Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia: Persuasion and Its Limits 9780804795388

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Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia

Studies in Asian Security se ri e s e di tor s Amitav Acharya, Chief Editor American University

David Leheny, Chief Editor Princeton University

Alastair Iain Johnston Harvard University

Randall Schweller The Ohio State University

i nte rnat i onal board Rajesh M. Basrur Nanyang Technological University

Brian L. Job University of British Columbia

Barry Buzan London School of Economics

Miles Kahler University of California, San Diego

Victor D. Cha Georgetown University

Peter J. Katzenstein Cornell University

Thomas J. Christensen Princeton University

Khong Yuen Foong Oxford University

Stephen P. Cohen The Brookings Institution

Byung-Kook Kim Korea University

Chu Yun-han Academia Sinica

Michael Mastanduno Dartmouth College

Rosemary Foot University of Oxford

Mike Mochizuki The George Washington University

Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University

Katherine H. S. Moon Wellesley College

Sumit Ganguly Indiana University, Bloomington

Qin Yaqing China Foreign Affairs University

Avery Goldstein University of Pennsylvania

Christian Reus-Smit Australian National University

Michael J. Green Georgetown University

Varun Sahni Jawaharlal Nehru University

Stephan M. Haggard University of California, San Diego

Rizal Sukma CSIS, Jakarta

G. John Ikenberry Princeton University

Wu Xinbo Fudan University

Takashi Inoguchi Chuo University

Studies in Asian Security Amitav Acharya, Chief Editor David Leheny, Chief Editor

The Studies in Asian Security book series promotes analysis, understanding, and explanation of the dynamics of domestic, transnational, and international security challenges in Asia. The peer-reviewed publications in the series analyze contemporary security issues and problems to clarify debates in the scholarly community, provide new insights and perspectives, and identify new research and policy directions. Security is defined broadly to include the traditional political and military dimensions as well as nontraditional dimensions that affect the survival and well-being of political communities. Asia, too, is defined broadly to include Northeast, Southeast, South, and Central Asia. Designed to encourage original and rigorous scholarship, books in the Studies in Asian Security series seek to engage scholars, educators, and practitioners. Wide-ranging in scope and method, the series is receptive to all paradigms, programs, and traditions, and to an extensive array of methodologies now employed in the social sciences.

Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia persuasion and its limits

Yuko Kawato

Stanford University Press  •  Stanford, California

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2015 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of America on acid-­free, archival-­quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data Kawato,Yuko, author. Protests against U.S. military base policy in Asia : persuasion and its limits / Yuko Kawato. pages cm — (Studies in Asian Security) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8047-9416-9 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Military bases, American—Political aspects—Asia—Case studies. 2. United States—Military policy—Case studies. 3. Asia—Military policy—Case studies. 4. Protest movements—Asia—Case studies. 5. United States—Military relations—Asia—Case studies. 6. Asia—Military relations— United States—Case studies. I. Title. II. Series: Studies in Asian Security. UA26.A84K39 2015 355.7095—dc23 2014038506 ISBN 978-0-8047-9538-8 (electronic)

To my family in Japan and France

Contents

List of Acronyms Acknowledgments Introduction

xi xiii 1

1 Response to Protests in Okinawa Under the U.S. Administration, 1945–­1972

41

2 Response to Protests in Okinawa, 1995–­1996 and 2009–­2010

65

3 Response to Protests in South Korea, 2000–­2007

98

4 Response to Protests in the Philippines, 1964–­1965 and 1972–­1979

127

5 Persuasion and the Closure of U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines, 1991

138

Conclusion

174

Notes Bibliography Index

187 211 219

Acronyms



ABC BANDILA BAYAN ConCom CPP CSP DOD DPJ EASI EDSA FLAG GNP GRI JAJA JCC JCS KAAKBAY KOMPIL LABAN LDP LP

Anti-­Bases Coalition Bansang Nagkakaisa sa Diwa at Layunin Bagong Alyansang Makabayan Constitutional Commission Communist Party of the Philippines Campaign for a Sovereign Philippines Department of Defense Democratic Party of Japan East Asian Strategic Initiative Epifanio de los Santos Avenue Free Legal Assistance Group Good Neighbors Program Government of the Ryukyu Islands Justice for Aquino, Justice for All Junior Chamber of Commerce Joint Chiefs of Staff Kilusan sa Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan Liberal Democratic Party Liberal Party

xii

acronyms

LPP MABINI MAN MBA MDT

Land Partnership Plan Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, Nationalism, Incorporated Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism Military Bases Agreement Mutual Defense Treaty



Ministry of National Defense Ministry of Defense Ministry of Environment Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy Nuclear-­Free Philippines Coalition Non-­governmental Organization Not in My Backyard New People’s Army Okinawa People’s Party Okinawa Socialist Mass Party Okinawa Socialist Party Okinawa Teachers Association People’s Action for Reform of the Status of Forces Agreement Pilipino Democratic Party Republic of Korea Republic of the Philippines Special Action Committee on Okinawa Self-­Defense Forces Status of Forces Agreement Sexually transmitted disease U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands U.S. Forces Korea Visiting Forces Agreement III Marine Expeditionary Force

MND MOD MOE MOFA MOFAT NAJFD NFPC NGO NIMBY NPA OPP OSMP OSP OTA PAR-­SOFA PDP ROK R.P. SACO SDF SOFA STD USCAR USFK VFA III MEF

Acknowledgments

Many people offered me time, insights, introductions, and good advice while I conducted research and wrote this book. These are some of the most precious gifts we receive in life and I am truly grateful. First and foremost I thank Elizabeth Kier, Jonathan Mercer, Robert Pekkanen, and Susan Whiting. I could not ask for a better group of people to guide my development as a scholar. Elizabeth Kier encouraged me to pursue my interest in researching protests against U.S. military base policy in Asia, when another professor told me that the topic is too politically controversial and is more suitable for after tenure. Her support gave me confidence to study a topic I felt passionate about. I also benefited from her expertise in the roles that norms play in international relations. Her comments improved my arguments significantly. Jonathan Mercer is a superb outside-­the-­box thinker, and offered some of the most interesting and unexpected comments on my work. He encouraged me to explore various literature and ways of approaching my topic, which greatly enriched my research experience and this final product. I thank him for his knowledge of psychology in international relations as well. I am equally grateful to Robert Pekkanen for introducing me to the literature on the state-­civil society relationship in Japan, which has been very helpful for thinking about why protests occur and how policy-­makers perceive and respond to protests. Thanks to his invitations to co-­author book chapters about Japan’s civil society, I have developed an expertise on the subject and have enjoyed the opportunity to stay connected to my country of origin

xiv

acknowledgments

while living abroad. I thank Susan Whiting for helping strengthen the comparative aspect of this book and for her expertise on social movements. Kerry Smith at Brown University assigned three books in his undergraduate history course Japan’s Pacific War that had a profound impact on my research interests. As an international relations concentrator, I read about foreign policy with policy-­makers as the main actors. But Japan at War: An Oral History by Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook (The New Press, 1992) taught me that ordinary people’s experience and beliefs are an equally important and fascinating subject of research. I decided to spotlight citizens’ perceptions about U.S. military base policy because of this book. Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb by George Feifer (Houghton Mifflin, 1992) got me interested in learning more about Okinawa and led me to read the works of one of the personalities he follows in his book: historian and former governor of Okinawa Ōta Masahide. In 1995, after three American military personnel raped a twelve-­year-­old girl in Okinawa, which triggered large protests, Governor Ōta refused to cooperate in a procedure to expropriate land for U.S. military use against landowners’ wishes. I wrote an honors thesis on the Okinawan protest of 1995–­1996 and later expanded my research to include other cases from Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines. John W. Dower’s War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (Pantheon Books, 1986), about how American and Japanese racial stereotypes of the Other influenced the way they fought the war, made me interested in studying the effects of personal beliefs on international security policy. Dower’s book also showed me a path to follow after Brown. I thought while reading his gripping book, “it is really cool to be able to do research and write a book.” I thank the authors of these books and Professor Smith for assigning them. I received generous help from many people during field research in Okinawa, South Korea, the Philippines, and the United States. I am grateful for the cooperation and encouragement of those I interviewed. In Okinawa, Ōta Masahide responded positively to my letter out of the blue offering to volunteer as an undergraduate intern at his Peace Research Institute, and allowed me to stay at one of his homes for a month with his daughter-­in-­law, Katsuko. I learned much from reading his writings and from conversations with Katsuko. I also want to express my gratitude to Steve Rabson for conversations about Okinawa while I was at Brown, and for commenting on the Okinawa chapters in this book. Takada Wakako shared her contacts and sent me material from conferences in Naha about base policy. Kubota Tomio introduced

acknowledgments

xv

me to many of his connections with diverse perspectives on the U.S. military presence. I am grateful for Davinder Bhowmik’s comments on the Okinawa chapters. For my field research in South Korea, Yong-­Chool Ha shared important contacts for interviews. He also offered invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this book. Special thanks to Byoung-­Inn Bai, Chang-­Jin Kim, Taedong Lee, and Joonseok Oh for their introductions. Professional interpreters Jeeyoung Kim and Kate Choi enabled me to conduct many interviews in South Korea. I thank Mixie Eddy for introducing me to Wonseok Park and his wife, Shimako, who helped me find a place to stay in Seoul and offered delightful company. I am equally grateful to Vicente Rafael and Nagano Yoshiko, who shared contacts in Manila and great advice. Patricio Abinales helped me secure an institutional affiliation with the Third World Studies Center at the University of the Philippines. I am greatly indebted to the center for sharing important contacts for interviews and providing office space, which made my stay there productive. I thank Teresa Encarnacion Tadem, Sharon Quinsaat, and Bienvenida Lacsamana. I am deeply grateful for Herbert Docena and Roland Simbulan’s comments on my chapters on the Philippines. I thank Jeffrey Checkel for his helpful comments on the Introduction. Richard Petty and Duane Wegener graciously responded to my questions about social psychological research on persuasion. Many other scholars generously commented on my conference papers that developed into this book: Linda Isako Angst, David Bachman, Kent Calder, Alexander Cooley, Leif Easley, Ayano Ginoza, Chikako Oka, Richard Samuels, Sheila Smith, Meredith Woo-­Cumings, and Andrew Yeo. My heartfelt thanks go to my colleagues at the University of Washington for their comments and encouragement: Byoung-­Inn Bai, Moon Yeong Choi, Joshua Eastin, Devin Joshi, Turan Kayaoglu, Taedong Lee, Terence Lee, Hironori Sasada, Jason Scheideman, Ki-­young Shin, Christi Siver, Theresa Squatrito, and Michael Strausz. I thank Sébastien Lechevalier and the France-­Japan Foundation of the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales for affiliation as a post-­doctoral researcher between 2010 and 2012. I thank the Asia Centre, an independent think tank in Paris, for being my intellectual home since 2012. I would like to express my deep gratitude to David Leheny, Amitav Acharya, and the editorial committee for this book series. The two anonymous reviewers deserve special acknowledgment for their extremely helpful suggestions for revision. I am also grateful to Geoffrey Burn, Rob Ehle, Richard

xvi

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Gunde, James Holt, David Jackson, and Tim Roberts at Stanford University Press. Chester Fritz Grant for International Study and Exchange from the University of Washington funded my research in the Philippines. General and Mrs. Matthew B. Ridgway Military History Research Grant from the United States Army Military History Institute and a research grant from the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation allowed me to visit archives and learn about American military perspectives on protests against base policy. I also acknowledge the support of the East-­West Center to develop this book manuscript. Finally I thank my parents and my husband. I have so much to be thankful for that it is difficult to list just a couple of things. So I thank them for everything. But above all, I thank my parents for the freedom to pursue my interests abroad and for telling me that wherever I am, they are happy if I am happy. I thank my husband, Nicolas, for making sure I laugh often. I also thank his parents for taking care of our son, Arthur Tsubasa, when I needed extra time to work. I thank Tsubasa for his smiles and hugs, which bring us profound joy.

Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia

Introduction

On April 25, 2010, approximately ninety thousand people gathered in an athletic field in Okinawa, Japan, to press Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio to keep his promise to relocate the Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station “out of Japan if possible, but out of Okinawa at the very least.”1 To fulfill this promise would have required him to rescind an agreement with the United States to relocate Futenma to a new facility in Henoko in northeastern Okinawa. Hatoyama was wavering. Instead of relocating all of Futenma’s functions out of the prefecture, he was considering a relocation of some helicopters to Tokunoshima Island in Kagoshima Prefecture and moving the rest of the functions to Henoko.The participants at the rally passed a resolution demanding Futenma’s swift closure and relocation to another prefecture or abroad. This rally was the largest to date on the issue of relocating the Futenma base. All political parties in Okinawa participated, as did Governor Nakaima Hirokazu and representatives from all forty-one cities, towns, and villages in the prefecture. A poll conducted in the prefecture one week before the rally showed that 89.8 percent of the respondents supported Futenma’s relocation outside of Okinawa.2 The opposition to Futenma’s relocation within Okinawa developed into what the people of Okinawa call an “island-­wide struggle” (shimagurumi tōsō).3 This was not the first “island-­wide struggle” in Okinawa on the issue of U.S. military bases. Three other significant episodes of protest that spread throughout Okinawa had occurred since the end of World War II. In the 1950s under the American administration of Okinawa, protesters mobilized

2

introduction

against a policy of land expropriation for American military use. The second wave of protests came in the 1960s against the American administration of Okinawa. Protesters demanded Okinawa’s reversion to Japan and the closure of all U.S. military bases. The third wave followed the rape of a twelve-­year-­ old girl by three U.S. military personnel in 1995. Protesters urged a revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to facilitate the handover of American suspects to Japanese authorities, and a reduction in the number and size of U.S. military bases in Okinawa. Protests against U.S. military bases and related policies have also occurred in the Philippines and South Korea. Some accidents and crimes that U.S. military personnel committed against citizens of these states triggered major protests, which asked the United States to transfer the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction and custody to the host states. Protests demanding closure of military bases and opposing new base construction occurred as well. The development of environmental consciousness in South Korea in the 1990s contributed to protests that expressed concern about the environmental policy governing U.S. military bases. From these episodes, we know that citizens of host states express their grievances about U.S. military bases and related policies through protests. However, we are less certain about the extent to which these protests influence the policy decisions of the United States and host states. Although protests often seem similar in terms of actors and issues, the results are often different. What explains the difference? There are four possible policy outcomes in response to protests. First, a protest can lead to a fundamental change in base policy. Closure of all U.S. military bases in the Philippines in 1992 is an example. Second, protests can result in limited policy change. For example, in 2001 the United States agreed to transfer custody of U.S. military personnel accused of crimes to Korean authorities at an earlier stage of judicial proceedings. However, the United States limited change by attaching various conditions for the transfer of custody, much to the frustration of protesters who demanded greater change. Third, states can decide not to change their policy in response to protests. For example, despite the significant protest mobilization in Okinawa in 2010, Hatoyama returned to the original plan to relocate Futenma to Henoko. In South Korea, some farmers and non-­governmental organizations (NGOs) vigorously opposed a bilateral plan to expand Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, but Seoul and Washington did not cancel the plan. Finally, in some cases where states decide not to change base policy, they nevertheless offer symbolic concessions to protesters. These are gestures to create a public image

introduction

3

that governments pay attention to grievances. For example, in 2000, protesters in South Korea demanded that the U.S. and Korean governments include some environmental provisions in their SOFA in order to oblige the United States to follow Korean environmental laws. The two governments attached a Memorandum of Special Understandings on Environmental Protection to their SOFA, but it was a symbolic declaration of the two states’ intention to cooperate on environmental protection. It did not change the environmental policy on U.S. military bases. Various outcomes such as these raise important questions about the extent to which protests influence policy on U.S. military bases. Why do some protests lead to change in base policy while others do not? When states decide to change base policy, what influences the extent of change? When states decide not to change base policy, why do they sometimes offer symbolic concessions? These questions are important to the United States, which maintains a global network of military bases, to governments that host those military bases, and to protest organizers and participants who challenge base policy. More specifically, studying the influence of protests on base policy is important for three reasons. First, ordinary people rarely seek participation in decision-­making in international security issues but base policy is an exception.4 Base policy is a part of “high politics” that governments normally handle without the public’s participation. This is why the popular expression of grievances on base policy is through protests. Protest is a means of communicating objections when people do not have direct access to policy-­making. Protesters challenge not only the content of base policy but also the fact that policy-­making occurs without their participation. Given their limited access to policy-­making, it is important to learn when, why, and to what extent U.S. and host governments take the public’s preferences into account. Second, examining the influence of protests on base policy is important because protests reveal some weak points of U.S.–­host state alliances, and state response suggests how policy-­makers intend to manage the alliances. U.S. military bases exist in Japan and South Korea, and existed in the Philippines until 1992, as an essential feature of the host states’ alliances with the United States. Protests against U.S. military base policy reflect popular discontent with how the alliances operate. State officials are often forced to respond to protests in order to maintain public support for the alliance, although the importance of this response varies across cases. Third, studying protests’ influence on base policy contributes to the on-­ going debate over U.S. grand strategy in East Asia, between those who argue that the United States should remain a deep engager with forward deploy-

4

introduction

ment of its military forces, and those who believe that the United States should retrench and become an off-­shore balancer.5 The study of local protests against U.S. military base policy sheds light on one of the challenges of deep engagement. It is useful to know how and to what extent protests complicate deep engagement. This will help with the evaluation of the strategy to either improve its implementation or to add to other arguments for changing it. This book explains the extent to which protests influence base policy by exploring state response to twelve protests: three in the Philippines between 1964 and 1991, four in Okinawa between 1945 and 2010, and five in South Korea between 2000 and 2007. The cases cover diverse policy issues including base closure, base construction through land expropriation, jurisdiction and custody when American military personnel commit crimes, storage and transit of American nuclear weapons, environmental problems in and around military bases, and prohibition of American military personnel’s involvement in prostitution as customers. In each case, protesters demanded change in base policy by arguing that existing policy violated important norms, which are widely shared principles. Protesters referred to one or more of the following norms: antiwar, antimilitarism, sovereignty, human rights, antinuclear, and environmental norms. Protest organizers used these norms to shape policy demands. I call norm-­based policy proposals “normative arguments,” and examine their influence on policy. In some cases, for example, protesters with antiwar and antimilitarism beliefs argued that military bases should be closed and new ones should not be built because they are instruments of war and generate military tension with neighboring countries. In criminal cases involving American military suspects, protesters demanded increased jurisdictional and custodial rights for host countries by arguing that limits placed on host countries’ rights represented a curtailment of sovereignty. When states expropriated land for military use without landowners’ consent, and when American military personnel were involved in prostitution as customers or raped local women, protesters argued that the U.S. military presence led to the violation of human rights and therefore U.S. forces should be reduced or withdrawn. Protesters demanded prohibition of transit and storage of nuclear weapons in U.S. military bases with the antinuclear norm. Protesters used environmental norms to urge governments to adopt more rigorous environmental standards on military bases. I argue that there are two processes by which protesters’ normative arguments change base policy. First, protesters’ arguments can persuade policy-­ makers. Persuasion is more likely when normative arguments do not contradict policy-­makers’ knowledge and beliefs, and when policy-­makers

introduction

5

think that protest leaders and organizations are credible. Persuasion leads to policy change under domestic institutional settings that allow persuaded policy-­makers to shape policy. Persuasion defines or redefines policy-­makers’ interests and can change base policy in fundamental ways. Second, when persuasion fails, normative arguments can change policy by mobilizing large protests that create incentives for policy-­makers to change policy. The type of incentives varies across cases. Policy-­makers in host states may become concerned that protests might reduce public support for their government. Policy-­makers in the United States and host states may worry about diminishing support for the security alliance and a reduction of U.S. military effectiveness. Policy-­makers try to eliminate these political and military concerns by changing base policy. Yet policy-­makers’ security, political, and economic interests compete with protesters’ demands and make fundamental change difficult. Policy-­makers limit change to protect their interests while hoping that their response will help placate protesters. Base policy does not change when protests fail to persuade policy-­makers or generate significant incentives for them. Base policy also does not change when protesters generate incentives for policy-­makers to change policy but other factors such as lobbying by actors that support the policy that protesters seek to change and states’ capacity under law to impose their will reduce or eliminate these incentives. Furthermore, my cases show that policy does not change when protesters generate incentives for host-­state governments to change policy but the United States opposes change. When policy does not change, policy-­makers can nevertheless offer symbolic concessions for three reasons. First, policy-­makers wish to show that the U.S. and host-­state governments are norm-­abiding even if they do not change policy in response to protests. Second, symbolic concessions allow states to save face. When policy-­ makers reject policy change, symbolic concessions help host-­state governments appear effective, and help prevent the United States from appearing like a bully. Finally, policy-­makers decide to make symbolic concessions to enable a smoother implementation of the policy that protesters oppose. Exploring how normative arguments influence base politics is new. Comparative research on base politics recently emerged with three pathbreaking volumes. Kent Calder’s Embattled Garrisons (2007) and Alexander Cooley’s Base Politics (2008) examine the influence of regime type on base policy.These scholars agree that protests and their normative arguments have very limited—­if any—­influence on base policy. Andrew Yeo’s Activists, Alliances, and Anti-­U.S. Base Protests (2011) argues that protests can influence policy when host states’ policy-­makers do not strongly concur that a positive relation-

6

introduction

ship with the United States is critical to national security. A weak security consensus opens up a political opportunity for antibase movements, and a strong security consensus closes it.Yet a review of protests in Asia suggests that policy-­makers respond to different normative arguments in different ways under a given security consensus. Explaining that variation requires a focus on normative arguments. This book reveals when, how, and to what extent protesters’ normative arguments matter. My analysis shows that normative arguments helped mobilize large protests in all twelve cases but had different levels of influence on policy. Protests led to policy change in five of the twelve cases. In one of these five cases, normative arguments persuaded policy-­makers and this resulted in policy change. In four cases, normative arguments did not persuade policy-­makers but large protests generated political and military incentives for policy-­makers to change policy. In the remaining seven cases, policy change did not occur. However, policy-­ makers offered symbolic concessions in five of the seven cases. These concessions aimed to make states appear norm-­abiding despite their decision not to change policy. Protests did not result in policy change or symbolic concessions in two cases. In sum, protests failed to bring about policy change more often than not (7 cases without policy change, 5 with policy change). When policy change occurred, this was more often due to large protests pressuring policy-­makers to change policy through a rational calculation of political and military costs and benefits (4 cases) than due to protesters’ normative arguments persuading policy-­makers (1 case). This confirms the intuition of other scholars that protests and their normative arguments have limited influence on policy-­makers. However, the finding that protests led to policy change is significant. In the earlier works on base politics and traditional research on international relations, scholars assumed that protests do not have an important influence on security policy. My research shows that we must include protests in our analysis to explain some changes in policy. Moreover, in the one case in which persuasion of policy-­makers led to policy change, all U.S. military bases in the host country were closed. Normative arguments may rarely persuade, but when they do they can produce significant results. This makes it important to examine the role of normative persuasion in base politics. We also need to explain why persuasion is so difficult. Furthermore, when persuasion fails, if norms produce incentives to change policy through mobilization of large protests, and policy-­makers change policy even in a limited way, norms play an important causal (though not constitutive) role and merit examination. This book explores the differ-

introduction

7

ent ways in which protesters’ normative arguments drive policy change. It also explains why some normative arguments fail to influence policy. Below I detail the processes of normative influence after presenting some background information about the main actors in politics over U.S. military bases and the types of normative arguments we often see in protests. I also discuss some complementary and competing explanations for change in base policy and conclude with an outline of the twelve cases.

Base Politics and Main Actors Politics over basing policy, which I call base politics, deals with various issues related to the U.S. military presence in host states. These issues include which land, sea, and air space host states provide to the United States, how the United States may use these military facilities, and what status U.S. military personnel have in host states. Base politics has international and domestic dimensions. At the international level, representatives from the United States and host states conduct negotiations on base policy. Officials who participate in policy-­making include executive leaders such as presidents and prime ministers, ministers and bureaucrats in foreign affairs, defense, and other relevant ministries depending on the policy issue involved (e.g., environment, justice), U.S. embassy and military officials stationed in host states, and legislators. Different actors from a state may have different interests and policy preferences. The relative importance of these officials and whose position prevails depend on the mode of policy-­making in each state and policy issue. Host-­state governments engage in negotiations with the United States with their domestic constituents in mind. An important part of base politics at the domestic level is whether and under what conditions local communities that host U.S. military bases accept state agreements. Reactions to base policy from outside of these communities are also important. For example, when communities that host military bases oppose a policy, broader public opinion (opposition to, support for, or indifference toward the policy) can influence the way host-­state governments respond to local opposition. Base politics also includes citizens’ attempts to influence states’ base policy, which is the focus of this book. Debate over base policy occurs in countries that host U.S. military bases because people have different perceptions about the purpose of military bases and how they operate. Many American and host-­state officials believe that military bases contribute to U.S. strategic goals and host states’ security by reinforcing alliances. Japan and South Korea host U.S. military bases

8

introduction

in exchange for an American commitment to defend them from external aggression. The Philippines had the same arrangement with the United States until 1992. The U.S. military presence strengthens deterrence against external aggression by signaling U.S. resolve to fight alongside its allies. Stationing U.S. forces in host states improves military readiness as well. The U.S. military conducts exercises in and around military bases. The U.S. and host states’ forces are able to improve interoperability by organizing joint exercises and other exchanges more easily. Furthermore, pre-­positioning U.S. troops, equipment, and supplies in host states can speed up the response to aggression if deterrence fails. U.S. military bases with theater-­level command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities enhance readiness and facilitate logistics to fight wars. American and host-­state officials also believe that the U.S. military presence helps maintain regional stability, which promotes trade and economic development. There is a significant level of tension in northeast Asia due to territorial conflicts, Chinese military modernization, and North Korean nuclear development. Historical problems involving Japan also generate neighboring states’ apprehension about its defense forces. American and host-­state officials think that in such an environment the role of U.S. military bases to provide regional stability is important. As the former secretary of state Hillary Clinton writes, “Along with our allies, we have underwritten regional security for decades—­patrolling Asia’s sea lanes and preserving stability—­and that in turn has helped create the conditions for growth.”6 While the U.S. and host governments envision security with military bases, the host states’ public continues to debate whether the U.S. military presence contributes to security. Some citizens believe that military bases threaten the security of their communities, countries, and regions. These citizens, especially those living near military bases, often conceive of security in terms of “human security” or safety in their daily lives. From this perspective, they express strong concern about various problems that the military presence causes, such as military aircraft and vehicle accidents, environmental problems including soil and noise pollution, and the criminal conduct of U.S. military personnel. They also believe that the presence of U.S. forces in their countries creates tension in the region by unnecessarily provoking other countries, and they worry that bases might become targets of external attack. For these reasons, they imagine security without military bases. Other citizens agree with their governments that U.S. military bases contribute to their state’s security. But many of them also believe that existing base policies do not sufficiently protect the interests of host communities. For

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9

example, many in Okinawa complain about the fact that the U.S. military can refuse local authorities’ request to conduct their own tests inside military bases after revelation of soil pollution.7 Some citizens also argue that bilateral basing agreements contain provisions that violate host states’ sovereignty. For example, they complain about host states’ lack of the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over offenses involving local victims and U.S. military perpetrators in the performance of their official duty. Opposition to military bases and related policies has generated protests in host countries. NGOs lead protest mobilization in most cases. Some organizations work exclusively on issues regarding military bases, while others work more broadly on issues related to military bases, such as human rights and the environment. These organizations often build a coalition to coordinate their demands and actions. Organizations publicize their plans for demonstrations through their networks and the press in order to encourage other citizens to join them. Protest mobilization has often occurred in response to “trigger” events, such as accidents and crimes that U.S. military personnel commit against local victims. Protesters also react to states’ announcement of a new base policy. Some protests occur preemptively to influence impending bilateral negotiations on base policy. There are national and local politicians in host states who agree with these citizens, either that the U.S. military bases should be closed or that the U.S. and host governments must improve base policy while maintaining the U.S. military presence. These politicians lend support to protest movements by bringing their arguments “from the streets” into official sites of policy discussion such as national and local assemblies. Politicians can also let protest organizations know about ongoing policy debates in government, legislatures, and bureaucracies, and provide other types of information that is not easily available to citizens. Protest organizations can shape demands and plan actions based on the information and suggestions they receive from politicians. Some politicians maintain close ties with protest organizations through exchange of information, participation in protest activities, and acceptance of electoral support. Through these politicians, their political parties can adopt protest movements’ policy positions on military bases. These politicians are often members of progressive parties in opposition to government, but there are also politicians from conservative parties who take protesters’ concerns about base policy seriously. In addition, local leaders such as governors and mayors as well as local bureaucrats participate in base politics. They help implement host governments’ base policy by carrying out delegated administrative tasks like process-

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ing land expropriation for U.S. military use. At times they refuse to perform this role in order to protect local interests or resist doing so unless some conditions are met. In addition, as representatives of local communities that host U.S. military bases, they can propose changes in base policy to national leaders. Although this book focuses on protests’ influence on national policy-­ makers who ultimately decide on policy, it is important to note that protesters often try to influence local leaders’ thinking as well, so that local leaders would present their position to national leaders as the official local position on base policy. Experts on issues related to base policy are an important set of actors as well. They include university professors in various disciplines (e.g., political science, history, sociology, natural science, law), policy analysts, journalists, and lawyers. They can help protest organizations evaluate existing base policy, shape demands for change, communicate policy preferences to the public and policy-­makers with authority, and evaluate state response to protests. Experts also offer information and expertise to policy-­makers, at times with significant influence on policy. Finally, there are local organizations and individuals that support the continued presence of U.S. forces, such as business associations, base workers’ organizations, owners of land used for military bases, and friendship associations that encourage exchanges between U.S. military personnel and local citizens. These groups become competitors to protest organizations when their policy preferences diverge, although pro-­base groups lobby mostly at the local level if at all. The diversity of actors working at local, national, and international levels makes base politics complex. My case studies try to capture this complexity by introducing different actors when they are important to the narrative and policy outcomes. While this book focuses on protesters’ effort to persuade policy-­makers that base policies should change, all actors mentioned above engage in persuasion. The United States and host-­state governments try to persuade each other in policy negotiations. Once they reach an agreement, they try to persuade the public to support their base policies by highlighting the importance of maintaining strong alliances and ensuring national and international security. When citizens debate whether a U.S. military base should close or not, groups that support the U.S. presence can stress the economic benefits of the base for the local economy. I acknowledge that multiple actors engage in persuasion in base politics but focus on protesters’ effort to persuade policy-­makers. This is because this focus allows me to answer my questions about protests’ impact on base policy most directly. I recognize,

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however, the possibility that other actors’ efforts to persuade the public make protest mobilization more challenging. Furthermore, policy-­makers’ efforts to persuade the public to accept their policies may make it more difficult for protesters to persuade the policy-­makers to change their policies. Nevertheless, my case studies show that protest organizers’ normative arguments can change base policy by persuading key policy-­makers or by mobilizing large protests that create incentives for policy-­makers to change policy. In the following section I introduce five types of arguments that appear often in protests, and discuss how protest organizations create and deploy these arguments.

Protesters’ Normative Arguments The social movement literature points to many factors that contribute to protest mobilization. These include the amount of resources that protesters can gather and the political opportunity structure that protesters face, such as increased policy access, division among elites, presence of influential allies, and a reduction in state repression.8 But particularly important in mobilization of protests against base policy is a broadly shared perception that a state policy violates norms, or collective understanding of proper behavior. Norms are statements—­rules, standards, principles—­that specify what ought and ought not to be done. Norms constitute personal, communal, and national interests, and help regulate the behavior of individuals and collectivities such as the state.9 When people protest against a base policy, they are arguing that the policy violates important principles. Protesters demand that states change their policy to accord with the prescribed norms. As norms are expectations of proper behavior that are commonly accepted, mobilizations to protest their violation can become very large, attracting people across social and political divisions. Protesters invoke one or more of the following five norms that they believe U.S. military bases and related policies violate. First, many protesters emphasize antiwar and antimilitarism norms. They wish to voice their opposition to war and other use of force (or threat to use force) as a means to settle international disputes. They see military bases and personnel as instruments of war and militarism, and demand base closure and the withdrawal of troops. Second, many protesters seek to protect host states’ sovereignty. They complain that the United States curtails host states’ sovereignty when it limits jurisdiction over crimes committed by U.S. military personnel. Protesters also argue that host states should be able to hold American military suspects prior

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to their indictment. Host-­state officials’ inability to enter military bases for environmental testing and other purposes without American consent also worries people. In addition, in the 1980s, the antibase movement in the Philippines argued that the U.S. policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons in the country violated the host state’s sovereign right to know. Furthermore, when the United States administered host communities (e.g., Okinawa, 1945–­1972) or was perceived as wielding great influence upon host governments to maintain military bases (e.g., Philippines, 1945–­1991), protesters criticized the violation of democratic principles. Related concepts such as nationalism and anti-­imperialism have also appeared in protests against base policy. Third, protesters emphasize environmental norms to draw attention to the soil, water, and noise pollution that military activities generate. U.S. forces abroad adhere to the environmental governing standards in the Department of Defense’s Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document and host states’ laws that are “uniformly applied and enforced” (i.e., application and enforcement not limited to U.S. forces), but many citizens in host countries think these environmental measures are inadequate. For example, American standards for remedying environmental contamination are contentious. U.S. forces address contamination that causes “known, imminent, and substantial endangerment to human health and safety.”10 Remedying contamination below this level is at the base commanders’ discretion and is not guaranteed, although there are bilateral consultation procedures in place. How the United States remedies contamination is another important issue. It could be a removal of toxic substances or simply a fence built around a contaminated site with a posted warning. Protesters also complain that the United States considers environmental agreements with host states as declarations of intent and non-­binding. In sum, protesters have demanded bilateral agreements to oblige the United States to follow (and not just “respect”) host states’ environmental laws, and clean up (and not just “remedy”) environmental contamination. In addition, human rights norms are important in many protests. For example, women’s organizations refer to “women’s human rights” to protest against American sexual crimes. Women’s organizations in Okinawa emphasized this norm after three U.S. military personnel raped a twelve-­year-­old girl in 1995. In addition, protesters argue that land expropriation without the owners’ consent is a violation of property rights. Furthermore, protesters highlighted human rights where the United States supported or appeared to support repressive governments. The antibase movement in the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship alleged that the United States violated

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human rights by providing Marcos with military assistance—­which he used to repress his political adversaries—­in return for military bases. Finally, a norm against nuclear weapons appears in some protests. Protesters demand prohibition of nuclear transit and storage in U.S. military bases. For example, antibase activists in the Philippines claimed that the United States stored nuclear weapons on military bases and that this could invite external attack. Before I explain how these norms influence base policy, let us look at how protesters create and deploy their normative arguments. There are three ways protest organizers choose the mix of norms to use in protests. First, protest organizers can match the type of grievances that they have about base policy with norms that address those issues. Norms against nuclear weapons and environmental damage are two examples. Second, protest organizers can apply a broader international norm to a grievance. The women’s organizations in Okinawa that condemned the rape in 1995 as a violation of “women’s human rights” had just attended the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, where they started to conceptualize “military violence against women” as a human rights violation. Third, protest organizers choose norms according to historical legacy. For example, antiwar and antimilitarism norms are potent in Okinawa given the memory of the Battle of Okinawa. Sovereignty and democratic norms are also powerful in the Philippines, South Korea, and Okinawa given their colonial experience. Protest organizers use norms to shape policy demands and solicit support from the public and policy-­makers. I examine the influence of these norm-­ based policy proposals, which I call “normative arguments.” For example, protest leaders rely on the environmental norm to argue that the U.S. military should not cause soil pollution on base. With this, protest leaders may propose a new policy that would permit host-­state representatives to enter U.S. military bases in order to conduct soil tests to monitor American efforts. Protest organizers may also argue that American military personnel’s rape of local women violates human rights, and as the number of rapes should correlate with the number of troops in host communities, the United States should reduce the number of military personnel (or withdraw them altogether). Protest organizations often coordinate their normative arguments through coalition building. A coalition usually includes organizations with diverse policy focuses and with different preferences about base closure. Coalition members coordinate among themselves to agree on strategy including the normative arguments to deploy in protest activities. Protest organizers choose the normative arguments that are most likely to attract public support, even

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if this might moderate the demands of some of the organizations in the coalition. Protesters try to persuade policy-­makers with normative arguments in several ways. First, protest leaders visit policy-­makers and government offices to submit petitions and other statements of protest. Second, protesters rely on media coverage of protest mobilizations that includes explanations of protesters’ arguments. Some protest organizations also inform academics, analysts, and other commentators who discuss base policy in the media. Third, protest organizations ask local elected officials such as governors and mayors to communicate their arguments to national policy-­makers. Fourth, in some rare instances, policy-­makers and protest leaders are friends, colleagues, or family members, making communication of normative arguments more direct and intimate.

Explaining Protest’s Influence on Military Base Policy Protest organizers’ normative arguments can influence U.S. military base policy by persuading policy-­makers or mobilizing large protests that create incentives for policy-­makers to change policy. Base policy does not change when protesters fail to persuade or create incentives for policy-­makers to change policy. Even when policy does not change, policy-­makers can offer symbolic concessions to create a norm-­abiding image, save face after failed negotiations, or enable a smoother implementation of the policy that protesters oppose. When Protests Persuade Policy-­Makers to Change Policy Protesters’ normative arguments can persuade policy-­makers to change policy. According to social psychologists, persuasion is a process in which a communicator transmits a message to change the attitude of another person, in a context in which the person has some degree of free choice.11 Attitude change includes adoption of a new attitude and of an attitude opposite to the initial one.12 Social psychologists have developed a vast number of hypotheses on persuasion.13 I highlight two as the most important in base politics. Protesters’ normative arguments are more likely to persuade policy-­makers when they fit with policy-­makers’ knowledge and beliefs, and when policy-­makers think protest leaders and organizations are credible. Key Factor 1: Policy-­Makers’ Preexisting Knowledge and Beliefs  Research in social psychology shows that an agreeable (pro-­attitudinal) or a disagreeable (counter-­attitudinal) message can persuade a person if the message carries a

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compelling argument that does not contradict the existing knowledge, beliefs, and interests of the person. The recipient of the message considers if the message is consistent with the facts that he or she knows.14 The recipient relates the message to his or her values as well.15 For example, social psychologists Sara Baker and Richard Petty conducted an experiment in which they gave university students a counter-­attitudinal message with different degrees of argument strength. The message urged them to commit to mandatory community service as a solution for the state’s fiscal crisis. Arguments that took into account the students’ assumed beliefs and interests were more persuasive. A strong argument said: “The performance of community services will provide students with hands-­on direct experience and training and career opportunities in the domains of their chosen majors.” This was more persuasive than a weak argument that said “mandatory community service will also provide students with a better opportunity to learn the streets and neighborhoods of the local communities outside the university.”16 The experiment showed that a recipient’s knowledge and beliefs (and interests that knowledge and beliefs shape) influence his or her perception of how compelling an argument is. In other words, persuasion is more likely when the argument does not contradict prior knowledge and beliefs. There are two ways in which this can be the case. First, an argument may fit with a recipient’s knowledge and beliefs. Second, an argument may address a topic on which the recipient has little knowledge or few beliefs. Political scientists have referred to the fit between a message and a recipient’s knowledge and beliefs to explain various policy outcomes. Jeffrey Checkel argues that policy-­makers’ “cognitive priors” influence state compliance with European citizenship norms.17 Thomas Risse, citing Jürgen Habermas, writes that participants in a discourse evaluate “the conformity with perceived facts in the world.”18 Risse demonstrates that at the end of the Cold War President George H. W. Bush persuaded President Mikhail Gorbachev to accept united Germany’s membership in NATO “on the basis of principled beliefs that fit the core of Gorbachev’s convictions.”19 My research also shows that persuasion is more likely when protesters’ normative arguments fit with policy-­makers’ prior knowledge and beliefs. In 1991, twelve out of twenty-­three senators voted to close U.S. military bases in the Philippines. Many of the twelve senators shared a historic understanding that the relationship between the Philippines and the United States had been unequal, mostly benefiting the United States to the detriment of the Philippines. They also opposed the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos and believed that the United States supported Marcos in order to maintain its military

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bases in the Philippines. Protesters’ normative arguments for closure of U.S. military bases fit with their nationalist and democratic beliefs. Persuasion is also possible when a normative argument addresses a topic that the policy-­maker knows little about. According to research in social psychology, a recipient without a preexisting belief can be more cognitively motivated to analyze new information and is more likely to be persuaded. Based on this, Risse writes that “uncertainty of interests and/or lack of knowledge about the situation among the actors” are conditions conducive to “truth seeking,” which is a process of “argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion.”20 Checkel also concludes that Ukrainian policy-­makers had “few ingrained conceptions of nationality and citizenship,” making European citizenship norms more likely to persuade them.21 In my research, this was true for one of the twelve Philippine senators who voted to close the U.S. military bases in 1991. He was an extremely popular actor before he entered politics to become a city mayor, and then a nationally elected senator. According to his advisors, he originally did not know much about U.S. military bases, even why they were in the Philippines.22 The advisors, who were critical of the U.S. military presence in the Philippines, decided that the senator should take up the issue and gave him a series of briefings. The issue fascinated the senator. He became actively involved in a campaign against U.S. military bases and eventually voted to close the bases. Key Factor 2: Credibility of Protest Leaders and Organizations  Protesters’ normative arguments are more likely to persuade policy-­makers also when policy-­makers think protest leaders and organizations are credible. Social psychologists show that credibility is based on expertise and trustworthiness.23 An expert who has presumed knowledge and the ability to provide accurate information is relatively credible.24 A trustworthy source of a message is also more likely to persuade others than an untrustworthy source. Trusted sources include those from the same social group and those with whom a recipient desires to identify.25 A source’s assumed or real ideological beliefs also provide information about his or her expertise and trustworthiness to a recipient.26 A recipient’s initial impression about a source’s credibility may come from the reputation of the source among the recipient’s trusted others. When credibility is uncertain, a recipient can establish it through evaluation of the source’s message based on his or her previous knowledge and beliefs. The source appears credible when the recipient perceives that the source presents believable and accurate information. In protests against base policy, protest leaders and organizations are the “sources” that disseminate normative arguments. A policy-­maker evaluates the sources’ expertise in terms of the content

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of their arguments or their reputation among his or her colleagues. A policy-­ maker may also have a personal relationship with a protest leader—­through friendship, family ties, or a professional relationship—­that creates trust in the source. The more that a policy-­maker thinks that protest leaders and their organizations are credible, the more likely he or she will be persuaded. The key factors of persuasion—­credibility and previous knowledge and beliefs—­can be closely linked when a recipient determines a source’s credibility by evaluating the source’s message with his or her knowledge and beliefs. However, once a recipient establishes a source’s credibility, this evaluation can remain unchanged and may have an effect on the recipient’s perception of the source’s messages in the future. If a recipient considers a source dishonest, he or she can assume that the source’s statements are false regardless of the statements’ truthfulness.27 Credibility and previous knowledge and beliefs are therefore conceptually separate, and each is sufficient to facilitate or block persuasion. In my cases, credibility and previous knowledge and beliefs were congruous. Persuasion occurred when credible sources offered normative arguments that fit the knowledge and beliefs of policy-­makers. Persuasion failed when sources that policy-­makers perceived as not credible offered normative arguments that contradicted policy-­makers’ knowledge and beliefs. However, these factors can be incongruous. A credible source may present an argument that does not fit with a recipient’s beliefs. A source that lacks credibility may also present an argument that fits a recipient’s beliefs. Social psychologists argue that such incongruity generates surprise, curiosity, a sense of threat, or concern in recipients. This makes them process a message more carefully to understand why a credible source would not agree with them or why a source lacking credibility would agree with them. As a result of this enhanced processing, persuasion is possible in both cases.28 Observing Persuasion Protesters’ principled arguments can persuade policy-­makers. Policy-­makers change their attitude or adopt a new attitude through persuasion. They redefine their interests and work toward changing policy in a way that is consistent with a norm’s prescription. Persuasion happens internally and is difficult to demonstrate. We must rely on some observable phenomenon to infer people’s attitudes.29 Based on research about persuasion in social psychology and international relations, I propose four ways of observing persuasion. First, I look for argumentative consistency. Do policy-­makers’ arguments remain consistent in front of different audiences? If, for example, a politician tells me that a norma-

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tive argument against military bases persuaded him but says otherwise in front of his pro-­base constituents, he may not have been persuaded. Risse writes that actors who change their arguments depending on the audience are probably engaging in rhetorical behavior, and their persuasion is questionable.30 Second, I look at costs that policy-­makers incur in being persuaded. Persuasion is likely to have occurred when policy-­makers follow their beliefs despite high costs.31 The costs include withdrawal of electoral support, imprisonment and exile, damaged reputation, and financial losses. Social pressure from family members and friends may also generate cost for policy-­makers. Third, I show that coercion, side payments, public pressure, and other domestic political factors cannot explain policy-­makers’ acceptance of normative arguments. When persuasion occurs, policy-­makers accept norms freely without coercion or material enticements. Constructivist research in international relations suggests that it is possible for policy-­makers to conform to norms due to cost/benefit calculations and to later internalize these norms. However, when and how instrumental conformity leads to internalization is not clear. Explaining this process would enrich our understanding, but I pursue a more modest goal of demonstrating normative persuasion without pressure or material incentives. Finally, I examine other observable reflections of persuasion. These include speeches in classified and public documents, voting records, and exchanges of support with particular organizations. I am aware that some validity issues are involved. For example, speeches and voting records may not reveal policy-­ makers’ true beliefs and persuasion. I am cautious about using these sources. I conduct careful process-­tracing and gather evidence from multiple sources. The more these indicators paint a similar picture, the more confident I am about policy-­makers’ beliefs. Policy-­makers in a country or even a smaller decision-­making group like a ministry can have different perceptions of protesters’ arguments and credibility. Protesters may persuade some policy-­makers and not others. In the empirical chapters I present what appears to be the dominant perception among policy-­makers in a decision-­making context. For example, when I say protesters failed to persuade bureaucrats in Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, what I mean is that protesters failed to persuade enough or the most important policy-­makers to change the ministry’s policy choice. Persuaded policy-­makers change policy through a political process. Persuasion influences base policy only under domestic institutional arrangements that allow persuaded policy-­makers to shape policy. The next section discusses

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how domestic institutions can facilitate or block persuaded policy-­makers’ effort to change policy. Domestic Institutions as Enablers of Policy Change Whether persuaded policy-­makers can change base policy depends on the domestic institutions within which they operate. Important domestic institutional factors include formal rules that allocate decision-­making authority, the balance of power among policy-­makers in different domestic institutions, and laws that policy-­makers can rely on to defend their position. First, formal rules that assign decision-­making power are important. Protesters’ normative arguments must persuade individuals who can influence base policy. For example, the Philippine constitution of 1987 gave the Senate the final authority to decide whether U.S. military bases would be allowed to remain after the expiration of the Military Bases Agreement in 1991. The constitution, which was created after the ouster of President Ferdinand Marcos through the People’s Power Revolution of 1986, curtailed presidential power. Until then, Philippine presidents maintained significant authority to negotiate and conclude base agreements with the United States through executive agreements. Under the new constitution, persuading the senators to close U.S. military bases became more important for protesters than persuading the president. Second, the balance of power among policy-­makers in different domestic institutions is important. Persuasion of an actor is unlikely to lead to change in policy when he or she meets opposition from those with more institutionalized power to shape and implement base policy. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense in Japan hold significant power to shape and implement base policy. If a prime minister seeks to change base policy but bureaucrats oppose it, bureaucratic resistance can make change very difficult. An important factor related to the site of decision-­making authority is the number of actors involved in decision-­making. The larger the number of people involved, the more difficult it is for protesters to persuade enough people to influence policy. When executive leadership plays a key role in policy-­ making, persuasion of this leader will have a significant impact on base policy. When there are more people involved in policy-­making, protesters’ normative arguments must gain sufficient support to win needed votes in the legislature, reshape institutional culture in bureaucracies, or create policy consensus in other ways.32

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Finally, when persuaded decision-­makers seek policy change, laws that strengthen their position become important. Persuaded policy-­makers can rely on them to defend their position and obtain support for policy change. For example, if protesters persuade policy-­makers that a current base policy violates an environmental norm, the persuaded policy-­makers can point to environmental legislation to seek broader support for policy change. Likewise, policy-­makers can rely on antinuclear legislation, human rights laws, and other relevant legal measures to reinforce their positions. In sum, protests can lead to fundamental change when normative arguments persuade policy-­makers who operate within enabling institutional contexts. However, my research shows that protesters’ normative arguments rarely persuade policy-­makers or bring about fundamental change. More often, protests generate incentives for policy-­makers to change policy in a limited way. This outcome I call compromise. When Policy-­Makers Respond to Protests with Compromise Solutions When persuasion fails, protests can still lead to policy change. Protesters’ normative arguments help mobilize large protests which create political and military incentives for state officials to change base policy. However, when policy-­makers’ interests clash with protesters’ demands, fundamental policy change is difficult. In this case, policy-­makers can offer limited change and hope that this will calm public outrage. Failure of Persuasion  As presented above, persuasion is more likely when a normative argument fits with a policy-­maker’s prior knowledge or beliefs, or when it addresses a topic about which the policy-­maker knows little. Research in social psychology demonstrates that the flip side of this is also true. Persuasion is less likely to occur when a normative argument contradicts the knowledge and beliefs of a policy-­maker. Policy-­makers’ perceptions of the military requirements to counter national security threats are important preexisting beliefs. The type and level of external threat shapes policy-­makers’ decisions about what is necessary to maintain military effectiveness. Key parts of military effectiveness include bilateral security cooperation, forward deployed forces, military-­to-­military relationships, military training, and morale. When protesters’ normative arguments demand changes that appear to undermine military effectiveness, they are less likely to persuade policy-­makers. An example is what Yeo calls “security consensus” among host states’ policy-­ makers. Many host-­state officials believe that maintaining a positive relationship with the United States is critical to national security.33 This belief may be

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embedded in the political and bureaucratic cultures of host states. I argue that policy-­makers’ commitment to the security alliance encourages them to resist protesters’ normative arguments about base policy. Policy-­makers who believe in the importance of the alliance can perceive protesters’ normative arguments as attacks on the alliance. They are more likely to reject the normative arguments as a result. Policy-­makers’ preexisting beliefs and protesters’ normative arguments often collide due to their different notions of security: policy-­makers focus on national security through alliance and basing, and protesters focus on human security without bases or with significant modifications to base policy. Policy-­makers’ beliefs about the importance of the security alliance and military effectiveness are not the only beliefs that are important. Policy-­ makers often find protesters’ normative arguments inconsistent with other kinds of belief. For example, policy-­makers agree with protest organizations that military personnel should not commit crimes and those who do should be punished. However, policy-­makers do not agree with some antimilitarism organizations that the U.S. military trains its personnel to be violent and this makes its personnel more likely to commit violent crimes. Policy-­makers are likely to reject arguments for base closure and other policy changes which rest on assumptions they believe are false. In addition, policy-­makers with intimate knowledge of base operations, highly technical base policy, and state efforts to address various base problems often find fault with protesters’ normative arguments. Social psychological research on issue-­relevant knowledge suggests that people with extensive knowledge about an issue tend to scrutinize messages more closely than people with low knowledge. People with greater knowledge only accept compelling arguments that fit with their understanding of the issue.34 For example, a Korean environmental organization claimed in 2000 that an illegal disposal of a toxic substance in a U.S. military base polluted a nearby river that served as the primary source of drinking water for Seoul. Subsequent protests condemned the environmental damage and demanded that the U.S. military follow Korean environmental laws. In response, U.S. military officials acknowledged that the disposal was illegal but they did not agree that it caused environmental damage. They asserted that the toxin was diluted in about 1.9 million gallons of other wastewater and that it went through three treatment processes. American officials’ knowledge about the waste treatment system as well as the various preventive and remedial measures for environmental problems on military bases led them to reject the protesters’ argument that they violated the environmental norm and that the U.S. military should follow Korean environmental laws.

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In this and other cases, protest organizations argued that the United States and host states violated important norms. However, policy-­makers did not see themselves as norm violators due to their knowledge of existing base policy and operations. Policy-­makers sometimes reject protesters’ demands because they know relevant policy is already in place and they believe it is adequate. Their knowledge can also make protesters’ demands appear unrealistic. American rejection of Korean protesters’ demand to conduct thorough environmental cleanups is an example. American officials believe that such cleanups would require prohibitive amounts of resources and time. An American official told me, for example, “it does not make sense” to clean up a bombing range that was used for fifty years to the standards required for building parks and residential areas. In sum, persuasion is more likely to fail if a normative argument contradicts policy-­makers’ preexisting knowledge and beliefs. Furthermore, protesters’ attempts to persuade policy-­makers can fail when other actors’ arguments fit better with what policy-­makers know, believe, and prefer. These actors are organizations and individuals that support the continued presence of U.S. forces and other types of base policies. They include local business associations, legislators who are not in policy-­making roles but nevertheless voice their preference, and the press that is critical of protesters’ policy demands. Persuasion also fails when policy-­makers believe that protest leaders and organizations are not credible. Credibility is a function of protest leaders’ and organizations’ expertise and trustworthiness. Policy-­makers can question protest organizations’ expertise and ability to provide accurate information. Policy-­makers can also suspect that protest leaders use base policy to manipulate public opinion in order to achieve ulterior ends, such as obtaining economic gain for the local communities and undermining security alliances. My interviews with policy-­makers suggest that they tend to evaluate the credibility of some protest leaders and organizations and apply that evaluation to the entire protest movement. For example, when organizations that policy-­makers do not think are credible lead a protest movement, policy-­makers tend to believe that the entire movement is not credible. It is important to note that policy-­makers conduct subjective evaluations of protesters’ normative arguments and credibility. It is possible that policy-­ makers are violating some norms but think that they are not violating them. Policy-­makers can also believe that a protest organization is not credible, but for the wrong reason or on dubious grounds. For example, some of my interviewees working for the U.S. military in South Korea told me that they suspect some protest organizations are receiving funds and directions from North

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Korea. I asked for evidence but they could not provide it. Representatives of these protest organizations denied this allegation and told me that this was a smear campaign. I could not go any further to verify policy-­makers’ assessments. But what is important is that policy-­makers can hold such negative perceptions of protest organizations and these perceptions contribute to their rejection of normative arguments. Another important point is that policy-­makers can believe that protest organizations are legitimate but not credible. Organizations are legitimate when they are “appropriate and accepted actors whose activities can be justified in terms of values, norms, laws, and expectation of the social contexts.”35 My interviewees in government and military organizations told me that they do not consider protest organizations as credible because the organizations lack expertise and trust. But they recognize the groups’ legal right to organize protests. In democratic societies, policy-­makers can conclude that protest organizations are legitimate actors but without credibility. In non-­ democracies where protest organizations are banned or repressed, policy-­ makers can believe that protest organizations lack legitimacy. This perception can contribute to the failure of persuasion. As we will see in the next section, even when protesters fail to persuade policy-­makers, base policy changes when policy-­makers perceive that protests have generated significant political or military incentives. Political and Military Incentives  Protests can generate political or military incentives for policy-­makers to change base policy. For example, protests can create a perception of political vulnerability for policy-­makers in a host state. Policy-­makers may fear that protests give ammunition to their political opponents, reduce public support for the government, or threaten their hold on power. Protests can be especially damaging if the government is already suffering from weak public support. Protests that occur before elections tend to heighten policy-­makers’ sense of vulnerability.36 Policy-­makers attempt to resolve these concerns by changing base policy. American policy-­makers cooperate, especially when they wish to defuse “anti-­American” sentiment in host states that threatens to undermine U.S. security, political, and economic interests. The U.S. government agrees to change base policy also when it expects basing agreements with the current host government to be better than those it could negotiate with a new government that might come to power in the wake of antibase protests. Policy-­makers can also perceive military incentives for policy change. American and host-­state officials who support the U.S. military presence in host states seek to maintain the U.S. forces’ effectiveness and the smooth oper-

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ation of base functions. When protests pose difficulties in maintaining military effectiveness, policy-­makers are more likely to change base policy. In addition, policy-­makers may fear that the public might turn against the alliance unless they improve base policy. Policy-­makers recognize that stable public support is essential for continued American presence and military effectiveness. State officials respond to protests with policy change in order to maintain a robust alliance. Furthermore, the United States is more likely to change policy when protests point out that it treats one ally better than another by maintaining different base policy in different host states. For example, when one host state holds more rights to exercise criminal custody over an American suspect than another host state, the United States becomes susceptible to criticism and it is more likely to change policy. These political and military incentives encourage policy-­makers to change base policy. However, policy-­makers’ security, political, and economic interests compete with protesters’ demands and make fundamental change difficult. For example, policy-­makers in a host state are unlikely to close all U.S. military bases when they believe that the American presence is important for national security. In addition, policy-­makers may think that protesters’ demands are unreasonable and cannot be fulfilled. Policy-­makers also reject fundamental change in base policy to avoid giving an impression that protests can cause significant change in policy, and to discourage future mobilizations. For these considerations, policy-­makers offer compromise solutions and limit the policy change. What does a limited change look like? In response to protesters’ demand to ban American nuclear weapons in a host state, the United States may agree to withdraw all nuclear weapons on condition that it can reintroduce them in emergency situations. When protesters ask the United States to transfer to host states the right to hold U.S. military suspects in custody, the United States may agree to transfer the right in certain cases but not others. The extent of compromise is a function of the incentives that protests generate and the degree to which states can be flexible on a given policy without undermining their interests. In sum, policy-­makers can decide to change policy even when normative persuasion fails. Policy-­makers may perceive political or military incentives to change policy when protests occur. However, policy-­makers’ interests, knowledge, and beliefs that conflict with protesters’ demands prevent a fundamental change in policy. Policy-­makers limit change to maintain the U.S. presence and military effectiveness, while hoping that their response will help calm the public’s indignation.

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One may wonder to what extent protesters influence compromise, because this process depends on policy-­makers’ perception of political and military incentives for change. Protesters influence compromise by organizing large demonstrations. Compromise is more likely within a context that generates important incentives for policy-­makers to change policy, such as before elections and during alliance talks, but protests do not necessarily occur in such contexts. In fact, many protests occur in reaction to random trigger events, in response to new base policy, or other events unrelated to the context within which protests are likely to generate significant incentives. Furthermore, it is possible that protest leaders expect limited policy change (if any at all) as an outcome, but this is not something that they aim at as a goal of a mobilization.They prefer a fundamental norm-­driven change over a limited policy change through compromise. Taking these observations into account, the most important work that protest leaders do to influence compromise is to mobilize large demonstrations. Whether or not compromise occurs depends on the context within which protesters mobilize and on policy-­makers’ assessment of incentives. It is also important to note that protests can generate political or military incentives for policy change, but there are four factors that reduce these incentives. The first is lobbying by actors that support the policy that protesters seek to change. For example, in response to protest against a plan to construct a new military base, actors that stand to gain from this plan, such as construction companies and other local business owners, can lobby the government to stay the course. Such lobbying can reduce or cancel out political incentives for change, especially if policy-­makers come to believe that there is a “silent majority” that supports the current policy. Second, despite large protests in local communities that host U.S. military bases, elected local officials such as governors and mayors can support the state’s base policy. As elected representatives of local residents, their support reduces pressure for change. Third, the state can use the courts to fight the pressure for change. The state can sue elected local officials that stand with protesters by refusing to perform delegated functions to implement state policy. The state can also sue protesters who obstruct implementation of base policy. Winning in court after a large protest helps reduce political pressure for change by making the court justify the state’s policy and force the defendants to do what the state wants. In addition, if deliberation in court takes time, the public’s focus might shift from base policy to some other issue, reducing political pressure for change. Other protracted actions, such as long bilateral negotiations publicly advertised as aiming to improve base policy, can mitigate political pressure.

