Proclus on the transition from metaphysical being to natural becoming: A new reading of the Platonic theory of Forms 9781463237660

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Proclus on the transition from metaphysical being to natural becoming

Gorgias Studies in Classical and Late Antiquity

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Gorgias Studies in Classical and Late Antiquity contains monographs and edited volumes on the Greco-Roman world and its transition into Late Antiquity, encompassing political and social structures, knowledge and educational ideals, art, architecture and literature.

Proclus on the transition from metaphysical being to natural becoming

A new reading of the Platonic theory of Forms

By

Christos Terezis Elias Tempelis

gp 2017

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2017 by Gorgias Press LLC

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2017

ISBN 978-1-4632-0692-5

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Printed in the United States of America

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents ..................................................................................... v Preface ...................................................................................................... vii Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 Proclus’ Philosophical Thought .................................................... 1 Proclus’ Theory of Forms: General Theoretical Frame ............ 4 1. The Theory of Forms in the Historical Evolution of Platonism ........................................................................................ 13 2. Henads and Forms ............................................................................. 31 3. Forms and Numbers.......................................................................... 51 Introductory Remarks................................................................... 51 Numbers and the First Triad of “Life”...................................... 54 The Properties of the First Triad of “Life” and the Arithmetical Relationships in Proclus’ Monistic System .................................................................................... 58 4. The Objective Existence of the Forms: Transcendence and Immanence ..................................................................................... 69 Introductory Remarks................................................................... 69 Ontological Arguments ................................................................ 70 Epistemological Arguments ......................................................... 80 5. The Levels of Presence of the Forms ............................................. 95 6. The Communion Between Forms and Sensible Beings ............105 7. Aspects of the Function of the Metaphysical Forms .................113 Introductory Remarks.................................................................113 Species and Irrational Souls .......................................................114 The Particular Empirical Souls ..................................................131 From the Souls to the Created Bodies .....................................144 Towards a Theory about Matter ...............................................151 Conclusions ..................................................................................155 v

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Epilogue .................................................................................................159 Bibliography ..........................................................................................163 Primary Sources ...........................................................................163 Secondary Sources .......................................................................163

PREFACE The present study examines how theories about the creation of world were understood as the Paltonic tradition began to reach its historical end. It will focus on the Neoplatonist philosopher Proclus (412–485), who revived interest in Plato’s theory about the metaphysical archetypal Forms. Proclus gives a systematic construction of this theory and includes it in ontological monism (which he clearly adopts). He presents the Forms as constructing, through their combinations, the presuppositions for the creation of the natural world, in such a way that it functions in an orderly and harmonious way. He aims to show that the natural world is not produced by chance or by means of automatizations, but that it has been teleologically planned. Its evolution within time is the presupposition for the utilization of the bestowments from the metaphysical world. In the coming chapters we will reflect on the way in which Proclus deals with the problem of objective reality and the specific nature of the “universals”. This problem, already present in the Platonic theory of the Forms, is probably the culminating point – both the agony and the glory – of the metaphysical Ontology of Greek Classical Antiquity. This problem is briefly expressed in two questions: (a) Do the universals exist autonomously and in reality beyond their particular manifestations in tangible beings or do they start to exist simultaneously with their production or formulation? And, (b) Are the universals the epistemological content of human thinking through the processes of abstraction or do they pre-exist in it innately as general theoretical schemes, undoubtedly with an ontological foundation? In other words, are we to talk, respectively, about acquisition or recollection of knowledge? If the second case is valid, then we might refer to a cognitive future, which is increasingly widened and would also render an integral but latent past more tangible and more conscious. vii

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Proclus deals with the problem of universals mainly in the framework of his theory about the Platonic Forms. In conformity with the theological character of his work he accepts – unquestionably – the existence of the Forms as universals, on their own and independently from any categorical or cognitive definition. He supports this view by arguing that transcendent Realism (ante res universals) has an ontological priority over immanent Realism (in rebus universals) and moderate or extreme Nominalism (the universals as general posterior ideas, which are formulated in abstraction and express the common characteristics of particular sensible beings). The problem of universals was extensively treated within the framework of the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria, particularly from the end of the 5th century onwards. It is also referred to systematically by the Byzantines as well, starting from the Patriarch Photius (9th cent.) onwards, while the contributions of Leontius of Byzantium (6th cent.) and John of Damascus (8th cent.) should not be neglected. It is a topic of philosophical research where Neoplatonism and Byzantine thought converge, although each side preserves as non-negotiable the basic tenets of its theory about the world. This convergence can take place because both Neoplatonism and Byzantine thought accept that the discussion about the universals is of utmost importance for the foundation of Ontology in specific ways – largely in the fields of metaphysics and cosmology. This view is present, too, in the work of Proclus, the last but one important representative of Athenian Neoplatonism. The study of Proclus’ related views is necessary not only to clarify the position of late Athenian Neoplatonism concerning the universals, but it can can also serve as the basis for a cross-examination of the scholarch’s theory about the world and the tradition he himself represents, with anterior, contemporary and posterior theories. Since our Neoplatonist philosopher has incorporated the tradition before him into his work and exercised influence on posterior philosophers and theologians, such a cross-examination will be particularly important for the history of philosophy. 1 It is our contention Concerning Proclus’ position in the history of philosophy, one may consult the introductory texts and the notes by J. Combés and L.G. West1

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that Proclus will be shown to be a philosopher aiming at synthetical approaches, although it is not impossible that he simply proceeds only to citations. This framework was also the point of conflict between Realism and Nominalism in medieval times, which could avoid the encounter between Platonism and Aristotelianism. In the historical evolution of the Platonic Academy, this relationship was at times seen in terms of radical juxtaposition, while at others it was seen in terms of a reconciliatory eclecticism. It was also seen through an open perspective of dialectical composition in the two leading philosophical currents of Antiquity. Proclus’ teacher Syrianus had followed almost the same direction, although Syrianus had insisted to a greater extent on an authentic philosophical elaboration of the theory of the Platonic Forms, while Proclus attributed to this theory an intense theological orientation. He insists, however, that his teacher also moved within a theological framework. The problem with the relevant literature is that Syrianus’ texts, where such a discussion takes place, have not been preserved. Proclus, an excellent historian of philosophy, has a clear knowledge of all three aforementioned tendencies and in his work he aims to show all of them are clearly established and justified. On the other hand, as a critical philosopher in certain cases he faces them in the perspective of their refutation. While he doesn’t change their general direction, he modifies certain points, since his constant aim is to construct every theoretical matter which had occupied ancient Greek thought in an absolutely geometrical way and by means of internal foundations. Even though he does not formulate such an ambition, he assigns the theoretical duty to himself to construct the definitive scheme of the topics of the tradition to which he belongs. The terms “Realism” and “Nominalism” were not used while Proclus was active as an author. They came into use much later and describe the famous ontological and epistemological dispute of the erink in Proclus, Theologia Platonica (6 vols). Also, cf. E.R. Dodds, Proclus. The Elements of Theology, 2nd edition, Oxford 1963, pp. XXVI–XXXIII and L.J. Rosán, The Philosophy of Proclus. The Final Phase of Ancient Thought, Cosmos, New York 1949.

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late Western Middle Ages. We use them, however, because they are terms that can readily be applied to everything the Neoplatonist philosopher deals with in his effort to bring to the fore the objective content of the transcendently and archetypically functioning metaphysical world, i.e. to argue that the Forms are not simply common notions. By using these terms we will attempt in each case to bring to the fore the way Proclus presents the relations, the differences and the priorities between the universals and the particulars. 2 Research has of course dealt with these topics before. Emblematic scientific personalities like Al. Kοjève, J. Trouillard, St. Gersh and C. Steel and many others as well have formulated excellent studies on and interpretative approaches to the Neoplatonic reading of the Platonic Forms. The aim of the present work will seek to show the general principles on which Proclus establishes the theory of Forms and Universals, and how the succession between them depicts the way he constructs his metaphysical system. It will will bring to the fore a substantial proposal for the reading of this most important issue of Ancient Greek Ontology.Wherever it is necessary, either for the sake of theory or confirmation, we will also deal with specific topics, however such is the wealth of detail Proclus brings forth that many must fall beyond the scope of this study.

For the development of the dispute between Realism and Nominalism in the Western Middle Ages, we cite Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1992, issue 1, under the title Les Universaux, with papers by Oliv. Boulnois, L.M. de Rijk, Cl. Panaccio, Alain de Libera, J. Jolivet. One of the advantages of the studies included in this volume is the connection of the Medieval philosophy with the ancient Greek one. 2

INTRODUCTION PROCLUS’ PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

Proclus was one of the last scholarchs of the Platonic Academy. He was a student of Syrianus, whom he succeeded in the direction of the School. He originated from Lycia, but lived in Constantinople for many years. He was an emblematic thinker, combining the characteristics of a consistent scientific researcher, an inspired philosopher and a theologian of transcendent reductions. He represents the vanishing ancient Greek world in its anxious but also permanently dignified attempt at reorganizing the power which still remained from its long struggle against – and encounter with – the cultural currents of the East, and Christianity in particular. In a dramatic atmosphere of advanced social introspection and peculiar intellectual mysticism, Proclus attempts to activate anew a long tradition of research and thought. It was, however, a tradition which had been cut off from the social body which it nourished in the past; the body which requested that spirituality be constructed in an authentic way in its relationship to external acts and which should depict the individual and collective searches with exactitude. Proclus was therefore addressing the needs of a previous time, and his work has a somewhat antiquated character. Thus, it serves more the request for a thorough and cohesive presentation of the dialectic evolution of Greek philosophy and not so much the search of an alive social reality, which would strive for its continuous renewal within historical becoming. However, a vitality of thought may be found in the treatises of the Neoplatonic scholarch. It was activated in an era during which the outbound spiritual world systematically recorded its past performance in a critical and an interpretative way. At the same time, in the works of Proclus we find an impressively detailed encyclopedia of the performance of the ancient Greek world, not in the form of typical repetitions, but in a dialec1

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tical means of recompositions and inclusions in wider theoretical categories. Proclus composed two important treatises through which he systematically articulated principles known as practical Reason. In his commentary on the Platonic dialogue Alcibiades I, he formulated thoughts with a wider anthropological content, which are of interest both from a psychological point of view but also from the point of view of moral and political choice and action. Proclus founded a rational and cohesive philosophy of the human subject, stressing that person is an irrepeatable particularity. On the other hand, through his commentary on the Platonic dialogue Republic, he formulated proposals for the construction of a progressive political system, clearly pioneering for his era. In addition to his proposals about justice as a principle governing the totality of social and political activities, he developed syllogisms favouring the combination of the exemplar of socialism with that of liberalism in the organization of collective conditions and operations. In this framework, his positions on the equality of the sexes are clear in all sectors of social life and in the institutional-political structures. However, Proclus’ leading performance is identified in the fields of metaphysical and natural ontology and epistemology. He registers both fields in his theory about the One-Good, which has both philosophical and theological content. According to the Neoplatonist philosopher, the One is the absolute cause of beings, defines their composition and function, organizes them through a strict hierarchical stratification in levels and with the implementation of principles, which have been formed exclusively by itself. It produces with no external intervention. However, despite this absolute productive projection, it itself remains ontologically undiminished. Proclus attributes such domination to the One, that he presents it as the causal presupposition even of Being. Through this universal control, he subdues the Metaphysics of the Platonic and the Aristotelian tradition to Henology. Or, more correctly, to the henological tendencies of Plato and Aristotle he attributes more tension, mainly with a theological content, in a strictly monistic theoretical scheme about the world. Extending the positions of the Neoplatonic tradition in a systematic way, he establishes the One in the area of radical transcendence. This means that the One remains in an absolutely unmoved condition and does not communicate directly with any being. It is radically imparticipated and, therefore,

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it is not attributed any clear definition by those who describe the metaphysical and the natural beings. The absolute apophaticism dominates here. The mission for the beginning of the productive process is undertaken by the Henads, which are the direct emanations of the One and form the superior genera of reality. The first chapter of our study is devoted to the Henads. Finally, the One as Good is also shown to be the final cause of all beings, to which everything will return as the absolutely desired Principle. Proclus constructs his theory about the One-Good by utilizing many Platonic dialogues (such as, for example, the Republic and the Philebus). As to this theory, however, he mainly leans on the dialogue Parmenides, which is the “Gospel” of the Neoplatonic School. Proclus was also prolific in other fields. His impressive achievements in mathematics and physics should be noted. Particularly interesting are his studies on numbers, geometrical shapes, stereometry, natural elements, natural laws and astronomy. The central core of his reference is to Euclid’s theorems, through the elaboration of which he strictly defines the ontological and the epistemological frame of mathematics in its permanent correlation with philosophy and physics. Proclus has also been a significant influence on later philosophical and theological currents. Many of his ideas are seen in the Christianity of the East and the West, in Islam (see G. Endress, “The New and Improved Platonic Theology. Proclus Arabus and Arabic Islamic Philosophy”, Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, ed. “Les Belles Lettres” and “Leuven”, 2000, pp. 553–570) and in the modern era, with Hegel as his main follower. His work holistically and synthetically develops dialogue with the totality of reality as well as with human existence. His formulations, both analytic and synthetic, were far from univocal theories and offer the attractive sense of approaching an open horizon. The Neoplatonist scholarch was the emblematic proponent of constructing a cohesive and thorough philosophical system which provides exhaustive interpretations. For the influence exercised by Proclus, we only cite the following studies: H.D. Saffrey – L.G. Westerink, Proclus. Théologie Platonicienne, vol. VI, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1997, pp. XXXVI– LXXXII; P. Bastid, “Proclus principal propagateur du Néoplatonisme”, Le Néoplatonisme, Paris 1971, pp. 403–407. Concerning, however, the more general spiritual atmosphere of Neoplatonism

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after Plotinus, we cite H.D. Saffrey’s studies contained in his collective volume Recherches sur le Néoplatonisme après Plotin, J. Vrin, Paris 1990. For the way in which the high achievements of Neoplatonism are manifested in Plotinus, Proclus and Damascius, see Sarah Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

PROCLUS’ THEORY OF FORMS: GENERAL THEORETICAL FRAME

Proclus’ theory about the Forms belongs within the framework of his general theory about the intermediates and their archetypal character. 1 In the philosophical system of the Neoplatonist thinker and his predecessors, intermediates are ontological realities and divine powers which intervene for the fulfillment of certain processes, which belong – in the sense of an exactly constructed technique – to teleological planning imposed by a superior entity. They are in between the supreme ontological reality, i.e. the One or the Good, and the multitude of its tangible substantiations. As they are The historical-philosophical beginnings of the theory of the intermediates are to be found in the last group of Plato’s dialogues, mainly in the Philebus. Plato there tried to define the number of the intermediate grades between two prima facie extremely opposing ontological levels, i.e. between the unity and uniqueness of the intelligible One and the multiplicity of the infinite matter. His ultimate aim was to show how and in what analogies of combinations the world of tangible experience is constructed, where matter plays an important role anyway. The ontological exemplar in Plato is dualistic, while in Proclus it has been replaced by a consistent monism. For the meaning and the function of the Platonic intermediates, see N. Boussoulas, “Étude sur l’ Esthétique de la composition platonicienne des mixtes (suite et fin)”, Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 61, 1961, pp. 142–158. For the use of the Philebus in the works of Proclus see J. Combès, “Les trois monades du Philèbe selon Proclus”, in J. Pépin and H.-D. Saffrey (eds.), Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens. Actes du Colloque International du CNRS, Paris, 2–4 oct., Editions du CNRS, Paris 1987, pp. 177–190; G. van Riel, “Ontologie et théologie. Le Philèbe dans le troisième livre de la Théologie Platonicienne de Proclus”, in A.Ph. Segonds and C. Steel (eds.), Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2000, pp. 399–413. 1

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numerous and each one of them has a certain content, they contribute to the organization and function of the natural universe as a whole by means of strict and schematic specializations. In other words, the intermediates are metaphysical beings, which express through their presence and function the progressive outflow of the One from its own self, according to appearances, since the One itself is absolutely eternal. They also express the gradual particularization of the productive activity of the One by means of processes of generation of gods and substances. Every such process consists of three stages, which could be characterized as constituting a cohesive dialectic of self-expession and self-realization. In particular, they follow the preset requirements of the triadic productive scheme “Remaining-Procession-Reversion”. This pattern could be conceived as the dialectic between cause and effect, which repeatedly follows various stages. 2 The first is placed on an initial level, that of “Remaining”, where they coexist under this causal relation which has not yet been manifested. Proclus evaluates the intermediates according to their ontological and axiological priority and this articulation defines their archetypal character. Thus, they are not only the archetypes of tangible beings, but they also function archetypically within the relationships among themselves. The superior intermediates are the archetypes of the inferior ones, in the Concerning Proclus’ scheme “Remaining-Procession-Reversion” see his treatise Institutio theologica, pr. 25–39, pp. 28.21–42.7. Cf. E.R. Dodds, Proclus, The Elements of Theology, pp. 212–223; J. Trouillard, L’Un et l’ âme selon Proclos, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1972, pp. 78–106; La mystagogie de Proclos, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1982, pp. 53–91; W. Beierwaltes, Proklos, Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik, Frankfurt am Main 1979, 2nd ed., pp. 118– 163. This scheme does not secure only the structure of the ontological system, but also its meaning both as to the source from which it derives as well and as to the end which either has been specified for it or it has undertaken to realize. In particular, (a) “Remaining” denotes the condition of the absolute integrity of the cause, (b) “Procession” denotes the outflow of its products from its own self, without even the slightest ontological alteration and (c) “Reversion” denotes the return of the products to their cause, a movement which basically means the realization on their behalf of the possibilities which the cause has bestowed them. 2

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framework of a system which is characterized by a consistent monism. It could be argued that this is a pyramid-like development. This pyramid shows how the multitude derives from unity or how the multitude projects the infinite richness of unity. The Neoplatonist philosopher develops his theories about archetypesintermediates in his work Theologia Platonica and connects them with the content and the progressive articulation of the ontological categories of the Second Hypothesis of the Platonic dialogue Parmenides. He connects them with strictly constructed and geometrically articulated methodological processes, thus responding to advanced epistemological demands. 3 Even though he himself insists that he follows an already shaped tradition, we would easily argue that he attributed impressive “spans”, both as quantitive enhancement and as qualitative (e.g. methodological) structures. He elaborates points which do not appear in Plato, as in his dialogues the paradigm of the divine hierarchies and, by extension, of the divine interventions is clearly absent. Furthermore, Proclus proceeds to a theological Theologia Platonica, I, 53.19–22: “τοῖς πράγμασιν ἑπόμενοι κόσμον διαλεκτικὸν ἀποφήναιμεν τὴν ὅλην ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν (sc. τὴν δευτέραν) ἄνωθεν ἄχρι τῆς ἀποπερατώσεως τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος προερχομένην διὰ τούτων τῶν μέσων γενῶν”. According to Proclus, in the framework of the evolution from the first until the final conclusion of this hypothesis, the “being” presents a progressive development-multiplication. The “one” as well follows its own distinctive development-multiplication in a horizontal and a vertical correspondence with that of the “being”. This standard correspondence is expressed through the gradually increasing correlation between the two terms and the gradual activation of their productive potentialities. All this results in the articulated development or production of new divine entities, which are philosophically symbolized through the ontological categories of the Second Hypothesis. The Neoplatonist scholarch approaches this hypothesis in a theological way of interpretation; therefore, he does not accept the view that it consists in an exercise on logical arguments. The mission of his research is to find out its deeper allegorical content. In many chapters of this first book he attempts, through numerous routes, to establish this theoretical choice of his. Ontologically this means: how the One posits itself in a process of productive projections and for which essential cause. 3

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and theogonic reading of the second hypothesis of the Platonic dialogue Parmenides, an approach which is not evident in the founder of the Academy. We might therefore talk of a metainterpretation of the Parmenides, defined within a specific cosmotheoretical perspective. At times, Proclus’ presents himself more like a historian of philosophy and a commentator rather than an original thinker. In particular, in his treatises In Platonis Parmenidem and In Platonis Timaeum commentaria he composed extensive commentaries on the Platonic views about the essence, the functions and the various relationships of the Forms. At the same time, he offers a rather systematic, and therefore valuable, account of the evolution of the theory of the Forms from Plato onwards until his present time. His contribution is important, although this presentation depends to a large extent on his own philosophical and theological views and occasionally does not identify the philosophers under discussion. It is of course possible that his listeners and/or readers would have known who he was citing thanks to their previous studies. In any case, the level of education of the students of the Academy was high, and this was due to the systematic course of studies they followed in which the careful reading of the Aristotelian treatises was included. In any case, this presents the evolution of a theory which attempts at the acquisition of consciousness of its own self. A more careful approach, however, will lead us to the conclusion that Proclus does not remain on the level of a systematic commentator. His main aim is to connect the theory about the Forms with the structures of his own complex system and to give access to questions which had not received the desired replies during the research of his predecessors. Thus, through the Forms he attempts at facilitating the transition from divine to tangible beings without either ontological confusion between them, or participation. 4 Through his own theory about the Henads he attempts to Proclus, consistently following the Platonic tradition, divides reality into divine and sensible. In his theological interpretation of the Platonic Parmenides he argues that its Second Hypothesis reveals the causal relationship of the One-Good with the divine beings which have derived from it, and that the three following hypotheses describe its causal relationship 4

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connect the transcendent One with the multitude of divine beings, and succeeded to a great extent. The Henads, as the second One, were the first and unitary multitude and, therefore, the necessary mediating factor, which made the full development of the divine powers-beings feasible. These powers, apart from the specific character they had, imposed ontological, productive and archetypal presuppositions for the multitude of tangible beings. 5 From a certain point onwards the Forms were responsible for the completion of the mission of the Henads. According to Proclus, the Forms, apart from their philosophical and theological character, define and realize the presuppositions for the transition from the metaphysical level to that of Nature and all this is in compliance with a consistent Realism. During this development the mode of their presence is gradually degraded and the ontological properties they possess are particularized. After the completion of these processes the Forms will have left the divine realm behind and will further function productively and archetypically, so as to be hypostatically present in sensible things. This does not mean that the transcendence of the Forms is affected, but that they acquire an immanent presence, through which they allow the sensible world to exist and develop under the implementation of strict legislative procedures. The way they are present in the natural universe is definitely regulative and it is a presence which is preserved until the natural world has absorbed to an absolute degree whatever has been bestowed on it by the metaphysical world. It should be noted that the cases the with the realities, which are subject to Becoming. See Theologia Platonica, I, 50.6–12 and 57.12–20. Therefore, Cosmology is absolutely and by means of compulsory terms defined by Metaphysics. 5 Concerning Proclus’ theory about the Henads, see Institutio theologica, pr. 113–165, pp. 100.5–144.8; Theologia Platonica, III, 5.6–28.21. Cf. E.R. Dodds, Proclus, The Elements of Theology, pp. 257–283; H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink, Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, III, pp. ix–lxxvii. Details of this theory will be given in the first chapter of our study, but it should be stressed in advance that it belongs to Proclus’ particularly original and well-constructed contributions. It should be noted that he himself attributes its systematic foundation to his own teacher Syrianus, whose extensive texts, however, have not been preserved.

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Neoplatonist scholarch refers to of enmattered Forms are not few, and this insistence was systematically shown by Syrianus in his commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysica. By means of this term both Neoplatonist scholarchs referred to the way the Forms offered matter the possibility to realize the teleological orientation which they had bestowed on it initially, since they created it as a nucleus of infinite possibilities. In what follows we will try to show that by means of his theory on the Forms, Proclus is in agreement with a consistent metaphysical and natural Realism, thus limiting any aspect of Nominalism to a minimum. To prove this, we will focus on an extended part of the totality of the relevant approaches of the Neoplatonist philosopher. We will also show that his theory is the end of a long philosophical discussion that had been going on for the past nine centuries concerning the nature of the universals. The presentation of Proclus’ views about the Forms faces difficulties because of the terminology used. The Neoplatonist philosopher in many cases adapts his own concepts to the general direction of his particular expositions. For instance, in his commentary on the Parmenides he mainly examines the transcendent character of the Forms, while in his commentary on the Timaeus he mainly examines their immanent character. We should therefore examine the two treatises in terms of immediate succession between them. It should also be noted that there are evident linguistic differentiations among his treatises and this indicates the evolution of his thought. In any case, the exactness of the concepts does not depend so much on their correspondence to a general theory about them, but mainly on how they reflect the particular scientific field they belong to. In his dialogues Parmenides and Timaeus, Plato himself does not use the same conceptual material. Nevertheless, he is consistent with the general principles he adheres to, as, for instance, with the theological content of the Forms and their position within the frame of Realism, that is, of the clearly accepted view about the self-foundation of the metaphysical world. Under this perspective, without any discussion, he considers them to be objective realities. However, the fact that he is a consistent historian of philosophy should make us suspicious that positions deriving from Stoic philosophy and Christianity may have been incorporated into his theories. Stoic philosophers as well as Christian theologians had already essentially contributed to the foundation of the branch of

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cosmology, as well as of epistemology. Moreover, the current of Middle-Platonism (with Philo as the leading figure) had influenced the posterior ontological systems (including Christianity). In particular, the representatives of Middle-Platonism moved towards the solution of the main problem of the Platonic dialogue Timaeus, i.e. what was the relation between God-Demiurge and the Forms? Their proposal was that the Demiurge is the supreme metaphysical Intellect and that the Forms were their specialized manifestations, i.e. the particular intellects. As to Philo’s contribution to the evolution of the Platonic tradition, see indicatively, A.J. Festugière, La Révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste, vol. II, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1990, pp. 519–585. The chapters of this study are arranged to comply with the principles by means of which Proclus constructs his philosophical system. The first chapter contains a historical introduction to the theory of Forms within the frame of the evolution of the Platonic Academy. In the second chapter, “Henads and Forms”, emphasizes that according to the Neoplatonist philosopher the henads are on the highest level of the metaphysical world and are the immediate emanations of the Supreme Principle, the One-Good. By means of this property they define the way the metaphysical world will be constructed in its totality, both horizontally and vertically. The third chapter, “Forms and Numbers”, presents the way the Forms appear for the first time in the second term of the supreme ontological triad “Being-Life-Intellect”. It is the triad which emanates from the manifestation of the henads and specifies the ways of organizing the metaphysical world, allowing it to function through an absolute programming as a productive and paradigmatic cause of the natural world. This specification includes the relation of Numbers with the Forms, which are in close collaboration among themselves, in order to bestow the totality of those regulative factors, which are necessary for the ordered function of the natural world. The fourth chapter, “The objective existence of the Forms”, develops some of the arguments Proclus uses in order to prove that the Forms are not only abstract intelligible schemes deriving from abstractively functioning human cognitive discourse. The fifth chapter, “The levels of presence of the Forms”, presents analytically the way the Forms pass through the totality of metaphysical levels, so as to activate all those necessary factors for the creation of the natural world to be set in motion. In the sixth chapter, “The commun-

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ion between Forms and sensible beings”, explores what is registered is the general frame of principles which define the way the Forms communicate with the world of sense experience. In the seventh chapter, “Aspects of the function of the metaphysical Forms”, what is specifically developed is one of the many ways through which Proclus estimates that the Forms function in the interior of the natural world, i.e. as inexhaustible legislative nuclei which will lead it to realize the teleological paradigm on the basis of which it has been created. Thus, the sequence of the chapters will show how the construction of the natural universe takes place by the Supreme Principle through interventions, i.e., how, on a theoretical basis, from Henology we are led to Cosmology, within the standard framework of principles of ontological monism. This last point clarifies Proclus’ differentiation from Plato’s and Aristotle’s dualism. This is perhaps the most decisive turn in the evolution of ancient Greek Ontology, that is, its registration in a clearly articulated theological field.

1. THE THEORY OF FORMS IN THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF PLATONISM The main problem Plato faced was how the metaphysical world, which expresses the absolute unity, intervenes in order to adorn and legislate concerning matter. Τhe consequence of this is the decisive contribution towards the rational construction of the natural universe, which represents the absolute multitude–multiplicity. Thus, there is a question about compatibility between the two worlds. The founder of the Academy attempts initially to solve the problem by introducing the theory of Forms, which, even though they are transcendent realities, express the construction of the metaphysical multitude. He, thus, introduces a dynamic henism, which is exactly expressed by these archetypical realities. They are rhythmical normalities, which, however, do not lead to a standard motion of interventions. They bring to the fore a variety, which excludes inflexible identities. Therefore, the natural universe, which will derive from their formal “settlement” in matter, is a world of ontic varieties, which causes charming stimulations to the observer. What’s more, in their totality, the Forms have a unity among themselves, even though each one has its own particularity. All are within all, each time in a particular way. Plato starts constructing in a systematic way his theory about the Forms with his dialogues Phaedo and Respublica. Through the dialogues of his later period, namely the Parmenides, the Timaeus and the Philebus, as well as with his so-called unwritten teaching, his elaboration reaches its peak with detailed specifications. Thus, he attributes to his theory the dimensions of a holistic system, which nourishes the tradition of the Academy until Damascius, its last scholarch. We will concisely and cohesively present his final posi13

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tions about the Forms in a way which essentially contributes to the comprehension of what Proclus argued eight centuries later. We should of course remind the reader that Plato adopts dualism, while Proclus adopts monism, a difference which is not negligible. The Forms, even though they have a multiple content, do not contribute so that the metaphysical world is developed or differentiated as to its ontological constitutive position, i.e. it is not subject to essential modalities. They simply express the infinite richness of unity, which characterizes the metaphysical world. Because the metaphysical world is from the beginning integral and unchangeable, its manifestation has no consequence whatsoever to its texture, which exists by means of self-foundation, and its structure. It is a dynamic world, which, as characterized by overcompleteness, is not diminished at all. In the natural universe, however, changes happen in the form of a thunderstorm. Mutations and destructions characterize every microcosmic scale. Macrocosmically, on the other hand, the coherence of the universe is taken for granted. Since, however, Plato adopts the view that the Forms express the metaphysical multitude, he judges that there should have been a reality superior to them in the leading condition of the metaphysical world, which will represent its authentic character to an absolute degree, i.e. its self-founding unity. Thus, the Forms express the absolute unified monads. Conclusively, each Form projects a particular presence of the absolute unity. The argumentation concerning this remark is in that we should avoid in every way to conceive the metaphysical world as being subject exclusively to multiplication. Plato, having as his criterion ontological integrity, estimates that metaphysical unity should be preserved in every way. But how will this aim be fulfilled? By means of a search for an entity which will express the absolute unity and will contribute to the development of the many Forms. Thus, he brings to the fore the internal richness of an initial and inviolable unity and, thus, approaches the metaphysical world in a dynamic way. He characterizes this entity as One or as Good. These are concepts which present two specific ways through which the one and only reality exists and functions. The first concept denotes the eternally undiminished identity of the supreme Principle with itself. The second denotes that this Principle permanently creates and exercises providence for its creation, i.e. for the natural world.

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Thus, this is a moving unmoved cause, a relation which Aristotle will enhance afterwards. Plato chooses a particular technique to bring to the fore both of his two aims in a stable way. This refers to two levels of presence: On the one hand, the absolute integrity is inviolable. On the other hand, explosive openings are observed and found and justify the existence of the multitude. The supreme Principle is separate from the natural universe and, on a second level, is the cause of its existence. We could, then, characterize the Forms as the executive branch of the Good. Moreover, if we attempt at defining the Forms, we would argue that they are the multiple specifications of the providence of the Good, which will be manifested again, through them, within its specific combinations. The crucial question posited refers to how the Forms are developed when they construct a multitude, while they are metaphysical realities. Plato’s estimation is that the metaphysical inflational world must exist, so that the inflational reading of the natural world can be explained. The Forms nourish matter with such possibilities, so that matter itself undertakes infinite initiatives. This contributes to our location of infinite microorganisms. This is where the preparation for the theory of the indefinite Dyad arises, which is expressed by the Forms, precisely from the fact that they have a pluralistic content that is clearly different from that of the natural world. However, this is a theory concerning which no written text by Plato is preserved and is, therefore, registered in what is defined as unwritten teaching. Plato invents, then, a second supreme metaphysical reality, apart from the One, which, he calls “indefinite Dyad”. However, this new theory is not free from problems. For example, how does the initial unity come to communicate with a condition which is the exactly opposite to it, that is of the two? Also, is the ontological strength of the former due to the presence of the second reality? Moreover, what led the One to proceed, in a way, to its duplication? These questions posit a detail liable to cause a philosophical panic at the Academy, since the integrity of the One is endangered. This problematism is enhanced at the moment when the distinction between the essence and its energy is not understood. In the form of a hypothesis Plato starts to formulate what can be characterized as “active causality”. The first Principle projects its internal dynamism without being subject to any alteration. This version

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opened its courses in a systematic way during the following periods of the Academy. Plato gradually introduces a dynamic consideration of the One, according to which it itelf is not satisfied to remain in the complacency of its ontological happiness. Thus, he proceeds to a self-reference as an enhanced reading of itself. Turning to itself, the One develops a double eyesight. It sees itself and, following that, it sees the projections of itself. Therefore, it proceeds to a “duplication” of itself without diminution of its unity-integrity in any way. At this point, we should introduce Plato’s dialogue Philebus to the discussion. This is a treatise which never fails to cause surprise. Here, Plato reverses himself with an astonishing agility. He introduces the concept of the infinite, which to an extended degree he identifies with matter. At the same time, however, he introduces the concept of finite, which he identifies with the Forms. In his new perspective he chooses a supreme Principle, which has the finite and the infinite in front of it and attempts in every way to compose them creatively, so as to bring to the fore a world where matter plays a central and not passive role. Plato, then, concludes that the One turns to itself, develops in a way a discussion with itself and is also formed as an indefinite Dyad, without ceasing to be One. Its self-evolution does not take place in time, but eternally. Plato here enhances the first place which he had attributed to the metaphysical world in his dialogues Phaedo, Respublica, and Phaedrus. What is particularly important, however, is that this enhancement takes place by means of weaponry, which he draws from the natural world. The turn of the One is an expression of a peculiar mobility it has, which was considered as an exclusive property of nature. And the first ontological condition which arises is that, in the metaphysical world itself, the concept of Dyad is developed and is the presupposition for the creation of the multitude. The concept of the indefinite is the natural extension of his general positions about metaphysics in a dynamic scheme. The divine world is not restricted by any other reality, and, consequently, cannot be in an indefinite way in a dialectical relation with itself. Moreover, Plato’s materialism begins to be reinforced, since it is seen that through the intervention of the indefinite Dyad matter is activated and undertakes certain initiatives. Therefore, it acquires the presuppositions to function indirectly. Together with the dialogue Philebus, the theory of “One-indefinite

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Dyad” (Ἕν – ἀόριστος δυάς) forms the theory about the mixture, which the philosopher considers to be that which derives from the combination of the metaphysical world with matter through the indefinite Dyad. These openings on behalf of Plato are evidently surprising. Concisely, in this process of ontological manifestations Plato follows the stages below: (a) The One-Good is initially in its absolute and unmanifested integrity as being itself. (b) Next, the One turns to itself and develops the indefinite Dyad, i.e. the way of exiting from the initial static unity. (c) The Forms, which construct the metaphysical multitude, derive from the indefinite Dyad, within which unity exists permanently. (d) The metaphysical multitude proceeds to quantitive infinite internal combinations, through which he intervenes into matter. (e) The multitude of the natural world or of the world of sense-experience derives through this intervention (this multitude develops in stages).

Finally, it should be noted that the intervention of the Forms into matter is not only ontological, but also normative-legislative. Precisely because the Forms introduce rhythmical normalities, the natural universe exists permanently and is evolved steadily. Shortly afterwards, in the Academy, as well as in the Lycaeum, this evolution will be explained through the teleological example (according to which nothing exists by chance). Therefore, every being or phenomenon exists because it must serve a particular aim, which is registered in the more general aim which the natural universe will realize in its entirety. 1

In our estimation, the study which exposes in the most systematic what we have referred to above is that by Leon Robin, La théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres d’après Aristote, Georg Verlagsbuchhandlung, Hildesheim 1968. In this study there is a full description of the course of the first period of the Platonic Academy, both as to its own theoretical itineries and through the prism of the critique exercised by 1

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Before we proceed to the systematic treatment of the theory of Forms in the work of Proclus, it is necessary to present in a concise way some of the most important moments in the framework of the Platonic tradition. We could easily argue that the theory of Forms was the major competition of the Platonic Academy throughout its history, with inevitable fluctuations in its research and foundation. Proclus, as one of the last representatives of the Academy, exhaustively utilized the tradition which was formed in its evolution and offered authentic formulations to its content. In order to secure certain – or at least historical – connections between Plato (4th cent. B.C.) and Proclus (5th cent. A.D.), we will briefly present the relevant positions of some of the most important philosophers of the Platonic tradition: Speusippus, Xenocrates, Antiochus of Ascalon, Plotinus and Syrianus. They are thinkers who mainly used the Platonic theory with reference to a deeper understanding of the relationship between the metaphysical world and the natural. However, the parameter which should be kept in mind is that Proclus – in contrast to the dualistic exemplar of the founder of the Academy – established the monistic exemplar in full detail. This is an evolution which should not be neglected within the framework of ancient Greek philosophy, since the totality of the ontological possibilities, plannings, and processes is placed in the metaphysical world. Matter, together with the richness of Forms through which it will be manifested, is a posterior cosmic system. With Speusippus and Xenocrates the theory of “Forms”, according to the way it was formulated by Plato, undergoes some changes, at least as to the external methodological schemes in which it is articulated or as to the (perhaps) new formations within which it is placed. As to its initial formulations it will not become one of the central points of the teaching of the Academy until a later stage of its development from Antiochus of Ascalon onwards. But its degradation – or, more correctly, its marginalization in the sense of a timely argumentation introduced for its transformation Aristotle. L. Robin’s most important advantage is that he exhaustively insists on the use of the relevant primary sources so that he can be led objectively to his conclusions.

