Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections: A Comparative Perspective 9780773548558

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T h e P r o m i s e a n d Challenge o f P a rt y P r i m a ry Elections

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections A Comparative Perspective

W i l l i a m C r o s s , O fer K en i g , S co t t P r u y s e r s , a nd G i d eo n R a hat

McGill-­Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago

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© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2016 isbn isbn isbn isbn

978-0-7735-4797-1 (cloth) 978-0-7735-4798-8 (paper) 978-0-7735-4855-8 (eP DF ) 978-0-7735-4856-5 (eP UB)

Legal deposit fourth quarter 2016 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Cross, William P. (William Paul), 1962–, author The promise and challenge of party primary elections: a comparative perspective/William Cross, Ofer Kenig, Scott Pruysers, and Gideon Rahat. Includes bibliographical references and index. Issued in print and electronic formats. ISBN 978-0-7735-4797-1 (cloth). – I S BN 978-0-7735-4798-8 (paper). – ISBN 978-0-7735-4855-8 (eP DF ). – I S BN 978-0-7735-4856-5 (eP U B ) 1. Political parties – Canada – Case studies. 2. Political parties – Israel – Case studies. 3. Primaries – Canada – Case studies. 4. Primaries – Israel – Case studies. 5. Comparative government – Case studies. I. Kenig, Ofer, 1971–, author II. Pruysers, Scott, 1985–, author III. Rahat, Gideon, author IV. Title. JL195.C 76 2016     324.271'0154      C 2016-904648-6 C2016-904649-4

This book was typeset by Marquis Interscript in 10.5 / 13 Baskerville.

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Contents

Tables and Figures  vii Acknowledgments ix Preface xi Introduction 3 1  Primary Elections: A Definition and Typology  15 2  The Spread of Primaries  37 3  Party Primaries in Canada and Israel  57 4  Rule-Making and the Administration of Party Primaries  81 5  Who Selects? Defining the Primary Selectorate  111 6  Primary Campaigns and Their Outcomes  136 7  Financing Primary Elections  160 8  Party Primaries: The Path Forward  179 Notes 197 References 201 Index 223

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Tables and Figures

Tables 1.1 Selectorates in the primary zone  28 1.2 Examples of electoral colleges in leadership selection around the world  32 1.3 Typology of primary election methods  35 2.1 Leadership selectorates in fifty-nine parties, February 2012  41 3.1 Leadership selection through primaries in Israel, 1992–2015 (contest years)  61 3.2 Candidate selection through primaries in Israel, 1977–2015 (selection years)  64 3.3 Leadership selection through primaries in Canada (contest years) 69 5.1 Demographics of party members and voters in Israel  129 6.1 Participation in Israeli primary elections (leadership contests) 141 6.2 Participation in Israeli primary elections (candidate selection) 142 6.3 Participation in Canadian primary elections (federal leadership contests)  145 6.4 Competition in leadership primaries, Israel, 1992–2014  150 6.5 Competition in federal leadership primaries, Canada, 1998–2013 151 6.6 Number of women candidates nominated by political party (Canada, 2004–2015)  156

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Tables and Figures

7.1 Spending limits and candidates’ expenses in Israeli leadership primaries (in Canadian dollars)  166 7.2 Highest amount spent in recent Canadian party leadership elections 167

Figures 1.1 Party selectorates  24 2.1 Leadership selectorates in thirteen parliamentary democracies 40 5.1 Party membership growth during leadership contests in Israel  118 5.2 Party membership growth during leadership contests in Canada 118

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Acknowledgments

In researching and writing this book, financial support from several sources has allowed us to meet together and to present early drafts of this work at academic conferences. In this regard, we are grateful to the Halbert Center at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada; Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada (the International Council for Canadian Studies); and the Honourable Dick and Ruth Bell Chair for the Study of Canadian Parliamentary Democracy at Carleton University. Valuable feedback was received from colleagues at the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Conference, The Canadian Political Science Association meetings and the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research. We also thank Yaara Aharony-Fogel for her research assistance.

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Preface

This book is about the way political parties choose their leaders and their general election candidates. These are among the defining tasks of political parties and are two of their most consequential activities. In recent years, students of parties have identified a strong, though not universal, trend toward an opening-up of these selection processes. Our focus here is on cases in which the “selectorate” – that is, the group of eligible voters in intra-party contests – is expanded to include a party’s rank-and-file members and, in some cases, its general election supporters. This trend has been widespread, encompassing many different parties in a large number of Western democracies. We consider the forces underlying this reform in party decision-making and consider how it fits within the broader context of intra-party democracy. While the general movement has been towards adoption of more expansive and inclusive selectorates, selection methods vary considerably. Some parties invite all interested citizens to participate, others impose a membership requirement; some require prior party activism while others share the voting authority among different party constituents through complicated “electoral college” processes. Parties have also adopted different labels for these elections, using terms such as “one-member-one-vote” contests, “party plebiscites,” “party primaries,” and “community pre-selections,” or simply calling them leadership or candidate elections. We bring order to this terminology by adopting the term “party primary” to describe these most inclusive processes and by offering both a definition of which elections constitute party primaries and a detailed typology of  the different types of primaries. In doing so, we improve the

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xii Preface

opportunity for meaningful comparative study of these party contests both within and across different party systems. In considering how parties actually implement primaries and what some of the principal challenges are, we turn our focus to parties in two countries with considerable experience using expansive selectorates for the choice of both their leaders and candidates: Canada and Israel. Parties in both countries were relatively early adopters of party primaries, and an examination of their experiences offers decades of evidence regarding both the challenges and opportunities primaries offer to parties. While both countries are well-established parliamentary demo­ cracies, they differ in important institutional features such as their electoral systems, their party systems, their levels of territorial centralization (federalism vs unitarism), and their political cultures. Thus, we argue that if parties in both countries have similar experiences with primaries, these likely result from the use of primaries themselves and offer generalizable findings relating to the effects and implications inherent in this method of leadership and candidate selection. And indeed, we do conclude that the adoption of primaries does bring a set of relatively consistent challenges to parties. These challenges and the way parties respond to them are the subject of the second half of this book. We are students of political parties and our focus is party-centred. That is, we are concerned with how parties implement primaries, how they deal with the challenges they present, and how the adoption of primaries affects a party. Many have heralded the expansion of primaries as an important, democratic step forward as they potentially empower party members and interested supporters to participate in some of the most important decisions parties make. In doing so, they offer the promise of making parties less hierarchical and more inclusive and participatory. Nonetheless, they come with their own set of difficulties. As intra-party contests, they are typically not regulated by the state, and our cases indicate that parties often find it difficult to construct and organize primaries in a fair and efficient manner. The ways in which rules governing primaries are made and how they are implemented are important questions considered in this volume. We also consider who participates in party primaries, with an emphasis on membership growth and the recruitment tactics of candidates, their supporters, and interested third parties. The nature of primary campaigns, including the role of policy, is also

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Preface xiii

considered. And finally, we turn our attention to questions relating to the financing of these elections. The Canadian and Israeli examples suggest that the institution of primaries presents parties with many challenges and that these, if not carefully considered and managed, can significantly diminish the democratic promise primaries offer. Our critique of primaries may be as much a criticism of the political parties in which they take place as it is of the institution itself. But this is precisely the point, as primaries are intra-party contests and thus generally are organized and operated by the parties themselves. Accordingly, they take on the party characteristics, and can only be as fair and efficient as the regulatory schemes put in place to oversee them. Whether parties have the capacity, not only in terms of resources but also in terms of determination and motivation, to properly oversee these contests is the ultimate question at play here.

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T h e P r o m i s e a n d Challenge o f P a rt y P r i m a ry Elections

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Introduction

Political parties are a central component of democratic life in most countries. The list of functions that parties perform is as long as it is impressive: they dominate legislatures, form governments, articulate and aggregate interests, set policy agendas, run election campaigns, mobilize voters, and provide a crucial link between citizens and their government (King 1969; Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011). There is widespread agreement in the literature that of all the functions that a party performs, among the most important is the selection of personnel. That is, the nomination of candidates and the selection of party leaders (Kirchheimer 1966; Sartori 1976; Ranney 1981). At the most basic level, the nomination of candidates for election is what distinguishes parties from other political organizations such as interest, lobby, and advocacy groups (Cross and Young 2013). It is safe to say that “a party must make nominations if it is to be regarded as a party at all” (Schattschneider 1942, 100). Likewise, while some parties (notably the Greens) have tried to eschew formal leadership (Burchell 2002), leaders are integral to political parties, especially as they become closer to governing (Michels 1964; Pilet and Cross 2014). Writing of the “presidentialization” of politics, Poguntke and Webb (2005) demonstrate the increasing importance, influence, and authority of party leaders both during and after election campaigns and inside and outside of legislatures. Perlin (1988, 2) sums up the importance of party leaders when he writes, “the choice of the leader sets the course of the major Canadian parties in virtually everything they do.” Beyond the fact that parties, by definition, require candidates for office, there are a number of reasons that personnel recruitment is

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worth examining. Principal among these reasons is that parties, in most countries, monopolize the recruitment of political elites (Weeks 2014). Although not universally the case, party channels tend to be the route through which political elites come to power. In order to be elected, would-be-parliamentarians must first go through a political party and win the right to bear the party label in the general election. The same holds true regarding the selection of a prime minister. General election voters have a very constrained set of options in this regard. In most parliamentary systems, leaders of major parties are the contestants for the prime ministership and the voters’ choice is essentially limited to these individuals. It is the parties that choose these leaders from among whom voters (in an indirect form) may select their head of government. In addition, leadership and candidate selection may also affect ministerial selection: candidates who perform better within the party are more likely to become ministers (Carty 1989; Kenig and Barnea 2009). The ability parties have to narrow the pool of individuals from which voters will create the legislature and choose their prime minister has considerable implications for the composition of that legislature and the interests most likely to be represented (Cross 2008). In this regard, recruitment decisions at the individual party level can enhance or detract from the health and vibrancy of democracy at the state level. A lack of women in national legislatures around the world, for instance, is often viewed as a problem of supply rather than one of demand. Research suggests that voters do not discriminate against female candidates in general elections. That is, when women are nominated and contest elections, they tend to do just as well as their male counterparts (Black and Erickson 2003; Lawless and Fox 2010). As gatekeepers to the legislature, political parties therefore not only play a crucial role in determining which individuals will be selected to contest the general election, but also which groups and interests will ultimately be represented inside of the legislature. Crotty (1968, 260) captured this implication when he noted: “The party in recruiting candidates determines the personnel and, more symbolically, the groups to be represented among the decision-­ making elite. Through recruitment, the party indirectly influences the types of policy decisions to be enacted and the interests most likely to be heard. Candidate recruitment then represents one of the key linkages between the electorate and the policy-making process.”

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Introduction 5

As candidates and leaders are the public face of political parties during election campaigns and inside of legislatures, once elected they have the potential to have a profound impact on the shape, content, and direction of their parties. Therefore the individuals responsible for their nomination have an indirect ability to shape the party, as they choose candidates who are most in line with their own views of the party and its future. Schattschneider (1942, 100) captured this perfectly when he observed that “he who has the power to make nominations owns the party.” Likewise, American politician William M. Tweed famously remarked, “I don’t care who does the electing, so long as I can do the nominating” (Stewart and Archer 2000, 3). Besides representing interests and ensuring representation, the personnel recruitment function that political parties perform can provide both party members and other citizens with a meaningful and direct opportunity to influence party politics and to participate in their democracy. In many cases, leadership and candidate selection are the principal, and sometimes the only, ways in which members actively participate in party life. This can be contrasted to the realm of intra-party policy development where party members play a rather minor role (Cross 2007; Gauja 2012, 220). While party members may participate in the development of policy motions, party leaders have the ability to manage the discourse. The lack of meaningful input from members in terms of policy formation (either by choice or because of a lack of opportunities) only serves to reaffirm the importance of their role in candidate and leadership selection processes. In fact, through candidate and leadership selection, party members are able to engage indirectly with policy development. By choosing candidates and leaders who represent social interests that usually fall outside of the scope of the parties (e.g. gender, ethnicity, etc.), party members can attempt to ensure that those interests will be reflected in the legislature and, ultimately, in the decisionmaking process.

P ri m a r i e s a n d O t h e r Selection Methods Given the key roles of party leaders and legislative candidates, the methods that parties use to select them are extremely important. However, until three decades ago, very few studies addressed this aspect of politics from a comparative perspective. Pioneering cross-

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

national comparative works on candidate selection (Ranney 1981; Gallagher and Marsh 1988) and on leadership selection (Punnett 1992; Marsh 1993) laid important foundations, and in the last two decades attracted more and more academic attention. Several single-country studies (Courtney 1995; Stark 1996) were followed by works that compared a small number of countries (Davis 1998; LeDuc 2001; Narud, Pedersen, and Valen 2002). But only after essential tools for comparisons were developed, especially by providing classification and measurement for both candidate and leadership selection methods (Rahat and Hazan 2001; Lundell 2004; Kenig 2009a), did more systematic cross-national comparisons appear (Hazan and Rahat 2010; Cross and Blais 2012a; Pilet and Cross 2014; Cross and Pilet 2015). Because political parties monopolize the recruitment of political elites, we might expect that these elites would guard their authority jealously by centralizing control over selection processes. Indeed, until three decades ago, party leaders and legislative candidates were mostly selected by relatively exclusive selection bodies (selectorates). Party leaders in many of the Anglo parliamentary democracies, for instance, were chosen by their parliamentary party group (PPG ). In continental Europe, party leaders were mostly selected by a party council or by conference delegates. Often this selection was just a ratification of the choice made beforehand by a much smaller party elite (Detterbeck and Rohlfing 2014). Ordinary party members, let alone voters, rarely played a part in the process. However, this reality has changed considerably in recent decades. Several surveys of internal party procedures across a variety of countries demonstrate a growing trend of democratization, manifested through empowering party members and supporters to select ­leaders and candidates (see, for example, Scarrow 1999; Seyd 1999; Cross and Katz 2013; Cross and Pilet 2015). While only a few decades ago party members and supporters often had little or no formal authority in these matters, today they play an active role in the selection of party personnel in many parties around the world. This considerable expansion of intra-party democracy has resulted in the rising popularity and increased usage of the term “primary” election. While still mostly associated with American politics (from where it emerged), the term “primary” has increasingly been used to describe open and inclusive selection methods in general. The term has gradually become more common in a number of other countries

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Introduction 7

such as France, Italy, and Israel. Despite the popularization of the term, little work has been done to create a clear definition or to identify the range of selection methods that fall under its umbrella. Because more and more candidates and leaders are selected by methods that may fall under the definition of primaries, more scrutiny should be given to the consequences – positive and negative – of this important selection method. These are indeed the two principle goals of this book: we aim both to provide a comprehensive definition and conceptualization of the term “primary,” and to assess the consequences of this selection method. A third objective is to re-examine the evidence concerning the spread of primaries. In general, the target of the book is to shed more light on primaries as one of the main and fastest-growing selection methods used by parties for choosing their leaders and candidates today.

T h e C a s e F o r a n d A gains t Primaries The growth of primaries makes it vital to investigate their potential consequences. Although many parties believe that primaries – as a more open and inclusive selection method – are beneficial for continued health, such methods are not without their own challenges. The adoption of primaries has implications both for the internal dynamics of parties and for the political systems in which they operate. With regard to participation, there is a widespread consensus that the movement towards more internal democracy is a response by parties to prevent further membership decline and to revitalize remaining party members and supporters (Scarrow 1999; Seyd 1999; Young and Cross 2002a; Young 2013). The adoption of primaries is therefore a step in the direction of enhancing participation and, as such, may be regarded as positive. The change in the number of selectors is often overwhelming. The leader of the British Liberal Party was selected in 1967 by its twelve-member PPG. Nine years later, following the opening of the selection method, the new leader was selected by nearly 20,000 party members. Similarly, most of the legislative candidates of the Israeli Labour Party were selected in 1988 by about 1,200 delegates to the party’s central executive-­committee. Four years later, following the adoption of primaries, legislative candidates were selected by more than 110,000 party members.

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

However, several studies have raised the possibility that greater participation may have a price. In their study, Rahat and Hazan (2007) claim that an increase in the inclusiveness of selection methods might breed a low “quality” of participation. This may be manifested in an uncommitted (and even uninterested) layer of party members who perceive their membership only as a temporary status allowing them to participate in the primaries. These so-called “instant members” create seasonal high tides in the size of memberships. When the contest is over, they do not bother to maintain their membership. Meanwhile, the party faithful see that their privileges are on par with those of the temporary visitors. Moreover, these instant members may sometimes be enrolled by vote-brokers working in the service of a primary candidate for the sole purpose of promoting narrow self-interests. Another concern is that enhanced participation may allow for the possibility of outsiders and single-issue groups to take over the selection process and “hijack” local party associations. In 1998, for example, a candidate with no meaningful ties to the party entered the Canadian Progressive Conservative leadership race for the purpose of campaigning against the Canada-US free-trade agreement that had been the hallmark achievement of the most recent Conservative government (LeDuc 2001). This prompted Joe Clark, the former prime minister and leadership frontrunner, to describe newcomer David Orchard and his supporters as nothing more than “tourists,” with no attachment or history with the party (Carty and Stewart 2002). Similarly, in 2015, the British newspaper The Independent (Grice 2015) reported that members of small and fringe parties (and also Conservatives who wanted to weaken Labour by having it led by a fringe candidate) registered to participate in the semi-open Labour leadership primary in order to support the candidacy of Jeremy Corbyn, described by some as a Marxist. And in Israel, an extreme right-winger, Moshe Feiglin, explicitly used the opportunities that an expansive selection process offers by attempting to take over Likud from within. He joined Likud in the late 1990s, and called on supporters from the extreme right to join him in his mission. By 2013 he not only succeeded in getting elected to the legislature, against the will of the chairman of the party, but he also managed to influence the selection of candidates, pushing Likud towards the ideological extreme. An important advantage of primaries concerns their transparent nature. As a selection method that is built upon formal voting and

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Introduction 9

not on behind-the-scenes consultations and negotiations, it draws a direct and transparent line between the will of the selectors and the actual results – namely who is elected. Yet transparency may come at a price when such things as the extent of membership recruitment, the level of turnout, and divisions within the party are widely reported in the media. While citizens typically view transparency as a positive democratic value, it can be harmful to political parties as their internal dynamics, grassroots strength, and organizational health are put on display for intense scrutiny and analysis. After the first round of voting in the 2011 Progressive Conservative leadership primary in the Canadian province of Alberta, for example, a number of news stories focused on these issues, with headlines such as “Mar Leads Alberta Tory Leader Vote, but Campaign Sees Low Voter Turnout” (Bennett and Graveland 2011). Despite the fact that some 60,000 Albertans participated in the first round of voting, the election was unfavourably contrasted to previous races in which there was greater turnout. As a result, many openly questioned the health of the party. The fact that primary contests are rarely regulated like general elections raises additional concerns about how fair and transparent these contests really are. That they are viewed as internal party matters means that there is often very little regulatory oversight, and many opportunities for abuse of membership-recruitment tactics, campaign spending, and so on. Without proper oversight, increasing the inclusiveness of the selectorate can create incentives for behaviour that may undermine the democratic celebration. Primaries, which involve large crowds of selectors, may also be perceived as beneficial to the democratic value of representation. However, it is not clear whether party members are more representative of the party’s electorate than are other selectorates (Young 2013). Several surveys have found that party members are older, on average, than electors, and are disproportionally male and financially well-off (Cross and Young 2004; Seyd and Whiteley 2004; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010). It is also debatable whether party members or supporters produce a more representative field of legislative candidates. Rahat, Hazan, and Katz (2008) argue that more inclusive selectorates may result in less representative candidates. Analyzing the Israeli case, the authors find that parties using the most open methods and inclusive selectorates failed to produce representative lists of candidates. In other

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words, increasing democracy at the level of the political party may harm democracy at the level of the party system. While Cross (2008) provides a compelling normative argument defending wider and more inclusive selectorates, especially given certain contextual factors (electoral system, degree of party discipline, etc.), there remains a concern about the representativeness of candidates selected through these methods. Primaries, as an inclusive, transparent, and participatory method, may also enhance competition. This may be perceived as a positive attribute. Competition allows new forces to emerge, increases accountability, and prevents stagnation. However, open and highly competitive contests can provide the opportunity for internal factions to engage in very costly and public battles that can create longlasting divisions within the party (LeDuc 2001). The Canadian Liberal leadership rivalry between Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin is illustrative. After nearly a decade of Chrétien leadership, Martin began to campaign openly as his replacement, despite the fact that Chrétien had suggested he might run for a fourth mandate. The leadership feud, which has been described as a “coup d’état,” left the party, its MPs, and the grassroots membership bitterly divided. Even after Martin assumed the party leadership the two factions continued to clash, as twenty-two members of Chrétien’s cabinet were either replaced or demoted to less prestigious portfolios (Jeffrey 2010). The divisions in the party were much more transparent, and were allowed to grow over a longer period of time, because of the open and inclusive nature of the leadership politics. The fact that these divisions persisted even after the leadership contest had concluded suggests that internal party cohesion and morale should be a concern for parties engaging in open and inclusive leadership contests. In Israel, the fierce rivalry between Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu caused serious internal damage to Likud. The 2002 leadership battle between the two was long and tense, and involved massive recruitment of new members by both rivals. Sharon’s eventual victory over Netanyahu ended in considerable success for Likud in the 2003 election, but the chasm between the two and their supporters continued long afterwards. In the end, the intense competition and its aftershocks probably contributed to Sharon’s decision to leave Likud and establish the new party of Kadima in late 2005. In addition, there is mixed evidence regarding the relationship between inclusiveness and competitiveness. With regard to leadership

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Introduction 11

selection, Kenig (2009a) suggests that inclusive selectorates attract more candidates but that they produce contests that are likely to be less competitive in terms of the closeness of the result. Similarly, Cross and Blais (2012a) find only modest effects relating to the type of selectorate used: more inclusive selectorates tend to attract slightly more candidates, but these contests are no more competitive in terms of the margin between the top two candidates. In a more recent study, Kenig, Rahat, and Tuttnauer (2015) conclude that selection by the extra-parliamentary party organization – conference delegates or council – is the least competitive. As for the inclusive primaries and rather exclusive P P G, the findings are different for different measurements of competition. Primaries attract more candidates competing for the leadership, but in terms of results, selection by the P P G is more competitive when it comes to the margin between the leading candidates. With regard to candidate selection, Hazan and Rahat (2010) point to a nonlinear relationship between inclusiveness and competition, with primaries resulting in mediumlevel competition. Two decades ago, Katz and Mair (1995) warned that party leaders and elites might in fact benefit from an opening up of the leadership selection process at the expense of dedicated and long-term party activists. It has been argued that members (who are believed to be less ideological – see May 1973) are easier to manage and manipulate compared to committed party activists, who might previously have been tasked with the role of leadership selection. The result might be that a dispersed and only occasionally engaged membership will find it more difficult, and be less inclined, to challenge the leader. Although internal democratization in general, and opening up candidate and leadership selection methods in particular, may be seen as a means of renewal, it is not clear whether party decline can be reversed so easily. Katz (2013) argues that since the decline of parties is largely due to exogenous factors, parties are unlikely to arrest this decline through internal reforms. He points to four reasons for the phenomenon of party change in the postwar era, each relating to broader system-level factors rather than decisions taken by the parties themselves: the breakdown of rigid social divisions, an acceptance of neoliberalism, a weakening of ideological debate (replaced by a discourse of efficiency and competency), and a growing emphasis on consensual democracy. The result of these changes,

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

Katz (2013, 49) suggests, is that partisan involvement in political parties has become “less attractive.” So while it is unclear whether these changes will work, parties nevertheless continue to address decline by reforming their internal workings to make them less hierarchical and more participatory.

T h e S t r u c t u r e of the Book Having set the stage for the chapters that follow with this brief overview of issues relating to the use of party primaries and particularly to their effect on both intra-party and state-wide democracy, we turn to a brief description of the structure of the book. This book is divided into two parts. The first presents a framework for the analysis of primary elections. Drawing upon examples from parties in both established and new democracies, Chapter 1 provides a definition of which selection methods should be considered primary elections and which should not. It also proposes a typology of primary methods based on the kinds of selectorates involved in the process. In Chapter 2 we reaffirm previous studies pointing to an expansion of the use of primaries. However, we do so drawing upon a larger number of observations and expand our investigation to include more political positions in more parties in more countries. In this chapter we also consider the reasons why many parties are moving in the direction of adopting primaries. The second part of the book focuses on identifying and analyzing the challenges of primaries. While acknowledging their obvious democratic virtues as an open and inclusive selection method, we point to the negative consequences of their use and the possible solutions to these problems. We build upon the experience of parties in Canada and Israel. As illustrated in Chapter 3, parties in both countries have used personnel selection contests with broad selectorates for several decades (for both leadership and candidate selection). While the two countries have different political cultures and institutional orders, we find many similarities in terms of the nature and consequences of party primaries in Canada and Israel. Chapter 4 outlines a number of challenges that are associated with rule-making and the administration of primaries. Although primaries resemble general elections in many ways, the latter are extensively regulated and monitored by the state while the former remain, for the most part, unregulated and unmonitored. As we

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Introduction 13

demonstrate, this opens the door for manipulation regarding the rules by which primaries are conducted, as reflected by their frequent, and seemingly arbitrary, changes. Among others, these include potential manipulation of rules concerning the timing of selection, candidate and voter eligibility, reserved positions, location of polling booths, and translation of votes to outcomes. Furthermore, monitoring of the process and enforcement of the rules of the game tend to suffer from the lack of both resources and motivation on the part of the parties. In Chapter 5 we focus on the recruitment practices that define primary contests. We show the extent to which primaries are vulnerable to manipulation, misconduct, and questionable recruitment tactics that surround the creation of the selectorate. These questionable recruitment practices, in turn, raise additional concerns regarding the quality of participation. Here we consider issues such as double membership, insincere members, and a selectorate that is unrepresentative of the party’s voters. Chapter 6 shifts the focus to primary campaigns and their outcomes. The first part considers the personalized nature of the primary campaign, examining the behaviour of candidates. We then turn to analyzing the behaviour of voters, considering both participation rates and the types of issues that drive their choices. The degree of competitiveness of various types of primary contests is also considered. Finally, we look at the relative representativeness of ­candidates chosen through primaries, with a focus on the inclusion of women. Chapter 7 then moves to an examination of the financial aspects of primary contests. Like general elections, primaries are expensive events, but unlike in general elections, candidates and parties are generally left to finance these elections on their own without direct support from the state (Scarrow 2013). Even when parties are heavily funded by the state, they do not receive specific funding to administer their primary elections. We explore financing from two angles, that of the candidates and that of the parties, and also look at the increased involvement of the state in the regulation of candidate and party financing. Notwithstanding the challenges inherent in party primaries, we believe they offer the possibility of enhancing democratic practice. In our concluding chapter, we identify three of the principal challenges primaries pose for political parties as organizations, and for

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

state-wide democracy more generally. In addition, we evaluate the different approaches taken by parties towards implementation of a broader selectorate for both candidate and leadership selection, identify best practices, and offer what we see as solutions to the shortcomings we have identified.

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1 Primary Elections: A Definition and Typology1

As illustrated in the Introduction (and detailed in greater length in Chapter 2), parties in many countries are expanding the group charged with selecting leaders and candidates. The considerable expansion of intra-party democracy in recent years has resulted in the rising popularity and increased usage of the term “primary” election. Despite the popularization of the term, little work has been done to create a clear definition or to identify the range of selection methods that fall under its umbrella. Without conceptual clarity and a common definition, political scientists will continue to lack the tools that are necessary for truly comparative work (Kenig et al. 2015). To that end, this chapter seeks to define primaries and to answer the following question: at what point can we label a participatory and inclusive selection method a primary? The chapter begins with an effort to provide a useful definition of the term primaries. Although still mainly identified with the United States (Caesar 1979; Ware 2002), it has gradually become more commonplace in a number of other countries. At the same time, in other parties and countries, the term “primaries” is not used, or used rarely in instances where it might apply. We thus begin by exploring the seemingly inconsistent use of the terms “primaries” and “primary elections.” Following this discussion, we provide an umbrella definition for the family of selection methods that can be labelled primaries. Included in the definition is a minimum threshold (relating principally to the degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate) for considering whether an intra-party candidate or leadership selection contest constitutes a primary.

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

The second part of this chapter offers a typology of the various types and sub-types of primary selection methods that are currently in use. The typology focuses on the selectorate – that is, the group of individuals who make the selection choice – as it is in the combination of selectorates that we find variation between the different methods. Based on the nature of the selectorate(s) involved in the process, the typology delineates pure primaries from mixed primaries, and also differentiates between several subtypes of each.

C o n c e p t ua l i z i n g Primaries The term “primary elections” emerged from the field of American politics, where it described the transition from local or state party leaders (kingmakers, bosses) selecting candidates or party officials to the power residing in popularly elected delegates (Meriam and Overacker 1928; Davis 1998, 16). The adoption of the direct primary (“direct” meaning selection with no moderation of delegates) in the United States is one of the most distinctive features of American politics. As early as 1899, Minnesota introduced legislation mandating the use of the direct primary and by 1915, only three states had not enacted similar legislation (Ware 2002, 15). Presidential primary laws soon followed and between 1901 and 1916, twenty-six states had adopted legislation for presidential primaries (Cross and Blais 2012a, 57). In other countries, the term “primary” has gradually become more common and is often used interchangeably with other terms such as party leadership contest, legislative nomination race, candidate preselections, and so forth. In fact, the use of the term primary or primaries is often a matter of local terminology, or national jargon. In some cases the term “primary” is used to describe selection methods that involve widespread participation from the rank-and-file party membership. In Israel, for example, selection processes in which party members are the selectorate are often referred to as primaries (Kenig 2009b). This was also the term used by the Social Democrats in Finland when party members seleced their candidate for the presidential election in 2011. In Italy and Argentina, similar processes are called primary elections (“elezioni primarie” and “elecciones primarias,” respectively) and in France the term describing the selection of François Hollande as the Socialist presidential candidate in 2011 was citizens’ primaries (“primaires citoyennes”; Désir 2013).

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A Definition and Typology 17

Yet many similar cases of processes that give party members (or even non-member supporters) an effective say in the selection of leaders and candidates – that might “deserve” to be called primaries – have been labelled in other ways. In Portugal, the processes by which Pedro Passos Coelho (Social Democratic Party, in 2010) and António José Seguro (Socialist Party, in 2011) were selected as party leaders by their members were termed direct elections (“eleições directas”; see, for example, Lisi 2010). In Belgium, selection by party members is called a poll system (De Winter 1988), and in Colombia, “consulta popular” has been used by the Liberals to denote their inclusive selection method for presidential candidates (Martz 2000). Despite using the same method (i.e. selection by the party membership), a number of different labels are currently in use. In other cases, we may see entirely different terms being used to describe the same selection process within a single country. The selection process that was used to choose Ed Miliband as the leader of the British Labour Party in 2010, for instance, was not generally described as a “primary” in the popular media. The Telegraph (Sawer 2010) and B B C (Kayte 2012) referred to the process as a “leadership race,” while The Guardian (Stratton 2010) described it as a “leadership contest.” The same can be said about the selection of Stephen Harper as leader of the Conservative Party of Canada in 2004. Despite being selected through a ballot of party members, the process was not commonly referred to as a primary election but instead as a “leadership contest” by the Globe and Mail (Fagan 2004) and a “leadership race” by the Toronto Star (McKenzie 2004). More recently the term “US-style primary” was widely used to describe the Canadian Liberals’ 2013 contest as a way of differentiating it from the earlier membership ballots as, for the first time, the party granted a vote to its non-member supporters (Ibbitson 2011; 2012; Hepburn 2012). It is worth noting that this inconsistency and lack of conceptual clarity is not only confined to journalistic and popular accounts in the media. One of the first academic studies of leadership selection via party-member balloting in the Canadian Journal of Political Science referred to these as “direct votes” (Cross 1996). A year later, a different article in the same journal referred to the Alberta Conservatives’ membership ballot as a “premier primary” (Stewart 1997). Other terms that have been used in academic work include “membership ballots” (Carty and Blake 1999; Quinn 2010) and

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18

The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

“one-member-one-vote systems” (Courtney 1995, 233). In other words, both journalistic and academic works have given a variety of names to similar processes. It is therefore important to determine a common definition of primaries – that is, to establish an umbrella term for these similar, yet not identical, processes. The challenge for this chapter is to propose a useful conceptual framework to decide which methods of intra-party elections should be regarded as primaries and which should not. As we will see, the term “primary” refers to a broad set of intra-party selection methods. In this regard, the methods found in the primary umbrella are analogous to the study of electoral systems. The most common and accepted way to study electoral systems is to group them into different categories, often referred to as “families” (Farrell 2011). Three broad families can be identified: plurality/ majority, proportional, and mixed (Reynolds, Reily, and Ellis 2008). The defining characteristic for this categorization is typically the degree of proportionality. Despite grouping them together under a common label, there are often significant differences between electoral systems in the same family. Take, for example, the group of electoral systems that fall under the umbrella of proportional representation (P R). This family of electoral systems includes those ranging from panachage, to open and closed list PR , to the single transferable vote (S TV). Some countries, such as Israel, use a single countrywide district while others, for example Argentina and Portugal, have a number of smaller districts (usually along the lines of sub-national units). Likewise, S TV asks voters to rank candidates in order of preference, while closed list P R provides voters no such option. A number of additional variations exist in the counting formula as well (e.g. Droop vs Hare quotas; see Farrell 2011). Regardless of this variation, the electoral systems in this family share a number of similarities and grouping them together under the umbrella of P R is helpful for comparative analysis. Similarly, while the selection methods brought under the umbrella of primaries are varied, they share a number of important commonalities. Whereas electoral systems are grouped based on proportionality, we propose categorizing primaries based on the inclusiveness of the selectorate(s) involved. We differentiate primaries into two main types. We begin by examining pure primaries, in which only the most inclusive selectorates

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A Definition and Typology 19

such as voters, supporters, or party members are granted formal authority. We then move to more multifaceted selection methods, mixed primaries, which include processes that combine the inclusive selectorates found in the first category with less inclusive selectorates such as conference delegates, affiliated organizations, the parliamentary party group (P P G), and so on.

P a rt y P r i m a r i e s : D e f inition and Scope In order to create a typology of primaries, we must first define what a primary is and the range of selection methods that fall under this umbrella. Three criteria will guide us in our conceptualization of primaries. The first is derived from the literal meaning of the term “primary election,” and has to do with the sequence of electoral events. The second relates to the nature of the process and focuses on primaries as being inherently party- specific events. The third and most important emphasizes the nature of the selectorate, and outlines a minimum threshold of inclusiveness. Sequence When we use the term “primary election” or simply “primaries” we imply, by definition, the order of the selection process. Broadly speaking, just as primary school is the first link in the chain of formal education, primary elections are first in a chain of electoral processes. This suggests a sequence of events: primary elections are held before the general election. Related to sequence is the timing of events. While not a requirement, primary elections typically occur only a few months prior to the inter-party election. When it comes to candidate selection, the reason for the close timing to the next general elections is clear: parties do not want to have defeated unhappy incumbents in parliament. But there are some cases – especially in single-member district electoral systems – when candidates are selected long before the next general election. In the U K , for example, if an M P announces that the current parliamentary term will be her last, the party may quickly select its candidate for the next election even if that is years away. Such a move is favoured from the party standpoint because it provides the selected candidate with time to establish herself in the community and to mobilize support before a general election is called.

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20

The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

Likewise, parties competing in electoral systems without fixed election dates may find it beneficial to be prepared, in the event that a snap election is called. If an MP announces that she will not seek reelection, it is prudent for the party to fill the gap quickly; otherwise they may have to prepare for an election campaign while simultaneously searching for a local candidate. This does not pose a conceptual problem for the term primaries, as the intra-party contest takes place prior to the inter-party contest, even if there are years between them. So while they may not always be close in time, the intra-party contest always occurs before the inter-party one in the sequence of electoral events. The selection of party leaders provides us with the most significant challenge in our quest for a definition in terms of sequence.2 Leadership selection does not have to be held a short time before the general election. In many cases, party leaders announce their resignation (or are pushed from their jobs) following a defeat in general elections, thus necessitating a new leadership contest (see, for example, Cross and Blais 2011, 151). This should not pose a problem for the requisite sequence, as the party would still have to compete in general elections, following the primary, before its leader could become a prime minister or a senior minister. Yet there are some instances in which a party is in government and its leader – who is serving as prime minister – leaves office. In such cases, the newly selected party leader becomes the prime minister without first running as the party leader in a general election. Gordon Brown, for example, became the British prime minister in 2007 following an intra-party procedure within the Labour Party, as did Canadian Paul Martin in 2003. In these cases the primary election is not necessarily closely followed by a general election. This is, by definition, specific to parliamentary democracies, in which the head of the executive is not directly elected but is formally chosen by the parliament (Heard 1991). Even these cases, however, are not all that problematic for our definition. Although in some cases the selection of a new party leader may be viewed as the selection of a prime minister, there are two distinct processes at work. First, there is an intra-party procedure in which a new party leader is selected. Second, legislation or constitutional convention dictates who will be called upon to serve as prime minister. As Heard (1991, 22) notes, “Canadian and British tradition appears to preclude the appointment of someone other than a party leader as first minister.” In these cases it is the Crown,

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A Definition and Typology 21

acting upon the direction of Parliament, who formally selects the prime minister, not the leadership contest. In Israel, the new party leader and hence the prime minister-­ designate has to be approved through an investiture vote in the Knesset before assuming office. The leadership procedure (or event) therefore only has an indirect role in informing the choice of prime minister. When considering the sequence of events, the first is the party’s selection of a new leader, the second is being chosen as prime minister in a non-party- based event, and the third is eventually contesting an inter-party general election, although the time between the first and last of these events may number in years.3 Party Contests The second criterion of our conceptualization of primaries is that they are party-specific events. While parties (either voluntarily or because the state dictates) may allow individuals other than their members to participate in the selection process, these are party events nonetheless. At the most basic level, the purpose of a party primary is to select the candidate to carry the party label during the next general election. Non-party actors such as independents, therefore, do not have to go through a primary before they can contest the general election. Without the desire to win the party label, participation in a primary is not needed. By contrast, would-be party candidates must first go through the preliminary intra-party contest before they are able to compete in the inter-party general election. Therefore, primaries should be viewed as processes that are specific and unique to political parties or electoral blocs.4 Thus, if a social movement or a trade union selects its leader through the direct participation of its members, this may be regarded as a primary, but not a party primary. A non-partisan primary (also know as the “Louisiana Primary”) is not a party primary, as it is an event in which all candidates for the same public office run against each other, regardless of party affiliation.5 In the same way, elections for organizational party positions (e.g. general secretary) should not be counted as primaries, regardless of who votes, since they do not determine the party’s candidates for public office and are not followed by general elections. Despite having to go through an additional layer of competition in order to contest the general election, party candidates vastly

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22

The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

outnumber those who are not affiliated with a political party. This is a result of the privileged position that political parties occupy in Western democracies – both inside legislatures and during election campaigns (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011). Notwithstanding the “decline of parties” thesis and the emergence of new challengers, election campaigns are still “party-centered” events (Wlezien 2009, 103). During elections, political parties are central to the discourse and debate, garner considerable media coverage, and have the tools required to run efficient and effective campaigns. Gaining access to all of these benefits (airtime, ballot access, election resources, staff, etc.) is the prize at stake for winning the primary. Who Votes (The Selectorate)? While the first two criteria are important, knowing that primaries are party-specific events that occur ahead of the general election does not tell us a great deal about the nature of the process. “Primary election” refers to a process that involves a formal means of aggregating opinion and voting of some kind. Thus, a deliberative process that produces a candidate without a formal vote should not be counted as a primary. Similarly, a consultative survey of party members or supporters is not a primary. When scholars use the term “primary,” they mainly refer to the open, participatory, or inclusive nature of what has traditionally been an exclusively intra-party selection process. A primary reveals who is entitled to vote. In other words, the defining element of a primary has to do with the nature of the selectorate. And here we face the key question: what is the minimal degree of inclusiveness for a selection process to be regarded as a primary? Carey and Enten (2011, 82) observe that “primary elections open competition over the selection of candidates within parties beyond high party officials to voters.” This is a good start, but we need to be more specific. The term “high party officials” is rather vague: does it include delegates to a party congress? Does it include the parliamentary party group? It is also not clear what “voters” means. Does this refer to all possible voters (the electorate) or perhaps only some voters (party members, registered supporters, or both)? We suggest labelling as “primaries” those selection processes that entail the widespread and direct involvement of rank-and-file party members and/or voters. Inherent in primaries is that any selector can take a direct part in the selection process – that is, for example,

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A Definition and Typology 23

place an “X” next to the name of the candidate/s they prefer (or maybe even ranking them) and that the winner(s) is directly determined by these votes. A selector might only need to vote (the most inclusive case), or she might need to pre-register (as in the American “closed” primaries), or she might even have to become a party member and pay dues in order to take part. She might even need to wait for a while, after joining a party, before she has the right to participate in leadership or candidate selection. While there may be some minor administrative hurdles (registration, waiting period, etc.), participation in primaries is, for the most part, open and inclusive. We can be assisted in our effort to define the minimum threshold of inclusiveness by referring to the two selectorate continuums introduced by Rahat and Hazan (2001) for candidate selection, and later adapted by Kenig (2009a) for leadership selection. We have combined both into a single continuum (Figure 1.1). It shows the various selectorates in use for these two processes, from the most inclusive (all voters) to the most exclusive (a single leader). We have also introduced one additional selectorate that was missing from earlier versions: party supporters. The previous classifications did not include this type of selectorate because they were not typically used outside the American context. In the United States, a method that involves such a selectorate is confusingly regarded as a “closed” primary.6 Indeed, until recently, the only selectorate from parliamentary democracies in the “primary zone” (see Figure 1.1) – save for the exceptional case of the Icelandic parties since the 1970s (Indridason and Krisrinsson 2013) – were party members (dues-paying/financial members, rank-and-file members). However, political reality is changing rapidly, and today several parties outside the United States allow non-members to participate in leadership and candidate selection. We call this selectorate “party supporters,” but others have called them party friends, registered sympathizers, party adherents, or even quasi-members (Scarrow 2014). As illustrated in Figure 1.1, the primary zone surrounds the selectorates of voters, supporters, and party members. When 100 per cent of the total vote is located within the primary zone, we can easily classify the process as being a primary election, since the selection clearly allows for widespread participation from the rank-and-file. This can range from simple selection methods that allocate 100 per cent of the vote to a single group (e.g. members only), to more complex methods that split the vote between two or more of the groups within

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

Primary Zone

Party members

Voters Party supporters

Single leader

PPG Party delegates

Party elite

Figure 1.1  Party selectorates

the primary zone (e.g. members and supporters). Regardless of the divisions or complexity of the procedure, when the entire selectorate is located within the primary zone, we have a primary election. By contrast, when 100 per cent of the vote is located outside of the primary zone, we can safely say that the selection method is not a primary election. In those cases that cannot be considered primaries, we either have 1) indirect involvement of party members/voters, or 2) no involvement at all by them. In the first case, party members may be involved indirectly by choosing delegates either for the specific purpose of selecting a party candidate or as representatives to a party congress that has the selection of candidates as one of several mandates. While this might be seen as a democratic process – as is indeed conceived in the German and the New Zealand party laws – it does not allow for direct rank-and-file involvement in the selection process. In the second, more exclusive case, party members have no say because candidate selection is conducted either by a single leader or a small group of elite party officials. One may argue that in certain instances of exclusive selectorates, the members and even voters have an indirect say. This might be the case, for example, when the parliamentary party group (composed of selectors who were themselves elected by voters) selects the leader. It might even be the case for a nomination committee whose composition was decided or ratified by party delegates. Yet these are still not “primaries,” because the influence of voters or members is indirect at best. Difficulty arises in classifying selection procedures when authority is shared between those groups located inside of the primary zone and those outside; that is, when neither group of selectorates has exclusive authority. Selection processes are not always straightforward, and there are many cases in which party members or even all voters are involved in the selection, yet more exclusive selectorates (such as conference delegates, the P P G , or even exclusive screening committees) are involved as well. Electoral colleges, for

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A Definition and Typology 25

example, often combine party members and the P P G into a single selection process (Punnett 1992; Quinn 2004). Borderline cases such as these make it imperative to arrive at a more clear-cut definition of what constitutes a primary selectorate. We thus propose that for purposes of our inclusiveness criteria: Primaries are the selection methods in which the cumulative weight of influence of party members, supporters and/or voters is equal to or greater than all other more exclusive selectorate(s) combined. Therefore, we can say that a selection method is a primary if the selectorates found within the primary zone (as illustrated in Figure 1.1) have an equal or greater influence than all of the other selectorates found on the continuum combined. Applying the inclusiveness threshold to a number of selection procedures that combine primary zone selectorates with non-primary zone selectorates will be illustrative of which methods meet our inclusiveness requirements and which do not. Candidate selection in New Zealand’s Labour Party, for example, where the party members’ vote weighs about one-seventh of the total, and is combined with votes of selected (local) and nominated (national) delegates, would therefore not be regarded as a primary (Labour: Constitution and Rules 2013). This is also the case for the electoral college that was adopted by Ireland’s Fine Gael in 2004 for its leadership selection. In this case, the P P G controls 65 per cent of the vote, party members 25 per cent, and local public office-holders 10 per cent (Rafter 2003). Despite giving party members a direct voice in the selection process, the fact that they only hold a fraction of the total vote means that we cannot consider these methods to be primaries. By contrast, the electoral college used by the Canadian New Democratic Party to select Jack Layton (in 2003) – a process that provided affiliated trade unions with 25 per cent of the vote share and party members 75 per cent – meets the inclusiveness requirements necessary to be regarded as a primary election. It is also important to note that some leadership and candidate selection mechanisms that may not be considered pure primaries do, in fact, have a primary component or stage built into the selection process. The British Conservative Party, for example, has used a multi-stage process since 1998 to select its leader. In the first stage, the P P G narrows the choice of potential candidates and selects the top two who will compete for the leadership position. In the second stage, party members vote directly for their leadership

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26

The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

preference, but they can only choose between the two candidates selected by the P P G (Alderman 1999; Bale and Webb 2014). This selection process combines a restrictive first stage with a primary second stage. Given that there is no reliable method to determine the relative influence of the first round, we cannot classify the entire process as a primary. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that a component of the selection method – the second round that is based exclusively on the party membership – is a primary. Even when the primary stage is definitive (e.g. when there are only two candidates contesting the leadership from the start), the formal rules provide significant authority to the P P G (a non-primary zone selectorate) and, as such, the entire process cannot be considered a primary. This is similar to the realm of electoral systems. Mixedmember majority systems, for example, are not typically included in the proportional family. However, it is recognized that these systems do contain a proportional element.