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Finally, states’ capacity under law to impose their will reduces policy-­ makers’ incentive for compromise. For example, the power of eminent domain allows states to expropriate private land. Even if there is large mobilization against land expropriation for U.S. military use, the state can emphasize the legality of this procedure as well as its purpose for the “common good.” Whether states actually impose their will depends on the expectation of policy-­makers about the consequences of doing so. They must consider if imposing their will through legal measures would attenuate public opposition with a fait accompli, or it would further enflame the opposition. In sum, even when persuasion fails, protests can change policy when they generate political or military incentives for policy-­makers.Yet the factors that reduce or eliminate the incentives can block protests’ influence on policy. When Protests Do Not Influence Policy The discussion above suggests that there are four circumstances under which protests do not influence base policy. First, protesters’ normative arguments persuade some policy-­makers but domestic institutions that empower unpersuaded policy-­makers block policy change. Second, normative persuasion fails, and protests do not generate political or military incentives among U.S. and host-­state officials. Third, normative persuasion fails, and the United States rejects policy change despite host-­state officials’ perception of political incentives and request for policy change. The United States does not agree to change policy because changing policy would hurt its interests. Thus far, I have discussed both American and host-­state officials as “policy-­makers” without making clear distinctions. Although American and host-­state officials may share the negative evaluation of protesters’ normative arguments and credibility, their interests may diverge in reaction to protests. Host-­state officials may perceive strong political incentives for policy change in the face of large protests, but American officials may have a strong interest in maintaining policy unchanged. This occurred in one of my cases, and this case shows that in such a circumstance America’s preference for the status quo prevails. Finally, protests do not influence policy when they generate incentives for change but some factors eliminate these incentives. However, policy-­makers sometimes offer symbolic concessions in response to protests even when they decide not to change base policy. These concessions include agreements that declare the importance of particular norms (e.g., attaching a memorandum on environmental protection to the SOFA) and improvements in military operational procedures and training. Policy-­ makers offer symbolic concessions for one or more of the following three rea-

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sons. First, policy-­makers wish to show that the U.S. and host-­state governments are norm-­abiding even if they do not change policy in response to protesters’ normative arguments. Second, American policy-­makers agree to give symbolic concessions to allow host states to save face. Protests, especially when the media broadly publicize them, channel public attention to host governments’ willingness and ability to defend national and local interests through policy negotiations with the United States. When American and host-­state officials reject policy change, face-­saving measures help improve the host state’s public image. American officials also wish to avoid having the United States appear as a bully, by signaling to the public that it is a “good neighbor” that is considerate of local needs. Finally, policy-­makers decide to give symbolic concessions to enable a smoother implementation of the policy that protesters oppose. Figure 1 shows the causal processes discussed in this book.

Complementary and Competing Explanations Theories of international relations offer important insights that help explain the extent to which protests influence base policy. However, my analysis of twelve cases shows that none of the theories provides a full explanation. Below I discuss why this is, and how the theories provide complementary and competing explanations for policy change. International Threat and Military Effectiveness Realism in international relations assumes that policy-­makers respond to international threats and that they try to ensure military effectiveness to counter these threats. International threats and military effectiveness are compelling explanations for state actions where there is no protest against base policy. But when there are protests, international threats and military effectiveness alone cannot explain the various policy outcomes. These are just two among many beliefs, forms of knowledge, and perceptions that influence policy-­makers’ evaluation of protesters’ normative arguments. In addition, while international threats and military effectiveness are useful in evaluating normative arguments for base closures and against some training such as nighttime flight exercises, they are less helpful in evaluating other types of base policies such as environmental policy. Furthermore, international threats and military effectiveness do not help explain states’ responses to the political incentives that protests generate. These shortcomings suggest that we must go beyond realism and adopt a more eclectic approach. Combining elements from multiple theoretical

Protestors’ normative arguments

1) Policy-makers’ beliefs and knowledge 2) Policy-makers’ perception of protest leaders’ credibility 1) Do not fit with protestors’ normative arguements 2) Not credible



Persuasion

No persuasion

Policy-makers’ perception of political and military incentives

Low or not shared by the U.S.

1) Fit with protestors’ normative arguments 2) Credible



Domestic institutions (empowerment of persuaded actors)

High for both host and U.S. governments

Not empowering

Empowering

No policy change Limited policy change through compromise

No policy change

Policy change through persuasion

No incentives

No symbolic concessions



Incentives to appear norm-abiding, save face, or facilitate implementation of existing policy

Symbolic concessions

figure 1 Causal Processes



Symbolic concessions

No incentives

No symbolic concessions

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approaches into an explanation allows me to better illuminate the complex policy-­making processes. My explanation is not parsimonious but I believe a structured synthesis offers a rich and accurate explanation of policy outcomes. Domestic Politics and Institutions Liberalism in international relations theory focuses on domestic political processes and institutions to explain foreign policy outcomes. Theoretical research on base politics has focused on domestic factors. Calder’s Embattled Garrisons asks how host-­nation politics influence the decision to retain foreign military bases, and he concludes that high population density in host communities, colonial experience, non-­liberating occupations, and regime shifts (democratization, de-­colonization, military coups) make military withdrawal more likely. Calder gives the most amount of attention to regime shift. He says regime shifts influence “1) the coherence of host-­nation elite networks that negotiate and ratify base agreements; 2) public sentiment toward foreign forces, especially those which have been closely identified with previous dictatorial regimes; and 3) the profile and base-­related incentives of key host-­nation political actors, such as the military, mass media, civilian bureaucrats, and NGOs.”37 According to Calder, nearly 80 percent of the forty-nine cases of regime shift since the 1950s led to foreign withdrawal. Where bases stayed, regime shift produced strong pressures to downsize them, constrain base operations, increase monetary compensation to host states, and conclude new SOFAs.38 Cooley’s Base Politics also highlights the importance of regime type. He argues that regime type influences the rational calculations of host states’ political elites about whether to honor or contest basing agreements with the United States. Authoritarian states are more likely to use basing agreements as leverage to extract private goods from the United States for regime survival. Democratizing states are more likely to politicize or challenge basing agreements that their undemocratic predecessors concluded. Consolidated democracies are more likely to honor basing agreements “regardless of public opinion toward basing issues, social mobilization, or changes in the international security environment.”39 Mechanisms that make consolidated democracies more likely to honor basing agreements are: 1) procedural legitimacy; 2) institutional stability and delegation; and 3) party system consolidation. These mechanisms increase consolidated democracy’s contractual credibility. Yeo’s Activists, Alliances, and Anti-­U.S. Base Protests sees the security consensus among policy-­makers of a host state as a political opportunity structure for antibase movements. A security consensus is the “intersubjective understand-

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ing of the concept of national security” which favors positive alliance relations with the United States.40 Yeo argues that when there is a strong security consensus among policy-­makers, activists find it difficult to gain elite access to reframe the debate about U.S. military bases. Possible policy outcomes under strong security consensus are marginal changes in basing policies or the status quo. When security consensus is weak, protests are able to influence base policy by forming ties with some policy-­makers and reshaping the policy debate. I offer a new perspective on base politics by focusing on policy-­makers’ evaluation of protesters’ normative arguments against U.S. military bases and related policies. This approach allows me to further our understanding of base politics in three ways. First, by highlighting the role of norms I am able to distinguish various types of base policies and offer a theoretical explanation for change in different types of policies. In base politics there is the first decision whether to maintain U.S. military bases in host states. If states decide to maintain them, they must consider other policies, including environmental policy, criminal jurisdiction procedures, and policy on base use and prior consultation, among others. Calder, Cooley, and Yeo acknowledge that there are different types of base policies, but their theoretical models lead us to expect that regime type and security consensus have a uniform influence on the likelihood of change in different policy areas. However, my case studies show that in a given regime type and level of security consensus, policy-­makers can respond to different normative arguments in different ways, with significant consequences for policy outcomes. Focusing on policy-­makers’ evaluation of normative arguments permits a policy-­specific explanation. I do not deny that regime type and level of security consensus influence states’ response to protests. As Calder, Cooley, and Yeo would expect, protests are less likely to close significant U.S. military bases in a consolidated democracy or when a host state’s policy-­makers operate under a strong security consensus. However, some protests lead to change in other types of base policies in consolidated democracies or under a strong security consensus. I explore this possibility by distinguishing among policy issues through a focus on norms. Other authors’ models do not allow us to examine policy-­specific change while mine does because we ask different questions about base politics and attach different meanings to our common dependent variable, base-­policy outcome. For Calder, the dependent variable for his regime shift hypothesis is whether a host state retains foreign military bases or not. Cooley’s goal is to “explain when and why bilateral military basing agreements become accepted, politicized, or challenged by host countries.”41 He therefore exam-

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ines whether host states contest base policy or not, and does not attempt to explain the specific content of policy change. For Yeo, “policy outcome is taken as a measure of movement effectiveness or movement success.”42 His dependent variable is also dichotomous: whether a movement can change base policy given a level of security consensus or not. My study also explores changes in base policy. However, when policy changes, my focus on policy-­ makers’ evaluations of normative arguments allows me to explain the specific content of policy change. I also explain why a policy does not change, given policy-­makers’ special considerations of the policy issue at hand. In sum, Calder, Cooley, Yeo, and I contribute to our understanding of base politics in different ways. My model allows us to examine a broader set of base policies in greater specificity than the earlier models. Second, I offer an explanation for the extent of change in base policy, which previous research has not done. Calder argues that about 80 percent of regime shifts since the 1950s led to foreign military withdrawal, while in cases where bases stayed the sending state faced increased pressure to downsize, raise rental payments, and improve the SOFA. He does not offer an explanation for the varying extent of change in base policy. Cooley’s aim is to explain whether host states honor or contest their basing agreements, and he does not examine the extent of policy change. Yeo’s study does not explain the extent of change in base policy either. He writes that limited policy change and sustaining the status quo are both possible under a strong security consensus. I argue that the greatest change in base policy occurs when protesters’ normative arguments persuade policy-­makers and domestic institutions empower these policy-­makers to shape policy. When persuasion fails, policy-­makers either offer a limited policy change or no policy change depending on the level of political and military incentives they perceive. Therefore, policy-­ makers’ evaluation of normative arguments and their perception of incentives, in combination, explain the entire range of policy outcomes. My model, which takes into account the various factors that policy-­makers must consider in response to protests, is better equipped to explain the different extent of policy change than models that rely mostly on a single variable: regime type or security consensus. Last but not least, unlike earlier research I incorporate the United States in the explanation of policy outcomes. Previous research marginalized the United States by focusing on the regime type of host states or the security consensus among host states’ policy-­makers. My case studies show, however, that the United States plays an important role in shaping policy outcomes. Although in many cases protesters target host states’ policy-­makers more than

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American policy-­makers, American policy-­makers are aware of protest mobilizations and their demands. American policy response reflects policy-­makers’ evaluation of protesters’ normative arguments. American officials’ perception of political and military incentives is also important. When American officials believe that protests have created a situation that hurts (or could eventually hurt) U.S. interests, they agree to change base policy. Base policy does not change when U.S. and host-­state officials agree that protests do not create significant incentives for change, or when American officials believe that protests do not threaten U.S. interests and changing policy would hurt U.S. interests. In the latter case, American officials reject policy change even if host states face high political pressure due to protests. In sum, taking American policy-­makers’ perspectives into account is important to explaining base-­policy outcomes. Norms and Social Influence The final set of competing and complementary explanations comes from the constructivists in the international relations literature, who highlight the importance of norms and social influence in political outcomes. I build on their research but depart from it in six important aspects. First, constructivists generally assume that norms are commonly and properly understood. I question this assumption. According to constructivists who were inspired by research on framing in social movement theory, there are several qualities that increase the influence of a normative argument. An argument’s form has two components: prescription (a statement of what to do or what not to do) and parameters (circumstances under which the norm’s prescription applies). Each should be clear and specific.43 An influential argument often has true and reasonable content.44 An argument can also be powerful when it points to discrepancies between policy-­makers’ words and actions.45 Then, protest organizers must frame the problems so that the arguments fit with existing norms and discourses in their communities.46 New normative arguments’ adjacency, precedent, and fit with existing norms are important to facilitate acceptance by the public and policy-­makers.47 Form and content combined, a normative argument would ideally provide a clear and fair causal explanation (e.g., task X within American military bases causes problem Y) and a prescription of proper behavior.48 Given these criteria for evaluating a normative argument, it appears protest organizers are more likely to win support when they construct their arguments well. However, evaluation of normative arguments according to many of the criteria—­such as reasonableness, truthfulness, specificity, and clarity—­is subjective. What one person thinks unreasonable or false could persuade

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another. In fact, a person’s evaluation of normative arguments’ reasonableness, truthfulness, specificity, and clarity may largely depend on his or her motivated and cognitive biases. A motivated bias occurs when recipients prefer one judgment to another, compromising their ability to process the message objectively.49 A cognitive bias occurs when a person’s preexisting attitudes and affinity influence the evaluation of normative arguments. Constructivists’ assumption that norms are commonly and properly understood is problematic when taking into account people’s cognitive limits and biases. The social psychology literature on persuasion helps in understanding this. Richard Petty and Duane Wegener write that “accurate understanding or learning of message arguments is not necessary for persuasion to occur. Rather . . . a person’s subjective perception of understanding the arguments is more important than actual understanding or learning of the information presented.”50 Some international relations scholars have incorporated subjectivity in their studies of normative influence. For example, Vaughn Shannon argues: “Due to the fuzzy nature of many norms and situations, and due to the imperfect interpretation of such norms by human agency, oftentimes norms are what states (meaning, state leaders) make of them.”51 In sum, interpretation of norms is subjective and policy-­makers’ preexisting beliefs influence it. The factors I examine (policy-­makers’ perception about protesters’ normative arguments and credibility) focus attention on the subjective evaluation of normative arguments. The second way in which my research differs from some constructivist research is that I distinguish two processes of normative influence—­ compromise and persuasion—­that some scholars assume to be two stages in a single process. Some constructivists have studied a norm’s life cycle, in which 1) “norm entrepreneurs” craft norms according to their commitments; 2) norm entrepreneurs “diffuse” or spread the norms, triggering a “norm cascade” after which the norms become commonly accepted; 3) policy-­makers face public pressure to craft policy in accordance to the norms; and 4) policy-­ makers “adopt” the norms and initiate policy change.52 More recent research, however, shows that policy-­makers can comply with norms for instrumental reasons and without internalizing them.53 I agree that this is possible, and argue that normative arguments rarely persuade policy-­makers to change policy in base politics. In my cases, normative arguments are more important in mobilizing large protests to pressure policy-­makers into changing policy through compromise. It is important to separate persuasion and compromise because persuaded policy-­makers can bring about more extensive and enduring policy changes (given an enabling domestic institutional arrangement and these policy-­

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makers staying in decision-­making posts) than policy-­makers who compromise. This is because persuaded policy-­makers internalize norms, which makes fundamental policy change and consistent policy choices thereafter more likely. Policy-­makers operating under compromise would change their behavior once incentive structures change. Separating persuasion and compromise is important to specifying both the different ways, and the extent to which, norms shape policy outcomes. Third, my research on persuasion differs from that of other international relations scholars because I do not explore this process by focusing on the role of international organizations. International organizations make persuasion easier by enabling repeated interaction between actors for norm deliberation and argumentation, and by fostering trust among the actors.54 Protests against U.S. military base policy attempt to influence state behavior outside of international organizations. Persuasion is more difficult without the facilitating mechanisms that international organizations offer. Furthermore, constructivists argue that member states of an international organization may change their behavior through a mechanism called social conformity, even when normative arguments do not persuade them. This social mechanism is not available in base politics. Member states in an international organization can reject norms but conform to them due to social rewards and punishments. Social rewards include status and good reputation among member states, and a sense of belonging to the international organization. Social punishments include shaming and shunning. What generates conformity is the states’ identification with the international organization.55 In base politics, there are no social rewards and punishments that induce states to behave in a norm-­abiding way. Unpersuaded policy-­makers respond to political and military incentives and offer compromise solutions in some cases. Without the social mechanisms available in international organizations, protesters against U.S. military base policy face a difficult challenge in trying to influence state behavior. As such, base politics provide a harder case for persuasion than the more likely cases within international organizations. Fourth, I depart from some constructivist research on persuasion with a different conceptualization of actors. Many constructivists study persuasion among counterparts who are relatively equal to each other, such as executive policy-­makers in bilateral negotiations or national representatives in international institutions. In my study of base politics, policy-­makers do not perceive protesters as their equal counterparts. In addition, constructivists who study persuasion within international institutions may deal with persuadees who are more open to normative argumentation and even to be persuaded, because

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these actors generally accept international organizations as venues for deliberation that may result in a reasoned consensus. However, in base politics most policy-­makers have interests and preferences that are less open to redefinition due to their commitments to security alliances that are to them as important as (or take precedence over) protesters’ normative arguments on base policy. Fifth, constructivists expect that protests have a difficult time persuading policy-­makers, but have not explained why. My research offers an explanation. For example, in his study of socialization processes, Checkel expects: “1) the socializing agency/individual does not lecture or demand but, instead, acts out principles of serious deliberative argument. 2) The agency/target interaction occurs in less politicized and more insulated, in-­camera settings.”56 These assumptions would lead constructivists to expect that protesters have a difficult time persuading policy-­makers. I show that this is indeed the case in base politics and explain why it is difficult for protesters to persuade, with a focus on policy-­makers’ perceptions of protesters’ normative arguments and credibility. Finally, I argue that both constructivist and rational choice perspectives are necessary to explain the range of base-­policy outcomes. Persuasion is a constructivist micro-­mechanism for learning.57 Protesters’ normative arguments reshape the interests and preferences of policy-­makers, and change policy. Compromise is a rational mechanism based on cost/benefit calculations. Policy-­makers choose the course of action that will maximize their predetermined preferences in response to protests. I specify the conditions under which each perspective is more appropriate to explain the policy outcome. By doing so, I follow the recent trend in international relations theory of moving away from choosing either rational choice or constructivism to explain a range of policy outcomes, in order to explore the scope conditions of the two perspectives.58

Cases in the Book The United States maintains 666 military sites of various sizes in forty countries.59 Of the forty countries, Germany, Japan, and South Korea host the largest number of installations. In this book I examine cases from Japan and South Korea but exclude Germany. The antibase movement in Germany is not active. In addition, the U.S. military presence in Germany is based on NATO’s multilateral treaty and a bilateral treaty, while the U.S. military presence in Asia is only through bilateral treaties. This makes the German case more complex than the Asian ones when examining alliance politics and decision-­making processes. Furthermore, including the Philippines gives a

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regional focus with more controlled variables such as the U.S. military objectives in the region and the role of race in civil-­military relations. Cases in this book include four protests from Okinawa (1945–­2010), five from South Korea (2000–­2007), and three from the Philippines (1964–­1991). In South Korea and the Philippines, U.S. military bases existed before the years that this book covers. However, protests against base policy became mass-­based only in the 1960s in the Philippines and in the 1990s in South Korea. Many organizations in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines have carried out small-­scale protest activities such as presentations of base problems to the public and submission of policy demands to the U.S. embassy and various offices of host states. This book, however, focuses on episodes of larger protest mobilization. Although there is no fixed number of protest participants to determine whether a mobilization is large, cases in this book are those that informed observers can easily identify as significant in scale compared to other activities in the history of protest movements, and with national and sometimes international press coverage. I conducted field research for a total of fifteen months between 2006 and 2011 in South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, and the United States. I interviewed representatives of protest organizations, national and local government officials in host states, U.S. Department of State officials, American and host states’ military officials, politicians, journalists, policy analysts, and academics. Most of my interviewees requested anonymity and some asked not to have the interview dates mentioned in order to avoid identification. Some representatives of protest organizations also asked to remain anonymous and that I refer to them by the names of their organizations. I have honored these requests. In order to establish protesters’ normative arguments, I used four types of sources. The first source is the activists I interviewed in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines. The second consists of publications and pamphlets of protest organizations and their leaders. The third is what leaders of protest organizations said in conferences and demonstrations that I attended during field research. The fourth source is the secondary sources about the protests. I used these four sources for recent protests, but for cases from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s interviews and attendance at demonstrations and other events were not possible. For those cases I established protesters’ normative arguments with publications by protest organizations and their leaders, and secondary sources. I conducted archival research in the following institutions: the National Library of the Philippines; the Archives of the Senate in the Philippines; the

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Archives of the House of the Representatives in the Philippines; the Okinawa Prefectural Archives; the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle, Pennsylvania; the U.S. Naval Historical Center’s Operational Archives; the U.S. Marine Corps Library and Archives; the Library of Congress; and the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. I also obtained archival materials from George Washington University’s National Security Archives, and used reports from the U.S. General Accounting Office. Collected materials also include military magazine articles, research institutes’ policy reports, newspaper articles, and documentary films. The multiple case studies buttress my argument that some protests can result in policy change through persuasion or compromise. I also explain why some protests do not result in change in base policy, and why states nevertheless make symbolic concessions in some of these cases. In each case study, I use process-­tracing to examine the unfolding of events that led to a particular policy outcome.60 Table 1 categorizes the cases by causal process and policy outcome. I examine a wide range of base policy. Some base policy is “bigger” than others, and a reader may wonder if this might affect case evaluation. My choice of cases would be a problem if protests can never influence those “bigger” issues and protests can always influence the “easier” cases. But as Table 1 shows, protests influenced some “bigger” issues and failed to influence “easier” ones. For example, one would expect a closure of all military bases would be difficult to achieve, but this occurred in the Philippines. Similarly, making U.S. policy on military prostitution stricter today may be considered “easier” than changing other types of policies but the results of protests in South Korea indicate otherwise. This suggests that a policy issue on its own does not determine the likelihood of change. Chapters 1 and 2 examine four cases of protest in Okinawa. I focus on bases in Okinawa instead of those in mainland Japan for two reasons. First is the higher concentration of American military facilities and personnel in Okinawa. Okinawa hosts about 75 percent of the total acreage of U.S. military facilities in Japan and more than half of the American military personnel in Japan. Second, two-­thirds of the land that the American military uses in Okinawa is locally owned with private, municipal, or prefectural ownership, unlike in the mainland where the state owns most of the base land. The mostly local land ownership and American military facilities’ concentration in Okinawa have generated more grievances about base policy in Okinawa than in the mainland. As a result, protests are more frequent in Okinawa, and the United States and Japan’s base policy has mostly concerned Okinawa.

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table 1. Cases Categorized by Causal Process and Policy Outcomes Causal Process and Policy Outcomes

Cases

Persuasion (Major change in policy)

Philippines, 1991 (Base closure)

Compromise (Limited change in policy)

Philippines, 1964–1965 (Jurisdiction) Okinawa, 1960s–1972 (Reversion to Japan) Okinawa, 1995–1996 (Return of Futenma, criminal custody) South Korea, 2000–2001 (Criminal custody)

No change in policy but with symbolic concessions

Okinawa, 1950s (Land expropriation) Philippines, 1972–1979 (Philippine flag, base commanders, etc.) South Korea, 2000–2001 (Environmental provisions) South Korea, 2002–2003 (Jurisdiction, safety in training) Okinawa, 2009–2010 (Futenma relocation to Henoko)

No change in policy and without symbolic concessions

South Korea, 2004–2007 (Land expropriation)

No change in policy but U.S. domestic pressure leads to policy reinforcement

South Korea, 2002–2005 (Antiprostitution effort)

Chapter 1 examines two cases of protest against U.S. military base policy in Okinawa. First, I examine the American response to local protests in the 1950s. The United States administered Okinawa after World War II and implemented a land policy that facilitated the establishment of military bases. Local residents opposed the policy which included compensation that they believed was grossly inadequate and forcible land expropriation if they refused to sign leases. The second case is from between the early 1960s and the Okinawan reversion to Japan in 1972. Okinawan protesters demanded a reversion to Japan without American military bases. Okinawa prior to reversion did not have a “host state” but my model can explain the earlier cases just as well, with emphasis on American policy-­makers’ perception of normative arguments. In both cases, protesters’ normative arguments failed to persuade policy-­makers. The first case did not lead to policy change, but policy-­makers decided to make symbolic concessions. The second case resulted in limited policy change through compromise.

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Chapter 2 discusses two more recent protests in Okinawa. First, I examine the protests in the mid-­1990s, which demanded a revision of the SOFA and a reduction of bases. Protesters’ normative arguments failed to persuade policy-­makers, but protesters generated significant incentives for policy change within a context in which Tokyo and Washington tried to strengthen their security alliance. The two governments offered a limited policy change through compromise. Second, I present an analysis of the policy outcome on the relocation of the Futenma base in 2010. I argue that protesters’ normative arguments, in addition to other types of arguments from local and national politicians, persuaded Hatoyama. Protesters argued that Futenma should close without relocation within Okinawa by referring to antiwar, antimilitarism, and environmental norms, as well as by contending that Okinawa already shouldered an unfairly disproportionate burden. Protesters’ normative arguments were persuasive given Hatoyama’s belief that Japan and the United States should reduce the U.S. military presence in Japan and eventually create an alliance without a U.S. military presence in peacetime. However, he was unable to change the existing plan to relocate the Futenma facility within Okinawa due to bureaucratic resistance. This case shows how persuasion of a key policy-­maker may not lead to policy change when other domestic actors have more power to veto an executive initiative. The United States also refused to change the existing plan. Chapter 3 examines five base-­policy outcomes in South Korea in the 2000s. A series of protests since the early 1990s led to a revision of the SOFA in 2001 on criminal custody and environmental protection. Seoul and Washington offered a compromise solution to enable the transfer of the custody of American suspects to Korean authorities after indictment, under some conditions. The two governments did not change environmental policy on base, but included some environmental provisions in the SOFA as a symbolic concession to protesters. Next, I explain why the massive candlelight protests of 2002–­2003 failed to change the SOFA. Protesters demanded Korean jurisdiction over cases involving U.S. military personnel on duty but they failed to persuade policy-­makers. Despite large protests that pressed Seoul to ask the United States for negotiations on the SOFA, the protracted negotiations reduced political incentives for change. The two states decided against a revision of the SOFA but agreed to offer a SOFA implementation agreement as a symbolic concession to protesters. Then, I turn to the two governments’ decision to expropriate land in Pyeongtaek for base expansion despite a significant protest mobilization. Normative persuasion failed in this case as well, and the governments proceeded

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with expansion without much change to their incentives as a result of the protests. Chapter 3 also includes an analysis of the U.S. military’s renewed effort to prevent military personnel’s involvement in prostitution and human trafficking in South Korea. Although Korean organizations had criticized American “military prostitution,” American domestic pressure had a more significant impact on the military to strengthen its efforts. Some U.S. Congress members who were engaged in global anti–­human trafficking efforts urged the U.S. forces in Korea to improve their measures against prostitution and human trafficking. The Department of Defense (DOD) responded with a top-­down effort, while the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) launched its own initiatives as well. This case shows that the credibility of the source of normative arguments is important. Korean organizations’ normative arguments against prostitution did not influence American actions, but those from the U.S. Congress and the DOD did. Chapter 4 analyzes two protests against the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in the Philippines in 1964–­1965 and 1972–­1979. In both cases, protesters’ normative arguments failed to persuade Philippine presidents who negotiated the MBAs with the United States.The Philippine presidents believed that the American military presence served Philippine security, political, and economic interests.Yet strong domestic criticisms of the MBA pressured them to ask the United States to modify its content. In 1965 Philippine and American policy-­makers compromised. They offered a limited policy change to diffuse Philippine domestic pressures while ensuring American military effectiveness. In 1979 domestic opposition to the MBA did not lead to policy change, but policy-­makers offered symbolic concessions. Chapter 5 discusses the Philippine Senate’s decision in 1991 to close all U.S. military bases in the country. The MBA between the United States and the Philippines was expiring, and this gave the Philippines a unique opportunity to consider whether it would continue to host U.S. military bases or not. American and Philippine negotiators created a treaty to extend the American military presence, but a 12–­11 vote in the 23-­person Philippine Senate defeated the treaty. I argue that normative arguments against military bases persuaded ten out of the twelve senators who voted against the treaty. Domestic institutions including the 1987 Philippine Constitution and various legislation allowed the antibase senators’ persuasion to translate into the policy outcome.

1

Response to Protests in Okinawa Under the U.S. Administration, 1945–­1972

In the first two island-­wide protests on base policy in postwar Okinawa, normative arguments mobilized large protests but failed to persuade policy-­ makers. The first wave of protests occurred under the American occupation in the 1950s, in which protesters mobilized against forced expropriation of privately owned land for American military use. Persuasion failed because knowledge and beliefs of policy-­makers led them to reject protesters’ normative arguments, and policy-­makers did not find leading protest organizations credible. Although protests generated important political incentives for policy change, the American military administration, which governed Okinawa with vast authority, was able to eliminate the incentives. Although the American authorities did not change the policy of forced land expropriation, they nevertheless offered symbolic concessions to ensure a smoother implementation of this policy.The second wave of protests came in the 1960s, in protest against the American military administration of Okinawa. Protesters demanded Okinawa’s reversion to Japan and closure of all American military bases. Persuasion failed, but protests generated important political and military incentives for reversion. Japan and the United States compromised and offered limited policy change both to calm the protests and protect their interests. Tokyo and Washington agreed on Okinawa’s reversion to Japan but kept U.S. military bases on the islands, contrary to the protesters’ preferences. In addition, in response to protesters’ antinuclear argument, the United States agreed to withdraw all nuclear weapons from Okinawa before reversion. But the two

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governments concluded a secret agreement that would permit the United States to reintroduce them in emergency situations in the future.

Protest Against the American Land Policy in the 1950s Expropriation Policy, Protest Mobilization, and Base Policy Outcome The U.S. military’s forceful expropriation of private land for military use, and many Okinawans’ belief that the United States failed to provide adequate compensation for the land use, led to the first “island-­wide struggle.” During and immediately after the Battle of Okinawa (April–­June 1945), the U.S. military sent local civilians to internment camps and secured land for military use without landowners’ consent.1 The United States justified the land acquisition on the basis of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907. Although the convention’s annex, Section III, Article 46 says “Private property cannot be confiscated,” Article 52 says “Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation.”2 The U.S. military had already declared itself an “army of occupation”; on March 26, 1945, concurrent with the American landing on the Kerama Islands that started the Battle of Okinawa, Admiral Chester Nimitz issued U.S. Military Directive No. 1, placing the Okinawa Islands under U.S. military administration. American forces built camps and airfields as they gained ground in the battle in order to continue the war effort both in Okinawa and the Japanese mainland. American forces also took over many airfields that the Japanese forces had abandoned. An example is Central Airfield. When Okinawans returned from internment camps, they found Central Airfield replaced by Kadena Air Base, which was approximately forty times larger than Central Airfield. The U.S. military occupied, partially or totally, land from fifteen Okinawan villages to make way for Kadena Air Base.3 Many Okinawans found themselves homeless due to American military use of their land. The majority of the population engaged in agriculture before the battle, and land was indispensable for making a living. They had also guarded their land with family tombs for generations, making land more than just a source of income or some property to sell. Despite the landowners’ predicament, the U.S. military continued to use the land without paying the landowners. The Hague Convention says: “Contributions in kind shall as far as possible be paid for in cash; if not, a receipt shall be given and the payment of the amount shall be made as soon as possible.”4 This article with loopholes—­payment “as far as possible” and

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“as soon as possible”—­did not bind the United States to pay for the land use. The U.S.-­Japan San Francisco Peace Treaty that came into force in April 1952 ended the American occupation of the Japanese mainland. However, it formalized the American administration of Okinawa while recognizing Japan’s “residual sovereignty.” Once the treaty came into effect, the United States lost legal recourse to the Hague Conventions for military land acquisition. The U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) under military command, which was the main policy-­making body on Okinawa, began to require contracts and payments for land acquisition. In November 1952, USCAR issued Ordinance 91, which announced that the United States would offer back payment for the use of land expropriated after July 1, 1950. With this ordinance, USCAR also created a system in which landowners leased their land to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI, a local government with limited powers), and USCAR in turn rented from the GRI. However, 98 percent of the landowners refused to sign the leases because they believed that the compensation was too little. USCAR offered less than 2 yen per year for one tsubo (3.3 square meters) of land, or 200–­300 yen per year to a landowner with an average landholding. At the time, a bottle of Coca-­Cola cost 10 yen.5 The landowners also refused to sign because the lease was for twenty years, which they thought was too long.6 In response, USCAR issued Ordinance 109 in April 1953, which allowed the U.S. military to expropriate land even without landowners’ consent. In 1953 alone, the U.S. military relocated 447 households and expropriated about 530,000 tsubo (1,749,000 square meters) of farmland.7 The U.S. military used force to expropriate when landowners refused to sign leases. Forceful expropriation occurred in Okinawan villages such as Aja, Mekaru, Hirano, Okano, and Gushi in 1953, in Iejima in March 1955, and in Isahama in March and July 1955.8 American soldiers used tanks, bulldozers, and fire to destroy landowners’ houses and crops, and brought tear gas and guns fixed with bayonets to force landowners off of their land.9 Dislocated farmers had to live in tents that the U.S. military distributed, suffering from heat, lack of drinking water, poisonous snakes, and water seeping from the ground when it rained. The U.S. military gave them cement, nails, and other materials to build new homes elsewhere, but the landowners preferred to return to their own land and the material largely remained unused.10 Separated from their farmland, many of them quickly became malnourished, and some even died of starvation. USCAR paid for land use after expropriation but the payment was only 2–­3 percent of the average agricultural revenue for the landowners.11

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The relocation sites that the U.S. military offered the landowners were mostly unsuitable for farming. The landowners were thus forced to continue farming within military installations when possible, often at great risk to their safety. Some farmers became injured or died during American military exercises. At times American security guards kicked and beat farmers in and around the military zones. USCAR considered that its ordinances and land-­use payments granted it the sole use of the land, and thus put the farmers found in exercise zones on military trial and imprisoned them. When the U.S. military destroyed crops in preparation for and during military exercises, it paid no compensation.12 In response, landowners created a land committee in each village, and these committees together created a Landowners Union (Shichōson Gunyō Tochi Iinkai Rengōkai) in 1953. Landowners negotiated with USCAR and the GRI for just compensation for land use, return of their land, and end to expropriations. In March 1954, USCAR announced a plan to obtain permanent leases from landowners with a lump-­sum payment. USCAR offered an amount that equaled 6 percent of the land value times 16 (for 16 years) for a permanent lease of the land for military use. This announcement shocked landowners and the public. There was a consensus that this would essentially amount to an American land purchase. Landowners opposed the plan also because USCAR’s lump-­sum payment would prevent them from receiving compensation for the increase in land value over time.13 There was opposition to the USCAR plan from across the political spectrum.14 The Okinawan parliament (Rippōin) declared its position in the Four Principles on the Land Issue (gunyōchi mondai ni kansuru yongensoku). The four principles were: 1) American land purchases, permanent use, and lump-­sum payments must not be permitted; 2) for land that is already in military use, the United States must provide adequate compensation (the rent must take into account the landowners’ asking price, and there must be annual rent evaluation and payment); 3) the United States must swiftly pay adequate compensation to landowners for damage; and 4) the U.S. military must return land that is not needed, and must not expropriate additional land. The Landowners Union, the GRI, the Okinawan parliament, and two organizations of local leaders (one for mayors and town/village chiefs, and the other for leaders of local assemblies) formed the Five Group Coalition (Gosha Kyōgikai) to negotiate with the American authorities.15 Delegates from the Five Group Coalition visited Washington in May 1955.

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Okinawan outrage increased in September 1955 after an American soldier kidnapped, raped, and murdered a six-­year-­old girl near the Kadena Air Base. Another American soldier raped another child less than a week later. Many Okinawans participated in the first Okinawan Citizens’ Rally (kenmin taikai) in protest. In the context of increasing Okinawan frustration, the U.S. House Armed Services Committee sent a special subcommittee headed by Melvin Price to investigate land issues in Okinawa for four days. Despite the Okinawan opposition to the land policy, the Price Report in June 1956 recommended the permanent lease of land for military use, lump-­sum rent payments, and further land acquisition. USCAR announced that it would raise the rent six times but it would continue the lump-­sum payments and carry out additional expropriations.16 The Price Report’s recommendations and the subsequent American actions were contrary to the Okinawan parliament’s Four Principles. In response, the GRI executive branch, members of the parliament, and chiefs of cities, towns, and villages threatened to quit in protest. Sixteen political organizations, including the Okinawa Teachers Association (OTA), the Youth Group Association, the Women’s Association, the Parents Association, the Okinawa Socialist Mass Party (OSMP), the Okinawa People’s Party (OPP), the Okinawa Democratic Party, the Chamber of Commerce, the Mayors Union, and the Landowners Union, formed the All-­Okinawa Coalition for Land Protection (Zen Okinawa Tochi o Mamoru Kyōgikai) to protest the American land policy. Within two weeks, approximately 160,000 to 200,000 people out of the Okinawan population of 800,000 joined rallies in fifty-­six of Okinawa’s sixty-­four cities, towns, and villages. Students from the University of the Ryukyus demonstrated for the first time on the streets, yelling “Yankees Go Home” and carrying placards with anti-­U.S. messages.17 On July 28, 150,000 people gathered at a rally for the Four Principles in Naha, Okinawa’s capital.18 In response, USCAR suspended the lump-­sum payment policy in April 1958, offering it—­in the form of a lump-­sum payment for a ten years’ lease—­ only to landowners who requested it. In February 1959, with Ordinance 20, the United States offered new lease terms with twice as much rent as in 1956, paid annually, and renewed every five years. The new rent equaled 80 percent of what the Land Union had demanded in 1956 and 60 percent of the annual farm income.19 The United States also allowed farmers to farm within military zones outside training hours (early morning, evening, and Sundays). The Americans called such areas “farming areas with tacit permission” (mokunin kōsakuchi). However, the United States reserved the right to cancel permission

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at any time, and did not pay for losses incurred by such cancellations. Moreover, under the ordinance, the U.S. military was still able to expropriate land without the landowners’ consent. In sum, the United States retained the policy of expropriating land at will, while making some symbolic concessions such as suspending lump-­sum payments, increasing rent, and designating farming areas with tacit permission. The following section explains this base policy outcome. Normative Arguments Against the Land Policy and Failure of Persuasion Protesters used several normative arguments to oppose the American land policy in the 1950s. First, they emphasized humanitarian concerns in opposing expropriation and asking for just compensation. Farmers said they could not survive without the land to cultivate or adequate compensation. The Iejima farmers’ “beggars’ march” across Okinawa was such an example. The death of two women by starvation after the expropriation of their land triggered the march. Twenty to thirty villagers marched for about nine months, publicizing the humanitarian costs of the American land policy. Human rights organizations supported the farmers. Roger Baldwin from the American Civil Liberties Union and the International League for Human Rights learned about the American land expropriation in Okinawa, and advised the Japan Civil Liberties Union (JCLU) to conduct an investigation. The JCLU investigated for ten months and published a report critical of the American administration in Okinawa, citing forceful land expropriation as a human rights problem.20 A second normative argument focused on protection of private property. For example, the OPP leader Senaga Kamejirō wrote an open letter to the deputy governor of the Ryukyu Islands, Major General David A. D. Ogden: It is a fact in Onna-­son to which your land acquisition order was recently accorded, that there is put up, in the area for which not rental rate has been determined nor has the contract been concluded, a notice-­board which reads “This area is belong [sic] to the State Department of the United States of America. No person is allowed to enter into this area without permission.” Such act, regardless of an individual and a state, as not only using another’s personal property without permission but also asserting his rights to another’s is considered not an infringement of property rights, but rather a plunder of property. It is also considered an act against justice and humanity, isn’t it?21

In addition, landowners protested with a slogan against the lump-­sum payment: “Money is for one year but land is for ten thousand years.” Landowners asked for the protection of private property and the provision of adequate compensation.

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Some landowners also made antiwar and antimilitarism arguments. In Iejima, landowners opposed expropriation and demanded their land back by arguing that they were against war, “which is the worst tragedy and crime of mankind.”22 This argument was informed by the Okinawan experience in the Battle of Okinawa, an extremely destructive battle, which claimed the lives of about one in three Okinawans. Landowners did not want their land to be used to prepare for and fight wars. In addition, one of the Iejima protest leaders, Ahagon Shōkō, was a Christian, and he cited the Bible while trying to dissuade American officials from expropriating land: “They that take the sword shall perish with the sword.”23 Although most landowners focused on humanitarian concerns and property rights, some of the protesters made political arguments as well.The Communist OPP criticized the existence of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa and opposed the “entrenchment of U.S. colonialism in Okinawa.”24 A related argument was a nationalist one. It appealed to many Okinawans’ desire for reversion to Japan, and argued that Okinawans should oppose the American land policy that would allow the U.S. military to use their land permanently. The OPP and the OTA combined the land struggle with the issue of reversion, stressing the “importance of Okinawa’s land rights for defending [the] integrity of ‘Japanese territory’ from US encroachment.”25 Okinawan people and organizations deployed these normative arguments through protests and in presentation of demands to American officials both in Okinawa and Washington. The normative arguments failed to persuade USCAR officials, who were the main policy-­makers on Okinawan issues, because the arguments did not fit with the officials’ beliefs. First, USCAR policy-­makers believed that the establishment and expansion of military bases through land acquisition would help ensure military effectiveness. A lump-­ sum rent payment in exchange for a permanent lease would ensure long-­term military effectiveness, a crucial issue for the United States since it considered Okinawa strategically important. The Cold War was taking shape by the late 1940s. In July 1949, in the context of the Chinese civil war which resulted in the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October, the U.S. Congress approved the allocation of 58 million dollars for military base construction in Okinawa.26 The Korean War, which erupted in June 1950, increased the strategic importance of Okinawa even more. American bombers based in Okinawa attacked North Korean targets.27 Okinawa thus became the “keystone of the Pacific,” allowing the United States to conduct surveillance over, and strike if necessary, many important targets in the Pacific and East Asia. In his address to the GRI’s legislature on April 11, 1958, the high

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commissioner (the top administrator of Okinawa), Lieutenant General James E. Moore, declared: “The United States maintains a military base here as its contribution to the defense of the Free World against the continuing menace of Communist aggression.”28 In this context, the antiwar and antimilitarism arguments did not persuade the Americans because they believed that their military presence was needed for maintaining security in Okinawa and the region. While many Okinawans believed eliminating military bases would help prevent future wars in Okinawa, American officials believed maintaining them would deter wars. In an oral history interview, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the USCAR chief between 1955 and 1957, recalled responding to OTA leader Yara Chōbyō’s argument that Okinawans were “interested only in peace” and “don’t want any [American] troops”: I said, “Look, Mr. Yara, you aren’t half as interested in peace as I am. I know you saw a little war at the Battle of Okinawa, but I’ve seen a hell of a lot of wars. I’m more interested in peace than you’ll ever be.” . . . I told him that, Gee whiz! You’re living in another world. Look at the area that you’re living in with Red China here and the Soviet Union. Don’t you think that they have got the design? You and your people may like to be a perfectly peaceful nation. Everybody does. But goddamn it, there are marauders in this world that envy what you’ve got. . . . He’s a civilian. He doesn’t understand half the game but just like in an audience the guy says, “I’m anti-­war gentleman.” . . . I said, “Look. You’re not one thousandth as anti-­war as I am.” I said, “What do you know about war?”29

Some protesters’ argument that the U.S. military should not expropriate land because Okinawa would revert to Japanese sovereignty did not persuade American officials who were mostly against reversion in the late 1940s and 1950s. While there were some people like General Matthew Ridgway who supported Okinawan reversion to Japan to improve U.S.-­Japanese relations (provided that the United States would keep control over its military facilities), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) strongly opposed reversion. A JCS report said: “The economic cost of administering the area is trivial when balanced against the cost in blood and treasure required to conquer the islands from Japan, their importance to U.S. security, and the expenditure of lives and equipment which might be necessary should the islands be given up and, subsequently, military necessity demand their recapture.”30 Most American officials were against reversion also because the American administration of Okinawa allowed the United States to use its bases freely without having to consult a host state. There were no restrictions on American military operations and storage of weapons in Okinawa, unlike in mainland Japan after the end of the U.S. occupation in 1952.

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Furthermore, American officials opposed reversion because they worried about Japan’s dependability as an ally in the Cold War. American officials were particularly concerned about the Japanese reluctance to rearm and fight wars in the Cold War together with the United States. Focusing on its postwar economic development, Japan eschewed military rearmament beyond developing a self-­defense force. American officials also worried that the “pro-­American” conservative Japanese governments might not survive the political left’s attacks, and that Japan would be neutral in the Cold War.31 American administration of Okinawa was important to ensure continued American access to the strategically important islands. American officials’ opposition to reversion contributed to the rejection of protesters’ argument that the U.S. should not expropriate land because Okinawa would eventually revert to Japan. The protesters’ argument that USCAR should respect private property did not persuade officials either. Many in the U.S. military considered that the large American sacrifices during the Battle of Okinawa entitled them to the land. They also relied on the Hague Convention and their own ordinances to legalize land acquisition, believing that this legitimated their land policy. USCAR declared through the exercise of eminent domain that any expropriation for “public need” was appropriate. Roderick M. Gillies, the first civilian deputy civil administer of the Ryukyu Islands (appointed in 1955), recalls that the Corps of Engineers were the “U.S. land acquisition and payment agents” but “didn’t see any reason why we didn’t just take the land and take title—­ exercise eminent domains. Saw no reason why we should pay.”32 In addition, protesters’ arguments against land expropriation that focused on the economic burden on Okinawans (i.e., lack of just compensation, humanitarian concerns about poverty, and so on) did not persuade many Americans because they believed that their military presence was essentially good for Okinawan economic development. According to George Kennan, General Douglas MacArthur (the Supreme Allied Commander during the occupation of Japan) thought the Okinawans could “pick up a good deal of money and have a reasonably happy existence from an American base development.”33 The U.S. military was the biggest customer for local products such as cement, vegetables, and fruits.34 By the early 1950s, about fifty thousand Okinawans found work on military bases as construction, maintenance, and service workers.35 High Commissioner Moore emphasized in 1957: “the needs of the U.S. Forces serve as a healthy stimulus to Okinawan economic activity, and that the training received in U.S. installations is rapidly building up the pool of skills needed to keep it going in the future. Much of the managerial and technical skills that have been fostered over the past decade are already

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being applied to enterprises that serve, not the U.S. Forces, but the long range economic needs of Okinawa.”36 Protesters’ arguments failed to persuade USCAR officials also because the Americans did not find the protesters credible. The American authorities in Okinawa considered most objections to its land policy Communist inspired. An American memo from February 1954, for example, characterized a farmers’ protest against land expropriation as such: “Although the amount of crops damaged by the operation was small and the Mayor had successfully offered a plan for removal of the crops, a group gathered, attacked, stoned and captured the bulldozer operator. This regrettable incident was caused by a group of natives who, immediately prior to the incident, had been incited by Communist agitators.”37 High Commissioner Moore, when he was the USCAR’s deputy civil administrator in 1956, said that the Price Report was fair but agitators with links to the Japan Communist Party fanned the protest movement.38 The American military perception, that Okinawan protesters were either Communists or influenced by Communists, undermined the protesters’ credibility. Not all individuals and organizations that protested against the U.S. land policy were Communists or manipulated by Communists. But in the 1950s USCAR engaged in anti-­Communist campaigns in Okinawa, and in this context even the Landowners Union—­a conservative, economic-­oriented organization that aimed for an amicable settlement of land disputes—­came under suspicion.39 Farmers in Iejima also feared that the Americans would associate them with Communists and consider them anti-­American. In fact, one of the items in their code of conduct in carrying out protests was that they should not become or appear anti-­American.40 Nevertheless, many Americans continued to consider the farmers either Communists or influenced by Communists.41 The landowners’ association with the OPP and the OTA in the land struggle may have led to this conclusion. The OPP, the only Communist party in Okinawa, supported the Four Principles and reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administration. The OPP also opposed the presence of the American military bases and the storage of nuclear weapons on bases. American authorities responded by suppressing the OPP. In 1954, they arrested 28 OPP members and put them on trial. In 1956, after the OPP chairman Senaga was elected as the mayor of Naha, USCAR terminated a subsidy to the city, cancelled a bank loan, and changed several city ordinances so that conservative city representatives could try to remove Senaga with a resolution of non-­confidence.42 Senaga was in office for only eleven months. The CIA also began sending financial assistance to “pro-­American” conserva-

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tive politicians of the Okinawan Liberal Democratic Party to forestall “communist” victories in elections.43 Deputy Civil Administrator Gillies delivered an address before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Okinawa in 1957, which further demonstrated the OPP’s lack of credibility among American officials. Gillies argued that the OPP’s aim was to “magnify and exploit all irritations, however minor, so as to foster discontent among Ryukyuans,” and “drive the U.S. out of the Ryukyu Islands.” In the same address, Gillies quotes from an “intercepted OPP directive” from November 1954: “Sponsor peace movements, movements for the protection of human rights, fund-­raising campaigns for dispossessed landowners, and Red Cross movements. People will donate money. Give a little bit of it to the cause for which collected and turn the rest in to the communist cause.”44 American officials believed that the Communists took advantage of the Okinawans’ grievances over land policy to agitate the locals against the American administration. In short, USCAR officials did not find the OPP credible and would not cave in to its demands on land policy. USCAR also put pressure on the OTA for protesting against the American land policy and advocating Okinawa’s reversion to Japan. In February 1954, USCAR sent a letter calling on the OTA to disengage from the reversion movement.45 A top American official declared that OTA members were teaching communism, and their aim in education was to increase the membership of the Communist Party.46 Protesters’ arguments failed to persuade American officials because the anti-­Communist Americans thought protesters lacked credibility. However, I argue that protests can lead to change in base policy even when their normative arguments fail to persuade policy-­makers. Policy changes in a limited way when protests generate significant incentives for policy-­makers. In the case of protest against land policy, the very broad protest created great pressure on American authorities. The protesters included the Okinawan chief executive Higa Shūhei and the rest of the executive branch, members of the parliament, parties across the political spectrum, various civic organizations that formed the All-­Okinawa Coalition for Land Protection, and a large segment of the public. A 1955 U.S. Army statement on the land issue noted: “Such widespread dissatisfaction strengthens the hand of elements eager to embarrass the U.S. and poses a definite threat to the success of the military mission and to the accomplishment of the Civil Administration objectives.”47 However, as I describe below, USCAR ruled Okinawa in an undemocratic way, and had such authority and power that it could minimize the political

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incentive for change that protesters generated. As a result, the policy of land expropriation did not change. Although in 1950 USCAR created the GRI, which was composed of an Okinawan chief executive, an elected parliament, and a judicial branch, USCAR maintained ultimate political authority. This cancelled the importance of the GRI’s opposition to the land policy. USCAR (headed by an American military high commissioner since 1957) had the powers to appoint the chief executives, remove elected officials from office, block the parliament’s legislation, and overrule the courts’ decisions. In fact, USCAR threatened to rule Okinawa directly if local administrative staff resigned in protest against the Price Report. This warning was enough to make Chief Executive Higa and other GRI officials reverse their earlier decision to resign.48 In addition, USCAR’s privileged position allowed it to employ three “divide and rule” tactics to weaken protests and reduce the pressure for change. First, USCAR put the civilian areas around military bases in central Okinawa “off-­limits” to soldiers and their families. This brought severe economic damage to local businesses catering to Americans and forced the mayor of Koza, a base town, to leave the Five Group Coalition.49 Second, USCAR negotiated directly with some landowners, offering case-­ specific benefits in exchange for a lease. For example, people of Henoko, fearing forced expropriation, negotiated certain terms with the U.S. military before signing leases in 1955. Conditions included minimized military use of farmland, priority given to locals in hiring, purchase of local vegetables for military use, and local use of excess American electricity and water.50 Third, USCAR announced a suspension of funding for the University of the Ryukyus. The Americans had founded and funded the university, but students’ protests upset USCAR. The university was forced to expel five students and suspend another, and announce that it would ban students from “joining any activities on or off campus without permission.”51 American officials maintained the policy of land expropriation due to the failure of persuasion and their ability to mitigate pressure for change. Nevertheless, USCAR made symbolic concessions, including the suspension of the lump-­sum payments, an increase in compensation, and “tacit permission” for farming inside military bases. Originally, USCAR was not going to make a concession on lump-­sum payments. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II wrote to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in February 1958: “I am told that our military people in Okinawa strongly influenced that [Price] Report and the recommendation regarding the lump sum settlement. Their position was, and continues to be, that the Okinawans

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would have to accept it and like it and that after an initial hue and cry there wouldn’t be any real problem.”52 However, the “hue and cry” did not subside and USCAR officials were forced to offer symbolic concessions in order to facilitate the implementation of the land policy.

Protest for Reversion of Okinawa without U.S. Bases, 1960s–­1972 On May 15, 1972, after twenty-­seven years of rule, the United States returned to Japan the right to administer Okinawa. This policy outcome represented a significant change in American preferences. In the 1940s and 1950s, American military officials believed that continued administration of Okinawa was necessary for military effectiveness. By the end of the 1960s, however, the U.S. military accepted that reversion of administrative rights to Japan was the best way to ensure American military effectiveness. What explains this change? The type of reversion that took place needs to be explained as well. Protesters demanded a reversion without U.S. military bases but the bases remained. In response to protests against nuclear weapons, the United States agreed to withdraw all nuclear weapons from Okinawa before reversion. But Washington and Tokyo created a secret agreement, which became publicly known in 1994, that the United States could reintroduce them to Okinawa in emergency situations. What explains this limited policy change? I argue that reversion became possible due to Okinawan protests against continued U.S. administration. Okinawan protesters offered antiwar, antinuclear, human rights, nationalist, and democratic arguments for reversion. These normative arguments mobilized large protests in Okinawa and attracted support in Japan. The normative arguments did not persuade American policy-­ makers, but protesters generated significant political and military incentives for them to return Okinawa to Japan. However, the United States made sure to maintain military effectiveness by keeping military bases in Okinawa and retaining the right to reintroduce nuclear weapons. This case is an example of the process I call compromise, in which policy-­makers offer a limited policy change in order to maximize American military effectiveness and diffuse large protests at the same time. Normative Arguments for Reversion There were several normative arguments that helped mobilize large protests in Okinawa to achieve reversion. First, in the 1950s and the early 1960s key protest organizations advanced a nationalist argument for reversion: Okinawans

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were Japanese, and therefore Okinawa should be reunited with its “motherland” or “home country.” Senaga, OPP’s chairman, wrote to Deputy Governor Ogden in 1954: “The tingling blood of the Okinawa Prefectural people is a part of the blood of the Japanese Nation of 85,000,000 population.”53 Teachers, who formed one of the most important pro-­reversion organizations (OTA), continued to emphasize nationalist instruction.54 Second, normative arguments for reversion included the exercise of self-­ determination and life under democratic rule. As discussed in the previous case, the U.S. military had administered Okinawa with undemocratic means since the end of the Battle of Okinawa. USCAR and the high commissioners gradually implemented some measures to make the administration of Okinawa more democratic, but Edwin O. Reischauer, American ambassador to Japan between 1961 and 1966, later recalled that “American military rule,” with its “alienness and arrogance . . . only grudgingly opened the way to local autonomy.”55 Many Okinawans supported reversion to Japan because of its postwar constitution that promised various freedoms and rights. USCAR curtailed freedom of expression, political beliefs, and assembly in addition to property rights, all of which were available in Japan. Protesters also referred to human rights when arguing for reversion. The number of crimes committed by American personnel in Okinawa increased sharply during the Vietnam War, and Okinawans became frustrated that the United States held jurisdiction over American suspects.56 Many felt that American military courts treated American military personnel too leniently, and saw this as a human rights problem in which Okinawan victims did not receive justice. For example, in an incident in February 1963 in which a speeding marine’s truck ran a red light and killed a thirteen-­year-­old boy, the U.S. court martial accepted the marine’s claim that it was impossible to see the traffic light because of the strong sunlight. The marine’s acquittal led to an Okinawan Citizens’ Rally with three thousand Okinawans protesting the verdict.57 Scholars also point to the Okinawan frustration with criminal jurisdiction as one of the reasons for a spontaneous and destructive riot in Koza on December 20, 1970.58 The Okinawan outrage with American crimes and criminal jurisdiction, as well as human rights problems like USCAR’s investigation of people’s political beliefs and American military personnel’s abandonment of Okinawan women and children, led to the establishment of the Okinawa Human Rights Association (Okinawa Jinken Kyōkai) in 1961. The association campaigned for reversion to improve various Okinawan rights.59 Antiwar and antimilitarism arguments for reversion received popular support as well. Many Okinawans who had endured hardship in the Battle of

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Okinawa and opposed the presence of American military bases supported reversion because they expected that the American bases would close thereafter.60 Repeated accidents during American military operations strengthened the arguments against military bases. For example, a U.S. Air Force jet fighter crashed on Miyanomori Primary School, killing 17 (including 11 children) and injuring 121 on June 30, 1959. A jet plane crashed into a home in Gushikawa village in December 1961, killing 2 people, injuring 4, and burning 3 houses. And in December 1962, a refueling plane crashed in Kadena village, killing 2 people and injuring 8. In the 1960s, Okinawan opposition to the Vietnam War added weight to the antiwar argument for reversion. The U.S. military carried out various kinds of training in Okinawa and deployed bombers and cargo planes to Vietnam. Many people in Okinawa thought that such military activities made them aggressors and violated their antiwar beliefs. One letter to a local newspaper, Okinawa Times, asked, “Isn’t Okinawa, which provides military bases and cooperates with the U.S. military, assailing the Vietnamese people who come under deadly bombing every day?”61 In June 1965, after a six-­ton trailer that an American military plane parachuted in a “drop” exercise landed in a civilian area two kilometers from the Yomitan Air Base and killed a young girl, twenty Okinawan groups mobilized about ten thousand people to demand a stop to “all military activities” in Okinawa related to the Vietnam War.62 Their belief, that the continued presence of American military bases in Okinawa made them participants in war against their will, strengthened the Okinawan support for reversion in expectation that military bases would be closed after reversion. By 1968, the largest segment of respondents in an Okinawan opinion poll (42.6 percent) supported closure of all military bases.63 Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which renounces war and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes, also attracted Okinawan support. Okinawan protesters advanced an antinuclear argument as well. Protesters correctly assumed that there were nuclear weapons in Okinawa, although the United States did not confirm or deny this for strategic reasons.64 Fearing a nuclear attack on Okinawa, protesters opposed both the storage of nuclear weapons and the stopover of nuclear submarines in Okinawa. An organization to protest the deployment of nuclear weapons (Okinawa Gensuikyō) was established in August 1958. The antinuclear argument became important in the protest movement for reversion when Japanese prime minister Satō Eisaku declared in December 1967 that his “three non-­ nuclear principles” would prohibit the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory as well as Japanese manufacturing and possession of

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nuclear weapons. Protesters wanted a reversion that would eliminate American nuclear weapons from Okinawa. These normative arguments successfully mobilized the Okinawan public in support of reversion.Yet they failed to persuade the American military officials who ruled Okinawa. Military officials’ beliefs led them to reject the protesters’ arguments, and they did not perceive leading protest organizations as credible. Failure of Persuasion There are several reasons why American military officials rejected protesters’ arguments for reversion. First, American military officials continued to view Okinawa as strategically important, and this made them resist reversion. Reversion of Okinawa to Japan was out of the question for American military officials in the early 1960s, because they worried that Japan might deny Americans the use of military bases in critical situations either due to “harassment” or “political instability.”65 American military officials continued to worry about Japan’s dependability as an ally in emergency situations and thought that keeping Okinawa was necessary to ensure access to bases. Protesters’ antinuclear argument clashed with the importance that American officials attached to Okinawa for their nuclear deterrence strategy. By the 1960s, U.S. military bases in Okinawa held the largest number of nuclear weapons of all U.S. bases in East Asia. In 1967, the United States stored 1,300 nuclear weapons in Okinawa, which was a third of all such weapons in American military bases in the Asia Pacific at the time.66 Protesters’ antiwar and antimilitarism arguments met resistance from American officials as well. Okinawa played a vital role in the Vietnam War as a strategic bomber base, a storage depot, a training ground, a repair facility, and a rest and recreation center.67 Lieutenant General Albert Watson II, the high commissioner between 1964 and 1966, said he perceived the Okinawan anti-­Vietnam War protests “as a mosquito bite.” He had some news releases made, pointing out “how our support of Vietnam was adding to the economic prosperity of the Ryukyu Islands.”68 The nationalist argument for reversion, that the Okinawans are Japanese and therefore should reunite with the Japanese “motherland,” did not persuade American military officials either. Lieutenant General Ferdinand Thomas Unger, the high commissioner between 1966 and 1969, claimed that “the Okinawans are not ethnic Japanese.”69 Lieutenant General Paul Caraway, the high commissioner of Okinawa between 1961 and 1964, agreed and said that “the Japanese do not need them, they are a troublesome, unJapanese minority, that most Japanese could not even tolerate.”70 Colonel William F.

