Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad 9781626370104

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Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad

Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad Rachel Vanderhill

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2013 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2013 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Vanderhill, Rachel. Promoting authoritarianism abroad / Rachel Vanderhill. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-58826-849-5 (alk. paper) 1. Authoritarianism—Cross-cultural studies. 2. Authoritarianism—Russia (Federation) 3. Authoritarianism—Venezuela. 4. Authoritarianism—Iran. I. Title. JC480.V36 2012 320.53—dc23 2012021784 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

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Acknowledgments

1 2 3

Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad: How, When, and Where

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Russia in Ukraine and Belarus: Geopolitical Ambitions

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Venezuela in Nicaragua and Peru: Chávez’s Varying Spheres of Influence

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Iran in Lebanon: Seeking Shiite Solidarity

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Concluding Thoughts

181 187 189 205 217

List of Acronyms Bibliography Index About the Book

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Acknowledgments

This book is the culmination of years of research and a long process

of intellectual development that has been assisted by the generosity of many people. I am grateful to Jeffrey Legro, Gerard Alexander, and John M. Owen for helping me develop the initial idea for the book. I am thankful for the encouragement I received from Amy Patterson, Grace Dyck, and Crystal Bruxvoort. At Wheaton College, I have a debt of gratitude to colleagues and staff who provided support for my work. I greatly appreciate the willingness of the “Friday afternoon research group”—Leah Anderson, Winnie Fung, Larycia Hawkins, and Sandra Joireman—to read multiple drafts of chapters and provide perceptive and helpful feedback. I am especially thankful for Sandra Joireman’s invaluable guidance throughout the entire writing and publication process. My gratitude also goes to Teresa Duncan for her editorial and logistical assistance, along with her personal support and encouragement. I thank Amy E. Black for her advice about the publication process and her willingness to answer questions along the way. I am very grateful to my student teaching assistants over the past three years—Justin Reppert, Joshua Walker, and Korey Dalton—who assisted with research on this project and cheerfully undertook multiple tedious tasks. I have been fortunate to work with many fine people at Lynne Rienner Publishers. I greatly appreciate Lynne Rienner’s faith in and commitment to this project from the early stages. Without her confidence in its value, this book may have never been published. I also wish

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to thank the three anonymous reviewers. Their insightful comments and suggestions greatly improved the book and helped me refine my argument. I am grateful to Laura Logan for patiently answering many questions throughout the process, Shena Redmond for guiding the book through publication, and Jason Cook for his skillful copyediting. My deepest debt of gratitude goes to my family for their support, unwavering faith in me, and complete confidence that this book project was a worthy endeavor. I especially thank my parents for their willingness to read several chapters; their editorial comments improved the clarity of my argument. In addition, many conversations with my father helped me to refine my thinking. I also thank my two sisters, Sarah and Laura, for their advice, encouragement, and love. —Rachel Vanderhill

1 Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad: How, When, and Where

Traveling through southern Lebanon after the 2006 conflict, one

would have seen billboards advertising Iran’s support for rebuilding schools, clinics, bridges, and roads damaged by Israeli bombs. There were brightly colored signs with the slogan “From the people of Iran to the people of Lebanon.”1 At first glance, this would look like generous humanitarian aid. However, upon further examination the story becomes much more complicated. Iran funneled the majority of its aid through the militant organization Hezbollah. Not only was Iran seeking to help a neighbor in need, but it also wanted to increase support for Hezbollah and thereby influence Lebanon’s domestic politics. Hezbollah, as a militant organization actively subverting the Lebanese state, is a serious challenge to Lebanese democracy. Iran’s support for Hezbollah increases the organization’s political influence in Lebanon and therefore facilitates the development of a more authoritarian regime. The story of Iranian support for Hezbollah is just one illustration of the promotion of authoritarianism that has occurred around the world in the past decade. Although recent events in Tunisia and Egypt have reinvigorated hopes for democracy in states where authoritarianism appeared durable, the resistance of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to democracy, the failure to establish democracy in 1

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Central Asia, and antidemocratic trends in Central America have raised concerns in recent years about a “democratic recession.”2 The long-term outcome of the revolutions in the Middle East is still unknown, but even if democracy is the result in some countries, those involved in the promotion of authoritarianism are likely not only to continue their efforts but also to intensify them due to the desire to insulate themselves and their neighbors from a “democratic threat.” Prior to the 2011 revolutions in the Middle East, foreign policy experts and analysts repeatedly expressed concerns about external support for authoritarian regimes. There were dire warnings about Hugo Chávez’s growing influence in Latin America. US secretary of state Hillary Clinton stated that the increasing influence of China and Iran in Latin America was “disturbing.”3 The rapid rise of Chinese involvement in Africa also caused unease. A report by Freedom House, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Asia argues that modern authoritarian states are more sophisticated than the totalitarian regimes of the Cold War and are working “diligently to spread their influence” through a variety of methods.4 Former Czech president and dissident Václav Havel warned that Russia is advancing a new type of authoritarianism at home and abroad with more sophisticated forms of control and influence than those of the Soviet Union.5 Even with the recent democratic developments, US and European officials still need to worry about their loss of influence in these regions and about the effects of external efforts to promote authoritarianism. Despite these concerns, we know little about authoritarianism and what determines its success or failure. Scholars and policymakers have focused on why Venezuela and other countries seek to support authoritarianism abroad and what the potential implications are for the United States and Europe. Therefore, there are many unanswered strategic and theoretical questions about the promotion of authoritarianism. For example, Chávez’s involvement in the 2006 Peruvian elections contributed to the victory of the candidate he did not want to win. In contrast, Iranian support for Hezbollah has helped it gain impressive political influence and power in Lebanon. Why has external support for authoritarianism assisted in the development of an authoritarian regime in some cases and not others? Is it due to unique circumstances, or are there generalizable causes of success and failure? What is the role of local conditions in explaining the effects of external support? How much are states actively “promot-

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ing” authoritarianism? How does promoting authoritarianism differ from promoting democracy? How does external support for authoritarianism interact with democracy promotion in recipient countries? Knowing more about the promotion of authoritarianism will also help policymakers design effective policy responses to these attempts to spread autocratic regimes. The existing literature on the international dimension of democratization has demonstrated that the role of international factors in democratization is complicated and rarely uni-causal. However, the interplay between domestic and international factors is even more complex when there is external support for both authoritarianism and democracy. All five of the cases discussed in this book highlight this complexity and interaction between external support for authoritarianism, democracy promotion, and local conditions (such as the balance of power between liberal and illiberal elites). Therefore, in this book I seek to do three interrelated things: (1) explain how states support authoritarianism abroad through changing elite strategies and capabilities; (2) illustrate how authoritarian promotion and democracy promotion interact to affect the regime outcome; (3) demonstrate that the effectiveness of external involvement, and the eventual regime outcome, depend not only on the nature and extent of outside support—either liberal or illiberal—but also on the interaction between these external factors and the conditions in the recipient state.

The International Dimension of Regime Change Much of the literature on the international dimension of democratization has focused on the role of EU conditionality and the accession process in postcommunist states. Through demonstrating how EU incentives affect elite calculations about the cost of compliance with external demands for reform, this research has proven that external actors can influence the process of regime change.6 The extensive empirical and theoretical work done on this issue has provided important insights into how states can promote democracy by providing incentives for elites to support democracy. My own work moves forward from these insights, adding to our understanding of the complex relationship between international influences and regime change, especially regarding external support for authoritarianism. In

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this book, I develop theoretical tools to explore how external actors affect domestic politics and regime change in target countries by developing specific mechanisms linking external assistance to changes in regime type.7 Another focus of the literature on the international dimension of democratization has been on the role of foreign aid. Data from the World Bank show a tenfold increase in expenditures on democracy promotion since the end of the Cold War.8 The focus in the policy realm on democracy assistance programs has resulted in increased scholarly attention. On the foreign policy side, scholars have studied why states provide foreign aid as part of programs to promote democracy. Many arguments draw on the democratic peace theory, leading to an assumption that promoting democracy will result in stable, friendly neighboring states.9 Others have critiqued US democracy assistance programs for their lack of flexibility, lack of attention to local conditions, and short duration.10 Thomas Carothers, a critic of US democracy assistance, does believe that democracy promotion programs can be influential when implemented well, but that such implementation is a rare occurrence.11 In contrast to the studies on EU conditionality, most studies of foreign aid have found that it had little effect on democratization.12 However, more recently, studies that examine only aid that is specifically focused on democratization have shown that democracy assistance programs can improve democratization.13 Steven Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell Seligson’s large quantitative study of the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID) democracy assistance programs found that targeted democratic assistance empowers prodemocracy actors in recipient countries and positively affects overall levels of democracy.14 Stephen Collins discusses different types of economic assistance that the United States has used to encourage democracy and argues that aid for election monitoring and civil society development has been the most effective.15 Although these studies tell us “very little about causality or the pathways of connections between external influence and domestic change processes,” they demonstrate that external actors can influence democratization.16 We can hypothesize that external actors are also able to influence the development of an authoritarian regime. A third category of literature about the international dimension of regime change developed out of the literature on the diffusion of policy decisions within states. Diffusion involves “the process by which

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an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system.”17 Scholars include many different processes under the general term “diffusion.”18 The geographic spread of ideas, policies, and institutions from one country to another (or within one state) can involve demonstration effects, diffusion through mimicry or imitation, or modular action. 19 Democratic diffusion is the concept that democratic ideas and norms spread across borders: the more democratic states there are in a region, the more likely it is that an authoritarian state in the region will become democratic. Multiple large-N studies have found strong support for the existence and influence of democratic diffusion.20 Primarily focusing on Russia’s relations with its neighbors, discussions and investigations of authoritarian diffusion have also begun.21 This book looks at cases beyond Russia in order to further explore the nature and role of authoritarian diffusion. Building on the existing research about the international dimension of democratization, this book addresses two underdeveloped areas of study. First, the literature has heavily focused on the role of democracy promotion, with limited examination of efforts to export authoritarianism. Only in the past few years have scholars even begun to consider how external factors can promote authoritarianism.22 Furthermore, what little has been studied about promoting authoritarianism comes primarily from a foreign policy perspective as opposed to a focus on regime outcomes.23 In other words, the existing literature is primarily about why Iran, Russia, or Venezuela would be encouraging the development of authoritarianism in their region, with less attention given to how this support actually influences regime type. Second, the nature of democracy promotion has been well documented elsewhere, but few have investigated how it relates to the promotion of authoritarianism and how these two external factors interact with local conditions to explain the regime outcome. Therefore, two important parts of the story, the interaction between democracy and authoritarian promotion, and their interaction with the recipient side, are understudied. Analysts often falsely conceive of states as passive recipients of efforts to promote authoritarianism, neglecting the role of the domestic political and economic situation. However, external efforts to change a regime, whether to promote democracy or authoritarianism, vary in their effectiveness due to circumstances beyond the control of the external actor. Understanding the recipient country’s domestic political and economic sit-

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uation is essential for explaining why external efforts to change the regime sometimes succeed and sometimes fail. I present a comprehensive theory that not only includes the policies of the external actor but also analyzes the economic and political circumstances of the recipient state.

Case Studies Theory needs evidence to support it, and in this book I examine a diverse set of empirical cases from three regions: Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. These cases include Russia’s involvement in Belarus and Ukraine, Venezuela’s engagement in Peru and Nicaragua, and Iran’s involvement in Lebanon. I chose these three external actors because they are currently the most active in supporting authoritarianism abroad. Although China has received a great deal of attention, especially its activities in Africa, there are no signs that China is actively seeking to influence regime type; rather, China’s international engagement has been economic in nature. Chinese support may help a nondemocratic government to avoid international pressure to democratize, but there is no conclusive evidence that the Chinese government seeks to develop authoritarian regimes. In general, the Chinese government has not tried to influence the internal politics of other countries, has not advocated for one political faction, and has not attempted to affect regime type. Instead, China has been seeking to secure access to economic resources, especially energy sources and minerals. China may be enabling authoritarianism, but it is not promoting authoritarianism. In contrast, as I will show in this book, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran are actively supporting the development of authoritarianism in other countries. Russia, Venezuela, and Iran are similar in that they are regional but not global powers, with significant interest in expanding their influence in their respective regions. All three states also desire to challenge what they see as the global dominance of the United States. They view the spread of democracy as tied to the spread of US influence because of a belief that more democratic states are more likely to support the United States. Furthermore, all three use their oil or natural gas wealth to fund the promotion of authoritarianism. Not coincidentally, the rise in the promotion of authoritarianism has corresponded with increases in the price of oil. Despite these

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similarities, these three countries are geographically, economically, and ideologically diverse. Venezuela has an anticapitalist agenda, but Russia has security, not ideological, goals. Iran also has ideological goals, but they are quite different from Venezuela’s, as they are rooted in religious, not economic, ideology. Each country also has a unique history with the recipient states. Russia once controlled the territory of Ukraine and Belarus. Iran strongly supported Shiite militant groups during Lebanon’s civil war. In contrast, until recently, Venezuela had no major exchanges with Peru or Nicaragua. These similarities and differences offer the opportunity to investigate how states support authoritarianism abroad. I chose the recipient countries based on several criteria. The countries had to have experienced external support for both authoritarianism as well as democracy. This was important, to ensure that cross-country differences did not distort comparisons between the two forms of external involvement. Second, in order to assess effectiveness, it was necessary to include cases where external efforts succeeded and others where it failed. It was especially important that they include the same external actor, so that I could eliminate differences between external actors as a cause of effectiveness. Third, given that the majority of research on the international dimension of democratization has been based on European cases, there was a need to include cases from other regions (Central America, South America, and the Middle East). Fourth, the diversity of cases also encourages the examination of the role of ideology compared to the influence of material incentives on elite calculations. These cases incorporate both situations where ideology was influential and situations where it was not a major factor. The examination of Russian, Venezuelan, and Iranian support of authoritarian regimes provides a comparative, cross-country approach and the opportunity to assess successful and failed attempts to promote authoritarian regimes.

Overview of the Argument Through considering Russia, Iran, and Venezuela’s efforts to influence the regime type in neighboring states, I examine how states promote authoritarianism and how this interacts with democracy promotion and local conditions to determine its effectiveness and regime outcomes. I divide the argument into two parts: the first looks specifi-

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cally at how states promote authoritarianism and the second examines effectiveness and explains regime outcomes. Using this two-part argument, I first describe how states cause regime change by affecting elite strategies and capabilities. States can alter the strategies of the political elite and increase the capabilities of different elite factions. States can offer positive incentives, such as trade agreements or cheap supplies of energy, to alter elites’ calculations about the costs and benefits of various strategies. States may also offer negative incentives, such as denial of important energy supplies, to change elite strategies. External actors can also provide additional financial resources that enable authoritarian leaders to purchase support and increase their repressive capacity. Second, I theorize that along with the nature of the external support for authoritarianism, democracy promotion efforts and local conditions determine the effectiveness of these mechanisms. The local conditions that are most influential are the balance of power among elites and the nature of the linkages between the recipient state and the external actor. If the country is relatively evenly divided between liberal and illiberal elites and there are multiple linkages between the recipient state and external actor (economic, historical, ideological), then promotion of authoritarianism is more likely to be effective. Throughout all the cases, it is important to remember that external actors and events do not work in isolation but instead interact with domestic actors and structures to bring about changes in the regime. As Wade Jacoby argues, “External influence is a multistranded process” that works in synergy with domestic factors.24 Two important points of clarification need to be made about what this book is, and is not, about. This book is about how states promote authoritarianism and about what determines the effectiveness of those efforts. It is not a book about the foreign policy goals and interests of Russia, Venezuela, and Iran. Therefore, the motives and interests of the external actor are not examined in great detail. However, it is important to note that the external actors generally, as do most states, have self-interested reasons for supporting a particular regime type in other states. Furthermore, the goal of their support for autocratic leaders in other states may not be just to affect regime outcomes; external actors may also have economic or geopolitical goals. In other words, their support for authoritarianism may involve multiple motives and interests. The primary goal of their support may not be to develop authoritarian regimes, but the outcome of their support

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is an increase in authoritarianism in the recipient country. In the case of the three external actors discussed in this book, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran, each state views the issue of regime type as connected to issues of global and regional alliances. If a neighboring state is democratic, then it is automatically seen as being supportive of the United States and within the US sphere of influence. For example, Russia fears that if Belarus or Ukraine were to become fully democratic, those countries would then join the EU and NATO, potentially resulting in the placement of US forces on its border. Given the sometimes contentious relations all three states have with the United States, the nature of the regime type in neighboring states can be seen as a matter of national security. Second, I am not claiming that external factors, whether the promotion of democracy or authoritarianism, are solely deterministic of regime type. Domestic conditions play an important role in explaining regime outcomes. I am also not attempting to develop a comprehensive explanation for the regime outcomes in Belarus, Ukraine, Peru, Nicaragua, and Lebanon. Instead, I examine how external involvement interacts with the domestic political and economic situation and when the interaction of these three factors will change the regime. Multiple internal factors, such as historical conflict among factions, explain why the countries have illiberal regimes. These reasons, outside of how they may affect the influence of external involvement, are not covered in this book. In other words, I am telling one part of a larger story. Last, when I write that an external actor is “promoting authoritarianism,” I mean that the actor is actively supporting illiberal elites, groups, or regimes through direct assistance. Furthermore, the external actor is not supporting any liberal elites or groups, and the assistance is targeted at specific factions. In general, international assistance is not given for the benefit of the country as a whole. Who Are Elites, and Why Focus on Them? Elites are the focus of this book because of their essential role in regime change. Transitions from authoritarianism to democracy are usually determined by the choices of elites.25 For example, economic elites are important for regime change because of their access to “extensive political resources” that enable them to “influence political outcomes in a wide range of areas.”26 In addition to financial

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resources, economic elites, usually from the same social background as the political leaders, have contacts and connections that give them access to government officials. Business leaders have incentives to engage in politics, as the policies of the government, such as taxation laws, trade policies, and assistance with foreign investment, have enormous consequences for them. Furthermore, Olsonian collective action theory argues that elites are able to mobilize successfully to advance their interests, whereas nonelites struggle to take collective action because they confront formidable barriers to mobilization given their large group size. During periods of transition, there is a high degree of uncertainty, providing greater opportunity and space for elite choice.27 Therefore, the decisionmaking of elites has a larger influence on the outcome than under more stable circumstances. However, despite the uncertainty of transitional periods, preexisting social relations, economic structures, and political institutions still, at least partially, shape actors’ interests, preferences, and capabilities.28 The interests and preferences of elites are contextually and structurally determined. Structural factors, such as a state’s level of economic dependency on other states, are confining conditions that restrict or enhance options available to elites. Political elites, as party leaders, politicians, and government officials, are heavily invested in a particular regime type and, with their access to government money and power, have the resources to affect regime change. If they currently hold office, political elites may be able to use repression to prevent a change of regime advocated by mass protest. Even in cases where mass protest has contributed to regime change, such as the protests in November 1989 in Czechoslovakia, the choices of political elites are important. In that case, the communist leaders chose not to use military force. If they had, events would have been much different.29 Therefore, political elites are in positions to influence regime change and have vested interests in the regime type. In addition to the importance of elites for regime change, research has shown that elites play an important role in determining the influence of international norms. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan argue that elite, not mass, receptivity to external norms is essential to the socialization process. In the socialization process, elites “buy into and internalize norms” articulated by the regional or global powers.30 Democratic or authoritarian ideas and norms may

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first take root among the masses, but they “must then spread to the elite level if they are to have important effect” on policy or regime change.31 Elites are important for both regime change and transmitting international factors into domestic changes. Illiberal Regimes Many states are neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian. The democratic transition literature implies that only democracy or authoritarianism is the equilibrium point where regimes will be stable. The existence today of numerous regimes that fall between these two points (such as Ukraine) challenges this assumption. Due to the lack of a common nomenclature, scholars have used terms such as “pariah regimes,” “hybrid regimes,” the “grey zone,” “electoral democracy,” “competitive authoritarianism,” “pseudodemocracy,” “electoral authoritarianism,” and “in-between” regimes.32 For clarity in the cases, I use the term “illiberal regime” to refer to countries located “in the middle.” An illiberal regime may have regular elections but lacks rule of law, separation of powers, and protection of some basic civil liberties, such as freedom of the press.33 Although these countries may not have the level of repression found in consolidated authoritarian regimes, such as North Korea, they are missing many components of a democracy. This definition builds on a liberal conception of democracy, which sees “transparency, civil liberty, rule of law, horizontal accountability (effective checks on rulers), and minority rights” as defining features of democracy along with regular, competitive, and free and fair elections.34 Regime Change Regime change has traditionally meant change from an authoritarian regime to a democracy or vice versa. However, this view is relatively unhelpful in understanding the shifts between the different “inbetween” regime types and democracy or authoritarianism in the twenty-first century. I redefine regime change to encompass not only shifts from authoritarianism to democracy, but also shifts from illiberal democracy to authoritarianism and vice versa. Change in the regime involves measurable changes in the nature of the political situation. A regime has become more authoritarian when multiple independent observers agree that one or more of the following has

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occurred: (1) elections no longer meet international standards for freedom and fairness; (2) there has been an erosion of press freedom characterized by government harassment of journalists, censorship laws, or restriction of private media broadcasting and ownership; (3) political and civil liberties of private citizens have been eroded, such as restrictions on right of assembly, criticism of the government, or formation of nongovernmental organizations. Measuring regime change requires measuring regime type. There is extensive scholarly criticism of all the major indices and measures of regime type.35 Therefore, in order to measure the level of democracy, illiberalism, and authoritarianism as well as regime change in each case, I use a combination of sources: Freedom House reports, Polity scores, reports of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), and reports from independent local journalists and academics. Freedom House reports and Polity scores provide comparative, standard, and annual assessments of democracy (or lack of democracy) in many countries throughout the world. Reports from INGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, and from local, independent journalists provide supplemental sources of information about the protection of civil liberties and minority rights within a country. I use the additional reports to check the accuracy of the Freedom House reports and Polity scores and to better assess the nuances of the political situation within a country. Although all of these measures have flaws, the combination of information from these four sources produces as reliable and accurate a measure of regime type and regime change as is currently obtainable.36

How States Promote or Encourage Authoritarianism A good starting point for analyzing how states promote illiberal regimes is the current literature on the promotion of democracy. The European Union’s efforts to promote democracy in postcommunist states showed that international pressure is influential when it is incentive-based.37 Incentive-based pressure uses conditionality, sanctions, or rewards to influence elite regime preferences, or at least elite behavior, and therefore promote economic and political reforms. Although elites in postcommunist states experienced the diffusion of democratic norms, “collective standards of proper behavior,” or a belief in the legitimacy of democracy, democracy promotion efforts

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were most successful when they combined democratic norms and incentives.38 Furthermore, democracy promotion involved efforts to change elite behaviors (e.g., end repression of civil and political liberties) and alter the relative balance of power between illiberal and liberal groups in a country (e.g., supporting the development of civil society). Building on the democracy promotion literature, I argue that there are two broad means by which external actors encourage authoritarianism: changing elite strategies and changing elite capabilities. Despite the important insights from the international dimension of democratization literature, external efforts to promote authoritarianism are not identical to those that promote democracy. Authoritarian states, not constrained by the norms of democracy at home or abroad, have greater freedom of action than democratic states. Democracy implies that the people have a right to choose their government. Therefore, when democratic states are promoting democracy, they cannot interfere to such an extent that they are removing the right of the local people to choose their government. 39 Authoritarian leaders face no such constraints, enabling them to directly fund allies in the recipient states. For example, Russia is willing to finance the political candidates and parties it supports in Ukraine, but the United States has generally been nonpartisan in its assistance to Central and Eastern Europe since 1989. However, there are important similarities to the promotion of democracy, which provide insight about the promotion of authoritarianism. Learning to Be Bad: Changing Elite Strategies External actors influence regime change through altering elite strategies or elite capabilities at the domestic level. Similar to much of the international relations and democratization literature, I assume that elites are rational actors. Assuming political elites are rational individuals who seek to maximize their own interests, they desire either to maintain power or, if out of office, to obtain power. Whatever their additional goals are, political elites generally need to have power to achieve them. Autocratic elites have a “menu” of options available to them for how to obtain or hold on to power.40 Other states can influence the decisionmaking process of elites and provide them either ideas or incentives to adopt particular strategies, such as how to manipulate an election. In the case of promoting democracy, we see set practices and common strategies across cases and regions. For

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example, Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik discuss the model of electoral revolutions—transforming elections in an authoritarian state into a genuinely competitive and fair process—which involves a standard set of practices used in multiple cases, such as the Philippines, Chile, Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia. 41 Surprisingly, we have also seen in the past decade the spread of common practices for how to establish a more authoritarian government. These are often cases of more “sophisticated” authoritarianism, where the state uses limited repression to maintain control and instead manipulate the political realm in subtle ways to prevent any challenges to its rule. For example, leaders in Russia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua have all gained control over the media through a combination of state ownership of major television networks and political ties with the owners of private media. Leaders can choose strategies from a “menu of manipulation” and, as this book will show, we see leaders choosing similar options across regions.42 This development suggests that there are cross-country influences on these choices. This mechanism builds on normative approaches focusing on the role of diffusion and incentive-based approaches, where an external actor may offer incentives or sanctions that will influence elite strategic choices about how to gain or maintain power.43 Although theoretically possible, there is no evidence of authoritarian external actors changing the regime preferences of elites in the recipient state from democracy to authoritarianism. In other words, despite international involvement, political elites’ regime preferences may remain the same (e.g., favoring authoritarianism), but their strategies for how to gain power change because of external influence. The lack of efforts to change regime preferences is one difference between promoting authoritarianism and promoting democracy. Through socialization and learning, democracy promotion activities by external actors can change not only strategies but also the regime preferences of elites. There are three mechanisms through which external actors influence elite strategies about how they obtain and hold on to power: demonstration effects, purposive and collaborative action by external “change agents,” and pressure. Demonstration effects. The first mechanism involves the diffusion of ideas, methods, and policy solutions across national borders. Diffusion generally does not refer to an outcome but “to a process by which policy choices are inherently interdependent—that is, a politi-

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cal entity’s choices are influenced by others, and these choices, in turn, influence others.”44 In the case of ideas about how to maintain or obtain power, diffusion involves elites learning from the successes and failures of other countries.45 Leaders exchange information about regime change, politics, and policy. “Political leaders are inclined to work as follows: they recognize a problem in their country, develop some basic theory about how to solve the problem, review the various solutions available, and attempt to ascertain the effectiveness of these solutions.”46 Elites will often know what actions leaders in other countries have adopted. In other words, elites will adopt policies, such as how to gain control over the media, because they have observed their successful adoption elsewhere. As Thomas Ambrosio discusses: Regimes which aim to strengthen their own power will seek out models which appear to meet their goals. The relative “effectiveness” of an autocratic path might be indicated by the ability of authoritarian governments to achieve economic growth [e.g., China] . . . or to insulate themselves from political pressures, as seen in the Kremlin’s multifaceted approach to undermining democratic trends at home and abroad.47

In addition, illiberal elites may decide not to adopt certain policies because of the negative consequences of these actions in other states. For example, they may decide not to allow international election observers into the country if they witness international election observers contributing to the overthrow of an autocratic regime elsewhere. For clarity and simplicity, I use the term “demonstration effects” to refer to this mechanism. A demonstration effect can have a normative component, where elites adopt strategies from abroad because they see the sources of these strategies as “legitimate and reputable,” and a strategic component, where elites adopt strategies because they are seen as effective solutions to their problems.48 This mechanism is informal and indirect. If this is the only mechanism observed, then the external actor is not “promoting” authoritarianism, because there is no deliberate action by the external actor. Purposive and collaborative action. The external actor may also take purposive and deliberate action to spread specific strategies and policies on how to obtain or maintain power. The spread of particular strategies for how to manipulate elections may involve not just

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the power of successful examples, but also the push of those that have already succeeded.49 These actions involve active collaboration with elites in the recipient state and are not coercive. People associated with the external actor act as “change agents,” who act intentionally to share the specific details on how change occurred elsewhere.50 These change agents or “innovators” are responsible for “peddling” ideas and strategies outside of their state. 51 Changing elite strategies this way requires external actors, who have already been successful in restricting democracy, to actively spread their ideas to other states. On the “demand side,” illiberal elites seek to emulate the success of those who have succeeded in establishing authoritarian regimes. Under the conditions of the promotion of democracy and the global norm of democracy, illiberal regimes have felt the need to develop allies to resist US and European efforts to promote democracy. Autocratic leaders seek to reproduce themselves elsewhere in order to consolidate their power at home and reduce external challenges to their rule.52 There is power in numbers; the more autocratic states there are in the region, the less likely there will be democratic diffusion. Research has shown that having more democratic neighbors “significantly decreases the likelihood that autocracies will endure”; leaders of authoritarian regimes who are aware of this conclusion will thus desire to prevent democratization in neighboring states.53 Recent strengthening of relations between Venezuela and Iran, and Venezuela and Russia, demonstrates the desire for “mutual empowerment” and the harnessing of numbers to protect strategic interests. In the diffusion of democracy, networks of local and regional political activists are important for the spreading of strategies about how to defeat illiberal leaders and for helping to develop the components of democracy, such as constitutions, judicial systems, and other institutions.54 Although the role of change agents and networks may be more visible in cases of democratic diffusion, there are also networks among authoritarian leaders through which they can actively and deliberately share ideas and policies about how to manipulate elections, prevent dissent, or eliminate term limits. External pressure. Through the third mechanism, the external actor will apply positive and negative incentives to encourage, or even force, elites to change strategies. Unlike the first mechanism, demonstration effects, this involves deliberate action on the part of the

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external actor, and unlike the second mechanism, purposive and collaborative action, there is an element of coercion involved. External pressure can alter the strategies of illiberal elites through changing the costs and benefits of the various options they have regarding the regime type. The clearest example of this mechanism would be the application of economic sanctions because of violations of human rights and democratic rule. In general, it is more common for external actors to use pressure (or even coercion) in case of democracy promotion (e.g., sanctions on South Africa during apartheid or on Libya in 2011). However, autocratic external actors can pressure leaders in recipient states to adopt particular policies, including policies that further restrict civil and political liberties. For example, when Bahrain experienced large-scale protests in support of democracy in 2011, Saudi Arabia pressured the Bahraini government not to give in to the demands of the protestors.55 External nondemocratic pressure to change strategies involves a combination of negative incentives or coercion and specific ideas about what policies the recipient state needs to change or adopt. External actors can also provide incentives to encourage cooperation among elites to support the development of an illiberal regime. Extensive political-party fragmentation and polarization weaken political movements, whether they are prodemocratic or illiberal.56 Nondemocratic external actors can provide elites with incentives to resolve divisions and offer a “focal point for cooperation.”57 Preventing divisions among antidemocratic groups reduces the probability of liberalization and helps antidemocratic elites to maintain or obtain office. In other words, external actors may shape the list of options available to elites and change the perceived costs and benefits of particular choices. Gaining the Ability to Be Bad: Changing Elite Capabilities External actors can also increase the capabilities or enhance the resources of different groups of elites. States may offer aid, cheap oil, or trade agreements to nondemocratic elites, enabling them to buy off the opposition and finance repression. Through altering the capabilities of particular elites, external assistance helps them to hold state power and may shift the relative balance of power among elites.58 Elites may also use external assistance to strengthen the “political and economic position of supportive domestic groups and

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weaken that of opponents.”59 Through changing the power of specific groups, external actors can undermine existing democratic regimes and assist groups seeking to establish illiberal regimes.60 For example, during the Cold War the Soviet Union provided weapons, money, and training to communist groups in Africa and Asia to assist them in establishing communist regimes. Efforts to enhance the capabilities of illiberal groups may occur through four different mechanisms: the provision of technical and financial assistance for political parties, assistance for civil society, overall economic assistance, and assistance for repression. Assistance for political parties. The first mechanism involves external actors directly providing technical and financial assistance to illiberal political parties and thereby increasing their ability to run political campaigns, mobilize supporters, and win elections. This is most likely to occur when the recipient state is an illiberal or hybrid regime that still has relatively competitive multiparty elections. Under these circumstances, illiberal political parties cannot resort to repression to guarantee their victory. Therefore, they have to resort to more indirect methods, such as monopolizing the media or bribing election officials to commit fraud. All of these activities require resources. External actors can provide nondemocratic elites the resources to run a campaign and to pay for electoral fraud. In Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election, Russia’s financial support for Victor Yanukovych (tens of millions of dollars) helped him bribe thousands of election officials, contributing to electoral fraud.61 In addition, external actors can “train” domestic allies to effectively manipulate election results. Among other methods, this training may include strategies for how to corrupt absentee voting, vote counting, and voter registration. The promotion of democracy may counterbalance this support by providing assistance for democratic parties. International assistance helps parties mount effective campaigns by recommending fundraising strategies, candidate selection methods, and ideas for party platform development.62 Recent research on the influence of international assistance for political parties finds that its effectiveness in promoting democracy is limited and depends significantly on the “institutional environment in a given country.” 63 The EU accession process and transnational relationships between Western European political parties has had some influence on the development of polit-

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ical parties and democracy in postcommunist states; however, the effectiveness of this mechanism in other regions is questionable. Along with offering financial and technical assistance, autocratic external actors can also provide political support for nondemocratic parties. Publicly stating that a fraudulent election was free and fair can confuse the situation internally and weaken international condemnation. International public recognition of an autocratic leader as the winner of an election can grant that leader some legitimacy, even in the case of a stolen election. Furthermore, if the autocratic state has strong linkages with the recipient state, its support for the nondemocratic leader may enhance his or her prestige and increase their domestic public support.64 Powerful external allies can also help prevent votes against autocratic leaders in international organizations, such as the United Nations Security Council.65 Assistance for civil society. Financial and technical assistance to civil society is another way to increase capabilities. Many people see civil society activity as promoting democracy. However, there are also nondemocratic “civil society” organizations (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan). Nondemocratic pressure can encourage the growth of nondemocratic civil society and thereby promote authoritarianism. States provide financial assistance and training to terrorist organizations, radical groups, and others to promote a particular ideology, alter another state’s policies, or to change the regime. This support encourages radicalism, intolerance, insecurity, and distrust in target states, which may promote public support for nondemocratic regimes. Furthermore, as Sheri Berman has argued, the effect of civil society growth and development on regime type depends on the political context.66 When political institutions are weak, civil society can challenge the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state. The existence of internal sovereignty is an important precondition for democracy. The development of civil society organizations may support either democratic or authoritarian regimes. Assistance for economic stability. States can also increase the capabilities of nondemocratic political leaders by providing them with the resources they need to maintain the economic stability and patronage networks necessary for their survival. In some cases, international financial support enables an authoritarian regime to produce economic growth or at least maintain minimal living standards,

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which grants some legitimacy to the regime. Assuming that state authority depends on some internal support and voluntary submission, external assistance may help the leadership avoid a legitimation crisis. If severe, an economic crisis can cause political “disintegration” or a revolt against the government.67 Governments can survive severe economic crises (e.g., the North Korean dictatorship over the past decade). However, most leaders prefer to avoid the potentially destabilizing effects of economic turmoil, because economic hardship can lead to major public protests against the regime, as the recent events in Tunisia and Egypt so clearly demonstrate. If international assistance allows the regime to avoid economic problems, then there is less domestic pressure to liberalize. In addition, if nondemocratic elites resort to violence or repression to maintain power, this can cause democratic countries to impose economically costly sanctions and suspend economic assistance. For example, the 2009 coup in Honduras led to a six-month suspension of foreign aid, leading to a loss of $320 million in grants and loans.68 For the third poorest country in mainland Latin America, the loss of aid significantly hurt the economy and government finances. Economic aid from illiberal states can help to counter the costs of economic sanctions and assist in maintaining relative economic stability. Assistance for repression. Giving leaders the equipment and resources to suppress dissent is a fourth mechanism through which states may promote authoritarianism. International assistance, in the form of either weapons or money, can make it easier for leaders to develop an internal security apparatus and block democratic aspirations. The provision of weapons and other military equipment by international allies directly aids the suppression of democracy. However, nondemocratic leaders can also use financial assistance to buy more weapons and pay for more internal security forces. Maintaining an authoritarian regime often requires substantial police and military forces, the financial costs of which are less if a foreign patron provides assistance. When external actors provide military and economic resources, this allows the ruler “to detach his repressive state apparatus from its social base and to dispense with domestic reforms.”69 The existence of international financial assistance increases the domestic autonomy of the ruling elites, making them less dependent on domestic societal interests. In more extreme situations, the exter-

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nal actor may actually provide soldiers and equipment to enable the recipient state’s leadership to suppress protests in support of democracy. A recent example of this is Saudi Arabia, which sent a thousand soldiers to Bahrain to support the government’s repression of protests; similarly, Iran has reportedly provided equipment to Syria to be used against protestors there. These cases are unusual; in the post–Cold War era, authoritarian states generally do not resort to military actions to support authoritarian neighbors. * * * All four of these mechanisms strengthen the capabilities and resources of elite factions in the recipient country. The existence of more than one mechanism increases the probability of the external actor successfully shifting the balance of power in favor of its domestic allies. There are some similarities between the methods to promote authoritarianism and those used to promote democracy. Like the promotion of authoritarianism, democracy promotion also seeks to aid political parties (although not usually financially), civil society, and economic stability. However, there are two major differences. Democracy promotion efforts, at least as undertaken during the past two decades, do not provide aid for repression. Second, a significant way of increasing democratic elite capabilities is through election monitoring. Democratic external actors help increase political competition and improve the likelihood of fair elections by providing independent election monitoring. Although these actions are usually nonpartisan, by their nature they challenge an illiberal government’s monopoly on the control of information and assist prodemocratic elites in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling elites.70 Helping to ensure a fair electoral process increases the likelihood of democratic opposition groups gaining power. Although elections are only one part of democracy, evidence demonstrates that this form of aid has significantly increased the authenticity of elections in transitional states.71 Independent, international reports about electoral fraud can be a powerful tool against illiberal governments. Over the past few years, in response to the success of international election monitoring in illiberal democracies, we have seen authoritarian states borrowing ideas from democracy promotion by developing their own version of election monitoring. Russia has devised an alternative election-monitoring organization to counter the influence of democratic international election-monitoring orga-

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nizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Having competing reports from “independent” election observers can confuse the situation in the country and reduce the influence of international assistance in support of democracy. This development illustrates how authoritarian governments have borrowed from democracy promotion and how they worry about independent reports on elections.72

Explaining Effectiveness and Outcomes The preceding section outlined how states support the development of authoritarian regimes in other countries through changing elite strategies or increasing elite capabilities. However, these activities do not happen in isolation and do not alone determine the regime outcome. Whether or not external support for authoritarianism tips the balance in an illiberal regime toward authoritarianism depends not only on the extent and nature of the external support, but also on the influence of countervailing international support for democracy and the local conditions. In other words, the effectiveness of external support for authoritarianism is the result of the interaction of three major factors: the degree of external support for authoritarianism (discussed in the preceding section), the nature and degree of external support for democracy, and the local conditions. The combination of these three factors determines why external efforts to change the regime (either toward authoritarianism or democracy) succeed in some cases and fail in others. Furthermore, the interaction of these three variables determines the regime outcome in all five cases discussed in this book. Countervailing International Influences: The Promotion of Democracy External support for authoritarianism interacts with countervailing pressure to democratize. All of the cases in this book (and many other countries) have experienced external support for both authoritarianism and democracy. Democracy promotion efforts have involved attempts to change elite strategies, especially cooperation among democratic opposition parties, and increase the capabilities of, in this case, pro-

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democratic groups in recipient states. The existence of international pressure to democratize can reduce the effectiveness of external support for authoritarianism (and vice versa). For example, international aid to both democratic and autocratic factions may result in no real change to the balance of power among elites. In addition, external support for democracy provides people and leaders with alternatives to the policy solutions proposed by the autocratic state. In their analysis of the influence of authoritarian and democratic diffusion on Russian local government, Vladimir Gel’man and Tomila Lankina found that the regions of Russia with greater interactions with the EU were more likely to retain directly elected mayors, against the wishes of the Russian federal government, than the regions with few connections to the EU. “Western involvement and the availability of alternative models” made it harder for the Russian federal government to obtain more authoritarian local government structures.73 The two external factors interact with each other and when states are subject to international pressures from multiple sources the outcomes are less deterministic. Furthermore, through what is called “counter-promotion,” external actors may promote authoritarianism in response to democracy promotion efforts.74 Democracy promotion may trigger a reaction not only to entrench the authoritarian regime at home but also to strengthen neighboring regimes. In response to perceived threats to its survival, the Russian government has actively countered democratizing efforts in Central Asia and Eastern Europe.75 Therefore, in order to explain the degree of effectiveness of external support for authoritarianism and the regime outcome, it is necessary to examine the role of democracy promotion in each case. Interaction with Local Conditions International support for authoritarianism and for democracy both interact with the local conditions in the recipient country. There are multiple structural conditions (such as level of economic development) that explain why each country is an illiberal regime as opposed to a consolidated democracy or autocracy. However, a full discussion of the structural and elite-level reasons for the development of an illiberal regime is outside the scope of this book. I focus here on how international factors interact with the existing structural conditions to bring about regime change and how local conditions may prevent

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external actors from altering the regime. Previous research has shown that impact of external promotion is dependent on the local conditions, especially on “domestic receptivity.”76 Receptivity influences the success of deliberate efforts to change elite strategies and of international assistance. Domestic elites must adopt the strategies, policies, or norms being promoted in order for the external actor to change the regime.77 Elites generally accept new strategies and resources from external actors because they perceive them as being in their interest. There are two general factors that influence receptivity and therefore the effectiveness of external support: the balance of power among elites and the linkages with the external actor. Balance of power among elites. An important component of explaining the effectiveness of authoritarian promotion is elite receptivity to external involvement. Accepting external support can be costly for elites in illiberal regimes, where success still somewhat depends on public support and there is some free media. Citizens of countries can react very negatively to external “interference” in their sovereign affairs. As studies about economic sanctions demonstrate, external pressure can produce domestic feelings of resentment about foreign interference and thereby produce negative backlash against anyone seen as connected to foreign governments.78 Furthermore, international assistance usually comes with conditions attached, which may be unpopular or costly for elites. In exchange for economic aid, Russia has demanded control over Belarus’s natural gas transit company and pipelines. Accepting outside assistance can have clear costs for elites. External support for autocratic elites during elections may also have the unintended effect of strengthening the democratic candidates by shifting the debate away from domestic issues and toward the role of external involvement in an election. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, one reason why Ollanta Humala lost the 2006 Peruvian presidential election was because of his association with Hugo Chávez. Therefore, there are costs and benefits to accepting external assistance. Elites are more likely to accept outside support under circumstances where the benefits of external support outweigh any potential costs. One such circumstance is where there is a relatively equal distribution of power between liberal and illiberal elites. When this occurs, then elite conflict over the regime type can be severe. Under these circumstances there is no agreement about regime type (democ-

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racy or authoritarianism is not the only game in town) and there are real possibilities that the country could move in either direction. Therefore, elites are fighting over the regime type and potentially their very survival. When elites perceive themselves to be threatened, “external factors are more likely to have more influence.”79 In circumstances of intense inter-elite conflict, at least one elite faction, if not more, may believe that the incentives or sanctions from the external actor will help tip the balance of power in their favor. External actors will be most likely to alter the relative power balance between these two groups, or facilitate new alliances, through changing elite strategies and capabilities when at least one faction believes that it can use the external actor to further its own interests. Two different types of literature have noted the importance of external allies for political elites. International socialization approaches argue that political elites will use international norms to further their own interests in policy debates.80 Research from the area of diplomacy and international bargaining observes that leaders may use international bargains to strengthen “the political and economic position of supportive domestic groups and weaken that of opponents,” with the “ultimate aim of permanently changing domestic structures.”81 Therefore, some elite factions may calculate that international criticism, incentives, or sanctions help them shift the balance of power in their favor. The more elites who view external actors as potential allies, the more likely it is that the external pressure will be effective in changing the regime. If either the liberal or the illiberal elites hold the majority of the power, then whoever holds power is more confident in their position and less in need of external resources. Facing few immediate threats to their rule or control over the state, they are less likely to seek or accept international involvement in domestic policy. If they still accept international assistance, it is less likely that this assistance can shift the balance of power, because the asymmetrical distribution of power makes this more difficult. Where there are consolidated authoritarian regimes, such as in Saudi Arabia, the supporters of democracy are so weak relative to the autocratic forces that the normal strategies of democracy promotion are unable to shift the balance of power enough to have any real effect. Linkages between the recipient state and the external actor. The relationship between the recipient state and the external actor

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will affect how receptive elites are to external involvement. In terms of demonstration effects, elites are most likely to be aware of developments in states that are regionally proximate or with which they have close cultural, ideological, or historical ties. Elites are more likely to look to states they perceive as similar. The networks connecting states—trade, culture, ideology—provide important conduits for information and aid. There are few formal international organizations designed to facilitate linkages among authoritarian states (the Shanghai Cooperation Organization being a rare exception); therefore, most of the networks are informal. In addition to linkages encouraging the spread of strategies, if the two states have a close and positive relationship, there are fewer costs for accepting financial or economic assistance from abroad. Research on the diffusion of democracy has found that proximity influences the likelihood of democratic ideas being adopted.82 The recent uprisings in the Middle East, where protests spread from Tunisia to Egypt to Libya, highlight the role of geographic proximity. The more democratic countries that are present in a state’s neighborhood, the more likely that state is to transition to democracy. However, proximity alone is not the only determinant of the relationship between the recipient state and external actor. Physical location does matter, but not on its own.83 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have argued that the greater the linkage to the West the recipient state has, the more likely the state is to democratize.84 The three dimensions of linkage relevant for the promotion of authoritarianism are ideological agreement, common cultural and historical backgrounds, and the nature of the economic relationship. First, political ideological agreement between the external actor and illiberal elites increases the likelihood that elites will respond favorably to outside involvement. In this book, I define a political ideology as a system of collectively held ideas, beliefs, and values about the fundamental goals of politics. It is a source of legitimacy for a particular group’s right to authority, and its principles express the institutional, economic, or social goals of the group. This incorporates the main elements of most definitions.85 It is important to note that political ideologies can be viewed as transnational. In other words, elites in different states can have similar ideologies. The literature on alliance formation between states provides some guidance for how ideological agreement or disagreement may affect elite receptivity to external pressure for regime change. Research on

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alliance formation has found that ideological similarities between state leaders increase the incentives for allying together. “The greater the ideological similarities among states’ leaders, the more likely they are to see one another as supports to both their domestic interests and the security of their state.”86 The success of ideological allies in other states strengthens politicians at home. Therefore, elites are more likely to care about the political success or failure of ideological allies in other states and be more willing to work with them to gain or maintain power. Furthermore, elites with similar ideological positions are more likely to see each other as members of the same group, even if they are from different countries, especially because political ideology is transnational.87 As social identity theory has found, people see the members of their group as more trustworthy and members of the outgroup as untrustworthy and threatening. If the external actor and recipient elites have similar political ideologies, they are more likely to see commonalities with the external actor and to perceive that actor’s involvement positively. Elites view incentives offered by an ideological ally more favorably and as having greater benefits than those from other states. Political ideological agreement may also cause elites to seek out external actors as natural allies. The ideological agreement between Daniel Ortega and Hugo Chávez makes Ortega more likely to accept Chávez’s assistance and use it to strengthen his internal political position. Ideological disagreements or tensions between the external actor and elites can reduce the probability of success in promoting authoritarianism or democracy. If the ideological disagreement is strong, it may even cause elites to reject economic assistance. The greater the ideological disagreement, the more likely elites are to be suspicious of the external actor’s objectives and involvement. This may be especially true if there is a history of ideological conflict. The cases from Latin America illustrate how the previous involvement of the United States in the region along ideological lines limited the effectiveness of its efforts to promote democracy. In the 2006 Nicaraguan elections, US condemnation of Ortega and threats to reduce aid if he won the election may have damaged efforts to encourage democracy. Ideological disagreement can significantly limit the potential positive effect of valuable economic incentives. Second, shared cultural similarities or historical experiences facilitate interconnectedness between a recipient state and an exter-

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nal actor and enable leaders to make analogies across cases.88 Leaders are more likely to see their situation or problem as similar to that of the external actor if they share a similar culture or historical experience with that actor.89 “Individuals who need to deal with a complex set of choices are inclined to regard the actions of other individuals with perceived common interests as a useful guide for their own behaviour.”90 This sense of familiarity can make elites more willing to accept outside input on what strategies to adopt to establish a more authoritarian regime. In addition, if there are close cultural or historical ties between the two states, the costs of accepting aid from the external actor may be less, because if the mass public views the external actor as a close ally, then they are more willing to accept external involvement. However, the historical relationship between the external actor and the recipient state can also reduce the effectiveness of its support. If there has been a long history of interference in the internal affairs of the state by the external actor, then citizens of the recipient state may react very negatively to any real or perceived interference in its politics. The long involvement of the United States in Central America can lead to backlash against any US actions to promote democracy in the countries there, especially if those efforts are seen as trying to directly influence the outcome of elections. Third, the nature of the economic rewards and sanctions offered by the external actor and the degree of economic dependency of the state on the external actor defines the economic relationship between the two states. The economic value of the incentives (positive or negative) offered by the external actor affects elite receptivity to external pressure.91 Clearly, if elites believe that an incentive is economically valuable, they are more likely to accede to international demands for regime change. For example, if the external actor offers a positive incentive, such as membership in the EU, elites determine the value of this incentive by considering the benefits of membership (e.g., amount of structural adjustment funds and influence over decisionmaking), the opportunity costs of not gaining membership, and the nature of their current and future economic relationship with the EU. In other words, how important is trade and investment with the EU to the economic growth and development of their country and therefore to their prospects for staying in power? Generally, the more the country is dependent on the external actor, the greater the value of the incentives. Research on economic sanctions and interdependence

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demonstrates that close economic ties and trade dependency increase the probability of external actors having political influence.92 Economic dependency relies not only on the amount of trade and investment between the two states, but also on how easy it is for the target state to find other trading and investment opportunities or to ameliorate the effect of sanctions.93 Economic dependency does not imply a “total transfer of authority over economic policy” to another state or entity, but instead refers to situations where the majority of a country’s trade and investment come from a single state or regional organization.94 A state with multiple trade and investment partners is likely to have greater economic and political autonomy. However, if a country is highly economically dependent on one specific external actor, then elites will give greater value to incentives presented by that external actor.95 In addition, if it is difficult or impossible to find alternatives to the goods provided by the external actor, then the target state may be especially vulnerable to external pressure.96 Belarus and Ukraine are vulnerable to pressure from Russia because of their dependency on Russian natural gas, which is an essential material not easily replaced. In situations of economic dependency and vulnerability, elites may still decide to defy the wishes of the external actor, but there will be political and economic costs. In addition, it is harder for external actors to encourage elites to change the regime when elites in the recipient state have extensive domestic economic resources. When a country has substantial resources, the country is less vulnerable to the external actor and elites have more policy options available. The elites of relatively small, poor states do not have significant internal economic resources and are dependent on regional powers, international organizations, or the United States for economic investment and trade. As Peter Katzenstein argued, small states are more dependent on a wide range of imports than larger countries, because they do not have the economies of scale necessary for all the industries required for a functioning domestic economy.97 In addition, because they have small domestic markets, these states have to export products in order to achieve economies of scale. Therefore, the small countries, “because of their small size, are very dependent on world markets.”98 Although Katzenstein was writing about Western European states, his conclusions about the higher level of dependency of small states on the global economy describe the international economic position of other states throughout the world. All of the recipient cases discussed

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in this book are, on a global economic scale, small states (Belarus, Ukraine, Nicaragua, Peru, and Lebanon). They are all dependent on international trade and investment for economic growth. External pressure is more likely to be effective when states can offer incentives that are economically valuable to elites in the target state. The value of incentives depends on the nature of the incentive and the economic relationship between the external actor and the target state. Therefore, if the country is severely economically dependent on a state, then the elites will give greater value to the incentive offered by that state. On the other hand, if the country is only weakly dependent on the state, then elites will place less value on the incentive and be less willing to comply.

