Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography [1st ed.] 9783030582623, 9783030582630

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Springer Geography

Radomir Bolgov · Vadim Atnashev · Yury Gladkiy · Art Leete · Alexey Tsyb · Sergey Pogodin   Editors

Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography

Springer Geography Advisory Editors Mitja Brilly, Faculty of Civil and Geodetic Engineering, University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia Richard A. Davis, Department of Geology, School of Geosciences, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA Nancy Hoalst-Pullen, Department of Geography and Anthropology, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA, USA Michael Leitner, Department of Geography and Anthropology, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA Mark W. Patterson, Department of Geography and Anthropology, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA, USA Márton Veress, Department of Physical Geography, University of West Hungary, Szombathely, Hungary

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Radomir Bolgov Vadim Atnashev Yury Gladkiy Art Leete Alexey Tsyb Sergey Pogodin •

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Editors Radomir Bolgov Saint Petersburg State University St. Petersburg, Russia Yury Gladkiy Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia St. Petersburg, Russia Alexey Tsyb Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University St. Petersburg, Russia

Vadim Atnashev Saint Petersburg State University St. Petersburg, Russia Art Leete University of Tartu Tartu, Estonia Sergey Pogodin Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University St. Petersburg, Russia

ISSN 2194-315X ISSN 2194-3168 (electronic) Springer Geography ISBN 978-3-030-58262-3 ISBN 978-3-030-58263-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

TIPG 2019 Preface

This volume is the proceedings of International Conference “Topical Issues of International Political Geography” (TIPG 2019) which held during September 20– 21, 2019, in St. Petersburg, Russia. The conference was organized by Peter the Great St. Petersburg State Polytechnic University in cooperation with the Research Committee on Geopolitics and Security (Russian Association of Political Science). The conference focused on specific aspects of contemporary political geography and international relations. TIPG 2019 provided a platform for discussion and collaboration of academicians and experts in the fields of political geography, human geography, geopolitics, urban studies, demography & population studies, migration politics, natural sources politics, international organizations & integration, conflicts & security, international law and other related areas of studies. TIPG 2019 is a continuation of the International Conference “Topical issues of international relations in the current geopolitical context,” which has been held in St. Petersburg annually since 2016. Prior to the conference, the Program Committee comprising the recognized researchers from 14 countries had conducted a rigorous peer review. Every day, the conference started with the joint plenary sessions where four keynote addresses were presented by: • Prof. Ebulfez SULEYMANLI (Uskudar University, Turkey). Democracy Culture in the Central Asian Republics after the Independence: The Impacts of Socio-Economic and Political Transformation • Prof. Natalia VASILYEVA (Saint Petersburg State University, Russia). Dichotomy of Globalization and Deglobalization Processes in the Modern World • Prof. Yury GLADKIY (Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia). Modern African Regionalism in Civilizational Dimension • Dr. Ksenia MURATSHINA (Ural Federal University, Russia). China's Infrastructural Expansion in Southeast Asia.

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TIPG 2019 Preface

The research part of TIPG 2019 was structured around paper sessions giving the floor for presenting the results of studies conducted by the researchers from China, Estonia, Macao, Palestine, Russia, South Korea, Spain and Turkey. The conference was concluded by the Plenary Session where the participants discussed the future steps and other organizational matters. We would like to thank those who made this event possible and successful. We especially express our gratitude to the Program Committee members for their contribution to the event. We thank the authors for presenting their papers and the session chairs for leading the fruitful discussions. We are grateful to all organizers, representatives of institutions and hosts who contributed to the success of this conference; we are proud to attract a great team of scholars from different countries and disciplines. We will work further to sustain and expand the TIPG community through joint research and collaboration. There are the beliefs that the TIPG has the good potential to turn into a new important platform for further academic discussion. Radomir Bolgov Vadim Atnashev Yury Gladkiy Art Leete Sergey Pogodin Alexey Tsyb

TIPG 2019 Organization

Organizers Peter the Great St. Petersburg State Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

Organization Committee Sergey Pogodin (Chair)

Radomir Bolgov (Program Coordinator) Alexey Tsyb (Program Coordinator) Vadim Atnashev (Program Coordinator) Li Jingcheng (Program Coordinator)

Peter the Great St. Petersburg State Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia St. Petersburg State University, Russia Peter the Great St. Petersburg State Polytechnic University, Russia St. Petersburg State University, Russia Peter the Great St. Petersburg State Polytechnic University, Russia

Program Committee Mustafa Altunok Hamza Ateş Vadim Atnashev

Ivan Arjona-Pelado Amneh Badran

Bolu Abant Izzet Baysal University, Turkey Istanbul Medeniyet University, Turkey North-West Institute of Management, RANEPA & St. Petersburg State University, Russia Foundation for the Improvement of Life, Culture and Society, Spain Al-Quds University, Palestine

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Zeynab Bakhturidse Nadezhda Bogdanova Radomir Bolgov Elena Boldyreva Adolfo Calatrava-García Dmitriy Gdalin Yuri Gladkiy Alexander Dawoody Konstantin Eidemiller Vladimir Fokin Rovshan Gatamov İsmail Güllü Wolfgang Holtkamp Anar Iskenderov Li Jingcheng Wang Juntao Bárbara Elena Karell-Furé Viktor Kirilenko Gabriele Kötschau Svetlana Kornekova Ekaterina Kuchumova Vadim Musaev Sunyoung Park Ingeborg Pardon Sofia Pereswetoff-Morath Sergey Pogodin Anna Riabova Francisco Javier Ruiz-Martínez Andrey Rusakovich

TIPG 2019 Organization

Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Russia Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Russia St. Petersburg State University, Russia Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Russia Carlos III University, Spain Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, Saint Petersburg, Russia Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, Saint Petersburg, Russia Marywood University, USA Saint Petersburg State University, Russia St. Petersburg State University, Russia Baku State University, Azerbaijan Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey University, Turkey Universität Stuttgart, Germany Baku State University, Azerbaijan Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Russia-China Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Russia-China University of Havana, Cuba North-West Institute of Management, RANEPA, Russia Wirtschaftskooperationen West-Ost, Hamburg, Germany St. Petersburg State University of Economics, Russia Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Russia Saint Petersburg Institute of History at Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia Sejong University, Republic of Korea Institut Dialogica, Berlin, Germany Stockholm University, Sweden Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Russia Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Russia Carlos III University and Alicante University, Spain Belarusian State University, Republic of Belarus

TIPG 2019 Organization

Marina Sablina Eduardas Spiriajevas Abulfez Suleymanov Vyacheslav Sukhorukov Alexey Tsyb

Natalia Vasilieva Thomas Wallgren Xu Xing Yang Xuewei Vatanyar Yagya

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Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Russia Klaipėda University, Lithuania Üsküdar University, Turkey Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, Saint Petersburg, Russia Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Sociological Institute of the Russian Academy of Science, Russia St. Petersburg State University, Russia Helsinki University, Finland Nankai University, China Tus-Holdings, China St. Petersburg State University, Russia

Contents

Migration and Socio-Demographic Processes Challenges of Contemporary Higher Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anna Riabova and Sergey Pogodin Challenges of Migration into the European Union and Proposal of Solution Through Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ivan Arjona-Pelado and Vadim Atnashev Migration and Dual Education System as Major Countermeasures for Problems on Labor Market in Federal Republic of Germany and Russian Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ekaterina Potapova and Nikita Ivannikov Socio-political and Political-Geographical Aspects of Migration Processes on the European Continent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Elena Demidova and Anna Mokhorova The Crisis of the Multiculturalism Policy in Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anna Matveevskaya, Valeriya Solovyeva, Sergey Pogodin, and Marina Ermolina

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Ideologies of Regionalism and Globalization in Historical Context. Philosophy of Politics Dichotomy of Globalization and Deglobalization Processes in the Modern World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Zeinab Bahturidze and Natalia Vasilieva

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Russian Identity in the Age of Globalization and Regionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Igor Chernov, Radomir Bolgov, Igor Ivannikov, and Dmitry Katsy

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Modern African Regionalism in Civilizational Measurement . . . . . . . . . Yuri Gladkiy, Viacheslav Sukhorukov, and Svetlana Kornekova

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Islamic Regionalism in Latin America: Background and Current Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Konstantin Eidemiller, Iuriy Gladky, Daria Petrenko, Regina-Elizaveta Kudriavtceva, and Maxim Gabrielyan The Political Status of Greenland in the 21st Century: The Path from the Colony of the Kingdom of Denmark to the Possible 51st State of the USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Konstantin Eidemiller, Anton Geht, Anni Nikulina, and Regina-Elizaveta Kudriavtceva History and Symbolics of the Catalan Sovereignism in the Context of Geopolitics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Vadim Atnashev and Alexey Tsyb Ideology and Geography of Foreign Policy of Philip II the Prudent Considering Philosophical and Political Discourse of the Era . . . . . . . . . 143 Nikita Ivannikov, Julia Pshenova, and Alexey Tsyb The Psychological Aspects in Political Ideas of the Cambridge Platonists as an Alternative to 17th Century Global Thinking . . . . . . . . 156 Olga Bachvalova, Nadezhda Golik, Alexander Semenov, and Alexey Tsyb Historical Knowledge as a Tool for Predicting the Prospects of Political Geography (On the Example of New Serbia) . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 Anastasiia Zotova and Sergei Poltorak Geographic Distribution of Foreign Businesses in Russia in the 10th–17th Centuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Olga Pavlova and Anna Ryabova National Policies and International Politics Democracy Culture in the Central Asian Republics After the Independence: The Impacts of Socio-economic and Political Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Ebulfez Süleymanli Alternative Models of Political Participation of Population in Developed and Developing Countries: Cases of Switzerland, Germany, Brazil and Uruguay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 Yuri Kovalev, Alexander Burnasov, Anatoly Stepanov, and Maria Ilyushkina The Migration Organization and Policies in the Turkish Public Administration: An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 Mustafa Altunok and Türkan Özkan

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Changes in Swedish Foreign Policy After 2018 General Elections . . . . . 228 Elena Boldyreva and Yekaterina Duisembina Geography of Oil and Gas of the Russian Federation in the World Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 Vatanyar Yag’ya and Talie Yagya Geopolitical, Geo-Economic Risks and National Security of Russia . . . . 244 Irina Ignatyeva, Boris Isaev, and Konstantin Losev Special Aspects of Modern Hybrid Warfare on the Internet: Ontological Analysis and Russian Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 Marina Krivko and Radomir Bolgov Geopolitical Consequences of the End of the Cold War in the post-Soviet Space: Prerequisites for the Emergence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268 Tamara Tarakanova, Sergey Pogodin, Anna Matveevskaya, and Lidiya Evseeva Russia’s New Eastward Policy and Transnational Development Cooperation in the Far East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 Sunyoung Park China’s Infrastructural Expansion in Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 Ksenia Muratshina and Aireen Grace Andal Development of BRICS Cooperation Mechanism in New Geopolitical Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 Jingcheng Li International Legal Problems of Fighting Corruption in the Context of Geopolitical Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 Vladimir Demidov, Dmitry Mokhorov, Anna Mokhorova, and Zohidzhon Askarov Revisiting International Law’s Discussion on the Moral Status of the Fetus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327 Aireen Grace Andal Cultural Dimension of International Relations Humanistic Content of International Cultural Exchanges in the Modern Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341 Vladimir Fokin The Role of Music as a Tool for Cultural Diplomacy During and After the USSR Period in the Development Process of Azerbaijan-Turkey Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 Ecem Tuğçe Akbulut

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Cultural Cooperation Between Russia and Iraq in the Context of the Common National Identity Problem of Iraqi People . . . . . . . . . . 357 Irina Kolesnik and Abu Baker Salih Mahdi Al Shammari Culture as the Basis for Shaping a Positive Image of Russia: Potential, Problems, and Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368 Natalia Bogoliubova, Julia Nikolaeva, and Elena Eltc Finno-Ugric Cultural Rights in the Context of Sustainable Tourism in North-Western Federal District of Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384 Vadim Atnashev, Elena Eltc, and Art Leete Geo-Branding as a Tool for Realizing Russia’s Interests in the International Arena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396 Victory Pogodina, Sofia Yakovleva, Anna Matveevskaya, and Vladimir Evseev Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409

Migration and Socio-Demographic Processes

Challenges of Contemporary Higher Education Anna Riabova(B) and Sergey Pogodin Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected], [email protected]

Abstract. The paper is aimed to resolve the trends in the transformation of the international academic society; to reveal the relevance of the virtual identity existence and its influence on the on-line image creation. In order to achieve the goal, the following tasks have been set: to examine teachers’ self-perception from a self-concept perspective; to view the development of concerns and beliefs about teaching in higher education; to analyze the shifts in the teacher’s focus of attention and the processes implicated in the articulation of tacit pedagogical knowledge and beliefs. The link between political geography and the curriculum design is emphasized. The Universities mission to teach young people around the world respect and international understanding is discussed. The opportunities offered by blended learning and the factors promoting sustainability within professional activity are revealed. The development of digitalization should be enhanced by the management culture, by investing in competence and support. The achievements in the educational innovation and the creation of the international academic community are discussed as the result of a complex of factors viewed in historical and sociological perspective. The paper emphasizes the necessity for individual human potential realization and discusses the content of the permeable structures that develops cross-disciplinary interaction, soft skills and critical thinking development. The novelty of the research is connected with the necessity to consider the appearance of the cultural behavioral patterns, which are based on the online ethnicity. Keywords: Challenges · Multiculturalism · Social institution · Higher education · Intellectual capital · Critical thinking

1 Introduction The goal of the paper is to reveal the framework of the skills and demands that contemporary educators need in order to accelerate their learning throughout their careers. In order to achieve the goal, the following tasks have been set: to analyze the challenges of contemporary education; to view the changing context of education in accordance with the challenges and requirements of political geography; to emphasize the need for the shared cultural vision. Education as a social institution is becoming increasingly important in our world. Without the development of educational institution, the economic and political life, the development of culture and science are impossible, therefore the development of national © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 3–12, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_1

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education systems have become the dominant public interest and efforts of most countries of the world [1]. The educational function has become one of the main duties and functions of the modern state. Indeed, without the advanced development of education today, neither political, nor economic, nor cultural growth of the state is possible. Education and intelligence are becoming a core value in the new 21st century. In the global age, all the advanced powers will rely not on the development of the production of goods, but on the acquisition of new knowledge and the creation of new technologies [2]. In many states, there is a growing understanding that education is a sphere of profitable long-term investments and effective capital investment. In developed countries, state funding for education per resident is 25–30 times higher than in developing countries [3]. Over 40 years, the relative share of education spending has doubled. It is characteristic that the share of spending on education in the United States exceeded the corresponding figure of most European countries, which to a large extent determined the industrial and scientific leadership of the United States in the post-war world. Not only advanced, but also many developing countries very quickly realized that a fundamental change of coordinates was needed with regard to education. Thus, more than half of high school graduates in South Korea go to higher educational institutions. Expenditures on education account for 22% of the state budget, which is more than in any other Asian country, with the exception of Japan. Since the 60s, the flow of investment in education has steadily increased. The leadership of South Korea, even with a deficit in foreign trade, by increasing foreign loans, kept investment in education at a high level. As a result of this policy, South Korea is now among the most developed countries in the world [4]. The political geography consideration should emphasize the shift towards the students’ personal connection with the demands of the region, the university is located in. The teaching strategy is to be developed in order to reveal the learning outcome and point out the relations between the academic learning and reality. There should be a new level of personal commitment to experience a challenge of high quality learning. The teaching staff who are able to fit such an expanded professional awareness can find the teaching activity rewarding. However, the problems and tasks to be solved are more than achievements. The main problem that worries all researchers of education is the decline in the level of real education, the crisis of education. In the last decade, the gap between the school and the university has dramatically increased: no more than a third of applicants enrolled in universities without additional (paid) training, i.e. 70% of applicants’ trainings are controlled by various commercial structures. It is also a matter of concern that the completion of students goes to 2/3 at the expense of the children of wealthy parents. Statistical analysis indicates a clear priority for children of wealthy parents in the structure of the most prestigious professions [5]. Impoverishment does not allow talented young people from the provinces to study at prestigious universities in the capital. In the present conditions, which do not allow the majority of those who wish to study to admit to higher educational institutions, the competitive situation becomes tougher.

2 New Learning Contexts Anxious for society are such trends in the field of education and science as the collective aging of scientific personnel, the high turnover of young people. Young people are not

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at all attracted to the field of science and education. Sociological studies show that only a few students want to work as teachers or as researchers after graduation. It is so unattractive from all points of view (including the material one) that it cannot facilitate the entry of young specialists into the sphere of these professions [6]. The transformation of western educational achievements into non-western contexts is often problematic, rather than being the expected panacea. The novelty of the research is emphasized by the necessity to consider the appearance of the cultural behavioral patterns, which are based on the online ethnicity. The new paradigm for blended learning approach has been viewed and new reasons for employing blended learning at tertiary schools have been provided. The link between higher education and the emphasis on political geography is revealed. Learning is seen in terms of variation, professional skills’ development and increased confidence. The students are to be transferable to new contexts and problems solution. The research questions are connected with the analysis of modern higher education in the context of new geo-political soft skills implementation and the development of new learning environment. In order to achieve the goal the following tasks have been set: to view the contemporary experience in educational teaching process; to discuss the export of academic processes; to examine the impact of the culture gap; to estimate the research work as the foundation of successful change; to underline the necessity of public money and management investment; to emphasize the effectiveness of blended learning in the context of higher education; to identify the issue of political geography in the field of University education.

3 Methods of Research The research methods included the comparative method, and the pragmaticcommunicative method. The research was based on the analysis of works targeted at the interpretation of the problem. The object of the research, the tasks and research methods are to be considered in relation to the impact of innovation on the educational strategy.

4 Theoretical Background There is a growing stream of practical books, aimed at guiding both new and experienced university teachers. Such researchers as Karasik [7], Komarova [8], Rubtsova [9] captured the major trends and perspectives of teacher education and put forth a vision for the future that is grounded in current education and research. The role of technology is evident. The networks make it possible to get the access to information that is situated in domains of practice. The number of authors considered the topic of blended learning implementation and the challenges of digital teaching environment: Allen and Seaman [10], Bekisheva [11], Gashkova, Berezovskaya and Shipunova [12] compared the blended learning with online classes and measured the positives outcomes for students in blended format. Simola [13] describes the Finnish model of higher education and the links between the Universities and local environment with the emphasis on political geography. The networks allow the students to join different professional

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communities, video tools can help the teachers evaluate and improve their curriculum to fit the international requirements.

5 Results of Research The contemporary experience in educational teaching experience has been viewed; the challenging academic processes have been discussed and compared; the efficacy of blended learning has been emphasized. Blended learning tuition involves a combination of elements, activities and inputs; the success of this type of learning depends on the understanding and commitment of the trainers, the effectiveness of well-organized and reliable administration, and the wholehearted engagement of learners, prepared to participate in a course for innovation to continue. The conclusions about what may be best practice in educational innovation should be attributed to the learning opportunities of the students as well as social, cultural and geographical contexts of entire education system combine with each other. 5.1 Multiculturalism Cultural contacts nowadays occur in a much more globalized and faster way. More than ever, intercultural communication is to be practiced, since the scope can encompass the relations between remote Eastern and Western cultures, as much as youth and senior, rich and poor, erudite and popular cultures within the same society, which is only apparently cohesive. The most significant manifestation of identity politics in modern society is multiculturalism. Multiculturalism proclaims the idea of ‘togetherness in difference’ [14]. Thus multiculturalism recognizes cultural diversity together with the fact that the differences should be respected and the importance of beliefs and values, sense of self-worth and various ways of life should be acknowledged. Cultures can enrich each other by extending cultural understanding and transcending the benevolence. Liberal multiculturalists tend to stress the vitality of civic unity, paying special attention to civic allegiance. Albeit, conservatives argue that developed societies must be based on common cultures, thus multicultural societies are conflict-ridden. All hostility, rivalry, violence between ethnic groups is a fact of social psychology but not a product of ignorance or inequality. Managers of higher education require the same amount of support as the teachers do at all stages of innovative process as the introduction of innovation brings about changes that are to be managed. The way out of higher education crisis is seen in the transformation of the institute of education into the real priority of society, including through a fundamentally new system of financing by the state. Those states that are able to assess knowledge, invest in education are solid investments, very often separating them from other spheres of economic life, prepare future specialists, professionally wealthy, competent, with practical skills and abilities. Expenditures on education are the most effective investments in the economy, therefore the governments of many countries invest huge amounts of money in the development of national education systems, considering them as investments in the future of the nation. In the modern world, knowledge is the most mobile resource, a source of enrichment not only for an individual, but also for society as a whole. With the beginning of the formation of the post-industrial

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society, the role of information technologies and human knowledge in the production of highly efficient goods and services has dramatically increased [15]. Intellectual capital replaces expensive equipment and becomes the main resource of the modern economy, the value of which is constantly growing. Political geography emphasizes the need for the curriculum renewal in order to fit the requirements of local businesses. 5.2 Intellectual Capital The institute of education faces the challenge of the information revolution. It is necessary to train not narrow specialists, but people with system training. We now are in the situation where online technology, mobile devices, and electronic learning contexts can be combined to create a functional learning environment. At best, information technology, and related applications enhance interactivity and motivation for learning, as well as provide the students with genuine opportunities to develop their skills in the area they are used to study and do the research in. Digital technology and related media have a significant impact on learning. For this reason, digitalization is believed to increase the number of new interactive teaching practices. The opportunities offered by digital learning and pedagogy include: 1. the technology provides students of various competence levels the opportunity to study in a manner and at a speed that is best suited to them. 2. The technology facilitates an active role of the learners 3. The technology develops new forms of literacy and offers new skills for searching and assessing information. The increased popularity of social media applications has created new pedagogical expectations for both teaching and learning with the emphasis on a learner – oriented approach. The role of a teacher is mainly that of guiding the learning process. Examples include: 1. Flipped classroom: a form of multimedia teaching that uses online study materials, increasing the opportunities for students-teachers interaction. 2. Blended learning: for example, merging of a classroom and virtual learning environment. This activity shifts the focus of teaching to the guiding of learning and the learning process. 3. PLE (Personal Learning Environment) are personal learning systems that help learners organize their own learning management. The support is provided in order for the students to be able: 1. to set their personal goals in the field of study. 2. to manage the studying process, both the content and the process. 3. to communicate with others during the research and studying process. The rapidly changing digital world requires from the teachers a new kind of attitude and readiness to take risks, which is a challenge. Research shows that teachers lack information and communication technology skills and would need more support from the management in order to upgrade the skills. Russian teachers consider the lack of good examples and further training as the main hindrances for the use of information and communication technology in teaching. The technology should be used more widely in teaching. The world’s most used digital learning solutions based on the number of users include Moodle, Fronter, and Blackboard. The development of Moodle started in the 1990s based on the philosophy of that time, i.e. when very few interactive web 2.0. tools existed. Most often the learning platforms were mostly used for storing study materials and documents, sharing and returning assignments, and administrative tasks relating to teaching. The main critique directed against such learning environments concerns interaction in the system that is felt to be awkward and limited to communication between the teacher and individual student. In the new kind of personal learning

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environment, the students can modify and use the space in any way they want by using the mobile devices they use in their everyday work or life. BYOD (Bring your own device) means that the workers and students use their own smart devices in the classrooms. The use of own devices requires that the IT management of the organization can be organized to provide sufficient information security and compatibility of software, and the potentially increasing need for support of the users can be met. It has been estimated that the BYOD strategy will rapidly become more common in the coming years. The programs need to recognize the importance of developing self-regulation and reflective practice as an integral part curriculum to goals explicit. Programs should ensure that learners have opportunities early in their study and should provide both the cognitive challenge and psychological support necessary to facilitate the development of self-regulation. Programs should set realistic expectations in terms of learning outcomes and encourage participants to do likewise. The trend to develop soft skills is associated with the development of educational standards [16]. As the result of teachers’ training provided by the administration, the University staff has been familiarized with digital thinking or various new virtual study units have been implemented on a smaller scale. For example, flipped classrooms, blended learning and PLE (Personal Learning Environment) models have been used in developing new ways to implement the study units. Some educational institutions have hired specialists whose duty is to introduce digital reformations within the organization. It is considered important that representatives of the IT management participate in the planning and implementation of training together with teaching staff. This ensures that the It infrastructure of the University goes hand in hand with the pedagogic expectations. Digitalization is in progress and the opportunities offered by the technology have been identified. Every teacher is supposed to apply information and communication technology to teaching and learning. This development should be speed up by a management culture that encourages digitalization by investing in competence and infrastructure. The digital revolution requires a positive attitude and eagerness to enter the new era together with colleagues and students. 5.3 The Challenges and Quality of Higher Education The modern employee is supposed to respond quickly and skillfully to any changes. The ability to adapt to changes will become more important quality than the possession of specific knowledge and skills [17]. In many spheres of activity, success and career growth depend on continuous education, therefore it is necessary to constantly improve and increase your professional knowledge. Learning from experience is another major theme of the impact study process. The team learnt by conducting the research process, but also by making decisions about the process. The team itself is a source of learning: learning from peer opinions, from team discussions and decision making, as well as from the good work or mistakes of colleagues. Change and learning are two key themes that describe the process and outcomes of conducting the study of the project team. An essential aspect of change management is to create opportunities for those involved to develop, to gain new insights into themselves and their circumstances, and to empower them to improve the circumstances, if they feel the need to do so. Change becomes sustainable when participants internalize the experience and translate it into the way they work, into patterns of behavior and belief, and into perceptions of their role. This process

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of assimilating or rejecting elements of innovation is essentially a process of learning, and carrying out an impact study was a worthwhile rewarding learning experience for the prosper team. Innovation and change can be planned in a more or less rational, linear way, with identification of problems and needs, the planning of action, implementation of the plans, and evaluation of results. Ten years ago, the International Diploma in Language Teaching Management (IDLTM) was launched and was designed in response to indications that there was a demand for a management course which, by being made available in blended learning mode, would enable participants to combine study with work. To be convincing, online material has to be updated regularly and links have to be checked thoroughly before each course and there needs to be a fast response to changes on the web that impact on access to resources. There is no such thing as a ‘finished’ course. In overall structure, the course involves two different modes of presentation: face-to-face and online. The course package consists of a syllabus, and a main course book, which itself is closely based on both the structure of the course and experience of teaching it. This book is supplemented by other publications covering the topics of the modules, as well as articles and material downloadable from the virtual learning environment (VLE) or from recommended online sources. The VLE is a critical component, being the main channel by which online material is made available to participants, as well as being the vehicle through which communication is managed between trainers and participants, and among participants themselves. The activities in the face-to-face phase provide participants with the opportunity to develop as a social group as they proceed through some of the stages involved in team formation, and establish norms of working as a team. Forming a social group and becoming a professional learning community is important in order to support the online and phase, when participants themselves act as sources of information and ideas and sharers of experience. However, as participants have become more experienced and sophisticated in blended learning, they are more critical. In a course covering a wide range of management areas, some activities are more appropriate or effective than others. For instance, a task in financial management intended to apply specific processes will have an outcome which will be either right or wrong. By and large, tasks which are relevant to the workplace, but allow for a range of responses from simple to complex, are the most effective at encouraging participation, collaboration and lateral learning. For instance, reading articles, which have an angle on a topic, and can then be mapped onto the participants’ own contexts seems to generate most discussions. In fact, some groups establish a very productive dynamic during the face-toface phase, which they then carry over to the online part of the course. The key variable appears to be the group itself. When it comes to synchronous activities, some have proven to be problematic. Firstly, participants are often in widely dispersed time zones, which can make scheduling of chat sessions complicated. Secondly, managing chat sessions with more than five participants is difficult. Some participants have commented that they found it more useful not to attend the chat sessions, but read the transcript afterwards. It was more conducive to their style of learning. Thirdly, the simulation generates a lot of involvement; it is a great way to bring participants together. The results of the students’ questionnaire revealed that nearly all of the students considered that an online learning management system helped them improve their knowledge.

