Public-Private Stewardship: Achieving Value-for-Money in Public-Private Partnerships 3031171306, 9783031171307

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Public-Private Stewardship Achieving Value-for-Money in Public-Private Partnerships Joshua M. Steinfeld

Public-Private Stewardship “How can we increase Value-for-Money and have successful Public-Private Partnerships in Defense Acquisition? In this well-written book and valuable contribution to improving PPPs, Joshua Steinfeld provides insightful theoretical, conceptual, and practical approaches for Public- Private Stewardship practices for achieving improved VFM and PPP outcomes. The book’s illustrations of seven portraits of public private stewards are excellent examples of how focusing on both profit-driven and public interest values can result in successful defense acquisition PPP results.” —Rene Rendon, Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA “Joshua Steinfeld has masterfully discussed and assimilated longstanding Defense and Federal acquisition tenets into and practical processes and actual examples for successful public and private sector partnerships. He addresses joint values for satisfying both profit and public interests; using existing tools to present broadly stated requirements to be solved by performance based contracting solutions and innovation; understanding of all stakeholders’ requirements and limitations; and continuous collaboration and communication from requirements inception to fulfillment to ensure success for all. With over forty-five years’ experience in Defense and Federal contracting in both the public and private sectors, I highly recommend this work for new acquisition professionals and as a refresher for longtime acquisition professionals in both the public and private sectors. It is essential to know what is already available and can be applied for solutions in today’s especially demanding economic climate.” —Jeff Brunner, Senior Acquisition Advisor to the Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (Retired), USA “As governments and firms partner on large complex projects, Dr. Steinfeld provides a compelling case of the need to align public values with business interests to ensure a successful outcome. Dr. Steinfeld’s tour through recent U.S. Department of Defense procurement provides an illustrative context for these increasingly common partnerships.” —Trevor Brown, Dean, John Glenn College of Public Affairs, The Ohio State University, USA

Joshua M. Steinfeld

Public-Private Stewardship Achieving Value-for-Money in Public-Private Partnerships

Joshua M. Steinfeld School of Public Service Old Dominion University Norfolk, VA, USA

ISBN 978-3-031-17130-7 ISBN 978-3-031-17131-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17131-4 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © John Rawsterne/patternhead.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Family and the U.S. Military

Contents

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1

Introduction

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Leadership as Stewardship

15

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Political Actor for Political Settlement

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The Catalyst of the Public Interest

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Implementation through Communication

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Transparent Engagement across Organization

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Progress from Learning and Adaptation

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Stewardship Theory over Agency Theory

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Applying and Implementing Public–Private Stewardship

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Conclusion

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Bibliography

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Index

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract The emergence of public–private partnerships (PPPs) is introduced with connections to public stewardship and value-for-money (VFM) in reaching successful outcomes. The theory and concept of public–private stewardship (PPS) is coined as an ideological advancement to new public management (NPM) and new public service (NPS). Seven portraits of PPS are set forth to achieve VFM in PPPs. The genesis for using the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of the Navy (DON) examples to illustrate PPS is articulated. Takeaways-focused chapter overviews are offered. Keywords Public–Private stewardship (PPS) · Public–Private partnerships (PPP) · Public stewardship · Public–Private steward · Portraits · Value-for-money · Fiduciary responsibility · Public values · Warfighter · Combat readiness · Acquisition · Decision making

To improve public service, governments have turned to public–private partnerships (PPPs) to complete projects better, faster, cheaper, and with more value, as an alternative to traditional contracting practices (see Kettl 1993). One of Linder’s (1999) six meanings of PPPs is that they are a “restructuring of the public service” (p. 46). However, the literature suggests that scholarship on PPPs is still in a developmental stage © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. M. Steinfeld, Public-Private Stewardship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17131-4_1

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(see Martin 2016). As examples, scholars debate the specific arrangements between the public and private sectors that define the term “PPPs” (Hodge and Greve 2010; Savas 2000), whether the perceived benefits of these arrangements such as improved project outcomes can be realized (see Forrer et al. 2010), or if tensions between public and private sector motives can be alleviated through partnering. It is widely recognized that public sector entities seek partnerships with private sector corporations when project size and scope extend beyond the available resources and technical expertise of the public sector, or to practice cost-effectiveness emanating from the economies of scale realized by specialized private firms (see Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011). To begin setting the stage for inquiry and analysis, Forrer et al. (2010) identified three critical conditions of PPPs. First, the relationship between the public and the private sector organization is long term, rather than a brief, one-time relationship. In other words, a one-time relationship occurs only in a conventional contract for a good or service. Second, the private sector cooperates in the production and delivery of public goods and services; a process which used to be solely the domain of the public sector. Third, the relationship involves a negotiated allocation of risk between the public and private sectors instead of the government bearing most of the risk (p. 476). Experience in PPPs indicates the importance of adopting new attitudes and charting new courses in the relationship between partners and the way that business is conducted to include the dual promotion of public values by both the public and private sector partners, a factor noticeably absent from the three conditions of PPPs. In search of an actionable approach, public stewardship works as a dual-action concept involving both the safeguarding of taxpayer funds and the advancement of public interest (Bauld 2016). Public stewardship fits the PPP model because it comprises aspects of public interest and business finance, thereby comprising the core value sets of the public sector and the private sector. The nuance regarding the promotion of public values, not just the upholding of public values, as a staple of public stewardship, implies an action-oriented approach that supports the frameworks for decision making of PPPs. A shift is taking place in PPPs from a sole focus on the transactional elements of cost, risk, and revenues between public and private entities to developing awareness that public interest needs to be built into PPPs. At the project level, this means that the upholding and promotion of public values is imbued in the contracting terms and conditions to include

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not just efficiency and effectiveness, but tenets of good governance such as transparency, accountability, and equity (see Sabry 2015). The practice of public stewardship applied to the public and the private sector, involving multi-sectoral efforts of collaboration, and mutual, aligned interests between sectors and respective stakeholders, is labeled as public– private stewardship (PPS). One unique characteristic of PPS compared to other theory-based and concept-based practices is that its practices must satisfy the needs and desires of all stakeholders without the consequence of trade-offs or negative externalities. The second major interesting characteristic of PPS is that decision making does not take place in isolation; decision making reflects the practitioner’s optimal pursuit and alignment of value propositions with individual and collective strategy, operations, tactics, goals, and objectives.

Connecting Public–Private Stewardship to Value-For-Money The foundation for PPS is already taking shape in public procurement and contract management, the subfields of public administration for which PPPs assimilate. Initiatives regarding small business and minority set-asides, going green, sustainability, equal opportunity, and open solicitation, have come to the forefront of strategic sourcing. Cumulatively, these considerations fall under the new label of social procurement and New Public Governance (NPG) (Barraket et al. 2016) with the primary defense of improving public service provision up and down the supply chain. For PPPs, public agencies’ choice of a private sector partner is reflecting more and more the tenets of the social procurement movement. While factors regarding know-how, cost, quality, delivery, capacity, and past performance remain to be criteria for selection of the optimal private sector partner or project, these inputs to conventional value-for-money (VFM) calculations are more effective in the technical aspects but less promising in adding public and social value in terms of advancing public interest. Public agencies are now prioritizing the development and use of approaches pertinent to community engagement, social responsibility, and citizenship of corporations in choosing a particular public project or a suitor for partnership. What does the term “value” as used in VFM really entail? Traditionally, value as it relates to VFM is seen in the sense of cost-effectiveness or profits, which means cost–benefit consideration with less focus on public

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value or public benefit. If, however, value refers to public value including public interest, accountability, and equity, there is now a new dimension both for the private entity and for the contracting agency. If the value refers to norms such as public values where there is a discussion of public interest, accountability, and equity, then that implies that the private partner should expect public values to be included in PPPs as relevant factors in achieving capabilities and performing to contract. If value is seen as pure economic value in the sense of cost-effectiveness or profits, then it may simply mean cost–benefit consideration with less focus on public value. Thus, the public and private sectors even though framing their agreement around the same term “value,” might have different or contradictory expectations. What may be missing is not simply a lack or an inability for understanding the term, but rather a lack of prerequisites considered in the planning or implementation phases; therefore, leading to the partial achievement of project goals and objectives. Expanding the meaning of value requires associating the traditional norms of efficiency and effectiveness to broader ethical norms of shared public values. This new prioritization for a publicness of values approach in PPPs has led to the following definition for VFM: “The optimum combination of whole-life cost and quality (or fitness for purpose) to meet the user’s requirement. It can be assessed using the criteria of economy, efficiency and effectiveness” (Jackson 2012). Through this definition, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) advocates a consideration for whom, of what, and by when (Jackson 2012) in the achievement of optimal outcomes while considering all factors, such as relevant costs and benefits, risks, and resources over the entirety of the product or service life-cycle. With these updated calculations for VFM, PPPs today are distinguished from the earlier PPPs that were fueled by political objectives to keep debt off the public balance sheet or by the ideological conception—think outsourcing and contracting out—that the private sector was more effective than the public in delivering projects (Siemiatycki and Farooqi 2012, p. 298; Thorne and Johnston 2012). This approach is also shared by the New Public Service (NPS) which in response to the New Public Management (NPM) principles provided its seven practical lessons for advancing public interest (see Denhardt and Denhardt 2015). These lessons are based on principles of serving rather than steering; making the public interest the aim, not the byproduct; thinking strategically, acting democratically; serving citizens, not customers; being accountable; valuing people, not just productivity;

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valuing citizenship, and public service above entrepreneurship (p. 664). This book recognizes the merits of the NPS lessons as the core of today’s public administration. However, when PPPs’ promise to VFM is challenged despite the tenets of NPS, how else can public administrators guide stakeholders in their actions? In other words, how can public stewardship increase the efficiency and effectiveness of PPPs while advancing public interest? The purpose of this book is to offer practical, conceptual, and theoretical approaches to achieve VFM and improve the outcomes of PPPs by demonstrating PPS practices, including profit-driven and public interest values. The book addresses the research question: “How can public administrators (and politicians, policymakers, and business administrators) lead stakeholders in their actions in order to increase VFM for all stakeholders and have successful PPP outcomes?” The book answers the research question by providing seven portraits of public–private stewards and examples of PPS practices to assist stakeholders of PPPs in achieving VFM.

Seven Portraits of Stewardship to Achieve Value-For-Money Political, economic, and social systems are complex, therefore making efforts of PPPs sometimes less visible and less consistent with the intrinsic goals of the public sector. As practitioners are looking to consider PPPs, there is a need to develop themes as a starting point for practitioners to model their approaches to engaging PPPs. From this research, portraits of PPS are presented to help ensure the stewardship responsibilities of a PPP. The seven portraits are: Leadership as Stewardship; Political Actor for Political Settlement; The Catalyst of the Public Interest; Implementation through Communication; Transparent Engagement across Organization; Progress from Learning and Adaptation; Stewardship Theory over Agency Theory. The public and private sectors not only strive to sustain the primary objectives of risk and benefit–cost management but also want to ensure that economic and democratic components are addressed to the satisfaction of the local, state, and federal governments and their resident stakeholders. Forrer et al. (2010) proposed a relevant framework of six dimensions to assess PPP accountability including risk, costs and benefits, social and political impact, expertise, partnership collaboration, and performance

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measurement (p. 479). Seven portraits are crafted here that stakeholders can model to ensure that through partnership, they are able to meet the needs of citizens. This framework is proposed to not only support the tenets of NPS but also to draw the attention of NPM that when it comes to delivering public goods and services, honest and win–win collaboration is necessary, and that can be achieved by observing one additional dimension. That is modeling portraits of public stewardship. Each of the seven PPS portraits reflects an aspect of public service and addresses a pattern of behaviors. Together, the seven portraits converge to create effective and efficient stewardship action. Thus, the discussion of VFM if it is to be significant for the public and private sectors in PPPs needs to articulate the value in the PPS sense. Without the PPS dimension to the VFM aspect of PPPs, public administrators are falling back to eroded and flawed principles about public service and business administrators are not maximizing profitability. Department of Defense (DOD) Procurement and Contracting as Exemplars This book applies a defense acquisition perspective. The examples that illustrate PPS practices are based on approaches utilized by the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of the Navy (DON) as a central arm based on the DOD organizational structure and responsibility for supporting the joint forces. There is no question that when it comes to global forces management, the Army and the Marine Corps have centralized powers as well. The DON works especially closely with the Air Force and the Marine Corps, and examples in this book are included from each, to exemplify PPS practices in the steady coordination of the integrated sea, air, land, and space objectives. The theories and concepts of PPS do not simply emerge from all PPPs. The greater the scope of complexity and challenges, the more likely that new directions are required for success (see Lynn 1981). The DOD is the single most complex public organization in the world. Honing-in on supporting joint forces, while the DON’s headquarters is located at the Pentagon, its Fleet Forces Command (FFC) nearby Naval Station Norfolk, serves as the focal point for command of all United States Navy operations worldwide. As of June 30, 2022, there are 344,022 active-duty personnel in the DON with a total of 1,317,200 active-duty DOD personnel. And as of March 31, 2022, there are 340,390 civilian

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personnel in the DON and 1,346,017 civilian personnel in the DOD (Defense Manpower Data Center 2022). The greater than 2.5 million strong workforce coupled with a 2023 Fiscal Year (FY) defense budget of $773 billion (U.S. Department of Defense 2022a) signifies that the scope and complexity of the DOD and its operations are second to none. The DOD activities involve the seven forces (Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, Coast Guard, and National Guard), with the most integrated and encompassing being the Navy. Led by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), the DON operational side of the branch consists of 11 combatant commands (COCOMS, and actually part of DOD vice DON), eight component commands, seven numbered fleets, and vestibules of task forces, task groups, task units, and task elements (U.S. Department of Defense 2022b). Led by the SECNAV as the civilian leadership and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) as the military leader, the DON administrative side of the branch consists of 15 shore commands, five system commands, and nine type commands including the Naval Surface Forces, Naval Air Forces, Submarine Forces, and Special Warfare Forces, for each the Pacific and the Atlantic (U.S. Department of Defense 2022b). The administrative functions involve the full corporate suite of business development, revenue, and cost functions only rivaled by a Fortune 20 company. Beyond the size and complexity of the DOD, whereby new approaches are called for in the face of some DOD project failures and a continual motive for improvement, the DOD mini cases in this book serve as the perfect exemplars for PPS practices because of the partnering dynamic that takes place between the DOD and the private sector firms. The DOD engages in a magnitude of business with private industry including large prime contractors, and small and medium-sized contractors including subcontractors, vendors, and suppliers to fulfill its needs for goods and services. The DOD involves in the entire scale of contracting including, as examples, decades long partnerships for research and development (R&D) and concept design of the F-22 Raptor advanced tactical fighter (ATF) jet, to years-long agreements for refurbishing nuclear vessels, for shipbuilding, low-rate production of cruise missiles, and military construction (MILCON) of shore facilities, or agreements for work that is completed on a quicker schedule such as ship repair or IT procurement. As a result, the DOD entertains a wide slate of contracting actions in order to fulfill requirements and meet mission objectives. These contracting actions involve procurement processes and are often

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conceived within larger acquisition program applications (see Rendon and Snider 2019). The full spectrum of contracting arrangements the DOD engages with the private sector reflect various dimensions of partnering from more transactional, hasty contracting relationships to extensive involvement between the public and private sector that is exemplary of the most intensive and enhanced form of partnership known, just consider as one facet the top-security nature of much of the work and its vital importance to democracy. While the top-security nature of the work can in some instances challenge the ability to partner, it demonstrates the stakes involved and the level of scrutiny at play. To engage with the DOD and the DON, begs a list of certifications, to begin with, that insinuates a mode of shared purpose. The expanse, complexities, and intricacies of the DOD acquisition programs is highlighted by the examples in the following chapters. The DON is a contracting organization with its actions prioritizing the warfighter at the individual level, and combat readiness at the mission objectives level. The objectives of DON make its core values and value propositions integral to successful project outcomes making it serve as the perfect model organization for examples of PPS practices. To prioritize the warfighter and achieve combat readiness, the DON workforce must consider public and private sector stakeholders in completing its work to deliver the greatest VFM—equated in this book to safeguarding the taxpayer funds to support the warfighter in the promotion of public interest values.

Overview of Chapters Chapter 2, Leadership as Stewardship, begins with emphasizing the importance of expertise in preparing for PPS practices. The various tools such as information technology (IT) that are at the disposal of the practitioner are introduced to highlight the role of coordination among stakeholders in very large organizations with highly complex structures, multi-sector business lines, and cutting-edge programs. The public–private interactive dynamic is then illustrated between the public and private sector agents. The importance of curiosity as a conduit for expertise that creates innovation is further emphasized with professional engagement suggested as a possible avenue. This chapter sets the tone of the book by providing background for the tensity of dynamics in federal

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government PPPs including stakeholder viewpoints, sources for tactics, regulation, and politicization. The sources for decision making, such as tools in procurement and contracting, including the focus placed on requirements, are broadly presented to illustrate areas of possibilities for PPS practices. A brief discussion of data analytics is included as an option for tool-based decision making and a vantage point for approaching the performance and the coordinating challenges faced by PPPs. To situate the context for the chapters that follow, this chapter gives initial insight into the realm and practice of PPS from the standpoint of a practitioner decision maker. Chapter 3, Political Actor for Political Settlement, provides a depiction of the interplays between the stakeholders of PPP. The high cost of acquisition is addressed through offering PPP practices in procurement that improve performance to contract and contribute to overall VFM. Stakeholder outlooks are provided to hint at the flux of caveats influencing decision making and the multiple lenses in large scale PPP acquisition programs that a decision maker must zoom in on. It is shown that the transaction costs arising from advantages and disadvantages between partners pose obstacles to successful PPP outcomes, but present windows of opportunity for PPS to be practiced. The issue of accountability is pointed out as a basic theme because of the impacts to incentives for performance, quality, cost, and delivery, and the connection to other public values such as transparency, inclusion, and environmentalism. In these spaces, public values can be developed that articulate public interest and the interests of the public and private partner for purposes of devising value propositions that may be shared by the public and private partner. A discussion of core values and value orientations of the public and private partner in business and contracting is provided along with the overall schemata of place and exercise of PPS practices. The rationale behind the public–private steward is explained with multiple analyses of how PPS practices come to fruition from the initial emergence of a challenge or other pursuit leading toward the identification of common values. Chapter 4, The Catalyst of the Public Interest, portrays the public– private steward as a facilitator of working platforms to promote the public interest and as a facilitator of values between stakeholders. The overarching interests and prevailing concerns of the public and private partner in acquisition contexts are resounded to establish levels of analysis for steward catalyst problem solving. The steward catalyst approaches and tactics are described including the use of standardization as a

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tool for process improvement, reaching milestones, and quality assurance. The complex requirements of large-scale federal PPPs engender a new mentality toward acquisition that revisits value orientations such as competition to recognize the benefits of collaboration and even consolidation. The devotion to public interest is further foreshadowed by the catalyst’s ability to instill a trait of publicness onto the private partner. It is shown how the values important to both the public and private partners interact with the operations and processes inherent to each respective organization and those that functionalize the partnering relationship. These synergies are drivers for PPP stakeholders especially decision makers with impacts on PPP outcomes. For the steward catalyst to act, the requisite landscape and preparation are codified in addition to showing how both knowledge of, and knowledge in, the process, is utilized for PPS practices. Chapter 5, Implementation through Communication, reflects the practitioner’s ability to manage the divergent needs of stakeholders by implementing PPS using communication as a tool. Examples of communication channels for means of authority and collaboration are identified to demonstrate how implementation can take place in the planning and formation of a PPP. The generation of value in acquisition processes is then presented including limitations such as rules and regulations. A discussion of communication routes for implementing PPS is provided highlighting key aspects for the public–private steward to consider in decision making. One of the most complicated elements of the formation of PPPs and the acquisition planning involves the design which is discussed as a procurement activity that has the potential to communicate PPS. The all-encompassing requirements of design planning give way to PPS in the form of public stewardship practice of the private partner, whereby public stewardship does not take place simply for the public at large but to also include the private sector firm and its employees as key stakeholders. Examples of contracting strategies and tactics that can be used as tools and techniques for PPS practices are presented according to procurement phases to demonstrate the effects of decision making in the planning and implementation of the PPP. Chapter 6, Transparent Engagement across Organization, describes where transparency is core to PPP practices and how it is an important influence of aspects involving public sector contract management such as solicitation, sourcing, choice of partner, acquisition planning, and operations, as well as impacts to the private partner’s performance

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and PPP outcomes. Beginning with the purposes and benefits of market research, transparency is presented as necessary for sufficient acquisition planning and successful performance to contract. Transparency is seen as a pathway to improving partnering to better achieve VFM and is shown to be linked to other public values and leverage opportunities for PPS practices. The purist-broker model that applies for decision making using public values is subsequently discussed that situates public practitioners according to a politicized or neutral ethos in public administration. A public values orientation that involves transparency can be connected to PPS practices geared toward sustainability and inclusion that results in promotion of other public values and a culmination of better VFM. The trade-offs between transparency and other value drivers derived from contract management activities and those of core public values are discussed to illustrate expected challenges and how to alleviate tensions between values. A strategy for reconceptualization of values is offered to accomplish transparency by organizing management practices around other value drivers that lead to transparency outcomes. Chapter 7, Progress from Learning and Adaptation, focuses on the fact that a public–private steward learns and adapts as the program and projects progress. This is important in public service and partnership because the actors initially operate from the perspective that may be either public value or market value. The ability for public administrators, and other stakeholders to PPPs, to not only learn but also adapt to new perspectives and unexpected requests becomes important for finding solutions. The pressing issues are articulated by people; metrics that are a measurable standard for performance are unlikely to capture elements of public values that are difficult to quantify. Public–private stewards have a knack for curiosity, self-reflection, and reciprocal learning. Partnering works better when partners share expertise and technical capabilities. In PPS, learning and adapting are accepted as necessary provision that stands the chance to add value in the short and long term. Chapter 8, Stewardship Theory over Agency Theory, provides a comparison and diagnosis of stewardship and agency theory. The structure of stakeholder relationships, stakeholder interests, and impact on VFM is juxtaposed for stewardship theory and agency theory. The implications and fit for PPS practices of each are discussed. The key fundamentals for theory, concept, and practice of PPS are revealed. This chapter also draws parallels between Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2015) seven lessons of New Public Service (NPS) and PPS. The seven portraits

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of PPS are derived from the principles of NPS to see how PPS derives from NPS as a foundational framework in public administration. The resulting setting for public and business administrators is conveyed by the new angles of stakeholder engagement that redefine how administrative activities are practiced and the goals that are pursued. This is done by establishing what public service values PPS entails and how these values are implemented within a public–private context. Accordingly, PPS practices can both contribute to the making of a partnership and to making a partnership better. Chapter 9, Applying and Implementing Public–Private Stewardship, generalizes a how-to approach showing how strategic public procurement and contract management is utilized to practice PPS in PPPs. This chapter demonstrates the application of PPS and how it can be applied generally to projects without regard to levels of government, such that the stepwise approach provided works at the local, state, federal, and international arenas of government. Intent actions aimed at PPS begin with strategic planning and the development of mission, vision, and values, which will be discussed. Then, specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-based (SMART) goals and objectives are described in the implementation of PPS along with the development and reconciliation of value drivers impacting diverse stakeholders and the processes they manage. The possible reconceptualization of values that may result, and the contribution or detraction from strategic and tactical alignment, is explained as outcomes of the implementation of PPS and requires senior executive management including personnel at all levels of the organization and across the partnership to coordinate successful strategic outcomes. Chapter 10, the Conclusion, summarizes the major findings of the book pointing to PPS practices as a daily approach to work and its preparation. The major takeaways from the previous chapters are highlighted to pose suggestions for widespread implementation and adoption of PPS practices. This chapter discusses, from an individual decision maker’s standpoint, how professionalism may be examined and applied to facilitate PPS practices in PPPs for improved outcomes. The concluding chapter also recommends areas for future inquiry into PPS, suggesting research that explores how VFM can be measured with consideration to externalities that affect both public and private sector stakeholders now and in the future regarding both fiduciary responsibility and advancing public values.

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References Barraket, Jo, Robyn Keast, and Craig Furneaux. 2016. Social Procurement and New Public Governance. New York: Routledge. Bauld, Stephen. 2016. Shift Needed in Public Procurement Stewardship. Daily Commercial News 89 (99): 1–2. Brinkerhoff, Derick W., and Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff. 2011. Public-Private Partnerships: Perspectives on Purposes, Publicness, and Good Governance. Public Administration and Development 31 (1): 2–14. Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). 2022. Armed Forces Strength Figures for June 30, 2022. U.S. Department of Defense. https://dwp. dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports. Accessed 12 Aug 2022. Denhardt, Janet V., and Robert B. Denhardt. 2015. The New Public Service: Serving Not Steering, 4th ed. New York, NY: Routledge. Forrer, John, James Edwin Kee, Kathryn E. Newcomer, and Eric Boyer. 2010. Public-Private Partnerships and the Public Accountability Question. Public Administration Review 70 (3): 475–484. Hodge, Graeme, and Carsten Greve. 2010. Public-Private Partnerships: Governance Scheme or Language Game? The Australian Journal of Public Administration 69 (S1): S8–S22. Jackson, Penny. 2012, May. Value for Money and International Development: Deconstructing Myths to Promote a More Constructive Discussion. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee. https://www.oecd.org/development/effective ness/49652541.pdf. Accessed 16 Feb 2023. Kettl, Donald F. 1993. Sharing Power: Public Governance and Private Markets. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Linder, Stephen H. 1999. Coming to Terms with the Public-Private Partnership: A Grammar of Multiple Meanings. The American Behavioral Scientist 43 (1): 35–51. Lynn, Laurence E. 1981. Managing the Public’s Business: The Job of the Government Executive. New York, NY: Basic Books. Martin, Lawrence L. 2016. Making Sense of Public-Private Partnerships (P3s). Journal of Public Procurement 16 (2): 191–207. Rendon, Rene G., and Keith F. Snider. 2019. Management of Defense Acquisition Projects, 2nd ed. Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Sabry, Mohamed I. 2015. Good Governance, Institutions and Performance of Public Private Partnerships. International Journal of Public Sector Management 28 (7): 566–582. Savas, Emanuel S. 2000. Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships. New York: Chatham House Publishers.

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Siemiatycki, Matti, and Naeem Farooqi. 2012. Value for Money and Risk in Public-Private Partnerships. Journal of the American Planning Association 78 (3): 286. Thorne, Kym, and Judith Johnston. 2012. PPPs: Benign Partners or Partners in Crime? Reply to Kee and Forrer. Public Integrity 14 (2): 203–210. U.S. Department of Defense. 2022a. The Department of Defense Releases the President’s Fiscal Year 2023 Defense Budget. U.S. Department of Defense https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/298 (DOD). 0014/the-department-of-defense-releases-the-presidents-fiscal-year-2023-def ense-budg/. Accessed 12 Aug 2022. U.S. Department of Defense. 2022b. Military Units—Navy. U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Mil itary-Units/navy/. Accessed 12 Aug 2022.

CHAPTER 2

Leadership as Stewardship

Abstract Leadership as Stewardship is presented as the first portrait of public–private stewardship (PPS). The importance of expertise in making positive practitioner contributions to public–private partnerships (PPPs) is discussed. The basis of the steward leader is generated by showing instances stakeholder tensions need to be reconciled. The link between expertise, curiosity, and steward leadership is presented to be foundational to the display of PPS. Leadership practices in contracting and partnering using expertise are examined to demonstrate how PPS can work. Keywords Expertise · Curiosity · Innovation · Professional associations · Steward leader · Requirements · Engineering · Combination specifications · Academics · Non-attribution · Information technology · Contracting

The PPS advocated in this chapter, Leadership as Stewardship, argues for distributed leadership where the individual willingly subjugates his or her personal interests to act in the protection of others’ long-term welfare. Wilkins (2014) finds that distributed ownership makes stewardship a unique aspect of leadership because owners are unlikely to relinquish their ownership and responsibilities. In this sense, the interests of all relevant

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. M. Steinfeld, Public-Private Stewardship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17131-4_2

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stakeholders, not just the public at large, are being considered in governance and public activities. Strategic competencies and values need to be developed among leaders in PPPs and numerous stakeholder factions, such that the leaders take on the role of effective and ethical agents in carrying out business, in the short, medium, and long term.

Expertise and Curiosity It is said that the acquisition field’s practitioners should not only know the most about the products and services that are being acquired but also be the personnel who have their ears closest to the market. To be an effective and ethical agent, a practitioner needs to become an expert in the marketplace that it is dealing in (see Rosenbloom and Piotrowski 2005). In acquisition, it is the pre-solicitation phase that the procurement or organizational agent engages in expertise building. This is done through conducting market research, discussing functions and features with vendors and suppliers, prospective synchronization and implementation, and possibly certain aspects of bidding on or administering any potential contract for the goods and services. In partnering, expertise building takes place through an iteration of stakeholder engagement, inquiry and study of processes, procedures, and science, and echoing the interactions to develop a personal and organization-wide understanding of the cross-functional nature. The steward leader takes an action-oriented approach stemming from both curiosity and needs in problem solving to understand all emerging aspects of the business and industry, and the goals, objectives, strengths, and weaknesses of the partners as well as direct and indirect stakeholders. Oftentimes beginning with a memorandum of understanding (MOU) or kick-off meeting, the intentions of partners and any adjoining stakeholders is sounded off. Typically, partnering agents will have an idea of their counterpart’s business models and a gist of their purpose for partnering but it is likely that some of those assumptions are incorrect. From the get-go, a pattern of misassumptions and even misconceptions are bound to take shape thus the importance of expertise building is paramount as a tool for leadership as stewardship. Decision making based solely on mutual goals founded upon tenets of profits, monetary value add, or return on investment (ROI) may neglect factors of human, social, and environment, at least in explicitness. Therefore, any misassumptions and misconceptions become costly and challenge the project success.

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Instead, decision making based on the pursuit of expertise, together in collaboration for advancement and innovation, seeking to improve quantity and quality where possible given program and project constraints of the profit model, provides a wider realm of possibility for not only impact but also what a steward leader can realistically address through decision making. The pursuit of expertise is one of many reasons for partnering, and thus the characteristic of curiosity, and further, in learning, is a more powerful and inclusive force for partnering. To suggest learning as a foundation for decision making insinuates a costly process for partnering and one that is reactive or proactive to an environment as opposed to intergalactic within and abound its world. At the organizational level, with its Office of Naval Research (ONR), the DON has shown to be exploratory in its approaches and individual leaders emerge that demonstrate leadership as stewardship. The ONR has Broad Agency Announcements (BAA) and Funding Opportunity Announcements (FOA) to fill requirements that increase knowledge or improve understanding. Additionally, the Pentagon hosts the Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer (SBIR/STTR) program that provides phase funding for new discoveries that have the potential to perform according to three phases of funding toward commercialization. There are thousands of proposals that have received funding, ranging from up to $250,000 in funding for phase one and up to $750,000 for phase two stages of development, to millions of dollars and full commercialization during phase three production and sales (SBIR/STTR 2022). Expertise and Curiosity as a Conduit At the individual level, there are examples within the DON, more specifically dealing in curiosity and expertise itself within the arena of discovery, such as an innovation policy and program analyst at the SBIR/STTR (U.S. Small Business Administration 2020). This position serves as a leader through the conduit of the SBIR/STTR pipeline. While the SBIR/STTR process is not overly difficult to engage and may be considered accessible, it still requires a concerted effort on behalf of interested parties to submit any type of proposal, albeit one that advances a concept that may be important to the federal government. So, while the prospects of submitting an SBIR/STTR proposal may serve as a basis for some engagement, it is simply a conduit to engage the arena and its forums.

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And, while it is impossible to know a particular practitioner’s own approaches and mindset, as a stakeholder from afar, it is the conduit of SBIR/STTR and its opportunities to submit proposals that serves as a conduit to latch on to and engage. Thus, even if engagement takes place as a response to others’ interest, and especially so, the steward leadership approach is working. Rather than anchoring on profitability metrics, interested parties can engage at the beginning from the standpoint of working together to accomplish something, in this case, an SBIR/STTR proposal. The more information that can be provided about the program and what makes an effective proposal, the greater the likelihood of a successful submission and mutual gains to be received by engaging parties thereafter such as achieving productivity goals for the SBIR/STTR’s agents, the researcher and start-up companies receiving funds to pursue discovery, and the increased capability for the federal government direct stakeholder and public at-large indirect stakeholder. There are real-world examples of how the SBIR/STTR program can stem partnering and how additional enterprises can grow as a result. Aspen Aerogels (New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) ticker: ASPN) is a publicly traded company listed on the NYSE that first began with the award of SBIR/STTR funding. Aspen Aerogels uses a proprietary carbon dioxide extraction technology to develop and manufacture aerogel insulation products to be more efficient, stronger, durable, and manufactured at lower cost and consumption of input materials. This carbon dioxide extraction technology can be utilized for Naval specific requirements in maritime, underwater, air, and space exploration, as well as in the provision of shore-based facilities. Simultaneously, these products apply to the broader construction industry. However, if the Department of Defense (DOD) has specifications for products that require specific, innovative technological applications in production that are needed to meet DOD requirements then such companies can incorporate those features into the manufacture, or work toward the discovery of those features. For small businesses, the concept may build on a prior or future SBIR/STTR proposal, especially considering that there are more than 10,000 proposals that have been submitted that can be accessed for their advancement in a new submission. The previous experience a company has with SBIR/STTR enables this type of productive relationship with the DOD, whereas the trust, understanding, and like-mindedness required for constructive collaborative arrangements may otherwise be lacking. A private sector firm can

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and certainly does, at times, modify its product and service offerings to meet the specifications of a public sector customer. As a matter of fact, such is good business in striving to produce goods and services that are demanded by customers. From a different set of philosophies, conventional acquisition regulations may forbid these types of arrangements where vendors are preselected without a competitive bidding process taking shape. However, there is an emergence of other wisdom, involving utilization of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and government off-the-shelf (GOTS) products and services offerings, including advance contracts, widespread use of other transaction authorities (OTA), and contingency contracting, among more involved relationships such as those that may take shape over a longer course of time. Over and again, it is observed the advantages of a free market, competitive system in a democratic society of social, legal, and business principles in the performance and sustainability of such advancements. In the defense realm, the impeded progress of Russian forces in its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, its substantial loss in equipment and personnel, and the deterioration of its economy and global social structure, is an example of how closed economies and systems result in stalled innovation, poor quality, and failures. Just as there are positive externalities from the pursuit of expertise and curiosity, there are countless examples in media reporting on the negative externalities that resulted in bad aesthetics, congestion, pollution, climate change, and threats to sustainability from hurriedness or overindulgence in production (see Waldo 1982). The DON is an organization that leads in innovation while also adhering to the low-technology requirements of the fleet. Too often, a public or private sector organization will overindulge in technologies to an extent that it affects governance, or the products and services mixes and interaction of those engagements. Or, to the demise of the organization, the operational model is based on a platform or methodology that can be rendered obsolete with an invention or generational change in technology. On the one hand, capabilities include the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System that is capable of detecting, through a series of algorithmic calculations and weapons systems checks, and intercepting with strike force any imminent threat to mobile large-class naval assets. On the other hand, the Aegis system is deployed upon a naval vessel with the same old-world maritime challenges of painting, propulsion, global positioning, and communications.

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While the Navy conducts arms acquisition in various ways such as through the Navy’s major systems commands (SYSCOMS) and supported by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) based in Alexandria, Virginia, with its inventorying of more than one million unique national stock numbers for over two thousand weapons systems, it is the smaller buys such as computer workstations, IT software, and hardware, that are characteristic of the purchasing activities of field contracting activities such as those operated by the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) in places like Norfolk, Jacksonville, San Diego, and Pearl Harbor. The obstacles that surface can be equally as challenging for some of the smaller purchases, and this could extend to the shipyard such as in the requirement of government-specified insulation flaps to regulate steam or super-duty, giant format bolts required to function with precision on an aircraft carrier. A can-do approach of the Navy-needs-it-get-it-done quickly becomes the idea of possibility and achievement. To start, is the decision of determining if the expertise exists on base to deliver the solution whether it be a repair or new program and projects. And, for the approximately $1 trillion in combined revenues and spending that occurs each year, most of the DON’s needs are fulfilled through contracting. This is where the PPS arrangement begins to take shape and steward leadership can begin to be displayed between stakeholders.

Leadership in Contracting and Partnering to Stewardship Mechanical and marine engineering in the Military Sealift Command (MSC), responsible for 125 civilian crewed ships that support U.S. Navy ships at sea and combat forces around the world, and conducts specialized missions, is an example of where leadership as stewardship can take place. Beginning with the need, for example, of a heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC) repair or installation on a maritime vessel, the engineer or staff of technical experts and contracting representatives, will convey requirements to the service provider. These requirements may be generated by engineering or otherwise dictated by standards or a requirements generation process. Through the process of communicating the requirements for a particular job, the engineering unit begins a process of collaboration with the contractor, the extent to which has the potential to be stewardship in nature.