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or decodification – does not mean that the first two successors of Plato (Xenocrates in particular, since Speusippus remained to an attempt with a cosmological content) had denied the basic distinction of his doctrine between the world of sensibles (as partially effects) and the world of intelligibles (as partially causes). That is, between the world of generation, motion and destruction and the world of rest, imperishability and eternal harmony, between Hence and Thence; basic terms for the construction of Western Metaphysics. This is an extension of thought which had already started through the contrast between the philosophy of Heraclitus and that of Parmenides and with the later attempt at their composition – e.g. by the compositionist philosophers for the validation of truth – either as becoming or as being or as their combination – for all levels of reality. 2 The position here, whether clearly seen or not, is that it is not possible to doubt the objective character of a world which owes its existence to the divine or the archetypical immanence. As is expected, Plato’s successors taught his theories following his own direction after the criticism against his original attempt concerning the “Forms” by the “heretical” Neo-eleatics – evidently with reference to its deviations as to the relation between rest and motion or between being and non-being –, by the representatives of the “materialistic” currents of his era – which were later expressed by the Stoics and the Epicureans under the prism of secularization –, but also by some students of the Academy, such as Aristotle. The philosophical currents of the ancient Greek world were enhanced and specialized in their research, so that criticisms from either side became unavoidable, as well as the well-explained agreements (up to a certain point) on the basis of certain scientific motives. In any case, it is beyond doubt that the Forms are one of Concerning Plato’s love towards Heraclitus’ thought, despite that he did not clearly confess it, see Abel Jeanière, La pensée d’Héraclite et la vision présocratique du monde, 1959, pp. 73–75. Ing. Düring notes on this point: “As to the information he gives us about the generation of the theory of Forms, Aristotle mentions three sources: Socrates, the Pythagoreans and the theory of Heraclitus about the flow of sensible things; Plato must have known Heraclitus’ doctrine during his youth through Cratylus” (Aristotle, vol. I, p. 441). 2

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the main criteria for the construction of the other theories. More specifically, the first students of Plato were at least in favour of the dual unity “One-indefinite Dyad”, where – according to the prevailing choices – the One was identical with the Good and with the generative cause of the “Forms”, which begin to be considered as emanations and, therefore, as ontologically dependent on and not without presuppositions. What comes to the fore is Henology, a new theoretical branch, which receives further possibilities from Plato’s metaphysics or incorporates and subjects it to a superior transcendent level. The main reason leading to the formation of this branch is skepticism as to whether the archetypal forces – or the numbers, which are directly or by means of quantitively few interventions related with sensible beings – can possibly possess the supreme or one of the supreme metaphysical positions. What derives is a more extended theologizing of metaphysics, which is cognitively covered by the curtain of apophaticism, i.e. conditions which consist the remote stage of the transcendent characteristics of pure science. The Platonic ἀνυπόθετον, i.e., that which requires no assumption, renders its ontological domination increasingly intense through its definite signification on those realities which are introduced by means of multiple specifications on the divine tree and they are considered to further reinforce the cognitive inaccessibility of its essence and the impossibility of its exact naming. 3 ReA.J. Festugiére, on the basis of certain doxographical points in Sextus Empiricus, observes the following as to a specific aspect of this issue: “Le Monade prémiere, l’Un considéré comme principe formel, est transcedant à tout le reel, puisqu’il est transcendant à l’un numérique, que cet un numérique est ἀρχὴ des nombres, et qu’enfin les nombres sont à la fois le principe et le substance des choses. C’est à cette transcendance de la Monade que fait allusion Philon, quand il distingue une Monade identique à Dieu κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν et une monade inférieure à Dieu en tant que partie du nombre” (La Révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste, vol. I, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1953, p. 29 [Translation: The primary Monad, the One, considered as formative principle, is transcendent with reference to any other reality, since it is transcendent with reference to the numerical one, while the numerical one is the principle of numbers, and because of the fact that numbers are at the same time the principle and the substance of things. This alludes to the transcendence of the Monad which is meant 3

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alism is pushed to its extreme consequences and wishes to have the thinking subject under the control of its self-restrictions. Xenocrates defines as his aim the strengthening of the ontological field with regard to its metaphysical foundations. Positing more clearly than Speusippus the indivisible (ἄτομα), geometrical sizes as principles of beings, he taught all the presuppositions of the theory of “Forms” before the Platonic Sophist, since he did not primarily bring to the fore the perspective of their mutual participation. Thus, it seems that he led Metaphysics to its formation in terms of a “static” model, to a more Parmenidean atmosphere, avoiding, however, rendering it also inflexible. Without abolishing the expansion of the cognitive searches, he turns, anew after Plato, to the strengthening of the basic ontological factors. He was mainly interested in the description of the “Forms” as archetypes, by means of the strict definition of their unity and identity, and in their implementation on geometry as pure science. The domination of the metaphysical over the natural is judged that it has to perceive absolute characteristics, secured by geometry through its schematizations, which are not simply scientifically descriptive, but mainly and in principle positing the foundations of ontology. At the same time, it particularly insisted on the “mystical”, at least as to its cognitive “captivation”, arithmology, which would evidently restrict scientific empiricism and would marginalize or continuously control the analysis of the particular in its version as a basic epistemological priority, and, by means of later terms, as introducing such nominalistic solutions which would threaten Plato’s traditional realism. It is evident in his theoretical programming that he included the exclusion of relativity in every way, which is compulsorily imposed by the discussion of particular cases, mainly when it is perceived as the only scientifically valid. And, of course, both epistemologically and logically it would lead to the choice of production and not of induction as a main method for the analytical approach and interpretation of reality. We could argue that Xenocrates basically undertakes the effort to secure the balances within the Academy in view of the new tendencies which begin to be shaped in an by Philo, when he distinguishes a Monad identical with God κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν and to one monad inferior to God as it is part of number]).

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impressively moving spiritual atmosphere. On the one hand, he preserves Plato’s view as to the integrity of science on the basis of its theoretical correspondence to the metaphysical world, insisting in a way to form a “epistemological” archetype. Thus, metaphysics starts receiving increasingly established epistemological characteristics and, through Speusippus’ secularized attempt, a tendency is formed which is subject to common places of research analysis with the natural world. On the other hand, by transferring the ontological archetypal character to the geometrical shapes, he attempts to render it more tangible and therefore prone to empiricism with the perspectives of a permanent definition, even though these shapes are not natural conditions, but their foundations or their definitions, and not only on a level of theoretical analysis. They are, at least, structural causalities and intervening laws for the internal order and external harmony. The conjunction of ontology with epistemology posits its requests in an intense way and thought appears to demand more and more certainties. Geometry is a secure axis, so that astronomy as well, as a leading projection of natural science, does not have any reason for an autonomous foundation, but is in search for “supporters” for its articulation. Thus, it is compulsory for a particular object to be approached both in itself, and mainly on the basis of the causes which have formed it. Aristotle evidently has Xenocrates’ attempts in mind – or, at least, must have discussed with him – when he was formulating his positions about natural science, mathematics and astronomy as well as their comparative examinations, in his works Physics and First Philosophy. Antiochus of Ascalon mixed Platonic and Aristotelian elements with elements of the teaching of the Stoics, according the eclectic tendency of his era, and brought the Academy back to its traditional occupations. It is an interesting case of a thinker who moved from his theoretical “orthodoxy” to the search of possible dialectical exercises. More generally, the mobility in his thought, independently of that which is produced, is evident. His return to the past is not a pathological adherence to the ancestors, but an attempt of a dialectic recomposition with the utilization of the theoretical extensions which were present in the meantime. It would suffice that there is strict compliance to the terms which are in each case required for the encounters. Undoubtedly, however, all the above is formulated under the new philosophical terms – models of research, which had derived. Here we have to underline that

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during this period what mainly flourishes is the noetic selfreferences of the research subject, which, and mainly due to the already formed new political conditions, moved almost independently, by necessity, from the current social circumstances and the financial activities. The reciprocal feedback between social becoming and philosophical thought belongs now to the recollection of a historical reality which had already belonged to the past and flows in a negative or a non-compatible way as to the correspondences of these two factors. Antiochus was a teacher of Cicero, who is the main source for his teaching. It is considered certain that he reintroduced the theory of the Platonic “Forms” to the Academy, but in common with elements from the Aristotelian teaching about the “form” (μορφή). It was an attempt at a contemporaneous utterance or even composition, with a clear succession between them, of the metaphysics of transcendence (Platonism) with the metaphysics of immanence (Aristotelianism). However, it is characteristic of his eclecticism that from Plato he did not receive the esoteric doctrine about the One and the indefinite Dyad, but his theory about the “Forms” as was formulated in his published dialogues. We should not, however, exclude the possibility that he may have been led to bring to the fore a reciprocal circumincession between the two Platonic theories, because their ontological horizon was almost the same and they could function in a probable conjunction between them with reference to the distinction between the two worlds, which however went through their combination as well. It is highly probable that he gathered information about the lost Platonic dialogues from the Aristotelian texts and evidently also elaborated the criticism which was formulated there concerning their content. That he preserved the theory about the “Forms” evidently is because Plato, at least in his dialogue Timaeus, had extensively also examined the presuppositions for their theoretical relation with Aristotle’s “form”. In Plato he evidently located a more specific analysis of this issue, as well as the dominant tendency in the Academy for the preservation of the transcendent world from any alteration in it deriving from its conjuction with matter. Already, however, this is the generation of an attempt to argue that Plato and Aristotle move at times in the form of juxtaposition and at times in a synthetic way basically on the same theoretical route and that their differences are simply seen in the details or the new needs which had been formed by the historical evolution in the field of

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philosophical deliberations, or from requests about clarification at certain “obscure” points. As to the last point, the Stagirite undertakes the attempt to construct a system of thought, which would give the epistemological terms for the understanding of philosophical searches attempted by his teacher. It should be noted, however, that this attempt will be tested throughout time and will be under constant critical re-examinations and reformulations mainly by the Neoplatonic thought, in any case permanently within the frame of construction of a unified theory which would shed light to all aspects of ancient Greeek philosophy. No matter how evident it is, the Academy tends to form the branch of the history of philosophy, in the sense of the discovery of a common extensive tendency which would cover the particular searches through the ages. Proclus will lead this branch to its culmination. 4 The last major thinker before Proclus as to the theory of Forms is Plotinus, the historical leader of Neoplatonism. His relevant views are mainly developed in his treatise On Intellect, the Forms, and Being, the basic points of which we will concisely present in what follows. According to Plotinus, the Intellect, the second of the three supreme hypostases of his system, i.e. One-Intellect-Soul, is permanently in the condition of actuality. The philosopher also clarifies that if the Intellect thinks something, it thinks as being in itself in the form of self-reference, and, if it possesses something, it has it from its own self, as something immanent. Thus, if it thinks through itself and with itself, it is what it thinks. Under the prism of this “hypostatic” repetition, it is a real intellect, thinks the true beings as its content and brings them to existence as formed. Consequently, it is identical with the true beings themselves, which by obligation have an authentic and immutable content. These terms of immutability and identity make clear that the Intellect thinks exclusively itself alone and only whatever is inside itself. In no case does it think them initially inside the sense-perceptible beings, i.e. in terms of their mutable nature. If it thought them there, it would Concerning the philosophical system of Speusippus, Xenocrates and Antiochus of Ascalon, see John Dillon, The Middle Platonists, Duckworth, London 1977. 4

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be imperfect as ignorant of itself and of being itself and the ontological priorities would be abolished. In order to stress this priority a bit more, the Neoplatonist philosopher notes that as to a particular produced being the first element with reference to the ontological power is not the sense-perceptible one, but its intelligible presupposition. At the same time, the species which is internal to the sense-perceptible beings, in the sense that it exists within matter, is a reflection of the real species. Thus, he validates the metaphysical realism, while he also criticizes the objectivity of sensationalism, which is promoted by certain philosophical circles mainly following the Aristotelian Ontology and Epistemology. Immanence has a clear metaphysical definition. Thus, the ontological integrity of the Intellect is guaranteed. According to Plotinus, since the true beings as expressions of its existence in its interior possess ontological priority concerning the world of sense experience, they possess the characteristics of the archetypes exactly as its essential primal conditions. What derives from this is that the Intellect is the real beings and it does not think them as existing in another area. In such equivalence there is no question of priority. The truly beings do not exist either before or after its own presence. The Intellect is the legislator or rather itself the law of their existence and they remain eternally in themselves, without being subject to deviations and alterations. Therefore, they have the property of being themselves and are expressions of the immutable metaphysical reality, the totality of presuppositions of which proceeds to its multiplications, independently from whether it will make them terms of productive activities. Based on the above, Plotinus permanently insists on the specification of the difference between the metaphysical and the natural beings. He observes that the beings which are subject to becoming and destruction acquire afterwards the property of being and in reality they have no particular and self-defined existence. As subject to materiality, they do not coexist with their source. Whatever exists, in the strict sense, is the truly being, from which the natural beings receive their ontological ingredients. The truly being has acquired its foundation as self-subsistent and has no need either of spatial dimensions or of the size of extension in order to be developed. Furthermore, it is not subject to temporal evolution either, because it exactly has the characteristic of eternality. Together with this distinction what is formulated is also an “answer” to the Stoics

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with reference to the possibility or impossibility of the selfformation of the spermatic logoi which are found in the senseperceptible bodies. Such a possibility, according to the Neoplatonist philosopher, may exist, but only because an eternal metaphysical substratum pre-exists and nourishes the processes which follow. After this, Plotinus observes that if the intellection of the Intellect is the intellection of an object which it itself contains, we face a species-Form, i.e. a truly being also as to its intelligible representation correspondingly, which, of course, has an ontological dimension. Thus, the species-Form is a particular intellect and an intellectual essence. Every Form is not different from the Intellect, but each one is one of its particular specifications. Here he repeats that the species which exist in the perceptible world have derived from the metaphysical world. Thus, qualities and quantities, numbers and magnitudes, generations and relations, actions and passions, motions and rest, in the sense that they are in compliance with the natural condition of things, exist in the supra-empirical realm in a universal manner. The relation the Intellect has with them is that of self-reference. Remaining within the theoretical lines of the Platonic tradition, Plotinus argues that we have to accept the existence of Forms of the universals as well. This means that there is no Form, for instance of a particular man, but generally of man. It is not possible for a Form of each individual human subsistence to exist, because among humans there are differences which are due to the interventions of matter. Thus, he does not accept the possibility of a metaphysical nominalism. He also remarks that of the differences of colours, some are due to the spermatic logos, others to matter itself and yet others to the specific conditions each field of the world of sense-perception forms with its properties. Thus, relativity is present everywhere in the natural universe. Furthermore, we would note that, independently from the axiological sign which is attributed to this relativity, there appears a condition which is not passive or static. Concluding his analysis, Plotinus formulates the view that there also pre-exist archetypes of certain specific characteristics of human existence, which are anyway of a superior qualitative order, given, however, the difference between them here as well. At this point he proceeds to a remark which is particularly crucial, since he

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clarifies the definition of the relation between archetypes and effects without compulsory commitments from the sense-perceptible appearence of the latter. This appearance represents a process which has already been metaphysically executed and is subject to evolutions within the frame of the produced world. Thus, he notes that if in the metaphysical field only what appears in the perceptible world pre-exists, then the ideal man is other than each particular man, the ideal soul is other than each particular soul and the ideal intellect is other than each particular intellect. He clarifies that all things that exist in the perceptible world are not images of the archetypes, but inferior ways of their appearance. He argues that the same happens with justice, prudence and science, which exist in human souls. What happens is that the species of these virtues exist in the internal world of every man in a way different from that according to which they exist in the metaphysical world. What remains for every man is to discover and realize in his own way whatever has been bestowed to him. Thus, the theory about the archetypal Forms touches upon moral issues as well. What is of particular interest in all this is that Plotinus accepts that the Forms move both within the metaphysics of transcendence as well as the metaphysics of immanence. This combination will be primarily utilized by Proclus, who will thus bring to the fore the request for Plato’s encounter with Aristotle. 5 Chronologically, the last systematic “reader” of the theory of Forms before Proclus was his own teacher Syrianus, who could also be characterized as the Aristotelian of the Platonic Academy. In his partially preserved commentary on the Aristotelian Metaphysics he attempts to examine the Platonic Forms from the point of view of criticism of the Stagirite philosopher on the content attributed to them by the founder of the Academy. The purpose of his research was an analytical presentation and rejection of the ArFor a relevant bibliography, see J. Trouillard, La procession plotinienne, P.U.F., Paris 1955; Chr. Rutten, Les catégories du monde sensible dans les Ennéades de Plotin, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1961; J. Moreau, Plotin ou la gloire de la philosophie antique, J. Vrin, Paris 1970; P. Hadot, “Être, Vie, Pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin”, Sources de Plotin, V, Genève-Vandoeuvres, 1960, pp. 107–141. 5

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istotelian positions, so that Plato’s theory is shown to be inviolable by any criticism. His basic position is that the Forms construct an objective metaphysical multitude and that, by means of this property, they communicate with the multitude of the natural beings – conditions, of which they are the efficient and the paradigmatic cause. He argues that the Forms are the content of the Intellect, a reality which is superior to them and its essence is the same with their own. The Intellect preserves the Forms in a permanent condition of activation, so that the process of production of the natural universe begins at the proper time. By means of these positions he clearly moves towards the direction of Plotinus. Therefore, initially the Forms are separate from the natural beings and on a following level they exist within their hypostasis as their causes. It should be noted, however, that the communication is not immediate, since the Forms through their combinations produce what is characterized as natural reason-principles, which even though do not belong to the metaphysical world, function in a metaphysical way. They are eternal nuclei nourishing the evolution of the natural universe. They are both transcendent and immanent. Mainly due to their second property, they become an object of observation on behalf of the human intellection and they are formulated on the basis of what is characterized as posterior common notions. Thus, the Forms are included in what is defined as conceptual realism. Syrianus posits in a particularly systematic way the ontological devaluation of the Forms within the metaphysical system, on the summit of which he himself places the supreme realities, i.e. the One and the Henads. This is a position which will be pushed to its last consequences by Proclus, who will utilize his teacher’s theoretical proposals in full. One of these proposals is that numbers and geometrical shapes have a metaphysical content and are not simple constructions of mathematical science. Finally, Syrianus’ contribution is particular with reference to two other levels: (a) He registers the Forms in the field of the “indefinite Dyad”, i.e. the selfdevelopment of the metaphysical world, so that it specifies its internal ontological richness. The expression of this Dyad is the Intellect. (b) He clarifies the beings of which there are Forms. Thus,

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he excludes from such an archetypical definition the elements of human body, such as hair, the manufactured objects and the products of the willed intentions of humans. 6

These topics are mainly exposed by Syrianus, In Metaphysica Commentaria, CAG, pp. 106–126, where he attempts in addition to “neutralize” Aristotle’s critique (Metaph. M) on Plato’s theory of Forms. For Syrianus’ philosophical system, see the collective volume A. Longo (ed.), Syrianus et la métaphysique de l’ antiquité tardive. Actes du colloque International, Université de Genève, 29 Septembre – 1er Octobre 2006, Elenchos, vol. 51, Bibliopolis, Napoli 2009. 6

2. HENADS AND FORMS This chapter belongs to what can be defined as the theology of Proclus. It is a theoretical field placed by the philosopher on the top of his system, both from the ontological and the epistemological points of view. The content he ascribes to his theology is of such a kind that he accepts it axiomatically, without reducing it to anything superior, and considers it as the basis for proving and justifying any other theoretical research. In such a context certain topics are covered by a clear apophaticism, i.e. they are conceived as not being subject either to research processes or to conceptual categorizations. Proclus’ famous theory about the Henads recapitulates the conclusions reached after his systematic critical reformulation of positions held by his predecessors within Neoplatonism, with the exception of Syrianus. In particular, his critique referred to the theories concerning the philosophical-theological interpretation and the relationship between the two first Hypotheses of the Platonic dialogue Parmenides. For the sake of scientific legitimacy it should be emphasised that this dialogue is the sacred book of Neoplatonic philosophy. 1 According to Proclus this issue is about the general principles, the structure, the content and the function of the hierarchical system of divine intermediate ontological orders. Secondly, it is about the nature and the limits of communication between this system and the supreme principle, the One-Good, both generally as For relevant and extensive references in Proclus we cite the treatise Theologia Platonica, Book 1, ch. 8–12, and the corresponding analysis by H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink in their introduction to the critical edition of this book: Proclus. Théologie Platonicienne, I, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1968, pp. LXVIII–LXXXIX. 1

31

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well particularly. It is an issue that has to do with analogy, as well, since this relationship has to do with articulations – each time of a particular type. The ontological system of the Neoplatonist philosopher is characterized by a corresponding inexhaustible hierarchically structured pluralism and, therefore, by the way the properties are bestowed and possessed and the way participations take place, as processes which instrumentally connect the cause with the effect. The philosopher argues that with their connection the hypotheses deal with the ontologically feasible and logically explained correlations between the One and the multitude of divine entities, which emanate after the One has come out of its own self with the intervention of the Henads. More particularly, according to Proclus’ theological interpretation, the One is the content of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, while the divine entities correspond to the ontological categories of the second. The problem, however, is the feasiblity of transition from the absolute and imparticipable unity to the manifold (even if it is the metaphysical multitude). These are two conditions belonging, prima facie, to different ontological levels, where evolution is the most important problem. How could such a condition be justified within the frame of the metaphysical world, in the field of radical transcendence? The Neoplatonist philosopher based the answers to the principles of his theory about the Henads in conformity with his own system. 2 There are divine entities of a highest order, which consist in the productive powers of the One or its participable element, by means of which all that exists, both divine and natural, acquires its being, whereas mediations – particularly causalities – dominate on a universal basis. They are what could be characterized as the second One, in the sense of a multitude which reveals, to a certain extent and not absolutely, the infinite unity of the first One. They are the content of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides and also impose the terms for The abovementioned function of the Henads is presented by Proclus in his treatise Theologia Platonica, III, 5.6–28.21, where he describes them as inexhaustible – and not only primary and static – sources of the processes which take place in the metaphysical realm. The Henads guarantee eternal life. Cf. G. Martano, Proclo di Atene, Napoli 1974, pp. 131–145. 2

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the development of the content of the second. 3 Even though they do not derive through mediation from the One, they themselves consist in the beginning-archetype for mediations. As a topic of research it would be interesting to examine the degree of correspondence of Henads to the indefinite Dyad, the reality which was of interest to Plato and Xenocrates, since it was them who mainly constructed it as a systematic theory. In such a perspective we would argue for a “duplication” of the One. The first appearance of the term “Henad” with a philosophical content is identified in the Platonic dialogue Philebus (15a6) in the plural: ἑνάδων. In this passage Socrates uses the term “Henads” instead of the term “Forms”, in order to characterize the supreme and intelligible genera of beings. 4 It should be noted that after this passage the term “Monads” is also used in order to denote the Henads and the Forms. 5 Undoubtedly, by means of these two terms Plato attributes a generalized mathematical character to the essence, the structure and the function of the Forms, a position which he must have further elaborated through his unwritten teaching. 6 Commenting on the use of the terms “Henad” and “Monad” in the Philebus, Proclus follows this mathematical dimension attributed to the Platonic theory about the Forms and examines it, in particular correlating them with other realities and making the following distinction between them: “Ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ Σωκράτης ποτὲ μὲν ἑνάδας καλεῖ τὰς ἰδέας, ποτὲ δὲ μονάδας˙ εἰσι γὰρ ὡς μὲν πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν μονάδες, διότι πλῆθός In Platonis Parmenidem, 1045.6–9 and 1069.6–8; Institutio theologica, pr. 116, p. 102.13; Theologia Platonica, III, 83.20–92.28. 4 See for instance E.R. Dodds, Proclus. The Elements of Theology. pp. 257–258; H.D. Saffrey – L.G. Westerink, Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, III, pp. xi–xiv. 5 Philebus, 15b1–2. 6 It is evident that this character belongs to the discussion about the articulated dialectical relationship of the “One” with the “Infinite”, which is the central theme of the Philebus and would later become the core of mature mathematical trends in the Academy, mainly through the discussion about the relationship of the “One” with the “indefinite Dyad”, as the source of the eternal multiplicity. 3

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ἐστιν ἑκάστη καὶ ὂν τι οὖσα καὶ ζωὴ καὶ εἶδος νοερόν˙ ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν παραγόμενα καὶ τὰς σειρὰς ἃς ὑφεστᾶσιν ἑνάδες˙ πληθύνεται γὰρ τὰ μετ’ αὐτὰς γινόμενα ἀπὸ ἀμερίστων ἐκείνων”. 7 According to this interpretation, the term “Forms” is used with two meanings. They are called “Monads” when they are examined as realities related to the One and project a version, which is evidently the leading one, of the metaphysical multitude. In a way, they are numerical cores with a clear ontological content. On the other hand, they are called “Henads” when they consist, as primary units, as the productive causes of the multitude of particular beings. These are evidently the natural beings, according to Plato, which are divided into different groups. In any case, they explain how the multitude is an initially metaphysical condition, without setting aside unity, even to a minimum degree. These are two functions – meanings which absolutely describe the ontological articulation which will follow. The multitude depicts the infinite richness of unity, since static monism is clearly absent. The metaphysics of transcendence, without being altered in any respect, posits the terms of the metaphysics of immanence. However, as is permanently stressed, unity is preserved, in specific bifurcations, in the totality of ontological conditions, independently from the level to which they belong. Conclusively, through his analysis and interpretation Proclus introduces us – in an indirect but also clear way – to his theory about the Henads, thus justifying its necessity for the construction of his ontological system. The Neoplatonist philosopher has received this theory in the framework of the history of philosophy from Plato, for two evident reasons: First, in order to justify his own proposal based on relevant positions of a philosophical authority. It should be mentioned, however, that he himself says that his own teacher Syrianus was the first who systematically constructed this theory. 8 Secondly, in order to avoid reprimands that In Platonis Parmenidem, 880.30–38. The same interpretation is repeated by Damascius in his treatise In Platonis Philebum, 44.1–3. 8 Theologia Platonica, III, 13.6–14.3. Cf. H.D. Saffrey – L.G. Westerink, Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, III, pp. li–lxxii. Cf. J.J. Cleary, “The role of mathematics in Proclus’ theology”, Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, Les 7

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he moves outside the framework of Platonic orthodoxy (which he has to follow as the Head of the Academy), in terms of regularization, on a first level at least. Thus he is presented as the follower of a tradition which is present both concurrently as well as in the historical past. In fact, he attributes to the Henads an ontological, and, consequently, a productive priority over the Forms, since he considers the Henads to be beyond substance, while he attributes the property of substance to the Forms, in its metaphysical dimension, of course, i.e. that which is not subject to evolution according to the imposed constitutive terms: “Οὐκ ἄρα ἐπιταράττειν δεῖ τοῖς περὶ τῶν θεῶν λόγοις τοὺς περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν, οὐδὲ τὸν τῶν μερικῶν εἰδῶν διάκοσμον εἰς ταὐτὸν συγχεῖν πρὸς τὰς θείας ἑνάδας, ἀλλὰ θεωρεῖν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν τοὺς θεοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τοῦ πλήθους αὐτοὺς καθ’ ἑαυτούς”. It should be noted that he himself is clear as to the position that every metaphysical entity – independently from its field from the point of view of the definition by the One – perceives its initial characteristics without alterations. This is a clear example of the way he adapts the Platonic theories to the theological and strictly henological dimensions of his philosophical system. 9 It is a system which depends to a large extent on the careful structural elaboration of the hierarchical elaborations. The structure goes together with “being”, in its wider sense, without the intervention of a certain time period between them. However, the presence of space and, therefore, extension is inconceivable in the metaphysical world. The “extension” has the form of oneness. Belles Lettres, Paris 2000, pp. 78–79, where it is shown that Proclus approaches the task of access to the One and the henads through analysis and demonstrarion, claiming also that such things are proved through the Second Hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides. Yet the outstanding question facing Proclus is whether the assumption that the “one in us” can be brought into contact with the One itself can be justified epistemologically. In this respect, he distinguishes a genuine science of dialectic, which is the basis for Platonic theology, from ordinary dialectical argumentation such as one finds in Aristotle. 9 In Platonis Parmenidem, 811.25–31.

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Proclus stresses, in particular, that the beings which derive from the Henads are in an indissoluble unity, based on the instrumental relationship among them as defined by the factor of the existence of all in all. This reciprocity takes place within the frame of absolutely equal powers in the field of the suprasubstantial. On the other hand, among the Forms there have been some differentiations, which means that unity is somehow restricted. In particular, he holds that, in conformity with its own way, each Henad contains in itself all other Henads. This complex coexistence – horizontally, of course – is due to the fact that among them there is a particularly strong unity as a result of their unitary emanation from the One, despite the peculiarity of each one of them. This coexistence, articulated on many levels, is initially in the condition of an indissoluble unity and expresses the second One, i.e. the productive aspect of the transcendent One before its own manifestation. 10 This unity is preserved during the process of the production of divine entities, but gradually receives new ontological identities in accordance with the level of production and the terms consecutively imposed by the metaphysical principle: “All things are in all things, but in each according to its proper nature”. 11 Each new ontological identity, however, does not influence at all the structure of the henads, but depicts a particular way by means of which, according to the supreme ontological presuppositions, it has been defined that it should be manifested. This way develops through the successively emanated divine entities. In contrast, concerning the Forms, the relation of coexistence is significantly restricted and their communion is defined by its ontological degradation because of participation. This declining development expresses the hierarchies processed in some cases: “Πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἑνάδες ἐν ἀλλήλαις εἰσὶ καὶ ἥνωνται πρὸς ἀλλήλας, καὶ πολλῷ μείζων ἡ ἕνωσις ἐκείνων τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσι κοινωνίας καὶ ταυτότητος… πᾶσαι γὰρ εἰσὶν ἐν πάσαις, ὃ μὴ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι˙ ταῦτα γὰρ μετέχει μὲν ἀλλήλων, πάντα δὲ On the importance of the second One in Neoplatonism, see P. Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus, I, Paris 1968, pp. 297–306. 11 Institutio theologica, pr. 103, p. 92.13: “πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, οἰκείως δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ”. Cf. J. Trouillard, L’Un et l’âme selon Proclos, pp. 76–77. 10

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ἐν πᾶσιν οὐκ ἔστιν”. 12 What is also interesting is his claim that unity is ontologically superior to identity, since the former denotes the absolute perpetual condition with no hierarchies, while the latter denotes the superior relationship of an entity with itself and its communion with the rest in terms of a developing otherness, as well. In the second case the evolution is evident and enhances the multitude to such an extent that the construction of the world of sense-experience is feasible. This perspective is not absent from the former, but is present in terms of including everything in an absolute way. Of course, it should be noted that the presence of unity in any ontological field is not abolished, but is expressed by means of particular identities and the cases of otherness among themselves. Proclus argues that the initial presence of the Forms is placed in the third triad of the Being, i.e. the first term of his famous triad “Being-Life-Intellect” (Ὄν-Ζωή-Νοῦς). 13 The full internal distinction-division of the Being, i.e. the development of its internal richness, which takes placed within its third triad, results in the development of the Forms. Due to this emanation, each Form does not belong to the level of the first Being, but is a τί ὄν, i.e. it is part of a particularized multiplicity of the primary and absolute Being. 14 Since the Forms do not belong to the multiplicity of beings, they cannot appear in the first triad of the Being, because it is exactly there where the first metaphysical reality develops in its full unity, In Platonis Parmenidem, 1048.11–21. For the content of this triad, see Institutio theologica, pr. 101–103, pp. 90.17–92.29. Cf. E.R. Dodds, Proclus. The Elements of Theology, pp. 252– 254; W. Beierwaltes, Proklos. Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik, pp. 93–118; P. Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus, I, pp. 213–246 and 260–272. According to Proclus, Being corresponds to the intelligible (or the intelligible gods), Life to the intelligible-intellectual (or the intelligible-intellectual gods) and Intellect to the intellectual (intellectual gods). See Theologia Platonica, IV, 10.21–13.18. There is a hierarchical gradation among the three terms: Being is first, Life is second and Intellect is third. This priority is determined also by their productive-archetypal function. See Institutio theologica, pr. 101, p. 90.17–31. 14 Theologia Platonica, III, 51.20–22; In Platonis Timaeum commentarii, I, 448.6–10. 12 13

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as repetition, in terms of the absolute unity which is possessed by the One and the henads. 15 They can neither appear in the second triad, where the power distinguishes and develops the multitude, without itself being a multitude. 16 Consequently, the Forms manifest themselves in the field of the third triad, having being as a property defining them as an essential accident in a sense, and consisting beings with a particular archetypal reference. 17 On the other hand, the context makes it clear that the absolute remaining within unity would deter any evolution. The relativisms are introduced here not in order to damage unity, but in order to show how it is gradually perceived, so that by means of any new specifications belonging to it, it increasingly develops the possibilities of its production. The Neoplatonist philosopher bases the ontological priority of the first Being over the Forms on the principle which he himself adopts, that the productive cause is superior to the paradigmatic. The first Being is definitely and univocally the transcendent cause, in the sense that it produces, in an accordingly specific way, all entities which follow its presence, bestowing the property of existence exclusively on them. This is a bestowment which takes place in a general way and does not become particular at least in an evident way, but only through the intervention of the addition of the paradigmatic cause, which is perceived mainly as formative. Undoubtedly, the Forms are productive causes, since the ability to produce Theologia Platonica, III, 83.20–86.14. Op. cit., III, 86.16–89.2. Cf. L. Siorvanes, “The problem of Truth in the Platonic Theology”, Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, pp. 51 and 58, where it is stated that Proclus posits intellection in the second intelligible triad, participating directly in its intelligible object, prime being. What joins unity (as essence) with being (as activity) in mutual participation, is a power between them. For the general conceptual frame of this topic, see G. van Riel, “Ontologie et Théologie. Le Philèbe dans le troisième livre de la Théologie Platonicienne de Proclus”, ibid., pp. 409–410. Concerning the way Damascius utilizes Proclus’ views here, see J. Combès, “La théorématique de la Théologie Platonicienne de Proclus d’ après Damascius”, ibid., p. 449. 17 Op. cit., III, 51.22–27. Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentarii, I, 238.5– 240.12. 15 16

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– according to Proclus – characterizes all divine entities till the end of metaphysical evolution. 18 Primarily, however, they are paradigmatic causes, a property meaning that they attribute to the produced beings the specific qualities and the analogies among them, i.e. they form them as particular existences. In other words, through their distinctive function, despite the relationship among them, they define the particular content of the objects of the archetypal reference. The bestowment of qualities and analogies is a transition from something simple to something composite or from indiscernible unity to variety, which, however, is not at all far from unity. At the same time, it indicates the course from the Being of the first triad, which is independent of categorical definitions, to the particular in each case definition of the “metaphysical” process of the third, i.e. from substance to predicate, as the particular essential property, as the new specific mode of existence. This transition expresses, at the same time, the potentially internal variety of the primary Being, which, through the archetypal function of the Forms, becomes actuality: “Τὰ μὲν εἴδη παραδείγματα καλεῖται τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ ὄν αἴτιον τῶν μετ’ αὐτὸ πάντων, ἀλλ’ οὐ παράδειγμα˙ τῶν γὰρ διηρημένων κατὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ διαφόρους τῆς οὐσίας ἐχόντων τοὺς χαρακτῆρας αἴτια τὰ παραδείγματα.” 19 The Institutio theologica, pr. 25, p. 28.25–27: “Τὰ μετ’ ἐκείνην (sc. τὴν μίαν τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴν or τὸ Ἕν) διὰ τὴν τελειότητα τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἄλλα γεννᾶν ἐπείγεται καταδεέστερα τῆς ἑαυτῶν οὐσίας”. In the same sentence (p. 30.9) the transferrable property of production is presented as deriving from imitation, since every secondary cause produces imitating the One. Therefore, by analogy it transmits not only existence, but unity. 19 Theologia Platonica, III, 52.3–5. Cf. Fr. Romano, “L’ idée de la causalité dans la Théologie Platonicienne de Proclus”, Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, p. 334, where Proclus’ use of the term αἴτιον is discussed. The distinction between the first Being and the Forms repeats, mutatis mutandis, the distinction between the One and the Henads. Cf. Institutio theologica, pr. 137, p. 120.31–122.6, where the One is presented as bestowing simple existence to the Being, whereas the Henads, as the suprasubstantial but productive powers of the One, define its ontological framework, properties and functions. These productive relations remind us, though clearly due to a different cause and following a different route, of 18

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formulations will start taking place only when the development of the multitude becomes possible, in terms of particularities of the initial unity, which of course will have been “damaged” on these levels as to being itself. This is the point where the initial forms of otherness, more correctly being characterized as internal distinction, which are necessary for production, begin to appear, i.e. as self-development without external additions. Referring to details in his analysis, Proclus argues that in the third triad of the Being there are four Forms: those of the gods, the angels, the demons and the mortal animals. These Forms are bestowed by the αὐτοζῷον, a term which denotes the Being according to Proclus’ interpretation of certain passages of the Platonic dialogue Timaeus. 20 The αὐτοζῷον, or the Self-Living, is the intelligible

the Aristotelian distinction between first and second substance (Categoriae, 5, 2a11–16). In Proclus’ system the Henads would correspond to the first substance, while the One would correspond to the second. The Forms would also correspond to the first, while the first Being would correspond to the second. Aristotle’s epistemological thought can be valid in the case of Proclus, as well, in the sense that if human consciousness had the same possibility concerning the metaphysical world, it would at first approach the Forms, the primary Being and the Henads. This is a sort of knowledge with no absolute character, based on the analogical reduction from the sensible to the intelligibles. From the point of view of ontological priority, however, the superiority of the One and of the primary being, in any given couple, cannot be doubted, as an expression of the superiority the unity possesses as to its internal “richness”, which it will manifest. 20 Theologia Platonica, III, 52.13–54.20. Here Proclus uses for the construction of his syllogisms terms from the Platonic Timaeus, a dialogue which has inspired him to make impressive philosophical, theological and scientific investigations. His commentary on this dialogue is arguably the most condensed work in ancient Greek literature both as to the branches it covers and as to the relationships among them. It mainly deals with how Metaphysics contructs Cosmology, on the basis of archetypal geometrical shapes and the archetypal numerical relations. Cf. J. Opsomer, “Deriving the three intelligible triads from the Timaeus”, Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, p. 365: “Proclus then, in the next chapter, points out that Plato calls the Living Being eternal (αἰώνιος) and that the model has being for all eternity. But to claim that it is eternal is equivalent to saying that it partici-

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archetype of the whole reality, which is produced after itself until the tangible entities, which, of course, possess the property of life. At the same time, it has ontological priority over the Demiurge; therefore, it does not communicate directly with the natural universe. Thus, on the basis of the principles of the intermediates, the Demiurge will apply to the sense-perceptible beings that which the Self-Living will have bestowed or assigned to him. The Self-Living contains the four general Forms of the immanent reality, while the Demiurge has to do with the multiplicity of their particularizations. 21 The Self-Living is characterized by unity of high degree, which does not give indications as to what is about to appear through analytical specializations. In contrast, multiplicity comes with the Demiurge, which means that we have the specialized projections of archetypal functions. Therefore, it is two different things to discuss a metaphysical property and to refer to its interventions, i.e. its immanence: “Ὧν γὰρ ἦν μονοειδῶς τὸ νοητὸν ζῶον ποιητικὸν ἅμα καὶ γεννητικόν, τούτων ὁ δημιουργός (…) διῃρημένος ἐκπληρώσατο τὴν αἰτίαν”. 22 The metaphysical orientation, which is characterized by mathematical exactness, is more pates in eternity; and what participates is always posterior to the participated; therefore the αὐτοζῷον is transcended by Eternity. And since the αὐτοζῷον exists for all eternity, it is completely filled with the power of eternity, which entails that it comes immediately after eternity (προσεχῶς). Analogously, the universe continuously and contiguously participates in time. Just as time measures the universe, eternity measures the existence of the αὐτοζῷον. Eternity then is the next level above the Living Being”. 21 Theologia Platonica, III, 53.1–15. Here reference is made particularly to the term αὐτοζῷον; therefore what is further shown is how it contributes to the productive process. Cf. J. Opsomer, “Deriving the three intelligible triads from the Timaeus”, in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, p. 361 and 364, where it is mentioned that the αὐτοζῶον is the third Intelligible Monad corresponding to all that lives. It is called eternal and living because it is filled with eternity and life from the principle superior to it. Thus, there is no living being before the αὐτοζῷον. 22 Theologia Platonica, III, 53.18–21. Cf. L. Gigineishvili & G. van Riel, “Ioane Petritsi: A witness of Proclus’ works in the school of Psellus”, in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, p. 584.

