Propaganda, Censorship and Irish Neutrality in the Second World War 9780748642809

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propaganda, censorship and irish neutrality in the second world war

International Communications Series Editor: Philip M. Taylor

This is the first comprehensive series to tackle the fast-expanding subject of International Communications. This multi-disciplinary subject is viewed as a field of enquiry and research that deals with the processes and impact of the transfer of information, news, data and cultural products as well as other forms of transborder communication between nation-states within the wider context of globalisation. As such it is not only a field of study in its own right but also directly connected to international history, international politics, international affairs and international political economy. Most writers in these more ‘established’ fields are agreed that communications have come to play an ever more significant part in relations between states at the political, economic, diplomatic, military and cultural levels. This series will show how communications serves to influence those activities from the points of transmission to those of reception. Enormous breakthroughs in communications technologies – satellite communications, computer-mediated communications, mobile personal communications – are now converging, and the possibilities which this might present are forcing a reconsideration of how established patterns of inter-state relations might adapt to, or be influenced by, this latest phase of the information age. Debates relating to international regulation, censorship, public diplomacy, electronic democracy, cross-cultural communications and even information warfare all reflect the sense that communications are transforming the nature and practice of government, education, leisure, business, work and warfare. Information has become the lifeblood of this globalising set of patterns. Books in the series reflect this phenomenon but are rooted in historical method, even when tackling more contemporary events. They are truly international in coverage. The range of books reflects the coverage of courses and teaching in international communications and they are carefully aimed at students and researchers working in this area. Books available in the International Communications series: Propaganda, Censorship and Irish Neutrality in the Second World War By Robert Cole Nazi Wireless Propaganda: Lord Haw-Haw and British Public Opinion in the Second World War By Martin Doherty British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War By John Jenks Forging Peace: Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space Edited by Monroe E. Price and Mark Thomson British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy By Philip M. Taylor

Propaganda, Censorship and Irish Neutrality in the Second World War Robert Cole

Edinburgh University Press

© Robert Cole, 2006 Edinburgh University Press Ltd 22 George Square, Edinburgh Typeset in Ehrhardt by TechBooks International Delhi, and printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wilts A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 0 7486 2277 2 (hardback) The right of Robert Cole to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Contents

Acknowledgements Abbreviations Preface Introduction 1. Setting the Stage: April 1937–August 1939

vi vii ix 1 5

2. ‘In Dublin’s Bright City’: September 1939–May 1940

20

3. The Hazards of Neutrality: June–December 1940

46

4. ‘More Than Ever “Ourselves Alone” ’: January–June 1941

66

5. From ‘Operation Barbarossa’ to Pearl Harbor: June–December 1941

85

6. Here Come the Yanks!: January–December 1942

105

7. ‘Now We Have Won The War!’: January–December 1942

125

8. Turning the Tide: January–December 1943

145

´ 9. ‘Eamon Who?’: January 1944 –May 1945

165

Bibliography Index

185 191

Acknowledgements

Help and encouragement came from the staffs of various libraries and archives in the research and writing of this book. In England, the Public Records Office, the House of Lords Library, the Institute of Historical Research and the British Library; in Ireland, the Irish National Library, the Public Records Office of Ireland, the State Paper Office, the Military Archives at Cahal Brugha Barracks and the Special Collections libraries at Trinity College and University College, Dublin; in Canada, the Special Collections Library of Victoria University; and in the United States, the National Archives, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the Houghton Library at Harvard University, and the Merrill Library at Utah State University. I am also grateful for the support of the faculty and staff of the History Department at Utah State University and especially for the advice, encouragement and assistance of Philip M. Taylor, John Nicholas Cull, Denis Judd, Stanley Palmer, Henry Weisser, Larry L. Witherell, John Ramsden, the late Commandant Peter Young of the Military Archives and Patrick Buckley of the Office of An Taoiseach. To all of these, my thanks; to myself, all responsibility for errors and other shortcomings of this book. Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to Ilona Jappinen, my wife, partner and best friend, who has always believed in me.

Abbreviations and Identifying Titles

AC (O) AC (P) AEF ASNE HS BBC NI BBCWAC C(H) CAB CBB CP D/T, S DCCR DCGR DDG DDP DFD DG DGFP DGP DLCR DLGR DO DP DPP DT EH ENTE ESD FCCGC FDRL FGP FIS FO FRUS GIB GPO

Assistant Controller Overseas Assistant Controller Programmes American Expeditionary Force Assistant Senior News Editor Home Service BBC Northern Ireland BBC Written Archives Center Controller Home Cabinet Papers Cahal Brugha Barracks Controller Programmes Department of the Taoiseach, S files Dublin Consulate Classified Records Dublin Consulate General Records Deputy Director General Deputy Director Programming Deputy Foreign Director Director General Documents on German Foreign Policy David Gray Papers Dublin Legation Classified Records Dublin Legation General Records Dominions Office Director Programmes Director Programme Planning Director Talks Department of Publicity in Enemy Countries Empire News Talks Editors Empire Service Director Federal Communications Commission General Correspondence Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Frank Gallagher Papers Foreign Information Service Foreign Office Foreign Relations of the United States Government Information Bureau Government Printing Office

viii HCD HHP HL HMP HO INL IRA ISC JBP JDP JWP LLGR MA MGP MOI MPPDA NAUS OCI OCR OOB OPC OSS OWI PFOD PID PRO PSF RAD RE´ RJH ROD RP RSP S/S SPO SWP TCD UCD UVL WO

abbreviations House of Commons Debates Harry Hopkins Papers Houghton Library Henry Morganthau Papers Home Office Irish National Library Irish Republican Army Ireland Situation Committee John Betjeman Papers James L. O’Donovan Papers John G. Winant Papers London Legation General Records Military Archives, Dublin Joseph P. McGarrity Papers Ministry of Information Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America National Archives of the United States Office of the Coordinator of Information Office of the Controller of Records Overseas Operations Branch Overseas Propaganda Committee Organization of Strategic Services files Office of War Information Publicity File Overseas Division Political Intelligence Department Public Records Office Presidential Secretary’s File Records, American Division ´ Radio Eireann Richard J. Hayes Papers Records, Overseas Division Recorded Programmes Robert E. Sherwood Papers Secretary of State State Paper Office Sumner Welles Papers Trinity College, Dublin University College, Dublin University of Victoria Library War Office

Preface

The neutrality of Eire (southern Ireland) during the Second World War – ‘the Emergency’, as it was designated in Ireland – was a matter of grave concern to the Allied powers Great Britain and the United States. Eire was one of five European nations that remained neutral throughout the war, but, unlike Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal, it did so for both practical and emotional considerations. Irish leaders saw engaging in the war as making Eire the target of German air and naval warfare; but they were also republicans who resented the partition that had been imposed following Ireland’s war of independence against Britain in 1919–1921, and hoped to recreate Ireland as a united, republican and free nation. The Eire government saw deciding for neutrality as exercising its sovereign rights, and also expressing the wishes of a vast majority of the Irish people. War began in September 1939, and Eire neutrality was problematic for the British and for the United States, which, though neutral until December 1941, clearly leaned towards support of Great Britain. Both London and Washington saw neutral Eire as a clear and present danger because of its strategic location relative to Atlantic supply convoys. Eire was Britain’s ‘back door’, so to speak, and a neutral Eire meant that the door was open. Allied propaganda was aimed at persuading the Irish to close it. However, Eire remained officially neutral through to the end of the war, with its censorship focused on squelching this propaganda. This was the ‘war of words’ over Eire neutrality that was an essential part of Eire’s war-time relationship with the Anglo-American alliance. The alliance may have scored at least a small victory. There is strong evidence that, official neutrality policy notwithstanding, Dublin was more sympathetic to London and Washington than to Berlin. British and American airmen shot down on Eire soil were released and returned to Northern Ireland whereas downed Luftwaffe pilots were interned, and both the United States and Britain supplied Eire with military and other aid. Thousands of Irish went to Britain to work in munitions plants, and one of the great heroes of the RAF was Eire-born ‘Paddy’ Finucane, a Spitfire ace killed in action in 1942. Neutral Eire has become a subject of considerable historical interest. Books addressing the subject, often within the broader context of political and diplomatic relations, include such works as T. Ryle Dwyer, Irish Neutrality and the USA 1939–47 and Strained Relations: Ireland at Peace and the USA at War 1941–45; John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich; Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality 1939–45; Paul Canning, British Policy towards Ireland 1921–1941; Dermot Keogh, Ireland & Europe 1919–1989:

x

preface

A Diplomatic and Political History; Jerrold M. Packer, Neither Friend Nor Foe: The European Neutrals in World War II; Tony Gray, The Lost Years: The Emergency ´ Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland 1939–1945: in Ireland 1939–45; and Donal O Neutrality, Politics and Society. However, these studies leave a gap where the vital propaganda-censorship aspect of relations between neutral Eire and belligerent nations in war-time is concerned. Propaganda, Censorship and Irish Neutrality in the Second World War fills that gap.

Introduction

Since the advent of mass communications, propaganda (or ‘perception management’, the latest euphemism for the term) and censorship have been essential elements in the conduct of war, with application to both neutral and belligerent nations. In the Second World War, they were of particular significance with regard to neutral Eire (Southern Ireland). Great Britain and the United States saw Eire neutrality as a clear and present danger, owing to Eire’s strategic location relative to Atlantic supply convoys. A ‘war of words’ ensued, pitting first Britain and then the United States against Eire and anti-British Irish-Americans. This ‘war of words’ over Eire neutrality is the subject of this study.1 It is often posited that Eire neutrality was simply getting back at the British Empire after a centuries-old war that had distorted Anglo-Irish relations and produced ‘intrigue and mutual suspicion’. Some historians saw it as an expression of ‘traditional Irish nationalism’, and others as Irish pique over the continued existence of partition.2 T. Ryle Dwyer concluded that Taoiseach (Prime Minister) ´ Eamon de Valera was sympathetic to the British cause, but dared not commit his government for fear that civil strife would result.3 Tim Pat Coogan, noting that the Black and Tans were still remembered in Eire, concluded that the Irish view was best summarised in the words of ‘an old farmer’ who reputedly said, at the outset of war, that he wanted ‘to see Britain “not bate, but nearly bate”’.4 The Allied governments were perplexed and annoyed that Eire clung to neutrality. Was not the defeat of Nazism and fascism the end towards which all democratic peoples should strive? If Britain fell to the Axis, could Ireland be far behind? Moreover, the death of Allied sailors at the hands of German U-boats lurking off the rugged west coast of Ireland would be on the heads of the Irish government and people. Initially, of course, objections to Eire neutrality voiced in the isolationist United States, which remained neutral until attacked by Japan in December 1941, had a slightly hollow ring. Nicholas Cull credits British propaganda with undercutting that isolationist mentality, and, by implication, bringing much American public opinion to side with Britain on the issue of Eire neutrality.5 Michael Balfour’s definition of propaganda as ‘the art of inducing people to leap to conclusions without examining the evidence’ fits well with the ‘war of words’ over Eire neutrality. So too John Rodgers’ characterisation of propaganda as the shaping and directing of public opinion in areas beneficial to a particular cause. Rodgers listed the following as channels for overseas propaganda dissemination: the press, books, magazines, broadcasting, cinema, booklets, ‘whispering’ campaigns (spreading rumours), and ‘talking points,’ that is, items for





British visitors abroad to include in conversations with locals.6 Influencing public opinion was a virtual obsession with both those who favoured and those who opposed Eire neutrality, including the Eire government, which imposed a rigid censorship on every communications medium with propaganda potential. In 1940, Eire Defence Minister Frank Aiken described foreign propaganda as threatening Eire’s neutrality, security and public order; therefore, Eire censorship must maintain a ‘moat of silence’ around Eire.7 Appropriately, the censorship was housed in Dublin Castle. The ‘war of words’ over Eire neutrality has not been a major theme in historical studies of ‘the Emergency’, as the war period was known in Eire. Robert Fisk’s In Time of War, for one example, makes only a single reference to British ´ Drisceoil’s press attach´e and propaganda organiser John Betjeman, and Donal O Censorship in Ireland 1939–1945 focuses on Irish culture and politics far more than on foreign propaganda.8 Yet both propaganda and censorship were central to the issue. The Allies’ objective in Eire was to persuade the Irish government to end neutrality, or at least to bend it in their favour – Germany preferred a neutral Eire, so its limited propaganda activity in Ireland sought to encourage that stance – while the Eire government imposed a strict, if not always consistent, censorship to stop foreign propaganda and in the process reinforce popular commitment to neutrality. The object of propaganda is persuasion: to induce to believe, to convince. However, as David Welch has argued, propaganda is more frequently, and effectively, employed as reinforcement: strengthening or increasing existing beliefs or opinions.9 The Allied governments sought to ‘persuade’ the Irish to take a different line, while the Eire government sought to ‘reinforce’ popular commitment to neutrality, to widen the ‘moat’ separating Eire from the war. How propaganda and censorship affected the neutrality issue is central to this study, as is the question of whether or not Allied propaganda in due course shifted its focus from ‘persuasion’ to ‘reinforcement’. Official Allied propaganda was disseminated through government agencies, whose responsibility was to set propaganda policy in line with government policy, design propaganda materials, organise the channels of dissemination and see that they were properly used. The MOI (Ministry of Information) took ultimate responsibility in Britain, and the OWI (Office of War Information) in the United States. Both faced internal differences over how to do propaganda in Ireland. Official propaganda was slow in coming on board for it took time for the MOI and the OWI to organise for the work at hand. On the other hand, unofficial propaganda – attempts at persuasion made voluntarily by anyone with the means to do so – began almost immediately. The United States ambassador to Eire, David Gray, was an enthusiastic advocate of the British cause on both political and moral grounds, and was not averse to manipulating Irish sensibilities in that direction. So too Wendell Willkie, unsuccessful Republican candidate for President of the United States in 1940, whose visit to Eire in 1941 was aimed at winning support for Britain’s resolve in the war. Also, the voices of the British press were trained on Eire virtually from day one.10 As





Philip M. Taylor has made clear, the press and print media generally have been accessible for use as propaganda channels virtually since they were invented.11 This study concentrates on Britain, the United States and Eire, but does not ignore the propaganda campaigns aimed at Eire by Axis states, and by the Eire government itself. Germany disseminated propaganda through its news agency Deutsche Nachtrichtenb¨uro, the Deutsche Fichtebund propaganda agency, and Irish-language broadcasts from Germany into Ireland. Italy circulated an English-language version of its news letter, put out by its news agency Stefani, but did little else. The Irish government developed its propaganda for neutrality in the pages of such publications as the Irish Press, the voice of Fianna F´ail, ´ Eamon de Valera’s political party, and even more through an ever-expanding censorship policy. German propaganda supporting Eire neutrality is examined in the context of how it affected Allied propaganda and foreign policies directed at Eire. There was a Japanese presence also, but it was even less visible than that of the Italians. At least the Italians were Catholic. Censorship is an unavoidable adjunct to propaganda as it manipulates opinion by denying the circulation of certain kinds of information. While the Eire censors may or may not have perpetrated the ‘scandal of western civilization’, as Gray maintained, they did play an integral part in how and with what effect the war of words was waged.12 The Irish government imposed an increasingly vigorous censorship on both propaganda and news generally, allowing only the most non-committal war reporting. Films also were censored in the interest of nonpartisanship; broadcasting less so, curiously enough, even though Eire possessed the capability to jam transmissions. Irish newspapers carried daily BBC broad´ ´ As Donal O ´ Drisceoil has cast schedules alongside those of Radio Eireann (RE). made clear, censorship was of seminal importance to how the Eire government manipulated Irish opinion, and it had a major impact on how Anglo-American propaganda efforts were conducted in Eire. This study hopes to contribute to an ever-widening understanding of the important and interactive role played by propaganda and censorship in an age of mass communications. Certainly the technologies of mass communications that existed in the 1940s lagged well behind those which have emerged in subsequent decades, but were well ahead of what existed during the First World War. Newspapers, journals and mass-produced and distributed leaflets and news letters were propaganda channels in both World Wars, with radio broadcasting and talking films added in the Second World War. Television, a most effective propaganda medium in the later twentieth century, existed in both Britain and the United States well before the war began, but on an experimental scale. Still primitive in quality and limited in scope, television was put on hold for the duration of the war in favour of radio. Had the war come two decades later, British television might have had a significant impact on Irish public support for Eire neutrality. Or not; the 1991 Gulf War provided ample evidence that government control and manipulation of opinion through the censorship of news reporting in print and broadcasting has advanced at roughly the same speed as the technology of





broadcasting itself.13 This fact suggests that the result in Ireland might have been the same in 1959-1965 as it was in 1939–1945.

Notes 1. Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, vol. III: The War of Words, Oxford and New York, 1995. 2. Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality 1939–45, London, 1985, pp. ix, 550; John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich, Dublin, 1985, p. 1; Jerrold M. Packer, Neither Friend Nor Foe: The European Neutrals in World War II, New York, 1992, p. 31. 3. T. Ryle Dwyer, Strained Relations: Ireland at Peace and the USA at War 1941–45, Dublin, 1988, p. 4; see also T. Ryle Dwyer, Irish Neutrality and the USA 1939–47, Dublin, 1977. 4. Tim Pat Coogan, Eamon De Valera: The Man Who Was Ireland, New York, 1996, p. 521; see also Paul Canning, British Policy towards Ireland 1921–1941, Oxford, 1985. 5. See Nicholas John Cull, Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American ‘Neutrality’ in World War II, Oxford, 1995. 6. Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War 1939–1945, London, 1979, p. 421; John Rodgers to Kenneth Grubb and Eric Bamford, 14 October 1941, INF 1/135, PRO. 7. Frank Aiken, memorandum: Neutrality, Censorship and Democracy, 23 January 1940, S 11486A, SPO, Dublin; see Admiral Sir Barry Domvile, Look To Your Moat, London, 1937. ´ Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland 1939–1945: 8. Fisk, In Time of War, pp. 441, 164; Donal O Neutrality, Politics, and Society, Cork, 1996. 9. See David Welch, The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda, London and New York, 1993. 10. See Philip M. Taylor, ‘If War Should Come: Preparing the Fifth Arm for Total War 1935–39’, Journal of Contemporary History 16, 1981, pp. 27–51; Robert Cole, ‘The Conflict Within: Sir Stephen Tallents and Planning for Propaganda Overseas before the Second World War’, Albion 14, 1982, pp. 50–71. 11. See Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day, Manchester, 1995. 12. Gray, Behind the Green Curtain, unpublished memoir, ch. 2, p. 2, #3082, DGP, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming. The original draft is in the Roosevelt Presidential Library at Hyde Park, New York. 13. See Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War, Manchester, 1992.

1

Setting the Stage: April 1937–August 1939

The ‘war of words’ over Irish neutrality actually began in 1937 when the Free State adopted the Irish word for Ireland and officially became ‘Eire’. At the same ´ time, Taoiseach Eamon de Valera declared Eire a neutral state, promising that it would be benevolently neutral so long as no Irish interests were at stake.1 A ´ year later, the Free State Broadcasting Service was renamed Radio Eireann. Such gestures were the Free State asserting its right and resolve to set its own policies, and to move further along the road to complete independence from Britain. Meanwhile, relations between the major European powers were disintegrating, Anglo-French appeasement policy notwithstanding, and in the summer of 1939, in the context of the crisis over the Polish Corridor, Eire officials vigorously reasserted Eire neutrality in the event of war.2 Taking the name ‘Eire’ was the Free State making a symbolic claim to all of Ireland; declaring itself a neutral state was drawing a line between Ireland and Great Britain. This was a reality check for the British government, and critical and pressing questions were raised: what would be Anglo-Irish relations in the event of a European war? Could a neutral Eire maintain its own security? What impact would a neutral Eire have on British defences, and how might Britain and its allies deal with that impact? And what impact might neutrality have on an Irish economy heavily dependent on Britain? The Irish also raised these issues, and de Valera warned that any Irish person thinking that neutrality alone would make Eire secure ‘lives in a fool’s paradise’. In July 1938, following the return to Eire of Bereshaven, Cobh and Lough Swilly, Irish ports retained by Britain as part of the 1921 treaty, he assured the British government that while Eire would not bend the rules of neutrality so that Britain could use Eire naval bases, neither would it for Britain’s enemies.3 Neutrality was popular in Eire, and de Valera was determined to maintain it so long as no war-time belligerent violated it. In that case, Eire would be prepared to fight. It was in this context that the British, and after Pearl Harbor the Americans, strove to move through propaganda, and diplomatic pressure that often resembled propaganda, the government and people of Eire towards active support for the Allied cause. The Eire government responded with a rigid and apparently arbitrary censorship that some observers regarded as scandalous. With neutrality declared, what would be Eire’s relations with Britain in wartime? In principle, the Irish Free State had accepted membership of the British Commonwealth since 1921; accepting membership in practice was another matter. In 1937, de Valera did not attend a conference of Commonwealth states, because the word ‘imperial’ was included in the conference title. This was

6

setting the stage

offensive to the Irish, and his presence at the conference would ‘embarrass him politically at home’. He also objected to the English king’s name being on Free State passports, despite this being customary in all Commonwealth countries. Meanwhile, Northern Ireland premier Lord Craigavon demanded that Eire be denied access to the Commonwealth on the grounds that Free State politicians could not be trusted.4 That demand was ignored, and the British government encouraged Eire participation in Commonwealth affairs in the hope that membership would assure Eire cooperation in war-time. The hope was forlorn. Eire entertained no sense of obligation or loyalty to the Commonwealth. As External Relations Secretary Joseph Walshe told the American charg´e d’affaires, John MacVeagh, Eire would remain in the Commonwealth ‘only so long as it suited her interests to do so’. Those interests did not include being drawn into war.5 By mid-1939 Eire had made its position clear, and when British Council director Lord Lloyd rather naively proposed a campaign of Empire cultural publicity for Eire, Sir Thomas Inskip replied that he would never get it past the Free State government.6 The return of the treaty ports did not guarantee Eire’s friendship, which was the expectation, but created more tensions. When the return was being negotiated, the Admiralty protested that plans for the defence of Britain from a hostile navy included access to these ports; the Eire government demanded that Britain help pay for maintaining the ports after their return, which roused Northern Irish hackles; and Eire assured the British government that the ports would not be available to the Royal Navy in time of war, since even a hint of British control would infringe Irish national sovereignty. The only concession was that if the British agreed to relinquish all claims to the ports, the Irish might feel more benevolent towards them if war came. Dominions Secretary Malcolm MacDonald recommended that Britain keep the ports.7 Finally, on 11 July 1938, after months of negotiation and amid great ceremonial display, the ports returned to Irish control. However, Irish views of Britain did not improve much as a result, a fact pointed out angrily in the House of Commons by Sir Ronald Ross, member for Londonderry.8 For evidence, one need consider ´ only Eire Defense Minister Frank Aiken’s justification to the D´ail Eireann (Irish parliament) for drinking a toast to King George on the occasion of the hand over: ‘I am quite prepared to drink his health every time they hand us over a lump of territory, and if he hands us over the six counties, I will drink his health six times.’9 Meanwhile, the Meteorological Control Station was also returned to Eire, and without controversy, despite the fact that in war-time this Atlantic weather-tracking station would have been fully as vital to the Royal Navy as would use of the ports. Of course, naval ports and battleships were more visible than a meteorological control station. Media providing information for public consumption were also an issue in pre-war Anglo-Irish relations. The British were particularly concerned because Eire’s location placed it ‘in a different and more dangerous category’ than other parts of the Commonwealth; they wanted, in the event of war, all telephone and written communications between Britain and Eire suspended if necessary,

april 1937−august 1939

7

and strictly censored otherwise. London recognised that the Eire government would have to cooperate if this control was to be effective. De Valera asserted that any Anglo-Irish cooperation in war-time, including censorship in aid of British security, would depend upon whether the Irish could trust the British – which, given the censorship imposed by Eire on British and American media once war began, sounded with an ironic ring.10 The trust issue especially applied to the increase in Eire’s dependency on Britain for food supply and trade in war-time. How much cooperation could be imposed upon de Valera in exchange for a supply of wheat and a market for beef, without raising accusations of British blackmail, thereby arousing Irish hostility? The emotional baggage on this issue was heavy indeed. The Irish had not forgotten the Great Famine of 1845–9, and many of them held the British responsible for its devastating affects.11 Hinting that Eire might be denied basic necessities in war-time was hardly a way to gain Irish trust. Nor was partition. In 1937, the Free State government hinted that the European situation was sufficiently dangerous to be ‘a reason for closing ranks’ with Britain, provided that Britain would consider ending partition; and if Britain would not, the Free State might leave the Commonwealth. The British government countered that the Free State leaving the Commonwealth would ‘make partition permanent’ – which was what Northern Ireland, which was on Britain’s side, wanted. As Craigavon put it: ‘I honestly believe that the man is not yet born who could govern the whole of Ireland if the North and South did come together.’12 Then in 1938 Britain gave in to German demands over the Sudetenland. Anti-partition rallies in Glasgow, Manchester and London followed. The theme was that if the Sudeten Germans could have independence from Czechoslovakia, why not the Northern Irish from the United Kingdom? In de Valera’s words: ‘So long as partition lasts the mutual good-will between the people of the two islands which is becoming more and more essential to their common safety and well-being cannot be secure.’13 Eire citizens overwhelmingly blamed Britain for partition, and for encouraging the Northern Ireland government’s oppression of the nationalist minority.14 Partition was linked to religion in Northern Ireland. The majority were propartition Protestants, and the minority anti-partition and nationalist Catholics. Eire leaders charged that the Northern Ireland government was tied to extremist Orange lodges, which demanded anti-Catholic discrimination at all levels, and gerrymandered constituencies to deprive Catholics of fair representation in the Stormont parliament. In Northern Ireland, the Protestant press castigated Northern Ireland Catholic bishops for mixing religion with political propaganda in their Lenten Pastorals, while the Catholic press applauded the bishops for doing so. A despairing Sir Harry Battersbee opined that both sides showed ‘a lamentable lack of statesmanship and foresight’.15 In short, Northern obstinacy would impede any offer Britain might make regarding partition, while de Valera was inclined to stir emotions by being provocative on the issue.16 The result was British frustration in dealing with the Irish, a frustration the propagandists would feel as well, when confronted by Eire’s war-time censorship. The link in Ireland

8

setting the stage

between religion and politics was of major concern to propaganda planners, and they were not clear on how to deal with it; they only knew that they must do something.17 De Valera regularly played the America card in dealing with Britain. In 1937 there were roughly thirty million Irish-Americans, many in positions of influence such as Cardinal William O’Connell and James T. Sullivan, Boston Globe editor and a vice-president of the Boston Edison Company.18 Most Irish-Americans were Catholic and resented Northern Ireland Protestants for supporting what they regarded as British oppression of Ireland. Many also belonged to, or sympathised with, such Anglophobic groups as Clan-na-Gael, the Ancient Order of Hibernians and the American Friends of Irish Neutrality. These groups had collaborated with Irish-American newspapers at least since the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin, in orchestrating anti-British and pro-Irish propaganda. Irish-Americans had raised millions of dollars between 1919 and 1921 in support of efforts to establish an Irish republic.19 Little had changed since. The Gaelic American, published in New York City under the editorial direction of Michael O’Reilly, purveyed the most vitriolic pro-Irish, anti-British press propaganda in North America. Prevalent themes included ‘free Ireland from Britain’ ‘free Ireland from not genuinely Irish patriots’, ‘keep Britain away from America’ and ‘Britain is an undemocratic nation that stole the lands of backward people through war’. ‘Another Propagandist Arrives’ was the response in 1938 when British MP Herbert Morrison visited the United States. Even de Valera came under attack if he showed the slightest inclination to co-operate with Britain, such as complimenting Neville Chamberlain for signing the 1938 Munich Agreement. To the Gaelic American that made de Valera a toady to British imperialists. The Gaelic American also blamed Britain and France for Adolf Hitler, denounced de Valera as a traitor to the Irish Republican cause, accused the British of using propaganda to get America into ‘any war that may be started in Europe by England’, and so on. ‘BEWARE OF IMPERIALIST WARS!’ was the front-page headline the day after Germany invaded Poland. The attached column denounced President Franklin D. Roosevelt as an ‘ardent partisan of England and France’.20 And once Britain was officially at war with Germany, the Gaelic American added sympathy for Germany to its vituperative commentary on England – all to further the cause of Irish nationalism. Most Americans were neither Irish nor enthusiasts for Ireland, and favoured Britain over the Axis powers. Ireland was the favourite country of only four per cent of Americans in 1938; that dropped to three per cent in 1939. Americans generally were not sympathetic towards a neutral Eire, and became less so as the war progressed. In January 1941 63 per cent of Americans thought that Eire should join Britain in the war, though they did not also think that the United States should do so. In fact, in September 1939, roughly 90 per cent of Americans favoured neutrality.21 Roosevelt and such of his advisers as Robert Sherwood and Harold Ickes were Anglophiles; so too major press commentators such as Dorothy Thompson, whose father was English. Even so, the president found it prudent to walk a middle ground. His government turned a sympathetic but

april 1937−august 1939

9

detached ear when de Valera urged America to pressure Britain on partition. It was made clear to him that US policy was ‘to treat Ireland separately [from Britain], that we recognize Ireland as an individual entity’: in other words, sympathy for Eire over partition, but not to the extent of annoying the British government or pro-British Americans. Middle ground is difficult to maintain. That de Valera was expected to open the Eire pavilion at the 1939 New York World’s Fair raised alarms among American and British officials, who feared he would use the occasion to ‘make frightful speeches’ and ‘raise the fiery cross’ regarding partition.22 In the event, de Valera did not go to New York, but remained in Dublin to protest against a British plan to introduce military conscription in Northern Ireland. It remained for Eire ambassador Robert Brennan to put de Valera’s case before America regarding both partition and neutrality. Brennan was a writer, a journalist, a survivor of the 1916 Easter Rising, a diplomat, a co-founder of the Irish Press and a former Sinn Fein propagandist. He was a rapid speaker of ‘beautiful English with but the faintest suggestion of brogue’, and a great admirer of the United States and Irish-Americans.23 Above all, his propaganda skills were exceptional, and he used them untiringly throughout the war period. There were Irish-Americans whom Brennan – and de Valera, for that matter – did not admire, extremists who were both anti-British and anti-Semitic. These ‘patriots’ looked to Nazi Germany as the potential liberator of Ireland, and disseminated truly inflammatory and divisive propaganda. They were encouraged by IRA leader Sean Russell, who claimed that Germany was Ireland’s only true friend.24 This element enthusiastically supported Father Charles E. Coughlin, the anti-Semitic and pro-German ‘radio priest’ from Detroit. When WMCA of New York City cancelled his broadcasts for their extreme bias, the Grand Knights of Columbus Joyce Kilmer Society, the Ancient Order of Hibernians and an Irish-dominated bricklayers’ union local in philadelphia protested to the Federal Communications Commission. The protests were signed with such names as Hennessy, Flanagan, O’Hanlan, Guinan, O’Neill, Loughlin, and Connally.25 Germany saw great potential here, and in 1939 a German-born German-American Bund propagandist and later Abwehr agent, Oskar Pfaus, who had worked in America as a lumberjack, a cowboy, a Chicago policeman and, he claimed, a soldier in the United States Army, was organizing Irish-Americans against the ‘Jew–British–Red’ combination in the United States. Also, Hitler reputedly invited Joseph P. McGarrity, IRA sympathiser and Philadelphia Clan-na-Gael leader, to visit Germany.26 Irish-Americans attracted to Russell were likely to do fund raising and propaganda for the IRA, working against both Britain and de Valera, who they believed had sold out. McGarrity was an important leader among them, with contacts in Eire.27 He corresponded frequently with these contacts, on such topics as the hope that if war was the outcome of the Munich Agreement, England would suffer ‘the fate [that] is in store for her’; concern that President Roosevelt might not understand Germany’s true grievances and be misled by the pernicious ‘Jew-Red controlled’ British press; and insistence that Frank Gallagher, head of the Eire GIB (Government Information Bureau) throw in with the IRA.

10

setting the stage

Gallagher responded that he would do nothing of the sort as McGarrity’s views were completely wrongheaded.28 McGarrity also wrote to the United States government. He warned Secretary of State Cordell Hull not to treat Northern Ireland as separate from the south, challenged Francis B. Sayer at the State Department to justify United States policy regarding Eire in relation to the United Kingdom, and requested Congressman and Clan-na-Gael activist James McGranery of Pennsylvania to protest against de Valera coming to the New York World’s Fair and urge the government to adopt a policy aimed at forcing Britain out of Ireland.29 McGranery agreed, but Hull ignored him and Sayer responded in language that resembled a press release. McGarrity expected to make propaganda from Sayer’s response. ‘We have succeeded’, he wrote, ‘in tearing away the veil that for a long time hid this miserable attempt to deceive the public as to the true status of the present ‘Free State’ Government in the eyes of the United States.’30 Irish-American nationalists regarded propaganda as an important weapon in promoting their agenda. John O’Hara Harte, organiser of the propaganda leaflet An Irish Letter, believed that propaganda backed by effective physical action was the difference between success and failure. He wrote: I am convinced that if the Clan-na-Gael and the IRB [Irish Republican Brotherhood] and the IRA had a 100 per cent loyal propaganda department in 1920 and 1921 there would have been no split, and the groups that split – Collins, etc – would have been properly branded, at that moment, as betrayers of the Republic instead of, as they were, being regarded as ‘eminent statesmen’ and all that twaddle.31 Harte’s propaganda channels were primarily letters to newspapers and government officials, and mass meetings ‘if possible’. Typical of his style was a ‘letter to the editor’ depicting American ‘Anglomanics . . . going wild with joy’ over a visit to America by the king and queen of England, who represented only ‘blood, misery, and plain thievery’.32 It is not clear to what extent McGarrity, Harte and others believed their efforts were effective, save that when planning a Clan-naGael convention in January 1939, the leadership thought it necessary to warn members to be on the lookout for British agents infiltrating the organisation.33 Harte also advocated propaganda ‘backed by effective physical action’, and supported some fifty-five IRA bombings of factories, bridges and other ‘important places’, mostly in Northern Ireland and England, in 1938 – which is ironic, considering that he was a Quaker and therefore, in theory at least, a pacifist.34 The IRA publicised its policies and actions in a propaganda sheet titled the Irish Bulletin, and Clan-na-Gael made certain that Irish-Americans knew it supported these policies and actions. When London’s Hammersmith Bridge was bombed, Clan leader James Brislane enthused: ‘Aren’t they wonderful men? What a credit to Ireland, we ought to feel very proud to be associated with such men.’ An IrishAmerican Catholic priest enquired of McGarrity whether action beyond protest rallies might be taken against the royal visit to Washington, DC.35 Whether by ‘action beyond’ he meant terrorist acts is not certain. In May 1939, Russell

april 1937−august 1939

11

returned to the United States to raise money and propagandise for the IRA cause, promising that until the British met IRA demands, weekly bombings would take place throughout Britain. He publicly praised Clan-na-Gael, but privately complained about its disorganisation and infighting, noting that recruiting and fund raising for the cause were successful mainly only in Boston, Springfield and New York City. For it’s part, the Clan saw Russell’s arrest and brief detention on charges of illegal entry as providing national publicity for the IRA and a boost to its’ fortunes.36 In fact, IRA terrorism achieved little – IRA violence in the North had inspired retaliatory attacks on Catholics by fanatical Ulster Protestants – and was outlawed by the Eire government as part of the Offences against the State Act. The British suspected IRA intrigues with the Third Reich against both British and Free State interests, a suspicion that was confirmed by the Czechoslovakian charg´e d’affaires in Dublin, who informed Whitehall that the former leader of the pro-fascist Blue Shirts, General Eoin O’Duffy, had arranged for German ambassador Dr Eduard Hempel and Gauleiter Reinhard Stumpf to meet with IRA leaders at Inveir, in County Donegal.37 Britain kept close tabs on Eire – German relations, and Ireland Situation Committee reports included references to de Valera welcoming Ambassador Hempel at Dublin Castle in 1937, to a German proposal for building an armaments factory in Ireland and to imports and exports between Germany and Eire, which in 1938 rose in value from 23.8 million to 40.4 million Reichsmarks – a particularly disquieting statistic from Britain’s point of view.38 Meanwhile, Hempel assured de Valera and Joseph Walshe that Germany fully supported Eire neutrality, and agreed to a press announcement to that effect issued by the Eire government.39 This did nothing to reassure London. The press, Irish and otherwise, was among the most important propaganda channels operating in Ireland both before and during the war, and suffered the most from Eire censorship. While the Cork Examiner, the only southern Irish daily published outside of Dublin, had some influence, the Dublin papers had the largest readership and therefore the most influence; that principle applied also in Britain with regard to London papers. The press on both sides of the Irish Sea regularly addressed the divisive issues with application to Eire: separation from the Commonwealth, partition, the ports and the IRA, among others. Robert Maire Smyllie’s pro-British Irish Times (circulation 32,000), to a lesser extent Frank Geary’s Irish Independent (circulation 140,000, Ireland’s most Catholic paper and associated with the Fine Gael party) and such London papers as the Morning Post (circulation 500,000) regularly published propaganda backing Anglo-Irish cooperation. William Sweetman’s Irish Press (circulation 108,000 and associated with Fianna F´ail) published pro-government and proneutrality propaganda, often couched in nationalist language. For example, an Irish Press editorial in 1939 complained about expanded defence spending, and implied that it was Britain’s fault because in the event of war, Eire would have to guarantee its neutrality by arming for self-defence. When the Irish Press was founded in 1931, editor Frank Gallagher directed sub-editors to ‘always give the Irish angle in the headlines’ and ‘be on your guard against the habits of British

12

setting the stage

and foreign news agencies who look at the world mainly through imperialist eyes’.40 The Irish Press was the primary press supporter of the neutrality policy; the pro-British Irish Times argued that it was unrealistic: ‘Constitutionally, Ireland can remain neutral in any war that may occur at any time. Constitutions, however, count for little or nothing in time of war.’ Rather, the government should focus on how Eire would defend itself, whether Britain would have use of the treaty ports in the event of war, and whether Eire could expect the Axis powers to respect its neutrality if, for example, ‘the German air force thinks that the Phoenix Park will provide a satisfactory base for an air attack on Liverpool’. The British press naturally shared these views, and urged that Eire ‘be governed by reality and not by vagaries of political chance’.41 Meanwhile, Irish Press editorials argued that the Irish owed their ‘British oppressors’ nothing, advocated Eire’s separation from the Commonwealth, and on occasion suggested that the British and the French were no better than the Germans when it came to tyrannical rule over subjugated peoples.42 Nonsense, countered the Irish Times. ‘Everybody knows perfectly well what matters most in the Irish Free State is its relationship with the nearby island.’ Exactly, wrote the London Morning Post. The further Eire separated from Britain, the more insignificant it became in the eyes of the world. That claim inspired the Irish Press to riposte: ‘The British connection is a thing of the dead past. Its dark and blighting shadow has been forever removed from the face of the country, and the echo of the rattle of its chains and the memory of its misdeeds only serve to recall the gallant struggle which resulted in the overthrow of British rule . . . ’43 Separation tied in with partition, for which the Irish Press naturally blamed Britain. An editorial praised de Valera’s warning that America would be hostile towards Britain if partition was not ended, a warning based upon what the Dominions Office termed ‘hysterical quotations’ from Irish-American newspapers. The Irish Press made much of an anti-partition signature campaign in the United States, and made a hero of Englishman and Oxford don Frank Pakenham (later Lord Longford), who was denied access to a hall at Queen’s University, Belfast, where he had planned to speak against partition.44 The Irish Times scoffed at all of this. Only ‘a handful of woolly-minded extremists’ actually believed that real political freedom for Eire depended on reunion with the North. Having said that, the Irish Times later opined that if British military conscription extended to Northern Ireland, it might have disastrous consequences for Anglo-Eire relations. The reproduction of the Anti-Conscription Pledge of 1918, which bore photographs of such Republican heroes as de Valera and Arthur Griffith and had been ‘signed all over Ireland’, in a 1938 issue of the Irish Press, probably resonated with the majority of Irish opinion.45 Naturally, the Irish Times opposed the IRA, and joined British newspapers in condemning terrorist ‘outrages’ along the border with Eire which greeted a royal visit to Ulster in August 1937. In January 1939, the Irish Times contemptuously dismissed as ‘Tomfoolery in Tralee’ an IRA bomb exploding behind the hotel in Ireland where Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s son was a guest. Letters to the editor condemned IRA bombings in England in the summer of 1939 and the

april 1937−august 1939

13

Eire government for not speaking out against such acts. Meanwhile, in a piece of classic press propaganda, the London Sunday Express, reporting Russell’s arrest in the United States for having overstayed his visa, depicted him as ‘the chief terrorist of our day’ (playing to fear) and a crude, fanatical individual (character assassination), who attracted ‘a good many German-American Nazis . . . and they contributed generously’ (consorting with the enemy).46 The Irish Press, on the other hand, reported Russell’s arrest with much sympathy: he was a hero of Ireland’s fight for independence beginning with the Easter Rising in 1916; the paper approved of his connections with such Irish-Americans as Joseph McGarrity and Congressman James McGranery; and he was not criticised for his aggressive and war-like tone when pleading to Clan-na-Gael for Irish-American support in the IRA war against Britain.47 The Irish Press also frequently soft-pedalled its commentary on Nazi Germany, and hinted strongly that Britain bore some of the responsibility when Czechoslovakia was occupied in 1938 in violation of the Munich Pact: ‘The Czechs, obviously, are too weak to offer much resistance alone . . . The die was cast at Munich. The Czechs know, at any rate, that they are not being deceived and that sympathy is all they need expect from their former allies.’48 And, when the Irish Press reported on Carl Heinz Petersen, a journalist for Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung and the German news agency Nachrichtenb¨uro, it did not even raise an editorial eyebrow to his claims that he was not a propagandist, that he was in Dublin only to report to Germany on Irish culture, and that there was no Nazi propaganda in Eire.49 In effect, the Irish Press followed government policy, which was to maintain good Eire–German relations. Even when it offered criticism of Germany’s pre-war treatment of Jews, the item was brief and was accompanied by a photograph showing British police forcing ten Czech Jewish refugees onto an aeroplane at Croydon aerodrome for repatriation to Warsaw. The written criticism of German persecution of European Jews was subtle compared to the photograph, which depicted the British as equally prepared to use force against the oppressed.50 Meanwhile, the Irish Times and Irish Independent were anything but soft on Germany, even though the latter was thought to have some pro-Axis staff. The Irish Times poked fun at the Nazis’ apparent fascination with Wagnerian opera, criticised the state-controlled German press for its treatment of Chamberlain during the Munich crisis, condemned Nazi persecution of Catholics and Jews with special reference to Kristallnacht, and called upon the Eire government to offer sanctuary to Jews fleeing Nazi persecution. The Irish Independent ran a tongue-in-cheek item concerning the ‘Aryanization’ of cats in Germany to make them more willing to wage war on rats, ‘who will eventually be classed as nonAryan and presumably relegated to the lethal chamber.’ It was then pointed out that cats originated in Egypt while rats came out of Norway, and therefore, the rat was much more likely to be a true Aryan than was the cat.51 The Irish Press lauded Irish-American opposition to partition. Among other things, it applauded a joint American Irish societies’ resolution denouncing conscription in Northern Ireland as a protest against partition; depicted an anti-partition International Irish Congress meeting in Chicago as proof that

14

setting the stage

Irish-Americans knew how to respect and defend liberty against aggressors; suggested that Irish-American immigrants were the actual creators of American democracy; and claimed that by welcoming Deputy Prime Minister Sean T. O’Kelly to New York in June 1939, Americans expressed sympathy with Ireland over partition while demonstrating that American opinion would never trust Britain so long as the aggression of partition continued. The Irish Press also described in glowing terms Ambassador John Cudahy’s ‘striking tribute to the part played by Irishmen in the development of the United States’.52 The paper clearly believed that America could influence Britain on matters important to Irish nationalism, and that Irish-American influence could bring its government on board to do so. Whether or not the Eire government encouraged the Irish Press to voice this perspective as a form of anti-partition propaganda is a matter for conjecture only. Propaganda channels also included broadcasting, the newest mass communications medium and the most difficult to censor, which was potentially more useful even than the press for the deployment of propaganda in war-time. Or in peacetime; radio certainly helped make the Hitler revolution possible, and contributed to Nazi success.53 Transatlantic broadcasting was possible through shortwave, as in 1938 when American newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst arranged the broadcast of an isolationist diatribe into Europe in six languages. Broadcasting advanced rapidly after the Great War. The first US radio station was on the air in 1920, and the BBC in 1922, broadcasting from Northern Ireland in 1924. By 1927, Britain had issued 2,269,644 receiving licences.54 Broadcasting began on a limited scale from Dublin in 1926 and from Cork in 1927, but expanded rapidly after a high-powered station was opened at Athlone in 1933. Between 1935 and 1937 the number of licences doubled, and by 1939 RE´ had an annual revenue of £113,500 from licence fees and advertising.55 Eire newspapers carried broadcast schedules for both RE´ and the BBC, well before the Emergency. By 1939, Dublin residents could hear educational programmes, sacred and Gaelic music, comedy, news in French, German and English, and much else.56 RE´ and the BBC cooperated throughout the 1930s with only occasional disagreements, such as when a BBC frequency began interfering with RE´ reception. On that occasion, RE´ Director T. J. Kiernan wrote to BBC Empire Service Director J. C. S. MacGregor: ‘I hope we are not going to have war in the air between Great Britain and Ireland!’57 Actually, once the Emergency began, BBC London ´ With regard to the ‘war of had more difficulty with BBC Belfast than with RE. words’, it was an indication of things to come when, in 1935, BBC Controller of Public Relations Sir Stephen Tallents was put in charge of planning for the war-time Ministry of Information.58 Cinema also was an effective propaganda channel. In 1939 weekly film audiences in the United States averaged 80 million, in Britain 23 million, and in southern Ireland 21 million. Mostly American and British films showed in prewar Dublin, with the former being the more popular.59 In all three markets, film makers had to contend with censorship, which in the 1930s expanded beyond moral issues to focus increasingly on politics. In 1937 the British Board of Film

april 1937−august 1939

15

Censors head, Lord Tyrrell, said: ‘We can take pride in observing that there is not a single film showing in London today which deals with any of the burning questions of the day.’60 War-time film censorship was most rigidly imposed in Eire, which made waging the ‘war of words’ all the more difficult, even when it reflected John Betjeman’s preference for ‘good relations’ over ‘propaganda’.61 In ´ September 1939, the D´ail Eireann passed both a constitutional amendment enabling the government to declare a state of emergency and the Emergency Powers Act, which gave the government wide-reaching powers regarding military matters, supplies, agriculture, transport and, above all, censorship. The Free State government had already established a committee, in 1935, to set up a censorship organisation in the event of war. Thomas Coyne and Edward Cussen, both of whom served as war-time censors, were members.62 The constitutional amendment effectively established that in official parlance there would be no war, only an “emergency”, a term also applied to Irish political life throughout the 1920s and 1930s. It now became, in the words of Robert Fisk, ‘a euphemistic description for what, north of the border, was to became the Second World War’.63 The euphemism was taken to heart and clung to during and long after the war. In 1988, this author told an inquisitive, grandmotherly cloakroom attendant at the National Concert Hall that he was in Dublin to pursue research on Ireland in the Second World War. She raised an eyebrow and said: ‘War? There weren’t any war. Surely you must mean the Emergency.’ But war there was: Eire was bombed, Irish ships were sunk, tens of thousands of Irishmen served in His Majesty’s Forces and thousands more were employed in war work in Britain, the southern Irish economy suffered from war-induced shortages, Eire sent fire brigades to assist when German bombs fell on Belfast, and airmen downed over Eire were interned – admittedly, Axis far more often than Allied. Meanwhile, Britain and then the United States employed propaganda, and diplomacy that often resembled propaganda, in an effort to persuade Eire to set aside denial (that the war had anything to do with Eire), resentment (that the British Empire had no right to expect the Irish to come to its aid in a war that was not of Ireland’s making), and neutrality that leaned towards the Allied cause. Of course, in September 1939 the United States was also neutral, and the British Ministry of Information was far removed from being in a position to disseminate much of anything resembling propaganda in Eire – or anywhere else, for that matter.

Notes 1. Note, Eire Department of External Relations to the United Kingdom Dominions Office, April 1937, DO 35/890/X1/52, PRO. Since it implied the whole of Ireland, the British government objected to this declaration with some vigour. Official press release, 30 December 1937, DO 35/892/X1/161, PRO; John Dulanty, quoted in Lord ´ Longford and Thomas P. O’Neill, Eamon de Valera, London, 1974, p. 307. 2. Memorandum, N. E. Archer, DO to R. H. Hadow, FO, 10 July 1939, FO 371/23966.W10380, PRO.

16

setting the stage

´ 3. ISC report on de Valera speech in the D´ail Eireann, 29 April 1938, DO 35/892/XI/6913; Sir Thomas Inskip, conversation with de Valera, 8 September 1938, DO 35/894/X31/18, PRO. 4. A. E. Jones to Malcolm MacDonald, 8 February 1937, DO 35/890/XI/15; Inskip, minute to Neville Chamberlain, 21 April 1939, DO 35/XII/303; MacDonald, note on conversation with Dulanty, 6 May 1937, DO 35/890/XI/56; MacDonald, note on conversation with Craigavon, 8 April 1937, DO 35/890/XI/54, PRO. 5. John MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 13 April 1939, RG 84/2 Dublin, DLCR, NAUS. 6. Inskip to Lloyd, 17 July 1939, BW 2/88, PRO. 7. Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality 1939–45, London, 1985, pp. 1–13; MacDonald, report to the DO, December 1937, DO ´ 35/892/X1/1; An Taoiseach speech in the D´ail Eireann, 27 April 1938, DO 35/893/X11/198, PRO; Sir Ronald Ross, Londonderry, 10 November 1938, HCD, 5th Series, vol. 341, cols 385–6. 8. ‘The Changing of the Guard . . . ’, Irish Times, 13 July 1938, p. 7; Ross, Londonderry, 10 November 1938, HCD, 5th Series, vol. 341, cols. 385–6. 9. Aiken, quoted in ‘Drinking the King’s Health: Minister Tells the Real Story’, Irish Times, 15 July 1938, p. 7. 10. A. E. Kemble to Wing Commander W. Elliot, 14 May 1938; memorandum: Censorship in Eire, 24 October 1938, INF 1/528, PRO. 11. De Valera to the DO, 24 November 1937, DO 35/8992/XI/121, PRO. 12. Item in Irish Independent, 6 May 1937, DO 35/891/X1/60; Sir Harry Battersbee to Sir Warren Fisher, 6 January 1937, DO 35/890/X1/2; MacDonald, note, 23 June 1937, DO 35/891/X1/81; note, Eire Department of External Affairs to the DO, April 1937, DO 35/890/X1/52, PRO. 13. ‘Mr de Valera on Partition’, Irish Times, 17 October 1938, p. 7. 14. Note on conversation between Chamberlain and de Valera, 4 October 1938, DO 35/893/X11/247; Irish Nationalist, 30 January 1939, p. 9; memorandum, 23 February 1939, DO 35/893/X11/287, PRO. 15. C. G. Markbreiter to Battersbee, 8 April 1937, DO 35/890/X1/50; religious breakdown of Northern Ireland as of 28 February 1937, INF 1/404, PRO; Ernest Ives to Joseph P. Kennedy, 20 February 1939, RG 84/5, DLGR, NAUS; Battersbee, minute, 18 November 1938, DO 35/893/X11/251, PRO. 16. MacDonald, note, 21 March 1938, DO 35/893/X11/234, PRO. 17. MOI, Preliminary Notes for Organization of the Catholic Division, 19 June 1939, INF 1/405; Hugh Maclennan, MOI Religions Division, memorandum, 21 August 1939, INF 1/38, PRO. 18. See T. Ryle Dwyer, Strained Relations: Ireland at Peace and the USA at War 1941–45, Dublin, 1988; and R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600–1972, London, 1988; ‘Ireland Determined to Keep Out of War, Her Envoy Declares’, Boston Evening Globe, 9 December 1939, p. 3. ´ 19. Longford and O’Neill, Eamon de Valera, pp. 157–9. 20. ‘Another Propagandist Arrives’, Gaelic American, 9 April 1938, p. 4; ‘De Valera Lauds Chamberlain’, Gaelic American, 1 October 1938, p. 4; ‘Beware of Imperialist War’, Gaelic American, 2 September 1938, p. 1. 21. See Gallup Poll Monthly for poll results from 1935, 1938 and 1939. 22. De Valera, interview in the United States, 12 December 1938, MS 21,256, FGP, INL; Cordell Hull to John Cudahy, 20 April 1939, RG 84/2, DLCR, NAUS; Roosevelt to

april 1937−august 1939

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29.

30. 31.

32.

33. 34. 35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

17

Cudahy, 9 February 1938, PSF, FDRL; Cudahy to Roosevelt, 6 April 1939, PSF, FDRL; notes on conversation, MacDonald and John Dulanty, 23 December 1938, DO 35/893/X11/265, PRO. ‘New Minister to USA: Appointment of Mr R. Brennan: Playwright and Politician’, Irish Times, 27 August 1938, p. 9; ‘Ireland Determined to Keep Out of War’, p. 3. Sean Russell to the German ambassador to the United States, 15 October 1936, MS 17,485, MGP, INL. A sampling of this correspondence can be found in the files of the Federal Communications Commission, RG 173/200, FCCGC, NAUS. Oskar Pfaus to James Philip Gaffney, 30 May 1939; Pfaus to Anna B. Sloane, 3 June 1939; Liam D. Walsh to Gaffney, 22 June 1939, FO 371/23039.C11402, PRO. Joseph McGarrity to Judge Joseph T. Lawless, 19 January 1939, MS 17,546(4), MGP, INL. McGarrity to Mick Mcdonnell, 13 August 1938; McGarrity to Jim Brislane, 27 September 1938; Gallagher to McGarrity, 25 June 1938; McGarrity to Brislane, 13 December 1938, MS 17,544(3), FGP, INL. McGarrity to Hull, 18 November 1938, MS 17,544(3), FGP, INL; McGarrity to Francis Sayer, various letters between 10 and 25 January 1939, and Sayer to McGarrity, replies from 26 January to 8 March 1939, MS 17,545, MGP, INL; McGarrity to McGranery, 20 March 1939, MS 17,546(4), MGP, INL. McGarrity to Clan-na-Gael members, note attached to copies of Sayer correspondence, 8 March 1939, MS 17, 545, MGP, INL. John O’Hara Harte, note, 9 June 1938; Harte to McGarrity, 21 December 1938, MS 17, 544(3), FGP, INL; see Robert Cole, Britain and the War of Words in Neutral Europe 1939–45, London, 1990, p. 58. McGarrity and Brislane, telegram to Clan-na-Gael members, 16 January 1939, MS 17,546(5), MGP, INL; draft of a letter to the editor of an unidentified newspaper, ca. May–June 1939, MS 17,546(8), MGP, INL. Circular to Clan-na-Gael members, 28 January 1939, MS 17,546(6), MGP, INL. Russell to McGarrity, 1 December 1938, MS 17,485, MGP, INL; MacVeagh to Hull, 12 August 1939, RG 84/5, DLGR, NAUS. Cudahy to Hull, 20 January 1939, RG 84/5, DLGR, NAUS; copy, Irish Bulletin, 8 July 1939, DO 35/894/X11/343, PRO; Brislane to McGarrity, 29 March 1939, MS 17,546(1); Father Sheridan of Our Lady of Mercy Rectory to McGarrity, 5 May 1939, MS 17, 546(3), MGP, INL. F. E. Evans, Consul General, Los Angeles, to the FO, 16 May 1939, FO 371/22831. A3874; Chancery to the American Department, FO 371/22831.A4050, PRO; Nellie Murphy to McGarrity, 8 June 1939, MS 17,546(2), MGP; Russell to McGarrity, 1939 (no day or month recorded), MS 17,485, MGP, INL. Note on an Irish Independent item, 24 June 1939, DO 35/894/X11/309; Alexander Maxwell, HO, to Sir Edward Harding, DO, 15 February 1939, DO 35/893/X11/285; M. Lisicky, Czech charg´e d’affaires, to the FO, 20 July 1939, FO 371/23039.C10609, PRO. ISC report to the Cabinet, 6 August 1937, DO 35/891/X1/99; G. S. Whitman, WO, to H. S. Sellar, parliamentary secretary to Inskip, 16 December 1937, DO 35/894/X31/8; German trade with Eire, FO 321/23041.C2854, PRO. Joachim von Ribbentrop to Hempel, 29 August 1939; Hempel to Ribbentrop, 31 August 1939; Ernst von Weizs¨acker to Hempel, 1 September 1939, DGFP, D, vol. VII, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1956; see

18

40. 41.

42. 43. 44.

45.

46.

47.

48. 49. 50. 51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56. 57.

setting the stage John P. Duggan, Herr Hempel at the German Legation in Dublin 1937–1945, Dublin, 2003. ‘The Estimates’, Irish Press, 28 February 1939, p. 8; memorandum, undated, MS 18,361(3), FGP, INL. ‘External Affairs’, Irish Times, 14 July 1938, p. 6; ISC reports to the Cabinet, 15 May and 24 July 1937, DO 35/891/X1/99; ISC report on the press, 11 January 1938, DO 35/891/X1/99, PRO. ‘War on Civilians’, Irish Press, 11 January 1939, p. 6; ‘What about Ireland?’, Irish Press, 22 March 1939, p. 8. ISC reports to the Cabinet, 19 May, 24 July and 31 December 1937, DO 35/891/X1/99, PRO. ‘The Way to Unity’, Irish Press, 24 January 1939, p. 10; ISC report to the Cabinet, 14 April 1938, DO 35/892/X1/99, PRO; ‘The Gael Will Triumph’, Irish Press, 31 May 1939, p. 8; ‘American Campaign Against Partition,’ Irish Press, 4 March 1939, p. 11; ‘Belfast University Hall Closed to Mr Frank Pakenham’, Irish Press, 14 March 1939, p. 1; ‘Forbidden Speech at Belfast: Vice-Chancellor’s Denial’, Manchester Guardian, 31 January 1940, p. 12. ‘Partition’, Irish Times, 23 November 1938, p. 6; ‘Anti-Conscription Pledge, 1918’, Irish Press, 5 May 1938, p. 11; ‘The North Prepares: Partition and Conscription: Issues Raised in New Light’, Irish Times, 28 September 1938, p. 7. ISC reports to the Cabinet, 6 August 1937, DO 35/891/X1/99, PRO; ‘Tomfoolery at Tralee’, Irish Times, 21 January 1939, p. 8; ‘The Bombing Outrages’, Irish Times, 1 August 1939, p. 5; ‘The Man behind the Bombs,’ Sunday Express, 30 July 1939, MS 21,155(1), JDP, INL. ‘Sean Russell Arrested in America’, Irish Press, 7 June 1939, p. 1; ‘Sean Russell is Released after Protest to US President’, Irish Press, 9 June 1939, p. 1; ‘Russell tells Clan Na Gael of Bombings’, Irish Press, 17 June 1939, p. 11. ‘Hitler Moves Again’, Irish Press, 14 March 1939, p. 8. ‘German Journalist’s Mission in Ireland’, Irish Press, 12 August 1939, p. 9. ‘Carried to ’Plane,’ Irish Press, 3 April 1939, p. 1. ‘The Bayreuth Festival’, Irish Times, 25 August 1938, p. 4; ‘Two Just Men’, Irish Times, 1 October 1938, p. 8; ‘Judah Verrecke!’, Irish Times, 12 November 1938, p. 8; ‘Aryan Cats,’ Irish Independent, 17 January, 1939, p. 10. ‘Irish Exiles Appeal to US Government’, Irish Press, 2 May 1939, p. 1; ‘US Never Stronger for Irish Cause’, Irish Press, 8 June 1939, p. 1; ‘US Minister’s Tribute to Irish Race’, Irish Press, 5 July 1939, p. 7. In 1951, in Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, Alan Bullock attributed Hitler’s success mainly to propaganda including his radio speeches. However, in The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda, David Welch notes that historians have questioned how Bullock and others evaluated the role of German broadcast propaganda. ‘Hearst Uses Radio to Flay Britain: Tirade in Six Languages in Reply to Mr Churchill’, Irish Times, 24 October 1938, p. 10; Arthur Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War: War, Peace and Social Change 1900–1967, London, 1968, p. 186. Rex Cathcart, The Most Contrary Region: The BBC in Northern Ireland 1924–1984, Belfast, 1984, pp. 18–23; Terence Brown, Ireland: A Social and Cultural History 1922– 1985, London, 1985, p. 153; ‘Broadcasting in Eire: Estimated Surplus of £17,000’, Irish Times, 24 March 1939, p. 8. ‘Radio Programmes’, Irish Press, 5 April 1939, p. 4. T. J. Kiernan to J. C. S. MacGregor, ESD, 11 May 1939, E1/946, BBCWAC.

april 1937−august 1939

19

58. See Robert Cole, ‘The Conflict Within: Sir Stephen Tallents and Planning for Propaganda Overseas before the Second World War’, Albion 14, 1982, pp. 50–71. 59. Allan M. Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942– 1945, New Haven, 1978, p. 57; James Chapman, The British at War: Cinema, State and Propaganda 1939–1945, London, 1998, p. 3; C. M. Gerrity, report on motion pictures in Eire, 9 February 1943, DLCR, NAUS; ‘More US Films in Ireland’, Irish Independent, 14 January 1939, p. 11. 60. Lord Tyrrell, quoted in Nicholas Pronay, ‘The Political Censorship of Film in Britain between the Wars’, in Nicholas Pronay and D. W. Spring, eds, Propaganda, Politics and Film 1918–45, London, 1982, p. 122; ISC memorandum, 18 March 1938, DO 35/852/X1,99/3, PRO. 61. See Robert Cole, ‘ “Good Relations”: Irish Neutrality and the Propaganda of John ´ Betjeman 1941–43’, Eire-Ireland 30(4), 1996, pp. 33–46. 62. Department of Defence, memorandum, 19 November 1935, S 8 202, SPO; Dublin – Censorship, MA 1/1, CBB. 63. Fisk, In Time of War, p. 101; see also Tony Gray, The Lost Years: The Emergency in Ireland 1939–45, London, 1997, pp. 2–4.

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‘In Dublin’s Bright City’: September 1939–May 1940

Initially, British official propaganda aimed at Eire was neither focused nor well organised, and Eire censorship was less exacting than it would become. Britain’s hope of moving Irish opinion to Britain’s side in the war was far from realised when the Battle of Britain began in May 1940, not least because the press and individuals with their own point of view were more visible than official propagandists. Indeed they often were in conflict with each other regarding the style and content of their material. The responsibilities of the MOI, launched on 3 September 1939, included neutral countries.1 However, no official British propaganda was disseminated in Eire for months to come. On the other hand, British press commentary critical of Eire neutrality was plentiful. For example, ‘In Dublin’s Bright City!’ by columnist ‘Cassandra’ (William O’Connor) and cartoonist Philip Zec of the Daily Mirror claimed that Dublin was where ‘the boys from the bogs foregather not to ´ discuss the wrongs of Hitler,’ and Eamon de Valera played the role of ‘Limelight Dev – the Great Barnum on the edge of the blackout’. When the Battle of Britain was in full swing, a British observer claimed that brightly lit Eire towns provided a useful guide for enemy aircraft in bombing raids on northern England.2 Meanwhile, anti-Irish cartoons, anti-Eire neutrality articles, and attacks on de Valera, Irish Catholics and Eire generally were standard fare in some London newspapers. Not good, advised John Betjeman. In mid-September ‘D’ Notices (Defence Notices) were issued calling on the press to modify its criticism of Eire neutrality.3 MOI Empire Division had responsibility for propaganda dissemination in Eire – an unfortunate choice given the history of Anglo-Irish relations. It was headed by H. V. Hodson, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, editor of the literary journal Round Table, and a specialist in Commonwealth relations. What he was to do was anyone’s guess. An MOI interoffice memorandum indicated that ‘in all the Dominions, save Eire [my italics], arrangements have been made through the regular channels for continuous co-operation between this Ministry and analogous Dominion Departments.’4 The MOI had no policy regarding Eire, and in fact questioned whether Eire should be targeted with official propaganda at all. It was not alone, as many voices outside of the ministry urged that ‘no propaganda is necessary or desirable,’ and that the Irish ‘are overwhelmingly on the side of Britain in the present struggle’. In October, Frank Pakenham resigned as head of

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the Empire Division Eire Section in protest against official propaganda aimed at Eire. Even those who favoured British propaganda in Eire wanted it kept low key.5 Lord Macmillan took office as Minister of Information on 4 September. His aim was to focus on Britain’s objectives and achievements in the war, orchestrated through all possible channels by ‘experts who know how to make the heart beat faster’. While Macmillan appeared to be calling for appeals to the emotions, an essential quality of propaganda, BBC news director J. C. S. MacGregor interpreted the directive to mean maintaining objectivity in news reporting. Therefore German communiqu´es, such as an unedited and uncommented-upon speech by Rudolf Hess, would be broadcast along with British news. Hodson thought this simply amounted to ‘strong pro-enemy propaganda’. He also was annoyed that since the MOI ‘officially guided’ the BBC, it got blamed for what many thought were ‘dull’ broadcasts. In fact, the MOI did not establish full claim over the BBC until July 1941. For the time being, propaganda materials ‘to make the heart beat faster’ were those created for the home front, including war-themed picture postcards such as ‘Mr Chamberlain in France’, ‘His Majesty the King and the French President’, ‘The Royal Warwickshire in France’ and ‘Fighters Accept the Challenge [Spitfire crews running toward their aeroplanes]’, all of which could be posted to friends and relatives in Eire.6 The Catholic Section of the MOI Religions Division held promise for Eire, at least in principle. Its theme for Eire would be that as Irish and English Catholics are on the same side morally, Irish Catholics ought to be for Britain in the war. Catholic journals such as the Tablet would be used to express sympathy for Poland and protest Nazi repression of the German Catholic Church. Well-known Tablet journalist Thomas Burns joined the Catholic Section, and Sir Shane Leslie urged the section to cultivate relations with Ireland Primate Cardinal Joseph MacRory, and make a point of not criticising Irish prelates. In his words, ‘lay off the nuncios.’7 However, Dublin sent an official warning that Catholic Section materials – articles, pamphlets, leaflets, films and the like – should not be sent into Eire. Consequently the Religions Division had to develop a strategy of ‘indirection’ for Eire. On the other hand, Northern Irish Protestants would receive pamphlets that connected the war to morality, and an invitation to participate in a ‘Franco-British Sunday’ on 4 August, all of which were on the Eire government exclusion list.8 On 3 September the D´ail passed the Emergency Powers Act, including provisions for censorship of all communications venues that might jeopardise Eire’s neutrality, including religious propaganda. The term ‘neutrality’ was not in´ cluded in the Act, for Eire neutrality was not official until October. As Donal O Drisceoil explained it, ‘Irish authorities regarded the Act as referring to neutrality “in fact” if not in name.’9 The Emergency Powers Act had one fundamental objective: empowering the government to maintain neutrality. The GIB, Eire’s official propaganda agency, promoted the concept. It circulated relevant materials to RE´ and to newspapers in Eire, Northern Ireland and Britain. English papers included the Daily Mail, the Daily Express, the Evening Mail and the Daily Herald, but excluded the Times and the Manchester Guardian.10 Despite

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being official government statements, all of this material had to pass the Eire censor. GIB Director Frank Gallagher complained to Defence Minister Frank Aiken, whose jurisdiction included the censorship, that as the GIB statements were issued ‘on behalf of responsible ministers’, he did not think it necessary to have them censored – unless, of course, Aiken so desired.11 He did. To many observers, Eire offering English women and children sanctuary, passing legislation ‘abrogating constitutional rights to a degree equal to that of a country engaged in actual warfare’ and flying the British ensign on its merchant ships, and Irish cinema audiences cheering pictures of Neville Chamberlain and the King and Queen when war was declared, did not exactly reflect ‘neutrality’.12 Also, Irish men were joining the British army and the Irish Times published their names and ranks, until the censor cracked down. Leslie estimated that 95 per cent of Irish Catholics favoured Britain going to war on behalf of Poland, while Howard d’Egville heard the Irish express indignation when a German propaganda broadcast urged Eire to ‘come out from under the Chamberlain umbrella’.13 Many prominent Irish were, or appeared to be, pro-British, including John Dulanty, the Eire high commissioner in London, who was Irish and devoted to Ireland, but had been born in England. James Dillon regularly backed Britain in the D´ail, Senator Frank MacDermot chastised the Irish as neutrals for viewing themselves as a people ‘too proud or too good or too oppressed to fight’, and Irish writer Oliver St John Gogarty depicted the British Empire as fighting for ‘the existence of human beings – fighting for a principle’.14 However, the majority of Irish favoured neutrality, a fact supported by thousands of Irish resident in England returning to Eire once the war began. Neutrality was seen by some as a policy that made Ireland ‘a safe place for Irishmen in time of international crisis’, and by others as a statement against the British role in Irish history. US ambassador John Cudahy was convinced that Eire neutrality was real, practical and not open to compromise in the interest of helping England, and so advised Washington. And the Eire government averred that unrestricted use of Eire territorial waters would not be allowed to one side as opposed to the other, and that Eire would fight back if any of the belligerents saw fit to attack.15 Then there was partition, which even the pro-British in Eire saw as a form of oppression. It was the most difficult obstacle facing Britain in the propaganda ´ war, not made easier by the fact that Eamon de Valera used partition to influence opinion in the United States. ‘Relations between Ireland and Great Britain can never be truly friendly until the reunion of Ireland has been accomplished by the removal of the border which, by British control, separates Northern Ireland from the main body of the country,’ he told a New York Herald Tribune reporter. Moreover, it weakened Britain’s moral claim to be fighting for the freedom of small nations. In his 1940 St Patrick’s Day broadcast to North America, de Valera called upon Irish-Americans to help end the ‘crime of partition’. From time to time de Valera hinted that ending partition would improve Eire’s attitude towards Britain in the war, and might even bring Eire into the war on Britain’s side.16 Meanwhile, Northern Ireland banned circulation of five radical, anti-partition Eire newspapers, complaining that the end of partition would violate Unionist

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rights. Then, in a move that suggests desperation, Empire Division planners tried to turn partition to the propagandists’ advantage by putting war matter not allowed in Dublin papers in Northern Ireland newspapers that circulated in Eire.17 This was done over time, though it is likely that Eire readers of such as the Belfast Telegraph were among the already committed. Disagree though they might over partition, the ports and neutrality generally, London and Dublin did agree on the IRA, which was as anti-de Valera as it was anti-British. Its bombings and other violent acts in Britain and Ireland were numerous in 1939–40, including a machine gun attack on officers collecting the diplomatic bag for delivery to Sir John Maffey’s office.18 The terrorism was supplemented by anti-British clandestine broadcasts and print propaganda. ‘IRISHMEN STOP AND THINK before you accept Churchill’s guns to fight for the British Empire’, was a typical line, followed by an appeal to Irishmen to rise up and help destroy the British Empire. While not always popular, IRA propaganda raised concerns, such as that of US consul in Cork, William A. Smale, who expressed fear that anti-British demonstrations, circulars calling for public protests and speeches by such past IRA icons as Mary MacSwiney could produce ‘some sort of IRA dictator’ in Cork and Kerry.19 The Eire government cracked down, and between October 1939 and May 1940 more than 120 IRA members were arrested – but not always with the approval of crowds in the street. The British government also operated against the IRA under the Prevention of Violence Act, and in May, de Valera effectively declared war on IRA terrorists, and entered into cooperation with the British in keeping track of them.20 Anglo-Irish cooperation over the IRA was more or less accepted by Irish public opinion, until the trial and later the execution of Peter Barnes and Frank McCormack (a.k.a. James Richards) for a December bombing in Coventry. Maffey warned that if carried out, the executions would simply revive memories of ‘the old spectre of Irish history – the English scaffolds for Irish patriots’. Protests came from all sides, including James Dillon and the Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Arthur Hinsley, who warned that extreme anti-British propaganda would result.21 Lord Lothian and Malcolm MacDonald expressed fear that Irish-Americans would be roused to pressure the American government to make difficulties for Britain. Widespread public demonstrations against the execution took place in both Eire and the United States, involving the likes of Irish novelist Liam O’Flaherty and Congressman John W. McCormack of Massachusetts. To no effect. On 7 February, Barnes and McCormack were hanged, and the response was as expected: Eire flags hung at half mast, including in front of the Irish pavilion at the World’s Fair in New York; Irish-Americans demonstrated in the streets against Britain and partition, and the Irish-American press lauded the pair as simply more victims in the crimes that make up English history; the IRA set off bombs in Birmingham and London and may have sunk an Irish mail boat off the west coast of England; and in Dublin, cinemas and theatres closed, sporting events were postponed, and workers carrying banners with anti-British slogans marched through the city centre.22 Maffey advised that ‘the

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situation here will be most delicate for some time,’ and recommended censoring British press commentary on an RE´ broadcast that quoted from the Germans.23 Germany encouraged the IRA, as when plans were found in the possession of an arrested IRA officer ‘for an uprising in Ireland, possibly with German aid, as a preliminary to a blow at England’.24 Press reporting was mixed over whether the IRA was actively engaged with Germany; for example, the Boston Daily Globe claimed there was overwhelming evidence that the IRA worked with Germany and that Irish-American extremists aided the process, whereas the New York Times dismissed IRA – German cooperation on the grounds that ‘IRA leaders are in fact as strongly anti-Fascist as they are anti-British.’25 In fact, pro-IRA German propaganda circulated in Eire – of which, interestingly, Ambassador Eduard Hempel disapproved. Joseph Walshe warned Hempel regarding connections between the IRA and ‘German agencies not under the control of the Foreign Ministry’, and Hempel in turn advised Berlin that Germany’s policy of keeping Eire neutral would be best served by a ‘stop to propaganda on both sides’. Throughout his tenure, Hempel, a ‘diplomat of the old school’, advised walking as softly as possible where Eire was concerned. However, German press attach´e Dr. Carl Petersen thought otherwise. He was suspected of being in touch with Liam D. Walsh, right-hand man of the pro-fascist Blue Shirts leader Eoin O’Duffy; Walsh certainly was in communication with German Fichtebund propagandist Oskar Pfaus.26 Fichtebund produced propaganda leaflets smuggled into Eire through pro-IRA groups in the United States. Examples: ‘Who let loose the scum of England – the Jew Greenwood’s Black and Tans – to murder, burn, and loot . . . ?’ and ‘Who is flooding Ireland with Jewish-Masonic drivel and filth . . . ?’; the pamphlet The True England listed England’s ‘filthy press’, ‘illegitimate offspring’, ‘starving unemployed’ and ‘the absolute Paganism of her people’.27 There was also the highly publicized ‘negotiation’ between the British People’s Party chairman, Lord Tavistock, and the Dublin German legation, which would return German overseas colonies taken after the First World War, and mutual disarmament. The German legation categorically denied involvement with any of this propaganda material. Nonsense, was the British response. I. S. Munro of the Foreign Office reported: ‘I understand that the Legation is among other things, the rallying point for defeatist propaganda aided by Lord Tavistock, John Beckett, William Joyce, Captain Gordon Canning and Ben Greene who, like [Charles] Bewley, are all tarred with the National Socialist brush.’ Meanwhile, Eire authorities kept tabs on Dermot Granger, who circulated ‘News from Germany’ and ‘War News’ in south Dublin, and was ‘being paid by the IRA for propaganda work’.28 Major-General Val Pollok, army commander of the Northern Ireland district, called for pro-British counter propaganda to be disseminated by Roman Catholic leaders (for obvious reasons), by the Americans (also for obvious reasons) and by the French, because the Irish could not be pro-French and anti-British at the same time. Pollok was heard and planning began. The papal legate and French, Americans and Canadians residing in Dublin were brought on board, including the Canadian high commissioner, whose name, appropriately, was Kelly.29

