Protector? An analysis of the concept and practice of loyalty in leader-led relationships within Malay society 9789672464150

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF LOYALTY IN LEADER-LED RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN MALAY SOCIETY

tHANDRA MUZAFFAR

PROTECTOR

The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (SIRD) is an independent publishing house founded in January 2000 in Petaling Jaya, Malaysia. The SIRD list focuses on Malaysian and Southeast Asian studies, economics, gender studies, social sciences, politics and international relations. Our books address the scholarly community, students, the NGO and development communities, policymakers, activists and the wider public. SIRD also distributes titles (via its sister organisation, GB Gerakbudaya Enterprise Sdn Bhd) published by scholarly and institutional presses, NGOs and other independent publishers. We also organise seminars, forums and group discussions. All this, we believe, is conducive to the development and consolidation of the notions of civil liberty and democracy.

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF LOYALTY IN LEADER-LED RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN MALAY SOCIETY

Chandra Muzaffar

E SIRD

Strategic Information and Research Development Centre Petaling Jaya, Malaysia

Copyright © 2020 Chandra Muzaffar

First published by Aliran in 1981 This edition published in 2020 by Strategic Information and Research Development Centre No. 2 Jalan Bukit 11/2,46200 Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia Email: [email protected] Website: www.gerakbudaya.com

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Perpustakaan Negara Malaysia / Cataloguing-in-Publicadon Data

Chandra Muzaffar PROTECTOR: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF LOYALTY IN LEADER-LED RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN MALAY SOCIETY I Chandra Muzaffar. ISBN 978-967-2464-15-0 1. Loyalty. 2. Allegiance. 3. Malays (Asian peopleJ-Social life and customs 4. Malays (Asian peopleJ-Politics and government I. Tide. 179.9 Cover design and layout by Janice Cheong

Printed by Vinlin Press Sdn Bhd 2 Jalan Meranti Permai 1 Meranti Permai Industrial Park Batu 15, Jalan Puchong 47100 Puchong, Selangor, Malaysia

Contents

Preface

vii

Chapter One

Loyalty in the Malaccan Period

Chapter Two

The Malaccan Period: Reactions to Loyalty

1 31

Chapter Three Loyalty: From Colonialism to Merdeka

47

Chapter Four

Loyalty: The Post-Merdeka Period

69

Chapter Five

Loyalty: Consequences: Reflections

109

Afterword to the New Edition

147

Preface

Protector? is a modest attempt at analysing an important dimension of the political culture of Malay society. It was in fact Syed Hussein Alatas, Professor of Malay Studies at the University of Singapore, who first suggested that unquestioning loyalty to a leader in return for protection of the led - which is widely acknowledged as a characteristic of the feudal epoch - could well be a feature of present day-Malay society. In ‘Feudalism in Malaysian society’, Civilisation (Vol. XVIII No. 4 Bruxelles 1968), he noted some of the contemporary manifestations of this feudal continuity. In this work - segments of which have been extracted from a doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Singapore in early 1977 - I have endeavoured to trace the origin and growth of the concept of unquestioning loyalty from the Malacca Sultanate of the 15th century through the colonial period to the contemporary setting. More than that, I have tried to link the concept and its practice to political, economic and cultural realities in different periods of history. The consequences of unquestioning loyalty and the nature and content of protection offered by the ruling elites, apart from the various social forces which are eroding the concept itself, have also been examined in some depth. It is an examination that has taken me beyond the conventional confines of studies in the political culture of a particular community. By relating ideas to their articulators, I have made an effort to understand how an idea serves the interest of its articulator - sometimes to the detriment of the larger community in whose name the idea is articulated. Studying ideas and their advocates is one of the primary concerns of the sociology of knowledge (see Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology ofKnowledge, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), one of the most fascinating branches of sociology. In a sense, it is this aspect of my analysis that is responsible for the title of this work! Finally, a study of this sort is bound to have certain shortcomings. The responsibility for them lies with me. It is my hope that future researchers will rectify them. However, whatever merit there is in this work belongs to vit

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many others as well - my family, my colleagues, my teachers and, most of all, my brothers and sisters in ALIRAN. 10 October 1979 Penang, Malaysia

C.M.

‘Behold me, behold me, charged with the care of government. I am not the best among you; I need all your advice and all your help. If I do well, support me; if I make mistakes, counsel me. To tell the truth to a person commissioned to rule is faithful allegiance; to conceal it is treason.’

Abu Bakar, the first of the four righteous caliphs in Islam.

Chapter One

Loyalty in the Malaccan Period

The relationship between ruler and ruled, leader and led is a theme that runs through the entire history of the study of human society. Every epoch manifests certain characteristics that help define the nature of this relationship. In the last few decades it has been a question of how much power the rulers possess, how much control they exercise over the ruled, what the ruler’s responsibilities are towards the ruled and how these responsibilities are discharged.1 The defining characteristics of the relationship between ruler and ruled in the feudal epoch2 were very different. The paramount concern was unquestioning loyalty to the ruler. In return, the ruler provided protection to the ruled. The politics of the feudal epoch revolved around this cardinal factor. In feudal Japan for instance, loyalty to one's ruler ‘was regarded as the highest duty’.3 i

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The themes mentioned are largely the central concerns of liberal democracy. For a useful discussion of democratic principles in contrast to totalitarian practices, see Raymond Aron, Democracy & Totalitarianism, tr. Valence lonescu (George Weidenfield & Nicholson, 1968). I realise that feudalism itself is a broad and often controversial concept. Samir Amin, The Arab Nation, tr. by Michael Pallis, (Zed Press, London 1977), has excluded China and the Arab World from ‘feudalism*. On the basis of this definition Malacca would not qualify as a feudal state. But feudalism can also be seen as a method of government, a certain relationship between the protector (the feudal lord) and the protected (his vassal). This view is advanced by R.Coulborn and J.R. Strayer in R. Coulborn, ed„ Feudalism in History (Archon Books, Connecticut, 1965). In this study it is the protector-protected relationship that I am concerned with. Thus, it is a political rather than economic conception of feudalism that one will find in this book See Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary and Donald Keene, Sources ofJapanese Tradition, Vol. 1, (Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 425.

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This study attempts to examine the concept of unquestioning loyalty as it expressed - and perhaps continues to express - itself in Malay society. First, I begin by analysing the concept in the context of feudal Malay society.4 Feudal Malay society here is synonymous with the Malay society of the Malaccan period. Broadly speaking, this is a period that began with the establishment of the Kingdom of Malacca at the turn of the 15 th century and ended with the formal introduction of British colonial rule in the Malay Peninsula towards the last quarter of the 19th century.5 In the second chapter I have tried to trace various reactions to the concept of unquestioning loyalty in that period. In the third chapter, an attempt is made to discover how ‘unquestioning loyalty’ operated from the colonial period right up to independence (“merdeka” in Malay). The most important chapter, however, is the fourth chapter where I have sought to establish the validity of the oft-repeated contention that the post-merdeka Malay ruling class - monarchs plus political elites - remains wedded to this notion of ‘loyalty’. Evidence is then provided of ‘loyalty’ in the contemporary period. In the fifth and final chapter there is some discussion about the consequences of loyalty in the present period. Those forces which have helped erode its original strength are also evaluated. The book ends with some reflections on the type of arguments which are sometimes articulated in academic circles about the intellectual viability of the whole thesis of ‘loyalty’ itself. Before I begin to look at the Malaccan period it is necessary to clarify a few things. Firstly, since it is the ruler or the ruling class that expects unquestioning loyalty, this is primarily an attitude that resides in the psychological processes of the ruler or the ruling dass. However - and this is the second point - as an attitude it can exist with as much strength among 4 Again, it must be stressed that the feudalism of Malay society referred to here is seen as a political relationship between a leader who offers protection in return for unquestioning loyalty from the led. No attempt is made to discover whether the economic structure of Malacca was actually feudal or not. 5 The term ‘Malacca* is used for the whole period because the administrative structure and the social organisation of the sultanates that emerged after the fall of the kingdom of Malacca were, on the whole, modelled after their renowned predecessor. For a detailed explanation, see my work in Some dominant concepts and dissenting ideas on Malay rule and Malay societyfrom Malacca to the colonial and Merdeka periods, Ph.D. thesis (University of Singapore, 1977), Chapter 1.

Chapter One: Loyalty in the Malaccan Period

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the ruled since it is they who demonstrate unquestioning loyalty. Thirdly, the ruling class and the ruled are seen as collectivities. It is quite conceivable that there may be individuals or groups within both categories who do not evince the same attitude towards loyalty. This should not in any way affect the validity of the overall analysis. Finally, the ruler in the Malaccan period refers specifically to the Sultan or monarch, and the ruling class to Malay royalty as a whole. The ruled refers to all his subjects, including those serving the court in any capacity. In the colonial period, rulers meant the Sultans but the Malay ruling class covers both the Sultans and other aristocrats and administrators who cooperated with the British. The rulers are still the Sultans in the post-merdeka period, but the ruling class incorporates both the Sultans and the political elites of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the mainstay of the government6 and the party that commands most support among the Malays. Sometimes the term ‘UMNO Leadership’ is used as a specific reference to that group, and often emphasis is given to the position of the UMNO president, who has also invariably been the prime minister. As prime minister, the nexus between his position, on the one hand, and UMNO and Malay society, on the other, is vital to our study of loyalty in the contemporary period. With this backdrop in mind, let us examine the concept of loyalty in the Malaccan period. Special attention will be given to i) the meaning of loyalty and how it manifested itself in various episodes, ii) the relationship of the concept of loyalty to ideas on the divinity and sanctity of kings, iii) the position of the concept from the point of view of Islam and iv) the effects of this concept of loyalty upon Malay society. Discussions on these themes need not necessarily follow the order in which they have been presented here.

Meaning The importance of loyalty to the king is emphasised at the very genesis of Malay history. According to the Sejarah Melayu,7 Sri Tri Buana, the first 6

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Editor’s note: UMNO lost power following the general election in 2018. See Afterword. Editor’s note: The full name of the work is Sulalat u’s-Salatin yakni pituturan segala raja-raja. Sejarah Melayu or Hikayat Melayu are some of the names it has gone by.

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royal ruler of the Malays, and a raja descended from Iskandar Dzu’l-Karnain (Alexander the Great), agreed to a covenant with one Demang Lebar Daun, the representative of his subjects. The covenant was necessary, in the opinion of Demang Lebar Daun, so that his daughter whom the king wanted to marry would not be stricken by a dreadful disease which 39 princesses had contracted after sleeping with the ruler. As a result, Sri Tri Buana was forced to abandon each one of his wives. So Demang Lebar Daun suggested that:

‘If your Highness desires your humble servant’s daughter, then you must your Majesty make a covenant with your humble servant, whereupon your humble servant will offer her for your Majesty’s acceptance’. [It was Demang Lebar Daun who was the originator of the expressions ‘your Majesty’ and ‘your humble servant’]. And Sri Tri Buana asked, ‘What is this undertaking that you would have of me?’ Demang Lebar Daun answered, ‘Your Highness, the descendants of your humble servant shall be the subjects of your Majesty’s throne, but they must be well treated by your descendants. If they offend, they shall not, however grave be their offence, be disgraced or reviled with evil words, if their offence is grave, let them be put to death, if that is in accordance with Muhammadan law’.

And the king replied, 'I agree to give the undertaking for which you ask: but I in turn require an undertaking from you Sir’. And when Demang Lebar Daun asked what the undertaking was, the king answered, ‘that your descendants shall never for the rest of time be disloyal to my descendants, even if my descendants oppress them and behave evilly’. And Demang Lebar Daun said, ‘Very well your Highness. But if your descendants depart from the terms of pact, then so will mine*. And Sri Tri Buana replied, ‘Very well, I agree, I agree to that covenant’. Whereupon both of them took a solemn oath to the effect that w’hoever departed from the terms of the pact, let his house be overturned by Almighty God so that the roof be land on the ground and its pillars be inverted. And that’s why it has been granted by Almighty God to Malay rulers that they shall never put their subjects to shame and that those subjects however gravely they offend shall never be bound of hanged or disgraced with evil words. If any ruler puts a single one of his subjects to shame that shall be a sign that his kingdom will be destroyed by Almighty God. Similarly, it has been granted by Almighty God to Malay subjects that they shall never be disloyal or treacherous to

Chapter One: Loyalty in the Malaccan Period

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their rulers, even if their rulers behave evilly or inflict injustice upon them.8

The covenant, which according to Josselin de Jong ‘lends a note of human dignity to the contacts between king and commoner’,9 has been commended by some scholars for its recognition of reciprocal rights and obligations. De Jong, for instance, in classifying Malay society as a ‘shame society* notes that, ‘the subjects promise loyalty, the ruler promises never to put his subjects to shame. Only if a ruler maltreats a subject in a manner that is shameful to the latter, may the contract of loyalty be broken’.10 RJ. Wilkinson seems to suggest that this bond between ruler and ruled is one of the proofs that in spite of the divine right of kings, there was no absolute monarchy among the Malays.11 While it is possible to agree with both men on their general evaluation of the covenant, there is still a need to reappraise certain aspects of it from a more critical angle. It is clear that loyalty is given on a condition - that the subjects are not put to shame. What constitutes ‘shame’ is hinted rather inadequately in the phrase ‘never be bound or hanged or disgraced with evil words’. If a ruler puts his subject to shame does it then follow that the subject can break his contract by acting disloyally? To put it differently, is rebellion Justified if a subject is put to shame? Does the pact between the ruler and the ruled sanctify rebellion? There is nothing to indicate that it does. All that we can say is that if a subject is disgraced or put to shame, he may withdraw his loyalty from the ruler, which is not the same as acting disloyally. Although this interpretation has some basis in the pact itself, it must be kept in mind that there is hardly a single instance in Malay society of a ‘withdrawal of loyalty’ being brought about by disgrace suffered at the hands of an oppressive ruler, which had won moral approval on the grounds that it was justified because the covenant had been broken by the king. On the contrary, Malay romances 8

See Sejarah Melayu, or, Malay Annals / an annotated translation by C.C. Brown; with a new introduction by R. Roolvink (Oxford University Press, 1970) p. 16. 9 P.E. de Josselin de Jong, ‘The character of the Malay Annals’, in J. Bastin and R. Roolvink, ed., Malayan and Indonesian Studies (Oxford University Press, London, 1954), p. 240. 10 RE. de Josselin de Jong, "Ihe Rise and Decline of a National Hero’, JMBRAS (Vol. 38, part 2,1965), p. 150. 11 R.J. Wilkinson, ‘Some Malay Studies’, JMBRAS (Vol. X, January 1932).

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and histories are full of episodes where the slightest hint of a rebellious act or attitude, even from subjects who have been humiliated and put to shame, are condemned and subsequently punished with extreme severity by both man and God.12 If disloyalty was not approved, how then was justice done to a subject who had been put to shame by a cruel ruler? The covenant has the answer. ‘If any ruler puts a single one of his subjects to shame that shall be a sign that his kingdom will be destroyed by Almighty God.’ In other words, retribution would be from God. It was this awareness of divine retribution which was expected to check and restrain the king in his relations with his subjects. Again, there are a number of evidences to show that certain rulers are acutely conscious of this moral restraint while in other cases violation of the covenant resulted in the destruction of their kingdoms.13 The relationship between the ruler and ruled is now clearer. The ruler, it should be apparent, was directly responsible to God and only indirectly responsible to his subjects insofar as his part of the covenant was concerned. The subjects, on die other hand, had a direct obligation to their ruler whom they had to serve with complete, unquestioning loyalty. Needless to say, oppression or cruelty on the part of the king did not negate this obligation. For their offences, of which disloyalty was a cardinal crime, they could be punished by the king: ‘If that offence is grave, let them be put to death, if that is in accordance with Muhammadan law’. Besides, as the covenant points out, any act of disloyalty will also invoke the wrath of God. It is this weaker position of the subjects, this obvious element of inequality in the pact, which Josselin de Jong and Wilkinson have failed to highlight. Unless this is understood, it will not be possible to gain a proper appreciation of the meaning of loyalty contained in the covenant

Manifestations If anything, various incidents and episodes narrated in a number of Malay romances and histories connected with the period under study will help confirm this view of loyalty. It is to these episodes that we now turn our

12 See this chapter for specific instances. 13 See this chapter for various examples.

Chapter One: Loyalty in the Malaccan Period

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attention to. In studying them, we shall attempt to classify these episodes on the basis of certain characteristics which tend to reveal the real nature of the concept of loyalty. First, unquestioning loyalty to the ruler meant carrying out his wishes and desires without questioning the motives behind his wishes or the rationality of his desires. The Hikayat Hang Tuah furnishes a number of instances. In this romance, the great hero of Malay feudal society, Hang Tuah, is depicted as a faithful servant of the royal court at Malacca who carries out the orders of the Sultan and his family without a murmur. On one occasion we see him accomplishing the difficult task of climbing an unusual coconut tree to get its fruit for the queen.14 On another occasion he succeeds in bringing back a wife for the Sultan from Majapahit after a whole series of adventures.15 There is a third, more heroic incident where he kills an amok who had tried to murder the Bendahara (the prime minister) and the Temenggung (the chief of security).16 Of course, there are numerous other episodes in the Hikayat Hang Tuah and other romances of loyal service to the varied dictates of the ruler. However, these acts of loyalty, though they fulfilled the whims and fancies of sometimes capricious monarchs, did not seriously violate the norms of justice and fairness. But there are other occasions where implementing an order of the ruler meant transgressing moral values and ethical conduct. The fact that these transgressions were accepted by the individuals who were given the task of executing the royal commands showed that they were loyal to the idea of complete submission to the will of the ruler. A couple of illustrations will suffice. Sultan Mahmud of Malacca was filled with a consuming desire to have as his wife a lady of great beauty who was already betrothed to the ruler of one of his tributary states. He promised half of his city and regalia to anyone who could get the woman for him. Through subterfuge, bribery and armed might, one of the royal warriors managed to kidnap the lady, Tun Teja, and persuaded her to marry the Sultan although she was very reluctant to do so. For his success, the warrior ‘was given the title of Tun Stia diraja and 14

15 16

See Kassim Ahmad, Hikayat Hang Tuah - selenggarakan dengan diberi pengenalan dan chatatan, M.A. thesis (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1973), pp. 226-7. Ibid., pp. 108-111. Ibid., p. 30.

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presented with a sword and it was ordered that he should stand on the step below the throne with the heralds’.17 The same story is told in the Hikayat Hang Tuah, although here Hang Tuah is credited with the kidnapping of Tun Teja. In his case, he had undertaken the hazardous task in order to win back the favour of the Sultan and to prove his loyalty to the monarch. The Sultan was so delighted with Hang Tuah’s achievement that he forgave him, embraced him and conferred upon him the title of Laksamana (admiral).18 However, a more outstanding example of unquestioning loyalty in carrying out a royal command relates to Hang Tuah’s killing of Hang Jebat, his close friend and comrade-in-arms. Hang Jebat had incurred the displeasure of the Sultan by fooling around with his concubines, behaviour which was considered as derhaka (treason). For his part, Hang Jebat was unhappy with the Sultan for having ordered the execution of his friend, Hang Tuah, without prior investigation of the accusation levelled at him. This was Hang Jebat’s reason for wanting to defy the monarch and the royal court His ‘derhaka’ and now his defiance angered the Sultan so much that he ordered the execution of Hang Jebat. No one, however, was brave or skilled enough to fight Hang Jebat, who had the added advantage of Hang Tuah’s magic keris (sword). It was at this crucial point that Hang Tuah was brought back to the Sultan’s service. It appeared that the Sultan’s command notwithstanding, Hang Tuah was not executed because the Bendahara who was supposed to carry out the order did not want to kill someone who might actually be innocent Now Hang Tuah was to be given the royal task of killing Hang Jebat which he accepted with great pride. It is significant that Hang Tuah greeted his friend with the words, ‘Jebat - you traitor!’, thus accepting the Sultan’s condemnation of the man without reflecting on the matter. It is equally significant that Hang Jebat, who was happy to know that his friend was still alive, responded differently: ‘Laksamana,’ he said, ‘it is because of you that I have done this [defied the ruler]’.19 In reply, Hang Tuah said, ‘If your sin had been something else you would not have to die...’ He continued, ‘It is better to die with a good name

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Sejarah Melayu, op. cit., p. 142. Hikayat Hang Tuah, op. cit., pp. 185 - 207. Ibid., p. 315.

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than to live with a bad name ...’20 Obviously for Hang Tuah, defying the ruler, even if it was on his own behalf, was a cardinal sin which deserved to be punished by death. The ethical aspects of the question were irrelevant. All that mattered was his unequivocal loyalty to the Sultan, which he was prepared to prove at the cost of truth and justice. So far, I have considered the loyalty of men executing the orders of the monarch irrespective of other considerations. Now I shall look at loyalty from another perspective - the loyalty of men who were either directly or indirectly the victims of royal injustice. How they sustained their unshakeable loyalty to the ruler was a manifestation of the dominance of this idea. Loyalty to these men meant accepting without question the obviously unjust decisions of the Sultan, which affected their own fate. The classic instance is of course the case of Bendahara Sri Maharaja. The Bendahara was accused by the Laksamana of plotting to overthrow the Sultan with the intention of making himself ruler of Malacca. The Sultan was quite prepared to believe the accusation, since he already had a grievance against the Bendahara. It was allegedly linked to the Bendahara’s unwillingness to show his lovely daughter to the Sultan.21 In any case, without further investigation, the Sultan ordered that the Bendahara be put to death. Two men were assigned the task. The two men went therefore (to the Bendahara’s house) accompanied by the Raja’s slaves. (When they arrived) Bendahara Sri Maharaja’s people and kinsmen gathered round him, all of them folly armed: and Thn Hassan Temenggung, the Bendahara’s son, was for fighting. But the Bendahara said, ‘What, Hasan, would you be disloyal to your Raja and spoil the good name of your forbears? It is the custom of Malays that they shall never be disloyal to their Rajas’. When he heard Bendahara Sri Maharaja’s words, Tun Hassan Temenggung threw away his weapon and stood with his arms folded. And the Bendahara said to his kinsmen and retainers, ‘If any of you

20 Ibid., p. 319. 21 The first time that the Sultan set eyes on the girl was on her wedding to Tun Ali, where *[t]here and then Sultan Mahmud bore malice in his heart against Bendahara Sri Maharaja'. See Sejarah Melayu, op. cit., p. 154.

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resist, I will denounce him in the world to come!’ When they heard the words of Bendahara Sri Maharaja, all of them threw away their weapons and returned each to his house, leaving Bendahara Sri Maharaja with his brother, the Sri Nara 'diraja and his people. Then Tun Sura ‘diraja and Tun Indra Segara came in bearing a creese (keris) from Sultan Mahmud Shah which had been placed on a salver and covered with a shoulder-cloth. They then took the creese out from under its covering (? and laid it) before the Bendahara saying, ‘His Highness greetings and prayers to God, verily the Will of Almighty God cometh to pass on this day’. And Bendahara Sri Maharaja and Sri Nara ‘diraja answered ‘whatever cometh to pass in accordance with God’s decree, I accept*. Then were put to death Bendahara Sri Maharaja, the Sri Nara 'diraja and all of their people who accepted to die with them.22 The Bendahara’s acquiescence with an unjust royal decree - especially since the accusation against this person was completely unfounded - epitomises the importance of unquestioning loyalty to the ruler in the Malaccan period. Predictably it finds expression once again in the attitude of Hang Tuah when confronted with an equally unjust death sentence. On the first occasion some chiefs, jealous of Hang Tuah’s position in the court as the Sultan’s favourite, fabricated a lie about his conduct with the ruler’s concubines. The Sultan was furious and without further investigation, he asked the Bendahara to kill Hang Tuah. Hang Tuah accepted his fate with the words, ‘Tuah will not serve other masters and Tuah does not want to commit treason against his master. Quickly... carry out the royal command’.23 Of course, Hang Tuah was not killed for the Bendahara was not prepared to do it As we have seen, after this episode he managed to kidnap Tun Teja for the sovereign and thus won back his favour. However, after a while a second attempt was made to discredit Hang Tuah in the eyes of the Sultan. Once again, the lie was related to Hang Tuah’s alleged misconduct with his favourite concubine. Again, the Sultan ordered

— Ibid., p. 157. The episode is also discussed in Syed Hussein Alatas’s ‘Feudalism in Malaysian Society: A Study in Historical Continuity? Modernisation & Social Change (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, Australia, 1972). His translation of the Bendahara’s advice to his son differs slightly. a Hikayat Hang Tuah, op. cit^ p. 169.

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Hang Tuah’s death without investigating the allegation. Again, Hang Tuah accepted the sentence in the same submissive manner, ‘Tuah,’ he told the monarch, ‘does not want to commit treason. I present my life. I do not want any other master’.24 Again the Bendahara saved his life. And once again, Hang Tuah managed to regain the Sultan’s esteem - this time, as we have already noted, by killing his friend Hang Jebat. While Hang Tuah’s unquestioning loyalty - and perhaps the Bendahara’s too - was simple, straightforward and unadulterated by any other consideration there were others who had a slightly more complex notion of their relationship to the ruler. These were men who were acutely conscious of their ability to resist royal orders but refused to do so and chose instead to remain faithful to the idea of loyalty. Indeed, this awareness of their ability to resist the ruler’s will was so intense that it has found verbal expression. The Kesah Raja-Raja Pasai provides us with a notable example. The Sultan in the story had decided to kill his own son, Tun Berahim Baba, because he had fooled around with one of the ruler’s concubines. Although Tun Berahim Baba had a premonition that he was going to be killed by his father and could have avoided death, he refused to seek escape. ‘... it is because I do not want to commit treason, if I wanted to commit treason then the whole of Pasai and the whole of Siam, and the whole of China, and the Whole of Kalinga will not be able to fight me.’25 It is significant that he repeated this on a number of occasions before he finally met his death. If Tun Berahim Baba was aware of his ability to resist but was prepared to subordinate it to the idea of loyalty to the king, there were also other cases of men who were conscious of the injustice of a certain royal deed but restrained themselves from taking action because they were expected to be loyal to the Sultan. For them it was the prevailing ethos, the dominant value of the day which acted as a restraint. In that sense they were different from the Bendahara and Hang Tuah on the one hand who were oblivious of the injustice involved, and from Tim Berahim Baba on the other, whose adherence to loyalty was an individually determined choice. An incident from the Sejarah Melayu will illustrate our point. Sultan Mahmud Shah was flirting with Tun Bayajit’s wife. One morning 24 Ibid., p. 289. 25 Kesah Raja-Raja Pasai compiled by Abdullah Hj. Musa Lubis (Pustaka Antara, Kuala Lumpur, 1963), p. 92.

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when he was coming back from her house, the husband who had been away on duty returned and discovered the king’s act. Tun Bayajit realised that Sultan Mahmud Shah was coming from his house and had he wanted to take his life there and then he could have done so. But because as a Malay subject he would not waver in his loyalty to the raja, he merely balanced his spear on this hand and said, ‘So that is how you behave Sultan Mahmud Shah! Alas that you are my master! Were you not, assuredly I would drive this spear of mine through your heart!’ And then the raja’s servants were for attacking Tun Bayajit, the king said to them, ‘Hold your hands! What he says is right, I have done him a wrong for which by the law of God he could take my life. It is only because he is a Malay subject who refuses to waiver [sic] in his loyalty that he behaves as he is behaving now’.26 It is perhaps worth noting at this point that not only was the aggrieved husband aware of the injustice of the deed, but the Sultan himself recognised that he had done wrong in the eyes of his religion. Obviously, Islam did not take a charitable view of the concept of loyalty prevalent at that time, as we shall find out later. For the moment, we shall look at yet another dimension of this concept of loyalty. We have seen how an individual, conscious of royal injustice, had chosen nonetheless to uphold the idea of loyalty. Now we have the case of an individual who continued to be completely loyal in the face of injustice but managed to restore some sense of honour to his own position. This is revealed in an episode involving Raja Muhammad, the son of Sultan Mansur Shah and Tun Besar, the son of the Bendahara. Raja Muhammad was once riding when Tun Besar, who was playing sepak raga (a type of ball game), accidentally kicked the ball in his direction. The ball hit Raja Muhammad’s headgear and knocked it off. Raja Muhammad was furious. One of his entourage was so enraged that he killed Tun Besar. When the Bendahara was informed of this, his followers wanted to retaliate. But the Bendahara restrained them, ‘you can’t be disloyal to the mount without being disloyal to the hill? For shame, all of your, for shame! For it is the custom of Malays never to be disloyal to their masters. But as for having this prince as our master - never!’27 The Sultan was subsequently persuaded to expel Raja

-s Sejarah Melayu, op. cit., p. 121. 2r Ibid., p. 89.

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Muhammad, who was in fact their heir-apparent, to the tributary-state where he was installed as ruler. Normally it would not have been possible to regain even an iota of dignity for oneself or one’s family in a conflict involving the throne, especially if the victim was committed to the idea of unquestioning loyalty to the sovereign. If the Bendahara succeeded to some extent, it was because the incident involved the heir-apparent and not the Sultan himself, and more importantly the Bendahara was a strong, powerfill, almost indispensable figure in the court who exercised a lot of influence over the king.28 The various examples of loyalty which have been discussed represent different manifestations of the same idea. It is not possible, for instance, to put Hang Tuah and Tun Bayajit in the same category. Hang Tuah was not only loyal but incapable of questioning the wisdom or fairness of royal decrees. Tun Bayajit, on the other hand, realised that the ruler was wrong but refrained from taking action because as a Malay he was expected to be loyal. The difference between the two situations must be recognised. Similarly, the Bendahara who accepted his fate without a murmur cannot be placed in the same category as the Bendahara who tried to achieve some measure of justice on behalf of his son. However, it is perhaps necessary to emphasise again that this classification of various types of loyalty does not mean that while Hang Tuah was unquestioningly loyal, Tun Bayajit, for instance, was not unquestioningly loyal. The available evidence shows clearly that they were all unquestionably loyal because not one of them doubted the need or necessity of being completely loyal to the ruler. Where some of them differed was in their evaluation of the ruler’s actions, which was another matter altogether.

Concept of Loyalty: Relationship to Society Having looked at the meaning and manifestations of loyalty, it is now necessary to trace the effects of this idea upon Malay society in the Malaccan period. These effects will be discussed on the basis of three vital questions: 28 The Bendahara in question was Tun Perak. He was largely responsible for consolidating Malacca’s power and its territorial expansion. An outstanding leader, he was noted for his shrewdness, diplomacy and forthrightness. For examples of this, see Ibid., pp. 54-56.

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a) is it true that the prevailing idea of loyalty helped create an oppressive ruling class? b) is it true that the prevailing idea of loyalty helped create a submissive subject-class? c) is it true that the prevailing idea of loyalty helped to prevent the outbreak of revolts and rebellions against the Malay ruling class? That there were a number of cases of royal oppression is undeniable. Some examples have already been provided. It is even possible to extend the catalogue of instances in the hope of giving greater emphasis to the fact. The Sejarah Melayu tells us a story of Singapura being attacked by swordfish. A large number of people were killed. The King ordered his men to make a barricade of their legs to defend the island. But still the men continued to be killed. At that moment, a boy was heard to remark, ‘What are we making this barricade of our legs for? Why are we deceiving ourselves? If we made a barricade of banana stems would not that be better?’29 The King realised that the boy was right and when his idea was implemented it worked.

Paduka Sri Maharaja [the King] then returned to the Palace and his chiefs said to him, ‘Your Highness, that boy will grow into a very clever man. It would be as well to be rid of him!’ And the King agreed and ordered the boy to be put to death. But when this boy was executed the guilt of his blood laid on Singapura.30 There is yet another instance of royal cruelty. A certain court official who was not liked by Sultan Mahmud Shah was reprimanded by him for arriving late at a royal festival The official begged for forgiveness. But the Sultan told him that he knew that the official did not like him, and ordered his death. Asked the official, ‘What is my offence against the Ruler? Can it be that for the trifling offence I have committed I am to be put to death?’31 Similarly, the Misa Melayu tells us that all those who failed to attend ceremonies for a deceased ruler, ‘were punished, dismissed from office, bound hand and foot and put in the sun; but many were subsequently forgiven. Many new honours were bestowed’.32 The same source narrates 29

39 31

32

Ibid., p. 40. Ibid., pp. 40-41. Ibid., p. 118. See Raja Chilian, Misa Melayu (Pustaka Antara, Kuala Lumpur, 1968), p. 214.

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how when ‘Sultan Mudzawar Shah fell ill and neither medicine nor alms nor the killing of a mad woman found in the Palace nor the lore of the Orang Kaya Besar availed, he died’.33 There is little doubt that these and other acts of persecution were made possible largely because the ruler’s position was inviolable. If, on the other hand, rebellion or even dissent and disagreement had been socially sanctioned, it is conceivable that some form of resistance would have emerged. Having said that, it must be acknowledged nonetheless that even in other societies where revolt was justified if it was directed against oppressive monarchs, there had been numerous instances of royal arbitrariness and harshness. In the medieval Muslim kingdoms of the Middle East, a strong sense of awareness in the righteousness of revolt against oppressive rulers existed among scholars, judges, religious elites and so on, but that did not prevent royal tyranny.34 This goes to show that while the concept of unquestioning loyalty to the ruler is an important factor in encouraging oppression, it is quite likely that oppression would have taken place even if it were not supported by this attitude. Indeed, it is even doubtful if the rulers were all that oppressive. To be sure, individual acts of great cruelty could be enumerated with ease but there is little to show that an oppressive outlook was part of the dominant consciousness of the Malay ruling class as a whole. This view will be substantiated later on; for the time being it is worthwhile to remember that British administrators and historians have been largely responsible for propagating this erroneous image of Malay sovereigns and their chiefs. In Clifford’s words, ‘[t]he old native rulers had been oppressive, with hearts like flint and hands of crushing weight, but they always had a personal motive for their acts, a motive which their people recognised and understood’.35 Elsewhere he gives numerous examples of oppression.36 So does Swettenham 33

Loc. tit.

34

For some discussion on the justification for revolt, see M.M. Shariff, A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. I (Otto Harvassowitz Wiesbaden, 1963); for references to revolts see Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History (Hutchinson University Library, London, 1970). Hugh Clifford, In a Comer ofAsia (Unwin Overseas Library, London, 1899), p. 163. See also Hugh Clifiord, Studies in Brown Humanity, Being Scrawls and Smudges in Sepia, White and Yellow (London, 1893); and his In Court and Kampong: Being Tales and Sketches ofNative Life in the Malay Peninsula (London, 1897). Stories by Sir Hugh

35

36

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in his writings.37 It is conceivable that the British chose to highlight individual acts of cruelty on the part of Malay rulers and present them as a general trend in order to justify colonial intervention38 Besides, the situation of anarchy in the late nineteenth century with its share of despotic monarchs and chieftains belonged to a phase in history which was in no way representative of attitudes prevalent during the larger part of the Malaccan period. If oppression had been exaggerated, would it be fair to say that there was extraordinary submissiveness on the part of the subject-class? We have already seen how submissive both high and low court officials were in the face of unjust royal decrees. It is possible to give another equally illuminating examples of submissiveness at the level of the court through the following instance. It illustrates in a dramatic way how little worth and value an obsequious, self-effacing official who attached to his own life to his interaction with the ruler had. It happened one day that Sultan Muzaffar Shah was giving an audience and it had lasted so long a time before the Bendahara arrived at the Palace to present himself that Sultan Muzaffar Shah retired, not knowing that the Bendahara had come, and as the Sultan went into the Palace the door was slammed by the wind. Whereupon Bendahara Sriwa Raja thought to himself. *1 have incurred the Ruler's displeasure. No sooner do I appear that the Raja retires and the door is shut!* And he returned to his house and took

poison from which he died.39 Like the court, the ordinary people were also on the whole completely submissive to the dictates of the Sultan and the ruling class when it came to work on their land or serving them in other ways. This attitude has become

37

3S

39

Clifford, selected and introduced by William R. Roff (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1966), is also worth looking into. See his The Real Malay (London, 1899) and Footprints in Malaya (Hutchinson and Company, 1941) as well as Stories and Sketches by Sir Frank Swettenham, selected and introduced by William R. Roff (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1967). For a discussion of some of the real motives behind British intervention, see Northcote C. Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya (University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1964). Sejarah Melayu, op. tit., p. 54.