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6 Conclusion The IDLTM model of blended learning is successful when judged from satisfaction level. On the base of the IDLTM experience, some guiding principles and practical considerations emerge, which may have implications for blended learning provision. When considering blended learning, there is, of course, no single perfect blend because it is grounded on the notion of flexibility, geographical and political demands. There is no prescription for designing effective blended learning practices. The planning and designing of effective practices can be challenging and demanding. To what extent to use technology and when to integrate it are important questions to be considered in order to find the most efficient combination of the two modes of learning for the individual contexts and objectives? Firstly, there is the role, reliability and accessibility of the platform for the blended learning components [17]. Martin and Perez consider students’ concerns over technical issues as one of the perceived weaknesses of blended learning, while the importance of both teacher and student training in the use of blended learning facilities is noted as beneficial [18]. Secondly, the course material must be directly relevant. The Universities should shift the curriculums towards the political geography demands. The Universities are to respond to the challenges of the regional economy and carry out realistic mission and responsibility. Thirdly, the trainers are supposed to create a forum for mentoring and the exchange of pedagogical practices. Fourthly, it is beneficial to create a strong University – Business partnership. The curriculum is planned by University management in order to collaborate with the local businesses. The course provision, facilitating communication and cooperation among the teaching staff becomes the most challenging requirement. Fifthly, the trainers themselves influence how, when and what participants contribute to online tasks and discussions. The field of education should enact the knowledge base through the development of pedagogy in the professional fields. Finally, the on-line identities differ from the real ones. The Internet culture has already shaped the special ethics and has formed its own culture with the special prejudice and privilege [19]. The digital revolution has been quick and keeping up with it requires a positive attitude and eagerness to enter the new era together with the students. The concept of academic community is complex with diverse areas of discussion amongst academics in different parts of the world. Communities of practice have a far-reaching scope of reference, extending from research partners and practitioners, professional academic bodies to online open resource development and shared repositories. The quality of higher education is a global concern. Teaching in higher education has to become more professional. Agencies are being set up in a number of countries, charged with supporting and/or accrediting the development of teaching competence. Faculties are paying greater attention to their teaching and to finding ways of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the support they provide to students. Universities are shifting budgets towards the improvement of learning and teaching and are strengthening the roles of faculty developers. These shifts are creating a demand for a better research-based understanding of the nature of teaching in contemporary higher education. The term ‘online learning’, ‘e-learning’, ‘networked learning’ are used almost interchangeably in much of the current discussion about innovation in education. What teaching has in common with a range of other professions is that the work serves others and,

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because of its social importance, must do so responsively. It should be concluded that thoughtful policymakers should pay more attention to investing in teacher quality as a way to improve student achievement [20]. Critical thinking is a skill crucial to all students studying on academic courses. Critical thinking requires elements connected with the emotional side of learning and is associated with the freedom the teacher allows. The students are encouraged to solve the problems independently, to convince the peers into their ideas and to analyze the results. There are many attributes that matter for teaching, such as enthusiasm, perseverance, flexibility, and concern for students. In addition, the teaching context matters for teacher effectiveness, including such factors as class size, curriculum approaches, and opportunities for teacher collaboration [21]. Being a professional involves understanding the social and legal obligations of one’s job, including making decisions in the best interests of the client, based on professional wide research and standards of practice. This commitment requires of professionals that they be aware of the current knowledge base in their field. Even if we had direct evidence to guide all of the elements of a professional preparation program, fields change, and new insights and interpretations frequently replace old ones. There are four kinds of research evidence to support the productive teaching practice: 1. the research how people learn, both generally and in special areas 2. the influences of different conditions, including specific teaching strategies, on what and how people learn 3. the teacher learning opportunities that are associated with teaching practice 4. The teachers’ engagement in practices should support the students’ development and learning. A great deal of effort is required for novices to function – in part because they have not yet developed the necessary pattern recognition and memory schemes that help them cope with complexity. In contrast, experts learn to recognize familiar patterns with great fluency and little effort. The students should realize how practical the knowledge is and how well they are prepared for their practical activities. A teacher cannot make headway without engaging students in the learning process Teachers’ education has not ignored the calls for change. Many of the teacher education reforms launched in the 2000s were developed in response to these critiques. The reforms are built upon the ideas that educating new teachers requires new preparation programs. The program of continuing professional development is based on papers targeted at the research of pedagogy of online learning. If the projects are to be launched political uncertainty can be an external factor, over which a project can exert no control. Uncertainty over political leadership always has a direct impact on the project team and teachers. Local opposition often undermines the integrity of any project. Very often low self-esteem amongst teachers, lack of the independence culture leads to a number of failures. It is important to ensure projects to be properly funded from the beginning. It is not surprising that the integration of critical thinking and soft skills in the process of teaching is considered as essential to prepare learners for modern workplaces. Critical thinking is considered as a key factor for education environment success.

References 1. Kiely, R.: Small answers to the big questions: learning from language programme evaluation. Language Teaching Research 13(1), 99–116 (2009) 2. Patton, Q.: Utilization-Focused Evaluation, 4th edn. Sage, Thousand Oaks (2008)

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3. Youngs, P., Odden, A., Porter, A.C.: State policy related to teacher licensure. Educ. Policy 17(2), 217–236 (2003) 4. Hativa, N.: Teaching for Effective Learning in Higher Education. Kluw Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, the Netherlands (2012) 5. Pazio, M.: Blended learning and its potential in expanding vocabulary knowledge: a case study. Teach. Engl. Technol. 10(1), 3–30 (2010) 6. Yakovleva, E.V.: The Intellectual Staff Management in The Industrial Enterprises. OmSTU Publ, Omsk (2014). [in Russian] 7. Karasik, V.I.: Discorsive personalization. Language, communication and social environment. Voronezh, pp. 78–86 (2007). (in Russian) 8. Komarova, Z.: Methodology, method, methodics and the technology of scientific investigations in linguistics. Ekaterinburg (2012). (in Russian) 9. Rubtsova, A.: Socio-linguistic innovations in education: productive implementation of intercultural communication. In: IOP Conference Series Materials Science and Engineering, vol. 497 no. 1 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1088/1757-899x/497/1/012059 10. Allen, E., Seaman, J.: Online Report Card: Tracking Online Education in the United States Babson. Survey Research Group and Quahog Research Group LLC (2016) 11. Bekisheva, T.: Blended learning: modern tendencies in higher education. Mod. Res. Soc. Probl. 11.2 (67) (2016) 12. Gashkova, E., Berezovskaya, I., Shipunova, O.: Models of self-identification in digital communication environments. In: The European Proceedings of Social & Behavioural Sciences, vol. 35, pp. 374–382 (2017). https://doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2018.02.44 13. Simola, H.: The Finnish miracle of PISA: historical and sociological remarks on teaching and teacher education. Comp. Educ. 41, 455–470 (2005) 14. Young, I.: Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton University Press, New Jersey (1998) 15. Martynov, A.V.: About the upgraded concept of economic transformation. Obshchestvo i ekonomika 4–5, 30–36 (2011). [in Russian] 16. Miller, L., Hanter, C., Fun, C.K.: Project based learning in a technologically enhanced learning environment for second language learners: students’ perceptions. E-Learning Digit. Media 9(2), 183–195 (2012). https://doi.org/10.2304/elea.2012.9.2.183 17. Pogodin, S., Matveevskaya, A.: Integration of migrants as a way to diminish proneness to conflict in multinational communities. Vestn. Saint Petersburg Univ. Philos. Conflictology 34(1), 108–114 (2018) 18. Martin, P., Perez, I.K.L.: Convincing peers of the value of one’s research: a genre analysis of rhetorical promotion in academic texts. Engl. Specif. Purp. 34, 23–36 (2014) 19. Ter-Minasova, S.: Language and Intercultural Communication. URAO Publishing House, Moscow (2000). [in Russian] 20. Privalova, G.: Active and interactive methods of education as a factor of improvement of educational process in higher schools. Mod. Probl. Sci. Educ. 3, 5–12 (2014). [in Russian] 21. Dobbins, M.: Higher Education Policies in Central and Eastern Europe: Convergence towards a Common Model?. Palgrave, MacMillan (2011)

Challenges of Migration into the European Union and Proposal of Solution Through Education Ivan Arjona-Pelado1 and Vadim Atnashev2,3(B) 1 Foundation for Improvement of Life, Culture and Society, Basque, Spain

[email protected] 2 St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia

[email protected] 3 North West Institute of Management, RANEPA, St. Petersburg, Russia

Abstract. In the paper, main aspects of the migration processes in the modern European Union are considered. The European Union attracts many migrants owing to its high level of social well-being, stability and multicultural environment. However, some problems that existed between the immigrants and the recipient societies before 2015 have become much more acute during the “immigration crisis”. Many events in Europe demonstrate the necessity to fight with violation of migrants’ collective and individual rights, to prevent migrantophobia, islamophobia, other forms of racial discrimination which push the societies just to chaos and conflicts. To solve problems of xenophobia, extremism as well as integration of immigrant communities, human rights of ethnical, language, religious minorities in Europe must not be curtailed. In addition, in order to stop the development of ‘nationalist’ movements all over the European Union, its parliament should launch various educational and training programs in cooperation with United Nations and other organizations that protect human rights. The authors conclude that the European countries should unite common efforts by investing into education and propose to create a joint EU financial fund for training purposes. Keywords: Immigrants · Discrimination · Xenophobia · Hate crimes · Terrorism · Human rights · Religion

1 Introduction Globalization has led to lots of positive outcomes in the world; however, these are not the only ones that have happened as a result of that phenomenon. Since people have got the availability to see other parts of the world, the processes of migration have been enabled due to the fact that human beings have always wanted to find a better place to live and chase greater living conditions. In turn, it is not a secret that the formation of the European Union has made the majority of countries-members developed and prospering where the level of social well-being is tremendously high. As a result, the European Union has

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 13–22, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_2

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slowly become an excellent place for immigration from developing countries. Due to the geopolitical situation of the formation, it has started accepting immigrants from the Middle East countries, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. Another crucial factor that plays a significant role in the scope of immigration to Europe is a multi-cultural atmosphere that varies from one country to another. Hence, every immigrant can find a suitable country and language to speak there. Unfortunately, last political tendencies in the European Union clearly illustrate the fact that an internal as well as external political approaches are constantly changing and not in favor of newcomers to the Union. In particular, the fact that xenophobia is rocketing up all the time has become regular for the majority of the countries. Besides that, the rise of extremism can also be tracked, and it is caused by both immigrants and locals who do not want to accept others’ foreign culture. Most importantly, there are many violations of human rights prescribed by the U.N. Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, which regulate inherent rights and freedoms of every human being, while the right of free movement is among fundamental, natural rights. A political situation regarding immigrants in the European Union keeps on becoming unfavorable for newcomers who are looking for a better life, and one of the solutions to stop such an adverse tendency in the future is investing in the education of children and adults concerning the protection of human rights. Many civil society organizations can contribute to this process.

2 Materials and Methods The methodological basis of the research is complex analysis of international conventions, other legal documents, as well as comparative legal and content analysis. Different data were analyzed basing reports of European structures and bodies and international non-governmental organizations, including European Commission on Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Human Rights Watch, Collectif contre l’Islamophobie en France (CCIF) and others. In the sphere of education, a program that has proven to be effective worldwide (both in written and audiovisual forms) is “Know Your Human Rights” of two NGOs – Youth for Human Rights and United for Human Rights. Practical activity of the Foundation for Improvement of Life, Culture and Society has also contributed to the preparing of the paper.

3 Problem Statement First of all, there is a need to underscore that the European Union has always been an attractive place for immigration due to a wide variety of opportunities that it offers to immigrants. At the moment, the Union includes twenty-eight countries, whereas many of them are most developed in the world (Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom). According to the latest economic indexes, an overall GDP of the European Union is equal to $18.8 trillion [4]. It is obvious that the economic situation in the Union is constantly getting better, while the level of social well-being is also rising.

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Considering the fact that the European Union is perfectly developed in the economic scope and has an excellent geographical location with various types of climate, it is significantly attractive for both tourists and immigrants from all over the world. The opportunities that the Union offers lie down in the essence of that political formation: namely, a freedom of movement between the countries, free and transparent flow of goods, and mutual currency that makes the life of population much easier. Even though there are some country-members that have not adopted Euro yet, the European Parliament does its best to make it happen in order to follow one of the core principles of the Union. Thus, since the European Union has such characteristics, it provides immigrants with the ability to travel all over the countries freely and experience different cultures and life. Moreover, every immigrant can move to any country once he or she has crossed the European border, and such a decision can, inter alia, depend on a language an immigrant knows or prefers. That is why the Union offers all types of opportunities that make it such an attractive formation in the scope of immigration.

4 Research Questions Immigration Crisis in the EU. Any political shift of a phenomenon has its beginning and its end, and the same situation has happened to immigration to the EU. In fact, the immigration crisis has not happened overnight but was a chain of events that has let to such a situation. There were many opinions regarding the question when it occurred, and different experts refer to various dates. However, the war in Syria can be claimed as the beginning of the crisis since that country has been the primary supplier of immigrants to the EU due to the military situation and war happened in Syria. Considering the number of immigrants that have arrived at the EU borders, these statistics substantiate such an assumption to a certain extent. According to reports the highest pick of the crisis is dated back to 2015. That year is considered to be the beginning of a new era in Europe due to a tremendous number of immigrants that have decided to find a better life in the Union. According to the statistics, in 2015, there were more than 1,800,000 illegal crossings of the European borders without counting those new-comers who have come legally to the EU [11]. That is a tremendous number of immigrants, considering an overall population in the European countries. Primarily, these were immigrants who were trying to escape military actions in the Middle East and those who fled from the African countries to chase better living conditions for them and their families. More importantly, the European countries did not know which preventive measures should be applied since they have never faced such a tremendous flow of immigrants to the Union. Due to a geographical location, such countries as Greece, Italy, and Spain were those states that should have accepted immigrants who continued to move all over the European Countries. The flow of immigrants was so huge that the countries mentioned above did not have enough border controls to properly accommodate that flow. Moreover, some of those immigrants coming without their properly administered request were much more aggressive than peaceful new-comers who were trying to go through a legal procedure. The situation in the year of 2015 has become a tough lesson for the European countries, and, as a result, that tendency has changed a lot since that time.

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After 2015, the number of both legal and illegal immigrants has started going down due to preventive measures that both the European parliament and separate countries have applied, including the EU’s agreement with Turkey. For instance, in 2016, the number of illegal immigrants plumped to the point below 600,000, while, in 2018, that number was just under 200,000 [11]. It is expected that those numbers will keep on going down due to the tough political approach that countries have adopted, and development of the political protectionism all over Europe. Finally, another reason for such a tendency has become a large number of terrorist attacks in the EU that have been committed by immigrants from developing countries. Political and immigration protectionism in the EU has started developing in the year of 2015, where the flow of ‘illegal’ immigrants has been significant. With that situation the European Union seems to believe that tolerance does not work in such cases, and some strict measures are to be applied. Each country has perceived such a change differently. For instance, one of the reasons for Brexit is an immigration crisis in the EU that has spread over Great Britain instantly (which would be inconsistent with the fact that Great Britain is one of the most multicultural and ‘multi’ nationality places). That is why European countries have opted for immigration rules as strict as possible. Terrorist attacks have been used as another reason for such a decision since lots of lives of peaceful people have been taken away. In particular, the EU has been suffering from wrongly called ‘Islamic’ terrorism due to a large number of illegal immigrants from the countries where Islam is a central religion. In particular, according to the statics, almost 500 people have died as a result of terrorism in the EU that was falsely motivated by ‘religion purposes’, mainly referred to Islam: In 2014, 4 people got killed, in 2015 - 150, in 2016 - 135, in 2017 - 62 [12]. These deaths include infamous terrorist attacks in Paris, Barcelona, and London, where dozens of innocent people died due to violent and cruel actions of terrorists who pretended to be motivated by ‘their’ religion. There are no doubts that such a tendency is totally unaccepted, becoming another piece of motivation for the European governments to change the political approach towards immigrants from the third countries. Therefore, a strong political lobby in the European parliament motivated by a series of violent events have created lots of challenges for immigrants in contemporary Europe. After the September 11 attacks in the USA, anti-Muslim rhetoric from different political figures and mass media created a climate that legitimized discrimination against the particular minority group. Such violation of individual and collective rights encouraged and provoked far-right extremist groups to commit hate and other crimes against Muslims. In the specific context of counter-terrorism, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has said that the principle of non-discrimination is not capable of limitation since it has become a norm of jus cogens. It is important to note that in its general recommendation No. 30 (2004), the CERD called on States to ensure that any measures taken in the fight against terrorism do not discriminate, in purpose or effect, on the grounds of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin and that non-citizens are not subjected to racial or ethnic profiling or stereotyping [1]. At the regional level, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) asked Governments to ensure that no discrimination ensues from legislation and

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regulations, or their implementation, in the field of law enforcement checks [2]. Earlier, the European Union Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights cautioned that profiling on the basis of characteristics such as religion, nationality, age or birthplace “presents a major risk of discrimination” [6]. Nowadays, Muslims and immigrants have become the main object of hate and xenophobia in almost all countries of Europe. Many of them were and are refugees and migrants, considerable movement of whom was caused by “political turmoil, internal ethnic strife, the settling of historical grievances, and religious extremism in various countries around the globe” [15]. One of the main reasons for discontent and protest among Muslim communities in Europe is discrimination, especially Islamophobic or anti-Muslims hate crimes that may be encouraged and legitimized. Discriminatory legislation result in social inequality in jobs, housing, social services and negative media representation of Muslims. As John Esposito argued many years ago, “Islam and Islamist revivalism are easily reduced to stereotypes of Islam against the West, Islam’s war with modernity, or Muslim rage, extremism, fanaticism, terrorism” [5]. So far, these stereotypes have not only been maintained but also widely disseminated by mass media, unprincipled politicians and racists. One needs to understand that religions are under attack in Europe and most of all in the Northern Hemisphere; especially when media or authorities blame it on a religion whichever it is instead of designating the criminals for what they are, regardless of political, philosophical or religious views. Such an attitude contributes to single out people, communities, favoring discrimination against the vast majority of people who belong to these minorities and who would never thing of hurting others, and so it creates the xenophobia that we are experiencing in Europe. A reflection would also have to be done as to how the actions of the EU members states in the third world countries are triggering such exodus to Europe.

5 Results of Research Extremism and the Rise of Xenophobia in the EU. Xenophobia is not the only adverse phenomenon that has developed as a result of the immigration crisis in the EU. Nationalism has always been an inherent element in lots of European countries due to historical development and WWII, where Germans showed a special type of nationalistic views that were proclaimed by Hitler [it is also true in my view that many felt coerced to ‘like it’ in order to survive]. At the moment, there is an evident tendency that a ‘nationalism’ increases all over the Union, and it is unlikely that something will stop it in the nearest future unless lots of education takes place on respect and diversity. While the flow of immigrants to the EU has been partly cut, the level of them is still on a high level since those people are not willing to come back home one they cross a border with any European country. The rise of nationalism is tracked not only in separate countries but also the European Parliament in terms of representation. According to the results of the elections to the highest legislative body in the Union, the representation nationalists has increased drastically [7]. The following countries are leading ones in the scope of nationalist increasing tendency: Sweden, Finland, Denmark,

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and Estonia. For instance, while in Italy a dominant figure on the political arena has turned out to be Matteo Salvini, Marine Le Pen is a leader of nationalists in the French Parliament whose support is constantly rising. It’s well known that she lost her last presidential elections with a minimal difference from Emmanuel Macron [10]. Germany has also stepped onto that path due to the fact that the year of 2017 was the first one when the Alternative for Germany has gone through the election barrier, entering the German Parliament. That has been the first case that right-wing nationalists have become the real part of Bundestag since the Nazi regime during the Second World War. The fact is that extremism is increasing both on social and political levels, while both racial and religious discrimination are also increasing, violating inherent human rights that are guaranteed by international treaties, in particular by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Regardless of any immigration rules or tendencies, inherent human rights cannot be violated since they are what European principles are based on. EU Fundamental Rights Agency is a governmental body that reports on violation of human rights all the time, and their latest researches in that area highlight the fact that there is a constant rise of intolerance towards immigrants and discrimination regarding them on various bases [16]. That is why there is a need for the European governments to handle that adverse situation, referring to principles and guaranteed human right as well as freedoms. The case of Germany. The immigration crisis, terrorist attacks that have been geopolitically motivated by people under the effect of drugs while blaming religion, and unexpected acceptance of a tremendous number of immigrants have resulted in the development of xenophobic tendencies all over the Union. In fact, the European Union has served as a time bomb that has exploded since the year 2015 as a reaction to what has been going on in the scope of the immigration crisis. There are lots of areas where xenophobia can be clearly tracked. For instance, the number of political asylums has dropped tremendously, while the procedure itself has become much tougher than it used to be throughout the European Union. Immigrants who have just arrived in countries have been forced to live in special camps created for refugees; in other words, they have been fully segregated from the rest of society. That is why the development of xenophobia is a predictable negative continuation of the immigration crisis in Europe that has led to unexpected outcomes. The case of Germany is an excellent illustration of the development of a xenophobic movement since the country has accepted millions of refugees from the Middle East and African countries. In particular, in 2015, Angela Merkel agreed to accept more than 1.1 million immigrants during the year, and such a decision made the German government pay a high price [13]. A. Merkel did advocate for such a decision as a leader of the country in order to help the rest of immigrants who were in need of political asylum. However, the spirit of nationalism that is an inherent part of German society has made the life of immigrants as difficult as possible. Even though there have not been any serious movements against governmental politics in the country, there is clear segregation in German society where immigrants are not able to assimilate due to cultural and religious differences. It is so that in Germany we still see governmental policies, at local and national level (for example, in Munich), that discriminate people because of

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their religion, forcing some of them to resign from their religion if they want to have access to a specific facility that the authority provides. Similar to France and some other European states, xenophobia and discrimination in Germany are also motivated towards Islam since the majority of immigrants are followers of that religion, and, as a result, the society considers it as a threat to the conservative nation. In particular, in accordance with the recent research, “44% of Germans hold the view that those immigrants who support Islam should be restricted from entering the country, even though that index was by 10% less in the year of 2014 before the immigration crisis reached its high peak” [9]. What is more, the same research also underscores the fact that “more than half of German society considers the fact that immigrants make them feel like strangers in their own country” [9]. These prejudicial views are logical since the German government has adopted the decision that is not typical for that country that is how Germans are being educated through media and other means used by the State. This is due to the fact that Germany has always been developing as a conservative country with a monolith society. The decision to adopt millions of refugees from other parts of the world served as a shock therapy for a part of the society. That is why such governmental politics lead to a widespread alarming opinion that a ‘dictatorship may be the best form of government for Germany’ and that democracy allegedly resulted in lots of immigration troubles that are not resolved yet. At the moment, the German government tries to adopt alternative solutions regarding the situation that has happened there to avoid further development of xenophobia in the country. Instead of accepting immigrants from developing countries, “the leader of Germany, Angela Merkel, has advocated for the creation of the fund in Africa with the budget of 4.3 billion dollars to eliminate all possible roots of immigration to Europe” [12]. That money should be spent on the development of the economic situation in those countries where the largest number of emigrants can be tracked. Also, the fund is targeted at employment, food, and educational purposes to reduce the number of people who would like to leave their home countries to find a better place for life. Other European countries, in turn, have set limits for the number of immigrants that can arrive at their border. Different European countries have adopted various measures, but all of them have a common goal: to reduce the number of coming immigrants either physically or through the creation of bureaucratic procedures for receiving asylum. While this is understandable in view of the way society and governments currently work, it would be unnecessary if the system would work well, in real symbiosis with other countries, rather than trying to expand and increase wellbeing even if at the cost of the suffering of people from poor countries. When it comes to physical restriction of immigrants, in April 2019, a migrant ship that had 64 people onboard could port at none of the European countries due to the fact that Italy and Malta denied such an opportunity [8]. On the one hand, such a decision may be considered as rather aggressive towards people who are in search of a better life. On the other hand, the European approach towards immigrants has changed a lot over the last several years, and that was a logical reaction of the most right-wing Italian government. In fact, it was a difficult decision because refusing them means denying other human beings of a better chance for their lives and the ones of their families, but on the other side, accepting the refugees, even

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with the best intentions of the civil society and NGOs, contributes to the market of human trafficking which capitalizes the good intentions of people.

6 Conclusion The rule of law should be above all, while international treaties in the area of human rights should always be enforced regardless of any conditions in the European Union. In accordance with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (henceforth Convention), “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status” [3]. This is an inherent rule that has been multiple times interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. In fact, it is a number one obligation of the European governments and law enforcement bodies to make sure that this principle is enforced, while any attempts of its violation are to be punished according to the law. If nationalist movements keep on encouraging the violation of that basic human right, the EU will easily lose inherent human values it was created for the protection of. When it comes to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is also a crucial international treaty that is aimed at the protection of human rights, including discrimination. Article 7 of the Declaration sets forth the following legal provision: “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination” [4]. Similarly, since all European countries are parties of that treaty, they should follow it strictly and create all conditions for its enforcement. In order to solve the problem of xenophobia, extremism against immigrants, and stop the development of ‘nationalist’ movements all over the European Union, the parliament of the latter should launch various educational and training programs in cooperation with United Nations and other organizations that protect human rights. There are no doubts that the launch of those strategies will require tremendous financial investments, and a common fund will be the best possible solution to make that idea come true. For instance, while so far there are 28 countries, all of them could invest 2 million euros as the capital of such a fund to keep a common control on money spent. As a result, there would be needed approximately 56 million euros to eliminate negative outcomes that the badly controlled migration crisis has caused through the territory of the European Union. Both diplomacy and education based not only on the formal approach but on the International Bill of Human Rights and the EU Charter, as well as practicing what Europeans preach in there, are capable of mitigating risks of extremism and xenophobia that has already developed in European countries. As it was mentioned above, the European crisis that has a long background has resulted in lots of challenges for both Europeans and new-comers who are in search of a better life in the EU. Political tendencies that are tracked in the European Union have created lots of challenges for immigrants, including xenophobia, extremism against immigrants, and the rise of nationalist movements (not to be confused with patriotism). At this point let us remind that the history of many countries and regions demonstrated

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that the more pressure, injustice and discrimination occur, the more uncompromising struggle arises. Thus, in order to solve those negative issues, the European countries should unite common efforts by investing into education and training of the society within EU and abroad. At the moment, the EU has launched the politics of protectionism due to various immigration reasons. In turn, the rise of xenophobia regarding immigrants can be clearly tracked in Germany. When it comes to the rise of nationalist movements, there are visible everywhere – for example, in France, Italy, Finland, and Sweden. The only way to terminate the development of those social phenomena is to refer to the rule of law and make European governments comply with the European Convention and with Universal Declaration on Human Rights. This is due to the fact that this is a number one task of law enforcement bodies. In an effort to prevent social conflicts and radicalization, multidimensional (political, educational, social, economic) approach seems to be particularly promising, though this requires long-term and trustful relationships. Besides, such work, especially with young people, shall always involve families, educational institutions, religious settings, communities and authorities at the local or national level. In the scope of education, the best solution would be the creation of a joint financial fund for training purposes all over the EU with an estimated budget of 56 million euros as for beginning to be used by many civil society organizations rather than for just a few macro NGOs or national agencies that loose the power of the investment because not reaching enough people and wasting too high percentages on administrative procedures and sometimes even on corruption.