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than evident here. It permanently develops from the universal to those particulars which are its genuine manifestations. What derives, evidently, is that the exemplar which comes to the fore is teleological. The presence of the four supreme Forms in the Self-Living, according to which, as the primary exemplar of beings, it wholly produces the four supreme genera of beings, i.e. the gods, the angels, the demons and the mortals, leads Proclus to the formulation of the following question: On the one hand, these Forms undoubtedly preexist as primary paradigmatic causes in an indissoluble unity in the field of their universal common cause, the Self-Living, which is the primary paradigm of all beings. But, on the other hand, how does this cause particularize its effects through its productive-archetypal function? How is the transition from unity to multiplicity possible? The Neoplatonist scholarch shows his concern about the process, which plays a decisive role in the construction of his system, but does not come clearly to the fore as to the way it is realized. It should be clarified at this point that in his system the process possesses a leading ontological content and does not simply describe the transitions which take place. This particularization is evident in that the Self-Living produces gods, angels, demons and mortals, i.e. dissimilar entities with ontological differentiations among them. 23 This question does not simply refer to the reasons – as aims which follow – of the manifestation of the unity or the initial indistinctive coherence in particularized Forms. It also refers to how this transition is possible and through which processes, which should be justified by the condition of the metaphysical world. What is clearly present here is the concern about the way we should conceive “becoming” within the metaphysical Theologia Platonica, III, 96.24–97.15. Proclus’ Platonic sources here are Timaeus 39e7–40a2, Respublica 475e4 and Phaedrus 246d7. The same topics are discussed by the Neoplatonist philosopher in his works In Platonis Timaeum commentarii, III, 106.19–110.12 and In Platonis Parmenidem, 802.22–803.5, depending on the epistemological basis which plays the leading role in each treatise. Cf. L. Brisson, “La place des Oracles Chaldaïques dans la Théologie Platonicienne”, in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, p. 155. 23

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field. This is a research project with extreme risks, which, whenever they appear, the Neoplatonist scholarch attempts to face by means of the term “πρόοδος”. This term denotes an emanation which is realized through ontological gradations until the first Principle. In any case, however, “procession” means construction, as well. Proclus solves the problem, based on logical arguments and the real ontological content he attributes to theogonies. According to the logical explanation, 24 he stresses that it is not necessary for everything that is produced from a common cause to be called by the same name, since each individual entity participates in the essence of the cause in a particular way in terms of its quality and quantity. The sort of participation defines the naming and the primarily ontological differentiation among themselves of the particular Forms-archetypes. The principle of ontological hierarchy is evident. The variety of the differences is manifest when the Forms come out of their common cause and acquire their special productive-archetypal property concerning the order of entities, of which they are sources and leading principles: “Ἕκαστον γὰρ εἶδος ἡγεῖται σειρᾶς τινος ἄνωθεν ἀρχόμενον καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων ὑφιζάνον”. 25 This particularization of the Forms, which causes a gradual degradation of their productive-archetypal property, reaches the totality of divine beings following their presence. Thus, they appear in each divine rank, according to its own particular ontological content, functions and the relationships it itself develops. 26 Relativism is evident here and the combinations are widening to such a degree that they can explain the variety of the natural universe. What is particularly interesting is that the range of the Forms reaches the extreme limits of reality, so that the totality of senseperceptible beings is subject to the category of the axiologically positive, with the corresponding gradations of course. Theologia Platonica, III, 97.16–98.9. Proclus’ source here is Timaeus 42d5–e4, while the influences he has accepted from Aristotle (Categories, I, 1a, 6–12) as to the logical articulation of his thought are also clear. 25 Theologia Platonica, III, 97.20–21. 26 Op. cit., III, 98.5–9. 24

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Proclus bases the real explanation 27 on the theogonic processes of division-multiplication, which, as he argues, are developed in the third triad of Being, which corresponds to the category of “multitude” of the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides. By definition the multitude seems to be the source of multiplicative development, which will follow until the lower material entities. Here the “One Being” (Ἕν Ὄν) produces the Form of gods by means of its henological level (ἑνὸς ὄντος) and the Form of angels by means of its ontological level (ὄντος ἑνός). On the other hand, the “Being One” (Ὄν Ἕν) produces the Form of demons, by means of its henological level, and the Form of mortals by means of its ontological level. 28 This productive evolution presents a clearly hierarchical

Op. cit., III, 98.10–99.9. Concerning the way Proclus combines the Platonic dialogues Philebus and Parmenides in order to construct his views here, see G. van Riel, “Ontologie et Théologie. Le Philèbe dans le troisième livre de la Théologie Platonicienne de Proclus”, in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, p. 411: “la position du Philèbe dans l’elaboration du système reste inférieure à celle du Parménide. Car bien que selon les principes ontologiques du Philèbe chaque ὄν puisse être analysé, ceci ne se fait que d’une manière abstraite et générale. En effet, si l’on se limite à la thèse que “tout ὄν est un μικτόν de πέρας et d’ἀπειρία”, l’on devra nécessairement constater que tous les êtres sont identiques: chaque être, sans exception, est constitué de cette façon” [Translation: The position of the Philebus in the elaboration of the system remains inferior to that of the Parmenides. This is because, while, according to the ontological principles of the Philebus, every being can be analysed, that of the Parmenides is subject to analysis in an abstract and general way. In fact, if we remain with the position that “every ὄν is a μικτόν of πέρας and ἀπειρία”, we necessarily have to accept that all beings are identical: every being, without exception, is constructed this way]. We should stress, however, that this scholar attributes to the Parmenides a more integrated ontology than to the Philebus. Of course, we have to note that the first two Hypotheses of the Parmenides in Proclus’ view clearly have a more theological content than that of the Philebus. These Hypotheses are considered to refer to gods, while the Philebus describes the way of construction of natural beings. 28 According to Proclus, in the frame of the third triad of the Being, the One and the Being are interconnected through the intervening function of the power, so that the One acquires the form ἕν ὄν and the Being acquires the form ὄν ἕν (Theologia Platonica, III, 89.1–18). It should be not27

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ontological construction, where the principle of intermediate entities functions. In particular, in between the extreme orders, i.e. the gods and the angels, two intermediate orders appear, those of the angels and the demons. 29 The successive transition from one order to another follows the basic principle of the system of intermediates, which defines the ontological continuity of beings without any gaps. This means that everything is contained in everything else, while the hierarchy is preserved intangible. According to this principle, the prior ontological element of each entity is connected with the inferior element of the entity which is behind it, which evidented here that the term ἕν denotes the Henads, the productive effect of which is the Being (or the true beings). Also, the philosopher holds that the One and the Being are interconnected throughout the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides and construct a hierarchical gradation. See op. cit., I, 47.2–55.9. Unity contributes to the appearance of the Being and to its revelation through its particular presences. What permanently exists is manifest as a unitary source of any reality. The concept of existence reduces primarily to unity. Cf. A.J. Festugière, “Notes critiques sur le livre I de la Théologie Platonicienne”, in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, p. xxxiv; S. Gersh, “Proclus’ theological methods. The programme of Theol. Plat. I 4”, in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, pp. 20, 23; F. Romano, “L’idée de causalité dans la Théologie Platonicienne de Proclus”, in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, p. 332. 29 For a systematic presentation of the above theogonies, see H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink, Proclus, Théologie platonicienne, III, p. 148. By the term “Henology” we refer to the theories about the One and the Henads, while the term “Ontology” has to do with the true beings (or the Being). Concerning the term “Henology”, see E. Gilson, L’ être et l’essence, Vrin, Paris 1948, p. 42; R. Schürmann, “L’ hénologie comme dépassement de la métaphysique”, Les études philosophiques, 1982 (No 3), pp. 331–350. Henology is the theory about those leading theological realities-conditions, which transcend human thought and, only in terms of theoretical economy, can belong to conceptual categorical schemes. This is the clause of absolute or radical transcendence. Cf. É. Bréhier, “L’idée du néant et le problème de l’origine radical dans le néoplatonisme grec”, Études de philosophie antique, Paris 1948, pp. 248–283, where the author basically articulates a strict systematic elaboration, with careful specializations, of the history of the Neoplatonic School on this most important topic.

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ly has the tendency for such a connection. In any case, it has derived from the reality with which it has the tendency to be (re)connected. This connection appears towards the end of the progress of emanation: “Αἱ τῶν δευτέρων ἑνώσεις οὐκ ἄδηλον ὅτι συνεγγίζουσι τῷ πλήθει καὶ τῇ προόδῳ τῶν ὑπερκειμένων”. 30 We see here a conjunction and an interchange between the two terms, ἓν and ὂν, something which is also established in that “οὗ μὲν τὸ ὂν ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος ἐστὶ μέρος, οὗ δὲ τὸ ἓν ὂν τοῦ ὄντος ἑνός, καὶ οὗ μὲν ἐστιν ἕνωσις οὐσιώδης, οὗ δὲ οὐσία ἑνοειδής”. 31 However, their hierarchical articulation is not abolished, since the dominant role of unity is indisputable. All this applies, provided that the distinction of the Being has been completed, as self-development, and that the One and the Being have developed respectively into unitary multitude and multitude of beings. 32 Thus, the dialectics between unity and multitude has placed its principles and prepares their particularizations for the construction of the world of tangible experience, in terms of articulation and functionality. This world knows that it cannot “avoid” unity, even though it “takes pride” in its ability to achieve multiplicity. The last point, which needs to be clarified, for the sake of structure, is why Proclus considers that the Self-Living produces four Forms, but no more or less. It should be parenthetically noted that for the Neoplatonist philosopher – who permanently follows the initial tradition of the Academy – the Numbers consist in a primary and paradigmatic ontological reality. Approaching the topic numerically, he argues that the tetrad of Forms is distinguished into a monad and a triad. 33 This distinction is due to the fact that the tetrad corresponds, mutatis mutandis, to the four supreme ontological principles, the One, the Finite, the Infinite and the Mixture. 34 The first Form corresponds to the One, while the following Theologia Platonica, III, 99.3–4. Op. cit., III, 99.6–8. 32 Op. cit., III, 89.16–17. 33 Op. cit., III, 65.14–66.20. Proclus’ sources here are Timaeus’ passages 30a and 40a. 34 Concerning the ontological principles “Finite-Infinite-Mixture” in Proclus, see Institutio theologica, pr. 89–96, pp. 82.1–86.7; Theologia Platonica, 30 31

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three correspond in turn to the Finite, the Infinite and the Mixture. Since the One, as supreme and transcendent principle, does not belong to the same level with the other three, this is why the Forms are distinguished into a monad and a triad. They repeat the hierarchical structures of the four principles and extend, by means of their productive-archetypal functions, until the extreme manifestations of tangible beings. Therefore, it is clear that there is no entity, irrespective of its position in the hierarchical climax, with no echoes from these principles, which it manifests in its own particular way. Thus, the fourth Form “τῇ τοῦ μικτοῦ φύσει προσήκουσαν καὶ θεοὺς ἀπογεννῶσαν τοὺς τὸ τέλος συνέχοντας τῶν ὅλων μονίμως καὶ κρατοῦντας τοῖς ἐσχάτοις εἴδεσι τὴν τῆς ὕλης ἀμορφίαν καὶ τὴν ἑστίαν τῶν ἐγκοσμίων εἰς ἓν τὸ τοῦ παντὸς κέντρον συνερείδοντος, ἀπὸ γὰρ τῆς πρωτίστης οἷον ἑστίας τῶν ὄντων ὑποστάντες καὶ τήνδε τὴν ἑστίαν αὐτοὶ μονίμως ἀφορίζουσιν”. 35 It should be mentioned here that the discussion about the mixture sheds light on the final compositions which have taken place in the metaphysical world, through the multiple combinations between the Finite and the Infinite, and also on the relationship of the Mixture with the components of the world of tanIII, 30.15–40.8. It should be noted that in the second treatise the topic is dealt with much more systematically than in the first. Cf. E.R. Dodds, Proclus, The Elements of Theology, pp. 246–250; J. Trouillard, L’Un et l’âme selon Proclos, pp. 69–77; W. Beierwaltes, Proklos. Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik, pp. 50–60. 35 Theologia Platonica, III, 66.20–26. Cf. H.J. Blumenthal, “Plotinus and the Platonic Theology of Proclus”, in A.P. Segonds et alii (eds.), Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, Leuven University Press, Belles Lettres, Paris 2000, p. 173; J. Opsomer, “Deriving the three intelligible triads from the Timaeus”, in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, p. 366. According to H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink’s comment: “Le foyer de tous, les êtres encosmiques, c’est évidemmente in terre; en effet dans le système de Ptolemée, la terre est à l’univers ce que le foyer est à la maison” (Théologie Platonicienne, III, p. 136 [Translation: The main entrance of everything, i.e. the intramundane beings is evidently on earth; indeed, in Ptolemy’s system the earth is for the universe that which the main entrance is for the house]). Evidently, here the speech is mythical and narrative.

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gible experience. This relationship, in fact, is nothing more than the tangibility of the metaphysical processes. Proclus’ system is clearly monistic. His clear position about “πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, οἰκείως δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ” should not escape our attention, if we aim at describing exactly what takes place in his system. At the same time, the divine bestowments also become immanent concerning the inferior ontological condition, i.e. matter, which thus acquires its own positive axiological sign. In fact, it owes its presence to the fact that it initially is the bearer (and composite expression) of the Forms. It has become clear now that the third triad of the Being has all presuppositions for emanations-productions, which multiply during their evolution. Of course, the production of tangible beings does not take place immediately by this triad, because everything in its field still exists in a unitary way and has not yet been fully particularized or has not yet manifested their full particularization. This process will be completed when the Forms have gone through the other levels of divine beings and will have acquired the totality of properties, which are necessary for the construction of the new ontological reality. “Εἰ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ (sc. the third triad of the Being) τὰ πρωτουργὰ παραδείγματα, δῆλον ὡς ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἡ τῶν δευτέρων ἄρχεται διακόσμησις˙ καὶ εἰ ζῷόν ἐστιν ἁπάντων ζῴων ὑποστατικόν, πᾶν μὲν τὸ ψυχικὸν πλάτος, πᾶν δὲ τὸ σωματικὸν ἐντεῦθεν ἔχει τὴν πρόοδον, καὶ περιέχει τῶν τε ζωογονικῶν πάντων διακόσμων καὶ τῶν δημιουργικῶν τὰς νοητὰς αἰτίας”. 36 Here, the hierarchy dominates every level of evolution, while all that has preceded exists within each being. At this point it should be clarified that whatever appears in the lower entities exists within the superior ones, but with the difference that in the superior entities it exists in a causal (“κατ’ αἰτίαν”) way, while in the lower entities it exists in a substantial (“κατ’ οὐσίαν”) way. The evolution from one condition to another takes place in the form of participation (“κατὰ μέθεξιν”), which is defined in two ways, as bestowment and reception. We may conclude that Proclus places the Forms on a level below the one they possess in Plato’s work. The Neoplatonist philosopher introduces the Henads and the first two triads of the Being 36

Theologia Platonica, III, 67.13–19.

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between the One-Good and the Platonic Forms. Thus, he restricts the absoluteness of the Platonic Ontology, an attempt which cannot be explained unless we examine it from his theological viewpoint, and, consequently, the priority he attributes to the One and the Henads over the Being, as the supreme archetype of the rest of the metaphysical and natural world which is produced. In particular, Proclus, who lives in an era of mysticism, theurgy and rituals, gives a theological character to his own work, appropriate for the initiated. 37 At the same time, he aims at including classical Ontology in the frame of his religious Henology, so that any theological argumentation is not possible without a permanent reference to henological presuppositions. 38 Thus, in his treatises it is absolutely normal for the Being to depend ontologically on the One and the Henads. In any case, independently of the devaluation of the Forms, there is no doubt that Proclus attributes a real content to them, as he moves within the frame of a consistent Realism, which posits clear epistemological obligations concerning the way the world of tangible experience is approached. The objective existence of the Forms establishes the presence of the natural universe in perpetuity. All that which follows in the next chapters presupposes the content of this chapter to an absolute degree. The Neoplatonist scholarch will gradually start moving from theology to philosophy, without marginalizing the theological axiomatic premises. The next chapters, which will be articulated as a series progressively leading to the distinction of philosophy, are to a large extent ways of speciConcerning the presence of mysticism in Proclus’ work and Neoplatonism in general, see P. Bouancé, “Théurgie et télestique néoplatonicienne”, Revue de l’ histoire des religions, 147 (1955), pp. 189–209, a study distinguished for the critical examination both of the primary texts and of the secondary bibliography. Cf. Also R.M. van den Berg, “Towards the Paternal Harbour. Proclean Theurgy and Contemplation of the Forms”, Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, pp. 425–443. 38 H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink, Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, III, pp. lvii–lviii; A.C. Lloyd, Procession and division in Proclus. Soul and the structure of Being in late Neoplatonism, Syrianus, Proclus and Simplicius, Liverpool University Press 1982, pp. 37–38. 37

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fication of the theological principles, that is, how man comprehends and implements them philosophically and scientifically. However, there is a pressing question for the historian of philosophy: Does Proclus utilize the theory about the indefinite Dyad, which had occupied research as an issue of intense debate during the first period of the Academy? Do the Henads represent the indefinite Dyad, the independent way through which the divine unity manifests itself in a multiplicative way? The answer can now be affirmative, at least as to the function of the henads.

3. FORMS AND NUMBERS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

One of the most important topics examined by Proclus in the framework of his theory about the Forms is their relationship with Numbers. Numbers are seen neither as mathematical entities nor as counting units, as they are supposed to have an ontological existence. In fact, they belong to the category of superior intermediate realities, evidently with all functions deriving from such a property, as, for instance, is the archetypal. We include this chapter immediately after that referring to the henads, which in a way consist of the initial numerical projection of the One. Numbers will show how this projection will be specialized by means of multiplication and will present one of the ways of the expanding development of the metaphysical world, to which the Forms will contribute through their presence as well. It should be mentioned here that this subject has not been dealt with extensively in philosophical research, even though it belongs to one of the most important topics already since the foundation of the Academy. The most systematic approaches were those by Annick Charles-Saget (L’architecture du divin, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1982, pp. 189–296) and S. Gersh (From Iamblichus to Eriugena, E.J. Brill, Leiden 1978, pp. 102–105, 139–141). Charles-Saget has extensively and systematically examined the relationship between mathematics and ontology both in Plotinus’ and Proclus’ philosophical systems. It is most interesting that, based on the latter’s texts, she identifies the distinction between mathematical Ontology as a structure of the metaphysical and physical universe and mathematics as a science of the objects, which exist inside this structure. She has also stressed that Proclus does not use an ontological mathematical method and a mathematical ontological one, as descriptive of reality, but a mathematical method of ontology as well as an ontological method of mathematics, thus leading to a clearly 51

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theoretical-systematic field. This distinction, through the particular relationships of the two branches, is important, mainly because the first couple of methods refer to a condition that has to do with a truly existing property. The second couple refer to a special way of approach selected by the scientist, who is an independent thinker to a certain degree, as he does not accept the domination of the idealistic approach. The scientist is a researcher who defines his method according to what is included in the objective reality. He simply judges that he has to utilize his intellectual possibilities to the highest degree so as to make his theoretical research easier. Charles-Saget starts from the position that mathematical beings are between what remains indivisible, i.e. the metaphysical, and what is divided, i.e. the natural. This view, the source of which is to be found in the struggle between Platonists and Aristotelians during the first period of the Academy, is found, according to CharlesSaget, in Proclus’ works Institutio theologica and In primum Euclidis Elementorum librum commentarii. It should be mentioned that the difference between the above works and the Theologia Platonica has to do, to a certain degree according to the researcher, with the underlying theoretical premises. However, some other details have not been properly clarified. In particular, in the Theologia Platonica Numbers are discussed with reference to their initial appearance on the upper metaphysical levels as self-subsistent entities, and what is stressed is their ontological productive and archetypal character. We shall deal with this topic in this chapter. In the other two works, however, what is examined is the structural and scientific function of mathematics, from an epistemological point of view. S. Gersh, on the other hand, refers to passages from the Theologia Platonica, which we shall study as well, but his general remarks are useful as his study is a landmark concerning the relationship between Neoplatonism and Christianity. Our aim is to identify in detail the place of Numbers in the frame of metaphysical Ontology according to Proclus and their relationship with species, in particular. These relationships further contribute to the specialized articulation of the metaphysical world and to the detailed formulation of archetypal terms for the construction of the world of sense experience, by means of strict structures. The Neoplatonist philosopher introduces his own theory about Numbers; one which is not to be found in the works of his predecessors. Since the basic tenets of this theory are absent from

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the Platonic texts, this means that Proclus is original compared to the philosopher who inspired him, or is differentiated from him. We propose that the introduction of this theory, in accordance with the specific way it is constructed, derives from the structure of his own ontological system and more specifically from his intention to devaluate the position of the species in its articulation in the metaphysical climax. The subordination of traditional Ontology to Henology was a demand on behalf of the Neoplatonic School and Proclus implemented it consistently and attributed extreme culminations to it. As we will try to show, Numbers are the cohesive and specific projections of the supreme principle, the One-Good, and through this property they define with a structural exactness the Forms and “collaborate” with them in their activities, both for the definite development of the metaphysical world and for the formation of the sources from which the world of sense experience will be produced. In any case, their ontological status does not at all exclude their mathematical scientific function on a second level. However, primarily they define nature (Platonism) and secondarily they describe it theoretically by means of exact conceptual frames and relationships (Aristotelianism). Given this succession, we would say that Proclus mainly agrees with Xenocrates, the third scholarch of the Academy, who continued Plato’s attempt to establish the theory of the eidetic Numbers. In particular, it is those Numbers which have an archetypal character, are structurally immanent in the natural beings and can be the object of scientific research. 1 As happens with the theory of Forms, similar to the theory of Numbers, the last important phase before Proclus corresponds to his own teacher Syrianus, who follows the general directions of Xenocrates and the Pythagorean and the Neopythagorean tradition. Syrianus, too, insists on the distinctions between the One and the indefinite Dyad, the former term denoting unity and the latter denoting the multitude of Numbers as initial monads which are multiplied. Each Number here is conceived as an initial ontological It should be noted that Xenocrates added an eidetic content to geometrical shapes as well. In relation to this, see fragments 122–154 of the relevant doxographical tradition. 1

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nucleus, which is the source for the successive production of a series of similar beings. It should be noted that he particularly insists on the ontological-eidetic character of Numbers, but this does not mean that he disregards their scientific-mathematical function. Proclus receives Syrianus’ views and extends them further, mainly in his commentaries on the Platonic dialogues Parmenides and Timaeus. The length he devotes to the development of his analysis is indeed impressive. Our position is that Proclus brings in the totality of the conclusions of the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides, which he approaches in a way pertaining to theogony and ontogenesis. If we follow these two commentaries and his treatise Theologia Platonica, we will be led to the estimation that he presents an extensive development of the notion of divine emanation, which, in his own view, is specified by each particular conclusion with reference to the ontological category he deals with. He argues that the first three conclusions, which correspond to Being, form the presuppositions for the development of the metaphysical numerical multitude, while in the other eleven conclusions this multitude appears with its particularities. In the fourth, fifth and sixth conclusions, which correspond to Life, the Neoplatonic scholarch mainly exposes the content of Numbers in itself before their eidetic-formative interventions. Finally, it should be noted that Proclus does not particularly insist on using the term “indefinite Dyad” (“ἀόριστος δυάς”), which he usually replaces by the term “infinite” (“ἄπειρον”), denoting the continuous successive emanations of the Supreme Principle. However, independent of this linguistic particularity, the content of his relevant analysis leads us to what is included in the notion of indefinite Dyad and its presence in the historic development of the Platonic Academy. Namely, it is the Dyad which develops by means of multiplication, without any diminution of its unity. That is, it bestows unity in each case in a specific way.

NUMBERS AND THE FIRST TRIAD OF “LIFE”

In the fourth Book of his treatise Theologia Platonica, Proclus clearly correlates his theory about the Forms with his theory of Numbers on the basis of general principles defining the totality of particularizations. This book is perhaps the most systematic text of the Neoplatonist scholarch with reference to those rules which explain the necessity of seeking refuge in Numbers, in order to understand the construction of the metaphysical world aiming at production. The

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philosopher systematically elaborates his theory of Numbers in the paragraphs dealing with the fourth conclusion of the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides. 2 According with his views about theogony, this conclusion – which is called a “Number” – philosophically corresponds to the first triad of “Life” or the “intelligibleintellectual” gods, i.e. it follows the full development of “Being”, which is the first principle after the Henads. Since the theory of Numbers is of great importance for the Ontology of the Pythagoreans, Plato and the members of the Academy, Proclus deals exclusively with this triad. 3 In his metaphysical system, the first triad of “Life” is presented as the continuation of the third triad of “Being” or the intelligible gods, which he calls a “multitude”. A “Number” is a multitude (but not an intelligible one) and develops distinctions inside it. These distinctions contribute to the development of otherness within itself as a transition to a new reality and not as a radical differentiation from that which initially existed. It is mainly J. Trouillard who has noticed that similar views are shared by Theon of Smyrna and Moderatus. 4 Otherness here differentiates “Life” from “Being”, in the interior of which there is power, which, of course, is the source for the development of the multitude, without itself being multitude. Even though this power distinguishes and divides the beings through its processes, its main mission is finally to connect them, so in a way it serves the initial unity, which, however, is thus presented so as not to be inflexible. Theologia Platonica, IV, 80.24–102.20. In this conclusion (Parmenides, 143a4–144e7) Plato presents the “One” as being “many” to an infinite degree, even though it is interwoven with “Being” in such a way, that it is distributed in a multiple way among beings. 3 Op. cit., IV, 80.24–89.5. According to Proclus, the “Being” (Ὄν) corresponds to the “intelligible” (νοητόν), the “Life” (Ζωή) to the “intelligible-intellective” (νοητόν–νοερόν) and the “Intellect” (Νοῦς) to the “intellective” (νοερόν). See op. cit., IV, 10.21–23.18. There is a hierarchical gradation among the three terms. The first one is the Being, the middle one is the Life and the last one is the Intellect. This order is set according to their productive-archetypal range. See Institutio theologica, pr. 101, p. 20.17– 31. Also W. Beierwaltes, Proklos. Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik, pp. 93–118. 4 J. Trouillard, La mystagogie de Proclos, pp. 160–171. 2

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Inside “Being” exists the “Monad” and the “Dyad”, which correspond to the “Finite” and the “Infinite”. They are the first and transcendent principles both of Numbers and of any other reality, and in these principles the multitude, as a possibility of a specific multiplication in each case, exists in a unified way. According to J. Trouillard, “Chaque nombre est un foyer d’unité. Il ne se rattache pas seulement à la monade par les nombres qui se placent entre lui-même et l’unité. Il détient en lui-même la source de laquelle il surgit et grâce à laquelle il se determine” [Translation: Every number is line of unity. It is not attached only with the monad through the numbers which are placed between itself and the unity. It preserves in itself the source through which it surges and due to which is is self-determined]. 5 Thus, the intelligible multitude is not a Number, since it does not accept distinctions or particular delineations, but exclusively an intelligible multitude. At the same time, according to the philosopher, the transcendent principles “Monad” and “Dyad” produce the monads and dyads, which are found to be in the “Number”, the “Number” itself as an archetype and the particular numbers in their totality as its developments-particularizations. In this production, which is of a transcendent order, otherness plays a part through its ability to cause distinctions, both universally and inside each entity. 6 The “Monad” should evidently consist in a manifestaJ. Trouillard, L’Un et l’âme selon Proclos, pp. 78–85. Theologia Platonica, IV, 81.17–20: “Oὔπω ἀριθμὸς τὸ νοητὸν πλῆθος, ἀλλὰ πλῆθος νοητὸν ἐν ταῖς μονοειδέσιν ἀρχαῖς νοητῶς ἱδρυμένον, ἐν μονάδι λέγω καὶ δυάδι, γεννητικῶς μὲν ἐν τῇ δυάδι, πατρικῶς δὲ ἐν τῇ μονάδι”. The presence of the Monad is related to the eternal preservation of unity as a universal principle. The appearance of the Dyad does not activate only the processes of production, but the particularization of unity through the formulation of new metaphysical entities. The dialectic which is developed here leads to compositions, even though prima facie it appears to lead to oppositions. The manifestation of the Dyad is possible after the necessary activation of the Monad, which it contains. It should be noted here that Proclus is clearly differentiated from Plotinus (Enneades, VI, 6, 9.35–10.5), who defines Number as the intermediate between the Being and the beings. Proclus clearly attributes to the Number a superior ontological status, and, therefore, we cannot but examine this ontolog5 6

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tion of unity, while the “Dyad” should manifest the multitude in which unity is its internal condition and which it particularizes. Here, too, the survivals of the Platonic unwritten theory about the One and the indefinite Dyad are most evident. According to Proclus, however, the first triad of “Life” derives not only from the third triad of “Being”, but also from the first, as it is produced in an analogous way. 7 On the other hand, however, even though it presents analogies with the first triad of “Being”, is not identified with it, as it is inferior to it. This hierarchy is due to the fact that even though in the field of the intelligible triad the “One” is in relation with the “Being”, i.e. the supreme condition of the metaphysical emanation comes to the fore, in the intelligible-intellectual triad we have the revelation of Otherness, which produces the multitude. 8 A general function is evidently attributed to “Being”, without reference to the specifications which will appear at a later stage. As it coexists in a direct relationship with the “One” it follows that it seminally includes what will derive. Following all this, whatever is united in “Being” will present its variety in the Number of “Life”, which derives from the “One” and the “Being” as its principles, but is not active in their interior. Thus, inside “Being” there exist the presuppositions of the Number, but within “Life” the multitude exists in a degraded mode, i.e. by means of participation or as a new bestowment, in the framework of a planning in progress. “Being” plays a mediating role in the whole process and consists in the source of otherness. As it ical reality in the frame of the scheme “Remaining-Procession-Reversion”. Undoubtedly, it must be characterized as self-subsistent, i.e. it should be formed by itself on the basis of the bestowments accepted from above. 7 Theologia Platonica, IV, 82.19–23. 8 Op. cit., IV, 82.26–83.5. According to H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink: “Avant toute différenciation, ni l’un ni l’être n’existent à part; le rôle de la relation, c’est-à-dire la Puissance, est alors seulement de construire la triade” (Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, Vol. IV, p. 176). Here, we would be far from reality if we argued that the power belongs both to the One and to the Being and that it is identical with the urge towards the development of the “perspectives” of their communication, which are principles for any deriving condition.

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contributes to the archetypically first relationship, it defines the specifications of the multitude. However, its initial co-presence with the “One” contributes to the integral preservation of its unity.

THE PROPERTIES OF THE FIRST TRIAD OF “LIFE” AND THE ARITHMETICAL RELATIONSHIPS IN PROCLUS’ MONISTIC SYSTEM

After this, Proclus presents the properties of the first triad of “Life” in his own view, which will evidently influence Numbers as well. The content of its properties depends on the fact that it itself is in an intermediate position between the “Being” and the “Intellect”. Thus, on the one hand, it produces, of course with the specific intervention of lower deities, which of course possess in their own way the property which it bestows, all that exists after its own subsistence till the level of matter, while it connects and combines everything. It possesses these two properties because inside it there exist the powers of the Dyad and the Monad. Through their projections they produce and accordingly connect immediately all beings which are inferior to the first triad of “Life”. 9 All this means that this triad unites even matter with the “Being”, and this is due to the monistic character of Proclus’ system, the main element of which is union both as condition and as a way of existence. The union of all beings takes place in a way which is not known to human beings. Therefore, negative theology dominates here. Simply, it can generally be formulated hypothetically or in a necessary analogy, on the basis of the functionality which is present in the natural universe. Thus, since this universe is produced by the metaphysical Theologia Platonica, IV, 84.18–22: “Πάντα μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπογεννῶν κατὰ τὴν τῆς δυάδος καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀρτίου φύσεως ἀπερίληπτον αἰτίαν τὰ προελθόντα πάλιν ἑνίζει καὶ συνελίσσει κατὰ τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὴν ταυτότητα τὴν περιττήν”. It is of interest that even though the cause qua cause is immanent, it is not contained as a whole in the effect. A certain area within itself remains imparticipated, an indication of the fact that the initial unity remains unviolated. This is also clearly a term for the totality of the following manifestations. 9

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one, the latter should possess the functions of the former to a greater degree of unity. Conclusively, this triad activates the powers of the “Being” and reverts the totality of beings to its own field. It functions as an intermediate factor of production and restoration applying the processes of “procession” and “reversion”. The distinction deriving from the activation of the Dyad does not lead to an infinite destruction, but returns to unity thanks to the permanent presence of the Monad. It is clear that the Monad and the Dyad repeat, mutatis mutandis, the functions of the Finite, which secures stability, and the Infinite, which nourishes multiplying development, respectively. Thus, there is a dialectical relationship between distinction and unity, “procession” and “reversion”, the productive power of the Dyad as Infinite and the unifying power of the Monad as Finite. Thus, the opposites are led to their composition, which is not at all a contradictory condition. What is more than evident here is the survivals of the dialogue Philebus and the unwritten Platonic teaching. All this is presented by H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink 10 in the following table of correlations, which was constructed in accordance with Proclus’ texts: 11 Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, vol. IV, p. 177. Theologia Platonica, IV, 84.25–85.13. Cr. d’Ancona stresses Syrianus’ influences on Proclus on this topic and, going through a brief historical examination of it, observes the following: “Syrianus soutient qu’il y a différence de degré entre les deux composants du couple des principes, le πέρας étant supérieur à l’ἄπειρον de par sa plus grande affinité vis-à-vis de la cause toute première, l’Un transcendant. Cette doctrine, qui va être reprise dans de nombreux passages de Proclus, est, à en croire Syrianus, attestée par Aristote lui-même. Selon ce dernier, en effet, tous les philosophes que l’on vient d’évoquer – les Pythagoriciens et Platon donc – ont appelé la plus divine des deux ἀρχαί “un”, alors qu’ils ont utilisé des noms variés pour l’autre principe: μέγα καὶ σμικρόν, ὀλίγον καὶ πολύ, ὑπερέχον καὶ ὑπερεχόμενον, ἄλλο, πλῆθος – il va sans dire que tous ces noms ne se réfèrent qu’à une réalité unique, la source de toute multiplicité: πανταχοῦ ἡ δυὰς αἰτία τοῦ πλήθους. C’est bien chez Aristote que Syrianus trouve toute prête son énumération des noms possibles de ce principe: il n’a plus qu’à contester l’inteprétation aristotélicienne pour avoir à sa disposition la véritable doctrine théologique des Anciens, dont il veut se faire le promoteur et qu’il lui revient d’expliquer à ses élèves” (“La doctrine des 10 11

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henad odd immutable realities creative realities indivisible class of demiurges encosmic beings endowed with intellect unified beings indivisible beings beings maintained in the causes

dyad even life-giving fertile divided creation deprived of reason

pluralised divided separated from the causes

It should be noted that the contents of the second list do not have the possibility to exist, without the precedence of those of the first. Thus, the dominant role of unity comes to the fore. At the same time, the Neoplatonist philosopher stresses that the Number realizes all its functions based on the powers it possesses. 12 These powers, however, do not appear here for the first time, but preexist in the Being. In any case, however, the manifestations do not take place as emanations of substance. The powers, as seminal nuclei, principes: Syrianus comme source textuelle et doctrine de Proclus”, p. 216 [Translation: Syrianus argues that there a difference as to ontological gradation between the two which construct the pair of principles, with the limit being superior to the infinite according to its particularly close affinity with the absolutely first cause, i.e. the transcendent One. This doctrine, which will be repeated in numerous passages in Proclus, has derived, following Syrianus’ reference, from Aristotle himself. According to the latter, indeed, all the philosophers he evokes, i.e. the Pythagoreans and Plato, have called the more divine of the two ἀρχαί as “one”, while they have used various names for the other principle: μέγα καὶ σμικρόν, ὀλίγον καὶ πολύ, ὑπερέχον καὶ ὑπερεχόμενον, ἄλλο, πλῆθος. Conclusively, all these names do not refer but to one sole reality, the source of all multitude: πανταχοῦ ἡ δυὰς αἰτία τοῦ πλήθους. Of course in Aristotle Syrianus finds the validation of his enumeration of these names for the particular principle. He had nothing else to do than doubt the Aristotelian interpretation in order to have at his disposition the true theological doctrine of the Ancients, which he wishes to introduce and to explain to his pupils]. Syrianus comments on a passage from the Metaphysica N1, 1087b12–27. 12 Op. cit., IV, 85.13–16.