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so deeply ingrained that it found expression in Malay folk philosophy. There are a large number of Malay sayings and proverbs which bear testimony to this. For instance, there is a proverb which says, 'Ten junks may come in but the dogs still tuck their tails between their legs'. W.E. Maxwell has interpreted this to mean that, ‘Ruler may succeed ruler, or other important changes in the government of a country may take place, but the condition of the lower classes will remain the same’. According to him, this thinking is best conveyed in another saying - 'Whoever may be raja, my hand goes up to my forehead all the same’.40 W.E. Maxwell has interpreted another saying - 'To be out of temper with water in the holcT - to mean that an ordinary subject ‘cannot afford to show temper with his chief, on whom he depends for support. His means of livelihood disappear if he does’.41 He regards the saying 'in life we are encompassed by regulations, in death by the mould of the grave’ as an example of ‘an expression of submission, humility or resignation. It is [sic] quoted when deferring to the order of a superior’.42 Similarly - 'moving along the floor like a child whose parents will not notice it’ - is, according to Maxwell, ‘said of a man who is in disgrace with his superiors. He may crawl after his lord praying to be taken back into favour but gets nothing but cold neglect’.43 Finally, he notes that Malay folk philosophy recognises that ‘the small are at the mercy of the great’ in the proverb, which says that 'small fish become the foodfor bigfish'.44 R.J. Wilkinson has also examined proverbs dealing with the people’s attitude to royalty and the court. An ordinary Malay, in his opinion, ‘thinks it is natural enough that a prince should gratify his passions whenever he gets the chance. After all, The python likes his chicken The crocodile is not averse to a corpse The fly loves to settle on an ulcer The flea finds its way to the hair

40

41 42

43 44

See W.E. Maxwell, ‘Malay Proverbs Part II’, JSBRAS (December 1878), pp. 143-4. Ibid., p. 158. W.E. Maxwell, ‘Malay Proverbs’, Ibid (July 1879), p. 19. Ibid., p. 27. WJE. Maxwell, ‘Malay Proverbs’, Ibid (June 1883), p. 35.

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The buffalo plunges wherever the hue of grass suggests the presence of water.45

More significantly, he suggests that ‘the idea of seeking vengeance against the tyrant excites the Malay’s bitterest ridicule:

The flea wants to fight the eagle The gnat is trying to drink up the ocean The sparrow has found the grain to be more than he can swallow The cock thinks that by refusing to crow he will prevent the sun from rising.46 The reason for this ridicule could be because ‘he knows that opposition to the chiefs means certain death: If Ifail I am burnt to ashes, if I succeed I am burnt to charcoal.47 Again, in Winstedt’s analysis of Malay sayings on the ruling class, the same feeling of utter helplessness, of complete submission, is conveyed. 'If the sky were about to fall, could it be kept up by finger? (can the weak withstand oppression?).’48 Almost in similar vein is another proverb which says, 'When the skyfalls, the earth is dissolved (when a King comes down on a subject, he is ruined)’.49 This overwhelming sense of diffidence, this devaluation of one’s worth and ability, this submission to the will of the monarch is certainly related to the idea of loyalty. This idea - perpetuated as a supreme cultural value - had such an iron grip upon the Malay mind that it paralysed one’s ability to act in variance with the ruler’s will and want. But it would be wrong to ascribe every instance of submissiveness to the influence of this idea of loyalty. Other influences must also be considered. Even if the idea of loyalty had not taken its existing form, it is possible that submissiveness to the ruler would have manifested itself as a product of the structure of Malay

45 R.J. Wilkinson, ‘Malay Proverbs on Malay Character’, in Malay Literature, Part III, Papers on Malay subjects (Kuala Lumpur, 1925), p. 3. 44 Loc.dt. 47 Ibid., p. 5. 45 R.O. Winstedt, Malay Proverbs (J, Murray, London, 1970), p. 47. 4S Loc. cit.

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society. As we know from the first chapter, Malay society was a hierarchical one with a ruling class and a subject-class. This hierarchy generated its own consciousness among its participants. Simply put, it was a hierarchy which made the weak acutely conscious of their inferiority and lowliness in relation to the strong. For instance, when a new seven-storey palace was being opened, the King and other participants in the ceremony were allocated various storeys on the basis of their rank, with the common subject occupying the lowest but one level.50 When the Sultan and his entourage went tuba-fishing, the stakes they used reflected their rank.51 When a Sultan wanted to reward a faithful official of his by marrying him to his daughter, the official refused. ‘I ask to be excused,’ said he ‘for I am but a slave and your Highness’ daughter is my master’. When the King persisted, he said, ‘... Seeing that all my forebears in bygone days were slaves of the Rajas of those times, the good name of Malays of those days would be impaired if I should now marry your Highness’ daughter’.52 Tun Teja, according to the Hikayat Hang Tuah, was compelled to turn down the offer of marriage from the Sultan of Malacca because she was conscious of her low status in relation to the ruler.53 This consciousness of status was reflected in distinct court-language, court-etiquette and certain privileges confined to royalty like its exclusive right of the use of yellow. The punishment for the violation of these rules was death.54 Perhaps it was this status-saturated atmosphere which gave birth to proverbs and sayings that reflected the gulf between the ruler and his followers. The peasant looks upon the chiefs as a race apart: they are hornbills, we are sparrows, however can we possibly fly in the same flock As a local rhyme has it: ‘let the great seek out the great, while we the poor, accept our fate.’55 Indeed, this consciousness of status was so real that it even extended to one’s idea of punishment. ‘If one has to be slapped, it is better to be slapped by a hand which carried a ring, if one has to be kicked it is better to

50 51 52 53 54 55

See Raja Chulan, Misa Melayu, op. cit., p. 95. Ibid., pp. 215-8. See Sejarah Melayu, op. cit., pp. 187-8. Hikayat Hang Tuah, op. cit., p. 92. Sejarah Melayu, op. cit., pp. 44-9. R.J. Wilkinson, ‘Malay Proverbs’, in Papers, op. cit, p. 3.

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be kicked by someone who wears a shoe.’56 There can be little doubt then that this consciousness of rank and status, of division and dichotomy in society, also helped create a submissive attitude. Likewise, it is possible that the economic relationship between the ruling class and the subject-class reinforced this attitude. For apart from those who served the court directly, other subjects were also under some form of control. The craftsmen, for instance, served the requirements of the ruling class while the cultivators had to work for their chiefs and the Sultan. As is known, technically all land belonged to the Sultan, although in reality he only exercised this right over a proportion of the grain. More importantly, the cultivator was liable to be subject to forced service (kerah). Under this arrangement, ‘the cultivator may be required to give his labour in making roads, bridges, drains and other works of public utility, to tend elephants, to pole boats, to carry letters and messages, to attend his chief when travelling, to cultivate his chief’s fields as well as his own, and to serve as a soldier when required’.57 Of course, the nature of services varied from place to place.

Thus in Perak one district used to supply the Raja with timber for building purposes, while rattan and other materials came from others, the people of one locality used to furnish the musicians for the Raja’s band, while another had to provide nurses and attendants for his children... Forced service... is not merely the result of the application of the law of the stronger; it is well understood to be an incident of the lot of the cultivator of land, he acquiesces in it as one of the conditions on which he holds his fields, and he usually submits quietly to the orders of his superiors until they reach the pitch of oppression at which he decides that emigration is preferable to slavery. He knows that, by emigrating, he will forfeit his land, and in fact it is at once seized by the Penghuhi [the village headman] and held for the Raja.58

It is not difficult to see how and why forced service (as an economic institution) tended to increase acquiescence and reduce the cultivator to so ST

5$

W.E Maxwell, ‘Malay Proverbs’, JSBRAS (June 1883), p. 72. W.E Maxwell, ‘The Law and Customs of the Malays with Reference to the Tenure of Land’, Ibid (June 1884), p. 108. Ibid., pp. 109-10.

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a submissive servant of the system. That is why the economic relationship between the ruling and subject classes - apart from the consciousness generated by the social structure and the influence of the idea of loyalty should be taken into consideration when explaining the submissiveness of the people. While it is conceivable that the political idea of complete loyalty to the ruler, nurtured over centuries, was the main influence in shaping this attitude, one should not ignore the other two factors. At the same time, one should not be under the impression that since submissiveness was such a pervasive outlook, there were no instances at all of resistance to royal authority. As we shall show later, this would be far from the truth. In view of the foregoing discussion, to what extent would it be true to say that this concept of loyalty was also responsible for preventing the occurrence of revolts and rebellions in early Malay society? It has been observed that the ‘history of Malaysia has been characterised by the absence of mass uprisings or any attempt thereto. What happened was the frequent emergence of conflicts between hostile and contending groups of chiefs and princes, between each other or against European colonial powers. The mass of the people had never been involved as in the case of a civil war or a general uprising. The Malaysian records from the 14th century onwards confirm the above’.59 It would be very difficult to refute the relationship between this idea of loyalty and the non-occurrence of revolts and rebellions against the Sultans. Indeed, one can even maintain that this idea of loyalty must have been the one most significant explanation for the absence of the phenomena in question. The various instances of injustice and oppression, of tyranny and cruelty accepted by their docile victims without a whimper because any show of defiance was tantamount to treason would support this contention. Blind loyalty, unquestioning service to the ruler, was truly ‘the ethical code of the day’.60 However, it would be an oversimplification to suggest that the idea of loyalty was the only factor responsible for the absence of any revolt against the monarch. Other causes must also be explored. For instance, it has already been noted that while there were a number of individual acts of

59 Syed Hussein Alatas, ‘Feudalism’, Modernisation, op. cit., p. 100. 60 R.J. Wilkinson, ‘The Malacca Sultanate’, JSBRAS (No. 61, June 1912), p. 70.

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cruelty and arbitrariness, the Malay monarchical system, as a whole, was not oppressive. Because of this, it is conceivable that the subject-class did not feel the need or the necessity to revolt against their royal masters. After all, the nature and extent of a response to a particular situation is conditioned by the type of challenge that the situation itself presents.61 Since by and large Malay monarchs were restrained in their attitude towards their subjects, and they did not go out of their way to oppress the people, there was no reason to challenge their position. One very important factor, it appears, discouraged the rulers from any great cruelty. This was the influence of religion. The Sultans as a group were conscious that, being Muslim monarchs, they could not be oppressive or unnecessarily harsh towards their subjects. Some attention had to be given to their welfare. Ihere was an awareness of the need for justice. As an example we are told in Kesah Raja-Raja Pasai, that just before he died, Malekus Salleh, the first Muslim ruler of the kingdom, advised his officials not to assign tasks to the people which were inconsistent with the law of God ‘because God has stated in the Holy Book, the Quran, that anyone who implements laws that do not conform to the law of God is an unbeliever’.62 More significantly, he advised his two grandchildren who were to succeed him not to covet the riches of his ephemeral world and ‘not to do anything which does not bring good in this world and the Hereafter. You must discuss every task so that God will bless you in the administration of your respective countries and grant all that you request from Him. To the people you must be just and always give consideration to them so that they will do good and avoid any evil deed’.63 It is perhaps useful to emphasise that in the Sejarah Melayu too, advice to abide by God’s injunctions was given at the time of death. As he was dying, the Bendahara Paduka Raja told his family:

61

62

63

Arnold Toynbee had used this concept of challenge and response to explain the rise and fall of civilisations. Jan Romein had applied the same idea to nationalism in Asia. ‘The aggression of the West was the challenge to Asia, and the various reactions to it the response Asia made.’ Quoted from The Asian Century: A History of Modem Nationalism in Asia (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1962), p. 41. Kesah Raja-Raja Pasai, op. cit., p. 46. Ibid., p. 47.

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‘Think not, my children, to truck your religion for (the attractions of) this world: for this world will not endure, and for those that live, there is but one end and that is death. In all sincerity of heart do your duty towards God Almighty and the Apostle of God (may God bless him and give him peace). And do your duty towards your Raja, forgetting not what the divines tell us, that a just prince is joined with the Prophet of God like two jewels in one ring’.64 The Bendahara’s counsel to his ruler, Sultan Alauddin, however, was of far greater political importance.

‘Hearken not, I pray your Highness,’ said he, ‘to words that have not the truth in them. If your Highness shall listen to such words, you cannot but regret it in the end. And let not your Highness yield to the lusts of the flesh, for many are the princes whose kingdoms have been brought to nought by Almighty God because they yielded to their fleshly lusts.*65

Sultan Alauddin, in turn, advised his son and successor - from his deathbed - on the duties of a ruler in a manner that was comprehensive in scope and scale. Indeed, there is no parallel in any of the Malay romances and histories to the magnificent eloquence of the Sultan’s counsel. ‘Know well, my son, that this world will not endure. Yea, my son, all that liveth here upon earth but die in the end; it is only the True Faith that endures for all time. When I am gone, be diligent in God’s Service; abstain from taking other men’s goods unlawfully, for God’s poor are all entrusted to your keeping. If they are in distress, be swift to help them. If they are victims of injustice, inquire diligently into the matter, so that in the day of Judgement Almighty God may not lay a heavy burden of responsibility upon you, for thus saith the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace) Kulukum Ra’in Wa-Kulukum Masulun Min Ra'iy-Yaiti, which means “all ye who tend will be questioned as to your tending”: that is to say, all rulers will be questioned by God as to the manner in which they

64 Sejarah Melayu, op. cit., p. 111. 65 Loc. cit.

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have tended their subjects. Therefore, it is your bounden duty to do justice and be diligent in inquiry so that someday in the world to come you may be taken into God’s loving care for all eternity. See to it that you consult with your ministers and chiefs, for no ruler, however great his wisdom and understanding, shall prosper or succeed in doing justice unless he consults those in authority under him. For rulers are like fire and their ministers are like firewood, and fire needs wood to produce a flame: ar-raiyyatu jurthuniatun sultanun darakht, which means “subjects are like roots and the ruler is like the tree”; without roots the tree cannot stand upright; so is it with rulers and their subjects. As for the Malays, however greviously they may offend, be not hasty in putting them to death except in cases where that penalty is ordered by the law of God, for the Malays are your clay as the tradition says, “Al-abdu tinu'l murabbi”, which being interpreted is “the slave is as it were (? the clay of) his master”. If you put them to death when they have done no wrong, your kingdom will be brought to nought. Remember, my son, these my last injunctions to you and act upon them (?) so that God may grant you the blessing which should be yours as a ruler.’66

This piece of parting advice in particular, and the other messages of dying Sultans and Bendaharas which we have mentioned, provide some interesting insights into the thinking of these men. To start with, they were aware of the importance of adhering to the teachings of Islam and acting in consonance with the laws of the religion. They were also aware of the danger of yielding to the lusts of the flesh. Similarly, greed, materialism and too much attachment to this ephemeral world were to be avoided. Even more significantly, they were conscious of the need to look after the poor, to respect the rights of the subjects and to ensure justice. As monarchs, they also knew that they had to consult their officials in order to achieve justice for their subjects. Finally, the Malay Sultans realised that injustice - especially putting a subject to death when he has done no wrong - could lead to the divine destruction of their kingdoms as stated in the covenant between Sri Tri Buana and Demang Lebar Daun. And indeed, some of the rulers who had disgraced their subjects were punished. The Raja of Singapura who on a false accusation had his wife, the daughter

66 Ibid., pp. 116-7.

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of the Bendahara, impaled naked in public was brought down by the Javanese conquest of his island.67 Similarly, soon after the execution of the Bendahara of Malacca on the strength of a fabricated charge, the kingdom was conquered by the Portuguese. If religious influence acted as a constraint upon the rulers, certain sociological factors had some effect upon the ruled. It is conceivable that men would choose to resist oppression if they had no other option. But as we have seen, the Malay cultivator who was harshly treated by the chief had a way out. He could always emigrate to some other state in order to escape tyranny. In other words, because he did not have to stay, he could afford to not fight. If, on the other hand, those who chose to leave could not be absorbed into some other setting, if they had been dislodged, dislocated elements who were not integrated into any milieu, it is conceivable that there would have been a greater inclination towards revolt. Ihe history of the millenarian movement in Europe shows quite clearly that it almost always was the dislocated and discontented poor who joined protests.68 But in the Malaccan period, the emigrant cultivator required very little effort to get himself wellentrenched in his new surroundings. Besides, it must also be remembered that peasant revolts in Europe, and to a lesser extent China, were often preceded by great natural and social disasters. In Europe, for instance, the Black Death and the famine after the Crusades were followed by a series of millenarian movements. Indeed, sometimes these movements were an aspect of such larger upheaval.69 The Malaccan period, on the other hand, was singularly free of any great social tragedy or natural calamity which, given other conducive circumstances, might have stimulated some mass protests against authority. Apart from all these factors certain political and economic realities may also deserve some consideration. If political power in the empires and states of the Malaccan period had been highly centralised, if there had been a single focus of symbolic and effective power, would it have been easier for revolts to develop? Similarly, if the primary source of the economic wealth of the Malay ruling class was the land and not the sea as it was for a major 67

68

69

Zainal-Abidin bin Ahmad, ‘Some Malay legendary talks’, JMBRAS (Vol. 24, February 1951), p. 79. See Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (Paladin, 1970). Ibid.

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part of the Malaccan period, would there have been greater control over the masses, which might in turn have provoked some reactions? It is, however, difficult to give much weight to these two explanations partly because similar circumstances were present in many other feudal societies where, by contrast, peasant rebellions did occur.70 It should now be possible to obtain a clearer picture of loyalty within the context of Malay society in the Malaccan period. From our discussion, it appears that the concept of loyalty was the most significant single influence on the relationship between the monarch and his subjects. More than any other factor, it helped to secure and stabilise the position of the ruler. But other factors must also be examined since they too had some impact upon the situation. It needs to be repeated that neither individual acts of oppression, the submissiveness of the subjects, nor the absence of any mass uprising against a monarch can be explained merely on the basis of the idea of complete loyalty to the Sultan.

Origin Having considered the link between loyalty and society, it is now necessary to ask: what were the origins of this idea of loyalty? To discover this, one has to go back to the early conception of kingship. In the Southeast Asia of ancient times, there was the idea of divine kingship: ‘The divinity of Kings was conceived in various ways according to the prevailing religion. Where Hinduism prevailed, the King was considered to be either an incarnation of a god or a descendant from a god or both. Mostly it was Siva who was thought to incarnate himself in Kings to engender dynasties.’71 But then our Malay kingdoms, except for a very brief period at the birth

70 Under the Tokugawa rulers of feudal Japan, foreign trade flourished. The rulers themselves took an active part in it Indeed, their trade was an important source of their strength. See Edwin O. Reischauer, ‘Japanese Feudalism*, Feudalism in History, R. Coulbom, ed. (Archon Books, Connecticut, 1965). But we are also told that right through the Tokugawa period there were peasant revolts including those directed against the governing class. See Hugh Borton, Peasant Uprisings in Japan of the Tokugawa Period (Paragon, New York, 1968). 71 Robert Heine-Geldem, ‘Conception of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia* Far Eastern Quarterly (Vol 2,1942), p. 22.

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of Malacca, were Muslim, not Hindu, polities.72 Did they also share this Hindu conception of kingship? We are told that the Constitution of Malacca, ‘so far from being based on any Muslim pattern embodies the ancient Hindu conception of a kingdom as an image of the heavenly world of stars and gods, a conception current in Founan and borrowed probably from Founan by Sri Vijaya’.73 The monarch was accordingly regarded as ‘the Lord over the Whole World’, he was a ‘Sultan’ and the ‘Shadow of God Upon EartK74 It was this so-called ‘link’ with the Omnipotent that provided an aura of divinity to the ruler’s position. Thus, in spite of the fact that the occupants of the office were Muslims, the old idea of divinity was retained and perpetuated in various ways.75 It was largely because the rulers were perceived as divine that unquestioning loyalty was accorded to them by their subjects. Their power was supposed to be rooted in the very idea of the Omnipotent and for that reason defying their wishes would constitute a transgression of divine authority. Their supernatural quality - their ‘daulat’ - was what ordinary mortals had to fear. ‘Malay chronicles give us tales of the working of this daulat. The poor girls who were made to wed the first Prince of Palembang were stricken with a foul disease for their presumption in being familiar with a man so highly placed.’ An Emperor of China, who wrote in his pride, ‘from below the feet of the son of Heaven to above the crown of the Sultan of Malacca,’ was afflicted with a form of itch for daring to insult a monarch who, though weak in power, was an anointed king nonetheless. The Sultan of Lembang found it painful to sit down after he had unwittingly taken a disguised Johor Prince into his domestic service. The house of Sang

72

73

74

75

Editor’s note: As for pre-Islamic non-Muslim polities, such as the one centred on Lembah Bujang in what is now Kedah, comparatively little is known about them. Richard Winstedt, Malaya and its history (Hutchinson’s University Library, 1953), p. 33. Papers on Malay subjects, R.J. Wilkinson, ed., selected and introduced by P.L. Burns (Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 370. However, in the various enthronement ceremonies practised in the Malay states where this idea of divinity was emphasised, certain Muslim features were also included. For instance, in Negeri Sembilan: "The local Kathi recites a prayer in Malay asking Allah’s guidance for the new Khalifah He has raised to the throne, the guidance He gave to the Prophet Solomon’. See R.O. Winstedt, ‘Kingship and Enthronement in Malaya’, JMBRAS (Vol. XX, June 1947), p. 137.

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Ranjuna Tapa (who turned traitor to the last Singapore King) was ‘struck down, and his rice turned to dust; and the traitor and his wife were turned into boulders that may be seen in the Singapore moat even unto this day’. Worst of all was the fete of Megat Seri Rama who slew the infamous Sultan Mahmud at Kota Tinggi in Johor; he escaped all human punishment, but ‘by God’s decree grass grew in his wound and for five years he lingered on between life and death suffering agony for his treason.76

Relationship to Islam It should be clear by now, however, that neither the idea of ‘daulat’ nor the punishment suffered by its transgressors who were sometimes the victims of royal injustice, were acceptable in Islam. Indeed, the whole notion of unquestioning loyalty of the Sultan was in conflict with Islamic values. Before we discuss the nature of this conflict, we must explain why the concept of loyalty is being evaluated on the basis of Islam. First, Islam was, and is, the religion of the Malays. Secondly, Islam and Islamic laws were mentioned in the covenant which defined the loyalty of the Malays to their ruler. Thirdly, the authority of the ruler, even his divine power, was rationalised and legitimised in terms of Islam - however erroneous this might be. Finally, as we have seen, at least one Sultan was aware that his right to accept unquestioning loyalty from a court official, a victim of his own wrongdoing, could find no justice at all in Islamic ethics. This more than anything else should encourage us to investigate the relationship between the two. As is well known, the cornerstone of Islamic political philosophy is the belief in the unity and sovereignty of God.77 It is only God who has the right to complete, unswerving loyalty. Loyalty to every other institution - whether it is the nation or a monarch - must be subordinated to this overriding factor. Of course, it is possible to be loyal to a monarch and to God at the same time provided that loyalty to the former does not entail disloyalty to the moral values and virtues associated with the latter. The values and virtues associated with God are laid out in the Qur’an 76 R.J. Wilkinson, *Some Malay Studies^ JMBRAS (Jan. 1923), p. 81. 77 For a thorough discussion, see Abdul A’la Maududi, Islamic Law and Constitution, tr. and ed. by Khurshid Ahmad (Islamic Publications Lahore, Pakistan, 1955).

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and embodied in the life and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Islam is also quite explicit about those disvalues and vices which Muslims must avoid. A Muslim ruler cannot expect loyalty from his subject if in carrying out the royal command, he is required to violate the moral values of his religion. For as Muhammad is reported to have said, ‘there is no obedience in sin. It is only in virtue’.78 And many of the duties which were performed in the interests of the monarch - like executing an innocent Bendahara or abducting a lady for marriage - were vices of a very serious nature in the eyes of Islam. To be sure, ‘the doctrine of passive obedience finds no room in Islam’.79 The people have a right to oppose vice and injustice. Muhammad is known to have remarked: ‘He who witnesses any vice should change it’.80 He had also once noted that, ‘A word of justice uttered before an unjust ruler is the greatest of jihad (holy war)’.81 Abu Bakar, the companion of the Prophet, who succeeded him at his death in 632 CE as the first caliph told the Muslim community: ‘Behold me, behold me, charged with the care of the government. I am not the best among you; I need all your advice and all your help. If I do well, support me; if I make mistakes, counsel me. To tell the truth to a person commissioned to rule is faithful allegiance; to conceal it is treason. In my sight, the powerful and the weak are alike; and to both I wish to render justice. As I obey God and His Prophet, obey me; if I neglect the laws of God and his Prophet I have no more right to your obedience.’82 And finally Omar, the second caliph and perhaps the finest example of Islamic justice, urged the Muslims to ‘put me right if you discover any crookedness in me’. One of the audience retorted, ‘By God Almighty if we had found any crookedness in thee we should have put you right with our swords’.83 There is no need to establish further that the Islamic conception of the proper relationship between ruler and ruled is fundamentally different from the ties which were sanctified by the covenant of loyalty in the Malaccan period.

78

79

80

81 82 83

Ibid., p. 192, Quoted from Muslim Al-Sahih. See Hussein Alatas, The Democracy ofIslam (W. Van Hoeve, The Hague, 1956), p. 25. Muhammad Qutb, Islam the misunderstood religion (Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, State of Kuwait, 1964), p. 291. Ibid., p. 292. Syed Hussein Alatas, The Democracy, op. tit., p. 25. Muhammad Qutb, op. tit., p. 290.

Chapter Two

The Malaccan Period: Reactions to Loyalty

Having seen how the concept of loyalty manifested itself in various situations in the Malaccan period, it is now pertinent to ask: Were there any reactions at all to this concept? Were there any instances or occasions where the subjects of a ruler displayed signs of defiance against, or at least noncompliance with, the prevailing notion of loyalty? Were there any moments at all in the history of the period when some other consideration like justice or honour or dignity managed to overwhelm - even if momentarily - the overpowering grip of loyalty to ruler? In order to answer these questions, I have chosen to examine certain episodes from the Malaccan period which may reveal the reactions we are interested in.

Tun Hassan In the execution of Bendahara Sri Maharaja we came across his son, Tun Hassan, who was prepared to fight the Sultan’s men but was prevented from doing so by his father. Tim Hassan’s abortive move showed a readiness to defend his father even if it meant defying the Sultan’s order. Apparently, loyalty to the Sultan’s will was secondary to the honour and dignity of his father and his family. In the conflict between the ruler’s interests and his family’s survival he chose the latter.84 It is for this reason that the incident is 84 See Sejarah, op. cit., p. 157. S.H. Alatas’s ‘Feudalism’ in Modernisation, op. cit., also raises queries about Tun Hassan’s conduct in relation to the Malay value system. See p. 103. *21

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significant - it is one of those rare occasions in the Malaccan period where in the mind of one of the ruler’s subjects, at least some other consideration had precedence over the Sultan’s command.

Bendahara Paduka Raja A dearer example of an action that did not fit into the dominant thought system would be the conduct of the Bendahara who was supposed to carry out the execution of Hang Tuah. Although Hang Tuah himself was prepared to die, the Bendahara felt that since the Sultan had sentenced the warrior to death on the basis of a fabricated charge which had not been investigated, it was not proper for him to implement the order. This was why the Bendahara helped Hang Tuah to escape on the first occasion. The Bendahara’s role in the whole episode was not discovered and eventually when Hang Tuah returned, the matter was forgotten since the' warrior had brought back with him the one object which the Sultan desired most passionately - Tun Teja.85 On the second occasion, the Bendahara in fact pleaded with the Sultan to conduct a proper investigation into the fresh allegation concerning Hang Tuah’s misbehaviour with the ruler’s concubine. The Sultan refused and insisted that the Bendahara carry out the execution as ordered. He even threatened to kill the Bendahara himself if the royal command was not obeyed.86 The Bendahara made another plea, ‘It will be difficult for Your Highness to get someone like the Laksamana [Hang Tuah],’ he told the Sultan, ‘He has sinned, besides Majapahit is our enemy - perhaps later on Your Highness will regret this’.87 The Sultan refused to listen to the plea. Still, the Bendahara was not prepared to kill Hang Tuah without any investigation. If he did, he told himself, the people would say, ‘Look at Bendahara Paduka Raja - he executed Laksamana who had not sinned without investigating. It would be a great sin against God.’88 For that reason, the sentence was not carried out We already know that after a while Hang Tuah was brought back to fight and kill Hang Jebat Consequently, the earlier allegation against him was 85 See Hikayat Hang Tuah, pp. 170-207. 68 Ibid., p. 288. 87 Loacit

83 Ibid., p. 289.

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forgotten since he had once again rallied to the Sultan’s defence. With that the Bendahara’s unwillingness to obey the royal order was also forgotten for a second time. How should we evaluate the Bendahara’s actions? It is apparent that the Bendahara was devoted to what was and is a very important principle in the administration of justice. Indeed, his firm commitment to justice, it will be observed, was linked to a fear of God and an awareness of how he would be judged by his fellow men. While he would not allow anything not even the threat of execution - to deter him from his high principle, he was not prepared to challenge or defy the Sultan in a dramatic fashion. His was a quiet sort of disagreement and defiance. After his pleas were rejected on the second occasion, he organised, as stealthily as he could without the knowledge of the Sultan or anyone else, the escape of Hang Tuah. Yet his action was significant for any disagreement with the ruler’s wishes amounted to treason. Evidently the Bendahara was prepared to be condemned for treason for the sake of justice.

Hang Jebat Hang Jebat’s approach, however, was very different. Hang Jebat, Hang Tuah’s second-in-command and close friend, was chosen by the Sultan to replace Hang Tuah whom he had sentenced to death. Hang Jebat, we are told, was very pleased with the appointment because it also gave him the right to use Hang Tuah’s magic sword.89 He then began to perform duties for the King like reading the Hikayats to him, which he is supposed to have done beautifully since he was gifted with a lovely voice.90 The Sultan grew to like him and decided to confer the title of ‘Paduka Raja’ - a title normally reserved for the Bendahara - upon him. For the ceremony, the Sultan wanted to invite the Bendahara and the Temenggung but Hang Jebat advised against it, knowing fully well that the Bendahara would not agree to the conferment of the tide. As his influence with the ruler grew, Hang Jebat became more assertive. When someone suggested that Hang Tuah was needed to defend Malacca

89 Ibid., p. 290. 90 Ibid., p. 291.

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he retorted, ‘Why do you say so? The Laksamana Jebat will take the place of the Laksamana - if there are enemies opposed to His Highness’.91 His assertiveness also manifested itself in his flirtatious relationships with the Sultan’s concubines, who incidentally found him very attractive. It was this that annoyed the ruler. Unbeknownst to him, it had been going on for a while. Disgusted with these developments at his court, the Sultan was persuaded to leave the Palace. He described Hang Jebat’s relationship with his women as ‘derhaka’ and wanted him killed. But no one could carry out the order since Hang Jebat had Hang Tuah’s magic sword. With the Sultan’s withdrawal, Hang Jebat began to enjoy himself in the Palace. He bathed, dressed and ate in the royal fashion. It was at this point that he announced to all those who confronted him that he was defying the ruler and the court for their unjust treatment of Hang Tuah. He wanted to avenge the death of his dear friend. He asked those who loved Hang Tuah why they supported the officials who had fabricated lies about him.92 As we already know, Hang Tuah was then brought back to kill Hang Jebat. We have seen in an earlier chapter that Hang Jebat was happy to know that his friend was still alive and told Hang Tuah that it was because of the injustice done to him that he had acted against the ruler. It need not be repeated here that Hang Tuah, ever loyal to the Sultan, was still as determined to kill Hang Jebat Even at that stage, Hang Jebat told his friend that he would rather die than cause Hang Tuah to ‘lose face’.93 After he was mortally wounded, the Hikayat tells us that he ran amok and killed thousands of innocent people.94 In fact, even before his epic battle against Hang Tuah he is supposed to have killed all the women in the Palace.95 The Jebat-Tuah episode has been described in some detail here for a good reason. Some students of Malay society have presented him as ‘a rebel’. He rebels against the existing feudal order. He is the herald of a newer age. This age belongs to a completely different category. It is the age which, in relation to the last, represents a leap forward from an absolutist to

92

93 94 93

Ibid., p. 296. Ibid., pp. 301-303. Ibid., p. 319. Ibid., p. 324. Ibid., p. 316.

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democratic plane. But Jebat’s concept of democracy does not even belong to the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist scheme. It does not even belong to the democracy of the modern Western type. His democratic principle, it would seem, is meant to apply only within the body-politic to which he belongs. He is thus a rebel with a nationalist turn of mind. We may, therefore, term him a prophet and hero of Malay nationalism. ‘His tragedy, then, serves to demonstrate artistically and concretely the nationalist ideals and aspirations are unrealisable within the feudal social scheme.’96 To put it mildly, the entire piece is an unwarranted exaggeration of Hang Jebat’s role and character. True, he had certain rebellious characteristics but that is quite different from saying that he was ‘a rebel against the existing feudal order, the herald of a newer age’. Did Hang Jebat demonstrate that he had some conception of what the ‘feudal order’ meant? Did he at any point express dissatisfaction with the ‘existing feudal order’? In this connection, it must be remembered that defying a Sultan and some of his officials cannot be equated with rebellion against a whole order. On the contrary, Hang Jebat was very much a supporter of the ‘feudal order’ until his sudden outburst. He served Hang Tuah and the Sultan as loyally and faithfully as anyone else. He took part in various missions on behalf of the ruler and was even prepared to defend the throne with his own life. After Hang Tuah was sentenced to death, he accepted his new appointment with relish. He made sure that neither the Bendahara nor anyone else would prevent him from getting the ‘feudal’ title of‘Paduka Raji And he performed his new feudal duties much to the liking of the Sultan. A close look at Hang Jebat’s outburst will reveal how little of a rebel he really was. His relations with the Sultan were amicable until the ruler got annoyed over Hang Jebat’s amorous activities. It was then that he ordered Hang Jebat’s execution. It was not Hang Jebat who planned a conscious rebellion out of his unhappiness with the ‘existing feudal order*. Rather he was put in a position where he had to either accept death or defy the royal order - brought about, if one may repeat, by his own flirtations with the

96 Kassim Ahmad, Characterisation in Hikayat Hang Tuah (Dewan Bahasa and Pustaka, 1966), p. 33. Josselin de Jong also discusses the characterisation of Hang Tuah and Hang Jebat and relates it to contemporary political trends. He has a more balanced view. See his ‘The Rise and Decline of a National Hero*, JMBRAS (Vol. 38, part 2, 1965).