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There were German fifth columnists in Eire, some connected with the IRA, and most somewhat less effective than, say, James Bond. Ernst Weber-Drohl, aged sixty and partially debilitated from having suffered a stroke, managed to drop into the sea the wireless set Abwehr had sent him to deliver before landing in Eire. Another example was former Luftwaffe officer Hermann Goertz, who had only minimal success in organising sabotage and espionage operations in Northern Ireland.30 In retrospect, it is difficult to see that the Abwehr was as serious about espionage in Eire against Britain as the British feared. All the same, British intelligence viewed Eire neutrality as ‘a grand cloak’ for German espionage, and it was subject matter in the war of words. Daily Mail columnist Charles Graves, for example, asked pointed questions, such as: Was the Eire ´ blackout lifted to please the Germans? Does Eamon de Valera credit stories concerning a shortwave transmitter at the German legation? What does he know about German propaganda and unneutral activities in Eire, such as support for subversive (IRA) activities? And a News Review correspondent described ‘strange men with square heads . . . striding self-importantly in and out of the red-brick Legation’ and de Valera ‘impotently . . . watching intrigues between Hempel and the illegal Army [IRA]’. This was press propaganda a` la New York Herald Tribune reporter Tania Long, who claimed the presence of German naval, military and air attach´es in Dublin; there were none. John Dulanty complained that her misinformation did nothing to help Anglo-Irish relations.31 The House of Commons also contributed to the war of words over the German presence. For example, James Little thought that the presence of the German legation made Eire ‘the Achilles heel of the British Empire’; Vernon Bartlett reminded members of the great apprehension German legation activities raised in Britain; and Thomas Levy wondered why, since Eire was part of the British Empire, there should be a German legation there at all. Sir John Reith, who had replaced Lord Macmillan as Minister of Information, agreed. Hempel’s presence in Dublin was ‘dreadful’.32 The highly publicised arrest of IRA leader Stephen Held and Iseult Stuart (whose husband was thought to be a German collaborator) with a radio transmitter and codes and ciphers in their possession heightened concerns even more, making intelligence reports believable that Eire was crawling with enemy agents and that Germany intended to invade Eire with Sean Russell, the IRA quisling, leading the way. In fact, Hempel considered using Held’s arrest for disinformation purposes, proposing, for example, to inform the Eire government that the German in whose rooms Held and Stuart were arrested was actually a British agent who had planted the incriminating evidence.33 Hempel did not favour links with the IRA beyond using it to disseminate disinformation, since deep involvement could only harm German–Eire relations. Still, straightforward on the issue though Hempel was, his government never excluded the possibility of working with the IRA in Eire. After all, as Paul Woermann explained to Joachim von Ribbentrop, ‘by reason of its militant attitude towards England the IRA is a natural ally of Germany.’34 Extremist Irish-Americans wanted German help for the IRA in its war against Britain. In correspondence with German officer Karl Bruch, Clan-na-Gael leader

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Joseph McGarrity congratulated Germany on successes in the submarine war, expressed gratitude that Hitler escaped an assassination attempt in Munich, prayed that Germany would destroy the British Empire, and requested copies of German materials dealing with the Irish cause which Clan-na-Gael would distribute as anti-British propaganda. He assured Bruch that God backed Germany and the IRA in breaking and dissolving ‘this hypocrite of a nation [Britain]’. Bruch responded with assurance that McGarrity was on the right path.35 This was not the Irish-American element to which de Valera looked, and his 1939 Christmas broadcast asked Irish-Americans to speak out against partition and give aid ‘to the rightful authority, to the freely elected Government of our people. Given elsewhere, it can only lead to frustration, or to civil war, and perhaps to the loss of all that has been gained.’36 For ‘elsewhere’, read ‘to the IRA’. Only a small portion of the more than thirty million Irish-Americans supported the IRA, but most, including some influential Congressmen, favoured US neutrality and were outraged by the proposal to allow arms sales to belligerents, which meant primarily to Britain. ‘For God’s sake don’t be a stooge for the stooges of England,’ pleaded a letter to Senator Mahoney of New York, and Representative James McGranery of Pennsylvania, a Clan-na-Gael sympathiser, proclaimed that arms sales would support the world-wide ‘reign of terror’ conducted by the ‘cruel, barbarous, and savage’ British Empire. The proposal was approved all the same, secretly backed by de Valera, though he did not support the US redrawing combat zones to include waters adjacent to Ireland. That would limit Eire–US trade and create shortages in Eire.37 In April 1940, David Gray replaced John Cudahy as US ambassador to Eire. Gray, sixty-nine, was a former journalist, lawyer and writer, a First World War veteran, a former US liaison officer with the French army, and Eleanor Roosevelt’s uncle by marriage. Tim Pat Coogan described his appointment as ‘obviously nepotic’. Gray stated publicly that he would pass on living in the Phoenix Park residence once occupied by British Secretaries of State for Ireland, because the British wanted it for Sir John Maffey. Coogan speculated that had Maffey got the house, the Dublin press might have proclaimed: ‘De Valera Lets British Back into Viceregal Lodge’, which would not have been good for An Taoiseach. Thus, when Gray arrived, a US diplomat “shook him warmly by the hand and, maintaining a smiling countenance, hissed in his ear: ‘Say it was a misunderstanding. You’re not giving up the house. Explain later.’ ” Gray was well received in Eire after the Irish Press quoted him saying that the history of Irish emigrants in the United States was largely the history of America. He tried to keep an open mind on Ireland, but his sympathies lay with Britain and with those Irish – Irish Times editor Robert Smyllie, for example – who also backed Britain in the war and were critical of Eire censorship.38 Links between Ireland and America were important. The Irish Press made this point frequently. For example, it saluted Dublin-born James Troy as the ‘only Irishman holding the commission of Lieut-Colonel in the US Army’, paid tribute (written by an American Jesuit) to the memory of First World War IrishAmerican chaplain Father Francis P. Duffy, and reproduced an anti-British letter

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to the editor of the Washington Post from American isolationist Charles Edward Russell.39 Eire had strong support among Irish-Americans, and Eire counted on it, as when de Valera made broadcasts to America calling for backing against partition. Indeed, Irish-Americans were regarded as influential in deciding United States attitudes towards the war, not least because they were outspoken. When isolationist Father Charles E. Coughlin – notorious also for his anti-Semitism – was taken off the radio, letters of protest flooded the Federal Communications Commission claiming that this was persecution of Irish-Americans, and that Coughlin’s opponents defined ‘pro-Americanism as pro-Britishism’. IrishAmericans had powerful sympathisers in politics, such as former Congressman Joseph F. O’Connell, who spoke to Irish-American groups on such issues as how Irish contributions to American history were ignored by English and American historians, and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr of Massachusetts, who praised ‘acts of heroism and self-sacrifice which men of Irish stock . . . have laid upon our national altar’. Lodge was a Boston aristocrat of impeccable Anglo-Saxon lineage, but also the grandson of isolationist Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who had orchestrated America’s refusal to ratify the Versailles treaty in 1919.40 And of course, Irish-American newspapers in areas with large Irish-American populations were important channels for disseminating pro-Eire and anti-British propaganda, notably the Gaelic American, the Irish World and the Brooklyn Tablet, all in New York City, and the Leader in San Francisco. The basic propaganda themes in these papers were pro-US and Eire neutrality, and opposition to Britain and anyone who was pro-Britain. For example, the Leader called pro-British Americans pro-Communist, anti-Catholic and ‘playing the role of cats paw for the British Empire’. Examples from the Irish World included a cartoon in which an English dandy (Neville Chamberlain) offers to escort home an innocent young lady (Poland), with the caption: ‘England . . . the most professional land-grabber and perfidious oppressor of all . . . weeps crocodile tears for the fate of the oppressed,’ and a piece in which Irish nationalist icon Maud Gonne MacBride described the 1921 treaty with England as ‘450,000 Irish Catholics . . . handed over gagged and bound to the Orange Institution, founded in 1795 for the extermination of Catholics’. Editorials supporting US neutrality were almost daily, along with letters from Dublin praising the Irish government for staying with neutrality while condemning the British for trying to compromise it, and for working to end partition while preserving neutrality.41 Anti-British propaganda was the mainstay of both news coverage and editorials in the Irish-American press. The Gaelic American repudiated peace with Britain, ‘which for centuries tried . . . to exterminate the Irish race’, until ‘the full freedom of Ireland is attained.’ The Irish World termed partition that ‘false boundary’ of value only to the ‘Thug Government’ in London and kept in place by a Catholic–Protestant animosity that existed only in British partition propaganda. The Gaelic American demanded the recall of the US ambassador to Canada, James H. R. Cromwell – an ironic name in the circumstances – because he was ‘rabidly pro-Ally’ and replicated New York Times pro-British propaganda. The Irish World warned that English propagandists would always be abetted by ‘an

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anti-American clique in the United States who . . . want the youth of America to be again murdered on the battlefields of Europe, while they stay home and give out the orders’. And the Gaelic American and the Leader accused British screen actors of making pro-British propaganda films in Hollywood, and urged Irish societies to boycott any cinemas which show films ‘glorifying England’.42 The Irish-American press never let up. When Sumner Welles refused an invitation to meet with the Derry City Irish Union Association and Anti-Partition Council, the British were blamed, for had he gone, wrote the Irish World, he would have seen British abuse of the Irish and understood ‘why the neutral countries of the world are so suspicious of British promises and statements’. The Gaelic American wrote in capital letters that ‘JOHN BULL’S RECORD IN IRELAND HAS BEEN AND IS THE MOST INFAMOUS IN HISTORY!’ and listed when and how parts of the British Empire were acquired, the object being to show England as ‘the most aggressive nation of ancient or modern times’. Save for Scotland, the ‘how’ list consisted entirely of the word ‘Conquest’ and, curiously enough, began with England itself, ‘conquered’ between 55 BC and 410 AD. No mention of the Roman Empire, however. When de Valera assured that Ireland would be ready in the event of an invasion, the Irish-American press automatically concluded that the invasion would be by Britain. One editorial claimed that if it was Germany, ‘it will rather be as a deliverer than an invader.’ Apparently that included from de Valera as well, for another Gaelic American editorial depicted him as ‘now a fullyfledged English imperialist and though pretending neutrality he is not neutral’.43 With all of this in mind, the paper concluded, readers should beware of ‘Anglo maniac’ American press propagandists, and put no faith in anything said by UK ambassador Lord Lothian. ‘Lord Lothian pretends to loathe totalitarianism, yet, what is the difference between totalitarianism and imperialism?’44 Propaganda was disseminated through many channels. Cinema was among the most significant, and among the most worrisome from the neutral’s perspective. On screen, fact and fiction could mix in the portrayal of good and evil, victory and defeat, courage and cowardice, love and hate, for the purpose of promoting a point of view. Both Americans and Irish spoke out on the subject. Motion Picture Herald publisher Martin Quigley criticised Walter Wanger’s Spanish Civil War film, Blockade, as ‘leftist’. Quigley objected that if partisan politics became standard practice in Hollywood, ‘the political propagandists would enslave the screen, just as they have done in all of the totalitarian states.’ The MPPDA (Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America) agreed, preferring that feature films ‘not depart from the pleasant and profitable course of entertainment, to engage in propaganda’.45 The Brooklyn Tablet published Quigley’s criticism, and warned against an oncoming flood of ‘hatred-making, propaganda films’, such as Nurse Edith Cavell, the story of an English nurse executed by the Germans in the First World War, which ‘prejudices one consciously and unconsciously against the Germans’.46 Meanwhile, the US ambassador to Britain, Joseph Kennedy, categorised Frank Capra’s Mr Smith Goes to Washington as ‘one of the most disgraceful things I have ever seen done to our country’. Capra, who later made propaganda films for the OWI, countered that actually the film reflected ‘true

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Americanism’ by showing how in a democracy ‘the least experienced of people’s representatives could arise in the highest legislative halls.’47 When the war began, Britain had few propaganda films. Britain had the best documentary film makers in the world, but, asked Arthur Calder-Marshall: ‘What use have we made of them?’ The MOI and the War Office simply told them to ‘stand by’. As Charles Peake noted, the MOI was not doing much with regard to films two months after war began simply because ‘there is no coordinated policy.’48 The few ‘official’ films released in the first months of the war, most notably The Lion Has Wings, were for home front distribution.49 So too were feature films; when the war began, only three features showing in Dublin contained even a hint of propaganda: The Spy in Black, about German naval espionage in the Great War, Spies of the Air, in which a supposedly British test pilot is actually an enemy agent, and The Four Feathers, extolling British courage under fire in the Sudan. The Eire censor banned The Spy in Black on the grounds that it would ‘cause offence to Germany’, but passed the others – which, if nothing else, suggests that the censors were not yet ‘clear on the concept’ regarding war propaganda. British war-time newsreels were shown in Eire, but were not always appreciated by Irish audiences.50 More American than British feature films showed in Dublin in 1940. Many had war-related themes, such as Beau Geste, Follow the Fleet, Calling All Marines, Espionage Agent and, of course, The Fighting 69th, the story of an Irish-American regiment in the Great War. All passed the censor; after all, the United States was a neutral. When The Fighting 69th ran in London, the Irish-American press claimed that British censors cut all scenes in which Father Duffy performed the sacred function of his office. Thus ‘the heroisms of the 69th’s beloved soldierpriest could be hailed but only in the guise of a good low-church Anglican minister.’51 Whether true or not, the charge provided an excuse for calling upon Irish-Americans to protest still another example of English prejudice against things central to Irish values. Broadcast propaganda, said a member of Parliament in 1941, was ‘potentially more important than all the rest of the propaganda we could do put together’. In Ireland, listeners had RE´ but also foreign broadcasts, including the BBC – though how many actually listened to it was not certain. Initially, British and American broadcasts were mainly music, sports, variety, drama, religion, news and soap operas.52 BBC broadcasting soon changed. The Sunday ban on jazz music was lifted; after all, ‘if you can fight a war on Sunday then the playing of jazz records is an innocuous practice.’ Then ‘The Minstrel Boy’, a tune with special significance for the Irish, was included in the music programme ‘Intermission’, which also began to feature Claude Hulbet and Enid Trevor in a semi-comic routine about helping with the evacuation scheme that included children going to Eire. Irish listeners also heard ‘Adolf in Blunderland’, a parody of Alice in Wonderland featuring the German F¨uhrer, and ‘The Empire Answers’, a chronicle of Commonwealth nations declaring for Britain in the war, with such references as ‘all sections of India have condemned Nazi aggression,’ and that news of the South African Assembly vote against neutrality ‘spread like wildfire through the vast

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crowds gathered in the streets’. Eire, the only Commonwealth member to remain neutral, was not mentioned.53 On 7 October the BBC broadcast ‘Run, Adolf, Run’, based on the tune ‘Run, Rabbit, Run’: Run, Adolf, run, Adolf, run, run, run; Look what you’ve been gone and done, done, done; We will knock the stuffing out of you, Field Marshall G¨oring and Goebbels too. You’ll love your place in the sun, sun, sun; Soon, you poor dog, you’ll get none, none, none. You will flop with Herr von Ribbentrop, So run, Adolf, run, Adolf, run, run, run.54 It aired the day after Hitler offered Britain the truce which Neville Chamberlain rejected, and was heard in Eire, including over the loudspeaker in a Dublin skating rink. Ambassador Eduard Hempel was not pleased.55 In coming months the Irish also heard broadcasts focused on British forces, the home front and Britain’s enemies, such as Val Gielgud’s tribute to the traditions of the British Army, Ann Hardy’s ‘Cooking in Wartime’, ‘The Home Front’, which dealt with such issues as Women in war, speeches by government leaders, Cardinal Hinsley’s plea to resist Hitler and fascism, ‘Kitchen in Wartime: Marmalade Making, with Ann Hardy’ (a programme created on orders from the MOI), ‘What I Saw of Nazi Rule in Germany: Sir Nevile Henderson’ and ‘Despatch from the Front’. And, by 17 April, ‘The Irish Programme’ was a more or less regular feature.56 BBC Listings were next to RE´ ones in all major Irish newspapers including the Irish Press, despite its claim that belligerents’ broadcasting was propaganda rendered useless by the efficiency of neutral press reporters covering war-connected events.57 The Irish Times supported the BBC, while castigating Axis broadcasting. The BBC diffused Britain’s doctrines, ‘which are the doctrines of democracy– throughout the whole of the civilized world’, whereas continental broadcasting ‘is so full of propaganda that the present generation can be pardoned for wondering how the Four Years’ War was fought without radio’. Deutsche Rundfunk, on the other hand, whose programmes were also listed in Dublin newspapers, told great lies: that British involvement in the war was the result of ‘international Jewish finance’; that Poland brought the German invasion on itself; that sinking the Athenia was a Churchill plot to incite the USA into the war; and that Minister of Information Lord Macmillan was not to be trusted. It was all propaganda, broadcast by ‘suave young Teutons who speak English with flawless accents’. The aim was to persuade neutral nations to pressure Britain into accepting an early peace, because ‘the Nazis see themselves face to face with a long and exhausting war, which they scarcely can hope to win.’ But, the Irish Times concluded, it would not work. ‘Dr. Goebbels’ radio campaign has been what is known vulgarly in theatrical circles as a ‘flop’, and it is becoming increasingly clear that the war cannot be won by wireless.’58 On the other hand, it considered William Joyce,

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nicknamed ‘Lord Haw Haw’ for his affected English accent, a danger because if he told one lie that convinced his English-speaking audience, ‘he [had] proved himself a good and useful propagandist.’ It could be said this applied as well in America, where the Leader published the entire text of a ‘Haw Haw’ broadcast which claimed that Winston Churchill had betrayed France.59 Britain hoped to expand broadcasting cooperation between BBC London, ´ The problem was that BBC NI took BBC NI (BBC Northern Ireland) and RE. its line from the Northern Ireland government, which thought that Northern Ireland should have nothing to do with Eire. BBC NI director George Marshall obstructed efforts at cooperation at every turn.60 He distrusted both BBC London and the southern Irish, and while he accepted the idea of ‘an occasional contribution’ from Eire ‘provided there are certain safeguards’, his basic attitude remained that cooperation over programming would always be complicated by the North–South political divide, and that BBC London should not even consider programming involving Dublin without first consulting him. BBC London accepted, and added that provision to the ‘working rules’ in April 1940. This did not end the bickering, however.61 RE´ was anxious to do nothing that might compromise neutrality, and Marshall doubted that RE´ director T. J. Kiernan would ever cooperate with BBC programme suggestions. Kiernan was also sceptical of a proposal that would permit neutral broadcasters to use BBC facilities to report back to their own countries.62 A contretemps over the St Patrick’s Day broadcast did not improve the situation. BBC NI proposed a 45-minute programme focused on Irish culture only, and without ‘the usual pompous publicity which Saints Day programmes are apt to have’. BBC London agreed, but cut it to thirty minutes.63 Kiernan then proposed an RE´ St Patrick’s Day broadcast using Belfast facilities; London thought this an excellent idea, but BBC NI did not, protesting that it would interfere with arrangements already made, and that BBC NI had not had much say in the proposed Eire programme. BBC London buckled, and the BBC NI programme was retained. Marshall, rather than London, explained the decision to Kiernan in order to avoid ‘political heat’ between Dublin and Belfast.64 The BBC NI programme was broadcast – Irish Rhythms and a short play by James Stephens, among other items – and was panned. ‘Altogether one felt that Northern Ireland had not wasted much effort on the broadcast.’65 In May, the MOI Empire Division concluded that while Britain could gain from broadcasting propaganda to Eire, it would have to be subtle as opposed to obvious, regardless of the subject. The Empire Division requested the BBC to come up with an appropriate programme for the purpose.66 However propaganda was disseminated, it had to get around the Eire censor – if possible. Joseph Connolly and Thomas Coyne were, respectively, Controller and Assistant Controller of Censorship, and Defence Minister Frank Aiken exercised ultimate authority.67 Nothing was overlooked. The censors watched telegrams, wireless transmissions, the post, theatre, film, newspapers, journals and other print materials. Of concern was Eire security and anything posing a threat to Eire neutrality. For example, a Theatre Royal sketch featuring satiric

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characterisations of Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler was deemed likely to harm Eire’s relations with both Britain and Germany, and banned.68 Film censorship rejected or made cuts in any film the exhibition of which would be ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order or to the preservation of the State or would be likely to lead to a breach of the peace or to cause offence to the people of a friendly foreign nation’. Headed by James Montgomery and overseen by the Department of Justice, this section was meant to cooperate with the Defence Ministry. However, the two did not fully agree on what was objectionable material, and Justice operated largely independently until stricter guidelines were mandated in July 1942.69 Press censorship, under Michael Knightly, had the biggest load and operated with the largest staff, under rules laid out in the Emergency Powers (No. 5) Order of 13 September 1939. These were that an ‘authorised official’ might ban importation of any foreign newspaper, poster or placard without a licence issued by an authorised person; refuse to issue a licence; attach conditions to any licence as he saw fit; revoke a licence issued under this article at any time; seize any external paper, poster or placard containing matter likely to prejudice public safety or order; issue to any newspaper proprietor temporary or permanent bans against publishing any particular class of material or matter; and prohibit publication of any matter until it had been submitted to and permitted by an authorised person. Material issued to the press by the Eire government clearly was excused, since, as the Irish Independent explained, an ‘authorised official’ was any government minister or high official of the Censorship Branch itself.70 The censor’s list of matter considered to have propaganda value for film or press included ‘Church Dignitaries’, ‘Home Affairs’, ‘War News’, ‘Propaganda’, ‘Heads of States’, ‘Countries’, ‘Cities’, ‘Atrocities’, ‘Book Reviews’, ‘Military Leading Articles’, ‘Correspondents to Foreign Papers’, ‘Balance File’, ‘Names of People’ and ‘Miscellaneous Matter’. The list was some time in coming, and the censors regularly bombarded Aiken, Connolly and Coyne for clarification on what actually should be censored, well into 1940.71 They understood that they were to prevent publication of anything challenging Eire neutrality; however, the job was complicated by pro-British elements such as the Irish Times and antiBritish nationalists who had high expectations regarding policies applied to the pro-British elements. Above all, the Censorship Branch had to satisfy critics in the D´ail, who charged that the branch was creating the ‘most asinine rumours’ by censoring news in Irish newspapers that could be got from other sources. One member argued : ‘Frivolous interference without very grave and adequate reasons was one of the easiest ways of undermining public confidence.’72 By December 1939 Knightly’s office was banning all press matter with effect on national security, such as weather, shipping, finance, trade abroad in Eire-produced livestock, photographs or plans with military value, appeals for funds, relief and comforts for any belligerent nation, and any letter or statement purporting to be from Irish citizens serving in the armed forces of a belligerent nation. Coyne claimed, with relief, that ‘pressmen appear to understand and accept the position.’73 There were slipups, of course. Officially prohibited items that got through included coverage

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of the torpedoing of the Athenia, lists of Irish RAF pilots killed in combat, a report that a South African regiment formed out of Irish e´migr´es had demanded to be sent into action, and a photograph of a downed German bomber.74 This is not to suggest that the censors were idle. E. Cussen, chief telegraph censor, warned Coyne to keep an eye on a Cork man ‘[who] specializes in vilifying this country in the low-class English press’. The London weekly Illustrated War News was forced to tone down ‘the indecency’ of its anti-German propaganda.75 The English press was a particular problem, simply because, as Joseph Walshe noted, ‘no other neutral in Europe so depends for its reading matter on the press of one belligerent as we do.’ That fact inspired the censors to work even harder, and with considerable success, at limiting material in both the domestic and foreign press that might compromise Eire neutrality or encourage Irish extremists. In one week alone in November 1939 the censor stopped references to the arrest of IRA extremists, criticism of Eire neutrality for being either too strict or not strict enough, reports on hunger strikes in Irish prisons, and an item in the Sunday Chronicle saying that Irish locals thought the Germans were sending gas balloons over Ireland. The Irish correspondent for the March of Time newsreels, Thomas Coulter, began sending his material through Britain ‘because British censorship is child’s play compared to ours. You just wouldn’t believe what is censored here.’76 Offending books, pamphlets, placards, posters, gramophone recordings and advertisements that ‘could easily be construed as offensive to the German nation’, were also on the censors’ list. That included posters in the windows of Woolworth’s in Grafton Street advertising the songs ‘We’re Going to Hang Out the Washing on the Siegfried Line’ and ‘Adolf ’, the latter illustrated by a cartoon showing a Tommy severely castigating a certain head of state. These were English propaganda songs; promoting them was hardly neutral and would not please the German legation. It was also not neutral for Irish nationals to be in communication with the propaganda services of belligerent nations as some were, and External Affairs requested that they be restrained from doing so ‘if possible’. Meanwhile, news agents’ shops displayed posters with such slogans as ‘How Hitler Hopes to Wipe Us Out’, ‘Nazi Sea Murders’ and ‘Do You Hate the Huns?’, which Knightly judged ‘cannot with propriety be allowed to be displayed on the public streets of a neutral State’.77 But how to prevent it? In Connolly’s words, the Censorship Branch had ‘no authority to deal with books, pamphlets, sheet music, gramophone records, effigies, wax figures, caricatures, flags, mottos or badges of foreign states’. Coyne feared that another Emergency Order imposing more restrictions might lead to what the public would regard as absurdities, such as banning sheet music because of a cartoon of Hitler, while allowing Fougasse war cartoons to circulate in Punch and the Evening Standard. Order 51 ‘makes it an offence to engage in propaganda against the State but it is going very much further to suggest we should ban propaganda against foreign states . . . Anyone is free to get up in O’Connell Street and denounce Hitler or Chamberlain to his heart’s content so long as he does not cause a breach of the peace.’ The distributors must be warned to

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‘police themselves’ or risk having the import of such materials banned. In due course the warnings were issued, and Woolworth’s and Eason’s Book Sellers among others complied – at least to a point. The Daily Mirror immediately informed its readers, which included Dubliners, that ‘Hitler Is No Joke in Eire – By Order’.78 Eire censorship intensified in the new year, justified by Frank Aiken, who said the Censorship Branch was meant to ban publication of any statements which might endanger Eire neutrality. If Eire banned the expression of antipathy to one belligerent while allowing it in regard to another, ‘there is no doubt that the belligerent offended against will regard it as a departure from the impartial conduct which neutrality imposes.’79 Aiken’s straightforward statement did not end confusion over application of the rules. Should the GIB be censored when it used the press as a channel for pro-Eire propaganda? Frank Gallagher thought not, since using the newspapers to shape public opinion to fit government needs was so very useful.80 Could the censor always be certain that the contents of a given publication was prejudicial to state policy? Should gramophone records played on private property be censored? Was it perhaps pointless to even try to censor gramophone records, since their content might be heard anyway in broadcasts by such as the BBC? And what limits might be imposed upon censorship, ‘even at a time like this’, to avoid eroding personal liberty beyond repair?81 At least the censors were agreed that any items casting doubt on neutrality, or using epithets or terms that might cause offence to friendly states, qualified for censorship. This included ‘scare stories’, alarmist or garbled versions of incidents affecting Eire police or military forces in connection with foreign states, such as the Sunday Independent report that an Irish torpedo boat was raided in Dun Laoghaire harbour. The story quickly escalated into an item used by ‘propagandist agencies’ throughout the world. In fact, it never happened; it was the invention of a crew member on ´ the boat. Even Eamon de Valera was involved in this discussion, which no doubt encouraged the decision to increase vigilance on press reporting, and to make the rules clear and unequivocal for submitting editorial comment in advance of publication.82 Censoring foreign material was the key to combating propaganda. Still, it was only in June 1940 that postal censors began looking at cross-channel mail.83 What they found was sometimes rather odd. For example, a German writing from Oslo wanted to bring three young male Jews to live in Ireland, who would come as Christians because ‘they are Christians inside’; and an Irishman described a letter he had received from Holland claiming that England supplied the Poles with poison gas. And there were complaints against the censors. A Miss Kelly of San Francisco complained to the Irish consul that a handkerchief and ten-shilling note included in a letter she sent to her cousin in Dublin were missing after the censor had opened it. Enquiries by postal censorship were inconclusive, but Miss Kelly was adamant, and the investigation spread to involve a significant number of postal censorship staff. A frustrated Coyne thought it would be simpler to just give Miss Kelly ten shillings ex gratia without admitting liability.84 By May postal censorship had sent some twenty-five packets of letters to the Censorship

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Branch Information Division, and by June, 60,000 letters and postcards were passing each day between Eire and Britain alone.85 It was more than the censors could manage, and the cost of additional personnel was more than the government could manage. In March, the D´ail set funding for postal censorship at L
5,517 with a staff of 212, mostly on loan from other departments who still paid them. It was not enough.86 Film censors also were busy, having to ensure that nothing ‘positively harmful’ was shown.87 This was in response to an Irish Times reference to three feature films about war banned under Article 52 of the Emergency Powers Order, ‘presumably because it was clear that they were designed for a definitely propagandist purpose’. In January 1940, the censor revoked sixteen pre-war film permits, rejected twenty-two other films outright and ordered cuts in another eighty-five, ‘for reasons having nothing to do with propaganda’. The censor’s main concern, as the Irish Times put it, was less about propaganda than it was about ‘ordinary standards of decency’.88 Perhaps, but they also made cut in newsreel war footage which, claimed an outraged Irish Times editorial, rendered it tedious, uninformative and likely to contribute to what the censors wanted to avoid, propaganda threats to Eire’s neutrality. The censors’ claim that they merely did what the public wanted was nonsense, for the real censors were a ‘noisy minority’ with their own ideas about what was propaganda, or moral or subversive, who had gained mastery over the censorship by ‘throwing ink at the screen and writing to the papers and talking to their TD, and airing their views in general’. The majority of people wanted to see occasional war footage, but this ‘vociferous minority’ objected that the commentary would be biased and threaten Eire’s neutrality. In fact, the real threat to neutrality, the editorial concluded, was what was not censored from the newsreels, the ‘scenes from country fairs and the like, simple, homely stuff, which might make us believe that the belligerent country had something worth fighting for. This, of course, is precisely the news we are allowed to see owing to the unintelligent attitude of this tiresome minority.’89 The censors were unmoved. By 1940, the press was more than ever the focus of Eire censorship. The same rigid standard was now applied to both imported and domestic press material, a rigidity inspired by a Daily Mirror item giving credence to rumours that Eire military and police searched for ‘mystery (read enemy) ships’ operating off the Eire coast. The British protested that the censor was not being fair. Cyril Radcliffe pointed out that Irish newspapers published weather reports and items about ocean liner sailing schedules – seventeen such reports between 12 and 18 January alone – both of which jeopardised British security. And if that wasn’t enough, Eire allowed Northern Ireland newspapers to send material censored in Britain to the press in the South, such as particulars of the sinking of the Ulster Queen off the Isle of Man.90 Irish newspapers appeared to accept press censorship as a necessary evil. Or did they? Both the Irish Times and the Irish Independent detailed coverage of public speeches extolling the vital role the press played in public life, editorialised on censorship in other countries, and implicitly praised Britain for allowing press self-censorship, even in the crisis summer of 1940. The

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Irish Independent quoted Lord Strabolgi: ‘I trust that no strain through which we may have to pass will lead any foolish people to imagine it will be necessary for us to suppress free comment and free criticism on the part of the Press.’ Of course, this and other, similar, reports frequently got the Irish Independent in trouble with the censor.91 The censorship saw British and Northern Ireland newspapers as a potential force in shaping public opinion. Estimated circulation figures in Eire for April 1940 included: 3,400 copies of Belfast dailies, the Times and the Manchester Guardian; 17,000 copies of such London dailies as the Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph, and 222,000 copies of such weeklies as the Sunday Times and the People. The list did not include Reynolds News, banned for a month for reporting IRA hunger strikes in Irish gaols, or Picture Post banned for three months after publishing H. G. Wells’ critical evaluation of Roman Catholicism and Irish culture. On 7 March 1,171 copies of News Review (simply an anti-neutrality propaganda channel, in Coyne’s view) and posters advertising it were seized in communities across Eire, for anti-Nazi cartoons and such articles as ‘Nazi Jackboots Threaten Other Neutrals’. News Review was banned altogether on 14 March, then reinstated, then banned again on 2 May, and then reinstated on 3 June, now that its proprietors ‘understand censorship regulations’. Reynolds News went through a similar cycle between 9 April and 25 May, as did the Daily Mirror between 17 April 1940 and 13 September 1941. The Sunday Times and the People were banned on 17 and 18 April respectively, but reinstated in each instance one day later.92 Other London papers that suffered from Eire censorship included the Daily Mirror, banned, ironically, on the day that its editor apologised for running offensive cartoons; the Evening Herald, stopped after Ambassador Hempel complained about an article listing Germany’s ‘annexations since 1933’ which quite absurdly included Anhalt, Hamburg and Bavaria; and the Daily Mail, for ‘What Bernard Shaw Would Do If He Were Running the War’, which aimed at persuading Eire to accept British forces as a ‘defence’ gesture. American journals also felt the censors’ pressure. Tania Long of the New York Herald Tribune was questioned for writing about Eire difficulties with the IRA, Eire defence plans, and the possibility of British occupation of Eire, which, incidentally, she condemned as a foolish idea. Coyne informed Joseph Walshe that the material had been written in London and sent off as if from Dublin, ‘to give it local flair’. While Walshe thought that Long probably meant no harm, on the advice of Ambassador Robert Brennan he cautioned Coyne to keep on eye on her paper.93 The press censors missed very little in the British press, yet some items allowed in the Irish press perhaps merited more raised eyebrows than they received. Examples in the Irish Times included photographs of French tanks and artillery on the western front, the German pocket battleship Graf Spee sinking a liner, and Finnish soldiers and refugees in the war with the Soviet Union (at least the Finns were at war with the Godless communists). The Irish Times also was not censored for reports on a German submarine sinking a Greek cargo ship with an Irish crewman aboard; the German assault on Norway; Duff Cooper’s speech to a St George’s Day luncheon in London that stigmatised the German people

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as criminals and their leaders as ‘blood-stained, money-making murderers’; and the fall of France, which praised French courage and English resolve to fight on. It was accompanied by a photograph of Winston Churchill looking determined. Meanwhile, the Irish Press published photographs of new German military aircraft, British fighter aircraft in flight, German officers accepting the surrender of Danish officers, a crashed German bomber and German bomb damage inflicted in East Anglia, and reports on German warnings to neutrals. Its perspective on the fall of France was nearly the opposite of the Irish Times’s. The Irish Independent ran photographs of the Graf Spee going up in flames, Finnish soldiers examining a Soviet tank they had destroyed and another they had captured, and a flight of RAF Hurricane fighters; and on the Finnish–Soviet war, it condemned the Soviet Union while heaping praise on the courageous Finns.94 These items were likely to stir some feelings, pro or con, among Irish readers about one belligerent or the other. The papers were called to account sometimes; however, as Robert Smyllie wrote when the war was over, ‘newspaper neutrality enforced by the censorship was an utter sham.’95 This might have been applicable to the first months of the war, perhaps less so during the period of intense uncertainty for both Britain and Eire inaugurated by the fall of France in June 1940.

Notes 1. See Ian MacLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II, London, 1979; Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War, 1939–1945: Organizations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany, London, 1979 (for a time, Balfour worked in the MOI); Philip M. Taylor, “If War Should Come: Preparing the fifth Arm for Total War 1935–39”, Journal of Contemporary History 16, 1981, pp. 27–51; Robert Cole ‘The Conflict Within: Sir Stephen Tallents and Planning for Propaganda Overseas before the Second World War’, Albion 14, 1982, pp. 50–71’; Robert Cole, “The Other ‘Phoney War’: Britain and the ‘War of Words’ in Neutral Europe, September–December, 1939”, Journal of Contemporary History 22, 1987, pp. 455–79. 2. ‘In Dublin’s Bright City!’, Daily Mirror, 20 December 1939, p. 8; Geoffrey Lloyd, Petroleum Department, to Sir Maurice Hankey, 25 November 1940, CAB 63/147, PRO; see also Martin Pugh, ‘The Daily Mirror and the Revival of Labour 1935–1945’, Twentieth Century British History 9(3) (1998), pp. 420–38. 3. H. V. Hodson to DDG, MOI, summary of report to Empire Division by Betjeman, 21 June 1940; Minutes of Meeting on Censorship at Senate House, 16 September 1939; Admiral Thomas Usborne, quoted in A. P. Waterfield to John Dulanty, 16 September 1939, INF 1/528, PRO. 4. Note for the Minister of Information, 12 September 1939, INF/26; Dominions Office Functions, February 1942, DO 35/1013/WQ53/15; Ministry of Information, Directors and Deputy and Assistant Directors, 8 September 1939, INF 1/23; Minister of Information, memorandum, 8 October 1939, INF 1/852, PRO. 5. Sir Shane Leslie quoted in Sir Stephen Gaselee, minute, 25 October 1939, DO 35/894/X11/356, PRO; ‘Well Out of It’, News Chronicle, 13 January 1940, p. 6;

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Hodson to Lord Macmillan, 18 October 1939, INF 1/28; C. R. Price, notes on conversation with Frank Pakenham, 14 October 1939, DO 35/1005/WG42/1; Pakenham to Hodson, 23 October 1939; Hodson to Price, 28 October 1939, DO 35/1005/ WG42/2; Howard d’Egville to Sir Alexander Cadogan, 27 October 1939, FO 371/ 23967.W16016, PRO. See Cole, “The Other ‘Phoney War’ ”; Macmillan, memorandum on principles underlying British war-time propaganda, 22 December 1939, PREM 1/441, PRO; ‘British Didn’t Like Radio Gibes at Nazis: Former London Broadcaster Tells of Propaganda Menace’, Boston Evening Globe, 13 December 1939, p. 9; MacGregor to Hodson, 20 September 1939; Hodson to MacGregor, 2 October 1939, INF 1/161, PRO; ‘News for Neutrals’, Daily Mail, 13 February 1940, p. 6; Robert Cole, Britain and The War of Words in Neutral Europe 1939–45, London, 1990, p. 29; Propaganda Postcards, CN 11/6, PRO. Preliminary Notes for the Organization of the Catholic Section of the Religions Division, 19 June 1939, INF 1/405; memorandum to Thomas Burns, 23 September 1939; Richard Hope to Hugh Maclennan, 21 December 1939, INF 1/396; note, Religions Section, 6 September 1939, INF 1/38; Gaselee, report on conversation with Leslie, 25 October 1939; F. R. Cowell to Basil Matthews, 27 October 1939; V. Cavendish Bentinck, marginal note, 11 April 1941, FO 371/29108/w3178, PRO. MOI Religions Division, Catholic Section Requirements, 6 April 1940, INF 1/396; Maclennan to Sir J. Cooke-Collis, 11 April 1940; Maclennan to Ivison Macadam, 1 May 1940; Religions Division, Policy for North Ireland, 10 May 1940; Religions Division, memo randam to R. Gransden, Stormont Castle, Belfast, 11 June 1940, INF 1/404, PRO. ‘Ireland Neutral: Oireachtas is Unanimous for Emergency Measures’, Irish Press, 4 September 1939, p. 10; ‘J’ai l’honneur de parter a` votre connaissance au nom de mon Gouvernement, que l’Irlande a l’intention d’observer la neutralit´e dans la presente guerre.’ Text of note presented to the League of Nations in Geneva, 4 October, 1939, ´ Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland 1939–1945: FO 371/23966.W14906, PRO; Donal O Neutrality, Politics,and Society, Cork, 1996, p. 26. Frank Gallagher, memorandum on the Information Bureau, 3 October 1927, MS 18, 357, FGP, INL; M. Cinnserdziz to Office of the Taoiseach, 6 October 1939, S 9 559, GIB, SPO. Joseph Connolly to Aiken, 20 November 1939, S 9 559, GIB, SPO; Connolly to Michael Knightly, 30 November 1939, MA 2/38, CBB; Gallagher to Aiken, 4 December 1939, S 9 559, GIB, SPO. ‘Irish Neutrality Faces Test Soon’, New York Times, 17 September 1939, p. 37L; ‘Irish Sympathies Lie with Britain’, New York Times, 11 September 1939, p. 5L. ‘40,000 Irishmen in England’, Catholic Herald, 5 January 1940, p. 3; Shane Leslie Diaries, entry, 4 September 1939, MS 22,863, INL; Howard d’Egville to Sir Alexander Cadogan, report on Dominions Opinion, 27 October 1939, FO 371/23967.W16016, PRO. W. P. Crozier, interview with Dulanty, 16 February 1940, in A. J. P. Taylor, ed., Off the Record: Political Interviews of W. P. Crozier 1933–1943, London, 1973, p. 140; Senator Frank Macdermot, ‘Eire and the War’, Spectator, 20 October 1939, p. 536; ‘Gogarty Here, Sees Ireland in the War’, New York Times, 30 September 1939, p. 8L. ‘Irish Citizens Flee England’, Boston Daily Globe, 19 September 1939, p. 9; letters to the editor of the Tablet in response to an article titled ‘Eire under Neutrality’, INF 1/528, PRO; Cudahy to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 11 September 1939, PSF, FDRL; Cudahy to R. Walton Moore, United States Department of State, 19

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16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21. 22.

23. 24.



November 1939, PSF, FDRL; ‘The Nation’s Call’, Irish Press, 7 September 1939, p. 6; ‘Neutrality Won United Irish Front’, Irish Press, 19 September 1939, p. 7; ‘Neutrality Vital for Small Nation’, Irish Press, 28 October 1939, p. 7; ‘The War and Its Consequences: Mr de Valera’s Warning in the Dail . . . ,’ Irish Times, 4 September 1939, p. 5n (pt 1), 30 September 1939, p. 7 (pt 2). ‘Eire’s Position’, Irish Times, 28 September 1939, p. 6; ‘Fine Words’, Irish Press, 6 January 1940, p. 6; ‘Britain and the Neutrals’, Irish Press, 1 February 1940, p. 6; ‘Neutrality Rights: Mr Chamberlain on Britain’s Attitude’, Irish Press, 28 February 1940, p. 7; ‘Partition Settlement Urged for Both Nations’, Irish Press, 29 February 1940, p. 1; ‘Plain Speaking’, Irish Press, 20 March 1940, p. 6; ‘Partition Cannot Last: Taoiseach Tells US How It Is Maintained’, Irish Press, 21 March 1940, p. 6; ‘The Truth Will Out’, Irish Press, 5 April 1940, p. 6; ‘Easter Monday’, Irish Press, 25 March 1940, p. 6; ‘Goodwill to end Partition,’ Irish Independent, 14 December 1939, p. 9. ‘Stormont on Our Neutrality’, Irish Press, 13 October 1939, p. 6; Joseph McConnell to the editor of the Times, 31 October 1939, INF 1/528, PRO; ‘Belfast Regime Bans 5 Irish Newspapers’, New York Times, 29 December 1939, p. 8L; MOI meeting to discuss censorship in Ireland, 16 September 1939, INF 1/528, PRO. Clippings from Irish Press, 19 July–28 November 1939, S 11 087B, SPO, Dublin; ‘100 Seized in Ireland as Arms Smugglers’, New York Times, 3 October 1939, p. L3; ‘3 Bombs Rock Heart of London . . . ’, New York Times, 19 November 1939, p. 1L; ‘IRA Break into Eire Broadcast’, News Chronicle, 8 January 1940, p. 7; ‘Bridge Dynamited in Irish Easter Disorders: De Valera Heckled at Graves of 1916 Rebels’, New York Times, 25 March 1940, p. 1L; anonymous note to Secretary of State, Dominions, 7 May 1940, PREM 4/53/6, PRO. IRA Propaganda Against War, ca. 1939–1940, MGP, MS 18,945, INL; Harry Short to McGarrity, 16 October 1939, MGP, MS 17,546(3), INL; William Smale, reports, February and March 1940, RG 84/3, DLCR, NAUS. ‘IRA Arms Plot in US, Eire Told; 100 Seized’, Boston Evening Globe, 2 October 1939, p. 1; ‘Armed Dublin Raid Nets 13 Suspects’, Irish Press, 18 February 1940, p. 1; ‘15 Irish Republicans Seized During Drill’, New York Times, 1 April 1940, p. 9L; Donald Stephenson to Maffey, 24 May 1940, DO 35/894/X11/377, PRO; “Terrorists” of IRA Warned by De Valera’, New York Times, 9 May 1940, p. L3. Dillon to Maffey, 1 January 1940; de Valera to Anthony Eden, 29 January 1940, DO 130/9; Hinsley to Chamberlain, 6 February 1940, PREM 1/416, PRO. Robert Brennan to R. Walton Moore, State Department, 2 February 1940, PSF, FDRL; Lothian to FO, 1 February 1940, CS 1/62; MacDonald to Chamberlain, 5 February 1940, PREM 1/416, PRO; H. Johnson to Michael Balfour, 7 February 1940; Order of Hibernians of Onandaga County, telegram, 7 February 1940, FO 371/24252.A1002; Cabinet report on the internal Eire political situation, 5 January 1940, CAB 65/5, WM 4(40)8, PRO; ‘Two Irishmen Executed: Theatres Close; Flags at Half Mast’, Irish Times, 8 February 1940, p. 5; ‘Explosions Sink Irish Mail Liner’, New York Times, 8 February 1940, p. 8L; ‘Ireland’s Latest Martyrs, Peter Barnes and James McCormack “Richards” ’, Irish World, 2 March 1940, p. 2. Maffey, telegram to DO, 8 February 1940, CJ 1/62; MacDonald, report to the Cabinet, 8 February 1940, CAB 65/5 WM 36(40)7, PRO. Dulanty, interview with Crozier, 18 January 1940, in Taylor, Off the Record, p. 124; anonymous intelligence report, 9 January 1940, Hankey Papers, CAB 63/147, PRO; German Consulate General at Genoa to the Foreign Ministry, 24 January 1940, DGFP, D VIII, p. 693; ‘British and Irish on Alert for Coup,’ New York Times, 26 May 1940, p. 1.

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25. ‘Indication IRA Would Accept Aid from Nazis’, Boston Evening Globe, 2 January 1940, p. 13; ‘Boston Irish Lay Whole Blame at Britain’s Door’, Boston Daily Globe, 5 January 1940, pp. 1, 2; ‘Eire Fears More IRA Outbreaks’, New York Times, 11 February 1940, p. 5E. See Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA: A History, Niwot, Colorado, 1994, pp. 151–62. 26. EH Analysis of German Propaganda, 15–30 November 1939, FO 371/23040.C20096; EH Report, 1–15 December 1939, FO 371/23041.C20764; MI5 to Gladwyn Jebb, 21 March 1940, FO 371/25222.W3906, PRO; G2 to Walshe, 2 November 1939, G2/x/0217; Thomas Coyne to Walshe, 15 December 1939; Walshe to Coyne, 18 December 1939, MA 7/28, CBB; Hempel to Undersecretary of State Paul Woermann, 16 December 1939, DGFP, D, VIII. See John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich, Dublin, 1985, pp. 149–50. 27. Garner (no first name indicated) to P. J. Dixon, March 4, 1940, FO 371/25222.W3906, PRO. 28. Hempel to the Foreign Ministry, Berlin, 23 January 1940, DGFP, D VIII; Hempel to the Foreign Ministry, Berlin, 21 February 1940, DGFP, D VIII; ‘Peace Move in Dublin: British Peer at German Legation’, Irish Press, 1 March 1940, p. 1; ‘Peer at Legation Did Not Meet German Minister’, Irish Press, 2 March 1940, p. 1; MacVeagh, telegram to US Secretary of State, 1 March 1940, RG 84/7, DLGR, NAUS; Munro, report, 5 March 1940, FO 371/24962.R3201; German propaganda analysis, 11 January 1940, FO 371/24392.CV371; 8 March 1940, FO 371/24293.C3708; 22 March 1940, FO 371/24293.C4349; and 8 April 1940, FO 371/24394.C5147, PRO; R. L. Daly to G2, 28 March 1940, MA G2/XI0085, CBB. 29. Pollok to the Director of Military Intelligence, 17 February 1940, CJ 1/64; Stephenson to Maffey, 18 April 1940, DO 130/8; note of meeting, 12 April 1940; Lord Perth, note on meeting with papal legate, London, 17 April 1940, CJ 1/64, PRO. 30. See F. H. Hinsley and C. A. C. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. IV: Security and Counter-Intelligence, London, 1990, pp. 17–90; ‘German, Who Waded Ashore on Strange Quest, Is Fined’, Irish Press, 25 April 1940, p. 7; intelligence report on Herman Goertz, HP, MS 22, 981, INL. 31. Intelligence sub-committee minutes, 16 May 1940, FO 371/25189.W7984; Beatrix, Lady Dunalley to Henry Morris-Jones MP, 23 May 1940, DO 35/1008/WG430/34; Ministry of Economic Warfare list of German firms operating outside of Germany, 18 January 1940, FO 371/25055.W1091, PRO; Charles Graves, ‘Germans in Eire: Some Questions for Mr de Valera’, Daily Mail, 1 April 1940, p. 6; ‘Eire’, News Review, 2 May 1940, p. 20; Eden, note on talk with Dulanty, ca. April 1940, FO 371/24254.A2621, PRO. 32. James Little MP, 9 April 1940, HCD, 5th Series, vol. 359, col. 476; Vernon Bartlett MP, 18 April 1940, HCD, 5th Series, vol. 359, cols 1127–8; Thomas Levy MP, 25 April 1940, HCD, 5th Series, vol. 360, cols 365–6; John Reith, The Reith Diaries, ed. Charles Stuart, London, 1975, p. 248. 33. ‘Secret Radio Found in Eire: An Arrest’, News Chronicle, 27 May 1940, p. 5; Desmond Morton to Lord Swinton, 8 June 1940, PREM 3/131/2, PRO; Hempel to German Foreign Ministry, 24 May 1940, DGFP, D, VIII, p. 432; ‘Pro-Nazi Suspect is Linked to IRA’, New York Times, 8 June 1940, p. L3. 34. Hempel, telegrams to Berlin, 14 and 30 November 1939, DGFP, D VIII; Woermann, memorandum, February 10, 1940, DGFP, D VIII. 35. McGarrity to Bruch, 6 November, 9 November, 12 November and 11 December 1939; Bruch to McGarrity, 29 October and 24 November 1939, MS 17,546(1), MGP, INL. 36. ‘Mr de Valera on the Securing of Peace’, Irish Independent, 25–6 December 1939 p. 7.

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37. ‘Eire’s Neutral Stand Praised by O’Malley’, Boston Daily Globe, 4 September 1939, p. 4; ‘Urges Senator Mahoney to Vote against Embargo’, Brooklyn Tablet, 28 October 1939, p. 8. Actually, this letter urged Mahoney to vote for the embargo; James McGranery, 1 November 1939, The Congressional Record, vol. 85, p. 1; entry of 20 October 1939, The Secret Diaries of Harold L. Ickes, vol. III: The Lowering Clouds 1939–1941, New York, 1954, pp. 43–4; A. A. Berle, memorandum on conversation with Robert Brennan, 13 November 1939, FRUS, vol. I, p. 230; ‘Ireland Protests Ban on American Ships; Country Is Neutral, Minister Declares’, New York Times, 14 November 1939, p. L1. 38. David Gray, Behind the Green Curtain, unpublished memoir, DGP, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, ch. 1, p. 66; Tim Pat ´ Coogan, Eamon de Valera: The Man Who Was Ireland, New York, 1996, p. 542; ‘New US Minister Named for Ireland’, Irish Press, 8 February 1940, p. 1; ‘New US Minister to Ireland’, Irish Independent, 8 February, 1940, p. 7; ‘US Minister to Eire Welcomed’, Irish Times, 8 April 1940, p. 7; J. D. Ennis, ‘Journalist-Lawyer-Playwright-Diplomat’, Irish Press, 20 May 1940, p. 6; Gray to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 12 May 1940; Gray to Roosevelt, 28 June 1940, PSF, FDRL; Gray, Behind the Green Curtain, ch. 2, p. 2. 39. ‘Ireland as Test for British War Aims’, Irish Press, 6 January 1940, p. 7; ‘Father Duffy of the 69th’, Irish Press, 14 June 1940, p. 6. 40. ‘Partition Is Not Lasting: Taoiseach Asks US Aid’, Irish Press, March 18, 1940, p. 1; Anthony Eden, note, 11 March 1940, CJ 1/64, PRO; I. S. Brown to George B. Porter, 5 February 1940; Theodore W. Thomas to Porter, 13 February 1940; extract from ‘Comment’ in Social Justice, ca. 20 September 1940, RG 173/55, FCCGC, NAUS; ‘O’Connell Says Irish Role in US Slighted’, Boston Daily Globe, 30 January 1940, p. 1; ‘Address by Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr, of Massachusetts,’ 18 March 1940, Congressional Record of the United States, A1465-6; ‘Congressman M. L. Sweeney to Expose British Propaganda’, Gaelic American, 16 March 1940, p. 2. 41. ‘Loyalty to America Alone Inspires Irish-Americans’, Leader, 28 October 1939, p. 8; ‘Lightning’, Irish World, 2 September 1939, p. 4; ‘English Policy in Ireland as Told by One of Ireland’s Illustrious Daughters’, Irish World, 30 September 1939, p. 1; ‘Ireland’s Foresight’, Irish World, 4 November 1939, p. 4; ‘American-Irish Anti-Partition League’, Irish World, 11 November 1939, p. 9. 42. ‘Irish Independence Is the Goal’, Gaelic American, 13 January 1940, p. 4; ‘More Irish Societies Protest and Condemn English Cruelty’, Irish World, 9 March 1940, p. 1; ‘De Valera’s St Patrick’s Day Message to America’, Irish World, 23 March 1940, p. 1; ‘Another Cromwell’, Gaelic American, 30 March 1940, p. 4; ‘English Actors at Hollywood Squeeze Out Native Talent’, Gaelic American, 16 March 1940, p. 12; ‘Why Aren’t They Doing Their Bit for Blighty?’ Leader, 9 March 1940, p. 8; ‘Propaganda and Yet More Propaganda’, Leader, 22 June 1940, p. 8. 43. ‘Kept Him Away From the Irish’, ‘Another Peace Conference’, Irish World, 13 April 1940, p. 4; ‘England is the Most Aggressive Nation: Her Wars and Booty’, Gaelic American, 1 June 1940, p. 8; ‘Who Is Going To Invade Ireland?’ Gaelic American, 8 June 1940, p. 4; ‘Will England Re-Occupy Ireland?’, Gaelic American, 29 June 29 1940, p. 4. 44. ‘Lothian – Master Propagandist’, Gaelic American, 27 April 1940, p. 4; ‘Pro-English Propagandist’, Gaelic American, 15 June 1940, p. 4; H. V. Hodson, interview with Nicholas Cull, 16 September 1987. 45. ‘Answers Move of Walter Wanger: Martin Quigley Replies to Use of Screen for Propaganda’, Brooklyn Tablet, 29 January 1939, p. 14; Production Code Administration, internal memorandum, December 1938, quoted by Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D.



46.

47. 48. 49.

50.

51. 52.

53.

54. 55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

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Black, Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits & Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies, New York, 1987, p. 17. The MPPDA was Hollywood’s self-censorship office. ‘Calls Edith Cavell Film Dangerous Propaganda’, Brooklyn Tablet, 21 October 1939, p. 8; ‘Expects Propaganda Films From Hollywood’, Brooklyn Tabler 16 September 1939, p. 9; ‘Propaganda Ensnares Youth of the Land’, Brooklyn Tablet, 25 November 1939, p. 10. Kennedy to Will Hays, 12 November, 1939; Harry Cohn and Capra to Kennedy, 14 November 1939, RG 84/71, LLGR, NAUS. Arthur Calder-Marshall, ‘Where Are Britain’s Propaganda Films?’ News Chronicle, 25 January 1940, p. 6; Charles Peake, memorandum, ca. November 1939, INF 1/30, PRO. See Frances Thorpe and Nicholas Pronay with Clive Coultass, eds, British Official Films in the Second World War: A Descriptive Catalogue, Oxford, 1980. See also Clive Coultass, Images for Battle: British Film and the Second World War 1939–1945, Newark, Del aware, 1989. ‘Programmes in Dublin Cinemas’, Irish Independent, 9 September 1939, p. 8; Department of Justice memoir, 21 September 1939, D/T, S 11450, NA; Roger Shaw, ‘Ireland and England,’ Commonweal, 26 January 1940, p. 302. The Spy in Black referred to the Germans as Nazis even though the setting was the First World War. ‘Father Duffy Censored in Film by England,’ Brooklyn Tablet, 1 June 1940, p. 10. ‘Our Propaganda Succeeding: Foreign Broadcasts’, Manchester Guardian, 7 February 1941, p. 7; Elizabeth Bowen, report to Dominions Office, 9 November 1940, PREM 4/53/6, PRO; John Betjeman, ‘Eire’, report to Hodson, June 1940, INF 1/528, PRO; ‘Radio’, Irish Independent, 1 September 1939, p. 4; ‘US Broadcasters Aim at Neutrality’, New York Times, 2 September 1939, p. 17L. ‘Radio’, News Chronicle, 11 September 1939, p. 7; BBC Home Service programmes, September–October 1939, BBCWAC; ‘On the Wireless’, Irish Times, 6 October 1939, p. 3; memorandum, Radio Broadcast, Empire and Home Service, 6 October 1939, DO 35/1013/WQ11/9, PRO. ‘Run Adolf Is War Song Written for London Show’, New York Times, 8 October 1939, p. 41L. Michael Knightly to R. C. Eason, 1 December 1939, MA 2/8, CBB. Films 165/166, BBCWAC; See ‘On the Wireless’, Irish Times, 13 & 17 October 1939, 18 & 23 November 1939, 11 & 21 December 1939, all p. 4; ‘Radio’, News Chronicle, 12 January 1940, p. 10; ‘Radio: Sunday’, News Chronicle, 17 February 1940, p. 10; ‘BBC Programme’, Irish Times, 23 January 1940, 24 February 1940, 17 April 1940, 18 May 1940, all p. 4; Broadcasting Arising from MOI Directives, INF 1/172. ‘News in English’, Irish Press, 27 October 1939, p. 5; ‘War News’, Irish Press, 28 March 1940, p. 6. ‘War by Wireless’, Irish Times, 23 October 1939, p. 5; ‘On the Wireless’, Irish Times, 18 November 1939, p. 4; News from Germany, September 1939, MA G2/x/0085, CBB. ‘Lord Haw Haw’, Irish Times, 1 January 1940, p. 6; ‘Lord Haw Haw on Churchill’, Leader, 27 July 1940, p. 4. Rex Cathcart, The Most Contrary Region: The BBC in Northern Ireland 1924–1984, Belfast, 1984, p. 108. George Marshall to MOI, 22 April 1940, E1/948; Marshall to BBC p. 18 March 1940; B. E. Nicholls, memorandum, April 19, 1940, E1/947, BBCWAC. W. Chetham-Strode to Marjorie Wace, MOI Empire Division, January (day not indicated) 1940; Wace to Chetham-Strode, 31 January 1940, E2/429; Marshall to Scottish Director, May 31, 1940, E1/948; J. B. Clark to BBC Assistant Controller

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63. 64.

65. 66.

67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75. 76.

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Operations, 23 April 1940, E1/947; Melville Dinwiddie to Controller Planning, 10 April 1940, E1/948; Marshall to BBC AC(O), E1/954, BBCWAC. Ursula Eason to DDP, 11 January 1940; DDP to Eason, 16 January 1940, E1/956/1, BBCWAC; Cathcart, Most Contrary Region, p. 108. Kiernan to R. A. Rendall, 21 January 1940; Rendall to Marshall, 29 January 1940, E1/956/1; Clark to Kay Fuller, 16 February 1940, E1/956/1; Eason to DPP, 8 February 1940; H.G. to Eason, 15 February 1940; Eason to H.G., 15 February 1940, R34/239/3; Marshall to DG, BBC, 23 February 1940, E1/956/1, BBCWAC. Eason to HG., 15 February 1940, R34/239/3, BBCWAC; Glasgow Herald, quoted in Cathcart, Most Contrary Region, p. 108. H. V. Hodson to J. C. S. MacGregor, 23 April 1940; Marshall to Connor (no first name indicated), 7 May 1940; Connor to MacGregor, 9 May 1940, R34/347/1; Andrew Stuart to CP, 28 May 1940, E1/952, BBCWAC. Emergency Powers Orders, 3 September 1939, MA 4/37, CBB; Cabinet minutes, 1 September 1939, CAB 2/2, SPO; G2 instructions passed to the censorship, September 1939, MA 7/21, CBB. F. H. Boland to G. F. Braddock, 7 September 1939, FO 371/23966.W13693, PRO; Arrangements for Doubtful Telegrams, memorandum, 20 December 1939; E. Cussen to Connolly, 27 November 1939, 4/17; Maurice Sheehy to Bernie, 8 September 1939; letter, 23 October 1939, 7/19; Connolly to Aiken, 21 December 1939, 5/14; J. J. Purcell to Coyne, 7 December 1939; R. J. Cremins to Purcell, 13 December 1939, 3/13; memorandum on the censorship, 17 October 1939, 7/22; Connolly to Aiken, 18 October 1939, MA 7/24, CBB. For a more detailed description of early film censor organisation, and of the theory ´ Drisceoil, Censorship and practice behind Eire censorship related to neutrality, see O in Ireland. Emergency Powers (No. 5) Order, 13 September 1939, Pertaining to the Censorship of the Press, RG 84/6m, DLGR, NAUS; ‘Censorship Order’, Irish Independent, 15 September 1939, p. 7. Censorship Index, 1943, 2/125; Connolly to Knightly, 20 November 1939, 2/7; Connolly to Purcell, 8 November 1939, 3/13; Peadar Doyle to Aiken, 22 November 1939, 8/6; Coyne to Colonel Liam D. Archer, 28 December 1939, MA 5/14, CBB. ´ Connolly, aide m´emoire for Eamon de Valera, 19 September 1939, S 11 302, SPO; ‘Censorship Criticized in Dail Debate . . . ’, Irish Independent, 29 September, 1939, p. 7; ‘Eire’s Attitude to the War: Task of Official Censorship: Stringent Neutrality’, Times, 2 October 1939, p. 5; ‘Is Censorship Worthwhile?’, Irish Independent, 26 December 1939, p. 6. Purcell, memorandum, 12 October 1939, 7/23; Coyne to Purcell, 13 November 1939; Purcell to Coyne, 15 November 1939, MA 3/11, CBB; Coyne to Admiral Thomas Usborne, 29 December 1939; Usborne to Coyne, 2 January 1940, INF 1/528, PRO. ‘British Liner 1,400 Passengers on Board: The Athenia Attacked’, Irish Independent, 4 September 1939, p. 9; ‘Irish Names in List’, Irish Independent, 26 September 1939, p. 8; ‘Irish Exiles Want to Fight,’ Irish Independent, 2 October 1939, p. 7; ‘Bomber’s Forced Landing’, Irish Press, 18 October 1939, p. 1. Cussen to Coyne, 8 September 1939; Joseph Walshe to Connolly, 17 October 1939; Connolly to Walshe, 25 October 1939, MA 4/17, CBB. Walshe, memorandum, 26 October 1939, MA 7/25; press items stopped, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 November 1939, MA 2/7 and 2/2, CBB; Thomas Coulter to March of Time, New York, 13 November 1939, FO 371/23966.W17769, PRO.

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77. Michael Farrell to the Garda, 7 October 1939; External Affairs to Coyne, 19 October 1939, 7/24; Margaret M. Pearse to the Press Censor, 23 November 1939; Knightly to R. C. Eason, 1 December 1939, MA 2/8, CBB. 78. Connolly to Walshe, 30 October 1939; Coyne to Connolly, 28 October 1939, MA 7/24, CBB; ‘Hitler Is No Joke in Eire – By Order’, Daily Mirror, 1 December 1939, p. 6. 79. Frank Aiken, memorandum: Neutrality, Censorship and Democracy, 23 January 1940, ´ Drisceoil, reproduced in Censorship in Ireland, p. 309. S 114860A, SPO, Dublin, O 80. Gallagher, memorandum, 1 January 1940, S 9 559, SPO. 81. John P. Kirwan to Knightly, 11 January 1940, 2/8; Censorship Branch, memorandum, 15 January 1940; J. E. Duff, memorandum, 25 January 1940; Knightly, memorandum, 7 February 1940, MA 5/17, CBB; Department of Industry and Commerce, memorandum, 6 February 1940, S 11 586, SPO. An order including gramophone records under censorship rules was issued on 9 February 1940. 82. Censorship Branch, minutes of meeting, 12 March 1940, 2/19; Connolly, memorandum, 24 April 1940, MA 2/24, CBB. 83. Coyne to Frank Boland, 19 June 1940; Ministry of Defence to Assistant Postal Censor, 22 June 1940; Connolly to Gallagher, June 22, 1940, MA 3/22, CBB. 84. Letter of 5 December 1939, Postal Censors files, 7/28; J. J. Purcell to Coyne, 31 January 1940, including extract of letter dated 29 January 1940, 7/28; M. Murphy, Irish consul, San Francisco, to External Affairs, 20 March 1939; Purcell to Assistant Controller Censorship, 19 April 1940; External Affairs to Controller Censorship, 4 July 1940; Coyne to Boland, 4 September 1940, MA 3/29, CBB. 85. Postal Censor records for February–May 1940, MA 7/19, CBB. 86. Coyne to Aiken, 5 June, 1940, MA 3/22, CBB; ‘Censorship’, Irish Times, 29 February 1940, p. 6. 87. ‘The Cinema’, Irish Press, 24 January 1940, p. 6. 88. Ibid.; ‘New War Films Rejected: Sixteen Permits Revoked: No Irish Pictures Submitted’, Irish Times, 23 January 1940, p. 3; ‘The Irish Cinema’, Irish Times, 23 January 1940, p. 20. 89. ‘Tedious News-Reels: The Censorship To-Day’, Irish Times, 7 March 1940, p. 4. ´ Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland; Connolly, memorandum, 8 January 1940; 90. See O Colonel Liam D. Archer to Connolly, 6 January 1940, MA 2/8, CBB; Admiral G. P. Thomson to John Dulanty, and Dulanty to Thomson, 23 January 1940; Radcliffe to Dulanty, 19 March 1940; F. N. Hillier to E. T. Crutchley, 15 March 1940, INF 1/528, PRO 91. ‘Newspapers’ Place in Life of Nation’, Irish Independent, 29 January 1940, p. 10; ‘French Censorship’, Irish Independent, 3 July 1940, p. 8; “Australian Censorship”, Irish Independent, 19 July 1940, p. 4; ‘Censorship of Press to Remain Voluntary’, Irish ´ Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland, pp. 171–4. Independent, 22 July 1940, p. 5; O 92. James Lynch, Estimated Circulation Figures for British Newspapers in Eire, 10 April 1940, MA 2/21, CBB; Connolly to Aiken, 8 April 1940; Brian O’Neill to Michael Knightly, 9 April, 1940; Sydney R. Eliott to Knightly, 22 May 1940, MA 2/70, CBB; ‘We Are Banned in Eire’, Picture Post, 13 January 1940, p. 45; P. Carroll, memorandum, 16 March 1940; Deputy Commissioner Garda, memorandum, 12 March 1940; Coyne to A. Cox, solicitor, 3 June 1940; 2/18; List of Newspapers Banned under order Emergency Powers (no. 5) 1939, 7 March–13 September 1941, MA 2/5, CBB. 93. Extracts from News Review, 18 April 1940, in Eire censors’ files; Coyne to Aiken, 18 April 1940; Item in censors’ files, 17 April 1940, 2/8; Frank Boland to Coyne, 18

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May 1940, 2/32; Coyne to Walshe, 28 March 1940; Walshe to Coyne, 6 April 1940, MA 2/23, CBB. 94. Photographs, Irish Times, 11 and 31 January 1940, both p. 7, 10 and 13 January 1940, both p. 9; ‘Torpedoed Crews Ordeal in Atlantic’, Irish Times, 2 February 1940, p. 7; ‘Britain’s Lightning Strike’, Irish Times, 16 April 1940, p. 5; “‘Never Again”: Mr Duff Cooper on the War’, Irish Times, 24 April 1940, p. 8; ‘France’s Life Is at Peril’, Irish Times, 14 June 1940, p. 5; “‘All Will Be Well”, Says British Premier’, Irish Times, 18 June 1940, p. 5; photographs, Irish Press, 13 February 2, 13 and 24 April 21 June 1940, all p. 1; ‘German Warning to Neutrals’, Irish Press, 13 February 1940, p. 1; ‘Germans Driving Near Paris’, Irish Press, 13 June 1940, p. 1; ‘Smoke Pall on Vacant Paris’, Irish Press, 13 June 1940, p. 7; photographs, Irish Independent, 2 and 3 January, 5 April 1940, pp. 7, 9, 3 respectively; ‘A Gallant Nation’, Irish Independent, 5 January 1940, p. 8; ‘Great Finnish Victory: Red Division Wiped Out’, Irish Independent, 9 January 1940, p. 7; ‘The Soviet’s Neighbours’, Irish Independent, 10 January 1940, p. 7; ‘Russia Discredited’, Irish Independent, 17 January 1940, p. 8; ‘Red Blast of Propaganda’, Irish Independent, 16 March 1940, p. 8. 95. Robert M. Smyllie, ‘Unneutral Neutral Eire’, Foreign Affairs 24, 1946, p. 324.