References 1. European Union countries by GDP (2018). http://statisticstimes.com/economy/europeanunion-countries-by-gdp.php 2. Sharp fall in illegal migration to EU. BBC News (2019). https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-46764500 3. Terrorism in the EU: terror attacks, deaths and arrests (2018). http://Europarl.europa.eu 4. Atnashev, V.: Impact of Islamophobia and human rights: the radicalization of Muslim communities. In: Dawoody, A. (ed.) Eradicating Terrorism from the Middle East, pp. 91–105. Springer (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31018-3_5 5. European commission against racism and intolerance. General policy recommendation N° 8 on combating racism while fighting terrorism (2004) 6. EU network of independent experts in fundamental rights. The balance between freedom and security in the response by the European Union and its member states to the terrorist threats (2003) 7. War crimes program. Department of justice of the Government of Canada (2015). http://www. justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/wc-cdg/prog.html 8. Esposito, J.: The Islamic Threat, Myth or Reality. Oxford University Press, New York (1992) 9. Is Europe seeing a nationalist surge? BBC News (2019). https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-36130006 10. Sergent, C., Farand, C.: The final results of the first round of the French election. The Independent (2017)

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11. World report 2019: rights trends in European Union. Human Rights Watch (2019). https:// www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/european-union 12. Tisdall, S.: Rise of xenophobia is fanning immigration flames in EU and US. The Guardian 22nd June 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/22/as-immigration-crisis-exp lodes-xenophobes-gain-ground-in-eu 13. Osborne, S.: Islamophobia and xenophobia on the rise in Germany, new study claims. The Independent (2018). https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-isl amophobia-xenophobia-racism-study-survey-extremism-a8622391.html 14. Migrant ship with 64 people denied safe port by Italy and Malta. The Guardian (2019). https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/04/migrant-ship-storm-64-people-denied-safe-portharbour-italy-malta 15. European convention on human rights. European Council (1950) 16. Universal declaration of human rights. The United Nations General Assembly (1948)

Migration and Dual Education System as Major Countermeasures for Problems on Labor Market in Federal Republic of Germany and Russian Federation Ekaterina Potapova(B) and Nikita Ivannikov Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected], [email protected]

Abstract. The article examines major unemployment trends on labor market in Federal Republic of Germany and Russian Federation. Problem of unemployment in both highly qualified and common labor market areas is stated. It is considered that youth unemployment is a significant peculiarity of labor market in Russia, while Germany maintains one of the lowest unemployment rates in Europe and keeps youth unemployment issue settled. Usage of migration positive effect and implementation of dual education system are regarded as an efficient mean to overcome some of labor market problems. Efficiency of current approach to these problems and possibility of implementing elements of dual education system in Russian Federation are estimated in the results of this research. Keywords: Migration · Dual education · Labor market · Employment

1 Introduction Key aspects of the researched topic presented in this article are employment, unemployment, labor market structure, dual and practice-oriented education system. Different information and data sources as well as article and studies were used to conduct this research. In order to research current state of the labor market in the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany, an analysis of statistical data presented on the main foreign and domestic sites was carried out. To find out the rate of unemployment and employment and another figures such websites like ec.europa.eu (Eurostat), www. gks.ru (Rosstat), www.oecd.org (OECD) and www.statista.com (Statista) were used. The works of German and Russian authors Dengler K., Gericke D., Abylkalikov S., Nikiforova E. helped to analyze the current state of the labor market and conditions of its formation. Works devoted to the study of the dual education system were also of interest while conducting the research. The issue of practice-oriented education in Russia is being considered by Vetrov I., Bondarenko T., Romanov M.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 23–34, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_3

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2 Unemployment on Labor Markets of Russia and Germany Unemployment is one of the most trending and relevant global problems. Its current rate has decreased from the 2018 5% to 4,9% [16]. In European Union this rate is about 6,5% [54]. It is higher comparing to 4,9% in Russia [8], but this may change due to the recent data that after the first quarter of 2019 official unemployment in Russia soared by 20% (raise of unemployment benefit is stated as the main reason, according to the Ministry of labor and social welfare of Russian Federation) [33]. Problem of population being employed is one of the major for European labor market. Regarding the fact that rates are varying in different states of the Union it may be stated that domestic policy in this area of the EU is not univocally efficient. Current unemployment rate in Germany - 3,2% of population - is one of the lowest (with Czech Republic being a leader with 2,1%) [52] comparing with Greece (18,4%) or Spain (14,5%) [51]. Though quantity of unemployed in the country decreases slightly every year (0,4% average from 2009) [53], long-term unemployment still exists. Major factors for creating and maintaining long-term unemployment are: relatively old age, health and language issues, lack of qualification is common that people are being unemployed for more than two years, 25% of such people are older than 55. But the most crucial problem among mentioned above is lack of qualification. In recent years 16% of vacancies demand higher education and 64% at least professional qualification. Only 20% of them did not demand any professional qualification. In 2016 almost half of unemployed simply didn’t have formal confirmation of their qualification which was fatal to their job applications [3]. There is also a negative correlation between overeducation of workers and unemployment (reduction in numbers of overeducated people would be beneficial for cutting quantity of unemployed people), which is needed to be mentioned, though it is not the subject of current research [32]. And still regional differences needed to be mentioned. While Bayern keeps 97% of its population employed, unemployment rate in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, SaxonyAnhalt, Berlin or Bremen is much higher than average in the state (7,9%; 8,3%; 8,8%; 10,3% respectively) [20]. Youth unemployment requires extra attention. In many societies, the problem of youth unemployment is a modern social problem. One of the reasons for this situation is that young people have limited social influence and information about jobs (these are not discussed in article but also needed to be taken into consideration [19]. General youth unemployment rate among 15–24 y/o people all over the world is about 13,2% [16]. This age gap includes young people who are graduated either from school or from university and who are seeking for employment. Global youth unemployment rate is higher than rate of any other age group. One of the reasons for this situation is the fact that majority of those, who had graduated recently do not satisfy employers’ needs for working experience. This problem is acute due to dependence of the future life if humanity on youth. Problem of youth unemployment is familiar to many states, but some of them do have solutions for this issue: it is a combination between efficient education process in universities and adaptation to the demands of contemporary labor market. Situation when majority of graduates are unable to use their skills and businesses have tough times

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looking for qualified specialists is common for Russia. According to Rosstat, share of youth under 25 y/o among unemployed is 18% (rate is lower than in 2018 with its 20,1%) [10]. There is advanced statistics for 2018: highest rates were for recently graduated urban youth of 18–20 y/o (29,2%) and their rural counterparts (25,6%). It was two times lower among young people of 21–24 y/o (12,5% and 15% respectively) [51]. It may be described by a variety of reasons. According to Rosstat research of 2015 (next one is planned for 2020) amount of graduates from universities was 10.7 m. 7,3 m of them faced difficulties while applying for a job and getting one. The major reasons for that are: • • • •

Lack of working experience (3,8 m) Not matching salary expectations (2,3 m) Absence of vacancies (1,7 m) Unable to find a workplace according to education profile (1,2 m) [43].

Education defines quality of labor which later may be regarded as competitive ability on the labor market. Low employee mobility and the significant size of the shadow sector are also leading to serious structural problems which can characterize the Russian labor market and affect unemployment rate [19]. Development of innovative economy implies toughening of labor force quality standards. Education and professionalism are main qualities of an employee. According to the collected data education level of unemployed in Russia is high. Data of Federal State Statistics Service provides the fact that 18,2% of all unemployed had higher education back in 2015 [35]. Quantity of unemployed with professional or secondary education is 39,9% and 31,5% respectively and that shows efficiency of higher education as an instrument to get a job [22]. Though it may be regarded as an instrument for improving financial well-being, its accessibility and frequent non-compatibility with the needs of the market have a negative impact on the latter [46]. Analyze of data about youth unemployment and state policy regarding training new workers and supplying with working positions of FRG may lead to a certain conclusion. This conclusion shows that Germany has achieved great success in decreasing unemployment among youth of 15–25 y/o. According to statistics FRG is the most successful European country with rates about 6% (the lowest one) [57]. Federal government of Germany seeks to achieve full employment. Supplying state with qualified labor force is still a crucial task, disregarding current demographical changes. FRG really succeeded in establishing efficient system, which allows young people to get required level of education and eventually to find matching position in order to practice their skills. German labor market is characterized by high employment rate which is one of the outcomes of having developed economy. Market shows its need in highly qualified specialists with higher education. Amount of new businesses requiring employees is growing. One of the major reasons for reaching such youth unemployment rate is implementing dual education system.

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2.1 Impact of Migration on Labor Market Mass migration as a part of globalization process definitely brought some changes into labor relations, it led to significant transformations on the labor market of host states. It may be easily drawn from regarding altered relations between actors on the market and its segmented by settling lots of migrants structure. This statement is consistent with many countries, not just Russian Federation. Contemporary labor market has plethora of vacancies, which get less and less appeal for the native population. Increasing demand in labor force supports growth of labor migration. There is also valuable finding that social capital may also affect employment. While vertical bridging is beneficial for finding adequate employment, horizontal bonding leads to low-skill occupation options or even unemployment [14]. There is a concept of dual labor market created by M. Piore which implies “separation” of labor market caused by controversies between labor and capital (this promoted segmentation of the market) [1]. Representatives of native population are not interested in the career choices presented by lower segment of labor market due to its wages and absence of vertical mobility opportunities. At the same time it looks as a profitable option for migrants, because there is significant difference in salaries comparing with these they have back home. Moreover they have no claims for career development and prestige brought by job. So while there is growing demand for unqualified labor force in big cities, a lot of migrants comes from not so developed countries (for Russian Federation they are mostly Asian and Transcaucasus countries). Employers usually consider migrants’ labor as more profitable [25]. Mentioned above process are not typical only for Russia, but they are global. Interesting that such status of RF is quite modern; as transformation of relationship with former Soviet countries continues it affects migration policy with these states, making Russia one of the most desirable country for migrants [31]. Great flow of labor force is concentrated in huge Russian centers because there are many job opportunities presented by unwillingness of natives to work in low-paid and low-status areas of economy. Henceforth, quantity of migrants in cities, district centers and capitals is a lot higher than wherever else in the country. Among market niches with low appeal to natives are: wholesale and retail trade, construction, agriculture, housing and public utilities. These areas require hard labor while having no demand in specific qualifications and language skills. Regarding statistics the following areas are the most popular with migrants’ occupation: 33,6% for automotive maintenance, 16,3% for construction, 13,9% for social, personal and housing service, 8% for housekeeping, 7,2% for food and lodging industry, 7% for transport with less than 15% for other types of occupation [36]. RF Ministry of labor already determined need in usage of foreign workers and established quotas for 2019 which are represented in RF Government Regulation №1494 from 6.12.2018. In order to define these needs an analysis of current labor market situation, principles of national labor resources usage and demographic situation was conducted. Current need of foreign labor force is stated to be 144 583 people for 2019 (which is 81% of 2018) [36]. As for FRG, nowadays market is overwhelmed with unqualified labor force. Almost 65% of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are occupied as maintenance staff (it

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is similar to Russian market). Unqualified labor is not of high demand among natives. But the situation with the labor migration is very different form the Russian one. As Deutsche Welle reports, 49% of German enterprises have a problem connected with lack of qualified employees. In 2017 there were 761 000 of opened positions with presence of 2,4 m of unemployed. These positions may be a hurdle for further economic development of a state. According to survey, 40% of enterprises already had rejected orders due to the lack of specialists [14]. Federal labor bureau reports, that there are opened different positions – from these requiring high qualification to professional, from maintenance service officers to IT-specialists. Needed to mention, there is an ongoing German program of supporting national high qualified labor force in order to draw its attention towards innovative sectors of economy. In the end of 2017 major areas with high labor force demand were transport, logistics, metalwork, energy sector, construction and healthcare [13]. Efficiency of timely training and retraining of the workforce is also estimated as an efficient measure of coping with such problems, [4] though it is not the objective of the research. Regarding the fact that quantity of opened vacations has raised up to 1,2 m, which may be dangerous to the economy of the state, since October, 2018 government of Germany has been working on a law which will make migration process for qualified specialists from non-EU states easier. This new law should be both a new impetus for economic development and an obstacle to illegal migrants’ flow. Voting process would be launched in Bundestag in 2019, if successful then come into force in 2020 [30]. It also should be taken into consideration that digital transformation will affect the labor market by making some of the positions substitutable (according to research this rate is about 15% of German employees) [5]. 2.2 Dual Education System as a Measure to Reduce Unemployment Position of youth on labor market needs more detailed scrutiny and analysis. This situation requires that RF higher education system should be developed. VCIOM data provides information that 91% of employers admit lack of practical skills among graduates [40]. Due to it may be concluded that graduates do not have opportunity to combine both theoretical and practical education in Russian Federation or do not use given opportunities properly. It presents an obstacle while applying for a job. It often happens that theoretical knowledge of student do not have its practical backing. This presents challenge not only to graduates but to enterprises too. It is common for young specialist to delve into production process for 2 or 3 years after getting a job, which implies extra costs to businesses. Such situation in Russia may be eased by using European experience in this area, specifically by introducing dual education system. It is widely used in Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, but in Germany especially efficient. Experience of FRG in this area is more than 15 years [33]. According to Federal statistical office of Germany 54% of employed labor force are presented by interns of dual education system [26]. Practice-oriented education is a point of interest in Russian education. It is one of the major directions of bachelor and master program development. Nowadays there are 3 approaches of conducting such educational programs:

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• Including in-service educational programs, externship and pre-degree practice. This approach is the most narrow, it connects practice-oriented education with forming of professional experience [55] • Usage of professionally-oriented technologies and modeling methods while studying principal and non-principal subject [2] • Practice-oriented education should provide acquiring of practice experience with its key objective as getting professionally significant qualities and perks. It implies deep students’ engagement and high level of activity, relatively similar to lecturers’. It also involves case studies, modeling, getting familiar with needed software [55]. The information that was generalized allows to summarize main practice-oriented features of contemporary Russian education system (while it should be mentioned that it highly depends on specialty [27]: • • • • •

Practice at enterprise; Students’ participations in real projects; Master classes by invited specialists; Case studies; Using training machines and computer simulations [45].

Nevertheless with existing practice-oriented approach problem of employment among graduates is still relevant and acute. While some specialists tend to claim that connection between employers, universities and students is weak, Ministry of labor states that there discrepancy between demand and supply on the labor market. But still more than 65% of employers do not interact with educational institutions in any way [37]. This is based on the fact that many enterprises do not estimate state educational system highly, while management of universities tends to claim that conditions of external practice do not match demanded ones. It caused by absence of normative regulations, organizational, informational and methodical support. There is no existing standardized model of interaction between enterprises and universities. Of course, there are some steps towards solving this problem, for employer-sponsored training, which obliges student to work some time on certain enterprise after graduation as this institution paid for education of the student. Nowadays around 3000 students are being employed every year because of it [46]. There are also some private grants, competitions, etc. Nevertheless, there is no system in it, so they are not as efficient as possible. Mechanisms of state-private partnership just started its development [38]. German higher education developed this partnership to the next level. It also presents opportunity to improve practical skills and therefore to be competitive on the labor market to its students. “Dual education system is a combination of practical education with part-time employment in an enterprise and education in traditional educational institutions” [24]. Close social partnership of government, employers and trade unions became the base of such kind of professional education. Such pedagogical alternative answers the new need of economy in qualified employees who got their background based on close cooperation of enterprises and professional schools. Dual education system in Germany is

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accepted by businesses and society. It includes two learning places: educational institution which provides one with theoretical and main practical knowledge, and enterprises where students gain practical skills and competences [39]. Dual education system achieves its efficiency by providing students with the opportunity to practice gained theoretical knowledge in either business or school laboratory. Theoretical information that students gain in classrooms today may be practiced tomorrow in businesses which participate in professional education of students by providing them with the opportunity to get practice as well as covering the costs of it, even salary payments are possible. Currently the time spent on dual system education is from 2 to 3,5 years depending in the specialization [21]. To matriculate in a dual education programme it is requires successful pass of the test on knowledge level and competency. Those who have passed the test successfully sign a contract with an enterprise. Students attend university once or twice a week which depends on chosen profession. The teaching is provided by the educators who have finished higher pedagogical and higher vocational education. As for practical part of education, students attend enterprise 3 or 4 times a week [6]. Here the practical skills are trained by experts in business and operational training who have pedagogical qualifications which they gained on postgraduate courses. Enterprises can pay students salary but the level of it is far below than the salary of a professional. There are 3 types of dual higher education: 1. Integrated into education - combination of classical university education and practical professional education; 2. Integrated into professional activity - aimed at those who have finished professional education or long-standing working experience; 3. Integrated into practice - combined education where the long working on an enterprise practice is provided; [29]. Federal institution develops educational standards for certain professions. There are three groups in the institution: employers, trade unions and state authorities. They are all equal in terms of voices and participants. Educational standards for the programs are developed by the working parties that consist of three mentioned groups’ representatives. The developed programs are approved by German Ministry of Economy then. Chambers’ and employers’ associations administer final exams. Examination board is formed by specific number of employers and teachers. There is a range of advantages of such educational system for students: [41]. 1. Dual system highly guarantees the employment; 2. Education sets relevant objectives for students; 3. Additional motivation in a form of salary which gives students the opportunity to save time and avoid side jobs; 4. The opportunity to find a job on the enterprise where the practice was held; 5. The employers’ demand for dual system graduates; 6. The enterprises participate in educational program establishment by adding corrections to curriculum which has to correspond with profiles and operational processes of companies; 7. International recognition of the system;

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8. During the learning process students meet all departments of the company, become familiar with departments’ duties and aware of their own possible future positions; 9. The enterprises do not need to train and adapt new employees as they already have all required skills and knowledge for the certain company which allows the formation of qualified workforce base [22]. Existing system helps students’ adaptation to new stages of life and eases start of an adult citizen life. German universities’ alumni do not face challenges of combining full-time education and work because of adjusted interaction between these two parts during studying [29]. This system allows state to fulfill its need for qualified specialists and to save money. German enterprises invest a lot in cooperation with universities (their costs are higher than governmental [48]) while getting payback with enroll of highly trained specialists.

3 Results of Research Necessity of specialist training system modernization is undisputable. Experience of European countries implementing dual education system may be beneficial to both Russian specialists and labor market, but centralized Russian educational system may be a hurdle to adopting European practices. Whole RF system needs to be changed in order to use foreign experience for its own benefit on full scale [41]. Demand for professionalizing of education must be fulfilled regardless the complexity of systems in educational systems. Nevertheless this idea has official recognition in Russia. There is signed agreement between Agency of strategic initiatives and Russian-German chamber of commerce which established cooperation for training technical specialists in Russia [43]. This document included recommendations for Ministry of economic development of RF and Ministry of economy and technologies of FRG and suggestion of creating programs for dual education was among them [22]. Results of this treaty are already apparent, in some regions of Russian Federation project for training professional specialists basing in dual education had been launched [11]. There are also projects brought up by Departments of universities in order to involve professionals into educational process, as it was in Peter the Great Polytechnic University [49]. There are some important features of dual education system. One of them are lecturers, there are very specific standards for such specialists, specified in relative document. Three categories of lecturers are needed to be prepared in order to provide proper functioning of the system. They are experts, instructors and tutors. Studying with lecturing staff, which is compiled with enterprises’ employees, is a major feature of described system [28]. Another one key feature is funding system, because dual education mostly funded by enterprises in EU member-states. It is doubtful that Russian businesses would eagerly take that burden. One of compromise suggestions presents participation of both business and state [47], where the first will includes budget of enterprises, trade and employers’ unions, and the latter includes federal, regional and local budgets. State will make majority of payments while business will be in charge of funding laboratories, high-technological workshops and resource provision [21]. It is important to

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motivate private investors either with tax privileges or financial rewards for achieving great results, because nowadays education financed either by state or students themselves [35]. Another crucial point that it is not only higher education institutions which require changes, vocational education also needs modern system in order to supply the labor market with needed specialists, though it is not as acute as problem discussed above [10].

4 Conclusions Overall, for Russian Federation it would be more reasonable not to copy German system, but only adopt some of its elements, because full-scale change of educational system would require such resources and efforts that are unavailable now. Nevertheless, it should still be a primary objective of government in order to improve economic situation in the country, develop existing assets. Problems of labor market, connected with low-qualified positions would easily be solved with current approach to migration policy on this stage. Problems of Germany are a bit different, because developed educational system already functions there and main issues to be solved are lack of highly qualified specialists and overwhelming quantity of non-qualified labor force. In this regard development of economy and adjustments in migration policy should be made, which are already being discussed and elaborated.

References 1. Abylkalikov, S.I.: Economic theories of migration: labor and the labor market business. Soc. Power 12, 1–19 (2012) 2. Bondarenko, T.N., Latkin, A.P.: The role of practice-oriented approach in education when forming and developing the branch and regional service markets. Mod. Probl. Sci. Educ. 6, 455 (2016) 3. Bräuninger, D.: German labour market policy Deutsche Bank research 10 (2017). https:// www.dbresearch.com/PROD/RPS_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000455340/German_labour_ market_policy:_Much_remains_to_be_d%20o.pdf%20 4. Davliatova, M.: The problem of timely training and retraining of workforce and innovative methods of the problem solution. In: IOP Conference Series: Materials Science Engineering, vol. 497, p. 012116 (2019) 5. Dengler, K., Matthes, B.: The role of practice-oriented approach in education when forming and developing the branch and regional service markets. Technol. Forecast Soc. Change 137, 304–316 (2018). ISSN 0040-1625 6. Duales Studium – studieren und Berufserfahrung Hochschul Kompass. https://www.hochsc hulkompass.de/studium/rund-ums-studieren/studienformen/duales-studium.html 7. Employment and unemployment in the Russian Federation in January 2019 2019 Rosstat (Official site of Federal state statistic service of Russia). http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/B04_03/ IssWWW.exe/Stg/d04/34.htm 8. Employment and unemployment in the Russian Federation in March 2019 Rosstat (Official site of Federal state statistic service of Russia). http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/IssWWW. exe/Stg/d04/79.htm 9. Fachkräfteengpassanalyse 2018 Federal Employment Agency ©. https://statistik.arbeitsag entur.de/Navigation/Footer/Top-Produkte/Fachkraefteengpassanalyse-Nav.html

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10. Fakhrutdinova, E.V., Fakhrutdinova, A.V., Yagudin, R.H., Vishnjakov, N.I.: The needs of the Russian Federation labor market in the workforce with different levels of education. Procedia Soc. Behav. Sci. 191, 2515–2518 (2015). ISSN 1877-0428 11. Fedotova, G.A.: Labor and professional training in the prism of Russian-German cooperation (Berlin: FIPO), p. 199 (1995) 12. Gericke, D., Burmeister, A., Löwe, L., Deller, J., Pundt, L.: How do refugees use their social capital for successful labor market integration? An exploratory analysis in Germany. J. Vocat. Behav. 105, 46–61 (2018). ISSN 0001-8791 13. Germany announced a shortage of 1.2 million workers Business portal Delo.ua. https://delo. ua/econonomyandpoliticsinukraine/v-germanii-rastet-deficit-rabochej-sily-351034/ 14. Germany urgently requires foreign workers. The official site of Deutsche Welle, URL: https:// www.dw.com/ru/%D0%B3%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8% D0%B8-%D1%81%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D1%82%D1% 80%D0%B5%D0%B1%D1%83%D1%8E%D1%82%D1%81%D1%8F-%D0%B8%D0% BD%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B% D0%B5-%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0% BA%D0%B8/a-42017735 15. Global unemployment rate falls to 5%, hits pre-crisis levels 2019 live mint. https://www.liv emint.com/news/world/global-unemployment-rate-falls-to-5-hits-pre-crisis-levels-155006 9660713.html 16. Global youth unemployment rate from 2009 to 2014 with a forecast up to 2019 2019 Statista ©. https://www.statista.com/statistics/269636/global-youth-unemployment-rate/ 17. Gurvich, E., Vakulenko, E.: Macroeconomic and structural properties of the Russian labor market: a cross-country comparison. Russ. J. Econ. 3(4), 411–424 (2017). ISSN 2405-4739 18. Hällsten, M., Edling, C., Rydgren, J.: Social capital, friendship networks, and youth unemployment. Soc. Sci. Res. 61, 234–250 (2017). ISSN 0049-089X 19. Ibragimova, Z.F.: Structural analysis of unemployment in the Russian Federation. Stat. Econ. 4, 33–40 (2017) 20. Ignatova, I.B., Pokrovskaya, E.A.: The theoretical basic for the organization of the dual training. J. Theor. Hist. Cult. 3, 27 (2016) 21. Ilyazova, N.B., Ilyazova, A.B.: Dual system of higher education in Germany as an instrument of improving unemployment problem and professional training Kyrgyz University of Economics named after M. Ryskulbekov, vol. 1, no. 35, pp. 159–161 (2016) 22. Kharitonova, N.: The dual system of higher education: effectivness of the implementation. Sci. Methodical J. Omsk State Agrarian Univ. 3 (2017). ISSN 2413–4066 23. Korlyakova, S.G., Shatskaya, E.Iu: Features of the system of higher education in Germany. Sci. J. Magistracy Bull. 3(30), 68 (2014) 24. Kumykov, A.M., Lyuev, A.H.: The impact of labor market segmentation in the Russian Federation. Humanit. Socio-economic Soc. Sci. 2, 71–75 (2015) 25. Laubor force Federal statistical office of Germany. https://www.destatis.de/EN/Homepage. html 26. Lazarev, G.I.: Practice-oriented training. J. HE. 4, 6 (2012). (in Russia) 27. Listvin, A.A.: Dual training in Russia: from the concept to practice. J. Educ. Sci. 3(132), 44–56 (2016) 28. Mutieva, T.A.: The dual system of vocational training: the experience of Germany and the realities of Russia. J. Sci. Time 12(24), 563 (2015) 29. New Migration Law: Germany opens doors for migrant workers (2019) Ukrinform ©. https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-world/2605023-novyj-migracionnyj-zakon-ger mania-otkryvaet-dveri-dla-rabocih-migrantov.html