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are activated productively through the activities of Number, which divide and unite the other inferior beings. The powers, therefore, have an initial character by itself before their own manifestation. They are transcendent with reference to their effects. These functions mean that the plan of production has been formed archetypically in the Being and expresses itself by means of the rules of mathematical logic, which are particularized according to the ontological formations. Each one of these rules is of course irrepeatable. Thus, both the metaphysical world and the world of sensible experience will be organized by means of arithmetical relationships, which are at the same time absolute conditions and productive powers. 13 In a system like that of Proclus this development cannot but depend on the rules of hierarchy as well and consequently of the mediations. Indeed, the Neoplatonist philosopher constructs a hierarchy of four Numbers, which derive from the archetypal Number and consist – evidently through their combinations – the cause of all beings. These Numbers are the following: (a) The intellectual Numbers, which bestow the species on the natural beings, which are ontologically inferior to them. They are universal and consist in the legislative principles of the processes of production. We would say that here what is formed is the general programming that which is about to be realized and the species are the tool for the formation of Numbers.

(b) The extramundane Numbers, which bestow life and limits on the immanent gods. They exist in the natural universe and preserve it eternally in its totality. We note parenthetically that Proclus in other research references uses a corresponding term concerning these gods. In particular, the term “enmattered species”, as depicting the complete condition of immanence, can be used for the next two following cases. (c) The heavenly Numbers, which define in detail the functions of the heavenly beings, i.e. the superior natural beings, which, as we 13

Op. cit., IV, 85.17–86.7.

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should note, are not subject to such destruction so as to be led to dissolution.

(d) The sublunary Numbers, which impose limits to the infinite and unstable matter through the Forms and the natural reasonprinciples, which have been constructed by them. Thus, the sensible beings acquire a certain content and are defined. 14 We would note that by means of the last three categories the metaphysics of immanence is founded in a cohesive way, the specifications of which are in the first category.

Proclus has already argued that the Numbers are related to the Forms. Their first relationship is that they collaborate for the production of tangible beings; 15 thus Proclus remains here as well consistent with the principles of the Academy. At this point Proclus brings to the fore Platonic doctrines on the topic in order to support his views and on their content he attempts at basing and continuing his own argumentation. He refers to the Respublica (546a7– b4), where it is argued that a perfect Number imposes limits on the period of the whole universe and also that some particular Numbers impose limits on the descent of the souls, while others on their ascent. It is also stated there that all Numbers in common contribute to the restoration-completion of the particular periods. The restoration theme is analyzed in the Phaedrus (248e5–249a5). He also refers to the view expounded in the Timaeus (37d6) that Time, which includes in a unitary way all psychic measures, develops according to the Number. For the Neoplatonist philosopher, however, all these will be valid, if the divine Number pre-exists all numbers, because this bestows the supreme cause, which adorns all beings. Concerning the cosmological dimensions attributed to the Numbers by Plato, Proclus argues that their unconditional and clear presupposition is their metaphysical cause. Through this expansion, he further fortifies the teleological model he adopts, the final divination of the natural world. It would be interesting if here he supported the view that what is meant is the “indefinite Dyad”, 14 15

Op. cit., IV, 87.5–7. Op. cit., IV, 87.20: “Πάντων ἀριθμοῖς καὶ εἴδεσιν ὑφισταμένων”.

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which, as leading Number, clearly has a superior ontological content compared to the Forms. But the problem that Ontology discusses with reference to Numbers and Forms, is which of these two realities has priority and superiority over the other, both in the field of metaphysics and in the production of tangible beings. It is a critical ontological matter, as it will specialise the form of the natural universe. Proclus starts his own exposition by saying that the Numbers – and not the first Number which is their source – appear in the first triad of the intellectual gods, or of the Intellect, but the Forms appear in the third triad of the intelligible gods or of Being. Thus, the Forms should have priority and superiority, as they derive from a field higher than that where the Numbers derive from. 16 This relationship is partly changed by the Neoplatonist scholarch, who stresses that it is phenomenal and not real and holds that the Numbers exist prior to the Forms. Explaining this refutation, he argues that the Numbers are beyond Substance, evidently of metaphysics, which is constructed after Being, while the Forms are not. Thus, every Form is also a Number. 17 This priority is due to the fact that the SelfLiving, from which the four categories of Forms derive, is an intelOp. cit., IV, 87.20–24: “Οἱ μὲν ἀριθμοὶ τὴν πρόοδον ἔλαχον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκρότητος τῆς νοερᾶς, τὰ δὲ εἴδη τὴν ἀπογέννησιν ἐκ τῶν νοητῶν ἔσχον εἰδῶν. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ τρίτῃ τριάδι τῶν νοητῶν τὰ εἴδη πρώτως, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρωτίστῃ τῶν νοερῶν οἱ ἀριθμοὶ πρώτως”. On the relationship of the Forms to the Numbers in Proclus and Syrianus, see S. Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, pp. 102–105, where we see the related passage: “Proclus’ argument is that, since Forms originate as a multiplicity within the Paradigm on the intellect of the hypostasis of Being, whereas numbers are produced within the three subdivisions (Being-Life-Intellect or Mind) of the hypostasis of Life, and since lower principles participate in all those terms which precede them in the emanative order of reality, although the reverse is not the case, then all numbers possess the characteristic of Forms by this participation, while some Forms are numerical and others not”. In this way, the participation or methexis is the criterion for the exact delineation of the ontological hierarchy. 17 Theologia Platonica, IV, 87.27: “Καὶ πρὸ τῶν εἰδῶν οἱ ἀριθμοί”. See also In Platonis Timaeum commentarii, III, 105.9–11. 16

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ligible Monad, which contains the universal Number in a mystical way. This Number develops and is particularized in the first intelligible-intellectual triad. 18 In accordance with the afore-mentioned doctrine, the Forms, as long as they derive from a cause superior to them – i.e. the SelfLiving – and are distinguished among themselves, are inferior to whatever exists in a unitary way in their own cause. At the same time, they are Numbers since they are subject to counting. In contrast, the unitary multitude, which exists in the cause, does not accept arithmetical definitions. The initial multitude, however, for Proclus does not denote counting, but defines the specifications for the development of the particular units from which the particular counted multitudes will derive. Thus, there are Numbers, which are found together with the Forms and before them. 19 The unitary Theologia Platonica, IV, 88.7–9: “Ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀκρότητι τῶν νοερῶν διακεκριμένως ὁ ἀριθμός, ἀνελίττων τὸν ἐν τῇ μονάδι κατ’ αἰτίαν καὶ ἑνοειδῶς προϋπάρχοντα”. The Number is not identical with unity, but with one of the ways of its manifestation and clearly reveals part of its infinite richness. 19 Op. cit., IV, 88.13–14: “Εἰσιν οἱ ἀριθμοὶ νοητοὶ μετὰ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ πρὸ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ κατὰ τὸν Παρμενίδην μετὰ τὸ πλῆθος ὁ ἀριθμός”. See also In Platonis Rempublicam commentarii, II, 16.3–74.26. Here we need to stress that the terms “multitude” and “Number” are repeated consecutively in all levels of the metaphysical world. This is a development which starts with simple unitary conditions and gradually is specifically advanced in a pyramid-like way. It also needs to be stressed that while Proclus develops some of his views about the Number, he criticizes Plotinus’ views as to the relationship between the Number and the intelligible archetype of animals, i.e. the Self-living. In particular, he attempts to refute the position of the leader of Neoplatonism that Number has an analogical priority to Self-living. The refutation is undertaken in the fourth book of the treatise Theologia Platonica (95.15–97.23). Proclus, following his positions about the hierarchical theogonies and about the correspondence of the Platonic ontological categories to the self-subsistent divine entities, places the Selfliving and the Number in the realm of divine hypostases. Based on this and while interpreting the Platonic dialogue Timaeus, he observes Plato attempting to specify the hypostasis of the divine exemplar of the whole 18

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multitude, which exists in the cause, is the Number of the Forms. This multitude particularizes its content in the field of “Life”. This particularization – a particularization of powers in a way – is necessary for the production of particular specifications of gods. These gods are the Forms, which consist of the archetypes of the sensible beings. We see here that Proclus devaluates the Forms from the point of view of Ontology. He constructs a system of Numbers, the functions of implementations of which are exercised by the Forms. In brief, the field of the “Being” contains the arithmetical and the architectural presuppositions of production, which are activated by the Forms, so that the divine can be connected with the tangible world in a special way. The Neoplatonist philosopher attributes a certain metaphysical content to Numbers. Thus, numerology does not describe Ontology externally, but is one of its immanent presuppositional elements. The Numbers, through their directly related definitions, show the domination of unity on all levels of the metaphysical realm. This position is an important contribution on behalf of Proclus to the theory of the Numbers within the framework of ancient Greek philosophy, as they are not perceived in terms of distinctions or isolated delineations. We would argue with certainty that Proclus is opposed to Aristotle, who attributed the implementation of the Number on everything that can sense-perceptible world, and argues that this reality develops in its interior the ontological presuppositions of every living existence which will appear. He calls this exemplar “Self-living” and argues that the four supreme paradigmatic Forms of the natural beings are presented in its realm for the first time. This is a topic which we will approach more analytically in a subsequent chapter. What is mainly of interest concerning this chapter is that Proclus deals with the relationship between the Self-living and the Number – mainly within his own theoretical directions – through a combination of the Platonic dialogues Timaeus and Parmenides. Namely he notes that the Self-living of the Timaeus corresponds to the category of “multitude”, which is the content of the third conclusion of the second hypothesis of the Parmenides. The estimation – which we could support here as well – is that Proclus exhaustively specifies the indefinite Dyad and includes in its content more conditions than those which he considers to develop in the metaphysical world.

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be counted rather than on everything that counts (Physica, IV, 219b). If he agreed with Aristotle’s position he would have to attribute simply a functionalistic or utilitarian property and place mathematics in the service of natural science. In his system what happens is exactly the opposite. Since the Numbers have an eidetic content, Mathematics becomes one of the constructive parts of metaphysical Ontology. Its concurrence with the first period of the Academy (Plato, Xenocrates) is evident here as well. Concerning this topic one should consult Proclus’ treatise In Platonis Timaeum commentarii, III, 9.23–28. At the same time we should stress that through the attribution of an arithmetical character to the divine, Proclus attempts at connecting philosophical numerology with religious theogony. It should be mentioned that in Plato there is absolutely no distinction among intelligible, intelligible-intellectual and intellectual gods. This effort on behalf of Proclus – which reflects the mentality of the representatives of the Neoplatonic School – constructs a complex theory about the world. This theory, even if it is perfectly constructed, probably leads human consciousness, and, of course, theoretical attempts at confusion. How could it offer solutions to human concerns regarding existential, social and political problems? Proclus, however, undertakes to propose solutions to such problems in his effort to connect the metaphysical Ontology with anthropological, moral and political problems in his commentary on the Platonic dialogues Respublica and Alcibiades Primus. He successfully showed how – without epistemological deviations – the practical reason is combined with the theoretical one, since they both deal in common with what was defined by the metaphysical archetypes. On the other hand, as he is fond of the holistic system, he cannot formulate evaluations about current topics, unless he refers in advance to what he considers to be the presuppositions for their authentic meaningfulness. All these, of course, permanently belong to Proclus’ perspective of constructing a unifying theory, which, despite its inexhaustible specializations, aims at covering both the metaphysical and the natural world, despite the fact that the former is mainly a qualitative magnitude, while the latter is mainly quantitative. Since the Neoplatonist scholarch attributes an eidetic content to Numbers, we would argue that what is secured is the possibility of the natural world to function by means of strictly pre-existing structural terms. However, beyond the distinctions identified be-

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tween Numbers and Forms, both metaphysical realities proceed together in order to construct the structures of production and function of the world of sense-experience. We could as well argue that they are two distinct ways of presence-function of one and the same reality, which also becomes immanent, through the variety of its implementations, without any alteration of its ontological content. All the above steadily shows that the Neoplatonist scholarch aims at how the natural universe will be subject to geometrical structures and numerical analogies, so as to conquer its teleology, evidently through their increasingly extended systematic utilization. It should be noted that in his whole commentary on the Platonic Timaeus he presents matter as bearer of the metaphysical archetypes in their causal presence, to undertake continuously initiatives and also quantitively increase and qualitatively improve its figurations.

4. THE OBJECTIVE EXISTENCE OF THE FORMS: TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

As with reference to his theories about the One and the Henads, as well as his theory on the Forms, Proclus moves by definition towards a strict Realism in the fields of metaphysics and physics. In conformity with this principle from the beginning he rejects Aristotle’s view 1 that Socrates was led to the foundation of the theory of the Forms because he was dealing with definitions and logical demonstrations. 2 He does not accept Aristotle’s proposal concerning the inclusion of this theory in the frame of logical and epistemological questions, thus getting away from nominalistic solutions. Therefore, the Neoplatonist philosopher approaches the whole topic through axioms by accepting the objective existence of the Forms, judging it independently from the degree of their cognitive approach on behalf of the human beings. The metaphysics of transcendence is clear with reference to any approach. This position is the basic content of his syllogisms in his commentaries In Platonis Parmenidem and In Platonis Timaeum and is evident, as we have seen above, in his Theologia Platonica. A more systematic exposition is Metaphysica, I, 6, 987b and M, 4, 1078b-1079a. See, for instance, P. Aubenque, Le problème de l’être chez Aristote, ed. P.U.F., 2nd edition, Paris 1991, pp. 255–256. 2 In Platonis Parmenidem, 784.7–10: “Οὐδ’ ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν, ἐπήχθη ἂν (sc. ὁ Σωκράτης) εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων θέσιν ἐκ τῆς περὶ τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς διατριβῆς, ἀλλ’ ὅτι διὰ θείαν ὄντως ὁρμὴν καὶ ταῖς ἰδέαις αὐτὸς ἐπέβαλεν”. 1

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found at the In Platonis Parmenidem 785.4–799.22 and 978.21– 983.18, by means of the use of particularly specific examples with ontological and epistemological content, which derive from the theoretical background of his system. These are arguments with a wide content and a cohesive articulation, so that they could be included in anything that may be characterized as system of geometrical theorems. It is self-evident, of course, that as a consistent realist and not only for methodological reasons, he will posit the ontological before the epistemological ones.

ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

I. Proclus starts 3 his elaboration by positing the question whether the world of sensible beings is self-subsistent. This is a question which is related to the discussion about ontological dualism, since it investigates the degree of possibility on behalf of matter to proceed to its own formation or to contribute to something like this by means of the bestowments it has received from the metaphysical world. This possibility is not alien to Proclus’ theoretical investigations, but the issue is whether there are common places of reformation in the metaphysical and the natural worlds. In his reply he stresses that if we accept its self-subsistence, many absurdities will occur. Such a definition will generate problems, since the natural world is corporeal and divisible, while only the incorporeal, simple and self-acting causes – or, more correctly, the self-causes – are self-subsistent. This is a distinction which does not lead to dualism, but to the degree of the initiative with respect to the “management” of the being, to which any of the two worlds can proceed as to itself in particular. It would be an extreme theoretical fault to mechanistically estimate that relationship between archetype and product. The following conclusion derives from the fact that the Op. cit., 785.5–786.28. On Proclus’ argumentation concerning the objective existence of the Forms, see L.J. Rosán, The Philosophy of Proclus. The Final Phase of Ancient Thought, New York 1949, pp. 158–163; G. Reale, Storia della filosofia antica, IV, Universitá Cattolica, Milano 1981, pp. 175– 185; C. Steel, “Proclus et les arguments pour et contre l’ hypothèse des Idées”, Revue de philosophie ancienne, 1984, No 2, pp. 3–27. 3

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initiatives of self-formulation belong to the metaphysical beings: Whatever produces itself, acts according to the ontological presuppositions of its subsistence, which is divine, as it has received from the One a self-sufficient character both of self-production and of production of new entities. He repeats actively that which has been bestowed to it, thus not remaining on the level of a passive or neutral recipient. This is a possibility not possessed by the corporeal essences, which are produced from outside and from essences not only superior to them but also ontologically different. 4 The Neoplatonist scholarch observes that the sensible world qua corporeal is not self-moved and that whatever lacks the possibility to move itself by definition is not self-moved. Thus, the world must be produced by a cause independent from itself and ontologically superior to it, which will evidently be self-moved. The ontological presuppositions of the sensible beings are placed in the area of selfsubsistent beings, which correspond to the categories of the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides. The Forms belong to this area as well and thus it follows that the function of the archetype presupposes the condition of being self-subsistent. Therefore, it is concluded that each world possesses a particular degree of initiative as to its own formation, and that, at the same time, the constitutive role of Metaphysics is reinforced, as a field which is not subject to any external definition. After that, 5 Proclus refers to the way of production of sensible beings, aiming, here as well, at a strict definition of that which will follow. He stresses that if the cause of the natural world produces at its will, then the production is unstable and dubious and takes place in a way which is not unified and articulated. In this case, the world as a whole will be perishable, since every entity deriving from On the concept of self-subsistence, see Elementatio theologica, pr. 40– 51, pp. 42.8–50.6. E.R. Dodds (Proclus, The Elements of Theology, pp. 223– 227, especially p. 225) identifies self-reversion or introversion as characteristic of the self-constituted. Also, J. Trouillard, L’ Un et l’ âme selon Proclos, pp. 76–77. For Proclus the self-subsistent beings are those divine entities, which correspond to the categories of the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides. 5 In Platonis Parmenidem, 786.29–788.12. 4

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a moving cause is mutable and perishable – and the will causes a motion, which is unstable. Creation cannot derive, exclusively at least, from projections of an emotional kind. Intentionality is not a primary factor. What is initially concluded is that from the ontological-productive point of view whatever moves is not considered as axiologically positive. Such an evaluation is presented as in need of a solid presupposition. Therefore, the productive cause will have to be different from will. Thus, the following syllogism is formulated: If the natural world is eternal, then its cause has a corresponding property in an absolute form and will be producing it by means of the Being, a term, however, concerning which he does not give the necessary clarifications. The Neoplatonist philosopher consistently – following his basic positions concerning production – observes that the entity which produces at its will, produces at the same time by means of the Being itself, thus introducing a carefully defined causal monism. He stresses that this does not necessarily occur the other way round, i.e. with the cause, which produces by Being, to move productively at its will as well. The production by Being is extended more widely than production at will, thus possessing an ontological and axiological priority over it. 6 It should be clarified here that for Proclus the entities which produce by Being have the property of eternity, which reflects a superior metaphysical reality, which, as such, is not subject even to the slightest alteration, not even by its own self. Whatever has been realized by means of selfestablishment will continue to exist infinitely in absolutely the same condition. He also stresses – evidently applying the principle of similarity 7 to the relationship of any divine cause with its sensible outcomes – that, if the cause of the natural world produces by means of the Being itself, it produces from its own essence and is primarily what the secondarily produced is. To similarity he attributes a clear ontological content as he does not perceive it only as denoting a relation. One should be careful here, because what is Concerning the production by the Being, see Theologia Platonica, II, 50.20–25. 7 On the principle of similarity, see Elementatio theologica, pr. 28–29, pp. 32.10–34.11. Cf. Ann. Charles – Saget, L’architecture du divin, pp. 241– 242. 6

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discussed is not a matter of compulsory succession between the two conditions, as it would introduce a mechanistic exemplar of processes within the same ontological category. Thus, this analogy clearly does not denote an identity, but is conceived in the sense that the cause bestows on its outcome that which itself is, but ontologically inferior. This gradation, in connection with his other views, eliminates any suspicion of pantheism, which is based on essential emanation. It is a bestowment, the content of which is not defined by the philosopher, evidently because it has a metaphysical derivation and is conceived by negations, at least as to its essence, if not as to its ad extra projections as well. Thus, if the world is the sensible fulfillment of the totality of the Forms, then conclusively these archetypes will exist primarily in the cause of the world, since this is exactly their own cause. Therefore, the Forms exist before the sensibles within the one cause of the world. It should be stressed here that it is not about two causes having a common ontological identity, because the relationship of the Forms with their cause is clearly metaphysical, while the relationship of the natural world with its own cause in initially metaphysical, with the involvement of the Forms as well, but afterwards it acquires cosmological content. The term “emanation” applies to the metaphysical world, while the terms “creation” or “production” apply to the natural world. The relationship “One-multitude” dominates here in a twofold dimension, which defines ambivalences analogically, i.e. one common presence in two radically different ontological fields. In any case, the whole line of thought moves within the general perspective towards the foundation of the metaphysical multitude to a continuously more extended degree.

II. Proclus’ second ontological argument 8 is based on his view that the archetypal principles are present in an imperfect way in sensible beings, a situation which imposes the necessity of their presence in a perfect way in a field superior to the sensible. It should be clarified here that the aforementioned imperfection is not due to the archetypes themselves, but to the way they are perceived by the natural beings, which are imperfect with their own gradations of 8

Cf. In Platonis Parmenidem, 788.29–790.4.

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course. In other words, the natural beings are unable to completely realize what their causes possess, as they are defective copies of them, but without any diminution of their ontological value due to this condition. The philosopher here mentions that in the natural universe similarity, dissimilarity, equality, inequality and the other categories do not exist in a perfect way, and consequently any categorical predication ascribed to it is not possessed as deriving from its source and in authentic way. Here the division into parts imposes its own domination: “Οἷς γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν τῷ ἀμερεῖ καὶ ἀδιαστάτῳ, πῶς ἂν εἴη ταῦτα ἐν τῷ διαστατῷ καὶ μεριστῷ πάντα τελέως.” 9 Thus, the first conclusion reached is that, before the reduction of the sensibles to the being, there exist the Forms, which possess ontological completeness or at least a completeness superior to a large degree to their own. The Forms, as well, even though they belong to the metaphysical world, are not self-sufficient. According to Proclus, the Forms are generated by the Demiurge of the whole world, in the sense that by contemplating himself he develops them in his ontological framework. In other words, the Demiurge, by means of an internal reflection upon himself, expresses the Forms as ways of his existence and as particular definitions of the specifications imposed by production as a planning from above. He does not have such a relationship with the sensible beings. The ontological distance from them is enormous, a differentiation which means that the Forms have an ontological priority in comparison with their hypostasis. We would note that, on the basis of the wider context of that which has been examined so far, what is generated is conceived by the Neoplatonist thinker to correspond in all probability to the triad “Being-Life-Intellect”. Within its framework what is constructed in a successive way is the total sum of the Forms, which bring to the fore their complete specification to the outermost metaphysical field, that of the Demiurge. We observe here something which will be assessed in its completeness in the following argument, namely that Proclus, in contrast with Aristotle, clearly accepts that the Forms have an objective existence in the field of the cause of the world and that they are not introduced as posterior concepts describing the common elements of 9

Op. cit., 789.11–14.

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sensible entities. 10 It should not be argued here that they are introduced simply in order to meet theoretical requirements or that they depict only the product of the abstractive properties of consciousness. Therefore, nominalism is already marginalized.

III. By means of his third ontological argument 11 Proclus aims at excluding the production of the sensible world by chance and at defeating any attempt with respect to the introduction of the mechanistic exemplar. He begins by positing the question about the possibility of the mutual coexistence of all natural beings and of the eternity of the world as a whole, in case the production is by chance. This is to say that he introduces the harmonious legislative order as a counter-argument. He answers that the Demiurge is one and that he bestows all measures and harmony on the world, which has a certain variety. Its parts are not of the same value and order, due to the law of hierarchy of beings. Therefore, he does not attribute to matter the possibility of self-formation, at least primarily. According to Proclus, whatever bestows essence as the ontological mode of existence, bestows order as well, as the structuring and determining way: “Καὶ οὕτως εἶναι πάντων ἀκίνητον αἴτιον (sc. τὸν δημιουργὸν τοῦ παντός) ὡς αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι πᾶσιν ἀφορίζοντα τὴν τάξιν”. 12 At the same time the Demiurge as a rational being does not ignore either order or the lack of order. If he ignored them, then the production would be a process or a result, which would characterize the irrational nature and the necessity of a divine and rational cause. The normative exemplar dominates here. It is clear that the Demiurge knows the lack of order, since he possesses absolute cognitive criteria and it belongs to his will, since, as a metaphysical entity, he possesses the property of goodness, to avoid any probability of lack of order. Therefore, its interventions afterwards Cf. Metaphysica A, 6, 987b-988a; H, 6, 1045; M, 4–5, 1078b-1080a. Cf. Bertr. Dumoulin, Analyse génétique de la Métaphysique d’Aristote, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1986, pp. 355–368, where the author correctly refers to Aristotelian logical treatises, like the Topica, for instance. 11 Cf. In Platonis Parmenidem, 790.5–35. 12 Op. cit., 791.12–14. 10

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clearly belong to the perspective of contingency, but this does not mean in any way that its initial bestowments were defective. Following that, 13 the Neoplatonist philosopher reinforces his argumentation by making the distinction between essential and accidental. He stresses that the causes themselves are prior and that from their manifestations derives what is by accident, as it is closely related with particular cases and that which is not absolutely compulsory for the construction and the preservation of the existence of a being. This could be also formulated through the distinction between the primary and the secondary properties. Thus, the essential cause exists before that which is by chance and corresponds to what is accidental. The Demiurge of the natural universe is essentially a cause and simultaneously he knows what he is the cause of. Contemplating himself and knowing himself, he knows, evidently instantaneously, his outcomes as well. Attention needs to be drawn here, as well, since two successive ontological levels emerge. In particular, the Demiurge, by means of his principles and his immaterial Forms, knows the mundane principles and the mundane Forms, which are the causes out of which the sense-perceptible world directly derives. Thus, whatever is created exists in the Demiurge as its cause, but without matter. Matter is by no means conceived as pre-existing and, following this, the intervention of the Forms and the reason-principles is accepted. The ontological exemplar is clearly monistic, since matter with its formations in terms of bodies derives from the manifestation of its metaphysical sources towards creation. Proclus also observes that the Demiurge does not reflect upon the beings because he is about to create them, since then the external activity would have been superior to the internal one and would define the content of its manifestation. The external activity would function by way of necessity for the internal activity, something which is not accepted by the philosopher. What actually happens is quite the opposite. Since the Demiurge reflects upon himself, he is the creator of the natural world. Thus, the external activity, i.e. the production of the natural world, depends on the internal activity, i.e. the development of the Forms. More specifically, the world as a whole is produced by the universal 13

Op. cit., 790.35–791.28.

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monad of the Forms and the special parts, which consist of the world or through which the world is manifested, are produced by the distinctive Monads-Forms. Once again, the relationship “One (manifested as monad)-multitude” controls all processes. If we wanted to further clarify the philosopher’s argumentation, we would stress that since the Demiurge is good he cannot but bestow the properties he possesses. Therefore, he does not produce in order to be self-realized, but because his ontological constitution is of such a structure which is manifested ad extra. Thus, it is not a necessity but a normal projection. The product by analogy is clear: Whatever the Demiurge possesses without matter, is possessed by the natural beings as enmattered, a conclusion which however is permanently cognitively not accessible.

IV. Proclus’ fourth ontological argument 14 is mainly about the implementation of the concept of hierarchy in the realm of the Forms, which dominates in his system and will be discussed in the relevant chapter. 15 The philosopher starts by observing that Nature, the immediate cause of the world of becoming, contains the reason-principles of the natural beings as a whole, i.e. the universal and created schemes of their production. But if Nature contains the reason-principles, there should be, prior to it, a superior cause containing the Forms. This pre-existence is absolutely necessary and is because whatever acquires its existence from inferior causes has its principles in the superior ones. 16 Here emerges the hierarchy as closely connected with the condition of the functional coherence within the perspective of an evolutionary exemplar, which preserves the principles and secures new formations. This could be defined as the course of development of a principle with repeatedly appearing ontological constructions, which tend towards the realization of a certain goal without even the minimum necessity. The Forms – which are ontologically superior to the natural principles – Op. cit., 793.5–796.13. Cf. Ist. Perczel, “Pseudo-Dionysius and the Platonic Theology”, in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, p. 529. 15 See pp. 88–134 of this book. 16 Cf. for instance Elementatio theologica, pr. 177, p. 156.1–24. Cf. E.R. Dodds, The Elements of Theology, pp. 292–293. 14

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will consequently preexist within a reality superior to Nature. Otherwise, their absorption by the sensible beings would be unavoidable, having as a consequence their complete worldliness and the establishment of pantheism. This reality has the divine properties – possibilities of knowing the content of its inner manifestation and of producing cognitively processes, which cannot be worked on by Nature due to its irrationality. It should be noted that the term “irrational” should be understood not as referring to animal condition, but as meaning the absence of an autonomous possibility for the planning of productive patterns with a teleological perspective. In the category “irrational” Proclus includes whatever is not selfsubsistent and its definition on the basis of its causes is particularly broad. It refers to whatever is close to becoming. So if the demiurgic cause contemplates itself, within itself all Forms are intellectual and cognitive and thus they do not exist only in the material world in the sense of their imperfect copies, i.e. as mundane reasonprinciples. The metaphysics of transcendence and the Platonic “orthodoxy” are preserved in every way. Consequently, the Forms initially are found in themselves ante res and after that they are found substantiated in rebus. Thus, Aristotle, too, is “satisfied”, even on a second level. This evolution follows a downward hierarchical process. Thus, the motionless causes of the Forms existing in the world, i.e. the substantiated ones, are first found in the Intellect, afterwards in the souls, then in Nature and finally in the sensible beings. Thus, they receive those properties which are necessary for the complete construction of the natural universe, so that it acquires the presuppositions to function and develop eternally. The intellectuals are immutable in essence and in activity, the ones in the soul are motionless in essence and movable in activity, the natural ones are invisible, but inseparable from the visible substantiated ones and, finally, the visible ones are to be found in the sensibles and are divisible. The transition from the absolute to the relative is evident here. The imparticipable gradually functions as inversely proportional to the participable and thus, what is gradually shown is the specific presuppositions of the appearance of the natural world, which must be scientifically explained with respect to its inexhaustible variety. However, scientific comprehension is not conceived in a Neoplatonic frame without the compulsory reduction to ontological presuppositions.

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Concluding his syllogisms, Proclus formulates his fourth argument referring to the ontological priority of the imparticipable over the participable, of the absolute unity towards communion. 17 Thus, having characterized the substantiated Forms as participable, he stresses that prior to them there existed the transcendent and immaterial monads. It should be noted that generally in his system of monads he characterizes particular units, from which series of similar beings emanate. In conformity with these views, he distinguishes among them matter as participating, the substantiated Forms as participable and the primary-intelligible Forms as imparticipable. At the same time, he observes that prior to the substantiated Forms the Demiurge created those which have a content themselves and are separate from sensible beings. The metaphysics of transcendence should by definition be preserved here as well in every way, evidently for the avoidance of all those connections which would lead to pantheism and, consequently, to the alteration and downgrading of the authentic theology: “Οὐ γάρ που τὰ μὲν ἀτελῆ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὄντα καὶ ἀμυδρῶς ὄντα πεποίηκεν ὅ τε θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις, τὰ δὲ τέλεια καὶ τελείως ὄντα καὶ ἑαυτῶν ὄντα οὐ παρήγαγεν˙ ἀλλὰ πολλῷ πρότερον ταῦτα ὑπέστησε, καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ ἀμυδρότερα καὶ μετεχόμενα καὶ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ὄντα. Διὰ ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ἐννοίας ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ εἰ δή τις ἄλλος, εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἰδεῶν ἀνήγετο θέσιν, καὶ τὰ μὲν μετεχόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα ἔλεγε, τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ χωρὶς ὑφεστηκότα˙ μάλιστα γὰρ τοῦτο προσήκει τοῖς εἴδεσι τὸ χωρίς”. 18 As long as the mundane phenomena extend further, the relationships are more complex and the absolute conditions are reduced, evidently within their own region and also as to the content their immediate causes have already received. In no case, however, are the constructions of Henology or metaphysical Ontology under threat. As long as the immanence of the archetypes is enhanced, its imparticipation remains Cf. In Platonis Parmenidem, 797.4–798.26. Cf. for instance Elementatio theologica, pr. 23, p. 26.22–28.7. E.R. Dodds (Proclus…, pp. 210–211) further discusses this proposition as embodying the Neoplatonic solution of the problem of reconciling the necessary immanence of the Forms with their necessary transcendence. Also Annick Charles – Saget, L’ architecture du divin, pp. 301–302. 17 18

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absolutely intact. It should be noted that the immanence is not further clarified as to its particularizations by the philosopher and this point indirectly leads us to the conclusion that the natural science has a certain range. Thus, it is not determined whether it will have the possibility to know the ontological nucleus even of the natural beings.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

Through the arguments, which will be discussed below, Proclus attempts to show the objective existence of the Forms, mainly based, according to the Platonic sources he accepts, on the correspondences between the hierarchical levels of reality and the hierarchies of the human cognitive powers. We could argue that the philosopher places here the foundation of a philosophy of the subject or of human internality as well. He observes that if the intellective knowledge and the intelligible knowledge are superior to senseperception, then conclusively the objects known through the intelligence and the intellect are superior to those which are known through the senses. The intelligence and the intellect contemplate the separate and immaterial Forms and the universals, while senseperception contemplates the Forms which are divisible, inseparable from the sensible beings and substantiated: “Ὡς γὰρ ἔχουσιν αἱ σύστοιχοι τοῖς οὖσι γνωστικαὶ δυνάμεις, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ τὰ γνωστὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχειν… Τὰ ἄρα καθόλου πρὸ τῶν μερικῶν ἐστι, καὶ τὰ ἄϋλα πρὸ τῶν ἐνύλων”. 19 Here, the principle of analogy has a clearly wider content, since it identifies strict correspondences between the ontological realities and the human cognitive powers. Within the frame of a more general examination of this topic, what is excluded here is idealism, i.e. the identification of the objective reality by means of the intellectual schemes of human consciousness. Afterwards, 20 Proclus stresses that the Universals and the immaterial beings do not exist in the human inner world in actuality. Evidently immanence bestows properties – functions in the status 19 20

In Platonis Parmenidem, 798.15–26. Op. cit. 978.26–35.

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of potentiality. Thus, as long as the actuality ontologically precedes potentiality, 21 the Forms should exist, in their primary condition, in the divine and separate essences prior to their presence in consciousness. In order to assist this position, Proclus promotes the priority of the One over the multitude, the latter term referring to the fields of ontology and epistemology. 22 Given that he stresses that the Forms as a whole exist in every consciousness, and, consequently, since they present a number of presences, they need their initial unity, which will secure the stability of their immanence. In other words, the reality which contains in a unified way – and, naturally, before each one of their substantiations – their whole variety. Therefore, their infinite immanence will not influence their specific character, a view which clearly moves within the frame of Platonic epistemology. In an analogous way, the self-moved entities pre-exist those which move due an external cause and the motionless entities pre-exist the self-moved, since something which is permanent and motionless possesses an ontological priority over the mutable and moved. In each of the above pairs, the first term is in actuality, while the second is in potentiality. Thus, if the motionless intellectual Forms did not exist, then, as a necessary consequence, the moving Forms in the soul would not exist either: “Οὐδὲ γὰρ θέμις μὴ περὶ τὰς μονάδας προϊέναι τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ περὶ

Op. cit., 979.1–980.3. Cf. J.J. Cleary, The role of mathematics in Proclus’ Theology, pp. 82–85, where it is shown that Proclus’ schema of priority is based on the standard Neoplatonic hierarchy, but owes a great deal to Aristotle, as can be seen from the claim that what is actual must be prior to what is potential, both in cognition and existence. Since the forms are only sometimes actualised in the human souls, this schema enables Proclus to argue that the Platonic Forms must exist as eternal actualities in a divine realm that is separate from and prior to the human realm. For Proclus this is confirmed by the fact that these monadic Forms are the transcendent causes of the forms in the human souls, which are their multiple effects. 22 Cf. Elementatio theologica, pr. 77, pp. 72.20–74.7. Cf. E.R. Dodds, Proclus. The Elements of Theology, pp. 241–242. 21

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τὸ τέλειον τὰ ἀτελῆ, καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀκίνητον τὰ κινούμενα”. 23 It should be noted that the monad can have an arithmetical content, but initially at least it should be conceived as a source and – why not! – as an archetype. It consists in the specialized reflection of the initial unity, and, consequently, a core of development of pluralities. Following this, 24 the philosopher – extending his realistic position concerning the Forms – stresses that our intellectual knowledge, evidently in its more authentic function here, does not refer to the posterior universals, because these intellectual schemes are inferior to sensible beings and to the common elements, which exist in their substantiation. At this point it is absolutely clear that Proclus, in a clear distance from Aristotle, excludes any conceptualistic or nominalistic solution of the problem of the Universals. This is about aspects to which he attributes only an a posteriori character. Thus, according to their first presence the Universals are neither rational-common concepts, nor intellectual abstractions, nor general words or simple names, but exist objectively in an unmixed condition independent from their substantiated presence and prior to any cognitive conception of them by human beings. It is not without meaning here for the domination of Realism that, according to Proclus, the common characteristics of the particular beings are ontologically superior to the concepts and the names, which are used for their description. These characteristics are their specific presences which are subject to sense-perception and categorization. Human consciousness is required to restrict itself and not succumb to the charms of Idealism or to an extreme autonomy of Nominalism. In addition it is clear that this is not about a simplifying realism, which is basically connected with the superficial empiricism. Immediately afterwards 25 the Neoplatonist scholarch discusses the priority of the Universals over the particulars, with respect to their ontological presence, based, however, on the content of dialectic demonstrations. He stresses that the demonstrations derive Op. cit., pr. 5, pp. 4.19–6.21. Cf. Annick Charles – Saget, L’ architecture du divin, p. 239. 24 In Platonis Parmenidem, 980.1–3. Cf. J.J. Cleary, op. cit., p. 85. 25 In Platonis Parmenidem, 980.8–17. 23

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from those data, which according to the implementation of their principles, here being logical, as well, consist in the causes of those, what is demonstrated. It is evident that there is no function of proof independent of “being” or any other ontological category. These data are the Universals – which have an absolute validity of implementations –, not the particulars. Therefore, based on the correspondence between the cognitive and the ontological levels, it is demonstrated that the Universal precedes the particular, i.e. the Forms are anterior to their particular manifestations, as they provide full demonstrative possibilities, with the generalizations they present. What derives from all this is that the Neoplatonic scholarch attributes an ontological and an epistemological content to metaphysics, and, as in other places in his work, he shows it to be a complete epistemology. Proclus’ position concerning definitions illuminates his views about the common characteristics of the particulars. The definitions are at the same time the presuppositions of the demonstrations. According to the philosopher, 26 the definition derives from the principle of the Form, i.e. in a sense, its conceptual formulation, which exists within the human soul. By means of the definition we describe what is common in the particulars, considering it as an initial and necessary fact that each Form exists in the human souls before they themselves conceive its image in the particulars. The term “image” (εἴδωλον) is a technical term denoting real reflection in the sense-perceptible world. Thus, since, for instance, the Form of Justice exists in every soul, it is evident that the just propOp. cit. 980.17–983.18. Cf. J.J. Cleary, The role of mathematics (…), p. 67, where it is shown that the theory of demonstration which guides Proclus’ practice in theology is borrowed from Aristotle’s Analytica. According to that theory, demonstrative premises must be prior to, better known than, and causative of their conclusions. The Neoplatonist philosopher claims that Aristotle is forced by the truth about demonstration to give priority to universals over particulars. It should be noted that this scholar in the last chapter of his study (pp. 84–87) presents in a particularly exact way the differences between the dialectics of the Platonic tradition and the syllogisms developed by Aristotle in the Topica on the basis of common opinions (ἔνδοξα). 26

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erties, which are established in the inner human self, are many – evidently so that it can approach every particularization of the Form of Justice – and have a common element among them. At this point, the validity of objectivity is further established, since the concept of commonness is broadened. Thus, if a certain soul knows the principle of justice, which exists within itself, it similarly knows those which exist within the rest of them and clearly will not differ among themselves, independently from how they are applied by each particular man. Immanence does not abolish the particularity of its interpretation. With all these in mind, if souls have something common among them, we define it by clarifying its content, as a general immutable condition. Thus, the beginning of the demonstration, which of course has to be common for all people, lies in what is a priori common and not in what is enmattered and mortal. This is due to the fact that concerning demonstrations and definitions the particular should be determined by the universal. Here we can make the following remark, which derives from what has been said so far: what is a priori common should be in actuality, while each particular presence of it should be in potentiality. Simultaneously, Proclus observes that the definition of the common notions, which we derive from the particular beings, does not include the totality of every particular being. Here he introduces the abstractive-inductive process, which proves the distinction between perfection and imperfection with reference to the common and the particular, respectively. This is a distinction which becomes clearer as long as the abstractive processes develops. But the main point is that the particular being cannot consist of the basis for the formulation of definitions. The nominalistic factor is thus strictly limited: “Ποῦ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ὅλος ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν, ὄντων ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλων ἃ ποιεῖ τὸ καλούμενον ἰδίως ποιόν.” 27 The reason-principle of the Form of Man, however, existing in all humans, contains in full every particular man. All this happens because the principle contains – ontologically speaking in a unified way – the totality of the powers and the differentiae, which exist in the particulars. Here a certain remark is made in order to fortify Realism to an extreme degree: The common notion does 27

Op. cit. 980.29–981.31.