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By using combination specifications (see Pitzer and Thai 2009), the contractor is provided the leeway to meet performance and design requirements. Each contractor has unique skill sets. Combination specifications allows contractors to apply their skill sets in approaching work that meets performance requirements and adheres to parameters of design set forth by the contracting party. When contractors are provided the leeway to use their most familiar skill sets and complete work in the desired manner, and the contracting entity has the need fulfilled, then both parties are working together in a partnering manner that supersedes the conventional contracting relationship that may be either solely performance-based or design-based. This is the essence of performancebased acquisition where outcomes to be met are set forth along with any essential governing standards that must be followed. Otherwise, generally, the government defines the “what,” the contractor defines the “how.” Once both parties to contract are working together to facilitate an environment that supports flexibility in approaches to achieving performance and design requirements, then elements of stewardship can be further divulged. Elements of stewardship such as fiduciary responsibility is especially difficult to achieve when the result of an HVAC repair or installation could be characterized as “on” or “off.” As such, contractors are expected to throw-the-kitchen-sink at the job and there is little margin for error. The job process may be costly to the contractor and deteriorate the contracting relationship, while the customer safekeeps those learned experiences for work with future contractors, and it starts anew with the contracting phases such as in pre-solicitation and solicitation. The writing of requirements is so important, not just because it defines the challenge, but because it may determine which contractors are interested in the job and what resources will be allocated to bidding and subsequently performance to contract. The procuring entity may seek to make accommodations not related to requirements or budget in order to alleviate contractor strains in performing to contract. While not directly related to a public good, it reflects a desire to support the sustainability of the entity and make the lives easier of those performing the work. A notion, or step, toward caring and sustainability, has the potential to ignite actions that do directly advance public goods. This could take shape in the form of innovation resulting from producing work with combinations of performance

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and design elements, or fruitful discourse that could lead to more efficient system utilization, lower carbon and gas-producing emissions, and improved durability and maintenance. The MSC, like other major military commands, engages in industry outreach to obtain the goods and services it needs. The Tidewater Government/Industry Council and Tidewater Association of Service Contractors (TGIC/TASC) of Hampton Roads, Virginia are examples of professional associations that take a non-attribution approach to developing partnerships (see Bylaws of TASC 2016). The TGIC and TASC have hosted events for the MSC, the Army Corps. of Engineers, the Air Combat Command and Acquisition Management Integration Center, the NavalX tech bridge, the Naval Information Warfare Center, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, and many others, including exchange briefings and industry outreach networking that enhances the quality of the competitive process and inclusion of all potential sources and solutions.

From Expertise and Curiosity to Leadership and Stewardship The TGIC and TASC are founded upon a belief in training, education, and professional development as well as access to business opportunities. From this perspective of being knowledgeable, remaining current, and engaging across sectors, representatives from an array of public and private entities can be informed by the center stage and engage when relevant. Regular exchange briefings and forums provide members of industry opportunities to be updated about prevailing trends, policies, procedures, rules, and regulations. All stakeholders can find opportunities to attend including academics whose purpose may be to learn about contracting activities whether it be the technologies, acquisition jargon, arrangements, or government-business relations. Increasingly, contracting is exemplified through an expedited arrangement that fuels partnering in its need for swift and flawless execution. This can be accomplished from speedy procurement or OTAs and is within itself a different form of partnering in the contracting arrangement. The non-attributional nature of the TGIC and TASC activities allows for generalizable discourses that do not violate laws protecting fair bidding and competition but serve to advance the interests of all parties in contributing a stewardship role. When information is made accessible

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to a diverse and inclusive set of parties, then it can be used for the betterment of activities toward successful outcomes for market participants. For example, the information could provide insight into a vendor that results in reducing the cost of doing business from a bidding or contract accounting perspective, or it could provide strategic insight into the types and categories of products and services that will be desired. In both examples, the industry can benefit from optimal use of resources as well as seek upstream or sidestream opportunities for partnering to deliver on any complex requirements. The academic can be an example of the leader as steward, and easy enough as any overly distracting monetary rewards may be constrained, for the most part, with the formal and informal rewards in higher education directly tied to the stewardship theory and concept. Aside from opportunities for consulting or entrepreneurship, which the academic may be best suited to stray away from, at least initially, the academic approaches with full cheering support. The academic standpoint of improving the lives of others through the creation and dissemination of knowledge is difficult to oppose while advocacy and allegiance may be a way of riding the academics coat tails toward partnership and opportunity for the public and private sector firms. Only the full-fledged support of defense activities and affairs is tolerated to reach the highest level of trust and collaboration with the DOD personnel. As it was the DOD that first developed and utilized the world wide web, accomplished the speedy development and distribution of Covid-19 vaccines, provided emergency resolution to the Suez Canal block up, and sought revenge for the attacks on 9/11 by assassinating AlZawahari with pinpoint accuracy using a combination of intelligence and aerial drone fire without committing the lives of any others, the DOD remains to be an agency characteristic of leading the way. It can therefore be understood why the high bar of excellence exists, and it optimally can never be achieved in full spirit, but the measures can be met to meet current and future missions. A mission-based, agency-focused outlook enables service to the DOD agencies and its agents while the academic stands to benefit from the nature and content of the interactions. The otherwise limited accessibility of the DOD representatives and forum to address targeted topic areas of combined or tangential interests is unique to this form of engagement. Even in a conference or colloquium setting, the audience may not be able to interact directly with the panel, and any subsequent interactions may

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be closely guarded in a discussion based on the formality of the event or guest appearance. Navy personnel may be highly compartmentalized, and despite the major and minor interdependencies across units and departments with a given decision, are largely focused on the environmental scope of activities within an assignment. This leaves a tremendous opportunity for the academic to apply theory and concepts in making valuable connections that support Navy enterprise resource management and planning. Navy’s organizational structure is cross-cutting and adaptive. Personnel with established roles in combatant commands take on dual responsibilities in support of the Navy-wide coordinated effort of U.S. Fleet Forces Command. Thus, the organizational structure with roles and responsibilities are in place for better enterprise resource management but areas for improvement remain among personnel whether it be between echelon level commands, flag officers and civilian leadership, management levels, the shipyards, contractors, or sailors. As appropriate for rigorous scholarly research, the academic attempts to fill the gap in the body of knowledge and practice. Academics can exercise academic freedom in providing data and information, logical scholastic argumentation, and supportive intellectual reasoning, in stating positions or conducting inquiries. Practitioners in the government and business sector may also utilize advocacy and helpfulness in building up a narrative that serves the customer, or core stakeholder, but in turn, advances the self-interests and therefore meets the need for profitability and public gainfulness in stewardship. Of profound importance is the relationship between business and government. It was evident at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic that government and society rely on the business sector for the provision of goods and services to sustain life. Indeed, Vice President Mike Pence appointed Vice Director for Logistics of the Joint Staff (J4) Rear Admiral John Polowczyk to be the Lead for The White House Supply Chain Task Stabilization Task Force, in full mobilization of the DOD efforts to secure personal protective equipment (PPE), and develop, and distribute vaccines. However, society’s vast mix of goods and services are predominately provided by the private sector. Any opportunity to improve the relationship between the public and private sector translates to a positive spin for generating narratives and insight from business and government agents. One way to highlight interaction points to improve the relationship between business and the

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government is to highlight the toolkit-based concepts that guide the organization of activities at the interface of partnering arrangements. For example, the six phases of contracting involving pre-solicitation, solicitation, proposal evaluation, contract award, contract administration, and contract closeout, are interdependent. Each phase consists of numerous activities, roles, and responsibilities, for stakeholders that could impact the achievement of VFM in that or other phases, including overall performance to contract. When factoring the combinations of activities, and those decision making points, there may be millions of combinations of decisions that could be made on a particular contract. Not all partnering emanates from a contract nor does PPS require formal partnering or contractual obligations for its practice and study. Stewardship itself is a hybrid theory and concept that involves how the practitioner should act (the theory) and the connections that exist (the concepts) in illustrating what is likely to take place if the theory’s environmental assumptions are met. Moreover, PPS takes place in a moment of intellectual space where a thought occurs, or an action is performed, that advances the counterparty’s obvious interests, perhaps at one’s own casual expense, but that both parties and the broader marketplace are likely to benefit immediately or in due time. Linking Expertise to Leadership Government rules and regulations known as bureaucratic red tape (see Miller 2002) are not inherently prohibitive but instead promote efficient and effective acquisition and can serve as mechanisms for signaling between sectors. As simple as the type of solicitation document or the way requirements and specifications are written in the scope of work, the government may be signaling, or at a minimum guiding the private sector to engage the arrangement accordingly. These subsequent steps, or contingency moves, better align the private sector in striving to win and perform to contracts. There can be a direct link between solicitation type and the opportunity for supplier diversity. Consider the resources and expanse needed to compete for an invitation for bids (IFB) with a narrow, more customized set of high quantity deliverables, as opposed to a request for proposal (RFP). Smaller firms offering unique craftsmanship may not be able to meet high quantity to narrowly generated requirements, especially at lower cost and quicker delivery. Expertise in contracting can be utilized

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as a tool for steward leadership to take place. One challenge is that it is typically not the case in contracting that one single personnel member has the authority to make cross-cutting decisions, and even so, such as in the case of a contracting officer (KO) or contracting officer’s representative (COR), the representative would lack the contracting authority and also be ill-informed to make decisions of such a high magnitude because contract value and impact is far too great for risks to be taken. Instead, the decision to utilize one solicitation type as opposed to another may be based on what is stipulated in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS), if the DFARS is to be applied, and what tools may be available within the FAR and the DFARS to execute the acquisition within construct (see U.S. General Services Administration 2022). Additionally, by design, the participants of the solicitation process are different from those in later contracting phases to avoid conflict of interest and to maximize contracting expertise. The tools and scenarios exist for leadership as stewardship, but the organizational dynamic needs to move toward improved organizational development and change that enables leadership as stewardship to thrive. The DON is characterized as a contracting organization but that is not by trade or nature. If informally surveying executive managers in the DON, it will be found that few managers associate with the public procurement function or consider themselves to be contracting specialists, who themselves are approximately 70,000 personnel referenced by the personnel code, Contracting Series 1102 (see Office of Personnel Management 2022). The supply function, housed in the command Naval Supply Systems (NAVSUP), is considered itself a separate, distinct functional operation independent of the objectives of other commands yet serving dual roles as a self-sustaining operational entity and supplier for combat forces. Otherwise, the breadth of operations and activities are covered as contingent responsibilities. As an example, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report showing that in FY 2018 there was $175 billion in obligated DOD contracts for services such as management support and IT that were procured by non-acquisition personnel (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2019) Yet, these roles and responsibilities are indeed linked to the core duties performed and managed by the public procurement job position (see Steinfeld 2022). The result is a lack of education and training in acquisition, and how

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acquisition equips to be a tactical factor in the strategic plan of the organization. The instances where windows of opportunity exist to display leadership, let alone the nuanced elements of stewardship as it relates to the public–private partnering process, are therefore not optimally identified and executed upon. The U.S. Fleet Forces in conjunction with the Old Dominion University of Norfolk, Virginia established a cohort program of GS-15 level executive managers, including managers at the GS-12, GS-13, and GS14 levels, focused on public sector leadership. Some of the work trains critical thinking and reasoning as it relates to the coordinated Navy-wide command readiness and operations. To do so, executives are challenged to identify linkages between stakeholder decision making that aligns with strategic and tactical goals and objectives. The program also builds on the overall expanse and positive impact of the U.S. Navy on the human, economic, business, security, and social environment it directly deals. Gathering and Understanding a Model of Leadership for Stewardship Contemporary leadership explains that leadership is not characterized by charisma, but rather measurable traits and characteristics tied to individual practices and team performance (see Kouzes and Posner 2023). In the DON such declarations to leadership do not necessarily apply, although quantitative ability is a staple of Navy personnel, the ability to lead or motivate may indeed deal with immeasurable or qualitative characteristics that are considered important to key practices such as consensus building, teamwork, and collaboration. Regardless, leadership in the DON is characterized by a genuineness in commitment to organizational values and ethics that decorates the image of public sector leadership at the highest professional level of fiscal and human authority. The presumption is selflessness, best practices, and success, where leaders demonstrate leadership through leading, rather than conformance as is promoted through contemporary leadership, making opportunities for unique contributions of leadership so others can be led in that instant without a necessary resulting herd phenomenon. Leadership performance is consistently stellar due to proper matching of personnel to teams, including job position, roles, and responsibilities. Rather than taking unnecessary risks, peer competition takes place through outperformance within the guidelines of the exercise, serving to improve the learning of others while furthering the Navy’s thematic efficiency and effectiveness

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objectives for combat readiness and superiority. Thus gradually, managers are afforded opportunities to display leadership along the way while moving up the federal job position general schedule. However, given the complexity of the DOD assets, operations, and mission objectives, evaluative measures rarely take place beyond the unit level, and even then, the transitory nature of military employment mixed with the lengthy duration of projects presents a major accountability issue when it comes to worker performance. As a result, to further emphasize, an integrated, cross-cutting decision making mechanism is only beginning to take shape in the DON, itself serving this role as a broad benchmark for the coordination of the DOD activities involving the Coast Guard, the Air Force, the Army, and the Marines. Data analytics is coming to fruition to capture organizational activities into data points that can be shared for decision making purposes. One challenge involves data collection and analysis, especially when it comes to making the changes necessary for decision making implementation that could create a substantial disruption to the current manner of activities and processes. The Navy regularly contracts for expansive IT systems including for uses of personnel management, data-driven decision making, cybersecurity, and research; there is no centralized IT operating system that consolidates data across these areas. Instead, a network of systems and chains of command work in sync to ensure readiness and operational excellence. Perhaps to the advantage of being adaptive or localized, a system where handheld palm pilots are used to operationalize job activities into data points for analysis is yet to exist, at least at the macro level. A network-wide infrastructure does exist, however, the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) that currently serves as the shared IT network platform, so the total incorporation of real-time, enterprisewide data processing and management is possible from the standpoint of data sharing capability. The fast-moving environment of the DOD and naval operations also presents leadership challenges. Naval focal points change based on stakeholder needs while mission objectives tend to remain the same. As an example, during the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, the DON remained uneffected in its objectives of readiness and operational excellence although adaptation was required based on threat assessment and need. Swift mobilization took place to instill safeguards and allocate resources to need, such as in the global deployment to provide PPE

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and the speedy readiness of the hospital ships USNS Comfort and USNS Mercy. Leaders in the DON displaying inter-operational capabilities and capacities emerged to assume the highest levels of leadership. Among the top, Matthew H. Swartz, the Executive Director of U.S. Fleet Forces/Chief of Staff for Fleet Forces Command, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Navy, was formerly the deputy commander of Naval Information Forces (NAVIFOR), executive director and command information officer for U.S. Fleet Cybercommand, and director for the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) Information Warfare (U.S. Department of the Navy 2021). At the expanded executive ranks, the managers capable of managing information for communications for large numbers of personnel across a broad range of high complexity in scope are sometimes regarded as more senior and higher utility in assignment for the achievement of the most complex and prioritized goals and objectives. Again, these managers emerge with the highest quality and performance of work with some of the greatest potential advancement pursuant to the organization’s mission objectives. To accomplish these feats, a substantial knowledge of the structure and inner workings of the organization is required to understand how various tactical options may exist that can improve operational excellence and provide sustainability in its objectives amid rapidly changing political economies. The value of information in decision making is paramount and it has the potential for numerous improvements in the DOD. One threat to operational excellence that exists is a potential, if only gradually, of transformation from a command chain, a top-down organization to horizontal approaches to decision making and accountability. The flatter leadership structures may work well in Silicon Valley however, the DOD does not have the luxury of market timing products and services in accordance with management appeal but rather must deal with those variables with countless others in accordance to the various time sensitive constraints facing a unit command. Having a clear chain of command allows work to progress rapidly and thoroughly. The complexity of the DOD combined with the direct and overlapping or contingency rules and regulations insinuates a system of balances that prevents unreasonable leadership values and decision making. Therein, the personnel reach a competency level that further connotes shared values in decision making such that guidelines and policy can be established that support operational decision making. These guidelines and

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policies as driven by management and the needs of the warfighter, lead to a normalization of operations providing opportunities to improve efficiency and effectiveness in practice. The reality is that mission objectives change, and so does personnel, and so a new process of learning and application must unfold to address the new challenges and meet the new objectives. Yet, the institutional memory and knowledge remains through the institutionalization of policies in a particular command and the practices as the workforce performs and manages a plethora of job duties over the course of a progressive military career. Institutionalizing and Practicing Leadership as Stewardship There are numerous stakeholders considered by the DON when decision making in an acquisition program. Consider contracting for cybersecurity, for which the 1996 Clinger–Cohen Act recognized the new importance of IT through the establishment of a Chief Information Officer (CIO) for each federal agency who would be accountable to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in their evaluation of information resources management (IRM) practices (U.S. Department of Defense Chief Information Officer Desk Reference 2006). In cybersecurity, the procuring entity has an interest in performance data to reduce threat, maintain combat readiness, and manage and maintain its systems and force. Meanwhile, it tries to accomplish this at minimal cost to the taxpayer. Differently, the provider of cybersecurity technologies is first accountable for delivery of value to shareholders prioritizing revenues. As a result, the private sector entity promotes frequent maintenance to address system vulnerabilities and mitigate attacks, while the Navy may be unaware of the IT performance and respective requirements because it lacks tools or information to evaluate effectiveness. The IT gap between the public and the private sectors extends to staffing challenges and system upgrades. An example is given by what was formerly known as “patch Tuesdays,” when a work stoppage was required for system-wide updates. Still operating in some fashions on legacy systems, the option does not exist for the Navy to go dark for enterprise-wide upgrades. Oppositely, the simplicity of the legacy system allows for a diffuse management of operations within and across commands that can be easily coordinated to include multiple echelons based on mission, operating system, or geography.

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Contractors are oftentimes concerned about sharing IT system performance data with the DOD because of any proprietary intellectual property that could be ascertained. If the IT system’s effectiveness cannot be gauged nor value assigned to its operation, then the contractor risks future business, to begin with, so it is in the interest of the contractor to provide performance data as requested. The information gained from this data could be used to write future contracts that are based on innovations developed from government IT engineers. If the DON can generate value-add calculations such as return on investment (ROI) for IT and cybersecurity, then it can align these ROI calculations with those of the contractor. These opportunities could surface in the form of costcutting or quality adding measures that involve the design and rollout of future IT systems, cybersecurity monitoring, and maintenance. There also may be opportunities where revenues can be generated from measurable value-add such as in the number of cyber defenses and counterattacks. Institutionally, the business enterprise of the DON, generating revenues that extend to the heights of the most successful mega-cap corporations, suggests a culture and commitment to resources that aligns with the private sector. Reaching a ground where the public and private sector agents can have a meeting of the minds to display leadership practices is a challenge that requires a motivational leadership effort. One common scenario is where the public or private sector agent can take an action that would support the financial interests of the other party, for example in cost or effort reduction. Another scenario is where the private sector agent can deliver exceeding quality at minimal cost but chooses not to because it will not be recognized or rewarded. These are scenarios where leadership as stewardship can be practiced. The repetitive nature of some contracts or the compartmentalization of the work in a complex system may at times pose obstacles to steward leadership. Yet, at the first turn, it is recognized that one single decision action implicates a row and file of decisions or actions. The more quickly and aptly these interdependencies are realized, evaluated, and applied, the more prepared the acquisition manager is to fully equip and fulfill the operational needs of the warfighter. The typical setting for public and private organizations may not provide for the opportunity for open dialogue involving suggestions for organizational improvement. In the private sector, many new employees have been told not to rock the boat, in academia, tenure-track professors may resort to near silence at faculty meetings, and the public sector is

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known to have glass ceilings. In the DON, the mission objectives are not stymied, and personnel decision making does not waver to include new pieces of information deemed to be from non-relevant sources. This compartmentalization poses a challenge to data-driven, coordinated decision making that leads to innovation that could enhance operational excellence and readiness. Without proper data and information to inform the need for change, there is little to no basis for change that could lead to improvements in areas important to the warfighter. After all, it is the operations and support for the warfighter that translates to activities for the manpower, train, and equip functions that can be operationalized into data points for analysis. The hierarchical organizational structure of the DON supports the coordinated efforts of the Navy enterprise through the efficient and effective transfer of information, instruction, and command.

References Bylaws of TASC. 2016. Second Amended and Restated Bylaws of Tidewater Association of Service Contractors, 7.6 Non-Attribution Policy, March 16. https://tasc-tgic.org/ByLaws. Accessed 7 Aug 2022. Kouzes, James M., and Barry Z. Posner. 2023. The Leadership Challenge: How to Make Extraordinary Things Happen in Organizations. Hoboken, NJ: JosseyBass. Miller, Hugh T. 2002. Postmodern Public Policy. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Office of Personnel Management. 2022. General Schedule Qualification Standards. Policy, Data, Oversight. Classification & Qualifications: Contracting Series, 1102. https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classification-qua lifications/general-schedule-qualification-standards/1100/contracting-series1102/. Accessed 7 Aug 2022. Pitzer, Jack T., and Khi V. Thai. 2009. Introduction to Public Procurement, 3rd ed. Herndon, VA: National Institute of Governmental Purchasing. Rosenbloom, David H., and Suzanne J. Piotrowski. 2005. Outsourcing the Constitution and Administrative Law Norms. The American Review of Public Administration 35 (2): 103–121. Small Business Innovative Research and Small Business Technology Transfer (SBIR/STTR). 2022. The Three Phases of SBIR/STTR. U.S. Small Business Administration. https://www.sbir.gov/about. Accessed 12 Aug 2022. Steinfeld, Joshua M. 2022. Leadership and Stewardship in Public Procurement: Roles and Responsibilities, Skills and Abilities. Journal of Public Procurement 22 (3): 205–221.

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U.S. Department of Defense Chief Information Officer Desk Reference. 2006. Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DOD CIO) Desk Reference, Volume I Foundation Documents, August. https://dodcio.defense. gov/Portals/0/Documents/ciodesrefvolone.pdf. Accessed 7 Aug 2022. U.S. Department of the Navy. 2021. Biographies, All Leadership: Mr. Matthew H. Swartz, Chief of Staff. https://www.usff.navy.mil/Leadership/Biogra phies/Article/2728593/chief-of-staff/. Accessed 7 Aug 2022. U.S. General Services Administration (GSA). 2022. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS). https://www.acquisition.gov/dfars. Accessed 7 Aug 2022. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2019. Steps Needed to Identify Acquisition Training Needs for Non-Acquisition Personnel. GAO-19556, September 5. https://gao.gov/products/gao-19-556. Accessed 16 Aug 2022. U.S. Small Business Administration. 2020. Leveraging America’s Seed Fund: Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR), March. https://www.sbir.gov/sites/default/files/SBA_ SBIR_Overview_March2020.pdf. Accessed 7 Aug 2022. Waldo, Dwight. 1982. The Enterprise of Public Administration. Novato, CA: Chandler & Sharp. Wilkins, John. 2014. Stewardship of Public Service Renewal and Reform. International Journal of Leadership in Public Services 10 (4): 188–199.

CHAPTER 3

Political Actor for Political Settlement

Abstract The Political Actor for Political Settlement, the second portrait of public–private stewardship (PPS), is described. The business norms and high costs of acquisition are provided as background to generate the need and show the prevalence of opportunities for PPS. The potential for positive impacts on performance and return on investment (ROI) from PPS is shown along with a normative discourse for practices. The process of value sharing and deriving value propositions are explained as key steps in PPS. Methods for gathering stakeholder buy-in are covered as a PPS practice. Keywords Cybersecurity · Performance · Return on Investment (ROI) · Transparency · Accountability · Shared values · Practices · Value propositions · Politicization · Stakeholder buy-in · Rear Admiral · Coronavirus Task Force · Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) · Covid-19 · Vaccines

The Political Actor for Political Settlement creates settings for dialogue between stakeholders having any kind of influence and interest on the inputs, the processes, and the outcomes of projects. The goal is to seek to maximize representation and democratic processes, a pragmatic way

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. M. Steinfeld, Public-Private Stewardship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17131-4_3

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to ensure sustainability from PPP outcomes (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011), especially in the case of decades-long agreements. The public–private steward, based on knowledge of the stakeholders and their interests, solicits stakeholders’ advice and gets their competing views at the early stages of a project, upon which public interest is articulated and built. The advantage is to ensure that trust and understanding are established between stakeholders to reduce risks, opposition, obstructions, and contradictions in later project phases.

Establishing Business Norms More and more the DON aims to adopt a corporate credo of businessmindedness alongside its security objectives. Due attention paid to budgeting (see Mikesell 2018) and effective communication channels to Congressional representatives have facilitated effective money management in the DON in conjunction with formal accounting department controls. The Navy has sought to maximize revenues and minimize costs as a standard business development model. Beyond accepted accounting principles and financial management, and within the political constraints of budget approvals from Congress (see Rubin 2019), the highly functioning organization reaches a point of efficiency where operational performance is excellent but certain growth and opportunities may not be identified or pursued due to being lackadaisical. This phenomenon is characteristic of cash cow corporations in the technology sector such as Microsoft, Cisco Systems, and IBM. Traditional profitability models in business are important because it is fundamental to the surplus value and monetary concept that guides economic activity and related incentives. At a much more finite level, compatible with the Navy’s extraordinarily complex organizational structure and countless moving parts, the standard business development model alone does not work because it has difficulty factoring the warfighter’s priorities and is not easily applied to assignment or duty specific decision making. At a middle-management level of analysis, consider a general DOD-wide challenge in which there can be high acquisition costs due to the unique specifications of many DOD requirements. It may be that new production assembly is required, input supplies are difficult to find, there will be low production quantities, or other logistical issues exist that make it expensive to procure an item or service. Oftentimes, the high-security nature involving the requirement leads to extensive costs of acquisition.

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Addressing the High Costs of Acquisition There are several keys to ensuring that the high cost of acquisition is reflected in the value of the good or service, not simply because it is a unique item, it deals in a high-risk environment, or because there are few vendors that produce the goods or provide the services. In other instances, a process leading to negotiations or renegotiations may ensue so that the price of goods and services in addition to the overall acquisition cost is not prohibitive but rather leads to enhancing the relationship between contracting partners and the sustainability of each. Consider the contracting for at-sea war games simulation planning and activities. There are very few, if more than one, vendor at a given time that has the know-how, human capital, security clearance, or interest in bidding on a particular contract at a particular time. This market dynamic may appear to give the contractor a decisive advantage in contracting, especially with regard to price, and even further, potential aspects of project performance and delivery. The contractor indeed has pricing power however that does not need to be the case considering that there are also limited numbers of customers demanding war games simulation. The critical window for stewardship to be practiced is where it becomes acknowledged that the sustainability of continued business activities for these services is dependent on fair pricing and manageable costs. The DOD is almost always the suitor, posting solicitations for what it needs and just as within, playing dictator with contractors who have a reputation reflective of its own business-minded objectives. When the DOD sets forth requirements and specifications without input or lessons learned on contract performance from previous partnering, then the potential to save costs, whether it be in the contract administration of the contract, or the actual work that is being performed, is diminished. There may be ways to reduce costs that save both the Navy and the contractor money on the project. The hope is also that those cost savings can be passed down the road for better pricing and quality, and perhaps even better training, or some other improved elements related to public values and performance to contract, as an externality to the cost saving action if innovations in those areas result. Through careful attention to contract administration and the respective work to be performed, there are ways to incentivize performance that leads to efficiencies whether it be cost savings, creation of slack resources, improved operations management and performance, including

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safety. In the world of shipbuilding and repair, the Naval shipyards face challenges of managing nuclear power and output in an effective and safe manner. When work is performed near the nuclear reactor aboard a nuclear-powered Naval warship, the repair crew will be escorted by an inspector wearing a gauge that detects for safety the presence of nuclear waves. The work must be performed in a manner that does not pose a hazard to the nuclear facility nor pose danger to the contractor. The Navy agent must work closely with contractors while work is being performed to ensure safety, and despite any obstacles this poses to contractors, it is for their own benefit. In this way, public–private stewardship is taking shape, and it is done without immediate consideration for the businessminded profit function. Certainly, if a hazardous event takes place, it will be costly for both the public and private sector participants. Very quickly, however, the public agent is taking on a more involved role, a partner in safety, and the private agent is also getting more involved by utilizing their expertise in performing the work with safety in mind. For this job, the scope of work would have been generated by another department or personnel, and if the scope of work is monitored for quality assurance for the job, at a minimum its final compliance check would be executed by other personnel, perhaps a subordinate or complimentary department. The Naval nuclear inspector further serves as public–private steward as the accountability is lacking for formal rewards and recognition, especially when considering that needs generation begins from a corresponding process between active duty and service component commands, a process exclusionary to those in the shipyard managing task completion. PPS must be practiced without the need to break chain of command and established lines of communication. There are oftentimes opportunities to communicate requests and insights to superiors in assignment or other colleagues working cooperatively toward an objective. In some non-typical cases, insight may be solicited or received with a sense of creative engagement or ingenuity. Usually, relevance to mission objective is paramount, and the ever-arcing flux of Naval divisions, departments, and subordinate and surface commands normally relegates tasks quite expeditiously. That is to say that the Navy enterprise functions as a hybrid closed-open system that is constantly iterating and mobilizing such that there is clarity in the completion of job functions and the respective roles and responsibilities. So, the focus of any officer or manager is categorized within those established roles and responsibilities frameworks, many

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remain informally established through institutional norms and memory, and others established formally through the DOD attempts at establishing job descriptions for the Navy acquisition professions. Nonetheless, the opportunities for steward leadership do not exist as in a flat organizational structure, and even if suggestions may be well-received, there are an intricate web of processes, procedures, and personnel that would be effected by any diversion. Improving Performance and Return on Investment in Cybersecurity Referring to the discussion of cybersecurity in the previous chapter, the business-minded elements of revenues and costs must be set aside without being sacrificed to focus on value-add propositions that directly relate to product and service provision. For the most part, revenues and costs do not translate to value for the warfighter. While excessive costs may result in difficult tradeoffs in acquisition, or cost cutting may result in poor quality, as examples, the utility of the good or service to the Fleet and its warfighters is more closely related to quality, reliability, delivery, and other aspects of performance. A steward leader may proceed to practice steward leadership in the early phases of new contracting processes, or once a relationship has been established between the contracting entity and contractor based on long-standing contracts and ongoing work packages. Partnering can begin by establishing performance goals and creating cost centers around those objectives, along with sounding out any concerns that either party has, especially from reviewing past performance evaluations and lessons learned collected from previous contract closeouts. In cybersecurity especially, the maintenance schedule becomes especially important because system downtime reduces system utilization, creates substantial on-base oversight and monitoring burden, occupies a substantial amount of bandwidth of the Navy-wide communications alert system in its detail, and requires management personnel to oversee. And, despite this, the DOD’s ROI for this maintenance may be unknown or unclear. Acceptable levels of performance need to be established across systems users with disruptions that can be defined and noted, with accompanying procedures for resolution. These parameters are in place but need to be geared toward relevant thresholds for system performance and utilization which may be above or below the level currently signaling for or previously scheduled for maintenance. An intuitive and deep-diving

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information gathering process can lead to PPS-based suggestions and amicable solutions that are innovative. To do so, however, may require sharing of methods, priorities, and even revealing uses of applications and proprietary technologies. Any questions that surface should therefore be posed from a diagonal to avoid revelations that may jeopardize individual commitments to one’s organization in the protection of intellectual property. This can be achieved by devising questions centered on learning about the IT system. This is an exercise that should be completed regardless in order to maximize usage of IT system capabilities, identify potential areas for innovation and research, model training programs and manuals, and improve all phases of contracting. By devising questions focused on learning about the system, knowledge and experience can be gained in the aforementioned areas, likely leading to additional revenues in the future for the contractor. There is no guarantee that the same contractor will bid on a subsequent contract or that the contractor will be successful in that bidding attempt, but there tend to be consistent narratives in the cybersecurity sector, among other sectors, regarding the lack of vendors capable of delivering on the most demanding technological suites, and at a minimum the lack of competition for those that can provide the expected performance to contract on a particular solicitation. Thus, there is a viable possibility of future business to result from stewardship practices. If the DOD learns enough about how a cybersecurity system works in terms of the relationship between performance and maintenance, then it would not be out of the ordinary for a new entire standalone program to be established that manages the operation. That department itself could have its own cybersecurity needs in addition to added requirements related to any new features of compatibility between departments, data collection, processing and analysis of data, triggers, and system responses. Of course, there is the consideration that contractors serving cybersecurity interests at U.S. DOD installations, based on their security level clearance, among other possible reasons, may have the best interest in delivering the highest level of quality in cybersecurity. This assumption, however, only exists within the confines of the organizational constraints imposed on that contractor’s set of devised and imbued roles and responsibilities. The assumption is further limiting or leveraging by the knowledge, skills, and abilities unique to a particular contractor.

