Public Opinion and Canadian Identity [Reprint 2020 ed.] 9780520347724

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PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

MILDRED A. SCHWARTZ Foreword by SEYMOUR MARTIN

UPSET

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley and Los Angeles

1967

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California Cambridge University Press London, England Copyright © 1967, by T h e Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 67-17693 Printed in the United States of America

FOREWORD

T w o NATIONS, the United States and Canada, resulted from the American Revolution. T h e first, representing the victorious revolutionary side, emerged with a national ethos proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, and subsequently furbished by the successful efforts of various political tendencies to extend the egalitarian aspects of that ethos. The liberal-left groups in the United States have repeatedly laid claim to the national tradition as they fought for universal suffrage, emancipation, state intervention on behalf of weaker and underprivileged groups, and currently equal rights for Negroes. Conservatives in the United States have been at a disadvantage as contrasted with similar tendencies in many European countries since the American national tradition has been identified with anti-elitist and Utopian (assumptions about human perfectability) conceptions. T h e extent to which this revolutionary tradition still informs the character of American society must be seen in comparative perspective, by contrasting different aspects of U.S. behavior and values with those of nations such as Canada which lack this tradition. Thus it will probably come as a shock to most Americans that the late Harold Innis, Canada's greatest social scientist, writing shortly after World War II, in discussing the emigration of Canadian university graduates to the United States, could present the problem as one involving "the training of our best students for export to countries with a revolutionary tradition." 1 More recently, a British Labor M.P., David Marquand, in reviewing Hofstadter's b o o k , The

Paranoid

Style in American

Politics,

p o i n t e d to

the fact that the "U.S. and the Soviet Union are both revolutionary countries, based on a belief in the perfectibility of man" 2 as an explanation of the belief in un-American and anti-Communist plots in both countries. Innis and a number of other leading Canadian social scientists, such as S. D. Clark, A. R. M. Lower, and Frank Underhill, made the fact that Canada, the North American nation formed from the losing side 1 Harold Innis, Essays in Canadian Economic History, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956, p. 384. 'David Marquand, "America's Bad Guys," The Observer, November 27, 1966, p. 27.

v

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PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

in the Revolution, has a counter-revolutionary tradition, the principal clue to an understanding of Canadian values. 8 T h e historic decision which led to nationhood was the rejection of the Declaration of Independence, and republican status. Whereas after the Revolution many supporters of the American cause left behind north of the new international border emigrated south, many thousands of Tories moved north. And from then on, what emerged as a separate Canadian identity has been based on justifying itself as not being American. As S. D. Clark has put it: "Canadian national life can almost be said to take its rise in the negative will to resist absorption in the American Republic." 4 In rejecting absorption into the revolutionary tradition, Canada chose the losing side from a world-wide ideological perspective. Although it ultimately incorporated most of the changes which everywhere are defined as "progressive" or "liberal"—independence, adult suffrage, welfare-state policies designed to further egalitarian ideals, widespread popular education on all levels—Canada made these adjustments much later than her southern neighbor in most cases. These reforms were rarely made as consequence of the triumph of a liberal egalitarian-oriented party or movement. Rather, as Canadian sociologist John Porter has argued, "their haphazard development has come about more by the 'demonstration effect' of their existence in other countries, than because they have formed the social philosophy of either of the two parties which have been in power at the federal level." 8 T h e presence of Quebec in the Canadian Confederation also represents a negative decision designed to counter the growth of liberal ideals. T h e ecclesiastics of Quebec, the dominant leaders of the French population after the British Conquest in 1763, did not seize the opportunity of the American Revolution to regain freedom from foreign rule. Rather they feared the revolutionary Puritans of New England more than the Anglican Royalists. And after the French Revolution of 1789 resulted in the widespread dispersion of anticlerical and democratic doctrines in their mother country, the French Canadian church leadership sought to cut their people off from the twin sources of intellectual contamination, the United States and 3 See S. M. Lipset, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution—The United States and Canada," in Thomas R . Ford, ed., The Revolution-Theme in Contemporary America (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press), pp. 21-64 for references to the literature dealing with these problems. 4 S . D. Clark, " T h e Importance of Anti-Americanism in Canadian National Feeling," in H. F. Angus, ed., Canada and Her Great Neighbor, Toronto: T h e Ryerson Press, 1938, p. 243. " J o h n Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965, p. 370.

FOREWORD

vii

France. Participation in a union with English Canadians under a British monarchy was far more preferable. The leaders of both English and French Canada found themselves in an independent large federal union after 1867, not because they wanted new nationhood, but because they did not desire links with revolutionary countries, and Great Britain refused to continue various responsibilities for her autonomous North American provinces. The very notion of Canada which had emerged in French Canada and spread to what is now Ontario, was foreign to the people of the Maritimes and British Columbia. For many decades, residents of these provinces continued to speak of going to Canada, meaning the central regions of the country. This tradition meant that the concept of a Canadian identity had little meaning to most citizens of the country. Until World War II, the term "Canadian" was not even used in Canadian passports. The British flag remained the flag of Canada until the 1960's. Canada's highest court of supreme appeal was the Privy Council of the British House of Lords until recently. Canada's constitution is the British North America Act, passed by the parliament of Great Britain in 1867. Amendments to the Constitution still require pro forma ratification by the British parliament. Such symbols of national inferiority which would be outrageous to the citizens of the various new nations of Africa and Asia apparently have bothered few Canadians. During the decades of the fifties and sixties, Canada has witnessed a weakening of federal power in favor of the provinces. Although her constitution written immediately after the American Civil War, gives to the federal government much more ultimate power over the provinces than is held by the U.S. government with respect to the states, many of these central powers have rarely been used, because of weak national legitimacy. In short, although Canada has been one of the most successful nations on earth from the point of view of economic growth and the provision of a high standard of living to its citizens, it still lacks a strong sense of national pride and identity. It is still not certain what it is, a North American nation, not much different from the United States, which a significant minority thinks ought to join the United States, a British nation with a large French subculture, two nations, one English and the other French, which exist in a loose confederation, or some combination of these and other concepts. This is some of the background to which Mildred Schwartz has addressed herself in this magnificent effort to bring together the public-opinion data gathered in many years bearing on the problem

viii

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

of Canadian identity. Her analysis indicates that the problem of identity is far from being resolved. Her emphasis on the integrative role of the two major political parties points to processes which analysts of the formation of national identity in other states have also suggested as crucial. For residents of the United States, this book supplies important insights into their own national development. It suggests that the nationalization of political orientations and opinions which have been occurring there are not a simple outcome of increased urbanization, industrialization, and better transportation and communication facilities. All of these which make the environment of most Americans similar presumably contribute to the formation of common reactions to comparable experiences in different parts of the country. But a basic cultural similarity and national ethos are also necessary for the growth of such value consensus. Where either is lacking, one may expect less integration. Even in very small countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands, cultural disparities in the form of sharp linguistic and religious differences have not resulted in a strong sense of national identity. Switzerland has much more than the others, resulting in part from the fact that, like the United States, its existence is the result of a conscious effort at maintaining its independence. I do not wish to comment further on the problems raised in this book, since this is properly the task of the author, a task which she has handled well. I would, however, like to note in conclusion that this book is not only important for its substantive findings, but it should be recommended reading to social scientists as an excellent example of the contribution to knowledge which can be made from a secondary analysis of the public-opinion data collected since the 1930's by the various commercial polling organizations. These materials provide a new dimension to historical and social science analysis. It is a commentary on the lack of imagination and training of scholars in these fields that this is the first book published based on such materials dealing with Canadian problems. 6 Mildred Schwartz, therefore, deserves to be congratulated both for her contribution to our understanding of problems of national identity, and for her methodological pioneering. Seymour Martin Lipset Harvard University • There is one previous work which uses Canadian opinion data in a comparative treatment of voting behavior in the four major Anglo-American democracies. See Robert Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies, Chicago: R a n d McNally, 1963.

PREFACE

T H E TWENTY-SIXTH parliament of Canada, in an act preceded by acrimonious argument, finally passed legislation giving Canada its own flag, distinct in design from that of any other nation. It was an act that was probably little noticed outside the borders of Canada. As far as Canada itself was concerned, it did nothing to solve pressing economic problems, nor did it contribute to the social welfare of the people. It did not even have much bearing on French-English tensions, except that in some quarters it served to exacerbate these. Where then does the significance of the new flag lie? It points up the anomalies of Canadian nationhood. Ninety-eight years after its formation as a viable state, Canada was only beginning to cope with problems most nations meet (though not necessarily solve) at their birth. Canada's late start in acquiring the symbols of nationhood is indicative of the larger problems it faces as a creation of Britain, a neighbour of the United States, and a nation peopled by groups that somehow had never developed many unifying bonds.

As a Canadian, and one who has also lived in the United States, I had my own ideas about what it meant to live in Canada. At the same time, as a sociologist, I was attracted to the question of what it meant to other Canadians, divided as they were by regional, ethnic, and religious loyalties. From my interest in the role of political parties in a democratic state, I was drawn to the part played by parties in the development of national ties. I saw these issues in comparative and historical terms, and I tried to obtain data which would permit me to so treat Canada's identity. In this regard I was helped by the availability of twenty years of Canadian Gallup material. But without disparaging these data, which form the basis of all my generalizations, they were after all collected by others to serve other purposes, and they put considerable limits on the kinds of analyses I was able to make or the conclusions I could draw. Whether they still provide valuable insights into Canadian society, I leave to the reader to judge. Data were obtained through Professor Philip K. Hastings of the Roper Public Opinion Research Center in Williamstown, Massachusetts, and Miss Byrne Hope Sanders of the Canadian Institute for Public Opinion Research, Toronto. Both Professor Hastings and Miss ix

X

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

Sanders and their staff were consistently helpful and prompt in meeting my requests for information. This book was originally a doctoral dissertation for Columbia University, partly supported by a predoctoral fellowship from the Canada Council. The dissertation was supervised by Juan J. Linz, whose critical comments have contributed immeasurably to the value of this work. Tabulations and calculations of statistical tests were done through the great generosity of Statistical Reporting and Tabulating Limited, Toronto, and the Computing Center of the University of Alberta, Calgary. I would particularly like to thank Ronald May, Anton Colijn, Philip Hadfield, and Mary Lynn Losie at the Center. An initial preparation of the hundreds of tables upon which this study is based was ably done by Mrs. Mary Engelmann. In preparing this book, however, it seemed unnecessarily cumbersome to include all these tables. For further information or confirmation of discussions in the text, the unpublished dissertation, "Canadian National Identity as Seen Through Public Opinion Polls: 1941-1963," is available on file at Columbia University. Other research assistance was provided by Moira Mclvor, Lois Carrier, and Victor Marshall. The style of this book has hopefully been improved by the discerning editorial comments of Rosemary Plotnick, Timothy Enos, Ann Jacobs, and especially Jean Block. The topics which I cover touch on a number of disciplines, and in all cases where I required expert advice I was able to call on my former colleagues at the University of Alberta, Calgary. Of the many who aided me, two in particular can never be adequately thanked. They are Frederick C. Engelmann and Eugene Oetting. Professor Engelmann's fund of knowledge about politics was always available to me, and his sage advice was a major source of support. Dr. Oetting brought his creative insight to bear on my methodological problems, and he was always ready to discuss these with me. Various versions of the first section of this book were discussed with Robert R. Alford, Leonard Binder, James A. Davis, Thelma H. McCormack, Donald L. Spence, Sidney Verba, Douglas Verney. Although I was not always able to use directly the suggestions they made, I benefited in all cases from their critical comments. Typing of the final manuscript was the work of Masako Oshita, Nella Siefert, Lillian Rochon, and Dolores Farrell of National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. M.A.S.