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royal concubines. He chose the latter and gave as his reason for defiance the injustice done to his friend, Hang Tuah. It was a specific grievance connected with a friend which concerned Hang Jebat. There was no consciousness of the larger injustices caused by the ‘existing feudal order’. It is even more fallacious to suggest that he was ‘a prophet and hero of Malay nationalism’. Where is the evidence to show that there was a conception of nationalism - or even the idea of a nation - in the Malaccan period? Is there any reference at all to nationalism in the Hikayat? What was Hang Jebat’s conception of nationalism? Besides, can we regard as a hero of whatever cause a man who had wantonly killed thousands of innocent people? No, Hang Jebat was neither a rebel against the existing feudal order, nor the herald of a newer age, nor the prophet and hero of Malay nationalism. He was a courageous man sufficiently devoted to his friend to be prepared to defy the Sultan. It is because he chose this line of action instead of submitting obsequiously to the ruler’s will that we have included him in the same category as Tun Hassan and the Bendahara Paduka Raja. Like Tun Hassan, a personal tie was more important to him than blind loyalty to the Sultan. Unlike Tun Hassan, however, Hang Jebat was able to transform his sense of outrage into action. Like the Bendahara, he was conscious of an underlying principle of justice linked to the fate of his friend. But unlike the Bendahara, the principle of justice - investigation before judgement - was not a major consideration: friendship was the more important factor.

Megat Seri Rama The case of the Megat Seri Rama, whom we have already met, has certain similarities to the Hang Jebat episode. Sultan Mahmud of Johor was sleeping when a man brought him a ripe jackfruit. The custodian of the palace kept the fruit for the Sultan. In the meantime, the pregnant wife of Megat Seri Rama, one of the Sultan’s warriors, came along and requested a bit of the fruit Since she was with child, the custodian granted her request. When the Sultan awoke, he explained this to him. The Sultan got into a rage and ordered the stomach of the woman ripped open and the unborn baby taken out The woman died. When the news reached Megat Seri Rama he swore vengeance. Since the Sultan was in any case unpopular because of his tyrannical attitude, the Bendahara and other influential officials did not

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object to Megat Seri Rama’s plan to murder the Sultan. In fact, Megat Seri Rama openly declared his intention to commit ‘derhaka’. Thus, on a Friday when the Sultan was being carried to the mosque for congregational prayers, Megat Seri Rama stabbed him to death.97 For Megat Seri Rama, as it was with Hang Jebat and Tun Hassan, it was an injustice against someone close to his heart which prompted him to act. Megat Seri Rama’s manner of retaliation was open, courageous and defiant - reminiscent of Hang Jebat’s style. However, it was not an impetuous response; some planning and thinking went into the assassination. Unlike Hang Jebat, he also had the support of other court officials. More significant, this is perhaps the only case in Malay history where a subject had murdered his ruler mainly on account of an injustice.98 Megat Seri Rama then embodies a value which was the antithesis of submissiveness and docility in the face of royal tyranny.

Some Final Observations Certain common elements are obvious in the various cases studied in this analysis: a) all the individuals concerned had some conception of injustice on the part of the ruler; b) all of them were prepared to act to rectify that injustice; c) in the course of their actions, all of them - with perhaps the exception of Tun Hassan - demonstrated some independence, individuality and assertiveness in character and outlook quite incongruent with the prevailing social environment; d) the majority of them chose to respond with a suddenness and a spontaneity that is startling if only because it was the convention to accept injustice in a docile, submissive manner. Only the Bendahara who attempted to present rational arguments to justify some investigation before passing judgment on Hang Tuah and Megat Seri Rama who thought out and planned his strategy for the assassination of Sultan 97 Tuhfat Al-Nafis, op. cit., p. 34. 98 The revolt against the ’Cannibal King’ in the Hikayat Merong Mahawangsa is not included in this study. Unlike other legends and fantasies which seem to have some indigenous base, the story is clearly Indian in both origin and detail. It is similar to the tale of the King of Benares in the Maha-Sutusama-Jataka. There is a good reason to believe that the whole episode was grafted on to the Mahawangsa. In any case, even in this story the king is not murdered - he just disappears. See C.O. Blagden, ‘The Cannibal King in the Kedah Annals’, JSBRAS (No. 79, September, 1918).

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Mahmud were the exceptional cases; e) with the exception of the Bendahara, all the others were moved to act not so much because of the principle involved but because the victim of injustice was either a friend or a relative - in other words, there was a personal, private element to their response; and f) finally, although all of them were prepared to act disloyally, not one of them was opposed to the concept of unquestioning loyalty as such. The Bendahara was faithful to the concept as was Hang Jebat or Megat Seri Rama. An isolated act of defiance in relation to a particular episode should not be misinterpreted as a conscious rejection of the idea of blind loyalty itself. Blind loyalty, needless to say, continued to reign supreme.

Loyalty, Royalty and Abdullah In fact, right through the Malaccan period there was no evidence of any open, direct, conscious criticism of the concept of blind loyalty. What we did have were criticisms of the character, attitudes and practices of the Sultan and the Malay ruling class as a whole. Since this criticism touched upon various aspects of Malay rule connected directly and indirectly with the practice of unquestioning loyalty, it is important that we evaluate it in a rational manner. The critic responsible for this was of course the well-known Munshi Abdullah. Abdullah would belong to the Malaccan period because he was bom in 1796 and produced his incisive comments on Malay royalty in the first half of the 19th century, that is, before the British had begun controlling the administration of various Malay sultanates. That he lived in Malacca which became a British territory during his lifetime does not alter the fact that he belongs to the pre-British period of Malaysian history." Abdullah, as we know, made many interesting observations about Malay society in general. As far as this study is concerned, however, our attention is focused upon what was undoubtedly his central preoccupation - the Malay royalty. Indeed, it is as the most powerful critic of Malay royalty to ever emerge in Malay society that Abdullah should be remembered in history. In this respect, at least, he is without peer even in our own day and age. Nearly 99 The details about his background are contained in Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir Munshi, Hikayat Abdullah I & II (Pustaka Antara, 1968) and in Kesah Pelayaran Abdullah, compiled by Kassim Ahmad (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1960).

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every aspect of royal life evoked some comment or other from Abdullah. Some of the habits and practices of the court, for instance, were severely criticised. The wives of the nobles, according to Abdullah, were lazy and boastful. They regarded work as degrading and would spend their time sleeping, dressing, doing their hair or ordering their slaves about.100 Apparently, the men were no better. Some were preoccupied with women. There were rulers and princes who took away the wives of their subjects.101 Sometimes, a ruler would force a young maiden into marriage without her consent or the agreement of her parents. Worse still, in the marriage ceremony itself, the ruler would be represented by his royal keris. Such a marriage, as Abdullah emphasised, had no validity in Islam.102 Yet other members of the royalty spent their time on cock-fighting competitions and drugs.103 On one occasion, Abdullah lectured a prince on the evils of drug-taking. ‘It is wrong,’ Abdullah told him, ‘from the point of view of religion; it destroys the body; depletes one’s money; it makes one lazy; it wastes one’s time; it spoils one’s good name and finally, it is hated by all good people.’104 Decadent habits were only part of the story; the customs and laws that existed also reflected an absence of positive values. Abdullah was appalled to learn, for instance, that in Terengganu people were not allowed to use an umbrella or wear shoes, or dress in yellow in the vicinity of the ruler’s residence.105 When he heard this, Abdullah thought to himself: ‘why aren’t the birds prohibited from flying over the Palace, or the mosquitoes prohibited from sucking royal blood or the lice from settling on the royal pillow or the elephants from trumpeting or people from strolling in front of the Palace?’106 Why should these insignificant matters be given so much attention while those activities which really harm the people - like drug-taking - are not forbidden? Similarly, Abdullah pointed out that the prevalence of disease, the lack of hygiene, of education and of productive

100 101 102 103 104 105 106

See Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir Munshi, Hikayat Abdullah I, ibid., p. 78. See Kesah Pelayaran, op. tit., p. 50; also Abdullah, Hikayat II, op. tit., p. 368. Ibid., p. 374. Kesah Pelayaran, op. tit., p. 57. Ibid., p. 102. Ibid., p. 46. Ibid., p. 47.

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labour among the population did not seem to engage the energies of the ruling class. ‘A noble and wise ruler, desirous of glory in the Hereafter, would not involve himself in degrading practices; on the contrary he Avill implement just laws so that the people will be safe from all oppression, misfortune and suffering.’107 And oppression and suffering, according to Abdullah, were brought about by the conduct of the rulers themselves. To establish this point, he looked at the underlying causes of poverty in Pahang. In the course of discussing various factors, it is significant that he dismissed negligence or indolence on the part of the people as a major explanation. There has never been a country in the world, Abdullah argued, where all its inhabitants were negligent in attitude. As long as the people can derive some benefit from their handiwork, as long as profits are assured, and some sense of satisfaction obtained, as long as at least one half of the population is prepared to slog constantly and sincerely for its livelihood it is certain that the country will become great and rich. If on the other hand - as it was in the case of Pahang - the people live in perpetual fear of persecution and greed of the rulers and the nobility, the country will become poor. For in Pahang whenever the people obtained a little extra money or food, the ruling class invariably seized their acquisitions. Given such a situation, the people concluded that there was no point at all in being industrious since they would not be able to enjoy the fruits of their toil. It was this factor, Abdullah pointed out, which accounted for the poverty of Pahang: the rapaciousness of the ruling class.108 The situation in Terengganu was no different. Again, the cruelty of the rulers had broken the spirit of the people. The people realised that if they remained poor there would be no problem. The moment they had wealth or a beautiful house or a big estate, the ruler would acquire their possessions. If they were not given to him, he would seize them by force; if there was resistance, the ruler would kill or impose a fine upon those who stood up to him.109 For carrying out his orders, for fulfilling his lusts and desires, the ruler

,r> Loc. cit. 105 Ibid., pp. 44-5. 109 Ibid., pp. 55-6.

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had a band of young men with him known as the Hamba Raja.110 These Hamba Raja had full freedom of movement and action. They not only pillaged and plundered on behalf of the ruler, but also committed various atrocities on their own initiative. So vast was their power and influence that if any of these Hamba Raja were killed, seven persons would have to die in retribution.111 Abdullah were convinced that the presence of these men was one of the factors that added to the general desolation in the Malay States. What was Abdullah’s solution to the problem? How did he hope to release the masses from the oppression and exploitation of a cruel, greedy, parasitic ruling class?112 Did he advocate for revolution? No, Abdullah chose the path of a reformer. He believed in the role of education. In fact, he advocated education - the need to acquire sound, proper knowledge - for the whole society. Knowledge, according to Abdullah, was the only thing created by God whose value could not be measured. It was not only priceless but also timeless. Nothing could destroy its essence. That was why he urged the young to seek knowledge, whatever the cost. It was the ladder for attaining wealth, honour and greatness.113 Needless to say, Abdullah was the first recorded Malay to place such a high premium on knowledge and education. But of all the groups it was the ruling class that needed knowledge the most. This was because of their important responsibilities towards the rest of society. As far as he was concerned, the greed and cruelty of the ruling class was a consequence of their lack of knowledge or education. ‘How can one become a craftsman without tools?’ asked Abdullah.114 Indeed for him the

110 Hamba Raja means ‘slave of a ruler*. It is useful to trace the development of this institution. After committing murder or some other crime for which he would normally be sentenced to death, a man may seek immunity by becoming the ruler’s slave. Once he becomes the ruler’s slave, his crimes are forgotten and has full freedom to act at the ruler’s behest. 111 Kesah Pelayaran, op. cit., p. 38. 112 A ‘cruel, greedy, parasitic ruling class’ is the impression one forms from Abdullah’s analysis. Indeed, Abdullah was even more forthright in his condemnation of the rulers. When asked to stay on in one of the Malay states and become a Kadhi (religious teacher) to the Sultan, he replied that to befriend a ruler is like befriending a poisonous snake. See Ibid., p. 106. 113 Abdullah, Hikayat I, op. cit., pp. 17-9. 1,4 Ibid., II, pp. 432-3.

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lack of education among the rulers and princes was the root cause of all the weaknesses of the Malay government and all the sufferings of the people.115 On one occasion he even advised a prince to seek knowledge and to obtain the advice and guidance of the wise. Abdullah recommended the Taj’ussalatin (a Genealogy of Kings) to the prince so that he would know who the just and oppressive rulers of the past were. He warned that God does not make one king so that he can satisfy his passions - by marrying ten or twenty women, accumulating wealth and killing in a dastardly manner. On the contrary, God wants a king to look after the people and to ensure that man does not oppress man.116 It should be obvious by now that for Abdullah, the purpose of education was to enable the royalty to exercise self-control and discipline and to attain an awareness of justice and the obligations of a good monarch. Education then was concerned primarily with character development, the inculcation of certain qualities and attitudes of mind. Like any good teacher, Abdullah also knew that this emphasis on character development as part of one’s general education should begin at a tender age. His observations of the attitude of the Malay rulers towards their young princes convinced him of this. It was the rulers who inducted their sons in various vices. Little girls were provided as playmates even when a prince was very young. When he grew a little bigger, a mistress and a keris would be presented to him for his enjoyment. The ruler competed with his son in gambling and cock-fighting. If the father took drugs, so would the son.117 Knowledge and education, Abdullah was convinced, would prevent this initiation into decadence. More than that, Abdullah hoped that through education, the Malay ruling class would be able to emulate some of the accomplishments associated with the British. For him, the British represented the apex of human achievement Their willingness to discard retrogressive customs and practices,118 their success in medical science,119 navigation, architecture and other facets of their civilisation impressed him tremendously.120 The concept

115 Kesah pelayaran, op. dL, p. 57. 115 Ibid., pp. 105-6. 1,7 Abdullah, Hikayat II, op. tit., p. 433. 118 Ibid., pp. 436-8. -1’Ibid., pp. 311-6. Ibid., p. 438.

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of equality embodied in their laws,121 the idea of justice manifested in their administration and the protection afforded to life and property under British rule won his accolades.122 He was equally complimentary about the ‘values’ created by the colonial government in Malacca and Singapore. Hard work and industry were appreciated, and people were allowed to accumulate wealth. Every man was rewarded according to his effort.123 Over and over again he compared the circumstances in the Malay states to the situation in the British colonial territories of Malacca and Singapore. In every respect, the former fared miserably in comparison to the latter. The former was backward, the latter was progressive; the former was caught in a mire of chaos and disorder, the latter was peaceful and harmonious; the ruling classes in the Malay states were tyrannical, oppressive and decadent while the British administrative elites in the colonial territories were just, fair and virtuous.124 In this regard, Abdullah showered lavish praises upon various British colonial administrators - the biggest bouquet of all going, of course, to Thomas Stamford Raffles.125 He left no doubt at all that he was proud to be associated with British administration and even prouder to be a citizen of a British territory. The social environment created by British colonial rule in Malacca and Singapore was certainly one of the factors that moulded Abdullah’s thinking. It made him critical of his own people, rulers and society. But it would be wrong to suggest that this was the only, or even the major, influence in his intellectual development. Islam played a crucial and significant role in his thinking. The evidence is innumerable. The Qur’an was the very foundation of his education. With respected religious teachers in both his parents’ families and with a father who was acutely conscious of Islamic values, Abdullah was able to imbibe some of the core ideas in the religion at a very early age.126 Most of all, of course, his writings manifest Islamic consciousness. This is obvious, whether in his condemnation of retrogressive

121 Ibid., I, p. 99. 122 Kesah Pelayaran, op. cit., pp. 123-4. 123 Ibid., pp. 124-5. 124 See Ibid., pp. 122-6 and pp. 103-5; Also Abdullah, Hikayat II, op. cit., pp. 431-9. 125 Ibid., I and II. Apart from Raffles, whom he served as a research assistant, Abdullah also complimented Lord Minto and Colonel Farquhar. 126 Ibid., I, pp. 10-43.

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customs and royal decadence or his counsel to a ruler on the obligations of his office. Invariably, he compared the actual situation to the Islamic ideal. Having examined Abdullah’s views on the royalty and the factors that may have influenced his thinking, it is now necessary to evaluate his analysis. It is amazing that despite all his criticism of the rulers, he did not question the concept of blind loyalty itself. And yet much of what he condemned in the character and conduct of the Sultans could be linked to the prevalence of this relationship between ruler and ruled. The indulgence in decadent practices, the acts of oppression, the neglect of the right values, the absence of concern and care for the subjects could be attributed, to some extent, to a situation where the unflinching loyalty of the people to their rulers was assured. Abdullah’s inability to understand or address the implication of the concept of unquestioning loyalty is, in fact, part of a larger inability to appreciate the role of the prevailing value system and social structure in perpetuating decadence and oppression.127 Decadence and oppression do not occur in a vacuum. The political relationship between ruler and ruled, the economic relationship between the ruling class and the subject-class and indeed the whole Malay ethos would have to be scrutinised in order to explain such social phenomena. This he failed to do. Quite apart from this, Abdullah did not place oppression within its proper perspective. While it is granted that there was a great deal of oppression perpetrated by the ruling class during his times, it cannot be denied that oppressiveness was not the dominant element in the mentality of the Malay royalty right through the Malaccan period. We know, for instance, that some rulers were conscious of the need for justice and some were aware of their obligations to their subjects. To be fair to Abdullah, he did acknowledge that there were wise and great monarchs in the past;128 but then he failed to give sufficient emphasis to this aspect of Malay history. Consequently, his study of the ruling class has created the impression that Malay monarchs as a whole were completely oppressive in outlook By the same token, he had a rather naive notion of British colonial government Of course, one cannot quarrel with Abdullah for his admiration 527 Kassim Ahmad makes more or less the same point in his ‘Introduction’ to the Kesah Pelayaran, op. tit., see especially pp. 9-10. I2S See Abdullah, Hikayat II, op. tit., p. 370.

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of certain virtues associated with British administrators like their industry and intellectual curiosity. But the more important question is: was he right in believing that the colonial government was of great benefit to Malay society? One can agree that the British brought about some law and order and provided a degree of security to the inhabitants in Malacca and Singapore. But it is also true that in both the territories, colonial economic and social policies were largely responsible for perpetuating Malay backwardness.129 Perhaps we can concede that Abdullah, writing in the first half of the 19th century, was in no position to understand the implications of British colonialism. Still, one cannot be accused of judging him with the knowledge of hindsight if we suggest that as an intelligent observer of society, he should have noticed that British-initiated projects in education, health and transportation only benefitted certain sections of the urban, non-Malay population. It was his inability to see this that makes his complimentary attitude towards colonial rule somewhat incongruous from a contemporary analysis. When all is said and done, however, Abdullah’s outstanding achievement remains his candid, forthright evaluation of the Malay ruling class. It is always difficult to assess the impact of an idea upon the political mores of later generations. Be that as it may, it is not inconceivable that Abdullah’s criticism of the monarchs helped persuade young Malay nationalists of the thirties and generations of Malays since then - who for a long while regarded Abdullah as the father of Malay literature - that unquestioning loyalty to the ruler had no right to exist in the new order of things.130

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129 This is analysed in the context of the Malay Peninsula as a whole in Syed Hussein Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native (Frank Cass, London, 1977). 130 For some of the controversy over Abdullah’s position as the father of Malay literature, see Tan Chin Kwang, Latar Belakang Intelektual Penulis-Penulis Cerpen Melayu Selepas PerangDunia Kedua, 1946-1970, MA. thesis (Department of Malay Studies, University of Singapore, 1971).

Loyalty: From Colonialism to Merdeka

So far, we have evaluated unquestioning loyalty in the Malaccan period. What we have to find out now is whether it exists as an idea, a practice, in present-day Malay society. But before that, one has to examine the concept within the context of British colonialism which separated the early Malay kingdoms from the contemporary period. Did British rule, for instance, bring an end to this relationship between ruler and ruled?

Colonialism and Loyalty As we know, when the British introduced the ‘Residential System’ (first in Perak through the Pangkor Treaty of 1874 and then, in the other Malay states of Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang in that order), they did not terminate the sultanates as such.131 The Sultans remained; so did the relationship between the Sultans and their subjects. Government was in the name of the Sultans. The British were there merely to offer advice and assistance in administration! Of course, as most historians have argued, the British residential system was nothing more than a convenient cover for British colonialism.132 They (the British) were in fact the rulers; the Sultans were mere puppets. In the states where the British imposed the advisory system, that is, providing officials known as advisers to the Sultans - as it was the case in Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu and Johor - the rulers on the whole enjoyed a little more power.133 But even in these places, control was very much in the hands of the British. However, what is of real significance to this study is the perpetuation

131 The whole process is discussed in C.D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins ofBritish Political Control (London, 1961). 132 This argument has been well made in R. Emerson, Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule (University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1964). 133 The struggle of a sultanate to maintain its administrative autonomy is recorded in R. Bonney, Kedah 1771-1821 (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971). 47

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of the relationship between the Malay monarchs and their subjects. Maintaining this nexus was part of the British design. Through this nexus between Sultan and rakyat, sanctified and solidified by time and tradition, the British hoped to achieve their own objectives. The legitimacy provided by this relationship made it easier for the British to formulate and implement various policies - policies which were proclaimed in the name of the monarch and supposed to be for the benefit of the people but which in reality only served to enhance the interests of the colonial power and in the process destroyed the well-being of the ordinary masses. Since this is not a treatise on British colonialism in Malaysia, we cannot go into details. Suffice to note that British policies, from land alienation and mineral development to transportation and education, bear ample witness to my assertion. It was the British who benefited most from the relationship between ruler and ruled. In other words, the unquestioning loyalty of the Malay subjects to their Sultans had worked to the advantage of the British. British administrators themselves were very much aware of the pervasiveness of such an attitude within the Malay community. Writing about the situation in 1874, Frank Swettenham, for instance, observed: "There was a broad line between the ruling classes and the people. The Rajas and Chiefs ruled, the people obeyed. The people had no initiative whatever: They were there to do the will of the Raja or Chief under whose authority they lived, with a general understanding that the commands of the Ruler must be followed by all’.134 Sw’ettenham repeated this view of the Malays in another of his works where he said: ‘Above all things, he is conservative to a degree, is proud and fond of his country and his people, venerates his ancient customs and traditions, fears his Rajas, and has a proper respect for constituted authority - while he looks askance on all innovations, and will resist their sudden introduction. The bit about conservatism and resistance to change has very little basis to it; however, what is important is Swettenham’s perception of how Malays related to their rulers and to authority as a whole. Hugh Clifford, an equally well-known colonial administrator, had also made some mention of the ‘loyalty’ trait He saw it in the Pahang Malays, whom he described as ‘extraordinarily loyal to his Rajas and Chiefs who have not always acted in

134 See Frank Swettenham, Footprints in Malaya (Hutchinson & Company, 1941), p. 48. :35 See Frank Swettenham, The Real Malay (London, 1899), p. 17.

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a way to inspire devotion’136 The unquestioning loyalty of Malay subjects to their rulers helped condition the attitude of the British to the Sultans. The Sultans had to be made their firm allies. The most effective way of getting the Sultans on their side was by providing them with all sorts of material benefits. Again, British administrators were acutely conscious of the need for such an approach and of the advantages it could bring them. Swettenham opined that ‘the Chiefs have been propitiated and proper allowances have been allotted to them while they shared, in a greater or lesser degree in everything that has been done. The rulers and their Chiefs do not feel that they have been set aside or ignored; indeed, as a matter of fact there are, at the moment, a good many more Malays holding high offices of State than there were in 1874. It is not only an honour and distinction to be nominated to such an office, but besides a title, it gives the holder a sense of power, of having a part in the government of the country and that is a Malay’s highest ambition. Moreover, every such office is remunerated in accordance with ancient custom and, in the selection of those who shall hold these posts, the rulers and his Malay advisers have practically a free hand. It is difficult to overestimate the value of thus securing the influence and goodwill of the Malay ruling class. The men chosen for these offices are not always the most respectable members of the community but they always have claims of influence’.137 Swettenham had just stopped short of revealing the underlying motives behind the diabolical colonial endeavour to look after the Malay ruling dass. Better allowances, lovely Palaces, important titles and high positions all had the same purpose: to secure the loyalty of the Malay rulers so that the unquestioning loyalty of their subjects would be at the disposal of British colonialism. What is perhaps really sad is that the rulers allowed themselves to be used this way. It was within the voluntary will of individual monarchs to resist and reject British overtures.138 Open, organised opposition geared

136

See Hugh Clifford, In Court and Kampong: Being Tales and Sketches ofNative Life in the Malay Peninsula (London, 1897), p. 18. 137 See Frank Swettenham, The Real Malay, op. cit., p. 49. 138 Even in a harsh, totalitarian setting - let alone the residential system - it is possible to reject the material bribes of controlling elites. This point is made by Alexander Solzhenitsyn in relation to the Soviet Union in ‘As breathing and conscious return’,

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towards mobilising forces against colonial authority would have been impossible. But surely rejection of the material bribes of the British would have been consonant with the dignity of the throne. Instead, the Sultans used their relationship with the British to demand bigger allowances and more power for themselves.139 It is this more than anything else that enabled the colonial power to exploit unquestioning loyalty for their own ends right up to 1941. After the Second World War and their return in 1945, the British made a significant shift in policy which is directly relevant to our study. This was the formation of the Malayan Union. The Malayan Union episode has been thoroughly studied by a number of scholars from various perspectives.140 Our purpose here is mainly to probe the connection between the Malayan Union and the question of blind loyalty.

The Formation of the Malayan Union: Loyalty in Perspective There is a need to look at the Malayan Union and the factors that brought about its formation. In a nutshell, the Malayan Union was a scheme through which the British hoped to replace the old system of government with residents in the Federated Malay States, advisers in the Unfederated Malay States and direct rule in the colonies of Penang and Malacca with a new single, unified, centralised structure. The Malay rulers were to be stripped of even the symbolic and ceremonial political powers they had hitherto enjoyed and reduced to the status of priest-kings with some control over religious affairs. The recently-domiciled non-Malay communities were to be granted citizenship on very liberal terms This would have had the effect of changing the demographics of the country drastically.141 Front Under The Rubble (Fontana Books, 1976), p. 24-5. 139 This was endent from the speeches made by rulers and other aristocrats in the State and Federal Councils. See for instance, Raja Chilian's remarks in the ‘Proceedings of the Federal Council of the Federated Malay Statesfor the Year 1932’, Federated Malay States (Government Printing Office, 1933). !’3 One of the most comprehensive studies is still James Allen, The Malayan Union (Yale University, 1967). U! The British were aware that their citizenship proposals could lead to a Chinese majority. See B. Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism 1945-1963 (Oxford University

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Many reasons have been advanced for the new policy. It has been said that the desire to create a militarily more defensible state given the British debacle in the face of the Japanese invasion of 1941, the disillusionment with the Malays since many of their leaders had sided with the Japanese during the war, the desire to reward the Chinese (some of whom had fought the Japanese) and the desire to prepare the country for eventual self-government, were among the major reasons for the formation of the Malayan Union.142 While all this may have influenced British policy-makers, it is doubtful if any of the factors cited could have been the major motivation. This is because none of the reasons given takes into consideration the whole thrust and direction of colonial economic policy. The Malayan Union cannot be understood merely in terms of its immediate historical background. What is forgotten is that even in the twenties and thirties there were considerable pressures from both British and local business circles to centralise the administration of the Malay States.143 A centralised administration would have resulted in the sort of efficiency that would produce greater returns on investments. The Malay rulers opposed these attempts because they realised that under a centralised system they would have to surrender whatever little powers they had. As we have already observed, British colonial officials were keen on accommodating the interests of the rulers. But then the whole logic of colonialism demanded that the obstacles in the path of profits should also be minimised. This is why the colonial government vacillated between a policy of centralisation and decentralisation right through the twenties and thirties.144 To put it differently, on the one hand it was a question of maintaining the loyalty of the rulers so that colonial administration could proceed unhindered; on the other hand, it was a question of expanding the scope of operation for the business elites so that the wealth of the colonial power would grow. After the war, the situation changed dramatically for two reasons. Firstly, the war had ravaged the British economy. The reconstruction of the economy - to replicate its spectacular growth in earlier decades - required solid assistance from the colonies. The wealth generated by rubber and tin

Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1969), p. 41. 142 See James Allen, op. cit., for a detailed exposition. 143 The centralisation issue is discussed in KJ. Ratnam, Contmunalism & The Political Process (University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1965). 144 Ibid., pp. 37-42.

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from our country had all along contributed immensely to the development of the British economy.145 Now with India - a major contributor to British coffers in the past - well on the way to independence, it was quite obvious that the Malayan economy would have to perform an even greater role in the reconstruction of Britain! As Noordin Sopiee rightly points out: ‘It has seldom been recognised that the need to rehabilitate quickly the Malayan rubber and tin industries was a major motivation for constructing a tight, highly centralised and efficient unitary state in Malaya’.146 The second reason is a related one. Powerful nationalist movements in the Indian subcontinent, Burma and, to a lesser extent, Sri Lanka, which gave rise to independent nation-states within three years of the end of the war must have convinced the British that the days of the colonial empires were over. What was important now was to prepare other colonies and protected territories for self-rule in such a way that British economic interests would not be jeopardised. Preparing a country for self-rule with one’s own interests in mind is not quite the same thing as paving the way for independence out of genuine commitment to decolonisation. That is why it is difficult to accept the view that ‘the desire to create a Malayan consciousness and nationalism, a desire related to the British commitment to the ideal of decolonisation was probably a major motive for the union policy’147 That the British were concerned primarily with the security of their assets and investments in independent Malaya - and not the creation of Malayan consciousness148 - is a fact that can be established quite easily 145 For some discussion on this, see Mohammed Amin and Malcolm Caldwell, ed., Malaya: Ute Making ofa Neo-Colony (Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Spokesman Books, 1977), pp. 242-3. 14$ See Mohd. Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation (University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1974), p. 17. 147 Loc. cit. 148 Though it is granted that the individuals responsible for the Malayan Union had very little knowledge of the Malaysian situation, it is nonetheless difficult to believe that the British could have conceived of a Malayan consciousness which ignored altogether the historical and cultural basis of the country. It is all the more amazing when it is recalled that they were acutely sensitive to the ’Malay position’ prior to the Malayan Union. For some idea of this sensitivity, see for instance the remarks of Sir Laurence Gulliemard, the British High Commissioner, in the Proceedings of the Federal Council of the Federated Malay Statesfor the Year 1920 with Appendix (Government Printing

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through a re-examination of the other important aspect of the Malayan Union scheme. The offer of extremely liberal terms of citizenship to what was then a recently domiciled immigrant population had one clear objective: to ensure continuity and stability in the rubber and tin industries and in the commercial and distributive sectors. Needless to say, both rubber and tin where non-Malay labour and management were crucial, and commerce and distribution where the network created by non-Malay traders was indispensable, were vital dimensions of British economic interests in Malaya. Without the protection provided by citizenship, there would have been a high degree of apprehension and insecurity which in certain circumstances - like the growth of a powerful Malay nationalist movement149 - could even lead to actual disruption of economic activities. The British would not have wanted their capital to be subjected to vicissitudes. Seen from this angle, British policy from the era of residents and protected sultanates to the Malayan Union episode with its liberal citizenship appears to be a consistent development with an inner logic of its own. As long as they were in control of the Malay States, it was necessary for the British to endear themselves to the monarchs, adjust to their whims and fancies and ensure that they remained on the side of colonial rule. As we have suggested before, this relationship endowed British rule with an aura of legitimacy in the eyes of the Malay rakyat - since the Malays were, on the whole, unquestioningly loyal to their rulers. That was why unquestioning loyalty was so important to the British as long as they were in charge of the Malay States. But once they knew that the colonial government was no longer possible and that political independence was in the offing, they tried to work out a new arrangement. The Malayan Union (which like the old arrangement, the protected sultanates) was also calculated to preserve and perpetuate their interests. The rulers were no longer important to them; blind loyalty could

Office, Kuala Lumpur, 1921), p. 65. 149 The British were afraid of a radical, left-orientated nationalist movement as obvious from their actions. It was one of the reasons for their banning of the Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM). However, considering the structure of Malay society at that time, it is doubtful if the left could have developed any real support. For some analysis of the PKMM, see Ahmad Boestamam, Merintis Jalan ke Punchak (Pustaka Kejora, Kuala Lumpur, 1972).

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be consigned to the rubbish-heap of history as an outmoded feudal trait. The paramount consideration now was how best to preserve British economic interests in the emerging order of things. This is what I meant when I said at the outset of this discussion that the Malayan Union can only be understood against the whole background of colonial economic policy.

Opposition to the Malayan Union and Loyalty But what the British had forgotten was that the prevailing Malay social structure which they helped perpetuate had generated certain attitudes that militated against the Malayan Union. Unquestioning loyalty to the ruler and the ruler’s own perception of his role as the protector of the Malays were the most significant of these. Any attempt to reduce the Malay Sultans to nonentities was bound to be resisted. After all, loyalty to the ruler, as we have seen in the first chapter, was a deeply ingrained attitude rooted in the very genesis of Malay history. This was one of the main reasons why the Malays could be mobilised so effectively to oppose the Malayan Union. The meetings, congresses, and demonstrations have been described in great detail elsewhere.150 One of the resolutions adopted at the first congress of UMNO - the body formed to oppose the Malayan Union - confirms this point It said that the Malayan Union, ‘exterminated the powers of the Sultans, and therefore, destroyed altogether the Malay States in the Malay Peninsula’.151 Because Malay opposition was so strong and determined, the British had no choice but to concede. Sovereignty was restored to the Sultans. They were back at the political apex of Malay society. And what is more important to us, the old relationship of loyalty between ruler and ruled could continue. Apart from providing a new lease of life, as it were, to the concept and practice of unquestioning loyalty, the Malayan Union episode is significant for another reason which has a great deal to do with this study. It enabled a group of administrators and aristocrats - the “administocrats”, as I shall call them - to establish their leadership of the Malay nationalist 150 See for instance Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics (University of London Press, 1970). 151 See Yunus Hamidi, Sejarah Pergerakan Politik Melayu Semenanjong (Pustaka Antara, Kuala Lumpur, 1961), p. 83.

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movement. Before the Second World War, there were various groups of Malay nationalists like the Islamic reformers, the indigenous intelligentsia and the traditional elites (administocrats).152 By and large, they operated independently of one another. Of these groups, the administocrats were least concerned with the larger issues of poverty, economic disparity, lack of educational opportunities for the masses and so on which confronted Malay society. Many of them came from the upper echelons of society and had actual links with the Sultan and the royal courts, although some administrators had humble beginnings. A significant segment of this group received their education at the Malay College in Kuala Kangsar, which was established originally for Malays from the upper echelons of society. Some of these administocrats served in the various State Councils and the Federal Council set up by the British. There they spoke on issues which were more intimately associated with the interests of the elite stratum of society rather than the Malay masses in the rural areas. More opportunities in the civil services, better promotions and more scope for the higher education of their children were among their principal concerns. No one is denying, however, that matters of some importance to the ordinary people were also raised by these administrators.153 In the thirties they formed a number of Malay associations in various states with the blessings of the Sultans and the active encouragement of the British. Expectedly, these associations were orientated towards the interests of the elite stratum - and the British. In fact, the administocrats as a whole - notwithstanding an occasional criticism of some insignificant aspect of British policy by some critic - were unabashed supporters of British colonial rule.154 These then were the men who came to lead the struggle against the Malayan Union in 1946. They constituted the leadership core of UMNO when it was founded in that year. Indeed, they had emerged as the undisputed leaders of Malay society as a whole. Perhaps the feudal structure

152

This is extensively analysed in W.R. Roff, Origins ofMalay Nationalism (University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1964). 153 See for instance the speech of Raja Kamarulzaman of Perak, who was concerned about the consequences of the unchecked exploitation of the nation’s tin resources, Proceedings of the Federal Council Federated Malay States, 1937, p. B. 78-9. 154 For an example of this support, see the Sultan of Perak’s speech in Shorthand report of the Proceedings of the Federal Council Federated Malay States, 1912, p. B. 58.