The Hazards of Neutrality: June–December 1940

The war of words intensified in the spring of 1940, reflecting how perilous the war situation had become. The Daily Mail urged Eire to cooperate with Britain for its own defence, and the Spectator warned that neutrality meant nothing if it would ‘suit the aggressor’s purpose to violate it’.1 The Times and the Manchester Guardian argued that Eire was now as much at risk as Britain, required British aid and must not be allowed to be a danger to Britain. Dubliner turned Briton George Bernard Shaw wrote that Eire had the right of protection by British forces, and should demand that Britain send forces to protect them from Germany, and remember that ‘the Pope is on our side’ and – to be practical – that British troops sent to Ireland ‘would spend a lot of money in the country’.2 To this the Irish Press and some Irish writers replied by supporting Eire neutrality ‘in the present war of Empires’, and opposing the British navy using Irish ports. Even the pro-British Irish Times was cautious, mainly only warning its readers that news coming into neutral countries would now likely be shaped by German propaganda.3 Sir John Maffey, hoping to restore ‘the strategy unity of our Island group’, sug´ gested to Eamon de Valera that President Franklin D. Roosevelt might arbitrate an end of partition if Eire abandoned neutrality. He was ignored. In frustration, he concluded that de Valera reflected ‘the most narrow-minded and bigoted’ Irish, who likely would cooperate with Germany; indeed, he wrote to Sir Eric Machtig, ‘the whole de Valera government is adjusting their position to the possibility of a German victory.’ Winston Churchill agreed, effectively giving up on persuading Eire to expel Axis legations and other enemy aliens from Eire.4 Still, Anglo-Irish cooperation was a central theme in the British press. The News Chronicle expressed hope that every necessary step had been taken to establish relations with Eire and Northern Ireland to make impossible a German coup in Ireland; the Spectator regarded the threat to Ireland as making palpable the idea of community of interest between Great Britain and Eire. The Evening Standard saw ending partition as absolutely essential for Anglo-Irish cooperation, which, of course, meant Northern Ireland premier Lord Craigavon cooperating with Eire. Not likely, wrote the Spectator: ‘Ulster Ministers, particularly Lord Craigavon, are not conspicuous for elasticity of mind.’5 Indeed, Craigavon adamantly opposed any compromise on partition, even charging that de Valera was ‘under German dictation and past reasoning with’, and that he was ‘blackmailing the British government to end partition’. Whitehall encouraged this view, unintentionally to be sure, by continuing to hint that Britain would work towards an end to partition if Eire would enter the war.6

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However, expectations were not high. The best hope likely was for ‘benevolent’ as opposed to ‘malignant’ Eire neutrality. In a speech in West Galway, de Valera urged the Irish to ‘realise that we are in danger’, to ‘let bygones be bygones as far as Britain was concerned’ and to recognise the common destiny and interests, which would ‘beget good relations’, of the Irish and British people. The Catholic Herald described it as ‘the gravest speech, perhaps of his career, warning our people that we may have to defend our neutrality with arms’.7 The press saw the speech as de Valera warning Eire of the German danger: the New York Times depicted him as reminding the Irish that ‘it would be futile to believe that our will to be neutral will save us,’ and went on to describe air raid siren testing, the Eire army on a war footing, political factions uniting, and an atmosphere in Eire that had gone ‘from one of light-hearted gaiety to one of deep concern and anxiety’. The Manchester Guardian opined that after the speech, the Irish understood where the real danger lay.8 Meanwhile, GIB propaganda promoted Eire neutrality and called upon young Irishmen to enlist in the Eire army. Frank Gallagher reckoned that propaganda for these ends ‘must be admitted to be of the first importance’. Advertising agencies were employed to develop schemes that would stimulate ‘national pride, honour, courage, fidelity, cohesion, etc’ and ‘make Irish men and women, generally, proud of their country’. These schemes included print propaganda to counter antigovernment civilian activities (read anti-IRA material) and, in the event Ireland was invaded, broadcasts to ‘launch a protest to the world and . . . give to our own people whatever instructions the government desires them to have’.9 The GIB was joined in promoting neutrality by the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Eire, Defence Minister Frank Aiken, who called any criticism of Eire neutrality ‘anti-Irish propaganda’, Irish Press editorials, and Eire’s ambassador to the United States, Robert Brennan, who prayed to ‘keep the cyclone away from Ireland’. And, responding to de Valera’s broadcasts to the United States and interviews with American journalists, Irish-Americans flooded newspapers with pro-neutrality letters, and the convention of the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic passed a resolution backing it.10 Of course, the British press called these views myopic nonsense. The Daily Mirror asked whether Eire would defend its neutrality with ‘pitchforks and shillelaghs’, adding that de Valera had locked the door against the ‘assassin outside the ivory door’; but ‘don’t send for an armed policeman. Stay put. Get assassinated. Then you’ll have been done in.’ Daily Mail headlines included such as ‘Look out, Eire!’ and an editorial which argued that Eire was ‘the back door to Britain . . . Burying her head, like Norway, Denmark, and Belgium, in the sands of neutrality’. Sir John Maffey did not approve of such attacks, complaining that the press was a major factor in Britain’s deteriorating relations with Eire. The attack had lightened by December, and some British papers conceded, however grudgingly, that while Eire faced a daunting task, at least there was unity of purpose in making neutrality work for Eire independence.11 By mid-1940, British public and military opinion – and much Eire opinion as well – was convinced that Eire neutrality was an advantage to Germany and

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a disadvantage to Britain. It was suspected that the IRA would aid a German attempt to install military force in Eire. There were reports of German overflights of Ireland, and of troop movements in preparation for invasion. Northern Ireland pleaded for Britain simply to take over the defence of Eire on its own.12 In fact, by mid-1940 the IRA was on the run, German fifth columnists were being rounded up, and 93 per cent of the Eire population supported neutrality policy but was prepared to fight anyone who attacked Ireland.13 Moreover, Berlin was aware that a German invasion of Ireland would arouse animosity in the United States, and that David Gray backed the Irish request for American arms supplies. Ambassador Eduard Hempel assured de Valera that Germany would respect Eire neutrality–an assurance apparently missed by the Luftwaffe, which flew over Eire (at least one aircraft actually crashed on Irish soil), occasionally dropped bombs on Eire, and attacked Irish and other ships within sight of the Irish coast.14 While adamant that Eire would never go to war in defence of the British Empire, de Valera nonetheless saw Eire’s freedom and security linked directly to Britain; over time, London and Dublin cooperated on military supplies and preparation for Eire’s defence, and in October, de Valera offered shelter for British women and children displaced by German bombs.15 This did not end British resentment of Eire, however. The Anglo-Irish novelist Elizabeth Bowen wrote: ‘The childishness and obtuseness of this country cannot fail to be irritating to the English mind,’ and the Manchester Guardian called Eire self-serving and hypocritical.16 Such criticism made the Irish suspect that British policy was either to get Eire into the war or to occupy Eire by force. John Dulanty demanded that Whitehall officially deny this, lest de Valera conclude that the British government was behind it ‘as a way to manipulate the Eire government’.17 The DO urged British heightened censorship of anti-Eire press commentary, ‘which is seriously disturbing Anglo-Eire relations’, and MOI ‘information’ campaigns denying any British intent to invade the island.18 Opinion surveys and postal censorship reports on Irish viewpoints were central to knowing what to address in ‘information’ campaigns. For example, many Irish believed that ‘Britain was already defeated’ and that its war reporting was ‘mildly propagandistic’; wild rumours circulating included that English banknotes were becoming worthless and that German submarine crews came into Cork nightly for a pint at the local.19 Negative views were expressed regarding Hitler and Nazism; so too regarding Britain. Above all, pro-neutrality opinion was as pervasive as ever, and some even believed that a Hitler victory would settle partition. That was beyond the pale for MOI intelligence, which concluded that ‘it is useless to expect rational or logical thought or sentiment in Eire.’20 Novelist and Dublin native Elizabeth Bowen was a useful MOI source on Irish opinion. When in Dublin she was ‘sought out, she was warmly entertained and hence able to meet with students, politicians, and clerics’. While pro-British, and sometimes critical of the Irish outlook, Bowen was also a realist.21 She warned against even hinting at any violation of Eire, which would ‘implement enemy propaganda and weaken the British cause’. Rather, take the line that the British government did not actually want Eire to enter the war. ‘A tactful broadcast,

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apparently to England, but at Eire, might do much. All English broadcasts are eagerly listened to.’ And, she warned, anti-Irish feeling expressed publicly in England did much harm. Bowen also offered advice on the use of language in propaganda to Ireland. Don’t depict the war as ‘revolutionary’, for the Irish will see ‘chaos, red flags and barricades’; avoid references to ‘social reform’ as too materialistic; stress the role of such British conservative icons as Lord Halifax, who at least were seen as Christians; be sympathetic to the Irish language, which even the Irish Times had begun to use; discourage the divisive Anglo-Irish view of themselves as ‘England’s stronghold here’; and avoid overt enthusiasm for James Dillon, whose commitment to democracy might be questionable. Bowen claimed that Dillon turned away from Irish Blue Shirts leader Eoin O’Duffy only when he sounded like an Irish version of Hitler.22 North–South relations continued to be a stumbling block to moving opinion in Eire. Lord Craigavon was adamant that British forces must defend Northern Ireland, and if de Valera would not see it that way, then the matter was finished. It did not help that he chose an Orange demonstration to make this announcement.23 The MOI Religions Division head, Hugh Maclennan, opined that perhaps an ‘Empire Army’ made up of Dominions forces would solve the problem, or else that propaganda should be intensified aimed at bringing Eire and Britain together.24 No official action was taken on either suggestion. British press voices took both sides on the North–South divide. The Spectator called the Axis presence in Dublin ‘utterly deplorable’, the Daily Mail demanded an increase in British forces in Ulster, and the Times military correspondent, Captain Cyril Falls, claimed that if de Valera had his say and partition ended with all of Ireland becoming neutral, British forces would be withdrawn from Northern Ireland and a German invasion would follow. Falls also accused the British civil service of being full of influential and talented Irish propagandists who backed de Valera.25 On the Eire side, in the News Chronicle Robert Lynd urged both sides to forget partition and work out a plan of defence, and Stuart Gelder concluded that ‘a free and united Ireland would be a better guarantee for Britain in the event of a German attack’. A Catholic Herald correspondent wrote that Craigavon’s intransigence made Northern Ireland effectively a fifth column, and from the Daily Mirror: ‘There is absolutely no excuse now why Ulster and Eire are not united behind the British shield.’ Then in November, Craigavon died, and the question was: would his successor, J. M. Andrews, ‘show the spirit which Craigavon so tragically lacked’?26 He would not. Meanwhile, in August the IRA sent de Valera a letter proposing an end to the North–South conflict. Had the IRA ‘reformed’? Not likely, was the British press view, which took the position that the still anti-British IRA posed a real fifth-column danger. David Gray and William Smale agreed, both reporting pro-German, anti-British IRA propaganda in County Limerick and County Kerry. The British government concluded that the IRA was certain to provide support for a German invasion of Eire, and so advised Dublin.27 The war of words over the ports issue intensified in the summer and autumn of 1940. The Spectator described in bitter language how German submarines operated with virtual impunity because Britain was denied naval and air bases in

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Ireland.28 Members agreed when Winston Churchill told the House of Commons that Eire’s refusal of ports access imposed ‘a most heavy and serious burden’ on Britain. J. J. Tinker MP said: ‘Mr de Valera, by what he is doing, is placing this country in jeopardy.’29 At year’s end Britain was taking drastic action, including shutting off war supplies for Eire and diverting feeding materials and fertilizer from Eire. When Lord Cranborne urged Parliament not to call for seizure of the ports because it would upset the Irish, Sir Cuthbert Headlam responded that it was preposterous that Britain should lose ships, seamen, food and munitions ‘for fear of annoying de Valera & Co!’ Such also was the prevailing view of ‘sea-faring men’ of his acquaintance.30 British press commentary was equally vitriolic on the issue. The Daily Mail: ‘Eire will not lift a finger to help Britain – but she expects Britain to return the favour by rushing to save Eire.’ The Sunday Express: ‘It is not British arms and ships that guarantee your safety any more than it is Irish hearts and weapons; it is the broken ships at the bottom of the Atlantic, the white, stiff fingers of drowned men.’ The Daily Mirror published a cartoon with de Valera sitting on a rock in the middle of the sea, his back turned on a sinking British ship, with the caption: ‘All Aid Short of Help!’ When de Valera complained regarding such ‘threatening and abusive language’, Churchill’s response was, ‘Let de Valera stew in his own juice for a while.’31 Britain wanted US backing over the ports. Lord Lothian suggested a propaganda campaign, President Roosevelt and his Cabinet agreed, and in December it was launched by the All Aid to the Allies Committee, which Nicholas John Cull defines as a group organised to defend America by aiding the Allies. Eire ambassador Robert Brennan protested that it would backfire, as Irish-Americans would likely claim that Britain wanted the bases solely in order to restore British dominion over Ireland.32 Meanwhile, Churchill announced trade restrictions on Eire and requested that the United States pressure Eire for use of the ports and for RAF bases in Ireland. When the New York Times backed Churchill, the Irish-American press protested that it and any other media backing Britain simply spewed forth anti-Irish-American and German-American, and pro-British and pro-Communist propaganda.33 David Gray said this was rubbish; the reality was that Americans simply could not understand de Valera’s stubbornness over the ports.34 In fact, Irish-Americans seemed to understand it quite well and responded accordingly, as when an Irish-American Congressman attacked a House of Commons speech by Churchill with such vehemence that Colonel William J. Donovan advised the British to back away from forcing the ports issue, and the New York Enquirer attacked ‘bellicose and Bullycose’ Churchill as Ireland’s greatest enemy. Martin Conboy argued that Eire had the right to deny its ports to any belligerent nation, the Ancient Order of Hibernians passed resolutions for neutrality and against British seizure of the ports, and in December, 6,000 members of the order unanimously protested against ‘the threatened invasion of Eire’s neutrality by the suggested seizure of Irish bases by England’. Petitions circulated in Massachusetts requesting that the US government guarantee Eire’s neutrality and the ports.35 This outpouring inspired Harold Ickes to write in his

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diary that the Irish ‘hate Britain to such a degree that many of them would be willing to see Great Britain defeated even if that meant an immediate attack upon us by Hitler’.36 The Irish World, the Gaelic American and the Brooklyn Tablet expressed the most extreme anti-British and Irish nationalist views, such as that the English had worked for 700 years to destroy Irish nationality, that British propagandists fed the American press anti-Irish lies inspired by the ‘pestiforous nuisance’ Craigavon (against whom famed Irish-born generals Gough and Montgomery protested) which were in the interest of continuing partition, and that the death of Clan-naGael leader and IRA sympathiser Joseph McGarrity was an event that affected the entire world. The ‘pro-British’ American press and President committed, among other crimes, giving American secrets to Britain, and, like their 1917 predecessors, had been lured by England into a war that was of no significance to the American people. German bombs falling on England simply fulfilled the biblical prophecy of the apocalypse, for England was the ‘Great Harlot’ and London was Babylon. ‘Keep Eire neutral!’ and ‘May the British Empire be destroyed in this war!’ were the underlying themes. Irish-American papers also published speeches demanding American recognition of an Irish Republic, anti-British and pro-Eire neutrality letters, editorials denouncing anyone who expressed negative views about the Irish, and publicity for public meetings – addressed by prominent Irish-Americans – supporting of Eire neutrality.37 The ports issue also was part of the Irish-American press contribution to the war of words. An Irish World cartoon captioned ‘England Aiming to Seize Irish Ports’ depicted the British lion crushing Ireland, with a letter to the editor condemning any Irish-Americans who might support Britain’s demand for use of the ports and calling on Irish World to ‘use your influence to awaken the Irish in this country to the danger that threatens Eire from the same type of people, who would save America by giving everything and everyone to England, if they had their way’.38 The Gaelic American was especially offended that such prominent Irish-Americans as Donovan, a First World War hero, and the Bishop of Kansas City, Edwin V. O’Hara, had called on America to aid Britain. They clearly were the victims of ‘subtle English propaganda’ disseminated by such ‘anglomaniacs’ as William Allen White’s All Aid to the Allies organisation. If he had his way White would ‘bleed America to death to preserve an Empire built on blood and conquest’. An editorial claiming that Britain would use force to take the ports appeared next to a poem titled ‘Irish Children Imprisoned in London Tower’, with such emotive lines as ‘Chivalry grows not on English ground. / Nor can Mercy about its throne / be found.’39 Some Irish-Americans were pro-German, and hoped Eire would be as well. Ambassador Hempel knew this, and used it in an effort to encourage Eire sympathy for the Axis. He carefully monitored de Valera’s connections with IrishAmerican opinion and assured him that Germany would give aid to Eire if Britain used force over the ports – from which de Valera demurred for fear that such aid would violate Eire neutrality. Of course, as ambassador, Hempel supplied Berlin

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with regular reports on what went on in Dublin, and some of it was turned into sometimes disturbing propaganda material:

r 3 June: 50,000 IRA equipped with US arms were ready to move against England, once Germany launched its final attack.

r 28 and 30 June (via the clandestine station calling itself the New British r r r r

Broadcasting Company): references to German invasion plans including landings in Ireland, and hints that plans for an invasion assisted by Irish fifth columnists were in place. 3 July: discussion of Irish distrust of the British. 5 July: Eire feared a British invasion. 6 and 7 July: Britain was concentrating troops in the west of England and had made preparations for entering Irish ports. 11 July: Germany followed developments in Eire only out of concern that Eire neutrality be maintained.

And so on. The object was to indicate the potential for good relations between Eire and Germany.40 However, Germany was also trying to impose a ‘total blockade’ on Britain, which would negatively affect the Eire economy. That, and bombs ‘accidentally’ dropped on Eire ships and towns, did not make the Irish feel particularly good about the Germans.41 Meanwhile, the MOI sent the Stephen King-Hall news letter (classified as propaganda by the Eire censor) to some 500 Eire subscribers per issue, and shipped leaflets to Woolworth’s. Examples of the latter included German Peace, with a drawing of a boot and spur in the shape of a swastika, and a message with the lines: ‘Remember what has happened wherever Germans rule. A German girl – she might have been your daughter – was sent to prison for 18 months for dancing with a Polish prisoner.’ Across the bottom was: ‘THE BRITISH PEOPLE WILL WIN.’ Another was Mightier Yet!, emphasising the role of the British Empire and dominions in the war. Eire postal censors seized this shipment, but returned it a few weeks later when the MOI Controller of Shipping explained that it had been ‘sent in error’.42 However, these leaflets and news letter notwithstanding, official British propaganda to Eire remained unorganised and unfocused. Empire Division director H. V. Hodson despatched John Betjeman to Eire. He talked with government officials, parish priests, landowners, agricultural workers, journalists, the Irish Turf Club, the British legation staff and ‘four proGermans – three IRA men’, from whom he gleaned such views as that the Irish feared a German invasion more than one by Britain and hoped that Britain would win the war but doubted that it could; that the IRA was not a major factor in Eire; that many Germans, some married to Irish women, lived in Eire; that the poorer Irish assumed they would live as well under Hitler as under de Valera; and that the pro-British in Eire consisted largely of Protestants and such ‘Castle Catholics’ as Senator Frank MacDermott. Betjeman concluded that British propaganda probably would not reach the general Eire population, ‘the total sale of Irish papers do not amount to 1/4 the population number,’ while those who heard foreign broadcasts regarded Lord Haw Haw as a wonderful

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joke and listened regularly, while the BBC was dull and unamusing. The best propaganda, Betjeman concluded, would be to end partition, because de Valera’s enemies were using it against him. Sir John Maffey agreed.43 Betjeman had doubts regarding propaganda to Eire, but had ideas all the same. Produce a Catholic Truth Society pamphlet on the persecution of Catholics in Poland; get the influential ‘racing fraternity’, with which Maffey had contacts, on Britain’s side; give pro-de Valera English newspaper articles and BBC talks wider Eire press publicity, but subtly, else ‘they will count as propaganda and not news’; and, if Maffey was receptive, appoint a non-Roman Catholic with a literary and social reputation as the legation press attach´e – which, of course, was Betjeman himself. He arrived in Dublin six months later to take that position. As a propagandist, Betjeman’s primary objective was ‘good relations’. He backed a call for stopping anti-Irish materials in the English press, encouraged the defence of all Ireland through Eire–Ulster cooperation, and recommended public appearances in Eire by distinguished and non-political English and AngloIrish such as T. S. Eliot and Elizabeth Bowen. Meanwhile, the Empire Division should order ‘from an unidentifiable source’ Irish and British newspapers with connections to areas central to matters Irish, such as the Kerryman (IRA) and the Northern Whig (Ulster anti-Catholic), and the Catholic Herald and the Tablet (English Catholic).44 The Religions Division explored possibilities such as encouraging North– South cooperation in disseminating propaganda aimed at bringing the Free State to Britain’s side. However, Arnold Lunn, a Catholic Action Society lecturer in Ireland, doubted that this was realistic, since Irish Catholics were largely negative on Irish Protestants, and regarded his talks on the future of the Catholic Church in Europe as ‘characteristic . . . British propaganda’. Still, he opined, at least 90 per cent of Irish Catholics did not want Germany to win, and some of them were pleased that the English thought them worth the effort. Therefore, propaganda should be designed that promoted the British cause as just and the certainty of a British victory.45 Yet, hopeful though this sounded, the Religions Division was doing no better than the Empire Division, and still discussed what ought to be done rather than what was actually being done. Further, propaganda inserted in Catholic journals evoked some negative response, as when the Irish Press editorialised that the Tablet ‘owe the deepest apology to the Irish people whom they have maligned, and to lovers of truth everywhere, whom they have betrayed,’ and the Irish Times that ‘in comparison with Germany’s efforts, British propaganda has been almost crude.’46 The Films Division also floundered. No newsreels and few of the 152 films listed for showing at the New York World’s Fair concerned Irish subjects or had direct relevance to the war situation. Twelve films concerned naval matters in the waters around Britain which implied relevance to the ports issue, and one Sidney Olcott film complimentary to Ireland, Come Back to Erin, was made in 1913.47 Britain’s outstanding documentary film makers were not being properly employed by the MOI or the British Council to make propaganda films, complained Arthur Calder-Marshall and Paul Rotha. And why not? Said Rotha,

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because they were not eager ‘to tell neutrals that Britain is changing from the status quo that led to Munich’. He must have been heard, because in due course he made documentaries for the MOI.48 Meanwhile, in September, the New Statesman and Nation was non-plussed that the Films Division had managed only three documentaries, Squadron 992, Spring Offensive and Men of the Lightship, since making The Lion Has Wings in 1939.49 The feature film side received similar negative attention, as when the Films Division advanced only L
25,000 towards making 49th Parallel (1941), set in Canada, and sent a large unit of talented people overseas ‘who are still there’. Michael Balcon, head of Ealing Studios, publicly attacked the Films Division for ‘time wasting’ and ‘ineffectual methods’, and announced that his company ‘now intended to make their own propaganda pictures and sell them in the ordinary way to the cinemas of the world’. Ironically, the Films Division Ideas Committee included Balcon along with Michael Powell, Sidney Gilliat, Leslie Howard and Anthony Asquith, among others. In fact, the MOI had more connections with British commercial film makers than did the OWI with Hollywood. Of course, any British film for export had to be vetted by the MOI-certified British censor.50 Films for Eire also had to pass the Eire censor, a fact central to the scarcity even of Hollywood films with overt war propaganda content. Between May and December, few Hollywood films in Eire had anything to do with the Second World War. An exception of sorts was Alfred Hitchcock’s first Hollywood film, Foreign Correspondent, which concerned spies and conspiracies and poked a subtle finger at US neutrality. The Irish Times claimed that the paucity of British films was because the few English studios still open worked mainly on propaganda films which obviously would not pass the Eire censor. The Irish Times was pleased that Dublin cinemas showed more Continental than Hollywood fare, such as Un Carnet de bal and Kameradschaft, because ‘the cinema-going public, after a surfeit of vulgarity, simpering blondes and their inane “boyfriends”, and too many “epic, soul-searing spectacles”, is awakening rapidly to the fact that the cinema has much more satisfying fare to offer.’ But the censor also cracked down on the ‘more satisfying fare’, because sometimes it was as much propaganda as was any other.51 So too documentary film: for example, Lovat Cave-Chinn’s Dublin at Night, with official broadcast warnings of the danger of invasion, lectures on ARP (Air Raid Precautions), shots of neon signs with ‘typical Irish names’, crowds leaving cinemas, well-lighted and well-supplied petrol pumps, and pointed references to the absence of a Dublin blackout. Cave-Chinn complained that ARP had given him permission to film whatever he wanted. Defence claimed that he was abusing the photographic permit originally issued. Cave-Chinn lost. Dr Richard Hayes, a practical man, took over film censorship in November 1940. It remained to be seen if this would benefit film makers and distributors.52 Broadcasters had it much easier, since short of jamming little could be done to stop foreign-based broadcasts. All BBC programmes were listed in Dublin newspapers, many of them reflecting MOI directives: ‘Kitchen in War Time’, ‘Calling All Women’, ‘War Commentary’, with such as Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert, ‘London under Fire’ and ‘London’s Blitz Life’, among others, and talks

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programmes with war-related subjects featuring the likes of Minister of Information Duff Cooper, Lord Cranborne, J. B. Priestley and L. S. Amery. One such programme, ‘The Land We Defend’, focused on Northern Ireland with implications for Eire. Musical programmes included military bands and, occasionally, Irish music.53 The British, Irish and Americans often shared broadcast facilities. RE´ studios were available to the BBC, for example. Propaganda was excluded, of course, save when David Gray’s 4 July broadcast on RE´ expressed the idea that freedom had to be fought for, defended, continually renewed, restated and maintained by those who enjoy it. One line was: ‘He that refuses to follow this path condemns himself to some form of serfdom.’ To the Irish listener, did Gray mean that the Irish should be on Britain’s side defending freedom against the Axis aggressors? Or, since the speech celebrated America’s Declaration of Independence from Britain, did he mean that Ireland too should be independent of Britain and partition ended? Doubtless Gray meant the first, but one can imagine perplexed expressions on the faces of British propagandists who heard the speech.54 The BBC sometimes found it easier to work with RE´ than with BBC NI. For example, George Marshall objected to Denis Johnston, a Dubliner whose family came from Belfast, working out of both Dublin and Belfast. The BBC prevailed, and he became a mainstay of BBC broadcast work with regard to Eire. A playwright (The Moon in the Yellow River and Lillibulero for example), Johnston had been with the BBC since 1937, and had scripted plays for BBC NI. His work related to Irish history made him attractive to the BBC but suspect to BBC NI, which saw him likely stepping on Northern, and possibly also Southern, sensibilities.55 Johnston stayed and became a BBC mainstay regarding Eire, but Marshall demanded and in December was granted the final say in all BBC programming directed at Eire, in order to keep off air material that might upset the Northern Irish – such as ‘The Minstrel Boy’ and ‘The Boyne Water’, Irish songs with political overtones.56 Part of the 1940 BBC agenda was programming for the Eire audience that was not overtly propagandistic. Rejected proposals included ‘news and views’ broadcasts that would ‘wake up the people here and make them forget their differences while they face the common enemy’, and a broadcast supporting the Irish Spitfire Fund because it included criticism of Eire’s neutrality policy.57 What was acceptable were programmes of immediate interest to Eire listeners. Of course, ‘immediate interest’ included much that was either too controversial (the ports, neutrality, partition), or too parochial (Irish agriculture). Also, what was to prevent Irishmen as broadcasters from adding their personal comments? Johnston suggested what he knew what the Irish liked: entertainment-variety perhaps built around Jimmy O’Dea, features, plays and poetry. He also recommended that all programming be coordinated with both the MOI and BBC NI.58 As these suggestions were made in December, it is clear that by year’s end, programming specifically for Eire was still only in the planning stage. ‘Rumour mongering’ – circulating rumours and disinformation for the purpose of misleading opinion – was applied in Eire at this point only by the Axis.59

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For example, the Italians charged that M. Ulysses Bywater, a former US consul in Italy, supplied the British with information for ‘vulnerable targets for bombing in Italy’ – there was no record of an American consul by that name – and the Berlin press circulated reports that Britain and Northern Ireland planned to take over Eire naval bases. And the ‘anti-Eire Irish’ claimed that Eire permitted German submarines access to the Irish coast for refuelling. Whitehall could ´ find no verification of this, and Eamon de Valera stated in no uncertain terms that ‘stories about refueling of German submarines on the Irish Coast are pure fiction’.60 Rumour mongering added to Britain’s anti-Eire neutrality position, but also made the Eire government more than ever security conscious. Censorship now played a central role in maintaining Eire security. In July Frank Aiken’s office directed the censorship to get on with creating more effective machinery for enforcing the ban on visual material that might be of use to belligerent nations in an invasion of Eire.61 It also was considered a danger to security that pro-British ‘ex-unionists’ and pro-German Fifth Columnists disseminated either anti-neutrality or pro-German propaganda. The Justice Secretary, Stephen Roche, wrote: ‘So long as this country is not attacked there is only one war that the Government will lend itself to and that is the war against those who would involve us in war. In this conflict we shall show no mercy . . . You have been warned.’62 Eire’s ultimate objective was to preserve neutrality and ensure that nothing would generate disorder within the state; therefore, opined Michael Knightly, never mind that the people and the press should have the right to express their opinions, ‘we just cannot afford the luxury of indulging even in academic discussion on rights and wrongs, merits and defects of the contending ´ Drisceoil, censorship was governments and forces.’63 However, wrote Donal O part of a ‘double game’ designed to paper over the crack between ‘illusion and objective reality’. Eire was publicly impartial in order to stay out of the line of fire, but secretly supplied Britain with weather information. In short, Eire pursued ‘benevolent neutrality’ in order to ensure that ‘the British could not acquire by conquest much more than she [Britain] gained through cooperation.’64 The censors became increasingly restrictive. They put off limits post and telegraph correspondence containing rumours and ‘loose talk’, such as reports of parachutists in nuns’ clothing and of ‘persons in female clothing with large red hands and bristly beards’ regularly seen leaving Irish beaches and ‘rowing out to strange looking sea-planes with mysterious bundles’. Of course, this was less troublesome than ‘rumour which turns out to be true’, such as atrocity stories from belligerents or governments in exile distributed for propaganda purposes. Meanwhile, Thomas Coyne was adamant that the censorship crack down harder than ever on such material as leaflets seeking donations for the British Victims of War Fund, and if need be, on telephone traffic between Eire and the UK – not easy, owing to staff and technical limitations and lack of cooperation from those committing breaches of censorship.65 Ambassador Eduard Hempel encouraged Coyne’s adamancy by complaining about the availability of ‘cheap publications of an anti-German and anti-Hitler nature’, such as Sebastian Haffner’s Germany – Jekyll and Hyde, the game called ‘Plonk’, in which the top score was secured by

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the player who got a dart into the mouth of ‘a Head of a State with which we are in friendly relations’ – namely, Adolf Hitler – and anti-Hitler jokes. One example of the latter is ‘Hitler’s Dream’, in which he has died, been denied entry into both heaven and hell, and when he awakes, cries: ‘It’s my worst dream yet / To Heaven I’ll not go, that I can tell / But it’s a damned awful thing to be kicked out of Hell’. Another involves Hitler’s final will, which bequeaths his ‘Heil Hitler’ salute to Jewish school children in England to use when needing to answer the call of nature; his moustache to Charlie Chaplin, from whom he had cribbed it in the first place; his voice to ‘any rag and bone merchant desiring an increase in his business’; and his brain to ‘the Chief Jewish Rabbi to be encased in a golden casket and thrown into a sewer’. The ‘executioners’ of the will were ‘brother Swines Goebbels and Goering’. Just the sort of thing to elicit protests from Hempel, whatever he might have thought of the jokes privately. Coyne agreed that this was not appropriate material in a neutral country. On 23 July the censors were given expanded powers to deal with such material.66 The press was the censors’ main problem. The power to seize offending newspapers was issued on 12 July in Emergency Powers Act no. 36, and Coyne requested legal proceedings against the communist Irish Worker’s Weekly for publishing material denied to other papers, in order to ‘make an example of one paper as a warning to the others against flouting our instructions’. Then Cavalcade was stopped for an article projecting an IRA-aided German invasion, Picture Post for a Tania Long article which was ‘a not very thinly disguised piece of propaganda against neutrality’, and Echo for reporting that the German government had admitted liability in the death of three girls when bombs were dropped in Eire. The object in this case was to placate Hempel. Of course, the censors were not always consistent: the fascist People’s National Party paper, Penapa, was seized for containing offensive materials, while the Eire Labour Party journal, Torch, was not even questioned for an anti-British, anti-capitalist propaganda piece.67 Items considered potentially harmful to Eire security or neutrality were increasingly varied: a British staff officer arrested for taking photographs and mapping the country around Longford and Monaghan; a report that British troops were invading Eire from the North; the arrival of three British trawlers at Kinsale Head; a protest meeting under the auspices of the Lady Mayoress of Dublin which got the death sentence of a man convicted of murder commuted to life in prison. And that was for July only. Ambassador David Gray concluded that outside views of ‘the situation’, meaning the war as it connected to Eire neutrality, could no longer be revealed to the Irish people or discussed by the Irish press.68 Indeed, in September the censors instructed the press that no news regarding attacks on Irish ships or vessels carrying Irish passengers in Irish waters, or refugees coming to Eire would be allowed, nor would anti-Semitic letters and articles. Material banned from one paper must be banned from all. Meanwhile, hands off all official belligerent governments’ communiqu´es other than propaganda.69 Occasionally the press fought back, as when Picture Post protested the ban of an issue with a Tania Long piece that included Irish landscape and urban photography, and other writers claiming that a ‘sympathetic statement’ of Eire’s case could

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be heard in the UK. The issue had been seen and approved by John Dulanty; then Dublin police seized it with no explanations. The famous Dublin writer Sean O’Casey was incredulous that anything in the issue should have raised the censorship spectre.70 The Irish Independent also protested censorship, as when it reported the German bombing of the Kerry Head and was warned that it would be forbidden publication after 7 August unless the report was submitted for approval by the censor. Of course, the item in question was printed before the ban was issued, and editor F. J. Geary protested that therefore no censorship rules had been violated and that the paper was being victimised. Geary and press censor Joseph Connolly debated the issue back and forth, Geary threatening to register protests ´ as high up the ladder as Eamon de Valera himself, which he did, but to no avail.71 It should be noted that when the Irish Press covered the Kerry Head bombing, it published only the official statement issued by the Eire government.72 The Irish Times depicted Eire censorship as, in some respects, ‘the most rigid censorship in the civilized world’. The paper basically accepted censoring matter which undermined security, public order and morality, but drew the line at press censorship, which ‘ignores the constitutional right of free expression . . . we object on principle to Press Censorship of any kind.’ This was the view as well of Sir John Keane, who in December 1940 introduced an anti-press censorship motion in the Seanad, and of the Irish Independent, which argued that censorship was ‘needlessly vexatious, harassing and inequitable’, and ‘leaves journalists completely bewildered’.73 Two days after the Seanad debated Keane’s motion, the Irish Times ran a photograph of a Local Security Force rally held in front of the Bank of Ireland, from which the censor had erased the Royal Arms emblem from the pediment. Frank Aiken justified the erasure by claiming that the photo was an Irish Times pro-British manoeuvre. The paper riposted that only the minister could come up with such an absurd idea. ‘Our readers have a right to expect better manners, if not better sense, from the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures.’74 Though resentment of censorship was real, it is a fact that the press was getting away with rather more than this exchange would suggest. Headlines and reports kept press readers well informed on aspects of the war. Examples in late 1940 included German bombs falling on Eire, President Roosevelt’s speech on the consequences for Eire if Germany defeated Britain, German progress and allied resistance to it, Germany bombing Britain and Britain bombing Germany, and in subtly heroic language, the resilience of ordinary British people surviving the ordeal. By December Dublin papers regularly carried columns commenting on the course of the war.75 Most revealing were the published photographs. Between May and December Irish papers ran photographs of British troops entering Belgium, bomb damage to French towns, German troops parading on ´ ees, and extensive German bomb damage in London and other the Champs Elys´ cities. The Irish Press stressed damage done to where Irish people lived in Britain; the Irish Times and Irish Independent were more general. All presented a vivid picture of what this war meant to civilian populations, as well as to air and naval personnel.76

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Why was it so? If press censorship was the ‘sham’ that Robert Smyllie wrote ´ Drisceoil described, then about after the war, or the ‘double game’ that Donal O perhaps photographs of bomb damage told the Irish that such ferocious conflict meant Eire was in danger more than ever and must be ready to face it, that Irish people living in England also were suffering, and perhaps it might be best to hope that Britain did not go under. Or, perhaps, the Eire censors still were not entirely clear on what the rules should be. Nor, for that matter, were the British propagandists. However, in 1941 the Empire Division had the good sense to assign the task of overseeing its role in the war of words in Eire to poet John Betjeman, a man at least as quixotic as the Irish.

Notes 1. ‘Eire “Couldn’t Repel Invader” ’, Daily Mail, 19 April 1940, p. 2; ‘Danger in Eire’, Spectator, 31 May 1940, p. 738. 2. ‘Hazards of Neutrality’, Times, 13 July 1940, p. 5; ‘Eire’s Motor Torpedo Flotilla’, Manchester Guardian, 27 May 1940, p. 4; ‘Irish Unity’, Manchester Guardian, 17 June 1940, p. 4; ‘G.B.S. Gives a Hint to the Irish’, Daily Mail, 2 July 1940, p. 2. 3. ‘Support of Neutrality Motion for Labour Party Conference’, Irish Press, 3 April 1940, p. 3; ‘Ireland Denies Ports Are Used by Britain’, New York Times, 12 May 1940, p. 34L; ‘Neutral Fears’, Irish Times, 20 April 1940, p. 6. 4. John MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 19 March 1940, RG 84/7, LLGR, NAUS; Maffey to Machtig, 10 June 1940, DO 130/10; Churchill, draft of letter to Lord Londonderry, June (no date) 1940, DO 35/1008/WG430/66, PRO. 5. ‘Ulster Gives Eire a Hint on Pact,’ News Chronicle, 25 June 1940, p. 5; ‘Danger to Eire’, Spectator, 21 June 1940, p. 826; extract from Evening Standard, 2 July 1940, R34/347/1, BBCWAC; ‘Ireland’s Opportunity’, Spectator, 28 June 1940, p. 854. 6. John F. L. Bray to Churchill, 10 June 1940, DO 35/1107/WX1/88; Neville Chamberlain, memorandum on negotiations with de Valera, 25 June 1940, CAB 66/WP(40)223; Chamberlain to Craigavon, 26 June 1940; Craigavon to Chamberlain, 27 June 1940; Chamberlain to Craigavon, 27 June 1940; Craigavon to Chamberlain, 29 June 1940, PREM 3/131/2; ‘Lord Craigavon on Irish Defence: “No Constitutional Change” ’, Times, 1 July 1940, p. 2; Cahir Healy to Churchill, 3 July 1940, DO 35/1107/WX1/92; FO to Lord Lothian, Washington, DC, 18 July 1940, FO 371/24194.A3446, PRO. 7. ‘The Danger to Eire: An Irishman’s Appeal to Mr De Valera’, Manchester Guardian, 18 July 1940, p. 10; ‘The Danger to Eire’, Manchester Guardian, 20 July 1940, p. 4; ‘Mr de Valera Sounds Grave Warning’, Irish Press, 13 May 1940, p. 1; ‘Wild Rumours Disturb Ireland’, Catholic Herald, 24 May 1940, p. 5. 8. ‘The Relevance of Ireland’, New Statesman and Nation, 5 April 1940, p. 454; ‘De Valera Warns of Peril to Ireland’, New York Times, 2 June 1940, p. 4L; ‘Taoiseach’s Call’, Irish Times, 27 May 1940, p. 4; ‘Ireland Alarmed, Hastens Defenses’, New York Times, 29 May 1940, p. 5; ‘Ireland Puts Army on War Footing’, New York Times, 30 May 1940, p. 6; ‘Eire’s Neutrality’, Manchester Guardian, 1 June 1940, p. 6. 9. Gallagher, memorandum, 17 June 1940; Peter McCarthy to Gallagher, 6 July 1940, S 11 935; Joseph Walshe to de Valera, 25 October 1940; minutes, Cabinet Committee on the Emergency, 19 December 1940, S 12 098, SPO.

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10. ‘Irish News Letter: Irish Hierarchy on the War’, Catholic Herald, 5 July 1940, p. 5; NBC interview with Aiken, entered in the Congressional Record by Hon. James E. Murray, 12 August 1940, Congressional Record of the United States, A4927; ‘Neutrality: No Change – Taoiseach’, Irish Press, 5 July p. 1; Brennan to Gallagher, 16 July 1940, 10058/152, FGP, TCD; memorandum for Cabinet Committee on Emergency Problems, 18 October 1940, S 12 094, SPO; ‘Taoiseach Statement on Irish Neutrality: Interview with American Journalist’, Irish Press, 21 November 1940, p. 1. 11. ‘Satisfied!’, Daily Mirror, 9 July 1940, p. 5; ‘None In – Done In’, Daily Mirror, 10 July 1940, p. 5; ‘Look Out, Eire!’, Daily Mail, 16 July 1940, p. 5; ‘If Eire Is Invaded’, Spectator, 16 August 1940, p. 158; ‘Eire’s War Views Are Truly “Irish” ’, Daily Mail, 18 July 1940, p. 2; Maffey, report to DO, 22 July 1940, CAB 65/8 WM 209(40)9, PRO; ‘Eire Ready to Defend Neutrality’, News Chronicle, 30 December 1940, p. 1. 12. W. K. Hancock, memorandum, 16 May 1940, PREM 4/53/2; Cabinet minutes, 20 May 1940, CAB 65/7 WM 131(40)3; Cabinet minutes, 27 May 1940, CAB 65/7 WM 141(40)9; Cabinet minutes, 30 May 1940, CAB 65/7 WM 147(40)3; Godfrey Haggard to Chancery, British Embassy, Washington, DC, 20 May 1940, FO 371/25222.W4826, PRO; Henry Morris-Jones MP, 23 May 1940, HCD, 5th Series, vol. 361, col. 310; Senator Frank Macdermot, ‘Eire and War Dangers’, Spectator, 31 May 1940, p. 744; Cabinet minutes, 3 June 1940, CAB 65/7 WM 153(40)8; Cabinet minutes, 17 June 1940, CAB 65/7 WM 170(40)1; Lord Abercorn to Churchill, 26 June 1940, PREM 4/53/2, PRO. 13. Royal Ulster Constabulary, report, 23 June 1940, PREM 3/129/2, PRO. 14. Herr Fricke to Hempel, 6 June 1940, DGFP, D VIII; William Smale to MacVeagh, 3 April 1940, RG 84/8, DLGR, NAUS; US Embassy, memorandum to Foreign Office, 13 June 1940; Orme Sargent to General Hastings Ismay, 13 June 1940; L. C. Holles to Sargent, 14 June 1940; Machtig to Sargent, 15 June 1940, FO 371/25222.W8386; Cordell Hull to Joseph P. Kennedy, 12 June 1940; Kennedy to Hull, 17 June 1940; Gray to Hull, 15 August 1940, p. 100, vol. I, FRUS; Lord Halifax to Lothian, 18 June 1940, 115/3789/28; Lothian to Halifax, 21 July 1940, FO 371/25222.W8386; Lothian to Foreign Office, 23 August 1940, FO 371/25222.W9784, PRO; ‘Nazis, Off Ireland, Attack Five Ships’, New York Times, 22 August 1940, p. 1; ‘Bombs on Eire’, Spectator, 30 August 1940, p. 210. 15. Malcolm MacDonald, report of conversation with de Valera, 6 October 1940, DO 35/892/XI/105; Captain Noel E. Fitzpatrick, Irish Guards, to Ian C. Hannah MP, report on visit to Eire, 23 December 1940, PREM 4/5316; Donald Stephenson to V. Cavendish Bentinck, 26 September 1940; Cavendish Bentinck to Stephenson, 1 October 1940, CAB 21/881; U.C.A. to Whyte (no first name recorded), 14 August 1940, DO 130/13, PRO; ‘Children to Get Homes in Eire’, Daily Mail, 23 October 1940, p. 6. 16. Elizabeth Bowen, Notes on Eire, 9 November 1940, PREM 4/53/6, PRO; ‘Irish Neutrality’, Manchester Guardian, 9 November 1940, p. 6. 17. Dulanty, interview with W. P. Crozier, 26 July 1940, In A. J. P. Taylor, ed., Off the Record: Political Interviews of W. P. Crozier 1933–1943, London, 1973, p. 179. 18. Dominions Secretary, memorandum, 24 July 1940, CAB 66/WP(40)274, PRO; ‘Ireland and Invasion: What the Typical Irishman Thinks’, Catholic Herald, 12 July 1940, p. 1. 19. ‘Ireland and Invasion’, p. 1; Thomas Bodkin to the editor, Catholic Herald, ca. August 1940, Bodkin Papers, 6984/5, Special Collections, TCD; Dulanty, notes, 14 October 1940, DO 35/1008/WG430/174; Postal Censorship Report, 12 September and 13 October 1940, INF 1/472, PRO.

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20. Postal Censorship Report, 12 September and 13 October 1940, INF 1/472; Weekly Intelligence Report, 21–8 October 1940, INF 1/292; Weekly Intelligence Report, 24–8 December 1940, INF 1/292, PRO. 21. Heather Bryant Jordan, How Will the Heart Endure: Elizabeth Bowen and the Landscape of War, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1992, pp. 100–1; Bowen, notes on Eire. 22. Bowen, notes on Eire. 23. De Valera to Neville Chamberlain, 4 July 1940, CAB 65/WP(40)251, PRO; ‘Craigavon Will Not Budge’, News Chronicle, 8 July 1940, p. 6; ‘The Irish People Are No Enemies of the British’, Catholic Herald, 19 July 1940, p. 5; ‘Stubborn Ireland’, News Chronicle, 10 July 1940, p. 4. 24. Maclennan to John Betjeman, 2 July 1940; Maclennan to H. V. Hodson, 11 July 1940, INF 1/404, PRO. 25. ‘The Peril of Ireland’, Spectator, 5 July 1940, p. 4; Captain Cyril Falls, ‘Ulster’s Case’, Picture Post, 17 August 1940, p. 31; ‘U-Boats Call at Eire for Petrol – Ulster MP’s Sensational Charge,’ Sunday Express, 13 October 1940, p. 1. 26. ‘There Are Two Irelands’, News Chronicle, 20 July 1940, p. 4; ‘This Is Eire’s Case’, News Chronicle, 1 August 1940, p. 4; ‘Irish People Are No Enemies of the British’; ‘Ireland Unite!’, Daily Mirror, 2 July 1940, p. 5; ‘What Next in Ireland’, Daily Mirror, 6 July 1940, p. 5. 27. Issue of IRA aims, ca. 1940, MS 21,155(4), INL; Sean Fitzpatrick and Joseph F. Kennedy, IRA, to de Valera, 22 August 1940, S 12 069, SPO; R.E.B. to DO, 5 July 1940, PREM 4/53/6, PRO; David Woodward, ‘The Fifth Column in Ireland’, News Chronicle, 26 July, 1940, p. 4; Gray to Hull, 28 August 1940; Smale to Gray, RG 84/3, DLGR, NAUS; memorandum, 2 October 1940, CAB 21/881, PRO. 28. ‘Eire and the Submarines’, Spectator, 23 August 1940, p. 182. 29. ‘Bright Intervals’, News Chronicle, 6 November 1940, p. 4; ‘British Ships and Ports of Eire’, Times, 6 November 1940, p. 4; ‘ “Neutral” Help’, Daily Mirror, 9 November 1940, p. 5; J. J. Tinker MP, 5 November 1940, HCD, 5th Series, vol. 365 cols 1270–1. 30. Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality 1939–45, Londan, 1985, pp. 178–9; Sir Wilfred Spender to Lord Hankey, 9 November 1940, CAB 63/147; Cabinet minutes on Eire trade relations, 21 November 1940, CAB 65/10 WM 293(40)11; Lord Woolton to Churchill, 26 November 1940; Cranborne, memorandum on Eire, 3 December 1940, PREM 3/128; Chief of Staff to Churchill, 6 December 1940, PREM 3/127/3A, PRO; Stuart Ball, ed., Parliament and Politics in the Age of Churchill and Attlee: The Headlam Diaries, Cambridge, 1999, entry for 5 November 1940. 31. ‘So Eire Won’t Give Us Bases . . . ’, Daily Mail, 8 November 1940, p. 2; ‘An Open Letter to de Valera’, Sunday Express, 24 November 1940, p. 6; ‘All Aid Short of Help!’ (cartoon), Daily Mirror, 5 December 1940, p. 5; Sir John Maffey to Cranborne, 20 November 1940; Cranborne to Churchill, PREM 3/127/1; Churchill to Cranborne, 22 November 1940, PREM 1/127/1. 32. ‘Neutral Help’, Daily Mirror, 9 November 1940, p. 15; Lothian on Irish ports, 12 November 1940, FO 371/25222.W11943, PRO; The Secret Diaries of Harold L. Ickes, vol. III: The Lowering Clouds 1939–1941, New York, 1954, p. 366, entry for 9 November 1940; Sumner Welles, memorandum, 9 November 1940, vol. I, pp. 166–7, FRUS; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, London, 1948, p. 922; Nicholas John Cull, Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American ‘Neutrality’ in World War II, Oxford, 1995, p. 73; conversation, Welles and Brennan, 9 December 1940, RG 84/3, DLCR, NAUS.

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33. Churchill to Roosevelt, 7 and 13 December 1940, Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley and Manfred Jones, eds, Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence, New York, 1975, p. 124; ‘Many Radio Commentators Are Paid Propagandists Who Mislead Their Audience . . . ’, Gaelic American, 3 August 1940, p. 1. 34. Gray to Sean T. O’Kelly, 22 July 1940, RG 84/3, DLCR, NAUS; Gray to Joseph Walshe, 6 August 1940, PSF, FDRL; Walshe to Gray, 12 November 1940, RG 84/7, DLGR, NAUS. 35. Notes on conversation, Donovan, Prof. T. North Whitehead and John Balfour, 19 December 1940, FO 371/24263.A5194, PRO; William Griffin, ‘Churchill’s Attack on Irish Neutrality,’ New York Enquirer, 11 November 1940, entered in Congressional Record of the United States, A6590; address by Conboy to the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic, 10 November 1940, entered in Congressional Record of the United States, A6646; resolutions of Ancient Order of Hibernians, 27 November 1940, entered in Congressional Record of the United States, A6940; ‘Opposing Ceding Ireland’s Ports’, Brooklyn Tablet, 14 December 1940, p. 3; ‘Holyokers Sign Petition to Help Eire Stay Neutral’, Irish World, 21 December 1940, p. 1. 36. Secret Diaries of Harold L. Ickes, p. 229, entry for 5 July 1940. 37. ‘England’s Hypocrisy’, Irish World, 27 July 1940, p. 4; ‘Neutrality and Independence’, Irish World, 3 August 1940, p. 4; ‘Ireland Loses a Great Friend in the Passing of Joseph M’Garrity’, Irish World, 17 August 1940, p. 1; ‘England Expects Every American to Do His Duty’, Gaelic American, 24 August 1940, p. 4; ‘War Hysteria and How It Is Fanned by the Newspapers, the Radio and the President’, Gaelic American, 24 August 1940, p. 1; ‘Is England the Great Harlot of St. John’s Apocalypse and London the Doomed Babylon?’, Gaelic American, 2 November 1940, p. 7; ‘US Aids British Censors’, Gaelic American, 2 November 1940, p. 2; ‘Ireland’s Position Seen Critical’, Brooklyn Tablet, 23 November 1940, p. 8; ‘Grateful for Publication of Mr Conboy’s Talk’, Brooklyn Tablet, 30 November 1940, p. 9; ‘Mass Meeting to Uphold Ireland’, Brooklyn Tablet, 7 December 1940, p. 4. 38. ‘England Aiming to Seize Irish Ports’ (cartoon), Irish World, 16 November 1940, p. 1; ‘Help Ireland Keep Neutral’, Irish World, 14 December 1940, p. 1. 39. ‘England Threatens Ireland’, ‘Irish Children Imprisoned in London Tower ’, a poem by T. D. McGee, Gaelic American, 16 November 1940, p. 4; Eduard Hempel to the Foreign Ministry, Berlin, 1 July 1940; Paul Woermann, memorandum, 3 July 1940; Joachim von Ribbentrop to Hempel, 11 July 1940; Hempel to Woermann, 31 July 1940, DGFP, D VIII, INL. 40. Ernst von Weizs¨acker to Hempel, 13 November 1940; Ribbentrop to Hempel, 26 November 1940; Hempel to Ribbentrop, 29 November 1940; Ribbentrop to Hempel, 5 December 1940; Hempel to Foreign Ministry, 17 November 1940; Hempel to Foreign Ministry, 7 December 1940; Hempel to Foreign Ministry, 10 December 1940; Hempel to Foreign Ministry, 29 December 1940, DGFP, D VIII. 41. General Hastings Ismay for the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 3 December 1940, PREM 3/127/3A; Maffey to Sir Eric Machtig, 23 December 1940, PREM 3/128; Lt. Col. Sinclair to Colonel Brooks, 17 July 1940, FO 898/30, PRO; ‘Total Blockade of Britain . . . ’, Irish Press, 19 August 1940, p. 1; ‘4 Irish Towns Hit’, New York Times, 27 August 1940, p. 1; ‘Germans Hit Eire Ship: A Protest’, Daily Mail, 19 October 1940, p. 6. 42. Policy Committee minutes, ca. May 1940, INF 1/848, PRO; J. J. Purcell to R. L. Daly, 9 July 1940; Assistant Controller Postal Censorship to the Revenue Commissioner,

− 

43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48.

49. 50.

51. 52.

53.

54. 55. 56.

57.

58.

59.



19 July 1940; C. M. Strickland to Chief Postal Censor, ca. 1 August 1940; Thomas Coyne to T. Malone, 9 August 1940, MA 3/27; note on distribution of belligerents’ propaganda, ca. December 1940, MA 7/58, CBB. Betjeman, ‘Eire’, report to Hodson, 21 June 1940, INF 1/528, PRO. Ibid.; Betjeman to Hodson, 24 June 1940, INF 2/528, PRO; 23 October 1940, HCD, 5th Series, vol. 365, col. 1047. Hugh Maclennan to Betjeman, 2 July 1940, INF 1/528; Very Rev. William Corkey to Maclennan, 8 July 1940, INF 1/404; Lunn, report, 19 August 1940, INF 1/404, PRO. Maclennan to Director General, MOI, 22 August 1940, INF 1/117, PRO; ‘Untruths – In Strange Places’, Irish Press, 11 July 1940, p. 6; ‘Propaganda’, Irish Times, 16 July, 1940, p. 4. Films Available for Showing in the British Pavilion, 1940, New York World’s Fair, 5 September 1940, BW/4/20, PRO. Paul Rotha, ‘Nobody Ordered Films’, News Chronicle, 6 September 1940, p. 4; John Caughie with Kevin Rockett, The Companion to British and Irish Cinema, London, 1996, pp. 140–1. ‘The Film at War’, New Statesman and Nation, 7 September 1940, p. 230. Anthony Aldgate and Jeffrey Richards, Britain Can Take It: The British Cinema in the Second World War, Oxford, 1986, p. 10; ‘Film Studio Attacks MoI: “Waste of Time” ’, Daily Mail, 11 December 1940, p. 3; The Export of Goods (Control) (No. 39), 4 November 1940, DO 130/81, PRO; Thomas Coyne, memorandum, 2 October 1940, MA 5/14, CBB. ‘Films in Wartime’, Irish Times, 3 December 1940, p. 4. David Gray to Secretary of State, 23 July 1940, RG 84/2, DLCR, NAUS; C. Rooney, Commandant, regarding Dublin at Night, ca. August 1940; Coyne to Frank Gallagher, 22 August 1940; Gallagher to Coyne, 28 August 1940; Colonel Liam D. Archer to Coyne, 31 August 1940; Archer to Coyne, 3 September 1940, MA 7/38, CBB; Eire Cabinet minutes, 24 September 1940, S 12 093A, SPO; ‘Leader Page Parade’, Irish Independent, 29 November 1940, p. 6. Broadcasting Arising from MOI Directives; Partial List of BBC Talks for August, October and November 1940, INF 1/172, PRO; see Irish Independent BBC listings for any day between 1 July and 31 December 1940. John Irwin to Kiernan, 1 July 1940; Kiernan to J. B. Clark, 12 August 1940, E1/956/1, BBCWAC; written text of broadcast by Gray, Dublin, 4 July 1940, DGP, FDRL. Clark to AC(O), 12 July 1940, E1/956/1, BBCWAC; Rex Cathcart, The Most Contrary Region: The BBC in Northern Ireland 1924–1984, Belfast, 1984, pp. 81–4. Marshall to CP, 18 July and 29 November 1940; Marshall to DPP, 2 December 1940, R34/347/1; B. E. Nicholls, Programme Directive no. 47: Relations between Eire and Northern Ireland, 18 December 1940, E1/950/1, BBCWAC. Sir Edward Villiers to R. Burns, 3 July 1940, R34/347/1, BBCWAC; Sir Eric Machtig to Cranborne, 14 November 1940; Cranborne, minute, 14 November 1940; Geoffrey Shakespeare to Doctor MacDonnel, 15 November 1940, DO 35/1107/WX1/115, PRO. Lindsay Wellington to Nicholls, 20 November 1940; Nicholls to Wellington, 26 November 1940; Nicholls to Wellington, 8 December 1940; Programmes for Irish Listeners, BBC Internal Circulating Memo, 21 December 1940, R34/347/1, BBCWAC. See Robert Cole, Britain and the War of Words in Neutral Europe 1939–45, London, 1990, pp. 25, 70.

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   

60. E. F. Tomacelli to Gray, 22 July 1940, RG 84/8, DLGR, NAUS; MacKenzie King, Sir Hubert Gough, Henry Harrison and Maurice Healey to Home Office, New York Times, 9 November 1940, p. 5; 22 September 1940, DO 35/1109/WX30/24, PRO; ‘Warns Ireland of Plot’, ‘Deal for Irish Bases by Britain Rumored’, New York Times, 14 December 1940, p. 5; MOI Home Intelligence, memorandum, 25 November 1940, INF 1/173; Ewen E. E. Montague, memorandum, 1 December 1940, INF ´ 1/405, PRO; ‘Eamon de Valera Labels Reports of Refueling off Eire as “Fiction” ’, Irish World, 28 December 1940, p. 1. 61. Archer to Aiken, 2 July 1940; H. Brady to Controller Press Censorship, 8 July 1940, MA 7/32, CBB. 62. Coyne to Roche, 30 July 1940, MA 5/20; Coyne, memorandum to Aiken, 3 December 1940, MA 2/44, CBB. 63. Knightly, minute to Aiken, 3 December 1940, MA 7/58, CBB. ´ Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland, 1939–1945: Neutrality, Politics, and Society, 64. Donal O ´ Drisceoil also noted Robert Smyllie’s post-war observation Cork, 1996, pp. 101–2. O that press censorship in Ireland had been ‘a sham’, and cited such historians as J. J. Lee and Tim Pat Coogan who saw Eire censorship as something other than what it appeared to be. 65. Press reporter blacklist, 3 June 1940, MA 4/17; Postal Censorship, various entries, autumn 1940, MA 5/20; Coyne to J. J. Purcell, 18 September 1940, MA 3/30; Controller Censorship, memorandum to staff, 20 October 1942, MA 2/42; Coyne to P. P. O’Donoghue, 3 October 1940, MA 5/20, CBB. 66. Joseph Connolly, memorandum to Aiken, 19 July 1940; lists of books offensive to Hempel at Dublin booksellers, ca. July 1940, MA 5/19; Anti-Hitler jokes circulating in Dublin in 1940, MA 7/55; Boland to Coyne, August 28, 1940; Coyne to F. H. Boland, 30 August 1940, MA 2/55, CBB. 67. Connolly, memorandum, July 32, 1940, S 11 586; Aiken, memorandum, 3 July ´ Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland, pp. 21–2; Papers 1940, MA 5/19, CBB; see O Banned under Order EP (No. 36) 1940, MA 2/5; Knightly to Circulation Manager, Argus Press, 20 August 1940, MA 2/8; notes on seizure of Picture Post, 30 July 1940, MA 2/33, CBB; Gray to Secretary of State, 30 July 1940, RG 84/3, DLCR, NAUS; Coyne to Aiken, 20 September 1940, MA 2/28; Coyne to Eason and Sons, 30 September 1940, MA 2/24; Knightly, order to seize Echo, 20 September 1940, MA 2/37; summary of ‘Ireland – A New Plantation’, Torch, 31 December 1940; Industry Ministry Office to P. T. Daly, 17 January 1941, MA 2/30, CBB. 68. Gray to Secretary of State, 30 July 1940, RG 84/3, DLCR, NAUS. 69. Assistant Controller Censorship to Knightly, 14 September 1940, MA 2/42; Controller Censorship, memorandum, 8 October 1940, MA 2/41, CBB. 70. ‘Another Ban in Eire’, Picture Post, 10 August 1940, p. 5. 71. W. H. Smith, Asst Chief Reporter, to Geary, 5 August 1940; Hector G. C. Legge, Chief Sub-Editor, to Geary, 5 August 1940; Geary to Connolly, 6 August 1940; Connolly to Geary, 8 August 1940; Geary to Connolly, 9 August 1940; Geary to de Valera, 10 August 1940, S 12 043, SPO. 72. Geary to Connolly, 15 August 1940, S 12 043, SPO; ‘Plane Bombs Ship: Irish Protest’, Irish Press, 3 August 1940, p. 1. 73. ‘The Censorship’, Irish Times, 4 December 1940, p. 4; ‘Senators Attack Censorship: “Arbitrary Powers”. Parliamentary Control Urged’, Irish Independent. 5 December 1940, p. 7; ‘The Censorship’, Irish Independent, 5 December 1940, p. 6. 74. ‘Arms and the Ban’, Irish Times, 6 December 1940, p. 5.

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

75. ‘German Bombs Kill Three in Country Wexford’, Irish Press, 27 August 1940, p. 1; ‘Bombs Fall in Counties Dublin and Monaghan’, Irish Independent, 21 December 1940, p. 5; ‘ “Could Ireland Hold Out?” Mr Roosevelt’, Irish Times, 21 December 1940, p. 5; ‘How London Is “Carrying On”: Cheerful Despite Air Raids’, Irish Independent, 5 October 1940, p. 7. 76. Among many others: in the Irish Press see 16 August 1940, p. 1; 14 September 1940, p. 7; 18 September 1940, p. 1; 2 October 1940, p. 1; 7 October 1940, p. 6; 23 December 1940, p. 1. In the Irish Independent see 14 May 1940, p. 3; 15 May 1940, p. 3; 14 June 1940, p. 3; 4 July 1940, p. 3; 16 September 1940, p. 5; 12 October 1940, p. 3; 18 October 1940, p. 7; 6 November 1940, p. 3; 21 November 1940, p. 3; 29 November 1940, p. 3. In the Irish Times see: 24 September 1940, p. 5; 30 September 1940, p. 5; 10 October 1940, p. 8; 12 October 1940, p. 9; 15 October 1940, p. 5; 18 October 1940, p. 5; 19 October 1940, p. 9; 26 October 1940, p. 9; 7 November 1940, p. 8; 16 November 1940, p. 7; 21 November 1940, p. 8; 7 December 1940, p. 7; 28 December 1940, p. 7.



‘More Than Ever “Ourselves Alone”’: January–June 1941

In the new year, pressure on Eire increased, but so did Eire’s determination to remain neutral. Critics of neutrality were harsh. A Daily Mirror cartoon depicted ´ Eamon de Valera building a sand castle flying an ‘Eire’s Neutrality’ banner, with the caption: ‘Build on Rock, Dev – It’s Safer’. Letters to the editor protested Irish ‘smug complacency’, and wondered how Eire could not join in a battle to defend Christianity and Freedom.1 To no avail; only one per cent of the people of Eire favoured joining Britain in the war; the rest mostly hoped, as an Irish farmer put it, that the English would be ‘not bate, but nearly bate’. The bottom line was for Britain to establish good relations with de Valera and tread lightly.2 Many Irish-Americans regarded Britain as a villain and gave Eire full support. Rhetoric ranged from denouncing pro-war Irish-Americans to scoffing at the image of Britain as ‘defender of small nations’.3 On 19 March, Frank Aiken arrived in Washington to promote neutrality and negotiate arms and other supplies for Eire. No skilled diplomat, certainly, he ranted against the British, and was told in no uncertain terms that Eire would get US arms and supplies only if its government became more cooperative.4 Aiken then launched a coastto-coast speaking tour aimed at getting Irish-Americans to put pressure on the American government. He promised that Eire would never abandon neutrality and would resist anyone who attacked Eire, accused Britain of disseminating anti-Irish propaganda, and called for the ‘moral support’ of Irish-Americans against aggression. Irish-American press coverage was enthusiastic, such as Irish World calling Aiken’s presentation a ‘clear, orderly and effective presentation of Ireland’s right to remain neutral’. Irish-American Congressmen also spoke of Aiken with enthusiasm, giving him confidence that he had succeeded as a propagandist, if not as a procurer of arms for Eire.5 Meanwhile, David Gray reported that the Eire government claimed Aiken had lined up Irish-American support, had won American approval of its neutrality policy, and was playing up American critics of President Roosevelt’s British aid plans as a way of inciting anti-British sentiment.6 Gray also expressed hope that when Wendell Willkie, who visited Dublin in February, told de Valera that Americans, including some Irish-Americans, were mystified that Eire refused to cede Irish ports to Britain, it might impress upon An Taoiseach that American opinion was solidly on Britain’s side.7 The Gaelic American disagreed, claiming that Irish-Americans vigorously opposed ceding bases to the ‘age-long enemy’, and quoting the Leader’s depiction

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of Willkie as ‘Windy Willkie, the Wonder Kid of the Wabash, the yodeling yokel of Hoop-pole County, Indiana’, who ‘made the amazing discovery that there are no hay-stacks in London; not even a corn-cob’.8 In fact, opinion polls in January 1941 indicated that 40 per cent of IrishAmericans opposed Eire neutrality, favoured England having the use of Eire bases, and either thought America should enter the war or were uncommitted – but were not opposed to it. Sixty-nine per cent of Americans generally believed America’s safety depended upon England winning the war. The average American, it was concluded, believed America should help Britain and that Eire should cooperate with Britain over military bases. Meanwhile, American press reports, editorials and letters to the editor indicated growing support among Irish-Americans for Anglo-Irish and Anglo-American cooperation as the only guarantee of securing Ireland from a German invasion. The Foreign Office was advised that it might now be possible to use pro-British propaganda – provided that it was disseminated by the Americans – to exploit Irish-American opinion which favoured aid to Britain.9 Still, 60 per cent of Irish-Americans opposed aid for Britain, and were well represented by anti-British Irish-American voices. The Leader, for example, dismissed the demand for Eire ports as a ruse ‘to cover over Britain’s gross ineptitude’ in naval warfare, charged Willkie and Henry Stimson with lying regarding tonnage sunk by German U-boats, and claimed that New York and Washington were centres for British propaganda led by Episcopalian (American Anglican) bishops. The Gaelic American accused Britain of starving millions of French children by denying them imports of oatmeal, and praised veteran film star Lillian Gish, who allegedly repented for having acted in pro-British propaganda films during the First World War.10 And Senator James Murray of Wyoming protested against British misrule in Ireland and called for America to support Eire’s right to not cede ports to Britain. He also claimed that pro-British propaganda disseminated in the United States defamed the Irish by suggesting that they favoured Germany over Britain. It is little wonder that when the MOI American Division was encouraged to ‘tackle Irish opinion in the USA’, it was reluctant to ‘grasp the nettle’ that such an undertaking represented.11 But grasp it did: by March 1941 plans were under way to create the Office of War Information, the American equivalent of the MOI, which would disseminate both pro-American and pro-British propaganda. Many Americans favoured pro-British propaganda; many Irish-Americans did not, particularly when it represented Britain as America’s ‘first line of defence’.12 While Eire accepted being placed in the British Navicert system in 1941 – ‘ship’s warrants’ without which neutral vessels operating in European waters were liable to seizure – that cooperation did not extend to the ports. A disgruntled Winston Churchill hinted that Britain would seize them if circumstances warranted. British newspapers backed such a move, General Sir Hubert Gough pleaded for an Anglo-Irish accord on the matter, the future Minister of Information Brendan Bracken suggested that the ports would have to be seized sooner or later so the way should be paved by air-dropping leaflets, and 129 prominent



‘

  ‘‘  ’’’

Irish-Americans signed a petition pleading that Eire cede the ports to Britain. A New York Times cartoon depicted Britain viewing de Valera as ‘The Last of the Neutrals’ whom Hitler was waiting for the right moment to attack.13 The result was an anti-British backlash, including accusations that the British were promoting a British takeover of Eire and pleas that British propaganda be recognised for what it was. The 129 petitioners were accused of engaging in war propaganda work at Ireland’s expense, Irish-American organisations opposed to the petition were cited, and Aiken, then on his visit to the United States, denounced in the Leader and Irish World American Catholic academic Francis E. McMahon’s appeal for the bases. ‘Aiken Answers Boob MCMAHON’ was the Leader headline. The response was entered into the Congressional Record, as were many other statements against British access to the ports, many of them published in the Irish-American press. While 52 per cent of Irish-Americans opposed opening the ports, the 40 per cent that approved, and questioned Eire neutrality, was a large enough number to spur anti-British propaganda in the Irish-American press.14 In April and May, German bombs fell on Belfast. Eire sent help and accepted thousands of refugees, generosity well covered in the Irish, British and American press. The BBC reported German leaflets ‘warning that if fire brigades were again sent to Northern Ireland, towns in Eire “might have some fires of their own to be put out” ’. Berlin denied the report while Dublin neither confirmed nor denied it, and continued to give assistance to Belfast. Eire volunteers were cheered in Belfast, and the ‘artificiality’ of partition revealed. Wrote the Irish Independent: ‘If anything further were needed to demonstrate the utter unreality of the artificial border that divides our country, the welcome that has been given to the refugees from Belfast provides it’. The Catholic Herald used the air raid as an opportunity to call for an end to anti-Catholic laws in Ulster.15 However, praising Eire aid to Belfast did not mean setting aside the war of words over Eire neutrality. Indeed, it remained a feature in the British press with Churchill’s approval. For example, cartoons depicted de Valera driving a donkey cart down a country road past a signpost pointing to ‘Strict Neutrality short cut to Nazi Slavery’, and saying to the donkey, ‘Shure take no notice of it. There’s no such place at all!’, and de Valera relaxing in a lawn chair beneath an umbrella bearing the word ‘Neutrality’, with the caption ‘Dreamland’. Such material reflected popular resentment of Eire’s position.16 Many Irish residents in England called upon Eire to back Britain in the war, with letters to newspapers, pro-Eire participation organisations, public appeals by such as Gough and L. G. Redmond Howard, nephew of the late John Redmond, and much ado over Germany dropping bombs on Eire. It was London’s view that the time was ripe for a German attempt to take over Eire, and that Britain must be prepared.17 London saw German official propaganda, directed by legation secretary Henning Thomsen and press attach´e Carl Petersen, as suggesting such. It included a ‘British plot’ to invade Eire, the British claiming Irish Catholics preferred an alliance with Britain over neutrality, and a St Patrick’s Day broadcast portraying Ireland’s patron saint as a benevolent, wonder-working hero. There also were reports that British subjects

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of Irish origin confined in Germany were given ‘specially favourable treatment’, and that an Eire woman who saved a crashed German pilot in Eire received a Nazi decoration.18 British official propaganda began in Eire only after January 1941, when John Betjeman, who had joined the MOI Films Division in 1940, was appointed press attach´e at the British legation in Dublin. Betjeman’s arrival meant that the MOI at long last had a man on the ground to direct, or at least suggest direction for, propaganda aimed at Eire. He was a poet, a raconteur, and well connected in Irish literary circles, ‘the sort of chap who could get on with the Irish’. And he did. Within a month he was taking Irish language lessons, and within a year was involved in planning the Laurence Olivier film version of Shakespeare’s Henry V, shot in Ireland and released in 1944. Mostly Irishmen filled the roles of English knights and soldiers.19 Appropriately, Betjeman’s successor as press attach´e, Reginald Ross Williamson, was historical adviser for the film. Betjeman’s objective was to put six points across to the Irish: (1) Britain was winning the war; (2) press photographs exaggerated the damage inflicted by German air raids; (3) if the Germans invaded Eire they would likely appear in British battle-dress; (4) Britain had given Eire a great deal of equipment (presumably military); (5) Britain was not vitally dependent on Eire for food supplies; and (6) in regard to shipping, Britain was treating Eire as a neutral country. He established connections with the press (the Irish Independent in particular), diplomats, broadcasters, writers and public speakers, to whom he provided information, supplied mostly by H. V. Hodson, regarding concentration camps, prisons, torture, spies and informers, and conscripted labour in Axisoccupied countries.20 He also distributed ‘Talking Points’ leaflets claiming that British forces captured fourteen Italian machine guns for every one of their own lost, that 100 recruits, some of them Irish, entered British forces every day, and that anti-British German broadcasts were based on false information. Empire Division propaganda postcards were on the list as well, with such themes as ‘In Freedom – Strength’, ‘How the War Is Being Won’ and ‘Some Achievements of Britain and Her Allies’.21 Betjeman was dubious about such propaganda material because the Irish were suspicious of ‘direct British propaganda’. Better ‘to work for good relations between Britain and Eire’ – treat Irish nationalism with respect, decrease the Irish sense of being ‘cut off from the world’, circulate informational more than promotional materials, visit with Eire officials, stop anti-Irish cartoons and articles in the British press, and work closely with the Americans. The MOI believed Betjeman was off to a good, if slightly eccentric, start. Said E. Rawdon Smith: ‘I hear you are immensely popular; but that some folk doubt your sanity. I cannot imagine a better foundation for success’.22 With Betjeman in place, MOI efforts expanded, save for Commercial Relations, which advocated bringing Eire businessmen on board as propaganda disseminators, a scheme Nicholas Mansergh thought wrongheaded, since many Eire businessmen were Anglo-Irish unionists, and which was set aside.23 Betjeman, a High Church Anglican, thought Religions Division propaganda was a better idea, with a much broader potential audience. The British cause could



‘

  ‘‘  ’’’

be promoted through religious pamphlets and books, and visits by such as the English Catholic bishop David Mathews. The Spiritual Issues of the War pamphlet series was soon in circulation. Contents included such themes as early Christians resisting anti-Christian tyranny, Norwegian bishops struggling against ‘Nazicontrolled Quislingites’, American churches supporting the Allied cause, and–a top priority – the Nazi order presented as anti-Christian. He persuaded the weekly Standard, Eire’s largest Catholic paper, and the England-based Universe, with copies sent to priests, convents and monasteries in Eire, to publish ‘straightforward illustrated articles’ on Nazi persecution of Polish Catholics.24 It would only be implied that Britain was the Christian defender. Betjeman also requested that the Religions Division provide Persecution of the Catholic Church under the Third Reich (‘EXACTLY what is wanted’, he wrote to Richard Hope; however, it did not get past the Eire censor); cartoon pamphlets, preferably explained in French or Spanish, since ‘English propaganda is suspect, however convincing’; Catholic Truth Society publications; the Tablet, sent via priests in England to friends in Ireland; and materials relating to Vatican broadcasts but without ‘pro-British “selection” ’.25 The Religions Division targeted Irish-Americans and Americans generally with radio talks, lectures by such as Father Dempsey and Arnold Dunn of the Catholic Action Society, its own Catholic Bulletin – identified only as an offshoot of the Tablet – Michael Powell’s Religion and the Reich, and the Catholic Herald, which warned Irish-Americans that they could be isolationists only by turning their backs on Christian moral standards, but also published letters which savaged pro-British Irishmen who spoke out against Eire neutrality.26 The Films Division continued to flounder under Eire censorship. In March 1941 no British feature films containing any obvious war period propaganda showed in Dublin cinemas, save perhaps for The Prime Minister, in which Benjamin Disraeli advocated the British ideals of freedom, justice and social improvement. Dubliners saw mostly American films such as Waterloo Bridge, Brigham Young, Bluebeard’s Eighth Wife, My Sister Eileen, The Maltese Falcon and A Yank at Eton, none of which were propaganda. What they did not see was Charlie Chaplin’s pure anti-Nazi propaganda film, The Great Dictator, nor British documentary films such as Corvettes, about the war at sea, and The Empire Marches, showing ‘the armed solidarity of the British Empire’. The latter film likely would have elicited rude comments from the audience.27 Broadcast propaganda, on the other hand, increased in the new year, including Axis broadcasts: on Radio Stefanie that the Irish saved Christianity when nonChristian barbarians overthrew the Roman Empire, and on Deutsche Rundfunk broadcasts that the British planned to starve the Irish into submission in order to obtain naval bases in Eire.28 A significant portion of MOI funding for BBC broadcasts was for broadcasting to Eire. Unfortunately, transmission quality left much to be desired, which led Betjeman to fear that Irish listeners might ‘switch to a foreign station as an alternative’. Hodson urged an increase in signal strength to Ireland and, as the best propaganda approach, Irish voices in feature programmes, Irish opinion and news, items of Irish interest, and British Home service programmes with sections targeting Irish listeners.29

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´ including programmes that might BBC London sought cooperation with RE, originate in Dublin–problematic considering issues between Northern and Southern Ireland including Eire neutrality. B. E. Nicholls was apparently not paying attention when he suggested that the BBC NI director, George Marshall, would not object to broadcasting to Eire, when in fact, Marshall had long made it clear that BBC London should not even think about broadcasts for Eire. ‘Who cares’, was BBC planner Christopher Salmon’s response when Marshall objected to discussions regarding cooperation with RE´ director T. J. Kiernan.30 Still, Marshall was not completely unreceptive to programme policies that stressed Irish issues. After all, German bombs fell on Eire as well as on Belfast. Of course, broadcast planning had to include propaganda elements that might appeal in Eire. Denis Johnston proposed more news bulletins with items such as Nazi Germany’s mistreatment of Catholics and the fate of European neutrals at German hands, stage plays adapted for radio, an Irish commentary on the news, and programmes on such Irish legends as Wolfe Tone and Robert Emmett. G. L. Marshall adamantly opposed the ‘Irish heroes’ idea as being unwelcome in the North.31 Some London planners had doubts about policy suggestions also. Salmon liked Hodson’s ‘Irish voices’ idea, but feared that his proposed Home service segment devoted entirely to Irish listeners would create animosity among English listeners. Do the twenty minutes, he said, but do them on the European Service.32 Salmon also suggested broadcasting a fortnightly Home service Irish commentary alternating between Dublin and Belfast, the latter to be read by Johnston. The BBC embraced Salmon’s scheme, adding that it might be useful propaganda if extended to Irish-Americans; the Dominions Office rejected it. Lord Cranborne ruled that the proposal ‘is not to be pursued’, unless by the Overseas Service, and only if the contents ‘were not of a highly political character’. Planners then argued over material to be included and how segments should be titled, such as J. Grenfell Williams objecting to a Johnston commentary about Irish men doing war jobs in Britain owing to ‘lack of authentic materials’. However, by September some agreements had been reached, and Johnston began broadcasting a news–talk programme from Dublin, which drew high praise from Empire News Service.33 It became a fortnightly programme in November. Johnston’s series did not necessarily mean that BBC–RE´ cooperation was better than it had been in 1940. When in the summer of 1940 it was feared that Germany might invade Ireland, Eire authorities had categorically denied the BBC facilities in Dublin to report on the situation. In March 1941, Eire still would not allow publicity to be broadcast via British circuits. Johnston opined: ‘They feel that in some psychological way it mixes them up with the war and with Great Britain’. Therefore, one should be prepared to be refused any access to RE´ facilities, including BBC broadcasts from Dublin by Irish people.34 Betjeman complained about the ban in a report to Sir Stephen Tallents, Controller of Overseas Broadcasting, which noted that even the Americans were denied broadcast facilities. The problem, he wrote, was that Frank Gallagher, GIB head and ‘really ´ chief of Radio Eireann’, was anti-British, and that Kiernan was pro-German and

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therefore antagonistic to the BBC. Why not just have Irish men ‘go abroad’ to ´ broadcast for the BBC, so long as it was not to Belfast? He promised to ‘woo’ RE, but was not optimistic about the outcome. Meanwhile, Betjeman composed a list of desirable themes for broadcasts to Eire including that Britain was bound to win the war, that Germany stood for anti-Christian materialism, Roman Catholic ecclesiastical happenings in England, and items about great Irishmen past and present, in war, politics, the arts and the Church. This, he proposed, was a way to build an Irish sense of self-worth. Just be sure that it was ‘not at all stage-Oirish’ and would preserve ‘the sense of nationality and pride in this nation . . . ’.35 Both Tallents and his assistant, J. B. Clark, assured Betjeman that he had got it wrong. RE´ studios were available to the BBC, subject only to the Eire censor, and had been since the outbreak of war. The problem was the Dominions Office, which was reluctant to use them.36 In fact, the use of Dublin facilities was a regular item at BBC Overseas Board meetings. Agenda items included ‘Talks from Eire’ on 30 January, 6, 13 and 20 February, ‘Reciprocal Programmes between BBC and Eire’ on 27 March, 3 April and 8 May; and ‘BBC and Radio Eireann’ on 15 May and 5 June. These discussions sometimes reflected failure to gain RE´ cooperation, but they also indicated that Kiernan was open to BBC programming of interest to Eire, and even looked to the BBC for advice, as on the occasion when he requested ´ that the BBC suggest candidates for a new Radio Eireann Music Director.37 ‘Programming of interest to Eire’ included St Patrick’s Day broadcasts, ‘a great opportunity for propaganda emphasizing the solidarity of the two countries’. Voices in the programmes might include Irishmen in the British war effort and in British forces, the civil service and munitions factories, leaders of Irish origin in the dominions and United States, and perhaps the Boys Corps, formed by the London Irish. BBC NI was consulted and, as was customary, dragged its feet. Assistant Programme Director Ursula Eason suggested a ‘light’ programme of Irish music, a sketch, and perhaps Richard Brinsley Sheridan’s St Patrick’s Day. The BBC was not impressed. Very well, she replied, what about Irish regiments of the British army that had been disbanded eighteen years earlier, and a feature on the Irish mail boat Scotia that sank during the evacuation of Dunkirk? It would be noted that there were Southern loyalists in the British Army, and that there was a real Anglo-Irish unity of purpose. Marshall demurred. Northern Ireland was part of the UK, and St Patrick’s Day was a Catholic celebration; a programme appropriate to both North and South ‘is not feasible’.38 In fact, an agreement was reached whereby Belfast and Dublin would do a joint broadcast of pure entertainment – Dublin comedian Jimmy O’Dea at the Empire Theatre in Belfast, and the final act of an Ulster play at the Abbey Theatre in Dublin. There would be no national anthems, ‘God Save the King’ or soldier’s songs. The broadcasts were made, and the ultra-Unionist Northern Whig was outraged: ‘There is no sort of hint that Ulster is fighting side by side in the War against Germany and Italy while Eire is nominally neutral, but is actually aiding the Empire’s foes in a number of ways . . . This is the short-sighted spirit of Munich all over again’.39 Then H. L. Fletcher proposed ‘Irish Magazine’, a ‘by the Irish for the Irish’ programme which hopefully would promote better understanding between the