Measurement of Variables Balance of Power Among Elites I use political parties as a proxy for elite factions in each country. The electoral strength and degree of public support for each political party provides an approximate measure of the division of power among elites. In addition, in situations without free elections, the level of suppression directed at the prodemocratic parties and organizations offers insight into the relative power of autocratic elites and democratic opposition. If the degree of suppression is high, such as in Belarus today, then the autocratic elites have a predominant amount of coercive power and there is an imbalance of power. The combination of these three factors enables a general measurement of the relative distribution of power among prodemocratic and autocratic elites. Linkages Between the Recipient State and the External Actor Ideological agreement. I assess ideological agreement by examining two different measures. One is the ideological rhetoric and actions of both the external actor and the receptive elites in the target state. If both the leadership of the external actor and the elites make similar ideological statements, such as condemning capitalism and globalization, and advocate similar actions, such as nationalizing

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major industries, then there is a high probability of ideological agreement. The second measure uses public opinion surveys to examine widespread perceptions about the external actor. Although not an exact measure for ideology, greater positive public opinion about the external actor may reflect ideological support. For example, positive views in Nicaragua about Venezuela and Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez would represent some public support for Chávez’s more socialist political ideology. The combination of these two measures provides a good idea of the ideological position of each side and their potential agreement or disagreement. Common cultural and historical backgrounds. In order to determine the degree of cultural linkage, I examine the historical relationship between the recipient state and the external actor. Have they had similar historical experiences, such as communism? Were there any previous military actions taken by the external actor against the recipient state? Do they speak a similar language? Do they share a common religion? In addition, I assess the public comments in each state about the external actor. Do leaders reference a long and positive relationship in their comments? Are they highly critical or positive about the external actor? What do regional experts say about similarities between the two? Through considering these questions I am able to develop a proxy measure of the cultural or historical connections between the recipient and the external actor. The economic relationship. The economic relationship between the two states is a function of both the nature of the rewards and sanctions offered and the degree of economic dependency of the state on the external actor. The rewards offered can include promises of increased trade, aid, or investment. Sanctions can consist of threats to restrict trade, reduce or deny aid, decrease investment, prevent financial transfers, ban travel of elites, and the like. I use public statements about promises (or threats) of increases or decreases in aid, investment, and trade by the state, the amount of financial assistance given by the state, and the existence of sanctions to evaluate the nature of the incentives being offered. The degree of economic dependency is a function of the size and strength of the internal market of the recipient state, its reliance on trade for growth in gross domestic product (GDP), and the availability of domestic financing—in other words, whether or not the coun-

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try is capital-poor. Economic dependency is a continuous, not dichotomous, variable. In the globalized economy, almost every state is on some level dependent on elements of the international economy. However, the degree of dependency varies from state to state. The greater the volume of exports and the greater the percentage of the recipient state’s GDP that derives from exports to one specific external actor, the greater the dependency of the state on that external actor. Despite widespread use of trade data as a proxy for dependency, there are limitations to this measure. The two main critiques of using trade data for economic dependency are that it fails to compare the “value of the incentive with the alternatives available” and fails to determine the “ability of the target state to compensate for the effects” of disruptions in trade.99 In order to address these problems, I incorporate into my measure of economic dependency the probability of alternative sources of trade and investment and the resources available to elites to compensate for sanctions or the loss of positive benefits. If the majority of a state’s GDP comes from trade with one state, if there are few alternative sources of trade and investment, and if elites have few resources available to ameliorate the effects of incentives, then the state is very economically dependent on that external actor. I use economic measures such as trade data, GDP, and the amount of foreign direct investment, along with economists’ assessments of the economic situation of the country, to determine its degree of economic dependency.

Structure of the Book The next three chapters lay out and test my argument about how states promote authoritarianism. Chapter 2 compares and contrasts the cases of Ukraine and Belarus, two countries where Russia has attempted to establish authoritarian regimes. Without Russia’s continued support for authoritarianism in Ukraine and Belarus, each country would have a more democratic and free regime today. Russia has been especially successful in obtaining the regime type it desires in Belarus, but has been less effective in Ukraine, especially during the 2004 presidential election. The domestic conditions played an important role in determining the degree of effectiveness of Russia’s involvement. Russia’s initial failure in Ukraine to obtain a nondemocratic, pro-Russia president was because of the strength of the democratic opposition and the influence of counter-

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vailing international democratic pressure. Although there are many similarities between these two countries, they responded differently to Russian pressure, which highlights the importance of the domestic situation for explaining the regime outcome. For Ukraine, the chapter focuses on the 2004 presidential election, or the Orange Revolution, which provides clear examples of Russia’s failed attempt to promote authoritarianism in Ukraine. For Belarus, the chapter covers the postindependence period and documents how Russia’s support was essential for President Alexander Lukashenko to develop an authoritarian regime. In Chapter 3, I further test the theory by examining the influence of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez in Latin America. Since becoming president in 1999, Chávez has sought to challenge US influence in Latin America and promote “twenty-first-century socialism,” or Bolivarism, throughout the region. Chávez’s support has, at minimum, aided the continuation of illiberal regimes, and in some cases, such as Nicaragua, helped the development of more autocratic governments. However, Chávez’s efforts to encourage ideologically similar regimes have not always succeeded, the most obvious case being the 2006 Peruvian presidential election. This chapter investigates how Chávez has supported authoritarianism in the region through providing a model of how to suppress democracy and offering financial aid to allies. I use Nicaragua as a case because of Chávez’s strong support for its illiberal leader, Daniel Ortega, and because of the clear erosion of democracy since Ortega’s election in 2006. I also examine the important role domestic factors play in explaining why Chávez’s efforts failed in Peru. In Chapter 4, I study Iran’s support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, which provides an example of a different form of international promotion of authoritarianism, one based on a religious political ideology. Despite this difference, Iran’s support for Hezbollah has similar effects, changing both elite strategies and capabilities in Lebanon. Iran’s support for Hezbollah has involved the transfer of billions of dollars of resources, significantly helping Hezbollah increase its political influence in Lebanon. The religious linkages between Hezbollah and Iran help to facilitate Iran’s involvement in Lebanon, even when Iran has forced Hezbollah to adopt detrimental policies. Despite its growing strength, Hezbollah has been unable to seize complete control in Lebanon because of the countervailing international support for democracy, the diversity of international linkages, and the high degree of elite divisions within the country.

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Chapter 5 offers an opportunity to review the argument and conduct further cross-regional comparisons. In this chapter I explore the empirical and theoretical implications of these cases, evaluate the mechanisms of promoting authoritarianism, and identify avenues for further research. I also discuss some of the differences between promoting authoritarianism and promoting democracy. The book concludes by considering some implications of these attempts to encourage authoritarianism for US and European democracy promotion efforts. While foreign policy in the West has been focused on democratization, other states in the world have been seeking to promote a more limited political arena. It is important to understand the methods and effectiveness of their actions if we are to better comprehend the forces shaping political outcomes abroad.

Notes 1. Logan, “Iran Rebuilds Lebanon to Boost Hizbollah.” 2. Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback,” p. 36. 3. “The Dragon in the Backyard,” p. 19. 4. Walker, Undermining Democracy, p. 11. 5. Ibid., p. 1. 6. For examples, see Epstein and Sedelmeier, “Beyond Conditionality”; Kelley, “International Actors on the Domestic Scene”; Magen and Morlino, International Actors; Pridham, “Effects of European Union Conditionality”; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe”; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, “Costs, Commitment, and Compliance”; Vachudova, Europe Undivided. 7. Pace, Seeberg, and Cavatorta, “The EU’s Democratization Agenda in the Mediterranean,” p. 6. 8. World Bank, World Development Report 2004. 9. The extensive discussion surrounding the democratic peace theory both in the academic and policy spheres illustrates this assumption and some of its critiques. For example, President Bill Clinton stated in his 1994 State of the Union address, “Democracies don’t attack each other. . . . [U]ltimately the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere”; “Excerpts from President Clinton’s State of the Union Message.” For discussions of democratic peace theory, see, for example, Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace”; Maoz, “The Controversy over the Democratic Peace”; Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace.

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10. Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad; Burnell, Democracy Assistance. 11. Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad; Ottaway and Carothers, Funding Virtue. 12. See Carapico, “Foreign Aid for Promoting Democracy,” p. 56; Burnell, Democracy Assistance; Knack, “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?” 13. Scott and Steele, “Sponsoring Democracy.” 14. Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building,” pp. 410, 414. 15. Collins, “Can America Finance Freedom?” 16. Magen and Morlino, “Hybrid Regimes,” p. 12. 17. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, p. 10. 18. Doorenspleet and Mudde, “Upping the Odds,” p. 823. 19. Bunce and Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions,” p. 287; Gel’man and Lankina, “Authoritarian Versus Democratic Diffusions,” p. 45; Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena.” 20. See Gleditsch and Ward, “Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization”; Brinks and Coppedge, “Diffusion Is No Illusion”; Doorenspleet and Mudde, “Upping the Odds.” 21. Ambrosio, “Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion”; Gel’man and Lankina, “Authoritarian Versus Democratic Diffusions.” 22. Burnell, “Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?” 23. Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash; Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner, “Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy?” 24. Jacoby, The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO, p. 4. 25. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy,” p. 360; Linz and Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, 16; Alexander, The Sources of Democratic Consolidation; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, p. 5. 26. Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change, p. 5. 27. O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 5; Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” p. 6. 28. Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” p. 6. See also, among others, Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, pp. 5–6; Mahoney and Snyder, “Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime Change,” p. 5; Ruhl, “Unlikely Candidates for Democracy.” 29. There are various reports that the Czechoslovak military leaders were willing to repress the demonstration, but the Communist party leaders decided not to call out the military. 30. Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” p. 283. 31. Ibid., p. 284.

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32. Pridham, “Uneasy Democratizations”; Beichelt, “Autocracy and Democracy in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine,” p. 114; Way, “Kuchma’s Failed Authoritarianism,” p. 131; Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.” 33. Zakaria, “Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” pp. 22–24. “Illiberal democracy” is becoming a prevalent term to refer to “in-between” regimes. 34. Coppedge et al., “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy,” p. 253. 35. See ibid. for an overview of the debates. 36. Michael Coppedge and John Gerring’s proposal for a new approach to conceptualize and measure democracy that corrects for some of the common problems with the existing indices may in the future provide a better measure; see Coppedge et al., “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy.” However, currently there are few other options than using these four measures. 37. For example, see McDonagh, “Is Democracy Promotion Effective in Moldova?”; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, “Costs, Commitment, and Compliance.” 38. Klotz, Norms in International Relations, p. 17; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe,” p. 9. 39. There are occasions when external actors promoting democracy attempt to more directly influence electoral outcomes. However, these are not common in the post–Cold War era and when they do occur they often backfire and give more support to the illiberal candidate. 40. Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation.” 41. Bunce and Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions,” p. 289. See also Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries. 42. Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation.” 43. For example, see Vachudova, Europe Undivided; Pridham, “The Effects of European Union Conditionality”; Pridham, “Uneasy Democratizations”; Whitehead, “Three International Dimensions of Democratization”; Pevehouse, Democracy from Above; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe.” 44. Ambrosio, “Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion,” p. 378. 45. The majority of the literature on diffusion focuses on elites. However, recent work by Johan Elkink suggests that diffusion may also affect mass publics, influencing the popular opinion about the regime; Elkink, “The International Diffusion of Democracy.” 46. Doorenspleet and Mudde, “Upping the Odds,” p. 827. 47. Ambrosio, “Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion,” p. 382. 48. Gel’man and Lankina, “Authoritarian Versus Democratic Diffusions,” p. 45.

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49. Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena,” p. 266. 50. Gel’man and Lankina, “Authoritarian Versus Democratic Diffusions,” p. 58. 51. Bunce and Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions,” p. 287. 52. Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena,” p. 265. 53. Gleditsch and Ward, “Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization,” p. 925. 54. Bunce and Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions,” p. 293; Doorenspleet and Mudde, “Upping the Odds,” p. 826. 55. Tomlinson, “Saudi Troops Enter Bahrain to Help Regime Quell Revolt.” 56. Vachudova, Europe Undivided, p. 18. 57. Ibid., p. 178. 58. Snyder, “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships,” p. 384; Crawford and Klotz, How Sanctions Work, p. 32. 59. Evans, “Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics,” p. 416. 60. Gleditsch and Ward, “Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization,” p. 919. 61. Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. 62. Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link, p. 93. 63. Burnell and Gerrits, “Promoting Party Politics in Emerging Democracies,” p. 1071. See also the entire issue of Democratization 17, no. 6 (December 2010) for more discussion about the efficacy of international political-party assistance. 64. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 49. 65. Russia’s permanent seat on the UN Security Council is one reason why there has been no UN action taken against Belarus, despite major violations of human rights. 66. Berman, “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society.” 67. Crawford and Klotz, How Sanctions Work, p. 28. 68. “The Cost of a Coup,” p. 79. 69. Snyder, “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships,” p. 385. 70. Freyberg-Inan, “Which Way to Progress?” p. 156; Vachudova, Europe Undivided, p. 142. 71. Collins, “Can America Finance Freedom?” p. 380. 72. McFaul and Spector, “External Sources and Consequences of Russia’s ‘Sovereign Democracy,’” p. 128. 73. Gel’man and Lankina, “Authoritarian Versus Democratic Diffusions,” p. 6.

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74. Burnell, “Promoting Democracy Backwards.” 75. Jackson, “The Role of External Factors,” p. 102. 76. Bunce and Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions,” p. 301. 77. Jackson, “The Role of External Factors,” p. 102. 78. Crawford and Klotz, How Sanctions Work, p. 32; Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, p. 146. 79. Jackson, “The Role of External Factors,” p. 115. 80. Cortell and Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter?” 81. Evans, “Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics,” p. 416. 82. Gleditsch and Ward, “Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization”; Kopstein and Reilly, “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World.” 83. Ambrosio, “Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion,” p. 385. 84. See Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism. 85. For discussions about ideology, see Hamilton, “The Elements of the Concept of Ideology”; Eagleton, Ideology. 86. Haas, “Ideology and Alliances,” p. 42. 87. Ibid., pp. 47–48. Mark Haas argues that group identification goes beyond citizen/noncitizen and that “when leaders from different states recognize that they both share a commitment to the same ideological objectives and possess the same ideological enemies, they will tend to view one another as closer to their own political identities than are those decision makers who do not meet these conditions.” Ideological agreement can override citizen/noncitizen identification. 88. Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena,” p. 263. 89. Bunce and Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions,” p. 297. 90. Doorenspleet and Mudde, “Upping the Odds,” p. 828. 91. In extremely asymmetrical relationships, elites may be receptive to international pressure from the external actor without explicit incentives, threats, or sanctions. If elites are in positions of great dependency, they may take into account the demands or concerns of the external actor because they fear jeopardizing an essential economic relationship. 92. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence; Baldwin, Economic Statecraft. 93. Crumm, “The Value of Economic Incentives in International Politics,” pp. 314–315. 94. Lake, “Escape from the State of Nature,” p. 60. 95. Ibid., p. 67. 96. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed., chap. 1.

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97. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets, p. 81. 98. Ibid., p. 24. 99. Crumm, “The Value of Economic Incentives in International Politics,” pp. 314–315. See also Baldwin, Economic Statecraft; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence; Wagner, “Economic Interdependence, Bargaining, Power and Political Influence”; Bayard, Pelzman, and PerezLopez, “Stakes and Risks in Economic Sanctions.”

2 Russia in Ukraine and Belarus: Geopolitical Ambitions

The previous chapter outlined how states can promote authoritar-

ianism and what determines its effectiveness. This chapter begins the causal narrative of the book with the cases of Ukraine and Belarus. Russia has been actively supporting authoritarianism in both countries, enabling interesting comparisons. Russia is seeking to prevent the development of democratic regimes in its region because it believes that democratic neighbors will leave its sphere of influence and ally with the European Union and the United States. Russia sees that outcome as detrimental to its security and its regional interests. Russia may also have additional motives for supporting autocratic leaders in Ukraine and Belarus, such as wanting to prevent instability that may accompany regime change in Belarus or seeking favorable economic deals for Russian companies. However, even when given for other reasons, Russian support has enabled the development of authoritarianism in each country. Ukraine and Belarus both experienced promotion of authoritarianism as well as democracy, as the United States and the EU have tried to encourage the development of the latter in the region. These two forms of external influence interacted with domestic conditions to produce an illiberal regime in Ukraine and authoritarianism in Belarus. In this chapter I show how Russia aided illiberal Ukrainian and Belarusian elites in developing effective strategies to establish less democratic regimes. Furthermore, Russia deliberately provided economic aid to strengthen the position of the illiberal leaders. Without

41

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Russia’s continued support for authoritarianism in Ukraine and Belarus, each country would have a more democratic regime today. However, domestic conditions played an important role in determining the degree of effectiveness of Russia’s involvement. Russia’s initial failure in Ukraine to obtain a nondemocratic, pro-Russia president was because of the strength of the democratic opposition and the influence of countervailing international democratic pressure. Therefore, the external involvement is not solely determinant in explaining regime outcome, but it can change the domestic political and economic situation to facilitate the development of either a more authoritarian or a more democratic regime.

Ukraine In the case of Ukraine I focus on the events surrounding the 2004 presidential election, as this election and its aftermath played a pivotal role in Ukrainian regime development. Although Ukraine has struggled with political and economic reforms since gaining independence, in contrast to Belarus it did not become an authoritarian state. Freedom House ranked Ukraine as partly free before the election, with scores ranging from 3.75 to 5.75 on most measures of democracy (on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being the most authoritarian and least free).1 After the Orange Revolution, Ukraine, despite continuing problems, became more democratic. In the areas of electoral process, civil society, and independence of the media, Freedom House improved Ukraine’s rating from 2004 to 2009 and overall ranked Ukraine as free.2 In 2009, Polity IV ranked Ukraine as +7 (on a scale of –10 to +10, with –10 being a fully consolidated autocracy and +10 a fully consolidated democracy).3 Unlike the 2004 election, under Victor Yushchenko’s presidency independent election observers declared Ukrainian elections fair and free. Therefore, many see the Orange Revolution as an important step in the development of Ukrainian democracy. It was also an event that attracted both Russian and Western involvement and interest. Although the emphasis is on the events surrounding these elections, I also investigate recent developments in Ukraine’s relations with Russia, especially since the 2010 election of Victor Yanukovych as president. Russian involvement in Ukraine reached its peak during the 2004 presidential election. According to a November editorial in the

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Moscow Times, the degree of Russian interference in the Ukrainian presidential election was “unprecedented.”4 By many calculations Russia should have succeeded in ensuring the election of Yanukovych as president of Ukraine in 2004. Instead, despite significant pressure from Russia and manipulation of the election, reform candidate Victor Yushchenko became president. The victory of Yushchenko stunned Russia’s leadership and led to deliberate, concentrated efforts to prevent the spread of electoral revolutions to other states in the region. Russian pressure failed to obtain the intended outcome (victory of Yanukovych) in the 2004 presidential election because of the strength of the Ukrainian opposition and civil society. In addition, pressure from the United States and the EU amplified the costs of repressing democracy. The United States and the EU also increased the capacity and strength of the democratic opposition through assistance to Ukrainian civil society. Therefore, prodemocratic pressure, although not determinant in the Orange Revolution, did help to counterbalance Russian involvement. In order to differentiate the effects of domestic factors, Russian influence, and democratic pressure, it is important to focus on the specific methods by which promotion of authoritarianism and democracy changed elite strategies and capabilities. As the discussion below will show, Russian involvement in the Ukrainian elections was more direct than European or US engagement, especially Russia’s financial assistance and public support for Yanukovych. Interestingly, the 2010 presidential election in Ukraine resulted in Russia’s favored candidate, Yanukovych, winning, but through free and fair elections. Russia’s involvement in the 2010 election was minimal compared to its extensive engagement in the 2004 election.

The 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Election The main actors involved in the 2004 presidential election were the incumbent president, Leonid Kuchma, who was not running; his chosen successor, Victor Yanukovych; and the opposition’s main candidate, Victor Yushchenko. Yushchenko, a former prime minister, had also presided over Ukraine’s first postcommunist economic recovery, giving him a degree of popularity. The main opposition parties, Our Ukraine, the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc, the Socialist Party of Ukraine

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united together behind Yushchenko in the later stages of the campaign and in the aftermath of the fraudulent election of 2004. Yanukovych, prime minister at that time, was closely associated with Kuchma and his undemocratic practices. In the years prior to the 2004 election, interelite conflict between propresidential (Kuchma) elites and antipresidential elites defined Ukrainian politics. Kuchma and his allies had used a combination of control over the media, coercion, and patronage to manipulate successfully the 1999 and 2002 elections. They hoped to repeat the practice in 2004, viewing the election as essential for retaining their positions of wealth and power. Ukrainian political observers and analysts argued that the 2004 presidential election was at that time “the most contentious, divisive, and dishonest . . . in the history of independent Ukraine.”5 During the 2004 presidential campaign, opposition politicians and their supporters experienced “intimidation and limited acts of violence.”6 Government security forces harassed, arrested, and beat members of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including the prodemocracy student organization Pora. Among other incidents, on October 23, 2004, pro-Yanukovych forces staged attacks on the headquarters of the Ukrainian Central Election Commission, using staterun television to blame Yushchenko’s supporters.7 Later that same day, about hundred armed thugs (some apparently members of the police) attacked some of Yushchenko’s followers, severely injuring several. The most serious acts of violence were the attempts on Yushchenko’s life, including efforts to kill him in a car crash and poison him with dioxin.8 In the latter case, it is believed that on September 5, at a secret meeting with the Ukrainian Security Service, someone added the poison to Yushchenko’s food. The dioxin almost killed Yushchenko and left him severely disfigured. Although we do not know who specifically ordered the poisoning, Kuchma and Yanukovych’s allies were most likely behind the attempt on his life. Along with the use of violence, Yanukovych’s supporters manipulated the election, resorting to outright fraud when media control and patronage failed to guarantee a Yanukovych victory. The US National Democratic Institute’s (NDI) report on the elections stated that there were “fundamental flaws in Ukraine’s presidential election process” due to blatant fraud, a suspiciously high rate of voting by mobile ballot boxes (allowing for ballot stuffing), and the “disenfranchisement of significant numbers of voters due to their names being omitted from the voter lists.”9 Along with these abuses, a secret

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Yanukovych team bribed election officials to gain access to the Central Election Commission’s database and alter the results electronically.10 On election night, they used their control over the commission to add a million votes after the polls closed, half of which went to Yanukovych’s home region, increasing turnout from 83.7 percent to 96.6 percent.11 Nearly all of these added “votes” went to Yanukovych. Prior to the voting on November 21, Yushchenko consistently polled higher than Yanukovych (in June 2004, 35.5 percent versus 24 percent).12 On election day, nonpartisan exit polling gave Yushchenko 52 percent of the vote compared to Yanukovych’s 43 percent, a clear victory.13 However, the Central Election Commission announced that Yanukovych won the election by 2.5 percent.14 This blatant electoral fraud, combined with efforts of the opposition parties and civil society, led to major protests in Kyiv’s Independence Square. The protestors called for a new, fair, and free presidential election to be held. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians protested against the election results for days, with thousands camping out in the square overnight. The days of protests and intense international pressure cumulated in a negotiated compromise between Yushchenko and Kuchma. The compromise included a new election, which Yushchenko subsequently won.15 Russian Involvement in the 2004 Election Russia has a history of being involved in Ukrainian domestic politics. Overall, Russia still sees Ukraine as part of its sphere of influence and believes the development of Ukraine as a pro-Russia, antiNATO, non-EU member is strategically important. Russia has geopolitical motives for supporting authoritarian leaders in Ukraine. Russia also has economic interests in Ukraine, especially protecting its access to European energy markets via Ukrainian pipelines. However, the recent opening of the Nord Stream pipeline, which bypasses Ukraine, may reduce those interests, as Russia will be less dependent on Ukrainian pipelines to reach Western Europe. In addition to geopolitical and economic interests, Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin has reportedly claimed that Ukraine is not even an independent state.16 If true, the statement reflects the Russian government’s lack of support for Ukrainian sovereignty. One Ukrainian analyst argued that “Moscow will never be satisfied with any concessions the

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Ukrainians make or friendship they offer, because Moscow does not need friendship and partnership in the ‘near abroad.’ It needs full obedience.”17 In the case of the 2004 presidential election, Russia, fearing that an electoral victory by Victor Yushchenko would move a more democratic Ukraine closer to Europe and the United States (a correct assessment), became involved to ensure the victory of its favored candidate, Victor Yanukovych. Yushchenko, the leader of the political party Our Ukraine, was the former chairman of the central bank and served as prime minister under Leonid Kuchma from 1999 to 2001. Kuchma removed Yushchenko from office “apparently due to his efforts to clean up corruption in the Ukrainian energy sector, widely perceived to be the source of millions of dollars of illegal income for leaders of oligarchic clans and their political protectors in both Ukraine and Russia.”18 Therefore, Yushchenko had strong reform credentials. During the campaign, Yushchenko also stressed his prodemocracy, pro-EU vision for Ukraine and criticized Kuchma’s policy toward the EU. Yushchenko argued that “everything possible and impossible has been made [done] to make the regime’s domestic policy a formidable challenge to the European community” by the Kuchma administration and that “there is a group among this country’s top leadership that openly seeks to make impossible even the slightest progress in Ukraine’s European integration bid.”19 Yushchenko went on to state that if he were to win the presidential election, “the Europe-oriented foreign policy and the European standards in Ukraine will become the alpha and omega in the policy.”20 In contrast, Yanukovych presented a strongly pro-Russian position during the campaign. One campaign slogan was “UkraineRussia; Stronger Together.”21 Reversing a previous position, Yanukovych also rejected NATO membership for Ukraine.22 Yanukovych announced that if elected president, he would have Russian adopted as an official language and he would offer dual citizenship for Russians and Ukrainians. Yanukovych’s connections to Kuchma and his violations of democracy along with his willingness to engage in electoral fraud illustrate his autocratic tendencies. Russia perceived that a more autocratic Ukraine under Yanukovych’s leadership was in its interest. Russian leadership assumed that a democratic Ukraine would not be an ally and that Yushchenko would bring about a more democratic Ukraine. Therefore the Russian government tried to

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ensure Yanukovych’s victory through advocating the use of electoral fraud and by providing resources to Yanukovych’s team. Influencing Yanukovych’s strategies. The close historical and cultural relationship between Ukraine and Russia made it natural for Yanukovych to look toward Russia for ideas on how to obtain power. Many Ukrainians still have family in Russia and desire positive relations with Russia. In a September 2004 poll, almost half of all respondents said that the Ukrainian people would be better off in a union with Russia than in a union with the EU. Moreover, 67.8 percent of respondents believed that Ukraine and Russia should be friendly states, with open borders and without visas and customs checks.23 Due to the strong ties with Russia, President Vladimir Putin’s successful consolidation of power and erosion of democracy was a clear demonstration effect for Yanukovych and Kuchma. Along with authoritarian diffusion, Russian leaders and political advisers directly collaborated with Yanukovych’s campaign in an attempt to ensure his victory. Although it is possible that the Yanukovych campaign would have considered electoral fraud even without Russian involvement, Russia’s repeated advocacy of fraud did encourage President Kuchma and Yanukovych to develop that strategy. At a meeting between Putin, Kuchma, and Yanukovych in November 2004, Putin persuaded Yanukovych to use “administrative interference” during the election by replacing “disloyal” local officials with loyal bureaucrats to ensure victory.24 Furthermore, Russian political operators Gleb Pavlovsky, Vyacheslav Nikonov, and Marat Gelman worked directly for Yanukovych’s campaign. They utilized Russian election campaign practices, such as using state-controlled media to run a pro-Yanukovych public relations campaign, exploiting internal divisions, and characterizing Yushchenko as “evil.”25 Russia assisted and encouraged the antidemocratic behavior of the Yanukovych campaign. Strengthening Yanukovych’s capabilities. Russia provided both political and financial assistance to Yanukovych and his political party, the Party of Regions, in the months leading up to the election. Russian television, widely viewed in eastern Ukraine, was strongly pro-Yanukovych and anti-Yushchenko in its coverage.26 Putin, very popular in Ukraine, showed his approval of and support for Yanukovych by repeatedly appearing in public with him and strongly

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endorsing him. At the end of October 2004, Putin attended a Ukrainian military parade and, in the words of Ukrainian journalist Tatiana Silina, “stood beside him [Yanukovych] during the parade, bathing the presidential candidate in the rays of his gigantic popularity with Ukrainians.”27 In contrast to Russia’s public support of Yanukovych, Russian officials refused to interact with Yushchenko during the campaign, despite his efforts to initiate a bilateral dialogue.28 Continuing his support of Yanukovych and seeking to solidify Yanukovych’s position, Russian president Vladimir Putin, along with the leaders of several other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, congratulated Yanukovych on his electoral victory even before the results were official. Furthermore, Putin labeled the election “open and honest.”29 As the political crisis developed in the following days, Moscow’s mayor Yuri Luzhkov gave a speech supporting Yanukovych, and the Russian lower house of parliament passed a resolution condemning Yushchenko and the demonstrators.30 The Russian government not only offered political support for Yanukovych, but also provided significant financial support for his 2004 campaign. Although there is debate about the amount of Russian financing given to Yanukovych’s campaign, Timothy Garton Ash and Timothy Snyder estimate that about $300 million came from Russian sources.31 The Russian energy company Gazprom channeled money to Yanukovych’s campaign through Ukrainian companies.32 The leaders of other Russian businesses, such as Alfa-bank, Basic Element, Lukoil, Sistema, Tatneft, and others, also gave financial support to Yanukovych.33 Russian financial support was important for the Yanukovych campaign and enabled it to bribe state election officials (approximately 85,000 of them) and commit other types of election fraud.34 Along with direct financial support to Yanukovych, Russia also provided economic assistance to Ukraine to help Yanukovych win. Prior to the election, the Russian government reduced Ukraine’s gas debt by approximately $1 billion.35 Russia also promised continued investment, cheap natural gas and oil, and trade if Ukraine were to elect Yanukovych. In exchange for this support, Russia wanted Kuchma’s agreement to join the Single Economic Space, a Russianled economic union. One of the clearest examples of economic support was the deal on changing the collection of value-added taxes. In September 2004, President Putin and President Kuchma signed a deal on value-added taxes on oil and natural gas that involved the transfer

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of $800 million to the Ukrainian national treasury.36 Russia engaged in this deal for political, not economic, reasons, as there was no economic benefit for Russia. This increase of resources for the Ukrainian national government enabled Yanukovych, prime minister at the time, to take populist actions to increase his popularity, such as increasing pensions twofold.37 Mykhaylo Pohrebynskyy, Ukrainian presidential adviser, stated on a Ukrainian website that the decision to increase pensions would help Yanukovych win the election.38 In an October meeting, Russian prime minister Mikhail Fradkov promised Yanukovych that the two countries would soon sign an accord lifting restrictions on trade and implied that the accord was dependent on Yanukovych’s victory.39 There is limited evidence that Russia aided the security forces in Ukraine or provided them with resources to engage in repression. However, there are rumors of Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers gathering intelligence on political parties in Ukraine. Jane’s Intelligence Digest reported that the FSB “have succeeded in infiltrating every major political party and faction in the country, including . . . Our Ukraine.”40 The involvement of Russian intelligence agencies in Ukrainian political parties may have potentially helped Yanukovych’s campaign know the strategies of his opponents. Beyond this report, there is no evidence of Russia using this mechanism to increase elite capabilities in Ukraine. Furthermore, as Ukraine was one of the world’s ten largest producers of weapons, there were more than adequate domestic resources available for repression. Russia promoted authoritarianism in Ukraine by trying to influence the election outcome in 2004. Yanukovych, closely associated with Kuchma, and having engaged in electoral fraud, had clear autocratic leanings. Through direct engagement in the electoral campaign, Russia sought to guarantee a Yanukovych victory. Russia deliberately collaborated with the Yanukovych campaign to develop a plan for electoral fraud. There is no clear evidence that Russia directly pressured Kuchma or Yanukovych to adopt illiberal policies or strategies. The Kuchma and Yanukovych factions had illiberal preferences prior to the direct involvement of Russia. However, as already indicated, Yanukovych’s team borrowed from Russia’s election manipulation strategies, and Russia deliberately sought to influence the specific strategies chosen. Furthermore, Russia clearly provided significant political and monetary support to Yanukovych’s

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campaign. Along with assisting Yanukovych and his political party, Russia also offered economic aid to help ensure economic stability prior to the election. This case involves the use of major assistance to a political party and aid for economic stability. Despite the extent of Russia’s actions, it was unsuccessful.

Why Was Russia Unsuccessful in 2004? Russia’s involvement in Ukraine was clear. What is not as clear is why Russia’s involvement was relatively ineffective. This was a strong case of promotion of authoritarianism, but it did not succeed. There are three reasons why Yushchenko was able to obtain victory in 2004. First, the United States and Europe offered important countervailing international support. The international support presented an alternative to following Russia’s path, strengthened Yushchenko’s position, and increased the costs of widespread violent suppression. Second, there was a relatively equal distribution of power between the liberal and illiberal elites in Ukraine at that time. The opposition managed to unite together behind a single candidate, significantly strengthening its legitimacy and influence. Third, unlike Belarus, Ukraine had linkages with both Russia and the EU, creating a diversity of interests among Ukrainian elites. The Countervailing Influence of US and European Involvement US and European involvement in Ukraine played “a direct, causal role in constraining some dimensions of autocratic power and enhancing some dimensions of the opposition’s power” through helping to strengthen the democratic opposition and civil society.41 For years prior to the 2004 election, the United States (and to a lesser extent the EU) had aided the development of Ukrainian civil society. In addition to direct financial support, the successful electoral revolutions in Serbia and Georgia provided models to Ukrainian organizers for how to counter electoral fraud. A combination of demonstration effects and deliberate action on the part of democracy activists influenced the strategies of Ukrainian civil society during the Orange Revolution. Along with assistance for civil society development, the United States and the EU played an important role during the protests by rejecting the legitimacy of Yanukovych’s election. They were able to immediately and decisively reject Yanukovych’s claims of

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victory because of the detailed, reputable reports of fraud by independent, international election observers. Civil society in Ukraine helped to strength the opposition to Kuchma and Yanukovych and shift the balance of power in the favor of Yushchenko. Organizations such as Znayu (“I Know”) ran voter participation programs, and the Committee of Voters helped to monitor polling stations and document electoral fraud. Ukrainian student organizations such as Pora (“It’s Time”) planned and organized a major portion of the protests in Kyiv after the second-round election. The electoral revolutions in Georgia and Yugoslavia influenced Ukrainian civil society,42 with the overthrow of autocratic leaders in those countries providing a demonstration effect for Ukrainians. The Ukrainian student organization Pora learned from Serbia’s Otpor and Georgia’s Khmara, youth organizations that had been instrumental in toppling Slobodan Milosevic’s regime in October 2000 and Eduard Shevardnadze’s regime in November 2003.43 Aleksandr Maric, a leader of Otpor, frequently visited Ukraine prior to the 2004 election; according to him: We trained them [Pora] in how to set up an organisation, how to open local chapters, how to create a “brand,” how to create a logo, symbols, and key messages. We trained them in how to identify the key weaknesses in society and what people’s most pressing problems were—what might be a motivating factor for people, and above all young people, to go to the ballot box and in this way shape their own destiny.”44

The activities of Pora, including its powerful campaign slogans— “It’s time to choose” and “It’s time to attack crime, lies, and corruption”—and clever stickers, demonstrate the influence of training along with the ability to adapt ideas to the situation in Ukraine.45 Pora itself acknowledges that “an analysis of prior practices and experiences of similar movements in Central and Eastern Europe (Slovakia, Serbia, etc.)” was important for its success.46 The international community, by providing financial and technical support for over a decade, had helped foster the development of Ukrainian civil society. However, the amount of funding was relatively low, as between 2001 and 2004 the US National Endowment for Democracy (NED) spent only about $350,000 in Ukraine.47 US and European governments and foundations did increase their aid prior to the 2004 election to fund voter participation and education

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campaigns. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) contributed $1.475 million for election-related programs, and the European Commission’s National Indicative Program, from 2004 to 2006, contributed 10 million euros to support civil society, the media, and democracy.48 For several years prior to 2004, a USAID-funded program, the Strengthening Electoral Administration in Ukraine Project (SEAUP), worked to improve the electoral legislative and regulatory environment. The program’s administrators, working with local Ukrainian NGOs (including the Committee of Voters), trained over 10,000 Ukrainian polling-station commissioners. One of the program’s greatest impacts on the election was through its relationship with Ukrainian Supreme Court justices, three of whom served as SEAUP trainers. The reports of extensive electoral fraud in the November 21 election outraged them and “energized them to assume leadership roles” on the court, which contributed to the court’s decision on December 3 to invalidate the results of the election and mandate a new vote.49 According to Nadia Diuk, director of the NED’s Europe and Eurasia division, “without years of foreign support of Ukraine’s nascent civil society, it remains a question whether the past two years of political campaigning [Yushchenko’s campaign] would have had such a result [Orange Revolution].”50 Furthermore, the organizational capacity of Pora and other groups enabled effective coordination of the protests against electoral fraud. Without largescale protests in Kyiv against electoral fraud, it is unlikely, despite Yushchenko’s insistence, that there would have been a new vote. The rejection by the international community, with the prominent exception of Russia, of the initial election results gave legitimacy to Yushchenko’s position and placed prodemocratic international pressure on the Ukrainian government to peacefully resolve the protests. The United States threatened negative repercussions if the Ukrainian government used violence against protestors. US secretary of state Colin Powell rejected the November 21 results and stated: “If the Ukrainian government does not act immediately and responsibly, there will be consequences for our relationship, for Ukraine’s hopes for a Euro-Atlantic integration and for individuals responsible for perpetrating fraud. . . . We cannot accept this result as legitimate.”51 The EU president, José Manuel Barroso, warned of consequences, such as aid cuts, travel restrictions, and other punitive measures, unless there was “a serious, objective review” of the election.52 According to Andrew Wilson, the fact that the international protest

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about the election fraud was “unexpectedly robust” threw the Ukrainian authorities off-balance.53 This international support for Yushchenko increased the costs to President Kuchma and his allies of repressing the protestors and contributed to their agreement to a peaceful resolution. The United States and the EU were able to strongly condemn the election results because of the multiple reports of election fraud by independent observers. Working with local Ukrainian NGOs such as the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, election observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the NDI all reported major violations of international election standards.54 The reports of domestic and international election observers along with exit polls, which showed a Yushchenko victory, contributed to the development of street protests. Channel 5 and other nonstate media sources helped to keep Ukrainians informed both about the exit polls and about the international condemnation of the elections. “This boosted the morale of the people protesting, as well, reassuring them that they were not isolated internationally.”55 A consortium of international donors, including the NED, the Charles Steward Mott Foundation, and several embassies, sponsored important exit polls conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Center. Anatoliy Rachok, director of the Razumkov Center, argued that “U.S. aid help for the [election] poll was absolutely important—the poll results after the second round made people go to the street.” 56 According to Michael McFaul, “the West’s central contribution to the Orange Revolution was in the form of long-term support of voters’ rights groups, think tanks, youth groups, and other civil activist organizations and media organizations that [were] instrumental in monitoring, polling, conducting PVTs [parallel vote tabulations] and exit polls, and disseminating information about voters’ rights and violations of those rights.”57 Without the existence of international and domestic election observers (primarily funded by Western sources), the extent of the fraud would have been hard to prove or know, which would have reduced the strength and legitimacy of the opposition’s claims. International assistance from the United States and the EU “was crucial” in exposing electoral fraud.58 Along with condemning the electoral fraud, members of the EU directly intervened in the crisis. Polish president Aleksander Kwas-

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niewski and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana visited Ukraine on November 24, only three days after the 2004 election. The Polish president had strong connections with many Ukrainian politicians, knew all of the players, and was able to assess accurately the situation in Kyiv.59 Furthermore, Kwasniewski and Solana’s early presence in Kyiv “provided the protestors with legitimacy and time, which were both vital ingredients in giving their action bite.” 60 At the first meeting with Kuchma, Yanukovych, and Yushchenko, the EU delegation achieved agreement from both sides to oppose the use of force. According to Oleksandr Sushko and Olena Prystayko, Ukrainian analysts, the international mediation “played an important role in preventing the use of force during the Orange Revolution.”61 The strong, united Western condemnation of the fraudulent elections strengthened the international legitimacy of Yushchenko and his calls for a new election. Furthermore, Western threats and EU intervention increased the cost for the Kuchma administration of using force against the protestors in Kyiv. During the negotiations in December, international pressure encouraged Kuchma to make an agreement with the moderate opposition, led by Yushchenko. Western support and intervention counterbalanced Russian support for Yanukovych and encouraged a peaceful solution to the crisis. Relatively Equal Balance of Power Among Elites In comparison to Belarus, the Ukrainian opposition movement in 2004 was relatively strong. An ongoing problem in Ukrainian politics is the intense divisions over regime type and the international position of the country (EU-oriented versus Russia-oriented). The positive side of these divisions is that no one faction has a predominant amount of power in Ukraine. Although illiberal elites connected to Kuchma and Yanukovych were influential in Ukraine, they were not dominant. The opposition in Ukraine had connections within the government, including within parts of the security forces. In the previous parliamentary elections, the main opposition parties struggled to unite, which enabled Kuchma’s allies to form the government. This earlier defeat helped to mobilize the leaders of the main opposition parties—Our Ukraine, the Tymoshenko bloc, and the Socialist Party of Ukraine—to unite and work together. The balance of power among Ukrainian elites was fairly evenly divided in 2004. Furthermore, in 2004 Yushchenko and his party, Our Ukraine, had public support, ran an effective campaign, were able to unite

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with other opposition parties, and successfully organized protests after the election. The opposition’s campaign was clever and appealing to many Ukrainians. They used a distinctive color, orange, and had a catchy campaign slogan: “I believe, I know, We can do it.”62 The years of assistance from the NDI, the IRI, and other organizations helped them design their campaign. The campaign also focused on grassroots support, which was important for the success of the mass protests after the fraudulent elections. Yushchenko and his allies held rallies and campaign events all over Ukraine, often four to five a day, an unusually active campaign for Ukraine.63 In addition, the lack of access to the media forced the opposition parties to organize their own information distribution network of activists, increasing the opposition’s mobilization ability. The combination of an effective campaign, grassroots mobilization, and a united opposition helped the opposition succeed. Furthermore, as Ukraine was an illiberal state, not a consolidated authoritarian regime, the Ukrainian opposition was able to organize publically. The opposition also benefited from having a visible and well-known candidate, Victor Yushchenko. The domestic strength of the opposition parties in 2004 played an important role in their victory and was one reason for the failure of Russian efforts to support authoritarianism in Ukraine. Diverse Linkages Ukraine has important cultural and economic linkages with Russia. Ukrainians, like Russians, are Slavs, and Ukrainian and Russian are closely related languages. Many Russians view Ukraine as part of Russia’s sphere of influence or even as still part of the country, as Russia controlled Ukrainian territory for much of the past several hundred years. Many Russians see Ukrainians as their “younger brothers.”64 Mykhaylo Pohrebynskyy, a political adviser to President Kuchma, argued that pursuing strong relations with Russia helped Yanukovych gain public support in parts of Ukraine. Yanukovych’s campaign research found that most Ukrainians wanted good relations with Russia, over 80 percent did not view Russia as a foreign country, and up to 35 percent desired to live with Russia in one country.65 One reason why Yanukovych announced during the campaign that he would support dual citizenship with Russia and adoption of Russian as an official language was to seek favor with voters in eastern Ukraine.66 Despite these close cultural and historical connections, by the time of the 2004 election there were also growing economic rela-

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tions with the EU. Along with the option of pursuing economic relations with the EU, Ukrainian nationalists wanted more independence from Russian influence in the country. Therefore, Ukrainians had linkages with both Russia and Europe. The diversity of the linkages weakened Russia’s leverage over Ukraine and provided a clear alternative to Russia’s path. In terms of trade, Ukraine has important economic relationships with both the EU and Russia. Since independence, Ukraine’s exports to the EU had grown and its trade with Russia had decreased (see Table 2.1). The volume of exports to the EU-25 tripled between 1996 and 2004, increasing to 30 percent of Ukrainian’s total exports. Over this same period, less than a decade, Ukraine’s exports to Russia decreased from 42 percent to just 18 percent. Although Russia has been a significant market for Ukraine, economic relations with the EU were growing in importance for at least some Ukrainian elites. There are divisions among Ukrainian economic elites about whether to pursue closer economic relations with the EU or with Russia. Eastern Ukraine, dominated by industry, especially the metallurgical industry, exports much of its output to Russia and other CIS countries. In 2007, over half of Ukrainian exports of machinery, equipment, and means of transportation went to Russia, with Belarus and Kazakhstan being the two other major markets.67 Furthermore, given that the Central European countries produce many of these same products, further integration into the EU is overall not beneficial to these industries. In contrast, central and western Ukraine is more agrarian and would potentially profit from better economic relations with the EU and access to European agricultural markets. The tension between these two positions contributes to fragmentation and conflict within Ukraine. As a Russian economist notes: “As a result of the conflict between the two programs [EU-oriented position and Russia-oriented position], the country is unable to follow a consistent course of integration into the Eurasian Economic Community, while also being unable to join the EU.”68 Although these divisions contribute to conflict and instability in Ukraine, they also help to diversify the interests of Ukrainian economic elites, weakening the influence and leverage of Russia. Despite the growing trade with the EU, there are still strong economic linkages between Ukraine and Russia in the energy and investment sectors. Ukraine is dependent on Russia for the majority of its oil and gas supply. Until 2005, Gazprom provided Ukraine with nat-

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Russia in Ukraine and Belarus Table 2.1 Ukraine: Trade and Investment Data, 1996–2004 1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

n/a

29.6

47.1

43.6

51.8

Exports to EU-25 in US$ millions as percentage of total exports

3,019 21.0

3,489 27.6

4,014 27.6

5,764 32.1

9,779 30.0

Exports to Russia in US$ millions as percentage of total exports

6,033 41.9

2,906 23.0

3,516 24.0

3,189 18.0

5,880 18.0

Imports from Russia in US$ millions as percentage of total imports

7,587 43.1

7,064 48.0

5,825 42.0

6,317 37.0

11,802 40.7

Foreign direct investment in US$ millions as percentage of GDP

541.3 n/a

747.0 1.75

593.2 1.92

916.6 2.22

2,252.6 3.57

Total exports as percentage of GDP

Sources: Ukrainian Statistical Office, http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua (accessed June 16, 2008); World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, Economic Outlook, http://www.imf .org/external/datamapper/index.php (accessed September 14, 2011).

ural gas at greatly reduced prices, $50 per thousand cubic meters compared to the $220–230 that Western Europeans paid.69 As Ukraine obtains the majority of its energy from gas, and has an economy that is relatively energy-inefficient, this “subsidy” from Gazprom helped the country’s economy. Furthermore, the difficulty of finding alternative sources of natural gas in Europe makes Ukraine especially vulnerable to pressure from Russia, as the multiple subsequent gas wars highlight. Russia also has economic interests in Ukraine that coincide with its geopolitical goals. Russia is a major investor in Ukraine, purchasing oil refineries, banks, aluminum plants, and parts of the media.70 President Putin supported investment in Ukraine as part of an effort to obtain influence over economics and politics in the country. Much of this effort focused on attempts to gain Russian control over Ukraine’s gas-transit pipelines to Europe, a recurring issue in RussianUkrainian relations. Various Russian companies have also purchased multiple public utilities in Ukraine, as well as the country’s two leading mobile phone companies.71 In 2005, Russian capital helped produce 70 percent of all commodities made in Ukraine.72 Thus Russia

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had economic motivations, in addition to its geopolitical goals, to ensure a friendly regime in Ukraine. Russia has provided Ukraine with valuable financing and energy. However, in the years prior to the Orange Revolution, Russia became a less valuable economic partner while the EU market increased in importance for the Ukrainian economy.73 Contrasting Ukraine to the Central Asian states, Nicole Jackson highlights how Central Asian economic elites are more closely connected to Russia because they do not have the same possibility of developing economic relationships with the EU: “Ukrainian businessmen are being wooed by the EU and therefore have a greater (and more personal) interest in the development of a more democratic and economically liberal state system. In comparison, much of Central Asia’s economic elite seems to be encouraged by its economic and business ties with Russia to preserve things as they are and withstand pressure for political liberalization.”74 The more-diverse economic linkages in Ukraine weakened Russia’s influence and helped to support efforts to democratize. Through influencing Yanukovych’s decision to engage in electoral fraud and by providing finances and public support for his campaign, Russia actively sought to ensure Yanukovych’s election and the continuation of an illiberal regime in Ukraine. These significant efforts failed in 2004 because of the countervailing influence of US and European support for civil society and pressure on Kuchma to agree to a peaceful end to the crisis. In addition, the strength of democratic opposition in 2004 and growing economic linkages in Ukraine also weakened Russia’s influence. The interaction of domestic conditions in Ukraine (united opposition and strong civil society movement), prodemocratic international pressure, and Russian support for Yanukovych produced a victory for democracy in Ukraine. Unfortunately, this victory was not complete or permanent.