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Schless, chief of staff of the U.S. Army Ryukyus Islands between 1969 and 1973, did not believe that the Okinawans saw themselves as Japanese: “I guess the best I heard on [reversion] was a State Department man’s explanation. He said in his view, ‘The way the Okinawans look at this thing is that the U.S. are bastards, but the Japanese are Oriental bastards.’”71 According to Reischauer, American military officials believed that “a few troublemakers” were saying that the Okinawans were Japanese.72 American policy-­makers responded to the Okinawan argument for reversion that stressed self-­determination with some reforms, such as a series of reforms for the selection of the Okinawan chief executive. The reforms aimed to respond to Okinawan demands for political autonomy but without reversion, so that the United States would be able to maintain its military bases. Reform did not come easily, however. In the early 1960s American military officials feared that reforms would be a step toward reversion and thus resisted them. Caraway also believed that Okinawan leaders were not ready for autonomy. In a speech that became highly controversial, he averred that “autonomy at the present time is a myth; it does not exist. . . . In the Ryukyus, as elsewhere, men must earn the right to wield power, political, or economic, or social; it is not to be bestowed carelessly upon the adolescent, the weakling, or the incompetent, no matter how loudly he may shout for it.”73 However, Caraway’s successors had to appease the Okinawans to ward off their demands for reversion, and prolong the American administration as much as possible. Watson, who believed that reversion would lead to a decrease or loss of American freedom of military action in Okinawa, recalled: “It was implicit in what I was told that I was to make our occupation and government as palatable as possible with the primary purpose, I suppose, of making our tenure in the Ryukyus Islands extend as long as possible.”74 Unger agreed: “My tenure could be capsulized as a continuing race between the ever-­increasing political momentum of the Okinawans for reversion and the efforts of the United States to provide meaningful palliatives which might delay or slow down the timetable for reversion.” For example, when Unger approved the popular election of an Okinawan chief executive in 1968, he “felt that the popular election palliative might momentarily satisfy Okinawan aspirations and thereby give us more time in putting off the day when our freedom of military operations would be circumscribed.” However, Unger eventually realized the limits of this approach: “We did not have much left to give away in order to continue a local acquiescence to our base status, which would not negate or at least partially erode the very purpose of our being there in the first place.”75

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The struggle over revision also shows that in general protesters’ normative arguments fail to persuade policy-­makers when policy-­makers do not find protest organizations credible. The American military perception of the reversion movement as anti-­American leftist agitation persisted in the 1960s, undermining normative arguments’ persuasive power over American military officials. Although the Okinawan reversion movement in the 1960s was broader than the simple “anti-­American” and “leftist” labels suggest, the American assessment of the movement as leftist was not completely off the target. Conservatives also supported reversion, but three left-­wing political parties (OPP, OSMP, and Okinawa Socialist Party) shared the leadership of the Okinawa Prefecture Council for Reversion to the Home Country (Okinawa-­ken Sokoku Fukki Kyōgikai, or Fukkikyō), the most important umbrella organization for reversion. American military officials continued to view the reversion movement as “leftist” and lacking credibility. For example, Caraway dismissed the OPP as “the most anti-­American group” and “you couldn’t do anything with as a party.” According to Caraway, leftist politicians “never said a kind thing about the Americans,” and the leftists’ argument that the United States was trying to colonize Okinawa was “a political gambit.”76 Further evidence that American military officials did not perceive protest leaders as credible is that American officials suspected that those advocating reversion were doing so to win more funding. Unger said: “I felt that the leaders of the GRI, particularly the radical coalition of opposition parties, were more interested in political confrontation and the hope that Japan would bail them out economically.”77 Caraway also wrote in a personal letter in 1962: “The Ryukyuans are still making as much fuss as possible, apparently in an endeavor to talk Japan and the U.S. out of money.”78 In sum, protesters’ arguments for reversion did not persuade American military officials who ruled Okinawa because the officials’ beliefs led them to reject protesters’ arguments and because the officials did not perceive protest leaders as credible. However, protesters generated sufficient political and military incentives for reversion that the United States agreed to return Okinawa to Japan. Incentives for Reversion Okinawan opposition to the American administration continued to grow in the 1950s and the 1960s, and created difficult political and military challenges for the United States. Although American officials had believed that the administration of Okinawa would ensure military effectiveness, these challenges made them think that keeping administrative control of Okinawa would become a liability to the maintenance of military effectiveness in Oki-

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nawa and Japan. Ambassador MacArthur in Tokyo wrote to State Secretary Dulles about Okinawa in 1958: “I think a situation is developing there which, unless we undertake constructive and most urgent remedial action, can only, over the period of the next several years, develop to the point where, if we are not actually forced out . . . Okinawa will no longer be a dependable military base which we could count on using effectively in the event of hostilities.” He continued: “We should recognize, therefore, that the time may well come in the next few years when, for one reason or another, we conclude that the national interest is best served by the return of administration of the Ryukyus to Japan.”79 Okinawan protests against the U.S. administration attracted strong support in Japan by the mid-­1960s, and this made American policy-­makers worry that America’s continued administration of Okinawa might undermine American security interests not only in Okinawa but also in Japan. A nationalist argument for Okinawa’s reversion, that Okinawa was a part of Japanese territory lost in World War II and it should be returned to Japan, was very popular among the Japanese public.80 All political parties in Japan agreed on reversion. U.S. State Department officials, who began to consider reversion earlier than military officials, worried that nationalist sentiment in Japan might turn against the United States if Americans continued to administer Okinawa.81 Ambassador MacArthur wrote to State Secretary Dulles: “Our over-­all relations with Japan will be so adversely affected by the Okinawa situation that they will steadily deteriorate to the point where they jeopardize our vital interests in this part of the world.”82 American State Department officials also worried that continuing the administration of Okinawa might have a negative impact on the Japanese domestic debate over the U.S.-­Japan Security Treaty, which was subject to termination in 1970. The two states agreed in 1960 to maintain the treaty for ten years, but thereafter either party could terminate it with one year of advance notice. Reischauer became an early advocate of reversion for these reasons, and his successor, U. Alexis Johnson, also tried to convince American military officials that an amicable settlement of the Okinawa problem was key to the survival of the security treaty.83 Another incentive for reversion was that it would strengthen Satō’s conservative government, which supported America’s security policies. Satō was firmly behind the U.S.-­Japan Security Treaty and supported the American war in Vietnam.84 He staked his domestic political reputation on Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, declaring in Okinawa in August 1965 on the twentieth anniversary of the end of World War II: “The postwar era will not end until the return of Okinawa to the homeland is realized.” American officials worried that their

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refusal to return Okinawa would weaken Satō’s government and strengthen leftist opposition parties that also supported reversion but opposed the security treaty and the Vietnam War.85 Moreover, Satō supported the continued American military presence in Okinawa after reversion, unlike the opposition parties. American officials clearly understood they could expect to negotiate more favorable conditions for reversion with Satō than with the opposition parties.86 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara also wanted to use the reversion of Okinawa as a lever to induce Japan to spend more on its own defense and send troops overseas in support of American military actions in Asia. In this regard also it would be easier to negotiate with Satō’s conservative party than the opposition parties.87 Strikes by Okinawan base workers generated yet another incentive for reversion. Base workers organized by the All-­Okinawan Military Workers Union, together with other unionized workers, became leading actors in the reversion movement. Base workers supported reversion because they wanted to enjoy the better labor rights in Japan. Okinawan base workers endured unjustified dismissals, lower wages than American and Japanese workers for the same job, and poor working conditions. The U.S. military also carried out ideological investigations of base workers.88 USCAR’s labor law for base workers permitted the right to unionize but prohibited collective negotiations and base workers’ participation in strikes. It punished workers who participated in strikes with fines, imprisonment, firing, and denial of future employment.89 Nevertheless, the Military Workers Union organized a series of large strikes. Watson believed that the Okinawans “had the power to shut down U.S. Military operations in the Ryukyu Islands by failing to work.”90 Unger worried that base workers’ strikes might get out of hand and compel him to request additional troops to Okinawa to perform the base workers’ tasks.91 The strikes contributed to an American perception that the U.S. military administration in Okinawa was growing untenable. In sum, the United States decided to return Okinawa to Japan in response to the reversion movement that generated important political and military incentives both in Okinawa and Japan. The protests in Okinawa and public opinion in Japan threatened to undermine American military effectiveness in both places if the United States were to continue its administration of Okinawa. Accordingly, with their Joint Communiqué on November 21, 1969, Satō and Richard Nixon announced the reversion of Okinawa would take place in 1972. However, the agreement’s content suggests that it was a compromise, or a limited policy change that aimed simultaneously at maintaining U.S. military

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effectiveness and assuaging protesters. First, as mentioned above, the American military bases would remain in Okinawa despite Okinawan protesters’ preferences. Second, in what is known as the “mainland-­level” (hondonami) reversion, the United States accepted some constraints on the use of bases in Okinawa like in the rest of Japan, but the number and scale of military bases in Okinawa did not decrease to the mainland level. Third, the two governments agreed to a “nuclear-­free” (kakunuki) reversion in which the United States would withdraw its nuclear weapons from Okinawa, but Satō and Nixon concluded a secret agreement that allowed the United States to reintroduce nuclear weapons to Okinawa in emergency situations in the “Far East including Japan.” “The Nuclear-­Free and Mainland-­Level” Reversion as a Compromise Satō originally considered reversion with unrestricted American use of military bases, including storage of nuclear weapons.92 However, his position changed in the late 1960s from a “nuclear-­attached and free-­use” (kakutsuki, kichi jiyū shiyō) reversion to a “nuclear-­free and mainland-­level” reversion. This fundamental change was prompted by protests in Okinawa and Japan. On November 15, 1967, when Satō and President Lyndon B. Johnson announced that the United States and Japan would negotiate Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, they already suggested that the American military bases would remain in Okinawa after reversion. This shocked many in Okinawa, who had demanded a reversion without military bases. Subsequently, Okinawan protesters demanded a “mainland-­level” reversion that would reduce the number and size of military bases in Okinawa to the level in the mainland. They also advocated changing the function of military bases, from what they believed was an offensive role (in the Vietnam War, for example) to a defensive one. Okinawan protesters strengthened their demand for a nuclear-­free reversion after a series of troubling events in Japan and Okinawa. First, in January 1968, the American nuclear-­powered aircraft carrier Enterprise entered Sasebo naval base in Nagasaki, Japan. The Japanese government denied that Enterprise was carrying nuclear weapons, but many people suspected otherwise. They were also aware of the aircraft carrier’s role in the bombing of North Vietnam. Opposition parties, labor unions, students, and the public joined in massive antinuclear and anti-­Vietnam War demonstrations across Japan. Following this episode, support for a “nuclear-­attached” reversion eroded within Satō’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).93 Second, while the Enterprise was still in Sasebo, a nuclear-­armed American B-­52 bomber crashed in Greenland, contaminat-

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ing a wide area with plutonium. This news shocked the people in Okinawa, where the United States stationed B-­52s for deployment to Vietnam. Soon after the Enterprise’s visit to Sasebo, North Korean patrol boats seized an American naval intelligence vessel, the Pueblo. The United States sent the Enterprise to the Sea of Japan and a large number of B-­52s to Okinawa. American air bases in Japan went on the alert and Johnson called up reservists. The Pueblo incident greatly alarmed the public in Japan and Okinawa. Support for nuclear-­free reversion increased even among conservatives. They also supported a mainland-­level reversion, defined as an application of all existent agreements for the American military presence in Japan to Okinawa. One of the most important agreements was on prior consultation. Japanese conservatives believed that the prior consultation mechanism would give Japan some degree of control over American deployment of troops and equipment to Okinawa, and over American military operations from Okinawa. In addition, given Satō’s non-­nuclear principles, “mainland-­level” reversion meant no deployment of nuclear weapons to Okinawa. Furthermore, in May 1968, abnormal levels of radioactivity were allegedly detected in Sasebo harbor during the visit of an American nuclear submarine, the Swordfish. Around the same time, an American F-­4 Phantom interceptor crashed in western Japan, just next to Kyushu University’s nuclear research institute. These events increased public concern and bolstered support for a nuclear-­free, mainland-­level reversion among politicians in Satō’s LDP.94 In Okinawa, a B-­52 crashed in Kadena Air Base in November 1968, and there were leaks of poisonous gas among other accidents and incidents.95 After the B-­52 crash, the Council for Reversion and various other organizations formed a new organization, the Okinawan Citizens’ Coalition to Protect Life (Inochi o Mamoru Kenmin Kyōtō Kaigi), with 140 member organizations. The coalition protested against the B-­52s, stopovers of American nuclear submarines, and nuclear weapons storage in Okinawa. Yara, the leader of the OTA and the Council for Reversion, won in the first public election of the chief executive in December 1968. Progressive political parties also won in the GRI parliamentary election and the mayoral election for Naha. Furthermore, the Citizens’ Coalition planned a general strike for February 4, 1969, the first anniversary of the redeployment of B-­52s to Okinawa. Although Satō was able to avert this general strike by pressuring Yara with economic leverage (the Japanese government was giving more aid to Okinawa than USCAR by then) and with a promise of early reversion, this episode revealed the strength of antinuclear sentiment in Okinawa. About 40,000 people demonstrated even after the cancellation of the general strike. Protest-

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ers gathered again on April 28, 1969, with about 170,000 people in Naha and 100,000 in Tokyo.96 Outraged Okinawans pushed the reversion movement to go beyond merely asking for a “mainland-­level” reversion. Protest organizers and their supporters realized that as long as there were military bases in Okinawa, they would not have the “antiwar and peace reversion” (hansen heiwa fukki) they wanted. In March 1969 the Council for Reversion revised its basic goals of the reversion movement from “opposition to military bases” and “closure of nuclear bases” to “closure of all military bases” and “termination of the U.S.-­Japan security treaty.” The council’s goal reflected the fact that the treaty allowed the United States to maintain military bases in Japan. After Okinawa’s reversion, the security treaty would become the legal basis for a continued American military presence in Okinawa. Therefore, the council’s leaders acknowledged that their struggle against bases must also be a struggle against the security treaty. These events generated political pressure on Satō to abandon his original position that the United States would be able to keep nuclear weapons in Okinawa and use its military bases without any constraint. On January 13, 1969, Satō instructed his ambassador to the United States to negotiate a nuclear-­free reversion. His diary around this time reveals his position as “denuclearized and free use” of bases.97 Satō then moved away from free use of bases. At the end of February 1969, Satō saw the Cabinet Research Office’s public opinion survey, which reported that the largest segment of respondents (45 percent) opposed immediate reversion if Washington did not remove nuclear weapons or if Washington maintained free use of bases.98 Subsequently, on March 10, 1969, Satō publicly announced that the goal of his negotiations with the United States was a nuclear-­free and mainland-­level reversion. A May 1969 opinion poll showed significant public support for this position: 52 percent supported a nuclear-­free, mainland-­level reversion, while 25 percent advocated complete removal of all American military bases from Okinawa, 9 percent supported nuclear-­free reversion with free use of bases, and 3 percent supported “nuclear-­attached” reversion with free use of bases.99 In the end, the United States and Japan agreed to a nuclear-­free and mainland-­level reversion, but the agreement represented a limited policy change in light of the Okinawan demand that military bases be eliminated and the U.S.-­Japan Security Treaty be terminated. The two governments did not consider closure of military bases or the termination of the security treaty during the negotiation process.100 The U.S. military bases would remain in Okinawa under the terms of the U.S.-­Japan Security Treaty, which was a “mainland-­level” application of existing bilateral agreements. Satō declared

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that the treaty played a significant role in maintaining regional security, and that the two states intended “firmly to maintain the Treaty.”101 The two governments did not accept the Okinawan definition of “mainland-­level,” which was to reduce the number and size of bases to the mainland level. In fact, after reversion, the size of American military bases in Okinawa has been reduced by only 19 percent, while those in the mainland have been reduced by 60 percent.102 Moreover, the “mainland-­level” reversion resulted in an increased military presence for the Okinawans, since it led to the deployment of the Japanese Self-­Defense Forces (SDF) to Okinawa. Okinawans subsequently engaged in anti-­SDF protests as well. Next, the two governments agreed that the United States would withdraw its nuclear weapons from Okinawa before reversion although the United States would be able to reintroduce them in emergency situations.103 Satō and Nixon established that this secret agreement about reintroducing nuclear weapons to Okinawa would be binding on subsequent administrations. The agreement satisfied the American interest in maintaining its military effectiveness in emergency situations, but it went contrary to Okinawan protesters’ preferences that no nuclear weapons would be in Okinawa after reversion. The secret agreement also violated one of Satō’s non-­nuclear principles, that Japan would not allow the introduction of nuclear weapons into its territory. Although Satō initially tried to avoid a secret agreement, he came to think that it was a necessary part of reversion. Satō believed that maintaining American military effectiveness was also in Japan’s interest, given the U.S.-­ Japan Security Treaty and the fact that Japan was under the American “nuclear umbrella.”104 Since the “nuclear-­free and mainland-­level” reversion did not live up to Okinawan protesters’ expectations, they continued their protests. They repeatedly demonstrated and carried out strikes until reversion, and held a large protest on the day of reversion. In sum, Japan and the United States agreed to the nuclear-­free and mainland-­level reversion as a compromise solution in response to protests. Protesters’ normative arguments for reversion without U.S. military bases did not persuade American policy-­makers, but American officials agreed to reversion when protests in Okinawa and Japan created important political and military incentives for it. Yet the U.S. and Japanese governments’ ultimate objective to maintain American military effectiveness led to a limited change in policy. The U.S. military bases remained in Okinawa, and the United States secured the right to reintroduce nuclear weapons in emergency situations.

2

Response to Protests in Okinawa, 1995–­1996 and 2009–­2010

State response to large protests in 1995–­1996, the first case in this chapter, shows that protesters’ arguments are unable to persuade policy-­makers when policy-­makers have knowledge and beliefs that contradict protestors’ arguments, and when policy-­makers do not think protest leaders and organizations are credible. The second case, from 2009–­2010, however, shows that persuasion is possible when protesters’ arguments fit policy-­makers’ knowledge and beliefs, and when policy-­makers find protesters credible. In the first case, the rape of a twelve-­year-­old girl by three American military personnel in 1995 triggered large protests demanding a reduction in number and size of U.S. military bases in Okinawa and a revision of the SOFA to enable Japanese authorities to take custody of American military suspects before indictment. Protesters made these demands by arguing that existing policies violated Japanese sovereignty, women’s rights, and the people’s constitutional right to live in peace (heiwa teki seizonken). In addition, there was an on-­going legal procedure to extend some leases of land for U.S. military use without the consent of antiwar landowners, and these landowners joined the protests, arguing that the land expropriation violated their right of private ownership. The protesters’ arguments did not persuade Japanese or American policy-­makers, but they did generate significant incentives for policy change in the context in which the two states tried to strengthen their alliance. Japan and the United States agreed to close Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and improve implementation of the SOFA. However, these were limited changes

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because the Futenma closure required a replacement facility within Okinawa and the two states did not revise the SOFA text itself. The second case examines how Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio became persuaded that Futenma should be relocated outside of Okinawa. Protesters opposed Futenma’s relocation to Henoko in northeastern Okinawa with antiwar, antimilitarism, and environmental arguments. They also argued that Okinawa, which already shouldered a disproportionate number of U.S. military bases in comparison with other prefectures, should not have to accept a new base. These arguments from protesters as well as arguments from national and local politicians regarding Okinawan economic development and U.S. military posture realignment persuaded Hatoyama that Futenma’s replacement facility should go to another prefecture or abroad. However, strong opposition from Japanese bureaucrats, the United States, and candidate communities for relocation in other prefectures blocked Hatoyama’s attempt to relocate Futenma outside of Okinawa. This case shows how persuasion of a key policy-­maker can fail to influence base policy.

Compromise Solutions to Save the Alliance, 1995–­1996 On September 4, 1995, three marines abducted and raped a twelve-­year-­old girl in Okinawa. Soon after the local media reported the crime, a large number of people took to the streets to protest. On October 21, approximately 85,000 people participated in the Okinawa Prefectural Citizens’ Rally, making it the largest demonstration in Okinawa since reversion.1 At the rally, protesters made four demands: 1) an expeditious revision of the SOFA; 2) a reduction in the number and size of U.S. military bases in Okinawa; 3) eradication of crimes by U.S. military personnel and the strict enforcement of discipline; and 4) apologies and payment of compensation to victims of crimes committed by U.S. military personnel. Okinawans made these demands through protests because they remained outside of the policy-­making process regarding U.S. military bases. The U.S. Departments of State and Defense, and Japanese Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, together with the president of the United States and the prime minister of Japan are key decision-­makers on policy regarding U.S. military bases in Japan. Although Okinawa’s governors were able to communicate local preferences to Japanese policy-­makers, a revision of the SOFA and a bold reduction of U.S. bases that the prefectural government had requested remained unfulfilled. Many Okinawans were frustrated that base policy did not reflect their preferences.

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At the Prefectural Citizens’ Rally, protest organizers argued that existing base policy violated Japanese sovereignty, human rights of women, and constitutional rights to private property and to live in peace. These normative arguments failed to persuade Japanese or American policy-­makers to change base policy because the arguments did not fit policy-­makers’ beliefs, and policy-­ makers did not find leading protest organizations credible. However, the protests occurred while Japan and the United States engaged in efforts to redefine and strengthen their security alliance for the post–­Cold War era. Faced with the protests, policy-­makers in both states worried that Japanese public support for the security alliance was at risk, precisely when they needed that support to strengthen the alliance. The protests generated incentives for change by fostering the perception among policy-­makers that the alliance was in crisis. In November 1995 the United States and Japan established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and offered compromise solutions to respond to the public’s grievances. The two governments agreed to return some base land, most importantly the Futenma Air Station, after relocation of its facilities and functions mostly within Okinawa. The Okinawan public welcomed the announcement regarding the return of the land, but strongly opposed the requirement to relocate facilities within the prefecture. Tokyo and Washington also decided to improve some SOFA procedures. Their plan included improvements on various issues such as accident notification to local communities and supplemental automobile insurance for U.S. military personnel, but the most important was the agreement that the United States would consider transferring American military suspects of heinous crimes (rape and murder) to Japanese authorities before indictment. However, this was an agreement to improve the implementation of the existing SOFA and not a revision of its text as the Okinawan protesters demanded. Consistent with the expected outcome when states compromise, in which states try to address some of the local grievances while ensuring U.S. military effectiveness, the SACO Final Report says: “The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of US forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of US forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements.”2 Normative Arguments in Protests There were several arguments that successfully mobilized large protests in Okinawa. First, women’s organizations referred to “human rights of women” in demanding change in base policy. The rape occurred during the Fourth

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World Conference on Women in Beijing, in which Okinawan representatives examined various women’s issues from the human rights perspective. The Okinawan representatives learned about the rape upon their return to Okinawa, and together with the League of Okinawan Women’s Groups organized a press conference denouncing the rape on September 11. The women’s organizations were the first of Okinawan antibase organizations to take public action on the rape, triggering the subsequent protest activities. Takazato Suzuyo, the leader of the Beijing delegation and a group, Okinawan Women Act against Military Violence, said at the press conference: “The question of the bases has been approached from peace, land, and the environment. But has it ever been approached from the human rights of women? . . . The rape of this young schoolgirl is a violation of the human rights of all the women of Okinawa.”3 She then issued a statement in which she and other organizers of the press conference demanded that the U.S. military in Okinawa establish a prevention program to address crimes against women, the three rape suspects be turned over to Japanese authorities for prosecution, and the U.S. military withdraw from Okinawa.4 Takazato also argued in a book she published the following year that militaries train people to become violent, and that military prostitution and other types of sexual violence would continue as long as bases remained.5 Second, protesters in Okinawa argued that the SOFA curtailed Japanese sovereignty, and that the two governments must revise it. According to SOFA’s Article 17, Section 5c, Japanese authorities could not take custody of American military suspects before an indictment, and in 1995, the U.S. military resorted to this provision in refusing to transfer the rape suspects to Japanese authorities. Protesters saw this as the curtailment of the Japanese power to investigate, and demanded a SOFA revision that would enable American military suspects’ transfer before indictment. Both progressive and conservative political parties in Okinawa agreed on the necessity of such a revision.6 The Okinawan demand for an earlier transfer was also because of a widely shared concern that American suspects could escape to the United States to avoid investigation and trial. In July 1993, a U.S. serviceman fled to the United States after assaulting a woman and being confined to a military base. In 1992, two servicemen suspected of robbery also escaped from their military base. In both instances, the United States allowed the suspects to move freely inside their base while prohibiting them from leaving the base.7 These and similar cases in the past made the Okinawan public skeptical of the U.S. military’s willingness and ability to hold crime suspects in Okinawa.

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As voices of protest increased in Okinawa, many started to advocate an extensive revision of the SOFA, instead of a limited revision of Article 17. In a survey published in a local newspaper, Ryūkyū Shimpō, on October 7, 1995, 80.5 percent of the respondents supported a SOFA revision.8 The Okinawa Prefectural Assembly and local councils issued resolutions in protest of the existing SOFA. One of the main demands of the Okinawa Prefectural Citizens’ Rally on October 21 was a revision of the SOFA. In response, on November 4, Okinawa governor Ōta Masahide presented Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi with a list of requests regarding the revision of the SOFA. The prefecture asked that statements be included in the SOFA to the effect that: the Japanese government would collect opinions from local governments and request a return of military facilities and training areas from the United States when these areas had a negative impact on local communities’ economic development, among other concerns (this request was in regard to Article 2); Japanese environmental laws would be applied to activities in U.S. military bases and surrounding areas, and the U.S. forces would promptly allow local governments to enter military bases when they wished to do so (Article 3); U.S. forces would not be allowed to use civilian airports except in emergencies nor move through civilian areas (Article 5); vehicles privately owned by U.S. military personnel would be taxed at the same rate as Okinawan residents (Article 13); Japanese authorities would detain U.S. military and civilian personnel who become criminal suspects, in all cases where Japan would exercise jurisdiction (Article 17); and the Japanese government would ensure that Okinawans received compensation when they become victims of accidents and incidents caused by U.S. military personnel, civilian personnel, and their family members, regardless of whether the personnel were on or off duty at the time (Article 18). Okinawa prefecture also asked that Tokyo and Washington negotiate a transfer of air traffic control at Naha Airport from the United States to Japan (Article 6).9 In addition, Okinawan protesters argued that the United States should consolidate and reduce the number and size of its bases in Okinawa because various base-­related problems violated the Okinawans’ “right to live in peace,” a right specified in the preamble of the Japanese constitution. This argument reflected many Okinawans’ belief that a reduction in the number and size of bases would help decrease base-­related problems. For example, protesters complained about accidents during military exercises that could threaten public safety. Okinawan residents worried about crashes of military aircraft and parts falling off of aircraft, which sometimes occurred outside of bases, as well as materials being dropped onto civilian areas by mistake during drop exer-

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cises. Okinawan residents were also critical of the environmental problems the American military presence caused, including noise pollution and oil and chemical leaks that allegedly polluted rivers, the ocean, and the soil. The protests that followed the rape also highlighted the problem of crimes committed by American military personnel. According to the Okinawa Prefecture’s Military Base Affairs Office, American military personnel, American civilians working for the U.S. military in Okinawa, and their family members committed 435 crimes between 1990 and 1995, of which 51 were “most heinous crimes” including murder, robbery, arson, and rape.10 One of the Okinawan demands at the Citizens’ Rally was thus “an eradication of crimes by U.S. military personnel.” Landowners whose land was in “mandatory use” (kyōsei shiyō) without their consent also demanded a reduction in the number and size of bases. They had refused to lease their land to the Japanese government for American military use due to their antiwar beliefs. They also argued that the expropriation of their land violated their constitutional right of private ownership. There are two types of “non-­contract” landowners in Okinawa. First, there are “antiwar landowners,” many of whom inherited the land that the American military had expropriated for its use during the occupation period.11 They are members of the Antiwar Landowners’ Organization that was established in 1971 with financial support from the Council for Reversion. The second group of landowners that protested in 1995 consisted of “one-­tsubo antiwar landowners,” who purchased small plots of land (one tsubo or 3.3 square meters) from antiwar landowners in order to support them by increasing the number of non-­contract landowners. The One-­Tsubo Antiwar Landowners’ Organization was established in 1982. Currently there are about a hundred antiwar landowners and 2,900 one-­tsubo antiwar landowners, out of about 30,000 base landowners.12 Although non-­contract landowners are a small minority compared to those who agree to lease their land to the Japanese state, they have continued their protest by refusing to cooperate with the expropriation procedures and by bringing multiple lawsuits against the state. In 1995, they joined the protest against base policy with their antiwar and constitutional arguments. Okinawans tried to persuade policy-­makers and simultaneously put pressure on them to change policy in two ways. First they organized a series of large protests. Various organizations held many protest rallies and street demonstrations, and issued protest statements with normative arguments. Their representatives visited Japanese and American officials to deliver statements denouncing the rape and demanding a revision of the SOFA. Eighteen Oki-

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nawan groups organized the massive Okinawa Prefectural Citizens’ Rally in October with support from some three hundred groups.13 The rally brought together politically conservative and progressive organizations, in a rare show of unity. Citizens’ groups continued their protest activities after the rally. Second, Governor Ōta refused to comply with Tokyo’s order to extend some base land leases without the landowners’ consent, and the Okinawan public supported him. This episode concerned a legal procedure for expropriation of base land under the Special Measures Law for Land Used by the American Forces. This procedure allows the Japanese government to secure base land for U.S. military use even when landowners refuse to lease their land. Under the procedure, when landowners refuse to lease their land, municipal leaders can sign necessary documents as proxies to move the procedure forward. If municipal leaders refuse, the governor can sign. In 1995, the mayors of Naha City, Okinawa City, and Yomitan Village refused to sign as proxies. Ōta declared his refusal to sign on September 28, 1995. In his statement, Ōta gave two main reasons for his refusal. First, he talked about the various base problems in Okinawa (heavy concentration of military bases, noise pollution, environmental problems, crimes including the rape earlier in the month, obstruction of economic development), and criticized the U.S. and Japanese governments for not making enough progress on base reduction and improvement of the problems associated with bases. Second, Ōta expressed concern about reaffirmation of the U.S.-­Japan security relationship and the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-­Pacific Region published in February 1995, which announced the continued deployment of about 100,000 troops in the region. Ōta feared that this deployment would perpetuate the American military presence in Okinawa.14 The Okinawan public strongly supported Ōta’s decision not to sign as a proxy. According to the Ryūkyū Shimpō’s survey on October 7, 1995, 74.5 percent of the respondents supported Ōta’s refusal to sign.15 Pressure on Japanese and American policy-­makers to change policy came from mainland Japan as well. The mainland media reported extensively on the Okinawan protests. Some civil society groups there mobilized to protest the rape and demand a SOFA revision.16 In addition, on October 13, an organization of Japanese governors whose prefectures host military bases passed a joint resolution to call for steps to prevent recurrence of rape and for a revision of SOFA’s Article 17.17 Moreover, polls showed that Japanese public support for the U.S.-­Japan alliance had fallen dramatically. According to Yomiuri Shimbun and the U.S. Gallup’s joint survey between October and November 1995, the number of Japanese citing “good” bilateral relations fell to just over 20 percent, the low-

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est figure since the survey started in 1978. Although 60 percent of the respondents said that the bilateral security treaty was “beneficial,” that figure was 14 points lower than in 1988 and 5 points lower than in 1994.18 A nationwide opinion poll in October 1995 also found that 76 percent of the respondents favored a “gradual reduction of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa.”19 Failure of Persuasion The normative arguments for a SOFA revision and a reduction of military bases failed to persuade Japanese or American policy-­makers. Policy-­makers did not accept the sovereignty argument for a SOFA revision nor the constitutional argument regarding the “right to live in peace” for a reduction of U.S. military bases. I detail policy-­makers’ reactions to these arguments in the next section together with their policy responses. As for “women’s human rights,” American officials had already issued statements that U.S. military personnel who attack local women would be punished. Ambassador Walter Mondale in Tokyo, Secretary of Defense William Perry, and President Bill Clinton were quick to denounce the rape in September and offered public apologies. Perry ordered a stand-­down (i.e., no training or exercises) of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) in Okinawa for a day of reflection.20 The U.S. military in Okinawa also put into place some temporary measures such as prohibiting the sale of alcohol on base after 9 p.m. and prohibiting access to a shopping and entertainment district in Okinawa City between midnight and 6 a.m.21 In addition, Perry promptly removed the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Admiral Richard C. Macke, after he said “if they [the rape suspects] had the money to rent a car [used in the abduction of the girl], why didn’t they just go out and buy themselves a woman?”22 However, American policy-­makers rejected the argument by Okinawan women’s organizations that the U.S. military trains its personnel to be violent and this makes them more likely to commit violent crimes in host communities. For example, a U.S. military public affairs officer in Okinawa stressed that the total number of crimes committed by American military personnel, American civilians working for the U.S. military in Okinawa, and their family members comprised only a small percentage of all crimes in Okinawa between 1990 and 1995 but protest organizations politicized the crimes.23 According to the Okinawa prefectural government, American military and civilian personnel and their dependents committed about 1 percent of all crimes (excluding traffic violations) that led to arrest in Okinawa during this period.24 It is important to note that the relatively small percentage of crimes by Americans does not justify

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the crimes, not all crimes lead to an arrest, and approximately 51,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel and their dependents were being measured against Okinawa’s population of about 1,400,000. In addition, politicization of American crimes is inevitable because the U.S. military presence in Okinawa itself is an important issue of political debate. Okinawan protests against American crimes make sense when considered from the perspective of human security: those who are supposed to provide security should not create local insecurity by committing crimes. Nonetheless, the women’s organizations’ argument that the U.S. military should withdraw to eliminate crimes was met with American policy-­makers’ claim that the number of crimes committed by U.S. military personnel is insignificant relative to all crimes in Okinawa, and with the policy-­ makers’ interest in keeping bases in Okinawa. As for property rights, Japanese policy-­makers rejected protesters’ arguments and instead prioritized the stable provision of base land to the U.S. military. After Ōta refused to participate in the procedure to expropriate some land, Murayama sued him on December 7, 1995, for failing to carry out his “delegated functions.” This was the first time the state sued a governor over compulsory base land use. Murayama’s successor, Hashimoto Ryūtarō, sued Ōta again on July 12, 1996, for his refusal to cooperate with the expropriation of some other land. In his statements at the Fukuoka High Court and the Supreme Court, Ōta stressed landowners’ property rights, citizens’ right to live in peace, and the prefecture’s right to autonomy. Pointing to the concentration of bases and troops in Okinawa, he also talked about the principle of equality under the law. Ōta’s refusal to sign as proxy in 1995 caused great embarrassment to Tokyo, as thirty-­five leases expired on March 31, 1996, and the U.S. military occupied the land illegally for over a year.25 The Supreme Court ruled against Ōta on August 28, 1996, and he cooperated with the land expropriation procedure on September 13.26 Other evidence showing that Japanese policy-­makers prioritized stable provision of base land to the United States over property rights of antibase landowners is the Japanese government’s amendment of the “Special Measures Law for Land Use by American Forces” on April 17, 1997. The amendment, which aimed to prevent embarrassing resistance by governors in the future, permitted the continued use of bases during renewal procedures following the expiration of leases. Furthermore, in another law that was passed in 1999 and came into effect in April 2000, the central government took back the power to administer expropriation procedures from local governments. This went against the general trend in Japan of delegating an increasing number of functions to local governments.

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Some American policy-­makers claimed that “anti-­American” and “antimilitary” groups were behind the protests, insisting that these groups were only using the rape to manipulate public opinion to serve their policy preference of eliminating military bases. According to Ezra Vogel and Paul Giarra, who served respectively as a senior analyst in the National Intelligence Council and the Pentagon’s senior country director for Japan, “Okinawa’s antimilitary and anti-­American groups sought to capitalize on the prolonged press attention given to the [rape] case and to the future of the overall security relationship.”27 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye said in his prepared statement for a subcommittee hearing in the House of Representatives, “The [rape] incident has . . . brought some long standing bilateral issues to the attention of the Japanese media. Certain elements within the Japanese polity are taking advantage of the situation to protest our presence, and in particular our bases in Okinawa.”28 In fact, when Perry ordered the stand-­down of the III MEF in Okinawa for a day of reflection, some sections resisted cooperating because of “a fear that they would be manipulated by political forces that were hostile to the alliance.”29 These accounts suggest that some American policy-­makers did not think leading protest organizations were credible, a perception that is likely to have contributed to their rejection of the protesters’ arguments against base policy. Although normative persuasion proved ineffective, widespread protest mobilization in Okinawa and the deterioration of public support for the alliance in the mainland generated significant incentives for policy change among policy-­makers in Japan and the United States. Policy-­makers became highly concerned about the declining public support for the security alliance just when they needed it to strengthen the alliance. The following sections describe the efforts to strengthen the alliance, and how Japanese and American policy-­makers responded to protests in this context. Their response—­a limited policy change—­was a compromise solution in which policy-­makers aimed to address protesters’ demands while maintaining military effectiveness. Strengthening the Alliance for the Post–­Cold War Era When the Cold War ended, policy-­makers in the United States and Japan did not have a clear idea about how to refashion the alliance. With the Soviet threat gone, the United States laid out a new approach, the East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI), in 1990, which aimed to reduce the U.S. forces in the region during the following decade. EASI generated some concern in Japan and other Asian states about the extent of the American security commitment. In addition, the focus of the U.S.-­Japan relationship shifted from security to

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outstanding trade issues, and trade negotiations created tension in the relationship. These factors contributed to the content of the Higuchi Report in Japan in 1994 (a report by the Higuchi Commission, which advised on the preparation of the National Defense Program Outline that would establish Japanese defense priorities for the next twenty years), which recommended that Japan prepare for more independent actions while depending on the United Nations and other multilateral institutions for security. It supported cooperation with the United States, but for the more important goal of making multilateral action more effective.30 Two events in the early 1990s revealed some of the limits and problems of the U.S.-­Japan security alliance, compelling some policy-­makers to refocus on the alliance. First, as the United States led a coalition of states in the Gulf War to evict Iraq from Kuwait, Japan was unable to send its SDF due to constitutional restraints that limited the SDF to defending Japan. After the war the Japanese government sent some SDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, but American policy-­makers perceived this as “too little, too late.”31 The Gulf War pushed Japanese and American policy-­makers to think about Japan’s contribution to international war efforts, especially those that might occur in Asia. Second, the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–­1994 made clear that contingency planning between Japan and the United States was an urgent task. In a conflict with North Korea, Japan would become important for American logistics and operations. However, no bilateral plan for the conflict existed, even for the defense of Japan.32 The Japanese Maritime SDF was unable to promise cooperation even on maritime interdiction operations that would help enforce economic sanctions against North Korea.33 According to Vogel and Giarra, the alliance was “totally unprepared for effective U.S.-­Japan action against North Korea,” and there were unrealistic planning presumptions in Japan “that all combat would occur on the Korean Peninsula, and all logistical support would be provided by American units stationed in Korea and operating elsewhere in the region.” American and Japanese policy-­makers worried that Japan’s failure to support American operations in a war on the Korean Peninsula would most likely lead to the end of the alliance.34 Nye took charge of an initiative to express a renewed American commitment to East Asia and redefine the U.S.-­Japan security alliance for the post–­Cold War era. On February 27, 1995, the U.S. Department of Defense published the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-­Pacific Region, or the “Nye Report.”35 This report outlined a four-­part strategy: 1) maintain the forward deployment of approximately 100,000 American troops in the region; 2) develop multilateral institutions as a reinforcing

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mechanism; 3) redefine alliances, especially the U.S.-­Japan security alliance, for the post–­Cold War era; and 4) encourage China to define its interests in ways that could be compatible with the interests of the United States and its allies.36 A significant part of the so-­called Nye initiative was to strengthen the U.S.-­Japan security alliance by making explicit how the two states would cooperate in dealing with regional emergencies. This required some expansion of Japan’s role, especially in providing logistics and other rear-­support in a conflict. American and Japanese policy-­makers started to engage in discussions on these issues. The Nye initiative met strong resistance in Okinawa. The Okinawan public became greatly concerned that the strategy to maintain the forward deployment of 100,000 American troops in the region would perpetuate the American presence. The rape in Okinawa in September 1995 occurred in this context. Compromise Solutions Vogel and Giarra write that the rape was a “political bombshell that shocked both sides of the Pacific.”37 The subsequent protests, which occurred while Tokyo and Washington were trying to strengthen their alliance, generated important incentives for Japanese and American policy-­makers to address protesters’ demands. A senior official at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) later said that he was “made painfully aware of just how fragile the level of support for the security relationship was in Japan, just like a piece of chipboard, despite all the pro-­alliance avowals.”38 Another senior official at the MOFA, shocked by the turn of events, said that the government had “completely misread the domestic condition” by focusing on strengthening the alliance and neglecting the Okinawan base problems.39 According to Vogel and Giarra, the rape “galvanized the attention of U.S. officials, especially those senior members less directly involved but ultimately responsible for substantive progress and for the eventual outcome of the Nye initiative.”40 Kurt Campbell, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia and the Pacific, coordinated with Perry, Nye, Mondale, and Rust Deming (deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo) to launch negotiations on an operational improvement of the SOFA’s Article 17 that would permit the pre-­indictment transfer of American military suspects “in specific cases of heinous crimes of murder or rape” to Japanese custody. Although American policy-­makers had to overcome the U.S. military services’ resistance to this step, Japan and the United States agreed to it on October 25, 1995.41 This was an agreement to improve the implementation of the existing SOFA and not a revision of its text as the Okinawan protesters demanded.

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Mondale, for example, did not agree with the protesters’ argument that a SOFA revision was necessary to protect Japanese sovereignty: “I understand well the feeling of the Okinawan people, but I can’t agree to what’s being said.”42 Foreign Minister Kōno Yōhei thought “all this talk about revising SOFA is going too far,” claiming that the investigation of the rape was proceeding unhindered.43 He also feared that a SOFA revision might create domestic pressure to revise the security treaty itself.44 Nevertheless, the agreement moved away from a decision that the MOFA and the U.S. embassy made immediately after the rape, that there was no need for a SOFA review.45 The Okinawan press castigated this initial decision, with headlines such as “Foreign Ministry Turns Its Back on Public Opinion,” “Just Like an Outpost of the U.S. Government,” and “Anger Voiced against the Cowardly Government.”46 Policy-­makers had to respond to the Okinawan uproar with a compromise solution, which was the implementation agreement. Kōno reasoned: “It would take at least one or two years to revise SOFA.What’s important is resolving this case to Okinawa’s satisfaction as quickly as possible.”47 Japanese policy-­makers feared that a full revision of the SOFA would “end in chaos,” as each government had parts it wished to change, which the other government would resist.48 Nye declared that “we will not touch one letter of the text. We will deal with it as a question of Article 17 interpretation and implementation.”49 Vogel and Giarra argue that the implementation agreement was helpful in “effectively forestalling the need for structural changes and major revisions to the SOFA.”50 This was supposed to be a compromise solution, or an attempt to respond to Okinawans’ grievances over criminal custody while ensuring alliance stability and military effectiveness. In light of the deep popular discontent, policy-­makers realized that they had to do more than improve the implementation of the SOFA’s Article 17. In November 1995—­following the Citizens’ Rally on October 21—­the two governments announced the establishment of the SACO to “realign, consolidate, and reduce” U.S. facilities. This was an unprecedented measure. Moriya Takemasa, then the deputy director of the Defense Bureau at the Japan Defense Agency, later admitted that Japan had never asked the United States to consolidate and reduce its military bases to lighten the Okinawan burden.51 According to an American participant in the SACO negotiations, U.S. and Japanese officials thought that they needed to do “something big”: a policy agreement that would capture the attention of Okinawa and the rest of Japan, and show that they were doing something about the base problems.52 The return of the Futenma Air Station within five to seven years became that “something big,” negotiated and agreed upon at the top echelons of the two states.

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Futenma Air Station occupies about 4.8 million square meters of land, in the middle of a crowded residential area of Ginowan City where about 84,000 people live. Local residents complained about noise pollution from aircraft take-­off and landing exercises, and feared plane crashes and emergency landings that could happen outside of the base. Japanese and American policy-­makers acknowledged that Futenma was a burden on the local residents.53 They aimed to reduce the U.S. military footprint in densely populated central and southern Okinawa by relocating Futenma and other facilities, functions, and troops to new facilities in less populated locations in the prefecture. This was viewed as a compromise solution because base closure was coupled with relocation within the prefecture. Protesters argued that the various base-­related problems violated their constitutional right to live in peace, but there is no evidence to suggest that this argument persuaded policy-­makers to change policy. Yet in response to protests, SACO offered adjustments to some training and operational procedures as a compromise solution. The U.S. military would relocate artillery live-­fire training over Highway 104 to mainland Japan, and relocate parachute drop training to Iejima, a small island adjacent to Okinawa Island. The U.S. military agreed to limit night-­flight training at Futenma Air Station. The two governments also agreed to implement noise reduction initiatives around two of the largest air bases in Okinawa. Okinawan protesters for the most part welcomed the relocation of the artillery training to mainland Japan, but night-­flights still continue in Futenma and recent tests have revealed that noise pollution still continues at high levels around major airbases in Okinawa.54 Japanese and American policy-­makers sought to save the security alliance with compromise solutions rather than implementing norm-­driven base policy. According to Funabashi Yoichi, a journalist who interviewed many of the policy-­makers involved in the SACO process, Perry thought that “we have to do something about the onerous burden on Okinawa. If we don’t, the bilateral security framework itself will come tumbling down.”55 American policy-­makers also worried about basing rights in Japan that the security treaty permitted. The United States General Accounting Office’s report on the SACO process pointed out that “according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the continued ability of the United States to remain in Japan was at risk due to the outcry over the rape incident, and the United States and Japan had to do something to reduce the impact of the presence on Okinawans.”56 On the Japanese side, Hashimoto was also concerned about the impact of Okinawans’ outrage on the security alliance: “If we don’t approach this seriously, the whole security system will go awry. There’ll be no point to a security alliance if all of Okinawa goes up in flames.”57

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In fact, Campbell later told Funabashi that the most important considerations in returning Futenma were “making the first move to keep the alliance” instead of waiting for the deepening public opposition to topple the alliance, and “insuring against criticism” to show that Pentagon leaders made their utmost effort, in case a grave incident should occur over Futenma in the future.58 In addition, according to an anonymous official, U.S. Department of Defense officials prioritized calming antibase sentiment in the Japanese mainland rather than in Okinawa, in order to save the alliance.59 These comments suggest that Okinawan protesters’ normative arguments only had an indirect effect on policy-­makers’ decisions. Normative arguments mobilized a large number of protesters and contributed to the deterioration of public opinion in Japan on base policy and the alliance. Japanese and American policy-­makers responded with compromise solutions to save the alliance. The compromise solutions were intended to serve the two states’ interest by strengthening the alliance. According to Vogel and Giarra, the United States hoped that Japan “would take some responsibility for external security and provide tangible rear-­area support to U.S. forces and operations; would directly acknowledge the importance of Korean stability to Japanese security; would renew the agreement to continue Host Nation Support payments of 5 billion dollars a year; would ease restrictions on the exchange of defense goods and services; and would agree to a review of the Defense Guidelines.”60 The SACO agreement on base reduction made it easier for Japan to agree on these issues. Accordingly, on April 15, 1996, the day the two states released the SACO Interim Report, the United States and Japan signed the Acquisition and Cross-­ Servicing Agreement. The two states reaffirmed their security alliance two days later with the U.S.-­Japan Joint Declaration on Security. They also announced new Guidelines for Japan-­U.S. Defense Cooperation on September 23, 1997. In sum, the normative arguments played an important part in mobilizing the protesters but Japanese and American policy-­makers’ focus was not on creating a norm-­driven policy. They changed aspects of base policy to address some of the Okinawan grievances so that they could calm public opinion and continue their work of strengthening the security alliance. The two states’ focus on maintaining American military effectiveness led to a limited policy change. The return of military facilities in Okinawa was on condition that there would be relocation mainly in the prefecture. In addition, the two government’s implementation agreement on Article 17 of the SOFA did not fulfill protesters’ demand that the states carry out a more extensive revision. Policy-makers perceived that the protests in Okinawa presented an opportunity to further strengthen the alliance. Vogel and Giarra conclude

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that the international crises of the early to mid-­1990s and the rape “contributed to [policy-­makers’] readiness to resolve outstanding issues and to reach an agreement that would put the relationship on a firm footing for the future. . . . These negotiations succeeded, in the final analysis, because each side was prepared to exploit the opportunities it was dealt by domestic politics, bureaucratic leadership, external events, and ideas whose time had come.” 61 Michael Green, a researcher at the Institute for Defense Analysis and a consultant for the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the time, agrees: “Alliance managers have for decades pieced together an increasingly active security partnership by using the tools at hand and by turning potential crises into opportunities for expanded defense cooperation.”62 Green argued that the bilateral effort to strengthen the security alliance before the rape was important in turning the crisis into an opportunity.63 While some of SACO’s plans have been implemented, others have not.The most significant agreement of SACO, the closure of the Futenma Air Station, remains unfulfilled. Tokyo and Washington’s decision to announce the closure of Futenma without a plan supported by Okinawa complicated this effort. Many in Okinawa continue to oppose the relocation of Futenma within the prefecture.

When Persuasion Does Not Change Policy, 2009–­2010 Protesters’ normative arguments on base policy rarely persuade policy-­ makers. But when persuasion occurs, norms shape policy-­makers’ policy preferences and policy-­makers seek to implement a norm-­based policy. Persuaded policy-­makers are able to change base policy when they have the power and authority to do so. Domestic institutions such as laws and informal rules that allocate power and authority are important. Persuaded policy-­ makers are able to influence policy only within permissive institutional settings. Base policy does not change when more powerful actors overrule persuaded policy-­makers. In addition, when persuaded policy-­makers are from a host state, they are less likely to change base policy when the United States opposes the change. This section discusses a case in which arguments from protesters, local and national politicians, and experts on base policy persuaded a Japanese prime minister, but he failed to change policy due to opposition by powerful bureaucrats and the United States. In an interview with me, Hatoyama Yukio described how three sets of actors with various arguments persuaded him that

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Futenma Air Station should not be relocated to Henoko in northern Okinawa as Tokyo and Washington had agreed upon, but to another prefecture or abroad.64 The first set of actors that influenced Hatoyama’s thinking consisted of politicians in his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) who drafted “Okinawa Vision,” a report on the party’s policy regarding Okinawa. This document, which first appeared in 2002, argued that a significant reduction in the number and size of U.S. military bases in the prefecture would facilitate Okinawa’s economic development. A revised Vision in 2005 recommended relocation of Futenma’s functions to another prefecture or abroad. The economic argument for Futenma’s relocation out of the prefecture influenced Hatoyama’s thinking. Second, Iha Yōichi, mayor of Ginowan City, where Futenma Air Base is located, among other experts on base policies, guided Hatoyama’s thinking about Futenma’s relocation. Iha and his staff examined a series of U.S. documents regarding its global posture realignment and concluded that the United States was planning to move most of the Marines from Okinawa to Guam. Iha argued that Futenma’s replacement facility in Henoko was not necessary. Last but not least, protesters offered normative arguments against Futenma’s relocation within Okinawa, and Hatoyama found them persuasive. Protesters highlighted antiwar and antimilitarism norms, potential environmental damage in Henoko, and the unfair, heavy burden that Okinawa already shouldered in maintaining the Japan-­U.S. security alliance. The combination of the different arguments—­economic, normative, and one regarding U.S. realignment—­ persuaded Hatoyama that Futenma should not be relocated within Okinawa. In general, persuasion is more likely when arguments do not contradict policy-­makers prior knowledge and beliefs, and when policy-­makers’ consider the arguments’ source credible. The arguments for Futenma’s closure without relocation within Okinawa were persuasive given Hatoyama’s belief that the Japan-­U.S. alliance should evolve toward one without U.S. military deployment to Japan in peacetime. Hatoyama also believed that the people who argued for Futenma’s closure without relocation within Okinawa were credible. Hatoyama became persuaded that Futenma’s replacement facility should be located abroad, or in another prefecture if it needed to be in Japan.65 He thus announced in 2009 as he campaigned for the House of Representatives election that if his party won the election and he became prime minister, he would seek to relocate Futenma “out of Japan if possible, but out of Okinawa at the very least.”66 However, he could not achieve this because he met strong opposition from Japanese bureaucrats and the U.S. government. In addition, communities in

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other prefectures that Hatoyama’s government considered as possible relocation sites vehemently opposed the move. Furthermore, Hatoyama had no plan of action, failed to exercise effective leadership, and made strategic mistakes throughout the process.67 As a result, persuasion of a key policy-­maker did not lead to a change in base policy. Despite a series of protests in Okinawa that pressed him to do what he had promised, Hatoyama announced on May 23, 2010, that he would accept the existing bilateral agreement to construct a replacement facility in Henoko. Tokyo and Washington offered symbolic concessions by stating that they would consider moving some military activities including training out of Okinawa (without specifying the activities or the duration of the move, and to communities that were highly unlikely to accept the move), and that they would consider concluding an environmental agreement unrelated to the Henoko plan. Protest Mobilization and Normative Arguments Against Relocation to Henoko In June 1996 Camp Schwab in Nago City surfaced as a possible site for the relocation of Futenma Air Station. Tokyo and Washington considered building a temporary, sea-­based heliport off the coast of Camp Schwab, facing the hamlet of Henoko. This received support from some local officials and residents who expected economic assistance from Tokyo. However, the Nago City Council passed a resolution against relocation to Camp Schwab on June 28. Henoko residents who opposed the plan formed the Henoko Life Protection Society in January 1997. In addition, four labor unions in Nago and the Okinawa Peace Center, a coalition of Okinawan labor unions, formed the Five Party Coalition in February. Nago citizens formed several other groups to oppose the heliport.68 In June, Nago citizens opposed to the heliport started to organize a referendum on the project. Twenty-­one Nago-­based organizations including labor groups, peace organizations, and progressive political parties formed the Nago Citizens’ Referendum Promotion Council.69 Officials from Tokyo and local pro-­base interest groups campaigned together to win the public’s support for the heliport, promising that accepting the project would lead to regional economic development. Although the outcome of the referendum showed that the majority opposed the heliport, the margin was small (53.8 percent in opposition and 46.1 percent in support), and observers believe this was due to Tokyo’s promise of economic assistance. Nago mayor Higa Tetsuya announced that the city would accept the construction of a heliport in exchange for state assistance for the local economy, and then resigned.