CONTENTS

PART

1. PERSPECTIVES

ON

IDENTITY Page

I II

T H E PUZZLE OF C A N A D A T H E ADOLESCENCE OF N A T I O N H O O D The Meaning of Identity, 8 Identity and Consensus, 24

III

CANADA: PROMISE A N D D I S A P P O I N T M E N T

25

National Problems, 25 Influences on National Identity, 45 Source Material, 53

PART

IV

II. DOMINANT TRENDS

OPINIONS

AND

THEIR

E X T E R N A L PROBLEMS

59

Introduction, 59 Views on Independence, 60 Canada's Role on the International Scene, 77 V

I N T E R N A L PROBLEMS

83

The Diversity of Social Interests, 83 The Role Government Should Play, 95 VI

PROBLEMS OF SYMBOLIC R E P R E S E N T A T I O N

106

The Flag, 106 The Anthem, 110 The Governor-General, 112 The Royal Family, 114 Other Symbols, 116 VII

T H E IMAGE OF C A N A D A

121

Xll

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN

PART

III. THE RELATION PARTIES TO A IDENTITY

IDENTITY

OF POLITICAL DEVELOPING Page

VIII

PARTY INFLUENCE ON OPINIONS

127

The Political Problem, 127 Methods of Discerning Opinion Climates, 128 Evidence of Party Influence, 130 IX

BARRIERS T O CONSENSUS

146

Regionalism, 146 Origin and Party, 158 The Consequences of Diversity, 171 X

T H E PULL BETWEEN PARTY AND CHARACTERISTICS

OTHER 172

Social Class and Party, 172 Party and Age, Sex, and Marital Status, 186 XI

T H E SIGNIFICANCE OF PARTIES

196

Canadian Party Types, 196 Differences Between Parties, 200 Cross-Party Consensus, 207 Political Consequences, 210

PART

XII

IV. CONFRONTATION PROBLEMS

WITH

NATIONAL

T H E I M P A C T OF N A T I O N A L PROBLEMS

215

The Meaningfulness of Issues, 215 Indicators of Salience, 217 An Assessment of Saliency, 231 XIII

RESPONSES T O T H E CHALLENGE OF N A T I O N A L VIABILITY

233

Problems and Solutions: Stability and Change, 233 Defining an Identity, 239 The Case of Canada, 250 INDEX

259

TABLES

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Page Percentage Distribution of Population by Region, 1881-1961 32 Per Capita Personal Disposable Income, for Canada and Provinces, 1961 34 Indicators of Differences in Living Conditions by Region, 1941-1961 34 Percentage Distribution of Population of Non-British Origin, by Region, 1961 35 Canadian General Election Results, 1940-1963 47 Opinions on Aid to Britain, 1942-1952 61 Opinions on Trade Relations with Britain, 1947-1963 62 Evaluation of Britain, 1942-1963 64 Evaluation of Britain, by Official Language, 1942-1956 65 Opinions on Military Relations with the United States, 1959-1961 66 Opinions on Economic Relations with the United States, 1943-1957 67 Opinions on Economic Relations with United States, by Region, 1943-1957 68 Opinions on Foreign Resource Development, 1954-1957 68 Evaluation of the United States, 1948-1963 70 Evaluation of the United States, by Region, 1956-1963 72 Opinions on Commonwealth, 1943-1963 74 Regional Variations in Favouring Independence from the Commonwealth, 1950-1962 76 Opinions on World Organization, 1945-1960 78 Opinions on Canadian Troops Serving Abroad, 1942-1958 79 Opinions on Canadian Troops Serving Abroad by Region, 1943-1954 80 Opinions on International Commitments, 1944-1962 82 Opinions on French-English Relations, 1942-1963 84 Regional Distribution of Canadians Stating Official Lan85 guage as Both English and French, 1961 Opinions of Change in Feelings Between English- and French-Speaking Canadians Over Past Five Years, 1963 86 xiii

xiv

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

Page 87 88 89

25 Opinions on Population Size, 1945-1960 26 Effects of Immigration, 1949-1961 27 Preferred Influences on Government, 1943-1960 28 Preferred Influences on Government, by Occupation of Household Head, 1952-1960 90 29 Participation of Organized Labour and Farm Groups in Politics, 1948-1962 91 30 Opposition to Organized Labour and Farm Groups in Politics, by Union Status of Household, 1948-1962 91 31 Evaluation of Confederation, 1945-1960 92 32 Opinions on Federal-Provincial Powers, 1943-1960 93 33 Opinions on Specific Areas of Responsibility for Federal and Provincial Governments, 1944-1957 94 34 Opinions on Public Ownership, 1943-1957 96 35 Opinions on Government Control Over Prices, 1941-1962 98 36 Opinions on Social Welfare Measures, 1942-1962 99 37 Opinions on Government Participation in Fields of Culture and Ideas, 1942-1957 102 38 Ideological Orientation, 1942-1961 104 39 Choice of National Flag, 1943-1963 107 40 Choice of Flag by Region, 1952-1963 108 41 Choice of New Flag by Party Preference, 1945-1962 109 42 Choice of National Anthem, 1950-1963 110 43 Choice of National Anthem by Region, 1950 and 1963 111 44 Desired Origin for Governor-General, 1944-1957 113 45 Opinions on Members of Royal Family as Governor-General, 1952-1958 114 46 Opinions on Royal Family as Governor-General by Origin, 1956—1958 115 47 Opinions on Royal Family, 1948-1959 116 48 Opinions on Other Political Symbols, 1943-1959 117 49 Opinion Consensus Within Types of Social Groupings, Regardless of Party Supported 131 50 Relation Between Problem Area and Intraparty Consensus for All Parties 132 51 Relation Between Problem Area and Intraparty Consensus for Each Party 133 52 Relation Between Party Preference and Residence in TradeUnion Household for Consensus on National Identity 134 53 Relation Between Party Preference and Type of Community 141 54 Relation Between Party Preference and Region in Canada 146

TABLES

XV

Page 55 Trends in Distribution of High Intraparty IGH's According to Stability of Preference, 1951-1962 56 Relation Between Party Preference and Religion 57 Relation Between Party Preference and Official Language 58 Relation Between Party Preference and Birthplace 59 Relation Between Party Preference and Occupation of Household Head 60 Trends in Distribution of High Intraparty IGH's According to Occupation of Household Head 61 Relation Between Party Preference and Education 62 Trends in Support from the University-Educated for Conservatives and Liberals, 1954-1962 63 Relation Between Party Preference and Age 64 Relative Effect of Age and Historical Situation on Opinions of Commonwealth 65 Relative Effect of Age and Historical Situation on Opinions of Government Activities 66 Relative Effect of Age and Historical Situation on Opinions of Political Symbols 67 Relation of Party Preference and Sex 68 Similarities in Viewpoints Between Party Supporters, by Problem Area 69 Party Supporters with No Opinions on Party Differences 70 Extent of Awareness of Problem Areas 71 Awareness of Symbolic Problems 72 Awareness of Internal Problems 73 Awareness of External Problems 74 "No Opinions" by Education and Problem Area 75 Proportion of "No Opinions," by Region, Language, Religion and Problem Area 76 Proportion of "No Opinions," by Party Preference and Problem Area 77 Proportion of "No Opinions," by Stability of Party Preference and Problem Area 78 Main Issues Facing Canada, December, 1957 79 Most Important Problem Facing Canada, July, 1960 80 Interest in Coming Election and Opinions on Having Organized Labour Support Own Party, January, 1962

155 159 166 170 174 176 180 184 187 190 192 193 194 201 209 218 219 219 220 222 224 227 228 229 229 230

FIGURES Page 1 The Relation of Party Types to Consensus 19 2 Canadian Identity: Underlying Problems and Critical Influ46 ences 3 Conditions Affecting Awareness, in Rank Order, Compared 221 with Actual Awareness 4 The Current Location of National Problems and Solutions 238 in Canada

xvii

I

THE PUZZLE OF CANADA

we are witnessing the creation of more new states than at any other period in history. Many of these are faced with serious problems stemming from a low level of industrial development, a high rate of illiteracy, and a burning impatience to bridge the gap between tradition and modernity. Some of them are also characterized by political instability, both as cause and effect of their other difficulties. Yet many of the problems troubling today's new nations were also troublesome to those created generations ago, and, in some instances, continue to plague long-established states. Among the vexing tasks facing new nations (which some older ones have even yet not resolved) is the need to create a sense of unity for disparate member groups. Partly to satisfy these diverse interests, such nations need to overcome gross inequalities of opportunity, raise the general level of existence, and hold up these accomplishments as a source of pride to their citizens. T h e political organizations are called upon, then, to prove themselves by providing for the satisfaction of wants. It is important too that, wherever appropriate, a marked disassociation from former colonial rulers take place. A T PRESENT

What happens to countries in the presence of these tasks is the subject of the growing literature on new nations. We will seek our answer, however, in the example of Canada, a country which in no sense of the term is a new nation or a developing country. 1 Canada, settled by migrants from developed countries, never had to contend with large-scale illiteracy or stultifying tradition, nor has it suffered from serious political upheavals. It possesses a differentiated social structure with all the accoutrements of a modern, industrial nation and an educated, technically skilled population. Yet Canada, although nearly one hundred years old, recapitulates in its daily existence many dilemmas experienced by newly emerging nations. Unity from diversity, the overcoming of gross inequalities, the need for a focus 1 Canada is found a m o n g the first-ranking countries on a technological scale a n d a m o n g the lowest-ranking countries on a d e m o g r a p h i c scale, indicating a high rate of economic development, with an absence of acute population pressures. B r i a n J . L . Berry, " B a s i c Patterns of Economic Development," Atlas of Economic Development, ed. by Norton Ginsburg, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, p p . 110-119.

3

4

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

for national pride, contrast with other nations—in short, the essence of the business of politics and the creation of stable nationhood are still prominent political concerns in Canada, as they are in other multi-ethnic states. Statehood of many years duration or status as a developed country do not in themselves guarantee the existence of an unambiguous national identity. T h e study of Canada then takes on special significance in illuminating the continued existence of problems of identity long after a nation has passed its infancy. T h e character of Canadian nationhood appeared as both an enigma and a cause few concern. That there should be a country called Canada distinct from the United States is a mere accident of history, in fact, a political paradox. Nature has not conferred upon Canada any particular personality of her own. There is no geographical difference to separate her from her great neighbour to the South. It is a problem to determine wherein lies Canada's centre of gravity: politically it is in England, and geographically it is in the United States—in either case outside her own boundaries. Her very existence is connected with this problem; for a purely British Canada could never be anything but a colony, and an American Canada could only be a group of states in the Union. 2

Although the Fathers of Confederation and notably the first Prime Minister, J o h n A. Macdonald, were gripped by the vision of a great nation emerging from their political efforts, and a later Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, saw the twentieth century as belonging to Canada, national greatness has often seemed just out of reach, and many have been dismayed at their chance of ever obtaining it. Throughout Canada's history, historians, political scientists, economists, and a host of commentators have expressed concern for the chances of Canada's continued existence as an independent country. 3 T h e y tend to view it as either a British colony or an American satellite. Even the less pessimistic recognize the historical developments which have produced the anomalies of Canadian existence. T o begin with, Canada and the other British colonies emerged as "essentially political projections of Great Britain." 4 More recently, the economic influence of the United States has been so great as to help perpetuate Canada's economic development as a resource-pro*Aiidr6 Siegfried, Canada: An International Power, trans. Doris Hemming, 2nd ed.; New York: Duell, Sloan, Pearce, 1947, p. 23. 'For a recent book in the pessimistic tradition, see George Grant, Lament for a Nation, The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965. 4 Alexander Brady, Democracy in the Dominions, 3rd ed.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958, p. 5.

THE PUZZLE OF CANADA

5

ducing country. Canadians have always had this prosperous and populous neighbour, and, when disappointments have grown too great and opportunities have seemed much richer across the border, scores of Canadians have left their homeland. In the 1880's and 1890's Canadian immigration to the United States was extensive. Again in the 1920's, with a population of under ten million, Canada lost about one million residents to the United States. T o one economist deeply concerned with Canada's development, the most realistic solution is for Canada to accept its limitations and to grow as best it can with them. Canadian economic policy has historically been dominated by the ambition to create a country rival in power to the United States, and so to prove that the Americans were wrong to revolt from colonial rule in 1776. The ambition to outgrown the United States is a futile one: in spite of the boasting about Canada's faster growth in the postwar period, it is a fact that the growth was insufficient to raise the ratio of the Canadian to the American population to what it was in I860. 5

The initial political dependence on Britain and the continued, growing, and pervasive influence of the United States are only two problems with which Canada has had to contend. Within Canadian society major differences exist as a result of settlement by a population heterogeneous in language, origin, and religion. These differences are accompanied, and in some cases reinforced, by the existence of physical resources, industries, and economic problems specific to particular regions. All these differences undoubtedly affect the development of national unity, and their nature and consequences will be elaborated in the analysis that follows. All mentioned factors have operated to create a puzzling and ambiguous nation. . . . we have emerged in a period of modern history when it has been impossible for the Canadian national unit to grow slowly in the quiet isolation of slowly moving centuries during which such older nationalities as Britain and France, or India and China worked out their individual way of life and solidified their national characteristics. A Briton or a Frenchman does not have to keep torturing himself now in the twentieth century by asking questions as to the nature of his national identity or as to how he is to distinguish himself from his national neighbours. 6 5 Harry G. Johnson, Canada in a Changing World Economy, Toronto: University of T o r o n t o Press, 1962, p. 62. • Frank H. Underhill, in The Price of Being Canadian, ed. by D. L. B. Hamlin, 7th Winter Conference, Canadian Institute of Public Affairs; Toronto: University of T o r o n t o Press, 1961, p. 5.