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Engineering for Values Using the Procurement Function PPS proves to be a viable option in partnering arrangements for situations that intent decision making based on a careful understanding and attention to strategy, operations, tactics, roles, responsibilities, and priorities, is demanded in the most complex environments. The earliest phases of contracting are where PPS should emerge to articulate and institute good governance values in tandem with business ethics. Public procurement mechanisms do not allow for seamless, enriching discourses among public and private stakeholders to address shared values between public and private entities especially those public values related to good governance. These values involve the provision of goods and services in an efficient and effective manner according to public needs and wants with transparency, accountability, fairness, diversity, and equity. Each value offers a manageable proposition that can be a platform for stakeholders to engage PPS. Each value is also somehow related to the business objectives involving cost-effectiveness and excellence. One resounding challenge involves the stark contrast between value pursuits in the public and private sector, and it is especially illustrative when comparing public and private sector procurement, or the goals of public and private sector management. The very notion of transparency is noticeably absent in private sector procurement without the requirement of a competitive bidding process for which transparency and fairness in competition are centrally important as evidenced by usual occurrences of contractor protests. The accountability standards and requirements in contract administration are also much more extensive in the public sector with the legal statute governing a portion of both intra and interorganizational public sector activities. To further illustrate, think of the amount of thorough emphasis placed on compliance in the biotechnology, education, banking, or finance industries, and make a comparison to expenditure in those areas and beyond with the added dimensions of governance accountability to political factors in PPPs. Politicizing Procurement for Value Sharing The public interest is articulated and built through politicizing the partnering arrangement according to value propositions. The value propositions underlying public service involve those of good governance in addition to environmental, social, and economic sustainability initiatives,

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just as in public procurement (see Alkadry et al. 2019). Specific values such as transparency, accountability, and diversity, are the foundation of the value propositions, especially as aligned with stakeholder interests (see Curry 2017). Additionally, there are public policy and political influences and ramifications in public service that are supportive of the purposes of these values. The DOD has guidelines for avoiding the contractingout of activities deemed to be “inherently governmental” and therefore requiring a public service agent to perform the duties. For the activities that are contracted for, reflecting the vast majority of acquired capability, in addition to serving as platforms for PPS practices, value propositions can emerge as vectors for contract management to positively impact the actual work performed. Transparency is a value that improves contract management for contract managers and the private sector partner and can improve the actual work performed and subsequent operations and maintenance of the associated combatant or non-combatant activities. Transparency in solicitation provides for higher quality bids, resulting in more satisfied proposal evaluators and more satisfied bidders. Within the DOD, transparency in solicitation has the potential to improve elements of coordination between requirements review boards, engineers, technical representatives, system designers and architects, system users and administrators, contracting office personnel, planning and implementation staff, flag officers, sailors, and other direct stakeholders. In terms of transparency, one example is the requirements review board may be informed about the use and utility underlying the requirement, but how it is used may not be as obvious. The active duty is mostly uninvolved and therefore does not inform in contract management that could result in a better project outcome even if it bears the brunt of contracting derelictions. The contracting personnel is limited in its influence on these exterior scope elements. Instead, contracting personnel such as a contracting officer (KO) serves as a senior manager of all things contracting and facilitator between internal stakeholders, including the KO’s staff, technical experts, other contracting staff, and civilian and active-duty military leadership. Finally, to consider, technical experts may be focused on just one single component part or technology involved in a more complex system, or system of systems (SOS). Technical experts’ ability to communicate to contracting personnel becomes especially important. KO’s contracting staff includes support from a Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR), however the two-way flow of

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information between technical representatives and Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) staff may fail to consider the broader, more important operational mission objectives for which the acquisition is meant to supply. Hence there are areas where the DOD can improve on transparency in contracting with imaginable benefits in the areas of program efficiency and effectiveness, potential for innovation, performance to contract, planning, and budget. There are two steps to follow. The first is to determine how transparency fits into the value propositions of the private sector entity and how those transparency measures can align between the public and private sector entities. Then, is to determine how that aspect of transparency fits between to align the interests of the public sector contract management and the private sector work performed as it relates to outcomes for warfighter operations. Whether PPS drives PPS solutions or spaces for PPS to be practiced may be determinant on variables such as the level of training and education of the workforce, the level of maturity of the private sector firm, and the program complexity. A more trained and educated workforce can problem solve through critical thinking and reasoning, especially when forming tiger teams, or integrated product teams (IPTs), so that PPS is practiced for solutions. The same is true for a more established and outperforming private sector firm that pursues and adheres to best practices in product quality and customer service. And, if a program is highly complex, then PPS may more incrementally take shape through engaging the correspondence of interactive elements between program concepts and acquisition component or subcomponent. What is important is that the shared values, in this example transparency, are brought forth between the public and private sector entities, inevitably molding to form the basis of understanding for a semblance of cooperation, if not partnering, beyond the contracting dimension. This is a critical event in the pursuit of practice of PPS. Transparency is favored by the private sector in many ways, perhaps most obviously in solicitation when it comes to submitting proposals in response to RFPs and various solicitations, proposal evaluation, and contract administration in terms of expected quality. The private sector is also interested in transparency regarding financial accounting and quality assurance, among other aspects, in new business or project areas. For the private sector, transparency in contracting is plainly and clearly linked to its business bottom-line objectives. Meanwhile, in cybersecurity, and

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many other high technology areas, the private sector may relate increased transparency as a risk to revenues when intellectual property or billing opportunities are at risk. Despite this, it is really the development activities in technology and the upkeep of capabilities in fulfilling customer needs that is rewarded by customer revenues. If a cybersecurity or IT contractor is utilizing aspects of service provision that lack transparency as an opportunity for billing, such as in the example mentioned earlier in the chapter of IT system maintenance where the contracting entity cannot measure ROI, then that contractor is following a business model that is not sustainable if customer needs change due to innovations in industry or changes in environment. Further, the contractor is missing an opportunity for quality improvement in performance of the cybersecurity system being contracted for. More oftentimes than not cybersecurity contractors will find that the opportunities for enhanced product and service offerings and the customer satisfaction far outweigh the initial risks to intellectual property and revenue growth model. When there is added complexity, which may be staffed with a more experienced and prominent workforce, the opportunity for partnering to materialize through a shared value platform is greater. Similar to the large scale of the DON when characterized as a contracting organization, in which the theories and concepts foundational to the body of knowledge in procurement, contracting, and onward to PPS, work especially well, values have an increased chance of surfacing as important for decision making when there are more opportunities for values to be applied in understanding and contribution to approaches in problem solving. In the greater scheme, transparency as a value undergirds the study and practice of cybersecurity at its functional and existential core. Values can emerge in ways such as from PPS practices as described or could be generated from other mechanisms such as the values from a department strategic plan. Core values as part of a strategic plan can commonly be applied to decision making frameworks that arise in defense procurement and contracting and can be leveraged as platforms for value propositions to be offered by the public and private sector agents. Other ways to generate values is to identify areas needing improvement, perhaps through a strengths-weaknesses-opportunities-threats (SWOT) analysis with themes emerging that are linked to core values. The values can therefore be pursued in ways simultaneously addressing the SWOT areas that may not otherwise be able to be directly addressed, but for which

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outcomes, that could be argued to be the sole important matter at hand, are improved through the accomplishment of the pursuit of the values. The attachment to a shared value platform creates a visualization board in spurring contribution and improving accessibility for personnel buy-in. The more widespread participation, the greater the potential impact for PPS results because of the expanse of the shared practices as inputs and outputs of PPS practices. As value-based management progresses, the importance of core values may shift to require new management calibrations toward a new set of values. The shift in values takes place for a myriad of reasons such as various environmental shocks, new scrutiny on country of origin for technology equipment, gradual internal changes such as new leadership, or institutional lean that gives way to new and improved ways of doing business or innovative practices. When this shift in values takes place, the advantages of partnership according to the shared PPS approach becomes more obvious for the public and private sector partner. The PPS also supports the public and private partners’ endeavors when values shift, as in the initial development of this described value structure, by mitigating concerns over risk and uncertainty through trust and understanding in partnering. From Shared Values to PPS Practice By using the values as platforms, it is possible to formulate value propositions that public and private sector agents can subscribe to partnership. The public interest can be identified and articulated through the value propositions, which again, adhere to the idealist value structures of both sectors and can be tied to business-mindedness of cost-effectiveness. PPS practices require leadership as stewardship by means of the spark by the practitioner in that window space of opportunity for decision making and for collaboration with the private partner. The accountability value promotes public interest and is important to both the public and private sector entities. To the greatest extent possible, each firm would like its workers accountable for the work that they perform and manage. The public sector entity also wants work performed to contract and the private sector entity wants to be compensated for its efforts. Once a project has begun, accountability is a major variable in contract administration. The public sector may invest substantial amounts of funding for contract management and administration to a degree that on some contracts there are thousands of public sector employees working

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on a single contract. Meanwhile, the private sector entity will be required to correspond with various personnel of the public sector contracting staff. The public sector entity could start by including a member from the private sector entity on the contract administration team (CAT) or including in contract negotiations the set-up of a corresponding combined public–private sector team that is a liaison to the CAT. The CAT may face obstacles in technical expertise during contract administration for the simple reason that the private sector entity is being included in the project for not only its human power and capacity but also its expertise and know-how. An open channel of communications helps the CAT members gain technical insight about how and why the project is progressing the way that it is. These understandings may also alleviate pressures for monitoring and quality assurance as well as provide a better notion of costs associated with the project and where value may exist. For example, elements where higher grades or higher thresholds are available for performance indicate an area of performance that has been deemed to be important in function by the producer or consumer. As a result, there is a greater likelihood that some value can be associated with these elements, for which costs can be justified and additional innovation can take shape. There are times when those added features are not important to the project success. Other times, those features are included nonetheless as a standard matter or in some cases may be able to be replaced at lower cost. Accountability is also important to numerous other internal stakeholders, such as in financial management including budgeting, comptroller, and business management. And there are external stakeholders such as political representatives, the taxpayer, the media, and to an extent the end user and consumer depending on their level of involvement with the acquisition and partnering arrangement. In some cases, end users may be surveyed, or their preferences gathered by other means such as in the case of sailors regarding the grade of materials used in sailor uniforms. However, after the survey or input, the end user involvement may be minimal. Differently, if the end user or consumer has engaged in the acquisition and partnering process along the way of the project progressing or is required to take some sort of action regarding project progress or delivery, then end user stakeholders serve more of an internal stakeholder role. When this is the case, there is a greater possibility that PPS will take

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shape because of the opportunity for the public and private sector agents to engage on a value platform. Together, the public and private sector agent can then work toward developing a value proposition, or the value proposition can be developed and set forth from one agent to the other with possible discussion or response to follow.

Gathering Stakeholder Buy-In The high technology nature of many Naval deliverables has instilled a perception of justification for high cost. However, it is oftentimes a series of low technology items that combine to form a high technology capability. Some examples may be a $17,000 oil drip pan for the Blackhawk helicopter or a built-to-spec heavy-duty bolt that costs $40,000 for a sea vessel. Another example is the Navy’s mobilization of more than 80,000 suppliers in the production of the F-35 advanced tactical fighter (ATF) jet (see Steinfeld 2012). The external stakeholders accepted an initial production cost that exceeded $200 million per ATF that would reduce to approximately $100 million per ATF for subsequent production over time. These seemingly bargain costs involve high-cost parts, and perhaps some of the cost is hidden in the substantial maintenance capability requirements and related costs. Nonetheless, there is great stakeholder buy-in for the ATF program as it moves from fifth generation to sixth generation standardization. There is minimal opportunity to plain and simply reduce costs because of the stringent requirements and technical assessments that may be in place across countless internal stakeholders at different program phases. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is a great example of the overlapping and concurrent processes involved in the DOD synchronization efforts for complex systems acquisitions (see Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018). JCIDS is an extremely complicated process and few can recall its steps like a well-traveled road map, which is valuable to the organization because it allows a high-level view of a project or program across a vast host of decision making points. Of course, simultaneous to JCIDS, are the institutional pathways for decision making processes and jurisdiction for roles and responsibilities that remain in place from institutional memory and are generated by imminent need from other stakeholders. These are the streams of flows running crosscurrent between individual projects and programs, and may influence or be impacted by tangential projects or programs.

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The DON proved to be effective in its ability to recognize the cross currents in its 2020 response to the Covid-19 pandemic as mobilized by Vice President Mike Pence and led by Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, Lead for The White House Supply Chain Task Stabilization Task Force. The Project Air Bridge utilized the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to transport PPE and other necessary supplies and equipment. Additionally, PPP occurred with companies such as General Electric, Tesla, FedEx, and Amazon for various support including the production of ventilators and later the distribution of vaccines. These efforts also involved substantial stakeholder engagement with thousands of professional associations (see Zavattaro 2021) in order to coordinate production, distribution, and utilization. From March 29 through June 28, 2020, the acquisition of nearly 1.5 million N-95 respirators, more than 2.5 million face shields, 937 million gloves, 2.4 million thermometers, 113.4 million surgical masks, 1.4 million coveralls, 509 million gowns, and 109,000 stethoscopes was achieved (Federal Emergency Management Association 2020). At the same time, Project Air Bridge received substantial criticism regarding its distribution efforts, including the matching of supply with demand in the provision of PPE. As an example, PBS televised an unfavorable report in its television series Frontline for the October 6, 2020, episode entitled “America’s Medical Crisis” that questioned, perhaps unfairly, the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of Project Air Bridge (PBS Frontline 2020). The White House Supply Chain Task Stabilization Task Force is an example of gathering stakeholder buy-in when considering that businesses were completely shut down and given the global nature of corporations, the allocation of private sector resources was a significant challenge for the private sector in the face of public sector pressures to produce goods and services without cost-effectiveness justifications; but to produce out of emergency and human need. During the uncertainty of the threats of Covid-19 facing each individual and businesses brainstorming how their resources can be best utilized to help in the production of needed supplies, two specific ways to organize stakeholder engagement were through professional associations and media reports. The professional associations provided a channel of communication to industry and its stakeholders and productive members, and media reports and local reporting helped determine localized need along with real-time data from medical providers collected through bureaucratic channels.

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When it comes to politics in bureaucracy and administration, The White House Coronavirus Task Force exemplifies how politicization can affect stakeholder trust and buy-in, and how despite the controversy, efficiency and effective public management coupled with private sector partnership prevails in serving the public interest. At the time, there were historic social movements for social equity and human rights amid police shootings of innocent victims. Local police departments are a function of the local executive branches and in turn, are one of the most powerful sources of presidential power at the local government level. The difficult social, political, and economic environment led to major polarization in media reporting especially at the national level. PPS supersedes the crude form of politics and points toward a shift toward value propositions that reflect political values, such as transparency, accountability, equity, and fairness. The partnering element indicates a level of representation of firms’ interests, further drawing parallel between the PPP environment and the political arena. When practitioners organize around common initiatives, for example, professional associations, innovation, or production, as examples, then politics in the ceremonial sense can be yielded to political values such as those that reflect democratic practices and its capitalist socio-economic model. PPS then liberates the practitioner to make decisions based on established shared values that demonstrate PPS practices without the need for explicit partner buy-in, unless a counter action or response is needed. Through diligent commitment, attention to detail, and bright decision making, in the U.S., a monthly face mask demand deficiency of 600 million face masks as of October 2020 was resolved by the end of December 2020. The U.S. government with its private partners achieved the production, distribution, and administration of vaccines to approximately two-thirds of its population totaling more than 600 million doses and supported the development and distribution of hundreds of millions more vaccines in aid to foreign nations. The U.S. government has also partnered in achieving the production of readily available test kits and anti-retroviral treatments at medical facilities to cure a severe illness. Also, important is the normalization of social and economic activity which was difficult to attain in a political sense based on any misinformation of the science of the Covid-19 disease, credibility issues regarding mixed messaging at the Center for Disease Control (CDC), how to stay safe, acceptable levels of risk, and intensity of government oversight.

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Perhaps a stark illustration of politicization in the U.S. national Covid19 response was evident at the June 9, 2020 hearing “Evaluating the Federal Government’s Procurement and Distribution Strategies in Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic” held by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (2020) with testimony provided by the witnesses Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator Peter Gaynor of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and Brett Giroir, M.D., Assistant Secretary for Health of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The polarizing political climate was evident from some of the witness questioning from Senators including an analogy given by U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris (at the time of the Hearing was the Senator of California), drawn directly to the insufficient federal response to the active California wildfires as a form of challenging the current presidential administration’s response efforts to the Covid-19 pandemic and the provision of PPE (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2020). The political environment eventually stabilized, but not until it initially intensified, recalling November 2020 when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley expressed concern regarding a smooth transition of power from President Trump to President Biden. At the time, Vice President Pence was the leader of The White House Coronavirus Task Force and his appointment to lead supply chain stabilization, again, was the Vice Chair for Logistics of the Joint Staff, Admiral Polowczyk, who was called upon by the Vice President to lead the FEMA and Department of Health and Human Services response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Admiral Polowczyk was second in command on the Joint Staff and first command of the DOD’s logistics, and thus in a way its total capability. Noticeably, while national media attention grew regarding a smooth transition of democratic leadership for the U.S. presidency, Vice President Pence maintained and followed through on the democratic promises of elected officials while the national efforts to develop and distribute vital Covid-19 vaccines and treat patients continued uneffected, despite its militarization extending beyond the development, distribution, and administration of vaccines to the way that public administration functions with regards to supplier management. As one illustration, recall the use of weapons system capable data management systems as a tool for managing the medical emergency’s supply chain activities. Just as critical response efforts were taking shape, simultaneous improvements were

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being instituted to establish new systems, processes, and formalized roles and responsibilities that have helped national and global response efforts as the Covid-19 pandemic continued large scale infection. PPS practices can reflect a single decision action or lead to several decision actions. At the most intense form of PPS practices, when real-time engagement regularly takes place between partners, then parallel narrative discourses can be presented by each party whereby it is not always clear what information is of most value to the receiver. This is where the notion of expertise resurfaces to be important. The engagement between partners presupposes an interest in expertise and is a foundation for the value-add of the partnering relationship as it exists between the public and private sector agents for a given project. If each agent maintains their position and respective narrative in the discussion, adding expertise to compliment the counter party’s narrative, advancing the discourse in ways that progress toward intent decision action, then the value can be generated from each agent for immediate action-orientation and future knowledge sharing. When PPS practices occur from developing value propositions together, with the promise of subsequent opportunities to engage value platforms, then there is more opportunity for those value propositions to be applied in numerous ways for decision making and subsequent management activities.

References Alkadry, Mohamad G., Evelyn Trammell, and Ana-Maria Dimand. 2019. The Power of Public Procurement: Social Equity and Sustainability as Externalities and as Deliberate Policy Tools. International Journal of Procurement Management 12 (3): 336–362. Brinkerhoff, Derick W., and Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff. 2011. Public-Private Partnerships: Perspectives on Purposes, Publicness, and Good Governance. Public Administration and Development 31 (1): 2–14. Curry, William Sims. 2017. Government Contracting: Promises and Perils, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge. Federal Emergency Management Association. 2020. FEMA Phasing Out Project Air Bridge, June 18. https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20210318/femaphasing-out-project-airbridge. Mikesell, John L. 2018. Fiscal Administration, 10th ed. Boston, MA: Cengage. Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2018. Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), August 31.

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PBS Frontline. 2020. America’s Medical Supply Crisis. Season 20, Episode 6. October 6, 2020. Produced by Peter Klein, Christine Brandt, Juliet Linderman, Martha Mendoza, and Kate McCormick. https://www.pbs. org/wgbh/frontline/documentary/americas-medical-supply-crisis/. Accessed 8 Aug 2022. Rubin, Irene S. 2019. The Politics of Public Budgeting: Getting and Spending, Borrowing and Balancing, 9th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Steinfeld, Joshua M. 2012. United States Air Supremacy: Government Purchasing and Supply Chain Management of the F-22 Raptor. In International Public Procurement Conference 5. Seattle, WA, August 17–19, 2012. http://www.ippa.org/images/PROCEEDINGS/IPPC5/Part13/PAP ER13-2.pdf. Accessed 8 Aug 2022. U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs. 2020. Evaluating the Federal Government’s Procurement and Distribution Strategies in Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic. Witnesses: The Honorable Peter T. Gaynor, Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, The Honorable Brett Giroir, M.D. https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/evaluating-the-federal-governments-pro curement-and-distribution-strategies-in-response-to-the-covid-19-pandemic. Accessed 8 Aug 2022. Zavattaro, Staci M. 2021. Public Branding and Marketing: A Global Viewpoint. New York: Springer.

CHAPTER 4

The Catalyst of the Public Interest

Abstract The catalyst of the public interest is described to be the third portrait of public–private stewardship (PPS). The steward catalyst is characterized according to the role of management expert and facilitator. The consideration of key stakeholders and the use of standardization as a tool are hailed to improve public–private partnership (PPP) outcomes. Approaches to facilitating public interest among actors are presented that address the public and private sector aspects of the partnership. The complexity of PPPs is demonstrated by how PPS can be applied for solutions to project challenges. Keywords Catalyst · Public interest · Facilitator · Steward catalyst · Military housing · Standardization · Complex requirements · Warships · Shipbuilding · Shipyards · Consolidation · Competition · Publicness · Knowledge · Procurement

The Catalyst of the Public Interest is a practitioner portrait of PPS portraying the steward as a catalyst that occupies a role of facilitator, addressing any threat to the spirit of public interest through dialogue between partners. Stewards are aware and convinced that they serve citizens, though the process requires a catalyst, someone assured of shared values and with the ability, the impetus and the dynamism to initiate © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. M. Steinfeld, Public-Private Stewardship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17131-4_4

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and serve the important aspects of delivery to ensure consistency in the process and sustainability in results. The public–private stewards are catalysts of innovation because of skills and roles in time, talent, resources, and communication management both vertically and horizontally in the organization (see Wilkins 2014). The behavior of the public–private steward is about serving collective and social goals by discarding any self-serving and self-interested ones, especially with respect to circular or iterative relationships that exist between public administrators, business administrators, and politicians. There are situations where obvious mistakes lead to PPP failures such as in the case of the Military Housing Privatization Initiative that was set forth as part of the 1996 Defense Authorization Act. The DOD would set up PPPs to privatize military family housing units over the course of a 50-year agreement. However, PPP mismanagement resulted in deteriorated and ill-suited housing conditions to a degree that the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act mandated the independent inspection of more than 200,000 military housing units that were part of the public–private venture (PPV). As will be conveyed, PPP failures are not always a result of substantial complexities, unforeseen circumstances, an intricate miscalculation, or some other plight of mismanagement (see Hood 1998). Instead, the best practices approach, or at minimum an approach that applies boilerplate business common sense, can oftentimes suffice. This caveat to the following example is not to reduce the esoteric nature of PPS study and practice or the dynamism that may be required of its practitioners. There is no textbook of social-political-economic business common sense. The knowledge, skills, and abilities that reflect best business logic are developed through an accumulation of inquisition, curiosity, learning, and practicing. Therefore, no presumption of obviousness exists for decision making, and perhaps some building blocks will be highlighted. For starters, the PPP relationship does not exist to transfer responsibilities, but rather to transfer risk such as when the public partner does not have the resources or does not want to risk the resources. In the Military Housing PPV, the public partner began relinquishing its roles and responsibilities to the private partner without sufficiently replacing those performance activities with management activities and controls. Both parties must understand the dynamics of the partnership so there are contributions from each in management and decision making in order for risks to be identified and mitigated, and joint opportunities capitalized on.

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Each partner must also be cognizant of its own extraordinary or daunting guarantees and those demands that it places on the partner. Once obstacles to meeting expectations by each partner have been vetted, then the partners can work toward universal factors to set expectations and agreed upon criteria to measure success. This is especially important in the case of multiple simultaneous private sector partners as in the case of the Military Housing PPV.

Key Stakeholders and Standardization as a Tool Standardization that leads to process improvement, the establishment of milestones, criteria for quality assurance, and monitoring for compliance, promotes sustained involvement between partners in PPPs. The key stakeholder in this mini case is the housing resident. Including the residents in quality assurance is a starting point for standardization through a combination of satisfaction surveys, data on accumulated work orders and task completion, and inspections during change of occupancy and new resident move-in. To do so, the level of service as it relates to specific requirements of each party must adhere to the PPP agreement as defined and established. From a business standpoint, differing business practices and policies in service delivery may make sense and even be considered necessary according to various logistics such as the geographic location of the housing unit. From the standpoint of the end user stakeholder, the resident, who may frequently move between housing units based on the transient nature of military life and its assignments, faces confusion and frustration with inconsistent business practices and policies. To exacerbate the issue, the residents are less able as a result to contribute to the core property management function if navigating new business practices and policies is prohibitive, resulting in a reduced benefit–cost of the partnership (see Weidenbaum 1981 for benefit–cost analysis). The residents can provide the greatest quality control of the housing units at the lowest cost because the residents reside on the property and are the first responders to any issues. The Military Housing Initiative is not necessarily reflective of a failure on behalf of the DOD or the private sector entities comprising the PPV. The purpose of standardization, as one value proposition, is to comprehensively address loose ends such as areas that should be improved in process for better quality and efficiency. There is the possibility that

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the property management industry’s standard operating procedures for conducting business employ methods that are incompatible with the DOD’s mission, vision, and values. Or perhaps the DOD and its stakeholders have a different expectation of service delivery based on its own culture and norms. Regardless, standards in business practices and policies that reflect the expectations of both entities with special attention to key stakeholders, serves to correct operational deficiencies that existed before the partnership. The formation of partnership has the feature of combining resources for this very reason, in this case, the residents are seeking more opportunities for stakeholder buy-in while the private partner is short on resources. Facilitating the Public Interest Among Actors The potential for synchronized action between partners in this fashion is an illustration of an opportunity to practice PPS. The catalyst of the public interest must challenge the process and inspire a shared vision (see Kouzes and Posner 2023). The partnering arrangement in many procurement and contracting contexts begins with pre-solicitation and intensifies through solicitation, award, and eventual performance to contract where the actual work is completed. As the contracting progresses, the relationship between the public and private entities may take on an intensified version of partnering, and for purposes of planning it is best when partnering materializes as early as possible. Of course, there are constraints, many related to fair and open competition, to the public sector’s involvement in partnering and when a contracting relationship may engage in more intensified forms of partnering. The public sector entity may have little opportunity to dictate how the contractor is to perform work, not because there are not requirements and specifications in the contract, but because it is difficult to convey how work is to be performed according to a scope of work. Especially when the private sector has considerable expertise in the project area or when operational complexity is high, the public sector may have more difficulty in conveying the best way to complete work. It is difficult to write requirements and specifications for standardization, especially in this case, because while the requirements and specifications may be written early on, they may be monitored in contract administration by a different stakeholder, and for longer duration contracts the end user is required to ensure the requirements are met. This means that

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the end user stakeholder is central to performance to contract and has an opportunity to be a catalyst through engaging the business practices and policies offered by the PPV to gain advocacy and seek improvement. The end user’s ability to positively contribute to the success of the partnership, rather than serving in the role as a problem stop gap, is dependent on a catalyst from a personnel member from the public sector, especially if the private partner’s service delivery seems to be deficient due to the hardships of meeting public sector requirements in comparison to private sector requirements. The catalyst in the public sector needs to work with the private partner to establish new standards for service delivery. Keeping in mind that few enjoy being told how to improve or how to do their job, a catalyst is required especially given the size and scope of many public projects. Oppositely, a private partner agent must emerge as a catalyst when PPS is required for a successful partnership. Reviewing the strategic plan and the activities in place that support the stakeholder-wide goals and objectives is an initial avenue for the catalysts. Subsequently, an inquiry into accountability to the strategic plan can commence through a mix of managerial techniques. The catalysts can develop accountability measures and new procedures where needed to ensure quality. The implementation of such standards then requires the reinvigoration of other PPS practice such as the Political Actor for Political Settlement in order to gather stakeholder buy-in. As middle-management is sorted out and reform is proposed, the upper-level managers become catalysts in accepting or rejecting the reform. More likely than not, some key mobilization efforts will need to be made by upper management that supersedes the public and private sector agents. The prospect of reform is not necessarily a bad topic for upper management and insinuates a proactive stance, which generally coincides with the broad principles of effective property management. So, PPS that results in reform or surfacing and solving of major problems may not typically be viewed by upper management as a negative event. Most importantly, is that PPS practices involve upper management as internal stakeholders to the partnership so that catalysts can shine before lagging reform is brought forth as a last resort. If a major reform is to be brought forth, it should thus be with the favoritism of upper management. In PPPs, it is typical that project failures result from a publicness aspect of the project. PPP success counts on the catalyst to institute the public interest through PPS practices. The values for public and private sector

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organizations may, by and large, be similar, but the value propositions for the way that the values are applied is much different. The steward catalyst uses knowledge of the partnership and expertise to latch on to angles of the PPP where managerialism can be applied to create synergistic value propositions between the public and private partner. The catalyst prioritizes the PPP and its key stakeholders over self-interest as shown by the shaking-of-ground created whereby no formal rewards system could have been in place to incentivize the catalyst. The catalyst is no more incentivized by risk management because major project failures are to be associated with widespread institutional failures. The greater the selflessness, the more illustrating the differences between the public and private sectors become in terms of operating models, goals, and objectives. Yet, the propensity of the public sector to partner with the private sector insinuates that most projects are not inherently governmental, even if the core values of such partnerships present foundational differences between the public and private sector partners. Hence the steward catalyst rises to prominence as instrumental in ensuring not only the successful formation of PPPs but also the overall success of the PPP as a project develops and successful outcomes need to be maintained. Without the steward catalyst’s contributions to innovative practices and communications for the organization, there is a possibility that PPPs will be founded upon shared values that are developed for value propositions based on private sector principles, for which the public sector also functions. The values of transparency and accountability could be with regards to revenue maximization and cost mitigation instead of quality improvement and cost-effectiveness, as examples. Also, equity could be viewed with regard to private sector notions of ownership and entitlement as opposed to public sector notions of fairness and equality. Since the public sector organizations face equivalent budgetary pressures as private sector organizations, it is likely that private sector-based value propositions will supplant without steward catalyst efforts.

Complex Requirements in Public–Private Stewardship The littoral combat ship (LCS) and guided missile destroyer (DDG) programs could benefit from consolidation as it involves enhanced partnering over covenants of competition. The LCS remains controversial to its stakeholders to this day (Murphy 2017) because of its maintenance

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issues on deployment while the Zumwalt-class destroyer’s far-reaching mix of technological aspirations eventually materialized, albeit with significant challenges. The DDG, even with its criticism, specifically the Arleigh Burke-class is a staple of Navy multi-mission capabilities harnessed upon the Aegis combat system and its versatile cruise missile launch platform and targeting. The failures along the path to initial operational capability (IOC) for the LCS program offer a light-felt stage to set discussion; and disdain from sailors, about what can go wrong, and why, on a major Navy contract. Beginning at the onset of contract award on May 27, 2004 (O’Rourke 2005), the initial partners involved one partnership with Lockheed Martin and Fincantieri’s Marinette Shipyard in Marinette, Wisconsin, leading the Freedom-class LCS project and one partnership with General Dynamics Information Technology (GDIT) and Austal Shipbuilding, a joint company between Austal of Australia and Bender Shipbuilding and Repair of Mobile, Alabama, leading the Independenceclass LCS project (Murphy 2017, p. 131). The LCS program was designed to make use of smaller ships without foregoing capability to navigate waters of the Pacific in meeting “everyday presence” requirements (see Murphy 2017, p. 159), where use of larger, high value unit (HVU) assets may be prohibitive due to geographic features of area coastlines, and a desire to mitigate vulnerability of HVUs. However, a legion of problems related to delivery, operations and maintenance, and reduced warfighting capabilities are characteristic of the LCS. The ambitious design and performance elements without substantial GOTS know-how in those areas enabled the solicited requirements and specifications to be too broad—therefore neither spurring competition in its desired product and service space nor garnering contract proposals that closely fit the pedigree of the fleet. The result was obstacles across PPP stages including early on in the design, discovery, and build, and eventually shipboard activities of operations and maintenance. Both the DDG and LCS faced numerous problem areas in the ambitiousness of the desired PPP outcomes. The DDG program, a DOD partnership with Bath Iron Works of Bath, Maine and Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Mississippi, sought the integration of next-generation technologies, including better use of onboard space, greater power generation, stealth, and sustained warfighting capability using boat-powered cannon and rail gun technologies. The LCS program, meanwhile, had far greater aspirations in its objective to produce a ship as nimble as a fishing

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boat corralling the southeast Asian coastlines of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, yet stacked with enough firepower to replace a larger class strike warfare vessel in open architecture and command system. The defense budgeting process, at the outset, usually involves funding for continuing resolutions (CR), or for a single Future Year Defense Program (FYDP), with the possibility of approval for accompanying multi-year procurement (MYP) contracts. The ramp-up to the defense budgeting process, and ramp-down back to the DOD, within a singleyear budget cycle leads to rushed, willy-nilly planning. For the LCS, poor planning led to a novel design that can be characterized by Velcro-fit, reminiscent of some of the novel design ideologies implored in the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Modernization program resulting in failed attempts to extend the hulls of national security cutters (NSC) rendering them not seaworthy (see Gordon et al. 2019; Brown et al. 2013). A system-of-systems (SOS) engineering management structure, similar to the Deepwater Modernization program, was utilized for the LCS and DDG builds in order to manage the simultaneous and overlapping design and technology configurations. An advantage of an SOS structure is that multiple partnering dynamics emerge across contracted work among the various deliverables so that quality assurance takes place through supplier diversification during countless transactions between stakeholders. The SOS structure consists of a web of principal-agent relationships formed from the partnership as major program objectives are delineated through an intricate network of life-cycle requirements, functional areas, testing and validation, technological contributions, and shipbuilding. With the partnering agreement as the overarching governing mechanism, each supportive activity serves as integral input to individual development and capability milestones as well as the core SOS goals and objectives including unit production. The conception of the LCS and DDG programs was not, despite the eventuality of a next-generation DDG-X program, to engage a multigenerational research and development (R&D) concept, although this approach was taking shape in the skies in reference to the ATF X-35 joint strike fighter (JSF) program and the fourth generation F/A-18 Hornets that yielded fifth generation F/A-18 Super Hornets. Unlike ATF’s, in which component technologies are regularly developed over time with intermittent Congressional approval ink-stamping scheduled, cost-mitigating production runs for a line of fighters, the warship final product must be combat ready. If elements of design and build are not

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solidified before the ship is laid down for production, then the reality is cost increases, delayed and diminished IOC, and surrendered warfighting capabilities. The LCS and DDG were intended to be combat-ready vessels serving expanded joint forces roles in forward deterrence for littoral dominance on expeditionary missions. Therefore, an acquisition strategy that involves an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracting method, like what is regularly used for ATF software development, will not result in the same cost-savings and capability enhancements that are experienced in ATF production. To produce the superior ATF capability requires production timing that aligns the most advanced currently available technologies into the weapons system with consideration of what technologies will be soon available and any new expected mission requirements. This strategy works for ATF because air supremacy is a conceptual objective; the mere demonstration of superiority provides mutually assured destruction (MAD) deterrence. Whereas the fleet of Naval ships enters the battlefield once lowered into the water from the dry dock, serving multi-mission objectives that include a variety of squadrons and detachments such as air wings and amphibious ready groups. Rather than the poignant operations of a series of sorties touching down to flight deck one by one, to be immediately attended to and nourished by a cadre of familiarized air force mechanics, warships must maintain operational status from the moment a vessel embarks, is deployed and underway, throughout its tour of duty, including any joint exercises and port calls, until returning to home port. The ATF needs to perform requirements in a moment of time, as measured by asynchronous and unilateral mission objectives, whereas warships such as the LCS and DDG must meet operational standards related to synchronous functionalities that are ongoing and cascading between a multitude of onboard personnel.

Consolidation and Competition The realities of shipbuilding, vice ATF development, are akin to the shipbuilding adage: A ship so nice, we built it twice. In the case of the LCS and DDG-1000, this adage is especially true when considering the two-pronged build of the DDG-1000 and the dual build of the LCS. The involvement of two shipyards, in public–private-private partnering arrangements, to construct the DDG and LCS likely resulted in wagon

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circling as opposed to trust and knowledge sharing given the prospect of future competition amid proprietary concerns. In the business of building ships, competitive advantage does not easily surface, hence the DOD’s decision to simultaneously contract with multiple shipyards instead of seeking the best value source selection (BVSS). It is difficult for shipyards to demonstrate best value in bidding because the government requirement involves such a high level of synchronization in development and delivery, for which a shipyard’s fulfillment of requirements will be dependent on a logistical effort with extensive coordinating activities between labor, equipment, material, expertise, and funding. For these reasons, decision making regarding even the most major SOS components for a ship build such as power generation or propulsion systems, may be delayed until appropriate market timing and availability of resources. The Publicness of the Catalyst The shipyard’s management and accounting systems are central to fulfilling requirements for a major SOS acquisition and offer an opportunity for intensification of a partnership between the public and private entities. It is the government procuring entity, not the contractor, that has the greatest burden of accountability, as the fiduciarily responsible party to the public stakeholder. The government checks boxes as work packages are completed and milestones are met. The sharing of management and accounting data and information support the public partner’s decision making in its own allocation of contracting resources, which are necessary for guiding the job completion toward progress by shipyard contractors and subcontractors. So, when the government favors competition between shipyards, given the complexity of deliverables, it is unlikely that the competitive advantage promised through the submission of competitive bids is reflective of superior capability in infrastructure, technology, or some other shipbuilding feat, but rather the readiness of the prime contractor through its networking of shipbuilding contractors and subcontractors. Even shipyard utilization issues can potentially be ameliorated through effective partnership with the government customer. It is the onslaught of contractors and subcontractors performing work at a shipyard that is more indicative of the competitive defense contracting environment than competition between the few remaining mammoth prime contractors in shipbuilding. The mobilization of small and medium-sized enterprises, in conjunction with the Navy and the

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prime contractor’s physical and intellectual resources, comprises the gist of the competition in shipbuilding from milestone to milestone. If competition between prime contractors exists, especially in the case of multiple award contract-multiple offer (MACMO) contracting that replaced multiple ship, multiple option (MSMO) ship repair and maintenance, then shipyards and its contractors will compete over the life-cycle duration, as opposed to combining resources to tangentially achieve the milestone objectives. MACMO contracting is a form of firm-fixed-price contracting that engages with those contractors best equipped and able to perform the work at desired cost, whereas the MSMO contracting method is an incremental cost-reimbursable approach that harnesses economies of scale and capacity advantages of larger, more dispersed private firms. MACMO contracting leads to a series of competitive frameworks in approaching work, but at a larger scope, such as in the case of the DDG and LCS builds, the same limitations of MACMO contracting in repair and maintenance surface in the broader competitive dynamic between prime contractors. The development of next-generation weapons systems, including the DDG and LCS, is best described as resource scarcity whether it be in commodities or ingenuity. For example, the F-22 Raptor ATF was plagued by price shocks in the market for titanium necessitating a shift to aluminum (Steinfeld 2012) and the catapult ATF launch system of the Ford-class aircraft carrier was determined after being laid down. This means that the collaboration and pooling of resources is more likely to achieve tenets of right quality, quantity, place, time, and price. Larger companies with consolidated, major capabilities can bid and perform work toward milestones according to award pools with award fees. The SOS nature of warship shipbuilding, while not concept-driven such as in ATF development, does involve a pin-on methodology of design-build that requires multiple attempts for successful fit-out. As such, a phase-based partnering arrangement can be attempted where the DOD partners with shipyards at different program phases to achieve milestones across a flux of requirements based on a prime contractor’s unique competitive advantages as they relate to specific facets of shipbuilding. This approach to partnering encourages coordination between private entities, with guidance from the public sector partner, to make optimal utilization of resources across the industry. The Deepwater Modernization program incorporated a centralized procurement approach by setting up a consortium of prime contractors

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to address upgrades in fleet-wide capability and operational requirements which resulted in accountability issues leading to poor contractor performance and failures in partnering outcomes (Gordon et al. 2019). The MACMO and MSMO contract types in ship repair and maintenance are terrific examples of parallel dynamics between ship repair and shipbuilding, and how a consortium framework could be utilized to organize programs such as the DDG and LCS. In Deepwater, just as in the DDG and LCS programs, the major private partners were invested more in chief organizing, coordinating, and logistics, than sweat equity, because such is how task completion (see Steinfeld 2017a, b for job tasks in public procurement) is organized in the shipbuilding industry. As far as competition is concerned, the MACMO and MSMO contract types prioritize values that have been established by the public partner; values that vary based on the contract scope and complexity. For ship repair and maintenance, the values of timeliness and reliability may be weighed greater than price and at times even quality, especially if it means freeing space at the dry dock or proceeding underway for joint forces duty. The MACMO contracting awards those vendors able to mobilize resources for performance to contract. The MSMO contracting prioritizes capability, over price, because it rewards contractors for performance based on completion of work packages, with subsequent rewards that are similar or ancillary to previous work enabling vendors to maximize their own efficiency and effectiveness. However, this efficiency and effectiveness are not necessarily translated to the benefit of the public sector partner because the price factor, and therefore also the quality factor, are mutually exclusive between the public and private sector partner. The private sector partner cannot provide more quality and lower price without other costs incurred in the form of tradeoffs to the public sector partner. The vendor has an incentive to mobilize in areas where it can be the most profitable, without due consideration to an overall ship repair and maintenance program, because a single vendor cannot be held accountable for the entirety of the asset or program.

