperation (Woods & Bowman, 2018; Carter, 2015; Ståhl et al., 2017; Abramson & Rosenthal, 1995; Chircop et al., 2015). Similarly the terms ‘cooperation’, ‘collaboration’, ‘co-ordination’ have been used interchangeably by a number of authors. ‘Partnership’, ‘inter-organization’ and ‘inter-agency workings’ are also used in place of one another. Lloyd et al. (2001) present an appropriate definition that encompasses the idea and practicality of inter-agency collaboration, that is several agencies working together towards a common goal in a formal and planned way rather than informally, outlined throughout the current literature. This includes a boundary-crossing approach by the organizations and the

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creation of new professional practices. Particularly for the intent of this chapter, the terminology of ‘collaboration’, ‘coordination’ and ‘partnership’ are going to be used interchangeably, which will be used to elaborate on networks as a mode of coordination.

2   Structuring Interagency Approach in Pakistan With the increasing trend of the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm and its use in day-to-day functions of the government, more stress is being placed on the role of specialization and the use of expert knowledge for managing individual agendas. This has led to the formation of separate full or semi-autonomous bodies by the government. Due to such fragmentation, leaders of agencies have called for collaborative approaches (collaboration, coordination, partnership or joined-up approaches) to solve issues that cannot be otherwise solved by individual agencies alone, the reason being the increase in contemporary and widespread issues that need the attention of more than one stakeholder to be solved timely and effectively (Jenkins, 2019). A number of government organizations in Pakistan are taking initiatives through joint efforts with government organizations, NGOs, private agencies and many others. One example of it is of the earthquake in 2008, the damage control efforts were apt and triumphant with assistance of Pakistan Army (Wilder, 2008). It had an intriguing paradigm, the humanitarians at first were uncomfortable in following orders of the army but in the absence of a plan for disaster management, military had to step up to direct. However, the initial friction was overcome by the passage of time and mutual efforts of humanitarians and army officials by element of ‘mutual respect, and trust’ (Cochrane, 2008). Hence, a reliable assisting institution within the nation worked as a catalyst to achieve efficacy of a comprehensive response and cooperation. In unexpected situations like these, collaboration has long been an option as no one organization can bring back stability. Other types of issues where collaboration has to be a planned and well-­ thought-­out process when the country faces dilemmas are not so sudden, like the shortcomings of public sector to provide funds and proficiency to improve the low education indicators, as recognized by the government of Pakistan (Government of Pakistan, 2004). From 2001, the government has facilitated all the sections of the society to overcome educational impediments. Numerous endeavors were directed towards ameliorating service distribution in state schools through consensus between

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government institutes, private sector (including NGOs) and public–private partnerships. Such efforts in Pakistan have promoted collaboration and given a structure to how joint efforts can work and made cohabitation of agencies for a common agenda possible. Another such illustration has been given below through the polio program which has been run by a number of agencies. It has been comprehensively discussed in order to understand the structure and workings of interagency collaboration in Pakistan. 2.1  Context of the Polio Program For years, government agencies have worked single-handedly, catering concerns of the general public on their own. This trend was mostly prevalent till the 1980s and was known to be the tradition public administration or hierarchies. With similar and supporting departments working at all levels, there is a chance of duplication of service delivery and lag in time (Barnes et al., 2018), creating a need to collaborate for integrated service delivery which led to the shift towards the New Public Management and finally towards New Public Governance. There has been a constant influx of ideas for reforming the public sector. Among the various measures proposed to improve services, this has been one of the most applicable tools utilized by nations for the better functioning of their agencies, also known to work as networks. Polio is still classified as an endemic viral infection. The conditions in Pakistan and Afghanistan related to operational activities for polio have always been more difficult as compared to other countries (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2008). Pakistan has had the highest number of paralytic polio cases among all polio-infected nations. The official efforts related to polio eradication in Pakistan began with National Immunization Days (NIDs) in 1994, which resulted in a significant reduction of poliovirus (Islam et al., 2013). A document by the Pakistan Polio Eradication Program outlines the eradication strategy for polio, all its priorities, identifying major focus areas, providing innovative solutions, modifications and developments that may help to address deep-seated challenges. Initially, the polio eradication program was a great success in Pakistan with marked reduction in the number of cases of acute flaccid paralysis from 1155 cases in 1997 to 28 in 2005 but, soon after there has been an upward trend in polio cases within Pakistan. There were eight

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cases discovered in 2008 just in Punjab, one of the central provinces of Pakistan which was said to be a polio-free district (Ghafoor & Sheikh, 2016). Through research, many social factors were identified, like religion, political culture, citizen awareness, security concerns, inequity, bad governance and other social issues (Mahmood, 2018). In 2017, polio was again managed with only eight cases left in that year but then the number started to rise again. Up till now, the highest number of cases exist in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with a total of 66 cases discovered in 2019. Other than that, a positive environment sample exists for the poliovirus. The major challenges for the current period are said to be community trust and acceptance as well as competent leadership at the national, provincial and district levels. The management of structures, vaccinator motivation, employee safety and operations handling have also been enlisted (Government of Pakistan: Ministry of National Health Services, Regulations, & Coordination, 2019). Pakistan is a nation trying to accomplish the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which are presented by the United Nations General Assembly, the 2030 Agenda. Those SDGs have been integrated into the national development agenda of Pakistan with Polio eradication one step closer to attaining those goals. Immunization is one of the most crucial elements of global health concerns which can help attain 14 of the 17 SDGs following the central agenda ‘leaving no one behind’ (GAVI, 2019). Therefore, Pakistan must formulate an all-­inclusive for polio eradication. Right now there are two ways available for immunization: Oral Polio Vaccine (OPV) and Inactivated Polio Vaccine (IPV). OPV is recommended as it is an easy and effortless way to administer the vaccine. Supplementary Immunization Activities (SIAs) and Routine Immunization Activities (RIAs) are carried out for eradication (Mateen et al., 2013). Pakistan focuses mostly on RIAs for most of the immunization activities. The issue faced is the inability to reach every child for vaccination. The GPEI mentions Pakistan as the sole nation facing regular impediments that hinder vaccination against the disease (Ali et al., 2019). A point of grave concern for Pakistan is that WHO has declared Pakistan as a polio-exporting country and this means that there are chances that polio might spread from here to multiple other countries. Travel restrictions have been imposed on its citizen and it can be applied on travellers within the nation to other provinces (Kanwal et al., 2016). These restrictions are for safety purposes and to contain the disease. Pakistan and Afghanistan are believed to be an epidemiologic block, where it is easy to contaminate and cause cross-border flow of virus (Centers for Disease

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Control and Prevention, 2008). In 2014, the WHO announced that it is mandatory for all individuals traveling from Pakistan to have a polio vaccination certificate. During the Hajj pilgrimage, a need for vaccination is a must for any age or any vaccination status to stop the spread of the disease through travelers (Elachola et al., 2018). If more cases come forward, we might be looking at increased scrutiny and sanctions from international bodies (Kazi et al., 2014). Hence, it is a beneficial step to take a look at collaboration in the context of the polio program and the elements presented by it that are directly or indirectly working against the polio eradication initiative. The collaborative activity in this study involves numerous government departments, private agencies and third sectors that share knowledge and build on it when collaboration occurs horizontally across sectors. Although Pakistan has been successful in eliminating type-two and type-three strains of polio (Grassly, 2013), 12 wild poliovirus (WPV) cases have been documented in the country in 2018 (Shah et al., 2019). The Government of Pakistan has tried to resolve the issues by including social mobilizers, religious leaders and police officials in their eradication activities. This helps them to ensure that the vaccination programs are streamlined. Still, the presence of 53 new polio cases in Pakistan between the months of January and August 2019, makes the country in dire need of increased rigorous strategies (Ali et  al., 2019). The number of cases is more than it was in the past three years. Proactive measures are required to contain the further spread of the disease. One of the distressing components discouraging anti-polio vaccination is the doubtfulness of a large section of the population to vaccinate their children.

3   Reformations of the Polio Program Towards Interagency Collaboration A multi-year plan formulated by the Government of Pakistan for improvement of routine immunization included increased human resource, funding, investment, logistics management and service delivery. There are numerous stakeholders under immunization programs comprising of international bodies like citizens, government, media, non-governmental organizations, physicians, researchers, the vaccine industry and the list keeps going on (Institute of Medicine, 2012). Cross-agency collaboration becomes a plausible solution when so many stakeholders are involved as

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no one organization alone can address the issue separately. According to the thematic pillars of the National Health Vision of Pakistan 2016–2025, the seventh pillar shows the importance of Cross-Sectoral Linkages in which the concept of ‘One Health’ and ‘Health in all policies’ is said to be promoted. An effective collaboration with multiple stakeholders is a must to understand effective collaboration that will identify certain features that can help in this regard. Stakeholder theory also believes that organizations do not work in isolation, instead they operate in a permeable environment where they need to cater to the society as well. Freeman (1984) interprets a stakeholder as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives’ (Freeman, 1984, p. 49); therefore, organization has the interest to work towards the expectation of stakeholders that have a direct or indirect effect on their firm. It has been accepted that context-based research can help all stakeholders involved in policymaking to make a better decision (Mwendera et al., 2017). According to the National Emergency Action Plan (NEAP) 2018–2019, ‘Effective Collaboration’ has been one of the guiding principles of the plan to eradicate polio. The idea rotates around ‘one team under one roof’ strategy where the government of Pakistan along with its supporting agencies works together in close vicinity of each other for polio eradication. Successful implementation of it entails collaboration among Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) partners, national governments, donors and other related agencies and institutions. Even though the government of Pakistan will chiefly be liable for the productive execution of the strategy at all the local levels, the GPEI and its partners will act as facilitators, allowing the smooth execution of the operations (National Emergency Operation Center, 2016). Under the above outlines, the Emergency operation centers (EOCs) have been created and they are there to facilitate improvements in routine vaccination to immunization. Here, the priority is given to joint work plans between the government and its collaborated partners for polio eradication (Imran et al., 2018). Such activities and endeavors in Pakistan are backed by many international agencies, including WHO, UNICEF, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Rotary International and the Global Alliance for Vaccinations and Immunizations (GAVI) (Owais et al., 2013). Pakistan is operating under the ‘one team under one roof’ strategy so that all partners along with the government are in close vicinity, work together as one team and not as a separate organization. EOCs were formulated in the NEAP, one exists at the national level and the other four at

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the provincial level. The purpose of the centers is to create one team under one roof. This is the strategy of co-location for collaboration. Co-location can lead to close-knit collaboration and assist in faster delivery of services (Richardson & Patana, 2012). It enables us to focus on data-driven, modern opportunities. It can make decision making at all levels of hierarchy easier and allows the joint analysis and planning. It can support in relationship building and mutual learning (Yodsampa, 2013). This allows the government to work with its supporting partners directly and efficiently (National Emergency Action Plan for Polio Eradication 2016–2017, 2016). Till now the operation centers have been fully mature and highly functional. It has provided a platform for multi-­ functional and collaborative endeavors. Based on the functional structure of the program, it is led by the Prime Minister’s focal person under which the EOC coordinators come to play which are responsible for their own EOCs. The health sector of Pakistan is classified into three levels. It includes primary level, secondary level and tertiary level of the health sector. For any collaborative effort, a central coordination personal plays a central role who ensures an active flow of information (Ghafoor & Sheikh, 2016). The government is the lead at all levels of the hierarchy. At the district level, with the supervision of the DC and District Health Officer (DHO) campaigns take place. Every campaign has three phases: pre-­ campaign, intra-campaign and post-campaign. There are evaluations and monitoring at all levels. Information is collected and through triangulation of data, quality is gauged and improved. At the tehsil and union council (UC) level, Assistant District Health Officer (ADHO) and Union Council Medical Officer (UCMO) do play a central role in polio eradication. Assistant Commissioner (AC) is the chairman while the Deputy District Health Officer (DDHO) is the secretary. The UCMO makes sure that each Area In-Charge in the UC contacts the teams every day when their day’s assignments end. A significant step taken by the NEAP was to introduce administrative leadership at all levels. The leadership exists to steer the polio eradication initiative in the right direction. The Chief Secretary at the provincial level and the Deputy Commissioner (DC) at the district level, which are also known as District Coordination Officers (DCOs) and Political Agents in some administrative divisions, are in place. They help in assembling the health sector as well as other parts of the government institutions so that they all are completely devoted to the polio eradication agenda (Wadood, 2014). The EOC has also been established for cross-agency collaboration, which is a complex task. It requires

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diligence by the collaborating stakeholder agencies to provide a smooth service (Conklin, 2006). The unification of purpose and alignment in the goals of the organization is the element that keeps all collaborating organizations to keep on working together. If the purpose of various organizations is separate from one another working together will be challenging for all (Khosla et al., 2016). The Government of Pakistan’s management and supervision staff has steady program operations at all levels, including collaboration and coordination across National and Provincial Emergency Operation Centers, the National Task Force, Provincial Task Forces, Divisional Task Forces, and District Polio Control Rooms (National Emergency Operations Centre, 2016). Attempts have been made to bring other religious groups, NGOs, influencers, media personals, hospitals, schools and private organizations on board for polio awareness and eradication activities. It can be seen throughout history that bringing most of the groups on one platform has never been an easy task as Pakistan has faced backlash from certain extremist groups (Hussain et al., 2016). Since then, a number of collaborations have been carried out. Constant initiatives for collaboration with other nations on an international level have been going on in the past. Iran offered to provide free anti-polio vaccines to Pakistan and Afghanistan (Wasif, 2015). Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) through its Emirates Polio Campaign under the United Arab Emirates Pakistan Assistance Program (UAE-PAP) assured to help Pakistan in resolving the issue of eradicating polio entirely by the end of the year 2022. Since the beginning of the program in 2014, millions of children have been vaccinated by it (Abid & Zayed, 2018). Similarly, Japan dispensed 510 million Yen to contribute to the eradication activities in Pakistan. The grant was exchanged among the Japanese Government, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and UNICEF (Japan Internation Cooperation Agency, 2018). Moreover, countries such as the United State of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), Canada and Germany are among the major donor countries. Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Rotary International, National Philanthropic Trust / Private Philanthropists, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, United Nations Foundation, Rotary International / United Nations Foundation (UNF) Private Sector Campaign and American Red Cross are among the highest-funding Private Sector/Non-Governmental Donors in immunization against polio disease (Global Polio Eradication Initiative, 2019).

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The health sector in the form of Government Health Centres, lady health workers, student nurses are included in assistance of the program. Other than that government non-health sector organizations that included the waste management company, police, army, civil defense, education department, housing society, Auqaf and Religious Affairs Department, educational institutes like schools, colleges and universities are directly part of the process. Hospitals and schools also cooperate, otherwise there can be consequences for them as the government is involved. Based on the concept stated by Sedgwick and Lemaire (2017), organizations come together due to isomorphic pressures and cooperate with each other. The degree of collaboration depends on the pressures and the gains which they might receive in return for that activity. There can be three types of pressures, coercive, normative and mimetic. When the government applies pressure on the agency to take part in a collaborative program it can be a form of coercive pressure, that is, a form of vertical agreement like in this case (Piña & Avellaneda, 2018) or can be caused by any other pressure. Collaboration with the Ehsaas program has also been introduced by the Government. An Ehsaas polio partnership was stressed upon by the Prime Minister of Pakistan in a meeting in August 2019, attended by senior Government officials, army personals and focal persons of polio program. He also stated that polio eradication is one of the top priorities of the government. Representatives from international donors and army assured that their support is with the government. Certain influencers are also involved such as celebrities, religious leaders, political leaders, ulemas, doctors, lawmakers, secretaries of various government departments and community groups among which groups of various ethnicity like the Pathan community are involved. Studies have also been conducted on the personality and personality traits of people and how their personalities affect their will to collaborate (Goldman & Kahnweiler, 2000). Nowadays, scholars have started analyzing interagency collaboration from multiple perspectives. The focus is not just of organizations being a unit of analysis instead, individuals and societies are also being given due consideration. In the context of our country, formal liaisons are present between GPEI and the Pakistani government. Along with that, the military of Pakistan has also collaborated with the vaccination teams to cover conflict zones as a strong example of health and security sector alignment (National Emergency Operations Centre, 2016). Apart from WHO and UNICEF, Rotary and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation are among the primary donors for the program. The primary global polio immunization program,

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PolioPlus, was set in motion in 1985 by Rotary. In 1988, it was one of the establishing partners of the GPEI. It is relentlessly working for polio eradication with the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (Majiyagbe, 2004). Microsoft founder Bill Gates with his wife Melinda are the creators of the world’s largest philanthropy. They have contributed assets worth $24.2 billion. Their main mission is the improvement of the health of the poor. Until now Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has contributed $2.5 billion on health initiatives including polio. This amount is more than twice the annual budget of the WHO. Similarly, an all-rounded collaboration with the media partners and on social media platforms has been carried out as a perception management initiative. Media has been taken on board to spread a positive image of polio vaccination and share its advantages. Similarly, messages have been shared on numerous social media platforms for the same purpose. Other than that, Facebook and Google Search Engine Optimization (SEO) has been used as a tool against anti-vaccine propaganda. Political and religious leaders have also been brought on board as a representative against a false impression of polio immunization (Government of Pakistan: Ministry of National Health Services, Regulations, & Coordination, 2019). According to NEAP 2019, a number of areas and Union Council have been underperforming. The number of missing children has plateaued. There is a persistent gap in immunization coverage in the most critical districts. Community-based vaccination (CBV) is one of the central plans for containing virus dissemination in the core reserves and areas of foremost priority for polio transmission in Pakistan. According to this plan, Community Health Workers (CHWs), also known as Female Community Volunteers (FCVs) work day and night to cover all areas. An issue at hand is of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) who settle anywhere in the country and act as a carrier (Alexander et al., 2014). They can be from FATA, KP or Afghanistan. Vaccination facilities at Permanent Transit Points (PTPs) have been created at various points and at airports so that mobile populations are catered to (Hussain et  al., 2016). National Immunization Days are also celebrated to raise awareness. In the current times, attacks on polio workers, centralized decision making, negative propaganda against the program, financial issues, not being able to follow the standard protocol and other such issues are some of the causes of relapse of the disease (Habib et al., 2017).

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4   Interagency Issues Specific to Pakistan The concept of collaboration is relatively new to most organizations in Pakistan so they lack the institutional memory to learn from experiences. A weak policy might not lead to the failure of collaborative activity, instead the fault lies more in the weak implementation of the policy and the collaborative process (Lira, 2010). Problems of authority and cultural differences also cause leadership issues and conflicts among leaders of individual agencies during joint actions for critical situations (Abbas et al., 2018). Commonwealth nations can profit from the examples of Australian know-hows for answers to national issues like law and order, safety and security, humanitarian support and disaster relief by collaboration (Haider, 2013). The constant change in government and the instability of the political parties cause additional problems. Finance is also a major concern while planning to collaborate. Collaboration can usually be costly but when strategically planned it can lead to a reduction of cost by all agencies through resource sharing. There might be times where the policymakers are not willing to invest their funds in a long-term collaborative program that is focused on vulnerable groups in society. This can be because duration is required to see some actual results of the integrated service program (Greenberg & Rosenheck, 2010). There are different agencies working on the same project in a collaborative effort. The same amount of commitment will be required from all of the agencies to make it a success. But the problem lies in the distribution of funds among the participating agencies as well. If one agency receives less funding or compensation for the same amount of work, the commitment might not be up to par (Richardson & Patana, 2012). UN utilized the clustered approach to support the response efforts after the Kashmir earthquake, knowing that such approach is still underdeveloped (Cochrane, 2008). According to an article written by Richelle S.  Grogg, the Humanitarian Policy Group performed an investigation which unearthed that the cluster approach might have helped but there was still ambiguity about its role, cluster leads, and their own organization’s purpose (Grogg, 2016). He found in another investigative report additional issues with coordination, such as, multiple unproductive cluster meetings, revolving around UN, excluded Islamic organizations, and indecisiveness. Furthermore, numerous local agencies were excluded because meetings were in English, there were a lot of cluster meetings, and NGOs gave high wages that deteriorated the morale of the maintained local staff. Such differences becomes the cause of

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dissatisfaction and demotivation of the human resource working in a collaborative environment. The daily predicaments and strains that challenge the agencies to preserve their own separate organizational identities while maintaining a strong alliance is also a battle in Pakistan (Irfan et al., 2017). Problems related to corruption, resource challenges and the difference in interests also remain constant. Therefore, it is necessary to address the basic issues before entering into a collaborative pursuit.

5   Collaborative Considerations Extracted from the Polio Program In the literature review there have been different authors stating the complexities of collaboration and how context alters what strategy is to be used. It is also evident that even if the collaboration is taking place in the same country, the exact methods cannot be used every time because certain elements are context-dependent (Mahmood et al., 2017). Some factors that have to be considered in the initial stages of collaboration taking place especially by the government should be the existence of some type of legal or policy guidelines as the base of the activity. This chiefly applies when collaborating with third-party NGOs, private companies or community-­based providers as their protocols and mandates could be different. For this project as well there are separate policy guidelines and the workplace environments are different. Concerning this, in the initial phases of strategy formation, a key consideration is analysis of the cultures and constructing ways in which combined working can be made easier as identified in the analysis. During the development of policies in the country, most of the insights are adapted from the best practices and successes of other countries but sometimes the ground realities are ignored (Hassan et  al., 2017). By ignoring the cultural, religious, social, economic and ethical aspects of Pakistan, problems will keep on erupting and complete elimination of the disease will not be possible. The moral for inter-agency collaboration is that rather than steer clear of or suppress conflict, the requirement is to identify methods in which conflict cannot just be acknowledged, but can be settled with collaborative activity (Kiplagat et al., 2016). Additionally, the system in which the organizations exist and the environment that surrounds them can also not be overlooked. One of the ways

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if the strategy of collocation or working together is used is for people to have joint accountability. If accountability is separate for all agencies then functions should also be disjointed. For any strategy to work there needs to be accountability on each step. Analyzing the interventions every step of the way is an essential part of a successful plan. One of the factors most important to such a collaboration in which diverse forms of agencies exist is careful planning. Plans related to the polio program are made at the federal level. The local government body has the most elaborate experience of managing the local issues in planning the strategies required for the total coverage. Their opinions and ideas should be considered while planning (Local Government New Zealand Excellence Programme, 2014). One point to be considered is making sure the field-level employees are well represented in the senior-level meetings. Trust among agencies is of paramount importance for carrying out a collaborative activity (Kalkman & Waard, 2017). Alongside this, information sharing between departments has to be up to the mark. An interesting factor identified in a study is the relationship between information sharing and trust. The giver and receiver of information must have trust between them, only then they will be comfortable enough to share all necessary information (Kostis & Näsholm, 2019). A proposal that has been put forth by Bingham and O’Leary in their book Big Ideas in Collaborative Public Management (2014) is incentivizing collaboration with the use of an appraisal system and legislation establishing an environment that allows freedom of information spread among collaborative partners. There is a lack of any such formal appraisal system incentivizing teamwork and promoting such behaviors based on the findings. Last but not the least, conflict often exists in inter-organizational collaborations. On the grounds of this, inherent interdependencies, tensions, and interactions among the parties engaged (Thomson & Perry, 2006) conflict management is considered an important part of the collaboration process as it can be either productive or destructive (Kiplagat et al., 2016).

6   Conclusion Polio is a national emergency having international concerns. Since the 1980s, the lack of success in managing the polio eradication has led to the international community joining hands and developing necessary networks. These networks and collaborative efforts are the need of the day to

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manage this disease. It requires the involvement of all parties for its successful eradication and it is one of the highlighted ongoing programs offering much to learn from. As the Government of Pakistan is actively trying to eliminate polio, the public health community as well as other agencies interested in such initiatives have a chance to make the most of their experience, lessons and structures and utilize the people engaged with the program using network as means of coordination between and across different agencies. Even though cross-agency collaborations are working in a downward method, the recent context in Pakistan requires an all-inclusive approach by the government for health interventions. For this, policy coherence is much needed. Also with the shift in technology, the ways to collaborate can and have changed; therefore, shedding light on how to incorporate technology and its potential in the nation and international collaborations will also be beneficial. There is also a need for researches to develop models and tests that can help identify whether a collaboration is a success or failure. After a collaborative venture is over, it should be investigated to find out its success level and extract the variables that made it a success. Acknowledging the effect of human skills and individual interactions is valuable for the overall program. There are a few studies focusing on the application of such skills that facilitate the process of collaboration. There is also a potential for research to focus specifically on change management in collaboration, which will enrich the literary work as well. A by-product of interagency collaboration can be the practice of it in one program that can have its effect on other programs. The participants become willing to apply similar practices for another problem they might be unable to solve alone. This chain reaction can have an impact on national and international agencies and make them more acceptable to collaborations (Kaiser, 2011). Collectively, these studies outline a critical role of collaborating efforts among agencies for emergency situations like immunization concerns and outline the reasons why such an approach can create a positive impact in its reduction, better yet the eradication of such diseases.

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PART II

Decentralization/Devolution

Trends in Local Government Reforms: Case of Environmental Protection Authority Zahra Ishtiaq Paul and Muhammad Adnan Sial

1   Introduction Extensive administrative reforms have been implemented globally mainly due to the shifts in roles of government and state since the mid of twentieth century (Jadoon & Jabeen, 2017). Administrative reforms concerning issues like inefficiency, corruption, lack of sufficient bureaucratic performance, accountability to political institutions, and constant need for devolution had been undertaken by many nations in the past few decades. The relevance and efficacy of modern development theories of administration are mirrored through these reforms.

Z. I. Paul (*) Institute of Administrative Sciences, Quaid-e-Azam Campus, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] M. A. Sial Division of Management and Administrative Sciences, University of Education, Lahore, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_8

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Devolution is nothing unique or applicable in Pakistan only. Devolution is a relatively new concept connoting the provision of empowerment, legitimacy and authority to local governments. It is a rapidly growing global concept and practice with positive features. Devolution is based on hierarchy-type mechanism (HTM). It helps achieve political stability through the transfer of political power to local governments and helps achieve effective and efficient service delivery and accountability (Yusuf, 1999). Many developing countries in Latin America, Europe and East Asia have applied devolution. Traditionally, only federal and provincial governments have administrative powers in Pakistan with very little input at the local government (LG) level. Federal and provincial governments are the policy makers; service delivery is carried on by bureaucracy; district authorities simply implement and execute policy; politicians have negligible say or role. The demand for decentralization in developing countries was started by international donors like World Bank. Resultantly, the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of International Monetary Fund in the 1980s and 1990s increased the pressure (Cheema & Mohmand, 2003). In 2001, the President Pervez Musharraf regime (1999–2008) raised the slogan of “empower the impoverished” for devolution program and tried to establish local governments with administrative and financial powers to bring democracy to grassroots levels. An overview of the LG reforms in Pakistan in the devolution of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from 2000 to 2019 in the four provinces (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan) of Pakistan is given in the current chapter. The chapter is divided into four sections and structured as follows: (1) examination of the institutional context of administrative reforms in Pakistan, (2) focus on trajectories in the process of LG reform efforts, (3) examination of the overall devolution program that is content, structures, process, implementation, changes after the 18th amendment in EPA, and (4) recommendations and future directions.

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2   Institutional Context of Current Administrative Reforms After independence in 1947, administrative reforms were implemented. To ensure properly functioning bureaucracy and law and order and revenue collection, structural reforms were brought about. Yet even after 74 years Pakistan still needs important reforms in the administrative system of bureaucracy. The history of administrative reforms in Pakistan can be traced back to normative techniques used in different reforms implemented in the public sector. The administrative reforms in Pakistan can be understood through four reform models: development administration (1947–1977), New Public Management (NPM) (1977–1990), good governance (1990–2012) and network governance (2012–to date). Development administration model was presented by Gant (2006). From 1947 to 1977, none of the recommendations of various reform commissioners were implemented. Only a few procedural changes were made. Efforts to make structural changes in bureaucratic structure were made by the Bhutto government in 1973. Notable reforms were the formation of occupational groups and lateral entry of professionals and technocrats in civil services. The role of government expanded due to nationalizing of organizations at the federal level. The management-style mechanism was used; that is, hierarchy-type in which top-down and unilateral strategy has been used; finances were managed through traditional input-oriented methods and it was a reshuffling of control and autonomy. The NPM model (Brinkerhoff, 1999; Pollitt, 2009) from 1977 to 1990s covers the military regime of General Zia ul-Haq and civil governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. A process of denationalization was started with a focus on privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and thus more of a market-type management (MTM) style had been adopted, where autonomy was given to public organizations. In 1981, Pakistan received World Bank loans and joined the IMF’s structural adjustment program. NPM-directed reforms were started generally focusing on privatization and reduction of government size and less focused on improvement and management of SOEs. The good governance model (ESCAP, 2006) highlighted through General Pervez Musharraf’s regime shows initiatives taken to endorse good governance through efficiency, development, capacity, accountability and legitimacy. Historically, all three military rulers General Ayub,

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General Zia and General Musharraf promoted local democracy but had a stranglehold of the center. General Musharraf also started his devolution program through reforming the structure of district governments and introducing a new LG system. He focused on political devolution by creating a third tier of government under his devolution plan. General Musharraf’s era was followed by the elected government of President Asif Ali Zardari who furthered administrative devolution under the 18th amendment in the constitution. This devolved 18 federal ministries to provincial governments, thus loosening the hold of the center on the federation. This era falls under MTM/HTM management type. They devolved the ministries but not in a true sense as autonomy and financial control was still at the provincial level. The network governance model (Considine, 2004; Provan & Kenis, 2008) currently underway relates to the processes of collaboration between public, private, civil society and third-sector partnerships, co-production, hybrid sectorial arrangements and so on. The network-type management (NTM) strategies were applied in projects like solid waste management, Lahore Transport Company, Punjab mass transit authority (Metro), Orange train and E-sahulat from 2012 to date.

3   Trajectories in the Process of Local Governance Reform Efforts in Pakistan Local government is nothing new in Pakistan as there has always been LG structure as the lowest-tier political structure. Government of India Act 1919 introduced reforms in the LG system. The district board chairmen were elected officials, not selected. The main revenue source of local governments was provincial fiscal transfers. LG reforms from 1947 to 2019 can be divided into six eras. 3.1  First Era The first era is from 1947 to 1958 reflects the inherited LG system where local governments had limited empowerment (Ali, 2014) and autonomy at the provincial level (Cheema et al., 2006). Due to a lack of infrastructure and resources, proper LG system could not be established. A visible rural–urban divide has been created in the absence of elective processes and under (indifferent) government-appointed administrators (Waseem,

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1994). Essential municipal services in urban areas were provided through urban local councils. Patronage was rampant in the appointment of rural councils where local elites with limited representation were selected (Jalal, 1995; Talbot, 1996). 3.2  Second Era From 1958 to 1969, the basic democracy (BD) system was implemented during the military regime of General Ayub Khan, with both elected and appointed members in  local/provincial setup. This cleared the path for future elections. In this era, civil government was set up under military leadership. There were LG institutions in rural and urban areas. All control in the BD system was vested in the bureaucracy. It could nullify the proceedings, resolution and power of local bodies. The functions of local bodies were related to the development and regulation or to fiscal deficit to some extent (Cheema et al., 2006; Siddiqui, 1992). 3.3  Third Era The third era is from 1969 to 1988, which ushered in the first elections in 1970 on the basis of adult franchise and elected the National and Provincial Assemblies. All local bodies were dissolved in 1971 and a civilian martial law was enforced from 1971 to 1977. Pakistan lost the Eastern wing as a result of the 1971 war and West Pakistan was divided into four provinces: Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier (later on named as Khyber Pakthunkhawa). Under the 1973 Constitution (still applicable), local governments work under provincial legislations. The four provincial governments enacted their respective LG legislation in 1979. With the dismissal of the Bhutto government in July 1977, local government ordinance (LGO) 1979 and 1980 were used effectively to legitimize the Zia regime. All local body members were elected directly or indirectly to decrease bureaucratic roles. Basic democracy LG elections were non-party based and were greatly criticized (Malik, 2009). Zia ul Haq’s aim was to create political centralization through LGOs using urban–rural local governments together. President Musharraf used the same tactics and made his military rule legal by creating division among representatives (Wilder, 1999). Local bodies were elected in the four provinces in 1979 and 1980 (Jalal, 1995). Two types of rural and three forms of urban LG structures

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were introduced through new ordinances (Quddus, 1981). With the managerial and economic powers centralized at the provincial and federal hierarchy, LGO was promulgated in 1979 in Punjab, Sindh and KPK, and in 1980  in Baluchistan. It was a four-level government system; rural areas were governed through district, tehsil and union councils. In urban areas, government was administered through town committees, municipal and metropolitan corporations. This three-tier governance was not fortified by further decentralization of federal or provincial administrations or financial powers devolved to LG (Cheema et al., 2006). In order to harmonize the urban/rural sectors and to avoid conflicts, same LG laws were used in rural–urban areas. Rights of representation to minorities were also given in the local council as per rules of the policy of the 1973 constitution. Elections were on a non-party basis and new chairmen were elected (Mukerjee, 1989). Local councils had the authority to approve financial plans and tax proposals. Local bodies were made obsolete with the revival of national and provincial governments after Zia’s death in 1988. Newly born fictions between local and provincial governments led to the suspension of local bodies between 1993 and 1998 (Cheema et al., 2006). 3.4  Fourth Era Fourth era comprising of years 1988–1999 saw an absence of proper LG structure (despite 1998 elections) during the elected governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. When the military coup of October 1999 occurred, there were very few active local governments. It is a lamentable fact that the elected rulers, civilians and government officials engaged in undemocratic, unjust and shady practices. In fact, civilian administration helped create or contributed to the institutional and political emergencies whereas a military administration moved to bring just society and legislation (Malik & Rana, 2019). 3.5  Fifth Era The fifth era from 1999 to 2010 was ushered with the Musharraf Coup; he took over as President in October 1999 with the enthusiastic response of common people after the inefficient civilian governments. The National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) designed the LG system which was applied on 14 August 2001 after LGO 2001 in all provinces with a district, tehsil

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(town) and union (local) governments. The LGO of 2001 is a comprehensive law used to devolve real administrative, financial and political power down to the grassroots level. Local governments of 2001 had the power to make decisions and control development expenditure, due to their bureaucratic structure, which gave them decision making and accountability authority. This effective devolution allowed people to plan and ensure the interests of common man. It provided opportunities for justice and better means of livelihood and was in the interest of the common public. The services related to agriculture, health, education, information technology, finance, community development, revenue and planning come under the jurisdiction of district governments. The middle tier is responsible for looking after the services of water, sanitation, roads and waste disposal. The union councils, which consist of the lowest tier were given monitoring responsibility. The main aim of LG is to award the chosen members after passing a discretionary procedure, the role of representation. Thus true representations like workers, minorities, laborers or females at the lowest government ranks come up and help bring financial change. Devolution of political power thus protects political rights at the local level and ensures them from being recentralized by elected governments. Previously, the Deputy Commissioner (DC) was an authoritative administrator of the region’s coordinated financial (revenue collection) and authoritative capacities, and he or she was accountable to the provincial or federal governments. The new LG framework has ensured against the dangers of impending elite class catch present due to the presumed projection of power authority nexus to weaken the structure. The most conspicuous amongst them are: Public Safety Commission (PSC), Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) and Zila mohtasib, which are intended to oppose any sort of defilement movement or force ill-use practised either by chosen agents or open authorities (IMF, 2010). There was no hierarchical relation between local and provincial governments as a result of the LGO 2001 implementation. It has made all government departments accountable to district councils by devolving administrative, financial and development powers to elected officials in local councils. The DCs reappointed as District Coordination Officers (DCOs) function as a subordinate to the District Nazim for executive approvals, performance evaluations and transfers. LGO 2001 allocated 33% reserved seats for women and minorities.

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As a result of nonparty elections of 2000 to 2001, 101 districts and local governments were formed. Local Government Ordinance 2001was applied in all provinces (Paracha, 2003). The civilian government, after the general elections of 2008, again weakened devolution and was not willing to maintain LG institutions. Non-elected administrators managed local governments. 3.6  Sixth Era Different structures of LG were seen in different provinces from 2011. Baluchistan provincial assembly passed the LG Act in 2010 and other three provinces in 2013 (UNDP, 2013). In the present form, LG Acts give limited autonomy to local councils in terms of control over service delivery, revenue, tax, police departments and fiscal management. There is a lack of clarity on the designation of the administrative and fiscal authority. Most taxes are to be redistributed through the federal center. Provinces retain control of large bodies like Karachi Water and Sewerage Board, Sindh Building Control Authority, Lahore Development Authority, and Solid Waste Management. Furthermore, admin control of education and health is still under provincial government control. LG Acts make local governments subservient to provincial governments, for example, province Chief Ministers can dismiss LG or council heads and appoint new ones (UNDP, 2013). Unlike LG Acts of military regimes, this LG Acts opts for party-based elections of LG. Asif Zardari (2008–2013) and Nawaz Sharif (2013–2017) were hesitant in the establishment of strong local governments as they wanted their provincial assembly members and ministers to retain development funds in their control and thus influence their networks through patronage. Political patronage was also furthered through local governments. Thus local governments could exercise authority only after being politically used by provincial and federal governments, which were controlled by the military even during civilian rule. Imran Khan assumed office as Prime Minister in August 2018. Amid rumors of military establishment’s backing, Imran rose to power as Prime Minister and soon dismantled LG systems in provinces under his party rule, replacing them with a new system. LG Acts 2019 was introduced in Punjab whereas other provinces have still not introduced the new LG Acts. LG Act 2019, after dissolving current LG institutions, called for new elections in Punjab in April 2020 (Mustafa, 2019). It reintroduced rural– urban divide and called for establishing metropolitan/municipal/town

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corporations for urban areas and tehsil councils for rural ones. The head of each LG is to be directly elected in contrast to earlier local governments and he will have a cabinet to assist him in the discharge of duties (education) provided in Schedules 3, 4 and 5 by a set of councilors and professionals, as given in 4th Schedule to Act (section 19 of Local Government Act 2019). Councilors will be elected on a closed-list proportional representation basis, that is, political party-based election and list of candidates provided by the party.