A T y p o l o g y o f P r i m a ry Elections The first two criteria of our definition are constant for all primary elections. That is, primaries are inherently party-specific events that occur prior to the general election in the sequence of electoral events. The nature of the selectorate and the degree of inclusiveness, however, can vary from one procedure to the next, so long as the minimum threshold is maintained. In other words, as long as the selectorates in the primary zone have 50 per cent or more of the votes, other selectorates may be involved in the process. Given that considerable permutations in selectorates occur, the following section investigates the various types and sub-types of selection methods used by parties that fall within the umbrella of primary elections. We begin with pure primaries and the four sub-types that are included in this category, after which we examine mixed primaries and their main sub-types. Pure Primaries The category of pure primaries, as the name suggests, is straightforward and easy to classify. A selection method falls under the “pure primary” classification when 100 per cent of the voting authority is

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A Definition and Typology 27

located inside the primary zone. The three most common variations of pure primaries are “open,” “semi-open,” and “closed” primaries. The differences between the three sub-types concern who is eligible to vote. Some include only party members, while others invite all ­voters. Despite these differences, what unites these sub-types is that each method provides exclusive authority to one of the selectorates in the primary zone. Note that we do not adopt the American conceptualization, although we use the same title for our categories. American open and semi-open primaries fall within our “open” primary category, while the American closed primaries fall within our “semi-open” category (Table 1.1). O pen P r i m a ry The most inclusive method is the open primary. Here every voter may participate in the selection process without any prior party-based registration. While open primaries are typically associated with candidate selection in several American states, they occur in a number of other countries. For example, the main Taiwanese parties decided recently to rely on the results of opinion polls for their leadership selection (Hellmann 2014). In fact, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (D P P ) recently rejected a proposal that would limit participation in its primaries to party members (Li 2013). This is also the case for political parties in Argentina. In 2009, the Argentine President introduced a bill mandating all parties to hold open primaries for the selection of candidates for a number of elected positions (president, national deputies, etc.). This was an extension of earlier legislation, the 1985 Party Law, that required all parties to adopt formal rules for internal governance and mandated democratic elections for party leadership (Scarrow 2005). While the Party Law did not require that parties hold primaries, only that they allow for a “democratic” selection, a number of Argentine parties voluntarily adopted primaries, allowing party members and supporters to participate in the selection of legislative candidates (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). Under the 2009 legislation, all voters are able (and mandated) to participate, regardless of party affiliation. In August 2011, three months prior to the presidential elections, simultaneous open primaries were held by the parties to select their presidential candidates. More than twenty million voters participated.

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

Table 1.1  Selectorates in the primary zone Selectorate

Non-American term

American term

Voters

Open

Open

Supporters

Semi-open

Closed and semi-closed

Party members

Closed primaries

No equivalent

Semi-o pe n P r i m a ry In other cases, parties allow non-members to participate in the selection process but in contrast to open primaries, these individuals need to register as supporters or sympathizers, or sign a declaration affirming that they support the party. In other words, participants here are affiliated, if only loosely, with the party. Until recently semiopen primaries, like their open counterparts, were rarely practised outside of the United States. However, current examples of parties using this method of candidate selection can be found in Taiwan, Mexico, and Iceland (Hazan and Rahat 2010, 40). Only recently have several European parties also begun to use this kind of selectorate. For instance, two leftist parties in France (the Socialists and the Radicals) conducted a joint semi-open primary (“primaires citoyennes”) for selecting a candidate for the 2012 presidential elections. Participants had to pay €1 and sign a charter pledging allegiance to the values of the left. More than 2.5  million individuals participated. In Greece, the Socialists (P A S O K ) opened their leadership selection in 2004 not only to party members but also to party sympathizers. This latter population was enrolled in a separate registry, but essentially there is no longer a distinction between genuine members and sympathizers in party life (Spourdalakis and Tassis 2006, 506). More recently, the Liberal Party of Canada also opened its leadership selection to allow supporters to participate in addition to registered party members. Supporters differ from members in this case, in that they must be at least eighteen years of age and do not have to officially join the party or pay a membership fee. Supporters must, however, certify that they do not belong to another political party, and acknowledge their support for the goals of the party. More than 100,000 Liberal party members and supporters participated in 2013 in the procedure that selected Justin Trudeau as their new leader (De Souza 2013). In 2015 the British Labour Party also selected its leader, for the first time, in semi-open primaries, allowing the

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A Definition and Typology 29

participation of members as well as registered supporters. Again, more than 100,000 supporters voted, overwhelmingly supporting the ­candidacy of Jeremy Corbyn. C lo sed P r i m a ry In the third major sub-type, the typical European closed primary, participation in the selection is restricted to dues-paying (or “financial”) party members. Here we can also identify some important variations. The most common of these have to do with the waiting period required before the member is allowed to vote. Most parties use waiting periods of a few months; however, there are cases in which parties demand significantly longer tenure. In Israel, for example, Likud requires a sixteen-month waiting period before participatory rights are granted. Likewise, the Irish Labour Party requires continuous membership of eighteen months before eligiblility to participate in leadership selection. In addition to waiting periods, a  number of parties have adopted more restrictive requirements. Ireland’s Fianna Fáil and a number of Australian state parties, for example, have attached political activism requirements (e.g. attending party meetings) to voting rights (Cross and Gauja 2014a). On the other hand, there are some parties with extremely short waiting periods and no additional membership requirements. In Greece, the New Democracy party (N D ) allowed citizens to register as members until voting day. Similarly, until 2016 reforms, the Pro­ gressive Conservative party (P C ) in Alberta allowed citizens over the age of sixteen to participate so long as they paid the $5 membership fee. The Alberta PCs did not have tenure requirements or other significant restrictions: membership in the party could be purchased at the polling station on the day of voting, membership could be purchased between the first and second rounds of voting, and there were no restrictions requiring that individuals not belong to another party. C o mplex P r i m a ry In addition to the three sub-types discussed above, pure primaries can share the vote among different groups within the primary zone. We call this sub-type of pure primaries complex. In some cases, while 100 per cent of the vote is concentrated in the primary zone, the selection is comprised of multiple stages or involves the weighting of  multiple primary-zone selectorates. Although typically associated with the mixed type of primary (discussed below), there have

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

been instances of weighted and multi-stage pure primaries as well. In 1998 and 2001, for example, the Democratic Progressive Party (D PP) in Taiwan selected legislative candidates through a method that weighed the votes of party members and of all voters. In 1998 the ratio was 50:50 between members and voters; however, party members were reduced to a 30:70 share in 2001 (Hellmann 2014). Another example of a party that splits the vote between primaryzone selectorates is the Democratic Party (P D ) in Italy. In its 2013 leadership election, not only did the P D split the vote between multiple primary-zone selectorates but it did so in a two-stage process. In the first stage of selection party members voted in local conventions, and only candidates who received more than 15 per cent of the vote nationwide (or the first three candidates) were qualified to compete in the second stage of the process. Once party members screened the candidates and narrowed the available options, the second stage allowed supporters to participate in the final decision. Despite the multi-staged nature of the P D process, or the weighting of votes involved in the D P P procedure, we can classify both methods as pure primaries since 100 per cent of the vote is found inside the primary zone. Mixed Primaries In contrast to pure primaries, some parties that have opened their internal procedures to members, or even to non-members, have been interested in retaining some control in the hands of party elites. Therefore they have not gone “all the way” in granting members or voters an exclusive role in selection but rather they are combined with selectorates from the less inclusive non-primary zone. This type of mixed primaries represents a kind of shared authority, combining the selectorates in the primary zone with other more exclusive selectorates that fall outside of the primary zone. Here we find two major variations: weighted and multi-stage procedures. When members and/or voters have at least 50 per cent of the total votes, these processes are considered primaries. It is important to note that in many such cases, selectorates falling within the primary zone are allocated less than a majority vote share. So while these contests cannot be considered primaries in their entirety, they do include a primary component. Thus we differentiate here between mixed processes where the entire selection event can be

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A Definition and Typology 31

considered a primary, and those in which there is a primary component. Examples of these are detailed under each sub-type. Weig ht e d Sy st e m s Combining primary zone and non-primary zone selectorates into a single-staged selection process is often referred to as an “electoral college.” These weighted selection methods allocate a proportion of the votes to separate and distinct selectorates (Hazan and Rahat 2010, 37). There are many variations, as reflected in Table 1.2. Based on our minimum threshold of inclusiveness, a weighted procedure must provide the primary zone with at least 50 per cent of the vote to be considered a primary. An example of a weighted primary can be found in South Korea, where the newly formed Democratic Unified Party (DUP ) selected its leader in early 2012 through an electoral college in which party delegates were allocated 30 per cent of the vote, and party supporters (including members) were allocated 70 per cent of the vote. In total, there were 21,000 party delegates, 127,920 party members and 643,353 non-members (Bae 2012). Despite including a non-primary zone selectorate (party delegates) in the selection process, the D U P exceeds the minimum threshold of inclusiveness (50 per cent) as the primary zone contains 70 per cent of the total vote. This was also the case for the electoral college in the British Labour Party that allotted (between 1993 and 2011) 67 per cent of the weight to party and trade union members.7 But in other cases, electoral college processes that include selectorates from within the primary zone are not considered mixed primaries because less than a majority of the total vote is from that zone: for example, in Ireland’s Fine Gael, where only 25 per cent of the vote is allotted to members. Mu lt i-sta ge Sy st e m s Multi-stage systems of the mixed primary type also blend selectorates from the primary zone with non-primary zone selectorates into a single selection method. Unlike weighted processes, however, they are not held simultaneously but instead one after the other. The result is a hybrid process: one component is a primary, while the other is not. The most common multi-stage procedures use a more exclusive selectorate to screen candidates and then allow the final choice to be made more inclusively. The case of leadership selection

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

Table 1.2  Examples of electoral colleges in leadership selection around the world Party and year

PPG Delegates or local Trade unions Party Non-members (voters (%) office-holders (%) (%) members (%) and supporters) (%)

Labour (UK) 1981–1993 1993–2011 2011–2014*

30 33.3 30

FG (Ireland) 2004–

65

10

25

FF (Ireland) 2015–

40

15

45

LDP (Japan)** 2012

60

DPJ (Japan)** 2015

35

DUP (S. Korea) 2012– Labour (New Zealand) 2013–

40 33.3 30

30 33.3 30

40 19

46

30

40

Labor (Australia) 2013– 50

10

70

20

40 50

* In 2011 the British Labour Party decided to allow party supporters to participate in leadership selection. According to the decision, supporters would have 10 per cent of the total vote, while rank-and-file party members, affiliated members (primarily trade unions), and the PPG would hold 30 per cent each (Hennessy and Donnelly 2011). This method was abolished in 2014, before ever being used, in favour of semi-open primaries. ** The electoral college method is used in the first round of voting. If a second round is needed, the decision is made solely by the PPG .

in the U K Conservatives, discussed above, is illustrative of a multistage selection process that uses a more exclusive selectorate (the PPG ) to screen potential candidates and narrow the field to two finalists. Only after the first stage is the primary zone selectorate (in this case party members) involved in the selection process. In contrast to the U K example, some methods begin with groups in the primary zone and end with more restrictive selectorates. Here we are referring to mediated procedures in which conventions of pledged delegates select the candidate(s). The most common examples are the presidential nominating conventions used in the United States and the earlier generation of leadership conventions in Canada. The Democratic and Republican presidential nominating conventions involve voter (or supporter) participation in the

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A Definition and Typology 33

early stages of the process to select pledged delegates (although voters are essentially voting for their preferred presidential candidate and these votes are then translated into delegates). In most cases, the nominating conventions are only a formality, as at the time they convene it is clear who will be selected by virtue of one candidate having won a majority of the delegates. In this scenario, the primary component of the process is definitive. However, there are times when there is no clear winner (rarely in the US, where such instances are known as “brokered” conventions; more commonly in Canada). In other words, none of the candidates has secured a majority of delegates. In these cases, a second ballot is called, and this time the pledged delegates are released from their obligation and may shift their support to other candidates. Because such circumstances – when the delegates can have the final say – can occur, the mediated procedure should not be regarded as a primary but as a hybrid system.8 While candidates for other federal offices in the United States (for example, members of the House of Representatives) are chosen through pure primaries, presidential nominating conventions do not meet the threshold of inclusiveness in cases of brokered conventions. Despite not meeting the requirements to be regarded as a primary, these multi-stage systems do clearly contain a primary stage. The Canadian Liberals are illustrative of this point. In both 2003 and 2006, the Liberal leader was selected through a mediated process involving grassroots party members and convention delegates. In the first stage of the process party members voted for their preferred candidates, and these votes were translated into convention delegates on a proportionate basis. Once at the convention, delegates were bound to vote according to the membership preferences. This, however, was only the case for the first ballot. On subsequent ballots, delegates were released to vote as they wished. In 2003, leadership contender Paul Martin won the overwhelming support of the party membership, capturing 94 per cent of the convention delegates in the first stage of the selection process. Given that delegates were bound to the membership vote on the first ballot, Martin easily won on the first round of voting. Since the first ballot was based entirely on the will of party members, we can say that the primary stage was definitive in selecting the party leader. Ultimately it was Liberal Party members, and not delegates, who chose Paul Martin as their leader.

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

By contrast, the 2006 Liberal leadership election, despite using the same rules, culminated in a very different result. After party members cast their ballots and these votes were translated into delegates, no candidate had a majority: Michael Ignatieff captured 29 per cent of the convention delegates, Bob Rae 20 per cent, Gerard Kennedy 18 per cent, and Stéphane Dion 16 per cent. As a result, the first ballot at the convention did not produce a winner. No longer bound by the directive of party members, subsequent ballots resembled the classic Canadian convention: delegates had complete autonomy to vote as they saw fit, eliminated leadership candidates endorsed their former rivals, and a great deal of brokering occurred on the convention floor. The outcome of these subsequent ballots was that Dion, who had come in fourth on the membership vote, was selected party leader in the fourth round of voting. Despite being organized with the same set of rules as the 2003 Liberal leadership election, the primary stage of this contest was not definitive. Convention delegates, not Liberal party members, selected Dion as their leader. The first stage of these Liberal leadership elections meet our requirements for a primary: party members have a majority of the authority and they directly vote for their leadership preference. Subsequent stages of the process, however, do not meet the inclusiveness requirement since authority resides with convention delegates, a selectorate that falls outside of the primary zone. Since either stage can be definitive, we cannot say that the process as a whole is a primary. However, we can say that while the entire process is not a primary, it does contain a primary component. When comparing within this sub-type, we can therefore distinguish between those elections where the primary stage was definitive (e.g. Canadian Liberals in 2003) and those elections where the primary stage was not definitive (e.g. Canadian Liberals in 2006). However, this relies on knowledge of the outcome, and thus is not suitable for differentiation within the formal typology. Table 1.3 summarizes the typology of primaries presented above. The table contains the two broad types of primaries and the various sub-types of each. Additionally, a brief description of the selectorate used in each sub-type is provided.

C o n c l u s ion This chapter defined the continuum of possible leadership and candidate selection methods that can be considered primaries. Rather

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A Definition and Typology 35

Table 1.3  Typology of primary election methods Type Pure primaries

Mixed primaries

Sub-type

Selectorate

Open primary

All general election voters

Semi-open primary

Supporters and party members

Closed primary

Party members only

Complex primary

Some combination of the above

Weighted primary

Combination of primary and non-primary zone selectorates in a single stage. Primary zone selectorates have at least 50% of the vote.

Multi-stage Primary

Combination of a primary stage and a nonprimary stage in a multi-staged selection process.

than continue to rely on country-specific terms and different names for essentially similar processes, we have identified the defining characteristics of primary elections and have offered a more precise and universal definition of the term. To sum up: Primaries are all those intra-party selection methods in which the formal weight of influence of party members, supporters, and/or voters is equal to or greater than all other more exclusive selectorate(s). This common language, the umbrella under which primaries are defined, provides the tools necessary for truly comparative work across parties and between countries. This chapter has also proposed a typology of primary systems, pure and simple, as well as mixed and complex. We began by examining pure primaries in which only the most inclusive selectorates such as voters, supporters, and/or or party members are granted formal voting authority. We then explored more complex methods in mixed primaries, which include selection processes that combine the inclusive selectorates found in the first category with less inclusive selectorates such as party delegates, affiliated organizations, the parliamentary party group, and so on. In addition to the two broad types of primaries, the chapter also identified a number of sub-types for each category. The four variations of pure primaries are the “open primaries” that involve all voters, the in-between case of “semi-open primaries” that involve an expression of support for the party, the “closed primaries” that in­­ volve only party members, and the “complex primaries” that involve some combination of the above. The two variations in  the mixed primaries category are the weighted mixed primaries in which there

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36

The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

is a combination of multiple selectorates simultaneously, inclusive (party members, trade union members, party ­supporters, voters) and exclusive (delegates, P P G etc.), and the multi-stage mixed primaries processes that combine multiple selectorates into a process involving both a primary stage and a more exclusive non-primary stage.

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2 The Spread of Primaries

The previous chapter outlined the spectrum on which different selectorates can be classified based on their levels of inclusiveness. At the most inclusive end of the spectrum is the primary zone, which includes selectorates comprised of party members, supporters, and voters. In this chapter we examine the extent to which primary-zone selectorates have been granted formal authority over the selection of party leaders and candidates. We begin with party leadership selection at the national level. The evidence in this area is rather clear: many parties in the democratic world have opened their leadership selection to wider selectorates in recent decades, allowing their members to play a significant role in the process. And, as we show, a number of parties have even expanded the franchise beyond party members to include not only their supporters in the electorate but sometimes even the whole electorate. We then turn to exploring cases in which primaries are used for selecting leaders and candidates for executive positions at the subnational level. This is important because, as the evidence implies, primaries at the sub-national level often serve as an experiment that precedes the adoption of primaries at the national level. Since the sub-national level is usually smaller and less complex, it has greater flexibility to introduce institutional reform and to modify existing practices. This is followed by a discussion of the way primaries are used to select candidates for national legislatures. Here as well, we find a trend towards more direct participation among the grassroots party membership. While the transformation is not as pronounced and widespread as it is for leadership selection, candidate selection

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

processes have experienced a considerable degree of democratization nonetheless. The final section of the chapter focuses on the reasons parties have decided to adopt primaries. Specifically, it asks: what are their objectives, and when do they engage in organizational reform aimed at producing more inclusive selectorates? In answering these questions, we engage with the literature on intra-party democracy and organizational reform and consider both the reasons parties offer for adopting these changes and whether there are observable patterns in their decision to do so.

L e ad e r s h i p P r i m a r i e s at the National Level Intra-party democratization (Cross and Katz 2013) has been particularly evident in the realm of leadership selection. A study comparing the selectorates used for leadership selection in 1960 compared to 2000 found “mixed evidence of change in the roles that party members play in the selection of party leaders” (Kittilson and Scarrow 2003, 71). Of the seventeen countries Kittilson and Scarrow examined in 2000, nine (or 53 per cent) had at least one party that allowed party members to vote in the process. As for individual political parties, 25 per cent of the seventy-four parties included in the analysis allowed rank-and-file members a vote. In the years that have passed since then, things have changed remarkably, as more parties – the Danish Social Democrats, the French Socialists, and the Dutch V V D , to name just a few – have adopted primaries for selecting their leaders. It is also the case that in the last decade, a number of parties have expanded their selectorates further, allowing supporters, and sometimes even all voters, to participate. Three more recent studies have found clearer evidence of a trend towards primaries. The first study investigated leadership selectorates in forty-five parties from eleven parliamentary democracies and found that in twenty-three cases, party members have been granted a formal role in the selection process (51 per cent). The rest of the parties split between those that select their leaders via the P P G and those that do so via delegates to a party conference (Kenig 2009a, 437). The second study looked at leadership selectorates in the five English-speaking parliamentary countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom: twenty-six parties in total.

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The Spread of Primaries 39

Comparing the selectorates in 2010 to those in the mid-1970s, the authors report a dramatic change. Prior to 1976, only the three Canadian parties granted any formal role to party members. By 2010, however, eleven parties gave members full authority over selection, while seven parties shared authority between the P P G and the party members (Cross and Blais 2012a, 132). Of the twenty-six parties that were examined, 42 per cent used a primary selection method. In the years that have followed Cross and Blais’s analysis, change has continued to occur. In 2013, for instance, labour parties in Australia and New Zealand held leadership selections in which there was significant grassroots involvement. The mixed selection methods provide party members with 40 per cent of the vote in New Zealand and 50 per cent in Australia. Finally, a third and more recent study examined leadership selectorates in eighty-three parties from thirteen parliamentary democracies. Of the eighty-three, Pilet and Cross (2014) identify thirty-one that made a change in the selectorate(s) responsible for choosing their leader (post 1965). Of these thirty-one, thirty opted to empower a more inclusive selectorate. What’s more, twenty-four (or 80 per cent) adopted a selection method that falls under the umbrella of primaries, with others (such as the U K Tories) adopting processes including a primary component. The study concludes that 29 per cent of all parties included in the analysis used a form of primary election for the selection of their party leader as of 2012. As Figure 2.1 shows, primaries have become so widespread that they were the second most common selection method in 2012, only trailing selection by party delegates (which accounts for about 50 per cent of the cases and has been in steady decline in relative terms). Moreover, there is a substantial gap between the use of primary elections and the next most common methods, which account for less than 10 per cent of total cases respectively. This is in stark contrast to the selection methods used in the 1960s. While almost 30 per cent of the parties used a type of primary to select their party leaders in 2012, none of the parties did so in 1965, and fewer than two in ten did in 1995. Not only have primaries become more popular over time but selection by party members or voters also spans a wide array of countries, representing different types of party and electoral systems, such as Belgium, Canada, Israel, Britain, Portugal, Romania, and Italy. Adding to these findings, we provide here an additional account of leadership selection methods and the trend indicates an ongoing

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40

The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections 65.5 58.1

60.0

51.5 Party members/voters 40.0

Delegates Council

27.9 13.8 20.7

20.0

17.7

0.0

Mixed

14.5 6.5

0.0

ppg

7.4 7.4 3.2

5.9

0.0 1965

1995

2012

Figure 2.1  Leadership selectorates in thirteen parliamentary democracies Source: Based on the database of Cross and Pilet (2015).

process of democratization. Table 2.1 outlines the leadership selectorates of fifty-nine parties from nineteen parliamentary democracies as of 2012.1 Consistent with the existing scholarship, more than one-half of the parties used inclusive selectorates to select their leaders in 2012. In addition, we can compare the selectorates used in 1975 to those in use in 2012. The number of parties here declines to forty-four, because fifteen parties did not exist or existed under non-democratic regimes, in 1975.2 In half of the cases (twenty-two out of forty-four) we see an opening of the selectorate, while the rest retained their existing selectorate. Interestingly, not a single party moved in the opposite direction (adopting a more exclusive selectorate). More important for this discussion, however, is the extent to which primaries, not just inclusive selectorates in general, are used to select party leaders. Of the fifty-nine selection methods used by the parties included in Table 2.1, we can classify twenty-four as falling under the umbrella of primaries. In other words, four in ten parties use a form of primary election to select their leader. Moreover, this represents a significant change from 1975, when there were no parties using primaries to select leaders in any of the nineteen countries. The evidence for leadership selection is clear: primaries have become more and more common. While primary elections were

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Table 2.1  Leadership selectorates in fifty-nine parties, February 2012 State

Party

Selectorate 1975

Selectorate 2012

Opening since 1975?

Primary type

Australia

Labor Liberals Freedom Party Greens People’s Party Social Democrats CD& V MR N-VA Open VL D Socialists (Flemish) Socialists (French) Conservatives Liberals

PPG PPG Party delegates n.a. Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates n.a. Party delegates Party delegates

PPG PPG Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party members Party members Party members Party members Party members

No No No n.a. No No Yes Yes n.a. Yes Yes

Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed

Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates

Yes Yes Yes

NDP People’s Party Liberals Social Democrats Soc. People’s Party Centre Left Alliance KOK Social Democrats CDU FPD Greens SPD New Democracy P AS OK

Party delegates n.a. Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates n.a. Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates n.a. Party delegates n.a. n.a.

Fianna Fáil Fine Gael Labour Kadima Labour Likud Shas Yisrael Beitenu Democrats PdL Democrats L DP CDA PvdA SP VVD Labour National

PPG PPG PPG n.a. Party delegates Party delegates n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Party elite PPG Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates PPG PPG

Party members Party members Supporters + members Party members Party delegates Party delegates Party members Party members Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party members Supporters + members PPG Mixed Party members Party members Party members Party members Leader Party delegates Voters Leader Mixed Mixed PPG Party members Party delegates Party members PPG PPG

Austria

Belgium

Canada

Denmark

Finland

Germany

Greece Ireland Israel

Italy Japan Netherlands

NZ

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Yes n.a. No Yes Yes No n.a. No No No No n.a. No n.a. n.a. No Yes Yes n.a. Yes Yes n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes No Yes No Yes No No

Closed Closed Semiopen Closed Closed Closed

Closed Semiopen Closed Closed Closed Closed Open

Closed Closed

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

Table 2.1  Leadership selectorates in fifty-nine parties, February 2012 (continued) State

Party

Selectorate 1975

Selectorate 2012

Opening since 1975?

Norway

Conservatives Labour Progress Social Democrats Socialists People’s Party Socialists Moderates Social Democrats Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats

Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates n.a. n.a. Party delegates Party delegates PPG PPG PPG

Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party members Party members Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Party delegates Mixed Mixed Party members

No No No Yes Yes n.a. n.a. No No Yes Yes Yes

Portugal Spain Sweden UK

Primary type

Closed Closed

Weighted Closed

Sources: Based on the database of Cross and Pilet (2015); supplemented with authors’ data.

virtually unheard of in the 1960s and 70s, parties have become increasingly willing to provide primary-zone selectorates with formal authority in the leadership selection process. Given the findings of the existing literature, and the information provided in Table 2.1, we can estimate that between one-third and one-half of political parties use a form of primary to select their party leaders. While there are still parties that resist the expansion of leadership selection to more inclusive selectorates, this is considerably less common than it was even a decade ago. In fact, changes are so rapid that Table 2.1 does not capture the recent developments in two nations in which major parties have long resisted the opening of leadership selection: in 2013 Labour parties in both Australia and New Zealand adopted an electoral college system, expanding leadership selection beyond the PPG (see Table 1.2). Similarly, the Spanish Socialists used a closed primary for the first time in 2014 to select Pedro Sanchez as leader. Not only is the use of primaries growing, there is also considerable diversity in the approaches being adopted. A number of parties are experimenting with even more open selectorates and extending the vote beyond their own registered party members (Scarrow 2014). The Democrats in Italy used an open primary in 2007 and again in 2009, while the Greek Socialists (P A SO K) used a semi-open primary in 2007 and 2012. The debate over the opening of the procedure to participation beyond the rank-and-file members continues in other parties as well. In April 2013, for the first time, the Liberal Party of

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The Spread of Primaries 43

Canada allowed party supporters (i.e., non-members) to vote for its new leader (Taber and Leblanc 2013), while in Britain in 2015, also for the first time, the leader of Labour Party was elected in semiopen primaries. These examples demonstrate that primaries are not only becoming more popular but also that political parties are willing to adopt their most inclusive forms. More recently, primaries have been held for the selection of multiparty presidential candidates as well as for multiparty prime ministerial candidates. Two parties of the French left (the Socialists and the Radicals) conducted semi-open primaries in 2011 to select their joint nominee for the 2012 Presidential election. The centre-left coalition in Italy, a pre-electoral coalition, has twice (2005, 2012) conducted open primaries to select their prime ministerial candidate. Finally, a recent study of elections in Latin America found that nearly 40 per cent of all presidential elections between 1978 and 2004 involved one or more candidates selected through a primary election (Kemahlioglu, Weitz-Shapiro, and Hirano 2009). While the majority of presidential candidates are still selected through non-primary processes, the use of primaries in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela demonstrates the growing use of more participatory and inclusive selection mechanisms.

L e a d e r s h i p P rimaries at t h e S u b - n at ional Level As Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 demonstrate, some countries and parties still resist opening up their selectorate.3 Having said that, at times we can find parties at the sub-national level utilizing leadership primaries even when their “mother parties” at the national or federal level show resistance. Germany offers one such example. At the federal level, party delegates select leaders (or candidates for the office of the federal chancellor) as stipulated in the German Party Law of 1967. The practice is actually even more exclusive than it may seem on the surface, since parties regularly try to avoid open leadership contests (Detterbeck and Rohlfing 2014). Party executives or smaller circles of party insiders usually agree upon a candidate, who is then presented to the party congress for approval. The single exception to this practice occurred in 1993, when the S P D conducted a nonbinding membership ballot to select the party leader from three contenders. Rudolf Scharping, who won the ballot, was then formally

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

selected by the party congress (Scarrow 1996, 64). The S P D 1993 ballot remains the sole German example of the use of a “consultative” primary at the national level. Meanwhile, at the sub-national level, parties seem to be more adventurous and experiment with more inclusive methods of leadership selection. Between 1994 and 2011, for example, regional parties in Germany (the C DU and SP D) conducted eighteen leadership primaries. What’s more, half of the primaries have been conducted since 2004, indicating a growing trend (Detterbeck 2011). It should be noted that for the sub-national as well as the federal level, the German party law states that Land party conferences have the final word over the selection of regional party leaders. Membership ballots can thus only be held as consultative votes, or non-binding primaries. However, there is a strong expectation that party elites and conference delegates will follow the decision of the rank-and-file members. Despite operating under the same legal regulations, parties at the sub-national level have been creative in devising ways to hold primary elections while still complying with the overarching German party law, while their federal counterparts have stuck with the status quo. On the Italian left, primaries at the sub-national level preceded the adoption of primaries for the party leadership at the national level. Mayoral primaries were already introduced in the late 1990s in the city of Bologna and several more have been conducted since, most recently in Genoa and Palermo. Primaries were also used for selecting the candidate to the office of Governor of the regions of Puglia (2005, 2010), Sicilia (2005), Umbria (2010), and Calabria (2010). Finally, primaries were conducted for the offices of regional party leaders in 2007 and 2009 (Sedonne 2010). In Spain the trend is more modest, but still there is similar evidence. While conference delegates select the party leader in most parties at the federal level (Barbera et al. 2014), in the regions we find several cases where leadership primaries have been conducted. The CiU (Convergència i Unió, the largest Catalan party), for example, has employed primaries for selecting both its leaders and candidates for a number of years (Hopkin 2001). Likewise, the ER C (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Catalan left nationalist party) also elects its party leaders using a closed primary method. In Canada, the first to adopt primaries for leadership selection were political parties at the provincial level. The Parti Québécois

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The Spread of Primaries 45

(1985), Ontario Progressive Conservatives (1990), and British Columbia ­Liberals (1993) were among the first parties to select their leaders by closed primaries involving a ballot of party members (Latouche 1992; Cross 1996; Stewart 1997). The use of primary elections at the sub-national level has become so widespread in Canada that, as of 2015, they have been used in each of the ten provinces, across at least thirty different parties, and in more than fifty leadership elections. A number of parties, particularly those in the province of Alberta, have experimented with extending the vote beyond party members. In 2011 the Alberta Liberal Party adopted semi-open leadership primaries, allowing registered supporters and party members to select the leader (a process that is similar to the one used by the Alberta Conservatives since 1992). Finally, in the United Kingdom, we also see parties at the subnational level using primaries. In 2011, the Scottish Conservatives held a contest for their leadership and opened it to all party members. The Plaid Cymru of Wales did the same in early 2012. The Scottish and Welsh Labour Parties imitate their “mother” party by selecting their leaders in an electoral college evenly split between PPG , affiliated members, and party members. In 2015 the Welsh Labour Party continued this pattern, directly electing its leader for the first time through a vote of party members and registered supporters. Overall, political parties at the sub-national level appear to be spearheading the movement towards the adoption of primary elections for the selection of party leaders whether it is in Germany, Italy, Canada, or elsewhere.

P r i m a r i e s f o r S electing L e g i s l at i v e C andidates Scholars of political parties have also identified a modest trend towards increasing members’ involvement in legislative candidate selection from the 1960s to the 1990s. Examining eleven European democracies, Bille (2001, 366) demonstrates an increase in the use of membership ballots from nine out of fifty-seven parties (16 per cent) in 1960 to sixteen out of seventy-one parties (23 per cent) in 1989. More impressive is the fact that, while parties in only three countries used membership ballots in the 1960s, by 1989 parties in six countries did so. Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell (2000) also document a shift towards more inclusive selectorates between 1960 and

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

2000 in eight of eighteen established democracies. Kittilson and Scarrow (2003) examined these eighteen countries a number of years later and identified a continuation of this trend: only four countries were identified in which there was no party whose members (or supporters) could not participate in candidate selection. Analyzing two large databases on candidate selection allows us to further estimate the spread of party primaries in recent decades (1990s–2000s). The first is that collected by Shomer (2014). Of the 349 cases of candidate selection (a case is a single party at a specific point in time) she coded since 1990, 126 (36.1 per cent) were coded as primaries. In nineteen out of forty-three countries (44.2 per cent) there was at least one party using a primary to select candidates. Out of the 191 parties coded since 1990, 66 (34.6 per cent) were coded as using primaries in the most recent selection for which data were available. The second candidate-selection database has been provided by  Atmor (2011).4 The data include 127 parties in thirty-eight countries (for twenty-seven parties data are from 1990 to 2000; for 100 parties data are from 2001 to 2010). Atmor coded candidate selection methods based on the twenty-four-point scale that was ­developed by Hazan and Rahat (2010). If we look for parties that allow some influence to party members, supporters, or voters, we find this is the case for forty-seven parties (37 per cent). In more than half of the countries (twenty out of the thirty-eight), one or more parties fell into this category. In other words, in more than one in three parties and in more than one-half of the countries, party members have a role in the selection of legislative candidates. If, however, we follow our stricter definition of primaries as a selection method in which members/supporters/voters have at least 50 per cent of the influence, we find that forty of the 127 (31.5 per cent) cases meet this threshold, and that in seventeen of the thirtyeight countries there was at least one party using a primary method. It is worth noting that in Atmor’s dataset some parties (for example, several in Belgium and Argentina) did involve party members in the selection of parliamentary candidates in some constituencies, but were coded as not using primaries because most candidates were selected by more exclusive selectorates. As with the evidence for leadership selection, we can identify some almost linear trends when considering the inclusiveness of

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candidate selection procedures. In Ireland, for example, democratization is evident since the 1990s, when more and more parties made use of membership votes rather than those of branch delegates to select their legislative candidates (Reidy 2011). Enhancing democracy within Irish parties has continued, as Fianna Fáil enacted reforms to its candidate selection procedures in 2013 to allow for the direct balloting of party members. In the U K, members are more and more involved in candidate selection, and before the 2010 and the 2015 elections the Conservative party involved non-members in the selection of some of its candidates. And the Australian Labour Party has experimented with what it calls “community preselections,” in which half the vote is reserved for party members and half for any eligible voters wishing to participate. To summarize, a trend towards involving party members and sometimes even supporters and voters is evident. We can estimate that between a quarter to a third of the more prominent parties in democracies make use of what we call “primaries” in order to select their legislative candidates. Additionally, we find that in about half of the democracies there is at least one party that involves its members in candidate selection, and in somewhat less than half, primaries have been adopted. While sharing the overall trend of democratization, there are differences in the trajectories of leadership and candidate selection processes. In particular, the democratization of candidate selection appears to be less stable than that of leadership selection. Belgium is an interesting case in which the use of party primaries for candidate selection varies among parties, within parties, and over time. Members of the Christian Popular Party, for example, took part in the selection of almost all of its candidates in 1958, but not in 1974, 1977, 1978, and 1981. Total statistics for the known cases for six parties in the 1958–85 period tells us that members took part in 94.7 per cent of the selections in 1958, but only in 11.6 per cent of the selections in 1978 (De Winter 1988). In addition to this wide range and fluctuations, we can identify a process of decline in members’ involvement since 1958. Nor is the Christian Popular Party alone. Indeed, a number of other Belgian parties have “phased out or abolished” the use of membership balloting as a means of selecting legislative candidates since the 1970s (Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell 2000, 140).

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We thus see that even if the general trend is towards democratization, it is less stable than that for leadership selection. In short, while the democratization of leadership selection seems to be almost irreversible, the trend of democratization of candidate selection is reversible. In terms of political personalization, centralized personalization that focuses on leaders seems to be more dominant than decentralized personalization that focuses on (many) individual politicians (Balmas et al. 2014). Why has the adoption of primaries been more common for the selection of party leaders? We may be witnessing differences between the ways in which leaders and candidates are selected because of different conceptions of representation inherent in different electoral systems. Party leaders, in parliamentary systems, play a relatively similar role regardless of what type of electoral system they operate in. Whether operating in a single-member system or a proportional one, party leaders represent the party as a whole and therefore represent all members.5 The representational nature of legislative candidates, however, is impacted by the electoral system. We already know, for example, that electoral systems shape, at least indirectly, selection rules for candidates. Parties in single-member districts only need to find an individual candidate, while parties in multi-member districts need to prepare an entire slate of candidates. In electoral systems with single-member districts, representation is geographically bound to one representative. This type of representation is less obvious and less important in other electoral systems that focus less on geography and more on proportionality. In single-member plurality systems, parliamentarians are meant to have strong representational bonds with their local electors. Given the representational differences, the presence of single-­member ­districts may encourage parties to adopt more inclusive selectorates for candidate selection. This is evident in Australia, where there is a  clear difference between the involvement of rank-and-file party members in preselections for the House of Representatives compared with those for the Senate (for a full discussion of this see Cross and Gauja 2014a). Involvement in the selection process is arguably more consequential and important when that candidate is tied directly to your district. Variation in electoral systems, and thus the representational roles of parliamentarians, may account to some degree for the slower adoption of primaries at the candidate level as compared to the selection of leaders.

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W h y P r i m aries? Given that primaries are becoming an increasingly popular method for the selection of party leaders and candidates for public office, it is worth considering why this is the case. That is: why, and perhaps more importantly, when, do parties engage in reform to provide rank-and-file members with considerable authority in selection processes? Given the importance of the personnel recruitment function, we would expect that party elites would typically guard this authority and centralize control. It is therefore somewhat puzzling that they would relinquish their authority to select legislative candidates and party leaders. Yet this is exactly what is happening. Political parties all over the world are voluntarily opening up their selection mechanisms to include party members, supporters, and voters in the selection process. In fact, the selection of party personnel is quickly becoming the most inclusive of all internal party processes. This, of course, raises another important question: why have party elites relinquished their authority in favour of empowering the rank-and-file? Following Panebianco (1988), Harmel (2002), Barnea and Rahat (2007), and Cross and Blais (2012a), we suggest that a party’s internal circumstances and external environment are crucial for understanding organizational reform. These factors include the party’s competitive position within the party system, position inside the legislature (government or opposition), the relative age of the party, and whether other parties have already adopted more inclusive procedures. While these party and party system factors culminate in organizational change, it is also important to understand why change happens in a particular direction. Why move towards a more inclusive selection method? Changes in leadership and candidate selection methods can be influenced from processes and actors at various levels. Barnea and Rahat (2007) propose looking at three levels of analysis in order to explain change (and preservation) of selection methods and its direction: the political system level, the party system level, and the intra-party arena. While these three levels are to a certain degree inter-related, each supplies answers to different aspects of reform: the political system influences the probable direction of reform and the politically admissible range of reform alternatives. The party system affects the timing of specific reform initiatives and the

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intensity of their initiation. Finally, the evolution of a specific attempt at promoting reform and its fate are determined through an internal power struggle. At the political system level, long-term developments constrain parties in their choice of selection procedure by defining the politically admissible range of options. That is, over time, democratization processes may make the more exclusive selection methods less legitimate and the more open ones more appealing. Parties have faced significant challenges in recent decades (see below), and there is growing pressure for them to allow more direct participation in internal party affairs. In the postwar era, citizens living in post-­ industrial democracies have experienced widespread and rapid change in their values, and in their perceptions of democratic norms. Most Western democracies have experienced long-term decline in  party activism (Whiteley 2011; van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2014), decline in levels of trust and deference towards parties (Nevitte 1996; Dalton 2007; Norris 2011), decreasing voter turnout (Gray and Caul 2000; Franklin 2004), falling party memberships (Mair and van Biezen 2001; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010; van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012), changing values and norms (Inglehart 1990), and an overall decline in traditional forms of participation (Norris 2002). This decline has been coupled with a rise in unconventional forms of participation such as political consumerism (Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti 2005; Stolle and Micheletti 2013) and increased support for direct democracy (Donovan and Karp 2006). Amid this declining deference, falling voter turnout, rising distrust and dissatisfaction, dwindling party membership and activism, and challenges from new institutions and unconventional forms of participation, political parties face a clear dilemma: how can they continue to claim that they connect citizens to the state without active and engaged party members? Examining the German case, Scarrow (1999, 345) found that parties responded to shifting societal values by “modifying both party and public decision-­making rules.” In particular, party rules were modified in such a way as to allow more meaningful and direct member involvement in leadership selection and removal, candidate nomination, and policy decisions. At the same time that Scarrow was writing, Seyd (1999, 383) observed that “Britain’s two major parties have rediscovered their members.” As in Germany, the major parties in Britain engaged in

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large-scale membership recruitment and began to offer more democracy in their internal procedures. Young and Cross (2002a) have documented a similar shift in Canadian parties from representational democracy to a plebiscitary model of democracy. The defining characteristic of this new form of party democracy is more frequent and direct member involvement in intra-party affairs such as the selection of leaders. As organizations that provide a crucial link between citizens and the state, political parties require members (Cross and Gauja 2014b). Therefore, parties have had to respond to the changes in their internal and external environments and find new ways to incentivize membership and to change their public image (Cross and Katz 2013; Young 2013). Offering more avenues for direct and meaningful participation has been the most common response. If citizens want to play an active role in democratic life but are turning away from political parties to do so, adopting internally democratic procedures for selecting legislative candidates and party leaders is perceived of as a way of making party membership more attractive and worthwhile.6 The adoption of primary elections is therefore part of the ongoing and evolving process of intra-party democratization as an attempt to curb party decline. In addition to being seen as more democratic, primaries are often viewed as a means of combating corruption. According to Ware (2002, 15), the conventional account of why American political parties adopted primaries focuses on Progressive reformers “who were intent on curbing the power of parties.” In this effort, nineteenthcentury reformers called for legislation that would strip party elites of their power to control the candidate selection process. If citizens could select candidates, party elites would have access to one less lever of political power. Concerned with corruption, between 1866 and 1877 fifteen American states enacted legislation relating to nominations, most of which were “aimed at preventing blatant fraud” (Ware 2002, 77). Similar to the American case, we also see parties in other countries citing corruption as a motivation for adopting primary elections. In Canada during the 1980s and 1990s, for example, there was growing criticism of the delegated convention process for leadership selection. The “trench warfare” (Carty 2007) that took place during these contests resulted in widespread abuse of membership rules and extensive manipulation of the process. When the Royal

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Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (also known as the Lortie Commission) provided its recommendations to the Canadian House of Commons in 1992, the final report stated: “Direct election of party leaders may also reduce the opportunities for abuse of membership rules. It is seen as a credible mechanism for rebuilding public confidence in the leadership selection process” (Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing 1991, 280). In response to growing criticisms about the delegate selection process and the widespread abuse of membership rules, Canadian parties, especially at the provincial level, began to experiment with new leadership selection processes (Courtney 1995; Cross 1996). The above discussion highlights two important objectives of primaries: to reduce political corruption and to arrest party decline and engage members. Despite being worthwhile objectives, however, parties have been described as being inherently conservative institutions in which change “does not ‘just happen’” (Harmel and Janda 1994, 261). If change will not happen automatically, when are parties likely to adopt more inclusive selectorates? In other words, when are parties most likely to engage in organizational reform? Following Cross and Blais (2012a), Harmel (2002), Harmel and Janda (1994), and Wilson (1980), we suggest that organizational reform is best explained by the occurrence of an external stimuli and conducive internal circumstances. Harmel and Janda (1994, 265), for example, suggest that while internal shocks can induce change on their own, “the most dramatic and broadest changes will occur only when the party has experienced an external shock.” Likewise, according to Wilson (1980, 539) “changes outside the party that affect the terms of competition are the ones most likely to stimulate party transformation.” While parties have various goals and therefore differ in terms of the importance placed on electoral success, competitive electoral pressures represent the most important external force motivating change. At the party system level, therefore, competition between parties influences their decisions to democratize. Indeed, Cross and Blais’s (2012ab) analysis of changing leadership selectorates finds that, in most cases, democratization occurred after an electoral defeat and when the party was in opposition. The shock of electoral defeat combined with internal circumstances conducive to change (potentially fragmented leadership, a desire to boost morale, difficulty

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recruiting new members, etc.) facilitate significant organizational change. It makes sense to expect parties to democratize when they are in opposition, as they can hardly influence things in other realms the way the governing party can. Instead, parties in opposition, particularly after suffering electoral defeat, often turn their focus inwards and engage in organizational reforms. Two recent examples of parties changing their selection methods while in opposition after long periods in government are New Zealand’s Labour and Ireland’s Fianna Fail. Focusing still on the party system level, a number of studies have also found evidence of a “contagion effect” (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002; Cross and Blais 2012ab; Pilet and Cross 2014). When parties within a given system perceive an electoral bonus (more votes, enhanced legitimacy, etc.) as a result of opening up their selection methods, other parties tend to adopt similar procedures in short succession. This contagion effect is especially powerful when one of the principal parties in a system has democratized its selection process first. Members in the laggard parties begin to demand similar powers for themselves. Typically, however, it is only when the contagion and electoral defeat conditions converge that change occurs. For example, in the UK, Labour party members began demanding change in their selection methods in the early 1970s, but nothing happened until after the party lost in the 1979 election. Conservative party members then began agitating for reform, but had no success until after the party’s defeat in the 1997 election. Similar patterns are evident in other countries (Cross and Blais 2012a). Yet, in each party, the influences of the external environment in general and of the party system in particular are translated into reform initiative and implementation as a result of activities within the parties. Each party reacts to external pressures according to its own timing, and each party is autonomous in deciding whether the reform of its personnel selection methods is the optimal way to respond to external events and pressures. The final decision, to reform or to preserve the existing system, is made at the intra-party level. The behaviour of intra-party actors can be best described as a result of the calculation of their interests as team players (influences of factors from the external levels) with their self-interests within the party. Here too we see the relationship between the party system and intra-party factors. When parties are removed from power after an electoral defeat, the balance of power

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within the organization often shifts away from the parliamentary elites towards the grassroots activists. For this reason, the party elite is less able to resist demands for organizational reform that increase the power of a more assertive rank-and-file (Cross and Blais 2012b). A more elitist interpretation of the aftermath of an electoral defeat would be that counter-elites and aspiring individuals, who had to patiently wait for their turn during times of success, now have the opportunity to effectively demand their share or even take over with the support of the party demos. In addition to the voluntary adoption of primaries, parties in some countries are required to conform to legal regulations imposed on them by the state. In some cases, party laws not only relate to the external activities of political parties, such as financing and spending, but also internal activities such as candidate and leadership selection, even if only offering broad guidelines. In this sense, the state can dictate party organizational reform. This, however, still fits within our understanding of party change, as the introduction of electoral legislation represents a significant external shock for political parties. The difference between party law and electoral defeat is that the law requires change, and therefore a supportive internal environment is not necessary to ensure such change occurs. Exploring party laws across 152 countries, Janda (2005, 14) finds forty-two cases in which there are “constitutional prescriptions for party organization.” Article 21.1 of the 1949 German Basic Law, for instance, states that “The political parties participate in the formation of the political will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal organization must conform to democratic principles. They must publicly account for their assets and for the sources and use of their funds as well as assets” (emphasis added). What it means for a party to “conform to democratic principles,” however, is somewhat vague and is left for individual parties to interpret. Does this allow, for example, for delegates to select party ­leaders and candidates? Does it require direct party-member involvement? On the specifics, the prescriptions in the German Basic Law are not clear. By contrast, Germany’s 1967 Party Law provides more direction, mandating that party members be involved in the selection of key party personnel through delegated conventions. Article 9.4 of the 1967 German Party Law states the following: “The party convention shall elect the chairperson of the local organization, his/her

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deputies and other members of the Executive Committee, the members of any other bodies, and the delegates elected to the bodies of higher-level regional organizations, provided that the present Act does not permit any other procedure.” Consistent with Janda (2005), a recent study of party law in Europe conducted by van Biezen and Piccio (2013, 30) demonstrates that a sizeable majority of post-war European democracies either recognize political parties in their constitution (84 per cent) or have adopted party specific laws (63 per cent). Beyond mere recognition, their analysis further demonstrates that 5 per cent of European democracies have adopted party law dictating that party members play a role in candidate selection, and three times as many European democracies (14 per cent) mandate a role for members in the selection of party leaders. Primaries, however, require more than the involvement of party members. As discussed in the previous chapter, primaries are the most inclusive of all internal selection methods and require that members, voters, and/or supporters have a majority of the influence in the selection process. The threshold of inclusiveness being so high for primaries means that while party laws often call for parties to operate democratically, it is rare for the law to go so far as to mandate the use of primaries. There are, however, some notable exceptions – cases in which primaries are required by law. Political parties in Argentina have been subject to party law since 1985. Early iterations of the legislation required that parties adopt formal rules for internal governance and made it mandatory to use “democratic” procedures to fill leadership positions within the party. Despite not requiring the use of primaries, many parties voluntarily adopted them as a means of complying with the legislation. In 2009, the Argentine Congress passed legislation requiring all parties to hold open primaries for the selection of candidates for a range of political offices. Primary legislation can also be found in Finland. In 1969 the Finnish Parliament passed a new law requiring all parties to hold closed party primaries for the selection of legislative candidates (Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell 2000, 140; Sundberg 2002, 79). Perhaps the most common example of a country with primary legislation is the United States. Indeed, American political parties have a long history of being regulated by such legislation. Between

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1899 and 1915, the vast majority of state legislatures passed legislation mandating the use of a direct primary (Ware 2002, 15). In the American case, primary laws have taken a number of different forms ranging from mandatory to optional, required for some offices and not others, and so on (Lawrence, Donovan, and Bowler 2013). Although primaries have a long history in the United States, they have not always been popular. In fact, parties often resisted more inclusive selectorates. Lawrence and colleagues (2011) note that shortly after their introduction, there were a number of attempts to repeal the direct primary laws of many states. In 1919 alone there were bills in Maine, Vermont, New York, and North Carolina to abolish primary legislation. Likewise, Cross and Blais (2012, 158) note that between 1920 and 1935, eight states with presidential primary laws abolished the legislation. Despite this initial resistance, however, primary elections are now a staple of electoral politics in the United States.