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Setting the Scenario for the Catalyst to Act A consortium set up with contingencies of small and medium-sized enterprises, rather than shipyards or highly capitalized prime contractors, has the potential to leverage the powers of competition between contractors, whether it be through values of time and reliability as in MACMO contracting or quality and capability in MSMO contracting. For ATF, the R&D takes place using a phased approach with a strong emphasis on concept design and capability, prototyping, and testing and validation. Differently, in shipbuilding, the partnership between sectors is whole cloth on the contract, so competition mostly takes place during the presolicitation and solicitation phases, as opposed to the actual shipbuilding. This dynamic is paramount considering that, just as in ATF development, the full suite of technological capabilities for a Naval vessel is not at full maturity when shipbuilding commences. The consequence is a lack of competition between major private sector partners as a ship is being built, with the competition being between their contractors, subcontractors, and logistical networks as opposed to seeking ways to pool the industry’s limited resources. The arrangement of two shipyards covering the same set of requirements creates non-public value-adding competition between private sector firms for which private values, as opposed to public values, determine the contractors and hence the contract outcomes such as matters of cost, delivery, and quality. Consider key value drivers for the public sector partner (see Kuchina-Musina et al. 2020), such as safety whether it be in the building, operating, or maintenance requirements of a vessel. The public sector partner holds the greatest stewardship responsibility for the health and safety of its personnel. The notion that the private sector partner maintains similar buy-in for safety cannot be assumed based on reputational factors meant to ameliorate the principal-agent dilemma (see Nanda 2003). The public sector partner has few alternatives in shipyards to address its warship needs, so shipyard failures do not result in immediate pressures to shift work to other private sector firms. It is more likely that competition from subcontractors partnering with the prime contractor will provide economic pressures for improvements. With respect to longterm VFM considerations such as sustainability, the arrangement of two shipyards covering the same set of requirements is not synonymous with the widespread concern regarding Navy shore infrastructure. There is

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a great need for modernization of shore facilities and harbors to build the future generation classes, maintain the level of effort (LOE), and to deter sea-level rise in areas such as Hampton Roads, Virginia, home to over 30 major military installations and the Naval headquarters at Naval Station Norfolk. Staffing and manpower challenges also exist in the completion of work at the deck-plate level in addition to the public sector contracting workforce due to retirements and the technical and administrative demands of the work. The catalyst of the public interest navigates the complex business arrangements in the large PPPs and achieves public VFM. In 2014, the Navy awarded General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works a contract to provide planning yard services for the LCS, where the contractor serves as a central manager for planning, engineering, build configuration, and logistics support, in the modernization of a class of ships (Murphy 2017, p. 139). This was a step toward closing the gap between the shipyard level and contractor-subcontractor level in terms of incentives and conducting business. Of course, challenges exist to how the private firm Bath Iron Works can achieve VFM for the PPP if it is to pursue private sector motives. Immediately, tradeoffs surface between public and private sector operational and accountability schemes, calling for the steward catalyst to identify and address VFM tradeoffs. Combining Expertise, Management, and Leadership to Practice Stewardship The Senior Executive Service (SES) and the DON Government Service15 (GS-15) executive supervisors are primary examples of steward catalysts. The GS-15 position designates a Navy civilian personnel member at the GS-15 highest level designation, capable of entering any operational situation and providing tactical management and command to meet mission objectives. The GS-15 has distinct areas of oversight with regard to the provision of combat forces, assigned service functions, operational coordination, and planning and coordinating joint missions (U.S. Department of the Navy 2022). Other specific functions could involve an infinite range to include the design and implementation of Navy-wide personnel management systems for sailors, disposal of obsolete ordinances and explosives, IT procurement, managing the cyber force, developing ATF software, managing war games simulations, administering Air Force

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communications control, submarine warfare, artificial intelligence, military sealift, supply, and logistics, shipbuilding and repair, engineering management, human resources management and training, construction of shore-based facilities, regional partnering, environmental management, budgeting, and more. To imply scope of responsibility for a DON GS-15, the typical allocation managed by a GS-15 in budgeting or IT procurement may range from $500 million to $2 billion per annum with a subordinate staff of anywhere from approximately 100–750 personnel members. The GS-15 has no managerial limitation, they are the best of the best; the crème de la crème—the cream of the cream. The GS-15 personnel member’s combination of expertise, management capacities, and leadership skills support this claim. The GS-15 has particularized expertise driven from the previous active-duty assignment, successive accomplishments in distinct areas as entry-level and mid-level managers, institutional knowledge, formal higher education and training, and tactical competencies to conduct activities across subordinate commands, major combatant commands, and global forces according to the strategic objectives of the DON and the grand theatre. Their talent and preparation align well with the demands of the position, especially when managing complex contracting arrangements and partnering initiatives as complex as everyday Naval affairs and far-reaching as the LCS and DDG programs. The GS-15 is guided by distinct roles and responsibilities with direct lines of communication for stakeholder accountability that is requirementsspecific and explicit. However, they have no limitation to the extent of the efforts that can be contributed to solving or optimizing operational management toward meeting objectives. Within the jurisdiction of relevant requests from senior flag officers with the closest accountability to the warfighter, a GS-15 can aim to facilitate the accomplishment of objectives utilizing the Navy network, making logical inquiries, challenging the process (see Kouzes and Posner 2023) when stakeholder buy-in is present, and engaging the private sector contractor to engage or enhance partnering. Referring to the competitive elements underlying the MACMO and MSMO contract types in ship repair, and drawing parallels for comparison to competition in shipbuilding, the GS-15 as a steward catalyst can be exemplified in terms of how action-orientations may be shaped, and eventual PPS practices take place. It is the GS personnel that applies knowledge-in-the-process to apply tactical solutions in solving

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strategic challenges. An inquiry into command, subcommand, and unit strategic objectives followed by in-depth stakeholder analysis is the first step to being a steward catalyst. In promoting the public interest, the stakeholder analysis consisting of the taxpayer, policymakers, politicians, internal and external stakeholders in the public and private sector, and the media, enforces a public-minded approach to work. The challenge becomes how to advance public interest through the contracting and partnering arrangement, which involves determining the specific values that contribute the most to VFM and taking action to develop value propositions that lead to PPS practice between relevant stakeholders. For the LCS and DDG, the value propositions involved innovation in the form of features and versatility; both can be expected to be achieved at high-cost trade-off if pursued independently without regard to other public values such as transparency, accountability, and competition. The LCS requirements called for a nimble ship packing large volume and payload with tailored mission package configurations. The DDG requirements are similarly innovative in their demands of forward-presence, joint forces mission objectives, and strike warfare; frequently accompanying carrier strike groups to meet multi-mission air defense, anti-submarine, and surface combatant readiness. In the context of features and versatility, the catalyst of the public interest displays PPS practices by pursuing the advancement of other public values as well. Hypothetically, it makes sense for the government to engage in concurrent partnerships with multiple shipyards for a single build class so that shipyards compete. The shipyards can compete for the available market resources to complete work packages as part of ship build and repair. And, if market resources are plentiful, then specifications can be met at the lowest price by using a cost-effective method of contracting known as lowest price, technically acceptable (LPTA). In practice, the large projects are awarded using BVSS, while the inclusive task orders are awarded according to LPTA. However, innovation cannot be expected to be attained simply because a prime contractor excels in solicitation, but when it comes to work completion, it is completed according to LPTA. The value-added of some best value propositions would be therefore missed under an LPTA approach, typically because there is a cost associated. This reduces incentives to provide innovation that could later be vital in overall ship or component systems compatibility requirements, especially for an SOS. Further, the public value of transparency supports

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innovation because of the knowledge, information, and data sharing that is required for fruitful innovation. The steward catalyst also comprises knowledge-of-the-process and utilizes that knowledge in PPS practices. One way for this to occur is through the use of organizational communication channels to identify institutional knowledge. There may be current contracting work or other contracts in the DOD that involve the same requirement of specifications, or otherwise serve a logistical function. It also involves engagement of the private sector partner. The steward catalyst seeks transparency through clarification, for example, to better understand how the various requirements and specifications are central to the broader objective or milestone. Additionally, clarification is garnered to determine how the requirements and specifications can be performed and managed for better VFM, whether it be advancing capabilities through features or reducing cost. With transparency, and associated accountability, there is a greater chance that PPS best practices will be normalized to affect culture within the partnership so that innovative practice as an example, whether it be through transparency or some other value, becomes widespread across stakeholders. Notice how innovation through transparency is different than innovation pursued independently. When pursued independently, motives of profitability, for both the private sector in the current partnership and the public sector for any related future foreign military sales (FMS), costeffectiveness, and competition arise as values, each with value propositions that lack public interest and pose more likelihood of project failure with possible repercussions to broader objectives of military dominance. Innovation pursued without transparency as a core value attributed to VFM calculations creates risk that development of features and advancements may not fit the ship’s mechanical ecosystem due to insufficient stakeholder involvement. The value propositions lead to remobilization of resources as the DOD and the DON seeks to achieve VFM and associated ROI. The value propositions with the greatest ROI may subsequently change. The concept of ROI itself may sway toward public interest as the steward catalyst makes decisions based on choreographed value propositions. The ROI premise that maximizes capital inflows per unit of capital outflows in monetary units only applies to the transfer of value into currency. Yet, there is no amount of money that could build an aircraft carrier. It is the workforce and resources mobilization efforts that lead to spectacles. The new variables for ROI would involve transparency with respect to cost,

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transparency with respect to innovation, innovation with respect to cost, and transparency with respect to SOS milestones.

References Brown, Trevor L., Matthew Potoski, David M. Van Slyke. 2013. Complex Contracting: Government Purchasing in the Wake of the U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program. New York: Cambridge University Press. Gordon, Mark D., John C. Morris, and Joshua M. Steinfeld. 2019. Deepwater or Troubled Water? Principal-Agent Theory and Performance-Based Contracting in the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Modernization Program. International Journal of Public Administration 42 (4): 298–309. Hood, Christopher. 1998. The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public Management. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kouzes, James M., and Barry Z. Posner. 2023. The Leadership Challenge: How to Make Extraordinary Things Happen in Organizations. Hoboken, NJ: JosseyBass. Kuchina-Musina, Dolores, John C. Morris, and Joshua M. Steinfeld. 2020. Drivers and Differentiators: A Grounded Theory Study of Procurement in Public and Private Organizations. Journal of Public Procurement 20 (3): 265–285. Murphy, Sean P. 2017. Acquiring the Tools of Grand Strategy: The US Navy’s LCS as a Case Study. Ph.D. Dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University. https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1021&context=gpis_etds. Accessed 9 Aug 2022. Nanda, Ashish. 2003. The Essence of Professionalism: Managing Conflict of Interest. Harvard Business School Background Note 903-120, June. O’Rourke, Ronald. 2005. Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress, February 9. Congressional Research Service. Steinfeld, Joshua M. 2012. United States Air Supremacy: Government Purchasing and Supply Chain Management of the F-22 Raptor. In International Public Procurement Conference 5. Seattle, WA, August 17–19, 2012. http://www.ippa.org/images/PROCEEDINGS/IPPC5/Part13/PAP ER13-2.pdf. Accessed 8 Aug 2022. Steinfeld, Joshua M. 2017a. The What, Who, and How of Public Procurement: Job Functions Performed and Managed by Professionals. In Global Public Procurement Theories and Practices, ed. K.V. Thai, 311–335. New York, NY: Springer. Steinfeld, Joshua M. 2017b. Task Specialization in the Public Administration Profession: A Job Analysis of Public Procurement Practitioners. Ph.D.

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Dissertation, Public Administration, Florida Atlantic University. https:// fau.digital.flvc.org/islandora/object/fau%3A33958/datastream/OBJ/view/ Task_Specialization_In_The_Public_Administration_Profession__A_Job_Ana lysis_Of_Public_Procurement_Practitioners.pdf. Accessed 9 Aug 2022. U.S. Department of the Navy (DON). 2022. Mission. U.S. Fleet Forces https://www.usff.navy.mil/About-Us/Mission/. Command (USFFC). Accessed 10 Aug 2022. Weidenbaum, Murray L. 1981. Benefit-Cost Analysis of Government Regulation. Center for the Study of American Business (CSAB). St. Louis, MO: Washington University. Wilkins, John. 2014. Stewardship of Public Service Renewal and Reform. International Journal of Leadership in Public Services 10 (4): 188–199.

CHAPTER 5

Implementation through Communication

Abstract Implementation through Communication is the fourth portrait of public–private stewardship (PPS), reflecting the efforts to operate across entities and between stakeholders. Public policies and means of authority and collaboration that enable communication to take place are detailed. The communication routes where PPS practices may take shape are produced. The public partner’s concern for the private partner, through PPS, is illuminated showing that the partnership is reciprocal. Contracting tools for PPS practices are then shared including tactics in contract pricing, solicitation, and source selection. Keywords Implementation · Communication · Public policies · Procedures · Contracting authority · Contracting officer · Collaboration · Peer review · Acquisition planning · Military construction · Contracting tools · Strategy · Objectives · Sustainability

The fifth chapter presents the PPS portrait of Implementation through Communication. The fourth portrait of PPS reflects the dynamism to navigate between actors and across organizations. Implementation through Communication is a portrait of the PPS practitioner that manages the divergent needs of stakeholders. Implementation of PPPs is perhaps the most challenging as it is first a test of the ability to plan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. M. Steinfeld, Public-Private Stewardship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17131-4_5

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activities and then is a test of the ability to follow through on the plan. These are the stages to make wise use of public and private monies, to ensure fluid communication, and exercise moral and ethical behaviors as sources to eliminate opportunistic behavior, and in doing so, maximizing VFM. PPS also consists of public buyers maintaining integrity and bridging with partners to set targets and monitor output and to minimize errors in judgment, performance, and agent abuses. The threat to VFM is substantial beginning with the pre-award phases of a contract and is then even more substantially captured in the contract administration phase of contracting. In the later contract phases such as contract administration, having a plan and defining expectations and communicating clearly about project changes reduces ambiguities and opportunistic behavior for change orders that may derail the continued focus on public interest. Kaufmann et al. (2010) defined government effectiveness as the quality of public services, its policy formulation and implementation, and the government’s credibility with respect to committing to its policies. However, Koala (2020) found that in a sample of the World Bank member countries and practices in infrastructure PPPs, the nations with a system in place for implementation had reduced performance for PPP outcomes. This chapter demonstrates how a hybrid approach leaning on a combination of policies and communication efforts can improve PPP effectiveness for outcomes by enhancing VFM. The impact of PPS is the appreciation of the role of the public and private partnerships and encouraging further involvement in the processes and new definitions of action for VFM.

Bridging the Public Policy Structure and Implementation Outside of the development of weapons systems and FMS, perhaps the most frequent and large-scale undertaking of DOD projects takes place through the Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC). At a suburban base in the Larchmont area of Norfolk, Virginia, the NAVFAC, Atlantic executes the allocation of billions of dollars in public funds committed to the construction of an array of shore facilities to support the Navy and Marine Corps. In addition to the NAVFAC Echelon II MILCON, the NAVFAC constructs utility systems, dredging,

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and preservation, systems and ground maintenance, and provides force protection in anti-terrorism, maritime, and underwater security. The Naval Facilities Acquisition Standards (NFAS) provide guidance to field KOs and is to be used in conjunction with the FAR, the DFARS, and the Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement (NMCARS). The NMCARS set the DON policies and procedures whether it be to implement or supplement the FAR and the DFARS. The longer-term NAVFAC projects that could involve agreements with design, build, finance, operate, and maintain (DBFOM) elements (see Steinfeld et al. 2019) present a prospect for partnering that allows for a cross-phase approach to be taken with more windows of opportunity to construct value propositions, albeit within the more constrained and complex terrain of cross-phase coordination. There are numerous opportunities in the NMCARS and NFAS models for PPS practices and for updates to be made to this guidance that transforms contracting activities into partnerships that alleviate organizational stresses. For starters, while the NAVFAC engages in PPV, the NMCARS does not address PPV and the scope of PPV as it is conceptualized by the DOD, and as played out in military housing, is insufficient for effective PPP outcomes that reflect PPS. Substantial effort and resources are devoted to source selection so that partnering molds together for the beginning of project planning with the greatest prospect of successive performance to contract. As discussed in both the military housing and battleship program exemplars in Chapter 4, the job activities taking place from contracting are a direct result of the earlier contracting phases. Communication Channels and Means of Authority The Head of Contracting Activities (HCA) is in command of spend packages until the $1 billion threshold, at which point approval is needed from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). As can be imagined, there is substantial planning that is required that coincides with source selection so that requirements and specifications can be relayed from Naval forces. NMCARS (2022) Subpart 5207.1 “Acquisition Plans” set forth guidance for the HCA and some of the contracting decision making, including the authority vested to the HCA. The Acquisition Plans leave substantial leeway for the HCA to conduct a procurement and thereby the flexibility to seek an intensified partnering relationship. For enterprise software agreements (Subpart 5208.74), the

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“HCA is the designated management official” and requests for policy and procedural waivers beyond NMCARS guidance are made directly with the DON CIO. This affords substantial room for the HCA to gain ground on the information imbalance between the public and private sectors in IT procurement that was illustrated in Chapter 3. For its assigned contracting activities, the HCA exercises the authorities vested to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Procurement (DASNP) and is the principal advisor and agent to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASNRDA), who as Navy Acquisition Executive and Senior Procurement Executive, is the direct report for the HCA. Subpart 5201.6 “Career Development, Contracting Authority, and Responsibilities” briefly outlines the normal course of acquisition planning involving the composition of acquisition documents that detail acquisition plans, strategies, and a determination and findings (D&F), requiring DASNP or higher approval (NMCARS 2022, Subpart 5201.601-90(D) “Department of the Navy authorities and responsibilities”). Even more so, subclause (L) expands the HCA’s scope in the acquisition, procurement, and contracting function stating that the HCA serves as the DON lead for proposed mergers and acquisitions (subclause L), the DON Acquisition Ombudsman (subclause N), and the Chair of the Navy Contract Adjustment Board (subclause O), among other titles and duties with respect to its assigned contracting activities. Meanwhile, the establishment of a peer review board for peer reviews of contracting activities is only required above the $50 million threshold for environmental, construction, and architecture-engineering (AE) solicitations and the $250 million threshold for most other solicitations (NFAS, Part 1 Federal Acquisition Regulations System, Subpart 1.170 “Peer Reviews”). And, as further stated, in subclause (E) of the same part, the HCA “approves individual and class deviations and waivers from the FAR and DFARS.” This last subclause is important because it relegates full contracting discretion to the HCA, a power that can be utilized to furnish PPPs where traditional contracting does not meet the changing needs. Much differently, when it comes to contract award, the NFAS, the FAR, and the DFARS can be explicitly detailed in the intricate guidance in terms of contract type and method which can limit more creative work and pricing structures. The use of OTAs and other expedited procurement initiatives such as defense innovation unit experimental (DIUX) are useful if there is a model fit between immediate public sector need, private sector willingness

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and ability to mobilize, and substantial barriers to competitive solicitation. On the extreme opposite, these forms of contracting also make sense when the objectives are concept based and involve a revolutionary discovery process. These circumventions, or deviations from the FAR and the DFARS, can be formalized in open professional settings intended on spurring nascent collaboration as a form of pre-solicitation. Hence the use of OTAs does not implicate a lack of competition in a private sector firm’s desire to be responsive to the public sector’s current needs or in the open forum that precipitated the dialogue. In fact, these contracting arrangements reflect a partnering integration at the beginning of engagement, but again are kosher, because they took place as a result of the private sector firm’s preparedness as opposed to some notion of public sector contractor preference. The HCA, due to their authority and the extensive list of contracting activities, is unlikely to have direct access to the agents of private sector firms in the marketplace. There are far too many actors serving active roles on behalf of the private sector firm for the HCA to have this type of access, nor would it be appropriate from a conflict-of-interest standpoint. Instead, it will be the contracting offices that administer the contract, sometimes consisting of thousands of personnel members working on a single contract, that deal directly with the private sector agents. In most circumstances, it would only be applicable for the most senior private sector managers to meet with HCAs, such as the C-level suite, for example regarding broad partnering objectives and critical outcomes. From there, the HCA can devise key performance indicators (KPIs) for contracting personnel in order to accomplish the measurable objectives that support the broader objectives. The command-wide commitment to KPIs is also a way of inducing shared values and value propositions, as individual stakeholders chart their impact on the KPI inputs and outputs. Communication Channels and Feedback Within the Organization The HCA achieves the assurance of best approaches and practices through the peer review (PR) process. Both pre-award and post-award peer reviews are mandated by NMCARS for the larger spends. However, only one PR is to take place for multiple award contracts (NFAS, Part 1 Federal Acquisition Regulations System, Subpart 1.170 “Peer Reviews”), indicating that there are cascading effects to the due course culminating from

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results of PR and that it is doubtful a single PR can capture the important elements of the most complex contracting dynamics. Furthermore, if multiple awards are to take place, and numerous contractors may be involved, then consideration is lacking in giving contractors the ability to exercise their strengths in any unique methodologies to completing work, inevitably practiced as result from the contractors’ perceived value-add of their own techniques. Additionally, contracting that allows contractors to approach work in methodologies that work best for that company also promotes the best use of resources and expertise, putting the company in a better position to pursue innovation with insights to, not replacements for, their style of working from the government entity. The peer review authority (PRA) consists of the Echelon III Chief of Contracting Office (CCO) and the Echelon IV CCO for services, environmental, and AE actions between $50 and $250 million, and supplies actions between $50 million and $500 million for sole source, and $50 million to $1 billion for competitive actions, each threshold totals base price plus all options (see NMCARS 2022, Subpart 1.170 “Peer Reviews”). Above these levels, an Echelon II commander (see Naval Operations Instructions 2022), is required for project approval (see NMCARS 2022, Subpart 1.170 “Peer Reviews”). The CCO or other PRA will identify the PR leader, designate the team, and facilitate the entire contracting process. The NMCARS, subpart 1.170(c), states that the PRA will not be re-delegated. That is to say, the PRA maintains its decision making for the entire contract, including a PR prior to the negotiations and a PR prior to the contract award, yielding the potential to incorporate strategy and tactics across the entire project duration. The PRA, through the review process, may deal with the CCO, the KO, the field contracting office, an Echelon II team leader, and a systems command (SYSCOM) manager. These personnel are each representing the interests of many other stakeholders whose requirements and specifications interrelate. Yet, the PRA must be independent of the KO whose procurement actions are upon review, and independent of the source selection authority (SSA) (NMCARS 2022, Subparts 1.170(d)(e) “Peer Reviews”) who determines the contractor of choice and the stipulations of such contractors in determining the contract award to begin with. Implementation through communication takes place in such a way; it may be as simple as an active-duty request from personnel such as a commanding officer (CO) (position) or a lieutenant commander (rank),

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or a civilian request stemming from the needs of stakeholders such as system administrators, system users, system designers, engineers, program managers, budget managers, others involved in requirements generation, or a flag officer. The issue is that the communication is not substantive enough to incorporate PPS practices absent a more formalized exchange between commands evaluating and the private sector provider, and therefore maximum VFM may not be achieved, thereby the accomplishment of military objectives would not be maximized either. The flow of communication between internal stakeholders is entirely based on requirements and specifications, or immediate needs, even if with respect to a broader planning or acquisition development cue. The influence of external public stakeholders such as taxpayers, policymakers, and politicians can only be merely echoed from the OSD. Regarding communication with the private sector entity, the interactions may be limited to the public and private sector contracting staffs, eliminating the possibility that technical experts from the public and private sector could collaborate and partner toward requirements. Even within the current PR structure, there is ample opportunity for the PRA to increase VFM by implementation through communication with the internal, external, direct, and indirect stakeholders. Generating Value from Acquisition Planning As a mainframe, the use of BVSS generally has become a relatively standard practice at NAVFAC, and it is best value, not LPTA, that generally promotes the exceeding of expectations with some exceptions. LPTA is a wonderful contracting method in circumstances dependent on the scope of products and services, the budget, and even as a motive that can lead to innovations by the product or service developer. As a note, LPTA should be used as a tool in part of a larger best value scheme, as it is in ship repair, but potentially be more limited to its use when dealing in more complex or more critically inventive products and services, especially as price sensitivity is raised as indicative of the LPTA method. The main idea is that NAVFAC is cognizant of the benefits of a best value approach and how it fits into and adapts with overall VFM. The challenge is then how to orchestrate the multitude of resources and actors necessary to make decisions and conduct work in manners that pursue shared public values with accompanying levels of accountability including measures of performance.

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To begin with, it may be quite difficult to agree on shared values, let alone agreed upon value propositions, from afar without keen understanding of the web of connections between stakeholders, their administration arenas, and the priorities of stakeholder interests. Additionally, when it comes to PPS, its practices are especially challenging because it supersedes the notion of a chain of command. Of course, the public– private steward must respect and operate within the confines of the chain of command as one of the most basic forms of action-orientation in the DOD and most other public and private sector organizations for that matter. Nonetheless, the public–private steward needs to utilize the available communication channels if PPS is desired to engage key stakeholders even if it means temporarily shifting the tunnel of vision to a space of shared values and devising of value propositions to increase VFM. The stringent narrative overhanging the FAR and the DFARS has slowly and gradually been relaxed by decision makers to entertain occasional waivers to the FAR and the DFARS. Of note, is that it is not necessarily that waivers to the FAR and the DFARS are required to engage in degrees of more collaborative and partnering behavior. Alternatively, it is usually the case that the FAR and the DFARS stipulate specific procurement and contracting tactics that may inhibit recommendations that flow from value propositions when PPS is practiced. However, if PPS is practiced in the early phases, as is currently being discussed here, then it could be argued that the scope of the FAR and the DFARS is different than that of a partnering dynamic. Again, the challenges arising if the FAR and the DFARS apply is when it comes to PPS practices that violate or have the effect of counteracting the FAR and the DFARS. Even so, since the FAR and the DFARS were developed as a form of rulemaking to improve contract outcomes based on contracting experience and expertise, then there is a likelihood that the constructs of the FAR and the DFARS can fit the architecture of an acquisition plan that insinuates PPS practices. With the realities of roles and responsibilities that are inherently governmental and the differing equity stakeholders between the public and the private sector firms, a full-fledged partnership in its traditional format, as previously mentioned is unlikely to be put into place. The recognition of a partnering arrangement is nonetheless implied by the DON in its language within the policy guidance. The NMCARS subpart 5209.1 “Responsible Prospective Contractors” states standards for contractor qualifications and names the Boeing company exclusively in

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its general standards (NMCARS 2022), implying a public sector acknowledgment of the allegiance in partnering as opposed to the counterparty in contracting relationship at the heart of the public–private dynamic. The argument will be that by using the communication strategy, it is possible to add partnering elements to these contracting arrangements; the repetitiveness of the nature of work, the established relationship with the largest private firms, and the day-to-day interactions between the public and private sector firms in contracting. Add-in PPS practices, and there is the potential to enhance the extent of the partnership while increasing the VFM for which conventional contracting practices have continually been improved and sculpted. Communication Routes for Public–Private Stewardship Practices The NMCARS Annex 17 Program Streamlined Acquisition Plan (PSTRAP) and Individual Streamlined Acquisition Plan (ISTRAP) is an administrative tool for the public–private steward. The PSTRAP must be submitted for approval by the DASNP with recommended approval from the HCA (or program executive officer (PEO), direct reporting manager (DRPM), or approving official), the CCO, the KO, and the program manager. The PSTRAP and ISTRAP are a set of prompts for information regarding aspects including the Background and Objectives, Acquisition Considerations, and Program Risks. The PSTRAP and ISTRAP are substantive and enable the practitioner an opportunity to inform about the full scope and details of the acquisition. Specifics such as a statement of need including any applicable acquisition strategies, memos, or boards, cost considerations, technical data, delivery, manufacturing, and the full spectrum of contracting activities and their impacts are included. In reference to any restrictions posed by the FAR and the DFARS in decision making when practicing PPS if it deviates from the rules, as may be cited by government procuring entity agents, the ISTRAP 2.5.2 states “Discuss the use and authority of multi-year contracting or other special contracting methods” and the ISTRAP 2.5.3 states “Discuss any applicable FAR or DFARS deviations that will be required.” Therefore, it is understood that caveats due to the individual and unique nature of many contracts could necessitate special contracting methods that are pursued independent of guidance from the FAR and the DFARS. Whether it is in the PSTRAP and ISTRAP, or other channels of communication, the opportunity exists for the public–private steward to

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communicate between the slate of lead decision makers at the DON. In practice, the agency head submits the STRAP for signatory approval (NMCARS 2020, Subpart 5207.103 “Agency-head responsibilities”). It is presumed that multiple stakeholders are consulted in composition of the STRAP. The STRAP is a tool with the utility to increase VFM through partnership. There is no need to draft external agreements such as in the case of PPV or facilities managed but not owned by the DON. The implementation of PPS practices in the STRAP, or when confronted with any of the prompts contained in the STRAP, is a possible option for better VFM. Drawing parallels from the items on the STRAPs that are to be provided for a wide range of programs being overseen by an agency and from some of the challenges facing defense PPPs that have been discussed in the previous chapters, there are numerous ways of implementing PPS beginning with the statement of need (see PSTRAP 2022, 1.1.1; ISTRAP 2022, 1.1.1). There may be numerous ways to solve a problem and if the government dictates how the problem will be solved, by jumping over problem solving and going directly to requirements, then the power and vigor of the defense industry is not being tapped at the crucial early stages in planning of a project. The stakeholders across agencies come into play in their interactions with the private partner on previous or current applicable contracts as a way of communicating PPS. The requisite buy-in from stakeholders of value propositions is likely to nearly be achieved at the onset from these interactions and entanglements. Identification of core values that appeal to both partners and that can be shared as theoretical bases for engagement is an initial step from either the public or private partner practitioner. The way the core values can apply to improve upon the KPIs that each stakeholder is accountable to is a lane for devising value propositions. The regulatory guidelines such as the NMCARS, the NFAS, the FAR, the DFARS, and the many others, exist for the public interest, so that aspects of fiduciary responsibility of taxpayer funds, prioritizing of the warfighter at the individual level and combat readiness at the mission level, and adherence to good governance takes place in military procurement. Just as the STRAPs are tools, so are the ways of conducting business as spelled out in the government regulations. The proper mindset is to not feel as though partnering cannot take place, or PPS practices that require increased communication and an implementation orientation are

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somehow contrary or deviant to the regulation. On the contrary, documents such as STRAPs show that a comprehensive and integrated stance across stakeholders is not just possible but is required. Otherwise, the acquisition will have a low probability of being successful—an all-handson-deck mentality is needed because the administrative and logistics trails are further than the eyes can see. Along with the needs assessment, is the technical data required to meet program objectives, including validation of the technical packages, and data requirements of the contractor (see PSTRAP 2022, 1.3). With the effective communication of PPS practices in the statement of needs and the objectives for technical data, it is then recommended to move to requirements and specifications, not at the start. The technical data is the quantifiable basis for the need that is to be generated. Meanwhile, the requirement is the function that needs to be met for the need to be fulfilled and the specifications are particularized aspects and features of the requirement, which are especially elastic to technical data. The mission objectives and taxonomy of the services, supplies, and equipment are important factors to consider in developing the requirements and specifications. The combination of activities that serve the mission objectives including the performance and management of the services, supplies, and equipment are the sources for the data. The job activities performed and managed as part of the contract, by both the public and private sector personnel, can be operationalized for data collection and analysis (see Steinfeld et al. 2016). Furthermore, the goods, services, and mission operations being served by these job activities can also serve as points for data collection and analysis for decision making. The chain of activities is important to consider, in terms of how each activity is an operative gear in the process, and how the activities utilize and interact with the data. If a requirement is being desired through an individual acquisition or an acquisition program that does not support a mission objective, or would not improve measurable mission outcomes, then the requirement may not be worth pursuing in and of itself unless the goal is shear concept and innovation. A requirement that increases system capability or capacity does not improve mission outcomes if the requirement is stove-piped, is not properly integrated into force management, there are functional, or process limitations. The MILCON, as an example, is one of the distinguishing acquisition areas for NAVFAC. The MILCON expanse of shore facilities, services, and maintenance, the long lead times characteristic of the construction

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industry, and challenges in matching facilities capabilities with Naval and Marine evolving functional requirements for the management and operations of joint forces, is especially challenging. As a quick consideration, the technology rapidly advances, and with it eventually the required capability, and the defense theater experiences volatile shifts between eras that change the orchestra of warfare. Designing, building, and operating facilities that meet the mission requirements of the future warfighter presents challenges that PPS can address with demonstrated VFM. The MILCON begins with receipt of a preliminary design authority (PDA) to convene a week-long comparison of actual program needs and costs with the planning document initially provided to Congress, for revision and resubmittal for updated funding levels, at which time a final design authority (FDA) is issued for generation of the RFP. The weekslong process of discovery may consist of an in-house design team or one that is procured via an AE contract, a representative from the installation for which MILCON is proceeding, technical representatives, and other key stakeholders. In many of the cases, the contractors awarded the MILCON contracts are listed on a Small Business Multiple Award Construction (MACC) contract or a large business MACC. However, to decipher between these contractors, additional evaluation factors are needed to gauge the contractor’s capacity to perform to contract for the MILCON in demonstrating an understanding of all systems, design, and performance requirements, and other unique specifications. PPS comes into shape whereby evaluation factors communicate critical aspects of performance to the contractor necessary in order to meet the requirements of the government procuring entity. Essentially, the government procuring entity sets a benchmark for contractors to target if the partnership is desired, that in return, assists the private firms to organize their business activities and allocation of resources. For the MILCON, an evaluation factor could weigh the ability of a private partner to manage their workloads, especially with respect to expertise, logistics, and data sharing. There is a tendency for private partners to underbid with low cost to win a contract award, only to submit revisions or change orders, based on increased complexities than initially conceived either because the contractor was short-winded in their comprehension and analysis of requirements or was over ambitious in their costing model. The public–private steward may act to develop the values that support and are supported by workload management, the relevant value propositions, and how decision making in this management area promotes overall

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VFM. Value orientations such as environmentalism, cost-effectiveness, and transparency, quickly arise as staples of workforce management when it comes to making the best use of resources in logistics and clarification in planning. In turn, the private partner benefits from the public partner’s leadership as a catalyst for PPS by improving efficiency and effectiveness of the private sector’s operations and enhancing the PPP for continued involvement that translates to revenues. The DOD most commonly uses the design-build (DB) or the designbid-build (DBB) method for approaching construction projects. With DB, the same private partner performs the design and the build, whereas for DBB there is one partner addressing the design, and a separate solicitation will be put out for the build. Thinking of the interrelationship between build design and build materials, templates, equipment, and know-how, it oftentimes makes sense to use the same partner for both the design and the build. On the other hand, there are some firms that inevitably are better at design while others at construction, perhaps because of the origins of a company’s founding, company practices to date, or market-driven forces in personnel talent, technology, and clientele. In other cases, a firm may seek to leverage their design and build capabilities sometimes resulting in less than ideal product and service offerings. NAVFAC informs that standard facilities, new construction, simpler work, and tighter schedules warrant the use of DB. Whereas DBB should be used when project complexity or uniqueness is high, there are numerous known or unknown elements, or the design is prescriptive with highly technical elements (Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command 2022, Slide 6). With such emphasis on design and its challenges, there is prospective opportunity for PPS practices to make contributions to achievement of VFM. The public partner’s design team must communicate the execution strategy with a milieu of templates, formalized steps and coordination efforts, failure points, related documents, external processes, and the gamut of AE professionals. In doing so, the design team must communicate coordination efforts across internal and external processes, the stakeholders, and the schedule of deliverables. The design team can devise tools for use as a communications matrix that prompts stakeholders for action and synergizes coordination between stakeholders as a way of attempting to implement PPS. Considering that a design manager may

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oversee approximately a half-dozen to a dozen MILCON projects at once, each potentially fitting a different DOD taxonomy or at different points in the project, communication to implement coordination efforts is vital.