Russian Influence Post-2004 Despite the defeat of Yanukovych in the 2004 election, Russia did not lose interest in Ukraine. Russia, distrusting Yushchenko and his desire to strengthen Ukraine’s relationship with the United States and the EU, regularly tried to undermine Yushchenko’s presidency. Although there were multiple domestic reasons for the problems with political fragmentation and inter-elite conflict that plagued Yush-

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chenko’s presidency, Russian involvement worsened the situation. The main way in which Russia tried to discredit Yushchenko was through its control over natural gas supplies to Russia. There were major disputes over natural gas prices in 2006 and 2009. In January 2006, Russia’s Gazprom cut off the supply of natural gas because of disagreements over prices. Eventually the two sides reached a temporary deal. However, the crisis contributed to instability in Ukraine when parliament voted to sack the government because of concerns that the deal to end the crisis was too favorable for Russia. Another gas war erupted in January 2009 when Moscow again suspended supplies of gas to Ukraine because of disagreements over the price Ukraine would pay for gas and how much Gazprom would pay in transit fees to Ukraine. In response to the suspension of gas supplies, Ukraine ended transit of gas to Europe (20 percent of Europe’s gas supplies flow through Ukraine). With dwindling gas supplies in Europe and Ukraine, intense European pressure resulted in Ukraine and Russia reaching a deal after more than two weeks of brinkmanship. Although Russia claims the disputes were about price, the disagreements were really about geopolitics. Russia sought to undermine President Yushchenko’s position at home and abroad and to gain control over Ukraine’s energy pipeline.75 As Vadim Karasyov, director of the independent Global Strategies Institute in Kyiv, stated: “The Kremlin wants to remove Yushchenko because he embodies the pro-Western and pro-NATO membership course for Ukraine.”76 Russia’s geopolitical desire to prevent Ukraine from entering a Western sphere of influence motivated its efforts to sow discord among elites and to weaken Yushchenko’s position. Yuliya Mostova, commenting on the gas crisis in the Ukrainian weekly Zerkalo Nedeli, argued that “the Russian side, setting its hopes on its immense information resources and numerous ‘fifth columns’ in Ukrainian political circles, obviously expected to not just discredit Yushchenko, but also to create an emotional background for launching the impeachment procedure, as there is no need to discredit the president whose popularity rating is less than four per cent.”77 Many analysts believe that Russia was also trying to discredit Ukraine as a potential member of the EU or as a reliable transit country for European gas. Russia hoped to gain support for building gas pipelines that could bypass Ukraine, which would remove an important source of revenue for the country. During the crisis, Alexander Medvedev, deputy chief executive of

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Gazprom, stated that Ukraine was “responsible for everything that has happened,” especially the suspension of gas deliveries to Europe.78 Furthermore, there was a rumor that Putin wanted Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, a former ally of Yushchenko in the Orange Revolution, to agree to impeachment proceedings against Yushchenko in exchange for a deal on the gas price. In response to questions about this, Tymoshenko stated: From a historical standpoint, those nine months remaining before the next presidential election is such a short term that there is simply no point in either party making it the subject of any systemic or largescale impeachment-related talks. It would be nice, of course, if the incumbent president’s term ended sooner. I think that is now the wish of all Ukrainian people. But we need to pluck up our courage and be patient.79

Clearly, in this reply, Tymoshenko did not deny that Putin was demanding impeachment, nor that she was willing to consider it. The 2009 gas dispute, like the 2006 dispute, helped to intensify intraelite conflicts in Ukraine. Tymoshenko’s comments demonstrated her animosity toward Yushchenko. President Yushchenko also used tensions over the gas deal with Russia to attack Tymoshenko. Yushchenko repeatedly publically condemned the deal, arguing that Tymoshenko had negotiated an agreement that was disadvantageous for Ukraine and calling on the Ukrainian Security Service to investigate. Under pressure from worried European leaders, Yushchenko agreed to accept the deal. However, Yushchenko continued to attack Tymoshenko throughout the presidential campaign. The intense fighting between the two former allies contributed to Yanukovych’s victory in 2010. Yanukovych won the election by only 4.5 percent of the vote. If Yushchenko and Tymoshenko had worked together, they could have beaten Yanukovych. The 2010 Election and the Yanukovych Presidency Although Russia’s involvement in the 2010 election was subtler than in 2004, the Russian leadership did demonstrate their disdain for Yushchenko. In August 2009, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev wrote an open letter to Yushchenko complaining that Ukraine was signing “treacherous” pipeline deals with the EU, kicking out Russian diplomats, supplying arms to Georgia, and falsifying Soviet his-

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tory.80 Furthermore, Medvedev said Russia would not send an ambassador to Ukraine until after the presidential election. There is no evidence (as far as we know) that Russia gave direct financial support to Yanukovych, but the preference of the Russian government was clear. Russia did not provide direct financial assistance this time because either the government had learned from the 2004 campaign that indirect support may be more effective or because after spending six years discrediting Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, the Russian leadership believed Yanukovych would win without direct financial support. Since Yanukovych’s victory in the 2010 presidential election, Russia has provided significant economic assistance and political support to strengthen Yanukovych’s position in Ukraine. In 2010, Ukraine received a $2 billion loan from Russia’s state-controlled VTB bank at below-market rates and the Yanukovych administration announced that it would rely on Russia for help if Ukraine failed to obtain a loan from the International Monetary Fund.81 Recently, Russia offered Ukraine $8 billion in natural gas subsidies if Ukraine agrees to join a customs union with Russia.82 However, if Ukraine enters into a customs union with Russia, this would eliminate the possibility of free trade with the EU. Yanukovych has so far tried to pursue economic relations with both Russia and the EU and therefore has rejected joining the customs union. Russia is clearly willing to assist Yanukovych in achieving economic stability as long as it serves Russian interests. Russia’s leadership, after its years of disdain for Yushchenko, has been publically supportive of Yanukovych. Putin traveled to Ukraine in July 2010 to congratulate Yanukovych on his birthday and spoke of his “special relationship with Yanukovych,” a dramatic difference from Putin’s hostile relationship with Yushchenko.83 Konstantin Kosachyov, chairman of the Russian Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee, stated: For us any president of Ukraine is absolutely fine who is realistically oriented toward the interests of Ukraine. [Former president Victor] Yushchenko interpreted those interests in a false way. Yushchenko thought they consisted of getting as far away from Russia as possible and quickly moving toward the West. That is precisely why we had such a hard time with him. But with Viktor Yanukovych, it is simple for us. He has [a] significantly more precise and adequate understanding of Ukraine’s interests.84

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Learning from Russia: Authoritarian Diffusion Yanukovych’s strategies for establishing a less democratic Ukraine illustrate authoritarian diffusion. Yanukovych’s actions to limit press freedom and manipulate elections follow Russian policies. Along with the geographic proximity, historical ties, and economic relationship, Yanukovych and his political party, the Party of Regions, have developed a close relationship with Russia. In 2005 the Party of Regions joined into a cooperation agreement with Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party. Therefore, there are many linkages between Yanukovych and Russia, providing opportunities for him and his allies to learn from Russia’s experience with establishing an autocratic regime. In Russia, the government has restricted press freedom through using a combination of strategies. The government either owns or controls who owns all the major electronic media sources, enabling the government to directly influence news coverage. In addition, the Russian government restricts access of journalists to the president and prime minister. Live press conferences are rare events. Even though there is no formal censorship, editors and journalists engage in self-censorship, especially after journalists and editors were fired from “independent” media for publishing stories critical of the government.85 Russian journalists also regularly receive threats, and several well-known investigative reporters, such as Anna Politkovskaya, have been murdered. Similar to Russia, since 2010 the Yanukovych government has tried to restrict press freedom in Ukraine by informal pressure on editors, leading to self-censorship. Reporters Without Borders has also warned of increased evidence of censorship, political pressure on journalists, and physical attacks on journalists in Ukraine.86 The Ukrainian Security Service has threatened journalists and placed them under surveillance.87 Ukrainian journalists have started the Stop Censorship campaign in protest against what they believe is selfcensorship by television news editors. Journalists argue that editors never broadcast reports that are critical of President Yanukovych. Viktoria Siumar, leader of the Stop Censorship campaign, states: “We have objective proof of censorship. Our news monitoring shows that television news has seriously changed.” Siumar said that criticism of those in power has practically disappeared from the news on the highest-rated television channels. “At the same time, members of the

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opposition are presented on TV news as marginal politicians. The most interesting statements by Yulia Tymoshenko never get on the air.”88

Furthermore, it is almost impossible for Ukrainian journalists to know President Yanukovych’s daily schedule, and he usually only grants interviews to journalists who write favorable stories.89 In addition to a greater level of violence against journalists and censorship, there are concerns that press freedom is being eroded in Ukraine, because the majority of television networks in Ukraine are now owned by oligarchs friendly with Yanukovych.90 Valeriy Khoroshkovsky, an ally of Yanukovych, sits on the Supreme Council of Justice (VSU) and is the owner of the most popular television channel in Ukraine, Inter. The court ruling depriving Channel 5 and Tvi of their frequencies was seen as an attack on press independence, because the judges had ties to the VSU, because those stations are Khoroshkovsky’s main competition, and because these two stations were the main opposition-leaning channels.91 Government attempts to manipulate the October 2010 local elections also reflected Russian strategies of restricting candidate eligibility and changing electoral law to favor the preferred candidates. For example, the Russian government restricted the ballot for the presidential election in 2008 so that only three minor candidates could run against Medvedev. The Russian government has also manipulated election law to serve its interests, such as through a 2004 law that makes it almost impossible to hold a referendum in Russia. Similarly, the October 2010 Ukrainian elections involved restrictions on candidate eligibility and changes in election law to serve the Party of Regions. The election-monitoring organization Opora documented multiple incidences where “law enforcement and security authorities pressured candidates not to run and observers not to monitor; election officials barred or removed candidates from the ballot . . . and prospective voters were subjected to intimidation and bribery.”92 Tymoshenko called the elections the “dirtiest and most unfair elections in the history of independent Ukraine” and pointed out that the nine-day delay for announcing the turnout and results provided ample opportunity for fraud.93 Along with the documented abuses during the campaign and on voting day, the changes to the law on local elections also raised serious concerns about the fairness of the electoral process. The new law, passed in July 2010, forbids blocs of parties from fielding candidates,

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which effectively ruled out Tymoshenko’s opposition bloc.94 In addition, the law only allows parties to run candidates in local elections, ruling out independent candidates, and restricts elections to parties that have been registered more than a year, which eliminated the second largest opposition party, Front of Change, from participating in the 2010 elections.95 Therefore, the changes to the electoral law guaranteed an electoral victory for Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and prevented opposition parties from winning. These efforts were successful, as the Party of Regions won the majority of local elections in 2010, with the exception of the far-western provinces of Ukraine. The Ukrainian leadership since the 2010 elections has chosen policies from the “menu of manipulation” that closely mirror earlier Russian actions. Given the close relationship between Yanukovych and the Russian government, it is likely that Yanukovych learned from the latter’s success in suppressing dissent. Furthermore, the Russian government actively worked to discredit the Yushchenko presidency but has economically and politically supported Yanukovych since his election in 2010. The contrast between the 2004 and 2010 elections highlights how international factors interact with the domestic conditions. In 2004, the balance of power shifted toward the liberal elites, partially due to US and EU support. In 2010, partially due to Russian pressure on Yushchenko’s administration, but also due to problems internal to the Orange coalition, power shifted back to the illiberal elites. Despite the growing similarities between the two countries under the rule of President Yanukovych, Ukraine is not Russia. Ukraine has a stronger opposition, a freer press, and a more developed civil society than Russia. In addition, the United States and the EU still have some influence in Ukraine. Therefore, it is less likely that Yanukovych, following Russia’s path, will be able to succeed in consolidating Ukraine as an authoritarian regime.

Belarus The case of Belarus covers almost two decades. It begins with Alexander Lukashenko gaining power in 1994 and continues to the present. After Belarus gained independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991, the country began to institute political and economic reforms. Acknowledging the start of reform, Freedom House ranked

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Belarus as partially free in 1993.96 The 1994 elections were considered fair and free. However, since Lukashenko’s election as Belarus’s first president that year, political and economic reforms have ended. Over the next decade, Lukashenko concentrated on strengthening his hold on power in Belarus. Independent media, NGOs, and opposition political parties faced increased repression and harassment as he consolidated power. By 1997, Freedom House ranked Belarus 6.25 on independent media and 6.00 on electoral process (on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being the most authoritarian and least free).97 The government controlled all television stations in Belarus and severely restricted radio news broadcasts. Today, Freedom House ranks Belarus as not free, with scores between 6.00 and 6.75 in the categories of electoral process, civil society, independent media, national democratic governance, and judicial framework.98 Substantiating Freedom House’s general assessment of the nature of the regime change in Belarus, Polity IV scored Belarus in the early 1990s as +7, but by 1997 the country’s score had dropped to –7 (on a scale of –10 to +10, with –10 being a fully consolidated autocracy and +10 a fully consolidated democracy).99 In December 2010, Lukashenko committed electoral fraud to win reelection as president and subsequently arrested the opposition leaders along with over 600 protestors. By any objective measure, Belarus today is not a democratic, free, or liberal country. This post-1994 trajectory demonstrates how Russia has supported the development of authoritarianism in Belarus and how Lukashenko has used this assistance to consolidate his authoritarian rule. Extending the range beyond the initial years of consolidation enables a more nuanced investigation of the complex relationship between Belarus and Russia by incorporating the disputes that have developed over the past several years. The extended timeframe also allows for an examination of the changing responses of Lukashenko to Russian and Western pressure. For more than ten years, the United States and the EU have both tried various methods to promote democracy in Belarus. Despite these efforts, democracy promotion has been unsuccessful. External assistance for democracy is unable to counter the support from Russia and Belarusian government coercion. Although Lukashenko had illiberal preferences prior to any Russian involvement, assistance from Russia has enabled Lukashenko to resist external pressure to democratize and, until recently, consolidate his rule.

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Belarus-Russian Relations, 1994–2001 In the initial years of Lukashenko’s reign, Russian support helped him solidify his position of power and encouraged Belarusian elites to back him. From the beginning of its status as an independent state, Russia was willing to intervene in Belarus’s internal politics. Russia had geopolitical motives for supporting Lukashenko’s regime and authoritarianism in Belarus. Russia saw a prodemocratic Belarus as being pro-US and potentially a NATO member, an outcome viewed as detrimental to Russian strategic interests. These interventions have generally assisted Lukashenko in turning Belarus into a personal dictatorship by increasing the costs of advocating democracy. The 1996 constitutional crisis was a turning point in Belarus’s movement toward authoritarianism. The crisis developed when the opposition parties tried to prevent a referendum proposed by Lukashenko that would have granted him, among other powers, the authority to appoint half of parliament. The Constitutional Court ruled that the referendum could only be advisory, but Lukashenko annulled the ruling. The opposition leaders then initiated impeachment procedures against Lukashenko. Three days before the scheduled vote on the referendum, a high-level Russian delegation, including Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin, arrived to negotiate a compromise. The Russians favored Lukashenko, and the “compromise” they negotiated allowed Lukashenko to use the referendum to overturn the democratic constitution and establish a dictatorship. 100 The Council of Europe, the EU, and the OSCE all considered the referendum illegitimate and did not recognize the presidentially appointed bodies created by the referendum.101 Russia, Belarus’s most important ally, clearly supported Lukashenko, which encouraged Belarusian elites to acquiesce to Lukashenko’s dictatorship. Moscow had significant influence over personnel in the Belarusian government during the first years of Lukashenko’s government, helping to influence policymaking. Russians have held top posts in the presidential administration, military, and security services.102 Lukashenko has also allowed Russian bases in Belarus. The Belarusian KGB, unreformed from communist days, had strong ties with the Russian government and former Russian KGB officials, helping it monitor and influence political developments in Belarus. During this period, Russia worked to increase Lukashenko’s capabilities through providing him public political support and eco-

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nomic aid. There is no evidence that Russia provided direct financial assistance for Lukashenko’s political campaigns. This may be because, since the 1994 elections, Belarus has not had a free election in which a democratic candidate had a chance of winning. However, the Russian government repeatedly demonstrated its support to Lukashenko’s regime through public statements and international support. After the parliamentary and presidential election, repeatedly condemned in the West as not free, fair, or democratic, Russian government officials praised Lukashenko and the electoral process. For example, following the 2001 presidential election, the Russian Duma called the Belarusian elections “democratic and free, conforming to generally acceptable international norms,” despite OSCE concerns of fraud and intimidation.103 Lukashenko thanked President Putin for his support after the elections: “I would like to express my deep gratitude to the heads of state and government, politicians, public figures, foreign citizens and my countrymen who congratulated me on my election for the presidential post, especially to my friend and colleague Vladimir Putin. Your support gives me strength and confidence that we made the right choice.”104 The support from Russia helped Lukashenko and his allies counter criticisms from the United States and the EU. In addition to this direct political support, Russia’s state-controlled media, widely available in Belarus, provided regular positive coverage of Lukashenko and his government. Coverage of Lukashenko by the Russian media was influential in Belarus, especially coverage of the political positions of President Putin, who was very popular in the country. Some observers argued that Lukashenko would not have won the 2001 presidential election without support from the Russian media; if the Russian media had presented the programs of the opposition and criticized Lukashenko, he would have lost.105 Russia’s continued public allegiance to Lukashenko and unwillingness to even communicate with any of the democratic opposition throughout this period further persuaded Belarusian elites to support the authoritarian regime. The Russian government largely ignored attempts by opposition parties to develop ties with Russia or gain its support.106 Stanislau Shushkevich, Belarusian opposition leader and former speaker of parliament, argued that “Moscow is quite content with the dictatorship in Belarus” and that Russia legitimized Lukashenko’s regime. 107 Given the importance of Russian support for Belarus, it was not surprising that “many Belarusians believe that

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Lukashenko’s dismissal is only possible with the Kremlin’s unambiguous consent.”108 Although public support from Russia was helpful, Russia increased the capabilities of Lukashenko and his supporters the most during this period by providing Lukashenko with economic aid. The financial support from Russia helped Lukashenko maintain Sovietera benefits in Belarus, such as almost full employment, low prices on staple goods, and free healthcare and education. 109 The existence of a state-guaranteed, although low, standard of living assisted Lukashenko in maintaining some public legitimacy. Some Belarusians admired Lukashenko because of the economic stability he guaranteed. One Belarusian, a thirty-four-year-old named Svetlana proclaimed: “In 1994 he [Lukashenko] received a ruined economy, which he, bit by bit, managed to put together and make it work for his people!”110 Andrew Wilson argues that Lukashenko used “an informal social contract” of offering economic stability and modest growth in exchange for public support.111 Furthermore, because of Russia’s economic assistance, Lukashenko was able to avoid painful economic reforms that would have triggered a decline in standards of living and thereby harmed his prospects of maintaining power. During the first seven years of Lukashenko’s rule, Russia offered significant trade, aid, and investment to support his government. Belarus was economically dependent on Russia (partially because of the legacy of the Soviet Union), and Russia subsidized the Belarusian economy by providing the country with oil and gas at below-market cost.112 This subsidy was substantial because Russia supplied Belarus with 100 percent of its oil, 100 percent of its gas, and 80 percent of its coal.113 Economic growth in Belarus was dependent on the low cost of energy from Russia. Russian and Belarusian economists estimated Russian subsidies to Belarus during this time as approximately $1–2 billion a year.114 According to analyst Clelia Rontoyanni: Subsidies to the Belarusian economy have included the cancellation of debts (. . . $1.5 billion of debt being pardoned in February 1996); lowinterest credits for the purchase of Russian products; favourable barter deals; added customs revenue . . . and support for the Belarusian currency. . . . However, reduced prices (below world market prices) charged to Belarus for gas imports have represented by far the most significant form of subsidy.115

Furthermore, oil-refining was an important source of government revenue for Belarus. Russia sold crude oil to Belarus duty-free,

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enabling Belarus to make a significant profit on refined products exported to Europe. Using money from Russia, Lukashenko was able to oversee a fivefold increase in wages by 2010.116 Russia was also Belarus’s predominant trading partner during the first years of Lukashenko’s rule. “In 1998 Belarusian exports to CIS countries represented 73.7% of the overall figure for exports, of which 65% went to Russia.”117 Russia also accounted for approximately two-thirds of all of Belarus’s imports (see Table 2.2). This percentage reflected Belarus’s extreme energy dependence on Russia. Along with a high volume of trade with Russia, Belarusian industry was intertwined with Russia industry. For example, Belarus’s military industrial complex developed components that were then assembled in Russian factories.118 Without Russian demand, Belarus would have been unable to sell its military products. Compared to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Belarus had limited trade and investment relations with Western Europe during the 1990s. For example, in 1996, per capita direct investment in Belarus was $2, in contrast to $60 in Poland and $117 in the Czech Republic.119 Annual foreign direct investment (FDI) in Belarus was the lowest in the region because, with a centrally controlled economy, there was little in the country to attract Western firms. Furthermore, the EU denied Belarus most forms of economic assistance because of its lack of democracy. Among other programs, Belarus was unable to participate in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy. Clearly, given its weak economic ties with the EU and its unreformed economy, Belarus was dependent on Russia in terms of trade and energy resources. The greatest assistance from Russia for authoritarianism in Belarus has come through support for economic stability. As Lukashenko worked to consolidate his power, he benefited from Russian assistance that enabled stable living standards and a calm economic situation. Lukashenko gained political support by claiming that he was the leader who could keep the Belarusian economy stable. The parts of the population connected to the state sector enjoyed good and stable living conditions under Lukashenko. Yaroslav Romanchuk, an economist and former opposition presidential candidate, has claimed that Lukashenko’s economic system, still statecontrolled, “is the basis of his power, [and it] will collapse if there is real economic reform.”120 During the first decade of Lukashenko’s rule, Russian subsidies accounted for about 20 percent of Belarus’s gross domestic product

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Table 2.2 Belarus: Trade and Investment Data, 1995–2008

Total exports as percentage of GDP Exports to EU-15 in US$ millions as percentage of total exports Exports to Russia in US$ millions as percentage of total exports Imports from Russia in US$ millions as percentage of total imports Foreign direct investment in US$ millions as percentage of GDP

1995

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

49.7

59.1

69.2

63.6

67.9

60.1

60.9

576 12.0

521 7.0

690 9.0

1,440 18.0

5,000a 36.3a

9,088a 46.0a

14,168b 43.5b

2,185 45.5

4,645 65.1

3,710 50.6

3,977 49.6

6,485 47.1

6,845 34.7

10,551 32.4

2,965 53.2

4,679 54.6

5,605 64.8

5,922 65.1

11,219 68.0

13,099 58.6

23,507 59.7

15 0.11

203 1.3

119 0.93

434 3.05

164 0.71

354 0.96

2,181 3.59

Sources: Belarusian Ministry of Statistics, http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/indicators/ftrade.php (accessed June 23, 2008); Economist Intelligence Unit, World Data Annual Time Series, 2006; International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php (accessed September 14, 2011); Shimov, “The Effect of European Union Expansion”; Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics /themes (accessed August 14, 2008). Notes: a. Data from 2004 and 2006 includes trade with EU-25. b. Data from 2008 includes trade with EU-27.

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(GDP).121 The Belarusian economy was still heavily integrated with and dependent on Russia’s. Furthermore, the alliance with Russia insulated Belarus from pressure to adopt political and economic reforms. The Russian government provided Lukashenko with economic support and legitimacy, helping to counteract any external pressure for democratization or reform. Belarusian scholar Clelia Rontoyanni states: As far as the Belarusian leadership is concerned, integration with Russia has brought substantial economic rewards to the country’s economy—most notably cancellation of debts to Russia, fuel supplies at subsidised prices, and practically free access to the Russian market for Belarusian producers. These have allowed President Lukashenko to take a very gradual approach to the introduction of potentially unpopular economic reforms, thereby avoiding a rapid decline in standards of living and maintaining relatively high approval rates—especially among the poorer and less educated sections of the population.122

Lukashenko is dependent on Russia for his survival. Lukashenko’s main policy, outside of eliminating any threats to his rule at home, is to gain the best deal possible from Russia, which, as Lukashenko has become more isolated, is no longer as good a deal as earlier.123

Belarus-Russian Relations, 2002–2012 Belarus-Russian relations deteriorated as Lukashenko gained more power and as Russia began to demand more from Belarus in exchange for economic subsidies. Starting with the gas dispute of 2002, Russia has shown that it is willing to use Belarus’s energy vulnerability to force the country to comply with its demands. In terms of gas supplies, Gazprom (a Russian gas company closely connected to the Russian government) has repeatedly threatened or actually stopped gas deliveries to Belarus to force concessions from the Belarusian government. In November 2002, Gazprom shut off the gas pipeline into Belarus in retaliation for Lukashenko’s refusal to agree to Russia’s terms regarding a future monetary union. Gazprom shut off the supply of gas again in February 2004 to pressure the Belarusian government to agree to higher gas prices and to a union with Russia. Although Belarus initially took the lead in advocating for the integration of Belarus and Russia into a union, Russia became

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more insistent about having control over the union after Putin came to power.124 Lukashenko realized that the union would make Belarus less independent and would subsequently reduce his power. As a result, he began to delay the integration process. In response, Putin used the issue of gas prices to force Lukashenko to make a decision on integration. After first reacting angrily, Lukashenko then downplayed the dispute and agreed to pay the higher price of about $50 per thousand cubic meters, compared to the $30 price Belarus paid in 2003.125 Again in 2006, issues of natural gas prices and Belarus’s failure to pay for previous shipments arose between Gazprom and the Belarusian government. After much negotiation and Gazprom’s threats to shut off gas supplies, Lukashenko agreed to a price increase to $100 per thousand cubic meters and to transfer a greater share in the Belarusian gas transit company Beltransgaz to Gazprom, a clear victory for Russia. Relations between the two countries improved slightly in 2007 when Russia gave Belarus a $1.5 billion stabilization loan, which helped to cover the costs of higher gas prices.126 Despite the repeated disputes between the two countries, Belarus still benefits significantly by paying less for natural gas than do its neighbors. In 2010, Belarus paid $168 per thousand cubic meters of natural gas compared to $305 in Ukraine.127 Russia has also used its control over oil supplies to change Belarusian policies. In 2003, for example, a dispute arose between Russia and Belarus over the oil supply. Russia transported crude oil to Belarusian refineries, where the oil was refined, some for domestic use and the remainder for export. The ability to import Russian crude oil duty-free and then export refined oil products to Europe was a major source of income for Belarus and its foreign currency reserves. The dispute broke out when Russia said it would not increase the amount of oil for Belarus’s use “if it fails to retain ownership of oil pipelines in Belarus,” and specifically if Russia lost the legal dispute over the ownership of the Mazyr oil refinery.128 If Russia had carried through on its threat, there would have been oil shortages in Belarus and a loss of revenue for Belarusian oil refineries, which earned $850–900 million in 2003.129 Although this dispute was settled, the oil issue arose again in 2010 when Prime Minister Putin announced that he would not renew the crude oil subsidy and would end duty-free exports of oil to Belarus. The two countries eventually resolved the dispute with a compromise that Russia would supply

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Belarus with 6.3 million tons of duty-free oil for domestic consumption, with the rest subject to export duties. A few months after Belarus agreed to the formation and actual implementation of a customs union with Russia and Kazakhstan in 2010, Putin announced that Russia would drop its export duty on all crude oil shipped to Belarus in exchange for export duties on oil products, estimated to be a $4 billion subsidy. Putin said that Russia would continue to subsidize Belarus’s oil sector: “There is an agreement that we will try— I’ll be speaking openly—to keep subsidies to the Belarus economy at the level of no less than that in 2007–09, before [Russia] introduced the export duty for crude.”130 Belarus is economically dependent on Russia, and Russia is willing to use its leverage to achieve favorable outcomes. Over the past several years, relations between Russia and Belarus have become more adversarial. The regular involvement of Putin, first as Russian president and then as Russian prime minister, in the natural gas and oil disputes highlights the political nature of the arguments. Although Russia has economic interests in the Belarusian energy industry, there is widespread agreement among scholars and analysts that the disputes have primarily been about geopolitical issues, such as the customs union, and not about economic gain for Russia. Furthermore, the significant economic asymmetry between Russia and Belarus (Russian GDP was $2.38 trillion in 2011 compared to Belarus’s GDP of $141.2 billion) demonstrates that the economic relationship is more important for Belarus than for Russia.131 Lukashenko’s resistance to Russian demands reflects his unwillingness to completely surrender to Russian pressure. Lukashenko tries to achieve what he wants from the relationship, support for his rule, without giving in to what Russia appears to want, an end to Belarusian sovereignty. Despite considerable Russian pressure, Lukashenko repeatedly refused to join a currency union with Russia and give up the Belarusian ruble. The dispute over the ruble demonstrates how Lukashenko has been able to resist successfully some Russian demands. Lukashenko stated in a 2003 interview about the currency union: “Where are the guarantees that our state sovereignty will not be violated, that our people will be independent?”132 Lukashenko is not completely subservient to Russia, but instead attempts to arrange the best possible deal for himself out of his dependency on Russia. The relationship between Belarus and Russia is complex, contentious, and close. Kathleen Hancock describes the

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relationship as one of mutual hostage-taking, in which not only is the Belarusian economy significantly dependent on Russia, but also Russia is vulnerable to Belarus’s control over pipelines carrying fuel to Europe.133 However, in the past few years, Russia has come closer to having control over the pipelines in Belarus, potentially increasing its dominance over the country. The problems between Russia and Belarus should not overshadow the fact that the Russian government has continued to support Lukashenko, has not sought to legitimize the Belarusian opposition, and has not cut off major subsidies.134 For example, the Russian Duma overwhelmingly approved a resolution describing the October 2004 Belarusian parliamentary elections as open, free, democratic, and legitimate.135 Russian media provided positive reports about Lukashenko during the 2006 Belarusian presidential campaign and characterized the protests afterward as being led by a “horde of extremists.”136 Similarly in 2008, Russian “election monitors” declared the Belarusian parliamentary elections as “free, open and democratic,” despite reports from the OSCE denouncing the elections as fraudulent.137 Although Lukashenko is not completely subservient to Russia, he is still dependent on Russian economic assistance for the stability of Belarus and his own survival, as the 2011 economic crisis highlights. By June 2011, the years of relative economic stability in Belarus had ended with double-digit inflation, a 36 percent devaluation of the Belarusian ruble, and a shortage of foreign currency reserves. The reduction of Russian oil and gas subsidies in 2010, especially the export of duty-free oil to Belarus, contributed to Belarus’s economic problems. In addition, ahead of the December 2010 elections, Lukashenko increased state wages by 30 percent and ordered banks to relax lending requirements.138 These factors, combined with the lack of structural reforms to Belarus’s economy, resulted in a dramatic increase in the current account deficit, inflation, and a depletion of government reserves. Russia eventually agreed to a $3 billion loan for Belarus, given through the Eurasian Economic Community (composed of the finance ministers of Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). Russia, as the largest donor to the Eurasian Economic Community, manages the organization’s anticrisis fund. However, Russia, not willing to give Belarus assistance for nothing in return, demanded significant concessions from Lukashenko. A major ele-

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ment of the concessions was a program of sweeping privatization that provides an opportunity for Russian companies to purchase statecontrolled assets in Belarus, especially the valuable Beltransgaz, the state-owned natural gas pipeline. The Russian energy company Gazprom already owns 50 percent of Beltransgaz, and Lukashenko has strongly resisted its attempts to buy the remaining half. Despite Russian talk about needed economic reforms, Ramunas Vilpisauskas, director of the Lithuanian International Relations and Political Science Institute, argues that Russian demands for Belarusian privatization in exchange for an emergency loan do not constitute a case of advocating for economic reform, but are instead about a transfer of Belarusian resources to Russia in exchange for financial assistance.139 The economic crisis has eroded Lukashenko’s popularity and forced him to make difficult choices: either become even more dependent on Russia or institute major economic reforms that may erode his domestic political support. The 2011 economic crisis highlights how, despite the contentious nature of the relationship, Belarus is still economically dependent on Russia, and how the Russian government is still willing to provide aid to prop up Lukashenko’s government and prevent any change in regime.

Supporting Authoritarianism in Belarus This narrative illustrates that despite the complexity of the relationship between Belarus and Russia, the Russian government has continued to provide essential support for Lukashenko and thereby enable first the consolidation of authoritarianism and then the continuation of his regime. The Russian government has a variety of motives for why its supports Lukashenko and authoritarianism in Belarus. Russia has economic interests in Belarus, such as its investments in the Belarusian energy industry. However, the economic interests coincide with geopolitical concerns over regime type in Belarus. Belarus without Lukashenko would be more likely to be democratic, which is seen as a geopolitical threat to the Russian government. The Russian leadership believes that the “survival of autocracy at home increasingly depends upon the failure of democracy abroad.”140 Russian leaders equate the advancement of democracy with the loss of influence in the region. Having learned from the success of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Russian

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elites have been actively seeking to prevent democratic diffusion or contagion in the region. In addition to viewing the spread of democracy as a threat, Russia also supports Lukashenko because it wants to avoid total collapse or chaos in a neighboring state. Russia wants a weak government in Belarus subservient to its interests, but not the end of Lukashenko’s regime.141 Russia helped to influence Lukashenko’s strategies during his consolidation of authoritarianism, but the majority of its efforts to promote authoritarianism in Belarus have been focused on increasing Lukashenko’s capabilities to ensure he stays in power. Influencing Lukashenko’s Strategies In considering the three mechanisms external actors can use to change elite strategies—demonstration effects, purposive action, and pressure—we find some interesting results. There is no clear evidence during the first period of mainly warm relations, 1994–2001, that Russia was a model for Belarus. In the 1990s, Russia was more democratic than Belarus. In 1997, Freedom House ranked Russia as 3.50 on electoral process and, as noted earlier, ranked Belarus as 6.00 (with 7 being the most authoritarian).142 There is also little evidence that Lukashenko was learning from Russia about how to repress dissent, eliminate free press, or manipulate elections. However, during the second period, 2002–2012, Belarus learned some methods from Russia for how to prevent a democratic electoral revolution. After the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Russia began to discredit any opposition movements as part of international terrorism. Russia made these claims not only about groups within Russia, but also about Belarus. In 2005, Russian FSB director Nikolai Patrushev claimed that the West was using unspecified terrorist organizations to finance the Belarusian opposition.143 About a year later the Belarusian government used similar methods to discredit the opposition. Just prior to the 2006 presidential election, Belarusian KGB chairman Stsyapan Sukharenka stated that adjoining countries were creating bases to train militants to destabilize Belarus and undertake violent acts against lawenforcement agencies. In addition, according to Sukharenka, the West had provided $5 million “for a coup in Belarus” to oust Lukashenko.144 Belarusian Television, a pro-government station, linked pro-opposition street protests to anti-Belarusian campaigns abroad and shipments of illegal weapons and drugs.145

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In the area of deliberate and collaborate action, Russia clearly influenced the outcome of the 1996 constitutional crisis. Russia did not direct Lukashenko’s decision to institute the referendum, but worked with him to determine the outcome. Another example of Russia sharing strategies with Belarus is how the Russian government contributed the services of Gleb Pavlovsky, a major Russian “spin doctor,” to Lukashenko’s propaganda network during the 2006 presidential election.146 Therefore, Russia undertook deliberate actions to ensure an outcome that strengthened Lukashenko and helped to erode democracy in Belarus. The multiple gas wars and disputes about oil exports demonstrate that Russia is very willing to apply pressure on Lukashenko to make him change policies or to gain control of assets. In many ways, Russia’s economic assistance during the second period (2002–2012) has been a form of conditionality. We generally think of conditionality as a tool states and international organizations use to promote economic and political reform, but in the case of Russia it is a tool to force concessions from the Belarusian government. Russia’s economic assistance comes with “conditions” attached. Lukashenko resists these conditions for as long as possible, but almost always concedes to obtain the needed assistance. However, given that by 2002 Lukashenko had mainly consolidated his rule over Belarus, Russian pressure did not bring about authoritarianism. Furthermore, Russia’s demands were not related to specific actions to change the regime type, but were about economic and political interests. Strengthening Lukashenko’s Capabilities The major method by which Russia promoted authoritarianism was through its support to increase Lukashenko’s capabilities. Russia consistently provided international political support for Lukashenko until approximately 2010. Whenever US and European election observers accused Lukashenko of rigging elections or repressing political opponents, Russia took Belarus’s side. The CIS election observers gave approval and legitimacy to Belarus’s election outcomes and strongly criticized the OSCE’s condemnation of the elections. After the 2006 presidential election, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov accused the OSCE observers of instigating mass protest in Minsk, the capital of Belarus.147 Russian leaders appeared to reduce their political support for Lukashenko in 2010 when they

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allowed negative documentaries about Lukashenko to appear on Russian television, which broadcasts into Belarus. Russia’s stateowned television channel, Channel One, continued with negative coverage of Lukashenko during and after the December 2010 election. Channel One dismissed the “official” result of 80 percent of the voting going to Lukashenko and discussed how fraud had occurred in Belarus. Russian media also covered the protests and detentions in Belarus in a negative light. Therefore, Russia’s public political support for Lukashenko has decreased significantly since 2010. The most important form of support for Lukashenko has been Russia’s economic aid. Without economic assistance from Russia, Lukashenko faces economic crisis. Belarus’s current economic problems are related to the reduction in Russia’s energy subsidy, from 14 percent of GDP to 7 percent.148 Despite Russian irritation at times with Lukashenko, the Russian government has signaled that it does not want regime change in Belarus, and therefore continues to support him. “Russia enjoys the biggest influence in Belarus. It is indeed subsidizing the regime, lending them money.”149 If Russia were to remove its economic support, Lukashenko would face massive economic crisis, an erosion of support, and a higher possibility of widespread challenge to his rule. Russia’s economic assistance to Lukashenko helps to insulate Belarus from the United States and the EU, reducing linkages to democratic states. However, even as Russia has reduced its political support and demanded more concessions in exchange for economic aid, the Russian state has not abandoned Lukashenko. Russia does not want a change in Belarus’s government, because the only change it sees as possible is a movement toward democracy. A democratic Belarus would be a potential ally of the United States and would join the EU and NATO, developments Russia does not want.

Belarus-US/EU Relations, 1994–2012 Russia has not been the only external actor engaged in trying to influence politics and the regime in Belarus. The United States and the European Union, especially over the past decade, have both tried a variety of methods to promote democracy in Belarus, ranging from sanctions to offers of assistance. The United States has discouraged

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US investment in Belarus, limited its interactions with the Belarusian government, adopted financial sanctions against top Belarusian officials, and criticized violations of democracy. The 2004 Belarus Democracy Act prohibits US financial aid to the Belarusian government.150 In January 2012, President Barack Obama signed into law legislation strengthening the sanctions in the 2004 act. The new legislation expanded the list of individuals subject to travel and financial sanctions and called upon the International Ice Hockey Federation to cancel plans to hold the 2014 championships in Belarus. The EU has also repeatedly condemned violations of democracy in Belarus and imposed sanctions. For example, after the suppression of peaceful protests during the 2006 presidential election, the EU issued further visa bans and an asset freeze against top Belarusian officials. 151 The EU has also tried a more “carrot”-based approach, eliminating travel bans and offering deals on trade and visas as well as closer political ties. The violent suppression of protestors after the 2010 presidential election forced the EU to abandon this approach and reinstitute asset freezes and travel bans on about 200 individuals connected to Lukashenko. In addition to these positive and negative incentives, the United States and the EU have tried to support civil society in Belarus, strengthen the opposition, and encourage a fair electoral process through election monitoring. However, despite all of these efforts, the United States and the EU have been unable to influence the regime type. The United States and the European Union have strived to develop prodemocratic civil society in Belarus, but with little significant success. The US Agency for International Development funds organizations that promote democratic governance as well as those that provide social services, such as health and environmental NGOs. USAID programs that emphasize civil society development include its rural and public (urban) club programs. The clubs, managed by local NGOs, provide rural and urban communities with access to information and a forum for discussing local issues. One example is the Baran Public Club, known locally as Stupeni, which used financial and technical support from the USAID programs to work with local businesses and government to improve water quality. 152 Although USAID was active in Belarus during 1996–2004, its programs repeatedly suffered budget shortfalls, limiting their activities. USAID programs only received $3.8 million in fiscal year 2000, down from $6.4 million in fiscal year 1999.153 The lack of adequate

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and consistent funding hampered ongoing programs and efforts in Belarus. After 2004 the funding situation improved. In 2007 and 2008 the US government spent approximately $9 million on building the capacity of NGOs in Belarus, strengthening independent media, and providing technical assistance to democratic parties.154 The US government has been the largest bilateral contributor to civil society development in Belarus. Despite significant EU aid to Belarus, the majority of the funds have gone to activities related to the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. However, in 1997 the EU Commission did establish the Civil Society Development Programme in Belarus, with a budget of 10 million euros.155 From 2000 to 2003 the program supported Belarusian NGOs with training and microgrants. Working with the OSCE, the EU has also sponsored programs in the country to support education, training, and increased awareness about human rights. The EU continues to fund an NGO capacitybuilding project in Belarus. More recently, Poland has taken an active role with democracy assistance to Belarus.156 Efforts to strengthen civil society in Belarus confront many barriers and challenges, primarily because of government repression. In 2005 the Belarusian government regularly banned the use of libraries, hotels, clubs, and movie theaters for NGO meetings or activities.157 Furthermore, USAID and its partner organizations suffer harassment from government security forces. The government of Belarus forced the closure of a nonpartisan civil society development program run by Counterpart Inc., a USAID contractor, in 2004. The Belarusian government refused to allow USAID to establish offices in Belarus, forcing USAID to build offices on US embassy grounds. According to USAID’s 2003 report, one of the greatest challenges for the USAID assistance program this year was the lack of respect by the GOB [government of Belarus] for human rights and freedoms, or commitment to the country’s democratization and economic development. In fact, 2002 demonstrated steadily increasing pressure and physical harassment by the GOB on civil society leaders and activists, political opposition leaders, and independent journalists.158

Government repression restricted the impact of civil society development, especially in regard to strengthening prodemocratic Belarusian elites.