6

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

At first glance Canada to the outsider appears almost indistinguishable from the United States. D. W. Brogan writes, I can remember my first visit to Canada, one of a few hours nearly thirty years ago. T o my then untutored eye, the only visible differences were the red coats of the police, the royal monograms and the advertisements for English chocolates. I know better now; but that first impression was not totally false. And there is, consequently, for an outsider like myself a permanent shock arising from the fact that Canada is so like the United States and another from the fact that being so alike she is not identical. 7

Nationalism has been shaped by many loyalties and has often been expressed with uneasiness and ambivalence. 8 As a further consequence, some commentators believe the state itself has been accorded only minimal legitimacy. Despite major problems of external relations and internal cleavages Canada, nevertheless, continues to exist. The statements of experts and intellectuals on Canadian history give an elitist conception of the difficulties of existence. It is of even greater relevance to ask how Canadians generally, as residents of an apparently viable nation, see their country. Although intellectual elites undoubtedly serve as spokesmen for various interests in the population and reflect common concerns, they also, because of differences in social background and position, often express views at variance with those of the people at large. Information on nontechnical matters seen only through the perspective of experts can thus be misleading. As the historian Planck writes: T h e great obstacle to ascertaining the values of a period lies in the paucity of information concerning the great masses of people as contrasted with the articulate few. What starts out as an attempt to portray the climate of opinion of an age turns out frequently to be a description of its intellectual leadership or of some other limited group. It has been suggested, for example, that the characterization of the Middle Ages as predominantly spiritual in its T

D. W. Brogan, "An Outsider Looking In," in Canada's Tomorrow, ed. by G. P. Gilmour, Toronto: Macmillan, 1954, p. 273. 8 For example, a pilot study conducted among 107 respondents in the spring of 1960 in the Toronto area on attitudes toward "Canadian products and practices" found the following results to this question. "Some people go too far in making an issue of their pride in Canada." Percent Strongly agree 7 Agree 36 Uncertain 12 Disagree 37 Strongly disagree 8

THE PUZZLE OF CANADA

7

values may have come about because the major primary sources for the period are the products of the clerical pen and mind, and that if a larger number of extant sources about medieval attitudes had been written or compiled by non-ecclesiastics our modern conceptions might well be open to modification. 9

T o overcome these limitations and consider more effectively the nature of Canada as it is perceived by the Canadian population generally, it is necessary to rely on public-opinion polls.10 Such polls covering two decades provide the main sources for this study. The use of public-opinion polls for the study of national identity can give us the views of a cross-section of Canadians, but it cannot provide a comprehensive definition of national identity, nor of the forces which have shaped its development. We have deliberately eschewed certain data in order to keep the present study within manageable limits and, more important, to point up the way in which national identity, as an end product of social and political forces not specifically examined here, is reflected in the opinions of Canadians. This technique allows us to answer such questions as how Canada can be described socially and politically, what areas of agreement and disagreement exist on this definition, which social groups are associated with particular viewpoints, and how opinions change over time. These questions are discussed from Part II onward. T h e remainder of this Part I is concerned with more general problems. Chapter II deals with the concept of national identity, presenting it in detail so that our subsequent analysis of empirical data may be pegged to significant social and political issues. Chapter III, a resume of Canadian development, illustrates the various aspects detailed in our conceptualization of national identity, filling in some of the gaps left by the public-opinion data. Part I, then, deals with the conceptual tools and the historical context and should be regarded as a prologue to the examination of survey data on the unfolding of Canada's public image in Chapters IV to XII. The concluding chapter returns to the general scheme set out in Part I and relates the empirical findings to it. Results of public-opinion polling are then assessed in terms of a more holistic view of Canadian society. •Russell E. Planck, "Public Opinion in France After the Liberation, 1944-1949"

in Common

Frontiers

of the Social Sciences, ed. by Mirra Komarovsky, Glencoe:

Free Press and Falcon's Wing, 1957, p. 214. 10 On the values of public-opinion polls to historians, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "The Historian and the Pollster," ibid., pp. 242-262.

II

THE

THE ADOLESCENCE OF NATIONHOOD

MEANING

OF

IDENTITY

THE CONCEPT of identity has been introduced to the social-science community from the psychoanalytic literature. Identity was first used by Freud in reference to the process by which infants discriminate among social objects and then internalize the appropriate object and associated values. Identity formation at this stage is largely a response to frustration. T h e concepts of self which emerge from initial familial experiences are elemental ones of boy, girl, son, daughter, sister, brother. Acting out the familial drama does not resolve the stream of crises associated with the definition of selfhood. Identity formation proceeds through adulthood, with problems coming to a head especially in adolescence. In adolescence, the individual moves out from the confines of the family to experiences with peers, the school, then to the work world, and the larger community. In this more complex social setting, the search for a consistent self-definition is often experienced with the turmoil we have grown to associate with that peculiar stage of development. For the adolescent, what he is and where he is going are critical matters. Although he enjoys many freedoms and privileges, some experiences are still closed to him; yet many of the moves he makes now will have major implications for those adult roles he will be able to play and those from which he has already shut himself off. 1 At the level of the individual, the concept of identity is not easy to understand or to use consistently. It is not a physical attribute, it cannot be quantified, and there is no simple means for obtaining empirical referents of it. It becomes especially important, then, that anyone using the concept give enough flesh to his discussion so that those with whom he communicates can grasp the social dimensions of identity. He needs, moreover, to avoid communicating any mystical aura to identity, although the temptation may be great for those so inclined to indulge in flights of fancy about the "spirit of selfhood." J T h e major intellectual debt on the study of identity is to Erik Erikson. His pertinent works are Childhood and Society, New York: Norton, 1950; Young Man Luther, New York: Norton, 1958; "Youth: Fidelity and Diversity," Daedalus, 91, Winter, 1962, pp. 5-27.

8

THE ADOLESCENCE OF NATIONHOOD

9

T r a n s f e r r i n g the concept of identity f r o m the i n d i v i d u a l to the nation presents even greater difficulties o n this score. T o speak of the identity of a nation is to engage i n metaphor, a n d whoever then goes o n to accept the metaphor as reality sinks into the morass of groupm i n d fallacies. B u t if identity in this context is viewed only as metaphor, then it can be a useful research tool. Indeed, it becomes possible to obtain empirical indicators of its nature, a l l o w i n g description of the nation's identity to take the most prosaic form. T h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h the public-opinion data are used in the f o l l o w i n g chapters should provide proof not only of the usefulness of the concept but also of the nonmystical perspective employed. T h e r e is n o thought given to h o w survey data m i g h t describe a national Geist, assuming there ever was such a thing. N a t i o n a l identity is of course n o t solely metaphor. It is used less abstractly to refer to one of the components of personal identity, that as a m e m b e r of a particular nation. I n this respect, everyone has a national identity. W h a t is variable, however, is the extent to w h i c h this aspect of personal identity is relevant. I n stable societies, it m a y only be under such unusual circumstances as travel to a foreign country that the i n d i v i d u a l is confronted w i t h the question of w h o he is. Otherwise his identity in this regard m a y simply be taken for granted. B u t under conditions of external threats a n d m a j o r internal changes, political or not, the issue of personal identity as a m e m b e r of a nation m a y become problematic. Hence, w h i l e the identity of the nation has n o independent existence outside of the shared understandings w h i c h people have about its nature, it does enter into the formation of collective identities as Canadians, Americans, or Nigerians. O u t of the interaction of historical events, actions of governments, activities, personalities, a n d ideologies of leaders, a n d conflicts a n d accommodations between interests, a nation emerges, a n d in so doing, acquires a distinctive character. T h i s image of the nation then provides the focus for the personal identities of its members, sometimes l y i n g dormant and other times bec o m i n g mobilized in the self-definitions of citizens. O n e person w h o has been especially concerned w i t h translating identity f r o m the personal to the national realm is L u c i a n Pye. From his interest in Erikson a n d his work i n Burma, Pye arrives at a view of national identity as b o t h a component a n d a counterpart of personal identity. T h e quest for nationhood, the awe of politics, and the widespread ambivalences of personal identity are clearly related phenomena, but it is not clear by what logic they are related. At the least, a circuitous pattern is present:

10

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

the search for individual identity hinges on the existence of a national identity, and the latter calls for a coherent and consensus-bound political process; but people cannot fundamentally respect their political spokesmen when they are not sure that they can respect themselves, and so back to the issue of personal integrity and identity. A dilemma is framed: the need for self-identity produces the need for a nation-state, and the need for reassurance of individual worth produces the need for a politics of status —and yet such a politics is inconsistent with the requirements of nationbuilding. 2

While using some imagery different from that which we employ, Pye's analysis of Burmese society illustrates the interplay between personal identity, the image of the nation, and the collective identities emergent from this interplay. Several contrasts exist, however, between our interests and Pye's. For one thing, he is directly concerned with the way in which personal identities emerge in Burma as a result of the historical context and the patterns of socialization within the family. He also looks at the life histories of political leaders, searching for clues to the development of ideologies which can provide a touchstone for the formation of collective identities for the population generally. In this fashion he is able to tackle much more directly than will be possible in this book the subjective meaning o£ being a member of Burmese society. But although we lack information on the Canadians' sense of identification with their nation, we are able, unlike Pye, to delineate more sharply the nature of the country itself as it is seen by its citizens. Pye explicitly pictures issues of identity, at both the individual and collective level, as of pressing concern in transitional societies. In terms of the analogy we are employing, these might parallel the identity crises of childhood. But one of the dilemmas of today's newly emerging nations is that their current crises adumbrate those of adolescence to such an extent that the initial problems do not have sufficient opportunity to be worked out. It is as if a child were faced, at the same time as he was establishing his primary identity vis-à-vis his parents and siblings, with defining himself in terms of more mature heterosexual relations. Thus the uncertainty, anxiety, and vacillation between urgent searching and passivity which Pye describes as characteristic of such nations 3 derives in part from the difficulty of answering under pressure "What am I?" "What is Burma?" and "What am I as a Burmese?" Demands for improving the life of the Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, pp. 4-5. * Ibid., p. 124. a

THE ADOLESCENCE OF NATIONHOOD

11

people are so vast and so pressing, and contrast with other, more successful nations is so acute, that not enough time is available for resolving problems stemming from ineffectual leadership, political organs either embryonic or not fully adaptive to current concerns, and a social structure itself out of step with the search for modernity. While such circumstances certainly contribute to the fascination of issues of identity in countries like Burma, at the same time they suggest that other, less harassed, societies might provide more efficient arenas for the study of national identity at the stage of emerging nationhood. In response to the painful struggles of new states to assume the identity of nations, Lipset has turned to an examination of the early history of the United States as the "first new nation." He traces the tentative steps, the trials and errors in the activities of leaders and particularly of George Washington; in the emergence of political parties, and especially the legitimacy of political opposition; and in the evolution of the system of government in forging a nation: "It was from this crucible of confusion and conflict that values and goals became defined, issues carved out, positions taken, in short an identity established. For countries, like people, are not handed identities at birth, but acquire them through the arduous process of growing up, a process which is a notoriously painful affair." 4 As a result of his formulation of the emergence of identity as a slow and painful process, he is more sanguine than Pye about the potentialities of today's new nations to achieve stable governments and even democratic ones. Pye's pessimism is probably well taken, however, because of the distinction implicit in the work of both writers. T h a t is, employing our imagery again, while the beginnings of the United States may properly be seen as the identity struggles of infancy, those of Burma are confounded by the problems of premature adolescence. This is obviously not the sole source of difference between the two countries. It may well be that the contrast in resources, population, values, and experiences are at the root of the differing lines of development as much as the particular problems they faced or the timing of these problems. Although it may be, then, that emerging nations at present can find little that is instructive in the beginnings of the United States, the student of politics in contrast does find it rewarding to isolate a "purer" instance of identity formation than is provided by today's new nations. Another of Lipset's contributions is that he goes on from his consideration of the early years of United States nationhood to deal with 4

S. M. Lipset, The First New Nation,

New York: Basic Books, 1963, p. 16.