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not contain all differentiae in actuality, but in potentiality. Of course, according to the context, the difference between the two conditions is both ontological and epiustemological. Thus the Form of Man, which exists in every man, is superior and more inclusive than the common notion of Man, because it contains all differentiae in a unified way (ἡνωμένως) and in actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ). Here, too, there is no room for the implementation of Nominalism. So, if we are led to a definition, it will be a definition of that thing which is inclusive of all particulars. This will be the Form, which exists in the human soul, and not the general notion of the particulars, which of course ontologically it makes no difference whether it will be formed or not. Here, the absolute regulative presupposition for the formulation of definition is clearly posited: the inclusion of all particular cases of the same kind. However, it should be noted that for the human sense-perception such a perspective is not easily feasible. The Neoplatonist philosopher basically seeks refuge in intuition, which due to a mainly mystical cognitive leap, can conceive the source of the particulars and, therefore, not be in need of the process of abstraction. Thus, “ἀναιρεθέντων τούτων (sc. τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν εἰδῶν) οὐδὲ ὁρίζεσθαι δυνατόν˙ οἰχήσεται οὖν εἰκότως καὶ ἡ ὁριστικὴ μετὰ τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς, ἀπολιποῦσα τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην νόησιν”. 28 The philosopher, here at least, clearly places Nominalism out of the way. It is also particularly interesting that the process of proof comes to the fore as a particularly developed implementation of definition. Thus, definition does not consist in the final product of abstraction, which functions by means of proofs, but is the compulsory criterion for any proof referring to the particulars. We could also attribute to it the property of the intermediary during the course towards complete knowledge. Thus, following almost the same way of thinking, Proclus develops the other two dialectical methods, i.e. division and analysis, 29 which clearly function downwards and transfer the research from what is general to what is particular. He notices that divisions distinguish the manifold from the one. All those preexist in a unified way in a totality, and are particularized by the divisions according 28 29

Op. cit. 981.9–11. Op. cit. 981.27–28.

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to the differentiae among them, which of course do not abolish their common source of origin. It should be noted that the divisions do not add the differentiae from outside or afterwards to the principles, which are found in the human inner self. On the contrary, they discover the variety of the principles and describe their particularizations, which are not evident from the beginning, and the differences among them, as depictions of whatever was bestowed on the natural universe on behalf of the metaphysical archetypes. They function strictly as methods and not as something autonomous with reference to the criterion of Realism. They come to clarify what is already accomplished. For the identification of these particularizations on behalf of the divisions, it is necessary for the essential Forms to exist in the human soul, in terms of theoretical schemes, of course, a position which by definition is accepted by the Neoplatonist philosopher, thus following the line of thought expressed by Plato in his dialogues Meno and Phaedo: “Δοξαστικῆς γὰρ ἐστι διαιρετικῆς τὰ ὑστερογενῆ διαιρεῖν, διανοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἐπιστημονικῆς τὰς οὐσιώδεις τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ λόγων διαφορὰς θεωρεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἡνωμένας δυνάμεις ἀναπτύσσειν, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁλικωτέρων ὁρᾶν ἀποφυόμενα τὰ μερικώτερα”. 30 Very interesting is the hierarchical evaluation, which has an epistemological and an ontological dimension, and is based on the distinction between opinion and science. In addition, immanent ontology (which is approached by means of science) is shown to be prior, with respect to the authenticity of the objective, to cognitive outcomes (to which opinion appertains). All this concerning demonstration, definition and division also applies mutatis mutandis with reference to analysis. 31 What derives from the above analysis is that the method aims to give a detailed description of whatever is considered to have an objective validity. It consists in a necessary tool, so that man can explore the depth of reality to a large extent, as much as this is possible. Proclus’ conclusion after the elaboration of the epistemological arguments is something which indicates, too, an extreme RealOp. cit. 981.28–31. Op. cit. 981.31–982.21. C. Steel, in his “Proclus et les arguments (…)”, pp. 10–16, briefly examines Proclus’ dialectical proofs in relation to the Platonic, Aristotelian and Hegelian corresponding views. 30 31

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ism: “Εἰ ἄρα μὴ ἔστι τὰ εἴδη, οὐδὲ οἱ ἐν ἡμῖν ἔσονται λόγοι τῶν πραγμάτων˙ εἰ δὲ μὴ εἰσὶν οἱ ἐν ἡμῖν λόγοι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐκ ἔσονται αἱ διαλεκτικαὶ μέθοδοι καθ’ ἃς τὰ ὄντα γιγνώσκομεν, οὐδ’ ὅποι τρέψωμεν τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξομεν˙ αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δύναμις μάλιστα τῆς ψυχῆς ποθοῦσα τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδη καταφεύγει καὶ τὰς μονάδας τὰς γεννητικὰς τῶν πολλῶν, ἡ δὲ δόξα καὶ τοῖς ὑστερογενέσιν ἀρκεῖται καὶ τοῖς ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστα κατατεταγμένοις”. 32 In this passage the hierarchical exemplar is present. It is clearly stressed that the notions of things are not formed as something posterior in the soul, i.e. after the observation of the external world. Thus, the abstractive-deductive method is not a starting point, but a tool used at a later time. In other words, between the Forms and the thinking soul, the material objects do not intervene as important cognitive factors. The soul, which possesses the theoretical imprints of the Forms, approaches them through its own cognitive means, and afterwards it names them. Thus, independently from the sensible stimuli which are perceived by human consciousness, its primary duty is to revert continuously upon its own inner self. One could argue of course that by means of this argument Proclus is led to a certain conceptualism. In our opinion, this view is dangerously simplifying, as does not notice the fact that the Neoplatonist philosopher clearly stresses that what is presupposed for the existence of the principles in the soul is the objective existence of the Forms in the realm of divine entities of the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides. Anthropology is absolutely defined by metaphysical Ontology and in the Neoplatonic sense this priority is conceived to be absolutely valid. At the same time, the human soul does not know the beings in accordance with epistemological presuppositions on its own, but approaches them cognitively in accordance with the abilities provided by the Forms, which, as we would thus argue, possess a scientific archetypical identity, as well. According to the tradition represented by the Neoplatonist scholarch, thinking consists of a supreme inherent condition of the metaphysical world and in a broad sense can be considered as selfreference. In this case, within beings the soul recognizes the imper32

In Platonis Parmenidem, 982.2–8.

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fect copies of the Forms, which it knows already through its superior cognitive powers as existing in itself by way of principles, i.e. theoretical schemes. Thus, the Forms exist initially in an objective way outside and beyond the soul and the sensible phenomena, while afterwards they are substantiated in the soul as principles and in the sensible things as productive archetypes. The totality of what exists depends, by means of particularly defined ways, on their presence; therefore, the systematic way of the corresponding construction is dominant. These conditions and relationships will be further illuminated, when the gradual hierarchical evolution of the Forms is examined. 33 Concerning the mode of existence of Forms within the soul, the concepts of the universal and the posterior and other relevant matters Proclus refers extensively in In Platonis Parmenidem 890.39– 898.2. The philosopher initially examines the following passage from the Parmenides: “Ἀλλὰ φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τὸν Σωκράτη, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ᾖ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκῃ ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς. Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἓν γε ἕκαστον εἴη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πάσχοι ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο”. 34 He posits the question whether the Forms are found only in the souls or even prior to them. This is a crucial question not for the relationship between Realism and Nominalism, but also for the possibility of their cohesion; therefore, the encounter between Platonism and Aristotelianism would be the next phase of his research. Initially, he stresses that Socrates calls the Form “meaning of the soul” and the soul “place of the Forms”. Based on these presuppositions, he argues that the Form existing in the soul possesses the properties of oneness and immateriality, while at the same time as a principle in the soul it transcends the multitude of its enmattered presences, as it does not belong to the same order and has no evidently initial ontological communion with them. However, the reason-principle in the soul is not even a meaning, because “νόημα λεγόμενον ὡς θεώρημά τι καὶ δόγμα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγιγνόμενον περὶ τῶν

33 34

See pp. 95–159 of this book. Plato, Parmenides 132b.

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δογματιζομένων καὶ θεοειδῶν πραγμάτων”. 35 The way the verb ἐγγίγνεσθαι is used here refers to the process required for the construction of meaning in the soul, which corresponds to the posterior Form of the Peripatetics, which Proclus does not seem to be fond of. In combination with the above, it means that despite the Forms as principles exist a priori in the human inner self, they do not necessarily lead directly to the construction of meanings. The Neoplatonic scholarch does not accept any kind of mechanization with reference to the production of cognitive outcomes. For Proclus the Peripatetic Form is totally different from the reason-principle in the soul, which is found in essence, i.e. in a really authentic way, in the souls. Having this version in mind it is concluded that the soul is the place of the Forms not in potentiality, according to Aristotle, but in actuality. The principle in the soul is evidently an essential principle, however, with all restrictions posited by the principle of transcendence. It should be stressed that what for the Peripatetics is posterior is ontologically inferior to the multitude of the sensible beings, “ἅτε ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ὂν καὶ οὐ πρὸ αὐτῶν. Διὸ κἀκεῖνο (sc. τὸ ὑστερογενές) μὲν ἧττον οὐσία τῶν πολλῶν, τοῦτο (sc. ὁ ψυχικὸς λόγος) δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν ὅσῳ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τελειότερον”. 36 Therefore, if we aim at a precise description of the reality, we should not remain with the posterior universals, but elevate ourselves to the essential principles. This is a harsh attack against Idealism, and any hope with respect to its presence lies only in conceptual Realism. Basically, what is proposed is the intuitional process, which, as self-reference, is a primary cognitive condition, i.e. without any theoretical or other interventions. Following this, 37 Proclus examines the possibility concerning the essential presence of the Universals in the souls in relationship with the productive manifestation of Nature. It is evident that he attempts to attach to the Universals a character which transcends their strict epistemological-logical identity. He argues that Nature is 429a.

35

In Platonis Parmenidem, 892.13–15. See Aristotle, De Anima, III, 4,

In Platonis Parmenidem, 892.32–35. Op. cit. 893.7–895.1. Cf. Theo Kobusch, “Das Eine ist nicht das Ganze”, in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, p. 321. 36 37

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the productive cause of the sensible things, as it possesses their principles. Thus, for instance, it produces the eyes by means of the principle of the Eye, which it possesses in its inner self. In an analogous way, the soul knows the beings and underlines their common elements, because it has contained their principles. This knowledge means that it does not derive the common elements of sensible things by means of observing them, because whatever is perceived from the sensibles is an image. Sense-perception is beyond doubt depreciated and any value it might have presupposes that it follows intuition. The principle in the soul is the presupposition for the construction of the posterior Form, which is merely a predicate defining the manifold. Naturally, it is not possible for us to observe all sensible things, in order to apply a common predicate to them: “Ἀλλαχόθεν ἄρα τοῦτο (sc. τὸ κοινόν) ὑφέστηκε, καὶ ἐξ ἄλλου παρεδέξατο ταύτην τὴν περιληπτικὴν ἑκάστου δύναμιν εἴδους˙ οὗ δὴ καὶ ἐστιν εἰκών, παρὰ δόξαν ὑποστάν, κατὰ ἀνάμνησιν ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων τῆς ἔνδον ἀνακινουμένης αἰτίας”. 38 Therefore, before the posterior Forms there should be the essential principles, which have a concrete a priori presence and an active cognitive function within the soul. The sensible phenomena have as their mission to activate through stimuli the recollection of the soul. In the sequence of his text, 39 Proclus examines the possibility that the Forms are notions. He observes that they can be understood as notions, in the sense that they are conceptions of the true and divine Intellect, “παρ’ ᾧ καὶ τὰ ὄντα νοήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ νοήσεις τὰ ὄντα”. 40 They are characterized as father-like notions and intelIn Platonis Parmenidem, 894.19–23. See op. cit., 893.7–895.1. 40 Op. cit., 895.6–7. Concerning the relationship between the Forms and the Intellect, see Elementatio Theologica, pr. 176–178, pp. 154.3–158.2. E.R. Dodds discusses in particular the Proclean distinction between the νοερὰ εἴδη, i.e. the content of the νόες, and the νοητὰ εἴδη, which are above νοῦς and constitute the ὄντως ὄν in the narrow sense (Proclus …, pp. 291–293, especially p. 292). Also, S. Gersh, From Iamblichus (…), pp. 86– 88, 105–106; J. Trouillard, La mystagogie (…), pp. 160–171; L. Gigineishvili 38 39

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lections, which have a productive content. However, they are not intellections of other entities but of themselves. This means that there is no intellectual reference to something exterior, but to the interior. This is exactly why the Forms are real essences and real intellections. It should also be noted that essence and intellection do not belong on different ontological levels, since there is no hierarchy within the framework of one metaphysical reality. After the father-like divine Intellect, the Forms are found in the intellectual essences, which are still notions. For the first time this is where the distinction between the knowing subjects and the intelligibles takes place, in the sense that the Forms as intelligibles are known by the knowing intellectual essences, within which they objectively exist in essence and not only intelligibly. The situation is the same on a lower level, concerning the always thinking souls. Here we have a clearer distinction between what knows and what is known. The intellections are transitory, while the essential principles remain in the same condition; this difference can be generally applied to the relationship between Epistemology and metaphysical Ontology. Finally, it is underlined that within the particular souls there are two kinds of notions, those of the essential principles and whatever derives by way of abstraction as a concept from the observation of the sensible beings. Here Realism reaches its summit. The second notions do not exist in essence in the soul, while the first as last offprints of the primal intelligence, pre-exist as Universals and afterwards they preserve their ontological existence and presence in the realm of the soul. Thus, “τὰς δὲ τῶν οὐσιωδῶν λόγων προβολὰς νοήματα λέγοντες, καθ’ ἃς γιγνώσκομεν ὅπως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ πάντων πλήρωμά ἐστι τῶν εἰδῶν, ἕτερον τρόπον νοήματα δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐγγιγνόμενα αὐτῇ διὰ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν αἰσθητῶν προβολῆς˙ ὑφεστώτων γὰρ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνα νοήματα καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντων ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντως ὄντα ἐνεικονιζομένων”. 41 Projecting these views, Proclus is led again to the conclusion that the Forms exist essentially in human beings and are the ontological presuppositions of the principles in the soul, which function cognitively exactly because – G. v. Riel, “Ioane Petritsi: A witness of Proclus’ Works in the School of Psellus”, in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, pp. 583–584. 41 In Platonis Parmenidem, 896.1–9.

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they themselves have ontological bestowments. Consequently, thinking is not simply a process, but is inextricably related from the beginning with human nature. According to what has been examined so far, we reach the following general conclusions: First, here, too, it has been clear that Proclus’ theory about the Forms is placed in the frame of a coherent Realism. The Forms exist, initially, objectively and independently of any of their substantiated presences in the divine realm of the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides (transcendent Realism). Afterwards, they become substantiated as productivearchetypal causes of the sensible beings – a presence which will be examined extensively below – and as essential principles in the soul (immanent Realism). In terms of causality and hierarchy the immanent Realism presupposes the transcendent. The Forms do not acquire real existence in the field of the natural universe, but, on the contrary, they consist of the ontological presuppositions of the reduction of the sensible entities to Being. The universalia in rebus consist of the substantiated images of the universalia ante res. However, it should be noted here that no reference is made to the principle of analogy; therefore, attention is needed as to how ambivalence and polyvalence will be used. At least, the hierarchy must not be undermined at all. Secondly, Proclus radically refuses any conceptualistic and nominalistic solution to the problem of the Universals. The reasonprinciples existing in the soul are neither the common notions or the posterior Universals of sensible beings, but are essential as projections of the Forms. The sensible beings do not define the presuppositions for their cognitive approach, but, on the contrary, become known by the soul, because within its field preexist in essence the principles of the Forms (in a way not defined by Proclus, because such a discovery is not possible). That is, the sense perceptions, following their categorization through the process of deduction, correspond to that which is inexisting in the form of unities within human consciousness. It should also be noted that the principles do not form initially the cognitive content of the soul on a metaphysical level, as this property is acquired as something posterior, i.e. after their essential existence in its own field. Therefore, Proclus excludes from this discussion the posterior logical definition of the intelligible and sensible essence and accepts the a priori ontological content of the epistemological categories, the

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common notions and the names. The philosopher accepts the possibility of formulation of the posterior Universals, but he downgrades them so as to consider them as conceptions of the inferior cognitive powers of the human soul or of consciousness. The Forms, through their immanent presence within the soul, are transformed into cognitive capacities, but their metaphysical objective validity is not preserved in their new condition. Thirdly, by placing the Forms in the divine Intellect, Proclus follows a tradition the beginning of which is found in the first century B.C.E. mainly in the works of the representatives of MiddlePlatonism. According to this tradition, the Forms are considered to be divine intellections and are thus ontologically downgraded in comparison with their position in the work of Plato. The theological orientation of the philosophical systems contributes to the hierarchical specification of the Forms. They are intellections which are shaped after the activation of their internal richness by the supreme principles. This richness acquires the characteristics of rational plans moving by means of its own initiative. Thus, it is intentional and personal. In any perspective, they are not internal necessities of the metaphysical world, which would impose the obligation for productive manifestation. Proclus fully utilizes this position and brings to the fore the complete ontological freedom of the metaphysical principles – which desire to observe part of themselves – to be participated by other realities. We can easily argue that Proclus used the totality of the above arguments with such an insistence, so that the Aristotelian nominalism (the Universals as simple notions) is not allowed to claim any domain of responsibility. Concerning this issue we cited a relevant text which, in our opinion, asserts the reasons for which the Neoplatonist scholarch used the extensive argumentation which we presented. From the above text we can understand the contingencies which Proclus wanted by all means to avoid. The extent of the arguments used by Proclus in order to prove the objective existence of the Forms, leads us to the estimation that – either explicitly or implicitly – he aims at the refutation, to a largest degree possible, of Aristotle’s critical views concerning Plato according to this consideration which is metaphysically founded. Clearly it is not within his intentions to allow the approach to the Forms as a strictly syllogistic or linguistic request or a request for definite attributions. For this reason he carefully at-

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tempts at the preservation of the lines. Thus, of course he does not exclude the formation of the universal notions, through the method of abstraction, under the presupposition that it is constructed strictly on a posterior field. Moreover, in no case will he estimate that they function only as predicates attributed to a multitude of similar beings on the basis of the tangible conclusions. Whichever communion or even identity is attested among the senseperceptible beings is due – according to his view – to the fact that they participate in the same archetypes, which have the possibility to particularize quantitively their presence in an infinite way. Therefore, the nominalistic solution is clearly found outside his planning and what is directly entailed is that he cannot agree with the empirical and epistemological starting points and standard views of Aristotle, such as those which are formulated, for example, in his treartises Sophistici Elenchi (165a–b) and Analytica Posteriora (86a–b). Therefore, each specific being of the world of sense-perception functions in the atmosphere of the research of the Neoplatonist scholarch simply as an excuse which stimulates the deductions to that which is beyond. This topic will have a long historical course and will reach its peak from the twelfth century onwards in the Western Middle Ages. Olivier Boulnois in his article “Réelles intentions: nature commune et universaux selon Duns Scot”, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 97, No 1, 1992, pp. 3–33, presents the aspect of that direction of the historical course in question with which Proclus would not agree. We think that the specific elaboration of the Neoplatonic survivals in posterior philosophy would cover some gaps of the history of philosophy with strict theoretical targets between realism and nominalism. Utilizing Syrianus, Proclus has already registered this in the philosophical worries.

5. THE LEVELS OF PRESENCE OF THE FORMS According to Proclus’ interpretation, since the Forms belong to the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides and acquire their existence for the first time in the third triad of the “Being” it is impossible for them to produce immediately the world of sensible experience. The so-called distance between the two realities is big and evidently does not refer to space alone. It is generally ontological and moves within the frame of the succession between what is prior and what is posterior. It should be noted that from Being until the definite development of the metaphysical world the distance, not in the sense of natural extension, is big and goes through particularized multi-layered processes. According to Proclus’ principles, they are ontologically necessary intermediate realities, which participate both in the metaphysical and the physical field and facilitate the communication of the intelligible archetypes with the multitude of generated beings. In the previous chapter we examined certain aspects of the way with which the communication between the two worlds is realized through the collaboration of Numbers with the Forms, as well as that the Forms have a numerical content from the beginning. By means of this property they will articulate the levels of their presence and their interventions. Thus, according to the Neoplatonist philosopher, these realities, which will combine the two worlds, are not definite particular entities different from the Forms or related to their content. It is the Forms, which themselves undergo a gradual ontological degradation on the other levels of the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides according to Proclus. The dynamic conception about metaphysics appears emphatically here. Therefore, their development downwards leads to the derivation of two new situations. First, the Forms go through a differentiation of their presence on many levels, in the sense of many additions or internal devel95

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opments of new properties, and they somehow change their essence, which was initially free from mixtures. More correctly, the case here has to do with some sort of self-change. Secondly, as a consequence of the above, the Forms gradually particularize more and more their archetypal-productive function. It is known that in the development from one conclusion to another in the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides, Proclus sees the gradual manifestation of the internal richness of the divine forces, with no hint even about the slightest addition from the outside. The metaphysical world is absolutely responsible for the generation to essence. It is about ontological factors, which in the first conclusion are found to be in an indistinctive and not manifested union among themselves. 1 Accordingly, the presence of the Forms is not limited to their exit

Theologia Platonica, II, 61.11–64.9 and 66.1–73.23. We should not ignore that the initial unity is covered by negations, since the presence of the One is dominant. Cf., for instance, G. v. Riel, “Ontologie et Théologie”, pp. 403–404: “C’ est précisément la negation des caractéristiques qui affirme leur valeur. Il ne faut nier que ce qui est digne d’être nié, et plus longtemps une caractéristique se maintient avant d’être niée dans la negation progressive, plus elle est proche de l’Un. De la sorte, les affirmations concernant les effets sont générées par les négations concernant la cause” [Translation: “Exactly this negation of properties affirms their value. We should not forget that what deserves to exist is in a condition of negation and as long as a characteristic is preserved in the initial condition of negation within the progressive negation is closer to the One. In addition, affirmations are in relation to the effects, which have been produced, and derive from the negations, which are related with the cause”]. In the above passages Proclus underlines that the absolutely transcendent unity is not independent from causality. Fran. Romano with reference the passage II, 72.12–18 stresses the following: “Ici apparaît très clairement la signification de la causalité de l’Un, comme premier principe absolu et transcendant, produisant chaque procession ou production des êtres divins ou supérieurs, qui dépendent de lui selon une hiérarchie causée et établie par une action causale et processive unique” (“L’idée de la causalité dans la Théologie Platonicienne de Proclus”, p. 330 [Translation: “Clearly here appears the significance of the causality of the One, as first absolute and transcendent principle, which produces every procession or production of the divine or superior beings, which depend on it, according to a causal hierarchy established by a causal and unitary processive act”]). 1

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from the level of Being and their movement within the totality of the Second Hypothesis. They proceed to a further “procession” and are open to references, which prepare something new. Thus, by coming out from the limits of the Second Hypothesis, they are (self-)transformed into natural reason-principles and form the content of Nature, i.e. the complex core, which causes the world of sensible experience to exist. Thus, the term “natural reasonprinciples” refers to realities of metaphysical origin, which can produce without interventions through combinations among themselves. They have made their presence familiar with whatever new can derive. We will come back to their content when we examine more analytically the relationships of the Forms with the sensible beings, while we should remember the almost identical theory of the enmattered species, which is seen especially in Syrianus. Proclus analytically presents the evolutions of the Forms from the superior to the lower levels. He mentions that in their initial presence, the Forms are found in the Self-Living and have acquired their active existence according to the noetic terms, while they neither move nor evidently reside in bodies. Generally they bestow essence by means of emanation of one way of their being without any act or motion on their behalf. They offer only that which is ontologically essential, so as to found the presuppositions for the productive processes which are scheduled to follow. It should be noted that this manifestation of their being is not led to direct absorption by the world which is subject to becoming, since it could lead to pantheism which is outside Proclus’ intentions. Despite their productive manifestation, they preserve part of their hypostasis unparticipated. After that, this general framework of production will be followed by the production, which takes place through act and motion, and is first seen on the level of the god who is called “Demiurge”. These are conditions which will immediately contribute to the production of the natural world and, consequently, they will, too, avoid pantheism. It should be noted that the Demiurge, as well, as a metaphysical entity preserves a part of his unparticipated. Thus, on the first level there are four Forms as Monads of the Self-Living or the “first Being”, which are identified as the universal causes of the particular beings, i.e. those sources which posit the compulsory terms for the foundation of the presuppositions of the natural “Being”. On the second level they are widened and, with the Demiurge as the first intermediate, they go through all subse-

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quent divine areas until the most exterior ones. This route, of course, is in accordance with the general principle of Proclus’ ontological system: every new appearance of a metaphysical reality with developments or additions makes it ontologically inferior to its previous one. This devaluation is owed to the elimination of the initial unity since the metaphysical multitude comes to the fore. The latter is necessary for the establishment and the explanation of the variety of the world of sensible experience. 2 The multitude does not consist only in a natural magnitude, but exists in every level of the metaphysical world, bearing in mind the following particularity: in every lower entity there are more properties, but with a lesser degree of ontological authenticity. After an extensive analysis through all metaphysical levels, Proclus discusses the tangible species, i.e. the instances of enmattered presence of intelligible species in the natural universe. Since in their new status the species are related with matter, they are imperfect conditions (existences) and possess in an ontologically inferior degree all properties of the divine levels they went through. In particular, the philosopher argues that the enmattered species are self-moved and eternal, because of their metaphysical derivation, and these are properties they possess from the intelligible realm. At the same time, every enmattered species as long as it possesses the property of multitude has been formed by its corresponding Number and has been completed by related Numbers. Its numerical definition was received within the intelligible-intellectual field by Life, so the species does not possess one property exclusively. Its main property simply contains the rest in its own way. Concerning the presence of Numbers we may recall to memory what we mentioned in the relevant chapter. Numbers are the compulsory companions of the Forms in their whole development and they reinforce them in their endeavours. Moreover, the enmattered species received from the same field the possibility to activate itself among the moving beings in a motionless way. This immutability is there, despite the fact that all the species have derived through motion, even if it would be more correct to stress that they have derived from a moment of the metaphysical “procession”. Thus, they 2

In Platonis Parmenidem, 801.27–803.5.

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belong to some kind of life-giving order and bestow the property of life on sensible beings. In addition, the enmattered species contain in themselves their own parts in unity and this is a property received from the intellectual realm, where everything still remains with no division, even if distinctions are already there. When they appear on earth of becoming they already possess unity, but here it is presented as containing the multitude; therefore their relationship with the natural multitude becomes more feasible. The fact that they are the factors which form matter is a possibility given by the Demiurge. Finally, they contribute to the assimilation of the sensibles to the intelligibles and this is achieved because they have gone through the level, where the species – only with reference to their metaphysical presence – have developed the property to assimilate. These are evidently the properties which will contribute to the lack of gaps in the totality of the ontological system. A system which is clearly presented as not being inflexible and will continuously realize relations. Unity will not be affected by those particularizations, which will be the main characteristic of the natural universe. 3 On the contrary, they will offer it a unitary character. In other words, the sensible character is subject to differentiations in space, which are evidently absent from the metaphysical world. Thus, two are the given facts. Initially, it should be stressed that a discussion about metaphysics of space lies beyond the human cognitive capabilities. By extension, however, as it is itself the image of the natural world shows that it has received characteristics of cohesion from the metaphysical archetype, which, however, functions as being widened in extension. Through the enmattered species or the natural reasonprinciples, all properties or ontological categories, which were manifest in the divine realm of the Parmenides’ Second Hypothesis, are considered to be immanent. The metaphysics of immanence is the new reality, which has been formed. Based on the new relationships, the natural reason-principles cannot be transcendent with reference to those entities, which have received the species and have been formed. They basically move on the same ontological level, i.e. the cosmological, and the priorities between them are 3

Op.cit., 803.6–804.17.

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clear. In fact, Proclus undertakes to specify in detail a condition which has been formed. Thus, for instance, the natural reasonprinciple of the species “Large” is not transcendent with reference to the particular large tangible beings – mainly in comparison and not absolutely, since the metaphysical specifications are not left aside – but is in conformity with their presence. 4 Within whatever is sense-perceptible Large there is, in a specific way, the natural reason-principle of Large and the species which has constructed it. It is evident that for Proclus both the immanent presence and the transcendent presence of the species are necessary; a perspective that leaves “orthodox” Platonism at stake. The immanent one causes a set of common characteristics to exist among the many beings, which are distinguished among themselves by means of divisions, in the world of experience. The transcendent one guarantees the eternity of such a world, which needs an immutable cause, in every level, so as not to perish. 5 It is a cause which will be only among the natural beings, but simultaneously it will possess stability and will have acquired the founding presuppositions of its existence in its own self. At the same time, since it is motionless, it will be prior to the moving beings, by which it will be continuously participated, however, because of its permanence. 6 This participation will offer moving things the possibility to exist until they complete their lives. It could be argued that Platonism dominates skillfully here using Aristotelianism as an “instrument”, or that the philosophy of Parmenides dominates using the philosophy of Heraclitus as an instrument. Within this scheme of combinations, in all probability there is the projection of interchanges of participation until the natural world conquers its completion. Based on what we have examined so far, we come to the following conclusions: First, in order to establish his theory about the twofold character of the species, the transcendent and the immanent, Proclus uses the methodological scheme “ImparticipableOp.cit., 886.30–38. Op.cit., 786.26–28, 790.7–10, 795.9–796.13. Cf. István Perczel, “Pseudo-Dionysius and the Platonic Theology”, Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, p. 529. 6 Op.cit., 887.26–35. 4 5

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Participable-Participant”, which clearly denotes certain hierarchies, both inside an entity and with reference to its relationships with the others. Imparticipable are the species as long as they are included in the totality of the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides. They become participable when they leave the divine level and receive the immanent property of the natural reason-principles, without becoming anyway identical with them, since transcendence would be abolished. Participants are the sensible beings, which are produced in the literal sense, and are absolutely dependent. This dependence, of course, aims at their hypostatic completeness. As the Henads, the participable element of the One, connect this supreme imparticipable principle with the participant Being (or the participant true beings), the species, in an analogous way, connect the metaphysical beings with the natural ones. At the same time, we can argue that mutatis mutandis there are correlations between the One and the species. As the One develops itself and becomes participable through the Henads, similarly the species undergo a progressive development and particularization of their content and is degraded to the level of the participable archetypes. 7 Just as a second One is discussed, in an analogous way we can refer to second species or to a second level of the species. The multitude as a metaphysical condition is developed in all levels. Secondly, discussing the transcendent and immanent character of the species, Proclus combines the functions they respectively have in Plato’s and Aristotle’s ontological systems. Consistently following the principles of his own system, he attempts at the preservation of the divine and transcendent character of the species but also at rendering production feasible, since he absolutely denies the materialistic exemplar and excludes the kind of production which is due to chance and automatization. It is found at the opposite side with reference to the mechanistic exemplar. Thus, he is led to combine Plato’s transcendent Realism (ante res universals) with Aristotle’s immanent Realism (in rebus universals). A. Kojève observes about this combination that Proclus wanted to reconcile the Platonic theory of the transcendent species with the Aristotelian theory of the enmattered species through the method of compro7

Op.cit., 1069.6–8.

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mise, i.e. by accepting the partial truth of these two opposing views. He accepted that one part of the species is transcendent while another part is enmattered, or, rather, that all species are partially transcendent and partially enmattered. In order to reconcile Plato with Aristotle, he believed that he should divide the objective (ideal) reality into an upper Platonic layer and a lower Aristotelian one. The upper layer is the Platonic intelligible world, which consists of the totality of individual “species” remaining eternally in the same condition identical with themselves. Thus, even though they extend to the empirical world, they remain also outside this field. The lower layer consists of the totality of Aristotelian species, which are eternally present in the empirical world. According to Proclus, the species are simultaneously (Platonic) archetypes separate from their images and (Aristotelian) causes inside their effects. 8 The only disagreement we can formulate to the above analysis is that the Neoplatonic scholarch does not use appositive solutions, but compound ones. In order for the species to become intramundane, they have to go through different levels and proceed to internal transformations, which will be later revealed through their products. However, in its totality the above takes place under the dominating prism of consistent monism. Thus, we could argue that, through the combination of the transcendent and enmattered species, Proclus aims to show – even if he does not declare it openly – that in his work one can find the dialectical combination of the two major ancient Greek philosophers. We could legitimately argue that he approaches both Plato and Aristotle considering them to be mutually complementary, and, therefore, that they are in a common ontological line. But as a Neoplatonist he clearly gives priority to Plato, since he stresses in order to become enmattered the species need to preexist as transcendent-separate. In fact he does not accept two categories of species – a position which would recognize some sort of priority to Aristotle –, but only one, i.e. the transcendent species, which becomes enmattered, too, through the hierarchical degradation of its level of presence. Thus, he basically examines the way the species See Essai d’une histoire raisonée de la philosophie paienne, vol. III, Paris 1973, pp. 456–464. 8

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“choose” to integrate themselves to matter, to define the terms of its formation in perpetuity. At the same time, we should stress that he does not attempt the reconciliation between Plato and Aristotle by means of an exact use of their theories, as would have been expected from the point of view of the history of philosophy. Instead, Proclus uses the tenets of his own system and the theogonic views of the Neoplatonic thought, which in his texts are led to their summit. This means that through this coloring he aims at serving the purposes of his own system through the use of the Platonic and the Aristotelian thought where necessary, instead of making a consistent dialectical combination of the two systems. Prima facie he tends to quote Plato and Aristotle and secondarily he attempts to combine them. We cannot have a consistent combination, if the categories we use for the frame of their articulations are incompatible, even if not in all aspects, with the theories which are combined. For instance, what relationship can there be between Proclus’ theogonies with the Platonic and the Aristotelian Ontology? However, a counter-argument, firmly based on logic and history, can be formulated against the above: it would be a mistake not to mention that from the fourth century B.C.E. until the fifth century C.E. theoretical studies were further developed and that the relationship between Plato and Aristotle had been examined in many aspects and has gone through various trials, with Syrianus playing the leading role here. Proclus, as a consistent historian of philosophy, at least, could not ignore the tradition, which had already been formed, so as not to use it critically and synthetically. On the other hand, he would not have been found original if he remained in the framework of thought of the two leading philosophers of classical Antiquity. His originality lies in the new perspective through which he approached and utilized them. He is not only a historian of philosophy. He is the thinker who dynamically prompts philosophy to a continuous transformation. Independent of whether Proclus proceeds to a citation or a composition of Plato and Aristotle, it is clear that he attempts to show their possibility to communicate with philosophical currents appearing in the evolution of time. Thus he shows the diachronical timeliness of their

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thought, which, in any case, emerged, and will continue emerging, by means of the tradition formed by the commentators. 9

9 For a general reading of the epistemological foundations in Proclus’ system, see E. Moutsopoulos, Les structures de l’imaginaire dans la philosophie de Proclus, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1985, pp. 97-115.