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Along with providing support for Belarusian civil society, the United States and the European Union have also tried to assist prodemocratic opposition parties in Belarus. Beginning in 1997, the International Republican Institute, a US democracy promotion organization, set up programs in Belarus to strengthen political parties. In 2001–2002 the IRI managed a USAID-funded program offering training to political parties in communications, organization, coalition building, and outreach. More recently, the IRI has worked with the United Democratic Forces, a prodemocracy coalition, on its campaign message and campaign strategy. Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists have offered support for the Belarusian socialist parties, including the Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Hramada) and the Belarusian Social Democratic Assembly. The secretary-general of Socialist International, Luis Ayala, has encouraged cooperation among all the Belarusian social democratic parties.159 Similar to civil society development efforts, international assistance to help the Belarusian opposition gain power has been ineffective because of widespread repression. The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has been the main international actor involved in monitoring Belarus’s elections. In 1998 the OSCE established an advisory and monitoring group in Belarus to track the political situation and encourage democratization. After the 2001 presidential election the OSCE’s limited election observation mission in Belarus declared that the “election process failed to meet OSCE commitment for democratic elections as formulated in the 1990 Copenhagen Document and Council of Europe standards.”160 In response to the OSCE’s negative report on the election, the Belarusian government, accusing the organization of working for the opposition political parties, expelled the OSCE advisory and monitoring group from the country. The OSCE was able to open a new mission in 2003 but with only a limited mandate, and the Belarusian government forced the mission to close its office and operations in December 2010. The OSCE and NDI have both provided support to domestic Belarusian election monitors. These monitors formed the Belarusian organization known as Partnership. The Belarusian government repeatedly refused to allow the organization to register and in 2006 arrested several of its leaders, charging them with “slandering the president and illegally running an unregistered organization.”161 Unfortunately, international

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efforts to increase fairness and competition in the political process in Belarus have failed to significantly shift the power balance toward prodemocracy elites or change the behavior of the Belarusian government. Today as throughout the past decade, Belarusian security forces continue to harass, assault, and jail leaders of NGOs, the independent media, and political opposition parties.

Analysis: Why Does Belarus Remain Authoritarian? The substantial efforts by US and European governments and organizations to encourage democracy in Belarus have clearly failed (at least so far), and Belarus remains an authoritarian regime. Why? Russia provides essential support to Lukashenko, enabling him to resist pressure to reform. In addition, there are three other reasons why democracy promotion has failed and Belarus remains an authoritarian regime: (1) the asymmetrical balance of power among elites in favor of autocracy; (2) widespread, deliberate action by the Belarusian government to repress any challenge, intensified by fear of international support for democracy; and (3) greater linkages with Russia than with the United States or the European Union. Asymmetrical Balance of Power The weakness of the Belarusian opposition, partially due to its internal problems and partially due to the repression of the Belarusian government, reduced the effectiveness of democratic international assistance. As Elena Korosteleva argues, the “parties in Belarus are highly fragmented, and have limited influence on voters in the regions. Oppositional party leaders are unable to overcome personal feuds and cannot attempt to campaign uniformly against the President. . . . All parties lack clear ideological doctrine and policy manifestos, especially in terms of economic reforms.” 162 The opposition to Lukashenko consisted of a “fractious and disparate group of politicians, civic leaders and students.”163 Opposition political parties in Belarus were unable to unite or resolve internal differences. Furthermore, through the first decade of Lukashenko’s rule, he was popular with many Belarusian voters, in contrast to the lack of public support for the opposition parties. Polling from 2003 shows that the highest

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level of support any opposition party received was 7.5 percent.164 More recently, the opposition has had greater coordination, but in the 2010 election there were still over half a dozen candidates, the main ones including Ales Mikhalevich, Uladzimer Nyaklyaeu, Andrei Sannikov, Vital Rymasheuski, and Yaroslav Romanchuk. The diversity of candidates represents a continuing lack of unity among the opposition. Overall, there is no clear, credible, charismatic leader of the opposition in Belarus, contributing to its weakness. The balance of power in Belarus is clearly on Lukashenko’s side. Government Repression Lukashenko’s control over the coercive apparatus enables him to prevent the opposition from gaining any strength and demonstrates the autocratic nature of his regime. Belarusian officials have repeatedly and continually harassed, attacked, and imprisoned any potential opposition leaders. One of the most serious and well-known instances of political violence was the 1999–2000 “disappearances” of opposition-party leaders Yury Zakharenko and Viktor Gonchar, along with businessman Anatoly Krasovsky and television cameraman Dmitri Zavadsky. Many in Belarus speculate that government security forces murdered all four men. There are other documented cases of political violence, such as when the secret police almost beat opposition leader Anatoly Lebedko to death. After the 2006 presidential election, the government arbitrarily jailed opposition leaders to prevent protests about the rampant electoral fraud from developing. The high degree of repression in Belarus is one reason why the country was placed on Freedom House’s “Worst of the Worst” list in 2010. Most recently, the Belarusian government arrested and jailed many presidential candidates in the 2010 election, including Andrei Sannikov and Pavel Sieviarynets. The government harasses and persecutes not only politicians, but also any independent, critical voice. Slandering the president is a criminal offense in Belarus, giving the government significant latitude with which to restrict any opposition. In June 2002 a Belarusian court, broadly interpreting the antidefamation law, sentenced two reporters of the independent newspaper Pahonya to two years of hard labor for libeling Lukashenko during the 2001 presidential campaign.165 Security forces have arrested people for holding candles in public, participating in silent protest commemorating the “disappear-

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ances,” and discussing the country abroad (an illegal action).166 A new law passed in 2005 made organizing a public protest illegal and punishable by three to five years in prison.167 Government forces, especially the KGB, also harass NGO organizations. Members of youth organizations, such as Zubr and Khopits, have been threatened, attacked, and arrested. The government regularly monitors their communication and restricts their activities. In one case, security forces threatened a student with expulsion from university for talking with a US reporter and with presidential candidate Alaksandar Milinkevich.168 The 2010 ruling that people entering Internet cafes must show identification and that such cafes must track their visitors for a full year demonstrates how the Belarusian security forces continue to monitor and suppress any potential dissident activity. The promotion of democracy has had the unintended effect of intensifying Lukashenko’s efforts to weaken the opposition and civil society in Belarus. Lukashenko, like Russian elites, learned from the success of the Orange Revolution in neighboring Ukraine. Vladimir Silitski documents how since gaining power in 1994 Lukashenko has systematically and deliberately sought to prevent any challenges to his rule.169 Continually fearful of any threats to his power, Lukashenko tries to preempt any potential opposition, which includes US and European attempts to promote democracy. After the Orange Revolution, Lukashenko ordered the Belarusian KGB to resist the export of democracy to Belarus.170 Belarusian elites studied how Ukrainian electoral revolution occurred and believed that international democracy promotion efforts were important for its success. Therefore, the government took specific actions to prevent any similar strategies from being adopted in Belarus. These actions included arresting the leaders of independent youth movements, forcing the closure of the Belarusian election-monitoring organization Partnership, making it illegal to participate in activities tied to unregistered NGOs, and making it impossible to register most NGOs.171 After 2004 the Belarusian government became very restrictive about allowing any international NGO activity or funding, making external efforts to develop prodemocratic Belarusian capabilities almost impossible. International democracy activists, such as IRI and NDI employees, have been unable to open offices in Belarus or even obtain visas to enter the country. The Belarusian government also barred the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), a US-funded agency involved in providing technical assistance to Belarusian media, from operating in the country.

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Competing International Linkages A weak Belarusian democratic opposition, severe repression, and deliberate efforts by Lukashenko to counter any attempts to promote democracy all help explain why the promotion of democracy has failed and why Belarus remains the last dictatorship in Europe. The multiple linkages between Belarus and Russia explain why Lukashenko and other Belarusian elites have been receptive to Russian assistance, even as they sometimes resent Russia’s dominance. The pattern of Belarus-Russian relations illustrates the cost to Lukashenko of accepting Russian aid. Furthermore, given Lukashenko’s significant initial popularity in Belarus, he could have won fair and free elections. Therefore, accepting Russian assistance was not always Lukashenko’s only choice. Strong economic, cultural, and historical ties with Russia influenced Belarusian elites’ decision to pursue relations with Russia over the European Union and United States. There are clearly strong economic ties between Belarus and Russia, involving both economic dependency and major transfers of resources. In contrast, for much of Lukashenko’s rule, Belarus has had weak economic relations with the EU (see Table 2.2). In 2003, Belarusian trade with EU member states was worth only approximately $4 billion, one-fifth of total Belarusian trade.172 After the East Central European states joined the EU, the percentage of Belarusian exports to the EU did double. If Belarus’s exports to the EU continue to grow and its trade with Russia continues to shrink, some argue that this may result in EU pressure having a greater impact. However, the events of 2010 and 2011 suggest that this is very unlikely. The EU offered Belarus a $4.2 billion aid package if Lukashenko would allow a fair and free election in December 2010. 173 Given the electoral fraud in that election and the attacks on the opposition afterward, Lukashenko clearly rejected this deal. The combination of significant economic assistance from Russia, low levels of trade and investment with Europe, and the low possibility of EU membership means the incentives offered by the Americans and Europeans to democratize have little value for most Belarusian elites. In addition to strong economic linkages, Belarusians and Russians share a common history and have strong cultural and social ties. Many Russians view Belarus as closely tied to Russia or even as still part of the country, as Russia controlled Belarusian territory for much of the past several hundred years. Russians also focus on the long cultural and religious ties between the countries. Russian for-

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eign minister Sergei Lavrov said that relations with Belarus “are based upon the historical spiritual and cultural similarity, interconnected economic interests, close ties between people.”174 The rhetoric used by Belarusian leaders over the years highlights how elites exploit positive relations with Russia to increase their public support. For example, in the last free election, in 1994, both Vyacheslav Kebich and Lukashenko campaigned on supporting reintegration with Russia. During the campaign, Lukashenko claimed that the Belarusian people, “from the depths of its soul,” longed for union with Russia.175 The issue of national identity has affected Russia’s relationship with Belarus and made some Belarusians more receptive to Russian engagement. Belarusians and Russians (along with Ukrainians) share a common Slavic identity. Belarus had almost no experience with independence prior to 1991 and had low levels of nationalism. In Belarus there are a variety of views about Russia, but many Belarusians strongly identify with Russia and seek a close relationship. Although recently there has been a reduction in public support for a union with Russia, in 1999 nearly 80 percent of Belarusians supported integration, because “Russians and Belarusians are historically one people, they are spiritually close, and have similar languages, cultures, and traditions.”176 In 2001, almost 60 percent of Belarusians said Russian president Vladimir Putin was an ideal head of state, 25 percent more than those who selected Lukashenko.177 Another survey found that only 50 percent of Belarusians regarded themselves as a separate nation, with 43 percent saying that they were part of a triune nation consisting of Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians.178 As relations with Russia deteriorated because of the conflict over natural gas, public opinion shifted. In March 2010, only 32 percent of Belarusians said they would vote in favor of a union with Russia.179 However, during the first decade of Lukashenko’s rule, while he was consolidating his power, support for integration was around 50 percent. The positive views of Putin and Russia made accepting assistance from Russia more popular and less costly. In contrast, Belarusians were not as supportive of integration into the EU compared to most postcommunist states. Support for EU membership generally averaged out to about 40 percent in Belarus, compared to 80 percent in some preaccession states such as Romania. 180 NATO has an especially negative view among Belarusians, with

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almost 37 percent viewing the accession of the Baltic states into NATO as a threat to Belarus.181 The natural gas disputes and Russia’s demands for closer integration illustrate how accepting support from Russia carries costs for Lukashenko. However, the strong linkages between the two countries reduce those costs and increase the benefits, especially compared to the alternative of pursuing closer relations with the EU and United States. Russia’s assistance helped Lukashenko in establishing an autocratic regime and has aided him in maintaining it since 1994. Russian support, combined with a weak opposition, strong state coercion, and weak linkages with Western Europe and the United States, explains the failure of democracy promotion and the persistence of authoritarianism in Belarus. Without Russian support, Belarus would have been more likely to follow the paths of its Baltic neighbors and establish a more democratic form of government.

Conclusion In the cases of Ukraine and Belarus, we see the influence of both democratic diffusion (Ukraine’s Orange Revolution) and authoritarian diffusion (Lukashenko and Yanukovych learning from Russia). Furthermore, in both countries, Russia worked deliberately and collaboratively with illiberal elites to develop strategies for gaining or maintaining power. Russia also provided both countries with economic aid and political support to strengthen illiberal elites. However, only in the case of Ukraine did Russia provide direct financial assistance to any political party or campaign. In Belarus, in contrast, Lukashenko did not need money to run an election campaign, but he did need economic aid to maintain economic stability. Russia adapted its strategies for promoting authoritarianism to fit the situation. The different regime outcomes in Ukraine and Belarus reflect the importance of domestic factors, especially the size, unity, and strength of the democratic opposition. However, the influence of external involvement and its varying levels of effectiveness interact with the domestic factors to produce the regime outcomes. Without Russia’s long-term economic support, Lukashenko would have been forced to adopt economic reforms, which although not guaranteeing democracy would have produced stronger linkages with the EU and

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provided more opportunities for democracy. The Belarusian government’s continued control over 70 percent of the economy contributes to its ability to control politics. In contrast, US and European support for Yushchenko increased his legitimacy and power in the key moments of the 2004 protests. What is equally interesting is what we do not see in these cases. There is no evidence of Russia changing elite regime preferences from democratic to authoritarian. We do not see any attempts to develop pro-Russian civil society or Russia offering major aid for repression. There are also no ideological linkages. Despite the common legacy of communism, Russia is not advocating a particular ideological vision and neither is Lukashenko or Yanukovych. The linkages are economic, cultural, and historical, not ideological. In contrast, the other cases explored in this book—Venezuela in Nicaragua and Peru, and Iran in Lebanon—all have an ideological component. Russia’s efforts to support authoritarianism in its region are some of the strongest and most direct forms of promotion of authoritarianism around the world. Its relative success suggests that external support for authoritarianism can, under the right conditions, influence regime outcomes and reduce the likelihood of democracy. The remaining chapters examine whether or not the promotion of authoritarianism is restricted to Russia and if not, how it occurs elsewhere in the world.

Notes 1. Freedom House, “Ukraine Country Report,” in Nations in Transit 2004, www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=347&year=2004 (accessed October 28, 2008). 2. Ukraine’s rankings on electoral process moved from 4.25 (2004) to 3.50 (2009), on civil society from 3.75 (2004) to 2.75 (2009), and on independence of the media from 5.50 (2009) to 3.50 (2009), with the lower numbers representing a more democratic process. Freedom House, “Ukraine Country Report,” in Nations in Transit 2009, www.freedomhouse.org /uploads/nit/2009/Ukraine-final.pdf (accessed June 14, 2010). 3. Polity IV, www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Ukraine2008.pdf (accessed June 13, 2011). Unfortunately, since Yanukovych’s election in 2010, there has been an erosion of press freedom and increased pressure on the opposition, leading to concerns about a slide into authoritarianism.

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4. Roman Kupchinsky, “Ukraine: Why Putin Voted for Yanukovych,” RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report 6, no. 41 (November 10, 2004), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1344002.html (accessed June 21, 2012). 5. Maksymiuk, “Ukraine: Presidential Race Becomes More and More Unseemly,” RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report 6, no. 36 (October 8, 2004), http://archive.rferl.org/reports/pbureport/2004/10/36-081004.asp (accessed October 30, 2008). 6. National Democratic Institute (NDI), “Preliminary Statement of the NDI International Election Observer Delegation to Ukraine’s December 26, 2004, Repeat of Presidential Runoff Election.” 7. Jan Maksymiuk, “Ukraine: The Game with No Rule Book,” RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report 6, no. 39 (October 26, 2004), http://archive.rferl.org /reports/pbureport/2004/10/39-261004.asp (accessed October 30, 2008). 8. Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, p. 96. 9. NDI, “Preliminary Statement.” 10. Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, p. 106. 11. Ibid., p. 1. 12. Karatnycky, “The Fall and Rise of Ukraine’s Political Opposition,” p. 37. 13. Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” 14. Ibid. 15. For more information on the Orange Revolution, see Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution; Åslund and McFaul, Revolution in Orange. 16. “Dear Viktor, You’re Dead, Love Dmitry,” p. 47. 17. Riabchuk, “What’s Left of Orange Ukraine?” 18. Kupchinsky, “Ukraine.” 19. “President Hampers Ukraine’s European Integration-Opposition Leader.” 20. Ibid. 21. Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, p. 93. 22. Prior to the elections Yanukovych had supported NATO membership for Ukraine, at a meeting of the Ukrainian diaspora in Moscow in October 2004, Yanukovych pledged that Ukraine would not enter NATO, but that it would continue to cooperate with the organization. Jan Maksymiuk, “Ukraine: The Kremlin Goes for Yanukovych,” RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report 6, no. 37 (October 12, 2004), www.rferl.org/content /article/1343998.html (accessed January 27, 2012). 23. “More Ukrainians Want Union with Russia Than with EU.” 24. Petrov and Ryabov, “Russia’s Role,” p. 157. 25. Ibid., p. 148. 26. Dyczok, “Breaking Through the Information Blockade,” p. 257. 27. Tatiana Silina, “Ukrainian’s National Pride,” Zerkalo Nedeli 44 (October 30, 2004), www.mw.ua/1000/1030/48223 (accessed October 30, 2008).

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28. Petrov and Ryabov, “Russia’s Role,” p. 147. 29. Jan Maksymiuk, “Ukraine in Turmoil After Presidential Vote,” RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report 6, no. 43 (November 23, 2004), http://archive.rferl.org/reports/pbureport/2004/11/43-231104.asp (accessed October 30, 2008). 30. Chivers, “Ukraine Premier Is Named Winner.” 31. Petrov and Ryabov, “Russia’s Role,” p. 153. 32. Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, p. 118. 33. Petrov and Ryabov, “Russia’s Role,” p. 152. 34. Andrew Wilson provides a well-documented summary of the types of election fraud that occurred. He reports that the Committee of Voters of Ukraine determined that 85,000 officials were involved in election fraud. See Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, p. 119. 35. Petrov and Ryabov, “Russia’s Role,” p. 150. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid., p. 161. 38. “Ukraine’s Yanukovych Poised to Win Poll After Upping Pensions.” 39. Maksymiuk, “Ukraine: The Kremlin Goes for Yanukovych.” 40. “Moscow’s Maneuvers in Ukraine.” 41. McFaul, “Ukraine Imports Democracy,” p. 48. 42. In an interview, Vladyslav Kaskiv, a Pora coordinator, denied receiving any funding from international sources. Julie Corwin, “East: Regime Change on the Cheap,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (April 19, 2005), www.rferl.org/content/article/1058543.html (accessed June 1, 2010). 43. Jan Maksymiuk, “Ukraine: Are Authorities Afraid of ‘Georgian Scenario’ in Presidential Election?” RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report 6, no. 38 (October 20, 2004), www.rferl.org/content/article/1055431.html (accessed April 13, 2012). 44. Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, p. 187. 45. Further information on Pora and its campaign in 2004 is available at http://pora.org.ua/eng (accessed October 30, 2008). 46. Vladyslav Kaskiv, “Pora—Vanguard of Democracy: A Case Study of the Civic Campaign Pora and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine,” http://pora.org.ua/eng/content/view/2985/325 (accessed October 30, 2008). 47. Laverty, “The Problem of Lasting Change,” p. 152. 48. Sushko and Prystayko, “Western Influence,” p. 135. 49. Jeffrey Clark with Jason Stout, “Elections, Revolutions, and Democracy in Ukraine” Development Associates, SEAUP Project, (October 2005), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADE309.pdf (accessed September 30, 2011). 50. Diuk, “Ukraine’s Future and U.S. Interests,” p. 82. 51. Chivers, “Ukraine Premier Is Named Winner.” 52. Weir, “The East-West Stakes over Ukraine.” 53. Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, p. 138.

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54. ENEMO, “1,000 Strong Election Observation Mission Releases Election Statement” (November 22, 2004), www.ndi.org/node/13359 (accessed May 31, 2010). 55. Dyczok, “Breaking Through the Information Blockade,” p. 257. 56. US Agency for International Development (USAID), “Rising Democracy 2005,” p. 12, www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance /publications/pdfs/democracy_rising.pdf. 57. McFaul, “Ukraine Imports Democracy,” p. 75. 58. Ibid., p. 48. 59. Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, p. 139. 60. Ibid., p. 138. 61. Sushko and Prystayko, “Western Influence,” p. 140. 62. Karatnycky, “The Fall and Rise of Ukraine’s Political Opposition,” p. 37. 63. Ibid., p. 39. 64. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between Ukrainian and Russian people both within Ukraine and between the states, see Lieven, Ukraine and Russia, pp. 150–151. 65. “Ukraine’s Yanukovych Poised to Win Poll After Upping Pensions.” 66. Ibid. 67. Grigor’Ev, Agibalov, and Salikhov, “Ukraine,” p. 20. 68. Ibid., p. 15. 69. Götz, “Ukraine and Belarus,” p. 155. 70. Bugajski, Cold Peace, p. 88. 71. Åslund, Ukraine’s Future and U.S. Interest, p. 28. 72. Bugajski, Cold Peace, p. 89. 73. In 1995, 44 percent of Ukraine’s exports went to Russia, compared to only 18 percent in 2004. Data from National Bank of Ukraine, reprinted in Economist Intelligence Unit, World Data Annual Time Series, 2006. 74. Jackson, “The Role of External Factors,” p. 108. 75. Karatnycky and Motyl, “The Key to Kiev.” 76. Weir, “Ukraine’s Leaders Bicker as Economy Burns.” 77. Mostova, “On the Cost of Mistakes and Price of Independence.” 78. “Pipe Down; Russia, Ukraine, and Gas.” 79. Mostova, “Compromise and Life Thereafter.” 80. “Dear Viktor, You’re Dead, Love Dmitry.” 81. Pavel Korduban, “Will Yanukovych’s Reform Plan Convince IMF?” Eurasia Daily Monitor 7 (June 16, 2010), www.jamestown.org/programs /edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36500&tx_ttnews[backPid]=484&no_cache =1 (May 18, 2011). 82. “Putin to Test Ukraine’s Resolve on EU Trade Talks,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (April 12, 2011), www.rferl.org/content/russia_to_test _ukraine_resolve_on_eu_trade/3554701.html (accessed May 17, 2011). 83. Pavel Korduban, “Vladimir Putin, Moscow Mayor, and Patriarch Kirill Promote Russian Interests in Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 7 (July

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28, 2010), www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[swords] =8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]= Ukraine&tx_ttnews[pointer]=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36675&tx_ttnews[back Pid]=7&cHash=5ad2957978 (accessed September 25, 2010). 84. Robert Coalson, “Kremlin’s Ruling Party Ties Across the Former Soviet Union,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (September 29, 2010), www.rferl.org/articleprintview/2171505.html (accessed September 30, 2010). 85. See Freedom House’s Nations in Transit annual reports on Russia for more details about violations of press freedom. 86. Alexa Chopivsky, “Press Freedom Under Threat in Ukraine,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (September 10, 2010), www.rferl.org/content /press_freedom_under_threat_in_ukraine/2153957.html (accessed September 7, 2011). 87. Taras Kuzio, “SBU Targets Opposition in Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 7 (August 16, 2010), www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache =1&tx _ttnews [swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews [any_of _the_words]=Ukraine&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36761&tx_ttnews[back Pid]=7&cHash=33091175d5 (accessed September 25, 2010). 88. Sydorenko, “On the Road to Democracy.” 89. Irena Chalupa, “They Didn’t Eat Cake,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (June 8, 2011), www.rferl.org/content/ukraine_press_freedom /24227893.html (accessed October 2, 2011). 90. Chopivsky, “Press Freedom Under Threat in Ukraine.” 91. Pavel Korduban, “Ukrainian Government Denies Accusations of Bias Against Opposition Journalists,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 7 (June 24, 2010), www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[swords]=8fd 5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Ukraine &tx_ttnews[pointer]=2&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36522&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=5431d37b9e (accessed September 25, 2010). 92. NDI, “NDI Sees Deterioration in Ukraine’s Election Environment and Urges Improvements,” www.ndi.org/Ukraine_local_elections_2010 _statement (accessed March 4, 2011). 93. “Ukrainian Opposition Leader Calls Local Elections ‘Dirtiest,’ ‘Most Unfair.’” 94. Pavel Korduban, “Will Ukraine Adopt a One Party System?” Eurasia Daily Monitor 7 (July 16, 2010), www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache =1&tx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews [any_of_the_words]=Ukraine&tx_ttnews[pointer]=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3 6628&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=e35fd794f0 (accessed September 25, 2010). 95. Korduban, “Will Ukraine Adopt a One Party System?” 96. Freedom House, “Belarus,” p. 102. 97. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2004, www.freedomhouse .org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=328&year=2004 (accessed May 24, 2010).

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98. Freedom House, “Belarus Country Report,” in Nations in Transit 2009, www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/nit/2009/Belarus-final.pdf (accessed June 14, 2010). 99. Polity IV 2009, www.systemicpeace.org/polity/blr2.htm. 100. Silitski, “Explaining Post-Communist Authoritarianism in Belarus,” pp. 45–46. 101. Sannikov (international coordinator for Charter 97), “Testimony for Belarus: Back in the USSR?” p. 29. 102. Bugajski, Cold Peace, p. 72. 103. “Russian Duma Observers Recognize the Legitimacy of Belarus Polls.” 104. “President Says Open to EU, USA, Thanks Putin for Support.” 105. Bugajski, Cold Peace, p. 65. 106. Ibid., p. 71. 107. Shushkevich, “Belarus: To Democracy Through Neo-Communism,” p. 59. 108. Jan Maksymiuk, “Belarus: Freedom to Submit,” p. 36. 109. Rontoyanni, “Belarus and the East,” p. 132. 110. White and Korosteleva. “Lukashenko and Postcommunist Presidency,” p. 71. 111. Wilson, “Lukashenko’s Game Is Up,” p. 278. 112. In 2003, Belarus paid only $29 per thousand cubic meters of gas, when Ukraine paid $50 and Western Europe $110. Alex Kudrytcki, “Belarus: Gas Wars,” Transitions Online (September 2–8, 2003), www.ciaonet .org/pbei/tol/tol_2003/sep2-8/sep2-8_f.html (accessed October 23, 2008). 113. Nesvetailova, “Russia and Belarus,” p. 158. 114. Rontoyanni, “Belarus and the East,” p. 130. 115. Ibid., p. 130. 116. Wilson, “Lukashenko’s Game Is Up,” p. 278. 117. Dumasy, “Belarus’ Relations with the European Union,” p. 185. 118. Hancock, “The Semi-Sovereign State,” p. 122. 119. Zlotnikov, “Possibilities for the Development of a Private Economic Sector,” p. 145. 120. Fred Weir, “Belarus Economy Appears to Unravel,” Christian Science Monitor (April 18, 2011), www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2011 /0418/Belarus-economy-appears-to-unravel-in-wake-of-terror-attack -crackdown (accessed August 22, 2011). 121. Ambrosio, “The Political Success of Russia-Belarus Relations,” p. 420. 122. Rontoyanni, “A Russo-Belarusian ‘Union State.’” 123. Marples, “Is the Russia-Belarus Union Obsolete?” p. 33. 124. “Bear Hug.” 125. Jan Maksymiuk, “Belarus: Lukashenka Backs Down in Gas Row with Moscow,” RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report 6, no. 7 (March 2, 2004), http://archive.rferl.org/reports/pbureport/2004/03/7-020304.asp.

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126. Nygren, “Putin’s Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region,” p. 7. 127. Kramer, “Ukraine Considers Selling Pipeline Control.” 128. Hryb, “Russia Threatens to Decrease Oil Export Quotas.” 129. Ibid. 130. Rodova and Rudnitsky, “Russia Resumes Crude Supplies to Belarus.” 131. Numbers are given in power purchasing parity (PPP). CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos /rs.html (accessed April 7, 2012). 132. Hancock, “The Semi-Sovereign State,” p. 130. 133. Ibid., p. 127. 134. Ambrosio, “The Political Success of Russia-Belarus Relations,” p. 414. 135. Alyaksandr Kudrytski and Dzmitry Markusheuski, “Belarus: Referen-doom,” Transitions Online (October 19–25, 2004), www.ciaonet.org /pbei-2/tol-1/tol_2004/oct19-25/oct19-25b.html (accessed October 23, 2008). 136. Silitski, “Contagion Deterred,” p. 297. 137. Levy, “Electoral Rot Nearby?” 138. Norton, “Belarus: Russia Crucial to Quashing Devaluation Fears.” 139. “Belarus’ Financial Crisis Pushing Minsk to Russia’s Embrace.” 140. Silitski, “Contagion Deterred,” p. 275. 141. Wilson, “Lukashenko’s Game Is Up,” p. 281. 142. Freedom House, “Russia,” in Nations in Transit 2003, www .freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2003/russia (accessed May 18, 2012). 143. Silitski, “Contagion Deterred,” p. 297. 144. Jan Maksymiuk, “Belarus: Spy Agencies Open Presidential Election Season for Belarus,” RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report 7, no. 19 (May 17, 2005), http://archive.rferl.org/reports/pbureport/2005/05 /19-170505.asp (accessed October 28, 2008). 145. Ibid. 146. Silitski, “Contagion Deterred,” p. 297. 147. “Russian Foreign Minister Accuses OSCE of Instigating Protests,” Belapan News Line (March 24, 2006), http://elections.belapan .com/president2006/eng/show.php?show=49325 (accessed June 4, 2006). 148. “Lukashenka at Bay.” 149. “Belarus’ Financial Crisis Pushing Minsk to Russia’s Embrace.” 150. Human Rights Watch, “Country Summary: Belarus” (January 2005), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/belaru9878.htm (accessed October 28, 2008). 151. European Commission, “EU-Belarus Relations” (November 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/pdf/political_legal_foundations _en.pdf (accessed October 28, 2008).

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152. USAID, “Belarus Civil Society Strengthening Program Final Report” (April 2003), http://dec.usaid.gov/index.cfm?p=search.getCitation &CFID=17340211&CFTOKEN=58921112&id=s_09EC586E-D566-FC5C -D178425904D9A07D&rec_no=138169 (accessed May 23, 2011). 153. USAID, “Belarus Results Review and Resource Request, 30 May 2000,” http://dec.usaid.gov/index.cfm?p=search.getSQLResults&q_descrgeo =Belarus (accessed May 19, 2010). 154. US Department of State, “Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Belarus” (January 20, 2009), www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/107776.htm (accessed October 22, 2009). 155. European Commission, “Country Strategy Report: National Indicative Programme, Belarus, 2005–2006” (adopted May 28, 2004), http://ec .europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/csp/05_06_en.pdf (accessed May 20, 2010). 156. Pospieszna, “When Recipients Become Donors.” 157. USAID, “Belarus Civil Society Strengthening Program Final Report.” 158. USAID, “Belarus Annual Report FY 2003,” http://dec.usaid.gov /index.cfm?p=search.getSQLResults&q_descrgeo=Belarus (accessed May 20, 2010). 159. Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Hramada), “General Secretary of the Socialist International Luis Ayala” (May 25, 2006), http://bsdp .org/?q=en/node/1196 (accessed May 19, 2011). 160. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2004, www.freedomhouse .org /template.cfm?page=47&nit=328&year=2004 (accessed May 24, 2010). 161. NDI, “Statement of Patrick Merloe Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe of the United States Congress” (March 2006), www.ndi.org/node/13562 (accessed May 23, 2011). 162. Korosteleva, “Party System Development in Post-Communist Belarus,” p. 77. 163. Kennicott, “With Simple Tools, Activists in Belarus Build a Movement.” 164. Marples, “The Prospects for Democracy in Belarus,” p. 37. 165. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Country Report: Belarus (2003),” http://old.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=344 &year=2003 (accessed May 17, 2012). 166. “Waving the Denim.” 167. Myers, “Bringing Down Europe’s Last Ex-Soviet Dictator.” 168. Ibid. 169. Silitski, “Contagion Deterred.” 170. Ibid., p. 289. 171. Ibid., pp. 289–290. 172. Shimov, “The Effect of European Union Expansion,” p. 14.

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173. “On the Verge of Economic Disaster,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (April 8, 2011), www.rferl.org/content/belarus_turns_to_russia_on _verge_of_ecenomic_collapse/3549085.html (accessed May 17, 2012). 174. “Russian Minister Says West’s Pressure on Belarus Has No Prospects.” 175. Burant, “Foreign Policy and National Identity,” p. 1136. 176. Rontoyanni, “Belarus and the East,” p. 134. 177. Zaiko, “Belarus: Give a Dog a Bad Name,” p. 97. 178. Rontoyanni, “Belarus and the East,” p. 134. 179. Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS), March 2010 National Opinion Survey, Geopolitical Orientations, www.iiseps.org/epress10.html (accessed June 15, 2010). 180. “Belarusians Prefer Closer Ties with Russia.” 181. Zaiko, “Belarus: Give a Dog a Bad Name,” p. 100.

3 Venezuela in Nicaragua and Peru: Chávez’s Varying Spheres of Influence

In the previous chapter we saw how Russia used its control over

energy resources and the economic dependency of Ukraine and Belarus to support autocratic leaders. Russia provided both demonstration effects and resources to increase the capabilities of illiberal domestic allies in each country. Is Russia’s promotion of authoritarianism unique, or are other states involved in similar actions? This chapter examines the influence of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez in Latin America. Since becoming president in 1999, Chávez has sought to challenge US influence in Latin America and promote “twenty-first-century socialism,” or Bolivarism, throughout the region. Taking advantage of Venezuela’s oil wealth, Chávez has offered financial and political support to leaders with similar ideological views, such as Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Chávez has a combination of ideological and strategic reasons for supporting these leaders. Chávez desires to spread his version of an illiberal, socialist regime and to counterbalance US influence in the region. Venezuela gains very little economically from these relationships, as Chávez expends more resources than the country gains. Chávez’s remarkable success in maintaining power for over a decade also provides a strong model for other leaders in the region. Chávez’s support has, at minimum, aided the con-

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tinuation of illiberal regimes, and in some cases, such as Nicaragua, helped the development of more autocratic governments. However, Chávez’s efforts to encourage ideologically similar regimes have not always succeeded, the most obvious case being Peru. In 2006, Chávez’s support for Peruvian presidential candidate Ollanta Humala contributed to Humala’s electoral defeat. This chapter investigates how Chávez has supported authoritarianism in the region through providing a model of how to suppress democracy and by offering financial aid to allies. I use Nicaragua as a case because of Chávez’s strong support for its illiberal leader, Daniel Ortega, and because of the clear erosion of democracy since Ortega’s election in 2006. I also examine how domestic factors help to explain why Chávez’s efforts failed in Peru. The Latin American cases provide an interesting comparison to the cases from Eastern Europe. Despite the significant and obvious regional differences, several of the mechanisms to change elite strategies and increase elite capabilities are the same. The Venezuelan government and the Russian government both provide resources for economic stability and direct financing for the political campaigns of allies. However, there are two major differences between the regions. First, ideology is much more important in the Latin American cases than in the Eastern European ones. Second, the United States faces greater difficulties in promoting democracy in Latin America than in Eastern Europe, because of its negative history of supporting repressive authoritarian regimes during the Cold War. The issue of economic ideology, especially negative reactions to neoliberal economic policy, also colors efforts by the United States to promote democracy. Nicaragua and Peru provide an important comparison, because both Latin American countries have been recipients of recent efforts to promote democracy and to support authoritarianism from the same external actors (the United States and Venezuela, respectively). In addition, there are several important similarities between the countries: both suffered from internal conflict in the latter half of the twentieth century, both are illiberal democracies, and until recently both were among the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere. However, there are several interesting differences, such as Peru’s recent rapid economic growth. There has also been more US involvement in Nicaraguan politics than in Peruvian politics. These similarities and differences help to highlight the importance of the causal mechanisms and independent variables.

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Nicaragua: Ortega and Chávez’s Friendship There is a long history of foreign intervention in Nicaraguan politics, especially by the United States. Since the Monroe Doctrine the United States has generally treated Central America as part of its sphere of influence. The rise of Hugo Chávez and his model of “twenty-first-century socialism” challenged US influence in Latin America, especially in Nicaragua. Chávez’s stated goal of establishing a “Bolivarian democracy,” a regime that expands the participation of the poor and dismantles the old political and economic order, appeals to Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega. Both Chávez and Ortega have populist, leftist backgrounds. Chávez and Ortega share socialist norms and values. After Ortega won the election in 2006, Chávez said that “he and Ortega would be ‘uniting as never before’ to construct a socialist future.”1 The demonstration effect of Chávez’s success in Venezuela along with his major financial support for Ortega have interacted with Nicaraguan domestic politics and the legacy of US involvement in the country to erode democracy in Nicaragua. Chávez’s guidance and support have helped Ortega maintain power and enable his autocratic policies. Ortega, learning from Chávez’s experience, has adopted strategies to restrict media freedom, prevent fair and free elections, and subvert democratic institutions. Although the United States has promoted democracy in Nicaragua for the past two decades, its support has been unable to prevent the development of a more autocratic regime. The negative legacy of US involvement in Nicaragua, especially during the conflict of the 1980s, combined with Chávez’s support, has eroded US influence and leverage over the country. The interaction of local Nicaraguan politics, Venezuelan support, and US democracy promotion efforts has produced an increasing illiberal Nicaragua. Daniel Ortega, the leader of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), was elected president of Nicaragua for a second time in 2006 and a third time in 2011. Ortega was previously president from 1985 to 1990. Ortega, lacking widespread political support in Nicaragua, managed to win in 2006 only by manipulating the electoral system. In 2000, Ortega orchestrated an agreement to reduce the percentage of the vote required to win in the first round of presidential elections from 45 percent to only 35 percent. Therefore, in 2006, after three previous failed presidential bids, Ortega was able to win the presidency with just 38 percent of the vote. Since taking office,

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Ortega has systematically consolidated his power and eroded democracy. In 2006, Freedom House ranked civil and political rights in Nicaragua as 3 (on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being the most authoritarian). By 2009, Nicaragua’s political rights had become more authoritarian, with a ranking of 4.2 Furthermore, Nicaragua has become a “country in which the parts of the state that are supposed to check the president’s power—courts, prosecutors, Congress, supposedly impartial agencies like the election commission—are controlled by the president.”3 Moreover, while the 2006 elections were free and fair, the 2008 municipal elections were quite different. Ortega refused access to both domestic and international election observers in 2008. Leading up to the November municipal elections, the government disqualified two opposition parties, had police raid the offices of critical journalists, and investigated fifteen nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including Oxfam, for money laundering and subversion.4 Independent groups strongly suspect that electoral fraud occurred in the capital city’s mayoral election. For several days after the elections, supporters of rival political parties engaged in angry confrontations, including exploding handmade mortars around the city. The Carter Center expressed significant concerns about the lack of transparency and democracy in the 2008 municipal elections. Among other concerns, the Carter Center’s statement mentions the failure to grant credentials to domestic observer organizations.5 In 2011, the Nicaraguan government again limited the access of domestic and international election observers. The Nicaraguan election-monitoring organization Ética y Transparencia (Ethics and Transparency) declared that the “electoral process was not fair, honest, or credible.”6 European Union and Organization of American States (OAS) electoral observer missions both denounced the lack of transparency in the 2011 elections, especially the fact that monitors were denied entry into multiple polling stations. These developments all demonstrate a shift toward a more authoritarian government in Nicaragua since Ortega’s election in 2006.

Learning to Be Bad The Demonstration Effect of Chávez Chávez’s activities in Venezuela have provided a demonstration effect for Ortega. Ortega learned successful strategies for maintain-

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ing power and eliminating challenges to his authority from Chávez’s experience. For example, Chávez and then Ortega manipulated the electoral process (e.g., changing electoral laws) to maintain power, instead of using force to seize power. Ortega’s current presidency involves autocratic activities that differ from those of his first presidency (1985–1990), suggesting the influence of Chávez. The strong ideological ties between Ortega and Chávez make authoritarian diffusion more likely and successful. Chávez and Ortega’s relationship is an example of identity convergence, a process where “political actors strategically emphasize shared norms and values . . . in pursuit of particular political goals.”7 Ortega has strategically emphasized the shared norms and values between the Sandinistas and Chávez. Ortega calls Chávez “our brother” and speaks of being in “solidarity” with him.8 Ortega and Chávez also share an anti-US ideology. For example, in 2008 Ortega and Chávez proposed forming a joint military force as protection against an attack by the United States. Ortega said that “if they [the United States] touch Venezuela, it will light up the region. No one is going to stand idly by, because to touch Venezuela is to touch all of Latin America.” 9 Chávez’s challenge of the United States and his rejection of neoliberal economic policies resonate with Ortega’s beliefs and worldview. The strategies Ortega has used to restrict the independence of the media, mobilize supporters, and manipulate the political process all reflect the influence of Chávez. The close personal relationship between Ortega and Chávez, combined with Chávez’s success at maintaining power in Venezuela, provides opportunities for authoritarian diffusion. Ortega has utilized ideas from Chávez to help him increase his control over society and government in Nicaragua. While autocratic diffusion has occurred, there is no evidence of Chávez pressuring Ortega to establish an authoritarian government. However, Ortega demonstrated more democratic “tendencies” during his presidency in the 1980s than he has during his current presidency. Under his leadership Nicaragua had two fair and free elections (1984 and 1990), the first in Nicaragua’s history. Moreover, Ortega peacefully relinquished power in 1990 when he lost the election. This behavior contrasts significantly with his manipulation of the constitution to enable a third presidential term. Ortega’s less democratic current presidency occurred after Chávez’s rise to power. Ortega, given his close association with Chávez, has learned from Chávez’s success at maintaining power and implementing a socialist agenda. Although Ortega has a long history of tense relations with the independent media in Nicaragua, since becoming president in 2006

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he has adopted some of Chávez’s strategies for attacking the media. Chávez and his supporters referred to media criticism of his government as part of a “media war” seeking to destroy his government. Chávez called those who were critical of his government in the independent media “fascists,” “terrorists,” “enemies of the people,” “liars,” “coup-mongers,” “immoral,” “trash,” and “laboratories of psychological warfare.”10 Ortega and members of his political party, the FSLN, have also launched direct attacks on journalists and independent news sources. Nicaragua’s government-controlled Channel 4 aired stories calling the director of independent daily newspaper El Nuevo Diario, Francisco Chamorro, and its news editor, Danilo Aguirre, “fascists.” 11 Ortega’s government has also attacked Carlos Fernando Chamorro, who runs the magazine Confidencial, serves as president of CINCO (a media research group), and hosts the television news programs Esta Semana (This Week) and Esta Noche (This Night). After Chamorro exposed a case of government corruption, Channel 4 ran an unsupported story that he had ties to international drug smugglers.12 Ortega has also borrowed from Chávez the idea of using citizen councils to bypass traditional local political institutions. The Sandinista party offices usually manage the appointment of local citizen councils, which has led the Nicaraguan Network for Democracy and Local Development to call the councils unrepresentative.13 Since the councils oversee the Zero Hunger program, through which the government provides assistance to the poor, opponents believe that Ortega uses the councils to improve his support among the people and disadvantage other political parties. Local mayors also object to the citizen councils, as they directly challenge their elected authority.14 Ortega utilizes the councils as a way to mobilize supporters and voters. Prodemocracy organizations and opposition elites see the councils as a way for Ortega to blur the lines between official government institutions and his political party, a strategy pursued by Chávez in Venezuela. The citizen councils are similar to Chávez’s “missions,” which exist outside the normal government institutions and provide health and educational assistance to poor Venezuelans. The work of the missions, which are often staffed by Cubans, helps Chávez maintain support among the poor. In addition, Chávez’s development of small neighborhood councils known as consejos comunales provides a model for Ortega’s citizen councils.15 The unelected Venezuelan councils also distribute government funds for

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social projects. Chávez has used the missions and councils to institute his vision of economic and political order, something Ortega seeks to accomplish with his own councils. There are strong commonalities between the methods Chávez uses to suppress civil society organizations, especially those with foreign sources of funding, and Ortega’s treatment of civil society organizations. Chávez characterizes human rights NGOs as agents of foreign governments seeking to destabilize the country or overthrow him.16 Under Ortega, the Nicaraguan government has launched investigations into the practices of multiple NGOs, including Oxfam, and barred Nicaraguan NGOs from monitoring elections. The first lady, Rosario Murillo, called NGOs “modern-day Trojan horses” engaged in “an international campaign against the revolutionary government” of Ortega.17 Furthermore, the Nicaraguan government refused to allow foreign election observers for the 2008 municipal elections, the first time observers were denied since the end of the civil war. These similarities between the strategies each leader uses to constrain civil society and reduce its capabilities illustrate authoritarian diffusion. Nicaraguan opposition leaders believe that Ortega attempted to utilize Chávez’s strategy of a public referendum to extend presidential term limits. Nicaraguan law prohibited Ortega from running again for president when his term ended in 2011. Ortega discussed plans to change the constitution to remove presidential term limits through either a parliamentary vote or a public referendum. Chávez used this strategy to successfully end Venezuelan presidential term limits. Chávez was one of the first leaders to adopt this strategy of eroding democracy in Latin America. Opposition lawmaker José Pallais claimed that “Ortega would be using the same Chavista recipe that Zelaya used in Honduras to say, if the constitution prohibits something, direct democracy can authorize him.”18 Although Ortega did not initiate a public referendum, he clearly considered using a strategy successfully employed by Chávez to extend his rule and control over government. Instead of the referendum, Ortega and other Sandinistas took advantage of their political influence over the Supreme Court of Justice to ensure another run for the presidency. Through complex manipulation of the law, Ortega achieved a ruling that the constitutional ban on holding office repeatedly does not apply to him or Sandinista mayors, but does apply to other politicians.19 Based on this ruling, Ortega ran for and won a third presidential term in 2011, an action deemed illegal by most independent observers.