12

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

later history, even to the current scene. He no longer speaks explicitly of the formation of identity, but it is not inappropriate to continue with this terminology in assessing later historical developments. For example, we can extrapolate that the definition of identity current in the mid-1800's was neither sufficiently unambiguous nor widely enough shared to prevent the Civil War and the threatened dissolution of the Union. The existing identity was, however, helpful in aiding in the absorption of masses of immigrants and in the expansion of the nation westward. While the crises of identity, one hundred years after the thirteen colonies broke away from England, could be seen as those of adolescence, Lipset does not leave us at that point either. Although we can only view the United States as a mature, developed nation, there are still major strains in the society. These strains are perhaps not best conceptualized as crises of identity, yet they do represent instances in which the stable identity of the nation is confronted with searing problems, problems sufficient to shake even the mature identity. Problems, then, such as the struggle of Negroes for equal rights, illustrate the continuing usefulness of focusing on identity at periods later than a nation's formative years. In the course of The First New Nation, Lipset uses the nature of the value system as his primary perspective on American society. In other words, it is mainly through values that he is defining the identity of the nation, even though, in the statements quoted, values appear as only one aspect of identity. Still, the usefulness of this approach is attested to by the success of his book. In the case of this study, the focus differs from the writers we have considered. Although there is a close relation both to the work of Pye and Lipset, this study differs from the former in not emphasizing the content of subjective identifications and from the latter in not emphasizing values. Our approach instead will be to concentrate on national problems. The selection of problems as the focus for this study of identity has been at least partly determined by the data available, but it is also based on other, more theoretically relevant, considerations. Our desire was to describe how citizens perceive their nation. This raised the necessity of having a simple means of classifying the public-opinion data which was both meaningful in the context of Canadian history and, in keeping with our comparative perspective, could be used for other nations. For this purpose we were able to derive generic problems common to all societies with differentiated political institutions. These basic political problems are of three types: external, internal, and symbolic. The external problems are those of maintaining national integrity—militarily, economically,

THE ADOLESCENCE OF NATIONHOOD

13

and politically. Internal problems concern the maintenance of order, as this involves regulating the allocation of resources and rewards of both a political and a more general nature. Symbolic problems imply the provision of unifying, emotion-laden ideas and objects which can serve as a focus for group loyalty. One advantage of stating the problems in this general form was that they could be used to subsume the concerns of nations at any stage in their development. At the same time, the particular form which the problems take do reflect differences in national status. For example, both the United States and Nigeria face external problems in defining, and maintaining the definition of, their identity. Yet the character of the external problems and the ways these are met are quite different. The United States, already in a position of hegemony, strives to anticipate and counter any threats to its dominance, whether in Viet Nam, the Dominican Republic, or Berlin. For a country such as Nigeria, although the external problems are equally important for its integrity, the cards are played in a less important game. For Nigeria, redefining its role in relation to Britain and acquiring new roles in the British Commonwealth and the African continent are the uppermost concerns. A further advantage which derives from focusing on problems is their analogy to the crises of identity at the individual level. Thus, in the preceding example, external problems for the United States are crises of maturity; for Nigeria, they are crises of childhood approaching the new-found independence of adolescence. Canada is older than Nigeria and younger than the United States. In response to the general problems, it has manifested the shift from childhood to adolescence, and in some instances to full maturity. We will go on to describe in detail how, in facing external problems, Canada has moved out from dependence on Great Britain to that on the United States, and how, in keeping with its more mature status, this new dependence has been more rankling. Internally, initial problems of self-definition were achieved with the emergence of a federal system of government and a system of political parties, but the solutions were not appropriate for later developments, and serious strains are now experienced as a result of the demands from Quebec for greater autonomy. Finally, although the national symbols adopted in the early years were adequate for that period, they have not kept pace with historical developments either. The nature of symbols in fact suggests that these, like primal sex-linked identities, need to be defined early in the emergence of nationhood to provide a continuing focus for group loyalties.

14

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

The ways in which different societies meet their problems vary greatly. These variations have been conceptualized in ways which emphasize the generic nature of the solutions. For example, Spiro uses political style to refer to the different arguments which are offered as rationalizations for ways of handling problems common to constitutional governments, 5 and Almond speaks of political culture as the patterned orientations to politics developed in each political system.6 Other terms, such as democracy, authoritarianism, or dictatorship, might also be considered as wholesale descriptions of the manner in which a country may meet its problems. In our usage, however, solutions may cover a wide range, from procedures for the conduct of government, the rights of citizens, and other basic understandings about the political process, to specific choices of governmental policy concerning internal relations among groups or relations with foreign powers. Not all solutions, nor all aspects of problems, need be either of critical concern to a particular country or sources of dissension. But, because we are dealing with the public definition of a country, opinions which happen to be surveyed are often about only those problems or solutions which are troublesome to a nation. This approach may therefore tend to exaggerate the lack of consensus, especially on those fundamentals present in most stable democracies; but this is an unavoidable difficulty. From problems underlying the formation of national identity, we turn to the influences affecting its definition. These influences can be thought of as operating at any level in the interplay between subjective identifications with the nation, the public image of the nation, and the collective identities of its members. In keeping with our interests in the public perceptions of the nation, our treatment of influences has been geared to emphasize their potential impact on the shaping of opinions. Influences on the definition of national identity are manifold and include, with societal and temporal variations, the following: (1) social groupings, organized or not, with special reference to intellectual elites and the military; (2) political parties, both as organizations and as aggregates of voters; (3) circumstantial factors including historical • Herbert J. Spiro, Government by Constitution, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1959, pp. 175-177. •Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," in Political Behavior, ed., by Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz, Glencoe: Free Press, 1956, p. 36. See also Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. Pye considers the definition of identity to be part of the political culture. Pye, op. cit., p. 124. However, sometimes it is more useful to view the political culture as a component of identity, particularly with reference to the identity of the nation.

T H E ADOLESCENCE OF NATIONHOOD

15

events and governmental action; (4) the mass media; and (5) the nature of education. Social

Groupings

It has been long observed that opinions are affected by position in the social structure. Social position affects the range of opportunities and experiences available; common conditions of life are highly correlated with common patterns of behaviour. Shared opportunities lead to the development of common attitudes and values.7 More recently, the literature on reference groups and relative deprivation has combined the two ideas of objective position and subjective evaluation of that position. In a society with a heterogeneous population, then, different social groups are apt to define the national problems in different ways.8 This differential evaluation has a high conflict potential, yet can be contained by the ties which surmount group boundaries, for example, through cross-cutting loyalties produced by identification with a number of groups simultaneously. In addition, groups may be dedicated to particularistic views on national identity, but the impact of these views can be restricted by the differential commitment of their members. Consensus may emerge, despite heterogeneity, through the existence of wider loyalties, so that, for example, being a German is more important than being a Berliner, or being a law-abiding citizen more important than being a segregationist. It is also significant that in a plural society only a small number of values require relatively widespread agreement in order to avoid major breakdowns in the political system. Social cleavages, then, are significant in affecting the development of national identity because of their capacity, at least potential, for leading to disparate views on national problems or their solutions. Yet these opinion differences can also be contained by the mechanisms suggested. In every social setting, then, there exists the empirical problem of ascertaining the relationship 7 According to Marx, for example, although the objective conditions for distinguishing between classes might exist, a class an sich did not become a class filr sich until the class members recognized their identity of interests and the need for working in concert. See the discussion by R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, rev. ed.; Glencoe: Free Press, 1957, pp. 462-463, 476-479. ' W h i c h group memberships or identifications are most significant in affecting points of view varies with the society in question. Political cleavages generally are related to class, including occupation, trade-union affiliation, education, income, and subjective evaluation of position; origin, which refers to birthplace, language, religion, race, and cultural group; age; sex; marital status; community size, and region. For a summary, see S. M. Lipset, Political Man, Garden City: Doubleday, 1960, pp. 179-282.

16

PUBLIC

OPINION AND CANADIAN

IDENTITY

between social groups and specific points of view, and the implications that this has for national identity. The intellectual elite.—One group which merits special attention is the intellectual elite. Intellectuals act as innovators and promulgators of values and ideas. It is they who first acquire a national culture, which is then communicated to the more parochial elements in the society who are less inclined to recognize common national bonds. Yet intellectuals may be restricted in their contribution to formulating a collective identity for a number of reasons. Since their ideas may derive from foreign sources, they are often troubled by ambivalent feelings toward their own and the foreign culture, especially where the foreign culture accents the apparent inferiority of the native. By training and disposition the intellectual may accentuate his position as critic in opposition to politicians and men of action; he may then end up taking little positive part in influencing the development of a collective identity. Even when he lacks such a negative outlook he may be hindered in his activity by resistance from traditional sectors in the society. Such resistance is most likely to arise when new ideas threaten the old value system. Despite these difficulties, the intellectual elite continues to play a historic role in providing a secular ideology with which to promote national unity. The military.—In the recent emergence of new states, the military has played a prominent role. While often lacking in political skills, it seems important in transitional societies because it provides a centre of stability. Existing social, cultural, and personality systems, and the political structure of transitional societies strengthen the hand of the military at the same time that they prevent the emergence of strong political and intellectual elites which could help unify these nations. Yet even when the army is not in political control, militarism may contribute to a definition of identity by providing a focus for national pride, offering at least the threat of solution to problems, and, where there is a citizens' army, serving to integrate different groups into the nation. National Political

Parties

Wherever they exist, national political parties contribute appreciably in answering the primarily political questions raised by the study of identity. Parties play this role by offering solutions to the central problems, and by their ability to transcend other group loyalties. Yet, even more visibly than other social divisions, party divisions are directly concerned with the generation and public awareness of con-

THE ADOLESCENCE OF NATIONHOOD

17

troversy. In this capacity, parties, by overcoming other centrifugal tendencies, may establish a highly coherent internal consensus. In states with more than one party this may mean that party cleavages become the critical ones, and, as a result, prevent the creation of a national consensus on the nation's image. In cases where one political party is most instrumental in accomplishing the move to modern nationhood, regardless of whether this required a revolutionary struggle, or where it has some traditional claim to the legitimacy of its leadership, the coincidence of party and national consensus may be a critical handicap to the emergence of legitimate opposition parties. But in those countries where democracy and multiple parties have become institutionalized, political parties, even while agents of controversy, have at least the ability to "nurture consensus." 9 This is facilitated by those mechanisms within the political structure which mitigate party polarization, but which do not exist for other group cleavages. These mitigants include the desire of all parties to get elected, after election to govern all citizens including their opponents, and to be recognized in this capacity as the rightful rulers. T h e contribution of political parties to the shaping of national identity is thus not confined to single-party systems. Multi-party systems would indeed appear to allow a greater degree of peaceful controversy, to provide the mechanisms for resolving it, and to offer the potential for achieving agreement on basic essentials, particularly on the legitimacy of the political system. But even specific issues, although beginning as matters of partisan controversy, so far as they are attractive to the general voter, may also ultimately become part of the general consensus. The nature of parties.—Parties, in translating issues of national identity into the political arena, do so mainly in relation to three dimensions. T h e first of these is organizational, and refers basically to the parties' membership structure. At issue here are the distinctions similar to the ones made by Duverger with respect to mass and cadre parties 10 and by Neumann regarding parties of individual representation and social integration. 11 For the sake of convenience, we will use Duverger's terminology even though our usage does not exactly coincide with his. For our purposes we will consider the cadre party •See Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956, pp. 508-511, for an elaboration of this ability in a two-party system. "Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, London: Methuen, 1954, pp. 63-71. u S i g m u n d Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in Modern Political Parties, ed. by S. Neumann, Chicago: University o£ Chicago Press, 1956, p. 404.