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English and the Irish. He was specific about what should, and what should not, be included. What should was Irish music, commentary on life in the Irish Guards and Irish regiments, interviews with Irish visitors and Irish people living in England including military leaders of Irish origins such as General Dill, war news, especially German bombs on Belfast which roused much sympathy in Eire, and regular features on Poland. Ireland and Poland were the two most Catholic countries in Europe, and Poland’s heroic struggle against German oppression had to appeal to Irish opinion. What should not be included was English martial and patriotic displays, ‘bogus Irish mythology’, English versions of democracy and of Irish humour, direct propaganda, and programmes in Erse.40 Much of his advice was heeded. The proposed format for the premier broadcast, scheduled for early July, included music and comedy acts, personal column items such as two Irish people meeting to discuss events and people in Britain or the United States, or their last visit home, transatlantic messages, a sound picture of Irishmen at war, a talk by someone just over from Ireland, library material of general Irish interest, and extracts from Abbey Theatre performances, or a short story about Ireland, or a recording from an Irish hurling match. No ‘un-Irish voices’ were to be used, and nothing politically controversial was to be included.41 It only lasted a few months, but ‘Irish Magazine’ indicated that broadcasting aimed at Eire was finding its way. Examples of programmes on Ireland available for broadcast as of May 1940 were Playboy of the Western World from the Abbey Theatre, ‘Life in Wartime in the Irish Guards’, ‘Irish Guards Band Programme’, Sean O’Casey’s The End of the Beginning, ‘Transatlantic Air Service – Arrival of Planes at Foynes’, ‘Irish Pipers’, and ‘De Valera from Athlone, on the Inauguration of the Eire Constitution’. BBC Home and Forces programmes had been heard in Eire since the outbreak of war.42 The censors could not easily control overseas broadcasts, but they could and did virtually every other form of communication in the new year. They had both detractors and supporters. Fine Gael Senator Frank MacDermott agreed that publication of sedition, treason, disaffection and military secrets should be censored, but not also ‘the right to express opinion and to persuade one’s fellowcitizens’. He pointed out that such Eire newspapers as the Cork Examiner and the Irish Times were ‘exceedingly dissatisfied’ because the censors allowed proAxis and anti-British material, while denying anything pro-British. Examples of the former included Italian embassy daily bulletins, and a photograph in the Standard of a poster that read ‘Irish Catholic Girls Forced to Follow the British Army’, by implication for immoral purposes. The accompanying story actually was about Irish Catholic girls from Ulster having to go to England for jobs. Examples of the latter included banning press publication of Cardinal Hinsley’s London broadcasts, and erasing the Royal Arms emblem on the Bank of Ireland from an Irish Times photograph. MacDermott also wanted to know what were Defence Minister Frank Aiken’s qualifications as a newspaper editor, since as head of censorship, editing was precisely what he was about. It was all in vain. In March, the D´ail voted 56 to 32 against lifting censorship restriction on free speech.43

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Government officials defended their responsibilities without apology. Aiken claimed that granting ‘the right to express opinion and to persuade’ would unleash a violent pro-British campaign which would incite an equally violent anti-British campaign. Either would threaten neutrality. Moreover, the government must maintain neutrality and allow no one to do anything that would endanger it. ‘As propaganda is a vital weapon at the moment, we must do nothing here–not even in the line of talking or writing – that would give offence to the belligerents’. ´ Eamon de Valera backed Aiken to the hilt as he assured the D´ail that ‘the censorship . . . had been carried out fairly and in accordance with the interests of the people and the safety of the community’.44 In short, the censors were not to back off from established policy, but if anything to expand it. The censors dealt with many issues, including what would need to be done ‘in the event of actual hostilities beginning in 1941’, and increasing strictures on press items sent abroad by telephone or telegraph. The latter resulted from a monitored telephone call in which Associated Press correspondent Norman Lodge hinted to his London bureau that following Germany dropping bombs on Eire, the government was considering asking for the recall of Ambassador Eduard Hempel.45 Cinema also was rendered nearly, though perhaps not entirely, propaganda free in the first half of 1941. Even war scenes were cut from newsreels, giving Elizabeth Bowen ‘the feeling of an invented world’. However, undeveloped film negative had not been subjected to the same degree of control, especially that including subject matter strictly disallowed under the 1939 Emergency Powers Act. Military Intelligence official Liam Archer was not pleased. ‘Any ill-disposed person can now escape detection’, he wrote to Cyril Connolly, ‘photograph anything he likes and send his undeveloped negatives out of the country for processing, without their being seen by any controlling agency’. Archer’s complaint was inspired by material discovered in a 16mm film which had been shot in Ireland, exported to England for development, then sent back for distribution. Thomas Coyne agreed that a film negative exporter should be required to submit to the censor in writing complete details of the film’s content. The negatives thus would be limited to what the censor allowed and the developed film, if sent back to Eire for any form of distribution, could be checked against the submitted ‘script’. Film stock marketeers naturally objected, complaining that the process would inevitably result in loss of business, which in turn would do harm to the Eire economy. Archer agreed that a complete or even a serious partial ban would cause a hue and cry. No firm policy had been set in motion as of June.46 Meanwhile, postal and telegraph traffic remained under tight scrutiny, including private correspondence in diplomatic bags, with some exceptions for ecclesiastical correspondence, much of it with the Vatican. Such exceptions did not extend to retired British colonels living in Eire, whose letters often expressed anti-Irish views on various levels. Coyne considered having the colonels deported; they were, after all, ‘genuine fifth-columnists bent on the destruction of this country’.47 Not so the authors of official foreign legation news bulletins apparently, for the censorship had only occasional objections to material found

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in the Belgian Bulletin de Nouvelle and nothing serious to complain about in the French Nouvelles de France.48 Even so, legation bulletins generally were now closely monitored for items of an overtly propaganda nature. Censorship notwithstanding, books on the war and war-time political theory were still readily available in Eire bookshops and libraries. The censor stepped in only if the contents overstepped the boundaries, such as C. M. Franzero’s Inside Italy, which was judged to be prejudicial to Italian–Eire relations, and Persecution of the Catholic Church in German-Occupied Poland and Persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich: Facts and Documents Translated from the German, judged likely to alienate Germany. Actually, Persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich was questioned on moral rather than on political grounds. Aiken described it as lacking ‘common decency’, and Joseph Walshe thought its illustrations and quotations, ‘no matter how good the excuse, were intended to bring the pope, the Church and its ministers into hatred and contempt’. Coyne agreed, adding that the book suppressed the truth to the point of downright lying. A member of the Justice Department, on the other hand, expressed bewilderment at their perspective. He thought it obvious that ‘the persecution of the Catholic Church in any country is of interest to the inhabitants of Eire . . . ’.49 Pamphlets, cartoons and the like were kept under close scrutiny, but not always acted upon directly. No action was taken when Ambassador Hempel complained about Gaullist pamphlets distributed at local news agents, which, Walshe advised Censorship, were indeed ‘wantonly unneutral’. Action was taken, however, against the Vatican organ Osservatore Romano, Cardinal Hinsley’s pastoral letters, and Stella Jackson, who was deported ostensibly in connection with a Fabian Society pamphlet, The Irish Question To-Day, which she had written under the pseudonym John Hawkins. Jackson was taken into custody in Cork, rushed to Dublin and put on a steamer for England, third class, after a night in gaol. She later claimed that the reason for her deportation was never explained to her, her questions were not answered, and she was denied access to an Irish barrister. She could only conclude that at issue was the Fabian Society pamphlet, which, so far as she knew, had never actually been banned in Eire.50 Meanwhile, Michael Knightly requested that booksellers withdraw from their store windows an antiHitler pamphlet, because if the German legation complained, copies would have to be seized. The booksellers should simply keep the material under the counter out of sight; after all, ‘we are not banning propaganda absolutely . . . we merely want you not to flaunt it’. While Knightly was committed to censorship as a preserver of neutrality, he was also committed to voluntary cooperation with the censor. For example, he left it to a Mr Jackson to choose whether to voluntarily withdraw blotting paper supplies decorated with a cartoon of Hitler as a house painter, or have the Garda seize them.51 Knightly hoped to avoid the latter, and divisive, action by encouraging cooperation with the censorship. That included the press, the censors’ most difficult target. Again, the object was to prevent publication of any matter that would be prejudicial to Eire’s neutrality or security by, for example, offending one of the belligerent powers. An Illustrated item titled ‘What Does It Mean to Live under Nazi Rule’ and

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including sketches of people in Warsaw being rounded up for labour gangs was judged ‘not helpful to Irish neutrality’; and the Ulster Protestant, which defamed Eire and the Catholic Church with ‘blasphemy and blasphemous obscenity’, was not helpful to maintaining good order in Eire.52 But again there was inconsistency, in this case from the top level of Eire government. The press was directed not to publish reports on a street accident involving officials from a foreign legation, but assaults on Eire neutrality in various American journals, and materials issued by the American Fight for Freedom Committee, were allowed on the instructions ´ of Eamon de Valera himself.53 This must have irritated the censors, though they managed not to say as much in their correspondence on the matter. Oddly enough, despite the tighter control for the English press in 1941 than in 1940, items critical of Eire neutrality sometimes slipped through. Examples included: a ‘very offensive caricature’ in the journal The War; a Daily Telegraph headline, ‘Eire’s Neutrality Dilemma: “No One Tells Us of the Evil Things Britain Fights” ’, which purported to be complaints by Irishmen against the censorship; and ‘offensively anti-German articles’ that continued to appear in the Sunday Chronicle and Reynold’s News. Coyne instructed Frederick Boland to assure Hempel that if a paper ‘passes the bounds of decency’ the offending issue would be seized, or the paper would be banned altogether. He hoped that banning could be avoided since ‘our enemies’ in England and America would misinterpret it. Meanwhile, the censorship continued to require that all foreign journalists in Eire submit stories to the censor before sending them out of the country.54 Of course, Eire censors had no impact upon what the English press published in Britain, where, Elizabeth Bowen noted, the popular press relentlessly propagandised its readers with a picture of Eire as dominated by ‘pigheadedness, ostrichism, childishness, apathy as to the fate of civilization and even a dishonourable timidity’, and the image of ‘Eire existing in indifferent comfort, under a British protection she does not recognize . . . ’.55 Policy remained unchanged regarding the Eire press, including a ban on references to meteorological data which might be of use to one belligerent at the expense of another, and the concession that matter which crossed the line could be made acceptable by deleting the offending parts as ordered by the censor. The Church of Ireland Gazette was frequently taken to task for anti-German references, as were the Torch, the Standard, the Irish Catholic and Penapa, and the mainstream Irish Times, Irish Independent and Cork Examiner; and the Worker’s Weekly was not allowed to publish birthday greetings to American Communist leader Earl Browder.56 War reporting had to be objective, but that depended upon whose ox was being gored. Italian ambassador Vincenzo Berardis protested the misrepresentation of Italian defeats in the Mediterranean in Irish newspapers, which printed the version provided by British and Greek official communiques and press despatches while ignoring the Italian version. Boland commented that ‘what he was really complaining about was the fact that the news of Italian defeats was printed at all!’ Coyne promised that Censorship would vet any matter submitted by the legation and work to ‘abate the propaganda nuisance’.57 Penapa, organ of the People’s National Party, was the most extreme pro-fascist

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and anti-Semitic paper and, said Coyne, much of its material ‘was prejudicial to the maintenance of good public order’. Penapa was also watched because of its link with radical grass-roots organisations which, in Joseph Connolly’s view, worked to promote social unrest.58 Mainstream press censorship turned around the maintenance of Eire’s neutrality and security. A letter to various newspapers from D´ail member T. F. O’Higgens suggesting that Britain was Eire’s chief trading partner was stopped because it might be ‘provocative to the other chief belligerent’ and induce that power ‘to take steps to interfere . . . ’. Dublin papers were not allowed to publish a D´ail debate in which Fine Gael leaders charged the censorship with allowing anti-British and anti-American press commentary, while suppressing anything critical of Germany or Italy – the likely reason was that the government response, including that by de Valera, was muddled and uncertain. Banned also were references in the debate to the censor passing the publication of ‘Nazi lies’ while banning Vatican radio announcements, a Spanish newspaper that depicted German propaganda as anti-Catholic filth, the word ‘Nazi’, claims that tendentious Italian propaganda circulated freely in Ireland, and all references to Irish people who had distinguished themselves in Britain. On the other hand, the Irish Independent was allowed to report on acrimony between rival parties in the Seanad over whether or not Britain was blockading Eire.59 However, it was censored for quoting Fine Gael critics of Frank Aiken’s visit to the United States in language that might be used in America to sabotage his mission, while the Irish Press and the Irish Times were ‘allowed certain words’ because they toed the line in their coverage of the mission. Book reviews critical of Eire neutrality also faced censorship. As Connolly put it to Irish Times editor Robert Smyllie: ‘Personally, I think the review headed ‘Britain and the Neutrals’ highly offensive and we have already prohibited publication of much less objectionable reviews of much less objectionable books submitted by other papers’.60 The censorship continued to allow press reporting on the war itself, so long as it remained detached and did not compromise neutrality. And it met that standard, to a surprising degree. The Irish Press led out in running photographs of bomb damage in Britain, usually on the front page; and on one occasion the Irish Independent reported a German raid on the west of England and a British raid on the German shipbuilding city of Bremen in the same column.61 These were objective reports in their way, and if the question arises why the Irish Press carried photographs of bomb damage more frequently than other major papers, the answer may well be that it was a form of official Eire propaganda: a way of reminding the Irish how much they had to lose if Eire turned away from neutrality. Eire had enough to lose as it was. All major Eire papers ran photographs of German-inflicted bomb damage in Ireland in detail and with less than objective imagery – after all, this was Ireland being bombed. Photographs included a damaged synagogue in Belfast, gutted private dwellings in Dublin, destroyed farmhouses in Carlow, and people left homeless by the raids. Reports described deaths, injuries and damages, and the Irish Press praised the ‘fortitude of the

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people’ of Belfast. Even so, inflammatory language was avoided. For example, when reporting Eire’s protest to Germany, the Irish Press said simply: The Irish Charg´e d’Affaires in Berlin has been instructed to protest to the German Government against air violation of Eire territory, and loss of life and destruction of property the result of bomb explosions, to claim full reparation, and to insist that effective steps be taken to avoid the reoccurrence of such happenings.62 It would appear that, when it came to bombs falling on Eire, graphic visual images were one thing, inflammatory words quite another. War reporting on events outside of Britain and Eire was required to be disengaged. The Irish Times illustrated its description of Britain’s attack on Benghazi with a single line drawing and the headline ‘British Drive on Benghazi’; a report on the AngloItalian battle for Bardia in north Africa was done in the same manner, with a headline reading: ‘How British Took Bardia’. The Irish Independent reported on Bardia in a similar manner, only without the line drawing.63 The censor was surprisingly lenient on press coverage of American military aid to Britain. The Irish Times editorialised about it, quoting Winston Churchill’s ‘glowing tribute’ to the United States Congress for passing the Lend-Lease Act, using such phrases as ‘the fighting democracies’. Of course, no Irish paper reporting on Lend-Lease took sides, at least not explicitly. However, the Irish Times report on Colonel William Donovan’s tour of Europe, Africa and Asia as President Roosevelt’s special envoy was implicitly pro-Allied propaganda. The report was taken almost entirely from the transcript, supplied by a Reuter’s correspondent, of Donovan’s radio broadcast in which he summarised conclusions drawn from the tour. These included that Lend-Lease was to aid the ‘moral forces against the Axis’, that England was the last bastion against German aggression, that the Greeks were heroic in resisting the Axis, and that Germany’s long-term goal was the domination of everyone. No line was censored, and no Irish reader could have mistaken the pro-democracy, anti-German propaganda contained in Donovan’s address.64 One other war-related press item was allowed by the censor: reports with pagewide headlines – ‘Germans Invade Russia’ – of the German attack on Russia along a 1,500-mile front, launched on 22 June. And so it should have been. It was a moment and an event of monumental importance for the outcome of the war, and, along with the German declaration of war on the United States six months later, for the conduct of the war of words over Eire neutrality.65

Notes 1. ‘More Than Ever “Ourselves Alone” ’, Irish World, 15 March 1941, p. 4; ‘An Irish Patriot to Eire’, Daily Telegraph, 9 January 1941, p. 4; ‘America Told about Neutral Ireland: Commentator’s Broadcast from Dublin’, Irish Times, 27 January 1941, p. 6; ‘Dublin’s Food Shops Full’, Daily Telegraph, 30 January 1941, p. 3; ‘Eire Trifles’,

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2.

3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

8. 9.

10.

11.

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Economist, 18 January 1941, p. 61; Daily Mirror, 12 April 1941, p. 4; ‘The Irish Idyll’, Catholic Herald, 6 June 1941, p. 2; ‘Ireland, a Suggestion’, Sunday Express, 16 February 1941, p. 6; ‘Irish Patriot to Eire’. ´ Tim Pat Coogan, Eamon de Valera: The man who was Ireland, New York, 1996, p. 521; Sir Campbell Stuart to Sir Alexander Cadogan, Report on Visit to Ireland by Herbert Shaw, 6 January 1941, FO 371/29108.W3446; Sir Hubert Gough et al., memorandum to Winston Churchill, copy to de Valera, February 1941, PREM 4/53/4, PRO. ‘Irish Societies Throughout the U. S. Back de Valera’s Stand on Neutrality’, Irish World, 22 March 1941, p. 1; ‘Sees Ireland as Force for Peace’, Tablet, 29 March 1941, p. 7; ‘People of Ireland United, Says Mr Brennan at Historical Society Dinner’, Irish World, 10 May 1941, p. 1. ‘Eire Defense Chief Here to Buy Arms’, New York Times, 19 March 1941, p. 9; Sir John Maffey to Lord Cranborne, 24 February 1941, FO 371/29108.W2227; Lord Halifax to FO, 8 April 1941, FO 371/29108.W4121, PRO; Sumner Welles, memorandum, 20 March 1941, SWP, FDRL; Cordell Hull to David Gray, 25 April 1941, vol. III, pp. 226–7, FRUS; ‘Food and Ships for Eire: No Munitions for Sale’, Irish Times, 21 May 1941, p. l. British Consulate, Los Angeles, notes, 12 May 1941, FO 371/29109.W7592, PRO, cited below as British Consulate, notes; ‘4,500 Hear Problems of Eire Revealed’, Tablet, 3 May 1941, p. 4; ‘Frank Aiken, Irish Minister, Captured Washington State’, Irish World, 17 May 1941, p. 1; ‘Eire Will Not Barter Away Rights’, Irish World, 26 April 1941, p. 1; British Consulate, notes; Arthur D. Healy, John W. McCormick, and Thomas H. Eliot, speaking in favour of arms for Eire, 25 March 1941, Congressional Record, vol. 85, part 3. Gray to Hull, 8 April 1941, vol. III, p. 225, FRUS; Gray, memorandum, 28 April 1941, RG 84/3, LLGR, NAUS; Gray to Roosevelt, 28 July 1941, PSF, FDRL. Report, talk between Willkie and de Valera, DO 35/1109/WX13/4, PRO; Gray to Roosevelt, 4 February 1941, PSF, FDRL; Gray to Hull, 4 February 1941, RG 84/4, DLCR, NAUS; Gray to de Valera, 10 March 1941, DGP, FDRL; Nigel Nicolson, ed., Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters, vol II: The War Years 1939–1945, New York, 1967. ‘Willkie’s Ridiculous Role’, Gaelic American, 15 February 1941, p. 4. Gallup Poll, 1941, p. 260; Gray, note on conversation with de Valera, 6 January 1941, PREM 3/133/2, PRO; Hull to Gray, 10 April 1941, RG 84/4, DLCR, NAUS; ‘Irish Opinion in the United States . . . ’, Manchester Guardian, 27 January 1941, p. 4; ‘Letters Urge Entry in War’, Boston Daily Globe, 12 May 1941, p. 4; ‘What an Empire!’, New York Herald Tribune, 1 February 1941, p. 13; ‘How to Save Ireland?’, Boston Daily Globe, 17 June 1941, p. 16; R. J. Herbert Shaw, notes on Irish-American opinion, FO 371/29108, PRO. ‘Enthusiasm and Unanimity Mark Gathering Sponsored by UIS’, Leader 4 January 1941, p. 1; ‘New York Meeting Upholds Eire’, Leader, 18 January 1941, p. 1; ‘Lies, Lies, Lies’, Leader, 17 May 1941, p. 8; ‘New York and Washington Are Centers of British Propaganda’, Leader, 7 June 1941, p. 5; ‘Erin Go Bragh!’, Brooklyn Tablet, 15 March 1941, p. 10; ‘Don’t Let England Starve Millions’, Gaelic American, 29 March 1941, p. 4; ‘Movie Star Repents of War Role: Lillian Gish Tells How British Made Use of US Talent’, Gaelic American, 12 April 1941, p. 3. Senator James Murray, 10 February 1941, Congressional Record–Senate, vol. 87, p. 838; C. Hargrove to T. North Whitehead, 13 June 1941, FO 371/26185. A4611/118/45, PRO.

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  ‘‘  ’’’

12. Robert Sherwood to Harry Hopkins, 9 March 1941, RSP, HL; Nicholas John Cull, Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American ‘Neutrality’ in World War II, Oxford, 1995, p. 135; ‘Should Eire Join the War?’, Commonweal, 25 April 1941, pp. 3–4; R. F. Sparks to Hopkins, 7 May 1941, HHP, FDRL; Liam O’Connor, ‘Truth in Propaganda’, Commonweal, 20 June 1941, pp. 200–3; ‘Irish Assert Loyalty’, Social Justice, 17 March 1941, HMP, FDRL. 13. Memorandum, M. E. W. on Navicert, 4 January 1941, FO 371/28889.W482, PRO; see Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality 1939–45, London, 1985, pp. 314–15; War Cabinet, minutes, 2 January 1941, CAB 65/WM 1(41)8; Cranborne, Cabinet minutes, 24 March 1941, CAB 65/WM 31/(41)6; FO to UK consul, New York, 11 March 1941, FO 371/29108.W2227; Maffey to Sir Eric Machtig, 9 April 1941; DO 130/21; Maffey to Cranborne, 19 January 1941, DO 130/17; Churchill to Cranborne, 17 January 1941, PREM 3/127/3A, PRO; Col. William Donovan to Secretary of the Navy, 11 March 1941, PSF, FDRL; Maffey, note, 17 February 1941, PREM 3/131/3; Maffey, memorandum on talks with Joseph Walshe, 14 March 1941, PREM 3/131/7, PRO; Nicolson, Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters, 4 February 1941; ‘Gen. Gough Leads Move for Anglo-Irish Accord’, Boston Evening Globe, 21 February 1941, p. 1; Bracken to Churchill, 24 June 1941, PREM 3/133/6A, PRO; ‘Irish American Plea Tells Eire to Cede Ports’, New York Herald Tribune, 10 March 1941, p. 4; ‘Eire’s Bases: American Appeal to de Valera’, Manchester Guardian, 24 May 1941, p. 8; ‘The Last of the Neutrals’, cartoon, New York Times, 11 May 1941, p. 4E. 14. ‘British Ready to Grab Eire’, Leader, 25 January 1941, pp. 1, 8; ‘Eire, Hating None, Desires Only Peace, Says O’Flaherty’, Boston Daily Globe, 27 January, 1941, p. 2; ‘de Valera Resolved to Hold the Ports of Ireland’, Irish World, 1 March 1941, p. 1; ‘Aiken Answers Boob MCMAHON’, Leader, 14 June 1941, p. 1; Hon. Richard J. Welch, extension of remarks, Appendix to the Congressional Record, vol. 87, 19 June 1941, p. A2959; ‘Propaganda to Drag Ireland into England’s Imperialist War Favored by Roosevelt’, Gaelic American, 1 March 1941, p. 1. 15. ‘Eire Gives Homes to Belfast Bombed’, Daily Mail, 18 April 1941, p. 1; ‘Eire Defies Nazis, Aids Belfast’, Boston Daily Globe, 6 May 1941, p. 1; Col. Dan Bryan to Walshe, 16 May 1941, MA G2/X/0678, CBB; ‘Aid for the Homeless’, Irish Independent, 18 April 1941, p. 4; ‘Eire Comes to Belfast’s Rescue’, Brooklyn Tablet, 10 May 1941, p. 4; ‘Ulster’s Blitz Unites All Ireland in Sympathy’, Catholic Herald, 25 April 1941, p. 5. 16. Churchill to Cranborne, 31 January 1941, PREM 3/13/3, PRO; cartoon, Daily Mirror, 3 January 1941, p. 5; ‘Mrs Murphy Shops While the Shopping Is Good’, and cartoon, Daily Mail, 10 January 1941, p. 2; cartoon, News Chronicle, 11 January 1941, p. 4; Lt. Col. C. H. Bury to Col. McNamara (no first name indicated), ca. 7–8 June 1941, MA 3/40, CBB. 17. ‘Irish in London Pledge Loyalty to Britain; Oppose de Valera’s Stand on Neutrality’, New York Times, 22 February 1941, p. 3; Fisk, In Time of War, p. 14; ‘Irish Appeal to End Neutrality’, Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, 22 February 1941, p. 5; L. G. Redmond Howard, ‘Empire Plea to Irishmen’, News Chronicle, 6 March 1941, p. 4; ‘Irish Accuse Nazis of Bombing; More Air Missiles Fall in Eire’, New York Times, 2 June 1941, p. 1; Lawrence J. Connery, extension of remarks, 30 January 1941, Appendix to the Congressional Record, vol. 87, pp. A340-A341; ‘Bombs on Eire: Nazis Try to Blame Britain’, Manchester Guardian, 8 January 1941, p. 6; Joachim von Ribbentrop to Eduard Hempel, 24 February 1941; Hempel to Ribbentrop, 11 March

− 

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25. 26.

27.



1941; Karl Ritter, memorandum, 13 March 1941, Vol. XIII, DGFP; R. Drax to Churchill, 16 June 1941, PREM 3/130; PID reports on Axis propaganda, 1 June 1941, FO 898/30, PRO. US legation, memorandum on Axis activities, ca. 1941, DGP, FDRL; Dan Brady to P. Carroll, 24 March 1941, MA G2/X/0678; Eire Intelligence Records, 8 January 1941, MA G2/X/0217, CBB; Note regarding German broadcasting to the British Empire, 26–7 February 1941, JBP, UVL; ‘Nazi Radio Attempts to Woo Irish in US With St Patrick Play’, Boston Daily Globe, 18 March 1941, p. 9; N. E. Costar to M. E. Antrobus, 18 March 1941, DO 35/1109/WX9/2, PRO; ‘Eire Woman Wins Nazi Medal’, Sunday Express, 29 June 1941, p. 8. See Robert Cole, ‘Good Relations: Irish Neutrality and the Propaganda of John ´ Betjeman 1941–43’, Eire-Ireland 30(4), 1996, pp. 33–46; Stephenson to Betjeman, 21 December 1940; Betjeman to Stephenson, 9 January 1941, JBP, UVL; Nicholas Mansergh, MOI Empire Division, interview with the author, 16 May 1988; H. V. Hodson, interview with Nicholas John Cull, 16 September 1987; Anthony Slide, The Cinema and Ireland, London, 1989, p. 28. Conclusions, meeting, Betjeman and Brig. P. G. S. Gregson-Ellis, Capt. R. P. Pim, Col. T. J. W. Winterton, L. Col. A. W. H. Conyers-Baker, Major Skrine, and Capt. A. L. Grant, 24 January 1941; Hodson to Betjeman, 18 and 20 February 1941; Counter-Propaganda Bureau to MOI, 25 February 1941; Hodson to Betjeman, 26 February 1941; Hodson to Betjeman, 1 March 1941, JBP, UVL. Talking Points flyer, 19–26 February 1941, JBP, UVL; H. W. Grigsby to Steven Skene-Smith, 14 March 1941, INF 1/646; Miss Morley to Grigsby, ca. March 1941, INF 1/647, PRO. Betjeman assessment of British newspapers in Ireland, ca. March 1941; Betjeman’s Catholic Diary for 1941, entries for 17 March, 5 and 29 April, 12 and 18 May, JBP, UVL; Betjeman memoranda on propaganda in Eire, ca. April 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC; Rawdon Smith to Betjeman, 21 March 1941, JBP, UVL. E. F. Hingeley to Mansergh, 16 January 1941; Hingeley to John Rodgers, 27 January 1941; note on conversation at Arthur Guinness, Son & Company, 29 January 1941, INF 1/539; Mansergh to V. Harlow, 16 June 1941; Harlow to Sir Maurice Peterson, 16 June 1941; notes of meeting, Rodgers, Mansergh, Hingeley, and Betjeman, 19 June 1941; Betjeman to Rodgers, 27 June 1941; Rodgers to J. C. C. Davidson, 2 July 1941, INF 1/539, PRO. A. W. Randall, memorandum, 13 June 1941, FO 371/29109.W7421; Religions Division to Mathews, 30 June 1941, INF 1/395, PRO; The Spiritual Issues of the War 69, 27 February 1941, published by MOI Religions Division, JBP, UVL; Betjeman to Hugh Martin, 14 March 1941; Martin to Betjeman, 17 March 1941; Religions Division, Catholic Section, to Betjeman, 28 March 1941, INF 1/786, PRO. Betjeman to Hope, 22 March 1941; Betjeman to Hope, 1 May 1941, INF 1/786, PRO. Martin to Mr. Lee, 14 January 1941; Douglas Williams to Martin and R. A. Rendall, 3 April 1941, INF l/782, PRO;. ‘Arnold Lunn, Propagandist’, Leader, 15 March 1941, p. 8; ‘American Catholic Isolationists’, Catholic Herald, 14 March 1941, p. 4; see cull, Selling War, p. 54; ‘Eire and the War: Protest against a Speech’, Catholic Herald, 23 May 1941, p. 2. ‘Films’, Irish Times, 15 March 1941, p. 3; Anthony Aldgate and Jeffrey Richards, Britain Can Take It: The British Cinema in the Second World War, Oxford 1986, p. 141; Frances Thorpe and Nicholas Pronay with Clive Coultass, eds, British Official Films in the Second World War: A Descriptive Catalogue, Oxford, 1980, pp. 96–7.



‘

  ‘‘  ’’’

28. Radio news from Italy, 3 April, 28 May, 24 June and 25 June 1941, MA G2/X/0678, CBB; reports on German radio broadcasts: ‘Eire: Cardinal Attacks Britain’, 28 February 1941; ‘Eire: Bomb Explosion’, 1 March 1941; ‘Britain Blockade of Ireland’, 2 February 1941. JBP, UVL. 29. MOI Grant-in-Aid to BBC figures, 31 December 1940, 31 March 1941, INF 1/64, PRO; Betjeman to Sir Stephen Tallents, 6 March 1941, E1/942; Hodson, memorandum, 26 March 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC. 30. Nicholls to BBC DFD, 28 February 1941; Marshall to C(H), 3 and 10 March 1941, R34/347/1; Marshall to A. P. Ryan, 1 April 1941, D1/953; Salmon to Ryan, 1 April 1941, R34/347/1. BBCWAC. 31. Johnston, Programmes Directed at Eire, 20 January 1941; Marshall, memorandum on Johnston’s Programmes Directed at Eire, 21 January 1941; Lawrence Gilliam to DFD, 18 February 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC. 32. Salmon to DT, 22 February 1941, R 34/347/1, BBCWAC. 33. Nicholls, memorandum, 11 March 1941; Salmon, memorandum, 1 April 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC; Cranborne to Sir Eric Machtig, 1 April 1941, DO 35/1109/wX10/7, PRO; Ryan, memorandum, 5 May 1941; Rendall to Ryan, 19 May 1941, R 34/347/1; M. Tyler to Empire Broadcasting, 19 June 1941, E1/953; Grenfell Williams to Gilliam, 25 March 1941; Gilliam to Grenfell Williams, 16 April 1941; Empire News Talks Editor to Rendall, 10 September 1941, E1/956/1, BBCWAC. 34. Johnston, note on broadcast talks and the Irish listener, 8 March 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC. 35. Betjeman to Tallents, 20 March 1941, E1/942; Betjeman, report, April 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC. 36. Tallents to Betjeman, 31 March 1941; Clark to Betjeman, 29 March 1941, E1/942, BBCWAC. 37. Extracts from minutes of Overseas Board, 30 January, 6, 13, 20 February, 27 March 3 April, 8, 15 May, 5, 12 June 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC. 38. Andrew Stewart to Godfrey Adams, 10 January 1941; Empire Division, memorandum, 15 January 1941; Eason to DP, 17 January 1941; H.G. to DP, 20 January 1941; Eason to DP, 22 January 1941; Marshall to DP, 29 January 1941, R34/239/3, BBCWAC. 39. Marshall to AC(P), 20 February 1941; Marshall to CP, 18 March 1941, R34/239/3 BBCWAC; Northern Whig, 14 March 1941, quoted in Rex Cathcart, The Most Contrary Region: The BBC in Northern Ireland 1924–1984, Belfast, 1984, p. 113. 40. Fletcher to CP, 6 May 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC. 41. Alec Sutherland to RP Production Unit, 24 June 1941, R46/272, BBCWAC. 42. List of recorded programmes on Ireland, ca. May 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC; radio broadcast listings, Irish Independent, 1 January 1941, p. 3, and Irish Times, 12 March 1941, p. 4. 43. ‘A Defence of the Censorship: Minister Explains Suppressions: Senator’s View of Eire’s Neutrality’, Irish Times, 30 January 1941, p. 5; ‘How the Censorship Operates’, Irish Times, 31 January 1941, p. 6; resolution introduced in the D´ail on 20 March 1941, MA 7/58, CBB; ‘Belligerent’s Blackmail’, Catholic Herald, 18 April 1941, p. 5; ´ motion introduced in the Seanad Eireann by MacDermott, 4 January 1941, MA 7/58, CBB. 44. Aiken, quoted in ‘Mr Aiken on the Price of Censorship’, Irish Press, 30 January 1941, p. 5; notes for minister regarding D´ail debates on censorship, ca. 21 March 1941, MA 7/58, CBB; ‘The Censorship is to Save Us from War’, Irish Press, 4 April 1941, p. 5.

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

45. Memorandum to Controller, 17 February 1941, MA 5/22; Aiken to Liam Archer, 1 January 1941, MA 7/39; Draft Order Restricting Uncensored Press Messages Sent Abroad by Telephone and Telegraph, 25 January 1941, MA 5/22, CBB. 46. Elizabeth Bowen, ‘Eire’, New Statesman and Nation, 12 April 1941, p. 383; Archer to Connolly, 14 January 1941; Coyne to Archer, 4 April 1941; Archer to Coyne, 16 June 1941, MA 7/40, CBB. 47. Michael Knightly to E. O’Keefe, 13 May 1941, MA 2/55; External Affairs, memo´ Drisceoil, randum to Censorship, ca. March 1941, MA 3/39, CBB; see also Donal O Censorship in Ireland 1939–1945: Neutrality, Politics, and Society, Cork, 1996, pp. 70–3; Joseph Walshe to Coyne, 25 April 1941; Coyne to Walshe, 28 April 1941, MA 3/39; E. Cussen to Coyne, 15 April 1941; Coyne to E. Cussen, 26 April 1941; Cussen to Coyne, 28 April 1941, MA 4/30; Coyne to Aiken, 9 June 1941, MA 3/40, CBB. 48. Walshe to Coyne, 12 February 1941; Coyne to J. J. Purcell, 18 March 1941, MA 3/38, CBB. 49. Bowen, ‘Eire’, p. 383; Knightly to O’Keefe, 6 May 1941, MA 4/55; Aiken to Coyne, 10 April 1941; Walshe to Coyne, 16 April 1941; Coyne to Aiken, 17 April 1941, MA 8/12; Justice Department memorandum, 26 June 1941, MA 2/55, CBB. 50. Walshe to Dom Brady, 7 February 1941; Brady to Walshe, 17 February 1941; ‘Cardinal Censored in Good Company by Eire’, Catholic Herald, 14 March 1941, p. 1; Hugh Martin to Miss Hanson, 20 May 1941, INF 1/786, PRO; ‘Deported from Eire: Case of Miss Jackson’, Manchester Guardian, 2 May 1941, p. 6. 51. Knightly to O’Keefe, 13 May, 1941, MA 2/55; Censorship to Garda, 14 May 1941, MA 2/56. 52. T. Malone, memorandum, 24 June 1941, MA 2/47; William Quicke to the Censor, 5 April 1941, MA 2/6; Aiken, response to question from James Dillon, 19 March 1941, MA 8/11; Censor to Stephen Roche, 31 January 1941, MA 2/48, CBB. For the kinds of ‘blasphemous obscenity’ of which the Ulster Protestant was capable, see ´ Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland, p. 199. O 53. Censorship, memorandum to Connolly, 15 March 1941; Connolly, minute, 18 March 1941, MA 7/20; Irish legation, Washington, telegram to Censorship, 17 May 194l; Coyne to Purcell, 9 June 1941; Walshe to Coyne, 30 June 1941, MA 3/41, CBB. 54. Knightly to R. C. Eason, 14 February 1941, MA 2/8; Headline, Daily Telegraph, 25 March 1941, MA 2/13; Coyne to Boland, 5 May 1941, MA 2/32, CBB. 55. Bowen, ‘Eire’, p. 382. 56. Flynn (no first name recorded) to Knightly, 28 February 1941, MA 7/20; Coyne to Press Room, 27 June 1941, MA 7/58; Knightly to editor, Church of Ireland Gazette, 18 April 1941, MA 2/58; Coyne to Oscar Traynor, MA 2/28, CBB. 57. Boland to Coyne, 13 January 1941; Coyne to Boland, 8 April 1941, MA 2/43, CBB. 58. Malone, memorandum, June 24, 1941; Coyne to Detective Reynolds, Garda, 16 January 1941; Knightly to George Griffin, 17 January 1941; Griffin to Knightly, 31 January 1941, MA 2/47; Connolly to Aiken, 17 February 1941, MA 2/47, CBB. 59. Connolly, note, 25 March 1941, S 12 043, SPO; material stopped relative to D´ail debate of 2 April 1941; ‘Britain is Not Blockading Eire: Stormy Scene in House’, Irish Independent, 20 March 1941, p. 5; deletions from debate on censorship, 3 April 1941. 60. Knightly to Coyne, 23 May 1941, MA 2/85; Connolly to Maurice Moynahan, 16 June 1941, MA 2/58, CBB. 61. Photographs of bomb damage in Britain, Irish Press, 2 and 22 January 1941, both p. 1; 5 February p. 14; 14 February, 22 and 23 April, 17 May, 19 June 1941, all p. 1; Irish Independent, 4 January 1941 p. 4; 7 January p. 3; 20 March, p. 5; 17 May, p. 3.



‘

  ‘‘  ’’’

62. ‘Bomb Damage’, Irish Presss, 3 January 1941, p. 10; ‘500 Killed in the Belfast Raid’, Irish Press, 23 April 1941, p. 1; ‘Dublin and Carlow Bombings’, Irish Times, 3 January 1941, p. 8; ‘Bomb Damage in Dublin’, Irish Times, 2 June 1941, p. 6; ‘Irish Government Makes Strong Protest to Germany’, Irish Press, 4 January 1941, p. 1. 63. ‘British Drive to Benghazi’, Irish Times, 31 January 1941, p. 5; ‘How British Took Bardia’, Irish Times, 6 January 1941, p. 5; ‘Tobruk to Benghazi’, Irish Independent, 24 January 1941, p. 4. 64. ‘Democracy’s Arsenal’, Irish Times, 13 March 1941, p. 4; ‘More Warships for Britain: American Naval Aid Likely: Axis Warning’, Irish Independent, 18 March 1941, p. 5; ‘Colonel Donovan Sums Up: Says Germany Must Not Win: Moral Forces against Axis’, Irish Times, 28 March 1941, p. 6. 65. ‘Germans Invade Russia: Fighting on 1,500 Mile Front’, Irish Independent, 23 June 1941, p. 3.

5

From ‘Operation Barbarossa’ to Pearl Harbor: June–December 1941

German military success in Russia in the summer and autumn of 1941 fuelled apprehension regarding Britain’s security, intensified Eire’s commitment to neutrality, and made the United States face the possibility that its survival might now depend on joining Britain in the war. On 10 July, 226 US consular officials were evacuated out of Germany, and in September Navy Secretary Frank Knox called for the repeal of the Neutrality Act because German success on the Russian front seriously challenged any hope of victory.1 With the launch of ‘Operation Barbarossa’, as the Germans termed the invasion of Russia, the war of words over Eire neutrality expanded – and took on a few variations in direction as well. On 17 July, James Dillon delivered a passionate pro-British speech in the D´ail. He said that ‘indifferent neutrality’ was ‘not the true interest, moral or material, of the Irish people’, and that not all Irish-Americans favoured US neutrality as Aiken claimed, since many understood that a German victory would lead to the extermination or Nazification of Eire, and that would mean the end of Christian civilisation. Therefore, both Britain and the United States should be granted access to Eire ports and air bases because ‘the Atlantic lifeline joining Great Britain and America – the two champions of democracy and Christian civilization at the present time – is no stronger than the weakest link’.2 Fianna F´ail members hurled threats at Dillon, such as A. Fogarty of Tipperary shouting, ‘I will put you out bloody quick, you bloody corner boy. If you do not shut your mouth we will shut it for you!’ When Dillon sat down, Fine Gael leader William T. Cosgrove affirmed commitment to neutrality policy, thus disassociating the party from Dillon’s views.3 The speech was anything but neutral in content or language, and an Irish Press editorial stressed that Dillon’s position was untenable, not least because his own party opposed it. Readers were reminded that unity was the thing on neutrality. The Irish Times hinted that it supported his views, while the New York Times ´ wrote objectively on both Dillon’s remarks and Eamon de Valera’s response to them; so too the Daily Telegraph, the Manchester Guardian, the Catholic Herald and the Daily Mirror, the latter emphasising Cosgrove’s references in his response to Dillon to the ‘despicable’ Eire ‘slave mind’ that always depicted Britain as set upon interfering with Irish liberty.4 The speech tightened the resolve of hardline Eire neutralists, and inspired propaganda language commentary, as when

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the Leader referred to anti-neutrality Eire Senator Frank MacDermott as ‘Judas MacDermott’. Ambassador Robert Brennan assured Irish-Americans that Eire neutrality would be defended against anyone who attempted to violate it, while de Valera urged the Irish to remain vigilant since Eire’s position was a target for both sides in the war, and praised Britain for respecting Eire neutrality.5 The GIB tried to counter ‘subversive’ press criticism by issuing ‘corrective’ statements to such as the News Chronicle and the Sunday Express reporting black-market activities along the Eire–Ulster border. Of course, the GIB did not mind when in the Catholic Herald Rev. Dr John Heenan denounced the Ulster Protestant for spewing anti-Catholic propaganda.6 Meanwhile, the preference for neutrality did not abate among the Irish people, but at the same time, pro-British attitudes seemed to increase, for example opposition to Britain having access to Eire ports and bases dropping from 65 per cent to 57 per cent, and Irish women wearing V for Victory signs, Union Jacks and RAF badges.7 Even so, trust was limited: German fifth-column activities in Eire were known to be aided by the IRA; a number of Dublin firms had German connections; two Eire civil servants were brought to court in Northern Ireland for taking photographs in prohibited areas of Belfast; a Port of Cork Authority official and former IRA member was suspected of fifth-column activity; and a pro-Nazi Dutch Irish Independent columnist was in Eire ‘for no good purpose’. ‘Disinformation’ was also in the game, as when Ambassador Brennan accused the United States government of encouraging IRA extremists in order to undermine the Eire government and weaken neutrality policy; the allegation was dismissed as nonsense by virtually everyone, including President Roosevelt.8 Journalists in particular looked into the fifth-column factor. William Bayles included among the pro-Axis Irish in Eire wealthy industrialists, professional men, and technicians, some Army men, and members of the IRA, the Irish International Brigade and the Knights of Columbanus, whose weekly paper was fed by Axis news and propaganda. He also claimed that ordinary Germans who had made their homes in Eire had been quietly replaced by ‘potent Nazi agents and spies’, and that Henning Thomsen, Ambassador Eduard Hempel’s ‘righthand man’, who resided in ‘Eire’s most strategic port’, Dun Laoghaire, was the architect of German spy activities. The Catholic Herald protested the indictment of the Knights of Columbanus, claiming that their aim was to promote Catholic ideals – hardly pro-Axis.9 In fact, the German government did plan an ‘Ireland Operation’ for late September, in which agents were to establish liaison with the IRA in Eire, prepare sabotage operations, arrange radio transmissions, and organise ‘underground resistance’ in the event that Britain or America occupied Eire. Carrying out such operations had become difficult, however, because the Eire government cracked down on foreign agents, such as Abwehr agent Hermann Goertz, arrested in December 1941.10 Repressing the fifth column did not negatively affect Axis propaganda efforts, which according to David Gray were well organised, influential, hostile towards America and potentially more problematic than a fifth column. Irish papers were supplied with such items as a Reader’s Digest article laudatory of German military

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efficiency, photographs of a German general, and reports on American Catholic church leaders urging America to stay out of the war.11 Radio propaganda included talks from Germany by ‘Pat O’Brien’ and ‘John O’Reilly’, the latter actually Irish who spoke with a Cork accent, to Germany’s ‘Irish friends’. Broadcasts included, among other items, accusing Senator MacDermott of being a British agent, describing the murder of an Irish woman by the British in 1920, noting British atrocities in the Black and Tan war, and criticising Russia on religious issues while emphasising that Eire’s neutrality saved the Irish from having to fight with England ‘for the establishment and furtherance of Bolshevism’.12 Italy’s Radio Stefani bombarded Eire with similar materials, ranging from praise for an Irish–American, Italian–American and German–American Axis working against the British, to assurance that the Axis would prevail in its opposition to the United States’ participation with Britain in the ‘plutocratic Bolshevik coalition’ – and, of course, praise for Il Duce. The publication Radio News from Italy was also distributed in Eire, with photographs of Italian workers and teachers in east Africa described as ‘Builders of Civilization’.13 Of course, Axis propaganda, German or Italian, was not helped when German bombs fell on Eire, or when German U-boats torpedoed unarmed and clearly marked Eire merchant ships such as the Clonlara in August and the Glencree in November 1941.14 Irishmen did not join German or Italian forces in large numbers, but they did the British, and it was thought more should be done to exploit the fact for propaganda purposes. The idea of forming an Irish Brigade, advanced by Sir Hubert Gough, appealed to Winston Churchill, and he proposed that it be done and with suitable publicity. The Dominions and War Offices, on the other hand, feared that publicity given to so many persons from neutral Eire serving the British cause might inspire de Valera to stop needed recruits coming to Britain. A compromise: create three Irish battalions with members from both Eire and Ulster, but give no special publicity to the scheme unless and until the group had distinguished itself. Then it could be pointed out how Irishmen from both North and South stood with Britain in the battle for liberty.15 That could apply as well to Irish labourers working in Britain. Ambassador Gray thought a well-publicised campaign to make the Irish public aware how much Eire depended on Britain would be useful pro-British propaganda – unless, warned Lord Cranborne, the British public saw it as Britain treating Eire with ‘undue tenderness at a time when the Irish government was doing nothing to assist us in the war’.16 Cranborne had a point. British opinion was now even less sympathetic to Eire’s neutrality than it had been at the beginning of the war. Arnold Lunn, an Anglo-Irish Catholic associated with the MOI Religions Division, opined that Anglo-Irish relations might have a more hopeful future if the Irish actually expressed some ‘sympathy, appreciation and gratitude’ for Britain’s contribution to liberating small countries and defending the future of the Church in Europe. Letters to Eire from Britain contained such lines as ‘people are as determined as ever to fight it out to the end’ and ‘we are fighting to a finish for freedom’. Of course, some also reflected frustration and resentment associated with the realities of war: ‘Here in this town there are people who wouldn’t give a damn if

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from ‘operation barbarossa ’ to pearl harbor

Jerry walked the streets so long as they have their cars, fur coats and a good time, the self rotten lot, it makes my blood boil to see them . . .’ and ‘Oh, how stupid it all is and how futile.’17 Meanwhile, in America, opinion was sharply divided between those who opposed neutrality, such as government leaders who refused to supply arms for Eire, and those who favoured it, such as the American Friends of Irish Neutrality, which got two million signatures on a petition demanding that Eire be given military and other supplies. Passing the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941 brought the ‘bases in Eire’ issue back into the war of words. The United States had taken Britain’s side, the US Navy would patrol the Atlantic to protect the shipment mat´eriel promised and, in July, Wendell Willkie called for US naval bases to be established in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and, the New York Times suspected, in Eire as well. Many Americans thought this would be an excellent idea.18 That did not include Irish-Americans, who condemned Willkie and called for public meetings to demand that Congress squelch his ‘outrageous plan’. Gaelic American editorials denounced Willkie and condemned Roosevelt as so pro-English he would gladly do Britain’s dirty work by taking bases in Eire. An Irish World editorial concurred, charging that if the excuse for occupying Eire was that ‘Ireland will be invaded by Germany,’ then rather than America occupying Ireland just to save face for Churchill, ‘the decent, sensible thing to do is to arm the Irish people.’19 Senator MacDermott urged Irish-Americans not to take this attitude, claiming that public support in Eire for neutrality was the result of censored news, a claim the Irish legation sought to counter by requesting that circulation figures for English newspapers in Eire be published in the United States. In October, on radio, MacDermott warned Irish-Americans that they were ‘playing Hitler’s game’ if they did not forget the past, think of the future, and support American backing of Britain’s war. In response, the Gaelic American called MacDermott an ‘Anti-Irish Irishman’ who spoke for the old ascendancy and used his membership in the Seanad ‘to give him a standing as a propagandist for England’, and who knew little about loyal Irish-Americans who opposed US involvement in the war only because American men and treasure ‘should not be expended in the age-long bickerings and conflicts of imperialistic and totalitarian nations’.20 Irish-Americans were growing more antagonistic towards America’s increasingly pro-British interpretation of neutrality. The Gaelic American was outraged when Roosevelt announced the Atlantic Charter, which clearly put the United States on Britain’s side. It charged that America’s ‘Anglomaniacs’ worked for the British Empire, that the American government was hand in glove with Britain in threatening Eire neutrality, that American participation in the war ‘would put an end to our American way of life, establish a dictatorship here and pile up a pyramid of debt that would crush Americans for many generations’, and that the British agreed to the Atlantic Charter only because they were desperate, and would no more live up to it than they had to Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points at the end of the First World War. ‘England is an aggressor nation which has annexed more than one-fourth of the earth’s land surface by force,’ hardly a nation with which the United States should ally itself. Britain was an ‘aggressor

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nation’, The Gaelic American concluded, had interfered with freedom of the seas, continued to deny rights to the peoples of its empire while calling for the restoration of rights denied to people by the Axis, and had made an alliance with ‘Red Russia, the most tyrannical nation that ever plagued the world’.21 The message here, as in other anti-British Irish-American papers and in pro-Eire organisations generally, was that Americans should ‘Fight back!’ against all Anglo-American propaganda that was pro-British or gave a positive image of the Soviet Union – especially that put out by MacDermott and his Irish-American allies in the Committee for American Irish Defense.22 The message was received. A joint meeting of Irish societies from New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania denounced the committee as an ‘anti-Irish propaganda group’ which aimed to disrupt Eire–United States relations and pledged vigorous opposition to it, while reaffirming support for de Valera and Eire neutrality. The Irish World reported the meeting in detail, and the Leader reproduced its report verbatim.23 By November, the Committee for American Irish Defense – which did not go away, of course – had evolved into the American Irish Defense Association. Its propaganda paper, American Irish Defense, was published in Chicago and overseen by William Agar. The Irish World termed Agar an ignoramus for referring to ‘the Irish Free State’ ‘which hasn’t been for some years’, and the paper a bad joke which assumed Irish-Americans were ‘too dumb to get the fine points about Ireland’s position’. The editorial expressed amazement that ‘these pseudo Defenders of Ireland . . . seriously ask us to believe, the life of the British Empire and the security of the United States depend upon little Ireland’s . . . abandoning the neutrality that has kept her safe in the hurricane of war . . . Have we in the United States come to harbor such counsel of despair?’24 Letters to the editor concurred. For example, Agar’s group was ‘Government-paid puppets’ and ‘paper Irishmen’ who had never lifted a finger in the cause of Ireland, advocacy of Eire ports for Britain was ‘a vicious gesture,’ and an Armistice Day ceremony rededicating the Times Square statue of famed ‘Fighting 69th’ chaplain Father Duffy was hypocrisy.25 Meanwhile, Irish-American Senator Wheeler accused the Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCI) of supporting pro-war groups (apparently something of a conspiracy theorist, Wheeler also claimed that the United States was secretly engaged in a shooting war with Germany in the Atlantic) and protested against a Times Square Armistice Day service because as part of it Hollywood stars helped launch a drive to collect Irish-American signatures for the anti-neutrality petition. The Brooklyn Tablet ran an Edward Fenlon piece which appealed to Irish-American emotions by recounting British brutality in Ireland during the Black and Tan war, argued that British religious intolerance and materialistic philosophy guaranteed that Britain and Eire could never ‘abide in peace under one roof ’, and that no Irishman would ever believe Britain was fighting for anything but the British Empire. Representative James McGranery entered the article in the Congressional Record.26 Pro-Eire Irish-American propaganda did not end with assaults on the American Irish Defense Association. The Irish World claimed ‘Thirty Million

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Irish Americans Support Ireland’s Neutrality’, the Brooklyn Tablet praised Eire neutrality as ‘strict adherence to international morality . . . They can find no moral cause for entering the war on either side,’ and the Ancient Order of Hibernians, Clan-na-Gael and others spoke out for Eire neutrality and American isolationism, and against partition, access by any foreign power to Irish ports and bases, and British propaganda which promoted designs on America that ‘did not end at Yorktown’.27 ‘Historicus’ in the Irish World wrote that Britain had betrayed every nation that had ever backed it against its enemies, while the Gaelic American claimed that a pamphlet warning Irish Catholics that neutrality would condemn Eire to the fate suffered by other European Catholics was simply ‘another sly piece of British propaganda, issued for the purpose of slandering the Irish people who insist on maintaining their neutrality in this war of the Anti-Christs’. The Gaelic American also objected strenuously to the ‘Bundles for Britain’ and ‘Sew for Victory’ programmes, conducted by department and dry goods stores across the United States, claiming they were supported by Britain as propaganda aimed at getting America into a war on the side of ‘imperialism and Communism’.28 Britain was bad enough alone, but its alliance with the ‘Godless Anti-Christ Soviet Union’ was unforgivable. Other protests included that ‘England . . . [re]pays magnificently all our generosity, by requiring America, a Christian people, to join hands with Russia–a No-God Nation’; that ‘we want no union with Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany or Imperialistic England, [the] anti-Christs who plan ruin’; that Britain welcomed the aid of a communist and ‘despotic nation’; and that the Roosevelt administration had ‘released Russian funds which had been frozen in this country to purchase military supplies for Stalin’s anti-Christ campaign’.29 An amusing irony: as those funds were to be used in ‘anti-Christ’ Stalin’s war with Germany, was the Gaelic American then identifying Adolf Hitler as Christ? And on it went: anti-British and anti-Soviet items and cartoons, and editorial diatribes against the United States departing from isolationism to join ‘Red Russia’ were commonplace in the second half of 1941. So too was criticism of President Roosevelt, whose Cabinet, according to the Leader, was a collection of dodos, war agents, disasters, and rubber stamps.30 It was time for the United States to officially enter the war of words. On 6 July William Donovan created the OCI, and playwright and Roosevelt speech writer Robert Sherwood organised the Foreign Information Service (FIS), which became the Overseas Branch of the OWI, launched the following year. He advised Donovan that ‘effective propaganda must follow a definite policy, must have a specific objective, and must stick to accomplishing that objective by continual repetition of the same thing in a thousand different forms of expression. There must be an intimate knowledge of the weak places in the German psychological armor.’ Sherwood saw telling the truth as the most effective propaganda approach, and in due course inaugurated Voice of America, which in the long run probably was America’s best propaganda channel.31 The British press and pro-British Irish papers were pleased by the apparent shift in America’s interpretation of neutrality. As the Irish Times put it, ‘technically, [America] is neutral to-day; in fact, she is by far the most useful of Great Britain’s allies.’32 After all, as it seemed clear by

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mid-1941, American opinion, including Catholics, was largely pro-British though not yet keen on going to war; also, Americans were becoming more resentful of Eire. In David Gray’s words, ‘Americans have lost or are losing sympathy with the Irish government and are asking, “Why should we make sacrifices for those who will make no sacrifice for us?” ’33 American journalists encouraged this resentment, as when American Mercury columnist William Bayles wrote that ‘the Swastika and Fascist tricolor wave with defiant persistence over German and Italian Legations in Dublin . . . The Irish radio is free to criticize England but no word may be broadcast against the Axis’, and PM reporter Ben Robertson claimed that ‘the only chance we have of obtaining Irish co-operation will come if the de Valera Government should fall.’ This infuriated Irish Press editor William Sweetman, who countered that given the long-lasting ties between Ireland and America, ‘the only purpose this effort to poison the wells against us in America can have is to serve some mean propaganda purpose.’ To Gray this exchange was proof that nationalist groups in America were doing damage, and said as much ´ to both Sweetman and Eamon de Valera. Sweetman was not impressed. So far as he was concerned, PM was simply doing pro-British propaganda.34 Meanwhile, John Betjeman as British press attach´e in Dublin continued to press for ‘good relations’ in Eire, with efforts ranging from lunching occasionally with GIB director Frank Gallagher to organising visits by British theatrical performers. He did not see this as propaganda, and was non-plussed when Nicholas Mansergh wrote that ‘[if] you have felt it possible to expand your propaganda work in certain directions, it would be a great help to me if you could let me know the lines along which you are working.’ At the bottom of the letter, Betjeman wrote: ‘Now what have I done to deserve this?!! I don’t do propaganda work at all. It is a waste of time. No one believes propaganda. Good relations.’35 However, the Empire Division expected Betjeman to disseminate propaganda. John Rodgers of the Commercial Relations Division laid out for him the Ireland Forever Association scheme, which was to disseminate materials stressing the value for Eire of economic connections with the United Kingdom, the Empire and the United States. The object was to make clear to Irishmen who ‘did not want to cut off their nose to spite their face’ what the connection meant in pounds, shillings and pence. Betjeman doubted that it would actually work, as did others, largely because if it came to be known that the British government was connected to the scheme, the result could be a propaganda disaster. Reluctantly, Rodgers agreed to set the scheme aside.36 Even so, commerce as a propaganda channel was not abandoned, and such tactics were considered as inserting ‘Convoy leaflets’ into packets of soap, toothpaste and/or toothbrushes, cocoa, coffee and Bovril shipped to Eire, and distributing propaganda postcards for Eire such as those extolling the courage and determination of the Free French.37 Betjeman got on better with the Religions Division, and circulated ‘The Spiritual Issues of the War’ to both Protestants and Catholics. Interestingly, some Protestants as well as most Catholics backed Eire neutrality and were critical of the pro-British stance customary in Anglican parishes. A letter to the Irish Times from a Protestant serving in the Eire army criticised his parish in neutral Dublin for offering prayers for British soldiers and singing ‘God Save the King’.

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Should not its members pray for all of the belligerents, including Germans, and should it not also pray for Irish soldiers?38 With regard to Catholics, Betjeman advised Richard Hope of the Religions Division to give more notice to ‘brave priests and Irish Catholics’, and to items such as the growth of Catholicism in Denmark and in England, in such Catholic journals as the Universe, the Irish Catholic and the Standard which circulated in Eire. He also wanted articles inserted in the Irish Rosary ‘and those other queer little papers produced in Dublin for various orders’. English Catholic clergy encouraged such efforts, for, as Rev. Dr John Heenan assured Hope, the Catholic Herald was making a major and successful contribution to moving Eire opinion along lines advocated in British propaganda. Hope replied, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, that the contribution might be even larger if Heenan’s writings would avoid references to the persecution of Catholics in Ulster.39 Irish-American Catholics protested efforts to sway opinion through circulation of major Catholic papers.40 Many claimed that the Catholic Bulletin of Foreign News, circulated by the MOI to Catholics in Britain, was simply a propaganda sheet that badly misrepresented Irish-American Catholic opinion through the ‘[skilful] selection of extracts from the speeches and articles of interventionist Catholics’. The Brooklyn Tablet claimed that 99 per cent of American Catholic ecclesiastics and laity opposed American involvement in the war, and a letter to the paper by a ‘British citizen’ called the Catholic Bulletin an ‘unreliable rag’ which aided British press, broadcast and cinema propaganda in giving the impression that respectable American Catholics enthusiastically backed ‘the War party . . . and England herself ’.41 Eire appeared almost amenable to British Catholic propaganda compared to the Irish audience in America, at least as it was represented in the Irish-American press. Irish-Americans also protested pro-British film propaganda. The IrishAmerican press supported Senator Bennett Clark’s pledge to bring down its present leaders ‘if the [film] industry does not end this propaganda for war . . . ’. The Gaelic American noted enthusiastically Clark’s criticism of British film maker Alexander Korda, and the British-born comic actor and film maker Charlie Chaplin ‘who has lived in this country for 30 years and made a great fortune here, and never thought well enough of the United States to become a citizen’.42 Chaplin’s The Great Dictator (1940) was an anti-Nazi propaganda film widely criticised in America, but wildly acclaimed in the United Kingdom. The IrishAmerican press regularly accused Hollywood of pandering to British propagandists, and called upon Irish-Americans to boycott the industry. They were heard. In October the United Irish-American Societies of New York passed a resolution demanding that ‘the likes’ of Korda and Chaplin be prohibited from ‘exploiting the American people as film producers and that the motion picture industry be put under proper restrictions in the public interest’, and warning that Harry Warner and his ilk would be boycotted out of business if they persisted in being warmongers for Britain.43 Propaganda films were increasingly evident in the still neutral United States, but remained thin on the ground in Eire. British Council films were not sent to

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Eire, and one of the few MOI films that focused on Eire at all, Fighting Irish, was not listed with a schedule for showing in Eire. Admittedly, Paramount’s I Wanted Wings, a ‘cheerful, overlong recruiting poster with concessions to melodrama’, opened at the Dublin Savoy on 27 August. Attendees were Ambassador and Mrs David Gray, and Commandant Patrick Quinn, Commandant Sheerin, Captain Devoy, and Lieutenants Quinlan, Higgins and Walker, and all the members of the Irish Army Air Corps. But that was it. Through November, the only film shown in Dublin with any connection to international affairs was In the Navy, an Abbott and Costello comedy which featured ‘two incompetents and a singing heart-throb’ as navy recruits–hardly the stuff of propaganda.44 British broadcast propaganda aimed at Eire was making progress, at least in subtle ways. Programmes under consideration included variety shows with Irish guest artists, Irish playlets, Irish prose and poetry, and contributions from Irish film stars working in Hollywood.45 This was indirect propaganda, the idea being to show that the British appreciated the Irish and their culture. Playwright Alexander McKecknie, an Irish speaker and devout Roman Catholic, was considered as a contributor, until he let it be known that ‘I would have no hesitation in pointing out to the Motherland of the Argyll Gael the error of her ways.’ This put off some in the Dominions Office, who warned: ‘To preach straight at them would be to start trouble.’ While the BBC Controller (Home), Christopher Salmon, who had long opposed direct propaganda for Eire, agreed, Empire Division director H. V. Hodson did not.46 He wanted direct propaganda to Eire, and suggested that the BBC Home Service – considered by many to be the best access to Eire audiences – allot twenty minutes each week to such programming. BBC planning demurred, fearing that this might annoy the British audience, and proposed instead a fortnightly commentary from Dublin and one from Belfast, and that Eire speakers occasionally take the microphone in extant programmes such as ‘The World Goes By’ and ‘Ariel in Wartime’. This package would include such BBC broadcasts from Dublin as Denis Johnston’s fortnightly broadcasts on ship launchings, conversations between Ulster and Eire women over the difficulties of war-time rationing, a train journey between the blacked-out North and the ‘gaily lit South’, and a short-story reading by the Irish writer Donagh Macdonagh.47 By July 1941, broadcasts concerning Eire aimed at overseas audiences were also a central issue in planning, encouraged by J. B. Clark, BBC Controller (Overseas). John Irwin, with the BBC Empire Services director, R. A. Rendall, encouraged matter-of-fact broadcasts aimed at the ‘distant listener’, with references to D´ail proceedings, Dublin theatre of the day, leaders in the Irish Times and the Irish Independent (the Irish Press was not mentioned), and how people managed with short or nonexistent supplies; in short, ‘an objective account which would convey a clear picture of the state of affairs existing in Eire today, and so help kill the sentimental picture of a lot of black-haired men and their colleens standing proudly before the white-washed cottages they can at last call their own after their gallant struggle against the English oppressor’. Meanwhile, Johnston raised the question of how talks originating in Dublin and ‘intended to have propaganda

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value’ were to be got around the censors in both Dublin and London.48 It was a legitimate question with no clear answer. On 15 November, ‘Irish Half Hour’ (conceived originally as ‘Irish Magazine’) was launched, a major programme for Eire, UK and overseas audiences. Though intended as a variety show, initial planning included materials ‘thought to have good propaganda value’ for Irish listeners, such as exchanges between Irishmen abroad and Irishmen serving in British forces, on controversial subjects – not including partition or North–South religious differences, however. Its creator, H. L. Fletcher, theorised it this way: SEAN MURPHY (Porter, say, in some New York store). ‘Is that yourself, Shamus? I hear you are with the Irish Guards these days. How are you getting on?’ SHAMUS O’DONOVAN (Private from the Irish Guards). ‘I am doing fine.’ (He does a very brief description of what he is doing, subject to censorship, and adds something like) ‘I wish you’d remember me to Flanagan, and what would O’Casey be up to now.’ etc. This kind of thing extremely popular over here.49 Materials recorded for the programme launch included a three-minute talk on Cavan by Desmond Fitzgerald; an interview with Father Cremin on the Gaelic Athletic Association; songs by James Moody and the Bachelor Girls; talks by Canadian Irishmen; songs by Denis O’Neill, including ‘The Green Isle of Erin’ and ‘Kissing the Blarney Stone’; and Irish bagpipe tunes. John Betjeman encouraged even greater emphasis on praise for Irishmen in British forces and in civil defence work in Britain, thus making the programme ‘a series which would keep alive among soldiers serving away from home the sense of Irish nationalism in the broadest meaning of the term’.50 Betjeman’s view was in line with B. E. Nicholls’ plan circulated on 12 August. It included John McCormack, an Irish singer who lived near Ascot, west of London, as both comp`ere and performer; the Anglo-Irish writer Elizabeth Bowen as contributor; singers Paddy Browne (a woman, despite the name) and Delia Murphy, wife of RE´ director T. J. Kiernan – rejected ultimately because she was thought to be pro-German; such Hollywood stars as Maureen O’Sullivan; Gaelic-speaking playwright Alexander McKecknie (see above); interviews with Irish priests (Betjeman’s idea), who might speak about the blitzing of Catholic churches in Europe; short features on such Irish generals as Field Marshal Sir John Dill; military awards to Irish servicemen; and leaving Ulster out of the programme altogether.51 However, for reasons that are not clear, after the Nicholls memorandum circulated, everything except variety material was stricken from the programme. Nicholls was pleased, asserting that ‘the programme is now on the right lines.’ Prominent variety performers came on board then, including Jimmy O’Dea, who would alternate with McCormack as comp`ere.52 ‘Irish Half Hour’ premiered on 15 November as part of the Forces Programme, opening with the strongly nationalistic ‘The Minstrel Boy’, despite objections from BBC NI director George Marshall, followed by comic patter, poetry,

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conversations about music and theatre, a selection from Handel’s Messiah (appropriate, since that classic had had its premi´ere in Dublin in 1741), and a finish with McCormack calling God’s blessings upon Irish serving in British forces. A week later, O’Dea was comp`ere for the second broadcast with much the same programme. The stand-up comedy routine was pointedly propagandistic. O’Dea took on the persona of a woman attending a masked ‘Char-Ladies’ Ball’ with ‘Larry’, whose costume was a map of the world. A mˆel´ee erupted at the ball and Larry’s map costume took symbolic hits – and one miss: Germany was kicked, the British Empire was torn apart, but Ireland escaped damage: ‘They broke everything on Larry except his neutrality’ was the operative line. E. Rawdon Smith liked the new programme which he thought promoted ‘a better feeling between Southern Ireland and the People of the United Kingdom’ by providing the Irish in UK forces with a Forces programme they could like, and by encouraging the people of Eire to listen to a particular programme on the Forces wavelength.53 BBC NI did not like it, however, and warned that the Belfast government would protest if any future broadcasts even hinted at North–South cooperation. Northern Ireland premier J. M. Andrews told the BBC Director General, Sir Frederick Ogilvie, that such a broadcast ‘would be an insidious form of propaganda’ misrepresenting both Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom and Eire’s attitude of indifference toward the war.54 Ogilvie told Andrews that he was missing the point of ‘Irish Half Hour’, which was to pay tribute to all those loyal men and women from Eire who had ‘thrown in their lot – plough-teams, lies and all – with our common cause’ by joining British forces. He did concede that the programme would receive a negative response from the North, and that it would be better to design it to for Eire members of the Forces only.55 Andrews thought Northern Ireland could accept this approach, so long as it was not implied that the Eire government and citizens were on the same level as the people and the governments of the United Kingdom and the dominions. That too was agreed.56 Of course, this was not the end of it. Northern Ireland also protested that Denis Johnston in a Home News broadcast referred to Dublin as ‘the Irish capital’, that ‘Irish Half Hour’ featured Delia Murphy, ‘a woman of pro-German sympathies’, and that it encouraged the anti-British section of the population by using Irish Gaelic in the broadcasts. Betjeman defended Murphy, pointing out that she had kept a Belfast audience entertained throughout the night of its worst blitz until six o’clock in the morning – though conceding that it might be prudent to proceed without her on the programme. Meanwhile Ursula Eason, Marshall’s assistant, insisted that Irish tunes for programmes broadcast to Northern Ireland must not include either ‘The Minstrel Boy’ or ‘The Wearin’ of the Green’.57 Yet despite his objections to aspects of the Irish programme, Marshall was positive about the role the BBC could play in making Eire see that its best interests lay with Britain in the war. He was confident that Johnston would work well with Eire broadcast officials to achieve positive results, such as offering Eire British broadcast facilities to shore up its shortwave-deficient radio system, adding a feature to the Forces Programme in which Irishmen from North and South would speak

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to their families and others back home, and broadcasting programmes directly to the Irish population in America and Australia – all of which would promote good-will. Betjeman agreed with him in principle, while also understanding that Marshall still had to appease the anti-Eire position of his government. Therefore, why not plan broadcasts for Eire without referring to Marshall, so that he could blame London when his government complained? Tempting though this proposal was in London, it never happened, at least not to the extent Betjeman was ´ suggesting.58 Meanwhile, BBC London worked surprisingly well with Eire’s RE, for example granting Kiernan’s request to use the Glasgow studios for a Gaelic cultural broadcast, and asking his advice on programming related to Irishmen serving in British forces. The BBC also cooperated with Eire censors regarding material coming out of Eire to be used in broadcasts from London.59 Censorship was always an issue, and came under much criticism. In July, ´ Eamon de Valera proposed extending the Emergency Powers Act for another year. Many voices, mainly from Fine Gael and Labour, objected. One claimed that the censorship was already doing enough damage to the minds of the people. Another suggested relaxing the censorship, because ‘the Government should resist the natural tendency to suppress criticism of itself.’ Still another scoffed that ‘the censorship was extremely incompetent and often silly.’ In reporting the debates, the Irish Press naturally took the government side, pointing out that if what the critics said about the censorship was true, their complaints would not have been allowed to appear in the press – an argument that was not altogether without merit.60 Meanwhile, complaints continued, such as Commonweal columnist Michael Williams charging that Eire’s leaders would permit nothing in the press or broadcasting that might be offensive to the Nazis ‘and thus tend to involve Eire in the war’, but would allow such as a ‘false lecture’ from a Spanish newspaper on how well treated Catholics were under Hitler, while banning the text of a Cardinal Hinsley broadcast because it was regarded as pro-British. The government denied Williams’ allegations, pointing out that ‘no sort of propaganda for or against either belligerent is permitted in Eire,’ including books about Nazi persecution of Catholics distributed by the British Ministry of Information.61 Thomas Coyne charged that antagonism to the censorship was primarily political. ‘We have no consciousness of sin’ was his line, and even as he spoke, anti-Soviet Union articles in the Torch and the Irish Catholic – and pro-Russian material in Worker’s Weekly – were being stopped, since Russia was now a belligerent and anything for or against it would likely offend either Britain or Germany, and that would conflict with Eire neutrality policy. In October, the list of censorable press items in general expanded to include anything on ‘illicit or suspicious entries into this country’ and anything relating to ‘espionage or other subversive activities’.62 Meanwhile, the censors were allowing British press material that in some opinions contradicted avowed censorship policy – which evoked protests among some Irish, such as a complaint regarding a British paper containing ‘a disgraceful cartoon involving the noble man [P´etain], now at the head of the French nation’ which likely ‘would not be tolerated if perpetrated by an Irish paper’. In October, the ban was lifted on the Daily Mirror and Cavalcade, notable for their sharp commentary on Eire neutrality; virtually all other English papers circulated

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freely throughout 1941. Perhaps their limited numbers in Eire had something to do with it. Why censor them if only a few people would see them? By August 1941 the copies of British dailies and weeklies in Eire had dropped from the August 1939 total of 1,226,003 to only 186,093.63 The censor was much harder on the Eire press, which had a much larger circulation. For example, in August it closed the writing-up in Irish papers of British Minister of Information Brendan Bracken’s Irish connections, and stories, including in the Irish Press, about the impact of the war on various commodities in Ireland. Items that had to be submitted before publication as indicated in the 1939 Emergency Powers Order (No. 5), seemed almost endless.They included: matter relating to defence forces, military stores, fortified positions, air and sea ports, civilian defence, defence conferences, external relations and diplomatic activities, recruitment for the forces, Irishmen in foreign forces and decorations bestowed in them, belligerents interned in Eire, hostilities apparently directed against the Irish state, bombs, mines etc., the presence of foreign forces, war charities, political or public offences, public alarm, taxes shortages, the weather, the wireless, official statements and omissions in newspapers; matter causing disaffectation; photographs, maps and plans; matter prejudicial to the neutrality of the state; offensive comments regarding friendly states; foreign comments regarding the Irish state; book reviews; obituary and other notices containing reference to military ranks; war news or commentary; war pictures; advertisements referring directly to the war; propaganda; and, of course, references to the censorship.64 The postal censor’s task was equally difficult, owing to ongoing staff shortages in the face of substantial postal traffic. In July 32,000 letters and postcards, 576 parcels, and 690 newspapers per day passed between Eire and Northern Ireland alone. The censor’s list also included ‘V for Victory’ badges and jewellery, propaganda leaflets and telegrams. Propaganda material when found was confiscated, and the censorship was unmoved by protests against such action. Interestingly, telegrams from German press attach´e Carl Petersen referring to the unveiling of a Roger Casement memorial plaque and to the placing of a wreath in memory of the Manchester Martyrs (Irishmen hanged in Manchester in the 1860s), were passed; others offering greetings to King George VI were not.65 Bookselling and book reviews were now more closely watched than ever before. Persecution of the Catholic Church in German-Occupied Poland and Persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich (propaganda books regardless of the truth or falsehood behind their assertions, Coyne argued) were ordered to be withdrawn from booksellers’ displays and seized by the police if they were not. An Irish Times review of By Order of the Gestapo was stopped, and Robert Smyllie let Coyne know what he thought: You would be the first to despise me if I should knuckle under to the censorship for which I can have no respect. We shall have to submit all our proofs, but I would be dishonest and unfair to you personally if I should pretend to willingly cooperate in suppression of views that are shared by readers of the Irish Times, to whom . . . my first duty is owed.66

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That was in September. In October, book distributors C. & M. Banks, caught out circulating By Order of the Gestapo, protested to the postal censor that banning propaganda books was news to them. Coyne doubted the claim, but it inspired him to order that all gaps and loopholes through which propaganda books might be imported and distributed be plugged forthwith. Then there was the bookseller R. C. Eason, who had agreed to self-censorship of materials with propaganda content. Now, Coyne found, he was stocking his shelves with the likes of Men Crucified, Under the Hell of the Gestapo, and The Persecution of the Catholic Church under the Third Reich. Coyne was blunt. ‘If necessary we can carry out a propaganda purge with the assistance of the police and it will be a crude affair. Neither you nor I want this.’67 Nor did other booksellers, who on 14 November agreed not to exhibit certain types of war books as laid down by the Controller of Censorship: atrocity stories, especially those containing religious persecution, ‘vulgarly abusive books’, books with offensive titles, propaganda books by well-known anti-Nazis or ex-Nazis, and official ‘anti’ propaganda.68 The censors’ bottom line appeared to be to shut down any propaganda activities that might jeopardise, in Joseph Connolly’s words, ‘the neutrality or safety of the state’. That included reimposing a ban on gramophone records and effigies, and on pamphlets of a questionable nature. The Dean of Chichester’s The Crooked Cross and Ronald Knox’s Nazi and Nazarene, both described as ‘gross propaganda’, made the list, as did reprints for private circulation of James ´ Dillon’s anti-neutrality speech in the D´ail in July. (Eamon de Valera later reversed this decision for political reasons.) Pamphlets by A. A. Milne, E. M. Forster and Harold J. Laski, described as ‘high grade propaganda’, were permitted. ‘It is not our purpose to prevent the bona fide student or reader from having access even to the grosser forms of propaganda; we are concerned solely to prevent the public display and overt distribution of scurrilous attacks on states with which we are in friendly diplomatic relations.’69 Film, on the other hand, was another matter. The censor cut so much out of Sergeant York, the American film that extolled the simple country boy virtues of a First World War hero, that Coyne wanted it banned altogether. What was left would make no sense to the viewer, and would make the censor look bad. Also, an Irish RAF officer was denied permission to bring the British documentary Target for Tonight into Eire to show to ’a few of my friends in private’, despite the fact that the official censorship rules only applied to public exhibition of films.70 The censorship notwithstanding, the war of words and images in Eire went on. The British and Americans were rarely absent from the pages of the Irish Times, where speeches by Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt were quoted at length, along with a British field marshal’s very British view of the progress of the shooting war. And there were detailed reports on major campaigns and battles with emphasis on the damage done to the Germans. The Irish Independent published graphic depictions of German air raid damage to Belfast, and even the Irish Press published photographs of German bomb damage to Moscow. It also quoted from a report on Germans killing French hostages following the assassination of a German officer.71 Admittedly, the source quoted was a Vichy

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France news agency, which put all of the blame on a ‘foreign plot’ ,and the Irish Press offered no commentary on the brutality of the reprisals. Then came 7 December, and the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The United States was catapulted into the thick of the global conflict, and in 1942 would emerge as an ’official’ participant alongside Britain in the war of words over Eire neutrality. Not that this fact altered that war; it merely made it more open and direct.