C o n c l u s ion This chapter presented clear evidence that more and more parties in more and more democracies are adopting primaries for selecting leaders, candidates for executive positions, and legislative candidates. Crucially left out of this discussion are the consequences of this development. What are the implications of this trend and what does it mean for parties that are moving towards primary elections? Studying the experiences of parties in Canada and Israel, two countries with decades of experience with inclusive selection methods, the following chapters explore the implications of party primaries and how their variations influence the behaviour of participants, the democratic nature of these contests, and the consequences for intraparty politics.

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3 Party Primaries in Canada and Israel

The previous chapter documented the extent to which primaries have become an increasingly common method for selecting party leaders and legislative candidates in a variety of countries and parties around the world. We estimate that nearly one third of parties in established democracies use primaries to select their legislative candidates, and slightly more do so for the selection of party leaders. Based on the evidence provided in Table 2.1, we can also identify closed primaries as the most common type, at least regarding leadership selection. In this chapter, we narrow our scope to focus on the Israeli and Canadian experiences. Parties in both countries have considerable experience with using open and inclusive selection methods and many have had primary elections for decades. In addition, a number of the Canadian parties that we examine have used more than one sub-type of primary over the course of their history. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a discussion of the evolution of leadership and candidate selection methods in these countries, an overview of the primary methods currently used by the major political parties, and an analysis of the factors explaining the spread of primaries within each system. In doing so we set up the remainder of the book, which evaluates the use of primaries, examines a number of their implications (intended or otherwise), and offers potential solutions to challenges that seem to be inherent in party primaries. In addition to the fact that parties in these countries have a long experience with inclusive selectorates for both candidate and leadership selection, the institutional and political culture differences between them allow us to examine whether implications of primaries may transcend national particularities.

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Our basic assumption is institutional: the adoption of a specific institution (in this case primary elections) creates incentives for particular types of behaviour. While differences in political culture and institutional structures (such as the electoral system, federalism vs unitarism) matter, our argument is that there will always be some political entrepreneur – a candidate or an actor who takes advantage of the opportunity to influence power – who recognizes the opportunities offered by the specific institution. Once such an opportunity is recognized, and is believed to serve a particular competitive cause, other actors will follow. These practices become pathologies if they hurt democratic norms and/or the strength and integrity of political parties. In other words, rational behaviour at the level of the individual competitor – whose aim is simply to win – might lead to a collective catastrophe for the party and/or for democracy. Our case selection, based on the comparative method of most ­different systems design, facilitates this approach. Explanations for ­political malpractice and corruption typically refer to the political culture of the country. Canada is a country that is known for its (relative) integrity. Canada’s average rank for 2006–12, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, was 9.29 (range 6–14) among 163–183 countries in the world. Israel, by contrast, ranked 33.43 on average (range 30–39). While Israel’s score is much better than most countries in the world, its score among other OE C D countries is relatively low. Whereas Canada belongs to the top third, Israel belongs to the lowest one. For example, in 2012 Canada placed eighth among the thirty-four O E CD countries (ninth in the world), while Israel was twenty-fifth (thirtyninth in the world). Canada’s political culture is praised for its integrity, as evidenced by the frequent calls on its political class to assist with democratic design and operational issues in many emerging democracies. Illegalism – political behaviour that explicitly breaks the law – is a significant feature in Israeli political culture (Sprinzak 1986). Canada and Israel also substantially differ in terms of institutional arrangements. In Lijphart’s (2012) terms, they have the most different regime structures: Israel has a consensus-unitary system of government while Canada has a majoritarian-federal one. Israeli parties need to produce a list of candidates for a single nationwide electoral district. In other words, candidate selection occurs in the most centralized arrangement one can imagine. Most or all candidates are selected at the national level, with the aim of

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deciding who will appear on the party’s list of candidates and in which position. Candidate selection produces a closed list of candidates who are elected in a single nationwide district using a proportional representation (P R ) formula. In Canada, parties need to select candidates in single-member ­districts in a highly decentralized polity. Thus candidate selection is conducted at the district level, with the aim of deciding which candidate will run for the party in each single-member district. There is little coordination in this regard and the process is largely decentralized and atomized. There is some evidence, however, of an increasing role of the central party apparatus in the selection ­process (Cross 2006). Finally, while parties in both Israel and Canada engage in multiparty electoral competition, the patterns of competition and government formation differ substantially. To begin with, the number of parties gaining legislative representation is considerably higher in Israel. The average effective number of parliamentary parties for the period from 1949–2013 was 5.3. In Canada, the average for the same period was only 2.5. In Israel, coalition bargaining is a central component of the government-formation process. Never has a single party won a majority of seats in the Knesset and therefore been able to govern alone. After the 2009 election, for example, there were twelve party lists represented in the Knesset (some of them composed of more than one party), six of which were part of the coalition government. By contrast, majority governments have been the norm throughout Canadian electoral history. Of the fortythree Canadian general elections, twenty-nine (or 67 per cent) have resulted in single-party majority government. Despite a series of recent minority governments (2004, 2006, 2008), Canadian parties have resisted the pressure to engage in coalition bargaining, instead insisting on governing alone with a minority of seats in the House of Commons. After the 2015 election, five parties had representation in the House of Commons, three of which controlled 97 per cent of the seats. Although brief, the above discussion should make clear that the two countries differ significantly in terms of their political culture, electoral systems, electoral competition, party systems, and government formation. Despite these differences, the following chapters reveal a number of similarities. Given the differences in political ­culture, we might expect Canadian parties to escape some of the

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pathologies of primaries. However, as the next chapters make clear, Canadian primaries suffer from the same troubling manifestations that Israeli primary elections encounter. Before getting to that, however, we set the stage by examining the evolution of party primaries in the two countries. We present here a short history of the adoption and use of primaries for leadership and then candidate selection for those parties that are represented in Parliament.

T h e I s r a e l i Case Leadership Selection Leadership selection in the Israeli parties has gone through a linear process of intra-party democratization, at least when it comes to the large mainstream parties. That is, party selectorates have become more and more inclusive (Kenig 2009c). In the 1950s and 1960s, leaders informally “emerged” within the parties. Somewhat more inclusive selectorates (though still outside the primary zone), composed of delegates to the party central committee or to a party convention, were adopted in the 1970s and 1980s. In the early 1990s, the two main parties adopted primaries as a method for leadership selection. The Labour Party was first to adopt leadership primaries, followed by Likud, Meretz, Kadima, and the Jewish Home. In total, twenty-two leadership contests in the format of closed party primaries have been conducted in these five parties between 1992 and 2015 (Table 3.1). Most other parties (save for an occasional tiny fringe party) have resisted the adoption of leadership primaries. In the Labour Party (and its predecessor Mapai), the selectorate for leadership selection has gradually expanded. Until 1963 there were no formal rules regulating the process. David Ben-Gurion’s leadership was undisputed since the early 1930s (Medding 1972: 170). In the mid-1960s, the party constitution was amended to require that the party’s parliamentary group and the central committee would henceforth jointly select the party leader. In 1977, and again in 1980 – on the basis of ad-hoc decisions – leadership selection was put in the hands of the party’s convention, a body of 3,000 delegates. This marked a further widening of the selectorate, although it still remained within the realm of selection by party delegates (Kenig and Rahat 2014).

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Table 3.1  Leadership selection through primaries in Israel, 1992–2015 (contest years) Labour Party

Likud

Meretz

Kadima

Jewish Home

1992, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2013

1993, 1999(1), 1999(2), 2002, 2005, 2007, 2012, 2014

2004, 2008

2008, 2012

2012, 2015

N=22

Following Labour’s defeat in the 1988 elections, the internal discontent with Shimon Peres’s leadership grew. At the same time, various forces in the party called for internal democratization to revitalize its old and stagnant public image. The opening up of leadership selection (introducing party primaries) was seen as a means of bypassing the party machine and as an expression of democratization. The decision to expand the franchise to every party member was officially adopted in 1991. The new rules, which provided for a contest with a run-off in case no candidate won at least 40 per cent of the vote or more, were used in subsequent contests and were also imitated by Likud and Kadima. Less than a year later, the first-ever leadership primaries in the party and in Israel were held, resulting in the ousting of incumbent Shimon Peres by Yitzhak Rabin. Labour’s victory in the 1992 general elections – the first in two decades – facilitated the entrenchment of primaries. Between 1992 and 2013, Labour conducted eight leadership primaries, attracting an average of 3.4 candidates. Notably, in all cases where the incumbent leader decided to compete (five of the eight primaries), he or she lost the primary elections. Likud (until 1988 an alignment between parties, led by the leader of the Herut Party) also experienced a gradual process of opening its leadership selection. The period up to the mid 1980s may be termed the “natural leader” phase. Until the resignation of Menachem Begin in 1983, there was never a succesful challenge to his continued leadership. After Begin resigned from his positions as prime minister and leader of Likud, the leadership was contested in the party’s central committee. Two such contests took place in the framework of the Herut party (1983 and 1984) and one in the Likud central committee (1992). This was the process until 1993. Likud’s defeat in the 1992 general elections led to calls for party renewal, specifically demands to follow the democratization

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introduced in Labour a year earlier, and for the adoption of party primaries. In November 1992, the party decided to hold leadership selection within four months and to open the process to the entire membership. The rules were almost identical to those introduced by Labour. Since the first leadership contest in 1993 seven more have been conducted, and closed primaries have been entrenched as the method for selecting the party leader, attracting an average of 2.9 candidates. In Likud, however, whenever incumbents competed, they won. Meretz is an alliance of three Dovish parties (Ratz, Mapam, and Shinui) that became a single unified party in 1997. Delegates to a party convention selected the first leader of the united party. Several years later the party turned to primaries, and selected its next two leaders this way (2004, 2008). After loosing a large share of its electoral support, the party organization decided to re-adopt selection by the party convention and the next leader was selected using this method in 2012. This is a rare example of a party moving away from a primary system for leadership selection. Leadership selection rules in Kadima changed dramatically in a period of less than three years, mainly due to the circumstances of the party’s establishment and the events that occurred in the first months of its existence. Kadima was established in November 2005, when Prime Minister Sharon decided to leave Likud and establish a new party. As the architect and founding father of the new party, he was self-acclaimed as Kadima’s first leader. In January 2006, less than two months after Kadima’s establishment, Sharon suffered a serious stroke from which he never recovered. The urgency of appointing a prime minister – especially with general elections already set for March – led the fledgling party to turn, by default, to Ehud Olmert, Sharon’s deputy. Olmert’s appointment as the new leader was adopted ad-hoc by the party parliamentary group. Sharon and Olmert both assumed the party leadership in precarious circumstances. However, as the party became institutionalized it followed Labour and Likud, adopting a closed primary. In the subsequent two leadership contests (2008, 2012), the selectorate was comprised of the party members that numbered around 100,000. The Jewish Home is the new name of a veteran party, the National Religious Party. It adopted primaries as part of a renewal process prior to the 2013 elections. The background for the adoption of primaries was quite similar to that of Labour two decades earlier:

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the party lost electoral support, and forces within the national-­ religious elite sought to regain support through actions that included a change in the leadership selection process. The move was quite successful when a new, younger, more charismatic leader was chosen, and when under his leadership the party won twelve seats, its best result since 1977. The elected leader, Naftali Bennett, was re-selected in early 2015, easily defeating a single, rather anonymous challenger. To briefly summarize, all of the major parties in Israel and a few of the smaller ones have adopted closed primary elections for the selection of party leaders. Moreover, we can see that with the exception of Meretz, no Israeli party that has adopted leadership primaries has returned to a more exclusive method.1 Candidate Selection Small nomination committees were the typical selectorates for candidate selection in Israel during the 1950 and 1960s. More inclusive selectorates – composed of delegates – were adopted in the 1970s and 1980s, with a single instance of party primaries in the short-lived Democratic Movement for Change (D M C) in 1977. Together with party primaries for leadership selection, the largest parties also adopted primaries for candidate selection in the 1990s (Table 3.2). While Labour has continuously used primaries since 1992 to select its legislative candidates, Likud has used both primaries (1996, 2008, 2012, 2014) and selection by delegates (1999, 2002, 2006). Other parties have considered using primaries from time to time, but only three (Meretz 1996, Kadima 2008, and the Jewish Home 2012 and 2015) have actually experimented with them. The methods adopted were aimed to design a single candidate list to be submitted to the Central Election Committee forty-seven days before the elections. Because the electoral system is a closed list system, the ranking of candidates by the party determines their chances to get elected; the higher a candidate is on the list, the better their chances to occupy a seat in the Knesset. While the default rule was that candidates were ranked in terms of their primary vote totals, the parties adopted various mechanisms to ensure territorial and other types of representation (gender, minorities, new immigrants, etc.). Sometimes they even reserved positions for specific individuals. This enabled candidates from various defined groups to win

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Table 3.2  Candidate selection through primaries in Israel, 1977–2015 (selection years) DMC

Labour Party

Likud

Meretz

Kadima

Jewish Home

1977

1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2015

1996, 2008, 2012, 2014

1996

2008

2012, 2015

N=17

realistic positions on the candidate list (that is, those with a good chance of getting elected) with relatively little support. Initiatives for involving party members in candidate selection were raised as early as the 1950s (Brichta 1977), but it was only in 1977 that primaries were first used to select a Knesset candidate list. The Democratic Movement for Change (DM C ), a new party, asked its m ­ embers (about 35,000) to rank up to thirty candidates out of the 151 that competed for their votes. The party adopted primaries as a way to illustrate the type of change it aspired to promote in Israeli politics. The D MC had a respectable electoral showing, winning fifteen seats, but suffered from internal conflicts that resulted in its quick demise. In the party’s post-mortem, some pointed to the use of primaries as a contributing factor to its internal tensions (Urieli and Barzilay 1982). The result was that many took a skeptical view of party pri­ maries and there was no real contagion effect to the other parties in the system. In 1992, the Labour Party was the first major party to adopt primaries for candidate selection. Since that year, Labour party members have determined the composition and rank of the candidate list for all subsequent Knesset elections. The top positions are decided on the basis of the results from a nationwide competition (with the use of reserved seats for women and sometimes also for other social groups). Until 2012, in order to ensure diverse representation on the list, some lower positions were allotted to the winners in several territorial and sectarian districts to which the voters and candidates belonged (Hazan 1997; Rahat and Sher-Hadar 1999). In 2012, however, the party decided that all kinds of representation (territorial, sectarian) would be ensured using the same mechanism that was used to ensure minimal gender representation. That is, they were to be selected by all members of the national selectorate, and if none of the under- represented groups were selected to a position higher or equal to a specific pre-determined position, they would be moved up to this reserved position.

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Likud first used primaries for candidate selection before the 1996 general elections. Under a system that was quite similar to that of Labour, candidates competed for positions that were allotted to winners in a national competition and in ten territorial districts. This particular system was used only once. In 1997, Likud returned candidate selection to a more exclusive selectorate, its Central ­ Committee. This occurred because Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister and Likud chairman, felt that due to the primaries, the representatives of his party in Parliament and government were acting in an independent manner and undermining his ability to govern and lead (Rahat 2002). The same person, Netanyahu, in an effort to rehabilitate the image of his party at the eve of its 2006 electoral defeat, took the initiative to return to selection through primaries. Likud’s candidate lists for the next three elections were determined using closed primaries. In 1996, Meretz, an alliance of three parties (Ratz, Mapam, Shinui) that together composed the third largest faction in the Knesset at the time, also adopted primaries for selecting its joint candidate list. It allowed the members of the three parties and members of the association of Citizens Who Support Meretz to select its candidates after a first screening round of the candidates in each party (by delegates). Each party presented a team of candidates in proportion to its agreed pre-determined share that was based on the parties’ electoral achievements in 1988, the last elections in which they competed separately (5:3:2 respectively for every ten candidates on the list). The positions for each party were also predetermined according to the same formula, and the candidates for each party were presented in separate ballots. Each voter selected nine out of Ratz’s fifteen candidates, six out of ten in the case of Mapam, and three out of five in the case of Shinui. This system was abandoned in 1999 when the alliance became a united party, because the delicate internal balance of power between the different parties could be better assured through the engineering of a party conference rather than through a selectorate composed of disparate party members. The candidate list for the first elections in which Kadima competed was designed by its party leaders, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his successor, Ehud Olmert. Kadima saw itself as a large, aggregative ruling party and it seemed natural that it adopt primaries at the time that both Labour and Likud used them. Thus, prior to the 2009 elections, Kadima used a closed party primary to determine its

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candidate list. Unlike Labour and Likud it did not ensure territorial representation but, like them, it used corrective mechanisms to ensure the representation of women, minorities, and new immigrants. In 2012 Kadima withdrew from using primaries and gave a three-man nomination committee the role of designing its candidate list. This move from a highly inclusive to a highly exclusive selectorate was made due to Kadima’s crash in the opinion polls: the party knew that it was going to lose most of its support (indeed it lost twenty-six of its twenty-eight seats and hardly passed the 2 per cent legal threshold) and did not want to have a divisive contest that would make things even worse for the few realistic positions that were left. Prior to the 2013 elections, the Jewish Home, the successor of the veteran National Religious Party, decided to adopt party primaries as part of an attempt to revitalize the party and its image. A week after it selected its new leader, party members selected candidates for the legislative elections. Each member ranked five candidates. The position of the candidates was decided using a sophisticated point system: each candidate earned four points for a first rank, two for a second rank, and one point for a third, fourth, or fifth rank. The party reserved positions for women and young candidates. In 2015, the party again used primaries, selecting their leader and legislative candidate at the same time. In 2015, a significant yet limited retreat from inclusiveness occurred. The three parties using primaries to select their legislative candidates (Labour, Likud, and the Jewish Home) allowed their leaders to nominate one or two candidates each to what were perceived to be realistic positions on the candidate list. This change was aimed at correcting representational imbalances and ensuring the nomination of candidates who were perceived to be electoral assets. Who Can Participate in Israeli Primaries? With the partial exception of Meretz in 1996, party membership has always been a prerequisite for participation in primary elections in Israel. Similar to requirements in most democracies, voting in Israeli general elections is restricted to citizens who are eighteen years of age or older. However, according to the Party Law, individuals can become party members at the age of seventeen.

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Those who register as members before a specific date determined by the party may participate in the forthcoming party primary. These “waiting periods” are typically a few months before the selection takes place. For example, according to the constitution of the Labour Party, the right to participate in intra-party selection is earned six months after becoming a party member. Yet the party has not always strictly enforced this rule and, at times, has bypassed it – passing a temporary provision that allows newcomers to vote – in reaction to pressures from interested candidates. In practice, waiting periods in the Labour Party have changed from one contest to the next, ranging from one and a half to ten months (Kenig and Rahat 2014). The fact that the selectorate is not defined at the outset of the primary campaign has turned membership recruitment into a crucial part of the selection contest. In a number of instances, extensive recruitment campaigns that aim to enroll supporters as party members before the deadline expires have determined the dynamics of the contest, creating a clear front-runner and persuading other candidates to withdraw. In recent years – reacting to some of the pathologies of party primaries that we consider in later chapters – some parties have begun to demand membership tenure of more than a year as a condition for participation. Likud amended its constitution in 2005 and extended the waiting period to sixteen months. Kadima adopted a rule that implemented a thirteen-month waiting period. However, this rule was not always enforced. This was especially the case when a candidate or candidates had an interest in the participation of newcomers and persuaded the party to adopt a temporary order allowing them to take part in the selection.

T h e C a n a d i an Cas e Leadership Selection For nearly a century, Canadian parties have offered their members a meaningful role in the selection of party leaders. In fact, Canadian parties were first among their Westminster counterparts to expand their leadership selectorates beyond those serving in Parliament and to include party members. Since the Liberals selected Mackenzie King at a party conference in 1919, all party leaders have been chosen through a process including the party’s grassroots members

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(Courtney 1995). Selection at delegated conferences was the norm until the 1990s when various parties, first at the provincial level and then nationally, began selecting their leaders through the direct votes of members (Cross 1996). Today all of the federal parties select their leaders through primaries. What’s more, parties in each of the Canadian provinces have experimented with the use of primaries for the selection of party leaders as well. Until recently, the one exception was the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, in which all party leaders were selected through delegated conventions. In 2013, however, the Liberals in that province opted for a closed primary, making it the last province to reach the milestone of having at least one party using a primary system. Table 3.3 highlights the extensive use of party primaries for leadership selection in Canada and documents the years in which these contests occurred. Prior to 1919, the Liberal Party followed the British tradition and provided the parliamentary party with the authority to select party leaders. The party’s first six leaders after Confederation were chosen in this fashion. The first significant change occurred when the Liberals selected Mackenzie King at a convention of local delegates and party elites in 1919 (the Conservatives followed suit in 1927). The delegated conventions that these parties pioneered became the norm for nearly a century, and the next significant opening up of the selection process did not occur until the 1990s. While the Liberals were the first national party to officially endorse a membership ballot to select their party leader at a conference in 1990, the party overturned this decision in 1992 before ever implementing it (Cross and Blais 2012b, 140). Instead of a closed primary election, the party offered a compromise to its members: each member would be afforded a vote, but these votes would be mediated through convention delegates. Members would vote for their preferred leadership candidates and convention delegates would be chosen based on these results. Delegates at the convention were bound to the grassroots preferences on the first ballot but had no such obligation in subsequent ballots. While this compromise did not grant party members the authority of a full primary, members did have significant influence in the primary stage – the delegate selection component of the process. What’s more, since delegates were bound to the members’ vote on the first round, this primary stage could, in fact, be definitive. As

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Table 3.3  Leadership selection through primaries in Canada (contest years) Liberal

Conservative**

NDP

BQ/PQ

Federal

2003,* 2006,* 2013

1998, 2000, 2002, 2004

2003, 2012

1985, 1997, 2005, 2011, 2014

Alberta

1994, 1998, 2004, 2008, 2011

1992, 2006, 2011, 2014

2014

2009

British Columbia

1993, 2011

2011, 2014

1993, 1994, 1995

Manitoba

1993, 1996, 1998, 2013

2006

New Brunswick

2002,* 2012

1997, 2008

Jurisdiction

Newfoundland and Labrador

2013

Nova Scotia

1992, 1997, 2002, 2004

1995

2002

Ontario

1992, 1996,* 2013*

1990, 2002, 2004, 2009

2009

1996, 2003

1990, 1996, 2010

Prince Edward Island Quebec Saskatchewan

Other Party

1985, 2005 1994

2001, 2009, 2013

1998

* Mixed selection method that included a primary component in which members voted followed by a delegated convention. ** Federal Conservative years include the Conservative Party of Canada and both of its predecessors (Canadian Alliance and Progressive Conservative). N = 68 Note: As of 2014. Does not include cases of acclamation.

discussed in Chapter 1, this was the case in 2003 when Paul Martin was selected as Liberal leader (and essentially prime minister) by the grassroots membership. The party used this method of leadership selection again in 2006, although this time, in the absence of a majority of votes for one of the winners, delegates were “released” after the first ballot was held and determined the outcome of the contest. After a number of disappointing electoral outcomes, particularly the 2011 federal election in which the party plummeted to a distant third place, the party sought to expand the leadership selectorate once again. This time, the Liberals opted for a semi-open primary

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process in which both supporters and members would be able to participate. While a number of provincial parties had already moved towards making their selection practices more inclusive (the Alberta PC s, for example, allowed memberships to be bought at the polling station and on the day of voting/in-between rounds; Stewart 1997), the Liberals were the first federal party to invite non-party members to vote in the selection process. In 2013, the party used this semiopen primary method to select Justin Trudeau as leader. Although the Liberals were the first federal party to endorse the use of primary elections, the Bloc Québécois was the first to use the primary process at the federal level. In 1997, more than 50,000 members participated in the contest that selected Gilles Duceppe as leader of their party. The other federal parties quickly imitated what was perceived as the Bloc’s successful leadership election. One year later, the Progressive Conservatives followed suit and selected Joe Clark as leader through a ballot of its membership. Although each member of the party was afforded a vote, the electoral formula weighted the votes to ensure that each electoral constituency across the country, regardless of the size of its membership or rate of participation, had an equal influence (Carty and Blake 1999). While the Reform Party officially adopted a party primary process in 1990, it did not have the opportunity to exercise this selection method prior to disbanding in 2000. After the dissolution of the party and the creation of the Canadian Alliance, the Alliance selected both of its leaders through a closed primary. This includes the election of Stockwell Day in 2000 and Stephen Harper in 2002. The Progressive Conservatives are the only federal party to have chosen a leader by a membership vote (closed primary) and subsequently revert to selection by a delegated convention. After choosing Joe Clark through a rank-and-file plebiscite in 1998, the party held a delegated convention to choose his successor in 2003. However, when the party merged later that year with the Canadian Alliance to form the Conservative Party, the new party used a closed primary to select Stephen Harper as leader. There has been no serious discussion of returning to a delegated convention since. Established in the 1960s, the New Democratic Party (N D P ) followed its federal competitors at the time and adopted a delegated convention to select its first leader in 1961. The party continued to use conventions to choose its next six party leaders. By 2003, however, pressure for a more inclusive selectorate was mounting. First, the other major federal parties were each using selection procedures

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that provided members with a meaningful role in the process. Second, a number of provincial New Democratic parties (Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan in particular) had already adopted the use of party primaries with considerable success (both parties achieved nearly 80 per cent turnout and substantial membership growth). Finally, the party had already experimented with membership participation in its 1995 leadership contest, in which the party held a series of regional and trade-union membership votes prior to the delegated convention in order to narrow the slate of candidates. While these regional votes were only a small component of a larger multi-stage process, this primary stage provided members with more authority and more opportunity to participate than before. These pressures ultimately led to a decision to amend the leadership selection process. Given the longstanding relationship between the N D P and labour unions, when the party sought to implement a more inclusive process for its 2003 election it created an electoral college, with labour unions receiving 25 per cent of the vote and party members the remaining 75 per cent. After considerable debate, the party adopted a closed primary and removed the privileged position of labour unions for the 2012 leadership race that selected Thomas Mulcair. While the use of primaries is now the norm in Canada, the major parties have taken a wide range of approaches in their implementation. Within the last decade alone, Canadian parties have utilized a number of different types and sub-types of primaries for the selection of party leaders. This includes mixed, closed, multi-stage, and semi-open primaries. Both the Liberals (2003, 2006) and the N D P (1995), for instance, have experimented with multi-stage processes that combine clear primary components with other less inclusive stages. The New ­ Democratic Party (2003) has also used a weighted primary that provided unions a substantial proportion of the vote and, more recently, the Liberals (2013) adopted a semi-open primary that allowed both members and supporters to participate. The Bloc has always used a simple closed primary that affords party members exclusive authority over the selection of party leaders. For their part, the Conservatives have often altered their closed primaries in an attempt to preserve a form of equitable regional representation in the decision-making process. This wealth of experience does not even take into account the considerable variation that can be found within the provinces. One of the implications of a lack of legal regulation of these

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contests is a near constant tinkering with the rules and processes, sometimes for partisan reasons. This “pathology” of party primaries is discussed in Chapter 4. As suggested in Chapter 2, the spread of primary elections at the federal level was, in large part, a response to the innovation of political parties in the provinces. Multi-level governance allows individual jurisdictions to experiment with new ideas, while others are able to wait and learn from earlier developments. As Courtney (2010, 132) explains, “federalism lends itself to a measure of ‘test-tube’ experiment conducted by its component parts.” Since the provinces are inherently more numerous, smaller, and less complex than the federal jurisdiction, they have the ability to introduce quick and meaningful change much faster than their federal counterparts. Canadian provincial governments, and not the federal government, for instance, were the first to grant women the right to vote, introduce election financing legislation, and to explore alternatives to the single member plurality (S M P ) electoral system. In terms of intra-party democracy, this was also the case with more inclusive leadership selectorates.2 Given their ability to innovate quickly, parties in the provinces were the first to provide members with an unmediated role in the selection of party leaders. The Parti Québécois, a provincial party, was the first major Canadian party to select its leader through the use of a closed primary. While the Parti Québécois may have been the first party to use a primary, it is perhaps with the Alberta Conservatives that the tradition is most closely associated. Since 1992 the party has used the primary process to select four leaders. Since then, political parties at the provincial level have pioneered the transition to party primaries, while federal parties have been much more cautious and slow to adopt the change. Although the first primary election of a major party leader took place in 1985 at the provincial level, it did not happen at the federal level until twelve years later, in 1997. Indeed, many provincial Liberal, Conservative, and New Democratic parties made the transition to primaries as long as a decade before their federal counterparts did. Candidate Selection Candidate selection in Canada occurs at the district level in each of the country’s 338 constituencies. In each of these “ridings,” party

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associations gather their members to vote for their preferred local candidate. From a comparative perspective, candidate nomination in Canada has been described as being “highly decentralized” and “very inclusive” (Hazan and Rahat 2010, 136). The norm for many decades has been selection at local party meetings at which all members are welcome to attend and vote (for an early, detailed description of local candidate selection, see Scarrow 1964). Even at a time when Canadian parties were weakly institutionalized, local party activists were charged with the nomination of candidates. Over a century ago, Siegfried (1907, 119) noted that “five or six weeks before voting-day the candidates are nominated by a local convention held in each constituency.” The inclusive nature of candidate selection was by design: in order to ensure that the candidate was truly representative of local interests, the process required widespread participation from community members. After conducting a survey of nomination processes across the country for the 1988 election, Carty and Erickson (1991) empirically confirmed the open and democratic nature of candidate selection in Canada. The authors concluded that a local nomination meeting open to all registered party members was the universally accepted method for selecting candidates. More than 98 per cent of federal ridings in the country held local nomination meetings for the purpose of allowing party members to participate (Carty and Erickson 1991). In terms of decentralization, the nature of the single-member plurality (SMP ) electoral system necessitates that candidate nomination occurs in each of the country’s ridings. This means that involvement in the candidate selection process is a very accessible opportunity for Canadians to participate in democratic life. Although candidate nomination is part of a broader national event – the general election – the local party association offers a focal point for direct participation. However, as Cross (2004; 2006) and Pruysers and Cross (2016) note, there has been increasing involvement of the central party in the selection of candidates. As such, local authority and control over candidate selection is not always absolute and the ability to participate is not always guaranteed as the central party leadership, particularly in the Liberals and Conservatives, has on occasion intruded on local autonomy by unilaterally appointing candidates. The norm of allowing local party associations wide latitude in candidate selection is part of a larger organizational arrangement

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between the central and local party, sometimes referred to as a “franchise” (Carty 2002) or “stratarchical bargain” (Carty and Cross 2006). While the local parties are given the ability to select candidates, the central party has the freedom to create and implement policy, manage the broader party brand, and to discipline candidates once elected. A number of changes in recent decades, however, have challenged this organizational bargain as the central party has become more involved in the process. The result is that while the parties’ rules call for closed primaries for the selection of their candidates, in a number of cases these are circumvented with the centre exercising its reserve authority to appoint candidates when it deems it in the best interest of the party. We briefly review the context below. The Canada Elections Act was amended in 1970 to include party labels in addition to candidate names on the ballot. To ensure that there was only one individual claiming to be a particular party’s candidate, party leaders were required to endorse local candidates and certify their candidacy. This provision, which required party leaders to sign the nomination papers of all local candidates, effectively gave them the right to veto individual candidates. If they disagreed with would-be-candidates or preferred someone else, they could simply refuse to sign the nomination papers. Shortly after being implemented, party leaders began using their veto powers. In 1974, for instance, Progressive Conservative Party leader Robert Stanfield used his veto power in order to block a New Brunswick candidate due to his regressive views on bilingualism (Koene 1998). In 1992 the Liberal Party went further, amending its own constitution to give party leaders even more influence over the selection of local candidates. During the 1984 and 1988 elections, supporters of Liberals for Life (a single-issue group focused on abortion) had taken over a number of local Liberal Party associations, often forcing out longtime party activists and members in the takeover process. In response to local associations being seized by single-issue groups seeking to nominate the candidate of their choice, the party amended its constitution. The amendments gave the party leader the power to appoint – not only block – local candidates. Other parties followed suit, and the practice of central party involvement in local candidate selection quickly increased. In 2006, for instance, Liberal Party leader Paul Martin ensured the re-­nomination of 121 incumbent candidates. In a similar fashion,

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Party Primaries in Canada and Israel 75

Conservative Party leader Stephen Harper unilaterally re-­nominated eighty-nine of the ninety-nine Conservatives who were elected in 2004 (Cross 2006, 177). While the unprecedented level of central party involvement in the selection of local candidates for the 2006 election is not the norm, it is significant nonetheless. The result of the central party’s increasing involvement in candidate selection is that influence by grassroots members can often be limited, especially in those ridings where the party is electorally competitive (has an incumbent) or where interest groups have mobilized supporters. Who Can Participate in Canadian Primaries? With the exception of the Liberal leadership contest in 2013, membership has always been a prerequisite for participation in party personnel selection in Canada. Nonetheless, as the examples below illustrate, the main parties have typically taken very expansive views towards party membership for participation in primaries. While the vast majority of contests have limited participation to party members, and in that sense may not appear as inclusive as their US counterparts, in many ways these closed primaries are more open than those held elsewhere. The requisite of membership is not a significant hurdle to participation, as would-be voters are typically able to meet eligibility requirements by joining the party during the primary election campaign. In some cases, membership can be obtained at the same time as voting – essentially meaning that participation is open to everyone willing to pay a modest membership fee (typically around $10–$20). And unlike parties in most other countries, party membership (and thus participation in internal primaries) is not restricted to those who are eligible to vote in general elections. Voting in Canadian general elections is restricted to citizens who are eighteen years of age or older. Party primaries, however, are not bound by these rules and parties have regularly chosen not to be so restrictive. The minimum age for participation is typically about fourteen years and parties regularly do not limit the vote to citizens though most, but not all, require residency in the country. The result is that these elections often include many participants ineligible to vote in general elections (Cross 2002).

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The selectorate, then, is not defined at the outset of the primary campaign. Rather, once the campaign begins the first task (and perhaps most consequential in terms of determining the outcome) for candidates is to identify and recruit potential supporters to the party. In this way, candidates attempt to construct a primary electorate favourable to their candidacy. As discussed in the chapters that follow, a result of these expansive, fluid, and ill-defined selectorates is often highly questionable voter-recruitment tactics employed by candidates and their supporters.

T h e S p r e a d o f Primaries i n C a n a da a n d Is rael The widespread and extensive use of primary elections in Canada and Israel allow us to further examine a number of hypotheses that have been posited in the leadership selection literature. In particular, these hypotheses relate to when and why individual parties adopt more inclusive selectorates. We find considerable evidence to support the Cross (1996), De Luca, Jones, and Tula (2002), and Cross and Blais (2012a) hypothesis that parties will be more inclined to expand their selectorate while in opposition rather than when they are in government. Due to fragmented and potentially weak leadership and the need to revitalize, parties are expected to make significant institutional changes, such as altering the process of leadership selection, while out of government. In addition, it makes sense to expect parties to democratize when they are in opposition, as they can hardly influence things in other realms and demonstrate their response to seemingly popular trends as can a governing party. Of the six Canadian federal parties that have used full primaries to select their leader, all first did so while in opposition. The evidence from the provincial level is similar. In Israel, three of the five adoptions of primaries for leadership selection occurred when parties were in opposition (Labour 1991; Likud 1993; Meretz 2004), one when a party was part of the ruling coalition but suffered a severe electoral setback (Jewish Home 2012) and one when a party was the ruling party in the coalition (Kadima 2006). As for candidate selection, three of the six adoptions of primaries occurred when parties were in opposition (Labour 1991; Likud 1993 and 2006), one when a party was part of the ruling

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coalition but recently suffered a severe electoral setback (Jewish Home 2012), one when a party was the ruling party in the coalition (Kadima 2006), and one when a party was in coalition (Meretz 1996). Thus the evidence from Israel lends some support for the first hypothesis, though there are some cases that do not fit the expected pattern. Although the emergence of new parties is quite rare, we do find support for the hypothesis that new parties will be more willing to adopt inclusive selectorates. The Saskatchewan Party, the British Columbia Reform Party, and the Alberta Wildrose Party at the Canadian provincial level all support this claim. Each of these parties adopted party primaries for the process of leadership selection soon after their creation. Likewise at the federal level, both the Canadian Alliance and the Conservative Party selected their very first leaders through a plebiscite of members. Although not immediate, the Bloc Québécois and the Reform Party also adopted a primary formula shortly after their respective founding. Similar to the Israeli Democratic Movement for Change (DM C ), these were cases of emerging parties wanting to illustrate that they were inclusive and more democratic than the old-line parties in the system. However, Israeli experience does not generally support the expectation that new parties will tend to adopt primaries. While the most electorally successful new party in Israel until the 2000s, the D MC , adopted primaries, its experience seemingly made other new parties reluctant in their approach to primaries. Most new parties have used relatively exclusive selectorates prior to their first electoral contest, and most have stuck with them (if they survived) except for Kadima. They seem to fear that opening up will expose them to external forces that might try to take advantage of their not having a solid membership base and take them over. A third hypothesis suggests the possibility of a “contagion” effect. When a party innovates and finds success or electoral support as a result, other parties are likely to adopt similar changes. Since primaries represent a party’s willingness to be more transparent and democratic, rival parties are expected to respond by holding their own primaries in an attempt to capitalize on the electorate’s good will or, at very least, to neutralize the potential advantage for the earlier adopter (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). We find evidence to support this hypothesis as well. Of the eleven jurisdictions that make use of party primaries in Canada (national and ten

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sub-national) as of 2014, nine of the eleven jurisdictions have multiple parties that select their party leader through a primary. In only two jurisdictions (Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador) is there only one major party that selects its leader through a plebiscite of party members.3 This suggests evidence of contagion: where some parties have adopted wider selectorates, other parties tend to follow. As discussed above, however, if the initial use of a primary is deemed a failure (and particularly if used by a small party) the contagion effect may be a negative one. This can delay the widespread adoption of primaries, as is evident in Australia and New Zealand where small parties that subsequently suffered great electoral losses (the Australian Democrats and New Zealand A C T ) were the first to adopt primaries. Contagion seems to be part of the explanation for most of the cases of the adoption of primaries in Israel. No other parties imitated the DM C , the first party to adopt primaries in 1977, due to its speedy collapse. Yet Labour’s adoption of primaries prior to 1992 elections, and its victory, led many parties to consider the adoption of primaries and two parties (Likud and Meretz) subsequently engaged in organization reform and adopted primaries. Both Likud and Meretz abandoned primaries for selecting their candidates after the 1996 election results refuted the association between primaries and electoral success (Rahat 2002). As noted, Kadima also appeared to imitate Labour and Likud when it adopted primaries. As for Jewish Home, primaries seemed to symbolize its attempt to become a party that reached beyond the national-religious electorate. Yet most of the smaller parties in Israel do not use primaries. Some do not use it because they are not expected to do so by their electorates (ultra-orthodox parties, Arab parties). In other cases, parties avoid this alternative because they do not want to cope with the challenges inherent in this selection method (see subsequent chapters), especially when they lack a solid base of members and activists. The final hypothesis worth examining suggests that change in leadership selectorates is unidirectional. That is, change occurs towards more inclusive and broader selectorates. In general, parties are not expected to change in favour of more restrictive procedures. Overall, the vast majority of changes in leadership selection methods confirm this hypothesis, as most move towards a more inclusive

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selectorate. The only party at the federal level in Canada that opted to change back to a more restrictive selectorate was the Progressive Conservatives in 2003, but the party returned to a primary method the following year. The same, however, is not true at the provincial level in Canada. While the vast majority of movement has been towards more inclusiveness, there have been a few cases in which parties have reverted to delegated conventions after experimenting with primary elections. The Nova Scotia Liberals, for example, moved back to delegated conventions after conducting four membership contests. Likewise, the Nova Scotia Progressive Conservative Party and the British Columbia Reform Party moved back to delegated conventions after conducting one direct membership election each. In their comprehensive examination of provincial leadership conventions, Stewart and Stewart (2008) offer two reasons why the Nova Scotia parties in particular moved away from the closed primary selection process. First, there was a perception that the membership ballot produced leaders who were responsible for a number of electoral defeats (Stewart and Stewart 2008, 196) and second, the parties ultimately found “the potential publicity of a traditional convention irresistible” (197). That said, 90 per cent of Canadian parties that have adopted party primaries have continued to use them while only 10 per cent have returned to less inclusive selectorates. In Israel, once the large parties (Labour, Likud, Kadima) adopted primaries for selecting their leader, they did not reverse. At the same time, only Labour continued using primaries for selecting its candidates for the legislature. Meretz, a small party, stopped using primaries for selecting its candidates after one attempt and its leader after two. It would thus seem that the size of the party is important here. That is, it seems that the convention is that a candidate for prime minister should be selected through primaries while leaders of small parties need not follow this norm. Our data from dozens of federal and provincial leadership primaries in Canada confirms the following: (1) parties rarely move towards a more restrictive leadership selectorate; (2) the vast majority of first-time uses of party primaries happen while a party is in opposition; (3) where one party adopts a primary others are likely to do so as well, and; (4) new parties tend to adopt inclusive processes immediately or shortly after their creation. The Israeli experience is solely at the national level but also includes cases of candidate

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selection. Generally it seems to verify the first three claims, although it seems that they are limited to the cases of the large parties. As for new parties, their tendency to be more open is not confirmed. A study of Israeli parties prior to 2013 elections (Shapira and Rahat 2015) finds that the new parties tend to be among the least democratic, overshadowed only by the ultra-orthodox parties.

C o n c l u s ion Parties in both Israel and Canada have used personnel selection contests with broad selectorates for several decades for both leadership and candidate selection. Indeed, the different political cultures and institutional orders have supported similar but distinct histories relating to the development of party primaries in these two countries. Yet even this brief examination of the hypotheses concerning the causes for adopting primaries clearly demonstrates the many similarities that can be found between these cases and the value that can result from such a comparison. The remaining chapters in this volume assess the implications of the adoption of party primaries in Canada and Israel.

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4 Rule-Making and the Administration of Party Primaries

While primaries allow for, and even encourage, greater rank-and-file and voter participation in party decision-making, they also tend to have a number of other, potentially troubling, manifestations. This includes questionable membership-recruitment practices, the implementation of unfair administrative rules, and a variety of other potentially corrupt behaviours. It should be stressed that some of the pathologies are not specific to primaries for leadership and candidate selection. They may appear in other contests (for intra-party positions, for example) and also with other kinds of selectorates. The problem is that – at least in comparison to more exclusive selectorates and less important positions – the stakes are higher and expectations for democratic legitimacy are rightfully greater when primaries are conducted. Thus if the process has troubling manifestations, there is more reason for concern. This chapter outlines a number of challenges associated with rulemaking and the administration of primaries. It starts with consideration of the claim that, although primaries resemble general elections in many ways, the latter are extensively regulated and monitored by the state while the former remain, for the most part, unregulated and unmonitored. This opens the door for manipulation regarding the rules by which primaries are conducted, as reflected by their frequent and seemingly arbitrary changes. These include manipulation of rules concerning the translation of votes into outcomes; the timing of selection; candidate and voter eligibility; reserved positions; and the location and number of polling booths. Beyond that, the monitoring of the process and the enforcement of

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rules may suffer from a lack of both resources and motivation on the part of the parties.