Public Stewardship of the Private Partner as Public–Private Stewardship So often, the discussion revolves around how the private partner can improve quality, increase delivery speed, reduce cost, create more innovation, or something else, for the public sector. Even if it means an initial expense to the private partner through labor and equipment costs, or other stresses on the firm, there is an expectation to begin with that the contractor will perform to contract. Beyond this baseline pressure, the desire for continual improvements as Naval requirements evolve is tremendous, especially with lagging defense industry growth and an aging harbor and base infrastructure. The contracting workforce shortages projections for the DOD and the DON will not help the private sector complete its part in any way. The PSTRAP (2022) subpart 2.3.6.4 is particularly interesting with regard to stewardship of private sector partners by the public sector partner because it provides guidance on how the public sector can support the performance and sustainability of the private sector partner. It is stated, that for major defense acquisition programs: “To the maximum extent practicable, the use of contract solicitations that…increase the productivity of the offerors and reduce life-cycle costs.” The public partner is not simply contracting with the private partner to get the best bang-for-the-buck. The public partner considers the sustainability of the private partner in the contract agreement and makes a connection to productivity and life-cycle costs, benefitting both the public and the private partners. This instills the notion that there is space for new and different approaches to be taken that connect the public sector to the private sector’s long-term sustainability, while also reducing government life-cycle cost, which itself leaves interpretation for various combinations of innovation, production, contracting, and partnering methods in the procurement. The public partner enables the private partner for purposes ranging from innovation to quality improvement to better performance to

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contract, when it encourages the private partner to choose its own methodical devices such as in the planning or assembly of unit production. Improved contractor performance then transcripts into performance evaluations during contract closeout, leading to an improved responsibility scoring, in which the DOD evaluates proposals based on responsibility and responsiveness, for bidding on future projects and therefore economic sustainability of the private partner. It has been argued, along these lines, that the DOD stay ahead of the technological curve in writing requirements and specifications that reflect the latest and greatest in products and services. This is so that the private sector can be rewarded for their innovations and related investments to quality improvement without the need to wait for resources and requirements review boards (RRRB) to adopt new requirements and specifications, for those to be inserted in solicitation documents, and then hoping that those solicitations contain the various variables in contracting mechanics such as solicitation type, contract type, and source selection method that would indicate a possibility of a proposal submission by the firm to prevail. Conversely, maintaining requirements and specifications according to needs for continuity supports immediate readiness, reduces cost to the taxpayer, and leads to targeted competition between private firms to innovate within the scope of current integration. It further emphasizes the importance of adaptability in innovation as a result of a just way the public sector can communicate signals for the direction of innovation. At the same time there are plenty of instances where the private partner may benefit from the public partner’s insight as an internal stakeholder with the end user. Particularly when aspects of safety, security, and performance are of greater relative consequence, then the public partner assumes the upper hand in its practitioners’ commitment to public service motivation (PSM) as the basis of federal service. The important facet is the partners work together in PPS to determine what is best from a shared values standpoint. Custom approaches to solutions are needed as the social, economic, and security environment changes or a particular procurement may have a unique caveat, as the vast many of major acquisition programs do. Consequently, PPS practices are to be a norm to address the DOD’s perpetual challenges.

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Basic Contracting Tools for Public–Private Stewardship Practices: Contract Pricing Types The public partner’s stewardship of the private partner, to the utmost degree of the definition in both fiduciary responsibility and advancement of public values aspects, is an example of PPS. As alluded to above, when it comes to improving productivity and reducing life-cycle costs, the use of contracting strategies involving contract type, methods, and techniques, among other factors such as requirements and specifications, terms and conditions, performance, monitoring, and reporting, are all at the practitioner’s leisure within DOD corroborated guidelines and approvals. While it is beyond the scope of this book to slice and dice the array of contracting methods and types to address the new-to-the-world scenario that exists each day in DOD affairs, there are some widely held conceptions among the contracting workforce that could be altered, or at a minimum reconsidered, given influences of PPS. For example, it is held in some circles that firm-fixed-price contract types shift cost risk from the private sector to the public sector because the private partner may shirk responsibility and deliver an inferior good or service if there is no cost association of the features or work performed. Others believe that firm-fixed-price contracts shift risk from the public partner to the private partner because it requires the partner to perform to contract and any miscalculation or misjudgments come at the private sector’s expense. Meanwhile, if the private partner completes the job quicker or the job proves to be less capital intensive than anticipated, then the public partner is still satisfied, even if it could have possibly negotiated a better price in this situation using a cost-reimbursement contract type, because it gets its need fulfilled at the price that it was willing to pay. The use of cost-reimbursement contract types requires substantial accounting controls from both the public and private sector partners and becomes more important when cost controls are tied to critical aspects of performance as opposed to being used as a tool to simply drive down cost. These accounting requirements and any additional maneuvering that contractors must undertake to achieve project profitability come at a cost of private partner resources that could be dedicated to on-time delivery, quality, and reducing overall costs. There is also substantial effort on behalf of the public sector in assigning government cost standards to cost expenditures. However, perhaps the notion of tying costs

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and work—and therefore aspects of VFM such as transparency and costeffectiveness come into play—outweigh the accounting burdens. For the DOD projects, the accounting controls exist through the comptroller’s offices within major military commands. At the contract level, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) provides contract administration services on over 200,000 contracts worldwide with its highly trained workforce of more than 11,000 personnel receiving over 1000 new contracts daily. The public–private steward can strive for enhanced project success using cost-reimbursement contracting by converting the accounting activity from a control-orientation to a managerial-orientation. This means that accounting controls are utilized as mechanisms to meet and exceed the performance of milestones and scheduled completion not merely to ensure that the private partner is shirking in quality or performance. The public–private steward analyzes the purpose and content of the data to determine how shared values, value propositions, and the diagram of combined efforts needed to meet the deliverable impact or could be impacted by the data. Data-driven decision making is thereby taking place that is based on the organizational, operational, and governance structure of both the public and private partners leading to greater efficiencies and effectiveness in each partner’s efforts to contribute to the success of the partnership. Together, the public and private partners can develop metrics for performance and delivery that are the bases of milestones and checkpoints, thereby satisfying the government’s desire to assign value to activities but doing so in a way that improves quality and performance. Thus potentially enabling the contractor to be innovative at the benefit to their future revenues in innovative products and services or in use of best practices approaches that can be associated with shared values, whether it be safety, transparency in how the work is performed, or use of environmentally-friendly materials. It is worth noting that the use of firm-fixed-price contracts could result in considerably additional profit in situations where the private partner is innovative in its approach and speedy completion results in less use of firm resources. This provides the speedy completion is not to the detriment of the public partner assuming quality requirements and specifications are met and so forth. Very quickly, the public sector can adjust its pricing for the next firm-fixed contract on similar work, anyway. The result is the alleviation of any accounting obstacles or other cogs that could be tied to cost-reimbursement contracts for the public or

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private partner. Both partners allocate substantial expenditure addressing the contracting elements of cost-reimbursement contracts, which threaten a private partner’s ability to manage costs and therefore affect sustainability, and the broader marketplace for those private firms lacking the administrative resources, the administrative know-how, or access to the affordable consulting services needed, to meet government contract cost accounting requirements. The example of firm-fixed and cost-reimbursement contracts is not to argue that one contracting convention or the other is wrong and there are far too many variables in every unique situation. The example is to demonstrate how the simple decision of choosing contract types has a major impact on the demands of partnership as well as how PPS practices may improve PPP outcomes. When weighing the options of contract types, methods, and techniques, in addition to solicitation methods, for example, RFP or IFB, or proposal evaluation methods such as BVSS or LPTA, and the various scoring criteria methods, there are millions of combinations of decisions to take place just at the contract-level of a PPP. There are thus ample opportunities to apply expertise and the organizational capacities of the PPPs to utilize these contracting mechanisms as ways to initiate and execute PPS practices. Basic Contracting Tools for PPS Practices: Solicitation Type and Source Selection Type The public practitioner can make substantial use of communication through the use of basic contracting tools, and this communication serves as a guiding force for private action. It was discussed in Chapter 2 how the solicitation type, whether it be RFP or IFB, may provide an advantage to one firm type or another, for example in supplier diversity, where larger firms may find it easier to meet stringent requirements or cost requirements that do not assign substantive weighting to quality or appropriate features that smaller or more specialized firms may have competitive advantage over larger firms. Where PPS comes into play is the matching of those features with capability, and more generally the at-face value of a particular procurement action with the shared core values and the overall VFM being pursued. This at-face value is reflected by the value commonly assigned to a procurement item or action as assessed independently, of course, which is not ideal or realistic, considering the decision tree of activities involved. The at-face value does provide a starting point

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and cornerstone for common understanding to level-set a discussion directed at establishing shared values between individual stakeholders that simultaneously apply to individual and organizational measures for success. It must also be determined whether the expected outcomes of the solicitation can be met, such as whether an RFP that allows significant room for a private firm in their conception of a project proposal, will garner acceptable proposals. Responsiveness, particularly when dealing with an IFB as opposed to an RFP, refers to those proposals that match what the solicitation requests, anticipatory of fulfilling the need solicited. Furthermore, private firms invest large amounts of effort and resources in responding to RFPs, known to only have low to modest levels of probability, not guarantee, of getting accepted. Meanwhile, there is always the chance that smaller firms may decide to focus efforts on responding to IFBs instead of RFPs if they lack resources to compose the proposal especially if they offer highly specialized products and services that matches perfectly with an IFB or if economics of geography, labor, or expertise, provide low-cost advantages to a smaller, local, or disadvantaged business. If this is the case, then issuing RFPs to communicate interest in supplier diversity and various proprietary approaches and methods to the private sector would be futile. The public–private steward can combine the solicitation type of RFP, if for example supplier diversity is deemed to be important for continuity of operations and hence combat readiness, with other contracting elements to achieve the desired number and substance of private sector proposals. The PPS could take place through thoughtful decisions regarding contracting actions. For example, revisiting the contract pricing type, such as whether to use firm-fixed or cost-reimbursement, if in combination with an RFP as opposed to an IFB, can communicate different messages to the private sector that would influence the number and content of proposals received by the private sector in response to a solicitation. An IFB that involves firm-fixed price may be attractive to a smaller firm that can utilize unique craftsmanship or intellectual capabilities to outmaneuver larger, clumsier firms in its own cost cutting in order to win the contract award based on price. And, yet, whether BVSS or LPTA source selection is utilized would create another layer and communication signal. Firms with definitive competitive advantages, whether large or small, desire to have those features equated into government’s requirements

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that contribute to acknowledged VFM and therefore drive public sector contracting decision making, for example, more and better contract awards for the company. If a private firm’s competitive advantage is baked into government requirements and specifications, then the smaller firms prefer LPTA, because their firm has that competitive advantage and can likely win the bidding on lower price. This is true even though conventionally LPTA is known to be favored by the larger firms that have economies of scale and even the ability to conduct business as a loss-lead in some situations in order to win add-on contracts, future business, or gain market exposure whereby a project is undertaken at little to no profit. If a private firm’s competitive advantages are not baked into government requirements and specifications, then it prefers BVSS where it can demonstrate VFM by means of the proposal and perhaps the greater versatility or adaptability that some smaller firms may enjoy. The idea that LPTA source selection could be favored by smaller firms on an IFB solicitation with a firm-fixed price contract type further demonstrates the power of PPS practices. Independently, a firm-fixed price contract solicitation may turn away a smaller firm that does not want to account for its supply chain to the government as in a cost-reimbursement contract. An IFB may also turn away a smaller firm as there is the expectation that the requirements and specifications are too stringent for a smaller firm to conform to. By the way, there is a way of devising or shifting, requirements and specifications, at times, that are pursuant to newly prescribed value propositions without jeopardizing fulfillment of need, mission objective, or readiness, and in fact may enhance all three goals. It is another form of PPS practices. And then, the idea that LPTA would be favored by a smaller firm that generally seeks higher pricing due to lower volumes of organizational capacity is fascinating. Smaller firms tend to seek higher margins where VFM is associated with features or unique requirements. These findings are indicative of how PPS practices can be utilized to transform PPPs without steering from institutional norms or grossly contradicting established practices.

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References Individual Streamlined Acquisition Plan. (ISTRAP). 2022. Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement (NMCARS)—Annex 18. U.S. General Services Administration. https://www.acquisition.gov/nmcars/ annex-18-âe“-individual-streamlined-acquisition-plan-istrap. Accessed 12 Aug 2022. Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, Massimo Mastruzzi. 2010. The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues. Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430. World Bank Group. https://openknowledge.wor ldbank.org/handle/10986/3913. Accessed 18 Aug 2022. Koala, Kouliga. 2020. Governance Impact on Public-Private Partnerships for Member Countries of the World Bank. Ph.D. Dissertation, Public Administration & Policy, Old Dominion University. https://digitalcommons.odu. edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=publicservice_etds. Accessed 18 Aug 2022. Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC). 2022. Introduction to Design-Build (DB) Training Module, PowerPoint Slides 1–59. NAVFAC Design-Build Training Series. Whole Building Design Guide. http://www.wbd g.org. Accessed 13 Aug 2022. Naval Operations Instructions (OPNAVINST). 2022. Standard Navy Distribution List. Shore Chain of Command. OPNAVINST 5400.45, July 1. https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/SECNAV%20Manuals/Shore%20Activit ies%20and%20Detachments%20Under%20the%20Command%20of%20Secr etary%20of%20Navy%20and%20Chief%20of%20Naval%20Operations.pdf. Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement (NMCARS). 2022. Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement. U.S. General Services Administration, U.S. Department of Defense, and Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulations System. https://www.acquisition.gov/sites/default/files/ current/nmcars/pdf/NMCARS.pdf. Accessed 11 Aug 2022. Program Streamlined Acquisition Plan. (PSTRAP). 2022. Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement (NMCARS)—Annex 17. U.S. General Services Administration. https://www.acquisition.gov/nmcars/ annex-17-âe“-program-streamlined-acquisition-plan-pstrap. Accessed 12 Aug 2022. Steinfeld, Joshua M., Clifford P. McCue, and Eric W. Prier. 2016. Examining Professionalisation in Public Procurement by Ranking Practitioner Job Positions According to Job Activities. International Journal of Procurement Management 9 (3): 328–353. Steinfeld, Joshua M., Kouliga Koala, and Ron Carlee. 2019. Contracting for Public Stewardship in Public-Private Partnerships. International Journal of Procurement Management 12 (2): 135–155.

CHAPTER 6

Transparent Engagement across Organization

Abstract Transparent Engagement across Organization is the fifth portrait of public–private stewardship (PPS) whereby transparency is a cornerstone of programs and projects achieving value-for-money (VFM). The importance of transparency in contract management decision making is discussed to illustrate the potential for improving partnering. Transparency is stated to be a core value of market research with impacts for the achievement of VFM in outcomes. The implications of transparency on public values decision making are also proposed. Strategies and tactics for overcoming obstacles and trade-offs to transparency are furnished. Keywords Transparency · Value-for-money · Contract management · Procurement · Market research · Cost-benefit · Best value · Trade-offs · Obstacles · Diversity · Inputs · Outputs · Purist · Broker

For PPPs, the partnership can be driven by transparency. Lack of transparency means that information does not get delivered, or the right content is not revealed. This can inhibit efforts to make well-informed decisions about the progress of work and quality of performance. It can

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also have a considerable impact on the project deliverables. The public– private steward utilizes every piece of pertinent information so that the end goal of achieving public interest is accomplished with integrity. This implies that efforts are made by the practitioner to gather the strength to do the right thing by being transparent even if it means revealing within one’s own organization aspects of weakness in an individual’s knowledge or unit’s performance. When it comes to the practitioner reporting all information in a transparent and accountable fashion, this means communicating to stakeholders the intent behind the matters underlying contract management and procurement decision making in PPPs, such as the powers of decision making with relevance to contract type, contract method, proposal evaluation, and contract administration, as was done in the previous chapters. Reynaers and Grimmelikhuijsen (2015) concluded that while input transparency is typically high in PPPs, process and output transparency is not. These critical components of contract management have numerous implications regarding the manner that projects will be planned and administered, whether accomplishing milestones and goals lead to meeting objectives, and who will be impacted through the PPP and to what extent. In chapters three and four, transparency was established as an important public value for PPS. Broad illustrations of methods for pursuing transparency as well as linkages between transparency and acquisition activities in PPPs were shared in those chapters. Transparency, as one of many public values, was also shown as an example of how the pursuit of public values can improve other process goals and work objectives in PPPs. This chapter demonstrates how transparency can be a cornerstone of acquisition in PPPs by first demonstrating opportunities for transparency to exist. Transparency is connected to a cadre of activities directly dealing with best value concepts tied to PPP outcomes. A link between transparency and public values is also established including a model to situate practitioner decision making. Transparency as a panacea to improve partnering is also presented. The chapter presents examples in practice of transparency’s importance and makes suggestions for improvement. Obstacles to seeking transparency are discussed to reflect the realities faced by the practitioner in large bureaucratic and corporate structures.

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Transparency and Contract Management Decision Making There are opportunities for transparency in PPP that can take place before the performance to contract begins. Once work begins and contract administration is taking place, then transparency takes on a quality assurance and monitoring function as opposed to a planning, design, and implementation function. Furthermore, for complex, multiple contracts, multiple partner environments such as the DOD, it is rare that the acquisition is taking place in one distinct phase at a moment in time. With regards to simpler public procurement environments, it is mostly presumed in academia and practice that the competitive bidding and solicitation process is conducted at arm’s length where at best, the interaction between the public and prospective private partners is exchanged in an open forum and board postings. For extremely complex and large-scale acquisitions, this oftentimes does not accurately depict the familiar relationships present in federal PPPs because of the high levels of expertise and coordination required between sectors in developing requirements and specifications to begin with. Meanwhile, familiarity in bidding does not necessarily create an obstacle for new or emerging firms because it is assumed that only firms with competitive advantages will survive in the marketplace to begin with, and these advantages will surface in bidding too. The long duration and multiple opportunity areas for job completion characteristic of major acquisition programs is another reason for familiarity between partners. Especially with regards to security sensitive environments, it is not so simple to step up and begin bidding on government contracts to become a long-standing partner in the development of a weapons system. It may be more critical to have transparency in the PPP process than it is to protect competitiveness, especially if the competitiveness is not explicitly tied to quality, cost, delivery or some other aspect deemed important to VFM. As a corollary, the research of Brunjes (2020) and Atkinson (2020) explored federal government contracts and found that competition does not necessarily lead to lower cost and higher quality. Without sufficient transparency in solicitation and bidding, prospective private partners may invest substantial resources in the wrong direction for the proposal, resulting in major consequences to a firm’s ROI and the

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potential for a firm to submit a protest. The Marine Corps applies transparency in its acquisition practices when conducting a best value analysis by filling out best value worksheets with the pros and cons for any and each VFM trade-off that can be identified. The best value worksheets are sent to bidders so they can recompose their proposal to focus on what is deemed most important by the government. The best value analysis is specifically spelled out and tailored according to each bid to justify the outcome of the bid and make future improvements. It must also be considered that there are numerous trade-offs that exist for a given procurement action in a project of an acquisition program. The trade-offs use public values as the core variables to devise comparison value propositions. It is argued in this book that trade-offs insinuate scenarios for PPS practices which take shape when applied to a project specific action that positively connects with the interests of all stakeholders and overall VFM. Sometimes the trade-offs involving the procurement action and that individual practitioner’s accountability metrics may be different or contradict the trade-offs underlying the objective or facing the command. As textbook illustrations, cost and speed are fundamentally trade-offs with quality because it is perceived that generally it requires time and money to create quality. While quality may be a priority for an individual practitioner, for example, an engineer or other technical expert, it may not be a priority for a program officer focused on minimal requirements for operational continuity. More poignantly, the engineer may be facing a time and quality trade-off while the program manager is facing a capability and time trade-off. The program manager needs minimum requirements met in a timely fashion for an SOS architecture so that the core capabilities can be achieved amid the engineering entanglement of additive deliverables. These differing value propositions pose the threat of immediate tension between stakeholders. Transparency as a core public value is a possible synergistic area for stakeholders to alleviate these tensions and contribute to VFM. Transparency Through Market Research Transparency is a core value when it comes to market research and the ability to be transparent in its activities add perhaps the most substantial VFM because market research is the basis for the public partner agent action and then dictates the private partner reaction. Market research is

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to be conducted anytime a requirement is developed. Since an analysis of trade-offs is conducted with the market analysis, then there is the potential for values-building practices to emerge such as PPS. The FAR (2022) Part 10 “Market Research” sets forth the following Policy 10.001: “Agencies shall-(1) Ensure that legitimate needs are identified and tradeoffs evaluated to acquire items that meet those needs; (2) Conduct market research appropriate to the circumstances-.” The FAR (Part 10.001[a.]– [b.]) further specifies that this analysis and the market research is to be done before (i) developing new requirements documents; (ii) soliciting offers above the simplified acquisition dollar value threshold; (iii) soliciting offers below the simplified acquisition dollar value threshold when the information is inadequate or circumstances justify cost; and (iv) soliciting offers that could lead to consolidation or bundling; (v) awarding a task or delivery order on an IDIQ; (vi) using commercially available market research methods to target small businesses and new entrants to the market; (a) an operation or defense involving cyber, nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack; and (b) disaster relief. The effectiveness of the required solution can be best determined using market research, which is a tool that incorporates the SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, time-based) objectives. Devising SMART goals and objectives assist in properly assessing the justifications for elements that may be adding to the cost, a major input for VFM. With respect to the time aspect of SMART objectives, a major challenge in DOD projects is the time that it takes from RFP to contract award, not to mention getting the actual work done. Surprisingly, even sole source contracts can take over a year before the PPP officially commences with the signing of a contract. When considering the concurrency strategy used in many PPPs, such as in the JSF, for example where the technology and ingenuity is to be discovered and developed as the project progresses in elliptical increments, a series of minor time delays that may be expected in any design, production, and delivery process, cascades into major time delay that can debilitate the realization of ROI in PPP outcomes. One suggestion is to have a third party to assist in market research. This third party could serve as a liaison between industry and government utilizing connections to industry in order to better understand market products and services and communicate those capabilities to government. The third party could help alleviate the time burden for both the public and private partners as well, not to mention serve as a guiding voice for

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SMART goals and objectives, by practicing PPS, and providing program accountability along with transparency. The reality is also that public and private partners may feel more comfortable opening-up in dialogue and venting with a team that sees both sides of the partnership and can be a set of objective ears. The third party could have direct channels of communications to the public partner’s specifications writing teams, technical evaluation boards (TEV), award fee boards, and the contract management professionals, with comparable channels to the private partner including engineers, project managers, and contracting staff. This three-party arrangement could also address public and industry scrutiny with respect to sole sourcing. In the world of IT, an external moderator could potentially convince IT contractors to more readily share capabilities that may generate heightened market research interest for potential business. The third party could also alleviate any IT contractors’ concerns by ensuring that their innovations are not being included in government procurement requirements in order to protect the private partner’s intellectual property and proprietary knowledge. If the public partner agents can cooperate with the private sector agents during R&D, then public values can be inserted into discovery and related functionalities and features. Conversely, a third-party liaison helps the public partner exercise its own transparency because defense agencies are always aware and show concern for any vulnerabilities that could be made evident to the global security environment. Yet, if security-related vulnerabilities are present but not being effectively communicated to the private partner who is contracted to address those types of vulnerabilities, then the accomplishment of security-related goals and objectives may be jeopardized. An external federal agency or civilian duty work group could serve as the third-party management team to address any concerns that either partner may have regarding information leaks. Lack of transparency in communicating vulnerabilities inhibits the accurate conveyance of need and therefore the ability to communicate appropriate government requirements. A third party could also ease the strains that can result after contract award such as changes to specifications and the need to develop resolution technologies.

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Transparency to Improve Partnering for the Achievement of Value-For-Money Transparency can be linked to numerous other public values and is directly linked to overall VFM as it relates to the overarching objective of combat readiness. In cybersecurity, assessing readiness relies on the ability to manage, manipulate, and protect the network. The substantial volumes of data from an abundance of sources computed with engineered interactions for data analysis and decision making make IT support and cybersecurity workforce management especially challenging. The management and operations of the U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (FCC), Headquarters is exemplary in the dynamics of partnering that it displays with its dual workforce approach of outsourced IT support and an internal high-qualify workforce. The FCC’s functional formation is the Commander U.S. Tenth Fleet (C10F). The Tenth Fleet monitors, assesses, communicates, coordinates, and performs operations for Fleet Cyber Command. The FCC also exercises operational control of joint task forces (JTF) across the cyberwarfare, information operations, signal intelligence capabilities, electromagnetic, and space domains. The FCC deals with operational complexities that result in first order and second order consequences. First order consequences involve security measures such as protecting data, technology, and systems while second order consequences are adverse events or non-optimal conditions that affect network infrastructure. The cost–benefit analysis (CBA) measures put in place serve as metrics for decision making in determining which functions to perform in house and which functions to outsource. Cost control measures including estimated and target costing are utilized with mixed results, because as discussed, price does not always incentivize quality and innovation, even though it can situation depending. For example, over-expenditure in some areas could result in cost-cutting in other areas that lead to reduced capability or assumption of other trade-offs. Steinfeld et al. (2017) examine the job activities in public procurement where decision making involving social responsibility is likely to occur. Steinfeld et al. (2017) find that there are job activities being performed and managed in public procurement according to a social responsibility orientation, including job activities that would be widely considered to be neutral tasks. In the context described by Steinfeld et al. (2017), the

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social responsibility factor includes aspects of transparency, accountability, ethics, sustainability, mission, vision, and values. In cybersecurity, one challenge is that some of the important characteristics of products and services including availability, maintainability, and supportability, are not always identified as important before issues arise in the moment, and even so they are difficult to capture in a CBA. This is because these characteristics are not quantifiable and if they add elements of cost, then they lose out in the LPTA contract method that is employed. The best value approach in the DOD assumes a stricter interpretation of the concept whereby LPTA is a part of the best value equation via price factor, which has its own advantages to overall procurement strategy in making the best use of taxpayer funds. A partnering approach that hinges on transparency can provide the practitioner a way of addressing the important qualitative capabilities through performing and managing job activities with targeted public values in mind. Transparency-fused partnering also helps overcome complexity-based obstacles in cybersecurity by using the management tools and techniques already in place. Currently, C10F uses partnerships for the inspection of external units which improves technical expertise because key stakeholder perspectives, both public and private sector, can be brought to bear. Availability to fill task orders is a major challenge and more formalized relationships that openly communicate service needs to match workforce availability could reduce job times, save money from efficient workforce management, and better align high-qualify personnel with system maintenance personnel and system operator requirements. Additionally, a collaborative forum where executive managers of the public and private firms share strategic planning insights informs planning and decision making especially for any major seed initiatives. Transparency can lead to better decision making but when the public or private sector partner is concerned that their grand strategy will be discovered, which is likely not on the minds of the partner anyway, then the benefits of collaboration cannot take place to begin with. The complexity of the DOD IT architecture along with its legacy format requires that each partner is flexible in its approaches. As more and more technical aspects are taken on transparency into the process becomes that much more imperative. An attempt at fragmenting the process can be made by simplifying or mapping out the process in order to determine if alternative solutions exist, perhaps from other private firms. Fragmenting is different than compartmentalizing because

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compartmentalization takes a component-based, additive approach. Fragmenting recognizes the continuous, as opposed to discreet, nature of data processing. As such, it may be possible to troubleshoot and fulfill the need by contracting for assembly as its own prong. Challenges to partnering in IT services support, and other acquisition areas, include the risk of protest if the CBA and associated weighted criteria do not reflect the perceived or recognized value drivers of need. This is a challenge to PPS practices because of the linearity inherent to decision making where inevitably not all stakeholders will always be on the same page. If the value drivers are effectively conveyed to PPP stakeholders and decision making reinforces these priorities, a matter of transparency, then there is less probability of a protest ensuing. Private firms that are not able to deliver on value drivers or functionalize transparency into its every day decision making and activities will face a feasibility issue in being competitive in partnering, a justification worthy of upholding protest. Transparency and Public Values Decision Making After seeing how transparency is integral to PPP practices and the achievement of VFM in outcomes, there are some questions that arise such as: Is it the PPP agent’s responsibility to uncover all of the moving pieces and overlapping processes with strategies and tactics? Is this expectation unreasonable? And if so, is it the agent’s responsibility to practice PPS by vocalizing and making known these dynamics through transparency? Or should the agent display strict adherence to immediate individual interests, more restrictive practice, and the usual way of doing business? To answer these questions, Roman’s (2017) purist-broker model can be applied to situate the two poles that practitioners may assume. Roman finds that public procurement practitioners complete work according to a purist or broker ethos. The purist tends to be rulebound, hierarchical, and descriptive, and the broker is inter-dynamic, multi-sectoral, and values based. Roman’s (2017) purist-broker model builds on Waldo’s (1948) dichotomous model of public administration positing the field as either political or neutral and declaring that politics and administration cannot be separated. As an assumption, it is argued that any practitioners dealing in the performance or management of public procurement activities, such as the job activities of a major acquisition program, are involved in public

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procurement (see Steinfeld 2017), and therefore fall under the puristbroker model. The purist-broker model works by the practitioner following an ethos in decision making. The purist may seek adherence to the FAR and the DFARS or perceive objectives in a more finite scope without due consideration of externalities. Differently, the broker may seek language in the FAR and the DFARS that provide policy guidance stipulating reporting activities that require information sharing and interpret these activities as opportunities to meet, engage stakeholders, and collaborate in presenting a cohesive approach. The purist may also conform to conventional wisdoms, such as incentivizing innovation through competition in the form of cost-effectiveness and adaptation instead of a broker’s inclination to take a best value standpoint by a willingness to invest to meet the capability and budgetary requirements for features that are innovative. Best value considerations that include the capability in addition to other value considerations that make up overall VFM add transparency to the marketplace because it allows companies to compete in a fair and ethical manner. For example, the tightly knit requirements and specifications of a vast majority of defense contract solicitations would have unknown jargon to most companies not already in or actively targeting the defense industry. Just as there are new entrants to the defense industry hence the defense technological industrial base (DTIB) remains strong, if barriers to entry are reduced then there would be many more industry members from those companies currently operational in the private sector or other government spaces. There are several agencies whose mission is to assist small and disadvantaged businesses gain exposure to opportunities to complete work on government projects. For example, there are Procurement Technical Assistance Centers (PTAC) located in most U.S. states, with some states having multiple offices. The DOD also has a mentor-protégé program and various commands may have their own office for small businesses. In particular, the Office of Small & Disadvantaged Business Utilization has programs that increase access for the private sector to opportunities with the federal government through programs such as the Woman Veteran-Owned Small Business Initiative (WVOSBI) that strives to promote collaboration between the public and private sectors in leveraging commercial resources and enabling access to procurement and learning opportunities (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 2022).

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It may be assumed that the requirements and specifications for a given deliverable do not allow for best value considerations especially those that assign importance and value to diversity, inclusion, and sustainability. Despite being stipulated by official policy as previously discussed in this book, and additional guidance for sustainability and inclusion that is stated in the DOD acquisition policy documents, practitioners may feel as though tertiary considerations, such as a company’s or industry’s sustainability are beyond the realm of concern. A misconception is that there is a necessary tension between sustainability and cost-effectiveness. Instead, the public sector can institute its priority for competition to drive down costs by focusing on sustainability as a core public value, with appropriate weighting criteria in proposal evaluation and benchmarks in planning, for an acquisition program or project. A further misconception is that diversity comes at an expense whether it be in cost, delivery, or quality. Unfamiliarity may arise about 8(a) business development program or business set-asides for small, disadvantaged, minority-owned, woman-owned, and veteran-owned businesses because of any extra or unfamiliar steps or processes that need to be taken, or because of perceived higher cost and reduced quality due to the preferential contract award. However, these concerns do not need to be the case at all, and there is such little application that the assumptions should be posed in reverse. The only caveat to not wanting to work with a small or disadvantaged business is if the scope of work involves an element posing high risk to the warfighter, or capability and continuity of operations. This situation can be depicted by an unproven firm laying the non-skid coating on an aircraft carrier—not the best choice of projects to choose an unknown or under-resourced firm. Otherwise, there are distinct advantages to vendor, contractor, and supplier diversity in the DTIB. The diversity value proposition can be simplified to a competitive context whereby constantly using the same firm leads to a deterioration in meticulousness as the firm loses incentive to stay optimally tuned. This is an example where the balance-beam between partner relations on one end and contractor-customer relations on the other end is challenging when it comes to PPPs. Diversity in the sense of simply rotating firms and claiming competition as a benefit does not make sense with regards to the advantages of partnering that is characteristic of longer-term contracting relationships. Diversification makes sense because it adds to the number

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of partners and skills that could be incorporated and supports the sustainability of the DTIB and the geographic areas serving it. Especially when it comes to strategic planning, the DOD makes concerted efforts at bridging the gap between military life and communities so that despite the transitory nature of some military careers, many of the urban and suburban military hubs boast robust economies and are great places to raise families. Nonetheless, there are wicked problems of poverty and climate change in many localities, including some of the most beautiful communities characterized by affiliation and support of military affairs. These efforts extend to PPPs focused on the planning and building of civilian and military infrastructure and economic development such as the placement of military facilities and construction of roadways to coincide with the DOD operational interests and those social-economic interests of the local community. Overcoming Trade-Offs and Obstacles There are trade-offs between transparency and other value drivers including but not limited to cost-effectiveness, sustainability, and diversity. In the common sense, the more labor, oversight, and regulations that are needed, the more costs that must be accounted for. One costeffective approach to transparency is to intently utilize contracting tools and techniques such as the scope, or description of work that can include the statement of work (SOW), the statement of objectives (SOO), and the performance work statement (PWS). These scope of work elements articulate and clarify the expectations of the public partner and can help drive transparency from an operational standpoint. The PWS focuses on outcomes such as measurable performance benchmarks and substitutes for the need of SOW when that sharing of information is classified or is not received well by contractors. The PWS may serve as an interface for transparently communicating the needs for fulfillment and do so in a way that drives innovation and alternative methods of performance. To do so requires a stakeholder perspective relative to the agent’s organizational stake in the outcome of a particular procurement or project. Furthermore, project success may be defined differently by various stakeholders. Fleet commanders who are the operational users of a particular solution have much different thresholds for delivery timelines, urgency, and ability or willingness to accept risk. Meanwhile, one stakeholder’s

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drive for efficiency and transparency may not be viewed in a receptive manner by other stakeholders. There may be competing narratives between a resource-constrained posture and environment versus the dictum to remain capable and relevant. Transparency faces a trade-off of vertical compliance regarding maintaining senior perspective on mission, vision, and values. Actors must stay on message and ensure that subordinate organizations conform to the strategic and top-level mission, vision, and values. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) are examples where transparency in partnership was mismanaged leading to significantly misguided steps and failed PPP outcomes. Major acquisition programs of these scales follow a planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process to fund requirements into a program of record (POR), at which time it becomes a necessary capability and is awarded continuous funding. The JCIDS process is utilized for planning and integrating major acquisition programs. As defined, major acquisition programs refer to the acquisition programs of weapons systems or warfighter support systems for the joint force of the U.S. Armed Services including the Coast Guard as dictated by law and policy. The JCIDS milestones achievement involves a preliminary design review (PDR), a capabilities design review (CDR), and a production readiness review (PRR) before low-rate initial production (LRIP), and eventually full rate production (FRP) after testing and inspection. The issues that arose in the $6 billion JTRS program, which began in 1997 with the goal of developing a software-defined, omnipurpose communications network that could support multi-mission, multi-platform capabilities, were related to the difficulty in transparent engagement across stakeholders. There was no incremental achievement of capabilities assigned to milestones, the capabilities were organized into clusters making commonalities in capabilities development difficult, and the lineage between milestones and the evolution of technology development was unclear or not present (see Gansler et al. 2012). The TSAT system, with estimated total life-cycle costs of $16 billion (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2007), experienced similar issues. The TSAT pursued the development of a global information grid with the main staple being advanced laser communications for connectivity of satellites and radio frequency (RF) devices between space and ground systems calling for the orbit of a five-satellite constellation that included backward compatibility with other satellite systems in orbit.

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These major acquisition programs lacked joint enterprise focus that extended beyond the cluster-level of analysis to consider gradual improvements to overall VFM. The sharing of these incremental accomplishments could be valuable in unanticipated manners, even if being applied outside of cluster, for which an external capability developed from that input could work back to the original or other clusters to advance capability, or additional overall VFM. The JCIDS process requires an assessment of technology readiness level (TRL) that becomes difficult to conduct if transparency is not apparent. The public partner may be hesitant to acknowledge weaknesses or shortcoming, especially if it could result in a threat to competitive advantage or higher prices if extra effort is subsequently deemed to be required for completion. To further implicate transparency, the reporting in the JTRS program was service-centric with accountability to each armed service, not a cross-coordinated unit or board, so once information rose to the higher-levels of macro decision making, it was too boilerplate and disassociated for meaningful connections to be made between capabilities, the potential for integration, and a roadmap for the private partners to develop and implement operational platforms for the JTRS and the TSAT. The JTRS and TSAT did not result in full-scale deliverables though some technological capabilities were likely developed for subsequent radio and satellite applications. These major acquisition programs demonstrate the importance of transparency but exactly how to improve transparency is another challenge. Management strategies can be used to reconcile the tensions between stakeholders who may be at odds when engaging valueladen decision making such as transparency-based approaches. The JCIDS is an input-based framework for major acquisition programs that integrates multiple series of progressions into broader concepts for inputs to the development of capabilities that serve component or sequential bases for building a major system deliverable. So, output-based approaches that disregard the inner workings of contracting personnel and those latched onto the procurement chain such as technical experts, system administrators, users, and stakeholders galore, are unlikely to result in the needed transparency for incremental accomplishments to be shared for dynamic, hop-stepping capacity building. The general resistance or inability for enhanced transparency characteristic of many organizations may be addressed through a reconceptualization of values, in this case transparency. By shifting to an input-based approach, transparency takes shape not from an emphasis on knowledge

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sharing and what some may consider an aspirational pursuit, but instead as a necessity in the form of data sharing and concurrency. These activities are facilitated from fungible reporting and specifications that contribute to the evolution of capabilities as a baseline for a best practices platform. This may consist of applications such as a portal that makes data, information, and project management available to stakeholders with tiered personnel access and controls working toward roadmap completion. Transparency would no longer be the apparent value driver, it is reconceptualized as data analytics, or more generally, efficiency or effectiveness, depending on what the metrics used to incentivize management performance in the acquisition are based on.