4   Devolution One of the main reforms made after 2000 is administrative decentralization, which concerns restructuring or reorganization of authority according to the principle of subsidiarity which provides authority and responsibility to LG for more capacity building, accountability, transparency, fair play and effective public service delivery (Kimenyi, 2018; Paracha, 2003; Yusuf, 1999) and efficient central government (Blair, 2000). Administrative decentralization is the result of adopting NPM. Its three categories include deconcentration, delegation and devolution (Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2014). Devolution is recognized as the most fundamentally change-oriented administrative decentralization and stands for the transfer of responsibilities from federal to state and local governments. These responsibilities can be services to municipalities (district councils) which elect their own mayors and councils, which raise revenues, and which can make independent investment decisions (Manor, 1999; Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2003; World Bank, 1999). LG has to work within prescribed rules set by the central government, not accountable to it but still hampered by it (Scott-­ Herridge, 2002). The 2001 devolution followed a template of Pervez Musharraf’s predecessors President Ayub’s basic democracy and General Zia-ul-Haq’s local bodies. Musharraf developed NRB with technical assistance from United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The devolution plan 2000 was one step ahead of previous systems as it assured broad political and administrative authority to district and sub-district governments by mapping federal and provincial grants to help them fulfill their new responsibilities. According to NRB, a new local governance system was established that aimed at empowerment of people through a focus on their rights to development, right to participation and right to information. The development

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of service-oriented governance infrastructure capable of delivering quality services within prescribed, given time and also to overcome the rural– urban divide were the additional aims of these devolution reforms. The five basic features of 2001 devolution were ‘devolution of political power’, ‘decentralization of administrative authority’, ‘deconcentration of management functions’, ‘diffusion of the power-authority nexus’ and ‘distribution of resources’. The relationship of provinces with districts was clearly defined. Districts were not independent units but were subordinate to the provincial governments in the administrative setup. The provinces continue to exert control over districts in spite of administrative decentralization. Provincial Local Government Commission is used to regulate local governance and district government–province relations. It assists the provincial Chief Executive in overseeing the LGs. The Provincial Finance Commission allocated funds to local governments but no local body representative was taken as a member of the committee. Distribution of funds was also not rational (Keefer et al., 2003). However, district governments generated their own funds through charges and fines. The prime aim of devolution was for local governments and agencies to intensify their local capacity. Three types of trajectories are tracked by the 2001 devolution: decentralization of decision making from provincial bureaucrats to district-level bureaucracy, changes in the decision maker’s accountability and changes in the fiscal resource allocation. 4.1  Devolution: A Case of Environmental Protection Agency Pakistan is a federal state governed by the 1973 Constitution with a President as the constitutional head of state. Its constitution since its enforcement has been subject to change depending upon political and societal needs. It has four provinces Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), a federally administrated territory (Islamabad) and two autonomous territories (Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan). Commonly, a politically elected prime minister acts as a chief executive assisted by cabinet ministers in a parliamentary government set up. Provinces yet again have an elected provincial (legislative) assembly led by the chief minister. For the past three decades or little more, the urbanization trend remained very high as masses moved to elevate their life standard, thus

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putting undue pressure on environmental policies. Needless to state that Pakistan’s Environmental Policy was aimed at achieving objectives of sustainable development through legally, administratively and technically sound institutions. The Ministry of Environment, Local Government and Rural Development established in 1994 was headed by Federal Minister, and the Secretary held the administrative charge. The local government wing of the Ministry managed both the local government and rural development divisions. Local governments were made to manage the environmental issues as a result of the local government ordinance of 2001. Maiden effort in Pakistan was the creation of Environmental Pollution Control Organization (EPCO) in 1975, which could not continue for long. This led to the creation of Pakistan Environmental Protection Ordinance (PEPO) in 1983 to set up environmental agenda. According to the ordinance, the Pakistan Environmental Protection Council (PEPC) and the Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (Pak-EPA) were the federal organizations working with Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) formed at the provincial level. In 1997, PEPO was superseded by the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (PEPA). PEPA had a bigger mandate, including protection, conservation, rehabilitation and improvement of the environment and prevention and control of pollution and promotion of sustainable development. The PEPC was also restructured after the enactment of Pakistan Environmental Act 1997, which went on to become an apex statutory body at the federal level under the Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (Pak-EPA). The prime mandate of the agency was to ensure the implementation and execution of policies defined by PEPC and its affiliate offices. The Director General (DG) of the agency was appointed by the respective ministry post PM endorsement. Provincial-­level implementation agencies are Punjab-Environment Protection Department, Sindh-Environment Protection Agency, Baluchistan-­ Environment Protection Agency and NWFP-Environment Protection Agency. Devolution plan was brought in place to empower the provinces to manage their issues in a most befitting manner. This empowerment includes policy making, receiving direct donations and ensuring citizens participation. Provincial EPAs in turn did delegate some of their powers to district-level governments, as mandated by the Federal government. A shift can be seen from strict HTM to NTM. But it was more like an NTM/ HTM management strategy being used in all the four provinces.

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However, as it holds true for other departments coupled with a very trivial structure of local governments, community participation stayed more on papers while decision making and power remained with administrative offices. Federal government nonetheless brought in place two tribunals, one each in Lahore and Karachi to cater for provincial matters. 4.2  Process of Devolution In order to ensure optimum public participation in decision making, provinces followed a three-tier devolution process through local government ordinance (LGO) 2001. This process was aimed at improving the controls with the effective utilization of resources: upper tier being the district government headed by Zila Nazim and district administration/managed by district officers; middle tier was the tehsil; and the last tier was the union level managed by tehsil Nazim and union Nazims. This devolution was made exactly in line with the plans to empower provinces on economic and community services. However, provinces did maintain proper checks on the financial matters down the tier through a network of district administration. The environment also included various other concerns like water, wildlife and forests fell under provincial jurisdiction. Many of the environmental concerns, pollution, seasonal movement of wildlife and inter-­ district spread of rangelands and forests required inter-district coordination and provincial control. The micro-level environmental concerns like land planning, solid waste management, green public spaces and pollution control were effectively and efficiently handled at the local level. Prior to devolution, a very tedious, time-taking and ineffective system was in place to manage environmental issues in provinces. The DG of Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) was the sole head of the authority and handled all complaints and processes related to the environment. DG managed the show through a team of inspectors having no authority. They were simply restricted to site inspections and reporting. 4.3  Implementation of Devolution in Environmental Protection Agencies in Different Provinces The process and effectiveness of devolution at the province level is as follows: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP): The NWFP LGO 2001 promulgated on 14 August 2001 in which environment remained low in priority. However,

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in August 2005 and with the LGO revision, the environment landed in limelight with the basic governance structure in the province in line with the three-tier devolution explained earlier with district, tehsil and union Nazims managing environment through a team of district officers and headed by EDO. In KPK alone, lack of funds and lack of environmental understanding did not help in bringing about a change in true spirits. More so, irregular sub-divisions within districts followed by improper flow of communication proved to be a messed-up affair. Punjab: Punjab also did the devolution of environmental management as a result of PLGO 2001 under the guiding principles PEPA 1997. This devolution did bring in certain improvements as a result of more community involvement and information sharing from the EPA to the ministry and Punjab assembly. However, political interference, decision-making conflicts and nepotism were never missing from the landscape of Punjab too. Punjab prepared a good district-level structure with a DO in lead, followed by DDOs, inspectors and field assistants. DO at the same time was reporting to both Zila Nazim and DCO, often adding undesirable delays in routine matters. As a result of mismanagement, donors did not yield the desired results. Another reason for this was the adherence to PEPA 1997 at the provincial level with not much change. There was some degree of transparency visible as departmental information was disseminated through newsletters, blogs and sometimes through newspapers. Lastly and most importantly, EPD Punjab also had to face a dearth of funds; a limited amount of funds and aids were provided to the DG and Nazim by the province. When the local governments were terminated in 2009, the authority of Nazim was transferred to DCO.  The rest of the procedure remained the same. Both Nazim and DCO were the administrators. When the Nazimeens were abolished in 2010, it gave monopoly to the CM of the province. The CM had the luxury to appoint a DCO at will or of his like. Punjab environmental tribunal rules were passed in 2011 as a result of the 18th amendment of the constitution. Sindh: Local governments were functioning in Sindh since 1979, prior to SLGO 2001. There were Zila councils and district governments in Karachi and Taluka councils, TMA and Union councils in rural areas (Sindh LGO, 2001). Sindh LGO 2001 presented a different mechanism revolving around transparency, participation and bottom-up-approach that unfortunately was not followed in true spirit. The Citizen Community

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Boards (CCB), entitled to 25% of the development budget, was never made fully functional. There has always been a lack of cooperation between the government agencies and the citizens. LGs were made functional after elections of Naib Nazims held in 2005. In Sindh like Punjab, there was an overlap of functional authority. Most of the environmental projects were completed without getting input from local government, TMAs were mostly federally and provincially driven, without the input of LGs (Memon et al., 2000). Not to forget the shortage of funds and awareness on account of the environment and its protection. Baluchistan: Baluchistan, in contrast to other provinces, formed the Environment, Sports & Youth Affairs Department in the year 2004 that looked after three directorates: Baluchistan-EPA, Baluchistan sports and youth affairs. The environment attained the status of a separate Ministry in 2005, looking after all related matters. The devolution nonetheless was again lacking its essence in terms of understanding and transfer of powers. The Baluchistan government was empowered to dissolve local councils and appoint government officers as Administrators in 2010. It was also decided that local body elections would be held no later than one year from the dissolution of local councils. The provincial government dissolved all local councils and appointed administrators in place of Nazims. The BLGO 2001 was replaced with the Baluchistan Local Government Act (BLGA) 2010, which is a replica of the 1979 local bodies system. 4.4  Changes after 18th Amendment in Different Provinces Post devolution, the 18th amendment was introduced in the year 2010, which aimed at the transfer of political power to local tiers. As enunciated in Article 140A, “every province shall establish a local government system. This LG will have elected officials through elections held by the Election Commission of Pakistan. Political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority will then be devolved by the provinces to local government officials”. Article 140A gives constitutional protection to local governments. The 18th amendment, in other words, has redefined the governance at federal and inter-provincial levels by revising the Federal Legislative List Part I and Part II and abolishing the erstwhile Concurrent Legislative List. Subsequently, the legislative and executive authorities of the federal and

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provincial governments have been redesigned by assigning the exclusivity of 53 subjects to the federal government, 18 subjects to the Council of Common Interests (CCI) and all residual subjects to the provincial governments (News, 2015). More so, provinces were free to design the basic structure for the functioning and governance of local governments. Resultantly, we have seen four different types of systems prevalent in the country. In furtherance to Article 140 (A) of the Constitution, provincial governments transferred and vested powers at district, Zila and union council levels. Post 18th amendment, 17 federal ministries were made redundant, the environment being one of them. The federal minister of the environment has been reassigned to the department of climate change, which was responsible for macro issues such as national policies, implementation strategies, and coordination measures, as well as serving as a focal point for international conventions and protocols. The downside of the transfer of environment as a subject to provinces was the missing national link. Previously, federal EPA used to collect nationwide data and handle and settle inter-provincial differences. However, in the absence of national control, provinces used to look inwards for support and assistance to settle issues. It did empower and improve service delivery but at the same time reduced harmony at the national level. Going forward, provincial governments were required to further devolve service provision and decision making to local bodies and LG under section 140-A, which was not fully made possible. In 2010, all provincial governments including KP, Punjab, Sindh, and Baluchistan dissolved all local councils and replaced elected Nazims with administrators. The local bodies’ elections were delayed, LGO 2001 was abolished and LGO 1979 was reinstated in Punjab, SLGO 1979 in Sindh. NWFP Land Laws Act 2009 was amended, which divided the province into administrative divisions and districts led by a Commissioner and a Collector respectively. The local governments in Pakistan functioned under LGO 2001 since 2009. Afterwards from 2009 to 2013, each province adopted and implemented different forms of LGO, those being LGO 1979 and LGO 2001. Even though the LGO system adopted was different for each province, the environment was given due importance by the respective assemblies. In 2013, LG acts were presented, which are different from previous LG systems and focused less on devolving adequate political, financial and administrative powers to lower tiers/local councils.

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There has been no election of local government in the last nine years except in Baluchistan. The first phase of local government elections took place in Baluchistan on 7 December 2013; the second phase on 29 May 2014; and the third phase on 31 December 2014. The fourth and last phase was conducted on 28 January 2015, which was for elections of mayors, deputy mayors or chairman and deputy chairman of 32 districts of Baluchistan. However, the devolution at the local council level did not take place even after the successful conduction of elections in Baluchistan owing to various reasons, be it law and order situation or capacity concerns. Punjab and Baluchistan Environmental Protection Acts were enacted in 2012 and KP and Sindh in 2014. Environmental Protection Councils were set up at provincial levels. However, only Punjab’s council has shown an inclination to enforce provisions of the Punjab Environmental Protection Act. The LG Acts of 2013 were not effective in empowering local governments (SPDC, 2016). LG Act 2013 did not empower LG, with admin powers to be held more at the provincial level. This increase in provincial control yet again did block the way for non-state options and citizens (Kalia, 2019). A Public-Private Partnership Authority Act 2017 was also brought in place; however, it did address large-scale infrastructure projects (like motorways, Orange train, bridges, metros), without citizen involvement (Ullah & Thaheem, 2018). As a result of all these changes, the environment once again slid through the back doors with no importance given both at the federal or provincial levels. It is evident from Randhawa (2016, 2018) that the environmental situation across the country has deteriorated over the past ten years and pollution is affecting the health and wellbeing of citizens. KP government though passed its own environment protection act in 2014, under which it was supposed to form the Environment Protection Tribunal, dissolving and superseding the tribunal formed by the federal government. Various and varied efforts have continued to be made at the provincial level for devolution but with no major success yet. All eyes are now on party-based local elections, as this may strengthen the fabric of local governments. Nevertheless, as we speak, the environment, along with many other subjects is made independent from the federal level with its autonomy and the power to legitimate lies with the provinces. This altogether has many a times made environment to ride the back seat; whereas, the need of the

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hour is to give maximum importance to environment protection. We need to ensure a sustainable environment for our future generations.

5   Conclusion The devolution 2001 gave autonomy to the local level and a locally elected representative was made the head of district administration, management and development as a process to facilitate the people and perk up the service delivery by supplying the service resources at the local level. But the formation of local governments in 2001 and their subsequent dissolution in 2010 had disturbed the real essence of devolution in Pakistan. Every military government in Pakistan introduced its own brand of LG.  In developing countries, decentralization may be either externally driven (through structural adjustment programs, donor pressure etc.) or internally motivated (by governments seeking to strengthen their legitimacy and gain popularity), though the country context is different in each case. In Pakistan’s scenario, decentralization is mostly internally driven and the military’s need to legitimize its control appears to be a prime reason behind the recurring attempts at LG reforms. It is evident that during democratic regimes, elected LG is less attractive as it provides an additional platform for citizen participation. The patronage of local governments under military regimes is not unique to Pakistan. Local governments were merely formed for a social change and were never recognized even by the constitution, although it addressed the rural–urban divide to some extent. The structure of governance in Pakistan is primarily two-tiered: the Federal and Provincial. The third tier of governance ‘Local Governments’ have not been able to make a significant impact, considering limited autonomy in implementation; it was rather more like hierarchy-type mechanism style. From 2001 till now, the reshuffling of lines of control is being observed among federal, provincial and local levels. Prior to LG structures, political bodies were divided on rural–urban basis under administrative officers. As the public was not involved in decision making, real power and authority lay with government officials at the district level and development was from top to bottom. So it is learnt that amendments did not get the desired results and local representatives remained puppet in provincial/federal elected members set up. The overall devolution program in Pakistan failed to deliver, mainly because of LGs having no authority and funds at their disposal. There was

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an increased focus on hierarchy-type management. In a nutshell, the functions of federal governments and finance were only deconcentrated with a shift to local governments. Constitutionally, the 18th amendment does not describe the type of local government that needs to be set up; provincial assemblies are free to enact their own local governance systems. Resultantly, four different systems of local government emerged in Pakistan. The 18th amendment created a balance through divisions of power between federal and provincial tiers of governance; however, the trickle-­ down effect of this vertical devolution was never equitably distributed to the lower tiers by the provincial capitals. Furthermore, local government elections remained an elusive goal in Pakistan. Institutional reform is not an easy-go process. It is an uphill task to actually improve public service delivery that requires continuity of political reform. However, all this was lacking in LG formation in 2001 and particularly in the case of EPA devolution.

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Decentralization Reforms in the Public Health Sector in Pakistan Aneeqa Suhail, Awais Gohar, and Trui Steen

1   Introduction Public sector reforms are part of the global agenda, which are experienced by every country. The drivers of these reforms vary across the world. While financial and economic crises are the major reasons for government-­ initiated reforms in developed countries, in developing countries these reforms are part of global development agendas, related to policy transfer or conditions for financial assistance from a donor organization such as the

A. Suhail (*) Department of Human Resource Studies, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] A. Gohar Department of Punjab Primary and Secondary Healthcare, Government of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan T. Steen Public Governance Institute, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_9

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World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or the United Nations (UN) (Smith, 1997; Turner, 2002). The purpose of these reforms is to modernize the bureaucratic system, fight nepotism, and make the government responsible, accountable, and efficient in its functions (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). Decentralization has been widely practiced in OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries to rebuild the deteriorating public health-care system, achieve more control, and increase efficiency and specialization (Smoke, 2015). During the last four decades, health systems in both developed and developing countries have adopted decentralization processes from national to regional and local levels, establishing a multilevel governance structure (Dan, 2014; Smith, 1997). As a developing country, Pakistan has also initiated decentralization to restructure the public health sector to improve service delivery and performance. The country has adopted a multi-tier governance structure in the social sector. The health system, which is a part of the social sector, will be discussed in this chapter. Based on secondary data sources including research articles, government documents, the World Health Organization (WHO) reports, and website reviews this chapter highlights the major administrative decentralization reforms and the current structure of the public health system in Pakistan. Having outlined decentralization reforms, we critically assess the implementation of these reforms and conclude with some recommendations for implementing decentralization reforms successfully. In this chapter, we aim to relate reforms with the typology of management mechanisms presented by Bouckaert et al. (2010): hierarchy-type management (HTM), market-type management (MTM), and network-type management (NTM). Combination categories of reform mechanisms for the context of Pakistan were taken from Zahra (2020) which were used alongside the three key categories of HTM, MTM, NTM.

2   Case of Pakistan: Devolution in Health Care Since the inception of Pakistan in 1947, the government has taken responsibility to provide free primary health-care services to the citizens. According to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, the federal government responsibilities were policymaking, health communication, monitoring, and evaluation and prevention of communicable diseases, while the

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provincial government was responsible for planning, management, financing implementation, training, and regulating. However, in practice, responsibilities were not performed accordingly because the federal government has always kept more control in its hands through high involvement in the management of vertical programs, financial assistance, and construction of hospitals and medical colleges at the provincial level. Provincial government was confined to implementation and service delivery (Abdullah & Shaw, 2007). Various public health reforms were initiated in Pakistan at the federal level. Developments in the health sector during these years are briefly summarized in Table 1. As can be seen from Table  1, the government has been consistently adopting HTM focusing on creation of new organization, to control and to maintain authority over resources. Pakistan has experienced devolution two times since its inception. These are briefly discussed in the following sections. 2.1  Local Government Devolution, 2001 In 2001, Pakistan experienced local government devolution during the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf. The Local Government Ordinance of 2001 devolved the strategic planning, administrative, supervisory, and financial powers for 13 sectors, including health, from the provincial to the district level (Khan, 2010). The decision-making roles in health sector were devolved to elected officials at district levels, while the deconcentration was practiced by granting greater powers to the civil servants in the health sector (Bossert & Beauvais, 2002). The local devolution plan aimed to enhance local accountability and improve service delivery. The role of the federal government remained unchanged. After the health sector was devolved, the division of responsibilities was redistributed between the provinces and the districts. Here, local government devolution can be regarded as reshuffling of lines of control and authority under HTM mechanism. Within few years, the Local Government Ordinance was repealed due to the chaotic arrangement of administrative responsibilities, such as low technical capacity, inefficient planning of resources, and a lack of visible improvement (Zaidi & Idrees, 2016). As a result, the responsibilities were returned to the provincial level.

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Table 1  Key Reforms in the Health Sector in Pakistan Year

Establishment

1947 There were 292 hospitals providing medical treatment for serious illnesses and emergency care, and there were about 722 dispensaries normally supervised by a qualified doctor and supported by Lady Health Visitor, Midwife and other allied staff. There were 91 maternal and child health centers and 14,000 beds for indoor patients with the ratio 1 doctor: 2500 patients. 1949 An institute of hygiene and preventive medicine was established at Lahore. 1962 A research institute by the name College of Physicians and Surgeons Pakistan was established in Karachi. 1966 The federal government also established hospitals for its employees and the general public at Islamabad. 1967 Another research institute for biological production, including vaccines and sera, was established at Islamabad by the name of the National Institute of Health (NIH). The research institute also provided public health programs like immunization, control of diarrheal diseases, and so on. 1970 Expansion of health infrastructure on a nationwide basis with a policy to establish one basic health facility at each union council (the most basic component of local government system). 1980 For the ratification of the Declaration of Alma-Ata 1978, the policy for expansion of health facilities was initiated and first-level care facilities were established at the community level, which included a Basic Health Unit at each union council, Markaz/Rural Health Centers in the community in line with the jurisdiction of three or four police stations, Tehsil and District Headquarter hospitals in each tehsil and district of the province. Teaching hospitals and specialized care hospitals, particularly for mental health diseases, were established in big cities. At the same time, the private sector health facilities also started to develop, especially in big cities. 1985 The Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences (PIMS) for postgraduate training was established at Islamabad. 1990 An Institute of Public Health was established in Balochistan for the training of doctors, nurses, and paramedical staff. The Prime Minister’s Program for Family Planning and Primarily Care through Lady health Workers (LHW) trained workforce and deployed them in rural and underserved urban areas. Each LHW was deployed for a population of about 1000 people. The country did not have a national health policy until 1997, yet incremental growth was under five-year plans. These plans were disease-oriented, with the goal to achieve the international health commitments of the country. 1997 Pakistan’s first health policy was drafted. 2001 Devolution of local government and revamped back to the provincial level. Second health policy was made. (continued)

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Table 1 (continued) Year

Establishment

2009 A comprehensive policy draft was developed following a consultative process, but this was shelved following the18thAmendment to the Constitution of Pakistan in 2011. 2011 The 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan; 21 social sectors including health was devolved from federal level to provincial level. 2014 The Planning Commission of Pakistan launched the “Pakistan Vision 2025,” which is currently serving as the national development vision. Note: Author’s own work based on information collected from different sources

2.2  Health Sector Devolution: 18th Constitutional Amendment In 2011, through the 18th Amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan, 21 social sectors including the health sector were devolved from the federal level to the provincial level (Global Health Workforce Alliance: Pakistan, 2012). The provinces were given more administrative and financial power, and, at the same time, the federal health ministry was initially abolished and the powers were dispersed across existing federal institutions such as Planning Commission and Federal Bureau of Statistics. The WHO mission recommended the establishment of Ministry of Inter-­ Provincial Coordination (IPC) to encourage coherence and coordination between federal and provincial government (Nishtar, 2011). Subsequently in 2013, federal ministry of health was recreated with a new name, Ministry of National Health Services, Regulations and Coordination (MoNHSRC), stressing its role to regulate the performance of the provinces (Zaidi et al., 2019). This multitier structural reform was meant to enable the provincial government to plan, organize, and execute health strategies with the aim to improve the service delivery at the local level. The devolution happened haphazardly, and the transfer of authority to the provinces was so sudden that provinces were not ready to take on this responsibility (Nishtar, 2011). Additionally, minimal interim support from the federal government was provided to the provinces to perform. After the devolution, each province had its own planning and implementation with an emphasis on providing primary health care to all in order to achieve the 2015 Millennium Development Goals of the UN.  All four provincial governments initiated several reforms of decentralization in the health sector. In three provinces of Sindh, KPK, and Balochistan, policy

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Table 2  Distribution of Federal and Provincial Roles and Responsibilities Function

Federal

Health planning International agreements and targets Financing

Co-financing preventive vertical programs (interim arrangement) insurance regulations Human resource Licensing HR production Service delivery Drug supply Health information system Governance

Oversight on international arrangements Licensing, registration, and pricing Research surveillance

Standard setting

Provincial Policies, strategies, plans, and legislations Financing curative + preventive financial arrangement HR planning, deployment, and management Service menu, programming, and implementation Market surveillance, supply system Monitoring and evaluation surveillance Strategic planning, regulation, and accountability

Source: Federal Legislative List Part I and II (Zaidi et al., 2019)

reform units were established, whereas Punjab had further revamped the health ministry by creating two new departments: that is, primary and secondary health care, and specialized medical and health institutions (Zaidi & Idrees, 2016). Similarly, various hospital reforms were initiated in each province, albeit with more efforts in Punjab and KPK. With the 2011 devolution, major responsibilities were decentralized to provincial governments, abolishing the concurrent legislative list by reducing the powers at the federal level. Details of this distribution of federal and provincial roles and responsibilities are presented in Table 2. 2.3  Health Policy and Planning Prior to devolution, health policy was federal domain, and all projects and planning were initiated at the federal level. Since the inception of Pakistan, there were three main health policies (1997, 2001, and 2010) that focused toward diseases, yet none were fully executed (Zaidi & Idrees, 2016). Launched in 2014 by the Planning Commission, the Pakistan Vision 2025 is currently serving as the national development vision. The Vision was endorsed by parliamentarians and representatives of all political parties,

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federal ministries, provincial governments, academia, and national and international experts. The MoNHSRC also provides details of international commitments to which Pakistan is bound. The National Health Vision Pakistan (NHV) clearly spells out the national commitment by following a similar design of policy principles, thematic pillars, and a customized expansion of WHO framework of health-care systems. The national commitment to increase budgetary allocation to health to 3% of the GDP and to enforce promulgation of public health laws reaffirm the seriousness of the government’s pledge toward health. These national guiding documents have established broad, overarching objectives for health. There has been room for provinces to contextualize and expand upon the instruments to support desired changes encompassing different developmental levels with different needs and pacing requirements. Provinces have better knowledge of their stakeholders’ interests and can tailor the narrative to fit their situation. Post-devolution, no policy development exercise was undertaken at the provincial level. However, since then, national health strategies have become the yardstick for the provinces. All these documents help the provinces design strategies and implement them according to their own capacities. Provinces have adopted a project model, which was mainly shaped by the donor-funding organization or the federal government. Initially, in the first two years, provinces have developed their own health sector strategies for the next ten years. These programs were assisted by international donor organizations including the World Bank, WHO, and UN (Zaidi et al., 2019). Strong ownership was shown by the political legislature at provincial levels in reforming the health sector. Salman (2015) found that decision-making and implementation of reform programs in Punjab province is done by the senior bureaucrats in the Provincial Health Department and the Planning and Development Department. However, districts are not fully involved in policy or decision-making. In contrast, Sindh and KPK provinces have begun to include districts in the strategic planning process. In health policy and planning, the federal government has taken an HTM approach by reshuffling the competencies and devolving the policy to the provincial level. Similar trends are seen at provincial governments by following top-down and unilateral strategic management and reshuffling of competencies only in the case of KPK and Sindh provinces.

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2.4  Health Financing Health financing in post-devolution relied on a single-line budget transferred to provinces from tax revenue from the federal level, which was further allocated by the provincial government to different sectors, including health. Relying on single-line budget was not enough for provinces, and soon there became a trend toward public–private partnership, contracting-out arrangements, and involvement of international donor organizations. With the support of international donor agencies, provinces moved the planning process forward by establishing district health plans at district levels. This was done particularly in Sindh (Shaikh et  al., 2012), while Punjab and KPK placed roadmaps to improve health delivery at public sector facilities by defining targets and investing in capital. The legislative activities were seen in all four provinces and were most importantly directed toward health reform areas of public–private partnerships. However, the capability was weak in building linkages between reforms, planning, and budgeting. The attention of donor agencies continued to be directed toward better-performing provinces, particularly those present in Punjab and KPK, less in Sindh, and absent in Balochistan. This led to an exacerbation of existing inequities in responding to devolution (Bossert & Beauvais, 2002). At the provincial level, districts are the largest consumers of health; however, in accordance with the WHO report, districts only partially manage the budget. The rest is controlled by the provinces (Zaidi & Idrees, 2016). The provincial government adopts the combination of HTM by the traditional input-oriented financial management system and NTM to collaborate with the third party, including the private sector, NGO, or international donor organizations. The federal health budget also provided co-financing of the vertical program and adopted HTM by traditional input-oriented financial management systems. However, there is fiscal stress faced by the provincial government due to consistent delays in fiscal transfers (Zaidi et al., 2019). To achieve universal health coverage, recently the government has announced Prime Minister’s National Health Insurance Programme to provide health subsidies to every citizen in Pakistan. This program is taken up by every province, and details will be shared under the case study of provinces. This initiative can be regarded as NTM.  Other functions such as human resource planning, service delivery, drug supply, health information

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system, and governance are regulated at the federal level, and the main planning, implementation, and monitoring are carried out at provincial levels.

3   Provincial Health Structure of Pakistan Pakistan is a federation comprising of four provinces, all have their own parliament and are significantly autonomous in making laws, yet remaining within the constitutional boundaries. As it is not necessary that one political party holds government in all the four provinces, as well as the central level, the decentralization of the health-care sector may vary from province to province in terms of its implementation. The health-care system in Pakistan is a mix of the public and private sectors, in which about 29% of the health services are provided by the public sector, with another 50% provided by qualified health-care workers in the private sector. Nevertheless, about 21% of the population seeks health-care services from health-care providers who are not qualified for modern medicine (i.e., Hakeem) (Khan, 2019). The overall provincial structure in Pakistan is divided into divisions: districts, tehsils (subdistricts), and union councils (the lowest administrative level which comprises ten villages) (Abdullah & Shaw, 2007). The provincial government comprises three elements, including the Minister of Health, the Administrative Secretariat Health Services, and the Director General Health Services. After the devolution, the Ministry of Health (MOH) became responsible for health services and the management of hospitals at the provincial level. A single-line budget was given to the provincial government. The MOH has been administered by the Minister and the Secretary of Health, which performs the overall organization and management of the entire province. Each district is managed by a Chief Executive District Health Officer (CEDO), and the Tehsils (subdistricts) are managed by a District Health Authority (DHA). A union comprises Markaz with Basic Health Units (BHUs) and Rural Health Centers (RHCs), managed by Medical Officers (MO). The villages are supervised by outreach teams, including a sanitary inspector, a vaccinator, and communicable disease supervisor. LHWs and midwives work at the health houses under the National Program for Family Planning and Primary Healthcare, also known as vertical programs (Tarin & Omar, 2009). Efforts have been made in Pakistan to produce a decentralized structure based on the WHO model of district health management. Since

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provinces were given total control, each province has adopted its own structure. We will discuss the general provincial health structure in the next section. 3.1  The Provincial Health Facilities The provincial health structure is composed of a three-tier structure as follows: 1. The maternal and child health-care centers, namely, Basic Health Units (BHU) and Rural Health Centers (RHC), constitute the primary level of health care. 2. The secondary level of health care is provided by tehsil and district headquarter hospitals. 3. The tertiary care is provided at hospitals attached to teaching medical institutions. Most medical hospitals, colleges, and teaching hospitals are managed at provincial levels, while some are still managed by the federal government. We will first explain the structure and decentralization of the primary and secondary health care system followed by tertiary care hospitals. 3.2  The Structure of Primary and Secondary Health Care in Pakistan The primary and secondary health-care system are: • Primary health care is the first tier that consists of BHUs and RHC. It also includes dispensaries with outreach-based community health workers, consisting of LHWs and community midwives. • Secondary health care is the second tier and consists of tehsil headquarter hospitals (THQ) and district headquarter hospitals (DHQ). The purpose of establishing primary and secondary health-care facilities was to have a referral system from lower-to higher-level facilities. Both the primary and secondary health care are managed at the district level. Table  3 shows the total number of primary and secondary health-care facilities. Ideally, a patient should be referred from a BHU to an RHC and then to a THQ and DHQ. However, the referral system is very weak and

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Table 3  Primary and Secondary Health Facilities in Four Provinces in Pakistan Province

Punjab KPK Sindh Balochistan

District Headquarter Hospital (DHQH)

Tehsil Headquarters/ Civil (Hospitals) (THQH)

Rural Health Centers (RHC)

Basic Health Units (BHU)

Total

36 21 11 27

84 77 56 10

291 90 130 82

2454 822 774 549

2863 1010 970 668

Source: Zaidi and Idrees (2016)

is never practiced properly (Mashhadi et al., 2016). Patients of a union or tehsil directly visit tertiary care hospitals by passing over the primary and secondary health-care systems. 3.3  Health Management and Information System (HMIS) In the 1990s, the government introduced the Health Management Information System (HMIS) with the objective of developing informed decision-making at all levels of management and planning. It was designed with multi-donor support, and reports are generated every month to make better decisions. Both BHU and RHC have standard HMIS reporting instruments and submit the reports to the policymakers. Instruments used for reporting are standardized, and health statistics are increasingly used by the policymakers. Monthly reports are generated electronically at the district level and sent online to the performance-evaluating system at provincial and federal health ministries. However, research has identified many flaws in this system, such as the duplication of data at vertical and district levels, fragmented data, poor use of logistic management systems to update medicines, lack of coordination among different HMIS systems, and no MIS for human resources (Qazi & Ali, 2009). In 2007, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have provided an evaluation of current HMIS and proposed district health information system (DHIS) to be implemented nationwide. Research shows that DHIS is more efficient and tends to focus on collecting data from all levels in health care compared to the previous HMIS that was

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Table 4  District Health Management and Information Systems in Four Provinces

Province

No. of Districts DHMIS (Dec. 2015)

Punjab KPK Sindh Balochistan

36 24 23 30

36 24 23 27

Source: Zaidi and Idrees (2016)

implemented only at the local level (Mashhadi et al., 2016). The District Health Management and Information Systems are installed in different health facilities at the district level in all four provinces in Pakistan (see Table 4).

4   Systematic Description Reforms

of Decentralization

There are different reform measures being taken for decentralizing the health-care system in Pakistan. 4.1  Decentralization in Primary and Secondary Health Care in Pakistan The Declaration of Alma–Ata, 1978 and the emphasis of international donor organizations to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) resulted in introducing reforms in primary and secondary health-care systems in Pakistan (Javed & Amin, 2007). In 1990, the delegation of financial powers was given to deputy district officers to manage their facilities. In this case, the government has used HTM by reshuffling the lines of control in financial powers. A pilot project was initiated in 1993–94 under the name of Sheikhupura Pilot Project. The project introduced incremental changes in management, provided training for local community representatives, facilitated staffing with volunteers, and proposed a plan for the management of primary health facilities. However, the project failed and was later abolished. Key reasons for the failure, as identified by Tarin and Omar (2009), were the transfer of initial members of the project and the overreliance upon individuals rather than upon the institutions.

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Later, in 1996, District Health Authorities (DHAs) were established to improve facilities at district levels. However, the project was replaced by the district health governments in 1997 in its initial stage. The purpose of this initiative was to restructure the centrally administered district health system. The chief executives were given power to manage, while district management committees were formed to manage small units at district and tehsil levels. The chief executives were also given training at district levels; however, the initiative did not get executed due to the military takeover in October 1999. The new government devolved the district health governments to district assemblies (Khan, 2010). Here, government adopted HTM by creating a new entity and abolishing it later. In 2003, the contracting of primary health care was an indigenous reform, and the initiative was taken first by the province of Punjab and was later adopted in other provinces in Pakistan. This reform was implemented and expanded to 75 of 113 districts in the country mainly due to a strong political will (Malik et al., 2017). To achieve more efficient functioning, some provinces contracted out Rural Health Centers and Tehsil Health Centers that were in remote areas. This initiative can be regarded as NTM/HTM by contracting out to NGOs, while the provincial health department kept control or authority of some BHUs. The National Rural Support Program (NRSP) was initiated at the national level, and each province implemented under Provincial Rural Support Programs (PRSP). These programs received funding from the government and are classified as quasi-nongovernmental organizations (Zaidi & Idrees, 2016). In 2012, the People’s Primary Healthcare Initiative (PPHI) was modified into public limited companies in two provinces—that is, Sindh and Balochistan—independent of rural support programs (Shaikh et al., 2012). More autonomy was granted to these provinces to enhance service delivery. A performance-based management system was introduced to evaluate and monitor their performance. According to a recent report by WHO, the results of these reforms are mixed, with an increase in out-patient volume but little improvement in preventive health-care targets (Hassan et  al., 2017). This event is pure MTM by adopting privatization and performance-­based management.

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The vertical programs,1 which were started in 1970, were controlled by federal government and continued until 2016. These vertical programs included education in the areas of HIV, nutrition, maternal care, childcare, national prevention and control of pandemic influenza, national tuberculosis and hepatitis control programs, family planning, and primary health-care programs, and some other expanded programs. During the health-care devolution 2011, the integration of vertical programs was well articulated at the planning stage, which was to be managed by the provinces. However, vertical integration was further delayed due to a lack of expertise and financial assistance at provincial levels. Deliberate actions were taken to enable provinces to integrate vertical programs in their health strategy. Due to the progressive use of overtime, in 2019, the structural integration of these vertical programs was taken on by the provinces and managed according to their own strategies. Recently, a fresh cycle of vertical projects has been started at the federal level with a revision of vertical program directors, which may reestablish federal authority over preventive care. The government has adopted HTM through reshuffling lines of control and authority. 4.2  Hospital Reforms in Pakistan The tertiary care hospitals in Pakistan comprise public hospitals, the private hospitals, and trust-based infrastructure. The private hospitals are self-financed and earn profit through service delivery. The trust- and NGO-based hospitals acquire funds through donations, while public hospitals are financed by the government and other resources. The tertiary care hospitals are directly controlled by the Minister and Secretary of Health at the provincial level. There are two main regulatory bodies: Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PM&DC), now named the Pakistan Medical Commission (PMC), and the College of Physicians and Surgeons (CPS). All medical and dental colleges operating in Pakistan are required to be reorganized by these two regulatory bodies and must follow standard rules and regulations given by them. Each province has experienced its own forms of decentralization in tertiary care hospitals. The provinces of Punjab and KPK have practiced 1  These vertical programs include Basic Support of Immunization, TB-DOTs, HIV AIDS Control, Avian Flu, Hepatitis B and C Control, Malaria Control, Maternal and Child Care, Family Planning, Nutrition, and Lady Health Workers.

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hospital autonomy reforms (Abdullah & Shaw, 2007; Suhail, 2021), while Sindh has chosen the health commission to manage all public institutions. In Balochistan, the provincial health department manages the tertiary care hospitals. Since major efforts of decentralization reforms have been initiated in two provinces, Punjab and KPK, these will be briefly reviewed in the following section.

5   Case Studies of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provinces 5.1  Primary and Secondary Health Sectors The government of Punjab undertook a detailed situation analysis of the health sector in 2011 and launched various health sector strategies. The Punjab Health Sector Strategy 2012–2020 was formally launched in April 2012, laying out the vision, principles, and the strategic direction for Punjab. In May 2013, the World Bank funded the Punjab Health Sector Reform Program (PHSRP) and was given the objective of supporting the implementation of the program by prioritizing the improvement of the coverage and utilization of essential quality health services. PHSRP was later revamped into a policy and strategy unit in 2014 based on the 2012–2020 strategy recommendation. The Punjab Growth Strategy 2018 was developed in alignment with the Pakistan Vision 2025. In January 2015, following the development of the growth strategy, the Health Department, the Population Welfare Department, and the Public Health Engineering Department–Housing, Urban Development (PHED-HUD), along with the local government department, developed the Punjab Health Sector Plan 2018. Under the stewardship of the Planning and Development Department, its aim was to address the critical challenges facing the health sector through a multi-sectorial approach. Due to the large population size and an extensive administrative workload, the provincial government divided the health department into two separate departments in November 2015, namely, the Primary and Secondary Healthcare Departments (P&SHD) and the Specialized Healthcare and Medical Education Department (SH&MED), each headed by a secretary (Table 5).

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Table 5  Domains of the health departments: Punjab Primary and secondary health-care departments

Specialized healthcare and medical education departments

Health Service Delivery Points BHUs: 2520 RHC: 315 THQ: 99 DHQ: 26

Health Service Delivery Points Teaching hospitals: 35 Medical universities: 6 Medical and dental colleges: 11 Nursing schools and colleges: 57 Specialized centers and institutes: 14

Source: Government of Punjab (2018)

The Punjab health department has adopted WHO building blocks of health systems to improve the delivery of health-care services. The central health system for patients was based upon six building blocks of health setups. In these six building blocks, various efforts were initiated by the Punjab province. In the next section, we will discuss the major initiatives taken by both Primary and Secondary Healthcare Departments (P&SHD). 5.2  Major Initiatives A pilot project in Lodhran/Rahim Yar Khan (1999) was another initiative of Punjab province. Through this project, government has outsourced infrastructure of primary health-care facilities to a private organization outside government (Khan, 2010). This project was replicated in 11 districts of Punjab under the name of the Punjab Rural Support Program (PRSP) and considered as one of the world’s largest initiatives in the contracting out of services. The project shifted from government control to government contracts. The purpose of the project was to outsource BHUs to NGOs, by giving them full autonomy to manage financially and administratively. Initially, the MOU was assigned to manage BHUs at district levels between the Health Department and Rural Support Programs. A single-line budget and administrative control was also transferred from the provincial health departments to Rural Support Programs. Some BHUs were not contracted out and were still managed by the primary and secondary health departments (Zaidi et  al., 2019). The government has adopted a combination of NTM by contracting out BHUs to NGOs and by following bottom-up and interactive strategic management, as well as HTM by providing single-line budgeting.