Notes 1. Knox, quoted in ‘ “End Neutrality Act Now”: US Merchant Ships May Be Armed’, Irish Times, 24 September 1941, p. 1. ‘Barbarossa’ was the sobriquet attached to the twelfth-century Hohenstaufen emperor Frederick I, always considered one of the great heroes of German expansionism. 2. ‘Mr Dillon Creates Dail Surprise: Participation in War Advocated: Bases for Britain and USA: Fine Gael Supports Neutrality’, Irish Times, 18 July 1941, p. 1. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.; ‘Dramatic Debate in the Dail’, ‘A Dramatic Debate,’ Irish Press, 18 July 1941, pp. 1, 2; ‘Dail Gets Demand Eire Offer Bases’, New York Times, 18 July 1941, p. 5; ‘Eire Urged to Cede Bases’, Daily Telegraph, 18 July 1941, p. 6; ‘Eire and the War: Dail Deputy’s View’, Manchester Guardian, 18 July 1941, p. 5; ‘Neutrality Attacked in the Dail’, Catholic Herald, 1 August 1941, p. 5; ‘Tells Eire to Aid Us’, Daily Mirror, 18 July 1941, p. 1. 5. ‘Irish Press Scores Mischievous Impertinence of Judas M’Dermott’, Leader, 11 October 1941, p. 1; ‘Papal Action for Peace’, Irish Independent, 17 November 1941, p. 2; ‘Ireland Unanimous in Support of Neutrality, Says Brennan’, Leader, 29 November 1941, p. 1; ‘Mr De Valera’s Reference to Britain’, Irish Times, 6 October 1941, p. 1; De Valera, memorandum, 20 November 1941, MA 7/51, CBB; Helen Kirkpatrick to David Gray, 8 September 1941, DGP, FDRL. 6. ‘Eire Worried by Border Food Trek’, Sunday Express, 14 September 1941, p. 5; ‘Protestant Unionists Expose the Tyranny and Trouble-Making of Orange Leaders: Attempts to Embitter Relations between Britain and Eire’, Catholic Herald, 12 September 1941. 7. Weekly Home Intelligence Reports, 9–16 July 1941, INF 1/292, PRO; John Irwin, report, 21 September 1941, E1/947, BBCWAC; note to Air Ministry, 3 October 1941, FO 371/29109.W11871, PRO; Consulate list of Dublin firms with clear German connections, ca. July 1941, RG 84/1, DCCR, NAUS; German Activities in Ireland: Parliamentary Question, 3 July 1941, FO 371/26589.C7455; Enemy Agents in Eire: Parliamentary Question, 31 July 1941, FO 371/29109.W9502; reports on new Defence orders, 5 August 1941, INF 1/336, PRO; 11 September 1941, HCD, 5th Series, vol. 374, col. 291 fifth-column activity, 11 October 1941, INF 1/336, PRO; ‘Nazi Agents in Eire Held British Peril’, New York Times, 4 July 1941, p. 4; ‘Enemy Agents in Eire: Appropriate Steps’, Manchester Guardian, 1 August 1941, p. 6; ‘German Spy Ring at Work in Eire’, News Chronicle, 2 October 1941, p. 1; Winston Churchill to H. G. Gee, 28 June 1941, PREM 4/53/3, PRO. 8. Francis H. Styles, memorandum, 7 August 1941, RG 84/1, DCCR; fifth-column activities, 6 August 1941, 6 September 1941 and 17 September 1941, INF 1/336;

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9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

16.

17.

18. 19.

20.

from ‘operation barbarossa ’ to pearl harbor William Smale to Gray, 11 September 1941; Smale to Styles, RG 84/1, DCCR; Reuters news item, 29 September 1941, MS 18,334, INL. Item in Belfast News-Letter, 8 August 1941, MA 1/87, CBB; ‘Meanwhile, the Nazis are Busy in Eire!’, Daily Mail, 14 October 1941, p. 2; ‘ “Aid to the Axis” Allegation against Irish Catholic Society and Newspaper’, Catholic Herald, 17 October 1941, p. 1. Proposal for the Ireland Operation, 24 August 1941, vol. XIII, DGFP; ‘Parachutist Arrested in Dublin: Sequel to the Case of Stephen Held’, Irish Independent, 4 December 1941, p. 3; see also F. H. Hinsley and C. A. C. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. IV: Security and Counter-Intelligence, London, 1990, pp. 42-44, 89–90. Gray, memorandum on axis activities in Ireland, 16 September 1941, RG 84/9, DLGR; Gray to Styles, 20 October 1941, RG 84/1, DCCR, NAUS; PID Propaganda Research Section, Axis Propaganda and Strategic Intent Regarding Eire, 28 June, 19 July and 2 August 1941, FO 848/30, PRO. ‘Nazis Trying to Stir Up Irish against US: Propaganda Line is that America Wants to Sell Out Eire to Britain’, Chicago Daily News, 29 August 1941, p. 1; G2 Intelligence, Intercept Service, 15 September, 18 October, 28 October, 6 December, 14 December, 20 December, 22 December, 23 December, and 25 December 1941, MA G2/x/0217, CBB. Radio Stefani broadcast, 1 July 1941, MA G2/X/0678, CBB; Gray to de Valera, 7 July 1941, RG 84/9, DLGR, NAUS; Radio Stefani broadcasts, 8, 12, 21, 22, 24 and 25 July 1941, MA G2/X/0678, CBB; Radio News from Italy, ca. mid-July 1941, MA G2/x/0678, CBB. ‘Irish Vessel Sunk off Spain Coast’, Irish Press, 22 August 1941, p. 3; ‘Irish Ships Not Armed’, Irish Times, 20 November 1941, p. 1. ‘An Irish Brigade’, Times, 26 September 1941 p. 5; Postal Censors Report, 1 October 1941, PREM 3/129/5; Cabinet minutes, 9 October 1941, CAB 65/WM 101(41)8; Joint memorandum, S/S War and S/S Dominions, 25 October 1941, PREM 3/129/5; (signature undecipherable), memorandum to S/S Dominions, 29 November 1941, CJ 1/85, PRO. Memorandum of a conversation between Sumner Welles and Brennan, 7 November 1941, SWP; ‘Meat from Eire’, Manchester Guardian, 3 September 1941, p. 4; ‘They Have Gone Back to Black Bread in Eire!’, Daily Mail, 3 October 1941, p. 2; report on food supplies for Eire, ca. 26 September 1941, DO 130/21; James Bridie, ‘Dublin in Wartime’, New Statesman and Nation, 4 October 1941, p. 328; Cranborne, note on conversation with Gray, 1 October 1941, DO 130/17, PRO. ‘To Urge Irish Aid’, Daily Mirror, 23 July 1941, p. 3; ‘Obstacle to Friendship’, Catholic Herald, 29 August 1941, p. 2; Postal Censorship, extracts with reference to Eire, 1 December 1941, PREM 4/100/1, PRO. ‘In the Nation’, New York Times, 11 July 1941, p. 14. ‘Irish Here Denounce Willkie’s Proposal’, New York Times, 12 July 1941, p. 5; ‘Keep Faith with Them! Men Who Fought with George Washington’, Gaclic American, 19 July 1941, p. 1; ‘Will Roosevelt Seize Irish Bases’, Gaelic American, 30 August 1941, p. 4; ‘Ireland and the Battle of the Atlantic’, Irish World, 22 November 1941, p. 4; ‘A World War Vet’, Irish World, 23 August 1941, p. 4; ‘Ireland, American Outpost?’, Irish World, 26 July 1941, p. 4. Joseph Walshe to Thomas Coyne, 16 September 1941, MA 1/21, CBB; ‘Irish in US Warned to Help in Defense’, New York Times, 18 October 1941, p. 8; ‘Anti-Irish Irishman’, Gaelic American, 25 October 1941, p. 4.

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21. ‘US Building Us N. Ireland Base’, Daily Mirror, 11 July 1941, p. 1; ‘American Base in Ulster?’, Gaelic American, 19 July, p. 4; ‘The Atlantic Treaty’, Gaelic American, 23 August 1941, p. 4. 22. ‘Alert!’, Irish World 11 October 1941, p. 4; ‘What’s Wrong with This Picture?’, Irish World, 6 December 1941, p. 4. 23. ‘Irish Denounce New Propaganda Group’, Irish World, 18 October 1941, p. 1; ‘Irish Score Fourflushers’, Leader, 25 October 1941, p. 1. 24. ‘Full Circle’, Irish World, 8 November 1941, p. 4. 25. ‘Paper Irishmen’, Irish World, 6 December 1941, p. 4. 26. ‘Wheeler Asks Senate Probe of War Plot’, Gaelic American, 5 July 1941, p. 1; ‘Hits Propaganda Move among Irish’, Brooklyn Tablet, 15 November 1941, p. 2; Edward I. Fenlon, ‘The Case of Fire’, Brooklyn Tablet, 19 July 1941, pp. 16–17; McGranery, extension of remarks in the House of Representatives, 8 August 1941, Appendix to the Congressional Record, vol. 87. 27. ‘Thirty Million Irish Americans Support Ireland’s Neutrality’, Irish World, 29 November 1941, p. 1; ‘Eire Shows the Way’, Brooklyn Tablet, 30 August 1941, p. 8; ‘Irish in US Oppose War’, Gaelic American, 2 August 1941, p. 1; ‘Clan-na-Gael Policy Stated’, Leader, 16 August 1941, p. 1; ‘Back Neutral Policy of Eire’, Brooklyn Tablet, 22 November 1941, p. 7. 28. ‘Sea Power and World Empire’, Irish World, 6 September 1941, p. 1; ‘Propaganda against Eire Repudiated’, Gaelic American, 27 September 1941, p. 8; ‘British Here Boycott Irish and Jews’, Gaelic American, 4 October 1941, p. 3; ‘Propaganda in Dry Goods Stores’, Gaelic American, 15 November 1941, p. 9. 29. ‘Thoughts’, Irish World, 5 July 1941, p. 1; ‘Fr Coughlin Acclaimed as True Patriot’, Gaelic American, 5 July 1941, p. 1; ‘Will US Aid Anti-Christ?’, Gaelic American, 5 July 1941, p. 4. 30. ‘Military Wedding’, Irish World, 2 August 1941, p. 4; ‘Protests Aid to Reds; Day Asks F. D. R. Curb!’, Gaelic American, 9 August 1941, p. 1; ‘All Aid to Red Russia’, Gaelic American, 9 August 1941, p. 4; ‘The Rottenest Apple’, Leader, 5 July 1941, p. 8; ‘Presidential Persiflage’, Irish World, 12 July 1941, p. 4; ‘We Plead No More. Now We Defy the Administration!’, Gaelic American, 8 November 1941, p. 1. 31. ‘A Playwright Enlists in The War of Ideas’, New York Times Magazine, 7 July 1940, p. 8; Sherwood to Harry Hopkins, 30 July 1940, HHP, FDRL; Holly Cowan Shulman, The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy 1941–1945, Madison, Wisconsin, 1990, pp. 16–20; Sherwood to Donovan, 12 July 1941, RSP, HL; Allan M. Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The office of War Information 1942–1945, New Haven, 1978, pp. 1, 27–8. 32. ‘The Neutrality Act’, Irish Times, 29 September 1941, p. 4; ‘The Good Neutral’, Manchester Guardian, 14 October 1941, p. 4. 33. John G. Winant interview with W. P. Crozier, 24 October 1941, in A. J. P. Taylor, ed., Off the Record: Political Interviews of W. P. Crozier 1933–1943, London, 1973, p. 247; ‘Fr Donovan (Brother of Wild Bill Donovan) Tells Us about American Catholics’, Catholic Herald, 26 September 1941, p. 1; Gray to Sean Lemass, 18 September 1941; Gray to Karl A. Bickel, 23 July 1941, DGP. 34. ‘Report from Ireland’, American Mercury, 1941 December p. 657; ‘Contemptible Journalism’, Irish Press, 19 July 1941, p. 2; Gray to Sweetman, 21 July 1941, DGP, FDRL; Gray to de Valera, 22 July 1941, RG 84/4, DLCR, NAUS; Sweetman to Gray, 24 July 1941, DGP, FDRL.

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35. Betjeman Catholic Diary, 1941; J. Denis McCaughey to Betjeman, 1 November 1941, JBP, UVL; Mansergh to Betjeman, 2 December 1941; Betjeman to Mansergh, 10 December 1941, INF 1/786, PRO; PRO; Betjeman to B. E. Nicholls, 28 August 1941, R34/347/1; Betjeman to N. E. Costar, 8 October 1941, R19/568, BBCWAC; Matthew J. McDermott to Betjeman, 31 December 1941, JBP, UVL; Betjeman, letter to the editor, Irish Times, 20 October 1941; Mansergh to Betjeman, 1 August 1941, JBP, UVL. 36. Rodgers to Betjeman, 7 July 1941; Betjeman to Rodgers, 15 July 1941; Rodgers to Betjeman, 22 July 1941; Betjeman to Rodgers, 15 August 1941; Rodgers to Betjeman, 20 August 1941; E. Rawdon Smith to Rodgers, 26 August 1941; Rodgers to Rawdon Smith, 30 August 1941, INF 1/539, PRO. 37. C. Tennyson to B. J. O’Donnell, Dunlop Rubber, Cork, 8 July 1941, JBP; E. F. Hingeley to Nicholas Mansergh, 17 December 1941; Mansergh to Hingeley, 30 December 1941, INF 1/539; Hingeley to Rodgers et al., 9 July 1941, INF 1/650, PRO. 38. Mansergh to Betjeman, 15 September 1941; Martin to Mansergh, 13 September 1941, INF 1/786, PRO; ‘Protestantism in Ireland’, Irish Times, 12 November 1941, p. 3. 39. Betjeman to Hope, 24 July 1941; Betjeman to Hope, 15 August 1941; Hope to Mansergh, 9 October 1941; Michael de la Bedoyere to Brendan Bracken, 20 November 1941; Hope to Heenan, 26 November 1941, INF 1/786, PRO. 40. F. Hannon to Bracken, 31 October 1941, INF 1/760, PRO. 41. ‘British up to an Old Game’, Leader, 30 August 1941, p. 1, reprint of an article from Brooklyn Tablet; ‘More on Propaganda from British Sources’, Brooklyn Tablet, 6 August 1941, p. 8. 42. ‘Shun Movies! Hit the Film War-Mongers’, Gaelic American, 20 September 1941, p. 1. 43. ‘United Irish to Challenge Film Czars’, Gaelic American, 4 October 1941, pp. 1, 2. 44. British Council memorandum, ca. April 1941, BW 4/62; list of new MOI film productions, 16 September 1941, BW 4/63, PRO; John Walker, ed., Halliwell’s Film Guide, London, 1996, p. 575; ‘US Minister Sees Savoy Film’, Irish Times, 28 August 1941, p. 5; ‘The Other Aspect of Divorce’, Irish Times, 10 November 1941, p. 5. 45. Betjeman to B. E. Nicholls, 14 August 1941; Nicnolls, report, 10 September 1941, R19/568, BBCWAC. 46. Andrew Stuart to Nicholls, August 1, 1941, R19/568; Ryan to Ivone Kirkpatrick, August 26, 1941, R34/347/1; Note by Controller Home Programme, October 1, 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC. 47. Sean O’Braonain to C. Connor, 17 October 1941; John Irwin to Johnston, 27 November 1941; N. G. Luker to O.L.M., 14 October 1941, E1/956/1; R. A. Rendall, memorandum to J. B. Clark, 5 October 1941, R34/347/1; Rendall to E. Rawdon Smith, 28 November 1941, E1/956/1; Irwin to ENTE, 16 July 1941, E1/956/1, BBCWAC. 48. Connor to Alex Sutherland, 18 July 1941, R19/347/1; D. F. Boyd to Johnston, 21 October 1941; Johnston to ASNE HS, 27 October 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC. 49. Nicholls, memorandum, 11 March 1941, R34/347/1; Sutherland, memorandum, 2 July 1941, R19/568; G. D. Adams to 11 July 1941; Fletcher to O.L.M., 7 July 1941, R46/272, BBCWAC. 50. R. H. Alexander to Sutherland, 21 July 1941; Sutherland, memorandum, 22 July 1941; Sutherland, memorandum, 1 August 1941, R46/272; Sutherland, memorandum, 24 July 1941; Betjeman to Nicholls, 23 July 1941, R19/568; Betjeman, quoted in Rex Cathcart, The Most Contrary Region: The BBC in Northern Ireland 1924–1984, Belfast, 1984, p. 119.

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51. Nicholls, memorandum, 12 August 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC. 52. F. H. Hetley, memorandum, 14 August 1941; Pat Hillyard to R.P.D., 26 August 1941, R46/272; Hillyard to Nicholls, 26 September 1941; Nicholls, memorandum, 28 September 1941; MOI to Betjeman, 4 October 1941, R19/568, BBCWAC. 53. See Cathcart, Most Contrary Region, p. 120; ‘Irish Half Hour’, 15 and 22 November 1941, films 165/166; Rawdon Smith to Nicnolls, 11 December 1941, R19/568, BBCWAC. 54. E. P. Northwood to Nicholls, 10 July 1941, R19/568; John M. Andrews to F. W. Ogilvie, 10 July 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC. 55. Ogilvie to Andrews, 2 August 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC. 56. Andrews to Ogilvie, 6 August 1941, R34/347/1; Nicholls to Northwood, 15 July 1941; Nicholls to Betjeman, 7 August 1941, R19/568, BBCWAC. 57. Marshall to ASNE HS, 9 September 1941, R34/347/1; Marshall to Nicholls, 18 November 1941, R19/568; Andrews to Marshall, 18 September 1941, R34/347/1; Marshall to Nicholls, 19 September 1941; Betjeman to Nicholls, 29 September 1941, R19/568; Eason to Organizer Scottish Children’s Hour, 26 September 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC. 58. Marshall, memorandum on broadcasting to and from Ireland, 21 September 1941, E1/954; Betjeman to Nicholls, 4 October 1941; C. Connor to ASNE HS, 24 October 1941, R34/347/1, BBCWAC. 59. Kiernan to DG, BBC, 23 July 1941, R34/347/1; Betjeman to Sir John Maffey, 30 August 1941, R19/568; Sean O’Braonain to J. B. Clark, 4 November 1941, E1/946; D. F. Boyd to Johnston, 12 November 1941, E1/956/1, BBCWAC. 60. ‘Further Attacks on Censorship: Damage to the Minds of People’, Irish Independent, 9 July 1941, p. 3; ‘Censorship under Fire: Dail Criticism of Its Operation’, Irish Times, 9 July 1941, p. 5; ‘Mr De Valera Defends the Censorship’, Irish Times, 24 July 1941, p. 6; ‘The Censor’, Irish Press, 10 July 1941, p. 4. 61. Michael Williams, ‘ Views and Review’, Commonweal, 22 August 1941, pp. 423–4, 3 October 1941, p. 565; memorandum on Tablet response to Williams’ article, ca. August 1941, MA 2/67, CBB. 62. Coyne to Maurice Moynihan, 7 July 1941; Joseph Connolly to Michael Knightly, 8 July 1941; Connolly to Staff, 8 July 1941, MA 7/78, CBB. 63. Patrick Brady to the Ministry of External Affairs, 6 August 1941, MA 2/8; extract on Irish Echo exposures from National Review for June 1940; Joseph Walshe to Connolly, 16 August 1941, MA 2/46; T. Malone to Press Room, 10 October 1941; Knightly to Revenue Commission, 28 October 1941; Coyne to Walshe, 19 September 1941, MA 2/8, CBB. 64. Captain Peadar Cowan, letter to Irish Independent, 6 November 1941, MA 2/75; enquiries regarding advertising in Irish Independent, 19 December 1941, MA 2/95; Coyne to Knightly, 15 December 1941, MA 2/42; Coyne to Knightly, 13 October 1941, MA 2/79, CBB. 65. Connolly to Knightly, 3 July 1941, MA 2/64; postal censor extracts, 4 July 1941, MA 7/19; P. J. Daly to Revenue Commissioner, 19 July 1941, MA 8/12; Connolly memorandum to Frank Aiken, 25 July 1941; Coyne to Department of Finance, 5 August 1941; Purcell, memorandum to T. Malone, 26 August 1941, MA 3/22; J. J. Purcell to Connolly, 9 September 1941; Coyne to Purcell, 10 September 1941, Woolworth to Connolly, 13 September 1941, MA 7/47; Postal Censor to Woolworth, 15 September 1941, MA 3/27; H. C. Brady to Controller, 27 September 1941, MA

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67. 68. 69.

70.

71.

from ‘operation barbarossa ’ to pearl harbor 7/47; cables sent by Petersen, 19 November 1941, MA 2/89; messages to the King, November 1941, MA 4/33, CBB. Malone to Coyne, 5 December 1941, MA 7/47; Coyne to Aiken, 2 July 1941, MA 2/55; Connolly to Aiken, 18 September 1941; Smyllie to Coyne, 28 September 1941, MA 2/58, CBB. C. & M. Banks to Postal Censor, 9 October 1941; Coyne, memorandum to Aiken, 3 November 1941; Coyne to Eason, 5 November 1941, MA 2/55, CBB. Minutes of a meeting of the Irish Branch of the Associated Booksellers of Great Britain and Ireland, 14 November 1941, MA 2/55, CBB. Connolly to P. P. O’Donoghue, 9 December 1941, MA 5/17; Connolly to Moynihan, 30 July 1941, S 11 586, SPO; list of Macmillan war pamphlets, 11 November 1941; Coyne to Eason, 13 November 1941, MA 2/55, CBB. Coyne to Joseph O’Connor, 30 December 1941, MA 7/48; 2nd Lieutenant T. A. L. Smith to Film Censor, 26 November 1941; O’Donoghue to Malone, 1 December 1941, MA 7/49, CBB. ‘Mobilization of the ‘V’ Army: German Counter-Offensive’, Irish Times, 21 July 1941, p. 5; ‘Invasion Season Is at Hand: Warned to Be Ready by September 1st: America ‘Advancing’ to Verge of War’, Irish Times, 30 July 1941, p. 1; ‘Mr Churchill’s Speech’, Irish Times, 15 November 1941, p. 7; ‘Same Danger as in 1917’: Roosevelt on Threat to Democracy’, Irish Times, 12 November 1941, p. 1; ‘Sir Alan Brooke: New Chief of Imperial General Staff ’, Irish Times, 19 November 1941, p. 1; ‘Convoy Attacked in Mediterranean: British War Vessels Sink Ten Ships’, Irish Times, 10 November 1941, p. 1; ‘Big Desert Battle Now Raging: 130 German Tanks Destroyed’, Irish Times, 22 November 1941, p. 1; ‘Tobruk-Sidi Rezegh “Bridge” Complete: “Italian Division Eliminated” ’, Irish Times, 29 November 1941, p. 1; ‘German Tanks Fail to Break Through’, Irish Times, 1 December 1941, p. 1; ‘Ravaged Area in Heart of Belfast’, Irish Times, 11 November 1941, p. 3; ‘Wrecked Buildings in Moscow after an Air Raid’, Irish Times, 5 August 1941, p. 1; ‘German Officer Slain: 50 Frenchmen Shot: 100 Face Death’, Irish Press, 23 October 1941, p. 1.

6

Here Come the Yanks!: January–December 1942

On 7 December 1941, Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, and on 8 December the United States Congress voted for a declaration of war. Oddly enough, the Irish Press responded by describing ‘a knitting together of the moral forces’ in the United States in response to a Japanese betrayal. If the point was to focus the Americans on the Pacific so that they would leave Eire neutrality alone, it did not work, for the Axis then declared war on the United States, which brought America into the European war. ‘Here come the Yanks.’ What might be the consequences for Eire neutrality?1 The Irish-American press was outraged over Pearl Harbor. It emoted about the need for new leadership in America, heroic Irishmen in the military, and Japan as ‘the horde of heartless murderers’, whose Pearl Harbor victims ‘must and will be avenged’ with Irish-American soldiers and sailors leading the way. Said one Irish-American, ‘One Irishman can lick a dozen armed Japs with his bare hands.’ The Irish World complimented him for having ‘the right spirit’. Still, these Irish-American papers did not waver from their anti-British, proEire neutrality stand, or from praising Irish-Americans who had ‘no love for England’.2 In Eire too sympathy was with the US against Japan; however, when ´ Germany declared war on the United States, Eamon de Valera publically and officially reaffirmed Eire’s neutrality, acknowledging Eire’s debt to America but assuring the audience that neutrality remained the only policy possible. The Spectator thought this very wrongheaded. However, ‘if Mr de Valera is prepared to alienate opinion in America, that is his affair.’3 David Gray was convinced that pro-Allies sentiment was growing in Eire and advocated a propaganda campaign to persuade the Irish that the United States might provide arms, food and supplies in exchange for access to facilities helpful in waging the Battle of the Atlantic. This optimism was subdued by a pro-neutrality backlash when James Dillon told the D´ail Eire should enter the war on America’s side. Gray opined that this reaction was encouraged by German propaganda, ‘which is spreading the story that we intend to invade Eire’.4 The United States joined the war of words at once, including cracking down on assistance to the enemy, and anti-British and anti-administration publications, including Father Coughlin’s pro-fascist Social Justice.5 On 13 June President Roosevelt ordered the founding of the OWI with Elmer Davis, an experienced man in press and radio circles, as its head. Robert Sherwood was appointed Administrative Director for Overseas Operations, and Archibald Macleish, lawyer, poet, democratic idealist and former head of the Office of Facts and

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Figures, Assistant Director in charge of the Policy Development Branch. Their job was to present ‘all US information to the world . . . as though it were a continuous speech by the President. That is the real voice of the USA and that is what the world . . . must steadily hear.’6 Davis circulated a memorandum regarding overseas publicity work which said: ‘Whatever else you may be, on this work for the US in foreign areas you are a publicity man . . . Your job is to get ideas and emotions favorable to the cause of the US into the minds and hearts of other people.’ The channels indicated included newspapers, magazines, radio, newsreels, luncheon groups, schools, churches, conventions, store windows, hotel lobbies, paid-space advertising, handbills, posters, billboards, direct mail, sound-trucks, aeroplane loudspeakers and sky-writers. Meanwhile, ‘there are a number of good books on propaganda in the First World War. Read some of these.’ Richard Watts and Dan Terrell, soon to be press attach´es at the Dublin legation, likely also received the memorandum, since they needed to be at least cognizant of what overseas propaganda operations entailed.7 Of course, they also had to deal with Eire’s increasingly rigid censorship, which decreased the impact of US propaganda dissemination. London saw America in the war as a major step forward in dealing with Eire. Americans surely were now pro-British. However, by May 1942, it appeared that anti-British feeling in America was intense owing to the ‘hard-core of Anglophobes’ (including Irish-Americans), failure to achieve an early victory in the war, British ‘bad behaviour’ at Singapore (their surrender to the Japanese, presumably), ‘the tendency common to all countries at war to blame their allies for doing nothing’, and UK ambassador Lord Halifax’s lack of appeal to Americans generally.8 Gray thought Ireland might get Americans on board, because Eire’s failure to enter the war in support of both Britain and the United States would have a negative impact upon US opinion, even among some Irish-Americans. Gallup opinion poll results published on 22 February indicated that 72 per cent of Irish-Americans favoured Allied war bases on the Eire coast, and 56 per cent thought Eire should join the Allies by declaring war against Germany. Of course, it was doubtful that these results would make it past the censor and into the Dublin press, in part because there was not yet a press attach´e at the American embassy in Dublin.9 The Gaelic American called anyone who accepted the poll a ‘Gallup stooge’. However, subsequent polls showed similar results, save that over 60 per cent of Irish-Americans regarded Britain as an oppressor. Interestingly, one revealed that 50 per cent of Americans did not know that Ireland was neutral.10 Irish-American opponents of Eire neutrality included Frank Ennis, who claimed that ‘Eire is doing her part to cut the Atlantic life line – and her own throat,’ Congressman John W. McCormack, Fordham University’s Father Cronin, anti-partition activist Patrick J. Murphy, former Congressman Joseph A. Conry, Richard Grozier, editor of the Boston Post, and US Attorney for Washington, DC, Edward M. Curran, among others. Gray urged that their views be exploited in order to promote US policy in Eire.11 Irish-American supporters of neutrality claimed that Ireland would be wronged if coerced into entering

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the war, and urged America to forget Britain and deal with Japan. The Irish World wrote the presence of that US forces in Northern Ireland was tantamount to endorsing partition, and the Gaelic American dismissed a report claiming a majority of Irish wanted Allied occupation of bases in Eire for prosecution of the war in the Atlantic as British propaganda and therefore a lie.12 The Tablet claimed that a neutral Ireland was ‘the sole hope of Christianity’ in the midst of a barbaric war, and the Leader wanted to know why American forces were in Ulster when there were 3,500,000 troops in Britain doing nothing save living on the charity of the US government. The Leader was the most vitriolically antiBritish Irish-American paper, and went well beyond the issue of Eire neutrality. An anti-Protestant editorial, for example, charged that ‘bigamy, incest, uxoricide and adultery’ were the norm for the various names associated with the English Reformation.13 Meanwhile, various Irish organisations condemned Britain and the Soviet Union as the prime enemies of Irish nationalism and Roman Catholicism. The OWI, whose job it was to diffuse rumour and misinformation regarding the war among Irish-Americans, had its work cut out.14 De Valera made his opposition to American forces in Northern Ireland clear both through formal diplomatic representations and in public speeches, widely reported on both sides of the Atlantic. In the first instance, his government filed a formal complaint regarding the War Department’s Pocket Guide to Northern Ireland, which claimed that Eire neutrality was ‘the real danger to the Allied cause’. The State Department countered that War Department information fully substantiated the claim.15 In the second instance, he protested that Eire had not been consulted, which was reminiscent of the way partition had been imposed twenty years before, and if the arrival of US troops in these circumstances was meant to justify partition it was a waste of time. The United States landing was ‘aggression’ and a serious threat to Eire neutrality, while the United States naval base at Londonderry was ‘a plot to invite an attack on Irish territory regardless of the lives of Irish non-combatants’.16 Primate of Ireland Cardinal MacRory backed de Valera, claiming that American troops were overrunning the North against the will of the nation. There was a sort of paradox here: in public, de Valera expressed anger and resentment at the Americans; in private, ‘he ordered an American Eagle squadron flier who came down on the Dublin airport secretly be given gasoline and told to hurry off over the border.’17 Meanwhile, the British press went on the attack. The Daily Mirror reported President Roosevelt’s amazement that Eire protested the AEF (American Expeditionary Force) coming to Ulster, since Dublin had no say in Northern Ireland affairs. Other papers quoted Northern Ireland premier J. M. Andrews pointing out that Northern Ireland did not need Eire’s permission to host US forces. The Times denigrated de Valera’s protest against the American presence in Ulster, since he had suggested that if the United States would pressure Britain to end partition, ‘the problem of naval bases in southern Ireland could be solved.’ Meanwhile, full coverage was given to Sumner Welles’ assurance that ‘the presence of US troops in Northern Ireland was in no way a threat to Eire,’ and to Robert Brennan’s counter that this was the United States preparing official propaganda

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to be disseminated among the Irish people ‘if and when’ US troops in the north attacked Eire. As usual, the public expressed its views pro and con on the issue in letters to the editor in the British and American press.18 The arrival of US troops in Ulster, many having Irish names, was well covered by the American press. The Boston Post reported that they were well received, and newsreel coverage claimed that they had taken terrific storms in stride when crossing the Atlantic, and were ready to ‘ “dish it out” soon!’ Newsreels also filmed troops ‘getting a taste of the “Ould Sod” ’, a reference to Irish rain and soldiers wading through mud, being cheered when parading in front of Irish onlookers, and in July, playing baseball. ‘And do the Irish love it,’ went the narrative. ‘A huge crowd turns out to see the game, which is played for charity . . . ’.19 In August, American war-reporting icon Ernie Pyle went to Eire and wrote columns providing an overview of Irish history and culture, interspersed with reasons why Eire ought eventually to enter the war. Sometimes he was hard: ‘From all that I can gather, they (the Irish) began fighting the minute they set foot on shore, and have been at it ever since’; and Ireland was ‘the weak point in Empire Defense’. He was also complimentary: Pyle credited Ireland with advanced education as early as the second century, and painted St Patrick as among the noblest figures in history.20 Pyle divided Irish opinion between extreme ‘rabid English baiters’ and ‘British lovers’ who ‘do not like Americans’, with the vast majority in the middle. He concluded that actually the Irish were pro-Allies, in spite of war-related shortages.21 Gray doubted that Americans would accept Pyle’s positive view of the people of Eire, in light of the Eire government and Cardinal MacRory publicly depicting British and American troops as ‘overrunning the country against the will of the Nation’. Indeed, Bishop Hurley of Florida wrote to MacRory: ‘There are forty million Fundamentalists in my country who have very little sympathy with your Church but who are staunch Americans, and it can only make trouble to have you broadcast your views at this time.’22 The British were delighted when United States troops arrived in Northern Ireland. Winston Churchill saw this as putting pressure on Eire to cooperate with the Allies, and J. J. Tinker MP said in the House of Commons: ‘I think the time has come to approach Eire, to point out what is happening, and to suggest that they ought to see the wisdom of joining this country and its allies in making a stand against Hitler.’ In July, Elizabeth Bowen reported to the MOI that anti-American feeling in Eire was running high, which ‘probably has had the effect of sending British shares up’.23 Meanwhile, the News Chronicle called the American soldiers ‘the flower of American youth’, and the Daily Mail ‘the toughest of her fighting men’, with a photograph of American soldiers, one with his arm around an Irish girl. The Daily Mail Irish correspondent was intrigued that American soldiers saluted British officers far more regularly than their own, and was pleased that the British and Americans seemed to get along well. The Daily Mirror provided its readers with a guide to American soldier slang, such as if an American soldier should cry out, ‘ “Look at the baby blimp,” don’t gaze skywards, for he will simply be pointing to a jolly fat girl.’24 The Daily

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Telegraph was intrigued that while ‘Scandinavian types’ were the most numerous, US ranks also included Mexicans, Chinese and Native Americans. Other British press observations included that American troops were intelligent, disciplined and courteous, that they had become ‘Ireland’s New Sons’, and that they were there ‘to display that this is not a British fight alone and that if Hitler invades Ireland Eire will be defended by the great Western democracy also’. The Catholic Herald opined: ‘Maybe they will prove the go-betweens of Anglo-Irish good will – who knows?’25 British papers condemned the Eire government’s protest against American forces in Northern Ireland. It was outrageous, wrote the Sunday Express, that the ‘black and obstinate stupidity of De Valera and his henchmen’ opposed America defending Ireland against Germany. If de Valera refused to welcome the Americans, then ‘be damned to him’.26 The Manchester Guardian cited negative comments on Eire’s refusal to assist the Allies in New York’s PM, the Louisville, Kentucky Courier-Journal, the Chicago Sun and the normally anti-British Chicago Tribune. De Valera’s conscience must have been troubled by such reproaches, the paper concluded, given ‘how much he personally owes to American aid . . . ’. Some letters to the Manchester Guardian were equally supportive, one such opining that ‘America, as one of the Allied Powers fighting for survival, has a perfect right constitutionally and morally to land troops there for the defence of the United States and the United Kingdom.’ However, others argued that those Irish who supported a British and American presence in Ireland were ‘Quislings’, and that reporting Northern Irish enthusiasm for the British presence was simply press and broadcast propaganda.27 Pro-de Valera voices on the issue were a small minority. It was reported that US soldiers arriving in Northern Ireland were greeted by ‘Irish colleens’ shouting ‘hi-yah, boys’ and observing that ‘they are handsome lads, all right.’28 Sir John Maffey advised de Valera that any public protest would likely create anti-Irish feeling in both America and Britain, and Gray informed Washington that no editorial comment on the arrival of US troops had appeared in the Dublin press.29 Meanwhile, American press coverage focused in particular on US soldiers with Irish names – such as Private Marvin O’Neal – O’Neill in Irish, it was quickly noted – from South Dakota, and reported US training exercises, the construction of a large US naval base (an open secret known by the Germans, it was generally assumed), advice to US troops not to argue religion or politics with local people, and the ban on military personnel travelling into Eire in order to ‘avoid incidents’ (a ban not imposed on British soldiers so long as they were in civilian clothes).30 And, of course, the occasional difference between the Irish and the Americans, as when a ‘Sinn Fein mob’ insulted two US soldiers in Belfast. This was because, as Robert Brennan pointed out, Irish Nationalists saw the US presence as condoning partition.31 It was not entirely unexpected that the Eire government was soft on internment of downed Allied air crews, often returning them across the border to Northern Ireland. Joseph Walshe agreed to Gray’s request that US air crews receive different – which is to say more lenient – treatment than those from Germany,

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provided publicity was suppressed. Leniency for the Americans also applied to British flyers, which pleased Maffey.32 Still, Irish sympathy for the United States notwithstanding, the Eire government would not bend its neutrality and give in to demands for US naval and air bases on its territory. The British press naturally favoured the United States, because with America now engaged in the Battle of the Atlantic, the use of Berehaven, Cobh and Lough Swilly ‘has become more urgent than ever’, and de Valera was rebuked for making no concessions while expecting Allied protection and support. Ulster MP Douglas Savory denounced the British for having turned the three ports over to Eire in the first place. The American press – save for the Irish-American press – was also critical regarding bases. Helen Kirkpatrick wrote that if they were needed, the United States would have to persuade de Valera to release them, and that it was wrong for the Eire government to deny bases to the Allies when Irish workers were coming to Britain and taking ‘highly paid jobs while Britons are in the fighting services’. And there were reports that ‘well-informed diplomatic circles’ believed Eire would grant use of the bases in return for protection from a German invasion.33 This was fantasy. De Valera accused Britain and America of plotting to invade Eire, and then demanded military supplies from the United States so that Eire could look after itself. Churchill, backed by the Northern Ireland premier, J. M. Andrews, urged that the US give Eire no arms at all, and President Roosevelt agreed. To Cordell Hull he commented that it was high time for de Valera to ‘come out of the clouds and quit talking about the quarter of a million Irishmen ready to fight . . . Personally I do not believe there are more than one thousand trained soldiers in the whole of the Free State.’34 Of course, over time Eire did receive military and other aid, and the Irish accepted the American presence in the North. American Red Cross aid soon became a regular feature of US-Eire relations. Gray saw this as a kind of propaganda through which cordial relations could be promoted while sacrificing nothing needed for the Allied war effort.35 By July 1942 he was disillusioned and bitter, seeing Eire policy as wanting everything for nothing, and promoting popular support for this policy through propaganda that assured the Irish people that ‘by remaining neutral they stand only to profit and at the same time pay off the ancient grudge against Britain.’ This was the disillusionment that informed Behind the Green Curtain, Gray’s unpublished memoir of his time in Dublin.36 Eire–German connections, always a factor in the war of words, increased in significance once the United States was in the war. The Allies’ immediate concern was the danger of a German invasion of Eire, which in de Valera’s view might be provoked by American troops in the North and publicity regarding the American naval base at Londonderry – all intentional as a way to force Eire to end neutrality. British, American and Eire authorities regularly exchanged memoranda and reports assessing possibilities and probabilities, and detailing every conceivable route through which the Germans might approach Ireland.37 Fear of a German invasion soon waned, but concern regarding German subversion and propaganda did not. Reports of German links with the IRA were a

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regular feature in the British and American press, as were reports of IRA threats against Americans in Ulster, which made many American readers conclude that Eire neutrality encouraged fifth-column activities. The Irish-American press attacked such reports as anti-Irish propaganda, while Brennan termed them anti-neutrality propaganda – much the same thing.38 German propaganda in Eire now intensified. John Winant concluded that given the number of Catholics in the AEF, German agents must have inspired an Ulster Protestant issue denouncing Catholics as traitors. German propaganda broadcasts to Eire were delivered by such pro-Nazi Irish expatriates as Pat O’Brien, Susan Sweeney and Francis Stuart, who appealed to Eire to defend its neutrality, attacked President Roosevelt as ‘selfish and brutal’ and a pawn in Britain’s imperialist game, warned against the threat to Ireland of Britishbacked Bolshevik Russia, made anti-Semitic commentaries supposedly based on the views of Irishmen, denounced Wall Street and Hollywood, which would support the British Empire at the expense of the Irish, paid tributes to IRA terrorists, read in Gaelic from the Wolfe Tone diaries, and much else.39 Meanwhile, Gray reported word-of-mouth stories spread by Axis agents, such as GIs behaving badly towards Irish women, and calls for public protests in support of jailed IRA terrorists. He was not surprised when the Brazilian consul told him that the German legation engaged in intense propaganda activities, directed what the Italian minister should do and say, ‘presumably, with instructions from Berlin’, and that Eire External Affairs officer Frederick Boland was pro-Axis and turned over to the German and Italian legations anything that might interest them. In March, he and Maffey discussed with Walshe steps that might be taken to curtail Axis propaganda. But Walshe feared the protests that might follow if such actions went beyond established censorship rules.40 For propaganda disseminated in Eire to work, a clear understanding of extant views was needed. Elizabeth Bowen regularly reported on Irish opinion to the Dominions Office, which shared her reports with the Americans. Her findings in 1942 included: not impressed by a German legation appeal for old clothes for German troops serving in Russia, many Dubliners collected rubbish – motheaten curtains, bits of carpet etc. – and dumped it on the legation steps; Dubliners took umbrage at James Dillon’s D´ail speech favouring an end to neutrality; Irish people generally regarded active participation in the war as out of the question, and resented US troops in Derry; the Censorship denied the Irish access to news films that actually dealt with the war, allowing instead only ‘escape films’ with little reference to events happening outside of Ireland; and in County Cork, there seemed to be almost no pro-German feeling.41 American diplomatic officials also assessed Irish opinion, which included a Cork resident informing US consul William Smale that ‘every decent Irishman hopes in his heart’ for a United Nations victory in the war. Smale opined that this might have something to do with the increased decline in the economy, which was inspiring more and more Irish to ask ‘what price neutrality?’42 Meanwhile, Gray noted Allied successes in North Africa and Russia, as reported in Letter from America, the legation propaganda bulletin launched in October. He wrote to the US Commander in

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Northern Ireland: ‘What has happened in North Africa is the best propaganda that could be imagined in this country.’43 It was a given that propaganda was central to moving Irish popular opinion in America’s direction. But what exactly was to be done? Most thought the best approach was unofficial propaganda, such as showing American advances in industry, agriculture, science, art, sports and the like as a way of gaining Irish admiration for the future.44 However, Gray wanted American propaganda in more political and war-oriented terms. He and James Warburg, the OWI’s man in London, agreed that propaganda ‘in the form of authoritative statements by world figures is the profitable line to take here’, such as that America would win the war, no binding peace could be made with Hitler, Germany was the enemy of the Catholic Church, and the US, the UK and Canada would establish a cooperative system for implementing the Atlantic Charter – ‘those who do not sign up will have their ticket written for them’ – which meant that those who enjoy freedom, such as Eire, must accept responsibility for helping preserve it. The ‘world figures’ Gray had in mind included Cardinal Hinsley in London, OWI head Elmer Davis and, of course, Roosevelt, commenting on Axis mistreatment of civilians and proclaiming Allied success in the war.45 Richard Watts was also at the meeting with Warburg, which was his initiation as the newly arrived US press attach´e into the war of words in Eire. Watts was Irish-American, a drama critic with the New York Herald Tribune, had many friends in Dublin theatre, and was a long-standing enthusiast for Dublin’s Abbey Theatre.46 He received his instructions and directions from the OWI Overseas Operations Branch, and was to report to Gray, whose office ‘will assist you in the transaction of your business’. Watts’ job, like that of John Betjeman, would be to disseminate propaganda – posters, pamphlets, periodicals and other printed matter, and documentary films – and to undertake ‘such general promotional activities of this agency as may tend further to increase already existing cordial relations’, such as continuing to write a New York Herald Tribune column on Dublin theatre.47 Gray was convinced that ‘there is an urgent need for action . . . to counteract German propaganda in Ireland.’ That meant getting around censorship controller Frank Aiken, who would not allow distribution of Look magazine, and would likely not allow press advertisements for American broadcast propaganda such as Voice of America and Voice of Victory.48 Moreover, there were no facilities for circulation of the print already in stock, nor storage space for more to come. In July Gray complained that an earlier report to this effect had been ignored. In fact, Robert Sherwood had offered the legation financial support through the OWI if it wished to hire local people to help circulate the material.49 However, in October Gray complained again that he still had no storage space for the propaganda material that was accumulating rather than being distributed. Moreover, Watts had received no instructions on how to handle the material. Gray advised that as things stood, sending more material was a great waste of money. That advice got Cordell Hull’s attention, and a week later he cabled Gray that up to $500 had been authorised for his use in distributing OWI materials.50 Even so,

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at year’s end the OWI still appeared unclear on what was actually needed, and neither Francis Styles, Gray nor Smale had any instructions from the OWI regarding propaganda in Cork. The confusion and lack of organisation was clear when Smale wrote to Styles asking what authority Watts had as press attach´e, and therefore by implication as director of propaganda in Eire, and Styles replied that Watts ‘has no authority to make you do anything’.51 Gray did convince Washington to authorise an American press bureau in Dublin, in order to counter the ‘clever and virulent propaganda’ being published by the German press bureau. Moreover, an American press bureau would help persuade the Irish that America would win, that Hitler was anti-Catholic and a liar, and that Ireland’s survival was tied to Allied success in the war. And it would avoid criticising the Eire government. These objectives could be accomplished by special broadcasts for a proposed Northern Irish radio service, and by mailing American periodicals (Gray specified Look, Life and Time) and a weekly news bulletin to the Catholic clergy and hierarchy, the Eire government, legislative and civil service members, Eire school teachers, members of the medical and nursing professions, and any Irish having contact with US consulates. Gray recommended Helen Kirkpatrick to head the bureau – an odd choice considering her outspoken negativity regarding Eire neutrality policy, and she was passed over in favour of Watts.52 While there were delays, the decision was made and by late autumn the bureau was up and running, with a mailing list of some 18,000, and ‘fan mail’ with a 90 per cent approval rate. Gray spoke well of Watts as bureau director and of the official news bulletin, Letter from America, though it could be improved. Gray was grateful that he did not have to be overlord of propaganda dissemination in Eire, though he did perceive his role as ambassador, which brought him into ´ frequent contact with Eamon de Valera, as doing ‘personal propaganda’. For example, when de Valera refused to give America an advantage by cutting back on censoring news to America, Gray replied, ‘But we want an advantage, a great advantage which we think we deserve.’ He considered telling de Valera that Eire would lose American opinion if it was known that he was reluctant to give the United States preferential treatment over the Axis powers. Gray thought that Roosevelt ignoring Eire’s views so far as US policy was concerned was a good idea. The one thing de Valera could not stand, he wrote to the President, was being ignored.53 Gray and Watts played down the dissemination of American propaganda; the press bureau ‘only gave out news’. For example, when E. R. ‘Spike’ Marlin addressed the Eire Labour Party on the US social security programme, he assured Gray that ‘if there were any in the audience who expected war propaganda they were disappointed.’ One interesting twist: when an anti-USA voice referred to the Statue of Liberty as a ‘memorial to the dead’, the crowd was angered, and some shouted out disassociation with the critic. Marlin was pleased: ‘The opposition roused by this pointless critic did more to win us friends than anything I could have said.’ Indirect propaganda to be sure, and useful; so was following the British lead and having American entertainers – singers, comedians etc. – come to Ireland.

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‘I think it would be good propaganda to get American entertainers over here,’ Gray opined at year’s end.54 Curiously enough, Gray made this observation to Erskine H. Childers, a member of the Fianna F´ail inner circle. The Irish saw propaganda content in American print, broadcast and film material, even after it had been examined by the Eire censors. They were not lulled into accepting that the bulletin Comments from the American Press was an ‘unbiased’ presentation of American press editorial opinion; after all, the purpose of editorials is to influence the reader’s opinion.55 The print material list included such news magazines as the Nation, Time and Look, circulated via mailing lists, and books and pamphlets, such as Robert Trumbull’s The Raft, the story of a downed bomber crew who travelled a thousand miles on a rubber raft measuring four feet by eight, and Children of the USA, which asserted that ‘his features might be familiar but you’d know, somehow, that this child was the result of a blending of races. He would bear the indefinable imprint of America.’ (Curiously, this comment was connected with a photograph of eight children, all looking unmistakably Anglo-Saxon.) Howard Fast’s novel Citizen Tom Paine was on the list, as was The United Nations, a pamphlet defining the Atlantic Charter as the idealistic guideline for British and American war aims and objectives.56 Mailing lists were limited in numbers and geography: for example, ‘Century of the Common Man’, Cork 6,000, Dublin 10,000; ‘The Right of the People’, Cork 3,000, Dublin 5,000; ‘2,000,000 US Airmen’, Belfast 500, Cork 1,000, Dublin 3,000; and ‘Nazi War against the Catholic Church’, Dublin 2,050.57 Gray was pleased that the mailing list had reached as much as 18,000 by November. Some pamphlets were produced in far greater numbers – ‘Wings of America’, 100,000 copies and ‘The Weapon of Ultimate Victory’, about the Flying Fortress, 200,000, for example – but were designed mostly for markets other than Eire.58 Literature and broadcasting were major channels for US propaganda. Regarding literature, American institutions were encouraged to donate books to the Irish National Library, an approach which caught on with Irish intellectuals. Sean O’Faolain wanted to produce a special issue of The Bell for Ireland, focused on Sinclair Lewis, Erskine Caldwell, Vincent Sheen, Ernest Hemingway, John Dos Passos and Edna St Vincent Millay, among others. The project was under way by October.59 As for broadcasting, by mid-1942 as many as fifteen daily news broadcasts were available Monday to Saturday, and were listed in the ´ 60 In July, a Cordell Hull broadcast, press alongside those of the BBC and RE. commented on favourably by the Irish Times, called upon neutrals to fight for liberty if they believed in it, and Boston shortwave station WRUL launched the ‘Friendship Bridge’ series to Ireland, with a broadcast by Irish-American P. A. O’Connell assuring that, neutrality notwithstanding, Eire was behind America’s cause in the war. The series went well, and Gray recommended that it continue with ‘personal greetings, particularly from Irishmen to Irishmen,’ added. Subsequent presenters included Boston Mayor Maurice J. Tobin, an Irish-American architect who reminded the Irish that Ireland was the most obvious symbol in history for defending the principles of liberty, a Boston journalist, a historian of Ireland, and the Clover Club Glee Club doing a concert of Irish songs. The

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emphasis was always on how much Ireland had to gain from the Allies winning the war. Eire also received ‘America Calling Europe’, which reflected John Betjeman’s admonition that for Eire the emphasis should be on good relations.61 Of course, there were complaints. For example, broadcasts that gave publicity to the US naval base in Londonderry were criticised as an open invitation to German bombings, and a ‘Friendship Bridge’ talk by a Mr Haggarty was overly propagandistic, and he ‘persistently’ pronounced ‘Eire’ as ‘Ire’. Even so, by year’s end, the OWI was confident that rapid progress was being made in giving America a powerful broadcasting voice in Ireland as elsewhere abroad.62 And there was film, so far as the censor would permit it. After Pearl Harbor, Hollywood churned out films set in a war context which emphasised courageous, gum-chewing, wisecracking Yanks learning how to fight back against their evil enemies: Across the Pacific, Casablanca, Desperate Journey, Black Dragons and Wake Island to name a few. And there were war newsreels, and cartoons with Bugs Bunny, Daffy Duck and others as purveyors of American anti-Axis propaganda.63 These films were for home consumption, but the OWI hoped to get them into cinemas overseas as well. The problem was, as Sidney Bernstein, MOI Films Division liaison with Hollywood, put it, much Hollywood film simply did not provide a realistic view of Americans. In Bernstein’s words: We don’t want dull or solemn pictures, but we would like some that seem less absurd in the daytime. We want pictures that give an honest interpretation of the war . . . that make the soldier appreciate the factory worker, and the munitions worker understand the monotony, the bitter frustration of the soldier’s life. Phony war romances and dramas haven’t their place in this war, for it is not a phony war. Bernstein wanted more Hollywood films along the lines of Mrs Miniver (a story of the indomitable will of ordinary British people to survive and win), released in 1942. George Gallup agreed, asserting that Mrs Miniver would make a much deeper impression on the viewer’s mind than would any number of government short films, and would be useful in promoting America in both Britain and Ireland.64 In October, the Irish Times noted that the war was changing for the better Hollywood’s approach to film making, and that even Walt Disney was turning to a more serious purpose: ‘Mickey [Mouse] has been drafted and Donald Duck is working full-time in the Navy.’65 The Dublin News Letter (official US propaganda), provided by OWI London and forwarded by pouch, was circulating in Dublin by spring 1942. It was filled with pro-American and anti-German information and propaganda.66 The Medical News Letter followed, put out by the American Medical Association, which aimed at creating ‘good feelings towards the United States among Irish medical men’. The most important US print propaganda for Eire, Letter from America, edited by Richard Watts, was circulated among clergy, teachers, government officials and lawyers, and later to anyone who requested it. By December its circulation was over 18,000 copies. Subject matter included American Catholics (reports of murdered missionaries, for example), the US war effort, President

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Roosevelt criticising Germany, teaching the Irish language in American universities, schedules for Voice of America broadcasts, photographs of General Dwight Eisenhower, honour paid to French resistance fighters, and items about the progress of the war emphasising Allied successes. There often were antiGerman jokes as well.67 Letter from America had to refine its efforts – too heavy and dull, complained Gray about the fourth issue – but it was considered overall to be a notable success. Of the responses received at the embassy, twenty-five were favourable and only five critical, one of the latter from someone claiming to be a National Socialist. Favourable letters increased in number over time and only a handful of people requested that they be taken off of the mailing list. Gray believed Watts was one of the main reasons for success. ‘You could not have sent a better man,’ he wrote to Elmer Davis.68 Some believed that distribution of Letter from America by post would make the censor a bit easier. Gray did not agree. He saw Eire press censorship as oppressive, even when Thomas Coyne encouraged Ernie Pyle’s reports from Eire on the grounds that Pyle avoided ‘ballyhoo’ in favour of matter-of-fact commentary. Coyne had warned Washington that the new Emergency Powers Order (No. 151) extended the censorship of printed matter and gave authorities additional power to ‘seize’ articles and other documents. Gray complained that many facts were suppressed by the censor, that even episcopal pastorals critical of the Axis and favourable to the Allies were not permitted publication, and that the censor allowed the Irish Press to be consistently anti-American. Clearly, he concluded, certain government officials were ‘venomously antagonistic to us’ for ‘upholding the British cause’.69 Frank Aiken topped the list. In October, Gray wrote to Roosevelt: ‘I fear that your friend Frank Aiken the Censor means to make trouble for our press bulletin when it finally appears . . . If Aiken tries to stop our publication, we ought not to take it lying down.’70 Gray was elated by the positive responses to Letter from America after its first month of circulation. However, Coyne noted that the censors received many letters expressing outrage. One from a priest complained that ‘the USA people in Dublin are busy on propaganda and that he doesn’t like it’; another that ‘it does not seem correct to me that citizens of a neutral country should be the subject of such propagandist communications’; and still another agreed that this was ‘war propaganda done up by one of the belligerents’, which was likely to do harm to Eire neutrality. Others cited offensive articles and suggested rather strongly that the censor ought to do something about it. Yet in spite of complaints, the censor did not crack down on Letter from America. The Censorship did go ‘a bit easier’ on the newsletter, and at year’s end Coyne was taking no steps regarding its contents, and so informed Aiken. All the same, the telegraph censor kept Coyne’s office well supplied with intercepted items sent from Washington to the legation for publication in the newsletter.71 Censorship of film was another matter. Film was a medium for mass public consumption and, in the outraged view of the Leader in San Francisco, a medium for anti-Irish neutrality propaganda and ‘defaming the race’. The latter complaint was based on a charge that Hollywood tended to give film villains

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Irish names.72 Throughout 1942, American and British film distributors accused Eire film censors of working overtime, and the film censorship director, Richard Hayes, of being unreasonable and unrealistic. Distributors were convinced that the German legation had a hand in this, since American pictures sympathetic to the Allies were cut or banned while Nazi films and newsreels were not.73 Cordell Hull directed Gray to find out if all this was true, because if it was, ‘discriminatory treatment of this character . . . could not be permitted to pass without the strongest representations on our part.’ Gray found that the accusations were well off base: Nazi propaganda and newsreel films were not shown, and 95 per cent of all films shown in Ireland were American. In short, while he did not and never would trust Aiken, Gray conceded that at this point there was ‘no ground on which this Mission may protest’. Indeed, films often were banned on moral grounds – the puritanical Irish clergy, he wrote – which was another matter altogether.74 However, the ambassador’s investigation did turn up some ‘curious at best’ reasoning on the part of the censors, such as banning the film Wake Up and Dream, which included the line ‘my garden is being attacked by Japanese beetles’. As the reference had nothing to do with Japan or the war, Gray wondered if the censor should not also cut references to ‘Brussel sprouts, German measles, Chinese White, Italian Spaghetti, French beans or Dutch Courage’? Then there was a scene in which a character kept smashing plates for no reason, and before smashing the last one, turns it over and reveals the words ‘Made in Japan’. Perhaps the censor saw this as an advertisement for Japan. Gray also found it curious that a number films banned in September 1939 – notably All Quiet on the Western Front and I Was a Spy – had played in Ireland at least once before the war began.75 The justification for film censorship was broad: it covered anything ‘the public exhibition of which would be prejudicial, directly or indirectly, to the public safety or to the preservation of the State’. Also, the apparatus for those who rented and showed foreign films and newsreels to lodge a formal appeal against the Censorship was abolished, which made the censor seem even more arbitrary and authoritarian. In a meeting with Aiken, spokesmen from the Kinematograph Renters Society (KRS) complained that audiences hungered to see newsreel material, which usually was information, not propaganda, and that the propaganda element in films such as Mrs Miniver was only a veneer ‘to catch the fancy of the war-minded’. Only minor cuts would be needed. The KRS was concerned that as of September 1942 the number of films available was rapidly dwindling – only 252 submitted to the censor for the year so far, and twenty-nine of those rejected and another eighty-eight cut – and if they were to maintain their business, there had to be more leeway. To that point, Aiken listened. Then the KRS asked, why allow A Yank in the RAF and then abruptly pull it from the market, and Aiken responded that any films which might lead to demonstrations in theatres and cinemas could not be permitted. But, the KRS countered, 40,000 filmgoers had seen A Yank in the RAF before it was withdrawn, and there had not been not a single demonstration. True, Aiken replied, but people had gone home afterwards

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‘with a certain amount of resentment and dissatisfaction at the exhibition of a film of this type’. At this point, the KRS spokesmen probably threw up their hands.76 Foreign films banned or cut in 1942 included serials, documentaries and features. Don Winslow of the Navy (USA) was paramount in the first category because it contained villains who were ‘evil-appearing composite types of German and Japanese’. In the second, A Day in the Life of Soviet Russia (USSR) was banned on Aiken’s direct order, for which he refused to provide justification. His only comment, apparently, was that while the government ‘hadn’t a leg to stand on’ in banning the film, it had to be understood that ‘this country is in a very delicate situation – very delicate.’ It was speculated that Ambassador Eduard Hempel had protested against the film. American feature films banned or cut in 1942 included Dangerous Moonlight, Sergeant York, The Philadelphia Story, The Man I Married, Man at Large, Underground, International Lady, Confessions of a Nazi Spy, Nurse Edith Cavell, Lancer Spy and Escape to Glory, among others. All were anti-Nazi, pro-British, or said to be immoral, as in the case of He Stayed for Breakfast and This Thing Called Love. The MPPDA did not even bother to send films such as The Mortal Storm, Nazi Agent and Somewhere I’ll Find You to Ireland because ‘we considered these had no chance’ of passing the censor. They did send To the Shores of Tripoli, however, a propaganda film promoting the US Marines which passed the censor and opened in Dublin in November 1942.77 Still, difficult though Hayes and Aitken could be, American films became a presence in Eire in 1942, just as did the AEF in Northern Ireland. At year’s end, the US consul filed an encouraging report regarding film as a weapon in the war of words. It included such statistics as that Eire had approximately 260 cinemas and film-halls with a total of 120,000 seats; that twenty-one million Irish attended films annually (which meant an average of seven film visits per annum per capita); that of the 457 feature films submitted to the censor in 1942, 401 were American and the rest British; and that 80 per cent of non-feature-length films were also American, save for the mostly British educational films and newsreels. Of course, the censor’s cuts spoiled many films, but on the other hand, war films that did make it past the censor ‘found ready acceptance’. The point was also made that as nearly all films shown were of United Nations origin, ‘this is propaganda enough without being of the direct order.’ Propaganda other than that of ‘the direct order’ included films with Irish themes in which Irish characters were realistic – no ‘Bowery cum brogue’ Irish accents, no depicting the Irish as brainless buffoons, no emphasis on characters as Protestant or Catholic, and no such blarney phrases as ‘begorrah,’ and ‘more power to your elbow’. In short, the consulate concluded, when done properly, which is to say with propaganda of such subtlety as to get it past the censor, American film could be as effective a propaganda channel in Eire as any other.78 Clearly, the Yanks not only had arrived but were well entrenched in Ireland by the end of 1942. If the Eire government was sometimes perturbed and even antagonised by the fact, the British certainly were not. American involvement

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in the war of words could only enhance their efforts at bringing the Irish on board the British cause, if for no other reason than that the Irish generally viewed Americans more positively than they did Britons. Soon after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Winston Churchill allegedly remarked: ‘Now we have won the war.’ He probably did not mean the war of words over Eire neutrality as well as the shooting war in Europe and the Pacific. Or did he?

Notes 1. ‘Japan Declares War on Democracies’, Irish Times, 8 December 1941, p. 1; ‘America’s Reaction’, Irish Press, 9 December 1941, p. 2; ‘US at War with Axis’, Irish Times, 12 December 1941, p. 1. 2. ‘Far and Near,’ Leader, 13 December 1941, p. 6; John Francis Casey, ‘The Fighting Irish’, Irish World, 10 January 1942, p. 1; ‘War with Japan’, Gaelic American, 13 December 1941. p. 4; ‘Irish Valor Again’, Gaelic American, 20 December 1941. p. 1; ‘ “One Irishman to Five Japs’ Regarded as a Fair Battle”, Gaelic American, 27 December 1941, p. 1. 3. David Gray to Cordell Hull, 8 December 1941, p. 250, vol. III, FRUS; Robert Brennan to Hull, 16 December 1941, pp. 250–1, vol. III, FRUS; ‘Eire and America’, Spectator, 19 December 1941, p. 570; ‘Taoiseach Greets United States: Sets Out Ireland’s Position’, Irish Press, 25 December 1941, p. 1; ‘De Valera Says Eire Neutral Unless Attacked’, Boston Daily Globe, 25 December 1941, p. 1. 4. Gray to Hull, 27 January 1942, vol. I, p. 751–3; Gray to Summer Welles, 14 February 1942, p. 758, vol. I, FRUS, NAUS. 5. H. G. Nicholas, ed., Washington Despatches 1941–1945: Weekly Political Reports from the British Embassy, London, 1981, pp. 14, 33; Harry Hopkins to Robert E. Sherwood, 30 January 1942, RSP, HL; The Secret Diaries of Harold L. Ickes, vol. III: The Lowering Clouds 1939–1941, New York, 1954, p. 45, entry for 11 June 1942; E. L. Packer, memorandum, 20 February 1942, RG 84/10, DLGR; Francis H. Styles to State Department, 7 November 1942, RG 84/2, DCCR, NAUS. 6. Sherwood to Hopkins, 24 February 1942; Roosevelt to Sherwood, June 13, 1942, RSP, HL; Allan M. Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information 1942–1945, New Haven, 1978, pp. 9–13, 31, 39; memorandum, 28 July 1942, RG 208/462/17, PFOD, NAUS; Sherwood to Hopkins, 17 December 1941, RSP, HL. 7. Memorandum, The Job Which You Are Going to Tackle, RG 208/462/17, PFOD; Robert Huse to Gardner Cowles, Jr, memorandum, 20 October 1942, RG 208/1/2, ROD, NAUS. 8. N. E. Costar, minute, 22 December 1941, DO 35/1109/WX10/9, PRO; Nigel Nicolson, ed., Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters, vol. II: The War Years 1939–1945, New York, 1967, 11 May 1942. 9. Gray to Welles, 26 June 1942, RG 84/10, DLGR, NAUS; Gallup poll, 22 February 1942, p. 323; Helen Kirkpatrick to Gray, 23 February 1942, DGP; confidential report, Office of Public Opinion Research, Princeton University, 3 July 1942, RG 84/5, LLGR, NAUS. 10. ‘Gallup Poll Is Being Used in Attempt to Prove Irish Here Want Eire Bombed’, Gaelic American, 21 March 1942, p. 1; ‘72% of Irish in US Want Bases in Eire; 56% in Gallup Poll Favor Joining in War’, New York Times, 22 February 1942, p. 12; Survey

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11.

12.

13.

14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

19.

20.

21.

here come the yanks! of Intelligence Materials No. 12, Office of Facts and Figures, 2 March 1942, HHP, FDRL. Ennis to Richard T. Cosgrave, 29 December 1941, DO 130/33, PRO; ‘Help of Ireland, India is Needed, Declares Curley’, Boston Daily Globe, 17 March 1942, pp. 1, 18; Robert Wilberforce to Richard Hope, 18 June 1942, FO 371/34127.A1868, PRO; ‘Ireland Shirks’, 27 January 1942, Appendix to the Congressional Record, p. A263–268; ‘Irish-Americans Favor Use of All Irish Ports by United States During War’, 10 March 1942, Appendix to the Congressional Record, p. A939; ‘Eire and the War’, 17 March 1942, Appendix to the Congressional Record, p. A1050; ‘Ireland’s Dilemma’, 13 April 1942, Appendix to the Congressional Record, pp. A1383–4; ‘The Sons of St Patrick’, Boston Post, 15 March 1942, p. 6; Gray to John Winant, 26 December 1941, RG 84/9, DLGR, NAUS. ‘Renewal of Threat to Ireland’, Gaelic American, 20 December 1941, p. 4; ‘Ireland’s Peril’, Gaelic American, 27 December 1941, p. 4; ‘Threat to Irish Neutrality’, Gaelic American, 10 January 1942, p. 4; ‘Hand Over the Bases or Else’, Gaelic American, 17 January 1942, p. 4; ‘US Army in Ulster’, Gaelic American, 31 January 1942, p. 4; ‘Bases Not Enough: Demand Now Is for the Whole of Eire’, Irish World, 24 January 1942, p. 1. ‘Keep Hands off Eire’, Tablet, 17 December 1941, p. 8; ‘Far and Near’, Leader, 24 January 1942, p. 6; ‘Clique That Is Trying to Smear the Irish Is Unrepresentative’, Leader, 28 March 1942, p. 1; ‘ “Martyrs’ Who Laid Foundation of Anglican Church Laid Bare”, Leader, 21 March 1942, p. 2. OWI Intelligence Report, 11 September 1942, PSF, FDRL. Welles, memorandum, 29 October 1942, pp. 768–9, vol. I, FRUS; State Department aide-m´emoire, 16 November 1942, RG 84/5, DLCR, NAUS. ‘Eire Calls AEF “Aggression”; De Valera Protest No Idle Gesture’, Boston Evening Globe, 30 January 1942, p. 1; ‘The Eire Protest’, Manchester Guardian, 29 January 1942, p. 4; ‘Dublin Protests Arrival of AEF,’ New York Times, 28 January 1942, p. 4; ‘Eire Was Not Consulted’, Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, 28 January 1942, p. 1; ‘Protest by Mr De Valera’, Irish Independent, 28 January 1942, p. 8; ‘US Troops in Six Counties: Statement by Taoiseach’, Irish Press, 28 January 1942, p. 1; Gray to Hull, 7 July 1942, p. 762, vol. I, FRUS. Gray to MacRory, 7 October 1942, DGP, FDRL; Hull to Gray, 27 November 1942, RG 84/2, DCCR; Gray to Hull, 30 January 1942, p. 754, vol. I, FRUS, NAUS. ‘Roosevelt Rebukes De Valera’, Daily Mirror, 28 January 1942, p. 1; ‘Ulster’s Reply to Mr De Valera’, Times, 29 January 1942, p. 2; Douglas Savory, 11 February 1942, HCD, 5th Series, vol. 377, col. 1498; ‘US and Eire’, Times, 30 January 1942, p. 4; ‘No Threat to Eire’, Irish Independent, 7 February 1942, p. 2; memorandum of conversation, Welles and Brennan, 25 February 1942, SWP, FDRL. ‘AEF in Ulster Eager for Fight with Nazis’, Boston Post, 27 January 1942, p. 1; ‘Irish Cheer AEF Troops on Parade: Mongrel Dog Adopted by Yanks Marches Entire Route’, Boston Post, 1 March 1942, p. 3; ‘It’s Batter Up in Erin’, 22 July 1942, newsreels, NAUS. ‘He Wouldn’t Be Surprised to See Eire Forced into War’, Boston Daily Globe, 25 August 1942, p. 15; ‘Island Weak Point in Empire Defense Line 400 Years Ago’, Boston Daily Globe, 26 August 1942, p. 32; ‘Goes to Dublin – People Courteous but Don’t “Drool” Over One’, Boston Daily Globe, 28 August 1942, p. 19. ‘Finds Irish Strong for Allies, Despite Their Own Neutrality’, Boston Daily Globe, 29 August 1942, p. 3; ‘Grave Shortage of Fuel – Cooking a Meal an Ordeal’, Boston Daily

january−december 1942

22. 23.

24.

25.

26. 27.

28. 29. 30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

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Globe, 1 September 1942, p. 17; ‘No Blackout in Eire, but Cities Are Dim Anyway’, Boston Daily Globe, 2 September 1942, p. 17. Gray to Welles, 21 March 1942, pp. 759–60, vol. I, FRUS; Gray to Joseph P. Kennedy, 11 November 1942, RG 84/10, DLGR, NAUS. Churchill to Lord Cranborne, 7 January 1942, FO 371/32591.W679, PRO; Tinker, 27 January 1942, HCD, 5th Series, vol. 377, col. 655; Cranborne, memorandum, 31 January 1942, CAB 66 WP(42)51; Elizabeth Cameron (Bowen), report on Eire opinion, 31 July 1942, DO 130/28, PRO. ‘The Yanks are Here’, News Chronicle, 27 January 1942, p. 1; ‘The “Doughboys” Arrive, Fighting Fit’, Daily Mail, 27 January 1942, p. 1; ‘They Salute Our Officers’, Daily Mail, 28 January 1942, p. 2; ‘US and British Navy Men Mix Well, Irish Visit Shows’, Boston Evening Globe, 6 July 1942, p. 2. ‘US Troops Settling Down in Ulster’, Times, 30 January 1942, p. 5; ‘Ireland’s New Sons’, Daily Mirror, 30 January 1942, p. 5; ‘Americans Now in Ireland’, Catholic Herald, 6 February 1942, p. 5. ‘Eire’s Folly’, Sunday Express, 11 January 1942, p. 4. ‘America to Eire’, Manchester Guardian, 12 January 1942, p. 4; ‘Spewing Hatred: While Genuine Americans Seek Unity Newspaper “PM” Sows Seeds of Discord’, Gaelic American, 25 April 1942, p. 1; ‘Smearers at Work’, Gaelic American, 11 July 1942, p. 4; ‘Eire’s Protest’, Manchester Guardian, 9 February 1942, p. 4; ‘ “Occupied’ Ireland”, Manchester Guardian, 14 February 1942, p. 4. ‘Thousands of Soldiers and Nurses Land Safely; Troops Fully Equipped’, Boston Daily Globe, 27 January 1942, pp. 1, 8. Cranborne to Churchill, 3 January 1942, FO 371/32591.W317, PRO; Gray to Welles, 27 January 1942, vol. 1, FRUS. ‘Big US Force Lands in Ulster with Tanks’, Boston Daily Globe, 19 May 1942, p. 1; ‘US Constructs Large Naval Base in Ireland for Battle of Atlantic’, New York Times, 2 July 1942, p. 1; ‘US Bans Visits to Eire by Troops’, New York Times, 19 February 1942, p. 4; ‘Our Men in Ireland Urged to be Cautious’, New York Times, 25 October 1942, p. 28. Ernie Pyle, ‘People Warming Up to the Americans,’ Boston Daily Globe, 21 July 1942, p. 14; ‘Londonderry Where US Has Naval Base’, Boston Daily Globe, 23 July 1942, p. 14; ‘Some Sergeants Not So Tough – They Even Drink Tea’, Boston Daily Globe, 12 August 1942, p. 17; ‘Eire Minister Protests’, New York Times, 8 September 1942, p. 8. Gray to Welles, 16 October 1942, vol. I, p. 767; Welles to Winant, 12 November 1942, vol. 1, p. 770; Gray to Welles, 1 December 1942, p. 773, vol. I, FRUS; Gray to Welles, 9 December 1942, vol. I, p. 776; Welles to Gray, 10 December 1942, p. 776, vol. I, FRUS. ‘US Presses Eire for Bases’, Boston Evening Globe, 12 January 1942, p. 1; ‘British Proposal to De Valera for Eire Naval and Air Bases’, News Chronicle, 12 January 1942, p. 1; ‘Eire is Neutral’, Spectator, 16 January 1942, p. 50. ‘Story of US Pressure on Eire for Sub Bases Is Called False’, Boston Daily Globe, 14 January 1942, p. 1; ‘British Have Washed Hands of Eire; Bases up to US’, Boston Evening Globe, 12 January 1942, p. 4; ‘Lord Chatfield Explains How Eire Got Bases’, Boston Evening Globe, 4 February 1942, p. 4; ‘Eire Expected to Grant Bases to Get Protection’, Boston Daily Globe, 6 February 1942, pp. 1, 3. Brennan to Hull, 20 April 1942, pp. 760–1, vol. I, FRUS; Churchill, minute, 5 February 1942; Andrews to Churchill, 12 February 1942, PREM 1/132, PRO; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, London, 1948, p. 1355.