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Chávez and Ortega’s Partnership: Collaborative and Purposive Action Along with the demonstration effect, Chávez has purposively worked with Ortega to restrict media freedom by enabling his allies to purchase private media. Although not officially government-controlled, television stations operated by friends and relatives of autocratic leaders engage in self-censorship to ensure only positive coverage. Chávez directly passed this strategy on to Ortega by helping his relatives buy the most important private television station in Nicaragua, Telenica (Channel 8). Reports suggest that the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), a Chávez–operated and sponsored organization, provided funds for the purchase of Telenica.20 The Venezuelan manager of ALBANISA (a company that manages Venezuelan investment in Nicaragua), Rafael Paniagua, claimed the company had purchased Telenica and that Chávez had “a nationbuilding project in Nicaragua.”21 Telenica had broadcasted Esta Semana and Esta Noche, hosted by Chamorro, a critic of the government. After the sale, Chamorro announced that he would no longer host his shows on Telenica, as he did not want to be part of a government-controlled station.22 The loss of Telenica as a truly independent television station has muted one form of criticism against Ortega and reduced freedom of the press, facilitating Ortega’s consolidation of power. With Venezuelan assistance, Ortega now controls half of the television stations in Nicaragua. Many analysts believe that Ortega’s control over the media, and therefore over his image, helped ensure his electoral victory in 2011. Arturo Cruz, former Nicaraguan ambassador to the United States, stated that “there was a fundamental shift in Ortega’s image over five years [since 2006], and one could argue that among contributing factors is his greater presence in the media.”23 Ortega’s power over much of the media enables him to criticize his opponents and present a positive image of himself. Freedom of the press is an essential component of democracy, and the erosion of media independence is part of an assault on democracy in Nicaragua. There is no evidence that Chávez pressured Ortega or the Sandinistas to become less liberal. However, the clear similarities between how the two leaders seek to reduce any challenges to their rule suggest demonstration effects and elite learning. The contrast between the free and fair elections of 1984 and 1990 and the manip-

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ulation of the 2008 elections demonstrates a change in the Sandinistas’ strategies. This change, combined with the demonstration of Chávez’s effective rule in Venezuela, illustrates the role of authoritarian diffusion in Nicaragua. Along with diffusion, Chávez has deliberately acted to support the erosion of democracy in Nicaragua by working with Ortega to reduce press freedom.

Strengthening Ortega’s Capabilities More directly than demonstration effects, Chávez’s financial and economic support has strengthened the capabilities of Ortega and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. External actors can affect elite capabilities through four mechanisms: provision of technical and financial assistance to political parties, aid to civil society, general economic assistance, and resources for repression. In this case, the two main mechanisms used by Chávez are direct assistance to the Sandinistas and the giving of general economic aid to Nicaragua. Chávez has not provided resources for repression. Ortega, elected with only 38 percent of the vote, saw external support from Chávez as very helpful in his efforts to maintain and consolidate power. Along with helping to shift the balance of power in his favor, support from Chávez has enabled Ortega to survive the reduction in foreign aid from the United States and the EU. Chávez’s assistance both strengthens Ortega’s position and reduces the leverage of the United States over Nicaragua. Furthermore, strong international support from Chávez, along with the disarray among the opposition in Nicaragua, has enabled Ortega to succeed in consolidating power. Assistance to Ortega and the Sandinistas A major method by which Chávez is attempting to influence politics in Nicaragua is through supplying Ortega’s campaign with financial assistance. During the 2006 election, independent reports suggested that Venezuela provided $6 million in funding for Ortega’s campaign. 24 Prior to the election, Chávez made a deal with Ortega to provide oil for Nicaragua at a reduced cost. 25 As four-fifths of Nicaragua’s energy comes from oil and the deal came at a time of a serious energy crisis in Nicaragua, the deal was helpful to Ortega. The agreement between Chávez and Ortega created a NicaraguanVenezuelan oil firm, managed by the Sandinista-controlled municipal

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government association AMUNIC.26 AMUNIC was then able to distribute the money through nontransparent means. Opposition leaders argued that the deal was a way for Venezuela to illegally supply money for Ortega’s campaign. Venezuela also sent fertilizer to Nicaragua, which, according to reports, was only distributed to rural areas that had voted for the Sandinistas in the previous election.27 In the November 2011 presidential election, aid from Venezuela again helped Ortega and the Sandinistas retain the presidency. The Sandinistas distributed Venezuelan aid only to mayors who were supporters of Ortega. Venezuelan assistance helped the Sandinistas gain votes through patronage. Chávez has repeatedly offered political support to Ortega. During the 2006 electoral campaign, Chávez hosted Ortega on his radio program, Aló Presidente, and declared that he wanted Ortega to win the election. After Ortega’s electoral victory in 2006, Chávez called Ortega to congratulate him, saying, “We’re happy here. We’re very proud of you.” Chávez added that the two countries would be “uniting as never before” to construct a socialist future. Ortega responded by praising Chávez’s leadership and saying, “You are showing us the path, long live Venezuela.” 28 Despite Chávez’s financial assistance, there was less public involvement by Chávez in the Nicaraguan election than in the Peruvian election a few months earlier. Chávez generally refrained from publically commenting on the election and the majority of his support came after Ortega became president, which has helped Ortega consolidate his rule. Providing for Economic Stability and Patronage Since Ortega won the 2006 election, the most important way that Chávez has supported Ortega is through economic assistance. Substantial economic assistance from Venezuela has helped Ortega ensure economic growth and some popular support. Venezuelan aid has given the Sandinistas and Ortega “more discretional funding than any other government in Nicaragua’s history and also helped the economy grow by 4.5 percent” in 2010.29 Without this economic assistance, Nicaragua’s economic growth would be weaker, as would Ortega’s popular support, which is partially dependent on populist assistance programs to the poor. There is a lack of transparency about where the Venezuelan aid goes. European donor countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Nicaraguan opposition leaders, and

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local journalists have all asked for information about Venezuelan aid to Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan government refuses to answer inquiries and responds to requests for information by claiming that journalists are trying to “destabilize the government.”30 Under pressure from the IMF, the Nicaraguan central bank did finally release a report on foreign aid in April 2011. The report provided line-item details on foreign aid from all major donors, except Venezuela. For example, one part of the report stated that $35.5 million of Venezuelan aid went to unspecified “other projects.”31 As of spring 2011, Venezuela had given Nicaragua $1.6 billion over the preceding four years, equivalent to the annual budget of the Nicaraguan government.32 The money goes into a separate discretionary fund, controlled by Ortega, that lacks independent oversight, enabling him to use the money as he wishes to enrich either himself or his allies. Venezuela’s aid, lacking oversight and given directly to Ortega, is clearly intended to help Ortega more than to assist poor Nicaraguans. In January 2007, Ortega joined Chávez’s Bolivarian Alternative of the Americas, which has been a conduit for Venezuelan aid. In April 2010, Chávez signed a deal with Ortega to finance the construction of a petroleum gas plant, a fertilizer plant, and a milkprocessing plant.33 Chávez noted that ALBA has undertaken over fifty projects in Nicaragua. ALBA is an additional source of political patronage for Ortega and the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas have “created a series of privately managed companies under the auspices of the Venezuelan-bankrolled ALBA. Those companies, which represent more than $530 million in energy contracts, tourism holdings, and cattle farms, are linked to the presidential couple and managed by the family and Sandinista party treasurer, Francisco López.”34 Investment by Venezuela, over $500 million per year, currently constitutes approximately 50 percent of all foreign investment in Nicaragua, a substantial amount.35 Furthermore, in the poorest country in Central America, where total gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 was only $6.3 billion (official exchange rate), GDP per capita was $2,900, and the government budget was $1.5 billion, $500 million is a large sum of money.36 During a 2008 visit to Venezuela, Ortega claimed that Nicaragua’s economy “would have collapsed” without aid from Venezuela, a sign of how important the aid is in Chávez’s mind.37 In addition to aid that affects the economy as a whole, Chávez also sponsored smaller projects to assist Ortega. During the 2006 electoral campaign, Chávez paid for eighty-five Nicaraguans to fly to

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Caracas, Venezuela, for eye surgery. Although this did not affect a large number of Nicaraguans, happy reports from recipients were positive propaganda for Ortega.38 The free eye surgery for Nicaraguans has continued since the election. Recipients are usually Sandinista supporters; however, some critics have also received surgery.

What Explains Ortega’s Success? A combination of international and domestic factors explain Ortega’s success in consolidating his power and influence in Nicaragua, at the expense of democracy. On the international level the support from Chávez has helped Ortega provide patronage to loyal Sandinistas, maintain economic stability, and resist pressure from the United States and EU to uphold democracy. Furthermore, the negative legacy of US involvement in Nicaragua weakens the ability of the US government to pressure Ortega. Ortega gains political capital among his supporters by resisting US “interference.” Therefore, the United States has limited moral or normative leverage over Ortega and the Sandinistas. In contrast, the ideological and personal linkages between Chávez and Ortega facilitate a close relationship and give Chávez greater influence over developments in Nicaragua. In addition to the international factors, on the domestic side the divided nature of the opposition, combined with the negative reputations of some of its leaders, helps Ortega outmaneuver opponents. “Ortega has also kept Nicaragua’s sluggish opposition divided and confused, giving Western nations no viable allies to work with.”39 As Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, argues: “Ortega seems to have made all the right moves not only to consummate his power grab at home, but to inoculate him against an effective international campaign.”40 Nicaraguan civil society and prodemocratic elites do exist and have likely been able to thwart the development of a fully autocratic regime. However, they have been unable to prevent Ortega from changing electoral rules to benefit himself, conducting fraudulent elections, and gaining control over many economic and political institutions. International Factors The United States has a long history of involvement in Nicaragua. Unfortunately, not all of this involvement has been positive. There is

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still lingering animosity among some Nicaraguans, especially members of the Sandinistas, because of the Ronald Reagan administration’s secret funding of the Contras (counterrevolutionaries), who fought against the Sandinista government in the 1980s. Launched in 1961 as a Marxist, revolutionary guerrilla movement, the Sandinistas sought to overthrow the authoritarian Somoza government. Through an alliance with the Catholic Church, trade unions, student groups, and moderate opposition parties, the Sandinistas succeeded in ending the Somoza dictatorship in 1979. The Sandinistas wanted to bring about major social and economic change, including land reform. The Reagan administration made the removal of the Sandinistas a high priority and actively funded the military activities of the supporters of the Somoza dictatorship, the Contras. The Sandinistas eventually defeated the Contras, but at enormous cost, with over 30,000 dead and the economy destroyed. Therefore, some Nicaraguans do not have positive views of the US government. In addition to the US government’s direct involvement in the Nicaraguan civil war, there is also a history of the US government supporting repression across Latin America. During the Cold War, tens of thousands of military personnel from Latin America attended the School of the Americas. Released government documents demonstrate that the training manuals used at the School of the Americas advocated human rights violations.41 The School of the Americas highlights the US government’s complicated, questionable, and messy history in Latin America, which continues to affect relations with Nicaragua. However, due to the combination of domestic pressure from the School of the Americas Watch and the end of the Cold War, the US government reformed the School of the Americas and relaunched it as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). The US military now includes training about human rights and democracy at WHINSEC. There is debate about how sincere and effective the human rights program is, but unlike during the Cold War there is no clear causal evidence linking training at WHINSEC to the use of repression in Latin America.42 However, as many of the Latin American military forces that participated before the change in curriculum are still active, the earlier training given by the School of the Americas may continue to affect the repressive capacity of security forces across the region. Although Ortega’s initial actions, such as working with former Contras and agreeing to free trade agreements, suggested a movement away from militant socialism, his rhetoric still reflects skepti-

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cism of capitalism and globalization. This, combined with the adversarial history with the United States, makes Ortega and the Sandinistas resistant to US pressure. In 2009 the Sandinistas attacked the US embassy in Managua and harassed the US ambassador at a university fair. Furthermore, Ortega often sees the United States as organizing a conspiracy against him.43 Therefore, Ortega is not ideologically receptive to US pressure. Despite the negative legacy of US involvement in Nicaragua, since the end of the Nicaraguan civil war the United States has sought to promote democracy through election monitoring, support for civil society development, and financial assistance for the Nicaraguan government. Between 1990 and 2006 there were international election observers in Nicaragua for all major elections. For example, in 2006, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Carter Center, the EU, and the OAS all sent election observers. Furthermore, the domestic NGO Ética y Transparencia had more than 10,000 domestic election observers. The OAS observer mission reported that the 2006 elections were peaceful, orderly, inclusive, and conducted according to law.44 Overall, they were transparent and democratic. In addition to having election observers, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) gave $8 million for voter registration, voter participation, and election monitoring.45 USAID funded International Republican Institute (IRI), NDI, and OAS activities that included “updating civil registries and files for voter registration, mobilizing public oversight coalitions and media involvement for electoral monitoring, increasing voter participation and public awareness.”46 The NDI, working with Ética y Transparencia and the Central American University, sought to determine the difficulties for Nicaraguans in obtaining national identity cards required for voting. The program wanted to reduce barriers to voting for Nicaraguans. Along with sponsoring election observers, the US government has also funded programs seeking to strengthen Nicaraguan political parties. In 2006, USAID spent $1.5 million on programs to improve Nicaragua’s Supreme Electoral Council and improve democracy within political parties by fostering reforms to increase transparency and citizen participation in the selection of candidates to help ensure fair and free elections.47 The NDI and IRI both have programs in Nicaragua to train young politicians and to help modernize political parties. The presence of international and domestic electoral

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observers and other programs has supported democratic elections in Nicaragua. Since the 1990s, the US government has also tried to increase the capabilities of prodemocratic elites in Nicaragua through its support for civil society organizations. USAID provides grants for a variety of Nicaraguan NGOs, including those that advocate for legal reform, promote access to information, and seek to increase awareness of citizen’s rights.48 Organizations supported by USAID include the Institute for Development and Democracy (IPADE), an organization that focuses on citizenship education, election monitoring, and election law reform; Ciudadanía por Transparencia en la Política, a network of Nicaraguan civil society organizations seeking to promote transparency in government; and Grupo Fundemos, an nonpartisan organization that emphasizes the encouragement of liberal and democratic values in civil society. In the period 2005–2007, USAID spent approximately $23 million on efforts to strengthen democracy in Nicaragua.49 Along with government-funded efforts, a large range of private foundations, religious groups, and other US NGOs are active in supporting Nicaraguan civil society development. US democracy promotion efforts have been long-running and significant in Nicaragua. They have helped to ensure fair and free elections, especially the crucial first post–civil war election in 1990. However, despite these efforts there has been an erosion of democracy in Nicaragua since 2006, as the fraudulent elections of 2008 so clearly demonstrate. Along with the recent problems, there are also long-term problems with corruption and weak democratic institutions in Nicaragua. US democracy promotion programs and efforts have been unable to ensure the consolidation of democracy. In addition to specific democratic assistance, the United States and European governments have provided foreign aid to Nicaragua to help with economic development. The Nicaraguan government is dependent on foreign aid to finance its operations. Nicaragua is one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere (see Table 3.1). The turmoil of the 1980s, especially the international recession, the civil war, and Sandinista economic policy, caused a severe economic crisis in Nicaragua. Economic output in 1994 was more than 60 percent below what it had been in 1977.50 By the 1990s the country had begun to experience economic growth again, despite the devastation of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, but the aftereffects of the economic crisis of the 1980s continue to hinder economic development. Nicaragua, partially

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Table 3.1 Nicaragua: Economic Data, 2006–2011

Real GDP growth rate (percentage) GDP per capita (US$) FDI (US$ billions)

2006

2008

2009

2010

2011

3.9 947 0.3

2.8 1,124 0.6

–1.5 1,082 0.4

4.5 1,127 n/a

4.7 1,239 n/a

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, http://www.imf.org /external/datamapper/index.php (accessed September 14, 2011).

because of its significant poverty, still relies on international economic assistance to meet internal and external debt-financing obligations. Traditionally, the United States and European states provided most of the aid to the country. However, after the reports of fraud during the 2008 municipal elections, the United States suspended $62 million in aid from the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the European Commission froze $65 million in aid.51 Recent reports from the Nicaraguan central bank show that the foreign aid from US and European donors was down 37 percent in 2010.52 Fortunately for Ortega, the substantial assistance from Venezuela helps to counter any negative effects of the suspension of some US and EU aid, especially as aid from Venezuela far surpasses the amount of other aid that has been suspended. Trade with the United States, as part of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), is important for the Nicaraguan economy, and is one reason why Ortega has generally honored CAFTA and maintained a market economy (see Table 3.2). Nicaragua’s largest export is coffee. However, there is hope that CAFTA will increase US investment in industry, such as in textiles, footwear, and jewelry assembly plants. Although trade with the United States is economically valuable to Nicaragua, the benefits of closer economic ties with Venezuela are significant. Ortega has much more control over resources sent by Venezuela, enabling him to use them to build patronage networks. Since Ortega came into office, trade with Venezuela has risen significantly, increasing more than fourfold between 2007 and 2010. Although trade between Venezuela and Nicaragua has grown in importance for Nicaragua, it is still a small percentage of Venezuela’s approximately $66 billion worth of exports.53 Therefore, the economic benefits for Venezuela for supporting Ortega are minimal. The assistance from Venezuela has also

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Venezuela in Nicaragua and Peru Table 3.2 Nicaragua: Trade Data, 2005–2010

Imports in US$ millions (percentage of total imports) United States Venezuela Exports in US$ millions (percentage of total exports) United States Venezuela

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

525.4 (20.7) 173.8 (6.9)

624.7 1,623.6 (22.8) (45.9) 186.0 152.2 (6.8) (4.3)

810.9 (17.1) 450.8 (9.5)

701.7 (20.2) 587.8 (16.9)

868.6 (20.7) 742.9 (17.7)

306.8 (35.4) 3.5 (0.4)

353.0 (46.5) 2.1 (0.3)

743.5 1,028.4 (62.2) (40.5) 6.2 25.7 (0.5) (1.0)

457.6 (32.8) 118.9 (10.8)

606.6 (32.8) 248.6 (13.5)

Source: UN Comtrade database, Ministerio de Formento, Industria y Comercio (MIFIC), http://comtrade.un.org/db/dqBasicQueryResults.aspx?px=BE&r=558&y=1995 (accessed February 23, 2012).

enabled Ortega to reject US pressure to support democracy. Furthermore, the ideological animosity between Ortega and the US government makes economic pressure from the United States less effective. Along with the economic aid and efforts to promote democracy, US involvement in Nicaragua was especially intense prior to the 2006 elections, as the George W. Bush administration did not want Ortega, the former US adversary, to become president. US government officials and private citizens directly supported specific candidates. US ambassador Paul Trivelli strongly and publically endorsed Nicaraguan presidential candidate Eduardo Montealegre and called Ortega “a tiger who has not changed his stripes” (a reference to his militant guerrilla days), an unusual action for an ambassador.54 In response to this vocal support, Ortega claimed that Montealegre was a “puppet” of Trivelli.55 US efforts to influence the election failed and in some ways backfired, as many in Nicaragua resented US “meddling” in the election.56 The United States, due to the combination of the negative legacy of its involvement in Nicaragua and the support from Chávez, has limited leverage over Ortega. Therefore, it is currently difficult for the US government to effectively pressure Ortega to respect democracy. Ortega is at least partially insulated from outside pressure to democratize.

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Domestic Factors Along with these international factors, Ortega is able to consolidate his rule in Nicaragua because of the weakness of the opposition. In 2012, as in 2006, the opposition to Ortega is fragmented. Furthermore, some major players in the opposition are unpopular among many Nicaraguans because of previous corruption. Although not a perfect measure, the political parties do serve as proxy for the different elite factions in Nicaragua. The original Sandinista movement has divided into the FSLN and the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS). Former members of the FSLN, such as Herty Lewites, minister of tourism in the Sandinista government of the 1980s, broke away because of Ortega’s militant ideology and his willingness to manipulate the political process to gain power. Herty, expelled from the FSLN by Ortega, ran against him in the 2006 presidential campaign. Herty claimed that his movement was center-left, built on modernity, globalization, and CAFTA. Early public opinion polling suggested the Herty was a serious threat to Ortega, as he received almost the same amount of support, splitting the more leftist vote. However, Herty died from a heart attack during the campaign, which reduced popular support for the MRS. On the anti-Sandinista side there were also significant divisions. Former president Arnoldo Alemán, who was later indicted on corruption charges, controlled the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) and chose José Rizo Castellón as the PLC candidate. Eduardo Montealegre, a former minister in Alemán’s government, split from Alemán and formed the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance–Conservative Party (ALN-PC). The US government tried to encourage these parties to work together to overcome internal disagreements. The US ambassador, Trivelli, also openly urged opponents of Ortega to unify behind a single candidate.57 The IRI attempted to organize a primary to help the PLC and the ALN-PC unite behind a single candidate, Montealegre. One of the main issues of contention was about Alemán. After his term ended in 2001, his successor, President Enrique Bolaños oversaw the prosecution and conviction of Alemán for embezzling over $100 million in state funds. Liberals loyal to Alemán strongly objected and refused to cooperate with President Bolaños in the National Assembly. All these endeavors to bring about cooperation failed, which helped Ortega win, as the combined vote for ALN and PLC presidential candidates was 55.4 percent, significantly more than Ortega’s 38 percent of the vote.58 Therefore, even if

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a single candidate had not received all of the votes of the two liberal parties, he would have likely defeated Ortega. Since 2006 the opposition remains unable to unite. In the 2011 presidential election, Fabio Gadea, a veteran radio producer, and Alemán both ran against Ortega. Along with the divisions among the opposition, the lack of strong, favorable leaders also hampers prodemocratic elites and supporters. Transparency International ranked Alemán, a major opposition leader, as the ninth most corrupt leader in the world in 2004. More recently, in January 2009, the Nicaraguan Supreme Court, controlled by Ortega, overturned the corruption conviction of Alemán in exchange for Alemán’s party supporting the FSLN in the National Assembly.59 The weakness of the opposition, the recent economic growth fueled by Venezuelan aid, and Ortega’s control over the Supreme Electoral Council ensured Ortega’s victory in November 2011. In addition to the divisions among elites, tensions between Sandinista supporters and opponents has intensified, with multiple outbreaks of violence. A year after the violent clashes over the electoral fraud in the 2008 municipal elections, Sandinistas attacked opposition protestors in Managua. The problems with the Nicaraguan opposition also restrict democracy promotion strategies. The US government has decided that it cannot work with or support Alemán because of his corrupt past.60 The ill-repute of Alemán along with the divisions among the opposition means that there are no strong local allies for US democracy promotion efforts. The negative history of Sandinista-US relations and the weakness of the opposition have both reduced prodemocratic international pressure on Ortega. In summary, Ortega learned from Chávez’s strategies how to seize power once in office without generally resorting to violence. Chávez provided a clear model for how to erode democracy and consolidate power through gaining control over government institutions and the economy, and manipulating the electoral process. Furthermore, Chávez’s oil-funded financial assistance to Ortega facilitates Ortega’s growing control over the political and economic system. Without Chávez’s financial assistance, Ortega would be more dependent on the United States, less able to develop patronage networks, and overall lack the resources to maintain a degree of popular support. In contrast to the very successful Ortega-Chávez relationship, US support for democracy in Nicaragua is hampered by its lim-

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ited economic leverage over Ortega and the lack of strong, viable, democratic local allies. The domestic political context strongly influences the effectiveness of both efforts to promote democracy and efforts to promote authoritarianism.

Peru: A Failed Case of Authoritarian Promotion? The story of Chávez’s involvement in Peruvian politics is fascinating. During the 2006 election campaign, Ollanta Humala publically stated his allegiance to Chávez and the latter’s version of “twentyfirst-century socialism.” Moreover, Chávez directly intervened in the 2006 presidential election by ridiculing the other presidential candidate and supporting Humala. However, the actions of Chávez contributed to Humala’s electoral defeat. Five years later, Humala won the Peruvian presidential election by, among other strategies, deliberately distancing himself from Chávez. Although there is significant debate in Peru about whether or not Humala is sincere about his changed views, in the 2011 presidential campaign he strongly avowed that Venezuela’s path was not right for Peru. Furthermore, one of his first actions as president-elect was to travel to the United States for a friendly visit with US government officials. Humala clearly learned some lessons. The Peru case demonstrates the potential costs of accepting outside assistance. Even for authoritarian candidates engaged in inter-elite conflict over the regime type, accepting outside assistance has political costs. Public opinion still matters in illiberal regimes. Therefore, a major question about the Peruvian case is why did external support for authoritarianism backfire? Why has Chávez’s support been so helpful in Nicaragua but not in Peru? An investigation of the 2006 and 2011 presidential elections will help us understand why external support for authoritarianism failed in Peru.

The 2006 Presidential Election in Peru The first round of the 2006 presidential election involved three major candidates. Alan García Perez represented the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), one of the oldest parties in Peru. García had previously been president of Peru in the late 1980s. This was a difficult time in Peruvian history, with significant economic

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turmoil, including high inflation, and increased tensions with the Maoist guerrilla movement Shining Path. Peruvians blamed García for these problems. Therefore, many in Peru did not have fond memories of his previous tenure as president. During his first presidency, García pursued populist, socialist policies. As a presidential candidate, García was still populist and left-leaning, but argued he would support liberal economic policies and was now following the model of Michelle Bachelet in Chile, a moderate socialist president. García argued that prosperity would come from trade and investment, supported the free trade agreement with the United States, and generally agreed to continue the same macroeconomic policies of the current government. The second major candidate in the first round of presidential elections was Lourdes Flores Nano of the National Unity (UN) party. She represented the conservatives in Peruvian politics and had the support of big business and government technocrats. However, during her campaign she actively tried to recruit support among the urban poor in Lima. Unlike the other two main candidates, Humala was relatively unknown prior to the election. A former military officer who participated in a failed coup against President Alberto Fujimori, Humala was able to appeal to Peruvians who were dissatisfied with the current political system and especially angry about corruption in traditional political parties. Humala’s campaign message was nationalistic, populist, and against the neoliberal economic model. During campaign rallies Humala stated: “We nationalists are going to found a new country. . . . Who is afraid of change? Are the people afraid of change? No! Those who are afraid are the ones in power because they know if the nationalists get to power, Peru will change.”61 Polling demonstrated that he received support from Peruvians who defined themselves as leftist. Humala’s antiglobalization message and anti–multinational corporation message appealed to these Peruvians. In an interview with a British reporter Humala argued that in Peru “there’s a dictatorship here headed by the economic powers that just hasn’t allowed my country to develop. . . . We need to defend our country from being totally globalised. They’re breaking into our sovereignty, weakening our national industries, and most importantly the application of the neo-liberal model hasn’t benefited normal Peruvian families.”62 Furthermore, he emphasized his indigenous roots to attract indigenous support. His crowds of supporters were usually poor and indigenous. Because of technical problems with his party

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registration, Humala ended up representing the Union for Peru (UPP), a party formed in 1995 against Fujimori. The second round of the presidential election paired García versus Humala. On voting day, a Peruvian interviewed after voting for García said, “How can you choose? One is awful, the other is improvised,” hardly a sign of strong support for García.63 Humala’s antiglobalization rhetoric and challenge to the economic powers scared the entrepreneurial class in Peru. When Humala’s poll numbers rose in the spring of 2006 into the 30 percent range, the Peruvian stock market suffered its largest fall in five years. Fritz Du Bois, director of the Peruvian Economic Institute, a free market policyanalysis organization, argued that if Humala won the election, there would be “a certain amount of capital flight and a fall in the stock market,” reflecting the fears of the business community in Peru.64 Claims of human rights abuses against Humala raised additional fears about his commitment to democracy. The main claims were that Humala had been “Captain Carlos,” a military commander involved in documented cases of torture and disappearances. 65 However, as the Peruvian military refused to comment on the claims, Humala managed to avoid any official proof or guilt. The combination of concerns about Humala’s potential for authoritarian rule and the challenge to the economic elite led Peruvian elites to greatly fear a Humala presidency. The majority of those who had voted for Flores in the first round supported García in the second round, for the obvious reason that García was less of a threat than Humala for Flores’s center-right supporters. García won the election with 52.6 percent of the vote compared to 47.4 percent for Humala. Chávez’s Involvement in the 2006 Presidential Election In 2006 Chávez did not pressure Humala into advocating autocratic policies or radical economic programs. However, Chávez’s ideas about socialism provided a model for Humala’s campaign. Humala learned from Chávez’s experiences in Venezuela and sought to replicate his policies. Similar to Chávez, Humala and his supporters emphasized his outsider status, advocated for the nationalization of Peru’s natural resources, wanted to rewrite the constitution (something Chávez did), and called for the ending of a trade deal with the United States. He pledged to “build an alternative model to this neoliberal model” and apply Chávez’s “twenty-first-century socialism”

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model.66 During the campaign, Humala spoke of “creating a ‘national army of youth’ that many compare to Chávez’s Bolivarian brigades, which seek to evoke the pan-Latin solidarity espoused by South American independence leader Simón Bolívar.”67 Humala, an avowed admirer of both Chávez and Evo Morales in Bolivia, emphasized his ties to Chávez and his ideology by wearing a red paratrooper beret like Chávez and traveling to Venezuela to seek Chávez’s approval.68 The main influence on Humala’s campaign strategy was through a demonstration effect. Overall, there is no evidence of Chávez pressuring Humala to adopt illiberal policies. However, Chávez did purposely influence Humala’s electoral strategy through having two of his political consultants run Humala’s advertising campaign.69 Chávez also sought to increase Humala’s capabilities through statements of public support and financial assistance. Chávez willingly expressed his support for Humala, calling him the candidate of the people and publically proclaiming, “I hope that Ollanta Humala becomes president of Peru. . . . Go, comrade! Long live Ollanta Humala! Long live Peru!”70 While praising Humala, Chávez directly attacked his opponent, Alan García, saying he was “shameless, a thief.”71 Chávez also threatened to sever diplomatic relations if García was elected, saying, “if, by some work of the devil, Señor García is elected President of Peru, I’m going to withdraw my ambassador from Peru because Venezuela cannot have relations with a president like that.”72 The OAS election-monitoring mission noted that, regarding “the statements made by the President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela which were interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of Peru and which generated negative reaction . . . [t]he Peruvian government presented an objection to the General Assembly of the OAS on June 5, 2010, emphasizing their conviction that these actions represented interference in the Peruvian electoral process.”73 Similar to the experience in Nicaragua, there were multiple reports during the campaign of financial support given to Humala by Venezuela. Peruvian government officials claimed that over $1 million came through the Venezuelan embassy in Lima.74 After the campaign, former Humala confidants alleged that Venezuela sent suitcases full of cash to Humala and that Humala’s wife received secret payments from a Venezuelan newspaper tied to Chávez.75 Because Humala was an outsider candidate without access to well-developed

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and financed parties, funds from Chávez were helpful for financing his campaign. Unfortunately for Humala, Chávez’s involvement in the Peruvian elections backfired and contributed to Humala’s defeat. In a University of Lima poll after the 2006 election, the top two reasons why people believed Humala lost the election were that he was perceived as authoritarian and that he was supported by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez.76 Chávez’s support for Humala became a major issue in the campaign, especially between the first and second rounds of voting, when a war of words developed between Chávez and García. In response to the threat to recall Venezuela’s ambassador, García publically stated that Chávez “must have drunk a lot of Venezuelan rum to say that if the chosen president is not his protégé, he will recall his ambassador. That the godfather jumps into the ring to support his protégé, Mr. Humala, deserves an energetic response from all Peruvians.”77 García used Chávez’s involvement to discredit Humala. García told Peruvians that their choice during the election was either to “go with Chávez, or with Peru,” implying that a vote for Humala was a vote for Chávez.78 During pro-García campaign rallies, participants chanted, “Chávez, out of Peru.”79 García argued that Chávez was “trying to impose his candidate” on Peruvian voters.80 García used Chávez’s comments to his advantage, making the most of Venezuela’s “interference” in the electoral campaign. Chávez’s support was initially very helpful for Humala. As an outsider candidate, Humala was fighting against the political establishment, and external allies helped provide technical and financial support. Unfortunately for Humala, his close connection to Chávez, due to Chávez’s bad judgment and García’s ability to manipulate the circumstances, became a hindrance to his campaign. Chávez’s involvement helped to solidify support for García. Limited US Involvement in the Election In contrast with its blatant involvement in the 2006 Nicaraguan election, the US government generally stayed quiet, at least in public, about the 2006 election in Peru.81 After the first round of voting, in which Humala received the largest number of votes, the US State Department did not comment on the candidates. In a May 10 interview (after the first round of voting), a State Department official stated, “We commend the Peruvian government and the Peruvian

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people for their strong commitment to democracy and these successful elections. . . . It is not appropriate to comment on a choice that belongs solely in the hands of the Peruvian people.”82 State Department officials also said that the United States would work with any elected Peruvian president who shared US interests and supported democracy. The US ambassador to the OAS, John Maisto, stressed that the Peruvian people should have the opportunity to choose their president without outside interference and that the United States would accept the results of the election as long as it was fair. 83 In comparison to the US government’s vocal, public, and active involvement in the Nicaraguan elections, these comments were circumspect and diplomatic. Even when Venezuelan officials called outgoing Peruvian president Alejandro Toledo “Bush’s office boy” and Alan García a “US puppet,” in public the US government remained outside of the controversy.84 García was also careful to not express close ties to the US government, arguing that rejecting Chávez’s involvement was not the same as supporting the US government.85 After the election, García claimed, “I am sure that if I would have received the support of the U.S. Embassy, I would have lost the elections.”86 Only after the second round of voting and the victory of García did US officials make any public comments about the candidates. At the meeting of the OAS, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick said that “Chávez overplayed his hand” in Peru and that the Peruvian people showed the best response to Chávez by not voting for Humala.87 The US government was happy with the results of the election, especially with the fact that Chávez failed, but they had little influence on the outcome.

The 2011 Election in Peru: A Case in Contrast In the first round of the 2011 election there were four main candidates in addition to Humala. Only Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori, currently in jail for human rights abuses and corruption, won enough votes to advance to the second round with Humala. On the center-right there were three candidates: former president Alejandro Toledo; Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, the former finance minister under Toledo; and Luis Castañeda, the former mayor of Lima. Humala and Fujimori advanced to the second round because the centrist vote was split among Toledo, Kuczynski, and

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Castañeda, preventing each from winning enough votes. Humala won the second round with 51.5 percent of the vote compared to Fujimori’s 48.5 percent. Humala was a very different candidate in 2011. Instead of having Chávez’s aides running his campaign, Humala had Brazilian campaign advisers. While he praised Chávez’s political and economic approach in 2006, in 2011 Humala praised Brazil’s economic achievements and its businesses (major investors in Peru’s mines). Humala promised in an interview that if he won, Peru would not join ALBA. Furthermore, he said that “the Venezuelan model is not applicable to Peru.”88 Again distancing himself from Venezuela and Chávez, Humala stressed the importance of a friendly relationship with the United States. Humala claimed that he wanted to “qualitatively improve” Peru’s relationship with the United States and work as partners in dealing with cocaine production and trade. 89 In an interview during his visit to the Inter-American Dialogue, a US think tank, Humala argued that if elected he would improve the enforcement of anticorruption laws, dramatically increase funding for education, and use a “democratic and participatory process” to reform the constitution.90 During the campaign, Humala also advocated for improved social policies (such as expanding childcare and conditional incometransfer programs for the poorest) to address the widening income gap in Peru between Lima and the rural areas, especially in the south and east. In order to further distance himself from Chávez, he promised to maintain Peru’s economic framework and to “promote investment and the free market.”91 Some Peruvians were skeptical that Humala’s change of heart was sincere and doubted that he was really supportive of democracy. However, despite questions about Humala’s democratic credentials, Keiko Fujimori was not necessarily a more democratic candidate. Fujimori initially said that she would pardon her father, who was serving a twenty-five-year sentence for authorizing a death squad that killed twenty-five people.92 She had previously served as the former president’s first lady and was closely connected to his corruption. Therefore, as one Peruvian said, “Both [candidates] are so bad that they are a total disappointment.”93 Analysts believe that Humala won in 2011 due to three key factors: his opponent was also controversial, many Peruvians felt they had not benefited from the economic growth, and he succeeded in convincing enough Peruvians that he had moved away from Chávez. Michael Shifter, an expert on Peru, argues that if Humala had failed

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to convince a large number of Peruvians that he had “distanced himself from Chávez,” he “would not have been elected.”94 Humala lost in 2006 at least partially because of his association with Chávez and won in 2011 because he separated himself from Chávez. Why Was Chávez’s Support Unsuccessful in 2011? Why was support from Chávez so unsuccessful in the case of Peru? Why did external involvement in Peru’s elections backfire? What differentiates the Peruvian case from Nicaragua? Furthermore, Chávez’s support for ideologically similar leaders in Ecuador (Rafeal Correa) and Bolivia (Evo Morales) has generally helped those leaders maintain power and adopt illiberal policies. What explains the outlier of Peru? At the international level, Peru has different ideological and economic linkages than Nicaragua. In Peru there was no equivalent of the Sandinistas, a deeply rooted political party ideologically similar to Chávez. Furthermore, with a growing economy and strengthening trade relations with the United States, Peru valued its economic relationship with the United States. The major international players also handled the elections in Peru differently than in Nicaragua. The US government generally stayed quiet in the Peruvian case, especially compared to the blatant interference in Nicaragua. The United States had supported the development of democracy in Peru, especially the pivotal 2000–2001 period of transition away from the authoritarianism of Fujimori. However, there is less negative history, especially compared to Nicaragua, in US-Peruvian relations. In contrast, Chávez was very vocal about his support for Humala. However, these differences at the international level fail to fully explain the divergent results. Explaining the outcome requires considering the domestic situation in each country, especially differences in electoral law, Humala’s status as a new, outsider candidate versus Ortega’s decades long involvement in Nicaraguan politics, and differences in their respective economic situations. International factors. Prior to 2006 the United States worked to promote democracy in Peru through election monitoring, civil society development, and support for political parties. International election observers played an important role in the 2000 and 2001 elections. Election observers ruled the 2000 elections as fraudulent and refused to continue their monitoring into the second round because of the lack

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of democracy. The widespread condemnation of the 2000 elections contributed to the series of events that led to the end of President Alberto Fujimori’s authoritarian rule in Peru. Following the November 2000 resignation of President Fujimori and his subsequent indictment, the interim government arranged for new elections in June 2001. International election observers from the EU, OAS, Carter Center, and NDI all participated in the 2001 elections. The 2001 elections, in dramatic contrast to the 2000 elections, conformed to international standards and were free, fair, and democratic. The independent confirmation that the elections were fair helped give the newly elected democratic government legitimacy in Peru. International election observers have assisted in the development of democracy in Peru. There was significantly less international attention given to the 2006 elections. The major international election mission came from the OAS. The OAS attested that the 2006 elections “took place in a calm, orderly and transparent fashion” and there were no cases of violence.95 Therefore, earlier election observation missions had increased the fairness of the political process in Peru and supported the transition to democracy. Similar to the experience in Nicaragua, as well as Ukraine and Belarus, the US government has been active in encouraging the development of prodemocratic civil society organizations in Peru. For example, in fiscal year 2007 (2006–2007), USAID spent almost $3.5 million on programs promoting good governance, political competition, and consensus building. These programs focus on improving government transparency, increasing accountability, and encouraging citizen participation. The NED gave grants to a variety of Peruvian NGOs involved in supporting democracy and advocacy work, such as Ciudadanos al Dia (“Up-to-Date Citizens”), which seeks to promote best government practices and raise public awareness at the local and regional levels. Despite these efforts, the US government spends the majority of its money in Peru on counternarcotics programs ($720 million in six years, compared to a few million dollars given to democracy promotion).96 The main focus of the United States in Peru is stopping the illegal drug trade, not democracy promotion. Along with US efforts to develop democracy in Peru, there are also growing economic linkages between the United States and Peru. Two months before the 2006 elections, the United States and Peru

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signed the US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement. The agreement immediately eliminated tariffs on 80 percent of US exports to Peru and on thousands of Peruvian exports to the United States. Earlier trade agreements with the United States helped Peruvian agriculture by removing tariffs on agriculture products such as cotton, mangoes, and asparagus. As Table 3.3 illustrates, the United States is the single largest trader with Peru. The trade agreement was an issue in the 2006 presidential campaign, as Humala repeatedly vowed to repeal it. In contrast, President Toledo actively championed the agreement. The trade agreement benefited some businesses in Peru, especially economic elites in Lima. Therefore, the US-Peru trade agreement, and its clear end with the election of Humala, may have increased support among Peruvian business leaders for García. There was countervailing international support for democracy in Peru, which had earlier helped to establish a more democratic regime. Furthermore, Peru had diverse linkages, with important economic relations with the United States. Peru’s economic relationship with Venezuela was significantly less important than its economic ties to the United States. However, these international-level factors do not alone explain the different outcomes of Chávez’s involvement in Nicaragua and Peru. Nicaragua, like Peru, had a history of US-

Table 3.3 Peru: Trade Data, 2005–2010 2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Imports in US$ millions (percentage of total imports) United States 2,220.1 (17.8) Venezuela 528.3 (4.2)

2515.7 (16.4) 544.9 (3.6)

3,584.2 (17.6) 226.6 (1.1)

5,647.5 4,339.3 5,815.4 (18.9) (17.2) (19.5) 333.0 256.8 96.8 (1.1) (1.2) (0.3)

Exports in US$ millions (percentage of total exports) United States 5,257.3 (30.7) Venezuela 298.5 (1.7)

5,707.5 (24.0) 412.0 (1.7)

5,585.9 (19.9) 765.8 (2.7)

5,835.3 4,603.8 5,767.0 (18.7) (19.8) (16.4) 1,079.5 614.2 512.9 (3.5) (2.3) (1.5)

Source: UN Comtrade database, Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI), http://comtrade.un.org/db/dqBasicQueryResults.aspx?px=BE&r=604&y=1995 (accessed February 23, 2012).

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funded programs promoting democracy. Democracy promotion in Nicaragua had actually been longer and involved greater resources than in Peru (e.g., $23 million in Nicaragua alone versus $9.3 million in Peru).97 Furthermore, Nicaragua’s exports to the United States are often 35–45 percent of its total exports, whereas exports to the United States are a smaller percentage for Peru (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Given the importance of foreign aid for Nicaragua’s government budget, Nicaragua was more dependent on the United States than was Peru. US relations with Peru have been less contentious than those with Nicaragua. Peruvians have chosen presidents with pro-US policies for the past two decades. However, although the Sandinistas resent US involvement, others in Nicaragua have seen the United States as a valuable ally in the past. Therefore, while there are some differences between Nicaraguan-US and Peruvian-US relations, democracy promotion from the United States and economic linkages with the United States are not sufficient to explain why Chávez’s support has been very helpful for Ortega and negative for Humala. The other major international factor is the nature of Chávez’s support. Since Humala did not win in 2006, the time period of comparison has to be restricted to the electoral campaign. In both Nicaragua and Peru, Chávez provided funds for presidential campaigns. Chávez also publically supported Ortega and Humala. However, Chávez’s involvement in the electoral campaign in Peru was more vocal than his involvement in Nicaragua. In Nicaragua Chávez did not berate the opposition or publically threaten to withdraw his ambassador if someone other than Ortega won. Chávez’s inflammatory remarks during the Peruvian electoral campaign contributed to Peruvians’ rejection of Chávez’s involvement and his supported candidate, Humala. Public opinion polls show that Chávez is relatively unpopular in Peru. Prior to the 2006 elections, the Peruvian polling agency Apoyo asked Peruvians their opinion about Chávez, and 61 percent had a “negative” opinion of him, 17 percent had a “positive” view, and 14 percent said they did not know.98 Although Chávez’s more aggressive behavior in Peru contributed to the backlash against his involvement, domestic political and economic factors were very important for explaining Humala’s defeat in 2006. Domestic factors. A key domestic factor that affected the election outcome in each case was electoral rules. In Nicaragua, Ortega man-

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aged to win the presidency only because he had earlier altered the electoral rules to allow a candidate to win with 35 percent of the vote in the first round. Peruvian electoral rules required a second round of voting if no candidate received more than 50 percent of the vote. Under Peruvian electoral rules it is unlikely that Ortega would have won. If there had been a second round of voting between the top two candidates, then the center-right votes split between Montealegre (29 percent) and Rizo (27 percent) would likely have joined together to defeat Ortega. Along with the electoral rules benefiting Ortega, Ortega was in a better position to accept assistance from Chávez without producing a negative political backlash among Nicaraguans. Ortega and the Sandinistas are well-established political entities in Nicaragua, whereas Humala was a newcomer to Peruvian politics and lacked Ortega’s entrenched support base. The Sandinistas, having a long history in Nicaragua and a clear ideological position, were better able to accept external support and not be considered a “lackey” of the outsider. With his experience as a leader during the civil war, no one would consider Ortega as Chávez’s disciple. Ortega is an independent actor who has taken advantage of Chávez’s support to strengthen his position in Nicaragua. However, Humala, a relative unknown prior to the 2006 presidential election, did not have a strong institutional base supporting him or a previously developed reputation. Therefore, he was more likely to be seen as a puppet of Chávez, raising greater concerns about Chávez controlling what Humala would do once elected. Peru is also in a different economic and ideological position than Nicaragua. As Table 3.4 illustrates, Peru was growing at a much faster rate than Nicaragua in 2006 (7.7 percent versus 3.9 percent; compare to Table 3.1). After the economic turmoil of the 1980s, Peru instituted major macroeconomic reforms, reducing inflation and government debt and liberalizing much of the economy. Peru had seen important economic improvements the decade prior to the 2006 election. In 2000, only 18.8 percent of Peruvians were employed in the industrial sector; by 2008 this number had risen to 42.1 percent. 99 High international demand for minerals has helped Peru’s copper, zinc, and gold exports grow, which is important for Peru’s macroeconomic stability given that minerals produce the majority of the country’s export revenue. Peru is one of Latin America’s fastestgrowing economies. However, Peru’s economic growth has not been

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Table 3.4 Peru: Economic Data, 2006–2011

Real GDP growth rate (percentage) GDP per capita (US$) FDI (US$ billions)

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

7.7 3,340 3.5

8.9 3,801 5.5

9.8 4,427 6.9

0.9 4,363 4.8

8.8 5,172 n/a

6.2 5,614 n/a

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, http://www.imf.org /external/datamapper/index.php (accessed September 14, 2011).

evenly distributed and the reduction in poverty has come slowly. The capital (Lima), the northern region, and the coastal region are all benefiting from economic growth and globalization. In contrast, in the southern Andean region, where Humala received the majority of his support, 70 percent of the population lives in poverty.100 Partially as a result of a lack of government support for agricultural development, many indigenous inhabitants of the mountainous region remain subsistence farmers. In addition, although high economic growth rates have produced new jobs, analysts estimate that 60 percent of the urban work force are employed in the informal sector.101 Despite these economic problems, there are positive economic developments, and a significant enough number of Peruvians were benefiting from liberalization and globalization to be fearful of Humala’s populist rhetoric. The economic changes in Peru affected voting behavior in 2006. The working poor in the capital city, Lima, did not align themselves with the rural poor in support of Humala partially because of the increased economic opportunities available to them with the export boom.102 Humala, with his close ties to Chávez and talk of nationalizing the mining industry, offered little assurance to those experiencing economic growth, especially in the coastal areas, that he would not destroy the source of their new economic prosperity.103 In both 2006 and 2011, Humala lost Lima by a large margin. Humala’s populist rhetoric and calls for change appealed to those in the south and rural regions who were not experiencing the advantages of economic growth. However, in 2006, the increased economic ties with the United States and continued free market policies promised under a García administration offered economic benefits for enough Peruvians to reduce the extent of Humala’s appeal. Humala’s less-threatening

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economic and political position in 2011 reduced the potential threat to those who were benefiting from the recent growth but at the same time promised moderate change. In 2011, Humala managed to balance the call for broader distribution of wealth with less of a clear threat to powerful economic interests. Despite Humala’s rhetoric, there were still concerns among many Peruvians about his economic policies, as the major drop in the Peruvian stock market upon Humala’s election demonstrates. Chávez’s form of populism and socialism has less appeal in Peru than other parts of Latin America because of the recent economic growth and the negative legacy of leftist political violence in Peru. The political violence unleashed by the radical, leftist, revolutionary Shining Path, together with the government response (an estimated 70,000 Peruvians died), reduced Peruvian support for radical leftwing movements, such as Chávez’s version of socialism.104 Furthermore, public opinion polling found that 37.5 percent of Peruvians identified themselves as right of center, a relatively high percentage for Latin America.105 Clearly, many Peruvians did not identify with Chávez or socialism, reducing the benefit of Chávez’s support for Humala. Overall, Chávez was a less valuable external ally for Humala than Ortega. Chávez’s support for Humala had significant downsides for Humala and led to his defeat in 2006. The benefits of Chávez’s support were less significant in Peru because of Humala’s weakness as a domestic ally, Peru’s stronger economic position, and the low appeal of radical socialist agendas to Peruvians. An important distinction between Nicaragua and Peru was the electoral law in Nicaragua allowing victory with only 35 percent of the vote. Despite the multiple forms and types of international involvement in Nicaraguan and Peruvian politics, domestic conditions are important for explaining the regime outcome and the influence of external support for authoritarianism in both cases.