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30. Nikiforova, E., Brednikova, O.: On labor migration to Russia: Central Asian migrants and migrant families in the matrix of Russia’s bordering policies. Polit. Geogr. 66, 142–150 (2018). ISSN 0962-6298 31. Obiols-Homs, F., Sánchez-Marcos, V.: Education outcomes and the labor market. Labour Econ. 54, 14–28 (2018). ISSN 0927-5371 32. Official unemployment in the Russian Federation grew by 20% in the first quarter 2019 The official site of Russian news portal Interfax. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/662082 33. Offisial site of Federal state statistic service of Russia. http://www.gks.ru/ 34. Pleshkov, K.B.: Development of new approaches in the development of practice-oriented education. J. New Sci. Strategy Vectors Dev. 2(4), 97–100 (2017) 35. Results of the year. Employment and labor migration official site of Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of Russia. https://rosmintrud.ru/employment/employment/718 36. Romanov, M.V., Churilova, I.G.: Modern problems of practice-oriented education. J. Serv. Plus 9(1), 58 (2015) 37. Romanov, M.V., Taneeva, E.Sh: Priorities for the development of education in Russia: the historical aspect. J. Serv. Russ. Abroad 52, 24 (2014) 38. Rumyantseva, L.N.: The dual education system: the German experience. Kostroma Hum. J. 1(1), 68 (2011) 39. Russia: Why are millions of graduates not working in their specialty 2018 Eurasianet ©. https://russian.eurasianet.org/node/65166 40. Sauro, E.B.: Dual learning; from the experience of participation in the pilot project. J. Prof. Ed. The Capital 5, 43–45 (2015) 41. Selective observation of graduate employment 2019 Rosstat (Official site of Federal state statistic service of Russia). http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/trud/itog_trud oustr/index.html 42. Statement between the Agency for Strategic Initiatives and the Russian-German Chamber of Commerce the site of Federal Institute for Educational Development. http://www.firo.ru/? page_id=11952 43. Sudakova, A.E., Agarkov, G.A., Shorikov, A.F.: Optimization of the graduates labour market: dynamic modeling Russian and foreign experience. IFAC Papersonline 51(32), 401–406 (2018). ISSN 2405-8963 44. Syupova, M.S., Bondarenko, K.A., Urazova, K.A.: The modern structure of higher education: advantages and disadvantages. Sch. Notes Toga 5(2), 297–301 (2014). ISSN 2079-8490 45. Target recruitment in the regions. Russian news portal RBK. https://volg.rbc.ru/volg/02/04/ 2014/55928fe49a794751dc834752 46. Tereshenkova, E.V.: Dual education system as a basis for training specialists. Sci. J. Concept 4, 43 (2014) 47. Teshev, V.A.: Dual education as a factor in the modernization of the system of social partnership between universities and enterprises. Bull. Adyghe State Univ. 1(135), 149 (2014) 48. Trostinskaia, I.R., Safonova, A.S., Pokrovskaia, N.N.: Professionalization of education within the digital economy and communicative competencies. In: Proceeding IEEE Forum Strategic Partnersip Universities Enterprises Hi-Tech Branches (Science Education Innovation), SPUE, pp. 29–32 (2017) 49. Unemployment among young people in Russia News portal Vedomosti. https://www.vedomo sti.ru/management/articles/2015/10/27/614577-bezrabotnih-molodezhi 50. Unemployment rate 2019 OECD. https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm 51. Unemployment rate in member states of the European Union in January 2019. https://www. statista.com/statistics/268830/unemployment-rate-in-eu-countries/ 52. Unemployment rate, total % of labour force 2019 OECD. https://data.oecd.org/germany.htm 53. Unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted,March 2019 2019 Eurostat (c). https://ec.europa. eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics

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54. Vetrov, Iu.P, Klushina, N.P.: Practice-oriented approach. J. He. 6, 43–49 (2002). (in Russia) 55. Youth unemployment rate in EU member states as of January 2019 2019 Statista ©. https:// www.statista.com/statistics/266228/youth-unemployment-rate-in-eu-countries/

Socio-political and Political-Geographical Aspects of Migration Processes on the European Continent Elena Demidova and Anna Mokhorova(B) Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected], [email protected]

Abstract. This study examines the political and geographical factors that determine the characteristic features of migration processes in continental Europe. These factors apply to many countries and their residents – representatives of various ethnographic communities, and have a significant impact on various social, political, economic, cultural, and religious aspects of people’s lives in many member states of the European Union. The authors analyze the essential traits of the migration of numerous groups of migrants and refugees from the Middle East and the African continent, who seek to escape from territories with an unstable socio-political situation by moving to the countries of the European continent and getting a foothold in the highly developed countries of the European Union, thus improving their socio-economic status and resolving personal issues. The study addresses the problems of the adaptation of migrants to the living conditions of the receiving states; examines the specific features of the migration policies of the leading Western European countries, primarily Germany as the leader of the European Union; highlights the topical issues of the accommodation of refugees within specific political-geographical regions, draws attention to the techniques and methods that are implemented by the governments of the leading countries of the European continent within the framework of comprehensive socio-economic measures aimed at forced migrants and refugees; reveals demographic factors that have a significant impact on the implementation of the migration policies of the EU member states; analyzes a number of factors associated with migration that have a positive effect on the future economic development of the receiving countries. Keywords: Migration · Adaptation of migrants · Demography · Immigrant-friendly policy

1 Introduction Nowadays, there are large-scale migration processes across the European continent as numerous immigrants from countries with an unstable political situation and weak economy try to make their way into the highly developed countries of the European Union.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 35–47, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_4

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This phenomenon opens the door for various migration crises, which can potentially occur in dozens of European countries, leading to real social, political, economic, and cultural problems. Representatives of the European community react differently to the large-scale immigration of refugees from North Africa and the Middle East, depending on their political beliefs [1–3]. Some presume that the European Union members are facing very serious issues that will have a negative impact on the continent’s local population. Other politicians claim that the influx of migrants and refugees will allow European states to overcome the demographic crisis [4–7]. The influx of migrants has increased significantly in recent decades, reaching the annual average of several hundred thousand people. Many authors note that “the European refugee crisis challenges European institutions [8],” especially since migrants and refugees often try to get into European countries illegally [9]. Mass migration processes can be explained by social, economic, political and military factors. It’s clear, that immigrants and refugees try to improve objective conditions of the existence which can’t be reached in their country. The unevenness of various regions development on the Earth inevitably generates burning issues like movement of a large number of people belonging to different ethnic groups and nationalities from places of compact residence to the territories, where they can really improve their economic and social conditions right now. In the history of a human civilization we can find lots of examples, when the most part of inhabitants moved from the countries with adverse geopolitical characteristics to the regions with higher level of living. Political and geographical factors during different periods of development of the human society played very essential value in lives of the specific nations, ethnic groups. The aspiration to change the most important characteristics of the socio-political, economic plan peculiar to the concrete period of the history of certain national communities made a very significant impact on the development of other countries to which the mass of immigrants, considerable on volume, went. The political and geographical inhabitancy of numerous human communities under the influence of the specified processes can change substantially in the positive or negative way that objectively affects inhabitants. Problems of migration are a subject of great attention for both foreign and Russian researchers. This interest is represented in the number of studies devoted to the most important aspects of migration problems in contemporary society. These researches provide insight into essential features of migration and suggest role of this phenomenon within international relations: studies by Aleshkovsky I.A. [10], Baburin S.N. [11], Iontsev V.A. [12], Bol’shova N.N. [13], Puhova M.M. [14], Semenenko I.S. [15] and others are among them. Many authors dedicated their researches to the issue of mass migration of population. There are authors both from Europe (including Russia) and North America - Dr. F. Rößger, O. Pötzsch, K. Koser, R. Penninx, D. Spencerand and N. Van Hear, who were researching key problems of migration processes are among them [16]. Stephen Castles, Heinde Haas, and Mark J. Miller analyzed socio-cultural issues which emerge during migration of significant amount of people [17]. C. Joppke, W. Kymlicka, P. Collier

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studied problems of stepwise assimilation of migrants into ethnic-cultural communities [18–20]. Special attention is pointed at researching issues of migrants’ adaptation to new realities of social life which are typical for developed states. Such approach may be seen in the works of Nguyen M. K. [21], Nesterov A.A. [22], Seliverstov N.A. [23], Tsapenko I.P. [24, 25]. Relevant problem of changing conditions for functioning of native nationalities’ social entities regarding mass migration of refugees from less developed regions of the world is analyzed in the article. Objective necessity of changes in political, economical, social and cultural life spheres of European community regarding rising influence of foreigners on traditional institutes of modern European democratic states is revealed.

2 Methodology Relevant problem of changing conditions for functioning of native nationalities’ social entities regarding mass migration of refugees from less developed regions of the world is analyzed in the article. Objective necessity of changes in political, economical, social and cultural life spheres of European community regarding rising influence of foreigners on traditional institutes of modern European democratic states is revealed. The methodology of the research was based on the following approaches: comparative-historical (by means of which various parts of migration processes in connection with a certain era of the people activity were compared), social and analytical (by means of which the most important social aspects of migration nature came to light), national and geographical (describes the structural changes happening in demographic characteristics of the population became clear).

3 Results Migration processes in the end of XX and the beginning of XXI centuries were regulated by national laws of particular states and a number of international legal acts [26–28]. Two major concepts underlying the regulation of migration processes may be revealed. One of them is based on the fact that there is freedom of travel for labour migrants between the developed and democratic states of EU. On the other hand, such states seek to develop a distinctive set of privileges for natives, basing on existing legal prohibitions for migrants from problem regions. Nowadays all countries of European communities face issues of mass migration from Asian and African continents. Due to that European Commission established a complex of means to regulate EU policy on migration. As the result of that, EU-member states should enforce their efforts to fight with illegal migration during the 2015–2020 period according to the respective Plan. Special emphasis should be put on strengthening of law enforcement and courts’ activities regarding collecting and sharing important data as well as enhancing cooperation with other states while fighting with illegal migration [29, 169]. Schengen Borders Code of 2006 was adjusted in March, 2017. That resulted in toughening of demands to people who are to pass through external EU-borders, introducing

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new legal means with implementation of ETIAS (European Travel Information and Authorization System) and EES (Entry-Exit system). These allow to define possibilities of migrants to cross the borders of EU-member states [29, 170]. There are two major directions of immigration from Africa and the Middle East [30]. “The geographical proximity factor remains important [31].” These routes are chosen by the vast majority of refugees trying to escape from countries permanently plagued by military conflicts between different warring factions or countries with an extremely low level of socio-economic life, i.e. where people live in absolute poverty. The flow of migrants gets into Europe primarily via the Mediterranean. The majority of illegal migrants try to cross the Mediterranean sea using various unsuitable sea vehicles, setting off for Italy from the coast of Libya. From the perspective of political geography, this can be explained by the fact that Italy is relatively close to Libya – just a few hundred kilometers away, which makes it much easier for migrants to get to the European continent. Then there is another significant factor. This direction of migration became possible only after the Gaddafi regime had been overthrown in Libya, plunging the country into a continuous civil war. To this day, different ethnic and terrorist groups have been operating in Libya, waging war against each other for control over oil and gas deposits, which make up the country’s natural wealth. It should be noted that there were no objective prerequisites for migration from North Africa towards the European continent while Gaddafi was at the helm of the State of Libya. However, since NATO forces used armed aggression to overthrow the legitimate government of Libya, the resulting power vacuum has created a favorable environment for various terrorist organizations. Furthermore, under Gaddafi’s rule, Libya served as an effective barrier preventing refugees from African countries and the Middle East from uncontrollably crossing into the European Union. After NATO’s armed aggression and toppling of the Libyan government, migration of the residents of African and Middle Eastern states became uncontrollable, and the number of refugees trying to escape from Africa and the Middle East has become extreme. So far, none of the attempts of the European states to suppress migration in this direction have yielded tangible results. On top of that, Italy is basically the only country that resists the flow of immigrants crossing the Mediterranean, since it is their primary destination. Dozens of refugee camps have been created along the southern coast of Italy, but the migration is still far from over. Other countries of the European Union provide little or no real assistance to Italy in its fight against illegal immigrants, which aggravates the country’s socio-economic situation as it has to deal with the problem of preventing illegal migration on its own. In the summer of 2018, the Italian government banned ships carrying illegal migrants from entering Italian ports and developed measures to tighten the admission of migrants. Italy spends considerable material and financial resources, which is a significant burden considering its rather difficult economic situation - Italy is one of the EU members with a very large public debt exceeding the country’s GDP [32]. In 2016–2017, the influx of immigrants from Venezuela increased due to the political crisis and deteriorating socio-economic situation in the country. Immigrants from this Latin American state sought to settle in Spain, also due to its geographical location.

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“In 2018, Spain ranked higher than Italy in the list of countries that received the most migrants sailing to Europe across the Mediterranean [33].” The “Malta declaration” on migration was adopted on February 3, 2017. Its main statutes touched upon issues of illegal migrant flow and human trafficking, aiding migrants’ repatriation and cooperation with Libya on migration routes’ control and supporting officers of Libyan coastal guard. Special attention was focused on Mid Mediterranean route, which were used by over 180 thousands of migrants for moving to EU during 2016 [34]. However, the Mediterranean is not the only channel through which residents of underdeveloped countries migrate to the European continent. The second geographical direction used by the residents of countries with a difficult socio-economic situation or prolonged civil wars is from Turkey over the Balkan Peninsula. This route is preferred by the residents of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The Republic of Turkey currently hosts several million forced migrants from these Middle Eastern countries. The Turkish government takes a dual approach to the regulation of migration processes through its territory to the countries of the Balkan Peninsula and beyond – to the highly developed countries of the European continent. The Republic of Turkey has a number of agreements with the EU countries, which state that Turkish authorities are to act appropriately to prevent unregulated migration from countries with a difficult political situation to Europe. “The case of the EU-Turkey Statement indicates that the “externalization” of European borders neither operates in a fully collaborative way nor simply moves outward from the European center [35, 36].” Under these international agreements, Turkey annually receives significant funds from the European Union members intended to cover the accommodation of migrants on Turkish territory. Since the number of such migrants reaches several million, the Republic of Turkey receives several billion dollars per year from the EU. However, depending on the current political and economic situation, the Turkish government may relax its grip on the migration processes. As a result, hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, and several other countries get a real chance of making it to the Balkan Peninsula. This causes serious problems for such countries as Greece and Bulgaria, which share borders with Turkey. The Turkish government often fails to prevent illegal migration through their territory due to a difficult current socio-economic situation in Turkey characterized by a high level of inflation and large public debt. All these factors combined have a negative impact on the quality of life of the population, and a large number of migrants on Turkish territory further exacerbates these problems. In order to provide security of EU territory from illegal migrants flow a treaty was signed between EU and Turkey on issue of migration regulation on March 18, 2016. Statutes of reforming Common European Asylum System was approved as well. It also included reformation of Dublin system (May 4, 2016). Those who seek to get to the highly developed European countries over the Balkan Peninsula – usually from Greece through Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia – reach Austria, Germany, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, where they try to obtain a legal stay permit. The influx of immigrants from the Middle East is accompanied by migration

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from the least developed Balkan countries, whose residents are willing to leave their countries behind due to very poor socio-economic conditions. A significant number of migrants come from Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Macedonia. Residents of these countries look for a way to get into highly developed countries, since this will allow them to significantly improve social and living conditions. Therefore, Balkan countries do nothing to hinder the influx of migrants from the Middle East while their population mixes with the migration waves from Muslim countries to enter the territory of highly developed countries – members of the European Union. At the same time, mass migration of these people shows that the geographical boundaries between the EU member states are poorly controlled, which inevitably facilitates the unregulated inflow of refugees and forced migrants. Migrants primarily target Germany, Austria, the Benelux, and Nordic countries, where they have real opportunities for long-term residence and gradual integration into society, since the laws of these countries provide immigrants with significant legal opportunities in socio-economic, political, and religious aspects. However, not all EU member states pursue refugee- and immigrant-friendly policies: in particular, Eastern European countries such as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary conduct migration policies that are drastically different from those of other members of the European Union. This is due to two factors: first, the above countries are very different from Western Europe in terms of the level of socio-economic development; second, the population of these countries is strongly opposed to the influx of forced migrants from the Middle East and Africa. These members of the European community implement a number of restrictive measures aimed at preventing the influx of undesirable immigrants on their territory. To solve this problem, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland completely close their borders in the geographical directions where migrants from the Middle East and North Africa come from. For this purpose, they employ large numbers of police officers and border guards, construct special barriers along the borders, impose strict control over migrants, i.e. they implement a set of measures aimed at the non-admittance of migrants and refugees, which sharply contradicts the policy of the European Union as a whole in the field of migration processes [8]. This circumstance causes serious conflicts between European countries, which hampers further integration of the members of the European community and exacerbates the contradictions between Eastern European states and the countries that have long been members of the EU. According to the recent administrative decisions of this political and economic union, all member states are assigned quotas that specify the number of immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East that each EU country should accommodate on its territory. However, the above-mentioned countries are not the only ones that are strictly opposed to providing accommodation to forced migrants and refugees. Such countries also include Austria, which is located along one of the major geographical routes of the migration wave. Austria’s position of non-admittance of migrants can be explained by the fact that its population has reached a high level of socio-economic well-being with a relatively small population size. If Austria provided ample opportunities for refugees, it would have a dramatic impact on the socio-economic situation in the country and would

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entail a number of problems, both political and national. An influx of large numbers of refugees to the country inevitably has a negative impact on the quality of life of the local population and aggravates national, religious and cultural problems, since refugees and forced migrants belong to different ethnic groups, mostly profess the religious doctrines of Islam, and their culture is drastically different from the traditional cultural foundations of Austria. Therefore, Austrian authorities are unable to prevent a mass influx of refugees and instead attempt to redirect thousands of migrants to the neighboring Germany and other European countries, which antagonizes the German government as well as governments of other Western European countries. Because Austria shares borders with the German state of Bavaria, the government of this state demands that Austria should take effective measures to curb migration flows and tries to close the border between Bavaria and Austria using various measures that do not comply with the fundamental principles of the Schengen Agreement. To some extent, the position of the Austrian government reflects the views of a considerable part of the European population, who do not want to face the various problems arising from the influx of hundreds of thousands immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe. It is worth noting here that residents of the EU states objectively fear that the influx of millions of representatives of other ethnic groups to their prosperous countries will entail acute problems in the field of inter-ethnic relations, which have been long avoided in most member states of the European Union. For any country, national issues serve as a crucial factor of political geography that affects the stability of relations between representatives of different nationalities, communities, and ethnic groups. Up until the last decades of the 20th century, the population of European countries has consisted predominantly of representatives of a single national group. Unlike other countries, they have not faced such problems for a long time and therefore do not have profound public and political experience in resolving inter-ethnic issues. The arrival of large numbers of migrants with no knowledge of local language, fundamentally different ideas about the organization of life, and different cultural attitudes leads to a wide range of issues that the government needs to resolve as urgently as possible. However, these problems of international significance objectively cannot be solved in a matter of decades. For example, a diaspora of Turkish immigrants has been forming in Germany since the end of the 20th century and first decade of the 21st century. Despite the fact that Germany has consistently taken a variety of measures aimed at assimilating immigrants from the Turkish Republic with the purpose of smoothly integrating them into the German population, the problem remains due to the fact that the arrival and resettlement of Turks in Germany has significantly altered the ethnic composition of the population in many municipalities. One of the reasons for this is that Turkish immigrants tend to form compact ethnic communities and settlements. In turn, Germany faces unexpected issues when thousands of Turks form social communities based on ethnicity with complete disregard for the political and religious doctrines of the German population. The problems of adaptation of Turkish immigrants to the German socio-economic realities are a major focus of the political-geographical measures developed and implemented in each German federal state depending on the specific local aspects of development and economic capabilities with the aim to implement a policy of smooth integration of the representatives of the Turkish diaspora into the German society. To this end, immigrants from this country

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are offered a variety of social, linguistic, political, and religious preferences aimed at the gradual convergence of cultural and national characteristics of Turkish immigrants and Germans as representatives of the indigenous German nationality. In some German regions, there are also federal programs and political-geographical land concepts aimed at the gradual integration of Turkish immigrants into Germany’s social, cultural, economic, and political realities. This very complex process takes several generations to complete and requires consistent and purposeful efforts on the part of the federal government and the local authorities of the individual federal states. An essential aspect of this process is that the German government takes consistent steps towards eliminating the language divide between the multi-million Turkish diaspora and the local population. Knowledge of German language makes it much easier for Turkish immigrants to adapt to the living conditions of the German society and to use the freedom of communication to overcome daily challenges in the lives of the former Turkish residents. According to German legislation, after a certain period immigrants from Turkey become full-fledged citizens with the whole range of political, economic, social, and cultural rights, which has a positive effect on the inter-ethnic problems associated with the mass migration of Turkish people to Germany. Furthermore, the German national policy is aimed at ensuring that Turkish immigrants learn German language and acquire professional skills during their stay in Germany so as to be able to work in different German industries. To this end, there are various vocational training and retraining programs for Turkish immigrants implemented via special learning centers established in Germany, which significantly affects the country’s political-geographical landscape. After acquiring a profession, Turkish immigrants will have the essential skills that make it easier for them to find an appropriate job, which will affect their social and legal status in a positive way and allow them to ensure an acceptable quality of live for themselves and their families. However, the problem of integration of Turkish immigrants into the German population has not been the only pressing matter in recent years. Every year, immigrants from countries other than Turkey arrive in Germany, and all of them require accommodation, social care, and conditions for their gradual adaptation to the social, political, and economic aspects of the lives of people on Germany. With regard to the political and geographical factors of developments, it should be noted that Germany is the leading country of the European Union in terms of the number of migrants. This is mostly because Germany has the largest population in the EU as well as significant economic potential, which determines its leading position in the European Union. According to the local legislation, under the provisions of the basic law Germany is obliged to accept and accommodate people who are persecuted for political beliefs in their home country and those whose country has become known for unfavorable socioeconomic conditions. Due to this constitutional provision, Germany has to fully solve the problems of numerous migrants and create a favorable environment for them across the federal states of Germany so as not to violate the requirements of the law and to comply with the fundamental provisions of the Constitution, which proclaims that Germany is a social, democratic state governed by the rule of law. Based on these assumptions, the country’s population should adequately respond to the large numbers of refugees from other countries that keep coming to Germany [37].

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Another important aspect is Germany’s extremely high quality of life and advanced economy, which creates favorable conditions for receiving hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants from countries with a low socio-economic quality of life and countries steeped in political conflicts that often result in protracted hostilities. Germany implements government programs aimed at providing substantial financial assistance to immigrants coming from regions with unfavorable socio-political conditions, which makes the country an attractive destination for an increasing number of foreigners seeking to leave their countries where they live in poverty and where the government cannot ensure protection of their rights and freedom. Immigrants arriving in Germany have a significant impact on the changes in the political-geographical properties of the said enclaves by settling in hundreds of specialized camps created across the federal states specifically to accommodate migrants. Those who are staying in these reception centers receive payments from the public authorities in the form of social benefits, the amount of which varies depending on the age of migrants in these camps. German legislation also provides that after a certain time migrants and refugees should vacate the reception centers and settle in the German regions that are ready to welcome new immigrants. As part of social and legal measures, representatives of forced migrants are provided with free housing in the territory of specific German administrative districts. They also receive social benefits over the entire time until they find a job and thus obtain a source of finance. By accommodating hundreds of thousands of migrants, Germany aims to achieve the pragmatic goal of increasing the size of the employable population, which is necessary for the continuous economic development within German society. In recent decades, Germany has been increasingly affected by the persistent aging of the local population, which takes its toll on the political-geographical situation in the country and manifests itself in the form of adverse changes in the age structure of German society. This trend is gradually leading to a decrease in the proportion of the employable population. According to demographic estimates, the number of people at the age of retirement will reach one-third of the total German population by 2060. It should be noted that an even bigger problem arises from an unfavorable economic situation due to a decrease in the proportion of young people. This circumstance leads to German society becoming less active in economic, social, and cultural terms due to unfavorable demographic changes, which has a negative effect on the country’s international competitiveness. A decrease in the proportion of the young active stratum of German society objectively leads to an urgent need for specialists in the leading industrial professions such as engineers, computer experts, service employees, and citizens who are able to work intensively in the modern sectors of the German economy. There are several measures aimed at alleviating the impact of the demographic crisis. Germany currently requires hundreds of thousands of skilled professionals of working age who would fill the niches in the labor market in the above-mentioned sectors of the German economy. These professional human resources can be formed out of young people immigrating to Germany from African and Middle Eastern countries by using political-geographical trends in a positive way. However, the proportion of highly skilled workers among migrants is usually rather low and not enough to fully meet the demand of the leading German industrial, agricultural, and service sectors. This means that Germany, apart from having to solve the problems of providing accommodation and social

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assistance to migrants and refugees, also faces the challenges of organizing efficient professional training of young people coming from Africa and the Middle East, which should affect the major political and geographical characteristics of German society. This circumstance predetermines significant additional material expenses on the part of German society to organize the process of developing advanced professional skills in large numbers of migrants. This problem is extremely important since the demand of the German economy for a highly skilled workforce is not shrinking – instead, the need for qualified young people grows from year to year. If the German government manages to solve the problem of mass professional training of immigrants from underdeveloped foreign counties, then this circumstance will not lead to undesirable political-geographical changes. Economists estimate that solving this problem will make it possible to significantly increase the growth rate in the leading sectors of the German economy. However, it should be noted that the organization of mass training in high-demand areas is significantly hindered by the fact that the overwhelming majority of migrants coming to Germany do not speak German. This prevents them from being able to acquire professional skills that are required in German industry and agriculture. In addition to the language barrier, the sentiments and expectations of hundreds of thousands of immigrants show a tendency towards obtaining various socio-economic benefits not related to employment. This is typical not only for migrants coming to Germany, but also for many migrants entering the territory of other developed European countries. Therefore, many members of the European Union receiving forced migrants and refugees from African and Middle Eastern countries face similar problems. Sociologists claim that when immigrants from countries with unfavorable socioeconomic and political conditions get into a more favorable environment, they quickly get used to the social assistance they receive from the government to make their stay in the EU member states comfortable [38–40]. Most migrants find this level of financial assistance from the government rather satisfactory, which discourages hundreds of thousands of migrants from taking an active part in finding an application for their abilities in the economic processes. Germany and other EU members face the problem of new immigrants becoming a significant share of the population that requires considerable material and financial expenses but does not contribute to the development of the national economy, which has a negative impact on the political-geographical environment for the local population. Considering that more and more immigrants are coming to Germany, this circumstance is objectively reflected in the attitude of most Germans towards forced migrants and refugees. German citizens are well aware that large numbers of immigrants from the Middle East and Africa are supported through the high level of taxes typical for Germany. Reallocation of funds from taxes that go into the national budget, budgets of the federal states and administrative districts in favor of social benefits granted to refugees reduces the level of social security of the local population and has a negative impact on their income. Such facts lead to a deterioration of relationships between the local German population and immigrants from underdeveloped countries and upset the political-geographical balance in the country. Furthermore, immigrants from the Middle East and Africa represent a completely different culture and often profess Islam, which further alienates

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them from the culture and mentality of the German population. It is no secret that the emergence of numerous camps to house refugees has led to a sharp increase in extremist sentiments, which are often manifested in dozens of attacks on refugee camps by young German people who share neo-Nazi views towards immigrants from unfavorable regions. At the time of the migrant crisis, even in such a distant country as Finland there was a rise of anti-migrant movements that viewed migration as a threat to the security of the local population – Soldiers of Odin and Closed Borders [41].