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PUBLIC O P I N I O N AND CANADIAN

IDENTITY

as having as its nucleus a relatively small group of experts and influential persons who control the policy-making decisions. T h e cadre party is thus organizationally an exclusive body of notables. Activities of the bulk of supporters are confined primarily to elections. In contrast, the mass party relies on the active participation of a large body of recruits without specialized talents. These supporters are expected to be relatively permanent, dues-paying members who are involved in the life of the party in their day-to-day existence. T h e second dimension is that of the social base from which the political parties draw support. T h e character of this support may be broad, so that all major groups in the population are represented, at least in a minority. T h e base, on the contrary, may instead be restricted to only selected social groups. T h e third dimension of party type is its focus of appeal. Here the difference is between those parties oriented to principles based on special interests, issues, groups, or ideology, and those primarily oriented to electoral success, where principle is secondary to getting elected. T h e interaction of these three dimensions has implications for the development both of intraparty consensus and national consensus on problems of identity. T h e organizational dimension makes its contribution only to intraparty consensus. O u r assumption here is that mass parties are characterized by a greater degree of mutual agreement than cadre parties, because the former involve the commitment and participation of larger numbers of supporters. T h e focus of appeal is significant in that those appeals based on principle, by explicitly soliciting support for some policy, have greater implications for consensus than those based on electoral success. Parties obtaining support from many groups would make some contribution to the development of national consensus, but intraparty consensus is likely to be higher in parties with a restricted social base. However, when this is taken in relation with the dimension of appeal, then broadbased parties of principle aid in the development of both intraparty and national consensus (see Figure 1). Party types and national identity.—A clearer conception of this typology should follow from a description of the eight party types derived. T h e broad-based mass party of principle is one which, by enlisting widespread participation and support aimed at specific goals, results in high intraparty and high national consensus. Illustrations of this type of party are the nationalistic, anti-colonial parties such as those found in West Africa. Examples of another sort are the Nazi and Communist parties, which, on assuming control, have be-

T H E ADOLESCENCE

F I G U R E THE

RELATION

OF

PARTY

19

OF NATIONHOOD

1 TYPES

Party types

TO

CONSENSUS

Effects on consensus

Organization

Base

Appeal

Intraparty

National

mass cadre mass cadre mass cadre mass cadre

broad broad narrow narrow broad broad narrow narrow

principle principle principle principle success success success success

high high high high low low low low

high high low low high high low low

come parties of "total integration." By making the party almost synonymous with the nation, integration of outlook is achieved, but at the cost of destroying deviance. T h u s the party's definition of national identity is the national identity. A s a solution to problems of identity this definition is one inimicable to democratic principles. T h e comprehensive, nationalistic party may, however, be grafted on to a democratic ideology, as has occurred in India. But the position of such parties in a system that includes a legitimate opposition tends to be unstable. T h e i r original strength lies in the ability to attract support from diverse interests for a principle which could command wide loyalty. But if the principle loses some of its strength, as in the case of anticolonial parties when independence is achieved, the parties then tend to become fragmented. T h e continuity of the Indian National Congress, for example, has been accomplished only by some shift in the character of its supporters and the nature of its appeal. T h e broad-based cadre party of principle is perhaps less consensusinducing than the first type, since decision-making is by an elite, yet appeal is also widespread, largely because of the principle propounded, which, too, is likely to be of a nationalistic nature. A good example is the U N R (Union pour la Nouvelle République), the Gaullist party of the Fifth Republic. A g a i n there are elements of instability in such parties due partly to their organizational structure, which, while attracting a large and varied base of support, concentrates power in the hands of a relatively unresponsive minority. These parties also exemplify that a principle, although important in providing a rallying point for supporters, can be the focus for internal dissension, as has been the case in the U N R and its predecessor. T h e Liberation Rally

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PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

of Egypt, founded by Premier Nasser in 1953, was also essentially a party of this type. Although there was an attempt to alter its organizational form by enlisting mass support, the principles it stood for appeared to be too diffuse for a meaningful appeal, and consequently was unsuccessful as a party. Still making a large contribution to intraparty consensus, but unable to overcome national cleavages, are mass parties of principle with a restricted base. Traditional Marxist parties resemble this type, as does the Swedish Agrarian party. The narrow-based, cadre parties of principle are even less able to promote national consensus than the previously described types. Here both decision makers and supporters come from special groups working toward specific goals. Hence they may resemble interest groups more than genuine parties. We would place in this category the preindependence Indian National Congress, the Australian Country party, the Poujadists, and Latin-American Church-oriented parties when such parties do not play a dominant role in the political life of the country. The broad-based, mass party of electoral success is relatively low on intraparty consensus because of its lack of principle, yet by drawing on wide participation and support, it makes some contribution to overcoming national cleavages. This seems to be the case of the National party of New Zealand since 1949 and, to some extent, of the Swedish Liberal party. Broad-based, cadre parties of electoral success stress compromise and containment of the interests represented. Intraparty consensus may then not be high, but social divisions at the national level are held in check. This tends to be true of the national Republican and Democratic parties in the United States. The situation of the narrow-based mass party of electoral success is likely to be unstable and to represent a transitional type. As such, internal consensus can be expected to be low and the contribution which such a party makes to a broadly appealing definition of national identity will also be relatively minor. The position of the British Labour party in recent years has some relation to this party type. Certainly the party has possessed significant principles. But a major movement under the leadership of Hugh Gaitskill downgraded these principles which had apparently become repellent to a large body of voters.12 Principle was thus being sacrificed to the hope of electoral "For a discussion of voter attitudes see Mark Abrams and Richard Rose, Must Labour Lose, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1960.

THE ADOLESCENCE OF NATIONHOOD

21

success. At the same time the retreat from traditional principles was a major source of dissension within the party. But it appears that the British Labour party under Harold Wilson is continuing to adapt itself to the demands of greater voter appeal. This is a further illustration of the potential of party principle for promoting dissension as well as consensus. Even more unstable than the preceding party type is the narrowbased cadre party of electoral success. This party is similar to Latin American ad hoc parties which spring up, generally around a strong leader, before an election and quickly disappear thereafter. Such parties are more likely to emerge during times of political instability. At such periods they appeal to those caught up by confused and confusing circumstances. The United States of the 1840's and 1850's saw the emergence of the Know Nothing party out of the decline of the Whigs and the disruption of the Democrats during a time of major social changes. While the Know Nothings were basically nativist, there were great variations from one state to another in what the party stood for, so that it can hardly be said to have possessed a unifying principle. The result was that the divisive elements in American life were played up at the expense of the unifying ones. The classification of parties along these three dimensions distinguishes the impacts of parties on national identity in terms of their programs and policies and their ability to establish both intraparty and national consensus. It should be apparent from this scheme that in a true party system, that is, a system with more than one party, a high degree of unanimity in national outlook would be represented by a considerable measure of interparty consensus despite partisan differentiation. The existence of a broad consensus on the identity of the nation and the subsequent emergence of collective identities qua nationals, then, is partly dependent on the ability of parties in the same political system to come to terms on central issues. Where they cannot do this, a lack of consensus may be more characteristic than its presence. The typology presented here has been intended to provide some guidelines in considering the relation between political parties and national identity. The actual parties cited in the discussion were used to illustrate this relationship. It is possible that this typology will have its greatest usefulness in the comparative study of parties, since it is not likely that any one country will possess all eight party types. Yet so far as political parties have a major bearing on the development of national identity, the absence of some party types also has impli-

22

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IDENTITY

cations for the character of a country's identity and the self-conceptions of its citizens. Parties are a major factor influencing national identity and provide the primary focus of our subsequent analysis. Other

Influences

Some additional influences remain to be discussed. Among these are historical circumstances, including deliberate efforts of governments to shape events bearing on the central problems of the state. Specification of these events cannot be made at this time since they are closely linked with the national problems and take shape only as these problems are defined. Hence, the perception of the nation's identity acquires its full meaning when it is treated in conjunction with past and current circumstances. Mass media.—The significance of the mass media in influencing political opinions and behaviour was first seriously challenged by The People's Choice.13 At the same time, the authors of this study noted that the media served important functions as reinforcers of opinions and as influences on opinion leaders. Later studies have elaborated on the political impact of the mass media extending beyond election campaigns: "Not only during the campaigns but also in the periods between, the mass media provide perspectives, shape images of candidates and parties, and define the unique atmosphere and areas of sensitivity which mark any particular campaign." 14 This tends to be obscured in industrialized societies, but the development of mass communication media serves as a precondition for the emergence of nationalism, and as a critical influence in societies undergoing major social change. Because of the political consequences of the mass media, it is not surprising that many societies have been concerned with controlling the content and reception of the communication. The place of the mass media in the study of national identity is thus of undoubted significance. The educational system.—The final influence, the educational system, makes its contribution to the definition of national identity by deciding, or accepting decisions made elsewhere, what should be taught and who should be educated. With respect to the former, one important decision pertains to the language of teaching. Whether this is the language of a foreign power, the indigenous population, 13

Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice, 2nd ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1948, p. 102. " Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang, "The Mass Media and Voting," in American Voting Behavior, ed. by Eugene Burdick and Arthur Brodbeck, Glencoe: Free Press, 1959, p. 226.

T H E ADOLESCENCE OF NATIONHOOD

23

a majority group, or all the linguistic groups in the society has an important bearing on the availability of an instrument for communicating national unity. The most common procedure has been and is the urgent insistence on the single national language as one of the central cores of the national being. Nationalist movements have with regularity been accompanied by a flurry of philological activity. As the Communists found the Russians to be the inventors and discoverers of all good things, so the nationalist must seek to derive his language solely from its own native roots without the intrusion of terms and constructions which have an alien flavor.15

T h e perpetuation of a language is not solely the task of the schools, but is the schools which can do this most readily and effectively. Of all the subjects taught, history, including what is known in some parts of North America as "social studies," is probably the one subject with greatest implications for national identity. At the opening of the [nineteenth] century history began to be definitely enlisted in the service of patriotism, and attention turned in consequence distinctly to national history. T h e patriotic conception was by no means novel. It had been suggested by Wimpheling in his textbook of 1505. It had moved the English Privy Council to the action of 1582. It had been in the minds of Comenius and Rolland. It had inspired the French proposals of 1793. "Especially the history of the Fatherland" had again and again appeared in school programs for history. 16

T h e manner in which schools teach their native history, if in fact they are permitted to do so, is an additional element in the definition of national objectives. The educational milieu is of course not confined to specific subjects, but also encompasses more general attitudes and values, and these too have a bearing on the manner in which the nation is perceived. In determining who shall be educated, a decision is also made as to which social cleavages will be perpetuated, and which the educational systems can at least attempt to overcome. Even when no group is formally excluded, values upheld by the educational system may serve to disqualify some from full competitive ability. T h e system of education in itself and the values upon which it is based thus deserve special attention as factors affecting national identity. 16 R u p e r t Emerson, From Empire to Nation, C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d University Press, 1960, p p . 135-136. 16 Henry Johnson, Teaching of History in Elementary and Secondary Schools, New York: Macmillan, 1916, p. 96. T h i s usage of history continues to play an important role, especially with the emergence of new states,

24 IDENTITY

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

AND

CONSENSUS

Central to our discussion of national identity is the existence of a degree of consensus, the degree to be, for the moment at least, left undefined. Such consensus is implied in defining national problems and solutions and in establishing shared outlooks and experiences as members of a single nation. Consensus is always to be understood in relative terms, as referring to some degree of agreement among particular social groupings with respect to their opinions on specific issues. Even though our subsequent discussion may sound at times as though we meant complete agreement when we speak of consensus, in fact it should always be understood in these relativistic terms. T h e extent of opinion agreement, its relative presence among different population groups and on different issues are all questions subject to empirical examination. By such an examination we can begin to evaluate the state of a nation's identity. For example, do we find widely shared beliefs and opinions? D o significant population groups hold similar distributions of opinion? Is there a single, related set of opinions which is highly dominant? If the answers to these questions are yes, then we have indications of common bonds between people, a united nation, and a clear-cut identity for the nation. In this way then we should be able to identify the m a j o r consensual elements which go to making u p the nation's identity and the collective identities of its citizens. W i t h the perspectives on national identity provided by the psychoanalytic literature and the writings of political scientists and sociologists, particularly Pye and Lipset, we were able to evolve our conception of national identity, differentiating between personal identity, the image of the nation, and collective identities. O u t of this conceptualization we focused on the problems underlying the definition of nationhood and considered some of the influences affecting this definition. A m o n g these influences, most attention was paid to political parties. It is now possible, with this as background, to turn our attention to Canada.

Ill

CANADA: PROMISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT

NATIONAL PROBLEMS PROBLEMS common to all political systems are manifested in Canada, in some cases in a unique fashion, with external problems of independence and foreign commitments, internal problems of internal cleavages and the role of government, and symbolic problems. The elaboration of these should indicate both the general and the unique natures of the problems.

THE

Independence Independence has become basic to Canada's identity as a result of several historical factors. In the modern world the attainment of full citizenship has come about either by revolutionary breaks with past governments or by the development of self-government within a colonial empire. For countries which have followed the latter course, the empire has gone through a major transformation in character. At the present this is the development which is most prevalent as Britain continues to divest itself of its colonial domains, but when Canada attained self-government it was the first of the British possessions to follow this course. It set an example for the states and dominions that have followed, but its problems have also been unique: "Canada had not only to achieve autonomy inside the British Empire, but also to maintain a separate existence on a continent dominated by the United States. She thus has to come to terms with two imperialisms, real or potential." 1 Dependence on Britain.—Canada is, first of all, a political creation of Britain, brought into being by an act of the British parliament and, until 1967, still dependent on that country for constitutional amendments concerning the federal structure. Since Confederation, Canada has had almost complete control over all local affairs except for appointments of the Governor-General; suggestion, and hence 1 Donald G. Creighton, "Nationalism in Canadian History," Conservative Concepts, 2, Spring, 1960, p. 6.