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In the gubernatorial election of November 1998, Inamine Keiichi, who accepted the Futenma relocation within Okinawa, defeated Ōta, who advocated Futenma’s relocation outside of the prefecture. Inamine envisioned an airport for joint military-­civilian use that the United States would be allowed to use for fifteen years only. Tokyo and Washington cancelled their plan to construct a temporary and removable sea-­based heliport to build a more permanent facility, while rejecting a time limit on the American use of the facility. After that the two governments revised the construction plan several times, with adjustments to the location and size of the facility. In 2006 Tokyo and Washington announced that they would build two 1,800-­meter runways by reclamation of the ocean off Henoko-­saki, as an extension of Camp Schwab.70 Many Nago citizens, together with other people of Okinawa, continued to protest. Protesters have deployed several normative arguments to oppose Futenma’s relocation to Henoko. First, they have used the antiwar and antimilitarism argument. Elderly people who survived the Battle of Okinawa are some of the most dedicated members of the protest movement. They believe that war comes where there are military bases because bases become targets of external attack. They also argue that military bases are for the purpose of fighting wars, not constructing peace.71 In addition, they emphasize they do not want to become involved in a war against their will, which could happen if U.S. forces deploy from Henoko to conflicts abroad.72 Second, protesters argue that construction in the ocean would cause environmental damage. Protesters worry that the construction would destroy a part of the coral reef, push dugongs (endangered marine mammals) out of their feeding ground, and affect other ocean life by changing the current.73 People who experienced the Battle of Okinawa and its aftermath add that they were able to survive because the bountiful sea provided food and a livelihood.74 They hope that future generations will be able to enjoy the beautiful ocean and its offerings without a new military base. Third, protesters argue that it is unfair to construct a replacement facility in Okinawa since it already shoulders a disproportionate burden for the Japan-­U.S. alliance in comparison with other prefectures. Okinawa hosts 73.8 percent of the total acreage of U.S. military facilities in Japan.75 Protesters see the high concentration of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa as discrimination and demand that the presence be reduced. Although Tokyo and Washington aim to reduce the alliance’s burden on Okinawa by closing Futenma in a densely populated area and relocating it to less populated Henoko, many in Okinawa perceive that the replacement facility, which would strengthen

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Futenma’s functions, would add to Okinawa’s burden. Protesters demand a reduction in the burden through Futenma’s closure without relocation, or relocation outside of the prefecture. In Henoko, protesters built a tent village facing the ocean that serves as a base for a sit-­in. Many protesters’ strong resolve has led them to physically obstruct government efforts to construct the new base.76 For example, when the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau tried to prepare for a boring survey in the early morning of April 19, 2004, protesters created a human barricade to block trucks from entering the port. Protest at sea started on September 9 when the bureau decided to go through Camp Schwab to access the ocean instead of going through the port where protesters had gathered. Protesters went by canoes and small ships both to obstruct the survey and, using the aforementioned arguments, to ask the bureau’s personnel and hired workers to stop the survey. In order to prevent the survey, protesters also dived to carry out a sit-­in on the sea floor and climbed onto scaffolding towers that the bureau built for drilling. The protesters took great safety risks when engaging in these activities. A violent response from workers hired by the bureau resulted in some injuries.77 The protesters’ efforts, however, led to a suspension of the boring survey. Protesters’ normative arguments inform many Okinawans’ opposition to Futenma’s relocation to Henoko. Prefecture-­wide opinion polls since 1997 have consistently showed that the majority of respondents are against the plan. By May 2007, only 16.9 percent of respondents supported the Henoko plan while 75.9 percent supported Futenma’s relocation abroad, relocation outside of Okinawa, or unconditional closure.78 The normative arguments persuaded not only the Okinawan public but also Hatoyama. He found the protesters’ arguments persuasive given his belief that the United States and Japan should reduce the American military presence in Japan and work toward creating an alliance without a U.S. presence in Japan during peacetime. Hatoyama’s Persuasion According to Hatoyama, he first became concerned about the issue of U.S. military bases in Okinawa when he visited Futenma in 1992 and saw the gigantic military base surrounded by densely populated residential areas. In his words, he “wanted to help reduce the burden on the Okinawan people somehow,” but took no action at the time.79 He visited Okinawa again in December 1995, after Okinawa erupted in protest following the rape of a girl by three U.S. servicemen in September. Hatoyama met with Okinawa governor Ōta and the U.S. military’s Okinawa Area Coordinator who oversaw all four

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military services in Okinawa. He learned more about various problems caused by the U.S. military presence there and thought strongly that they must be resolved.80 In September 1996, he established the DPJ and declared his view that the Japan-­U.S. alliance should operate without a U.S. military deployment to Japan in peacetime. He has argued since that the Japan-­U.S. security alliance is important but an independent state continuing to host a foreign military is not normal.81 He envisions a gradual reduction and eventual elimination of U.S. military bases in Japan as states in Asia make progress in enhancing regional security. He proposes working toward the establishment of the East Asian Community following the European model that will increase trust among states and prevent conflicts in the region. Hatoyama believes that multilateral cooperation in Asia will help create a Japan-­U.S. alliance without a constant U.S. military presence in Japan. Soon after the DPJ’s establishment, the SACO Final Report of December 2 officially announced Camp Schwab as a potential relocation site for Futenma. At that time Hatoyama did not yet have a clear position on Futenma’s relocation, although he already recognized Okinawa’s disproportionate burden and the importance of other prefectures taking on some of that burden.82 It was in the early-­to mid-­2000s that he became persuaded that Futenma’s replacement facility should be outside Okinawa, and this conviction solidified with time. According to Hatoyama, there are three groups of people that influenced his thinking. The first are DPJ politicians, including Takemasa Kōichi, Watanabe Shū, and Fujimoto Yūji, who drafted Okinawa Vision, which described the party’s policy for Okinawa with a focus on its economic development. In August 2002 they created the first Vision after consultation with the Okinawa Vision Council, a newly established group of seventeen Okinawan representatives from political parties, the business community, labor, and academia. The 2002 Vision was vague on Futenma. It said that the party will “consider every possibility” for Futenma’s relocation. However, it acknowledged the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa and argued for a significant reduction of bases in order to facilitate the prefecture’s economic growth. The Vision stressed the importance of Okinawa’s independent growth through development of industries that tap into its strengths: its rich and distinctive nature, culture, and history. In addition, the Vision included the protection of the coral reef, and dugongs and other wildlife unique to Okinawa, which protesters against the Henoko plan demanded. In consideration of Okinawa’s wartime experience and its strong antiwar sentiment, the Vision also said the party would facilitate peace research in Okinawa.

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The party clarified its position on Futenma in 2004 when it said it would seek to have the facility relocated abroad, possibly to Guam, in its manifesto for the House of Councillors election in July and a policy report released in September. The revised Vision of August 2005 then announced the party’s policy that Futenma’s functions should be relocated to another prefecture or abroad. The Vision said that the party will seek to disperse Futenma’s functions to other prefectures as a first step, and then aim to relocate the functions abroad while considering the evolution of the strategic environment. A manifesto for the House of Representatives election in September 2005, and a third Vision issued in July 2008, reiterated this policy. According to Hatoyama, the Vision that recommended Futenma’s relocation to another prefecture or abroad within a comprehensive policy for Okinawa’s independent economic development helped shape his preferences on Futenma’s relocation.83 When the DPJ organized a symposium in Naha about the third Vision in August 2008, Hatoyama attended as the secretary-­general of the party and said: “The Okinawa Vision contains policies that the party would very much like to implement, if it comes to power.”84 The second group of people that persuaded Hatoyama about the need to relocate Futenma outside of Okinawa included Ginowan mayor Iha and other experts on base policies. In March 2005, Hatoyama became the founding chairman of a parliamentary discussion group on issues regarding military bases in Okinawa and other prefectures (Okinawa tō kichi mondai giin kondankai), which started with seventy-­four Diet members from opposition parties. This group aimed to achieve three main objectives: 1) reduction in the number and size of U.S. military bases in Okinawa and other prefectures; 2) revision of the SOFA; and 3) exploration of future visions for Okinawa. Hatoyama says that he did not have deep knowledge about the U.S. military presence in Okinawa when the group started.85 The group met every two weeks for lectures by invited experts and to engage in discussion. It contributed to Hatoyama’s persuasion that Futenma should be moved out of Okinawa, preferably abroad. In our interview Hatoyama named Iha as someone who especially influenced his thinking. Iha, a progressive mayor of Ginowan, which hosts Futenma Air Station, was elected in 2003 on the platform of asking Tokyo and Washington to return Futenma within five years. The parliamentary discussion group invited him to speak in the group’s first meeting on March 30, 2005. Iha was invited again to express his opinion on July 7, when the group visited Ginowan for a town meeting. As Ginowan’s mayor, his priority was to close Futenma to ensure the safety of local residents. He reminded his audience that Tokyo and Washington

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agreed to return Futenma in 1996 in order to reduce Okinawa’s burden and eliminate the danger that this base posed in a densely populated area. A U.S. military helicopter based in Futenma crashed inside the Okinawa International University campus in Ginowan on August 13, 2004, highlighting the urgent need to close Futenma for public safety. However, Iha argued that relocation to Henoko would neither help close Futenma quickly (because building a replacement facility would take a long time) nor help reduce Okinawa’s burden. Relocation to another prefecture would be better but difficult given the fact that there are many densely populated areas in the mainland as well. For this reason he recommended Futenma’s relocation abroad.86 More specifically, Iha and his staff studied a series of U.S. government documents since 2006 regarding its global posture realignment, and argued that the United States planned to move the headquarters and operational units of the III MEF from Okinawa to Guam, leaving behind only a small contingent of Marines. Iha believed, therefore, building Futenma’s replacement facility in Henoko was not necessary.87 Iha pointed out that Washington originally planned to move only the headquarters of the III MEF from Okinawa to Guam and other locations, and relocate operational units to Henoko.88 However, by May 2006 Washington decided to move operational units to Guam as well, and the United States Pacific Command created the Guam Integrated Military Development Plan in July 2006. Iha said subsequent U.S. statements and documents corroborated his conclusion.89 Iha’s argument, that a new base should not be built in Henoko because most Marines will go to Guam, persuaded Hatoyama given his preference that the U.S. military presence in Japan be reduced and eventually eliminated. In addition, Hatoyama agreed with Iha’s argument that as far as the United States is concerned the military bases in Okinawa were more important for responding to global contingencies than for defending Japan.90 Hatoyama once said that the U.S. military presence on Okinawa might be important for U.S. global strategy but “that is an American logic and not a Japanese logic.”91 Hatoyama found this a convincing reason to oppose the Henoko plan. Last but not least, Okinawan protesters’ normative arguments against the Henoko plan persuaded Hatoyama. He visited Okinawa several times before becoming prime minister. In July 2005, Hatoyama and the parliamentary discussion group visited the protesters’ tent village in Henoko, Futenma, and other locations after the town meeting in Ginowan. Hatoyama returned to Okinawa for the election campaign of 2009 as well. Through these visits Hatoyama gained a “deep appreciation of how the people of Okinawa felt,” and he “felt more and more strongly that [he] wanted to stand by them.”92

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According to Hatoyama, he “naturally” (tōzen) agreed with protesters’ arguments against building Futenma’s replacement facility in Henoko, given his belief that the U.S. military presence in Japan should be reduced in order to ultimately create a security alliance without a U.S. deployment in peacetime.93 He accepted the Okinawan argument that there is a high concentration of U.S. military bases in the prefecture and this unfair distribution of the alliance’s burden must be corrected with Futenma’s relocation to another prefecture or abroad. Hatoyama also supported the environmental argument against the Henoko plan. He remembers that a representative from Okinawa Dugong Environmental Assessment Watch Group, who attended the parliamentary discussion group as an expert presenter, influenced his thinking.94 He said as prime minister: “When I stood by the sea of Henoko, I strongly felt that reclamation of the sea was a defilement of the nature. The current plan should not be accepted.”95 Although Hatoyama referred often to these two arguments to oppose the Henoko plan, he was relatively quiet on the protesters’ antiwar and antimilitarism argument. The argument is that war comes where there are military bases, and military bases are to fight wars and not to create peace. When I asked about this, Hatoyama responded that “this way of thinking is not wrong,” but antiwar, antimilitarism, and antibase arguments might be associated with anti-­Americanism, and the arguments may appear politically tinged like what the Communist Party might say. He said he did not argue against the Henoko plan with antiwar and antimilitarism arguments during his tenure as prime minister because he was concerned that these arguments might appear politically biased.96 However, Hatoyama thinks the antiwar and antimilitarism arguments against the Henoko plan are not wrong because war, military expansion, and military threats do not foster peace.97 He hopes also to decrease tension and increase trust among Asian countries, and eventually establish an East Asian Community.98 In sum, fellow DPJ politicians who drafted Okinawa Vision, Iha and other experts who participated in the parliamentary discussion group, and protesters persuaded Hatoyama that Futenma should not be relocated within Okinawa. In general, persuasion is more likely when a message that seeks to persuade fits well with the recipient’s existing beliefs. The various actors were able to persuade Hatoyama because of his belief that Tokyo and Washington should gradually reduce the U.S. military presence in Japan and eventually create an alliance without U.S. forward deployment in peacetime. Between Futenma’s relocation to another prefecture or abroad, Hatoyama preferred relocation abroad as a way to move toward creating such an alliance.99 But if relocation

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abroad were difficult, Hatoyama would try to relocate Futenma’s functions to existing bases in mainland Japan in order to reduce Okinawa’s burden. Hatoyama also thought that people who argued for Futenma’s relocation outside of Okinawa were credible. Credibility is based on perceived expertise and trust, and it facilitates persuasion. Hatoyama thinks that the authors of Okinawa Vision are trustworthy politicians who studied various issues related to U.S. military bases. He described Iha as one of the most knowledgeable people about issues regarding U.S. military bases in Okinawa, and someone whom he trusts and respects deeply. Hatoyama then said that there are protest leaders and organizations that are credible, although he cannot say all protest leaders and organizations are alike because there are many of them. According to Hatoyama, protest leaders he has met are extremely knowledgeable about the issues they are concerned about, and they are trustworthy. He said also that political conservatives tend to regard protest leaders as peculiar and with outlook from the extreme left, but he has seen that ordinary people lead and participate in protests against U.S. military base policy in Okinawa.100 In short, Hatoyama thought people who argued for Futenma’s relocation outside of Okinawa were credible, and this facilitated persuasion. In general, one way of telling if a person is persuaded or not is to look for argumentative consistency. A persuaded person is likely to remain consistent in his public remarks even when the audience or the situation that surrounds him changes. One indication of Hatoyama’s persuasion that Futenma’s relocation outside of Okinawa was the best course of action is that he continued to argue for it even after his party moderated its position in its 2009 election manifesto. The party’s Okinawa Vision from 2005 and 2008 included protesters’ normative arguments and declared that the governments must explore Futenma’s relocation to another prefecture or abroad. However, the 2009 election manifesto did not mention Futenma at all. It only said the party would “review” the presence of U.S. military bases and U.S. force transformation in Japan. In the DPJ “policy index,” which is attached to the manifesto, the party said it would aim to reduce local communities’ burden related to the alliance and include local governments in discussions of base policy. According to Hatoyama, when party leaders drafted the manifesto, many expressed concern that they, once in power, would not easily be able to achieve Futenma’s relocation out of Okinawa. They argued against including an explicit promise and instead proposed to mention the party’s policy direction that it will “review” the presence of U.S. military bases. Hatoyama still believed in the goals stated in Okinawa Vision, but agreed to go with the

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toned-­down expression in the manifesto on condition that other party leaders would continue to work toward realizing the Vision. Although the party shied away from making an explicit promise, Hatoyama continued to say that he intended to move Futenma “out of Japan if possible but out of Okinawa at the very least” because he was persuaded that this was the right thing to do. He remembers that while he campaigned in Okinawa he saw that the people really wanted relocation outside of the prefecture, and he wanted to achieve it for them once in power.101 Other evidence showing that Hatoyama was persuaded is that he continued to explore a way to fulfill his election promise even after this effort appeared increasingly hopeless and his government grew more vulnerable. In general, persuasion is likely to have occurred when a policy-­maker continues to support a norm-­based policy despite the high cost this generates. Hatoyama certainly incurred a heavy political cost for his attempt to relocate Futenma outside Okinawa. Hatoyama’s inability to find a viable alternative site for Futenma’s relocation contributed to the public’s perception that he was a weak leader. Hatoyama’s government enjoyed a public support rate of 62 percent in November 2009, but this decreased to 48 percent in December, 37 percent in February 2010, 33 percent in April, and 24 percent in May.102 He lamented on April 21, 2010: “How easy it would have been if I had just settled on Henoko.”103 Yet he continued to emphasize his opposition to the Henoko plan, until his public capitulation in late May. A Lonely Battle: Lack of Intra-­Party Consensus and Bureaucratic Support Hatoyama faced great difficulty in finding a viable relocation site for Futenma. He met strong resistance from his own ministers, bureaucrats in the Japanese Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, candidate communities for relocation, and the United States. Hatoyama’s determination to move Futenma out of Okinawa did not lead to policy change due to their resistance. First, Hatoyama’s own ministers did not agree with him that it was possible or desirable to relocate Futenma outside of Okinawa. Minister of Foreign Affairs Okada Katsuya and Minister of Defense Kitazawa Toshimi sided with the opinion of their ministries, which supported the Henoko plan and opposed relocation outside of Okinawa.104 Hatoyama later told the press that only a few people supported his goal, including Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano Hirofumi.105 Some DPJ politicians did not perceive Okinawan protesters as credible, and this is likely to have contributed to the politicians’ resistance to Hatoyama’s effort to relocate Futenma outside of Okinawa. For example, according to a confidential cable sent from the U.S. embassy in Tokyo to the secretary of state

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in Washington, DPJ’s Diet Affairs Chair Yamaoka Kanji told embassy officials on December 8, 2009, that Okinawa opposed bases whenever they were discussed, and that “it’s all about opposing for its own sake.” He said that “nothing will ever happen” if Okinawa’s will was respected. Yamaoka referred to Okinawan protesters against the Henoko plan as “agitators.”106 Japanese bureaucrats in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) opposed Hatoyama’s effort. MOFA and MOD are the most important Japanese actors shaping and implementing base policy in cooperation with the United States. These ministries had conducted a series of negotiations with the United States, Okinawa Prefecture, Nago City, and local actors since the mid-­1990s to relocate Futenma to Henoko.107 Hatoyama declared that he would relocate Futenma out of Okinawa without prior consultation with the ministries. As a result, bureaucrats strongly opposed Hatoyama’s initiative to find alternative relocation sites.108 Hatoyama’s action stems from a promise the DPJ made in the 2009 election, that politicians would take back policy-­making leadership from bureaucrats. On the U.S.-­Japan relationship, DPJ politicians pledged to exercise leadership in order to depart from the assumed bureaucratic practice of “following” the United States. They believed Japan needed a more independent foreign policy. The decision to cancel the Henoko plan and seek an alternative site outside of Okinawa without prior consultation with bureaucrats was Hatoyama’s attempt at political leadership. However, for politicians to take a lead in policy-­making regarding military bases, especially when they seek to overturn what bureaucrats had decided, they must have a clear strategic vision for the U.S.-­Japan alliance, knowledge of the history of bilateral negotiations, and command of highly technical base issues. Hatoyama and his colleagues were short on these prerequisites for proceeding without bureaucrats’ cooperation.109 After quitting his post, Hatoyama admitted that he should have relied more on bureaucrats’ expertise.110 Bureaucrats strongly resisted Hatoyama’s initiative to take control over them. According to a secret U.S. embassy cable from September 2009 released by WikiLeaks, MOFA Director General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Saiki Akitaka told embassy officials that “if the DPJ tried to crush the pride of professional bureaucrats, it would not succeed.” The cable continued: Regarding DPJ leaders’ call for an “equal relationship” with the U.S., Saiki confessed that he did not know what was on the minds of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and FM Okada, as the bilateral relationship was already equal. Saiki theorized that the DPJ, as an inexperienced ruling party, felt the need to project an image of power and confidence by showing it had Japan’s powerful bureaucrats under control and was in

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Another U.S. embassy cable referred to a MOFA official and said: “That he stated repeatedly the DPJ members ‘just didn’t get it’ on security matters speaks volumes about how some talented career diplomats at MOFA view the Hatoyama Cabinet.”112 Some Japanese bureaucrats went as far as giving advice to American officials in order to thwart Hatoyama’s effort to relocate Futenma outside of Okinawa. According to a U.S. embassy cable, for example, MOD Defense Policy Bureau Director General Takamizawa Nobushige suggested to the U.S. State-­DOD delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell in October 2009 that “the U.S. Government incorporate changes since 2006 on U.S. capabilities, war plans, and increased coordination with the Japan Self Defense Force when briefing on the continued validity of realignment plans to Japanese government officials and politicians.” The cable also revealed that “Takamizawa added that the U.S. Government should also refrain from demonstrating flexibility too soon in the course of crafting an adjusted realignment package palatable to the DPJ Government.”113 MOFA officials gave similar advice to American officials as well.114 Hatoyama’s plan to relocate Futenma out of Okinawa was exceedingly difficult to achieve with bureaucrats working to undermine his efforts. When No One Wants a U.S. Military Base in His Backyard Hatoyama failed to get Futenma relocated out of Okinawa also because he could not find communities in mainland Japan that would accept Futenma’s facilities, troops, equipment, and functions in whole or in part.115 Hatoyama’s explanation that he was looking for alternative sites in the mainland to reduce Okinawa’s burden was not sufficient, unfortunately for Okinawa, which continues to bear a disproportionate share of the burden. Communities in the mainland that appeared in the media as candidate sites organized preemptive protests. Candidate communities raised objections because they knew by observing Okinawa and base hosts in the mainland that various problems persisted despite the host communities’ repeated pleas for improvement. Governors of prefectures that host U.S. bases had requested a revision of the SOFA but the two states only agreed on a few administrative improvements that the governors considered insufficient. Military exercises and operations, such as nighttime take-­off-­and-­landing exercises and flights at low altitude above residential areas, continued despite local governments’ opposition. Indeed, local governments appeared powerless, and the national government either powerless or unwilling

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to improve the various base problems. Having witnessed this, communities that were named as candidates for relocation opposed the move. Hatoyama’s failure to improve upon various base problems before taking up the relocation issue made it more difficult for him to win communities’ support. Mainland public opinion supported the relocation of Futenma Air Station out of Okinawa and a more equitable burden-­sharing among prefectures. Opinion polls in four national newspapers (Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, and Sankei Shimbun) showed that the number of people who said Futenma should be relocated out of Okinawa or the Henoko plan “should be reviewed” exceeded the number of people who supported the existing Henoko plan. Asahi Shimbun’s poll had 54 percent of the respondents saying that Futenma should be relocated outside of Okinawa or abroad. Even in the poll of the conservative Sankei Shimbun, 46 percent of the respondents said that Futenma should be relocated outside of Okinawa, which was 10 points higher than those answering that Futenma should be relocated within Okinawa.116 Nevertheless, people opposed relocation to their own communities. The candidate sites expressed their “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) sentiment in demonstrations as well as prefectural and local assembly resolutions. Governors from other prefectures rejected Hatoyama’s request to accept some of Okinawa’s burden in a meeting on May 27, 2010. Lack of Incentive for the United States to Change the Henoko Plan American officials agreed with the MOFA and MOD bureaucrats that relocation to Henoko was the best plan for moving forward with Futenma’s closure. Soon after the DPJ came into power in 2009, American officials communicated to DPJ politicians and bureaucrats their strong preference for implementing the Henoko plan. According to a U.S. embassy cable, Assistant Secretary Campbell told Japanese officials that “he had worked on Okinawa issues since the mid-­1990s and that, for the first time in that span, prospects for significant progress had emerged. Reasons for confidence included: (1) a strong consensus within the U.S. Government and U.S. military; (2) Congressional budgetary commitment to realignment plans; and, (3) support from local elected leaders in Okinawa.”117 Relocation to another site would require redoing everything from the start: obtaining local acquiescence, redrawing construction plans, and restarting the environmental impact assessment. American officials warned that repeating these processes somewhere else would significantly delay Futenma’s closure. American officials also declared that they would not consider any proposal that they had rejected in the past or new proposals that did not enjoy local sup-

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port. This declaration reflected the strong American preference for the Henoko plan and created an added obstacle for Hatoyama. Many of the sites that his coalition government considered had been rejected in past negotiations between Tokyo,Washington, and Okinawa. Preemptive protests in local communities also showed that Hatoyama did not have sites that accepted relocation.118 Protests in Okinawa and public opinion in mainland Japan on the Futenma relocation issue did not produce important political or military incentives for the United States to cancel the Henoko plan. In addition, the mainland media primarily focused on Hatoyama’s lack of leadership and the “damage” he had supposedly done to the alliance, instead of focusing on the American resistance to changing the Henoko plan despite the strong local opposition to it. Furthermore, during the NIMBY protests in candidate communities for relocation, the United States maintained its basic stance that protests regarding where to locate U.S. military bases are a domestic problem for the Japanese government to handle, because Japan is responsible under the security treaty for providing military bases to the United States. The United States also continued to occupy Futenma, and did not have an urgent need to relocate. American officials suggested that the Marines would continue to use the facility if the Henoko plan did not materialize.119 Moreover, State Minister for Okinawa, Northern Territories, and Disaster Prevention Maehara Seiji told the United States on December 9, 2009, that the Hatoyama government would accept relocation to Henoko if no alternative plans that would satisfy both Okinawa and the United States could be found. The United States had no incentive to cooperate with Hatoyama’s search for alternatives. Hatoyama knew that he would have to accept the Henoko plan if no alternatives could be found. He gave himself a deadline of May 2010 to find an alternative plan.120 Contrary to some speculations that by December Hatoyama had given up on finding an alternative, he still was resolved to find one. He felt that he “must absolutely find an alternative site.”121 Maehara’s message to U.S. embassy officials, which Hatoyama claims was delivered without his knowledge, added to the difficulty of relocating Futenma outside of Okinawa. A U.S. embassy cable reporting the meeting with Maehara to the U.S. secretary of state concludes: “Under this scenario, if the U.S. does not agree to any alternative to the existing FRF [Futenma Relocation Facility] plan, the DPJ would be prepared to go ahead with the current relocation plan.”122 In short, the United States had no incentive to change the Henoko plan.

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The Futenma Relocation Facility Goes Back to Henoko Although Hatoyama as prime minister was certainly a key policy-­maker, and was persuaded that the Futenma base should be relocated out of Okinawa, he was unable to block the Henoko plan due to opposition by Japan’s bureaucrats as well as by the United States and candidate communities. In short, in this case persuasion of a key policy-­maker did not lead to policy change. On May 23, 2010, Hatoyama announced that the government would accept the Henoko plan. He explained that there was uncertainty in East Asia—­he alluded to the tension generated by the North Korean attack on a South Korean navy ship in March—­and that he could not damage the deterrent effect of the U.S. forces in Japan. In view of this, he said, there was concern that relocation to another prefecture or abroad would significantly reduce the capabilities of the U.S. Marines by separating Futenma’s helicopter unit from the rest of its forces. He announced that implementing the Henoko plan was the best solution to maintaining the deterrent effect of the U.S. forces.123 In interviews in January and February 2011, however, Hatoyama revealed that he referred to deterrence only to justify his decision to accept the Henoko plan. He said: I had to justify the Henoko plan. . . . I do not believe that the Marines’ presence in Okinawa has a direct effect in deterring wars. It is just that all components of the U.S. forces work together to provide deterrence, and when the Marines are not there the U.S. forces are unable to provide it effectively. . . . I thought the word “deterrent effect,” in a broad sense, would be useful although you might say this is an expedient (hōben) and it may be so.124

While working on the Futenma issue, Hatoyama focused solely on relocation and did not explore other ways to respond to Okinawans’ grievances (such as dealing with environmental problems in and around military bases and a revision of the SOFA) until the very end of the negotiations with the United States. As a result, the Joint Statement of the U.S.-­Japan Security Consultative Committee of May 28 that reaffirmed Henoko as the relocation site made no mention of specific improvements in various base problems. While the statement recognized “the importance of responding to the concerns of the people of Okinawa that they bear a disproportionate burden related to the presence of U.S. forces,” the statement merely announced the allies’ willingness to: 1) consider relocation of military “activities” including training to Tokunoshima in Kagoshima Prefecture “subject to development of appropriate facilities,” SDF facilities and areas in mainland Japan, and to Guam; and 2) consider an agreement on the environment including “reasonable” access

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to U.S. facilities and areas in cases of environmental incidents and for surveys before land returns.125 The promise to “consider” relocation of Futenma’s activities and an environmental agreement were symbolic concessions in response to Okinawa’s opposition to the Henoko plan. Relocation of Futenma’s activities to other prefectures appeared difficult: Tokunoshima’s residents and governors of other prefectures rejected relocation when Hatoyama requested it. Relocation to Guam was tied to progress on the Henoko plan. The activities that would be considered for relocation and the duration were not specified. The environmental agreements the statement mentioned were important but separate issues. They did not address the environmental damage that construction in Henoko would generate. These symbolic concessions were intended to create a norm-­abiding image that Tokyo and Washington recognized the importance of the environment and a reduction of the unfair burden on Okinawa. In addition, the symbolic concessions were meant to save face so that the Hatoyama government would not simply go back to the previous agreement concluded by its political opponent, the LDP.126 Hatoyama and his cabinet also hoped that the concessions would help calm the Okinawan opposition to implementing the Henoko plan. Okinawan protesters saw through these attempts and strongly criticized the joint statement. Okinawan opposition to the Henoko plan strengthened during Hatoyama’s premiership. On November 8, 2009, about 21,000 people gathered in Ginowan City to express their opposition to relocating the Futenma base within the prefecture.127 Approximately 90,000 people participated in the Prefectural Citizens’ Rally on April 25, 2010, demanding relocation outside Okinawa. A joint survey by Ryūkyū Shimpō and Mainichi Shimbun on May 28–­30, 2010, showed that 84 percent of the respondents in Okinawa opposed relocation to Henoko. The percentage had gone up by 17 percent since the papers’ survey in October–­November 2009.128 Moreover, opposition to relocation within the prefecture spread to all levels of local government during Hatoyama’s tenure. First, Inamine Susumu was elected the mayor of Nago City, where Henoko is located, in January 2010. He declared opposition to the Henoko plan and defeated an incumbent who supported it.129 Second, on February 24, 2010, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly passed a unanimous resolution opposing Futenma’s relocation within the prefecture and calling on Tokyo and Washington to relocate Futenma to another prefecture or abroad.This resolution became possible because the LDP branch in Okinawa and conservative business organizations that had once supported the Henoko plan changed their position due to the strong public opposition

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to the plan. All political parties in Okinawa participated in the Prefectural Citizens’ Rally on April 25. In addition, all forty-one mayors, town and village chiefs in Okinawa told the Okinawa Times in early April that they opposed relocation within the prefecture.130 Furthermore, Inamine’s election and the Prefectural Assembly’s unanimous resolution pushed Okinawa governor Nakaima Hirokazu to revise his acceptance of the Henoko plan. Nakaima participated in the Prefectural Citizens’ Rally and later declared that relocation to Henoko was “close to being impossible” given Okinawan public opinion. On February 15, 2011, he declared in the Prefectural Assembly that the prefectural government would pursue relocation of Futenma out of Okinawa as a formal policy. Today, the opposition to the Henoko plan remains strong. Even though Nakaima approved reclamation of the bay in Henoko in December 2013 while still claiming that he supported relocation out of the prefecture, 61 percent of respondents in an Okinawan opinion poll opposed his decision.131 By mid-­2014 Nakaima had changed his position on the Henoko plan again, declaring support for it as a means to facilitate Futenma’s closure.132 Another poll in Okinawa in August 2014 showed that only 10 percent of respondents supported relocation to Henoko while 79.7 percent supported Futenma’s relocation outside of the prefecture or its closure without a replacement facility.133 In the gubernatorial election of November 2014, Nakaima was defeated by Onaga Takeshi, who opposes the Henoko plan.. Yet Okinawan protesters continue to face great difficulty trying to have Futenma relocated outside of the prefecture. Although some U.S. senators have argued that the Henoko plan cannot be implemented due to local opposition, their alternative proposal still involves relocation within the prefecture, to Kadena Air Base. In addition, the two governments reaffirmed their commitment to the Henoko plan in the Japan-­U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting in June 2011. In August 2014 the Japanese government restarted the boring survey in Henoko, with Japanese Coast Guard vessels blocking all attempts by protesters to approach the test sites to stop the tests. Furthermore, after Onaga’s victory, Tokyo and Washington announced that they will keep the Henoko plan. How this issue will develop remains to be seen, but the Henoko plan or any alternative plan involving relocation within Okinawa will continue to meet strong opposition.

3

Response to Protests in South Korea, 2000–­2007

In South Korea a protest movement against U.S. military base policy emerged in the 1990s following democratization. Under the previous authoritarian regime, the National Security Law permitted the authorities to arrest critics of the U.S. military presence. This discouraged participation in protests. In the 1990s, some incidents involving personnel from the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) led to the formation of civil society organizations that protested the U.S. military presence and base policies. Protest organizers relied on sovereignty, human rights, antiwar, and environmental norms to mobilize the public and communicate their policy demands to policy-­makers. This chapter highlights protests regarding environmental policy on military bases, criminal jurisdiction and custody, land expropriation for military use, and involvement of American military personnel in prostitution as customers. In all of the five cases discussed in this chapter, protesters’ normative arguments failed to persuade American and Korean policy-­makers. In general, persuasion is more likely to fail when protesters’ arguments contradict policy-­ makers’ knowledge and beliefs, and policy-­makers think that leading protest organizations are not credible. In the five South Korean cases, many American and Korean policy-­makers had interests and preferences that made them reject fundamental changes in base policy. Their knowledge of the various aspects of the American presence in South Korea also led them to reject protest organizations’ arguments on base policy as exaggerated, unfair, and unrealistic. In addition, many policy-­makers had a negative perception of protest organizations as leftist agitators working to undermine the U.S.-­Republic of Korea

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(ROK) security alliance. These perceptions contributed to the failure of protesters’ attempts at persuasion. Even when persuasion fails, policy-­makers can decide to change base policy in a limited way if protests generate important incentives for policy-­ makers to do so. However, base policy will not change when policy-­makers in both countries do not perceive incentives to change policy or when the United States rejects change despite the host-state government’s request for change. When base policy does not change, the two governments can still offer symbolic concessions that allow them to appear norm-­abiding, save face for the failed attempt to change policy, or implement an unpopular policy. Policy outcomes in the five cases varied due to the different levels of incentives that Korean and American policy-­makers perceived in response to protests. In January 2001, the United States and South Korea agreed to a limited change of criminal custody procedures in a revised SOFA. The United States decided against changing environmental policy in 2001 and criminal jurisdiction procedures in 2002–­2003, but offered some symbolic concessions. Later, Seoul and Washington expanded a military base through land expropriation in 2006–­2007 despite large protests against it. Finally, USFK renewed its fight against prostitution in 2002 due to a congressional investigation and a top-­ down effort by the U.S. Department of Defense. Local protests against military prostitution had no influence on policy in this case.

Revision of the SOFA on Criminal Custody, 2000–­2001 The original SOFA from 1966 provided that in cases where South Korea is to exercise jurisdiction, the U.S. military authorities would hold in custody accused personnel until the conclusion of all judicial proceedings. In 2001, the two governments announced that the United States would, under some conditions, transfer custody to the Korean authorities after indictment. These conditions include: 1) the offense falls within certain “categories of cases of sufficient gravity”;1 2) there is “adequate cause” for believing the accused committed the offense charged; and 3) there is a “necessity” for custody, “because there is reasonable ground to suspect that the accused has destroyed or may destroy evidence; that the accused may flee; or that the accused is likely to cause harm to the life, person or property of a victim, a potential witness, or a family member of a victim or potential witness.”2 In addition, in cases where South Korea could exercise jurisdiction and the Korean authorities had arrested a serviceman, the United States agreed not to request transfer of custody when: 1) “there is adequate cause to believe that he has committed a heinous crime of murder or an egregious rape”; 2) there

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is a “necessity” for custody (as defined similarly to above); and 3) “unless there is legitimate cause to believe that a failure to request custody would result in prejudice to an accused’s right to a fair trial.”3 The SOFA revision was in response to public pressure in the 1990s. Coalitions of protest organizations emerged to mobilize public opinion for a SOFA revision, following several well-­publicized crimes committed by USFK personnel against Koreans. Protest organizations’ normative arguments emphasized human rights and sovereignty, and demanded an expansion of Korean rights to exercise criminal jurisdiction and custody. The normative arguments did not persuade American or Korean policy-­makers. However, protests generated important incentives for policy-­makers to change policy. Policy-­makers revised the SOFA to enable an earlier transfer of accused American personnel to the Korean authorities.Yet by attaching various conditions for a transfer of custody, the United States ensured that it would continue to maintain custody of its personnel until the conclusion of all judicial proceedings in most cases where South Korea exercised primary jurisdiction.4 In sum, this was a compromise solution: a limited policy change that sought to address the public’s grievances while safeguarding U.S. interests. Protest Mobilization, Normative Arguments, and Failure of Persuasion In the early 1990s protest organizations began to demand a revision of the SOFA to expand Korea’s right to exercise criminal jurisdiction and custody. They charged that the SOFA was unequal in two respects. First, it denied Korean jurisdiction over on-­duty offenses when Korean citizens are involved as victims. Protest organizations complained that courts-­martial were biased and lenient toward military personnel, and did not deliver justice to Korean victims. Second, in cases where South Korea had primary jurisdiction, the Korean authorities’ inability to take American suspects into custody until the end of judicial proceedings hindered their investigation by making it difficult for them to interrogate suspects. Protest organizations pointed to the U.S.-­ Japan agreement in 1996, which enabled pre-­indictment transfer of custody in heinous crimes (murder and rape), to argue that the ROK-­U.S. SOFA was flawed. In sum, protest organizations demanded Korean jurisdiction over USFK personnel in on-­duty as well as off-­duty cases, and an earlier transfer of custody. They claimed they stood for Korean victims’ human rights which U.S. courts-­martial violated by being lenient toward American suspects. They also argued for South Korea’s sovereign right to jurisdiction over all crimes occurring within its territory and to hold in custody all suspects from the beginning of the legal process.

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The public pressure to revise the SOFA mounted after Private Kenneth Markle was arrested and charged with the murder of a prostitute, Yun Kumi, in October 1992. This was an extremely violent case that shocked the Korean public.5 Soon after this murder, twenty-­three organizations, including labor, student, religious, human rights, and women’s groups, created the Joint Commission for Counter-­Measures for the Yun Kumi Incident. A year later, these groups inaugurated a more permanent organization, the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea.6 The organization asked: “How should Koreans interpret the reality that the ones who are supposed to be here for the security of our nation are in fact threatening our life and safety? Is this situation benefiting or hurting Korean national security?”7 The organization then declared: “The purpose of this campaign is to research and investigate the crimes committed by U.S. troops against Korean citizens, eradicate such crimes, work for the revision of SOFA toward an agreement that guarantees equal rights, and finally reform the unequal system of international relations between the U.S. and South Korea in order to work towards autonomy as a nation.”8 Protest organizations renewed their demand after Corporal Christopher McCarthy was arrested for killing Kim Songhui, a prostitute, in February 2000. McCarthy escaped while being held in U.S. military custody pending his trial in a South Korean court. Although he was caught within eight hours, this episode convinced many Koreans that South Korea should obtain greater custodial rights over American suspects through a SOFA revision. Protest organizations stepped up their efforts ahead of the bilateral SOFA negotiations in August 2000. Organizations critical of the SOFA created another umbrella organization, People’s Action for Reform of the Status of Forces Agreement (PAR-­SOFA), which included the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, Green Korea United, Korea Federation of Environmental Movements, Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, National Campaign for the Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea, and a human rights and peace organization, Korea House for International Solidarity.9 The Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice challenged the SOFA in Korea’s constitutional court in July 2000. The coalition raised criminal jurisdiction and custody as some of the key concerns, alleging that the SOFA “violates the Korean Constitution’s provisions on human dignity, equal rights, the right of criminal victims to testify in court, environmental rights, and the right to the pursuit of happiness.”10 The PAR-­SOFA also designated the week between July 24 and August 2 as “People’s Act Week,” demanding an official apology for U.S. troops’ crimes and a “total” revision of the SOFA.11 The pro-

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test organizations’ arguments won broad public support. A public opinion poll in August 2000 showed that 78 percent of the respondents supported a SOFA revision.12 However, protest organizations’ normative arguments did not persuade Korean or American policy-­makers. On the Korean side, key policy-­ makers regarding base policy are in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and the Ministry of National Defense (MND). The Ministry of Justice participates in policy-­making regarding criminal jurisdiction and custody. On the American side, the Department of State and the Department of Defense are important actors. The U.S. embassy in South Korea and the USFK are representatives on the ground. South Korean protesters failed to persuade policy-­makers in these Korean and American government organizations, despite their efforts through office visits, writing letters to officials, press conferences, protest activities like the People’s Act Week and demonstrations on the street, and the aforementioned court case.13 First, MOFAT and USFK representatives told me that the protesters’ argument that the SOFA violated Korean sovereignty was weak because the SOFA was a bilateral agreement that the South Korean government had negotiated and signed as a sovereign state.14 Second, the protest organizations’ argument that the two governments should conduct a “total” revision of the SOFA to give all jurisdictional and custodial rights to South Korea seemed to negate the purpose of the agreement, which is to create a balance between the needs of the two states.15 The SOFA is intended to strike a balance between Korean sovereignty and requirements for American military effectiveness. The American “need” in this balance is twofold. First, American officials believe that maintaining jurisdiction over on-­duty offenses enables a freer execution of activities by preventing foreign states from judging the appropriateness of U.S. military actions. Second, limiting foreign custody of military personnel is a force protection measure to prevent possible violation of their rights during interrogation and detention by host states. The protest organizations’ demand appeared unreasonable when considering this balance. A Korean MOFAT official working on the SOFA said: “States must give some to get some in negotiations. In an alliance, it is important to reach agreements that benefit each other.”16 Third, protesters’ argument that U.S. custody of crime suspects inhibited investigations by the Korean side did not persuade American officials. The United States had agreed in the 1966 SOFA to “promptly make any such accused available to the authorities of the Republic of Korea upon their request for purposes of investigation and trial” (Article XXII, Paragraph 5c).

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American officials believed that they were adhering to this agreement, and found the protest organizations’ allegations unfair. In addition, according to a USFK official familiar with the SOFA procedures, U.S. and Korean authorities conducted a joint investigation and interrogation in the Markle case, contrary to the protesters’ argument that the United States hindered Korean investigators.17 Fourth, American officials did not accept the protest organizations’ argument that U.S. courts-­martial were biased and lenient toward military personnel. American officials argue that U.S. military personnel who commit crimes could receive heavier sentences in U.S. courts-­martial than in Korean courts. For example, in Markle’s off-­duty murder case, the Korean Supreme Court reduced his life-­imprisonment sentence to fifteen years, and a Korean judicial committee released him in 2006 with two years and nine months left on his sentence.18 This surprised USFK officials familiar with court-­martial procedures, who said Markle would still be in prison if the United States had jurisdiction over him.19 It is difficult to verify this type of counter-­factual claim. Yet this is what American officials believe, and they rejected protesters’ normative arguments based on this belief. An American official also pointed out that South Korea often waives its primary jurisdiction because it knows that U.S. courts-­martial are fair and often give harsher punishments.20 Protest organizations argued that only the Korean judicial system can deliver justice to victims, but this did not persuade USFK officials.21 In short, American and Korean officials did not accept protest organizations’ arguments that the SOFA needed to be revised because it violated Korean sovereignty and the rights of crime victims. In fact, my interviews reveal that many American and Korean officials considered protest organizations’ demand for a SOFA revision a political attempt to weaken the U.S.-­ ROK alliance.22 Many officials believe that antibase organizations support North Korea’s Communist ideology and are part of the “North Korean campaign to discredit the Americans.”23 A retired Korean general familiar with protest organizations, for example, said he has always wondered if the organizations were connected to North Korea because “their arguments are just the same as the North Korean propaganda.”24 Some officials even suspect that North Korea funds, infiltrates, and incites many of the protest organizations. When asked about this perception among policy-­makers, activists responded that such a “groundless rumor” and “slander” is meant to direct the public’s attention away from the problems of the USFK presence.25 In fact, when I asked USFK and Korean officials for evidence of the alleged collaboration between North Korea and NGOs in South Korea,

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they could not provide any. Yet the negative perception of protest organizations among policy-­makers does not help these organizations win state support for their normative arguments. Together with policy-­makers’ perception that protest organizations’ arguments were incorrect and unreasonable, policy-­makers’ perception that protest organizations were not credible blocked normative persuasion. Compromise Although persuasion failed, Korean and American policy-­makers agreed to change the criminal custody procedures in the revised SOFA in 2001. This was in response to the overwhelming public opinion supporting a SOFA revision. A MOFAT official said that the criminal incidents during the 1990s and the protest organizations’ activities impressed upon the public the need for revision and created a momentum for it.26 Some political events in 2000 created further incentives for changing the SOFA. On the Korean side, President Kim Dae-­jung’s party suffered a setback in the National Assembly election of April 13. For the first time in Korean history, the ruling party failed to secure a majority in the assembly. Although the historic inter-­Korean summit of June was a major victory for Kim, whose public support rate shot up to 70 percent, by October the support rate dropped to 47 percent due to various problems within his administration.27 These political setbacks made progress on the SOFA important for the Korean government. The inter-­Korean summit created some incentives for the United States to agree to revise the SOFA. The summit led many South Koreans to think that North Korea posed no threat and to question the utility of an alliance with the United States. This perception was especially pronounced among the younger generations who did not experience the Korean War. As the perception of a threat from North Korea diminished and inter-­Korean nationalism became stronger, more people started to focus on the burdens of the ROK-­U.S. alliance rather than its benefits.28 The United States had to respond to the protesters’ demand for a SOFA revision in this context. In addition, the United States was vulnerable to the Korean criticism that on the issue of criminal custody the ROK-­U.S. SOFA was not as equal as the Japan-­U.S. SOFA.The Japan-­U.S. SOFA of 1960 says that in cases where Japan is to exercise jurisdiction, the United States will transfer the custody of American suspects to Japan after indictment. In October 1995, in response to the protest in Okinawa, the United States declared in a SOFA implementation agreement that it would give sympathetic consideration to Japanese requests for a custody transfer before indictment in cases of murder and rape. Korean

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protesters and government officials argued that the ROK-­U.S. SOFA that enabled the United States to hold a suspect in custody until the conclusion of all judicial proceedings was unfair in comparison with the Japan-­U.S. SOFA. However, American policy-­makers, especially military officials, were reluctant to change the ROK-­U.S. SOFA on criminal custody. According to a USFK official familiar with the SOFA procedures, American policy-­makers believed that they had had a “bad experience” under the agreement with Japan. They were frustrated that American representatives could not communicate with suspects during interrogation, and believed that this increased the risk of self-­incrimination.29 This made them resist the idea of putting the ROK-­U.S. SOFA on a par with the Japan-­U.S. SOFA. They therefore agreed to a more limited change to the ROK-­U.S. SOFA by allowing South Korea to hold military suspects in custody after indictment in “cases of sufficient gravity,” as described above. The various conditions attached to the custody transfer ensured American custody of its personnel until the end of the judicial process in most cases in which South Korea had primary jurisdiction. Therefore this agreement was a compromise solution, or a limited policy change in which the United States tried to address the public’s concerns in order to maintain its support for the alliance, while rejecting a fundamental change in policy to serve its interests. The SOFA amendment, which attached many conditions for the earlier transfer of custody and did not change the provisions on criminal jurisdiction, disappointed the protest organizations that had asked for a more significant change on these issues. Women’s organizations also criticized that the term “egregious rape,” which the two governments identified as one of the heinous crimes, is “confusing and nonsensical,” questioning the possibility of non-­ egregious rape.30 Unsatisfied, protest organizations sought to prevent the ratification of the amended SOFA through rallies and participation in a National Assembly debate.31 The assembly ratified the amended SOFA, however, and it came into effect on April 2, 2001.

Adding Environmental Provisions to the SOFA, 2000–­2001 The revised SOFA of January 2001 included a memorandum on environmental protection (Memorandum of Special Understandings on Environmental Protection). This memorandum announced the two governments’ intention to cooperate on environmental issues related to the USFK’s facilities and areas. Although the original SOFA from 1966 said that the United States, within its facilities and areas, “may take all the measures necessary for their . . . safeguarding” (Article III, Paragraph 1) and that it shall carry on its operations “with

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due regard to the public safety” (Article III, Paragraph 3), the SOFA had not explicitly mentioned environmental protection before 2001. Two factors explain this addition to the SOFA. First, a greater environmental consciousness developed in South Korea and the U.S. military since the 1990s, and the two governments established stricter environmental laws. This was the normative and legal contexts for the agreement. Second, two large protest mobilizations in 2000, one over a bombing accident in Maehyangri and another over a USFK mortuary worker’s inappropriate disposal of a toxic chemical, served as the immediate causes of the agreement. Although Korean environmental organizations’ normative arguments failed to persuade Korean and American policy-­makers, the large protests pressured the governments to attach the memorandum on environmental protection to their SOFA. However, the memorandum did not change the environmental policy on military bases. Rather, it was a declaration of the two states’ intention to cooperate on environmental protection and described environmental policy that was already in place. Therefore, the memorandum was a symbolic concession to protesters entailing no change in policy. This lack of policy change is surprising because the two governments negotiated the environmental policy within the same political context that led to a change in the policy on criminal custody. Based on my interviews with American and Korean officials it is apparent that environmental policy on military bases did not change because American policy-­makers believed existing policy was already adequate to protect the environment on bases. American officials also hoped that adding the environmental provisions to the SOFA for the first time—­even if they reiterated the existing policy—­would create a public image that progress on this issue had been made. Although the Korean Ministry of Environment (MOE) argued for a policy change, MOFAT and MND, which are more important ministries in base policy-­making, accepted the American position and called on MOE to back down. Environmental Norms, Protest Organizations’ Demands, and Failure of Persuasion By the 1990s there had been, in the words of Robert Durant, a “greening of the U.S. military.” President George H. W. Bush’s secretary of defense, Richard Cheney, began to argue soon after assuming his post in 1989 that environmental conditions in U.S. military bases needed to improve and that the goal of providing security “is no excuse for ignoring the environment.” He announced his Defense and Environment Initiative in 1990. Its ambitious goal was to create a “beyond-­compliance” ethic, which would replace the “war-

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rior culture of sovereignty, secrecy, and sinecure that thoroughly marginalized [environmental and natural resources] values” during the Cold War.32 The Base Realignment and Closure Act and the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 reinforced the effort to develop an environmental ethic in the U.S. military.33 Durant reports, however, that “evidence abounded throughout the Clinton and George W. Bush years that progress was nowhere near as broad, willingly pursued, or deeply ingrained as the Pentagon claimed.”34 Nevertheless, the U.S. military’s environmental awareness and actions improved during the 1990s. Of special importance to the U.S. military’s environmental policy abroad was a message from the Secretary of Defense Leslie Aspen, Jr., in December 1993, which charged local commanders with remedying “known, imminent, and substantial endangerment to human health and safety” caused by U.S. military operations.35 The level of pollution that required remedy was high, enabling local commanders to disregard environmental problems below this level if they so chose. However, this policy that clarified local commanders’ responsibility regarding the environment was a step forward. Environmental consciousness developed in South Korea in the 1990s as well. At the state level, a government restructuring effort led to the promotion of the Environmental Division under the Ministry of Health and Society to the Ministry of Environment in January 1990. Many environmental laws and regulations established in the 1990s reflected the increasing environmental awareness. In fact, six environmental acts were adopted in the 1960s and nine in the 1970s and the 1980s combined, while twenty-­three acts were adopted in the 1990s.36 As political decentralization progressed in South Korea, local governments enacted their own environmental laws as well. Creation of environmental organizations in the 1990s also reflected the development of environmental consciousness in South Korea. Two major Korean environmental organizations, Green Korea United and the Korea Federation of Environmental Movements, were established in 1991 and 1993 respectively.37 Their involvement in military base policy started with their collaboration with the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea. In cooperation with organizations around U.S. bases and some local residents, these environmental organizations started to assess the environmental impact of U.S. military bases in 1996. In May 1999, Green Korea United, which had became one of the leading organizations critical of base policy, created the Korea Environmental Litigation Center for cases related to U.S. military bases.38 Based on their research, environmental organizations charged that the USFK caused oil leakages, noise pollution, as well as water and soil con-

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tamination with heavy metals and other hazardous wastes.39 They demanded South Korea and the United States insert environmental provisions into the SOFA, obligating the United States to publicly disclose all cases of pollution and conduct thorough cleanups using its own funds and restoring affected land to its “original” state. They also asked for specific measures to prevent base pollution. Finally, they demanded their participation in environmental decision-­making and implementation.40 USFK officials were aware of the rising environmental consciousness in South Korea, and agreed that they should prevent and remedy serious environmental pollution that harmed people’s health. However, environmental organizations failed to persuade them about the need to strengthen their environmental policy and accept new obligations such as restoring polluted land to its original state.41 First, since USFK officials adhered to the U.S. environmental policy to remedy “known, imminent, and substantial endangerment to human health and safety,” they did not think that they were violating environmental norms. Second, Article IV of the U.S.-­ROK SOFA states that the United States is not obliged to restore military facilities to their original state, or to compensate South Korea for restoration. Environmental organizations’ “polluter pays” principle, which demanded that USFK pay for cleanups, sounded unfair to USFK officials given the SOFA. Officials also believed that their presence significantly contributed to Korean security and South Korea should share the alliance’s financial burden. Third, environmental organizations’ demand that the USFK clean up all pollution sounded unworkable to many officials. A USFK official, for example, said “it does not make sense” to clean up a bombing range used for fifty years to the standards required for building parks and residential areas.42 Such a cleanup would require decades and be extremely expensive. Another USFK official agreed that it is “unrealistic” to try to restore an environment to its “original” state.43 An official from the Korean MOE said that it would like the United States to restore base lands to their “1960 level” and it was not asking the United States to “re-­create mountains and rice fields.” However, this official also conceded that environmental organizations’ demands could at times be “very radical.”44 All in all, protest organizations’ arguments did not fit the knowledge and beliefs of American policy-­makers, and moreover policy-­ makers considered protesters’ arguments unrealistic and unfair. As a result, persuasion failed. Furthermore, many USFK officials did not find South Korea’s environmental organizations credible. They wondered how these organizations could evaluate pollution on bases without having access to the bases. In question-

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ing environmental groups’ finding that U.S. military bases were highly contaminated, a USFK official said that if there were significant environmental problems on base, the USFK would fix them for the sake of the health of the Americans and Koreans who worked and lived there.45 In addition, many USFK officials considered environmental organizations as a part of the antibase coalition that “picked on” and “went after” the USFK to damage the U.S.-­ROK alliance.46 A USFK official, for example, told me that he had the impression that Green Korea United was “being used by North Korea to drive a wedge between the U.S. and ROK.”47 Although a leader of Green Korea United emphasized that the group was not anti-­ American or antibase and merely focused on environmental problems that harm local residents living around bases, many USFK officials saw the organization as anti-­American and antibase.48 Green Korea United in fact joined a coalition of organizations that included antibase protest groups, and it participated in rallies after various incidents related to the USFK. Furthermore, despite the group’s focus on environmental issues, its website has sometimes posted its own and other organizations’ writings that include a demand for a U.S. military withdrawal.49 Based on these observations, USFK officials saw Green Korea United as part of the antibase coalition, and believed it used its research findings politically. For all these reasons, many officials did not consider environmental organizations credible, and the organizations’ normative arguments were not persuasive. Protest Mobilizations in 2000 Although environmental organizations’ normative arguments failed to persuade policy-­makers, two large mobilizations pressured them to include environmental provisions in the SOFA. First, on May 8, 2000, an A-­10 fighter plane had an engine problem in flight and dropped six live bombs within the Kooni Firing Range in Maehyangri as an emergency measure to ensure the safety of the aircraft and its crew. According to local residents, this incident broke windows and caused other damage to more than a hundred houses near the bombing range, injured thirteen residents, and caused miscarriage in forty-­two cows. A strong local protest prompted South Korea and the United States to start a joint investigation ten days after the accident.50 Despite the local complaints about the damage, the investigative team announced on June 1 that the accident did not directly harm people, buildings, or livestock. The day after this announcement, the U.S. Air Force restarted the A-­10 exercises. Local residents became outraged. In a subsequent protest rally, they and their supporters from outside Maehyangri clashed with riot police.