Conclusion In Nicaragua and Peru we see several of the same mechanisms used to strengthen illiberal allies as we saw in Belarus and Ukraine. Chávez provided direct financial assistance to Ortega’s and Humala’s electoral campaigns. In Nicaragua, Ortega had control over important

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patronage and economic resources because of Chávez’s economic assistance. Furthermore, Chávez’s success at maintaining power influenced Ortega’s strategies for restricting media freedom and controlling Nicaraguan politics. These cases also highlight that in order to understand the regime outcome, it is necessary to know the international and domestic conditions and how they interact. The case of Peru illustrates how external actors, whether promoting democracy or authoritarianism, can cause a backlash if the domestic audience is not receptive to international involvement. Chávez’s experience in Peru is somewhat similar to the negative backlash the George W. Bush administration experienced in Nicaragua in 2006. Accepting international assistance has costs for both liberal and illiberal elites, restricting its potential influence. Although domestic factors were very important for explaining the differing effects of Chávez’s support for authoritarianism, the balance of power among elites was not. Both Nicaragua and Peru experienced significant divisions between liberal and illiberal elites and overall elite fragmentation. Therefore, the variation in outcomes was due to differences in electoral rules, the strength of the political parties, and the interaction with international factors. Chávez’s recent health issues, combined with Venezuela’s economic problems, suggest that Chávez will have less regional influence in the future. Illness will restrict Chávez’s ability to forcefully publically support allies such as Ortega. More important, Venezuela’s growing economic problems and reduced production of oil will reduce the financial resources available to Chávez to aid other countries. If Chávez has to withdraw his support, it will weaken Ortega’s position in Nicaragua. Whether or not the Nicaraguan opposition would be able to take advantage of that change is hard to predict. The future of Chávez’s “twenty-first-century socialism” in Venezuela and around the region is currently uncertain.

Notes 1. McKinley, “Ortega Redux.” 2. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World: Nicaragua 2009,” www .freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2009&country=7673 (accessed April 6, 2010). 3. Rosenberg, “The Many Stories of Carlos Fernando Chamorro.” 4. “How to Steal an Election.”

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5. “Statement on the Status of Democracy in Nicaragua.” 6. Rogers, “Daniel Ortega Appears Set to Win Presidential Election.” 7. Subotic, “Europe Is a State of Mind,” p. 310. 8. “The ‘Chávez Factor’ Prowls Nicaraguan Elections,” El Universal (November 3, 2006) www.eluniversal.com/2006/11/03/imp_en_pol_art_03A 799847.shtml (accessed March 1, 2010). 9. Chris Carlson, “Venezuela, Nicaragua Propose Joint Military Force for Latin America,” http://venezuelanalysis.com/print/3105 (accessed March 1, 2010). 10. Human Rights Watch, A Decade Under Chávez, p. 72. 11. Lauria and Simon, “Nicaragua Special Report,” p. 3. 12. Ibid., p. 4. 13. Avila, “Ortega Foes Fear Return to Authoritarianism.” 14. Ibid. 15. Ellner, Rethinking Venezuelan Politics, p. 126. 16. For a detailed discussion of Chávez’s treatment of civil society, see Human Rights Watch, A Decade Under Chávez, pp. 198–229. 17. Booth, “Democracy in Nicaragua in Peril.” 18. Lee, “Nicaragua’s Ortega Eyes Recall, End to Term Limits.” 19. Brendan Riley, “This Ongoing Institutional Crisis Brought to You by Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs (June 16, 2010), www.coha.org/this-ongoing-institutional-crisis-brought-to-you-bynicaragua%E2%80%99s-daniel-ortega (accessed August 14, 2011). 20. “Chávez Helped Ortega Buy Nicaraguan Station,” Inside Costa Rica (January 28, 2010), www.insidecostarica.com/dailynews/2010/january/28 /centam-10012804.htm (accessed March 23, 2010). 21. Although ALBANISA is technically a private company, reports suggest that the Nicaraguan government has used company funds for state purposes. “Nicaragua News Bulletin,” NicaNet (February 9, 2010), www.nicanet .org/?p=915&print=1 (accessed March 23, 2010). 22. “Chávez Helped Ortega Buy Nicaraguan Station.” 23. Schmidt, “Nicaragua’s Leader Rules Airwaves to Control Image.” 24. “The ‘Chávez Factor’ Prowls Nicaraguan Elections.” 25. Nicaragua had to pay only 60 percent of the cost of the oil within ninety days of delivery; 40 percent of the cost could be paid off over twenty-five years at 1 percent interest. Rogers, “Chávez Plays Oil Card in Nicaragua.” 26. Rogers, “Chávez Plays Oil Card.” 27. McConnell, “Nicaragua’s Turning Point,” p. 85. 28. James, “Venezuela’s Chávez Praises Ortega as Next Nicaraguan Leader.” 29. Rogers, “Venezuela’s Chávez Bankrolled Nicaragua.” 30. Rogers, “Chávez Oil Fails to Stem Nicaraguan Crisis.” 31. Rogers, “Venezuela’s Chávez Bankrolled Nicaragua.”

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32. Ibid. 33. “Nicaragua News Bulletin,” NicaNet (April 20, 2010), www.nicanet .org/?p=931 (accessed June 17, 2010). 34. Rogers, “In Nicaragua, Former Comandante Defends Capitalism.” 35. Allison Fritz, “Ortega’s Rhetoric Obscures His Economic Pragmatism,” Inter-American Dialogue (October 31, 2008), http://www.thedialogue .org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1656 (accessed June 17, 2010). 36. CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the -world-factbook/geos/nu.html (accessed April 2, 2010). 37. Romero, “Free Eye Care from Chávez.” 38. Allen-Mills, “Smiling Strongmen of South America Flex Their Muscles.” 39. Rogers, “Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega Renominated for President.” 40. Ibid. 41. Blakeley, “Still Training to Torture?” 42. For some of the debate on this issue, see ibid. as well as McCoy, “Trained to Torture?” 43. Booth, “Democracy in Nicaragua in Peril.” 44. Organization of American States (OAS), “Nicaragua’s November 5 Elections Were Transparent” (November 22, 2006), www.oas.org/OAS page/press_releases/press_release.asp?sCod (accessed June 16, 2010). 45. Feinberg and Kurtz-Phelan, “Nicaragua Between Caudillismo and Modernity,” p. 82. 46. US Agency for International Development (USAID), Nicaragua Operational Plan FY 2006, p. 7, http://dec.usaid.gov/index.cfm?p=search .getCitation&CFID=12656695&CFTOKEN=57247380&id=s_470588B1 -D566-FC5C-D52A12E55E899477&rec_no=141271 (accessed June 17, 2010). 47. Ibid. 48. USAID, “Nicaragua Success Stories: US Government Support Strengthens Democracy in Nicaragua,” http://nicaragua.usaid.gov/bulletin may07_2.html (accessed June 17, 2010). 49. Ibid. 50. Phillip Wearne, “Economy (Nicaragua),” in Europa World Database (2010), http://www.europaworld.com/entry/ni.ec (accessed June 22, 2010). 51. US Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Background Note: Nicaragua” (2010), www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1850.htm (accessed April 7, 2010); “EU Official to Visit Nicaragua to Consider Aid Resumption.” 52. Rogers, “Venezuela’s Chávez Bankrolled Nicaragua.” 53. CIA World Factbook. 54. Lacey, “Ortega Dominates Campaign in Nicaragua.” 55. Allen-Mills, “Smiling Strongmen of South America Flex Their Muscles.”

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56. “Observers Warn of U.S. Manipulation in Nicaragua.” 57. Ibid. 58. Lean, “The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Nicaragua,” p. 829. 59. Rosenberg, “The Many Stories of Carlos Fernando Chamorro.” 60. Rogers, “Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega Renominated for President.” 61. Forero, “Nationalism and Populism Propel Front-Runner in Peru.” 62. Esler, “The Monday Interview with Ollanta Humala.” 63. “García Claims Victory in Peru.” 64. Forero, “Nationalism and Populism Propel Front-Runner in Peru.” 65. Cameron, “Peru’s Ollanta Humala.” 66. Forero, “Nationalism and Populism Propel Front-Runner in Peru”; Bridges, “Hugo Chávez’s Message Fails to Attract Peruvians.” 67. Lopez, “Venezuelan Leader Plays Supporting Role in Peru’s Presidential Elections.” 68. Ibid. 69. Bridges, “Hugo Chávez’s Message Fails to Attract Peruvians.” 70. Forero, “Seeking United Latin America, Venezuela’s Chávez Is a Divider.” 71. Ibid. 72. Hennessy, “Insults Fly After Election Victory.” 73. OAS, “Electoral Observation Mission of the OAS Presents Preliminary Report on the Second Round of the Presidential Election in Peru” (June 6, 2006), www.oas.org/OASpage/press_releases (accessed June 16, 2010). 74. Luhnow and Kozak, “Peru May Join Latin America’s Populist Tilt to Left.” 75. Bridges, “Hugo Chávez’s Message Fails to Attract Peruvians.” Humala’s wife supposedly received $4,000 a month from an Englishlanguage newspaper, the Daily Journal, in Caracas even though she never had an article published and does not speak English. 76. Ronald Bruce St. John, “Politics of Peru in Flux,” Foreign Policy in Focus (June 29, 2006), http://fpif.org/fpiftxt/3333 (accessed March 18, 2010). 77. “Mud Slinging Chronology Between Peru’s García and Venezuela’s Chávez.” 78. Reel, “In Peru, a Political Makeover Aids Ex-Leader’s Election Bid.” 79. McClintock, “An Unlikely Comeback,” p. 105. 80. Ellner, Rethinking Venezuelan Politics, p. 210. 81. Leaked documents by WikiLeaks suggest that the presidential candidates (except Humala) visited the US embassy prior to the election, possibly seeking support or acceptance. 82. US State Department, “Washington File: Inter-American Group Prepares for Peru’s Presidential Elections” (May 12, 2006), www.lexisnexis .com/us/lnacademic/ (accessed June 21, 2010).

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83. Irizarry, “OAS Chief: Venezuela Has Not Interfered in Peruvian Elections.” 84. McClintock, “An Unlikely Comeback,” p. 105. 85. Reel, “García’s Win in Peru Is a Loss for Chávez.” 86. Bajak, “Peru President-Elect Backs Free Markets.” 87. Katz, “Peruvian Voter Rejected Chávez by Electing Former President.” 88. Romero, “A Candidate in Peru Tacks Toward Brazil’s Course.” 89. Ibid. 90. Bridget O’Loughlin, “A Conversation with Ollanta Humala,” InterAmerican Dialogue (September 14, 2010), www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm ?pageID=32&pubID=2465&s=ele (accessed July 19, 2011). 91. “Victory for the Andean Chameleon.” 92. “No Lesser Evil.” 93. Romero, “A Candidate in Peru Tacks Toward Brazil’s Course,” p. 10. 94. Council on Foreign Relations, interview with Michael Shifter, InterAmerican Dialogue (June 7, 2011), www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID =32&pubID=2676 (accessed July 19, 2011). 95. OAS, “Electoral Observation Mission.” 96. Reel, “New Challenge to U.S. Drug Policy in Andes.” 97. Nicaragua data from 2005 to 2007, Peru data from 2007 to 2009. USAID, “Budget Justification: Western Hemisphere” (2009), www.usaid .gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/101444.pdf (accessed June 12, 2011). 98. “Opinión Data,” Apoyo Opinión y Mercado 6, no. 73 (2006), p. 5. 99. United Nations, “UN Data,” http://data.un.org/CountryProfile .aspx?crName=Peru (accessed June 22, 2010). 100. “Poverty amid Progress: Peru.” 101. Sandy Markwick, “Economy (Peru)” in Europa World Database (2010), http://www.europaworld.com/entry/pe.ec (accessed June 22, 2010). 102. Cameron, “Peru’s Left and APRA’s Victory,” p. 7. 103. Ibid., p. 17. 104. Ibid., p. 7. 105. Contreras, “The Upbeat Upperclass.”

4 Iran in Lebanon: Seeking Shiite Solidarity

Lebanon’s convoluted internal and international politics make it

one of the most complicated cases in this book. In addition to the multiple internal players, Lebanon has been the battleground for regional conflicts. Since 1975, Lebanon has experienced several military invasions by Israel and Syria, civil war, and political violence. Lebanon is a country with extensive international interference in its internal politics. This chapter focuses on the two forms of international involvement that have sought to directly influence the regime type: Iran’s support for Hezbollah and US and European prodemocratic pressure.1 Although Israel has invaded Lebanon multiple times, it has never done so with a desire to change the country to an authoritarian or democratic regime. Its invasions have obviously affected domestic politics and possibly the country’s regime type, but these effects are indirect or unintentional. In other words, this chapter focuses on external actors motivated to change the regime type, not just to achieve specific security objectives. This chapter tells a political story, not a military, security, or terrorism story. Clearly, there are times when this political story about regime type overlaps with military issues and arguments about terrorism, but the focus here is not on Hezbollah’s activities as a terrorist organization. Instead, the emphasis is on Hezbollah’s political and social role in Lebanon, and its affect on regime type. Under these criteria, I emphasize Iran’s role in promoting authoritarianism in Lebanon, primarily through its 135

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extensive support for Hezbollah, or the Party of God, a Shiite political and guerrilla movement. As part of the investigation of Iran’s role and Hezbollah’s response, I also examine Syria’s influence, as the two forms of external involvement often interact. The other external actors attempting to influence regime type are the US government and the European Union. US and EU support for democratization in Lebanon attempts to counter Iranian involvement, but with limited effect. Although the United States and the EU provide some support for democracy in Lebanon, this is relatively small compared to Iran’s assistance. The high level of elite fragmentation in Lebanon prevents either democratic or authoritarian consolidation. Until the recent Arab Spring, Lebanon was one of the leastauthoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Unlike in much of the region, Lebanon allowed press freedom and freedom of expression. Despite the significant political turmoil from 2006 to 2011, the removal of Syrian occupation and the relatively free 2009 elections have led Freedom House to rank Lebanon as partly free. Polity IV gives Lebanon a score of 8 on democracy (with 10 being the most democratic).2 The country is currently an “in-between” regime, neither authoritarian nor democratic. The vibrant free press, civil society organizations, and competitive political process mean that Lebanon is not an authoritarian regime. However, the institutionalized confessional-based system, which ensures that each sect receives an allotted number of seats in the parliament, and the fraudulent election system, demonstrate the lack of democracy in Lebanon. In the 2009 elections, vote-buying was rampant.3 Freedom House’s 2011 ranking of Lebanon’s political rights at 5 and its civil liberties at 3 (with 7 being the most authoritarian) illustrates the country’s “inbetween” status as an illiberal democracy. International influence is potentially very effective in illiberal regimes, because the openness of society allows for international involvement. In addition, as a majority of elites have not accepted that democracy or authoritarianism is the only game in town, it can be easier to shift a country toward democracy or authoritarianism. Similar to the Belarus case, this chapter follows a longer timeframe in order to adequately tell the story of Iran’s support for Hezbollah and its affect on regime type. The time period includes both the Lebanese civil war and more recent developments, especially the events since the 2005 assassination of Rafik Hariri, former prime minister of Lebanon, and the removal of Syrian occupation

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forces. Although Iran’s support for Hezbollah has not yet resulted in an authoritarian government in Lebanon, it has contributed to Hezbollah’s military and political success and its growing influence in Lebanon. Iran has directly determined Hezbollah’s policies and increased its capabilities by providing it with substantial economic and military resources for the past two and half decades. However, Hezbollah is not a “puppet” of Iran. The leaders of Hezbollah have their own agenda and use Iran’s support to achieve those goals.

A Brief Overview of the Political and Historical Background Although this chapter does not present a history of Lebanon or an analysis of Lebanese politics in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, in order to understand Hezbollah and its relationship with Iran it is necessary to briefly discuss the Lebanese civil war and the major events and players since that time (see also the timeline of events in the chapter’s appendix). The Lebanese population is ethnically and religiously diverse, partially explaining its fragmented political culture. Differences in religious beliefs, communal loyalties, kinship and fealty sentiments, and sectoral loyalties all contribute to the complexity of Lebanese politics. There are seventeen recognized major sects, including the Maronite Christians, Greek Orthodox, Shiite Muslims, Sunni Muslims, and the Druze (a sect with roots in Shia Islam). Although sectoral and religious identities are important for understanding events in Lebanon, the groups are not uniform or cohesive. Lebanon has also had intracommunal conflict, such as between the Shiite groups Amal and Hezbollah. Regional powers have exploited Lebanon’s internal intercommunal and intracommunal divisions. The country has been and still is the battlefield for regional disputes, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict. External interference in Lebanon had intensified and even produced local battles. The Lebanese Civil War, 1975–1990 As Hezbollah arose in Lebanon during the turmoil of the Lebanese civil war, it is appropriate to begin by briefly discussing the major events of the civil war. A caveat before I begin this discussion. This is not an attempt to provide a comprehensive, authoritative account of Lebanon’s 1975–1990 civil war, a complex and convoluted event.

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Instead, I seek to provide a brief overview of major events and players for readers unfamiliar with the country. There is no universal agreement on the causes of the Lebanese civil war of 1975–1990.4 Despite the lack of consensus, there are several elements that most agree are important for understanding the protracted conflict in Lebanon. Some of the roots of the conflict go back to Lebanon’s independence from France. At that time, the two main political players in Lebanon, the Christian Maronites and the Sunni Muslims, negotiated the National Pact of 1943. Based on a questionable 1932 census that gave the Christians a slight majority, parliament and the cabinet were to represent a six-to-five Christianto-Muslim ratio, giving Christians greater political power. The pact further institutionalized power distribution based on religious affiliation by requiring the president to be a Christian Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, the speaker of parliament a Shiite, the deputy speaker a Greek Orthodox, and the army chief-of-staff a Druze. One of the problems with this arrangement was that Muslims, especially Shiite Muslims, were politically disadvantaged. Although the government refused to conduct another census for fear of destabilizing the country, most believed by the 1970s, because of significant Christian Lebanese emigration and higher birth rates among Muslim Lebanese, that the Christians were now a minority. In addition to the disparities in political power, Christians controlled most of the businesses and sources of economic wealth in Lebanon. Therefore, by the start of the civil war, the Shiites were economically and politically disadvantaged in Lebanon. The second major component leading to war was the Palestinian situation. Lebanon’s neutrality in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ended in 1968 when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) moved its base of operations to southeastern Lebanon. The PLO would launch attacks against Israel and Israel would retaliate. The rising popularity of the Palestinian cause, combined with the damage inflicted on the Lebanese by Israeli military actions, led Muslim leaders to offer their support to the Palestinian position. Furthermore, Muslim groups used the Palestinian issue as a tool in their intracommunal conflicts.5 At the same time, Christian groups felt threatened by the growing pan-Arabism and the security threats the Palestinian camps produced.6 When the Lebanese Army was unable to restore law and order, Christian communities began to mobilize and form private militias to compensate for the state’s inability to protect them.

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They also sought to ensure the country’s sovereignty, which they saw the Palestinians as violating.7 The situation in Lebanon continued to deteriorate and by 1974 public disorder was widespread, with the regular occurrence of explosions, robberies, and abductions. Most regard the official beginning of the war as April 13, 1975, when Phalangists, members of a Christian Maronite political movement, ambushed a bus in Beirut and killed twenty-seven Palestinian passengers. Thus began fifteen years of conflict, the disintegration of Lebanon, and the development of Hezbollah. The war went through several stages, involved many different factions, and resulted in multiple shifting alliances. At one point, there were 186 warring factions in Lebanon. 8 The major stages and events of the civil war included the 1976 Syrian invasion in support of the Christian-right forces (to prevent the victory of the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement, a secular, leftist coalition); the 1982 Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon to destroy the PLO; and Syria’s second major invasion to end fighting between Amal (a Shiite group) and the PLO. The Syrian invasion began an almost nineteen-year occupation of Lebanon. Although the war is often framed as a Christian versus Muslim conflict, that is an overly simplistic depiction. Much of the fighting during the civil war was within communities (Christian versus Christian, Shiite versus Shiite), and alliances crossed religious boundaries regularly. For example, Amal and Hezbollah, both Shiite militant groups, fought each other for control of southern Lebanon and Beirut’s suburbs. The Taif Accord was able to finally bring about the end of the war in the 1990s. The accord, negotiated in Saudi Arabia, attempted to redistribute power in favor of Lebanese Muslim groups. The president (traditionally Christian Maronite) lost power and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies (Shiite) and the prime minister (Sunni) gained power. Although the accord affirmed support for Lebanese sovereignty, Syrian and Israeli troops occupied parts of Lebanon for the next fifteen and ten years, respectively. Hezbollah’s rise occurred as a result of a congruence of local and regional events in the context of the Lebanese civil war. The existence of intracommunal and intercommunal fighting in the civil war, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the Islamic Revolution in Iran provided the conditions necessary for the formation of new militant Shiite organizations. Before the outbreak of fighting, Imam Musa alSadr founded several Shiite civil society organizations in southern

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Lebanon. The development of armed militias by various factions in Lebanon before the civil war encouraged the formation of a militant arm of al-Sadr’s movement, the Battalions of Lebanese Resistance (known by the Arabic acronym Amal). After al-Sadr’s disappearance in 1978, Amal moved in a more secular direction under the leadership of Nabih Berri. Amal’s charter called for political secularization and improvements to the current political system.9 This, combined with Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, contributed to increased intracommunal tensions among Shiites. The Islamic Revolution deeply affected young Shiites in Lebanon, who identified with the revolution’s ideology and the religious authority of Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The revolution’s ideology included a “belief in the importance of struggling against secularism, injustice and the oppression of Muslims by foreign imperialists spearheaded by the USA and its regional manifestation, Israel.”10 After the Islamic Revolution, dissatisfaction with the more secular elements in Amal arose among the more religious Shiites, especially those who were supporters of Khomeini. Disputes intensified in the organization over how to respond to the Israeli invasion and how to deal with the PLO, which led to splits within Amal. Various strands of militants that were moving away from Amal eventually combined together to form a more unified organization, Hezbollah, in May 1984. Hezbollah formally made its existence public with an open letter “in which it pledged to fight for Israel’s ‘departure from Lebanon as a prelude to its final obliteration,’ called for an Islamic state while pledging not to impose it by force, and urged all Muslims to emulate the Islamic revolution in Iran.”11 Ironically, Israel’s attacks on the PLO in Lebanon helped give rise to Hezbollah, a new, powerful organization that further decreased Israel’s security. Even members of Hezbollah privately admit that “the movement was in large measure ‘created’ by Israel. Without the raison d’être of opposing the occupation, Hizballah would not have been able to build a broad [Shiite] constituency.”12 The Lebanese civil war dramatically changed the country’s political landscape. The war left approximately 170,000 people dead, out of a population of 3.5 million. A survey taken in the middle of the war years (1983) found that 54 percent of respondents had experienced property damage and 66 percent had been forced to take refuge in a shelter at some point because of the conflict.13 The war traumatized the population. In addition, it encouraged the formation of separate community spaces based along confessional lines. Muslims no

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longer traveled to Christian areas of Beirut, and Christians now avoided Muslim areas. This intensified confessional identities and the “balkanization” of Lebanon. For example, prior to the war the proportion of Muslims living in the eastern suburbs of Beirut (seen as a Christian area) was 40 percent; by the late 1980s the population had decreased to 5 percent.14 The massive geographical shifts in Lebanon and the trauma of the war reinforced kinship, confessional, and communal loyalties. Major Post–Civil War Political Developments Since the end of the war, there have been several important events relevant to this discussion. One key development was Hezbollah’s decision to become a political party. Hezbollah agreed to contest the 1992 parliamentary elections and began the process of becoming a major political party and a provider of social services in southern Lebanon. This combination of activities makes Hezbollah hard to categorize, because its military arm is clearly involved in terrorist activities, but it is also a political party sitting in parliament. Throughout the 1990s, Hezbollah attacked Israeli positions in the occupied zone and Israel retaliated. Israel finally withdrew from the security zone in 2000, after eighteen years of occupation. Many in Lebanon see the Israeli withdrawal as a victory for Hezbollah. Although members of Hezbollah had seats in Lebanon’s parliament and competed in elections since 1992, these actions do not mean the organization or its membership are supporters of democracy. Hezbollah currently has a seat in the government’s cabinet, but often acts outside of the state. Hezbollah has its own intelligence and communication networks, separate from and unaccountable to the rest of the Lebanese government. The party leadership still advocates sharia law, not parliamentary law, and generally does not believe in liberal democracy.15 Furthermore, Hezbollah has continually refused to give up its weapons (the only militant group not disarmed as part of the Taif Accord), hardly a democratic action. Hezbollah’s political machinations during the 1992 parliamentary election illustrate its undemocratic practices. Hezbollah’s security forces monitored every polling place in the areas under its control. Reportedly, this monitoring involved making sure that people voted for Hezbollah’s candidates. 16 “The same reports said that the Security Organ [Hezbollah’s security forces] bribed employees in gov-

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ernment departments in various electoral districts, offering thousands of dollars to release hundreds of identification cards of dead people which were used for voting by Hizbullah’s members.”17 Hezbollah was not unique in Lebanon in violating democratic practice, but its participation in parliament does not automatically mean that it supports democracy. Despite the existence of regular elections in Lebanon, throughout this period Freedom House ranked the country as not free because of the Syrian occupation. 18 The situation in Lebanon changed dramatically in 2005 with the assassination of Rafik Hariri and Syria’s subsequent withdrawal of troops from Lebanon. In September 2004 the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Partially in response to international pressure, Hariri renounced his loyalty to Syria, resigned as prime minister, and joined the opposition. Given these events, when a car bomb killed Hariri in February 2005, people immediately suspected the Syrian government of being behind the attack. These suspicions produced large anti-Syria protests in Beirut and strong international pressure on Syria. International as well as local pressure forced Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon, ending almost two decades of occupation. A new anti-Syrian coalition, the March 14 Coalition, gained the most seats in parliament in the 2005 elections. However, several major problems remained, including the continued existence of an armed Hezbollah and the pro-Syrian president Emile Lahoud. Hezbollah’s military control over parts of Beirut and southern Lebanon means that the Lebanese government lacks internal sovereignty and monopoly over the use of violence, a serious detriment to the development of democracy. The division between pro-Syrian president Lahoud and the March 14 government impeded reform and paralyzed government decisionmaking. Despite this, the end of active Syrian occupation increased the level of democracy and removed a major obstacle for democratization in Lebanon. The next six years witnessed a return to war with Israel’s 2006 attack on Hezbollah’s positions in Lebanon and increased political turmoil. The six-week war between Israel and Hezbollah severely damaged the country’s infrastructure and sidelined the promising democratic reforms begun in 2005. Israel’s inability to defeat Hezbollah and retrieve captured Israeli soldiers enabled Hezbollah to claim victory. The next six years also involved multiple political

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assassinations, political deadlock, large protests in Beirut, and controversies over the investigation into Hariri’s assassination. Clashes between Hezbollah and progovernment factions in May 2008 resulted in at least eighty deaths, sparking concerns about a return to civil war. The UN Special Tribunal’s investigation into Hariri’s assassination is a continuing source of political tension in Lebanon. In January 2011, Hezbollah withdrew its support for the national unity government because of the expected report from the UN tribunal, returning the country to political crisis. It took six months of negotiations to form a new government in Lebanon. The situation became even more tense when the first indictments issued by the tribunal, in June 2011, were for four Hezbollah members. The Lebanese government is obligated under international law to arrest those indicted, but if they do so it could spark a violent response from Hezbollah.19 Tensions increased again in late 2011 over funding for the tribunal. Lebanon has international obligations to fund the tribunal. As Hezbollah and its allies reject the authority of the tribunal and its indictment of Hezbollah members, the issue of funding is extremely contentious. Prime Minister Najib Azmi Mikati resolved the crisis by providing the required funding from his budget, narrowly averting the collapse of the government. With the outbreak of violence in neighboring Syria and concerns about the stability of Lebanon, Hezbollah has recently muted some of its objections to the tribunal. The conflict in Syria causes problems for Hezbollah, as it has maintained a strategic relationship with Syrian president Bashir al-Assad. Although Hezbollah has supported uprisings elsewhere, its alliance with Assad threatens its standing in the region.20 This brief overview of recent events in Lebanon demonstrates how regional conflicts and external actors have continually affected political developments in the country. However, the focus of this chapter is not on the security situation in Lebanon, the IsraeliHezbollah conflict, or its turbulent history, but rather on regime type. More specifically, this chapter focuses on how Iran’s support for Hezbollah has prevented democratization in Lebanon and encouraged authoritarianism. I also examine efforts to promote democracy in Lebanon. However, such efforts, undertaken by the United States and the EU, are relatively new, as most US and European policy has focused on developing stability in Lebanon and responding to the terrorist threat from Hezbollah.

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How Iran Influences Regime Type in Lebanon The relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is one of the closest explored in this book. Iran played a significant role in the formation of Hezbollah and since then has financed many of its activities. Furthermore, the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, unlike Russia’s relations with Belarus and Ukraine, involves much more than strategic interests. The strong religious, political, and ideological ties between Iran and Hezbollah have given Iranian leaders greater influence over Hezbollah’s actions. The close relationship between the two has enabled Iran to influence Hezbollah’s strategies for achieving its goals of political power, defeating Israel, and establishing an Islamic state. Iran’s financial support over the decades has also increased Hezbollah’s ability to obtain these goals. However, as Hezbollah grew in strength and organizational capacity, it began to pursue its own political agenda in Lebanon. Hezbollah has emerged as a powerful local actor in the country. Influencing Hezbollah’s Strategies Since the founding of Hezbollah, Iran has influenced the organization’s strategies and policies. Iran’s support for Hezbollah involves ideological and strategic motives. Under Ayatollah Khomeini’s leadership, Iran pursued a foreign policy based on exporting Islamic revolution. Khomeini argued that their Islamic revolutionary movement was “not for Iran alone,” and that Iran was only the starting point.21 The rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon was a great opportunity for the new Iranian government to put its theory into practice in the 1980s. Desiring to support similar Islamic revolutionary movements and already having close ties to Lebanese Shiite leaders, it was natural for Iran to lend its support to Hezbollah. Hezbollah, especially after its military victories, presents a successful example of Iranian revolutionary ideology.22 Iranian revolutionary ideology, emphasizing the development of an Islamic state and restricting freedom of expression, is undemocratic. First under Ruhollah Khomeini and now under Ali Khamenei, the Iranian regime desires to promote its version of authoritarianism in Lebanon through Hezbollah. On the strategic side, supporting Hezbollah gives the Iranian government greater political influence in the region and enables the Iranian government to illustrate its commitment to the proPalestinian and anti-Israeli movement. Moreover, given Iran’s few

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friends in the region, having a friendly government in Lebanon is a worthy strategic goal. Even without Hezbollah in government, its political position is currently strong enough in Lebanon to guarantee that the state will not take any strong anti-Iranian actions.23 Iran believes it is in its strategic interests to support Hezbollah and advocate for an Islamic state in Lebanon. Iran has influenced Hezbollah’s strategies, especially during the early days of the organization, by being an important model of an Islamic Shiite state, by pressuring Hezbollah to take specific actions, and by working purposively and collaboratively with Hezbollah to help it grow in strength in Lebanon and serve Iran’s regional political interests. Demonstration effects. The close religious and ideological ties between Hezbollah and Iran enables the diffusion of ideas about an Islamic state. Hezbollah’s leadership sees Iran as a model of an Islamic state. According to Naim Qassem, deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah, its positive relationship with Iran is due to three major reasons: 1. Both Iran and Hizbullah believe in the jurisdiction of the JuristTheologian, and that Imam Khomeini was himself that leader—the embodiment of this jurisdiction in our times. Iran and the Party thus met within one framework of international leadership legitimacy. 2. Iran’s choice of an Islamic republican system of government coincided with the Islamic principles held by Hizbullah. . . . 3. Political concord also existed on the issue of Iran’s absolute rejection of superpower hegemony, the safeguarding of independence, and support for all the liberation movements—especially those aimed at resisting Israeli occupation. Such was the view held by Hizbullah, with a priority awarded to the confrontation of Israeli occupation and whatever that entails in terms of opposing powers or projects of domination.24

Qassem’s comments refer to three major areas of agreement with Iran. First, Hezbollah’s leaders have always pledged obedience and loyalty to Ayatollah Khomeini and now his successor Ayatollah Khamenei as the leader of the religious jurists, or the jurisconsult. 25 The jurisconsult is a position of high religious authority within Shia Islam. In terms of religious authority for Hezbollah, the hierarchy begins with God (Allah), followed by the Prophet Muhammad, the Twelve Imams, and finally the wali al-faqih (leader of the Islamic

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jurists, currently Khamenei). Accepting Ayatollah Khamenei as a religious authority increases his ability to influence the Hezbollah leadership’s ideas about Islam, government, and regime type. Second, Hezbollah’s official position states that the party hopes to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon similar to the formation of an Islamic state in Iran. Hezbollah seeks to combine political and religious authority, as has occurred in Iran. This commonality illustrates the diffusion of Iranian ideas about what an Islamic state looks like to Lebanon. The third area of agreement refers to a shared regional and global strategic view. Iran and Hezbollah both rally against what they see as US global hegemony. A key part of this view is opposition to Israel. Hezbollah and the Iranian government both deny the right of Israel to exist. These areas of commonality between Iran and Hezbollah illustrate the demonstration effect of Iran on Hezbollah. External pressure. Along with the diffusion of ideas about the formation of an Islamic state from Iran to Hezbollah, Iran more directly pressured Hezbollah to change its military strategies during the Lebanese civil war, primarily to serve Iran’s regional security interests. There was a complex dynamic among Amal, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran during the civil war. At that time, Iran’s primary concern was its war with Iraq. Syria was a strategic ally of Iran’s against Iraq. However, Syria strongly supported Amal, a rival of Hezbollah. Syria tolerated the existence of Hezbollah only because it found Hezbollah’s anti-Israel activities useful. The Syrian leadership has always been wary of Hezbollah, whose fundamentalism is a potential threat to the secular Syrian government. This complicated dynamic affected Hezbollah’s military actions during the civil war. For example, Syria reoccupied western Beirut in 1987 to support Amal and in the process killed twenty-three Hezbollah fighters. This placed Iran in a position of choosing between supporting its ally in Lebanon, Hezbollah, and its ally in the Iran-Iraq War, Syria. It chose the latter. Therefore, because of Iran’s pressure, Hezbollah muted its reaction to the death of its fighters. The comments of Hezbollah’s spokesman that “the interests of wilayat al-faqih (namely Iran) dictated extreme restraint” demonstrate Iran’s influence over military strategy. 26 Iranian pressure again restrained Hezbollah’s actions in 1989, because its fighting with Amal threatened Iran’s relationship with Syria. Syria and Iran attempted to mediate the conflict between Amal and Hezbollah. By threatening to reestablish good relations with Iraq, Syria was

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able to persuade Iran to agree to Syrian dominance in Lebanon. Therefore, the settlement (at that time) favored Amal. Throughout the civil war, Iran intervened to directly change or influence Hezbollah’s strategies against its adversaries. Although these forced changes in strategies were not directly related to regime type, they do demonstrate the extent of Iranian influence over Hezbollah. With the end of the civil war, Hezbollah had to decide whether or not it would join the political process. Iranian politics and foreign policy strongly influenced the outcome of this debate among Hezbollah’s leadership. Following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, President Akbar Rafsanjani of Iran sought to develop a more pragmatic foreign policy that included a rapprochement with the West. One faction argued that Hezbollah should remain in a state of “perpetual jihad against all those who opposed their vision of an Islamic order.” 27 The other faction, supported by Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khamenei, argued for rapprochement policies, including Hezbollah’s participation in the political process and elections in Lebanon. The second faction won the debate, although the issue remained contentious among party leaders. Ayatollah Khamenei encouraged Hezbollah to participate within the Lebanese system, including competing in the 1992 parliamentary elections.28 In addition, Iran pressured Hezbollah and other related militant factions to release all Western hostages, which they did by 1992. 29 Hezbollah’s shift toward a political party reflected strong Iranian influence. Ironically, in this case Iran’s involvement contributed to stability in Lebanon and strengthened the electoral process by encouraging Hezbollah to participate. Collaborative actions. Iran’s influence on Hezbollah’s strategies and actions began with its important role in the founding of the organization. Iran helped the formation of Hezbollah by, among other things, purposely and collaboratively encouraging cooperation among Lebanese Shiite militant groups that were active in the Bekaa region in 1982.30 The leaders of these different groups formed a council and sent a delegation to Iran to seek guidance from Ayatollah Khomeini. Lebanese Shiite leaders consulted with Khomeini on what to name the new organization, and the name Hezbollah (Party of God) reflects his instructions to adopt a name that would unite all the factions.31 During this time the Iranian government, having already sent troops to help with the resistance against Israel, actively fol-

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lowed the situation in Lebanon and strongly supported the militants in Bekaa, who were the predecessors to Hezbollah. As Hezbollah developed, its spiritual leader at that time, Sayyid Fadlallah, regularly traveled to Tehran to meet with government and religious leaders.32 Hezbollah’s founding document, the 1985 open letter, strongly reflects Iranian influence. As Lebanese scholar Augustus Richard Norton writes, “Hizballah’s remarkable open letter to ‘The Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World’ . . . bears a distinctive made-inTehran coloration and, in fact, is reliably reported to have been written by an Iranian.”33 Iran’s influence over Hezbollah’s actions continued throughout the civil war. “Iran’s early hand in coordinating, if not always controlling, Hizballah was not difficult to discern. Indeed, during the 1980s Hizballah hewed closely to the Iranian line.”34 For example, when the consultative council (leadership council) of the party was unable to agree upon a decision, they would appeal to Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran to resolve the dispute. 35 Throughout the civil war period, Iran worked closely with Hezbollah to protect its regional interests and to help Hezbollah defeat adversaries, especially Israel. Since the end of the civil war, Iran has continued to work with Hezbollah to help it gain power in Lebanon. As Hezbollah has gained in strength, the relationship with Iran has become more collaborative and less dependent. For example, during the 2006 political crisis over the establishment of a UN tribunal to investigate the murder of Rafik Hariri, there were reports of meetings between Hezbollah secretarygeneral Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Iranian Revolutionary Guard soldiers in Lebanon, and a top Syrian security adviser, on how to best use the crisis situation and what moves each should take.36 In this strategic planning meeting, Hezbollah not only sought Iranian and Syrian assistance, but also suggested actions Syria should take. For example, Hezbollah reportedly suggested that the concentration of Lebanese military troops in Beirut would result in a reduction in border patrols and therefore Iran and Syria could take advantage of this opportunity to smuggle more weapons into Lebanon for Hezbollah.37 The revolutionary model of the Iranian Islamic state, combined with Iran’s more direct involvement in Hezbollah’s founding, its activities during the civil war, and its more recent policies, all illustrate how Iran has influenced Hezbollah’s strategies. During the civil war, changes in strategies imposed by Iran were sometimes detrimental to Hezbollah. In the post–civil war period, Iran’s influence

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over strategy has helped Hezbollah gain political power. Iran’s degree of control over Hezbollah has led some analysts to view the organization as Iran’s proxy and as an entity imposed from abroad. However, survey data from 1993, only a decade after Hezbollah’s founding, demonstrate the degree of local Lebanese Shiite support for the party: 41 percent of those surveyed said Hezbollah was their preferred political party.38 Hezbollah has strong local support and roots. Despite Iran’s assistance to and importance for Hezbollah, it is a Lebanese, not an Iranian, organization. Strengthening Hezbollah’s Capabilities Although Iran has influenced Hezbollah’s strategies for gaining political power, it has been most helpful in increasing Hezbollah’s capabilities. In this case as in others explored in this book, external assistance to nondemocratic organizations is a major method of promoting authoritarianism. Iran’s financial, technical, and public support for Hezbollah has been very significant for the organization’s growth and development. In terms of financial transfers, Iran has provided far greater amounts of money to Hezbollah than Venezuela has supplied to Nicaragua. The type of assistance Russia has provided to Belarus is different, but the degree of importance to the recipients is very similar to the case of Iran and Hezbollah. Along with direct assistance for the party, Iran has also aided in the development of Hezbollah’s social organizations, economic development programs, and military ability. Providing assistance for political parties. It is difficult to find accurate numbers on the amount of financial assistance Iran gives Hezbollah. However, analysts in Lebanon estimate that it ranges from $100 to $200 million per year, although some estimates, excluding military support, range as high as $1 billion per year. 39 The funding from Iran has had a direct effect on politics. Analysts believe that Hezbollah can pay full-time demonstrators in Beirut $100 a day, enabling it to maintain long-term street protests in its favor.40 The party also uses Iranian assistance to help resolve financial problems. After many members of the party lost money because of the failed Ponzi scheme of Lebanese businessman Salah Izz-al-Din, Nasrallah reportedly asked for financial assistance from Iran to compensate people for their losses. Nasrallah believed that if the party did not help people recoup their losses, the Lebanese people would lose con-

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fidence in Hezbollah. According to a Kuwaiti newspaper, Ayatollah Khamenei approved a transfer of $300 million from Iranian government funds that he has exclusive control over.41 The sources revealed that the amount has been transferred by the delegation accompanying Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad, who recently visited Damascus. The amount was handed over to Nasrallah and it had not been transferred through the Lebanese banks or through the Export Bank of Iran [Bank Saderat Iran] in Lebanon to ensure confidentiality and not to be recorded in bank statements. . . . The sources concluded by saying that Khamene’i asked Hasan Mahdavi, leader of Lebanese branch of the Qods Force affiliated to the Iranian [Islamic] Revolution Guards Corps, to personally supervise the distribution of money to those who incurred losses. Khamene’i asked Mahdavi to finally present a detailed report to him that includes the names of those who got the compensations and the amounts they got.42

Iran clearly provides essential financial support to Hezbollah. Furthermore, it seeks to influence and control how that money is spent by Hezbollah. In addition to direct financial support for the party and its political activities, Iran reportedly provided the initial funding for Hezbollah’s al-Manar satellite television station in 1991 and continued to contribute to its annual budget.43 Al-Manar is the leader of Hezbollah’s media outlets, which include several radio stations and newspapers. It is one of the most watched television stations in Lebanon. Its footage of Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli forces attracted many Lebanese who were angry about the occupation.44 After the Israeli withdrawal, the station broadcasted endlessly looped footage of Hezbollah ousting Israel, highlighting the success of Hezbollah.45 Hezbollah’s media outlets help it convey the party’s message and spread its ideology. Hezbollah seeks to use al-Manar to “enter into the hearts and minds of the party’s members, supporters, and friends and to ideologically indoctrinate them.”46 Iran’s financial support for al-Manar has helped Hezbollah grow in political influence in Lebanon and abroad. Along with financial assistance, Iran provides public support for the movement. The government of Iran has consistently offered public condemnation of Hezbollah’s adversaries and public praise for the organization and its leaders. For example, the leader of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard stated after the death of a Hezbollah leader, “We will soon witness the destruction of the cancerous scum of Israel

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at the strong, capable hands of Hezbollah.” 47 In 2006, Iranian president Mohammad Khatami “likened Hizbullah to a shining sun which warms the hearts of all oppressed Muslims in the world.”48 President Khatami also said that the call to disarm Hezbollah was a conspiracy on the part of the enemies of Islamic nations and that all Shiites are proud of Hezbollah.49 Ayatollah Khamenei claimed that Hezbollah was “a source of pride for the Islamic world,” and that the party possessed “wisdom and skill in the field of politics as it has [in] the power and initiative in the field of resistance [to Israeli occupation].”50 After the war with Israel, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, secretary of the Iranian Guardian Council, called on “the Muslim people to extend any assistance, including political, financial, and propaganda aid, to Hezbollah, because it is their religious duty.” Ayatollah Jannati went on to praise Nasrallah, claiming he “is the man of the century, because he is standing alone against the savage attacks of the Zionist regime.”51 Iran has continually and repeatedly provided staunch, unwavering support for Hezbollah. Developing civil society. Iranian assistance also helped Hezbollah gain influence and support through the provision of social services. Hezbollah has been able to succeed in this area because the weak Lebanese state has repeatedly failed to serve the needs of the Lebanese Shiite population. During the civil war, Hezbollah began to organize social and public services to help the hundreds of thousands of Shiites in the suburbs of southern Beirut and in southern Lebanon who were suffering from the effects of war. As part of this effort, Hezbollah developed several major nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Hezbollah’s social activities represent an expansion of civil society in Lebanon. As noted in Chapter 1, the development of civil society does not always support the growth of democracy. Sheri Berman argues that civil society’s influence on the regime type depends on the political context. When strong political institutions are missing, in other words when the state is weak and unable to provide basic services, then an increase in civil society activity may signal political problems, not a growth in democracy. “In such situations, civil society can work to undermine political stability further by alienating citizens from traditional political structures, deepening dissatisfaction, and providing rich soil for oppositional and revolutionary movements to mobilize and grow.”52 Berman discusses how the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt saw the failure of the government

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to provide hope, welfare services, or jobs and used that failure to supplant the state’s role in society. Hezbollah’s civil society organizations have also moved in where the state has failed and therefore have increased its ability to attract supporters and spread its ideology. Currently, Hezbollah’s popularity as a political movement partially comes from its provision of social services, especially where the state has been unable or unwilling to provide basic services, such as healthcare and education. There are three units involved in supplying social services: the Social Unit, the Islamic Health Unit, and the Education Unit. The Social Unit includes the Holy Struggle Construction Foundation (Mu’assasat Jihad al-Bina’), which is financed by Iran and is one of Lebanon’s most prominent NGOs (the activities of the Construction Foundation generally involve economic reconstruction and development and therefore are discussed later, in the section on providing for economic growth and stability).53 The Social Unit also incorporates the Martyrs Foundation (Mu’assasat alShahid) and the Foundation for the Wounded (Mu’assasat al-Jarha), which respectively offer aid for the families of those who have been killed in combat against Israel and aid for civilians injured in Israeli attacks. The work of these organizations has led to Shiites trusting that Hezbollah, not the Lebanese state, will meet the needs of residents when they are victims of conflict.54 Among other clinics, the Islamic Health Unit operates three hospitals, twelve health centers, and twenty infirmaries, often supplying the only healthcare in the communities in which the Islamic Health Unit operates. Doctors’ fees and hospital costs are low and the institutions generally offer high-quality care. Overall, Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Unit provides healthcare services to more than 400,000 people living in Beirut’s southern suburbs, while the Lebanese government has failed to provide any health services in many communities.55 Hezbollah has actually taken over responsibility for some government hospitals when the Lebanese government demonstrated that it is financially and technically unable to operate them. Along with gaining popular support through offering health services, Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Unit employs hundreds of doctors, nurses, technicians, and support staff who are likely to support the party in elections. The low quality of the Lebanese public school system means that Hezbollah’s Education Unit supplies another “indispensable service to the Shiite poor.” 56 Over a five-year period, Hezbollah spent

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approximately $14 million on financial aid and scholarships for more than 10,000 students.57 As Hezbollah scholar Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh notes: Clearly, the Education Unit of Hizbullah has made a difference in the lives of poor and needy students who have benefited from its financial aid and scholarships, and the almost cost-free education in Hizbullah’s schools and institutes. . . . The total expenditure on education by the Lebanese government has not exceeded 812,608 Lebanese lira ($541,739) per year and remains far behind in comparison with Hizbullah. In this endeavor, the party has accumulated considerable support among needy Muslim students, in particular the Shi’ites.58

The provision of social services is a common tool of political patronage in Lebanon. Other political parties, such as Amal, often use the offer of government resources to gain support among constituents. For example, if someone needs a hospital bed, they would have to approach their legislator and ask for the bed as a “favor” to be returned on election day by the extended family of the sick person.59 In this context, Hezbollah has a cleaner, less corrupt reputation because it does not misuse government bureaucracy to gain community support. Hezbollah is able to provide social services without misappropriating government funds because of Iranian assistance. Furthermore, as Judith Harik’s surveys of Shiite communities found, the “massive destruction caused by the civil war and Israeli raids in the south, combined with Lebanese government impotency, had a leveling effect on general need, producing an expanded clientele of all classes for party services.”60 Hezbollah provides social services, like clean water, to people of all income levels. In response to questions about who has contributed the most to Shiites’ educational, health, and social needs, 64 percent of respondents in a 1993 survey answered Hezbollah.61 Hezbollah’s party members include not only the economically disadvantaged but also Lebanese professionals, such as doctors and lawyers. Hezbollah’s civil society organizations have paid off politically, as they have increased the number of their members in parliament because of their service to poor Shiites. 62 Providing social services to underserved communities can be a very effective path to power. Without Iran’s support, Hezbollah would have been unable to provide the same level of services and therefore would be less popular in Lebanon.