4 Conclusions Considering the wide range of socio-political aspects of the mass migration of representatives of underdeveloped countries into the EU countries, it can be concluded that the problems of reception and gradual adaptation of migration flows in Western Europe are highly relevant, and the EU member states are forced to develop and implement a set of socio-economic, political, and cultural measures to influence the situation that affects the interests of the local population in these countries, at the same time creating conditions for the gradual adaptation of new immigrants and refugees to the socio-cultural realities established in most of the European countries. Regarding used methodology, social and historical aspects the following suggestions should be taken in consideration. Appealing factors for vast number of migrants to live in certain European states should be analyzed thoroughly. Viable politico-legal models granting efficient solution for acceptance of mass migration should be created using results of social analysis of above mentioned factors. Another thing to do is creating a complex of practical means for preventing acute controversies between natives and immigrants from Asia and Africa. This should be done considering national and geographical peculiarities of each EU-member state. EU states should conduct aligned policy towards migration processes in order to prevent emergence of interstate tensions. Positive experience of particular states may be used by EU governing institutions while dealing with issues of uncontrollable migration flows. Nowadays many researchers study thoroughly different aspects of migrants’ integration in Europe due to various problems related to regulation of forced migration in the past. This may create opportunities to efficiently influence migration processes. Apart from that, there is an arising need for dealing with problems of significant changes of ethnic makeup in certain states due to growing number of foreign citizens trying to adapt to living conditions in different states of European community. Accepting countries need to consider differences of various peoples of Middle East and North Africa in order to make adaptation process more harmonious for migrants. Consequential and well-adjusted both economically and socially policy of certain states’ authorities has a positive impact on migration problems and allows for countries which accept a great number of migrants to benefit economically due to enlarging of labor force. This may also have a positive effect on resolving controversies between natives and migrants.

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The Crisis of the Multiculturalism Policy in Sweden Anna Matveevskaya1(B) , Valeriya Solovyeva1 , Sergey Pogodin2 , and Marina Ermolina1 1 Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected], [email protected], [email protected] 2 Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected]

Abstract. At present, both Sweden and other European countries are experiencing a crisis of multiculturalism policy, which has been in place since the 1990s. The “incomplete” integration has led to several negative consequences, including an increase in the number of racially motivated crimes, the spread of xenophobic attitudes, and the growing popularity of nationalist parties and organizations. However, the rejection of this policy and the ban on foreigners’ entry into the country is neither a solution nor possible: migration contributes to the stabilization of the demographic situation in Sweden, as well as to the problem of labor market shortages. Thus, there is an urgent need to modernize the policy of multiculturalism in order to maintain a balance between preserving the cultural identity of migrants and ensuring that they comply with the Swedish law. The purpose of this research is to identify the influence of multiculturalism on the internal political situation in Sweden by highlighting the characteristic features of Swedish multiculturalism, determining the causes of the crisis, analyzing the crisis phenomena that originated in Swedish society, predict the prospects for resolving the crisis. Keywords: Multiculturalism policy · Migration · Sweden · Economic crisis · Swedish multiculturalism

1 Introduction Population migration became an important factor influencing the economic and social development of all regions of the world in the second half of the 20th century. Growing and taking new forms migration is the result of increasing globalization. Intensified interethnic conflicts, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and significant changes in the socio-political structure of the Eastern European countries led to the intensification of migration flows. The processes related to migration have an impact on both the migrants themselves and the population of the receiving countries. This is reflected in the dynamics of cultural and democratic foundations, changes in the national identity, domestic and foreign policy of donor countries.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 48–62, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_5

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Migration played an outstanding role in the history of mankind and was linked to the processes of settlement, land development, the development of productive forces, and the mixing of races, languages, and peoples. During the XX century, there was an intensive expansion of migration flows, and to this day the phenomenon of migration has become a constituent factor of all global problems. Today, it is difficult to find an ethnic group that has not been influenced by other cultures and at the same time has not tried to preserve its own identity [1]. It was in the XX century that migration not only changed the lives of immigrants themselves, but also created a new situation for receiving states. After the Second World War, some of the Western European countries became the center of attraction for thousands of immigrants, mainly from outside the EU [2]. The result of this phenomenon was the multinationality of the states hosting migrants, as well as the issues raised concerning national diversity and the preservation of immigrant culture. The issues related to the adaptation of immigrants are now widely discussed by politicians and the public, which makes the problem of immigrants’ integration in the European Union particularly relevant. Immigrants arriving in a new country bring their own culture, traditions, and languages. Such innovations became more visible only in the twentieth century, when migration flows increased [3]. The composition of immigrants is diverse: permanent migrants and their families, seasonal and temporary workers, border workers, as well as delinquent immigrants and asylum seekers. Migration has a controversial impact on the economy and especially on social change. The increase in immigration flows over the past fifty years has led to the emergence of a society of great cultural and ethnic diversity. Multiculturalism is one of the most popular concepts widely used by the media and politicians. There are only two ways in which society reacts to such diversity: to accept and respect the culture of the newcomers, or to try assimilating them to some extent [4].

2 Materials and Methods Sociology, economics, political science, history, and demography study population migration as a special process. Within the framework of these sciences, certain theoretical notions of population migration were developed. An important place in the study of this issue belongs to political geography. Of interest are the theoretical provisions and scientific principles developed by such specialists as A.G. Vishnevskiy, Z.A. Zayonchkovskaya [5], V.A. Iontsev [6]. One of the aspects created by migration is the process of necessary adaptation to the new living conditions of migrants. It is stipulated by a considerable range of naturalclimatic, ecological, socio-economic, and cultural factors. Therefore, social adaptation of migrants is one of the objects of research of modern humanitarian geography. In sociology, “social adaptation” is considered as a process and result of active adaptation of an individual to the conditions of a new social environment. In psychology, the term “adaptation” is understood as restructuring an individual’s psyche under the influence of objective ambient factors, as well as a person’s ability to adapt to different requirements of the environment without feeling inner discomfort, i.e. without a conflict with the environment. Geographical studies have not examined regional peculiarities of social adaptation of migrants and the formation of a tolerant attitude towards migrants in receiving countries

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[7]. The term of social adaptation is required for the geographical study of modern regional geography of the population. In our study, we proceeded from the assumption that the essence of successful social adaptation of migrants to new living conditions is the unity of relations between the migrant and the society receiving him/her. Several issues related to migration are global, while others have regional specificities. The first are: intensive globalization of the economy, differences in demographic reproduction patterns, increasing polarization of living standards in the developed and developing countries [8]. Migration problems with a regional perspective are characterized by differences in social and political freedoms between local populations and migrants, possible political and civil conflicts, differences in the employment rate of the able-bodied population, and rising unemployment levels [9]. The adaptation success of migrants’ integration into a new society can be determined when evaluating the successful implementation of their social potential (language skills, improving education, professional qualifications, participation in the public life of the country, etc.). Today, in the world practice, there are three main models of integration of immigrants in the socio-cultural and political life of the state. The German model is an ethnic one, in which citizenship is based primarily on kinship (“right of blood”), as well as linguistic, cultural, and religious commonness. In this case, foreign ethnic communities are not considered to be subject to assimilation, and the state policy, in its turn, does not set the main task to turn them into citizens of the country. The French model is a republican one, according to which the idea of joining a social contract (“right of the soil”) is the basis for granting citizenship. Acculturation and then assimilation of immigrants through social institutions is the main goal of the policy. The Anglo-Saxon model is a multicultural one in which all groups in society have equal civil rights to preserve their identity and cultural identity. These rights can be enshrined in legislative acts of the state [10]. Australia, Canada, Sweden, and the United States are examples of countries where the multicultural model of integration has developed. Since the position of the governments of different Western European countries regarding the adaptation of immigrants differs, the states can be roughly divided into two main groups [11]. France, Germany, and Switzerland belong to the first group, which follows the policy of assimilation to a greater extent. The main goal of France is to preserve the principle of the French Revolution, i.e. to have a society where all individuals are free and equal. This is achieved through naturalization, after which the person becomes a “Frenchman”, i.e. a French citizen, regardless of the place of birth and migration movement, race and ethnicity. In this case, the school system plays a very important role, where the education of children is aimed at bringing up a single French nation. The second group of countries includes the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, where governments pursue a policy of mutual coexistence of cultures [12]. However, many of these countries are attempting to limit the scope of new immigration. Today, integration policy is mainly developed in the Western countries, but in order to be more effective, each country should find its own approach considering its specific circumstances.

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3 Results By the middle of the XX century, the Kingdom of Sweden became known as a state in which it was possible to combine the liberal market economy with the state policy of social security. In the 1950s and 1960s, the recruitment of immigrant workers played a significant role in creating the tax base needed to expand the public social security sector. Yet Sweden did not become a country of global immigration. After the Second World War, the largest flow of immigration to Sweden was from the neighboring Nordic countries, especially Finland. However, since the early 1970s, immigrants were mainly refugees and migrants who came due to family reunification from the non-European countries of the Middle East and Latin America. During the period of 1985–1995, Sweden was hosting refugees from the third world countries, which launched a chain migration process [13]. Thus, by 1990, the share of the foreign population of Sweden had already increased to 9.2%, which was significantly higher than in other Scandinavian countries. On January 1, 1995, Sweden joined the European Union and acquired new obligations on receiving migrants, which led to a further influx of foreigners. During the second half of the XX century, residents of the majority of the continents actively moved to Sweden [14]. The main share of migrants was from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Eritrea, Somalia, Yugoslavia, the Latin American countries, and some Eastern European countries. Thus, representatives of various nationalities and cultures found themselves in Sweden. Sweden acceded to a number of important international treaties, including the United Nations Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, which enshrined nondiscrimination (Article 3), continuity of residence (Article 10), inalienable rights of refugees, social care (Chapter IV), and administrative assistance of a receiving state (Article 25). Thus, the rights of refugees were protected in all spheres of life [15]. The country also joined the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Rights of National Minorities, signed on February 1, 1995, the provisions of which were applicable to the migrants staying in the country. According to the Convention, the state was to prohibit discrimination, assimilation policies, create conditions for preservation of culture, ensure freedom of assembly, religion, expression, use of minority language, and integration in the field of education, which once again strengthened the rights of visitors and led to an increase in the number of migrants. Chain migration was an important reason for the increase in migration flows. Relatives of refugees had the right to obtain citizenship under a simplified procedure, which motivated foreign citizens to move as whole families [16]. Sweden, as a welfare state, decided in 1968 that immigrants have the right to use all the benefits of the country equally with the local population: democratic power, a developed and stable economy, social legislation, and the inviolability of the law [17]. Sweden has been and is one of the countries with one of the lowest crime rates, even though it has increased in recent years. It is worth noting that the main flow of migrants from the third world countries were young people aged 16 to 35 years [18]. This age group is the group of people who most easily adopt protest sentiments and are always ready to express their dissatisfaction in the form of rallies, pickets, or more radically - riots. This fact also contributed to the government’s early awareness of the need to move to a new form of migration policy, not only to ensure comfortable coexistence of

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citizens, but also to establish a secure environment in the state. Thus, the government gradually concluded that a new and improved migration policy was needed. Multiculturalism as a policy was an excellent option, implying “integration without assimilation”. This should have contributed to the creation of a society with equal rights for all citizens, based on tolerance and preservation of cultural identity, which could have reduced the level of tension and confrontation in the society. The official transition to the policy of multiculturalism took place in 1975 [19]. Also, multiculturalism contributed to the facilitation of life for migrants. There were created immigrant media, various information resources “lätt svenska” (a simplified version of the language for those who have just started learning it), days of the Swedish language in cultural and entertainment institutions (e.g. special days in museums, when a guide speaks slowly to improve the perception of information by migrants) [20]. Thus, Sweden not only contributed to the improvement of migrants’ living standards, but also rejected the need to fully assimilate foreigners with the local population. The main reasons for Sweden’s transition to the multiculturalism policy can be considered: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Increase in migration flows. Gradual transition of many Western European countries to multiculturalism. The desire to preserve their own national identity. Sweden’s hosting of refugees from different historical and cultural regions. Migration of the predominantly young part of the population, which required special attention to the control of migrants’ lives and ensuring a decent standard of living in order to avoid conflicts [21]. 6. The need to ensure equal rights for Swedish citizens and immigrants. 7. Risk of conflicts between Swedish citizens and immigrants. 8. Increased crime rate. The general features of the policy of multiculturalism can be mentioned as follows: creation of a pluralistic society, preservation and protection of ethno-cultural peculiarities of its members, providing equal political and economic rights and freedoms with the possibility of granting special forms of autonomy in the social sphere, allocation of subsidies for development. Canada, Australia, and the United States, “pioneers” of multiculturalism, are the countries that were originally formed at the expense of immigration, while the countries of Western Europe were traditionally territories of cultural and ethnic uniformity, which made it much more difficult to implement the policy of multiculturalism and spread the mood of “tolerance” towards foreigners from other historical and cultural regions. The term “multiculturalism” appeared in the 60s of the XX century in Canada during an intense discussion of the problem of separatist sentiments of Quebec and ways to overcome it. Thus, it was decided to consider a society not as a whole, but as a system of various ethno-religious and ethno-cultural communities. The adoption of this policy was a necessary step to eliminate tensions and discrimination against migrants within the state. In European countries, the transition to multiculturalism was largely caused “artificially”, by labor migration, which was encouraged by the states. In order to fight

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against the consequences of a sharp increase in migrants, the transition to multiculturalism was carried out. It is worth noting that, unlike many European countries, Australia and Canada made an official transition to the policy of multiculturalism: amendments to the Constitution were adopted, special legislation on discrimination was created, i.e. this policy was institutionalized [22], while in Europe the transition was not always accompanied by an official announcement of a certain policy course and creation of the required conditions for it. The Social Democratic Party has played a major role in shaping this policy in the Kingdom of Sweden, which for many years has been the relative majority in the Riksdag and in the 60s and 70s of the XX century was one of the most influential forces in the country [23]. It was due to its activities that multiculturalism was adopted as a political programme, which distinguishes the kingdom from other European countries. Sweden’s multiculturalism is based on three principles: equality of rights of minorities and indigenous people, freedom of choice of ethnicity, and perception of partnership as mutually beneficial cooperation. It should be noted that Swedish multiculturalism does not separate cultural and economic issues, i.e. the aim of this policy is not only to preserve national identity, but also to ensure the participation of migrants in the economic life [24]. Multiculturalism is supported by the state institutionally and financially: the opportunity to receive education in one’s native language, employment without knowledge of Swedish have provided, and the immigrant media are actively developing. Thus, migrants have the opportunity not to undergo the process of cultural assimilation. De jure, immigrants were first classified as minority members of the Swedish society, and in 1986, they became full-fledged members of it, losing their “minority” status, which was also facilitated by the activities of social democrats, who sought to ensure equal rights for migrants and indigenous people in the society. Unlike other European practices, Swedish multiculturalism is characterized by a very low level of integration of migrants into society, resulting in negative consequences. De facto, migrants were unable to become full-fledged members of the society, thus intensifying ties within the immigrant community, alienating them from the Swedish realities and creating numerous “Utsatt område” - territories with a high level of danger due to the criminal activities of migrants [25]. Swedish multiculturalism has several differences from other European practices. For example, just like in the UK, Sweden has a highly polarized society. However, there is no separation of educational or organizational employment in the Scandinavian state, and the standard of living of migrants and their social security are much higher. There are also differences among other Scandinavian countries neighboring Sweden. In Norway, visitors are obliged to accept the cultural identity of the Norwegians in order to integrate into the society and to be able to participate fully in the activities of the state, and Denmark has a stricter migration policy, which makes the foreign diaspora in this country very small, unlike the Swedish one. Thus, Swedish multiculturalism can indeed be called a unique phenomenon that has no equivalents among migration policies of other countries. It combines features of both Western European and American multiculturalism. The following are the characteristic features of Swedish multiculturalism: 1. The “forced” nature of the transition to the policy of multiculturalism.

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2. Implementation of the official transition to this migration policy: multiculturalism is supported by the state institutionally and financially. 3. Immigrants are full members of the society; they do not have the status of “minority”. 4. Low level of integration of migrants into the Swedish society, preservation of their national identity. 5. The expectation of a long stay of migrants in the territory of Sweden with the possibility of full moving. These features of Swedish multiculturalism prove that this state is taking attempts to implement the “classical” version of this policy and, according to the theorists’ definitions, really strives to create a society that will provide an opportunity to preserve the cultural identity of different peoples with equal participation in all spheres of the society [26]. However, strict adherence to the principles of multiculturalism for more than 40 years has not ensured full equality of the local and foreign population and comfortable coexistence of multiple cultures. Now, there is an acute crisis of multiculturalism and the growth of xenophobic attitudes.

4 Discussion The end of the first - the beginning of the second decade of the XXI century was marked by a series of events that inevitably affected the migration policy of the European Union. The global economic crisis, the “Arab Spring”, the intensification of hostilities in Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen, terrorist acts in Turkey and West Africa, and, of course, the war in Syria forced the states of the European continent to reconsider their policy of receiving and settling immigrants in the EU member states. They were also forced to do so by the brutal terrorist acts in France and the United Kingdom committed by people from Asia and Africa. In Paris, London, Brussels, and other capitals of the EU member states, the issue of ensuring national, regional, and global security has become a critical one. The situation became even more acute when the flow of migrants into the EU literally erupted. According to CNN’s data released on March 5, 2016, 1.2 million people arrived in Europe in 2015. The number of refugees in Europe also increased in the first months of 2016, making intra-Union relations difficult. In fact, the EU is going through an acute immigration crisis that seriously affects the political, economic, geodemographic, and geostrategic positions of this integrational association, which is considered the most successful in the global integration process in the modern world. The revision of a whole range of its foundations, including humanitarian, geopolitical, and international legal ones, has begun [27]. In 2011, leading European politicians announced the failure of the multiculturalism policy. French President N. Sarkozy and British Prime Minister D. Cameron, Chancellor of Germany A. Merkel expressed their opinion. The crisis of multiculturalism did not bypass Sweden, although there were no official statements from the authorities. Currently, about 15% of the population (1.5 million people) of Sweden are newcomers. At the same time, migrants are not integrated into the Swedish society at all - they are not familiar with the Swedish language and most often live in areas with a high concentration of foreign population. “Partial” or incomplete integration has gradually led to

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an increase in xenophobic attitudes due to mass fears of the local population for their national identity. The problem of preserving national identity is extremely relevant for Sweden, as it is now under attack by the policy of multiculturalism, European integration, and globalization processes. The concept of “Swedishness” - svenskhet - has been formed [28]. Nowadays, the Swedish culture is carried by not only the Swedes themselves, but also by the people who have adopted the cultural values of the kingdom. It is worth noting that unlike the Western European countries, the concept of national identity of Sweden is based more on ethno-cultural characteristics than on political or economic factors. This is what makes it difficult to accept foreigners into society, especially those from other historical and cultural regions. For example, the leader of right-wing conservative party “Swedish Democrats” stated that Muslims (Islam is the most widespread religion among immigrants) are the greatest threat. According to him, it is Muslims who have caused the greatest discord in the functioning of the Swedish society. Indeed, according to the Swedish police, the largest number of crimes among members of the immigrant community are committed by Muslims [29]. Moreover, according to the Swedish State Security Service, the number of jihadists increased from 200 in 2010 to 2000 in 2017 [30]. Thus, due to cultural differences and the lack of communication between local and immigrant populations, stereotypes and prejudices about other cultures are widespread in the Swedish society. In turn, the increase in crime is due to the low level of integration of migrants into the new society and the lack of opportunities to get a highly paid job due to the lack of language skills. Thus, the behavior of migrants caused by the complexity of living in an unfamiliar society confirms many stereotypes and fuels the growth of xenophobic attitudes. Neo-Nazi groups and right-wing radical or conservative parties, which fuel the growing tension in the society, do not contribute to the decrease of xenophobic attitudes. For example, some parties have started to exaggerate the problems of multiculturalism, increasing their own popularity, and neo-Nazi groups have repeatedly attacked representatives of social democratic parties which support migrants (the most notable was the 2009 attack on Matthias Bernhadson, who opposed racism and refugee deportation). Along with xenophobia, there is an increase in extremist sentiments among the migrants who feel the lack of rights in the new society and who have not adopted the Swedish culture. In schools and universities, the authorities found networks of several banned organizations such as Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, etc. To date, law enforcement agencies have not been successful in stopping the development of a network of terrorist organizations, which causes concern in the Swedish society [31]. It should also be noted that in the third quarter of the XX century, Sweden encouraged migration flows due to the lack of unskilled labor force. Today, the kingdom is no longer in need of human resources in this category, but the number of migrants has increased. It has become more difficult for newcomers to get a job, ensuring a prosperous existence. Many migrants, i.e. 1/3 of them, become economically passive, while at the same time receiving appropriate support from the state - unemployment benefits, causing indignation among taxpayers. One of the main values of the multiculturalism policy is the equality of rights and opportunities of residents and immigrants. The labor market research shows that the

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salaries of the “local” residents are higher. Moreover, the salaries of immigrants differ, although insignificantly, depending on their nationality. Germans, Danes, Norwegians have the highest salaries, the salaries of representatives of the Eastern Europe and Balkan region are slightly lower, and the lowest salaries are paid to former Middle Eastern citizens. Another problem we highlight is the employment process itself and a high unemployment rate among migrants. The sphere of qualified labor has expanded, and, consequently, the need for workers in this area. Migrants who often do not have an adequate level of education and basic skills, such as the Swedish language and computer skills, cannot compete with the local population. It is interesting that the feeling of discrimination arises not only among immigrants, but also among the local population. A welfare mentality is formed, because the programs on integration of foreigners into the Swedish society, social payments, unemployment benefits are provided from the state budget, which is largely formed at the expense of taxpayers. Moreover, there is a positive discrimination - migrants are given various privileges, benefits, allowances. Thus, the crisis of the multiculturalism policy in Sweden is caused by contradictory provisions in the theory of this policy and the impossibility of its full implementation. For example, incomplete integration has led to a larger cultural gap between the Swedish society and immigrants. Xenophobic sentiments have increased, the activities of rightwing conservative and right-wing radical parties have become more intense, which has only aggravated the attitude of the local population towards newcomers, and the activities of neo-Nazi groups have become apparent, which only confirms the impossibility of peaceful existence of many cultures in one society without assimilation. The problem of preserving national identity is also an important cause of the multiculturalism crisis, as Sweden, which was one of the most ethnically and culturally homogeneous states, has directly faced the threat of losing its uniqueness. The Swedes feel that they are victims of positive discrimination because of the government’s policy, and they feel that the number of migrants is growing. Sweden’s multiculturalism does indeed require reforms, and the current domestic political environment clearly demonstrates its failure. The crisis of multiculturalism has led to many negative consequences affecting the level of security in society. The crime rate in Sweden has risen sharply in recent years. It is worth noting the year 2013, when there was a sharp increase in the crime rate due to the increase in the wave of immigration. In order to analyze the criminal situation, let us look at the five most common types of crimes against the individual in ascending order in Sweden: robbery, murder, harassment, sexual violence, and blackmail. The number of robberies in Sweden is quite low, with about 1.2% of the population having been robbed in 2017. It is worth noting that this figure is the most stable and practically does not change under the influence of migration. Until 2016, the number of victims did not exceed 1% of the total population [32]. This is explained by the stable support of immigrants by the state, the provision of necessary social payments, and high unemployment benefits. About 5.8% of the population is harassed and 6.4% of the population is sexually abused, which is an extremely high and growing rate in Sweden. The Gatestone Institute reports that the number of rapes in Sweden increased by 1472% between 1975 and 2017 [33]. Of course, it should be noted that the kingdom has procedures for registering sexual crimes, which allow for the classification of acts of various kinds as rape, and therefore

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the statistics show such a high rate. However, it cannot be denied that a sharp increase in rape occurred in 2013 after receiving another wave of migrants. Moreover, 90% of crimes of this nature are committed by immigrants [34]. The most common type of crime against an individual is blackmail, the receipt of threats to which 8.3% of the Swedish population was subjected in 2017. The crisis of multiculturalism can be seen most clearly here, i.e. the impossibility of peaceful coexistence of several cultures without a minimum level of integration. Even considering the specifics of the registration of this type of crime (a huge range of phrases and actions can be taken as a crime now), a huge number of victims can be noted. Immigrants also became organizers of major disturbances. For example, in 2008, the first major riots of immigrants in Sweden took place in Malmö, caused by the closure of an Islamic cultural center. In 2010, there were riots in Rinkeby County, Stockholm, where about 53% of the population are immigrants from the non-European countries. They were provoked by spontaneous actions of young immigrants, who set fire to the school and attacked the police station. There were no exact demands, the reason was the tense social situation. In 2013 and 2017, there was also a wave of riots [35]. In May 2013, there were several clashes between the Swedish police and migrants in Stockholm due to the dissatisfaction of “newcomers” with their social status. More than 100 cars were burned during the disturbances. Due to the actions of the police to stop the riots, a group of right-wing radical young people were also disarmed, who were planning to carry out armed intervention to stop the actions of immigrants. In the spring of 2016, riots broke out throughout Sweden in Norrköping, Burleng, Uppsala, Erebro, etc. The organizers were young immigrants, who demanded a reduction in the degree of segregation, which was felt because of the poor experience of partial integration [36]. In addition to these major disturbances, there are regular disturbances in the “vulnerable areas” that have become a special phenomenon in the Swedish society. The term was introduced by the Swedish police to refer to the areas that are socially excluded and characterized by extremely high levels of crime. At the time of 2017, there were 61 “exclusion zones” throughout Sweden, some of which are in the largest cities of the country. Examples include the Husby area in Stockholm, the Norby area in Buros, and Gotsunda in Uppsala [37]. The “vulnerable areas” are mainly inhabited by migrants. Due to the criminal situation, emergency services, such as ambulance, fire department, police, refuse to enter these areas. The de facto “vulnerable zones” are fully managed by migrants and the situation within them is not regulated by law. Thus, partial integration has led to the consolidation of radical migrants and the formation of areas that are not actually subordinate to the authorities. The difficult situation with migrants has led to the popularization of right-wing parties. For example, in the parliamentary elections to the Riksdag on September 9, 2018 [38], the Social Democratic and Moderate Parties of Sweden, which support the policy of multiculturalism, lost 27 seats in total. In turn, the Swedish Democrats Party, which supports the reduction of non-European migration, the preservation of Swedish traditions, and financial support for culture, won 13 more seats than in the previous elections [39]. The data shows that the Swedish society is dissatisfied with the course of the migration policy and is ready to accept the rejection of multiculturalism.

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In addition to the right-wing parties, neo-fascist movements have become more active. One of the most influential was the Northern Resistance Movement, which was banned in Finland in 2017. Its supporters advocate an immediate end to the migration of non-whites, the deportation of refugees from Sweden and the rise to power of neo-Nazis through gradual social influence or a revolution. In 2013, members of the Northern Resistance Movement violently attacked anti-racist demonstrators in Stockholm. In 2014, 2 members of the organization, running for office from the Swedish Democrats, managed to win the election of the municipal council. In 2015, the Northern Resistance Movement even managed to register as a political party but failed to win enough votes to enter the Riksdag [40]. In 2017 and 2018, members of the movement organized repeated attacks on peaceful demonstrations, conducted explosions to draw the attention of the government, and attacked politicians supporting multiculturalism. Thus, the crisis of the multiculturalism policy has led to several the most dangerous phenomena affecting the level of security in the whole state. There has been a sharp increase in crime, the government has begun to lose control over radicalized migrants, the country is regularly experiencing mass disturbances, and the activities of the neoNazi organizations, which are gaining influence in society, have intensified. Now, the political situation in Sweden is tense. The sentiment in society requires changes in the current course of the migration policy or its complete revision.