6. THE COMMUNION BETWEEN FORMS AND SENSIBLE BEINGS We have already found out that the way through which, according to Proclus, the Forms are distinguished and communicate with the sensible beings is exactly specified by their twofold presence, the transcendent and the intramundane. On the one hand, the philosopher argues that in their totality the Forms are undivided, immaterial, free from what is imperfect and in time, while their initial presence also transcends space. Having these properties, which express unity, they remain in themselves and do not communicate with the natural universe. However, the same properties contribute to the function of their immanence analogically. Thus, being dimensionless, they are present in the same way to all beings, which participate in their emanations, independently from whether they have dimensions, since they are natural. They are omnipresent without any difficulty; therefore, their unity is absolutely preserved. Simultaneously, as they are independent from time, they exist in the objects of their productive-archetypal reference timelessly and in a unitary way and are not subject to becoming. On the contrary, since every corporeal being has a concrete dimension and depends on the presuppositions and restrictions of its presence in space and time, it cannot be omnipresent and, more than that, by extension, it cannot be present in the same way in the more general and the particular beings. 1 Its presence is strictly specific and not categorically reducible, and, therefore, functions exclusively as a concrete subject. It cannot conquer the concept of the “universal”, while the 1

Cf. In Platonis Parmenidem, 871.7–873.34.

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area it possesses, because of its initial position or of its position later on, is strictly specific. Strictly in the framework of the metaphysics of immanence, however, the Forms are present to those beings which participate in their emanations, through their element that is transmitted and substantiated. Thus, based on the scheme ImparticipableParticipable-Participant they communicate with the world, which is subject to sense-perception, only through the element which derives from themselves, while at the same time they do not communicate because of their unmixed character of their essence. According to the principles of the Neoplatonist scholarch, this twofold way of existence is not contradictory. “Τὰ εἴδη καὶ πάρεστι τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν διὰ τῆς μεταδόσεως, καὶ οὐ πάρεστι διὰ τῆς χωριστῆς ὑποστάσεως, … καὶ κοινωνεῖν τὰ εἴδη τοῖς μετέχουσι, καὶ μὴ κοινωνεῖν˙ τῷ μὲν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν ἐλλάμπειν αὐτά, κοινωνεῖν, τῷ δὲ ἀμιγῶς εἶναι πρὸς τὰ ἐλλαμπόμενα, μὴ κοινωνεῖν”. 2 By extention, and due to the contribution of epistemological and logical parameters, it is noted that the Forms do not communicate with the sensible beings according to the principle of synonymy, which is implemented later anyway, but as something primary – and, of course, ontologically superior – to secondary things. 3 This is a distinction which clearly defines the ontological superiority, which also specifies the use of the concepts, which can be common, but are harmonized analogically. Therefore, ambivalence does not lead to ontological identity. As is clear, the whole relationship of the particular beings with the Forms takes place through participation, which excludes the identity among them and does not result in any sharing. However, it is underlined that this participation is not embodied, but immaterial. 4 Such participation brings to the fore two questions, which are interconnected: How are the Forms bodily present to the sensible beings and how do they communicate with them? There is a discussion, on the one hand, about a bodily manifestation of the Forms, and, on the other hand, about an incorporeal way of particOp. cit., 890.2–9. Op. cit., 880.4–13. 4 Op. cit., 856.4–858.40. 2 3

6. COMMUNION BETWEEN FORMS AND SENSIBLE BEINGS 107 ipation of the natural beings. Contradictions lurk here, since changes of ontological conditions are not excluded. Proclus undertakes to answer the questions again based on the principles he selects. Thus, he stresses that prior to the embodied beings and the immanent presence of the Forms there exist natural reason-principles, which, as we have seen, are not transcendent with reference to these beings, even though they consist in their immediate causal presuppositions. As a result, the natural reason-principles are in the same line with the sensible presences of the Forms. In our estimation, this formulation means that the natural reason-principles go through such processes in “collaboration” with matter, as well, so as to render the presence of the Forms sense-perceptible. On the other hand, natural reason-principles are nothing else but a projection of the way the Forms are combined, in a specific way in each case. Evidently based on this point, Proclus appeals to his beloved Realism. Thus, he stresses that the natural reason-principles bear the common element of particular beings. Thus, for instance, in the natural reason-principles preexists the natural reason-principle of Man, which consists the immediate productive cause of the first sensible man. After this, the many people, who are produced, participate in the first, who exactly expresses the first materially constructed presence of the natural reason-principle (the latter functioning now in connection with the inheritance of anything that might derive). Therefore, the natural reason-principles are intermediate and, to the extent that they are connected with matter, do not possess the perfection of the divine presence of the Forms, which has an authentic metaphysical content and does not mix directly and from the beginning with sensible beings. 5 Their presence, however, is not to be neglected, as they do not allow pantheism, while, at the same time, they explain how the metaphysical is transformed to material. Despite all these, his clarifications leave open questions. What is the ontological status of the natural reason-principles? Do they have an autonomous presence or are they part of the transformations? From the context of his texts, it seems that Proclus is not led to a sufficient solution. Our position is that the responsibility of 5

Op. cit., 877.32–880.3.

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any transformation belongs to the Forms. But since they consist in metaphysical realities, it is not possible for the human consciousness to describe their activities with the desired exactness. The participated elements of the Forms are connected in such a way which leads to the derivation of the reason-principles. In addition, Proclus holds that the Forms bestow existence and names on the particular beings. 6 As an extension of his transcendent realism, he observes that those who argue that the names are a matter of convention, accept as a consequence that the principle of their view is in the sensible beings. He holds, however, that this view is far from truth, evidently because it makes absolute what is intramundane, or, at least, it partially disconnects it from the metaphysical. He bases his critique on the fact that the Forms possess an ontological priority over the enmattered beings, while at the same time they consist their productive-paradeigmatic presuppositions. Whatever exists in the enmattered beings, preexists in the Forms. Consequently, the names belong firstly and mainly to the Forms and secondarily to the sensibles by way of reflection. Thus, “τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ νοεροῦ εἴδους λέγεται κυρίως, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ οὐ κυρίως οὐδὲ πάντῃ ἀληθῶς”. 7 It would be awkward for the cause to give existence to the effect and, at the same time, not to participate in its name. But, of course, the process takes place conversely as to the cognitive process of identification or formation of names. Finally, Proclus deals with the communion of the Forms with the sensible beings under the perspective of the relationship of the One with the manifold, which is evident in his system. This is a principle which presents a variety of specializations, depending on the field of its application. In his ontological system there is no field where it is not applied. 8 Thus, according to his formulation, Op. cit., 849.16–853.12. Op. cit., 851.5–7. 8 Op. cit., 869.29–870.39. Cf. J. Cleary, “The role of Mathematics in Proclus’ Theology”, p. 71: “As his commentarty on the Idea of Equality in Plato’s Parmenides reveals (In Parm. IV, 868.24–870.39), Proclus regards equality as the cause of harmony and proportion in all things. Within this context, he also refers to Plato’s Timaeus where the Demiurge, in con6 7

6. COMMUNION BETWEEN FORMS AND SENSIBLE BEINGS 109 every Form is the head of a related series and “ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσι νοεροῖς ψυχικοῖς, ἔτι δὲ καὶ σωματικοῖς, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς ἄλλως ἐν ἄλλαις, θείαις, δαιμονίαις, ἀνθρωπίναις καὶ ἐν σώμασιν ἄλλως ἐν ἄλλοις, οἷον τὸ καλὸν θείοις ἢ δαιμονίοις ἢ καὶ τούτων ὑφειμένοις”. 9 Every Form has, of course, its own unviolated character, but in its inner self it contains the totality of the causespowers, by means of which it will later become intramundane. This intramundane character is presented in many ways. However, before the immanence of the Forms, there exists their presence by means of the relationship “One-Many” both in the metaphysical and the intermediate levels. The metaphysical articulations-hierarchies here should be carefully examined. For instance, the presence of beauty with reference to daemons is perfectly understandable, but its presence with reference to gods is problematic. To which particular divine hypostases is it present? Evidently not to those which are superior to the Forms, since their field is not approached in strict terms cognitively by man, but to those which are inferior to them. In any case, whatever the Forms bestow pre-exists their own presence and activity. Their mission is to transmit the bestowment in a more specific and absolutely regulative way. Thus, every natural being gains its existence and defines its functions and relationships on the basis that it possesses particular powers of the Forms, with the analogies which correspond to itself and have been defined from above: “Μία γὰρ ἡ αὐτοϊσότης οὖσα πασῶν ἔχει τῶν ἰσοτήτων ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰς αἰτίας, τῆς ἐν βάρεσι, τῆς ἐν ὄγκοις, τῆς ἐν πλήθεσι, τῆς ἐν ἀξίαις, τῆς ἐν γενέσεσιν˙ ὥστε ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων παντοδαπῶν ὄντων ἴσον τὶ ἐστι, τὴν δύναμιν ὑφειμένην ἔχον τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τὴν ἀξίαν”. 10 It is not absolutely clear what is denoted by the term “value” (ἀξία). It is rather closely related to the place every being possesses in the hierarchy, on the basis of its participation in the archetypal emanations. structing the universe, used all the mathematical means (arithmetical, geometrical and harmonic) along with the uniting bonds that are based on them. So he concludes that Equality is the one intellectual cause that generates and organises the cosmos.” 9 In Platonis Parmenidem, 869.31–36. 10 Op. cit., 870.19–25.

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This passage is understood better than the previous one. The term “multitude” (πλήθεσι), however, does not denote exactly a concrete condition like weight, mass and generations. Even though the syntax of the sentence is not particularly helpful, what is more likely is that it refers to any natural condition which has the property of multiplying, and, therefore, also that of the extension in space for a specific period of time. Certainly, in any case, what is stressed is the undoubted Neoplatonic view about the overall priority of the metaphysical over the natural. Consequently, we understand that Proclus accepts two kinds of production – the divine and the intramundane –, their main, but not the only, difference being the distinction between what is subject to the sense-perception – not of course in an immediately direct way but as a process – and what is not. To justify this, we cite the following commentary on the 6th Book of the Platonic Republic, namely on the passage 507a7–b8: “Πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πλήθη νοητῶν ἐξάπτει (sc. ὁ Πλάτων) μονάδων, οἷον τὰ μὲν καλὰ πάντα τοῦ αὐτοκαλοῦ τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ πάντα τοῦ αὐτοαγαθοῦ τὰ δὲ αὖ ἴσα τοῦ αὐτοΐσου˙ καὶ τὰ μὲν νοητὰ θέμενος τὰ δὲ αἰσθητὰ (αἱ δὲ ἀκρότητες αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἵδρυνται μονοειδῶς), πάλιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν τούτων εἰδῶν ἐπαναβαίνειν ἀξιοῖ, καὶ τὴν ἀγαθότητα τὴν ἐπέκεινα τῶν νοητῶν μειζόνως σεβομένους, δι’ ἐκείνην πάντα καὶ εἶναι καὶ τελειοῦσθαι τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν˙ ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πλῆθος εἰς μονάδα τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἀσύντακτον ἀνάγομεν, καὶ διὰ ταύτην ἀξιοῦμεν καὶ τοῦτο τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν, οὕτως ἀνάγκη τὸ νοητὸν εἰς ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀναφέρειν μὴ συναριθμουμένην τοῖς νοητοῖς, ἀφ’ ἧς καὶ ταῦτα τὴν τε οὐσίαν ἔλαχε καὶ τὴν θείαν ὕπαρξιν”. 11 Thus, the Neoplatonist thinker succeeds in bridging the gap between the transcendent One-Good and the world of perceptible beings, by attributing feasibility to the process of becoming and by saving, at the same time, the independence of the supreme Principle from any concept of absolute worldliness. Of special interest is also the explicit reference to the Monad. The philosopher places it on two levels. First, he considers the Monad as the top and the source of a series of similar sensible beings, but it does not belong to the same 11

Theologia Platonica, II, 45.26–46.12.

6. COMMUNION BETWEEN FORMS AND SENSIBLE BEINGS 111 category with them. Secondly, he discusses the Monad of similar metaphysical beings, evidently meaning the Henad in each case. But in the first case as well, unity is preserved but in a specific way in each ranking. In his both references he insists mutatis mutandis on the presence of transcendence. This is the imparticipable, which remains absolutely independent from any process. Therefore, even though human consciousness succeeds in proceeding to a description of the metaphysical world, it cannot go further after a certain point. Negation shows a very strong resistence. Humans acknowledge their limits and the more objective solution they select is the principle of analogy, which, however, is a venture and an achievement. It is that principle which legalizes ambivalencies under certain terms. A term may be attributed to both worlds, but under particular presuppositions to each one of them. The prefix “αὐτο-” is in any case that which distinguishes the archetype from the effects and imprints the difference between the absolute and the relative possession of a property. Finally, we should note that even though in the cited passage above Proclus does not cease to use the concepts of his own system, he is clearly closer, in comparison with other cases, to the Platonic expressions which define the clear distinction between the metaphysical and the natural. However, two presuppositions are preserved, namely, that: (a) Plato does not refer to the intervention of theogonies, and (b) the difference between the Platonic dualism and the Neoplatonic monism is permanently there. 12

12 For a systematic reading of the above as expressing causality, see E. Moutsopoulos, Les structures de l’imaginaire dans la philosophie de Proclus, pp. 43-60.

7. ASPECTS OF THE FUNCTION OF THE METAPHYSICAL FORMS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In this chapter we will undertake the examination of certain aspects of Proclus’ theory about the Forms, which are developed in his commentary on the dialogue Parmenides, the “Gospel” of the Neoplatonic School. We will elaborate his attempt to show that the entities mediating between the metaphysical and the natural world need to be defined by particular species, so that the direct productive transition of the former to the latter is possible. Moving consistently within his theory about the intermediates, the Neoplatonist scholarch is presented here as generally arguing that the transition from species to matter does not take place in a direct way. It should also be noted that a chaotic image of disorder is far from the Neoplatonic theoretical schemes about the world, which are by definition teleological. This is an interpretation which is connected with the way each reality acquires its own hypostatic reasonprinciple, both as to what it receives from above as well as to how it utilizes it. The above are projected through a variety of distinctions-multitudes, which specifically secure the transition from the metaphysics of transcendence to the metaphysics of immanence. In this chapter our reference will be made to Proclus’ views about the irrational souls and all their inferior realities which intervene successively until matter. In his previous thematic unit he had referred to the species of the rational souls, i.e. of the realities which constitute the last authentic stage of development – as an increasing degradation – of the metaphysical world. It is the stage which, more than its posterior ones, is not mixed with the conditions subject to becoming and is not directly involved in their processes, no matter how extensively it had already prepared them by means of rational terms of construction. From the irrational souls 113

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onwards starts the transition to the sense-perceptible world, i.e. the area of enmattered circumstances and change, which is defined as undervalued only in comparison to what has preceded it. Here the following condition is added: the world which is subject to senseperception follows in total – despite the particular disappearences – a course of increasing improvement, a realization in new terms of bestowments from the metaphysical area. In our estimation, this issue is ontologically primary, because it is also connected with a possibility bestowed to the natural world from above aiming at its divinization, within the framework of the metaphysics of immanence, which gradually receives an always wider content. In these terms, the meaning of the natural universe is not exhausted within its typical operations, but reaches the way it shows within itself its transcendent principles and their plannings. Therefore, the cosmological process moves to improvements, so that the universe acquires the unity which is its destination. Finally, we should clarify that in Proclus’ monistic system there is no pure Form of matter. This is simply posited in certain cases for the sake of theoretical facilitations. In truth, it is the product of the composition of metaphysical reason-principles and, as such, it gradually appears by means of new formations, until the teleological planning is realized.

SPECIES AND IRRATIONAL SOULS

At first for Proclus it is self-evident that even the irrational souls have an intelligible paradigm or “Form”, by which they are defined in themselves and as to their projections and their relations. He founds their metaphysical determination on the fact that something analogous happens with reference to the other ontological fields which are related to the production of sense-perceptible realities. We should stress that this production is more or less indirect on every level of hierarchy, since the literally direct production is executed by the irrational souls. He observes that, since there are certain immutable elements in various other entities of a lower ontological level concerning the authentic metaphysical unity, by necessity an analogous immanence should exist in the souls of this cate-

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gory 1. The concept of analogy clearly has not only an epistemological, but also an ontological basis as well, and is defined as gradation of the same combinations; therefore, on the level of naming a number of meanings of the same term occurs. It is clear that here Proclus defends the view that the metaphysical powers preserve their presence and bestow their properties on ontological levels which are subject to transformations, i.e. on those which belong to the branch of cosmology. The analogy, however, is not only an internal condition of the metaphysical world, but also a way of encounter between the metaphysical and the natural. Therefore, from the point of view of epistemology, the same describing terms can be used for both worlds. The bestowment of the former on the latter transfers real ontological conditions, which of course the latter did not possess from the beginning. This intervention evidently shows the projection of a kind of consistent monism, since the metaphysical world is not deprived of its responsibilities, even if the process of “becoming” has commenced. On the contrary, it imposes them absolutely, independently from the degree of its initial absorption or the time period which will be required for the completion of their penetration. On the other hand, we should not forget that universally the intelligibles are not only efficient and paradigmatic causes, but also final as well. Only in a consistent monistic model can the final cause function in its completeness, since the terms are from the beginning permanent in their stability. On the other hand and for the sake of further confirmation, the totality of what exists returns to the condition that it consists not only of the sublime but also the exclusive reality of authentic ontological exemplar and meanings. Furthermore, it should be noted that the irrational souls are characterized as “μερισταὶ περὶ τοῖς σώμασι”, an expression which needs clarification in any case, since there is no discussion about “ἐν τοῖς σώμασι”. What is more likely is that the discussion is about non-material interventions for legislative penetrations. Even though the selected expression does not denote an informing and permanently repeated intervention, it rather refers to whatever legislative is inserted among the natural bodies and will preserve them 1

See In Parm., 819.30–33. Cf. Plotinus, Enn., VI. 7,9.

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in the particular condition and position. The normative model in descriptions of this kind cannot be absent, since it is not possible for matter to proceed to self-regulation without deviation. On the other hand, even if such an interpretation is defended on the basis of the self-movement of the natural universe, it should not be misunderstood that this condition is due to the metaphysics of immanence, which is activated in a permanent and stable way. As an indication of this we cite the following text: “Ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεὸς ἀθρόως πάντα καὶ διαιωνίως παράγει, κατ’ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰώνιον τῶν ὅλων νόησιν καὶ τὰ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ πάντα ἀπογενᾷ, τά τε ὑπερκόσμια καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ σύμπαντα, νόας, ψυχάς, φύσεις, σώματα, τὴν ὕλην αὐτήν […] Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὁ τὸν πατέρα μιμούμενος διὰ τῆς ἐμφανοῦς δημιουργίας δῆλον ὡς ὑφεῖται τῆς διαφανοῦς καὶ ἀφανοῦς ποιήσεως. Πάντων δ’ οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς δημιουργίας ὁμοῦ καὶ αἰωνίως παραγoμένων ὅμως καὶ ἡ τάξις σώζεται τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων πρόεισι γὰρ ἀθρόως ἕκαστα μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν τάξεως” (In Tim., III, 102.7–19). Therefore, the law defines the order which can also be hierarchical. However, attention is necessary as to the word “ὁμοῦ”. Evidently, it is used to exclude an evolution in the supernatural field analogous to that of the natural. Also of interest is the position concerning eternal production, which should be conceived as an eternal bestowment to becoming on behalf of the divine archetypes. Thus, its total reduction to authentic existence at once is excluded. Clarifying his terminology, the Neoplatonist thinker underlines that he calls “irrational souls” all those ontological realities which preserve the properties of life and evidently of being, which is a universal presupposition, but are inferior in comparison with the content of the metaphysical world. These are two categories which ensure the existence and function of the natural universe respectively; therefore, the reference to their presence is clearly self-evident. It is evident, however, according to Proclus’ rules concerning hierarchical evolution that they possess and preserve the properties they have received by the inferior divine levels, which extend till their own constitutive beginning. What is basically discussed is the properties which are defined as transformations of the essential self of its prior causes. It is entities which have derived during the last phases of the metaphysical development through the process of the “specialized partition”. Precisely because of this degraded – in a sense but clearly not absolute – property, they have

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been settled in the bodily hypostases, which they themselves have basically created according to the metaphysical planning they follow. It should be noted that this planning has an inexhaustible variety, which is an indication of a consistent teleology without typical repetitions. We cite here a passage from the In Tim.: “Τριττῆς δὲ οὔσης τῆς περὶ τὸ πᾶν δημιουργίας, πρώτης μὲν καθ’ ἣν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ἀναλογίᾳ δεθέντων ὅλον ἐξ ὅλων αὐτὸ παρήγαγε, τῆς δὲ δευτέρας καθ’ ἣν ἐκ τῶν ὅλων αὐτὸ σφαιρῶν διεκόσμησεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ὄν μὴ διηρῆσθαι ταῖς σφαίραις· τρίτης δὲ τῆς ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν αὐτὸ συμπληρούσης ζῴων, οὐρανίων, ἀερίων, ἐνυδρίων, χθονίων, ἐν τούτοις τὴν μέσην ἡμῖν ἐξέφηνεν” (ΙΙΙ, 281.23–30). According to Proclus’ usual tactics, the paradigm of evolution which is subject to analogies is present everywhere, moving in terms of distinctions and coherences. At the same time, however, the described souls are eternal and this eternal condition they enjoy needs to derive from the totality of their metaphysical causes, which preserve their properties independently from their interventions. 2 In order to understand the objective foundations of See In Parm., 819.33–35. We also cite the following passage, which is an indication of how Proclus conceives the presence of gods in the natural universe, after the end of the metaphysical evolution: “Ὁ περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ σελήνην θεῶν λόγος συνεχὴς ἐστι τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν οὐρανίων θεῶν καί τῷ ἐκείνης ἐξηρτῆσθαι τὸ τέλειον ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ γενεσιουργὸς τῶν θεῶν χορὸς συνέπεται τοῖς ἐν οὐρανῷ θεοῖς καί κατά μίμησιν τοῦ οὐρανίου κύκλου συνελίσσει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ γενέσει κύκλω· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἡνωμένην πρόοδον ἕπεται τὰ δεύτερα τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν· … πάντες μὲν οἱ νῦν ὑφιστάμενοι θεοὶ τὸ γεννητικὸν καὶ τὸ τελεσιουργὸν ἀποσώζουσι τοῦ γεννήσαντος τό τε δημιουργικὸν καὶ τὸ σταθερὸν τῆς ποιήσεως, μέτρα δὲ καὶ ὅρος καὶ τάξιν ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρός παρεδέξαντο, καὶ ὅσα ἐκεῖνος ἐξῃρημένως ἐπιτροπεύει καὶ ὁλικῶς, ταύτα οὗτοι διελόμενοι κατὰ κλήρους δημιουργοῦσι καὶ γεννῶσι καὶ τελειοῦσι” (In Tim., V, 162.1–163.4). The encounter between Plato (transcendence of the source) with Aristotle (teleological immanent presence of the source) and the Stoics (reference to reason), is seen often in Proclus’ texts. Concerning this point A. Kojève underlines: “Proclus admet, avec Aristote, la nécessité d’ une Cause idéelle immanente, qui est chez lui la Physis comprise comme ensemble des Raisons séminales stoïciennes. Mais il affirme, avec Pla2

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ton, qu’il y a un Modèle du Monde qui est transcendant à lui” (Essai d’ une histoire…, III, p. 465 [Translation: Proclus accepts, in accordance with Aristotle, the necessity of an immanent ideal Cause, which for himself is Nature viewed as totality of the spermatic logoi of the Stoics. But in accoedance with Plato he asserts that there is an Exemplar of the World which is transcendent to it]). In our estimation in the work of Proclus the spermatic principles of the Stoics correspond to that which is contained in Nature, and, therefore, are inferior to the Forms. They are rather projections of the Forms at a stage prior to becoming perceptible. Generally, however, the Forms, independent of the way of their communication with becoming, preserve their separate character. We cite A. Berger’s following remark, which exactly defines the levels of simplicity and non-necessity of the immanence of the Forms: “Si les idées peuvent se communiquer à tous les êtres sans se mêler à eux, sans cesser d’être elles-mêmes, c’est que, pour emprunter l’expression de Platon, chacune existe en soi, αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό. Ces deux mots sont réunis à dessein: ils experiment deux caractères differents de l’existence des idées. Αὐτό désigne leur simplicité; elles sont ce qu’elles sont, et rien autre chose. Kαθ’ αὑτό sert à montrer qu’elles ne resident point en un sujet, dont l’union avec elles serait la condition nécessaire de leur existence; ce qui les distingue aussitôt de ce que nous nommons dans un genre le caractère commun. Celui-ci, en effet, n’existe point en soi: il n’est réellement, que lorsqu’il est dans la manière: aussi n’est-il point éternel, mais changeant et périssable” (Proclus. Exposition de sa doctrine, Paris 1840, p. 63 [Translation: If the Forms can communicate with the Beings without intermingling with them, i.e. without ceasing to be their own selves, this means, in order to borrow Plato’s expression, that each one remains itself, αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό. These two words are united in one cohesive perspective: they express two different characters of the existence of the Forms. Αὐτό denotes their simplicity; i.e. it is what it is and nothing else. Kαθ’ αὑτό serves to show that they are far in relation to a sense-perceptible subject, the unity of which with the rest it preserves as a necessary condition of its existence: that which distinguishes them par excellence is what we call the common character in a genus. This subject here indeed does not exist so much in the condition of being itself: it does not really exist unless it exists in modality: also, it is not eternal at all, but is subject to change and destruction]). Therefore, we identify three levels: (a) that of the independent presence of the Forms, (b) that of their immanent presence in the senseperceptible beings, and (c) that of the sense-perceptible things themselves, which do not preserve the immanent presence of the Forms in the con-

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eternity, we should recall the basic principle of the philosopher that the transcendent source of every principle remains undiminished, i.e. the condition of “remaining” (μονή). Thus the relationship of the metaphysical region with the structural elements existing in the natural is also located in the analogous presence of the properties, which are channelled from the superior to the lower ontological levels and remain there as they promote certain functions of construction and eternally legislative norms. Whatever specialization is found in the natural field should have been formed in its generality upon the transcendent field. Of course, there is no mechanistic correspondence either of one term with the other or of parallel structures, since each archetype is one, while its imprints are many. We will find out in what follows that the transition from the archetypes to the effects is not realized in an immediate way. In all of his texts where Proclus refers to production, the way in which the aforementioned bestowment of properties takes place follows a long process of specializations, which begins accordingly at a certain point of the metaphysical space, evidently on the basis of a planning which has multiple radiations. This point is an ontological nucleus with everlasting possibilities of production of common specifications for whatever is subject to its archetypical responsibility. Afterwards certain laws are activated and this ordered intervention results in a broad spectrum of manifestations and the bestowments on lower levels acquire a strictly special content. The natural law does not impose mechanistic inflexibilities, even though its general principles are inviolable. We would say that it is implemented accordingly in terms of a special adaptation, which, in a system with the divine as its centre, cannot but be directed by providence, which, even though it is one, it is specialized. In order to make his remarks more exact, the Neoplatonist philosopher mentions that at the starting point which is discussed here there is one monad and one “Form”, which specify the irrational souls. He also stresses that in all ontological manifestations this kind of starting point is necessary to exist, so that the particularly appropriate result is completely realized. The monad and the tinuum and from a certain point onwards they are led to disappearance. However, this takes place on a microscopic scale.

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Form consist in a necessary combination, so that the sources are preserved inviolable in every new perceptible appearance. It should be noted that in his commentary on the Platonic Timaeus 36e Proclus clarifies the following as to the way, despite particularities, the cohesive coherences are still preserved. Once again it is stressed that the natural articulations do not influence the way of existence of the source: “καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ σ υ ν α γ α γ ε ῖ ν τὴν ἕνωσιν ἐμφαίνει τὴν δημιουργικὴν καὶ τὸν δεσμὸν τὸν αὐτόν, καθ’ ὃν ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ πᾶν, τὸ δὲ π ρ ο σ α ρ μ ό σ α ι τὴν ἐναρμόνιον ὁμιλίαν τοῦ σώματος πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν, ἐκείνης τε τὰ ἑαυτῆς πραττούσης καὶ τούτου τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν διαφυλάττοντος καὶ οὐ περισπῶντος τὴν νόησιν τῆς θείας οὐσίας οὐδὲ καθέλκοντος· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐναρμόνιον τῆς κοινωνίας εἶδος” (In Tim., III, 283.6–13). Planning is evident everywhere and moves in the form of an evolution from the initial constitutive limitation of the source within its productive projections, among which there should evidently exist a common principle of presence, since the transcendent itself is not divided. Both the monad and the “species” in their combinations have undertaken a certain mission, which in its totality causes the existence of a specialized product, even though here, too, the terms of encounter follow general rules and are closely interconnected with the other missions. If they were not interconnected, the possibility of realization of the teleological exemplar would have been abolished. The monad is an ontological condition with almost inexhaustible possibilities of bestowments, since in its interior there are in spermatic condition or in the form of plannings those corresponding entities which are about to be produced in a following stage. Thus, by means of its manifestation the relationship “one-multitude” is formed and has common terms of cosmical development, which are particularly hypostized. Here, however, a clarification is necessary: The monad which is discussed cannot be identified with the one (the second ἕν). It is accordingly the product of the one, which undertakes a special mission initially moving within its own space by means of its multiplication: “Πᾶσα τάξις ἀπὸ μονάδος ἀρχομένη πρόεισιν εἰς πλῆθος τῇ μονάδι σύστοιχον, καὶ πάσης τάξεως τὸ πλῆθος εἰς μίαν ἀνάγεται μονάδα” (Elem. Theol., pr. 21, p. 24.1–3). For instance, the intellect as a monad produces the particular intellects. The encounters begin from the point where the initial monads have ended their projections. More specifically, certain particulars are connected and con-

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sist in the monad of a series of perceptible beings, which are produced through its multiplication. But how is the constitutive position of the Form defined at this point? First, we would say that the Form functions additionally to the monad and consists in the paradigm or the archetype which offers the general property possessed here as well commonly but also in a specialized way by the entities to appear. Therefore, from the specific combination of the monad with the Form a common category of beings will occur. They will be connected in terms of similarity, which does not abolish the initial-nuclear essential identity. Proclus observes that this particular starting point can be named by means of various terms, depending each time on the relationship we identify it has with the entities which are produced. 3 The name which is accordingly given, among the many which can be formulated, denotes mainly relationship and not so much the content of the interconnected ontological fields. Therefore, we can discuss an apophaticism of a peculiar type or the acceptance of productive relativism, which describes the See op. cit., 819.37–820.2: “Καὶ τούτων (sc. τῶν ἀλόγων ψυχῶν) μονάδα μίαν προτακτέον καὶ ἰδέαν μίαν, εἴτε πηγαίαν φύσιν, εἴτε αἰσθητικήν, εἴτε ὁπωσοῦν αὐτὴν ἐθέλοις καλεῖν”. The domination of the empirical factors here is clear with reference to the needs of the descriptions, but from any point of view “appearing” does not become autonomous from “being”. In such a case, the whole Neoplatonic construction would be demolished. The epistemological expressions are in any case not distant from what we would define as possibility with strict descriptions. Their perspective belongs to the horizon of the possible. Summarizing the structure of Proclus’ ontological system on the basis of the function of the monads, J. Trouillard observes the following: “L’univers de Proclos est construit de telle sorte que chaque monade est un tout qui symbolise avec le Tout, grâce à quoi elle peut rejoindre la loi de tout production ainsi que le centre universel. La procession n’abolit jamais la manence dont elle part, mais s’ appuie constament sur elle” (La mystagogie de Proclos, p. 224 [Translation: The world of Proclus has been constructed in such a way, that each monad is a whole symbolizing the Whole, due to which it can unite the law of every production with the universal centre]). The Procession never abolishes the Remaining, from which it derives, but is applied firmly on it. The metaphysics of transcendence is in close relationship with the metaphysics of immanence. 3

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“how” of the manifestation of the indescribable conditions, or probably the product of their encounter as well. On the basis of what has been elaborated so far, if we were in search of the term which distinguishes the monad from the Form, we would be led to that the former is recorded as a multiplying power, while the latter as constructive-functional. On the basis perhaps of an organismic model, they repeat their combination for as long as it is programmatically specified from above and produce at the same time – but in terms of eternity for themselves – a product which is aesthetically remarkable. Despite all this, there is still a question as to which of the two metaphysical realities precedes over the other. The question is reasonable only because Proclus has used hierarchy to an uncontrollable extent; therefore, the reading of the rules he proposes is not easy. Some necessary clarifications are not available with reference to this topic; therefore we have to look for other texts of Proclus in which he contemplates the whole issue through the necessity of interventions. Thus we read: “πᾶν γὰρ εἶδος καὶ ἑνός ἐστι καὶ πλήθους γεννητικόν· ἑνὸς μέν, ὅτι πρὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἑαυτῷ παραπλησίαν ὑφίστησι μονάδα, πλήθους δέ, ὅτι πᾶσα μονὰς ἔχει μεθ’ ἑαυτῆς σύστοιχον ἀριθμόν. καὶ τὸ αὐτοζῷον οὖν ὡς μὲν μονάδα τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ὑφίστησιν, τῷ δὲ ὅλῳ καθ’ ἑκάστην τάξιν ἀνάλογον ἀπογεννᾷ τὸ τὴν πρὸς τὸ πᾶν ὁμοιότητα κατ’ ἐκείνην τὴν σειρὰν ἀποσῴζειν δυνάμενον. καὶ τὸ ἡλιακὸν παράδειγμα γεννᾷ μὲν καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν ἥλιον τὸν ἐμφανῆ, παράγει δὲ καὶ ἡλιακῶν ζῴων ἀριθμὸν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἐχόντων, ὡς ἀφ’ ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν, ἀεὶ τῶν δευτέρων ἀμυδροτέραν ἐχόντων τὴν πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον εἶδος ὁμοιότητα. καὶ ἔστι τοιαῦτα ζῷα τὰ μὲν οὐράνια, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ σελήνην, ὡς καὶ μέχρι γῆς καθήκειν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀριθμόν. καὶ τοίνυν καὶ ὁ αὐτοάνθρωπος οὐκ εὐθὺ παράγει τὸ πλῆθος τοῦτο τὸ ἄπειρον· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἄμεσος ἡ πρόοδος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν τῇ μονάδι προσεχῶν καὶ οἰκείων ἀριθμῶν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ νοητὸν εἶδος ἕν ἐστι, δεῖ μὴ τὸ ἄπειρον ποιεῖν εὐθύς, ἀλλὰ μονάδα πρῶτον, εἶτα τὸν οἰκεῖον ἀριθμὸν καὶ ἐφεξῆς· τοῦ γὰρ νοητοῦ μὲν ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ πεπληθυσμένου μέσον ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν μέν, μοναδικὸν δέ, τῷ μὲν προελθεῖν αἰσθητὸν γενόμενον, τῷ δὲ σῶσαι τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ παραδείγματος μοναδικὸν ὑποστάν” (In Tim., Ι, 444.16–445.5). The hierarchical order is clear, the priority of species is accepted and simultaneously the ontological relationship within the successive levels, in the form of unfolding and not only developing, is left un-

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touched. We can also argue that there is no essential difference, since the monad is a self-developed number and contains the monad which has proceeded to the “progress” corresponding to it. It has already been shown that in each case monad and number possess a specific content compared to all the rest. Also of interest is the transition from the intelligible to the perceptible, which takes place through a perceptible entity which has not become multiple and to some extent preserves its similarity with the intelligible source, itself remaining unique and irrepeatable with reference to what follows. At this point, it should be observed that according to Neoplatonic theories the production on all levels with no exception has many dimensions, both in depth downwards by means of new entities and in width as horizontal with the establishment of the necessary limits so that the successive coherences are founded accordingly and indirectly concerning the totality. From the macroscopic point of view, however, what is in depth and what is in width cannot be independent from each other, especially when the model is holistic, both in itself and as to its aims, and by definition subject to unity. Human consciousness, however, does not have the presuppositions to acquire full knowledge of those “dimensions”, mainly for reasons related to the range of its immediate sense perception. Therefore, it remains on the level of an analogical approach to them, according to what it can include in its own cognitive capacity concerning the outcomes of the metaphysical manifestations. Here again the way the products are created needs to be specified. Proclus holds consistently this view, without proceeding in any way to an uncontrolled transcendence of cognitive limits. Thus, for instance, he mentions that due to the existence of the cognitive capacity within irrational souls, the expert on this topic would argue that they acquire their hypostasis from that extreme and spontaneous ontological condition which possesses superior epistemological capabilities. Also, because of the existence of appetite in their natural structure, he would add that they acquire their hypostasis from that extreme and spontaneous ontological condition as well which possesses the property of appetite. Finally and conclusively, that from all those productive causes and from the rest which are nec-

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essary, comes the multitude of those souls which are activated with their various properties within the world of sense perception through the process of progressive development. 4 The deriving general position is that every universal property is prior to the multitude of their particular specifications, which are immanent within the things. As a result, every immanent soul possesses a set of interconnected elements and is not characterized by a simplifying monism, indepedent from the fact that in its interior a certain property prevails. This property defines the rest and aims at the strict ontological definition of the soul. It defines both its own selfidentity and its otherness with the rest and the functions it will undertake or the relationships to which it will proceed permanently within the framework of a particular and a general teleology. This various inherence, through an enhancement of theoretical limits, could be perceived within the perspective of the Stoic “sympatheia”, i.e. of the reciprocity which dominates among all factors which consist the existent. Referring to their properties, Proclus stresses that these souls are, of course, eternal as to their motion, and evidently as to their sources, but they are irrational as to their essential hypostasis. It could be argued, therefore, that a kind of pampsychism prevails in the world of natural entities, like a power filling everything with soul but without a clear rational function, at least as to the degree it becomes conscious of it, at least from the beginning. Probably here a mechanistic model of a lower order is introduced, since in all the previous interventions the property of rationality dominates. As to which causes are characterized as irrational, this is evidently due additionally to the fact that they themselves do not have a principle of self-realization and intervention concerning the specific content of which they will not be conscious. They do not have an autonomous normative character, since it is accompanied by certain other realities, the specific content of which they will not have the necessary knowledge. On the other hand, the philosopher argues that as to the regulative responsibility they possess, they have settled within hypostases which move eternally, but in a divisible way. This See op. cit., 820.2–8. Also, J.Trouillard, La mystagogie de Proclos, pp. 109–118. 4