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of society had a great deal to do with their acceptability as leaders in 1946 and afterwards. In a society where the court was still highly revered, in a society where monarchs and aristocrats were seen as people who had an inherent right to rule, in a society where power and authority were regarded as the natural attributes of the traditional elites, only those who belonged to that stratum could hope to be accepted as the leaders of society. To put it differently, it is doubtful if any other group could have succeeded in mobilising Malay society in 1946. Both feudal history and British colonialism had conspired to bestow the privilege of power and position upon this group. There was only one occasion in history - the period of the Japanese occupation - when their ‘natural’ right to rule was challenged. This was because the Japanese had set aside the administocrats whom they rightly regarded as allies of the British and instead decided to cultivate the republican-oriented indigenous intelligentsia. But it was such a brief period that it failed to make any real impact upon the subsequent flow of history.155 The administocrats’ acceptance as ‘natural’ leaders and their ability to mobilise society is extremely relevant to the theme of this study. In the past it was just the monarchs - holders of inherited office - who were the objects of unquestioning loyalty. While they continued to remain beneficiaries of this attitude, another group had now emerged, closely aligned to the traditional monarchical system, which was also in a position to reap the advantages of this feudal relationship between ruler and ruled. The Malayan Union episode proved that a group associated with the court and linked to royalty could also make a legitimate claim to the allegiance of the Malays. In a nutshell, the administocrats too - although not monarchs - could expect to emerge as the objects of unquestioning loyalty. Since the administocrats were the original UMNO elites, the question that has to be asked now is whether the UMNO leadership of the post­ Malayan Union period has also benefited from the phenomenon of blind loyalty. To what extent has the UMNO leadership sought to preserve and perpetuate this attitude among the Malays? To what extent has the Malay community itself adhered to this concept in the midst of all the challenges that have taken place? These then are the central issues that the rest of this 155 The effect of Japanese policy was most vividly expressed in the attitude of the Malay socialists after the war. But it did not extend to Malay society as a whole. For a fuller discussion, see chapter five.

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study is concerned with. But before we probe these questions, we will have to show how opposition to the Malayan Union is pertinent to our inquiry in yet another way. So far, we have tried to establish that the perpetuation of the monarchical system and the emergence of the administocrats as the political leaders of the Malays - both consequences of the opposition to the Malayan Union - had helped sustain the concept and practice of unquestioning loyalty. A third factor in the Malayan Union episode had the same effect. The Malayan Union brought into sharp focus the whole question of the non­ Malay presence through the conferment of citizenship on the vast majority of this recently domiciled population.156 The Malays feared that this would affect their own position in the country and render them an insignificant community: a fear heightened by their economic weakness. The underlying sentiment was that the Malay community was the indigenous community. It therefore had an unassailable claim to the land. Its status had to be safeguarded. This concept of the Malay community as the indigenous community, the historical community, was reflected in the entire agitation against the Malayan Union. As evidence, one of the resolutions adopted at the UMNO congress in March 1946 argued that common citizenship with equal rights that does not consider ethnicity or religion will destroy ‘existing independent, Islamic Malay States, and the Malay race and take away from the Malays their inherent rights’.157

Indeed, apart from the status of the rulers, it was this question of citizenship that aroused so much passion and anger within the Malay community. Without any doubt, this issue provided the emotional spark for the strength and solidarity of the whole movement against the Malayan Union. And as with rulers, the British had to submit to the demand of the Malays. Common citizenship was scrapped. Even before 1946 - from the 1920s onwards - there was already a great 156 According to KJ. Ratnam, the proposals would have qualified 83 per cent of the Chinese and 75 per cent of the Indians for citizenship. See his Communalism, op. cit., p.75. 157 See Y. Hamidi, op. cit., p. 83-4.

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deal of concern about the ubiquitous role of the non-Malay immigrant communities in the economy. Pockets of non-Malay affluence in the commercial sector were invariably contrasted with the poverty of the Malay mass in the rural areas.158 But neither non-Malay economic activities nor the non-Malay presence created a feeling of crisis, a sense of being threatened, until the Malayan Union was announced. In a sense this was understandable. For as long as the non-Malays were regarded as immigrants (and British policy regarded them as such)159 there was no fear of the peninsula losing its Malay identity. However, the moment the non-Malays were granted citizenship on such a liberal scale, fear and apprehension set in. This fear, this apprehension, is the key to our discussion. As I have already observed, it was the fear of a community that was not only indigenous but also poor. The fear of being overwhelmed by others in their own land created the sort of anxiety, the sort of insecurity that had no parallel in Malay society. This is why the Malay leadership demanded a return to the old protectorate system with citizenship confined to the Malays. In feet, according to one source, the slogan was ‘protection, not annexation’160 since they saw the Malayan Union scheme as an attempt to annex the Malay States. The desire to seek protection for what were perceived as Malay interests is indicative of the psychology that prevailed at that time. Because it was protection that was being sought in a situation of tremendous insecurity, the need for protectors became very real. In traditional Malay society, the Sultans were seen as the ultimate protectors, with various representatives at lower levels fulfilling the same role. During the colonial period, the Sultans continued to be seen as the protectors of the Malays with the difference being that British ‘advisers’ were also perceived as assisting in the protection of the community. When the Malayan Union happened, however, the British were seen as a people who had betrayed their role as protectors. The 15s A number of Malay novels and short stories of the thirties discussed Malay poverty along these lines. For some analysis see my Some Dominant Concepts, op. cit., especially chapter six. 159 This was British thinking right up to the outbreak of the Second World War. It was stated again in 1936 by High Commissioner, Shenton Thomas. See W.R. Roff, op. a't„ pp. 109-110. !s- In fact, even a British official conceded that the Malays wanted a protectorate - not a colony. See B. Simandjuntak, op. cit., p. 44.

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feeling of hurt arising from betrayal emerges dearly from all the resolutions adopted at the UMNO Congress.161 But more significantly in early 1946, when educated Malays first began to react to the Malayan Union, there was a feeling that even the Sultans had let them down since they had initially agreed to the proposal. This will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. For the time being, all that we have to note is that for a while the Sultans were also perceived as men who had failed to protect the position of the Malays.162 It was in that vacuum that the administocrats emerged as the protectors of the community. Now protection, as we know, had a special meaning in a feudal milieu. The perception of the Sultan as a protector was a feudal one because in return for protection, the subject remained unquestioning loyal. In the first chapter, we showed how this worked in pre-colonial Malay society. In the early part of this chapter, we showed how colonialism utilised the sentiments associated with the protector-protected relationship. It is my contention that when the administocrats acted as protectors in the Malayan Union episode they were doing so as protectors in the feudal tradition. They perceived themselves as protectors in that tradition and were perceived by the community as protectors in the same tradition. No other perception was possible given Malay history and the social background of the community. Thus, the administocrat protector had succeeded in harnessing a very ancient sentiment. While the relationship of protector-protected was sanctioned by tradition, the purpose of protection was somewhat never sanctioned as such. As we have seen, it was to protect the indigenous community from the immigrant threat. It was to protect Malay identity in the face of the massive accommodation of non-Malays. It was to protect an economically weak indigenous community from being overwhelmed by what was perceived as an economically strong immigrant community. There can be no doubt now that non-Malay citizenship in the Malayan Union had served as a major stimulus for the idea of protection and the

161 See Y. Hamidi, op. cit., for a description of the resolutions. 162 Apparently, many of the rulers were coerced to agree to the Malayan Union proposals. The British used the past association of some of the rulers with the Japanese as a weapon to threaten them with dethronement. Also, some of them did not have time to consult their menteri besar and advisory councils. See UMNO 20 Tahun (UMNO Headquarters, 1966).

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unquestioning loyalty of the protected that accompanied it. Therein lies the significance of the Malayan Union. In a sense, it is a great watershed moment in the evolution of the concept of unquestioning loyalty. Any attempt to study unquestioning loyalty from the perspective of traditional society must culminate in the Malayan Union. Any attempt to analyse the concept in relation to the contemporary period must begin with the Malayan Union. On the one hand, opposition to the Malayan Union, as we have observed, gave a fresh lease of life to unquestioning loyalty. On the other hand, as I shall show shortly, the Malayan Union has been the foundation for the emergence of new notions of unquestioning loyalty. It can be said, without fear of contradiction, that of all the historical events relevant to the study of unquestioning loyalty, the Malayan Union episode is the most significant.

1946-1957: Loyalty in the Transitional Phase The Malayan Union’s significance was not diminished in any way by the events that transpired between 1946 and 1957. This phase must be regarded as a transitional phase which wrought some changes to the nature and character of the concept of unquestioning loyalty. To start with, the monarchs and administocrats had to define their roles in relation to one another. As students of Malaysian politics know, the Sultans were compelled to agree to the Malayan Union under threat of dethronement.163 It was only after the British had obtained their consent in this manner that educated Malay’s began to realise the folly of their rulers’ actions. So, for a short while there was a bit of unease in the relationship between the monarchs and these educated Malays (the administocrats) who later constituted the leadership of UMNO. In fact, Datuk Onn Jaafar, the leader of the Anti-Malayan Union Movement and the first president of UMNO, even warned the rulers that they would be denounced by the Malays if they attended the ceremony to inaugurate the Malayan Union.164 Since they did not attend the occasion, a

£6J It was partly because of the ‘threat’ that Malay leaders forgave their rulers quickly. Besides, once opposition to the Malayan Union began, ruler after ruler came out in the open with stories of how they had been compelled to sign the proposals. See I. Allen, op. tit. 164 J. Allen reports that there was even a move to force the abdication of Sultan Ibrahim

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conflict between the two groups did not materialise. However, it was obvious during the Malayan Union crisis that it was the administocrats, the UMNO leadership, who mobilised the Malays and galvanised them into a powerful movement, who had become the real or substantive protectors of the community. The Sultans who by then had joined the protest were now mere symbolic protectors. Of course, the Sultans had been symbolic leaders in a sense even during the colonial era. But the difference was that now they were symbolic leaders in relation to another group within the Malay community itself, that was beginning to be perceived as the more substantive leadership. This had never happened before. All the events that followed in the wake of the Malayan Union episode - negotiations for the Federation of Malaya Agreement, the emergence of various political parties, electoral competition, preparations for independence and so on - only helped to reinforce the role of the UMNO leadership as the substantive protector. Needless to say, the symbolic protectors had some difficulty adjusting to the new situation. This was why they did not take too kindly to Dato’ Onn’s suggestion that the Sultanates should be reformed in the direction of constitutional monarchies.165 They interpreted it as an attempt to curb their powers. Similarly, they saw Dato’ Onn’s idea of a Malay deputy high commissioner to assist the British High Commissioner in paving the way for independence (merdeka) as an attempt to belittle their status.166 Although the British eventually turned down the proposal, the unhappiness with Dato’ Onn’s politics remained.167

of Johor, which however fizzled out Ibid., p. 35. 165 Anwar Abdullah provides some indication of the opposition by some of the Sultans against Dato* Onn. See his Data’ Onn Riwayat Hidup (Pustaka Nusantara, Kuala Lumpur, 1971). 166 Ibid. Anwar Abdullah who served as Dato’ Onn’s private secretary makes it very clear that Dato’ Onn did not want the position for himself. He felt that the office would promote the interest of the Malay community and the nation. For some of the Sultans the idea of an office occupied by a Malay which could command more authority than their positions was totally unacceptable. 167 It has been suggested that this ‘unhappiness’ led to certain manipulations against Dato* Onn which in turn eventually led to his downfall See my Protection of the Malay Community: A Study of UMNO's Position and Opposition Attitudes, M.S.Sc. thesis (Penang, 1974), chapter one.

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However, his successor, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was also committed to the idea of constitutional monarchies. As chief minister of the transitional government in 1955, he was determined to ensure that the Sultans remained at the apex of their respective states but only as constitutional rulers. They would in turn elect one of the rulers as a constitutional monarch for the whole nation for a period of five years.168 In formulating the principles of the Merdeka Constitution this was one of the Tunku’s main considerations. Because of his tremendous popularity at that time and the overwhelming strength of UMNO, he managed to get the support of everyone including the Sultans, although a few concessions had to be made in the process.169 Thus, by merdeka in 1957, there was this dual concept of protector the Sultans as symbolic protectors and the UMNO leaders as substantive protectors. Lest it is misunderstood, it must be made very clear that the UMNO leadership was completely devoted to the concept of a monarchical system. After all, as we have observed over and over again, it had its own roots in the royal courts. What the UMNO leadership wanted, however, was the right to exercise actual power in the political process. To do this, the Sultans had to be made constitutional monarchs. This relationship between the UMNO leadership and the Sultans was not some unique arrangement. In other monarchies too, notably Japan, a more or less similar arrangement had evolved between the rulers and political elites from the upper stratum of society, who were basically loyal to the monarchical institution. We shall discuss this again in the last chapter. For now, we shall turn to another change that took place between 1946 and 1957. It will be remembered from the first chapter that while the ruler offered protection to his subjects in return for unquestioning loyalty, the subjects did not have the right to withdraw their loyalty if the ruler failed to protect them. There is nothing to suggest that the situation changed during the colonial era. There are no recorded evidences of rebellions against the rulers even though they signed treaties with the British which, in effect, destroyed Malay sovereignty. There were times, of course, when Malay

16S For a description of the monarchical system, see Suffian Hashim, An Introduction to the Constitution ofMalaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1972), especially chapters two and four. *e* Allowing the states to retain control over land matters was one of the concessions that the rulers sought This was suggested to the writer by Tunku Abdul Rahman.

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chieftains fought the British but never their own monarchs.170 Even in the Malayan Union episode, the rakyat did not withdraw their loyalty from the Sultans because the latter had failed to protect their interests.171 However, after the Malayan Union there was a change of sorts. In order to understand this, one has to analyse the ‘Dato’ Onn incident’. Some time in 1950 Dato’ Onn suggested that non-Malays should be allowed to become equal members of UMNO. He felt that this was an effective way of laying the basis for a united and harmonious nation after merdeka. It was important, he thought, for the major communities to try and understand each other through cooperation in a multiethnic party.172 Certain segments within UMNO interpreted the proposal as a threat to Malay interests. Membership to non-Malays was seen as an attempt to force ‘the Malays to share equal rights with foreigners by giving further concessions to them in this country...’173 Someone else noted that ‘in comparison with the Chinese and Indians the Malays are merely babies just beginning to crawl. Prizes of sweets would still be sufficient to make them think that Destruction was Protection.’174 Apparently, equal membership in UMNO for the non-Malays was viewed as granting political equality to them which, in the opinion of Dato’ Onn’s critics, would spell destruction for the Malay position. The essence of their fear was that the non-Malays would overwhelm the Malays if they were brought into the same party. Protecting the Malay position meant preserving the ethnic identity of UMNO. Since Dato’ Onn wanted to change that identity, he began to be seen as a threat to the Malay position. He was no longer capable of performing the role of a protector. Dato’ Onn himself realised that he was no longer perceived as the protector of the community. That was why he decided to resign. By resigning, Dato’ Onn robbed us of the opportunity to discover 170 See Syed Hussein Alatas, ‘Feudalism’, Modernisation, op. eft:, p. 100. 171 On the contrary, once the rulers joined the opposition, they became the rallying point See Jubilee Perak UMNO Malaysia 25 Tahun Dalam Kenangan (Utusan Melayu Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971). 172 At the time of publication, Dato* Onn’s multiethnic politics were being studied in depth for a forthcoming Aliran publication. 173 See R.K. Vasil, Politics in a Plural Society (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971), p. 47. 174 Ibid., p. 48.

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whether UMNO members would be prepared to throw out a leader whom they felt had betrayed their interests. Although the opportunity did not present itself - just as an open conflict between the rulers and the administocrats was averted in 1946 - the criticisms directed against Dato’ Onn were sufficient to show us that because he was no longer seen as a protector, the membership had ceased to be unquestioningly loyal. The very act of criticising, of questioning him, proved that UMNO members were no longer blindly loyal to him. But one must be a little careful in making this sort of analysis. The purpose is not to create the impression that, in the relations between leader and led, unquestioning loyalty had ceased to be a factor. Far from it, Dato’ Onn’s own tenure as president of UMNO showed that members were completely loyal to his person on all issues. They followed his dictates without as much as a whimper - except of course when it came to the question of non-Malays in UMNO which they perceived as a threat to the Malay position. Unquestioning loyalty then had a condition: the leader had to guarantee the security of the Malay position in relation to the non-Malay situation. In other words - unquestioning loyalty in return for ethnic protection. If we reflect upon this notion of protection and loyalty, and contrast it with ideas about protection and loyalty from the Malaccan period to the Malayan Union episode, we would admit that what is embodied is a more equal and balanced concept of the relationship between ruler and ruled. In a sense, this concept was more akin to the conventional feudal relationship between monarch and subject How ironic that the sort of reciprocity that characterised a good feudal relationship should finally emerge in the 19461957 phase! There are two other changes in this phase which are relevant to our analysis. As we had observed in 1946, the administocratic leadership in UMNO had complete control over Malay society. While the UMNO leadership continued to see itself as the protector of the whole community and for that reason expected the allegiance of all the Malays, there were developments which made it difficult to maintain the commanding position it had achieved during the Malayan Union crisis. Groups which at one time supported the administocrats decided to operate as independent political

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parties.175 Obviously they did not owe their loyalty to the UMNO leadership. The introduction of electoral competition and the varying viewpoints that crystallised within the Malay community during the course of the march towards merdeka further fragmented Malay politics. All this will be discussed in a different context in the last chapter. What is important to remember now is that the monolithic hold which the UMNO leadership had over Malay society in 1946 was no longer there; by 1957 UMNO was still the single most dominant force in Malay society capable of commanding the support and loyalty of the overwhelming majority of Malays but there were, nonetheless, groups who owed their allegiance to other parties and other causes. This change within Malay politics aside, the overall environment underwent some transformation. In spite of the opposition to non-Malay citizenship in 1946, both the Malay leaders and the British managed to work out citizenship rights for a restricted number of non-Malays in the 1948 Federation of Malaya Agreement.176 The whys and wherefores of this need not concern us here.177 What is more important is whether the non-Malay citizenry whose size kept increasing from 1948 onwards was also drawn into the protector-protected relationship. One has to pose this question because in 1954 the UMNO leaders had come to an agreement with their Chinese and Indian counterparts in the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) respectively to form the Alliance.178 The leader of the Alliance was Tunku Abdul Rahman, the UMNO president at that time. It was UMNO which was the mainstay of this three party interethnic coalition. Did the Tunku therefore expect his MCA and MIC colleagues, and through them the communities they represented,

175 These would include parties like PKMM, Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API), Angkatan Wanita Sedar (AWAS) and so on. See Ahmad Boestamam, Dr Burhanuddin Putera Setia Melayu Raya (Pustaka Keroja, Kuala Lumpur, 1972). 176 For details see B. Simandjuntak, op. cit., pp. 178-182. 177 Briefly, Chinese pressure, the need to win Chinese support in view of the largely ethnic Chinese communist movement, and most of all, the British desire to retain non-Malays who were useful to the rubber and tin industries, had something to do with their restricted accommodation in 1948. For a fuller discussion on the Federation of Malaya Agreement, see M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., p. 30-55. 178 For a succinct description of the genesis of the Alliance, see T.H. Tan, ‘The Struggle of the Alliance for the Independence of the Federation of Malaya^ Pamphlet (1958).

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to be unquestioningly loyal to him and the UMNO leadership? Did these communities and the political parties concerned display unquestioning loyalty to the UMNO leadership? The available evidence shows that no such thing happened. On the contrary, MCA leaders in particular disagreed openly with UMNO leaders on matters relating to citizenship, which was a major controversy in the fifties.179 The MCA members, and to some extent MIC members, were on occasion highly critical of their leaders for what they regarded as unnecessary concessions to the UMNO position. The UMNO leadership, for its part, was prepared to tolerate some of these criticisms. Certainly, they were far more tolerant of dissent from the Chinese and Indian communities than they were of dissent within the Malay community. By the same token, criticisms from UMNO members were totally unacceptable. This attitude of the leadership towards criticism from UMNO and the Malay community was severely chided by a Malay newspaper in 1956:

At the moment when Malay leaders had become more influential, the voices of the rakyat had begun to fade... the hands of the rakyat got tied up and their lips sealed. While the Chinese and other non-Malays were vehemently demanding the implementation of the principle of jus soli and while the MCA and MIC branches were allowed to voice their criticisms freely, the Malays on the other hand were not allowed to do so ... If the Malays were forced to follow their leaders blindly and be subjected to constant scolding, the psychological effect upon the Malays would eventually cause them to be like the ancient Jews under the tyrannical rule of the Pharaoh.180 The greater latitude given to the MCA and MIC establishes very clearly that the UMNO leadership was determined to preserve a feudal relationship only with respect to its own members and the Malay community. It viewed the non-Malays as belonging to another world with their own concept of leaderled relationships. Perhaps it can also be argued that the UMNO leadership was more concerned about protecting feudal ties within the party because, between non-Malay dissent and Malay dissent, it was Malay dissent that

There is a great deal of discussion about the citizenship controversy in KJ. Ratnam, op. cit., chapter three. IM A H’arta Negara view quoted in the Straits Echo, 21 April, 1956.

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could really affect its power and authority. In a nutshell, the integration of Chinese and Indians into an interethnic coalition with the Malays did not in any way draw them into protector-protected relationships of the type that prevailed in UMNO. Neither did it influence the feudal ties that continued to exist within UMNO. We have some understanding now of the politics of unquestioning loyalty on the eve of merdeka. There were the Sultans as symbolic protectors and the UMNO leaders as substantive protectors. Both these interlinked elites expected unquestioning loyalty from the Malay community. As far as the UMNO leadership was concerned, it could be more or less certain of the complete allegiance of its own members. UMNO members, for their part, were prepared to show unquestioning loyalty to their leadership on all issues - except on what were perceived as threats to the Malay position. At that point, they would challenge their leader and question his judgement Unquestioning loyalty - to put it differently - was withheld if protection of the Malay ethnic position was not guaranteed. With that background let us now explore unquestioning loyalty in the post-merdeka and present period.

Chapter Four

Loyalty: The Post-Merdeka Period

Loyalty and the Symbolic Protectors As we have already noted, the 1957 Constitution recognised the rulers as constitutional monarchs. Loyalty to a ruler is an established norm in any constitutional monarchy. In fact, loyalty to a ruler in such a system implies loyalty to the constitution, to the values enshrined in that constitution and to the people from whom the constitution derives its authority. Seen from this perspective, loyalty to a constitutional monarch is not loyalty to his person; indeed the monarch himself owes his loyalty to the constitution, and through the constitution to the people. In the constitutional monarchies of Western Europe, for instance, it is the people who are supreme; it is in them that sovereignty resides.181 If loyalty to a ruler is understood along these lines, there would be no problem for it would then express a democratic conception of loyalty consonant with the ideals of our age. Normally in countries where loyalty to the monarch is perceived this way, the people are quite prepared to scrutinise the ideas and attitudes of the ruler. Both the people and the monarch know that this does not imply any disloyalty to the institution concerned. It is just that the people are loyal but not unquestioningly loyal to their monarch. And the monarch realises that if the people are unquestioningly loyal, they would not be a functional constitutional monarch since power is actually vested in the people. It is only right, from the point of view of the constitution and democracy, that the people question the behaviour of their ruler.

181 For a history of the monarchy in the Scandinavian states, see Scandinavian States and Finland (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1951).

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This is how the concept of a constitutional monarchy is understood and practised in countries like Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium and Britain. Questioning loyalty has in no way diminished the love and respect of the people for their kings and queens. Besides criticisms of the institution itself, the people in these countries have on the whole remained staunch supporters of the monarchical system. It is interesting that the Islamic conception of a monarch bears some similarity to the Western European notion of a constitutional ruler. Of course, sovereignty in Islam lies with God - not the people as in these constitutional monarchies. Besides, in pristine Islam, there is no conception of monarchy as such since office and authority are not hereditary.182 However, monarchs had emerged in the course of history and Muslim thinkers attempted to determine what the characterstics of a good ruler should be. Al-Farabi, Al-Mawardi, Al-Ghazali and Ibn Khaldun were among others wrote on this theme.183 Their writings indicate clearly that there are certain perennial values like a love for justice, compassion for the poor, respect for other opinions and so on which must be upheld by any ruler. Loyalty on the part of the masses should be to these values, not the person of the monarch.184 If a ruler deviates from these values he has no right to the allegiance of his subjects. Expressed in another way, it simply means that there is no unquestioning loyalty to a monarch in Islam. Loyalty has a condition: the ruler himself must adhere to certain values. Indeed, as I have pointed out in the first chapter, in Islam there is only one source that is worthy of unquestioning loyalty - and that is God. A little bit of adumbration at this point would be usefuL According to Abul A’la Maududi, a well-known contemporary Muslim thinker: The real and sole object of our obedience is Allah, the real sovereign. He alone is to be obeyed in His own right A Muslim is, first and last, the

182 See A. Shalaby, Dasar-Dasar Pemerintah Islam (Pustaka Nasional, Singapore, 1967). !H For the writings of these philosophers, see H.K. Sherwani, Studies in Muslim thought and administration (Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Pakistan, 1970). 184 Indeed in Islam, loyalty to God is loyalty to the ideal nature of man, which in turn constitutes these divine values. A number of great Muslim thinkers concur on this. See, for instance, Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction ofReligious Thought in Islam (Kitab Publishing House, Delhi, 1974), p. 147.

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subject of God, His abd (slave). All other positions are just secondary. The centre of loyalty and obedience for a Muslim, in his individual as well as a collective life, is God alone. All other loyalties must be subject to and totally within the sanction of God. None of them should, even in the minutest degree, amount to a repudiation of the loyalty we owe to Him.*85 Since our Sultans are constitutional monarchs, and at the same time the defenders of Islam in their respective States, it is only proper that we evaluate their relationship with their subjects from both perspectives constitutional monarchism and Islam. We have seen that as constitutional monarchs and Muslim rulers, they have no right to expect unquestioning loyalty and yet it is unquestioning loyalty which has been assiduously cultivated since 1957. Leaving aside a handful of critics of the monarchical system and the ways of the monarchs which will be discussed in the last chapter, Malay society as a whole has never openly questioned the attitudes of the rulers or their public conduct. It is not true to say that there aren’t any aspects of their public life which should not be examined more critically in the interest of the nation and indeed of the monarchical system itself. The alleged utilisation of public funds for private purposes, the apparent extravagance in lifestyles, involvement in businesses, interference in strictly political matters, the inability to uphold high ethical standards and most of all, the absence of an image of excellence which can inspire emulation these are some aspects of the institution which can and should be discussed in public.186 It would be constitutional and Islamic to do so. It would in fact help to strengthen the institution in the long run since it would be a sort of cleansing process. It must be noted here that shortcomings in the behaviour of the rulers are talked about quite often in private gatherings. One wonders then why they are not articulated publicly. Is it because of the Constitution Amendment Act of 1971 which inter alia prohibits any person from

185 See Abdul’ala Maududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, Khurshid Ahmad, tr. and ed. (Islamic Publications, Lahore, Pakistan, 1955), p. 191. 186 I have no doubt at all that Malaysian political elites and sections of the public know exactly what I mean. They would, on their own, be able to provide the details. For some discussion of this theme see my Protection of the Malay Community, op. tit., especially chapter three.

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questioning the sovereignty of the rulers as enshrined in Article 181?187 If that is the reason, it is patently clear that Malay and Malaysian society as a whole does not understand that the amendment pertains only to the position of the rulers and the concept of constitutional monarchs. It does not prohibit anyone from questioning the workings of the institution or what may be regarded as the actual operations of the monarchical system. Tun Abdul Razak, UMNO president and prime minister when the amendment was approved by parliament, made this point. In his own words: As regards the provision relating to the sovereignty of the rulers, surely no one will disagree that their position should never be open to attack or challenge. Any self-respecting people will surely want to ensure that the position of its Rulers should not be the subject of debate in the political arena.188 Perhaps a lack of appreciation for the distinction between the ‘position’ and the ‘actual workings’ of the monarchy is one of the explanatory factors that we are looking for. But there must be other more important reasons too. After all, long before 1971 the unwillingness to evaluate the workings of the institution was already apparent. The real explanation, it seems to me, lies in Malay perception of the rulers as protectors of the community in relation to what is regarded as the non-Malay ‘threat’. Again, one of the fundamental elements in the protector-protected relationship that we are familiar with provides a basis for our analysis. Ever since 1957 when citizenship guaranteed non-Malays political rights and privileges which were once exclusively Malay,189 there has been a lurking fear that they (the non­ Malays) would one day pose a threat to Malay political pre-eminence. More specifically, it is fear of non-Malays taking over the country, of occupying the apex of society. The Malay Sultans who are the heads of the various states and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the King) who is head of the whole Federation at least help ensure that the apex will always be Malay. This is

187 See Parliamentary Debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill 1971 (Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1972). :w Ibid., pp. 3-4. J8S For some discussion of how the politics of fear works among both communities, see the speech of Mohd. Khir Johari in Whiter Democracy? An Analysis of the Malaysian Experience, Khoo Yoke Kuan ed. (Aliran Publications, Penang, 1978).

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all the more so because their positions are not open for competition and, as we have seen since 1971, cannot be questioned or challenged any more. The Malay Sultans thus provide some psychological comfort, a sense of security in the midst of ethnic apprehension. It is conceivable that the Malay community or sections of it do not want to lose this psychological security by questioning the ideas and attitudes of the rulers, although they may well be aware that it need not affect the position of the institution itself.190 Perhaps the feeling is that once discussion and debate commences on the workings of the monarchical system, with both Malays and non-Malays participating, a situation could develop where the aura of the institution would be diminished. For some, even such a development is sufficient to create a sense of insecurity and apprehension. Whether this ethnic fear is well-founded or not, and whether the Malay community is justified in deriving psychological comfort from the presence of the rulers, are matters that we will touch upon in the last chapter. For the time being, I shall try to establish that it is this perception of the Sultans as protectors of the community which accounts for unquestioning loyalty by examining a concrete episode. It is significant that the episode I am about to analyse took place in 1978, twenty-one years after merdeka. On 4th August 1978, at the official opening of the fifth session of the Perak State Assembly, six assemblymen - all non-Malays - from the preponderantly non-Malay opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) failed to take their oath of allegiance to the ruler. According to the Constitution of the State of Perak, an assemblyman who is not a Perak state resident is not required to take the oath.191 Guided to some extent by the advice of the State Legal

”° It seems to me that the need for this psychological security is more acutely felt at the level of the Malay middle class than among those below them. Of course, it is quite possible that there may be the same feeling at the lower level, but it has not been articulated in the open. 191 The concept of a ‘state national’ predates merdeka. Before the Federation of Malaya came into being in 1948, each of the Malay States had its own ‘citizens’, meaning by which they were subjects of the respective Sultans, after Merdeka, an all-embracing concept of federal citizenship was created. However, the idea of a state national has remained. Subjects of particular Sultans - state nationals - are sometimes given priority in things like state scholarships. For a discussion of the constitutional aspects of citizenship, see H.E. Groves, The Constitution ofMalaysia (Malaysia Publications, Singapore, 1964).

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Adviser and the Speaker, and partly because of their own lack of sensitivity to the prevailing cultural milieu, the six assemblymen decided against taking the oath of allegiance. Infuriated by the whole incident, the Sultan was quick to describe it as an act of disloyalty. He regarded it as an insult to the throne and a challenge to the Malay tradition of loyalty to the ruler. What is more interesting to us is the way in which various Malay groups reacted. UMNO branches in Perak, branches of the opposition Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), the National Youth Wing of UMNO and Malay literary societies condemned the action in strong, forceful language.192 Almost all of them saw it as an attack upon the tradition of loyalty to the ruler. Some even interpreted it as an affront to the Malay community. In fact, a group of Malay members in DAP itself threatened to leave the party if its Perak assemblymen persisted in their attitude.193 Though the issue resolved itself in the end without any action being taken against the six assemblymen,194 the whole episode has a great deal of importance for our analysis. Firstly, it has to be noted that both the Sultan and most Malay bodies that participated in the controversy perceived loyalty in terms of a Malay tradition’. A Malay - as opposed to an Islamic - tradition can only mean the feudal tradition. There was apparently no conception of loyalty in a constitutional monarchy. Secondly, if loyalty was conceived in the constitutional sense, both the Sultan and the Malay groups concerned would have made some reference to the idea of respect for those democratic ideals which should lie at the root of the whole system. That loyalty to the ruler in a constitutional monarchy is, in the ultimate analysis, respect for the sovereignty of the people, is something that did not occur to all those who criticised the erring assemblymen.195 If it did, they would have approached the issue differently. Thirdly, by linking the issue to the position of the Malay community, especially when the assemblymen in question were all non-Malays, the notion of a non-Malay threat to the Malay position was effectively conjured. The Sultan in such a situation was

192 See Utusan Malaysia, 7-15August, 1978. 193 Ibid, 9 August, 1978. 194 The Sultan of Perak stated that he would raise the issue at the Conference of Rulers in Penang in December 1978, but nothing has been heard of it since then. 195 The Executive Committee of Aliran took this position in an analysis of the whole controversy which appeared in Watan, 2 September 1978.

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bound to be seen as the protector and loyalty to him as a way of protecting the Malay community. In a sense, the last point about the Malay position encompasses the other two. Seeing loyalty as a Malay tradition also establishes the ethnic character of the whole sentiment, just as the inability to relate loyalty to a constitutional monarchy and the democratic system only serves to alienate the non-Malays. For while non-Malays may be able to empathise with the ethnically neutral concept of a democratically sanctioned constitutional monarchy, they will not be able to feel anything for an institution that is perceived from the perspective of Malay tradition and custom. It should be obvious now that the ethnic situation has a great deal to do with unquestioning loyalty to the ruler. As the ‘oath of allegiance’ incident showed, it is ethnicity that endows a strength, a potency to the relationship between protector and protected, Sultan and subject in Malay society. It is this - and not the constitution or the laws - which will ensure the continued survival of the institution for some time to come.

Loyalty and the Substantive Protectors - The Political Dimension When all is said and done, however, the symbolic protectors are far less important compared to the substantive protectors, the UMNO leadership. In analysing its relationship to unquestioning loyalty, we must bear in mind that its entire philosophy revolves around the idea of a protector (the UMNO leadership itself) and a protected (the Malay community). It is no mere coincidence that even the UMNO constitution talks about protection.196 But in order to understand the concept and its practice fully, one has to separate this overall philosophy into three categories - the political dimension, the economic dimension and the cultural dimension. The political dimension of protection and unquestioning loyalty has three major elements in it: a) the way in which unquestioning loyalty and communal solidarity are demanded as a price for protecting the community from what are perceived as threats to its political position; b) the manner in

196 The crucial word is memelihara, used in Artide 4 of the UMNO Constitution (1960). Recent amendments (1979) to the UMNO Constitution have not affected this concept in any way.