5 Conclusion The strengthening of social multiculturality has determined one of the important tasks of the Western countries’ immigration policy after the Second World War. A complex of issues related to the social adaptation of immigrants rises before most of the societies receiving migrants. Particularly relevant are the questions of whether the identity of immigrants should be preserved and whether the immigrants themselves or their receiving countries should take responsibility for its preservation [41]. Adaptation is a holistic, systemic process that characterizes human interaction with both natural and social environments. It is a complex socially conditioned phenomenon, for which there is a contradictory unity of the three types of adaptive human behavior: biological, psychological, and social. Social adaptation implies not only adaptation of the subject to the environment, but also the response of the environment in relation to the subject. Studying the problem of social adaptation of immigrants to the new environment should be considered in the context of natural and humanitarian environmental conditionality of the existence of society. The success of this two-way process of people’s entry into a new society depends, on the one hand, on the well-being of the migrant himself, and, on the other hand, on the socio-economic and political stability in the society. In this connection, the role of programs on formation of tolerance and resistance to xenophobia and extremism is growing in modern society. The study of regional peculiarities of social adaptation of migrants and formation of a tolerant attitude towards migrants in receiving countries is new for geographical research. However, the geographical study of the current regional geography of the population is impossible without the study of the processes of social adaptation. In our work, we proceeded from the assumption that the essence of successful social adaptation

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of immigrants to the new living conditions is the unity of relations between the migrant and the society that accepts him/her. Today, in many European countries, adaptation of immigrants to the new socio-cultural society is accompanied by numerous problems and contradictions. This process depends on such factors as the length of living in the new place of residence, the type of settlement and the number of immigrants, the level of education and socio-economic status of immigrants, the religious basis of the ethnic community, and the level of unemployment among foreigners. According to the results of the research conducted by the British Council and the Brussels Group in 2015 among the EU countries in the field of successful integration policy, Sweden took the lead. Its integration index was 83%. In order to accurately calculate the index, 148 different indicators were used, which should provide an objective picture in six main areas affecting the speed and success of immigrants’ adaptation in the new environment [42]. These include indicators such as access to the labor market; the possibility of family reunification; obtaining a residence permit; the possibility to participate in political life, elections, referendums; obtaining citizenship; and the equality of rights of immigrants and residents. Sweden had taken a leading position on all six basic criteria and thus confirmed its status as the most favorable country with perfect conditions for the adaptation of immigrants. However, it can be said that the policy of multiculturalism in Sweden has not achieved its goal: so far, it has not been possible to create a conflict-free society in which representatives of different cultures interact on an equal level, and the current internal political situation can be characterized as extremely tense. The program of the policy turned out to be unimplementable in practice. The main reason for the failure of multiculturalism is the incomplete integration of refugees in the life of the state, which forces visitors based on their identity to consolidate with the representatives of their historical and cultural regions and alienate themselves from the Swedish society. There has been a clear division of society into “newcomers” and “locals”, and migrants often do not feel like full members of society. In this regard, there has been a sharp increase in crime rates, mass demonstrations of dissatisfied refugees, the formation of “vulnerable areas”, and the spread of radical sentiment among refugees. Moreover, Sweden is no longer economically capable of receiving the same number of migrants, provided that the principle of providing refugees with decent housing, social security, payments, and employment is respected. Apart from the economic reasons for the decrease in the flow of refugees, it is necessary to mention the fear for the loss of Swedes’ own national identity, who more often feel that they are victims of positive discrimination. The need to pay special attention to other cultures, which is often mentioned in the media and by leading politicians in the kingdom, only adds to the impression that the rights are being violated. This situation is aggravated by the activities of neo-fascist groups, especially the Northern Resistance Movement, whose members actively promote their interests and find a response in society. The victory of the movement’s representatives in municipal elections is a clear proof of the acute domestic political crisis. However, the current crisis is not unsolvable. The main possibility to resolve it is to introduce measures to limit the flow of migrants and refugees without considering geographical, political, and racial factors. Reducing migration will help to avoid the

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further spread of xenophobic sentiment among the Swedes and will allow the authorities to pay more attention to improving the living standards of migrants who are already in Sweden. Of course, there is a need to establish state institutions for the integration of foreigners into the Swedish society. The experience of the kingdom has shown that the acceptance of cultural identity is necessary to feel like a full member of the society. The state should also encourage organizations that integrate migrants into the Swedish life. Their activities not only help to speed up the process, but also destroy cultural barriers between the Swedes and representatives of other cultures. Work in this area will help to improve not only the socio-political situation (reduce crime, increase the number of able-bodied populations, increase the level of education of immigrants), but also the economic situation, in particular, it will help to attract more foreign investments, prevent capital and large industries from leaving the countries, which are often caused by high taxes in these countries. The issue of creating an equitable multicultural society is perhaps the most difficult to resolve in the Western countries today. Societies with a single national culture are a phenomenon of the past, and the problems of immigrants’ integration are the most urgent tasks of political life.

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Ideologies of Regionalism and Globalization in Historical Context. Philosophy of Politics

Dichotomy of Globalization and Deglobalization Processes in the Modern World Zeinab Bahturidze1(B) and Natalia Vasilieva2 1 Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint-Petersburg, Russia

[email protected] 2 Saint - Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected]

Abstract. The world order of the 21st century is characterized by transformational processes, changing the spatial–temporal coordinates of international life almost beyond recognition. The features of the present stage are ambivalent processes (integration and disintegration; globalization and deglobalization). The crisis state, in which the science of international relations resides, creates the conditions for the inevitable formation of new concepts and paradigms. Nowadays the events and processes in the sphere of international relations are intricately intertwined, and their causes and consequences are asymmetric. The subject of discussion are such characteristics of the new world as unpredictability, integration and disintegration processes, the problems of the dialectical relationship between globalization and deglobalization, which reflects the formation of a new polycentric world order based on the principle of unity in diversity. Transformation processes need a competent guiding influence, for the implementation of which it is necessary to realize the logic of the development of the modern system of the world order, which is highly likely to lead to a final change of the scientific paradigm in the field of research of international relations. Keyword: Globalization · Deglobalization · Space · Time · State · Regionalization · Universalization · Unification · Synergetics · International relations

1 Introduction International life in the first half of the 21st century is characterized by integrative development, which implies significant transformations of its space time coordinates. The problems of dialectical interrelation between globalization and deglobalization come to the fore, reflecting the emergence of a new polycentric world order based on the principle of unity in diversity. In fact, it is a combination of universal space (global) of human activity and traditionalist plurality of cultures, based on the preservation of customs, rules, taboos, codes, symbols of individual (local) communities. In the late twentieth century, the French philosopher A. Touraine noted that the fate of world civilization henceforth depends on whether a compromise is found between development © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 65–76, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_6

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as a universal goal and culture as a value choice [1]. The connecting link between the globalist, regional and local forms of development of the modern world society is the Internet space, where network interaction takes place at various levels. In this context, the dichotomy of globalization and deglobalization is expressed in the interrelation of two positions – on the one hand, the formation of the knowledge society and the digital economy leads to global interdependence and universalization of society, and on the other hand, the pressure of globality causes a deglobalization response, which leads to the revival of the matrix foundations of local cultures and civilizations.

2 Objectives of the Research The integrative orientation of world development determines the need to rethink a number of geopolitical concepts. The concepts of ‘space’, ‘globalization’ and ‘regionalization’ seem to be the most important in this conceptual sense. With regard to the concepts of ‘space of international relations’, ‘globalization’, ‘regionalization’ and their interaction, it can be assumed that if space can be considered as a certain environment or sphere, then globalization and regionalization are processes of internal structuring of this environment. It is necessary to classify the spaces, the types of their mutual influences, as well as their internal restructuring under the influence of globalization and regionalization. Thus, if we bring together such characteristics of the space of international relations as globalization, regionalization, the Internet and the network principle of interaction, then it seems logical to consider the process of global regionalization as an internal structuring of the space of international relations, where the Internet and the network principle of interaction are the conditions for the most optimal development of global regionalization, which is the most adequate process of the world political content of the spatial form of international relations of the 21st century. In this regard, it is important to consider through the prism of typological characteristics both theoretical approaches to the analysis of the space of international relations and practical actions of the main actors of intern LISTNUM ational relations in the process of global regionalization.

3 Methodology of Research B. Badie, a professor at the Paris Institute for Political Studies, in his book The End of the Territories, emphasized that globalization means, among other things, recognition of the growing interdependence of states, nations, societies. According to N. A. Kosolapov, globalization is a powerful tool for the formation of new world spaces. In this sense, it encourages to consider carefully the highly informative opportunities of the method of examining international relations as a specially organized space [2]. Based on this thesis, it is possible to propose various options for international spatial differentiation which, along with socio-economic criteria for determining differences, may include non-traditional, for example, confessional ones [3]. At the same time, many authors, reflecting on the impact of globalization on the space of international relations, focus on the integrative component which is embodied in the formation of macro-spaces (or areas)

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which are characterized, according to V. Strada, by “not only spatial, but also temporal dynamism […] they are connected with each other by the relation of attraction and repulsion, depending on the specific features that constitute the ingenious character of each area” [4, p.111]. In this regard, it is interesting to consider the process of formation of macro-spaces in the context of A. Toynbee’s cultural and historical geosophy. Toynbee identified three historical stages of macro-spatial unification of the world [5, p. 67]. The first one refers to the times of Babur, the fifth generation of Tamerlane’s descendant, who united large territories in the center of Asia, the base for which was the Desert, which was a kind of ocean without waters, and had its own ports and means of transportation. However, although the Desert served as a unifying center, the connections were sporadic. Since the early 16th century, mankind has united into one world community, achieved through the integration of America and India in the geopolitical European space, the replacement of the Desert by the Ocean as the main center of world communications. Nowadays, scientific and technological advancement has made the Air an important communication environment, uniting humanity into a global system. As N. A. Kosolapov rightly observes, in modern conditions “the essence of the globalization restructuring of international relations and world development is the actual creation of a new architecture of spaces that will determine the life and development of the world in the coming decades: global both in terms of territorial coverage and organization within the framework of this architecture of all major spaces previously emerged and formed” [2, p, 10]. Thus, globalization contributes to the formation of a complex-structured space of international relations, where it is possible to identify certain strata that are in differentvector interaction. According to M. M. Lebedeva and A. Yu. Melvil, “globalization is only the most general vector of world development, a kind of resultant of a wide variety of forces and trends. As for a particular region or a particular historical period, here we can find elements of regression, including autonomization” [6, p.23]. Moreover, if globalization can be viewed as a chaotic, uncontrolled process, then regionalization is a process of self-organization of actors in international relations. The latter circumstance should be emphasized since according to the second law of thermodynamics, in closed systems entropy eventually increases, the process of uncertainty and chaos. At the same time, open systems have the property of self-organization. To emphasize this fact, the German scientist H. Haken introduced the special term ‘synergetics’, which means joint, or cooperative action. “Such systems can only function by supplying them with a flow of energy (and matter). Unlike machines constructed by man, which are designed for a certain type of functioning, the above-mentioned structures are formed spontaneously: they are self-organizing" [7, p.10]. Therefore, in order to resist the laws determined by the second law of thermodynamics leading to the disorganization and degradation of complex systems, living and social structures must be open which makes it possible to extract from the environment the necessary elements for life. However, the implementation of such processing requires an ever-increasing amount of information because, according to the American scientist J. Beniger, the very process of transformation and utilization of matter and energy for

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the purpose of self-maintenance and development of living and social systems requires constant monitoring which is defined as a ‘purposeful influence on a predetermined goal’ [8, p. 9]. As long as the system is able to exercise appropriate control over transformation processes, it remains viable. But as systems become more complex, it is necessary to process matter and energy in a larger volume and with continuously increasing speeds. Therefore, the stable functioning of such systems requires control, which, according to Beniger, information technology is designed to fully implement, so it can be considered as a product of the objective need for the evolution of living and social systems. The synergetic method we have considered, provides an opportunity to take a fresh look at the processes of globalization and regionalization, where the emphasis is on openness, i.e. the principle of ‘transregionalism’ which is largely determined by the doctrine of ‘open regionalism’ in the framework of world integration processes. The multitude of spaces emerging in the process of globalization and regionalization makes their contact and interaction inevitable. In recent years, the Internet space has become particularly important for global regionalization. It most closely corresponds in its characteristics (speed of information transmission, ease of establishing connections, global scale) to integrative trends of modern society. Establishing of a global information network united by the Internet is a new global space that determines, according to M. Castells, the structuring of all other spaces [9]. No less important condition for the spatial development of international relations is the network principle of organizing spatial relationships, through which political, economic and other systems of the world society acquire flexibility and the ability to adapt, i.e. those qualities without which in a rapidly changing environment they will not survive.

4 Results of Research Scientific reflection on the practical socio-economic consequences of the formation of the knowledge society also permeates the analysis of macroeconomic processes. Russian experts note the increasing innovation component in the digital economy, and therefore changes in approaches and methods for assessing the risks of innovative projects are necessary [10]. U. Beck wrote a lot about this, introducing even a new concept - the risk society [11]. Modern communications (transport and media systems) have led to revolutionary changes in the way of life of the vast majority of the planet’s inhabitants. As noted by the Russian researcher L. G. Kirianova, “the intensification of commodity and financial flows across the borders of national states, the growing number of international organizations eventually led to fundamental qualitative changes in the spatial organization and structure of social interaction, both at the level of daily practice of people, and at the level of relationships between previously self-sufficient and relatively closed territorial entities – cities, regions, states” [12, p. 226]. In fact, there is a conceptual diffusion of territoriality into ‘spatiality’ which does not have such a feature as a border. Under the influence of the digitalization of the world economy, the sovereignty of state power becomes relative, which affects not only production, trade and finance, but also politics, culture,

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environmental protection opportunities. Numerous non-state actors have become active in the global space, which, as A. Giddens noted, has led to new spatial and temporal realities when social relations are deprived of the local interaction context, therefore a new concept of ‘displacement’ is proposed [13]. Cosmopolitanism replaces traditional cultural and social communication practices leading to erosion of local identities, which is a fundamental characteristic of the modern world. According to Russian researcher V. I. Spiridonova, “the concept of sovereignty, which was the last fundamental stroke in the theory of social contract, shaped the understanding of the state as a rational entity endowed with a will, having rights and obligations to its citizens. Globalization destroys the established concept. If for some time the sovereignty remains, then its meaning will be limited to control over the territory when solving certain tasks prescribed by international law” [14]. But at the same time, the presence of the transnational agenda did not eliminate the considerable heterogeneity of the political and geographical space of the modern world where the trends of unification and disengagement coexist This can be observed in various regions of the world. For many decades, the Western and Eastern regions had directly opposite vectors of ‘movement’: in some of them, the idea of supranationalism prevailed, others were in a state of disintegration. According to Yu. V. Kosov’s figurative remark, the ‘tidal’ or ‘marching’ lands of Central Europe that belonged to the West then to the East “move like marching columns from one part of the continent to another and vice versa” [15, p. 93]. The intricate ‘segmentation’ of the space of international relations in the 21st century leads to a number of difficulties, for example, in understanding the nature and ways of the world community development. In the year 1945, fifty-one states joined the UN, and today 193 states are members of this universal organization. In addition, a segment of large states with large population dominated on the political map of the world not long ago, but now most states can be classified as sovereign entities small in size and population. As the Georgian political scientist A. Rondeli rightly points out, “in our politicized world, where it is still very important to have economic and military power, which, first of all, determine the ‘weight’ and influence of a particular state in international relations, small states have a special place, and interest in them is growing rapidly” [16]. According to Alexander Rondeli, “the viability and ‘vitality’ of small countries, their functions in the international political and economic systems, as well as the processes and peculiarities of the formation of statehood of young independent states are of particular interest” [16]. Indeed, one of the most urgent problems for new members of the international community is the problem of gaining real international recognition, which is especially difficult for small states entering the world political arena for the first time. The democratic nature of the principles of the United Nations Charter created a unique opportunity for small states to discuss and make decisions on the most important problems of our time on a par with the world’s leading states. Thus, a certain disappointment of the United States with the activities of the United Nations is also explained by the fact that often most of the member countries do not support their position (for example, on the Iraq military operation in 2003), although small states constitute the majority. It is important to understand that strengthening of the small states role in world

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politics is associated with the strengthening of the positions of international organizations which provide conditions for the non-discriminatory nature of the interactions of all participants within the framework of international law. In addition, a great influence on the growing importance of small countries have “geographical, political, ethnic and economic conditions and factors, as well as the interest of strong countries in the existence of small states. Small countries help maintain a balance of power at the global and regional levels, and their existence is determined by a functional necessity” [16]. Another subject matter in this context are the so-called unrecognized or partially recognized states, formed after the collapse of the USSR, which became part of political reality (for example, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, etc.). A number of terms are used in relation to them: ‘quasi-states’, ‘unrecognized territories’, ‘self-proclaimed states’, ‘self-proclaimed republics’, ‘de facto states’, and others [17]. These terms, however, define the same phenomenon of world politics – territories that have declared themselves independent states and have certain characteristics of statehood: state name, state symbols, population, territory, power exercising control over the territory, government system, constitution. At the same time, this group of states does not have diplomatic recognition from the majority of the world community – from the UN member states, and their territory is officially considered as part of the state territory of one or several UN member states. This phenomenon is typical not only for the postSoviet space, but recently it is the unrecognized states of the region that have become the focus of attention of the world community. Active involvement of unrecognized states existing in the post-Soviet space in the modern world political processes, as well as the application for the emergence of new ones (for example, the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic) contribute to increasing attention to this phenomenon of politicians and scientists from different countries. Indeed, despite the fact that these states have not received wide international recognition, they mutually recognized each other, creating a military-political union, and unrecognized states actively interact with each other in various spheres of social and political reality. A large diversity distinguishes the political map of ‘boiling’ Asia, “No other part of the world gives so many different types of political and geographical conflicts for the borders, the territory or ‘around’ the territory” [18, p. 230]. The trouble areas of territorial conflicts remain in Latin America, and the problem of borders continues to be acute on the African continent. In Canada, the situation with Quebec is alarming. According to experts in the field of political geography, regional differences are strongly felt in the USA. “American culture (including political) is characterized by an unusually bright regional identity of citizens, by virtue of which they clearly associate themselves with certain areas of the country addressing their patriotism to it, and opposing themselves, sometimes very harshly, to other areas of the country and their inhabitants” [18, p. 230]. Exaggeration of the ‘global’ does not correspond to reality not only in the spatial but also in the temporal dimension. Life according to Greenwich Mean Time is a mere formality. With external synchronization of world politics, the temporality of political processes in different regions of the planet is not the same, and individual social entities have their own rhythms. It is known that for a number of civilizations of the East, the periods of the highest perfection are lost in the depths of centuries and even millennia, and a return to them is the goal that determines the meaning of human life and society.

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According to the Russian researcher K. S. Pigrov, every culture and every major political movement has its own time rhythm and points of attraction. For example, in Russia, in the early 21st century, Kairos of the three major political forces denoted “being in the past (as a matter of principle) ‘fullness of times’.” For liberals it is the year 1913, for nationalists it is Holy Russia, for communists – the 30s–50s of the 20th century in the USSR […]. It turns out that we are able to step into the future only thinking that we “revive” the fullness of the past” [19, p. 160]. In this context, it is important to emphasize the idea of the Israeli researcher Sh. Eisenstadt that the commitment of society to its own traditions acts as a stabilizing factor, gives stability and consistency to modernization [20, p. 29]. Thus, it can be stated that the acceleration of physical movement, as well as the exchange of ideas, information, values, lifestyle models contributes to the unification of the world, but at the same time there is a steady trend towards sovereignization of their cultural and value spaces by local societies. At the same time, one of the symbols of deglobalization is the state, which, according to K. Popper, requires special caution in using (observance of the principle ‘the razor of liberalism’) on the one hand, to protect the civil rights of the population, and on the other hand, so that the price for the protection of citizens is not too high [21, p. 510–513].

5 Discussion The idea of A. S. Panarin [22] about identifying a number of political and philosophical structure-forming directions in which it is necessary to elaborate scientific research of political ontology, within the framework of which problems of the objective foundations of world development are analyzed, seems to be correct. In this context, it is important to analyze the new objective characteristics of world political being (globalization, integration, migration, fragmentation, etc.) that require new conceptual justifications. In this regard, it is appropriate to apply the methodological approach of connecting the global and regional when considering the dichotomy of globalization and deglobalization of the modern world space. Civilization regionalization. This conceptual approach goes back to the historiosophical concepts of O. Spengler and A. Toynbee. In modern conditions, the theory of S. Hantington is the most popular [23]. This theory substantiates the idea that the process of civilizational regionalization can lead to a “clash of civilizations”. The process of ‘westernization’ can be viewed as a process of global expansion of a regional civilizational European structure. In its turn, the process of ‘modernization’ is understood as the process of adaptation of other civilizations to Western civilization, and globalization is identified with westernization. Geopolitical regionalization. One of the most important ideas of the American geopolitics of the early twentieth century, A. Mahan [24], was that the confrontation between sea and earth forces allows uniting the states in two global geopolitical zones. In the 50s of the 20th century, the process of global regionalization acquired a practical embodiment in the formation of various world political constructs. For example, the French demographer A. Sauvy in his article published in the journal L’Observateur on August 14, 1952 introduced the term ‘the third world’ into scientific use to describe the

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underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa that were neither in the capitalist nor in the socialist world. The scheme of global regionalization proposed by the French scientist turned out to be very popular, which, in particular, was reflected in the ideology of the “non-alignment” movement, as well as in the Maoist world political paradigm, where the “first world” are the USSR and the USA, the “second world” are their obvious allies, the “third world” are non-aligned states (China at the top). According to D. N. Zamyatin [25, p. 147], the very principles of development and interaction of geopolitical spaces lead to the emergence and active functioning of various buffer and intermediate territorial zones between strong or rival states, which, in fact, can be productive geopolitical images at the same time. Thus, the status of ‘territories of dual subordination’ largely corresponded to the position of the ‘third world’ countries and the countries of the ‘socialist camp’ during the Cold War era, when geopolitical regionalization, based on the principle of two superpowers, created for political and economic vassals the possibility for political bargaining-blackmail in the conditions of tough competition of the USSR and the USA. Multipolar regionalization. “New growing giants” – China, India and Brazil represent the “building material” of the future multipolar world [26]. Russia stands somewhat apart, being an important regional center of influence, but striving to restore the lost global level through active diplomatic “stimulation” of the institutionalization of BRIC as a new pole of world politics. The process of forming a multipolar world is uneven, which affects the anarchic character of the modern system of international relations [27]. The European Union, due to supranational forms of government, has restored the global status lost by Europe in the twentieth century. Japan, using the factor of innovations in technological development, has become an important post-industrial pole of the global economy. The United States continue to be the most important world political pole, although the idea of “PAX AMERICANA” is losing its attraction. Macroeconomic regionalization. Currently, within the framework of the UN Development Program, the concept of the “three regions” has been established in accordance with the system of economic and socio-political indices: a division into developed, developing and least developed states has emerged. The greatest attention is paid to the problems of adaptation to globalization processes. In this regard, it is important to mention the theoretical developments of Latin American scientists, for example, F. Cardoso who has introduced the concept of ‘dependent’ or ‘peripheral’ capitalism to explain the negative consequences of the entry of developing countries into global processes [28]. The concept of “dependent development” justified the fundamental difference between the global regionalization of developing countries, since peripheral capitalism is inherently programmed for dependent development which leads these countries to lag. World-system regionalization. It seems appropriate to include in this classification form, the well-known concept of I. Wallerstein of global regionalization according to the ‘center-periphery’ principle [29]. This type of regionalization is very vividly commented by A. N. Bobrovnikov who emphasizes the political and economic idea of distinguishing between the developed North as the center and the developing South as the periphery, “the world divided into technological centers and vast periphery, and more and more immersing in a kind of virtual economic environment […] periphery, echelons extending to the boundaries of marginalization in the global economic space, to the ‘deep South’ model, to break free of which is simply not possible for countries” [30, p. 20]. Typical of

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the 90s of the twentieth century was the idea of ‘unipolarity’, for example, the concept of A. L. Straus representing global regionalization as a rapprochement of countries and regions on the basis of universal (western) standards [31, p. 34]. World politics was seen as a tool for creating a single ‘world government’ led by the USA and a group of the most developed countries. Macro-geographical regionalization. “Integrity” as the most important characteristic of world political and economic development trends is presented in the macro-geographic scheme of A.V. Bobrovnikov, where the directions of development of world integration processes will be determined by two vectors: the ‘northern hemisphere’ and the ‘southern hemisphere’ [32]. In the ‘northern hemisphere’, globalization will proceed according the ‘western’ type, leading the social structures of its member countries to greater unification and universalization. In the ‘southern’ hemisphere, the integration trends will take place in accordance with the concept of multipolarity and taking into account the peculiarities of the socio-economic and political development of the regions that it includes. Although at this stage the development of the ‘northern hemisphere’ is characterized by the predominance of disintegration trends, due to the presence in this area of three strongest leaders – the United States, the European Union and Japan, who do not want to give up their positions on the world stage, however, in the future A. Bobrovnikov sees integrative trends. The ‘southern hemisphere’, in its turn, demonstrates a clear ‘desire’ to unite, which, in particular, is reflected in the UN strategic project on mutual assistance of the countries of the global South. Along with the classification of theoretical approaches to the processes of global regionalization, it seems logical to trace the integrative trend within the framework of practical interaction between actors of international relations and world politics. Global regionalization in the context of global governance. According to D. N. Zamyatin, any authority or power structures are by their nature oriented towards the formation of a space of power, which may not be limited to real state borders [25, p. 148]. The G20, BRICS, WTO and other structural units of global governance are inherently predisposed to form a supranational, cross-border space as an essential condition for their effectiveness. One cannot but agree with N. A. Kosolapov [2] who writes about the actual hierarchy of states in international relations with their formal international legal equality. Examples of this are the systems of institutions that regulate economic processes at the global level—IMF and the World Bank Group. Global regionalization in the context of transcontinental interaction of states. In modern conditions, the tendency of rapprochement and interaction of states that are thousands of kilometers apart is gathering speed. Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS), Brazil, India, South Africa (SATO), Ibero-American Summits, APEC, and other forms of global integration indicate new trends in global regionalization. The explanation for this may be objective needs for efficient development. For developing countries, the ‘South – South’ cooperation provides an opportunity to maximize the use of their own growth resources and thus respond to the challenges of globalization. The ‘South – North’ direction creates conditions for optimizing the consequences of migration processes, for the global implementation of scientific and technological progress. In addition, conditions are being created for long-term and stable partnerships for mutual benefit to address major global challenges.

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Global regionalization in the context of the development of ‘corporate empires’. The processes of global economic interactions in the 21st century have reached the greatest development in transnational corporations (TNCs). Their structure is based on a network of branches located in different parts of the world, and at the headquarters located in the ‘parent state’. Thus, standalone corporate network empires are formed, independent of borders and political tendencies, connected with the host state only by formal obligations. In fact, there is a situation of ‘state within a state’ or ‘corporate state’, where branches of companies are dependent both on the policy of TNC headquarters and on changes of political and legal nature in the host countries. Therefore, according to experts, companies have new opportunities, but at the same time they are exposed to new risks and greater uncertainty. There are various sources of uncertainty but the main contribution is made by economic factors [33]. In fact, we can speak about the network form of global corporate regionalization. Global regionalization in the context of organized crime. Globalization has brought to life a number of negative phenomena, which is largely associated with the existence, as R. Cooper puts it, ‘pseudo-states’ (Somalia, South Sudan, etc.), where the degradation of power structures is expressed in the inability to maintain a monopoly on violence within the state and protect its external borders. The fate of these ‘pseudo-states’ (according to the UN terminology – ‘failed states’) is unenviable, because they gradually turn into ‘great economic deserts’ successfully mastered by the criminal business [26]. There is no doubt that the typological characteristics of global regionalization highlighted in this article do not exhaust all possible trends. For example, extremely interesting is the typology of global regionalization, based on the allocation of the main cultural spaces of international relations: traditional, modernist and postmodern, confessional, etc. It was important to understand the general trends of the internal reforming of the global space of international relations, their theoretical comprehension, as well as the forms of integrative interaction of the main actors of the twenty-first century world political processes.