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In 2006, the Punjab government introduced Health Sector Reform Program (HRRP) to improve BHUs and RHCs. In HSRP the facilities were rebuilt, including building, boundary wall, and roads, and purchasing of new equipment such as all necessary medical instruments, computers, and ambulances. Staff were hired, and substantial improvement in basic package was made for doctors to work in these areas. Regular monitoring and supervision were ensured by district and provincial staff. All districts have signed partnership agreements with the provincial government to implement (Javed & Amin, 2007). There were establishment of new units including Policy and Strategic Planning Unit (PSPU), which was originally called the Punjab Health Sector Reform Program (PHSRP); Integrated Reproductive, Maternal Neonatal and Child Health (IRMNCH) Unit to provide health sector nutrition interventions; the Multi Sectoral Nutrition (MSN) cell within the Punjab Planning and Development Department to provide technical advice, evaluation, and coordination of multi-sectoral nutrition interventions; and Punjab Healthcare Commission (PHCC) for monitoring and evaluation of health-care facilities in the province. Directorate general offices were also created for monitoring and evaluations. The government adopted HTM instruments by creating new organizations and units. Health insurance program, Sehat Sahulat Program, has been introduced in the province to provide health insurance to all citizens. The programs have been implemented in 29 districts. State Life Insurance company collaborated with the government in this initiative; however, provincial government is the main source of financing. This initiative can be regarded as a combination of NTM, by collaborating with an insurance company, and HTM through traditional input-oriented financial management system. Different Health information units are established; for example, Health Information Service Delivery Unit (HISDU), Organization Research and Knowledge Management Unit, District Information Management System, and so on. Mashhadi et al. (2016) found that independent information system has been installed, yet there is lack of collaboration that creates problem in reaching informed decision-making based on the available information.

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5.3  Hospital Reforms In Punjab, a hospital reform, entitled the Sheikhupura Pilot Project (SPP) 1993, was introduced in 1998 as part of a pilot project funded by the World Bank. The aim of the reform was to provide autonomy to the public hospitals under the Punjab Medical and Health Institution Ordinance 1998. The reforms were to eliminate the control of provincial government from the health-care delivery and give hospitals the right to improve quality, performance, service delivery, and accessibility of health-care services. As a result, all 9 hospitals attached to the teaching hospitals and 16 medical hospitals were given autonomy in three phases in 1998, 2003, 2021. However, autonomy remained an issue between provincial and federal governments for some of these hospitals. The governance structure of the hospital was changed in all three phases. These changes include the name of the Board of Governors, the number of members on the Board, and the creation of ad hoc/contractual employment. Some minor amendments in the Act of 1998 were introduced, and the Act of Punjab Medical and Health Institution (PMHI) Ordinance 2003 practiced in Punjab till 2020. The policies were developed in the regulation wing of the Provincial Health Secretariat. The Specialized Health and Medical Education Department (SH&MED) looks after the medical teaching of autonomous and nonautonomous hospitals. The SH&MED implements the promotion and compensation of grades 17 and 18 employees working in all public hospitals. The Provincial Health Secretariat looks after the promotion of grades 19 through 21, working in all public hospitals. The vice-­ chancellor of public hospitals is appointed by the provincial chief minister, directly recommended by the selection committee comprising different members. According to the Punjab Medical and Health Institution (PMHI) Ordinance 2003, some administrative and financial powers were delegated from the provincial government to the autonomous medical hospitals. Each autonomous hospital is governed by a Board of Governors. There are six members on the Board of Governors, two of which are government officials (the Secretary of Health, the Secretary of Finance), the Principal as the head of the institute is appointed by the government, and remaining three are from the private sector (e.g., a medical professional and a retired officer) per the Punjab Medical and Health Institution Ordinance Act,

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2003 (Government of Punjab, 2003). Autonomous hospitals are given a small amount of budget for minor things in the hospital, while the major financial needs are managed by the provincial health department. Even after the reforms, the administrative and financial powers were kept under the control of the provincial health department (Abdullah & Shaw, 2007). The hospitals only have financial and administrative rights contractual employees and for the staff below grade 17, within the strict government directives given by the Health Department. Similarly, policymaking, decision-­making, monitoring, and control remained under the control of the provincial government. Doctors are appointed through the centralized structure under the Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC). Autonomous hospitals have low discretion in recruitment, selection, promotion, training, development, and performance evaluation. Even the implementation of recruitment and selection, and promotion and compensation are carried out by the provincial health government. All these factors have resulted in high dissatisfaction among employees of the public hospitals (Suhail & Azhar, 2016). Recently, Punjab Medical Teaching Institute (MTI) Act 2020 was introduced and being practiced in medical teaching institutes in Punjab. According to the Act, the MTI hospitals will be a corporate body under public law will follow policies of provincial policy board and implement them in the hospital. Moreover, The MTI Act 2020 states that a provincial policy board should be established to supervise the functions of all MTI institutes and advise government on policy matters. Provincial policy board should have more than five members and less than seven members, out of which no members can be from government or a board member of the hospital at the same time. There should be one retried professor of a medical institute. Policy board should ensure that the minimum service delivery standard is met by every MTI hospital, and electronic records are maintained; it should also advise government on health-related matters. Currently, the provincial board in Punjab has two members from the government that creates some controversies (Chaudhary, 2021). The MTI hospitals should have a board consisting of five to seven members which must include a chairperson elected by the board; the vice-­ chancellor of the medical university shall be an ex-office member of the board and from diverse profession. The board should be appointed and notified by the government. Moreover, top management, for example, dean, hospital and medical director, should be appointed by the board

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rather than government as in the previous acts. Moreover, MTI hospitals shall have funds that contain single-line budget from the government, donations, and grants money from different sources that could be used by the MTI hospitals. Additionally, hospitals can generate revenue through institute-based private practice. Punjab MTI Act 2020 was introduced in the late 2020s and is still in the process of implementation (Government of Punjab, 2020). Provincial government has adopted MTM by granting autonomy to medical teaching hospitals and encouraging them to generate their own revenue through institute-based private practice. For financial management, government adopts HTM by providing single-line financial budgeting to these hospitals and creating provincial policy boards. The MTI Act 2020 is recently introduced and is still in its early phases of implementation.

6   Case of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province 6.1  Primary and Secondary Health-Care Sector KPK provincial government has taken several steps to improve the governance and accountability in the health sector by focusing on rules of business and the organizational structure of the health department. The province has a health-care delivery mechanism with multiple players, which includes government-funded facilities, a parastatal health system, the private sector, a civil society, and philanthropic contributors. The domain of health department includes different facilities at primary and secondary health-care levels and at the tertiary health-care level (see Table 6). Table 6  Domains of the health departments: KPK Primary and secondary health-care departments

Tertiary care facilities

Health Service Delivery Points BHUs: 822 RHC: 90 THQ: 102 DHQ: 21

Health Service Delivery Points Medical and teaching hospitals: 09 Medical and dental colleges: 16 Nursing schools and colleges: 22 Specialized centers and institutes: 24

Source: Government of KPK (2018)

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The KPK government developed a health road map after completing a detailed situation analysis in 2010 to use innovative and targeted interventions in high-priority areas of health care. The KPK government has developed a mechanism to structurally combine the vertical programs into a single efficient, minimum-service delivery package with a single budget and administrative monitoring structure (Zaidi & Idrees, 2016). The shortage of a provincial budget is overcome through input by development partners in the health sector in KPK.  There are various initiatives which were funded by the World Bank, just as in the case of Punjab. The KPK government has doubled the budget of the health sector from 30.3 billion in 2012–13 to 66.49 billion in 2017–2018 (Government of KPK, 2018). Key governance initiatives also involve district decentralization and attempts at improving the monitoring and accountability of the public sector delivery. District councils now have planning and financial authority for public sector health facilities. We have highlighted the major initiatives. 6.2  Major Initiatives • The KPK government has also adopted HTM instrument for the creation of new units under P&SHCD Health Care Commission Act 2015, which was established to regulate health-care services in the province. The commission has multiple roles, including providing license to newly registered individuals and health-care facilities, supervising fees and fines, and enforcing minimum quality and safety standards in every health-care facility. • Formation of Health Management Committees is another major step under HTM by the health department of KPK. These committees oversee the health-care delivery at the district hospital level. • Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Health (Surveillance and Response) Ordinance 2017 was passed to ensure compliance with WHO international health regulations. Moreover, under HTM instrument, government has created Health Sector Reform Unit. • KPK health roadmap 2016 was created under MTM and NTM that facilitates public–private partnership, contract management, and other effective management initiatives to strengthen the health facilities • In 2015, Sehat Sahulat Program under Social Health Protection Initiative was launched in four districts and can rightly be termed a

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­ agship program of the KP Government. Insurance company is also fl collaborating with the government. The program was financially supported by the German and KPK’s provincial government. The program caters to the underprivileged population and provides a benefit package that covers 100% maternity care, cancer in OPD and hospitalization in secondary care, and to some extent in tertiary care. Government has adopted a combination of NTM by collaborating with an insurance company and HTM through traditional input-­ oriented financial management system. • KPK government like other provinces have contracted out their BHUs to NGOs to enhance service delivery and performance. These initiatives are taken under NTM that focuses on bottom-up and interactive strategic management. • In 2016, to ensure equitable provision of health services, KPK government has launched minimum health service delivery package (MHSDP) for primary health-care facilities and secondary care hospitals. The program focuses on structural elements such as buildings, equipment, drugs and medical supplies, and increasing human resources. An evaluation by Asian Development Bank shows that there is improvement based on previous years, yet the infrastructure is inappropriate in almost all facilities at KPK and still require serious efforts from the government for improvement (ADB, 2019). Government adopted HTM mechanism by providing traditional input-­oriented financial management. 6.3  Hospital Reforms The KPK health sector has also introduced hospital reforms. There are 11 tertiary hospitals, 9 of which are medical and teaching hospitals in KPK. In 2000, KPK provincial government granted a similar form of autonomy to the four largest medical teaching hospitals in the province with slightly more powers to the board of governors than those of Punjab (Abdullah & Shaw, 2007). Since then, five major hospital autonomy reforms have been introduced in the province. In 2015, the Medical Teaching Institute Act (MTI) 2015 was introduced, according to which the medical teaching hospitals are given the status of a corporate entity under public law and have full autonomy to make and implement policies. They are given one-line budgets from the provincial health department to

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manage the hospital, and they are monitored by the provincial health department. All MTI hospitals have a board of governors that consists of six members, one from the government and five from diverse sectors including medical professionals, retired officers, and practitioners from the health sector, who make decisions for the hospital. The board is responsible for policymaking, setting objectives, and management and performance of the hospital. The hospital administration (hospital director and medical director) and the medical institute administration (dean and medical director) were given financial and administrative rights to make their own decisions. Although financially single-line budget is given to the MTI hospitals, they are allowed to generate revenue through institute-based private practice. Hospital management can make committees; for example, finance, recruitment and performance, and so forth (Government of KPK, 2017). However, the civil servants hired before the act are still managed by provincial health departments. The boards of all MTI hospitals are accountable to the provincial government for their performance. There have been several amendments to the MTI Act 2015, and major changes were introduced in the MTI Act 2018. According to the amendment in 2018, a provincial policy board should be established that supervises the functioning of MTI institute and provides policy advice to the government (Government of KPK, 2018). The provincial policy board should have more than five members and less than seven members, and none of the members should be from the government or be a board member of the hospital at the same time. There should be one retried professor from a medical institute. After the creation of the provincial policy board, now the boards of the hospitals implement policies and ensure compliance with rules and regulation of the policy board. Provincial governments have adopted MTM by granting administrative autonomy to medical teaching hospitals and by encouraging them to generate their own revenue through institute-based private practice. HTM has been adopted for financial autonomy, and government adopted HTM by providing single-line financial budget to these hospitals and creation of a provincial policy board. These reforms have been implemented and are being practiced since 2015.

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7   Discussion While Pakistan is ranked among the low-middle-income countries, it has been trying to provide a health-care system for its general masses. The existing system consists of a mix of public and private entities. The public health-care system has experienced a process of decentralization. The process of transitioning power from federal to provincial governments came abruptly through health-care devolution in 2011. In the pre-devolution era, planning and resources were managed at the federal level. The provinces were, therefore, confronted overnight with additional responsibilities and thus were unprepared for resourcing and planning. The said transition also created a vacuum at the federal level, particularly with respect to nation-wide coordination between global health commitments, drug licensing, and regulation of the medical and paramedical profession. On the recommendation of WHO, the government has created the Inter-­ Provincial Coordination Ministry (IPC) to encourage coherence and coordination between federal and provincial governments. Within a year, Federal Health Ministry was recreated through an executive order, later renaming it the Ministry of National Health Services, Regulations and Coordination (MoNHSRC). The process of decentralization started shortly after the process of devolution, yet the new central structure remains vague. The declining federal government support and post-­ devolution challenges, such as the expansion of services, compelled the provinces to revisit the vertical programs. Recently, vertical projects have been taken back at the federal level with a revision of vertical program directors, which may reestablish federal authority over preventive care. In this way, Pakistan’s health sector experienced recentralization within decentralization reforms. It is similar to the trend seen in the West and Central African countries, where recentralization happened after devolution due to chaotic interprovincial coordination (Awortwi, 2010). There is a trend toward HTM by devolving the planning and implementation at the provincial level through the reshuffling of lines of control and, at the same time, recreating federal ministry. For health financing, the provincial budget is allocated to health care and other sectors in line with their priorities. Strong ownership could be seen for the approval of health budgets through provincial standing committees on health constituted by the respective chief ministers. At the same time, for vertical programs, there has been fiscal stress due to insufficient and delayed transfer of funds from the federal level to the provinces. A

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major trend of HTM can be seen with some flavor of NTM through contracting out and public–private mechanism. Pakistan has a multilayer structure, where the provincial government is the intermediary between the federal and local governments rather than giving full autonomy to local levels. The provincial government helps in decreasing the fragmentation and increasing coherence in policy implementation. This implies that it is still better to decentralize to the provincial level than directly to the local level. Otherwise, an even greater inequity could be expected. Examples of failure in decentralizing at local levels can be seen in the multi-structure cases in Kenya and Nigeria (Barasa et al., 2017). 7.1  Overall Trends of Reforms Initiatives under Different Mechanisms Scholars argue that governance structure and mechanism types are interdependent (Provan & Huang, 2012). Governance structure influences the mechanism adopted by the government. Pakistan has a hierarchical governance structure, although decentralization and devolution reforms were implemented in the public health sector, still HTM has been the dominant mechanism focused on the reshuffling of lines of control, authority, and traditional input-oriented financial management systems. Moreover, a combination of NTM/HTM has been adopted by establishing a coordinating entity of interprovincial coordination, and a council of common interest was created to enhance coordination. Comparing decentralization in Punjab and KPK provinces at the primary and secondary level shows that HTM and NTM are dominant by creating new units, traditional input-oriented financial management system, and bottom-up and interactive strategic management. At the hospital level, a combination of MTM/HTM has been adopted by granting autonomy to public hospitals and traditional input-oriented financial management as well as, to some extent, by allowing public hospitals to generate their own income.

8   Conclusions Decentralization reforms in the health sector have been considered a means of improving its performance, efficiency, responsiveness, participation of the local community, and local accountability to the health-care

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system (Torrisi et  al., 2013). However, there have been always mixed results of decentralization in this sector; this is due to the complexity of the process involved and challenges in implementation. Therefore, the desired benefits are not always achieved. In the case of Pakistan, devolution provided the requisite financial and administrative authority to provinces and equitable increases in health financing to the provincial health-care system. Although decentralization reforms have been implemented at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels in Pakistan, better results can be seen at primary and secondary levels in all provinces compared to the tertiary levels. KPK and Punjab provinces have made rigorous efforts not only to achieve decentralization at primary and secondary health-care levels but also to introduce devolution at the tertiary care level by granting autonomy to medical teaching hospitals. A combination of all the three mechanisms has been adopted; however, HTM is a prominent trend with some flavor of NTM and MTM seen in the decentralization reforms in the public health sector in Pakistan.

References Abdullah, M. T., & Shaw, J. (2007). A review of the experience of hospital autonomy in Pakistan. International Journal of Health Planning and Management, 22(1), 46–64. ADB. (2019). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Sector Review: Hospital Care. Asia Development Bank. Retrieved April 25, 2021, from https://policycommons. net/artifacts/392521/khyber-­pakhtunkhwa-­health-­sector-­review/ Awortwi, N. (2010). The past, present, and future of decentralization in Africa: A comparative case study of local government development trajectories of Ghana and Uganda. International Journal of Public Administration, 33(12–13), 620–634. Barasa, E. W., Manyara, A. M., Molyneux, S., & Tsofa, B. (2017). Recentralization within decentralization: County hospital autonomy under devolution in Kenya. PLOS ONE, 12(8) https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182440 Bossert, T.  J., & Beauvais, J.  C. (2002). Decentralization of health systems in Ghana, Zambia, Uganda and the Philippines: a comparative analysis of decision space. Health. Health Policy and Planning, 17(1), 14–31. Bouckaert, G., Peters, B. G., & Verhoest, K. (2010). Coordination: What is it and why should we have it? In The coordination of public sector organizations. Palgrave Macmillan. Chaudhary, A. (2021, March 16). Policy Board formed to oversee functions of hospitals. Dawn News. https://www.dawn.com/news/1614634/policy-­board­formed-­to-­oversee-­functions-­of-­hospitals

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Deregulation in Higher Education Institutions of Pakistan Hafsa Noor and Nasira Jabeen

1   Introduction In recent years, the term “good governance” has been a concern among countries across the world. Leaders have kept trying to improve their systems, including administration, finance, HR, and policy aiming to improve the good governance in their specific areas. From 1980s, new approaches were introduced to manage the system more effectively and efficiently. The New Public Management (NPM) was one of such frameworks, introduced during the 1980s, which encapsulated the shift from a centralized structure to an autotomized and decentralized one. The proceedings of the 1998 Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE) also incorporated such approaches. The Conference concluded that governance was based on institutional and structural reforms and the governments needed to implement them in all possible sectors to achieve efficiency in the overall system.

H. Noor (*) • N. Jabeen Institute of Administrative Sciences, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_10

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The dominant pattern in the NPM reform is based on the “market model”. The basic purpose is to improve effectiveness and efficiency through cost reduction. Prior to this, the public sector was theoretically based on Weber’s bureaucratic model (1947) with its focus on division of labor, rules and procedures. This pattern is called “hierarchy” type management (Boukaert et al., 2010). It is widely established that the governance system in developing countries has also been affected by external pressures. In this context, donor agencies play an influential role and, to an extent, are directly responsible for policy adaption from developed to the developing countries (Pleskovic & Stiglitz, 1999). In line with the universal trends, the Pakistani higher education sector also introduced massive restructuring, deregulation, decentralization, autonomy, efficiency, financial, HR and administrative reforms. This study selected the province of Punjab for understanding the evaluation of the reform of deregulation in the higher education sector of Pakistan. The selected universities included: Government College University Lahore, Forman Christian College, Lahore College for Women University, Government College Women University Sialkot, and Government College Women University Faisalabad. All the above universities are public except the Forman Christian College, which falls in the list of private chartered universities. The research study explored the governance and management practices of the five selected cases. Actual patterns of autonomy and control were analyzed from inception to date in two eras, that is, before deregulation and after deregulation, and then these patterns were compared with the formal ones to understand whether HR, Academic, financial and administrative policies and practices are affected or influenced by these patterns or not. The broad problem area of this research is to analyze the mechanism of decision-making in a university regarding academic, financial, policy-­ making and administrative matters. Its purpose is to determine the sources affecting the decisions, and the freedom given to these universities to actually implement the legal governance framework pertaining to the Higher Education sector of Pakistan. The following questions provide the focus and direction for the research: 1. What are the patterns of autonomy and control in the colleges granted university status after the educational reform?

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2. To what extent has the internal management of the university changed by these patterns? 3. How are the changing patterns of autonomy and control explained in different eras—before and after the deregulation?

2   Significance of the Study The primary motivation for this study is to provide greater insights about university governance in Pakistan. Although extensive research has been conducted in this domain in Western countries, there is a lack of research on this topic in developing countries including Pakistan. This study uses an academic and theoretical perspective to explain the findings of the research, which is based on public administration perspective and is named “Organization Theory” by international researchers (Christensen et  al., 2007:1). This research study can play a pivotal role in evaluating the generalization of the above-mentioned theory in the context of Pakistani Higher Education sector. On top of expanding knowledge, there are two other, equally important, reasons to foster this research. First, it has been more than a decade since the reforms were introduced in the country and this is an opportune time to evaluate these reforms. This is an area of research interest and it has been observed that many Western universities are giving their reviews on these reforms, with some capturing the objections of protesting students and professors (Norton & Cherastidtham, 2015). Second, for Pakistan, a properly run educational system is of utmost priority as its economy is going from bad to worse and needs urgent human capital development, especially in youth. The quality of the higher education system is the cornerstone of the future capacity building leading to economic development and prosperity. Currently, there are many shortcomings in Pakistan’s educational system, some of which this research will identify and try to suggest corrective measures by evaluating the reform of deregulation in Higher Education institutions. Third, the government of Pakistan needs to grant limited funds at its disposal in a very transparent and efficient manner. As of now, universities are being governed through an agency which is the Higher Education Commission (HEC) established in 2002, while before its establishment the University Grant Commission (UGC) was the agency responsible for regulating and funding universities in Pakistan. The University Model Ordinance (2002) was the legislative promulgation that resulted in the establishment of the HEC. This research

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aims to reveal whether the instituting of the HEC improved the performance of universities or not. Finally, by researching the important intersection of law, policy and education, this study seeks to not only identify potential future problems but also offer solutions. This research can be considered a small first step that will eventually lead to corrective action. It will start by a systematic analysis of the current state of governance and management reforms by measuring levels of autonomy and control in various dimensions, that is, financial, HR, administration, and academics.

3   Literature Review The basic objective of reforms is to modernize administrative systems. Currently, with increasing globalization, it is important to continuously update systems in order to bring improvements in procedures. In the context of Public Administration, people have started sharing their views and ideas under the roof of governance; hence reforms are also shared to enhance the concept of globalization (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). The scope of “governance” is much broader than the concept of “government”. Jabeen and Jadoon (2013) elaborated that governance is a better fit to address the complexities of environmental change globally and it can create better understanding of the holistic view of these changes. A significant example of a governance approach is the New Public Management (NPM), and Pollitt et al. (2007) thought that now governance has been reinvented after the introduction of NPM. European literature explains that NPM has two models of public service for the reinvention of government, and that market economics played an important role in developing these models (Streeck et al., 2005). Deregulation was also a part of this set and it was implemented in many developing countries like India, Pakistan, Tanzania and Singapore, and it was applied to different sectors of administration, for example, Education and Health. Cost reduction has been the main theme of the NPM reforms (Chand & Moene, 1999). Considering the case of Pakistan, it is important to understand the reasons why Pakistan and other developing countries are not adopting this model as a whole. Is culture proving to be a barrier or are there other reasons? Detailed information and discussions can answer such questions, and this research study proves a significant initiative in this respect. Pakistan’s history shows a long list of failures, whether they were constitutional reforms or any other narrow scope reform, for example, administrative reforms or financial sector reforms (Islam, 2004). These failures

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raise doubts about the position or sagacity of other upcoming reforms. This study will also highlight some important facts about the context of Pakistani administrative system in Education. Reformers need to learn from past experiences. Besides these, they should learn about the culture of Pakistan. Currently, the higher education of Pakistan needs new context-­friendly reforms, and to achieve this, the reformers should seek to answer two questions. Why reforms are needed and how they would be implemented (Rahman, 2004). Classical research on autonomy focused on the relation between government, coordinating bodies, and higher education institutions (Marton, 2005). The present study focuses on the reforms of deregulation of higher education institutions and highlights the working relationship of a college or university, the Higher Education Commission (regulatory agency), and the provincial Government (Government of Punjab) including Higher Education Department and Punjab Higher Education Commission. Dill (2001) noted that there is a difference between procedural and substantive autonomy. While substantive autonomy refers to the freedom of decision-­ making in goals, programs or policies, procedural autonomy refers to the techniques used to accomplish the goals. The study focuses on both aspects to understand the implementation of these reforms thoroughly. The following literature focuses on the factors that affect the patterns of autonomy and control. Şeneldir et  al. (2018) showed that higher autonomy was linked with less complex tasks because there was a lower risk. Besides this, there was more control over information management and an increase in formalized interactions. Another research found that autonomy led to job satisfaction and lowered absenteeism in a small town whereas results were not positive in an urban setting (Finn, 2001). Levačić (2008) noted that more autonomy to front-line managers would lead to an increase in the competitiveness of the organizations. Vidal (2013) described that low-quality working life is related to low autonomy. This shows the importance of autonomy, which varied from time to time. Hall (1991) explained that an organization could be rated based on the level of autonomy. This idea relates to those organizations that have many subunits, for instance, a corporation with different business entities. Deregulation in the Higher Education sector is a significant issue in the world these days. This research study highlights the real picture of this reform in the context of Pakistan. Torres and Schugurensky (2002), Olssen and Peters (2005), Jessop (2008) worked on the political economy

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of higher education and its impact on university autonomy, a topic that this study is also focusing on. Ordorika (2003) described that the level of autonomy of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) has varied according to different historical conditions. Political relations and conflicts affect the degree of autonomy of a university. Estermann and Nokkala (2009) noticed that reforms could not show positive results without creating institutional capacity and developing human resources. Universities and public authorities should focus on good leadership and technical expertise for achieving good governance. Kartashova et  al. (2015) explained that complex layers of cultural norms and values are added from time to time that make an organizational structure more complex. Boin and Christensen (2008) called it “institutional smartness” which consists of norms and values and types of appropriateness. The complexity of culture showed its significance when modern reforms were introduced, for example, NPM reforms had to face difficulties in front of the traditional culture of the public sector (Christensen & Laegrid, 2001). These factors were picked up from the literature and were analyzed in the context of Higher Education Institutions of Pakistan to understand the phenomenon in detail. As far as the governance plans in case of Education in Pakistan are concerned, it is evident from history that Pakistan could not be successful in achieving goals effectively (Ali, 2013). Ali (2013) also added that the Education Governance System is on a developing path but it is not developed. The primary motive of Pakistani leaders was either undoing what predecessors had done or it was to give least priority to those plans. No one has tried to find out the causes of failures of previous plans. All the governments preferred to adopt short-term measures to get political mileage but did not make significant efforts to make investments for future generations.

4   Theoretical Framework The “organization theory” has been adopted for explaining the findings of this research (Christensen et al., 2007:1). This approach offers three perspectives, namely, structural/instrumental, Cultural/institutional and Environmental/myth, describing the factors to understand the change within the specific eras of the institution. Structural/instrumental perspective focuses on the rational choice of actors and works on the logic of consequence. Change in structures becomes a reason for the change in the

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specific phenomenon. Cultural/institutional perspective explains the organizational path dependency and culture. These factors are very significant to analyze the implementation of the reform. The Environmental/ myth perspective highlights the role of external factors to understand the change in an organization.

5   Theoretical Model (Fig. 1) Meanwhile, we will also analyze the reforms from the lens of hierarchies, markets and networks, the operationalization taken from the work of Boukaert et al. (2010) as illustrated below in Fig. 1.

6   Methodology This study adopts a deductive approach, which applies a general rule to a particular case. In this respect, possible predictions are made based on the discussed theoretical model and their associated different relevant research outcomes. The selected cases of colleges upgraded to universities are analyzed in light of the relevant literature and the theoretical framework. The Case Study Method, with a high level of detail, is chosen for the research study, and the main emphasis is on the construction of verbal description of behavior or experience. As this study is done for evaluating the real implementation of reforms, it is very important to access all aspects; hence, it is considered that the case study method is appropriate. Based on purposive sampling five universities were selected. Initial criteria for the selection of the universities were as follows: • Old Institutions through which evolution, culture and context can be understood properly. • The universities should have a general specialization focus, so that they have similar governing bodies in order to make the governance structure more comparable, since specific specialty institutions like health and engineering universities are governed by different governing bodies and are by nature incomparable. Pakistan has four provinces, namely, Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. The province of Balochistan has no institution that has been awarded a charter. However, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has one university named Islamia College University, which was established in

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Governance and Management of the Universities Description of an era

Culture -Norms and Values

Structural/ Instrumental Approach

Deliberate Actions -NPM, HEC regulations, University Ordinance

Other Environmental Pressures -Politics, economic crisis

Cultural / Institutional Approach

Environmental / Myth Approach

Patterns of Autonomy and Control

Fig. 1  Adapted from Christensen et al. (2007)

1913, while the university status was awarded in 2008. Sindh has an institution, Government College University Hyderabad, which was established in 1917 and was granted chartered status in 2018. Punjab has seven colleges that were upgraded to university status. As this province has the maximum number of cases and this is the only province where public and

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Table 1  Years of Establishment and Deregulation Sr. no.

Organization

1

Government College University Lahore (GCU) Forman Christian College (A Chartered University) (FCC) Lahore College for Women University Lahore (LCWU) Government College Women University Faisalabad Government College Women University Sialkot

2 3 4 5

Establishment of college

Establishment of university

1864

2002

1864

2004

1922

2002

1934

2013

1951

2012

Source: Higher Education Department (Government of Punjab) Archives

private universities were granted autonomy, based on purposive sampling the Punjab province is selected to provide sufficient data for the analysis of the implementation of deregulation and understanding the comparison of the public sector and private sector. The other provinces are at the infancy stage and they have only one case, therefore, comparison of governance structure at the provincial level, which ruled them out as feasible options. The selected cases in Punjab are given in Table 1. These universities are distributed into two phases, so it would be easier to compare the cases considering the evolution and the change of the acts. In the first phase, there were four universities that were upgraded in the early years of the first decade. The second phase includes three universities that were upgraded in the second decade. Creswell (2009) elaborates to select fewer cases to make the comparison easier and valid. Mason (2010) also concludes on getting a small sample to avoid saturation. In the first phase, the Government of Punjab upgraded the colleges in only one city of Punjab, that is, Lahore. In the second phase, other cities were focused in this respect. Forman Christian College is the only private institution that comes under this category. Table 2 lists information on the institutions. The population of the study includes Vice Chancellors, Principals, Deans, Registrars, and Deputy Registrars, Treasurers and Deputy Treasurers, Heads of Departments (HoDs), Head of Academic Staff

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Table 2  Facts and Figures about the Institutions Sr. No.

Factors

GCU

LCWU

FCCU

GCWUS

GCWUF

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

No. of students No. of departments No. of faculties No. of affiliated colleges No. of faculty members Students–teacher ratio No. of deans Financial dependence on the government

16,405 27 5 6 427 38:1 5 45%

18,624 44 7 3 360 52:1 2 60%

5028 28 6 0 297 17:1 6 2%

7383 18 3 0 162 46:1 0 60%

16,663 30 4 0 134 124:1 0 60%

Source: Higher Education Department (Government of Punjab) Archives

Association, Higher Education Department (Government of Punjab) officials, Punjab Higher Education Commission officials, and Higher Education Commission officials. Qualitative research is relevant to this study as it would be easy to explore the patterns in multiple variables, for which an interview guide is used. Non-probability sampling technique has been used for this research study because of its cost-effectiveness and efficiency. Snowball sampling is utilized because it is very difficult to approach the high authorities. Fifty-­ four semi-structured interviews were conducted. The researcher tried to maintain the code of ethics during the interviews, and the associated data were explored through NVivo 12 software.

7   Results and Discussion This section is divided into two sections to elaborate upon the research questions of the study. 7.1  Patterns of Autonomy and Control Patterns of autonomy and control were analyzed concerning four dimensions, that is, administration, finance, academics and HR.

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7.2  Era 1 Before Deregulation Two of the cases were connected with two different affiliating bodies in dissimilar times, that is, Government College, Lahore and Forman Christian College. First, they were affiliated with Kolkata University and later on with the University of the Punjab (Forman Christian College, 2020, February 18; Government College University Lahore, 2020, February 18). Lahore College for Women was affiliated with the University of the Punjab right from the start of its establishment. Government College Women University, Faisalabad and Government College Women University, Sialkot are similar cases as both were affiliated with the University of the Punjab till 2010 when the former received affiliation from Government College University Faisalabad and the latter obtained it from the University of Gujrat. Before Partition, an elected minister controlled all activities and was following the major policies of the British system given by the viceroy based on “populist legitimacy”. The structural perspective explains that the government provides funds and the University of the Punjab was concerned with academics. The University of the Punjab was also a funds distributing agent of the government at one time before the partition of the subcontinent. The rules and regulations were made by the Education department, and the hiring and dismissal of employees were also done by the government. Ostrom (2008) elaborated that earlier, organizations had uniform functions, comprehensive procedures and specific hierarchy. The selected cases followed this system of uniformity, and all was done with strict control discouraging any intervention by the college. After the partition of Pakistan and India in 1947, the same system was followed, and the administrative style was centralized. Pechar (2005) noted that in the 1960s there was more control on higher education institutions. For Austria’s higher education institutions, it was noted that more power was exercised by the governmental department, and the same was true in the case of Pakistan; however, Forman Christian College was an exception. This college was under the ownership and administration of the Presbyterian Church, United States (Forman Christian College, 2020, February 18). It was nationalized in 1972, and then it was given back to the church in 2003. The alumni of the college working in the government played an important role in denationalization. With help from its alumni, the leadership of Government College Lahore had strong relationships and connections with the provincial bureaucracy and politicians, which

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were able to influence decisions about the college administration. Hence, all of the colleges were handling administrative matters except Human Resource. The cultural perspective highlights values that are deeply embedded in the institution’s culture that neither employees nor employers can change. In the case of Government College, those values have been determined to be positive. Whenever employees went against the culture of GC, they had to suffer, and as such, there is no doubt in claiming that there was a strong vertical institutional depth in the college. Similarly, the Church of USA played a significant role in developing the values of the Forman Christian College, and it had to face ambiguities and identity crisis during the nationalization period of 1970s and 1980s. The rest of the cases were also considered quite formalized in following the embedded values of their respective organizations. In the 1970s, Pakistan underwent nationalization, in which educational institutions were nationalized and made part of a central system. It was clear that the political factors were used to influence the structure of the nationalized educational system, for example, Forman Christian College previously had political student unions, and there was an effort to make them apolitical. Saxena (1990) narrates that in Bihar, India (1988), the governor, in his capacity as the Chancellor, terminated VCs of all the universities on political grounds, which resulted in the decrease of institutional autonomy and a resultant increase in government control. The situation in Pakistan was not much different as there was an increase in political pressure and interference that manifested in the recruitment of teachers and staff selection decisions in HEIs. Two of the colleges, that is, Government College Lahore and Lahore College for Women were given selective autonomy. Initially, in 1989, GC was formally given financial and administrative autonomy. This was followed, after a year, by a similar autonomy being granted to Lahore College for Women. During the same time, in the 1990s, Austria also focused on a new concept, “institutional autonomy”, which provided an impetus for the introduction of new reforms (Pechar, 2005:14) in Punjab. Both colleges were given autonomy for self-revenue generation, via fee collection, and were given the delegation to plan their own annual budgets. The Punjab government provided supplementary funds, and spending was decided by the Board of Governors (BOGs), a new body having only one internal member, that is, the principal. As far as administrative autonomy was concerned, BOGs could make regulations and take decisions

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regarding various small issues. A positive point about this body was that it increased efficiency in the system as the autonomy was delegated to a specific body that was able to make decisions more quickly. This concept was explained by Woodrow Wilson that changing the structure and strategies becomes a source of efficiency (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2009). Previously, the college administration had to wait for the approval from Government of Punjab while having the BOGs saved time as they could meet locally as frequently as needed. The colleges were autonomous in appointment of the heads of the departments, but teachers were still appointed by the Punjab Government (Higher Education Department). The college theoretically had the autonomy to create posts; however, this autonomy was not effective because the colleges were not given an additional budget to hire the new positions. It was seen that the linkage between the top management and middle management was weak. The management was taking some steps to increase the quality and standard, and often these steps did not have the buy-in of the employees. As far as horizontal structural specialization was concerned, employees were very confused as was the top management, which resulted in a problem of communication between different executive functions of the organizations. This led to an environment where in the management began to increase control to minimize these confusions. Such moves were resisted by the teachers who created an informal association to oppose the idea collectively, and by doing so, the employees clearly showed their opposition to augmented control. This was not a surprise as various researchers have concluded that the teaching community has continually resisted the reform process (Rahman, 2004). The cultural perspective explains that although the relation between the top management and middle management was not smooth, employees on the same level started to collaborate to cover up the problems faced by the institute as a whole. This was a period of growth not only in the structure but also in the mindset of employees. Schneewind (1998) elaborated that culture considers “autonomy” as a moral value which is a result of social construction. This change created some ambiguities in the start and gradually they were resolved. The environmental perspective explains that privatization was used for window dressing to show development in the higher education system. . Experts supported it, which showed that it was a normatively based adoption. The Pakistani government was also impressed by the European countries, and once different countries implemented the reforms, Pakistan

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also accepted them based on mimetic adoption. As a result, these colleges also had to accept these changes, although most of the employees resisted. They thought that the government was trying to put off their burden and it wanted to give these responsibilities to the institutes. Christensen and Lægreid (2008) also pointed out that NPM reforms had to face difficulties confronting the traditional culture of the public sector. The employees should have been trained before the transition began and the top management should have full buy-in for the concept. The above discussion shows that the government managed the colleges differently considering their location, time, and ownership. Government College Lahore and Lahore College for Women were managed similarly, and the Government College Women Faisalabad and Government College Women Sialkot were managed in a correspondingly similar style. The timeline and structure of autonomy transition were different in the case of Forman Christian College as it was previously a private college, and was de-nationalized and handed back to its previous owners. Examining the factors of the functions of HR, finance, academics and administration, the results show that the mechanisms were mainly framed into the hierarchy in all of the colleges including FCC (a private college). 7.3  Era 2 After Deregulation Government College Lahore and Lahore College for Women got university status in 2002, and in addition, another development during this time was the establishment of the HEC in the same year. This body started controlling the activities of the universities. In addition to funding from the HEC, additional funding was shared by the Punjab Government. All the major projects and internal restructuring were done by the HEC whereas the Punjab Government was only concerned with the salary structure of different grades. Even though the HEC (Pakistan) provided major rules pertaining to academics, still these universities continue to enjoy substantial academic liberty. There is a different story when it comes to autonomy in administrative matters, which is limited and influenced by the Punjab government. In this context, the situation of the Government College University and Lahore College for Women University is similar, the only difference being that the GCU wields more influence in the Punjab government bureaucracy that results in more favorable treatment.

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The office of the Registrar in these universities handles administrative matters without the involvement of the HEC and the Punjab Government, especially in the examination system and maintaining discipline; the selection and recruitment process is carried out by the selection board, where the VC has great influence. However, apex-level selections like VC were made by the Chancellor before the 18th amendment, and after its promulgation, the involvement of the Provincial Chief Minister is compulsory and considered very important. These universities are also autonomous in selections and promotions of their faculty and staff; however, they do not have the authority to alter the hiring regulations. European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (2015) also concluded that for academic decisions, legal frameworks were given in the universities of 20 countries, and universities were free to take decisions on administrative issues. On the other hand, if we take the cases of Government College Women University Sialkot and Government College Women University Faisalabad, we observe differences, for example, the head of their apex body Syndicate is the Minister of Higher Education rather than vice chancellor (VC)/rector as in the rest of the cases. Besides, the usage of the vice chancellor’s emergency powers is limited. Forman Christian College is the most autonomous in all these cases as their Act does not involve the government in case of appointments of officials and policy matters. Although the authority of legislative statutes lies with the Punjab government, the HEC has been very active in policy-making that has implications at the operational level for universities. Public universities always try to comply with these operational rules as they consider it a necessary precondition for being given HEC funding in the future. These universities are autonomous in generating funds, but still, they are not independent because of their infancy stage and thus try to always take guidance from the HEC regarding different conflicts and other important issues. It seems finance is the major factor that became an obstacle in exercising autonomy with its real meaning. HEC’s excessive funding imposed restrictions on the public universities somehow to exercise autonomy especially in policy-­ making (substantive autonomy). Procedural autonomy was affected by funds allocation. The most important thing is that these new universities accepted the HEC in a fatherly role, and while the Punjab government is a controlling body, it has minimized its role. In recent years, the HEC has cut down funds and stopped some projects and programs; in turn, the universities have begun

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thinking of generating their own funds, for example, partnership with corporate sector, industry, joint research projects, collaboration with other universities/ academic institutions, fees increase, etc., keeping in view their context. It is viewed that, the more the HEC would curtail its hand, the greater would be the independence granted to these universities. The funds of Forman Christian College are generated through foreign donors, fees, and alumni, thus giving them financial freedom, which translates to independent decision-making. In addition, the selection of the rector is also not done by the government, so all these points make them the most autonomous among the others cases. Accreditation is the main reason they have to follow the HEC, and this university is trying to make linkages with one of the accreditation bodies in the United States. The future will tell whether the Act of this university allows them to take this step or not. Hence, this proves that the private universities cannot separate themselves from the government completely as their Acts do not allow them. Up till now, the PHEC does not interfere much in the policy-making; rather they only fund small projects, trying to make their own place in the whole scenario. Within the institutions, almost all of the vice chancellors did not transfer autonomy to the departments other than academics. The VCs did not think that their employees were worthy enough to give them freedom in operational matters. The succeeding VCs arranged training sessions for the grooming of their employees. The VC/rector of Government College University Lahore and Forman Christian College are moving toward decentralization as they provide autonomy in some administrative matters, for example, attendance sheets, purchase committees, curriculum review and development, assessment and evaluation, etc. Estermann and Nokkala (2009) also noticed that reforms could not show positive results without creating institutional capacity and developing human resources. At other newly upgraded universities the VCs behave just like principals of a college. The administration exerts more control after getting autonomy. This also shows that the system operates from top to bottom. More control from outside resulted in more control of internal management. Beetham (1991) described that if governance rules are made with shared beliefs after seeking consent of stakeholders then power can become legitimate. Most of the VCs missed that, regardless of their good intention for the improvement of the system. They worked hard in this respect but they couldn’t create a balance between improvement in the infrastructure and the satisfaction level of their employees.