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which criticisms from within UMNO are curbed and controlled. Uncritical acceptance of the views of the leadership is often insisted upon; and c) the way in which unquestioning and therefore loyal supporters are protected and rewarded. The first element will be analysed in relation to certain events in the post-merdeka period. We shall begin with the MCA-UMNO crisis of 1959. The incumbent MCA President, Dr Lim Chong Eu, demanded that his party be allowed to contest 40 out of the 104 parliamentary constituencies. Since the MIC had been promised three seats, the proposal would have left UMNO with 51 seats. The MCA president argued that the allocation was necessary in order to check Malay communalism197 which he felt was the inevitable consequence of Malay political pre-eminence. What he and his colleagues in the MCA wanted to do then was to curtail this pre-eminence by increasing Chinese strength in parliament. UMNO leaders read the demand as a challenge to the role of their party in the AUiance. More than that, they were convinced that it posed a threat to the political position of the Malay community itself. In fact, this was how the issue was presented to the Malay community at large. And to a great extent, the community stood solidly behind the UMNO leadership. Partly because of the solidarity within UMNO and the Malay community, and partly because of internal differences which had begun to develop within the MCA, the Tunku was able to adopt a firm position. He refused to concede to the MCA’s demand and in the end the party had to accept UMNO’s terms, under which it was given 31 seats.198 Thus in the UMNO-MCA crisis of 1959, UMNO leadership succeeded m enhancing its image as the protector of the Malay political position.199 How did it fere in the next episode? The next episode concerns Lee Kuan Yew, the prime minister of Singapore and his party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), when Singapore was part of the Malaysian Federation from September 1963 to August 1965. After a few months as part of Malaysia, Lee Kuan Yew began to make

See Straits Times, 10 July, 1959. l,i> See Straits Echo, 13 July, 1959. 199 Enhancing its image was particularly important because UMNO had suffered severe setbacks in the state elections in Kelantan and Terengganu, two preponderantly Malay states. In both states, PAS had come to power.

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indirect references to the stronger political position of the Malays. He argued that there was no real political equality and that one community dominated the political scene. In order to reduce this ‘dominance’ and to create a more equal nation, the PAP organised the Malaysian Solidarity Convention (MSC) with its slogan of a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’. The MSC was composed of non­ Malay political parties. Since the issues it articulated - like the question of political equality for instance - were more attractive to the non-Malays, it derived its support from that quarter. UMNO perceived the organisation and activities of the MSC, and particularly the postures adopted by Lee and the PAP, as inimical to the political position of the Malays. Even before the MSC was formed, an acrimonious debate had commenced with UMNO leaders and a Malay newspaper, the Utusan Melayu, owned largely by UMNO officials, on one side, Lee’s PAP on the other. These UMNO leaders and Utusan pointed to various statements allegedly made by Lee to show that the main motive of the PAP’s participation in West Malaysian politics was ‘to challenge the political power of a predominantly Malay government’.200 As evidence they referred to his comments on ‘the office of the Prime Minister and other major political positions’, ‘recruitment into the armed forces’, ‘the Sultans’ and, most of all, the ‘indigenous status of the Malays’. Apparently, Lee had argued that the Malays were no more indigenous than the others.201 This really incensed the Malay community for it was a direct attack upon the very premise on which Malay political pre-eminence rested. It is interesting that even PAS saw the entry of the PAP as ‘aimed towards the elimination of Malay power’202 The antagonism between the two forces - UMNO and the PAP - became so serious towards the middle of 1965 that the top echelon of UMNO decided to take some form of action. So, after some deliberation, the TUnku and his colleagues decided to separate Singapore from the rest of the federation on the 9th of August 1965.203

200 Chan Heng Chee, Singapore: The Politics of Survival, 1965-1967 (Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 6. 201 Straits Times, 5 May, 1965. 202 Utusan Melayu, 5 March, 1964. 203 For a comprehensive discussion of the various factors which brought about separation, see R.S. Milne, ‘Singapore’s Exit from Malaysia: The Consequences of

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The separation was regarded by UMNO, and perhaps the Malay community as a whole, as an attempt to safeguard their political position. Once again it was the UMNO leadership which, in their opinion, had performed the role of a protector. This of course reinforced the relationship between protected and protector and provided fresh justification for unquestioning loyalty to the UMNO leadership. In that sense, it is paradoxical but true that Lee, who once criticised the sort of society which the UMNO elites maintained as ‘a medieval feudal society’,204 had unwittingly helped to strengthen feudal bonds between leader and led! Our third and final episode is related to the 1969 General Election. For the first time in history, the ruling Alliance suffered severe setbacks though it managed to retain an overall majority in parliament. In all, it won 67 seats compared to 89 in 1964. In the state elections, the situation was even more critical. It lost Penang to a newly established multiethnic opposition party, the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan), failed to defeat PAS in Kelantan and almost lost Terengganu, Perak and Kedah. In Selangor, there was an electoral deadlock with both the Alliance and the opposition in control of 14 seats each in a 28-member Assembly.205 The results indicated that there had been an erosion of both Malay and non-Malay support for the Alliance. Non-Malay disillusionment was obvious in terms of the number of urban seats that the coalition had lost while Malay disillusionment was borne out by the remarkable performance of PAS in rural constituencies.206 However, what was immediately apparent to many was that in Selangor, where the federal capital (Kuala Lumpur) and therefore the heart of political power was then situated, the strength of the completely non-Malay opposition was equal to that of the preponderantly Malay Alliance. There

Ambiguity*, Asian Survey (Vol 6, March 1966). See Mohammed Noordin Sopiee, op. cit., p. 221. 195 For details of the election results, see R.K. Vasil, The Malaysian General Election of 1969 (Oxford University Press, 1972). -’5 The extent of PAS’s success cannot be gauged merely through the very narrow defeats it suffered in a number of Malay constituencies. It has been suggested that PAS could well have obtained more Malay votes while UMNO won more Malay seats with the help of the crucial non-Malay minorities found in most Malay constituencies. For a discussion of this see KJ. Ratnam and R.S. Milne, ‘The 1969 Parliamentary Election in West Malaysia^ Pacific Affairs (Summer 1970).

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was the fear that Malay political power was being threatened in a state which was after all a Malay sultanate, whose constitution required a Malay as the chief minister (menteri besar). The desire of the Chinese leader of the major non-Malay opposition party in Selangor, the DAP, to use a qualifying clause about the eligibility of a non-Malay for the menteri besar’s post to enable him to form a government only reinforced Malay apprehension.207 More than anything else, of course, it was the victory procession of the non-Malay opposition held in Kuala Lumpur two days after the election which aggravated tensions to a point where ethnic riots broke out the following day. According to one source, non-Malays who participated in the procession openly insulted the Malay political position. They are reported to have shouted slogans like ‘the Malays have fallen’, ‘Malays do not have power any more’, ‘we are now in control’, ‘Kuala Lumpur now belongs to the Chinese’, ‘Malays can return to their villages’, ‘this country does not belong to the Malays’, ‘we want to chase out all the Malays’ and so on.208 True or not, a certain section within the UMNO leadership began to see non-Malay jubilance over their electoral gains and the manner in which a number of non-Malay based political parties challenged Malay political pre-eminence during the election campaign as evidence of a rising demand for political equality. These UMNO leaders were of the opinion that the non-Malay challenge to the Malay position had been brought about by the Tunku’s extremely accommodative attitude towards the non-Malays. Various actions of his,209 his critics felt, had encouraged non-Malay politicians to exhibit greater and greater boldness in their public stances. Consequently, they managed to acquire widespread support among their communities. The non-Malay challenge, in turn, had convinced a lot of Malays that UMNO as

207 See Goh Cheng Teik, The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971). 203 See May 13 Tragedy, A Report by the National Operations Council (Kuala Lumpur, 1969), pp. 29-35. 209 The Hinku, for instance, was criticised for advising the king to grant pardon to a number of Chinese Malaysians who had earlier been sentenced to death for treasonous activities carried out during Indonesian Confrontation of Malaysia between 1964 and 1966. By 1969, however, the relations between the two nations had become quite cordial. This criticism is contained in a four-page letter allegedly written by Dr Mahathir Mohamad who was then one of the leaders of the movement against theTunku.

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a partner in an inter-ethnic arrangement known for mutual compromises could not be counted upon to defend Malay interests. For that reason, argued these UMNO leaders, a substantial portion of the Malay vote went to PAS, which was regarded as a more able advocate of the Malay position.210 As a logical consequence of this thinking, these leaders who were supported by some bureaucrats, academics and various student organisations agitated for the resignation of the Tunku. In their opinion, the Tunku should no longer lead UMNO since he had failed to protect the political position of the Malays.211 Like Dato’ Onn before him, the Tunku was being seen as someone who had deviated from the basic philosophy of protection and abdicated the role of protector. No leader, however loyal his followers might have been at one point, has been able to remain in office in the face of this ethnic-motivated challenge. And so, the Tunku retired as UMNO president and prime minister in September 1970.212 The Tunku’s retirement merely helped to reaffirm the presence of all those elements that constitute the psychological basis of the protectorprotected relationship. There was first the perception of an external, non­ Malay threat There was then the upsurge of feelings of insecurity, of ethnic apprehension. It was followed by feelings that the protector had failed to protect the protected. Unquestioning loyalty to him immediately ceased to exist His withdrawal therefore became imperative. Equally crucial, his successor, who was now perceived as the new protector, became the focus of unquestioning loyalty. The aura that surrounded Tun Razak when he emerged as the new president of UMNO and prime minister, the way in which UMNO and a variety of Malay groups rallied around him, the affection and admiration that he evoked and most of all, the tremendous faith that his followers placed in him as a ‘miracle-worker’ on behalf of Malay destiny, attests to this. There is thus a new idol in the old protector-protected relationship. Many of the policy measures which Tun Razak put into effect in the first few years of his administration were clearly designed to protect what was

:i0 For a discussion of this see Anthony Reid, ‘The Kuala Lumpur Riots and the Malaysian Political System’, Australian Outlook (December, 1969). :i; See C.T. Goh, op. cit., pp. 28-31. Quite apart from these pressures, the Tunku had indicated that he would retire once his nepheir, the Sultan of Kedah, became the king. This happened in September 1970.

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perceived as the Malay position. The Constitution Amendments of 1971, which we referred to in passing, made it illegal for anyone to question the special position of the Malays and other indigenous peoples as provided for in the constitution, just as it prohibited anyone from challenging the status of Malay as the sole official and national language and the sovereignty of the Malay monarchs. Of course, aspects of these amendments and the amendment in regard to citizenship placed certain non-Malay interests in the same category.213 But what is more significant to us is the manner in which the new protector and his group provided a new sense of security to the Malay community by reinforcing its constitutional position. Similarly, the National Education Policy, which makes Malay the main medium of instruction in the education system, and the New Economic Policy (NEP), one of whose objectives is securing a bigger role for Malays in commerce and industry, had the effect of bolstering the image of the new group as a genuine, reliable protector of the community. It was the sort of image which enabled the new UMNO leadership to expect unquestioning loyalty, not only from UMNO members but also from the Malay community as a whole. It is interesting to note that even PAS, UMNO’s erstwhile rival, sought accommodation within this new order of things.214 The impact of the protector was irresistible. The 1959 UMNO-MCA crisis, the Lee Kuan Yew challenge of 1965 and the 1969 episode, all of which we have analysed in some depth, reveal the workings of the protector-protected relationship in situations that were not altogether dissimilar. How ethnic solidarity and unquestioning loyalty helped strengthen the hold of the leaders over their followers is a phenomenon that should not escape our notice. With that as our background, we shall now examine how the leaders have approached the problem of criticism within UMNO. Before we discuss the leadership’s attitude to criticism as such, there is 213 As with the protection provided to the Malay language and special position, it was no longer possible to question the role of the other languages and the legitimate aspirations of the non-Malays. Besides, the citizenship amendment was in the interest of the non-Malays. For details of the legislation, see Parliamentary debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill 1971 (Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1971). 214 To be sure, UMNO’s determination to champion Malay causes was one of the reasons for the PAS-UMNO coalition. The politics of coalition is discussed in my 'Coalition Politics’, Commentary (University of Singapore Society, January-March 1973).

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a need to explain - given the unquestioning loyalty - how criticism within UMNO could have emerged at all! Mild, muted criticisms of policies and programmes which have nothing to do with any perception of a threat to the Malays have been part of UMNO since 1957. The annual general assembly is one occasion when this phenomenon comes to the surface. The changes which have occurred in the larger social system would be responsible for this. Since this will be discussed in the last chapter, there is no need to examine it in any depth at this point. Suffice to observe that these criticisms are the products of changes external to UMNO; they have not emerged through any redefinition of the internal relationship between UMNO leadership and ordinary members. As proof, one can examine the Tunku’s leadership of UMNO from 1957 to 1970. In almost every major address to UMNO, he stressed the importance of unquestioning loyalty to the leader. The more loyal ones were automatically regarded as the better men in the party and cabinet. Other attributes like efficiency, ability or integrity had little weight. As Dr Mahathir Mohamad, then out of UMNO, said in 1970 when it was apparent that the Tunku’s position was on the wane: but independent Malaya chose to treat membership of the cabinet as a reward for loyalty to party chiefs and acceptability to the Prime Minister. Once appointed, no amount of dereliction of duty could affect the position of a Minister. On the other hand, even if the Minister performed well, failure to remain on good terms with the Prime Minister meant removal from the ministry.215

This was precisely what happened in the case of Abdul Aziz Ishak. When Aziz was minister of agriculture and cooperatives, he suggested certain rural development projects which conflicted with the thinking of Tun Razak, deputy prime minister and a renowned Tunku loyalist. The Tunku transferred Aziz to another ministry. Because of this disagreement, the Tunku described the minister (who subsequently resigned) as treacherous.216

:ss See Mahathir Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma (Donald Moore, Singapore, 1970), pp. 11-12. He had been expelled from UMNO for writing the letter mentioned in footnote 29. Later he was readmitted into the party. See Tunku Abdul Rahman, ‘Peijuangan UMNO sesuai dengan aliran zaman, UMNO

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Tun Razak perpetuated this concept of loyalty. As deputy prime minister and deputy UMNO president, he showed absolute loyalty to the Tunku. In fact, he took great pride in this. As he once observed, ‘It is my pleasure and privilege to serve under Tunku, over beloved national leader. As long as Tunku is still our leader and captain of the ship, I will serve him loyally and wholeheartedly’.217 Once he took over leadership he insisted upon the same degree of loyalty from his subordinates. Seeing that there was some disagreement with the implementation of some of his policies, he reminded the UMNO Youth Assembly in 1975 that one of the elements in the character of the Malays which is praiseworthy is that they are always loyal and obedient to the leadership which they have elected ... provided the leaders did not deviate from the policy that has been decided and provided ... the leadership is always prepared to serve the interest of the party, the race and the nation. Because there is this characteristic of loyalty to the leader and because there is this spirit of trust in those to whom they have given their trust, UMNO has been able to implement its democratic policy in a smooth and satisfactory manner... I have said all this because I hope that, that praiseworthy quality in Malay character and conduct [viz. loyalty to the leader] will remain so that UMNO will be strong in the future and will be able to give leadership and guidance to others as well ...2l8 The important point in this appeal to UMNO is ‘this characteristic loyalty to the leader’; the other references to a leadership that does not ‘deviate’ and ‘is prepared to serve the interest of the party, race and the nation’ must be regarded as mere rhetoric designed to camouflage what was basically an evocation of a traditional sentiment with all the laces and trimmings of a modern, democratic attitude. After all, if it is just a question of loyalty to good and honest leadership, there is no reason to link it to Malay character. Would such an attitude be any more ‘Malay’ than the search for justice or the yearning for truth? Surely these are attitudes which have universal validity. 20 Tahun (UMNO headquarters, Kuala Lumpur, 1966). 2,7 See The Alliance, Journal of the Alliance Party (Vol. 3,11 March, 1966), p. 1. 218 See Utusan Malaysia, 31 May, 1975.

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In any case, Tun Razaks actual political manoeuvres revealed he was referring to the time-worn concept of unquestioning loyalty to the leader. Towards the end of 1971, the Youth Division in UMNO under Dato’ Harun Idris7 * took on the ask of mildly criticising the implementation of government policies for the Malays. It was felt that not enough was being done to enable more Malays to assume executive roles in ommerce and industry.220 The op leaders in UMNO reacted to this criticism by warning the youths against acting is a pressure group wit hin fee party.221 The UMNO Youth, however, continued to play the part of a cautious critic. Perhaps one of the major factors which persuaded Dato Harun to adhere to his role was the situation in UMNO. For the first time since 1951, when the Tunku took over the presidency of UMNO and made Tun Razak his deputy there was no dear-cut successor to fee new leader of the party Both Tun Razak’s deputies • first Tun Dr Ismail, then Dato’ Hussein Onn - were not regarded then a eventual party presidents 122 This meant that between 1970 and 1975 if was still uncertain as to who would emerge as the ‘heir apparent’. By 'fryfog to establish himself as an articulate champion of Malay interests, the ambitious Dato Harun was in fact putting himself at the forefront of the tussle for that coveted po sition. At the same time he knew that, like everyone else in UMNO, he had to demonstrate his unquestioning loyalty to the party leader. This he tried to do in various ways.223 In spite of all their efforts, Tw Razak continued to regard Dato’ Harun; disagreement with the implementation of certain government policies as a direct challenge to his leadership It needs to emphasised s t this stage that

2,9 Date’ Harun had become UMNO youth leader in 1971 He was also menteri besar of Selangor at that time. One of the reasons for his popularity was his mage as a ‘Malay champion’ - an image which developed from the May 13th riots. 220 For an example of such criticism, see Utusan Malaysia 26 May, 1975. 221 See Tun Dr Email Tindakan Baru Pemuda Wanita UMNO’, Pamphh (2 June, 1972), pp. 17-8. 222 Tun Ismail was older than Tun Razak and in ill health, while Dato’ Hussein Onn was also in poor health. More importantly, however, Um Razak was expected to be in power for at least another .ten years. No one suspected then that he was reason, it seemed more likely that some of the younger UMNO leader stood a better chance in the long ran. 223 He quoted Tun Razak often and openly pledged loyalty to his. leadership. See for instance Ulusati Malaysia, 21 Juno 1975

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Tun Razak’s own position, both in the party and the government, was not the issue. Not once did Dato’ Harun or anyone else question even obliquely the authority and dominant influence of Tun Razak. Indeed, he was unassailed and unassailable.224 If we may repeat, it was the heir-apparentness which was the object of intra-party rivalry. Yet, he interpreted Dato’ Harun’s stand as a threat to his own leadership and made sure that he was defeated in the elections to one of the vice-presidencies of UMNO in June 1975.225 His political career, however, did not end with his defeat. What ended his political career was his involvement in corruption.226 But before that, he was already sacked from UMNO by Tun Razak’s successor, Dato’ Hussein Onn. This triggered adverse reactions towards the leadership which Dato’ Hussein tried to contain by reminding UMNO members of the age-old tradition of Malay loyalty.227 In a sense, therefore, all three UMNO presidents and prime ministers of the post-merdeka period have had occasion to insist upon unquestioning loyalty. Invariably, it has been either some form of disagreement with the top leader or men associated with him or some mild criticism of policies which had prompted them to adopt such a posture. In all the cases that we have examined, it is the leader at the apex who had triumphed - and the critic who had lost. It is an indication, no doubt, of the continuing significance of unquestioning loyalty within UMNO circles. It is not just in the attitude towards criticism that a ‘feudal’ psychology is manifested, but also in the manner in which loyalty is rewarded. As we have seen, ‘dereliction of duty’ was not a crime as long as one was also unquestioningly loyalty. The outstanding instance from the Tunku’s term of office was, of course, the ‘Rahman Talib affair’. Dato’ Abdul Rahman Talib, minister of education in the Tunku’s cabinet in the early sixties, was found corrupt by the High Court. In spite of this, he was given all the protection 224 This point is well made in Subky Latif, Suka Duka Politik Tun Razak (Amir Enterprise, 1976), chapter eight. 225 Ibid., pp. 136-7. 226 There were a number of charges of corruption against him involving both his positions as menteri besar and chairman of Bank Rakyat. He was convicted and served three years of his six-year prison term. For a description of the charges, see Marwilis Haji Yusuf, Datuk Harun di Mahkamah (Amir Enterprise, Kuala Lumpur, 1976). 227 See, for instance, New Straits Times, 10 May, 1976.

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possible by the Tunku. The Tunku even proclaimed his innocence before the judge had reached a decision. More important, his legal fees amounting to more than eighty-eight thousand dollars were paid by the government and the Tunku severely castigated critics of the corrupt minister.228 Later, the minister who resigned from the cabinet on his own accord was made an ambassador. Needless to say, he was an ardent Tunku loyalist. When Tun Razak became UMNO president, he too tried to ensure that the party’s supreme council would consist of men and women who were absolutely loyalty to him. From one perspective, the 1975 UMNO elections marked the apex of his success. The three vice-presidents who were elected, for instance, were all his loyalists. He had, in fact, provided subtle support to their candidatures.229 Compared to the Tunku, however, Tun Razak attached some importance to ability and efficiency. Still, these were not primary values to him for it was abundantly clear that often he provided protection to men whose only qualification for office was loyalty to him.230 So far, we have examined the three main elements in the political dimension of loyalty in the post-merdeka period. A striking feature of our analysis has been the way in which protection and unquestioning loyalty have shaped and moulded the political life of UMNO in particular and Malay society in general. The question we must now ask ourselves is: how great has the impact of the economic dimension of loyalty been?

Loyalty and the Substantive Protectors - The Economic Dimension Unlike the political position of the Malays, the concept of protecting the economic position of the community is enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution itself. Certain articles in the constitution provide special opportunities for the Malays in public services, trade, the acquisition of

-s This is discussed in Syed Hussein Alatas’s ‘Feudalism’, Modernisation, op. cit. They comprised Ghafar Baba, Tunku Razaleigh Hamzah and Dr Mahathir Mohamad. See Mingguan Malaysia, 22 June, 1975 for the detailed results. ~3 The emergence of a clique around Tun Razak is studied in a vague manner in Harun Hassan and Subky Latif, Siapa Selepas Tun Razak? (Amir Enterprise, Kuala Lumpur, 1975).

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scholarships and in the ownership of land.231 As a matter of fact, many of these opportunities were first made available under colonial rule when the British, together with the Malay elites, pretended to be protectors of the community.232 That their protection was completely ineffectual was demonstrated by the poverty of the Malay masses at the time of merdeka.233 It was protection that left the protected poorer than ever before, that deprived them of any control over the economy! As we have just noted, the UMNO leadership in 1957 incorporated these colonial notions of protection into the national constitution. In addition to that, they gave some emphasis to the creation of a rural infrastructure and the expansion of educational opportunities for the Malays.234 But like the British, they failed to come to grips with the underlying causes of Malay poverty, of the disparity between rural and urban areas, of the paucity of Malays in commerce, industry and professions. They failed to realise that the real problem was an economic system based upon capital and unlimited profits which would inevitably discriminate against the poor and disadvantaged, the majority of whom happened to be Malays. Because their analysis of the problem was wrong, their solution was also wrong. They decided to maintain a competitive market economy with minimum modifications while providing special opportunities for Malays in different spheres. No structural transformation was envisaged. This approach synchronised beautifully with the whole philosophy of protecting the Malays. To put it differently, the UMNO leadership of 1967 to 1969 saw itself as the protector of a community that lacked capital. In such an economy based upon capital, the need for a protector was keenly felt at all

231 These would be Article 153 (on positions in the public services, scholarships and licenses in business) and Article 89 (on land). See Suffian Hashim, op. cit. for details. 232 For the development of these opportunities refer to my Protection of the Malay Community, op. cit., especially chapter two. 233 Ungku Aziz has suggested that at the time of merdeka about 90 per cent of the Malay working population earned less than $200/- a month. See his 'Facts and Fallacies of the Malay economy’, Mimeograph, p. 3. According to Silcock and Fisk, in spite of a numerically larger working population within the Malay community, aggregate individual incomes in 1957 worked out at 23-25 per cent as compared to 60-63 per cent for the Chinese community with its smaller working population. See their Political Economy ofIndependent Malaya (Eastern Universities Press, 1963). 234 This is elaborated in my Some Dominant Concepts, op. cit., chapter four.

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times. The protector would then be able to perpetuate himself ad infinitum - a protector of the poor Malay from the rich non-Malay. Indeed, regarding all Malays as poor Malays who need protection from the rich non-Malays has been part of the psychology of UMNO leadership right up to the present. It was only in 1978 that Dr Mahathir Mohamad described the Chinese as the very fat Siamese twin of a very thin Malay!235 On that basis he justified the need for protection. Ihe Tunku too often saw all Chinese as successful businessmen in contrast to the Malays, who were seen as poor farmers and fishermen.236 It is not just this conception of the Malay economic position, juxtaposed against the Chinese economic situation, which characterises the philosophies of the pre- and post-1969 leaderships. In spite of the NEP and all the other changes in personalities and programmes, the basic philosophy of the UMNO leadership has remained the same. It continues to perpetuate the main features of a competitive market economy, with perhaps greater governmental intervention on behalf of Malay interests, than the previous group was inclined to.237 But intervention in essence merely seeks to carve out a bigger role for the community in various sectors of the economy, without challenging the fundamental premises of the system - in a manner in which disadvantaged Malays would benefit more. Thus, one of the principal aims of the NEP was ensuring that 30 per cent of commerce and industry were in Malay hands by 1990, which would only result in an artificially created commercial and industrial community protected by and dependent upon employment quotas, special credit facilities and various trading privileges. Again, it would only reinforce the psychological need for a protector who can protect these opportunities in the midst of a non-Malay dominated world of commerce and industry, where the emphasis on growth is bound to generate even more wealth for an already affluent non-Malay elite. If we examined yet another objective of the NEP - the reservation of places in institutions of higher learning for Malays and other bumiputeras

~’5 See Utusan Malaysia, 26 April, 1978. The underlying sentiment is contained in his May 13 Before and After (Utusan Melayu Press, 1969), especially chapter 17. This is discussed in my work: "Ihe New Economic Policy and the quest for National Unity*, Fifth Malaysian Economic Convention (Malaysian Economic Association, 1978).

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on the basis of a quota system - we would be able to detect a similar approach. It is an attempt to protect what are perceived as Malay interests in higher education and eventually in the upper echelons of commerce, industry and the professions from the competitive challenge of non-Malays who, in the past, had dominated colleges and universities. Underlying this whole concept of protecting the Malay economic position was a feeling that without special opportunities and quotas they (the Malays) would not be able to compete. It should be remembered that the same feeling was articulated by those who opposed Date’ Onris proposal to open the doors of UMNO to the non-Malays. The fear that Malays would not be able to compete against the economically advanced non-Malays has remained as strong as ever. Tun Dr Ismail expressed this sentiment in 1969 when he said:

Actually you can argue that it is the Malays who are the second-class citizens just as in golf it is the weaker players who are given easier terms. We felt, as educated Malays, that this special position was a slur on the Malays but if they didn’t have it they wouldn’t have a chance. We envisaged that the Malays would give up this special position when a united nation was a reality. I still believe this - that when the Malays have found their feet they will feel that this special position is no longer necessary. But it is not for the others to demand this because it is a breach of the terms under which Malaya came into being. For the present the Malays feel they cannot compete and we must deal with this reality.238 Once it is accepted that Malays are ‘weaker’ that they have not ‘found their feet’, that they ‘cannot compete’ it becomes necessary to protect them. And the UMNO leadership has even attempted to explain why the Malays cannot compete. According to one line of thought, the problem is essentially cultural Revolusi Mental, a book published by UMNO to herald the ascendancy of the Tun Razak regime,239 has outlined various characteristics which in

238 See Straits Times, 7 July, 1969. 239 A number of individuals including some academics helped produce the book which, on the whole, manifests a lack of knowledge of the social forces that shape change. The book has been effectively criticised by Syed Hussein Alatas, Siapa Yang Salah

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the opinions of its authors stand in the way of Malay economic and social progress. These range from a lack of initiative, curiosity, rationality, original thought, imagination, realism, self-confidence, industry and seriousness to a lack of attachment to life on earth, a belief that fate determines everything, an incapacity to value time, take risks or look towards the future and a wasteful attitude towards money.240 The book then advocates a mental revolution to demolish these attitudes. Dr Mahathir has also criticised certain ‘Malay values’ and ‘characteristics’. He sees the Malay as spiritually inclined, tolerant and easygoing. Fatalism characterises the Malay attitude towards life and often life itself is regarded as a preparation for the Hereafter. Time is not valued and ‘disregard for time is seen in the careless way in which it is spent. Doing nothing, or sipping coffee or talking is almost a Malay national habit’.241 Neither is the potential of money understood. Finally, Tun Razak too alluded to certain cultural traits as impediments. He perceived Malay peasant attitude as being encapsulated in the proverb, 'Kais Pagi Makan Pagi; Kais Petang Makan Petang’, implying that the Malay masses do not live beyond the moment On countless occasions he had urged the Malays to change their attitudes in order to achieve progress.242 The Gerakan Pembaharuan (Renewal Movement) campaign that he launched in 1972 was aimed at achieving this goal. The primacy accorded to cultural attitudes as obstacles to progress, and the role that UMNO leaders have assumed as individuals capable of demolishing those attitudes, only serve to strengthen their position in relation to the rest of society. Once again, they become indispensable in the endeavour to lead the community out of its cultural morass. It is they who will protect the community against itself, its values, its cultural attitudes so that the ‘positive’ traits of the non-Malays like their competitive spirit, the importance they attach to money, their inclination towards materialism and so on will not overwhelm the Malays with their ‘negative’ qualities/ (Pustaka Nasional, Singapore, 1972) and in his The Myth of the Lazy Native, op. cit. ;43 See Reivlusi Mental, Senn Abdul Rahman, ed. (Utusan Melayu, Kuala Lumpur, 1971), pp. 75-6. Mahathir Mohamad, op. cit., p. 163. -4: See, for example, his speech at the Bumiputera Economic Seminar, Utusan Malaysia, 5 April, 1973. -4- Apart from the invalidity of the argument that Malay society possesses the traits mentioned, which is dealt with in chapter five, I do not regard inclination towards

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Besides, since these cultural attitudes are deeply ingrained in the life of the community, they cannot be easily eliminated. And as long as they are there, there will be the need for protection and a protector. This is one way in which the UMNO leadership justifies protection. However, at least cultural attitudes can be eradicated in the long run. The situation becomes even more perilous when genetic factors are involved. A couple of UMNO leaders of considerable weight have used this argument to defend the need for protection.244 The Malays, they argue, just cannot compete because of various genetic impediments. Dr Mahathir Mohamad, one of those who have advocated this view, seems to believe that frequent first-cousin marriages, early marriages, marriages between imbeciles and the aged or between ‘backward’ relatives have had the cumulative effect of producing a weak species.245 There is hardly any need to point out that this sort of analysis is not only without any basis, but it is also totally repugnant to modern social sciences.246 What is more interesting for our purpose is the conclusion he draws from this: Besides, unlike China which had no considerable immigrant settlers, Malaysia has far too many non-Malay citizens who can swamp the Malays the moment protection is removed. The frequent suggestion that the only way to help the Malays is to let them fight their own battles cannot therefore be seriously considered. The answer seems to lie somewhere in between; in a sort of ‘constructive protection’ worked out after a careful study of the effects of heredity and environment Until this is done, the deleterious effect of heredity and environment on the Malays is likely to continue.247

How the philosophy of protection has worked out in the economic sphere should now be clear. First, the UMNO leadership chooses to maintain a materialism as a positive quality in any community. For some discussion of the ethical foundations of development see Denis Goulet, The Cruel Choice (Atheneum, 1977). 244 Dr Mahathir aside. Tun Dr Ismail, also a medical doctor, is known to have held his view. He had expressed it to student audiences in the United States in the early seventies. 245 See Mahathir Mohamad, op. tit., especially pp. 28-29. 246 See Syed Hussein Alatas, Siapa, op. tit. and Myth, op. tit. for a cogent rebuttal of Mahathir’s genetic 'theory* from a social science perspective. 247 See Mahathir Mohamad, op. tit., p. 31.

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capitalist economic system. The very nature of the system helps to highlight the plight of a largely poor Malay community. This reality convinces the Malays of the need for protection. The UMNO leadership provides that protection. More than that, it argues that if the protection is removed, the community will lose out through competition. Again, the nature of competition within a capitalist system convinces the Malays of the validity of the argument. To make it even more convincing, they are told that in addition to everything, there are cultural and genetic248 obstacles in the way of their economic development which can only be overcome through protection. Thus, protection becomes a vital need. But protection, as we should now know, is never unaccompanied. In return for protection, the UMNO leadership expects unquestioning loyalty from those who have benefited from protection in the economic sphere. This desire for loyalty expresses itself very vividly in the leadership’s unwillingness to accept criticisms from these groups. Any criticism is quickly labelled as ‘ingratitude’ or ‘disloyalty’. Specific instances will now be examined to establish this point. Utusan Malaysia reported on 2 June 1979 that then deputy prime minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, ‘reproached some FELDA (Federal Land Development Authority) settlers who were not grateful to UMNO for its struggle which had enabled them to enjoy comforts. Some of them not only hate UMNO but more than that, have chosen to support opposition parties that turn down UMNO’s efforts’.249 The above remark contains many interesting elements which are highly relevant to our study. In order to understand them fully, one has to say something about FELDA schemes. These land schemes were started in the mid-fifties with the aim of providing land to the landless and increasing rural incomes. Under the FELDA programme, the government clears the land, provides roads, electricity, water and other facilities and finally moves the settler-families to the new sites. There they plant rubber or oil palm on a ten or twelve acre plot allotted to each of these families. It has been estimated that the total cost of settling a single FELDA family could Editor’s note: The tendency to attribute economic backwardness to genetic factors is not just a Malaysian problem. Lee Kuan Yew was know to have espoused similar views in post-independence Singapore. Zii See L'tusan Malaysia, 2 June, 1979.

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be anything between eighteen to twenty-four thousand ringgit.250 After a few years when rubber trees are ready for tapping and oil palms ready for harvesting, the settlers are able to earn good incomes.251 Though the number of rural dwellers involved in these schemes is small252 there is no doubt that compared to the average farmer, fisherman or rubber small-holder, the FELDA settler is, on the whole, better-off. It is because the government has been responsible for their higher income status that UMNO leaders expect gratitude from these settlers. It is significant that they do not see the government they lead as merely fulfilling its duty, its responsibility to the people. The people elect leaders to improve the conditions of the masses. This is done with the wealth created by the people, with the taxes collected from the public. In other words, the money belongs to the people. The people expect the government they have elected to use that money wisely in the interest of the people. The people therefore have the right to pass judgement on the leaders to whom they have entrusted their destiny. It is judgement from the people that leaders must expect - not gratitude. A leader may disagree with the people about the way in which he and his party have been judged but he cannot deny them their right to judge, evaluate and criticise. If he denies them that right he does not understand the values and principles of a democratic government, for in a democracy, to use a hackneyed cliche, the people are supreme and sovereign. The fact that many UMNO leaders have a different conception of the function of government reveals certain dimensions of their psychology. Firstly, it shows that they see development carried out for the people as a great favour done by them. It is not something that the people are entitled to. Secondly, they see public funds as money belonging to the party in

250 The costs and benefits of FELDA schemes have been studied by Lun Sow Ching, Land Development Scheme in West Malaysia: A Study of Benefits and Costs, Ph.D. thesis (Australian National University, Canberra, 1972). 251 R. Thillianathan suggests, ‘FELDA settlers may be having an income of $300 per month’ in his ‘Public policies and programmes for redressing poverty in Malaysia: a critical review’, Poverty in Malaysia, B.A.R. Mokhzani and Khoo Siew Mun, eds. (Persatuan Ekonomi Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1977), p. 257. 252 At the end of 1976 there were only 38,835 settler families. It is estimated that by the end of 1980 there would be about 60,400 settler families. This is nothing when it is remembered that in 1976 alone there were 18,477 successful applicants on waiting list for emplacement in FELDA schemes. SeeLaporan Tahunan FELDA 1976, p. 7.