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36. Memorandum, US State Department to British Foreign Office, 7 August 1942, FO 371/32951.W11271, PRO; W. F. Quinlan to Gray, 25 April 1942; Gray to Quinlan, 1 October 1942; Gray to Welles, 13 May 1942; Gray to George Allen, 18 September 1942; Allen to Gray, 16 November 1942; Gray to Norman H. Davis, 23 December 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. 37. Gray to Welles, 23 December 1941, pp. 252–3, vol. III, FRUS; Gray to Welles, 21 July 1942, RG 84/5, DLCR, NAUS; see: David Gray, Behind the Green Curtain. unpublished memoir, DGP, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming. 38. Memoranda and reports, January–July 1942, PSF, FDRL. 39. ‘IRA Spies Tell Germans Our War Secrets’, Daily Mail, 21 March 1942, p. 3; ‘IRA Threat Seen to American Units’, New York Times, 1 September 1942, p. 6; ‘Eire “Workers” Spy for Nazis at US Bases’, Daily Mirror, 22 September 1942, p. 5; ‘Arms Dumps in Ulster: Police Discoveries: IRA Manifesto’s Threats’, Manchester Guardian, 2 September 1942, p. 5; ‘Unfair Propaganda’, Gaelic American, 26 September 1942, p. 4; Brennan to Welles, 25 November 1942, SWP, FDRL. 40. Gray to the Duke of Abercorn, 18 October 1942, JWP, FDRL; transcriptions of German broadcasts taken down by Eire intelligence, 3 January–30 December 1942, MA G2/X/0217, CBB. 41. Gray to Parker W. Buhrman, 13 April 1942, RG 84/10, DLGR, NAUS; memorandum, 14 May 1942, DGP; Gray to Roosevelt, 3 September 1942; Gray to Roosevelt, 8 September 1942, PSF, FDRL; Gray, memorandum, 16 February 1942, RG 84/5; Gray, memorandum, 31 March 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. 42. Elizabeth Cameron (Bowen), report, January–July 1942, DO 130/28. 43. Gray to Welles, 30 September 1942, RG 84/5, DLCR; John Horgan to Smale, 15 October 1942; Smale to Gray, 1 December 1942, RG 84/2, DCCR, NAUS. 44. Gray to Winant, 7 December 1942; Gray to Welles, 28 December 1942, RG 84/10; Gray to General Russell P. Hartle, 5 December 1942, RG 84/10, DLGR, NAUS. 45. Gray to Roosevelt, 8 May 1942, PSF, FDRL; H. F. Brennan to E. L. Packer, 25 June 1942; Brennan to Packer, 21 July 1942; Brennan to Packer, 22 July 1942; Packer to Brennan, 23 July 1941, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. 46. Gray to Hull, 26 August 1942; Gray to Hull, 10 September 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. 47. ‘Mr Watts for Dublin’, Irish Times, 17 September 1942, p. 1. 48. Robert E. Sherwood to Watts, 25 September 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR; Gray to Hull, 26 August 1942, RG 84/5, DLCR; Welles to Gray, 3 October 1942; Packer to Henry E. Stebbins, 19 October 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR; Wallace Carroll to Watts, 24 October 1942, RG 84/5; Davis to Gray, 5 November 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. 49. Gray to William Donovan, 5 June 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. 50. Gray to Hull, 24 July 1942, RG 84/5, DLCR; Sherwood to Gray, 4 July 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. 51. Gray to Hull, 1 October 1942; Hull to Gray, 7 October 1942, RG 84/5, DLCR, NAUS. 52. OWI to Watts, 5 December 1942, RG 84/5, DLCR; OWI Overseas Branch, minutes of intelligence officers’ meeting, 16 December 1942, RG 208/468/808, PFOD; Styles to Smale, 17 December 1942; Smale to Styles, 19 December 1942; Styles to Smale, 22 December 1942, RG 84/2, DCCR, NAUS. 53. Gray to Hull, 29 June 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. 54. Gray to Roosevelt, 28 December 1942, PSF, FDRL; Gray to Carroll, 31 December 1942, RG 84/5, DLCR, NAUS.

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55. Marlin to Gray, 6 November 1942; Gray to Erskine H. Childers, RG 84/10, DLGR, NAUS. 56. Comments from the American Press, 14 November 1942, RG 208/462/9, PFOD, NAUS. 57. Welles to legation, 14 April 1942; Smale to Styles, 12 May 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR; Gray to Hull, 27 April 1942, RG 84/5, DLCR; Gray to Morris Gilbert, 3 July 1942; Gilbert to Gray, 19 July 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR. 58. Lists of materials prepared for OWI for overseas distribution 1942–3, RG 208/462/14, PFOD, and RG 208/1/3, ROD, NAUS. 59. Pamphlets and other propaganda items, September–November 1942, RG 208/468/ 808, PFOD; Hull to Gray, 30 July 1942; Gray to Hull, 6 August 1942; Gray to Hull, 28 August 1942; Welles to Gray, 6 October 1942, RG 84/10, DLGR, NAUS. 60. See Winkler, Politics of Propaganda, chapter 3; ‘On the Wireless’, Irish Times, 7 July 1942, p. 2; T. A. Hickock to Irish Times, July 6, 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. 61. OWI Guidance for Broadcasts, 22 August 1942, RG 208/362/130, OCR, NAUS; ‘Allies’ Post War Plans: Mr Cordell Hull’s Broadcast’, Irish Times, 24 July 1942, p. 1; ‘Eire’s Sympathies with America, Says P. A. O’Connell in Broadcast’, Boston Daily Globe, 14 July 1942, p. 4; ‘Dr. McGinnis Tells Ireland Exploits of Irish in America’, Boston Daily Globe, 4 August 1942, p. 4; Gray to Hull, 12 September 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS; See Robert Cole, ‘Good Relations: Irish Neutrality and the ´ Propaganda of John Betjeman 1941–43’, Eire-Ireland 30(4), 1996, p. 40; ‘Give Last Radio Talk to Ireland: 10th WRUL Broadcast Presented by Friendship Committee – Mayor Tobin Speaker,’ Boston Post, 15 September 1942, p. 4. 62. Parker W. Burhman to Hull, 18 July 1942, RG 84/5; Hickock to Gray, RG 84/11, DLCR; Frederick B. Bate to John Winant, 23 September 1942, JWP; Edward Barrett to Phillip Hamblet, 21 November 1942, RG 208/367/320, RAD, NAUS. 63. See Robert Cole, Propaganda in Twentieth Century War and Politics: An Annotated Bibliography, Lanham, Maryland, 1996, pp. 266–93. 64. Sidney Bernstein, ‘The War Job of Motion Pictures’, reported in the Film Daily, 26 June 1942; Gallup to Gardner Cowles, Jr, 11 August 1942, RG 208/1/1, ROD, NAUS. 65. ‘Films’, Irish Times, 18 October 1942, p. 3; ‘Donald Goes to War’, Irish Times, 7 September 1942, p. 3. 66. Winant to Gray, 4 May 1942, RG 84/5; Gilbert to Gray, 6 June 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. 67. Hull to Gray, 21 July 1942, RG 84/11; Hull to Gray, 19 October 1941, RG 84/5; Watts to James Warburg, ca. April 1942, RG 84/5; R. White to Warburg, 28 October 1942, RG 84/11, DLCR, NAUS; Letter from America, 30 October, 13, 20 and 27 November, 4, 11 and 18 December 1942, MA G2/X/1092, CBB. 68. Gray to Watts, 20 November 1942; Gray to William White, 16 December 1942; Watts to Gray, 28 December 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS; Gray to Roosevelt, 6 November 1942, PSF, FDRL; Gray to Davis, 23 December 1942, RG 84/5, DLCR, NAUS. 69. Pyle to Coyne, 1 July 1942; Coyne to Pyle, 3 July 1942, MA 2/91, CBB; Gray to Hull, 12 March 1942, RG 84/12; Gray, memorandum on the state of Ireland, 8 September 1942, RG 84/5; Gray to Hull, 25 September 1942, RG 84/10, DLCR, NAUS. 70. Gray to Roosevelt, 8 October 1942, PSF, FDRL. ‘Your friend’ was a parody of how Roosevelt and Aiken had got along on the Defense Minister’s visit in 1941. 71. Coyne, memorandum, 9 November 1942; M. P. Crow to Office of Censorship, 23 November 1942; J. Thomas to Stephen Roche, 2 December 1942; Michael

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72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

here come the yanks! Connaughton to Office of Censorship, 15 December 1942; Coyne to Aiken, December 5, 1942; Telegraph Censor records, 8 November 1942, M2/110, CBB. ‘Irish Censorship and Hollywood Propaganda’, Leader, 23 May 23 1942, p. 6. Hull to Gray, 5 October 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. Ibid.; Gray to Hull, 6 November 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. Gray, memorandum, 6 November 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. E. L. Packer to Hull, 20 August 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS; minutes, Kinematograph Renters Society meeting with Aiken, 18 September 1942, MA 5/39, CBB. Gray to Hull, 9 July 1942; Louis Elliman to Gray, 22 July 1942; MPPDA, to Gray, 5 August 1942; A. G. Neville to Packer, 23 October 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. US consul, Dublin, memorandum, ca. December 1942, RG 84/7, DCGR, NAUS.

7

‘Now We Have Won The War!’: January–December 1942

In 1942, American and British air crews who crashed in Eire were released while Axis crews were interned. Eire neutrality appeared to be more ‘benevolent’ towards the Allies, probably the result of recognising the practical realities of the now overwhelming Allied presence. The British grew confident that the war of words was moving Eire in their direction. Still, the Irish dared not abandon the principles upon which neutrality rested. As Robert Fisk phrased it, ‘to be neutral in public was one thing. To oppose neutrality in public was quite another.’1 Eire neutrality seemed as staunchly defended as ever in the new year. Daniel Binchy, former Eire ambassador to Germany, told Harold Nicolson that Ireland took pride in its neutrality, and Defense Minister Frank Aiken called for more food production so that the belligerents would understand Eire’s determination not only ‘to fight it out to the end, but to last it out to the end economically’. The Irish Independent called for political unanimity in support of neutrality, while Minister of Local Government Sean MacEntee warned that no internal conspiracy to engage Eire in the war would be tolerated. It is likely that he was more concerned about pro-British Irish than pro-Germans in the IRA. Even the Irish Times argued that Eire must be prepared to resist with arms ‘belligerent pressure’, for not to fight back ‘would be the last degradation’.2 Pro-neutrality propaganda was in order, and GIB director Frank Gallagher proposed a Weekly Bulletin that would explain neutrality policies in a more posi´ tive manner.3 D´ail members urged more broadcast propaganda on RE´ and Eamon de Valera speaking more frequently to the people. Press propaganda expanded with the Irish Press almost daily promoting neutrality and denouncing partition– in the latter case, on the death of Mary MacSwiney, virtually canonising the suffragette and heroine of Ireland’s war for independence – and the Irish Times demanding better propaganda than boring speeches for recruitment of Eire Defence Force volunteers. Local government and Public Health Office officials expressed the view that it was high time Eire began exporting Irish journals such as The Bell, the Dublin Magazine, the Capuchin Annual and the Leader (not San Francisco) for propaganda dissemination.4 Some in Britain doubted that Eire neutrality could survive in light of America’s entry into the war. A Daily Telegraph correspondent observed that now ‘there is a slightly more questioning note in the affirmation of faith in neutrality than when I was last in Ireland eight months ago,’ and that British propagandists

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might serve best by supplying Eire with news about the Roman Catholic world outside of Ireland ‘that is so resolutely anti-Nazi’. J. H. MacDonnell reported to the Dominions Office that little anti-British feeling was being expressed in Dublin because the ‘war in the Pacific has had a marked effect on the country as a whole.’5 Others saw little if any change in Irish opinion. Rev. Dr John Heenan was convinced that in the Irish view, ‘to declare war on Germany would mean the annihilation of her own within a few days and nights,’ that to give Britain access to air or naval bases would mean the occupation of Eire – which, of course, brought back bitter memories. Spectator columnist Alexander Duff came to similar conclusions. An Irishman had told him: ‘We are an independent nation, and . . . we decline to allow any other country to interfere’; Duff thought this a fair summary of Eire’s justification for ‘the comfortable policy of neutrality’. He also thought this was imposed by the de Valera government, which ‘refuse to tolerate any contrary opinion’, rather than an expression of the nation’s will. After all, Eire censorship made it impossible ‘to utter a word of protest in the Irish newspapers, on the radio, on the platform, on the films, or in the churches’.6 Such British press comments inspired a retort from Captain Denis Ireland that any doubts regarding the commitment of the Irish people to neutrality came purely from ‘ink-slinging journalists who propose to defend Britain by sowing dragons teeth in Ireland’. And Ambassador Robert Brennan assured Americans that at least 95 per cent of the people of Eire backed neutrality.7 Clearly, Eire neutrality was firmly in place, and pressure put on de Valera by Winston Churchill was having no effect.8 All the same, Anglo-Irish relations improved in the new year as Britain provided a well-publicised supply of additional Arms to Eire, and permitted Eire army officers into the British Army Battle School in Northern Ireland, which, it was thought, would correct ‘any impression that may exist in Eire that British troops are in any way inferior to the Germans’. Meanwhile, Eire supplied the British with food and drink–beef, scallops, eels, eggs, bacon, poultry, rabbits, mussels, salmon, kippers, herrings, oysters and 250,000 gallons of Irish whiskey.9 However, de Valera complained that British military aid was insufficient for Eire’s needs; Whitehall replied that in the war-related limitation on supplies, Britain had to put its own needs first. And there was the ports issue. De Valera demanded assurance that Britain would not occupy the ports, while the Admiralty asserted that their occupation would be a natural response to any attempted German invasion. A British film, Ireland – The Plain Issue, which the Eire government protested, exhorted Eire to give up the ports.10 And, while they did improve, economic relations remained strained. There was the transfer of many non-war production British industries to Eire – Britain supplied Eire with raw materials and received two-thirds of the output, Eire kept factories going and brought down rising unemployment, and Britain released some 50,000 British workers for war work. The arrangement did not give Eire priority status relative to Britain’s allies and other neutral countries, however, and the Navicert system was expanded to cover all supplies, which the Irish resented, putting strain on Anglo-Irish relations. Anglo-Eire relations were

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strained further when a King’s Bench Divisional Court ruled that on the basis of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act passed by Parliament in 1914, Irish citizens in Britain were liable to conscription into military service. This was too much for de Valera, who protested this was a blow to the ‘honourable respect’ Britain had heretofore paid to Eire’s neutral status.11 Then there was Protestant Unionist-dominated Northern Ireland, which continued to favour conscription in the North, even after Churchill dropped the idea, and remained as firm as ever on partition.12 Partition was a symbolic issue in the war of words. Opponents saw its existence as justification for neutrality; supporters saw it as the line distinguishing a loyal Northern Ireland from a disloyal Eire. Premier J. M. Andrews opposed creating an ‘Irish Brigade’ which would give recognition to Eire citizens supporting the Allied cause, for it would ‘confuse and mislead public opinion’ on the distinction between Northern Ireland and Eire. Andrews was committed to partition and wanted to sustain the Unionists’ cynical view of Eire. He had his supporters. Northern MP Douglas Savory and Senator Henry Taylor claimed that Ulster made great contributions to the defence of Britain, whereas by denying Britain access to Eire ports, harbouring German and Italian agents, and protesting the presence of Americans in Northern Ireland, Eire undercut it.13 Unionist extremists waged a propaganda war against the Catholic Church in Ireland. Headlines in the Ulster Protestant in October and November included: ‘Menace of Jesuitism: Our Deadly Foes Are All around Us!’; ‘Hitler’s Rule and Pope’s Identical’; and ‘Why Aren’t Convents Inspected? The Priests’ Brothel: Amazing Convent Revelations: The Murder of Infants’. David Gray suspected that German agents had something to do with these outrageous claims in an effort to turn Northern Catholics against Britain in the war.14 London encouraged the Eire censor to crack down on distribution of the Ulster Protestant south of the border. The MOI discouraged the British press from overdoing criticism of Eire, such as a Daily Mirror cartoon with de Valera sitting on a pile of firewood surrounded by flames designated ‘World War’, and leaning against a sign proclaiming Eire neutrality and refusal of naval bases. The caption was: ‘Flames Can’t Read, Dev!’15 However, the view was while Eire was in denial regarding the war and used strict censorship to impose that denial on its citizens, such as permitting not a glimpse of the war to appear in newsreels, it deserved harsh criticism. The Daily Telegraph claimed that the press, radio and even D´ail members ‘are completely at the mercy of the censorship’, and the Manchester Guardian reported Eire members of the Irish Trades Union Congress defeating a resolution that expressed ‘irreconcilable opposition to fascism’ because the fascist powers were belligerents, whereas Eire was neutral. Cyril Connolly wrote in Picture Post that the Irish took secret pride in the many Irish in the British forces, but also took a servile attitude towards Germany. Said one Irishman: ‘Ah, Hitler – ’tis no doubt he’ll be a terrible hard taskmaster, but ’tis no doubt we’ve deserved it, all of us.’ Connolly concluded that neutrality was sacred in Eire, but that beneath it lay a feeling of guilt.16 The MOI’s discouragement had little effect on the critical British press.

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The British press was sympathetic–within limits–regarding hardships inflicted on Eire by the war. Eire’s dependency on Britain was noted, along with the rising fear of famine in a country that had fallen into a ‘siege economy’. A Daily Mail headline read: ‘Famine Shows in Eyes of Irish Cottagers’, with a description of Irish people collapsing in the fields for lack of nourishment. The implied parallel with the Great Famine of 1845 was obvious. There also were reports of horses slaughtered to save oats, beef destroyed for want of buyers, and Eire going back to black bread, ‘and a sodden mass it is, made of whole wheat, potato, and barley flour’. Perhaps it was with such suffering in mind that the Manchester Guardian advised the MOI to go easy on specialised propaganda aimed at Eire.17 Anglo-American cooperation in confronting Eire neutrality had existed even when the United States was neutral. Now that cooperation expanded. Gray suggested that Britain and America set up an economic policy for Eire based on making ‘good-will tokens’ to the Irish people, so well publicised that the Irish government would be unable to exploit them for political ends. The idea was affirmed in a bilateral Eire policy discussion in June. The US and UK also discussed joint dissemination of propaganda to all foreign countries ‘in order that common objectives can be pursued and even common machinery employed’; except, perhaps, to Eire. Gray thought the Allies should not take on the Axis in a campaign of ‘circularized vituperation’ in Eire, and that they should try to persuade the Eire government ‘to stop all unsolicited propaganda’. Actually, Irish censorship already regarded all foreign propaganda in Eire as ‘unsolicited’.18 The discussions also considered that British and American propaganda should take on, in the first instance, hard-core American Anglophobes, including IrishAmericans, and in the second, anti-American sentiments present in Britain. The MOI had been working on the American ‘anti-British” factor for a long time, with positive results at least so far as the mainstream American press was concerned. Now, the OWI British Division would take on ‘explaining America and combating anti-American sentiment in Britain’, with former New York Times correspondent Ferdinand Kuhn in charge.19 The MOI had its work cut out where the Irish-American press was concerned. Its reporting was more anti-British than ever in 1942. The Leader’s editorials condemned ‘British diatribes’ such as Eire depicted as a pathetic little part of an island and damning de Valera as obstinate and stupid if he did not see the threat of a German invasion. A typical headline was: ‘Parlous Plight of ‘Eire’ Sore on Tender Heart of John Bull: He Would Fain Defend Her from the Trust [Thrust?] of the Horrible Hun – Says He Will Save Her Whether She Will or Not – Mentions Poland, Whom He Also Promised to Save’. The Leader also dismissed the Tablet as an anti-de Valera channel of British propaganda, claiming that it was more British imperialist than Catholic and ignorant of the facts of history, which were that Britain had always treated Ireland with villainous disregard. The Tablet’s ‘Englishness’ was mocked with this subheadline: ‘Cawtholic Journal Assails de Valera’. ‘Cawtholic’ occurred in other parts of the editorial as well.20 Meanwhile, the Gaelic American called for American opposition to any permanent Anglo-American alliance and attacked all pro-British commentary on

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the neutrality issue, whether British or American, as being anti-neutrality and anti-Irish, the work of ‘a horde of propagandists’ who continuously abused the Irish and even called them cowards. The ‘horde’ included American journalists in Britain and Ireland who ‘misrepresented’ virtually everything about Anglo-Irish relations. The paper was indignant when William Bayles wrote that the Irish were the only people on earth who saw banshees and fairies on toadstools in the moonlight and that 80 per cent of them favoured Britain in the war, ‘for which Bayles presented no evidence whatsoever’, and when American reporters claimed that the IRA bombed the Royal Hippodrome in Belfast because it was being used for entertaining American troops. Narrow, mean and simply not true. And when the New York Herald Tribune claimed that England ‘is seriously inconvenienced by Ireland’s neutrality’, the response was that: ‘Ireland has not been created for the purpose of aiding and bolstering up the British Empire at the sacrifice of her own interests.’ The Irish World agreed.21 Meanwhile, the Brooklyn Tablet pleaded with American Irish societies to step up their support for ending partition and uniting all of Ireland, and attacked critics of neutrality for suggesting that Eire was pro-Nazi. In fact, ‘its sympathies are certainly pro-Allies.’22 These were typical of Irish-American press views of Britain, reflecting the views of a significant part of Irish-American opinion. The fact only could encourage the Eire government’s determination to stand by its neutrality policy. Meanwhile, the always anti-British IRA encouraged British soldiers in Northern Ireland to desert to Eire, where they were promised ‘civilian jobs’. Those who accepted the offer ‘can be counted on the fingers’, and were mostly Irishmen.23 Sean MacEntee received wide press coverage when he reported in the D´ail that an ‘organisation’ in Eire, implicitly the IRA, was conspiring ‘to provoke attack upon us and bring about what these people have wanted – an actual state of war between Eire and Great Britain’. There may well have been something to it. An IRA propaganda sheet designated Britain as Ireland’s only enemy, listed all of the recent wrongs it had done to Ireland, and called upon the Irish to attack everything in the country with any British connections.24 Some in the Eire government feared that a significant portion of the Irish public might back an IRA conspiracy to provoke war between Eire and Britain if the execution of the six IRA men on Death Row for having murdered a Belfast policeman went forward. The American government agreed, and pleaded for clemency. In the end, only the man who actually fired the bullet was hanged. The Gaelic American claimed that if the ‘six Irish boys’ had been executed it would have been ‘mass murder’, the whole episode being simply another ‘act of British tyranny in Ireland’. The Irish World made the same claim, though in milder language.25 The pace of IRA terrorism escalated in 1942, beginning with a plot in late 1941 to assassinate John Betjeman, which, fortunately, never got past the planning stage.26 Terrorist acts in 1942 that did included a prison warder and a policeman killed by IRA men, attacks on police barracks on the Northern Ireland border, shootings in Belfast in retribution for the execution of the IRA killer, and, also in Belfast, bombings and manifestos promising armed assaults on British and American troops.27 Security generally was tightened, and anyone applying for

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travel permits between Eire and Ulster was closely scrutinised by both American and British authorities. The MOI, meanwhile, tried to keep track of IRA propaganda dissemination and encouraged the publication of any material indicating that IRA members were more ‘anti-fascist’ than ‘pro-Nazi’.28 Presumably, this was meant to encourage the Irish to favour the Allied over the Nazi cause. It was agreed that the IRA was ‘contaminated’ by contact with Nazi agents, and was prepared to aid Germany in the war. Speaking from prison, IRA chief of staff Stephen Hayes claimed that IRA–German connections were mainly propaganda designed to encourage IRA soldiers in their war against Britain. However, his own contact with Nazi agent Hermann Goertz was well documented, and the British government, and the British people, continued to assume that the IRA did espionage for the Germans in Eire. It was front page news in England when German spy Hans Marchner broke out of Mountjoy Prison and eluded the Eire authorities for two months. One of the implicit, if not always explicit, questions was whether the IRA had effected his escape.29 The Americans were also suspicious of Germans in Eire. That included possible interaction between Americans resident in Eire. For example, the State Department suspected that Dun Laoghaire resident Julester Shrady Post, known to be friendly with the Dun Laoghaire German colony and the Hempels, was likely a German agent, and so informed Francis Styles. (In fact, she had written to Frau Hempel in January to inform her ‘most sorrowfully’ that they could not see each other while the war lasted.) Styles looked into the matter, and found that in fact, Post had spoken out in favour of America winning the war, and while not particularly pro-British, was likely neither pro-Nazi nor a German agent. Meanwhile, David Gray informed the State Department that there were at least sixty-two firms and individuals in Eire with Axis-related economic and other interests; that did not make Washington happy, either. Both American and British radio broadcasts suggested that the German navy profited from weather reports supplied by Dublin. This did not make the Irish happy. Then there was fear that Germany would launch an attack on Ireland aimed at driving a wedge between Eire and the United States, which, James Dillon predicted, would end ‘in this country being turned into a German Gibraltar in the Atlantic’. There were reports of German planes ‘scouting’ US military installations in Northern Ireland, maps of Britain and Ireland being printed in large quantities in Belgium by the Nazis, a formal Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department file documenting the possibilities of a German attack on Eire, and on the paranoid side, a rumour that German agents plotted to inject cows with foot and mouth disease.30 Some press reports downplayed the more extreme views of the German danger, but took very seriously the German propaganda being disseminated in Eire as fully as the Censorship would permit.31 Broadcast propaganda included such ‘reports’ as that Britain was planning to hand Europe over to Stalin; US Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter as the Jew who was ‘Washington’s back-seat driver’; Black and Tan atrocities in Ireland compared with Bolshevik atrocities in Finland, Romania and Latvia; Irishman Francis Stuart warning the Irish that only money and power interested the Allies; blaming the horrors of the

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Great Famine on Britain; the execution of an IRA man as an act of British terrorism; and readings from Wolfe Tone’s diary with emphasis on the 1798 ‘rising’ against England. Programs in Irish Gaelic came from a station in Germanoccupied Oslo.32 Print propaganda included Hitler and Ribbentrop speeches, and an ‘information’ sheet for Eire newspapers and important individuals containing attacks on Allied leaders and promises that Sir Arthur Harris would be called to account for the wanton slaughter of women and children in his bombing of Germany. Betjeman provided Sir John Maffey with a detailed description of what he would do if he was Germany’s chief propagandist in Eire, with the primary objective of creating disunity in preparation for a German invasion. Being Betjeman, he signed his memorandum ‘Heil Hitler’.33 Allied propaganda had to counter all of this as well as promote the Allied cause. The pro-British Irish, including those serving in the British armed forces, were sometimes exploited for that purpose, for example lists of Irishmen in the RAF winning decorations published in Bulletin from Britain, and a letter provided to the Times by Betjeman from an Irish woman, who railed against the Catholic Church in Ireland for turning a blind eye to the anti-Christian implications of Nazism and censoring an Irish bishop for backing Poland against Germany.34 The British press helped by giving prominent recognition to Irishmen serving in British forces and, if an Irishman who won a medal for heroic action died in the process, making them larger than life, such as Royal Fusiliers Temporary Captain James J. B Jackman of County Dublin, who was awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously for leading his ‘machine-gun trucks’ in aid of a successful British tank attack near Tobruk in north Africa: ‘Standing up in the front of his truck, with calm determination he led his trucks across the front between the tanks and the guns’.35 The Foreign Office supplied the US State Department with a list of Eire volunteers awarded distinctions for their service in the British forces, which was to be made public with Irish-Americans as the target audience.36 That one of them was RAF Squadron Leader and Dublin native Brendan ‘Paddy’ Finucane, who had a shamrock painted on his Spitfire, had become a popular press idol, had thirty-four ‘kills’ by June 1942 and, as the British press implied, was doing what all Irish ought to be doing, did no harm. When he was shot down and killed in July, ‘Paddy the Hero’ became ‘Paddy the Martyr’. His last reported words were: ‘This is it, chaps!’ Later, when reporting a war memorial fund in his memory, the Daily Mirror wrote that ‘Paddy Finucane is dead, but he lives and is loved in the memory of people all over the world.’37 Above all in the United States. The New York Times wrote: ‘His shamrock-marked Spitfire was always in the van of aerial battle . . . With calm courage and unbroken spirit, such as his, no man or no nation can be beaten.’ The Boston Daily Globe emphasised both Finucane’s Irish heritage and his family’s commitment to the British in the war. Quoting Finucane’s cousin: ‘He was a grand thing for Ireland.’ Even the Irish World praised him, making the point that ‘one thing Finucane never forgot was that he was an Irishman,’ and the Brooklyn Tablet printed a poem which declared that Finucane’s Catholic faith gave him the strength to die bravely.38 No official propagandist could have created a more heroic image. But that was only in the

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British and American press coverage; the Irish Times, the Irish Independent and the Irish Press obeyed press censorship and printed only the essential facts of his demise, with no reference to his Irish connections.39 Meanwhile, John Betjeman had his hands full as press attach´e. The execution of IRA terrorists did not please the Irish, paper shortages cut into press availability in Eire, electricity rationing reduced the amount of broadcasting being heard, and not supplying the Irish with items in short supply encouraged antiBritish attitudes.40 On the bright side, historian W. K. Hancock viewed Irish attitudes as leaning towards Britain, and doubted that Eire’s neutrality policy would last. Of course, resentment over partition remained, and the Irish generally assumed a pose of isolationist virtue with regard to the war (which seems somewhat at odds with Hancock’s expectation that the neutrality policy would end.) Hancock praised Betjeman’s low key approach, putting the British case without being ‘high falutin’ or striking too high a moral tone.41 He and the MOI faced endless obstacles regarding propaganda to Eire, such as the collapse of a proposed ‘inter-Allied information bureau’, British Trade Commission opposition to placing propaganda leaflets in packaged products shipped into Eire, and firms refusing to withhold advertising revenues from anti-British Irish newspapers. A frustrated Nicholas Mansergh noted that ‘every proposal put forward at this end was torpedoed on grounds of policy at the other end.’42 Obstacles notwithstanding, Betjeman continued to work hard at getting the British message across. He organised not always successful public lectures by such as Harold Nicolson, who, speaking to the Dublin Law Society, referred to the British lion as ‘an elderly, replete, self-satisfied, moth-eaten animal . . . but an animal which at this moment is alert and angry . . . ’. The Dublin press reported the speech as if that was all he said, and an outraged member of Parliament in London demanded that he be dismissed from the BBC for making such a ‘defeatist speech’. Betjeman thought the Polish consul general’s address to the Catholic Association for International Relations was much better, as were talks by Christopher Hollis before the Holy Ghost Fathers and Maynooth College, regarding missionary work within the British Empire.43 Meanwhile, Betjeman pursued good public relations, the best propaganda in his view. He wrote letters, conversed with important people, gave dinner parties, supported cultural and tourist organisations, and helped Irish people get travel permits to England. Humour was a Betjeman strong point. At a dinner party when asked how long he would be in Ireland ‘poisoning the minds of the Irish in favour of Britain’, he replied: ‘I was chiefly concerned with poisoning the minds of the English in favour of Ireland.’ But he could also be confrontational. When a letter to the Irish Times charged that the library at Trinity College, Protestant and with close historic ties to England, was guilty of corruption, Betjeman wrote to the author that these were baseless and offensive charges. Betjeman was a deeply committed High Church Anglican, and this gained respect for him from at least some Irish Catholics.44 The MOI was working hard to expand propaganda dissemination in Eire. Betjeman oversaw the distribution of MOI print, film and broadcast propaganda

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and religious materials connecting Britain’s cause in the war to the defence of Christianity. This included such posters as ‘British Navy Job is World Wide’, and pamphlets, What the British Empire Has Done, India at War, Underground War, Battle of Supply, As Hitler Sowed and Increasing in Friendship. He once suggested to Mansergh that it would be helpful if they could find some German materials showing that the Germans had a low opinion of Celts.45 Film propaganda also was Betjeman’s concern, though it was severely limited by Eire film censorship. G. L. Mercier of the MOI Films Division wrote to Betjeman in March that the division was making ‘quite good’ films, and asked: ‘Is there any hope for our stuff there?’46 Depends on what it is, Betjeman replied. He suggested a short documentary on Maynooth College, whose 800 students mostly went out as missionaries, which would forge a link with Ireland to which the Belfast government could not possibly object – an optimistic conjecture, given Northern Ireland’s objection to nearly any ‘link’ Britain sought to forge with Eire. Betjeman was pleased when Carol Reed’s film Young Mr Pitt, based upon England’s youngest Prime Minister, passed the Eire censor with deletions only of the ‘too obvious parallels between Napoleonic and Hitlerite Europe’.47 Eire film censors were sensitive regarding their role, but in 1941 had banned outright only sixty-five films. That number increased somewhat in 1942, the sort that were, as the Irish Press pointed out, ‘the propaganda type’ – the sort likely to offend friendly nations.48 The BBC also continued as a propaganda channel, and the number of Eire listeners may have been substantial because, according to the Irish Independent, RE´ broadcasts of public events were ‘dreary, uninspiring, at times almost incoherent’, while talks on specialised subjects were rarely given by people who actually knew something about them.49 The BBC continued its interactive re´ which included studio access for the Forces Programme. lationship with RE, ´ and brought RE´ music director Captain The BBC made lines available to RE, Michael Bowles to London in return for an Irish visit by English conductor Sir Adrian Boult. Betjeman opined that the line to take with Bowles (which clearly worked) was that in the Forces Programme, the BBC desired to preserve in Irish listeners their sense of being Irish.50 On the downside, security continued to be a problem; vetting Irish nationals engaged by the BBC needing travel permits to the UK required the BBC consulting Mansergh, who consulted Betjeman, who consulted MI5. The procedure probably began in July when Betjeman tried to send Frank O’Connor, a left-wing anti-Nazi married to an English woman and the most influential literary man in Dublin after Sean O’Faolain, to London to do a BBC broadcast on behalf of Britain. He had made pro-British broadcasts from London before, but this time, London refused him permission for security reasons. Betjeman protested, but no avail. O’Connor had to do his broadcast from Dublin with RE´ cooperation.51 London and Belfast often disagreed over broadcasting to Eire. On St Patrick’s Day, Belfast wanted emphasis on Irish culture – songs, a play, and a Home Service talk by an Ulster government minister; London wanted a more ‘general Irish programme’ with James McCafferty doing patter and singing, accompanied

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by harp and/or piano, and had its way.52 Meanwhile, ‘Irish Half Hour’ was suspended while Jimmy O’Dea fulfilled his commitments to the Dublin pantomime season; Northern Ireland premier J. M. Andrews wanted it cancelled altogether on the grounds that it had political implications that could strain North–South relations. If it was to resume, the name should be changed to ‘Eire Half Hour’, since the programme was ‘in no way concerned with Northern Ireland.’ Andrews was also displeased when a London broadcast praised southern Irish serving in British forces but ignored Ulster regiments.53 The BBC tried to accommodate both Ulster and Eire in 1942 with such programmes as reports on improvements in Northern Ireland naval bases, commentary from Dublin by both George Marshall and Denis Johnston, revival of ‘Irish Half Hour’ as part of the Forces Programme, and special news items of Irish interest, all containing a ‘mild flavour of propaganda’.54 Ideas considered not acceptable and dropped included an Irish version of ‘Brains Trust’, a programme of lively and witty debate on issues of the day. ‘I cannot see how an Irish Brains Trust could end in anything but broken and bloody high brows,’ said Controller of Programmes B. E. Nicholls, because it would have to deal with such questions as ‘does the Brains Trust think that de Valera is wrong not to hand over the Treaty Ports to the Americans? and so on’. Nicholls also opposed the MOI Empire Division’s idea for programmes of ‘goodwill to Ireland’, including a broadcast by American journalist William L. Shirer. They thought it a bad idea to have any American broadcast ‘at the Irish’ on the BBC, and the idea was dropped.55 ‘Irish Half Hour’, which Betjeman saw as an excellent channel for promoting good relations, resumed in May. In the old ‘Irish Half Hour’ the Anglo-Irish connection and the war were present but very subtle, in such Jimmy O’Dea lines as ‘Celtic twilight. That’s half a blackout’ and ‘The blessings of the Saints of Ireland and Liverpool be upon this house tonight’, the latter an obvious reference to the large number of Irish people living and working in Liverpool, England. The propaganda qualities of the programme were in the Irish content and performances, which, in the opinion of Betjeman and Sir John Maffey, were viewed by the Irish both in and outside of Eire as flattering to the Irish, and which made those listeners take a more positive view of both the BBC and Britain. Extreme Irish nationalists did not like the programme of course, but increasing numbers of ‘ordinary’ Irish did. The new ‘Irish Half Hour’ eliminated Ulster and Gaeliclanguage material as a gesture to the Northern Ireland government, and limited Irish-American items so as not to suggest Irish collaboration with US troops stationed in Ulster.56 Interestingly, the first May broadcast included Irish tenor Caven O’Connor, who had appeared as a singer in the decidedly anti-IRA 1936 British film Ourselves Alone. The MOI Religions Division’s task continued to focus on moving Irish Catholic opinion in a pro-British direction. However, ‘any material which purports to come from English Catholic channels is regarded as highly suspect by Irish Catholics.’57 The Religions Division sent copies of a public letter from the Archbishop of Cincinnati in support of US entry into the war for distribution

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in Eire, and in May, three Irish journalists were given travel permits to attend a Catholic international press conference in London. Distribution of Catholic Truth Society pamphlets continued, with a special effort to maximise distribution of the 1941 papal Christmas address. Betjeman had doubts about circulating the London-based Catholic Herald, since the Irish were suspicious of English Catholics, but accepted it because the paper included anti-German materials.58 Eire censorship, the greatest obstacle facing Betjeman and journalists generally, was expanded by Emergency Powers Order (No. 151), article 9, issued on 17 February 1942. It forbade journalists to send any communications out of the ´ country that had not been passed by the censors. Eamon de Valera approved of, and may well have inspired, the expanded power, as his commitment was to guarantee the security of Eire neutrality by keeping out of the country ‘anything that was going to stir up bitterness or ill feeling towards other peoples’.59 Items added to the list of forbidden matter included the marriage of Irish women to members of the British military, using the terms ‘Fighting French’ and ‘France Combattante’ when describing General de Gaulle’s Free French as opposed to merely ‘De Gaullist forces’, and press coverage of Maffey being entertained at the residence of T´anaiste (deputy to the Taoiseach) Sean T. O’Kelly. Thomas Coyne noted that Frank Aiken wanted ‘to stop all publicity of this kind’ because the Axis might read it as Eire being sympathetic to the Allies. And when Ambassador Eduard Hempel complained that news about Germany was being published in a negative light, Coyne replied that the censor told the press what not to publish, not what it must publish.60 Opposition deputies frequently complained in the D´ail about the censorship – it was unfair, uneven and extreme, for example – but to no avail. Policy was clear: nothing regarding neutrality could be published until Aiken himself gave approval. The censor was everywhere. Postal, telephone and telegraph communications continued to be closely monitored, as was ‘Question Time in the D´ail’, aired on ´ despite Aiken’s assurance that censorship did not apply there. Censorship RE, was not applied in fact to films shown privately by the British and American legations, which annoyed a D´ail deputy, who complained that such films were ‘propaganda against a country with which Ireland maintains friendly relations’, and that something should be done about it. Otherwise, film censorship increased on de Valera’s order issued in July. One example was cutting from Young Mr Pitt this line: ‘England has saved itself from Napoleon and is destined to save Europe as well.’61 Careful watch was also kept on print propaganda, including anti-Semitic and anti-Nazi leaflets, and anti-Nazi books such as Nazi Nuggets, published in London by Victor Gollancz. Nazi Nuggets contained anti-Nazi cartoons and claims – ostensibly from Germany – that the Pope actually was ‘a Jew named Lippman’, and that an ‘official’ report on sterilisation and race improvement came from an authority on horse breeding. This was ‘British material’ of course, and one Censorship officer wanted to know what was the point of conducting antipropaganda press censorship if booksellers continued ‘to foist the very lowest and most blatant of cross-channel muck’.62 ‘British material’ also included an

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anti-fascist article in the English Sunday paper the People. A reader with obvious fascist sympathies complained to the censors’ office that the article accused Benito Mussolini of being a ‘murderous unscrupulous villain, unfaithful to his wife, and the possessor of a “mistress” ’. Such a charge was ‘an indecent, filthy diatribe on the head of a great state’, and ‘unfit reading for Catholics on a Sunday afternoon’. Therefore, ‘this Freemason propaganda against a great Catholic statesman should not be tolerated.’63 Meanwhile, ‘Run, Rabbit, Run’ reappeared at a public amusement park, and propaganda was a staple of various foreign legation newsletters and overseas news agencies, which were closely monitored, but not always censored. In January, for example, La Belgique Ind´ependente and La Guerre Illustr´ee passed intact because though ‘one-sided and propagandist’, they were not also ‘offensive and violent’. The censor was far more exacting regarding any news items sent from Eire to foreign news agencies, such as the French agency Havas, that could be read as Eire bending its neutrality in favour of the Allies. Items cut included any reference to the number of Irish that might be serving in British forces.64 Censoring British journalists proved endlessly frustrating. They were prohibited from sending uncensored material provided by Irish sources to Britain, but they could get such material to Belfast, from where it was sent to Britain and/or published in Belfast papers. The frustration is well illustrated by the case of Montague Lacey of the Daily Express, who was allowed to put through an article containing objectionable items simply because, in Coyne’s words, ‘if I had said no to Lacey he would have published his article in spite of me [in Belfast] and might have made it more sensational and less friendly . . . I am convinced that expediency must be the only guide in dealing with these English newspaper men and that, in cases like this, we have simply got to make the best bargain we can.’ Then in June, Lacey was allowed to send a report on the state of Eire’s armaments that went beyond what the Irish press could publish. In fact, it drew positive conclusions regarding how fairly Eire had operated its neutrality policy to that point, which suggests that a bargain had been struck.65 Meanwhile, a photographer denied permission to photograph a Garda poster of an escaped German internee took it anyway, and it appeared in London in the News Review. Daily Express reporter Joseph Kenny, scolded for sending a report to London regarding the reprieve of six convicted IRA terrorists, claimed that the censorship regulations simply were not clear. This was not his first transgression, and Coyne claimed that he evaded the censorship on purpose, as did other Daily Express journalists. Coyne threatened additional restrictions such as prohibiting incoming cross-channel telephone calls altogether, and limiting outgoing calls to texts of messages submitted to the censor in writing.66 This was no guarantee, however that the journalists would not find other ways around the censorship. Betjeman was the shiny side of the censor’s coin. Stressing ‘good relations’, he went out of his way to be cooperative, and encouraged English press editors to do the same, which was, in fact, official British policy. When Betjeman submitted an article for the Sunday Chronicle critical of Eire neutrality, he indicated to the censor that the editor would omit the entire article from the Irish edition of

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the paper, if it was found to be unsuitable for Irish consumption. The censor was appreciative, but also noted, in mildly peevish tones, that while the author could say what he liked, he and other English journalists ‘are not entitled to argue that by remaining neutral we have given the English people a just cause for complaint’. Betjeman’s relations with Coyne were cordial; they lunched together on occasion, their official exchanges were informal, and they even joked with each other in official correspondence. When Betjeman asked Coyne if he could explain peculiar behaviour on the part of the Daily Express regarding reactions in Dublin to the deportation of Channel Islanders, Coyne responded: ‘How should I know?’ Betjeman replied; ‘You are the Sherlock Holmes and I am a mere Watson.’ Coyne then penned, for Betjeman’s benefit, a Holmes–Watson discussion in Arthur Conan Doyle’s style regarding the origin of the Daily Express item, which concluded with an Irish joke: ‘And now for a spot of deer stalking and don’t forget your Ulster – you will be glad you brought it with you when we get to the Six Counties.’67 Coyne also sometimes used the ‘broguish’ phrase ‘sure ting!’ with Betjeman, a ‘sure’ indication of their cordiality. The press attach´e, meanwhile, worked at learning Irish: ‘By this time next year my letters will be wholly in Irish if I am alive,’ he wrote to Coyne in September.68 Coyne decided early in the year to allow military correspondents to be critical, providing their criticism ‘appears to be bonafide and not purely propaganda’. He also permitted publication of MOI-supplied extracts from Vatican Radio broadcasts, so long as he was kept informed of how much was used.69 References to Irishmen serving in the British military was still forbidden, including in one instance a kinsman of the Blessed Oliver Plunkett who was a prisoner of war in Italy. Other examples were references to a head of state or the family thereof, unless first cleared by Coyne, pictures of or references to the British Royal arms or Royal doings under the heading ‘Court and Personal’, which specifically targeted the Irish Times, and items clearly based upon rumour or which were unsubstantiated – such as an Irish Press item claiming that an Irishman was deported from Britain for refusing to serve in British forces. Actually, the Irishman in question had simply ‘left work in Britain out of laziness’; serving in British forces never came into it. No reason at all was given for confiscating the October and November 1941 issues of Irish Freedom, and a year later the editor still had been given no reason for the confiscation.70 The Eire press remained objective almost to a fault, despite Coyne’s ‘relaxation’ of war reporting policy which was at best narrow in scope. Michael Knightly made that clear when he warned the Kilkenny People editor that any war reporting that favoured one side over the other would be censored. Of course, that did not apply to reporting that favoured Eire neutrality, as when the Irish Press was allowed to assert that Eire remained outside of the war ‘thanks to the Grace of God and the determination of her people’, and would continue to do so because ‘the right to neutrality belongs to us both by natural and international law.’ So too an Irish Independent editorial in December 1942: ‘We in this island, not far removed from the centre of the titanic struggle, have providentially escaped for another year most of the horrors that have been visited on so many countries.’71

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Most Dubliners got their war news from the Irish Independent and the Irish Times, which reported in objective language. When the Irish Independent wrote ‘Germany’s army in Russia is in full flight, and Soviet troops are advancing victoriously along the entire front,’ it was implied that this was the language of Russian radio broadcasts. Headlines were simply descriptive: ‘Soviet Drive in All Sectors: Germans in Full Flight’ and ‘Four Thrusts at Rostov: Russians Gain Forty Miles in Day’.72 Likewise the Irish Times, its pro-British editor Robert Smyllie notwithstanding, which used headlines and military reports that presented both sides of what was happening, and attributed information to the source from which it came. Irish Times reports were longer and more detailed than those in the Irish Independent, and dominated page one as opposed to being on pages two or three. Typical Irish Times headlines were ‘German Hold on Don Growing: Fierce Fighting on 300 Mile Front’; ‘Russians Advance 50 Miles: Germans Lose 14,000 Dead, 13,000 Captured’; ‘Heavy RAF Raid on Duisburg: Many Fires in Ruhr’; ‘Axis Army Retreating on Whole Front: Allies Take 9,000 Prisoners’; ‘Allied Forces Approaching Tunis Key Bases: Axis and French Clash: Darlan Deprived of Command’; ‘Heavy Raid on Bremen: 19 Bombers Lost’; and ‘22 Ships Sunk in Allied Convoy: German Claim’. The Irish Times reported in detail the disastrous Dieppe raid, with in-depth analysis of what was attempted and where it all went wrong. But the language was detached, and there was no overt taking of sides, any more than in any other Irish Times war reporting.73 In sum, Coyne’s war reporting policy was relaxed only to the extent that more of it was allowed. The content and structure remained the same as in the past. The rule applied as well to press coverage of war leaders, though occasionally the Irish Times thumbed its nose at the rule and got away with it. While the Irish Press carried without comment an Associated Press item on Hitler’s New Year’s message to German troops, and on a Hitler speech that called upon the German army to ‘fight to the last man’, the Irish Times reported the Churchill–Stalin meeting in Moscow in depth, complete with photographs of both leaders and editorials about what the meeting might mean. The editor took this dig at the censorship: Churchill’s absence in Russia ‘has been the subject of free discussion here in Ireland as in every other country on earth; and we do not think that we offend against the laws of impartial comment in remarking that speculation boiled down to a simple question: “Moscow or hospital?” ’ The Irish Times also wrote disparagingly of a Hitler speech, and approvingly of one by Churchill, and Knightly’s office passed it all.74 The Irish press continued to show war photographs in 1942, such as American soldiers arriving at Port Moresby, bomb damage to St Paul’s Cathedral in London, a British aircraft carrier later sunk by a U-boat, German soldiers in shell-shattered areas of Stalingrad, and the German-inflicted ruins of the Russian city of Voronezh. There were also reports of German atrocities, though that term was not used, which was a departure. Admittedly, the reports came via Vichy Radio and one case was described as a reprisal against communists and Jews for ‘a cowardly and vile attack’ on a German soldier. But in another, the Vichy broadcast indicated that 500 communists and Jews would be sent to labour camps in the East, a fact that would have been difficult for Irish readers to view as anything

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but an atrocity – save for those Irish who thought communists got what they deserved.75 Though it was slight, Eire censorship eased in 1942, something that was unthinkable a year earlier. However, in 1942 the Allies were making progress against the Axis, save in the Pacific, and the AEF was well established in Northern Ireland. Also, both American and British channels for waging the war of words were beginning to make useful progress, and John Betjeman had made ‘good relations’ into a positive factor in waging that war. Had Britain ‘won the war’ as Winston Churchill claimed? Perhaps it had in the sense that, continuation of the war in the Atlantic notwithstanding, Britain’s Irish back door was not so open in January 1943 as it had been in January 1942. That being the case, the Allies might see Eire neutrality throughout the remainder of the war as being less significant than it once had been.

Notes 1. Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland Ulster and the Price of Neutrality 1939–45, London, 1985, pp. 327, 332. 2. Nigel Nicolson, ed., Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters, vol. II: The War Years 1939– 1945, New York, 1967 p. 217, 16 March 1942; ‘Freedom and Neutrality Depend on the Farmers’, Irish Press, 9 January 1942, p. 3; ‘Eire’s Neutrality’, Irish Independent, 23 March 1942, p. 2; ‘Plot to Embroil Country In War’, Irish Press, 30 January 1942, p. 1; ‘Neutral Sweden in War-Time: Comparison with Eire To-Day’, Irish Times, 4 september 1942, p. 1; ‘Eire’s Neutrality’, Irish Times, 2 December 1942, p. 3. 3. Meeting of government departments to discuss Weekly Bulletin proposal, 2 March 1942, S 9 559, SPO; Taoiseach Office to Gallagher, 11 February 1942, MS 18,369, FGP, INL. 4. ‘Minister Says No Harangue Propaganda’, Irish Press, 3 March 1942, p. 3;‘Mary MacSwiney,’ Irish Press, 9 March 1942, p. 14; ‘Publicity’, Irish Times, 24 September 1942, p. 3; Local Government and Public Health Office to Taoiseach, 8 April 1942, S 12 795, SPO. 5. ‘Neutral Eire’s Misgivings in Midst of War’, Daily Telegraph, 29 July 1942, p. 4; MacDonnell, report on Eire, 6 February 1942, DO 130/28, PRO. 6. ‘Finds Eire Does Not Fear Britain’, Brooklyn Tablet,17 January 1942, p. 7; ‘Irish Are Immune to Fear of Nazis’, Brooklyn Tablet, 24 January 1942, p. 7; Alexander Duff, ‘The Outlook of Eire’, Spectator, 20 February 1942, p. 177. 7. ‘Captain Ireland and Foreign Press Attacks’, Irish Press, 15 January 1942, p. 3; ‘Irish Will Shun War, Eire Minister Says’, New York Times, 1 August 1942, p. 9. 8. Churchill to de Valera, 8 December 1941, PREM 3/131/6, PRO; ‘Mr De Valera: Denial of Rumours of “Secret Bargain” ’, Manchester Guardian, 13 January 1942, p. 5. 9. Lord Cranborne, note on conversation with de Valera, 17 December 1941, DO 130/17, PRO; ‘Britain Sends Eire Arms’, Boston Evening Globe, 31 January 1942, pp. 1–2; Sir John Maffey, summary of situation of defence of Ireland, 10 March 1942, DO 130/27; Clement Attlee to Churchill, 12 March 1942, DO 121/10B, PRO; ‘Irish Whisky for the UK ’, Manchester Guardian, 18 March 1942, p. 4; ‘Eire Packs Food Ships’, Sunday Express, 15 February 1942, p. 5.

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we have won the war! ’

10. Nicolson, Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters, p. 220, 18 March 1942; Cranborne to Churchill, 4 February 1942, PREM 3/127/3A; C-in-C Western Approaches, memorandum, 18 April 1942, ADM 1/13032, PRO; ‘Eire Ready to Take Over British Non-War Industries’, Boston Evening Globe, 7 February 1942, p. 3. 11. ‘Eire Ready to Take Over British Non-War Industries’; ‘Eire Offers Trade Exchange Agreement’, News Chronicle, 10 February 1942, p. 1; Earl of Drogheda to N.E Archer, 29 July 1942, FO 371/32591.W10656; Maffey to Sir Eric Machtig, 18 December 1942, DO 35/894/X23/9, PRO; ‘Citizens of Eire: Conscription Test Case’, Manchester Guardian, 20 March 1942, p. 8; ‘Irishmen – Liable to British Military Service’, Catholic Herald, 10 April 1942, p. 6. 12. ‘Ulster Demand for Conscription’, Manchester Guardian, 17 January 1942, p. 8; James Little MP, 18 June 1942, HCD, vol. 380, col. 1655. 13. ‘Evil Fruit of Partition,’ Gaelic American, 28 March 1942, p. 4; Andrews to Attlee, 23 January 1942, CJ 1/85, PRO; ‘Ulster and Eire’, Spectator, 4 and 11 December 1942, pp. 528–9, 553. 14. Ulster Protestant clippings, October and November 1942, CJ 1/86, PRO; Gray to Duke of Abercorn, 19 October 1942, RG 84/10, DLGR, NAUS. 15. Donald Stephenson to Archer, 22 January 1942, DO 130/27, PRO; ‘There Ain’t No Sich Animal’, News Chronicle, 29 January 1942, p. 3; ‘Flames Can’t Read, Dev’, Cartoon, Daily Mirror, 18 December 1941, p. 3. 16. ‘De Valera’s Land of Silence’, Daily Mail, 15 January 1942, p. 2; ‘Rigours of Censorship in Neutral Eire’, Daily Telegraph, 10 February 1942, p. 5; ‘Eire and the War: Neutrality as a Way of Life’, Manchester Guardian, 7 August 1942, p. 4; Cyril Connolly, ‘Neutral Eire Is Slowly Changing under the Impact of World’s War’, Picture Post, 11 April 1942, pp. 7–14. 17. ‘Eire Minister Warning: Fear of Famine’, Daily Telegraph, 28 January 1942, p. 5; ‘Famine Shows in Eyes of Irish Cottagers’, Daily Mail, 30 April 1942, p. 4; ‘Neutral Eire Goes Hungry,’ Daily Mail, 1 May 1942, p. 2; ‘Irish Go Back to Black Bread’, Daily Mail, 11 October 1942, p. 2; ‘Eire and the War: Relations with Britain and the US’, Manchester Guardian, 11 August 1942, p. 4. 18. Gray to Maffey, 16 March 1942; memorandum of conversation, Gray, Attlee and Paul V. Emrys-Evans MP, 17 June 1942, DO 130/29; Lord Swinton to Churchill, 29 May 1942, PREM 4/100/1, PRO; C. J. Radcliffe to Archibald MacLeish, 29 April 1942; MacLeish to Radcliffe, 4 May 1942, SWP, FDRL; Gray to Brendan Bracken, 10 February 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. 19. Nicolson Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters, p. 226, 11 May 1942; The Secret Diaries of Harold L. Lckes, vol III: The Lowering Clouds 1939–1941, New York, 1954, p. 51, 3 July 1942; see Nicholas John Cull Selling War: The British Propoganda Campaign against American “Neutrality” in World War II, Oxford, 1995; Washington Despatches, 27 December 1942, p. 129. 20. ‘Parlous Plight of “Eire” . . .’, Leader, 24 January 1942, p. 1; ‘The London Tablet Elongates Its Neck’, Leader, 20 December 1941, p. 6. 21. ‘Churchill’s Bid for Anglo-US Alliance’, Gaelic American, 3 January 1942, p. 4; ‘Ireland Remains Neutral’, Gaelic American, 9 May 1942, p. 4; ‘Daily News Criticizes Irish’, Gaelic American, 31 January 1942, p. 4;‘Anti-Irish Propaganda’, Gaelic American, 21 March 1942, p. 4; ‘Off on the Wrong Foot’, Irish World, 14 March 1942, p. 4. 22. ‘Believes Now Is Time for Eire’s Independence,’ Brooklyn Tablet, 21 February 1942, p. 8; ‘Eire’s Sovereignty’, Brooklyn Tablet, 28 February 1942, p. 11.

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23. ‘IRA Tell Soldiers: “Cross over the Border and We Will Find You Jobs” ’, Sunday Express, 8 March 1942, p. 5. 24. ‘McEntee Says Organization in Eire Seeks to Provoke War on Britain’, Boston Daily Globe, 30 January 1942, p. 2; IRA propaganda pamphlet, Warning to British Imperialists, DO 130/27, PRO. 25. Maffey, memorandum of interview with de Valera, 14 August 1942, DO 130/27. PRO; Cordell Hull to John Winant, 15 August 1942, vol. I, p. 764, FRUS; ‘Six Irish Boys’, Gaelic American, 5 September 1942, p. 4; ‘Death Penalties Commuted of 5 of the Six Irishmen in Belfast’, Irish World, 5 September 1942, p. 1. 26. Diarmuid Brennan to Betjeman, 10 December 1967, JBP, UVL; see also ‘Good Relations,’ p. 40, and Fiachra Gibbons, ‘How Verse Saved Betjeman from IRA Assassins’, Guardian Weekly, 27 April 2000, p. 11. 27. ‘Gunmen Slay Prison Warder in City Street – IRA Hunt’, Daily Mirror, 7 February 1942, p. 4; ‘IRA Kill Policeman in Gun Battles’, Daily Mail, 6 April 1942, p. 1; ‘Arms Dumps in Ulster: Police Discoveries. IRA Manifesto’s Threats’, Manchester Guardian, 2 September 1942, p. 5; ‘More Shooting in Ulster Capital after Execution’, Boston Evening Globe, 5 September 1942, p. 4; ‘More Bombs in Belfast’, Daily Telegraph, 8 October 1942, p. 1. 28. ‘Arms Dump Find Foiled Rebellion Bid’, Daily Mirror, 2 September 1942, p. 1; ‘Army Hunts IRA Killer’, Daily Mail, 2 November 1942, p. 8; N. E. Costar to N. E. Archer, 7 May 1942, DO 130/27; Betjeman to Nicholas Mansergh, 29 July 1942, DO 130/30, PRO. 29. ‘IRA Willing to Help Germany’, Daily Mirror, 29 January 1942, p. 8; ‘Nazi Link with Irish Republican Army Charged’, Boston Daily Globe, 29 January 1942, p. 3; ‘IRA and Nazi Agents’, Manchester Guardian, 29 January 1942, p. 5; ‘Hayes Jail Letter’, Irish Independent, 20 June 1942, p. 3; ‘Nazi Recaptured in Ireland: Free for Two Months’, Daily Telegraph, 27 April 1942, p. 1; James Little MP, 24 February 1942, HCD, 5th Series, vol. 378, cols 31–2. 30. Post to Frau Hempel, 7 January 1942; State Department to Styles, 3 March 1942; Styles, memorandum, undated but ca. July 1942; Gray to Hull, 9 February 1942, DG 84/2, DCCR, NAUS; ‘Inventions’, Irish Press, 17 February 1942. 31. ‘Eire to Be Blackmailed with Blitz’, Daily Mirror, 11 February 1942, p. 1; ‘Nazi Planes Scout Northern Ireland; No Bombs Dropped’, Boston Daily Globe, 28 July 1942, p. 4; ‘Nazi Maps of Britain, Eire’, Daily Mirror, 14 October 1942, p. 2; PID, Axis Propaganda and Strategic Intentions, 7 and 14 February 1942, FO 898/30, PRO; John Betjeman diaries, entry for 9 March 1942, JBP, UVL. 32. James Wellard, ‘How the Axis Uses Eire’s Neutrality’, News Chronicle, 3 November 1942, p. 2. 33. PID, Propaganda Research Report, 19 February 1942, FO 898/184; German broadcasts into Ireland, 6, 15, 17, 29 and 30 March, 9 and 15 April, 11, 13 and 18 May, 5, 11 and 15 July 3 and 22 September and 14 and 21 October 1942, MA G2/X/0217, CBB. 34. ‘Comment on Broadcast’, Irish Times, 31 July 1942, p. 1; Betjeman, report on enemy propaganda, 21 March 1942; Betjeman to Maffey, notes for propaganda in Ireland, ca. April 1942, DO 130/30, PRO. 35. ‘British Pay Tribute to Irish Fighters’, Tablet, 23 May 1942, p. 10; letter signed ‘Irish Correspondent’ forwarded to theTimes by Betjeman, ca. May 1942, INF 1/786, PRO; ‘Irish Doctor Aided RAF Man – Fined’, Daily Mirror, 30 October 1942, p. 4.

142

‘now

we have won the war! ’

36. ‘A Fifth VC Goes to Eire’, Daily Mail, 1 April 1942, p. 1; E. L. Packer to Hull, Volunteers from Eire Serving with the British Forces Who Have Won Distinctions, 20 June 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS. 37. ‘Paddy Finucane of the RAF: A Broth of a Boy’, Sunday Express, 4 January 1942, p. 4; ‘Finucane Equals Top Score over france’, Daily Mail, 18 May 1942, p. 1; ‘This Is It, Chaps’ as Plane Hit Sea; Pal Avenged Him’, Daily Mirror, 18 July 1942, p. 1; ‘Paddy Finucane Is Still Loved in Memory’, Daily Mirror, 19 November 1942, p. 2. 38. ‘Finucane of the RAF’, New York Times, 20 July 1942, p. 12; ‘“Finest You’ll Meet,” Says His Irish Cousin, a Hero in Own Right’, Boston Daily Globe, 24 July 1942, p. 6; ‘Brendan Finucane, Irish Flying Ace in RAF Killed in Channel’, Irish World, 25 July 1942, p. 1; ‘An Irish Hero’, Brooklyn Tablet, 8 August 1942, p. 9. 39. ‘ “Paddy” Finucane Death Crash in Channel’, Irish Times, 18 July 1942, p. 1; ‘Air Ace Killed’, Irish Independent, 18 July 1942, p. 3; ‘“Paddy” Finucane Killed in Action’, Irish Press, 18 July 1942, p. 1. 40. Betjeman to MOI, 28 August 1942, DO 130/27; A. A. Mowat, report, August– September 1942, DO 130/28, PRO. 41. Hancock to DO, 9 November 1942, DO 130/28, PRO; Xavier Zaleski, Acting Polish Consul, Dublin, to Packer, 17 April 1942; Packer to Zaleski, 22 April 1942; Zaleski to Packer, 23 April 1942, RG 84/5, DLCR, NAUS. 42. Mansergh to Betjeman, 22 January 1942; Mansergh to Betjeman, 27 January 1942; G. F. Braddock to E. S. Baynes, 30 January 1942; C. E. Stringer to E. F. Hingeley, 12 March 1942; Mansergh to V. Harlow, 10 February 1942, INF 1/539, PRO. 43. Nicolson to Betjeman, 15 January 1942, JBP, UVIC; Nicolson, Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters, p. 218, 16 March 1942, pp. 218–19, 17 March 1942, p. 220, 20 March 1942, Betjeman to Mansergh, 13 January 1942; Betjeman to Christopher Hollis, 21 March 1942, INF 1/786, PRO. 44. Betjeman’s Catholic diary for 1942; Betjeman to anonymous, 1 February 1942, JBP, UVL. 45. Betjeman to Mansergh, 2 May 1942, INF 1/766; publicity materials for Eire, INF 2/8, PRO. 46. Mercier to Betjeman, 12 March 1942, JBP, UVL. 47. Betjeman to John Beddington, 24 April 1942, INF 1/786, PRO; MOI New Films, 16 November 1942, BW 4/21, PRO; notes for Betjeman in the press attach´e’s office, ca. 23 September 1942, JBP, UVL. 48. ‘Censor Passed 1,276 Films Last Year’, Irish Press, 27 February 1942, p. 3; ‘The Films’, Irish Press, 10 March 1942, p. 2; ‘Films for Ireland: London Complaint’, Irish Press, 30 March 1942, p. 3. 49. ‘Radio Eireann’, Irish Independent, 8 July and 16 September, 1942, both p. 2. 50. Sean O’Braonain to J. B. Clark, 15 June 1942, E1/954; H. B. Rantzen, Head of Lines Department, to H. C. Fenton, 29 December 1942; Clark to Fenton, 9 January 1943, E1/946; O. Thompson to Elsie Bowerman, 2 July 1942, E1/956/2; Betjeman to B. E. Nicholls, 19 August 1942, R34/347/2, BBCWAC. 51. Hilton Brown to Frank O’Connor, July 4, 1942; Betjeman to Maffey, July 8, 1942, DO 130/30, PRO. 52. Ursula Eason to R. J. F. Howgill, 16 January 1942; Eason to Nicholls, 30 January 1942; Eason to Director Features and Drama, 18 February 1942; Hubert Clifford to Eason, 10 February 1942, R34/239/3, BBCWAC.

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53. George Marshall to CP, 13 February 1942, R19/568; Denis Johnston to John Irwin, 23 January 1942, E1/956/2; Marshall to C(H), 17 March 1942, R34/347/2, BBCWAC. 54. Irwin to Johnston, 6 January 1942; Irwin to Johnston, 29 January 1942, E1/956/2; Robert Fraser to Harman Grisewood, July 14, 1942, R34/347/2, BBCWAC. 55. E. Rawdon Smith to Nicholls, 24 January 1942; Nicholls to Rawdon Smith, 24 January 1942; R. Gransden to Marshall, 21 February 1942, R34/347/2; Nicholls, memorandum, 6 March 1942, E1/980/1; A. P. Ryan to Nicholls, 20 March 1942, R47/1074/1, BBCWAC. 56. Mansergh to Nicholls, 26 January 1942; BBC to Mansergh, 4 February 1942; Betjeman to Nicholls, 19 February 1942, R19/568; ‘Irish Half Hour’ script, ca. 30 January 1942, 165/166, BBCWAC; BBC Broadcast Planning Meeting, minutes, 6 March 1942; Marshall to Nicholls, 23 March 1942,; Maffey to Sir Cecil Graves, 13 February 1942; Graves to Maffey, 18 February 1942, R19/568, BBCWAC. 57. MOI, planning meeting, 7 February 1942, INF 1/786, PRO. 58. Mansergh to Richard Hope, 3 February 1942; Mansergh to Betjeman, 5 February 1942, INF 1/766; Hope to Mansergh, 29 April 1942; Hope to Mansergh, 14 October 1942; Frederick Boland to Hope, 12 May 1942; Mansergh to Betjeman, 13 May 1942; Betjeman to Hope, 20 July 1942, INF 1/786; Hope to Betjeman, 26 August 1942; Betjeman to Mansergh, 2 September 1942, DO 130/30, PRO 59. Emergency Powers Order (No. 151), article 9, 17 February 1942, MA 2/13, CBB; ‘De Valera Replies to Attacks on His Neutrality Stand: Blames Newspapers for Much of Trouble in the World’, Boston Evening Globe, 15 January 1942, p. 7. 60. Items listed as ‘Refused for Publication in the Irish Papers under Censorship Regulations’, ca. July 1942, DGP, FDRL; Controller to Press Censor, 15 July 1942; Controller to Press Censor, 20 October 1942, MA 2/42; Coyne to Censorship Press Room, 11 April 1942, MA 7/58; Coyne to Boland, 3 November 1942, MA 2/32; Coyne to Staff, 28 October 1942, MA 2/42; C. S. Collinson to William P. Fay, 11 August 1942; Coyne to Boland, 10 November 1942, MA 2/112; John Leydon to Coyne, 20 May 1942, MA 1/28, CBB. 61. J. J. Purcell, memorandum, 5 August 1942, MA 3/50; Sean O’Braonain to Coyne, 3 October 1942; Michael Knightly to O’Braonain, 13 October 1942, MA 2/128; D´ail debates, 19 January 1942, MA 2/38, CBB; ‘Film Censorship’, Irish Times, 29 July 1942, p. 3; ‘Celtic Twilight’, Spectator, 13 November 1942, p. 451. 62. Coyne to P. Berry, 30 June 1942, MA 5/32; Coyne to Frank Aiken’s Office, 2 October 1942, MA 2/129; Patrick Brady to Coyne, 18 November 1942; Purcell, memorandum, 23 November 1942, MA 2/55, CBB. 63. P. J. Treacy to the Justice Department, 30 November 1942, MA 2/8, CBB. 64. Garda Sgt. Joseph O’Rourke, memorandum, 18 November 1942, MA 7/24; Boland to Coyne, 3 January 1942; Coyne to Boland, 7 January 1942, MA 3/38; deletions from Newman material for Havas, May–October, 1942; Coyne to Joseph Walshe, 25 November 1942, MA 2/96, CBB. 65. Coyne to Knightly, 8 January 1942; Lacey, message passed by censor, ca. June 1942, MA 2/109, CBB. 66. Entry in Controller Censorship log book, 23 March 1942; intercepted telephone conversations between Manchester Central (London) and Joseph Kenny of Daily Express, 9 and 13 April 1942; Knightly to Coyne, 30 August 1942; Coyne to Kenny, 31 August 1942; Kenny to Coyne, 1 September 1942; Coyne to Kenny, 8 September 1942, ´ Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland 1939–1945: Neutrality, MA 2/109, CBB; see Donal O

144

67.

68. 69. 70.

71. 72.

73.

74.

75.

‘now

we have won the war! ’

Politics, and Society, Cork, 1996, pp. 201–4; see Robert M. Smyllie, ‘Unneutral Neutral Eire’, Foreign Affairs 24, 1946, p. 324. Betjeman to Censor’s Office, 8 January 1942; Censor to Betjeman, 9 January 1942, MA 2/13; Betjeman to Coyne, 15 October 1942; Coyne to Betjeman, 16 October 1942; Betjeman to Coyne, 16 October 1942; Coyne to Betjeman, 17 October 1942; Coyne to Betjeman, 19 October 1942, MA 1/115, CBB. Coyne to Betjeman, 7 September 1942; Betjeman to Coyne, 4 September 1942; Coyne to Betjeman, 7 September 1942, MA 2/112, CBB. Coyne to Brady, 11 January 1942, MA 2/42; Coyne, memorandum, 14 September 1942, MA 2/107, CBB. T. O’Muircheartaigh to Censor, 4 October 1942; Knightly to Coyne, 5 October 1942, MA 2/114; Coyne, memorandum, 9 February 1942, MA 2/42; Knightly, directions to the press, 13 March 1942, MA 5/28; Knightly to proprietor, Irish Times, 19 March 1942, P20/2; Boland to Joseph Connolly, 24 June 1942, MA 7/20; Pat Dooley to John Dulanty, 11 January 1942; Dooley to Coyne, 2 December 1942, MA 2/127, CBB. ‘1941–1942’, Irish Press, 31 December 1942, p. 2; ‘Three Years of War’, Irish Independent, 31 August 1942, p. 2. ‘Soviet Drive in All Sectors’, 10 January 1942, p. 3; ‘Counter-Attack by Russia’, 1 August 1942, p. 3; ‘Russians Retreat in the Caucasus’, 8 August 1942, p. 3; ‘Stalingrad Battle: Germans Being Driven Out, Moscow Claims’, 22 september 1942, p. 3; ‘Four Thrusts at Rostov’, 31 December 1942, p. 3; ‘Raids on Germany’, 11 August 1942, p. 4; ‘Progress of the War’, 10 January 1942, p. 2; ‘The War, East and West’, 4 May 1942, p. 2; ‘Heavy Fighting in North Africa’, 9 November 1942, p. 3; ‘Americans Take Oran’, 11 November 1942, p. 3; ‘Marshal Rommel Retreats Again’, 15 December 1942, p. 2. All from Irish Independent. ‘German Hold on Don Growing’, 10 July 1942, p. 1; ‘Russians Advance 50 Miles’, 23 November 1942, p. 1; ‘Heavy RAF Raid on Duisburg’, 27 July 1942, p. 1; ‘Axis Army Retreating on Whole Front’, 5 November 1942, p. 1; ‘US and British Troops in Africa’, 9 November 1942, p. 1; ‘Allied Forces Approaching Tunis Key Bases’, 17 November 1942, p. 1; ‘Heavy Raid on Bremen’ and ‘22 Ships Sunk in Allied Convoy’, 15 September 1942, p. 1; ‘Tanks in Nine Hours Raid’, 20 August 1942, p. 1; ‘The Raid on Dieppe,’ 20 August 1942, p. 3. All from Irish Times. ‘Hitler Message to His Troops’, Irish Press, 1 January 1942, p. 1; ‘Hitler Speaks in Berlin’, Irish Press, 31 January 1942, p. 1; ‘Mr Churchill Meets M. Stalin’, Irish Times, 18 August 1942, p. 1; ‘Mr Churchill Re-appears’, Irish Times, 18 August 1942, p. 2; ‘Also Sprach . . . !’ Irish Times, 1 October 1942, p. 3; ‘No Weakness Will Be Shown’, Irish Times, 13 October 1942, p. 1. ‘American Soldiers Arriving at the Allied Base at Port Moresby’, Irish Times, 2 October 1942, p. 1; ‘Cathedral Amid Ruins’, Irish Press, 21 April 1942, p. 1; ‘Aircraft Carrier Sunk,’ Irish Times, 13 August 1942, p. 1; ‘German Soldiers in the Wrecked Suburbs of Stalingrad’, Irish Independent, 24 October 1942, p. 3;‘Ruins of the City of Voronezh’, Irish Independent, 10 November 1942, p. 3; ‘Five Frenchmen Shot as Reprisal’, Irish Press, 9 May 1942, p. 1.