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The cultural perspective explains that the VCs’ extra control gave the employees more dissatisfaction whereas those VCs that worked on improving the quality of working life, gained more popularity within the organization. The organizational culture should not be influenced forcibly; rather, it should be improved  by influencing the  mindset of employees while considering the context of the respective university. The environmental perspective highlights that Pakistan has always preferred quick coupling. Governance system implemented reforms without examining the context of the local area. The HEC is bombarding reforms all the time. The political economy of Pakistan plays a major role in the decisions of governance and management of the Higher Education system. Jessop (2008) also focused on the political economy in the case of the Higher Education system and concludes that the patterns of autonomy are affected because of this factor. Moreover, the study shows that each university has its own culture and needs time to understand reforms before moving on to implementation. Besides, people need to have the mindset to accept the change. It appears from the findings of the study that there is dearth of proper planning, with more focus on implementation, which is inadequate. Value-based organizations do reject reforms that are not compatible and suitable to them (Christensen et al., 2007), which is not the case in higher education institutions of Pakistan. In case of the functions of HR, finance and administration of public universities, the coordination mechanisms are mainly based on hierarchy but the distribution of funds leans toward market mechanism. The technocratic regulatory body, HEC, is the main funding body and this organization has made procedures that are encouraging competition among different universities. On the other hand, HED is still following a hierarchy mechanism. Boukaert et  al. (2010) explained that the hierarchical coordination mechanism draws primarily on authority and power as fundamental processes and resources. In the case of FCCU (a private university), the administration is mainly implementing the market model by virtue of encouraging performance and emphasizing competition. The interaction of the owners, the BOD, and the BOG is primarily based on a network mechanism that leads to cooperation, trust, and consensus (Table 3).

Termination

5

After Deregulation 1 Recruitment and Selection Faculty

Promotion

4

Selection Board HOD (Grade 1–4) Grade 1–16 Competent authority-VC Grade 17-above Competent authority- Syndicate

HED BOG Deportation

BOG (before nationalization) HED BOG (before nationalization) HED Deportation

BOG+ Missionary (before nationalization) PPSC (faculty) HED for administration Private pay structure (before nationalization) BPS ACR

FCCU

Selection Board Selection Committee HOD HOD (Grade 1–4) (Grade 1–4) Grade 1–16 Competent authority-VC Grade 17-above Competent authority- Syndicate

HED BOG Deportation

HED BOG

ACR

Evaluation

3

ACR Through DPI HED BOG

BPS

Compensation BPS

2

LCWU

PSC PPSC (faculty) HED for administration

GCU

Before Deregulation 1 Recruitment PSC and Selection PPSC (faculty) HED for administration

Sr. Factors no.

Table 3  Patterns of autonomy and control in case of HR

Selection Board Grade 1–16 Competent authority-VC Grade 17-above Competent authority-Syndicate

HED Deportation

HED

ACR

BPS

PPSC (faculty) HED for administration

GCWUS

Selection Board Grade 1–16 Competent authority-VC Grade 17-above Competent authority-Syndicate

HED Deportation

HED

ACR

BPS

PPSC (faculty) HED for administration

GCWUF

240  H. NOOR AND N. JABEEN

7

6

4 5

Recruitment and Selection of Administration

3

Promotion

Administration Not Faculty

Selection Board CM Approval by Chancellor 3-year contract Termination Syndicate Compensation BPS TTS Package Evaluation QEC for faculty PER (goes to VC) TTS by HEC

Recruitment Search Committee and Selection by PHEC of VC/Rector Pro-chancellor CM Approval by Chancellor 4-year contract

2

Administration Not Faculty

QEC for faculty PER (goes to VC) TTS by HEC

Selection Board CM Approval by Chancellor 3-year contract Syndicate BPS TTS

Search Committee by PHEC Pro-chancellor CM Approval by Chancellor 4-year contract

BOG Contractual job for 1 year (following TTS model) QEC for faculty and administration PER (goes to Vice Rector) Administration Not Faculty

Survey from faculty, admin, BOG, BOD BOD US BOD PK BOG PK Approval by Patron (Only 1 candidate) 4 years contract Selection Committee Approval by BOG 3 years contract -BOG by BOD

Administration Not Faculty

QEC for faculty PER (goes to VC) TTS by HEC

Selection Board CM Approval by Chancellor 3-year contract Syndicate BPS TTS

Search Committee by PHEC Pro-chancellor CM Approval by Chancellor 4-year contract

Administration Not Faculty

QEC for faculty PER (goes to VC) TTS by HEC

Selection Board CM Approval by Chancellor 3-year contract Syndicate BPS TTS

Search Committee by PHEC Pro-chancellor CM Approval by Chancellor 4-year contract

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H. NOOR AND N. JABEEN

Table 4  Patterns of autonomy and control in case of Finance Sr. no.

Factors

Before deregulation 1 Allocation of funds

2

Audit

3

Generation of funds

After deregulation 1 Sources of Income

2

3

Allocation of funds spending rules and regulation by Govt. Dean financial power HOD financial power Generation of funds

GCU

LCWU

FCCU

GCWUS

GCWUF

Principal power Rs. 25,000 GOP

Principal power Rs. 25,000

Principal power Rs. 25,000

Principal power Rs. 25,000

GOP

GOP

–

–

Principal power Rs. 25,000 Internal audit GOP –

–

–

45% fee 1% donation 54% Govt. ✓

40% fee and 71% fee donation 27% 60% Govt. donation 2% Govt. ✓ –

40% fee and 40% fee and donation donation 60% Govt. 60% Govt. ✓

✓

–

Rs. 25,000

–

–

Rs. 10,000 ✓

Rs. 10,000

–

–

✓

✓

GOP

✓

Rs. 50,000 Rs. 10,000 ✓

GCU

LCWU

After deregulation 1 Curriculum HEC 20–30% flexibility Approved by Academic council HEC 20–30% flexibility Approved by Academic council

Examination University of Kolkata University of the University of the Punjab Punjab

HED

3

HED

Programs

2

Before deregulation 1 Curriculum University of Kolkata University of the -University of the Punjab Punjab

Sr. Factors no.

American Curriculum Approved by Academic council

American curriculum -University of Kolkata (before nationalization) -University of the Punjab -BOG (before nationalization) -HED University of Kolkata (before nationalization) University of the Punjab

FCCU

Table 5  Patterns of autonomy and control in case of Academics

HEC 20–30% flexibility Approved by Academic council

University of the Punjab

HED

University of the Punjab

GCWUS

(continued)

HEC 20–30% flexibility Approved by Academic council

University of the Punjab

HED

University of the Punjab

GCWUF

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GCU

HEC rules and regulation -Needs NOC from HEC and relevant regulatory body -Approved by syndicate

Sr. Factors no.

Programs

Examination -University exam -NTS by HEC (requirement) -Same course and exam in each session

2

3

Table 5 (continued)

-University exam -NTS by HEC (requirement) -Same course and exam in each session

HEC rules and regulation -Needs NOC from HEC and relevant regulatory body -Approved by syndicate

LCWU

-University exam -Feat test by FCCU for admissions

Consider HEC’s requirements -needs NOC from HEC and relevant regulatory body -Approved by BOG

FCCU

-University exam -NTS by HEC (requirement) -Same course and exam in each session

HEC rules and regulation -Needs NOC from HEC and relevant regulatory body -Approved by syndicate (headed by the minister)

GCWUS

HEC rules and regulation -Needs NOC from HEC and relevant regulatory body -Approved by syndicate (headed by the minister) -University exam -NTS by HEC (requirement) -Same course and exam in each session

GCWUF

244  H. NOOR AND N. JABEEN

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Table 6  Patterns of autonomy and control in case of Administration Sr. Factors no.

GCU

LCWU

FCCU

Before deregulation 1 Policy-­Making GOP GOP BOG (before (HED,CM, (HED,CM, nationalization) Chancellor) Chancellor) GOP (HED,CM, Chancellor) 2 Accountability GOP GOP BOG (before of principal nationalization) GOP After deregulation 1 Approval of -Syndicate -Syndicate -Approved by statutes -­HED -­HED BOG -CM -CM as policies -­Approved -­Approved by by Chancellor Chancellor 2 Approval of Act by GOP Act by GOP Act by GOP rules and -­Syndicate -­Syndicate -BOG and other regulations and other and other statutory bodies statutory statutory bodies bodies -­Academics -­Academics by HEC by HEC 3

Accountability Syndicate of VC GOP

4

Emergency powers

Syndicate GOP

BOD US BOD PK BOG 7 days-pro-­ 7 days-pro-­ 6 months chancellor chancellor approval from 45-approval 45-approval BOG in the from from next meeting syndicate syndicate

GCWUS

GCWUF

GOP GOP (HED,CM, (HED, Chancellor) CM, Chancellor) GOP

GOP

-Syndicate -­HED -CM -­Approved by Chancellor Act by GOP -­Syndicate and other statutory bodies -­Academics by HEC Syndicate GOP

-Syndicate -­HED -CM -­Approved by Chancellor Act by GOP -­Syndicate and other statutory bodies -­Academics by HEC Syndicate GOP

7 days-pro-­ chancellor 45-approval from syndicate

7 days-pro-­ chancellor 45-approval from syndicate

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8   Conclusion In summary, the academic institutions/universities in Pakistan have always been controlled by different factors/actors, first by the British Government before partition, then by the Government of Punjab, and ultimately by the HEC after 2002. Forman Christian College is an exception among the studied cases as before nationalization it was in the ownership of a church in the United States, and after that it came under the control of the Government of Punjab. Denationalization resulted in giving the institution back to its previous owners and now it is a private institution. This institution is the most autonomous among the others due to its Act and financial independence. Among all other organizations, “academics” exhibited significant autonomy as compared to finance, HR and administration, and this autonomy in academics was delegated to the departments. Even after the establishment of these institutions as autonomous bodies, dependency on external funds has been the main reason for accepting external control in operational matters. Due to this external influence, the administrative style adopted by the universities’ executive leadership was authoritarian toward its employees. Autonomy is not delegated to the departments in a real sense even in the selected private institution where there is much less interference from the outside because all of the institutions have been run in the same path for decades and they need proper training to accept this change. The personality of the head of the institution is very significant in devolving the powers. Although for a new university this administrative style resulted in less complexity in the system. The NPM reform set, which is related to market mechanism, differs in the context of Pakistan. Additionally, its applicability varies with public and private ownership of HEIs. The reform mechanisms mainly revolve around the hierarchy-type management with some elements of markets in case of public universities, whereas for private universities it is mainly based on market mechanism and in some aspects, network mechanism.

References Ali, S. (2013). Pakistan: Target revision in education policy. Education in West Central Asia, 30, 163. Beetham, D. (1991). Max Weber and the legitimacy of the modern state. Analyse und Kritik, 13(1), 34. Boin, A., & Christensen, T. (2008). The Development of Public Institutions: Reconsidering the Role of Leadership. Administration & Society, 40(3), 271–297.

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Boukaert, G., Peters, B. G., & Verhoest, K. (2010). The coordination of public sector organizations. Chand, S.  K., & Moene, K.  O. (1999). Controlling fiscal corruption. World Development, 27(7), 1129–1140. Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2001). New Public Management: The effects of contractualism and devolution on political control. Public Management Review, 3(1), 73–94. Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2008). NPM and beyond – structure, culture and demography. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74(1), 7–24. Christensen, T., Lægreid, P., Roness, P. G., & Røvik, K. A. (2007). Organization theory and the public sector: Instrument, culture and myth. Routledge. Creswell, J. W. (2009). Mapping the field of mixed methods research. Journal of mixed methods research, 3(2), 95–108. Denhardt, R. B., & Denhardt, J. V. (2009). Public administration an action orientation. Thomson Wadsworth. Dill, D. D. (2001). The regulation of public research universities: Changes in academic competition and implications for university autonomy and accountability. Higher Education Policy, 14(1), 21–35. Estermann, T., & Nokkala, T. (2009). University autonomy in Europe: Exploratory study. European University Association. Finn, C. P. (2001). Autonomy: An important component for nurses’ job satisfaction. International journal of nursing studies, 38(3), 349–357. Forman Christian College. (2020, February 18). https://www.fccollege. edu.pk/about/ Government College University Lahore. (2020, February 18). https://www.gcu. edu.pk/About.htm Hall, R. H. (1991). Organizations: Structures, processes, and outcomes. Prentice Hall. Islam, N. (2004). Sifarish, sycophants, power and collectivism: Administrative culture in Pakistan. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 70(2), 311–330. Jabeen, N., & Jadoon, Z. (2013). Civil service system and reforms in Pakistan. Public administration in South Asia: India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, 172, 453–467. Jessop, B. (2008). A cultural political economy of competitiveness and its implications for higher education. In B. Jessop, N. Fairclough, & R. Wodak (Eds.), Education and the knowledge-basedeconomy in Europe (pp.  11–39). Sense Publishers. Kartashova, A., Shirko, T., Khomenko, I., & Naumova, L. (2015). Educational activity of national research universities as a basis for integration of science, education and industry in regional research and educational complexes. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 214, 619–627.

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PART III

Involving the Market

Pakistan Post and the Creation of an Innovative Business Model to Enhance Financial Inclusion Naubahar Sharif and Athar Mansoor

1   Introduction As information and communication technology (ICT) applications in increasingly many industries have disrupted traditional practices, new business models are emerging to enable companies to adapt to shifting socioeconomic contexts within which these applications operate. These business models play a critical role in reshaping people’s lives and social behaviors, especially in developing countries and emerging economies (where the impact of business model change combined with technological change is potentially greater given the low level of technological sophistication that characterizes such economies). In response to the challenges encountered in emerging economies, ICT applications, together with

N. Sharif • A. Mansoor (*) Division of Public Policy, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Kowloon, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_11

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innovative business models, have been adapted to a wide range of social, economic, industrial, and technological contexts. As an emerging economy, Pakistan has sought to embrace ICT applications with new business models. Such innovative business models are emerging in the country now, whereby soon-to-be-launched ICT applications in the Pakistani mobile phone and traditional postal industries are positioned to disrupt traditional practices. This innovative business model in particular should enable adaptation to the specific socioeconomic context in Pakistan to leverage both the power of Internet-ready smartphones and the breadth of the well-established and reputable network of Pakistan Post to provide a wide array of traditional postal and financial services to the citizens especially the rural population, a large proportion of which remains financially excluded and does not have access to modern financial services. In this chapter, we investigate and analyze the recent efforts led by Pakistan Post to create a new business model characterized as a comprehensive public–private partnership (PPP) plan. This plan proposes combining Pakistan Post’s network of post offices—which serve as savings banks—with mobile phone platforms, enabling people across Pakistan to access financial services either physically or virtually. With the involvement of private cellular companies, every Pakistan Post Office will be equipped with the requisite computer hardware, software, and point-of-sales (POS) terminals, broadening the availability of financial services beyond urban customers to suburban as well as remotely located, less educated, rural users. We analyze three key sets of issues: First, we explicate the characteristics of this new ICT-driven PPP business model within the specific context of Pakistan and assess the extent of the model’s reliance on ICT (see discussion under “Characteristics of ICT-induced PPP Business Model”). Second, we dissect the PPP model to understand the degree to which it suits Pakistan’s prevailing socioeconomic context. Third, we discuss the applicability of the model—under which mobile phones serve as a key tool for solving social problems and creating innovative public enterprises—to other neighboring South Asian economies such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Nepal (which represent similar levels of socioeconomic development).1 1  We deliberately avoided considering India as a country of comparison because of its more advanced stage of general technological progress (e.g., World Bank data show that India

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Prior to addressing the above-mentioned issues, we present prevailing ideas regarding PPPs from the extant literature, subsequently describing the background to our case and explicating our methodology. We end the chapter by offering some conclusions drawn from our analyses.

2   Public–Private Partnerships According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a PPP can be understood as an “agreement between the government and one more private partners according to which the private partners deliver the service in such a manner that the service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with the profit objectives of the private partners” (OECD, 2008, p. 12). While PPPs are attracting much interest among scholars, it is important to remember that such partnerships are not new arrangements. Governments have partnered with private organizations to provide public services for centuries.2 According to Bovaird (2004), the term “PPP” was first used about 40 years ago and, since then, has grown in prominence. As per Bovaird’s (2004) broader, widely used definition, PPPs are “working arrangements based on mutual commitment (over and above that implied in any contract) between a public-sector organization with any organization outside of the public sector.” Bovaird’s broader definition of PPPs covers an assortment of organizational structures ranging from partnerships between national government agencies and companies to partnerships between local government departments and community groups. In his research, Weihe (2008) discusses several types and classifications of PPPs.3 exported US$13.3 billion in high-technology exports in 2016 compared with Pakistan’s US$300 million) and the sophistication of India Post (e.g., in 2012, India Post rolled out its IT modernization project—entirely government-funded—with an outlay of INR49 billion, while Pakistan Post had barely even conceived of similar projects). Other South Asian economies lack such fiscal resources for modernizing their postal networks. 2  Woodson (2016, p. 1411) quotes Wettenhall (2005) in describing how the Dutch East India Company operated as a partnership between the Dutch government and local industries to encourage worldwide trade. During World War II, governments relied heavily on private industry to provide supplies and services for the war effort. 3  PPPs provide a variety of functions such as policy design, policy evaluation and monitoring, implementation, capacity-building, activism, and resource mobilization (Bovaird, 2004; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011).

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Woodson (2016, p. 1411) outlines three rationales behind the formation of or need for PPPs. First, the complexity and interconnectivity of problems prohibit most organizations from accomplishing their goals on their own. As such, organizations hoping to succeed must form partnerships (McQuaid, 2000; Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2001).4 Second, a group of organizations often can better overcome market deficiencies than a single actor. PPPs can spread the risk of failure over multiple parties and projects (e.g., in some cases where innovations face high technical risk that make them economically unattractive, while other innovations generate low monetary returns; Greve, 2006). Third, PPPs also improve economies of scale to facilitate R & D and pool talent across sectors (Bovaird, 2004). Independent organizations may not have the personnel or financial resources they need to manage, evaluate, or implement multiple highly technical projects (Moran et al., 2010). PPP policies and institutions have increasingly diffused across a broad range of countries (Vining et al., 2005; Hodge et al., 2010). Earlier scholarship has shown that establishing PPPs depends on a wide range of factors, including political commitment (Flinders, 2005), fiscal conditions (McQuaid & Scherrer, 2010), and the presence of a supportive legal framework (Tvarnø, 2006). In other words, institutional elements in the business environment can facilitate or hinder the development and success of PPPs. Indeed, the response of national governments to the rise of PPPs has been similarly varied. Whereas some national governments have developed extensive partnership programs and embarked on widespread PPP development, others have remained skeptical (Verhoest et  al., 2013). Varied governmental responses to PPPs have also stemmed from their reactions to the New Public Management (NPM) era of the 1990s (Angerer & Hammerschmid, 2005; Petersen, 2011) that promised results-based management to reinvent government agencies, eliminate inefficiencies, and impose fiscal discipline through the transfer of private-sector management principles and tools.5 4  The need to partner to cope with increased complexity is especially relevant for organizations working with highly scientific emerging technologies. These technologies operate at the forefront of knowledge, and a wide range of sectors must share knowledge to develop them (Cozzens et al., 2010). 5  NPM includes various public management reform prescriptions and practices representing multiple analytic perspectives. These perspectives emphasize, among other things, performance-enhancing interventions that drive reform through new management technologies and systems (Moynihan & Pandey, 2005; Larbi, 2006; Manning, 2001). While acknowledg-

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3   Background to the Case 3.1  Financial Inclusion in Pakistan Pakistan, with a population of approximately 207 million people, is located in South Asia.6 In the Global Microscope Report of 2018,7 Pakistan was ranked 21st of 55 countries on a scale measuring the capacity of its political economy to enable financial inclusion, in spite of which the country actually suffers from low levels of inclusion. Fewer than one in ten Pakistani adults have registered accounts at institutions providing a full suite of financial services.8 This stands in stark contrast to the 45% average for South Asian countries overall.9 Pakistan is ranked just above Afghanistan in the region. India and Sri Lanka have account ownership rates of 80% and 75%, respectively. In the Indian case, the Jan Dhan Yojana scheme launched by the government in August 2014 is mainly responsible for these high rates. While almost one-third of Pakistani adults (44 million individuals) borrow money, only 3% borrow from formal financial institutions.10 During the early 2000s, Pakistan experienced a major surge in cellular phone company operations and many global names such as Telenor, Zong (China Mobile Pakistan), and Mobilink began operating there. Subsequently, the number of consumers using cellular phones and mobile money grew dramatically.11 Today, Pakistan’s mobile network is well ing that our use of the term involves some degree of oversimplification, we use the label to streamline our presentation. 6  Available at: http://www.pbscensus.gov.pk/content/provisional-summary-results-6thpopulation-and-housing-census-2017-0. Accessed on 3 July 2019. 7   Global Microscope, 2018. Available at: http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/ WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=EIU_Microscope_2018_PROOF_10.pdf & mode=wp & campaignid=Microscope2018. Accessed on 3 July 2019. 8  Financial Inclusion Insights, 2017. Available at: http://finclusion.org/uploads/file/ Pakistan%20Wave%204%20Report%2019-July-2017(1).pdf. Accessed on 4 July 2019. 9   The Global Findex Database, 2017. Available at: https://globalfindex.worldbank. org/#GF-ReportChapters. Accessed on 3 July 2019. 10  National Financial Inclusion Strategy Pakistan. Available at: http://www.sbp.org.pk/ ACMFD/National-Financial-Inclusion-Strategy-Pakistan.pdf. Accessed on 4 July 2019. 11  Mobile phone access in Pakistan is skewed toward males and there is an 18% gender gap in mobile phone access. From “Financial Inclusion Insights, 2017.” Available at: http:// finclusion.org/uploads/file/Pakistan%20Wave%204%20Report%2019-July-2017(1).pdf. Accessed on 4 July 2019.

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1,200,000

1,005,518

1,000,000 800,000 600,000

972,714

914,089 776,491

766,540

400,000 200,000 -

225,753 175,149

Dec'17

192,890

Mar'18

266,980

215,896

Jun'18

Sept'18

Dec'18

Number of transactions during the quarter (number in ‘000’) Value of transactions during the quarter (Rs. In millions)

Fig. 1  Most Recent Trends in Mobile Money Transactions in Pakistan. (Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Branchless Banking Quarterly, Oct–Dec, 2018)

developed with nine out of ten households enjoy access to mobile phones and in possession of an operational Subscriber Identification Module (“SIM”) card. In 2019, there were 162 million cellular subscribers in Pakistan. Currently in Pakistan there are 71 million third-generation (3G) and fourth-generation (4G) cellular subscribers.12 Fifth-generation (5G) service has recently been launched by Zong. Against this backdrop, mobile money solutions are seen as a way to expand financial inclusion in the country. New technologies and the rise in branchless banking offer opportunities to broaden financial inclusion. The most recent trend in mobile money transactions in Pakistan are shown in Fig. 1, indicating rising use of financial services outside of traditional bank branches (e.g., through mobile phones). The State Bank of Pakistan calls these transactions ‘M-wallet’ transactions. 3.2  Pakistan Post Pakistan Post is one of the largest and oldest public enterprises and is fully owned and operated by the Government of Pakistan. After the partition of India in 1947, the Department of Post and Telegraph—incorporating Pakistan Post—was established by the independent Government of

12  Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, Telecom Indicators. Available at https://www. pta.gov.pk/en/telecom-indicators. Accessed on 30 September 2019.

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Pakistan. In 1962, Pakistan Post was spun off as an independent entity, operating separately from the Department of Post and Telegraph. Presently, Pakistan Post operates under the Ministry of Communications headed by a Federal Minister (Mr. Murad Saeed) who is a member of the Prime Minister’s cabinet.13 Pakistan Post is also a member of the Universal Postal Union, a specialized agency of the United Nations. As of the end of June 2019, there were approximately 13,000 post offices with an employee base of about 48,000, of whom 9000 are postal carriers. To serve the population, Pakistan Post divides the country into seven postal circles, each of which is headed by a Postmaster General.14 3.3  Distribution of Financial Services in Pakistan Pakistan endorsed the “Maya Declaration” in 2011,15 committing the country to creating an enabling environment that increases access to, and reduces the costs of, financial services, including the use of new technologies. To put this commitment into practice, the government-owned State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) unveiled the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS) in May 2015.16 The primary goal of the NFIS is to build an inclusive financial sector to support Pakistan’s growth. The SBP is acutely cognizant that technological innovations such as mobile financial services make it possible to advance its financial inclusion agenda and is keen to operationalize the potential for doing so. The current network over which financial services in Pakistan are distributed is sparse and fragmented, especially in rural areas. Small firms and individuals—particularly women—cannot easily access even basic bank 13  This Federal Minister runs Pakistan Post with a Federal Secretary of the Ministry of Communications and the Director General of Pakistan Post. The Director General is also the ex-officio Chairman of the Pakistan Postal Services Management Board, which is a high-level steering body comprising members from the private and public sectors. The Board is responsible for the strategic direction of the organization and keeping it in line with modern developments in the postal industry. 14  For administrative purposes, regionally based Deputy Postmasters General report to the respective Postmasters General. 15  The Declaration represented the world’s first platform that would enable Alliance for Financial Inclusion member institutions to make (and meet) concrete inclusion targets, implement in-country policy changes, and regularly share progress updates. 16  The NFIS envisions a country in which “individuals and firms can access and use a range of quality payments, savings and credit insurance services to meet their needs with dignity and fairness” (NFIS Pakistan, 2015, p. viii).

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accounts. The NFIS, therefore, aims to make increased and diversified financial service access points available to hitherto financially excluded groups of Pakistan’s population. These access points include bank branches, bank agents, automated teller machines (ATMs), POS terminals, mobile money agents, and remote access through mobile devices and the Internet (the strategy does not limit access to traditional savings and checking accounts while granting access through digital transactional accounts such as branchless bank accounts).17 Given the rapidity of the spread of the mobile telephone network in Pakistan, in 2008 the government introduced “branchless banking” regulations that enabled banks and microfinance banks to leverage mobile phone communications and distribution networks to bring financial services closer to customers across the country.

4   Methodology The research for this chapter was conducted from November 2018 through August 2019 through two main channels. We began by scouring the Internet and other sources to obtain publicly available information relating to the case. Unfortunately, because the topic has only recently come into play and is related to a developing country, such information was scant and superficial. Indeed, while the new ICT-driven business model involving a PPP has been conceived of, planned, deliberated upon, and readied for launch, it has not yet been launched (as this chapter was being written). Second, documentation (such as reports, internal company documents, and plans and proposals) related to Pakistan Post, Pakistani mobile device operators, and financial services distribution was collected in person in Pakistan. Although these resources comprise secondary data, the associated documentation is not publicly available. It was sourced through the two authors’ extensive and widespread contacts in various Pakistani government ministries—such as the Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of Finance, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, the Reforms Unit of Pakistan Post, and the SBP (one of the authors has spent time as a deputy director–level bureaucrat in Pakistan)—as well as through the authors’

17  In Pakistan, “branchless banking” refers to the provision of transaction services to a specific class of accounts classified as branchless banking accounts, operated entirely through electronic fund transfers through various alternative delivery channels such as agents, ATMs, and point-of-sales (POS) terminals.

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contacts with the senior-level managers in mobile phone companies (another author has spent time in private industry). Furthermore, through an intensive period that involved conducting face-to-face interviews in Pakistan from early 2019 through the summer with the majority of the same actors who made the secondary but privately held data available, we obtained interview recordings and, in cases where the respondents preferred not to be recorded, took copious interview notes. All interviewees were working at top-level managerial positions in Pakistan Post either at the Headquarters in Islamabad or operational offices in the provincial postal circles and were deeply involved in the planning process of the project. The major officers interviewed included the Additional Director of General Operations, the Director of the Reforms Unit, the Postmaster General of Punjab Province, the Postmaster General of Central Punjab, the General Manager of Postal Life Insurance in Northern Pakistan, the Director of Special Initiatives, the Assistant Deputy Director General of Special Initiatives, the Deputy Postmaster General of Lahore, and the Assistant Postmaster General of Financial Services of Central Punjab. Both interview recordings and interview notes were transcribed by us and analyzed using NVivo 11 Pro. This analysis enabled us to organize our qualitative data and identify recurring themes and trends. Finally, a small number of follow-up interviews were conducted during phone calls in cases where clarification or additional information was required. The process, therefore, was iterative.

5   Characteristics of the ICT-induced PPP Business Model The new PPP business model did not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, it emerged in response to certain conditions in Pakistan Post in a context that included rapidly diffusing technological developments and governmental direction when the model was adopted. We will relate the new model with the typology of management mechanism delineated by Bouckaert et  al. (2010): hierarchy-type management (HTM), market-­ type management (MTM), and network-type management (NTM). Aside from executing traditional mail delivery, Pakistan Post has been providing a number of services to its clients (but only over-the-counter services in physical post offices, not through mobile carriers or mobile

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Table 1  Pakistan Post’s Service Offerings Mail services

Financial services

Ordinary Mail Registered Mail Domestic Urgent Mail Service International Speed Posts Cash on Delivery Service Same Day Delivery Service

Savings Banks Military Pensions Payments Postal Life Insurance Electronic Money Orders Western Union Money Transfers Ordinary Money Orders Provincial and Federal Tax Collection Utility Bills Collection

Source: Authors’ fieldwork in Pakistan in summer 2019

phones; see Table  1 for a summary of Pakistan Post’s over-the-counter service offerings). The department presently loses money, focusing primarily on serving community needs rather than earning profits. During the interviews we learned that Pakistan Post had been incurring losses since 2009 and its leadership had been actively searching for ways to transform it into a viable and sustainable entity. Until recently, no viable practical or cost-effective solutions had been identified to extricate it from its malaise. Several of the aforementioned Directors and Postmasters General were involved in making a first presentation to then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on 22 December 2015 in which they made the case that Pakistan Post should partner with a private enterprise and deploy MTM to enable the organization to achieve the NFIS objectives of increasing the penetration of financial services across Pakistan. In 2016, Pakistan Post provided further details about the plan and received cabinet approval in early 2017. Under this ICT-driven PPP model, Pakistan Post intends to acquire a digital platform on which to leverage 13,000 physical points and 9000 mobile points (postal carriers). Customers and clients of the Post Office Savings Bank will be linked through their smartphones with accounts in the post offices, other 1-Link financial institutions, and the local postal carriers in their areas.18 These steps will make use of NTM. According to our interviews, the key ‘selling point’ of the plan was that there was an ‘untold story’ behind Pakistan Post’s losses since 2009, 18  1-Link is a consortium of 11 Pakistani banks that is incorporated under Section 42 of the Companies Ordinance 1984. It has operated since 2003 with the objective of developing a strong e-payment network in the country to enable efficient real-time transactions.

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because continuing to serve its ‘social function’ of providing stable and steady employment was just as important as making profits. With 48,000 employees, Pakistan Post is the third-largest public enterprise in Pakistan after Pakistan Railways and the Water and Power Development Authority. A major objective of the plan was to build a unique model for providing sophisticated financial services by combining the broad, well-established, and reputable network of Pakistan Post with the latest digital technologies and delivery couriers (postal carriers) who were employed by Pakistan Post. Because Pakistan Post lacked the financial and technical wherewithal to execute the plan independently, a PPP model using MTM was proposed. Under this model, the technological inputs would be provided by the private sector to be combined with Pakistan Post’s delivery network to offer financial services to those—either suburban or rural—without bank accounts in Pakistan. The new ICT-induced PPP business model, known as the ‘Mobile Money Solution,’ is depicted in Fig. 2. Pakistan Post has been providing

Fig. 2  Mobile Money Solution. (Source: Pakistan Post Records)

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limited and basic banking services in the form of the Post Office Savings Bank, whereby every post office in the country is designated as a savings bank that provides limited banking services such as time deposits, salary disbursement, and sales of special savings certificates. This banking function is being performed by the department as an agency function on behalf of the Ministry of Finance. Under the proposed model—which has still not been launched—the physical network of the savings bank at post offices will be virtually connected through 1-Link ATMs, POS terminals, mobile phone platforms, and digital handheld devices that postal carriers carry with them. Savings bank accounts at post offices will be linked to users’ smartphones as well as the 1-Link ATM debit cards, enabling account holders to conduct an array of financial transactions such as receiving pension payments for retired persons at their doorsteps, applying for and receiving loans from microfinance institutions, making person-to-person electronic payments, making government-to-person (and vice versa) payments, paying utility bills electronically, and buying various types of insurance policies. All of these functions will be made possible through users’ mobile phones, through local postal carriers, or through Pakistan Post’s physical outlets throughout the country. The distinguishing feature of this PPP model that makes it most attractive to Pakistan Post is that all investments will be borne by a private partner while the revenue generated by providing financial services under this model will be shared equally between Pakistan Post and the private partner. Presently, pensioners in the Pakistan Army, the Capital Development Authority, and Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited draw their pensions from post offices and these organizations pay a commission to Pakistan Post in lieu of the services provided to the pensioners. Similarly, the Ministry of Finance also pays Pakistan Post service charges for performing savings bank functions. These are a few of the sources that Pakistan Post expects will increase revenue under the PPP model. During our interviews, the Director of the Reforms Unit shared his ambitions for increasing the number of savings bank account holders from the present estimated number of 4 million to 12 million by the end of 2021 and increasing the number of pensioners from an estimated 1.2 million to 2.4 million (also by 2021). The proposed model through NTM will enable residents in the remotest areas of the country to gain access to physical as well as virtual services such as money transfers, bill payments, pension receipts, and micro-credit

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disbursement. With the help of the private partner,19 every post office will be equipped with hardware such as computers and POS machines and the corresponding software. Postal carriers will be equipped with handheld devices integrated with the entire system. Linking post offices and postal carriers to perform financial transactions will be one of the key distinguishing features of this model. Customers and clients using the post office’s financial services will have the option of performing various financial tasks such as person-to-business, person-to-government, and person-to-person transactions (on their smartphones, at a post office branch, or with the help of postal carriers) by making use of NTM. For example, when a client’s monthly utility bill is generated by the relevant authority (e.g., an electricity bill from the Water and Power Development Authority), the user will receive a message on his or her smartphone and will have the option of settling the bill through direct debit, physically at the post office, or through a postal carrier. Our interviewees explained that, as the model’s features gradually roll out in full, new e-commerce-related features will be added, which may make use of the Internet of Things (IoT). For example, a smart grocery app would be connected to a user’s IoT-enabled-refrigerator. As and when grocery items such as eggs, dairy, or meat became depleted in the refrigerator, a Pakistan Post carrier would deliver these items from the user’s supermarket of choice and the client could pay cash on delivery or simply order by direct debit from his or her account at the post office. If such a networked linkage is achieved, it will represent a sophisticated IoT model.

6   Suitability of the ICT-Induced PPP Business Model to Pakistan The context in which the PPP business model we are analyzing has emerged is unique to Pakistan, but more importantly it appears to be highly suitable to Pakistan. We cite three main sets of reasons that make it so. First, Pakistan has achieved extensive mobile phone penetration. Over the past seven years, the number of individuals with mobile phones has 19  A pilot was rolled out with the help of a local fintech company named FINJA in the fall of 2017 to identify critical issues to be resolved before rolling out full-scale and the organization presently remains in the process of awarding the final contract to a private bidder. Technical and financial scrutiny of the interested parties is being carried out.

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Table 2  Cellular and 3G/4G Subscribers in Pakistan Year

Cellular subscribers (millions)

3G/4G subscribers (millions)

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

127.7 139.9 114.7 133.24 139.6 149 162

Not available 1.4 13.5 29.5 40.6 53 71

Source: Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, Annual Reports

increased from 127.7 million to 162 million (see Table 2).20 More pertinently, even more recently the penetration of smartphones has accelerated. Currently, 71 million Pakistanis subscribe to 3G or 4G services—up from just 1.4 million in 2014 (see Table 2 for recent trends).21 Considered a luxury (even a status symbol) that has been associated predominantly with urbanites only a few years ago, smartphones have dropped in price (especially Chinese-made smartphones from manufacturers such as Huawei, Oppo, and QMobile) to such an extent that even rural mobile phone users are increasingly smartphone users. With the ICT-induced PPP business model operable on smart mobile phones as opposed to traditional (or non-smart) mobile phones, this has played a key role in making the new business model applicable in Pakistan. Mobile phone operators have facilitated this significant uptake in smartphone usage. The three dominant operators (Pakistan Mobile Communications Limited—formerly Mobilink—Telenor, and Zong), which account for 87% of mobile phone users in Pakistan, have been aggressively expanding coverage to rural areas over the past several years. Whereas in 2010, 45% of the rural population was covered under a mobile phone operator’s network, by 2017 this figure had increased to 75%. This in turn has motivated rural users to take advantage of mobile communications. 20  Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, Annual Reports 2012 to 2018. Available at https://www.pta.gov.pk/en/data-&-research/publications/annual-reports. Accessed on 24 September 2019. 21  In the absence of other reliable data, numbers of 3G/4G subscribers can be considered as a proxy for the penetration of smartphones.

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For their part the mobile phone operators have also been extremely active in promoting the purchase of new models of (Chinese) smartphones. Insofar as Zong (one of the three largest three mobile phone service providers in Pakistan) is owned 100% by China Mobile, this is perhaps unsurprising. But even the other two largest mobile phone operators—Pakistan Mobile Communications Limited and Telenor—although predominantly Dutch or Norwegian-owned, have found Chinese-made and to a lesser extent Korean-made (Samsung) smartphones particularly suitable for meeting the tastes, design preferences, and especially the price requirements of Pakistani consumers. Each of the big-three mobile phone operators runs active and attractive trade-in schemes for users willing to purchase new phones on the operators’ networks and even more generous schemes for customers willing to tie themselves into one-year fixed-rate monthly phone packages (allowing a certain number of airtime calls per month, messages, and Internet usage in terms of gigabytes-per-month data packages). Smartphone usage has been facilitated by a vibrant second-hand market for used smartphones. Whereas older but perfectly usable models are discarded with abandon by urban middle-class users, we observed an active second-hand market for these phones that are typically resold by dealers to second-tier cities or rural areas for resale. These second- and third-tier cities and even rural areas support ample local populations of repairers and other accessory sellers that enhance the longevity of these smartphones. Finally, while the provision of most other kinds of infrastructure—such as gas, clean water, and transportation—in Pakistan is patchy and variable in quality (e.g., gas outages are all too common, especially in winters) the provision of reliable mobile phone networks and communications (through Internet-connected mobile phones) has become a story of genuine technology-adoption success. With a far greater degree of certainty than is typical with other types of infrastructure provision, mobile phone users are able to rely on stable phone lines and, for smartphone users, stable communications through the Internet (WhatsApp and Facebook are two extremely commonly used applications, especially by rural smartphone users). The PPP business model is highly suitable to Pakistan also because Pakistan Post has maintained a steady presence in the country. Unlike other large employers such as Pakistan Railways and the Water and Power Development Authority, Pakistan Post has enjoyed an especially positive reputation. This higher standing has been achieved in part because the

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organization has been involved in fewer scandals than its larger, state-­ owned counterparts in Pakistan.22 This has allowed Pakistan Post to be perceived—fairly or unjustly—as a relatively more stable government entity, less prone to corrupt influences and, crucially, less likely to act as a vehicle for meeting an incumbent political party’s objectives. This reputation has benefited Pakistan Post insofar as governmental stakeholders have sought to broaden its functionality to include financial inclusion in its mandate. Whereas either traditional banks (such as Habib Bank, Allied Bank, United Bank, and MCB Bank) or traditional phone operators (such as Pakistan Mobile Communications Limited, Telenor, and Zong) could conceivably have been the vehicles for rolling out this new model of financial inclusion, one crucial difference is that their images suffer by comparison (and they also offer less robust infrastructural capacity and presence). The traditional—private and public—banks are perceived to be too profit-­ oriented and unlikely to roll out services that are more beneficial to the public good than to their private interests and profits. Similarly, the large telephone operators are already large and oligopolistic, subjecting any broadening of their services into financial services to scrutiny and intense regulation. The confluence of these issues has created a unique space where Pakistan Post can take charge of this government ambition to broaden financial inclusion. It is perceived—in governmental circles (as intimated by our respondents through our interviews) and among Pakistan’s citizenry—to be middle-of-the path or neutral, enabling it to spearhead this effort to enhance financial inclusion in the country. A third set of factors that support Pakistan’s suitability for this PPP initiative must be considered against the backdrop of broader geopolitical and trade developments that have affected the country—in particular the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC and other global developments have instilled a renewed sense of urgency in the government, incentivizing it to improve departmental operations by, among other things, making them more accountable, increasing their role in 22  In 2016, the embezzlement of PKR 50 billion was unearthed in WAPDA. Available at https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/pakistan/mega-corruption-revealed-in-water-and-powerministry/. Accessed on 24 August 2019. Similarly, an audit report revealed corruption to the tune of PKR 42 billion in Pakistan Railways in 2016. Available at: https://defence.pk/pdf/ threads/42-billion-corruption-in-railways-comes-to-surface-audit-report.371222/. Accessed on 24 August 2019.