25

26

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

really appointment of, the Governor-General became the prerogative of the Canadian government in 1926. Except for some Canadian participation in discussions, initially Britain alone formulated foreign policy, and in this way some leaders saw Canada committed to the Boer War. This was the first occasion on which Canadians, particularly those of French origin, could complain about "entanglement in British imperialist wars." 2 British initiative again brought Canada into World War I, although, with the formation of the Imperial War Cabinet in 1917, the Dominion prime ministers were permitted to participate directly in policy-making. But this war also produced bitter feelings, and, in 1917, when the Conscription Act was passed, those French-Canadian Liberals who were opposed to it formed a splinter group of the party while the remaining Liberals joined Robert Borden and his Union government. With the Statute of Westminster of 1931, the self-governing dominions attained full autonomy if they wanted to exercise it. When war came in 1939, some dominions felt that Britain's declaration included them, but Canada waited seven days before declaring war. Again the Canadian government had to come to terms with the heritage of previous wars. In this instance, however, Prime Minister MacKenzie King was able to adopt a number of alternatives which avoided the breakdown in relations between French and English that had occurred in 1917. Although for the American colonists British trade policies were a major source of grievance, since that time Britain's economic relations with her possessions have often appeared advantageous to the latter. The importance of trade with Britain is so crucial to some Commonwealth members that British politicians have had second thoughts about the value of joining the European Common Market. T h e Canadian government played a leading role in criticizing Britain's proposed membership in E.C.M. in the early 1960's, since, as a leading trading nation, Canada was greatly disturbed by the prospect of losing traditional markets. Among Canada's ties with Britain are those of population, and this has undoubtedly contributed to the continued development of Canada as an English-speaking country within the British Commonwealth. The largest group of Canadian citizens born outside the country come from Britain. Since the end of World War II about two million immigrants have been admitted, of whom about one-third are of ' Frank H . Underhill, The British Commonwealth, published for the D u k e University Commonwealth Studies Center; Durham: Duke University Press, 1956, p. 82. See also W. L. Morton, The Canadian Identity, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961, p. 49.

CANADA: PROMISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT

27

British origin. While British immigrants have not been faced with the same discriminatory legislation passed at various times to curtail immigrants from other countries, a certain amount of ill feeling has been expressed against them. Unlike the objection against those from continental European countries, the objection against the British can never be made that they cannot speak the language or understand the basic political institutions. Opposition is less defined, expressing itself in feelings that British immigrants treat Canadians like colonials, or are always commenting on better ways of doing things. Dependence on the United States.—If relations with Britain, particularly those involving dependency, have been crucial in shaping Canada's existence, then those with the United States are at least equally important. Politically, the United States was an important example to the Fathers of Confederation in developing a system of federal government; in other respects, however, it served as an antimodel. Federation was not the child of an aggressive democratic impulse or a powerful mass pressure. The colonial leaders, although they championed self-government, shrank from anything like a leveling democratic polity. They were Whigs or contemporary British Liberals rather than Jacksonian democrats. "In our federation," remarked Sir Georges Cartier, "the monarchical principle would form the leading feature, while on the other side of the line, judging by past history and present conditions of the country, the ruling power was the will of the mob, the rule of the populace." 3

Despite a famous unguarded boundary, fear of an invading army was an important impetus in bringing about Confederation in 1867, and attack seemed imminent as late as 1895.4 In boundary disputes before Canada attained dominion status the disadvantages of being a small, powerless nation were consistently proved, for even Britain was not willing to antagonize the Americans. Since World War II, as new power arrangements have emerged, Canada and the United States have come to work together more closely in defence plans, to the resentment of some Canadians. The reason why we in Canada become so neurotic as we brood upon our relations with our North American neighbour is that since the revolution of 1940 we have been going through a difficult period of adjustment to new conditions in the North American triangle. For 100 years before 1940 * Alexander Brady, Democracy in the Dominions, 3rd ed.; Toronto: University of T o r o n t o Press, 1958, p. 42. T h e speech of Sir Georges Cartier is quoted from Confederation Debates, 59. • T h i s was related to the Venezuela boundary dispute with Great Britain, which President Cleveland saw as an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine.

28

PUBLIC O P I N I O N AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

after Lord Durham's Report in 1839 we enjoyed living in the British century, w e took British leadership for granted in everything that concerned our participation in world affairs. Since the Ogdensburg agreement of 1940 we have passed into the American century of our history: we now have to adjust ourselves to American leadership. 5

Materially and artistically, the United States has always served as a basis of comparison, and Americans have usually been the style setters. Robert Barr, a Canadian journalist who moved to the United States at the turn of the century, told his fellow writers to "get over the border as soon as you can. . . . Shake the dust of Canada from your feet, get out of the land that is willing to pay money for whiskey, but wants its literature free in the shape of Ayer's almanac." 6 Large numbers of Canadians study in the United States, and many of these, as well as others who have taken advanced training in Canada, often decide that opportunities are greater in the neighbouring country. Immigration contributed about 47,000 professional workers to the supply during the first ten postwar years. Much of this gain, however, was offset by the emigration of about 31,000 professionals to the United States. In the first five years, the outflow of professional workers to the United States was actually greater than the gain from immigration. In the next five years, when immigration reached a much higher level, the number of professional workers among immigrants outnumbered professionals emigrating to the United States by about 18,000. 7

In the 1940's, the government appointed a royal commission to investigate the ways in which the United States was influencing Canada's cultural development, with a view to presenting proposals for confining some of these. Government agencies specifically designed to confine American cultural influences include the National Film Board, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Canada Council, and National Research Council, most of which existed even before the Royal Commission made its recommendations. Despite these measures, Canadians receive most of their news, television programs, movies, and magazines from the United States.8 'Frank Underhill, "Canadian and American Foreign Policies," in Text of Addresses Delivered at the 25th Annual Couchiching Conference, Geneva Park, Lake Couchiching, Ontario: August 4-11, 1956, p. 117. See also Mason Wade, "New Relations of the United States with Canada," in The United States and the World Today, ed. by Clyde F. Kohn, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1957, p. 38. • Quoted in Brady, op. cit., p. 37. 'Economics and Research Branch, Department of Labour of Canada, Skilled and Professional Manpower in Canada, 1945-55, Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, Ottawa: July, 1957, p. 67. •For evidence on the penetration of American mass media in Canada, see H. F. Angus, Canada and Her Great Neighbor, Toronto: Ryerson, 1938, pp. 124-172;

CANADA: PROMISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT

29

Canada, rich in natural resources but always with a limited population, has depended on the nationals of other countries for its economic development. Resources have been developed mainly with foreign money. In some cases, particularly that of the United States, subsidiary manufacturing companies have been set up in Canada. Since 1939, the United States and Great Britain between them have made about 90 percent of the total direct investment in Canada, with the share of the former much greater than that of the latter. 9 Among the difficulties stemming from this extensive United States investment in Canada are those related to American foreign policy. Restrictions on trade with mainland China have been extended, for example, to Canadian subsidiaries who have been prevented from shipping automobile parts to China. While this incident aroused considerable resentment, particularly because of the size of the economic loss entailed, Canada's continued trade with Cuba after the United States broke with the Castro government did not appear to have an economic motivation, since trade never achieved a great volume, but rather an emotional appeal, as a way for Canada to show its defiance of American policy. Canada has always been concerned with the nature of its trade relations with the United States. As early as 1891 the federal election campaign centred on reciprocal trade with the United States, but, through the strength of nationalist appeals, the pro-reciprocity Liberals were defeated. Another movement for reciprocity, this time under American auspices, emerged in 1911, and again this issue contributed to the defeat of the Liberals who were now in power. Since about 1936, more amicable trade agreements have been worked out between Canada and the United States, but the issue of trade conReport of the Royal Commission on Publications, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1961. Other countries too receive much of the content of their mass media from the United States. But what has been especially troublesome for the Canadian mass-communication industry is the geographic closeness of the competition, the sameness of language, the apparent technical superiority of the finished product coming from the United States, and the economic advantages of Americans in competing for the same markets. T h e results have been, for example, that 92 of the 96 periodicals in Canada which sell more than 10,000 copies per month are American, that there are no nationally recognized newspaper columnists, and that almost the only Canadian films which have won international recognition are those produced by the government-sponsored National Film Board. John A. Irving, "The Problems of the Mass Media," in Mass Media in Canada, ed. by John A. Irving, Toronto: Ryerson, 1962, pp. 221-235. ' J. Grant Glassco, Certain Aspects of Taxation Relating to Investment in Canada by Non-residents, Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, Ottawa: February, 1956. T h i s has been a continuing trend, which the present administration is attempting to limit.

30

P U B L I C OPINION AND CANADIAN

IDENTITY

tinues to be a source of dissatisfaction. With each passing year, the amount of American ownership of Canadian industry and resources grows, and, with it, the extent of Canadian resentment seems also to grow. But no matter how concerned Canadians may be about the economic influences of the United States, there are limitations to the amount of ill-feeling that can be expressed or the kinds of reprisals which may be taken: "Owing to the facts of North American civilization, Canadians who set store by material development—and most do—must inevitably be nationalists of a qualified type." 10 Links with the Commonwealth.—Another traditional tie is that with the British Commonwealth. The new Commonwealth which has emerged since World War II is neither a significant export market nor a major source of immigrants for Canada. But it is perhaps in less tangible ways that the Commonwealth has attained great importance in recent years. Herbert Spiro notes how present-day African nationalism differs from European nationalism of preceding generations in its "internationalist" character. Emerging African nations often seem more concerned with developing pan-Africanism than with uniquely national identities.11 There may be an analogy to this in the relations between the Commonwealth and Canada. At the same time that the United States has become an increasingly powerful neighbour, Britain has lost much of its power on the international scene. Meanwhile politicians of many countries have been concerned with the development of a third force that could somehow mediate between the United States and Russia. The Commonwealth has then appeared as one such alternative, where membership is a way of acquiring a greater voice in world affairs. Other foreign commitments.—In other international commitments Canada has tried even harder to establish for itself a unique role internationally. One of the primary facts of modern life is the division of the world into two main ideological camps. Nations then have the choice of identifying with one or the other of these blocs. (This identification is of course not always voluntary.) Another alternative is to stay aloof from political struggles and attempt to retain friends "Alexander Brady, "Nationalism and Democracy in the British Commonwealth: Some General Trends," American Political Science Review, 47, December, 1953, p. 1030. An economist who strongly argues against nationalistic economic measures such as protectionist tariffs and "forced insertion of Canadians into the ownership and management of American enterprises in Canada" is Harry G. Johnson, in "Problems of Canadian Nationalism," International Journal, 16, Summer, 1961, pp. 238-249. 11 Herbert J. Spiro, Politics in Africa, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Spectrum Books, 1962, pp. 12-23.

CANADA: PROMISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT

31

in both camps. For Canada, remaining apart from international conflicts and commitments has always been difficult. Canadian governments have never believed that such isolation is possible, and this is reflected in the views of the Canadian people. Canadians have always had economic, political, and emotional ties with Great Britain, the Commonwealth, and to a more limited extent with France, and there has always been the pervasive evidence of American influence and proximity. In the context of present international realities and the historic and economic ties which involve countries in each other's affairs, what can a country such as Canada do to establish its identity on the international scene? The solution that has become increasingly prominent is participation in international bodies. Through membership in such bodies single nations, by themselves of limited influence and importance, can attain support for national policies and enhance their status on the international scene. For example, the United Nations, through its formal commitment to values of nondiscrimination and self-government, the opportunities it provides as a world meeting place and forum, and its involvement in trusteeship territories, has become an important focus for the new African states eager to acquire stature and throw off colonial ties. In the same way Canada, through its international involvements, has attempted to control and mitigate the influence of the United States on its own affairs. Canada has taken an active part in the United Nations and its specialized agencies from the inception of the parent body. But participation in international organizations does not necessarily contribute to a characteristic identity unless Canada at the same time pursues some distinctive policies. In particular there should be divergence, at least some of the time, from positions taken by the United States and Britain. Such differences have occurred in Canada's commitments to NATO, the concept of the role Canada should play in North American defence, its lack of participation in the Pan American Union, and reactions to British involvement in Suez. But in many cases Canadian international activities have been guided or at least influenced by the perceived interests of traditional allies. For example, while Canada trades with mainland China and has some cultural exchanges with that country, governments up to the time of writing have never pressed for United Nations recognition of the Chinese Communist government in the face of American opposition, although the British government has officially recognized that country. Up until about 1960 Canadian activities in the United Nations with respect to issues of colonialism were limited and relatively insignificant partly because of the lack of colonial experience and the

32

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

limited popular appeal of this issue within the country. At the same time Canada's ties with countries which do have colonial and trusteeship experiences probably contributed to the minor role which Canada has played. Internal

Cleavages

T h e social and economic diversity within Canada presents major problems both for political stability and for identifying an unambiguously Canadian nation. Unequal distribution of people and resources.—Among the major internal differences is the unequal distribution of resources, both human and economic, and of allied rewards. Although Canada covers a land mass of more than three and a half million square miles, settlement has been concentrated only in certain areas, spreading along the southern border; the northern hinterland has few permanent residents. T h e centres of population have always been in the central provinces of Ontario and Quebec, but, since Confederation, other population centres have shifted from the Maritimes to the west (see Table 1). There is also a considerable difference in the extent to which different areas of the country have become urbanized. T h e most highly urbanized provinces are Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec; the least urbanized are New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and TABLE PERCENTAGE

DISTRIBUTION

1

OF POPULATION

BY R E G I O N ,

1881-1961

Year

Atlantic*

Quebec

Ontario

Prairies

British Columbia

1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961

20 18 16 13 11 10 10 12 10

31 31 31 28 27 28 29 29 29

45 44 41 35 33 33 33 33 34

1 3 8 18 22 23 21 18 17

1 2 3 5 6 7 7 8 9

s

•Newfoundland is not included in the Atlantic provinces until 1951. Percentage'" do not add to 100 because of rounding and the exclusion of the Yukon and North-Wes Territories. SOURCES: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ninth Census of Canada, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951; and 7967 Census of Canada, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962.