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power or perhaps even to them as individuals who are part of a collective which in turn utilises the money for the people’s benefit motivated by a sense of generosity, by a spirit of benevolence much in the same way as a philanthropist would donate to a charity. Thirdly, their expectation of gratitude not only lends reinforcement to the first two points - about development and funds - but it also reveals how UMNO leaders link gratitude to an unquestioning attitude and to loyalty. That criticism should be interpreted as ingratitude indicates that gratitude has only one meaning: unquestioning loyalty to the leadership. If we looked closely at a few episodes in Malaysian politics, it will become obvious that these attitudes are prevalent and pervasive. We shall begin with the UMNO leadership’s attitude towards students. In the early and mid-sixties when University of Malaya was largely non-Malay, the government allowed some latitude to students. Political debates and even demonstrations and protest marches were organised from time to time. As the University of Malaya campus became more and more Malay-dominant and as new colleges and universities with huge Malay student populations were established,253 the government’s attitude began to change. This was because UMNO leaders perceived the increase in Malay student numbers (brought about by state policies to an extent) as one of their bounties to the community. For that reason, they expected the recipients of their generosity to be loyal and grateful ever after! When criticisms began to emanate from the campuses, UMNO leaders therefore became uneasy and angry.254 One of the earliest indications of this was from the Tunku. Referring to demonstrations against him in 1969 for his alleged inability to protect the Malay position, he said: ‘They demonstrated at the Dewan Tunku Chanselor against me - a building which is named in tribute to me as the Chancellor of the University. Their behaviour was utterly disgraceful, a shame to their nation, their race, their families and their University. Never had I thought that such things could happen in my lifetime in the University which I had

235 For data on the ethnic composition of colleges and universities from 1970 to 1973, see Mid-term Review ofSecond Malaysia Plan 1971-75 (Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1973), p. 193. 234 It was because of student criticisms and among other reasons that the Universities and University Colleges Act was promulgated in 1971.

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helped to build.’255 From time to time, whenever students or academics disagree with or criticise the government the Tunku took it upon himself to chide them for indulging in activities that were unbecoming of people who have benefitted tangibly from the policies of those in power.256 In December 1974, when students organised demonstrations in Penang and Kuala Lumpur in support of peasants protesting against declining rubber prices and rising inflation which had adversely affected their livelihoods, Tun Razak, who was then prime minister, adopted a moreor-less similar attitude. He too expressed regret that Malay students who had benefited so much from the government’s special efforts to assist them should now question and criticise the ruling group.257 To him and other UMNO leaders, the nature of the issue that concerned the students and their capacity to transcend ethnic loyalties in their mobilisation were matters of little import. It was the idea of a group which had benefited from Malay social development challenging them that really bothered the UMNO leaders. It was to control and eliminate any such challenge in the future that the government introduced amendments to the University and University Colleges Act in 1975. Under these amendments, a student was forbidden from expressing an opinion in public on any political issue. He could not even express support for or oppose any political party in any capacity. Apart from these, there were a whole host of other restrictions.258 There is no doubt that the Act was an attempt to force the student population to be unquestioningly loyal to the national leadership. Academics have also been compelled to observe certain rules under that act. Again, a certain pattern is discernible. In the sixties when the vast majority of university lecturers were non-Malays, there was quite a bit of leeway for social commentary and criticism.259 By the early seventies 255 See Tunku Abdul Rahman, May 13, op. cit., pp. 133-34. 256 He does this in his weekly column in The Star. See for instance his ‘As I see it’, 17 July, 1978. He was particularly critical of students and academics who supported the opposition party PAS in the July 1978 election. He has also argued that academics have no right to participate in politics. 257 For Tun Razaks strong reaction to the student demonstrations, see the Straits Times, 6 and 9 December, 1974. 258 See A Bill intituled an Act to amend the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971. 259 In 1966 for instance, the Academic Staff Association of the University of Malaya,

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the Malay university lecturer had emerged as a significant element in the academic community. Unlike most other Malay professional groups in the public sector, Malay academics were not directly dependent upon the government for reward, recognition and advancement. The administration of the university as a separate, somewhat autonomous institution helped create such a situation. More important, this limited autonomy also provided the Malay academic with the opportunity to judge and evaluate the performance of the UMNO-led government - an activity which in a sense synchronised with his professional and intellectual background, especially if his training had been in the humanities and social sciences. When Malay academics evaluated government performance unfavourably, UMNO leaders often reacted harshly. Invariably they argued that as individuals who had been provided with opportunities to enhance their education through special facilities made available by the government, it was not right of them to criticise the UMNO leadership. As Dr Mahathir once put it: In fact nearly all the bumiputera participants at this convention [The Bumiputera Economic Convention at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia] whether they are on this stage or down below have benefitted from the NEP. If they are already working, I am sure that their income is much higher than the incomes of their parents before. If they are still studying this too means that their income has improved because in fact the fee to support a student in the University cannot possibly be borne by a poor family. Whether they get scholarships or not, a big proportion of the expenses of giving them the education is borne by the Government... It is most inconsistent with the teaching of Islam to deny the gifts given to us by others and instead to condemn the donors [the government] especially when we [bumiputeras] are poor and in need of help.260

He then went on to say that, ‘Ever since we became independent and ever since the NEP was launched many of us, in fact all of us bumiputeras (the

which was mainly non-Malay in composition, threatened to take industrial action. The government reacted with less panic than in February-March 1979 when the same union - now with a big Malay membership - decided to go on strike. ZV1 See New Straits Times, 1 April, 1978.

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Muslims) have received much benefit whether directly or indirectly. This feet must be admitted by us and we must be mindful and grateful because ofit’.261 Because Malay academics were not mindful or grateful, it became necessary to control the active participation of academics as a whole in politics. Indeed, it is not just direct political party activities which are prohibited under the 1979 rules for academics but also their right to express opinions in public on matters political.262 Students and academics aside, Malay commercial and industrial workers are also perceived as a group that should be unquestioningly loyal since they have benefitted from the NEP. This partly explains why the government retaliates sternly when workers in institutions where a substantial number of Malays decide to strike or take other forms of industrial action. The 1974 strike by workers in the National Electricity Board was a case in point. A better example would be the work-to-rule actions of the workers in the Airlines Employees Union (AEU) in 1979. To be sure, a number of other factors including the legality of the workers’ action and the role played by international trade union organisations persuaded the government to adopt some tough measures.263 But the fact remains that the defiant attitude of the workers, a majority of whom were Malays, also piqued the government The government felt betrayed not only because a Malay-majority union refused to abide meekly by the dictates of the state but also because a number of the workers who were UMNO members were plainly more loyal to their union than to their party. In most other societies, competing loyalties of this sort would be accepted as a normal happening. In fact, leaders who are genuinely committed to unity and harmony would welcome such a development where ethnic loyalty is superseded by a loyalty based upon occupational ties and directed towards common socioeconomic objectives. But in a situation where ethnic loyalty expressed through allegiance to the UMNO

261 Loc. cit. 242 These rules have in feet been gazetted under the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 and are known as the Discipline of Staff Rules. For an evaluation of the rules, see Aliran’s ‘The Rules for Academics: The Pitfells*, National Echo, 19 February, 1979. 243 For information on the actual dispute, see New Straits Tinies, February to March 1979.

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leadership is a supreme consideration, UMNO leaders are bound to adopt an unfavourable view of new loyalties.264 There is perhaps no better evidence of this than some remarks made by Dr Mahathir at the 1979 UMNO General Assembly meeting. He noted that: MAS was bom through the initiative of UMNO. And it was also because of UMNO that the number of bumiputera workers in the airline was increased. Such a situation would never have materialised if MAS had remained as the former MSA [Malaysia-Singapore Airlines]. It was unfortunate that the airline workers, when ordered to go on strike by certain people, were willing to do so without realising for one moment that they were in MAS because of UMNO. Without UMNO, they might not have their jobs and yet, without any sense of gratitude, they still went on strike.265

So far, we have looked at specific instances of how the UMNO leadership expects loyalty as reciprocation for economic assistance provided by the government However, there have been occasions where the UMNO leadership has insisted upon a demonstration of loyalty before state aid is given: it follows that it has threatened to deny state aid if there is no expression of allegiance from the people concerned. This has happened in almost every general election since 1959. It is such an interesting phenomenon that it is worth studying in some depth. In both the 1964 and 1969 general elections, top UMNO leaders made it very dear to the Kelantanese that they would get economic assistance only if they dedded to support their party. (In 1969, the Kelantan state government came under the control of PAS.) After its failure to wrest Kelantan from PAS’s hands in 1964, UMNO leaders became quite desperate and in 1969 Tun Razak even made a specific offer of 548 million ringgit worth of economic aid to the state if it supported UMNO. The PAS president ridiculed the offer which he described as ‘political corruption of the highest order in the history of democracy’.266

The importance of developing occupational loyalties in the labour movement has been emphasised in my article on behalfof Aliran entitled ‘Labour at the Crossroads* National Echo, 7 May, 1979. See New Sunday Times, 8 July, 1979. 266 See Utusan Melayu, 16 April, 1969.

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It was, however, more than political corruption. It was the manifestation of a certain psychology which cannot distinguish between the party and the state, a psychology which as we have seen regards public funds as a sort of party or private largesse to be distributed to the loyal. It is because there is such a psychology that the UMNO leadership has failed to understand that in a federal system where the possibility of a state government coming under the control of a party opposed to UMNO is very real. Every state that constitutes the federation has the right to expect development assistance, irrespective of party affiliation. Besides, the rules governing the conduct of elections which all parties are supposed to abide by specifically prohibits any attempt to influence a voter’s choice of his leaders, whether by promise of gain or threat of injury.267 And yet even in the 1978 elections after this provision in the Election Offences Act was brought to the notice of the electorate, the ruling party continued to promise the voters in opposition constituencies that they would be amply rewarded with all sorts of facilities and amenities if they voted for Barisan Nasional. At the same time, in 1978 as in previous elections, the voters were warned in no uncertain terms that their constituencies or states would be deprived of development aid if they voted for opposition parties or candidates. This was the main campaign slogan of the ruling party in Penang in the 1969 election when it was confronted with a powerful challenge from Gerakan.268 The many examples we have provided, ranging from FELDA schemes to elections, show that the UMNO leadership invariably links economic protection with allegiance and loyalty to its own position. This expectation of loyalty establishes beyond any doubt that the economic dimension of loyalty in the post-merdeka period has all the major characteristics of the protector-protected relationship.

267 This is contained in the Election Offences Act Aliran informed the public of this stipulation in its campaign to get all election candidates to declare their assets to the voters. See Watan, 15 June, 1978. 268 In spite of this warning, the Penang electorate voted Gerakan with a clear-cut % majority in the state assembly. See R.K. Vasil, The Malaysian General Election of1969, op. cit.

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Loyalty and the Substantive Protectors - The Cultural Dimension Like the political and economic dimensions of loyalty, the cultural dimension is also concerned with protecting certain aspects of Malay society from what are perceived as non-Malay challenges. Of the cultural facets of Malay society which are most obvious to an observer, Islam and the Malay language would be outstanding. Islam, however, does not fall into the category of a cultural characteristic which needs to be protected because non-Muslim religions threaten its position. Neither the status of Islam as the official religion nor the attention given to it in public policies and programmes has yet provoked an adverse reaction from the non-Muslim communities. This idea of an external challenge or threat is therefore not applicable. This could, of course, change in the future if certain trends and tendencies begin to dominate Malay thinking on Islam.269 With the Malay language the situation is quite different. Even when the Merdeka Constitution was being formulated in 1956 and early 1957, a number of Chinese and some Indian organisations refused to accept the position of Malay as the sole official language.270 The promulgation of the constitution did not end the controversy. In fact, in the 1959 UMNOMCA crisis which was examined in an earlier context, a bigger role for Chinese education was one of the demands of the MCA. The UMNO leadership perceived this as a threat to the Malay language, a perception which was shared by a broad cross-section of the community. It helped in the mobilisation of the community and in ensuring that UMNO members remained loyal to their leadership. When Lee Kuan Yew began to challenge the political position of the Malays in 1964-65, the question of a more equal role for the Chinese 269 One such trend would be an intolerance of non-Muslim religions. If that happens, non-Muslims are bound to react Also, too much emphasis upon Islamic rituals, events and the like could create some disaffection among the non-Muslims. The need for a new outlook on Islam is discussed in my introduction to The Universalism of Islam (Aliran Publications, Penang, 1979). See, for instance, Lau Pak Khuan, Chairman of Perak MCA’s "Views’, Straits Echo, 29 March, 1957. Also, the stand of the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce in B. Simandjuntak, op. cit., p. 85.

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language in administration and education also figured prominently in his agitation. Again, in the 1969 election, equal status for the non-Malay languages was a major objective of the campaign by non-Malay based opposition political parties like the DAP.271 On both occasions, UMNO leadership was able to convince its membership and the community as a whole that the status of the Malay language as the sole official and national language would be jeopardised if these non-Malay demands were accommodated. In the crisis that followed the 1969 election, it will be recalled that the alleged inability of the Tunku to protect the Malay position was a central factor. His compromising attitude on the implementation of Malay in administration and education, according to his critics, was one of the manifestations of his failure as a protector.272 Thus, because of the inability to protect the Malay language, loyalty was withdrawn from a leader. The rise of Tun Razak and his group was distinguished by a firm, unyielding commitment to the implementation of Malay as the main medium of instruction in the education system. As we have observed, this emphasis upon the Malay language endeared UMNO’s leadership to the community. It reinforced the bond of loyalty between the led and the leader. With this new emphasis in the seventies, the Malay language has begun to acquire, gradually, the image of a Malaysian language. As it becomes the language of social communication for all Malaysians, including a substantial portion of young non-Malays, it will be apparent that it cannot be preserved in its old form as an exclusive symbol of the Malay community. Once it ceases to perform that role, it ceases to be relevant to the protectorprotected relationship since what is normally protected is some aspect of the community that is exclusive to its position in its interaction with the non­ Malays - like Malay political pre-eminence or Malay economic interests. It follows that when the Malay language is no longer an exclusive Malay concern, it will not be possible to evoke the idea of an external threat or demand internal solidarity in defending the integrity of the language or, most of all, insist upon unquestioning loyalty in return for the protection accorded to the language. All this does not mean that in the interregnum, 271 See DAP’s ‘DAP and Cultural Democracy’, Pamphlet, p. 4. Also, Lim Kit Siang’s remarks on the use of other languages, Sin Chew Jit Poh, 28 April, 1969. 272 For an analysis of this, see my Protection, op. cit., especially chapter three.

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as the Malay language develops into a truly Malaysian language, attempts to question its implementation in the education system in particular will not be interpreted as threats which can only be dealt with through open demonstration of support and loyalty to the UMNO leadership.273 Since the Malay language is bound to lose its significance to the whole concept of protection in the future, the question that now emerges is this: what else is left of the cultural dimensions of loyalty? To answer this, one has to examine what I shall call the ‘cultural atmosphere’ created by the perpetuation of certain ceremonies, the institutionalisation of certain awards and titles and the glorification of certain feudal heroes and heroines. The total effect of all this has been the perpetuation of a cultural atmosphere which bestows legitimacy upon the political and economic dimensions of unquestioning loyalty. Before I embark upon the actual analysis, it is necessary to clarify an important point In most modern monarchies one would expect a certain degree of revivification of practices associated with the traditional past when kingship was feudal in attitude and character. But what happens very often is that the customs and ceremonies of the feudal court undergo a massive transformation in consonance with the emergence of a modern, constitutional monarchy. It is true to say that by and large this has not happened in the constitutional monarchy in Malaysia. Many ceremonies of the old feudal courts in various states are still in fashion.274 At important state and national functions like the birthday of a ruler or on private occasions like the marriage of a princess, or the circumcision of a young prince or the birth of a royal baby, these ceremonies are re-enacted with meticulous accuracy. I am making this observation in a discussion about the substantive protectors, though it concerns the symbolic

The Merdeka University controversy towards the end of 1978, in which sections of the Chinese community demanded a Chinese-language university, would be an example of language conflicts in the interregnum. The controversy itself has been studied in The Real Issues: Aliran on the Merdeka University (Aliran Publications, Penang, 1979). The ancient ceremony to mark a young prince’s first contact with the earth was re-enacted in Negeri Sembilan not so long ago. Ear piercing and circumcision ceremonies are conducted with traditional splendour. This happened in the Perak royal household recently. In the early years of merdeka, the daughter of a ruler who was then the king was married off with all the pomp and grandeur of the old royal courts.

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protectors for the simple reason that it is the former that has the power and the responsibility to modernise the monarchical system. Their unwillingness to do so stems partially from a desire to preserve a certain atmosphere that facilitates the protector-protected relationship. Other instances will further strengthen this contention. If one looks at the awards given at royal birthdays since merdeka, one would be struck by the similarities they bear to the titles that existed in feudal Malacca and its successor-kingdoms. ‘Tun* and ‘Dato” would be two good examples. More importantly, the amount of money spent on these awards at both state and federal levels,275 the significance the government attaches to the whole exercise and the time and energy that political leaders and senior bureaucrats devote to the preparation of the award lists and the attendant ceremonies would astound and confound a faithfill defender of a modern, constitutional monarchy. It is not just the attitude of the power-holders which helps sustain the significance of these awards in present-day Malaysia. The recipients, actual and potential, have also contributed to the situation. The middle and upper class regard these titles and awards as important ‘prestige badges’. It is wellknown that many of them, especially those who are active in business or establishment politics, spend a lot of energy, and in some cases allegedly money,276 to ensure that their names get onto the ‘roll of honour’. The feet that over 112,000 such titles and awards have been issued at the federal level alone since 1958277 in a country where the adult population is about 5V4 million has not diminished the interest and enthusiasm of these title­ seekers and award-chasers. It is a mark of the significance accorded to these honours by the middle and upper class that, once a medical doctor or a university don receives a ‘Tan Sri’ or ‘Datuk*, the title takes precedence over his professional prefix which is relegated to the background. The only title that would take precedence over that title would be a hereditary royal

275 S.H. Alatas suggests that, ‘in the last ten years since Merdeka, Malaysia must have spent millions in medals and ribbons* in ‘Feudalism^ Modernisation, op. cit., p. 109. The figure today must be much higher. 276 A recent (early 1979) court case involving two ladies from a certain royal house who had allegedly accepted bribes from a businessman keen on acquiring a high title through their assistance is, I suppose, a possible example of what I mean. 277 For figures, see New Straits Times, 6 June, 1979.

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title like ‘Tunku’ or ‘Ungku’.278 This by itself establishes the overwhelming importance of the court and the feudal tradition. Titles and awards aside, the feudal atmosphere finds expression in yet another form. This is through the UMNO leadership’s conception of a hero in society. How a group conceives of the social hero is often a reflection of its value system. It reflects what it regards as good, noble and virtuous in a man and in his community. While it is undeniable that there are other notions of the hero which UMNO leaders subscribe to,279 it is equally true that the feudal conception of the hero has a dominant influence upon their thought processes. As evidence, one has to be reminded that the annual child-hero award - one of the nation’s most distinguished awards - is named after Hang Tuah (the Pingat Hang Tuah).280 Hang Tuah, as we know from the first chapter, was the perfect embodiment of slavish, unquestioning loyalty to the ruler. That was his one most outstanding characteristic, a characteristic that overshadowed all others and conditioned his total outlook. It is that name that graces the nation’s annual award to its bravest child. One can interpret the Pingat Hang Tuah as an attempt to present Hang Tuah as a model worthy of emulation by the nation’s young. One can argue that the UMNO elites would like to see the youth of Malaysia demonstrate their bravery in the way in which Hang Tuah displayed his courage - willing to fight for his leader even if his (the leader’s) interests transgressed every ethical consideration in his religion. That Hang Tuah is regarded as a great and mighty hero is evinced in a number of other things as well. Roads, buildings, boats, bridges and schools in different parts of the country have been named after him. He is an integral aspect of Malay folklore, an important character in Malay literature. Why, he is even quoted at times especially when the object is to instill a sense of confidence in the Malay community.281 278 In this connection, it is usefill to note that neither Tunku Abdul Rahman nor Tunku Razaleigh (the Finance Minister) use any of the other titles conferred upon them. 279 There is also the capitalist notion of a hero as embodied in Revolusi Mental, op. cit., p. 172. 280 This award was started by Tunku Abdul Rahman in the early years of Merdeka. It is still with us. A detailed analysis of Hang Tuah in relation to Malay political culture is found in Shaharuddin Maaruf, The Conception of the Hero in Malay Society, MA. dissertation (University of Singapore, Singapore, 1979). 251 This is what Dr Mahathir tried to do in the introduction of his Menghadapi Cabaran

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As far as feudal history is concerned, it is not just Hang Tuah who has the honour of an award named after him; for the outstanding lady citizen of the year there is the Pingat Tun Fatimah. Tun Fatimah, a royal personality from 15th century Malacca, had no outstanding trait in her which would justify an award in her honour. Neither did she make any distinguished contribution to the kingdom. Even as a historical personage, the crafty and intelligent Tun Kudu is better known. All that one can say in favour of Tun Fatimah is that she was the wife of one of the Sultans of Malacca! Surely, much more should be required of a person whose name adorns the highest award that the nation's female population is capable of winning. The Tun Fatimah medal merely goes to illustrate the significance that the UMNO leadership attaches to the court and to its own feudal traditions. To understand this better, some comparison is needed with the Indonesian situation. There, its great women are now awarded the ‘Raden Kartini’ medal. Raden Kartini was, as we know, one of the earliest Indonesian women to be concerned with the emancipation of her sex from the shackles of Javanese custom. Her writings are generally regarded as an important contribution to the growth of Indonesian nationalism. To honour her is to honour the struggle for freedom of both the Indonesian women and people. Thus, while the Indonesian award has a great deal of meaning for contemporary society, the Pingat Tim Fatimah has little relevance to the aspirations of a modern nation. Hang Tuah and Tim Fatimah apart, other personalities from the Malay feudal past have also been honoured in a multitude of ways - confirmation, no doubt of the reverence accorded to the court It is not uncommon to find the main thoroughfares of cities named after Sultans and princes. Government offices, colleges, halls and other public places of importance also bear the names of royal personages from both the past and the present. The total effect of all this has been the preservation and perpetuation of a cultural atmosphere which facilitates the psychological relationship of protection in return for loyalty between ruler and ruled. So important is this atmosphere that one is compelled to suggest that the continued perpetuation of political, economic and cultural relationships which centre around the (Pusaka Antara, 1976), p. XIV. The quotation he used was the famous remark attributed to Hang Tuah, ‘Ta’kan Melayu hilang dart Dunia* (The Malays will not disappear from the world).

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notion of unquestioning loyalty has created what may be described as a ‘neo-feudal’ situation. Compared to the simple, straightforward ties between monarch and subject in chapter one, the neo-feudal situation is more complex and complicated. There are now two foci of loyalty operating in two different ways. The Sultan, who was the sole focus of unquestioning loyalty in the traditional context, is now only a symbolic protector while the UMNO leadership (and more specifically its president) is perceived as the substantive protector. There is, of course, a nexus between the symbolic protector and the substantive protector. Quite apart from this difference between the traditional and contemporary periods, the substantive protector - unlike the symbolic protector whose position is unassailable - has to make every effort to ensure that it is able to maintain its hold over the community and the party. The infrequent challenges to the authority of the UMNO leadership has in a sense brought about a new situation which has no parallel in the earlier period. Why this is so and how these challenges manifest themselves will be discussed in the next chapter. For the time being, it is enough to remember that the political environment in which the UMNO leadership has sought to sustain the concept of unquestioning loyalty is a totally different one. It is not just the political environment which is different; the ethnic environment too has changed radically. As we have seen, it is this new ethnic environment with its huge non-indigenous population which has bestowed a new potency upon the UMNO leadership’s protector role. More than any other factor the non-indigenous presence, it will be recalled, is responsible for the very existence of the quid pro quo relationship between protection and loyalty. The external environment never had quite the same impact upon the monarch-subject ties of the past. There is another point of variance. In traditional society, the concept of unquestioning loyalty was used largely to further the personal interests of the ruler. While personal interests may still have some influence, there is no doubt at all that today, the concept serves mainly the interests of a whole group, perhaps a whole class, with a particular political orientation and particular economic thrust In other words, unquestioning loyalty is not insisted upon for its own sake anymore; it is linked to larger goals and larger aims.

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Finally, if the relationship between ruler and ruled in traditional society was unequal as we established in the first chapter, the relationship between protector and protected in contemporary society is certainly far more equal. It has been shown how each time a protector is perceived to have failed in his role, the protected invariably withdraw their loyalty. This did not happen in traditional society where the ruled had no choice but to accept the ruler even if he betrayed their interests. God - not the people - was expected to punish him. In spite of all these differences, however, there is still that expectation of loyalty in return for protection. It is this expectation operating within a new environment and responding to new challenges that we shall call ‘neofeudalism’. Neo-feudalism then is part of the political outlook of the UMNO leadership. As a doctrine, it retains the essence of the feudal relationship between ruler and ruled, but at the same time has a character of its own derived from its new milieu.

Chapter Five

Loyalty: Consequences: Reflections

Having examined the concept and practice of unquestioning loyalty from the Malaccan to the post-Merdeka period, it is now necessary to evaluate its total impact upon society. As far as the Malaccan period is concerned, we have in a sense already shown the adverse consequences of unquestioning loyalty. With the colonial period too, we had noted in chapter three that unquestioning loyalty to the Sultans benefited primarily the British while the Malay masses remained poor and neglected. How has it been with the period after the Second World War, beginning with the Malayan Union episode? The great apprehension within an economically weak indigenous community about being overwhelmed by a huge immigrant tidal wave was, we have seen, both real and actual. The fight against the Malayan Union was therefore a just struggle. But it does not follow from this that the only way in which victory could be secured was through unquestioning loyalty to the administocratic class. Hypothetically speaking, other groups with more rational conceptions of ruler-ruled ties could have also fought the Malayan Union since they too were vehemently opposed to the whole scheme.282 However, we know that given the feudal structure of Malay society only the administocratic class was in a position to mobilise and unite the Malays. And it is this advantage which the administocrats utilised to their own benefit. For while fighting the Malayan Union citizenship proposals on behalf of the Malay community as a whole, the administocrats also managed to protect the position of the monarchs and Malay administrators which was threatened by the new British policy. 282 Among them would have been groups like PKMM, API or even the social democratic SEBERKAS with its base in Kedah. See Gordon Means, Malaysian Politics (University of London Press, 1970), especially chapter seven.

ino

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This remarkable convergence of interests between the ruling class and the Malay community is a point of great significance. The Malayan Union was but the first of a series of episodes where the same convergence has manifested itself. It is the sort of convergence which often allows the ruling class to manipulate the interests of the masses for its own benefit. The bond between ruler and ruled that facilitates this is, of course, the attitude of unquestioning loyalty. Various episodes of the post-merdeka period which we studied in chapter four provided further support for this contention. Take the 1959 UMNO-MCA crisis, for instance. Given a historical Malay polity and the conferment of citizenship upon a huge segment of the non-Malay population in 1957, the level of non-Malay participation in politics was already significant.283 The MCA demands for more parliamentary seats was from that point of view totally unjustified. It certainly constituted a challenge to the legitimate Malay political position - apart from being a challenge to the role of UMNO within the Alliance. Nonetheless, the UMNO leadership was wrong in suggesting that it was only through loyalty that the Malay political position could be protected. What Malay society did not know was that its political position was already secure through weightage for rural constituencies in the electoral system. Rural weightage, incidentally, had nothing to do with ethnicity when it was first formulated in 1954.284 It is a system that exists in other countries where limited access to public services and the dispersed character of rural populations, among other considerations, makes it necessary to provide greater weightage to rural constituencies in order to achieve some parity in relation to the more advantaged urban constituencies.285 As long as there is this disparity in access, rural weightage would be justified.286 Within the Malaysian

233 For a detailed analysis of the increase in non-Malay political participation, see my Protection, op. cit., chapter five. 234 The system was formulated by a committee appointed by the federal council. It was a multiethnic committee and its recommendations are contained in the Report of the committee appointed to examine the questions of elections to the Federal Legislative Council, 1954. 253 The various reasons for rural weightage are traced in my Protection, op. cit., chapter one. This also means that as the rural situation improves, there should be adjustments in the wpightage system. The principles for working out the weightage system are set out

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electoral system, rural weightage produces many more Malay-majority constituencies than non-Malay-majority constituencies. It is this - more than any other factor - that ensures Malay political pre-eminence. In other words, the Malay political position is safe and secure as long as there is rural weightage. Unquestioning loyalty to the UMNO leadership is certainly not a prerequisite for the protection of the Malay political position. It is, however, vital for the preservation of the political position of the UMNO leadership. We have just seen how the MCA challenge provided an opportunity for the UMNO leadership to merge its interests with that of the Malay community. A similar pattern unfolded in the Lee Kuan Yew episode. Without any understanding of the historical background of the land and of the accommodation of non-Malays in what was essentially a Malay polity, Lee launched a massive attack upon Malay political pre-eminence, the dominant role of the Malay language and even the indigenous status of the Malay community. Expectedly, this generated a great deal of fear within the community. As we had observed in the previous chapter, the UMNO leadership used the occasion to insist upon unquestioning loyalty from its own rank-and-file and the community. It argued that this was the only effective way of protecting Malay interests. In reality, however, Malay political pre-eminence created by the weightage system and a pervasive consciousness within the community of the legitimacy of that pre-eminence which had begun to crystallise by the mid-sixties were much more powerful guarantees. It is a pity that the Malay community was never really given an opportunity to discover this. Even to this day, there is very little understanding of the key variables in the Malay political position. In the 1969 episode which we analysed in the last chapter, the electoral challenge mounted by some non-Malay based political parties - a challenge to the Malay political and cultural position - was manipulated to ensure the emergence of a new UMNO leadership which very quickly became the cynosure of unquestioning support and loyalty. Once again, the electoral reverses suffered by UMNO did not affect the Malay position as such since the opposition (PAS) with its uncompromising stand on the Malay language, Islam and Malay political power was now stronger than it was in 1964 or

in the 13th schedule to the Constitution. See Muhammad Suffian, op. tit., p. 69.

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even 1959 based on the votes polled.287 Of course, it could still be argued that the Malay position was in jeopardy in 1969 if we chose to equate it with the UMNO position! Equating the UMNO position with the Malay position and then using said equation as the basis for validating the leadership’s role as the protector has undeniably developed into a political habit within the nation’s biggest political party. In the process, the leadership has had to conceal the actual and real nature of the situation of the Malay political position. Because the actual situation is not revealed, one is tempted to suggest that Mannheim’s definition of the particular conception of ideology fits the UMNO leadership. Mannheim defined it ‘as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his [the person’s] interests’.288 Certainly it would not be in the interest of the UMNO leadership if the Malays realised that it is the existing, non-ethnic, electoral system that is more crucial to their political position than the protection that their substantive, or for that matter symbolic, leaders can offer! Describing the protector-protected relationship as an ideology in the Mannheimian sense assumes even greater meaning when we begin to examine the economic dimensions of that relationship. Like citizenship in the Malayan Union and non-Malay challenges, which we have just analysed, there were undoubtedly various elements in the objective economic situation that created fear and insecurity among the Malay population. The poverty of the Malay masses, the paucity of Malays in the professions, commerce and industry, and the smaller Malay component in the middle-and-upper levels of society - especially within a capitalist structure where the possession of wealth implies power, prestige and influence - have all contributed to this feeling of insecurity. As we have observed in chapter four, the UMNO approach to the problem is to provide special opportunities and facilities to the Malays without upsetting the fundamentals of a capitalist economy. I have already discussed how an economy based upon capital and directed towards profits is bound to heighten the predicament of a poor community An interesting analysis of the voting pattern can be found in KJ. Ratnam and R.S. Milne, “The 1969 Parliamentary Election...’, op. cit. See Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, preface by Louis Wirth (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1966), p. 49.

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which, apart from everything else, has been repeatedly told that because of various cultural factors it just cannot compete with the others. It is a sense of diffidence arising from this - as I have argued - which makes protection and its twin companion, loyalty, possible. If we can show that the ‘special opportunities and facilities’ approach is not vital to the resolution of those economic obstacles confronting the poor Malay majority, we will be able to establish that protection and therefore, unquestioning loyalty, have no raison d’etre. To start with, both the ‘special opportunities and facilities’ provided for in the constitution and those that are made available through a multitude of public agencies can only hope to have a limited impact upon the total situation. A few examples will be sufficient to establish the point. To an extent, land reserved for Malays - a constitutional provision - has protected the concept of Malay land ownership.289 But since the provision does not make any internal distinction between rich Malays and poor Malays it means very little to the poor Malay who is either landless or sometimes compelled to sell whatever land he has to the rich Malay.290 Similarly, all the opportunities provided in commerce and industry through licenses, loans, advice, training and the like have only benefited certain categories of Malays desirous of entering business. Since political contact and other extraneous ties are known to be decisive in obtaining substantial credit facilities for commercial ventures, it is not inconceivable that genuine businessmen may sometimes be ignored in the endeavour to create a Malay commercial and industrial elite.291 It is not surprising, therefore, that after all these years the most viable Malay trading community in the country is still the one in Kelantan which developed through its own internal dynamism aided, no doubt, by the very limited role

289 This is spelt out in Article 89 of the Federal Constitution. See The Federal Constitution (Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1964). 290 For some description of the problem of landlessness in relation to the Malay reservations, see The Seed, Vol. 2, No. 5 and 6 (Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, Singapore, 1964), pp. 4-5. Also, Raja Mohar Badiozaman, ‘Malay Land Reservation and Alienation’, Intisari, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, Singapore). 291 The individuals and groups who dominate the Bumiputera Economic Congress provide some indication of this. See, for instance, Konggeres Ekonomi Buniiputra Kedua, Memorandum dari Perseorangan (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1968).

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of colonial entrepreneurship in that state.292 Even in education, special facilities such as loans, scholarships and places in post-secondary schools, colleges and universities mean little to the vast majority of Malay pupils who enter school every year. Given the high drop-out rate in the rural schools that most of them attend,293 it is more likely than not that only a handful of them will survive the school system to enjoy these benefits. Ihus, special facilities in education are irrelevant to the overwhelming majority of Malay families. By the same token, quotas in favour of Malays in the first division of the civil service, the legal and judicial service and certain other branches of the public services - which incidentally are also provided for in the constitution as a general principle294 - cannot possibly transform the economic condition of the bulk of Malay society. It is obvious that those who have really benefited are the officers themselves and their immediate families! In spite of all this, there is no denying that in certain specific areas ‘special opportunities’ have helped segments of Malay society. Special opportunities in education - though elitist as I just pointed out - have brought a significant increase in the Malay student population at tertiary levels 295 Also, special opportunities have expedited the growth of the Malay workforce in the urban sector,296 especially in those occupations which hitherto were dominated by non-Malays. But then in both instances we should not ignore a fact that tends to be ignored very often: that even if there were no special opportunities, the number of Malays in tertiary education and in urban occupations would have increased steadily over the years. The reason is simple. With the growth of primary and secondary education, more and more Malays have been qualifying for entry into colleges and universities, just as those who fail to get into these institutions and others who seek jobs upon completion of school, are bound to be

For a history' of economic development in Kelantan, see Tjoa Soei Hock, Institutional Background to Modem Economic and Social Development in Malaya (with special reference to the East Coast) (Liu & Liu Agency, Kuala Lumpur, 1963). See Kajian Keciciran (Ministry of Education, Kuala Lumpur, 1973). For details on the quotas applied in the various services, see Muhammad Sufitan Hashim, op. tit., chapter 17. See Mid-Term Review Second Malaysia Plan, op. tit., p. 192. :’5 Ibid., p. 151.