References Atkinson, Christopher L. 2020. Full and Open Competition in Public Procurement: Values and Ethics in Contracting Opportunity. International Journal of Public Administration 43 (13): 1169–1192. Brunjes, Benjamin M. 2020. Competition and Federal Contractor Performance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 30 (2): 202–219. Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). 2022. U.S. General Services Administration (GSA). FAR Part 10 Market Research. https://www.acquisition.gov/ far/part-10. Accessed 15 Aug 2022. Gansler, Jacques S., William Lucyshyn, and John Rigilano. 2012. The Joint Tactical Radio System: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward. Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, University of Maryland School of Public Policy. Reynaers, Anne-Marie, and Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen. 2015. Transparency in Public-Private Partnerships: Not So Bad After All? Public Administration 93 (3): 609–626. Roman, Alexandru V. 2017. Tracing the Effects of Politicization on Public Procurement Specialists’ Decision-Making Through Values: A Structural Equation Model of the Broker-Purist Lens. Journal of Public Procurement 17 (1): 53–88. Steinfeld, Joshua M. 2017. The What, Who, and How of Public Procurement: Job Functions Performed and Managed by Professionals. In Global Public Procurement Theories and Practices, ed. K.V. Thai, 311–335. New York, NY: Springer. Steinfeld, Joshua M., Clifford P. McCue, and Eric W. Prier. 2017. Professionalism as Social Responsibility in Procurement and Administration. European Business Review 29 (3): 320–343.

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U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. 2022. Office of Small & Disadvantaged Business Utilization. https://www.va.gov/OSDBU/WVOSBI.asp. Accessed 16 Aug 2022. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2007. DOD Is Making Progress in Adopting Best Practices for the Transformational Satellite Communications System and Space Radar but Still Faces Challenges. GAO-07-1029-R, August 2. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-07-1029r.pdf. Accessed 16 Aug 2022. Waldo, Dwight. 1948. The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration. New York: The Ronald Press Company.

CHAPTER 7

Progress from Learning and Adaptation

Abstract Progress from Learning and Adaptation is the sixth portrait of public–private stewardship (PPS). The practitioner-researcher is advocated for by engaging interaction research. The triangle of public, administration, and theory is analyzed regarding its utility for practitioner learning and adaptation. Training and education in public procurement and administration is mentioned for the practitioner to make progress. Contract auditing and contract closeout are highlighted as areas where organizational, process, and individual learning and adaptation takes place. Keywords Learning · Adaptation · Practitioner-researcher · Interaction research · Training · Roles · Responsibilities · Workforce · Education · Lessons learned · Contract auditing · Contract closeout

This chapter presents the PPS portrait of Progress from Learning and Adaptation. A steward learns and adapts as the project progresses. This is important in public service and partnership where all actors operate from the perspective that may be either public value or market value. The ability of public administrators, and other stakeholders to PPPs, to not only learn but also adapt to new and unexpected situations becomes important for

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finding solutions. The pressing issues are articulated by people; productivity is only the metric for which these issues can be measured. Actors must have a knack for curiosity, self-examination, and reciprocal learning. For the public–private steward, learning and adapting can also be viewed as cost-effective and is therefore a fundamental aspect of PPPs.

The Practitioner-Researcher as a Form of Learning and Adaptation Hendriks (2003) informs about the strategy and practice of interaction research that deals with interpretation in public administration. The research seeks to use translation and coding to retrieve messages that correspond between the publicness of administration and the actual administrative activities, and between the theory and the practice of public administration. The importance of expertise and curiosity was discussed in Chapter 2 as an element to steward leadership. Interaction research puts some dependence on expertise, competency, and the desire for inquiry as it puts the researcher at the center of a research triangle of public, administration, and theory (Hendriks 2003, p. 394). While practitioners are not conducting research in an academic sense, the recommendation is that practitioners approach their work under the guise of inquiry and interpretation, motivated in work by the curiosity to learn and the expertise bestowed. The analysis can take place simultaneous to the normal course of approaching work, or in a time of self-reflection for larger strategic exercises that will require more in-depth crafting. Interaction research enables the practitioner an opportunity to participate in research and reap the benefits without having to separate from the assigned workload while eliminating the gap between research and practice to the extent that the theory as an applicable tool allows. Interaction research as a method for learning and adaptation also makes sense because it is widely held that there is a time and knowledge gap between theory and practice. This gap results from the research and publication time, and then the time it takes for the theory to be developed and applied from there. It could easily take two to five years for researchers to conduct studies, compose the manuscript, work through the submission and revision process, and to print, if not longer. There is also a gap regarding what takes place in actual practice and the data the researcher is attempting to collect, operationalize, study, and analyze.

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The interaction researcher accesses the body of knowledge and theory in the fields of interest and applies it to the activities that are occurring to see if the activities are being performed and managed with alignment to what the theory would suggest, or somehow contrary. Theory is prescriptive, it implies what a practitioner should, or ought, to do if similar circumstances, conditions, and scenarios arise. The practitioner can assess if aspects of public stewardship are reflective of the progression of those activities. The practitioner can look for evidence of decision making that prioritizes efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, accountability, environmentalism, innovation, readiness, and more. Most likely, the stakeholders to the perimeter of the practitioner-researcher are unaware of the values underlying their decision making and actions, having been driven by norms of practice. If stakeholders are made aware of the influence of their own actions, there is the possibility that they can identify other areas where that public value could be promoted, and in ways that support overall mission objectives. The link between the public values and the administrative practices is of significant focus so that there is an understanding of how the public values can be operationalized. The processes and procedures are tools, techniques, or constraints, and each of which can reflect public values priorities. Some processes may be emblematic of transparency while others provide practitioners statutory authority to proceed autonomously without consultation with others. More restrictive acquisition practices may typically be reflective of prioritizing values of cost-effectiveness or security when it comes to the FAR, the DFARS, and other regulations. However, the regulations also help support coordination and continuity because the mandates were developed for a reason and that is typically from experiences and to support best practices. These reasons could also involve benefits toward innovation, timely delivery, and other facets related to partnering. Steering all three points of the triangle to center, the theory helps the practitioner assess a decision making scenario or opportunity to act while incorporating varying public aspects such as public values in the decision or action. It is the essence of PPS. But how does it help the practitioner learn and adapt? For one, it is difficult if not impossible to engage all stakeholders in a PPP, even if direct, internal stakeholders. The closest of colleagues and those paramount to the task completion and the success of a project may simply be too busy to informally interact or engage beyond formally

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scheduled meetings and interactions. In other cases, access between some stakeholders is unavailable or against institutional norms. As Hendriks (2003) writes, “policy instruments and communication technologies produce interactivity when they establish functional-rational connections between actors” (p. 397). Direct one-to-one communication is not necessary between stakeholders if the project flow does not call for it. The administrative apparatus yields plenty of opportunities for practitioners to interact through the execution of paperwork, meetings, and reports. The practitioner-researcher learns by applying the interactive research methodology in the same ways described prior, though instead of assessing an operationalization of job activities as it relates to performance or management, it is done through analysis of documents and listening by interacting in-person. If the combination or sequence of decision making is discovered to align with a theory in public or business management, or a pertinent field, then the theory is at play. Learning takes place from a realization that the administrative activities can be values-oriented, and that the practitioner can exercise decision making to advance the desired public values. Learning in this fashion is another way for PPS practices to emerge. Adaptation takes place when the realization occurs that a practitioner has been completing tasks in a manner contrary to what theory or public values would suggest. Or, adaption takes place when the alignment of theory, public values, and administration activities, leads to PPS practices that are misaligned with the value inputs for VFM or do not directly support objectives. This may happen when the practitioner has been hard charging toward goals and objectives but has been misguided in the approach based on an inquiry of interactive research. The practitioner can also adapt by shifting toward a different emphasis moving between public, administration, and theory. Public values-based arguments may be too broad or misguided for a particular project or contracting action. Differently, administrative paperwork and tactics could be overshadowing critical work processes that inhibit the achievement of VFM or the accomplishment of objectives. Third, the practitioner may be making decisions too much based on theory and not according to SWOT considerations or realities of the work situation at groundlevel. The practitioner-researcher may shift attention between these three emphases so that, as an example, a theory is disregarded for piece-meal or disconnected decisions that need to be made and thus the focus becomes administration not theory. In this case, the practitioner will attend to

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the administrative activities in and of themselves, in a purist fashion and with disregard to theoretical implications that may impact PPP outcomes. Alternatively, the practitioner-researcher may seek to promote theory through administration, for example, if PPS narratives are not being wellreceived or it has become difficult to lay the groundwork for PPS practices to begin with. The practitioner can utilize various administrative and contracting tactics to exemplify theory through administration. This could involve an unlimited number of distinct actions. For example, if competition is being promoted to safeguard taxpayer funds in cost-effectiveness and to promote the public value of transparency, then seeking ways to lengthen the window for bidding or writing requirements that reflect policy priorities are contracting tactics for promoting these values. And, if the administrative practices and the theoretical underpinnings of PPP practices appear lacking or needing adjustment, then the publicness aspect becomes crucial. It may be unclear how administrative and professional work corresponds to enhancing VFM and accomplishing objectives. Or it may be that the project is headed in a misguided direction. This is where the public values considerations are so important, in order to determine how the purposes and the work of the PPP promote public values as partnering arrangements that leverage public resources and have public impact. Linking Training and Adaptation The NAVSUP Contracting Services procure supplies and services through the Navy Field Contracting System (NFCS) that supports the DON where there is no other contracting activity, office, or command that has HCA authority. The NFCS is responsible for 42 percent of the DON’s contracting actions (approximately 120,000 actions) and 9 percent ($7.5 billion) of the spend (Bennington 2018, p. 12). It could be argued that the CORs utilizing the NFCS do not receive sufficient command-level nomination, training, and education. The CORs are nominated by their command and, upon completion of required COR training, appointed by a warranted KO, to serve as the contracting liaison on behalf of the public sector for interactions with stakeholders to the contract. The KOs have met the prerequisites and training mandated by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) and granted authority via a warrant specifying allowable dollar spending thresholds. The DAWIA was enacted in 1990 and as part of the 1991 Defense Authorization

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Act called for establishing and professionalizing an acquisition workforce with training, education, and work experience. The CORs serve in the subordinate function of chief contracting coordinator monitoring the contract for technical and performance/delivery compliance, specifications and requirements per the scope of work, working with technical representatives, assuring quality and security requirements, activity-based accounting, and communicating with other stakeholders such as at the program, project, or force levels. The issue is that the roles and responsibilities of the COR have evolved to include all phases of acquisition such as the planning and strategy elements of contracting and partnership. Under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, the Naval Acquisition Career Center (NACC) offers the Naval Acquisition Development Program (NADP) to increase the knowledge and ability of personnel entering the Navy’s acquisition workforce. Those entering the defense acquisition workforce are trained to specialize in one of seven aspects of the acquisition system: Business-cost Estimating, Business-Financial Management, Contracting, Engineering and Technical Management, Life Cycle Logistics, Program Management, and Test and Evaluation (U.S. Department of the Navy 2022). However, there is no such directorate comprehensive to all specializations and the nature of interactions that the COR expects to confront. And surprisingly, the Contracting specialization is the only area that procurement is outlined as a major functional area of specific duties (Defense Acquisition University 2022). The DAWIA requires certification for levels I, II, and III for DOD positions grouped into 14 acquisition career fields. To obtain certification, personnel must complete specific to each career field and the commensurate certification level: a slate of DAU courses, experience in practice, successful assessment through exams, and continuous learning. Yet, the Procurement career field only extends to level-II DAWIA certification and the overall scope of the Contracting career field certification as it is conceived may be lacking in the business, finance, analytical, and technical areas as it relates to the wide range of duties for CORs. At a minimum, it is to be expected that personnel may be assigned duties as a COR who specialized in one of the 14 DOD acquisition career fields that is not contracting or procurement. The Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI) offers the Federal Acquisition Certification for Contracting Officer’s Representative (FAC-COR), who may be interacting with technical experts in each of those areas in and

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out of the acquisition workforce. However, to be certified as a levelI COR, generally appropriate for low-risk contracts or simple contracts such as supply contracts or orders, only eight hours of self-paced online instruction is required with no work experience. To be certified as a level-II COR, appropriate for contract vehicles with moderate to high risk and complexity including both supply and service contracts, only 40 hours of instructor-led training is required with one year of previous COR experience. For level-III COR certification, two years of previous COR experience is required with an additional 60 hours of instructorled and self-paced online training (Federal Acquisition Institute 2022). It is argued that this is not enough training in the area of procurement and contracting, exclusive of business management and technical knowledge and expertise, for preparation to be the focal point of contracting if maximum VFM is to be achieved through the procurement function. Irrespective of COR certification and acquisition career field training, approximately 70 percent of the 90,000 DOD personnel that served as CORs from 2016 to 2018 were not members of the acquisition career field (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2019). And of the CORs, many are assuming the role as a secondary collateral duty. In PPS practices, the ability to promote public values is developed through formal education in public administration, public policy, and political science. Simultaneously the safeguarding of taxpayer funds may be developed in public budgeting courses, business administration, finance, supply management, and accounting, among other subfields of public and business administration. The various certification and credentialing requirements for the DOD acquisition workforce cover the administration aspects of learning, but due to the format of the courses, limited diversity in practice of the students, and other aspects differing from the formal education setting, the theory, and public elements may leave room for improvement in learning and adaption. The academic setting offers a backdrop of academic freedom and liberal dialogue that spurs critical thinking and reasoning outside of the box emanating from students, faculty, and staff coming from an array of cultural and professional backgrounds. The theory-based approaches of academia and the emphasis on non-profit-driven motives in teaching and the pursuit of knowledge assist in practitioner development of theory and public values. Through the study and application of theory, practitioners learn how to make prescriptive connections and considerate factoring of stakeholder positions as inputs for strategic decision making

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that is focused on immediate needs and higher values. Furthermore, the scholastic emphasis on applying theory and concepts to practice helps the practitioner settle and prepare to be a practitioner-researcher.

Lessons Learned in Contract Auditing and Contract Closeout Contract auditing and contract closeout are areas where learning and adaptation take shape at the organizational, process, and individual levels. Significant attention has been devoted to contract closeout, specifically in the backlog of incurred cost audits. One of the remedies was to increase the dollar threshold that triggers an automatic audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) from $15 million to $250 million, revise the criteria for determining a proposal’s level of risk, and reduce the number of low-risk audits that were randomly sampled (see U.S. Government Accountability Office 2012). Unfortunately neglecting contract auditing does not serve to increase contracting efficiency and effectiveness. Also of potential magnified interest, is the outsourcing of some auditing activities to independent public accounting firms potentially raising issues of government accountability. The FAR (2022) Part 4.804-5 “Procedures for closing out contract files” details 29 activities in the area of administrative closeout, contract completion, and appropriate filing. In reference to learning and adaptation are subparts (a) “(8) Price revision is completed; (9) Subcontracts are settled by the contractor; (12) Contract audit is completed; (13) Contractor’s closing statement is completed” and (b) “(10) A statement that all required contract administration actions have been fully and satisfactorily accomplished” (FAR 2022). The price revision subpart (FAR Part 4.804-5[8]) gives immediate insight into what went wrong or what was unexpected and is directly related to cost-effectiveness and aspects of public values that may have created any cost increases such as a lack of transparency between the partners. There may be the occasional case of a downward price adjustment that may provide insight into how to better estimate level of effort and resources required for project completion. With respect to subcontracts being settled by the contractor (FAR Part 4.804-5[a][9]), this has major implications to VFM such as quality of work, market sustainability, and equity. It is imperative that contractors engage in fair contracting practices with subcontractors and enforce government requirements upon its subcontractors when dictated. As an

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example, a contractor may find its subcontractors to be deficient in work or performance and hold back payment, but still seek full payment from the government upon project completion. If these deficiencies existed, then there may have been a negative impact on the quality of work delivered to the public partner. Or contractors may be overdemanding of the subcontractors in achieving performance that was not sufficiently communicated upfront in requirements and specifications as the government and private sector partners have difficulty enough in getting on the same page, let alone indirect communication from government to the subcontractors. This could strain subcontractors financially and threaten the robustness of the market for subcontractors, posing both issues of equity and sustainability. In relation with price revisions and subcontractor contracting issues, the matter of preparing a statement that all contract administration actions have been taken (FAR Part 4.804-5[b][10]) is an opportunity to connect issues of price revisions to contracting activities. This contract closeout activity reflects the post-award elements and may also be indicative of pre-award contracting elements; if there is poor planning then execution is bound to be challenging especially as it related to meeting a targeted requirement or objective. The back and forth of approaching and completing project work resembles a substantial portion of the partnering arrangement. Since contract administration addresses the actual performance of work to a contract and is the execution of what may have been in-depth planning between partners, it is a phase in contracting where tensions can run high. For one, instances of costly change orders can be frequent, and two, due to the logistics and sequence of work breakdown structures, keen decision making with timely and precision execution is oftentimes expected. The contract audit (FAR Part 4.804-5[a][12]) is an area where exceptional levels of learning and adaption may take place. The contract audit objective is to “assist in achieving prudent contracting by providing those responsible for government procurement with financial information and advice relating to contractual matters and the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of contractors’ operations. Contract audit activities include…the negotiation, award, administration, repricing, and settlement of contracts” (Defense Contract Audit Agency 2022a, 1-104.2 “Contract Audit Objective”). Contract auditing is not intended as a main purpose to detect procurement fraud or unlawful activity (Defense Contract Audit Agency 2022a, 1-102[c]), but instead as stated, a way

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to improve the performance to contract. This is where the quantification of important measures and metrics are comparatively analyzed using data analytics. Effective contract auditing uses data points that are relevant to the most important facets of the contract including those most critical to decision making for VFM and accomplishing project objectives. It is beneficial if PPS practices are reflected in the contract auditing measures in order to gain credible, analytical support and be informed for data-driven decision making. From the standpoint of the public, administration, and theory triangle (see Hendriks 2003), conforming to the accounting standards and targets of the DCAA and Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) assists in transcribing the public and theory aspects into the administration. Two challenges to effective contract auditing are the lack of defined structure for the time and place of contract auditing and the difficulty in providing comprehensive contract auditing on all facets of a contract. The frequency of audits is guided by both contract terms and conditions or a KO’s need for audit services to make decisions (Defense Contract Audit Agency 2022b). Thus, there is bound to be inconsistency from contract to contract and no overarching guarantee that the full schedule of contracting activities will be subject to contract auditing. The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General’s (DODIG) report “Top DOD Management Challenges—Fiscal Year 2022” lists “Increasing Agility in the DOD’s Acquisition and Contract Management” as the fifth of 10 challenges. To achieve agility in acquisition requires the ability to make quick and timely calculation, using SMART objectives, and this becomes increasingly difficult if contract audits are not completed regularly and consistently. From 2011 to 2016, as examples, the average number of days to complete a cost incurred audit was between 885 and 1184 days (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2017). With the multiple contracts, multiple awards, long duration, and in some cases repetition of contracts characteristic of DOD acquisition, the lag time for contract auditing as well as those contracts that are void of audits altogether prevents learning and adaption from taking place for both the public partner agents and the private partner agents. Finally, the contractor’s closing statement (FAR Part 4.804-5[a][13]) is a major activity of contract closeout. This is where the private partner can convey the yeoman’s work to support positive ratings and clarify any mishaps during the project that resulted in price revisions, change orders, delays, or performance issues. Perhaps most importantly for

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the private partner, is the impact that the contractor’s closing statement and any contract closeout scoring aggregates have on a private firm’s responsibility. Since future contracts will be awarded based on responsibility and responsiveness, the private partner’s prior performance counts substantially toward responsibility in contract proposal evaluation. Responsiveness can be better achieved too by a prospective private partner if financial and accounting metrics for success are better understood through previous contract work.

References Bennington, Mark D. 2018. Everybody Wants to Be a Contracting Officer. The Navy Supply Corps Newsletter (Summer): 12–13. https://media.defense. gov/2018/Jun/21/2002662237/-1/-1/0/180621-N-ZZ219-8053.pdf. Accessed 20 Aug 2022. Defense Acquisition University (DAU). 2022. Defense Acquisition Workforce Position Category Descriptions. https://icatalog.dau.edu/onlinecatalog/pcd. aspx. Accessed 20 Aug 2022. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). 2022a. DCAA Contract Audit Manual. https://www.dcaa.mil/Portals/88/Documents/Guidance/CAM/ Chapter%201%20Introduction%20to%20Contract%20Audit.pdf?ver=K82E6f 3vWcgv1HVZV899rg%3d%3d. Accessed 20 Aug 2022. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). 2022b. Audit Process Overview. https://www.dcaa.mil/Small-Business/Small-Business-Presentations/AuditProcess-Overview/. Accessed 20 Aug 2022. Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI). 2022. Federal Acquisition Certification Contracting Officer’s Representative (FAC-COR) Certification Requirements. https://www.fai.gov/certification/fac-cor/contracting-fac/fac-cor-cer tification-requirements. Accessed 20 Aug 2022. Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). 2022. U.S. General Services Administration (GSA). FAR Part 10 Market Research. https://www.acquisition.gov/ far/part-10. Accessed 15 Aug 2022. Hendriks, Frank. 2003. Public, Administration, Theory and Learning: Interaction Research as Interpretation. Administrative Theory & Praxis 25 (3): 393–408. U.S. Department of the Navy (DON). 2022. The Naval Acquisition Development Program (NADP) Employment Opportunities. Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. https://www.secnav.navy.mil/ rda/workforce/Pages/NADP-Employment-Opportunities.aspx. Accessed 20 Aug 2022.

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U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2012. DOD Initiative to Address Audit Backlog Shows Promise, but Additional Management Attention Needed to Close Aging Contracts. GAO-13-131, December. https:// www.gao.gov/assets/gao-13-131.pdf. Accessed Aug 2020, 2022. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2017. Federal Contracting: Additional Management Attention and Action Needed to Close Contracts and Reduce Audit Backlog. GAO-17-738, September. https://www.gao.gov/ass ets/gao-17-738.pdf. Accessed 20 Aug 2022. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2019. Steps Needed to Identify Acquisition Training Needs for Non-Acquisition Personnel. GAO-19556, September 5. https://gao.gov/products/gao-19-556. Accessed 16 Aug 2022.

CHAPTER 8

Stewardship Theory over Agency Theory

Abstract Stewardship Theory over Agency Theory, the seventh portrait of public–private stewardship (PPS), portrays the practitioner to be guided by collective interests. The stewardship and agency theories are compared with respect to goal differences and public interest. The advantageousness of contracting in line with stewardship theory is affirmed against the deficiencies of contracting with agency theory. The differences of each theory applied in decision making and the pursuit of value-formoney (VFM) are given. Finally, the seven portraits of PPS are derived from the seven principles of new public service (NPS). Keywords Stewardship theory · Agency theory · Contracting-out · New public management · New public service · Principles · Goals · Multi-layered · Principal-agent · Autonomy · Theory · Concepts · Responsibility · Responsiveness

This chapter presents Stewardship Theory over Agency Theory, portraying the implication of the six previous portraits of PPS. Davis et al. (1997a, p. 24) explained that in stewardship theory, the model of the practitioner is based on a steward whose behavior is ordered such that pro-organizational, collectivistic behaviors have higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviors; even when the interests of the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. M. Steinfeld, Public-Private Stewardship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17131-4_8

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steward and the principal are not aligned, the steward places higher value on cooperation than defection. Differently, in agency theory, actors and counterparties model entrepreneurs to develop incentives that are mutually beneficial but may respond to these incentives opportunistically (see Osborne and Gaebler 1992). For example, both the public and private partners value cost-effectiveness but may decide to pursue it in different ways, at different times, while sacrificing different values, or individually at the other partner’s expense.

Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory in Contracting-Out The agency theory formulates a necessary framework with prescriptive modeling given the advent of New Public Management (NPM). Quite simply, the U.S. government could not keep up with the economic boom times fueled by electronics and computing. Pollitt (1993), Hood (1998), and Dunleavy et al. (2006a) detail the plights of NPM but do little to suggest opportunities, strategies, and practices for improvement through partnering. The NPM insinuates a tendency to contract-out, and it articulates the management form of obtaining public goods and services. In fact, collaboration and contracting have been offered as strategies for governing in “a hollow state” that lacks production, expertise, and public interest (see Milward and Proven 2000). One defining characteristic of the DOD is that perhaps more than local and state governments, based on the size of its workforce and the extensiveness in development of the career fields, it is not unusual for those engaging in contracting to have background expertise in the area being contracted for. There are some obstacles to utilizing contracting as a strategy for addressing issues of the hollow state. The private sector personnel that performs and manages the work completion does not work in the public sector and therefore may lack the knowledge, training, and commitment to public values. The private sector actors may also prioritize their own commitment to company shareholders instead of the public sector actors’ commitment to the public interest. Kettl (1993), Neill and Morris (2012) demonstrate the problems with principal-agent theory including monitoring, oversight, information asymmetry, and goal differences. Nanda (2003) examines the principal-agent dilemma and identifies issues of accountability in effort and quality suggesting that industry reputation is an amelioration. The limitation to this solution is that reputation

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applies broadly whereby the manner of completion for any given task or employee may be variable. The private firms with better reputations are also perceived to have higher standards, and standardization was emphasized in the fourth chapter as a tool for quality assurance. Another obstacle to contracting as a strategy to saturate the hollow state is that the principal-agent relationships can be multi-layered (see Breaux et al. 2002). There are a host of accountability and coordination issues that make collaboration prohibitive. Especially in the DOD, with its massive size and scope of complexity regarding goods, services, requirements, deliverables, and operations, and the numerous stakeholders across the public and private sectors, the challenges of multi-layered principalagent relationships are considerable. Partnering through PPS practices have been offered as an approach to engage stakeholders cohesively in pursuit of the same public values, cooperative goals and objectives, and means of practice. In terms of achieving VFM in PPPs, the stewardship theory can be of great assistance to stakeholders in making solid and well-planned decisions by prioritizing collectivistic behaviors at a higher-level of analysis and realization, to extend beyond incentive and performance-based systems of contracting to yield a strategic approach that considers the mission, vision, and values of the organizations. Meanwhile, incentive-based and performance-based contracting (PBC) are contracting techniques that possess much utility, but effectiveness may be dependent on the extent that partnering relations can overcome obstacles to accountability in the principal-agent relationship where the government actors are principals and the private sector actors are agents. The private sector actors may also serve as principals when using subcontractors, creating an additional layer. When agents perform and manage work on behalf of stakeholders that have interests in the outcomes, then additional principal-agent layers are formed making decision making more complicated because the trails of moving parts, people, and sequential impacts lead to that many more viewpoints and competing values. PPS demonstrates the importance of public values in contracting as well as collaboration, advocating for an enhancement of Milward and Proven’s (2000) strategies that connote to partnership. PPS is a way to advance contracting and collaboration into partnering dynamics that promote shared public values and increase VFM resulting in improved

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PPP outcomes. PPS also has no starting or ending point, whereas traditional contracting arrangements are viewed in isolation for each contract, without due consideration for continued sharing in benefits and costs. PPS can alleviate issues of multi-layered principal-agent relationships through PPS practices that (1) establish shared values; (2) gather stakeholder buy-in; (3) devise value propositions that enhance VFM and accomplish goals; (4) operationalize strategies into procurement and contracting practices; and (5) meet requirements, fulfill need, and correspond in partner learning. There is no limitation based on job position or principal-agent roles to participate and contribute to these five general steps for PPS practices. Both the public and private sector partners can equally participate depending on access to information and decision making. The practitioner can only hope to pursue PPS practices within the sphere of influence that exists because extending too far out runs the risk of diverting the proper attention away from objectives in place and mindset.

Decision Making in Stewardship Theory and Agency Theory Snippert et al. (2015) conduct a literature review for a comparison between stewardship theory and agency theory. Stewardship reverberates an ongoing sense of obligation or duty to others based on the intention to uphold the covenantal relationship and the individual willingly subjugating personal interests to act in the protection of others’ long-term welfare (Hernandez 2012, p. 175). In stewardship theory, there are mutual goals and objectives, pro-organizational behavior has a higher utility than individualistic, trust is developed with an involvementoriented philosophy, and there is personnel autonomy and asset specificity (Snippert et al. 2015, p. 574). In this sense, asset specificity can be perceived as being related to the transparency of functions, processes, and measures, and individual accountability to those processes and resources. The stewardship theory assists individuals in making calculated, informed, and when possible, data-driven decisions, through transparency, accountability, involvement, and mutually beneficial collective priorities. At the organization-level, Davis et al. (1997b) argued that stewardship theory denotes a strong relationship between the success of an organization and the level of satisfaction of the steward and the other stakeholders (p. 575).

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The link between stewardship, organization success, and employee satisfaction connotes well to improving the performance and management inputs that go into successful PPP outcomes. Different from stewardship, the agency theory is characterized by goal incongruence, an initial position of distrust, control-orientation, theoretical assumptions derived from economics, and incentives and sanctions foster goal alignment (Snippert et al. 2015). Van Slyke (2007) found that over time, the principal-agent relationship evolves into a principalsteward relationship, however, as Davis et al. (1997b) argued in response to Albanese et al.’s (1997) proclamation for a hybrid agency-steward model, the orientation of the principal is a disqualifier for the stewardship model of shared, prioritized collective interest. VFM in Stewardship Theory and Agency Theory The presence of a principal leads to a sticks-and-carrots scenario for the agent who faces numerous bilateral concoctions for dictating, determining, and generating value. Comparatively, in stewardship, the practitioner focal points encompass the internal control of individual responsibility and the external control of accountability to others (Kass 1988, p. 28). In effect, the stewardship theoretical model builds-up shared and collective support whereas the agency theoretical model builds-out to create stakeholder synergies. The disadvantage with agency theory is that the model extends from the practitioner in diagramming principal-agent relationships between and across layers. With stewardship theory, the formal efforts are built from the collective core utilizing the expertise and position of the practitioner to diagram an interconnected foundation of inputs among stakeholders. Here, the VFM is pursued through the alignment of shared core values, goals, and objectives, as opposed to the pursuit of VFM by means of a composition of unilateral principal-agent networked relationships. In the context of PPS practices, such a networked approach may prove to be valuable, but not if stakeholders are considered engaged in unidimensional formations based on principal-agent relationships. As opposed to being confined to preconceived ties and arrangements, stewards have the capacity to self-govern, a strong sense of autonomy, and responsibility for outcomes (see Block 2013). This autonomy and vested approach serve as a means for correlating the theoretical underpinning of stewardship and the constructs of VFM. Snippert et al. (2015) found

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that in theory, the VFM approach shares similarities with the stewardship theory approach in that VFM emphasizes an expert actor whose behavior is focused on creating win-win situations based on validated trust with a focus on high performance and creating pro-organizational, pro-project value (p. 574). In practice, however, VFM and stewardship are different because of the use of traditional economic, control-oriented approaches as a guiding force for interactions and behaviors to generate VFM (see Snippert et al. 2015). The value of PPS is that it enables and connects stewardship with VFM according to both theory and practice. In VFM, the value is generated by the agent on behalf of the steward’s interest, as opposed to value that the agent can realize directly. Steinfeld et al. (2019) find public stewardship to be the critical link to VFM and public values, and this book advances those findings by offering PPS practices as a solution to achieve VFM in PPPs for all stakeholders, public and private. In that research, best value, leadership, and collaboration emerged as outcome variables for public stewardship after factoring for public values and sheer VFM (see Steinfeld et al. 2019). The implication for this research is that these three fundamentals are thematic to PPS practice and appear in various ways. In practice, as it was remotely presented in earlier chapters, best value connotes source selection, leadership as stewardship, and collaboration as a means for transparency, communication, public interest, and ultimately partnering. The building blocks of PPS are constructed from public stewardship fundamentals that occupy spaces across concepts (best value), theory (stewardship), and practice (collaboration). PPS practices as displayed require a multitude of lenses approach that is characteristic of stewardship not agency. PPS bridges VFM and stewardship because it recognizes the fact that value generation takes place as a result of work for and between partners, as in the transactional nature of VFM, but links those same practices to shared values and value propositions that contribute to a pro-objective, collective VFM. Both the VFM and stewardship concepts lack a public values interest concern, equating organization-wide with collective as opposed to public interest. PPS was initially conceived from a theoretical conceptualization that stewardship theory lacks a publicness aspect, and that public stewardship concepts did not fit the applied approach of PPP practices to include the contracting function that underlies agency theory. From a VFM and stewardship composite sketch, a

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public interest aspect is missing and so is the link to VFM from an inanimate, collective values standpoint, and stewardship from a theoretical, practitioner-centered standpoint. The process pursuant to PPS practices provide linkages and they are built upon the shared values and objectives of an amalgamation of stakeholders spanning the public and private partners. PPS also enables a stakeholder to purposefully contribute to VFM without having to force-fit into the principal-agent structure to make the assessment and realize value, thereby creating an open, autonomous space conducive to investigation and analysis by the practitioner-researcher, described in Chapter 7. It may be that value is found to be generated according to many more factorials than imagined, providing a plethora of public values areas for the practitioner-researcher.

Linking New Public Management to Public–Private Stewardship Dunleavy et al. (2006b) declared the end of NPM based on the emergence of digital era governance (DEG) (see also Dunleavy et al. 2006a). This digitized form of governance led to a shift of the contracting spectrum in the market explosion for IT, data management and processing, cybersecurity, and related knowledge experts. It also enabled major neo-liberal reforms to be executed with the performance management movement likened to the federal government’s National Performance Review. The New Public Service (NPS) transformed the enterprising spirit of NPM and DEG by infusing a level of human inculcation into the goals and objectives of a public administrator. Denhardt and Denhardt (2015) craft the following seven principles of NPS: Serve citizens, not customers; Seek the public interest; Value citizenship over entrepreneurship; Think strategically, act democratically; Recognize that accountability isn’t simple; Serve rather than steer; Value people, not just productivity. These principles defined the new public values in public administration against a backdrop of the hollow state. Subsequently, the New Public Governance (NPG) model has been set forth that captures the lessons of the NPS and makes connections to inputs, outputs, and externalities in practice. PPS goes a step further by developing the approaches, decision making, and practices.