T h e C h a l l e n g e : C a n a Party Replace t h e  S tat e  i n O r g a n i z ing Elections? In many ways primaries resemble general elections: both are participatory and inclusive events that enable citizens to take a direct and active role in electoral politics. In fact, it is safe to say that primaries more closely resemble general elections than they do other less inclusive personnel selection methods such as party conventions or selection by the parliamentary party group. Yet there are a number of differences between primary and general elections (Rahat 2013), the most crucial of which, for our purpose here, are found in the extent of state regulation and the stability of the general election rules. Democracies have developed extensive state-sponsored rules and regulatory mechanisms to ensure that general elections operate in a fair, transparent, and democratic manner. Moreover, the regulations for general elections tend to be specifically outlined and legislated by the state (see, for example, the Canada Elections Act, Knesset Elections Law, and Party Finance Law). This includes rules surrounding the eligibility of voters and candidates, the electoral system (how votes are translated into seats or winners), the financing of elections, what constitutes electoral fraud, the consequences for violations, and so on. State involvement, however, does not end with passing legislation or monitoring its implementation. States also take an active role in administering elections by managing and overseeing polling stations, educating voters, training officers, and overseeing the counting of votes. It has been estimated that two-thirds of democracies have independent Election Management Bodies (E M B s) that are tasked with organizing and managing elections (Carter and Farrell 2010, 42). Elections Canada, for instance, is an independent non-partisan agency funded by the Canadian government that has more than 300  full-time employees and an annual operating budget greater than $100 million, with the sole purpose of ensuring free and fair elections (Treasury Board of Canada 2008). In Israel, the Central Elections Committee is a multi-partisan body that is composed of representatives of the political parties, nominated in proportion to the size of each party’s representation in the Knesset. A Supreme

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Court judge leads the committee, and members of the judiciary also head regional multiparty election committees that are established for each election. The composition of the Canadian and Israeli committees, however, is different, and based on different philosophies. In the Canadian case the perception is that non-partisanship ensures fair administration of elections, while in the Israeli case the idea is that “the cats guard the milk” from each other under the supervision of a responsible supervisor (a judge). Notwithstanding these differences, in both cases general elections are highly monitored and regulated events. Thousands of employees and volunteers are recruited to ensure the proper administration of election day and to make sure that any manipulation is the exception rather than the rule. The same state involvement, however, does not exist for intraparty elections such as primaries. Political parties in Europe, Canada, and Israel have been traditionally viewed as private or voluntary associations (van Biezen 2004; Whiteley 2014). This understanding of political parties has resulted in a long history of parties operating at arm’s length from the state and, as a result, their internal operations have fallen outside the scope of state regulation. This means that the rules governing even one of the most crucial of party tasks – the selection of leaders and candidates – traditionally have not been found in state law but instead are outlined in party statutes and constitutions. As private associations, parties have been, and for the most part continue to be, self-governing when it comes to their internal activities (van Biezen and Piccolo 2013). Recently, conceptions of political parties have begun to move away from political parties as private associations towards parties as public utilities (Epstein 1986; van Biezen 2004). This new understanding of political parties has coincided with increased state involvement in their activities generally. The rise in state regulation, however, has primarily been in the external activities of parties. Indeed, regulation of parties’ general election activities is now routine in many democracies, although there is great variance. In particular, states have been interested in how parties raise and spend money (CasasZamora 2005; Koss 2010). As parties around the world become increasingly reliant on the state for their funding, their position as purely private organizations has been called into question (Katz and Mair 1995). According to the International ID E A Political Funding Database, as of 2010 more than half of democracies worldwide

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provided direct funding for political parties (Scarrow 2013, 163). The extent of state funding, according to van Biezen (2004, 702), has “paved the way for the legitimation of direct state involvement in their internal affairs.” Party finance legislation is now a common feature in most democracies. States have been far more reluctant to regulate the internal activities of political parties. Leadership and candidate selection in particular remain, for the most part, unregulated and unmonitored. Even in Germany and New Zealand, where party laws dictate that parties organize in a democratic fashion, the administration and monitoring of these contests remains in the hands of the parties themselves. The United States is a striking exception. There, the state has taken over the primary selection process, monitoring, ­regulating, and funding these elections on behalf of the parties. Notwithstanding this exception, however, the internal activities of political parties generally continue to be viewed as largely outside of the purview of state regulation. In most countries, parties create their own rules for the selection of leaders and candidates (in a few cases, as noted, with some guidance of a party law) and typically monitor these elections without direct support from the state. This creates challenges because parties lack the capacities and resources available to the state. In addition, while democracies successfully developed independent agencies to ensure electoral integrity, parties often lack the capacity to do so, as well as the motivation to expose any wrongdoing, as unlike state regulators, they are competitive participants in the electoral process itself. A second significant difference between primaries and general elections has to do with the stability of the rules that govern them. The rules regarding general elections tend to be conservative insofar that they change infrequently. Indeed, electoral systems have been described as “one of the most stable democratic institutions” (Norris 1997, 297). In the vast majority of countries, rules governing elections have not meaningfully changed since their emergence (Norris 1995, 3). While changes do occur, they tend to be at the margins. Adding new seats for the legislature, for example, is often required to keep up with population growth and distribution (Courtney 2004). Although this change may be important and impactful, it does not alter the basic rules governing the election, nor does it change how the system translates votes into seats. When change does

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occur, the new rules stabilize quickly and are unlikely to fluctuate between elections. For example, two of the most important changes to the franchise, the inclusion of women and lowering of the voting age to eighteen, were quickly institutionalized after their initial adoption and not subject to change from one election to the next. It is also important to note that changes to the electoral system tend to be long- drawn-out affairs with widespread debate and public consultation. New Zealand (1992) and the United Kingdom (2011), for example, used statewide referendums as a means of determining whether the electoral formula should be altered. In Canada, the British Columbia Citizen’s Assembly on Electoral Reform, an independent non-partisan body, spent one year deliberating electoral reform in 2004.1 Ultimately the assembly proposed the single transferable vote system (ST V ) and this proposal was put to two provincewide referendums. As the ST V proposal did not meet the 60 per cent threshold for approval and implementation, the experience in British Columbia demonstrates how difficult it can be to make substantial changes to the foundational rules of the electoral system. In contrast to general elections, the rules governing candidate and leadership selection change regularly and, given the self-­ governing nature of political parties, these changes are typically made with relative ease. There is no need for parties to engage in widespread public consultation or referendums as these are viewed as internal party matters. In their study of more than 200 leadership elections in five countries, Cross and Blais (2012a, 84) find that leadership selections with expanded electorates change their rules more frequently than do those with less inclusive selection methods. Primaries in particular are subject to frequent modification from one election to the next. Only 3 per cent of parties that used the P P G as the selectorate changed their rules in any given year, compared to 14 per cent of parties that had delegates as the selectorate and 21 per cent of parties that provided rank-and-file members with the vote. The self-governing nature of parties allows rules to be changed whenever the party decides; in addition, primary elections suffer from constant “tinkering,” because they are more complex and involve many more regulations than less inclusive selection methods. Selection by a small elite is relatively straightforward and does not require an extensive set of rules and regulations. On the question of the selectorate, primaries involve many more decisions. For

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example, will all voters be eligible to participate or will the election be limited to party supporters? If participation is limited to the party’s supporters, will there be a distinction between dues-paying members and other party supporters? And, if participation is limited to members, will there be a waiting period for activating membership rights? If so, how long prior to the election will members need to sign up if they wish to participate? To complicate things further, will the primary combine general-election voters, supporters, or members with other groups such as the P P G or party delegates? If so, how much authority will each group be granted in the outcome? Primaries are more complicated than other selection methods in a number of other ways as well, and this complexity necessitates a more comprehensive set of rules. Primaries, by their nature, require a longer campaign period for candidates to travel and meet with thousands of party members rather than a limited number of delegates or even just a few members of a nomination committee. While selection in the party room may happen in the course of an afternoon (Cross and Blais 2012a), a primary election requires candidates to campaign as they would in the general election. The “trench warfare” (Carty 1988) that accompanies an expanded selectorate – that is, the politics of recruiting and mobilizing thousands of atomized party members and supporters – necessarily requires a full-length campaign period. As a result, rules need to be in place dictating the length of the campaign, when campaigning can begin, and so on. Additionally, a longer campaign with a large body of potential voters demands that candidates raise large amounts of money in order to compete effectively. This, of course, requires additional rules: spending limits, levies on funds raised, entrance fees for potential candidates, etc. These two phenomena – a lack of state regulation and a constant tweaking of the rules – raise a number of concerns about how primary elections are conducted. It is not clear whether political parties are properly equipped to adequately administer, regulate, finance, and monitor these expansive and expensive elections on their own. Unlike general elections that have the full backing and support of the state and a wealth of resources at their disposal, the regulation of  primaries is limited to what parties can offer. Both in terms of resources and competency, primary elections may be difficult for parties to effectively manage in a democratic manner. Three concerns about the legitimacy of how primaries are conducted are worth discussing here.

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It is widely accepted that in politics, as in sport, the rules of the game can shape the outcome (Massicotte et al. 2004). One implication of unstable rules and frequent tweaking is that changes may be made to favour one candidate at the expense of others. This can result in candidates and their supporters manoeuvring to situate themselves in positions of authority prior to leadership and candidate selection contests so that they can influence the rules in a manner that serves their own self-interests. This kind of manipulation can include overarching issues such as the nature of the selectorate (convention delegates, all party members, and/or trade-union members), the voting system (i.e. the threshold required for winning), and more administrative issues such as the timing of the contest, rules regarding voting eligibility, and the oversight of polling locations and vote counting. Manipulation of the selection procedure can often result in candidates arguing that the rules (and/or their implementation) were stacked against them from the beginning of the campaign. While primaries do not inherently cause manipulation and abuse of the process, they certainly exacerbate the problem. The complexity of primary elections requires many rules and provides a wide range of opportunities to manipulate the selection process. In this sense, there are pathologies that are unique to primaries. In many cases, abuse or corruption can be attributed to a lack of regulation and oversight. As illustrated below, the self-governing nature of intraparty events therefore calls into question the ability of parties to competently monitor internal selections and prevent issues such as voter fraud. Without the deterrent of state oversight and enforcement, a second concern is that primaries are likely to suffer from the kinds of abuse that have long since been eliminated from general elections. A reliance on party volunteers as opposed to trained election officers to manage and monitor the actions of thousands of voters, for example, opens the door for potential ballot-stuffing and other forms of corruption. This is compounded by the fact that any opportunity to challenge alleged abuses and wrongdoing in the selection process is largely restricted to intra-party review panels – which may themselves be controlled by the dominant campaign team. Furthermore, the interest of a party in publicly displaying any procedural abuses and penalizing leading candidates may also be suspect.

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A final concern, explored in Chapter 7, is whether parties have the resources to adequately finance these elections. Without the assistance of the state, parties often have to engage in cost-saving measures when conducting primaries. Such measures may include introducing high candidate-entrance fees and limiting the number of polling stations. While these decisions may help offset the cost of holding a primary election, they may have inadvertent and adverse consequences for the legitimacy and fairness of the selection process. In the remainder of this chapter we explore the first two concerns enumerated above. We find evidence in both Canada and Israel of candidates and party elites manipulating the rules and procedures of the primary election. This section concludes with consideration of the concerns relating to minimal independent or state oversight that leaves the parties to manage and coordinate the actions of thousands of voters on their own. Reserved for the next chapter is consideration of the large-scale recruitment drives that often accompany closed party primaries. In evaluating these implications, we suggest it is worth considering what general elections would be like if in the run-up to them, new rules and processes were regularly adopted for their conduct and if these changes were made for overtly partisan reasons. It is unlikely that citizens would tolerate this kind of behaviour. More probable is that tampering with the electoral system would be met with widespread public outcry and protest. Given that the implications of primaries are so widespread and consequential – they choose candidates and leaders, limit the possible choice of prime ministers, and set the direction and course of the party both inside and outside of the legislature – it is somewhat puzzling that there is so little regulation. Finally, a comparison of the Israeli and Canadian experience demonstrates that, in the absence of rigorous state regulation, parties often are unable to adequately enforce their own internal rules, as it is often against their own self-interest and potential electoral success to expose corruption and punish leading candidates, especially on the eve of a general election.

Ru l e M a k i n g a n d R u l e Manipulations Who Makes the Rules? When considering the making of rules for Canadian and Israeli intra-party contests, the starting point is acknowledgement that the

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rules are made by the parties themselves. Decisions about contest rules are generally made by a committee empowered to design specific regulations to give shape to a contest whose contours are determined by party statute. For example, party statutes and constitutions may stipulate that leaders will be chosen through a vote of all party members, but details such as the length of the campaign, requirements for voting eligibility, voting fees, and voting times and locations are only specified before each contest. Article 6.3a of the New Democratic Party Constitution, for example, outlines the broad criteria of how party leaders are to be selected, stipulating that “every member is entitled to cast a ballot for the selection of the Leader.” The Constitution also notes, however, that: “The Council shall determine other leadership selection guidelines” (New Democratic Party 2013). Working within the framework outlined in the party constitution, the “other rules” are set by the party’s federal Executive Council. In 2003, the Council decided to split the leadership vote between party members (75 per cent) and affiliated unions (25 per cent). Additionally, it set a $7,500 entrance fee and a $500,000 spending limit. Leading up to the party’s next leadership election in 2012, the federal executive made a number of changes to these rules while respecting the general guidelines of the party’s constitution. First, after significant and heated debate, the Council removed the privileged position that trade unions had received in the previous primary. The new formula was a straightforward closed primary in which only party members were eligible to participate. The Council also doubled the entrance fee for potential contestants to $15,000, while the $500,000 spending limit remained the same (LeBlanc 2011). Similar to the case of the NDP , a small party body – the Leadership Election Organizing Committee (L E O C) – determined the rules regarding the 2004 Conservative party leadership election. Upon merging, the Progressive Conservatives and Canadian Alliance parties agreed to establish a committee with the sole purpose of setting the rules for the new party’s upcoming leadership campaign. Consisting of four individuals appointed from each party,2 the L E O C determined all of the administrative and practical rules surrounding the election: levies on money raised by the campaigns, whether or not the party would allow voting by fax, the number and location of  polling stations, mandatory campaign events, voting hours, entrance fees, and so on. As we will see later in this chapter, it is not uncommon for candidates and their teams to lobby these election

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committees heavily as important decisions about the selection process are being made. Gaining the favour of the committee is an important aspect of the campaign, as the rules they set are likely to influence the outcome of the election. This was especially the case with the L E OC , as its members clearly represented different “factions” of the party (Flanagan 2007). After considerable debate, the L E OC allowed fax voting, instituted a 10 per cent levy on campaign fundraising, insisted on only one voting location per electoral district, set a four-hour window for voting, and required a $50,000 non-refundable entrance fee and a $50,000 refundable compliance deposit for each candidate (Flanagan 2007). While the general voting formula was outlined in the party’s constitution as a result of merger negotiations, the L E O C retained considerable authority to shape the other aspects of the election. The question of who makes the rules for candidate selection in Canada is slightly more complex. Like leadership selection, party statutes and constitutions outline the broad guidelines that have been set by the central party apparatus. This tends to encompass questions of the selectorate: namely, who can vote. These guidelines, however, leave considerable room for local autonomy. As detailed in Chapter 3, Canadian parties are characterized by a stratarchical bargain (see Carty 2002; Carty and Cross 2006) that provides local constituency associations with some independence so long as they work within the national framework. As a result, decisions over the exact timing, location, number of polling stations, and other administrative details are often left to the local constituency executive. Thus, even nominations that take place at the same time may be run under somewhat different rules designed by local organizations. Section 7.c of the Conservative Party’s “Candidate Nomination Rules and Procedures,” for example, states that the local constituency association Board of Directors (the executive) “shall select the date, time and location of the nomination meeting(s)” (Conservative Party 2014). Similarly, section 60.2 of the Liberal Party’s Constitution allows rules to “vary from province to province or territory” including issues such as access to membership forms, length of membership to be eligible to vote, voting procedures (internet, etc.), location and duration of the meeting, and so on (Liberal Party 2014). In all Canadian parties, the central executive determines general guidelines while leaving room for local discretion to tweak the rules to fit their constituency. This means that

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within each party, there may be 338 slightly different ways of choosing the local candidate. Rule-making for leadership and candidate contests in the Israeli parties is also devolved. Party constitutions lay down general outlines such as the selectorate and the voting system, but other aspects of the contests are finalized by intra-party “central election committees” or “constitution committees” that publish a “regulations book” (takanon) prior to each contest. These usually require the approval of the parties’ central committees. Article 84.2 of Likud Constitution (2014) outlines the general principles of the leader’s selection, stipulating that “the chairman will be selected in individual, general, direct, equal and secret elections by all voters appearing in the voters’ book.” The constitution further details the majority requirement and voting system (modified majority runoff) and the eligibility requirements for voting and candidacy. Thus, the party convention or central committee must approve every modification to these rules. In fact, many rules are changed from one selection to the next. In the course of thirteen years, Likud changed the selectorate that chooses legislative candidates three times: they adopted primaries (1993), abolished them and authorized the delegates of the party central committee with this task (1997), and then returned again to primaries (2006). The other attributes of leadership and legislative candidate contests in Likud are outlined in ad-hoc regulations books that are published by its central election committee, an internal organ headed by a former judge. The rules regulating different contests often differ from one to the next. For instance, the deadline for filing candidacy forms was fourteen days prior to election day in the 2007 leadership contests and thirty days prior to election day in 2012. Frequent changes also occur with regard to the number of supporter signatures required to stand as a candidate, with regard to the amount of entrance fees, and – in the case of legislative candidate selection – with regard to the number of candidates each member may vote for. Similarly, the general principles of leadership selection appear in the constitution of the Labour Party. Articles 15.1 and 132.2 both state that the party chairman will be elected by all party members in primary elections. The constitution further regulates the timing of  primaries, the majority requirement, and the voting system. However, it leaves other attributes of primary contests to be regulated elsewhere. For instance, article 133.3 states that a candidate

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for the party leadership must present signatures of supporters “in a number that would be decided by the party’s central committee.” Furthermore, article 132.3 requires that prior to any primary contest, the central committee will nominate an “election committee” that will compose a “regulation book” for that specific primary election. Similar principles and division of labour (between the party constitution and other documents) also apply to the selection of legislative candidates. In both countries, although a general framework is outlined in the parties’ constitutions, the executive or a small party committee (either local or national) has considerable influence in shaping the rules for both leadership and candidate selection. This, of course, is in direct contrast to the way in which general elections are conducted in most democratic systems. The rules for general elections are typically outlined in state legislation, they remain stable from one election to the next, and independent bodies implement them in a largely non-partisan manner. Without a set of stable selection rules, candidates realize that influencing the game can significantly improve their chances for success. A consequence of this is that candidates often jockey for power before the selection by attempting to capture control of the executive as a way of establishing rules favourable for their own candidacy. The most common forms of manipulation tend to occur before the election has been held. These often involve questions relating to the timing of the election, eligibility for prospective candidates and voters, where voting will take place, the timing and length of polling hours, whether mail-in and proxy voting will be allowed, how votes are to be weighted and counted, and the financial regulations governing the contests. These discussions about who ought to be able to participate and how are rarely principled in a normative or democratic sense but instead often revolve around two or more candidates attempting to gain the upper hand. A detailed exposition of the importance of influencing rules in a Canadian leadership primary may be found in a recent account by Tom Flanagan, a political scientist who ran the 2004 leadership campaign for Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper (Flanagan 2007, 115–16). Flanagan illustrates how candidates have sought advantage by influencing all sorts of rules prior to the outset of the contest, and how these can prove determinative of the outcome. In Harper’s case, Flanagan recounts suspicions that a party-appointed

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LEO C “was being influenced by advisers hostile to Harper,” and how his campaign worked to counter this and ensure L E O C decisions did not unduly disadvantage their candidate. Manipulation of the Translation of Votes into Outcome Two recent leadership primaries in Canada, one involving the N D P and the other the Conservative party, are illustrative of the kind of debates that take place because the alteration of selection rules can translate votes into outcomes. The 2003 NDP leadership primary allocated 25 per cent of the vote to affiliated trade unions. When it was time to select the party’s next leader in 2012, significant debate surrounded the union vote. In these discussions, the leading contenders sought to alter the selection rules to be preferential to their own candidacy. Supporters of Thomas Mulcair, a candidate without substantial ties to organized labour, argued that union members should be treated the same as other party members. Understanding that the union vote would likely not be in his favour, Mulcair’s supporters sought to dispense with it in order to secure his victory. Leadership rival Brian Topp, however, suggested that a close relationship with organized labour was part of the party’s “DNA ” (Kilpatrick 2011). Topp was a union leader himself and had already secured significant backing and support from the United Steel Workers, so his supporters fought to keep the unions involved in the selection process. But in the end, the special role of unions was eliminated and Mulcair was chosen as party leader. In the second case, when the Canadian Alliance and the Pro­ gressive Conservatives merged in the new Conservative Party, one of the most fought-over provisions was the formula for selecting the next leader. Members of the former Canadian Alliance proposed a one-member-one-vote mail-in ballot, a closed primary in which every party member would be able to participate. Progressive Con­ servatives, however, rejected this idea, citing the need for greater regional equality in the process. The P C proposal would weight each electoral district equally in order to ensure that districts with large memberships did not have more influence in the selection outcome. While regional equality is a worthy goal consistent with the PC s’ brokerage nature,3 this was not the only motivation for rejecting the straightforward closed primary. In reality, the PCs also

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worried that the 110,000 former Alliance members, heavily concentrated in western Canada, would easily “swamp” the 40,000 former PC members if an un-weighted vote were to occur (Flanagan 2007). Thus, the debate over how votes were counted may have been as much about which candidate would have the advantage as about fairness and regional equality. After much debate the Alliance acquiesced, and the weighted model was chosen. As Flanagan (2007) recounts, however, the Alliance only agreed to a weighted model after it was clear that the party could win the leadership selection using either model. These two recent examples demonstrate that rules matter. More importantly, the adoption of certain rules can help particular candidates while disadvantaging others. On the surface, the debates inside the Conservatives and New Democrats appeared to be principled discussions about regional equality and the role of unions in the electoral process. In reality, however, these debates were also about individual candidates seeking advantage in the primary. Although these examples focus on large questions of who can vote and how votes are counted, parties routinely change minor rules from one election to the next. Even these seemingly mundane changes, however, can significantly advantage one candidate over another. For example, as described below, debates often occur over the location of the single voting place in Canadian candidate selection contests. In centralized Israel, there have been no deviations from the onemember-one-vote rule. However, as we shall see, there have been many other attempts to influence selection through manipulations of the rules of the game. Timing of the Election One of the most basic ways in which the rules can be manipulated to favour one candidate over another is timing. The timing and length of the contest can have a significant impact on the outcome of an election. While candidates for the legislature were historically selected on the eve of general elections, the timing of candidate selection in Canada is becoming increasingly fluid. In this regard, candidate selection resembles leadership selection. Unlike members of Parliament, Canadian party leaders tend not to have fixedterm tenures (Cross and Blais 2012a; Pilet and Cross 2014; Gruber et al. 2015). Without a set election date, party elites are able to more

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readily manipulate the timing of leadership contests in their favour. Even if party regulations set deadlines for leadership selection, in many cases these rules are surmounted. This applies to cases where incumbent leaders are being pressured to call a contest in order to re-legitimize their leadership. In such cases, the struggle over the timing of the contest is regarded as the unofficial opening of the leadership race. Often, incumbents who are forced into a leadership contest would like to set it as early and quickly as possible in order to prevent challengers from gathering support by recruiting new party members and from building an  effective campaign. In Israel, that was the case in 2000, when Avraham Burg challenged prime minister and Labour Party leader Ehud Barak. Barak managed to convince the Labour Party executive committee to approve a very short campaign period. As a result, Burg did not have the time to build an effective organization and ultimately withdrew, leaving Barak’s position uncontested. In other cases, incumbents with the prospect of a likely defeat may try to postpone the contest to cling to their position. Such was the case in 2007, when Labour leader Amir Peretz delayed the leadership race as long as he could. We can find prominent examples of such tactics in Canada as well. After winning his third straight majority government as leader of the Liberal Party in 2000, Jean Chrétien worked tirelessly to delay his next leadership review vote.4 According to Jeffrey (2010, 362), Chrétien “wanted to serve as much of his final term as possible without becoming a lame duck.” Fearing that once a departure date was announced he would lose all control over his cabinet, Chrétien sought to set a review date as late as possible into his new term. Despite not having had a leadership review since 1998, and the Party’s constitution calling for one within eighteen months of an election, Chrétien and his supporters on the party’s executive managed to push the next vote forward to 2003. Before the review could take place, however, Chrétien announced that he would be stepping down as party leader in February 2004, thus eliminating the need for a 2003 vote and allowing him to cling to power even longer. Timing manipulations also apply to cases where there is no pressure on the incumbent leader. In contrast to the above cases the incumbent may feel secure, and take advantage of the political climate by calling a quick primary election that reaffirms his position as the undisputed leader of the party. The 2012 Likud leadership

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primary is a case in point. Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, used his power to influence the timing of selection and, in a surprise move, announced that leadership primaries would be held in January 2012, more than one year before they were expected.5 The rationale for Netanyahu’s move was twofold. First, his potential rivals were unable to conduct an effective campaign since they had expected a different time-frame. Second, the leadership selection was conducted on the same day that members of the party convention (which is also its central committee) and local branches were selected. This manoeuvre occured to ensure reasonable turnout for a predictably non-competitive race, and assured his easy re-selection with a resounding 77 per cent of the party members’ vote. While more common for leadership primaries, the timing of primaries for candidate selection can also be manipulated to favour one candidate over another. Local constituency executives and party elites in Canada are often accused of setting an extremely short deadline (with as little as twenty-four-hours’ notice) for submission of complicated nomination papers (including things such as a p ­ olice background-check) to ensure that only a favoured candidate will be able to meet the deadline (Cross 2002; 2004). An example of such behaviour was seen in 2006, when the Liberal Party orchestrated the timing of a nomination in order to effectively acclaim their preferred candidate and subsequent party leader, Michael Ignatieff. In this case, the incumbent member of Parliament for the electoral constituency of Etobicoke-Lakeshore, Jean Augustine, formally announced her retirement on a Friday. In order to assure Ignatieff’s successful nomination, the deadline to contest the local nomination was set for the following day (Saturday) at 5:00 p.m. Despite attempts by others to complete the paperwork and gather enough signatures, the party concluded that only Ignatieff had completed the necessary paperwork on time (Cross 2006). The manipulation of the timing of the contest posed a significant disadvantage for those who opposed Ignatieff’s candidacy, and ultimately resulted in his acclamation. Eligibility of Candidates and Voters A key aspect of primary rules that is subject to determination prior to  each selection is the eligibility of both candidates and voters. Changing candidacy requirements may make it more difficult for some potential aspirants to qualify and easier for others. In 1996, for example, the Israeli Labour Party raised the minimum number of

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signatures required for leadership candidacy in order to prevent two minor candidates from competing. It was just two months after Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination, and the party elite wished to endorse Shimon Peres as the sole candidate and avoid an open contest. Manipulating voter eligibility is even more common. Parties face a choice here between restricting participation to existing members or viewing the contest as a recruitment tool and allowing a significant period for new members to join and acquire voting eligibility. While decisions regarding the cut-off date for new members in closed primary elections may be based on principled arguments that have to do with the party’s organizational needs and democratic norms, these are particularly subject to abuse. Most party constitutions in Israel include clauses that regulate the minimum time required for a member to be eligible to vote in primaries, but these clauses are easily changed. For example, Labour’s constitution specifies a waiting period of six months for new members to be eligible, but waiting periods have ranged from forty-five days to ten months in recent primaries. In Canada, by contrast, voter eligibility tends to be specifically left out of the parties’ constitutions, allowing these decisions to be made at the outset of each primary election. Altering the waiting period should not be seen as a merely technical issue. Extending the cut-off date or moving it forward may work in favour of one candidate and against others. Those candidates favoured by the existing composition of the party membership benefit from long waiting periods, whereas other candidates may benefit from the ability to recruit large numbers of new members. Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, has tried to shorten Likud’s sixteen-month period in order to enable newcomers to gain eligibility and thus to reduce the power of hardcore supporters of the radical right wing. Similarly the Jewish Home, a religious right-wing party, decided in 2012 to extend the membership recruitment campaign to almost fifty days before the leadership and legislative candidates’ primaries in November. This extension served the wealthy, maverick newcomer Naftali Bennett, who was in the midst of a large recruitment campaign and needed more time to establish his advantage. He eventually won the leadership contest by a wide margin. Rules relating to access to membership forms and membership cut-off dates are often fought over in Canada as well. There have been a number of cases of party leadership candidates who, believing they are favoured by the existing membership, attempt to make it more difficult for their opponents to sign-up new members. They

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do this by arguing for a shorter campaign period, an earlier membership deadline, and rules restricting access to membership forms. In the 2003 Liberal leadership contest, supporters of the frontrunner and eventual winner Paul Martin orchestrated the adoption and implementation of party rules limiting the number of blank membership forms a campaign could access at any time. In this particular case, individuals other than members of the constituency executive were limited to five membership forms to be completed and returned before more were distributed. Members of each local executive, however, had access to one hundred forms at a time. This made it far more difficult for would-be challengers to sign up the large number of new members necessary to catch up to Martin’s lead among existing members. Additionally, given that Martin supporters had captured a majority of the constituency association executives, the new rules meant that Martin’s team would have access to significantly more membership forms at any given time. As one potential leadership rival explained, “the party hierarchy has been captured by Martin sympathizers” and it would be “virtually impossible for anyone else to mount a successful campaign” given the rules that had been adopted (Jeffrey 2010, 367). Decisions to change the waiting period for voting eligibility, however, can have consequences beyond simply providing an advantage to a particular candidate. From a party point of view, there are significant risks associated with having a short waiting period for new members. In the past there have been a number of occasions in both Canada and Israel in which the party or a local constituency association has been “hijacked” by a single-issue group or individual with no meaningful connection to the party. This was the case throughout the 1990s when the group Liberals for Life sought to nominate supporters within the Liberal party. Taking advantage of short membership requirements, members of this group were able to take over a number of Liberal constituency associations, ultimately outnumbering party regulars who had a long history with the party. The challenges inherent in this sort of membership recruitment are considered more fully in the next chapter. Reserved Positions In both the Likud and Labour parties, correction mechanisms in the form of reserved positions on the party’s candidate list are used for the

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purpose of ensuring a minimum level of territorial and social representation. Yet these mechanisms have often seemed to reflect the status quo rather than any attempt to change it. That is, they have been used to favour incumbents. The number of positions reserved for women, for example, has usually been quite low, and typically reflected the number of female incumbents. That is, if the party had forty seats, including four female representatives, the party typically reserved four seats up to the fortieth position for women. A real attempt to enhance women’s representation would have required reserving more positions likely to result in the candidates’ election – a move that would have upset the status quo and the male incumbents. In other cases, a reserved seat for a social group or specific region can be used as means of ensuring the selection of a candidate the party elite already has in mind. In 1996, a position on the Labour party’s list was reserved for a new immigrant. After the party members chose someone of Ethiopian origin rather than an immigrant from the Former Soviet Union (FSU ) who happened to be close to Labour’s leader at the time, the party created a new reserved position specifically for immigrants from the F S U and conducted an immediate race to fill it. In 1999 a new territorial district was created in the Labour party. This district, the result of a division of the Southern district that was used in 1992 and 1996, had its candidate placed in a relatively high position on the party list. Not incidentally, a newcomer who was loyal to the party chairman at the time, Ehud Barak, easily won this race. In short, the definition of some of the reserved positions, the number of reserved positions, and their rank on the party list, often reflect personal interests of party elites rather than genuine representation. Changing the rules shortly before legislative primaries may also occur when the party elite wish to exempt a high-profile politician from competing, instead reserving a position for him high on the list of candidates. Such was the case in 2002, when Likud decided to reserve the second position on the list of candidates for Benjamin Netanyhau, who lost to Ariel Sharon in the leadership primaries held a few weeks earlier. Similarly, positions were reserved for Shimon Peres (1999 and 2002) and Binyamin Ben-Eliezer (2002) in the Labour Party, for Silvan Shalon (2006) in Likud, and for Shaul Mofaz (2008) in Kadima. Shortly prior to the 2015 elections, party leaders in Israel were given the authority to appoint candidate/s to certain position/s on

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the candidate list. This was perceived as a means of correcting the unbalanced lists that had resulted from the primaries. Likud members voted in favour of their leader’s request to allow him to appoint candidates to the eleventh and twenty-third positions. The vote was actually held on the same day as the legislative primaries. The central committee of the Labour Party approved the leader’s request to appoint a candidate to the eleventh position on the candidate list. Both leaders took advantage of their privilege. Location of Polling Booths Canadian electoral districts outside of major urban centres are geographically large. When two candidates represent two different towns in an electorate, the decision to hold voting in one of them can severely disadvantage the candidate whose supporters are primarily found in the other, which may be 100 kilometres or more away. The disadvantaged candidate’s supporters may have to travel for hours to reach the polling location, just to spend an additional two or three hours at the nomination meeting (Cross 2004, 57). Even the most committed supporters may find this too much of a burden in addition to family and work responsibilities, and postal or proxy voting is typically not permitted in these contests. The choice of location can therefore be a significant disadvantage for one candidate as it may supress the rate of turnout and participation of her supporters. This can be contrasted with non-primary, locally based preselections in parties such as those in some of the Australian states. In these cases, local party branches elect delegates to a convention that then selects the candidate. Rank-and-file members need only attend a local branch meeting, of which there are often many in a single electorate, to participate. However, their influence is indirect at best, and these contests cannot be considered primaries (Cross and Gauja 2014a). Given that there is only likely to be one polling station per riding and its location can be consequential, well-organized candidates often seek advantage by placing their supporters on the local association’s executive in the lead-up to a nomination contest so that they can control where the station will be. The ability of a candidate’s supporters to influence such processes has led to clear abuses, including moving a polling location on the day of the primary without informing all the candidates. In one hotly contested 1988 Liberal

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candidate nomination primary, the local party executive changed both the date and location of the meeting at the last minute. One candidate, Mario Racco, appealed to the party, noting that he had already purchased and distributed campaign material with the previous date and location. Racco also argued that the change in venue to outside the electoral district would advantage those candidates who could afford busses to transport their supporters (McQuaig 1988). Maria Minna, another candidate in the riding, described the nomination process as follows: “the game becomes who can cheat the most” (Cameron 1988). The local party executive, however, was unsympathetic to these complaints, and went forward with their proposed changes. A National Film Board (NFB ) documentary, The Right Candidate for Rosedale, demonstrates the impact that the location of a polling station can have. In this contest, the local party executive, favouring John Evans (then president of the University of Toronto), moved the polling station from a downtown church to the grand ballroom of the Sheraton Centre – an upscale Toronto hotel. This change of venue put his main competitor, Ann Cools, at a significant disadvantage. For one, the new location was outside the electoral district and made transportation and accessibility an issue for her supporters. Second, Cools had worked to build a strong base among lowerincome individuals so not only did travelling outside the riding present some difficulty, but many of them felt uncomfortable and intimidated by the prospect of going to a grand ballroom to cast their ballot (Cross 2004). As this example demonstrates, it is not just the geographic location of the polling station that can be manipulated to favour one candidate over another but the social and cultural implications of its venue as well. Decisions concerning the number of polling stations to be deployed across the country can also influence results. Before the primaries for Likud’s candidate list in 2012, Prime Minister Netanyahu ordered that the number of polling stations be doubled and that more of them be placed in various locations in order to increase turnout. While increasing voter turnout is consistent with democratic values, the decision may also have benefited Netanyahu, since increased turnout would help balance the impact of the more radical (and committed) groups within the party. The assumption was that shorter queues for voting and closer proximity would increase the chance that moderate members, more likely to vote for

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moderate candidates preferred by Netanyahu, would show up and vote. Decisions to lengthen the time that polling stations are open have also occured on election day itself, with the aim of assisting candidates who are likely to enjoy higher turnout (examples include the cases of Netanyahu in Likud’s 2012 primary and Tzipi Livni in Kadima’s 2008 primary). Polling stations were the topic of a mini scandal in the build-up to the 2013 Labour Party leadership primaries between incumbent Shelly Yachimovich and challenger Yitzhak Herzog. Several months prior to the primaries, the party’s election committee published a regulation book in which Article 10 stated that the number and locations of the polling stations would be decided by the election committee. Fifty days before election day, the committee decided to  deploy about seventy-five polling stations nationwide. Herzog regarded this decision as playing into the hands of the incumbent. He claimed that the committee, controlled by the incumbent’s representatives, decided to reduce the number of polling stations not to save money but rather due to political considerations. After attempts to reach common ground failed, Herzog’s campaign team appealed the decision to the party’s constitution committee. The appeal was rejected, but eventually five more polling stations were added. In the end, Herzog defeated the incumbent leader.

A d m i n i s t r ation Concerns about primaries go beyond the rules that frame them. There are also concerns with the ability of parties to effectively monitor elections as vast and complicated as primaries. While general elections employ trained officials, parties tend to rely on volunteers with little training or experience. Without adequate oversight or the deterrence of state enforcement, internal party elections are open to allegations of corruption and misconduct. Monitoring of Primary Elections and Enforcement of Rules When considering the administration of the vote, there have been allegations of fraud in many Labour and Likud primaries for years. In Labour there have been charges of stuffing ballot boxes for favoured candidates in Arab and Druze towns and villages. During

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the 2001 Labour leadership primaries, for example, some claimed that there was systematic electoral fraud in Druze villages, including ballot stuffing and the disappearance of ballot boxes. This led to a revote at about forty ballot stations a month later. This, in turn, led to a change of result: the loser according to the first count became the clear winner after the second (Navot 2006). Kadima’s 2008 leadership primary was especially significant since the winner of this contest was anticipated to replace Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. The tight battle between Tzipi Livni and Shaul Mofaz created significant pressures for fraud and irregularities during voting day. Shortly after balloting closed and early counting confirmed the tight margin between the two, a ballot box in the Arab town of Rahat was set on fire. The box apparently included more than 400  votes (with estimations that most were in favour of Mofaz), while the margin between the candidates in the final results was also about 400 in favour of Livni. Mofaz’s advisors pressured him to appeal the results, but he refused. Several years later, in an interview, he charged that criminal acts occurred in the primaries, resulting in Livni ­winning the leadership (Somfalvi 2010). Close scrutiny of the vote count in Likud’s candidate selection for the 2015 elections found various biases for and against specific candidates. Repeated vote counts not only changed the results but significantly changed the candidates’ position on the list (Azulay 2015abc). Primaries for candidate selection in the Canadian parties have often been marred by allegations of ballot irregularities, individuals voting more than once, eligible voters being turned away from polling stations, and so on. Perhaps the most prominent case of alleged abuse in the administration of a primary occurred during the 2004 Liberal nomination contest between Sheila Copps and Tony Valeri in the federal district of Hamilton East-Stoney Creek. Copps, a former cabinet minister and deputy prime minister, lost the nomination race by a slim margin and described the primary as a “massive, orchestrated fraud” (Bryden 2004; Canadian Press 2004). The alleged abuse was so widespread that Copps sought a number of different remedies: she appealed the decision to the Party in hopes of being granted a new nomination contest, she contacted Elections Canada to inform the chief electoral officer of wrongdoing, and she requested a police investigation into the tactics of her opponent’s campaign team. Among other complaints, Copps alleged the following irregularities:

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Hundreds of her supporters were denied entry into the nomination meeting where balloting took place. Her supporters were charged $10 for parking at the ballot location while Valeri supporters were allowed to park for free. Valeri’s campaign team provided free memberships to 800 of his supporters. Ballot stuffing. Hundreds of names were “mysteriously” deleted from the local membership list. Her supporters suffered systematic discrimination at a specific voter registration table. Her office’s phone system was tampered with to keep her supporters from turning out to vote. Copps’s campaign message was deleted and replaced with the following: “Hi, Bob. Please leave a message.” (Bryden 2004; Canadian Press 2004)

As a result of her experience, Copps has become a strong proponent of increased regulation and monitoring for all candidate nominations. In fact, she has gone so far as to call on Elections Canada to oversee all future nominations for all political parties in order to ensure a fair and transparent process. As she suggests, the extent of her allegations calls into question the ability of party volunteers, however well-intentioned, to adequately and competently monitor thousands of votes at a single location on a single day. The size of these elections, coupled with the limited resources that parties can expend on monitoring and oversight, raises serious concerns about how well-equipped parties are to manage primary elections and ensure a fair outcome. A year later another former deputy prime minister, John Manley, supported the reforms proposed by Copps, calling for Elections Canada to oversee internal party elections. In his plea for democratic reform, Manley noted the complexity of primary elections and the need to professionalize the ways in which candidates and leaders are selected by introducing state regulation and non-partisan and independent monitoring: “It’s time to professionalize this process by turning it over to Elections  Canada.  Parties already benefit from election financing laws that include hefty subsidies. Parties, therefore, owe it to taxpayers to use a  candidate  selection process that meets the standards of a modern democracy” (Manley 2005).

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Calls to transfer the monitoring of primaries to extra-party organs have recently appeared in Israel as well. A bill in this spirit was proposed by four members of the Knesset (M Ks) in early 2012. It proposed that the State Comptroller should conduct the inspection of primaries in accordance with the regulation book of each party. If adopted, this bill would mark a significant expansion of the State Comptroller’s role in primaries, as currently this institution has oversight only of their finances (see Chapter 7). Internal Appeals and Review Processes Given the lack of state regulation of primaries in Canada and Israel, the first recourse for candidates or others who believe they have been harmed through the violation of a primary’s rules is an internal party process. Both Israeli and Canadian parties have internal appeals’ processes and review panels to manage disputes concerning candidate and leadership selection. In Canada, these review mechanisms are often set up in a manner that discourages appeals. Section 12.5 of the Liberal Party’s rules for candidate selection, for example, requires all monetary deposits and fees to be paid prior to any appeal hearing (Liberal Party 2013). Deposits for the process can be upwards of $1,000. While a deposit may be necessary to discourage unwarranted reviews, this may be a prohibitive burden on a candidate who has just waged an expensive primary battle. In addition to the financial cost, the deadline to initiate the appeal is typically very short, ranging from twenty-four hours after the initial vote for the Conservatives to seventy-two hours for the Liberals. This has resulted in a number of cases in which candidates claim they were unable to file the appropriate paperwork and financial deposit prior to the deadline. Coupled with the fees and short timeframe is the composition of the review panels. In Canadian parties, these review bodies consist of a committee and chair appointed by the executive. This may be problematic if the winning candidate has already captured control of the executive in the lead-up to the election, which is often the case for leadership primaries, because then the review panel is unlikely to be sympathetic to the allegations of a challenger. Thus, even if a losing candidate is able to complete the paperwork and submit the deposit on time, it is unclear how impartial the review will be.

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Finally, regardless of the above, many parties have strict limitations on what decisions can be appealed. Section 49.2 of the Liberal Party Constitution, for example, states that “the decision of the National Campaign Committee or the Leader is not reviewable by the Permanent Appeal Committee” (Liberal Party 2014). Thus, the actual purview of the review board tends to be limited in scope. Despite these potential hurdles, there have been successful appeals. In a number of cases the results of the local primary have been annulled and a second nomination held due to the extent of the irregularities and misconduct in the initial contest. Most recently, the provincial P C party in Alberta overturned the results of the candidate primary in the electoral constituency of Calgary West. After convincing evidence of voting irregularities was provided, the party executive ordered a new nomination election in which the same candidates would compete (Cryderman 2012). Despite some successes like the case above, it must be noted that successful appeals are few in number. Between 1970 and 1994, for example, the Parti Québécois only overturned a single candidate nomination (Authier 1994). Similarly, it was not until 1988 that the Liberal party overturned the results of a local candidate primary for reasons relating to electoral integrity (Smith 1988). Given such limited success with internal review boards and appeal panels, individuals have sometimes sought judicial intervention. The response of the courts, however, has been somewhat mixed. In 2004, a Calgary judge ordered the provincial P C constituency association in Calgary-Montrose to hold a new nomination contest. In this case, the judge rejected the view of parties as private associations. Although parties are a voluntary group, the judge wrote that the PC party “is not a chess club or a fraternal organization” (Heyman and Wilton 2004). Citing the party’s electoral dominance, the judge’s ruling defended judicial intervention into what has typically been viewed as an internal party matter. Similarly, in 2007, a group of eleven Conservative activists launched legal action against the federal Conservative constituency association in the riding of Calgary West after losing an initial partybased appeal. They claimed that the local executive manipulated the nomination rules in order to ensure that incumbent Rob Anders would be acclaimed. After hearing the case, a Calgary judge ordered the party to hold a new nomination election (Komarnicki 2007). Three months later, however, the Alberta Court of Appeal ruled in

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favour of the party. In its decision, the higher court stressed the party’s right to resolve internal disputes without judicial interference. Unlike the 2004 example, this ruling was based on the conception of political parties as private associations. It is worth quoting from the decision in some length: Neither constituency associations nor political parties are given any public powers under the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c.9. They are essentially private organizations. It is true that their financial affairs are regulated: they may only give tax receipts in certain circumstances, and they may only spend the money they raise in certain ways. However, merely because an organization is subject to public regulation does not make it a public body subject to judicial review … It is argued that the democratic ­process, elections, and the activities of political parties are of great public importance. That is undoubtedly true, but public importance is not the test for whether a tribunal is subject to judicial review. When arranging for the nomination of their candidate in Calgary West, the Party and the Association were essentially engaged in private activities, and their actions, in this case, are not subject to judicial review. (Knox v. Conservative Party of Canada 2007; emphasis added) In 2008 the Supreme Court of Canada refused to hear an appeal from the eleven activists, officially putting an end to the dispute. Despite some willingness on behalf of lower courts to rule on internal party matters, higher courts have resisted, either overturning earlier decisions or declining to hear such cases at all. In Israel, candidates who believe they have been harmed through a violation of a primary’s rules also appeal to their parties’ semi-­ judicial institutions. Such cases typically concern the validity of results, the timing of the contest, defining the selectorate (who is eligible to vote), and administrative aspects (number of polling stations, voting hours). Perhaps the most significant case occurred in the aftermath of Labour’s 2001 leadership primaries. The results placed Avraham Burg as the victor over Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, with only about 1,200 votes separating the two (a margin of less than 2 per cent). The defeated candidate appealed to the party’s internal review committee, demanding a delay in publishing the official results until allegations of fraud in about forty ballot stations could

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be adjudicated. The committee decided to suspend the official publication of the results until the charges could be evaluated. After weeks of delay, the winning candidate, Burg, handed in his own appeal to the committee, demanding to be proclaimed the winner. The committee rejected this appeal, allowing the inspection process of the suspected ballots to proceed. After more than three months of internal judicial struggle, the two sides reached a compromise, agreeing to hold a new election at the suspect stations. The subsequent election overturned the initial result, and Ben-Eliezer was elected party leader. However, by that time, the party’s public image and credibility were deeply harmed. On several occasions during this bitter struggle, Burg had contemplated taking the case to an external national court, but eventually decided against it. Candidates have also turned to internal judiciaries with concerns regarding administrative aspects of voting. As mentioned earlier, during Labour’s 2013 leadership primaries, Yitzhak Herzog challenged the decision to reduce the number of polling stations. In several other cases candidates have filed appeals demanding an extension of voting hours, claiming that long queues were disenfranchising their supporters. Other appeals have been lodged against decisions to exempt candidates from having to face a contest and instead reserving a safe position for them on the list. In 2008, Labour’s activists appealed against the decision to reserve the sixth spot on the list of candidates for MK Binyamin Ben-Eliezer. They pointed to the illegality of the procedure by which the decision was made at a party convention several weeks earlier. In this case, the party’s review committee accepted the appeal and Ben-Eliezer was forced to compete in the primaries. Similarly, in 2006 an appeal was made against the decision to reserve the second spot on Likud’s list of candidates for M K Silvan Shalom. Illustrating a lack of consistency in these decisions, the party’s internal court rejected this appeal. In some cases, the decisions made internally by parties marked the end of the appeals process. But in others, petitioners did not accept the rejection of their cases and sought the intervention of national courts. This is not surprising, since some of the decisions made by the semi-judicial institutions seemed to have been biased. And the reaction of the national courts to petitions that were submitted against decisions of intra-party judicial bodies demonstrated that

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Rule-Making and the Administration of Party Primaries 109

indeed, their decisions were problematic from a nonpartisan point of view. District courts sometimes overruled the decisions made by the parties but the Supreme Court, displaying a doctrine of restraint, accepted most of the parties’ petitions and overturned the district court decisions. Nonetheless, the Court did express discomfort with some of these intra-party rulings (Rahat and Sher-Hadar 1999). When the 2008 results of candidate selection in Likud were made public, Netanyahu’s arch-rival within the party, Moshe Feiglin, was selected to the twentieth position on the list. Feiglin has campaigned for party leadership several times and challenged Likud policies from a radical right position. Subsequently, a candidate close to Netanyahu petitioned, claiming that another article in the primaries’ regulations book implied that the order of the candidates should be different. Likud’s election committee adopted this position and Feiglin was pushed down the list to an uncompetitive position. This decision, that affected the positioning of several candidates, led some of them to appeal to the district court. The district court adopted one of the petitions that was submitted against this decision. In res­ ponse, the party appealed to the Supreme Court, which overturned the decision of the district court. Thus the decision of the party’s semi-judicial body, that interpreted the rules to the benefit of Netan­ yahu, won the battle. This seems to be an example in which both sides had a case for a different interpretation of the results. Yet the fact that, at the beginning, Feiglin was announced as number twenty on the list seems to imply that the regulation that worked for him was re-examined only after the results were made public and somebody (likely the party chairman) decided that he could not live with them. Courts, as well as other state organs such as the State Comptroller, are becoming more involved in some aspects of monitoring primaries. This sometimes gives support to the attempts of parties to clean up their stables. For example, in the lead-up to Labour’s 2005 leadership primaries, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer asked the district court to nullify the party’s decision to disqualify the participation of thousands of members in the upcoming primaries. The district court rejected the petition, so Ben-Eliezer proceeded to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, which also rejected his request. Yet this is post-­ factum monitoring and support. The parties are still left with their limited resources and capacities and lack of motivation to monitor primaries in real time.

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C o n c l u s ion In this chapter we have highlighted the internal processes by which parties make rules about, administer, and oversee their primaries. In the absence of state regulation, parties are left to make their own rules and are largely responsible for their enforcement. One result is that rules are often made by individuals with an interest in the primary’s outcome and are easily changed in the lead up to each new contest. While the alteration of party selection rules may not, in itself, be inherently problematic, the above discussion highlights many ways in which rules can be manipulated to favour some candidates over others. Despite extensive cultural and institutional differences, we find evidence of party elites manipulating the rules at multiple stages of the primary election process in an attempt to advantage themselves, or their favoured candidate(s), in both countries. While a public outcry would surely erupt if this kind of behaviour was present during the lead-up to general elections, citizens and party members appear much more tolerant of the biases in rulemaking and administration of party primaries. Despite this apparent tolerance, manipulation of selection rules can undermine the legitimacy of what should be a fair and democratic event. Parties, however, have at times been hesitant to enforce the rules they adopt. Given the courts’ acknowledgement that primaries have significant impact beyond the parties themselves, a perceived inability to organize these in a fashion that ensures their integrity may result in greater judicial oversight of the process.