6 Conclusions It is important to understand that globalization is often conceptually defined as unification, that is, universality is understood as following a pattern, similarity. Such a movement towards universality has a tragic example from the recent past, when the western model turned into the Procrustes’ bed of the Soviet civilization, where individualism as a creative Promethean principle of the western attitude to life was transformed into the ideology of individual terrorism; rationalism – in the technocracy of the militarized partocracy; the ideas of freedom and equality – in the asceticism of total uniformity, and the messianic idea of the exodus of the working people through struggle and suffering in the realm of freedom. At present, the process of restoring the identity of historical and cultural civilizational forms, both in Russia and other countries, has begun. There is a complex but natural search for individual ways of civilizational ascent to the heights of spiritual freedom and social equality. In this context, planetarity can be understood as the evolvement of universality through forming the unity of multiplicities, as a way of creating a mosaic picture of a global society from unique diverse communities that

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coexist in modern spatial and temporal frames, i.e. as a way of creating unity in diversity. The ‘end of history’ as the end of the Western globalization project can be defined on the basis of the provisions of the second law of thermodynamics. The Western model of globalization, by virtue of its unifying universalism, is closed, and therefore its entropy increases over time, i.e. the process of uncertainty and chaos. Therefore, the ‘bifurcation effect’ of modernity can be interpreted precisely from the standpoint of the development of planetary universality, which is born from the chaotic interaction of the entire set of modern communities (civilizations, states, civil society, traditional societies and structures, etc.). Summing up, it is important to note that in modern prognostic science there is a tendency to create non-linearly constructed models, which, according to the well-known sociologist E. Laszlo, reflect the patterns of human civilizational development. “Differentiation in integration is a distinctive feature of the future society, with its inherent emerging unity and diversity in all areas and at all levels. The tendency towards centralization and homogenization prevailing in the present period is transformed into decentralization with coordination and mutual solidarity with respect for differences” [34, p. 490]. If globalization continues to be carried out by ignoring the historical, social and cultural characteristics of the regions, then a global community may emerge, onedimensional in content and form, and therefore incapable of qualitative renewals. The dialectic of contradictions between the processes of globalization and deglobalization creates the need for their regulation and resolution. This regulator can be global regionalism, which allows the general trends of the knowledge society and the digital economy to adapt to local specific conditions, and thus to preserve the diversity of the social world, and to protect the uniqueness of each individual culture in the growing universalization process.

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Russian Identity in the Age of Globalization and Regionalism Igor Chernov1 , Radomir Bolgov1(B) , Igor Ivannikov1 , and Dmitry Katsy2 1 Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] 2 Bonch-Bruevich Saint - Petersburg State University of Telecommunications, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected]

Abstract. New age of globalization and regionalism unavoidably change a political geography and political discourse. The paper examines how the globalization and regionalism transform the traditional Russian identity. The paper discusses the possibility of its movement towards the values of “open society” and multiculturalism. In this paper, we study the impact of globalization to the civilizational identity of Russia. Does globalization erase the issue of nationalism, or does it do the opposite and sharpen the existing contradictions? Keywords: Globalization · Regionalism · Multiculturalism · Nationalism · Open society · Russian identity · Political discourse

1 Introduction One of the acute problems Russia faces in the contemporary world is the issue of its identity. Having multiple internal and external dimensions, this question is traditionally scrutinized from both inside and outside of the country’s borders, thus making learning about the subject an extremely complicated process. It is for this reason that any efforts to read and analyze the content of the most impressive writings devoted to Russian Identity may not necessarily lead an inexperienced reader to clear and verified conclusions because this very issue constantly suggests a world of meaning that is larger than the material one. In other words, the notion of identity is unavoidably subjective. It does not exist outside of time, space, socio-political and economic contexts, personal experience, psychological and spiritual needs, and many other aspects of cultural life and so on. Therefore, it can be useless to look for a ‘true’ notion of identity out of the framework in which it is represented by socially determined and interrelated notions of individuals. At the same time, no matter how subjective this form of reality may look to us versus them or vice versa, identity is not just a predominantly given product of certain social structures’ activities because individuals change their social realities. They often cannot

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 77–90, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_7

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change them alone and have to be united by common interests and organize themselves at national, ethnic, social, political, corporative, religious and other levels. Hence, the axiom is that people are using their ‘common’ understanding of what makes sense for them in their daily social practices according to what they think is or isn’t ‘fair’, what is ‘good’ and who is ‘right’, what ‘should be done’, and what ‘must be avoided’, etc. Thus, one’s identity not only reflects reality but also makes it by creating a certain system of cognitive orientation, or so-called world-view. From this point of view, Russian identity (Rossiiskaya identichnost) is a fairly neutral term. It can have different meanings with regard to how people in Russia understand it, in the sense of whether it is primarily the state or civil society to which they identify themselves with first and foremost. As it was noticed, “the idea of the civic community as a political nation is just emerging in Russia, and people, when asked about civic identity, often imply that it belongs to the state” [1]. So under the formation of state identity through the will of a political leader, certain ideas, symbols and signs come into play in official documents for the political elite to utilize in education and media, thus having an impact on public opinion and constructing loyalty to the state and its representations of history, laws and standards [1]. On the one hand, the term Russian identity is quite often criticized for being fairly loose by many professionals as well as numerous ‘volunteers’, both ethnic Russians and non-Russians. On the other hand, the term does help to avoid unnecessary tensions when it comes to differences between followers of the two alternative concepts of civil and ethnic nationalism within the territory of the Russian state. Clearly, tensions between these two types of nationalism, each pretending to master its own house, usually result in violence. At the same time, the Russian Federation is a place of diverse ethnicities, indeed. It is one of the biggest poly-ethnic states in the world. According to the Russian census record of 2010, residents of 193 ethnicities who use 277 languages and dialects inhabit the country’s territory. Of these languages and dialects, 89 are used in the public education system—30 as a language of instruction and 59 as a subject of study. Historically, some of the ethnicities living in the country’s territories (chud’, golyad’, muroma, merya, etc.) have dissolved into Russians, but many regions are populated by integrated ethnic societies of non-Russian ethnic origins. The political leadership traditionally had to take these facts into account and carefully avoid contra-posing the twofold meanings of the very word ‘Russian’: rossiiskij (associated with the country as a whole) and russkij (ethnic, nationality). It is for this reason, for example, that after his re-election in 1996, Russia’s first President Boris Yeltsin did not approve the intentions of his political advisors and the country’s intellectuals to start debates on any kind of ‘Russian national idea’ because, in his view, such an idea could be easily misunderstood. Instead, he suggested developing an ‘idea for Russia’. As an experienced politician, B. Yeltsin could not but have known what he had in mind. In 1990, it was he who suggested the national autonomies of the Soviet Union to ‘take as much sovereignty as you can swallow’ in his speech in Tatarstan. At that moment, he did it to gain popularity from regional leaders and succeeded. However, it was also B. Yeltsin who signed a decree on sending military troops to the city of Grozny to restore constitutional order and stop the secession of the Chechen Republic from the Russian Federation in 1994. Later in 1999, his political successor Vladimir

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Putin also mentioned the idea of rossiiskaya (not russkaya) in his speech, “Russia on the frontier of the millennium”, stressing the importance of unconstrained civil accord in the country and making a point that he was against any kind of official state ideology [2]. Naturally, the debates about nation in Russia remained a pretty hot issue ever since. In 2007, for instance, those debates were still characterized by political struggles for establishing not a political dialogue, but a monopoly with a clear perspective on having no consensus across Russia’s political space [3]. From this view, the term Russian identity does help to characterize a multisyllabic concept, which is not the predominantly given result but, rather, an effect of joint interactions between individuals and their social environment and institutions, both formal and informal. Though imperfect, the term does have a non-ethnic, neutral connotation and makes contemporary discourse about the Russian nation less contradictive and helps to strengthen the basis for collective beliefs and consensus in the country.

2 Research Question Today the rapid development of new information and communication technologies raises the question of how the social process changes in the age of globalization. Whether the use of new instrument of communication in the global world leads to the modernization and the changes of traditional Russian identity?

3 New Age of Globalization and Regionalism: Live Local, Think Global The need for strengthening Russian internal unity has its reasons. One of them is the psychological factor. The thing is that an individual’s identity is not something given to them for life. In cases of crisis and uncertainty, people have to adapt to the changes in their social environment; they also have to look for and find new places for their activities. In this process, people are much more inclined to imagine situations that they do not want to become real, rather than to think about what they want to happen. Similarly, people realize whom they do not identify themselves with much more readily due to their own instinctive, primitive reactions provoked by negative emotions and fear. In these cases, we have the effect of so-called negative identity. The phenomenon is not new in itself, but some authors who write on Russian identity claim that it is mainly negative due to the country’s internal social mechanisms, which diminish one’s adaptability and are typical for the members of a coercive society [4]. Negative identity is not at all an exclusive distinguishing feature of Russian citizens, but it is certain that individuals who have few positive incentives are not so open to the opinions of others, are less tolerant to unfamiliar or ‘new’ ideas, and do not readily believe in the solidarity of different social groups as well as good intentions of all real and imaginable ‘others’, including foreigners. There is also another important factor. Russia’s internal diversities and domestic problems are one thing while the international environment of the country is another. There are some serious problems here as well. The changes in the international arena do

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not seem to give many reasons for optimism. Regardless of what has been said in recent decades, the contemporary world has not become a safer place to live in. Numerous intellectual concepts of the ‘new world order’, originally intended to organize ideas and to present them in simple categories, too often swamp us with details and fall victim to their own limitations because we have too much irrelevant information nowadays. There are too many ideas and too much data to make sense of it all, so people often prefer to oversimplify the existent complications and use their favorite ‘simple arguments’ in their search for ‘simple solutions’, unless things get entirely too complicated. A point to continue seems to be that globalization (no matter how it is defined) has not transformed our big, bad world into a peaceful set of national interactions so far. The reverse is the case. Some fascinating stories about the end of history have become history. Transfer of technologies, international trade and the mobility of financial flows do not guarantee local prosperity. The Internet seems to have nothing to do with democracy and vice versa. Economic ties do not guarantee peace in itself. Prospects for a collective security system in Europe look gloomy as “the European system of stability, security and economic interdependence was based partly on double standards and partly on a lack of due responsibility” [5]. Regional tensions are intensified in the Middle East, in northern Africa, the Ukraine, and others. Radical political movements find their supporters quite easily and even recruit suicide-bombers. Unidentified militaries sometimes shoot down civil aircrafts for no apparent reason. The United Nations is not so much united together as it is divided. War is not unthinkable, the positive idea of nuclear non-proliferation is somewhat unpopular, and so on. Naturally, the above-mentioned points do not mean that the numerous and intensive links between states, nations and regions in the world are nothing but failures. Certainly, it is not so. Since the time of the Cold War, the incompatible ideologies of capitalism and communism put an end to their mutual competition for the sake of saving the world from the threat of nuclear apocalypse, and international relations grew enormously. Communication costs dropped significantly, allowing almost instant contact between people in geographically distant locations. Global work teams have created new industries in information technology and outsourcing services. Foreign direct investments and other financial activities have brought real changes to many areas of social, political and cultural life, but it does not seem to be the right time yet to celebrate an upcoming Golden Age of international law, multilateral cooperation, and integration of economies, industries, markets, cultures and policy-making around the globe. Regardless of whether we like it or not, a mutually beneficial trade-off between the interests of global corporations and local daily needs and practices is difficult to achieve. So Russian society, not unlike many other state entities, also finds itself needing to establish a balance as to how, to which degree, and in what areas of its domestic affairs the pressure of globalization must be adopted. Traditionally, Russia has had to rely on its own resources. As a matter of fact, the dissolution of the Soviet Union did not help the country to be recognized as part of the ‘European civilization’ politically, nor in mainstream academic literature on contemporary international relations published in English. Not quite to the contrary, the Russian

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academic tradition recognized an inconsistency in the political games with the country’s ‘civilizational identity’, but it usually admitted to the existence of possibilities for transforming the discourse of the debates somewhat easier [6]. In recent years, many historians and political scientists have analyzed in great detail the ways in which the quest for a Russian identity was answered under the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. The typical conclusions were that, at best, Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the West, but it had never been and would not become a part of it [7, 8]. Regrettably, this rather specific ‘together but separate’ [9] approach with no answer to the questions about contemporary Russia’s relationship to the West seemed to be the best option for all the parties concerned. As it has been noted, the quality of this relationship depended in many ways on international security and the global order [9]. The latter does not seem to be established in reality, however. The world is getting increasingly more polycentric and in many respects, regressive and nationally oriented. Russian citizens have better realized in the last two decades that globalization brings success to a number of varying economic and national systems but that it does not benefit them all. It is not a thing which results in nothing but ‘good’ gifts, more wealth, trade, and ‘civilization’, more and new sources of revenue and jobs, or ‘better’ results from education and so on. The current results of globalization often look impressive but are somewhat uncertain in terms of perspective because financial capital is much more mobile than actual people who usually have to stay in one place and experience real problems. In the end, globalization is simply a nation-state, which can guarantee a secure living for the majority of the population—that is, this is what many people believe in many countries. The politics of ‘Euroskepticism’ in the nation-states of the European Union alone could be an example to admitting the existence of such a tendency. Under these conditions, it is clear that in the contemporary world, states will have to compete. In this sense, Russia is of no exception. As someone has put it, the Russian ruling elite may be dumb, but it is not stupid. Even during the 1990s, it had few reasons to believe in the death of Realpolitik or get completely disappointed with the idea that the law of power governs the world. To the contrary, it was stressed on many occasions that a strong state cannot be sustainable without common ideas. Spiritual unity of the people and moral values to unite them were recognized as important factors for the development of political and economic stability [10]. As a matter of fact, Russians, while often accused of ‘imperialistic ambitions’, have not been more ‘imperialist’ in the course of world history than any other sufficiently organized entity in terms of military might and political motivation driven by expansionist logic to push the boundaries of its territory as far as it could stretch. In its present situation, Russia certainly does not need any new lands, but it is naive to believe that the Russian political leadership has too many illusions about the ends and means by which other states and civilizations have projected their influence over certain parts of the world. For instance, when speaking before the Federal Assembly in April of 2007, President V. Putin expressed the point clearly: “Looking back at the more distant past, we recall the talk about the civilizing role of colonial powers during the colonial era. Today, ‘civilization’ has been replaced by

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‘democratization’, but the aim is the same—to ensure unilateral gains and one’s own advantage and to pursue one’s own interests” [11]. In essence, it has always been a struggle for control over the territories and a redistribution of the available resources that has nourished the interests of many states in the world. It has not been just the Russians or any other ethnic community in particular who invented such a way of thinking. Certainly, the idea that technology transforms culture so that more technically advanced nations dominate the world because they want and are able to do so is not usually presented to the public. Yet, this does not make the desire for dominance non-existent. Old habits die hard, as the saying goes. Here are some more points that characterize the ideology of a true statesman: “I do not agree that the dog in a manger has the final right to the manger even though he may have lain there for a very long time. I do not admit that right. I do not admit, for instance, that a great wrong has been done to the Red Indians of America or the black people of Australia. I do not admit that a wrong has been done to these people by the fact that a stronger race, a higher-grade race, a more worldly-wise race, to put it that way, has come in and taken their place” [12]. These words of Sir Winston Churchill were published seventy years after he said them about the Arab residents of the British Palestine Mandate in 1937. Surely, the line of reasoning he presented had logic. But it was one of a specific kind. In his words, “The Arabs had no reason to be against the Jews,” Churchill said at a luncheon on September 11th. He then went on to explain, “The Jews have developed the country, grown orchards and grain fields out of the desert, built schools and great buildings” in lands “which under Arab rule have remained a desert.” Understandably for a British politician aimed at establishing a strategically important, culturally close and regionally powerful ally in the Middle East, the situation seemed to be perfectly justified: “Why is it injustice because there is more work and wealth for everybody? There’s no injustice. The injustice is when those who live in the country live it to be a desert” [12]. Churchill seemed to be quite sincere in his words that “Fanaticism and a sort of envy have driven Arabs to violence, and for the present, the problem is one of proper policing until harmony has been restored” [12]. Alas, we have not seen much harmony in contemporary Israeli-Palestinian relations so far. Unfortunately, some people do begrudge others for what they cannot enjoy themselves. However, it is not the aim of this text to blame some people and praise others, mainly because the discipline of international relations is not necessarily about judging “who is right and who is wrong”. Rather, it is about how to get on, from time to time at least. After all, Sir Winston Churchill said what he had to say and did what we did. It is another matter that some of his words had to wait seventy years before their publication. Perhaps they were ‘too good’ (or ‘too bad’) to be heard at that time, especially by Palestinians. So why do we think now that there are plenty of reasons to believe that nowadays the general attitudes of ‘the powerful’ have been irreversibly changed if Realpolitik really undergoes a renaissance in the English-speaking world? Shall we just learn more about using ‘politically correct’ vocabulary, or should we simply forget about the many dramatic events in world history because we all need to ‘look into the future’ and not poison our memories by remembering and reminding others of some old, bad stories?

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Yes, we should try to forget them if we can and when we need to. People do this from time to time. However, states cannot afford to do it. They have archives, armies and a longer memory. That’s the difference.

4 Russians for Russia? There is a massive amount of academic and popular literature explaining why contemporary Russia is not a nation-state. However, it has to become one or recognize that such an idea cannot be realized in practice. Historically, Russia was lagging behind the process of nation-state formation in Europe, where nations were ‘built’ from the population of multiethnic empires by different means. Some of these means are, at the very least, ethically unacceptable and even officially forbidden now, but all of them are not at all forgotten (genocide, ethnocide, linguicide, forced resettlements, information blockades, a ‘scorched earth’ policy, mass terrorism, targeted killings, assimilation, etc.). Alas, world history has many examples of when these ‘methods’ worked and that is what counts. In France, for instance, linguistic plurality disappeared with the French Revolution because the political body of citizens, le peuple français (the French people), did not need the linguistic, social, religious, and regional divisions that had existed in the country under the old regime. Instead, a single state language directly affected the geographically distant people of the country by a revolutionary ideology coming out of Paris to the French provinces. This kind of ‘Frenchification’ policy was both functional and political, and it was not indifferent to the regional needs and languages associated with clericalism and anti-modernism [13]. The policy was about creating the sentiment of belonging to the same symbolic community, a sense of communion with many thousands of people united by their ‘common beliefs’, ‘political will’, ‘world mission’, ‘national fate’, etc. Notably, starting from the declarations of linguistic liberty for all citizens of the Republic, the revolution subsequently progressed to the imposition of a common language, which was to do away with the other languages of France. Other languages were seen as keeping the peasant masses in obscurantism [14]. After the revolution, the French political elite systematically continued to consolidate political institutions, strengthening the foundations of a national education system, spreading cultural standards, and making the ‘nation’ a part of every citizen’s everyday experience. Metaphorically, it was, to a great degree, a ‘nationalization of the mind’ for Alsatian, Breton, Catalan, Provencal, etc. To some degree of difference is the situation in the United Kingdom, where its people do have a number of other languages apart from English. It has been estimated that half a million people speak Welsh, a few thousand Scots are fluent in Gaelic, and about four hundred people speak Cornish, while the number of Manx (the language of the Isle of Man) speakers is perhaps as small as one hundred [15]. Both of these cases are good examples, however, they do not have to be taken as a universal instruction. On the one hand, globalization will mean that many languages disappear. On the other hand, membership in the same nation cannot solely be based on rational interests. There must be a communal relationship—that is to say, the appearance of a subjective sentiment for belonging to a national community and sharing the same identity [13]. After all, there are some communities in the contemporary world that do

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live apart, separated by distance and many other barriers, but they keep their languages alive. Romany and its dialects, for example, still exist both in Russia and Europe despite all previous efforts by the authorities to ‘nationalize’ the Romani people [16]. In yet another case, the Kurdish identity had to survive for a long time without a written language, which the Kurds nonetheless managed to develop into an adequate means of written communication and education [17]. It is quite another matter how exactly they managed to do this, how much time it took, and how many lives were lost, but the sense of their unity and identity were always at the heart of the matter [18]. Therefore, it is far too soon to declare an end to nationalism and parochial understanding of identity in the contemporary world [19]. If enough people want to speak their original language, they can. Regrettably, Russian history has many dark pages, including the Soviet period. From 1937–1938, for example, the leadership of the Communist Party approved a number of secret orders on so-called ‘National Operations’, targeting a number of the country’s diaspora minorities suspected of being a hotbed of spies and wreckers [20]. The vast majority of those people were Soviet citizens whose ancestors had resided in the Soviet Union for decades, or sometimes centuries in the Russian Empire and even long before that. Their cross-border ethnicities were the only aspect of their identity taken as a sufficient reason for disloyalty and the justification for their arrest and execution. The Soviet Union, however, was a separate case. Its domestic policy was never aimed at creating ‘one nation’ because a ‘true Soviet man’ was supposed to be a supranational ‘internationalist’. His mission was to liberate ‘oppressed peoples’ (ethnic minorities) in capitalist countries, not to develop a nation of his own. Some leading Russian academics even suggest that the Soviet people actually constituted a civic nation, with the Soviet Union being a kind of nation-state while such a reality was never admitted or acknowledged by the Soviet leadership itself [21]. To a great degree, this is where the very issue of contemporary ‘Russian nationalism’ originates. Strong emotional appeals—to the point that ethnic Russians “were permitted to rule in exchange for their refusal to develop a nation of their own” [22]—sometimes came from abroad. It is also no secret that contemporary Russia does have citizens who understand ‘nation’ as a particular ethnic group and ‘nationality’ as an ethnicity. In any case, this certainly is a sensitive issue. For instance, as a set of specialized studies by the Russian Academy of Sciences has shown, the share of those respondents who believed that “Russia is a ‘multinational’ (polytechnic) country, but the ethnic Russian majority should have more rights” doubled from 14% in 1995 to 31% in 2011. If the share of those who pointed out that “Russia should be a state of Russian people” are added, they would count towards 45% of the respondents altogether in 2011 [1]. Naturally, most often the idea of Russian exclusiveness was supported by youths and uneducated people. No doubt that such a tendency had a connection to the overall situation in the country where competition for prestigious jobs and social positions was tough while the competitors’ expectations were high but not always realistic. The influx of non-national workers certainly exacerbated nationalistic feelings and, unfortunately, sometimes resulted in

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radical opinions and even actions, such as what occurred in the Russian city of Kondopoga (2006), Manezhnaya Square in Moscow (2010), or in Moscow’s industrial suburb Biryulevo-Zapadnoe (2013). This kind of ‘political activism’, however, did not go unnoticed by the authorities. During the first decade of the 2000s, the manifestations of ethnic nationalism were usually treated as hooliganism. However, in May of 2012, President V. Putin approved a decree on ensuring national harmony, binding the country’s legislation to form the Russian Presidential Council on Interethnic Relations in order to develop a ‘National Ethnic Policy Strategy’ for the present to 2025 and to implement other measures aimed at the creation of mechanisms for the prevention of interethnic conflicts [23]. In December of the same year, the President approved an official draft of the abovementioned strategy with the aim of coordinating the work of the state authorities at all levels and to ensure their interaction with civil society institutions. The Russian government was duly instructed to develop an action plan to implement the new strategy, monitor its implementation, and submit annual reports to the President [24]. Noticeably, as a result of the changes in the state legislature, some demonstrative preventive actions had to take place. For example, in the summer of 2014, Russian national television widely translated a case concerning the detention of about 250 young people, one in three of them under the age of 18, who had gathered in the Izmailovo Hotel in Moscow to discuss a charter for a nationalist organization and to develop plans for the future. It certainly meant an understanding of the fact that Russian identity not only mirrors the formation of the political, civil nation, but also includes views and attitudes that are not always relevant to the ideals of civil society. Surely, the group’s ideas about Russian identity, according to which people associate themselves as ‘rossiyane’, depended on the specific regional situation that was being influenced by ethnic, religious, cultural, economic, and other factors.

5 Identity in the Process of Formation Importantly, contemporary Russian identity as a process in the formative stage demonstrated its viability in the first decade of the millennium. Before that period, sentiments of ethnic identity prevailed in such republics of the Russian Federation as Northern Ossetia (Alaniya), Tatarstan, Tyva, and Sakha (Yakutiya), etc. However, it was also recognized that Russian identity was relatively quick in re-establishing itself. In 2002, this was reported by about 62% of respondents in several studies independently conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences [1]. Characteristically, respondents identified themselves with the country of Russia twice more often in 2011 than they did in 2004 when other forms of their personal identifications (professional, ethnic, and outlook on life) slightly prevailed. Before 2011, as it was stressed, this was the other way around, i.e., the respondents more often preferred to identify themselves with their ethnicity rather than with the state. According to the researchers, it was the state that proved to be the main factor of consolidating public attitudes in the process of Russian identity construction (60– 75%). Among the other factors of consolidation, ‘responsibility for the country’s future’, ‘human contacts’, ‘common history’, ‘homeland’, ‘wild nature’, language, and culture

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were specified (about 20–35% for each category). No more than 10% of the respondents pointed at other factors like customs, manners, ‘national character’, etc. [1]. Thus, it was suggested that in the last twenty years, Russian identity became prevalent over ethnic and other forms of identity in the federal subjects of Russia where the share of the ethnic Russian population was dominant. Most often, the respondents identified themselves as rossiyane in ten regions of the country as indicated below [1]: – 74.5–60.7% in regions like Russian Far East, Northern Caucasus, Central Russia, Volga, Central Black Earth, Volga-Vyatka, and the Urals; – 59.7% in Northwest Russia; – 51.5–54.3% in the West Siberian and East Siberian regions; – 64.3% altogether in Russia (in 2006). As for other areas: – In Sakha (Yakutiya), 90% of both Sakha and Russian respondents identified themselves as rossiyane; – In Tatarstan, 63% of respondents identified themselves as rossiyane while 71% associated themselves with the name of the Republic; – In the city of Grozny, 25% of respondents confidently identified themselves as rossiyane [1]. – Thus, the notion of Russian identity depended on the specific regional situations under which people associated themselves in terms of: – Their belonging to the country as members of a state community with political identity; – A greater fulfillment of their obligations to their fellow citizens, civic identity. There is no impenetrable wall between these two concepts of identity. However, civil society in Russia is just in the process of its formation, so the historical experience traditionally draws people’s perceptions towards loyalty to the state rather than to civil solidarity. Therefore, the indicators of people’s identification with the ‘symbols of russiannes’ can differ in a particular region and between regions as well. So it was assumed that the relatively high rates in the North Caucasus region were related to people’s associations with the state or to their intentions to demonstrate loyalty to it [1]. Importantly, respondents could have also been demonstrating their intention to show that people from Northern Caucasus are just like any other citizen of the country. The main conclusion of the previously mentioned studies was that the growing Russian identity, combined with ethnic identity, does integrate people. However, this process did not remove certain factors, such as dissatisfaction with the existing system of redistributing resources, solidarity against injustice and social inequality, corruption and abuse of law, and so on. As it was noticed, symbolic statements officially made about ‘the unity of the Russian nation’, ‘tolerance in interethnic interactions’, and ‘love for the country’ should be consistent with what people have in reality. Otherwise, the state, and even the civil identity, will not save ‘us’ from being hostile to ‘others’. It certainly requires the efforts of society and the authorities to make Russia a common house for its citizens, not just in theory but in everyday practice.