8

Turning the Tide: January–December 1943

In 1943 the Allies turned the tide against the Axis in Europe. Germany was defeated in north Africa and went on the defensive in Russia, and the Allies defeated Italy and intensified their bombing raids on Germany – none of which had any visible affect on Eire neutrality. Eire’s ambassador to the United States, Robert Brennan, assured a Boston audience that 99 per cent of the Irish favoured neutrality, and an Irish-American audience cheered the Fordham University president, Father Robert I. Gannon, SJ, when he claimed that ‘Ireland’s neutrality is en´ tirely justified’. At year’s end, Eamon de Valera assured the D´ail that Eire would stay out of the war ‘no matter what comes our way’. London and Washington saw little hope that this would change in the foreseeable future.1 Would the war of words devolve then into bickering over specific issues, with promotion of the Allies as ‘the side of right’, the underlying theme since 1939, taking a back seat? James Dillon opposed neutrality in the D´ail, and the next day stones were hurled at him as he was leaving Sunday mass. Historian Henry Steele Commager slammed Eire for being neutral and was slammed in turn by Brennan for getting his facts all wrong; then Belfast MP D. L. Savory said that Brennan had his facts all wrong, because it was hardly ‘neutral’ when he protested the entry of US troops into Northern Ireland.2 Meanwhile, Eire was preparing for elections, and, in de Valera’s words, ‘censorship will continue as long as the war does. This means that during election time, speeches will not be given extreme latitude’.3 It was reported that the Eire government feared the general election might have a divisive impact on the nation. Fine Gael talked about a ‘national government’, while Fianna Fail claimed to be solely responsible for the ‘present peaceful state of Ireland’. The Irish Independent called this nonsense, since all parties backed neutrality and would do so whoever was leading the nation. The Manchester Guardian expressed concern that Fianna Fail might become Eire’s only political party, and establish a totalitarian state.4 It did not happen. The election was held on 22 June, and Fianna Fail lost seven seats in the D´ail – which cost de Valera his absolute majority – and Fine Gail nine, while Labour gained seven, the Farmer’s Party four, and six went to Independents. US ambassador David Gray thought this meant there was rising dissatisfaction with de Valera’s government.5 What there was not was any desire to end neutrality, despite the negative affects it might have on Eire’s post-war economy. Hugh Dalton, Britain’s Minister of Economic Warfare, hinted that indeed it might.6

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Eire sought to counter such negativity by emphasising the good aspects of the Irish people and the injustice of partition. Ambassador Brennan lectured to American audiences, explaining that historic Ireland’s culture was among the most advanced in Europe and its economy one of the healthiest in Europe, and excoriating Britain as responsible for the horrors associated with partition. Edward William Lindsay-Hogg, husband of Dublin-born actress Geraldine Fitzgerald, tried to persuade the Eire government to establish ‘an Irish propaganda office’ in the US with him in charge, while Gray warned against subversive post-war anti-partition and anti-British propaganda in Eire, which Irish-American newspapers were already disseminating. He also reported the wide circulation of Orange Terror, an anti-partition propaganda pamphlet.7 Gray was frustrated by Eire neutrality, which in his view was increasingly obstructive and alienating, now that Germany was losing the war. He also took a dim view of Eire’s economic capabilities, and argued that as America obtained nothing from Eire, it was under ‘no moral obligation’ to make sacrifices for its welfare. Gray also suspected that de Valera’s emphasis on ending partition even while stressing ‘good relations with England’ meant that he was preparing some sort of reprise of the 1916 uprising.8 But perhaps things were not as dark as they seemed: Ireland mourned the death of England’s Cardinal Hinsley in March, and Dublin crowds cheered the American Cardinal Spellman’s visit.9 The bases, ports, supplies and Axis legations in Dublin continued to be issues affecting American–Irish relations. Both Britain and the United States regarded bases and ports as essential to transatlantic shipping, yet by year’s end, no formal request for access to them, or for the removal of the Axis legations, had been submitted to the Eire government, despite Gray urging an Anglo-American demand to that effect.10 Meanwhile, Brennan’s request to purchase a cargo ship from an American firm to replace two others, also from America, that had been sunk, was denied on the grounds that Eire had given America no credit for providing the two that were sunk. Cordell Hull urged de Valera to wake up to the fact that by attacking Irish ships, the Axis was making war on Eire.11 Anglo-American interaction in pressuring Eire over neutrality increased in 1943, including cooperation between the MOI and the OWI. Brendan Bracken assured Gray that he would give the OWI all assistance in his power as well as provide propaganda material prepared by his ministry, and the Manchester Guardian lauded OWI director Elmer Davis as ‘one of the best interpreters of American politics over the wireless’.12 Of course, America and Britain had to consider Irish-American opinion when making policies regarding Eire neutrality. Irish-Americans largely supported US military success against Japan and lauded Irish-American war heroes, but continued to favour Eire neutrality and resented those who wrote anti-neutrality essays for the press and journals. The Irish-American press backed Ambassador Brennan when he said that the Allies taking over Eire ports would ‘create anti-American feelings in Ireland’ and accused such newspapers as P.M. of being anti-Irish and anti-Catholic, and the Ancient Order of Hibernians passed a resolution urging the abolition of the Northern Ireland government.13 ‘To

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back Britain was to back British imperialism’ was the ongoing line. The Leader supported North Dakota Senator Gerald Nye’s protest against America going to war in Europe, and the Gaelic American warned against pro-US–British alliance propaganda, financed by wealthy pro-British businessmen and high government officials, and disseminated by Lord Halifax and others. America must wake up, or ‘we will be back again under the “Union Jack” ’.14 Meanwhile, the Leader excoriated British soldiers, Eleanor Roosevelt for speaking well of Britain and the British way of speaking ‘as if their mouths were full of hot mush’, and claimed that ‘Anglophilism’ had ‘betrayed us into Russian hands’. And, while there were pro-British Irish-American Catholics – Cardinal Dougherty, Archbishop of Philadelphia, and Colonel Donovan, head of the OSS (Organisation of Strategic Services), for example – Irish-American backing of Eire neutrality intensified in 1943 and the British Foreign Office doubted that this would change.15 Meanwhile, the UK representative in Eire, Sir John Maffey, was offering his views on how to deal with Eire – and Irish-Americans, at least to the extent that they must be persuaded to accept America pressuring Eire for facilities for prosecution of the war. He was convinced that de Valera did not like to be ‘ignored’ regarding the war, such as being told that when all was said and done, Britain could deal with the situation on its own. Maffey said he tried to be at least firm with de Valera, explaining that better Anglo-Irish understanding would never exist unless Eire indicated some practical sympathy with the Allies such as showing ‘maximum . . . leniency towards our downed airmen’, and that a new Vichy minister to Eire appointed by the Germans would arouse new suspicions regarding German espionage in Eire.16 Clearly, Maffey’s job was to pressure de Valera to the greatest extent possible, and he was much concerned when Home Secretary Herbert Morrison delivered a speech in London in July, warning Eire that ‘we shall not forget’ its refusal to join in the struggle for the cause of human freedom, a refusal that ‘does not stand up too well in the history of the nations’. In response, an angry de Valera asked which country was responsible ‘for the continuing crime of partitioning this ancient nation of Ireland’ and forced a half million of its people ‘to endure the denial of the ‘freedom and liberties’ for which this war in the ’cause of human freedom’, to quote Mr Morrison, is being fought’. Maffey feared that neither the speech nor the reply would go down well in America and the dominions, where a large audience always regarded England as ‘being in the wrong on any Irish issue’ and glorified Eire’s neutrality as ‘a fight against Partition’. He was not far off. Responses to the Home Secretary in the Irish-American press and in the Irish Press were as resentful as were de Valera’s words.17 Maffey as UK representative and Gray as US ambassador had to deal with numerous difficulties, not least of which was the Belfast tabloid the Ulster Protestant, which, among other things, claimed that Eire convents were brothels for priests. Gray warned Maffey that as the paper was accessible to American Catholic soldiers and chaplains stationed in Northern Ireland, it could have a disastrous impact on American Catholic and Irish-American opinion on the war. Moreover, what was to prevent enemies of England circulating the paper among the

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Catholic population in America ‘with the truthful statement that it had been lawfully printed and sold in Northern Ireland without Government protest or apology’? Maffey agreed, noting that the Ulster Protestant was doing the Irish Nationalists’ work for them. ‘You never hear any complaints about such publications from Cardinal MacRory’, he told DO secretary Sir Eric Machtig. In fact, there had been many complaints against the Ulster Protestant; however, according to law, it ‘has the right to publish what it chooses’, which it did as in a September piece headlined ‘Will Pope Be on the List of War Criminals?’.18 Meanwhile, there was the arrival of American troops in Ulster, against which de Valera protested vigorously, and the possibility that their presence might be dragged into the Northern Ireland–Eire controversy. Consequently, Eire was declared ‘out of bounds’ for US soldiers.19 The questions of Axis espionage and fifth-column activities in Eire continued to concern both Washington and London. US intelligence prepared a rating chart for suspected fifth columnists. It included such items as nationality, connections with an Axis government, party ties – Nazi, Fascist or Falangist – overt expressions of pro-Axis sympathies such as displaying Axis emblems, being a member of ‘the German Club’, association with known Nazi sympathisers, trips to Axis countries, association with dissemination of pro-Axis propaganda, and having relatives living in Axis or Axis-dominated countries. OWI estimates were that some 300 Germans in Eire were loyal to the Nazis, and that many Irish citizens favoured German victory in the war and actively spread pro-German propaganda. Gray thought it entirely feasible for Germany to employ the IRA in its espionage operations. By May British intelligence had broken the German wireless code and was gaining information about German operations without the Germans knowing it.20 Axis propaganda in Eire also concerned the Allies, though Italian news letter activity was described as ‘slight’, and Nouvelles de France foundered over a split in the French legation between pro- and anti-Vichy factions. The weekly German legation newsletters had the largest circulation, to clergy, politicians, the press and professional people, and covered a wide range of topics: German success against the USSR; Britain’s ‘post-war fears’ that the US would further its economic interests ‘with brutal and ruthless egoism’; and denigration of neutral Sweden’s ‘hardly neutral’ press.21 Axis broadcasts were a much greater concern, which, in the view of OSS operative ‘Spike’ Marlin, ‘undoubtedly have an influence upon public opinion’. Deutsche Rundfunk gave Francis Stuart a regular progamme titled ‘Through Irish Eyes’, in which Stuart, claiming ‘not to be interested in propaganda’, praised Germany while satirising General Patton as ‘Major Pittin’ and the United States as the result of excrement tossed overboard from Noah’s Ark, and excoriated ‘Britannia’ as a lofty hypocrite who acted as an international gangster. Other broadcasts claimed that Anglo-American terror raids on Berlin indicated the weakness of their military forces, assured that Germany had no desire to impose National Socialism upon neutral nations, and claimed that America would never ‘relinquish her hold on the Six Counties’ and that Eire neutrality was a safeguard from ‘Jewry’. And there were talks in Gaelic by Hans

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Hartman, sketches and short plays, and Patrick Joseph Cadogan’s commentary on current events. Cadogan was an Irishman who, they claimed, had recently arrived from New York.22 The themes in German broadcast talks were consistently antiSemitic and racist, anti-Bolshevik, anti-American, anti-British, pro-Catholic, and pro-Irish nationalism. OWI propaganda in Eire ostensibly began in the autumn of 1942 with Richard Watts in charge. It was still in a somewhat confused state in early 1943, in part because of constant attacks from anti-Roosevelt congressmen, the State Department, and the OSS, from which the OWI had taken over control of foreign propaganda. But unresolved policy matters were of more immediate concern. Watts wanted a tough-line approach in Eire, such as that nations not participating in the war risked being left in the cold. The OWI and the State Department preferred a ‘good-will’ approach, promoting Irish-American relations with such items as cultural films and contributing to a library.23 In May, Watts was replaced by Dan Terrell, who was sceptical that much was being done in Eire, despite the fact that by December the US propaganda film Mrs Miniver was in Dublin cinemas, RE´ was playing Boston Symphony recordings, and more than 100,000 were reading Letter from America. Terrell himself gave a subtle propaganda speech about Hollywood film making to the Dublin Writers, Artists, Actors and Musicians Association. Still, he agreed when Gray opined that it would be no great loss if the OWI closed its Dublin office.24 It was odd that Terrell sounded the ‘glass half empty’ perspective, considering how much official propaganda was in place by year’s end. Material aimed at John Betjeman’s ‘good relations’ approach included: Letter from America and Medical News; photographs and clip sheets for Dublin newspapers; ‘special stories’ to the Irish press; The Road to Victory, expressing American Catholic views on the war, given to the Irish hierarchy, clergy, school teachers, and dispensary doctors and nurses; ‘Comment from the American Press’, ranging from the New York Times to the Salt Lake City Tribune; American cultural material such as The Story of American Music; illustrated pamphlets such as The Four Documents Signed at the Moscow Conference, The American Army in Europe, and Rural America: Farms and Farmers in the United States; sheet music and recordings of the uncomplimentary to Hitler ‘The Fuehrer’s Face’; such magazines and newspapers as Newsweek, Time, Life and the New York Times; commercial and non-commercial films; private showings of films with overt propaganda themes; Terrell going into the Irish community as widely as possible and doing an ‘All Ireland lecture tour’; and material for radio broadcasts. Regular reports were sent to the OWI, including Eire press notices of Watts’ excellent work, published a few days before he left at the end of May.25 The most significant single OWI propaganda channel was Letter from America, a news letter designed to appeal directly to Irish sensitivities. Its readers mostly represented an educated and urban portion of the population. References to American war heroes with Irish names were frequent, for example the list of Irish-American servicemen cited by Attorney-General Francis Biddle in an address to the Friendly Sons of St Patrick banquet in Philadelphia. Another issue

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extolled the heroism of the ‘Fighting Sullivans’, five brothers who died in battle in the Pacific, along with that of Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan, who died in a naval battle in the Solomon Islands.26 Regular features included the Catholic Church, Catholic leaders speaking out against Nazism, and Nazi attacks on the Church, one of which was a three-instalment report titled ‘The Nazi War against the Catholic Church’. One instalment quoted Hitler: ‘If I wished to, I could destroy the Church in a few years. It is hollow and rotten and fake through and through’.27 Other major themes were women in war-related activities, democracy, resistance movements, Axis atrocities against priests and nuns, Axis looting, anti-Nazi cartoons and jokes, and the Allies winning the war. The Censorship took a surprisingly lenient attitude towards Letter from America, and the Eire External Affairs office received only a few protest letters.28 Letter from America faced difficult obstacles, however, such as the ‘common talk in Eire’ that the Allied nations planned to ‘monopolize the commodities of the world’ after the war, and that while the Irish generally accepted that the Allies would win the war, ‘a definite concern is growing about Ireland’s place in the postwar world’. Dubliner Desmond O’Kennedy wrote to the OWI that the Irish were ‘a logical and cynical crowd who feel that all the major powers are playing their own selfish game’.29 In December OWI Dublin wrote a report on Irish popular and official opinion, and how Letter from America propaganda might influence it. Basic conclusions drawn included: the Irish preferred, but did not wish to participate in, an Allied victory; they thought the Anglo-US-Russian alliance would end after the war; they believed the Allies were out for individual gain from the war; the Irish were misinformed on the qualities of the US education system, the US’s cultural achievements and its deep religious interests; and they were ‘smugly satisfied’ regarding neutrality policy. Propaganda must persuade them that not participating in the war would leave Eire on the outside looking in when it was over, that the Allies fought only to make a free world and that US soldiers and sailors made huge sacrifices in the war, and it must feature the courage and sacrifice of other small nations as a challenge to Irish complacency as a neutral nation.30 The trick was to make this propaganda believable and acceptable, and to get it past the censor. Eire censorship showed no indication of letting up in 1943. Terrell reported on Eire censorship over the three months between July 21 and October 22, limited to items concerning the bombing of Rome and developments in Italy, and based upon a newspaper report apparently ‘leaked’ to OWI Dublin by an unnamed source. There were nine deleted items from reports on the Rome bombing and 150 from those on developments in Italy, including Vatican statements, reports of possible street riots in Rome, ecclesiastical criticism of America for having carried out the bombing, Italy failing in the war, criticism of Mussolini, Allied air raids on Italian cities, threats to Swiss neutrality and victory celebrations on Malta.31 Film propaganda dissemination expanded in 1943. A Dublin consulate report in February covered the issue in much detail, beginning with the fact that an estimated twenty-one million a year went to the cinema, and that Hollywood was the source of more than 90 per cent of films shown. Moreover, cinema

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tickets were ‘within the public’s capacity to pay’. The problem was the censor cracking down on propaganda films. Still, the OWI had arrangements with film producers to have special newsreels made for Eire without propaganda from any of the belligerents. Documentaries also were popular, at least in Dublin and Cork, though not in rural areas. A hopeful sign was that Irish film audiences liked the few American war films that had passed censorship. The report also indicated that while Disney cartoons remained acceptable, their popularity was on the wane. Suggestions for improvement included making films with serious and accurately portrayed Irish themes, no caricatures of Irish culture, such as ‘Bowery cum Irish brogue’, and find ways to get around the censorship. Unfortunately the censorship was encouraged by the likes of a former Eire film censor, James Montgomery, who published an article in the Irish Quarterly Review titled ‘The Menace of Hollywood’.32 American film making now began to include Ireland. Letter from Ulster, a documentary aimed primarily at US audiences, concerned how American troops settled down in Northern Ireland. Colonel I. S. Dierking of the US Army said: ‘This film will ease the minds and gladden the hearts of the mothers of America’. Doughboys in Ireland, a feature film made for American audiences, also focused on US troops in Ulster. And American-made short documentary films, some with war-related themes, were allowed to circulate in Eire so long as they were not promoting the war. Titles included Paratroops, Autobiography of a Jeep, Cowboy, Oswego and Swedes in America. Meanwhile, Dublin cinemas were running American films with war-related themes such as Top Sargeant, Johnny Doughboy, Victory Caravan, To the Shores of Tripoli, Yankee Doodle Dandy, Aerial Gunner, Flight for Freedom, Army Surgeon and The War against Mrs Hadley. These played alongside Hollywood fare with no connection at all to the war, such as westerns, a film genre that apparently appealed to Eire filmgoers.33 Film reviewers in the Irish Press were not always impressed by Hollywood, and Eire film censors took a hard line on both news film and Hollywood productions. The Irish Press depicted the heroine in The War against Mrs Hadley as unsympathetically snobbish, and hinted that Lucky Jordan had little substance; the US Army newspaper, Stars and Stripes, blasted American films for ‘their flag-waving, vain-glory, lack of taste and presentation of the American soldier as a superman hero’. Frank Aiken granted March of Time permission to make a film in Ireland only provided that the censors had final approval of both film and soundtrack. Censorship of United Newsreels also was strict, and Terrell was not optimistic that they would get past Aiken – ‘not a friendly man’ – without serious cuts.34 Indeed, as a result of the 1942 Emergency Powers Act, Aiken – or any other government minister – could tell the film censor what to do regarding any film. Serious cuts, and withdrawal of films altogether, occurred regularly. The MPPDA’s Martin Quigley complained that the thirty cuts ordered by film censor Richard Hayes in A Yank in the RAF were pointless. Hayes was notoriously tough, and on one occasion told a news reporter that ‘a full 90 per cent of the films we get from England and America these days have more than their fair share of propaganda, even the non-war films. And it’s the devil’s own job cutting it

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out’. While admitting he had no proof, Quigley nonetheless was convinced that the German legation inspired the cuts because legation members had been seen accompanying Hayes to the cinema ‘to make sure that the further cuts made in a picture satisfied the Nazis’. He also referred to a local fascist organisation, Altieri na haseirghe, claiming responsibility for having A Yank in the RAF removed from the cinema altogether. Quigley encouraged the General Council of Theatre and Cinema Associations to complain to Aiken regarding censorship. They did, but to no good. Typical of Aiken, he assured them that their complaints would be considered, and then revoked a licence granted months before, for showing a documentary short on training American army chaplains. David Gray urged that Quigley put more pressure on the censor over A Yank in the RAF, because the present ‘revolutionary Irishmen’ controlling Irish policy would regard any compliance from the film industry as a sign of weakness. On the other hand, March of Time received plaudits from the Defence Ministry for being cooperative on Eire neutrality.35 The film censor showed no signs of softening on US or British films in 1943. For example: Army Chaplain was banned after having played for six weeks in five Eire theatres; a scene with a Churchill poster in the background was cut from Forever and a Day; a scene with the American flag in the background was cut from Good Luck Mr Yates (in this case, however, Aiken later rescinded the decision and the flag scene was reinstated); A Day in the Life of Soviet Russia was first allowed, then cancelled; and even March of Time aroused complaints in the D´ail over a scene shot at the Gresham Hotel which included champagne being served at a social function. Wrote Gray: ‘Many Irish hate to be displayed before the world as enjoying themselves extravagantly while the rest of the world is at war’. According to GIB director Frank Gallagher, there was much more to object to in the film than champagne – such as cattle export scenes, the UK permit office, the Victoria Cross awarded to Irishmen, and references to press ´ and postal censorship. Meanwhile, Eamon de Valera defended censorship and the censors, and virtually anything else that derived from the Emergency Powers Act. Coyne vehemently defended the censorship on the grounds that it was ‘purely for security’.36 The MOI Empire division clearly understood the limits imposed by the censors when drafting its first complete propaganda plan for Eire, in January 1943. Prior to that, the division had ‘infiltrated our point of view into Eire by indirect means’ through press attach´e John Betjeman. The plan now laid out was to actively disseminate propaganda, taking into account that Eire opinion generally was committed to neutrality, save for perhaps an actively pro-British five per cent of the population and a handful of anti-British, pro-German IRA and IRA sympathisers. Ironically, the plan was more an admission of what could not be done than what could be. It called for increasing the supply of British newspapers in Eire, while recognising that it would be self-defeating to aim broadcast propaganda at Eire beyond such programmes as ‘Irish Half Hour’, and talks and news items of Irish interest that already existed. It also called for increasing the sale of MOI booklets and pamphlets, while admitting that propaganda films could not be

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got past the censor, as was the case with war-related photographs for Irish newspapers. In short, the plan reaffirmed the aims and objectives Betjeman pursued as press attach´e; that is, propaganda taking the form of ‘exploiting the existing war situation in the long-term interests of good relations with the Irish’.37 That this policy had a visible affect is debatable. Observations on Eire public opinion submitted in 1943 varied from optimism to pessimism. In January, A. A. Mowat informed Nicholas Mansergh, who passed it on to the DO, that ‘there is abroad now a sense that the day of reckoning . . . is not far off and it behoves the Irish nation as distinct from the Eire government to present its record in a favourable light’. In March, Betjeman advised the DO to remember that despite de Valera’s anti-British election campaign, he had a record of benevolent neutrality toward the Allies which would likely increase if he won the election. Once again Betjeman emphasised good relations – and that meant, among other things, not being overly concerned about businessman J. J. Walsh trying to form a new Fascist Party in Eire. After all, he observed, in not particularly complimentary language, ‘one must remember that in Ireland the time lag which appears in architecture appears equally in everything else, and when Fascism and Nazism have ceased to exist in Europe they will probably be just starting in Ireland . . . ’ Meanwhile, in September, eyebrows were raised in London when de Valera publicly suggested that the Axis would lose the war. Reported Reginald Ross Williamson: ‘It is said that this is the first time An Taoiseach has ever made a public hint of such an outcome’.38 Betjeman’s last few months as press attach´e were spent following his usual routines: assisting applicants for travel permits to Britain, hosting visiting dignitaries and paving the way for his successor, Ross Williamson, from the Admiralty Press Division.39 He also was given time off from his Eire duties to write a film script – he already had been involved in the making of Laurence Olivier’s Henry V, which was filmed in County Wicklow – only the project was abandoned almost before it began because there was too much else going on. He remained in Eire until Ross Williamson replaced him. The Irish response to his departure indicated how successful Betjeman had been in his role. The Irish government gave him a black-tie farewell dinner, and Gallagher said, ‘We’ll all be poorer through you going’, to which Betjeman responded: ‘I am very depressed at going. So many friends, so much kindness’. Farewell notes included: from E. Hardiman, ‘Your successor will never be able to fill the position as ably as you have done’; from Denis Ireland, ‘I shall miss our flights of fancy, sustained and stimulated by brandy, in the University Club’; and from Cyril Cusack, ‘You have a knack of making it possible for people to miss you from amongst them, even upon a short, very haphazard acquaintance’.40 And there were many more. Clearly, Betjeman had made ‘good relations’ work. Reginald Ross Williamson was a Cambridge graduate with a historical, archaeological and journalistic background, and attempted to follow in Betjeman’s footsteps. He backed Coyne for censoring a Dorothy Crisp article which referred to Eire’s ‘iron censorship’ and de Valera’s ‘iron dictatorship’, but regretted that Coyne banned the Sunday Dispatch for running it; he also urged Coyne to

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suppress news regarding British aircraft accidents over Eire territory because it might give the impression that British civilian aviation was ‘accident prone’. Ross Williamson maintained close contact with London on such issues as the question of re-creating the Irish Guards regiment and Eire censorship of effusive press reports on British military success in Sicily. Meanwhile, running the office was frustrating – the telephone constantly rang, visitors with ‘indeterminate missions’ crowded the room, and officials in the office such as Mr Hanks took a devil-may-care attitude towards their responsibilities. Two weeks after taking up his post, Ross Williamson admitted that ‘hitherto I have been too new, soon – I hope – hardened, but now I am at the doubting stage’.41 Still, it was early days, and it remained to be seen how things would go over time. Eire was on the list for much of the expanding amount of British propaganda material being produced – provided it got past the censor. Texts of Radio Vatican broadcasts such as ‘War Indefensible: Peace through Peace’, ‘Advent Pastoral Letter by the Bishop of Berlin, Dr Konrad Count von Greying: The Source of Right: God or State?’ and ‘Anti-Papist Feeling in Britain Declining’ were aimed at Catholic opinion. So too photographs of Cardinal Hinsley presiding at a luncheon in London. Robert Wilberforce interpreted his being seated at the high table next but one to the presiding officer at a meeting of the Brooklyn Diocese in New York, the largest and most Irish diocese in America after Boston, as indicating a positive change in Irish-American Catholic attitudes towards Britain.42 Propaganda materials aimed at the dominions also were aimed at Eire. They basically lauded British accomplishments associated with the war, making much of Irish volunteers serving in British forces, including special attention given to the Irish Guards serving in Tunisia, while bashing anything associated with Nazi rule in Europe. Print materials available for distribution in Eire for 1943 alone included five wall sheets, twenty-six pamphlets, twelve Commonwealth and other leaflets and fifteen posters, and hundreds if not thousands of copies of each could be made available for shipment to Eire. Titles included ‘Volunteers from Eire’, ‘A Picture of India’, 50 Facts about the Colonies’, ‘Open Air Justice in Africa’, ‘Protection of Native African Cattle from Diseases’, ‘Underground War’, ‘Trip in a Giant Bomber’, ‘Four under Hitler’, ‘Women behind the Guns’, ‘Anti-Aircraft Guns Go into Action’, and ‘Britain’s Industrial Achievement’, and the coloured posters depicted such military chiefs of staff as Montgomery, Mountbatten, Cunningham and Harris.43 ‘Talking Points’ leaflets also were a high priority. The problem was that because of the censor, much of this material aimed at Eire did not see the light of day in Eire except on a very limited and private, as opposed to public, basis.44 Films with themes appropriate for Eire were on the to-do list as well. Robert Speaight proposed ‘The Catholic Church in Britain’, which would include a reference to the Irish flooding into Great Britain and ‘helping to build the great new Catholic Cathedral at Liverpool’. However, this was a bit much, and the project was abandoned. Fires Were Started, on the other hand, which dramatised National Fire Service work during the 1940–41 blitz, was made and the Dublin Fire Brigade chief requested a copy. A print was sent and was viewed by both the

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Fire Brigade chief and the censor; it was approved for public showing, providing a number of cuts were made.45 The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp, a film inspired by David Low’s cartoon character in the London Evening Standard, was also approved but only after sixty-two cuts were made. Ross Williamson noted that the cuts ‘rendered the film so mutilated as to make it not worth while, and [it] is not being shown here commercially’.46 Items cut from the film included formation of the Home Guard, Home Guard defence of London, mention of Pearl Harbor, German anti-British propaganda at the time of the Boer War, references to the Boer War, criticism of the German Imperial Army in the Great War, mention of the Swedish military attach´e, reference to Americans fighting in France in the Great War, interrogation of German prisoners in the Great War, reference to Italy being an ally in the Great War, German acceptance of the armistice terms in 1918, a Catholic bishop referring to admiring war heroes, BBC news bulletins referring to raids on Malta, criticism of Marshal P´etain’s ascendancy in France, playing of the British national anthem, a shot of the Union Jack, and several lines regarding women engaged in war either as nurses or in the military. Ross Williamson was correct; it would have been difficult to make any sense of the film.47 Early in the year, it was acknowledged that broadcasting was a well-established propaganda channel into Eire. The United States continued its ‘Friendship Bridge’ broadcasts among other programmes, and the BBC its programmes ranging from musical and dramatic performances to talks, some by Cardinal Hinsley. The BBC Symphony Orchestra also performed in Dublin late in the ´ For obvious reasons, the single most year, with the enthusiastic support of RE. exploited broadcast opportunity was St Patrick’s Day. For example, Nicholas Mansergh recommended that the opening of the Shamrock Club in London be broadcast on St Patrick’s Day over the Forces Programme – to which BBC NI director George Marshall objected on the grounds that it might sound like a statement for reunification, and that could produce severe repercussions in Northern Ireland. The point was taken, and it was agreed to do a St Patrick’s Day Home Service programme suggested by Ursula Eason, involving traditional Irish music played by Philip Martin from County Fermanagh on uilleann pipes, discussion of St Patrick’s Day celebrations and entertainments, an American soldier describing how St Patrick’s Day was celebrated in America, and a discussion segment titled ‘St Patrick Was a Gentleman’. The bottom line, of course, was that the broadcast was aimed at Northern, not Southern Ireland, and in Eason’s view, this was as it should be. Godfrey Adams complained that it was a ‘humdrum affair lacking distinction’, and doubted that under present circumstances ‘we can ever hope to do a St Patrick’s Day programme which will be really worthy of the occasion’.48 But St Patrick’s Day was only once a year. There was much discussion about broadcasting aimed at Eire, and at Irish audiences outside of Eire. That included whether or not to do a Gaelic-language news bulletin aimed at countering antiBritish material broadcast in Gaelic from Germany, to appeal to the people of Eire against the government’s neutrality policy (which J. B. Clark thought a bad

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idea), to do ‘factual’ broadcasts aimed at the dominions regarding upcoming Eire elections, and to work with RE´ and BBC NI on all broadcasting planned for Eire. And there was the accent issue: as Eire and Northern Irish accents were different, should there be equal representation from North and South for a programme titled ‘Every Accent Tells a Story’?49 In fact, these discussions had only limited effect on regular programming for both Home and Forces Programmes, which remained more or less as they had been in 1942. Eire censorship appeared now to be more stringent than ever. Every print line now had to be submitted to the censors, and mention of rank and unit of anyone serving in British forces, regardless of nationality, could not be included in wedding announcements or obituaries in the press, nor could troops in Ulster be mentioned or the Axis criticised. A tight watch was kept on telegrams coming from outside of Eire, and on film makers who might ‘influence public opinion in America in a manner hostile to the Irish government and people’. The censors had a sensitive side too, as when John Betjeman was told that a Joan Haslip article, ‘De Valera’s Other Island’, had been stopped, and that ‘if there is much more of this sad-sympathy-with-the-mists-that-do-be-on-the-Irish-bogtrotters type of propaganda in the British press regarding Irish neutrality it will be necessary to let the Irish people know about it, and to allow Irish publicists to reply’. Cobbett Wilkes complained in the Spectator that virtually anything referring to Britain was suppressed – no references to the Royal Family, no war films in cinemas, no English newsreels with reference to the war or the King, and even a story about a heroic ATS woman was killed by the censor, only to have it appear later as a story about a gallant German woman soldier – and that it was all ridiculous.50 And yet, the Irish Press had been allowed to quote from a papal letter broadcast to German bishops, which criticised the Axis powers. But, then, this came just after Frank Aiken announced that censorship rules would be relaxed for the period preceding the June elections.51 Complaints against Eire censorship were not lacking. Charles Eade complained when the Sunday Dispatch was banned because articles by Dorothy Crisp criticised Eire neutrality, the de Valera government, Eire’s economic situation, the harbouring of Axis agents in Dublin, and denying the Royal Navy the use of Eire ports. Sean Nolan was outraged when Aiken backed Thomas Coyne banning advertisements for a public lecture on Leon Trotsky. It had no effect, of course, and Coyne went so far as to accuse Nolan of being a spokesman in Eire for the Communist Party.52 Peter Matthews despaired that the Eire censor clearly favoured the Axis, and because of the censorship, ‘only in Eire are the papers condemned to an insipidity which is a disgrace to the Press and an unreal detachment which is a danger to the country’. Wilkes agreed. The Manchester Guardian was appalled by another seemingly pointless act of censorship, which was to ban publication of the Irish Labour Party’s resolution expressing admiration for the ‘struggle of the democratic peoples the world over against Fascism . . . ’. Interestingly, when asked what action it would take over Eire banning the Sunday Dispatch, the MOI replied that it was not concerned with the action of the Eire censor. Not so the OWI. It was very interested in what the outcome would be of a protest to Aiken

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over not passing George Fielding Eliot’s ‘Pacific Roundup’ to the Irish Times, when German commentators Sertorius and Dietmar were passed regularly.53 Complaints had little effect. Copies of Persecution of Catholics in the Third Reich were ‘detained’ by the censors on the assumption that they were MOI propaganda distributed in Eire ‘through the medium of a bogus book club’. A New Spirit, published by Clann na Saoirse (Racial Resurgence Party) was stopped because its supposed Irish nationalist theme was actually a form of fascism. An Ulster Union Club booklet, Let Irishmen Defend Ireland, was banned simply because a Unionist piece would not go over well in Eire, whatever its message.54 Eason’s bookshop also came under fire for again putting books about the war on its shelves. Coyne told Robert Eason that the censor would not pass The Dead Look On by Gerald Kersh, William Shirer’s Berlin Diary, Victor Bridges’ The Gulls Fly Low, which depicted Irishmen aiding the Germans against the British, or a Victor Gollancz pamphlet, Let My People Go. It was likely to foster antiSemitism, was Coyne’s view. Indeed, he saw all of this material as ‘the grosser type of propaganda’, and dismissed the Progressive Book Centre as ‘nothing but a Communist Propaganda den’. However, the censors did not close it down because there was no evidence that the centre circulated material that was ‘blasphemous, seditious, or indecent’. The censors were strict, but not at the same time absolute. Meanwhile, Michael Knightly banned an issue of the Cork Examiner for running a sales ad for oats, barley and wheat, because the ad did not make clear that the Ministry of Agriculture had authorised the sale.55 The press topped the censor’s list in 1943. A variety of items were banned. For example, Lady Glenary was denied publication of her letter to the Irish Times because she named Irishmen serving in British Forces. Another letter was banned from both the Irish Times and the Irish Independent for claiming that no true Catholic could deny that the war against Nazism was a war for the existence of Christianity. Meanwhile, a report on Canadian airmen being held at Curragh was published only after some items were deleted, and an Irish Times article on Irish servicemen in British forces was banned because it said they had joined up as ‘a matter of conscience’.56 Some newspapers were banned altogether under Emergency Powers Order (No. 151) of 1942. Irish Freedom, for example, published in London, was banned on 29 March for opposing neutrality and calling for Irish Labour to stand up in support of the United Nations in the war against the Axis. Coyne effectively set the ban process in motion as early as January when he described the paper to Joseph Walshe as ‘a purely propaganda publication which makes a profession of Irish Nationalism for the purpose of furthering the British war effort in the interests of the Soviet Union’. In other words, a pro-communist sheet. For that reason, Coyne later advised that postal communication between Irish Freedom and Eire should be disrupted, because one P. Dooley was using the paper to recruit Irish labour for Britain, ‘which shows him in his true colours’.57 The British Sunday Dispatch was also banned. At issue was ‘My Plan for Ireland’, a second Dorothy Crisp article critical of Eire neutrality, which the editor refused to suppress as demanded by the Eire censor. The ban was imposed

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on 11 September, and the next day, under the headline ‘BANNED!’ the editor wrote defiantly that he would be an unworthy trustee of the paper’s 141-year record of ‘vigorously fearless journalism’ if he gave in to ‘dictation and blackmail from the government of Eire’.58 English opinion agreed. K. G. Aked, for example, thought that it was right for the paper to refuse being dictated to by ‘an unpatriotic pro-German crowd like that’, and that ‘I think we should ban trading with them after the war’. Irish opinion did not agree. Anna Murphy advised Crisp not to lose any sleep over Ireland. ‘Somehow or another we have been able to look after ourselves even when you sent over your Black and Tans . . . Why don’t you take on the Swedes and Swiss for their neutrality?’59 Unlike Irish Freedom, the Sunday Dispatch ban lasted only three weeks, when a deal was struck: the ban was lifted in exchange for publishing a piece by Dublin journalist John T. Grealish giving the Eire viewpoint on neutrality – which also was scrutinised by the censor before being published.60 Censorship of Eire newspapers regarding war reporting had eased in 1942, which continued to be the case in 1943. War news was a daily portion of the Eire press, especially in the major Dublin papers, much of it supplied by the Reuters news agency and reported in graphic detail. Irish Independent and Irish Press coverage of the war in North Africa was detailed but usually not on the front page – an exception being an Irish Press report on the Allied capture of Tunis and Bizerta. War reports were frequently accompanied by maps charting the course of the Allied advance, and photographs of such military leaders as General Montgomery and Field Marshall Rommel. The Irish Press also editorialised on the significance of the north African war for Europe generally.61 Photographs of General Dwight Eisenhower, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill also appeared in Dublin papers, and the pro-British Irish Times reported in detail on Anglo-American cooperation and Roosevelt’s great contribution to the rebuilding of America after the Great Depression. It also took an implicit dig at Eire neutrality with a short report on Northern Ireland participation in the war titled ‘Northern Ireland Doing Its Duty’. And, of course, the Allied leaders’ meeting in Tehran in December to discuss post-war plans was a major item in the Dublin press.62 Meanwhile, reports with accompanying maps covered the war in Russia as fully as in north Africa, and a photograph of Soviet Marshal Voroshilov accompanied one Irish Independent report on the relief of Leningrad.63 The European theatre dominated press war reporting and commentary. Would there be a second front, and when? There were detailed reports on the battle for Sicily, and, of course, Italy’s capitulation with Marshal Badoglio taking over from Benito Mussolini, British troops establishing a beachhead on the Italian mainland, and German forces moving in to re-establish control in Italy south to Rome. Coverage was detailed, and sometimes in language that Americans found frustrating. R. B. Stewart wrote to David Gray that ‘Irish press headlines on the battle of Salerno is the clearest instance of coloring the news in favor of Germany I have yet seen’.64 Meanwhile, Allied bombing raids on Germany and Italy, especially on Rome and the Pope’s plea that it end, were extensively

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covered. T. A. Hickock, charg´e d’affaires of the US legation, wrote to Cordell Hull that while Dublin papers expressed regret that Rome was bombed, they did not condemn it – which clearly was not quite the pro-German flavour to which Stewart referred. It also was not quite accurate, since the Irish Independent termed the bombing a violation of Vatican neutrality and the Irish Press featured Pope Pius XII pleading for it to end.65 And there was the regular publication of war-related photographs: shattered buildings in Stalingrad, bomb damage in London, in the Vatican and in German cities – including a report that the Irish legation in Berlin was destroyed during an air raid, German soldiers on the Russian front and elsewhere, and photographs of British aircraft in flight.66 Why the Dublin press got a great deal of war-related material in print and past the censor may be simply put. In 1943, the Allies made major inroads into the Axis domination of Europe, Germany did not defeat the Soviet Union and went on the defensive in north Africa, and Italy effectively collapsed, becoming no longer an Axis partner but rather a German-occupied nation. Clearly, the tide of war was turning.

Notes 1. ‘Minister Brennan is Eire Society Guest at Boston Dinner’, Gaelic American, 5 May 1943, p. 1; ‘Eire’s Neutrality Justified Fr. Gannon Tells Feis Throng that Fills Fordham Campus’, Gaelic American, 25 June 1943, p. 1; ‘De Valera States Ireland’s Stand on Neutrality’, Gaelic American, 11 December 1943, p. 1; Anthony Eden to John G. Winant, 29 December 1943, CAB 66/W.P. (43)589, PRO; T. A. Hickock to Cordell Hull, 1 May 1943, RG 84/13 DLGR, NAUS. 2. ‘I Want to See Nazi Germany Defeated’, Irish Independent, 18 June, 1943, p. 2; extracts of Steele Commager’s Evening Standard article, ‘The Price of Eire Neutrality’, FO 371/34212.A4384, PRO; ‘Whose Grudge? Robert Brennan, Ireland and the War: Reply to Prof. Commager’, Irish World, 17 April 1943, p. 1; D. L. Savory, letter to the editor, Belfast Telegraph, 23 June 1943, FO 371/36602.W10519, PRO. 3. De Valera, speech on press censorship, 15 February 1943, S 11 306, SPO. 4. War Cabinet reports on Eire, 25 February 1943, CAB 66/ W.P.(43)87; ‘Making Neutrality an Issue’, Irish Independent, 7 June 1943, p. 2; ‘Mr De Valera: Majority Still in Doubt’, Manchester Guardian, 25 June 1943, p. 5. 5. Gray, memorandum, 27 June 1943, DGP, FDRL. 6. Hugh Dalton, Official Report, 4 August 1943, DO 130/36, PRO. 7. ‘Ireland Was the Light of All Europe Says Brennan’, Irish World, 15 May 1943, p. 1; ‘Fresh Presentations of Ireland’s Case by Minister to Washington’, Leader, 31 July 1943, pp. 1–2; Francis Styles to Hull, 27 August 1943, RG 84/6, DLCR, NAUS; Gray to Hull, 19 September 1943, DGP, FDRL; Gray to Hull, 16 October 1943, DLGR, NAUS. 8. Gray to Hull, 14 January 1943, RG 84/6, DLCR, NAUS; Gray to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 February 1943, PSF, FDRL; Gray, memorandum on US–Eire economic collaboration, 21 April 1943, FO 371/36602.W8317, PRO; Gray to Hull, 1 October 1943, GPO.

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9. ‘Death of Cardinal Hinsley’, Irish Independent, 18 March 1942, p. 2; ‘Crowds Cheer Dr Spellman’, Irish Independent, 1 April 1943, p. 3. 10. Cordell Hull, Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of London, 1948, pp. 1356–67; Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, 11 August 1943; Hull to Roosevelt, 13 September 1943; Hull to Gray, 18 September, 5 October and 30 December 1943, FRUS; Gray, memorandum on recommendations for the adoption of a joint Anglo-American economic policy towards Eire shaped with reference to political considerations, 14 May 1943 Gray to Roosevelt, 13 December 1943, PSF, FDRL. 11. Brennan to Hull, 4 December 1943; Gray to Hull, 18 December 1943; Hull to Brennan, 29 December 1943; Hull to de Valera, 30 December 1943, FRUS. 12. Gray to Hull, 23 November 1943, FRUS, pp. 162–3; Gray, memorandum of conversation with Brendan Bracken, 26 June 1942, RG 84/11, DLGR, NAUS; ‘Mr Elmer Davis’, Manchester Guardian, 24 July 1943, p. 6. 13. ‘Men in US Forces to Be Honored at Irish Ball’, Irish World, 23 January 1943, p. 1; Hickock to Hull, 8 July 1943, RG 84/6, DLCR, NAUS; cartoon, Boston Daily Globe, 17 March 1943, p. 1; ‘Brennan Refutes Lies’, Gaelic American, 10 April 1943, pp. 1–2; ‘ “PM” Stirs Race Hatred!’, Gaelic American, 9 January 1943, p. 1,‘Why the Attacks?, Gaelic American, 30 October 1943, p. 3; Consular Report for August 1943, FO 371/34171.A9716, PRO. 14. ‘Americans Fight for Just One Thing – America, Nye Asserts’, Leader, 13 February 1943, p. 6; ‘Churchill Speaks for England’, Gaelic American, 27 March 1943, p. 4; ‘A $60,000 Gift’, Gaelic American, 25 September 1943, p. 4. 15. ‘What Does She Mean by “Your” People?’, Leader, 23 January 1943, p. 6; ‘Internationalism, Anglophilism Betrayed Us into Russ Hands’, Leader, 15 February 15, 1943, p. 1; British Consulate (Philadelphia) despatch, 29 June 1943, INF 1/766; Halifax to FO, 29 April 1943, FO 371/24212.A4030; Frank C. Evans, minute, 5 February 1943, FO 371/36602.W2962, PRO. 16. Maffey, conversation with de Valera, 23 February 1943, CAB 66 W.P. (43)88; Maffey, conversation with de Valera, 17 April 1943; Maffey to Sir Eric Machtig, 17 June 1943, DO 130/33; Maffey, conversation with de Valera, 11 September 1943, DO 130/32, PRO. 17. ‘British Minister on Neutrality’, Irish Independent, 15 July 1943, p. 2; ‘De Valera Answers Herbert Morrison on Eire Neutrality’, Gaelic American, 14 August 1943, p. 1; Maffey to element Attlee, 16 July 1943, DO 130/33, PRO; ‘Mr Morrison’s Speech’, Irish Press, 16 July 1943, p. 2; ‘De Valera Answers Herbert Morrison on Eire Neutrality’, Leader, 28 August 1943, p. 1. 18. Gray to Maffey, 4 January 1943, RG 84/13 DLGR, NAUS; Maffey to Machtig, 11 January 1943, DO 130/34; DO to Morrison, 21 January 1943; Morrison to DO, 14 December 1942, CJ 1/86, PRO; Gray to Maffey, 10 September 1943, RG 84/13, DLGR, NAUS. 19. ‘Training in Northern Ireland’, Manchester Guardian, 27 February 1943, p. 3; Parker W. Buhrman, memorandum, 9 March 1943, DGP. 20. Chart of certain unit factors used in rating, (undated), RG 84/11; Hull to Gray, 27 November 1943; Gray to Hull, 30 November 1943, RG 84/6, DLCR, NAUS; Attlee to Winston Churchill, 3 May 1943, DO 121/108, PRO. 21. Dan Terrell to Hickock, 24 September 1943, RG 84/14, DLGR; Gray to Hull, 15 April 1943, RG 84/6, DLCR; Weekly Review of the German News Agency, 2 September 1943, RG 84/14, DLGR, NAUS.

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22. ‘Spike’ Marlin, ‘What Influence Do the Axis Broadcasts Have on Public Opinion in Eire?’, 7 January 1943, RG 84/13, DLGR, NAUS; Stuart, transcripts of German broadcasts to Eire, 30 January, 23 February, 14 March and 27 March 1943; German broadcasts, 2 and 17 March 1943; Johann Mikele, 28 April 1943; John Smythe, summary of German broadcasts, 1 April and Cadogan Talk, 2 May and 1 June 1943, MA G2/X/0217, CBB. 23. Washington Despatches, 13 February 1943; John G. Winant to Gray, 9 April 1943; Gray to Winant, 12 April 1943, RG 84/6, DLCR; Watts to Edward Stanley, 30 January 1943, RG 208/362/134, OCR; Hull to Gray, 25 April 1943, RG 84/6, DLCR; Ferdinand Kuhn to Terrell, 6 October 1943, RG 84/14, DLGR, NAUS. 24. Winant to Gray, 4 April 1943, RG 84/6, DLCR; Terrell to Kuhn, 21 October and 17 December 1943, RG 208/362/134, OCR; Gray to Hull, 20 December 1943, RG 84/6, DLCR; Terrell to Gray, 24 December 1943, RG 84/14, DLGR, NAUS. 25. Activities of the OWI in Ireland, 1943; Gray to Cardinal Francis J. Spellman, 13 January 1943, RG 84/14; ‘A Year in Eire’, OWI report ca. September 1943, RG 208/362/135; ‘Comment from the American Press’, 11 June 1943, RG 208/462/9; Pamphlets for Distribution in Eire, 1943, RG 208/462/25,25,26, and 27, DLGR, NAUS. 26. Gray to Department of State, 30 January 1943, RG 84/6, DLCR, NAUS; ‘Biddle on War Heroes’, Letter from America, 26 March 1943, p. 2; ‘Americans of Irish Descent Praised for Heroic Efforts’, Letter from America, 29 October 1943, pp. 1–2, RG 208/462/9, DLGR, NAUS. 27. ‘The Nazi War against the Catholic Church’, Letter from America, 19 and 26 March and 2 April 1943, p. 3, RG 208/462/8, DLGR, NAUS. 28. Gray, memorandum of conversation with Joseph P. Walshe, 6 January 1943, RG 84/6, DLCR, NAUS. 29. Gray to State Department, 16 March 1943, RG 84/6, DLCR; Watts to the State Department, 9 September 1943, RG 84/14, DLGR; Terrell to Kuhn, 30 November 1943, RG 208/362/134, OCR; O’Kennedy to OWI Dublin, 8 October 1943, RG 208/14, DLGR, NAUS. 30. ‘An Analysis of Irish Reactions at End of 1943’, RG 84/14, DLGR, NAUS. 31. Terrell to Gray, report on Eire censorship, 3 November 1943, RG 84/13, DLCR, NAUS. 32. American consul, Dublin, ‘Current Information on Motion Pictures in Eire’, 9 February 1943, RG 84/8, DCGR, NAUS. 33. 1943 Documentary Letter from Ulster, INF 6/347, PRO; Kuhn to terrell, telegram, 3 December 1943, RG 84/14, DLGR, NAUS; ‘On Stage and Screen’, Irish Independent, 28 March and 2 October 1943, both p. 2. 34. ‘Films of the Week’, Irish Press, 22 March and 13 July 1943, both p. 2; Dorothy Thompson, ‘Soldier’s Criticism of Movies Should Be Listened To’, Boston Daily Globe, 21 April 1943, p. 18; Walshe to Thomas Coyne, 26 March 1943, MA 7/54, CBB; Terrell to Kuhn, 16 September 1943, RG 208/362/134, OCR, NAUS. 35. Hayes, quoted in Donal O’Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland 1939-1945: Neutrality, Politics, and Society, Cork, 1996 p. 35; Quigley, notes on censorship of A Yank in the RAF, ca. September 1943; Aaron S. Brown, memorandum, 29 September 1943; Brown, memorandum, 21 October 1943; Gray to Francis Harley, 21 October 1943, RG 84/14, DLGR, NAUS; Major Guilfoyle, commentary, 1 October 1943, MA 7/54, CBB. 36. Terrell, report, 8 October 1943, RG 208/362/134, OCR; G. Ray to Gray, 25 October 1943, RG 84/14, DLGR, NAUS; Coyne, memorandum, 30 October 1943, MA

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37. 38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48.

49.

50.

51. 52.

turning the tide 5/39, CBB; Gray to Cordell Hull, 9 December 1943, RG 84/14, DLGR, NAUS; Gallagher, memorandum, 23 December 1943, MA 7/54, CBB; de Valera to Gray, 25 October 1943, RG 84/14, DLGR, NAUS; Coyne to Frederick Boland, 31 December 1943, MA 7/54, CBB. OPC Plan for Propaganda in Eire, 10 February 1943, INF 1/562, PRO. Mowat to Mansergh, 28 January 1943; Norman Archer to W. C. Hankinson, 11 March 1943; Betjeman to Hankinson, 21 March 1943, DO 130/33; Betjeman to R. B. Pugh, 6 July 1943, DO 130/30; Ross Williamson to Mansergh, 30 September 1943, DO 130/40, PRO. Lynn Millar to Betjeman, 25 August 1943; Alan Pryce-Jones to Betjeman, June 1943; Betjeman to Archer, 20 July 1943; Ross Williamson to Betjeman, 26 March 1941, JBP, UVL. Gallagher to Betjeman, 15 June 1943, JBP, UVL; Betjeman to Gallagher, 16 June 1943, 10050/420, Trinity College, Dublin; Hardiman to Betjeman, 15 June 1943; Ireland to Betjeman, 18 June 1943; Cusack to Betjeman, 24 June 1943, JBP, UVL. Ross Williamson to Mansergh, 11 September 1943; Ross Williamson to F. N. Hillyer, 8 December 1943, DO 130/39; Pugh to Ross Williamson, 14 October 1943, DO 35/1211/WN 240/19/3; Mansergh to Pugh, 16 September 1943, DO 130/39, PRO; Ross Williamson to Betjeman, 14 September 1943, JBP, UVL. MOI propaganda materials received in the Eire censorship bureau, 19 January 1943, MA 2/112, CBB; Richard Hope to Mr Vincent, INF 1/766; Wilberforce, report for Religions Division Catholic Section, December 1943, INF 1/767, PRO. Donald Stephenson to S/S, 14 June 1943, DO 35/1211/WN240/19/3; publicity materials for the United Kingdom and Eire, INF 2/8, PRO. R. Nunn May to Chief Constable, Oxon Constabulary, 11 January 1943; Arthur Elton to Betjeman, 20 February 1943, JBP, UVL. Memorandum on Catholic Church in Britain, January 1943, INF 1/222; Robert C. McKew to John Jacobs, 11 November 1943, PRO. Ross Williamson to Pugh, 27 November 1943, DO 130/39, PRO. ‘The War in the Ether’, Irish Independent, 12 January 1943, p. 4; Betjeman to Sir Stephen Tallents, 21 March 1943, R34/347/1, BBCWAC; Betjeman to B. E. Nicholls, 7 October 1943, JBP, UVL. Mansergh to J. C. S. MacGregor, 9 January 1943; Marshall to DDP, 25 January 1943; Eason to CP, 18 January 1943; Adams to Eason, 2 February 1943; William R. Oliver, memorandum, 15 February 1943; Eason to Adams, 23 March 1943; Adams to BBC NI Director, 20 March 1943, R34/239/3, BBCWAC. Marshall, memorandum, 2 April 1943; Clark to BBC Director General, 26 May 1943, R34/347/2; A. P. Ryan to BBC Director General, 15 June 1943; Programme Directive, 2 July 1943, E1/950/1; Marshall to CP, 26 October 1943, R34/347/2, BBCWAC. Mansergh to Pugh, 17 February 1943, DO/130/39, PRO; Thomas Coyne to Frank Aiken, 14 May 1943, MA 2/64; censorship memorandum, 6 April 1943, MA 2/130; J. J. Purcell to Michael Knightly, 18 June 1943, MA 4/17; Coyne to Joseph P. Walshe, 5 August 1943, MA 7/54, CBB; Office of Controller Censorship to Betjeman, 17 July 1943, DO 130/39; Cobbett Wilkes, ‘Censorship in Eire’, Spectator, 4 June 1943, pp. 520–1. T. A. Hickock to Cordell Hull, 29 May 1943, RG 84/14, DLGR, NAUS. ‘Editorial’, Sunday Dispatch, ca. January 1943, DO 130/39, PRO; Nolan to Aiken, 29 January 1943; Coyne to Nolan, 6 February 1943; Nolan to Aiken, 3 March 1943; Coyne to Nolan, 8 March 1943, MA 1/122, CBB.

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53. Peter Matthews, letter to the editor, Irish Times, 18 June 1943, MA 2/132, CBB; Wilkes, ‘Censorship in Eire’; ‘Censorship’, Manchester Guardian, 28 July 1943, p. 4; HCD., vol. 392, col. 223, 22 September 1943; Jean G. Parker, report to OWI, Washington, 15 November–15 December 1943, RG 108/6G/1, DLGR, NAUS. 54. Purcell to Aiken, 12 January 1943, MA 8/12; Eamonn MacMurchadha to the Censor, 14 February 1943; Coyne, memorandum, ca. March 1943, MA 2/129, CBB. 55. Coyne to Eason, 31 March 1943; Coyne to Eason, 8 April 1943; P. N. Lee, note, 15 October 1943, MA 2/55; J. G. Reynolds to John McCann, 4 September 1943; G. Boland to McCann, 15 September 1943, MA 2/122; Knightly, ban on Cork Examiner, 17 June 1943, MA 5/28, CBB. 56. Coyne to Knightly, 19 April 1943, MA 2/42, CBB; censored letter to Irish Times and Irish Independent, 3 June 1943, DO 130/33, PRO; Boland to Coyne, 30 August 1943, MA 2/133; Coyne to H. Curran, 8 October 1943, MA 2/13, CBB. 57. Papers Banned under Order E. P. (No. 151), 1942, MA 2/5; Coyne to Walshe, 26 March 1943; Coyne to Walshe, 25 January 1943; Coyne to Aiken, 25 May 1943, MA 2/127, CBB. 58. ‘BANNED!’, Sunday Dispatch, 12 September 1943, p. 4, MA 2/125, CBB. 59. Aiken to the Misses Butler, 22 September 1943; Murphy to Crisp, 17 September 1922, MA 2/125, CBB. 60. Telephone conversation between Coyne and Travers Hutchins, 1 October 1943, MA 2/125, CBB. 61. ‘British Drive: Tripoli Threat Grows’, Irish Independent, 21 January 1943, p. 3; ‘Allied Units Race to Close Vital Gap’, Irish Independent, 25 January 1943, p. 2; ‘Three Axis Objectives in Tunisia’, Irish Independent, 10 March 1943, p. 3; ‘8th Army Attacks Rommel’s Line’, Irish Independent, 7 April 1943, p. 3; ‘Tunis and Bizerta Captured in Swift Advance after Great Tank Battle’, Irish Press, 8 May 1943, p. 1; ‘North Africa’, Irish Press, 25 January 1943, p. 2. 62. ‘US President Confers Medal’, Irish Press, 4 February 1943, p. 1; ‘Review of War by Mr Churchill’, Irish Independent, 12 February 1943, p. 2; ‘Anglo-American Accord’, Irish Times, 27 March 1943, p. 5; ‘Northern Ireland Doing Its Duty’, Irish Times, 5 February 1943, p. 1; ‘Plans for Victory – and the Peace: Four-Day Talks in Iran’s Capital’, Irish Independent, 7 December 1943, p. 3. 63. ‘Russians “Widen Their Don Ring” ’, Irish Press, 5 January 1943, p. 1; ‘Moscow Claims Vital Triangle’, Irsih Press, 12 January 1943, p. 1; ‘Leningrad is Relieved’, Irish Press, 19 January 1943, p. 1; ‘Leningrad Relieved’, Irish Independent, 19 January 1943, p. 3. 64. ‘Waiting’, Irish Times, 30 June 1943, p. 3; ‘Sicily – Landings Continue’, Irish Independent, 12 July 1943, p. 3; ‘German Lines Breached: Battle for Catania Intensified’, Irish Times, 20 July 1943, p. 1; ‘Mussolini Resigns: King Takes Command. Badoglio Appointed Premier; Tells Italy: ‘War Goes On”, Irish Press, 27 July 1943, p. 1; ‘British Troops Push into Italy’, Irish Independent, 4 September 1943, p. 3; ‘Italy Capitulates: Allies Land Near Rome’, Irish Press, 9 September 1943, p. 1; ‘Rome Surrenders to Germans: Allies Occupy Taranto’, Irish Independent, 4 September 1943, p. 3; Stewart to Gray, 4 October 1943, DGP, FDRL. 65. ‘Italian Bases Attacked in Heavy Raid’, Irish Times, 17 May 1943, p. 1; ‘Anglo-US Bombing Offensive Goes On’, Irish Press, 5 March 1943, p. 1; ‘Many Anglo-US Air Attacks’, Irish Press, 15 March 1943, p. 1; Hickock to Hull, 20 July 1943, RG 84/6, DLCR, NAUS; ‘The Bombing of Rome’, Irish Press, 20 July 1943, p. 2; ‘The Holy Father’s Plea That Rome Be Spared’, Irish Press, 22 July 1943, p. 1; ‘Rome Should

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Be Spared’, Irish Independent, 7 October 1943, p. 2; ‘Vatican Neutrality Violated’, Irish Independent, 8 November 1943, p. 2. 66. ‘Shattered Buildings in Stalingrad’, Irish Press, 27 January 1943, p. 1; ‘Daylight Raid Damage’, Irish Press, 25 January 1943, p. 1; ‘Irish Legation Destroyed’ and ‘Bomb Damage in Vatican City’, Irish Independent, 30 November 1943, p. 3; ‘Destruction of a Bridge’, Irish Press, 13 November 1943, p. 1; ‘A Wellington Bomber in Flight: Underneath is a Spitfire Fighter’, Irish Press, 3 July 1943, p. 1.



´ ‘Eamon Who?’: January 1944–May 1945

In 1944 the European war turned in the Allies’ favour, and in May 1945, Germany surrendered unconditionally.1 Russian troops occupied Berlin, Hitler committed suicide, and on 8 May, the Allies declared victory in Europe. All well and good for the shooting war; however, for the war of words over Eire neutrality, in Alphonse Karr’s famous words, ‘Plus c¸a change, plus c’est la mˆeme chose.’2 Allied propaganda and rigid Eire censorship went on to the bitter end, with Eire–Allied relations strained by such issues as partition, refusal to remove Axis legations from Dublin, threats of retaliation with blockade and sanctions, and claims that neutrality would deny Eire a voice in the post-war world. ´ Eamon de Valera regularly played the partition card in defending neutrality, but not always wisely. In March 1944 in Limerick he called for abolishing English in Eire as ‘the language of the conqueror’. This hardly was an inducement to the North to rejoin Eire, and critics characterised it as de Valera’s ‘usual compromise between the profession of democracy and the practice of despotism’. In any case, the Northern Ireland Protestant establishment had no interest in reunification. Orange Society Grand Master Sir Joseph Davison proudly affirmed anti-Catholic bigotry and intolerance, and Cahir Healy MP reported gross discrimination practised by the Northern Ireland government against Catholic ex-servicemen.3 Meanwhile, the Irish Press characterised partition as ‘a wanton, arbitrary and totally immoral act’, the Irish Independent dubbed it a crime skirted around even by Eire’s leaders, and the Irish Times was sceptical that anyone in the British House of Commons or the Fianna Fail party had any grasp on how to address the problem. Eire leaders made it clear that partition would greatly affect post-war attitudes and be a rallying point for Irish-American extremists. The Primate of Ireland, Cardinal MacRory, thought the Allies should be grateful that Eire had not gone in with the Axis, given the centuries of being mistreated by Britain and despoiled by partition.4 Neutrality continued to be difficult for Eire. The Irish Times described with envy how well the Swiss handled neutrality, the Irish Press depicted a Sunday Times article praising continental European neutrals while condemning Eire as a mix of ‘bitterness and propaganda’, and George Bernard Shaw argued that sanctioning Eire would only strengthen Irish resolve.5 Indeed, that was high on de Valera’s agenda because he saw neutrality as being for the safety of the Irish people and as an expression of Eire independence. He assured a Fianna Fail audience that ‘neutrality is the policy of the whole people. It is the policy of every party and every organisation’, and Fine Gael leader W. T. Cosgrave



E´ 

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agreed: ‘The Government’s policy of neutrality. . . remained in the circumstances of the country’s position, the best course to adopt during the war.’ And there was no pro-Germanism involved, for An Taoiseach hated Nazism and feared what might happen to Eire should England go the way of France, Norway and Denmark. Reports in May 1944 and June 1945 indicated that Irish opinion had been and remained strongly pro-British and pro-American, while expressing virtually no sympathy for the defeated Germans.6 Eire neutrality had its costs. When the American songwriter Irving Berlin appeared in Dublin, David Gray warned that the public might react negatively since he ‘represented the American Army’, and on the night of 7–8 May 1945, demonstrators in Dublin threw rocks at the American consulate and the Shelbourne Hotel, known as a ‘British’ establishment. Ironically, the demonstrators were students at the English-founded and primarily Protestant Trinity College. Meanwhile, the censorship kept factual news of German concentration camp atrocities from the Irish people, which an outraged Gray claimed led the people of Eire to assume that atrocity stories were simply propaganda. Eire experienced a monumental shock when the censorship ended and the evidence poured in that indeed the atrocities had taken place.7 In May, Winston Churchill scathed de Valera on radio for not aiding Britain when it was under attack from Germany, while praising Northern Ireland’s ‘loyalty and friendship’ and the valour of thousands of Irish volunteers in the British military. De Valera went on air in response to justify neutrality and criticise Churchill – and to praise Britain for not invading Ireland – and Britain was requested to provide facilities to rebroadcast the speech to the United States. They were provided, for if denied, there would be accusations of ‘exercising a stranglehold on communications’.8 ‘Irish bashing’ in the press was now commonplace, such as a report that Mrs George Bernard Shaw bequeathed $600,000 to the cause of teaching the Irish to move beyond ‘awkward manners’ and ‘vulgarities’, and a Walter Lippmann column warning that Eire would pay for having remained neutral.9 Irish Press editorials reacted by defending de Valera’s rejection of Allied requests to send Axis legations out of Eire, denying as ‘sheer inventions’ British and American press reports that 3,000 Japanese had landed in Eire and were living in disguise, and dismissing as simply anti-Irish propaganda negative reports of de Valera’s condolence visit to Ambassador Eduard Hempel on the death of Adolf Hitler. Of course, these editorials, in emotive language and close enough to the truth to be believable, were also propaganda, as was the Irish Press rhapsodising about the importance of Rome to Christian civilisation and what might happen to the German-occupied city if the Allies attacked.10 The Anglo-American alliance also had difficulties. Francis Styles complained that British lecturers in Dublin to promote Anglo-Eire relations ‘glorified the British Commonwealth and belittled the United States’; of course, they were so ardent ‘that even the most unintelligent Irishman hearing these remarks knows that the United States could not be so black as these people picture them’. Styles warned Washington that propaganda publications approved by Britain implied that the French and Chinese resented America, and that British and Anglo-Irish

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people in Dublin protested that America’s demand of German unconditional surrender simply prolonged the war. He claimed that such perspectives were inspired by British propaganda.11 Meanwhile, President Roosevelt made it clear to Churchill that the United States did not embrace Britain’s desire to impose economic sanctions on Eire, which Lord Cranborne depicted as an American attack of cold feet. Other complaints included when one Allied government made representations to Eire without consulting the other, when the UK travel permit office in Dublin discriminated against Americans, and when the United States negotiated a bilateral civil aviation agreement with Eire without consulting Britain. In Maffey’s words, ‘the British and American Governments are now on different courses.’12 However, America’s softening on Eire was mixed. On the one hand, there was the note demanding that Eire end neutrality and remove Axis legations from Dublin, which, as A. McGuinness wrote to the New York Times, ‘can do nothing but harm to Eire’s well known friendliness to the United States and to the cause for which she is fighting’ and which was opposed by a very vocal IrishAmerican press which defended Eire’s refusal to bow to American demands.13 On the other hand, the US provided Eire with aircraft on terms agreed to by the British, and Styles worked to improve US–Irish cultural relations, despite de Valera’s wholly negative response to the American note.14 In the end, American ‘softening’ turned into ‘hardening’. In January 1945, the United States dismissed Eire as a possible peace negotiator when the war ended. In Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius’ words: ‘They have already missed the boat, and have no rightful claim to a place at the peace table.’ Of course, opined Thomas McEnelly, given the ‘present Russian attitude’ and Eire’s influence in the world out of all proportion to its population, the US and Britain would likely need it as a post-war ally.15 De Valera’s insistence on the right to maintain relations with Germany was the problem. He denied rumours that the government might be turning a blind eye to German agents operating in Eire, and Ambassador Robert Brennan assured Americans that their government ‘has been grossly misinformed’ regarding Axis espionage in Eire–by Associated Press reporters, according to the Irish-American press.16 Still, there were reports of Irishmen dropped into Eire from German aircraft and others slipped in via U-boats, and of Irishmen recruited by German intelligence (Abwehr) and aided by Irish nationalists. Also there was Hermann Goertz, charged as a German spy in November 1941 and kept in prison until 1946, when he was released and shipped back to Germany.17 Meanwhile, the Allies protested against de Valera’s promise to offer sanctuary to Axis asylum seekers providing they did not pose a threat to neutrality or the interests of the Irish people; neutral Switzerland had claimed the right to do so, and Eire would follow suit. The Irish-American press backed de Valera on the issue, but other papers called his position ‘highly unrealistic’, and possible only because the United Nations had kept Eire safe during the war. De Valera stuck to his position, and the Eire government denied rumours circulating in March 1945 that Germans were taking refuge in Eire.18

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Then there was the war of words over Axis legations in Dublin. The US and British delivered notes to de Valera on 21 February 1944, accusing Eire of violating neutrality by operating more in favour of the Axis than of the Allies, and demanding that Eire oust Axis diplomatic representatives from Dublin. Both notes charged that the presence of Axis legations was a threat to keeping secret Allied plans for the Normandy invasion. De Valera called the notes an ultimatum and an outrage, categorised them as a violation of Eire neutrality and demanded that they be withdrawn. The Allies assured him there would be no Allied troops sent into Eire even if he rejected the notes. In response, he expanded security on the border, at ports and at airfields, and appealed to Canadian Prime Minister MacKenzie King to intervene. King replied that he would, provided Eire expel the Axis legations and ally itself with the United Nations.19 The demand and de Valera’s rejection of it made the front pages of major American, British and Irish newspapers, all of which speculated about what the Allies might do next. The text of the US note was released to the press, followed by numerous editorials, mostly opposing Eire’s position, and reports that the Eire population overwhelmingly backed de Valera’s stand. Washington was now concerned that a serious breach in US–Eire good relations might occur.20 After all, there were many issues beyond the note, such as US refusal to sell a merchant ship to Eire because of Axis submarines attacking American ships flying the Irish flag, a travel ban between Eire and Britain imposed at the request of General Dwight Eisenhower for reasons of military security, American troops patrolling the Ulster–Eire border, and Irish fear that the Allies would impose economic or military sanctions; David Gray suggested propaganda appeals to the Eire man in the street that America really was Eire’s friend. De Valera’s St Patrick’s Day address declared that the Axis legations would not be expelled, and that Eire could look out for itself. George Bernard Shaw thought Eire had won the day. But had it? In April Allied pressure on Eire increased, and in May the United States black-listed thirty-eight firms in Eire on the grounds that they were under Axis control.21 The economic consequences of that move were substantial. If, as noted above, ‘Irish bashing’ was commonplace in some British and American press, ‘British bashing’ was no less a presence in the Irish-American press and among such Irish-American Catholic clergy as Monsignor Curley, who regarded Britain as the principal enemy of both Irishmen and Americans.22 The Irish World blasted as ‘typical British “gratitude” ’ Churchill’s speech rebuking de Valera’s neutrality policy, pointing out how much Eire, through soldiers, food and clothing, had aided Britain during the war, and the Gaelic American claimed that the primary aim of the San Francisco conference would be to give England everything it wanted.23 The Leader emoted that ‘as long as Winston Churchill is dictator of the British Empire the peace and freedom of Ireland are in danger,’ that Churchill ‘is one of those reactionaries who uphold the hands of Privilege’ in Britain, while not being opposed to communism elsewhere, and that Churchill was the ‘most directly responsible for the outrages committed in Ireland’ during the Black and Tan war. The Leader justified its anti-British rhetoric with the claim that British propaganda was more dangerous in America than ever before

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because ‘no strong counter-propaganda was possible,’ save, perhaps, for German radio propaganda broadcasts, which ‘may have tended in a small way to neutralize it’. British bashing was so bitter in 1944 and 1945 that in January 1945 Sir John Maffey requested the MOI to produce more propaganda to counter it.24 Northern Ireland also was on the ‘English-bashing’ list, with the Gaelic American pleading with Irish-Americans to call attention to ‘the brutal persecution of Irish Catholics that is going on in the six British controlled counties of Northern Ireland’.25 Demeaning Britain’s role in the war and personal attacks on Churchill took propaganda to extreme limits; pointing out discrimination against and even persecution of Catholics in Ulster did not. Meanwhile, improvement in Anglo-Eire relations appeared to be a sometimes thing. For example, Churchill ‘glowers terribly’ when speaking about Eire in the House of Commons, and chastised Lord Halifax for promising that pressure would not be put on Eire regarding neutrality, while another MP told the House that Eire presents ‘this quaint little anomaly of neutrality, giving house-room to the agents of our enemies who seek to do evil against us’. On the other hand, 200,000 Irish men and women worked in Britain or served in British armed forces, Eire had sent an estimated L
45,000,000 worth of foodstuffs to Britain, and even the Irish Press reported improved relations.26 In March 1944, Maffey assured de Valera that British isolation of Eire was for purely military purposes, to which he responded with ‘great relief ’ and assured Maffey that ‘he had always been anxious to help us in the utmost.’ In January 1945, a White Paper on the British war effort received positive comments from all Dublin papers, and in February, the Dominions Office reported that throughout the war ‘the Eire government were willing to accord the UK Government any facility which would not be regarded as overtly prejudicing their attitude of neutrality.’ And the War Office decorated Delia Murphy, wife of RE´ director T. J. Kiernan and Eire representative to the Vatican, for her service to escaped British prisoners of war in Rome. Interesting, since the BBC had rejected her as a participant for ‘Irish Half Hour’ for being ‘pro-German’.27 Still, Britain and Eire did not see eye to eye on some important questions. There was the demand for expelling Axis legations from Eire, which de Valera refused, and Axis espionage. In the British view, border security between Eire and Northern Ireland might not be adequate to prevent espionage by enemy aliens and sympathisers crossing between South and North. Picture Post claimed that Axis agents in Eire threatened the security of the UK–US naval base at Londonderry, rumours circulated that German submarine crews came ashore in south Donegal and were lavishly entertained by hotel owners of German extraction, and de Valera was accused of being in denial regarding German espionage.28 The espionage concern led to closure of the Eire–Northern Ireland border, suspension of all travel between Eire and Britain, cutting Eire–British phone line connections, putting some limitations on Eire shipping – much of the closure applied to Northern Ireland as well, which did not go down particularly well there – and sanctions were sometimes threatened, but not imposed. The Eire government protested, of course, citing among other things that shipping

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restrictions might result in petrol shortages and hunger for the Irish people. Churchill assured President Roosevelt that these steps were being taken solely in the interest of US and British soldiers’ lives with regard to the upcoming Normandy invasion.29 In 1944, the Allies were cracking down. ‘He who is not for us is against us’ was a Daily Mail paraphrase of Cordell Hull’s warning that Eire might be denied supplies of vital materials. Equally severe crackdowns were imposed on any trade between Eire and Germany, and on financial and monetary arrangements for defeated enemy nations or leaders transferring assets to neutral nations. De Valera affirmed that Eire would never participate in such an activity. Meanwhile, he put a hold on brewing and shipping beer to the UK unless the British government agreed to ship barley to Eire.30 De Valera claimed that Britain owed Eire friendship, given the tens of thousands of Irishmen said to have volunteered to serve in British forces. The Dominions Office pointed out that the number had fallen ‘since facilities have been available for Irish workers to earn high wages in this country without running risks of military service’. It also denied Beatrix Dunalley’s request for funding for the Men of Eire Association plan to knit woollen clothes for ‘our Eire men in British forces’. In Nicholas Mansergh’s view Dunalley was a ‘well intentioned busy-body whose enthusiasm is out of all proportion to her judgement, tact or administrative capacity’.31 Public opinion regarding Eire neutrality was of concern to the UK government, such as the possible effect when Eire Church leaders claimed that traditional Irish Catholicism might be weakened ‘by the influence of the press and radio of “pagan” and “godless” England’.32 Better news came from the postal and telegraph censors, who examined mail passing between Eire, the UK and the US. For example, 77 per cent approved the American request that Eire remove Axis legations, a majority of whom writing from Britain ‘appear to be Irish’ critical of de Valera for clinging to neutrality. Of course, there was criticism of the US for making the request, since Japanese and German diplomatic representatives were allowed in the US while America was neutral. A majority also favoured the travel ban, and 80 per cent in Northern Ireland thought closing the border was an excellent idea. Eire opinion was not so favourable.33 Letters to the editor in the British press were more often negative than positive on Eire, for example claiming that de Valera got public support for Eire by muzzling the press. Letters also charged that Irish workers did not come to Britain in support of the Allied cause but for the ‘big’ money they could earn, that ships were torpedoed off the southern Eire coast because Britain was refused the ports, that Eire neutrality helped Nazi Germany, and that de Valera dared to claim to have a ‘moral code’ when by declaring neutrality he abandoned the cause of nations overrun by Nazi aggression.34 Meanwhile, some British newspapers charged that RE´ broadcasts were ‘the greatest single source of information about the weather to the Germans’ and that in order to avoid Eire internment, Allied seamen wrecked on its coast had to be taken in small open boats, ‘with much suffering’, to Northern Ireland. The Dominions Office denied these claims.35

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Needless to say, when on 2 May 1945 de Valera and Joseph Walshe called on Ambassador Eduard Hempel to pay condolences for the death of Adolf Hitler – a visit taken ‘in accordance with strict protocol’ – the press on both sides of the Atlantic were outraged. ‘Is diplomatic etiquette so rigid, so exacting and so alien to moral values’, asked the Daily Mirror, ‘that the head of a nation still forming part of the British Commonwealth feels himself compelled to take a course which proclaims him the friend of the foulest enemy democracy has ever had to face?’ The New York Times wrote: ‘Considering the character and the record of the man for whose death he was expressing grief, there is obviously something wrong with the protocol, the neutrality, or Mr de Valera.’ Letters to the editor also excoriated de Valera for this visit. Only in Eire was de Valera justified – and, of course, in the Irish-American press.36 1944–45 saw no downturn in the war of words, neither in terms of controversy between the Eire and Allied governments nor in the official propaganda war. The OWI British Division continued to direct US official propaganda in Eire, primarily through Letter from America, and not always perfectly. The US consulate in Dublin complained that when the ‘Week in America’ column included a quote from a New York priest that de Valera was one of the world’s greatest personalities, it would only appeal to the anti-war section of Ireland. The issue was withheld from circulation. In December 1944 it was suggested that the American government’s viewpoint should be disseminated in Eire through American newspapers, since any political material circulated by the OWI would be considered propaganda and treated as such. Indeed, by January 1945, Ferdinand Kuhn, the OWI man in charge of Eire, considered closing down the OWI in Dublin altogether.37 In fact, this had been the subject of internal debate since January 1944, when David Gray advised that as Eire was convinced the United Nations would win the war, the cost of continuing propaganda to Eire was no longer justified. The State Department disagreed, and the OWI remained open until 25 April 1945 after which Eire was regarded as ‘a State Department area in which the OWI has no representation’.38 Alice Ford succeeded Dan Terrell as OWI Dublin director in March 1944. Her reports affirmed that most of the Irish backed neutrality, were glad not to be in the war, held de Valera in high regard, and were limited by the censorship on what they actually knew about the war. Gray advised her that the best propaganda was ‘news of every kind which shows the Axis in a bad light’, and urged her to back his requests to the OWI to provide a clip sheet translation of French news broadcasts. Print materials available to the OWI Dublin office for distribution included commercial magazines such as Fortune, Nation, Life, Newsweek and Reader’s Digest for news stand sales; A Handbook of the United States of America and Music in the USA; pamphlets on communicable diseases and tuberculosis; a cartoon book, The Life of Franklin D. Roosevelt (‘not intended for the intellectual’); Truman, a pamphlet with photos of the new President and another containing his message to Congress on 1 June 1945; and The American Program for the Defeat of Japan. Victory Bulletin, a magazine which covered OWI activities, was

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considered essential for the OWI Dublin outpost. Due to some mixup, it was not being received well into 1944 in London, Commonwealth libraries or in Dublin.39 As always, Letter from America, read weekly by 100,000 Irish, was the top item on the OWI propaganda list. The results were not always positive. An unidentified Irishman called Gray’s office and said: ‘You should stop publishing that trash in this country,’ and the next day a letter was received warning the OWI that ‘drastic measures’ would be taken to stop Letter from America’s distribution. Also, a Dubliner to whom a copy was sent unsolicited complained to his solicitor that its distribution was ‘a breach of the laws of Neutrality’. On the other hand, the OWI received positive comments such as ‘it is very welcome and much appreciated, and I look forward to receiving it regularly,’ ‘I have read it and it is wonderful’ and ‘it is the only paper I have read so far with any real snappy news in it.’ In February 1945, Ford received a request that Letter from America be published in Irish, which she thought an excellent idea. She told Gray: ‘I am getting in touch with Myles na gCopaleen to offer him the job of translator.’40 It is not clear whether she followed through. Of course, the function of Letter from America was propaganda, which headlines made clear: ‘New Terrorism in Norway Shows German Uneasiness’, ‘Army of Liberation Lands; Assault Is Begun in France’, ‘US Bombers Strike’. There was a special issue featuring President Roosevelt’s obituary alongside a biography of his successor, Harry S Truman, and photographs of US soldiers and airmen at war, of General Eisenhower, and of the Supreme Allied Command seated around a table with an Eisenhower quote as the caption: ‘You Are About to Embark on a Great Crusade . . .’. This was the 16 June 1944 issue, which also included a photograph of soldiers in landing craft approaching a beach ‘somewhere on the coast of Europe’. Odd that Normandy was not mentioned by name, since, ten days after it took place, D-Day was hardly a secret. Meanwhile, both Gray and the OWI were kept informed how Letter from America was functioning in Eire.41 American films dominated Eire cinemas through to the end of the war. They included westerns (Northwest Mounted Police, San Fernando Valley), literary dramas (Jane Eyre, Rebecca), historical dramas (Cardinal Richelieu), films extolling Christian virtue (The Keys of the Kingdom), mysteries and thrillers (Double Indemnity, Shake Hands with Murder, The Mad Miss Manton, slapstick comedies (Allergic to Love, Beautiful but Broke, Hail the Conquering Hero) and musicals (Can’t Help Singing, Two Girls and a Sailor, Irish Eyes Are Smiling). The film censors were strict. It was very rare when a war film, such as Desert Victory, could be seen in a public cinema because by their very nature, such films could either encourage or discourage sympathy for one side or the other.42 However, the American war films The Fighting Sullivans and The Fighting 69th were shown in Dublin cinemas. The likely reason was their Irish context: the former focused on five Irish-American brothers who died serving together in the Pacific theatre; the latter was the story of an Irish-American regiment serving in the First World War. The Irish Times panned The Fighting Sullivans. ‘This film is all rather on the surface – easy heroism, easy humour, easy pathos.’43 A Nation at Work, a film about Switzerland in war-time, also showed in January 1945. And why not;

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Switzerland was neutral.44 The 1939 Emergency Powers Act was annulled in May 1945, but it was some time before film censorship was lifted altogether and Eire audiences could see American propaganda feature films such as Mrs Miniver and Watch on the Rhine. Again on the order of the censorship, American documentary films and newsreels were shown mostly to private audiences. It seemed to work. By December 1944 tens of thousands of Irish from Dublin to County Mayo were seeing newsreels, March of Time films (The Irish Question), documentaries, war operations films (The Battle of Britain, The Nazis Strike), and OWI documentaries and educational films describing various aspects of American life. Autobiography of a Jeep, Building of Boys, Pipeline, Cooperative Wool and How to Get Rid of Rats were among the titles. In January 1945 film attendance and requests for American films were on the rise. Response to the films was divided, however: the most receptive were those with family members fighting in Allied forces; among others an anti´ British bias showed strongly; and most interesting perhaps was that Eamon de Valera was the only government official who had not attended showings of OWI films.45 Reginald Ross Williamson directed MOI operations in Eire after John Betjeman left in October 1943. Apparently it had not gone well for him, despite his hard efforts to continue Betjeman’s ‘good relations’. His correspondence with John and Penelope Betjeman described the Irish as ‘these unbelievably ungrateful people’ who insulted him in the street, despaired that he had learned ‘to savour fully the absolute second-ratedness of everybody and everything in this horrible little country’, and complained that he was ‘so bloody sick of this country I am not going to care any more’. Even Ross Williamson’s personal life was unravelling, if some of his letters are to be understood as they sound. In March he wrote to Penelope: ‘I am desperately in love and Eileen has begun to care for Se´an O’Faolain’; and in December to John: ‘I lie awake in your bed at 3 o’clock in the morning, surrounded by bottles of pills, wondering how long I can go on at all and with no one to wake up to ask because Eileen, long ago, has gone to another room and I am too frightened of God and the dark to get up and enquire.’ Meanwhile, he did not get on well with Gray. On one occasion he wrote: ‘We rather hope the American minister will be shot before long.’46 All the same, Ross Williamson did his job, which included maintaining contacts with such as G. O’Mahoney, manager of the Irish Times, and Irish Press journalist M. J. McManus, both of whom liked him, and reporting useful information on Irish opinion connected with the war and Allied relations.47 His work agenda was as varied as ever Betjeman’s had been: negotiating with the Dublin City Manager to purchase a statue of William of Orange housed in a shed in Dublin; requesting the Stationery Office print 15,000 copies of an index to Volunteers from Eire for distribution; supplying the MOI Empire Division with the number of Roman Catholic as compared to Protestant pupils in schools in Eire and Northern Ireland; supplying the Dominions Office with information about Axis and other news bulletins circulated in Eire, noting in the process that the press attach´e’s office received eleven such bulletins regularly; helping distribute

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information telling the Irish the story of Nazi persecution of Christians; and advising the Dominions Office on what was likely to be useful and what not useful as published material for Eire.48 A good example of the latter items in his view was Nicholas Mansergh’s Britain and Ireland, a historical disclaimer regarding British misgovernment of Eire during the Great Famine. In Ross Williamson’s words, ‘if we enlist ourselves in the already vast army of amateur historians of Ireland . . . we should inevitably become far deeper involved in disputation than would be good for us.’ Mansergh’s booklet was useful for distribution to intelligent and enquiring British and American journalists, and was regarded as a ‘ “dishonest” piece of work by Frank Gallagher and Company’.49 And, of course, Ross Williamson oversaw the distribution of propaganda materials, including MOI advertisements for public relations events in religious magazines (Christian Irishman, Irish Christian Advocate, Irish Presbyterian,) and even a Gaelic-language magazine, An Gaidheal. Copies of Sir Ernest Barker’s British Constitutional Monarchy were supplied to ‘privileged libraries’, and more than 300 copies of Statistics Relating to the War Effort of the United Kingdom were made available for circulation. It is not clear that material circulated elsewhere in the Commonwealth was also displayed in Eire, such as photographs of Air Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder, General Sir Bernard Montgomery and Winston Churchill, maps of Allied battlegrounds with the caption ‘Helping to Safeguard Freedom’, leaflets depicting Eire as a British dominion with the words ‘Eire has equal status with these other self governing members of the Commonwealth . . .’, and a pamphlet, The Art of Lying, which showed how Hitler and Goebbels had lied about everything, including about Britain.50 This most likely was circulated in Eire. British films were shown in Eire, though not on the scale of American cinema, and were more often documentary than feature films, distributed through the press attach´e’s office. The semi-documentary The Way Ahead (distributed in America as Immortal Battalion), with David Niven as the leader in combat of a platoon of raw recruits, was not one of them; This Happy Breed was, however, a semi-documentary film based upon Noel Coward’s play about the life of ordinary British people between the world wars. The Irish Independent gave the film an excellent review, noting that after ‘so many bricks have been flung at British studios it is a pleasurable change to be able to hand out a bouquet . . .’. As noted above, newsreels were shown mostly to private audiences because, as an unsigned report phrased it, ‘British and American newsreel companies refuse to go to the expense of submitting reels they know will be cut to pieces if not banned outright.’ This led to complaints about the ‘paucity of British material’ available for newsreels, so that they were not even comparable to Frank Capra’s Why We Fight series.51 After the war, Mansergh wanted to turn distribution of British films in Eire over to the National Film Institute of Ireland. Ross Williamson objected on the grounds that the Film Institute was a ‘Church-controlled body’ which could exercise both ‘religious and political discrimination in its distribution’.52 He prevailed, at least for the foreseeable future.