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5 Who Selects? Defining the Primary Selectorate

The previous chapter explored the politics surrounding the creation of the rules and regulations governing primaries for the selection of party leaders and candidates and the administration of voting on election day. Crucially left out of the discussion was the campaign itself. In this chapter we focus on defining the primary selectorate and look at voter recruitment practices. Campaigns in primary elections tend to differ from those of other, less inclusive, selection methods in a number of critical ways. Perhaps the biggest difference is that primary election campaigns often involve large-scale efforts to engage and sign up new party members. Less inclusive methods offer no incentive for candidates to recruit new members, as participation in these contests is typically limited to party elites. Primaries provide an opportunity for the candidates, and other interested actors, to construct the selectorate. For this reason, these campaigns often centre on and prioritize recruitment efforts as candidates attempt to build their extra-parliamentary organizations. Not all primaries, however, place the same emphasis on the recruitment of party members. As discussed in Chapter 1, there is considerable variation in who can vote in the different types of primary elections. Different kinds of primaries reflect different conceptions of party membership as well as different goals that the party wishes to accomplish. Accordingly, each type involves tradeoffs that the party must be willing to accept and each results in different campaign dynamics. It is worth considering the various types of primaries and the emphasis or value that each places on recruiting new members and supporters.

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D i f f e r e n t N o t i o n s o f P o l itic al Mobilization: T h e V a r i o u s T y p e s of Primaries Most inclusive are parties that invite all general-election voters to participate in the selection of party leaders or legislative candidates. Parties that have adopted open primaries typically view intra-party elections as a means of growing the party’s support base. In an age of membership and party-identification decline (Scarrow and Gezgor 2010; Whiteley 2011; van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012), some parties are seeking to entice individuals to engage with the party by providing new members, supporters, and even general election voters with decision-making authority within the party. As Scarrow (2014) suggests, parties view this inclusiveness as a potential pathway to more traditional membership. Ultimately the hope is that non-members, after participating in the primary, will form an attachment to the party and become members. At a minimum, the party will have an expansive list of potential supporters, campaign volunteers, and donors to contact during the next general election. Open and semi-open primary elections also provide the party with enhanced legitimacy and a public image of being as democratic as possible. Such public perceptions are particularly important if the party’s competitors have yet to adopt inclusive selection methods themselves. This course of action, however, is not without challenges. For one, many participants in an open primary are unlikely to maintain a long-term relationship with the party. In other words, the growth in involvement in intraparty affairs that the party experiences during an election is unsustainable, and declines until the next intra-party election (Carty 1991; 2013). Additionally, open primaries may act as a disincentive to traditional party membership. Dues-paying members may question what their long-term and financial commitment to the party provides them, given the decision-making authority that has been extended to the party’s non-member supporters. Not only can this act as a disincentive to joining the party in a traditional fashion, but it may also alienate existing long-term, committed party members. Another challenge associated with open primaries is the possibility of “party raiding” (Donovan 2008). This is a phenomenon in which members or supporters of one party participate in another party’s primary. The purpose is typically to support the weakest candidate, hoping he will compete in the general election – or at least

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Defining the Primary Selectorate 113

to create further divisions and chaos within the party. While there is some evidence to suggest that this kind of malicious and strategic voting is not widespread (see, for example, Sides, Cohen, and Citrin 2002), it is nonetheless a concern. In other cases, strategic participation by other parties’ supporters is less malicious and arises from a desire to participate in party politics. In one-party dominant systems, supporters of other parties have little agency in the general election, since the end result is predetermined. Participation in the dominant party’s leadership primary, however, provides these individuals with an opportunity to influence the selection of the prime minister, an opportunity not afforded to them during the general election (Cross 2008). Open and semiopen primaries therefore engage in the following tradeoff: party growth, however unstable or sustainable, is prioritized at the expense of committed members and despite the possibility of party raiding. At the other end of the primary zone are parties that only allow dues-paying members to participate. Within this closed primary type, additional restrictions may apply as well. In other words, some closed primaries may be more closed than others. A number of state parties in Australia, for instance, require not only long waiting periods (upwards of two years) but also a service record (having attended a number of local party meetings in the past year) for voting in candidate selection contests (Cross and Gauja 2014a). In contrast to open primaries, parties that have adopted a very closed primary are not concerned with quickly growing the party. By restricting participation to longstanding members, they are attempting to give value to party membership and signalling that members should be rewarded for their service and loyalty. These parties also see value in having the decision made by those with experience in  party affairs. Such restrictions on participation also ensure that “party raiding” (American term), “branch stacking” (Australian term), “hostile takeover” (Israeli term), “entryism” (British term), or “hijacking” (Canadian term) do not occur in the lead-up to the vote. A consequence of these restrictions, however, is that the party will not enjoy widespread growth as a result of its intra-party elections. While the increased value of party membership may incentivize some individuals to join, the “payoff” (i.e. participating in an intraparty contest) may be months or years away due to the restrictive nature of the process. Candidates have no incentive to spend time

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and resources recruiting new party members during the campaign period, since new members will be unable to participate in the primary. In other words, the selectorate is clearly defined at the outset of the campaign. As a result of a short or non-existent recruitment period, the party will never achieve the same immediate growth that parties using open primaries experience. In fact, such policies may actually result in a net decline in membership. Indeed, a number of Australian parties have experienced “branch stripping” as a result of the strict requirements for participation. This tradeoff is very different from that outlined above concerning the adoption of open primaries. In this case, the party rewards committed members, but loses the ability to use the contest to quickly and rapidly grow the supporter base. Most parties that have adopted primaries, however, have not chosen either of the above models. Both wide-open and highly restrictive closed primaries are relatively uncommon. Only one of the eighty-three parties that Pilet and Cross (2014) examined, for example, allowed all general-election voters to participate in the selection of the party’s leader. Likewise, only one party in Table 2.1 extends participation to all voters. Similarly, movement towards more inclusive selectorates means that cumbersome restrictions on participation such as party service or long tenure are likely to become less common. The trend appears to be towards parties adopting a semi-open or a closed primary that requires membership, but makes it readily attainable and does not place significant restrictions on membership participation (see Table 2.1).

C a n a d i a n a n d I s r a eli Parties: M o d e r at e  C l o s e d Primaries Canadian and Israeli parties have adopted closed primaries with varying requirements for voting eligibility. Although there is great variety in terms of membership deadlines, all of the federal parties in Canada allow recruitment after the primary campaign has begun. According to Cross and Crysler (2009, 189), the average length allowed for membership recruitment prior to leadership selection in Canadian parties between 1998 and 2006 at the national level was 109 days after the commencement of the campaign. These rules are typically not governed by party statute but rather are set at the outset of each primary.

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Defining the Primary Selectorate 115

An example is offered by the leadership contest held by the N D P in 2012. The party’s leadership became vacant in August 2011 and the leadership election was officially launched on 15 September. In  order to be eligible to vote, members had to join the party by 18 February 2012; voting began on 1 March and ended on 24 March. Two aspects of this particular primary – the long campaign period (six months from the official start) and the minimal waiting period for new members – are typical of the rules adopted by each of the major Canadian parties. Leadership campaigns in Israel do not have a typical length; length is dictated by the specific circumstances of each contest, and is prone to manipulation. The Party Law defines a “campaign period” for the purpose of monitoring and oversight of candidates’ donations and expenses. According to the law (clause 28.1), the period begins the day the party sets the date for the selection. This makes the length of campaigns very flexible. For instance, during the 2011 Labour leadership contest, the “official” campaign began about six months before the day of selection. In contrast, during the 2012 Likud leadership contest, the “official” campaign began only forty-six days before the primary. As the two examples above demonstrate, the time frame of primary campaigns is broad and is dependent on circumstances such as the influence of the incumbent leader (Kenig and Rahat 2014). According to the Israeli Labour Party constitution, the right to participate in intra-party selection is earned six months after becoming a member, but the constitution allows these rules to change from one contest to the next and waiting periods have ranged from as little as forty-five days to as long as ten months. Yet even when the party respects its constitution and holds to the six-month rule, the exact date of selection can affect who is eligible to vote. Indeed, one of the highlights of the 2013 leadership primary was the fight over the timing of election day. Shelly Yachimovich, the incumbent, was interested in preserving the existing selectorate and thus favoured an earlier announcement of the date in order to freeze membership, while her challenger favoured a later date in order to open the election to new members. While the party leader won this battle, she nevertheless lost the war; her challenger won even though he could not enjoy the support of the new members he and his affiliates recruited or intended to recruit. An important implication of minimal restrictions on members’ participation is that the selectorate may not exist at the beginning of

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the campaign. Since new members can often join throughout the campaign, the selectorate will change dramatically by the time voting begins. Similarly, a result of a lengthy campaign period is that candidates have a very strong incentive to spend the first months of  the campaign (or in the Israeli case the pre-campaign period) recruiting new members in an effort to build a selectorate favourable to them. Since party membership numbers are relatively low in the periods between personnel-recruitment contests, the relative ability of candidates to recruit large numbers of new members can often determine the outcome. This, of course, is very different than the campaign dynamics found in other types of intra-party elections. For open or very closed primaries, the selectorate is established at the outset of the election: it will include either all possible voters, or only those members who have already met certain requirements (service, length of membership, etc.). Recruitment does not play an important role. By contrast, Canadian and Israeli primary campaigns emphasize the recruitment and registration of new members. As described below, the number of newly recruited members often equals or surpasses the number of existing members, meaning that the candidate preferred by the new recruits often emerges victorious. A key point is that those who have the greatest interest in the results of the contest are also able to define and shape the selectorate. This almost singular focus on recruitment raises a number of questions about primary election campaigns in Canada and Israel that need to be explored. Membership Growth and Instant Members Through recruitment campaigns, the major parties in both countries are able to attract tens of thousands of new members and supporters in a relatively short time. This widespread growth in party membership translates into one of the principal democratic virtues of primaries: they provide vast numbers of ordinary citizens with a meaningful opportunity to participate in important political decision-making. In countries with an electoral system that lacks a personal element and restricts citizens to expressing their preferences among parties, primaries may serve to enhance democratic choice (Cross 2008). In almost all Israeli parties that have experimented with primary elections – leadership and legislative alike – the recruitment

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Defining the Primary Selectorate 117

campaign (mifkad, in Hebrew) forms a critical phase in the race. As Figure 5.1 illustrates, in many instances membership has doubled and even tripled in recruitment campaigns prior to primaries. Before Likud’s 1993 primary, for example, membership increased by 332 per cent (from 50,000 members to 216,000). Likewise, Labour’s 1996 primary witnessed a membership increase of 223 per cent (from 80,000 members the year prior to more than 260,000 by the end of the campaign). It is well established that membership patterns in Canadian parties are similar to those found in Israel. Parties typically have few members during the periods in between personnel selection contests. Membership numbers soar – often by more than 100 per cent – in the lead-up to local nomination and leadership contests. Figure 5.2 illustrates the increase in membership numbers during recent Canadian leadership primaries. In the governing parties, Liberal and Conservative memberships more than doubled, while the increase is smaller, though still significant, for the New Democrats. In the 2003 Liberal leadership primary, for instance, membership increased from 100,000 members prior to the start of the campaign to 531,000 by the time voting occurred, an increase of 431 per cent. The dynamics are similar in local candidate selection primaries in Canada. The membership deadline for these contests is often less than thirty days prior to the vote. The result is that constituencies with contested nominations see dramatic increases in their membership numbers as candidates engage in significant recruitment efforts. Carty, Cross, and Young (2000, 159) report that membership numbers increase by two and three times or more in local associations with contested nominations. The consistent and rapid growth that parties experience during primary elections poses both challenges and benefits for parties. At a basic level, parties gain legitimacy from maintaining a healthy extra-parliamentary membership (Scarrow 1996). Grassroots growth and excitement projects a sense of vibrancy from which parties derive enhanced validity. The Canadian Liberal party, for example, was happy to claim that its 2013 leadership primary had “the largest number of people to elect a leader of any political party in the history of Canada” (Pearce 2013). Similarly, Likud’s general manager proudly announced that following the 2002 recruitment campaign, “Likud is now the largest political movement in Israel in

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Defining the Primary Selectorate 119

all times. This is an unprecedented public demonstration of trust that confirms the position of Likud as a ruling party” (Verter 2002). During each primary election, parties routinely publicize their membership numbers, claiming to be true grassroots organizations with widespread support. Parties actively encourage candidates to recruit more and more members before the election so that they may appear more inclusive than their competitors. This is especially important given that parties are often viewed as hierarchical, elitedominated, and sometimes impenetrable by ordinary citizens. Parties also benefit from membership growth to help them prepare for the next general election. Membership surges like those depicted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 provide political parties with a robust list of potential supporters, voters, activists, and donors that they can call upon in the general election. An up-to-date and centralized list such as this offers them an organizational head start on their competition. Parties using less inclusive selection methods typically do not engage in such widespread extra-parliamentary campaigning, and therefore do not expand and build on their existing grassroots organizations to the same extent. While costly and time-consuming endeavours, primaries have benefits for parties that can have implications for the health and success of the party after the primary has concluded. Finally, as discussed in Chapter 7, parties may also benefit financially from the increased membership numbers. A membership fee is typically charged, so tens of thousands of new members represent a significant amount of revenue for the party. While parties may benefit from enhanced legitimacy, additional sources of fundraising, and election preparedness, there are also challenges associated with extensive and rapid membership growth. The first challenge pertains to the commitment of these newly enrolled members and supporters. The incentive for mass registration often creates a situation in which membership is related to the selection event, not to the party. In other words, many members join not out of support for the party but instead to support specific candidates. Young and Cross (2002b) find that more than eight in ten members of Canadian parties joined for the purpose of participating in a personnel recruitment contest. In a survey that was conducted in Israel, in response to the question “Why did you join the party?” more than half of the respondents declared that one of their reasons for joining was to support a particular candidate in the

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primaries (Kenig et al. 2014). This does not create an enduring relationship between the party and these new members. Many of these members disappear as soon as the primaries are over. In the Canadian case (and also to our best estimation concerning the Israeli case), it appears that it is not a consistent group of casual partisans that join, exit, and re-join the party following the candidate selection cycle. Instead, the complexion of the inflated party membership reflects the communities from which candidates are able to recruit – something that changes over time and reflects the particular characteristics and civil society attachments of the candidate. These new recruits may be more closely aligned with a particular candidate than with the party, which can fuel a “personalization” of politics. This challenge is considered more fully in the concluding chapter. Thus, while the party certainly benefits from growth, enrolling new members as the prologue to a primary election may create an uncommitted layer of members who perceive their involvement as temporary. This layer (often referred to as “instant members” or “casual partisans”) has the same participatory rights as the more faithful layer: those who regard membership as more than the right to vote in primaries. By providing new members and supporters with the same participatory rights in internal party affairs as long-term and committed activists, party service and a history within the party are deemed unimportant. Existing members may perceive the influx of new members as diluting their voice in internal party politics. Recruitment Tactics and Oversight The ability of parties and candidates to recruit tens of thousands (sometimes hundreds of thousands) of new members in a matter of months raises the issue of how these individuals are recruited. Although large numbers are recruited through legitimate means, primary contests in Canada and Israel routinely involve claims that candidates and their supporters have acted unethically (and sometimes illegally) in recruiting scores of new recruits, sometimes without their knowledge. The need for candidates to recruit large numbers of members in a short time often results in the emergence of “vote contractors” (the Israeli kind) or “vote brokers” (the Canadian kind). Very often these actors attempt to register as many members as possible on

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Defining the Primary Selectorate 121

behalf of a preferred candidate. Not only are potentially questionable tactics problematic for parties engaging in what should be open and transparent elections, but these practices also call into question whether parties can regulate and monitor this level of party growth. Questionable Recruitment Practices Canadian leadership contests, even before the introduction of party primaries, have had a long history of questionable recruitment practices. Examples include the recruitment of residents in a men’s homeless shelter in Montreal on behalf of Brian Mulroney’s 1976 candidacy for the leadership of the Conservative party. News reports suggested that these men had their party memberships paid for by the Mulroney campaign, and were enticed to vote by promises of free food and drink (Zeisman 2000). Other candidates have been criticized for recruiting members of youth sports teams and highschool students, again with promises of free pizza and drink. Joe Clark’s 1983 campaign team, for instance, was reported to have signed up twenty-five youth (some as young as fourteen) from a local boys and girls club to participate in leadership selection (Bauch 1993). Similarly, Courtney (1995, 149) notes that there have been a number of reports of “Tiny Tories” – that is nine- and ten-year-olds – being recruited to participate in the selection process. In other cases, the incentives that leadership candidates have used to recruit members have been more substantial than beer and pizza. Sawatsky (1991, 414), for example, describes how a leadership candidate in the P C party once offered a “$500 cash donation to a senior citizens’ centre in return for 100 able bodies who agreed to sign a P C membership card and vote the right way.” Nor are these examples highly unusual in Canada. In fact, this was one of the main reasons that a 1991 Royal Commission recommended the adoption of primary elections for leadership selection (Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing 1991, 280). As we will see, however, primaries have not proved to be an effective antidote to corruption. If anything, closed primaries may have exacerbated the problem. With the recruitment campaign playing such a central role, candidates face greater pressure to sign up as many new members and supporters as they can, often using whatever strategies work.

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In a 2000 primary election for the leadership of the Canadian Alliance party, supporters of one candidate signed up 2,800 new members from the Gaspé region of Quebec – a remote area with no history of support for the party whatsoever. These numbers surprised observers, and media investigations determined “that many of those new members weren’t aware they belonged to the party,” and when phoned, more than half of the new members “had no idea what the Canadian Alliance was” (CBC 2000). In a similar case, an NDP campaign worker in a 2009 provincial leadership election was found to have signed up 1,100 new members from First Nations band lists without the individuals knowing they had joined the party (CBC 2012). In the end, it was not the party that sanctioned the worker and exposed the fraud but rather the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). After receiving a number of complaints, the RCMP investigation resulted in a conviction for forging documents. A recent leadership election in the British Columbia N D P reveals a number of similar problems. After the candidates recruited more than 11,000 new members in a relatively short time, complaints began to surface from community members and the candidates themselves. An internal audit of the membership revealed a number of “irregularities” in 1,400 of the 11,000 new memberships. In other words, there were problems associated with at least 13 per cent of all new members recruited during the campaign. The investigation ultimately found that 1,301 members were signed up without their knowledge, and another 108 already belonged to different provincial parties (Luman 2000). In these types of cases, lax rules relating to online, postal, fax, and proxy balloting allow campaigns to cast ballots on behalf of members who may not have actually joined the party. Parties have tried to prevent these abuses by adopting rules requiring that members sign their own membership forms and pay their own membership fees. In addition to adding members without their knowledge, largescale ethnic mobilization has long been a part of candidate and leadership contests in Canada. Candidates needing to sign up thousands of members realize this is difficult to accomplish through individual recruitment. Instead, they often seek the support of leaders and vote-brokers in hierarchical ethnic and religious communities who can be relied upon to mobilize large numbers (Cross 2004). As Courtney suggests, candidates often target ethnic communities that have a reputation for being “close-knit and often intensely loyal”

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Defining the Primary Selectorate 123

(Courtney 1995, 112). In candidate selection contests, this can result in a local party association seeing its membership swamped by busloads of new members arriving at their first party meeting for the sole purpose of supporting a particular candidate. Every recent general election includes complaints from long-time members that their candidate selection was “hijacked” by non-Canadian, non-­ English-speaking immigrants mobilized for the sole purpose of supporting a favoured candidate (Offman 2014). This has been particularly pronounced in the Asian and Sikh communities. While some argue that this is an efficient way of socializing new arrivals into the political process, Cross and Young (2004) find that very few of these members maintain association with the party. The mass recruitment of certain ethnic groups can also result in a temporary party selectorate that is highly unrepresentative of the party’s actual electorate. This issue is explored in greater detail below. Similar actors – known as “vote contractors” – are active on the Israeli scene. These actors view the primaries as an opportunity to promote specific ideology and interests. As was the case for Likud and Kadima until recently, and is still the case for Labour, the candidates and the vote contractors keep the membership forms in their possession until the last moment so they are not exposed to their competitors. On “D-day,” the party witnesses the submission of thousands of membership forms. These are processed within a few weeks so that all candidates have a (rather limited) chance to identify the full selectorate before voting day. Recruitment can also be bought in return for support of policies that favour specific vote contractors, and from leaders of unions, ideological blocks, and private interests. Leaders of strongly organized unions sometimes act as vote contractors in the large Israeli parties, promising the votes of their members in return for support of policies that will preserve and enhance their status. Motorcyclists and dairy farmers, for example, organized mass registration in Likud prior to the 2012 primaries to fight an increase in the price of motorcycle insurance and to counter an attempt to reduce milk prices. The demand for longer tenure for party members as a condition for participation in the selection event – which was adopted (and later also implemented) by Likud and Kadima in the last few years – seems to have somewhat complicated the work of the vote contractors. They can no longer hold the membership forms in their possession until the last moment, and they have to ensure that membership

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is sustained for a longer period. That is, vote contracting is not a  ­one-shot project anymore but is about nurturing members. In Likud’s candidate selection primaries prior to the 2013 general election, only members with sixteen months’ tenure could vote. If this experience can teach us anything, it appears that vote contracting did not disappear but became centralized in the hands of two strong groups within the party, the right-wingers (“Jewish Leadership”) and the head of the Israel Aircraft Industries union. Thus, the question may be – if there is indeed a strong link between the length of waiting periods and the type of vote contracting – which is worse: centralized or decentralized vote-contracting? Oversight and Accountability A number of cases of ineffective party oversight have, in recent years, served to delegitimize the primary process and to call into question the integrity of party membership lists and modern recruitment practices. In 2012, for example, the executive director of the New Brunswick Conservative Party registered his dog in the province’s Liberal leadership election. When his voting package arrived in the mail, he cast his pet’s ballot online (Brownlee 2012). Despite attempting to complete a verification of all 19,000 names on the voters list, the party acknowledged that it was unable to do so (Bissett 2012). Similarly, a cat joined the British Columbia Liberal party in 2011 to vote in the party’s leadership contest (Hunter 2011). As in the case above, the party did not have the staff or resources to verify the 35,000 new party memberships that were sold during the campaign. These cases raise concerns about the ability of parties to adequately scrutinize and vet new members that have signed up for the sole purpose of participating in the party primary. Describing the Israeli case, Hofnung (2005, 77) explains that “In the absence of mechanisms to eliminate fictitious membership engineered by vote contractors (who have also been able to control the ‘preferences’ of their cohorts), candidates have had to participate in a very costly and legally dangerous electoral game.” Parties have, however, taken some steps to ensure the accuracy of their membership lists. In 2005, for example, the Israeli Labour Party nominated a committee, headed by a former judge, to ensure that all new members – who joined on the eve of a leadership contest – were recruited according to the Party Law and party regulations. Almost one-half

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of the 91,211 new memberships were rejected on various grounds. A third of these rejections resulted from a failure of the party apparatus to register or charge membership fees on time (an administrative failure), while two-thirds were rejected for reasons labelled as “substantive.” These included breaches of the Party Law such as the payment of membership fee by others (22 per cent of the annulled forms), and also fraudulent signatures (22 per cent of the annulled forms; Labour Party Journal 2005). It would be reasonable to believe that this committee opened a Pandora’s box that exists in many more cases, one that parties usually prefer to keep closed. Similar irregularities in Labour Party membership forms were found in 2011. More than 15,000 were rejected, mainly due to problems with the payment of membership fees. In addition, dozens of membership forms were affiliated with the same telephone number, clear evidence of the work of a vote contractor. Who Is Recruited? The previous sections have highlighted a number of issues concerning the commitment of newly recruited party members and the tactics that are used to sign them up. The massive amount of recruitment taking place during primary elections raises a variety of additional questions, such as: who is joining the party, and how representative are the newly enrolled members? An unrepresentative selectorate is problematic because democracy is based on the notion that elected politicians are the agents of their voters (whether as delegates or as trustees). If an elected politician is an agent of two significantly different principals, this may create a problematic chain of delegation. Of course, less inclusive selectorates – party delegates and party elites – can also be unrepresentative in similar ways, although it is sometimes easier to balance their composition. The problem is that the inclusive selectorate of party members, and perhaps supporters, may claim the legitimacy it does not deserve of being representative of the population of party voters. While data are sparse in some instances, the following section addresses what we know regarding these issues and examines the characteristics of those individuals who are recruited to join parties during the campaign period. We begin with a short discussion of the representativeness of other, more exclusive selectorates. The P P G is a body that selected (and

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still selects) leaders in several Anglo-Saxon democracies. Selection in the party room has the potential to represent the party’s electorate if the elected members in the legislature are reflective of the makeup of the broader society. While certainly possible, studies of national parliaments demonstrate that their composition is often lacking in diversity (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Docherty 1997; Reynolds 1999). Therefore, selection in the party room is often very unrepresentative of the broader electorate as a number of groups, such as women and ethnic minorities, typically struggle to get elected to national legislatures. Other groups are left out too. White (2005) notes that as a result of their full-time paid position, there are no poor or unemployed members of Parliament. Thus, by the very nature of the institution, some groups are excluded from the selection process. In S MP systems, regional representation may also be a concern. If a party has few or no elected members from a particular region, that region will be underrepresented in the decision-making process. So long as legislatures continue to lack diversity, selection by the P P G will remain largely unrepresentative. In fact, a lack of geographic balance in the PPG was an important factor for many parties in deciding to expand the selection beyond this group. For example, this was the case for the U K Conservatives and Liberals, the Canadian Liberals, and Ireland’s Fine Gael (Cross and Blais 2012a). Somewhat parallel is the selection of candidates through nomination committees. These are small bodies that interview candidates, deliberate, and decide on candidacies. The composition of such committees may or may not be representative, depending on their size and the ways they are designed and their composition ratified. What we know from the Israeli case (nomination committees were the selectorates in Israeli parties until the 1970s, and in some cases until the 1980s) is that these committees were far from being representative in terms of proportionality (that is, for example, half men and half women). Yet they did try, in order to gain legitimacy, to include representatives of various intra-party groups. Representation was primarily based on power and social norms; we would expect to find representatives of the senior figures in the party and also some women and representatives of relevant intraparty sectors (Brichta 1977). In contrast to selection by the P P G , other non-primary selection methods such as delegated conventions that were typical of

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leadership selection in Canada have the ability to ensure greater representativeness in the selection process. Parties that so desire are able to determine and shape the socio-demographic composition of conventions. For example, concerns regarding sufficient representation of women and youth in the selectorate resulted in the national parties in Canada establishing quotas requiring that the pool of delegates selected by each electorate include a minimum number from each of these groups. The result was that parties constructed convention selectorates that included significant numbers of young voters and achieved near gender parity. Courtney (1995, 135) notes that the Liberal convention in 1919 had only fifty-one female delegates out of nearly 1000. By 1990, however, the party was able to ensure that the percentage of female delegates reached 45 per cent. One of the most important cleavages in the Canadian context is  region. Parties have gone to great lengths to ensure equitable regional representation in their leadership selectorates. When selection was made at party conferences, the Liberals and Conservatives adopted rules ensuring an equal number of delegates were included from each geographic constituency (Courtney 1995). Given the significant regional variance in party support, this meant that some local party associations with very few members had the same say in the leadership choice as did those with large, vibrant associations. In Israel from the 1970s to the 1990s, party delegates often selected both leaders and candidates. These delegates, however, were not selected for this sole purpose. They were members of party institutions (central committees, conventions) who were selected by party members for a term of several years and met to decide additional issues such as policies and joining and leaving coalition and electoral alliances. While party regulations did not dictate proportionality of representation, they did set a certain minimum for the representation of social groups, sectors, and interests to ensure their presence. Selection by the Party Membership In closed primaries, the composition of the selectorate is largely beyond the control of the party and ultimately depends on who is recruited during the campaign. Rahat and Sher-Hadar (1999) identified thirteen Israeli towns in which the number of Labour Party members was larger than the actual number of voters in the 1996 election. A shared characteristic of most of these towns – low

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socio-economic standing – indicates that media allegations con­ cerning patron-client methods in the registration campaigns were grounded in reality. These practices continued in 2009: Arabs – who are especially prone to patron-client pressures due to their low socioeconomic position and ethnic minority status – comprised 14 per cent of Labour’s and Kadima’s members, but only 4 and 2 per cent of their general-election voters respectively. Table 5.1 presents the demographic characteristics of party members and voters in the three Israeli parties that held primaries prior to the 2009 elections. The selectorates are clearly not representative of the parties’ general election supporters. In most cases the bias is in the expected direction. That is, women, youth, the less educated, and poor people are under-represented among members in comparison to the parties’ general-election voters (Norris and Lovenduski 1997). But an interesting phenomenon is the over-representation of Arabs within the ranks of Kadima and Labour members. This is surprising if we compare this to data about the share of minorities in party membership in other countries. That is, minorities are usually under-represented among party members (Norris and Lovenduski 1997). Yet we know that, in the U K and Canada, minorities are over-represented in specific nomination and leadership votes, and that this is often a result of patron-client networks recruiting them for the sole purpose of selecting a specific candidate. The patron-client relationship seems also to be the basis for relatively widespread Arab registration. We do not have data regarding the representativeness of voters in Canadian leadership primaries at the federal level, although data on membership in the national parties suggests that members are disproportionately male, older, and from higher socio-economic groups (Cross and Young 2004). Some data are available from provincial primaries and this suggests that the electorates are fairly representative of the general population. For example, Stewart (1997) finds that the electorate for the Alberta Conservatives’ 1992 leadership primary was more representative in terms of gender and other socio-economic indicators than were delegates to the party’s 1985 leadership convention (though the primary voters were older). However, Cross’s (2002) examination of Liberal and Conservative leadership elections in the province of New Brunswick suggests that closed primary elections may not always be more representative. Comparing the 1997 Conservative closed primary to the 1998

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Table 5.1  Demographics of party members and voters in Israel (%, by party) Party members

Party voters

Difference

Likud

36

48

-12

Kadima

36

58

-22

Labour Party

32

46

-14

Female

Arabs Likud

1

1

–

Kadima

14

2

+12

Labour Party

14

4

+10

Likud

12

25

-13

Kadima

18

23

-5

9

18

-9

Likud

42

27

+15

Kadima

41

33

+8

Labour Party

48

31

+17

Likud

26

41

-15

Kadima

28

38

-10

Labour Party

23

48

-25

18–30 age group

Labour Party Holders of an academic degree

Below-average monthly expenses

Source: Based on Kenig, Rahat, Philippov, and Tuttnauer 2014.

delegated Liberal convention, Cross (2002, 47) found no significant differences when considering the sex, age, education, and family income of selectors. In fact, this particular case reveals that women and young voters were underrepresented in each process, while those with higher levels of income and education were overrepresented. Where possible, Canadian parties have attempted to ensure greater representativeness. While this is more difficult, and at times controversial, to accomplish in more inclusive methods, Canadian parties have managed to include region in their primary selection models. The Conservatives, for example, pioneered a primary process in which each geographic constituency is granted one hundred votes in the leadership contest. This means that members’ votes are counted at the constituency level and essentially converted to percentages of support for each candidate. The result is that votes cast

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in areas of a party’s strength have significantly less influence on the contest’s outcome than do those votes that are cast where the party is weak. For example, in the 1998 Conservative election, some votes counted ninety-six times more than others (Stewart and Carty 2002; Cross 2004, 95). While this violates the principle of one-person onevote, the party decided that equitable regional representation was a more important concern. The federal Liberals copied this method in 2013. The selection method pioneered by the Conservatives is a primary election response or solution to the question of how best to manage regional cleavages in the selection process. While such an approach may be useful for other federal and multi-level democracies that struggle with regional tensions, this does alter the dynamics of the campaign. At the very core, the recruitment of massive numbers of new party members remains an essential component of the campaign even in regionally weighted systems. However, recruitment campaigns must now be carried out in a very different way. Rather than focusing on the total number of supporters, candidates need to spread their recruitment efforts evenly across the entire country. Having regional strongholds and signing up thousands of new members in a single area will not translate into the widespread support that is needed to perform well under this system. While this may be challenging for individual candidates, it provides the party as a whole with a number of benefits. First, a geographically weighted primary can be a nationalizing force for the party. Candidates are required to build the party’s extra-parliamentary organization from coast to coast, mobilizing citizens from every region of the country. Second, this is a useful exercise for parties to engage in prior to a general election, particularly in countries with geographically defined electoral systems. This weighted model ensures that the party has potential supporters, voters, and donors across the entire country instead of merely pockets of support where the party is strongest. Overall, concerns about the representativeness of primary selectorates are not unfounded. The Israeli case demonstrates a considerable difference between party selectorates in primaries and general-election voters. In particular, youth, women, and less-­ educated individuals are underrepresented. While there is interparty variation, this is the case for all of the major parties in Israel. Evidence in the Canadian case is less clear and often mixed. While

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some studies have demonstrated primaries to be more representative than other methods, other studies have shown no significant differences. This is likely a result of flexible selectorates that are not defined at the outset of the campaign and thus the degree of representativeness is dependent upon who is recruited. While Canadian parties have taken steps to ensure greater regional representation in their primaries, it is difficult, if not impossible, to do the same for other groups. Double Membership, Insincere Membership, and Party Raiding In every primary, especially those with open and liberal registration rules, concerns are raised about the possibility of infiltration of supporters of other parties who might participate for the purpose of mischief-making. To discourage this behaviour, Israeli Party Law and some parties in Canada have adopted rules that forbid their members from simultaneously belonging to another party. It is quite hard to enforce these rules, however, since the parties’ membership rolls are not publicly available, and thus it is difficult to verify whether a new member also belongs to another party unless the state conducts an audit (as was done in Israel in 1996) or parties cooperate with one another (as has happened several times in Israel). The phenomenon of double membership – simultaneous membership in more than one party – appears to be more prevalent in Israel. In 1996, for example, it was found that 8 per cent (22,237 out of 277,333) of Labour members were also members of other parties (Rahat and Sher-Hadar 1999). In 2008, Likud and Kadima crosschecked their membership lists and discovered that 3,691 people belonged to both parties (Somfalvi 2008). In 2011, it was reported that 5.9 per cent (about 5,000 out of 85,000) of Labour members were also members of other parties (Wolf 2011). A year later, it was reported that 2,800 citizens were simultaneously members of Likud and the Jewish Home (Yahav 2013). In a survey conducted in 2010, 12 per cent of Likud members, 15 per cent of Kadima members, and 17 per cent of Labour members declared that they did not vote for “their” party in the previous general election (Kenig et al. 2014). In addition, 27 per cent of Labour members – who have participated in the selection of their party’s leader and candidates since 1992 – reported that while they

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were members, they voted for another party. In Likud – a party in which members have selected the leader since 1993 – 26 per cent indicated that while belonging to the party they had voted for another party in the general election (Dahaf Survey 2010). In many cases, these numbers do not result from an attempt by supporters of other parties to raid competitors, but they are still what we consider “insincere” members in that they are recruited by special interests for the purpose of seeking a preferred policy outcome. For example, union members who want to defend a status quo that benefits them (a monopoly, for example) have been recruited en masse. Such people can be recruited to join more than one party, or a party other than their first preference, for the sole purpose of voting for candidates supporting their policy preferences. On occasion there are also ideological raids during primary contests. For several years it has been widely known that right-wingers join Likud to influence primaries, but do not vote for the party in general elections. This “Trojan Horse” strategy is particularly evident among Jewish settlers in the occupied territories who join Likud in order in order to exert pressure on the party’s M Ks and prevent them from moving to the centre of the political map. The activists who recruit them explicitly say that they do not have to vote for Likud in general elections (Kenig, Philippov, and Rahat 2013). Apparently this strategy works well, as is evident from the fact that in several settlements there are more Likud members than Likud voters. In 2012, there was a (failed) attempt to counter this pattern when an organized movement among leftist voters attempted to recruit supporters to join Likud for the same reason: to influence it from within. As recounted earlier, during the 1998 Canadian P C leadership contest one candidate, David Orchard, had little affiliation with the party and was opposed to the recent accomplishment that most members were proud of: the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Orchard signed up thousands of new members who had no prior connection to the party and were largely attracted by his opposition to the trade accord. His principal opponent in the race, Joe Clark, criticized this recruitment effort, and referred derisively to Orchard’s supporters as “tourists” in the party (Stewart and Carty 2002). While not as stark as the Israeli case, a survey of Canadian party members conducted by Cross and Young in the spring of 2000 highlights similar issues. For example, the survey found that one in five

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members had belonged to a different political party in the past. Additionally, 9 per cent of Conservative party members, 7 per cent of Liberal members, and 6 per cent of New Democrat party members did not vote for their own party in the previous general election. The same year, an internal Liberal party audit in the province of British Columbia revealed that 3,069 individuals on the N D P membership list were also members of the province’s Liberal party (Luman 2000). Since parties typically guard their membership lists tightly, it is unknown how widespread the phenomenon of double membership truly is. In a more recent Canadian example, six-term Conservative MP Rob Anders accused “temporary Tories” of hijacking his attempt to win the party’s legislative nomination in the electoral district of Calgary Signal Hill. Anders accused his opponent of signing up a number of members from other political parties, individuals who would never consider voting for the party in a general election. Speaking to the media, Anders said that “My opponent has signed up people who will not vote for Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party in the next federal election. They are what we call temporary Tories” (C B C 2014). This type of strategic behaviour is not always a sign of maliciousness. In some Canadian regions there have been long periods of one-party dominance, as with the Alberta Conservatives, who governed from 1971 to 2015 without interruption. In these cases supporters of other parties often desire to participate in the party primary, as they view it as their only real opportunity to influence the choice of premier. In fact, this may be viewed as one of the democratic virtues of primary elections. In an electoral system that inflates majority governments, alienates thousands of voters, and maintains one-party dominance, primaries provide citizens with an opportunity to influence the selection of their local member of Parliament or even the prime minister/premier. Despite the democratic virtue of primaries (an expansive selectorate provides a meaningful opportunity for participation), there is a cost. With less inclusive methods, the party can ensure that the selectorate is comprised of committed members. As illustrated in this chapter, this is not the case with primaries. In fact, primary selectorates are likely to include members of other political parties, less committed individuals who have joined solely to participate in the primary, and who may be unrepresentative in a number of other

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ways. The issue for parties conducting primaries is whether the newly recruited will select a candidate who is acceptable to the party’s committed activists, and particularly to the P P G whose confidence the leader requires to succeed in the job.

C o n c l u s ion The vast majority of primary systems that have been adopted in Western parliamentary democracies restrict participation to party members. Parties differ, however, in terms of how they define membership for the purposes of participation in primary elections. The Canadian and Israeli cases suggest that in many closed and semiopen primaries, the recruitment of new members and supporters becomes the central focus and strategy of the campaign. This occurs because candidates are able to build a favourable selectorate through recruitment of large numbers of new supporters, and outside groups are able to influence the party’s decision by joining en masse to support a candidate who shares their policy preferences. When considering the recruitment and mobilization efforts that take place during primary campaigns, we have highlighted a number of concerns. First, in primaries with liberal membership requirements there is always the potential for party raiding or hijacking or extensive and relatively easy vote-contracting, both of which can undermine the integrity of the selection process. Evidence from Israel and Canada reveals that this may be occurring on a modest scale. In Israel in particular, a sizeable minority of party members participate in the internal selection process but do not vote for the party in general elections. Second, since recruitment is prioritized over other aspects of the campaign, and because parties have limited ability to ensure compliance with their regulation of these contests, there is both an incentive and opportunity for underhanded and questionable tactics. Vote contactors/brokers in each country sometimes sign up hundreds or even thousands of members without their knowledge, circumvent party rules concerning registration, and so on. Related to this is the concern that these instant members have little attachment to the party and are largely unrepresentative of the party’s electorate. Giving voice to tens of thousands of newcomers in the primary also undercuts the value of membership for those who remain loyal members between these contests.

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Finally, there is a genuine concern, similar to that raised in the previous chapter, about whether parties are adequately equipped to monitor and regulate the recruitment of thousands of new primary voters within a relatively short time. While extreme, cases of cats and dogs being registered to vote in Canadian leadership primaries call this into question. Although some parties have created internal committees to ensure that recruitment efforts are meeting the party’s guidelines (see, for example, the case of the Labour party in Israel in 2005), oversight and enforcement remains minimal. While the concerns noted above are undoubtedly serious, primaries bring benefits as well. Chief among them is their ability to mobilize and engage thousands of citizens. As this chapter demonstrates, primary election campaigns provide the party (through the candidates) with the opportunity to reach out to a large number of people, persuade them to enroll and participate in the intra-party election, and in doing so expand the democratic engagement of citizens by providing them the ability to affect important events including, at times, the selection of the prime minister. Furthermore, primaries allow the party to present itself as open, democratic, and popular, challenging the view of parties as elite-dominated hierarchical institutions. Primaries, however, do more than just contribute to the democratic well-being of a polity. They also have benefits for the parties themselves. As detailed in the next two chapters, holding a primary election provides political parties with significant fundraising opportunities, prepares them for upcoming general elections by encouraging candidates to build a solid extra-parliamentary organization, and strengthens the party’s health and vibrancy by establishing an expansive list of potential voters, supporters, donors, and activists who can be called upon to assist in future electoral efforts.

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6 Primary Campaigns and Their Outcomes

Primary campaigns, in which candidates must reach thousands, tens of thousands, and sometimes hundreds of thousands of potential selectors across large geographic expanses, are inherently different from other contests in which voting is restricted to party elites. While primaries are intra-party affairs, they more closely resemble general elections than candidate and leadership contests held among more exclusive selectorates. Having considered, in previous chapters, party rule-making, oversight, and voter recruitment, we turn now to the behaviour of the selectorate and candidates. We briefly consider whether campaigns are about policy or about electability, as well as their impact on the behaviour of candidates. We also explore the levels of participation, the degree of competitiveness, the representational outcomes of primary elections (that is, who gets selected), and whether these differ from other selection methods. In the next chapter, we consider the financial aspects of primary campaigns.

T h e C o n t e n t o f t he Campaign The principal question here is whether primary election campaigns are about substance (i.e. policy), the candidates’ personalities, perceptions of electability, or simply about organizational strength in terms of recruiting new members and delivering them to the polls. Intra-party competition is almost naturally less about policies and ideology than is a general election (though the US example suggests this is not always the case) and more about personalities and whether they best serve the organizational and electoral needs of the party. Here we examine whether the different nature of the selectorates

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resulting from primaries, as opposed to other selection methods, results in different factors being the focus of these contests. As might be expected, there is evidence demonstrating that different selectorates prioritize different factors in their vote calculus. When considering the P P G, the literature has identified electability as the central determinant of vote choice (Alderman and Carter 1995; Stark 1996; Heppell 2008; Cross and Blais 2012a). While electability is multifaceted, its dimensions often include being a strong campaigner, having a strong extra-parliamentary base of support, and the ability to raise the necessary funds to support a campaign effort. A focus on electability when parliamentarians make the choice is hardly surprising, given that the success of the parliamentary party is often linked to the electability of the new leader. Without their jobs on the line, conference delegates and other mid-level party elites typically place somewhat less emphasis on electability. Consistent with May’s (1973) law, these individuals tend to focus more on ideological positions and policy concerns (Krause and LeDuc 1979; Frizzell and McPhail 1979; Perlin 1980; Brady and Johnston 1988; Sasada 2010). Unlike parliamentarians, who are often willing to sacrifice ideological concerns for electability, party activists are generally more extreme in their views and more concerned with policy than with immediate electoral success (Cross and Blais 2012a). While limited outside of the United States, the available evidence suggests that primary voters cast their ballots according to similar considerations as the PPG. The literature suggests that membership votes often come down to questions of electability (Latouche 1992; Fitzgerald, Kennedy, and Lyons 2004; Quinn, 2010). Like the PPG, these individuals are more moderate in their policy views (in comparison with activists) and are more focused on winning future elections than changing the direction of the party. In their analysis, Cross and Blais (2012a, 153) conclude that “policy concerns may be most important in contests dominated by party activists at conventions while more casual partisans, who participate in membership votes, and MPs, voting in the party room, may be equally or more concerned with questions of party unity and electability.” This conclusion is consistent with Brady and Johnston’s study that compared American primary voters and Canadian convention delegates. Overall, Brady and Johnston (1988) find that ideological preferences are more important to vote choice among convention delegates than among primary voters.

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The emphasis that primary voters place on electability is reflected in how candidates run their campaigns. First, these campaigns rarely have a strong policy component to them. Instead, the focus tends to be on party strategy and tactics for upcoming elections. Second, with little policy differentiation, candidates focus on their own personal skills and qualities to differentiate themselves. Finally, as discussed in the previous chapter, candidates focus much of their campaign effort on recruiting as many new members as possible, not only to build a favourable electorate but also to demonstrate that they have both widespread support and the capacity to build an effective extraparliamentary organization. Research on the Canadian parties shows that primaries for legislative candidates rarely include a policy dimension. Cross (2002) surveyed local party associations following the 1993 election and found few where the policy positions of candidates played any significant role in their nomination (Cross 2007). Similarly, only a minority of local associations with contested nominations even reported holding a debate among the candidates. Leadership campaigns in  Canada typically have a greater policy dimension, as candidate debates are now routine. It is unclear, however, how influential these debates are, considering that a majority of voters are recruited to the party during the contest. Presumably the large majority of these voters are already committed to the candidate who recruited them and will not easily be swayed by what occurs during the campaign. Of course, uncommitted voters and long-time party members may be influenced by these events. However, candidates typically avoid emphasizing policy distinctions and instead focus on issues of strategy and tactics. This is hardly surprising given that members/supporters tend to prioritize these issues over others. As Cross (2014) notes, this was most certainly the case in the 2012 N D P leadership primary. The issue that defined this campaign was whether the party should temper its ideological positions in order to appeal to a greater number of voters in the next election, or the party should remain committed to its ideological principles. While this issue resulted in vigorous debates that clearly differentiated some of the candidates, the focus was on which approach would best serve the party’s strategic interests and, as a result, there was little substantive differentiation between the candidates on questions of policy. Instead of talking about policy, primary candidates, both legis­ lative and leadership alike, spend their time emphasizing their

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Primary Campaigns and Their Outcomes 139

personal qualities. Principal among these is how well each candidate can mobilize new party members. The strength of a candidate’s networks – family, friends, and co-workers – therefore becomes much more relevant to the campaign than does policy and ideology. In leadership selection in Israel, candidates may be differentiated according to their stands on the main issues of Israeli politics. Even if the candidates think alike, the race for leadership is about candidacy for prime minister and, as a result, who would do better in promoting common policies and therefore stand the better chance of being elected. Still, personalization is also a common feature of Israeli primary campaigns. Obviously leadership and candidate selection are personality contests, whatever selectorate is used. Yet the wider the selectorate, the more explicit is the personal aspect of the contest. Rahat and Sheafer (2007) demonstrate that the adoption of more inclusive selectorates – in this case, the replacement of the exclusive nomination committees with selection by party delegates – started a process of personalization of Israeli politics. Evidence for this can be found in the realm of political communication, as well as in changes in the behaviour of politicians and voters (Balmas et al. 2014). That is, the adoption of primaries has accelerated the personalization of Israeli politics. In candidate selection, interest politics and populist politics can come into play much more easily. In multi-vote contests in Israeli candidate-selection primaries, in order to get news coverage and the support of organized groups willing to register their members as party members, candidates have incentives to differentiate themselves from the crowd by being identified with particular issues or interests. This has encouraged incumbents to submit tens and even hundreds of private-member bills. They have also been known to petition the Supreme Court (Dotan and Hofnung 2005) and voice dissenting opinions in the mass media to get exposure and differentiate themselves from competing M K s: that is, to create a personal brand of sorts. When the primary approaches, candidates use this brand awareness, not policy, to recruit new party members in order to win the intra-party election.