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Deriving Public–Private Stewardship from New Public Service The following analysis is a derivation of the seven PPS portraits from the NPS principles to demonstrate how the established principles of public service are related to and advanced by PPS practices, and the added nuance of a private sector partner. Meanwhile, the NPS is emblematic of the agency theoretical approach because of the exchange nature whereby the principles are presented by Denhardt and Denhardt (2015) from the standpoint of a government principal, or a government agent acting on behalf of the government principal to provide for the public citizen. The duality of the seven principles, depicting the field’s necessary transition from pure agency to agency-steward, also parallels the dual aspects of public stewardship, the elements of advancing public values and fiduciary responsibility. The initial public and private-oriented interests of each partner in PPPs also relates well to this duality of NPS principles for the purpose of inducing elements for PPS portraits. Leadership as Stewardship entails a double requirement to be a steward of labor and capital resources; to be a good leader you need to be a good steward. The first portrait involves understanding stewardship, differing from traditional leadership models characterized by hierarchical power, authority based on position, and strict managerial control. The leadership models in practice are ill-suited for the modern governance system (Denhardt and Denhardt 2015, p. 668). Traditional leadership is based on practices with unfilled blanks, and so has led to the disintegration of accountability. In PPPs, stewardship as the desire, willingness, persistent self-investment, and the need to build trust sets it apart from leadership characterized by doing the least or just meeting mechanical or technical standards of work. The second portrait, Political Actor for Political Settlement, posits the practitioner as understanding the politics affecting partnerships. It is a challenge that requires dialogue with stakeholders. Conflict or divergent interests and views may harm public interest. For Denhardt and Denhardt (2015), the goal should be to reach an agreement over public interest. Thus: “Public administrators must contribute to building a collective, shared notion of public interest. The goal is not to find quick solutions driven by individual choices. It is the creation of shared interests and shared responsibilities” (p. 66). As it relates to PPPs, the development

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of shared interests involves encapsulating a diversity of public and private sector interests. The third portrait, The Catalyst of the Public Interest, involves the commitment of the steward to promote public interest. The public– private steward is a catalyst that occupies a role of facilitator as well, where any threat to the spirit of public interest is addressed through interaction between partners. Stewards love their jobs and have the passion, ethics, persistence, and humility to succeed. They accept the need for change and welcome the opportunity to improve how government and partnership works. Stewards are aware and convinced that they “serve citizens, not customers.” Put otherwise: “The public interest is the result of a dialogue about shared values rather than the aggregation of the individual self-interests. Therefore, public servants do not merely respond to the demands of customers, but rather focus on building relationships of trust and collaboration with and among citizens” (Denhardt and Denhardt 2015, p. 44). The process requires a catalyst, someone assured of shared values and with the ability, the impetus and the dynamism to initiate and serve the important aspects of delivery to ensure consistency in the process and sustainability in results. The fourth portrait of PPS, Implementation through Communication, is the dynamism to navigate between actors and across the organizations and managing needs that may seem divergent. This requires thinking strategically and acting democratically because: “Policies and programs meeting public needs can be most effectively and responsibly achieved through collective efforts and collaborative processes” (Denhardt and Denhardt 2015, p. 106). Implementation of PPPs is perhaps the most challenging as it is a test of initiative and then of the planned activities. It is therefore a reflection of the effectiveness of strategies and the democratization of rules, regulations, and processes in efficient completion of work. It is crucial to clearly and continuously communicate the why, what, who, and how of the initiative to all stakeholders, making effective use of those communities of interest best positioned to act as actors and change agents. The fifth portrait, Transparent Engagement across Organization, emulates a partnership driven by transparency and accountability. Lack of transparency means that information does not get delivered, or the right content is not revealed. This can deter efforts at engaging in PPS practices, inhibiting the progress of work and quality of performance. It thus has a considerable impact on the VFM generated and the outcomes

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of project deliverables. The steward evaluates every piece of information so that the end goal is achieving public interest values with integrity. That may imply that all parties make more efforts to seek moral strength to do the right thing. As Denhardt and Denhardt (2015) indicate, the public servant should recognize that accountability is not simple and “… should be attentive to more than the market, they should also attend to constitutional laws, community values, political norms, professional standards and citizen interests” (p. 123). Being attentive to more than the market means overcoming the temptation to defend self-interest. What is needed is the capability to engage using creative and innovative means. Advances in means of information and communication can allow instant communication between contractors and public agencies. The engagement of the whole apparatus permits a common understanding of the needs and challenges of the agencies toward accomplishing objectives that can be made feasible through partnering. The implication is that no information is hidden by one party from the other to avoid incurring costs or value reductions where addressing the issue might have been to the benefit of both. Importantly, the goal of engagement is to ensure that meaning is communicated from early planning throughout the process. Missing that key point is what might lead to an imbalanced focus between the technical aspects of a contract and the expected VFM, or a one-sided domination of public or private sector values. The sixth portrait, Progress from Learning and Adaptation, emphasizes the benefits of change, adjustment, and readjustment in the process through audit and learning. Stewardship presumes the disposition to collaborate within the organization and among the partnership, to share, learn from, and pass to partners. Denhardt and Denhardt (2015) recommend that in the process, public participants “value people, not just productivity,” and conclude: “Public organizations and the networks in which they participate are more likely to be successful in the long run if they are operated through processes of collaboration and shared leadership based on respect for all people” (p. 161). A public–private steward learns and adapts as the project progresses. This is important in public service and partnership where all actors operate from the perspective that is ideally joint public and private, not silos of value systems characteristic of agency theory. The ability to not only learn but also adapt to new and unexpected situations becomes important for finding solutions in PPS practices. There

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is evidence of successes, failures, and remedies that partners can refer to find answers to pressing issues, including aspects of private firm responsibility. Also, the experience learned from one stage may serve as a guide for the next stages or preemptive changes brought to other aspects. Partnering is more valuable when it is viewed as an opportunity to educate one another about the technicalities and areas that are complex or specific to partner’s expertise. For the public–private steward, learning and adapting is a process of educating and re-educating by and between partners. Therefore, it is a core aspect of PPPs. The seventh portrait of PPS, Stewardship Theory over Agency Theory, portrays the implication of the six previous portraits. This portrait amasses PPP stakeholders and researchers to consider the theory of stewardship as it may play out in public service. This description echoes with Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2015) call to “value citizenship over entrepreneurship,” stating: “The public interest is better advanced by public servants and citizens committed to making meaningful contributions to society than by entrepreneurial managers acting as if public money was their own” (p. 85). The public–private steward is challenged with balancing responsibility and responsiveness in public administration to satisfy stakeholder interests along with the pursuit of VFM. In the public administration context, responsibility refers to adherence to neutral public administration whereas responsiveness connotes to catering to stakeholder interests via a politicized connotation. In PPS, the practitioner is guided by sets of shared values in devising value propositions, and the responsibility-responsiveness public administration conundrum is an additional cognitive layer that makes PPS practices complicated and dynamic.

References Albanese, Robert, Tina M. Dacin, and Ira C. Harris. 1997. Agents as Stewards. The Academy of Management Review 22 (3): 609–611. Block, Peter. 2013. Stewardship: Choosing Service Over Self-Interest, 2nd ed. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler. Breaux, David A., Christopher M. Duncan, C. Denise Keller, and John C. Morris. 2002. Welfare Reform, Mississippi Style: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and the Search for Accountability. Public Administration Review 62 (1): 92–103. Davis, James H., F. David Schoorman, and Lex Donaldson. 1997a. Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management. The Academy of Management Review 22 (1): 20–47.

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Davis, James H., F. David Schoorman, and Lex Donaldson. 1997b. Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson Reply: The Distinctiveness of Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory. The Academy of Management Review 22 (3): 611–613. Denhardt, Janet V., and Robert B. Denhardt. 2015. The New Public Service: Serving Not Steering, 4th ed. New York, NY: Routledge. Dunleavy, Patrick, Helen Margetts, Simon Bastow, and Jane Tinkler. 2006a. Digital Era Governance: IT Corporations, the State, and e-Government. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Dunleavy, Patrick, Helen Margetts, Simon Bastow, and Jane Tinkler. 2006b. New Public Management Is Dead-Long Live Digital-Era Governance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16 (3): 467–494. Hernandez, Morela. 2012. Toward an Understanding of the Psychology of Stewardship. The Academy of Management Review 37 (2): 172–193. Hood, Christopher. 1998. The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public Management. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kass, Henry D. 1988. Stewardship as a Fundamental Element in Images of Public Administration. Dialogue 10 (2): 2–48. Kettl, Donald F. 1993. Sharing Power: Public Governance and Private Markets. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Milward, H. Brinton., and Keith G. Proven. 2000. Governing the Hollow State. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10 (2): 359–379. Nanda, Ashish. 2003. The Essence of Professionalism: Managing Conflict of Interest. Harvard Business School Background Note 903–120, June. Neill, Katharine A., and John C. Morris. 2012. A Tangled Web of Principals and Agents: Examining the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Through a PrincipalAgent Lens. Politics and Policy 40 (4): 629–656. Osborne, David, and Ted Gaebler. 1992. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector. New York, NY: Penguin Books. Pollitt, Christopher. 1993. Managerialism and the Public Services: Cuts or Cultural Change in the 1990s? 2nd ed. Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishers. Steinfeld, Joshua M., Kouliga Koala, and Ron Carlee. 2019. Contracting for Public Stewardship in Public-Private Partnerships. International Journal of Procurement Management 12 (2): 135–155. Snippert, Tim, Wiebe Witteveen, Hans Boes, and Hans Voordijk. 2015. Barriers to Realizing a Stewardship Relation Between Client and Vendor: The Best Value Approach. Construction Management and Economics 33 (7): 569–586. Van Slyke, David M. 2007. Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the Government-Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationship. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 17 (2): 157–187.

CHAPTER 9

Applying and Implementing Public–Private Stewardship

Abstract The acquisition aspects and nature of public–private stewardship (PPS) practices covered in the book are briefly summarized. Closing remarks posit the public–private steward and conditions for PPS. Public administration professionalism including a professional commitment is suggested to position the practitioner for decision making in public– private partnerships (PPPs). Self-reflection is stated to be a strategy for preparation and improvement. Areas for future research point toward the need to quantify public values for decision making and further develop the PPS theories, concepts, and applications, with more discovery for stakeholder involvement and decision making. Keywords Competency · Critical thinking · Professionalism · Esoteric · Public administration · Commitment · Self-reflection · Future research · Complexity · Conceptual linkages

Public–private stewardship (PPS) can be achieved from numerous approaches. Yet, oftentimes, there is a challenge to determining or prioritizing value-add. For example; value-add for who (which stakeholders ?), what (this objective or some other objective/goal ?), where (the process at hand, a secondary/supportive process, a cascading/stovepipe process, some other metric that is considered important?), when (now, at a certain © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. M. Steinfeld, Public-Private Stewardship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17131-4_9

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point in time, fluid demand and supply, environment dependent, low-rate production, contingencies?), and why (revenues attached, cost reduction, improve quality, quantity, delivery, preparedness, readiness, immediate demand?). Hodge and Greve (2007) point toward the two promises of PPPs, namely the easy shift of government resources to policy priorities and the enablement of better value for money (VFM) to be achieved. Moulton and Wise (2010, p. 357) argue that the dichotomy between the public and private sector is not a reality and that public–private configurations are endowed with political authority through formal institutions, and are responsible to act in the public interest, and therefore serve public values. It is the prioritization of values that is the first step in applying and implementing PPS as established by the process that follows in this chapter. While PPS can begin from latching onto any aspect of a strategic plan and emanating PPS practices from there, a general starting point with sweeping influence and relevance oftentimes has to do with value. In fact, Witesman (2010) critiques Moulton and Wise’s (2007) three prescribed dimensions of public interest, economic, and management as they relate to PPP alignment and cohesion. Witesman (2010, p. 362) critiques the comprehensiveness of these three dimensions in the development of policy and practice impacting PPPs because the individual is largely ignored in the framework and considerations at different points in the project life cycle are overlooked. It is the individual unit of analysis that the seven portraits of PPS are meant to address to begin with! It has been described and detailed how an individual may proceed to pursue and exercise PPS practices by following the principles and tenets of each PPS portrait. The perspective of how at an organizational level that can be generalized to partnerships involving all levels and types of governments and private sector companies, is presented in this chapter. The questions that opened the chapter are considered with the requirement generation that fuels and steers PPPs but there may not have been due consideration for strategic procurement planning in the formation and execution of the PPP. Think about specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-based (SMART) objectives and how they support goals that align with mission, vision, and values, of the department and organization. In applying and implementing PPS, some additional questions need to be addressed: Does the decision or otherwise action at-hand support the overall strategy and priorities? Is the strategy pursuant to organizational requirement? What are likely to be the effects

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on the unit, department, organization, and stakeholders, especially as an environment changes or optimization in one area eventuates to deficiency or mediocrity in another area? Surely, agency, departmental, and individual culture and identity help shape the ethos that undergirds approaches to public administrative practices such as PPS, modern/postmodern, authoritative/decentralized, progressive, resilient, sustainable, and beyond. Accordingly, at any given time, practitioners may aim to pursue values of transparency, accountability, equity, efficiency, effectiveness, utility, innovation, speed, functionality, cooperation, competition, diversity, uncertainty/risk, adaptability, quality, quantity, cost, reliability, inclusiveness, readiness, versatility, agility, and more. This chapter is organized according to the broad steps that can be taken to apply the PPS theory and implement the theory from the conceptual linkages that will be illustrated. The illustrations showing the stepwise approach to applying and implementing PPS will be discussed at a generalizable level of analysis, because PPS can be practiced in PPPs shaped by all levels of government (federal, state, local, and international) and industries of product and service delivery.

Describing How Each Factor Can Drive Value There is an endless list of values that could be determined for a department or organization that are deemed important to accomplishing goals and objectives, meeting mission, achieving vision, and attaining values. Some examples include efficiency, effectiveness, adaptability, reliability, transparency, accountability, quality, speed, sustainability, diversity, equity, inclusion, versatility, innovation, and autonomy. To illustrate further, efficiency will be discussed, as a value that is important in demonstrating good stewardship for taxpayer funds and in delivering value in the form of profitability to the private sector, not to mention the benefit of the end user enjoying the fulfillment of the need in a quicker, more efficient manner, if that is deemed a priority in the circumstance. For efficiency, a cost-effective and optimal, maximum resource utilization approach supports the use of performance objectives that allow for flexible infrastructure in planning and building of PPP projects and incentives for contractors. Flexibility supports the maximum use of private sector expertise, use of technology, and life-cycle cost reduction. Further, flexibility can lead the private sector participant to propose solutions to problems

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that arise in the project that may enhance the sustainability of the project build and subsequent maintenance, including the insertion of technology over the life-cycle. Challenges to efficiency, such as in achieving just-in-time (JIT), may involve obstacles related to adopting improved or new technologies, staff turnover, a disorganized workforce, and restrictions on worker autonomy to problem solve. To overcome these obstacles to efficiency, adaptability can be pursued by forming cross-functional teams and emphasizing crosstraining. Through preparing and deploying a more skilled, knowledgeable workforce, efficiency may be successfully achieved from a greater understanding and interpreting the complexities that exist across personnel and processes. Driving Value for a Project Efficiency is important throughout the project life-cycle because it serves as a key feature in defining value in the pre-solicitation and solicitation phases so that competing bidders know that economical use of resources is a priority for the public sector. Furthermore, efficiency is a critical element for performance and assessment to ensure the components of work are properly executed according to best practices, providing a measurable way to convey and incorporate progress and benchmarks to quality. At project closeout, efficiency can be a mechanism to evaluate contractor performance especially as it relates to use of industry standard processes and practices, including the use of appropriate resources, including professionals, manpower requirements, tools, and materials. Additionally, efficiency measures enable the accounting of project inputs, outputs, and outcomes for planning and executing the mission by accomplishing goals and objectives. Oftentimes, the optimum and appropriate use of resources, as gauged by availability and usage of inputs, with respect to the outputs that can be achieved and their respective use, including aspects of tangibility, and the contribution of the project’s outcome given these inputs and outputs, is the critical success factor (CSF) of a project, and how projects and the encompassing programs are evaluated for success and continuance.

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Driving Value for a Department or Organization Considering Mission and Goals Efficiency drives value for a department or organization by incorporating efficiency into goals and objectives and making them SMART. The mission of an organization may involve readiness, as in combat readiness, or ready to serve, as commonly associated with a police or fire department, or as applicable to any form of governance or customer service. If readiness is the mission, then efficiency can add value to the mission of readiness by having the SMART goals and objectives involve measures of efficiency that contribute to readiness. The goal may be to achieve adaptability as a way of being ready, and as measured by efficiency because the efficient use of personnel, equipment, and other resources may help ensure the ability to convert, or adapt, those resources to other uses. The proper and effective use of personnel and equipment may also be considered an aspect of efficiency that supports readiness, especially in capability and capacity for serving the public, or as measured by the outcomes of a PPP. The goal of adaptability can be achieved by accomplishing supporting objectives, which should be SMART with respect to the stated value of efficiency, or whatever values are deemed most important to any department or organization being applied in practice. Specific objectives that support the goal of adaptability through efficiency may involve historical data or time to completion of a task, as examples. Measurable objectives supporting the goal may involve percent of task completion. Achievable objectives could involve the completion of training or capabilities development. Relevant objectives may be those pertaining to the use of processes or application of policies, and notation of outcomes important to mission, vision, and values. Time-based objectives could involve the effective matching of updated technologies. Meanwhile, a vision of the design and actions of what operationalizing the SMART goals and objectives looks like and entails, facilitates planning, implementation, operations, maintenance, and lessons learned. The accomplishment of each objective should lead to achieving the goal, align with the vision in the way it is to be performed and managed, be in accordance with the values of the organization, and support the immediate and broader missions, such as that of the unit and that of the organization.

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Trade-Offs Between the Chosen Factors Instead of the alignment of readiness, adaptability, and efficiency, as was just described, consider an example where there are trade-offs among the three values. When it comes to high performance or the requirement of precision and accuracy, where efficiency as the bases of measures comes into play, then adaptability may not rate highly in terms of feasibility. Also, efficiency may not necessarily lead to readiness, instead readiness may be tied to excessive use of resources whether it be in more preparation or advancement than necessary, whereby emphasis on efficiency rather than innovation may diminish readiness. Also, while adaptability may be closely associated with readiness, as in the ability to respond to a range of threats or challenges, perhaps adaptability comes at the trade-off of ability for overachievement and outperformance.

Identify Contract Management Tactics Using Tools and Techniques There are substantial opportunities to drive overall value, that consider these trade-offs, using tools and techniques in contract management from choice of solicitation method to contract type, method, pricing and negotiating strategies, evaluation factors, and contract administration. Even before, as part of determination of a requirement, the pre-proposal phase of contracting offers opportunities for the public and private partner to engage in determining how best to fulfill the need, whether that is the use of current technologies and applications or those that need to be developed, to what the complexities and major challenges may involve. Public procurement has been identified, especially as one major tool in project management, and a practice in contracting organizations, as a method of solving managerial problems. The procurement practices may be captured in the job activities necessary to accomplish the objectives and could be reflected by the broader goals of an acquisition system, which could be a core component of strategic management. Strategic public procurement and targeted use of contract management tools and techniques, many that have been highlighted in the book, can be a main staple and conduit of an organization’s operations or at a minimum an important component or subcomponent of operational excellence.

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The contract management techniques themselves may also be inclined to a particular value, such as efficiency. For example, in some circumstances, a firm-fixed price contract may be more efficient and support a particular goal and objective, perhaps because it alleviates cost-accounting and related elements of contract administration. In other cases, a costreimbursement contract may be more inclined to efficiency because costs may be associated with quality and the best, most transparent use of resources. Identify the Positive and Negative Effects on Stakeholders A particular contract technique may have various impacts on stakeholders, some of which may seem positive or be welcomed by a stakeholder, and others that may be perceived as negative to a stakeholder. Ideally, PPS practices will lead to congruency of positive effects on stakeholders, but that may not always be the case, especially initially, considering the prevalence of stakeholders and the foundational differences of incentives between the public and private sectors. Furthermore, there may be impacts on the processes that various stakeholders manage, and the value drivers that motivate that individual stakeholder and their unit, department, and organization. These stakeholder effects need to be identified and addressed, especially where weakness may inhibit strategic orientation and achievement of goals and objectives, including related strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats as it pertains to mission, vision, and values.

Management Strategy at the Senior Executive-Level The intention is that the pursuit of the SMART goals and objectives serve to reconcile the tensions between stakeholders arising from value-laden decision making that takes place as a means of practicing PPS. Management strategy involves the development of SMART goals and objectives in line with mission, vision, and values that reflect stakeholder priorities and ethics. Management utilizes levers at their disposal, such as those of acquisition strategy including public procurement and contracting practices, or other mechanisms of managerialism to spur change or execute a plan.

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The management strategy begins with the prioritizing of a value, the establishment of a mission, the articulation of a vision, setting of new or updated goals and objectives, or with focal points of inputs, outputs, and outcomes that connect with these strategic planning elements, and hence are impacted by strategic management as part of PPS. The senior executive-level manager is assumed to have the autonomy for decision making that is cross-departmental and requires the cooperation of personnel across the organization, at different levels, and having crosssector, cross-functional effects. The capacities for management strategy from autonomy of executive managers is enhanced through networking and knowledge of the organization, its functions, processes, and strategic planning aspects and intricate workings. The capabilities for management strategy are developed by the critical and creative thinking that enable the congruence of tools and techniques among actors and stakeholders toward strategic goals and objectives. This involves coordination and collaboration dependent on positive working relationships, both role specific and shared competencies, and commonalities in professionalism and culture that foster performance and management of the strategic plan. At the more finite level, executive management emphasizes key performance indicators (KPIs), critical success factors (CSFs), the improvement of specific activities of major importance, or solving problems that inhibit or advance the strategic plan or aspects of the PPP that have been identified to be top priorities. Reconceptualizing Values and New Value Drivers Management strategy reconceptualizes values that leads to new value drivers. The reconceptualization of values takes place as management strategy interacts with policies and procedures in place within the organization and those emanating from across the partnership. This leads to decision making consequences, potentially new allocation of resources, and a host of interactive effects at various personnel levels and across activities, which may impact or be impacted by the gamut of direct and indirect stakeholders. New linkages are drawn between concepts inherent to the prioritized values, and as those values implicate the actual job activities that are performed and managed to achieve goals and accomplish objectives. An emphasis on one value leads to emphasis on other values. Referring to efficiency, it may be determined that transparency must be

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prioritized to attain efficiency. Perhaps aspects of efficiency, such as costeffectiveness, speed, or output maximization, among others, can only be improved with appropriate transparency in collection of data or assessment of performance. Or, perhaps quality as it relates to functionality and effectiveness, leading to the emphasis of yet other value drivers, is imperative in attaining and ensuring efficiency. The new value driver of transparency therefore shifts the priorities of the organization, perhaps to include certain KPIs, CSFs, and other metrics, its operations, and allocation of resources including human capital, and even warrant the revisiting of the strategic plan. The new value drivers can be pursued in tangent with the previous organizational structure and organizational dynamic, by adding a layer or dimension of complexity to the agency, and the partnership in a PPP.

Contribution and Detraction from Strategic Alignment and Tactical Alignment Output values, such as adaptability, result as a contribution from strategic and tactical alignment as it relates to efficiency, because the available resources are most efficiently utilized and therefore maximum output is possible when all other conditions are satisfied. However, if adaptability is a value takeaway from prioritizing efficiency as part of the strategic plan, again simply for purposes of exemplifying PPS but not insinuating that efficiency should always be a value priority, then there may be many other factors that are impacted such as requirements for training, desired qualifications for employment, the scope and importance of personnel roles and responsibilities, the procurement and contracting processes that fuel the spend and build sides of PPPs, and the responsibilities that partners to contract are accountable for. The complexities and ambiguities that result from new value drivers detract from strategic alignment as the organization and department transform to meet the new strengths and weaknesses of the organization and the surrounding environment, including new strategic planning to reach new heights. The tactical alignment is affected in the operations beginning with personnel moves, organizational restructuring, and growth in programming activities and business infrastructure such as information technology to support new programming and investment geared toward innovation and advancement. The interaction between

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partners is likely to be affected that may create new tensions that challenge the original and new prioritized values. PPS offered seven portraits, as could be applied by practitioners in the federal government, defense setting, to address such tensions and navigate the adoption of new value drivers and interplay between values, elements of the strategic plan, and the operationalization of such elements through practitioner job activities. The PPS theory, and its concepts as illustrated in this chapter through generalizable application and implementation reflective at any level of government and type of business, assists in connection of the variables mentioned and balance their impact to manage the complexities in a position of autonomy that enables space for analysis and managerial decision making. However, the consolidation of organizational factors into new value drivers, or data points broadly referred to as KPIs and CSFs, or other data points or statistics, poses the risk of being an organization susceptible to any mode of underperformance with regards to that KPI, CSF, or other statistics, and thus would be a threat to adaptability, identified as an output value in the example. Senior executive management in conjunction with organizational actors and complimentary partnering organizations, therefore, are needed to steer the execution of the strategic plan to ensure a beneficial and valueadding progression of the institution and its strategic plan according to the wants and needs of the stakeholders.

References Hodge, Graeme A., and Carsten Greve. 2007. Public-Private Partnerships: An International Performance Review. Public Administration Review 67 (3): 545–558. Moulton, Stephanie, and Charles Wise. 2010. Shifting Boundaries between the Public and Private Sectors: Implications from the Economic Crisis. Public Administration Review 70 (3): 349–360. Witesman, Eva M. 2010. Order Beyond Crisis: Organizing Considerations Across the Public Service Configuration Life Cycle. Public Administration Review 70 (3): 361–366.

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion

Abstract The acquisition aspects and nature of public-private stewardship (PPS) practices covered in the book are briefly summarized. Closing remarks posit the public-private steward and conditions for PPS. Public administration professionalism including professional commitment is suggested to position the practitioner for decision making in publicprivate partnerships (PPPs). Self-reflection is stated to be a strategy for preparation and improvement. Areas for future research point toward the need to quantify public values for decision making and further develop the PPS theories, concepts, and applications, with more discovery for stakeholder involvement and decision making. Keywords Self-reflection · Preparation · Improvement · Professionalism · Professional commitment · PPS Theories · PPS Concepts · Quantify

This book approached the acquisition aspects of federal government defense PPPs with public procurement and contracting theory and concepts as a baseline. The contract management cycle provides a way of thinking linearly, compared to PPS that can be conceptualized from distinct angles. Simultaneously, there are motions up, down, and across bureaucracy reflected by leadership actions using tools, techniques, and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. M. Steinfeld, Public-Private Stewardship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17131-4_10

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knowledge according to prevailing opportunities. Areas of interest, or capabilities, combined with the study and practice of contracting tools and techniques based on the understanding of the relationships between moving parts, are places to start in determining the functionalities involved in pursuing the achievement of a requirement. The process for PPS practices including creating opportunities, making contributions, gathering buy-in, and implementation were all presented and discussed in the book. The importance and interplay of values for the public and private sector partners were illustrated including the fusing of stakeholder interests and ways to overcome obstacles. A core theme that arises is the complexity of the DOD which aligns well with PPS practices because of the abundance of variables and equations to piece together in identifying areas to make positive impacts to shared values and ultimately, through shared value propositions, increasing overall VFM. Specific examples were provided as exemplars for PPS practices in small business innovation and technology transfer, mechanical and marine engineering, wargames simulation, IT and cybersecurity, leadership response to Covid-19, military housing, warship building and repair, weapons systems, military construction, enterprise-wide communications, acquisition planning and regulations, contract auditing and closeout, strategic planning, professional development, and other senior-level executive management mini cases across a host of operational areas in the DOD and the DON. PPS practices were advocated to be pursued according to combat readiness as the main organizational objective and prioritizing the warfighter as the individual objective. Together, these objectives are held as the barometer for overall VFM with cost-effectiveness as a mediating variable. Perhaps, the practice of PPS was described to be simpler than it is. A major focus of the book was on decision making and the realization that strategic and tactical decisions can be made within the organizational structure. In fact, for the DOD and the DON, along with other large public and private organizations, strategy and tactics are a major emphasis from strategic planning exercises to explicit policy guidance, as shown earlier through examples in the FAR and the NMCARS. The public–private steward is posited as a practitioner with high levels of competency, inquiry, and desire to contribute. The opportunity to apply PPS practices in PPPs is ample, but the critical thinking necessary requires substantial thought, learning, and consideration. There are domino effects, for example, in the underlying public procurement and

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contract management activities. Consider the following tertiary effects, such as the interactive effects of how one procurement or contract activity impacts other tasks, such as innovation and development, or resource utilization and operations. For example, if a capability serves as an input in the supply chain for meeting and sustaining a requirement on a contract, then this contract somehow effects that capability and all else having a relationship with that capability. Tactics and strategy then adjust accordingly or influence the structures in place through resilient measures that could include adaptability, cooperative, sustainability, and socio-economic. These activities create varying needs for mobilization of labor and capital on behalf of both the public and the private partner as mission is met and subsequent needs assessment dictates a billet for preparedness and formation. From contracting for operations and functions, a matching of resources takes place resulting in the need for a recalibration of strategic contract formation and strategic contract administration (see McCue and Johnson 2010). Meanwhile the complexity of products and services themselves present their own specific procurement and contracting challenges. One of the interesting facets of PPS is that it works best when there is substantial organizational and project complexity for opportunities to make contributions. Especially in procurement and contracting, where different units and departments within the DOD may follow different sets of activities and approaches with varied applications and interpretations of overhanging and contingent guidelines that apply uniquely based on goods, services, and operational requirement. Whereas in agency theory, complexity only makes things more difficult and exacerbates the presence of multiple competing values among stakeholders. PPS also relies on the engagement of stakeholders and gathering widespread buy-in from both the public and private sector actors. Unlike agency theory, however, in stewardship theory, the practitioner’s ROI for efforts geared at public service may not come to fruition in the form of transactional gains or some form of circular rewards in the future. Value propositions pertaining to innovation and sustainability may require long durations for matriculation, and the impact of PPS practices to broad objectives may only be evident by means of reminiscent connections only recognizable by the practitioner of record. In a career field characterized by the commitment to duty, questions arise as to the mechanisms guiding the performance and management of behaviors and

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actions of that commitment, and how the organizational and administrative forces will affect the potential for PPS to be practiced and the tools, techniques, strategies, and tactics that will be utilized. The goals and objectives, as a reflection of shared stewardship values, are directly determinant upon the commitment to duty.

Professionalism and PPS The choice of pursuing PPS practices and how far-reaching those influences are intended to be is determined on the individual, the situation, and other stakeholders’ decision making as it relates to their PPS. Professionalism in public administration is a study of practice that helps position the practitioner for decision making in the public administrative setting. The traits of public sector professionalism are undoubtedly based on public sector values that are a vanguard for the professional’s decision making. Parsons (1939) was an early philosopher who likened professionalism with technical specialty and empirical rigor. Kline (1981) established criteria for public sector professionalism that include the field’s esoteric nature and adds the social aspects of barriers to entry, professional association, training and education, ethical code of conduct, and a priority to the collective over self-interest. Professionalism is put forth as an everyday compass to help practitioners navigate the community of practice that is interjacent with PPS. Gordon et al. (2000) conclude that public procurement is a profession and that its practitioners are professionals based on the distinct purchasing practices and the existence of widely accepted criteria constituting a profession. The same convention that professionalism imbues the work and study of PPP, just as in the closely related fields of public procurement and public administration, is adopted here. The short essay submitted to the Minnowbrook at 50 conference, Perry’s (2018) “Making Professionalism a Central Focus in Public Administration,” is a reinvigoration for a focus on professionalism and advocates for it as a construct for understanding and acting in public administrative contexts (p. 1). Perry’s essay calls for an examination of professionalism that extends beyond the sociological hang ups of describing professions, incorporates multiple levels of analysis ranging from institutions to operations, and diversity in the fidelity of obligations

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(p. 2). In this sense, multiple philosophies may exist for professionalism so that it envelops the abounding numbers of job positions and job titles that are part of PPPs in some form as actors or stakeholders. It is this adaptiveness for thematic expressions of professionalism that gel so well with PPS. The public–private steward effectuates PPS practices by assuming veils of professionalism that are akin to the daily mantra of the department, organization, and conditions of the partnership. The practitioner must judge the organizational climate, team morale, and the status of the project progression and partnering relations in matching the contracting and operational environments to actions of PPS practice. Professional Commitment and Self-Reflection It is vital to practice PPS with the necessary realistic individual restraint and within the confines of institution and policy. A willingness for sacrifice and assumption of a level of risk in performance, reputation, and rewards, may be wagered to a small degree for the potential of achieving VFM. If done through PPS practices, the level of risk to the practitioner for organizational consequences and sustained blowback is reduced because of the shared public values orientation and the opportunity for collective buy-in and benefit. The transformation to a public–private stature in shared pathways forward gives the practitioner an upper hand from a bottom-up standpoint when conveying stakeholder interactions toward the practice of PPS with supervisors and colleagues. Basically, the advantageous circumstances of partnering efforts in PPS connote to benefits for the organization in future activities, if those interactions are handled professionally and with respect to important considerations that could include top-secret security levels and a high-qualify environment. The practitioner’s professional commitment is anchored on valuing the collective benefit above self-interest and aligning self-interest with collective benefit is a major obstacle in practicing PPS. If the practitioner’s attempts to practice PPS leads to a shift of project focus from teambased activities to the novelty of a practitioner’s efforts then there is a risk of the practitioner losing their fit in the unit or department, and therefore potentially losing the prospect of ascending the hierarchy or everlasting employment at the organization. To avoid this, the practitioner can apply an inward focus and redirect outward actions into a process of self-reflection so that when the practitioner has a large, more clear space for practicing PPS, then the practitioner is prepared to take

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appropriate action. The sharing of stories to build self-awareness, deep listening, acting as a critical friend, and carrying a positive mindset are all important to self-reflection (Parker et al. 2018). The personal looking back time of self-reflection should be instantaneous or momentary, with a self-recognition of awareness, a new self-esteem, and then immediately forgetting about any negative occurrences. Any decisions or actions that need to be made differently should be stored mentally along with a renewed, high-charging spirit for PPS. Also, with respect to self-reflection and thought process, it should be mentioned that over time, varied perspectives and changes of opinion can take place. Just as there was stated earlier to be millions of combinations of decisions that could be made by the practitioner during the management of a contract, there were hundreds, if not thousands, of connections linking PPS practices in this book. There is always the chance, and perhaps even hopefully, that any one of the theoretical, conceptual, or practical connections that are espoused are subject to inquiry and debate, with the advent of alternative logic and fact finding. If this is the case, then the book is gaining attention and a scholarly body of knowledge surrounding PPS may be forming. As one example with respect to the context of this book, Steinfeld (2022, p. 137) makes note of a perceived organizational hesitancy regarding news in 2019 that the Space and Naval Warfare Systems (SPAWAR) command would be transformed into the Naval Information Forces (NAVIFOR) with a newly formed Space Force. However, looking back, the realities of SPAWAR are reflective of the focal points of the NAVIFOR to meet and defeat the modern threat, with the explorational units to be captured by the Space Force, even if in different modes and mediums for discovery—the SpaceX launches evidently reflect the national interests and priorities in the global frontier. This last reference is intended to demonstrate the mindset of practitioners and the extent that they become a part and vested of the work; it reflects the commitment and culture in the DOD. Whether it be the verbal gasps exerted when hearing mention of the LCS or DDG, proving superior command of the FAR, or being able to relate to nearly every managerial phenomenon incumbent to practice, the DOD and Naval commitment is tailor-made for PPS. It is a professional commitment that

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mirrors PPS because it is based on the essence of shared organizationwide values that supersede the departmental-line targets garnering annual bonus pay for personnel in the private sector. Without the individualline monetary incentives in the public sector, PPS practices are that much more important for public organizations to adopt as a form of incentives beginning with stakeholders’ preferences toward public values. If the private sector wants to be successful in PPPs, it will need to rally around the public–private stewards’ efforts, while itself may be appreciative of the PPS promise of enhanced VFM, especially as any corporations in a cash cow phase of company maturity seek ways to boost the revenues growth rate and profit margins.

Areas for Future Research Future research on VFM is needed to figure out ways that nonquantitative factors, in addition to quality, can be assigned values as inputs and outputs of decision making in PPPs. Perhaps the values of equity, inclusion, sustainability, innovation, quality, safety, and readiness can never be quantified for decision making. It may be that the accumulation of PPS practices is a guiding light for teamwork and the organization to making decisions that achieve the best VFM as a result of action oriented to shared value propositions and objectives. An area of possible research is to develop scorecards and blueprints for quantifying the many values underlying PPS for inclusion into VFM calculations and decision making. This would help bridge the theory and practice of VFM and provide support for PPS practices. Future research on PPS is needed to shape and mold the theory, its conceptual linkages to public administration practices, and applications unique to different types of public organizations, levels of government, and industries. Practitioners and scholars are having a challenging enough time deciphering what subfields fall within public administration, aside from how PPS fits in, so the destination is not easy. For decades, scholars have been trying to establish the identity of public procurement (see Prier et al. 2013), the fit within the academic field and practice of public administration (see Trammell et al. 2020; Snider and Rendon 2012), as well the fit with business administration disciplines (see Thai and Grimm 2000), including purchasing and supply chain management, project management, and engineering.

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The use of PPPs may also at times be controversial along with the bases for determining what constitutes successful outcomes. Further research is needed to determine how PPS fits into varying degrees and types of partnerships and how additional stakeholders can be brought into the mix with more ideas for PPS decision making. Additional study of PPPs to create a vista for the alignment with public procurement, contract management, acquisition, and public performance management is justified for better PPP outcomes. More coordination and camaraderie among these subareas and in connection to the scholars and practitioners of the public administration community are suggestions to assist in research and enquiry.

References Gordon, Stephen B., Stanley D. Zemansky, and Alex Sekwat. 2000. The Public Purchasing Profession Revisited. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting, and Financial Management 12 (2): 248–271. Kline, Elliott H. 1981. To Be A Professional. Southern Review of Public Administration 5 (3): 258–281. McCue, Clifford P., and Barbara R. Johnson. 2010. Strategic Procurement Planning in the Public Sector. Herndon, VA: National Institute of Governmental Purchasing. Parker, Polly, Douglas T. Hall, Kathy E. Kram, and Ilene C. Wasserman. 2018. Peer Coaching at Work: Principles and Practices. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Parsons, Talcott. 1939. The Professions and Social Culture. In Essays in Sociological Theory, Rev, ed. T. Parsons, 34–49. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. Perry, James. 2018. Making Professionalism a Central Focus in Public Administration. Minnowbrook at 50 Concept Paper. https://www.maxwell.syr. edu/docs/default-source/research/minnowbrook/james-perry-making-pro fessionalism-a-central-focus-in-public-administration.pdf?sfvrsn=b5ab7472_3. Accessed 19 Aug 2022. Prier, Eric W., Clifford P. McCue, and Joshua M. Steinfeld. 2013. Identifying Position Domains in Public Sector Procurement: Towards the Establishment of Standardized Job Descriptions for the Profession. National Council for Public Procurement and Contracting (NCPPC). Herndon, VA: National Institute of Governmental Purchasing. https://www.nigp.org/resource/job-descripti ons/ncppcjobdescreport.pdf. Accessed 19 Aug 2022. Snider, Keith F., and Rene G. Rendon. 2012. Public Procurement: Public Administration and Public Service Perspectives. Journal of Public Affairs Education 18 (2): 327–348.