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A local antibase leader was arrested after he entered the bombing range and tore up a flag that signaled military exercises. This arrest increased the wrath of the protesters, which by then included people from fifty protest groups that composed the National Committee to Abolish the Maehyangri U.S. Air Force Training Range. They organized a protest rally, reported by both Korean and foreign media, with about three thousand participants in Maehyangri.51 Soon after the accident in Maehyangri, another event outraged the Korean public. In spring 2000, Green Korea United received information that a large amount of formaldehyde, a toxic chemical commonly used to preserve corpses, was inappropriately disposed of in the Yongsan Army Garrison in Seoul. After three months of evidence gathering, Green Korea United announced in a press conference in July 2000 that a deputy director of the Eighth Army’s mortuary ordered his subordinates to pour 480 bottles (228 litters) of fluid containing formaldehyde down the drain on February 9, 2000. Green Korea United charged that this toxin, which flowed into the Han River that supplies water to Seoul, was strong enough to kill eight thousand people.52 Korean environmental groups publicized the issue widely and organized protests with other organizations. They alleged that formaldehyde could cause cancer and miscarriages.53 Environmental organizations lobbied the MOE to include environmental provisions in the SOFA. Korean newspaper editorials supported this, arguing for the need to compel the USFK to comply with Korean environmental laws. Korean lawmakers from both the ruling and opposition parties asked the USFK to strictly punish the officials involved. Six days after the press conference by Green Korea United, the USFK promised to investigate the issue and, if warranted, punish those involved.54 In September 2000, the USFK announced the result of its investigation, which admitted that the deputy director of the mortuary, a civilian employed by the USFK, ordered two subordinates to dispose of a formaldehyde mixture.55 The USFK said that the disposal violated both U.S. and Korean laws, and that it punished the deputy director with a one-­month suspension without pay. The USFK emphasized, however, that the disposal did not pollute the Han River, because the formaldehyde mixture was diluted in about 1.9 million gallons of other wastewater and went through three treatment processes.56 Despite the USFK’s announcement that the toxin did not pollute the Han River, the protest organizations’ arguments raised fear and suspicion among the public. An MOE official confirmed that the incident was decisive in the formation of the public’s preference that environmental provisions be included in the SOFA.57

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State Response The mobilizations against the bombing incident in Maehyangri and the toxin disposal in the Yongsan Garrison pressured the two governments to include environmental provisions in the SOFA. Given the increasing environmental awareness in South Korea, the Korean government had pushed for the inclusion of environmental issues in the SOFA negotiations in 1995–­1996 and 2000. However, the U.S. government had resisted the inclusion of environmental issues in the agenda for the negotiations.58 In fact, when the United States gave the Korean government a SOFA proposal on May 31, 2000, to prepare for a new round of negotiations, the proposal focused solely on the criminal custody issue.59 The protest organizations’ efforts in publicizing the environmental problems associated with military bases generated incentives for the United States to include environmental provisions in the revised SOFA in 2001.60 The SOFA provisions sought to calm the popular outrage without changing the environmental policy on bases. In the negotiations that started on August 2, 2000, the two governments added an Agreed Minute to the SOFA, which read in part that the United States confirms its policy to respect relevant Republic of Korea Government environmental laws, regulations, and standards. According to an MOE official, the ministry preferred that the Americans accept responsibility to comply with Korean environmental laws, but MND and MOFAT compelled it to accept the more ambiguous wording that the United States would “respect” Korean environmental laws.61 The American obligation to respect Korean domestic laws was not new, as it had already been codified in the SOFA (Article VII, Respect for Local Law). The two governments also signed the Memorandum of Special Understandings on Environmental Protection, which included four sections: environmental governing standards, information sharing and access, environmental performance, and environmental consultation. These sections, however, reiterated the existing USFK policy and did not offer anything new. Moreover, the United States considered the memorandum a declaration of intent and not binding.62 Although policy-­makers negotiated the environmental provisions within the same political context that changed the SOFA on criminal custody, they decided against changing the environmental policy.There were two reasons for this decision. First, a change in policy in this case would have entailed relaxing the principle of remedying “known, imminent, and substantial endangerment to human health and safety,” and this would have created expensive obliga-

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tions that the United States was unwilling to assume.63 Furthermore, base commanders already had the authority to remedy pollution below this level of environmental damage at their discretion, based on expert advice. Given this, American policy-­makers believed that the United States was not in violation of environmental norms and that a change in policy was not necessary.64 Second, policy change did not occur because adding the environmental provisions to the SOFA appeared sufficient to create a public impression that the United States cared about the environment. Environmental provisions were not a part of the SOFA, and American officials hoped that the addition—­even if it were a mere declaration of existing policy—­would generate a public image that a progress on this issue had been made.65 As such, the environmental provisions in the SOFA were symbolic concessions short of policy change that signaled the U.S. adherence to environmental norms. The symbolic gesture was also a face-­saving measure, which allowed Seoul to claim credit for some progress on the issue. The revised SOFA was signed by the two states on January 18, 2001, and came into effect on April 2, 2001. As there was no policy change, environmental organizations remained unsatisfied. Green Korea United, for example, argued on its website that the SOFA revision was a “sugar-­coated provision with no actual content,” and “a lie which mock[s] Korean citizens.” The organization was especially critical of the fact that the new SOFA included neither a clause on punishing those responsible for “U.S. environmental crimes,” nor a clause on American “obligations to take appropriate measures to restore the environment to its original state.”66

Candlelight Protests for Korean Jurisdiction Over On-­Duty Cases, 2002–­2003 The issue of criminal jurisdiction resurfaced in massive protests between November 2002 and the early months of 2003. The protests followed the acquittal by U.S. courts-­martial of two American soldiers charged with negligent homicide. The two accidentally killed two Korean schoolgirls with an armored vehicle on a public road during a military exercise. Although protest organizations demanded another SOFA revision to expand Korean jurisdiction over American personnel accused of on-­duty offenses, American and Korean policy-­makers remained unpersuaded by their arguments based on Korean sovereignty and human rights. Policy-­makers also continued to believe that protest organizations were not credible. The large protests created important incentives for Seoul to propose a SOFA revision to the United States. However, the primary right to exer-

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cise criminal jurisdiction in on-­duty cases remained non-­negotiable for the United States. As a result, the two states responded with a SOFA implementation agreement on May 30, 2003, which was not a formal SOFA revision, but an agreement detailing the procedures to better implement the SOFA. The agreement aimed to strengthen the two governments’ cooperation during initial investigations of incidents involving USFK personnel, and outlined some safety procedures to prevent accidents during USFK exercises.The implementation agreement was a symbolic concession to protesters without a change in policy on criminal jurisdiction. Protest Mobilization On June 13, 2002, a fifty-six ton American military armored vehicle accidentally ran over and killed two fourteen-­year-­old girls on a narrow stretch of road in Kyonggi Province during a military exercise. At first, in the excitement of the World Cup that South Korea co-­hosted with Japan in May–­June 2002, in which the Korean national team achieved unprecedented success and reached the semifinals, the accident did not receive much press attention. However, reports on the accident on internet news sources and protest organizations’ web pages eventually led to a large protest mobilization. Pressed by the protests, the Korean Ministry of Justice made an unprecedented request to the USFK to waive its jurisdiction in this on-­duty case. The voices of protest became louder when the USFK refused to waive its jurisdiction, and massive protests occurred after U.S. courts-­martial acquitted two USFK soldiers (the driver and controller of the armored vehicle) of negligent homicide in November 2002. The acquittals renewed the impression among the Korean public that courts-­martial were lenient toward military personnel. Protest organizations argued again that the SOFA, which gave the United States the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over its military personnel in on-­duty cases, was unfair when incidents involved Korean victims. They charged that the SOFA violated the victims’ human rights and Korean sovereignty. In massive candlelight protests between late November 2002 and the early months of 2003, protest organizations demanded a SOFA revision so that American military personnel would be tried in Korean courts for on-­duty crimes. On December 14, 2002, approximately 45,000 people gathered in front of the Seoul City Hall to protest, in what a government source described as the largest “anti-­American” rally in Korean history. Protests occurred in more than sixty locations across South Korea that day.67 On December 31, 2002, about 25,000 protesters gathered near the U.S. embassy in Seoul for another candlelight rally.68

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State Response The protesters’ normative arguments, however, failed to persuade Korean and American policy-­makers, for the same reasons as in 2001. Contrary to the protesters’ allegation that the SOFA violated Korean sovereignty, American and Korean officials pointed out that the SOFA was an agreement concluded between two sovereign states. The United States, to prevent foreign states from judging the appropriateness of U.S. military activities, refused to negotiate its primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over on-­duty personnel. American policy-­makers also rejected protest organizations’ argument that U.S. courts-­ martial were biased and lenient toward military personnel, and therefore did not deliver justice to Korean victims. To counter this allegation the USFK provided the victims’ family members, Korean government officials, media, and some NGOs “an unprecedented level of access” to the trials in 2002.69 In addition, many USFK officials’ perception that protest organizations were not credible became reinforced during this period, preventing normative persuasion. American officials resented the inaccurate information and rumors that they believed some protest organizations spread about the incident. For example, a USFK official remembers that some Korean press reported that after the U.S. military vehicle ran over the girls it went back over them to destroy the evidence. He said some press and protest organizations distorted the truth in order to weaken the alliance.70 The USFK Commander, General Leon LaPorte, recalled in a Senate hearing in 2003 that protest organizations “used biased and inaccurate media reporting to inflame anti-­United States Forces Korea sentiments and mobilize demonstrations.”71 Some protest organizations also insisted that the United States was unrepentant and refused to take responsibility for the incident, although top officials offered apologies and took responsibility immediately after the incident. Soldiers in the Second Infantry Division participated in a candlelight vigil at Camp Howze on June 18. USFK soldiers presented more than $22,000 to the families through the Red Cross. Each of the victims’ families accepted an initial payment of 1 million won and subsequent payment of about 195 million won, in September 2002. In addition, the USFK put into place safety measures for its exercises, directly in response to the accident.72 Given the apologies and the decision to implement new safety measures, American officials complained about some protest organizations’ allegation that they were unrepentant about the accident. In short, protesters’ arguments that relied on sovereignty and human rights norms failed to persuade policy-­makers. Policy-­makers rejected the argu-

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ments given their knowledge about the SOFA and courts-­martial. In addition, American officials did not find protest organizations credible. However, the massive protests in late 2002 pressured the two states to conclude the SOFA implementation agreement in 2003.73 A November 2002 poll, conducted a few days after the acquittal of the two military servicemen, showed that 81.3 percent of the respondents favored revising the SOFA to enable South Korea to exercise jurisdiction over on-­duty cases.74 Korean politicians from both ruling and opposition parties asked for a SOFA revision. Popular support for a SOFA revision expressed through the massive protests and public opinion polls prompted President Roh Moo-­hyun to propose a revision to the United States. Roh had an added incentive to do so. He won the presidential election of December 2002 in part by riding the wave of protests, promising to pursue a more equal ROK-­U.S. relationship. He declared during the campaign: “If elected, I will deal with the Bush administration with national assertiveness. I will not kowtow to Washington.”75 He won with significant support from progressive organizations and young voters in their twenties and thirties, many of whom supported a SOFA revision. Roh had to make good his promise from the election campaign. Proposing a SOFA revision became even more important after Roh had to moderate his policy position on North Korea. He had declared support for his predecessor’s Sunshine Policy and opposition to the use of force against Pyeongyang under any circumstances.76 However, in the ROK-­U.S. summit of May 2003, Roh agreed with Bush to seek peaceful means to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis but without excluding economic pressure or military action as final options.77 Roh also had to moderate his tone on the ROK-­U.S. relationship. These changes in Roh’s approach to North Korea and the United States displeased his progressive constituents and made the gesture of proposing a SOFA revision on criminal jurisdiction politically important. The large protests of 2002–­2003 created important pressure on the United States to offer some kind of response, but negotiating to cede the primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over on-­duty cases remained out of the question. Moreover, three factors mitigated the pressure for change that the protests generated. First, even at the height of the protest against the SOFA, public support for the ROK-­U.S. alliance and the U.S. military presence in South Korea remained strong. A public opinion survey in December showed that 54.8 percent of the respondents opposed the withdrawal of the USFK.78 An incident in June 2002 in which North Korean patrol boats crossed the sea demarcation line, sank a South Korean ship, and killed five navy men is likely

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to have contributed to this level of support for the continued presence of the USFK. Second, the pressure for change was reduced by the fact that the ROKU.S. negotiations on the SOFA dragged on from December 2002 to May 2003. That the negotiations were protracted, which is common in SOFA negotiations, helped the United States manage and reduce the incentive for change that the protests generated. By May, when the two states signed the SOFA implementation agreement, the protests had long calmed down, and 76.3 percent of respondents in an opinion poll saw a need for the ROK-­U.S. alliance.79 Third, as the bilateral negotiations continued and the United States refused to negotiate a change to criminal jurisdiction procedures for on-­duty cases, Korean negotiators came to accept that it was more constructive to improve the implementation of the SOFA than to continue the potentially divisive and unproductive negotiations to revise it.80 For these reasons, the two governments responded to protests with an implementation agreement instead of a SOFA revision. The implementation agreement was a symbolic concession to protesters that aimed to create a public image that something had been done to improve U.S. military practices. The SOFA implementation agreement incorporated new safety measures during the USFK’s off-­base military exercises. The two states also agreed to strengthen their cooperation in investigating accidents and crimes involving USFK personnel, and to facilitate Korean authorities’ interrogation of USFK personnel when the United States maintained custody. The SOFA, however, had already included provisions on bilateral cooperation in these areas.81 Although Seoul and Washington did not revise the SOFA, they put a positive spin on the fact that the negotiations took place and they concluded the implementation agreement. The deputy commander of the USFK, Lt. Gen. Lance Smith, said: “We will never meet all the demands of the activists and some of the more extremist NGOs. But we’re making every possible effort to make sure that we operate as safely as possible.”82 A MOFAT statement stressed that the bilateral negotiations showed that the USFK was a “caring member of the Korean local community.”83 In fact, in response to the protests the USFK strengthened its civil-­military exchange programs to improve its image among the Korean public. Various such programs existed before the protests, but the USFK formalized them through the Good Neighbors Program (GNP) and implemented it at all command levels in 2003. Although the GNP engaged the Korean public in general, the USFK decided to make a special effort in reaching Korean youth. According to a USFK official familiar with the program, people with Korean

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War experience tend to support the American military presence, and people in their forties without the war experience tend to oppose the American presence, while youth have not formed an opinion but tend to be more “proU.S.” However, he said, the demonstrations of 2002–­2003 showed that “it did not take much to tip the youth to the anti-­U.S. side.” Indeed, a public opinion poll in December 2002 showed that Koreans in their twenties were the only age group in which more people responded that the USFK should withdraw.84 The GNP aimed to “seek out the population that is undecided about the Americans” and create a positive impression of the United States and the American military presence in South Korea.85

Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land Expropriation in Pyeongtaek, 2004–­2007 On March 29, 2002, representatives from the United States and South Korea signed an agreement, the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), to reduce the number of U.S. military installations from forty-­one to twenty-­three through consolidation of many facilities. This realignment involved the closure and reduction of facilities mainly in the region north of Seoul, and enlargement of some key facilities south of Seoul. As a part of this plan, the two governments signed a follow-­up plan, the Yongsan Relocation Plan, on October 26, 2004. One of the most significant consequences of the LPP and the Yongsan Relocation Plan was to expand Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek from 1,210 acres to 3,538 acres, in order to accommodate the USFK headquarters from Yongsan Army Garrison in Seoul and the Second Infantry Division from near the border with North Korea, among other units. The South Korean government purchased the required farmland adjacent to Camp Humphreys for base expansion in 2005. Some of the landowners accepted the land purchase and left their land, but the rest refused to move from their expropriated land.86 Residents who opposed the expropriation formed protest groups, and organizations from outside of Pyeongtaek joined them to form the Pan-­South Korean Solution Committee against Base Extension in Pyeongtaek (KCPT) in March 2005.87 KCPT organized daily candlelight vigils, marches, press conferences, fund-­raisers, and other activities to campaign against expanding the base in Pyeongtaek. Some of the demonstrations were very large. For example, a Peace March in Pyeongtaek on July 10, 2005, attracted 12,000 people, including delegates from protest organizations in Okinawa and the Philippines.88 The protesters advanced two normative arguments against base expansion. First, KCPT argued that Pyeongtaek farmers needed their land to survive, and

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expropriation would violate their human rights by taking away their livelihood. KCPT declared that “most residents wish to live and die on the land that they currently live on. The hopes of residents should not be a dream, but their right: their right to life and their right to work.”89 A KCPT leader emphasized that “expropriation is a form of violence. Pyeongtaek farmers only want to farm the land.”90 Second, KCPT used the antiwar and antimilitarism norms to argue that base expansion threatened peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. They contended that relocation of U.S. forces away from the North Korean border was a force protection measure in preparation for a preemptive U.S. attack on North Korea.91 President Bush’s inclusion of North Korea in the “axis of evil” in January 2002 and the subsequent doctrine of preemptive action generated this perception among protesters. KCPT warned: “Rather than moving towards peace and reconciliation, the Korean Peninsula is reverting towards a direction of confrontation and war.”92 KCPT also argued that base expansion would make Camp Humphreys a giant hub that would allow the United States to deploy its forces to regional conflicts more easily. The protesters feared that this would carry “the potential for large-­scale military confrontation in the entire Northeast Asia region.”93 KCPT members especially worried about American deployment to a conflict between China and Taiwan, which might entangle South Korea into a conflict that might not serve its interests.94 KCPT tried to persuade American and Korean policy-­makers to change policy by visiting their offices, handing or sending letters to officials, holding press conferences, and organizing demonstrations and other protest activities mentioned above. However, protesters’ arguments did not persuade policy-­makers. First, the argument that the land expropriation violated farmers’ human rights did not persuade because policy-­makers believed that the Korean government offered adequate monetary compensation and relocation aid, such as alternative land to farm or places to live. Some American officials believed that the residents who continued to protest did so not out of any principle but for the sake of generating more compensation.95 The belief that economic compensation eliminates a human rights concern and that local protesters’ aim was to receive more compensation minimized the predicament of farmers and other residents in the expropriated area. But this appears to be a broadly shared belief among American and Korean policy-­makers. Second, that the land expropriation was legal added an obstacle to normative persuasion. Article 23 of the Korean constitution guarantees the right of property, but it also enables “expropriation, use, or restriction of private prop-

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erty from public necessity” with compensation. An official from the National Human Rights Commission of Korea confirmed: “NGOs tend to think in terms of justice and moral rightness, but the commission must think in terms of legality. The government is carrying out the relocation legally.”96 Third, the protest organizations’ antiwar and antimilitarism argument that expanding Camp Humphreys would make conflict more likely on the Korean Peninsula and in the region did not persuade American and Korean policy-­makers. In fact, policy-­makers believed the opposite, that advancing base consolidation in South Korea through the expansion of Camp Humphreys would enhance the USFK’s military effectiveness and deterrent capabilities. Policy-­makers believed military effectiveness would be strengthened in two ways. First, base consolidation would enhance U.S. force protection and combat readiness. Many of the installations targeted for closure are between Seoul and the border with North Korea. This area, including Seoul, is within the range of North Korean artillery.The relocation of forces there (most importantly the USFK headquarters in Seoul and the Second Infantry Division near the border) to the south would make U.S. forces “less vulnerable to North Korean artillery or to being overrun during a North Korean attack.”97 Policy-­makers aimed to improve operational responsiveness and strategic flexibility through the consolidation of the USFK units throughout South Korea into key hubs including Camp Humphreys. Second, American policy-­makers believed that base consolidation would improve U.S. military personnel’s quality of life and morale, with significant consequences for military effectiveness. The USFK faced challenges on this issue. A DOD survey in 2001 found that Army and Air Force personnel considered South Korea as the least desirable assignment, and that many were avoiding service there by retiring, declining to accept command assignments, and other means.98 USFK personnel often work in small, isolated, and obsolete facilities, which the USFK commander, General LaPorte, claimed “impair readiness, reduce the efficiency of uniformed and civilian workers, and lower retention rates of highly qualified and otherwise motivated people.”99 Base consolidation aimed to replace these facilities with new ones. In addition, roughly half of the soldiers deployed to South Korea are married, but most of them have had to come unaccompanied.100 Unaccompanied tours, which last one year, create high annual turnover in Army units and reduce their cohesion and capability. Unaccompanied tours also decrease the likelihood that a soldier will reenlist.101 The USFK planned to increase the share of accompanied army tours from 10 percent (2,800 soldiers) to 25 percent (7,000 soldiers) through construction of better facilities and the move away from the border with North Korea.102

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In sum, American and Korean policy-­makers aimed to enhance U.S. force protection, combat readiness, and morale through base consolidation, with the ultimate goal of strengthening military effectiveness and the U.S.-­ROK alliance. They believed that this would also strengthen deterrence, and this belief contributed to policy-­makers’ rejection of KCPT arguments that base consolidation through expansion of Camp Humphreys would make conflict more likely on the peninsula and in the region.103 Finally, policy-­makers did not consider many organizations that joined the KCPT from outside of Pyeongtaek as credible. The lack of credibility is likely to have created an additional barrier to normative persuasion. Both Korean and American policy-­makers believed that national protest organizations—­ which mobilized or joined other protests regarding U.S. military bases—­ latched onto the Pyeongtaek case, dramatizing the plight of the farmers to create a negative image of the USFK and further the ulterior cause of prompting a U.S. withdrawal from South Korea.104 KCPT did not demand a U.S. military withdrawal but instead focused on stopping the base expansion in Pyeongtaek, in order to obtain broad public support and keep the coalition of diverse organizations together. However, policy-­makers saw that KCPT’s leadership and members included national organizations that advocated a U.S. withdrawal in other contexts, and assumed that they were inciting local residents to further their ulterior goal. Furthermore, there were many organizations in KCPT that did not advocate U.S. military withdrawal but had participated in other protests against U.S. military base policy. These organizations suffered from a lack of credibility among policy-­makers, who considered them organizations that would take any opportunity to attack the USFK and damage the U.S.-­ROK alliance. A former MND official who met with representatives of these organizations to discuss the Yongsan relocation also said they asked “distorted questions” and employed untruths and rumors spread through the internet. The official perceived that the protest organizations were ideologically motivated to hurt the alliance and rejected whatever the ministry told them.105 In short, protest organizations’ human rights and antiwar arguments against base expansion in Pyeongtaek did not persuade policy-­makers. Policy-­makers’ belief that land expropriation was legal and compensation for land owners was sufficient, in addition to their aim of strengthening military effectiveness and deterrence, contributed to the failure of persuasion. Policy-­makers’ perception that protest organizations were not credible also obstructed persuasion. Although KCPT organized some large demonstrations, there is no evidence that policy-­makers felt that protests created significant incentives to cancel the

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expansion of Camp Humphreys. Thus, the two governments maintained the policy of land expropriation for expanding the base in Pyeongtaek. This resulted in some confrontations between the protesters and government agents such as MND workers and riot police between March and May 2006. Clashes on May 4–­5 turned violent. The Korean government’s effort to expel the protesters, fence off the land, and destroy remaining construction continued for months. Local residents who remained to fight and the Korean government finally signed an agreement in February 2007 in which the residents agreed to vacate their land by the end of March.

Renewed U.S. Effort Against Prostitution and Human Trafficking, 2002–­2005 Katharine Moon argues that in the 1970s the USFK tacitly permitted the involvement of its personnel in prostitution as customers and helped administer medical examinations to prostitutes in cooperation with local authorities.106 According to Moon, the U.S. military condoned prostitution to maintain the troops’ morale, and regulated it to protect them from sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), with the ultimate aim of ensuring military effectiveness. Women’s organizations in USFK camp towns charge that military personnel’s involvement in prostitution continues today. These organizations joined the coalitions of protest organizations in the 1990s and the 2000s to stop military prostitution and advocate for prostituted women in camp towns by referring to human rights norms. In 2002 the U.S. military renewed its antiprostitution effort abroad, starting in South Korea. Although Korean organizations had long criticized the USFK for not doing enough to prevent military personnel’s involvement in prostitution, these organizations did not influence the USFK’s decision to renew its antiprostitution effort. Rather, it was U.S. congressional pressure on DOD that led to a rigorous antiprostitution campaign. More specifically, some American Congress members who were involved in the global anti–­human trafficking campaign saw a Fox News report that alleged USFK personnel’s involvement in prostitution as customers. These Congress members called on the DOD to investigate and engage in a more vigorous prevention effort. The DOD and the USFK responded with a new campaign against prostitution and human trafficking. This case shows the limit of local protests, because Korean protesters’ normative arguments did not persuade American policy-­makers to strengthen the antiprostitution effort. But this case also highlights the importance of an international norm (anti–­human trafficking) in shaping base policy through a

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U.S. domestic political process. This is a rare case in which U.S. congressional pressure influenced base policy abroad. The case also illustrates the key role credibility plays. Congressional and DOD actors were more credible sources of the normative argument against prostitution than Korean protest organizations. The internal, top-­down pressure was more effective than protests in influencing USFK actions. Korean Organizations Against Military Prostitution Several organizations have been established since the mid-­1980s to advocate for and improve the life of women living and working in USFK camp towns. My Sister’s Place (Durebang) opened in 1986 to work primarily with Korean women who are married to American servicemen, supported by them, or working in clubs.107 The organization was the first counseling and advocacy center for camp-­town women and one of the first in South Korea to treat violence against women as a political issue.108 One of the leaders of this group helped develop the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in 1993. Saewoomtuh, another counseling and advocacy center for camp-­town women, was established in 1996 in Tongduch’on. Activists who had worked at My Sister’s Place and Saewoomtuh also became active members of a feminist peace organization, Women Making Peace (established in 1997), and Magdalena House, a shelter for women working in the sex industry.109 According to Moon, these organizations’ main aim is to “recognize and publicize the plight of U.S. military camptown (kijich’on) prostitutes as victims of debt bondage and objects of foreign domination.”110 Some leaders of the “kijich’on movement” have “blamed U.S. imperialism and U.S.-­led capitalism for the plight and abuse of the kijich’on women. In their view, South Korea is a colony of the United States, and the plight of the women represents the oppressed plight of the Korean people.”111 As noted earlier, women’s organizations protested after USFK personnel killed a prostitute in 1992 and another in 2000. The organizations joined national coalitions to demand a SOFA revision to include 1) social welfare programs for kijich’on women, 2) termination of government-­sponsored STD examinations mandated for women working in camp-­town bars and clubs, 3) financial support for Amerasian children abandoned by their American fathers, 4) enforcement of HIV/AIDS tests for U.S. military personnel, and 5) training programs on sexual violence and crime prevention for U.S. troops.112 Women’s organizations demanded these changes by stressing human rights norms. There are two aspects of the USFK’s renewed antiprostitution effort that suggest that women’s organizations did not have much impact on USFK offi-

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cials’ thinking. First, the American effort to fight prostitution was a part of the global campaign against human trafficking. Foreign women who were forced into prostitution in South Korea, in addition to Korean prostituted women, became a matter of concern for American officials. Korean activists’ focus in the early 2000s, however, was on the protection of prostituted Korean women around military bases.113 Second, although the USFK’s effort aimed to stop the violence inherent in prostitution as women’s organizations demanded, the USFK was also concerned about other consequences of the involvement of its personnel in prostitution that women’s organizations did not discuss. The USFK commander, General LaPorte, who led the USFK’s antiprostitution effort, said in his statement to a congressional committee: “We acknowledge the terrible physical and psychological toll exacted on the victims of prostitution and human trafficking, as well as the corrosive consequences these activities may produce by creating tensions in our unique alliance with the Republic of Korea, financing other criminal enterprises or terrorism, and affecting the combat readiness, good discipline and spiritual fitness of our service members.”114 The U.S.-­ ROK alliance, the fight against organizational crime and terrorism, and military readiness were not a part of the NGO discourse on prostitution. Two other factors limited the policy influence of women’s organizations. First, military prostitution was not a salient issue in the large protests of the 1990s and the early 2000s. Even when American military personnel murdered Korean prostitutes in 1992 and 2000, national coalitions of protest organizations (which included women’s organizations) prioritized the demand to revise the SOFA on criminal jurisdiction and custody over the demand to stop military prostitution and provide for camp-­town women. Second, due to women’s organizations’ participation in various protests against base policy, USFK officials perceived them as a part of the broader antibase coalition working to embarrass the USFK on prostitution to drive them out of the country.115 USFK officials did not perceive women’s organizations as credible, and this limited the organizations’ policy influence. U.S. Congressional Pressure and the DOD Response The immediate cause of the USFK’s renewed antiprostitution effort, as mentioned above, was some U.S. Congress members’ insistence that military personnel’s involvement in human trafficking and prostitution should not be tolerated. In March 2002, a Fox News report alleged that U.S. troops in South Korea were patronizing bars and other establishments where trafficked women from the Philippines, Russia, and other countries had been forced into prostitution.

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The report also claimed that the USFK leadership, by providing military police patrols to monitor troops’ behavior in these establishments, essentially condoned illegal activities. This report alarmed thirteen Congress members who had been involved in the global anti–­human trafficking efforts including the enactment of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. The Congress members called for an investigation by the DOD Inspector General on May 31, 2002. They asked for a “thorough, global and extensive” assessment of the allegations that “U.S. military personnel, particularly those stationed in South Korea, are engaged in activities that promote and facilitate the trafficking and exploitation of women.”116 The USFK responded with an initiative to fight human trafficking and prostitution starting in June 2002, which I describe in the next section. A top-­down effort to fight these crimes followed the congressional request for an investigation. On December 16, 2002, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-­22), “Combating Trafficking in Persons.” The directive assigned federal agencies including the DOD the task of developing plans to combat human trafficking. On January 30, 2004, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz emphasized a “zero tolerance” approach to human trafficking in a memorandum to commanders and other leaders of the DOD. This policy would apply to service members, civilian employees, indirect hires, and contract personnel. In addition, Bush issued an executive order on October 14, 2005, and amended the Manual for Courts-­Martial to state that “patronizing a prostitute” was an offense, with a maximum punishment of dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for one year. Even before this executive order, patronizing a prostitute was considered punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice’s catch-­all General Article 134. However, the executive order made the prohibition more explicit. In addition, by including dishonorable discharge and a one-­year confinement in the maximum punishment, the executive order revised in principle the offense’s status from being a “minor offense” that commanders could deal with using non-­judicial punishment, to being a more serious offense to be dealt with by a court-­martial.117 According to USFK officials, personnel caught engaging in prostitution would now be “hammered for embarrassing the uniform,” and this could “ruin their careers.”118 USFK Initiatives In 2002, the USFK established the Prostitution and Human Trafficking Working Group, which meets quarterly to review policies and procedures on these

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issues. The USFK also enhanced its educational effort to fight human trafficking and prostitution. A “Newcomer’s Orientation” briefing for newly deployed personnel and those on temporary duty includes prostitution and human trafficking awareness training.119 In addition, the USFK briefs its personnel about these crimes during various leadership training programs and during “New Horizons’ Day,” a semi-­annual training day for the entire Eighth Army, focused on prostitution and human trafficking, sexual harassment and sexual assault, cultural awareness, values, and safety.120 The USFK also maintains a list of off-­limits businesses and areas around military bases, where personnel are not permitted to go. USFK Regulation 190-­2, “Off Limits Areas and Establishments,” prohibits USFK personnel from entering “all houses of prostitution.” On Fridays, in weekend safety briefs, personnel receive updates on off-­limits sites. As of September 2004, there were more than six hundred such establishments in South Korea.121 The USFK and the Korean National Police conduct joint patrols to make sure that USFK personnel are not in off-­limits establishments. They also identify establishments that should be placed off-­limits. Officers on patrol are in uniform, but there are also undercover agents who go into bars to check on compliance. These patrols existed previously, but the USFK strengthened the training for the patrol officers and increased the undercover operations.122 The USFK punishes its personnel for involvement in prostitution. As it is often difficult to prove involvement in prostitution, the USFK also punishes its personnel for related offenses, such as being found in off-­limits establishments and breaking curfew. According to General LaPorte, 5 service members received disciplinary action for solicitation of prostitution and 398 servicemen for related offenses, within Area I (“the location of the greatest number of allegations against U.S. personnel”) between January 2003 and September 2004. These servicemen received non-­judicial punishment, adverse administrative action, or punishment through courts-­martial.123 According to the USFK Prostitution and Human Trafficking Working Group, 6 USFK members received punishment for participation in prostitution and human trafficking-­related activities in 2010.This number has remained relatively consistent for the past several years.124 These data show that some servicemen’s involvement in prostitution continues despite the strengthened USFK effort to train its personnel and punish offenders. However, in 2006 the DOD inspector general evaluated the USFK efforts positively, stating that they “resulted in cultural change involving all levels of the chain of command and local business owners.”125 In sum, arguments against military prostitution from Korean women’s organizations did not persuade USFK officials to work toward preventing

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the involvement of military personnel in prostitution. In protests following the murder of prostitutes, national coalitions of protest organizations highlighted the importance of expanding criminal jurisdiction and custody for South Korea more than women’s organizations’ demands to stop the involvement of military personnel in prostitution and to ensure camp-­town women’s well-­being. Preventing prostitution was not a salient demand of the protests. Many USFK officials also thought that women’s organizations were a part of the broader coalition of NGOs that used every opportunity to embarrass U.S. forces, with the ultimate goal of driving them out of South Korea. U.S. Congress members and DOD officials, who appeared more credible to USFK officials, triggered the USFK actions against prostitution and human trafficking. However, in recent years the USFK has made efforts to interact with some organizations that assist victims of prostitution and human trafficking. This is rather surprising given the dominant perception among USFK officials that these organizations are not credible. Just like the fight against prostitution and human trafficking, the initiative to exchange views with some women’s organizations came from above. It was in response to the DOD inspector general’s recommendation in 2006 that the USFK establish a forum to meet periodically with NGOs to review issues related to human trafficking and prevention initiatives.126 The USFK’s Prostitution and Human Trafficking Working Group has tried to exchange views and information with relevant organizations, primarily My Sister’s Place and the Dasi Hamkke Center, at least twice a year. According to the Working Group’s action officer, “Open dialogue regarding CTIP [combating trafficking in persons] is productive as we have a common end-­state, the elimination of P&HT [prostitution & human trafficking]; these exchanges of information provide a venue for understanding and collaboration in achieving this goal.”127 On issues such as criminal jurisdiction, custody, and the environment, however, USFK-­NGO dialogue remains limited because the two parties often do not share a “common end-­state” they could work toward.128 Most of the time, demands of protesters clash with policy-­ makers’ knowledge and beliefs. In addition, as noted earlier, policy-­makers often do not find protest organizations credible. These factors make state-­ NGO dialogue difficult and continue to limit NGOs’ influence on policy.

4

Response to Protests in the Philippines, 1964–­1965 and 1972–­1979

The American military presence in the Philippines started with the Spanish-­ American War of 1898 and the American colonization of the Philippines. After the Philippines became independent in 1946, the two countries concluded a Military Bases Agreement (MBA) the following year, which allowed the United States to maintain its military presence. In the 1960s and 1970s, the MBA became the focal point of popular protests. Philippine nationalism, which developed under Spanish, American, and Japanese colonialism, shaped protesters’ arguments against the MBA.1 Protesters stressed that the MBA served American interests rather than Philippine interests, allowing the United States to dominate and exploit the Philippines. In 1964–­1965, protesters demanded that President Diosdado Macapagal negotiate a change in the MBA with the United States. Protesters argued that the MBA, which limited the Philippines’ right to exercise criminal jurisdiction, had to be amended to protect Philippine sovereignty. Then, in the late 1960s and the 1970s, protesters called for a termination of the MBA and a closure of military bases to end what they considered American neo-­colonialism. They referred to human rights and democratic norms. They argued that military bases should be closed because the United States supported President Ferdinand Marcos, a dictator who violated human rights, in order to maintain access to military bases. Furthermore, protesters demanded that bases be closed by arguing that they attracted nuclear attacks from enemies of the United States, who may not necessarily be enemies of the Philippines.

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In both cases, protesters’ arguments against the MBA did not persuade the Philippine president or his cabinet members who negotiated base policy with the United States. Philippine policy-­makers believed that the American military presence served the Philippines’ security, political, and economic interests. This belief contributed to the rejection of protesters’ arguments that stressed the importance of sovereignty in both cases, as well as the antinuclear argument in 1979. In 1979, human rights and democratic arguments persuaded neither the Philippine dictator who violated them nor American policy-­ makers who chose military bases over those values. In addition, persuasion is more likely when arguments come from credible sources that are considered trustworthy and knowledgeable, but in both cases arguments against the MBA came from the Philippine presidents’ political opposition. The presidents did not consider protesters credible. Yet Philippine presidents had to respond to domestic criticisms of the MBA, especially when public opinion strongly demanded MBA revision and generated relevant political incentives. The United States wished to prevent a growth of anti-­American nationalism in the Philippines. In 1965 Macapagal faced reelection, and protests that occurred in this political context generated important incentives for a limited policy change. In the second case, protests that occurred under martial law did not create significant political incentives for policy change. Manila and Washington decided against changing base policy but they offered symbolic concessions to protesters in order to cultivate a nationalist image for Marcos.

Responding to Protests Before a General Election, 1964–­1965 In late 1964, two incidents in which American military personnel killed Filipinos triggered large demonstrations and led to an MBA amendment on criminal jurisdiction. On November 25, Airman Larry Cole shot and killed a sixteen-­year-­old Filipino within the Crow Valley Gunnery Range on Clark Air Base. The Air Forces of the United States and the Philippines used the range to practice strafing and bombing exercises, and Filipino civilians used to enter the restricted area to gather scrap metal and empty ammunition shells as a source of income. Cole’s job was to guard the range but when he shot the victim he was off-­duty, hunting for birds. The second incident was at Subic Naval Base on December 13, where two marines on sentry duty shot and killed a Filipino. The victim was on a boat allegedly approaching a restricted area where ammunition was stored. Demonstrations in response to these incidents quickly followed. About two thousand people protested on December 27 in Angeles. Approximately a

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thousand students and faculty members of the University of the Philippines protested in front of the U.S. embassy in Manila on January 22, 1965. On January 25, about five thousand people gathered again in front of the U.S. embassy. Many smaller protests also occurred. These demonstrations are important in the history of protest against base policy in the Philippines because they were some of the first mass-­based protests. Immediately after World War II, leftist organizations opposed the MBA but failed to win support from the generally pro-­American public. In the 1950s and early 1960s, nationalist politicians and intellectuals dealt with the military base issue without mobilizing the public. Mass-­based groups, many of them from the political left, started to emerge in the mid-­1960s. They lacked access to policy-­making on base issues, which the Philippine president and his cabinet members attended to. Organizing protests became a means to express their preferences on base policy. In 1964 and 1965, some protesters demanded an immediate renegotiation of the MBA so that the Philippines would obtain exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving American perpetrators and Filipino victims, regardless of location and duty status. These protesters relied on a nationalist argument, that the existing MBA violated Philippine sovereignty. Other protesters used nationalist arguments to demand an immediate abrogation of the MBA and a removal of U.S. military bases. The demand for base closure was new because the politicians and intellectuals who had led opposition to the MBA in the 1950s and 1960s focused on making the MBA more equal for the United States and the Philippines and did not demand base closures. In 1964–­1965, protesters carried placards proclaiming “Remove all bases,” “Revise bases treaty,” “Send your trigger-­happy APs to Vietnam,” “Americans, are you friend or foe?” Protesters also burned a cardboard Uncle Sam labeled “U.S. imperialism” in front of the U.S. embassy.2 President Macapagal supported the continued presence of U.S. military bases, so some protesters’ argument that bases should close because of the inadequate MBA provisions on criminal jurisdiction did not persuade him.3 In fact, Macapagal declared publicly that the United States should not withdraw from the Philippines because “to do so would play into the hands of the Communists.”4 The protesters’ nationalist argument for an MBA revision on criminal jurisdiction did not persuade him either. Macapagal wrote in his memoir: “I have always felt that nationalism that does not extend to chauvinism is a dynamic force in the building of a prosperous and great nation. Nationalism is, however, not to be shouted as a slogan from the rooftops.”5 Persuasion was difficult also because Philippine policy-­makers did not find the protesters credible. Policy-­makers thought the protests that included

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groups from the political left and their argument against anti-­imperialism were Communist-­inspired, as Macapagal’s comment above suggests. Former secretary of foreign affairs Felixberto Serrano, who participated in previous MBA negotiations and advised the Philippine panel members in the negotiations of 1965, also criticized the attitude of those “who would want our existing defense agreements with the United States scrapped every time a Filipino citizen becomes an unhappy victim in the hands of an American serviceman. Reactions of this sort are understandable but unwise and should not be permitted to exert their perverse influence in the policy councils of the nation.”6 However, Macapagal had to respond to these protests because he faced reelection later that year, and protests that occurred in this context generated political incentives for policy change. He was fighting an uphill battle, and both public opinion and the legislature strongly pressured him to resolve the criminal jurisdiction issue.7 The American ambassador, William McCormick Blair, Jr., wrote in a cable to the State Department that there was a “Philippine desire” to “reach some agreement promptly with one eye on recent furor and the other on election campaign.”8 Macapagal ordered Secretary of Justice Salvador Mariño to conduct an investigation of the killings and write a report with recommendations on the criminal jurisdiction issue. In his report of January 30, 1965, Mariño compared NATO’s SOFA and the R.P.-­U.S. MBA to argue that the United States granted less jurisdictional right to the Philippines than to host states in NATO. Mariño pointed out that under the R.P.-­U.S. MBA the United States held primary jurisdiction over all offenses on base, while the NATO SOFA gave primary jurisdiction to the United States only when 1) the offense was solely against the property or security of the United States; 2) the offense was solely against another American or his property; and 3) the offense arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty. In other words, host states in NATO held primary jurisdiction over crimes committed by off-­ duty American military personnel against host-state citizens on military bases. Mariño also reported that under NATO’s SOFA, the United States had no jurisdiction over host states’ citizens unless they were members of the U.S. military. Under the R.P.-­U.S. MBA, the United States could exercise jurisdiction over Philippine citizens when they committed offenses on U.S. military bases. Mariño concluded: “My findings of fact on these base killings and my study of the law and treaty applicable with reference to jurisdiction constitute an unassailable argument for the revision of the Bases Agreement.”9 The press closely followed Mariño’s investigation, and printed his long report in its entirety. Domestic pressure in response to the Mariño report

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pushed Macapagal to ask for an amendment of the MBA and the United States to agree to it.10 The differences between the NATO SOFA and the R.P.-­U.S. MBA on criminal jurisdiction had existed since the NATO SOFA was created in 1951, but the Mariño report officially acknowledged and publicized the differences. The United States became vulnerable to the criticism that the Philippines had a less favorable SOFA than NATO states. This forced the United States to offer a comparable agreement to the Philippines. The U.S. interest in obtaining Philippine support for the escalating Vietnam War also served as an incentive for change. The escalation made the U.S. military bases in the Philippines even more vital. As the U.S. involvement in Vietnam increased, President Lyndon Johnson requested the Philippines to send troops to Vietnam.11 In return, he promised to support the Philippine efforts to obtain loans from the World Bank, and to increase economic and military assistance to the Philippines.12 The United States and the Philippines agreed to the MBA amendment in the context in which the United States was willing to give support to the Philippines on various issues in return for Philippine cooperation in the Vietnam War. While the Philippines obtained primary jurisdiction over offenses that off-­ duty American military personnel committed against Filipinos on military bases, the two governments agreed to transfer the authority to determine if a suspect was on duty or not from the Philippines to the United States. This was thus a limited policy change, or a compromise that accommodated protesters’ criticisms while safeguarding U.S. interests.

A Dictator Cultivates a Nationalist Image, 1972–­1979 In 1979 the United States and the Philippines amended the MBA in six ways. First, to assuage a long-­standing concern in the Philippines about American military personnel who became crime suspects but left the country without facing trial, the United States agreed to “retain accused personnel in the Philippines for a reasonable time, and to prevent their inadvertent departure, in order to provide opportunities for adequate discussions between the two governments relating to the jurisdiction question in official duty cases.”13 Second, the two countries agreed that the Philippines would assume responsibility for perimeter security of U.S. military bases. This was a measure to decrease contacts between Filipino civilians and U.S. military personnel in order to prevent incidents like the fatal shootings in 1964. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance wrote: “These new arrangements should contribute greatly to easing the problems of criminal jurisdiction.”14

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Third, the two countries agreed to review the MBA every five years to address outstanding concerns. Fourth, the United States and the Philippines agreed to place a Philippine base commander in each American military base. The Philippine base commanders’ authority was very limited, however, making the position symbolic. Fifth, the two countries reaffirmed Philippine sovereignty over military bases and agreed to fly the Philippine flag “singly” on bases. Finally, President Jimmy Carter promised to make his “best effort” to persuade Congress to grant an increased compensation package for military bases for the subsequent five years. None of these measures represented a change in base policy. They were symbolic concessions in response to protests against retention of U.S. military bases in the Philippines. Opposition to U.S. military bases came from two brands of nationalists—­leftist nationalists and conservative nationalists—­both of whom linked their opposition to military bases with their opposition to Marcos. Nationalists from the political left had opposed the presence of U.S. military bases as an instrument of neo-­colonialism during the entire postwar era. To them, Marcos was the latest American puppet who guaranteed military bases to the United States in return for American support for his regime. Conservative nationalists opposed Marcos for his domestic policies, and opposed the U.S. military presence as an extension of this because they believed the United States supported Marcos in order to maintain the military bases.15 Despite the difference in logic, these protesters agreed that the United States supported Marcos in order to maintain access to military bases and that the military bases must close. Protesters’ arguments against military bases emphasized democratic, human rights, and nationalist norms. As I describe below, these normative arguments did not persuade Marcos or American policy-­makers, whose beliefs and interests clashed with the normative arguments. Furthermore, Marcos did not consider the protesters credible. Under martial law, protests did not generate significant incentives for Marcos to ask the United States to change its base policy. Marcos negotiated the MBA amendment in order to respond to some of the domestic criticisms and create a nationalist image for himself. American policy-­makers agreed to give symbolic concessions in exchange for Marcos’s reassurance that the United States would be able to conduct “unhampered military operations involving its forces in the Philippines.” American policy-­ makers believed giving symbolic concessions to protesters would help Marcos remain in power, and this in turn would allow the United States to maintain its military bases.

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Protests Against U.S. Military Bases Under Marcos Marcos was elected president in 1965 and won reelection through fraud in 1969. He failed to deliver economic, political, and social reforms, and his government was highly corrupt. Opposition to Marcos grew but the United States continued to support him in exchange for military bases even during the rule by martial law between 1972 and 1981. During this period, Marcos prohibited political demonstrations and put in place a curfew. He imprisoned and tortured opposition leaders and personal enemies. He also shut down newspapers and radio and television stations that criticized his regime. The opposition argued that the United States supported a dictator who repressed democracy and human rights in order to maintain its military bases. Between the mid-­1960s and the early 1970s, various organizations emerged to protest against Marcos and the U.S. military bases. These organizations from different sectors, including professionals, students, workers, farmers, and businessmen, created the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) in February 1967. Declaration of martial law in 1972 quieted popular protest at first, but opposition leaders and activists continued to argue against military bases in and out of prison and also in exile in the United States. Mass organizations resurfaced in the late 1970s to organize antibase rallies. The labor sector created the Workers Party (Lapiang Manggagawa) and the Socialist Party, peasants organized the Free Association of Peasants (Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka), and Communists organized anti-­Marcos and antibase protests. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was formed in 1968 and organized a military wing, the New People’s Army (NPA). The CPP adopted an antibase position as a part of its program against American imperialism. The CPP influenced various student and labor organizations in cities and created a foothold there against the “U.S.-­ Marcos dictatorship.”16 Priests and nuns also became involved in anti-­Marcos and antibase activities. Religious organizations and women’s organizations argued that the Philippines incurred high social costs for hosting U.S. bases, including prostitution of women and children, sexually transmitted diseases, drug addiction, and alcoholism.17 The Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines did not issue a pastoral letter on military bases but individual members of the Catholic Church engaged in anti-­Marcos and antibase activities.18 The National Council of Churches in the Philippines, an organization of non–­Roman Catholic churches, publicly expressed its opposition to the martial law and concerns about American military bases.

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University students were an important part of the anti-­Marcos and antibase protests. They formed the Nationalist Youth (Kabataang Makabayan) and other nationalist organizations. Historians also rewrote Philippine history from a nationalist perspective in the 1960s, and students read those works in campus teach-­ins.19 Between January and March 1970, a large number of students together with workers, intellectuals, and peasants participated in a series of anti-­Marcos demonstrations in Manila, in what is now known as the First Quarter Storm.20 Students also proclaimed the establishment of the Diliman Commune at the University of the Philippines in February 1971, which the army broke up. After Marcos declared martial law, hundreds of student dissidents fled the cities and joined the NPA “in the hills” in order to escape imprisonment. Even during martial law, students in universities continued to protest against various issues, among which was base policy. In January 1979, 350 students from thirty schools and universities in Metro Manila and nearby provinces met and resolved to launch an organized antibase campaign.21 The protesters used several normative arguments against U.S. military bases. First, leftist nationalists argued that U.S. aid to the Philippines in exchange for military bases created a neocolonial relationship between the two countries. Second, the aid to Marcos, which he used to suppress the opposition and strengthen his support base, contributed to the regime’s violation of human rights and undemocratic rule. Third, protesters argued that U.S. military bases were unnecessary because the Philippines faced no external threat, but the existence of military bases made it possible that the Philippines might be attacked by enemies of the United States, maybe with nuclear weapons. Failure of Persuasion Protesters’ normative arguments that military bases should close did not persuade Marcos. As noted in earlier chapters, generally persuasion is more likely when a person perceives that the source of an argument is credible. Credibility is a function of perceived trustworthiness and expertise. In this case, the normative arguments came from Marcos’s political opposition that he repressed, jailed, and forced into exile during the martial law regime. Marcos did not find them credible. Persuasion is more likely also when a normative argument fits the existing beliefs and interests of a recipient. However, protesters’ normative arguments for base closure went against Marcos’s belief that the United States would continue to support his regime as long as he provided military bases. In addition, protesters’ normative arguments went against Marcos’s interest in continuing to provide military bases to the United States in order to obtain economic and military aid in return. Marcos used the aid to

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repress domestic opposition, secure his grip on power through patronage, and maintain an extravagant lifestyle.22 Marcos was simply not going to terminate the MBA and close bases. Also as noted in earlier chapters, even when persuasion fails, policy change can occur when protests generate significant incentives for policy-­makers. In this case, the protests did not generate political incentives for Marcos to change base policy. Under martial law, which continued until 1981, Marcos possessed great political power and used the military and the constabulary to suppress domestic opposition. Base policy did not change. Philippine protesters’ normative arguments against U.S. military bases did not persuade American policy-­makers either. American policy-­makers were aware that they supported a dictator in order to maintain military bases and that this undermined human rights in the Philippines. David Newsom, American ambassador to Manila, acknowledged: “We have certain specific national security objectives, namely, the retention of our military bases, which we can only achieve by reaching agreement with a leadership considered by many in the United States—­ and in the Philippines—­to be in violation of accepted norms of human rights.”23 Carter’s security policy in Asia increased the importance of bases there. The Carter administration planned to withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea, which was one of his presidential campaign promises. Carter also decided to work toward normalization of relations with China, which would make the continued presence of American troops in Taiwan difficult. Given the planned American withdrawals from South Korea and Taiwan, military bases in the Philippines increased in significance as a symbol of America’s commitment in Asia. The American presence in the Philippines was important also because American forces withdrew from Thailand under President Gerald Ford in 1976, following Communists’ victories in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in spring 1975.24 After the Communist victory in Vietnam, the Soviet Union built up its air and naval presence there, further increasing the importance of U.S. military bases in the Philippines.25 Some in the United States were critical of dealing with a human rights violator to retain military bases. For example, Senator William Fulbright pointed out in a Senate subcommittee hearing in as early as 1969 that supporting a repressive regime in return for bases could harm U.S.-­Philippine relations in the long run.26 Patricia Derian, Carter’s assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, also pressed others in the administration to take a firmer stand against Marcos’s human rights violations.27 Nonetheless, between military bases and human rights, American administrations chose military bases. After Marcos declared martial law in 1972 dur-

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ing Richard Nixon’s presidency, a staff report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations said that U.S. government officials were willing to accept Marcos’s increased authority and control because “military bases and a familiar government are more important than the preservation of democratic institutions which were imperfect at best.”28 In addition, Robert J. McCloskey, assistant secretary of state for congressional relations under Ford, stated that if the United States terminated military assistance to the Philippines, American influence with Marcos would decrease, making it difficult for the United States to pressure him to improve his human rights record.29 General Theodore Allen, the commander of U.S. forces in the Philippines, shared this opinion.30 Furthermore, Richard Murphy, Carter’s ambassador to the Philippines, worried that if a human rights report the State Department was preparing for Congress singled Marcos out as the worst offender of human rights in Asia, the report would have a negative impact on the ongoing MBA negotiations. He was concerned that Marcos would cut off talks or retract agreements already made during the negotiations. Murphy was also anxious that the human rights report would prompt the U.S. Congress to reject aid to the Philippines, even if the American and Philippine negotiators were able to conclude the MBA amendment. Murphy recommended that the State Department make an “extraordinary effort” to avoid offending Marcos.31 Clearly, the United States prioritized military bases over human rights, contrary to protesters’ demand to stop supporting a human rights violator for military bases. Protesters’ normative arguments failed to persuade Marcos and American policy-­makers. Under martial law, Marcos did not perceive significant incentives to ask the United States to change its policy. However, Marcos used the MBA negotiations to renew his nationalist, norm-­abiding image and allay domestic criticism. The symbolic concessions of 1979—­the Philippine flag on base, Philippine base commanders with limited authority, perimeter security by Philippine forces, MBA review every five years, the American promise to hold suspects in the Philippines for a “reasonable” amount of time, and the American “best effort” to obtain congressional approval for aid—­served this purpose. In fact, during the MBA negotiations Marcos proposed that if the United States allowed the Philippines to provide perimeter security, he would not press for a significant revision on criminal jurisdiction.32 This shows that Marcos was only interested in cultivating his nationalist image and did not seek a fundamental change in base policy. The United States agreed to the symbolic concessions in exchange for Marcos’s promise not to restrict American military operations. Allowing the United States to conduct unhampered

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military operations was also a Philippine retreat from its negotiating position in previous MBA negotiations in 1976. The effort by Marcos and the United States to cultivate Marcos’s nationalist image can be interpreted as their attempt to reduce the appeal of the protest movement, which relied on nationalism to mobilize the public. Their effort, however, was limited by their interest in maintaining U.S. military bases. They could not fully cultivate Marcos’s nationalist image by closing the bases. The two cases in this chapter, in addition to other cases in this book, show that it is difficult for protesters to persuade policy-­makers with normative arguments. However, at times normative persuasion occurs, with important consequences on base policy. I argue in the next chapter that persuasion under an enabling domestic institutional arrangement led to the Philippine Senate’s decision in 1991 to close American military bases.

5

Persuasion and the Closure of U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines, 1991

The impending expiration of the MBA between the United States and the Philippines in 1991 created a unique opportunity for Philippine policy-­makers to consider whether their country would continue to host U.S. military bases. The president of the Philippines, Corazon Aquino, supported continued U.S. military presence, and negotiators from the two countries drafted a treaty to extend the American military presence after the MBA’s expiration. However, on September 16, 1991, the 23-­person Philippine Senate voted 12 to 11 against the proposed treaty. Since the Philippine constitution requires support from at least two-­thirds of the Senate to ratify a treaty, the treaty was rejected. This led the American military to withdraw in November 1992. I argue that normative arguments against military bases persuaded ten out of the twelve senators who voted against the treaty. The two remaining senators had non-­normative motives to vote against the treaty. Persuasion was the main causal mechanism for the policy outcome because the constitution’s two-­thirds rule meant that eight senators’ votes against the treaty were enough to close the bases. According to social psychologists, persuasion can result in the adoption of a new attitude or of an attitude opposite to an existing attitude. The ten senators who voted against the treaty adopted a new attitude against U.S. military bases. Persuasion is more likely when policy-­makers have few beliefs and knowledge that challenge normative arguments. There are two ways in which this can be true. First, normative arguments fit policy-­makers’ beliefs and knowledge. Nine senators—­Jovito Salonga, Aquilino Pimentel, Teofisto Guingona, Rene Saguisag, Wigberto Tañada, Agapito Aquino, Victor Ziga,

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Orlando Mercado, and Sotero Laurel—were persuaded through this process. Second, policy-­makers may not have well-­defined beliefs or knowledge that can contradict normative arguments. Joseph Estrada was persuaded through this process. Normative arguments against military bases fit with nine senators’ knowledge and beliefs. They were nationalists with a particular view of Philippine history, according to which a succession of foreign powers directly controlled or interfered in the Philippines’ politics and economy to serve their interests. The antibase movement’s argument, that U.S. military bases were instruments of American neocolonialism and they should be closed for true Philippine sovereignty and independence, was therefore persuasive. These senators actively participated in the campaign against Marcos’s dictatorship, which adopted an antibase position in protest against the perceived American support for the dictator in exchange for military bases. The senators became persuaded that U.S. military bases must close when they participated in protests against Marcos’s dictatorship. Even after Marcos’s fall, these senators believed that the American interest in securing military bases made American interference in Philippine politics likely. Before the Senate’s vote on the treaty to extend the U.S. military presence, there were anti-­treaty protests and lobbying. They played a supportive role for these senators without contributing to their persuasion. Other normative arguments against military bases found support among these senators as well. Under Marcos’s dictatorship, many of the senators suffered imprisonment and exile, and defended political prisoners as lawyers. To those who fought against Marcos’s human rights violations, antibase normative arguments referring to human rights—­to protect the rights of Filipino victims of American crimes, to oppose military prostitution around bases, and so on—­were persuasive. In addition, some of the senators opposed construction of a nuclear plant in the Philippines in the 1980s. This experience led them to accept protesters’ antinuclear argument against military bases. The United States maintained a policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons in military bases but the prevailing view was that the U.S. military kept nuclear weapons in the Philippines despite the Philippine constitution and legislation that declared “freedom from nuclear weapons.” The senators believed that the Philippines as a sovereign state should know whether or not there were nuclear weapons in its territory. The senators also believed that the nuclear weapons could attract attack from American enemies that may not be enemies of the Philippines. Protesters’ normative argument—­that military bases

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should close because the United States stored nuclear weapons there and this infringed on Philippine sovereignty and security—­persuaded the senators. Normative arguments against U.S. military bases fit these senators’ beliefs, knowledge, and experience, making persuasion more likely. Senator Estrada’s persuasion against military bases followed another process. He did not have a well-­defined belief that could contradict normative arguments against military bases, and this facilitated his persuasion, as social psychologists expect. Unlike the nine senators mentioned above, he did not have a well-­developed nationalist worldview or experience under Marcos’s dictatorship that made him oppose U.S. military bases before becoming a senator. After he came into office, his nationalist advisors decided that he should take up some nationalist issues, and briefed him on U.S. military bases. He became persuaded that the military bases must close, and became an active participant in the antibase movement. Persuasion is more likely when policy-­makers perceive that a normative argument’s source is credible. Credibility is based on trust and assumed knowledge. People with credibility influenced the senators’ thinking about military bases.They included the senators’ family members, friends, colleagues, advisors and respected others whom the senators trusted and thought were experts on the military base issue. Some of these credible people led protest organizations, making their organizations credible as well. With their persuasion that the American military bases must close, the antibase senators’ attention turned toward the duration of the transition period before American withdrawal. After the MBA’s expiration in 1991, they preferred to conclude a new treaty with a short duration (maximum of five years), during which both the United States and the Philippines would prepare for and complete withdrawal. Many of the senators believed that such a treaty would minimize the economic dislocation of base closure in the Philippines.1 However, the treaty that the governments of the United States and the Philippines proposed for Senate approval was for ten years of American military presence with the possibility of subsequent extension, and without a clear date for withdrawal. The senators who were averse to military bases opposed this treaty. They faced various pressures to ratify the treaty in 1991 but they voted in accordance with their preferences. Persuasion of policy-­makers influences base policy only when they operate within domestic institutions that enable them to do so. The post–“People Power uprising” constitution in 1987 endowed the senators with the final authority to decide on the treaty in 1991, transferring the power previously vested in the president. Other provisions in the constitution, together with a

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series of resolutions in the Senate, also offered the antibase senators legal arguments to defend their position. These domestic institutions permitted the persuaded senators to influence base policy.

Postwar Nationalists Who Influenced the Antibase Senators Claro Recto, Lorenzo Tañada, and Jose Diokno, three prominent post–­World War II nationalist senators, greatly influenced many of the senators who voted against the treaty in 1991. Recto was the most important nationalist politician of the 1950s. He penned a large number of speeches and writings on the relationship between the United States and the Philippines.2 Arguing that the Philippines had “followed America” on foreign policy due to its economic, military, and political dependence on the United States, Recto characterized the Philippine foreign policy as “mendicant.” He said in a well-­known speech in 1951: “A bankrupt administration must necessarily have a foreign policy of mendicancy; and it is inevitable that it should invite foreign intervention to do what it cannot do for itself. . . . Because beggars cannot be choosers, we can be safely ignored, taken for granted, dictated to, and made to wait at the door, hat in hand, to go in only when invited.”3 Recto argued for an independent foreign policy based on the Philippine national interest, not the American national interest. Although Recto was not against the security alliance between the United States and the Philippines, he argued that it had to be on the basis of mutual commitments.4 He therefore proposed that the two countries conclude a mutual defense treaty (MDT), because the MBA did not require the United States to defend the Philippines if it came under attack. The negotiated MDT, however, did not include automatic retaliation as in the NATO charter. Given this, Recto warned that the American military bases would not deter external attacks, but could become magnets for aggression instead.5 Recto proposed various changes to base policy throughout the 1950s, such as placing the military bases under joint U.S.-­Philippine command, reducing the 99-­year lease term under the MBA to 20 years, and reexamining criminal jurisdiction. In the immediate postwar period Recto’s criticisms of the MBA did not have much policy impact because the Philippines had to make concessions to the United States; the Philippines needed American aid for postwar reconstruction and this aid was offered in exchange for military bases. However, economic conditions had improved by the mid-­1950s, and more politicians joined Recto after some failed attempts to make the U.S.-­R.P. relationship more equitable.6 Recto’s nationalism inspired Tañada. When Tañada became a senator in 1947 he waged a campaign against corruption, exposing it even in his own

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party. But Recto told him: “Fighting graft and corruption is spectacular, but it is a negative attack; what the country needs is a positive approach through nationalism.”7 Tañada embraced the nationalist cause and worked closely with Recto. They ran as the presidential and vice-­presidential candidates of the Nationalist-­Citizens Party in November 1957, although they lost the contest. After Recto’s death in 1960, Tañada continued his nationalist crusade. He filed many resolutions in the Senate including resolutions to amend the MBA. Tañada retired from his 24-­year senatorial career in 1971. During the martial law years, Tañada became a legal counsel for opposition leaders whom Marcos imprisoned, including Senators Diokno and Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr., and some of the senators who voted against military bases in 1991. In 1978, Tañada convinced Aquino to run for the Interim National Assembly election from Lakas ng Bayan (Power of the People), with the acronym LABAN (Fight). As expected under Marcos’s dictatorship, all candidates from LABAN for Manila were defeated through electoral fraud. In protest, Tañada led several opposition leaders and some three thousand students in a “funeral march” for democracy, carrying a casket emblazoned with the words “Democracy is Dead!”8 He was arrested together with other LABAN leaders and more than five hundred protesters. Tañada, at age 79, was detained for five days.9 Some of the senators who voted against bases in 1991 joined Tañada in these activities, as the next section details. During the martial law period and afterward, Tañada played a central role in many anti-­Marcos and antibase organizations. He argued that military bases were the “main consideration in the continuing American decision to give full support to the Marcos dictatorship.”10 He also believed that the argument about military bases contributing to security, freedom, and democracy was false and hypocritical under a dictatorship where people had no security, freedom, or democracy.11 One of the coalitions Tañada led was the Nuclear-­Free Philippines Coalition (NFPC), a precursor of the later antibase coalitions. The NFPC started in January 1981 to oppose the establishment of the Bataan Nuclear Plant. The NFPC alleged that the plant was unsafe and that Marcos had received a huge kickback for the project. The NFPC engaged in antinuclear education in schools and churches, increasing awareness of nuclear power’s potentially catastrophic problems.12 Although the NFPC concentrated on the nuclear issue, the antinuclear campaign later helped the antibase campaign. Antibase activists correctly contended that the United States stored nuclear weapons in its military bases, although the United States neither confirmed nor denied it for strategic reasons. Antibase activists argued that military bases could become

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targets of nuclear attack and relied on the antinuclear network to obtain support.13 LABAN and the Pilipino Democratic Party (PDP) merged in 1982, bringing together the two major opposition parties. The PDP-­LABAN, with Tañada as its honorary chairman, became the only party at the time that openly adopted an antibase position. In August 1983, when Aquino returned to the Philippines from exile in the United States, he was assassinated at the airport. In response, Tañada and others organized the Justice for Aquino, Justice for All (JAJA) movement. JAJA placed the responsibility for Aquino’s death on Marcos and demanded his resignation.Various organizations including citizens’ groups, neighborhood associations, student organizations, religious groups, and trade unions announced their affiliation with JAJA and organized protests.14 In addition, Tañada founded, led, or joined other organizations, such as the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, Nationalism, Incorporated (MABINI, named after a prominent leader of the 1898 Revolution), Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), and Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (NAJFD). Last but not least, Tañada and other opposition leaders in the Convenor Group (organized to bring unity to the opposition and select a leader to run in a presidential election if Marcos died) signed a Declaration of Unity in December 1984, which included the statement: “Foreign military bases on Philippine territory must be removed and no foreign military bases shall hereafter be allowed.”15 Diokno was another important leader in the anti-­Marcos and antibase movement. He served as senator for two terms, 1963–­1969 and 1969–­1972. He and Marcos were members of the Nacionalista Party but Diokno resigned from the party when Marcos suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971. Diokno’s second term as senator was cut short when Marcos declared martial law on September 21, 1972. Diokno, one of Marcos’s most vocal critics, was among the first to be arrested. He spent nearly two years in prison without charges until Marcos released him on September 11, 1974—­Marcos’s fifty-­seventh birthday.16 Once out of prison Diokno established a network of human rights lawyers called the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), offering free legal services to ordinary citizens who became victims of martial law. He also documented cases of torture, summary executions, and disappearances. He served as chair of the Civil Liberties Union for seven years and joined other anti-­dictatorship organizations such as JAJA and Congress of Filipino Citizens (Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilipino, KOMPIL).