Vo t e r P a rt i c i pat i o n i n Primary elections While thousands of new members are attracted to Israeli and Canadian parties in the run-up to a primary vote, it is perhaps

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curious that a significant number of party members do not participate in these contests. While we have become somewhat accustomed to relatively low and declining rates of voter participation in general elections in many countries, the difference in most party primaries is that the turnout rate is not measured among the entire electorate (whether at all interested in politics or not) but only among those who have chosen to affiliate with the party. Party members have paid a fee and completed some paperwork; that is, they have invested effort in becoming eligible to vote. Still, turnout is usually lower than in general elections. Perhaps the large number of non-voting party members is reflective of the abuses in member recruitment discussed in Chapter 5. Participation in Primaries in Israel The adoption of primaries in Israel clearly widened the intra-party arena. It has allowed any citizen who is willing to register with a party and pay a reasonable membership fee to take part in what was, in the past, the privilege of a few. In this sense, primaries have democratized party politics, especially in the context of having a closed list electoral system in which voters previously had minimal influence on the personal composition of the legislature (Cross 2008). As shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, primary election campaigns have succeeded in attracting tens of thousands of citizens to participate in internal party affairs. Still, the turnout rate in primary elections is lower than that in general elections. The average turnout of the party membership has been 56.5 per cent for leadership primaries and 58.7 per cent for candidate selection primaries. By comparison, the average turnout in general elections for the Israeli Knesset for the 1992–2015 period was 71.5 per cent. The turnout rate in the Labour Party ranged from a low of 52 per cent in the 2013 leadership primary to a high of nearly 75 per cent in the 1996 candidate selection primary. In Likud, turnout rates in primaries have also had large fluctuations, illustrated by the dramatic drop from 67 per cent in the 1993 leadership election to 31 per cent in the first of the two 1999 leadership primaries. Generally, exceptionally high turnout rates (around 70 per cent) are typical of the first contests held under the primary format. It seems that the novelty of the new method created a sort of buzz and attracted many members. Once the initial excitement was gone,

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Table 6.1  Participation in Israeli primary elections (leadership contests) Party

Year

Selectors

Turnout of party members (%)

Mobilization* (%)

Labour

1992

108,347

71.4

11.9

Labour

1997

114,144

69.2

13.9

Labour

2001

64,219

54.8

14.1

Labour

2002

66,256

60.0

14.6

Labour

2005

64,204

63.9

13.6

Labour

2007(first round)

67,454

65.2

14.3

Labour

2011(first round)

44,067

66.0

10.2

Labour

2013

28,806

52.3

6.7

Likud

1993

145,000

67.1

22.3

Likud

1999A

52,696

31.3

11.3

Likud

1999B

50,000

34.8

10.7

Likud

2002

140,918

46.2

15.2

Likud

2005

55,620

43.3

19.7

Likud

2007

37,279

39.3

13.2

Likud

2012

63,150

50.4

7.1***

Likud**

2014

45,390

47.0

4.6

Meretz

2004

15,935

77.4

9.7

Meretz

2008

10,450

72.8

10.5

Kadima

2008

39,872

53.9

5.3

Kadima

2012

40,399

42.2

51.2

Jewish Home

2012

37,465

69.3

10.8***

Jewish Home**

2015

45,120

64.5

15.9***

* We compared the selectors to the party voters in the general elections closest to the time of the primary contest. In fifteen cases this was the forthcoming general election and in seven cases this was the previous general election. ** In these cases, for the first time, leadership and candidate primaries took place at the same time. *** In these elections, the parties ran in alliance with other significant parties that did not conduct primaries. Source: Kenig 2009c, updated.

turnout rates dropped. This phenomenon was also identified by Wauters (2014), who finds that the first time a party organizes a full member vote, participation is high. In addition, turnout is also affected by the competitiveness and perceived importance of the race. Thus, the exceptionally low turnout in the two Likud leadership contests in 1999 can be explained. The first of these was a

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Table 6.2  Participation in Israeli primary elections (candidate selection) Turnout of party members (%)

Party

Year

Selectors

DMC

1977

25,025

75.4

Mobilization* (%) 12.4

Labour

1992

118,197

72.0

13.0

Labour

1996

194,788

74.6

23.8

Labour

1999

101,087

62.0

15.1***

Labour

2002

58,783

53.0

12.9

Labour

2006

68,331

58.4

14.5

Labour

2008

31,789

53.9

9.5

Labour

2012

35,035

58.0

8.1

Labour

2015

28,742

58.8

3.7***

Likud

1996

91,907

51.4

12.0***

Likud

2008

48,458

49.2

6.6

Likud

2012

73,073

59.2

8.3***

Likud**

2014

45,390

47.0

4.6

Meretz

1996

18,968

55.6

8.4

Kadima

2008

35,125

44.1

4.6

Jewish Home

2012

33,212

61.4

9.6***

Jewish Home**

2015

45,120

64.5

15.9***

* Number of selectors divided by the number of voters in the forthcoming election. ** In these cases, for the first time, leadership and candidate selection took place at the same time. *** In these elections, the parties ran in alliance with other significant parties that did not conduct primaries. Source: Rahat 2011, updated.

de-facto reselection of the incumbent leader (and prime minister). It was obvious that the challenger did not pose a real threat, so interest in the contest was minimal. The second contest was perceived by many as selecting a sort of interim leader of the party, and therefore this selection was not viewed as particularly important either. Raw numbers of participants range from a high of 194,788 voters in the 1996 internal Labour elections to a low of 10,450 voters in the 2008 Meretz leadership primary. Notably, even at the low end, participation is considerably higher than previous methods of leadership selection. The highest number of direct participants in a leadership contest prior to the adoption of primaries was the 3,019 convention delegates who selected the Labour Party chairman in

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1980. This was followed by 2,912 delegates who selected the Likud list of legislative candidates in 1992. By contrast, the twenty-two leadership and seventeen candidate-selection primaries had an average of about 62,000 voters. Beyond membership turnout, we can also explore the rate of participation in leadership and candidate primaries by examining the mobilization of the electorate more broadly. By dividing the number of participants in a primary contest by the total number of votes the party received in the most proximate general election, we can determine the percentage of the party’s electoral supporters that participated in the intra-party contest (Cross 2004). While turnout examines how well the parties are able to persuade their members to vote, mobilization examines how well parties convert their electoral support into membership and active participation, and vice versa.1 As the mobilization figures in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 demonstrate, in all cases but one only a small minority of the party’s general-election voters participate in primaries. Leaving aside the exceptional mobilization rate in the Kadima 2012 leadership primaries, parties mobilized between 3.7 per cent and 23.8 per cent of their voters to take part in their primaries. The average mobilization (excluding the three outlier values of Kadima) is 12 per cent. This means that an average of one in eight or so of a party’s electoral supporters turn out to participate in primary elections. Labour has a pretty stable mobilization rate: in twelve out of its sixteen primary contests it succeeded in mobilizing between 8 and 15 per cent of its voters. Likud has similar mobilization rates, although it is far more successful in mobilizing voters to participate in leadership selection (13 per cent) than in candidate selection (7.9 per cent). These relatively low mobilization rates are consistent with the general decline in rates of political party activism found in many Western nations in recent decades (van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2014). The extremely high mobilization rate in Kadima (51.2 per cent in 2012) is somewhat misleading. The results of leadership primaries held in March 2012 actually enhanced the collapse in public support for the party. At the time the contest was held, Kadima was still the largest party represented in the Knesset. However, a short ten months later, the party had barely managed to pass the 2 per cent electoral legal threshold. In fact, the number of eligible party members in the leadership primaries of 2012 was higher than the number of voters for Kadima in the January 2013 general elections. Remarkably,

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Kadima also recorded very low mobilization rates: 4.6 per cent and 5.3 per cent for the 2008 leadership and legislative primaries. Such extreme mobilization values reflect the nature of Kadima as a “seasonal” party with no solid membership. Participation in Primaries in Canada As the discussion in previous chapters makes clear, the rules and practices surrounding leadership and candidate selection in Canada are, on the whole, inclusive and open. Party primaries, whatever form they take, certainly allow for greater participation from ordinary Canadians than previous methods have. Widespread participation, however, is neither automatic nor necessarily realized. As shown in Table 6.3, the adoption of party primaries for the selection of party leaders has been relatively successful at encouraging Canadians to participate in internal party affairs. Although lower than the level of participation found in general elections, the average turnout for leadership contests at the federal level has been approximately 51 per cent of the party membership. This ranges from a low of 25 per cent in the 2003 Liberal election that selected Paul Martin as leader to a high of 71 per cent in the 2002 Canadian Alliance primary that selected Stephen Harper. Raw numbers of participants range from a high of 132,750 voters in the 2003 Liberal election to a low of 14,039 voters in the 2011 Bloc leadership primary. Even at the low end, participation is considerably higher than that enjoyed by previous methods of leadership selection. The large leadership conventions that dominated much of the twentieth century, for example, typically allowed between 2,000 and 5,000 Canadians to directly participate in the selection of the party leader (Courtney 1995). By contrast, the eleven federal leadership primaries that occurred between 1997 and 2013 have had an average of 77,000 voters. As the mobilization figures in Table 6.3 demonstrate, only a small percentage of a party’s general election voters participate in Canadian leadership contests.2 As is the case with turnout, there is considerable variation in how well parties are able to mobilize their supporters. While not shown in Table 6.3, the highest mobilization rates come from primaries at the provincial level. The more inclusive primaries adopted by the Alberta Conservatives appear to help the party mobilize a greater number of participants. The first three

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Table 6.3  Participation in Canadian primary elections (federal leadership contests) Turnout of party members (%) Mobilization (%)

Party

Year

Selectors

PC

1998

47,089

52

1.92

NDP

2012

64,140

50

2.55

NDP

2003

44,609

54

2.09

Liberal

2013

104,552

36

3.75

Liberal*

2006

90,000

49

2.01

Liberal*

2003

132,750

25

2.64

Conservative

2004

97,397

39

2.42

Alliance

2002

88,228

71

2.69

Alliance

2000

120,557

59

3.68

Bloc Québécois

2011

14,039

36

1.58

Bloc Québécois

1997

50,418

45

3.64

* Federal Liberal leadership elections in 2003 and 2006 used a multi-stage selection method that included a primary component.

Alberta Conservative primaries rank among the four most successfully mobilized leadership selections in Canada. Their 2006 primary, for instance, mobilized nearly three in ten general election voters (28.8 per cent). Not only are the Alberta Conservative elections more inclusive, but the party has also removed a number of administrative barriers. The party operated a minimum of one polling station in every constituency and opened these stations for a minimum of eight hours each day that the polls were open. The openness of the selection process combined with the party’s electoral dominance during this period may account for its considerable success at mobilizing the Alberta electorate to participate. In addition, in each of these primaries it was directly selecting a premier – something that no doubt increases participation rates. As would be expected, and similar to the Israeli case, the mobilization figures are much smaller compared to the turnout numbers. Average mobilization at the federal level is 2.63 per cent. In other words, an average of about one in forty of a party’s electoral supporters participates in the selection of that party’s leader. In terms of candidate selection, it has been observed that more Canadians will participate in the candidate nomination process than

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any other party activity (Cross 2002, 378). But unlike that for leadership contests, comprehensive and comparative data for participation in candidate selection is not readily available. Two surveys of constituency associations across the country conducted in 1988 and 1993, however, provide some insight into the level of participation in the candidate nomination process. According to survey data from 1993, the average number of party members participating in candidate selection for the Liberal, Conservative, and Reform parties was 413 (Cross 2004, 56). Since there were 295 federal ridings in 1993, we can estimate that approximately 120,000 Canadians participated in an average party’s nomination proceedings. This rate of participation is similar to the 120,557 Canadians who participated in the Canadian Alliance’s 2000 leadership selection. On the whole, however, the average of 120,000 members participating in a party’s nomination process is considerably more than the 77,000 Canadians who participate in a typical federal leadership contest. Like involvement in Canadian leadership contests, the rate of participation in candidate nomination varies considerably from one riding to another. The number ranges from a high in the 5,000 range in the most competitive nomination races to a few dozen in others. Given that Canadian parties have often enjoyed highly regionalized support, it is not surprising to witness such variation. In regions where the party is electorally weak, it is not uncommon for it to have only a handful of members. Finally, survey data from both 1988 and 1993 confirm that turnout for candidate nomination elections averages less than 50 per cent of the total party membership in the riding (Carty and Erickson 1991; Cross 2006).

Co m p e t i t i v e n e s s o f P r imary Contes ts While competition is considered, together with (universal) participation, as a necessary condition even in the minimalist definitions of democracy (Schumpeter 1943; Dahl 1971), there is no straightforward answer to the question of whether it should appear in intraparty selection procedures. This question relates to a broader issue that divides political scientists: should democracy be found within parties and not just between parties? Some have argued that intraparty democracy is not a precondition for democracy at large. Sartori (1965, 124), for instance, claims that “democracy on a large scale is

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not the sum of many little democracies.” Others (Teorell 1999; Mersel 2006) have argued that a party that is not internally democratic cannot really be externally democratic. Are party primaries more or less competitive than selection methods that use more exclusive selectorates? There are several reasons why we should expect the composition of the selectorate to influence the level of competition. First, the mere size of the selectorate may be a factor. On the one hand, the smaller the selectorate is, the better the chances are that more candidates (including new ones) will have the opportunity to introduce themselves and become known to the voters. As such, these races should be more competitive. On the other hand, large-scale selectorates are conceived as less influenced by power-holders and thus may be expected to allow for a more open contest. Second, as already mentioned above, different selectorates may apply different calculations to their decisions (Stark 1996), and this may affect the level of competition. Party members may be more exposed to the influence of opinion polls monitoring public support for candidates. If such polls indicate an early front-runner, undecided voters tend to “get on board the winning bandwagon.” This “front-runner effect” enhances the probability of a candidate gathering considerable support and therefore reduces competitiveness (Kenig 2009b). In addition, it may also persuade potential candidates not to run. Delegates to party conventions or the P P G are less likely to be affected in such circumstances, since they are also influenced by factors such as personal relationships, loyalties, partisan factions, and ideology. Third, different selectorates may affect the motivation of candidates to join a contest. For instance, as discussed in the following chapter, running a primary campaign and appealing to the entire party membership or the entire electorate is very costly. This cost can deter potential candidates who might have competed had the selection taken place among a smaller group of selectors. On the other hand, we may expect that primaries would attract higher media attention. Extensive media coverage may lure potential candidates to run in order to improve their status within the party, even if they have a very low chance of actually winning. In order to evaluate levels of competition, we look at the central characteristics of the selection process: are new leaders or candidates mostly acclaimed or do they rather compete for the position?

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How many candidates step forward? How close are the results? To what extent are incumbents secure in their office? Examining approximately 500 leadership selection events in fourteen parliamentary democracies, Kenig, Rahat, and Tuttnauer (2015) concluded that selection by the organizational party – conference delegates or council – is the least competitive. As for the inclusive primaries and rather exclusive P P G , the findings are different for different measurements of competition. When primaries are the rule, there are more candidates competing for leadership and it is more difficult to coronate. But selection by the P P G is more competitive when it comes to the margin between the first- and secondplace contenders. With regard to candidate selection, Hazan and Rahat (2010) point to a nonlinear relationship between inclusiveness and competition, with primaries resulting in medium-level competition. In their comparative study of leadership contests in fourteen parliamentary democracies between 1965 and 2012, Kenig, Rahat, and Tuttnauer (2015) place Canada and Israel in relatively high positions on various measurements of competitiveness. Leadership contests in Canada are the most competitive and in Israel the third most competitive on each of the following measures: the likelihood of coronations, the highest average number of candidates in a contest, and the smallest margin between the two top candidates. Yet there are also significant differences between parties and contests, and so we take a closer look. Competitiveness in Primaries in Israel The adoption of leadership primaries in Israel has enhanced the levels of competition in terms of the number of candidates competing. A study analyzing twenty-seven leadership contests between 1965 and 2012 found that less inclusive selectorates have never attracted more than three candidates, with an average of 1.9 candidates per contest. Leadership primaries, on the other hand, have seen contests with up to five contenders, with an average of 3.1 candidates per contest. The most competitive contest in terms of number of candidates was the Labour Party’s 2007 leadership primary. This contest is also one of only two cases where a second round of voting was necessary to select the leader (no candidate met the 40  per cent threshold required for victory on the first ballot).

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However, with regard to the closeness of the results, the difference between primaries and more restrictive selection methods is rather small. In fact, the average margin between the top two finishers is  slightly greater in primaries than in other methods, 20.6 and 17.8 per cent, respectively (Kenig and Rahat 2014). However, contests in Likud seem to be much less competitive than those in the Labour Party. In its eight leadership primaries between 1993 and 2014, the average number of candidates was 2.9 and the average margin of victory was 37.5 per cent (Table 6.4). In the eight leadership primaries of the Labour Party (1992–2013), the average number of candidates was 3.4 while the average margin of victory was only 9 per cent. The difference between the parties is also reflected in the incumbents’ success. While Likud’s incumbent leaders have never lost a primary contest, easily defeating their challengers, ousting leaders in the Labour Party has become a sort of “sport.” In all five leadership contests in which the incumbent leader competed, he or she was defeated. Rahat, Hazan, and Katz (2008) compared the levels of competitiveness of candidate selection in three types of selectorates (nominating committees, delegates, members) in Israel between 1948 and 2003. They found that selection by party members was more competitive than selection by nominating committees. But in terms of the number of candidates and the success rate of non-incumbents, they were less competitive than selection by delegates. Yet primaries were slightly more competitive than selection by delegates in regard to the rank of those nonincumbents who succeeded in the contests. Interestingly, a study of candidate selection prior to the 2009 elections (Rahat 2008; 2011) found that the more exclusive the method of candidate selection was, the more likely incumbents were to lose their seats to newcomers. Thus, the Israeli experience suggests that while competition in primaries is much more explicit and publicly exposed than in the case of other more exclusive selectorates, it is not necessarily more competitive in terms of its structure (number of candidates) and its results. Competitiveness in Primaries in Canada The Canadian case provides mixed evidence regarding the relationship between competitiveness and selection method. It is not clear, for example, that primaries have increased the competitiveness of

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Table 6.4  Competition in leadership primaries, Israel, 1992–2014

Average number of candidates

Likud

Labour Party

2.9

3.4

Average margin of victory

37.5

9.0

Incumbents’ success

5/5

0/5

8

8

N

leadership elections as significantly as they have in Israel. As Cross (2014, 184) notes, leadership contests in Canada have long attracted a comparatively high number of candidates, and there are only small differences between the number of candidates contesting delegated conventions versus primaries. The average number of candidates in a leadership primary is 4.1 compared with 3.6 for delegated conventions. At minimum, however, it is clear that primaries are not discouraging candidates from entering the race. While there are potential organizational challenges for would-be-leadership contestants entering a primary election (fundraising, recruiting new members, etc.), these do not appear to be significant barriers to entry. There are more significant differences between selection methods when considering other measures of competitiveness. The margin of support on the first ballot, for instance, is much closer in primary elections, suggesting a more competitive and close election. In twenty-five leadership elections between 1965 and 2012, the vote margin between the top two leadership contestants was 22.9 per cent. By contrast, the margin was half as large (11.8 per cent) when only considering those elections conducted by a primary (Cross 2014, 185). Thus, while the number of candidates is similar, their vote share is much closer in Canadian primaries compared to less inclusive delegated conventions. Table 6.5 highlights the differences across parties for margin of victory (different from the margin of support on the first ballot reported above), number of candidates, and the success rate of incumbents in recent Canadian primaries. Here we find that the N D P primaries tend to be the most competitive, both in the number of candidates as well as in the average margin of victory. Also, there is no tradition of incumbent leaders reseeking the top job but when they do, they tend to be unsuccessful (Preston Manning, Stockwell Day).3

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Table 6.5  Competition in federal leadership primaries, Canada, 1998–2013 Liberal* Average number of candidates

Conservative**

NDP

5

4.25

7

Average margin of victory

54.7

30.25

21.6

Incumbents’ success

N/A

1/3

N/A

3

4

2

N

* Includes 2003 and 2006 elections which only included a primary component. ** Includes current Conservative Party as well as its two predecessors.

Limited evidence is available for candidate selection. Canadian parties have used primaries to select legislative candidates for generations and there is no comparable data between primary and nonprimary selection methods in this regard. Nonetheless, the evidence we have regarding candidate primaries suggests that they are typically uncompetitive events. Cross (2006) reports that few nominations are contested. In other words, the majority of nominations only have one candidate. Less than 10 per cent of Liberal associations, for example, reported a nomination contest for the 2006 election (Cross 2006, 185). Evidence from the 2011 and 2015 federal elections supports this finding as well. According to reports filed with Elections Canada, the majority of Conservative, Liberal, and N D P local associations had a single contender for their nomination and therefore resulted in acclamation. While leadership elections tend to be relatively competitve events with numerous candidates and often close races, primaries for legislative candidates in Canada are comparatively uncompetitive.

W h o G e t s S elected? With participation and competitiveness considered, it is now worth exploring the outcomes produced by these contests. In particular, what types of individuals are selected through primary elections (age, gender, etc.), and do these results differ from those of other selection methods? This is especially important given the democratic consequences associated with choosing both leaders and legislative candidates. As gatekeeper to the legislature, the candidate-selection process narrows the options voters can choose from when casting their ballots (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). The

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composition of Parliament therefore depends on the diversity of candidates that parties nominate. More women, for example, must first be nominated as candidates before their numbers in Parliament can see any significant increase (Pruysers et al., forthcoming). Likewise, given that prime ministers are typically selected from those serving as party leaders (Heard 1991), party leadership has clear representational implications as well. Many scholars have posited that the inclusiveness of the selectorate can actually undermine the representativeness of the outcome (Rahat 2009; Vandeleene 2014). The logic is rather simple: when selection authority is granted to members and voters, the decision is made by a group of decentralized, atomized, and anonymous individuals. The dispersed nature of this selectorate creates a coordination problem, as meaningful deliberation and communication is not possible. By contrast, when a more exclusive group is tasked with selection, consensus-building can occur and representational deficiencies can be addressed. Empirically, however, the evidence regarding the inclusiveness of the selectorate and the representativeness of the outcome is somewhat mixed. In the candidate-selection literature, a number of studies have found that the inclusiveness of the selectorate has a direct (negative) effect on the types of individuals who are selected (Kristjansson 1998; Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008). By contrast, recent studies focusing on leadership selection have found no effect at all (Sandri, Seddone, and Venturino, 2015; Wauters and Pilet 2015). Examining candidate-selection in Israel, Rahat, Hazan, and Katz (2008) find that participation and representation are unlikely to be simultaneously maximized in the same system. The authors find that the adoption of inclusive selectorates produced lists of candidates that were less balanced in terms of gender. Similarly, Matland and Studlar (1996) and Caul (1999) suggest that exclusive, and especially centralized, selectorates are better equipped to ensure greater representation for women. As Kittilson (2006) suggests, decentralized and inclusive selectorates rarely consider what is occurring ­outside of their own districts when making decisions about local candidates. Additionally, without a wide and dispersed selectorate to “blame,” centralized party organizations can be held directly accountable for the number of women nominated. This pressure can provide an incentive to ensure more diversity among the candidate pool.

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An example of this is the New Zealand Labour Party, which operates in a mixed system with both a largely decentralized, inclusive selectorate at the local level, and centralized, more exclusive selection of “list” candidates. Despite a commitment to representational equity, the party’s pool of candidates in the single-member constituencies often suffers the same representational shortfalls as those found in other countries. The more centralized rankings for the party list are then used to correct for these shortcomings. Thus, while limited, the evidence from the candidate-selection literature suggests that inclusiveness may reduce representativeness. However Gauja and Cross (2015), using data from the two largest Australian parties, find significant inter-party differences despite similar insti­ tutional arrangements. The Labour party nominates significantly more women when more centralized, exclusive processes are utilized rather than more inclusive, decentralized methods, but the same is not true for the Liberal Party. They interpret this difference as suggesting that while more centralized selection methods offer an opportunity for constructing more balanced pools of candidates, the parties’ ethos and commitment to representational equity are equally important factors. When considering the selection of party leaders, however, there does not appear to be a clear link between the selectorate and the demographic characteristics of those selected. Examining age and political experience in fourteen countries, Sandri, Seddone, and Venturino (2015) find that broadening the selectorate to include party members and voters does not impact the degree of what they term “leadership renewal.” That is, primary voters are no more likely to select young and inexperienced leaders than are other, less inclusive, groups such as the P P G. While the roles of electoral strength, ideology, and candidate characteristics have been examined in relation to the selection of female party leaders (O’Neill and Stewart 2009), very little attention has been devoted to the influence of the selectorate. Examining 535  party leaders selected between 1965 and 2012, Wauters and Pilet (2015) offer the first comparative exploration of the relationship between primaries and the election of women. Overall, the authors find little evidence to suggest that the selectorate influences the gender of the winner. As they conclude, it is not the rules of the selection process (i.e., the inclusiveness of the selectorate) that determines the number of women chosen but rather the openness

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to women in the broader political system that matters. Female leaders are most likely to be selected in countries with more gender-­ balanced parliaments and in parties that have already had a woman as leader, regardless of the inclusivity of the selectorate. The most recent comparative cross-national evidence suggests that there does not appear to be a significant relationship between the inclusiveness of the selectorate and the age, gender, and political experience of the leaders who are chosen. Representational Outcomes in Canada and Israel As elaborated above, the important question here is whether primaries produce different outcomes as a result of their inclusive selectorates. Are fewer women selected, are winners less politically experienced, or are they younger? Although the number of women leaders selected in Canada and Israel is perhaps too limited to be definitive, the experience appears to be consistent with the findings of Wauters and Pilet (2015). The inclusive selectorate does not seem to be preventing women from winning party leadership in either country. In Israel, for example, three of the twenty leaders of the five largest parties selected between 1965 and 2012 have been women (one Kadima and two Labour; Kenig and Rahat 2014). Of the fifteen leaders chosen through a primary two (13 per cent) have been women, while the third female leader was selected by delegates at a party convention. At the federal level, the major Canadian parties selected twentyseven leaders between 1965 and 2012. During this period, twelve party leaders were selected through primary elections (44 per cent), fourteen by convention delegates (52 per cent), and one by a party council (4 per cent). Of the twelve chosen through a primary, none were women (Cross 2014). While Canadian parties have indeed selected female party leaders (three in total, two New Democrat and one Conservative), all have been chosen at delegated conventions where there were rules ensuring an adequate numbers of female delegates (see Chapter 3). Provincially, however, women have experienced much greater success with primaries. Recent examples of women winning leadership through a party primary include Rachel Notley (Alberta N D P ), Christy Clark (B C Liberal), Pauline Marois (Parti Québécois), and Alison Redford (Alberta

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P C ). Interestingly, each of these women went on to be premier of her respective province. Beyond gender, it is also worth considering the age and political experience of party leaders and whether there are meaningful differences based on the selection method. Consistent with Sandri, Seddone, and Venturino (2015), we find that age does not differ according to the inclusiveness of the selectorate. In Israel, for example, both primaries and delegated conventions produce party leaders who are on average sixty-one years old when selected. In Canada, the average age of party leaders upon selection is fifty-one years, and this varies only slightly by selectorate with delegated conventions choosing leaders with an average age of forty-nine and party members choosing slightly older leaders at fifty-three. The same is true for political experience: party leaders in both countries are no more likely to be inexperienced if they are selected by a primary compared to a delegated convention. Thus, in terms of age, gender, and political experience, the available data from leadership elections in Canada and Israel suggest that the inclusiveness of the selectorate does not make a significant difference in terms of who is selected. While the inclusion of party members in leadership selection does not appear to change the outcome, is the same true for candidate selection? As detailed in Chapter 2, the major Canadian parties have used primaries to select legislative candidates for generations. However, party leaders still retain the authority to appoint candidates directly. Consistent with the expectations of Matland and Studlar (1996) and Rahat, Hazan, and Katz (2008) concerning centralization and exclusivity of the selectorate, party leaders are more likely to unilaterally appoint women than men (Koop and Bittner 2011). In this regard, more exclusive and centralized selection methods may be beneficial for women’s representation in Canada. Most candidates, however, are not appointed and, as Table 6.6 demonstrates, only one in four candidates nominated in the past five federal elections has been a woman. A lack of women in the candidate pool in recent Canadian elections, however, is not the result of the inclusiveness of the selectorate. As with general elections (Sanbonmatsu 2006; Tremblay 2007), there is compelling evidence to suggest that when women seek party nomination they tend to perform just as well as their male counterparts. Erickson (1991), for example, finds that of the associations that had both men and women seeking nomination, women won 54

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Table 6.6  Number of women candidates nominated by political party (Canada, 2004–2015) Year

Party

Women candidates

% of total candidates

2015

NDP

145

43

2011

2008

2006

2004

Liberal

105

31

Conservative

65

19

NDP

124

40

Liberal

90

29

Conservative

68

22

NDP

104

34

Liberal

113

37

Conservative

63

20 35

NDP

108

Liberal

79

26

Conservative

38

12

NDP

96

32

Liberal

75

25

36

12

1309

28

Conservative Total

per cent of the time. She concludes that “like the larger electorate, local activists who participate in selection ballots show little evidence of resistance to women politicians” (1991, 112). In other words, when given the opportunity, party members are just as likely to select a woman as they are a man. The lack of women nominated is therefore not a problem of demand but rather an issue of supply – not enough women are coming forward to seek nomination in the first place. While parties still have a role in terms of searching for and encouraging women to run for office (Lawless and Fox 2005), and while the decentralized nature of primaries in single-member districts makes it difficult to ensure social diversity (Krook 2010), the inclusive nature of the selectorate is not preventing women from winning party nominations in Canada. Rahat, Hazan, and Katz (2008) compared the representation of women in candidate lists that were selected by three types of selectorates (nominating committees, delegates, party members) in Israel from 1949 to 2003. They found that the most exclusive selectorates

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produced the most representative lists, while primaries produced more representative lists than did selection by party delegates. They also argue that we have to consider the fact that the most exclusive selectorates were used mainly in the earlier periods, and that the most inclusive ones are more recent: “as the Israeli parties moved towards highly inclusive selectorates – more so than in other P R democracies … their lists of candidates became less representative, both absolutely and even more so comparatively” (Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008, 672). For later years (2006–15), the parties that had the best record in terms of female representation were those in which the leaders, the most exclusive selectorate one can imagine, unilaterally designed the candidate lists (Rahat 2011). That is, these leaders, who had the authority essentially of an autocratic dictator within their parties, used their powers to produce more representative candidate lists. While the method may not ultimately be determinative of the outcome, both candidate and leadership primaries entail significant barriers for women. Baskevkin (2010), for example, demonstrates that male candidates often outspend their female counterparts by a significant margin during leadership elections. While this is problematic for any selection method, it is particularly relevant in primaries, given the expansive and expensive nature of their campaigns (see Chapter 7). In order to reach a diverse selectorate across the entire country, leadership contestants competing in a primary need to raise and spend significant sums of money. Travel, communication, advertising, and professional staff make primaries the most expensive selection method. While research suggests that women can often raise money just as well as men during general elections (Fox, Lawless, and Feeley 2001), this does not seem to be the case for intra-party contests (Erickson 1991; Bashevkin 2010). Writing about primaries for candidate selection in Canada, for instance, Erickson (1991) suggests that men have greater access to both financial and human resources, and that this inequity may discourage women from entering the race. Thus, while party members may not discriminate against women when casting their ballot, the resources needed to reach party members and connect with them during the campaign may act as a significant hurdle for women. Beyond money, other aspects of primary elections might serve as obstacles for women. Given their expansive nature, primaries tend

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to be more “mediatized” than other selection methods with narrower selectorates (Wauters and Pilet 2015). To wage a successful campaign and reach tens of thousands of voters not only requires a well-resourced campaign but also requires considerable media attention. Without the ability to speak with selectors individually and directly (as is the case with more exclusive selectorates), name recognition becomes an important element of a successful campaign. Given that men are disproportionately represented in Parliament, there is less room for women to break into the candidate pool. One result of the gendered nature of incumbency is that there are more politically experienced and recognizable men than there are women. Moreover, as primaries are often about signing up new members in a show of organizational strength (see Chapter 4), established politicians (who are disproportionately male) are at an advantage, as they are more familiar to voters. That said, some research suggests that competitive female candidates attract heightened media attention given their “unusualness” in a male-dominated campaign (Trimble 2007). This heightened attention, however, may come at a cost, as the media can trivialize and sexualize female candidates (Trimble 2007; Bashevkin 2009; Lawless 2009), ultimately undermining their candidacy. Overall, the name recognition, political experience, and positive media exposure required to win a party primary may pose additional obstacles for women.

C o n c l u s ion Substantive policy debate plays at best a secondary role in party primaries, as those who do vote are most concerned with questions of electability. As one former Liberal M P said prior to the 2015 election, “the real problem is the nomination process, in which the best and brightest with the biggest ideas are not always set up to succeed. It’s how many memberships can I buy or sell” (Offman 2014). All of this fuels the personalization of politics, a theme we return to in the concluding chapter. There is no denying that party primaries open up participation in the choice of legislative and leadership candidates to many more voters. This is particularly true when new recruits are welcome to participate. However, many new members do not vote in these elections. This provides further evidence that a significant proportion of those newly signed up by candidates and vote-contractors alike are

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not committed to the party and choose not to participate even in the contest for which they were recruited. In addition, low turnout might be a sign of organizational problems and/or a lack of adequate resources needed to transform primaries into a democratic celebration. Recent comparative cross-national work on the subject of leadership selection has found little evidence that the selectorate matters in shaping representational outcomes. While the data from our individual case studies is somewhat limited, it tends to support conclusions from comparative work on the subject. Whereas two of the three female Israeli leaders were chosen through a primary election, convention delegates have selected all the female party leaders in Canada. The fact that no woman has been elected as a federal party leader in a Canadian primary has led some observers to suggest that membership votes are a significant barrier for women’s electoral success (Bashevkin 2010). However, when the success of women at the provincial level is taken into account, it does not appear that the move towards primaries is preventing women from winning. Studies of candidate nomination in Canada reveal that party members do not discriminate against women candidates and are just as likely to choose a woman as they are a man. Yet it is clear that women are vastly underrepresented in party leadership and the candidate pool. The evidence from Israel concerning candidate selection is different, and suggests that primaries may be an obstacle to female representation. This issue would benefit from more empirical, comparative research.

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7 Financing Primary Elections

Like general elections, primary elections are expensive. Coordinating tens of thousands of voters, managing and monitoring polling stations, engaging in voter mobilization efforts, and campaigning make primaries a costly endeavour. Although the number of party members and supporters participating in a typical primary is much lower than the number of voters in a general election, the geographic area the contest covers tends to be similar. Unlike during general elections, however, parties are typically left to finance these elections on their own, without direct support from the state (Scarrow 2013). As the previous chapters make clear, party primaries in most parliamentary systems are largely viewed as taking place within private associations (van Biezen 2004), outside of the purview of state regulation and therefore undeserving of public funding. This lack of statesponsored support, however, raises a number of questions concerning parties’ ability to adequately fund open and expansive internal elections, as well as candidates’ abilities to raise the necessary funds and to compete in a fair and transparent manner. This chapter starts with a review of the campaign-financing regulatory scheme relating to primaries. This regulatory framework has repeatedly been shown to have the potential to have a significant impact. Like rules concerning timing and eligibility for participation, financial regulations have traditionally been left to the parties. In recent decades, however, we have witnessed increased involvement from the state in both Canada and Israel. Since 1992, Israel has adopted a number of regulations concerning the financing of intra-party contests. Although much slower to do so, Canada enacted

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modest financial regulations for leadership contests and candidate nominations in 2004. The next part of this chapter considers the costs of these elections as well as attempts to control them and to regulate candidates’ spending in order to ensure a fair, democratic contest. As with concerns associated with the timing, location, and eligibility requirements for primaries (see Chapter 4), we find some evidence of misconduct relating to the financial aspects. While both countries have similar concerns in regard to the financing of primary campaigns, Israel has gone considerably further in involving the state in regulating these contests. The willingness to involve the state means that this type of abuse is handled differently – with more capacity and willingness from the side of the regulator – from other manipulations of the rules of the contest. Yet, as the final part of this chapter demonstrates, in both cases the parties themselves have to fund the administration of primaries, and the accompanying necessity to raise funds and cut costs has implications for the integrity of the electoral process. Issues surrounding buy-in costs, administrative expenses, and voting fees, for example, have a real influence on the accessibility of these contests for candidates and voters alike.

S tat e R e g ulation The financing of candidate and leadership selection has long been of concern in Canada and Israel. Traditionally, concerns have been threefold: 1) the costs involved in running a competitive campaign make candidacy prohibitive for some, and particularly for underrepresented groups such as women; 2) the costs of candidacy, coupled with a lack of public funding, make candidates too dependent on fundraising from private donors; and, 3) lack of public regulation of these contests means that rules regarding public disclosure and those regarding contribution and spending limits in general elections do not apply. Canada and Israel have taken different approaches to the question of financial regulation. In particular, the Israeli state responded earlier and with a more robust regulatory regime than its Canadian counterpart. At the core of the Canadian regulatory framework are disclosure requirements and contribution limits. In Israel, state regulation not only includes disclosure and contribution limits but

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also establishes spending limits and clear penalties for violations. It is worth outlining these two regulatory regimes in some detail, as they represent a significant departure from the traditional view of parties as purely voluntary associations. In August 1993, only four months after it was adopted, the Israeli Party Law was amended to include a separate chapter concerning the funding and other financial aspects of primaries for leadership and candidate selection (at both the national and local levels). The length of this new chapter exceeded that of the original law. The law limited the origin of contributions: donations from corporations, minors, and anonymous sources were prohibited, as well as cash donations in excess of NI S 200 (about $70).1 It specified the maximum amount that each person could donate to a candidate or candidates. As of 2014 the specifications are as follows: for legislative primaries in parties in which the selectorate is smaller than 50,000 voters, the donor cap is NI S 11,480 (about $3,900), and in parties in which the selectorate is bigger than 50,000 voters, the cap is N IS 34,420 (about $11,700). In these cases, an individual may donate to more than one candidate as long as the sum does not exceed the cap. For leadership primaries, in parties with a selectorate of at least 50,000 voters, the cap is NI S 45,880 (about $15,500) and the donor may donate to only one candidate. Moreover, the law restricts the sum that a candidate is allowed to raise and spend. Limits are again in proportion to the size of the  selectorate. For example, candidates in the Labour 2011 leadership primary were allowed to raise and spend a maximum of NIS 1,295,372 (about $440,000), reflecting a selectorate of about 66,000  members. Candidates in Likud’s 2012 leadership primary were allowed to raise and spend up to NIS 1,999,032 (about $680,000), reflecting a larger selectorate of about 125,000 members. The law also instructed candidates to administer their finances according to the requirements set by the party registrar and required them to file reports with the party. The law also detailed sanctions for candidates and parties by setting fines on those who violate its rules. Adding a chapter on the regulation of the funding of primaries was an important first step in involving the state in regulating internal party affairs. Since then, numerous other amendments concerning the financing of primaries have been submitted, and several have been adopted. The most important amendments to the law were adopted in the years 2005–2008. These began as temporary

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orders (that amended the law for a limited time) in 2005, and in 2008 the law was formally amended on the basis of these earlier orders. The law was expanded to cover all selection methods, not only primaries; addressed the loophole created by the definition of the period in which the finance rules apply (“selection period”) by explicitly stating that some of the rules were valid beyond this period; and outlined which expenses should be counted and which could be excluded from the limits (something especially relevant for active politicians). The most important change, however, was that of assigning the State Comptroller the task of regulating primary campaign  fi­­ nance.2 These amendments can be seen as a clear statement that the parties failed in their mission to adequately administer primaries on their own. The State Comptroller, a public apparatus with more resources and capacity than the parties’ internal organs and the party registrar, appears to be much better equipped for the task. Since the changes were adopted, candidates file their reports with the State Comptroller. These reports include the list of donors and the sums they have transferred to the candidates. The law also gives the State Comptroller the authority to fine candidates who do not follow the rules and also added other potential sanctions, including imprisonment. Nearly a decade after Israel introduced its first regulatory legislation of intra-party primaries, Bill C-24 brought significant and comprehensive changes to Canada’s electoral financing framework. Prior to its enactment, leadership and candidate selection contests were wholly outside of any state regulation. There were no spending or contribution limits, no disclosure requirements, and no limits on who could donate. The adoption of this legislation, however, directly challenged the view of parties as private associations and outlined a clear role for the state to be involved in internal party affairs. Bill C-24, while modest in many respects, altered the rules of the game in a number of ways. First, corporations and trade unions were prohibited from contributing to leadership campaigns. Curiously, however, the bill still allowed corporations to donate up to $1,000 to a candidate seeking the party’s nomination for a legislative seat. Individual donations to leadership elections and candidate nominations were capped at $5,000 and, in addition to regulating who could donate and how much, the financing regime now required donations of $200 or

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more to be fully disclosed and made public. Finally, these rules set nomination contestants’ spending limit at 20 per cent of the amount allowed for general-election campaigns (approximately $20,000; Young and Jansen 2011). A similar spending limit for leadership elections was not included in the legislation. Bill C-2 was passed in 2007, building upon the 2004 changes and establishing a more restrictive financing regime (Cross and Crysler 2011). The core of the financing regime stayed intact; however the donation limit for individuals was reduced to $1,000 (indexed for inflation) and corporations were prohibited from contributing to nomination contestants. Like the 2004 legislation, spending limits for leadership elections were left up to the party’s discretion.

E x p e n s i v e a n d E x pa ns ive Campaigns Significant resources are needed to address a widespread, atomistic, largely passive selectorate of party members and voters. Primaries require an expensive campaign that is less regulated than a generalelection campaign and is not directly subsidized by public finance. In this section, we explore the costs associated with running a primary campaign and assess the impact of the financial regulatory regime that has been adopted in each country. While the state mandated rules appear to be working, minor infractions, loopholes, and inadequate internal enforcement still exist. Despite state regulation, primaries still take place within parties that have little incentive to expose corruption and bad practice, especially on the eve of a general election In Israel, in addition to the party leaders, almost all candidates competing in primaries for legislative seats need to address the national selectorate. The top positions (and all positions since 2013) on the party lists of Labour and Likud, as well as most of the positions in the lists of the other parties that conduct primaries, are selected in a single nationwide district. In order to address this large and dispersed audience of party members, candidates require much more money than is needed to address the hundreds or few thousand conference delegates, not to mention the few individuals who composed earlier nomination committees. Even those who compete for the lower positions (those reserved for the districts) have to  address thousands of members who are spread over large geographic areas. Money is needed to establish and activate campaign

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headquarters, to send brochures by mail, to set up websites, manage Facebook or Twitter accounts, and to hire campaign professionals (who will pave the way to unpaid media exposure) as well as many other campaign expenses. Table 7.1 details the expenses of various candidates in recent leadership primaries in Israel. The amounts range from N IS 415,000 (about $143,000) to NI S 2.6 million (about $880,000). These are large sums, yet they seem to be limited thanks to the cap put on the amount that candidates are allowed to spend. There are some contests in which candidates spend similar amounts of money, and some in which the ratio between the highest and lowest spender is 3:1 and even close to 5:1. In all but one of the eight contests that appear in the table, the highest spender won. This may not imply that victory is bought with money because it may be the other way around; that is, more money is “invested” in those who are more likely to win. However, any way you look at it, it raises concerns about the linkage of money to democratic politics. For local candidate nominations in Canada, the costs of candidacy largely revolve around recruiting members and turning them out to vote. In addition to sometimes paying for membership fees, this can entail costs associated with phone banks and mailings to potential supporters, the hiring of buses to transport supporters, and catering of food to keep them at the voting location in case multiple ballots are required. While most local contests are not particularly expensive there have always been concerns, often expressed by women’s groups, that the costs of the most competitive contests, waged in those electorates where a party is likely to win in the general election, are expensive and prevent candidates without access to significant resources from being competitive (Young 2000). The issue of campaign costs and fundraising has been more salient in leadership contests. From the late 1970s to the 1990s, party leaders were selected at party conventions with leadership campaigns fighting pitched battles at the local level to ensure their supporters emerged victorious in the rank-and-file balloting that chose delegates. While members’ preferences were filtered through convention delegates, these campaigns were, in many ways, similar to closed primaries, as all members were given a vote in delegate selection. Candidates expended significant resources recruiting new supporters at the local level and on get-out-the-vote efforts. The costs of leadership contests grew exponentially during these years (Courtney 1995).

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Table 7.1  Spending limits and candidates’ expenses in Israeli leadership primaries (in Canadian dollars) Party Labour 2007

Likud 2007

Kadima 2008

Labour 2011

Likud 2012

Kadima 2012

Jewish Home 2012

Labour 2013

Spending limit

Candidate

Actual expense

Ehud Barak*

877,464

Ami Ayalon*

843,284

Danny Yatom

510,596

677,966

Amir Peretz

428,377

Ophir Pines

340,329

Benjamin Netanyahu

677,966

Moshe Feiglin

293,504

Danny Danon

143,103

Tzipi Livni

656,725

677,966

677,966 Shaul Mofaz

599,623

Meir Shitreet

281,833

Avi Dichter

219,417

439,109 Amir Peretz*

507,994

Arel Margalit

454,363

Yitzhak Herzog

436,073

Shelly Yachimovich*

209,410

Amram Mitzna

207,680

Benjamin Netanyahu

370,001

Moshe Feiglin

204,541

Shaul Mofaz

551,846

Tzipi Livni

538,146

Naftali Bennett

435,083

Zevulun Orlev

360,726

Yitzhak Herzog

409,645

Shelly Yachimovich

160,620

677,638

552,776

411,916

401,435

* These candidates qualified for the second round of voting (majority runoff) and their spending limit was thus expanded to $847,458 for the 2007 contest and $548,886 for the 2011 contest. Source: Various State Comptroller reports.

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Table 7.2  Highest amount spent in recent Canadian party leadership elections

Party

Year

Highest-spending candidate

Liberals

1990

Chrétien

2,446,036

Yes

Conservatives

1993

Campbell

3,000,000

Yes

Conservatives

1998

Segal

1,200,000

No

Canadian Alliance

2000

Long

3-4,000,000

No

Canadian Alliance

2002

Harper

1,200,000

Yes

New Democrats

2003

Layton

758,436

Yes

Conservatives

2003

MacKay

1,000,000

Yes

Liberals

2003

Martin

7,750,000

Yes

Conservatives

2004

Stronach

5,356,168

No

Liberals

2006

Rae

2,987,556

No

NDP

2012

Mulcair

595,117

Yes

Liberal

2013

Trudeau

1,484,969

Yes

Amount spent ($)

Highest-spending candidate won?

Source: Cross and Crysler 2011, updated from news sources.

Table 7.2 shows the amount expended by candidates in these contests. Major candidates routinely spent millions of dollars, with Paul Martin’s 2003 campaign for leader of the Liberal party being the most expensive at an estimated eight million dollars. In several of these contests, high-profile M P s who were thought to be interested in the leadership declined to enter the contest because of the costs associated with running a competitive campaign (Cross 2004). While Canadian parties and general-election candidates receive extensive public financing in support of their organizational and electoral efforts, there are no similar funds available for internal party contests. Candidates must raise these funds through contributions from private donors. This creates significant fundraising pressures for primary candidates and their supporters, and presents a huge hurdle for those candidates without easy access to large numbers of contributors. Although Bills C-24 and C-2 did not impose a spending ceiling for leadership elections, the experience of the Liberal party in a highly contested 2006 primary suggests that the donor limit and prohibition on corporate funding may serve to lower overall expenses. In prior Liberal and Conservative contests, a significant portion of funding was raised from corporations, and most of the candidates in

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the 2006 contest found it difficult to raise sufficient funds in small individual contributions. The result was less spending than in prior contests. The 2013 Liberal semi-open primary also saw less spending but this contest was not competitive, as Trudeau was an easy winner. It remains to be seen if this will be a permanent result of the new law or whether parties and candidates will adjust to it and become more effective at raising funds, in relatively modest amounts, from individual donors.