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citizens’ lives, and increasing government revenues. As one of our respondents from a government secretariat made very clear to us: “In 2013 the Pakistani economy was in really bad shape. So much so that even within the government there was a predominant feeling among politicians and bureaucrats alike that something drastic needed to be done to pull Pakistan out. To be sure, some things were beyond our control, like attacks by terrorists from abroad. But that which was under our control the government sought to fix in a way more determined than I have seen ever before.” This sense of needing to ‘get back on track’ was, as another one of our respondents made clear, the reason that no less an individual than the thenPrime Minister himself had focused his attention on Pakistan Post. Even more critically, the urgent need to right the ship motivated him and his cabinet to give their blessing to Pakistan Post’s willingness to try something innovative. As the respondent stated, “I think the Prime Minister’s office felt that there was little to lose given the fact that we had been incurring losses since 2009. Furthermore, he had just returned from a visit to China at that time and his officials were telling us about how the Prime Minister was very much impressed with the way Jack Ma of Alibaba had used his company to increase financial inclusion in China. The Prime Minister was very keen to achieve the same kinds of results in Pakistan, and we presented our new model at the right time. The time was ripe for it to be accepted and given a chance to succeed, despite some of the handicaps we face.”23

7   Applicability of the ICT-Induced PPP Model to Neighboring South Asian Economies The ICT-driven PPP model that Pakistan Post hopes to have adopted in 2021 may well be adapted by and applied in other South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, given their cultural, social, and economic similarities. To be sure, some forms of financial services are already being provided at postal outlets in each of these countries, but the unparalleled reach of their postal networks seems well suited to further leveraging that would enable them to broaden financial inclusion for their citizens. 23  Needless to say, since then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his officials gave their blessing to Pakistan Post to undertake these reforms, the prime minister’s post has been occupied by another person. However, in our interviews we did not sense any change in direction regarding what Pakistan Post hopes to achieve in broadening financial inclusion.

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As public-sector organizations, the post offices in these countries face challenges similar to those faced by Pakistan Post. There is, for example, a scarcity of financial resources (i.e., the post offices do not possess the financial wherewithal to roll out such services on their own), technical expertise (i.e., the incumbent post office staff are fully conversant with the latest technological developments in ICT infrastructure), and aversion to change (i.e., as public-sector organizations unaccustomed to change, these countries must overcome entrenched inertia). In this sense, neighboring countries are ripe subjects for PPPs, for the three reasons advanced by Woodson (2016, p.  1411). First, given the technological and financial complexity involved, it is difficult for any single organization to accomplish the goal of broader financial inclusion. MTM and NTM are, therefore, attractive options in this scenario. Second, PPPs spread the risk of failure over multiple parties. Third, while independent organizations lack the resources needed to manage, evaluate, and implement a highly technical project (Moran et  al., 2010), with PPPs talent can be pooled (Bovaird, 2004). As smartphone usage increases, PPPs can help other South Asian countries overcome these constraints and benefit from sophisticated digital technologies developed in the private sector to construct models suited to specific societies and economies. If they learn from Pakistan’s experience, they will understand better how to implement aptly devised change-­ management plans to overcome the forces restraining the ICT-driven innovative PPP model we have analyzed here. We can assess the applicability of this PPP model to neighboring South Asian economies by better understanding the challenges Pakistan Post has faced in designing the model as well as the challenges it will face implementing it. It seems unfortunate that, following a lapse of almost six years since the prime minister’s approval was granted, Pakistan Post has been unable to roll out the project. In this case, several major organizational obstacles must be addressed—urgently—to make this project a reality. First, there is a lack of suitably qualified technical staff expertise in Pakistan Post that our interviewees cited as a grave concern. While the bulk of the technically related responsibilities will fall on the shoulders of the private partner, there is nevertheless deep concern over the wide chasm in technological knowledge between what Pakistan Post employees can do now and the know-how required to implement and execute the PPP model. We argue that Pakistan Post faces serious capacity issues that impede its efforts to implement this innovative PPP project. Several of our

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interviewees complained that, during the last year and a half, 27 private sector companies expressed their willingness to partner with Pakistan Post. The department due to its centralized decision making, which is based on HTM, was however not successful in maintaining their interest, failing to offer clear and attractive terms and conditions for the project. Frustrated with this slow progress and inability to manage the technicalities of the project, in September 2019 the Ministry of Communications made this PPP project a component of another project for Pakistan Post being implemented by the government of South Korea. South Korea offered Pakistan Post a soft loan of US$ 20.635 million to implement new projects in addition to already—planned departmental upgrades. Presently Korean consultants are helping with several new projects and the ICT-­ driven PPP model for financial inclusion has also been integrated into the Korean projects. Officials hope that the Koreans’ superior technical capacities will facilitate the rollout of the long-delayed PPP project. Second, because frontline postal carriers will be operating one of the triad of interfaces with their handheld devices (the other two being physical post offices and smartphones), many worry not only that these postal carriers are ill-equipped but also that they may be highly reluctant to undertake—or are incapable of achieving—the upskilling they will require. Given the severity of the issue—each of the 9000 existing postal carriers will require retraining to be linked via their handheld devices to the system—there is a real fear that this will become a major bottleneck. Historically, Pakistan Post has been slow and superficial in adopting digital technologies, auguring ill for the staff’s ability to retrain. On a related note, Pakistan Post itself will be unable to undertake the employee retraining without which it cannot implement or execute the new PPP model. This will raise the costs associated with outsourced training within an already loss-making organization, adding to the financial pressures coming from the Federal Government. Insofar as the current rules regulating retirement allow any official who has served for more than 25 years to opt for early retirement with full pensionary benefits, our interviewees expressed a deep-rooted feeling that old and experienced staff that are not technologically savvy will prefer retiring to retraining. Combining the low levels at which knowledge-sharing is institutionalized at Pakistan Post with its poor knowledge-management systems, knowledge expiry within the organization may be unavoidable. Another fear relating to Pakistan Post is that, while the new PPP model will usher in a new era of financial inclusion for Pakistan’s citizenry, the

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winds of change will bring Pakistan Post’s performance under closer scrutiny. Broader performance-based remuneration systems may also be introduced in the course of planned changes, of which the PPP model may just be a microcosm. Hitherto postal employees have enjoyed an ‘iron rice bowl’ irrespective of their performance levels—a typical feature of public organizations in Pakistan. Pakistan Post faces additional challenge from its acting as a savings bank under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance. In this regard, specific laws and rules applicable to savings banks will also become applicable to Pakistan Post. These laws were framed relatively long ago (in the 1950s, soon after Pakistan became independent) when manual processes and systems predominated and automation was negligible. Furthermore, these laws were enacted with traditional business models rather than PPPs in mind. In light of this digital disruption and new business model, the rules and laws have not yet been revised to keep pace with the technological and other changes brought about by ICT and the PPP project. On this front, progress has been painfully slow, although Pakistan Post continues to move forward with its transformation. PPP models display their own peculiarities and these need to be adjusted to local contexts. Ideally, new laws governing PPPs need to be framed ahead of the full-scale execution of such arrangements. Moreover, the new laws are being created with limited or little input from the operational staff that will need to adhere to them regularly. Meanwhile, many Pakistan Post employees, fearful of being made redundant, have adopted an adversarial (rather than cooperative) approach by refusing to participate sincerely and wholeheartedly in the discussions and debates surrounding the enacting of the new laws and systems that will govern the PPP project. Finally, there is a very active and powerful union of postal employees known as the National Organization of Postal Employees (NOPE). As a public-sector entity, Pakistan Post provides secure employment to its workers. The NOPE has operated at the forefront of postal employees’ rights advocacy and views this PPP scheme as the first step toward complete privatization of this monolithic public enterprise. The NOPE has even begun mobilizing its members across the country to resist the change. Pakistan Post faces another obstacle in its ‘status quo’-oriented organizational culture. Under the PPP, it will have to move toward greater accountability, which includes meeting key performance indicators. As evidenced by our interviews, the organization’s top-most leadership has not taken a proactive approach to bringing the NOPE sufficiently on board

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with the changes it proposes. This has further raised the NOPE’s hackles, creating an additional layer of friction. If neighboring countries are to implement similar ICT-driven PPP models, they would do well to heed the challenges facing Pakistan Post. It is by no means a ‘given’ that the proposed Pakistan Post model will succeed. If it were to fail or experience only limited success, it is likely that one or a combination of the above factors will have acted as a major headwind. As earlier academic scholarship has shown, successful establishment of PPPs rests on a degree of political commitment (Flinders, 2005) that Pakistan has hitherto not demonstrated. Moreover, fiscal pressures (McQuaid & Scherrer, 2010) on Pakistan Post will remain in place, with or without the development of the PPP model, and the absence of a supportive legal framework (Tvarnø, 2006) that would enable the new business model to enhance financial inclusion will also impede progress.

8   Conclusions The Government of Pakistan since early 2015 has recognized modernization of the public sector and institutional reforms as one of the pillars of development and growth framework. It is also aiming to enhance efficiency effectiveness, accountability, and transparency of the public sector through broad-based as well as specific reforms. The new PPP business model analyzed in this chapter is part of the Government of Pakistan’s larger public sector reform agenda. It has been adapted to Pakistan’s social, economic, and technical context and represents an opportunity for the country to leverage the power of the Internet to enhance financial inclusion by employing MTM and NTM.  This chapter shows how this new-to-Pakistan business model, combining physical with virtual resources, can play a central role in reshaping, in particular, rural people’s lives and social behavior. The PPP business model promises to reconfigure the socio-technical regime in rural areas by helping villagers access financial services that would otherwise be unavailable to them. The Pakistan Post model contrasts with Grameen Telecom in Bangladesh, which provided employment opportunities to the rural poor, especially women, enabling them to own cell phones and use them for commercial purposes. In contrast to the Grameen model, the model being rolled out by Pakistan Post seeks to integrate Pakistan’s population with post offices and postal carriers to access financial services (Grameen Telecom was an innovation brought to fruition with the help of a private

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partner—Grameen Phone—not a government agency). To be sure, the model we see in Pakistan differs from what we have witnessed in developed countries insofar as the Pakistan Post model is an inclusive growth model aimed at achieving broad-based economic growth by offering financial services to financially excluded sections of Pakistani society. We expect Pakistan Post’s PPP model to be rolled out only if some or all the challenges identified earlier are addressed and the results of implementing this innovative approach can be assessed only after it is completely rolled out and in operation. Therefore, this study evaluates the suitability and applicability of the model to Pakistan’s socio-economic context (mobile phone penetration, post office presence, government resources, etc.). We hope that our analysis generates interest in learning how a variety of approaches can be adopted in efforts to solve complex policy problems, especially by making use of ICT and PPPs.

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Sustainable Public–Private Partnership Delivery in Pakistan; Evolution, Barriers, and Way Forward Beenish Bakhtawar, Muhammad Jamaluddin Thaheem, and Husnain Arshad

1   Introduction Partnership and collaboration are fast becoming the new paradigm in strategic decision-making at both country and regional levels. This can be attributed to realization on the part of decision-makers of their individual incapacities and the wonders of conjoint efforts in solving real-world sustainable development issues. These issues include hunger, poverty, connectivity, social equity, water and sanitation, health and safety, education, environmental protection, good governance, and provision of efficient

B. Bakhtawar (*) • H. Arshad BRE Department, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected] M. J. Thaheem Deakin University, Geelong, VIC, Australia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_12

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infrastructure. Responsibility and risk of service delivery were the sole premise of government bodies. But a shift in global economic policies is seen due to the emergence of neoliberalism and new public management agenda. In view of developing sustainable solutions, new business and governance models are being established through keen involvement of private sector. The amalgam of many such models and their variations is called Public-Private-Partnerships (P3s). Generally, P3 can be referred to any kind of partnership relationship between private and public parties. OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) defined P3 as, Public-Private Partnerships (P3s) are long term agreements between the government and a private partner whereby the private partner delivers and funds public services using a capital asset, sharing the associated risks. P3s may deliver public services both with regards to infrastructure assets (such as bridges, roads) and social assets (such as hospitals, utilities, prisons). According to the popularly followed arrangements, both management contracts and privatization model are excluded from the P3 continuum. However, the definition of P3 depends on the definition legitimized by the government of the country. In Pakistan, management and service contracts, public–private joint ventures, and some forms of privatization like divesture contracts have also been considered in various contexts under the wider P3 spectrum. With reference to different sectors of implementation, most common types of P3 models are shown in Fig. 1. In Pakistan, the definition of P3 evolved over the years with two major revisions. Initially, P3 Policy, 2010 defined P3 as a partnership between the

Fig. 1  Spectrum of P3 arrangements (State Bank of Pakistan)

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public sector represented by a Government Agency and a private party for the provision of an infrastructure facility or service with a clear allocation of risks between the parties (IPDF, 2010). Then, Public Private Partnership Act, 2017 gave a new definition applicable to all sectors (NA, 2017b). As per its definition, P3 is a commercial transaction between an implementing agency and a private party in terms of which the private party 1. Performs an implementing agency’s functions on behalf of it 2. Assumes the use of public property for a project 3. Assumes substantial financial, technical, and operational risks in connection with performance of the implementing agency’s functions or use of the public property or 4. Receives a benefit for performing the implementing agency’s functions or from utilizing the public property, either by way of, (a) Consideration to be paid by the implementing agency from its budget or revenue; or (b) Charges or fees to be collected by the private party from users or customers of a service provided to them; or (c) A combination of such consideration aids such charges or fees. As Public Sector Development Program (PSDP) in Pakistan can fund limited projects, choosing P3 as the delivery model can relieve the financial burden of the government, with a significant control over delays due to active availability of funds (Shah, 2018). However, its efficient delivery is hindered by several country-specific issues. For Pakistan, P3 implementation started formally in the country in 2010; however, the level of implementation was carried mostly on ad hoc (project to project) basis or at the company level because of lack of federal legislative structure in the early period. Pakistan still faces several implementation barriers in infrastructure projects at federal, provincial, and local levels (Shah, 2018). Although the legal and regulatory system of Pakistan and the institutions render strong support to private investment in the form of venture capital availability, the country suffers from low macroeconomic ability, high terrorism incidences, low social capital, poor quality of land administration, and unsatisfactory auditing standards (Klaus, 2018). In particular, delay in release of funds, procurement delays, lack of management capacity of implementing agency, delay in land acquisition, insufficient and weak coordination system, and weak governance and slow recruitment are among the top implementation bottlenecks identified in this regard out a total of 176 projects

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facing delays since 2011–2018 (Shah, 2018). These issues lead to private sector mistrust and lack of bidding environment for large infrastructure development projects, proving to be major barriers to P3 implementation. This is also reflected in the PPI Annual Report, 2018, which reports an overall decline in private investment in the country after 2017, when it received the highest investment level ever. By attracting a staggering investment of US$5.9 billion in investments, Pakistan was promoted to the world’s top five private participation in infrastructure (PPI) investment countries (PPI, 2017). In contrast, all of Pakistan’s $1.2  billion investment commitments in 2018 were in the power sector; $1.1 billion of that was channeled to a coal power plant in Baluchistan (PPI, 2018). The projects that are currently in implementation are facing efficiency issues. The situation is, therefore, alarming and raises questions on the sustainable delivery of P3 projects in the country. One of the most important aspects of delivering a sustainable P3 project is through provision of conducive, enabling environment for such projects at country and company levels (Hong & Kim, 2018; Regan et al., 2017; Yuan et al., 2018). Such an environment is provided using legislative and regulatory tools compliant with the country’s socioeconomic and cultural fabric. Keeping this in view, this chapter focuses on exploring the feasibility of sustainable P3 delivery in developing countries, especially Pakistan. The main aim of this chapter is to present a holistic picture of development of infrastructure-related P3 projects in Pakistan and analyze the introduced structural reforms considering reform mechanisms. For this purpose, the authors present past developments and the current state of P3 policies and procedures in the country, considering political and socioeconomic changes. The method adopted for this part is systematic review and policy analysis of government documents and international reports. Analysis also gives insight into the main reform mechanisms introduced and their categorization rationale. Successively, the barriers of sustainable project delivery through P3 model in Pakistan are discussed using valuable input from leading industry experts involved in different stages of P3 delivery. These experts belong to both public and private organizations and all have a 10+  years of relevant experience. With discussion with experts, some key measures of resolving the identified barriers are also presented. For the purpose of brevity, the discussion on impediments in P3 delivery only covers real cases from the highway sector but the results may be applied to increase understanding of other sectors as well.

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2   P3 Development in Pakistan The P3 development process from the perspective of the government of Pakistan generally starts from the preconception stage. During this phase, market and demand analysis of the project is carried out for approval of relevant government department. The project demand is either identified by local public or government. Either way, after approval, the implementing agency organization of the government is mobilized for project planning and structuring. During project structuring, different feasibility studies are carried out including financial, commercial, economic, and social feasibilities through specialized consultants. The consultant as per field survey is supposed to suggest the modality of P3 for the project in accordance with the terms of reference (TORs). During the project feasibility, the decision of bankability or viability of the project is made in consideration with the selected P3 modality. This means whether the project can sustain its cost on its own?—for the government, operating and maintenance cost is also important in addition to capital cost. Additionally, for private sector, investment decision mainly depends on the required rate of return—whether the revenue streams/cash flow streams of the project are strong enough to pay off? Next, the decision-makers move on to the tendering stage of the project. Firstly, an expression of interest (EOI) in the newspaper is given to invite bidders for pre-qualification. In this process, potential bidders are shortlisted based on their qualifications after which request for proposals (RFPs) are submitted by shortlisted parties. Pre-­ qualification is optional, but highly recommended to ensure transparency. In the RFP, pre-conditions are also given in addition to the project details. For example, that private sector must invest 30% of the total cost, that is, as equity share and they can raise at least 70% of the project cost through debt. The level of participation or support provided by the private sector is dependent on legislative environment of the country, project, and financial constraints. So, development of a sound enabling environment for P3 development is regarded as a prerequisite of the process. For this purpose, it is useful to look at the development trends for the P3 model, its implementation and reform mechanisms in the country elaborated in this section. In Pakistan, private involvement in public infrastructure and service delivery has a long history marked with frequent shifts in policies between nationalization and privatization of industries with each government implementing a highly contrasting national economic strategy. Looking at

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6B

16 14

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Number of Projects

Total Investment

18

Total Investment Number of Project

7B

4

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1990

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Fig. 2  Private investment trends in Pakistan (Source: PPIAF database)

the P3 investment trends in Pakistan reported by PPIAF, shown in Fig. 2, the 1990s can be marked as the nascent period of P3 implementation in the country with limited private investment. The investment trend came to a halt in late 1990s and saw a rise after 2004. The size of private investment grew visibly after 2015. These peaks in private investment also resonate with the policy developments for P3 in Pakistan, which can be divided into four main development periods: The 1990s, marked by the nationalization versus denationalization debacle; Post 2000, marked by rigorous privatization of SOEs through Privatization Act 2000; Post 2010, marked by the establishing of P3 legal and regulatory framework through formal approval of country P3 policy; and Post 2018, marking the establishment of P3A. In the 1950s, with the creation of Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC), the privatization concept began to emerge as a policy strategy to assist industrialization growth of the agriculture-led economy of the country. Denationalization (privatization) of private-owned enterprises (SEOs) is, however, a political sensitive process and attracts wide social apprehension due to little focus of private owners toward social sustainability. The program, on the one hand, made Pakistan an industrial hub in Asia, while, on the other hand, it led the lower-income class into a poor quality of life. This led to a shift toward a nationalization policy, with Bhutto’s regime focusing on a socialist agenda that heavily affected the business community in the country. The privatization process gained some momentum in 1990s in the Benazir Bhutto’s government coming at a halt in 1998 with Nawaz Sharif declaring economic emergency after performing nuclear deterrence in wake of Indian nuclear aggression during his reign. Privatization led to significant increase in GDP during the 2000s

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during the Musharraf era initiated by the privatization act, 2000 but it faced wide criticism for interest groups throughout this time as it led to decrease in overall job security in the country and high rate of increase in unemployment of labor and workers that were laid off as a result of transfer of ownership. The process came to a halt when the Supreme Court of Pakistan (SC) intervened in the privatization of Pakistan steel mills. By looking at the reform mechanisms involving nationalization versus privatization shift in policies, it is clear that nationalization of industries through creation of state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) is purely a hierarchy-­ type mechanism (HTM), due to centralization of power with the government, little involvement, and autonomy for organizations to involve private sector. On the other hand, the denationalization is a complete reverse of the process. In this process, the government lets go of its responsibility of service delivery by leasing out the relevant industries to private parties. The organizations become autonomous with limited involvement of the government in running the affairs, following a competition-based market-type mechanism. Analyzing Pakistan’s situation, it can be further concluded that either strategy fully favoring either the business monopoly or the local interest groups are headed for limited sustainable growth of the economy and poor investment climate in the country. In contrast, a win-win-win strategy outlook can pave way for all the three main stakeholders in a development project (the government authority, private company, and the general public) to be satisfied in a transparent project structuring process. P3 projects offer the same opportunity, resonating well with the local requirements and offering a middle ground harnessing private capacity and local support—which is why the contract type gained so much support from the government. It is also helpful to understand the local policy shift toward P3 by looking at the world dynamics. Post-World War II, United States took the seat of economic and political dominion, globally. However, a power shift occurred due to the rapid urbanization in Asia catalyzed by the global economic crises of 2008–2009. Changes in the world’s economic order has created a new balance of power as the world is diverging from geopolitics focusing their attention toward economic rather than political dominion (Hawksworth & Chan, 2015). Both, the notion that ‘trade follows the flag’ (that the projection of national power has economic consequences) and that ‘the flag follows trade’ (that there are geopolitical consequences of essentially economic phenomena) point to the subject matter of geo-­ economics (Bhattacharyay et al., 2012). Steering this power shift is China,

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followed by India and other emerging markets. China spearheaded the recovery from global economic crises along with other south Asian and ASEAN countries (Das, 2013). This is due to the lessons learned by these countries during the Asian crises, 1997–2002 (Loftus & Purcell, 2008), resulting in the region’s commitment to invest in infrastructure and regional connectivity. Today, China has comfortably retaken its seat as the largest economy of the world (based on purchase power parity) and India is expected to overtake the United States by 2050, according to statistics of IMF (Hawksworth & Chan, 2015). Despite bright projected growth prospects, the Asian economies face a huge challenge of infrastructure bottlenecks putting a restraint on economic growth. It needs both ‘hard’ infrastructure (physical assets that provide connectivity such as transport, energy, information and communication technology, water, and sanitation) and ‘soft’ infrastructure (policies, regulations, systems and procedures, knowledge and capacity, strategies and institutions to support the development and efficient operation of physical structures) of both regional and national levels in order to remain competitive in the global market (Bhattacharyay, 2010; Bhattacharyay & De, 2009; Bhattacharyay et al., 2012). In order to increase regional connectivity and sustain growth, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (Mehar, 2017). Pakistan also benefited from this initiative, being a strong ally of China and having a strong geostrategic position as an important trade route in the region. In an effort to benefit from the opportunity, Pakistan collaborated with China on CPEC, promoting both foreign direct investment (FDI) and private investment through P3 (Bukhari et al., 2018).

3   P3-Related Policy Developments in Pakistan For any country to have a successful P3 program, government must provide an enabling environment. In this regard, Asian development bank (ADB) measured the capacity of countries for delivering sustainable P3 projects (ADB, 2015). Six types of factors were identified for the purpose: legal and regulatory framework, institutional framework, operational maturity, investment climate, financial facilities, and subnational adjustment. According to the ADB report, Pakistan has significantly improved its P3 policy framework and is building a rich body of experience in selecting, evaluating, and implementing P3 projects ranks. Sindh province in Pakistan has been ranked separately owing to the development of distinct P3 policy framework and distinguishing performance at the subnational level (ADB, 2015).

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The government of Pakistan (GoP) recognized the importance of improving and expanding infrastructure services for sustaining economic and social development in its medium-term development framework (2005–2010). A detailed P3 policy framework was formulated as a result by IPDF when it formally initiated the federal regulatory process for P3 projects (IPDF, 2010). The policy developments in Pakistan regarding P3 are further elaborated in Fig. 3. Initially, the process began by regulating the energy and telecommunication sectors. Starting from Power Policy 1994, Pakistan power policy has gone through a series of reforms in order to provide sustainable power supply, optimize energy mix, and attract private investment. Although, the government launched its renewable energy policy in 2006, there was little implementation on the policy. The present government has made a commitment in Vision 2030 to achieve renewable energy projects. However, the promise faces dilemma due to investment

Fig. 3  Policy development timeline for P3 in public infrastructure in Pakistan

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in six coal projects. The power sector still holds the most attractive position for private investment due to deficiencies in uninterrupted power supply in the country with it being one of the only sectors attracting foreign investment in 2018. In other sectors, P3 projects were governed by the implementing agencies on project-to-project (ad hoc) basis. In line with these efforts, the federal government also established Infrastructure Project Development Facility (IPDF) in 2006 through Ministry of Finance (MoF). The IPDF was made to act as the advisory body for facilitating relevant ministries and other autonomous bodies for development, structuring, and procurement through P3 model of delivery mainly in the infrastructure sector (IPDF, 2010). The typical P3 model envisaged by IPDF through P3 policy, 2010 is shown in Fig. 4. As per IPDF, the business model presented here can be adopted for P3 development in power, highway, airport, utilities, and urban transportation projects. The model is also applicable to many social infrastructure projects like hospitals, schools, social housing, etc. In healthcare, water services, land use and agricultural sectors, etc., service-­based P3 models are applicable (Kaarhus, 2018; Ponnusamy et  al., 2017; Smith et  al., 2018). Discussion on service P3s, however, is beyond the scope of this chapter. At the provincial level, individual P3 units were established, which worked independently in liaison with IPDF and line ministries implementing projects as per their approved ordinances. Sindh P3 unit was particularly successful in this regard spearheading the P3 development in the country, followed by Punjab and KP P3 units each working under their individual policy framework (Govt.ofPunjab, 2014; KPGovernment, 2014; SindhGovt, 2010). Very recently, a P3 act has come under discussion in Baluchistan as well, to facilitate the projects being developed under CPEC (Shamsuddin, 2018). Though the provincial-level P3 units were given enough autonomy with a strong support at provincial and federal government level for P3 development but the implementation system is heavily fragmented hindering uniform development (Mubin, 2008). According to P3 Infrascope report, 2018, Pakistan ranked on top in terms of P3 maturity but in the absence of a centralized regulatory framework for P3 implementation, projects are suffering from poor accountability. However, with the creation of the P3A authority, in 2017, the government promised a more centralized system (NA, 2017a). In the past, the role of the federal regulatory authority for P3 projects was practically limited and governance of these on the objectives of fairness and transparency was difficult.

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Fig. 4  Typical P3 project structure (Source: IPDF)

The model that governed the P3 framework followed by IPDF, follows a network type management (NTM) because IPDF played the role of an advisory body for autonomous public bodies at federal and provincial levels acting as implementing agency in the P3 delivery. Additionally, provincial, and federal P3 units, served a coordinating role for the IPDF in every province. The individual departments initiating the projects

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worked rather autonomously. The creation of IPDF helped create an enabling environment for the P3 projects filling the gap for lack of local understanding of the project delivery model in the country. However, later, the P3A authority was created in 2017, in an effort of the federal government to bring P3 project implementation under moderation of the government. This centralization of power favors a more hierarchytype management (HTM). This reform has long-term effects on the P3 governance in the country. It allows the government to have a more active role in the procurement and hiring of competitive organizations on projects and enable more efficient performance assessment and monitoring of ongoing projects.

4   Public–Private Partnership Authority Recently, Public–Private Partnership Authority Act (No. VIII), 2017 has enabled Pakistan to enter a new era of P3 development with the provision of a federally regulated P3 legal and regulatory system (NA, 2017a). Key features of the P3A Act, 2017 are as follows: 1. By virtue of the act, the Infrastructure Project Development Facility (IPDF) has been converted into Public–Private Partnership Authority (P3A). 2. The P3A will provide the enabling environment for P3 development by attracting both domestic and international financial investment, reducing transaction costs, and administering regulatory control over the P3 projects on principles of good governance. 3. The concession period of P3 contract cannot exceed a period of 30 years. The projects listed with the IPDF mostly belong to the highway sector, since the highway and power sector were the only federally administered sectors. Apart from that, all other sectors came under the discretion of the provincial governments. However, even in these two sectors, in the absence of a federally administered policy framework, organization policies took precedence. The P3A has now started to act as the central regulatory body. Some of the projects advised by the IPDF/P3A are listed in Table 1.

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Table 1  Projects under different stages with IPDF/P3A

Ongoing projects 1 Construction of Sukkur Hyderabad Motorway 2 Pakistan Post Reforms Agenda 3 National University of Science & Technology (NUST) Science & Technology Park (STP) Pipeline projects 1 Upgradation and Operation of Pakistan Railways Carriage Factory, Islamabad (CFI) 2 Upgradation and Operation of Pakistan Railways Locomotive Factory, Risalpur (PLF) Completed projects 1 Overlay and modernization of Lahore Islamabad Motorway 2 Construction of Habibabad Flyover 3 Conversion of existing 4-lane superhighway into 6-lane Karachi Hyderabad Motorway 4 Construction of Lahore Sialkot Motorway

P3 model for development

Sector

BOT P3 BOT

Highway Postal R&D

JV

Railways

JV

Railways

BOT

Highway

BOT BOT

Highway Highway

BOT

Highway

Source: P3A website

5   Sector-Wise Dynamics of Infrastructure P3 Projects According to the World Bank statistics, 2018, coupled with the author’s own compilation of statistics, the sector-wise distribution of private financing in the four phases of P3 development is shown in Table 2. Looking at this sectoral distribution (excluding road and railway projects), around 100 P3 projects met financial close in the country in the said period. Most of the private funding in Pakistan is dedicated to electricity power generation projects in order to solve the power crises in the country with highest number of projects in the sector. The power sector still holds the most attractive position for private investment due to deficiencies in uninterrupted power supply in the country with it being the one of the only sectors attracting foreign investment in 2018. However, Pakistan has negligible private investment in renewable energy projects recently, according to PPI Annual Report, 2018, and only one operational P3 project for solid waste disposal and only four projects in natural gas as shown in Table 2.

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Table 2  Sector-wise breakdown for private investment in Pakistan from 1990–2018 Subsector

The 1990s

Post 2000

Post 2010

Post 2018

Total project count

Non-­ P3

26 3 1 0

33 9 2 0

40 1 0 1

4 0 0 0

103 13 3 1

17 1 3 0

86 12 0 1

0 1 31

1 3 48

0 0 42

0 0 4

1 4 125

0 4 25

1 0 100

Electricity Ports ICT Treatment disposal Airports Natural gas Total

P3

PPIAF World Bank, 2018

In the 1990s phase, private investment in power sector was mobilized with the power policy, 1994 and subsequent establishment of private power and infrastructure board (PPIB) in 1994 as a One-Window Facilitator on behalf of the Government of Pakistan (GOP) to promote private investments in power sector. As a result, 26 energy projects were approved, out of which 19, funded by independent power producers (IPP), financially closed under the Build-Own-Operate (BOO) model. Out of the total projects, 12 were MDB supported. In the post 2000 phase, Chashma-2 Nuclear power plant was financially closed in addition to privatization of K-electric to a foreign consortium in order to solve Karachi power crises with the government retaining 26% of its shares. In this phase, following the rental power policy 2008, an interesting and seemingly innovative electricity generation idea of rental power plants (RPPs) was commissioned. It involved setting up of small power plants by local and foreign private companies to bridge the demand–supply gap on an urgent basis. A unique and then world’s biggest ship-mounted floating power plant from Turkish firm Karkay Karadeniz Electrik was also a part of these RPPs. In total, 19 RPPs were approved out of which 5 were unsolicited. However, the deals were declared illegal, nontransparent, and against social justice in 2011 and canceled by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. This was done under suspicion of rampant corruption, mismanagement, and inefficiencies of the government bodies involved in these transactions. Even after heavy payments for mobilization of projects, none of the power projects could kick off to complete production capacity. The

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rental power fiasco became a very grim lesson for the government as the government officials involved were arrested by the National Bureau of Accountability of Pakistan (NAB) for corruption charges and the government faced international litigation for years before losing to Karkey at the ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) and being fined around $800 million. Karkey claimed that the project failed due to interference of Pakistan government organizations, non-supply of gas, and illegal detention of vessels. Pakistan sought a stay over the ruling and has recently found proofs of corruption with a government official confessing in 2019 to receiving kickbacks in the procurement dealings. The highway sector of Pakistan has had to face similar issues (Mubin, 2008). In the early 1990s, motorway projects were implemented on BOT basis, the first one being the 367-km-long, 6-lane controlled access Lahore–Islamabad Motorway (M-2). The project includes 89 bridges, 7 interchanges, and numerous underpasses and drainage culverts. The motorway was constructed by the South Korean Daewoo Corporation and is operational since 1997. Soon after M2 became operational, the 154  km, 6-lane M1 (Islamabad–Peshawar) and the 54-km, 4-lane M3 (Pindi Bhattian–Faisalabad) became operational but faced delay in completion of construction. These early projects faced various issues like frequent changes in scope, design errors, unstable political environment, immature government changes, organizational interferences and changes in officials, adversarial relationships, financial problems, and lack of experience of government (Ullah et  al., 2017). In the developed world, the scope of infrastructure P3 projects is focused on those projects that involve a foreign private concessionaire that implements public infrastructure and services on the country government’s behalf. However, in Pakistan, sustaining foreign investment in lieu of political and organizational instability, unpredictable market changes, and global financial crises, has been difficult. As a result, locally available private sector finances have been mobilized to bridge the infrastructure deficits especially before 2015. In the country, local private businesses and state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) have actively been made a part of public infrastructure delivery following a compromised, blended form of the more popular P3 model like the independent power producers (IPPs) in energy sector, and the state-owned subsidiaries in highway sector (Alfan, 2010; Ullah & Jamaluddin, 2017). Although generally the outlook followed by developing countries for P3 projects has been the same, the model, however, has been administered in accordance with local requirements and encumbrances considering

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problems unique to the lower- and middle-income countries. For example, Malaysia involved United Engineers (UoM), termed as a government linked company (GLC) (Mubin, 2008). Though, not exclusively a private party, certain SOEs and GLCs can be used to overcome process barriers for formation of P3 in presence of poor foreign investment climate in the country. Pakistan also followed this example and involved many SOEs and GLCs as concessionaires in P3 projects. Details of these companies can be found in Table 3. On the one hand, these companies empower the existing setup to deliver large infrastructure projects; on the other hand, it makes the implementation and auditing of these projects complex, especially when foreign investment banks are approached for funding. The ADB recognizes the strong role SOEs play in public procurement in the developing countries (ADB, 2015). However, there are two main issues with the involvement of SOEs in the public procurement, balancing state control and organizational autonomy. The details for several transportation projects as compiled by the authors can be seen in Table 3. From Table 3, it is clear that NHA has been the primary implementing agency in agency for development of state Table 3  Highway projects developed under P3 model in Pakistan (1990–2019) Sr. Project names no.

Private party

Public party

Start Completion Type

1

Daewoo Corporation ZKB Consortium

NHA

1993 1997

Road

NHA

1993 2007

Road

LAFCO (FWO)

C&W

2004 2006

Road

China Road and Bridge Corporation FWO

NHA

2013 2020 (Due)

Road

NHA

2014 2015

Road

NHA

2014 2017

Road

2 3

4

5

6

Lahore–Islamabad Motorway (M-2) Islamabad–Peshawar Motorway (M-1) Lahore–Sheikhupura– Faisalabad dual carriageway KKH Phase II (Thakot– Havelian Section) Construction and Development of Habibabad Flyover/ Overhead Bridge at National Highway (N-5) Hasanabdal–Havelian Expressway (E35) Package-I (Burhan—Jarikas)

CGGC—GRC (JV)

(continued)

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Table 3 (continued) Sr. Project names no.

Private party

Public party

Start Completion Type

7

SCORE (FWO)

NHA

2015 2018

Road

China State Construction Engineering Corporation Limited Lahore–Sialkot Motorway LSMIM (FWO)

NHA

2016 2019

Road

NHA

2016 2019

Road

Not yet decided

NHA

Not yet started

Road

Not yet decided

NHA

Not yet started

Road

China Road and Bridge Corporation MORE (FWO)

NHA

Not yet started

Road

NHA

Not yet started

Road

Not yet decided

Pakistan Railways

Not yet started

Rail

Not yet decided

Pakistan Railways

Not yet started

Rail

8

9 10 11

12

13

14

15

Karachi–Hyderabad Motorway (M-9)— Conversion of existing 4-Lane Superhighway into 6-Lane Motorway Peshawar–Karachi Motorway (Multan– Sukkur Section)

Khuzdar–Basima Road N-30 (110 km) Upgradation of D. I. Khan (Yarik)—Zhob, N-50 Phase-I (210 km) KKH Thakot–Raikot N35 remaining portion (136 km) Overlay and Modernization of Lahore–Islamabad Motorway (M2) Construction of Havelian Dry port including cargo-handling facilities Rehabilitation & Up-gradation of Karachi–Lahore Peshawar (ML-1) Railway Track

Source: Self-compiled

highways, motorways, and expressways. Due to adversarial tensions with foreign companies involved in earlier motorway projects, low foreign investment climate, poor investor confidence, difficult and sensitive nature of projects, the military-owned federal works organization implemented several mega projects in the highway sector through its subsidiary firms forming joint ventures with other local construction firms operating through its BOT department.