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Providing for economic stability. In addition to its extensive provision of social services, Hezbollah has also sponsored reconstruction projects and development programs. The Holy Struggle Construction Foundation works on infrastructure projects, such as after the 2006 war, when it assessed damage and offered reconstruction compensation to victims in southern Lebanon. The Construction Foundation has built schools, hospitals, and mosques. It also supplies water and electricity to hundreds of thousands of Lebanese. The foundation built 400 reservoirs of potable water for residents in Beirut’s southern suburbs and currently satisfies about 45 percent of their water requirements.63 Along with reconstruction assistance in urban areas, the Construction Foundation has an extensive program assisting rural development. The foundation offers technical assistance, such as guidance to farmers in land reclamation and installing irrigation networks, and it also provides credit to farmers. Independent assessments of the rural development activities of the Construction Foundation found that its program is efficiently run, well organized, and staffed with technically skilled people.64 In many ways, it is a model of how a development NGO should operate. Hezbollah is also a major source of lending to small businesses to support economic growth and development. The organization far surpasses any other NGO in Lebanon in the number and amount of loans it gives out. It averages 7,500 loans per year and in 2001 it loaned out $4.5 million, which was five times more than any other NGO in Lebanon.65 In contrast, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) financed loans to only 590 borrowers, significantly less than Hezbollah’s efforts.66 Hezbollah receives money from a variety of sources to fund all its economic development activities, including donations from Lebanese both at home and abroad. However, a major source of funding is Iran. “It is impossible to acquire any solid information about the extent of the funds coming to Hezbollah from Iran, but it is well known that it is in the tens of millions annually and is carefully allocated to all sorts of projects through Reconstruction Campaign [Construction Foundation].”67 Hezbollah’s leaders publically acknowledge the importance of Iran for its funding of economic development. Nasrallah stated that “Iran’s financial involvement in the bulk of our development and social services is not a secret.” 68 A specific example of Iranian funding for economic development is its assistance to Lebanese farmers, especially in the poorer southern

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regions. The Iranian delegation gave “$50 million in farm aid, including a farm credit program and food processing factories, as well as technicians to train the Lebanese in fish farming, beekeeping, and improved mechanization.” 69 This compares to the $1 million given by the US government to farm programs around the same time.70 After the 2006 war, Iran actively and publically funded rebuilding efforts in Lebanon. Within a year, Iran had rebuilt 200 schools, 150 places of worship, 30 clinics, and 25 bridges.71 Iranian-funded reconstruction had banners stating: “From the people of Iran to the people of Lebanon.”72 According to its own government, Iran spent $155 million in Lebanon during the year after the 2006 war with Israel, more than USAID reconstruction funding.73 Iran funneled much of its assistance through Hezbollah. In addition, the money usually only went to areas controlled by Hezbollah and to construction firms managed by supporters of Hezbollah. Iranian financial assistance not only directly financed rebuilding efforts but also enabled Hezbollah to help victims of the war. Nasrallah publically declared that Hezbollah had spent $381 million to give assistance to victims of the war with Israel, including rebuilding infrastructure, providing temporary shelter for 25,000 families, and granting up to $12,000 in compensation for each destroyed home.74 Most analysts believe that the financing for this came from Iran. Hussam Khoshnevis, the head of Iran’s reconstruction efforts in Lebanon, states that there is no limit on its spending in Lebanon and that “the Islamic Republic decided to pay as much as is needed on the ground.”75 The comparison between the success of Iran and Hezbollah’s relief work and the failure of the Lebanese government to quickly and adequately aid people in Shiite communities was a public relations victory for Hezbollah. Iranian financial transfers help Hezbollah fund its programs, which assists the political side of the movement in gaining public support in Lebanon. Hezbollah expert Judith Harik notes: “The political impact of Hezbollah’s social and public services has assuredly been profound. None of their rivals, right or left, religious or secular, can compete with them as large patrons.”76 Providing military assistance. As the 2006 war with Israel clearly demonstrated, Hezbollah is a “well-organized army, unified, [and] well-equipped.”77 Iranian technical training and transfers of military

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technology have helped Hezbollah become a major military power in the region. During the civil war, Iranian money enabled Hezbollah to recruit members for its militia because it could pay them equivalent to $160 per month for part-time service, which was a significant amount in the underprivileged Shiite neighborhoods.78 This financial support for its fighters aided Hezbollah in its fight with Amal in 1988, as it could pay its fighters more than Amal because of Iranian money. The combination of Iranian money and Iranian Revolutionary Guard soldiers made it possible for Hezbollah to almost eliminate Amal’s presence in the southern suburbs of Beirut.79 Iran also sent soldiers to Lebanon to train Hezbollah members and sponsored Hezbollah fighters to attend Iranian military courses. Over the years, the number of Iranian soldiers in Lebanon has varied. After the Israeli invasion in 1982, Iran sent some Iranian Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon to aid in the resistance against Israel’s occupation. As Naim Qassem, deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah, recounts: Ayatullah ordered the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to support Lebanon’s confrontation with Israel, primarily through military training and the provision of the necessary infrastructure. A delegation of high-ranking Iranian military officials visited Syria for coordination. Syria agreed to the passage of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard into Lebanon, and training camps were set up in the Western Bekaa district. An advanced system of training, religious practice and personal as well as moral cultivation was devised, and large numbers of young men joined these camps. Hizbullah’s participation was marked, and the Party had by then attracted many more believers in its goals.80

At peak deployment, an estimated 2,000 Iranian elite soldiers were in Lebanon, primarily in the southern region supplying training and technical assistance to Hezbollah. More recently, Iran has withdrawn most of its soldiers from Lebanon, although it continues to send military equipment.81 Iran and Syria have provided thousands of antitank missiles and other weapons, such as unmanned drones with surveillance equipment, to Hezbollah.82 Hezbollah successfully attacked an Israeli ship off the coast of southern Lebanon with a subsonic missile (the C802), a weapon more sophisticated than many believed Hezbollah possessed and likely supplied by Iran. There were also reports in 2010 that Syria provided Hezbollah with Scud missiles. However, the majority of military assistance to Hezbollah over the years has come from Iran (although often transported

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through Syria with its knowledge). Iran reportedly spent $50 million financing terrorist training camps for Hezbollah and Hamas in the Bekaa Valley, including training on how to use short-range Fajr-5 missiles and Sa-7 antiaircraft rockets.83 During the recent election campaign, the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, used Iran’s military support for Hezbollah as a reason to vote for Hezbollah, because it could defend Lebanon against Israel: “The Islamic Republic of Iran, and in particular Ayatollah Khamenei, will not hold back on anything that will help Lebanon be a strong and dignified state, and without conditions,” Hassan Nasrallah said. . . . “Air defence systems are necessary for the army to face Israel,” Nasrallah told a crowd of thousands of supporters in the eastern town of Baalbek. “Who can secure these weapons for Lebanon? Vote for the opposition [Hezbollah and its allies] and I will point you in that direction,” he said.84

Hezbollah’s leadership has acknowledged that Iran’s support helped the organization achieve its greatest victory, the end of Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.85 The majority of this military assistance is for Hezbollah’s continued resistance against Israel. However, it also has political implications, as the preceding quote illustrates. Hezbollah’s military success against Israel, partially dependent on supplies from Iran, has gained it support and prestige among Muslims in Lebanon and the region. Furthermore, Hezbollah’s military strength helps it maintain close control over parts of Beirut and southern Lebanon. After the 2006 war with Israel, Nasrallah announced that the organization had more than 20,000 rockets.86 Although this statement has not been independently verified, the Hezbollah leader has a reputation of speaking the truth about Hezbollah’s capabilities. In addition to its stockpile of weapons, Hezbollah has several thousand fighters whom the party could use against adversaries within Lebanon. For example, in May 2008, Hezbollah fighters launched armed assaults in Beirut. Hezbollah managed to seize control of the western sector of the capital, subdue Druze regions of Mount Lebanon, and reopen the road to Damascus, which had been closed by progovernment militants.87 These events occurred in the middle of a political stalemate in Lebanon and in response to government decisions the organization disliked. Hezbollah’s actions forced the government to repeal its decisions. Its military strength, greater than that of the Lebanese

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national army, combined with its ability to mobilize large numbers of supporters, allows Hezbollah to circumvent the normal political process. The weakness of the Lebanese military means that even if the Lebanese state had the political will to force Hezbollah to disarm, it would be unable to militarily challenge Hezbollah. The existence of a strong, armed, active militant group in a state does not support democratization. Therefore, Iran’s military support for Hezbollah helps prevent the development of a liberal democratic regime in Lebanon. * * * In summary, Iran has supplied substantial assistance to Hezbollah. Iran’s technical, financial, and public support has enabled Hezbollah, an undemocratic organization, to become a major political actor in Lebanon. Without Iran’s aid, Hezbollah would have been unable to offer the same level of social services and economic development that have helped the organization gain public support. Moreover, Iran’s military aid has furthered Hezbollah’s growth as a powerful militant organization. The development, with Iranian support, of a strong, influential Hezbollah harms democracy in Lebanon. In contrast to Iran, Syria’s involvement in Lebanon has been less about regime type and more about wanting to prevent any one faction from becoming too powerful and able to challenge Syria’s influence over the country. During the civil war, this policy explains why Syria invaded in support of the Christians, then fought against them, and then supported the Shiite group Amal. Syria is often referred to in US policy circles as a supporter of Hezbollah, but the relationship is much more complex than that and has shifted over time depending on Syria’s interests. Periodically, Syria has tried to reduce or directly counter Hezbollah’s political power. Syria saw its main ally in Lebanon as Amal, Hezbollah’s rival. Naim Qassem’s comments about relations with Syria reflect the degree of practicality in the relationship and the lack of warmth. According to Qassem, “the relationship with Syria has so far proven its utility and necessity.”88 Syria’s actions in Lebanon, not in pursuit of any particular regime type, instead seek to maintain a delicate power balance within Lebanon, use Lebanon as a tool in its relationship with Israel, and ensure its position as an important regional actor. Therefore, although Syria’s secular government fears the Islamic nature of Hezbollah, during the civil war Syria allowed Iran to supply Hezbollah through

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Syria because of Hezbollah’s usefulness against Israel. After the civil war and during Syria’s occupation, Syria used Hezbollah as leverage in negotiations over the Golan Heights.89 An implicit assumption in the negotiations was that Syria could ensure Hezbollah’s disarmament in exchange for a favorable agreement. However, since Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon, it is extremely unlikely that Syria has this degree of influence over Hezbollah, if it ever did.90 The current internal disorder in Syria reduces its influence on Lebanese politics, as the Syrian government is preoccupied with domestic problems. There is widespread concern that the conflict in Syria could spread into Lebanon and destabilize the fragile peace there. As of mid-2012, this has not happened. If the civil war developing in Syria spreads to Lebanon, the consequences will be very dire for the stability of the region. In comparison to the other cases, Iran’s assistance has expanded Hezbollah’s civil society organizations and military capabilities more than either Russia’s assistance to Belarus or Venezuela’s aid to Nicaragua. One reason for this difference may be that Hezbollah, although politically powerful, does not control the government. Since Russia’s and Venezuela’s local allies already have political control, there is no need for them to gain influence through civil society development. The importance of external military assistance reflects the unique circumstances of Lebanon, especially the war against Israel. Without the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and the Palestinian situation, it is unlikely Iran would have played the role of major weapons supplier to Hezbollah. Despite these differences with the other cases, there are some strong commonalities. The general mechanisms for promoting authoritarianism are the same. In all cases, the external actor influenced strategies and increased capabilities. Moreover, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran have all helped local allies with direct financial assistance and economic development to fund political patronage.

Explaining the Effectiveness of International Assistance and Lebanon’s Regime Type Iranian assistance has been very effective in helping Hezbollah grow in strength and influence in Lebanon, to the detriment of democracy. Despite the benefits of Iranian assistance for Hezbollah, it is impor-

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tant to realize that there have been downsides to accepting Iranian assistance, especially during the Lebanese civil war, during which Iranian regional interests forced Hezbollah to accept outcomes detrimental to its interests. However, the close ideological relationship between Hezbollah and Iran increases Iran’s influence over Hezbollah and helps override any tensions in their relationship. In other words, Iran’s assistance and guidance given to Hezbollah has been especially effective because the close ideological relationship between the two, combined with the substantial amount of financial support, means that the benefits of accepting external assistance outweigh any costs. Hezbollah has become a major political actor in Lebanon, able not only to militarily seize control of parts of Lebanon but also to bring down the government. In contrast to the strong ideological, financial, and military ties between Hezbollah and Iran, linkages with the United States and the EU to other Lebanese factions are weaker. However, US and European efforts to support democracy in Lebanon have helped to counterbalance Iran’s and Syria’s influence in Lebanon. The combination of countervailing international involvement and elite divisions explain why Hezbollah has been unable to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon. The elite fragmentation and conflict in Lebanon contributes to the failure to consolidate any regime type, either authoritarian or democratic. Countervailing International Involvement Iran is not the only external actor attempting to influence Lebanon’s political development. There is also international support for democratization in Lebanon. Two main sources of countervailing international influence are US and European democracy promotion efforts, and Lebanon’s economic linkages with the EU. Both these factors help to strengthen prodemocratic forces in Lebanon. However, the external support for democracy is weaker than Iran’s support for Hezbollah. Influence of democracy promotion. The United States and the European Union have both sought to directly promote democracy in Lebanon. Both consider a stable, democratic Lebanon to be in their interests. The US government lists Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and views it as a threat to its important ally Israel. This perception, combined with Hezbollah’s close relationship with Iran, a major adversary of the United States, made the US government very interested in support-

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ing Hariri’s March 14 Coalition. Part of US policy in the Middle East is to limit Iran’s influence through Hezbollah, which translates into supporting its opponents in Lebanon. Furthermore, it is official US government policy to support democracy in the Middle East. The EU, although not as strong an ally of Israel or as vocal a promoter of democracy in the region, has similar strategic interests. Therefore, the United States and the EU have tried to promote democracy in Lebanon to counter the influence of Iran. Their efforts have focused on improving elections and supporting civil society development. More controversially, the United States has also been providing military assistance to strengthen state capacity in Lebanon. The greatest improvements in Lebanese democracy due to international assistance have been seen in the conduct of the country’s elections. USAID, working with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Republican Institute (IRI), and with a budget of almost $8 million, supports efforts to strengthen the electoral process, including improving citizen access to voting and registration.91 The NDI, working with local Lebanese NGOs, is advocating electoral law reform through the multifaceted Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform. In addition to aiding electoral and parliamentary reform to strengthen democracy in Lebanon, the US government, along with the EU, has funded election observation missions. During the 2009 elections, the NDI led an international election-monitoring team. The team observed the electoral campaign and voting on election day along with domestic election observers from the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections. The election observation missions helped to increase confidence in the credibility of the election results. The NDI and the EU election observation missions found that the elections were peaceful, had a high rate of participation, and were fairly competitive. Despite these positive characteristics, they both reported several serious structural problems, such as having no official, preprinted ballots, which facilitated widespread vote-buying. Under the current system, political parties print their own distinctive ballots and hand them to voters before they enter the voting booth. This system makes vote-buying much easier, as parties can know whether their money really bought the vote. In addition, weak campaign finance and media regulations can circumvent democracy. However, the greatest problem for democracy in Lebanon is the con-

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fessional distribution of seats, through which each group is guaranteed a set number of seats in parliament, reducing competition. The NDI and the EU election observation missions both stressed that reforms are necessary in order for Lebanon to democratize.92 Part of the reason for Lebanon’s movement from not free to partly free on Freedom House’s rankings is the increased competitiveness of the electoral process. International assistance for electoral reform and election monitoring has helped improve elections and further democracy in Lebanon. Over the past several years, especially since the withdrawal of Syrian forces, the United States and the EU have been actively supporting the development of civil society in Lebanon. USAID has a program offering grants of up to $50,000 to Lebanese civil society organizations for projects encouraging transparency and accountability in government. Overall, the program has a budget of approximately $9 million over several years.93 The NDI helped develop the program Citizen Lebanon, which, through partnerships with seven local NGOs, runs a nationwide citizenship education and advocacy program. The program funds the training of facilitators in advocacy, local and municipal government, and electoral rules. The facilitators then return to their communities to conduct discussion groups and training for citizens. The goal of Citizen Lebanon is to build social capital and allegiance to the state, as opposed to sect or religious community. As of 2009, approximately 7,000 Lebanese had participated in the program.94 The EU’s AFKAR program also funds activities to strengthen civil society in Lebanon. It focuses on organizations that work to build cross-sectarian relationships. Working with a budget of 4 million euros, AFKAR funds Lebanese NGOs involved in raising awareness about human rights. Over the next several years, the EU’s program for Lebanon seeks to further strengthen the capacity of NGOs to “play an active role in shaping political, social and economic reforms in the country.”95 Leading up to the 2009 elections, there was greater civil society activity in Lebanon than in previous electoral cycles. US and European democracy advocates see the growth of civil society activity, especially advocacy organizations, as a positive sign for democratization in Lebanon. However, it is still unknown whether the international support for civil society will actually contribute to the development of democracy. As noted earlier, more vibrant civil society

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organizations do not automatically strengthen democracy in a country. By replacing the Lebanese state, Hezbollah’s civil society organizations do not help, but instead harm, the development of democracy. An essential prerequisite for democratic governance is state sovereignty, something that Hezbollah challenges. Furthermore, in contrast to the years of substantial support from Iran, US and European efforts are relatively new and small. Unlike in the Latin American cases, US government assistance to the Lebanese military is intended to help the country become more democratic. The 2006–2008 events, especially the war with Israel and Hezbollah’s seizure of Beirut, led some analysts to argue that democracy in Lebanon requires a stronger military. The assumption is that a stronger, more effective military would enable the Lebanese government to regain control over all of its territory and therefore weaken Hezbollah. When Syria occupied Lebanon, the Lebanese military deteriorated to such an extent that soldiers could only fire thirty rounds a year during training.96 The military also lacks combat helicopters, night-vision equipment, and sensors to use along its borders. Based on these arguments, the US government has begun helping the Lebanese military gain equipment and sponsor training. Over half of the official US government assistance given to Lebanon in 2009 was for improving the Lebanese military. Despite this intention to strengthen the Lebanese military as a counter to Hezbollah, it is not clear that this will occur. Even if the Lebanese military becomes better trained and equipped, there may not be the political will to confront Hezbollah. During internal conflict in May 2008, the Lebanese military refused to take sides or take any action against Hezbollah, the victor in the fighting. Former prime minister Saad Hariri’s statement supporting the right for Hezbollah to maintain weapon stockpiles is evidence of an unwillingness to challenge Hezbollah too directly. Given Hezbollah’s position in the Lebanese cabinet, some US lawmakers have expressed concerns that US military aid may end up under Hezbollah’s control, and in August 2011 the US Congress temporarily suspended the military aid. In addition to these concerns, given Hezbollah’s political, economic, and military strength within the Shiite community, military confrontation may return the country to civil war, an outcome all international actors want to avoid. In comparison to the strong connections to Iran for Lebanese Shiites, the Lebanese people have mixed feelings about the United

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States. Although members of Hariri’s coalition may find US and European assistance helpful to rebuild the country and in elite conflicts, there are not the same ideological linkages with the United States as there are between Iran and Hezbollah. US involvement in Lebanon results in several different responses, with Sunnis and Christians generally being the most receptive to US support. Not surprisingly, Hezbollah’s leadership uses US engagement as a tool against opponents. Nasrallah argues that the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora “accepts all demands by the US administration without discussion. Any demand by the United States is approved by the current government within 10 minutes. . . . That’s why I called it the government of [US ambassador Jeffrey] Feltman. Whatever he asks for is given. All Lebanese know that Feltman visits the government headquarters daily or almost daily.”97 Overall, a June 2008 public opinion poll by Information International found that the United States is perceived more negatively in Lebanon than Iran, with 48 percent of those surveyed saying that the United States was an enemy of Lebanon, compared to only 30 percent saying that Iran was an enemy and 26 percent saying that Syria was an enemy. Although more Lebanese had negative views of the United States, their positive views were similar, with 15 percent saying that Iran was an ally and 12 percent saying that the United States was an ally. Attitudes about Iran and the United States do vary according to confessional position. Among Lebanese Shiites, 89 percent view Iran as an ally or friend and 88 percent view the United States as an enemy. In contrast, only 32 percent of Maronites view Iran as a friend and 48 percent view the United States as an ally or friend. Support for the United States is actually greatest among Sunni Lebanese, 64 percent of whom say the United States is a friend or ally.98 The United States clearly has a favorable impression among some Lebanese, but evokes stronger negative attitudes than positive views. The strong negative reaction to the United States reduces the effectiveness of its efforts to promote democracy, especially because Shiites interpret US involvement as being in support of Sunnis and Christians. It will be very difficult for US democracy promotion efforts to reach Lebanese Shiites, which is problematic because they constitute a large portion of Lebanon’s population. The United States and the EU have both tried to promote democracy in Lebanon primarily through supporting election monitoring and civil society development. Although there have been some

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improvements in democracy in Lebanon, it is too early to know whether these efforts will be successful, especially as the Lebanese government has been unable to address major problems preventing democratization. As of mid-2012, it appears that Iran’s efforts to support the growth and development of Hezbollah have been more successful than programs to support democratization. However, as an illiberal democracy, where neither the prodemocratic nor the more authoritarian factions have control, there are many possible futures for the country. Diverse economic linkages. While its strongest ideological linkages are with Iran, the economic linkages of Lebanon are diverse. Furthermore, Lebanon has important economic linkages with the United States and the EU as both provide economic aid to Lebanon. In fiscal year 2008 the US government provided approximately $44 million in economic support, in 2009 it provided $67.5 million, and the Barack Obama administration requested $109 million for fiscal year 2010.99 The European Union, since the signing of the EULebanon Association Agreement in 2006 and the finalizing of the EU-Lebanon Action Plan in 2007, has also supported economic development in the country. EU programs have focused on economic reconstruction and recovery, economic reform, and democratic reforms. Overall, for the period 2007–2010, the EU provided Lebanon with 187 million euros of assistance, and spent approximately 83 percent of that money on either economic reconstruction or economic reform.100 The EU has allotted 150 million euros for the period 2011–2013, with a similar portion going to economic recovery and reform. In January 2007 the EU participated in the Paris III conference, where the international community, including EU member states and Arab states, promised $7.6 billion in economic assistance for Lebanon. Compared to the Latin American cases, Lebanon is a wealthier, middle-income country (see Table 4.1). With a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of $9,227 in 2010, the country does not have the same degree of dependency as Nicaragua. However, as a small state, Lebanon is dependent on foreign investment and international trade for economic growth and development. The most valuable trade incentives come from increased trading opportunities with the EU. As Table 4.2 illustrates, the EU is by far Lebanon’s largest trading partner. The importance of trade with the EU to the Lebanese economy

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Table 4.1 Lebanon: Economic Data, 2004–2010

Real GDP growth rate (percentage) GDP per capita (US$) FDI (US$ millions)

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

5.1 3,450 2,484

4.6 5,394 3,321

0.6 5,476 3,132

7.5 6,060 3,376

9.3 7,219 4,333

8.5 8,321 4,804

7.0 9,227 4,955

Sources: World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries?page=1 (accessed January 21, 2012); UNCTAD Stat, http://unctadstat.unctad.org (accessed August 30, 2011).

Table 4.2 Lebanon: Trade Data, 2006–2010

Imports in US$ millions (percentage of total imports) European Union United States Iran Syria Exports in US$ millions (percentage of total exports) European Union United States Iran Syria

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

3,932 (40.8) 1,016 (10.5) 24 (0.3) 178 (1.8)

4,720 (38.5) 1,139 (9.3) 33 (0.3) 206 (1.7)

6,071 (36.2) 1,849 (11.0) 43 (0.3) 211 (1.6)

6,230 (38.4) 1,764 (10.9) 38 (0.2) 234 (1.4)

6,430 (35.8) 1,909 (10.6) 38 (0.2) 339 (1.9)

299 (10.6) 53 (1.9) 36 (1.3) 176 (6.3)

491 (13.7) 68 (1.9) 89 (2.5) 210 (5.9)

576 (12.9) 49 (1.1) 43 (2.3) 224 (5.0)

450 (12.9) 50 (1.4) 49 (1.4) 225 (6.5)

768 (18.1) 61 (1.4) 40 (1.0) 221 (5.2)

Sources: Lebanese Customs Administration, Ministry of Economy and Trade, http://www .economy.gov.lb/MOET/English/Statistics/Trade/Pages/BilateralTradeTablebycountries.aspx (accessed August 30, 2011).

was clear when even Hezbollah announced during the 2009 electoral campaign that it had talked to the EU about continued financial support should its coalition win the elections.101 Unlike the United States, which threatened to reduce assistance to Lebanon if Hezbollah won, the EU made no threats. In addition, many European gov-

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ernments, such as the British government, maintain relations with Hezbollah’s political arm. The EU’s behavior toward Lebanon contrasts with its actions regarding East European states, especially potential future EU member states. In Central and Eastern Europe, the EU used its economic leverage and control over membership to encourage democratization. Even with Ukraine, which has a low probability of EU membership, the EU has used economic relations to push for political reform. In contrast, although the EU has leverage over Lebanon because of its economic relationship, the EU did not use this leverage in 2009 to influence the outcome of the election. Lebanon is clearly economically dependent on other nations for trade and investment. Although the EU is its largest trade partner, Lebanon’s economic linkages are diverse, reducing the leverage of any particular international actor over the country. The multitude of international actors involved in Lebanon means that if one state withdraws aid or institutes sanctions, another state is in place to counterbalance the effect. In order for states to be economically dependent, it has to be difficult for them to replace the trade, aid, or investment if it ends. Lebanon is not economically dependent on any one external actor. Trade deals and aid appear to help particular factions increase their capabilities, but not to shift many elites from supporting democracy to supporting authoritarianism or vice versa. Furthermore, Lebanon’s largest trade partner, the EU, has not linked trade agreements to regime type. The diversity of economic linkages reduces the ability of the United States to push for democratization in Lebanon, but it also reduces the dependency of Lebanon on Iran. Role of Fragmented Elites Although the combination of diverse economic linkages and international support for democracy in Lebanon has helped to counterbalance against the growing influence of Hezbollah, an important reason why Hezbollah has been unable to seize complete control is the high degree of elite fragmentation and conflict. There are multiple factions of Lebanese elites who are opposed to Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s political base is composed primarily of Lebanese Shiites. Lebanese Sunnis, Christians, and other factions hold enough power currently to prevent total Hezbollah control. The elite conflict and fragmentation have repeatedly brought the country to the brink of civil war and contributed to the failure to consolidate any type of regime. There is

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a lack of elite unity about regime type and the relationship between Islam and the government in Lebanon. Since the civil war, Hezbollah has gained political power. However, the division of power among elites is still equal enough to prevent any one faction from being able to rule the whole country on its own. The events since 2006 highlight the divisions among elites and the distribution of power. A clear sign of the continued divisions among elites is the political rhetoric. During one political crisis, the Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, challenged Hezbollah’s antigovernment activities: “You want anarchy? [We] welcome anarchy. You want war? [We] welcome war. There is no problem with weapons. . . . War does not scare us. We have no problem with war or rockets,” Jumblatt said in reference to Hezbollah’s possession of thousands of missiles. “We will seize the rockets from you because we don’t fear martyrdom.”102 In November 2006, ministers from Hezbollah, Amal, and other groups resigned from the national unity government over the issue of supporting a UN tribunal investigation into Rafik Hariri’s assassination. Hezbollah launched days of protests in Beirut to bring down the government. In a televised address on al-Manar, Hezbollah’s station, Nasrallah said that the government of Prime Minister Siniora was “incompetent and has failed to fulfill its promises and achieve anything significant.”103 Nasrallah then called on people to join peaceful protests to bring down the government. In response, Siniora said, “Lebanon’s independence is threatened and its democratic system is in danger.”104 In an official statement the March 14 Coalition called for an end to occupation of Beirut by Hezbollah and its supporters, including the Christian Maronite faction led by General Aoun. It went on to caution “against the dangers of continuing the incitement campaigns and instigating hatred that some Hezbollah’s officials and its media outlets have been assertively and consistently launching.”105 During this crisis, all sides referred to the other as “thieves and murderers.” The language during the 2009 electoral campaign also reflected the degree of conflict among Lebanese elites. In an official statement the March 14 Coalition asked, “What will the future of our freedom of expression be if they [the opposition] rule in Lebanon?” 106 At one point, a March 14 candidate for a Shiite seat in the Bekaa district claimed that his opponent had threatened to kill him. 107 More recently, Elie Mahfoud, a member of the March 14 Coalition, claimed that Hezbollah “wants to turn the lives of the Lebanese into

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a living hell” and that, in referring to Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm, “the Lebanese must voice their opposition to this form of illegitimate military.”108 This rhetoric highlights not only the divisions among Lebanese elites but also their willingness to subvert the normal political process to achieve victory over adversaries. The strongest indication of inter-elite conflict in Lebanon is the high level of political violence in the country. For example, between February 2005 and December 2007, eight Lebanese politicians or government officials were assassinated; seven were killed by car bombs and one was shot. The most dramatic was the assassination of Rafik Hariri in February 2005, which resulted in twenty-one people killed overall. There is evidence that some members of Hezbollah assisted with the assassination of Hariri, although independent analysts do not know if they were acting on their own or on orders of the party leadership. Political violence reached its peak in 2008, when many feared a return to civil war in Lebanon. The government decided to ban Hezbollah’s separate telephone network and fired an airport security official allied with Hezbollah. The Druze leader, Jumblatt, accused Hezbollah of using its ally at the airport to place security cameras to monitor the movements of progovernment, anti-Syrian politicians in order to help plan assassination attempts. In response to these actions and ongoing disputes over choosing a new president, Nasrallah stated that the government had issued a declaration of war against Hezbollah. Nasrallah went on to argue that “gangs” were running the country under orders of the United States. “It is a war between two groups, one who is honest and wants to live in dignity and the other wants to follow the American agenda in the region.” Nasrallah also stated that Hezbollah did not seek to overthrow the government, because “if we [Hezbollah] want a coup, the leaders of this country will be in the sea or in jails.” 109 The resulting clashes between progovernment groups and Hezbollah’s supporters resulted in the killing of eighty people. Although Hezbollah demonstrated its military strength in this crisis by seizing control of parts of Beirut, it was unable to take over the country without risking a return to civil war. Opposition to Hezbollah is strong enough to prevent an easy takeover, but not strong enough or unified enough to consolidate democracy. The relatively diffuse distribution of power, combined with the high level of conflict in Lebanon, makes international allies and their

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assistance essential. Furthermore, as some groups have gained international allies, other groups have also sought external assistance to counterbalance the increased capabilities of their adversaries. As one Lebanese analyst noted during the early stages of the civil war: The Sunnis were allied to the Palestinians, the Christians with the West and with Israel, leftwing parties had their Palestinian, Libyan and sometimes Syrian connections, along with the Soviet Union. Only the Shi‘a were alone. They had the sense of being the most threatened and vulnerable community in the civil war. . . . In this context, an Iranian role found favorable support. And the Iranians themselves were not passive. . . . They took the initiative; they were cooperative.110

Lebanese political factions take advantage of international involvement to strengthen their position relative to that of their adversaries and to use as tools against opponents. International alliances arise as issues in Lebanese electoral campaigns. Members of the March 14 Coalition played up Hezbollah’s connections with Syria and Iran as a way to discredit the party’s position and agenda. In turn, Nasrallah criticized the relationship between Saad Hariri and the US government. The intensity of inter-elite conflicts makes external allies helpful and, as long as the “other side” has its international friends, each group is likely to continue to seek international assistance. Elite fragmentation and conflict prevent consolidation of either democracy or authoritarianism and provide the opportunity for external involvement.

Conclusion Hezbollah’s ability to form, grow, and thrive in Lebanon is partially due to Iran’s significant and lasting support. The strong ideological ties between Iran and Hezbollah facilitate cooperation. Iran’s support for Hezbollah has not yet produced an authoritarian government in Lebanon, but it is preventing the development of a stable, democratic state. Hezbollah’s military capabilities and its provision of social services challenge the sovereignty of the Lebanese state. Having control over national territory is an essential precondition for the development of a liberal, democratic government. In comparison to Russia’s support for Lukashenko and Venezuela’s support for Ortega, Iran has provided substantial assistance that has strengthened Hezbollah’s capabilities. Although direct compar-

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isons are difficult, Iran has certainly equaled, if not surpassed, Russia’s aid for Lukashenko and has definitely far exceeded Venezuela’s aid. Despite this, Hezbollah has been unable to seize power in Lebanon. This fact demonstrates how the influence of external actors is always constrained by the domestic circumstances in the recipient country. The deeply divided nature of Lebanese politics (along with policy decisions by the party leadership) has prevented Hezbollah’s political victory. However, Hezbollah’s political and military strength does restrict what actions the Lebanese government takes, and Hezbollah’s ability to bring down the government in January 2011 demonstrates its influence over politics in Lebanon. Although Hezbollah has not seized total power, it has enormous political, economic, and military influence in Lebanon because of Iran’s financial and strategic support for almost three decades.

Appendix: Lebanese Timeline January 1, 1944. Lebanon gains independence from France. 1958. First civil war between supporters of pro-Western president Camille Shamun and supporters of Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser’s pan-Arab movement. US troops are sent into Lebanon, per the agreements made when Lebanon signed the Eisenhower Doctrine the previous year. June 1967. Six-Day War between Israel and Arab states; Lebanon remains neutral. 1968. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) moves its base of operations to southeastern Lebanon. December 28, 1968. After an attack on an Israeli airplane in Athens, Greece, by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a PLO member organization, Israel retaliates and destroys thirteen airplanes at the Beirut airport. November 3, 1969. Following a Cairo Arab League meeting, the PLO is given the right to conduct its activities from Lebanon. April 10, 1973. Israel conducts a raid on Beirut and kills three individuals connected to Yasser Arafat. 1975. Amal is founded. April 13, 1975. The Lebanese Civil War begins when Christian Maronite Phalangists ambush a bus in Beirut, killing twentyseven Palestinian passengers.

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June 1976. Syria invades Lebanon in support of the Lebanese Christian-right forces. October 1976. Cease-fire agreement is established and Syria leads the Arab Deterrent Force to maintain the agreement. March 14–15, 1978. Israel launches another invasion into Lebanon after new Palestinian attacks on Israel. March 19, 1978. The UN Security Council issues Resolution 425, calling for an Israeli withdrawal and creating an interim peacekeeping force to ensure Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. June 13, 1978. Israel transfers control of land in southern Lebanon to its ally, the South Lebanon Army, a Christian militia. 1979. Islamic Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini’s movement overthrows the Shah and establishes an Islamic state in Iran. 1982. Hezbollah emerges largely in response to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. 1982. Iran sends Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon to aid in the resistance against Israel’s occupation. June 6, 1982. Operation Peace for Galilee commences; Israel invades Lebanon again, after an attempt on the life of Israel’s ambassador to the United Kingdom. Israel’s goal is to destroy the PLO. August 12, 1982. Israel conducts a large air attack on PLO targets in Lebanon, with very few strategic benefits but large numbers of Lebanese civilian casualties. September 14, 1982. Bachir Gemayel, Lebanese president-elect, is assassinated by a pro-Syrian group. September 15, 1982. Israeli troops begin occupation of West Beirut. September 16–18, 1982. Phalangists massacre hundreds of Palestinians in refugee camps. September 24, 1982. First international peacekeepers arrive. May 17, 1983. Israel and Lebanon agree to end hostilities and that Israel can establish a border security zone in southern Lebanon. October 23, 1983. In Beirut, 243 US Marines and 56 French paratroopers die in two closely timed attacks by Shiite militias. February 16, 1985. Hezbollah publically announces its goals and objectives in its open letter to “The Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World.” June 16, 1985. Hezbollah hijacks an airplane and demands the release of Shiites held by Israel. September 1985. Lebanese National Resistance, consisting of the Popular Socialist Party, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, Amal, the Lebanese Communist Party, the Communist Action

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Organization, the Najjadah, the Lebanese Arab Army, the Baath Party, and various groups supportive of Nasserite ideals, effectively pushes Israel back to the border zone between the two states. May 1988. Amal and Hezbollah fight for control of southern Lebanon and Beirut’s suburbs. September 1988. Lebanon is controlled by two governments, a Christian government led by General Michel Aoun and a Muslim government led by Selim al-Hoss. October 1990. Civil war ends when Michel Aoun flees the presidential palace for the French embassy. December 24, 1990. Omar Karami becomes the first post–civil war prime minister. 1991. All militias, except for the South Lebanon Army and Hezbollah, disband. May 22, 1991. Syria and Lebanon sign “A Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination.” 1992. Hezbollah participates in Lebanon’s first parliamentary elections since before the start of the civil war. July 1993. Israel commences Operation Accountability against Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine– General Command (PFLP-GC), the largest attack on Lebanon since the various actions in 1982. April 1996. Operation Grapes of Wrath is launched by Israel against Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon. May 24, 2000. Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon ends when the South Lebanon Army collapses. May 12, 2003. Iranian president Mohammad Khatami visits Beirut, demonstrating the importance of Iran for Hezbollah and the popular support for Iran among Lebanese Shiites. February 14, 2005. President Rafik Hariri is assassinated in a car bombing in Beirut. March 14, 2005. Prompted by the assassination of Hariri, thousands of Lebanese protestors rally against the assassination of their president and the continued occupation of their country by Syria. April 2005. Syria claims that all of its troops have left Lebanon. June 2005. The anti-Syrian March 14 Coalition wins the most seats in parliamentary elections. July 2006. Israel launches an air, sea, and ground attack on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Approximately a thousand Lebanese civilians die.

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August 14, 2006. Truce between Israel and Hezbollah comes into effect and international peacekeepers, under the auspices of the United Nations, arrive to enforce the peace. 2006 onward. Hezbollah, financed by Iran, provides assistance to Lebanese harmed by the 2006 war. November 11, 2006. Five government ministers from Hezbollah and Amal resign ahead of the Lebanese cabinet’s drafting of a resolution for the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon. January 25, 2007. Donor countries meeting in Paris commit to $7.5 billion in aid to help rebuild Lebanon after the Israeli war. May 19–September 2, 2007. Conflict between the Lebanese Army and Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon leaves over 300 dead. May 30, 2007. Security Council gives approval to form the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon. November 23, 2007. President Emile Lahoud steps down when parliament does not name a successor, setting off a six-month period of violence and political turmoil. May 2008. Violence escalates throughout the month as Hezbollahallied forces seize West Beirut. Violence also breaks out in Tripoli. May 25, 2008. After six months of a political impasse, Michel Suleiman becomes president; however, sporadic violence continues. September 16, 2008. Various political factions finally meet in Beirut seeking reconciliation. October 14, 2008. Syrian president Bashir al-Assad announces that Syria will establish official diplomatic relations with Lebanon. June 7, 2009. Parliamentary elections are held, with Saad Hariri’s March 14 Coalition eventually forming a government in November 2009. August 3, 2010. A misunderstanding at the Lebanon-Israel frontier causes a small outbreak of violence that leaves four dead. October 2010. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad makes his first official visit to Lebanon, creating a new fear of destabilization. January 2011. Hezbollah and its allies succeed in nominating their candidate Najib Mikati to be the new prime minister, setting off a series of violent protests. January 17, 2011. UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon issues a sealed indictment, which many believe names Hezbollah members, for the February 2005 attack against President Rafik Hariri.

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June 2011. After five months of negotiations, a new government is formed, dominated by Hezbollah and its allies. The UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon issues four indictments for Hezbollah members. Sources: Saouli, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah”; “Timeline: Lebanon,” BBC News (no date), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/819200.stm (accessed August 25, 2010); Parkinson, “Israel’s Lebanon War”; Library of Congress, “A Country Study: Lebanon” (no date), http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/lbtoc .html (accessed August 25, 2010); Wenger and Denney, “Lebanon’s FifteenYear War, 1975–1990”; “Timeline: Lebanon,” Al-Jazeera (2009), http:// english.aljazeera.net/focus/lebanon2009/2009/06/200961145224882101.html (accessed May 21, 2012).

Notes 1. As Hezbollah’s name is transliterated from Arabic, there are many different spellings in English, including “Hizbullah” and “Hizballah.” For consistency I use “Hezbollah” throughout unless in a direct quotation. 2. Polity IV, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Lebanon2010.pdf (accessed May 21, 2012). 3. Some votes went for up to $800. Worth, “With Votes for Sale in Lebanon, Money from Abroad Floods In.” 4. There was an earlier, shorter civil war in 1958. 5. Barak, “Intra-Communal and Inter-Communal Dimensions of Conflict,” p. 635. 6. During 1971 and 1972 the Lebanese Army reported that members of the Palestinian camps had committed over 787 violations of the law, including carrying explosives, kidnapping civilians, imposing checkpoints, seizing property, and committing armed robberies. Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon, pp. 219–220. 7. Barak, “Intra-Communal and Inter-Communal Dimensions of Conflict,” p. 636. 8. Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon, p. 240. 9. Harik, “Between Islam and the System,” p. 45. 10. Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, p. 16. 11. Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” p. 220. 12. Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdraw from Southern Lebanon,” p. 27. 13. Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon, p. 254. 14. Ibid., p. 247. 15. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 112. 16. Hamzeh, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah,” p. 333.

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17. Ibid. 18. Freedom House’s 2002 report ranks Lebanon as 6 on political rights and 5 on civil rights (on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being the most free and democratic). Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2002: Lebanon,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2002/lebanon (accessed May 17, 2012). 19. Suleiman Franjieh, the former Lebanese interior minister, said: “If the indictments come out against Hezbollah in the trial of the Hariri assassination, there is war in Lebanon . . . and today the atmosphere is just waiting for a spark.” He also said: “If the international tribunal [issues] a ‘sectarian’ decision, then yes, why don’t we cancel it? . . . The scenario of the next war is Sunni-Shi‘ite.” “Hariri Case ‘Could Cause Civil War,’” AlJazeera (September 24, 2010), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middle east/2010/09/201092323209682399.html (accessed November 19, 2010). 20. Mona Yacoubian, “Regional Dynamics of the Syrian Uprising: The Impact on Lebanon and Hezbollah,” United States Institute of Peace (October 13, 2011), www.usip.org/publications/regional-dynamics-the-syrian -uprising-the-impact-lebanon-and-hezbollah (accessed April 8, 2012). 21. Menashri, “Iran’s Regional Policy,” p. 154. 22. Ibid., p. 160. 23. For example, when Lebanon had a seat on the United Nations Security Council, it abstained from a vote about Iran’s nuclear program. 24. Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, p. 236. 25. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 33. 26. Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” p. 226. 27. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 110. 28. Ibid., pp. 110–111. 29. Hamzeh and Dekmejian, “The Islamic Spectrum of Lebanese Politics,” p. 39. 30. Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” p. 218. 31. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 25. 32. Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” p. 220. 33. Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon,” pp. 25–26. 34. Ibid., p. 25. 35. Deeb, “Shia Movements in Lebanon,” p. 693. 36. “Lebanese Hezbollah Leader Hosts Meeting with Syrian, Iranian Officials.” 37. Ibid. 38. Harik, “Between Islam and the System,” p. 50. 39. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 63. 40. Sullivan, “Levantine Labyrinths,” p. 92. 41. “Iran’s Supreme Leader Reportedly Helps Hezbollah with Money After Bankruptcy.”