E x a m p l e s o f F inancial V i o l at i o n s a n d L oopholes As mentioned earlier, in 2005 the Israeli Party Law was amended in a manner that transformed the authority of financial oversight of primary campaigns from the hands of the parties to the State Comptroller. Since then, the State Comptroller has published detailed reports concerning financial aspects of primary candidates’ campaigns (Kenig and Rahat 2014). The most common violations of the party law involve candidates spending in excess of the limit. As shown in Table 7.1, in the eight leadership primaries that were held between 2007 and 2013, four of the twenty-five candidates exceded the spending limit. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that other candidates did not spend more than allowed. Perhaps they engaged in under-the-radar fundraising and spending, exploiting loopholes in the law. Yet, the general impression is that things have improved in this respect since the State Comptroller assumed oversight for the financial aspects of primary campaigns. Other violations of the party law involve breaking the maximum ceiling for a single donation, receiving a donation in cash money in a sum higher than NI S 200 (about $70), and receiving a donation from a corporation. The report that monitored the legislative primaries before the 2009 elections found the following violations: • • •

•

5 candidates broke the spending limit; 6 candidates illegally received donations from a corporation; 8 candidates illegally received a single donation higher than allowed; 5 candidates illegally received a cash donation higher than N IS 200.

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Studying primaries in Israel, Hofnung (2005, 68) makes the following estimation: “It is believed that to be in a position to win a safe seat in primaries within the two major parties (with 150,000 and 200,000 eligible voters), new challengers and incumbent backbenchers need to spend (prices adjusted to 2003) roughly N IS 2 million” ($625,000). In such a situation, wealthy candidates are at a significant advantage, as they do not need to invest the same effort in recruiting donations as might other candidates. Incumbents are also in a much better position, because they can use the resources of the Knesset to stay in contact with party members and they are in a better position to get free media. Rahat, Hazan, and Katz’s (2008) analysis of candidate selection in Israel demonstrates that incumbents have higher success rates in party primaries in comparison to selection by delegates. Indeed, incumbents tend to be experienced and successful fundraisers. What is troubling is that the current system appears to encourage finding loopholes in the financing legislation. The reason is that the spending limit is much lower than the estimated amount of money that is needed to run an effective campaign. At the time in which Hofnung made the estimation that $625,000 was needed for an effective campaign, the state mandated limit was about $77,265 for candidates in parties with less than 150,000 members and about $158,275 for parties with more than 150,000 members. Hofnung’s (2005, 77) analysis of the Israeli scene is worth quoting at some length: Competing in major party internal contests requires substantial financial resources to enable candidates to reach as many voters as possible, but campaign finance regulations have instituted fund-raising and expenditure limits that conflict directly with electoral constraints. These demands have proven to be irreconcilable. Candidates who obeyed the campaign finance laws to the  letter were certain to find themselves at a severe electoral disadvantage, unable to do much more than mail one letter to each ­eligible voter. However, candidates who followed the advice of experienced campaign managers and opted to use available resources, were likely to find themselves in breach of the law to a lesser or greater degree. The ready availability of money increased the temptation to skirt or break the law, especially

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The Promise and Challenge of Party Primary Elections

when it was obvious or taken for granted that party leaders, officeholders, and incumbent Knesset members were also involved in such irregular or illegal practices. The grave impli­ cations of such behaviour for the maintenance of the rule of law cannot be overstated. The original version of the Israeli party law, as well as its numerous amendments over the years, clearly reflect an attempt to counter the possibility that politicians will be influenced by private money: that is, receive money in return for supporting the interests of their donors. The sources of funding are limited, the sum for an individual donation and the overall sum that a candidate can collect are capped, and transparency is required as the names of donors appear on the internet in the final report of each candidate. Yet, there are loopholes that seem to be inevitable. Hofnung (2005, 68) explains the problem as follows: “In a country such as Israel, where there is heavy involvement of the central government in many economic activities, personal contacts in government offices can pave the way for grants, licenses, and building authorizations. For such reasons, businessmen are willing to ‘invest’ in politicians, to contribute to their campaigns, and to offer all kinds of campaign services.” Indeed, there have been many allegations concerning political corruption in party primaries in Israel, but very few investigations and even fewer convictions. The most prominent conviction was of Omri Sharon, the son of former prime minister Ariel Sharon. He was convicted and sentenced to jail because he broke the law in regard to the financing of his father’s 2001 primary campaign and because he subsequently engaged in a cover-up. This, however, might have been just the tip of the iceberg of corruption. As will be discussed later, there are a number of reasons to believe that many wrongdoings do not come to the surface. While there are fewer state-mandated financial regulations in Canada, here too we find evidence of violations of campaign-­ financing legislation. Among other infractions, Eagles et al. (2005) document the following violations of the rules surrounding candidate nomination for the 2004 election: •

20 candidates reported zero as the total amount spent although this was clearly incorrect;

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•

•

Financing Primary Elections 171

Three candidates accepted illegal corporate contributions over $1,000; One candidate spent in excess of the legislated limit.

Despite legislation specifically banning corporate donations at the federal level, there are some clear loopholes. In 2006, for example, Liberal leadership contender Joe Volpe received $108,000 in donations from executives of Apotex Inc. and their spouses and children (Bryden 2006). Each individual, including minors, donated the legal maximum of $5,400 to his campaign. Leadership rivals within the Liberal party and politicians from other parties claimed that Volpe was essentially taking a contribution from Apotex, and was therefore in clear violation of legislation banning contributions from corporations. Notwithstanding criticisms from outside and inside the party, the Liberals opted not to open an investigation, claiming that it was Elections Canada’s responsibility to ensure compliance with electoral legislation, and not the party’s. Despite Elections Canada stating that Volpe did not violate any election financing laws, his campaign returned the five cheques from the children after sustained media criticism.

E n f o rc e m e n t a nd Expos ure Writing of the Canadian case, Cross (2004) and Cross and Crysler (2011) suggest that there is considerable evidence that candidates frequently spend in excess of any limits set by their party. For example, the two front-runners in the N D P ’s 2012 leadership primary exceeded the party’s internally set spending limit by more than $100,000 combined. Although the party capped spending at $500,000, Thomas Mulcair and Brian Topp spent $579,696 and $553,035 respectively (Elections Canada 2012). The experience of the Canadian parties with setting their own spending limits illustrates the great difficulty parties have enforcing their own rules. There are a number of impediments to effective enforcement of internal rules for the selection of party leaders and candidates. First, as discussed in earlier chapters, one reason parties turn to primaries is to rehabilitate their public image with citizens who view parties as elite-driven, hierarchical, and unresponsive. Primaries are a way for parties to engage party members, recruit new supporters, and

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demonstrate their commitment to the democratic process. Exposing rule-breaking behaviour only serves to undermine an improved public image and may negate any benefit the party would receive by holding a primary election. Second, there is little incentive for parties to discipline leading candidates, since this only serves to bring negative attention to a possible future leader of the party. In the 2006 Liberal contest, an internal party body did find that a second-tier candidate had violated rules relating to the signing-up of new members. This candidate complained that the party was using a double standard in enforcing the rules vigorously against him while being more lax with the leading candidates. The timing (just as the voting for delegates began) and the unprecedented severity of the fine ($20,000)3 was seen by some as a way for the party to set a clear example without interfering with leading candidates and, therefore, the outcome of the election (Clark and McArthur 2006). By enforcing the rules and exposing the malpractice of minor candidates while turning a blind eye to frontrunners, parties may be able to give the impression that they are conducting fair and transparent elections. The final impediment to effective enforcement of a party’s own rules is that many potential violations do not come to light until after the conclusion of a contest. A party is extremely unlikely to investigate a recent leadership contest winner and discipline him should a violation be proven, as such action would not be in their electoral self-interest. This is especially true if the new leader is now serving as prime minister or will be leading the party in an upcoming election campaign. In addition to the problems of self-enforcement, it appears as though the minimal level of state regulation of leadership elections that does exist in Canada is unable to adequately regulate these contests in certain cases. More than seven years and two additional leadership contests later, four leadership candidates had still not repaid their campaign debts from the 2006 Liberal leadership race. While Canadian law requires candidates to repay their debts within eighteen months of the election, Canada’s chief electoral officer has called the legislation “toothless” (Galloway 2013). It has been estimated that hundreds of past candidates and current members of Parliament have failed to repay campaign debts, collectively owing “millions of dollars” (Galloway 2013).

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Of course, these concerns are not limited to party primaries but, as Cross and Blais (2012a) suggest, these contests typically involve more rules and the potential for more questionable behaviour than do other forms of intra-party selection. Given the lack of public regulation of party primaries, the limited ability of parties to establish and enforce regulations governing how they are operated becomes all the more important. The inability of Israeli parties to enforce the rules led them to transfer their enforcement to the state. The State Comptroller now reviews the candidates’ reports of their intra-party campaign expenses, publishes the results of the reviews, and sanctions those who are found to break the rules. For example in 2012, out of 195 candidates who competed in legislative primaries in three parties, fifty-two had to pay fines and an additional twenty-three received a warning (State Comptroller 2013). Several candidates who competed in leadership primaries were also found to have broken the rules, and a few had to pay a fine. Indeed the “outsourcing” of primaries’ oversight from the parties to the state exposes candidates to increased public scrutiny. Yet the fines are quite low and sanctions may be unfairly concentrated on those who do not file perfect reports, not necessarily those who intentionally break the law. The fact that a few cases reached the level of police investigation may, however, make candidates think twice about filing false reports. The story of loopholes and transgressions of campaign finance laws is, of course, not new in relation to general elections. As parties move to primaries for the selection of their leaders and legislative candidates, these intra-party contests take on many of the attributes of general elections. Included among these are the increased costs of these campaigns and the related challenges of regulating candidates’ finances to ensure fair and transparent processes.

R e s o u rc e s a n d C o s t -S aving Measures In addition to the costs associated with campaigning, primaries have considerable administrative costs for parties (registering voters, managing poll stations, etc.). As Scarrow (2013, 150) notes, “implementing inclusive types of I P D [intra-party democracy] can be an expensive proposition, because there are costs to running the selection procedures and campaign costs for those competing in this

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added layer of elections.” Yet, despite recent legislation regulating spending and fundraising, neither the Canadian nor the Israeli state has offered funding to assist with the operation of party primaries. The cost of administering the UK Labour party’s 2007 mail ballot of its membership for the position of deputy leader, for instance, was estimated at more than £2 million (B BC 2006). This election, however, only included existing party members and did not involve an extensive recruitment campaign. The costs associated with conducting a primary are likely to be much higher when parties engage in lengthy recruitment campaigns, as the party’s membership base swells and with it the costs associated with establishing hundreds of polling stations or mailing postal ballots, registering new members, and so on. Considering how expensive primaries can be, we must question whether parties have the financial resources to manage internal elections of this magnitude in a fair and open manner. This is especially important given that the state typically provides nothing in the way of funding and that a number of the “pathologies” of primaries appear to stem from the financial burdens that ensue. The remainder of the chapter examines a number of ways in which cash-strapped parties have tried to raise funds, the most common methods used to offset the costs of conducting primaries, and some of the negative implications that can arise from both. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, Canadian and Israeli parties routinely recruit throngs of new members before primaries, often doubling their membership base. While the cost of recruiting and registering these new members is substantial, these newly enrolled members can be an important source of income for the party and a means of defraying the cost of the primary election. The Alberta Conservatives, for example, raised $779,986 in membership fees according to their 2006 financial statement. It is important to note that this was a year in which the party held a hotly contested leadership primary. In the fiscal year that followed, a year without a leadership primary, the party received fees totalling $141,760 (Elections Alberta 2014). Membership fees represented fully one-quarter of the party’s annual revenue in 2006. Parties in Israel raise significant amounts of money from membership fees as well. According to the reports that Likud submitted to the State Comptroller concerning its revenues for 2011–12, membership fees totaled around 6.7 million N IS (about 2.3 million

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dollars). This amount represents approximately one sixth of the party’s income for that period. Yet, we should remember that the cost of administering the primaries is in the millions, so it is unclear if the party is able to “earn” more than it “spends” on membership participation. In addition to membership fees, parties have sometimes been known to charge a polling fee to participate. The Italian Union electoral alliance (L’Unione), for example, charged a single euro for participation in its 2005 leadership primary. Although only a modest fee, more than three million people participated in the election, generating significant revenue for the alliance (Scarrow 2013, 153). While polling fees are typically minimal in cost for the average voter, some provincial parties in Canada have charged polling fees as high as $45 (Cross 2004). Depending on the number of members enrolled and mobilized to vote, membership and polling fees may raise considerable sums of money. Members and voters, however, are not the only source of income for parties seeking to conduct an expensive party primary. The introduction of candidate deposits (also referred to as buy-in costs or entrance fees) has served two goals. One is to discourage fringe and uncompetitive candidates with no realistic chance of winning from entering the race and increasing its costs without any significant added democratic value. Second, by having candidates pay an entrance fee, the party is somewhat able to compensate for a diversion of donor funds to candidates that might otherwise have been directed to the party itself. High entrance fees are relatively common at the federal level in Canada. In 2003 and 2004, both the Conservatives and the Liberals introduced non-refundable entrance fees of $50,000 for leadership elections. Given the number of individuals seeking the leadership, both parties were able to raise hundreds of thousands of dollars from candidates alone. The Liberal party raised the entrance fee for candidacy to $75,000 for the 2013 leadership primary. What’s more, candidate deposits are not limited to leadership primaries. Although less substantial, Canadian parties typically require the deposit of $1,000 for candidates seeking the party’s nomination in the general election. Entrance fees are also the norm for leadership and legislative primaries in Israel. They might be large enough to block fringe candidates, yet their contribution towards covering the millions a party

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spends on administering primaries is marginal. In 2014, Likud’s general manager estimated the cost of primaries would be N IS 5 million, roughly $1,720,000 (Likud vs Supreme Court 2014), but the entrance fee for leadership candidates (as of 2014, in Likud as well as in Labour and the Jewish Home) was set at N IS 10,000 (about $3,400). The amount for a leadership candidate in the Labour Party has increased from NI S 5,000 (about $1,700) in 1997, to N IS 10,000 (about $3,400) in 2002, and NI S 15,000 (about $5,100) in 2005 (then dropping back to NI S 10,000 level). Somewhat surprisingly, fees for candidates in legislative primaries in Likud and Labour are identical to those for leadership primaries (N IS 10,000). In the Jewish Home, the fee for legislative candidates was lower: N IS 3,500 (about $1,200) in 2012 and NI S 7,000 (about $2,400) in 2015. Like buy-in costs and polling fees, there are practical and financial reasons for other party decisions as well. Given that parties finance primaries on their own, limiting the number of polling stations can be an effective means of reducing their overall cost. According to Elections Canada, there were approximately 65,000 polling stations across the country during recent federal elections (Elections Canada 2011). With more than 300 electoral districts, voters in an average constituency are presented with a large number of different voting locations and are likely to be assigned to one that is reasonably close to their residence. This is in sharp contrast to the way that parties tend to nominate candidates. As a cost-saving measure, legislative candidate primaries in Canada typically have only one polling station available for the entire electoral district. In other words, parties will typically operate little more than 300 polling stations for candidate primaries compared to the 65,000 stations that the state manages during the general election. The Israeli parties engage in similar cost-cutting measures. The number of polling stations used in the leadership primaries of the large Israeli parties is a few hundred at most. For instance, Likud operated 512 polling stations in 154 locations in its 2012 leadership primaries, while the Labour Party deployed 125 polling stations in 84 locations in its 2013 leadership primaries. This is in contrast to the 9,881 polling stations used in the 2013 general elections. Limiting the number of polling stations may also inadvertently provide an advantage to one candidate over another. In fact, the opportunity to influence the number and location of polling stations may provide an incentive for individuals to capture control of

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the party executive. While more expensive, operating more polling stations across the constituency would limit the potential for this type of manipulation. Besides potential manipulation, having fewer polling stations undermines the democratic nature of primaries by making participation more difficult for the average voter than it is in the general election. This is especially true in large electoral districts. The Canadian riding of Timmins-James Bay, for instance, is 246,275.67 square kilometres. With a limited number of polling stations available, participation for many voters in a large rural area like this is difficult. The end result is that the cost associated with voting in a primary election is much higher than that of participating in a general election. Although the decision to limit the number of polling stations, to enact a poll tax, or to increase entrance fees may be a result of financial realities as parties attempt to manage expensive internal elections, such cost-saving measures can be detrimental to the fairness of the electoral process. Many of these challenges can be  somewhat addressed through adoption of fax, online, and postal balloting, all of which can significantly reduce the costs associated for voter participation in a primary (but potentially increase costs for the party). These options, however, have been reserved almost exclusively for leadership contests and have often been controversial, with rival campaigns arguing over whether they should be permitted. Secure online voting in Israel, for instance, has not yet been practised. More­ over, like a number of other rules, some voting techniques may benefit specific candidates while disadvantaging others. For example, online balloting may help a candidate with strong support among young party members and thus disadvantage candidates with support of older members. While it is reasonable for parties to find methods of reducing the  costs of primaries, the fundraising and cost-saving measures ­discussed above can have a number of negative, if unintended, consequences. The introduction of polling fees, for example, can undermine the open and inclusive nature of primaries and act as a barrier to participation. While high fees are not the norm, any amount in addition to membership dues is essentially a “poll tax” levied on individuals seeking to participate in the democratic process. Cross (2004) finds that participation is higher in those primary contests without additional fees, evidence that costs that are passed on to the voters may indeed supress turnout.

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Prohibitively high candidate deposits, as well as arbitrary changes to the cost of deposits from one election to the next, are problematic as well. The New Democratic Party’s executive council doubled the entrance fee for leadership candidates from the 2003 election ($7,500) to the next election in 2012 ($15,000). Likewise, the Liberals raised their candidate deposit by $25,000 between recent leadership elections. Given that candidate deposits can change from one election to the next, these fees are subject to possible manipulation. Substantial candidate fees can limit the pool of individuals who can participate. By introducing higher fees to defray the cost of conducting the primary, the party may favour some candidates while serving to keep others out of the race completely.

C o n c l u s ion Successful democracies cope with the challenge of managing elections and of regulating their financing. They do so by investing significant resources because they believe that these are necessary to have reasonably fair, open, and honest elections. The challenge for parties is to find a delicate balance between managing the financial burdens that primaries necessarily entail while providing a fair, inclusive, and participatory internal election that is consistent with democratic norms and expectations. But parties lack the needed resources (and often the motivation) to fulfill this role. These problems lead to many of the challenges associated with primaries outlined in the preceding chapters. One potential solution is increased state involvement in the regulation of party primaries – in what was traditionally considered the private affairs of parties. It is also important to keep in mind that candidates do not enjoy any direct state support in funding their primary campaigns. This exposes them to pressures that public funding from the state, in general elections, is meant to alleviate. That is, if democracies provide considerable public resources to parties, and general-election candidates, to ensure that they are not overly beholden to the interests of corporations and the rich, primaries, because they are expansive, open the door for such influence. Whether states will continue to ignore this problem, or start to fund these intra-party contests and not just try to regulate them, is a question for the future.

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8 Party Primaries: The Path Forward

At the beginning of this book, we declared that our objective was to shed more light on primaries as one of the main and fastest-growing selection methods used today by parties for choosing leaders and legislative candidates. We set three goals: first, to provide a solid and comprehensive conceptualization of the term “primary”; second, to re-examine the evidence concerning the spread of primaries; and, third, to assess the consequences of primaries. The main purpose of Chapter 1 was to provide scholars who take part in the cross-national comparative study of leadership and candidate selection methods, and also of political parties in general, with improved conceptual tools. After reviewing the inconsistent use of various terms to describe inclusive leadership and candidate selection methods, we outlined a definition of what constitutes a party primary. We suggested that the most important element in its definition is the nature of the selectorate: Primaries are the selection methods in which the cumulative weight of influence of party members, supporters and/or voters is equal to or greater than all other more exclusive selectorate(s) combined. That is, we define the range on the inclusive-exclusive continuum of selectorates that constitute party primaries. The next step was proposing a classification of types and subtypes of primaries on the basis of the nature of the selectorate(s) involved in the process. We differentiated primaries into two main types: pure primaries, in which only the most inclusive selectorates such as voters, supporters, and/or party members, are granted voting authority; and mixed primaries, which include selection processes that combine the inclusive selectorates found in the first category with less inclusive selectorates such as party delegates,

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the parliamentary party group (P P G ), small “nomination committees,” and so on. We also identified a number of sub-types for each category. For the pure primaries we identified four sub-types: the open primaries that involve all voters, the in-between case of semi-open primaries that require affirmative expression of support for the party, closed primaries that involve only party members, and the complex primaries that involve some combination of the above. The two most common variations in the mixed primaries category are the weighted mixed primaries in which there is a weighted combination of multiple selectorates simultaneously, from both inside and outside the primary zone, and the multi-stage mixed primaries processes that combine multiple selectorates into a single selection process involving both a primary stage and a more exclusive non-primary stage. Chapter 2 re-examined the evidence concerning the spread of party primaries. Drawing upon a large number of observations and expanding our analysis to more parties in more countries we found that indeed, it is clear that party members and sometimes even nonmembers are more involved than ever before in the selection of party leaders and also of party candidates for public posts (legislative and executive posts, including sub-national positions). The adoption (and sometimes, much less often, the abolition) of primaries has to do with specific intra-party and inter-party circumstances, yet the menu is clearly biased towards more inclusive methods. It is clear that we are dealing with a general trend, one that requires and indeed is beginning to receive increased attention from scholars. This leads us to the third and largest part of the book, that dealing with the consequences of party primaries. Chapter 3 set the stage for our focused comparison between primaries in Canada and Israel. It started by demonstrating that the two countries differ significantly in terms of their political culture, electoral system, government formation, and electoral competition. That is, we deal with a focused comparison with two most different cases in terms of political culture and institutional environment (at least in the context of established parliamentary democracies). We then presented a short history of the adoption and use of primaries for leadership and candidate selection, and an analysis of the causes for adopting these selection methods in the two countries. While the causes for adopting primaries are not identical, the many

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similarities between them illustrates that primaries have specific properties that are pronounced even in different cultural and institutional settings. This observation led us to the next four chapters dealing with the challenges primaries pose to parties, and the similar consequences found in both environments. Chapter 4 highlighted the internal processes by which parties determine, administer, and oversee primaries. We saw that rules are often arbitrarily made by individuals with an interest in the primary’s outcome and are easily changed in the lead up to each new contest. These include manipulations of the timing of the selection, rules concerning voting and candidacy eligibility, types and definitions of representation correction mechanisms, location of polling booths, the monitoring and enforcement of primary rules, and the way that parties deal with internal appeals and review processes. We argue that such manipulation of selection rules – of their determination, implementation, and enforcement – can undermine the legitimacy of what should be a fair and transparent democratic event. Chapter 5 focused on the recruitment practices that define the selectorates in primary contests. The Canadian and Israeli cases suggest that in many primaries, the recruitment of new members and supporters becomes the central focus and strategy of the campaign. This occurs because candidates are able to build a favourable selectorate through recruitment of large numbers of new supporters, and outside groups are able to influence the party’s decision by joining en masse to support a candidate who shares their policy preferences. The extent to which primaries are vulnerable to manipulation, misconduct, and questionable recruitment tactics are of great concern. Especially in primaries with liberal membership requirements, there is always the potential for party raiding or hijacking, or extensive and relatively easy vote-contracting, which can undermine the integrity of the selection process. Not only is membership often not representative of the party (in terms of the properties that characterize its voters), but significant parts of it are defective: many are instant members who come and go with the candidates and the vote-contractors, and among them some are not even supporters of the party. Giving voice to tens of thousands of newcomers in the party’s primary also potentially undercuts the value of membership for those who remain loyal between contests and see their votes swamped by new arrivals. Indeed, such

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phenomena raise concerns whether parties are adequately equipped to monitor and regulate the recruitment of thousands of new voters within a relatively short time. Chapter 6 analyzed the content of campaigns and the behaviour of candidates and voters. When it comes to campaigns, substance seems to be less important than electability. This fuels the personalization of politics, a theme we return to later in this concluding chapter. As for membership turnout, a significant number of party members do not participate in primary contests. There is significant variance in participation rates that appear to be related to the relative importance of the contest, the level of competition, and crucial “technicalities” such as the accessibility of polling booths. We also considered the effects of primaries on the type of candidates selected, and the competitive nature of primary contests, particularly in comparison with other selection methods. Chapter 7 considered the financial aspects of primary contests. Unlike the case of general elections, parties and candidates are left to finance these events without support from the state. Our analysis points to several pathologies that challenge the integrity of primaries: from candidates who do not respect the rules concerning campaign finance to the lack of resources needed for the parties to properly administer these elections. In recent years, state regulation of primary financing has expanded in an attempt to cope with these challenges. This creates a dilemma with which we deal later in this chapter. On the one hand, parties seem to be ill-equipped and often lacking in motivation to monitor primary finances themselves. On the other hand, giving the state a more significant role in regulating primaries may undermine the autonomy of parties. When we assessed the consequences of primaries in chapters 4 through 7, we focused largely on pathologies, on the empty half of the glass. This is not because we do not believe in party democracy in general, or in the value of primaries in particular. That is, we do not intend to follow Michels’s footsteps and to give up on democracy, not even on intra-party democracy. What we aimed to do is to expose the problems that must be tackled in the pursuit of robust, meaningful intra-party democracy. Our comparison of two differing cases makes clear that the pathologies of primaries are not simply due to political culture or a result of state-level institutional structure, but arise from the particular incentives that primaries offer to those involved in them: parties, candidates, activists, and voters. This leads

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to the next part of this concluding chapter, in which we focus on three broad challenges resulting from the adoption of primaries, and on possible solutions.

Three I n t e r r e l at e d C h a l lenges that Parties F ac e i n t h e E r a o f Primaries While this book is about primary elections, we are first and foremost students of political parties. It is therefore important to reflect on the implications that primaries have on those parties that adopt them. The implications of these highly inclusive and expansive intraparty elections are numerous and wide-ranging, encompassing issues of democratic responsiveness, competitiveness, fairness, and representativeness. Here we focus on what we consider to be three of the most fundamental and consequential issues parties face when adopting a primary selection method. These issues have surfaced repeatedly in the previous chapters but have not yet received sustained attention. These are the personalization of campaigns and recruitment tactics, the changing nature of party membership, and the risk of parties becoming empty vessels through de-institutionalization and over-regulation. It is important to note that these issues are largely inter-related. Personalized recruitment tactics, for example, change the nature of party membership into something much more transitory, and without a stable membership parties can be transformed into a hollow shell. Despite their complex and interrelated nature, we address each of these issues individually. Personalization One of the most immediate and identifiable consequences of primary elections is the emphasis that these intra-party contests place on candidate-centred politics. Primaries promote personalization, that is, “a process in which the political weight of the individual actor in the political process increases over time, while the centrality of the political group (i.e., political party) declines” (Rahat and Sheafer 2007: 65). As Rahat and Sheafer (2007, 68–9) explain: Democratization of intraparty candidate selection methods, that is, the adoption of more inclusive selectorates … [is] an expression of institutional personalization. Candidate selection is

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transformed from an intraparty matter, decided by a few leaders and senior apparatchiks behind closed doors, into a public contest in which candidates explicitly compete with their fellow ­partisans through personal campaigns. Selection through nominating committees symbolizes the cohesion of the group: It is about producing a balanced list of candidates through deliberation; usually, a selected party agency ratifies this list en bloc. Selection by party agency and party members means that the aggregation of individual votes decides the composition of the list. The relatively small size of selected party agencies, as well as the deep involvement of their members in intrapartisan politics, enables selection coordination for the sake of producing a somewhat balanced candidate list, a team. Selection by the less informed, less committed, unstable, and atomistic crowd of party members transforms the process into a purely personal matter. While, as discussed in Chapter 6, intra-party competition generally tends to emphasize personality over policy, the campaign and recruitment tactics that characterize primary elections exacerbate the tendency towards personalization. Without meaningful policy debate to differentiate between the candidates, many primaries are fought and won on how well candidates can recruit and mobilize new members. As Chapter 5 highlights, recruitment campaigns are a central component of many primary contests. These recruitment efforts, however, are highly personalized. A majority of Israeli party members (Kenig et al. 2014) and more than 80 per cent of party members in Canada (Young and Cross 2002b) claimed that they joined their party for the purpose of participating in a candidate or leadership primary. As a result, membership is more about candidates than it is about the party as an entity that aggregates interests and represents a collective ideology and policy program. Membership in many parties that have adopted primary elections is therefore highly personalized – members are enrolled and mobilized to support an individual candidate and often do not renew their membership after the primary contest ends. At the time of the next selection event the process repeats itself, with new candidates attracting new members to the party. Membership is therefore a reflection more of the candidates than the party itself.

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The personalized nature of party membership is beginning to extend into other areas as well, specifically to the realm that was labelled by Scarrow (2014) as “multispeed membership.” There are already party leaders and other politicians who have a larger number of friends (Facebook) or followers (Twitter) than does their party. Canadian Liberal leader Justin Trudeau, for example, had 539,000 Twitter followers as of early 2015. This is 380,000 more individuals than the party has in members and registered supporters combined, and 400,000 more individuals than participated in the 2013 Liberal leadership primary. What’s more, Trudeau has nearly six times as many Twitter followers as his party, despite only being selected party leader in 2013. Although not as stark, the Liberal leader has 196,962 Facebook “likes” compared to the Liberal party’s 65,964. Nor is this level of personalization unique to Justin Trudeau and the Canadian Liberals. Stephen Harper, then prime minister and leader of the Canadian Conservative party, had fifteen times as many Twitter followers (678,000) in 2015 than did his party (44,000). Similar patterns are evident in Israel as well. As of early 2014, Israeli prime minister and Likud party leader Benjamin Netanyahu had more than 575,000 Facebook “likes,” more than four times Likud’s 125,000 registered members. Even some back-bench politicians in Israel have more Facebook “likes” then their respective parties. Likud M K s Miri Regev and Danny Danon, for instance, both had more than 200,000 “likes” compared to Likud’s 24,832. While a more systematic study is needed to establish the claim that parties with primaries are indeed more personalized in the social media, there are clear signs that this might be so. That is, when one looks at countries in which party leaders are selected by more exclusive selectorates, the case seems to be different. The German chancellor, Angela Merkel (selected by conference delegates), had 1,002,187 “likes” as against 90,668 for her party, the CD U , yet she seems to be the exception rather than the rule. Sigmar Gabriel, leader of the German SP D and vice-chancellor (selected by conference delegates), had 39,737 “likes” on his Facebook page against 82,238 for his party. Horst Seehofer, leader of the CS U , had 36,222 “likes” compared to 37,915 for his party. Tony Abbott, Australia’s prime minister and leader of the Liberal Party (selected by the P P G ), had 425,321 “likes” compared with 227,596 for his party. Stefan Lofven, Swedish prime minister and leader of the Social-Democrats

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(selected by conference delegates), had 77,575 “likes” against 126,257 for the party, while Jimmie Akesson, leader of the Swedish Democrats, had 75,169 “likes” versus 93,098 for the party. Personalization, however, does not end with the grassroots members and online supporters. The many similarities between primaries and general elections have meant that candidates contesting a leadership primary (and, to a lesser extent, a candidate nomination) need to utilize more professionalized campaign-tactics. The ability to compete requires a campaign organization that is capable of recruiting new members, mobilizing supporters, and addressing a  sprawling electorate. A crucial first task for would-be leaders is, therefore, to “assemble a team of advisers, strategists, and consultants who are expert in the management of party leadership campaigns” (Noel 2007, 197). As a personal choice of the candidate, these entourages are highly personalized. If the candidate is successful, this inner circle often transitions into an integral component of the party’s machinery, taking on key responsibilities and leadership roles with a principal commitment not necessarily to the party, but to the leader. Once selected, party leaders and legislative candidates have both a highly personalized entourage in charge of key responsibilities and a highly personalized membership base that was recruited to support their candidacy. The winning candidate largely defines the party, as his supporters have essentially captured the party and its various components. While all selection methods are inherently personalized, the nature of primary elections exacerbates this trend. Primaries also allow winning candidates to claim a mandate from a broad selectorate. Some have argued that this tips the balance of power between the leader and his parliamentary party in the leader’s favour (Mair 1994). The argument is that it is harder for the P P G , or even for activists gathered at a party conference, to hold a leader chosen through a primary to account. The leader is able to argue that his mandate comes from the broader selectorate, so that is the group he should be accountable to. The problem that Mair and others have identified is that primary selectorates, including loosely affiliated members and potentially non-members, are not regularly engaged in party activity and are more likely to be both deferential to the leader and to have less opportunity and motivation to scrutinize his performance on a regular basis. This too can exacerbate a personalization of politics centred around the party leader.

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Changing Nature of Party Membership More than just personalization, the discussion above speaks to the changing nature of party membership. The growth of low cost, low barrier methods of entry to joining political parties (sympathizers, friends, supporters, etc.), the rise of cyber-membership, the extension of voting privileges to non-members (Scarrow 2014), and the cyclical nature of membership recruitment patterns (Carty 2013) are fundamentally altering what it means to be a party member and what it means for a party to have members (Rahat and Hazan 2007). As the data in Chapter 5 demonstrate, membership numbers tend to soar in the lead-up to primary elections only to fall off once they are over. This is a result of members joining only to support an individual candidate; such personalized recruitment does not engender a long-term commitment. This is especially true for members who joined the party to support a candidate who ultimately lost. These individuals are likely to let their membership lapse after the primary. Even those whose preferred candidate has won can simply let their membership lapse until the next selection event, which may be years away. It should be remembered that a significant number of these members are not even supporters of and voters for the party itself. This creates a situation in which tens of thousands of “instant members” come and go. As Carty (2002, 738) writes, “personalized, as opposed to institutional, loyalties do not make for particularly enduring memberships or stable organizations.” What it means to be a member therefore shifts from a supporter of the party, its ideology, and brand, to merely the supporter of an individual candidate. While this is not true for all members, recruitment patterns and membership cycles demonstrate that this is, indeed, the dominant trend. The rapidity of change in many parties with regard to candidate and leadership selection also deserves attention. The literature has just begun to recognize the move to closed primaries, and already we are witnessing parties moving onward to semi-open and open primaries. Ten years ago, we could write about the opening of the selection processes to party members as a means to “bringing them back in” (Hopkin 2001). Now, as selection is beginning to be made by party supporters or voters, what will be the fate of the rank-and-file party members? Will traditional party membership survive? And, if so, to what purpose?

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If contests are wide open, with any party supporter in the electorate eligible to participate, then there is little incentive for anyone to maintain membership between these contests and parties may see a decline in membership. While there are other incentives to membership (the ability to meet and socialize with like-minded individuals, policy and ideological motivations, etc.), desire to participate in a leadership and candidate selection process is among the most important. Without the ability to offer this incentive to potential new members (who can receive voting privileges without paying dues), parties will need to discover new ways of attracting and retaining members. Empty Vessels? Perhaps most concerning for political parties is whether they can remain relevant democratic actors with the transition to primaries – whether fair and transparent primaries can exist in cohesive and autonomous political parties. Two factors are important for this discussion. First, the changing nature of party membership may discourage members from joining, turning parties into empty shells and fundamentally challenging their identity as membership organizations. Second, the level of regulation and oversight that may be needed to ensure the proper functioning of primary elections may ultimately hollow out political parties through over-regulation and de-institutionalization (Whitely 2014). In terms of membership, we have already identified the potentially adverse effects of primaries. While the recruitment campaigns succeed at enrolling thousands of new members, this is largely transitory. After primaries are concluded, parties in Canada and Israel return to relatively low levels of membership. This is especially problematic for parties conducting open primaries in which nonmembers can participate. Without the ability to offer selective incentives to potential members (i.e., participation in a party primary), it is unclear whether traditional party membership can survive. If the right to participate can be attained otherwise, the decline of traditional dues-paying membership is likely to be hastened. In this sense, primaries may contribute to the hollowing out of political parties as institutions that link the society to government and politics. While parties will gain “supporters,” “cyber members,” and the like, it is yet to be seen whether these new individuals will offer

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The Path Forward 189

parties the same support and commitment that traditional members have in the past. Primaries, as we have illustrated, are expansive and expensive selection events akin to a general election. And as the previous chapters demonstrate, the size and complexity of primaries raise a number of concerns about how well monitored, funded, and administered these elections truly are, and whether parties are capable of managing them on their own. With limited resources to adequately supervise and administer voting, and few incentives to expose rule-breaking and corruption, party-run primaries experience a number of problems in both Canada and Israel. To avoid these pathologies, the state has taken a much more active role in other countries. In the United States, for example, much of the role parties perform in Canada and Israel has been usurped by the state. The state funds, sponsors, regulates, monitors, and administers these events just like it does general elections. Meanwhile, the parties are largely passive observers, waiting for “their” candidate to be chosen. While the state is far more equipped to ensure fair and transparent primaries, its intervention undermines the autonomy and organizational capacity of American political parties. State-run primaries undermine a party’s ability to use elections as party-building opportunities. The desire to have “fair” primaries may ultimately de-­institutionalize parties by providing the state too much authority in what has traditionally been viewed as an intra-party event. This over-regulation and de-institutionalization, coupled with a potential hollowing out of party membership, should be an important consideration for parties transitioning to more open selection methods.

L e s s o n s a n d P o s s ible Solutions As the previous chapters demonstrate, primary elections in Canada and Israel have a history of being marred by numerous troubling practices. We therefore end with a discussion of what can be done in order to avoid some of the major pathologies of primaries. Finding solutions and implementing them is an extremely important democratic mission because otherwise self-interested politicians will succeed at legitimizing undemocratic selection methods. This is the case for the allegedly liberal party in Israel, Yesh Atid, whose leader, Yair Lapid, is a one-person selectorate. This is also the case for

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parties in South Korea and Taiwan. Some of these parties use opinion polls to decide candidacies which, while they may be seen as an inclusive method, empty the meaning of party organization and membership. Another non-democratic solution is the use of a small nomination committee in which more than half of the members were not affiliated with the party (Hellmann 2014). We argue that the movement towards more inclusive selectorates for party personnel elections is a positive democratic development, but one that requires careful consideration and execution in order to avoid many of the challenges that primaries otherwise face. These potential solutions, derived primarily from the experiences of parties in both Canada and Israel but also from other countries, offer examples for parties around the world that are just now beginning to experiment with more open and inclusive selection methods. To be clear, there is no universal solution to these problems. Each political party, as well as the state in which it operates, has a different ethos, different conceptions of democracy, different circumstances, and different priorities. And, as such, not all parties are engaging in precisely the same activity when choosing a leader or candidate. Nor will they want, or should they be forced, to take the exact same approach when conducting a primary. Principal parties are choosing a (potential) prime minister or at least an opposition leader, while minor parties are choosing (at best) candidates for less important ministries, who may have far less public influence and prominence. Labour parties may wish to extend the franchise to supportive trade unions and affiliated members while other parties will refrain from such practices. One party may be organizationally weak after suffering a serious electoral setback while another might have a large and vibrant membership base. Some parties may want to reward committed members by restricting participation to those who have belonged for a number of months or years while other parties may want to use the primary as a method of recruiting new members by allowing them to participate immediately. One set of detailed regulations is not likely to meet the needs of all parties. However, the fact that the same pathologies appear in such differing polities as Canada and Israel – countries that differ in terms of  political culture, electoral system, government formation, and regime structure – points to some of their universal characteristics. This means that while the solutions should be sensitive to domestic conditions, they may also share some similar characteristics.

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Fundamental tensions inevitably crystallize when consideration is given to how to respond to the pathologies of party primaries. The parties themselves usually lack both the resources and the will to cope with many of these challenges. On the other hand, while the state has the capacity to do so, its involvement challenges the voluntary character of parties. So there is a dilemma. Perhaps the best way out of this conundrum is that the state involve itself only in those areas wherein the parties fail to self-regulate. It may also be possible to let each party decide whether to invite the state to regulate, while supplying positive incentives for doing so such as public financing for the contest. Less extreme measures might include parties attempting to solve problems that have to do with registration of new members either by adopting a restrictive definition of membership that prevents new recruits from participating or by doing away with the requisite of membership. Either way, the incentive to identify and recruit new members, and the accompanying abuses described above, are eliminated. Candidates would know in advance who the selectorate is: either all existing members prior to the contest or potentially the whole electorate (or at least the party’s potential voters). The problem with either approach is that, while it may do away with many of the abuses, it serves only some of a party’s interests. If participation in the primary is restricted to long-time members, greater purchase is given to membership and partisans are encouraged to maintain their involvement on an ongoing basis. The weakness of such an approach is that parties miss the opportunity of using these contests to attract new members and revitalize at a grassroots level. On the other hand, if contests are wide open with any party supporter in the electorate eligible to participate, then there is little incentive for anyone to maintain membership between these contests. Moreover, in the context of open primaries, vote-contracting might become easier, requiring just the mobilization of people, without pre-registering them to parties. A middle ground may thus be optimal, providing members greater influence than supporters. Some of the Australian parties have recently experimented with processes in which vote shares for candidate selection are divided between active party members and self-identified party supporters in the electorate. While the rules vary, in these contests half or more of the vote may be reserved for those who have belonged to the party for several years and attended a number of meetings, with the other

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half allocated to anyone from the electorate who chooses to vote, without the requirement of joining the party. Long-term party members are given greater say and their individual votes count for more in these processes, as there are far fewer of them, while the party also benefits from inviting new supporters to participate. This is evident in the Australian Labour Party’s 2014 “community pre-selection” in the Sydney electorate of Balmain. Half of the total vote was allocated to the 157 individuals who qualified as party branch-members and the other half to the 5,110 voters from the electoral roll who chose to participate. Such a process does away with the need for candidates to sign up new members in the early stages of a campaign and thus dispenses with questionable recruitment activities. It still encourages voter recruitment and mobilization, but in a fashion more akin to a general election. The influence of new recruits is also diminished and, accordingly, candidates are likely to spend more time courting existing members whose votes will carry significantly more weight. These campaigns may also be more likely to include a focus on policy, as this is likely to be of greater interest to long-time party members. A second possible institutional solution might be using several selectorates in a multi-stage or weighted process. This spreading of power among several selectorates – as in Aristotle’s idea of the mixed regime – might also address some of the pathologies. During the selection process, a candidate who faces screening by a central party body might be more reluctant to engage in corrupt behaviour. The fact that party members would not be the sole selectors might decrease the incentives to invest everything in one type of race and might thus restrain nonparty actors such as donors and vote-­ contractors. Candidates would have to balance their responsiveness between the preferences of several selectorates, so populism and personalized behaviours might also be inhibited; the influence of non-party actors would be balanced by those of party actors (Rahat 2009; Hazan and Rahat 2010). In leadership selection, a process that includes both a party’s parliamentarians and grassroots members might best meet the dual objectives of increasing participation while ensuring the leader has support within the parliamentary party. This can either be accomplished through a weighted primary, in which voters in the primary zone have at least 50 per cent of the vote, or through a multi-stage process like that used by the UK Tories. The internal divisions in the

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U K Labour Party, resulting from the membership’s election of Jeremy Corbyn in the face of overwhelming opposition from his parliamentary colleagues, illustrates the risk of a leadership primary with no privileged position for the P P G . Perhaps one of the least intrusive ways to curb the pathologies of primaries is involving state funding. While it is not necessary for the state to pay for the entire primary process, some financial support for the administration of primary elections would begin to address a number of the pathologies that we have discussed. Reducing the financial burden that primaries place on parties, for example, would allow more polling stations to operate, and for longer hours. This, in turn, would limit a candidate’s ability to gain favour in the primary election by limiting the number of or strategically locating polling stations, or manipulating voting times. State-sponsored financial support might also reduce the need for prohibitively high buy-in costs that discriminate against certain classes of candidates, as is the case for some Canadian parties. Furthermore, access to state resources could also be used to enhance the oversight capacity of parties. Officials who are properly trained to count and administer the vote would alleviate corruption at the ballot station. As many of the pathologies of primaries relate directly to a lack of resources, state funding (specifically designated for the purpose of conducting/administering a primary election) would go a long way toward alleviating them. On the other hand, state funding for political parties, as Katz and Mair (1995) warn, can have a number of negative and unintended consequences. Indeed, one of the principal arguments against public financing of political parties is that it can start (or hasten) a process whereby parties retreat from civil society and begin to become embedded within the state, weakening the linkage between citizens and their government. Without a reliance on members and civil society groups for fundraising, parties can become more and more insular. This critique of state funding, however, seems less applicable when considering the practice of primaries. Primaries, by their very nature, draw parties closer to civil society, because a broad and inclusive selectorate is invited to participate. One need only look to the massive recruitment campaigns that parties engage in during primaries to see the grassroots involvement. It is therefore unlikely that partial state funding would truly harm party-civil society relations in this regard.

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The Israeli and Canadian cases also demonstrate the usefulness of state-mandated spending limits for primary elections. In Canada, where the parties are free to set their own limits, there is often little or no recourse against a candidate who overspends. Without state oversight and the motivation to comply with electoral legislation, Canadian parties have little incentive to enforce their own rules and, as a result, overspending is relatively commonplace. In Israel, by contrast, spending in excess of the limit is far less common. The difference, as Chapter 7 highlights, is that the state imposes limits and closely monitors candidates’ spending in Israeli primaries. Imposing spending limits, while certainly infringing on the autonomy of political parties, may be a fair trade-off, especially if the state begins providing financial assistance for primary elections. Another possibility is that of providing “matching funds” for small donations, enhancing involvement of the grassroots and encouraging candidates to look for such resources rather than potentially problematic large donors. Beyond some of the financial aspects, recommendations become much more difficult and depend on the circumstances of the individual parties. Parties have a legitimate interest in preserving their organizational autonomy, and some solutions to the pathologies of primaries may weaken parties as political organizations. Before rushing to regulate or even take over the process, parties should be given the opportunity to demonstrate that they can effectively administer and oversee internal elections. In many respects, Canadian and Israeli parties have “earned” what state regulation they have: they have had years – decades, in some cases – to demonstrate the ability to cope with the challenge of administering primaries, but they have often failed. If parties are not able to self-regulate against the most basic forms of voter fraud such as ballot-stuffing, improper counting of votes, and voter impersonation, then there may be a role for the state to impose a basic regulatory framework to ensure compliance with fundamental democratic norms. On the one hand, as the American experience tells us, parties must be cautious when asking the state to get involved in their internal affairs; otherwise they might essentially become nationalized and become empty vessels (Katz and Kolodny 1994). On the other hand, not all countries enjoy the conditions that enable the Icelandic parties to administer open, democratic, and successful primaries on

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their own (Indridason and Kristinsson 2013). Thus the solution for this dilemma is likely to be one that finds a balance between state intervention and party autonomy. Parties would voluntarily put themselves under some form of state regulation in return for financing or administrative help. The state would benefit from providing financial assistance because primaries enhance the democratic practice in many ways when they are properly conducted, and cashstrapped parties would benefit by unloading some of the administrative costs. Nevertheless, the opening up of these contests to state regulation should be done carefully. Party primaries are rightly celebrated for opening up important democratic events to a broader electorate. The selection of party candidates and leaders is one of the most consequential activities in determining who is represented in the legislature, as well as the issues that may dominate policy debates. It is not surprising that, in an increasing number of states, party members and supporters have been invited to be included in these processes. Nonetheless, as we have illustrated here, parties must be careful in adopting and implementing these potentially more democratic selections. Democracy is, of course, a multi-faceted concept and issues of fairness, transparency, representation, and the quality of participation all have to be weighed and considered in the adoption of primaries. Primaries have many potential implications for parties; by focussing on the Canadian and Israeli experiences, we have highlighted many of these. Some are positive developments while others are more worrisome. What is important, therefore, is to find an appropriate balance, a balance that ensures fair, effective, and transparent primary elections that live up to their democratic potential while, at the same time, not overregulating internal party life and undermining its organizational autonomy.