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absorbed into a whole variety of urban occupations.297 All this merely means that ‘special opportunities and facilities’ have performed a very limited role in the actual battle to improve the livelihoods of the majority of Malays. This will become even more apparent when we begin to analyse areas of the economy which have a direct bearing upon the well-being of the community. The problem of uneconomic padi and rubber holdings, exploitation in the rural credit and marketing system, landlessness, the paucity of rural industries, low income at the lowest levels of urban employment, among other features of the existing socioeconomic structure, have had the total effect of shackling the Malay community to the poverty it inherited from its colonial and feudal past. What is more significant to us is that none of the problems we have outlined can be resolved through ‘special opportunities and facilities’. Each and every one of them requires fundamental changes to the prevailing social structures. Economic holdings, for instance, can only be created if we make basic alterations to the pattern of ownership and control of land in the rural economy. Similarly, the marketing system will benefit the poor only if the mechanisms of distribution and exchange are fair and just to the poor. Low urban incomes will improve only if the concept of labour in relation to capital undergoes a transformation 298 Structural changes of this sort are not being attempted. And yet most writers on problems confronting the Malay economy have recognised the urgent need for structural transformation in order to alleviate the poverty and misery of the community.299 Indeed, it is true that without a massive socioeconomic transformation, the majority of Malays will continue to be as poor as they had been under the British and their own monarchs in the

297 For instance, Malay participation in the manufacturing sector in particular had already reached the 30 per cent mark by 1970 without any rigid enforcement of quotas and the like. Loc. cit. 298 For some discussion of the need for such changes, see Kamal Salih, ‘Unbalanced growth and persistent poverty: The consequences of unequal access in urban and rural development*, Colloquium, The Etiology of Poverty (Malaysian Economic Association, March 1976) and his "The TMP at the mid-term: A Review of the Review’, Seminar Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysian Plan (Malaysian Economic Association, May 1979). 299 For examples, see Poverty in Malaysia, B.A.R. Mokhzani and Khoo Sew Mun, eds. (Persatuan Ekonomi Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1977).

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past. The British could not be expected to undertake such a transformation since it would have been against their colonial objectives. The Sultans were part of a feudal era where the huge gap in wealth and status between the ruling class and the subject-class was one of the defining characteristics of that period in history. The question is: what has prevented the post-merdeka protectors from performing this task? Part of the explanation lies in the way in which an expanding Malay middle and upper class has benefited from all the bounties that capitalism has bestowed upon them.300 The conservative political outlook of the group that inherited power from the British in 1957 and the ties it had developed with the capitalist-oriented MCA would be among some of the other factors. The crucial point that needs to be emphasised over and over again, however, is that the existing capitalist set-up is clearly inimical to the genuine interests of the Malay masses - and yet it is being maintained for the benefit of the upper echelons of society. Thus the economic dimension of the protector-protected relationship is a key part of the ideology. The real nature of the situation - that it does not serve the interest of the majority - is disguised. In this way the power and position of the elites are preserved and protected. In a sense, the protectors have more than succeeded in disguising the situation. The Malay community appears to be more or less convinced that the ‘special opportunities and facilities’ approach is vital for their survival. The widespread acceptance of this approach is indicative of what can be called a ‘false consciousness’ within the community, ‘a set of mistaken beliefs about matters important to them shared by a whole group of persons or even a whole community’.301 False consciousness operates in a manner that is easily discernible. Any suggestion of structural transformation is discredited as ‘socialist’, ‘communist’ or ‘anti-national’ propaganda even though it may have been propounded by individuals and groups who have nothing to do with socialism of any variety.302 The Malay community is then persuaded that

For some discussion, see my Some Dominant Concepts, op. cit., especially chapter four. 5;i This is, of course, a Marxian concept For an interpretation see John Plamenatz, Ideology (MacMillan, 1970). The quotation is from pp. 23-4. 55- This ‘labelling* is done very often by a variety of leaders at both federal and state levels. Some of them have an extremely superficial knowledge of socialism. For an

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without special opportunities they would be destroyed completely. Its limited usefulness is cleverly concealed from the masses. The impression is that every form of economic activity directed towards the community is connected with its ‘special position’. The harsh realities of competition in the existing capitalist system is presented as proof that without special assistance the Malays will remain poor and backward. That it is the system itself which by its very nature favours the well-established entrepreneur endowed with capital - that makes it difficult for Malays to compete is a truth that is never revealed. Neither are they aware that the ‘rags-to-riches’ story of an odd individual or two does not offer salvation for a whole community.303 More importantly, the Malays are incessantly reminded that a whole lot of cultural factors impede their capacity to compete or to progress on their own. There has never been an occasion where an UMNO protector has admitted that the Malays have adapted admirably to social change. Their enthusiastic response to modern education, modern medicine, to double cropping, to large-scale irrigation, to form mechanisation, to FELDA schemes, to industrialisation, to urban jobs, to new occupations, all go to show that the Malay cultural ethos is not, and has never been, an obstacle to progress and development.304 On the contrary, leaders who complain that the Malays lack initiative sometimes discover, much to their chagrin, that they (the Malays) are quite capable of opening up land on their own especially if the bureaucracy is slow in responding to their applications.305 Even in colonial times, Malay initiative was not lacking. We know, for instance, that rural Malays were keen on English education. In feet, they requested that English schools be built in their kampongs. It was the British and the Malay elites who turned down their requests on the ground that English-educated Malays ‘would not take kindly to the pursuit of their

example of such ‘labelling’, see Mahathir Mohamad’s comments in the New Straits Times, 28 May, 1977. For superficial, even erroneous, understanding of socialism see his views in Utusan Malaysia, 14 September, 1979. 303 In this connection, a leading Sunday newspaper, the Sunday Mail, has been featuring success stories of Malays who have made it ‘to the top’ in business and industry in the hope -1 suppose - of inspiring others! 304 See my “Ihe New Economic Policy and the Quest for National Unity’, Fifth Economic Convention (Malaysia Economic Association, Kuala Lumpur, 1978). 305 See S. Husin Ali, Malay Peasant Society and Leadership (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975), pp. 157-160.

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forefathers’306 Malay initiative was manifested in yet another way. When the price of rubber began to increase during the First World War, many rural Malays who had hitherto grown rice on their reservations decided to turn to the new crop. The British were, however, determined to step up food production which had been affected by the war. This was why they amended the Rice Land Enactment to ensure that only padi was planted on reservations. Malays who planted rubber had their trees cut down or sometimes enforcement officers deliberately flooded the peasant’s fields in order ‘to kill any other cultivation there’.307 It should be apparent now that from the colonial period right up to the present, the ruling class’s attitudes rather than the subject class’s cultural traits appear to be the main impediments to progress. And yet Malay society as a whole seems to believe that its cultural shortcomings constitute the real hindrance. It is an outstanding example of false consciousness, just as the inability to appreciate the need for structural transformation, the inability to understand the limited usefulness of the special opportunities approach and the inability to connect the fear of competition to the capitalist system are equally important aspects of false consciousness. Indeed, it is because of false consciousness that the masses have come to believe that they need a protector. They labour under the mistaken belief that in a situation where an economically weak community is so dependent upon special opportunities, a protector is simply imperative. One mistaken belief leads to another. Once a protector becomes imperative, unquestioning loyalty to the protector becomes equally imperative. The community then begins to feel that the only way in which its economic well-being can be safeguarded is by maintaining its internal unity through unstinted loyalty to the UMNO leadership. False consciousness thus facilitates the protector-protected relationship. It facilitates the perpetuation of that relationship as an ideology. To put it differently, the elites begin by creating false consciousness, mistaken beliefs, within the community about matters important to it These beliefs, which

535 See for instance Raja Chilian’s comment quoted in Lim Chong-Yah, Economic Development ofModem Malaya (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1967), pp. 175. 3-" See Lim Teck Ghee, Peasant Agriculture in Colonial Malaya, Ph.D. thesis (Australian National University, Canberra, 1971), p. 127.

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have become pervasive, in turn help the leadership to camouflage the actual situation. By camouflaging the actual situation, the leadership encourages the growth of false consciousness. It then becomes a mutually reinforcing process. So far, we have looked at the economic dimension of the protectorprotected relationship - a relationship which we described as neo-feudal at the end of the last chapter. Now neo-feudalism as we know it also operates in the cultural sphere. That court-based ceremonies, Hang Tuah and the award-system merely strengthen the position of the ruling class is something that should be obvious to any discerning observer. Unfortunately, such a perception has not developed within Malaysian society as a whole. This is partly because the middle and upper classes, within both the Malay and non-Malay communities, are direct beneficiaries of the award-system. It has influenced their mentality to such an extent that they cannot distinguish their own interests from the interests of the ruling elites, vis-a-vis the award­ system. It is this that has enabled the elites to disguise the actual situation. It is this that makes the cultural dimension of neo-feudalism an ideology in the real sense of the word. From all this, we can conclude that the existence of neo-feudalism as an ideology is the single most serious consequence of unquestioning loyalty. It acts as a psychological block to the realisation of the genuine interests of the Malay community in the political, economic and cultural spheres. It allows the ruling class to protect and perpetuate its own interests at the expense of the community. It strengthens and solidifies the position of the elites in a manner that is detrimental to the well-being of the community. It enables the elites to consolidate their hold upon the community to a point where its capacity for independent expression and action is adversely affected. This brings us to the second consequence of unquestioning loyalty. Without any doubt at all, democracy within UMNO in particular and Malay society in general - since the former has such a great impact upon the thinking of the latter - has been conditioned by this relationship between leader and led. In a democracy it is natural to expect lively debate and discussion on the views and decisions of the ruling elites. When such an atmosphere is missing one begins to doubt whether democracy is in operation at all. From that angle, the situation within UMNO defies the canons of democratic behaviour - though it makes a lot of sense within the context of a neo-feudal psychology.

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In order to show that genuine democracy has never really developed within UMNO, I shall analyse just two events. Towards the middle of 1972, UMNO and PAS leaders were actively considering the possibility of establishing coalition governments between the two parties at state and federal levels.308 Since the two parties had been arch rivals for almost two decades, and since any decision would have had a tremendous impact upon the future of Malaysian politics, it was only fair that the issue be debated thoroughly at least by PAS and UMNO. As far as PAS was concerned, the issue was hotly discussed at branch and divisional meetings before a special assembly was called to make a decision on the coalition proposal. At the assembly itself the opponents of the proposal aired their views freely and although the advocates of coalition won the day, the decision was certainly made in a democratic atmosphere.309 In UMNO, on the other hand, the issue was not discussed at branch and divisional levels by the rank-and-file of the party. No special assembly was called; indeed even the annual UMNO assembly meetings in 1972 and 1973 did not probe the coalition question. It was the leaders in the supreme council who decided; the rest merely followed suit It illustrated quite vividly the absence of a democratic outlook among both leaders and followers. On almost all issues, with the exception of those which are interpreted as constituting ‘a threat to the Malay position?10 there is a general inclination to refrain from questioning the wisdom of the leaders, especially the party president An unwillingness to judge, to evaluate the power-holders. At best some delegates to the UMNO assembly may decide to chide an important leader in an oblique, somewhat deferential manner. The crucial point is that UMNO assemblies have yet to emerge as arenas for serious, sustained analysis on the performance of an UMNO-led government.

333 See Ucapan, Pembukaan Resmi Data* Muhammad Asri Konggeres PAS Ke-18,1972. 339 For details, see Straits Times, 22 December, 1972. 310 The Communist insurgency, mainly because of its association with the Chinese, has often been seen as a threat to the Malay political position. For that reason, it has always generated a lot of debate in UMNO circles. This happened in the 1976 UMNO general assembly which came in the wake of disclosures of communist infiltration in UMNO. See Utusan Malaysia, 3 and 5 July, 1976 and Mingguan Malaysia, 4 July, 1976. Tn a sense, the arrival of illegal Vietnamese immigrants was also perceived as a threat to the Malay position - hence the reactions at the 1979 UMNO general assembly. See Utusan and Mingguan Malaysia, 7-9 July, 1979.

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It is because of this attitude, which is certainly a by-product of unquestioning loyalty, that transgressions in the conduct of public affairs are seldom challenged. The second event which I alluded to earlier will help buttress this argument. Just before the UMNO general assembly in July 1976, it was disclosed in the High Court during the corruption trial of Dato’ Harun Idris that since 1959, Tun Razak, first as UMNO deputy president and later as UMNO president, had been operating a ‘special fund’ to which huge firms and industries in the private sector, apart from local millionaires, had been contributing to on a regular basis.311 The menteri besar of many of the states also operated similar funds in their capacity as the local head of the ruling party. The money collected was apparently used for party purposes such as election campaigns. It must be emphasised, however, that the party constitution does not authorise any official to operate such a fund,312 which in any case had not been approved by either the general assembly or the party’s supreme council. Besides, it did not observe any accounting procedures on any of the other rules and regulations that normally govern such activities. In fact, the whole of UMNO was in the dark about the fund which the presiding judge appropriately described as a ‘secret fund’.313 What is significant is that not a single delegate to the general assembly raised the matter which had been widely publicised in the press. There was no discussion at all on an issue which in some other societies would have destroyed the very foundations of the organisation. The unwillingness of the delegates to challenge the leadership - a leadership which had inherited its authority from Tun Razak314 - on a moral question of such importance manifests the degree to which the concept of loyalty has influenced UMNO and, perhaps, Malay society as a whole. The ‘special fund’ episode in fact leads us to the third consequence of unquestioning loyalty. It has created a situation where ethics and integrity are subordinated to the idea of loyalty. Indeed, it can even be said that it is partly because loyalty occupies such a central role in Malay political thought

3,1 312 3,3 314

See reports on the ‘Harun trial,’ New Straits Times, 22 April - 5 May, 1976. See The UMNO Constitution (1960). See New Straits Times, 22 May, 1976. Of course, Tun Razak was already dead at that time. Dato’ Hussein Onn was acting UMNO president and prime minister. He had served as deputy prime minister to Tun Razak and was clearly very attached to the Dm.

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that a strong sense of moral aversion towards corruption, abuse of power, exploitation and oppression have not developed within UMNO and the community. The usual association of disvalues - abuse of power would be a good instance - with the ruling class means the act of condemning and crusading against them must include some castigation of the powerholders themselves! Surely a party which has been inculcated with the attitude of unquestioning loyalty to the leader cannot be expected to do this. Neither can it be expected to give sufficient importance to some of the other qualities which accompany the modernising process such as rationality, efficiency, ability, honesty, diligence and industry. For, in a situation where loyalty takes precedence over most other considerations, it is conceivable that men who are neither efficient nor able to play significant roles will be in UMNO and the government. Efficiency and ability will have less weight in the evaluation of the UMNO leadership than servility. It is these attributes rather than some sterling qualities of mind and heart which will be rewarded. Ihe leadership’s method of evaluating men is bound to have some impact upon the thinking of ordinary members of UMNO - a phenomenon which is easy to understand since those in authority very often influence the behaviour of their followers, as both Ibn Khaldun and Karl Mannheim had observed.315 Thus UMNO branches and divisions have been known to support individuals with a dismal record of public service simply because they are absolutely loyal to the top leadership, whose confidence they enjoy.316 As long as this is so, as long as negative human qualities which affect work, enterprise and the public good are accepted in the name of loyalty, UMNO cannot claim to have developed a modern, rational conception of leadership and society. The scope that unquestioning loyalty affords to the perpetuation of negative human qualities persuades us to consider the phenomenon from the perspective of the human being as such. What does unquestioning loyalty’ do to the human being? Since concepts of the human being, of man, tend to vary in different traditions, I shall examine the issue from the Islamic

315 See Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddintah: An Introduction to History, Frantz Rosenthal, tr. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967), Vol 1, p. 300. Also, Karl Mannheim, Man & Society in an Age ofReconstruction (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, London, 1940), p. 40. 3:6 Harun Hassan and Subky Latif have made similar arguments in Siapa Selepas Tun Razak? (Amir Enterprise, 1975), chapter two.

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standpoint. After all, Islam is regarded as the religious and philosophical basis of Malay society. As far as man is concerned, Islam’s central purpose is the creation of a moral being completely devoted to God. This being must incorporate in his personality all those noble values which constitute the ethical crux of the Qur’an like a love for justice, a commitment to truth, tolerance, compassion, integrity and righteousness.317 As we have just seen, unquestioning loyalty to the leader has a baneful effect upon the growth of many of these values. More important, unquestioning loyalty tends to deprecate the position of man itself. For, in Islam, one of the most precious attributes of man is his dignity. Maintaining one’s dignity would mean that every individual should relate to another on the basis of true equality.318 It also means that neither rank nor position should deter a human being from expressing what he feels is right and just. Throughout this study we have recorded episode after episode which establishes beyond any doubt that where unquestioning loyalty prevails, righteousness and justice have to be content with subordinate roles. The individuals who find themselves in such situations cannot possibly protect their dignity. When all is said and done, this is perhaps the most serious indictment against the whole notion of unquestioning loyalty: it affects the very heart of man. Finally, let us find out how unquestioning loyalty is connected to ethnic relations and the quest for national unity. We are aware from our analysis that unquestioning loyalty is something that a Malay protector expects from the Malays and from UMNO in return for what he sees as the political, economic, cultural and psychological protection provided to the community and the party. It is, in other words, a relationship within the community. In itself it cannot be defined as a communal relationship; it is merely a community-based relationship. But that relationship becomes communal the moment the UMNO leadership seeks to maintain and reinforce the protector-protected bond through the evocation of a non-Malay threat to the Malay position. For the idea of a non-Malay threat presupposes a Malay in-group defending itself against a non-Malay out-group. While it is granted that the actions of non-Malay elites have created some insecurity within the 317 See B.A. Dar, ‘Ethical teachings of die Quran*, A History ofMuslim Philosophy, Vol. 1, M.M. Sharif, ed. (Otto Harvassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1963). 318 See Ibrahim Makdour, ‘The Concept of Man in Islamic Thought’, Ute Concept ofMan, S. Rahdakrishnan and P.T. Raju, eds. (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1960).

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Malay community, there is no denying that Malay elites themselves have used the situation to their own advantage - as we had noted a while ago. Insofar as this truth is camouflaged by the whole practice of unquestioning loyalty, we can state quite positively that it is a bane upon ethnic relations. Distrust and suspicion between communities which must accompany any perception of one as a threat to the other will only serve to hinder the process towards national unity. Because this perception is so crucial to the ideology of loyalty, there is a constant endeavour to sustain and strengthen its effect upon the consciousness of the community. Every effort in that direction, needless to say, will further polarise the communities. Complete polarisation, however, will injure the position of the UMNO leadership itself since it is the dominant partner in the interethnic Barisan Nasional which presides over a multiethnic nation. For that reason, there has to be a certain degree of interethnic understanding. But at the same time, genuine multiethnic consciousness would be against the interest of the UMNO leadership since it would cut deep into the protector-protected relationship. For once such consciousness emerges, it would not be possible to maintain a special intra-ethnic tie between a Malay protector and his flock Such a tie would then have no validity, no basis for existence. This explains why the UMNO leadership has always been apprehensive of genuine, earnest efforts to forge multi-ethnic solidarity whether through the labour movement or through social action groups.319 Since the crystallisation of genuine multiethnic consciousness which transcends ethnic barriers is widely recognised as a prerequisite for the creation of national unity, one can therefore conclude that unquestioning loyalty is certainly a stumbling block in the pursuit of that objective. Thus, unquestioning loyalty has very serious consequences for national unity, the development of an Islamic consciousness, the growth of an ethical outlook and the creation of a genuine democracy. Besides, it prevents the emergence of the sort of understanding which would make it possible for UMNO and the Malay community as a whole to realise its real interests in the political, economic and cultural spheres. 319 The concept of what constitutes a multiethnic movement is contained in Aliran: Basic Beliefs, 3rd Edition (Aliran Publications, Penang, August 1979). The difficulties that ALIRAN has been confronted with in getting its ideas across would bear testimony to this.

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Serious as these consequences are, it is nonetheless true that in spite of everything, sections of the Malay community are not only critical of Malay leadership but also quite prepared to defy and challenge its power and authority. We had observed this in a previous chapter; we had also suggested that this is one of the main reasons why the neo-feudal environment is different from the feudal setting. We shall now examine the phenomenon in greater depth. The question we should pose is: what factors have been responsible for the erosion of the original strength of unquestioning loyalty? If we are to examine the phenomenon from the perspective of time, the first factor would be the direct, sometimes effective, criticisms of the ways of the monarchs, which in a sense began with Munshi Abdullah. Abdullah’s views have already been studied in a previous chapter. What we have to bear in mind at this point is the effect such criticisms would have had upon segments of Malay society, especially its intelligentsia. For the first time, they would have been made aware of the flaws and foibles in the conduct and character of certain monarchs. The supernatural aura of infallible greatness would have lost its lustre in their eyes. Perhaps a more critical attitude even if unexpressed - would have begun to take root. A subtle yet perceptible transformation of this sort could be regarded as the first dent. Though Abdullah began the process, others in the 20th century, notably the Islamic reformers and the Malay socialists, developed and strengthened this thinking. Both the reformers and the socialists were influenced by powerful intellectual currents from outside Malay society. This in itself is a significant fact because it shows that a critical attitude towards unquestioning loyalty did not develop from within as a result of the interplay of sociological forces in the Malay Peninsula. The Islamic reformers, for instance, were strongly influenced by the dynamic, progressive movement for the revitalisation of Islam pioneered by Syed Jamaluddin Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh in the Middle East, and began to reappraise Malay society from a more critical angle.320 The writings of reformers like Syed Shaikh Al-hadi, Shaikh Tahir Jallaluddin, Shaikh Muhmmad bin Salim al-Kalali, Syed Muhammad bin Aqil and Tuan Hajji Abbas bin Muhammad Taha covered a whole range of issues

320 See S.H. Tan, The Life and Times ofSayyid Shaykh Al-Hadi, Academic Exercise, BA. Honours (University of Malaya, Singapore, 1961).

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which have been analysed elsewhere.321 What concerns us here is their criticism of certain attitudes related to the theme of our study. Malay society, they observed, accepted without question the authority of the established religious elites or the traditional ulama. This attitude was, in their opinion, inimical to Malay progress since the ulama were opposed to social and economic change or acquiring knowledge and ideas from the West. More importantly, the ulama were not prepared to fight colonialism; for the Islamic reformers, on the other hand, colonialism and the attendant denial of political freedom were the major causes of the backwardness of the Malays.322 Criticism of the ulama led inevitably to indirect comments about the Malay ruling class who were the ‘religious employers’ of the ulama. The allegedly decadent lifestyles of certain rulers and traditional leaders, their inability to provide leadership for the community and the reformers’ insistence upon the equality of all human beings could be interpreted as attacks upon the ruling class. The way in which the ruling class reacted to these criticisms merely goes to prove that they perceived the reformers’ thinking as a danger to their position.323 By highlighting the rakyat’s passive acceptance of the ulamas’ wisdom and by showing that the ruling class had some serious shortcomings, the reformers had made a small but significant contribution towards the erosion of the concept and practice of unquestioning loyalty. However, like Abdullah, they failed to link passivity and the locality of the community with the numbing effect of an age-old tradition.324 Neither did they criticise unquestioning loyalty to the ruling class as such. In one sense the Malay socialists were bolder. Exposed to the radical ideas in nationalism and socialism from Indonesia, these young Malays were even contemplating the replacement of the monarchical system with a republican form of government325 Many of them were Malay-educated school teachers and journalists, prominent among whom were Ibrahim

5:1 See W.R. Roff, op. cit., especially chapters two and three. ■— See S.H. Tan, op. cit., p. 58. 3:3 See W.R. Roff, op. cit., p. 79. I am not suggesting that there weren’t other causes for the passivity of the community. This has been made clear in chapter one of this study. 325 See my Some Dominant Concepts, op. cit., pp. 262-7.

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Yaacob, Hassan Manan, Abdul Karim Rashid, Onan Siraj, Othman Abdullah and Ahmad Boestamam. Most of their writings reveal that they were more concerned with the poorer strata of Malay society, with economic domination by the other communities, with colonial exploitation and with developing the Malay language. There was hardly any attempt to establish their loyalty to the rulers or the traditional elites. If anything, they felt only ‘contempt for the “lick-spittle” traditional elite who profited from colonial rule and maintained their own positions at the expense of the peasantry and the urban proletariat. These feelings, however, seem to have been vented largely in private, and though this may have afforded some cathartic relief for the members, it did not lead to political action’.326 Nevertheless, this was certainly evidence that, at least within the Malay socialist coterie, there was a feeling that the ruling class did not deserve any loyalty. The Japanese occupation of the country from 1941 to 1945 further fanned this feeling. The Japanese set aside the Malay ruling class since they regarded it as a class that had collaborated closely with the British during colonial rule. In its place, they decided to cultivate the Malay socialists. The overall purpose was, of course, to gain the active support and cooperation of a Malay group which could then be used to accomplish Japanese ends. For the Malay socialists like Ibrahim Yaacob, the Japanese scheme presented a great opportunity to propagate their nationalistic aspirations. They travelled all over the country trying to mobilise support for the idea of an independent, socialist Republic of Malaya and Indonesia to be called ‘Melayu Raya’.327 Every advance made by the socialists represented a setback for the traditional elites - and a setback for the cornerstone of their philosophy, the notion of unquestioning loyalty. But it was only a temporary setback Once the British returned - and after the Malayan Union was demolished - the traditional elites, as we had observed in chapter three, were back at the apex of Malay society. The socialists were robbed of a chance of developing a new set of relations between leader and led. Still, the consciousness generated by the occupation experience was not altogether 326 See W.R. Roff, op. cit., p. 233. 327 See Yoichi Itagaki, ‘Some Aspects of the Japanese Policy for Malaya under the Occupation, with special reference to Nationalism’, Papers on Malayan History, K.G. Tregonning, ed. (Singapore, 1962).

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lost. Within socialist circles there was obviously some reluctance to accept the leadership of the administocrats who were at the very helm of UMNO. And so, once the Malayan Union issue was settled, the Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM) - the party which some of the socialists had established after occupation - decided to pull out of UMNO.328 The PKMM leaders used the controversy over the colours for the proposed UMNO flag as the excuse.329 Since the PKMM was now on its own, it decided to mobilise Malay support. A few other dissident organisations joined the PKMM and eventually a socialist-cum-nationalist coalition of sorts was born - the Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (PUTERA).330 Though PUTERA failed to make any impact, its very existence, like the decision of the PKMM earlier on to leave UMNO at a time when Malay society was solidly united behind the administocrats, is a phenomenon that merits some discussion. The presence of the PKMM and PUTERA indicated dearly that there were now Malay groups that were psychologically prepared to remain outside the ‘court-rakyat’ bond. More than that, it meant that there were Malay groups who were confident enough to demonstrate openly that they did not owe their political loyalty to the UMNO leadership. It also meant that some Malays at least were beginning to feel that their unwillingness to assodate with UMNO did not amount to a betrayal of their Malayness. Islamic reformism, Malay socialism of the thirties, the Japanese occupation and the PKMM-PUTERA defiance of the UMNO leadership were therefore some of the forces and factors which weakened unquestioning loyalty. A more powerful factor, however, was yet to emerge. This came about with the introduction of electoral competition in the early

3:8 The PKMM - unlike the Ibrahim Yaacob group - was committed to merdeka for Malays. However, Indonesian nationalism was still its inspiration. At that time, it was possible to withdraw from UMNO since UMNO was essentially a confederation of parties, not a single party. See Ahmad Boestamam, Merintis, op. cit. The PKMM wanted red and white, the colours of the Indonesian nationalist movement What was accepted by the rest of the UMNO delegates was red and white with a yellow circle in the middle and a green keris. They remain UMNO’s colours. See Ahmad Boestamam, Dr Burhanuddin Putera Setia Melayu Raya (Pustaka Kejora, Kuala Lumpur, 1972), pp. 11-2. 333 See Ahmad Boestamam, Merintis, op. cit. Among the other organisations were API, AWAS, Hizbul Muslimin and Gerakan Angkatan Muda (GERAM).

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fifties. Parties could legitimately compete against each other. The UMNO leadership could be criticised by Malay groups and individuals as part of the electoral game. Whether they liked it or not, the UMNO leaders had to listen to these criticisms. Party politics and electoral competition must have been an altogether new and totally unfamiliar experience for the Malay ruling class with its roots in feudal history. As we have just hinted, it was the PKMM and PUTERA which first began playing the role of a sort of Malay opposition to UMNO. But the PKMM and a number of its allies were banned by the British in 1948 as part of the attempt to destroy radicalism in the movement for national independence.33* That is why when electoral competition was introduced, only the multiethnic Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) founded by Dato’ Onn Jaafar after he had left UMNO was in a position to perform as a critic. The sharp and frequent exchanges that Dato’ Onn and some other Malay leaders in the IMP had with the UMNO elites served to show the Malays that it was possible to challenge a group which wore the mantle of feudal authority.332 The fact that the critics were men who also came from an administocratic background and had worn the same mantle a while ago must have lent considerable weight to their criticisms. Indeed, it provided a great deal of respectability to dissent, to criticism and most of all to the right to be ‘disloyal’. One is doubtful if the socialists ever managed to gain such respectability, if they ever succeeded in providing legitimacy to dissent and ‘disloyalty’. The whole structure of Malay society - as noted in a previous chapter - was against them.333 From the socialists to electoral politics and Dato’ Onn, the right to question the Malay ruling class had moved yet another step forward. With the injection of Islam into anti-UMNO politics in the mid-fifties, it became even more legitimate to question and criticise the admistocrats. In a sense, 331 In fact, the PKMM was banned even before the Communist Party of Malaya was banned. See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Left Wing in Southeast Asia (Stanford University, California, 1955), pp. 144-5. 332 For some of these disagreements, see R.K. Vasil, Politics in a Plural Society (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971), especially chapter two. 333 Indeed, even the socialists - in their weaker moments - sought acceptability from the administocratic dass. See, for instance, an interesting account of a dialogue between the two groups which reveals this attitude. Ahmad Boestamam, Merintis, op. tit., pp. 37-8.

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Islam provided the sort of legitimacy that even Dato’ Onn could not. For, after all, Dato’ Onris withdrawal from UMNO could - and was - interpreted as a betrayal of the Malay cause especially by his political foes. However, dissent presented in the name of Islam, dissent justified on the basis of Islam - given the cherished image of the religion in the eyes of the Malay community - was a different matter. Whatever else it was, it could never be seen as a betrayal of the Malay cause. On the contrary, Islam has invariably been perceived as a defender of the community’s position. This image of Islam is perhaps due in part to the very intimate and pervasive relationship between the religion and the total culture of the Malays.334 Therefore, a party using Islam as its official philosophy can be expected to strike a responsive chord. The success of PAS from 1959 and its continued strength and influence, in spite of all the vicissitudes of politics, is testimony to this.335 In this connection, it should be noted that no other Malay group opposed to the UMNO leadership has achieved as much electoral success. Dato’ Onn, for all his standing within the community, failed to win a seat from 1955 to 1959 even after he had established a Malay communal party like Parti Negara to replace the non-communal IMP. Parti Negara was not seen as an Islamic party and for that reason, the dissent it represented did not have the same legitimacy. Eventually, when Dato’ Onn won a seat it was through the assistance of PAS.336 It was the same with Parti Rakyat, the socialist successor to PKMM. It failed to develop any support in Malay areas partly because its challenge to neo-feudal authority was not well received by the community as a whole. Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaya (PSRM), a modified version of Parti Rakyat, is in a similar situation - despite the fact that its leadership is Malay and its membership is preponderantly Malay. Indeed, so important is the role of Islam in the legimisation of dissent that one can go back into history and point out that even Bendahara Paduka Raja from the 334 Hiis is well discussed in Syed Muhammad al-Naquib al-Attas, Islam Dalam Sejarah dan Kebudayaan Melayu (University Kebangsaan, Kuala Lumpur, 1972). 333 In spite of PAS’s expulsion from Barisan Nasional in early 1978 and its electoral setbacks in both the Kelantan state election in March that year and in the Federal election in July, the party remains the only real competitor to UMNO. For the politics that led to PAS’s expulsion, see my ‘The National Front on Trial’, Southeast Asian Affairs 1978 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1978). 336 Dato’ Onn won a parliamentary seat from Terengganu in 1959. In the state elections held earlier PAS had captured power in Terengganu.

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Malacca Sultanate was prepared to defy the order of the Sultan to execute Hang Tuah because he was aware that it violated Islamic justice. The relevance of all this to unquestioning loyalty is only too apparent. Since Islam became part of opposition politics, the UMNO leadership has been confronted with the most serious challenge ever to the maintenance of its particular conception of loyalty in its relations with the community. If unquestioning loyalty is sanctified by Malay tradition, challenge to authority has now discovered a basis in Islam. This is especially so since Islam, as a social philosophy, legitimises such a challenge particularly when a leadership has deviated from justice, a point I observed in a previous chapter. It is Islam in politics then - more than anything else - which has transformed the environment and atmosphere in which unquestioning loyalty is being preserved and perpetuated. The effect of this transformation is being felt within UMNO itself. The new environment has indirectly helped generate guarded criticisms of the UMNO leadership from within the organisation. A couple of internal developments have aided the whole process. Firstly, after Tun Razak succeeded the Tunku, there was (as we had analysed in chapter four) some uncertainty about the ‘heir-apparency1. During this period from 1970 to 1975 there were some criticisms of the conduct and attitude of individuals who, according to these critics, were under the patronage of Tun Razak337 True or not, the intra-party arguments that prevailed created, for a short while at least, a sort of atmosphere which had not existed before. Secondly, after his three years or so as prime minister, Datuk Hussein Onn appeared to have made some adjustments to his political style. In his presidential address at the UMNO general assembly in July 1979 he noted: ‘We must bear in mind that the Government’s money is actually the people’s money. The government’s allocations or loans to agencies and similar organisations are in fact the people's money. We must hold this trust well, with efficiency and honesty. Do not disappoint and disillusion the people who have placed their hopes on us. We must not, like the proverbial hedge, devour the padi, we must guard’.338 The significant element in that speech is the recognition that ‘the Government’s money is 337 One of the individuals referred to very often was Datuk Abdullah Ahmad, a deputy minister in the prime minister’s department He is now under detention because of suspected involvement in communist activities. See Subky Latif, Suka Duka, op. cit. 338 See New Straits Times, 7 July, 1979.

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actually the people’s money’ In some other setting such an assertion would not have been necessary since it is something that should be understood by everyone but within the UMNO context, it assumes a great deal of meaning given the attitude that state aid is some donation from the leaders to the people. Similarly, Datuk Hussein’s emphasis on the importance of cultivating ‘praiseworthy qualities’ like ‘trustworthiness, honesty and integrity’339 stands out in stark contrast to Tun Razak’s appeal to preserve the Malay trait of ‘loyalty’ In this connection, it has to be noted also that in the 1978 UMNO election, Datuk Hussein Onn, as acting UMNO president, was opposed by an ordinary member. This had never happened in UMNO before, where the president and deputy president have always previously returned unopposed.340 Datuk Hussein Onn’s attitude raises a very interesting possibility. Since the UMNO president and prime minister is in a sense the main actor in the protector-protected relationship, it is not inconceivable that a present or future leader who is determined to demolish neo-feudal thinking could, through conscious endeavours, further erode unquestioning loyalty. Of course, this would require much more than an occasional speech or even speeches. It must be a sustained effort carried out over a period of time, buttressed by a whole army of political leaders and intellectuals. Whether the interests of the UMNO leadership as a group, whether the interests of the social classes that maintain the present group in power, will allow an UMNO president to achieve such a change is another matter. Everything considered then, the likelihood is that unquestioning loyalty can only be eroded by forces outside UMNO. These would be forces which we have studied in the last few pages. Islam in particular could play an even more important role in this erosion in the future. This could happen when Islam emerges as the rallying point for a significant segment of what is really a continually expanding Malay middle class. As the Malay middle class grows, it will not be so easy to ensure the sort of rapid mobility which a smaller group of educated Malays enjoyed in the sixties and early seventies. Indeed, if existing trends are anything to go by, it may not even be possible

3W Lee. at.

w The challenger was Sulaiman Haji Ahmad (Palestine), an UMNO stalwart who served briefly as the party’s information chief. Associated with the Dato* Harun faction, his support came from some of the fringe elements in the party.