CANADA: P R O M I S E AND

DISAPPOINTMENT

33

Prince Edward Island, in the order given. The proportion of those living in cities in the three highly urbanized provinces is about twice as large as the proportion living in the least urbanized. A limited number of staple products have always had overriding importance in the Canadian economy. Beginning with furs, the major wealth of Canada has also been derived from fish, lumber, pulp and paper, grain, and mineral resources. These products are related to particular regions, and provinces vary in their resource wealth. For example, the major part of the pulp and paper industry is concentrated in northern Ontario and Quebec, whereas the prairie provinces have become the main granaries for the world. At the same time provinces differ in their economic dependence on these staple products. In the trend toward modernization and mechanization throughout the world, increasingly smaller proportions of labour are required in agriculture. In recent years expansion has been in the tertiary sector of the economy, as the primary and secondary sectors become more highly automated; Ontario is the most modern, with less than 15 percent of the male labour force engaged in agriculture and more than 40 percent in tertiary industry. Ontario is followed in this respect by British Columbia. Prince Edward Island and Saskatchewan emerge as dramatic contrasts, with more than half of the male labour force still engaged in primary industry. There are even differences in the rewards received for similar types of work. For example, the highest median earnings in manufacturing are to be obtained in Ontario and British Columbia, those in the Atlantic provinces are considerably less. (See Table 2 for total provincial differences.) As a consequence, each region has a different standard of living. (See Table 3 for some examples.) Regional differences in ethnic and religious groups.—The second important internal cleavage derives from the marked difference in social composition of the population in various regions. For example, Quebec has a heavy concentration of people of French origin; they also make up a sizable proportion of the population of New Brunswick, while all the other provinces have some representatives of French origin but in lesser proportions. At the time of the first census in 1871, people of European origin who were neither British nor French made up 7 percent of the total population. At the 1961 census the same group constituted 26 percent. Since the last decades of the nineteenth century, continental Europeans have been important in the settlement of the prairie provinces and in recent years their numerical significance has grown in Ontario (see Table 4). The great diversity in settlement patterns of ethnic groups has

34

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN TABLE

IDENTITY

2

P E R CAPITA PERSONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME, FOR CANADA AND PROVINCES,

1961,

Canadian dollars

Provinces Canada

1,400

Newfoundland Prince Edward Island Nova Scotia New Brunswick

860 920 1,130 990

Quebec

1,230

Ontario

1,640

Manitoba Saskatchewan Alberta

1,080

British Columbia

1,640

1,340 1,460

SOURCE: Financial Post, 1962 Survey of Markets and Business Year Book, Toronto: Maclean-Hunter, 1963, p. 19.

TABLE

3

INDICATORS OF DIFFERENCES IN LIVING CONDITIONS BY REGION,

Percentage of labour force unemployed Region Canada Atlantic" Quebec Ontario Prairies British Columbia

19511955

19561960

3.3

5.7

5.5

9.7 7.4 4.2

4.5 2.7 2.2 4.0

3.3 6.4

1941-1961

Infant mortality per 1,000 live births 1941

1951

1961

7.2

61

39

27

11.1 9.3

71

5.5 4.6

45 48 31 32

31

76 46 52

8.5

37

30

1961

31 23 26 24

* Newfoundland has been included in the Atlantic provinces for all years. SOURCES: Percentage of labour force unemployed: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Unemployment in Canada, Bulletin 71-503; Ottawa: April, 1962. Infant mortality: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Vital Statistics, Ottawa: 1963.

CANADA:

PROMISE

AND

TABLE PERCENTAGE

DISAPPOINTMENT

4

DISTRIBUTION

OF

POPULATION

OF NON-BRITISH ORIGIN, BY REGION,

SOURCE: Census

1961

Non-British and Non-French

French

Canada

26

30

Atlantic Quebec Ontario Prairies British C o l u m b i a

9 9 30 50 37

19 81 10 7 4

Region

of Canada,

35

1961.

been accompanied by a diversity in religious groups. As would be expected, Roman Catholics are dominant in Quebec because of their connections with the French, but they have also become an increasingly important denomination throughout Canada, making up, for example, the largest single group in Ontario. Fundamentalist groups are concentrated in the prairie provinces. Related to origin and religion is the distribution of foreign-born Canadians. Since Canada has always been a country of immigration, the foreign-born have naturally contributed significant numbers to the population. Here again settlement has been unevenly distributed throughout the provinces. Since the postwar years Canada has accepted more than two million immigrants, and a sizable proportion, possibly half of these, have settled in Ontario, with major consequences for the composition of the population. Effects of this diversity on the Canadian political system.—The wide range of interest groups represented in the country and their unequal geographical dispersion present a politically volatile situation. If there is a complete coincidence between social and economic interests, and these are concentrated in particular geographic regions, the likelihood becomes great that they will find an outlet in united political action of a highly divisive sort. When Confederation was still in the planning stages, those concerned with creating a unified nation had already to contend with the varied character of Canada's resources and population. T h e existence of a French minority was an obvious problem. T h e Fathers of Confederation also had to come to terms with the prior existence of colonial legislatures. There were some who

36

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

favoured a unitary system of government, as in Britain. But a more realistic policy had to take into account a French minority, which needed guarantees for its continued existence before it would give its loyalty to the new nation, and sectional interests which were represented by the existing legislatures. Already there was some rudimentary manufacturing industry in Ontario, and those engaged in these enterprises were anxious to have protection. This was the beginning of a conflict that would continue between the manufacturing interests in the central provinces, and those, first in the Maritimes and later in the prairie provinces, whose prime source of income depended on trade in unfinished resources, and who therefore benefited from the free movement of products. T h e solution to the problem of accommodating all these divergent interests was in a federal system of government. T h e Canadian political system which has developed has therefore incorporated several devices to protect sectional interests. These include representation in the House of Commons and Senate, the continued existence of provincial governments, and judicial interpretations on the distribution of powers between provincial and federal governments. Another means of insuring sectional interests has come about through the development of Cabinet government. Although there is no official recognition in the British North America Act of a party system or a Cabinet, tradition, following that employed in the British parliament, has given Canada two or more political parties, a Prime Minister, and a Cabinet normally appointed from members sitting in the House of Commons and responsible to it. T h e desire for the representation of various interest groups in the Cabinet has grown as the Senate, the body originally intended to reflect regional interests, has shown itself less effective politically. It has become customary for an effective Cabinet to take into account the proportionate size of each province, special regions within the provinces, and various ethnic and religious groups in the country. T h e existence of major sectional, ethnic, and economic cleavages and the distribution of power, both actual and desirable, which should exist among interest groups based on these cleavages, become then other important determinants of Canada's identity and of the identities of its citizens. The

Role

of

Government

T h e role of government is important in affecting the definition of national identity because what government does is an important way of characterizing nations; government activities in the economic sphere have been significant instruments in nation-building; and govern-

CANADA: PROMISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT

37

ment activities in the realm of ideas have aided in the development of national cultures. One of the primary ways of characterizing modem nations is by the amount and kind of governmental participation. Whether they have socialist or free-enterprise systems is thought to have implications, not just for the economy, but for many critical social institutions. There are those who contend that issues pertaining to government activities are no longer significant today. But even if, as Dahl and Lindblom remark, "it has become increasingly difficult for thoughtful men to find meaningful alternatives posed in the traditional choices between socialism and capitalism," 12 these choices refer to decisions between government policies and not to the ideological tone associated with particular forms of government. It is this tone rather than the concrete policies with which we are concerned here as a determinant, in part, of a country's internal character and thus its identity. Related to this ideological content, the role of government has further relevance because of its connection with class-based appeals. For example, survey material from the United States reveals that those who identify with the working class tend to favour government action in the areas of social welfare, public ownership, and the regulation of economic activities.13 Attitudes toward the role of government should then serve as an extension of the preceding discussion on cleavages by giving content to class-based appeals in Canada. Secondly, and more important, however, is the fact that government economic activities have often been a conscious tool used to develop the nation. Part of the "national policy" of the first Prime Minister was the building of a transcontinental railway. Although this railway, the Canadian Pacific, has never been publicly owned, the government's generous assistance in funds and land grants has kept it in an enviable financial position to this day. The publicly owned Canadian National Railways have not fared as well financially, but they "are not to be judged merely by the test of profitable returns on investment, since, like other lines, they have been an instrument of nationbuilding, drawing together widely-scattered communities and making possible the exploitation of natural resources remote from the industrial heart of Canada." 1 4 The impetus for government economic activity and regulation has often come, not from organized labour, " R o b e r t A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare, New York: Harper, 1953, p. 3. 13 Heinz Eulau, Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years, New York: Free Press, 1962, p. 64. "Brady, " T h e State and Economic Life," in Canada, ed. by George W . Brown, Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1950, p. 357.

38

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

but from the business community. Thus, public regulation of hydroelectric power in Ontario was encouraged by manufacturers and merchants. For these groups in Ontario and elsewhere, government help was needed to protect business interests from American competition or domination. "The concept of Canadian nationality has lent coherence to the numerous claims of these interests for protection, and in public debate has given such claims a more attractive complexion." 15 The tradition of cooperation between private business and government has been an important aspect of the economic life of Canada since 1867, and indications remain that this will continue to be the dominant policy. In a statement made in 1958 a prominent Canadian businessman, R. M. Fowler, president of the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association, said that "the businessman does not, or should not, want to escape from public regulation of business practices and that such regulation is a proper and necessary function of the modern democratic state. Indeed, you will probably think—with some accuracy —that I am suggesting better control and regulation in the national interest than business has had under the present misconceived and misdirected effort." 16 The acquiescence of business interests to government regulation continues to be strongly motivated by a concern with countering American influences. As a consequence of the way government is seen in Canada—as promoting the development of the nation and controlling competition from the United States—it has been a major participant in economic endeavors. Such varied activities as scientific research, communications, air and rail transport, development of products and resources such as synthetics and atomic energy, have all come under the aegis of government. While the federal government continues to play an important part in economic affairs, its concern in recent years has been more with social-welfare services. Welfare measures include unemployment insurance, family allowances, old-age pensions, and a hospital plan shared with the provinces. At this time the government's efforts at nation-building have been directed toward reducing economic inequalities. Thirdly, the federal government has attempted to promote the distinctive character of Canada not only through its activities in the economic and social fields, but also in the realm of ideas. 16

Ibid., p. 354. R. M. Fowler, "The Future of Competition in Canada: A Businessman's View," in The Canadian Economy: Selected Readings, ed. by J. Deutsch, B. S. Keirstead, K. Levitt, and R. M. Will, Toronto: Macmillan, 1961, p. 69. His derogatory reference was to the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker. 16

CANADA: PROMISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT

39

Protection . . . has extended beyond the sphere of material interests. The establishment of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1936), patterned in the main upon the British, was designed to afford protection and encouragement to many elements of cultural life. It has ambitiously but quietly sought to foster in the populace some sense of a national community and a national culture, both of which have seemed menaced by the power and success of the private broadcasting companies in the neighbouring country.1''

Mention has already been made of the creation of government cultural agencies. Since the time of Confederation, cultural domination from outside the country appears to have grown into an increasingly critical issue for many Canadian intellectuals and, through them, the government. For example, in the Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, the conclusions drawn were that something must be done to develop a unique and rich cultural life in Canada. The best course to follow appeared to be the provision of funds by the three levels of government, although recommendations concerned only federal expenditures. 18 Even in the newspaper and magazine fields, where the participation of government could be viewed as an infringement on freedom of the press, government protection is still seen as a critical necessity. The recent Royal Commission on Publications thought it necessary, in order to have specifically Canadian publications, that the government take steps to enforce economic discrimination against American publications in terms of advertising and postage rates. In their report to the government the Commissioners stated in their introduction that, only a truly Canadian printing press, one with a "feel" of Canada and directly responsible to Canada, can give us the critical analysis, the informed discourse and the dialogue which are indispensable in a sovereign society. The view of the Commission is that in an area as vital and sensitive as that of the press, whatever is done should be positive rather than negative, with the goal the promotion of the Canadian periodical, not the suppression of the foreign. 19 17