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42. Ibid. 43. Levitt, “Hezbollah: Financing Terror Through Criminal Enterprise.” 44. Burns, “Remade Militant Group Learns Press Kits and Websites Have Their Uses.” 45. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 60. 46. Ibid., p. 61. 47. “Iran Guard Predict Israel Demise,” BBC News (February 18, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7250894.stm (accessed May 17, 2012). 48. “Lebanon Resistance Heralds Victory of Justice over Injustice.” 49. “Iran Supports Hezbollah as an ‘Independent Political Party.’” 50. “Islam-Iran-Lebanon.” 51. “Persian Press: Jannati Calls Hezbollah’s Nasrallah ‘Man of Century.’” 52. Berman, “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society,” p. 266. 53. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 49. 54. Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad,” p. 125. 55. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, pp. 54–55. 56. Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad,” p. 125. 57. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 56. 58. Ibid., pp. 57–58. 59. Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad,” p. 129. 60. Harik, “Between Islam and the System,” p. 55. 61. Ibid., p. 56. 62. Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad,” p. 130. 63. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 51. 64. Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, p. 91. 65. Ibid., p. 92. 66. US Agency for International Development (USAID), “Middle East: Lebanon,” www.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/countries/lebanon (accessed July 18, 2010). 67. Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, p. 87. 68. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 63. 69. MacFarquhar, The Media Relations Department of Hizbollah, p. 62. 70. Ibid., p. 61. 71. Logan, “Iran Rebuilds Lebanon to Boost Hizbollah.” 72. Ibid. 73. Rafei and Daragahi, “Iran Builds a Presence in Lebanon.” 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, p. 92. 77. Iftach Shapira, analyst for The Middle East Military Balance, quoted in Rosenberg, “Hezbollah’s Transformation Is a Case Study.” 78. Vaziri, “Iran’s Involvement in Lebanon,” p. 7. 79. Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” p. 227.

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80. Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, p. 20. 81. Wright, “Most of Iran’s Troops in Lebanon Are Out.” 82. Rosenberg, “Hezbollah’s Transformation Is a Case Study.” 83. Levitt, “Hezbollah: Financing Terror Through Criminal Enterprise.” 84. “Hezbollah: Iran to Support Lebanon,” Al-Jazeera (May 9, 2009), www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/05/20095308035507613.html (accessed April 13, 2012). 85. Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, p. 237. 86. “Hezbollah Has More Than 20,000 Rockets.” 87. Saab, “Rethinking Hezbollah’s Disarmament,” p. 93. 88. Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, p. 243. 89. For further discussion of this, see el-Hokayem, “Hizballah and Syria.” 90. El-Hokayem, “Hizballah and Syria.” 91. USAID, “Electoral Process in Lebanon” (February 2010), http:// www.usaid.gov/lb/about_us/factsheets.html (accessed July 23, 2010). 92. For more information on the elections, see National Democratic Institute (NDI), “Final Report on the Lebanese Parliamentary Election, June 7, 2009,” www.ndi.org/node/16115 (accessed July 27, 2010). 93. USAID, “Transparency and Accountability Grants” (February 2010), http://www.usaid.gov/lb/about_us/factsheets.html (accessed July 23, 2010). 94. For more information, see NDI, “Lebanon,” www.ndi.org/lebanon ?page=0%2C0 (accessed July 27, 2010). 95. European Commission, “European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument: Republic of Lebanon—National Indicative Programme, 2011– 2013,” http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_lebanon _en.pdf (accessed July 27, 2010). 96. Worth and Lipton, “U.S. Is Resupplying Lebanon’s Military in Effort to Stabilize a Strategic Ally.” 97. “US Blocking Lebanon Reconciliation.” 98. These polling data are from a June 2008 poll by Information International, an independent research firm in Beirut. Information International, “Foreign Countries, Friends, Allies or Enemies?” no. 74 (September 2008), http://information-international.com/info/index.php/expertise/opinion-polls (accessed August 2, 2010). 99. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East, p. 11. 100. European Commission, “ENP Country Report 2009: Lebanon,” http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/180 &format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed July 27, 2010); European Commission, “European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument: Republic of Lebanon.” 101. Worth, “Hezbollah Says It Is Talking to European Union and IMF.” 102. “Jumblatt Said Lebanon Nearing Anarchy.”

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103. “Hezbollah Leader Says Government Has Failed.” 104. Chassay, “Hizbullah Mass Protest a Threat to Democracy.” 105. “Lebanese Politicians React to Hezbollah Leader’s Ashura Speech.” 106. “Lebanon Opposition Politicians Trade Accusations.” 107. Ibid. 108. “Manfoud: Hizbullah’s Ideological Concepts Will Not Last Long.” 109. “Second Roundup: Hezbollah Chief Calls Lebanon’s Government a ‘Gang.’” 110. Gendzier, “Iran and Lebanon,” p. 23.

5 Concluding Thoughts

Woodrow Wilson famously said that we must “make the world safe

for democracy.” With this statement, Wilson was not advocating for promoting democracy everywhere, but instead arguing that he wanted a world where it was safe for democracies to exist.1 In this book I have examined strategies and policies designed to make the world less safe for democracy. Russian, Venezuelan, and Iranian support for authoritarianism has made the development of liberal democracies, already a challenging task, much more difficult. Furthermore, their support has made the development of authoritarianism much easier in their respective regions. Support for illiberal leaders reduces the leverage of sanctions or incentives intended to promote democracy. As we saw in the case of Nicaragua, the reduction of US aid has not pressured Daniel Ortega to become more democratic because Venezuelan aid has replaced the lost money. The goal of making the world safe for democracy or even, more controversially, making the world democratic, is strategically important for the United States and other democratic states today. US security requires a “world safe for democracy” and evidence suggests that democracies do not fight each other, which, if true, means that a more democratic world is a more peaceful world. Therefore, understanding how and when efforts to promote authoritarianism succeed is essential for developing effective responses. Reflecting upon all five cases presented in this book, some interesting conclusions arise. First, in all the cases, elites learned strate-

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gies from external actors for how to maintain or obtain power. The specific lessons ranged from ideas for how to bribe election officials and steal an election (Ukraine) to strategies for how to circumvent institutional checks on power (Nicaragua). The learning occurred both indirectly through demonstration effects and directly through collaborative strategy-making. In both Ukraine and Lebanon, there was purposeful external influence on nondemocratic elites. Russian political strategists managed Victor Yanukovych’s electoral campaign, and Iranian leaders dictated Hezbollah’s strategies during the civil war. The only major case of coercion involved Russia and its relationship with Belarus and Ukraine. In these situations, the Russian government used its control over natural gas supplies to forcibly obtain its desired political outcome. Second, in all of the cases, external actors sought to increase elite capabilities. Although the specific methods varied, the overall purpose, increasing the resources of domestic allies, was the same. The two most widespread mechanisms were direct financial support for illiberal elites, and resources for economic development. Russia, Venezuela, and Iran all provided money to political allies in direct, nontransparent payments. In addition to the financing of political parties and leaders, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran all gave large amounts of economic aid to help their favored leaders maintain economic stability. These diverse external actors used similar methods to support authoritarian groups and elites. One major difference was Iranian aid to Hezbollah, which facilitated its role as a civil society organization. This difference may point more to the unique nature of Hezbollah as a political party, terrorist organization, and provider of social services, than to any major difference in Iranian strategies. The mechanism that did not appear in the cases, again with the potential exception of Lebanon, was aid for repression. Although financial transfers to political elites may be subsequently used for repression, external actors do not appear to be directly supplying resources, such as weapons, for repression. Even in the case of Lebanon, where Iran has given Hezbollah major military assistance for years, its original purpose was to aid Hezbollah in its fight against Israel, not against domestic democratic groups. Therefore, the Lebanese case is a weak example of aid for repression. Third, the regime outcome in each case reflected the interaction of external support for authoritarianism, external assistance for

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democracy, and the domestic conditions. The balance of power between liberal and illiberal elites, combined with the nature of the linkages with the external actors, determined the effectiveness of the promotion of authoritarianism. The types of linkage varied, but in all cases, the more linkages that existed between the external actor and the recipient, the greater the likelihood that elites would turn to the external actor to develop strategies to erode democracy. A relatively equal balance of power between liberal and illiberal elites provides opportunities for external involvement, as both sides may seek international assistance in their power struggle. However, as the Lebanese case illustrates, a relatively even distribution of power can produce a fragmented elite that prevents regime consolidation, either democratic or authoritarian. External support for authoritarianism reduces the effectiveness of democracy promotion by reducing the leverage of the democratic external actor. However, external support for democracy can also counterbalance promotion of authoritarianism. Economic, social, and cultural linkages with democratic states provide an alternative to relations with the autocratic external actor. Furthermore, if democracy promotion efforts increase the strength of prodemocratic factions, then this may prevent illiberal elites from being able to seize power, even with the support of an autocratic ally. The two forms of international involvement can interact. In other words, states may increase or decrease their level of support in response to the level of assistance from the other external actor. It is surprising how similar the methods are for promoting democracy and for promoting authoritarianism. Both involve the diffusion of strategies and ideas across borders, statements of public support for domestic allies, aid for economic development, and occasionally coercion. Overall, there is a similar emphasis on changing elite strategies and increasing elite capabilities. There are a few differences in the approaches. For example, it is more common for promotion of democracy to involve the use of coercive tools like economic sanctions. External actors promoting authoritarianism are more likely to directly fund domestic political allies. The US government and the European Union generally do not directly contribute to political campaigns in order to promote democracy, whereas Russia, Venezuela, and Iran have all been willing to contribute money to the political campaigns of domestic allies. In addition, democracy promotion

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almost always involves aid for civil society, but authoritarian support for civil society development is rare. Despite these exceptions, there are more similarities than differences between the two approaches.

Implications for Foreign Policy Overall, the cases in this book suggest four important implications for foreign policy. First, the domestic situation of the recipient country is essential for understanding how and when external support for authoritarianism will succeed. In both Peru and Ukraine, attempts to promote authoritarianism failed because of domestic political and economic circumstances. Enough elites believed that acquiescing to proauthoritarian external pressure for authoritarianism was not in their interests, and they were strong enough to act against it. Although there were unique factors for why the promotion of authoritarianism failed in each case, an important similarity was that there were viable strong alternatives available both internationally and domestically. Ukraine and Peru also had at least modest levels of economic diversity, which reduced their dependency on any single external actor. Internally, the more democratic option was unified, at least temporarily, and had a viable candidate. These similarities suggest that having legitimate democratic options is significant for elite decisionmaking when facing proauthoritarian pressure. Second, active efforts to support or encourage authoritarianism weaken and harm democracy promotion efforts. Furthermore, assessments of attempts to promote democracy usually fail to consider the role of external support for authoritarianism and how it affects democratization. This may lead to an overall underestimation of the effectiveness of attempts to promote democracy. For example, the failure of democracy promotion in Belarus is at least partially due to the countervailing influence of Russian aid to Alexander Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime. Along with this realization, it is important to remember that the leverage of external actors may increase or decrease over time. The United States and EU would have had more leverage over Belarus in the early 1990s before Lukashenko consolidated his power. However, little effort or attention was given to the issue of democracy in Belarus at that time. The EU has also realized that once postcommunist states join the EU, it loses its greatest source of leverage—

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membership in the EU—to press for democratic reform. The recent erosion of press freedom in Hungary and the EU’s limited options for how to respond highlight the reduced leverage of the EU to encourage democratization. Third, promoting authoritarianism can be very successful under the right conditions within the recipient state. Regional authoritarian states have developed effective strategies to support and develop authoritarian regimes in their neighborhoods. Surprisingly, given the regional diversity of the cases presented in this book, there are significant commonalities among the methods used. All three regional powers utilized wealth from commodities, especially oil and natural gas, to offer large amounts of monetary aid to allies within recipient states. Moreover, the regional powers have developed sophisticated methods for exporting authoritarianism, including borrowing strategies for democracy promotion. For example, Russia has established its own election-monitoring regime to give greater legitimacy to fraudulent elections in Central Asia. Authoritarian regimes make use of the Internet to gain greater control over their own people and spread anti-Western, antidemocratic ideas at home and abroad.2 The encouragement of authoritarianism abroad does not always succeed, as several cases have demonstrated, but given the right international and domestic circumstances, it can. Fourth, given the increasing strength of nondemocratic states in the world today, it is likely that the promotion of authoritarianism abroad will continue. Russia and Iran have become more influential in their regions and in global politics over the past decade than in the 1990s. Despite significant internal economic issues and the recent prodemocracy protests in Russia, both states are likely to remain major regional powers supporting authoritarian regimes abroad. Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, facing serious economic problems at home, declining oil output, and challenges from the opposition, may lose some of its ability to influence events abroad. However, the growth of nondemocratic China offers the possibility of a global, not regional, power supporting authoritarianism abroad. Currently, China, strongly influenced by the concept of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, does not actively promote any regime type. As China grows in power and influence, this strategy may change. If this occurs, the consequences for weakly developed democratic states may be severe.

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Future Research As a new area of study, there is still much that we do not know about the international dimension of regime change. Furthermore, the complexity of interaction between external factors and domestic conditions makes it challenging to differentiate causal relationships. Despite these challenges, more research on several key topics would greatly improve our understanding of this relationship. Although this book provides a necessary start, more cross-country, and ideally cross-regional, research is needed. This is especially true for the question of effectiveness. States have limited resources, and knowing where external support for authoritarianism is more likely to be successful will enable wise use of those resources and lead to better methods to counterbalance the promotion of authoritarianism. Along with the need for more cross-country research, there are lingering questions about how external actors can change elite strategies. Scholars need more information about the specific means and methods by which external actors alter elite strategies. Although this book has illustrated some of these means and methods, more analysis is necessary to fully comprehend this relationship. Changing elite strategies is an interesting mechanism not only for the study of regime change but also for considering other important foreign policy goals. How states can change the actions and strategies of elites in other countries, short of using coercion, is a theoretically and empirically important question. As the recent overthrow of regimes in the Middle East illustrates, regime type fundamentally matters to people. It is an issue over which people will risk their livelihoods, their freedom, and sometimes their lives. Greater understanding of how and why external efforts to influence regime type succeed or fail will assist in determining how others can help or hinder these attempts at regime change.

Notes 1. Kennedy, “What Would Wilson Do?” 2. See Morozov, The Net Delusion, for more information on how the Internet is not a uniquely prodemocratic tool and is actively used by authoritarian leaders to maintain power.

Acronyms

ALBA ALN-PC

Amal APRA CAFTA CIS ENEMO FDI FSB FSLN GDP IFES IMF INGO IPADE IREX IRI

Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América) Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance–Conservative Party (Alianza Liberal Nicaraguënse–Partido Conservador) Battalions of Lebanese Resistance American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, Peru) Central American Free Trade Agreement Commonwealth of Independent States European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations foreign direct investment Federal Security Service (Russia) Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) gross domestic product International Foundation for Electoral Systems International Monetary Fund international nongovernmental organization Institute for Development and Democracy (Instituto para el Desarrollo y la Democracia, Nicaragua) International Research and Exchanges Board International Republican Institute 187

188

KGB MRS NDI NED NGO OAS OSCE PFLP PFLP-GC PLC PLO SEAUP UN UPP USAID VSU WHINSEC

Acronyms

State Security Agency of the Republic of Belarus Sandinista Renovation Movement (Movimiento de Renovación Sandinista, Nicaragua) National Democratic Institute (United States) National Endowment for Democracy nongovernmental organization Organization of American States Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine– General Command Constitutionalist Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista, Nicaragua) Palestine Liberation Organization Strengthening Electoral Administration in Ukraine Project National Unity (Unidad Nacional, Peru) Union for Peru (Unión por el Perú) US Agency for International Development Supreme Council of Justice (Ukraine) Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation

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Index

AFKAR, 162 ALBA. See Alliance for the Americas Alemán, Arnoldo, 114, 115 Alliances: democracy suppression by, 20–21; domestic political, 183; ideological, 26–27, 30–31, 38n87; illiberal regime use of, 16; Lebanese Civil War, 170; political assistance and, 19; regime type connection to, 9. See also specific leaders Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), 104, 107, 122 Amal, 140, 146–147, 153 Ambrosio, Thomas, 15 American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), 116 AMUNIC, 105–106 Antidefamation law, in Belarus, 83 Aoun, Michel, 168, 173 APRA. See American Popular Revolutionary Alliance Argument overview, 7–9 al-Assad, Bashir, 143 Authoritarian promotion: democracy promotion comparison with, 14, 20, 183; democracy promotion interaction with, 5, 22–23; diffusion strategy for, 5; election monitoring in, 21; external support

role, 3–4, 183; failed, 116, 184; linkages in, 26; measuring ideological agreement in, 30–31; oil price increase linked with, 6–7; political ideology agreement dimension in, 26–27, 38n87; repression assistance in, 20–21, 182; two means of, 13. See also specific cases Authoritarian regimes: Belarus as, 41, 82–87; criteria for determining, 11– 12; support from neighboring, 185. See also Illiberal regimes Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and, 17, 21 Balance of power, 8, 21, 24–25, 54–55, 82–83, 183; measuring, 30 Barroso, José Manuel, 52 Beirut, 157, 168 Bekaa, 148, 157 Belarus: asymmetrical balance of power in, 82–83; as authoritarian regime, 41, 82–87; in case study comparison, 129–130; civil society in, 80–82; constitutional crisis of 1996, 66, 77; countervailing influences in, 184; democracy rankings for, 64–65, 83; democratic opposition in, 67–68, 76, 82–83; economic integration with Russia,

205

206

Index

71; election monitoring in, 74, 81; EU aid proposal to, 85; exports to EU, 85; international linkages in, 85–87; protests suppressed in, 83– 84; Putin support in, 86; regime outcomes in Ukraine and, 87–88; Russian economic aid to, 24, 29, 68–71, 74–75; trade and investment data for, 70tab; US/EU relations with 1994-2012, 78–82 Belarus Democracy Act, 79 Belarus-Russia case study: asymmetrical relations in, 73; authoritarian promotion in, 32–33, 49–50; cultural and social linkages, 85–87; economic integration, 71; ideological agreement lacking in, 88; natural gas and, 29, 59, 71–72; 1994-2001, 66–71; oil disputes, 72–73; privatization demands by Russia, 75; Russia’s geopolitical motives, 66; stabilization loan, 72; 2002-2012, 71–75; union with Russia debate, 73, 86–87 Beltransgaz, 72, 75 Berman, Sheri, 19, 151–152 Bolaños, Enrique, 114 Bolivarism, 97, 107, 119 Bunce, Valerie, 13–14 Bush, George W., 113, 130

CAFTA. See Central American Free Trade Agreement Capabilities: changing, 17–21; civil society assistance mechanism, 19; economic assistance mechanism, 19–20; political party assistance mechanism, 18–19; repression assistance mechanism, 20–21, 182; strengthening Hezbollah, 149–158; strengthening Lukashenko’s, 77– 78; strengthening of Ortega’s, 105– 108; strengthening Yanukovych’s, 47–50 Carothers, Thomas, 4 Carter Center, 100 Case studies: Belarus-Ukraine compared with Nicarauga-Peru, 129–130; conclusions from, 181– 184; Eastern European compared to

Latin American, 98; foreign policy implications of, 34, 184–185; future research based on, 186; Iranian support compared to Russia and Venezuela, 129–130; overview of, 6–7; rationale for Latin American, 98. See also BelarusRussia case study; Hezbollah/ Hezbollah-Iran relations; specific countries Castañeda, Luis, 121–122 Central America, US involvement in, 28, 99 Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), 112, 114 Central Asia, economic elites of, 58 Central Election commission, 45 Chamorro, Francisco, 102 Chávez, Hugo, 2, 24, 31; demonstration effects with, 100– 103, 119; health issues and influence of, 130; Humala’s campaign financed by, 119–120; Humala’s distancing from, 122– 123; illiberal regimes as aided by, 97–98; influence in Latin America, 33; Peruvian view of, 126, 129; in 2006 Peruvian election, 118–120; unsuccessful support of Peru in 2011, 123–129. See also Ortega, Daniel, and Chávez Chernomyrdin, Victor, 66 China, 6, 185 Christians, Lebanese, 138, 164, 167; Maronite, 168; Syrian support of, 139, 158 Citizen councils (consejos comunales), 102–103 Citizen Lebanon, 162 Civil society: in Belarus, 80–82; capabilities assistance for, 19; EU and US assistance to Ukrainian, 43, 50–52; in Lebanon, 151–153, 162– 163; in Nicaragua, 108, 111 Civil Society Development Programme (EU), 80 Civil war, Lebanese: 1958, 171; 19751990, 137–141, 171, 172, 173, 175n4; alliances during, 170; events leading to, 138; Hezbollah-

Index Israel war, 142; Iranian influence on Hezbollah during, 148; official beginning of, 139; stages of, 139; 1975-1990 political developments resulting from, 140–144 Clinton, Hilary, 2 Coercion, 17, 182 Cold War, 18 Collaborative and purposive action, 15–16, 104–105, 145, 147–149, 182 Collective action theory, Olsonian, 10 Collins, Stephen, 4 Committee of Voters of Ukraine, 53 Conditionality, 77 Consejos comunales (citizen councils), 102–103 Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC), 114 Contras, 109 Corruption, 102, 111, 114, 115, 117, 121, 122 Council of Europe, 66 Countervailing influences, 22–23, 50– 54, 58, 125, 160–167, 184 Cross-country approach, 7 Cultural interconnectedness, 27–28, 31, 85–87 Czechoslovakia, protests in, 10, 35n29

Democracy: assistance programs, 4; measurement and rankings of, 12, 36n36; peace as result of, 181; suppression by allies, 20–21. See also Freedom House reports; Polity IV; specific countries Democracy promotion: authoritarian promotion borrowing from, 21–22; authoritarian promotion compared with, 14, 20, 183; authoritarian promotion interaction with, 5, 22– 23; election monitoring as, 21; EU economic leverage as, 167; international factors and complexity, 3. See also specific countries Democratic opposition: in Belarus, 67– 68, 76, 82–83; “disappearances” of party leaders, 83; unified, 184. See also Opposition Democratic peace theory, 4, 34n9

207

Demonstration effects, 14–15; of Chávez in Nicaragua, 100–103; of Chávez in Peru, 119; in Lebanon, 145–146; normative and strategic components of, 15; for Yanukovych and Kuchma, 47 Dependency, in elites, 38n91; trade data for measuring, 32. See also Economic aid Diffusion, 23, 46, 62–64, 183; definition of, 4–5; elites and, 15, 36n45; recent strategy of authoritarianism, 5 domestic conditions, 8; interaction with, 23–30. See also specific countries domestic political allies, 183

Eastern European case, Latin American case differences from, 98 Economic aid: Belarus economic integration with Russia, 71; capabilities strengthening through, 19–20; case conclusions and, 182; Chávez assistance to Ortega, 106– 108; economic rewards and, 28–29; EU aid to Lebanon, 165–166, 166tab, 167; incentives and, 28–30; Iran aid to Hezbollah, 154–155; to Lebanon, 165–167, 166tab; measuring dependency on, 31–32; Russian aid to Belarus, 24, 29, 68– 71, 74–75; US aid to Peru, 124– 125; Venezuelan aid to Nicaragua, 106–108 Economic elites, 10, 19–20, 56, 58 Economic sanctions, 24, 28–29 Economy: Belarus, 74–75; Lebanon, 166tab; Nicaraguan, 112tab; Peru, 128tab; Venezuela, 185 Education Unit, of Hezbollah, 152–153 Egypt, international assistance to, 20 Elections, 12, 18, 45; electoral revolutions, 14, 51; PVTs, 53; in transitional states, 21. See also Election of 2004 in Ukraine; Election of 2010 in Ukraine; specific countries Election monitoring, 21; in Belarus, 74, 81; in Lebanon, 161; in

208

Index

Nicaragua, 100, 103, 110; in Peru, 119, 123–124; by Polity IV, 12, 88n3; Russian monitoring of Belarus, 74 Election of 2004 in Ukraine, 43–45; fraud in, 53–54; reasons for Russia’s unsuccessful intervention in, 50–54; Russia’s involvement in, 43, 45–50; US and EU condemnation of results, 53; Yanukovych campaign and, 44–47, 55, 90n34 Election of 2010 in Ukraine: electoral process laws and, 63–64; fraud and delayed turnout, 63; Yanukovych presidency and, 60–64 Elites: balance of power among, 8, 21, 24–25, 30, 54–55, 82–83; change to capabilities of, 17–21; change to strategies of, 13–17, 186; collaborative actions of, 15–16; definition and role of, 9–11; dependency of, 38n91; diffusion and, 15, 36n45; domestic political allies, 183; economic, 10, 19–20, 56, 58; fragmented, 25, 167–170; political, 10, 18–19, 30, 183; receptivity to external actors, 24– 30 Eurasian Economic Community, 74 European Union (EU), 12, 23, 80; accession process, 18–19; aid proposal to Belarus, 85; Belarus exports to, 85; Belarus relations with US and, 78–82; condemnation of Ukraine election, 53; countervailing influence in Ukraine of US and, 50–54; democracy promotion in Lebanon, 164–165; economic aid to Lebanon, 165– 166, 166tab, 167; election monitoring in Lebanon, 161; incentives, 3, 28, 184–185; Lebanese policy of US and, 143; Lebanese trade with, 166tab, 167; membership incentive, 28, 184– 185; Ukraine civil society assistance by US and, 43, 50–52; Ukrainian trade with, 56 Export. See Trade

External actors: backlash caused by, 130; collaborative and purposive action by, 15–16; counterpromotion by, 23; definition of, 8; demonstration effects mechanism of, 14–15; elites’ receptivity to, 24– 30; external pressure mechanism of, 16–17; factors in effectiveness of, 22–30; measuring ideological agreement between states and, 30– 31; motives of, 8; recipient state linkages with, 25–31. See also specific leaders External support: authoritarian promotion role of, 3–4, 183; mechanism of, 16–17 Eye surgery, Nicaraguans receiving free, 107–108

Fadlallah, Sayyid, 149 Federal Security Service (FSB), in Russia, 49, 76 Financial assistance: to political elites, 18–19. See also Economic aid; specific countries Flores Nano, Lourdes, 117 Foreign aid, regime change role of, 4. See also economic aid; specific countries Foreign policy implications, 34, 184– 185 Foundation for the Wounded, 152 Fradkov, Mikhail, 49 Freedom House reports, 12; for Belarus, 64–65, 83; for Lebanon, 136, 142, 162, 176n18; for Nicaragua, 100; on Russia, 76; for Ukraine, 42, 88n2 Front of Change, 64 FSB. See Federal Security Service FSLN. See Sandinista National Liberation Front Fujimori, Alberto, 121 Fujimori, Keiko, 121, 122 Future research, 186 García Perez, Alan, 116–121 Gazprom, 56–57, 59–60, 71–72 GDP. See Gross domestic product Gel’man, Vladimir, 23

Index Global Strategies Institute in Kyiv, 59 Golan Heights, 159 Gonchar, Viktor, 83 Gross domestic product (GDP), 31–32; in Belarus, 70; in Lebanon, 165; in Nicaragua, 107; in Peru, 128tab; in Ukraine, 57 Group identification, 38n87

Haas, Mark, 38n87 Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar, 153 Hancock, Kathleen, 73–74 Harik, Judith, 153 Hariri, Rafik, assassination of, 136– 137, 142–143, 148, 169, 176n19 Hariri, Saad, 170 Havel, Václav, 2 Hezbollah/Hezbollah-Iran relations, 135; case comparison for, 170–171; collaborative actions of, 145, 147– 149; downside to accepting Iranian assistance, 159–160; economic stability and, 154–155; Education Unit of, 152–153; election manipulations by, 141–142; external pressure on military strategies of, 146–147; financial assistance from Iran, 149–151, 154–155; formation of Hezbollah, 147–149; fragmented elites preventing total control by, 167– 170; funding sources other than Iran, 154–155; Hariri assassination indictments against, 143, 176n19; ideological ties with, 145–146, 160; Iranian influence on strategies of, 144–149; Iranian support for, 1, 2, 33, 137; Iran’s Islamic Shiite state as model for, 145; Islamic Health Unit of, 152; Israel war with, 142; Lebanese government viewed by, 169; Lebanese national army compared to, 157–158; Lebanon timeline and, 171–175; military assistance, 155–158; NGOs developed by, 151–153, 154; occupation of Beirut, 168; parliamentary participation of, 141–142, 147; rapprochement

209

policies of, 147; religious hierarchy in, 145–146; rise of, 137, 139–140; Shiites helped by, 153; social services provided by, 151, 152, 153; Social Unit, 152; strengthened capabilities of, 149–158; terrorist training camps financed by Iran, 157; US view of, 160–161; US viewed by Iran and, 146; use of term, 175n1 Historical relationships and linkages, 28; measuring, 31 Holy Struggle Construction Foundation, 152, 154 Humala, Ollanta, 24, 98, 116; antiglobalization campaign of, 117, 118; Chávez distanced by, 122– 123; García Perez’s discrediting of, 119, 120; nationalism of, 118–119; 2006 campaign of, 118–120, 128; 2011 campaign of, 122–123, 128– 129; 2011 victory of, 122; US and, 122 Human rights violations, 109

Ideological agreement, 26–27, 38n87; measuring, 30–31. See also specific countries IFES. See International Foundation for Electoral Systems Ikenberry, John, 10 Illiberal regimes: allies used by, 16; Chávez aiding, 97–98; definition of, 11; international influence in, 136; promotion analysis for, 12–13; Ukraine as, 41 IMF. See International Monetary Fund In-between regime types, 11; Lebanon as, 136 Incentives, 12–13; coercion and, 17, 182; economic dependency and, 28–30; EU, 3, 28, 184–185 INGOs. See International nongovernmental organizations Institute for Development and Democracy (IPADE), 111 International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 161 International Ice Hockey Federation, 79

210

Index

International linkages: countervailing influences of, 22–23; diffusion of policy role in, 4–5; foreign aid and, 4; in illiberal regimes, 136; in regime change, 3–6, 22–23, 136. See also specific countries; specific leaders International Monetary Fund (IMF), 61, 106–107 International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), 12 International Republican Institute (IRI), 53, 84, 110, 114, 161 International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), 84 IPADE. See Institute for Development and Democracy Iran: alliance with Russia and Venezuela, 16; Islamic Revolution in, 139–140, 144; Islamic Shiite state model for Hezbollah, 145; Lebanese civil war and, 148; Lebanese regime type influenced by, 144–159; Russia and Venezuela compared with, 6–7, 129–130, 170–171; Syria and, 146–147; US viewed by Hezbollah and, 146. See also Hezbollah/Hezbollah-Iran relations Iranian Guardian Council, 151 Iranian Islamic state, 145, 148 Iranian Revolutionary Guard, 148, 150–151, 156 Iraq, 146 IREX. See International Research and Exchanges Board IRI. See International Republican Institute Islamic Health Unit, of Hezbollah, 152 Islamic Revolution, in Iran, 139–140; exporting of, 144 Israel, 135, 141, 142, 150; Hezbollah resistance to, 157; Lebanon occupation by Syria and, 139; Palestinian conflict, 138

Jackson, Nicole, 58 Jacoby, Wade, 8 Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 49 Jannati, Ahmad, 151

Journalists, violence against, 62–63

Karasyov, Vadim, 59 Katzenstein, Peter, 29 Kazakhstan, 73 Kebich, Vyacheslav, 86 KGB, in Belarus, 66, 76 Khamenei, Ali, 144 Khamenei, Ayatollah, 145–146, 147, 150 Khatami, Mohammad, 151 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 144, 145, 147 Khomeini, Ruhollah, 144 Khoroshkovsky, Valeriy, 63 Korosteleva, Elena, 82 Kosachyov, Konstantin, 61 Krasovsky, Anatoly, 83 Kuchma, Leonid, 43, 44, 46, 53, 54, 55; demonstration effect for Yanukovych and, 47; opposition to, 51 Kuczynski, Pedro Pablo, 121–122 Kupchan, Charles, 10 Kwasniewski, Aleksander, 53–54

Lahoud, Emile, 142 Lankina, Tomila, 23 Latin America: case studies rationale for, 98; Chávez influence in, 33; Eastern European case differences from, 98; US in, 27, 109 Lavrov, Sergei, 77, 85–86 Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections, 161 Lebanese national army, Hezbollah compared to, 157–158 Lebanon, 1, 2; aid for repression in, 182; balkanization of, 141; Christians in, 138, 139, 158, 164, 167, 168; civil society in, 151–153, 162–163; complex case of, 135; countervailing influences in, 160– 167; democracy promotion in, 160–165; demonstration effects in, 145–146; division among elites of, 167–170; economic aid to, 165– 167, 166tab; elections and votebuying in, 136, 161, 175n3; electoral use of international alliances, 170; ethnic and religious

Index diversity in, 137; EU and US policy towards, 143; EU economic leverage as democracy promotion in, 167; farmers in, 154–155; Freedom House rankings of, 136, 142, 162, 176n18; GDP, 165; Hariri assassination, 136–137, 142– 143, 148, 169, 176n19; as inbetween regime, 136; international assistance effectiveness and regime type in, 159–167; Iranian influence on regime type in, 144–159; Israel withdrawal from, 141, 150, 157; Israeli invasions and occupation of, 135, 139; in Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 138; NGOs in, 151–153, 154, 162; political and historical background of, 137–144; political violence in, 169; regime change as focus for, 135–137; Syrian involvement in, 158–159; Syrian occupation of, 139, 142, 172; timeline for, 171–175; trade data on, 166tab; US military assistance to, 161, 163; US viewed by people of, 163–164; USAID projects in, 155, 162. See also Civil war, Lebanese; Hezbollah/HezbollahIran relations Levitsky, Steven, 26 Lewites, Herty, 114 Linkages, 26; cultural and historical, 28, 31. See also International linkages; specific countries Lithuanian International relations and Political Science Institute, 75 López, Francisco, 107 Lukashenko, Alexander, 33, 64; authoritarian promotion and, 75– 76; dissent suppressed by, 84; media control by, 65, 83; repression under, 83–84; Russian influence on strategies of, 76–77; Russian integration campaign of, 86–87; Russian support of, 66–68, 71, 74, 76–78; strengthening of capabilities, 77–78 Luzhkov, Yuri, 48 Mahfoud, Elie, 168–169

211

Maisto, John, 121 March 14 Coalition, 142, 160–161, 168 Maronites, Christian, 168 Martyrs Foundation, 152 Mazyr, 72 McFaul, Michael, 53 Measurement: balance of power, 30; cultural connectedness, 31; of democracy, 36n36; economic dependency, 31–32; ideological agreement, 30–31; regime change, 11–12, 36n36 Media: Lukashenko’s control of, 65, 83; Ortega’s control of Nicaraguan, 101–102, 104; Russian government restriction of, 62; Yanukovych’s control of, 62–63, 88n3 Medvedev, Alexander, 59–60 Medvedev, Dimitry, 60–61, 63 Mikati, Najib, 143 Milinkevich, Alaksandar, 84 Military: Hezbollah military strategies, 146–147; Iran aid to Hezbollah, 155–158; military aid for repression in Bahrain, 21; US-Lebanon aid, 161, 163 Montealegre, Eduardo, 113, 127 Morales, Evo, 97 MRS. See Sandinista Renovation Movement Muhammad, Prophet, 145–146 Mutual empowerment, 16

Nasrallah, Sayyid Hassan, 148, 149– 150, 151, 154, 169 National Democratic Institute (NDI), 44, 53, 84, 110, 161 National Endowment for Democracy (NED) US, 51 National Indicative Program (NID), 52 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Natural gas: Russian supply and control of, 24, 29, 56–57, 59–60; 2001 disputes between Belarus and Russia, 71–72 NDI. See National Democratic Institute NED. See National Endowment for Democracy

212

Index

NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations Nicaragua, 31; in case study comparison, 129–130; civil society in, 108, 111; corruption in, 114, 115; democracy promotion in, 110, 111, 113, 115–116; domestic factors in regime of, 114–116; economic crisis in, 111; economic data for, 112tab; election monitoring in, 100, 103, 110; elections, 100, 101, 104–105, 111, 115; foreign aid to, 111; foreign intervention in, 99; foreign investment in, 107, 112; GDP in, 107; international factors in regime of, 108–113; media in, 101–102, 104; NGOs discredited in, 100, 103; 1984 and 1990 compared to 2008, 104–105; oil-funded assistance to, 105–106, 115; opposition in, 103, 108, 114–116; Ortega-Chávez friendship context for, 99–100; Peru compared with, 98, 127–128, 129; trade in, 112, 113tab; 2006 elections in, 27; US involvement in, 99, 108–110; Venezuela in, 97–116; Venezuelan economic aid to, 106–108 NID. See National Indicative Program Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): in Lebanon, 151–153, 154, 162; in Nicaragua, 100, 103 Nord Stream pipeline, 45 Norms, international: as demonstration effect component, 15; internalization of, 10–11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 46 Norton, Augustus Richard, 148

OAS. See Organization of American States Obama, Barack, 79, 165 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 81 Oil: authoritarian promotion and, 6–7; disputes between Russia and Belarus, 72–73; NicaraguanVenezuelan, 105–106, 115

Olsonian collective action theory, 10 Opora, 63 Opposition: in Nicaragua, 103, 108, 114–116. See also Democratic opposition Orange Revolution, 33, 75–76; new vote in, 52; Ukraine’s democracy after, 42; Western contribution to, 53–54 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 53, 66, 67, 74, 81 Organization of American States (OAS), 100, 110, 119, 121, 124 Ortega, Daniel, 27, 97, 181; election of, 99, 100, 101; electoral laws manipulated by, 127; fraudulent elections of, 99, 100, 101, 111; illegal third presidential term of, 103; Nicaraguan media controlled by, 101–102, 104; success factors, 108–116; US viewed by, 109–110 Ortega, Daniel, and Chávez: assistance to Ortega and Sandinista, 105–106, 115; collaborative and purposive action by, 104–105; demonstration effects, 100–103; economic aid, 106–108; election manipulation by, 101; friendship between, 99–100; strengthening Ortega’s capabilities, 105–108 OSCE. See Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Our Ukraine, 43–44, 49, 54–55 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 138; camps, 138, 175n6 Pallais, José, 103 Paniagua, Rafael, 104 Parallel vote tabulations (PVTs), 53 Paris III conference, 165 Party of Regions, 47, 62, 63, 64 Patrushev, Nikolai, 76 Peru: authoritarian promotion failure in, 116, 184; in case study comparison, 129–130; Chávez viewed by, 126, 129; Chávez’s 2011 unsuccessful support of, 123– 129; countervailing influences in, 125; domestic conditions in, 126–

Index 129; economic linkages between US and, 124–125; election monitoring in, 119, 123–124; electoral laws in, 126–127; international relations and, 123– 126; Nicaragua compared with, 98, 127–128, 129; presidential candidates in 2006, 116–118; presidential candidates in 2011, 121–123; trade data on, 125tab; transparency concerns in, 124; 2006 election in, 116–121; 2011 election in, 121–129; US democracy promotion in, 124, 125. See also Chávez, Hugo PLC. See Constitutional Liberal Party PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organization Pohrebynskyy, Mykhaylo, 49, 55 Political elites, 10, 30, 183; technical and financial assistance to, 18–19 Political ideology agreement, 26–27, 38n87 Politkovskaya, Anna, 62 Polity IV, 12, 42, 65, 88n3 Pora, 44, 51, 52 Postcommunist states, 12–13 Powell, Colin, 52 Protests: Belarus suppression of, 83– 84; Czechoslovakia 1989, 10, 35n29; military support for Bahrainian repression of, 21. See also Orange Revolution Purposive action. See Collaborative and purposive action Putin, Vladimir, 45, 47, 48, 57, 72–73; Belarus support for, 86; Yanukovych and, 61; Yuschenko impeachment demands of, 60 PVTs. See Parallel vote tabulations Qassem, Naim, 145, 156, 158

Rachok, Anatoliy, 53 Rafsanjani, Akbar, 147 Reagan, Ronald, 109 Receptivity, 24–30 Regime change: definition of, 11–12; domestic conditions in, 8; elite strategies change as method for,

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13–17, 186; interaction with domestic conditions as factor in, 23–30; international linkages in, 3– 6, 22–23, 136; Lebanon focus on, 135–137; measurement of, 11–12, 36n36; role of elites in, 9–11; state strategies for, 8; three mechanisms of, 14–18. See also Illiberal regimes; States; specific regimes Regime outcomes, 87–88; case summary in light of, 182–183; factors in effectiveness and, 22–30. See also specific countries Regime type: alliances connected to, 9; illiberal regimes defined, 11; importance of, 186; in-between, 11, 136. See also specific countries Reporters Without Borders, 62 Repression assistance, 20–21, 182 Research, future, 186 Rizo Castellón, José, 114 Romanchuk, Yaroslav, 69 Rontoyanni, Clelia, 68, 71 Russia: alliance with Iran and Venezuela, 16; authoritarian promotion in Belarus and Ukraine, 41–42; diffusion in, 23; economic aid to Belarus, 24, 29, 68–71, 74– 75; election involvement in Ukraine, 43, 45–50; election monitoring in, 21–22; financial support to Ukraine, 48, 58; Freedom House ranking of, 76; Iran and Venezuela compared with, 6–7, 129–130; Lukashenko support from, 66–68, 71, 74, 76–78; natural gas supply and control, 24, 29, 56– 57, 59–60; post-2004 Ukrainian influence of, 58–64; press freedom restrictions in, 62; stabilization loan to Belarus, 72; Ukraine election lack of success of, 50–54; UN Security Council seat of, 37n65; Venezuela and Lebanon compared with, 170–171; Yushchenko presidency undermined by, 58–60. See also Belarus-Russia case study

al-Sadr, Musa, 140

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Index

Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), 99, 107, 109, 114; Chávez’s assistance to Ortega and, 105–106 Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), 114 Sannikov, Andrei, 83 Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and, 17, 21 SEAUP. See Strengthening Electoral Administration in Ukraine Project Security Organ (Hezbollah), 141–142 Self-censorship, in Ukraine, 62–63 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 26 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 51 Shifter, Michael, 108, 122–123 Shiites, 140, 144, 149, 151, 164; Hezbollah contribution to, 153 Shushkevich, Stanislau, 67 Sieviarynets, Pavel, 83 Silitski, Vladimir, 84 Single Economic Space, 48 Social Unit, of Hezbollah, 152 Socialist Party of Ukraine, 54 States: external actor linkages with recipient, 25–30; focus on regime change strategies of, 8; illiberal regime promotion by, 12–13; measuring ideological agreement between external actors and, 30– 31; postcommunist, 12–13; transitional, 10, 21 Stop Censorship campaign, 62 Strengthening Electoral Administration in Ukraine Project (SEAUP), 52 Sukharenka, Stsyapan, 76 Sunnis, in Lebanon, 164 Supreme Council of Justice (VSU), 63 Syria: Christian communitas supported by, 139, 158; Hezbollah aided by, 156–157; Iran and, 146–147; Lebanese current view of, 164; Lebanon involvement of, 158–159 Syrian occupation, of Lebanon, 139, 142, 172

Taif Accord, 139, 141 Technical assistance, to political elites, 18–19 Telenica, 104 Toledo, Alejandro, 121–122

Trade: Belarus, 70tab, 85; economic dependency measured by, 32; Lebanon, 166tab, 167; Nicaragua, 112, 113tab; Peru, 125tab; Ukraine, 56, 57tab, 91n73 Transitional states, 10; elections in, 21 Trivelli, Paul, 113, 114 Tunisia, 20 Tymoshenko, Yuliya, 54, 60, 63–64

Ukraine: authoritarian diffusion in, 62– 64; authoritarian promotion failure in, 184; balance of power in, 54– 55; in case study comparison, 129– 130; civil society assistance by EU and US, 43, 50–52; democracy rankings in, 42, 88n2, 88n3; exports, 56, 91n73; as illiberal regime, 41; regime outcomes in Belarus and, 87–88; Russian financial support to, 48, 58; Russia’s authoritarian promotion in, 32–33, 49–50; self-censorship in, 62–63; trade, 56, 57tab, 91n73. See also Election of 2004 in Ukraine; Election of 2010 in Ukraine Ukraine-Russia case study: diverse linkages between, 55–58; economic dependency, 29; Russian financial aid, 48. See also Election of 2004 in Ukraine; Election of 2010 in Ukraine Union for Peru (UPP), 118 United Nations Security Council, 19, 37n65, 172 United Russia Party, 62 United States (US): Belarus relations with EU and, 78–82; in Central America, 28, 99; condemnation of election results by EU and, 53; countervailing influence in Ukraine of EU and, 50–54; democracy assistance programs of, 4; democracy promotion in Nicaragua, 110, 111, 113, 115–116; democracy promotion in Peru, 124, 125; economic aid to Lebanon from EU and, 165–166, 166tab; economic aid to Peru, 124–125;

Index Hezbollah viewed by, 160–161; Humala and, 122; Iran, Russia and Venezuela view of influence of, 6; Iran and Hezbollah view of, 146; Latin American involvement of, 27, 109; Lebanese people’s view of, 163–164; Lebanese policy of EU and, 143; military assistance to Lebanon, 161, 163; Nicaraguan involvement of, 99, 108–110; Ortega’s view of, 109–110; Peruvian election of 2006 stance of, 120–121; Shiites’ view of, 164; trade between Nicaragua and, 112; Ukraine civil society assistance by EU and, 43, 50–52 UPP. See Union for Peru US. See United States US Agency for International Development (USAID), 52, 79, 110, 154, 155, 162 Venezuela: alliance with Russia and Venezuela, 16; current economic problems in, 185; economic aid to Nicaragua, 106–108; Iran and Russia compared with, 6–7, 129– 130; in Nicaragua, 97–116; oil agreement with Nicaragua, 105– 106, 115 Vilpisauskas, Ramunas, 75 Vote-buying, in Lebanon, 136, 161, 175n3 VSU. See Supreme Council of Justice

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Way, Lucan, 26 Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), 109 Wilson, Andrew, 52–53, 68 Wilson, Woodrow, 181 Wolchik, Sharon, 13–14 World Bank, 4 Yanukovych, Victor, 43; 2004 campaign and election of, 44–47, 55, 90n34; demonstration effect for Kuchma and, 47; media control under, 62–63, 88n3; opposition to, 51; as prime minister, 44; Putin and, 61; Russian influence on strategies of, 47; strengthened capabilities of, 47–50; 2010 election and presidency of, 60–64 Yushchenko, Victor: allies of, 55; free elections under, 42; poisoning of, 44; pre-election polls on popularity of, 45; Putin demands for impeachment of, 60; reasons for victory of, 50–54; reform credentials of, 46; Russia’s fear of victory by, 46; Russia’s undermining presidency of, 58–60; victory of, 43 Zakharenko, Yury, 83 Zavadsky, Dimitri, 83 Zero Hunger program, 102 Zoellick, Robert, 121

About the Book

Recent years have seen efforts by several states to promote authori-

tarianism abroad, garnering the attention of foreign policy analysts— and raising a number of questions. What determines the success or failure of these efforts? How does the relationship between international and domestic politics play out? Do states comply with external pressures for ideological reasons, or primarily to attain material benefits? How does promoting authoritarianism differ from promoting democracy? Addressing these questions, Rachel Vanderhill draws on the experiences of Russia, Venezuela, and Iran to provide an illuminating comparative analysis. Rachel Vanderhill is visiting professor of international relations at Wheaton College.

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