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6   Barriers and Way Forward to Sustainable P3 Delivery in Pakistan Generally, in the world, P3 projects are considered brittle attracting criticism over the delicacy of effective implementation and requirements for long-term success (Dunn-Cavelty & Suter, 2009; Grimsey & Mervyn, 2005; Santandrea et al., 2016). Although, the P3 arrangement is reported to improve the sustainability performance of projects, the implementation framework of P3 projects rarely endorses a sustainability agenda. Thus, it is essential to make the P3 development processes sustainable in a whole life-cycle perspective. The decision-making in P3 projects mainly includes consideration for project viability, feasibility, risk, and procurement, contracts, and stakeholder and project management. For such decision scenarios, it is necessary to ensure social and environmental protection beyond the minimum acceptable limits, while maintaining financial and economic performance over project life to enable sustainability. There are various studies exploring effective implementation of P3 projects. For example, Patil et al. (2016) has identified value for money (VfM) as the primary metric for sustainability during project planning. However, current feasibility studies fail to realize long-term project success. According to Atmo (2014), attaining VfM in P3 projects requires an intricate balance of project cost, risk, and performance. Additionally, Kivila et al. (2017) highlights that assessment of long-term project performance is not possible through present assessment models available as these models are only based on time, cost, and quality performance during project construction. As a solution, Martens and Carvalho (2016) proposed a central position for sustainability in project management frameworks to ensure long-term project performance in areas of social benefits, environmental footprint, and effectiveness. However, little is known about sustainable P3 delivery (Aarseth et  al., 2017) and the management tools, techniques, and methodologies that can help align P3 with sustainability agenda (Silvius, 2017). Implementation-level ramifications can be enabled only with stringent policy-level interventions and strong government support. In order to do that, a deeper look into the barriers of sustainable P3 implementation needs to be assessed. Barriers are the factors hindering implementation of a practice and drivers are the positive factors enabling adoption. The following section elaborates on these barriers and suggests a way forward.

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Table 4  Interviewee demographics Sr. no. 1 2 3 4 5 6

Relevant experience 16 8 15 28+ 16 10

Relevant organization

Designation in organization

Private sector Private sector Public sector Public sector Public sector Public sector

Manager P3 projects Asst. Manager P3 projects Director P3 General Manager P3 Manager Planning Deputy Director P3

To identify the barriers and challenges facing sustainable P3 delivery in Pakistan, in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted from experts considering highway sector as the case in point, for brevity. The experts consulted in the study were high-ranking officials of organizations involved in implementation of P3 projects in Pakistan. Their details are presented in Table 4. Two main themes of questions asked from the expert are as follows: What are the constraints/and barriers for inclusion of sustainability in P3 projects? What measures and solutions can be adopted for enabling sustainability in P3 projects? Based on the information gathered from the experts, various barriers were identified and different real project cases from highway and power sector were discussed. Each interview lasted for around 45 minutes. As a result, the interviewees gave rich insight into the P3 system of Pakistan and highlighted the various remedial measures for implementation encumbrances. A qualitative analysis was performed on the transcripts of the interviews’ data during which different themes were identified and elaborated further in this section. 6.1  Financial Barriers In Pakistan, the country risk is high, because of which involvement of private sector in project delivery accumulates additional layers of risk over the project, making it difficult for the project to reach financial close. In this scenario, investor skepticism is a major barrier for foreign investment, which can lead to the higher project close. Interviewee#1 remarked that the private sector has to be given assurance against countryspecific instabilities before they make an investment decision. In Pakistan, investors are concerned for political instabilities, law and order

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instabilities, and corruption issues. He further explained the barriers in the investment decision of foreign investors as the equity holders prioritize the projects where political instabilities are accounted for. Securities need to be present in the concession agreement where private entity can bail out in case of default from the public entity. As local companies are aware of ground situation, they are unwilling to invest. Foreign companies, on the other hand, have overdue demands during negotiation due to which project cost gets heavily inflated. One odd example of this is cynosure insurance. It gives coverage for theft and terrorism. Now, insurance against terrorism is relevant when the host country is a warzone. The rate for insurance against war is 6–7%. So, the project cost can get too high. Another major barrier related to financial structuring is the repatriation of funds. The senior officer elaborated that at the end of concession period, the private entity has to take the money out of the host country, during which different kinds of currency-related issues arise. This is called repatriation of funds. In Pakistan, the legal and regulatory system to enable this process is not that developed. The currency is devaluating at such a rate that converting it into its actual dollar value in future creates problems. To prevent this, he suggested that clauses in contract can be introduced but the issue needs to be resolved at policy level. 6.2  Local Resource Maximization Barriers Keeping in view the problems involved in foreign investment, Interviewee#6 suggested that increase in reliance on local resources can help resolve funding issues. But low experience in P3 delivery may lead to lack of confidence and lack of monitoring policies for local resource maximization. In context of Pakistan, he elaborated that, When it comes to manpower with sufficient technical abilities, companies tend to doubt local professionals’ capabilities. Pakistan has ample financial resources, but it suffers from the lack of stringent monitory policies for handling the resources related issues in P3 projects. He gave the example of M2 that, at the time of financial close of M2, the international consultant defaulted at the time of construction. Therefore, local experts were involved on the project. Two relevant Pakistani professionals acted as advisors on the panel and with their help, the concessionaire was able to complete the project, successfully. Similar examples can be found in other sectors, as well. Like in dam construction, there are issues of making the mechanical components. For that, we have options of local firms, HMC, HIT, and some private companies as well. Interviewee#6

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further highlighted that local subletting can be used to overcome local resource utilization issue. He asserted that, International companies often sublet to private companies because they have expertise. On Ghazi Barotha dam, 70% of the companies were sublet by the international firms. So, locally available expertise should be used, when they have experience on projects. Chinese companies working in Pakistan, are using their prisoners as workforce, because they do not need to pay them. Moreover, they underpay their manpower. The manpower being used on the projects should’ve been local. They do not use the local manpower, but they sublet the work to make themselves risk-free. 6.3  Contract-Related Barriers In order to enable sustainability in P3 projects, all the interviewees suggested that rigidness of contracts can be a major barrier and instead more flexible contacts need to be adopted, like alliance contracts. In P3 projects, the performance is mostly assessed after the project is complete (Ex-post evaluation), an approach which involves ‘learning from failure’. A shift from this approach is required for renegotiating the terms in accordance with the experience so that the project may continue to function properly. In some parts of the world, renegotiation clauses are included in the contract to reconsider the changing conditions through project life. This involves ‘learning from experience’ as result of performance evaluation every 5 or 10 years. 6.4   Lack of Understanding of Sustainability At present, there is not much deeper understanding of sustainability in large infrastructure projects, which is a major barrier identified by the interviewees. Interviewee#5 remarked that, In political motivations, projects get announced but the question of sustaining the projects over the life cycle is not being addressed. To manage resources throughout the project life cycle is a huge issue. New projects are being announced while it’s difficult to manage the existing projects sustainably because resources would be shifted towards the new projects. There is need to look at the projects from a futuristic point of view at the resource generation of these projects. Maintenance of these projects is done using the toll collection. But toll generation is susceptible to many uncertainties. Due to this project start going in loss, and often result in failure. M9, superhighway went into rehabilitation mode early. The original

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rehabilitation schedule was 10 years, but funds could not be arranged even after 35 years of project completion. So, P3 was opted as a solution for ensuring financial sustainability. 6.5  Roles and Responsibility Adherence Barriers Moreover, interviewee#3 suggested that commitment of the parties to adhere to their roles and responsibilities is highly important for sustainable delivery of projects. If even one stakeholder is not fulfilling its role, it will impact the entire project. He gave the example that it’s the government’s responsibility to notify the toll. If it doesn’t fulfill this responsibility, the project can even result in failure. If the private party increases the toll without taking the approval, anyone can go to court. Even the banks can pull out in this regard at any time, if any of their conditions are not met. These projects are sensitive in which private party comes with calculated risks. In case of unforeseen risks, if government does not extend support or pulls back, it will not have any choice but failure. 6.6  Corruption Barrier One major hindrance highlighted at global level is the concern for corruption. They identified two types of corruption in P3 projects, that is, upfront and indirect. Explaining upfront corruption, Interviewee#5 explained that for assessment of payments, financial models are used. So, if there is a ‘mistake’ in the model, corruption will be upfront. Interviewee#3 further added that In P3 projects, corruption is mostly indirect. If international companies are involved, corruption becomes more difficult to assess. For example, Power sector started using P3s in 1992 by establishing P3 units. At that time, there was a condition in the concession agreement that “even if the buyer doesn’t buy the electricity still it has to pay” for the 25 years of concession so that the seller can cover its returns in the period. The risk of corruption cannot be eliminated but it can be minimized. To prevent corruption, all interviewees consented to the establishment of corruption control committees and studying past trends. For timely prevention of corruption, Interviewee#5 suggested hiring financial experts to accurately estimate project cash flows for better judgment.

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6.7  Public Support Barrier In reference to maximization of local resources, interviewee#4 expressed major concern over the social value creation of P3 projects in order to build acceptability of local communities toward large infrastructure projects. He narrated the experience on one motorway concession: As a strategy to gain the support of locals of the area so that they do not resist or oppose the project, the concessionaire felt the need to establish a school for locals of the area to grant them low-cost education. Though the project (motorway) itself is beneficial regarding improving their access and reducing the travel time and cost, but these are the effects which do not materialize instantly. Building a school, however, has immediate and more obvious impacts. This was an initiative of the concessionaire. And the cost of the school was also borne by the concessionaire. Such good will gestures can be a good way to reduce local skepticism.

7   Conclusion Overall, Pakistan has a huge scope of local and regional P3 projects in almost every sector. Though this study focuses on infrastructure projects, Pakistan is also applying the P3 model in technology, education, health, and other services. However, there is a slight difference in both the models in terms of its greater flexibility and active involvement of international NGOs in these sectors. At present, Pakistan needs to focus on issues of corruption, law and order, financial stability, and reducing political fluctuations in the country ever threatening the stability of in-power government to sustain investor confidence and stringent quality control in order to deliver sustainable infrastructure through P3. The structural reforms for P3, discussed in the chapter are further summarized in Table 5. It is visible from the table that the early involvement of private parties in infrastructure and service delivery has been a confusion of extreme reforms with little success and value creation. Although the long-term privatization led by Musharraf did stabilize the economy, government, however, had little control over the industries privatized, creating various social problems. Various financial scandals like those related to the notorious IPPs were revealed later showing that complete dependence on private parties is not very successful in Pakistan. Thus,

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Table 5  Reform mechanisms summary for P3 projects Reforms

Mechanisms

Creation of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and nationalization (1990s) Privatization of some sectors like power and telecom (Late 1990s) Rigorous Privatization of industries (Early 2000s) IPDF organization created as a federal regulatory body for P3 projects acting in an advisory and coordinating role for the gov. department implementing the project. The system had provincial autonomy with their own P3 units established for regulating the projects within the province (Post 2010) Establishment of P3A as the federal regulatory authority for P3 projects acting as the main central authority for registration of new projects and their auditing (Post 2018)

HTM MTM MTM NTM

NTM/HTM

various reforms related to a public–private partnership approach were adopted. With the creation of P3A, a more power balance between public and private sector is created with the focus now on creating more sustainable projects.

References Aarseth, W., Ahola, T., Aaltonen, K., Økland, A., & Andersen, B. (2017). Project sustainability strategies: A systematic literature review. International Journal of Project Management, 35(6), 1071–1083. ADB. (2015). Evaluating the environment for PPPs in Asia-Pacific: The 2014 infrascope. Alfan, E. (2010). The Malaysian public-private partnership (PPP): Financing the tolled highway projects. Asian Journal of Business and Accounting. Atmo, G. D. (2014). Improving investment sustainability for PPP power projects in emerging economies: Value for money framework. Built Environment Project and Asset. Bhattacharyay, B. (2010). Estimating demand for infrastructure in energy, transport, telecommunications, water, and sanitation in Asia and the Pacific: 2010–2020. SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1678417 Bhattacharyay, B. N., & De, P. (2009). Restoring the Asian Silk route: Toward an integrated Asia. Bhattacharyay, B.  N., Kawai, M., & Nag, R. (2012). Infrastructure for Asian connectivity. Bukhari, S. W. H., Jabeen, M., & Jaffry, Q. R. (2018). Energy dynamics of China-­ Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC). Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 36(3), 99–122.

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Das, D. K. (2013). The Asian economy: Spearheading the recovery from the global financial crisis. Routledge. Dunn-Cavelty, M., & Suter, M. (2009). Public-Private Partnerships are no silver bullet: An expanded governance model for Critical Infrastructure Protection. International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2(4), 179–187. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2009.08.006 Grimsey, D. L., & Mervyn, K. (2005). Are Public Private Partnerships value for money?: Evaluating alternative approaches and comparing academic and practitioner views. Accounting Forum, 29(4), 345–378. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. accfor.2005.01.001 Hawksworth, J., & Chan, D. (2015). The World in 2050: Will the shift in global economic power continue. PwC’s Economics and Policy (E&P) Team in the UK. Hong, S., & Kim, T. K. (2018). Public-private partnership meets corporate social responsibility  – The case of H-JUMP school. Public Money & Management, 38(4), 297–304. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2018.1449476 IPDF. (2010). Pakistan policy on public private partnerships. Kaarhus, R. (2018). Land, investments and public-private partnerships: What happened to the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor in Mozambique? Journal of Modern African Studies, 56(1), 87–112. https://doi.org/10.1017/ s0022278x17000489 Kivila, J., Martinsuo, M., & Vuorinen, L. (2017). Sustainable project management through project control in infrastructure projects. International Journal of Project Management, 35(6), 1167–1183. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. ijproman.2017.02.009 Klaus, S. (2018). The Global Competitiveness Report 2018. Paper presented at the World Economic Forum. KPGovernment. (2014). The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Private Partnership Act, 2014. KPGovernment. Loftus, J. A., & Purcell, J. A. (2008). Post-Asian financial crisis reforms: An emerging new embedded-relational governance model. Accounting, Business & Financial History, 18(3), 335–355. Martens, M. L., & Carvalho, M. M. (2016). The challenge of introducing sustainability into project management function: Multiple-case studies. Journal of Cleaner Production, 117, 29–40. Mehar, A. (2017). Infrastructure development, CPEC and FDI in Pakistan: Is there any connection? Transnational Corporations Review, 9(3), 232–241. Mubin, S. G. (2008). BOT contracts: Applicability in Pakistan for infrastructure development. Pakistan Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences, 3, 33–46. NA, N. (2017a). Public Private Partnership Authority Act (No. VIII of 2017). Authority. NA, N. (2017b). Public Private Partnership Authority Act, 2017. Government of Pakistan.

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Patil, N. A., Dolla, T., & Laishram, B. (2016). Infrastructure development through PPPs in India: Criteria for sustainability assessment. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 59(4), 708–729. https://doi.org/10.108 0/09640568.2015.1038337 Ponnusamy, K., Bonny, B. P., & Das, M. D. (2017). Impact of public private partnership model on women empowerment in agriculture. Indian Journal of Agricultural Sciences, 87(5), 613–617. PPI. (2017). Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI), 2017 Annual Report. PPI. (2018). Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI), 2018 Annual Report. Regan, M., Smith, J., & Love, P.  E. D. (2017). Financing of public private partnerships: Transactional evidence from Australian toll roads. Case Studies on Transport Policy, 5(2), 267–278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. cstp.2017.01.003 Santandrea, M., Bailey, S., & Giorgino, M. (2016). Value for money in UK healthcare public-private partnerships: A fragility perspective. Public Policy and Administration,31(3),260–279.https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076715618003 Shah, S.  A. H. (2018). Appraisal of PSDP projects’ implementation. Planning Commission. Shamsuddin. (2018). The Balochistan Public Private Partnership (Act No. 1 of 2018). Authority. Silvius, G. (2017). Sustainability as a new school of thought in project management. Journal of Cleaner Production, 166, 1479–1493. SindhGovt. (2010). The Sindh Public-Private Partnership Act, 2010. Sindh Government. Smith, E., Umans, T., & Thomasson, A. (2018). Stages of PPP and principal-­ agent conflicts: The Swedish Water and Sewerage Sector. Public Performance & Management Review, 41(1), 100–129. https://doi.org/10.1080/1530957 6.2017.1368399 The Punjab Public Private Partnership Act, 2014, PAP-Legis-2(26)/2014/1083 C.F.R. (2014). Ullah, F. T., & Jamaluddin, M. (2017). Concession period of public private partnership projects: Industry–academia gap analysis. International Journal of Construction Management, 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1080/1562359 9.2017.1333400 Ullah, F., Thaheem, M., & Umar, M. (2017). Public-private partnerships in Pakistan: A nascent evolution (Vol. 1, pp.  127–150). Cambridge Scholars Newcastle upon Tyne. Yuan, J. F., Xu, W., Xia, B., & Skibniewski, M. J. (2018). Exploring key indicators of residual value risks in China’s Public-Private Partnership projects. Journal of Management in Engineering, 34(1), 16. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce) me.1943-­5479.0000561

PART IV

Adopting the New Trends

Digital Government: Transforming Sialkot into a Citizen-Friendly District Athar Mansoor and Syed Bilal Haider

1   Introduction The turn of the second millennium witnessed governments of many developed countries experimenting with their public service delivery systems. Leveraging on their superior political, financial and technical resources these richer countries emphasized innovation and quality for delivering higher public value to the citizens through efficient and effective services. Some prominent names in this period of experimentation are Barack Obama of the United States, Helen Clark of New Zealand, David Cameron of the United Kingdom and Park Geun-hye of South Korea. Obama

A. Mansoor (*) Division of Public Policy, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Kowloon, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected] S. B. Haider Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_13

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promoted “an unprecedented level of openness” in government (2009), Clark set foot on “Incremental Government”, Cameron advocated the “Next Age of Government” by empowering citizens and involving them actively in the functioning of the government (2010) and Park supported “Government 3.0” to realize the dream of scientific and people-oriented public administration (2013). However, Linders et al. (2018) have identified how the lacking of a clear blueprint, in general, slowed down the realization of such transformations. During the last two decades, we have, therefore, increasingly seen new technologies disrupting the business models of all kinds of organizations, especially the private firms. Today, in the private sector we are accustomed to a perpetual digital change making our lives simpler and comfortable. From online banking to real-time travel information and from on-demand music and films to international video calls, private companies have improved our day-to-day living and added unprecedented convenience to it (Brown et al., 2014). Unlike private sector, governments are not operating in an ‘innovate or evaporate’ environment and do not face competitive pressures to continuously upgrade their services. Strategy as a means to fight the competitors has been used extensively in businesses primarily to give bottom-line results. Public sector, on the other hand, only after the New Public Management reforms in the late twentieth century started considering efficiencies, deployment of market type mechanisms, and other ways to improve its sustainability. Hood (1991) considers the public sector reforms of 1980s for improving the quality of public service delivery as a paradigm shift from the traditional bureaucratic model of public administration. In spite of this late start, there has been substantial progress, in the public sectors across the world using disruptive technologies for better delivery of services to the citizens. There are considerable disparities, however, between the developed and the developing countries. The main reasons for these among others are better informed citizenry, evolved models of governance, higher risk-taking propensity and availability of more resources in the advanced countries. Redesigning of the public services to better meet the needs and demands of the citizens has, therefore, been more sophisticated in the richer countries in contrast to the developing countries. In this chapter, we have related the redesigning and reforms in the public service delivery system in a district in a developing country setting, that is, Pakistan with the typology of management mechanisms presented by Bouckaert et al. (2010): hierarchy-type management (HTM), market-type management (MTM), and network-type management (NTM).

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2   Successful Cases and Shifting Trends Taiwan has been studied extensively as a success story for making use of new technologies for delivering various public services. The Taiwanese government started implementing an ‘Intelligent Taiwan’ strategy to “flip the service delivery model by shifting from the ‘pull’ approach of traditional e-government-in which the citizen must seek out government services-­towards a ‘push’ model” (Linders et al., 2018, p. S68). The main objectives of this program were to proactively and seamlessly deliver services to the citizens based on their needs, preferences and location. This innovative e-governance model in Taiwan stood tall and high on the pillars of citizen-centricity, data-driven personalization, and the empowerment of frontline civil servants (Linders et al., 2018). It clearly made use of MTM/ HTM. Use of information and communication technologies (ICT) as a strategic priority for enabling operational efficiency, digital inclusion and effective governance has led Taiwan toward the top of the world rankings beating other notable advanced countries such as Germany and Canada (Bilbao-Osorio et  al., 2013; Waseda e-Government Research Center, 2013; West, 2008). Most advanced governments of today have also implemented comprehensive e-government portals such as eCitizen (Singapore), Gov.UK (United Kingdom) and USA.gov (United States). The United Nations’ data (2012) show that one-stop-shop websites by governments are becoming very common and these are actually a norm in most of the developed world. E-government initially started with a focus on digitizing conventional government services and has now moved beyond this somewhat narrow scope towards making use of ICTs for bringing transformation in governance and how governments operate (Eggers, 2007; Tapscott et al., 2007). Millard (2010) points out that beyond their portals, most advanced economies have now largely digitized the full range of their services. In this era of digital disruption, new technologies are, therefore, being increasingly used to develop networked interactions between government agencies and citizens, that is, digital government. There is a clear shift occurring from analogue government to e-government to digital government. Scholarly research has also shown how advanced technologies can be used for NTM to engage citizens in processes of co-creation, co-­production and citizens sourcing (Meijer, 2015). Technological advancements have surely opened up important new possibilities for public administration that hold a lot of potential for transformative change, including ‘Open

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Government’ (Lathrop & Ruma, 2010; Linders, 2012), ‘Smart Cities’ (Naphade et al., 2011; Townsend, 2013), and ‘Open Innovation’ (Noveck, 2009). All of which deploy either MTM or NTM or both.

3   Case of Developing Countries Several factors ranging from lack of political will and vision, inadequate management expertise and competencies and poor technological infrastructure have led a to a higher failure rate of e-government projects in developing countries (Hossan et al., 2006). Too often we find media in these countries full of headlines about failures in the government with stories of huge sums of money wasted on ill-planned and badly executed programs. Brown et  al. (2014, p. XVI) explain how instead of making government nimble, effective and efficient, technology has “often fossilized the past, ‘freezing’ inefficient processes, hierarchies, services and organisations.” The major challenge here is to deploy NTM and to reach an agreement among the stakeholders on redesigning the government and stop merely injecting more money and technology fossilizing the old processes and ways of doing things.

4   Scope of the Chapter Although this chapter is not aiming to understand the causes of failure of e-government or digital government projects, the aforementioned discussion of the previous sections is important to understand that there are no substitutes for astute planning and execution of these projects. There is much to learn from failures and as more of these projects get rolled out in developing countries, parallel research can help identify issues beyond those mentioned above for smoother deployment of the projects and delivering value to the public. Through our research, we endeavour to provide an account of how digitizing public services at the local district level of a developing country influences the lives of citizens. We have gathered and analysed data on digital government in a Pakistani district. The setting involves the case of a digital government project introduced by the district administration of Sialkot in the province of Punjab, Pakistan. We have selected Sialkot district as it is the forerunner of extensive digital government initiatives in Pakistan. Introduced in the last quarter of 2018 with the roll out completed in 2019, the digital government project in

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Sialkot has commanded its fair share of appreciation among the policy circles of Punjab and the citizens. There are at least 1200 people taking benefit from the digital services in Sialkot every day. Some of the more successful services of this project have also been replicated in other districts of Punjab. Our study has shed light on how the citizens of Sialkot see these services and how much convenience and ease these have added into their lives? These aspects are important to investigate as the main objectives of the redesigned services were to make citizens’ lives simpler and easier. This study has presented an empirical examination of the perception of the digital government by the people of Sialkot and how successful these services have been in fulfilling the objective of providing essential services to the people in a respectable manner at their doorsteps where they should not be compelled to visit the government offices. Variables on digital services such as frequency of usage, timely response from the service providers, courteous behaviour of the dealing officials, satisfaction levels of users, ex ante difficulty level in getting the services, convenience in usage of services, positive impact on users’ lives, reduction in number of visits to the government offices and replicability of the services were measured through a district-wide survey using simple random sampling technique. Through in-depth semi-structured interviews, we have also investigated the planning behind the digital government services introduced in Sialkot and the strategies used to overcome the barriers for implementation. We have aimed to answer specific research questions such as: What are the perceptions of the digital government project among the citizens? How effective the project has been in meeting its goals? How resources were mobilized for the project? How were barriers removed in the conception and implementation phases of the project? Our intention is to inspire a constructive debate and to help government not only in Pakistan but also other developing countries understand the importance of digital government and the potential of improving people’s lives through this. We are also aiming to understand how digital government is perceived by the most important stakeholders, that is, the citizens in a developing country. Digital government is not mature in Pakistan although e-government has been there for almost two decades in organizations such as the Directorate of Information Technology and Federal Board of Revenue, at the national level. The interventions we have examined in this chapter, fall under the purview of digital government and provide an ideal opportunity to analyse how people feel when they are able to participate in policy implementation with the help of everyday ICTs and NTM.

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5   E-Government Versus Digital Government This chapter has delved deep into a digital government project introduced in Pakistani settings. The application of this concept is new in Pakistan although e-government projects have been working in various government departments of the country for some time. For example, Pakistan Railways, Directorate of Information Technology, Federal Board of Revenue and Provincial Excise and Taxation departments. These organizations have put some of their services in an online environment as part of the e-government initiatives of various governments in Pakistan. Before going into the details of the digital government interventions at Sialkot, we would like to shed some light on how digital government differentiates itself from e-government. E-government has been defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as, “the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs), and particularly the Internet, to achieve better government” (OECD, 2003, p. 11). E-government can be seen as the use of various technology tools to improve efficiency of government with better online access to information and quality of service and delivering the services to citizens on their terms and convenience. The major focus of e-government has been on efficiency and productivity in delivering the services. Initially, e-government activities had revolved around simply putting information and services online. However, with the passage of time, it has been realized that e-government needs to do more than just putting information and services online, and emerging technologies can be used as powerful instruments to transform the structures, processes and cultures of government organizations. There is a lot of room to make government services more transparent and user-oriented with the help of ICTs. The e-government literature is filled with transformational promises, arguing, for example, that we are in the middle of a once-in-a century transformation of government, enabled by unprecedented technological advances (Eggers, 2007). However, the traditional e-­government utopia of a unified government portal, for instance, no longer suffices, at least not on its own (Linders et al., 2018). Advances in consumer ICTs ranging from cell phones to social media are continuous phenomena of today. Sophisticated innovations like cloud and big data carry a lot of promise for reshaping citizen expectations and technological possibilities. Moreover, mass adoption of ICTs by the citizens into the way they live, work and play has connected them to an

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unprecedented scale along with greater expectations and NTM from service providers in private and public sectors. These developments present big challenges and opportunities for e-government efforts. The problem, of course, is that citizens on a daily basis are interacting with a range of public agencies and it is not realistic and efficient for these agencies to send their officials to the door steps of the people to ascertain if someone needs a service or not. It is considered citizens’ responsibility to visit the appropriate government offices at the right time and sequence to get their problems resolved. E-government aims to address this complexity by providing services through a single platform for wide range of services. However, as problems move up the complexity chain, a more advanced approach utilizing NTM and involving the citizens, for co-production and co-creation of policy, is required. This realization has led to the development of the concept of digital government which OECD considers as integrating digital technologies and reuse of data in core processes and activities of government in order to establish new ways of working and promoting greater openness and collaboration (OECD, 2019). Digital government, therefore, has taken e-government to the next level by focusing on governance, openness, transparency, engagement with and trust in government in addition to efficiency and productivity. It has made citizen-­government relationship more transactional, transformative and translucent in favor of the citizen. Figure  1 captures the progression from traditional analogue government to digital government through e-government. To become fully digital is challenging on several counts. First, governments need to adopt digital technologies and use data as vital components of their strategies to modernize the public sector. Second, integration of

Analogue government Closed operations and internal focus, analogue procedures

E-government

Digital government

Greater transparency and usercentred approaches, ICT-enabled procedures

Open and user-driven approaches, process and operational transformations

Fig. 1  Progression towards digital government. (Source: Adapted from OECD (2019))

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digital technologies and data into the core procedures, processes and activities is needed for promoting openness and collaboration and new ways of doing things. Third, digital technologies are not to be seen as merely tools to digitize archaic government processes and having fancy online portals offering public services online. Rather governments need to utilize technologies and data to redesign public services through more citizen-centric approaches. Eventually, a transformed public governance, using digital technologies, should produce outcomes that best meet user needs (OECD, 2014). Research evidence from developed countries shows that digital government uses latest mobile technologies and rampant connectivity as the primary delivery channel. With the dawn of the age of ubiquitous mobile connectivity, governments have a channel to reach their people anytime as they carry their mobile phones everywhere. Moreover, not only mobile phones but other mobile smart devices such as tabs and iPads are now fully integrated into the everyday lives of the people. Millard (2010) has explained how mobile phones give new impetus to personalization and developing completely new upside-down business models starting from the needs of citizens. A clear depiction of NTM. Hence, a greater need to involve the people in delivering public services. Digital government is in fact more than just involving people. It employs new advances in data analytics to enable its core components of deep personalization and proactive problem identification (Linders et al., 2018). Effective use of innovations for data analytics, therefore, affords new opportunities to uncover the needs of a society and individual citizens in a proactive manner and develop services shaped around the citizens’ preferences, habits, needs and demands. Linders et  al. (2018) have explained that digital government is user driven and aims to deliver low-touch, seamless “services without boundaries.” Services are orchestrated in such a way that the users do not need to navigate bureaucratic structures and instead only have to react at key points (e.g. perform an action upon request or when they observe something which needs government’s response) while automated workflows take care of the sequencing of agency requests and actions—in a way, rendering the bureaucracy ‘invisible’ (Millard, 2013). Digital government is, however, challenging as it requires a shift in government thinking and a move away from a government structure based on siloes and administrative fiefdoms toward NTM.

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6   Case Background Prior studies on Pakistan are limited to e-government projects and have highlighted various barriers such as government, citizen, structural and cultural for the smooth implementation of these projects (see Qaisar & Khan, 2010). Strategies to overcome these barriers have also been proposed in the relevant studies. Digital government is a recent phenomenon in Pakistan and its introduction in district Sialkot gave us the unique opportunity to produce scholarship on this understudied area in the country for the benefit of researchers and practitioners alike. Our research is a pioneer study in the domain of digital government in Pakistan. From an academic perspective, it adds to the existing body of knowledge on digital government which is primarily focused on developed and richer countries with very different political, social, economic and cultural forces at play as compared to developing countries. By investigating a case in Pakistan, we have brought to the fore the issues and challenges relevant to the developing countries. From the angle of practitioners, we have highlighted the importance for developing countries to start experimenting at small scale with affordable ICTs to better streamline their services and involve citizens in the policy process, before scaling out. District Sialkot is situated in the north-east region of the province of Punjab in Pakistan. It is the fourth largest industrial city of Pakistan and is famous for its exports of surgical instruments, leather products, textiles and sports goods.1 The expertise of the city in sports goods is particularly well known around the world. For example, the soccer balls named ‘Brazuca’ used in FIFA World Cup 2014 at Brazil and ‘Telstar 18’ used in FIFA World Cup 2018 at Russia were manufactured for Adidas by a company named Forward Sports in Sialkot. High-quality cricket bats and precision surgical instruments are also exported from Sialkot. The extent of the wealth and the strength of the business community of Sialkot can also be gauged by the fact that South Asia’s first private sector international airport was built by the industrialists  of the city on their  own after the successive governments in Pakistan had failed to recognize the demands of the business community of Sialkot for an international airport. Eventually, the private sector came together in 2001 and raised resources to get the 1  In 2019, Pakistan’s total exports were US$ 22.9 billion. For 2019, the foreign exchange earned by Pakistan from the various exports of Sialkot was US$ 2.25 billion. Reported in the Business Recorder. Available at https://fp.brecorder.com/2019/07/20190703493834/. Accessed on 1 May, 2020.

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international airport constructed by 2007. The population of the district according to the 2017 census was approximately 3.89 million and it is geographically subdivided into four tehsils, namely, Daska, Pasrur, Sambrial and Sialkot. In the last quarter of 2018, the district administration of Sialkot headed by its Deputy Commissioner launched a digital government project in an attempt to improve the public service delivery and delegate some roles of the government to the citizens. An effort employing NTM. The overarching aim of all these initiatives was to use technology and data to strengthen the role of citizenry in governance, provide basic services to them at their doorsteps and create an environment of trust and openness between the government and the people. These aims clearly marked a shift toward digital government in Sialkot with the goal of transforming it into a citizen friendly district of Pakistan.

7   Digital Government Services Introduced in Sialkot Figure 2 shows the services with their main features introduced at Sialkot. We will now discuss each one of them. 1. Qeemat Sialkot (Price Sialkot) Qeemat Sialkot2 (Price Sialkot) was an app that could be downloaded easily on any smartphone. It became so popular among the users that the government of the Punjab launched it on the provincial scale after renaming it as Qeemat Punjab (Price Punjab) in July 2019. It has easy to use features and helps the district administration of all the districts in Punjab keep a check on the price of essential items of daily usage with the help of the citizens by using NTM. Price control was an extremely important issue in Pakistan given the high levels of inflation the country was experiencing for several years before the introduction of the project at Sialkot.3

2  It has now been replicated across Punjab and the name of the app is now Qeemat Punjab and not Qeemat Sialkot. 3  Headline CPI inflation (2007–2008 = 100) was recorded at a level of 11.6% on year-onyear basis in August 2019. Available at http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/inflation_ Monitor/2019/Aug/IM_Aug_2019.pdf. Accessed on 27 September, 2019.

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Qeemat Sialkot Mobile App

Sarkar Sialkot Mobile App

• Official prices of essentail kitchen items notified on monthly basis • Official prices of major fruits and vegetables notified daily at 8 am • Citizens can complain on quality, hoarding or overcharging of the commodities • Price magistrates raid and report the punitive action taken directly to the complainant within 24 hours

• Contact details of government officials of various departments • Land Revenue Officer, Secretary Union Council, Station House Officer Police Station, Incharge Basic Health Unit, School Headmaster, etc • Complaint against not responding or misbehavior can also be lodged

Salam Sialkot Saaf Suthra Mobile App Sialkot Photo • Information on Complaint 18 services provided by and departments in Response the district System • Domicile, Passport, Identity Card, Birth/Death Certificates, Agricultural Loans, etc. • Fees, documents required, processing time, name and contact details of officers concerned

• Citizens can take pictures of filth/garbage in the street and send to Waste Management Company • Within 6 hours action taken and pictures of the cleaned spot sent back to the complainant

313

Sialkot Patient Referral System

Sialkot Litigation Tracking System

• Information about patient referral in real time at departure and reception points coordinated between primary and secondary healthcare facilities through a dynamic mobile app

• Record of all the cases pending in the revenue courts of Sialkot • Information about the next date of hearing regarding a citizen's case on the fingertips

Fig. 2  Services introduced at Sialkot as part of digital government

The monthly maximum prices of essential kitchen items such as lentils, flour, rice, eggs, mutton, beef, milk, etc. are made public through the Qeemat Punjab app. Moreover, maximum rates of major seasonal fruits and vegetables are notified on daily basis through this app. Common citizens play a pivotal role for implementation of price controls through this app. A complaint about overcharging, hoarding, or substandard sale of any of the notified commodities can be lodged through this app. The geo-­ mapped ICT-based system directs the complaint to the concerned zonal price magistrate, who has to visit the shop or the cart about which the complaint has been made and take the remedial action after on-spot verification of the complaint, within 24 hours. The price magistrate tracks the location through google coordinates received by him through the complaint and is obliged to either issue warning, impose fine, shut down the sale point or arrest the culprit vendor, based on the extent of the violation of anti-profiteering or food safety laws. The action taken by the price

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magistrate is sent back to the complainant in the next six hours, to ensure government responsiveness. This citizen-led governance model replaces citizen’s physical contact with the government functionary to get the service. It saves the citizen the time, resources and effort to lodge and follow up on his complaint, physical or telephonically, which at times cost self-­ respect and dignity, besides time and money, in such underdeveloped government settings. The internal records of the district administration showed that during the month of July 2019, a fine of PKR 4.1 million was collected and 36 people were arrested and sent to jail under the law for overcharging. 2. Sarkar Sialkot (Government Sialkot) Sarkar Sialkot is an app containing the contact information along with the pictures of government officials from five major departments (education, health, local government, revenue and police) having the highest exposure with citizens, for getting different services. For example, the frontline bureaucracy, that is, revenue officials, secretary union council, in charge basic health unit, station house officer of police station, school headmaster, etc. Office addresses and contact details such as office telephone number and mobile number can be easily accessed through this app. Citizens can call the concerned officials for discussing their issues and problems. Complaints about rude behaviour or non-responsiveness of the officials can also be lodged by the citizens through this app. A strict monthly monitoring plan has been introduced to keep a check over the call response rate of the officials. At the launching of this app during the month of January 2019, the response rate of the officials, that is, picking up the phone and attending to citizens’ requests, was only 13%. Due to strict actions taken by the district administration, on the complaints of the citizens, the response rate went up to 53% in July 2019. A monthly audit is in place to monitor the response rates. 3. Salam Sialkot (Greetings Sialkot) Salam Sialkot is a mobile app which contains information on 18 public services provided by 12 relevant government departments in the district. The categories and the services on which information is provided are:

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(a) Citizen services such as domicile, passport, computerized national identity card, character certificate (b) Local government services such as birth certificate, death certificate, marriage certificate and divorce certificate (c) Revenue services such as fard issuance (ownership document) and mutation of land (d) Education services such as admission criteria for various classes and fees of schools (e) Financial services such as zakat and ushr (Islamic taxes), social welfare, bait-ul-maal (treasury for helping the poor and needy) and agricultural loans (f) Employment services like job bank, job matching, deployment and job monitoring for unemployed citizens Names and contact numbers of concerned government officials, eligibility criteria, documents required, office timings, processing times, fees, etc. are available to the citizens online, through mobile app. They do not need to visit the government offices or government functionaries to get the information and can simply prepare their cases at home and visit the office once everything is in order and complete to get a particular service from a specific agency. The first retrospective, quarterly, in-house periodic review revealed that on average 25 to 30 citizens were availing these services daily at the time of data collection for this chapter. 4. Saaf Suthra Sialkot (Clean Sialkot) Saaf Suthra Sialkot is a mobile app designed to keep Sialkot neat and clean with the help of citizens’ involvement. Through this participatory governance-based digital tool and NTM, the citizens can take and send pictures of any filth heaps, water blockage, stagnant polluted or rainwater causing environmental hazards in their vicinity. The staff of the Sialkot Waste Management Company (SWMC) within six working hours goes to the spot, removes the garbage or filth and sends back the pictures of the cleaned spot to the complainant. Google coordinates are used for exact location of the spot from where the picture was generated by a complainant. On average, more than 600 complaints were being addressed monthly through this digital intervention; the complaint resolution rate was at 91.3%, while the citizen satisfaction rate was measured at 83.7%.

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5. Sialkot Patient Referral System Sialkot patient referral system is a unique digital intervention used via a dynamic mobile app which helps coordinate between the primary, secondary, and tertiary health care infrastructure for patient referral up along the hierarchical healthcare facilities depending upon the complexity and urgency of the ailment.4 Information is transmitted in real time between the departure point, that is, the primary healthcare unit and the recipient destination, that is, the secondary or tertiary healthcare facility about the patient referral. It was deemed necessary to introduce this service allowing the receiving healthcare facility to make available the requisite arrangements like emergency response to patients, bed space, diagnostic testing, availability of specialist doctor, or surgical theatre, etc. by the time a critical patient arrives at the referred facility. These are patients that have complicated or critical illness or have met emergency situations like road trauma or heart attack and the closest primary health facilities do not have resources and expertise to provide them sufficient medical services. On average, the distance between the healthcare facilities was observed to be 50 km, consuming two-hour travel time, given the poor road condition in the district. Further, earlier, patients were kept waiting for the emergency response for hours in the referred facilities upon arrival for want of making necessary arrangements. But with the help of this ICT-­ coordinated digital system, the referred hospitals were prepared to receive the patient benefitting from the time difference between the departure, which is notified the moment the patient is set off from referring facility, and the arrival time at the referred to facility. On average, 43 patients are referred up along the administrative healthcare hierarchies per day, and the number is rising with the capacity strengthening of the system. 6. Sialkot Litigation Tracking System This app contains the record of all land revenue related cases pending in the revenue courts across district Sialkot. The parties involved in the cases of mutation, correction of record, inheritance, etc., can get 4  Primary healthcare units are small medical facilities in the tehsils where major treatments cannot be provided. Secondary healthcare facilities are either located at the tehsil headquarters or district headquarters and have treatment facilities for major emergencies and traumas. Tertiary healthcare includes major hospitals of the country.

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information about the next date of hearing of the court proceeding, interim-­orders, judgments and deferrals, etc. to ensure transparency and citizen convenience online, through the app, without being compelled to visit courts. On average, more than 8000 such contending parties in revenue suits are benefitting from this digital interactive platform, hence, saving them time, resources and inconvenience. Seeing the potential, scope and benefits of the app., the Punjab government has also started scaling this IT-initiative out, province-wide, since February 2020.