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Recto’s nationalism had a profound impact on Diokno.17 He agreed with Recto that the Philippines should adopt a foreign policy independent of the United States.18 Diokno was critical of the U.S. military bases for the same reasons as Recto and Tañada. First, he argued that the military bases might drag the Philippines into an American war and invite attack on the Philippines.19 Second, he opposed U.S. military bases because of the possibility of a nuclear accident or nuclear attack.20 Third, Diokno argued that the presence of U.S. military bases diminished Philippine sovereignty by making the country “a neo-­colony.”21 Fourth, the American support for Marcos in exchange for bases permitted Marcos’s violation of human rights to continue.22 Diokno led the Anti-­Bases Coalition (ABC), established in February 1983, the first issue-­specific coalition by various organizations across sectors and political affiliations. The coalition included members of the church, the academe, students, workers, peasants, professionals, and various groups on the political left. Tañada was one of its key participants.23 In addition, in March 1983 Diokno co-­founded the Movement for Philippine Sovereignty and Democracy (Kilusan sa Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan, or KAAKBAY), which addressed various nationalist concerns including U.S. military bases. He then joined the Convenor Group and played a leadership role in creating the Declaration of Unity that rejected U.S. military bases. Tañada and Diokno, two of the key leaders of the anti-­Marcos and antibase protest movement, and their organizations thus argued against U.S. military bases using nationalist, democratic, human rights, and antinuclear norms. These normative arguments persuaded many of the ten senators who voted against the base treaty in 1991, as they joined Tañada and Diokno in the anti-­ Marcos protests.

Voting a “Conscientious No” to Military Bases Jovito R. Salonga Salonga, Senate president at the time of the 1991 vote rejecting an extension of the American military presence, told me in an interview that he credits Recto with contributing to his nationalist beliefs.24 Salonga also writes in his memoir that Recto’s wartime letter to a lieutenant general of the Japanese army, describing many of the Japanese abuses and atrocities, made him admire Recto “for his courage and for his ability to outwit the Japanese general and his men who could have jailed him for his anti-­Japanese propaganda activity.”25 Recto’s action impressed Salonga, whom the Japanese military police arrested, tortured, and imprisoned for his anti-­Japanese activities during World War II.26

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Recto and Salonga worked as colleagues at the Lyceum of the Philippines, where Recto was the dean of law and Salonga was a faculty member. Salonga writes of those days: “I enjoyed teaching at Lyceum where I had the chance to exchange views with Recto . . . on many subjects before and after my classes.”27 When Recto ran for president in the election of 1957 on a nationalist platform, Salonga worked for Recto’s campaign in his district.28 Salonga was elected to the Senate in 1965. He worked with nationalist Senators Tañada and Diokno to oppose Marcos’s bill to send an engineering construction battalion to Vietnam in support of the American war effort. Salonga won reelection in 1971. When martial law was imposed the following year, Salonga openly criticized it as Marcos’s attempt to remain in power beyond his presidential term limit in 1973. Salonga handled the cases of many political detainees, including Ninoy Aquino. Salonga and other leaders of the democratic opposition including Tañada held meetings to discuss how they would resist martial rule. These meetings led to a 16-­page manifesto, of which Salonga was one of the principal authors, questioning Marcos’s legitimacy.29 Salonga also headed an organization, People’s Alliance for Freedom (Katipunan ng Bayan para sa Kalayaan, or Kabaka), which stood for “nationalism, the creative balancing between order and freedom [unlike CPP-­NPA’s reliance on armed struggle or Marcos’s repressive dictatorship], and the primacy of basic human rights.”30 In October 1980, after a series of bombings in Metro Manila, Salonga was falsely charged and detained until his release in November. Salonga and his wife left the Philippines in March 1981 and lived in the United States in exile until January 1985. In 1984, Philippine opposition leaders named Salonga as one of the fifteen alternative leaders to Marcos.31 In the course of his involvement in anti-­Marcos efforts, Salonga became persuaded that U.S. military bases in the Philippines must close. The normative arguments that persuaded Salonga—­that bases violated sovereignty, democracy, and human rights—­fit with his nationalist beliefs and knowledge of human rights violations under martial law. Given his nationalist beliefs, he found convincing the argument that the American support for Marcos in exchange for military bases constituted interference in Philippine politics and a violation of Philippine sovereignty. In addition, defending political prisoners, being a prisoner himself, and being in exile, Salonga was acutely aware of Marcos’s human rights violations and anti-­democratic rule. He came to believe that the United States contributed to the continuation of Marcos’s human rights violations through its attempt to maintain military bases. For example, Salonga found absurd Vice President George Bush’s tribute to Marcos in 1981: “We love your adherence to democratic principles and pro-

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cesses.”32 Salonga writes in his memoir that the “necessity of maintaining U.S. military bases here—­the biggest U.S. overseas bases in the world—­explains why Washington continued to extend increasing military and economic aid to the Marcos dictatorship.”33 Furthermore, in response to the Mondale-­Marcos joint communiqué in May 1978 that said the two states would “conclude negotiations on amendments to the Military Bases Agreement on terms fully consistent with Philippine sovereignty,” Salonga writes: I felt that was a masterpiece of contradiction—­a bases agreement between the Philippines and a foreign power can never be “fully consistent” with our sovereignty. In the conflict between the human rights of Filipinos and the security requirements of the U.S. (which underscored the importance of American military bases), I saw beyond doubt that the latter would always prevail.34

In November 1984, Salonga joined the Convenor Group headed by Corazon (“Cory”) Aquino, widow of Ninoy Aquino, and Tañada, and supported the anti-­Marcos and antibase Declaration of Unity.35 After the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, Salonga, who was reelected to the Senate, continued to oppose military bases. In a speech explaining his vote against the treaty in 1991, Salonga declared: “As long as the bases are here our relations with the United States will not be healthy and normal.”36 The theoretical literature contends that persuasion is likely to have happened when policy-­makers follow their beliefs despite high costs. Salonga’s opposition to military bases remained consistent throughout the martial law era despite significant risks. Marcos imprisoned him, and Salonga had to go into exile. When Salonga was preparing to vote against the treaty in 1991, he also faced “unrelenting” pressure from various people and groups.37 First, President Cory Aquino supported the treaty and pressured the senators to ratify it. Aquino signed the Declaration of Unity calling for removal of military bases but she modified her position while running for president. She declared that she would respect the MBA until its expiration in 1991, and after that she was going to “keep her options open.” In the end, President Aquino decided to support the new treaty to extend the U.S. military presence and encouraged the senators to ratify the treaty.38 Almost all of the 24 senators elected in 1987 got elected as “Cory’s Choice,” or due to the popular president’s declared support.39 Aquino met with the senators individually and in groups, “offering promises or threatening sanctions” to have them vote for the treaty.40 She also organized a pro-­treaty march to the Senate six days before the vote to put pressure on anti-­treaty senators. Second, Salonga faced pressure from leaders and supporters of his Liberal Party (LP) whose help he would need in the presidential election in 1992.

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Salonga reports, for example, that in August 1991 a high party official communicated a request from others: “Why can’t you just abstain? . . . Even if you abstain, the treaty will still be defeated.” Salonga replied: “I don’t think I can do that. Please tell our friends that I am ready to go down on this issue.”41 On another occasion, Salonga learned that some businessmen who might otherwise have contributed to his presidential campaign would not do so if he voted against the treaty. Salonga replied that he intended to “put my vote on the record as the Senate vote has historical implications, that the LP has been against the presence of U.S. military bases, and that as Party president, I must cast my vote.”42 Third, Salonga came under pressure from his friends, who wanted him to vote for the proposed treaty. For example, two of his comrades in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps during the Japanese occupation tried to convince him to support the treaty.43 American policy-­makers also visited Salonga to request his support for the treaty. One of them was Salonga’s personal friend Congressman Stephen Solarz. Salonga told him: “Sorry, Steve, I can’t. It is one-­sided, unjust, and anachronistic. The Cold War is over. Who are your enemies now? The USSR and China have become your collaborators.”44 Finally, public opinion was in favor of the treaty. In August 1990, a survey conducted by a social research institution called Social Weather Stations showed that nearly 80 percent of the respondents were willing to have the bases stay after 1991.45 American military bases significantly contributed to the Philippine economy as the second largest employer after the Philippine government.46 Communities hosting military bases voiced concern about loss of employment, especially after the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, which wrecked havoc on the local economies of Central Luzon, where Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base were located.47 The senators also contemplated base closure in the context of weak economy. The Philippine Chamber of Commerce and other business associations pressured the antibase senators to ratify the treaty, saying that the United States was a very important importer of Philippine products and treaty rejection would jeopardize trade relations.48 Salonga’s position remained firm despite the pressures. Salonga stressed that he publicly declared his opposition to military bases while running for the Senate in 1987. He also cites in his memoir Edmund Burke’s speech to his constituents, which illustrates Salonga’s idea of leadership: “Your representative owes you not only his industry but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”49 Furthermore, in his Senate speech explaining his vote in 1991, he acknowledged the pressure from both pro-­and anti-­treaty camps and said that “questions of right and wrong are not

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decided by shifting temporary majorities.”50 In short, Salonga voted against the treaty in 1991 because normative arguments against military bases had persuaded him. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. Senator Pimentel also voted against the treaty in 1991 due to persuasion. After Marcos declared martial law, Pimentel became one of the key opposition leaders. Another leader in the opposition characterized him as “the poster boy of defiance to dictatorship”; Marcos imprisoned him four times and put him under house arrest once. Pimentel’s background as a lawyer shaped his decision to oppose Marcos. He writes in his memoir: “My having read law and my having practiced it rather extensively deepened my belief that the Rule of Law anchored on the Constitution was the best way to protect the rights and liberties of our people. And I tried to use my knowledge of the law to fight against the martial law dictatorship of Marcos, indeed without much material success but with great personal satisfaction.”51 In the Constitutional Convention that Marcos established to increase his presidential power, Pimentel became a key opposition delegate. He refused to vote on the 1973 draft constitution that would allow Marcos to serve beyond his term limits. Out of 286 delegates, Pimentel was one of only fifteen who opposed the draft constitution. In the same year, Pimentel signed Salonga’s manifesto against Marcos’s martial rule.52 Diokno influenced Pimentel’s decision to fight martial rule. Pimentel writes in his memoir: “Diokno provided the most cogent philosophical and legal reasons for opposing martial rule.”53 Pimentel also worked with Tañada against the dictatorship. When Tañada and Ninoy Aquino called on opposition leaders to run in the 1978 election under the banner of LABAN, Pimentel became one of the candidates. At the “funeral march” for democracy that followed the electoral defeat of LABAN candidates, Pimentel was arrested with Tañada and others. Tañada and Diokno served as Pimentel’s lawyers when he was repeatedly arrested.54 The normative argument, that U.S. military bases must close because the United States supported Marcos for bases and this curtailed Philippine democracy, persuaded Pimentel. He argued that military bases “propped up the Marcos dictatorship as instruments of the further oppression of the people, instead of being used to protect and enhance our freedoms and liberties.”55 He pointed out that American economic and military aid that Marcos obtained in exchange for military bases helped sustain the dictatorship.56 Pimentel led the PDP, which merged with LABAN. PDP-­LABAN became the only politi-

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cal party that was antibase. In addition, he joined Tañada in his antinuclear campaign, which became the basis of his opposition to military bases due to the antinuclear norm. Pimentel joined the Convenor Group that Tañada and Cory Aquino organized, and signed the Declaration of Unity that included the antibase statement. Arguments against military bases fit with Pimentel’s nationalist beliefs and opposition to Marcos. Pimentel became a senator in the first election after EDSA (or the “People Power uprising” that overthrew Marcos, which happened on EDSA, Epifanio de los Santos Avenue) and voted against the treaty in 1991. He voted against bases despite the strong public opinion for their retention. This strengthens my argument that his vote was due to persuasion. In response to the public support for military bases due to economic concerns, Pimentel made an economic argument for base removal: “The removal of the bases was not asserted merely to massage the perceived national ego but also—­and more importantly—­to lay the basis for the fast economic development of the areas then being used primarily as advance defense perimeters of the US and as rest and recreation zones for American troops.”57 In his Senate speech explaining his vote in 1991, he also cited Edmund Burke on leadership.58 Pimentel also referred to electoral and physical threats to the antibase senators: “On this day, therefore, the day of our final deliverance, I hope, from the clutches of a colonial power, I say to those who threaten us with political oblivion or physical extinction for our vote of rejection: Go ahead, do your worst because we will do our best!”59 Cory Aquino later wrote that Pimentel “march[ed] to the different drum of principled politics.”60 His vote against the military bases in 1991 was one such example based on persuasion. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. Senator Guingona was another senator who voted against the treaty in 1991. Like Pimentel, he was also one of the outspoken delegates in the 1971 constitutional convention that opposed Marcos’s attempt to hold onto power. Guingona refused to sign the final draft of the proposed constitution.61 Marcos arrested Guingona upon declaration of martial law and kept him in jail for almost three months. Guingona rallied against the Marcos dictatorship with Tañada and other opposition leaders. Guingona joined Pimentel, Salonga, Diokno, and others in discussions about ending the martial law, and signed Salonga’s manifesto against Marcos.62 Then, Guingona ran in the 1978 elections as a LABAN candidate, and was arrested at the “funeral march” for democracy with his wife, Ruth, son TG, Tañada, and Pimentel.63 Later, when Pimentel was arrested

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again, Guingona represented him as his lawyer.64 In 1984, Guingona was also present when Tañada and other opposition leaders led a large anti-­Marcos demonstration at the Mendiola Bridge near Malacañang, the presidential palace in Manila. The police and the military used tear gas, water cannons, and plastic bullets on the demonstrators after they refused to disperse.65 Guingona signed a petition for the impeachment of Marcos the following year.66 Guingona was a businessman and demonstrated his nationalist inclination by preferring to “protect local industries from undue competition by foreign corporations.”67 It is likely that normative arguments against military bases that emphasized democratic and nationalist norms persuaded Guingona. He joined Tañada and Pimentel’s PDP, and subsequently PDP-­LABAN.68 In his memoir, Guingona says there was no pressure from the pro-­treaty administration of Cory Aquino: “From the administration side, President Cory no less, Ambassador Emmanuel Pelaez, Secretary Manglapus and others knew from the outset where I stood, and although they made general appeals for a rational vote from senators, they did not personally approach. I was glad. I took that to mean they respected my stand as much as I respected theirs.”69 However, Guingona’s colleagues from the business world tried to convince him to vote for the treaty: “As the day of the decision neared, I received a lot of pressure, as I am sure other senators on our side were likewise subjected to. Businessmen for example went for stability, seeing it hard to break away from the emerging superpower with whom we relied on for more trade and aid. So a number of them personally called or came to visit to persuade me to go for a reasonable extension because it would spur the nation’s economy.”70 Despite this pressure, Guingona voted against the treaty because nationalist arguments persuaded him. In his Senate speech explaining his vote in 1991, he briefly described the history of post–­World War II U.S.-­R.P. relationship from a nationalist perspective. He then charged that the 1991 agreement was “unequal, unjust, and unfair.”71 The United States would have it only as an executive agreement (instead of a treaty), without guaranteeing compensation. Guingona declared that the treaty infringed on Philippine sovereignty and national independence, and therefore “it is time we came into our own, time to become truly self-­ reliant. Time we stood by ourselves in cooperation with others as equals. Time to end our dependency relationship with the United States of America.”72 Guingona referred to Filipino nationalists to make his argument for elimination of military bases: “Men like Andres Bonifacio, Manuel L. Quezon, Claro Mayo Recto, and Lorenzo M. Tañada dreamed of breaking up the shackles of foreign dominance in the land. It is time we took up the challenge from their

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lifeless hands.”73 In addition, Guingona addressed those who were concerned about the economic impact of base closure by suggesting that skilled base workers could get jobs at other military bases abroad. He also cited examples of other base closures that led to increased employment.74 Rene A. V. Saguisag Senator Saguisag was also persuaded to vote against military bases in 1991. In the 1960s, student activism provided momentum for antibase protests. Saguisag was a student at the time, but he was not involved in protests because he “thought that the main business, or the only business of the student, was to study.”75 But when he went to Harvard University to obtain his master’s degree in law, he witnessed the civil rights movement and anti-­Vietnam protests that many students participated in. After his studies at Harvard, he decided to spend a year at the University of California, Berkeley. In an interview with me, Saguisag described his transformation during his stay there. Berkeley “was even more of the hotbed of protest than Harvard, meaning at times we could not go to school because of the tear gas, the helicopters and the National Guards, etc. So I could not really have been the same person I went [sic]. I could not have been unaffected or insensitive to the role that the young people should be playing in coursing the destiny of the nation.” When Saguisag returned to the Philippines in 1971, “there were all sorts of demonstrations and protests against the Marcoses over almost anything” including students’ rights and oil prices. The next year, martial law was declared and Saguisag, following his transforming experience in the United States, became an active member of the opposition to the Marcos dictatorship. He joined Salonga, who is his uncle, and other opposition leaders in meetings and rallies. Saguisag became impressed by Philippine nationalists’ arguments. He met and/or read the works of the key nationalists: Tañada, Diokno, J. B. L. Reyes, Alejandro Lichauco, and Recto. Saguisag said of Recto: “My God, I mean, Don Claro could write. His rhetoric was incredible. And he was appealing to our potential strength as a nation, able to chart our own destiny.” During the 1978 election campaign for the interim National Assembly, Saguisag edited a periodical for the LABAN slate.76 In 1984, Saguisag joined Tañada, Guingona, and other opposition leaders at the violently dispersed Mendiola Bridge demonstration.77 In the same year, an opposition group named Saguisag one of the fifteen alternative leaders to Marcos, along with Tañada, Diokno, Salonga, and Pimentel. Saguisag was jailed once during martial law.78 He was also a human rights lawyer during martial law. One of his clients was Pimentel, whom he defended with Tañada and Guingona.79 Saguisag was

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a part of Diokno’s Free Legal Assistance Group and later founded MABINI, the nationalist lawyers’ group. Saguisag said that he formed MABINI when “we the human rights lawyers decided to go beyond merely lawyering but taking stands on national issues.” One of MABINI’s planks was the elimination of American military bases, and its members included Guingona.80 Saguisag became persuaded against military bases during the martial law period. He told me that he, like many other people from his post–­World War II generation, had not questioned the American presence in the Philippines. American GIs gave him “more chocolates than [he] could use,” and after watching John Wayne movies, those of his generation become even more pro-­ American, believing that the Americans “stood for all the right things.” But this changed during martial law. Saguisag came to believe that Marcos became a guarantor of military bases for the United States so that as long as he was in power the Americans would have military bases, and “America would look the other way in relation to human rights violations and the dictatorship.” Normative arguments against military bases that stressed human rights and democratic norms persuaded Saguisag since they fit his nationalist beliefs and experience as a human rights lawyer under the martial law regime. Saguisag, like many other nationalists, joined PDP-­LABAN and signed the Declaration of Unity that included the antibase statement. As pointed out earlier, persuasion is likely to have occurred when a person acts according to his beliefs despite external pressure to do otherwise. Although Aquino encouraged Saguisag to vote for the treaty, he remembers that her pressure was “subtle and gentle, as President Cory knew where I had stood.” She called for him and “very delicately said, I would appreciate it if you could support me. Not in so many words, but . . . I just said ask me another.” In his Senate speech explaining his vote, Saguisag said: “Last Tuesday’s [pro-­treaty] rally, led by President Aquino, was particularly painful and anguishing for one such as I who have been honored and privileged to be her friend. I hope I still am. She must know; she has to know that I think the world of her, and always will. But I believe that on the bases issue I have made the right, or at least the better, choice in the most thoughtful way possible and am capable of, given my limitations after a study of many years.”81 Aquino was not the only source of pressure on Saguisag. Saguisag remembers that “there was an intense, furious lobbying up to the last minute.” There was “tremendous pressure from the Americans, from our own people.” A bishop even raised the specter of eternal damnation for the antibase senators and their supporters. Worse, some charged that the antibase senators were

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neo-­Nazis who wanted a “final solution” for the Filipinos.82 Saguisag said that the controversial issue has “subjected friendships—­cherished ones with colleagues, the President, and the Americans—­to stresses and strains. . . . All of us have died a little in the process.” Yet persuasion caused Saguisag to vote against U.S. bases, saying “at the end of the day we answer to history and to our conscience.”83 When I asked about voting against public opinion, which was in support of the military bases, Saguisag recounted some of the decisions in his life that were highly unusual. He talked about defending Marcos’s human rights victims when “most of the hotshot lawyers did not want to touch martial law cases.” He also said he declined a Supreme Court appointment in 1987, and that his current legal practice is mainly pro bono despite his credentials. Saguisag explained: “Polls showed how unpopular our position was but early on in life, I became a contrarian used to sailing against the wind.” In response to the popular economic argument for retaining military bases, Saguisag said in his Senate speech: “Men and nations sooner or later must decide who or what they are. True, we cannot eat abstractions such as human rights, democracy and constitutionalism. . . . Is eating the zenith of our national aspirations? Is finding a job the acme of our dreams?”84 On voting against public opinion, Saguisag declared: “Paying no taxes may be popular. Rolling back the price of oil may be popular. But making unpopular decisions, in the national interest, is part of the burden of leadership.”85 Saguisag also reminded the public that eliminating military bases was one of the election platforms from 1987.86 In 1991, Saguisag had a “granitic position” and voted with conviction. Wigberto E. Tañada Senator Wigberto “Bobby” Tañada, who also voted against the treaty in 1991, is the son of Lorenzo Tañada, a trusted and credible source who transmitted nationalist beliefs to his son. Bobby Tañada paid homage to his father in his Senate speech explaining his vote: “A man under whose caring arms I grew up to learn love of country above self.”87 In an interview with me, Bobby Tañada said he followed his father into antibase campaigns when he was in law school.88 He joined some student organizations and demonstrated against American military bases. After Marcos declared martial law, Bobby Tañada joined anti-­Marcos demonstrations. He also became involved in nationalist, pro-­democracy and antibase organizations such as New Patriotic Alliance (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, BAYAN), NAJFD, JAJA, ABC, NFPC, MABINI, among others. Like his father,Tañada believed that the United States supported the Marcos dictatorship in order to retain its military bases in the Philippines.

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According to a scholar of the antibase coalitions, Tañada “steadfastly carried the anti-­bases banner.”89 He signed the Declaration of Unity including the antibase statement, which his father drafted. He was actively involved in antibase coalitions that civil society organizations formed, and after his election to the Senate in 1987 he became the main link between protest organizations and the Senate.90 Tañada remembers that Cory Aquino did not pressure him into voting for the treaty. He told me that “before the voting, she would call the senators to the palace to discuss, but she never talked to me. I would be there, but she never told me, Bobby, I would like you to support me, I would like you to vote this way. She did not. She respected my father, and she respected also, maybe, me. I appreciated that.” However, there were other pressures on Tañada to vote for the treaty. He remembers being called “all kinds of names . . . Communist, cruel, heartless,” for his antibase position, which would create unemployment. There was also a threat that his antibase vote would be the end of his political career, and more general threats that “investors will leave the country, the economy will collapse, then the Communists will take over” with the treaty’s defeat in the Senate.Tañada said that all these pressures made it “really heart and gut wrenching, a very very very difficult decision.” Yet, Tañada explained that his nationalist reading of the Philippines’ history, with foreign domination and unequal relationships throughout, made his antibase vote easier to cast. He listed a number of Filipino nationalists at the beginning of his Senate speech explaining his vote, and continued: “The spirits of our heroes . . . must be hovering in these very halls, stirring our hearts, filling it with courage to fulfill the dreams and aspirations of a people long longing for freedom and prosperity. Today is our turn to perform our duty to history. And we must not fail.”91 He also declared that although the Philippine government must offer assistance to people who would lose jobs with the base closures, “we cannot let an entire nation continue suffering from the deeper and more far-­reaching effects of foreign domination.”92 He voted against public opinion in order to secure what he believed was the true national interest. Agapito A. Aquino Senator Agapito “Butz” Aquino also voted against the treaty in 1991 due to persuasion against military bases. In an interview with me, he described the process through which he became persuaded.93 He said that the antibase arguments, which focused on sovereignty and freedom from foreign influence, fit his belief in the importance of personal independence. Aquino was a “working

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student” in college, as his father died when he was eight years old and he did not want to ask his mother for money. Aquino believed that it was important to become independent, “develop ourselves, learn to rely on ourselves, and stand up on our two feet.” His belief in personal independence translated into his belief in national independence. Aquino also mentioned that his grandfather fought against the Spanish, and once asked: “What is the difference between the Spanish and the Americans?” From early on, Aquino thought that no foreign country should have a military presence in the Philippines. Originally, Aquino had no interest in politics. He thought it was a “game of the rich,” and he had a “natural distrust of politicians” since he considered them corrupt. Unlike many of the other senators, who had a background in law, he studied electronic engineering and entered manufacturing. He became the national president for the Junior Chamber of Commerce (JCC) in 1968 and the international vice-­president of the JCC in 1969. One of his activities as the JCC national president strengthened his nationalist beliefs. At the time, one of the JCC’s projects was prisoner rehabilitation. The JCC introduced prisoners to livelihood and handicraft training, as well as lessons on how to raise chickens, hogs, and farm fish. Aquino was involved in this project at Fort Bonifacio Prison Camp, where there were about three hundred prisoners.The prisoners included leaders of different criminal gangs, but more importantly the Politburo and other leaders of the CPP, other left-­leaning prisoners, and nationalists. Aquino visited them almost every week, each time spending several hours in conversation with them. He said this was where his “nationalistic tendencies were probably brought out more clearly.” His political involvement during the martial law regime was at first limited to helping his elder brother Ninoy Aquino’s campaign for the 1978 Interim National Assembly election. Despite his distrust of politics, Butz Aquino was “catapulted to a leadership role” in the opposition to Marcos after Ninoy’s assassination in August 1983.94 He became a leader of opposition groups including A Nation United in Thought and Purpose (Bansang Nagkakaisa sa Diwa at Layunin, BANDILA) and KOMPIL, and worked with Lorenzo Tañada, Diokno, Salonga, and others in fighting against the dictatorship. Aquino also organized businessmen and professionals in the August Twenty-­One Movement (ATOM).95 In addition, he was one of the leaders at the Mendiola Bridge demonstration in September 1984, and signed the 1985 petition to impeach Marcos.96 Aquino said that his antibase position became “hardened” after Ninoy’s assassination and after joining Tañada and others in demonstrations. In the early 1980s, Butz Aquino demanded a negotiated withdrawal of military bases

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“as soon as possible.”97 He also joined the Convenor Group and signed the antibase Declaration of Unity. When the senators prepared to vote on the fate of military bases in 1991, many thought Aquino would be under pressure from his sister-­in-­law, President Cory Aquino, to vote for the treaty. For example, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile did not believe that Butz Aquino would vote against the treaty—­in a personal bet, Enrile wagered he would vote for the treaty. Cory Aquino indeed tried to obtain Butz Aquino’s support for the treaty. According to Butz Aquino, Cory Aquino was in “near tears in trying to convince me” to vote for the treaty, for the sake of the Filipinos who would lose their jobs and R.P.-­U.S. relations.98 Butz Aquino said: “I think she was convinced that the extension will be good for the country.” On the nature of the president’s pressure, Butz Aquino said that Cory Aquino was the type of person who “lets you know how she feels,” and she did not request or solicit a favor outright. She gave “subtle hints,” like “if you don’t support me here, I won’t support you later (come election time).” Despite the president’s subtle pressure, Butz Aquino told me that he was certain of his antibase vote from the beginning of the Senate deliberations on the treaty. If the treaty were approved, he was not sure if the military bases would be terminated after ten years. He also thought he might not be in the Senate in ten years to decide. He believed that “there will be no end” to basing if he did not vote against the treaty, and considered the 1991 vote his chance to terminate the bases. He “wanted it to be final.” Both pro-­and antibase organizations tried to influence Aquino’s vote. Groups that supported the treaty told him “It’s not going to be forever—­only ten years,” even though the treaty could be further extended. They promised electoral support for the 1992 senatorial election if he voted for the treaty. Representatives from groups against military bases came to speak with him as well, making an appeal to nationalistic sentiment. They also promised electoral support. Aquino did not entirely believe the two camps’ promises of electoral support. He explained: “People promise many things and do not necessarily deliver when the time comes.” He tended to discount the value of such “advance support.” When I asked about public opinion, which supported base retention, Aquino responded that he was not a politician before becoming a senator. He was “not converted to being a politician” in his short senatorial career, and public opinion was “a secondary concern” for him. He continued, giving further evidence to the role of persuasion in decision-­making: “I must make the right decision for the country even if it’s unpopular.” This par-

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ticular understanding of leadership allowed him to prioritize normatively informed national interest (terminating military bases) over the material interests of those who would lose out from the rejection of the treaty. In his Senate speech explaining his vote, he urged the government to alleviate “the plight of displaced workers.” “But,” he continued, “we must emphasize that in no way can these specialized needs of a few local communities and those of a particular sector dictate the direction of the national agenda.”99 All in all, despite the various sources of pressure, Aquino’s persuasion against military bases led to his vote. In his Senate speech, he declared: “The most compelling reason for my stand hinges on the all-­important issue of sovereignty. . . . The proposed treaty perpetuates U.S. infringement on Filipino sovereignty, thus, in effect, prolonging our colonial, master-­slave relationship under the guise of ‘special relations.’”100 Aquino continued, his words evocative of Recto’s arguments: “This oppressive, exploitative arrangement not only has rendered our nation ever susceptible to U.S. manipulation, but, even worse, has inflicted our people with a widespread and deeply embedded colonial mentality. This has resulted in self-­defeating, self-­fulfilling, and self-­ perpetuating attitudes of subservience, mendicancy, and parasitism.”101 Demonstrating that his vote was due to persuasion that withstood pressure, Aquino said: In closing, I would like to mention the tremendous amount of soul-­searching, pressure, and pain I went through in order to arrive at my final decision. By insisting on my stand on rejection, I have risked the contempt of my friends, the loss of support of my constituency, and the anger of the President, whose opinion and approval I value. Nevertheless . . . I stand firm in my decision to vote against the proposed Treaty. . . . I love my country more than I love my President.102

According to Butz Aquino’s staff, his privileged speech in the Senate two weeks before the vote also included the line “I love my country more than I love my President.” The staff suggested, and Aquino did not deny, that this previous speech made it easier for other senators to vote against the treaty.The staff said that other senators might have thought, “If the president’s brother-­ in-­law is voting against her, it may be OK for the rest of us to vote against her.” In any case, Butz Aquino’s vote was due to persuasion against military bases. Orlando S. Mercado Senator Mercado told me in an interview that persuasion led him to vote against the continued presence of American military bases in the Philippines.103 He gravitated toward the left and its antibase position in the 1960s

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while he was a student at the University of the Philippines. He was a student leader in the Nationalist Youth, and had read the writings of Recto and a nationalist historian, Renato Constantino. Nationalist and leftist thinking formed the basis of his persuasion against retention of the U.S. military bases. Like other senators, Mercado opposed Marcos during the martial law regime. He was a broadcast journalist and Marcos detained him for almost ten months after the declaration of martial law. He ran as an opposition candidate in the May 1984 elections to the Batasan (a unicameral legislative body created by the 1973 constitution), and defeated a pro-­Marcos candidate in Quezon City. Mercado also participated in anti-­Marcos rallies. As the 1991 vote neared, Mercado faced some warnings and pressures not to vote against the treaty. For example, his advisor warned him that he might lose votes for his reelection in 1992 due to his opposition to the treaty. His staff was divided on the issue. Some military officers also came to see him, and told him that they were worried about the loss of military assistance from the United States. Cory Aquino did not demand that he vote for the treaty but told him “you know how I feel about this,” and asked him to support her. In addition, Mercado was aware that the public supported the retention of military bases. Despite these concerns and the pressure to influence his vote, Mercado voted against the treaty.When considering Cory Aquino’s request and her previous help in getting him elected to the Senate, Mercado concluded that the vote on the military bases was “not a purely partisan decision, and was beyond personal relationship.” On voting against public opinion, he reasoned: “True leadership does not require poll-­taking before decision-­making,” and “what people favor at one point is not set in granite because conditions change.” In his Senate speech explaining his vote, Mercado stated: “To those among our people who cry that economic damnation will surely follow rejection, I say:You of little faith, is Subic [Naval Base] all that we have, the only resource we own, the only strength that we possess? Dire and fearful as our immediate economic future might loom, I hold abiding confidence in the resilience and the inner reservoir of strength of our people.” In his speech reminiscent of Recto’s nationalism, Mercado continued: “National pride and self-­respect are not mere words; these are solid and indispensable values which we must nurture and strengthen within ourselves. They are what make us a nation and not just a population. These are the values that will empower us to rise above the morass of mendicancy, and with an enlightened leadership and firm national resolve, finally develop into a self-­respecting and respectable member of the community of nations.”104

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Victor S. Ziga Senator Ziga also voted against the continued presence of American military bases due to normative persuasion. In an interview, he told me how he came to believe that the U.S. military bases must close.105 His nationalist beliefs and anti-­Marcos activities formed the foundation of his opposition to military bases. He participated in anti-­Marcos demonstrations during the First Quarter Storm of 1970 when he was a law student at the University of Santo Tomas. He coordinated with students from other schools to organize rallies and founded a nationalist law student fraternity at his university. Ziga protested against the declaration of martial law and opposed the 1972 constitution. After graduating and passing the bar in 1974, he taught law for a while but entered politics in 1984 following his parents’ footsteps. His father, Venacio Ziga, was a governor of Albay appointed by President Manuel Roxas. He also served as a congressman. His mother, Tecla San Andres Ziga, the first woman to top the bar exam in the Philippines, went on to serve as a congresswoman, cabinet member under President Macapagal, and then a senator. Victor Ziga won as an opposition candidate in the May 1984 election to the Batasan, despite massive vote-­buying by his pro-­Marcos opponent. He worked with Pimentel in the Batasan, and together with others, he signed a petition to impeach Marcos in 1985. In the post-­EDSA election of 1987, he became a senator from Salonga’s Liberal Party, under the banner of Cory Aquino’s LABAN. According to Ziga, his mother influenced his thinking about U.S. military bases. Ziga’s mother served as a senator in the 1960s and worked closely with Senators Tañada, Salonga, Diokno, and others. She joined opposition leaders at anti-­Marcos rallies during the martial law years, and participated in protests against military bases and nuclear weapons. She was active in many antibase organizations such as the NFPC and the ABC. She also became a founding chairwoman of GABRIELA, a woman’s organization that participated in the antibase movement. She made Ziga aware of the various problems related to U.S. military bases. According to Ziga, “She was leading me to all these different organizations. Personally I subscribed to the principles against military bases. Not just because of my mother, but because the principles were correct in my view. There was nothing wrong with them—­all nationalist. It was a natural thing for me to follow.” He became persuaded that U.S. military bases must close. He said that his mother did not talk to him about his vote in 1991: “She knew that I could make a stand of my own.” Likewise, his friends and rela-

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tives did not try to influence his vote. Most of his friends and family members were against U.S. bases too, and expected him to vote against the treaty. However, Ziga said other people were not so sure about his vote. Cory Aquino had selected him to become a senator under her banner, and chose him to serve as the cabinet minister for general services, a custodian of all government assets and property. More important was his personal relationship with Aquino. When Ziga married his wife, Ninoy Aquino served as one of their sponsors. Cory Aquino, being Ninoy’s wife, was also considered a sponsor of Ziga’s marriage. According to Ziga, Ninoy and Cory Aquino were like second parents. Cory Aquino talked to Ziga about the vote. She also asked him whether American representatives had talked to him about the vote, and when Ziga told her that they had not approached him personally, she was surprised. Ziga thinks she called the U.S. ambassador; the ambassador and Senator Solarz contacted him soon after. Ziga told them he would study the issue, just to be diplomatic, but he had already decided to vote against the treaty. Both pro-­ treaty and anti-­treaty organizations lobbied him as well. In the Senate speech explaining his vote, Ziga mentioned the “circus of persuasions” from both camps leading up to the vote.106 But these efforts did not have an impact on Ziga since he had already decided to vote against the treaty. In his Senate speech explaining his vote, he made some nationalist arguments. For example, he declared: “Any US military facility within our shores, therefore, would be a visible intrusion in our territorial sovereignty and an admission that we have compromised, if not disregarded, our constitutional fiat and sacrificed our right to self-­determination. For the presence of the United States bases in the country would certainly inhibit, if not prevent us, from freely pursuing a truly independent foreign policy.”107 Furthermore, he agreed with women’s organizations in the antibase movement: “The rest and recreation privileges of the US military personnel have subjected our moral fiber to perpetual siege and simultaneously institutionalizing prostitution, decadence and the exploitation of our women and children.”108 On voting against public opinion, Ziga reminded the public that he and other senators from the Liberal Party were elected in 1987 on a platform of removing the bases, and that the constitution also “stands foursquare against the continued stay of foreign military bases.”109 He concluded his speech by referring to the pro-­treaty campaign and public opinion: I refuse to ride the crest of this fleeting popularity. I refuse to be deceived by fancy rhetoric and cheap propaganda. I refuse to sacrifice our national interest in exchange for a bundle of vague promises. Rather . . . I choose to continue to work for what I

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believe is right and just for our country. I, therefore, submit my action to the lasting judgment of history with my conscience and firm conviction as my cause. I vote . . . a conscientious No to the Treaty.110

Sotero H. Laurel Senator Laurel passed away in 2009 and I could not interview him, but I was able to interview his son, Roberto P. Laurel.111 Senator Laurel’s vote against the treaty was due to persuasion. His father, Jose P. Laurel, and Recto had a “formidable nationalistic influence” on him. His father also transmitted his conviction that U.S. bases must be removed. His father was a credible source of a normative argument, which stressed the importance of national independence. Sotero Laurel studied law at Harvard University and Georgetown University from August 1941. When World War II broke out, he was stranded in the United States. President Manuel Quezon ordered his father, then secretary of justice, to stay in the Philippines to serve the people while Quezon and Vice President Sergio Osmeña evacuated to establish the Commonwealth Government in exile in the United States. The situation became more difficult for Sotero Laurel after his father accepted the presidency under the Japanese occupation in 1943. He had to deal with the American perception that he was a son of a traitor, although Quezon and General MacArthur believed his father was loyal to the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth Government.112 He studied international and constitutional law because he anticipated that after the war his father would be charged with collaborating with the Japanese and he wanted to defend his father as his lawyer. According to Sotero Laurel’s son, Jose Laurel was the most important source of Sotero’s nationalist beliefs. Jose Laurel had a strong nationalist reputation from the prewar era. Witnessing his father serve the nation in wartime also made an impression on Sotero. After President Roxas’s amnesty proclamation in 1948, Jose Laurel returned to public service as a senator in 1951. He sponsored a bill with Recto to make nationalist author Jose Rizal’s Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo mandatory reading in all universities. The following year, Jose Laurel established the Lyceum of the Philippines. With a motto “Veritas et Fortitudo, Pro Deo et Patria,” the university emphasized nationalist education to the youth. Jose Laurel asked Recto to become the first dean of law school at the Lyceum. Sotero Laurel became the executive secretary of the university. As a lawyer, Sotero worked with Recto and Salonga on a case that tried leaders

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of the Philippine Communist Party in 1950–­1951. At that time, Sotero and Salonga were partners in their own law practice. According to Sotero’s son, Jose Laurel was the most important source of Sotero’s nationalist beliefs, but Recto also influenced his thinking. Sotero Laurel’s father, as mentioned above, influenced his thinking about U.S. military bases. Jose Laurel opposed the MBA and resisted going onto U.S. military bases because he did not want to ask permission from foreigners to step into his own land. Sotero Laurel adopted his father’s opposition to U.S. military bases. Sotero Laurel’s son described his father’s opposition to U.S. bases and the 1991 treaty: “My father was independent. If you are independent, why would you ask a friend to take up a big room in your house to guard your house? You know his primary goal is to guard his own interests. Guarding your house is his secondary concern. My father knew that. So he was against the bases from the start. He did not have to be convinced to vote No.” Some of his friends from the business community visited him in order to convince him to vote for the treaty in 1991. Salonga once said in a speech that Laurel’s “many dear friends and close relatives” asked Laurel to vote for the treaty in 1991.113 Laurel voted against the treaty despite such pressure, which suggests that his vote was due to persuasion. In his Senate speech explaining his vote, Laurel said that the treaty failed to pass the “common sense test.” He thought that it was strange not to know if there were nuclear weapons in Philippine territory, due to the American policy to neither confirm nor deny their existence.114 He also argued for the importance of certain values such as “fairness, justice, independence, self-­ determination, self-­respect and equality” that “can make our nation strong, progressive and even great.” He stated that these values could not be sacrificed for “some sectors of the population who may suffer” due to the defeat of the treaty. Referring to the public opinion in favor of base retention, Laurel said: “The times . . . call for moral courage, the courage to differ and take [a] position on controversial issues in the larger interest of the people themselves. It is now time for inspired and well-­informed leadership, and it is time for leaders to lead.”115 Joseph E. Estrada Arguments against American military bases also persuaded Senator Estrada. In the late 1980s Estrada became close friends with Senator Wigberto Tañada, and soon took in progressive advisors including Randy David (professor of sociology at the University of the Philippines and a public affairs talk show host) and Francisco Nemenzo (president of the University of the Philip-

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pines). According to Nemenzo, Estrada was a “lightweight senator,” having had experience only as a mayor of a small city (San Juan, a municipality of Metro Manila) after his extremely successful acting career.116 His advisors decided that Estrada should take up some nationalist issues after his election to the Senate in 1987. They suggested military bases and foreign debt as two issues for Estrada to focus on. Nemenzo remembers that Estrada “didn’t know anything about bases,” even why the Philippines hosted them. Nemenzo, David, and others gave Estrada a series of briefings on military bases. Through this process Estrada became “fascinated by the idea of a bases campaign” and decided to take up the issue. The process of persuasion for Estrada was different from that of other antibase senators. According to social psychologists, persuasion occurs when people hold few beliefs that challenge the persuader’s message. There are two ways in which this can be the case. The first process matches other antibase senators’ experience. Antibase normative arguments persuaded the senators because they fit the senators’ preexisting beliefs and knowledge (e.g., nationalism, anti-­dictatorship, importance of human rights). Estrada’s persuasion is an example of the second process, in which persuasion occurs because a recipient of a message does not have any well-­developed beliefs and knowledge that can contradict normative arguments. Estrada did not have well-­defined nationalist beliefs nor did he share other senators’ experience under martial law. Estrada acquired knowledge of nationalist arguments and military bases from Nemenzo, David, and other nationalist advisors who served as expert and credible sources. Estrada became a tremendous asset to the antibase campaign due to his great popularity as a former movie star. He also owned movie production companies and brought along his friends in the film industry to contribute to the antibase movement.117 One day, he and his antibase friends (including Roland Simbulan, a University of the Philippines professor who was leading the antinuclear and antibase campaigns at the time) were joking that Estrada should make an antibase movie.118 Shortly afterward, he really made one. He starred in a movie titled In the Claws of the Eagle (Sa Kuko ng Agila, 1989), along with an antibase congresswoman, Nikki Coseteng. The antibase campaign showed the movie all over the Philippines to popularize the military base issue. Estrada also traveled to appear at many speaking engagements and antibase rallies coupled with screenings of the movie. Simbulan attests that the movie helped greatly in “awakening consciousness,” augmenting public support for the antibase cause. According to Nemenzo, Estrada also had a knack for translating complex concepts into simple lan-

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guage that people understood. When Estrada traveled, people gathered to see a star. Estrada succeeded in communicating the antibase message to many people whom protest organizers alone could not have reached. Estrada was so successful that respondents in a public opinion poll in July 1990 named him the most helpful government official in clarifying military base issues.119 As the 1991 vote in the Senate neared, Estrada revealed that an American embassy official had approached him to say that the United States would support his future presidential candidacy if he would vote for the treaty.120 In his Senate speech explaining his vote, he also mentioned pressure from the business community: “The big businesses continue to cling to the interests of the colonizers to the point of pressuring this Senate to ratify the treaty that is laid before us. . . . We are continuously being harassed and abused to accept an unjust agreement.”121 He continued: “With this painful decision, I know that we have placed our political careers on the line.”122 He voted against military bases despite the pressures. In his speech, he stressed that the U.S.-­R.P. relationship had been unequal and unjust. He charged that the United States had been meddling in the Philippine’s politics and economy. He declared that getting rid of the American military bases would make the Philippines more independent.123 Convinced that closing the military bases was in the Philippine national interest (even if public opinion favored retaining the bases), Estrada said: “To the Americans, we say that we still have enough courage to assert our convictions. But we do not have the courage to betray our people.”124

Other Motives for the Vote The ten senators discussed above voted against the treaty in 1991 due to normative persuasion. Two other senators voted against the treaty but their votes were not due to persuasion against U.S. military bases. These senators had some other motives to vote against the treaty. Juan Ponce Enrile Senator Enrile voted against the treaty and explained his vote using nationalist arguments. However, it is likely that nationalist and other normative principles were not the most important basis for his vote. Enrile declined to be interviewed on this issue so I was unable to confirm this with him, but there are two reasons to argue that his vote was not due to normative persuasion. First, Enrile served as Marcos’s secretary of defense and he supported the continued presence of American military bases during his tenure. Enrile was a

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Philippine negotiator in base negotiations with the United States during the Marcos era. American military aid, paid in exchange for military bases, helped sustain the military that Enrile oversaw. Marcos’s dictatorship and the American acquiescence strongly influenced other senators’ opposition to military bases. Enrile did not share this experience with the other senators. In fact, Enrile was one of the principal architects of the martial law regime that many of the senators fought against. Enrile is likely to have known that armed gangs connected to Marcos’s constabulary commanders carried out bombings in and around Manila leading up to the declaration of martial law.125 In addition, the day before the declaration of martial law, news reports said that Enrile had been ambushed. Marcos pointed to this “insecurity” as one of the justifications for martial law. However, during the EDSA “People Power Revolution” fourteen years later, Enrile publicly revealed that it was a fake ambush.126 After the declaration of martial law, Enrile closed down civil society organizations and authorized the arrest of Marcos’s political opponents.127 In fact, Enrile ordered the arrest of Salonga, Pimentel, and Guingona during martial law.128 Military men under Enrile’s command often made arrests without warrants and tortured political detainees.129 Enrile also enriched himself under Marcos. Enrile was the chairman of the Philippine National Bank (1968–­1978) and the Philippine Coconut Authority (1975–­1978). He allegedly acquired a “near monopoly of the country’s logging and timber industry, one of the most lucrative after coconut and sugar, using his military muscle to force competitors out of business or to sell their operations to him.”130 In sum, Enrile embodied the political, military, and economic abuses of the martial law regime, together with the first couple. While other senators’ antibase persuasion occurred as they opposed the dictatorship and American support for Marcos, Enrile had no reason to oppose the American military presence in the Philippines during the martial law regime. The second reason to argue that his vote in 1991 was not due to normative persuasion is that he might have voted against the treaty because President Aquino supported it. In 1991, he was the only opposition senator. In addition, scholars and other observers argue that Enrile wanted to become president after Marcos, and was not happy that the position went to Aquino. Enrile and General Fidel Ramos’s coup attempt against Marcos triggered the “People Power Revolution” of 1986, which ended with Aquino taking the oath of office as president and Marcos fleeing to Hawaii on an American military aircraft.131 Enrile campaigned hard to reject Aquino’s new constitution in February 1987, although 76 percent of the electorate voted to approve it.132 Enrile

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and a faction within the military plotted multiple coups against Aquino during her presidency.133 Enrile’s approval of military bases during martial law and his political opposition to Aquino are only indirect evidence to suggest that his vote against the treaty in 1991 was not due to normative persuasion. However, these episodes cast strong doubt on Enrile’s declaration of nationalist, antibase principles in his senate speech to explain his vote. Ernesto Maceda Senator Maceda also voted against the treaty in 1991. In an interview with me, he said that sovereignty and other nationalist issues related to military bases were important, but the most important reason for his vote was the inadequate compensation package from the United States.134 Maceda passed the bar exam in 1956 and became a city councilor of Manila in 1959. He then left for Harvard Law School to obtain his master’s and doctoral degrees. In 1964, Marcos invited Maceda to join his campaign for the presidential election of 1965. Maceda held several cabinet posts under Marcos: secretary for rural development, secretary of commerce and industry, and the executive secretary. In 1971, Maceda became a senator from Marcos’s Nacionalista Party. When Marcos declared martial law in 1972 and closed the Senate, Maceda joined the anti-­Marcos opposition. He ran for the Interim National Assembly election in 1978 as a LABAN candidate, but lost. Around this time, Marcos told Maceda’s wife that he was unhappy that Maceda defected, and that he would make life difficult for Maceda. Maceda decided to go to the United States in exile. Between 1978 and 1985 he practiced law in New York and became Ninoy Aquino’s confidant. While he was in Marcos’s administration, Maceda did not participate in any of the R.P.-­U.S. MBA negotiations. He said he accepted the U.S. military bases, although he was aware that “left wingers and activists were advocating military withdrawal.” The U.S. military bases never became an important issue for him until he had to cast his vote in 1991. Unlike the persuaded senators who voted against the military bases, Maceda did not make his position on the treaty public until the very end. In February 1991, when Senate president Salonga circulated a survey to gauge other senators’ position on the treaty that the United States and the Philippines were then negotiating, Maceda responded that he would “reserve opinion” while all the persuaded senators responded that they were against the treaty and retention of military bases.135 Similarly, in his Senate speech explaining his

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vote, Maceda mentioned that he “kept an open mind” throughout the hearings on the treaty, unlike the persuaded senators who knew how they would vote from the beginning.136 When asked about this, Maceda admitted that declaring that he was keeping an open mind was a political strategy to attract media attention for his reelection the following year. He calculated that if his position remained uncertain, the media would speculate how he would vote, and he would benefit from this added publicity. He thought that the Senate vote would be close, and sought the role of one who would cast a decisive vote. Maceda eventually decided to vote against the treaty because he thought the compensation package that the United States would offer in exchange for the continued presence in the Philippines was inadequate. When he met with the American ambassador to the Philippines, he told the ambassador that he could not accept the proposed package. He asked if the United States could provide a better one. He told the ambassador, “You’re now disengaging from the Middle East. If you can’t increase the amount of rental, send us a squadron of A-­18s and other equipment that you are not using any more.” The ambassador replied that the United States could not improve the package. In explaining why he voted against the treaty, Maceda told me, “Why vote for it when we have nothing to get from it?” When asked if he would have voted for the treaty in exchange for a more satisfactory package, he responded, “I’m a practical person. It might have influenced my vote.” He thought nationalist arguments against U.S. military bases were also important, but compensation was the decisive factor. This is in contrast to the senators who voted against the U.S. military bases due to normative persuasion. They said they would not have voted for the treaty even if the United States provided a better compensation package. In sum, ten out of the twelve senators who voted against military bases in 1991 did so due to normative persuasion. It is important to note that domestic institutions serve as a condition variable for persuaded policy-­makers’ impact on policy. In 1991, the senators’ persuasion shaped base policy because domestic institutions made it possible. The 1987 constitution and antinuclear legislation gave the senators the final authority to decide on the U.S. military bases and some legal justifications to defend their vote.

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The Role of Domestic Institutions The 1987 Constitution In May 1986, President Aquino created a 48-­member Constitutional Commission (ConCom) that would draft a new constitution. The ConCom completed its work in October 1986, and Aquino submitted the constitution to a plebiscite in February 1987. The public ratified the new constitution with 76 percent of almost 22 million voters approving it. The constitution included several provisions that would have significant implications for base policy. First, in anticipation of the MBA expiration in 1991, the new constitution granted the Senate the final authority to decide on the fate of military bases. Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions Article XVIII reads: After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

The decision to allow the Senate to ratify or reject a treaty on military bases in 1991 was a clear break from the past, because all previous agreements on military bases except the original MBA were executive agreements. The ConCom decision to require Senate approval for a national referendum on the military bases would also turn out to be important. In the aftermath of the 1991 Senate vote, Cory Aquino tried to organize a national referendum to reverse the Senate’s decision but could not carry it out because the Senate did not approve it. This section of the constitution is very important because it allowed the persuaded antibase senators’ opinions to prevail over the president’s. Without this constitutional provision, another presidential agreement would have extended the American military presence beyond 1991, making the senators’ persuasion unimportant. Another key section in the constitution is Article VIII, Transitory Provisions, Section 4, which says at least two-­thirds of the Senate must support ratification of treaties. In 1991, pro-­treaty senators needed at least 16 votes out of 23 to ratify the treaty, while 8 anti-­treaty votes were enough to defeat it. The final vote (12 against the treaty and 11 for it) seems close at first glance, but it was in fact a clear victory for the anti-­treaty senators. Also important was that the new constitution stressed the importance of some norms that the senators could use to argue against military bases. Arti-

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cle II, Section 7 declares: “The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-­ determination.” The new constitution also included an anti–­nuclear weapons provision. Article II, Section 8 reads: “The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.” Other constitutional provisions that antibase senators used to explain their votes include: 1) renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy (connecting the presence of military bases with indirect involvement in American war); 2) prescription of independent national economy; and 3) prescription to limit exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources to Filipinos. Antinuclear Legislation Since 1987, the Philippine Senate has created legislation to strengthen the constitutional declaration of “freedom from nuclear weapons.” That legislation gave the antibase senators added legal basis to defend their position in 1991. In August 1987, Senator Tañada argued that a recent visit of the USS Missouri to the Subic Naval Base violated the “freedom from nuclear weapons” provision. In response to this visit, Tañada and Pimentel introduced Senate Bill 67 to prohibit storage of nuclear weapons in the Philippines “including the existing military facilities of the United States,” and Senate Bill 68 to forbid the “transit, port calls, stationing, and servicing” of nuclear armed, nuclear powered, and nuclear capable ships, submarines, and aircraft.137 In April 1988, Tañada combined these two bills with another on nuclear inspections of visiting ships and aircraft to create the Freedom from Nuclear Weapons Act (Senate Bill 413). This act supplemented the constitutional provision by specifying how it would be implemented. The Senate passed this bill in June 1988 by a vote of 19–­3 with one abstention. In June 1989, the Senate also passed a resolution stating there were parts of the MBA that did not conform to the provisions of the antinuclear constitution and legislation. The treaty of 1991 included sections that violated some of the legislative provisions. For example, one section read: “The storage or installation of nuclear or non-­conventional weapons or their components on Philippines territory shall be subject to the agreement of the Government of the Philippines. Transits, overflights or visits by United States aircraft or ships, however, shall not be considered storage or installation.”138 This was a clear violation of the Freedom from Nuclear Weapons Act, which specifies in Section 6: “Any relevant treaty or international agreement entered into by the Philippines

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shall include a condition that no nuclear weapons or any nuclear parts or components thereof, shall be introduced, stored or installed in, or pass in transit through, any part of Philippine territory.” In sum, the constitution and the antinuclear legislation together shaped the domestic institutional environment that allowed the persuaded senators to make a difference in base policy. The constitution gave the Senate the final authority to decide on the treaty. In addition, the constitution and the antinuclear legislation gave the antibase senators some legal justifications to defend their unpopular position. Persuaded senators within the enabling domestic institutional context produced the base policy outcome. Looking at how each senator became persuaded about the need to close military bases makes clear the roles of normative arguments and credible individuals in persuasion, but the role of protest organizations needs more elaboration. In fact, the role of protest organizations varied over time and they had different relationships with different senators. The next section offers a synthesis on this subject.