Brady, "The State and Economic Life" (n. 14, above), p. 354. Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, 1949-1951, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951, p. 272. See also the recommendations for government expenditures on pp. 276-382. See also Hugh MacLennan, in The Price of Being Canadian, ed. by D. L. B. Hamlin, 7th Winter Conference, Canadian Institute of Public Affairs; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961, pp. 27-35. 19 Report of the Royal Commission on Publications, p. 2. 18

40

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

In a report on the state of scholarly research in the humanities and social sciences in Canada, the author concluded that the only effective solution to the development of these fields in competition with those of the United States was through massive doses of government investment in universities and specifically in research opportunities. 2 0 Political Symbols Before looking at such Canadian symbols as flags, anthems, leaders, rules of government, and historical heroes and events, we must consider their nature and significance in general. T h e minimal attribute of political symbols is that they are easily recognizable communicative devices. More noteworthy is their peculiarly emotional content. Symbols also have some roots in the traditions of the people they represent, whether these nations are new or have existed for centuries. By their appeal to history symbols can help to enforce respect for authority and for existing institutions. 21 Through this link with the past, symbols also serve to legitimate new laws and practices. They acquire additional importance as they become the basis of some ideological elaboration. In this way, the American Constitution may be regarded as the basis of a relatively consistent system of beliefs in which particular events are always judged in terms of their constitutionality, regardless of the utilitarian value of such judgements. Monarchical institutions also take on this ideological character. A further characteristic of political symbols is their potential for serving as either unifying or divisive rallying points for the residents of a country. For example, in the United States, the refusal of Jehovah's Witnesses children to salute the flag brought forth a historic decision by the Supreme Court which stated in effect that certain aspects of national unity were more important than other constitutional guarantees such as freedom of religion. T h e ultimate f o u n d a t i o n of a free society is the b i n d i n g tie of cohesive spirit. Such a sentiment is fostered by all of those agencies of the m i n d a n d the spirit which may serve to gather u p the traditions of a people, transx Bernard Ostry, Research in the Humanities and in the Social Sciences in Canada, published for the Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Social Science Research Council of Canada; Ottawa: 1962. Herbert J . Spiro, Government by Constitution, New York: Random House, 1959, p. 377. In relation to the British monarchy see Edward Shils and Michael Young, " T h e Meaning of the Coronation," Sociological Review, 1, December, 1953, pp. 63-81. T h e unifying potential of the monarchy is questioned by N. Birnbaum, "Monarchs and Sociologists: A Reply to Professor Shils and Mr. Young," Sociological Review, 3, July, 1955, pp. 5-23.

CANADA: PROMISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT

41

mit them f r o m g e n e r a t i o n to generation a n d thereby create that continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a civilization. " W e live by symbols." T h e flag is the symbol of o u r national unity, transcending all internal differences, however large, within the framework of the Constitution. 2 2

In Nigeria the use by the British of legal forms and terminology linked with the Crown helped to mobilize national sentiments of Nigerians against British policies. Even before Bismarck added red to the black and white Prussian flag, the political and national aspirations of Germans were divided by loyalties symbolized by different flags. There are religious groups in both Turkey and Israel which do not accept some of the national heroes and which express their opposition in a variety of ways. By enumerating the attributes of symbols in addition to merely communicative ones, attention is drawn to their political consequences. One view is that at least some of these symbols, notably national rituals and holidays, represent a "major test of legitimacy" 2 3 for the nation. Examples cited where symbols had divisive effects would be taken to indicate that some proportion of the population does not accord legitimacy to the state. This raises an empirical question of how critical this is for political stability. In the view of the Justices who ruled in the case of Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the uniform acceptance of symbols was essential for national unity, but the later ruling acknowledged that this was not in keeping with other values of the United States: "Freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. T h e test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order." 2 4 But in countries such as Germany and South Africa, lack of approval of political symbols has been highly divisive. A major difference between these countries and the United States is that symbols in the former have served as focal points for public advocacy. Jehovah's Witnesses make up a small proportion of the American population, and their activities are primarily centred in the religious sphere, with only secondary implications for the polity. If, however, they should «Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S. Ct. 1010, 84 L. Ed. 1375 (1940). Three years later this ruling was reversed. 33 S. M. Lipset, Political Man, Garden City: Doubleday, 1960, p. 80. For an interesting discussion on the use of ritual in legitimating the identity o£ Yankee City, see W. Lloyd Warner, The Family of God, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961, pp. 89-154. M West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943).

42

PUBLIC

O P I N I O N AND CANADIAN

IDENTITY

increase greatly in number and extend their activities to opposing other aspects of the state, then the danger to political stability could indeed be great. In Germany and South Africa differences in attitudes towards political symbols have been mainly related to political matters and have become associated with specific parties. Agitation then has been conducted principally in the political sphere, with important consequences for national unity. In Canada, the provision of either unambiguous or unifying symbols has been singularly lacking. At Confederation Canada was given permission to fly the Red Ensign, the flag of the British Merchant Navy. By 1891, the Commonwealth dominions were permitted to use either the Red or Blue Ensign with the addition of their coat-of-arms. Prime Minister MacKenzie King in 1925 attempted to introduce a new flag but dropped the idea in the face of strong opposition. A parliamentary committee met in the fall of 1945 to consider more than two thousand designs and select a new flag. Although the committee made a choice, the government failed to act on it because, for one thing, it feared that the continued inclusion of the Union Jack would be offensive to French-speaking Canadians. A uniquely Canadian flag was adopted in 1965, but not until great controversy had been generated about the design which most appropriately represented Canadian origins and loyalties. The official national anthem of Canada is generally recognized to be "God Save the Queen," and it is this song which is most often played at public assemblies. After Confederation many felt that Canada needed a national song of its own. At that time Englishspeaking Canadians were singing "The Maple Leaf Forever," which Alexander Muir wrote in 1867. In it reference is made to the British victory at Quebec and it has never been acceptable to French Canadians.25 In 1880 Calixa Lavallie wrote "O Canada," and although this has not yet been acknowledged as an official anthem, it is the most widely accepted national song in English and French-speaking Canada today. Canada is a constitutional monarchy, and the Queen does not share in any governmental activities except ceremonial ones. When she is absent from the country her representative, the Governor-General, carries out these activities. Many outsiders still believe that Canadians support the royal family through direct taxation. This is not the case, but it is understandable how such a misconception may persist in 25 At the 1963 meeting of the Canadian Authors' Association, it was agreed that a contest be held to obtain new words for the music of " T h e Maple Leaf Forever," words which would be acceptable to all Canadians.

CANADA: PROMISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT

43

view of the widespread display of the Queen's picture on Canadian money and postage and in public places generally. Canadians apparently feel a real bond of affection for the royal family, as witnessed by the widely read magazine and newspaper articles about it and the warm welcome that accompanies its visits. Some commentators have considered this the Canadian equivalent to attitudes toward Hollywood stars, but the significance of the Queen as a unifying symbol for all Canadians is a topic which has never been publicly discussed.26 The hostile reception which the Queen received during her 1964 visit to Quebec may then have come as a shock to many Canadians. The Governor-General, like the monarch, has, over the years, evolved into a symbolic rather than an actual head. Appointment of the Governor-General as the Queen's representative had been interpreted by the British parliament as lying within their purview. After the Imperial Conference of 1926, the Governor-General was appointed only after consultation with the Canadian Cabinet, which meant in effect that the Canadian Cabinet decided on whom it wanted. In 1952, the first Canadian, Vincent Massey, was appointed. It has been questioned whether the Governor-General can ever attain the same emotional appeal as the monarch. Since he is nominated by the Canadian government and holds office for a relatively short period of time, it does not seem likely that he can build up the same prestige or inspire the same loyalty. But now, as a Canadian, his unifying potential is conceivably greater. The British North America Act, though drawn up by Canadians from two major political parties and presenting a number of points of view, was never ratified by the Canadian people. Instead it was passed as an ordinary Act of the British parliament. In contrast, the Australian Constitution, which was drafted somewhat later, was passed by a direct vote of the people as well as by the British parliament. The British North America Act does not provide for amendment by Canadian authorities and full responsibility for this has yet to be settled. Many written constitutions contain formal guarantees of basic rights. The Canadian one has never had this, and it was not until 1960 that a Bill of Rights was passed by parliament. This is in striking " F o r the Queen's possible impact on non-British, non-French immigrants, see Mildred A. Schwartz, "Political Behaviour and Ethnic Origin," in Papers on the 1962 Election, ed. by John Meisel, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964, p. 258. A Canadian T V star, now resident in the United States, raised an outcry from some segments of the public when she appeared on the Jack Paar show before a royal visit and said that most Canadians were "indifferent" to the Queen. Reference is made to this event in one of the polls discussed in Chapter VII.

44

PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

contrast with the American Constitution in which the drama of the Bill of Rights and the preamble to the Constitution provide foci to which people can pay homage. In the neighbouring republic, the constitution as a single written document has been from the outset an arch of the covenant, the sign and seal of the state, whereby civil and political order is preserved. Its very creation was a break with the past, and it has been cherished as the major symbol of the nation. But in Canada the constitution has never been viewed in such a light, because in many significant features it is much older than the British North America Act. It is grounded deep in British law, precedent, and convention, and has assimiliated miscellaneous elements of the British constitution. 27

Although Canadian history seems short, it is certainly lengthy enough to have acquired historical heroes and dates of important events. But, lacking a revolutionary tradition, Canada has none of the dramatic heroes or historical occasions that are commemorated by other peoples. Politicians in Canada, because of the requirement of knitting together so many divergent strains, have been, where successful, experts at compromise, and as such they are often considered rather colourless individuals. National heroes inherited from earlier periods are marked by their divisive potential. If the English Canadians have General Wolfe, the French Canadians have General Montcalm. History has been taught in French Canada with an emphasis on past glory rather than on present conditions. But Canadian history often seems even more remote to English-speaking Canadians. 28 Perhaps the most fitting summary of the state of Canadian symbols is contained in a verse by F. R. Scott, T h e Canadian Centenary Council Meeting in Le Reine Elizabeth T o seek those symbols Which will explain ourselves to ourselves Evoke unlimited responses And prove that something called Canada Really exists in the hearts of all "Brady, Democracy in the Dominions (n. 3, above), p. 63. Brady suggests here that the Canadian constitution does not have the emotional appeal that the American does because of the former's deep roots in British precedent and its close connection with British law-making. 20 A Toronto newspaper reported how a group of children made elaborate preparations to enact the American Civil War. Questioned on the appropriateness of this battle rather than one more closely related to Canada, the children's teenaged adviser answered, "We thought about that, but we seem to know so very little of our own history. The kids see Civil War scenes on television, and this is more interesting to them." Toronto Star, August 23, 1962.

CANADA: PROMISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT

45

Handed out to every delegate At the start of proceedings A portfolio of documents On the cover of which appeared In gold letters not A Mari Usque Ad Mare not E Pluribus Unum not Dieu et Mon Droit but COURTESY O F COCA-COLA

INFLUENCES ON NATIONAL Political

LIMITED.29

IDENTITY

Party

T h e political party plays a major role in influencing the character of the nation and the identities of its members. (See Figure 2.) Political party is defined here as made up of respondents who have indicated that they would vote for that party in a forthcoming election. 30 T o suggest that party identification alone influences opinion would be to take an absurd position. It is rather the intention of this study to examine the degree to which parties have an impact on their supporters. This may be taken as a further attempt to grapple with Lazarsfeld's statement that "a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially" as an explanation of political attitudes. Before proceeding, some comments are in order about the nature of the Canadian party structure. Despite some changes in name, the national scene has been dominated by two parties, the Liberal and the Conservative (see Table 5). Along with this two-party dominance M

F . R. Scott, "National Identity," Maclean's, J u n e 1, 1963, p. 2. In referring to party supporters it should be understood that the main unit and its constituent parts are only relative terms since many supporters will not vote and some may change their allegiance in a coming election. But the important thing is that at the time of each survey respondents were willing to identify themselves as party sympathizers. It might increase the significance of this study if it were possible to discover how strongly partisan supporters were, but this information is not available. Still, as the subsequent analysis will indicate, this conception of parties is a useful device as long as it is recalled that parties are loosely organized and allow considerable shifts in composition over time. Even if we were concerned with party membership we would still find major definitional problems. See Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, London: Methuen, 1954, pp. 61-64. 30

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