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means that they do not have the constitutional dimension of metaphysical beings, which function as unities in a permanent way, with reference to that which emanates from their hypostasis. This motion, however, takes place in accordance both with a certain number, which has been established initially in their interior, and with that measure which has the possibility of interventions so as to impose a particular “Form”. 5 What is expected is that they acquire knowledge of the internal equipment they have so that they can activate themselves accordingly. This compound order means that whatever exists in the world of sense-perception functions on the basis of the principles and the functions defined by the metaphysical realities, which offer whatever is related to limitations, i.e. the harmonious order and the formed characteristics; therefore, the aesthetic model functions here additionally as well. At first glance, there is no reason to seek for parallel terms in the two worlds, because the pantheistic scheme would be implemented through the construction of pyramids with entities of equal power. However, after all that has been elaborated so far, the parallel character is feasible during the discussion of the intermediate perceptible reality, which, by being one, brings to the fore whatever precedes in metaphysics. For instance, the first perceptible man reflects the ideal man as a metaphysical Form in its momentum towards production. For the construction, however, of the ideal man, superior metaphysical powers are combined in a special way, and this is the difference from the first snse-perceptible man in the field of ontology. Finally, within the region of the natural universe the many men project the creation which begins with the first perceptible man, with reference to whom it is not explained how he exactly derives from the ideal man. The principle of interventions dominates and goes through the many dimensions presented by the terms “monad” and “multitude”, a route which is not absolutely knowable by humans. In search of the general framework in which the abovementioned condition is placed, Proclus stresses that the whole ontologSee In Parm., 820.8–12. For a systematic elaboration of Proclus’ theory about “Numbers”, see Ann. Charles-Saget, L’architecture du divin, pp. 191–296. 5

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ical system functions within limits, even though it is in the developing process of multiplication. Specifying this principle, he underlines that every eternal multitude, i.e. of a metaphysical order, does not extend to the infinite, as it has limits in the sense of that definite reception of the Form which is appropriate to it. At the same time, prior to every finite multitude, i.e. subject to becoming, there exists the reality which offers it the limits and organizes it by means of numbers, i.e. it renders it concrete in a way which is also quantitively measurable and capable of scientific elaboration. 6 It is well meant, of course, that numbers have a teleologically limited ontological content and a cosmological content prior to that, while at the same time the presuppositions for scientific analysis, which are ensured, are characterized by different degrees of tension. For instance, the scientific approach of the metaphysical world presupSee In Parm., 820.12–14: “πᾶν γὰρ ἀΐδιον πλῆθος πεπέρασται, παντὸς δὲ πεπερασμένου πλήθους προϋπάρχει τὸ περατοῦν ταῦτα καὶ ἀριθμοῦν”. Also, J.Trouillard, L’Un et l’âme selon Proclos, pp. 69–77, where in the first paragraphs it reads: “Une théorie néoplatonicienne de l’âme implique une prise de position sur le problème classique de la matière et de la forme. Là encore Proclos se retrouve devant l’héritage aristotélicien […] Le Lycien assimile la distinction forme – matière à l’opposition pythagoricienne et platonicienne πέρας-ἄπειρον, qu’il semble tenir pour équivalante de la division μονάς-δυάς ἀόριστος” (p. 69 [Translation: A Neoplatonic theory about the soul applies a version of the position on the classical problem of matter and form. Proclus here is in front of the Aristotelian heritage … The Lycian philosopher assimilates the distinction to the Pythagorean opposition πέρας-ἄπειρον, which seems to be the equivalent of the distinction μονάς-δυάς ἀόριστος]). In the last couple of concepts there is a clear reference to Plato’s unwritten doctrines, Speusippus and Xenocrates. Cf. W. Beierwaltes, Proklos, Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik, pp. 50–60. In any case, more than evident here is the influence of the Platonic dialogue Philebus, which comes intensively to the fore and becomes a central subject of research in late Neoplatonism, mainly because it posits in a mandatory way the necessity of the exact specification of the multitude. Parenthetically, we should note that the finite corresponds to the One and the “infinite” to the indefinite Dyad. The reality of unity denotes its domination and allows from this point onwards the beginning of the productive processes. 6

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poses other tools as well, like intuition. Parenthetically, we should remark that the careful theoretical constructions of this kind correspond, by means of indirect reductions, to the theological orientation of the Neoplatonist philosopher. When all beings by definition are directed by the divine powers, they cannot be led to disordered chaos; thus they offer the presuppositions for their own scientific elaboration. Their order is doubtlessly guaranteed, while Proclus adds that the multitude of the irrational souls derives from the rational souls as well and mainly from the archetypal paradigms which exist within their interior, in the frame of a “monadological” pluralism. The recall of the coherence of the Form with the monad here as well is beyond all doubt. The species is the general normative basis which the monad specifies in multiple ways. In our opinion, this emanation exactly denotes the preexistence of the effects within their causes as well as the posterior existence of the causes within their effects, while here any sort of equality in power is excluded. On the other hand, Proclus in all his ontological treatises does not abolish his position that the condition of participation is a connection of a superior with an inferior reality. Thus, their coeternity could be investigated here, together, of course, with the discussion as to from what point onwards. At the same time what is evident here, as well, is the implementation of a principle which was dear to the philosopher, namely that of intermediate or intervening causes. This principle is about co-production, with its internal specializations and the variety of shares and connections which are ensured. However, here we could posit something like an objection as to the way participation is realized, as projection and reception respectively, between two realities which are directly connected. Is intervention not necessary here? How is the lower point of the superior reality interconnected with the upper point of the inferior one? Is there not a space in between? The scholarch has rather solved the problem through the production within the frame of the same ontological field, as a hierarchical co-existence of the cause and the effect: “Πᾶν τὸ ἀμέθεκτον ὑφίστησιν ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τὰ μετεχόμενα, καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ μετεχόμεναι ὑποστάσεις εἰς ἀμεθέκτους ὑπάρξεις ἀνατείνονται […] τὸ δὲ μετεχόμενον πᾶν, τινὸς γενόμενον ὑφ’ οὗ μετέχεται, δεύτερόν ἐστι τοῦ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως παρόντος καὶ πάντα ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ πληρώσαντος.” (Elem. Theol., pr. 23, p. 26.22– 23). Implementing this general proposition on our case, we cannot

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but defend that the rational souls develop a participated – logical, as well, but of a secondary degree – condition in which the irrational ones participate. Anyway, Proclus here is mainly interested in showing that co-production is exactly the cause which contributes to the attachment of the irrational with the rational souls in the world of sense-perception, for the derivation of the beings which are subject to becoming by means of their particular appearance. Therefore, in every being of the world of sensible experience there is a degree of rationality, following a certain hierarchy of course, even by means of interventions. On the other hand, in the metaphysical field it is unavoidable that one measure or the initial ontological basis of the irrational souls is found to be together with the many archetypal “Forms” of those natural entities, the number of which they jointly produce. This number will impose their own limits. 7 Independently from what processes take place in the natural universe as to evolution, their presuppositions have been posited with an absolute exactness in the metaphysical field according to the combinations which will take place as well. This view is critical, because it shows that the cosmological “game” focuses on selfformations and joint formations which transcend it. What is discussed is metaphysical powers in the process of self-management See In Parm., 820.15–21. Here the rational souls are presented as efficient and paradigmatic causes of the irrational ones, with the latter property preceding the former. Also, Proclus, Theol. Plat., vol. IV, 6.6–17.14. Clearly extreme materialism is excluded from the world of experience and it is recognized as having a divine content, since the metaphysics of immanence is preserved till the final limits of matter, which cannot be conceived independent of the qualities by means of which it is accordingly manifested. From this citation, which is a sample of Proclus’ theogony, we will isolate a passage which deals with our argumentation in the main text of our study concerning a possible metaphysical nominalism: “τὰ θεῖα γένη πάντα συμπλοκὴν ἀδιάλυτον ἔλαχε καὶ κοινωνίαν καὶ φιλίαν θαυμαστὴν καὶ ὕφεσιν εὔτακτον καὶ ὑπεροχὴν τὴν μὲν συντεταγμένην, τὴν δὲ ἐξῃρημένην. Καὶ ἀεὶ τὸ προϊὸν συνεχές ἐστι τῷ παράγοντι καὶ μετὰ τῆς σταθερᾶς ἐν τοῖς αἰτίοις ἱδρύσεως ποιεῖται τὰ δεύτερα τὴν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν πρόοδον, καὶ μία σειρὰ καὶ συγγένεια τῶν πάντων, ἀεὶ τῶν δευτέρων ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν δι’ ὁμοιότητος ὑφισταμένων” (op. cit., 13. 10–18). 7

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by means of combinations, the quality of which will be evaluated afterwards on the basis of their products, and of the possibility they themselves have for exact participations. With reference to number, we would say that quantitively it should be infinite or as big as teleology requires, given that matter has the presuppositions to participate in these processes, proceeding by means of continuous improvement. According to Proclus, we should also have in mind that both the divine and the pure souls (evidently those which are not mixed with matter) preserve in an authentic way their rational, i.e. cohesive and unificatory, manifestations, even when they are in the natural universe. 8 This immanence is clearly indirect as well, even though they are present through the intervention of the irrational souls. Thus it is stressed here once again that the metaphysical substratums are continuously preserved in their a priori condition with no changes. If there were changes, the teleological model would gradually become invalid. Therefore, when they are activated, they appear in the form of those interventions which have an integrated and structural character, independently from the way they are perceived or participated. The capability to absorb becomes something relative and it improves itself as to the structure and the formation of those which appear gradually. By means of this property the fields where they intervene are preserved and do not perish as to their generality, despite the destruction or loss which is observed in the particulars. What would be the evolution of the empirical world in perpetuity and how would it gradually realize its entelechy, unless its sources were ontologically stable? Also, unless the general frames of its self-activity were strictly defined, since they ensure the “regenerations” as well? The affirmative reply to these questions leads us to argue that the intermediate condition between each archetype and the multitude of the imprints, i.e. the perceptible which is unique and develops a relationship with the two extremes, remains ontologically inviolable. Otherwise, if we are led to the conclusion that such duration is not possible for the natural uniSee In Parm., 820.21–22. Here reference is made to the preservation of the clarity of reason, as a specificontological condition, i.e. of the totality of the causal factors in their composition and their overall presence. 8

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verse, we can argue that from the beginning it bestows properties, which have the possibility of eternal reproduction. Their stability in the continuum is secured by their metaphysical derivation. From the point of view of the biological organisms, however, there will be a question as to how the impetus from the very first perceptible man, for instance, will be transmitted to the first out of the infinitely many men which will follow. This is a question which needs special scientific knowledge, which at that time was restricted and covered, to the effect that this was possible, with logical deductions and general cosmotheoretical schemes. At this point, with reference to the combination between the Form and the monad, it is necessary to examine whether a type of nominalism develops within the metaphysical field. How could the specifications be defined here? The first remark which could be formulated against such a view is that each corresponding combination like this is not autonomous, but derives from others prior to it in the frame of a definite planning. In fact it is a multitude which has derived from a certain way of contraction, so that it consists in a particural unity. The combinations are inexhaustible, while at the same time the connections of the particular units form a permanent ontological status. A. Kojève’s remarks in the framework of his effort to show the presence of Plato and Aristotle in Proclus are useful here: “Il est nécessaire d’admettre une Multiplicité transcendante ou un Transcendant multiple[…]. Si les Idées sont immanents aux choses, c’est-àdire si elles ne se presentment qu’en tant que coprésentes aux choses, les universaux s’interprénènt en tant que tells et il y a une koinonia tôn genôn, c’està-dire une “communaute”, des genres (et des espéces)” (Essai d’une histoire raisonnée, III, p. 453 [Translation: It is necessary to accept a transcendent Multiplicity or multiple Transcendent … If the Forms are immanent in the things, i.e., if they are not presented only as immanent in things, the universals, they are interpreted as such and there is koinonia tôn genôn, i.e., a community of the genera and the species]. The cognitive approach of a Form presupposes the knowledge of its sources, which in other combinations are found in the other Forms. The totality of combinations is realized a priori with reference to the Forms; therefore, the reference to a transcendent multitude is justified. A programmic systematic planning precedes in any case of metaphysical evolution. In a way it is condensed and afterwards it depicted on the new level with its specifications.

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At this point Proclus specifies his references to whatever takes place in the sequence of the ontological evolutions by means of the production of the inferior souls; thus, he adds another rank to the hierarchy which he generally introduces to the souls as well. He observes that the particular empirical souls need even the irrational ones for their development and that due to this addition their way of life is characterized by a variety of appearences or, at least, of possibilities which are manifested in perpetuity. In some cases, during their production the superior element from which they derive preserves its power, even though elsewhere it is downgraded. This is an existential ambivalence, which evidently derives from the lack of stability of the natural world, from its inability to fully absorb what is offered to it, or from the domination of different conditions accordingly. Some kinds of hierarchy also appear in the world of sense experience, which are defined according to how and to what extent the divine archetypes are received. This means that the superior element of projection which leads to cosmological processes does not suffer any alteration itself. All empirical souls, which are mortal, received their reduction to being from the eternal irrational souls, according to a “Form” which corresponds to the cosmological case they represent. However, in order to avoid misinterpretations concerning the integrity and the eternity of the “Form”, it should be noted that the souls, even as mortal ones, present a twofold way of existence, moving in a sense on the verge of charges, which will evidently be repeated in various ways. In particular, due to the metaphysical exemplar on which they depend, they are preserved in their generality and this parameter secures their possibility with respect to perpetual bestowments. Universally such souls will exist eternally, therefore in this sense there is no probability in the future concerning the inexistence or the chaotic malfunction of the whole world. On the other hand, however, they are led to destruction as to their immanent presences in the sense of human bodies. This nihilistic situation is due to the fact that they have also received their existence from some other inferior powers, which have been activated sec-

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ondarily on another level, which, too, is of a inferior ontological order and follows that of their initial source. 9 In some way there is a destiny here, the content of which should be discussed on the basis of the perspective of the restoration to what is correct and to the assimilations to the divine. All this means that in the field of mortal souls there is a perpetual cycle of destruction of old and of generation of new ones. However, this change also excludes here See op. cit., 820.22–25. Also, J. Trouillard, La mystagogie de Proclos, pp. 53–70, where we read the following: “Proclos maintient après Plotin (Enn., VI, 4,4,34–46) que les âmes ne sont pas particularisées pas leurs corps, mais par la procession antérieure à leur incarnation. Chacune se confère par son autoconstruction une singularité formelle, tandis que dans ses individualités successives elle subit l’influence du corps et de la situation. Mais les essences des âmes particulières sont comprises à titre de raisons dans les lois sérielles des âmes divines. Ce qui ferait difficulté si on perdait de vue que chaque âme parcourt en elle-même la totalité de la procession et si on identifiait spontanéité et contingence” (pp. 58–59 [Translation: Proclus preserves after Plotinus (Enn., VI, 4,4,34–46) that the souls are not particularized in their bodies, but their particularization is prior to their incarnation. Each soul through its self-construction shows a formal particularization, while within their successive particularized presences it is subject to the influence of body and of the situation in which it is found to be. But the essences of the particular souls are comprehended on the basis of the reasons of the hierarchical laws posited by the divine souls. Difficulty would occur if we lost sight of that each soul has registered in itself the totality of procession and identified it with spontaneity and contingency]). Basically Proclus does not aim here at anthropological theoretical foundations but at the inclusion of the metaphysical within the really existing spirituality of matter. In any case, however, from the epistemological point of view the following question arises: Is it possible for the thinking subject to proceed to categorical constructions of those scientific regions which include objects or fields mainly reflecting what appears to be and not what really is? How will the necessary reduction for the comprehension of Being be possible? It should not escape our notice that Proclus, attributing scientific possibilities to the data of sense experience, allows for a cognitive approach to the metaphysical world and constructs an optimistic exemplar for thinking. Of course, the principle of analogy preserves the main responsibility and resides on speculations or logical deductions. 9

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the total loss of the world of experience, which is thus continuously revived, until it achieves its existential fullness, its teleological realization. Evidently according to the context, change here serves a planning of successions imposed from above, but not in the sense of typical repetitiveness, because by definition the teleological model would have been realized and every time it would be simply validated. The question which remains, however, is about the nature of the Form which determines destruction, because, at first glance such a relationship is defined as contradictory. More reasonable would be a discussion about matter itself as a factor which leads to deviations from being to nothingness in an eternal, variable and repeated process, each time with new formations leading to their loss, till the realization of metaphysical programming. Or, according to the abovementioned planning, it is a Form which will define this process as necessary for the ontological fulfillment of the world of tangible experience through successively changing improvements. More moderately, we could argue for the probability that this is an inferior Form which does not have the presuppositions yet to produce things with a continuous cosmic presence. Perhaps because it itself is not self-subsistent and in some way it “sacrifices” repeatedly its authenticity in order to preserve the material substantiations, at least by means of the possibility of their reproduction. In any case, how would it remain in their region, if it did not have absolutely common elements with their own nature? Again, how would this world be preserved in its generality, if there were not a reality capable of preserving itself? Ad. Berger stresses that among the Forms there is a hierarchy and clarifies: “Au dernier degré seront celles qui agissent immédiatement sur les individus, et constituent la monade qui est en eux: par example les idées d’homme, de cheval, etc.” (Proclus. Exposition de sa doctrine, p. 63 [Translation: At the last scale one will find the Forms acting among the particular sense-perceptible beings and construct the monad which exists within them: for example, the Forms of Man, Horse etc]). Undoubtedly a comparative co-examination of his positions with those of Al. Kojève would be a fascinating research project. This is a topic which even in modern times faces significant problems of research and interpretation. Moving within the same theoretical framework, the philosopher observes that the irrational souls were generated by certain souls superior to them, while at the same time their production is

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intertwined with the monad of the whole series to which they belong or which they construct afterwards as emanations of this monad. Here we need to recall what was discussed above about numbers. Initially it should be noted that whatever derives is a condition of alteration. This is a condition of distortion, provided of course that the perishability of the natural field, which was discussed, does not result in something similar to the metaphysical field. It is characteristic that even irrational souls do not perish, because of their privileged intermediate position between the metaphysical and the mortal ones and because they owe their constitutive presuppositions to the former. 10 Completing his reference to See In Parm., 820.26–34. J. Trouillard summarizing the syllogisms formulated until now compares it with views of Aristotle and observes the following: “La logique néoplatonicienne est ici l’inverce de celle d’Aristote. Ce dernier ne connaît que l’ universel constitué, simple projection, selon les néoplatoniciennes, de l’universel constituan. En celui-ci la compréhension est raison directe de l’extension, le plus étendu étant le plus fondamental et le plus efficase. Il ne reçoit pas ses differences du dehors, mais se les donnes du dedans. Comme des lois opératoires, les genres enveloppent leurs espèces, et celles-ci les singuliers. S’il n’y a pas une idée de chaque âme dans sa cause, il y a au moins une raison génératrice de la chaîne des differences formelles” (L’Un et l’âme selon Proclos, pp. 45–46 [Translation: The Neoplatonic logic here is the reverse of Aristotle’s. The latter did not recognize the universel constitué, simple projection, according to the Neoplatonists, of the universel constituan. For himself comprehension is the direct reason of the extensión of consciousness, by being the more extended, the more fundamental and the more efficient. He does not accept the differences of the projections of reason on the basis of their extensión, but according to what takes place inside. As happens with the laws which refer to actions, the genera develop their species and their species develop singularities. If there is not one Form of every soul within its cause, there is at least one generic reason which contributes to the connection of the formed differences]). In any case, the difference between the “Form” and a generic principle is to an extent difficult to distinguish. We could argue, specifying the internal differentiations, that the former contributes to formation, while the latter bestows existence, with the exception of a slight distinction between the principle of causality and the generation as a condition as a perspective which activates it. One should not, however, exclude the following version: the species defines the metaphysical imprints, while 10

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the souls, Proclus underlines certain analogies among them, i.e. the possession of common properties in a different way. Thus in the frame of the real existence of the divine within the empirical world, the perishing souls present a certain analogy to those metaphysical ones which have entered, through the rational ones, their region and from which they have already acquired their existence. At the same time, the immortal irrational souls also present certain analogies to their metaphysical causes, which, as “Forms” they imprint upon them their initial ontological characteristics. 11 Consequently, there are three levels of souls, with an evolution from the superior to the inferior ones, in such a way that monism is not abolished, given the development of a common property here, which anyway possesses an infinite internal richness. The first the generic principle incorporates them in the natural field as senseperceptible conditions, without it being visible in itself. Our attention, however, needs to be drawn to the fact that the Neoplatonists approach the topics concerning reason and syllogisms as projections of conditions existing within human consciousness. On the contrary, in Aristotle the discussion focuses mainly on the methodological ways through which the formulation of syllogisms will be comprehended. He does not refer to an inherent ontology of consciousness. Aristotle is in search of that ability of the human intellect which classifies into categories that which is perceived by sense experience. Proclus attributes the function of an initial stimulation to the data of this experience, so that the human intellect presents a systematically articulated content, which it already possesses. The main difference is identified in that the Neoplatonist philosopher considers the a priori ontological armament of the human intellect as undoubted. 11 See In Parm., 820.34–37: “Ἔχουσι γοῦν τινά ἀναλογίαν αἳ τε φθειρόμεναι πρὸς τὰς ἐνταῦθα θείας αἰτίας ἀφ' ὧν καὶ ὑφίστανται, καὶ αἱ ἀθάνατοι πρὸς τὰς ἐκεῖ τούτων εἰδητικὰς αἰτίας”. The analogy here seems to have an ontological basis, but for its specific classification into levels the discussion must necessarily go through cognitive processes. It is valid to argue that Proclus finally introduces the existence of multiple parallel situations, specified in each ontological field. In any case, however, he avoids a typical reproduction of the previous in what follows. Combinations are formed as intermediates, which are revealed in each following reality, in an extremely repetitive way, but not with an inflexible content.

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level is clearly metaphysical, which activates the “Forms”, or, more correctly, renders their intervention possible, so that, through a particular process, the second level – that of the irrational souls – develops. The second level consists of the possibility for the transition to the third, where the law of change and destruction continuously dominates. The intermediate reality of the irrational ones preserves eternity, as transcendence of a somehow Platonic type, and evolution, as immanence of a somehow Aristotelian type, and, at the same time, it avoids pantheism, which seems to have also been marginalized by means of the destruction of the particulars. Therefore, what could be defined as theologizing of the natural universe or would refer to its universal eternity or its extreme fulfillment, or, in any case not a priori in relation to itself as it is, moves according to an ontological ambivalence, which permanently leads to its revival. In our opinion, the Neoplatonist scholarch does not proceed here to a compromising citation of Plato and Aristotle, first because he has already introduced to the metaphysical field the function of motion as a progressive evolution towards lower levels. Evidently whatever new arises will be an improvment on what is anterior. The “Forms” already with the support of the souls have been intensively striving to construct a moving natural universe. As an indication of this we cite the following axioms from Proclus’ Elementatio Theologica concerning the constitutive condition of the souls: (a) “Πᾶσα ψυχὴ μέσῃ τῶν ἀμερίστων ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τοῖς σώμασι μεριστῶν” (pr. 190, p. 166.1–2); (b) “Πᾶσα ψυχὴ μεθεκτὴ τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν αἰώνιον ἔχει, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν κατὰ χρόνον” (pr. 191, p. 166.26–27); (c) “Πᾶσα ψυχὴ πάντα ἔχει τὰ εἴδη, ἅ ὁ νοῦς πρώτως ἔχει” (pr. 194, p. 168.30); (d) “Παντὸς τοῦ ψυχικοῦ πλήθους αἱ μὲν θεῖαι ψυχαί, τῇ δυνάμει μείζους οὖσαι τῶν ἄλλων, συνήρηνται κατὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αἱ δὲ αὐταῖς ἑπόμεναι καὶ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῷ ποσῷ μέσην ἔχουσιν ἐν πάσαις τάξιν· αἱ δὲ μερικαὶ τῇ μὲν δυνάμει καταδεέστεραι τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν, εἰς ἀριθμὸν δὲ πλείονα προεληλύθασιν” (pr. 203, p. 176.31–36). They are positions which bring to the fore an internal articulated model of evolution, with transitions from essence to power and energy. In these terms, we would express a moderate scepticism concerning A. Kojève’s following hypothesis, which he himself, however, places under careful examination: “Seulement, dès le début, Proclus indique (explicitement) que les notions de l’Idée-modèle (transcendante) et de l’Idée-cause (immanente) sont contraires, de sorte que leurs dévelopments discursifs se contre-disent néces-

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sairement. Il l’indique en présentant d’emblée la “solution” c’est-à-dire le “compromis” éclectique (parathétique), qui consiste à dédoubler la Réalité-objective “idéelle” en une couche platonicienne transcendante et une couche aristotélicienne immanente” (Essai d’une histoire raisonée, p. 460 [Translation: Only at the beginning Proclus explicitly insists that the notions of the Form-exemplar (transcendent) and of the Form-cause (immanent) are contrary, on the basis that their discursive developments are necessarily contrary. He insists by presenting in its totality the parathetic eclectic “compromise” as a “solution” which consists in that it duplicates the “ideal” objective reality to a transcendent Platonic category and to an immanent Aristotelian category]). In many instances in our study we have shown that the Neoplatonist scholarch moves towards a synthetic consideration of the two traditions, even if in some cases he does so on the basis of his own categories of thought. Afterwards Proclus examines the evidently rhetorical question as to whether and in what sense we should accept the existence of a metaphysical archetype of “Nature”. If we proceed to a synthetic comparative examination of some of his texts, as “Nature” we should consider that ontological field which contains the more general or the more specific schemes, in the form of pre-empirical “universals” in spermatic condition or in a condition which awaits activation. Through these schemes the world of sense experience will be manifested. 12 In any case, however, Nature is the eternally See op. cit., 820.38–821.1. Also, P. Bastid, Proclus et le crépuscule de la Pensée Grecque, Vrin, Paris 1969, pp. 383–397, from where we cite the following: “La nature est encore une réalité intermédiaire entre l’âme et les puissances corporelles, inférieure à l’âme du fait qu’elle se fractionne dans les corps et qu’elle ne jouit pas du pouvouir de se retourner vers elle-même, mais surpassant les choses qui lui sont postérieures parce qu’elle contient les raisons ou principes producteurs de tout ce qui en elles. La nature est cependant chose des corps, ellle plonge en eux et en est inséparable” (p. 383 [Translation: In addition, nature is an intermediate reality between the soul and the corporeal powers, inferior to the soul due to the fact that it is divided within the bodies and it does not enjoy the possibility to return to itself. It simply transcends the things which are posterior to it, since it contains the reasons or the productive principles of every condition existing in their interior. Nature, however, is really a condition 12

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living product of the combination of metaphysical archetypes and, of course, the field which intervenes for the activity of the irrational souls. The Neoplatonist thinker underlines that, in contrast with of bodies, penetrates them and is inseparable from their existence]). A. Berger had already specifically described the issue: “On peut nommer l’idée de l’Âme, et encore l’idée de l’Âme irrationelle. Nous admettons aussi l’ idée de la Nature, puisque nous ne contestons pas celles du Feu et de l’Eau, etc., que l’Eau et le Feu sont des effets de la nature” (Proclus. Exposition de sa doctrine, p. 64 [Translation: We can talk about the Form of soul and additionally about the Form of irrational soul. We also accept the Form of nature from the fact that we have no doubt about the Forms of fire, water etc., since water and fire are effects of nature]). The combination of the metaphysics of transcendence with the metaphysics of immanence is also evident here, with reference to the mode of existence-presence of Nature as well, which is shown to consist in the last intermediate between the two worlds. We cite two references from the Elementatio theologica: (a) “τῇ φύσει τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχει τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ ἥ τε μία φύσις τὰς πολλὰς ἔχει συνηρτημένας καὶ αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐκ μιᾶς εἰσι τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως” (pr. 21, p. 24.22– 25), where Nature is meant to be the source of the created bodies, not of matter. Cf. E.R. Dodds’s discussion of the universal and the particular φύσις (Proclus…, p. 209) (b) “πᾶσα σώματος μερικὴ φύσις διά τε τῆς ὅλης φύσεως καὶ μερικῆς ψυχῆς μετέχει τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς” (pr. 109, p. 96.26–28; cf. E.R. Dodds, Proclus…, pp. 255–256), where the principle of the intermediates is formulated in a strictly typical way. However, we should note that in the Theologia Platonica during the elaboration of the theory about the henads reference is made not to Nature but to Body: “Τῶν τοίνυν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔσχατόν ἐστι τὸ σωματικόν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ τὴν τελειότητα πᾶσαν ἐξ ἄλλης αἰτίας ἔχει πρεσβυτέρας καὶ οὔτε τὸ ἁπλοῦν οὔτε τὸ σύνθετον οὔτε τὸ ἀίδιον οὔτε τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας δυνάμεως ἔλαχεν” (ΙΙΙ, 20.9–13). Without dealing particularly with this issue, we would argue that Body is in an ontological stage before Nature, since it is defined by the Henad corresponding to it and transfers exactly to Nature that which it possesses, the latter undertaking to activate it. The relationships here are exhaustively complex and in each treatise they are described in a specific way, an indication of the particular reconstructions to which the philosopher proceeds.

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Plato, he does not accept the existence of a certain “Form” of fire, water or motion, i.e. of particular elements and conditions which pervade the natural universe as substratums or normative rhythms. On the contrary, he considers that a particular metaphysical cause of “Nature” has been formed, which afterwards consists of the immediate productive source, like an all-inclusive unity, of these natural factors. In some way he may attempt to “naturalize” and secularize certain factors which were considered to be of a transcendent archetypal value or of a relative value with reference to such a property. In any case, however, he considers that this cause specifies Nature and the cosmogonic elements which it contains and cosmologically projects. Therefore, the relationship between the One and the multitude here is emitted by Nature but derives from its archetype. Utilizing the context of Proclus’ positions concerning the downward course of the metaphysical world, we would argue that this cause is basically the result of the combination of certain factors superior to itself. According to Plato, however, we should argue here that the “Form” which resides in the intellect of the Demiurge is the cause which bestows existence on every natural entity which has the property of motion. Again, the combined activity is shown to be the presupposition for the completion of the productive process through conditions which lead to eternal evolution. As in other points as well, here, too, he attempts to show that in fact he does not disagree with Plato, but he specifies some of his positions with dense meanings. However, the following problem arises: Which is the immediate cause and which are the intermediate causes of motion? Of course, motion is a natural law and we could also consider it independent of natural bodies, and in addition as source of their presence and of the relationships among them. Another question arises however: What is the relationship of the Demiurge with Nature? It is stressed afterwards by the philosopher that this evidently last “Form”, as Timaeus also argues, the Demiurge, is revealed to the souls. This intervention takes place as he shows them the natural condition of the whole universe and announces to them, in a way, the immutable laws which pervade it and evidently, we would add, that they have to undertake the mission to fully implement them within the framework of teleological planning. This is a revelation of a project which is already in the process of its realization. The questions begin to find their answers now, since it is clear that the

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above-mentioned Form has summarized within itself that which Nature is about to reveal. All metaphysical combinations have completed exactly on this Form. Therefore, as a logical conclusion we will be led to the view that there is a particularly close relationship between the Demiurge and this “final” Form, metaphysical realities which could be considered as the spirituality of matter. It is also clarified that these projections are due to the fact that the one Nature resides in the field of the Demiurge, as an all-inclusive unity of sense-experience. In a sense this is the field where all those legislative norms are contained, according to which the Demiurge set the universe in order and defined its specifications by means of particular distinctions. 13 Therefore, we could argue that this meta-

See In Parm., 821.1–16. It is interesting here that the laws are characterized as destined. In our opinion the reference to fate is not in accordance with the whole thought of Proclus, who insists on well-ordered harmonious cosmic schemes, which are subject to necessities of a normative nature, in order to be led to their fulfilment. Of course, it cannot be excluded that the term is used in a narrative way. Also, Plato Leges, 891c; Timaeus, 41d6. That it is a species which will consist in the composition of some other ones – superior to it ? – in the frame of a progressive descentexpansion of the metaphysical world, necessarily must impose the encounter between the afore-mentioned factors (demiurge, form, souls) with matter. However, we cannot neglect the necessity of the interventions, which is compulsory in Proclus, as well as the constitutive ontological position of the new realities. Secondarily we seek refuge in the philosopher’s following view, which brings to the fore the categories of “becoming” and “being”, the former describing what has become senseperceptible and the latter describing whatever is transcendent: ”Τοιοῦτος δὲ (γιγνόμενος) οὗτος καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὁ ἐν τοῖς κινουμένοις καὶ ἡ μεταβατικὴ νόησις τῶν ψυχῶν. ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν πᾶσα κίνησις κατὰ μέρος ὑφίσταται καὶ οὐχ ὅλη ἅμα ἔσται, δῆλον. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ κόσμου γένεσιν ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἀίδιον αὐτῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν ἐστὶ τὴν χρονικήν, ἐπιστήσειεν ἄν τις καὶ ἐπιστήσας συλλογίσαιτο πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι δεῖ τῶν αἰωνίως ἀιδίων καὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει χρόνου γενητῶν εἶναι μεταξὺ τὴν κατὰ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον γενητὴν ὑπόστασιν” (In Tim., I, 277.30–278.5). The refuge in this passage serves the aim to show that the discussion about the irrational souls has supplementary items, specifications from above, manifested through particular products. The model of evolution, however, is present here and 13

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physical reality used to function in the sense of self-activation or in a way according to which it projected towards outside what it contained already within itself, evidently spermatically, in the mode of what takes place according to a cause. However, a main and new condition is that of motion, which consists in a factor of distinction between Hence and Thence, since it is clearly combined with eternally repeated changes. In any case, the motion which takes place within “Nature” is undoubtedly not of the same type with that which afterwards consists in cosmological process, the source of which, however, is not clarified here. It is rather meant that this is a projection of the motion existing within the field of Nature, which must contain the totality of laws pervading the sense-perceptible universe. That is, we could characterize motion as the ramification of the already formulated laws which has sensible in the continuum. Developing these syllogisms, Proclus stresses that if indeed the Demiurge is the entity which emits and in a way announces certain archetypal elements, then he has the possibility to lead the souls to reversion upon himself. He evidently offers them those motion consists in its immanent factor. Despite these, the reference to the intermediate generated hypostasis is problematic. By means of the metaphysical functions every intermediate condition has already been led to its completion, so as to function as such. What is related to time cannot have acquired its fulfilment. The philosopher deals with the topic and formulates the following view, which cannot be understood outside teleological principles: “ἢ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἀίδιον ἔχουσαν εἰς τὸν ὅλον χρόνον, τὰ δὲ μέρη ἐν μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου, οἷα τὰ τῇδε στοιχεῖα, ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὰ μέρη συμπαρατείνοντα πρὸς τὴν ἀιδιότητα τοῦ χρόνου παντός, ὡς τὰ οὐράνια (op. cit., I, 278. 5–9). It is about an initial condition which is already formed but has to go through its real specializations, which are manifested in time. Such bodies will evidently be formed during the process of its specializations and will not be subject to destruction any more until the aimed imperishablility is universally completed. Evidently during the process of its specializations, the bodies which will be formed will not be subject to destruction any longer until the targeting as to imperishability is completed on a universal scale.

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terms of consciousness with reference to the content of what they receive, so that they acquire their existential fulfillment. In order to support such a view, the Neoplatonist scholarch evidently acknowledges that the souls have possibilitites for a partially selfsubsistent presence. He adds that if he also has the inherent presuppositions to realize certain manifestations outwards, he shows them much more in his own internality, in the sense of a creativity which exists within his own hypostasis, but is not initially projected ad extra. He will have acquired, evidently inherently and together with his constitutive foundations, the knowledge of the ontological nature of everything and of the immutable laws which pervade it. He will have comprehended whatever exists in the sense of cause in his internality. Evidently this knowledge will take place without the intervention of temporal evolution. However, we could argue that by means of self-reversion of himself and of the reversion of the inferior entities to himself, he will acquire full consciousness of the abovementioned cosmological plans, so that they are manifested in a field proper to eternity. All these within his cognitive horizon will have been formed before they manifest themselves in a sensible way. He places himself in such a way so that he acquires full control over himself. Clearly the consciousness of the plans also contains the cause which forms them. He receives the commandment not to remain in the state of happiness because of the bestowments he has received. All this system of knowledge and functions, which ontologically preexist in comparison with their appearences outwards, justifies the fact that on the level of the Demiurge there exists the one and all-inclusive “Form” of “Nature”. For reasons of hierarchy and the immediate character of the production to follow, this Form will not have the same possibilities with its source, in relation to ontological authenticity. 14 Also, as a See In Parm., 821.16–21. Cf. P. Bastid, Proclus et le crépuscule …, pp. 383–384: “La nature est la dernière des causes qui fabriquent cette essence corporellement formée et sensible. Elle est la limite des essences incorporelles; elle est pleine de raisons créatrices et de puissances, grâce à quoi elle gouverne les êtres cosmiques […]. La nature est une essence incorporelle, inséparable des corps, contenant les raisons et les principes producteurs de ceux-ci, et incapable de regarder vers elle-même” [Translation: Nature is the last of the causes of the corporeally formed and sen14

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projection of the ontological developments, the souls which have the possibility to intervene specifically and not generally to the work of the Demiurge, their mission being to offer assistance, emanate from themselves those natural conditions which offer their particular qualities for a concrete formulated productive result. On their behalf, the same eternal souls produce the particular souls and those which are subject to temporal processes, i.e. construct in detail the productive manifestations and the way of transition from the metaphysical to the natural level. 15 The bestowment of motion, which consists of a law, must necessarily be included in the frame sible essence. It is the last limit of the incorporeal essences. It is the fullness of the creative reasons and the powers, due to which it governs the worldly beings. (…) Nature is an incorporeal essence, inseparable from bodies, containing the reasons and the productive principles of what is here, but is unable to turn to itself]. It should be noted that only the authentically metaphysical and at the same time self-subsistent entities have the possibility to revert upon themselves. Therefore, the projections have been assigned to Nature. See Elem. theol., prs. 42–44, pp. 44.11–46.11. Here we can regard Nature as an intermediate between the distinctions discussed in the following sentence: “Αἱ γὰρ πρόοδοι πᾶσαι δι’ ὁμοιότητός εἰσι, καὶ πρὸς τῶν πάντῃ ἀνομοίων συνεχῆ τοῖς πρώτοις ὑφίσταται τὰ ὅμοια πρὸς αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ὄντα ἤ ἀνόμοια, τοῖς δὲ αἰωνίοις συνάπτειν τὰ ἐν μέρει χρόνου γινόμενα ἀδύνατον […] Λείπεται ἄρα τὸ ἀεὶ γινόμενον εἶναι τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῖν, τῷ μὲν γίνεσθαι συνάπτον τοῖς χείροσι, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ μιμούμενον τὴν αἰώνιον φύσιν” (pr. 55, pp. 17–29). The term “φύσις” here does not refer to Nature, but to the self-subsistent beings because of the preexistence of the characterization “αἰώνιος” (eternal). Nature is in a continuous becoming as an eternally nourishing principle as to cosmic evolvements, without itself being subject to any evolution as to what itself is from the beginning. 15 See op. cit., 821.21–24. Also, Proclus, Elem. Theol., prs. 201–211, pp. 174.1–184.20. The first proposition brings to the fore the condition of motion: “Πᾶσαι αἱ θεῖαι ψυχαὶ τριπλᾶς ἔχουσιν ἐνεργείας, τὰς μὲν ὡς ψυχαί, τὰς δὲ ὡς νοῦν ὑποδεξάμεναι, θεῖον, τὰς δὲ ὡς θεῶν ἐξῃρτημέναι· καὶ προνοοῦσι μὲν τῶν ὅλων ὡς θεοί, γινώσκουσι δὲ τὰ πάντα κατὰ τὴν νοερὰν ζωήν, κινοῦσι δὲ τὰ σώματα κατὰ τὴν αὐτοκίνητον ὕπαρξιν” (pp. 176.1–5). It should be noted that the self-moved consists in a downgraded reflection of the self-subsistent and an enhancement to the natural cycle.