Protest Organizations’ Impact on Policy Many of the senators who voted against U.S. military bases in 1991 worked together in their opposition to Marcos’s dictatorship. Nationalist, anti-­Marcos organizations that these senators created and joined embraced an antibase position. These organizations served as one of the venues in which future senators exchanged views on U.S. military bases and became persuaded that the United States supported Marcos for military bases and that the bases must close for true Philippine sovereignty. These organizations also helped solidify the senators’ antibase persuasion and transformed individual persuasion into a shared policy commitment among the opposition leaders. In the post-­EDSA period, Senator Tañada continued to assume leadership in coalitions of antibase organizations with his father. At the same time, other senators who became persuaded against military bases during the martial law regime disengaged from leadership in protest organizations. Senator Estrada joined the antibase campaign after his election to the Senate and persuasion by his nationalist advisors. In the post-­EDSA period, protest organizations played a supporting role for the senators instead of a persuasive role. Protest organizations supported the senators in two ways. First, the NFPC and the ABC, together with about sixty organizations, created the Campaign for a Sovereign Philippines (CSP) which provided research materials to ConCom representatives so that they could argue effectively against military bases and nuclear weapons during deliberations to draft the new constitu-

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tion.139 Later, these provisions made the senators’ position against military bases defensible. Second, protest organizations supported the senators by informing the public of problems related to the U.S. military bases. This helped the organizations mobilize vocal and well-­informed supporters for the antibase senators in order to mitigate the fact that the broader public preferred the retention of military bases. There was a special section within the antibase campaign that gave facts and analyses to the media, and the media took up the base issues often.140 Protest leaders traveled to spread the campaign as well. Senator Tañada believes that the campaign offered moral support to the antibase senators, without which they “would have been discouraged, or they would have lost heart.”141 I argue that antibase organizations did not play a persuasive role vis-­à-­ vis the senators in the post-­EDSA period, for three reasons. First, they did not persuade pro-­treaty senators to vote against the treaty. Some international relations scholars of NGOs and norms argue that NGOs rely on the “power of the better argument” to influence policy.142 However, my interviews with protest leaders—­and my analysis of other cases in this book—­ suggest that the “power of the better argument” has limits. According to Simbulan, it was difficult for the organizations to sway the pro-­treaty senators only with arguments, especially when the senators had already made up their mind.143 Another leader said lobbying pro-­treaty senators “seemed useless,” as “there was no way to persuade them. . . . Even putting a knife into their hearts would not change their mind.”144 According to yet another leader, rallying in the streets was more important than lobbying the senators, because “superior arguments alone would not get you too far.” If superior arguments were enough, “the activists would have won long ago,” or bases would have closed much earlier.145 Given the perceived difficulty in changing pro-­treaty senators’ mind, the protest organizations’ primary goal was not to persuade them to vote against the treaty but to ensure that the antibase senators would stay on their side. However, lobbying the antibase senators might not have been necessary. Salonga’s memoir does not make significant reference to antibase organizations’ activities leading up to the Senate vote. When I asked about this, he said that in most cases the antibase senators’ experience during the Marcos era was the basis for their vote, suggesting that their own participation in protests was more important than antibase organizations’ lobbying immediately before the vote.146 Butz Aquino agreed that antibase organizations’ lobbying had “very little” influence on the already persuaded senators.147 An antibase pro-

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test leader admitted that the elimination of the military bases was mostly due to luck: having a sufficient number of senators with enough “foresight and vision” to favor closing the bases.148 Second, I argue that antibase organizations did not have a persuasive role in the post-­EDSA period because they could not stop some senators—­who activists thought would vote against the treaty—­from voting for the treaty. For example, one activist mentioned Senator Heherson T. Alvarez as “a big disappointment” since he voted for the treaty despite his leadership in the anti-­ Marcos campaign. He participated in the student movement and was exiled in the United States during the martial law regime. He was a human rights lawyer and had brothers in the anti-­Marcos campaign who were tortured. Similarly, the activist said that antibase organizations expected Senator Jose D. Lina, Jr., to vote against the treaty. Lina was one of the leaders in the First Quarter Storm of 1970 and the antibase PDP-­LABAN.149 I interviewed Senator Alvarez to ask about his vote. He told me that he became convinced during the martial law period that U.S. bases had to be closed. However, in view of the economic conditions of the Philippines in 1991, he decided that the bases could not be removed all at once. His strong concern for the Philippine economy prevented the translation of his fundamental opposition to military bases into a “no” vote. I could not interview Senator Lina, and with very little information about his earlier life or his vote in 1991 that I could find, it is not possible to evaluate whether normative arguments against military bases persuaded him during the martial law years. However, if normative arguments persuaded him, various pressures might have generated costs too high for him to vote against the treaty, or, like Alvarez, he prioritized the economy or some other factors over base closure, and his persuasion did not translate into a vote against the treaty. In any case, antibase organizations could not keep these senators from being won over by pro-­ treaty organizations’ arguments. Third, antibase organizations’ supportive role vis-­à-­vis the persuaded senators after EDSA is clear when considering the fact that the organizations followed the persuaded senators’ actions. Originally, leaders of antibase organizations assumed that the treaty would pass and that they could do nothing about it.150 The organizations engaged various progressive issues simultaneously, and given their pessimistic prediction of the Senate vote, they prioritized other issues over military bases. They organized an anti-­treaty campaign only after Senator Tañada informed them that the Senate was likely to reject the treaty, and mobilized for a final rally before the vote only after learning that President Aquino would lead a pro-­treaty “people power” rally six days

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before the Senate vote.151 Even then, the expectation that the Senate would ratify the treaty persisted among some of the protest leaders, and there was a debate whether to hold an antibase rally before or after the Senate vote, concurrently with the pro-­treaty rally before the vote or an “indignation rally” protesting ratification of the treaty. Lack of resources prevented them from holding both rallies.152 It thus appears that protest organizations during the martial law decade had a significant impact on the Senate’s decision in 1991 to close U.S. military bases, while protest organizations after EDSA had a supporting role for persuaded senators and did not influence the policy outcome. My analysis of other cases in this book shows that protests have limited, if any, influence on base policy.This is because protesters’ normative arguments rarely persuade policy-­makers to change policy. Normative arguments against base policy often clash with policy-­makers’ beliefs, knowledge, and interests. In addition, policy-­makers often do not perceive protest leaders and organizations as credible. When policy-­makers change policy, it is mostly because protests generate significant incentives for policy-­makers. Policy change in such cases would be limited. Yet as this chapter demonstrates, normative persuasion of policy-­makers can occur and lead to a significant change in base policy—­in this case, a closure of all U.S. military bases in the Philippines. Normative arguments fit many of the anti-­treaty senators’ beliefs and knowledge, and the senators perceived protest leaders and other sources of the arguments as credible.153

Conclusion

My analysis of twelve protests that attempted to persuade policy-­makers to change U.S. base policy on the basis of normative prescriptions has led to four findings. First, protesters rarely persuade policy-­makers. Protesters’ arguments persuaded policy-­makers only in two cases: ten Philippine senators in the case from 1991 and Prime Minister Hatoyama in the case from 2009–­2010. Why is persuasion difficult? Persuasion failed in ten cases because protesters’ normative arguments conflicted with policy-­makers’ beliefs, knowledge, and interests. Policy-­makers also doubted the credibility of protest leaders and organizations. My second finding is that domestic institutional arrangements that empower persuaded policy-­makers are important. In the Philippines in 1991, which is the only case in which persuasion led to policy change, persuaded senators were able to fundamentally change base policy—­closing all U.S. military bases in the country—­because the Philippine constitution gave the Senate the power to decide on the future of U.S. military bases. The constitution also set the number of votes in the Senate necessary to close U.S. military bases, and there were enough persuaded senators to meet this requirement. In addition, other laws such as the Freedom from Nuclear Weapons Act allowed the senators to defend their unpopular position. The Futenma relocation case from 2009–­2010 also demonstrates the importance of domestic institutional arrangements that empower persuaded policy-­makers. Protesters’ arguments persuaded Hatoyama but more powerful bureaucrats who preferred the existing policy prevented him from changing it. In addition, this case reveals the

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difficulties that an opposition party that comes into power can face when there are more powerful policy-­making actors with entrenched interests that can block policy change. My third finding is that even when normative persuasion fails, protest leaders and organizations are still able to change base policy in a limited way by mobilizing large protests and generating important political and military incentives for policy-­makers. In this process that I call compromise, normative arguments help mobilize large protests but do not have a persuasive impact on policy-­makers. Policy-­makers’ decision to change policy is due to their rational calculation of costs and benefits in the face of large protests. Policy-­makers’ security, political, and economic interests prevent a fundamental change in base policy according to normative prescriptions. Policy-­makers offer compromise solutions, which are limited changes in policy, in order to calm public outrage and maintain U.S. military effectiveness. When policy-­makers do not perceive important political or military incentives, they do not change policy. In addition, when American policy-­makers believe that changing policy will hurt U.S. interests, they do not agree to make a change even if host-­state policy-­makers have important incentives for change. My fourth finding is that in some cases where policy does not change, policy-­makers offer symbolic concessions. For example, in response to protests that demanded an inclusion of environmental provisions in the SOFA, policy-­ makers from South Korea and the United States created the Memorandum of Special Understandings on Environmental Protection in 2001. This was a declaration of the two states’ intention to cooperate on environmental protection on military bases. Environmental policy on base remained the same. In this and four other cases, policy-­makers offered symbolic concessions to generate a norm-­abiding image, to save face for a failed attempt to change base policy, and to facilitate the implementation of an existing policy. U.S. military bases in the Philippines closed in 1992, but bases remain in Okinawa and South Korea and continue to be controversial. My findings should be instructive to policy-­makers and protest organizers for future decision-­making and activism. I present my recommendations below.

Recommendations to Policy-­Makers My first recommendation is that policy-­makers should not wait until large protests break out to respond to local grievances about the American military presence. A retired American soldier who is now a military historian told me that “no protests, no problem” is a common belief in the U.S. military. My research suggests that this is a common belief among host states’ policy-­

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makers as well. “No protests, no problem” is a bad principle because it does not encourage policy-­makers to manage the relationship between the U.S. military and citizens of host communities before it becomes highly strained. Protests, which are an action of last resort for local citizens, reflect their strong frustration that the U.S. and host governments neglect local interests and policy preferences. A proactive approach will better manage the relationship between the U.S. military and local communities. Before protests occur, American and host-­state policy-­makers can acknowledge the problems that military bases bring to local communities and they can work to secure local communities’ well-­being.This will improve the U.S. military and host governments’ relationship with local communities and help reduce protests. A smoother civil-­military relationship is not the only benefit of a proactive approach. It is also good for security alliances. Following the “no protest, no problem” principle can strain security alliances by putting allies through potentially contentious negotiations in a hurry to respond to protests. In addition, in negotiations after protests, host-­state governments must play a high-­ stakes game because the public pays great attention to their governments’ ability and willingness to defend national and local interests vis-­à-­vis the United States. A proactive approach contributes to reducing tension within security alliances and during base policy negotiations. My second recommendation to American and host-­state policy-­makers is to develop a greater partnership with local governments and take their requests for policy improvement seriously. Local governments have had a limited influence on base policy because central governments negotiate and create base policy to serve the national interest. The United States also maintains significant rights in and around military bases and it is difficult for local governments to influence American activities. Although consultative mechanisms between national and local governments in host states exist, the general practice of the national governments “requesting” local communities to accept their final decisions continues. This is essentially an order from above, with compensation and other measures to facilitate the process. Inviting local representatives to participate in crafting base policy and in monitoring their implementation might help improve local sentiment toward the American military presence. The importance of treating local governments as partners in ensuring security became clear during the Futenma relocation case of 2009–­2010. Many Okinawans voiced objection to Futenma’s relocation within the prefecture through an island-­wide protest, and when Hatoyama asked other prefectures to accept a relocated base or a transfer of military functions at a meeting of

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all Japanese governors in May 2010, none of the governors responded positively. One important reason for the governors’ rejection was that there were many unresolved problems related to U.S. military bases and local governments appeared powerless before the two states’ apparent unwillingness to negotiate fundamental change.1 Local communities make an important contribution to national and regional security through assuming the alliance’s burden, but Tokyo and Washington do not treat them as true partners. Communities outside of Okinawa know this and rejected Futenma’s relocation in 2010, revealing that no community in Japan wishes to host a new U.S. military base or additional military personnel, aircraft, and exercises at existing bases. If Japanese and American policy-­makers value the security alliance, and if they believe that it functions through Japan’s provision of military bases, they should be alarmed by the fact that no community wishes to host new U.S. bases, personnel, and functions. My third recommendation is not to overestimate the value of monetary compensation to local communities as a means to increase local support for the American military presence. Providing concrete solutions to local grievances is better. Economic compensation has mollified some of the protest supporters and solidified the acquiescence of some locals that directly benefit from the compensation. However, my empirical cases show that protests recur when local grievances remain unresolved, regardless of the amount of economic compensation. States should continue to allocate economic assistance to local communities that host U.S. military bases, but they should not expect this to prevent protests. Fourth, I advise policy-­makers not to characterize the whole of a protest movement as “anti-­American” or “anti-­alliance.” I heard this often in my interviews with American and host-­state policy-­makers. It is true that protest movements include a small number of people with anti-­American and anti-­alliance views, but most protest participants are not anti-­American or anti-­alliance. Most people participate in protests because they have serious grievances about some aspect of base policy that compel them to commit their time and energy to protest activities. Similarly, my interviews revealed some officials’ perception that young people participate in protests as a social activity with friends, just for fun. This may be true for some participants, but young people generally choose the protests they join. Many young people participate in protests that appear to fit with their beliefs, values, and interests. Labeling protesters as anti-­American, anti-­alliance, or fun seekers and brushing aside protests as unworthy of their attention can prevent policy-­ makers from recognizing reasonable grievances as such. Large protest mobili-

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zations suggest that existing base policy may not be sufficient to protect local and national interests even if policy-­makers believe that current measures are adequate. My fifth recommendation is to continue to reduce the U.S. military footprint in host states. The U.S. and host governments have tried to consolidate bases in Okinawa and South Korea. Local communities usually see problems in base relocation plans, and states must make an utmost effort to address them. However, a realignment of the U.S. forces that reduces the number of military bases and personnel in host states, especially in populated areas, will decrease friction between U.S. forces and local communities. In addition, the U.S. effort in military transformation to develop rapidly deployable forces that can reach distant theaters quickly should contribute to reducing deployment abroad in peacetime. Other American efforts including 1) assuring access to foreign bases in emergency situations, 2) enhancing the naval forces’ capabilities to project more power from the sea, and 3) developing wartime capabilities for rapidly seizing, holding, building, and protecting the infrastructure needed for U.S. forces in enemy territory should decrease the need to maintain military bases abroad in peacetime.2 Improving host states’ capabilities to defend themselves and ensuring the effectiveness of joint operations with U.S. forces should also contribute to reducing American deployment to host states. Finally, I recommend that the U.S. and host governments engage in a better public relations effort so the public becomes more informed about the American military activities in their community, country, and the region. This involves engaging the media and developing more accessible and informative websites to improve the public’s understanding of military activities and their purposes. For example, the debate over the Henoko plan in 2009–­2010 revealed how unclear the operational requirements for deterrence, alliance effectiveness, and defense of Japan are to the Japanese public. Japanese and American policy-­makers continue to say that a new construction in Henoko is necessary to maintain the alliance’s deterrence effect, but they have not adequately explained this in terms of operational requirements and why other alternatives are not acceptable. In this and other debates over basing decisions, detailed information about “how much and what kind of capabilities must be located where to fulfill what goals” would be useful. Information about the extent of flexibility and potential trade-­offs would also be helpful. For example, if Futenma’s functions were to relocate to Kagoshima or Saga prefectures (which were two of many reported candidate sites), what kind of change would it bring to deterrence

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and other measurements of military effectiveness? Relying on abstract ideas like “deterrence” and “security” seems no longer sufficient to explain a particular base policy to the public. Similarly, other base policy can be very technical and difficult to understand without an explanation. Environmental policy on U.S. military bases and criminal jurisdiction procedures are two examples. Efforts to inform the public about base policy are important if states wish to obtain greater support for the alliances. It is also important for states to publicize their efforts to address local grievances. In addition, the U.S. and host governments should respond when protest organizers use factually wrong or exaggerated arguments to press for base policy change. For example, the USFK’s website now lists the names of its personnel tried in courts-­martial and Korean courts, the charges against them, and the trials’ results (including the sentences when the personnel are found guilty). This helps correct a common misunderstanding that Korean courts have no jurisdiction over USFK personnel and crime perpetrators go unpunished. Similar efforts to increase transparency should go a long way in improving the U.S. military’s relationship with host communities.

Recommendations to Activists My research also provides important lessons for activists. First, persuasion takes time. The accounts of Philippine senators’ persuasion demonstrate that people acquire and reinforce a belief over time, as they interact with credible others and participate in various activities. It may be unreasonable to expect that short-­term lobbying efforts will persuade policy-­makers and lead to a fundamental change in policy. A better approach to changing policy through persuasion is to focus on public education and to mold future leaders’ attitudes toward military bases and related policies. Second, my research shows that normative arguments are more often important for mobilizing large protests to pressure policy-­makers to change policy in a limited way than persuading policy-­makers to change policy in a fundamental way. Therefore, protest leaders might prioritize organizing large demonstrations and other expressions of public discontent (e.g., local referenda, petition drives, or letter-­writing campaigns) that generate political pressure, over lobbying policy-­makers to persuade them. Protest leaders should expect incremental—­and not fundamental—­changes in base policy (if any change at all) because policy changes more often through compromise than through persuasion. Third, my research suggests that protests that include participants from across the political spectrum create the most pressure on policy-­makers. Pub-

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lic and policy-­makers’ perception of protest organizations matters. Protest organizations’ leftist image can discourage public participation and make conservative policy-­makers resist policy change. Building a politically neutral movement should improve public appeal and help secure a larger influence in the policy-­making process. Fourth, my cases show that protest organizations have more policy influence when they present what policy-­makers perceive as fair criticisms and reasonable demands. Policy-­makers tend to reject criticisms and demands that they perceive as unfair, inaccurate, or unreasonable. However, developing normative arguments that policy-­makers consider reasonable and workable can be difficult. Adherence to some norms requires protesters to demand fundamental change. For example, when protesters rely on the sovereignty norm to expand a host state’s criminal jurisdiction, the normative argument would necessarily demand exclusive jurisdiction for the host state even in on-­duty cases. It is highly unlikely that the United States will agree to this, and therefore the normative argument will continue to sound unreasonable to American policy-­makers. At times reliance on norms contributes to the loss of credibility of protest leaders and organizations because policy-­makers believe that only non-­experts who do not understand the complexity of base policy or the need to strike a balance between what host countries and the United States prefer would make such unworkable demands. Protest leaders and organizations face a credibility dilemma, in which increasing credibility among policy-­makers by moderating demands would decrease credibility among protest supporters who want fundamental change according to normative prescriptions. Protest leaders and organizations often decide to deploy normative arguments for fundamental change despite the risk of losing credibility among policy-­makers. Persuasion is rare in base politics, so protest leaders could aim to mobilize large protests with fundamental demands and generate incentives for policy-­makers to put forward a limited change in base policy through compromise. My fifth recommendation to activists is to work with people and organizations that policy-­makers perceive as credible. My research shows that credibility is an important asset for protest leaders and organizations. Once they lose credibility it is difficult to regain it, and this loss could jeopardize their policy influence. Actors with limited influence could work with people and organizations that policy-­makers believe are credible. Credible actors could serve as messengers to communicate local grievances to policy-­makers. In South Korea, for example, the USFK maintains a close relationship with Korean veterans’ associations and other friendship organizations. These are conservative

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organizations that value the U.S. military presence in South Korea. They tend not to discuss controversial base policy issues in their discussions with the USFK.3 They often have a negative perception of protest organizations, and this will make it challenging for activists to establish a dialogue with them. But if activists convince these organizations that some change in policy is necessary and would improve public support for the alliance, the organizations might transmit the message to the U.S. forces with more influence. My final recommendation to activists is to encourage host states to improve domestic laws and practices that are relevant to base policy, in order to facilitate change in base policy itself. For example, a SOFA revision to allow host states to take American military suspects into custody at an earlier stage of the legal process may become more acceptable to the United States if host states resolve some of the American concerns about methods of investigation and interrogation. Protest organizations could also press host states to implement stricter domestic environmental standards in order to improve environmental policy on U.S. military bases, because the U.S. military’s environmental governing standards take host states’ standards into consideration. In addition, organizations seeking to end “American military prostitution” should also pressure host governments to punish domestic businesses that prostitute women and to prevent human trafficking with stricter visa controls. In sum, protest organizations could facilitate change in base policy by encouraging domestic changes. This will also help enhance the organizations’ credibility by demonstrating that they are serious about policy change and by refuting policy-­makers’ criticism that they are protesting only to embarrass the United States and hurt the bilateral alliance.

Issues for Further Research On Persuasion Persuasion continues to be an important research topic in international relations for several reasons. First, constructivists have focused mostly on persuasion within international institutions; more research on persuasion outside of institutions is necessary. Studying persuasion within international institutions makes sense because they are important venues of international communication and socialization. State and non-­state actors often attempt to persuade each other within institutions, and constructivist research has shed light on how persuasion works or fails there.4 However, international politics occurs outside of international institutions too, as in the base politics that I examine in this book. More research on persuasion outside international institu-

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tions will clarify if persuasion is more likely inside institutions due to various mechanisms that facilitate the process, and if there are different processes and conditions for persuasion inside and outside of institutions. International institutions offer various mechanisms that facilitate persuasion that are either absent or weak outside of those institutions. It is therefore possible that persuasion succeeds more often in international institutions than outside of them. International institutions provide an opportunity for repeated face-­to-­face interaction among actors that enables active and continuous argumentation about normative behavior. In addition, state actors may be more open to examining their beliefs and behaviors, and possibly to being persuaded, because they generally accept that one of the important functions of international institutions is to encourage deliberation. Furthermore, international institutions foster trust among actors through repeated interaction, treatment of national representatives as equals, and acceptance of registered non-­state actors as legitimate participants in argumentation. These conditions are either lacking or weak outside of international institutions, and this could make persuasion less likely. Moreover, the process and conditions under which persuasion occurs inside and outside international institutions may be different. The Habermasian communicative action model assumes that actors are relatively equal and are open to argumentation, which is with the ultimate goal of arriving at a reasoned consensus.5 This model may better describe the process of persuasion within international institutions than outside them. In most of my cases, state actors did not perceive protest leaders and organizations as equals or as credible participants in base politics. Policy-­makers were not open to argumentation with protesters or interested in reaching a reasoned consensus with them. The second avenue for research on persuasion is to study the process in other security issues and in non-­security issues. This will illuminate if persuasion in base politics failed most of the time because it is in the domain of security policy. Persuasion is rare in base politics because protesters’ normative arguments to protect the environment, human rights, sovereignty, and other important things are competing against the states’ equally important goal of providing national and international security. Such competition of valid goals may exist in other cases concerning security. Research on how state actors rank and prioritize different norms will be instructive. In other policy fields, alleged norm violators may not have justifications that are as significant or broadly accepted as ensuring international and national security. Normative arguments may encounter less challenge from policy-­makers’ existing beliefs, knowledge, and interests, making persuasion easier.

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The third issue for future research is on how norm compliance without persuasion eventually leads to norm internalization. Constructivist research suggests that norm compliance through strategic calculation can potentially lead to norm internalization, although the process by which this occurs is not clear. Checkel proposes a process in which individuals who begin to act according to normative prescription for strategic reasons may need to justify these acts to themselves and others. They resolve cognitive dissonance that may arise between what they privately believe and how they act in public by internalizing the norms.6 My research suggests that legal and other precedents may drive a long-­term evolution of base policy in the direction of normative prescriptions. When I set aside my snapshot case studies (in which protesters failed to persuade policy-­makers most of the time) and look at the evolution of base policy and related practice in the long term, there have been significant changes. For example, today the U.S. military has procedures for discarding toxic waste water instead of releasing it directly into the soil and rivers. The U.S. military and host states no longer expropriate land without compensation. The U.S. military no longer condones its personnel’s involvement in prostitution. Host states can try U.S. military personnel suspected of crimes against host-­state citizens if the suspects were off-­duty at the time of the crimes. It appears that legal and other precedents play an important role in norm internalization over a long period in base politics. Once policy-­makers who carry out rational cost-­benefit calculations create new laws, policy, or practice in the direction that norms recommend, these laws, policy, or practices become authoritative precedents that shape policy-­makers’ behavior and beliefs. Over time, precedence-­following and incremental changes may lead to internalization of norms. In any case, protests that repeatedly forced policy-­makers to think about normative resolution to base problems over the years appear to have been important in the evolution of state behavior. But we have yet to theoretically explain such evolution in state behavior that reflects gradual internalization of norms. Fourth, social psychologists have identified a diverse set of variables that facilitate or obstruct persuasion, and political scientists can continue to examine their relevance for international relations. In my study, for example, I did not explore the impact of source variables such as power, status, attractiveness, and non-­verbal behavior. I did not assess aspects of a message such as positive versus negative framing of arguments, emotion versus reason in messages, fear and threat appeals, argument quantity, and duration of exposure to a message. Furthermore, persuasion can occur through a number of mechanisms that

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depend on a recipient’s motivation and ability to carefully examine a message, but I did not consider these factors. Political scientists have examined only a limited number of variables on persuasion that social psychologists have identified as important. Some unexplored variables may be pertinent for persuasion in international relations. On the Importance of U.S. Domestic Politics for Base Policy Abroad The case studies in this book suggest that American preferences on base policy abroad mostly depend on American policy-­makers’ perception of international threats and evaluation of requirements to achieve military effectiveness. This book has examined aggregated American preferences and has not explored the process of policy coordination within the U.S. government. Domestic political variables such as presidential politics, congressional politics, bureaucratic politics, and budgetary concerns are likely to influence American preferences on base policy abroad. Studying these factors in detail will give a more complete picture of U.S. preferences and offer additional evidence on why the United States rejected policy change in some cases and agreed to limited policy changes in others. The influence of American public opinion on military base policy abroad is also an important topic of research. According to a Rasmussen Reports poll conducted in the United States in January 2011, 82 percent of the respondents said they believe that economic challenges are a greater potential threat to the United States than military challenges. The public has become less supportive of large spending to maintain military bases abroad. In fact, 48 percent of the respondents in the same poll said that the United States should “remove troops from Japan and let the Japanese defend themselves,” while 36 percent said the troops should stay in Japan. More people said U.S. troops should stay in South Korea; 60 percent endorsed continued deployment, while 30 percent preferred withdrawal.7 To what extent will American public opinion influence U.S. deployment abroad in the future? U.S. military base policy abroad has not been an important subject of public discussion in the United States. It will be interesting to see if public opinion and activism in the United States will have an increasing influence on U.S. base policy overseas as the United States deals with its budget deficit and other economic challenges.

Imagining Security Policy-­makers often believe military bases are essential to security and implement base policies that maximize U.S. military effectiveness. They recognize

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the importance of normative actions such as protecting the environment, respecting sovereignty, ensuring human rights, and minimizing negative impacts on local communities. They work toward crafting base policy that is consistent with these norms, but tend to prioritize the goal of providing national and international security when it competes with the norms. Many people in host states imagine security differently. People living near military bases focus on peace and security in their daily lives. They live with the problems that U.S. military bases generate. Night-­flight exercises can keep people awake and aircraft can crash in civilian areas around military bases. Local residents realize that while U.S. military bases may provide security for the nation and even for the region and beyond, their daily lives are not entirely peaceful and their living space is not secure. Many people who do not experience base-­related problems in such immediate ways agree that residents living near military bases should not suffer or worry about those problems. Many people also believe that security provision should not be considered more important than other objectives such as protecting the environment, human rights, and sovereignty. They engage in protests to challenge base policy with normative arguments. Past cases suggest that protesters are likely to feel frustrated in future mobilizations because protests usually lead to limited policy changes, if there is any change at all. In addition, some policy responses—­like the closures of Futenma and Yongsan in exchange for relocation facilities—­can generate difficult dilemmas for protesters because the new policy relieves some people’s burden while transferring it onto others. However, as long as policy-­makers and citizens imagine security with different priorities, and as long as citizens feel their priorities are neglected, there will be protests against base policy. Although the snapshot views of my case studies show limited or no change following most protests, it is important to remember that protests over the years contributed to the evolution of state behavior in the direction of normative prescription. As I discuss above, today policy-­makers are more aware of people’s concerns about base problems and responsive to them than in the immediate postwar period. Recurring protests seem to have created a stronger foundation for policy-­makers and citizens to imagine security together. My research shows that protests are not always successful in changing base policy but they push policy-­makers to maximize military effectiveness within domestic constraints. I find that this conclusion is not only true but also reasonable to expect in democratic societies. We all have a stake in security policies because we must live with their consequences. Many citizens realize this, and that is why they organize and participate in protests to voice their opin-

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ions. While these citizens are concerned about the various problems that U.S. military bases generate, they also understand that there are certain requirements for national and international security that host states must help fulfill if they wish to maintain an alliance with the United States.Very often, what the public seeks is a better balance between fulfilling security requirements and enhancing “human security” in people’s daily lives. Protesters are challenging policy-­makers to skillfully balance the various requirements to ensure security for all, in its fullest sense.

Notes

introduction 1. Remark at the Japan National Press Club, August 17, 2009. 2. “Kokugai, kengai e: 90% Futenma isetsu, honshi kinkyū yoron chōsa,” Okinawa Times, April 20, 2010. 3. The concept of “island-­wide struggle” (shimagurumi tōsō) comes from Arasaki, “Okinawa tōsō,” 74. 4. Protests against nuclear weapons, landmines, and wars are other examples. 5. Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific.” 6. Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century.” 7. The United States and Japan announced in December 2013 that they agreed to start negotiation toward concluding a SOFA implementation agreement to allow local governments to enter U.S. military bases for environmental testing. 8. Tarrow, Power in Movement, chap. 5. 9. On how norms constitute identity and interests, and ultimately influence state behavior, see the essays in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security. 10. Secretary of Defense Leslie Aspen, Jr., “DoD Policy and Procedures for the Realignment of Overseas Sites” MSG142159Z, December 1993. 11. Perloff, The Dynamics of Persuasion, 14. 12. Social psychologists assume that persuasion has occurred when a person’s attitude shifts in the direction of the message. This includes the two persuasion outcomes I focus on: adoption of a new attitude and adoption of an attitude opposite the initial one. But persuasion can also reinforce an existing attitude that the message promotes, and can weaken an attitude that the message opposes without the recipient being won over by the position that the messenger promotes. I do not examine these outcomes but acknowledge that they are possible. 13. For an excellent review, see Petty and Wegener, “Attitude Change.” I do not explore the impact of many conditions that social psychologists have found important, such as the

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mood of policy-­makers and source variables besides credibility such as attractiveness, status, power, and non-­verbal behavior. I do not assess aspects of a message like positive versus negative framing of arguments, emotion versus reason in messages, fear and threat appeals, and argument quantity. Furthermore, persuasion can occur through a number of mechanisms that depend on a recipient’s motivation and ability to carefully examine a message, but I do not consider these factors. 14. Petty et al., “To Think or Not to Think,” 84. 15. Zimbardo and Leippe, The Psychology of Attitude Change and Social Influence, 149–­50, 166. 16. Baker and Petty, “Majority and Minority Influence,” 8. Also see Johnson, Wahlbeck, and Spriggs, “The Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court,” 110. 17. Checkel, “Why Comply?,” 568. 18. Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!,’” 9. 19. Ibid., 27; Risse-­Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely.” 20. Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!,’” 1, 19, 25, 33. 21. Checkel, “Why Comply?,” 562–­68. 22. Interviews, January and February 2007. 23. Zimbardo and Leippe, The Psychology of Attitude Change and Social Influence, 153, 166; Petty et al., “To Think or Not to Think,” 85–­86. 24. Petty and Wegener, “Attitude Change,” 344–­49. 25. Zimbardo and Leippe, The Psychology of Attitude Change and Social Influence, 54–­65. 26. Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” 498. 27. Petty and Wegener, “Attitude Change,” 329. 28. Clark et al., “Source Expertise and Persuasion.” 29. Fabrigar, Krosnick, and MacDougall, “Attitude Measurement,” 18. 30. Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!,’” 18. 31. Ibid., 19. 32. Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies, 45. 33.Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-­U.S. Base Protests, 27–­31. On “elite consensus,” also see Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 47–­49. 34. Petty and Wegener, “Thought Systems, Argument Quality, and Persuasion,” 148. 35. Brown, Creating Credibility, 2. 36. Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 49–­50; Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” 188. 37. Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 113. 38. Ibid., 44, 255. 39. Cooley, Base Politics, 23–­24. 40.Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-­U.S. Base Protests, 14. 41. Cooley, Base Politics, 3. 42.Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-­U.S. Base Protests, 182. 43. Shannon, “Norms Are What States Make of Them,” 295. 44. On message content, see Petty and Wegener, “Attitude Change,” 349–­56. 45. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 904. 46. Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements.” 47. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 908. 48. Petty and Wegener, “Attitude Change,” 352. 49. Ibid., 330. 50. Ibid., 332.

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51. Shannon, “Norms Are What States Make of Them,” 294. 52. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 895. 53. Checkel, “Why Comply?”; Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe”; Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’”; Schimmelfennig, “Strategic Calculation and International Socialization.” 54. Deitelhoff, “The Discursive Process of Legalization,” 44; Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’”; Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.” 55. Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” 499. 56. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe,” 813. 57. Other micromechanisms are deliberation and argumentation. Checkel, “Why Comply?,” 561. 58. Ibid., 581; Zurn and Checkel, “Getting Socialized to Build Bridges,” 1047. 59. United States Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, Base Structure Report (FY2012), 7. 60. Process-­tracing is a method that helps identify different causal paths, locate potentially key variables, and check for spuriousness. Beach and Pedersen, Process-­Tracing Methods.

chapter 1 1. Miyume Tanji writes that the American military secured 45,000 acres. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 55. Masahide Ōta says that by 1951, the United States occupied 30,642 acres in the main Okinawan island. Ōta, Okinawa: Kichi naki shima e no dōhyō, 113. 2. Emphasis added by the author. Also see Ōta, Okinawa: Kichi naki shima e no dōhyō, 113. 3. Arasaki, Okinawa: Hansen jinushi, 20–­21. 4. Article 52, Section III (Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State), Annex to the Hague Convention IV, Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of the War on Land, October 18, 1907. 5. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 62–­63. 6. Arasaki, Okinawa: Hansen jinushi, 28. 7. Ōshiro, Shōwa shi no naka no Okinawa, 32. 8. On expropriation in central Okinawa, see Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 63, 70. On expropriation in Iejima, see Ahagon, Beigun to nōmin. Also see Okinawa Ken Kichi Taisakushitsu, Okinawa no beigun kichi (2003), 2–­3. Ōta writes that approximately 200 families had to move in Isahama and about 120 in Iejima. Ōta, Okinawa: Kichi naki shima e no dōhyō, 114. 9. See Ahagon, Beigun to nōmin; Arasaki, Okinawa: Hansen jinushi. 10. Ahagon, Beigun to nōmin, 92, 114, 116. 11. Arasaki, Okinawa: Hansen jinushi, 56; Ahagon, Beigun to nōmin, 93–­94, 122, 168. 12. Ahagon, Beigun to nōmin, 25, 63, 95, 110, 113–­18, 166–­69, 172–­74, 178; Arasaki, Mikan no Okinawa tōsō, 96. 13. Ōta, Okinawa: Kichi naki shima e no dōhyō, 115; Arasaki, Okinawa: Hansen jinushi, 31. 14. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 65. 15. Okinawa Ken Kichi Taisakushitsu, Okinawa no beigun kichi (2003), 3. 16. Arasaki, Okinawa: Hansen jinushi, 34–­35; Kurima, “Okinawa shakai to gunyōchiryō,” 210. 17. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 71–­72; Ōshiro, Shōwa shi no naka no Okinawa, 35. Ōshiro puts the number of protest participants at 400,000, which was half of the

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Okinawan population. Sarantakes puts the number at 100,000. Sarantakes, Keystone, 93. Also see Aharen, “Okinawa no kichi mondai no genzai,” 26. 18. Ōshiro, Shōwa shi no naka no Okinawa, 35. 19. Ōta, Okinawa: Kichi naki shima e no dōhyō, 119; Kurima, “Okinawa shakai to gunyōchiryō,” 198; Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 74, 191n42. Arasaki puts the figure at 70 percent of the Land Union’s demand. Arasaki, Okinawa: Hansen jinushi, 36. 20. Ahagon, Beigun to nōmin, 79; Ōta, Okinawa: Kichi naki shima e no dōhyō, 123; Oshiro, Shōwa shi no naka no Okinawa, 34. 21. Open letter from Senaga Kamejiro to Major General David A. D. Ogden, 27 May 1954, p. 4, Ryukyus Papers, Box 9, United States Army Military History Institute. 22. Ahagon, Beigun to nōmin, 160. 23. Ibid., 76–­77. 24. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 60, 65. 25. Ibid., 72. 26. Ibid., 55. 27. Ōshiro, Shōwa shi no naka no Okinawa, 25. 28. Addresses by High Commissioners to Legislature, Government of the Ryukyu Islands, 1958–­60, High Commissioner James E. Moore’s address on April 11, 1958, James E. Moore Papers, Box 2, United States Army Military History Institute. 29. Oral History of General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Senior Officer Oral History Program, Interview Session 2, 4 May 1972, pp. 10–­11, United States Army Military History Institute. 30. Sarantakes, Keystone, 63, citing CINCFE to JCS, Dec. 5, 1951, JCS Files folder, Box 7–­3, Ryukyus Papers, United States Army Military History Institute, and Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Jan. 14, 1952, JCS Files folder, Box 7–­3, Ryukyus Papers. 31. Sarantakes, Keystone, xviii, 65. 32. Roderick Gillies Papers, Interview on 31 March and 1 April 1982, p. 5, Ryukyus Papers Box 6, United States Army Military History Institute. 33. Rabson, Okinawa, 7, quoting from Kennan’s recounting of MacArthur’s remarks in “conversation between General of the Army MacArthur and Mr. George F. Kennan, March 5, 1948,” in Foreign Relations 6 (1948): 701. 34. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 80. 35. Rabson, Okinawa, 9, 12, 24; Sarantakes, Keystone, 69, 75–­77. 36. “Address by Lt Gen J.E. Moore High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands at 7th Annual University of Ryukyu Festival, 7 December 1957,” pp. 4–­5, James E. Moore Papers, Box 2, United States Army Military History Institute. 37. RCCA-­GL 601.53, Subj: Land Incident in Okinawa, 6 February 1954, pp. 2–­3, Ryukyus Papers, Box 9, United States Army Military History Institute. 38. Ōta, Okinawa no teiō, 113. 39. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 60. 40. Ahagon, Beigun to nōmin, 50. 41. Ibid., 112. 42. Ōshiro, Shōwa shi no naka no Okinawa, 37. 43. Sarantakes, Keystone, 97. 44. Roderick M. Gillies’s address to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Okinawa, May 9, 1957, Roderick M. Gillies Papers within Ryukyus Papers, Box 6, United States Military History Institute. 45. Nagumo, Senryōka no Okinawa, 36; Fukuchi, Kichi to jinken, 66. 46. Nagumo, Senryōka no Okinawa, 36.

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47. “Statement of Department of the Army Policy with Respect to Land Acquisition and Utilization in the Ryukyu Islands,” 5 October 1955, p. 3, Ryukyus Papers, Box 18, United States Army Military History Institute. 48. Ōta, Okinawa: Kichi naki shima e no dōhyō, 118–­19. 49. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 74. 50.Yamamoto, Okinawa to Nihon kokka, 54–­56. 51. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 74, 191n40. 52. Letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles from Douglas MacArthur II, February 1, 1958, Ryukyus Papers, Box 1, United States Army Military History Institute. 53. Letter from Senaga Kamejiro, Secretary-­General of the OPP, to Major General David A.D. Ogden, Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, 27 May 1954, Ryukyus Papers Box 9, United States Army Military History Institute. 54. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 57. 55. Rabson, Okinawa, 15, citing Edwin O. Reischauer, The Japanese (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1977), 348. 56. American personnel committed 973 crimes in 1964, 1,003 in 1965, and 1,407 in 1966. Violent crimes composed 265 of those in 1964, 275 in 1965, and 466 in 1966. Ibid., 14–­15n40. 57. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 81. 58. Ibid., 103–­4; Rabson, Okinawa, 20–­21; Okinawa Shi Kikaku Bu Heiwa Bunka Shinkō Ka, ed., Beikoku ga mita Koza bōdō; Arasaki, Mikan no Okinawa tōsō, 396–­408. 59. Fukuchi, Kichi to jinken, 63–­76, 80–­88; Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 85. 60. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 66. 61. Letter to the editor of the Okinawa Times from Ikema Shinsuke on August 27, 1965, cited in Abu, “Sora kara torērā ga futtekita,” 133 (the translation is mine). 62. Ibid., 132. 63. Poll between February 26 and March 3, 1968, printed in Ryūkyū Shimpō, cited in Arasaki, Mikan no Okinawa tōsō, 314. 64. Miki, Dokyumento, 319; Gabe, Okinawa henkan towa nandattanoka, 79, 158. 65. The words “harassment” and “political instability” come from CINCFE to Department of the Army, May 20, 1957, Japan sec. 23 folder, box 11, 1957 Okinawa Geographic File, CS Files, RG 218, NACP; JCS to the Secretary of Defense, May 1, 1958, Japan sec. 27 folder, Box 8, 1958 Okinawa Geographic File, CS Files, RG 218, NACP, cited in Sarantakes, Keystone, 109. 66. Gabe, Okinawa henkan towa nandattanoka, 79. 67. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 223. 68. Albert Watson II, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, August 1964–­October 1966, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, Interview by Colonel Harold Miller and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Adcock, April 15, 1975, pp. 27 and 42, Ryukyus Commander Papers, Box 1, United States Army Military History Institute. 69. Lieutenant General Ferdinand Thomas Unger, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, November 1966–­January 1969, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, Ryukyus Commanders, Interview by Colonel Hal Miller and Lieutenant Colonel Tom Adcock, Part 1, April 23, 1975, page 5, Box 3 Ryukyus Commander Papers, United States Army Military History Institute. 70. Caraway’s memorandum for General Wedemeyer, US Army, Retired, undated, Caraway Papers Box 26 (1970), United States Army Military History Institute.

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71. Interview of Colonel William F. Schless, Chief of Staff of the US Army Ryukyus Islands, 16 August 1969–­14 May 1973, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, Ryukyu Commanders, Ryukyu Commander Papers Box 2, Interview by Colonel Harold Miller and Lt. Colonel Thomas Adcock, Part 1, January 10, 1975, Root Hall at Carlisle Barracks, p. 14, United States American Military History Institute. 72. Takamine, “Kokunai seiji no hensen to Okinawa kichi,” 223–­24. 73. Remarks by Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway at the Regular Monthly Dinner Meeting of the Golden Gate Club, 5 March 1963, pp. 2–­3, 8–­9, Caraway Papers Box 18, United States Army Military History Institute. 74. Albert Watson II, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, August 1964–­October 1966, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, Interview by Colonel Harold Miller and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Adcock, April 15, 1975, Ryukyus Commander Papers, Box 1, pp. 3 and 57, United States Army Military History Institute. On the expected decrease or loss of American freedom of action, Watson’s comment to Asahi Shimbun, April 17, 1965, in Arasaki, Mikan no Okinawa tōsō, 137. 75. Lieutenant General Ferdinand Thomas Unger, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, November 1966–­January 1969, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, Ryukyus Commanders, Interview by Colonel Hal Miller and Lieutenant Colonel Tom Adcock, Part 2, April 29, 1975, pp. 24–­28, Box 3 Ryukyus Commander Papers, United States Army Military History Institute. 76. Interview with Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway, Paul W. Caraway Papers, Box 28, Recollections and Reflections. Transcript of Debriefing of LTG Caraway by Colonel Herbert H. Ray, April 21, 1971, pp. 46–­47, 51, 65, United States Army Military History Institute. 77. Lieutenant General Ferdinand Thomas Unger, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, November 1966–­January 1969, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, Ryukyus Commanders, Interview by Colonel Hal Miller and Lieutenant Colonel Tom Adcock, Part 2, April 29, 1975, p. 9, Box 3 Ryukyus Commander Papers, United States Army Military History Institute. 78. Caraway’s letter to Brigadier General Forrest Caraway, USA Ret. on 5 January 1962, Caraway Papers, Box 17, United States Army Military History Institute. 79. Letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles from Douglas MacArthur II, February 1, 1958, Ryukyus Papers Box 1, United States Army Military History Institute. 80. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 73. Note this nationalist argument was territorial, which is different from the nationalist argument in Okinawa that Okinawans were Japanese. 81. Sarantakes, Keystone, 129, 134, 144. 82. MacArthur to Dulles, February 1, 1958, Ryukyus Papers Box 1, United States Army Military History Institute. 83. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 239–­40; Gabe, Okinawa henkan towa nandattanoka, 64. 84.Yonakuni, Okinawa: Hansen heiwa ishiki no keisei, 138. 85. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 91; Sarantakes, Keystone, 137, 167; MacArthur to Dulles, Feb. 1, 1958, Ryukyus Papers, Box 1, United States Army Military History Institute; Kissinger, White House Years, 326–­29. 86. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 73, 91; Gabe, Okinawa henkan towa nandattanoka, 79, 121–­22, 142. 87. Sarantakes, Keystone, 143–­44; Gabe, Okinawa henkan towa nandattanoka, 62, 81–­82, 97–­ 98, 100; Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 226–­27, 240; Wakaizumi, The Best Course Available, 51.

notes

193

88. Fukuchi, Kichi to jinken, 63. 89. Nagumo, Senryōka no Okinawa, 32–­36. 90. Albert Watson II, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, August 1964–­October 1966, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, Interview by Colonel Harold Miller and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Adcock, April 15, 1975, p. 27, Ryukyus Commander Papers, Box 1, United States Army Military History Institute. 91. Lieutenant General Ferdinand Thomas Unger, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, November 1966–­January 1969, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, Ryukyus Commanders, Interview by Colonel Hal Miller and Lieutenant Colonel Tom Adcock, Part 1, April 23, 1975, pp. 39–­41, Box 3, Ryukyus Commander Papers, United States Army Military History Institute. 92. Nishiyama, Okinawa mitsuyaku, 40. 93. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 234. 94. Ibid., 237–­38. 95.Yonakuni, Okinawa: Hansen heiwa ishiki no keisei, 73, 113–­14. 96. Ibid., 111. Ōshiro puts the number at 50,000. Ōshiro, Shōwa shi no naka no Okinawa, 57. 97. Wakaizumi, The Best Course Available, 56, 60. 98. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 241. 99. Ibid., citing a Mainichi Shimbun poll in May 1969. 100. Wakaizumi, The Best Course Available. 101. Joint Statement of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Satō and U.S. President Richard Nixon, November 21, 1969, Articles 5 and 6. 102. Aharen, “Okinawa no kichi mondai no genzai,” 29; Okinawa Ken Chijikōshitsu Kichi Taisakuka, Okinawa no beigun kichi, 24. 103. The secret agreement on nuclear weapons clarifies the American intention to withdraw them by the time of reversion. Wakaizumi, The Best Course Available, 236. 104. Ibid., 55.

chapter 2 1. Herikichi Hantaikyō, Shimin tōhyō hōkokusho, 170. 2. SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996. 3. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 298. 4. Francis, “Women and Military Violence,” 190. 5. Takazato, Okinawa no onnatachi. 6. “Nichibei chiikyōtei kennai kakutō no kenkai,” Okinawa Times, September 14, 1995, morning edition; Okinawa Times Sha, Okinawa Kara, 28. 7. Okinawa Times Sha, Okinawa Kara, 40–­41. 8. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 157. 9. Ryūkyū Shimpō Sha, Chiikyōtei Shuzai Han, Kenshō chiikyōtei; Okinawa Ken Kichi Taisakushitsu, Okinawa no beigun kichi (1998), 213–­14. 10. Okinawa Ken Kichi Taisakuka, Okinawa no beigun oyobi jieitai kichi (2007), 87, 114. The total number of crimes excludes traffic infractions. 11. Arasaki, Okinawa: Hansen jinushi. 12. Okinawa Times Sha, Okinawa kara, 217; Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 108, 112. Tanji puts the number of one-­tsubo landowners at 3,000. 13. Arasaki, Okinawa gendai shi, 209. For a list of leading organizations, see “Raigetsu 21-­ nichi ni kenmin taikai,” Okinawa Times, September 29, 1995, morning edition.

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14. Ōta, Okinawa: Heiwa no ishiji, 127–­32. 15. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 157. 16. “Hahaoya ga tachiagarō: Koreijyō no gisei mappira,” Okinawa Times, September 23, 1995, morning edition; “Ampo haiki no koe uzumaku,” Ryūkyū Shimpō, October 5, 1995, morning edition. 17. Smith, “Challenging National Authority,” 87n20. 18. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 70. 19. Soto’oka, Honda, and Miura, Nichibei dōmei hanseiki, 512. 20. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 302; “Saihatsu bōshi, kōki shukusei o yakusoku,” Okinawa Times, September 28, 1995, morning edition. 21. Okinawa Times Sha, Okinawa kara, 24, 29. 22. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 335–­36. 23. Interview, July 3, 2007. 24. Okinawa Ken Kichi Taisakuka, Okinawa no beigun oyobi jieitai kichi (2014), 18–­21, 107–­9. 25. Mulgan, “Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa,” 165. The prime minister signed the leases (as permitted under the mandatory use procedure) on March 28, 1996, after Ōta refused to comply with the High Court’s order and appealed to the Supreme Court. But the procedure required fulfillment of additional steps which took time, and the illegal occupation of land occurred. 26. Ōta, Okinawa: Heiwa no ishiji, 187–­88; Okinawa Times Sha, Okinawa kara, 248–­49. 27.Vogel and Giarra, “Renegotiating the U.S.-­Japan Security Relationship, 1991–­96,” 129. 28. United States House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, and Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, U.S.-­Japan Relations and American Interests in Asia, 102. 29. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 302. 30. Green, “The Search for an Active Security Partnership,” 146; Soto’oka, Honda, and Miura, Nichibei dōmei hanseiki, 493; Vogel and Giarra, “Renegotiating the U.S.-­Japan Security Relationship, 1991–­96,” 94, 99–­100, 114–­15. 31. Green, “The Search for an Active Security Partnership,” 144–­45. 32. Vogel and Giarra, “Renegotiating the U.S.-­Japan Security Relationship, 1991–­96,” 111. 33. Green, “The Search for an Active Security Partnership,” 147. 34. Vogel and Giarra, “Renegotiating the U.S.-­Japan Security Relationship, 1991–­96,” 101–­12. 35. On American efforts leading up to the Nye Report, see Soto’oka, Honda, and Miura, Nichibei dōmei hanseiki, chap. 9. 36. Nye, “The ‘Nye Report,’” 98. 37. Vogel and Giarra, “Renegotiating the U.S.-­Japan Security Relationship, 1991–­96,” 129. 38. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 345. 39. “Shōjyo bōkōjiken de yureru Gaimushō,” Okinawa Times, September 28, 1995, morning edition. 40. Vogel and Giarra, “Renegotiating the U.S.-­Japan Security Relationship, 1991–­96,” 130. 41. Ibid.; Soto’oka, Honda, and Miura, Nichibei dōmei hanseiki, 508. 42. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 303.

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195

43. Ibid. The United States cooperated with the investigation to an unprecedented degree. At first, the prefectural police complained that they could not carry out a satisfactory investigation with the United States holding the suspects in custody. As a general practice, the prefectural police could not interrogate suspects beyond the working hours of the U.S. military (between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m.), and it was difficult to interrogate suspects on weekends and holidays. With Kono’s and Mondale’s intervention, the Americans agreed to late-­night and off-­days questioning of the suspects, which helped speed up the evidence-­ gathering process. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 303; Okinawa Times Sha, Okinawa kara, 54; “Chiikyōtei minaoshiron takamaru,” Okinawa Times, September 14, 1995, morning edition. 44. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 304. 45. Okinawa Times Sha, Okinawa kara, 38–­39. 46. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 105. 47. Ibid., 303. 48. “Nichibei chiikyōtei minaoshi mondai: Unyōmen kaizen ni gentei,” Okinawa Times, September 26, 1995, morning edition. 49. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 306. 50. Vogel and Giarra, “Renegotiating the U.S.-­Japan Security Relationship, 1991–­96,” 139. 51. Soto’oka, Honda, and Miura, Nichibei dōmei hanseiki, 510–­11. 52. Interview, September 6, 2005;Vogel and Giarra, “Renegotiating the U.S.-­Japan Security Relationship, 1991–­96,” 130. 53. “Kichi nuki ampo wa mainasu de aru: Conversation between Richard Armitage and Mike Mochizuki,” Bungei Shunjū 78, no. 8 (2000): 303. 54. “Beigun yakan kunren, renya 80 decibel chō, jyūmin ‘netsukenai,’” Ryūkyū Shimpō, September 10, 2014; “Shin sō’on shihyō, 9-­kasho kijyun goe, jyōtaika urazuke,” Ryūkyū Shimpō, September 24, 2014. 55. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 23–­25. 56. United States General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence, 18. 57. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 29. 58. Ibid., 70. 59. Okinawa Times Sha, Okinawa kara, 188. 60. Vogel and Giarra, “Renegotiating the U.S.-­Japan Security Relationship, 1991–­96,” 130–­31. According to Funabashi, a senior DOD official told him that Perry said “SACO was a kind of down payment for the guidelines.” Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 82. 61. Vogel and Giarra, “Renegotiating the U.S.-­Japan Security Relationship, 1991–­96,” 140–­41. 62. Green, “The Search for an Active Security Partnership,” 152. 63. Ibid., 158. 64. Interview, August 20, 2014. 65. Ibid. 66. “Futenma, kengai isetsu ‘kōdōsuru’: Minshutō Hatoyama daihyō,” Ryūkyū Shimpō, July 20, 2009. According to social psychologists, persuasion can lead to adoption of a new attitude or adoption of an attitude opposite to the initial one. The former type characterizes Hatoyama’s persuasion, as he had never advocated Futenma’s relocation within the prefecture. 67. “Hatoyama zen shushō ichimon ittō: Mitōshinaku kengai hatsugen,” Ryūkyū Shimpō, February 13, 2011. 68. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 161–­76.

196

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69. Mulgan, “Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa,” 169; Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 167. 70. On the evolution of the Henoko plan, see Moriya, Futenma kōshō hiroku. 71. A visit to the protesters’ tent in Henoko and interviews with activists, June 30, 2007. 72. Urashima, Henoko, 93. 73. Interview with Hanawa Shin’ichi, WWF Japan, August 29, 2008. Also see Ashitomi Hiroshi’s chapter in Kōbunken, ed., Okinawa wa kichi o kyozetsu suru, 22–­29. 74. Urashima, Henoko, 17, 78. 75. Okinawa Ken Kichi Taisakuka, Okinawa no beigun oyobi jieitai kichi (2014), 1. 76. Conversations with Henoko protesters, June 30, 2007; Kikuno and Norimatsu, “Henoko, Okinawa.” 77. Urashima, Henoko, 128–­33. 78. “Fukki yokatta 82%: Fukki 35nen kenmin yoron chōsa,” Ryūkyū Shimpō, May 8, 2007. 79. Interview, August 20, 2014. 80. Interview, October 23, 2014. 81. Hatoyama, “A New Path for Japan,” New York Times, August 26, 2009. Also see Hatoyama’s speech on May 26, 1998, on his website www.hatoyama.gr.jp/speech/ ot01_2.html, and www.hatoyama.gr.jp/masscomm/0205.html (accessed on February 16, 2011). 82. “‘Kane wa Henoko no umi ni sutete’ Okinawa, Nichibei gōi hantai shūkai,” Asahi Shimbun, May 28, 2010. 83. Interview, August 20, 2014. 84. “Minshutō Okinawa vision 2008 no symposium o genchi Okinawa de kaisai,” Democratic Party of Japan News, August 11, 2008. 85. Interview, August 20, 2014. He also said so in his speech at the founding meeting, as reported in “Okinawa tōkichi mondai giin kondankai: 74-­nin de hossoku, Futenma no sōki henkan o mezasu,” Hitotsubo Hansen Tsūshin, April 28, 2005. 86. Iha, “Heri tsuiraku genba karano shōgen,” 17–­21, 41. 87. Iha, “Why Build a New Base on Okinawa When the Marines Are Relocating to Guam?” 88. See “U.S.-­Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” Japan-­U.S. Security Consultative Committee Document, October 29, 2005. 89. Iha pointed to statements from U.S. officials during a fact-­finding tour to Guam by central Okinawa mayors (July 2007), a report presented by the U.S. Secretary of the Navy to the House of the Representatives (September 15, 2008), a statement by Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. James Conway at the Senate Armed Services Committee (June 2009), and the Environmental Impact Statement Draft on Guam and CNMI Military Relocation (November 2009); Iha, “Why Build a New Base on Okinawa When the Marines Are Relocating to Guam?” 90. Iha, “Heri tsuiraku genba karano shōgen,” 25, 37–­38; Interview with Hatoyama, August 20, 2014. 91. See Hatoyama’s website, www.hatoyama.gr.jp/masscomm/0205.html (accessed on February 16, 2011), which reprints Hatoyama’s interview with Hiruta Yūichi, in Hiruta’s Hatoyama Yukio (Tokyo: Kyūryūdō, 2002). 92. Interview, August 20, 2014. 93. Ibid. 94. Interview, October 23, 2014.

notes

197

95. “Shushō, Henokoan yōnin no beishihōdō o hitei: ‘shizen e no bōtoku,’” Asahi Shimbun, April 24, 2010. 96. Interview, August 20, 2014. His government also considered the Japanese Self-­ Defense Forces constitutional. 97. Interview, October 23, 2014. 98. Interview, August 20, 2014. 99. Interview, August 20, 2014, and “Hatoyama zenshushō ichimon ittō: Mitōshinaku ‘kengai’ hatsugen,” Ryūkyū Shimpō, February 13, 2011. 100. Interview, October 23, 2014. 101. Interview, August 20, 2014. 102. “Naikaku shiji 37% ‘shūin minshu kahansū’ hantai 55% yoron chōsa,” Asahi Shimbun, February 22, 2010; “Kenmin no sōi senmei: Futenma isetsu yoron chōsa,” Okinawa Times, April 20, 2010; “Futenma ‘kōyaku ihan’ 66%,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 9, 2010. 103. “Hatoyama shushō: Henoko ni kimeteireba donnani rakudattaka,” Asahi Shimbun, April 21, 2010. 104. Okada explored relocating Futenma’s functions to Kadena Air Base, but eventually accepted the Henoko plan. 105. “Hatoyama zenshushō ichimon ittō: Mitōshinaku ‘kengai’ hatsugen,” Ryūkyū Shimpō, February 13, 2011. 106. From the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State in Washington, on Dec. 9, 2009, Subject: FRF: Senior DPJ Leader Says “No Deal” This Year, Cable number 2815 (released by WikiLeaks on May 4, 2011). 107. Moriya, Futenma kōshō hiroku. 108. “Motto shidōryoku areba: Hatoyama zen shushō, Futenma mondai de hansei no ben,” Asahi Shimbun, June 12, 2010. 109. Kawato, “Inheriting Hatoyama’s Boomerang,” 4. 110. “Nichibei dōmei, Fukushima-­shi himen nado: Hatoyama shushō kishakaiken no yōshi,” Asahi Shimbun, May 28, 2010. 111. From the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State in Washington, on September 21, 2009, Subject: EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell’s Meeting with MOFA DG Akitaka Saiki, Cable number 2197 (released by WikiLeaks on May 4, 2011). 112. A secret cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State in Washington, on December 16, 2009, Cable number 2875, Subject: MOFA “Alliance Hands” Express Frustration at DPJ Government’s Handling of “Secret Agreements,” FRF (released by WikiLeaks on May 4, 2011). 113. A secret cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to Secretaries of State and Defense in Washington, on October 15, 2009, Cable number 2378, Subject: A/S Campbell, GOJ Officials Discuss the History of U.S. Force Realignment (released by WikiLeaks on May 4, 2011). 114. A secret cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State in Washington on December 30, 2009, Cable number 2946, Subject: Ambassador’s December 21 Lunch Meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Yabunaka; A secret cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State in Washington, on December 16, 2009, Cable number 2875, Subject: MOFA “Alliance Hands” Express Frustration at DPJ Government’s Handling of “Secret Agreements,” FRF (both released by WikiLeaks on May 4, 2011). 115. A committee to explore relocation sites, which was created by three parties in Hatoyama’s coalition government, considered Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands as potential relocation sites. However, relocation within Japan seemed necessary as a first step

198

notes

before relocation abroad, because sites abroad would have to be prepared for relocation (e.g., building military facilities and developing local infrastructure). Ryūkyū Shimpō Sha, Jyubaku no yukue, 180. 116. “Kokumin yoron ‘kengai’ tasū: Futenma isetsu zenkokushi nado chōsa,” Okinawa Times, November 29, 2009. 117. A secret cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretaries of State and Defense in Washington, on October 15, 2009, Cable number 2378, Subject: A/S Campbell, GOJ Officials Discuss the History of U.S. Force Realignment (released by WikiLeaks on May 4, 2011). 118. Kawato, “Inheriting Hatoyama’s Boomerang,” 4. 119. “Henokoan denakereba kaiheitai tettai mo: moto beikokubō fukujikan,” Asahi Shimbun, March 3, 2010. 120. The timing took into account the fact that he would be extremely busy until March trying to get a budget though the Diet, and there would be an election for the House of Councillors in July. 121. Interview, August 20, 2014. 122. A secret cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State in Washington, on December 10, 2009, Cable number 2822, Subject: Ambassador Roos’s Meeting with Minister Maehara; A confidential cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State in Washington, on January 26, 2010, Cable number 164, Subject: Hatoyama Confidante on Futenma, Nago Election; A secret cable from the Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State in Washington on December 30, 2009, Cable number 2946, Subject: Ambassador’s December 21 Lunch Meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Yabunaka (all released by WikiLeaks on May 4, 2011). Also see Hatoyama’s explanation in “Hatoyama zen shushō ichimon ittō: Mitōshinaku ‘kengai’ hatsugen,” Ryūkyū Shimpō, February 13, 2011. 123. “‘Kengai, mamorenakatta’: Shushō ga Okinawa chiji tono kaiken de owabi,” Asahi Shimbun, May 23, 2010. 124. See his interview in “Hatoyama shushō ichimon ittō: Mitōshinaku ‘kengai’ hatsugen,” Ryūkyū Shimpō, February 13, 2011. 125. Joint Statement of the U.S.-­Japan Security Consultative Committee, May 28, 2010. 126. “Futenma Nichibei kōshō no saizensen o kataru: Okada Katsuya interview,” Chūō Kōron 125, no. 7 (2010): 92. 127. “Futenma no kennai isetsu ‘hantai’: Okinawa kenmin taikai ni niman issennin,” Asahi Shimbun, November 9, 2009. 128. “Henoko hantai 84%: Ryūkyū Shimpō–­Mainichi Shimbun kenmin yoron chōsa,” Ryūkyū Shimpō, May 31, 2010. 129. The election for Nago’s City Assembly on September 12, 2010, also resulted in a shift in the majority from those supporting the Henoko plan to those opposing it, further complicating the situation for Tokyo. 130. “Zen’in ga kennai hantai: Futenma isetsu 41 shichōsonchō ni chōsa,” Okinawa Times, April 11, 2010. 131. “Chiji shōnin fushiji 61%: Kōyaku ihan 72% Shimpō/OTV chōsa,” Ryūkyū Shimpō, December 30, 2013. 132. “Futenma ‘michisuji tsuita’: Chiji, Henoko suishin ni dōchō,” Ryūkyū Shimpō, June 17, 2014; “Seifu sagyō ‘genjitsuteki da’: Chiji, Henoko suishin senmei ni,” Ryūkyū Shimpō, September 26, 2014. 133. “‘Henoko chūshi’ 80%: Isetsu kyōkō, hanpatsu hirogaru,” Ryūkyū Shimpō, August 26, 2014.

notes

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chapter 3 1. The “categories of cases of sufficient gravity” listed under the agreed minutes are: “(a) murder; (b) rape (including quasi-­rape and sexual intercourse with a minor under thirteen years of age); (c) kidnapping for ransom; (d) trafficking in illegal drugs; (e) manufacturing illegal drugs for the purposes of distribution; (f) arson; (g) robbery with a dangerous weapon; (h) attempts to commit the foregoing offenses; (i) assault resulting in death; (j) driving under the influence of alcohol, resulting in death; (k) fleeing the crime scene after committing a traffic accident resulting in death; (l) offenses which include one or more of the above-­referenced offenses as lesser included offenses.” Amendments to the Agreed Minutes of July 9, 1966, concluded on January 18, 2001, new agreed minute on Article XXII, Paragraph 5(c), 3. 2. See the Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea Amending the Agreement under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea of July 9, 1966, as Amended on January 18, 2001 (Article I on Article XXII, Paragraph 5[c]); and the Amendments to the Agreed Minutes of July 9, 1966, from January 18, 2001 (the new agreed minute on Article XXII, Paragraph 5[c], 2–­5.) 3. Amendment to the Agreed Minutes, Article XXII Paragraph 5(c), 2, January 18, 2001. 4. The 1966 SOFA (Article XXII, Paragraph 5c) permitted the United States to transfer custody of accused personnel to South Korea “at any time” if it so chose, although the United States reserved and exercised the right to hold in custody accused personnel until the conclusion of all judicial proceedings. The 2001 agreement maintained the possibility of pre-­indictment transfer of custody (amendments to Agreed Minutes, Article XXII, Paragraph 5c, No. 11), but added a new rule that South Korea must file an indictment within twenty-­four hours of transfer of custody or release the suspect (Article XXII, Criminal Jurisdiction, Agreed View No. 22). The short period of time between transfer of custody and indictment prevented thorough investigation, making it practically impossible for South Korea to obtain custody of accused personnel before indictment. The twenty-­four-­hour rule was eliminated in a bilateral agreement in May 2012. 5. Moon, “Resurrecting Prostitutes and Overturning Treaties,” 129. 6. Interview, National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea, December 15, 2006. 7. National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea, “Understanding the United States through the Crimes Committed by Its Troops in Korea,” 3. 8. National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea, “Introduction of Organization,” 1. 9. Moon, “Korean Democracy, Civil Society Activism, and Anti-­Americanism,” 59. 10. Moon, “Korean Nationalism, Anti-­Americanism, and Democratic Consolidation,” 149. 11. Kim, “Korea Women’s Peace Movement,” 117. 12. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Path to an Agreement, 10. 13. On activities: based on interviews with activists from the Lawyers for Democratic Society on November 30, 2006, and the National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea on December 15, 2006.