8   Methodology and Data Through surveys of citizens and focus group semi-structured interviews of relevant government agencies, we have brought out various ex ante and ex post aspects of the entire project at Sialkot. We aimed to answer specific research questions such as: What are the perceptions of the digital government project among the citizens? How effective has the project been in meeting its goals? How were resources mobilized for the project? How were barriers removed in the conception and implementation phases? For investigating the effectiveness of the project and measuring citizens’ perceptions we used surveys. Over a period of one week (21 August to 27 August 2019), survey data were collected across the four tehsils (rural and urban) of Sialkot district, that is, Daska, Pasrur, Sambrial and Sialkot. The surveys were filled anonymously and the respondents were not required to give any information which could reveal their identity. Random sampling technique was used for getting a representative sample of the entire district. People were randomly approached, so that everyone had an equal chance to be selected in our sample, to fill the surveys at public places (bus stops, hospitals, shopping malls, restaurants, tea bars, and district and tehsil courts), homes, places of employment and educational institutions at different times of the day. First part of the survey collected data on variables like age, education level, smartphone ownership, awareness and source of information of the digital government services in Sialkot. The second part of the survey used a five-point Likert scale. Data were collected on variables such as frequency of usage of the services, satisfaction levels, behaviour of the staff providing the services, convenience of usage, effects of services on people’s daily lives and whether the services should be replicated in other parts of Punjab. Respondents were asked to record their response on a scale ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘consistently’ and ‘do not agree’ to ‘agree’ depending on the question. Responses were quantified for the purpose of analysis. The

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total number of surveys collected (sample size) was 225. The response rate was about 70%. Data for the last two research questions were generated through focus group semi-structured interviews and in-depth presentations from the officials of various departments involved in digital government at Sialkot. Interviews were scheduled in advance and conducted from mid-August 2019 to end August 2019. We also collected information through detailed analysis of planning and design documents used internally by the district administration of Sialkot. The major departments participating in the focus group interviews were revenue, health, education, police, passport/ identity card and SWMC.  Copious notes were taken during the focus group interviews as recording was not allowed. Open-ended questions were asked from the participants and dichotomous questions which could be answered with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ were avoided. Many questions were framed with the ‘think back’ philosophy and not asking the participants about the future. Questions sequentially proceeded from general to specific to get insights about resource mobilization and removal of barriers. Based on Eynon and Dutton (2007), we came up with a set of questions for the participants of focus groups regarding barriers to digital government—from the supply side—such as legal, technological or institutional. These barriers are discussed in the literature as impeding supply of services by acting as hurdles or disincentives for public organization to provide digital government services. Taking lead from Meijer (2014), the first set of questions from the focus group participants regarding overcoming barriers were related to the idea generation phase (conception of the project). As pointed out by Dougherty (1992), it is in this phase that many actors will not be prepared to change the way they have been viewing themselves, others and the world. Our questions were related to how the interpretive barriers in this stage were overcome. The next set of questions was related to the idea selection phase because organizational resources and attention are always scarce. Margetts and Dunleavy (2002) have argued that in this stage it is important to overcome political and organizational barriers as the idea of digital government needs to compete with other ideas for attention and resources. Then we moved to the idea-testing phase (implementation of the project). Eynon and Margetts (2007) have explained how idea is usually tested on a small scale to see its practicality and it is important to understand how technological, institutional and organizational barriers are removed in this

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phase. The next set of questions asked the participants about the idea promotion phase to get digital government implemented at a larger scale. Bekkers et al. (2011) and Rogers (1995) have discussed how in this phase, financial and capacity barriers may prevent the process of innovation from moving forward. Lastly, we asked questions about the idea roll-out phase where technological and organizational barriers again come into play (Eynon & Margetts, 2007). Questions at each stage were specific; however, general questions regarding personnel capacity, leadership, political support and inter-organizational issues at each stage were also asked. Interviews were coded and themes were fleshed out manually.

9   Results We believe that the results and findings from this research may have profound implications for the formulation and implementation of policies for digital government in developing countries. We now move to the survey findings. Table 1 shows the results about the general characteristic of the sample along with smartphone penetration and awareness of digital services in Sialkot. The data collected through this part of the survey clearly revealed that about 90% (203/225) of the surveyed were owners of smartphones as well as aware of the digital government services (202/225) being provided—main requisites for availing the services launched in the district. As far as the source of information about the digital government services was concerned (not shown in the table), 94 respondents mentioned the advertisement material by the district administration as their source of information followed by social media (58 respondents) and friends/ relatives (41 respondents). Only 17 respondents mentioned electronic media such as radio and television and eight respondents mentioned other sources as their sources of information. This means that advertisement and social media are important vehicles of mass communication today. The finding about social media confirms that generally there is high usage of smartphones in Sialkot and people can be communicated effectively through various social media channels. The results of the second part of the survey which captured the various dimensions of the user experience and general perception are shown in Tables 2 and 3. More than half of those surveyed were less than or equal to moderate users (58%) of the digital services and about 41% were frequent to

Min

225

Mean

Median Max

Education level

Secondary and higher Bachelor’s and secondary above 18 years 32 years 30 years 59 years 84 133

Age

Observations (n)

Table 1  General information on the respondents

203

Smartphone ownership

202

Awareness of digital services

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Table 2  User experience Frequency of usage of digital services

Timely response form service providers

Not at all Frequently Below Above to to average average moderate consistently to to good average 58% 41% 35% 60%

Courteous behaviour of officials Below average to average 24%

Satisfaction level of users

Above Low to average moderate to good 70% 32%

Difficulty in getting the services before digitization

High Low to to moderate very high 61% 42%

High to very high 52%

Note: The percentages in the two sub-columns of a single dimension do not add up to 100% as some of the respondents did not reply. The data had some missing values

Table 3  General perception Convenience in the usage of digital services

Positive impact on lives due to digital services

Not at all to neutral

Convenient to highly convenient

25%

74%

Do not agree to neutral 26%

Reduction in number Replication of the of trips to government digital services in offices after other parts of Punjab introduction of digital services

Somewhat Do not agree to agree to agree neutral

Somewhat Do not Somewhat agree to agree to agree to agree neutral agree

74%

73%

23%

17%

81%

Note: The percentages in the two sub-columns of a single dimension do not add to 100% as some of the respondents did not reply. The data had some missing values

consistent users. In terms of timely response, around one-third (35%) felt that it was below average and about one quarter (24%) were not happy with the behaviour of the staff providing the services; 61% of the respondents were highly satisfied from the services and 52% agreed that before the introduction of digital government in Sialkot, they faced high to very high levels of difficulty in getting these services. Nearly 74% of the respondents rated the services as convenient to highly convenient and also believed that these have made a positive impact on their lives; 73% of those surveyed reported that these services have reduced their number of trips to the government offices. Finally, a large portion of respondents (81%) were of the view that these services should be replicated across Punjab.

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The focus group interviews as part of our methodology had two purposes: to explore how resources were mobilized and how barriers in conception and implementation were removed. Surveys, on the other hand, were used to measure perceptions about the project. Majority of the focus group participants explained that the bureaucratic leadership of the district played an instrumental role in removing the technical and financial barriers at the implementation stage. The head of the district administration, that is, the Deputy Commissioner was quick in sanctioning funds for buying hardware and software and was in close contact with the political leadership of the district for getting removed any bottlenecks from legal perspective. The apps were developed by the Punjab Information Technology Board and the team of the Deputy Commissioner’s office was quite effective in getting those developed in a timely manner at a cost of PKR 5 million (US$ 31,000 approx.). This seems to be a reasonable cost as we have earlier mentioned that Qeemat Punjab generated PKR 4.1 million as fine revenue for the government just in the month of July 2019. The participants also pointed out the provision of smartphones to staff such as price magistrates and SWMC in a timely manner and without any delays. However, several of the participants pointed out that during the idea generation and idea selection phases, the interpretive barriers were not removed so effectively and the officers of district administration remained in the driving seat as compared to other departments because of the structure of the civil service in a district. A clear depiction and manifestation of HTM. High power distance culture is prevalent in district administration and the ideas and contentions of senior officers could not be challenged much by the subordinate staff. Moreover, the participants also pointed out that idea testing phase was not implemented in a very enthusiastic manner. This created several administrative issues as officials were not ready for getting large number of complaints through Qeemat Sialkot and then responding in a timely manner (within 24  hours). Complaints through Qeemat Sialkot involved liaison with the local police to raid and impose penalties and police was also not ready for this quick response as they have other duties to do. Generally, the participants agreed that idea testing could have improved the full roll out and helped identify problems of coordination in a better manner. Participants also showed some dissatisfaction with inter-organizational coordination and explained that the office of the Deputy Commissioner, which is the lead office in this project, is overburdened with many other things which sometimes created coordination issues.

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10   Findings The feedback of the digital government services was reasonably positive, across the district as shown by the responses of the citizens belonging to all the four tehsils of Sialkot and rural as well as urban areas of the district. The services have improved convenience and access to the government besides having a positive signalling effect that district administration is mindful of the ideas of participatory, citizen-friendly and responsive government which are important for NTM.  The district administration has endeavoured to connect with its citizens through the concept of digital government and tried to resolve their issues with their help. Digital government in Sialkot has proactively sought a complementary role of technology by using ICTs to empower civil servants to deliver holistic and inclusive services. Back office operations and repetitive functions have been optimized to a good extent to free civil servants to embed themselves in the community to proactively identify needs of the citizens and deliver holistic services. As envisaged in the current literature (Dawes, 2008; Dunleavy et al., 2006; Milakovich, 2012), Sialkot’s administration has tried to use digital government to help government to strengthen interactions with citizens and societal actors to solve societal problems collectively. Millard (2013, p.  85) has argued, “equally important to empowering citizens is to empower public sector staff” who “see the real time performance and impact of public services” on citizens and who can accordingly help improve the “service experience if they were given the data, tools, and incentives to do so.” There has been a reasonable attempt by Sialkot administration through HTM to equip the staff with data, tools and incentives for getting effective outcomes. For example, Internet-enabled smartphones have been given to the price magistrates, SWMC employees and primary and secondary healthcare units in the Sialkot patient referral system. Incentives like cash rewards are awarded to good performers who respond to citizens timely and effectively through Sarkar Sialkot and Salam Sialkot apps. The closely and regularly monitored citizen feedback is leveraged upon to notify monthly performance charts of the departments and the officials to engender concepts of result-based management and restructure the incentive system to performance based, accordingly. Based on the research evidence collected, we, therefore, argue that the digital government services in Sialkot are a first step towards a potential

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system of governance in Pakistan which could be data driven and context-­ sensitive for enabling deep personalization and anticipating needs of the citizens. If the process continues in a sustainable manner, it can ultimately make use of the data such as individualized citizen insights to customize government’s menu of services for individual needs and circumstances. Sialkot is a trend setter in the domain of digital government and based on learnings from here, Punjab can roll out more services in different geographical parts of the province like it has done in the case of Qeemat Sialkot and is currently doing for Litigation Tracking System. Subsequently, other provinces can also replicate these services. Digital government in Sialkot has tried to come up with an array of citizen-centric services for improving the lives of the people. However, the data regarding a large portion of respondents in the ‘not at all’ to ‘moderate’ categories of frequency of usage of services implies three things. First, many people are still not used to the modern way for accessing the services provided under the digital government project. Second, people may not have high trust in government and have privacy concerns about their information being misused through apps. Third, the services introduced in Sialkot only cater to the needs of some segments of the society and people in general are not using these services. More research needs to be done to ascertain how important these services are for the public at large. Trust levels between the government and the citizens is not high in developing countries and for sustainability of digital government, evidence needs to be collected on what aspects must be improved as far as trust levels are concerned. It needs to be clearly understood that for digital government to sustain, an environment needs to be created where all stakeholders cooperate in the co-production and co-creation of services through NTM.

11   Conclusions Our research findings suggest that it is extremely important to understand that transformation is a complex issue and there are no universal approaches to lead the process (Klievink & Janssen, 2009). It is better to progress incrementally while experimenting and letting evolution proceed organically rather than taking grand transformative steps based on abstract visions and aspirational theoretical constructs of questionable credibility (Coursey & Norris, 2008). As policy-makers and implementers move from e-government to digital government, lessons need to be learned

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from practical experiences and experiments with digital government. Academic insights combined with these lessons are the pragmatic way forward. The digital government project at Sialkot is the first step toward transforming it into a citizen-friendly district in Pakistan. The potential of this step is already bringing some positive results as seen through our survey data and decision of the provincial government of Punjab to replicate at least two of these services on a province-wide scale. We have also come to know that the third, Saaf Suthra Sialkot will also be replicated in Punjab soon. Our analysis of the digital government at Sialkot has further revealed that the main goal for the services introduced at the district is to bring out the government agencies out of their fiefdoms and mesh provision of basic public services across erstwhile tight silos in which these agencies operated. This has a strong potential to resolve the issues of a duplication of effort and reduction in cognitive burdens and the compliance costs placed on the citizens or private firms while navigating through complex, hierarchical government bureaucracies (Dunleavy et al., 2006). The implementation of digital government requires an approach where technology should be used to redesign the services. District administration at Sialkot has tried to follow this principle in at least three of the services, that is, Qeemat Sialkot, Saaf Suthra Sialkot and Patient Referral System. Whereas services such as Sarkar Sialkot, Salam Sialkot and Litigation System are part of a positive development; they can be categorized under the umbrella of e-government rather than digital government. While augmenting the physical infrastructure for the former three services, there has been a parallel effort to simplify and integrate administrative processes such as cutting down on forms and regulations and streamlining back end functions. The simplification of the services has been able to proactively guide the users rather smoothly through what was otherwise a bureaucratic maze. This guidance is playing an instrumental role in helping the population to get services in a convenient and respectable manner without requiring interactions with a multitude of agencies. The survey results also showed that in the past at least 52% respondents faced high to very high levels of difficulty in getting various services which have now become part of digital government. Our presentation with various agencies informed that it was the complexity of the bureaucracy which made it too complicated to contact the right agency and resolve public issues in a timely and convenient manner.

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Digital government strategies have recognized that some sectors of the society especially in developing countries have fewer opportunities than others in accessing the digital services due to age, personal preferences or geography. We find this phenomenon applicable in Sialkot as well as the frequency of usage in high to very high category remained at 41% only. Around 59% people use these services from ‘not at all’ to ‘moderate levels’. This is true despite the smartphone ownership rates and awareness rates of the services both standing at 91%. More research is required to understand the causes of the usage rates and add or remove services which are not preferred by the citizens. There may be some citizen barriers at play here or the citizens need some other services. As more evidence comes through research, steps may need to be taken to remove citizen barriers which have been highlighted in the current literature (Margetts & Dunleavy, 2002). For example, if citizens do not expect much from a government or they do not trust in, their willingness to interact with digital means will be minimal. Sialkot’s implementation of digital government offers insightful examples for how governments of developing countries may capitalize on new opportunities presented by innovative ICTs to move beyond the e-­government in pursuit of effective service delivery, operational efficiency, and digital inclusion of their people. Too often we tend to see technology as a goal in itself. We need to be careful. Motivating citizens’ technological frames are not enough and we need to connect technological opportunities to the production of value. Framing digital government in terms of its contributions to a society is essential for its success. In line with Selznick (1957), we believe that convincing stories and leadership may be of crucial importance as citizens need to be convinced of the need to change their belief and value systems and to adopt new routines in the use of new technologies. Lastly, external selling of digital government to the citizens is as important as internal selling to the civil servants.

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Disaster Management Reforms in Pakistan Aisha Azhar

1   Introduction Disaster management is the organization and management of the resources and responsibilities for dealing with all humanitarian aspects of emergencies (preparedness, response, mitigation, and recovery). The aim is to reduce the harmful effects of all hazards, including natural or man-made disasters. Pakistan, as a developing and less-resourced country, faces huge amount of risk posed by natural and man-made disasters. Natural disasters include floods, landslides, flood, earthquakes, droughts and cyclones; whereas threats caused by man-made disasters consist of terrorism, health epidemics, civil conflicts, political movements, and challenges associated with a high number of internally displaced populations (IDPs). Disaster management has been identified as one of the major domain to work on in the past one and a half decades in Pakistan. Considerable and sound management is required to deal with the aftermath of the disasters

A. Azhar (*) School of Governance and Society, University of Management and Technology, Lahore, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_14

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in Pakistan. The response programs initiated by the government sometimes contradict, overlap, and even replicate in certain scenarios. As a result of which, ordinary citizens are impacted in such times. The ideal coordination system would be of aligned services so that people could escape further misery. This finds a strong theoretical basis in hierarchal mechanism of coordination that ensures applicability of services under complete control thereby making it efficient. If a government fails to exercise coordination through control in the times of disaster, it doesn’t deliver what is the need of the hour. A quick look at the history of disasters in the last one decade shows that Pakistan has been hit by three major disasters: earthquake (2005), floods (2010, 2012), and droughts (2000). Man-made disasters include, among the most prominent ones, the brutal killing of the students and teachers of Army Public School (APS) and the forced migration of local natives from Swat to other places as a result of military operations in the local areas (2008) and from Waziristan in 2007 (Table 1). These examples suggest that Pakistan has become extremely vulnerable to man-made and natural disasters. National, international, and nongovernmental organizations work quite effectively to address the post disaster conditions. However, results indicate that most of the disaster management work is performed generally with the help of international or national volunteer agencies that primarily focus on addressing immediate needs and do not completely perform the recovery phases of disaster management. Furthermore, the phases of preparedness for the next disasters are either not carried out at all or are performed with least funds and attention. The central pattern of interaction in the institutional arrangement of the disaster management institutions in Pakistan is hierarchical. The Table 1  List of natural disasters: losses and damages Natural disasters

Floods 2017 Floods 2016 KP Earthquake 2015 Floods 2012 Massive floods 2010

Losses and damages Deaths

Injuries

Houses damaged

271 153 272 571 1985

359 113 856 2902 2946

996 1452 96,152 636,438 16,02,765

Source: National Disaster Response Plan 2019

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authority is operationalized in administrative orders, rules and planning, on the one hand, and dominance and authority as the basic control system, on the other hand. Although the emergency management institutions have attempted to undertake market-oriented approach with the involvement of private sector and international nongovernmental organizations, the coordination mechanisms rely primarily on authority and power as fundamental processes and resources. The implementation mechanisms and coordination of strategic issues among local and international agencies are majorly controlled by political leaders. The subordinate agencies also fail to align their activities with those of bureaucratic and political government. The control exercised by the politicians is often imperfect, and hence the bureaucratic elements of hierarchy may dominate aimed toward effectiveness, but there are still attempts by the politicians to rule. When a disaster strikes, it creates a need for extreme coordination among all levels of relief activities. In other words, the management framework to address the post disaster relief needs is extremely weak. In order to effectively manage and lessen the effects of all such vulnerabilities, it is necessary to devise a multidimensional and comprehensive approach for pre- and post-disaster-related events.

2   History of Disaster Management in Pakistan Pakistan has a population of 197 million and total land area of 796,095 sq. km. The country is highly susceptible to natural and man-made disasters due to its topography, geographical location, high population levels, and rapid urbanization. The brief history reveals that Pakistan has been hit repeatedly by the natural disasters including floods, earthquakes, cyclones, droughts and landslides. In addition to this, the country is continuously affected by the other types of disasters including fires, disease epidemics, industrial disasters, road, rail and air accidents, and civil and military armed conflicts. Factors like weak emergency response systems, extremely poor infrastructure, and high levels of poverty further aggravate the effect of these disasters, particularly in rural areas with weak coping mechanisms. The early history of disaster management in Pakistan dates back to the time of independence. Soon after independence, there was an urgent need to establish institutions for disaster management. The National Economic Council (NEC) took the initiative of National five-year plan (1955–2003)

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Table 2 Disaster management evolution

1955–1960 Calamity Act 1971 2005 2007 2010

Emergency Relief Cell (ERC) Federal Relief Commission National Disaster Management Ordinance NDMA

to administer and manage uncertain conditions with preparedness (Khan & Khan, 2008) (Table 2). The first plan (1955–1960) was merely based on improving the agricultural sector of Pakistan through better sanitation measures and protection of agriculture from saline waters. The five-year plans did not show much achievement in the sector of managing disasters. There was no investment in physical infrastructure as well as human resource. In 1970–1975, NEC felt the need to upgrade the plans to control the floods and epidemics. After 1983, few improvements were seen in disaster management with workable plans to achieve physical targets as well as sustainable and legislative goals. By the end of 2003, the state enabled itself to improve the sustainable, health and environmental goals through improvised objectives and policy-making. A ten-year plan was launched with an investment of Rs 11, 287 billion to target the millennium development goals. Throughout its history, the disaster management approach had largely remained reactive in Pakistan until the earthquake calamity hit the country in 2005. The sudden state of catastrophe forced the state to come up with a productive initiative of establishing Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA), which would work to provide post disaster management and assessment. In 2010, the Disaster Act 2006 was promulgated by the approval of the assembly as National Disaster Management Ordinance (NDM), according to which the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) was established at the federal level to deal with disaster preparedness and management. Subsequently, the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) and District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA) were created to implement the disaster management plan. In the last one and a half decades, Pakistan has been affected by a series of natural disasters, including the 2005 earthquake and major floods in 2010, and 2012. These disasters cost millions, devastating large-scale

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infrastructure, housing, agriculture, livestock, and equipment, and killing thousands of humans and livelihoods. These disasters had led to the loss of major state infrastructure and large-scale temporary population dislocation, thus aggravating existing gaps in educational and health services that ultimately resulted in the reduction of living standards and increased level of poverty. The situation further exposed the lack of coordination that existed among the departments. It also implied the need for cooperation among the government departments in times of disasters to accelerate the recovery process. Due to the series of repeated large-scale disasters, Pakistan had to introduce forced changes at policy level as well as in the development of institutional infrastructure. This decision was coherent with the hierarchal mechanism of coordination that entails authority and control over the processes (Bouckaert, 2010). Such forced policies foster consistency throughout and also stimulate mobility within departments. However, the current practices of disaster management in Pakistan are inadequate to address the severe damages caused by these calamities. Most of the relief activities, carried out by NDMA, international agencies or nongovernment organizations, are restricted toward the response phase in which immediate relief is provided to the affected people by providing them food, clean water, medical services, temporary shelters, etc. The recovery or rehabilitation phases have been given no or very little attention in the past. Results indicate that the activities for the recovery of the affected areas and preparedness for future disasters are performed only in the major urban areas, whereas, according to the disaster statistics, major disasters have been hitting the remote areas the most where even the immediate response services are quite weak.

3   Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030) The Sendai framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is a global agreement that aims to reduce the loss caused by natural and man-made hazards. It emphasizes on building economic and social resilience by preventing or minimizing negative impacts of man-made and natural disasters. Pakistan has started working on the adaptation of Sendai Framework keeping in view the country’s vulnerability to various hazards. In order to emerge as a developed state, Pakistan is effortlessly working toward

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achieving Sustainable Development Goals set forth by United Nations in the 3rd World conference. The 17 goals that are focused on removing hunger and poverty globally are aligned with the targets of Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Unless Pakistan works toward minimizing the losses caused from natural and artificial disasters, it will not be able to ameliorate its citizens.

4   Reforms in Disaster Management Although, during the past disaster management efforts, several capacity gaps were observed in terms of technical expertise and systematic response within emergency relief authorities, there are numerous improvements seen in the overall disaster management framework of Pakistan. These are as follows. 4.1  Institution Building in Disaster Management The deadly earthquake in 2005 forced the state to come up with a productive initiative of establishing Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) that was aimed to provide post disaster management and assessment. Working over the policy and solutions to provide rehabilitation and reconstruction in affected areas, this institution emerged as an expert and reliable organization that can be used to develop better strategies and plans for disaster management. Policy implementation and planning over disaster management relied heavily on the local bodies and actors that were incompetent to manage the unorthodox situations of disaster. For the first time, ERRA took the charge to work as a competent authority by working over the long- and short-term objectives for disaster management (Khan & Khan, 2008). This typology matches with the hierarchal mechanism of coordination that exercises control over the activities of different actors involved in the process. In the same way, the ERRA exercised and imposed administrative control that accelerated the recovery process in case of unexpected disaster. Under normal circumstances, some form of delegation can be implemented for carrying out the processes. But in the time of disasters, hierarchal mechanism of coordination becomes obsolete. As Bouckaert (2010) maintains, establishing and changing lines of control provide a structural yet hierarchical way of achieving better coordination. A coherent and coordinated manner enhances the collective performance thereby making the recovery process easy.

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In 2010, National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) was established under the NDMA Act. Under the NDMC, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) was established at the federal level to deal with disaster preparedness and management. Furthermore, the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) and District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA) were created to implement the disaster management plan. Disaster Risk Management is defined as the way unprecedented disasters are managed through proactive planning and strategies. Disaster Risk Management (DRM) policy formulation and subsequent development of national plans and strategies are laid down by NDMC. It provides funds and constitutes advisory committees as and when required. NDMA implements, coordinates, and monitors the whole range of DRM activities under the guidelines and policies laid down by NDMC. Provincial Disaster Management Commission (PDMC), headed by their respective chief ministers, replicates the federal structure in respective provinces in exactly the same manner The Director Generals, the heads of PDMAs are appointed by the provincial government. PDMAs formulate, coordinate, and implement DRM policies and plans for province. The District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA) is chaired by the head of district council and is comprised of District Coordination Officer (DCO), District Police Officer (DPO) and Executive District Officer (EDO) Health and other district-level officers. The DDMA formulate, coordinate, and implement national and provincial DRM polices and plans at the district level. At the time of disasters, the availability of the relevant human and nonhuman resources is ensured by the local authorities. These authorities further ensure carrying out all other pre- and post disaster activities and enforcing buildings codes in their jurisdiction. However, the implementation of coordination among all these ministries, authorities, and attached organizations is weak. Forcing provincial and district-level organizations to align activities in line with the goals of government may ensure the effectiveness of the aligned institution building as an outcome of managing hierarchical authorities (Bouckaert, 2010). S hifting Focus from Response Devastation to Preparedness and Planning Disaster management approach had largely remained reactive before the 2005 earthquake calamity. After the approval of National Disaster Management Ordinance (2010) and establishment of ERRA and NDMA, the disaster management approach incorporated all important phases of

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the disaster management cycle: planning and preparedness, response, recovery, and rehabilitation. Over the last one decade, significant attention has been given to managing disaster risk. In addition to the development of the institutional frameworks for disaster risk reduction (DRR), a detailed and thorough system of DRR was launched in the country. Responsibilities for disaster risk were devolved to various levels of local government. Numerous platforms across ministries were set up to coordinate various aspects of disaster risk related activities and dedicated budgets were set aside for risk reduction activities. Community training and awareness programs have been launched to prevent or mitigate the adverse effects of the disaster in collaboration with local bodies and the government. This type of coordination within government departments finds a strong theoretical basis in network mechanism of coordination that is driven by collaborative actions among government departments. Conducting emergency response preparedness (ERP) such as identifying hazards, hazards, risks, and strategic forecasting in the pre-disaster phase are some of the steps taken by the National Disaster Risk Planning (NDRP). The Japanese Rain River Flow Induction model has been introduced by NDMA and PDMA to predict the weather as an early warning system. Some of the measures taken by the management officials have reduced the casualties significantly. Important tasks such as risk assessment, weather monitoring, stockpiling of relief materials are available at short notice, so that people can get safe evacuation (Bacha, 2016).  ecentralization: Shifting More Disaster Relief Responsibility D from the Federal Government to the Provincial and Local Authorities After the 18th Amendment, which gave the provinces financial and strong legislative power, the federal government had no special requirements to regulate relief responsibilities. The three-level NDMA as national, provincial, and district-level management seeks to deal with the crisis. The NDMA, Emergency Relief Cell, Civil Defense, Federal Flood Commission, and National Crisis Management Cell are all controlled by the federal government and its liaison offices. Local government and stakeholders can efficiently improve local responses related to their regions. Province and district bodies are given legal, financial, and technical autonomy to manage disaster relief responsibilities effectively and efficiently (Ahmed, 2019).

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Disaster Management Plan 2019 seeks to improve contingency planning, capacity building, and state capacity to control future disasters. The planning, implementation, and all relief measures, developed around the federal government incorporate the participatory approach of the provinces and stakeholders in these plans. Such participatory approach of provinces resonates with the network mechanism of coordination that signifies extreme cooperation among all levels. When a specific collaboration occurs within the organization, it results in faster actions. While strict control may ensure consistency of the implementation policy, it cannot be denied that some form of delegation is also required in such circumstances. The informality to some extent can be incorporated to enhance information exchange within the departments while dealing with the aftermath of the disasters. The political economy of interest and relief has always been a problem at the federal level.

5   Disaster Management: Education and Training/NIDM National Institute of disaster Management (NIDM) provides training and capacity-building programs for the effective functioning of natural disasters management in Pakistan. In addition to providing training NIDM has also developed the database of disaster management related capacity development and training initiatives being conducted by public, private, and humanitarian institutions in Pakistan. The initiative aims to provide the stakeholders a unified platform where contributions toward making the country resilient against disasters can be shared. Training and capacity building through workshops, seminars, mock drills, and simulation are provided to the public employees and civil servants appointed all over the country. The concerned departments have started creating mass awareness through exhibitions and festivals (NIDM, 2014). Several disaster management related academic activities including short courses, diploma courses, and degree courses are being offered by various public and private universities. Disaster Risk Management related case studies and research articles are produced to assist legislators and policy-­ makers for informed planning and decision-making. Need-based disaster management training of different stakeholders is emphasized on different platforms.

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6   Disaster Management Curriculum and Academic Collaborations DRM agenda will remain inconclusive unless they are incorporated into the national education system. The government has made sufficient efforts to mainstream DRR in education curricula at all education levels including schools, colleges, and universities. However, the most critical task is to develop the DRR curricula in national and regional languages for subsequent mainstreaming. The planning and development department of government emphasizes over conducting research studies to assist policy-makers and administrators for informed DRM-related planning and decision-making. The need to develop networks with educational institutes provided the government a way out from hierarchical administrative management to network-based management to achieve better results. Developing curriculum and building academic collaborations were the areas where government could not work solely with strict hierarchical control. The government had to establish new lines of control leading to structural and procedural shifts while keeping the central bureaucratic and authoritative management intact. The applied component of national curriculum emphasizes the academic partnership between disaster-related institutions and national and international universities. Similarly, operational initiatives such as hiring consultants or engaging organizations for undertaking disaster-related research studies is given due significance. The government attempted the combination of hierarchy- and network-based management, where the governmental authorities maintained the ex post controls and increased coordination among academic units with bargaining and negotiations among the partnered organizations. 6.1  Community-Based Disaster Risk Management Community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM) has a significant role to play in strengthening the structures and systems of DRM and DRR.  Although established principles, strategies, and guidelines for CBDRM exist at the global level, the local and international nonprofit organizations in Pakistan have mostly been implementing CBDRM programs and activities according to their own understanding of the local context.

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There have been several communities-based disaster risk management (CBDRM) initiatives in Pakistan since the 2005 earthquake. Actors undertook different approaches that all yielded different results, depending upon different methodologies and tools. However, all approaches emphasized the inclusion of vulnerable groups, for example, women, disabled, and specific geographical (rural) areas (UNDP, 2017). Aligned with the market-type approach, the government opted for the inclusion of global competitive models in the disaster management framework. The NDMA included CBDRM framework in the National Disaster Management Plan (2012), which was further improved by UNDP in the form of additional steps included in the CBDRM implementation in 2014–2015. With financial support from the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Pakistan, UNDP implemented a community-focused project on building resilience through community-based disaster risk management and implemented it in the rural disaster-prone areas such as Chitral, Lower Dir, Ziarat, and Tharparkar. CBDRM has been found as a powerful tool for risk-informed development in addition to its actual disaster preparedness focus. Market-based management incorporates the attributes of New Public Management (NPM) that aims to have more competition within public sector and management becomes more result-oriented (Zahra, 2020). Since the government majorly follows the hierarchy-based management to maintain control, it can be said that they opted for a blend of hierarchy-, networks-, and market- based approach to achieve communitybased disaster management outcomes. The NDMA and PDMAs partnered with UNDP as network partner to address the needs of humanitarian communities. CBDRM process has not only addressed the needs of at-risk communities in terms of disaster preparedness, but has served as a gateway for long-term community development that touches upon the integrated themes of social cohesion, women empowerment, livelihood opportunities, and poverty eradication, among others (UNDP, 2017).

7   Information Technology: Infrastructure Development The government has taken several initiatives to incorporate technological component into the DRM and DRR. After the floods (2010, 2012), the Punjab Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) in collaboration with the Punjab Information Technology Board (PITB) set

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up the Punjab Flood Relief and Rehabilitation portal. A variety of information, including statistics related with human and nonhuman losses, financial information, damage assessment estimates, and details of relief activities are being updated regularly and being publicized through this portal. All spatial data over vulnerabilities and risks are available for the public on Disaster Maps Portal. Social media, radio, and television are efficiently utilized as part of information campaign. A comprehensive and reliable project of NDMP, Multi Hazard Early Warning System (MHEWS) was also initiated with a budget of US$188 million that includes improvement of provincial, regional linkages by upgradation of existing radar stations (Bacha, 2016). Rainfall River Flow-Inundation Model with the support of Government of Japan has been developed for smooth flow forecasting. The World Metrological Organization (WMO), using satellite data, established Flash Flood Guidance System for effective forecasting of floods. UNESCO has supported the installation of automatic stations for remote area data collection. The government has put in some efforts to improve disaster management through technological advancement. The aim is to promote awareness and trainings through visual arts, digital advertisement, and gamification. The initiative has an objective to not only protect lives and economy but also provide value to employers, institutions, and government organizations that are actively involved in disaster preparedness. Disaster-related games help the individual to build confidence to be resilient by practicing in simulated disastrous situations through virtual arts and graphics. The digital advertisement helps the public learn about relief and recovery actions on their own.

8   Global Coordination Frameworks The government of Pakistan in consultation with the disaster management authorities has progressed well to incorporate national as well as international standards for managing disaster management. This is based on the mechanism of network coordination that entails informal patterns among the departments. The network approach became prominent in the 2000s with an emphasis on control and coordination by the cabinet or parliament, improved performance information from the attached ministries, and regulatory agencies for improved integration (Osborne, 2010;

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Bouckaert et al., 2010). The United Nations office of Disaster risk reduction initiated the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 as an outcome to Third UN World Conference in 2015  in Sendai, Japan (Margareta Wahlström, 2015). Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–2015 is the predecessor of the Sendai Framework that works to improve the global network for disaster reduction and Yokohama strategy for a safer world. Seven global targets were defined as reducing risk, structuring guiding tools that include state responsibilities to reduce and prevent disasters, actions to prevent from new risks, strengthening resilience and engagement of society and state institutions (Nawaz, 2017). The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030) proposed an extraordinary opportunity for the countries, such as adoption of precise, consigned, and operational framework for risk mitigation, strengthening resilience of nations against disasters, consideration of experiences secured through national or regional policies to reduce risk of disaster, and modification of guidelines to implement the 2015 framework for disaster mitigation. The framework seeks to strengthen resilience, eliminate poverty, reduce risk, and guide multi-hazard management of risk through small- and large-scale technological and biological investments across all the sectors. Pakistan is further trying to align the goal fulfillment with the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Establishing disaster risk management policies by promoting public–private partnerships, the government has promoted and incentivized businesses with modification in policies, providing tax-free zone or free land in areas of calamities to populate and rebuild those areas (IRDR, 2014). China-Pakistan economic Corridor (CPEC) is one of the largest initiatives taken by Pakistanis and the Chinese approximately worth of $62 billion that targets many areas of Baluchistan, KPK, Sindh and Punjab. The government has managed to bring in more foreign direct investments in deprived areas to modernize and uplift the vulnerable class of society (Ministry of Planning & Development, 2017). The disaster management institutions in Pakistan established effective horizontal collaborations with national and international organizations with a control over increased government structure. The literature on managing horizontal coordination offers network-type mechanisms as an effective solution to these problems. With the involvement of specialized,

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autonomous, and international organizations, the government needs a different approach for managing the fragmented structure than what it has been doing with hierarchies (Bouckaert et  al., 2010; Zahra, 2020). Effective outcomes may require informal interactions within organizations to some extent. Negotiations and consultancies on managing disasters with other countries, another tool for managing networks, provides Pakistan an opportunity to increase consistency in goals, policies, measuring tools, and indicators for implementation.

9   Inclusion of New Public Management National Disaster Management Act also incorporates new public management practices to make the disaster management more systematic and outcome driven. Integrating international frameworks, that is, Sendai framework, for minimizing the damages caused by hazards depicts the effort to leapfrog challenges faced in the time of disaster. Being the seventh most disaster-affected country in the world, there is a dire need of yielding better results through a competent Disaster Risk Reduction. The adaptation to NPM has helped streamline the operations and enhanced the government’s responsiveness to citizens’ needs in time of crisis. Furthermore, detailed guidelines regarding responsibilities, set up roles and tasks for relevant authorities at NDM assist in making the mechanism more efficient (Fig. 1).

Management

Provincial & District level departments

Decentralization

Established roles and responsibilities of each relevant authorities

Participation

Community response mechanism

Technology

Latest machinery, technical people

Fig. 1  Adoption of new public management at various stages of disaster management

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9.1  Resource Mobilization in Case of Disaster The mechanism for mobilization of resources is clearly defined to combat disasters at every level. National level: National-level actions are managed directly by NDMA. The complete scale of hazard is managed by the lead members of the department. From preparedness to prevention and from response to rehabilitation, the whole process is monitored in coordination with other departments. • Federal ministries are alerted • Deployment of search & rescue teams, armed forces, USAR • Technical assistance deployment in coordination with National Commission • Mobilizing of food items to PDMAs & DDMAs • Coordination with relevant ministries Provincial level: Provincial disaster management policy is formulated in coordination with provincial commission. The mutually decided guidelines are then followed to cater to the repercussions of the disaster. Meanwhile, the NDMA is also updated consistently. It further includes: • Utilization of provincial preparedness plans • Provincial emergency operation centers • Deploying of resources at provincial level, that is, rescue services • Update to NDMA • Goods and logistic support is managed • Voluntary organizations are activated • Information to public through media District level: District-level plan is implemented in accordance with the guidelines of national and provincial authority. Task force, trainings, involving community and dissemination of information to the citizens are done at this level to manage disaster situation. Also: • Relief camps setups • Medical, search & rescue team deployment

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• SOPs for each department are updated • Complain mechanism development • Situation report to NDMAs & PDMAs

10   Analysis and Areas of Improvements From the analysis of the development and progress related with disaster management in the country over the last 50 years, it appears that there was inertia in the disaster management initiatives and plans. After independence in 1947, the legislation and policies were derived from British systems in the new state as a colonial legacy. The plans related with national infrastructure and development—including the contingency planning for natural hazards—were designed without adapting them to the new conditions due to lack of capacity, experience, and resources (Mustafa, 2003). Moreover, policies have been focusing on single type of hazard, that is, floods, as it remains the most recurrent and damaging hazard in the country. The risk acceptance remained a norm with no concern to improve the livelihoods of affected communities (Mustafa & Wescoat, 1997). Following hierarchy management structure, the first nine five-year plans from 1955 till 2003 solely focused on managing floods with major concentration on response and relief. Political hierarchical control was discernable because politicians played a prominent role in controlling the government by political hiring and by politicizing the nonpolitical institutions including judiciary and bureaucracy. It was after 2005 that the disaster management focus was shifted from flood-centered policy to a multi-hazard approach. The post 2005 period demonstrates changing dynamics in disaster management over time in the components and structural arrangements of government. With the combination of network- and market-type economic policies required to reform the disaster management, the government oddly preferred to continue with strict control and top-down management. After the National Disaster Management Ordinance in 2007,—later transformed into NDM Act- 2010—the disaster management approach undertook progressive pace. In this context, the disaster management policies and plans started addressing relevant aspects of potential hazards, vulnerability analysis, appropriate roles and responsibilities of stakeholders, identification of shortcomings, and most importantly expounded cost-effective disaster countermeasures (Ahmed, 2019). The new policies claim to use a comprehensive national approach with improved capacity to minimize risks and prevent losses.