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of the above-mentioned processes. Otherwise, the transition from the first world to the second could not be realized.

FROM THE SOULS TO THE CREATED BODIES

From this point onwards, Proclus cites only his personal estimation, thus arguing that in the frame of the demiurgic intellect the general ontological exemplar of the unified conditions or beings, i.e. those which have the privilege of eternity, has included its number, which should not be considered only or as much as a counting method. It should be noted that in the whole of his work he presents number as an emanation from the monad, which thus shows the multitude existing in it. This is a projection which brings to the fore and consequently confirms the ontological degradation and the cosmological causes. It also confirms, on the other hand, that within the god, who produces the “species” of the body, as a general condition, there exist the causes of the eternal natural conditions in a distinguished and defined manner. The reference to causes denotes the efficient cause, while the species refers to the paradigmatic cause, and this is clearly signified, because we are shortly before the cosmological beginning. Evidently this will be a discussion about the archetypal elements or nuclei, which have now become natural and eternally cater for the cosmical processes. They will be going through the developments which are subject to becoming, without themselves turning out to be natural as to the changes which would take place because of their bestowments. Thus the whole natural order and the number of the natural parts which construct it acquire immediately from this deity their own existence and are set in constant motion, 16 that is, the God transSee In Parm., 821.24–33: “… παρὰ τούτου (sc. τοῦ γεννητικοῦ Θεοῦ) γὰρ καὶ ὑφίσταται προσεχῶς καὶ ἀναζωπυρώνεται πᾶσα ἡ φυσικὴ τάξις καὶ ὁ τῶν φύσεων ἀριθμός”. The verb “ἀναζωπυρώνεται” could of course cause interpretational problems concerning the coeternity of the divine and the natural world, but what is more likely is that the discussion is about a renewal within the same natural field, according to the eternal character of the elements. A question, however, is posited in any case concerning the plural “φύσεων”: Why is a number of them discussed and what is their relation to the general category of “Nature”? As a whole the 16

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fers the way of his existence to those nuclei which immediately passage says the following: In the intellect of the demiurgic god himself the paradigm of the becoming natures includes the number of those which have acquired eternal existence. If we interpret the text like this, we will be led to the view that there are unified natures which have not acquired the property of eternity. However, such an interpretation is replete with serious problems. For instance, what is the criterion of the separation among the unified natures and why are some of them not eternal? Therefore, we will accept that reference is made to all unified natures. Afterwards, we have to examine that the philosopher emphasizes that in the god, who has produced the species of body, the causes of the eternal natures exist in a divisible way. The narration introduces certain ontological levels hierarchically articulated. The first is possessed by the demiurgic god, who has produced the paradigm of the unified natures, the second is possessed by the paradigm itself, the third by the unified natures and the question is which these natures are. There is also a second hierarchy, where the paradigm just mentioned possesses the first level and the divisible causes of the eternal natures possess the second. But why is the first case about unified natures which have acquired eternity, while the second is only about solely eternal ones? We think that neither the use nor the omission, respectively, is by chance. In our opinion, the text needs special attention. In the first emanation number makes its appearance, while in the second one appear the divisible causes with a clear hierarchy among them. Evidently, it is superior as a number of unified natures, not so much because it is a number. However, there are more questions: in the first case reference is made to a paradigm, while in the second to a form. Is there any difference between them or not? The first term seems to function more as to its relationship with the sense-perceptible imprints. It would be interesting to examine the version that the term “εἶδος” refers to being in itself and the term “παράδειγμα” to its projection-relation. Independent of these, the demiurgic divine intellect does not have the possibility to proceed to immediate production, which is realized by the demiurge due to his ability to divide. What is, however, the hierarchical relationship between the paradigm and the second god? In order to make the most of the context, we would say that Proclus is consistent with his position concerning the successive interventions, which develop from unity to distinction through the downward climax of the gods and it is highly probable that the demiurge functions as the immediate paradigm.

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activate the natural processes. It is highly probable that what is meant is that these parts follow certain successive phases, since Proclus does not defend anywhere in his work a kind production which takes place once. It is evident that the Neoplatonist thinker introduces an ontological and productive determinism, which, however, is dynamic in its specializations, since he advances the question of the exact limitations and the quantitive measurements of the substantiations, particularly stressing the necessity of a multisided production or of a co-production. It is a necessity which serves the generalization of unity on all levels of that which exists. Therefore, no condition is by chance and thus the processes of construction as a whole and their products have been defined as to the ways they will exist and function. 17 This determinism could imply that a certain, but unknown, number of entities will be produced, but, however, it is not connected with a strict mechanistic model. It recognizes aesthetic dimensions in the production, for the identification of which one should go through the commentary of the Neoplatonist philosopher on the Platonic Timaeus, where this condition is discussed with tension. As an indication for this we cite this passage: “Εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ὁ ποιήσας ἐκεῖνο, πῶς ἤ οὐ καλῶς ἥρμοσεν, ἤ καλῶς ἁρμόσας ἔφθειρεν; Εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἀγαθός, πῶς ἐποίει τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον μὴ ὤν ἀγαθός; ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τὸ κοσμεῖν ἄλλα καὶ τάττειν” (2.284.29–285.3). The Good permanently reaches its termination. Implementing his syllogistic reasoning on what is relevant to particular bodies, Proclus observes that here, too, the downward function of production should be examined by analogy. He starts his syllogism by positing two questions referring to archetypes and production: First, may we suppose that the one and total cause, which exists in the first demiurge, contains the seeds of the whole number of bodies to be produced, in a way completely articulated See Plat. Theol., vol. IΙΙ, 100.1–102.6: “[…] θείαν ὕπαρξιν, γεννητικὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὅλων τῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ θεῖα διανεμομένων, ἐν οἷς ὑφεστήκασιν οἱ θεοί”. The metaphysics of immanence is not absent, but has a universal presence and is regulative, while it constructs a cosmic system with a positive axiological evaluation and with the perspective of transformation. 17

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with reference to all particular cases and, as we could add, in perpetuity, as well? Becoming is now the new constitutive reality and questions of this kind cannot but be raised in the syllogisms or the hypotheses which are formulated. If the answer is affirmative, then this will be an extreme teleological programming, which is characterized by its infinite variety. Here, of course, two issues should not be neglected, i.e. why the demiurge is characterized as first and why there is a distinction between the demiurge and the cause existing in his hypostasis. The ontological doublicity and triplicity is a condition existing in the interior of every metaphysical entity and is due to three reasons: (a) what it receives from above (b) the functions to which it proceeds in its hypostasis and (c) that which it bestows. In general, it is due to the way it combines within itself a totality of ontological elements and relationships, as receptions, as self-references and as bestowments. Thus, it is not the same thing to discuss the demiurge himself and the demiurge as a cause, because the second condition in a way consists of his selfunfoldment, i.e. the way he comprehends himself with creative ability. Concerning the first condition, reference should be made to a hierarchy which precedes the natural formations and renders them objective, but on condition that in no case can they proceed to self-definition. Together with the reference to a cause, the demiurge as self should be distinguished from his projections, to which he will proceed. Ontologically they are not at a distance from their source. Secondly, do we have the presuppositions to argue that close to this ontological reality, which as a demiurgic monad produces the bodies in a general way, there are certain special causes which contribute to their distinction? As will be shown, the question is rhetorical, because in Proclus’ whole work combined causality is not abolished at all. As an indication for this we cite the following axiom: “Πᾶν τό ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως, ἀφ’ ὧν καὶ τὰ δεύτερα παράγεται” (Elem. Theol., pr. 56, p. 54.4–6). The philosopher considers that concerning both questions the affirmative reply corresponds exactly to what really happens and thus continuously moves within the limits of an inflationary realism. This means that the ontological reality, which contains the one “species” of the natural world is the first father of all of its elements as to their constitutive reduction to Being, and it is the entity which generally be-

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stows existence both on the particular sources and, indirectly, on their products. For the existence of the products it is of course necessary that the elements should have the possibility to communicate, so that they are mixed together in a variety of ways and, thus, causality does not have an one-sided character alone. All parts which derive either as already formed or according to formations, are by necessity distinctions or parts of the complete products that will appear and need that special providence which will construct them as such. 18 Of course there is always a question as to whether the planning covers a concrete number of bodies in the continuous evolution until the realization of the desired end, as a completion of the world of sense-perception. We would note, however, that even if an numerical determinism existed, it would not be accessible to human understanding. According to the Neoplatonist thinker, however, as was the case with the souls, we should approach bodies in an analogous way. Thus he evaluates them as such within the climax of the ontological values, and not only with reference to the general principles on which they depend. He identifies some abilities existing in their hypostasis. This means that it is necessary to accept that the bodies have causes, which are within the metaphysical field and particularly in its third and last level. These causes possess at the same time possibilities to intervene, by means of which they bestow particular characteristics on their products, so that they contribute to their hypostasis and function, and the products themselves have the presuppositions to absorb them. The examples referred to here are the moving appearences (σχήματα) of the daemons and of the particular inferior souls, which participate in different ways in these causes and thus acquire the terms of their presence. By means of the term “σχήματα” what is meant is rather the formed specialized borderlines of the particular hypostases, which, since they move, are subject to a legislating teleology. What is referred to here have already been executed as programmatic planning and simply wait to become sensible. On the other hand, it should be underlined that the aesthetic element is not at all absent See In Parm., 821.34–822.10. Also, J. Trouillard, “Note sur προούσιος et πρόνοια chez Proclus”, Revue des études Grecques, LXXIII (1960), pp. 80–87. 18

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from the cosmological programming, which is characterized by mathematical analogies. On the same syllogistic line it is noted that the “species” of the solar body generates both the moving vehicles of the divine souls and the corresponding vehicles of the particular inferior souls. 19 Therefore, we would say that among the causes and the effects which are related to the above-mentioned productive processes certain relationships develop which “comply” with standard regularities. Whatever (pre)exists within the cause, is bestowed on the effect, but with modifications. Within the cause it has been established as an initial element of itself, but in the effect it is developed both as an acquired property and as a necessary ontological accident, i.e. as something essential under the type of the specific formed hypostasis. In addition, we would be far from relity if we argued that the causes discussed here only bestow formulations. Monism would then be in doubt and matter would acquire the compulsory – to some extent – responsibilities it used to possess in Plato’s work concerning the construction of the natural universe. It is particularly interesting, however, that some species possess the property of being productive principles both with reference to immaterial and material conditions, which, through their combination, introduce the category of the enmatttered, which, as such, does not possess all the presuppositions to bestow meaning on itself. In any case, it should be noted that the enmattered is not of the same See In Parm., 822.10–20. Among the paradigmatic-efficient causes there are analogies with reference to their relationship with the effects. On the “analogy’’, both as to the ontological premises and as to the epistemological method, see Plat. Theol., vol. IΙ, 43.13–51.19, where we as an indication cite the following passage: “Διὰ τούτων (sc. τῶν σωκρατικῶν διορισμῶν) ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ὅλως τῶν μετεχομένων καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ὄντων καὶ πεπληθυσμένων ἐπ’ αὐτὰς τὰς νοητὰς ἑνάδας τῶν ὄντων καὶ τὰς πρωτίστας οὐσίας ἀναγαγών, ἀπὸ τούτων αὖθις μέτεισιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξῃρημένην τῶν καλῶν πάντων καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν” (46.25–47.3). The analogy is at the same time also a method, both upwards and downwards, or the condition for the production of ontological formulations and is developed universally, passing through the dialectical relationship between multiplicity and unity. 19

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cosmological specialization as the bodily, which denotes the presence of certain properties, as well, probably within the framework of a natural evolution, of a somehow Darwinian type. At the same time the bodily appears with some particularities and reflects the infinitely various modes of existence, the latter being manifest both functionally and divided in branches. In a system like that of Proclus, as long as the natural universe is specialized, there is a quest for corresponding specializations in the metaphysical universe. Proclus generalizes by arguing that due to the multitude of metaphysical causes, we should look for clear hierarchies and priorities, evidently in order to explain the mode of existence and the structure of reality, both as to its transcendent and its mundane condition. Since, however, his system is monistic, he stresses that the inferior causes exist within the superior ones, in a way which determines the productive specializations which will follow. What is according to causes regulates what is within the hypostases which is manifest formally. Thus, for instance, within the metaphysical cause which generally produces the bodies, in the sense of created sensible entities, there exists the particular causes of the particular bodily hypostases, while within the metaphysical cause of the souls there exists the particular causes of the particular souls. Here, of course, again there is the question whether a naturally infinite determining numerical factor is developed. It is underlined, however, that within the demiurge, who has acquired his constitutive presence on a superior level, there existed both the bodily and the psychic causes, with no evident distinctions yet, but with a more general property, that of the existence which has life. 20 Thus, the ontological system, from its compressed “initial” condition, gradually See In Parm., 822.20–28. It should be noted that in Proclus’ work “Life” is the hierarchically second metaphysical reality in the frame of the triad “Being-Life-Intellect”, which is immediately first after the Henads, the projections of the One for the construction of the metaphysical world. “Life” is the field which mainly reflects the “transfer” of the metaphysical world from its unity to its self-differentiation, a necessary condition for the beginning of natural processes afterwards. By means of this reality the metaphysical universe ceases to be unambiguous. It does not only exist, but functions as well, and, therefore establishes a “democratic” system. 20

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moves to levels of developments and specializations. By means of the reference to life there is a discussion about new motions, compulsory for the function of the natural world, so that it does not remain in a non-organic or an elementary organic condition. Also interesting is that the discussion is not only about the causes of certain bodies and souls, but of their totality, so that, beyond teleological planning, the necessity of reproduction is further reinforced as a tool which will realize it, that is, of a repetition in new terms of creativity. It would also be legitimate to argue that in every production of souls or bodies the causes are manifest in a special and – why not – irrepeatable way. The nuclei of the initial causes are present and are revealed each time through the immediate natural causes by means of specific effects. Mechanization is not particularly known to flourish. As an indication we cite the following sentence: “Πᾶν ψυχῆς ὄχημα συμφυὲς καὶ σχῆμα τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ καὶ μέγεθος ἔχει, μεῖζον δὲ καὶ ἔλαττον ὁρᾶται καὶ ἀνομοιόσχημον δι’ ἄλλων σωμάτων καὶ ἀφαιρέσεις” (Elem. Theol., pr. 210, p. 184.1–3).

TOWARDS A THEORY ABOUT MATTER

Finally, Proclus examines all that should apply to matter, on the basis of the ontological correlations which have arisen in its own field or have appeared before its own formation. Thus he moves to the field of what is strictly particular, where the reasons for which the metaphysical archetypes organized their programming are clarified. His question refers to whether matter in total has a certain “species” or whether this is the privilege of only a part of it. As will be become apparent, this is a technical question, since due to the philosopher’s positions the “species” have a universal presence all over the natural universe. Otherwise, he would be characterized by ontological discontinuities. Starting from the particulars, he observes that if we argue that the matter of the heavenly bodies, which are considered to be stable natural realities, are without “species” or shape, we have to admit that there would not exist a more general “species” analogous to the totality of matter itself. At this point he posits for discussion a hypothesis which is surprising because it proceeds to a particular revaluation of matter. He formulates the following argumentation: If matter is a being, i.e. an immutable reality, then either it will have suffered the interventions of the “species” or it will have been a “species” itself. He clarifies that it is impossible for a reality which has no rhythm or immanent

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“species” to be similar to a certain transcendent “species”. 21 Indirectly it is concluded that he recognizes some inherent qualities in matter, since in its totality he shows it to be immutable or at least undiminished and to have the property of being as well and not only that of becoming. Therefore, we could conceive matter as the immediate source of all differentiations, which could probably be infinite. Through them the world of sensible experience will be constructed, in a sense on a pre-ontological level with reference to itself, and afterwards it will be subject to evolutionary processes. It utilizes whatever has been bestowed to it in an explosive way. If we accept that the heavenly matter – which differs from the earthly one, according to the scientific views of that era – has acquired its own “species” by a metaphysical principle, then for Proclus evidently this will be its exemplar from whence it will receive its specifications. The metaphysical principle is an archetypal ontological nucleus, which is responsible for the formation of new conditions by means of a harmony of correlations and belongs to the heavenly matter as its own presupposition. The philosopher bases this view on the need that the creation of every ontological reality – even of the lowest one – should not start from imperfect causes, See op. cit., 822.29–823.2. This is a crucial cosmological observation, since it excludes the consideration of matter as a neutral or passive reality or substratum without any initiative. The attempt towards a composition of the Platonic tradition with the Aristotelian one is evident, since both the principles of the formation of matter come to the fore and the active character of matter is discussed. In the relevant treatise concerning matter, the commentary on the Platonic Timaeus, Proclus extensively refers to the divine interventions on matter. The content of the following passage is particularly important: “Πᾶς γὰρ δημιουργὸς ἀγαθὸς κρατεῖ τῆς οἰκείας ὕλης καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐπιτίθησιν ὅ βούλεται τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, καὶ πολλῷ πλέον ὁ ὅλος δημιουργός, ὅς καὶ αὐτὴν ὑφίστησι τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν, ὥς που καὶ ἄλλοι λόγοι φασί, καί οὕτως ὑφίστησιν αὐτήν, ὡς ἄν ἐνεργὸς εἴη πρὸς τὸ δέξασθαι τὸν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ κόσμον καὶ τὴν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ δημιουργίαν” (II, 329.21–28). The term “δημιουργός” (Demiurge) is used with a technical general meaning referring either to the deity which prepares the production or to the particular deities which specify its own planning. 21

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but from certain superior ones, the characteristics of which are the immanent stability and, by means of projection, the possibility to offer unifying limits to their effects. 22 Thus, according to this evolutionary productive process, matter as a whole owes its own production both to a specific superior metaphysical reality, where the distinctions have not yet been particularized, and to an exemplar, which evidently contains all spermatic conditions and offers to matter its own specific characteristics, 23 which it will manifest in a Cf. op. cit., 823.2–10. Also, J. Trouillard, L’Un et l’âme selon Proclos, pp. 69–89, from where we cite the following conclusive remark: “Proclos a tenté de comprendre matière et forme à partir de l’ universelle disjonction déterminant – infini, et celle – ci à travers la double démarche procession-conversion. Cette démarche compose un cycle, puisque la conversion ramène toujours à l’ origine de la procession. Et chez les êtres authentiques ce cycle est intrinsèque, puisque leur propre centre générateur coїncide partiellement avec le centre universelle” (p. 89 [Translation: Proclus has the tendency to comprehend matter and form starting from the universal distinction between limit and infinite and this here through the double process of procession-reversion. This itinery composes a circle, since reversion always leads to the source of progression. And as to the authentic, i.e. the metaphysical, beings, this circle is internal, since its specific generative centre coincides, to the corresponding extent, with the universal centre]). Thus, the authentic source of the self-existing entities remains inexhaustible, independent of the emanational-productive projections, which have been or will become manifest. Concerning this topic, the Neoplatonist philosopher expresses stable views in all his treatises. For instance, we read: “Τὸ φαινόμενον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κάλλος καὶ ἡ τάξις τῶν περιόδων καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῶν ὡρῶν καὶ ἡ ἁρμονία τῶν στοιχείων καὶ ἡ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα ἀναλογία δείκνυσι τοῖς μὴ παντάπασι ἐσκοτωμένοις, ὅτι κάλλιστον τὸ πᾶν” (In Tim., 2.332.20–23). This is one of the many pointsproofs which are used so that the excellence of the ontological quality of the Demiurge is shown. 23 See In Parm., 823.10–15: “Καὶ αὕτη (ἡ ὕλη) μὲν διχόθεν ἂν ἔχοι τὴν γένεσιν, ἔκ τε τοῦ παραδείγματος καὶ ἐκ τῆς θείας αἰτίας μόνον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοερὸν πᾶν μετὰ τοῦ θείου ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ θεῖον καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ προϊὸν καὶ ἄχρι τούτων ἃ μὴ ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν ἐξ ἐκείνου”. This passage confirms J. Trouillard’s remark above and shows the combined causality to be a universal legislative reality. In order to continue the exposition of the above positions, we cite two passages from the In Tim. The first refers to 22

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sensible way when it starts proceeding to initiatives. In any case, this is valid in Proclus’ system in both emanation and production. Thus, from the general notion of causality, which basically offers the property of existence, as the presupposition of all beings, we move to the specific and particular causality, and thus the ontological system is articulated in a perfect structural and functional way, permanently preserving the hierarchical ordinance of its parts. This very permanence consists of the eternity of the world of senseperception, which is continuously manifest through the produced particularities. Ad. Berger stresses the following: “Au point de une de son ensemble, le monde est un; il est unique, puisque son paradigme est unique. Il est le premier des êtres sensibles, puisqu’il est un seul et même animal, que les animaux individuels vivent en lui, et qu’en dehors de lui rien n’existe. L’Univers est parfait; car il résulte, et ne pouvait résulter que d’êtres harmonisés. Chacune des parties qui le composent peut avoir certaines imperfections: l’Univers lui-même n’en a pas. Les êtres particuliers ont leur fin particulière; toutes concourent à la fin générale” (Proclus. Exposition de sa doctrine, p. 71 [Translation: From the point of view of its totality, the world is one; it is unique, since its exemplar is unique. It is the first of the the theory of evolution: “Αὐτὸς ὁ κόσμος ἀπὸ τοῦ πλημμελοῦς ἄγεται πρὸς τὴν τάξιν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν ὁμοίωσιν ὑπὸ τῆς δημιουργίας” (2.334.19–21). The second clarifies the modes of the metaphysical interventions: “Διαφέρει δὲ ὅμως δημιουργεῖν παραδειγματικῶς καὶ παράδειγμα εἶναι δημιουργικῶς· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐνεργεῖν οὐσιωδῶς, τὸ δὲ οὐσιοῦν ἐνεργητικῶς, καὶ τὸ μὲν νοεῖν νοητῶς, τὸ δὲ νοητὸν εἶναι νοερῶς· ἴδιον γὰρ παραδείγματος μὲ τὸ τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖν, δημιουργοῦ δὲ τὸ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν” (2.335.28–336.1). Here we consider the dialectic between essence and energy to be very important and in need of specific elaboration. First, it is clear that there is mutuality between the Demiurge and the paradigm, which also defines the categorical reciprocal changes. However, there are differences among the deriving pairs as to the factor which primarily manifests their intervention. In any case, priority is possessed by a particular factor, which, however, is accompanied by the other one by means of an adverbial clause denoting manner. Both factors, however, have derived from the final metaphysical transformations, in order to manifest themselves productively through ways characterized by an infinite variety.

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sensible beings, since it is the only and the same living being, in which the particular living beings develop their own way of life and because nothing exists outside it. The world is perfect; for it derives and cannot but derive from harmonious beings. Each one of its constituting parts may have certain imperfections; the world itself, however, has none of these. Each particular being has its own end; all of them, however, move towards the general end]). However, the question remains as to the specific difference between the heavenly and the earthly matter and as to the extent the latter possesses clear metaphysical properties, which form the basis for the preservation of its eternity together with the evolution which is necessary so that can be ontologically completed. Proclus deals with this topic extensively in his commentary on the Platonic Timaeus. In his commentary on the Parmenides he insists more on formulating the general principles by means of which he constructs the transition from the metaphysical to the natural world, rather on the functional processes of the latter or on the strict specializations of its own fields. This is the point where natural science, which by definition moves analytically, will undertake the responsibility to conduct research.

CONCLUSIONS

First, Proclus clearly rejects that there is any gap between the metaphysical world and the natural world and presents the latter as the product of the emanation from the former, without, however, introducing pantheistic choices. In order to prove this relationship, he introduces into the metaphysical world the dynamic factor of “procession” as an “eternal” movement, which afterwords activates its infinite productive capabilities. “Procession” secures the presuppositions so that what initially “remains” – as the “rest” – reveals its internal richness, of course without external interventions, which would alter its autonomy. “Procession”, which takes place independently from natural place and time, transforms one aspect of the divine energy into properties, through successive levels of formed hypostases. However, the jurisdiction of “remaining” is not abolished and preserves its general principles, which are defined by the undiminished unity. Secondly, he presents the metaphysical world as logically structured. Namely, he recognizes that human intelligence has the responsibility to describe its articulation, on the presupposition that

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it does not exclusively remain in the data of sense-perception. In other words, we face the projection of metaphysics as logically formulated knowledge and at the same time as a supreme source and validation of syllogisms. It is not only seen through the ontological prism as a specialized registration of “being” according to its levels, but also through the epistemological prism as well, which, by extension, also defines he methodological regularities which should be followed. Theology is therefore reduced to a strict science. Thirdly, he constructs the monistic ontological system by means of further terms, since he accepts that the natural world fully owes its existence to the metaphysical one and is not self-defined. What is more, the variety of the formations and functions of the natural world does not abolish monism, since the multitude here is considered to consist of the development of an initial unity during its perpetually dynamic projection to new productions. At the same time, the philosopher re-evaluates matter in the climax of values and excludes its characterization as privation of good or evil. Thus, he adds a direction to Neoplatonism, which is new as to that given by Plotinus in the third century A.D. The theory about the world and life clearly becomes more optimistic, with the result that man is persuaded that his presence on earth has such meaning, the fulfillment of which he will discover in the metaphysical realm. In this proposed monistic system there are no contrasts, despite the ontological differences. The relationships do not flourish and the divine world is not dealt with by means of superstitio or mythically imaginary prejudice. Damascius and his philosophical circle will further extend the above and will deify reason during its encounter with sacramental elements, in terms of a charming dialectic. Fourthly, he manages to summarize in a synthetic way theories from the ancient Greek tradition, which prima facie were considered to be incompatible among them. The transition from the one historical-spiritual world to the other consisted for its bearer the most critical occasion for showing how the selection of proper material from different philosophical traditions may give the desired solutions to any arising questions. We cite here as well Al. Kojève’s estimations, who, in our estimation, is the researcher who brings to the fore Proclus’ synthetic and “encyclopedicalhistoriographical” virtues: “Proclus remarque très justement dans son Commentaire que l’on trouve dans le Parménide un exposé des trois Théories des universaux possibles, les Théories in re et post rem y étant exposées

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explixitement et la Théorie ante tem implicitement. Mais il veut faire croire à tort que Platon admettait la validité de toutes ces Théories et non seulement celle de la dernière. D’après Proclus, les trois Théories peuvent et doivent être affirmées à la fois, à condition de les rapporter à trois types distincts d’Universaux, qui sont respectivement des Idées au sens de l’ “Idéalisme” platonicien, des Essences au sens du “Réalisme” aristotélicien et des Sens au sens du “Nominalisme” héraclitéen, les Idées étant transcendantes et “atomiques” et les Essences imannentes et “communautaires”.” (Essai d’une histoire raisonnée de la philosophie païenne, vol. III, pp. 468–469 [Translation: Proclus remarks particularly correctly in his relevant Commentary that in the Parmenides we find an exposition of the three theories of the universals in their possible formulation, i.e. the in re and post rem theories, which are analytically described, and the ante rem theory, which is concisely described. But he wants to lead us to believe intensely that Plato accepted the validity of all these theories and not only of the last one. According to Proclus the three theories can and must be affirmed at the same time because of that they refer to the three distinctive types of Universals, which respectively are the Forms in the perspective of the Platonic “Idealism”, the essences in the perspective of the Aristotelian “Realism” and the concepts in the perspective of the Heraclitean “Nominalism”. The Forms are transcendent and “atomic” and the Essences are immanent and “factors contributing to communication”]). Utilizing the above estimation as to what we have examined about the irrational souls, we have to underline the following: the irrational souls (a) are prior to the sense-perceptible objects, (b) as nourishing bestowments to matter and the bodies, that are within them, possessing the properties of authenticity, (c) by means of their specifications through the lower souls they indirectly become objects of observation and mental elaboration. But since they are considered true reflections of the rational souls, indirectly the above can be applied to whatever is prior and all the way until the henads. In whichever version they are viewed, they are the factors which specify the productive mission of the Soul of the natural world, which has Platonic origins and is presented by Ad. Berger as follows: “À l’Âme du monde, qui est intelligence et vie, se rattache immédiatement, essentiellement, et par une corrélation nécessaire, ce que nous nommons l’Étendue. L’étendue est le lieu des corps: elle reçoit et contient toutes les parties de l’Univers. Tout est en elle, rien en dehors; rien, et pas même le vide. La masse du monde occupe le lieu tout entier. Tout se meut dans le sein de l’ Étendue, qui est elle-même immobile. Nous ne

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pouvions en effet la supposer mobile, sans la faire mouvoir dans un lieu autre qu’elle, et nous aurions seulement reculé la difficulté” (Proclus, Exposition de sa doctrine, p. 70 [Translation: To the Soul of the world, which is Intellect and Life, that which we call Extension is attached immediately, essentially, and in a necessary relation. The extension is the space of bodies: it receives and contains all parts of the Universe. Everything exists in it and nothing is outside it, not even the vacuum. The mass of the world completely occupies the space. Everything moves within the interior of the Extension, which itself is immovable. We cannot really consider it as moving, without making motion in a space other than this, and the only thing we will secure is to increase the theoretical difficulties]).

EPILOGUE According to what has been exposed so far, we have reached the following conclusions: First, in Proclus’ system the Forms as particularizations of the First Being belong to Metaphysics and allow for Cosmology to exist. Through these properties they consist of the intermediates between Henology (One-Henads), as an expression of absolute unity, and natural reality, as an expression of absolute multitude. Through this function they avoid pantheism and preserve integral ontological definitions. Secondly, through his theory on the Forms, the Neoplatonist scholarch clarifies his argumentation about the Second Hypothesis of the Platonic Parmenides, which is basically meta-interpretational. The Forms, passing through the divine levels of this hypothesis and ontologically specifying their own content, express the progressive development and degradation of the divine revelation of the One. We would note through this passage they acquire consciousness both of themselves and their mission. The Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides is the necessary factor for the One, so that it constructs Nature through the henads and the Forms. It is also necessary for the derivation of sensible beings with their particularities, belonging, of course, to general categories together with similarities among them. These categories will be constructed a posteriori by human intelligence, within a system which is not considered to be saturated. The Forms, at a level lower than that of the henads, consist in the productive powers of the One, i.e. the way the One becomes, evidently through its initiatives, intramundane without losing its transcendence at all, or the exclusive way towards the feasibility of the mundane with the ramifications which it chooses. Thirdly, the Forms, just like the henads, have both a theological and a philosophical content in Proclus’ system. Their theological content is justified as they abide in the hierarchical mechanisms, 159

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according to the Neoplatonic reading, in the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides which cause the divine to exist, and, therefore, they are divine entities. Their philosophical content is due to the fact that they preserve elements of the Platonic Forms and the Aristotelian Species and possess general ontological and arithmetical properties. By means of their twofold property, they are a standard example of the way the philosophical thought of the 5th century A.D., as well as that of the two previous centuries, prevailed against theological and religious elements, or, at least, is in balance with them. In any case, however, they reflect the way these two branches (philosophy and theology) justify their reciprocity and combination and construct an enhanced holistic system. Fourthly, by means of his theory on the Forms Proclus completes his theories which cover wider topics and refer to intermediates-archetypes. Through a magnificent system of theogonies and a surprisingly systematized architectural composition, he created a gigantic and complex construction in order to connect the divine immobility and immutability with the becoming of the tangible reality. Thus, he introduced a specific kind of becoming into the metaphysical world. This construction, with its horizontal and vertical branches, is not easily classified into the specific categories required for the promotion of its pyramid-like structure. However, this is most clearly a proof of a geometrically structured thinking, which has the ease to move by means of analogies having an impressively increasing variety. Fifthly, the Forms have a real existence, which is independent of their particular manifestations and the perception of human intellect. Proclus carefully follows the principles of a consistent realism, which contains the totality of ontological levels. He places the Forms in an area which cannot be fully described – only analogically and hypothetically, by the categories of the material beings – and most persistently controls or selectively uses their nominalistic version. Of course, he accepts their inherent existence in the sense of concepts or reasons which are the presuppositions for the construction of theories in the human soul. He clearly stresses, however, that this inherent existence is posterior and depends absolutely on the requirements of their metaphysical presence. Therefore, we can argue that the Neoplatonist scholarch finally renders his realism conceptual, with the exclusive stipulation that he preserves without any changes its character which is prior to and above sub-

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jectivity, is epistemologically approached and is logically described. Under this perspective, he bestows a clearly ontological content on the epistemological capacity of human consciousness. Thus, the human consciousness is not led to discoveries of new knowledge, but it recalls and finds out how the phenomena correspond to conceptual schemes which it a priori possesses. Therefore, it itself is constructed in successively evolutionary terms in the future, so that the past is further clarified. Having evaluated all these conclusions, we are led to the view that Proclus deals both systematically and creatively with the issue of the Universals or the archetypal Forms. For reasons which at least refer to the history of philosophy, it is also necessary to crossexamine his views about the Universals comparatively with the corresponding views of the Alexandrian Neoplatonists and the Byzantine thinkers. Such an examination will reveal the similarities and the differences between ancient Greek thought and Christianity during the 5th century, a period which was crucial for the history of thought. And, of course, research on aspects of the Athenian Neoplatonism has not yet been finalized. Soon afterwards, Damascius will write down the definite compositions of this School on almost all ontological issues in his famous treatise Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles and in his commentaries on the Platonic dialogues Parmenides and Philebus. They are treatises in which philosophy is closely connected with the sciences, i.e. interpretation with analysis, but without marginalizing the metaphysical foundations here as well. It should be noted that Damascius, too, moved within the encounter between Platonism and Aristotelianism, specifying the various levels of presence of the Forms from the supreme metaphysical realities to the immanent presence in matter. He, too, was a keen supporter of the internal relevance among the Forms, which he considered to be fruitfully translated in the world of sense-experience. We conclude by underlining that both Proclus and Damascius developed certain conditions-manifestations of the Forms as to their relevance with the natural elements. This is an issue pertaining to the more general relationship of metaphysics with cosmology or natural philosophy and awaits further attention on behalf of scientific research.

BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES Εἰς τὸν Παρμενίδην τοῦ Πλάτωνος

a) Proclus, Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, vol. I, edited by C. Luna & A.Ph. Segonds, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2007.

b) Procli In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria, “Oxford Classical Texts”, edited by C. Steel, Oxford 2007-09. Εἰς τὸν Τίμαιον Πλάτωνος

a) Procli Diadochi In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria, vols. I–III, edited by E. Diehl, Amsterdam 1965.

b) Proclus, Commentaire sur le Timée, vols. I–IV, translated, commented by A.J. Festugière, Paris 1966–68.

Περὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα Θεολογίας

Proclus. Théologie Platonicienne, vols. I–VI, edited by H.D. Saffrey & L.G.Westerink, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1968–97. Στοιχείωσις θεολογική

Proclus. The Elements of Theology, edited by E.R. Dodds, Oxford 1933 (2nd ed. 1963).

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Beierwaltes W., Proklos, Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik. Frankfurt am Main 1979. Berger A., Proclus. Exposition de sa doctrine, Paris 1840.

Bouancé P., “Théurgie et téléstique néoplatonicienne”, Revue de l’histoire des religions, 147, 1955, pp. 189–209. Boussoulas Ν., “Étude sur l’ Esthétique de la composition platonicienne des mixtes (suite et fin)”, Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 66, 1961, pp. 142–158.

Bréhier É., “L’idée du néant et le problème de l’origine radical dans le néoplatonisme grec”, Études de philosophie antique, Paris 1948, pp. 248–283. Brisson L., “La place des Oracles Chaldaïques dans la Théologie Platonicienne”, Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, Les Belles Lettres, Leuven University Press 2000, pp. 109–162.

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Gersh St., “Proclus’ theological methods. The program of Theol. Plat. I.4”, Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne”, pp. 15–27. Gigineishvili L. – G. v. Riel, “Ioane Petritsi: A witness of Proclus’ Works in the School of Psellus”, Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, pp. 571–587.

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Lloyd A.C., Procession and division in Proclus, Soul and the structure of being in late Neoplatonism. Syrianus, Proclus, and Simplicius. Liverpool University Press 1982, pp. 18–45. Martano G., Proclo di Atene. Napoli 1974.

Moreau J., Plotin ou la gloire de la philosophie antique, J. Vrin, Paris 1975. Moutsopoulos E., Les structures de l’imaginaire dans la philosophie de Proclus, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1985.

Opsomer J., “Deriving the three intelligible triads from the Timaeus”, Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, pp. 351–372. Perczel I., “Pseudo-Dionysius and the Platonic Theology. A Preliminary Study”, Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, pp. 491–452.

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Siorvanes L., “The problem of Truth in the Platonic Theology”, Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, pp. 47–63. Steel C., “L’hénologie comme dépassement de la métaphysique”, Les études philosophiques, 3, 1982, pp. 331–350.

Trouillard J., La procession plotinienne. P.U.F., Paris 1955.

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