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to find jobs for a number of Malay graduates. The educated would be unemployed, occupationally stagnant and others who for a variety of reasons are dissatisfied with the present order of things could well join forces with existing Islamic youth groups and coalesce into a powerful movement under an Islamic banner.341 Both their attacks upon the powerholders, which are inevitable, and their deeper knowledge of the Islamic right of criticism could help convince the core of Malay society that unquestioning loyalty should be destroyed completely! But unquestioning loyalty, as we have maintained right through this study, has a powerful ally. This is the ethnic situation in the country. In order to control the pressures upon its own position, the UMNO leadership could evoke the notion of a non-Malay threat which may have some basis, given the general insensitivity of non-Malay elites to the Malay situation. As it has happened in the past, the resulting apprehension could persuade the UMNO membership and perhaps the Malay community as a whole to close ranks behind the UMNO leadership. In no time professions of loyalty would echo through the length and breadth of the land to be followed, no doubt, by solemn promises of protection. The protector-protected relationship would then have another lease of life. The strength of the ethnic situation should not be underestimated. Why, it is even possible that an Islamic group that replaces the present UMNO leadership - its criticism of unquestioning loyalty in the preceding period notwithstanding - could also insist upon the complete allegiance of its supporters in the interest of preserving ‘Islamic solidarity1 in a multi-religious situation where there is the ever present danger of a ‘non-Muslim’ threat! After the cautious peep into the future, it is now necessary to deal with a couple of points which are sometimes raised in academic circles. There is the argument that colonial rule and modern education have also eroded feudal psychology.342 It will be realised that I did not include both these factors in my analysis. From chapter three it should be obvious that colonial rule did not weaken unquestioning loyalty. True, the character of the monarchy

341 For an analysis of this, see my ’Generasi Baru dan Politik Masa Depan*, Dewan Budaya, September 1979 (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1979). 342 This argument is found in Radin Seonamo, Hie Political Attitudes ofthe Malays before 1945, Academic Exercise, B.A. honours (Department of History, University of Malaya, Singapore, 1959).

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changed in the direction of a more regulated and less arbitrary institution but the feudal bond between ruler and ruled was preserved and even reinforced since it served the colonial purpose. That modern education per se is not a factor may not be all that apparent. It has been suggested that as more and more Malays are exposed to democratic concepts and ideas through the education system, their attachment to feudal notions and practices becomes weaker and weaker. This is one of the main reasons - so the argument goes - which explains the erosion of unquestioning loyalty in the post-merdeka period. In a direct way, this argument has been repudiated in the course of his study. Let me examine it in a more direct manner. If we are thinking of the older generation of UMNO elites, it is certain that they had all their education in the colonial period. Did the education the colonials designed promote democratic ideas? The evidence does not suggest this at all. If anything, the purpose was to enslave the mind even more. As an Islamic reformer, T. Abdullah, wrote in 1927: ‘We do not deny the fact that education is necessary for freedom, but we do not believe that the education which is given in countries without freedom does contain the seed of freedom. The knowledge given to them is influenced by foreign aims and it is calculated to make the enslaved peoples completely subservient’.343 Perhaps the few Malays, mainly from upper-echelon families, who went to England and other places for higher studies had some exposure to democratic institutions and values. One is doubtful, however, if it made any deep impression upon the mind. At least the subsequent conduct of some of the more prominent of these individuals - the Tunku and Tun Razak for instance - does not seem to indicate any conscious rejection of feudal sentiments. What about the attitude of the younger generation of UMNO elites, those who are in their late thirties and early forties? In their case, their primary and most of their secondary education would have been in the colonial period while their tertiary education would have been in the post-merdeka period. Colonial education we have dealt with. As far as the post-merdeka university education is concerned, those in the humanities, social sciences and in certain areas of study in law would have come into

343 Ibid., p. 16.

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contact with ideas about different historical epochs, varying social systems and civil rights and liberties. It is conceivable that all this knowledge would have made them realise that feudal loyalties and practices are anachronistic. Except for the odd individual or two, this realisation does not seem to have compelled young UMNO elites to re-think the protector-protected relationship or to re-examine the various dimensions of unquestioning loyalty. Why is this so? The answer, it seems to me, is linked to the larger problem of education and social existence. An individual’s formal education may furnish him with certain ideas about social reality. But this does not mean that he will try to change social reality in accordance with his ideas. It is only the committed reformer, the rare idealist who will attempt to do so. The vast majority will choose to adjust to the environment especially if it ensures their material well-being, if it guarantees a high status and prestigious roles. It will be a matter of time before some of them begin to defend the existing order of things in the name of public interest. Obviously then, education on its own does not lead automatically to the rejection of attitudes which serve the individual’s purpose. This study has shown how the educated UMNO leadership, the educated Malay middle and upper class and indeed, the educated non-Malay middle and upper class have all benefited directly and indirectly from neo-feudalism. How can one therefore expect education to erode support for unquestioning loyalty? Clearly it is not education that is important but one’s social existence.344 It is because social existence is far more important than education that the educated are quite willing to be absorbed by the neo-feudal political, economic or cultural system.345 Constant absorption of the educated elements of society - which is often facilitated by other factors346 - could

344 This, to my mind, is one of the central arguments in Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, The German Ideology, part I, CJ. Arthur, ed. and intro. (International Publishers Co. Inc., 1970). 345 An interesting work on how individuals from class backgrounds which are different from that of the class at the apex are willingly absorbed and transformed is R. Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies ofModem Democracy, Eden & Cedar Paul tr. (New York, 1959). 346 Our impressive economic growth brought about by the favourable international market for most of our export commodities has enabled the power holders to satisfy the rising aspirations of the middle and upper classes. This is perhaps one of the very few countries in the Third World where wages of public servants have increased in

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even help to strengthen the neo-feudal system since the educated are very capable of providing persuasive rationalisations for the system’s continued existence. In that sense, education in a certain context may even reinforce unquestioning loyalty! There is no point in refuting it any more: neither education nor colonial rule had eroded unquestioning loyalty. There is, however, a more serious allegation which is sometimes bandied about in local academic coteries.347 It has been argued that there is no such thing as a neo-feudal psychology or unquestioning loyalty. There was unquestioning loyalty in the past but over the decades it has disappeared. What I have described as a neo-feudal relationship between protector and protected especially in the merdeka period is actually nothing more than political control exercised by leaders and political obedience expected of the led. In most societies, leaders expect loyalty from their followers and leaders generally reward the faithful and punish the deviant. Criticism is not brooked even in societies which have been free of feudalism like many modem African states, for instance, which emerged out of tribal history. It is granted that there is political control and the expectation of political obedience where the loyal are rewarded and the disloyal punished. It is granted that criticism is frowned upon even in non-feudal societies. I would go even further. I am prepared to concede that, in all the situations that I had analysed in chapter four, political control or the desire to reward and punish may have been a motivating factor. But that does not mean that the attitude towards political control itself - in fact the whole attitude of leaders towards their followers and followers towards their leaders - is not the product of a certain history, of a certain tradition. The analogy that one must use is this: let us say that there are two almost identical fires. All that we can possibly establish is that the intensity of the fires and their effects may have certain similarities. This is what we can observe from the outside. We should not conclude from this that their causes are also identical. An African state with a tribal background and a Southeast Asian state with a feudal history

real terms. For an idea of our gross domestic product growth and per capita incomes during 1976-80, see Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980 (Government Press, 1976), pp. 1 have heard this from a number of academics, especially those who are not familiar with the historical background of the country. It is pity that none of them have ventured to commit their news in writing.

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may both have leaders who expect complete loyalty from their supporters. In both cases, it might be a desire to gain control and dominance. In one instance, history may not be an explanatory factor; in another, the impulse may have come from that country’s cultural background. I shall try to show now that only by examining history in depth will we be able to understand the protector-protected relationship in contemporary Malay society. In this connection, there is a somewhat unique feature in our history which must be considered. This is the almost unbroken continuity associated with the court in Malay society. The causes of this continuity are more important to an understanding of the situation than the continuity itself. For want of a better term we shall call it a feudal continuity. Feudal continuity is manifested in the following ways: a) the continuous, uninterrupted existence of the royal court in Malay history from the Malaccan period to the present - that is from Sultans as absolute monarchs to Sultans as symbolic protectors; b) the consolidation and reinforcement of the ruler-ruled relationship in the colonial period; c) the creation by the British of an administocratic class associated with the court; d) the emergence of this class as the core of the UMNO leadership in 1946 and its dominance over the rest of Malay society; e) its continuous absorption of non-administrocratic Malays who adjust to the feudal background of the leadership since it safeguards their interests and legitimises their position; and f) the effective manipulation of the ethnic situation which has strengthened the UMNO leadership’s role as the substantive protector and the subsequent formulation of political, economic and cultural arrangements designed to secure its position. Those who argue that unquestioning loyalty as such does not exist fail to realise that from phase to phase - as I have just shown - social groups and relationships emanating from the court have maintained their hold upon Malay society. It is this continuity that makes the leader-led relationship in Malay society much more than a mere attempt by one side to control the other. This will become clearer when we look at societies where continuities of this sort were more or less broken. Indonesia would be a good example. Indonesia went through a revolution in the way which Wertheim defined it. He suggested that, ‘a revolution always aims at an overthrow of

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the existing social order and of the prevalent power structure’348 New social and economic groups and new psychological attitudes which often follow the disintegration of old clusters, relationships and values are some of the accompanying elements of a revolution.349 In Indonesia too, the traditional aristocracy were on the side of the Dutch colonial masters. Unlike Malay society, however, they were challenged by a rising indigenous middle class. This middle class comprised of government officials, professionals, teachers, traders, and the like. It was a class that had grown under Dutch rule although some of its constituent elements had existed in an earlier period. The government officials who were the largest single group in the middle class, the professionals and the teachers discovered that, in spite of their Dutch education, their social mobility was blocked by the Dutch hiring policy.350 Ihe indigenous traders also had reason to feel unhappy. When the Dutch decided to lift most travel and residence restrictions pertaining to immigrant Chinese traders, the remaining Indonesian merchants and industrialists of the interior, who had been relatively unmolested previously were thereby subjected to the full brunt of aggressive Chinese competition’.351 Ihe frustrations of the Indonesian middle class, combined with the exploitation of the Javanese peasantry, provided the basis for the Indonesian revolution. As students of Indonesian history know, the Dutch introduced the cultivation system in 1830 under which the peasant was forced to plant commercial crops designated by the government. He was, in effect, an agricultural labourer of the state. Although in theory he was supposed to be exempted from paying a tax upon delivery of the designated crop in practice: the peasant paid his former land tax plus whatever amount of crops the various financially interested elements in the hierarchy operation the system could squeeze out of him. He had no choice as to the crops he grew, and the amount of coffee, sugar, indigo etc left to him from what he produced was

348 See W.F. Wertheim, Evolution and Revolution (Pelican Books, 1974), p. 125. 349 Ibid., especially part two. 333 For an interesting discussion of the various groups and classes involved in the Indonesian revolution, see G.M. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Cornell University Press, 1969). 331 Ibid., p. 28.

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frequently not enough for him to purchase sufficient food for his family, so that in some areas serious famines resulted. As a result of a succession of famines between 1842 and 1848 the population of one regency fell from 336,000 to 120,000 and that of another from 89,500 to 9,000.352 Even after the cultivation system was finally abolished in 1919, the economic, sociological and psychological effects of the whole experience remained right through the struggle for Indonesian independence. In this connection, it must be noted that apart from cultivation, the peasant was also forced to provide cheap labour for the construction of roads and other public works. Since the mobilisation of peasant labour was done with the active cooperation of the Javanese aristocratic hierarchy, it is not surprising that it became a primary target of the Indonesian revolution. In fact, in order to secure the support of the aristocracy, the government gave them ‘grants of land and made their office hereditary. In addition, it gave them as well as lesser native officials and the new European officials a direct financial interest in the system’s operation, a percentage of the crops collected from the peasantry’.353 The similarities and differences between the Indonesian and Malay situations are astounding. In both cases, the colonial overlord used the aristocracy for its own benefit. In both cases, it reaped tremendous success. The Dutch, for instance, managed through the cultivation system to pay off by 1877, ‘the East India’s Company’s debts of 35,500,000 guilders and in addition brought into the Netherland’s home treasury a tribute totaling 664,500,00 guilders’.354 For the British, the advantages that accrued in every sphere - as we had suggested in chapter three - were beyond measure. But that is where the similarities end. The traditional aristocracy in Malay society, however, was never challenged effectively by the community. Why was this so? Why was it that Malay society never managed to challenge its aristocracy? After all, like the Indonesians, they too could not have been happy with the way in which the ruling class cooperated with the colonial overlord. The sentiments of the Islamic reformers, and more so

352 Ibid., p. 12. 353 Ibid., p. 11. 354 Loc. cit.

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the Malay socialists, were indicative of this unhappiness in some circles at least. Why were they not able to mobilise the masses against the aristocracy as part of the nationalist struggle? We had suggested earlier that the feudal structure of Malay society prevented them from assuming leadership. True, but why was that structure able to sustain itself so well for so long? This is where our brief description of the forces in the Indonesian revolution becomes very relevant. There are two reasons. Firstly, in Malay society of the colonial period, there was no comparable non-aristocratic middle class which could challenge the authority of the aristocracy, wrest power from it and lead the struggle for independence. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there was no exploited, oppressed peasantry conscious of the wrong-doings of both the aristocracy and the colonial power, which could lend support to the revolution. The question that we must now ask is this: why didn’t a Malay middle class develop and why was there no colonial exploitation of the peasantry? The answer, it seems to me, is linked to colonial policy. The British, unlike the Dutch, decided that they would develop their colonial economy with imported, not indigenous, labour.355 More specifically this meant that the exploited labour of British capital were imported Indian, and to some extent, Chinese workers in the rubber estates and tin mines. The Malay peasantry, as we know, was excluded from the colonial economy. To repeat, there was no direct, large-scale exploitation of the Malay peasantry by British colonialism. Thus, strong antagonisms towards the British and the aristocracy could not develop. Because the colonial economy was largely non-Malay in character, the majority of the beneficiaries of colonial education also happened to be non­ Malays.356 Education in most colonial societies was the conduit through which a middle class had emerged and later expressed itself. Circumstances being what they were, the middle class in colonial Malaya turned out to be 355 Hie migration of Chinese and Indians is discussed in Rupert Emerson, Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule (University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1964). See also K.S. Shandhu, Indian Migration and Population Change in Malaya c. 100 1957A.D., M.A. dissertation (University of British Columbia, 1961). 356 For a description of the colonial education system in relation to our multiethnic society, see Chang Min Phang, A Survey and Critique of the Development ofa National System ofEducation in a Plural Society with special reference to Malaysia, M.A. thesis, (University of London, 1968).

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a non-Malay, non-indigenous middle class. After a few decades of colonial rule, it was obvious that there was a non-Malay preponderance in the middle echelon of the public services, in the professions and in the trading sector. If anything, a liberal colonial policy towards the migration of Chinese and Indians including those with English education aggravated the situation.357 A non-indigenous middle class could not be expected to mobilise the indigenous community. Neither could it be expected to challenge the Malay ruling class. The absence of a Malay middle class with real frustrations meant that the aristocracy was secure. There was no threat to its position. Even if one examined the situation in countries other than Indonesia - like India and the Philippines for instance - one discovers that it is an indigenous middle class supported by an exploited mass which had destroyed the traditional elites associated with the colonial power. In India, the transformation of agriculture under British rule, the decline of village industries, the rise of a modern proletariat and a new middle class made it difficult for the conservative elites to cooperate with the British.358 The oppression of the peasants in the Philippines by the Spanish and the emergence of a group within the middle class opposed to the wealthy and those who worked with the colonial authorities created the Philippine Revolution.359 Indeed, even a comparison with countries which have evolved from period to period, retaining some of their fundamental characteristics, while adjusting to new circumstances will produce some surprises. Leaving aside the fact that Japan and Thailand were not under colonial tutelage an important difference - it is nevertheless true that, like Malay society, they have also preserved the monarch and the court right through history. As with Malay society, the monarchy has always exercised a great deal of influence in both these countries. We had observed in an earlier chapter that in Japan - as in Malay society - there is a special bond between the court

357 Rupert Emerson, op. cit. 358 See A. R. Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1966). Especially chapters three - seven. 359 See Theodora A. Agoncillo, Malalas: The Crists of the Republic (Quezon City, University of the Philippines, 1960). However, Angoncillo argues that as a whole the middle class betrayed the first phase of the revolution. The role of the individuals from the middle class is nonetheless acknowledged.

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and the ruling political elites who are completely loyal to the monarchical institution. After that point, however, there are certain crucial differences. In Japan, the actual repository of feudal power for 265 years, the Tokugawa Shogunate, collapsed in 1867 as a result of certain political events, economic transformations and the changing role of various social classes.360 The restoration of power to the ruler, the Meiji Emperor, marked the rise of a new group within the aristocracy, the Daimyo, or the court-nobles. It was this group, supported by Japanese society, that pioneered the modernisation of Japan. Modernisation in effect meant the decline and death of feudalism. The new Japanese elites consciously eradicated feudal conceptions of government and feudal relationships. For example, the Charter Oath of Five Articles promulgated by the Emperor Meiji sought, among other things, to establish, ‘deliberative assemblies’ and suggested that ‘all matters be decided by public opinion*. It also called for the abolition of ‘absurd customs and practices of the past’.361 According to Yanaga, ‘the Charter embodied the progressivism of Yuri Kimmasa who had been strongly influenced by the democratic ideas of Yokoi Shonan, the liberalism of the Tosa School, and the anti-feudal ideas of Kido Takayoshi’.362 The modemisers went even further. A new governmental structure was announced based upon the doctrine of the separation of powers. Though it did not work well in an environment which had just thrown off the feudal yoke, the aim and intention was certainly admirable. Of course, in the case of Malay society there was no powerful feudal group outside the royal court Neither did Malay society experience those changes which preceded the collapse of feudalism in Japan. Nonetheless, it is true that it failed to produce a group of aristocrats or a monarch with the commitment of the Japanese elites to the modernisation of society. For it must be remembered that is was a commitment which entailed a readiness to sacrifice the material and psychological privileges of feudal power enjoyed by the earlier Shogunate. There was no question of the Daimyo becoming the new recipients of an old feudal sentiment like complete subservience

560 See Chitoghi Yanaga, Japan since Perry (Archon Books, Hamden, Connecticut, 1966), chapter three. Also, E. Herbert Norman, Japan’s Emergence as a Modem State (Institute of Pacific Relations, USA, 1940). 361 See Yanaga, op. cit., p. 48. 352 Lot. cit.

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to the ruling elites. Unquestioning loyalty to the emperor remained but the modernising nobles were not part of it. They perceived themselves as the articulators and implementators of new democratic ideas which they had imbibed from American and British treatises.363 This then is what makes the Japanese experience different from the Malay situation: the political elites associated with the emperor did not see themselves, nor were they seen by the people, as a group that deserved unquestioning loyalty. Perhaps their exposure to anti-feudal ideas within the context of a vigorous intellectual tradition364 and more importantly, their aversion to the manner in which the Shogunate had built up its feudal dominance365 helped shape their attitude. Conflict within the feudal class of this sort - in essence a conflict between the lower aristocracy and the higher aristocracy366 - was not part of Malay historical experience. Even the Thai situation is not an exact parallel to ours. In Thailand, there was a direct open confrontation between young educated elites - leaders of the People’s Party - and the monarch in 1932.367 These elites succeeded in changing an absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy and, for the first time, established the supremacy and sovereignty of the people. Of course, the UMNO leadership also managed to create a constitutional monarchy operating within a democratic framework This was accomplished without any confrontation because, as we know, the rulers had already lost a lot of their powers under the British. The vital difference, however, is connected with their respective conceptions of leader-led relationships. From the very onset the People’s Party leaders did not regard themselves as a group that had a right to the loyalty of the Thai masses. For them the country belonged to the people and the money that the royalty used came

363 While this is true, it cannot be denied that until 1880 or so, there was a centralised monarchy and administration was essentially oligarchic. See Hugh Borton, Japan’s Modern Century (The Ronald Press, New York, 1970), pp. 79-126. 364 For some idea of Japan’s intellectual tradition, see Sources ofJapanese Tradition, Vol. I & II, R. Tsunoda, W.M. de Bary and D. Keene, compiled (Columbia University Press, 1964). 365 For details, see Yanaga, op. tit., p. 57. 366 See E.H. Norman, op. tit., p. 80. 367 This confrontation has been wrongly described as a ‘revolution’. It was not a ‘revolution’ in the sense in which the term is used in this study. The confrontation is discussed in K.P. Landon, Siam in Transition (Greenwood Press, New York, 1968).

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from the people.368 These young, educated elites saw themselves as part of the people; they knew they could not expect any special privileges in their relationship with the people. This perception could have developed as a result of their social background. The leaders of the People’s Party were commoners.369 They had no special connection with the court. They did not have aristocratic antecedents. In that sense, they were different from the UMNO core with its administocratic background. This is perhaps one of the many reasons why Thai political elites since 1932 have often been criticised and challenged by all sorts of social groups. They have even been overthrown in popular uprisings.370 To put it simply, they did not - and could not - inherit a feudal aura. That aura has remained the exclusive privilege of the Thai monarch. From all that has been said it is clear therefore that in more ways than one, feudal continuity in Malay society is a unique feature. If British immigration policy had been restrictive, if there had been a Malay middle class or an exploited peasantry in the colonial period, things might have been different. If there had been sufficient awareness among UMNO elites about the incongruence of unquestioning loyalty in relation to democratic values brought about by the actual social situation rather than mere education, or if the UMNO elites in 1946 did not possess such a close link to the court, things might have been different But then the course of history was such that the aristocracy remained without an effective challenge and with it remained unquestioning loyalty. The critics might now concede that unquestioning loyalty could well be a feudal continuity. However, they could still ask: there is a Malay middle class now, so why hasn’t this class challenged the concept and practice of unquestioning loyalty? The answer, in fact, has been explicitly stated right through this study. It is because of the ethnic situation, more specifically the manipulation of the ethnic situation. I shall show this even more lucidly by presenting a hypothetical situation. Suppose the non-Malay component of the citizenry was small and the country largely Malay, it would not

359 Ibid., p. 11. 369 Ibid., pp. 24-27. Hie biographical details of the leaders can be found in these pages. 370 In October 1973, for instance, a mass uprising in which student participation was significant managed to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachom. Incidentally, the monarch was on the side of the uprising.

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have been possible to evoke the idea of a non-Malay threat. Indeed, their numerical insignificance would have dissuaded the non-Malays from challenging Malay political or cultural pre-eminence. In such a situation, the Malay elite would find it difficult to pose as a protector of the community against an external threat. It is conceivable that, without this fear of a non­ Malay challenge, internal differences within the community arising from sheer competition for power would have manifested themselves more easily. A segment of the Malay middle class could, in such a situation, challenge the concept of loyalty simply because it was the ideological underpinning of the dominant group of adminstrocrats. As we have seen in chapters three and four, what developed was just the opposite. A large number of non-Malays were made citizens which in turn enabled some of their elites to challenge the Malay position. Both the ethnic situation and these challenges were in turn manipulated to justify the role of the UMNO leadership as protector and to demand complete loyalty from the community. In the name of safeguarding the interests of the community, the emerging Malay middle class was effectively absorbed by the administocratic apex. It was not just a question of‘being absorbed’; the middle class was only too happy to be absorbed given the attraction to status, power and wealth. In this connection, it is important to observe that if the country was not so prosperous it might not have been possible to satisfy the ever-growing expectations of the middle class. Neither would it have been possible to give the impression that the Malay peasantry was being looked after, and indeed some of the basic needs of the Malay peasantry, especially in education and health, have been met as we had noted previously. Thus, in an indirect way, Malaysia’s magnificent economic growth brought about by the favourable position of its export commodities has also conspired to perpetuate unquestioning loyalty. It is this almost unique conspiracy of circumstances which we must bear in mind. In spite of what happened in the colonial period, things might have developed differently in the post-merdeka era if there had been no manipulation of the ethnic situation and if the accommodation of the middle class and the peasantry had not been possible. As it turned out a new situation prevailed immediately after the war which merely helped to perpetuate an old feudal relationship. Unless this is understood, one will not be able to appreciate the position of unquestioning loyalty as feudal continuity.

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Finally, it is hoped that this analysis of the historical and contemporaneous circumstances that caused a feudal trait to remain in a somewhat transformed manner will convince us of the importance of examining a particular social situation in great depth and detail. Only in this way can we provide a firm basis for comparative analysis which in the end is the goal of the whole endeavour to study human society.

Afterword to the New Edition

In Protector? (1979) and in its updated Bahasa Malaysia version, Pelindung? (1992), I argue that the UMNO led government has been the principal beneficiary of the phenomenon of unquestioning loyalty to leadership. Has this phenomenon come to an end with the ouster of UMNO as the mainstay of the federal government in the 2018 general election? The defeat of UMNO through the ballot box was no ordinary event. It was the defeat of a party at the helm of the longest ruling coalition in a democracy anywhere in the world - 61 years in power from the time the nation obtained independence from British rule in 1957. As a party, UMNO has had a profound impact upon Malaysia’s structures of governance and political culture. If it was possible to vanquish UMNO at the polls, it was partly because unquestioning loyalty to its leadership was far less significant in 2018 than in the past. More than any other prime minister before him, Mohd Najib Razak contributed unwittingly to the erosion of this phenomenon. His allegedly pivotal role in the massive IMalaysia Development Berhad (IMDB) financial scandal exposed him as a traitor - not a protector - of the Malays. There was no reason to be blindly loyal to a leader who according to reports was not only corrupt on a mammoth scale but also had no compunctions about stealing the people’s money. It was not just IMDB which tarnished his image. Serious wrongdoings associated with the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) and gross financial mismanagement at Tabung Haji, the Muslim Pilgrimage Fund, both deeply intertwined with the well-being of the Malays, further compromised his standing and the standing of UMNO as the protector of the community. Rising costs of living, exacerbated by an unpopular consumption tax, which had a huge adverse impact upon Malays in the lower and middle income strata of society convinced a lot of fence-sitters in

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the 9th May 2018 polls that the UMNO-led government had failed to look after the majority of the people. However, the decline of UMNO leadership as the protector of the Malays did not begin with the Najib government. In both Protector? and Pelindung? I have traced numerous changes in the seventies and eighties that affected unquestioning loyalty to leadership. Factional politics within UMNO; a significant challenge to the UMNO president Dr Mahathir Mohamad in 1987; the democratic electoral process itself; the expansion of the Malay middle class; political mobility; and the overall growth of education and awareness in society over the decades have all contributed to a situation where a substantial segment of the community is no longer willing to accept without question the dictates of government leaders. The rejection of UMNO in May was in a sense the culmination of a change in one of the fundamental political attitudes of the Malays that had evolved over a period of time. One should not conclude from this change that UMNO or loyalty to leadership that had helped to sustain the party in power is no longer relevant. We should remember that in the 2018 general election, UMNO, in spite of all its flaws and foibles, captured 35% to 40% of the Malay vote, making it the most popular of the Malay based parties in the country. It secured 54 seats in parliament on polling day itself although the number has now dwindled to 37. It still forms the government in two states in the Malaysian Federation, namely Pahang and Perlis. It is obvious that in the post 14th general election phase, the UMNO leadership is determined to perpetuate its image as the protector of the Malay's and as the defender of their rights. It is attempting to do this through a three-pronged strategy. One, it is going all out to portray the Pakatan Harapan government as a government that is incapable of protecting the Malays. Two, at the same time, as noted a while ago, it seeks to convince the Malays that it is the entity that continues to wear the mantle of the protector of the community. Three, its assumption of this role has acquired a degree of credibility because UMNO is now cooperating with PAS, the party which sees itself as the spokesperson and protector of Islam in the country and which for ages was UMNO’s mortal foe in Malaysian politics. UMNO’s first strategy has been helped in a way by a perception that since coming to power, the PH government has not been able to address the economic woes of a lot of Malays in the rural sector and at the lower rungs of the urban sector. The plight of fisherfolk, rubber tappers, padi farmers

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and FELDA settlers, apart from urban workers with modest incomes, often highlighted by the UMNO-inclined Utusan Malaysia underscores the situation. While their suffering deserves attention and resolution, Utusan and UMNO politicians also unscrupulously exploit ethnic and religious sentiments without any regard for actual facts in order to depict the PH government as anti-Malay and anti-Islam. The Mariamman Temple fracas in November 2018 would be a case in point. Whipping up communal feelings among Malays over the appointment of non-Malays and non-Muslims to certain positions in the cabinet and the federal administration which in no way undermines the Malay position would be yet another example of reckless ethnic and religious manipulation in a diverse society like ours. Manipulation of ethnic and religious sentiments is also integral to UMNO’s second strategy. In the last ten months or so, UMNO has endeavoured to present itself as the protector of the position of the Malay rulers and Islam. Its opposition to the PH government’s ratification of the Rome Statute based on the fallacious argument that it undermines the sovereignty of the Sultans illustrates the point at hand. An international treaty that seeks to bring to book leaders responsible for genocide and mass executions cannot be inimical to the interests of a nation which by and large has treated people humanely and is at the forefront of the quest for global peace. Creating fear without justification was also the motive behind the UMNO-engineered opposition to the PH government’s move to endorse the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). Contrary to vile propaganda, it would not have compromised the position of Islam or the status of the Malay rulers. The vast majority of Muslim majority states and constitutional monarchies have acceded to ICERD. Nonetheless, the PH leadership could have handled the issue with greater understanding and sensitivity. For the negative reaction of the Malay masses to the government proposal sprang from a dimension in the collective consciousness of the community that rightly views present day Malaysia as a nation that has evolved from Malay sultanates that had, through an unparalleled degree of magnanimity, accommodated the large immigrant Chinese and Indian communities. Given such a history, the Malays do not regard any arrangement that protects the community’s identity and interests in a competitive multi-ethnic milieu as ‘discriminatory’. The PH leadership should have shown some appreciation of this and explained the situation to all Malaysians.

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This understanding of the history and identity of the Malays and the land is linked to what is emerging as the third dimension in UMNO’s strategy for perpetuating the ideological underpinning of the party and the community. Cooperation between UMNO and PAS in defending the Malay position assumes an added significance because of PAS’s presence. It means that UMNO, which had always included Islam in its concept of the Malay position, is now committing itself explicitly to Islam as ideology. Whether this commitment also means embracing wholeheartedly PAS’s notion of Islam, it is still not dear. What is obvious at this stage is that the two parties perceive a threat to the Malays and Islam emanating from PH. PH, they allege, is dominated by the Chinese-based DAP. Statistically this is not true because DAP has only 42 out of PH’s 129 parliamentary seats. Besides, with the exception of the still unresolved Unified Education Certificate (UEC) issue which appeals to a big segment of the Chinese community, there are hardly any other PH policies or programmes which can be attributed to DAP’s ‘ethnic agenda’ in government. Whatever the reality, UMNO and PAS continue to use the DAP bogeyman to strengthen their position as the protectors of the community. This bogeyman was one of the many factors that facilitated UMNO’s victory in three recent by-elections. Two of the three contests were in Malay-majority constituencies. As a result of these victories, the UMNOPAS cooperation has received a tremendous boost. If the UMNO-PAS bond is further strengthened, it may well become a powerful basis for the rejuvenation and legitimisation of the ideology of unquestioning loyalty. In this regard, we may want to remind ourselves that though uncritical acceptance of leadership is un-Islamic, it is a trait that has flourished in various periods of Muslim history. An allegedly Islamic imprimatur to unthinking loyalty to leadership via a party like PAS would be a severe setback to the political maturation of Malaysian society. What should Pakatan Harapan’s response to a possible new challenge posed by the rejuvenation of the loyalty-protector syndrome be? For a start, all four PH parties should demonstrate through deeds that they are not prepared to allow attitudes and practices associated with the syndrome to take root in their organisations. There should be a conscious attempt to nurture a leader-led relationship that is genuinely democratic, that encourages critical evaluation of those who exercise power and authority by the rank-and-file and that rewards autonomous, independent thinking

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among the membership. Members for their part should be respectful of leaders and loyal to them as long as they do not deviate from universal moral values and principles. PH leaders should realise from our own history and the history of other societies that ensuring the well-being of the people is the most effective way of retaining their trust and consequently guaranteeing their loyalty. What this means in specific language is that the PH government should strive hardest to improve the standard of living of the majority, narrow the gap between those who have-a-lot and the ones who have-a-little and curb corruption and abuse of power. Since this is at the core of the PH’s current focus, it should stay the course and perhaps enhance its performance. Good governance signified by honest, upright leaders and effective implementation of policies that benefit the weakest and most vulnerable in society is - and has always been - the real antidote to narrow, bigoted communal politics. Of course, communal politics has its own appeal. Sometimes even exemplary governance may not be able to weaken the hold that a politician who insists upon unquestioning loyalty to him, as the defender of the community and its religion, still has over the masses. This is why the PH government should try to understand the depth and breadth of issues related to religion and ethnicity. The politics of identity cannot be separated from the challenge of governance. By taking cognisance of the politics of identity - while not succumbing to the manipulative aspects of issues connected to religion and ethnicity - the PH leadership may even be able to loosen further the grip that the loyalty-protector syndrome has over a segment of the Malay masses. This is a challenge that has become crucial in light of PAS’s newly forged link with UMNO. If PAS misuses Islamic teachings to justify unquestioning loyalty to the PAS-UMNO leadership, PH will have no choice but to show that such notions of loyalty are not only un-Islamic but also one of the reasons why Islamic civilisation began to decline from the 14th century onwards. It is loyalty to eternal values and principles such as justice and compassion, freedom and love, equality and kindness that Islam cherishes - not blind, unthinking loyalty to leaders and their organisations. Need we emphasise that it is loyalty to these values which brings us closer to God - God who in the ultimate analysis is the one and only true Protector?

Chandra Muzaffar. 10 April 2019.

■I

"It is granted that there is political control and the expectation of political obedience where the loyal are rewarded and the disloyal punished. It is granted that criticism is frowned upon even in non-feudal societies.... But that does not mean that the attitude towards political control itself - in fact the whole attitude of leaders towards their followers and followers towards their leaders - is not the product of a certain history, of a certain tradition."

i; In the republication of Chandra Muzaffar's modern classic, he breaks down the idea of being a "protector" in both traditional and contemporary Malay society, analysing the dimensions of symbolic and substantive protectors. It examines the various forms of power held by the Sultans and the class of late-colonial era "administocrats" that replaced them in the post-independence period, as well as the economic and political consequences for broader Malaysian society. First published in 1979, and building on the pioneering work of Syed Hussein Alatas, this short volume remains essential reading today.

Dr Chandra Muzaffar is currently president of the International Movement for a Just World. He was previously the first Director of the Centre for Civilisational Dialogue at the University of Malaya, and later Noordin Sopiee Professor of Global Studies at the University of Science in Penang. He was also the Founder-President of Aliran Kesedaran Negara (1977-91).

Strategic Information and Research Development Centre

ISBN 978-967-2464-15-0

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9 789672 464150*

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