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The revised disaster management formulation framework includes disaster response at different levels of government structure, identifies roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders and lays down coordination mechanism for activities involving the United Nations, civil society organizations, NGOs and INGOs, public and private sector organizations, and media to harness the full potential for efficient disaster management. As mentioned, since the government has been following the combination of hierarchy, network and market-based approach, there is a need to utilize the existing mechanism of coordination with related agencies to enhance the extent of cooperation, information exchange, negotiations, and decision-­making. This acts as a support within public sector administration facilitating mutual interdependent actors and achieving collective goals. The coordination through control and authority is achieved relatively quicker than network coordination (Bouckaert, 2010). However, there should be some kind of information sharing to have sufficiently reliable recovery process. While revised disaster management policies and plans sound all-­ inclusive, it is the implementation that decides the effectiveness of these plans. The implementation involves interdepartmental collaboration in which they function together to pursue a determined goal, associating closely with hierarchy mechanisms. Through improved coordination system and arrangements, ideas exchange, and smooth flow of information, the relief activities can be done in accordance with the disaster management policies. The post-2005 disaster policies implementation reflects gaps in terms of less strategic focus on prevention, preparedness and capacity building. While communities in the affected areas have shown to take active part in disaster response and relief activities, the NDMA and associated institutions have remained unable to exploit the community potential and increase community resilience, especially in floodplains or areas regularly exposed to disasters. Research has also highlighted the chronic absence of civil society organizations in disaster reduction and management. In order to have improved administrative processes, not only do we need enhanced coordination between relief and recovery phases but also the harmonization of the management systems throughout the relief activities. The country needs to adopt a smart approach to incorporate network and market-based mechanism in the existing hierarchical management structure through increased coordination among the different stages of the recovery processes.

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There are several opportunities that the government can avail of to bring further improvements in the existing disaster management infrastructure. Government can promote public and private businesses in disaster-­prone areas by creating safe environment for the residents while benefiting and incentivizing the third party. Government may further promote tax-free businesses at calamity areas. Given that Pakistan is a developing country where prioritization of basic needs over disaster management is not something surprising, the progress made by the country in disaster management is considered significant. The countries with lower GDPs are found to have less capability to invest in the preparedness phase of the disaster management cycle (Todd & Todd, 2010).

11   Conclusions This chapter highlights the structural reforms undertaken in the domain of Disaster Management while analyzing them against the three types of typologies: hierarchical, network and market-based reforms. Pakistan has undertaken several reform efforts in disaster management since 2005. The results of these reforms are mixed, and many of them are still in progress. Since the time of independence, the civilian and military governments have been following the hierarchical mode of administration to ensure command and control over the disaster-related decisions and institutions. It was after 2005 that Pakistan realized the importance of adopting a market-­based approach and developed networks with national and international disaster-related frameworks and institutions. Despite the government having opted for market-based mechanisms, the central approach remained hierarchical to maintain the command and control. While the government has developed disaster-related institutions, laws, and policies; shifted focus from flood management to multiple hazard; encompassed preparedness and prevention in addition to response and recovery; and strengthened capacity to handle emergencies in the country, there are issues of exercising direct control over administration of disaster management reforms, lack of sufficient funds for investing on preparedness and mitigation, use of full support from civil society or nonprofit organizations, lack of coordination in horizontal networks, adopting of decentralized approach in administering post-disaster activities, and capacity building in the field. Partnering with several strong international organizations such as UNDP, UNESCO, and World Bank for global

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coordination frameworks while keeping the hierarchical controls intact, created a blend of market- and hierarchy-type mechanisms. It is important to understand that hierarchical instruments are used to exercise direct control over the management and administration of activities by multiple competing forces in system. Network and market-oriented mechanisms require some degree of sharing power, which actors in postcolonial bureaucratic structures are not willing to engage in. There is a need to increase the coordination among the horizontal units in a network, develop a holistic-integrative approach to disaster governance with less bureaucracy, efforts to make use of local expertise, knowledge and experiences, and building capacities for DRR, mitigation, and management.

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Nawaz, M. G. (Ed.). (2017). Pakistan School Saftey Framework (PSSF). Gender and Child Cell. Retrieved from http://www.ndma.gov.pk/Publications/ PSSF%20v10%203.pdf NIDM. (2014). Retrieved from National Institute of Disaster Management. Retrieved from http://nidm.edu.pk/Training/NidmJointInitiatives Osborne, S. P. (2010). Introduction. The (New) Public Governance: a suitable case for treatment? In S. P. Osborne (Ed.), The New Public Governance? Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public Governance (pp. 1–16). London; New York, NY: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.1016/ S0074-6142(10)97039-3 Todd, D., & Todd, H. (2010). National disaster response: Lessons from evaluations of the World Bank and others. World Bank Report. Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/621591468350106378/pdf/657860N WP0Box30at0disaster0response.pdf UNDP. (2017). UNDP publication launch—Beyond preparedness: Development impact of community-based disaster risk Management in Pakistan. UNDP News. Retrieved September 19, 2019, from http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2017/03/28/undp-­ publication-­launch-­beyond-­preparedness-­development-­impact-­of-­community-­ based-­disaster-­risk-­management-­in-­pakistan.html Wahlström, M. (2015). New Sendai framework strengthens focus on reducing disaster risk. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 6(2), 200–201. Zahra, A. (2020). Structural reforms and performance management systems: An exploratory analysis of state organizations in Pakistan (Doctoral Dissertation). KU Leuven Public Governance Institute, Belgium. https://lirias.kuleuven. be/3172020?limo=0

Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Concluding Reflections Muhammad Zafar Iqbal Jadoon, Nasira Jabeen, Geert Bouckaert, and Abiha Zahra

Public sector reform is a policy that includes design, decision, implementation, and evaluation. Increasingly, public management reform policy is globalized and comparative. Visions on ‘Whole of Society’, and ‘Whole of Government’ include ideological, political, and technical choices between ‘Hierarchy’, ‘Market’, or ‘Network’ as driving forces of these reforms. The

M. Z. I. Jadoon • N. Jabeen Institute of Administrative Sciences, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] G. Bouckaert Public Governance Institute, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] A. Zahra (*) Public Governance Institute, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Department of Governance and Global Studies, Information Technology University, Lahore, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0_15

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globalized dimension refers to major models of reform that are spreading around the world. The comparative dimension refers to similarities and differences based on path-dependencies, legal frames, political systems, and cultural features. The general assumption is that it is possible to learn from one another about content of reforms and about how to handle them. From this point of view, a country case analysis becomes interesting since it allows looking at the linkages with globalized reform agendas, as well as comparing reform policies between countries. Therefore, the Pakistan public sector reform policy becomes relevant beyond the single country case study since it allows to compare and to connect to a globalized agenda of public management reform policy. The book, Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan addressed the core question: To what extent has Pakistan utilized the prevailing reform paradigms (markets and networks) in its hierarchical and centralized administrative system? Pakistan, a postcolonial state and a society significantly influenced by Islam, the state religion, inherited a centralized administrative system with a well-organized civil service dominated by a generalist cadre (a descendent of Indian Civil Service), organized military, and weak democratic traditions and institutions. This led to the emergence of an imbalanced power structure that persists. The state became a contesting ground among military, bureaucracy, judiciary and political parties organized around personal charisma, ethnicity, or religion with competing narratives for the destiny of a new nation in South Asia. The above context of the country explains why Pakistan took 25 years, after experimenting with two constitutions of 1956 and 1962, to have the 1973 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan with national consensus. Even the 1973 constitution was suspended twice, first by General Zia ul Haque in 1977 and second by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999. Tragically, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who had led the framing of the 1973 constitution was not only overthrown by General Zia ul Haque but also executed through a judicial trial. To prevail, Zia ul Haque used religion as an instrument of legitimacy for his authoritarian regime. The authoritarian regimes led by the military chiefs before and after 1980 have always used the judiciary, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in particular, for securing legal legitimacy and gaining political favors. However, this tradition broke down when the former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was removed by General Pervez Musharraf, the then President of Pakistan, who did not become a party to his ambition for extending his rule, followed by the historic Lawyers’ Movement in 2007, ultimately ending his long military rule. These events have clearly

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led to the emergence of judicial activism in the country. Contrary to the Western and mature democracies, the Pakistani state, and society, has weak traditions of constitutionalism, rule of law, public accountability, formalization, equality, rationality, and performance-based merit. This breeds reflexive tribalism fueled by loyalty, patronage, and nepotism rather than rule of law, equity, and performance-based merit in state institutions at all levels. Power play within and across state institutions and in society at large is masked by administrative, cultural, and religious symbolism. This unique context of Pakistan has implications for choice, implementation, and performance outcomes of structural reform mechanisms at all levels of government and in all sectors. The findings of the chapters can be explained in the light of the six hypotheses outlined as follows. Hypothesis 1  Frequent reform attempts are made at federal, provincial, and local levels for better performance over the years. The history of administrative reform in Pakistan reveals that every regime, elected or nonelected, picked and chose reform mechanisms from international reform trends/doctrines/paradigms to suit its short-term political interests without altering imbalanced power structure tilted toward generalists cadre of civil service and military elites vis-à-vis political elites. While selected hierarchical reform mechanisms continued throughout history, market- and network-­type reforms have also been chosen in post-1980 periods without disturbing an established order grounded in the hierarchical and centralized ethos of administrative system. Over the years, frequent reform attempts have been made in the country at the federal, provincial, and local levels to improve the functioning of government but without making explicit efforts toward making efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and performance as norms within and across state institutions and organizations. The 12 chapters contributed to this book confirm this trend, covering a wide range of reforms initiatives undertaken in various sectors, at various levels and issues of national importance, including health, energy, training of civil servants, environmental protection, higher education, digital governance, infrastructure, postal services, and disaster management. Chapter 3 gave a wider view of the reforms at the federal level, while adopting the longitudinal method from 1947 to 2018. The schematic diagrams gave an opportunity to review the shifts in the reforms during different periods for comparative analysis and discussion. Chapters 4, 7, and 9 discussed various

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reform initiatives taken in the health sector in the light of the 18th Constitutional amendment, according to which divisions of powers were created at federal and provincial levels, considering health and education as provincial subjects with a lesser role at the federal level. The chapters focused on health sector and hospital reforms including the decentralization, delivery of services and granting of autonomy to teaching hospitals in the provinces of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtun Khwa (KPK), creation of healthcare commissions in Punjab, KPK and Sindh for performance review, transfer of powers from Punjab Health Care Department to District Health Officers, and launch of Polio Eradication Program with enhanced interagency collaboration. Chapter 5 discussed major structural initiatives that the federal government has taken over the years after unbundling of WAPDA, a sole federal agency responsible for hydel power production and distribution. This process led to the creation of a whole set of new organizations such as PEPCO, electricity distribution companies, and involvement of private sector in production of thermal power. Chapter 6 while explaining federal-level reforms in training institutions discussed the evolution and emergence of federal training institutions for civil servants. It reviewed major restructuring after 2000 marked by the establishment of the National School of Public Policy, an apex body attached with the Establishment Division, coordinating the activities of National Institutes of Management in all four provinces. Chapter 10 focused on devolution and decentralization reforms in the education sector and issues of autonomy and control with upgradation of colleges to universities in the province of Punjab initiated after the inception of Higher Education of Pakistan in 2001. Public Private Partnership, a new institutional choice for service delivery has also received considerable attention in recent years. While Chap. 12 discussed Public Private Partnership (PPP) from a policy perspective, Chap. 11 reviewed its application in one of the most important federal enterprises—the Pakistan Post. The Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are also being enthusiastically used by provincial governments particularly in the Punjab province to improve public service delivery. Chapter 13 discussed processes of co-creation, co-­ production and citizen engagements in various cell phone applications, service delivery mechanisms being used in the district of Sialkot for improvement in local public services. Chapter 14 discussed the structural reform initiatives taken by the federal government after the devastating earthquake in 2005, to improve the country’s capacity to deal with disasters and to handle emergencies. The multilevel reform initiatives include

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creation of the National Disaster Management Authority, provincial disaster management authorities, and district disaster management authorities. Hypothesis 2 Some state institutions that are not directly involved in reform programs have been affecting the implementation of reforms in Pakistan. In view of the unique context of Pakistan as outlined above, the military and the judiciary have been affecting public sector reform both independently and complementing each other. Pakistan has experienced extended military rules since inception in 1947. The country has also witnessed extended periods of martial law and military coups. For example, General Zia ul Haq used religion as an instrument for legitimizing his long authoritarian military rule from 1977 to 1988. He held a national referendum to get a  public mandate for implementation of the  shariah in the country as promised in the 1973 Constitution that he suspended/abrogated. During his regime, several Islamic legal reform initiatives were taken to implement Sharia laws to project the country as truly Islamic and strict implementation was emphasized. Similarly, the country’s political and constitutional evolution process was interrupted by the military takeover by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999 that was legitimized by the judiciary. He held the positions of both, the ‘Chief of the Army Staff’ and the ‘President’ with highly centralized command and control rule in his authoritarian regime. In order to strengthen the military rule, gain validity and political favors, political devolution reforms backed by the political parties, military and technocrats were initiated; however, the devolution could not take place in any real sense and accountability, performance, and services provision at the grassroots level remained a distant dream due to the absence of administrative, financial, and diffused political power transfers at local governance. The role of judiciary has strengthened since Musharraf’s period. Chapter 2 built the overall reform narrative of the country with particular focus on different reform actors including the military and the judiciary. The different reform actors kept intervening in the domain of other actors while their capacity to intervene varied over the years. Yet, none of these prominent reform actors left the picture  of reforms. Chapters 2, 3, 4, 7, and 10 focused on the political, constitutional, international reform interventions in different sectors pointing to the dominant role of the military, the judiciary and the religious parties in reform measures and their implementation.

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Hypothesis 3  Pakistan’s administrative system has a high tendency to maintain hierarchical settings even after multiple reform attempts. Pakistan inherited two institutions, the  civil service and the  military, developed by British colonial power based on principles and norms of bureaucracy with hierarchy as their fundamental feature in a traditional society governed by familialism, ethnicity, religion and regionalism. While a colonial regime could afford to keep these institutions insulated from societal and cultural pressures, this was no longer possible to do so after independence in 1947. Hierarchy has been a natural and dominant mode of organizing in government and military, other than merit largely providing the basis on which upward mobility is decided. While ascription is the norm in political parties, the military being insulated from political interferences clearly stands as the dominant institution followed by the civil service. However, when it comes to the top bureaucratic positions, status, and privileges, the generalists cadre, that is, Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS), previously known as the District Management Group (DMG), gets the major share vis-à-vis other cadres and non-cadre professional positions. Moreover, PAS acts as a clan to protect the power and privileges of its members without taking responsibility for performance and result-oriented outcomes in any regime, be it political or military rule. The members of PAS hold the top positions at federal, provincial, and local levels in core governance structure as well as in public sector organizations without tenure and any defined mechanism for their performance evaluation. This arrangement suits both politicians in ministerial roles as well as bureaucrats as a group, however, it also  breeds a clout of personal loyalists to political bosses at all levels. Public sector reforms in Pakistan take place within this unique political and bureaucratic context. This is one of the major reasons that Pakistan despite several reform efforts has maintained hierarchical settings. The hierarchical-type reforms offer more opportunities for career advancement, prestige, and power to the dominant civil service cadre, more opportunities to the politicians to look after their loyal bureaucrats. Over the years, several hierarchical-type mechanisms were adapted including devolution, decentralization, creation of sectoral bodies, regulatory agencies, establishment of companies for service delivery in various sectors at federal and provincial levels as discussed by different authors in the book. There is, however, a consistent finding in all of the chapters that most of the reform mechanisms used fell in the hierarchytype management category. Reform results in all the areas discussed in

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different chapters are not satisfactory mainly due to the fact that central approach remained hierarchical inorder  to maintain command and control, whether it is the case of hospital autonomy, the  restructuring of energy sector, the deregulation of higher education in provinces, service delivery, or the training sector. Hypothesis 4  Pakistan adopted more market (MTM) and network (NTM) reform mechanisms compared to strict hierarchies (HTM) post 1980s with the changing trends in the developed world. One prominent feature of public sector reforms in Pakistan is its receptivity to emerging ideas and practices in Western countries particularly the United States since its independence in 1947. The only exception was the five years of the first popularly elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who had shaken the core structure of bureaucracy through 1973 administrative reforms, often termed as sweeping civil service reforms. Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was abolished and the civil service was organized into various occupational groups, unified pay structure, and common training program for new entrants was introduced. The reservation of key posts for CSPs was also abolished offering opportunities of career progression to the lateral entrants/professionals/technocrats in senior government positions. However, the elite character, power, and prestige attached to the CSP cadre remained and the descendent of CSP was called  the District Management Group, more recently named Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS). Bhutto’s government also carried out massive nationalization under his socialist political ideology that affected the industry and all other services sectors at a broader level. Keeping in line with the global trends and changing requirements in managing the public sector is also seen in reforms undertaken after 1980s, though on selected basis, in the hierarchically controlled public sector. Market-type reform mechanisms such as public–private partnerships, allowing government-run hospitals to generate funds from private practice by their physicians, involvement of private sector in higher education, self-­ supporting programs in public sector universities, user fees in various services, establishment of companies at federal, provincial, and local levels with market-based compensation discussed in the book in various chapters (3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14) endorse these changing reform trends. While market-type reform mechanisms received more attention after 1980s with the push from international donors and financial institutions,

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that is, the IMF, UNDP, UNESCO, the World Bank, etc., there is also a thin presence of new network-type structure initiatives in the form of co-­ production, co-creation through civil society, NGOs, and citizen engagement in the processes within the hierarchical settings of public sector in the country as discussed in Chaps. 3, 5, 7, 11, 12, and 13. The use of trending reform paradigms markets and networks, however, was mostly combined with a blend of hierarchies, producing new hybrid forms of reform instruments specific to the context of a developing country— Pakistan. This invites us to think around the applicability of Western reforms models in a context different from the West. Although developing countries are seen to be receptive when it comes to the new reform paradigms for solving governance issues, their implementation, however, is often diverse and not completely convergent with the West. Hypothesis 5  The use of three different reform mechanisms is not linear in the whole country since the dynamics vary across the policy fields and levels of government. Pakistan is constitutionally a federal state with a federal government and four provincial governments in Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtoon Khwa, and Balochistan. Since these four provinces have uneven socioeconomic and institutional development, the content, pace, and results of hierarchical-type reforms are not linearly spread over the provincess even after the Devolution in 2001. While Punjab tends to replicate and imitate the federal reform mechanism, the other provinces try to assert their own identity as federating units. For example, Punjab replicated Higher Education of Pakistan as Punjab Higher Education Commission whereas other provinces have different institutional mechanisms to coordinate the functioning of higher education. Similarly, hospital autonomy to teaching hospitals is being pursued in Punjab, Sindh, and KPK but not in Balochistan. Market- and network-type reform mechanisms were adapted earlier at the federal level before it reached the provincial level. Moreover, there were variations in the selection of reform mechanisms in different policy areas including education, health, energy, infrastructure, and others. As discussed throughout the book by different authors, the hierarchical type of reforms has been at the core of all reform initiatives, keeping intact the specific command and control culture context of public sector in Pakistan. However, the discussion in almost all of the chapters point to the fact that reform history, reform patterns and trajectories over time have

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not been linear and it is not so easy to define them in a neat and clear manner. It is also highlighted that Pakistan has a diverse polity represented by four provinces and federally administered tribal areas, each having its distinct subculture and interests. Therefore, variations in implementation of public sector reforms are obvious, as some institutions and provinces outperform in terms of reform delivery and implementation. Hypothesis 6  Reform choices in Pakistan have created more of a layered or marble cake instead of pendulum swings (shift from one reform paradigm to the other). Pakistan represents a polity where there is no general consensus on basic issues: (a) What is the role of religion in the state despite the fact that 1973 Constitution clearly promises declaration of any law repugnant that is not in accordance with Islamic injunctions? (b) What is the role of armed forces in politics even though the 1973 Constitution declares abrogation of constitution, a high treason for which death penalty is the punishment? (c) What is the role of local government when 1973 Constitution does not recognize this third tier of government? (d) What is the role of Supreme Court of Pakistan, interpretation of constitution or executive despite the fact that there is a clear separation of powers laid down in the  1973 Constitution? (e) To what extent efficient management of hierarchies in government is important for reducing corruption given the fact that corruption is more sensational as compared to inefficiency? In view of the above ambiguities, Pakistan is still struggling toward promoting efficiency and effectiveness in public sector hierarchies despite making frequent attempts to improve their functioning. While corruption being a sensational governance issue catches more public attention, efficiency is rarely noticed in political discourse. In an administrative context where hierarchies are not managed properly, market mechanisms and network mechanisms cannot flourish since that requires well-managed and well-run government machinery. That is why in Pakistan, we do not see a swing between reform paradigms. On the other hand, Pakistan has experienced a pendulum swing in policy, for example, expansion of state enterprise through nationalisation in 1973 under the  Bhutto regime, and privatisation and decentralisation after 1980; however, it did not turn back to the same position of nationalization again. Chapter 3 discussed the shifts in different periods, which elaborated that the choice of reform instruments did not completely shift to another new reform mechanism. In fact,

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there were context-specific choices, often blending MTM and NTM with the hierarchies creating layers over the hierarchies with bits of markets and networks. Sometimes, the reform choices were so well blended that it appeared like a marble cake where it was hard to differentiate between different layers of the three reform mechanisms. The frequent use of combination strategies, creating new flavors with sprinkles of Western and fancy reforms on the hierarchical base, has been the norm in Pakistan.

1   Some Reflections on the Way Forward An in-depth review and analysis of public sector reform as discussed in the book has led us to draw the following conclusions coming mainly from the institutional context of public sector reform, reform content and strategy, and their sincere implementation should be considered seriously as a way forward. 1.1  Institutional Context of Reform • With a set of reform drivers including religion, military, and judiciary alongside politics and administration, Pakistan represents a case divergent from the Western world. The interaction of these reform actors has not been static, which has implications for reforms. It is important for the actors to stay in their constitutionally defined boundaries and the state needs systematic policies and repercussion for not following them. • The contextualization of the adopted policy reforms is imperative when it comes to isomorphic pressures. Institutional learning around the world is a desirable concept but the context, institutional history, and the capacity of the state to adopt and implement a particular reform are major variables while determining policy success. So careful attention must be paid to these variables and policies must be indigenized to ensure implementation and acceptance. • We suggest that it is extremely important to understand that transformation is a complex issue and there are no universal approaches to lead the process. It is better to progress incrementally while experimenting and letting evolution proceed organically rather than taking grand transformative steps based on abstract visions and aspirational theoretical constructs of questionable credibility.

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1.2  Reform Content and Strategy • There is a dire need to have long-term policies linked with structural reforms that do not change with changing governments/ruling regimes as usually happens in Pakistan since the intensity of reforms increases with the changing governments and political heads. • Reform processes needs to be inclusive, engaging different stakeholders on board in policy discussions and dialogue. Such consensus-­ ­ based reform should be implemented only after an approval through legislation to avoid arbitrary and ad hoc measures of reform. • Public sector reform needs to be strategic in nature and reviewed occasionally as per requirements of time, technology, and policy. • Periodic monitoring and evaluation of reform need to be ensured through consistent feedback at each step to keep strengths and remove weaknesses of the reform. • Reform mechanisms need to be reviewed on timely basis, that is, working in network is quite different from the traditional hierarchical structures. The actors in network are autonomous actors with interdependencies. In this arrangement, government authorities cannot maintain control and command relations rather they need different capacities such as consensus building and collaborative decision-making. • The government shall slowly shift from a hierarchical approach to one of institutional enablement, in which the government does not control or impose interaction but rather serves as an autocatalytic set of functional interactions among network players. 1.3  Sector-Specific Measures for Reform Implementation • There have been a number of international organizations that have led and are continuing to lead the polio project in Pakistan. Different methods have been adopted and used in different countries that have worked effectively in their context. It is important to take a closer look at the local problems that act as major hindrances in the way of achieving the reform goals. Policy-makers need to understand that deeper analysis of grassroots issues is necessary to come up with

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indigenous solutions. Measures according to the respective analyses to be followed for reform implementation. • There are growing concerns about the capability of local government to effectively implement an environmental statute demanding political commitment and managerial skills. Like national and provincial elections and power to take decisions, the elections for local governments are also important and should be held properly in all the provinces to get better results of devolution and reform implementation at the grassroots level. • The investment for technical capability development in a devolved structure is required in countries like Pakistan, where reforms are politically driven. There are no resources, and there is not enough time for learning by incremental approaches, as in the case of developed countries. This also means that the central government should be encouraged to provide continued support to the provincial government, in order to safeguard against local political pressure and leadership instability. In turn, the provincial government should empower institutions at local levels to achieve effective implementation and improved service delivery in health and other areas. • There is a need to improve monitoring and evaluation of all healthcare facilities including primary, secondary, and tertiary care levels. Standard performance quality instruments should be established to evaluate the performance of health care facilities and applied in all four provinces to provide standardized quality services to every citizen of Pakistan. • The authors have recommended that there are no substitutes for astute planning and execution of any digital government project. There is much to learn from failures and as more and more of these projects get rolled out in developing countries, parallel research can help identify issues and challenges beyond those mentioned in this book for smoother deployment of digital government projects and delivering value to the public in the shape of efficient and effective public service delivery. • There should be minimal interference of the Ministry of Education in operational matters. The charters granted to the universities should be revised, focusing on removing the loopholes for the interference of politics. The syndicate should be empowered for approv-

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ing the statutes and appointments of registrar, controller, and treasurer and at the same time the government should take significant measures for accountability rather than being involved in the decision-making of operational matters. • Reforms, which are being implemented through the HEC, should be reviewed considering the local context under the ideology of “glocal”—keeping in view global importance and local needs. Moreover, HEC and PHEC should involve the management of the universities in policy-making. • The vice chancellor should be accountable to the Syndicate in the same way as a corporate chief executive officer (CEO) is accountable to the board of directors of a corporation. The Syndicate should, in turn, be accountable to the public in the same way as the board of directors of a corporation represents the interests of its shareholders. Bi-annual reports should be published by the Syndicate on the performance of the administration and the university to increase transparency. • Post offices, for financial inclusion of their citizens, can leverage on their reach and enter into technical and financial collaboration with private partners for improving and enhancing their financial service delivery. • Future policies should focus on investing more toward the preventive approach rather than spending heavily on the response aspect of disaster management. We suggest using full support from civil society or nonprofit organizations, adopting decentralized approach in administering the post-disaster activities, and capacity building in the field. To conclude, the reforms in Pakistan appear to be like a  marble cake where it is hard to segregate the hierarchies, markets, and networks. Since there is no one recipe for better implementation of reforms and effective outcomes, the state needs to bring in need-based reforms that aim to solve a specific governance problem with clearly defined mechanisms on evaluation of that reform. Bringing in prevailing reform paradigms might appear fancy; however, importance should be given to solving governance problems rather than increasing the intensity of reforms or trying out new reform ideas.

Index1

A Accountability, vii, 37, 50, 81, 136, 147, 166, 175–177, 181, 183, 184, 197, 214, 215, 219, 270, 271, 284, 351, 353, 361 Administrative decentralization, 12, 183, 184, 196 Agencies, v, vi, ix, x, 6, 8, 11, 14, 30, 35, 45, 52, 56, 57, 75, 89, 98, 100, 102, 107, 116–120, 122–125, 128, 129, 134–137, 141, 145–149, 154–156, 158, 159, 161, 162, 164–167, 184–188, 202, 224, 225, 227, 253, 254, 257, 262, 272, 277, 279, 284, 285, 290, 305, 309, 310, 315, 317, 325, 330, 331, 333, 340, 345, 352, 354 Agencification, 136–137, 141

Agency autonomy, 113, 125, 134, 135, 137, 138, 145, 147, 148 Analogue government, 305, 309 Article 140 (A), 188, 189 Attached departments, 57, 59, 61, 71, 79, 134, 135, 138, 143, 144 Authority, 44, 45, 49, 60, 63–65, 72, 73, 79–84, 89, 97, 98, 116, 117, 119, 122, 125, 128, 147–149, 164, 176, 178, 180–183, 186–188, 191, 197, 199, 207, 208, 215, 218–220, 228, 232, 237, 239, 263, 281, 284, 286, 331, 333–338, 340, 342, 343, 345, 353, 359 Autonomous departments, 138 Autonomy, 6, 8, 10, 28, 45, 48, 57, 59, 61, 62, 65, 71, 76–78, 80–84, 87, 88, 93–108, 116,

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

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© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Zahra et al. (eds.), Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan, Public Sector Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96825-0

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118, 119, 122–125, 128, 129, 134, 137, 138, 141, 142, 145, 147–149, 177, 178, 182, 184, 190, 191, 203, 207, 209, 210, 212–214, 216, 217, 219, 220, 224, 226–228, 231, 232, 234–244, 246, 281, 284, 285, 290, 336, 342, 352, 355, 356, 359 B Barriers, 10, 13, 14, 95, 96, 102–103, 105–108, 226, 275–298, 307, 311, 317–319, 322, 326 Bureaucracy, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 38, 41, 59, 62, 65, 68, 81, 88, 112, 115, 118, 120, 122, 124, 136, 142–144, 176, 177, 179, 184, 233, 236, 310, 314, 325, 344, 350, 354, 355 C Capacity, vi, x, 3, 14, 28, 95, 114, 120–121, 124, 128, 129, 133, 134, 143–145, 147, 177, 181, 183, 184, 190, 197, 201, 225, 228, 234, 238, 255, 266, 268, 269, 277, 281, 282, 288, 316, 319, 334, 337, 344–347, 352, 353, 358, 359, 361 Citizen, v, vi, 14, 26, 28, 76, 114, 157, 158, 185, 188, 190, 191, 196, 202, 211, 252, 267, 303–315, 317, 323–326, 330, 334, 342, 343, 352, 356, 360, 361 Civil service reforms, 34, 36, 71, 149, 355 Civil service training, 143 Coercive isomorphism, 147

Collaboration, x, 11, 113, 116, 119, 123, 125, 128, 145, 153–167, 178, 211, 238, 275, 309, 310, 336–339, 341, 345, 352, 361 Complexity, 25, 105, 107, 108, 125–126, 129, 147, 165, 220, 226, 228, 246, 254, 254n4, 268, 309, 316, 325 Coordination, 6, 11, 42, 45, 84, 88, 95, 98, 103, 112, 113, 116, 119–125, 128, 129, 134, 144, 145, 148, 153–167, 186, 199, 205, 211, 218, 219, 239, 277, 322, 330, 331, 333–338, 340–343, 345–347 Cost-efficiency, 94, 232 Covid-19, 10, 93–108 D Decentralization, vi, vii, 3, 11–13, 48, 84, 95, 97, 104, 176, 180, 183, 184, 191, 195–220, 224, 238, 336–337, 352, 354, 357 Decision making, 2, 12, 22, 94, 95, 97, 99–100, 106, 112, 115, 160, 163, 181, 184, 186, 187, 189, 191, 197, 201, 205, 211, 213, 224, 227, 238, 269, 275, 292, 337, 338, 345, 359, 361 Deconcentration, 183, 197 Deregulation, 12, 78, 116, 122, 123, 223–246, 355 Developing countries, v–vii, x, 4, 7, 8, 12, 14, 52, 56, 93, 94, 96, 98, 104, 122–124, 134, 136, 146, 176, 191, 195, 196, 224–226, 251, 258, 278, 289, 290, 304, 306, 307, 311, 319, 324, 326, 346, 356, 360 Development administration, 144, 146, 177

 INDEX 

Devolution, 11–13, 45, 46, 86, 144, 175, 176, 178, 181–192, 196–203, 208, 218–220, 352–354, 356, 360 Digital government, vi, 14, 303–326, 360 Disruption, 35, 47, 112, 270, 305 Donor agencies, 75, 88–89, 117, 122, 123, 136, 146, 202, 224 E Efficiency, 6, 65, 66, 68, 118, 123, 124, 137, 177, 196, 219, 223, 224, 232, 235, 271, 278, 304, 305, 308, 309, 326, 351, 357 E-government, 305–311, 324–326 18th Amendment, 12, 83, 84, 100, 100n5, 145, 176, 178, 187–192, 199–200, 237, 336, 352 Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs), 159, 160, 343 Energy sector, 10, 111–129, 289, 355 F Federal government, 45, 46, 57, 65, 79, 84, 87, 134, 138, 181, 182, 185, 186, 189, 190, 192, 196–199, 201, 204, 208, 212, 218, 269, 284, 286, 336–337, 352, 356 Federal training institutions (FTI), 10, 11, 133–149, 352 Financial inclusion, 13, 251–272, 361 Fragmentation, 6, 113, 119, 123, 125–126, 129, 144, 155, 219 G Good governance, 116, 145, 177, 223, 228, 275, 286 Governance, vii, x, xi, 2–5, 7, 8, 12, 24, 31, 40, 48, 49, 81, 87, 93,

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119, 129, 134, 136, 153, 154, 157, 178–184, 187–189, 191, 192, 196, 203, 212, 214, 215, 219, 223–226, 228, 229, 231, 238, 239, 276, 277, 284, 286, 304, 305, 309, 310, 312, 314, 315, 324, 347, 351, 353, 354, 356, 357, 361 Governance networks, 124–125, 177, 178 H Health budget, 93, 94, 98, 202, 218 Healthcare institution, 100 Health-care sector, 203, 214–215 Health infrastructure, 95, 102, 107 Hierarchy, 1–15, 32, 36, 38, 55, 56, 89, 107, 112, 120–124, 129, 134, 135, 144, 153, 156, 160, 180, 224, 229, 233, 236, 239, 306, 316, 331, 342, 344, 345, 354–358, 361 Hierarchy-and network-based management, 338 Hierarchy type management (HTM), 12, 89, 95, 97, 107, 112, 113, 134, 147, 148, 176, 191, 281, 347 Hospital autonomy, 8, 10, 93–107, 209, 216, 355, 356 Hospital reforms, 200, 208–209, 212–214, 216–217, 352 I Innovation, 6, 254, 257, 271, 303, 308, 310, 319 Innovative business models, 251–272 Institutional isomorphism, 137, 145–149 Institutional theories, 135, 137

366 

INDEX

Institutions, x, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 22–24, 26, 27, 29–33, 35, 42, 45, 48–52, 55, 56, 59, 63–68, 70, 72, 73, 78, 79, 81, 82, 88, 97, 104, 105, 107, 115, 116, 124, 133–149, 155, 159, 160, 175, 179, 182, 185, 199, 200, 204, 206, 209, 223–246, 254, 255, 257n15, 260, 262, 277, 282, 317, 330, 331, 334–338, 340, 341, 344–346, 350–355, 357, 360 Integration, 6, 119, 123, 124, 145, 154, 208, 309, 340 Inter-agency collaboration, 153–167, 352 Interdependencies, 125, 166, 359 Intergovernmental cooperation, 154 Inter-organizational relations, 113, 116, 123, 129, 154 Inter-organization and inter-agency working, 154 Inter-sectoral collaboration, 154 Intra-governmental cooperation, f, 154 Isomorphism, 8, 137, 145–149 J Judiciary, vi, 9, 23, 24, 28, 30, 32, 39, 42, 43, 46, 49–51, 56, 57, 59, 74, 82, 83, 85, 88, 344, 350, 353, 358 L Legitimacy, 29–31, 33, 34, 40, 145, 176, 177, 191, 350 Liberalization, 38, 79, 88, 116–118, 122, 123 Local government (LG) reforms, 11, 31, 38, 41, 45, 48, 68, 76–79,

81, 84, 88, 166, 175–192, 197, 209, 219, 253, 314, 315, 336, 357, 360 M Management mechanism, 93, 95–97, 104–105, 107, 134, 143, 149, 196, 259, 304 Market, 1–15, 56, 78, 89, 107, 116, 118–124, 134, 135, 226, 229, 239, 246, 254, 265, 279, 282, 289, 304, 349–351, 356–358, 361 Market-based management, 339 Market type management (MTM), 95, 97, 104–108, 112, 113, 120, 122, 129, 134, 135, 138, 147, 148, 281, 304 Military, vi, 9, 23, 24, 26–51, 56, 62, 65, 68, 70–74, 74n4, 76, 78, 79, 81–83, 85–88, 104, 115, 116, 155, 162, 177, 179, 180, 182, 191, 197, 207, 330, 331, 346, 350, 351, 353, 354, 358 N National action plan, 94 National Disaster Management Ordinance (NDMO), 332, 335, 344 Network, 1–15, 56, 89, 118, 124–125, 129, 154–156, 166, 167, 182, 186, 229, 239, 246, 252, 253n1, 255, 257, 258, 260n18, 261, 262, 264, 265, 267, 285, 336–342, 345–347, 349, 350, 355–359, 361 Network governance, 177, 178 Network type management (NTM), 12, 95, 113, 123, 124, 129, 134, 135, 138, 148, 341

 INDEX 

New Public Governance (NPG), 113, 156 New public management (NPM), 6, 95, 98, 113, 122, 123, 134, 136, 137, 141, 146, 147, 155, 156, 177, 183, 223, 224, 226, 228, 236, 246, 254, 254n5, 276, 304, 339, 342–344 Non-government organization (NGO), 100, 155, 156, 161, 164, 165, 202, 207, 208, 210, 216, 297, 333, 345, 356 O Open Government, 305 Organizational autonomy, 96, 290 Organizational change, 95 P Pakistan Polio Eradication Program, 156 Pilot project, 10, 95, 98, 99, 104, 107, 206, 210, 212 Policy cycle, 96–98 Policy evaluation, 100–102, 253n3 Policy implementation, 45, 71, 93, 96, 100–101, 113, 122, 219, 307, 334, 345 Policy making, vi, 12, 45, 115, 149, 185, 224, 237, 238, 332, 361 Polio immunization, 162, 163 Population rate, 95 Primary healthcare, 98, 196, 199, 204, 207, 208, 210, 216, 316, 316n4 Privatization, 8, 38, 41, 50, 75, 78–80, 85–88, 96, 112, 116–118, 122, 177, 207, 235, 270, 276, 279–281, 288, 297 Provincial autonomy, 28, 94, 95, 105, 106

367

Provincial health-care, 220 Public health policy, 95, 100 Public health sector structure, 12, 196, 219 Public hospitals, 93–108, 208, 212, 213, 219 Public-Private Partnership Authority Act 2017, 190, 286 Public value, 6, 303 R Reform models, 8, 122, 123, 135, 136, 177 Reforms, v–vii, x, xxii, xxiv, 1–15, 21–52, 55–59, 65–67, 71, 72, 76, 78, 81, 83, 85, 87–89, 93–99, 104, 105, 107, 111–129, 133–149, 175–192, 195–220, 223–229, 234–236, 238, 239, 246, 254n5, 267n23, 271, 278, 279, 281, 283, 286, 297, 298, 304, 329–347, 349–361 Reforms in disaster management, 329–347 Religion, vi, 9, 23–30, 32–34, 36–37, 39, 40, 42–44, 46, 47, 50, 51, 61, 157, 350, 353, 354, 357, 358 Renewable energy, 114, 115, 120–121, 126, 129, 283, 287 Restructuring reforms, 119, 124 Rotary International, 11, 159, 161 S Secondary healthcare, 200, 204–208, 214–215, 220, 316n4, 323 Sector reforms, v, vii, x, xxii, 1–15, 55, 96, 99, 111–129, 136, 137, 146, 195, 226, 271, 304, 349–361 Semi autonomous bodies, 57, 71, 155 Sendai Framework, 333–334, 341, 342

368 

INDEX

Service delivery, vi, 12, 61, 94, 100, 100n4, 104, 106, 137, 141, 143, 146, 148, 156, 158, 176, 182, 183, 189, 191, 192, 196, 197, 199, 202, 207, 208, 212, 213, 216, 253, 276, 279, 281, 297, 303–305, 312, 326, 352, 354, 355, 360, 361 Situational analysis, 95, 104 Smartphones, 252, 260, 262–265, 264n21, 268, 269, 312, 317, 319, 322, 323, 326 Sustainable development, 116, 185, 275 Sustainable infrastructure delivery, 297

T Tertiary healthcare, 93, 94, 98, 214, 316, 316n4 Thermal power, 114, 115, 117, 118, 126, 127, 129, 352 Training Institutions, 8, 10, 11, 133–149, 352 U Universal health coverage (UHC), 94n1, 202