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Index

A Abilities, 8, 10, 11, 27, 40, 42, 48, 53, 54, 57, 73, 77, 78, 84, 90, 92, 98, 100, 101, 106, 111, 116, 117, 120, 131, 132, 139, 140 Academic, 23, 24, 112, 117, 151 Access, 22, 77, 90, 104, 109, 114, 126 Accountability, 3–5, 9, 28, 29, 38, 41, 42, 45, 46, 49, 57, 58, 62, 64, 66–69, 79, 98, 100, 102, 108, 113, 118, 124–127, 129–132, 137 Accounting, 23, 36, 43, 62, 88–90, 116–118, 120, 121, 138, 141 Acquisition, 6, 8–11, 16, 19–22, 25, 26, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 43, 46, 48, 61, 62, 76, 79–81, 83, 86, 87, 96–99, 103, 105, 107–109, 113, 116, 117, 120, 140, 141, 145, 152 Action-orientation, 51, 67, 80 Additive, 98, 103

Administration, 3, 5, 11, 12, 25, 37, 41, 43, 45, 46, 49, 50, 56, 74, 80, 89, 96, 97, 103, 112, 114, 115, 117–120, 129, 133, 140, 141, 147, 148, 151, 152 Admiral, 50 Advanced contracts, 19, 125 Advanced tactical fighter jet (ATF), 7, 47, 60, 61, 63, 65, 66 Advancements, 19, 69 Agency theory, 5, 11, 123, 124, 126–128, 132, 133 Agent, 16, 31, 38, 42, 47, 51, 57, 60, 65, 74, 76, 98, 103, 106, 124–130 Air Combat Command, 22 Aircraft carrier, 20, 63, 69, 105 Akin, 61, 149 Amalgamation, 129 Ambiguities, 74, 143 Analysis, 2, 9, 28, 32, 36, 40, 44, 55, 68, 83, 84, 98, 99, 101, 108, 112, 114, 125, 129, 130, 136, 137, 144, 148

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. M. Steinfeld, Public-Private Stewardship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17131-4

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INDEX

Ancillary, 64 Apparatus, 114, 132 Applications, 8, 40, 108, 109, 140, 147, 151 Approach, 2, 4, 12, 16, 18, 20, 22, 45, 54, 60, 63, 65, 68, 74, 75, 78, 79, 89, 101–104, 106, 108, 112, 114, 125, 127, 128, 130, 137 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, 59 Army Corps. of Engineers, 22 Artificial intelligence (AI), 67 Aspirations, 59 Assembly, 36, 87, 103 Asset, 19, 28, 59, 64, 126

B Bandwidth, 39 Baseline, 86, 109, 145 Benchmark, 28, 84 Best practices, 27, 43, 54, 69, 89, 109, 113, 138 Best value, 62, 79, 96, 98, 102, 104, 105, 128 Best value source selection (BVSS), 62, 68, 79, 90–92 Bidding, 16, 19, 21–23, 37, 40, 41, 62, 87, 92, 97, 115 Blueprints, 151 Body of knowledge, 24, 44, 113, 150 Broker, 11, 103, 104 Budgeting, 36, 46, 60, 67, 107, 117 Bureaucracy, 49, 145 Business development, 7, 36, 105 Business management, 46, 114, 117 Business practices, 55–57 Business set-asides, 105

C Capabilities design review (CDR), 107

Capability, 4, 11, 18, 19, 28, 29, 40, 42, 44, 47, 50, 59–65, 69, 83–85, 90, 91, 98–102, 104, 105, 107–109, 132, 139, 142, 146, 147 Capacity, 3, 29, 46, 63, 67, 83, 84, 90, 92, 108, 127, 139, 142 Catalyst, 5, 9, 10, 53, 56–58, 66–69, 85, 131 Caveat, 9, 54, 81, 87, 105 Centralized, 6, 28, 63 Challenges, 6, 8, 9, 11, 16, 19, 21, 26, 28, 30–32, 36, 38, 41, 48, 56, 59, 66, 68, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 87, 99, 102, 103, 108, 120, 125, 130, 132, 135, 138, 140, 144, 147 Chief information officer (CIO), 30, 76 Chief(s) of Staff, 29, 50 Civilian personnel, 7, 66 Closed-open system, 38 Coastlines, 59, 60 Combatant command, 7, 24, 67 Combat readiness, 8, 28, 30, 82, 91, 101, 139, 146 Combinations, 21, 23, 25, 55, 67, 74, 83, 86, 90, 91, 114, 150 Combination specifications, 21 Command, 6, 26–30, 32, 38, 50, 60, 66, 68, 75, 77, 78, 80, 98, 115, 150 Commander, 29, 78, 106 Commercialization, 17 Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS), 19 Communications, 5, 10, 19, 29, 36, 38, 39, 46, 48, 54, 58, 67, 69, 73, 74, 78–83, 85, 86, 90, 91, 100, 107, 114, 119, 128, 132 Community of practice, 148 Compartmentalization, 31, 32, 103

INDEX

Competition, 10, 22, 27, 40, 41, 56, 58, 59, 62–65, 67–69, 77, 87, 97, 104, 105, 115, 137 Competitive advantage, 62, 63, 90–92, 97, 108 Compliance, 38, 41, 55, 107, 116 Component, 5, 7, 38, 42, 43, 60, 62, 68, 96, 103, 108, 138, 140 Comptroller, 46, 89 Concept, 2, 3, 6, 7, 11, 17, 18, 23, 25, 36, 60, 63, 65, 69, 77, 83, 102 Concurrency, 99, 109 Conditions, 2, 54, 88, 101, 113, 120, 143, 149 Configuration, 66 Connections, 24, 25, 80, 99, 108, 114, 117, 129, 147, 150 Consolidated, 63 Consortium, 63–65 Construction, 18, 67, 74, 76, 83, 85, 106 Consumption, 18 Contract administration, 25, 37, 41, 43, 45, 46, 56, 74, 89, 96, 97, 118, 119, 140, 141, 147 Contract closeout, 25, 39, 118–121 Contracting arrangements, 8, 67, 77, 81, 126 Contracting officer (KO), 26, 42 Contracting officer’s representative (COR), 43, 115–117 Contracting officer’s technical representative (COTR), 42 Contractor, 20, 21, 31, 37–41, 44, 56, 62–68, 77, 78, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 105, 118–121, 138 Contract type, 64, 67, 76, 87, 88, 90, 92, 96, 140 Contributions, 27, 54, 58, 60, 85, 133, 146, 147 Cooperative, 125, 147

167

Cooperatively, 38 Coordination, 6, 8, 28, 42, 63, 66, 75, 85, 86, 97, 113, 125, 142, 152 Core values, 8, 9, 44, 45, 58, 82, 90, 127 Cost, 2, 3, 7, 9, 18, 23, 25, 30, 31, 37, 39, 46, 47, 55, 61, 63, 65, 69, 81, 84, 86–88, 90, 91, 97–99, 101, 102, 105, 118, 120, 137 Cost-effectiveness, 2–4, 41, 45, 48, 58, 69, 85, 89, 104–106, 113, 115, 118, 124, 143, 146 Cost mitigation, 58 Cost reduction, 137 Cost-reimbursement, 88–92, 141 Counterattacks, 31 Covid-19, 23, 24, 28, 48–51 Criteria, 3, 55, 90, 103, 105, 118, 148. See also Evaluation criteria Cross-coordinated, 108 Culture, 31, 56, 137, 142, 150 Customer, 4, 19, 21, 24, 37, 43, 44, 62, 105, 129, 131, 139 Cybersecurity, 28, 30, 31, 39, 40, 43, 44, 101, 102, 129 Cyberwarfare, 101

D Data analytics, 9, 28, 109, 120 Data collection, 28, 40, 83 Data processing, 28, 103 Data sharing, 28, 69, 84, 109 Decision making, 2, 3, 9–11, 16, 17, 27–30, 32, 36, 41, 44, 45, 47, 49, 51, 54, 62, 75, 78, 81, 83, 84, 89, 92, 96, 101–104, 108, 113, 114, 117, 119, 120, 125, 126, 129, 142, 144, 146, 148, 151, 152

168

INDEX

Deepwater Modernization program, 60, 63 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFARS), 26, 75–77, 80–82, 104, 113 Deliverables, 25, 47, 60, 62, 85, 89, 96, 98, 105, 108, 125, 132 Delivery, 2, 3, 9, 25, 30, 37, 39, 46, 54–57, 59, 61, 62, 65, 81, 86, 88, 89, 97, 99, 105, 106, 113, 116, 131, 137 Democratic, 5, 19, 35, 49, 50 Department, 24, 36, 38, 40, 44, 49, 136, 137, 139, 141, 143, 147, 149 Department of Defense (DOD), 6–8, 18, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 47, 50, 54–56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 69, 74, 75, 80, 85–89, 97, 99, 102, 104–106, 116, 117, 120, 124, 125, 146, 147, 150 Department of the Navy (DON), 6–8, 17, 19, 20, 26–32, 36, 44, 48, 66, 67, 69, 75, 76, 80, 82, 86, 115, 116, 146 Deployment, 28, 59 Descriptive, 103 Design-based, 21 Design-bid-build (DBB), 85 Design-build (DB), 63, 85 Design-build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM), 75 Destination, 151 Development, 3, 12, 17, 22, 23, 26, 44, 45, 49, 50, 60–63, 65, 69, 74, 79, 97, 106–108, 117, 124, 130, 136, 139, 141, 147 Dichotomous, 103 Dictum, 107 Direct reporting manager (DRPM), 81

Disadvantaged business, 91, 104, 105 Disposal, 8, 66, 141 Diversification, 60, 105 Diversity, 25, 41, 42, 90, 91, 105, 106, 117, 131, 137, 148 Dominance, 61, 69

E Echelon, 24, 30 Economic, 4, 5, 27, 36, 41, 49, 65, 87, 91, 106, 124, 127, 128, 136 Economies of scale, 2, 63, 92 Effectiveness, 3–5, 27, 30, 31, 43, 48, 64, 74, 85, 89, 99, 109, 113, 118, 119, 125, 131, 137, 143 Effectuates, 149 Efficiency, 3–5, 27, 30, 36, 37, 43, 48, 49, 55, 64, 85, 89, 107, 109, 113, 118, 119, 137–143 Electromagnetism, 101 Elements, 2, 7, 10, 11, 21, 22, 27, 37, 39, 42, 43, 46, 49, 59, 60, 67, 75, 78, 81, 85, 90, 91, 99, 102, 105, 106, 112, 116, 117, 119, 130, 138, 141, 142, 144 Emergency, 23, 48, 50 Engagement, 3, 8, 12, 16, 17, 19, 23, 38, 48, 51, 69, 77, 82, 107, 132, 147 Engineering, 20, 60, 66, 67, 98, 151 Environment, 16, 17, 21, 27, 28, 37, 41, 44, 49, 50, 62, 87, 97, 100, 107, 137, 143, 149 Environmentalism, 9, 85, 113 Equipment, 19, 45, 48, 62, 83, 85, 86, 139 Ethics, 27, 41, 102, 131, 141 Evaluation criteria, 105 Exchange briefing, 22 Executive director, 29 Executive manager, 26, 27, 102, 142

INDEX

Expectations, 4, 55, 56, 74, 79, 86, 92, 103, 106 Expedited, 22, 76 Expeditiously, 38 Expertise, 2, 5, 8, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 25, 26, 38, 46, 51, 56, 58, 62, 67, 78, 80, 84, 90, 91, 97, 102, 112, 117, 124, 127, 133, 137 External stakeholders, 46, 47, 68

F Face masks, 49 Facilitate, 12, 21, 67, 78, 139 Failure, 7, 19, 54, 55, 57–59, 64, 65, 69, 85, 133 Features, 16, 18, 40, 46, 59, 68, 69, 83, 88, 90–92, 100, 104 Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), 26, 75–77, 80–82, 99, 104, 113, 118, 146, 150 Fiduciary, 12, 21, 82, 88, 130 Filing, 118 Firm fixed-price, 63 Fiscal, 27 Fleet, 7, 19, 39, 59, 61, 64, 106 Flexibility, 21, 75, 137 Foreign military sales (FMS), 69, 74 Formation, 10, 56, 58, 101, 136, 147 Forward-presence, 68 Fragmenting, 102, 103 Framework, 2, 5, 12, 38, 44, 63, 64, 108, 124, 136 Fulfill, 7, 31, 103, 126, 140 Full rate production (FRP), 107 Functionalize, 10, 103 Functions, 7, 16, 20, 26, 32, 38, 46, 49, 50, 55, 58, 66, 69, 76, 83, 97, 101, 116, 117, 126, 128, 142, 147 Fungible, 109

169

G Gear, 83 Gel, 149 General, 28, 81, 108, 126, 136 Global forces, 6, 67 Global positioning, 19 Goals, 3–5, 12, 16, 18, 27, 29, 35, 39, 41, 54, 57, 58, 60, 83, 92, 96, 99, 100, 107, 114, 124–127, 129, 130, 132, 136–142, 148 Good governance, 3, 41, 82 Goods, 7, 16, 19, 22, 24, 37, 41, 48, 83, 125, 147 Governance, 16, 41, 89, 129, 130, 139 Government off the shelf (GOTS), 19, 59 Gradual, 45, 108 H Harbors, 66 Headquarters, 6, 66, 101 Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), 20, 21 Hesitancy, 150 Hierarchical, 32, 103, 130 High-qualify, 101, 102, 149 Horizontal, 29 Hull, 60 Human capital, 37, 143 Human resources, 67 I Implementation, 4, 5, 10, 12, 16, 28, 42, 57, 66, 73, 74, 78, 79, 82, 97, 131, 139, 144, 146 Improvements, 29, 32, 50, 65, 86, 98, 108 Incentives, 9, 36, 64, 66, 68, 105, 124, 125, 127, 137, 141, 151 Inclusion, 9, 11, 22, 105, 137, 151

170

INDEX

Incremental, 63, 107, 108 Individual Streamlined Acquisition Plan (ISTRAP), 81, 82 Industry, 7, 16, 18, 22, 23, 41, 44, 48, 56, 63–65, 82, 84, 86, 99, 100, 104, 105, 124, 137, 138, 151 Information technology (IT), 7, 8, 26, 28, 30, 31, 40, 44, 66, 67, 76, 100–103, 143 Infrastructure, 28, 62, 65, 74, 86, 106, 137, 143 Inherently governmental, 42, 58, 80 Initiatives, 3, 41, 49, 67, 76, 102, 131 Innovation, 8, 17, 19, 21, 31, 32, 37, 40, 43, 44, 46, 49, 54, 68–70, 76, 78, 79, 83, 86, 87, 100, 101, 104, 106, 113, 137, 140, 143, 147, 151 Inquiries, 2, 12, 16, 24, 57, 67, 68, 112, 114, 146, 150 Installation (military base), 66 Installation (work), 20, 21 Institutional memory, 30, 47 Integration, 59, 77, 87, 108 Intensification, 62 Interaction, 16, 19, 23, 24, 79, 81, 82, 97, 101, 112–116, 128, 131, 143, 149 Intercepting, 19 Interdependencies, 24, 31 Interdependent, 25 Inter-dynamic, 103 Interface, 25, 106 Intergalactic, 17 Intermittent, 60 Internal, 45–47, 57, 79, 85, 87, 101, 113, 127 Internal stakeholders, 42, 46, 47, 57, 68, 79, 87, 113 Inter-operational, 29

Interorganizational, 41 Interpretation, 86, 102, 112, 147 Interrelationship, 85 Invitation for Bid (IFB), 25, 90–92 Issues, 9, 11, 28, 36, 49, 55, 59, 62, 64, 79, 102, 103, 107, 112, 116, 118–120, 124–126, 132, 133 Iteration, 16

J Job activities, 28, 75, 83, 101–103, 114, 140, 142, 144 Job tasks, 64 Joint capabilities integration and development system (JCIDS), 47, 107, 108 Joint forces, 6, 61, 64, 68, 84, 107 Joint strike fighter (JSF), 60, 99 Joint tactical radio system (JTRS), 107, 108 Joint task forces (JTF), 101

K Key performance indicators (KPI), 77, 142, 144 Knowledge, 10, 17, 23, 29, 30, 36, 40, 51, 54, 58, 62, 67, 69, 96, 100, 108, 112, 116, 117, 124, 129, 142, 146

L Lackadaisical, 36 Leadership, 5, 8, 15–18, 20, 24, 26–29, 31, 39, 42, 45, 50, 67, 85, 112, 128, 130, 132, 145 Lessons, 4, 5, 11, 37, 39, 129, 139 Level of effort (LOE), 66, 118 Level-set, 91 Leverage, 11, 65, 85, 115 Life-cycle, 4, 60, 63, 86, 88, 107

INDEX

Limitations, 10, 63, 67, 83, 124, 126 Linearity, 103 Littoral combat ship (LCS), 58–61, 63, 64, 66–68, 150 Logistics, 50, 55, 64, 66, 67, 83–85, 119 Lowest-price, technically acceptable (LPTA), 68, 79, 90–92, 102 Low-rate initial production (LRIP), 107 Low-rate production, 7, 136

M Maintenance, 22, 30, 31, 39, 40, 42, 44, 47, 58, 59, 63–65, 75, 83, 102, 138, 139 Management, 3, 5, 6, 10–12, 24, 26, 28–30, 36, 37, 39, 41–43, 45, 46, 49–51, 54, 57, 58, 60, 62, 66, 67, 76, 83–85, 96, 100–103, 108, 109, 114, 124, 127, 129, 136, 140–142, 144, 145, 147, 150–152 Manager, 26, 28, 29, 31, 38, 42, 57, 66, 67, 77–79, 81, 85, 98, 100, 133, 142 Managerialism, 58, 141 Manpower, 32, 66, 138 Mantra, 149 Marines, 20, 28, 84 Market research, 11, 16, 98–100 Materialize, 44 Maturity, 43, 65, 151 Maximize, 26, 35, 36, 40, 64 Mechanical, 20, 69, 130 Mechanism, 28, 60, 138 Media, 19, 46, 48–50, 68 Meet, 6, 7, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 30, 61, 66, 68, 76, 77, 83, 84, 89, 90, 99, 104, 126, 143, 150

171

Methods, 40, 56, 61, 63, 68, 76, 79, 81, 85–88, 90, 91, 96, 99, 102, 106, 112, 140 Milestone, 63, 69 Milieu, 85 Military construction (MILCON), 7, 74, 83, 84, 86 Military Sealift Command (MSC), 20, 22 Minority-owned, 105 Missile-guided destroyer (DDG), 58–61, 63, 64, 67, 68, 150 Mission, 7, 8, 12, 20, 23, 28–30, 32, 38, 43, 56, 61, 66, 68, 82–84, 92, 102, 104, 107, 113, 125, 136–139, 141, 142, 147 Mobilization, 24, 28, 47, 57, 62, 69, 147 Modernization, 66 Monetary, 16, 23, 36, 69, 151 Monitoring, 31, 39, 46, 55, 88, 97, 116, 124 Motives, 2, 7, 66, 69, 79, 117 Multi-mission, 59, 61, 68, 107 Multiple-award contract, multiple-offer (MACMO), 63–65, 67 Multiple-ship, multiple-order (MSMO) contract type, 64, 67 Multi-sectoral, 3, 103 N Narrative, 24, 40, 51, 80, 107, 115 National security cutter (NSC), 60 National stock numbers, 20 Naval Facilities Acquisition Standards (NFAS), 75–77, 82 Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC), 74, 75, 79, 83, 85 Naval Information Forces (NAVIFOR), 29, 150

172

INDEX

Naval Station Norfolk, Atlantic Command, 6, 66 Naval Supply Systems (NAVSUP), 20, 26, 115 Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement (NMCARS), 75–78, 80–82, 146 Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), 28 Network, 28, 60, 67, 101, 107 Neutral, 11, 101, 103, 133 Next generation, 60 Nimble, 59, 68 Normalization, 30, 49 O Objectives, 3–8, 12, 16, 26–30, 32, 36, 37, 39, 41, 43, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 66–69, 77, 79, 83, 96, 99, 100, 104, 113–115, 120, 125–127, 129, 132, 136–142, 146–148, 151 Obstacles, 9, 20, 31, 38, 46, 55, 59, 89, 96, 102, 124, 125, 138, 146 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 47, 75 Operationalization, 114, 144 Operations, 3, 6, 7, 10, 26–28, 30–32, 37, 40–43, 59, 61, 83–85, 91, 99, 101, 105, 119, 125, 139, 140, 143, 147, 148 Operative, 83 Opportunities, 11, 18, 22, 23, 27, 28, 30, 31, 36, 38, 39, 44, 51, 54, 56, 75, 90, 96, 97, 104, 114, 124, 140, 141, 146, 147 Optimize, 67, 137 Orbit, 107 Organization, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 16, 19, 25–27, 29, 31, 36, 40, 44, 47, 54, 58, 73, 80, 96, 107, 108, 125, 126, 131, 132, 136, 137,

139, 140, 142–144, 146, 149, 151 Organizational dynamic, 26, 143 Organizational structure, 6, 24, 32, 36, 39, 143, 146 Other transaction authorities (OTA), 19 Outsourcing, 4, 118 Overlapping, 29, 47, 60, 103

P Painting, 19 Pandemic, 24, 28, 48, 50, 51 Payload, 68 Peer review authority (PRA), 78, 79 Pentagon, 6, 17 Performance, 3, 5, 9–11, 19, 21, 27–31, 36, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 46, 54, 59, 64, 74, 75, 79, 83, 84, 86–89, 95, 96, 103, 106, 109, 114, 116, 119–121, 127–129, 131, 137, 138, 140, 142, 143, 147, 149, 152 Performance-based, 21, 125 Performance to contract, 25, 37, 40, 56, 57, 64, 87, 97, 120 Performance work statement (PWS), 106 Personnel, 6, 12, 16, 19, 23, 24, 26–30, 32, 38, 39, 42, 45, 46, 57, 61, 65–67, 77, 78, 83, 85, 89, 102, 108, 109, 116, 117, 124, 126, 138, 139, 142, 143, 151 Phase, 16, 17, 25, 74, 97, 119, 140, 151 Planning, 4, 10–12, 24, 37, 42, 43, 56, 60, 66, 75, 76, 79, 82, 84, 85, 87, 97, 102, 105–107, 116, 119, 132, 136–139, 142, 143, 146

INDEX

Policies, 17, 22, 29, 30, 42, 55–57, 74–76, 80, 104, 105, 107, 114, 115, 117, 136, 139, 142, 146, 149 Policymakers, 68, 79 Politicians, 5, 54, 68, 79 Politicization, 9, 49, 50 Politics, 49, 103, 130 Pool, 65 Portal, 109 Posture, 107 Practices, 1, 2, 3, 5–12, 24, 25, 27, 30, 31, 39, 40, 42–45, 49, 51, 54, 56–58, 67–69, 74, 75, 77, 79–83, 85, 87, 90, 92, 96–99, 103, 112–118, 120, 124–133, 136–141, 146–151. See also Public-private stewardship (PPS) Practitioner, 3, 8–10, 16, 18, 25, 45, 49, 53, 73, 81, 82, 88, 90, 96, 98, 102, 104, 112–115, 117, 118, 123, 126, 127, 129, 130, 133, 144, 146–150 Preliminary design authority (PDA), 84 Preliminary design review (PDR), 107 Presidency, 50 Pre-solicitation, 16, 21, 25, 56, 65, 77, 138 Principal, 60, 65, 76, 124–127, 129, 130 Priorities, 36, 40, 41, 80, 98, 103, 105, 113, 115, 126, 136–138, 141–143, 148, 150 Private values, 65 Procedures, 16, 22, 39, 56, 57, 75, 113, 118, 142 Process, 2, 7, 10, 12, 16, 17, 19–22, 26–28, 30, 35, 37–41, 46, 47, 51, 53–56, 60, 67, 69, 74, 77, 78, 83–85, 96, 97, 99, 102, 103, 105, 107, 108, 112–114, 118,

173

126, 129, 131–133, 136, 138, 139, 141–143, 146, 149, 150 Procurement, 3, 7, 9, 10, 12, 16, 22, 26, 41, 42, 44, 56, 63, 64, 66, 67, 75, 76, 78, 80, 82, 86, 87, 90, 96–98, 100–104, 106, 108, 116, 117, 119, 126, 136, 140, 141, 143, 145–148, 151, 152 Production, 2, 7, 17–19, 36, 47–49, 60, 61, 86, 87, 99, 124 Production readiness review (PRR), 107 Professional association, 22, 48, 49, 148 Profitability, 6, 18, 24, 36, 69, 88, 137 Program, 8, 9, 11, 17, 18, 20, 27, 30, 40, 43, 47, 58–60, 63, 64, 67, 75, 79, 82–84, 86, 87, 97, 98, 100, 103–105, 107, 108, 116, 131, 138 Program executive officer (PEO), 81 Program Streamlined Acquisition Plan (PSTRAP), 81–83 Progressions, 108, 113, 144, 149 Project, 2–4, 7, 8, 16, 17, 36, 37, 42, 43, 45–47, 51, 56–59, 69, 74, 75, 78, 82, 85, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 96, 98–100, 105, 106, 109, 111, 113–116, 118–120, 128, 132, 136, 138, 140, 147, 149, 151 Property management, 55–57 Proposal, 17, 18, 25, 42, 43, 59, 87, 90–92, 96–98, 105, 118, 121 Proposal evaluation, 43 Proprietary, 18, 31, 40, 62, 91, 100 Propulsion, 19, 62 Protest, 41, 98, 103 Public goods, 2, 6, 21, 124

174

INDEX

Public interest, 2–5, 8–10, 36, 41, 45, 49, 53, 56, 57, 66, 68, 69, 74, 82, 96, 124, 128–133, 136 Public-private partnership (PPP), 1–6, 9–12, 16, 36, 41, 48, 49, 54, 55, 57–59, 66, 73–76, 82, 85, 90, 92, 95–97, 99, 103, 105–107, 111–113, 115, 125–128, 130, 131, 133, 136, 137, 139, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 149, 151, 152 Public-private steward, 5, 9–11, 36, 38, 54, 80, 81, 84, 89, 91, 96, 112, 131–133, 146, 149, 151 Public-private stewardship (PPS), 3, 5–12, 15, 20, 25, 38, 40–46, 49, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 67–69, 73–75, 79–85, 87, 88, 90–92, 96, 98–100, 103, 111, 113–115, 117, 120, 123, 125–133, 135–137, 141–152 Public-private venture (PPV), 54, 55, 57, 75, 82 Public service motivation (PSM), 87 Public stewardship, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 113, 128, 130 Public values, 2, 4, 9, 11, 12, 37, 41, 65, 68, 79, 88, 96, 98, 100–102, 113–115, 117, 118, 124, 125, 128–130, 136, 149, 151 Purchasing, 20, 148, 151 Purist, 11, 103, 104, 115 Purpose, 5, 8, 9, 11, 16, 22, 28, 42, 55, 56, 86, 89, 115, 119, 130, 143 Q Qualitative, 27, 102 Quality, 3, 9, 17, 19, 22, 29, 31, 37–40, 42–44, 46, 55, 57, 58, 60, 63–65, 74, 86–90, 95, 97, 98, 101, 105, 116, 118, 119,

124, 125, 131, 137, 138, 141, 143, 151 Quality assurance, 10, 38, 43, 46, 55, 60, 97, 125 Quality enhancement, 22 Quantifiable, 83, 102 Quantify, 11 Quantity, 17, 25, 36, 63, 137 R Radio frequency (RF), 107 Rear admiral, 24, 48, 50 Reasoning, 24, 27, 43, 117 Reconceptualization, 11, 12, 108, 142 Reconcile, 108, 141 Regulations, 9, 10, 19, 22, 25, 29, 82, 83, 106, 131 Reliability, 39, 64, 65, 137 Reputation, 37, 124, 149 Request for proposal (RFP), 25, 84, 90, 91, 99 Requirements, 7, 9, 10, 17–21, 23, 25, 30, 36, 37, 40–42, 47, 55–57, 59–65, 67–69, 75, 78, 79, 82–84, 86–92, 97–100, 102, 104, 105, 107, 115–119, 125, 126, 130, 136, 138, 140, 143, 146, 147 Research and development (R&D), 7, 60, 65, 100 Resilient, 137, 147 Resistance, 108 Resources, 2, 4, 21, 23–25, 28, 31, 37, 48, 54, 56, 62–65, 68, 69, 75, 78, 79, 84, 85, 87–91, 97, 104, 107, 115, 118, 126, 130, 136, 138–143, 147 Responsibilities, 3, 5, 6, 12, 15, 21, 24–27, 38, 40, 41, 47, 51, 54, 65, 67, 80, 82, 87, 88, 101–103, 116, 121, 127, 130, 133, 143 Responsibility (in bidding), 87

INDEX

Responsible (in politicization of bureaucracy), 136 Responsiveness (in bidding), 87 Responsiveness (in politicization of bureaucracy), 133 Return on investment (ROI), 16, 31, 39, 44, 69, 97, 99, 147 Revenues, 2, 20, 30, 31, 36, 39, 40, 44, 85, 89, 151 Reverberates, 126 Roadmap, 108, 109 Roles, 8, 16, 22, 24–27, 38, 40, 41, 46, 47, 51, 53, 54, 57, 61, 67, 74, 77, 80, 116, 117, 126, 131, 142, 143 Rulebound, 103 Rulemaking, 80 Rules, 10, 22, 25, 29, 81, 131

S Safeguards, 28, 115 Sailors, 24, 42, 46, 59, 66 Schemata, 9 Scheme, 44, 66, 79 Scholarly, 24, 150 Scope of work, 25, 38, 56, 105, 106, 116 Scorecards, 151 Sea-level rise, 66 Seaworthy, 60 Self-interest, 24, 58, 131, 132, 148, 149 Sequential, 108, 125 Series, 19, 26, 47, 48, 61, 63, 99, 108 Service-centric, 108 Services, 1–7, 11, 12, 16, 19, 20, 22–24, 26, 29, 36–39, 41–44, 48, 55–57, 59, 66, 74, 78, 79, 83, 85, 87–91, 99, 102, 103, 108, 111, 115, 117, 120, 124,

175

125, 130, 132, 133, 137, 139, 147 Shipbuilding, 7, 38, 60–65, 67 Ship repair, 7, 63, 64, 67, 79 Shore-based facilities, 18, 67 Signal, 87, 91, 101 Skills, 21, 40, 54, 67 Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), 17, 18 Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR), 17, 18 Smaller buys, 20 Socio-economic, 49, 147 Software, 20, 61, 66, 75, 107 Solicitation, 3, 10, 21, 25, 26, 40, 42, 43, 56, 65, 68, 77, 85–87, 90–92, 97, 138, 140 Source selection authority (SSA), 78 Space, 6, 9, 18, 25, 43, 45, 59, 64, 80, 86, 101, 104, 107, 128, 129, 144, 149 Specifications, 18, 19, 21, 25, 36, 37, 56, 59, 68, 69, 75, 78, 79, 83, 84, 87–89, 92, 97, 100, 104, 105, 109, 116, 119 Staffing, 30, 66 Stakeholders, 3, 5, 8–12, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 35, 36, 41, 42, 46–48, 55–58, 62, 67–69, 73, 77–80, 82–85, 91, 96, 98, 102–104, 106–109, 111, 113–117, 125–131, 133, 137, 141, 142, 144, 146–149, 151, 152 Stakeholder trust, 49 Standardization, 9, 47, 55, 56, 125 Standards, 11, 20, 21, 36, 41, 46, 56, 57, 61, 79, 80, 85, 88, 120, 125, 130, 132, 138 Start-up companies, 18 Statement of objectives (SOO), 106 Statement of work (SOW), 106

176

INDEX

Stewardship, 5, 8, 11, 15–17, 20–27, 31, 37, 40, 45, 65, 86, 88, 123, 125–128, 130, 132, 137, 147, 148 Stewardship theory, 5, 11, 23, 123–133, 147 Strategic objectives, 67, 68 Strategic sourcing, 3 Strengths, 16, 78, 141, 143 Strike force, 19 Subcomponent, 43, 140 Submarines, 67 Subordinates, 38, 67, 107, 116 Success, 6, 16, 27, 46, 55, 57, 58, 89, 91, 106, 113, 121, 126, 127, 133, 138 Superiority, 28, 61 Supersedes, 21, 49, 57, 80 Supervisor, 66, 149 Supplier, 7, 16, 25, 26, 47, 50, 60, 90, 91, 105 Supply, 3, 26, 43, 48, 50, 67, 92, 117, 136, 147 Sustainability, 3, 11, 19, 21, 29, 36, 37, 41, 54, 65, 86, 87, 102, 105, 106, 118, 119, 131, 137, 138, 147, 151 Synchronization, 16, 47, 62 System of systems (SOS), 42, 60, 62, 63, 68, 70, 98

T Tactical, 12, 27, 29, 66, 67, 143, 146 Tactics, 3, 9, 10, 41, 78, 80, 103, 114, 115, 146–148 Tangential, 23, 47 Techniques, 10, 57, 78, 88, 90, 102, 106, 113, 125, 140–142, 145, 146, 148 Technological, 40, 59, 60, 65, 87, 104, 108

Technology, 18, 19, 22, 30, 36, 40, 42, 44, 45, 47, 59–62, 84, 85, 99–101, 107, 108, 114, 137–140 Technology readiness level (TRL), 108 Tensions, 2, 11, 98, 105, 108, 119, 141, 144 Testing, 60, 65, 107 Theory, 6, 11, 23–25, 44, 112–115, 117, 120, 123–128, 132, 133, 137, 144, 145, 147, 151 Threats, 19, 28–30, 48, 53, 74, 98, 108, 131, 140, 141, 144, 150 Thresholds, 39, 46, 106, 115 Tidewater Association of Service Contractors (TASC), 22 Tidewater Government/Industry Council (TGIC), 22 Tiered, 109 Tiger teams, 43 Time, 19, 25, 29, 37, 47–50, 54, 60, 61, 63, 65, 84, 87, 97–99, 107, 112, 120, 127, 137, 139, 150, 151 Tradeoffs, 3, 39, 64, 66, 140 Training, 22, 26, 37, 40, 43, 67, 115–117, 124, 138, 139, 143, 148 Transaction costs, 9 Transformation Satellite Communications System (TSAT), 107, 108 Transparency, 3, 9–11, 41–44, 49, 58, 68–70, 85, 89, 95–98, 100–104, 106–109, 113, 115, 118, 126, 128, 131, 137, 142, 143 Transparent engagement, 5, 10, 95–109, 131 Troubleshoot, 103 Trust, 18, 23, 36, 45, 49, 62, 126, 128, 130, 131

INDEX

U Underway, 61, 64 U.S. Air Force, 7, 28, 66 U.S. Coast Guard, 107 U.S. Fleet Forces, 24, 27, 29 U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), 26 USNS Comfort, 29 USNS Mercy, 29 Utilization, 19, 22, 39, 48, 62, 63, 104, 137, 147 V Vaccines, 23, 24, 48–50 Validation, 60, 65, 83 Value drivers, 11, 65, 106, 142–144 Value-for-money (VFM), 3–6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 25, 65, 66, 68, 69, 74, 79–82, 84, 85, 89, 90, 92, 97–99, 101, 103, 104, 108, 114, 115, 117, 118, 120, 125–129, 131–133, 136, 146, 149, 151 Value-laden, 108, 141 Value proposition, 3, 8, 9, 41–45, 47, 49, 51, 55, 58, 68, 69, 75, 77, 80, 82, 84, 89, 92, 98, 105, 126, 128, 133, 146, 147, 151 Veil, 149 Vendor, 7, 16, 19, 23, 37, 40, 64, 105

177

Versatility, 68, 92, 137 Vertical, 107 Veteran-owned, 104, 105 Vice president, 24, 48, 50 Vital, 8, 50, 68, 86, 149 Volume, 68, 92, 101

W Warfighter, 8, 30–32, 36, 39, 43, 67, 82, 84, 105, 107, 146 War games simulation, 37, 66 Weaknesses, 16, 108, 141, 143 Weapons system, 19, 20, 50, 61, 63, 74, 97, 107 Web, 23, 39, 60, 80 Woman-owned, 105 Workforce, 30, 43, 44, 66, 69, 85, 86, 88, 89, 101, 102, 116, 117, 124, 138 Work packages, 39, 62, 64, 68 Workstations, 20

Y Yeoman’s work, 120

Y Zumwalt-class destroyer, 59