200

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14. Interviews with a USFK officer, November 11, 2006, and Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials working on the SOFA, December 14, 2006. 15. Feinerman, “The U.S.-­Korean Status of Forces Agreement as a Source of Continuing Korean Anti-­American Attitudes,” 197. 16. Interview, December 14, 2006. 17. Interview, November 27, 2006. 18. “Former GI Convicted of Murder Released from South Korean Prison Early,” Stars and Stripes, October 29, 2006; Interview, November 27, 2006. 19. Interviews, November 27 and December 13, 2006. 20. Interview, December 6, 2006. 21. A leader from the National Campaign for Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea emphasized that the length of punishment is not what is important. What is important is that American suspects are tried in Korean courts. Interview, December 15, 2006. 22. Interviews, November and December, 2006. 23. Interview with a USFK official, November 21, 2006. 24. Interview, December 13, 2006. 25. Interviews, November 24 and December 15, 2006. 26. Interview, December 14, 2006. 27. Ha, “South Korea in 2000,” 34–­35. 28. Smith, Shifting Terrain, 18; Lee, “The Rise of Korean Youth as a Political Force,” 22–­24. 29. Interview, November 27, 2006. In April 2004, Japan and the United States agreed to have an American representative present during questioning of suspects by the Japanese authorities. 30. Moon, “Resurrecting Prostitutes and Overturning Treaties,” 148. 31. Moon, “Korean Nationalism, Anti-­Americanism, and Democratic Consolidation,” 154–­55; Moon, “Korean Democracy, Civil Society Activism, and Anti-­Americanism,” 62–­ 63. 32. Durant, The Greening of the U.S. Military, ix, 2, 5–­6. 33. Ibid., 6–­8. 34. Ibid., 9. 35. Message from Secretary of the Defense, “DoD Policy and Procedures for the Realignment of Overseas Sites,” MSG142159Z, December 1993. Also see Phelps, “Environmental Law for Overseas Installations,” 56. 36. Ministry of Environment website, http://eng.me.go.kr/docs/laws/laws .html?topmenu=D&cat=400 (accessed on November 20, 2009). 37. Interviews with representatives from Green Korea United on November 3, 2006, and Korea Federation of Environmental Movements on November 24, 2006. 38. Moon, “Korean Nationalism, Anti-­Americanism, and Democratic Consolidation,” 147. 39. For example, see Green Korea United, “Current Situation of U.S. Armed Forces Stationed in South Korea,” 2. 40. Interview with a Green Korea United leader, November 3, 2006. 41. The evidence that follows comes from my interviews with multiple American officials in November and December 2006. 42. Interview, November 27, 2006. 43. Interview, November 21, 2006. 44. Interview, December 12, 2006. 45. Interview, November 27, 2006.

notes

201

46. Interviews with USFK officials, November and December, 2006. 47. Interview, December 11, 2006. 48. Interview with a Green Korea United leader, November 3, 2006. 49. For example, a Green Korea United posting on September 1, 2001, said that in order to solve the environmental problems on bases, “a number of involved organizations must unite, both at the domestic and overseas level to stop the destructive U.S. presence in the world.” “We Want Peace Now!” http://green-­korea.tistory.com/76 (accessed on November 19, 2009). 50. Ryūkyū Shimpō Sha, Rupo, 152. 51. Ibid., 154–­55. 52. Ibid., 172. 53. The National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea, “Understanding the United States through the Crimes Committed by Its Troops in Korea,” 3. 54. Ryūkyū Shimpō Sha, Rupo, 172. 55. According to the Stars and Stripes, the mixture amount was 192 bottles containing 16 ounces each of formaldehyde, which is significantly lower than the amount alleged by Green Korea United. Choe Song-­won, “Army Civilian Still Could Be Tried in Formaldehyde Case,” Stars and Stripes, October 25, 2003. 56. Jeremy Kirk, “USFK Negotiates with S. Korea on Punishment in Formaldehyde Dumping,” Stars and Stripes, May 24 2001. 57. Interview, December 12, 2006. 58. Moon, “Resurrecting Prostitutes and Overturning Treaties,” 149; Ryūkyū Shimpō Sha, Rupo, 180. 59. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Path to an Agreement, 10. 60. Interview, December 11, 2006. 61. Interview, December 12, 2006. 62. Interview, December 11, 2006. 63. Interview, November 27, 2006. 64. Interview, December 11, 2006. 65. Interview, March 9, 2011. 66. Green Korea United, “GKE Strongly against Revised SOFA.” 67. “Kako saidai kibo no hanbei shūkai, beikan chiikyōtei kaitei o yōkyū: Kankoku,” Asahi Shimbun, December 15, 2002. The number of participants is from the Korean police. 68. “Chiikyōtei no kaitei motomeru taibei kōgi shūkai, ōmisoka yoru mo: Kankoku,” Asahi Shimbun, January 1, 2003. 69.“Statement by Thomas C. Hubbard, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea,” November 27, 2006, http://seoul.usembassy.gov/pi112702.html (accessed on November 15, 2009). 70. Interview with a USFK civil affairs officer, December 13, 2006. 71. United States Senate Armed Services Committee, Prepared Statement of General Leon J. LaPorte. 72. “The June 13 Accident, Q’s and A’s,” U.S. Embassy Seoul website, http://seoul.usembassy.gov/june13acc.html (accessed on November 15, 2009). 73. Interview with a USFK official, November 21, 2006; Jeremy Kirk, “In Wake of S. Korea Road Deaths, Changes in SOFA Implementation OK’d,” Stars and Stripes, June 4, 2003; Interview with the MOFAT official, December 14, 2006. 74. Oh and Arrington, “Democratization and Changing Anti-­American Sentiments in South Korea,” 345. 75. Kim, “The U.S.-­Korea Alliance,” 29.

202

notes

76. Chung, “Adapting the U.S.-­ROK Alliance to New Realities,” 27. 77. Kim, “The U.S.-­Korea Alliance,” 32–­33. 78. Kim, “Ambivalent Allies,” 286n33. 79. Cha, “South Korea in 2004,” 36–­37. 80. “What Lies under the SOFA?,” Korea Times, May 7, 2003. 81. On the content of the agreement, see Jeremy Kirk, “In Wake of S. Korea Road Deaths, Changes in SOFA Implementation OK’d,” Stars and Stripes, June 4, 2003; and “U.S. Agrees to Remedy Base Contamination,” Korea Herald, May 31, 2003. The agreement included environmental measures as well. The states agreed to conduct joint environmental surveys on land scheduled for return from the United States to South Korea, as well as on new land scheduled for use by the USFK. If a survey were to find contamination in USFK facilities and areas, the USFK would remedy it with its funds. If a survey were to find contamination in the new land to be granted to the USFK, the Korean government would remedy it with its funds. 82. “U.S. Agrees to Remedy Base Contamination,” Korea Herald, May 31, 2003. 83. “Enforcement Theme of S. Korean SOFA Meeting,” Stars and Stripes, February 11, 2003. 84. Bong, “Yongmi,” 160. 85. Interview, November 21, 2006. 86. In April 2006, the Korean MND said that it had purchased land belonging to 535 households through expropriation, and 300 of those households had moved out. “Protesters Stop Workers from Blocking Canals,” Stars and Stripes, April 9, 2006; “S. Korean Police Move in to Oust Pyeongtaek Farmers,” Stars and Stripes, May 5, 2006. 87. Several local organizations against relocation existed since the early 1990s when Seoul and Washington considered the possibility of relocating the Yongsan Garrison to Pyeongtaek. The number of organizations in KCPT differs in different accounts, ranging between 120 and 200. On KCPT’s leadership and membership, see Yeo, “Local-­National Dynamics and Framing in South Korean Anti-­Base Movements,” 44. 88. Interview with a KCPT leader, November 23, 2006. 89. KCPT, “Proposal for International Solidarity Action on Behalf of Pyeongtaek Peace,” January 13, 2006. 90. Interview with a KCPT leader, November 24, 2006. 91. Interview with a KCPT leader, November 23, 2006. Also see Nam, “Relocating the U.S. Forces in South Korea,” 626. 92. KCPT, “Proposal for International Solidarity Action on Behalf of Pyeongtaek Peace,” January 13, 2006. 93. Ibid. 94. Interview with a KCPT official, November 26, 2006. 95. Interview with a USFK official, November 27, 2006. 96. Interview, December 5, 2006. 97. United States Congressional Budget Office, Options for Changing the Army’s Overseas Basing, xvi; Interview with a USFK official, November 15, 2006. 98. United States General Accounting Office, Defense Infrastructure, 7. 99. United States Senate Armed Services Committee, Prepared Statement of General Leon J. LaPorte. 100. United States Congressional Budget Office, Options for Changing the Army’s Overseas Basing, 32. 101. Ibid., xi, 7, 15. 102. Ibid., xvi.

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103. Reducing friction between the USFK and local residents was another important goal for the overall base consolidation plan. Urbanization brought residential areas in proximity with military bases. It also increased the value of the land that some of the USFK installations used, and local governments and businesses pushed for the land’s return. The Yongsan Army Garrison is a good example. Following the protests of the early 2000s, policy-­makers also considered the negative influence that the American military presence in Seoul might have on Korean public opinion about the U.S.-­ROK alliance. 104. Interviews with a USFK official, November 27, 2006, and a former MND official, December 13, 2006. 105. Interview, December 13, 2006. 106. Moon, Sex among Allies. 107. Sturdevant and Stoltzfus, Let the Good Times Roll, viii. 108. Moon, “Resurrecting Prostitutes and Overturning Treaties,” 134. 109. Ibid., 135; Interview with a Women Making Peace representative, November 9, 2006. 110. Moon, “South Korean Movements against Militarized Sexual Labor,” 311. 111. Ibid., 317. 112. Moon, “Resurrecting Prostitutes and Overturning Treaties,” 147–­48. Current U.S. policy on financial support for Amerasian children abandoned by American fathers is that the United States will enforce child support through legal channels if the mother of an Amerasian child is married to the child’s father or she has legal documentation that a military member is the father. As for HIV tests, all U.S. military members receive a test every two years, and members being assigned overseas must have the test within one year prior to deployment. 113. Ibid., 132, 143, 150; Korea Church Women United, “The Peace Campaign of the Korea Church Women United,” 106. 114. United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the House Armed Services Committee, Enforcing U.S. Policies against Trafficking in Persons, 113. 115. Interviews, December 2006. 116. United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the House Armed Services Committee, Enforcing U.S. Policies against Trafficking in Persons, 4, 59–­61. 117. Manual for Courts-­Martial, United States (2008 edition), Part V Nonjudicial Punishment Procedure, Section 1, e. 118. Interview with a USFK official familiar with the antiprostitution and human trafficking efforts, December 13, 2006, and correspondence with another official, December 2006. 119. United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the House Armed Services Committee, Enforcing U.S. Policies against Trafficking in Persons, 113. 120. Ibid., 113–­14. 121. Ibid., 12. 122. Interview with a USFK official, December 13, 2006. 123. United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the House Armed Services Committee, Enforcing U.S. Policies against Trafficking in Persons, 116. 124. Correspondence with the Action Officer of the USFK P&HT Working Group, April 2011. 125. Inspector General of the United States Department of Defense, “Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons,” November 21, 2006, 27. 126. Ibid., 29.

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notes

127. Correspondence with the officer, April 2011. 128. Interviews with USFK officials and Korean NGOs, November and December 2006, March 2011.

chapter 4 1. Abueva, ed., Filipino Nationalism. 2. On these protests, see articles in the Manila Times, December 27–­28, 1964, and January 23–­26, 1965. 3. Berry, U.S. Bases in the Philippines, 113–­14. 4. Douglas MacArthur II, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, to John Stennis, Acting Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, May 21, 1965, DEF 15–­4 Base Agreements Phil-­US, 4/1/65, DEF 15–­4 Phil-­US 7/1/66 to DEF 15–­4 Phil-­US 1/1/64, Political & Defense, Central Foreign Policy Files. 1964–­66, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, MD. 5. Macapagal, From Nipa Hut to Presidential Palace, 89. 6. “Mendez, Blair Confer,” Manila Times, January 5, 1965. 7. Matsumiya, Kōshite beigun kichi wa tekkyo sareta, 68. 8. William McCormick Blair, Jr., American Ambassador to the Philippines, to RUEHCR/Secstate WashDC., Jan. 13, 1965, Def 15–­4 Base Agreements Phil-­US 1/1/65, Defense, DEF 15–­4 Phil-­US 7/1/66 to DEF 15–­4 Phil-­US 1/1/64, Political & Defense, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–­6 6, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, MD. 9. Manila Times, February 2, 1965. 10. Matsumiya, Kōshite beigun kichi wa tekkyo sareta, 68. 11. Macapagal could not certify the Vietnam bill to send troops due to opposition from the Senate. Marcos, his successor, sent engineers to Vietnam. 12. Berry, U.S. Bases in the Philippines, 135. 13. Exchange of Notes Regarding General Agreements, January 7, 1979, in Romualdez, A Question of Sovereignty, 599. 14. Romualdez, A Question of Sovereignty, 624–­26. 15. I thank Herbert Docena for pointing this out. 16. Brands, Bound to Empire, 288, 303. 17. Ferrer, “The Dynamics of the Opposition to the US Bases in the Philippines,” 71. 18. According to a church leader whom I interviewed in February 2007, this was because the bishops were split. Many of the bishops feared identification with the Communists or the broader left. They also wanted to keep a strict separation of church and state. The organization issued indirect statements against abuses during martial law. 19. Ferrer, “Anti-­Bases Coalitions,” 7. 20. Lacaba, Days of Disquiet, Nights of Rage; Ferrer, “The Dynamics of the Opposition to the US Bases in the Philippines,” 78. 21. Ferrer, “Anti-­Bases Coalitions,” 6–­7. 22. Berry, U.S. Bases in the Philippines, 163, 282. 23. Brands, Bound to Empire, 312. 24. Berry, U.S. Bases in the Philippines, 157, 190. 25. Ferrer, “The Dynamics of the Opposition to the US Bases in the Philippines,” 66. 26. Berry, U.S. Bases in the Philippines, 143–­44.

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27. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator. 28. Berry, U.S. Bases in the Philippines, 168. 29. Ibid., 169. 30. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, 375. 31. Brands, Bound to Empire, 309–­10. 32. De Bobes, “The Military Perspective,” 86.

chapter 5 1. Bengzon and Rodrigo, A Matter of Honor, 53–­54, 255. 2. For Recto’s speeches and writings, see Constantino, Recto Reader; Constantino, Vintage Recto; Arcellana, The Relevance of Recto Today. 3. Constantino, Vintage Recto, 75. 4. Constantino and Constantino, The Philippines, 274. 5. Ibid., 273. 6. Berry, U.S. Bases in the Philippines, 87, 96. 7. Bailen, The Odyssey of Lorenzo M.Tañada, 86, 167. 8. Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, 186; Guingona, Fight for the Filipino, 136–­37. The number of participants differs in different accounts. Guingona recalls “almost a thousand” protesters. 9. Bailen, The Odyssey of Lorenzo M.Tañada, 129; Guingona, Fight for the Filipino, 139. 10. Bailen, The Odyssey of Lorenzo M.Tañada, 142. 11. Republic of the Philippines, Senate, Record of the Senate, 1118. 12. Ferrer, “Anti-­Bases Coalitions,” 8; Bailen, The Odyssey of Lorenzo M. Tañada, 158–­59. On the NFPC’s activities, see Simbulan, A Guide to Nuclear Philippines; Simbulan, The Continuing Struggle for an Independent Philippine Foreign Policy. 13. Bailen, The Odyssey of Lorenzo M. Tañada, 173; Interview with Cora Fabros, February 19, 2007. 14. Magno, Kasaysayan, 273; Bailen, The Odyssey of Lorenzo M.Tañada, 133. 15. Bailen, The Odyssey of Lorenzo M.Tañada, 147. 16. Jose Dalisay Jr., “Jose W. Diokno: The Scholar-­Warrior,” February 25, 2011, accessible on the Jose W. Diokno Foundation website, http://diokno.org/post/3497430090/jose-­w-­ diokno-­the-­scholar-­warrior (accessed on July 13, 2014). 17. Interview with Diokno’s daughter, Socorro Diokno, March 6, 2007. 18. See Diokno’s speech from 1975 on Recto’s nationalism, Manalang, ed. A Nation for Our Children, 147–­54. 19. Ibid., 183. 20. Ibid., 255. 21. Ibid., 190. 22. Ibid. 23. Ferrer, “Anti-­Bases Coalitions,” 9–­10; Ferrer, “The Dynamics of the Opposition to the US Bases in the Philippines,” 79. 24. Interview, March 6, 2007. 25. Salonga, A Journey of Struggle & Hope, 31. 26. Ibid., 13–­17. 27. Ibid., 66. 28. Ibid., 80. 29. Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, 133.

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30. Salonga, A Journey of Struggle & Hope, 251. 31. Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, 355. 32. Salonga, The Senate That Said No, 194. 33. Salonga, A Journey of Struggle & Hope, 188. 34. Ibid., 275. 35. Ibid., 356. 36. Republic of the Philippines, Senate, Record of the Senate, 1124. 37. Salonga, A Journey of Struggle & Hope, 447; Salonga, The Senate That Said No, 215–­19. 38. Aquino explained: “As president, one has greater responsibilities and one is really committed to the entire country and to taking care or at least trying to take care of all the needs of the people who would be most affected by the closure of the bases.” Bailen, The Odyssey of Lorenzo M. Tañada, 156. Some argue that she needed American officials on her side as rebellious military officers staged coups. She also needed American financial assistance to cope with foreign debts that Marcos accumulated, and in the context of poor economic health. Ferrer, “The Dynamics of the Opposition to the US Bases in the Philippines,” 67. 39. Salonga, The Senate That Said No, 17. Aquino subsequently appointed Senator Raul Manglapus to the post of the secretary of foreign affairs, reducing the number of the senators to 23. 40. Ferrer, “The Dynamics of the Opposition to the US Bases in the Philippines,” 82. 41. Salonga, A Journey of Struggle & Hope, 447. 42. Ibid., 447–­48. 43. Ibid., 450. 44. Ibid., 448. 45. Bengzon and Rodrigo, A Matter of Honor, 92. Base retention under existing terms received a plurality in a July 1991 survey as well. See the Republic of the Philippines, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Public Hearing on the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security, August 19, 1991, 6–­9. 46. United States Information Service, Background on the Bases, 16–­23. Also see the records of the Philippine Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s public hearing on the treaty, especially for August 16 and September 4–­6, 1991. 47. In a 1991 survey in the host communities of Angeles and Olongapo, base retention received a plurality. See Republic of the Philippines, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Public Hearing on the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security, August 19, 1991, 10–­88. 48. Matsumiya, Kōshite beigun kichi wa tekkyo sareta, 147–­48. 49. Salonga, A Journey of Struggle & Hope, 450. 50. Republic of the Philippines, Senate, Record of the Senate, 1122. 51. Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, 5, 11. 52. Ibid., 74–­76, 133. 53. Ibid., 156. 54. Ibid., 186, 320, 330, 407. 55. Ibid., 73–­74, 413. 56. Ibid., 426, 431. 57. Ibid., 482. 58. Republic of the Philippines, Senate, Record of the Senate, 1090. 59. Ibid. 60. Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, viii. 61. Guingona, Fight for the Filipino, 124.

notes

207

62. Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, 133; Guingona, Fight for the Filipino, 131–­32. 63. Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, 186, 192; Guingona, Fight for the Filipino, 134–­ 38. 64. Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, 320. 65. Ibid., 395–­96. 66. Ibid., 453. 67. Ibid., 174; Guingona, Fight for the Filipino, 57–­63. 68. Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, 256, 261. 69. Guingona, Fight for the Filipino, 168. 70. Ibid., 167. 71. Republic of the Philippines, Senate, Record of the Senate, 1058. 72. Ibid., 1060–­61. 73. Ibid., 1061. 74. Ibid., 1060; Guingona, Fight for the Filipino, 164–­65. 75. Interview with Saguisag, March 28, 2007. 76. Salonga, A Journey of Struggle & Hope, 269. 77. Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, 395. 78. Interview with Saguisag, March 28, 2007. 79. Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, 320. 80. Guingona, Fight for the Filipino, 132. 81. Republic of the Philippines, Senate, Record of the Senate, 1100. 82. Ibid., 1102, 1104. 83. Ibid., 1100. 84. Ibid. 85. Ibid., 1101. 86. Ibid., 1107. 87. Ibid., 1117. 88. Interview with Bobby Tañada, March 29, 2007. 89. Ferrer, “Anti-­Bases Coalitions,” 14. 90. Ibid., 18. 91. Republic of the Philippines, Senate, Record of the Senate, 1116. 92. Ibid., 1117. 93. Interview with Butz Aquino, March 15, 2007. 94. Ferrer, “The Dynamics of the Opposition to the US Bases in the Philippines,” 75. 95. Magno, Kasaysayan, 273. 96. Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, 395–­96, 452–­53. 97. Ferrer, “The Dynamics of the Opposition to the US Bases in the Philippines,” 75. 98. Interview with Butz Aquino, March 15, 2007. 99. Republic of the Philippines, Senate, Record of the Senate, 1051. 100. Ibid., 1050. 101. Ibid. 102. Ibid., 1051. 103. Interview with Mercado, March 5, 2007. 104. Republic of the Philippines, Senate, Record of the Senate, 1079. Between 1992 and 1998, Mercado served as the chairman of the defense committee, and then he became the secretary of defense. During his tenure, he supported the U.S.-­R.P. Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which included a SOFA that VFA opponents attacked with nationalist arguments. In our interview, he explained that while serving on the Defense Committee and

208

notes

becoming the secretary, he realized how critical American military assistance was for the R.P. military. In addition, the visiting American forces would stay on Philippine military bases and not on American military bases, and he thought this would alleviate most of the nationalist concerns related to military bases. To him, his persuasion against U.S. military bases in 1991 and support for the VFA were not inconsistent. 105. Interview with Ziga, February 23, 2011. 106. Republic of the Philippines, Senate, Record of the Senate, 1118. 107. Ibid., 1120. 108. Ibid. 109. Ibid., 1118. 110. Ibid., 1121. 111. Interview, February 21, 2011. 112. See Quezon and MacArthur’s statements in Quirino, The Laurel Story, 100–­101, 29–­32. 113. Salonga, “A Tribute to Dr. Jose P. Laurel,” a speech at the Awards Convocation, Lyceum of the Philippines, 8 March 2000, www.hartford-­hwp.com/archives/54a/056.html (accessed on November 20, 2008). 114. Republic of the Philippines, Senate, Record of the Senate, 1065. 115. Ibid., 1066. 116. Interview with Nemenzo, February 16, 2007. 117. Ferrer, “The Dynamics of the Opposition to the US Bases in the Philippines,” 81. 118. Interview with Simbulan, January 18, 2007. 119. Miranda, Public Opinion on the American Military Facilities in the Philippines, 7. 120. Matsumiya, Kōshite beigun kichi wa tekkyo sareta, 148. 121. Republic of the Philippines, Senate, Record of the Senate, 1055. The original text of Estrada’s speech is in Tagalog. I quote from a translated text by Maria Agnes Paculdar. 122. Ibid., 1056. 123. Ibid., 1055–­57. For his antibase nationalist position, also see his speech in the Senate on April 19, 1988, titled “The U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines: A Challenge of Nationhood.” 124. Republic of the Philippines, Senate, Record of the Senate, 1056. Estrada became the president of the Philippines in 1998. During his tenure, he supported the R.P.-­U.S. VFA. Estrada emphasized that the VFA is different from the MBA because U.S. forces would be on Philippine military bases. See Salazar, Pangulong Erap, 215–­16. Also, Policy Statements of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, vol. 7, no. 2 (October–­December 1998), Office of the Press Secretary, Bureau of Communications Services, 5–­6. 125. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, 101, 128. 126. Salonga, A Journey of Struggle & Hope, 202. 127. Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, 164. 128. Salonga, A Journey of Struggle & Hope, 310; Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, 102–­3; Guingona, Fight for the Filipino, 111. 129. McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, 204–­6, chap. 6; Pimentel, Martial Law in the Philippines, 167. 130. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, 264–­65. 131. McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, 231, 243–­49. 132. Ibid., 275. 133. Ibid., chap. 8.

notes

209

134. Interview with Senator Maceda, April 29, 2011. 135. Salonga, The Senate That Said No, 209–­10. 136. Republic of the Philippines, Record of the Senate, 1072. 137. Berry, U.S. Bases in the Philippines, 289–­90. 138. Supplementary Agreement Number Two of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America: Agreement on Installations and Military Operating Procedures, 1991, Article IV, Section 12. 139. Ferrer, “Anti-­Bases Coalitions,” 10; Interview with Cora Fabros, February 19, 2007. 140. Interview with Cora Fabros, January 26, 2007. 141. Interview with Tañada, March 29, 2007. 142. See, for example, Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!,’” 28. 143. Interview with Simbulan, January 18, 2007. 144. Interview with an anonymous leader of an organization, 2007. 145. Interview with Lidy Nacpil, March 1, 2007. 146. Interview with Salonga, March 6, 2007. 147. Interview with Aquino, March 15, 2007. 148. Interview with an anonymous protest leader, 2007. 149. Interview with an anonymous antibase activist, 2007. 150. Ferrer, “Anti-­Bases Coalitions,” 19. 151. Ibid., 20–­21. 152. The campaign held a rally before the vote. Interview with Renato Constantino, Jr., March 25, 2007; Simbulan, “How ‘the Battle of the Bases’ Was Won.” 153. My reading of the case is different from Yeo’s and Cooley’s. Yeo argues that a weak security consensus among policy-­makers allowed protesters to penetrate the policy-­making arena to transform the policy debate, leading to a change in policy. I think Yeo gives too much credit to protest organizations in the post-­EDSA period. Protest organizations did not transform the policy debate. Policy changed because of the senators who became persuaded against military bases during the martial law years. In fact, the presence of the persuaded senators created a weak security consensus. Cooley writes that politicians in democratizing states take up military bases as a “symbol of their commitment to breaking from the authoritarian past.” Democratization generates “benefits and political opportunities” for policy-­makers to “promote their domestic political self-­interest” through contestation of basing agreements. Policy-­makers use the issue for “elite-­induced populism, nationalism, and aggressive mobilization strategies for use as electoral issues,” and to assert the legislature’s institutional authority. He points to the decision of the Philippines to eliminate U.S. military bases in 1991 as an example of this. I agree with Cooley that the Philippine senators who voted to close the military bases in 1991 wished to break with the authoritarian past. But I disagree with him about the process through which base closure occurred. Democratization does not necessarily generate support for closure of U.S. military bases. In 1991, public opinion in the Philippines was strongly in support of a continued presence of U.S. military bases. President Cory Aquino, who fought against the Marcos dictatorship and sought a break from the authoritarian past, also supported a continued U.S. presence. Eleven out of twenty-­three senators voted in favor of keeping the U.S. military bases. In addition, most of the senators who voted against the bases did not do so in order to strengthen their political power through populism. On the contrary, they knew that they risked a loss of political support by voting against public opinion to close military

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bases. Many of their political backers also threatened to withdraw support in the elections the following year if they voted against the bases. Their votes were not to strengthen the Senate’s institutional power either; the constitution had already designated the Senate as the final authority on the U.S. military bases. Policy changed in 1991 not because democratization changed policy-­makers’ rational calculation for political self-­preservation, but because the particular historical circumstances of this regime shift allowed certain people opposed to military bases to come to power. Democratization had an important influence on the base policy outcome, but not as directly or in the way that Cooley thinks. Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-­U.S. Base Protests, chap. 2; Cooley, Base Politics, chaps. 1–­3.

conclusion 1. “Futenma mondai zenkoku chijikai: shushō to shusseki chiji no omona yaritori,” Asahi Shimbun, May 27, 2010. 2. Larson et al., Assuring Access in Key Strategic Regions, 116–­26. 3. Interviews with some friendship organization representatives, November and December 2006. 4. See, for example, the special issue of the International Organization, vol. 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2005) on international institutions and socialization in Europe. 5. Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!.’” 6. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe,” 813–­14. 7. Rasmussen Reports, “Half Want Troops Out of Europe, Japan, But South Korea’s Another Story,” February 4, 2011.

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Index

accidents involving U.S. military, 2, 8–9, 61–62, 67, 185; on Okinawa, 54–55, 69–70, 78, 87; in South Korea, 38, 106, 109–16 Ahagon Shōkō, 47 Allen, Theodore, 136 Alvarez, Heherson R., 172 American Civil Liberties Union, 46 Anti-Bases Coalition (ABC), 144, 153, 159, 170–71 Antiwar Landowner’s Organization, 70 Aquino, Agapito, 138–39, 154–57, 172 Aquino, Benigno, Jr., 142–43, 145–46, 148, 155, 160, 166 Aquino, Corazon, 138, 146, 149–50, 152, 154, 156– 60, 165–66, 168, 172, 206nn38, 39, 209n153 Arasaki Moriteru, 190n19 archival research, 36–37 Aspen, Leslie, Jr., 107 August Twenty-One Movement (ATOM), 155 authoritarian states, 29 Baker, Sara, 15 Baldwin, Roger, 46 BANDILA, 155 Blair, William McCormick, Jr., 130 Bonifacio, Andres, 150 Burke, Edmund, 147, 149 Bush, George H. W., 15, 106, 145–46 Bush, George W., 107, 115, 118, 124 C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence), 8

Calder, Kent, 5, 29–31 Cambodia, 135 Campaign for a Sovereign Philippines (CSP), 170–71 Campbell, Kurt, 76, 79, 92, 93 Caraway, Paul, 56, 57, 58 Carter, Jimmy, 132, 135, 136 Catholic Bishop’s Conference of the Philippines, 133, 204n18 Checkel, Jeffrey, 15–16, 35, 183 Cheney, Richard, 106–7 China: civil war, 47; military modernization in, 8; relations with United States, 48, 76, 118, 135, 147 Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, 101 Civil Liberties Union, 143 Clinton, Bill, 72, 107 Clinton, Hillary, 8 cognitive bias, 33 Cold War, 47, 49, 107, 135, 147 Cole, Larry, 128 Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), 133, 145, 155, 162 Congress of Filipino Citizens, 143 Constantino, Renato, 158 constructivism: in international relations, 18, 32–35; norms and social influence in, 32–35, 183; persuasion in, 34–35, 181; social conformity in, 18, 34 Convenor Group Declaration of Unity, 143–44, 146, 149, 152, 156 Cooley, Alexander, 5, 29–31, 209n153

220

index

Coseteng, Nikki, 163 criminal conduct of U.S. military personnel, 8–9, 21, 195n43; custody, 2, 11–12, 24, 38–39, 65, 67–68, 76, 98–105, 110, 112–17, 123, 126, 179, 181, 199n4, 199nn4, 200n21; involvement in prostitution as customers, 4, 37–38, 40, 68, 98–99, 101, 121–26, 139, 160, 181, 183; jurisdiction over cases, 2, 4, 11–12, 38–40, 54, 69, 98–105, 110, 112–17, 123, 126–27, 129, 131, 136, 179–80, 183, 199n4, 200n21; on Okinawa, 2, 12–13, 38, 45, 65–68, 70–74, 76–77, 80, 84, 104, 191n56, 195n43 Dasi Hamkke Center, 126 David, Randy, 162, 163 Defense and Environment Initiative of 1990, 106–7 Deming, Rust, 76 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 81, 85–86, 88–94 Derian, Patricia, 135 Diokno, Jose, influence of, 141–45, 148–49, 151–52, 155, 159 domestic institutions: Philippine Constitution of 1987, 19, 40, 140–41, 160, 165, 167–70, 174; and policy change, 19–20, 26, 29–32, 39–40, 80, 90–93, 95, 137, 141–42, 167–70, 174–75 Dulles, John Foster, 52, 59 Durant, Robert, 106–7 East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI), 74 eminent domain, 26, 49 Enrile, Juan Ponce, 156, 164–66 USS Enterprise, 61–62 Estrada, Joseph, 139–40, 162–64, 170, 208n124 Ford, Gerald, 135–36 Free Association of Peasants, 133 Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), 143, 152 Fujimoto Yūji, 85 Fulbright, William, 135 Funabashi Yōichi, 78–79 GABRIELA, 159 Germany, 35 Giarra, Paul, 74–76, 77, 79–80 Gillies, Roderick M., 49, 51 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 15 Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), 43–45, 47–48, 52, 58, 62 Green Korea United, 101, 107, 109–10, 112, 201nn49,55 Green, Michael, 80 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 79

Guingona, Teofisto, 138–39, 149–51, 152, 165, 205n8 Gulf War of 1991, 75 Habermas, Jürgen, 15, 182 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 42–43, 49 Hashimoto Ryūtarō, 73, 78 Hatoyama Yukio, 1, 2, 84–93, 94, 96, 176–77, 197n115; persuasion of, 39, 66, 80–82, 84–90, 95, 174–75, 195n66 Higa Shūhei, 51, 52 Higa Tetsuya, 82 Higuchi Report, 75 Hirano Hirofumi, 90 human trafficking, 40, 121, 123–26, 181 Iha Yōichi, 81, 86–89, 196n89 Inamine Keiichi, 83 Inamine Susumu, 96–97 influence of protests on base policy, 1–7, 10–11, 14–35; evolution of state behavior, 183, 185; fundamental change in base policy, 2, 5–6, 14–26, 28, 30–31, 33–34, 37, 137–73, 179; lack of change in base policy, 2, 5–7, 14, 26–27, 31–33, 38, 39–40, 52, 90–97, 99–100, 120–21, 134–37, 184; limited policy change/ compromise, 2, 5–6, 11, 14, 20–28, 31–32, 34, 38–41, 51–53, 58–67, 74, 78–80, 94, 99–100, 104–5, 109–13, 115–17, 128, 130–31, 135, 175, 179–80, 184–85; recommendations to activists regarding, 179–81; symbolic concessions, 2–3, 5–6, 14, 26–28, 37–41, 45–46, 52–53, 82, 95–96, 99, 106, 111–13, 116, 128, 131–32, 136–37, 175. See also persuasion internalization of norms, 18, 183 international institutions and persuasion, 34–35, 181–82 International League for Human Rights, 46 international relations: constructivism in, 18, 32–35; liberalism in, 29; rational choice in, 35; realism in, 27 In the Claws of the Eagle, 163 Japan: constitution, 55, 69, 75; Ministry of Defense (MOD), 19, 66, 90–91, 93; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 18–19, 66, 76–77, 90–93; number of U.S. installations in, 35; relations with United States, 1, 3, 7–8, 39, 41, 43, 48–49, 53, 59–61, 63–67, 71–72, 74–83, 91, 95, 97, 100, 104–5, 184, 187n7, 200n29; reversion of Okinawa to, 38, 41, 47–48, 50, 51, 53–64, 192n80; Sasebo naval base, 61, 62; Self-Defense Forces (SDF), 64, 75, 92, 95; Status of Forces Agreement

index (SOFA), 2, 39, 65–70, 72, 76–77, 79, 86, 92, 95, 104–5, 187n7; Supreme Court, 73 Japan Civil Liberties Union (JCLU), 46 Japan Communist Party, 50, 88 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, 95–97 Johnson, Lyndon B., 61, 131 Johnson, U. Alexis, 59 Joint Commission for Counter-Measures for the Yun Kumi Incident, 101 Justice for Aquino, Justice for All (JAJA), 143, 153 KAAKBAY, 144 Katzenstein, Peter J.: The Culture of National Security, 187n9 KCPT. See Pan-South Korean Solution Committee against Base Extension in Pyeongtaek Kennan, George, 49 Kim Dae-jung, 104 Kim Songhui, 101 Kitazawa Toshimi, 90 KOMPIL, 155 Kōno Yōhei, 77, 195n43 Korea Environmental Litigation Center, 107 Korea Federation of Environmental Movements, 101, 107 Korea House for International Solidarity, 101 Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, 101 Korean War, 47, 116–17 LABAN, 142–43, 148–50, 152, 159, 166, 172 Land Partnership Plan (LPP), 117 Laos, 135 LaPorte, Leon, 114, 119, 123, 125 Laurel, Jose P., 161–62 Laurel, Roberto P., 161 Laurel, Sotero, 139, 161–62 law suits, 25 League of Okinawan Women’s Groups, 68 Lemnitzer, Lyman L., 48 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 61–62, 96–97 Liberal Party (LP), 146–47, 159–60 Lichauco, Alejandro, 151 Lina, Jose D., Jr., 172 Lyceum of the Philippines, 145, 161 Macapagal, Diosdado, 127–31, 159, 204n11 MacArthur, Douglas, 49, 161 MacArthur, Douglas, II, 52–53, 59 Maceda, Ernesto, 166–67 Macke, Richard C., 72 Maehara Seiji, 94 Magdalena House, 122

221

Manglapus, Raul, 150, 206n39 Marcos, Ferdinand, 12–13, 14–15, 19, 127–28, 132–36, 139, 142–46, 148–53, 155, 158–59, 164–66, 170–73, 204n11 Mariño, Salvador, 130–31 Markle, Kenneth, 101, 103 McCarthy, Christopher, 101 McCloskey, Robert J., 136 McNamara, Robert S., 60 Memorandum of Special Understandings on Environmental Protection, 3, 105–6, 111, 175 Mercado, Orlando, 139, 157–58, 207n104 Mondale, Walter, 72, 76, 146, 195n43 Moon, Katharine, 121–22 Moore, James E., 48–50 Moriya Takemasa, 77 motivated bias, 33 Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), 133 Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, Nationalism, Incorporated (MABINI), 143, 152–53 Murayama Tomiichi, 69, 73 Murphy, Richard, 136 My Sister’s Place (Durebang), 122, 126 Nago Citizens’ Referendum Promotion Council, 82 Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau, 84 Nakaima Hirokazu, 1, 97 National Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (NAJFD), 143, 153 National Campaign for the Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea, 101, 107, 122, 200n21 National Committee to Abolish the Maehyangri U.S. Air Force Training Range, 110 National Council of Churches in the Philippines, 133 National Human Rights Commission of Korea, 119 Nationalist-Citizens Party, 142 Nationalist Youth (Kabataang Makabayan), 134 NATO, 35, 130–31, 141 Nemenzo, Francisco, 162–64 New Patriotic Alliance, 153 New People’s Army (NPA), 133–34, 145 Newsom, David, 135 Nimitz, Chester, 42 Nixon, Richard, 60, 64, 136 normative arguments: antinuclear arguments, 4, 12–13, 20, 24, 41–42, 53, 55–56, 61–63, 127–28, 134, 139–40, 142–44, 149, 169–70; antiwar/ antimilitarism arguments, 4, 11, 13, 21, 39, 47,

222

index

48, 54–56, 63, 65–66, 70, 74, 81, 83, 85, 88, 98, 118–19, 134, 169; causal processes regarding, 28; and coalition building, 13–14; definition of norms, 11; democratic arguments, 127–28, 132–34, 144–45, 148, 150, 152; disproportionate burden arguments, 39, 81, 83–84, 88, 92, 96; environmental arguments, 4, 8–9, 12–13, 20– 22, 26–27, 39, 66, 70, 81, 83, 85, 88, 95–96, 98, 107–9, 175, 182, 185; human rights arguments, 4, 12–13, 20, 46, 53–54, 65, 67–70, 72–73, 78, 98, 100, 113–15, 117–18, 122, 127–28, 132–36, 139, 144–45, 152, 182, 185; against land policy, 46–53, 65; nationalist arguments, 47, 53–54, 56, 59, 139–40, 141–44, 145, 150–51, 154–55, 157–64, 166–67, 170, 192n80, 207n104; sources for, 36; sovereignty norms, 4, 9, 11–13, 65, 67–68, 72, 77, 98, 100–103, 113–15, 127–29, 132, 134, 137, 139–40, 145, 150, 154–55, 157, 160, 168–70, 180, 182, 185. See also influence of protests on base policy; persuasion North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 35, 130–31, 141 North Korea, 103–4, 109; nuclear development in, 8, 75, 115; relations with South Korea, 95, 104, 115–16; relations with United States, 62, 118 Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition (NFPC), 142, 153, 159, 170–71 Nye, Joseph, 74–76, 77 Ogden, David A. D., 46, 54 Okada Katsuya, 90 Okinawa: All-Okinawa Coalition for Land Protection, 45, 51; All-Okinawan Military Workers Union, 60; Battle of, 42, 47–49, 54– 55, 83; Chamber of Commerce, 45; Citizens’ Rallies, 45, 54, 66, 67, 69–71, 77, 96–97; criminal conduct of U.S. personnel on, 2, 12–13, 38, 45, 65–68, 70–74, 76–77, 80, 84, 104, 191n56, 195n43; economic conditions, 49–50, 66, 81, 85–86; environmental issues, 9, 70, 78, 83, 85, 88, 95–96; Five Group Coalition, 44, 52; Five Party Coalition, 82; Four Principles on the Land Issue, 44–45, 50; Futenma Air Station, 1, 2, 38–39, 65–67, 77–97, 174, 176–79, 185, 197n115, 198n129; Ginowan City, 78, 81, 86–87, 96; Gushikawa Village, 55; Henoko, 1–2, 38, 52, 66, 81–85, 87–88, 90–91, 93–97, 178, 198n129; island-wide struggles, 1–2, 42; Kadena Air Base, 42, 62, 97; Kadena Village, 55; Koza, 54; land expropriation on, 1–2, 37–38, 41–53, 65, 70–71, 73, 189nn1,8, 194n25; Landowners Union, 44–45, 50, 190n19; Mayors Union, 45; Miyanomori Primary School, 55; Nago City, 82–83, 91, 96; Naha,

45, 50, 62, 71; Okinawa City, 71; parliament (Rippōin), 44–45; Prefectural Assembly, 69, 96–97; reversion to Japan, 38, 41, 47–48, 50–51, 53–64, 192n80;Yomitan Village, 71 Okinawa Democratic Party, 45 Okinawa Dugong Environmental Assessment Watch Group, 88 Okinawa Human Rights Association, 54 Okinawa International University, 87 Okinawan Citizens’ Coalition to Protect Life, 62–63 Okinawan Liberal Democratic Party, 51 Okinawan Women Act against Military Violence, 68 Okinawa People’s Party (OPP), 45–47, 50–51, 54, 58 Okinawa Prefecture Council for Reversion to the Home Country, 58, 62–63, 70 Okinawa Socialist Mass Party (OSMP), 45, 58 Okinawa Socialist Party (OSP), 58 Okinawa Teachers Association (OTA), 45, 47–48, 50–51, 54, 62 Okinawa Vision Council, 85 One-Tsubo Anti War Landowner’s Organization, 70 Osmeña, Sergio, 161 Ōta Masahide, 69, 71, 73, 83, 84, 189nn1,8, 194n25 Pan-South Korean Solution Committee against Base Extension in Pyeongtaek (KCPT), 117–18, 120, 202n87 Parents Association, 45 Pelaez, Emmanuel, 150 People’s Action for Reform of the Status of Forces Agreement (PAR-SOFA), 101–2 People’s Alliance for Freedom, 145 Perry, William, 72, 74, 76, 78 persuasion: failure of, 4–6, 10–11, 14–20, 26, 28, 31, 33–35, 37–42, 47, 51, 53, 56–58, 64–65, 67, 70–74, 78–79, 98–100, 102–4, 106, 108–9, 112, 114–15, 118–21, 125–26, 128–30, 132, 134–37, 144, 148–49, 152–53, 156–59, 161, 163, 165–67, 171, 179–80, 182–84; future research regarding, 181–84; of Hatoyama, 39, 66, 80–82, 84–90, 95, 174–75, 195n66; and international institutions, 34–35, 181–82; observing persuasion, 17–19; of Philippine Senators, 19, 40, 137–64, 170, 172– 74, 209n153; relationship to social pressure, 18, 140, 146–47, 152, 157, 162, 164; social psychologists on, 14, 187nn12,13, 195n66 Petty, Richard, 15, 33 Philippine Coconut Authority, 165 Philippine National Bank, 165 Philippines: antinuclear legislation, 167, 169–70,

index 174; Bataan Nuclear Plant, 142; Chamber of Commerce, 147; closure of U.S. bases in, 2–3, 15–16, 19, 37–38, 40, 137–75; Constitution of 1987, 19, 40, 140–41, 160, 165, 167–70, 174; economic conditions, 147, 149, 151, 153–54, 158, 172; EDSA “People Power Revolution”, 149, 165, 172–73; First Quarter Storm, 134, 159, 172; Junior Chamber of Commerce (JCC), 155; jurisdiction over cases involving U.S. personnel, 127, 129–31, 136; Mendiola Bridge demonstration, 150–51, 155; Military Bases Agreement (MBA), 19, 40, 127–28, 130–32, 136–38, 140–41, 146, 162, 166, 168–69, 208n124; mutual defense treaty (MDT), 141; nationalism in, 127–29, 132, 134, 136–37, 139–44, 150–51, 153–54, 161; public opinion regarding bases in, 147, 149, 153–54, 156–58, 160–62, 164, 171, 206nn45,47, 209n153; relations with United States, 2–3, 8, 12, 15–16, 127, 130–33, 135–36, 139–42, 145–46, 149–51, 153, 157, 164, 166–67, 206n38, 207n104, 208n124; Senate, 19, 36, 40, 137–67, 168–73, 174, 206n39, 209n153; U.S.-R.P.Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), 207n104, 208n124 Pilipino Democratic Party (PDP), 143, 148–50, 152, 172 Pimentel, Aquilino, 138–39, 148–52, 159, 165, 169 policy issues: base closures, 1–4, 13, 15–16, 19, 21, 27, 37–41, 55, 63, 65–67, 77–79, 80–97, 129, 134, 137–73, 174–79, 185, 197n115, 198n129; children abandoned by U.S. personnel, 54, 122, 203n112; criminal custody of U.S. personnel, 11–12, 24, 38–39, 65, 67, 68, 76, 98– 105, 110, 123, 126, 181, 199n4; environmental problems, 3, 4, 39, 78, 98, 99, 105–12, 126, 179, 181, 183, 201nn49,55, 202n81; human trafficking, 40, 121, 123–26, 181; involvement of U.S. military personnel in prostitution as customers, 4, 37–38, 40, 68, 98–99, 101, 121– 26, 139, 160, 181, 183; jurisdiction over cases involving U.S. personnel, 4, 11–12, 38–40, 54, 69, 98–105, 112–17, 123, 126–27, 129–31, 179–80, 183, 200n21; land expropriation for U.S. bases, 1–2, 4, 10, 12, 26, 38, 41, 42–53, 65, 70–71, 73, 98, 117–21, 183, 194n25, 202n86; storage and transit of nuclear weapons, 4, 12–13, 20, 24, 41–42, 53, 55–56, 61–63, 127–28, 134, 139–40, 142–44, 149, 169–70. See also normative arguments policy-makers: attitudes regarding military effectiveness among, 5, 20–21, 23–24, 27–29, 47–48, 53, 58–61, 64, 67, 74–76, 79–80, 102, 119–20, 175, 178–79, 184–86; attitudes regarding national security among, 20–21, 24, 29–31, 35; compromise solutions offered by,

223

20–26, 28, 33–35, 37–40, 53, 60–67, 74, 78–80, 99–100, 104–5, 131, 175, 179–80; credibility of protesters among, 16–18, 22–23, 26, 28, 33, 35, 40–41, 50–51, 58, 65, 67, 74, 81, 89–91, 98–99, 103–4, 108–9, 112, 114–15, 120, 122–23, 126, 128–30, 132, 134, 140, 173–74, 180–82; of host-nations, 4–6, 7–8, 10–11, 15–16, 20–21, 23–24, 26, 28–30, 36, 39–40, 55–56, 59–67, 72–82, 84–92, 98–99, 100, 102–4, 106, 110–14, 118–20, 128–31, 134–64, 174–79, 209n153; prior knowledge and beliefs of, 14–16, 17, 20–22, 24, 27–28, 33, 39, 41, 47, 56–57, 65, 67, 81, 84–85, 87–89, 98, 108, 126, 132, 134–35, 138–40, 144, 146, 149, 163, 173–74, 182; recommendations to, 175–79; and regime type of host state, 29–31; security consensus among, 20–21, 29–31; of United States, 4–6, 7–8, 10–11, 23–24, 26, 28, 31–32, 36, 38–41, 47–53, 56–61, 64–67, 72–81, 92–94, 98–100, 102–6, 108–15, 118–20, 122–23, 128, 131, 135–37, 175–80, 184. See also influence of protests on base policy; persuasion Price Report, 45, 50, 52–53 pro-base groups, 10, 22, 25, 66, 82, 156, 180–81 USS Pueblo, 62 Quezon, Manuel L., 150, 161 Ramos, Fidel, 165 rational choice theory, 35 Recto, Claro, 141–42, 144–45, 150–51, 157–58, 161–62 regime type, 29, 30–31 Reischauer, Edwin O., 54, 57, 59 Reyes, J. B. L., 151 Ridgway, Matthew, 48 Risse, Thomas, 15–16, 18 Rizal, Jose: El Filibusterismo, 161; Noli Me Tangere, 161 Roh Moo-hyun, 115 Roxas, Manuel, 159, 161 Saewoomtuh, 122 Saguisag, Rene, 138–39, 151–53 Saiki Akitaka, 91–92 Salonga, Jovito, 138–39, 144–49, 151–52, 155, 159, 161–62, 165–66, 171–72 Satō Eisaku, 55–56, 59–64 Schles, William F., 56–57 security consensus, 20–21, 29–31 Senaga Kamejirō, 46, 50, 54 Serrano, Felixberto, 130 Shannon,Vaughn, 33 Simbulan, Roland, 163, 171 Smith, Lance, 116

224

index

Socialist Party (Philippines), 133 social movement theory: framing in, 32 Solarz, Stephen, 147, 160 South Korea: Camp Humphreys, 2, 117–21; constitution, 101, 118–19; criminal jurisdiction and custody of U.S. personnel, 2, 38–39, 98–105, 110, 112–17, 123, 126, 179, 199nn4, 200n21; democratization in, 98; environmental issues in, 3, 21, 38–39, 105–12, 126, 175, 201nn49,55, 202n81; land expropriation in, 38–40, 98–99, 117–21, 202n86; Ministry of Environment (MOE), 106–8, 110–11; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), 102, 104, 106, 111, 116; Ministry of Justice, 102, 113; Ministry of National Defense (MND), 102, 106, 111, 120–21, 202n86; National Assembly, 104–5; National Police, 125; National Security Law, 98; number of U.S. installations in, 35; People’s Act Week, 101–2; Pyeongtaek, 117–21, 202n87; relations with North Korea, 95, 104, 115–16; relations with United States, 2–3, 7–8, 39–40, 98–99, 101, 104–6, 111–13, 115–17, 135, 184, 199n1, 203n103; Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 3, 39, 99–117, 122–23, 175, 199n4; Supreme Court, 103 Soviet Union, 48, 74, 135 Spanish-American War, 127 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), 67, 77–80, 85 Special Measures for Land Use by American Forces, 71, 73 Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), 26, 29, 31; U.S. and Japan, 2, 39, 65–70, 72, 76–77, 79, 86, 92, 95, 104–5, 187n7; U.S. and South Korea, 3, 39, 99–117, 122–23, 175, 199n4 USS Swordfish, 62 Takamizawa Nobushige, 92 Takazato Suzuyo, 68 Takemasa Kōichi, 85 Tañada, Lorenzo, 141–44, 146, 148–53, 155, 159, 170 Tañada, Wigberto, 138–39, 153–54, 162, 169, 170–71, 172–73 Thailand, 135 Ukraine, 16 Unger, Ferdinand Thomas, 56–58, 60 United States: Base Realignment and Closure Act, 107; Congress, 40, 45, 47, 121–24, 136; Department of Defense (DOD), 12, 40, 66, 75–76, 78–79, 99, 102, 121, 124–26; Department of State, 66, 102; global posture realignment, 81, 87; House Armed Services Committee, 45; Pollution Prevention Act,

107; public opinion in, 184; relations with China, 76, 118, 135; relations with Japan, 1, 3, 7–8, 39, 41, 43, 48, 49, 53, 59–61, 63–67, 71–72, 74–83, 91, 94–95, 97, 100, 104–5, 184, 187n7, 200n29; relations with North Korea, 62, 118; relations with Philippines, 2–3, 8, 12, 15–16, 127, 130–33, 135–36, 139–42, 145–46, 149–51, 153, 157, 164, 166–67, 206n38, 207n104, 208n124; relations with South Korea, 2–3, 7–8, 39–40, 98–99, 101, 104–6, 111–13, 115–17, 135, 184, 199n1, 203n103;Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, 124 University of the Philippines, 158, 162, 163; Diliman Commune, 134 University of the Ryukyus, 45, 52 U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), 43–45, 47–54, 60, 62 U.S. Department of Defense Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document, 12 U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), 40, 98, 100, 102–10, 112–16, 119–26, 135, 179–81, 202n81, 203n103; Good Neighbors Program (GNP), 116–17; Prostitution and Human Trafficking Working Group, 99, 124–26 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, 79 U.S.-Japan San Francisco Peace Treaty, 43 U.S.-R.P.Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), 207n104, 208n124 Vance, Cyrus, 131 Vietnam War, 54–56, 59–62, 131, 135, 145, 204n11 Vogel, Ezra, 74–77, 79, 80 Watanabe Shū, 85 Watson, Albert, II, 56–57, 60 Wegener, Duane, 33 Wolfowitz, Paul, 124 Women Making Peace, 122 Women’s Association, 45 Workers Party (Lapiang Manggagawa), 133 World Conference on Women, 68 Yamaoka Kanji, 91 Yara Chōbyō, 48, 62 Yeo, Andrew, 5–6, 20–21, 29–31, 209n153 Yongsan Relocation Plan, 117, 120, 185, 202n87 Youth Group Association, 45 Yun Kumi, 101 Ziga, Tecla San Andres, 159 Ziga,Venacio, 159 Ziga,Victor, 138–39, 159–61

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