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Notes

Chapter one 1 An earlier version of this chapter appeared as Kenig, Cross, Pruysers, and Rahat, “Party Primaries,” Representation 51 (2), 147–60. 2 Party leaders are not necessarily candidates for public positions but, in most cases in parliamentary democracies, they are recognized as candidates for the prime ministerial position, or at least for the most senior position the party might hold in the event of joining a coalition government. See Pilet and Cross 2014. 3 On rare occasions, newly selected leaders may be removed prior to the next general election. What is important is that when selected as party leaders, the expectation is that they will lead the party into the next general election. 4 In some rare instances, primaries may involve more than one party. Parties of the left in France (2011), and Italy (2005, 2012), for example, have held primaries jointly to select a single candidate from a bloc of parties. 5 If no candidate receives a majority of the vote, the top two contest a runoff election regardless of their party affiliation. 6 When the direct primary was introduced in the United States, most states opted for a so-called “closed” primary. In this case, the selectorate is restricted to those who declare that they have voted for the party in the past, or will do so in the next general election. Yet there was no means of enforcing this in the era of the secret ballot. In practice, anyone who wanted to register to vote in a party primary could probably do so, although requiring that registration occur some time in advance could do much to prevent the party being infiltrated by trouble-making interlopers. This meant that there was some difference between “closed” primaries,

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Notes to pages 31–72

which required stating party affiliation when registering annually as a voter, and “open” primaries, in which a voter could decide at the voting booth in which party’s primaries they would participate. The core party supporters would have more influence in the former, but the difference between the two systems was not always that great (Ware 2012). 7 When the votes of unions are not those of their members but instead of union leaders, we cannot consider that portion of the vote as falling within the primary zone. However when individual members are balloted, this portion lies within the primary zone. 8 It should be noted that both the American nominating conventions and earlier Canadian national conventions also include ex-officio delegates (“super delegates”) who are not selected by members or voters. This implies that these methods are also mixed in a way similar to electoral colleges.

C h a p t e r two 1 This includes all parties that received at least 8 per cent of the vote or seats in the last two general elections, as of March 2012. 2 The C D& V, MR, and Open VLD (Belgium) were compared to the C V P, P R L , and PVV in 1975, respectively; the Conservatives (Canada) were compared to the Progressive Conservatives in 1975; Likud (Israel) was compared to Herut in 1975; the Liberal Democrats (UK ) were compared to the Liberals in 1975. 3 An analysis of what types of parties are most likely to adopt these reforms can be found in Lisi et al., 2015. Among their findings is that parties on the left are slightly more likely than those on the right to adopt primaries. 4 We are grateful to Shomer and Atmor for providing access to their databases. 5 For a discussion of the differing roles of party leaders in different systems, see Pilet and Cross 2014. 6 Note that some scholars, such as Katz (2013), are skeptical of parties’ ability to reverse these trends solely through intra-party reforms.

C ha p t e r th re e 1 Kadima subsequently disbanded and did not contest the 2015 elections. 2 Israel, as a unitary state, lacks a substantial sub-national government level. Still, Labour experimented with open mayoral primaries in two cities in the 1990s, and other parties also briefly experimented with closed primaries for the candidacy of mayor. However, these short experiments

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Notes to pages 78–162

199

were contemporaneous with the adoption of primaries at the national level and did not precede them. 3 If we include Québec Solidaire (the party won three seats in the 2014 Quebec election), only one jurisdiction that uses party primaries has fewer than two parties doing so.

Chapter four 1 Similar citizen’s assemblies and commissions have been utilized in a number of other Canadian provinces such as Ontario, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Quebec. 2 Splitting the members of the L E O C between Canadian Alliance appointees and those appointed by the Progressive Conservatives was a compromise to ensure a more balanced set of selection rules post merger. The party’s constitution now states that the National Council (an elected party body) will appoint the members of the L E O C for future leadership elections. 3 In fact, the PCs had used a regionally weighted system in the past. In the 1998 P C leadership primary, members were provided a direct vote; however, voting took place on a “constituency-by-constituency basis” that assigned each constituency 100 points in order to ensure regional equality (LeDuc 2001, 334). 4 A “leadership review” is essentially a confidence vote that Canadian party leaders are occasionally required to pass in order to remain in their position. 5 This decision required the approval of the party’s central committee, but this organ rarely rejects the leader’s requests. Indeed, Netanyahu’s proposal was approved by a large majority.

C ha p t e r s ix 1 Mobilization numbers may, of course, include participation by members who vote for other parties in general elections. 2 Table 6.3 includes federal leadership contests only. 3 The earlier case of Conservative leader Joe Clark unsuccessfully seeking re-election as party leader can be added to this list.

C ha p t e r s e ve n 1 All values in Canadian dollars, according to the exchange rate as of 15 July 2015.

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200

Notes to pages 163–72

2 The Israeli State Comptroller is an established institution with constitutional status, resources, and expertise (its functions and authorities are laid down in a Basic Law enacted in 1988). It inspects the activities of public authorities and one of its main functions is monitoring issues ­concerning party finance. 3 Upon appeal the fine was reduced to $1,000.

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Index

Note: Page numbers in italics refer to figures or tables. Abbott, Tony, 185 acclamation vote, 96, 151 accountability, 10, 124–5, 152, 186 A C T (New Zealand), 78 administration of party primaries, 102–9; appeals and review process, 105–9; lessons and solutions, 189–95; monitoring and rule enforcement, 12–13, 102– 5, 171–3, 181–2, 194; organi­ zation reforms, 51, 198n6; resources and cost-saving measures, 82, 88, 157, 164–8, 173– 8, 189, 193; role of state, 189, 191, 193–5 Akesson, Jimmie, 186 Alberta, 45, 69 Alberta Conservative Party, 128; administrative costs, 174–5; appeals and review process, 106–7; leadership selection, 17, 45, 70, 72; mobilization rates, 144–5 Alberta Court of Appeals, 106–7 Alberta Liberal Party, 45

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Alberta Progressive Conservative Party, 9, 29 Alberta Wildrose Party, 77 America / American primaries: administration, 84, 189, 194; history, 6–7, 15–16; nominating conventions, 32–3, 198n8; primary legislation, 16; primary types, 23, 27–8, 28, 33, 197n6; Progressive-era reforms, 51 Anders, Rob, 106, 133 Apotex Inc., 171 Arabs / Arab villages, 102–3, 129 Argentina, 16, 18, 27, 43, 46, 55 Aristotle, 192 Atmor, Nir, 46 Augustine, Jean, 96 Australia: delegated conventions, 100; electoral college system, 32; leadership / candidate se­lection, 29, 38–9, 47–8; ­membership recruitment, 113–14; selectorate composition, 41; social media, 185; spread of primaries, 78; vote shares, 191

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224 Index

Austria, 41 Ayalon, Ami, 166 ballots: ballot irregularities, 87, 102–5, 124, 194; mail-in ballots, 92–3, 124, 174, 177; membership ballots, 17, 44–5 ballot-stuffing, 87, 102–4, 194 bandwagon effect, 147 Barak, Ehud, 95, 99, 166 Barnea, Shlomit, 49 Baskevkin, Sylvia, 157 Begin, Menachem, 61 Belgium, 17, 39, 41, 46–7, 198n2 (chap. 2) Ben-Eliezer, Binyamin, 99, 107–9 Ben-Gurion, David, 60 Bennett, Naftali, 63, 97, 166 Biezen, Ingrid van, 55, 84, 160 Bill C-2, 164, 167 Bill C-24, 163–4, 167 Bille, Lars, 45 Blais, André: campaigns, 137; rules enforcement, 173; selectorate composition, 11, 39, 76, 85; use of primaries, 49, 52, 56, 86 Bloc Québécois, 69, 70, 77, 145 Bologna, mayoral primary, 44 Brady, Henry, 137 branch stacking, 113 branch stripping, 114 Britain. See United Kingdom (U K) British Columbia: Citizen’s Assembly on Electoral Reform, 85; leadership selection primaries, 69; Liberal Party, 45, 124, 133; ND P, 122; Reform Party, 77, 79 brokered conventions, 33–4

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Brown, Gordon, 20 Burg, Avraham, 95, 107–8 buy-in costs, 175–6, 193 Calabria, governor primaries, 44 Campbell, Kim, 167 Canada / Canadian party primaries, 57–80; Bill C-2, 164, 167; Bill C-24, 163, 167; Canadian party comparisons, 198n2 (chap. 2); candidate selection, 72–5; compared to Israel, 57–60; leadership selection, 67–72; political culture, 58–9, 80; spread of primaries, 7, 39, 42, 45, 76–80; transparency rankings, 58. See also female ­candidates; moderate closed primaries Canada Elections Act, 74, 82 Canadian Alliance Party, 70, 77, 93, 118, 122, 145, 146, 167, 199n2 (chap. 4). See also Conservative Party (Canada) Canadian Journal of Political Science, 17 candidate selection: campaigns, 72–5, 138–9, 148–9, 151, 157; Canada, 72–5, 90–1, 96, 103–4, 145–6; Canada-Israel comparison, 155–8; candidate deposits, 175–6, 178; competitiveness levels, 148–51, 151; entrance fees, 88; female candidates, 155–6, 156; influence of electoral system, 48; Israel, 63–6; local party associations, 72–5; motivation to run, 147; personnel recruitment, 3–5; representativeness, 9–10, 151–8; selection methods,

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Index 225

5–7; spread of primaries, 37–8, 45–8; timing of selection, 19–20, 94–6; voter participation, 142. See also party primaries; selectorates / selectorate composition Carey, John M., 22 Carty, R.K., 51–2, 73–4, 86, 117, 187 cats and dogs as registered voters, 124 C D& V Party (Belgium), 41 C DA Party (Netherlands), 41 C DU Party (Germany), 41, 44 Central Elections Committee, 82–3 Centre Party (Finland), 41 Chile, 43 Chrétien, Jean, 10, 95, 167 Christian Popular Party (Belgium), 47 citizens’ primaries, 16 Citizens Who Support Meretz, 65 CiU (Convergència i Unió; Spain), 44 Clark, Christy, 154 Clark, Joe, 8, 70, 121, 132, 199n3 (chap. 6) closed primaries: American closed primaries, 23, 27, 197n6; candidate selection, 74; definition and scope, 29, 71, 114, 180; leadership selection, 57; mayoral elections, 198n2 (chap. 3); membership recruitment, 113– 14; primary zone selectorates, 28; selectorate composition, 35, 41–2, 127; voter eligibility, 97 coalition bargaining, 59 Coelho, Pedro Passos, 17

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Colombia, 17, 43 community pre-selections, xi, 47 competitiveness levels, 10–11, 58–9, 146–51, 150, 151, 180, 184 complex primaries, 23–4, 29–30, 35, 180 conference delegates, 6, 11, 19, 24, 44, 137, 148, 164 consensual democracy, 11 consensus-unitary government ­system, 58 Conservative Party (Canada): appeals and review process, 105–6; campaign funding, 90; candidate selection, 73–5, 90; competitiveness, 151; entrance fees, 175; female candidates, 154, 156; leadership election finances, 167; Leadership Election Organizing Committee (LEOC ), 89–90, 92–3; leadership selection, 17, 68, 69, 70–1, 77, 92–3, 199n3 (chap. 6); membership growth, 117–19; recruitment tactics, 121; re­presentativeness, 127–31; rule-­making, 89; selectorate composition, 41; social media, 185; voter participation, 145, 146 Conservative Party (Israel), 118 Conservative Party (Norway), 42 Conservative Party (UK ): candidate selection, 47; leadership selection, 25–6, 32, 39; multistage systems, 25–6, 32, 192; organizational reforms, 53; representativeness, 126; selectorate composition, 42

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226 Index

contagion effect, 53, 64, 77–8 conventions / convention delegates: brokered conventions, 33–4; competitiveness levels, 147, 150; electoral college systems, 32; female candidates, 154, 159; Israel, 96; leadership selection, 51, 68, 79, 165; local party associations, 100, 165; multi-stage systems, 30, 32–3; party selectorates, 24; representativeness, 125–7, 157; selectorate composition, 41–2; weighted systems, 31 Cools, Ann, 101 Copps, Sheila, 103–4 Corbyn, Jeremy, 8, 29, 193 corporate donations, 171 corruption, 51–2, 58, 87–8, 102, 121, 164, 170, 189, 193 councils, 40 Courtney, John C., 72, 121–3, 127 Cross, William: campaign finances, 171, 177; campaigns, 137–8, 150–1; legislative candidate selection, 73; outcomes, 153; party membership, 119, 123, 132–3; primary typology, 117; rules enforcement, 173; selectorate composition, 10–11, 39, 76, 85, 114, 128–9; use of primaries, 49, 51–2, 56, 86, 184 Crotty, William J., 4 Crysler, John, 114, 171 C S U Party (Germany), social media, 185 cyber-membership, 187–9 Dahaf Survey (2010), 132 Danon, Danny, 166, 185

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Day, Stockwell, 70, 150 delegated conventions. See conventions / convention delegates delegates. See conventions / convention delegates De Luca, Miguel, 76 democracy, concept of, 195 Democratic Movement for Change (DM C ), 63–4, 77 Democratic Party (Australia), 78 Democratic Party (Italy), 30, 41, 42 Democratic Party (Japan), 41 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP; Taiwan), 27, 30 Democratic Unified Party (DUP; South Korea), 31, 32 democratization, 38, 47–8, 50 demographics: party leaders, 155; party membership, 9, 75, 127– 9, 129 Denmark, 41 Dichter, Avi, 166 Dion, Stéphane, 34 direct primaries, 16, 56, 197n6 direct votes, 17, 68 diversity / diversity quotas, 126–7, 152–8. See also representativeness D MC Party (Israel), 64, 78 double membership, 131–3 D PJ Party (Japan), 32 Druz villages, 102–3 Duceppe, Gilles, 70 Eagles, Munroe, 170–1 electability, 137, 158, 182 Election Management Bodies (EM B s), 82 Elections Canada, 82–3, 103–4, 151, 171, 176

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electoral college system, xi, 24–5, 31, 32, 45 electoral reform, 85, 199n1 (chap. 4) electoral systems: Canada-Israel comparison, 58–9, 180, 190; concepts and definitions, 10, 18, 26; districts, 19, 58–9, 176; fixed election dates, 20; geographically defined, 130; influence on candidate selection method, 48; mixed-member majority, 26; single-member ­plurality (S MP), 72–3 Enten, Harry J., 22 entrance fees, 88–9, 175–6 entryism, 113 E R C Party (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; Spain), 44 Erickson, Lynda, 73, 155–7 ethnic mobilization, 122–3 Evans, John, 101 exclusive selectorates: definition, 36; multi-stage systems, 31–2, 36; representativeness, 125–6, 152, 156–7; single leader, 23–4, 24. See also inclusive selectorates; selectorates / selectorate composition extra-parliamentary organizations, 11, 111, 130, 135, 137 Facebook, 165, 185 factions, rise of, 10 Farrell, David M., 45–6 Feiglin, Moshe, 8, 109, 166 female candidates: Canada-Israel outcomes comparison, 154–8; candidate selection, 4, 13, 152– 6, 156; election organization,

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Index 227

85; legislature members, 4; reserved positions, 99; resource availability, 157; sub-national primaries, 154, 159 Fianna Fáil (FF), 25, 29, 32, 41, 47, 53 finances, 160–78, 182; campaign violations, 168–70; Canadian campaign violations, 170–1; Canadian leadership elections, 167; candidate entrance fees, 88; contribution limits, 161, 170; enforcement and exposure, 171– 3; entrance fees, 88–9; leadership primaries, 166; public funding, 160–1, 167, 178, 191, 193; regulatory framework, 83–4, 161–4, 171–3, 194; resources and cost-saving measures, 88, 164–7, 173–8, 193; statemandated spending limits, 194; violations and loopholes, 168–71 Fine Gael (FG), 25, 31, 32, 41, 126 Finland, 41, 55 First Nations, 122 fixed terms, 94 Flanagan, Tom, 92–4 Former Soviet Union (FSU) party, 99 FPD Party (Germany), 41 France, 7, 16, 28, 197n4 Freedom Party (Austria), 41 fringe candidates, 8, 175 front-runner effect, 147 future of party primaries, 179–95; challenges, 183–9; changing nature of party membership, 187–8; lessons and solutions, 189–95; relevancy of political parties, 188–9

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228 Index

Gabriel, Sigmar, 185 Gauja, Anika, 153 general elections: candidate entrance fees, 175; eligibility requirements, 75; organizing, 82–5; professional campaigns, 186; rules / rule changes, 84–5, 173 German party law: Basic Law, 54–5; candidate selection, 24, 84; leadership selection, 24, 41, 43–5, 84; membership recruitment, 50–1; organizational reforms, 50 Germany: Land party conferences, 44; spread of primaries, 44–5 government formation, 58–9, 180, 190 grassroots party members: activists, 54; candidate / leadership selection, 10, 39, 67–9, 75, 192–4; membership growth, 117, 119, 191; social media, 186 Greece, 28–9, 41 Green Party (Austria), 41 Green Party (Germany), 41 Harmel, Robert, 49, 52 Harper, Stephen, 17, 70, 75, 92–3, 133, 144, 167, 185 Hazan, Reuven Y.: competitiveness levels, 148–9; incumbency, 169; legislative candidates, 46; outcome, 152; party membership, 187; representational lists, 155– 7; selectorate composition, 8–11, 23, 152 Heard, Andrew, 20–1, 152 Herut Party, 61 Herzog, Yitzhak, 102, 108, 166

28205_Cross.indd.indd 228

hijacking, 113, 123, 134, 181 Hofnung, Menachem, 124, 169–70 Hollande, François, 16 hostile takeover, 113 Iceland, 23, 28, 194–5 Ignatieff, Michael, 34, 96 inclusive selectorates: competitiveness, 10–11; definition, 16–18, 35–6; degree of inclusiveness, 22, 25; minimum threshold, 15, 23, 26, 31; representativeness, 9–10, 125, 152. See also exclusive selectorates; selectorates / selectorate composition incumbents: campaign competitiveness, 62, 149–51, 150, 151, 169; campaign content, 139; gendered nature, 158; polling stations, 102; reserved positions, 99; timing of elections, 19, 95–6; voter eligibility, 115 insincere members, 132 instant members, 8, 116–20, 134, 181, 187 International IDEA Political Funding Database, 83–4 intra-party democracy (IPD): challenges, 182; cohesion, 10; competitiveness, 146–7; costs / funding sources, 173–8; expansion, xi, 6–7, 15, 19; organizational reforms, 47–50, 198n6; policy development, 5; review panels, 87 investiture vote, 21 Ireland, 25, 29, 31, 32, 38–9, 41, 47, 53 Israel, 60–7; candidate selection, 63–6, 64, 91–2, 142; Central

2016-09-09 12:45:13



Index 229

Elections Committee, 82–3; Israeli party comparisons, 198n2 (chap. 2); leadership selection, 21, 39, 60–3, 61, 91–2, 140–4, 141, 166; political culture, 58–9, 80; reserved positions in, 98–100; rule-making, 91–2; selectorate composition, 41, 66–7, 79–80, 130, 157; spread of primaries, 7, 39, 42, 45, 76–80, 78; transparency rankings, 58; voter participation, 140–4, 141, 142. See also moderate closed primaries Israeli Aircraft Industries union, 124 Israeli State Comptroller, 105, 109, 163, 168, 173–4, 200n2 Italian Union electoral alliance (L’Unione), 175 Italy: joint primaries, 197n4; leadership selection, 39, 41, 43; mayoral elections, 44; open primaries, 42–3; selectorate composition, 41; spread of primaries, 7, 39, 42, 45 Janda, Kenneth, 52, 54–5 Japan, 32, 41 Jeffrey, Brooke, 95 Jewish Home: adoption of primaries, 78; candidate selection, 63, 64, 66, 142; double membership, 131; entrance fees, 176; leadership selection, 61, 62–3, 76–7, 141, 166; membership recruitment campaign, 97; voter participation, 141, 142 Jewish Leadership Party, 124 Johnston, Richard, 137

28205_Cross.indd.indd 229

joint primaries, 28, 197n4 Jones, Mark P., 76 judicial review, 106–7, 109 Kadima: administration of party primaries, 103; adoption of primaries, 78; candidate selection, 63, 64, 65–6, 142; double membership, 131; female candidates, 154; history, 10, 198n1 (chap. 3); leadership selection, 60–2, 61, 76–7, 79, 102–3, 141, 166; Livni-Mofaz contest, 103; membership demographics, 128–9, 129; mobilization rate, 143–4; recruitment tactics, 123– 4; representativeness, 128–9; reserved positions, 99; seasonal party, 144; selectorate composition, 41, 67; voter participation, 141, 142 Katz, Richard S.: candidate selection, 155; competitiveness levels, 149; funding, 169, 193; intra-party reforms, 198n6; party decline, 11–12; representational lists, 9–10, 152, 156–7 Kenig, Ofer, 11, 23, 148, 184 Kennedy, Gerard, 34 King, Mackenzie, 67–8 Kittilson, Miki Caul, 38, 152 Knox v. Conservative Party of Canada 2007, 106–7 K OK Party (Finland), 41 Labor Party (Australia), 32, 39, 41, 42, 47, 153, 192 Labour Party (Ireland), 29, 41 Labour Party (Israel): administration of party primaries, 102–3,

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230 Index

124–5; adoption of primaries, 78; appeals and review process, 108–9; Burg / Ben-Eliezer contest, 107–8; campaigns, 115, 162, 164; candidacy requirements, 96–7; candidate selection, 63–4, 64, 66, 142; competitiveness, 148–9, 150; double membership, 131–2; entrance fees, 176; female candidates, 154; leadership selection, 7, 60–1, 61, 76–7, 79, 91–2, 102, 141, 166; mayoral primaries, 198n2 (chap. 3); membership demographics, 128–9, 129; membership growth, 117–19, 118; mobilization rates, 143–4; polling stations, 176; representativeness, 127–8; reserved ­positions, 99; selectorate composition, 7, 41, 67, 127; timing of elections, 95–6; voter eligibility, 97, 115– 16; voter participation, 141, 142–3, 142 Labour Party (New Zealand), 25, 32, 39, 41, 42, 53, 153 Labour Party (Norway), 42 Labour Party (U K): administrative costs, 174; electoral college system, 32; leadership selection, 7–8, 17, 20, 28–9; organizational reforms, 53; selectorate composition, 42; semi-open ­primary system, 43; weighted systems, 31, 193 Lapid, Yair, 189 Latin America, 43 Lawrence, Eric, 56 Layton, Jack, 25, 167

28205_Cross.indd.indd 230

LDP Party (Japan), 32, 41 Leadership Election Organizing Committee (LEOC ), 89–90, 92–3, 199n2 (chap. 4) leadership renewal, 153 leadership selection: accountability, 186; campaign resources, 165–8; Canada, 39, 67–72, 69, 145; changing nature of, 40–2; competitiveness levels, 150, 151; democratization, 11, 47–8, 192; electoral system, 48; finances, 167; incumbents, 150; Israel, 21, 39, 60–3, 61, 91–2, 140–4, 141, 166; labels and methods, 6–7, 16–19, 189–90; margins of victory, 151; mobilization rates, 143–5; multi-stage systems, 31–4, 36; regulatory framework, 171–3; representativeness, 153–4; rule changes, 85–6; selectorate reforms, 79–80; sub-national level, 43–5, 79; timing of elections, 19–21, 94–5; voter participation, 141, 144–5, 145. See also conventions / convention delegates; party conferences Left Alliance Party (Finland), 41 legislative candidates. See candidate selection LEOC (Leadership Election Organizing Committee), 89–90, 92–3, 199n2 (chap. 4) Liberal Democratic Party (UK ), 42 Liberal Party (Australia), 41, 153, 185 Liberal Party (Canada): appeals and review process, 105–6; campaign violations, 172, 200n3;

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Index 231

candidate deposits, 178; candidate eligibility, 98; candidate selection, 73–4, 90, 96; Chrétien-Martin leadership rivalry, 10; competitiveness, 151; Copps-Valeri contest, 103–4; entrance fees, 175; female candidates, 156; financial violations, 171; leadership selection, 17, 28, 33–4, 42–3, 67–71, 69, 145, 167–8, 167; membership growth, 117–19; nomination primary, 100–1; representativeness, 126–9, 131; selectorate composition, 41; single issue groups, 98; social media, 185; timing of elections, 95; voter participation, 144, 145, 146 Liberal Party (Colombia), 17 Liberal Party (Denmark), 41 Liberal Party (Israel), 118 Liberal Party (U K), 7, 126 Liberals for Life, 74, 98 Lijphart, Arend, 58 Likud: administration of party primaries, 102–3; adoption of primaries, 78; campaign length, 115; campaign resources, 162, 164, 166; candidate selection, 63, 64, 65–6, 103, 109, 142; competitiveness, 148–9, 150; double membership, 131–2; entrance fees, 176; extreme right influence, 8; leadership selection, 8–10, 60–2, 61, 76–7, 79, 91, 95–7, 101–2, 140, 141; membership demographics, 129; membership fees, 174–5; membership growth, 117–19, 118; mobilization rates, 143–4;

28205_Cross.indd.indd 231

party raiding, 132; polling stations, 176; recruitment tactics, 123–4; registration / waiting period, 29; right-wingers, 8; selectorate composition, 41, 67; Sharon-Netanyahu leadership rivalry, 10; social media, 185; timing of elections, 95–6; voter eligibility, 97; voter participation, 140, 141, 142, 143 Livni, Tzipi, 102–3, 166 local party associations, 8, 72–5, 98, 123, 127, 138, 151 Lofven, Stefan, 185 Long, Tom, 167 Lortie Commission (Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing), 52, 121 MacKay, Peter, 167 mail-in ballots, 92–3, 124, 174, 177 Mair, Peter, 11, 186, 193 majoritarian-federal government system, 58 mandates, 186 Manitoba, 69 Manley, John, 104 Manning, Preston, 150 Mapam Party, 62, 65 Margalit, Arel, 166 Marois, Pauline, 154 Martin, Paul, 10, 20, 33, 69, 74, 98, 144, 167 Matland, Richard E., 152, 155 May, John D., 137 mayoral primaries, 44, 198n2 (chap. 3) May’s law, 137

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232 Index

media attention, 158 membership. See party members membership fees, 119, 125, 165, 174–5 membership forms, 97–8, 123 Meretz: adoption of primaries, 78; candidate selection, 63, 64, 65, 142; leadership selection, 60–3, 61, 77, 79, 141; selectorate composition, 66; voter participation, 141, 142–3, 142 Merkel, Angela, 185 Mersel, Yigael, 147 Mexico, 28, 43 Michels, Robert, 3, 182 Miliband, Ed, 17 minimum threshold, inclusive selectorates, 15, 23, 26, 31 Minna, Maria, 101 Minnesota, 16 minority representation, 128–9 Mitzna, Amram, 166 mixed primaries: definition, 16, 19, 35, 179; electoral college, 24–5, 31, 32; leadership selectorates, 40; multi-stage systems, 25–6, 30–4; New Zealand, 153; selectorate composition, 35, 41–2; weighted systems, 31 mobilization. See political mobilization moderate closed primaries, 114– 34; background, 114–16; membership growth and instant members, 116–20; membership strategies, 131–4; oversight and accountability, 124–5, 135; recruitment tactics and oversight, 120–4, 128, 134–5; selection by party membership,

28205_Cross.indd.indd 232

127–31; selectorate representativeness, 125–7 Moderates Party (Sweden), 42 Mofaz, Shaul, 99, 103, 166 MR (Belgium), 41 Mulcair, Thomas, 71, 93, 167, 171 Mulroney, Brian, 121 multi-speed membership, 185 multi-stage systems, 25–6, 29–34, 35, 36, 68, 71, 180 name recognition, 158 national level primaries, 37, 38–43 National Party (New Zealand), 41 National Religious Party (Israel), 66 N DP (New Democratic Party; Canada): campaign content, 138; campaign-spending vio­ lations, 171; competitiveness, 150, 151; electoral college, 25; entrance fees, 178; female candidates, 154, 156; leadership selection, 25, 69, 70–1, 89–90, 93, 167; New Democratic Party Constitution, 89; recruitment tactics, 122; rule-making, 89; selectorate composition, 41, 93; trade unions, 71; voter eli­ gibility, 115; voter participation, 145 neoliberalism, 11 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 10, 65, 96–7, 99, 101–2, 109, 166, 185, 199n5 (chap. 4) Netherlands, 41 New Brunswick, 69, 128–9, 199n1 (chap. 4) New Brunswick Conservative Party, 124

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Index 233

New Democracy Party (N D ; Greece), 29, 41 New Democratic Party. See N D P (New Democratic Party; Canada) Newfoundland and Labrador, 68, 69, 78 new members: commitment level, 120, 188; political mobilization, 112, 130, 150, 158, 184; recruitment campaigns, 10, 53, 98, 111, 115–16, 134, 136, 138, 174, 181; “tourist” members, 132; voter participation, 139– 40, 158–9, 190–1; voting eligibility, 97, 114–15, 188; voting privileges, 188. See also recruitment tactics and oversight new parties, 77, 79–80 New Zealand: candidate / leadership selection, 24–5, 32, 38–9, 42, 53; electoral college system, 25, 32; leadership selectorates, 38–9; mixed system, 153; party laws, 24, 84; primary rules / administration, 84–5; selectorate composition, 41; spread of primaries, 53, 78 nominating committees, 24, 126– 7, 184 nominating conventions, 198n8 non-partisan primaries, 21 Norway, 42 Notley, Rachel, 154 Nova Scotia, 69 Nova Scotia Liberal Party, 79 Nova Scotia N D P Party, 71 Nova Scotia Progressive Conservative Party, 79 NP D Party (Israel), 118 N- V A Party (Belgium), 41

28205_Cross.indd.indd 233

Olmert, Ehud, 62, 65, 103 one-member-one-vote systems, xi, 18 one-party dominant systems, 113 online voting, 177 Ontario, 69, 199n1 (chap. 4) Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, 45 open primaries: challenges, 189, 191; definition, 27–8, 35, 180, 197n6; Italy, 42–3; membership recruitment, 112–13; primary zone selectorates, 28; selectorate composition, 35, 41–2 Open V LD Party (Belgium), 41 opinion polls, 27, 66, 147, 190 opposition parties, 53, 79 Orchard, David, 8, 132 organizational reforms, 50–6. See also regulatory framework Orlev, Zevulun, 166 Panebianco, Angelo, 49 parliamentary democracies: competitiveness, 148; leadership selection, 6, 20, 197n2; national leadership primaries, 38–43; selectorates, 23, 38–40, 40, 134 parliamentary party group. See PPG (parliamentary party group) Parti Québécois (PQ), 44–5, 69, 72, 105 party activists, 11, 50, 73–4, 137, 143, 156 party-affiliated organizations, 19, 35. See also trade unions party cohesion, 10, 184 party conferences, 6, 11, 24, 127, 186 party congress, 24

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234 Index

party contests, 21–2 party councils, 6, 11 party delegates. See conventions / convention delegates party discipline, 10 party elites: campaign content, 137; election timing, 94–5; manipulation of rules, 110; mixed primaries, 30; party selectorates, 24; recruitment, 4, 6; representativeness, 125; reserved positions, 99; selection process reforms, 49–56; selectorate composition, 41–2 party infiltration, 197n6 party laws, 54–6; America, 55–6; Argentina, 27, 55; Canada, 163–4, 167; Finland, 55; Israel, 66, 82, 115, 124–5, 131, 162–3, 168–70, 200n2; New Zealand, 84. See also German Party Law party leaders: demographics, 155; female candidates, 153–4, 159; importance of, 3, 5, 48; leadership review, 199n4 (chap. 4); leadership selection terminology, 16–18; prime ministers, 4, 20–1, 152, 197n2; recruitment, 6; removal, 197n3; representativeness, 152; selectorate composition, 41–2; single-member districts, 48; timing of selection, 20 party lists, reserved positions, 99–100 party members: candidate and leadership selection, 23–4, 37, 40, 45–8; changing nature, 187–8; closed primaries, 29; commitment levels, 119–21,

28205_Cross.indd.indd 234

123, 186–8, 190; cyclical patterns, 187–8; declining numbers, 50, 112; demographics, 9, 75, 127–9, 129; eligibility requirements, 75–6; growth during leadership contests, 118; instant members, 8; membership recruitment, 76, 111–35, 187; membership requirements and voting rights, 29; multistage systems, 25–6, 33–4; personnel recruitment, 4–6, 49; policy development, 5; political mobilization, 112–14; registration / waiting period, 29; representativeness, 125; value of membership, 181–2, 187; weighted systems, 31. See also moderate closed primaries; recruitment campaigns party primaries, 15–36, 81–110; abuses, 87; adoption of, xii, 79–80, 180–1; advantages, 7, 11, 38, 51; case for and against, 7–12; challenges, 112–13, 190– 1; competitiveness, 10–11, 58–9, 146–51, 150, 151, 180; costly nature of, 157; definition and scope, xi, 6–8, 15–26, 34–5, 179; degree of inclusiveness, 22–6; integrity, 182; member registration, 197n6; membership strategies, 131–4; monitoring and oversight, 9, 12–13, 104–5, 188, 193, 200n2; organization reforms, 49–56, 198n6; organizing elections, 82–8; outsourcing, 173; regulation and management, xii, xiii, 86–8; ­relevancy of, 188–9;

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Index 235

representativeness, 9–10; resources and cost-saving measures, 173–8, 193; rule changes, 85–7; sequence, 19–21; timing, 19–20; transparency, 8–9; voting methods and election outcomes, 93–4. See also administration of party primaries; future of party primaries; Israel; recruitment campaigns; rules / rule-making; selectorates / selectorate composition; spread of primaries party primaries in Canada and Israel, 57–80; background, 57–60; Canada, 67–76; candidate selection (Canada), 72–5; candidate selection (Israel), 63–6; Israel, 60–7; leadership selection (Canada), 67–72; selectorate (Israel), 66–7 party primary types, 26–36; direct primaries, 197n6; membership commitment levels, 186–8; runoff elections, 197n5; selectorate composition, 35. See also closed primaries; complex primaries; mixed primaries; moderate closed primaries; multi-stage ­systems; open primaries; pure primaries; semi-open primaries; weighted systems party raiding, 112–13, 132, 134, 181 party supporters: leadership se­lection, 28, 37; multi-stage pri­maries, 30; party personnel selection, 6; party selectorates, 24; primary zone selectorates, 23, 28; representativeness, 125; selectorate composition, 41–2;

28205_Cross.indd.indd 235

selectorate participation, 23, 24, 28–9, 35, 36, 43, 86, 187, 191, 197n6; weighted systems, 31 party systems, 58–9; Canada-Israel comparison, 58–9; electoral defeats, 52–4; organizational reform, 52–3 PA SOK (Socialist Party; Greece), 28, 41, 42 patron-client recruitment methods, 128 PC Party (Canada). See Progressive Conservative Party (PC ; Canada) PdL Party (Italy), 41 People’s Party (Austria), 41 People’s Party (Denmark), 41 People’s Party (Spain), 42 Peres, Shimon, 61, 97, 99 Peretz, Amir, 95, 166 Perlin, George, 3 personalization, 48, 120, 139, 158, 182–7, 192 Piccio, Daniela, 55 Pilet, Jean-Benoit, 39, 114, 153–4 Pines, Ophir, 166 Plaid Cymru of Wales, 45 plebiscitary model of democracy, 51 Poguntke, Thomas, 3 policy and ideology, 137–8, 158 political consumerism, 50 political culture, 58–9, 80, 180–3, 190 political experience, 155 political mobilization: challenges, 191, 199n1 (chap. 6); defined, 143; leadership contests, 144–5; one-party dominant systems, 113; party members, 112–14;

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236 Index

recruitment campaigns, 130, 135, 158; voter participation, 141, 142, 145 political parties: decline of, 11–12, 22, 50; election campaign role, 22; female candidates, 156; gatekeepers to legislatures, 4, 151; growth during leadership contests, 118; organizational reforms, 49–56; party functions, xi, 3–5; party-government relations, 83; party systems, 58–9; as public utilities, 83; renewal strategies, 11; selectorate composition, 41–2; self-governing nature, 85–6, 171–3; transparency rankings, 58. See also finances; party laws; recruitment campaigns; regulatory framework poll fees, 175, 177 polling booths / polling stations: accessibility, 182; location, 13, 89–90, 100–2, 145; membership recruitment, 29; number of, 88–9, 101–2, 174, 176–7 poll system, 17 poll tax, 177 populism, 139, 192 Portugal, 17–18, 39, 42 postal ballots. See mail-in ballots P P G (parliamentary party group): accountability of leader, 186; competitiveness levels, 11, 147– 8, 153; definition, 24; electoral college system, 32, 45; leadership selection, 6–7, 24–6, 32, 39, 41, 134, 192–3; multi-stage systems, 25–6, 32, 36; representativeness, 125–7; rules / 

28205_Cross.indd.indd 236

administration, 85–6; selectorate composition, 24–6, 24, 40, 41–2, 180; vote choice, 137, 147–8 presidentialization of politics, 3 presidential nominating conventions, 32–3 presidential primaries, 16 primary campaigns, 136–59; ­campaign content, 136–9, 182; c­ampaign debts, 172; candidate selection campaigns, 72–5, 138–9, 148–9, 151, 157; competitiveness levels, 10–11, 58–9, 146–51, 150, 151, 180; leadership campaigns, 115–16, 138–9, 157, 186; length, 115–16; professional, 186; resources and cost-saving measures, 82, 88, 157, 164–8, 173–8, 189, 193; social media, 185–6; spending limits, 9, 168, 171, 194; violations and loopholes, 168–71. See also primary election outcomes; recruitment campaigns; regulatory framework primary election outcomes, 150, 151–9, 151. See also rules / rulemaking; turnout primary zone / primary zone selectorates, 23–6, 24, 28, 37 prime ministers, 4, 20–1, 152. See also party leaders Prince Edward Island (PEI), 69, 199n1 (chap. 4) private-member bills, 139 Progressive Conservative Party (PC ; Canada): candidate selection, 74; history, 70, 199n2 (chap. 4); leadership selection,

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Index 237

8, 79, 93–4; membership growth, 118; recruitment tactics, 121; voter participation, 145; weighted system, 199n3 (chap. 4). See also Canadian Alliance Party; Conservative Party (Canada) Progress Party (Norway), 42 proportional electoral system, 48 proportionality, 18, 26, 48, 126–7 proportional representation formula (PR), 59 proxy voting, 100 Pruysers, Scott, 73 public disclosure, 161 public funding, 160–1, 167, 178, 191, 193 pure primaries, 26–30; definition, 16, 18–19, 26–7, 30, 35, 179; degree of inclusiveness, 22–6; selectorate composition, 35. See also closed primaries; complex primaries; open primaries; semiopen primaries PvdA Party (Netherlands), 41 Quebec, 69, 78, 122, 199n1 (chap. 4), 199n3 Québec Solidaire, 199n3 (chap. 3) Rabin, Yitzhak, 61, 97 Racco, Mario, 101 Radicals Party (France), 28, 43 Rae, Bob, 34, 167 Rahat, Gideon: competitiveness, 11, 148–9; elections, 82; incumbency, 169; intra-party democracy, 80; organizational reform, 49–50; outcome, 152; party

28205_Cross.indd.indd 237

membership, 187; personalization, 183–4; representational lists, 156–7; representativeness of candidates, 9–10, 155–7; selectorate composition, 8, 23, 127, 139, 152; spread of primaries, 49 Rahat ballot-box fire, 103 rank-and-file party members, 16, 22–4, 38, 100. See also grassroots party members Ratz Party, 62, 65 recruitment campaigns: admi­ nistrative costs, 174; extra-­ parliamentary organizations, 111, 130; focus of primary campaigns, 181; grassroots involvement, 193; party tourists, 134, 188; personalization, 184; questionable recruitment practices, 121–4; regionally weighted systems, 130; voting eligibility, 97–8 recruitment tactics and oversight, 120–4, 128, 134–5, 181–2 Redford, Alison, 154 Reform Party (Canada), 70, 77, 146 Regev, Miri, 185 regional representation, 126–7 registration / waiting periods: Australia, 113; closed primaries, 29; Israel, 67; NDP (Canada), 115; open primaries, 23, 27; patron-client recruitment methods, 128; semi-open primaries, 28; vote contracting, 124; voter eligibility, 97–8, 115 regulatory framework: Bill C-2, 164, 167; Bill C-24, 163–4, 167;

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238 Index

campaigns, 86; Canada, 161, 171–3; Israel, 161, 173; political parties, 83–4; self-regulation, 171–3, 191, 194; state involvement, 54–6, 173, 178, 182; voter fraud, 194 representational democracy, 51 representativeness: Arab population, 128; Canada-Israel outcomes comparison, 154–8; Canadian parties, 128–30; election outcomes, 151–9, 195; female candidates, 156; Israeli parties, 127–8; minority representation, 128; personnel recruitment, 5; regional representation, 128–31; selectorate composition, 123, 125–7, 130– 1, 152–4, 159; single-member districts, 48, 153; S MP systems, 126 reserved positions, 63–4, 66, 98–100 resources and cost-saving measures, 82, 88, 157, 164–8, 173– 8, 189, 193 Right Candidate For Rosedale, The, 101 right-wingers, 8, 97, 124, 132 Romania, 39 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (R C M P ), 122 Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Lortie Commission), 52, 121 rules / rule-making, 88–102; candidate selection, 90–4; double standard, 172; eligibility of candidates and voters, 96–100; general elections, 173; leadership

28205_Cross.indd.indd 238

primaries and manipulation, 93–4; polling booth locations, 100–2; reserved positions, 98–100; rule-making bodies, 88–93; selectorate rules and changes, 84–5, 87, 94; timing of elections, 94–6; votes and election outcomes, 87, 93–4. See also regulatory framework run-off elections, 197n5 Sanbonmatsu, Kira, 155 Sandri, Giulia, 153, 155 Sartori, Giovanni, 146 Saskatchewan, 69, 71 Saskatchewan Party, 77 Sawatsky, John, 121 Scarrow, Susan, 38, 45–6, 50, 112, 173–4, 185, 187 Scharping, Rudolf, 43–4 Schattschneider, E.E., 5 Scottish Conservative Party, 45 Scottish Labour Party, 45 Seddone, Antonella, 153, 155 Seehofer, Horst, 185 Segal, Hugh, 167 Seguro, António José, 17 selection period, 163 selectorates / selectorate composition: Canada, 41, 69, 75–6; changing nature of, 40–2; closed primaries, 35, 127; competitiveness levels, 10–11, 147– 9; complex primaries, 35; composition by primary type (1975 / 2012), 35, 41–2; definition, xi, 6, 16; democratization, xi, 6, 8, 14; future of party primaries, 179–80, 184, 186; Israel, 61, 64, 66–7, 157;

2016-09-09 12:45:13



Index 239

national level primaries, 37–9; parliamentary democracies, 40; party members, 22–4, 24, 35, 41–2, 127–34; primary zone selectorates, 23–6, 24, 28; ­representativeness, 123, 125– 7, 130–1, 152–4, 159; rule changes / reforms, 78–80, 85–6; selectorate continuum, 23, 24; semi-open primaries, 35, 41–2; single leader, 23–4, 24. See also exclusive selectorates; inclusive selectorates; moderate closed primaries; recruitment campaigns; rules / rule-making semi-open primaries: definition, 28–9, 28, 35, 71, 114, 180; party legitimacy, 112–13; primary zone selectorates, 28; selectorate composition, 28, 35, 41–2; sub-national leadership selection, 45 Seyd, Patrick, 50–1 Shalon, Silvan, 99, 108 Shapira, Assaf, 80 Sharon, Ariel, 10, 62, 65, 99, 170 Sharon, Omri, 170 Shas Party, 41 Sheafer, Tamir, 139, 183–4 Sher-Hadar, Neta, 127 Shinui Party, 62, 65 Shitreet, Meir, 166 Shomer, Yael, 46 Siegfried, Andre, 73 single-issue groups, 8, 74, 98 single-member districts, 19, 48, 58–9, 153, 156 single member plurality (S MP) electoral systems, 72–3, 126

28205_Cross.indd.indd 239

single nationwide electoral district, 58–9 single-party majority governments, 59 Social Democratic Party (Austria), 41 Social Democratic Party (Denmark), 38, 41 Social Democratic Party (Finland), 16, 41 Social Democratic Party (Portugal), 17, 42 Social Democratic Party (Sweden), 42, 185–6 Socialist Party (Flemish; Belgium), 41 Socialist Party (France), 16, 28, 38, 43 Socialist Party (French; Belgium), 41 Socialist Party (PA SOK ; Greece), 28, 41, 42 Socialist Party (Portugal), 17, 42 Socialist Party (Spain), 42 Socialist People’s Party (Denmark), 41 social media, 185–6 South Korea, 31, 32, 190 Spain, 42, 44 SPD Party (Germany), 41, 43–4, 185 spending limits, 168, 171, 194 SP Party (Netherlands), 41 spread of primaries, 37–56, 76–80; background, 7, 15; future of party primaries, 180, 190; impetus for change, 76–8; legislative candidates, 45–8; national leadership primaries, 38–43; organizational reforms, 49–56;

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240 Index

sub-national leadership primaries, 43–5 Stanfield, Robert, 74 Stark, Leonard P., 147 Stewart, David, 79, 128 Stewart, Ian, 79 stratarchical bargain, 74, 90 Stronach, Belinda, 167 Studlar, Donley T., 152, 155 sub-national primaries: electoral college system, 45; female candidates, 154, 159; German party law, 44; institutional reform, 37; leadership selection, 43–5, 79; mayoral elections, 44, 198n2 (chap. 3); mobilization rates, 144–5; spread of primaries, 43–5 Supreme Court (Canada), 107 Supreme Court (Israel), 108 Sweden, 42 Taiwan, 27–8, 30, 190 Teorell, Jan, 147 timing of elections, 52–3, 95–6, 115 Topp, Brian, 93, 171 tourist members, 132–3 trade unions: campaign contributions, 163; electoral college system, 32; leadership selection, 21, 71; New Democratic Party (NDP ), 71; selectorate composition, 25, 32, 36, 89, 93, 190, 198n7; vote contractors, 123– 4; vote shares, 25; weighted ­systems, 31 transparency, 8–9, 170, 173, 181, 189, 195 Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 58

28205_Cross.indd.indd 240

Tremblay, Manon, 155 trench warfare, 51, 86 Trojan Horse strategy, 132 Trudeau, Justin, 28, 70, 167, 168, 185 Tula, Maria Innes, 76 turnout / turnout rates: Canada, 100; candidate nomination, 146; challenges, 182; decline in political participation, 50; defined, 143; mobilization rates, 145; representational outcomes, 159; suppression, 177. See also election outcomes; voters / voting behaviour Tuttnauer, Or, 11, 148 Tweed, William M., 5 Twitter, 165, 185 Umbria, 44 United Kingdom (UK ): candidate selection, 47; election organization, 85; electoral college system, 32; leadership selection, 17, 19–21, 38–9, 45; multi-stage systems, 32–3; organizational reforms, 50–1, 53; party comparisons, 198n2 (chap. 2); primary election timing, 19–20; selectorate composition, 42 United States. See America / American primaries United Steel Workers, 93 Uruguay, 43 US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 132 US-style primary, 17 Valeri, Tony, 103–4 Venezuela, 43

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Index 241

Venturino, Fulvio, 153, 155 Volpe, Joe, 171 vote-brokers, 8, 120–2, 134 vote-contractors, 120–1, 123–4, 134, 158–9, 181, 191 vote counting, 194 voter eligibility, 97–8, 114–15, 124. See also registration / waiting periods voter impersonation, 194 voters / voting behaviour: electoral college systems, 32; par­ ticipation levels, 50, 139–46, 141, 142, 145, 177, 182, 195; political activism requirements, xi, 29; selectorate composition, 24, 28, 35, 40, 41–2; vote choice factors, 137–8; voter ­eligibility, 29, 85, 97; voter fraud, 194 vote shares, 25, 150, 191–2. See also weighted systems V V D Party (Netherlands), 38, 41

28205_Cross.indd.indd 241

waiting periods. See registration / waiting periods Ware, Alan, 51 Wauters, Bram, 141, 153–4 Webb, Paul, 3, 45–6 weighted systems: definition, 29–30, 35–6, 71, 180; future of primaries, 192–3; leadership selection, 94; regional representation, 130, 199n3 (chap. 4); selectorate composition, 35, 42; trade unions, 31 Welsh Labour Party, 45 White, Graham, 126 Wilson, Frank, 52 women. See female candidates Yachimovich, Shelly, 102, 115, 166 Yatom, Danny, 166 Yesh Atid Party (Israel), 189 Yisrael Beitenu Party (Israel), 41 Young, Lisa, 51, 117, 119, 123, 132–3, 184

2016-09-09 12:45:13