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German broadcasting to Eire was on the wane by 1944 – pro-Nazi expatriate Francis Stuart disappeared from the air altogether in February – whereas Allied broadcasting, just as it had been since the war began, was heard both in Eire and ´ Programming was much the in Northern Ireland as much if not more than RE. same as well: the American Friendship Bridge to Ireland continued, and Voice of America was heard in Eire as elsewhere in Europe, though speaking out on the issue of asylum for war criminals in Eire did not go down well with all listeners. BBC Home Service broadcasts that could be heard in Ireland as well as Britain included ‘The Daily Dozen’ and ‘The Kitchen Front’ series, classical music, news, talks programmes, plays, Gaelic-language programmes and occasionally popular music.53 The idea was to present a positive image of Britain and promote good Anglo-Eire relations, while not offending Northern Ireland. It remained the general rule that no programmes concerning Northern Ireland–Eire relation, political and otherwise, would be broadcast without the input of the BBC NI director. And, of course, St Patrick’s Day programming continued to be an issue, since the holiday was not significant to the majority of Northern Irish. On that day, Irish music performed by the London Irish Pipers and such Irish artists as Len Camber and Tessie O’Shea was an essential; so too were reports on Irish people serving in British forces and speakers from Irish regiments – even one from Eire, suggested assistant programme director Ursula Eason, ‘as long as the majority of speakers are clearly Ulstermen’.54 External broadcasts were the one propaganda channel that could get around the censor, since the only option was transmission jamming. For others the censorship remained as strict as always, the reason still being the suppression of anything that might be ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order or to the preservation of the State’ or was overtly propagandistic – such as the American film A Yank in the RAF, banned after one week’s showing in Dublin on the grounds that it might provide the IRA with an excuse for creating disturbances in cinemas, and the circulation of propaganda bulletins by various foreign legations, which could not be stopped altogether, but could be and was kept under close observation by the Controller of Censorship.55 Nothing was as rigidly censored as the press, even obituary notices. Examples of press censorship included banning: all references to Irish policy in a speech by South African premier Jan Smuts; the import of Irish Freedom, an Irish nationalist paper published in London, which, the censor said, aimed at undermining Eire neutrality ‘by means of the most blatant propaganda’; press speculation regarding the Eire–Northern Ireland border closure; copies of News Review (also published in London) with references to a post-war blacklisting of Eire traders; photographs of Normandy landings because ‘they might hurt the sensibilities of the Germans’ – however, the Irish Press was allowed to publish a front-page photograph of a beach littered with wreckage of Allied landing craft; all but a one-paragraph reference to a speech by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden; and references to atrocities committed by Axis powers. It was very frustrating for Ross Williamson, who felt helpless because even as British press attach´e, there was little he could do about it. Strict press censorship was

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´ officially ended only on 14 May 1945; Eamon de Valera was praised for lifting it, even by such Eire-critical journals as the Manchester Guardian.56 Press censorship topped the list, but there was much more. Such magazines as Everybody’s Weekly, Strand Magazine and World Digest were banned in the spring of 1944 on the grounds that they had ‘chosen to insert political propaganda against this country’, postal censorship was as strict as ever, books remained on the list both for moral and political reasons, as did manuscripts for as yet unpublished books, pamphlets and the like and, of course, foreign films for public showing, presented to the censor by the Irish Film Society.57 Frank Aiken viewed all films that were in question. Films that were either banned or allowed only with cuts because of propaganda content included A Yank in the RAF, His Girl Friday, This is The Army and March of Time documentaries (US), Les Otages (France), San Demetrio and Millions like Us (UK), and Kameradschaft (Germany). The Soviet film We from Kronstadt was allowed, despite Aiken’s reservations. So too was Storm in a Tea Cup, a 1937 anti-fascist British film because it was ‘perfectly innocuous from our point of view’. Meanwhile, a Martin Quigley article for the Film Society Bulletin was censored because it criticised an Irish Press piece for complaining that American films ‘were only a jumble of noise, a lot of people having a good time, and a spice of salaciousness’.58 There were more complaints about the censorship now than in the earlier years of the war, probably because after January 1944 victory was clearly moving in the Allies’ direction. On one occasion, when censorship policy was attacked in the D´ail, Aiken defended it with such claims as that ‘we have cut out violent atrocity propaganda, which, as everybody knows, in the last war was lies.’ That there was abundant evidence of atrocities in the present war apparently was beside the point. No wonder that the American government, and the Irish Times, one of the most censored newspapers in Dublin, regarded Aiken as of limited intelligence. The day following his defence of the censorship, an Irish Times editorial effectively dubbed Aiken a liar with a warped imagination.59 Meanwhile, British and Northern Ireland papers chafed that the censor discriminated against them in favour of Eire newspapers; D´ail independent member James Dillon protested the rule forbidding newspapers mentioning Irishmen on military service outside of Eire; and a Dr O’Higgins claimed that the Eire people were in a mental vacuum with regard to the war and Eire’s international position because of ruthless censorship and an entirely false presentation of news. David Gray described Eire censorship as ‘one of the unbelievable scandals of Western civilization’. Irish Times editor Robert Smyllie had many rows with Coyne – Smyllie was lauded after the war as having been the leading consistent opponent of press censorship in Eire – including Coyne censoring a correspondent for using the nom de plume Outis rather than his actual name. Gwendolen Carter, a political scientist at Smith College, concluded that thanks to the Eire censorship, ‘the people of Eire have little awareness of the great changes taking place in the thought of nations actively engaged in the conflict,’ and Eire Senator Sir John Keane called Aiken’s order to ban a press publication of Senate proceedings a violation of

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parliamentary principles and the imposition of ‘a mental black-out’ on the Irish people.60 Mental blackout, indeed. It was only after the censorship was lifted in mid-May 1945 that the Irish people finally heard about the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps. Yet, rigid censorship notwithstanding, the Eire press continued to report much having to do with the war, excepting war atrocities. The material came mostly from international news agencies, since apparently there were few Irish correspondents in foreign countries.61 Reports of the Russian front, the supreme command of Allied forces, Allied landings near Rome and in Normandy, Allied troops entering Paris, the attempted assassination of Hitler, Mussolini’s execution, Hitler’s death; maps; photographs of landing craft, military aircraft and leaders, and war damage – Dresden after Allied bombing raids, for example – all these were items that could be found in the Irish Times, the Irish Independent, the Irish Press, the Times Pictorial and the Kerryman, among many others. Interestingly, the censorship sometimes allowed the Irish Press to carry materials denied to the Irish Times, such as huge front-page photographs of the Normandy beaches. That the Irish Press was Fianna F´ail’s party paper may have had something to do with it.62 Clearly, while censorship remained tight generally, it seemed to ease more and more regarding the war itself as the end of the war neared. What was not reported were German war atrocities, a fact that had angered many in Britain and the United States. Indeed, photographs in the Irish Press of civilians suffering from the war were most often of Germans. The European war ended in May 1945, and with it the war of words over Irish neutrality, at least in principle. Who had won? Eire of course, since the censorship prevented Allied propaganda from having any serious impact upon Irish opinion, and de Valera presented Eire’s neutrality position in such a way as to ensure that Irish opinion would favour it. Still, the Allies did not lose the war of words. Even while claiming strict adherence to neutrality, Eire clearly did more for the Allies than for the Axis – such as allowing downed Allied airmen to cross the Northern border and sending aid to Belfast when it was bombed by the Luftwaffe. John Betjeman had been right in advocating ‘good relations’ with the Irish instead of overt propaganda. All the same, a Dominions Office report in December claimed that Eire disseminated ‘persuasive’ anti-British and pro-neutrality propaganda through diplomatic representatives in locales ranging from Washington, DC to the Vatican. It would appear that Allied governments were not altogether happy with Eire’s refusal to engage on their side in the war.63 Perhaps neither was Allied public opinion, particularly in Britain. The novelist and naval war veteran Nicholas Monsarrat made this clear in these lines from his 1953 novel, The Cruel Sea: It was difficult to withhold one’s contempt from a country such as Ireland, whose battle this was and whose chances of freedom and independence in the event of a German victory were nil. The fact that Ireland was standing aside from the conflict at this moment posed, from

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the naval angle, special problems that affected, sometimes mortally, all sailors engaged in the Atlantic, and earned their particular loathing . . . The loss of the naval bases in southern and western Ireland, which had been available to the Royal Navy during the First World War but were now forbidden to them . . . Escorts had to go ‘the long way around’ to get to the battlefield, and return to harbour at least two days earlier than would have been necessary: the cost, in men and ships, added months to the struggle, and ran up a score that Irish eyes a-smiling on the day of Allied Victory was not going to cancel.64 Whether fair or not, these lines reverberated with many in Britain after the war, and no doubt in America as well. It probably is that the war of words over neutrality waged by those who were in the shooting war would never completely end.

Notes 1. See Robert Goralski, World War II Almanac 1931–1945: A Political and Military Record, New York, 1981, p. 300. 2. ‘The more things change, the more they remain the same.’ 3. N. E. Archer, note on conversation with Frederick Boland, 14 September 1944, DO 130/44, PRO; ‘ “English Must Go” Speech Denounced by FG Leader’, Irish Times, 9 March 1944, p. 1; letter to the editor, Irish Times, 9 March 1944, p. 3; ‘Almost Exactly’, Irish Press, 31 January 1944, p. 2; ‘Cahir Healy Tells Us How Catholic Ex-Soldiers Fare in Northern Ireland’, Catholic Herald, 26 January 1945, p. 6. 4. Irish Press extract of 19 April 1944, DO 130/44, PRO; ‘Irish Unity’, Irish Times, 13 October 1944, p. 3; ‘Silence on Partition’, Irish Independent, 2 March 1945, p. 2; extract from Irish Times, DO 130/47; Sir John Maffey, memorandum, ca. 10 April 1945, DO 130/60, PRO; ‘Cardinal’s Plea to End Partition’, Irish Times, 21 February 1944, p. 1. 5. ‘Other Neutrals II – Switzerland’, Irish Times, 25 January 1944, p. 2; ‘Why?’, Irish Press, 18 February 1944, p. 2; ‘Eire’s Neutrality and Its Sequel’, Irish Times, 9 February 1944, p. 1; ‘ “Outrageous” Says Bernard Shaw’, Irish Times, 14 March 1944, p. 3. 6. ‘Taoiseach on Foreign Neutrality Lie’, Irish Press, 28 February 1944, p. 1; ‘Neutrality: Not a Personal Policy’, Christian Herald, 10 March 1944, p. 5; ‘National Government Plan and Neutrality’, Irish Times, 20 March 1944, p. 1; ‘The Government’s Policy of Neutrality Best Course During the War, Mr Cosgrave Says’, Irish Times, 21 October 1944, p. 1; Betty Milton Gaskill, ‘What Ails the Irish’, Liberty, 27 May 1944, FO 371/38573.AN 1801; Elizabeth Cameron, report on opinion in Eire, 10 June 1945, DO 130/65, PRO. 7. Gray to Berlin, 27 January 1944, RG 84/7; Paul D. Thompson, report, 8 May 1945, RG 84/10; Thomas McEnelly to Edward R. Stettinius, 9 May 1945, RG 84/10, DCGR, NAUS; M. D. O’Sullivan to the Bell, 14 May 1945, DO 130/49; Robert Murphy to Gray, 28 May 1945, FDR, DGP; Gray to Francis P. Matthews, 8 June 1945, RG 84/15, DLGR, NAUS.

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8. ‘Eire Came Close to Invasion – by Us’, Daily Mirror, 14 May 1945, p. 8; ‘Mr De Valera’s May Reply’, Daily Telegraph, 16 May 1945, p. 1; J. P. to Churchill, 16 May 1945, PREM 4/53/6, PRO; ‘Reasons for Ireland’s Neutrality’, Irish Independent, 17 May 1945, p. 1. 9. ‘Mrs Shaw Leaves Fortune to Irish’, Boston Evening Globe, 16 February 1944, p. 1; ‘Mrs. Shaw’s Will and G. B.’s Cracks Bring Sharp Retorts from Bostonians’, Boston Evening Globe, 17 February 1944, p. 1; Walter Lippmann, ‘Neutrals, Satellites Reap as They Sow’, Boston Daily Globe, 6 May 1944, p. 7. 10. ‘The Paper Wall’, 18 March 1945; ‘Past a Joke’, 21 March 1945; ‘Another Lie’, 17 April 1945; ‘Traffic in Lies’, 19 May 1945; ‘Rome’, 25 March 1945. All from Irish Press, all on page 2. 11. Styles to Cordell Hull, 16 March, 23 May and 19 September 1944, RG 84/3, DCCR, NAUS. 12. Churchill to Roosevelt, 17 March 1944, PREM 3/133; Roosevelt to Churchill, 5 April 1944, FO 371/42680.W5772; Cranborne to Churchill, 17 March 1944, FO 371/42679.W4256; FO to Washington embassy, 21 September 1944, DO 130/46, PRO; Styles to Hull, 27 October 1944, RG 84/3, DCCR, NAUS; Churchill to Roosevelt, 27 January 1945, Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley and Manfred Jones, eds, Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence, New York, 1975, pp. 652–3; Maffey to DO, 20 March 1944, FO 371/42679.W4374, PRO. 13. John G. Winant to Hull, 14 March 1944, FRUS, vol. III; ‘Letters to the Times’, New York Times, 12 March 1944, p. 7, 15 March 1944, p. 18; memorandum on US– Eire relations, DO 35/1228/WX101/1/69, PRO; ‘Comments on Eire’, Irish World, 1 April 1944, p. 1; ‘Washington Has Made a Mess of the Irish Neutrality Question’, Leader, 1 April 1944, p. 1. 14. Winant to Hull, 10 February 1944, FRUS, vol. III; Stettinius to Gray, 17 February 1944, FRUS, vol III; Gray to de Valera, 21 February 1944, SPO S 13 450B; Gray to Hull, 21 February 1944, FRUS, vol. III; de Valera to Maffey, 8 March 1944, CAB 66 W.P.(44)156, PRO. 15. Stettinius to Gray, 6 January 1945, DGP, FDRL; Styles to Stettinius, 12 January 1945, RG 84/10, DCGR; McEnelly to Gray, 5 May 1945, DCCR, NAUS. 16. Maffey to DO, 1 March 1944, FO 371/42679.W3154, PRO; ‘US Misinformed on Espionage’, Irish Press, 21 March 1944 p. 1; ‘Associated Press Convicted of Spreading Lies against Ireland’, Leader, 27 May 1944, pp. 1, 2; H. L. Will and E. R. Marlin to Col. David Bruce, 10 May 1944, RG 84/7, DLCR; Gray to William Smale, 29 February 1944, RG 84/3, DCCR, NAUS; ‘Two Irishmen Dropped from Planes in Clare’, Irish Press, 20 January 1944, p. 1; Gray to Hull, 5 February 1944, FRUS, vol. III. 17. R. J. Hayes, typescripts, undated, for post-war volume, The Swastika in Ireland, RJH, MS 22,983; Hempel to Berlin, 31 August 1944, MS 22,981; Goertz to ‘friends’, undated; Goertz, ‘ “Testament” of His Doings,’ MS 22,984, RJH INL. 18. Aide m´emoire from Department of External Affairs, Dublin, 9 October 1944, DO 130/46, PRO; de Valera, quoted in Leader, 25 November 1944, p. 1; Berne to FO, 22 November 1944, DO 130/46, PRO; ‘Proud of Irish Neutral Stand Says Captain Wm J. Grace in Regard to War Criminals’, Gaelic American, 25 November 1944, p. 1; ‘No Haven in Eire for Hitler’, Catholic Weekly, reproduced in Gaelic American, 9 December 1944, p. 1; Christian Science Monitor, 15 November 1944; Washington Post, 17 November 1944, DO 130/46, PRO; Dinty Moore to Frank Gallagher, 2 December 1944, MS 18,343, INL; Smale to Styles, 7 March 1945, RG 84/4, DCCR, NAUS.

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19. Stettinius to Winant, 3 February 1944, FRUS, vol. III; Maffey to Sir Eric Machtig, 22 February 1944, PREM 3/133/3, PRO; Winant to Stettinius, 28 February 1944, FRUS, vol. III; ‘Dublin Mobilizes, Seeing Ultimatum’, New York Times, 11 March 1944, p. 2. 20. Samples of headlines regarding the notes: ‘Plea to Eire Reported’, New York Times, 10 March 1944, p. 3; ‘Eire Rejects American Request’, Manchester Guardian, 11 March 1944, p. 5; ‘Eire Rejects US Plea to Oust Axis’, Boston Daily Globe, 11 March 1944, p. 1; ‘Eire Rejects Request from USA to Recall Axis Representatives’, Irish Times, 11 March 1944, p. 1; ‘Eire Rejects US Request’, Times (London), 11 March 1944, p. 4; Hull to Gray, 11 March 1944, FRUS, vol. III; Winant to Stettinius, 14 March 1944, PREM 3/133/3, PRO. 21. ‘US Rift with Eire Growing’, Boston Sunday Post, 12 March 1944, pp. 1, 17; ‘Eisenhower Asked Action on Eire’, Boston Evening Globe, 14 March 1944, p. 1; ‘Yank Troops May Patrol Ulster Line’, Boston Daily Globe, 14 March 1944, p. 1; State Department to London, embassy 14 March 1944, PREM 3/133, PRO; Gray to Stettinius, 15 March 1944; Hull to Winant, 14 March 1944, FRUS, vol. III; ‘Eire Always Firm, De Valera Warns’, New York Times, 18 March 1944, p. 1; ‘Shaw Gives Eire a Victory over Us’, New York Times, 31 March 1944, p. 5; ‘Pressure on the Neutral,’ Boston Daily Globe, 15 April 1944, p. 4; ‘US Blacklists 38 Firms in Eire’, Boston Sunday Globe, 7 May 1944, p. 1. 22. Peter Sedgwick, memorandum, ca. 30 March 1944, INF 1/767, PRO. 23. Reginald Ross Williamson to N. E. Costar, 7 September 1945, DO 130/55, PRO; ‘Churchill up to His Old Tricks Again’, Irish World, 19 May 1945, p. 4; ‘Interfering in Our Election’, Gaelic American, 12 February 1944, p. 4; ‘Perfidious Albion’, Gaelic American, 30 December 1944, p. 4; ‘Constructive Suggestions to the United States of America Spokesmen at the Coming San Francisco Conference’, Gaelic American, 14 April 1945, p. 8. 24. ‘Churchill Constant Menace to Ireland’, Leader, 26 February 1944, p. 6; ‘Is Churchill Behind Anti-Irish Campaign?’, Leader, 4 March 1944, p. 6; ‘What Ireland Sees in Winston Churchill’, Leader, 24 February 1945, p. 6; extract from Leader in DO files, 15 September 1945, DO 130/59; R. Pugh to F. O. Darvall, 2 January 1945, FO 371/50364.W217, PRO. 25. ‘Ireland Is Not Yet Free’, Gaelic American, 17 March 1945, p. 6; ‘Irish Vitality’, Gaelic American, 17 April 1945, p. 4; note of resolution of the Eire Society of Rhode Island sent to President Roosevelt in 1944, DO 130/43, PRO. 26. Nigel Nicolson, ed., Harold Nicolson, Diaries and Letters, vol. II: The War Years 1939– 1945, New York, 1967, p. 356; Churchill to Halifax, 14 March 1944, PREM 3/133/3, PRO; Lt. Col. Sir Thomas Moore, 20 April 1944, HCD, 5th Series, vol. 399, col. 473; William Teeling to Churchill, 25 April 1944, PREM 4/53/6, PRO; ‘Eire Neutral or Hostile?’, Spectator, 31 March 1944, p. 291; Styles to Hull, 16 March 1944, RG 84/3, DCCR, NAUS. 27. DO to Maffey, 27 March 1944, Maffey to DO, 29 March 1944, FO 371/42680.W4936; A. C. E. Malcolm, minute, 18 October 1944, FO 371/42680.W147.95; report, British War Effort, INF 1/980; Lord Cranborne, memorandum, 21 February 1945, DO 114/117; FO 371/50364.W12139, PRO. 28. Dr James Little, question, HCD, 5th Series, vol. 409, cols 370–1, 15 March 1945; ‘Behind the Crisis with Eire: The N. Ireland Base We Must Protect’, Picture Post, 25 March 1944, pp. 10–13, 26; anonymous to Little, 20 March 1944, ADM 1/17089, PRO; ‘IRA Planned to Aid Enemy: US Envoy Showed Captured Map’, Daily

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29.

30.

31.

32. 33. 34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.



Telegraph and Morning Post, 1 April 1944, p. 3; British Intelligence Reports, July 1944, FO 371/38573.AN1801, PRO; Captain C. S. Collinson to G. F. Braddock, 12 May 1944, RG 84/13, DCCR, NAUS. ‘All Travel to Ireland Barred’, Daily Mirror, 12 March 1944, p. 1; ‘Halt Travel to and from Eire’, Boston Post, 13 March 1944, pp. 1, 5; ‘Churchill on Travel Ban: “First Step to Isolate Eire” ’, Boston Evening Globe, 14 March 1944, p. 1; ‘British Cut Phone with All Ireland’, New York Times, 6 April 1944, p. 1; ‘Irish Blockade Tightened by US and Britain’, Boston Evening Globe, 13 April 1944, p. 3; Ross Williamson to Maffey, 14 March 1944, DO 130/51, PRO; Churchill to Roosevelt, 19 March 1944, FRUS, vol. III, pp. 243–4. ‘Helping the Enemy’, Daily Mail, 12 April 1944, p. 2; de Valera to Maffey, 9 December 1944, DO 130/41; Costar to Maffey, 2 November 1944, FO 371/41094.UE1778; Jay Llewelyan to Cranborne, 21 September 1944, DO 130/63, PRO. Costar, memorandum, 12 July 1944, DO 35/1231/WX153/2; Dunalley to Brendan Bracken, ca. mid-June 1944; Mansergh to Pugh, 28 June 1944, DO 35/1190/ Z477/5/80, PRO. An American report estimated 150,000 Irishmen in the British army and as many as 300,000 Irish workers in the UK ca. 1944, RG 84/15, DLGR, NAUS. Extract from Manchester Guardian, 22 February 1944; FO Research Department memorandum, 1 March 1944, DO 130/45, PRO. Postal and Telegraph Censorship Report, 1 April 1944, DO 130/43, PRO. ‘Eire – Neutral or Hostile?’, Spectator, 7 April 1944, p. 313; ‘Eire and the War’, Times, 24 April 1945, p. 6; ‘Eire – Neutral or Hostile?’, Spectator, 14 April 1944, p. 338; ‘Eire, Greece and Spain’, Spectator, 8 December 1944, p. 429; ‘Mr de Valera’s “Moral Code” ’, Daily Telegraph, 21 May 1945, p. 5. Cranborne to Maffey, extracts from Daily Telegraph and Manchester Guardian, 4 and 5 January 1945, DO 130/58; M. B. H., minute, 12 January 1945, DO 35/1228/WQX101/89; N. E. Archer to Costar, 25 January 1945, DO 130/58, PRO. Frank McDermott to ‘Patricia’, 20 April 1971, DO 999/84; ‘De Valera Condoles!’, Daily Mirror, 4 May 1945, p. 2; ‘Mr De Valera’s Regrets’, New York Times, 4 May 1945, p. 18; ‘De Valera Did the Correct Thing’, Leader, 19 May 1945, p. 6. Cable, OWI from London, 17 August 1944, RG 208/362/134; Paul C. Daniels to Edward R. Stettinius, 21 December 1944, RG 208/367/320, OCR, NAUS; Aaron Brown to David Gray, 15 January 1945, DGP, RG, FDRL. Jean G. Parker, memorandum, 12 April 1944, RG 208/6J/1; Gray to State Department, 21 January 1944, RG 84/7, DLCR; London to OWI, 23 February 1944, RG 208/362/134, OCR; T. L. Barnard, memorandum, 12 April 1945, RG 208/6J/1, RG NAUS. Ford to Kuhn, report from Dublin, 28 February 1945, RG 208/462/187, OCR, NAUS; Gray to Robert E. Sherwood, 5 July 1944, DGP, FDRL; A Handbook of the United States of America, January 1944, RG/462/18; Pamphlets and Other Materials Sent to Dublin for Distribution, 20 September, 27 October and 18 December 1944, RG 208/469/2966; The Life of Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 1944, RG 208/462/15; Truman and The American Program for the Defeat of Japan, 1 June 1945, RG 208/462/27, PFOD, NAUS; E. Trevor Hill to W. Kirby, 18 March 1944, PG 208/462/2965, PF, NAUS. Terrell to Gray, 10 May 1944; Frank Allen to OWI Secretary, 5 June 1944; comments about Letter from America, 21 January 1944; Ford to Gray, 23 February 1945, DGP, FDRL.

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41. Letter from America, 28 April, 9 and 16 June, 20 April 1944, 20 April 1945, all p. 1; Terrell to Gray, 15 July 1944; OWI in Eire, General Outline of Present Activities, 15 July 1944; Gray to Cordell Hull, 20 November 1944; Brown to Stettinus, 19 November 1944, DGP, FDRL. 42. Terrell, memorandum, 13 January 1944, RG 208/362/134, OCR, NAUS; ‘Cinemas’, Irish Independent, 6 January, 1 May and 19 May 1945, all p. 2; ‘Film Notes’, Irish Times, 17 July 1944, p. 3; ‘Jane Eyre’, Irish Times, 24 February 1944, p. 3. 43. ‘War-Time Films May Be Shown in Eire’, Irish Times, 14 May 1945, p. 1. 44. ‘War Films for Public Showing’, Irish Independent, 14 May 1945, p. 2. 45. OWI Overseas Branch, Motion Picture Bureau, report, 1 May 1944, RG 208/6H/1, RH NAUS; March of Time film, The Irish Question, April, 1944, RG 200 MT NAUS; report, Distribution of Propaganda Films by This Mission, 16 December 1944; Elizabeth C. Bouch, report on distribution of war films, 25 January 1945, DGP, FDRL. 46. Ross Williamson to Penelope Betjeman, 5 March 1944; Ross Williamson to John Betjeman, 16 March 1944; Ross Williamson to Penelope Betjeman, 5 March 1944; Ross Williamson to John Betjeman, 31 December 1944, Ross Williamson to John Betjeman, 15 July 1945, JBP, UVL. 47. O’Mahoney to Ross Williamson, 27 July 1944, DO 130/52, PRO; McManus to Betjeman, 3 January 1944; McManus to Betjeman, 16 March 1944, JBP, UVL; Ross Williamson, report, 13 October 1944, DO 130/44, PRO. 48. Kenneth Clark to Ross Williamson, 24 January 1944, DO 130/50; Ross Williamson to R. Pugh, 26 August 1944; Nicholas Mansergh to Ross Williamson, 8 November 1944 DO 35/1211/WN240/19/2; Nancy Bill to Ross Williamson, 7 November 1944, DO 130/51; Pugh to Ross Williamson, 24 November 1944; Ross Williamson to Pugh, 4 December 1944, DO 130/52; Ross Williamson to Pugh, 12 December 1944, DO 130/50; Ross Williamson to K. G. Grubb, 12 January 1945, INF 1/953, PRO. 49. N. E. Archer to Ross Williamson, 22 February 1945; Ross Williamson to DO, 24 February 1945, DO 130/55, PRO. 50. List of magazines for MOI ads, INF 1/686; H. M. Peacock to R. J. Mitchell, 12 September 1944, INF 1/661; publicity regarding British war effort, INF 1/980; propaganda materials, INF 2/8, PRO. 51. Samuel Goldwyn to Filippo Del Giudice, 1 July 1944, INF 1/224, PRO; ‘British Studios Challenge’, Irish Independent, 22 January 1945, p. 2; William D. Patterson to Luther Conant, 10 May 1944, RG 208/359/834, OCR; unsigned report, ca. July 1944, RG 84/15, DLGR, NAUS. 52. Mansergh to Ross Williamson, 16 March 1944; Ross Williamson to Sir John Maffey, 20 August 1945, DO 130/62, PRO. 53. OWI to Gray, 25 November 1944, RG 84/6, DLCR, NAUS; BBC programmes, Home Service, Irish Times, 7 and 15 January, 12 and 26 April, 10 July 1944, and 9 January 1945. 54. Programme Directive 111, 3 July 1944, E1/950/1; Eason to CP, 5 January 1945; R. A. Rendall to BBC NI Director, 31 January 1945; Robert MacDermot to AC (O), 27 February 1945, R34/239/3, BBCWAC. 55. OSS report on Ireland, 24 May 1944, RG 84/6, DLCR, NAUS; Joseph Walshe to Controller Censorship, 16 February 1945, MA 2/118. 56. Unsigned report, ca. July 1944, RG 84/15, DLGR, NAUS; ‘Obituary Notices Censored’, Irish Independent, 26 April 1945, p. 3; Gray to Cordell Hull, 28 January 1944, RC 84/7, DLCR, NAUS; Thomas Coyne to Walshe, 29 February 1944, MA 2/127;

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57.

58.

59. 60.

61. 62. 63.

64.

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Coyne, memorandum, 20 March 1944, MA 2/13; Coyne, note, 22 May 1944, MA 2/18; Aaron Brown to Hull, 23 June 1944, RG 84/7, DLCR, NAUS; Coyne to F. J. Keane, 21 April 1945, MA 2/150. Ross Williamson, note, 9 August 1944, DO 130/49; Ross Williamson to Pugh, 21 December 1944, DO 130/52; DO to Maffey, 16 May 1945, DO 130/58, PRO; ‘Newspaper Censorship Ends’, Irish Independent, 12 May 1945, p. 2; ‘Eire under the Censorship’, Manchester Guardian, 17 May 1945, p. 4. J. C. M. Eason to E. D. Lush, 14 June 1944, MA2/137; ‘Practical Censorship’ Irish Times, 21 January 1944, p. 3; Dan Terrell, report, 22 January 1944, RG 208/362/134, OCR, NAUS; Censorship Office to Chief Postal Censor, 30 May 1944, MA 2/55; Coyne to Justice Secretary Stephen Roche, 5 October 1944, MA 2/142; Ross Williamson, note, 25 November 1944, DO 130/44, PRO. E. Hardman to Maffey, 10 February 1944, DO 130/49, PRO; Terrell, weekly report, 23 June 1944, RG 208/362/134, OCR, NAUS; ‘Eire Censors Ban “This Is The Army”, Boston Daily Globe, 11 August 1944, p. 1; Coyne to Aiken, 26 September 1944; Films Submitted to Censor by Irish Film Society, October 1944; Coyne to Peter Sherry, 20 October 1944; Coyne, memorandum, 9 February 1944; Coyne to ´ Laoghaire, 27 October 1944; O ´ Laoghaire to Coyne, 1 February 1944, MA Liam O 7/55. ‘Mr Aiken Strong on “Irish Times”: Censorship: “We Are at Daggers Drawn” ’, Irish Times, 26 April 1944, p. 1; ‘A Different Outlook’, Irish Times, 27 April 1944, p. 3. Press complaints to Coyne, 23 February 1944, MA 2/13; ‘Appeal for Relaxation of Censorship’, Irish Times, 28 June 1944, p. 1; extract from Irish Times, 29 June 1944, DO 130/44, PRO; Gray to Ferdinand Kuhn, 31 January 1945, RG 84/15, DLGR, NAUS; ‘How Eire Was Cloaked in Ignorance, Despite One Editor’s Gallant Fight’, reprint from World Press News, 21 March 1946, FDRL; Smyllie to Outis, 26 October 1944, P20/6, UCD; Extract from Gwendolen M. Carter, ‘Eire – Its Neutrality and Post-War Prospects’, 1 February 1945, DO 130/55, PRO; ‘Censorship Attacked by Sir John Keane’, Irish Times, 22 February 1945, p. 1; ‘Eire Hears of Buchenwald Horrors’, Daily Telegraph, 14 May 1945, p. 1. List of Foreign Correspondents in the United States, 1 March 1944, RG 208/367/ 320, RAD, NAUS. Outpost Bureau Reports on Material Published by the Irish Newspapers, 1944–5, RG 208/OWI, NAUS. Note on Principal Eire Propaganda Claims with Answers Thereto, 14 December 1945, DO 130/55, PRO; R. M. Smyllie, ‘Unneutral Neutral Eire’, Foreign Affairs 24, 1946, pp. 317–26. Nicholas Monsarrat, The Cruel Sea, New York, 1953, p. 179.

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MS 17, 546(3) MS 17, 546(4) MS 17, 546(5) MS 17, 546(6) MS 17, 546(8) MS 17, 984 MS 18, 334 MS 18, 341 MS 18, 357 MS 18, 361(3) MS 18, 945 MS 21, 155(1) MS 21, 155(3) MS 21, 155(4) MS 21, 256 MS 22, 853 MS 22, 863 MS 22, 981 MS 22, 984 John Betjeman Papers, UVL John G. Winant Papers, FDRL Joseph P. McGarrity Papers, INL National Archives of the United States RG 84 RG 108 RG 200 RG 208 Public Records Office Adm 1 BW 4 CAB 21 CAB 63 CAB 65 CAB 66 CJ 1 DO 35 DO 114 DO 121 DO 130 DO 999 DO 1109 FO 371 FO 848 FO 898 INF 1 INF 2 INF 6

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PREM 1 PREM 3 PREM 4 Richard J. Hayes Papers, INL Robert E. Sherwood Papers, HL State Paper Office, Dublin S 9 559 S 11 935 S 12 043 S 12 069 S 12 093A S 12 094 S 12 450B S 12 795 Sumner Wells Papers, FDRL

Diaries, memoirs, documents Ball, Stuart, ed., Parliament and Politics in the Age of Churchill and Attlee: The Headlam Diaries (Cambridge, 1999) Eckersley, Roger, The BBC and All That (London, 1946) Gray, David, Behind the Green Curtain, unpublished memoirs Green, Candida Lycett, ed., John Betjeman Letters, vol. I: 1926 to 1951 (London, 1994) Hull, Cordell, Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London, 1948) Loewenheim, Francis L., Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jones, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York, 1975) Nicholas, H. J., ed., Washington Despatches 1941–1945: Weekly Political Reports of the British Embassy (London, 1981) Nicolson, Nigel, ed., Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters, vol. II: The War Years (New York, 1967) Secret Diaries of Harold L. Ickes, The (New York, 1954) Sherwood, Robert, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins (2 vols, London, 1948) Stuart, Charles, ed., The Reith Diaries (London, 1975) Taylor, A. J. P., Off the Record: Political Interviews of W. P. Crozier 1933–1943 (London, 1973)

Secondary sources Adams, Michael, Censorship: The Irish Experience (Tuscaloosa, AL, 1968) Aldgate, Anthony and Jeffrey Richards, London Can Take It: British Cinema in the Second World War (Oxford, 1986) Allen, Trevor, The Storm Passed By: Ireland and the Battle of the Atlantic 1940–41 (Dublin, 1996) Barton, Brian, The Blitz: Belfast in the War Years (Belfast, 1989) Briggs, Asa, History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, vol. III: The War of Words (Oxford, 1995)





Brown, Anthony Cave, ‘Wild Bill Donovan’: The Last Hero (New York, 1982) Brown, Terence, Ireland: A Social and Cultural History 1922–1985 (London, 1981) Canning, Paul, British Policy towards Ireland 1921–1941 (Oxford, 1985) Carroll, John T., Ireland in the War Years (New York, 1975) Carroll, Joseph, ‘U.S.–Irish Relations 1939–45’, Irish Sword 19(75–6), 1993–4, pp. 99– 105 Carter, Carolle J., The Shamrock and the Swastika: German Espionage in Ireland in World War II (Palo Alto, CA, 1977) Cathcart, Rex, The Most Contrary Region: The BBC in Northern Ireland 1924–1984 (Belfast, 1984) Caughie, Jon and Kevin Rockett, The Companion to British and Irish Cinema (London, 1996) Chapman, James, The British At War: Cinema, State and Propaganda 1939–1945 (London, 1998) Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War (6 vols, London, 1981) Cole, Robert, Britain and the War of Words in Neutral Europe: The Art of the Possible (London, 1990) Cole, Robert, ‘ “Good Relations”: Irish Neutrality and the Propaganda of John Betjeman ´ 1941–43’, Eire-Ireland 30(4), 1996, pp. 33–46 ´ Coogan, Tim Pat, Eamon de Valera: The Man Who Was Ireland (London, 1993) Coultas, Clive, Images for Battle: British Film and the Second World War 1939–1945 (Newark, DE, 1989) Cronan, Se´an, Washington Irish Policy 1916–1986: Independence, Partition, Neutrality (Dublin, 1987) Cull, Nicholas, Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American ‘Neutrality’ in World War II (Oxford, 1995) Dallek, Robert, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1979) Doherty, Richard, Irish Generals: Irish Generals in the British Army in the Second World War (Belfast, 1993) Domvile, Admiral Sir Barry, Look to Your Moat (London, 1937) Duggan, John P., Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin, 1985) Duggan, John P., Herr Hempel and the German Legation in Dublin 1937–1945 (Dublin, 2003) Dwyer, T. Ryle, Irish Neutrality and the USA 1939–47 (Dublin, 1977) Dwyer, T. Ryle, Strained Relations: Ireland at Peace and the USA at War 1941–45 (Dublin, 1988) Eckersley, Roger, The BBC and All That, (London, 1946) Fisk, Robert, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality 1939–45 (London, 1985) Girvin, Brian, and Geoffrey Roberts, eds, Ireland and the Second World War: Politics, Society and Remembrance (Dublin, 2000) Gray, Tony, The Lost Years: The Emergency in Ireland 1939–45 (London, 1997) Heinrichs, Waldo, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (New York, 1988) Hinsley, F. H. and C. A. C. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War (London, 1990) Hull, Mark M., Irish Secrets: German Espionage in Wartime Ireland 1939–1945 (Dublin, 2003)





Jordan, Heather Bryant, How Will the Heart Endure: Elizabeth Bowen and the Landscape of War (Ann Arbor, MI, 1992) ´ Keogh, Dermot, ‘Eamon de Valera and Hitler: An Analysis of the International Reaction to the Visit to the German Minister, May 1945’, Irish Studies in International Affairs 3(1), 1989, pp. 69–92 Keogh, Dermot and Aengus Nolan, ‘Anglo-Irish Diplomatic Relations and World War II’, Irish Sword, 19(75–6), 1993–4, pp. 106–30 Kurth, Peter, American Correspondent: The Life of Dorothy Thompson (Boston, 1990) Laurie, Clayton D., The Propaganda Warriors: America’s Crusade against Nazi Germany (Lawrence, KS, 1996) Leigh, Michael, Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937– 1947 (Westport, CT, 1976) ´ Longford, Earl of (Frank Pakenham) and Thomas P. O’Neill, Eamon de Valera (Boston, 1971) MacLaine, Ian, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two (London, 1979) MacManus, M. J., ‘Eire and the World Crisis’, Horizon 5(25), 1942, pp. 18–22 ´ Drisceoil, Donal, Censorship in Ireland, 1939–1945: Neutrality, Politics, and Society O (Cork, 1996) Oram, Hugh, The Newspaper Book: A History of Newspapers in Ireland 1649–1983 (Dublin, 1983) Packard, Jerrold M., Neither Friend Nor Foe: The European Neutrals in World War II (New York, 1992) Pronay, Nicholas and D. W. Spring, eds, Propaganda, Politics and Film (London, 1982) ´ Raymond, Raymond J., ‘American Public Opinion and Irish Neutrality 1939–1945’, EireIreland 18(1), 1983, pp. 20–45 Raymond, Raymond J., ‘David Gray, the Aiken Mission and Irish Neutrality 1940–41’, Diplomatic Quarterly 9, 1985, pp. 55–71 Robertson, James C., The British Board of Film Censors: Film Censorship in Britain 1896– 1950 (London, 1985) Rocket, Kevin, Luke Gibbons and John Hill, Cinema and Ireland (London and Sydney, 1987) Rolo, Charles, Radio Goes to War (New York, 1943) Rosenberg, Joseph L., ‘The 1941 Mission of Frank Aiken to the United States: An American Perspective’, Irish Historical Studies 22, 1980, pp. 162–77 Salmon, Trevor C., Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy (Oxford, 1989) Share, Bernard, The Emergency: Neutral Ireland 1939–45 (Dublin, 1978) Short, K. R. M., ed., Film and Radio Propaganda in World War II, (London and Canberra, 1983) Short, K. R. M., ‘The White Cliffs of Dover: Promoting the Anglo-American Alliance in World War II’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 2, 1982, pp. 3– 25 Shulman, Holly Cowan, The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy 1941–1945 (Madison, WI, 1990) Slide, Anthony, The Cinema and Ireland (London, 1989) Sweeney, Michael, Secrets of Victory: The Office of Censorship and the American Press and Radio in World War II (Chapel Hill, NC, 2001)





Taylor, Philip M., The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919–1939 (London, 1981) Taylor, Philip M., ed., Britain and the Cinema in the Second World War (London, 1988) Thompson, George P., Blue Pencil Admiral: The Inside Story of the Press Censorship (London, 1947) Thorpe, Francis and Nicholas Pronay, British Official Films in the Second World War: A Descriptive Catalogue (Oxford, 1980) Vansittart, Robert, The Mist Procession (London, 1958) Welsh, David, The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda (London, 1993) Winkler, Alan M., The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information (New York, 1978)

Index

Adams, Godfrey, 155 Admiralty, 6, 126, 153 Agar, William, 89 Aiken, Frank, 2, 6, 22, 31–2, 34, 47, 56, 58, 66, 68, 73–5, 77, 85, 112, 116–18, 125, 135, 151–2, 156, 176 American Friends of Irish Neutrality, 8, 88 Amery, L. S., 55 Ancient Order of Hibernians, 8, 9, 50, 90, 146 Andrews, J. M., 49, 95, 107, 110, 127, 134 Archer, Liam, 74 Asquith, Anthony, 54 Balcon, Michael, 54 Balfour, Michael, 1 Bartlett, Vernon, 25 Bayles, William, 86, 91, 129 Beckett, John, 24 Belfast, 12, 14–15, 31, 36, 55, 68, 71–3, 77–8, 86, 93, 95, 98, 109, 114, 129, 133, 136, 145, 147, 177 Berardis, Vincenzo, 76 Bernstein, Sidney, 115 Betjeman, John, 2, 15, 20, 52–3, 59, 69–72, 91–2, 94–6, 112, 115, 129, 131–7, 139, 149, 152–3, 156, 173, 177 Bewley, Charles, 24 Biddle, Francis, 149 Black and Tans, 1, 158 Boland, Frederick H., 76, 111 books Berlin Diary, 157 By Order of the Gestapo, 97–8 Children of the USA, 114 Citizen Tom Paine, 114 Dead Look On, The, 157 Gulls Fly Low, The, 157 Inside Italy, 75 Men Crucified, 98 Nazi Nuggets, 135 Persecution of the Catholic Church in German Occupied Poland, 75, 97

Persecution of the Catholic Church In the Third Reich, 75, 97 Raft, The, 114 Under the Hell of the Gestapo, 98 Boult, Sir Adrian, 133 Bowen, Elizabeth, 48–9, 53, 74, 76, 94, 108, 111 Bowles, Capt. Michael, 133 Bracken, Brendan, 67, 97, 146 Brennan, Robert, 9, 36, 50, 86, 107, 109, 111, 126, 145–6, 167 Brislane, James, 10 broadcasting BBC, 14, 21, 29–31, 34, 53–5, 68, 70–3, 93–5, 133–4, 155, 169, 175 BBC NI (Northern Ireland), 31, 55, 71–2, 95, 156, 175 Deutsche Rundfunk, 30, 70 Irish Half Hour, 94–5, 134, 152, 169 Radio Éireann (RÉ), 3, 21, 29–31, 55, 71–2, 94, 96, 114, 125, 133, 155–6, 170 Voice of America, 90, 112, 116, 175 Voice of Victory, 112 Burns, Thomas, 21 Cadogan, Patrick Joseph, 149 Catholics and Catholic Church, 7–8, 11, 13, 21–2, 27, 47, 52–3, 68, 70–3, 75–7, 86–7, 90–4, 96, 111–15, 118, 126–8, 131–2, 134–6, 146–50, 154–5, 157, 165, 168–70, 173 Cave-Chinn, Lovat, 54 censorship and censor, 1–3, 5, 7, 11, 14–15, 20–2, 24, 26, 29, 31–7, 48, 52, 54, 56–9, 70, 72–8, 88, 94, 96–8, 106, 111–14, 116–18, 126–8, 130, 133, 135–9, 145, 150–9, 165–6, 170–3, 175–7 Chamberlain, Neville, 8, 12–13, 30–32 Churchill, Winston, 30–1, 37, 46, 50, 67–8, 78, 87–8, 98, 108, 110, 119, 126–7, 138–9, 158, 166–70, 174





Clan-na-Gael, 25–6 Clark, J. B., 72, 93, 155 Commager, Henry Steele, 145 Commonwealth, British, 6–7, 12, 20, 29–30, 154, 166, 171–2, 174 Conboy, Martin, 50 Connolly, Cyril, 74, 127 Connolly, Joseph, 31, 33, 58, 77, 98 Coogan, Tim Pat, 26 Cooper, Duff, 36, 55 Cosgrove, William T., 85 Coughlin, Fr Charles E., 9, 27, 105 Coulter, Thomas, 33 Coyne, Thomas, 15, 31–4, 36, 56–7, 74–7, 96–8, 116, 135–8, 152–3, 156–7, 176 Craigavon, Lord (formerly Sir James Craig), 6–7, 46, 49, 51 Cranborne, Lord, 50, 55, 71, 87, 167 Crisp, Dorothy, 153, 156–8 Cudahy, John, 14, 22, 26 Cull, Nicholas, 1, 50 Curran, Edward M., 106 Cussen, Edward, 15, 33 Czechoslovakia, 7, 13 Dáil Éireann, 6, 15, 21, 35, 73–4, 77, 85, 93, 98, 105, 111, 125, 127, 129, 135, 145, 152, 176 Dalton, Hugh, 145 Davis, Elmer, 105–6, 112, 116, 146 Davison, Sir Joseph, 165 d’Egville, Howard, 22 de Valera, Éamon, 1, 3, 5–12, 20, 22–3, 25–8, 34, 46–51, 53, 56, 58, 66, 68, 74, 76–7, 85–7, 89, 91, 96, 98, 104, 107, 109–10, 113, 125–8, 134–5, 145–8, 152–3, 156, 165–71, 173, 176–7 Deutsche Fichtebund, 3, 24 Deutsche Nachsrichtenbüro, 3 Dill, FM Sir John, 73, 94 Dillon, James, 22–3, 49, 85, 98, 105, 111, 130, 145, 176 Donovan, Col William J., 50–1, 78, 90, 147 Duffy, Fr Francis P., 26, 29, 89 Dulanty, John, 22, 25, 48, 58 Dun Laoghaire, 34, 86, 130 Eade, Charles, 156 Ealing Studios, 54 Eason, Robert, 157 Eason, Ursula, 72, 95, 155, 175

Eire (Ireland) and Irish Free State, 1–15, 20–7, 29–37, 46–59, 66–70, 72–8, 85–8, 105–13, 115–18, 125–37, 139, 145–58, 165–71, 174–7 Emergency Powers Act, 15, 21, 57, 74, 96, 151–2, 173 Emmett, Robert, 71 Ennis, Frank, 106 Fall, Capt. Cyril, 49 fascism, 30, 127, 153, 156–7 Fianna Fáil Party, 3, 11, 85, 114, 177 films (selected), feature and documentary All Quiet on the Western Front, 117 Autobiography of a Jeep, 151, 173 Blockade, 28 Calling All Marines, 29 Come Back to Erin, 53 Corvettes, 70 Day in the Life of Soviet Russia, A, 118, 152 Doughboys in Ireland, 151 Empire Marches, The, 70 Espionage Agent, 29 Fighting Irish, 93 Fighting 69th, The, 29, 172 Fighting Sullivans, The, 172 Follow the Fleet, 29 49th Parallel, 54 Four Feathers, The, 29 Ireland – The Plain Issue, 126 Johnny Doughboy, 151 Lion Has Wings, The, 29, 53 March of Time, 33, 151–2, 176 Nurse Edith Cavell, 28, 118 Paratroops, 151 Prime Minister, The, 70 Spies of the Air, 29 Spring Offensive, 53 Spy in Black, The, 29 Squadron 992, 53 Target for Tonight, 98 This Happy Breed, 174 Way Ahead, The (Immortal Battalion), 174 Yankee Doodle Dandy, 151 Fine Gael Party, 11, 77, 96, 145 Finucane, Sqn Ldr Brendan ‘Paddy’, 131 Fisk, Robert, 15, 125 Fletcher, H. L., 72, 94 Ford, Alice, 171–2 Friendly Sons of St Patrick, 149

 Gallagher, Frank, 9–11, 22, 34, 47, 71, 91, 125, 152, 174 Geary, F. J., 11, 58 Gelder, Stuart, 49 German Legation, 24–5, 53, 75, 111, 117, 152 Germany, 8–9, 11, 13, 24–5, 28–30, 32, 36, 46–8, 51, 53, 58, 67–9, 71–2, 74–5, 77–8, 85, 87–90, 95–6, 105–6, 109, 112, 116, 125–7, 130–1, 135, 138, 145–6, 148, 155, 158–9, 165–7, 170 Gielgud, Val, 30 Gilliat, Sidney, 54 Goebbels, Joseph, 30, 57, 174 Goetz, Hermann, 86, 167 Gogarty, Oliver St John, 22 Gough, Sir Hubert, 51, 67–8, 87 Government Information Bureau (GIB), 9, 21–2, 34, 47, 71, 86, 91, 125, 152 Grand Knights of Columbus Joyce Kilmer Society, 9 Granger, Dermot, 24 Graves, Charles, 25 Gray, David, 2–3, 26, 48–50, 55, 57, 66, 86–7, 91, 93, 105–6, 108–14, 116–17, 127–8, 130, 145–9, 152, 158, 166, 168, 171–3, 176 Great Britain and England, 2, 5, 7–15, 20–3, 25–8, 30–3, 35, 37, 46–53, 55–6, 58–9, 66–70, 72–3, 76–8, 85–90, 92, 94–6, 99, 106–7, 109–11, 115, 132–4, 136–7, 139, 145–8, 153–4, 156–7, 165–70, 174–5, 177–8 Greene, Ben, 24 Grozier, Richard, 106 Halifax, Lord, 49, 106, 147, 169 Hancock, W. C., 132 Hardy, Ann, 30 Harte, John O’Hara, 10 Hartman, Hans, 149 Hayes, Richard, 54, 117–18, 151–2 Hayes, Stephen, 130 Headlam, Sir Cuthbert, 50 Healy, Cahir, 165 Heenan, John, 86, 92, 126 Held, Stephen, 25 Hempel, Eduard, 11, 24–5, 30, 36, 48, 51, 56–7, 74–5, 86, 118, 130, 135, 166, 171 Henderson, Sir Neville, 10



Hess, Rudolph, 21 Hickok, T. A., 159 Hinsley, Card. Arthur, 23, 30, 73, 75, 96, 112, 146, 154–5 Hitler, Adolf, 8–9, 14, 20, 26, 30, 32–4, 48–9, 51–2, 57, 68, 75, 88, 90, 96, 108–9, 112–13, 127, 131, 138, 149–50, 165–6, 171, 174, 177 Hodson, H. V., 20–1, 52, 69–71, 93 Hope, Richard, 70, 92 Howard, L. G. Redmond, 68 Howard, Leslie, 54 Hull, Cordell, 10, 110, 112, 114, 117, 146, 159, 170 Ickes, Harold, 8, 50 Inskip, Sir Thomas, 6 IRA (Irish Republican Army), 9–13, 23–6, 33, 36, 47–9, 51–2, 57, 86, 110–11, 125, 129–32, 134, 136, 148, 152, 175 Ireland, Capt. Denis, 126 Irish-Americans, 1, 8–10, 12–14, 22–9, 47, 50–1, 66–8, 70, 85–9, 92, 105–6, 112, 114, 128–9, 131, 134, 145–7, 149, 154, 165, 167–9, 171, 173 Italy, 56, 72, 77, 137, 145, 150, 155, 158–9 Johnston, Denis, 55, 71, 93, 95, 134 Joubert, AM Sir Philip, 54 Joyce, William, 24, 39, Keane, Sir John, 58, 176 Kennedy, Joseph, 28 Kiernan, T. J., 14, 31, 71–2, 94, 96, 169 Kirkpatrick, Helen, 110, 113 Knightly, Michael, 32–3, 56, 75, 137–8, 157 Knights of Columbanus, 86 Knox, Frank, 85 Korda, Alexander, 92 Kuhn, Ferdinand, 128, 177 Leslie, Sir Shane, 21–2 Levy, Thomas, 25 Little, James, 25 Lloyd, Lord, 6 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr, 27 Lodge, Norman, 74 Long, Tania, 25, 36, 57 Lothian, Lord, 23, 28, 50 Lunn, Arnold, 53, 87 Lynd, Robert, 49





MacBride, Maud Gonne, 27 McCafferty, James, 133 McCormack, John, 94–5 McCormack, John W., 23, 106 MacDermott, Frank, 52, 73, 86–9 MacDonald, Malcolm, 6, 23 McEnelly, Thomas, 167 McGarrity, Joseph P., 9–10, 13, 26, 51 McGranery, James, 10 MacGregor, J. C. S., 14, 21 McGuinness, A., 167 MacIntee, Sean, 125 Macleish, Archibald, 105 Maclennan, Hugh, 49 McMahon, Francis E., 68 McManus, M. J., 173 MacMillan, Lord, 21, 25, 30 MacRory, Card. Joseph, 21, 107–8 MacSwiney, Mary, 23, 125 MacVeagh, John, 6 Machtig, Eric, 46, 148 Maffey, Sir John, 23, 26, 46–7, 53, 109–11, 131, 134–5, 147–8, 167, 169 magazines and newsletters Bell, The, 114, 125 Bulletin from Britain, 131 Capuchin Annual, 125 Cavalcade, 57, 96 Commonweal, 96 Dublin Magazine, 125 Illustrated War News, 33 Irish Catholic, 76, 92, 96 Leader, The (not San Francisco), 125 Letter From America, 111, 113, 115–16, 149–50, 171–2 Life, 113, 149, 171 Look, 112–14 Nation 114, 169 New Statesman and Nation, 54 Newsweek, 149, 171 Penapa, 57, 76 Picture Post, 36, 57, 127, 169 Reynolds News, 36 Social Justice, 105 Spectator, 46, 49, 105, 126, 156 Time, 113–14, 149 Torch, 47, 76, 96 Universe, The, 70, 92 Washington Post, 27 Worker’s Weekly, 76, 96 Mansergh, Nicholas, 69, 91, 132–3, 153, 155, 170, 174 Marchner, Hans, 130

Marlin, E. R. ‘Spike’, 112, 148 Marshall, George, 31, 55, 71–2, 94–6, 134, 155 Matthews, Peter, 156 Mercier, G. L., 133 Milne, A. A., 98 Ministry of Information (MOI), 2, 20–1, 29–31, 48, 52–5, 67, 69–70, 92–3, 108, 127–8, 130, 132, 137, 146, 152, 156–7, 169, 173–4 American Division, 10, 67 Commercial Relations Division, 69 Empire Division, 20–1, 23, 31, 53, 59, 69, 91, 134, 152, 173 Films Division, 53–4, 69–70, 115, 133 Religions Division, 21, 49, 53, 69–70, 87, 91–2, 134 Monsarrat, Nicholas, 177 Montgomery, FM Sir Bernard, 51, 154, 158, 174 Montgomery, James, 32, 151 Morrison, Herbert, 8, 147 MPPDA (Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America), 28, 118, 151 Munro, I. S., 24 Murphy, Anna, 158 Murphy, Delia, 94–5, 169 Murphy, Patrick J., 106 Murray, James, 67 Nazis and Nazism, 1, 13–14, 21, 29, 36, 48, 68–71, 75, 77, 86, 90, 92, 96, 98, 111, 114, 117–18, 126, 129–31, 133, 135, 148, 140, 152–4, 157, 166, 170, 174–5, 177 newspapers Belfast Telegraph, 23 Boston Daily Globe, 24, 131 Boston Post, 106, 108 Brooklyn Tablet, 27–8, 51, 89–90, 92, 129, 131 Catholic Herald, 47, 49, 53, 68, 85–6, 92, 109, 135 Cork Examiner, 11, 73, 76, 157 Daily and Sunday Express, 13, 21, 50, 86, 109, 136–7 Daily Mail, 21, 25, 36, 46–7, 49–50, 108, 128, 170 Daily Mirror, 20, 34–6, 47, 49–50, 66, 85, 96, 107–8, 127, 131, 171 Daily Telegraph, 36, 76, 85, 109, 125, 127

 Evening Standard, 33, 46, 155 Gaelic American, 8, 27–8, 51, 66–7, 88–90, 92, 106–7, 128–9, 147, 168–9 Irish Independent, 11, 13, 32, 34–7, 58, 68–9, 76–8, 93, 98, 125, 1322–3, 137–8, 145, 157–8, 165, 174, 177 Irish Press, 3, 9, 11–14, 26, 30, 37, 46–7, 58, 77–8, 85–6, 91, 93, 96–7, 98–9, 105, 116, 125, 132–3, 137–8, 147, 151, 156, 158–9, 165, 169, 173, 175–7 Irish Times, 11–13, 22, 30, 32, 35–7, 46, 49, 53–4, 58, 73, 76–8, 85, 90–1, 93, 97–8, 114–15, 125, 132, 137–8, 157, 165, 172–3, 176–7 Irish World, 27–8, 51, 66, 68, 88–90, 105, 107, 129, 131, 168 Leader, The, 27–8, 31, 66–8, 86, 89, 107, 116, 128, 147 Kerryman, 53, 177 Manchester Guardian, 21, 36, 46–8, 85, 109, 127–8, 146, 156, 176 New York Herald Tribune, 22, 25, 36, 112, 129 New York Times, 24, 27, 47, 50, 68, 85, 88, 128, 131, 149, 167, 171 News Chronicle, 46, 49, 86, 108 News Review, 36, 136 Northern Whig, 53, 72 Osservatore Romano, 75 P.M., 91, 109, 146 Sunday Chronicle, 33, 76, 136 Standard, The, 70, 73, 76, 92 Tablet, The, 21, 53, 70, 128 Times, The (London), 21, 36, 46, 49 Ulster Protestant, 76, 86, 111, 127, 147–8 Worker’s Weekly, 76, 96 Nicolson, Harold, 125, 132 Nolan, Sean, 156 Northern Ireland and Ulster, 6–7, 8–14, 21–5, 31, 35–6, 46, 49–9, 53, 55–6, 68, 71–3, 86–8, 93–5, 97, 107–8, 110–12, 118, 126–7, 129–30, 133–4, 137, 139, 145–8, 151, 155–7, 165–6, 168–70, 173, 175–6 Nye, Gerald, 147 O’Brien, Pat, 87, 111 O’Casey, Sean, 73 O’Connell, Card., William, 8 O’Connell, Congressman Joseph F., 27



O’Conner, Frank, 133 O’Connor, Cavin, 134 O’Dea, Jimmy, 55, 72, 94–5 Ó Drisceoil, Donal, 3, 21, 56, 59 O’Duffy, Gen. Eoin, 11, 24, 49 O’Faolain, Sean, 114, 133, 173 O’Hara, Bp Edwin V., 51 O’Higgens, T. F., 77 O’Kelly, Sean T., 11, 135 O’Kennedy, Desmond, 150 Office of War Information (OWI), 2, 28, 54, 67, 90, 105, 107, 112–13, 115, 128, 146, 148–51, 156, 171–3 Ogilvie, Sir Frederick, 95 Orange lodges, 7 Pakenham, Frank (Lord Longford), 12, 20 pamphlets American Program for the Defeat of Japan, 171 As Hitler Sowed, 133 Battle of Supply, 131 Crooked Cross, The, 98 Increasing in Friendship, 133 India at War, 133 Irish Question Today, The, 75 Let Irishmen Defend Ireland, 157 Let My People Go, 157 Nazi and Nazarene, 98 Orange Terror, 146 Spiritual Issues of the War, The (series), 70, 91 Talking Points, 1, 69, 154 True England, The, 24 Truman, 171 Underground War, 133, 154 United Nations, The, 114 Victory Bulletin, 171 What the British Empire Has Done, 133 Partition, 2, 7, 9, 11–13, 22–3, 26–8, 46, 48–9, 51, 53, 55, 68, 90, 94, 106–7, 109, 125, 127, 129, 132, 146–7, 165 Peake, Charles, 29 Pearl Harbor, 5, 99, 105, 115, 119 Petersen, Carl Heinz, 13, 24, 68, 97 Pfaus, Oskar, 9, 24 Pollok, Maj.-Gen. Val, 24 ports and treaty ports, 5–6, 11–12, 23, 46, 49–53, 55, 66–8, 85–6, 89–90, 97, 110, 126–7, 134, 146, 156, 170 Post, Julester Shady, 130 Powell, Michael, 70 Prevention of Violence Act, 23





Priestley, J. B., 55 propaganda and channels, 1–3, 5, 7–11, 13–15, 20–4, 26–29, 31–6, 46–8, 50–7, 66–78, 85–7, 89–98, 105–7, 109–18, 125, 127–36, 139, 146–52, 154–7, 165–9, 171–2, 174–7 Protestants, 7–8, 11, 21, 52–3, 91 public opinion, 1–2, 23, 34, 36, 127, 148, 153, 156, 170, 177 Pyle, Ernie, 108, 116

Stimson, Henry, 67 Stormont Parliament, 7 Strabolgi, Lord, 36 Stuart, Francis, 11, 130, 148, 175 Stuart, Iseult, 25 Stumpf, Reinhard, 11 Styles, Francis, 113, 130, 148, 166–7 Sudetenland, 7 Sullivan, James, 8 Sweeney, Susan, 111 Sweetman, William, 11, 91

Quigley, Martin, 28, 151–2, 176 Radcliffe, Cyril, 35 Radio Stefanie, 70 Redmond Howard, L. G., 68 Reith, Sir John, 25 Religions Division (MOI), 21, 49, 53, 69–70, 87, 91–2, 134 Rendall, R. A., 93 Robertson, Ben, 91 Roche, Stephen, 56 Rodgers, John, 1, 91 Roosevelt, Pres. Franklin D., 8–9, 46, 50, 58, 66, 78, 86, 88, 90, 98, 105, 110–13, 116, 158, 167, 170, 172 Ross, Sir Ronald, 6 Ross Williamson, Reginald Pole, 69, 153–5, 173–4 Rotha, Paul, 53 Russell, Charles Edward, 27 Russell, Sean, 9–11, 13, 25 Salmon, Christopher, 71, 93 Savory, Douglas L., MP, 110, 127, 145 Second World War, 1, 15, 54 Sherwood, Robert, 8, 90, 105, 112 Shaw, George Bernard, 36, 46, 165–6, 168 Shirer, William L., 134, 157 Sinn Fein, 9, 109 Smale, William A., 23, 49, 111, 113 Smith, E. Rawdon, 69, 95 Smyllie, Robert Maire, 11, 26, 37, 59, 77, 97, 138, 176 Spellman, Card. Francis J., 146 Stalin, Joseph, 90, 130, 138 Stephens, James, 31 Stettinius, Edward R., 167 Stewart, R. B., 158–9

Tallents, Sir Stephen, 14, 71–2 Tavistock, Lord, 24 Taylor, Henry, 127 Taylor, Philip M., 3 Terrell, Dan, 106, 149–50, 171 Thompson, Dorothy, 8 Thomsen, Henning, 68 Tinker, J. J., 50, 108 United States of America (USA), 1–3, 8–15, 22–4, 26–9, 47–8, 50, 67–8, 72–3, 77–8, 85, 92, 99, 104, 106–10, 113, 115, 128, 130–1, 146, 155, 166–8, 177 Walsh, J. J., 153 Walsh, Liam, 24 Walshe, Joseph, 6, 11, 24, 33, 36, 75, 109, 111, 157, 171 Wanger, Walter, 28 ‘War of Words’, 1–3, 5, 14–15, 25, 46, 49, 51, 59, 68, 78, 85, 88, 90, 98–9, 105, 110–12, 118–19, 125, 127, 139, 145, 165, 168, 171, 177–8 Warburg, James, 112 Watts, Richard, 106, 112–13, 115–16, 149 Weber-Drohl, Ernst, 25 Welles, Sumner, 28, 107 Wells, H. G., 36 White, William Allen, 51 Wilkes, Cobbett, 156 Williams, J. Grenfell, 71 Williams, Michael, 96 Willkie, Wendell, 2, 66–7, 88 Wolfe Tone, 71, 111, 131 Zec, Phil, 20