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6 Conclusion. Building a New Russian Identity The necessity to create a new Russian identity that could include all the peoples of Russia was recognized at the highest level of the state. In May of 2010, for instance, thenPresident Dmitry Medvedev expressed explicitly, “The task is to create a new Russian identity. If we cannot create it, then the destiny of our country is very sad” [25]. Sometime after in December of the same year, at a State Council meeting, he stated, “The idea of a Russian nation (rossiiskoj natsii) was absolutely productive” [26]. Basically, he meant that the process of transforming contemporary Russia into a nation-state should be given a new impetus. Another important signal was given in February 2011 at the meeting of the State Council in the city of Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, where the deficit of both common civil identity and sentiments were mentioned as belonging to the spiritually united polity of the Russian citizens (rossiyane) where common civil solidarity comes from. As it was suggested, this common form of identification should be basic for all citizens of Russia, but with no means of cancelling their ethnic, confessional, or religious self-identification forms [27]. Understandably, ‘building a nation’ is a long and complicated process. Nonetheless, the Russian leadership has never demonstrated any doubts that the issue of gaining and strengthening a national identity is a fundamental one. In fact, the debates on this topic gradually started to gain more and more public attention. To a great degree, it was due to the activities of the Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations established in June of 2012 to improve state policies in this area. Importantly, the members of this Council included leaders of national ethnic community organizations, academics and experts, the heads of the federal legislature, and the executive bodies. During the first meeting of the Council, which was held in the city of Saransk, Republic of Mordovia, the President reminded the audience of the fact that of the 171 languages spoken in modern Russia, 89 were taught in the state school system [28]. He drew attention to the fact that no European country offered such a level of protection for their citizens’ ethno-cultural rights and welcomed all reasonable and substantive ideas that would help to achieve and strengthen interethnic harmony and peace. Speaking of basic strategic priorities, President V. Putin selected the following four main points: – To strengthen Russia as a unique world civilization with the key binding role played by the Russian language and by the Russian people and culture; – To strengthen Russia’s multiethnic people’s sense of civic unity by taking into account the positive experiences built up over past decades but not idealizing anything, including the Soviet Union’s interethnic relations policies; – To harmonize interethnic relations and to not ignore any negative tendencies that occur in this sphere, threatening to destroy the very foundations of the state by pushing and provoking separatist tendencies inside the nation; – To ensure the successful integration and adaptation of foreign and domestic migrants and to modernize the entire system of migration management [28]. As it was suggested, the national policy strategy should not be developed in isolation or exclusively on a bureaucratic level. Thereby, the necessity of extensive public discussion, including one within the framework of the Council, was readily admitted,

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and during the past two years, the Russian political leadership and the media began to use the terms Russian identity and national identity as easily interchangeable synonyms in public discourse [29]. Symptomatically, the term Russian identity did not often need to be used in the official language of the country’s guiding documents on nation building. Rather, an opposite tendency established the norm. Understandably, this official document language was intended for all the country’s needs and deeds at the national level, so unnecessary specification was not required. For example, the “National Ethnic Policy Strategy to 2025” does not contain the word ‘nation’ (natsiya) at all. However, the document suggests multiple notions derived from the root of the word ‘nation’ in more than 160 cases. In fact, it emphatically speaks about ‘national policy’, ‘national language’, ‘national culture’, ‘national security’, ‘national dignity’, ‘national belonging’, ‘national harmony’, and others. Conversely, notions derived from the word ‘ethnos’ were used significantly less often (38 entries). As to the term ‘identity’, it is mentioned in the document only once—in Paragraph Two, which is devoted to the description of the state of affairs in the country’s interethnic relations. In this paragraph, the document clearly recognizes the “lack of educational, cultural and educational measures to create a Russian civic identity, a culture of interethnic communication, and the study of the history and traditions of the peoples of Russia and their experience in strengthening solidarity and the protection of the common state of the Homeland” [30]. It must be added that this part of the document provides the reader with a rather critical description of reality, which does not underestimate the amount of the existing problems that the contemporary Russian state has to deal with. Naturally, the very fact of understanding that Russia has objective obstacles in its path to building one nation has generated divergent interpretations, both inside and outside of the country. As it was noticed, there was too much ‘against’ and too little ‘for’ it, but it resonated well with the broader public mindset. In any case, the rise of contemporary Russian nationalism was recognized as an undeniable trend later, though not in the mainstream of publications in English where opinions usually displayed either skepticism or, at best, rather moderate assessments. By the autumn of 2013, the Russian internal debates on the issue of the country’s identity were gaining momentum. One of the most informative examples, demonstrating the varieties of ideas and approaches to the issue, was the Valdai International Discussion Club meeting in September. In his speech there, Russian President V. Putin was quite straightforward. For instance: “Meanwhile, Russia’s current national identity is experiencing not only objective pressures stemming from globalization, but also the consequences of the national catastrophes of the twentieth century, when we experienced the collapse of our state two different times. The result was a devastating blow to our nation’s cultural and spiritual codes; we were faced with the disruption of traditions and the consonance of history; with the demoralization of society; with a deficit of trust and responsibility. These are the root causes of many pressing problems we face. After all, the question of responsibility for oneself, before society and the law, is something fundamental for both legal and everyday life.

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After 1991, there was the illusion that a new national ideology, a development ideology, would simply appear by itself. The state, authorities, and intellectual and political classes virtually rejected engaging in this work, all the more so since the previous, semiofficial ideology was hard to swallow. And in fact, they were all simply afraid to even broach the subject. In addition, the lack of a national idea stemming from a national identity profited the quasi-colonial element of the elite—those determined to steal and remove capital and who did not link their future to that of the country, the place where they earned their money” [31]. According to the President, Russia is not a project; it is a destiny. However, ‘pathetic’ these words may look to some people, they will certainly resonate with many, sometimes those painfully confused with their own identity, in personal, corporate, political, religious, and national ways, or otherwise. Importantly, after the Valdai meeting, a report was published in which the young authors of the report concluded, among other things, that in the long run, Russia will become some hybrid form of a civic and culture-based nation [32]. What was beyond a doubt for the authors is that the Russian identity exists and that there is no need to reinvest in it. Surely, it is going to be a challenging, important and creative work to develop further.

References 1. Drobizheva, L.M.: Russian identity and problems of interethnic accord. Kazanskij Federalist 4(30), 5 (2011). (in Russian) 2. Putin, V.: Russia at the turn of the millennium. Nezavisimaja gazeta, 30 December 1999. (in Russian) 3. Malinova, O.: Konstruirovanie identichnosti: vozmozhnosti i ogranichenija (Identity construction: possibilities and limitations). Pro et Contra, May-June, pp. 60–65 (2007). (in Russian) 4. Gudkov, L.: Negative identity. Articles 1997–2002. Moscow (2004). (in Russian) 5. Torkunov, A.: New World Order. http://valdaiclub.com/russia_and_the_world/73401.html 6. Malinova, O.: Russia and the West: a discourse on national identity in the context of “catching up” modernization. In: Pain, J.A., Volkogonova, O.D. (eds.) Rossijskaja modernizacija: razmyshljaja o samobytnosti, pp. 235–250. Tri kvadrata Publ., Moscow (2008). (in Russian) 7. Duncan, P.J.S.: Contemporary Russian identity between east and west. Hist. J. 48(1), 277–294 (2005) 8. Golubev, K.A.: Constructing narratives about the taliban by Russia’s ministry of foreign affairs. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Int. Relat. 12(2), 229–241 (2019). https://doi. org/10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.208 9. Zlobin, N.: Together but separate: Russia and Europe in the New Century. Harvard Int. Rev. 26(3) (2004) 10. Putin, V.: Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. April 26. Moscow. Kremlin (2007). (in Russian), http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2007/04/26/1156_type633 72type63374type82634_125339.shtml 11. Putin, V.V.: Annual Address to the Federal Assembly. April 26, Kremlin, Moscow (2007). http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/04/26/1209_type70029type82912_125 670.shtml 12. Gilbert, M.: Churchill and the Jews: A Lifelong Friendship, p. 120 (2007)

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13. Dieckhoff, A.: Nation and nationalism in France: between idealism and reality. In: Workshop: National Identity and Euroscepticism: A Comparison Between France and the United Kingdom (2005) 14. Language Policy in France. http://community.worldheritage.org/articles/Language_policy_ in_France 15. Bider, D.: St. Kitts & Nevis. Are dying languages worth saving? BBC News Magazine, 15 September 2010 16. de Gila-Kochanowski, V.: Causes and consequences of nomadism among the Gypsies of Europe. Romani Union. Extracts from the study. Meeting of experts on the study of ethnodevelopment and ethnocide in Europe. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Karasjok, Norway), 29 May–2 June (1983) 17. Kreyenbroek, P.G., Sperl, S.: The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, p. 54. Routledge, London (1992) 18. Katsy, D.: The Kurds and Problems of Providing Security and Stability to the South of Russia. Post Communist Countries in Search for Security and Stability. Saint Petersburg State University Press, pp. 48–67 (2005) 19. Chernov, I., Katsy, D., Bolgov, R.: E-government, Open Society and Russian Identity. In: ACM International Conference on Proceed. Series. 3rd International Conference on Electronic Governance and Open Society: Challenges in Eurasia, EGOSE 2016, pp. 178–183 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1145/3014087.3014115 20. Werth, N.: The NKVD Mass Secret National Operations (August 1937 - November 1938) Online encyclopedia on mass violence. Sciences Po, Paris (2010) 21. Tishkov, V.: The Russian People and National Identity. Russia in Global Affairs 3 (2008) 22. Paul Goble: Russian national identity is the weakest in Eurasia. Golos Ameriki, 10 May (2013). (in Russian) 23. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of May 7, 2012 # 602 “On ensuring interethnic accord”. Rossijskaja Gazeta 9 May (2012) 24. Executive Order on Russia’s National Policy Strategy through to 2025. December 19 (2012). http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4782 25. Verbatim record of the meeting of the Council for the Promotion of the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights May 19, 2010 (Moscow, Kremlin). http://kremlin.ru/ events/president/transcripts/7792. (in Russian) 26. The idea of the Russian nation is “absolutely productive,” Medvedev said. RIA Novosti, 27 December (2010). (in Russian) 27. The meeting of the Presidium of the State Council on measures to strengthen interethnic accord. February 11, 2011. Verbatim report. http://www.kremlin.ru/news/10312. (in Russian) 28. Vladimir Putin held the first meeting of the Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations in Saransk, 24 August 2012 (Saransk). http://eng.special.kremlin.ru/news/4324 29. Putin: our whole history should become a part of Russian Vesti.ru. (in Russian). http://www. vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1132042 30. The strategy of the state national policy of the Russian Federation for the period until 2025 (2012). (in Russian) 31. Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, 19 September 2013. http://eng.kremlin. ru/news/6007 32. National Identity and the Future of Russia. Valdai Discussion Club Report. Moscow, February, p. 28 (2014)

Modern African Regionalism in Civilizational Measurement Yuri Gladkiy1(B) , Viacheslav Sukhorukov1 , and Svetlana Kornekova2 1 The Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, St. Petersburg, Russia

{gladkiy,suhor}@herzen.spb.ru 2 Saint Petersburg State University of Economics, St. Petersburg, Russia

[email protected]

Abstract. The nature of African regionalism in the context of civilizational development is considered. The main research approach is the historical reconstruction of the map of events and a systematic view of the object of knowledge. Using the expression “African civilizations”, the authors give an account of its conventionality, since the most of the major socio-cultural communities of the continent have an insufficient set of necessary features. The authors call them protocivilizations. Modern civilizational regionalism of Africa is analyzed within the framework of theoretical ideas of “conglomerate societies” characterized by long-term co-existence and stable reproduction of layers of heterogeneous model-forming elements and relations based on them. Among the spatial forms of regionalism stands out “macro” and “local”. The first is associated with numerous attempts at economic integration of states, the second is associated with the processes of tribalism and has predominantly ethnic nature. It is concluded that the globalization of the world economy and the processes of regionalism it creates are still poorly manifested on the African continent. Keywords: Civilizations of Africa · African civilizational regionalism · “Macro-Formatted” regionalism · Regional associations of Africa · Local regionalism · Ethnic fragmentation of Africa

1 Introduction The lack of clarity of the term “region”, its “maneuvering” between various branches of knowledge and scientific schools naturally translates to the widespread concept of “regionalism”. Representatives of geography usually cite the fact that this concept introduces a “confusion” in the theoretical reflections of geographers. As early as the middle of the last century, D. Whittlesey, one of the authors of famous “American Geography”, noted: “The term “regionalism”, although it is in high use, is not suitable for geographical research, because it has too many special meanings, and most often serves interests alien to geography” [2]. The reason for this attitude is likely to lie in the attempts of sociologists and political scientists to completely “privatize” this concept, although its interdisciplinary nature is obvious to specialists. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 91–103, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_8

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In accordance with the norms of most European languages, the end of “ism” can mean a property, a tendency, a desire for something, an intellectual current or a doctrine. It indirectly indicates the dynamism, mobility associated, for example, with the regional policy of the state, the ideology of its intervention in the life of individual territories, etc. According to the established tradition, the term “regionalism” is used primarily in relation to heterogeneous social processes - economic differentiation of space, movement for ethnic rights, decentralization of government, intergovernmental cooperation of neighboring regions, etc. While regionalization is associated primarily with natural trends in the formation of regions, regionalism is more often understood as a deliberate social process, usually led by authorities, social groups or parties with similar platforms to achieve common goals and values. At the same time, the concept of “regionalism” can have both domestic and interstate contours. In international relations, regionalism is an expression of a collective sense of identity combined with the formation of institutions capable of initiating collective action in a geographical region. Regionalism is considered to be one of the three pillars of the international trading system (along with multilateralism and unilateralism). However, practice of its use introduces significant changes in the above-mentioned interpretation. In this connection, with regard to the African macro region, the authors appeal not so much to the criterion of various intellectual currents and doctrines that affect the spatial differentiation of society, but to the widespread principle of territorial organization of economic, socio-cultural, political aspects of the population’s life. Among them - the diverse contacts of ethnic and religious groups, economic complementarity, political cohesion, etc. In any case, in the development of the processes of regionalism the civilizational past of peoples plays an important role (often latent).

2 Discourses in the Scientific Literature There are not many comprehensive works on African regionalism in the modern scientific literature. This is due to the fact that in terms of content, regionalism acts as an opposition that focuses on the understanding of being in the regional manifestation, that is, in the “local” dimension. Therefore, in the concrete knowledge of the regional world, the main problem to be solved is the problem of the essence of “place”. In this case, the “place” is identified with the geographical space and is considered as the center of human experience of a certain territory. As a result, regionalism acquires a universal character, which requires deep intersubject integration and a multi-functional understanding of the existing realities of life. The literature sources used by the authors reflect the general content of accumulated subject knowledge in the field of regionalism. A number of publications belong to the category of historical and educational literature [2–4, 8–11, 17], but most of the titles are the results of deep analytical understanding of the issues of regionalization of the modern world, presented by Russian and foreign experts [1, 5–7, 12–16, 18–25]. Among the publications, we will highlight a collective monograph by the staff of the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences, dedicated to the problem of food security of the continent [1]. It brings together historians, geographers and economists under a common cover, aiming at a comprehensive analysis of all the factors and aspects of

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this extremely important topic. The collective nature of the research provided a wide range of text in the book, in which a rich factual material is closely intertwined with the decisions of world conferences, global summits, regional assemblies and “agendas” for countries and associations. The relevance of the tasks put forward by the research team is that, against the background of a reduction in the number of people suffering from malnutrition and hunger in the world, their number is increasing in Africa. The food situation in Africa (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa) is now the most vulnerable link in the global security system and is turning the continent into a global “pole of hunger”. In our opinion, the context of this book is notable for its understanding of the deep nature of hunger. The causes of famine in Africa are now rooted not in natural accidents, but in fluctuations in economic mechanisms, in imperfect social relations. Therefore, the solution of the issue of food security in modern conditions depends not on auxiliary natural circumstances, but on the strength of the world community and a conscious person capable of creative activity. Probably the best way to solve this and other problems on the continent is to humanize society and raise the level of education of people. It is easier for an educated person to escape from the clutches of poverty and hunger, change their lives and help others.

3 Internet Discussions Science shows that various ways of regionalization of geographical space and aggregation of its subject components are possible as we move along the hierarchy levels. In other words, the number of regional spaces is usually determined by certain logical reasons and practical considerations. Meanwhile, any region, no matter how new and comprehensive it may be, remains an integral part of the global space and the entire world community. Thus, the modern world, densely filled with communications, consists of a variety of regional social systems that unfold in parallel with the previously formed and now emerging civilizational complexes. At the same time, the basis of such regional geospaces is the ethno-cultural identity and position in the system of social coordinates. The issue of identification of regional socio-economic systems remains unresolved in science. The main task here is to construct a structural calculus in the form of sign (logical-mathematical) relations (formulas). The presence of a very wide range of heterogeneous indicators, often internally contradictory, indicates that it is probably impossible to deduce an exhaustive regional indicator. However, it is so important that it is extremely necessary to address it at all research levels and discussion platforms. In the Russian-language Internet, an information site is very interesting ru.globalvoi ces.org, containing valuable socio-political analytics. On the African theme, the philosophical direction draws attention here. Modern African philosophy is now aggressively striving to overcome traditional judgments about Africa, which are deeply ingrained in the world. At the same time, “local” philosophers become leaders of public opinion that seeks to understand the “African identity”. However, the “return to the roots” and active “regionalization” of ethnic consciousness can cause excessive isolation of the continent from the world. In this regard, a more obvious direction of African thinking should be the establishment of an intercultural dialogue, not closed, but open and global.

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The Twitter service also does not ignore the “African studies”. The specified channel contains a huge number of tweets. In the meantime, their content is more suitable for the preparation of educational and reference products. Political discussions on African regionalism are not widely practiced or sufficiently visible here.

4 Purpose and Methods of Research Modern Africa is associated with the periphery of the current man-made world. There are numerous destructive processes that cause deep concern. A scientifically based regional policy of the continent can be a way out of this situation. Its development requires the deep analysis of the accumulated scientific material on the dynamics and characteristics of African regionalism. The main purpose of this work is to understand the specifics of the processes of regionalism in Africa, their forms and causes of weak efficiency. The theoretical basis of the study is the geohistorical approach, provided a holistic vision of the subject of the scientific picture. Understanding of the logic and specificity of geohistorical development of Africa allowed to reveal the modern features of the studied object and to designate the results in the form of systematic representations. For realization of this task were used as information resources that reflect the current state of Affairs in Africa [1–6].

5 Research Results 5.1 The Civilizational Factor of African Regionalism Modern Africa, fragmented into artificial post-colonial formations, is poorly perceived in the current realities as a single strategic construct. Meanwhile, the geohistorical events of the African continent provide compelling evidence of Africa’s extremely rich, diverse and sophisticated past. This is the basis to talk about the specifics of African civilizational centers and their elements, which act as a common denominator for the cultures and peoples inhabiting this part of the world. Using the expression “African civilizations”, the authors are aware of its conventionality, since most of the major socio-cultural communities of the continent, with the exception of the high civilizations of the Middle East, had an insufficient set of necessary features. It is more correct to call them as proto-civilizations. The space of the African continent has traditionally been divided into three parts: Mediterranean (or European) Africa, the Nile Basin (or Egypt) and sub-Saharan Africa (or Genuine Africa). On this basis, the following civilization zones are considered in Africa - the Egyptian and Berber zones originating in the Nile Basin and North Africa, Kushitskaya (in the southern Nile basin), as well as West African (sometimes called Sudanese), Bantu and Khoisan, representing “Genuine Africa”. All of them are the subject of special research. We confine ourselves to the most common sketches of these civilizations. Egypt occupies a lonely position among all civilizations of Africa, the purpose of which was “to become a great center of independent culture” [8]. Egypt throughout its long history (for several millennia before the Arab conquests) remained a pole of

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powerful “radiation”, which “affected” the entire African continent and the adjacent Eurasian space. On sailing and rowing ships Egyptians walked along the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, made long voyages on the Red sea to the South in the country of punt, located in the horn of Africa [8, p. 10]. There is evidence that the Egyptians went even further - to get to Lake Chad, the tropical forests of the Congo and the green hills of Uganda [10, p. 39]. As Egypt lost its power, a hard-working and enterprising people - the Phoenicians moved into the civilizational arena. Their role as great seafarers and merchants was very significant. Gradually they managed to master North Africa, founded the mighty city of Carthage, whose ruins are now the main attraction of the capital of Tunisia. Enterprising spirit and thirst for prey quickly expanded and strengthened the position of Carthage in Africa. In the V century BC several large cities-colonies of Carthage were built. The farthest of them is Kern. It was placed at the same distance to the South of the Pillars, which to the East of them was Carthage. In those centuries the sea route from ports of Egypt on the Red sea to an exit to the Indian Ocean was already mastered. From the Bab el Mandeb Strait, it continued to the East and the South in two branches: along the African coast to Cape Guardafui and along the Arabian coast to southern Iran and India. By the II century BC these routes extended to Zanzibar and Southeast Asia. In the immediate vicinity of these sea routes was the ancient Kingdom of Axum, which arose in the V century BC and existed on the territory of modern Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Yemen and Arabia. The axumites had economic ties with Egypt, the Roman Empire, South Arabia, India and possibly China. The main centers of the Axum Kingdom were the port of Adulis and the capital city - Aksum. The first was considered the largest on the sea route from the Northern part of the Red Sea to India and Southeast Asia. The second was located to the south-west of Adulis and was the cultural and political center of the state. Latitudinal routes connected these cities with the Nile valley. The axumites also actively contacted the peoples to the South of their lands, but it is unknown how far they penetrated deep into Africa. Axum Kingdom, which remained until the middle of the middle Ages, represented the Kushite proto-civilization, which was under the strong influence of Egypt [11]. The Berber proto-civilization, which existed in North Africa, the Sahara and parts of the Sahel, is also of ancient origin. Only vague legends have survived from this civilization. From the VII Arabs living in the Arabian Peninsula began to extend their power to the vast territory of North Africa. In the VIII century they already owned the Eastern, Southern and Western shores of the Mediterranean Sea, all the shores of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, the Northern coast of the Arabian Sea. At the same time, the Arabs discovered the Comoros and soon reached Madagascar. They occupied the east coast of Africa and became mediators in Africa, Europe and Asia. In parallel, in West Africa, where the Arabs often visited, there were also strong states and empires. Among them, Ghana was the most powerful. Soon it was replaced by the Malian Empire, and it was replaced by the Songhai power and Bourne, long maintained a dominant position in West Africa.

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East, Central and South Africa represent the proto-civilization zone of the Bantu peoples. Throughout the space of their settlement, they reproduced a similar socio-economic model of existence and were distinguished by a sufficiently high social solidarity [11]. Khoisan proto-civilization is the weakest and most virtual among African cultures. It was a visualized unity of the archaic tribes of Central and South Africa (before the arrival of the Bantu peoples). Their characteristic features were hunting and gathering, as well as the use of a special autochthonous khoisan language, which is now in danger of complete disappearance. Of course, these civilizational zones do not reflect the fullness of cultural and historical differentiation of the continent. Visible traces left by a local proto-civilizations Ife (to the South of the Sudanese civilization zone), in the “bowels” which formed the civilizations of the Yoruba and Bini; Akane-Ashanti (West); the Muslim Swahili proto-civilization (the city-states of Mombasa, Kilwa, Lamu, Malindi, Pate, Sofala, etc., the Sultanate of Zanzibar); the Zimbabwean (Zimbabwe, Monomotapa) protocivilization (X–XIX centuries), etc. It must be said, the above-mentioned zones have largely determined the basic contours of modern cultural and historical differentiation of Africa. 5.2 Civilizational Regionalism Today Using the concept of “modern world civilizations”, it can be argued that the current African space is represented by both Islamic and Negro-African civilizations, and individual centers of Western Europe (for example, in South Africa in the last century developed the culture and art of European colonists-Boers, i.e. Afrikaners, and then the British). A vulnerable link in this logical chain is the thesis of Negro-African civilization, the existence of which is often questioned. Often expressed the idea that instead of a single civilization, there is, they say, only “a set of dissimilarities.” There are many reasons to qualify such a judgment as extreme, not taking into account the fact that similar historical and natural-economic conditions played the role of a kind of “synthesizer” in the appearance of many common features in social structures, art, mentality of the peoples of Bantu, Mande and other. By the way, this point of view was held by many authoritative African intellectuals of the XX century and, above all, Leopold Sengor - politician, philosopher, poet, the first President of Senegal, a prominent figure of pan-Africanism, one of the developers of the theory of the Negrohood (African spirit). He believed that African civilization was determined by such factors as emotionality, intuition, close connection with nature, and the “watershed” between African and European lies in the psychosocial plane: if the “Negro-African” personality is focused on emotions and intuition, the “HellenicEuropean” - on reason and rationality. In our opinion, the modern civilizational regionalism of Africa is rightly considered within the framework of theoretical ideas of “conglomerate societies” characterized by long-term coexistence and sustainable reproduction of layers of heterogeneous modelforming elements and relations based on them. The authors of such ideas usually define conglomeration as a partial kind of non-system organization, contrasting African societies with homogeneous societies of the “system type” of the West. “Conglomeration can unwittingly act as an opposition to consistency, although conglomeration can be

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represented as a variant of consistency. However, both types of societies embody different types of relationships. Conglomeration as unity exists at the level of connection of different entities, this unity through the co-development of different, and not through the merger in the same” [13]. Therefore, to compare the Negro-African civilization with the European one is like drawing a parallel between the system, where the type of interaction of the forming elements is dialectical, and the conglomerate, where the connections are formed on the principles of parallel co-development. Although in the latter case, all types of relations are usually in demand, and the lack of synthesis is compensated by the preservation of the original properties. It would be a mistake to refer both major African civilizations to the same type of conglomerate (heterogeneous) organization of societies of non-system organization. The North African Islamic civilization zone (Arab subculture), despite the existing intraregional conflicts, is characterized by greater similarity of types of ties, which is due to the cultural heritage of Islamic civilization. It includes mosques and Muslim schools (madrasahs), types of social economy, traditions and customs, art, etc. Thanks to the unprecedented expansion, the “rise” of Islam has become a significant event in world history. “Arab warriors carried the new faith all the way to the Atlantic coast of Africa. …Every nation conquered by the advancing Muslims was offered a choice: to accept Islam, the protectorate or to disappear,” writes the Patriarch of American political science. And the main thing for our context: “the Areas that Muslims conquered… were considered to be a single political entity - Dar al-Islam, “the territory of Islam”, the Kingdom of peace” [14]. Of course, it cannot be said that the countries of the African Mediterranean today have established stable dialectical ties that take place in homogeneous societies of the “system type”, but the level of “connectivity” of local societies here is immeasurably higher than in sub-Saharan Africa. This is partly evidenced by the idea of the modern American geopolitics R. Kaplan, inspired by the “Arab spring”: “The first phase of the conflict in the Middle East witnessed the defeat of geography due to the huge influence of communication technologies. Satellite TV and social networks, seething revolution in the Internet, created a single space of people (emphasis ours - ed.), protesters in the Arab world” [15]. The formation of such a space in the countries of Tropical Africa, despite the fairly well-defined system of spiritual and material values, seems today a utopian idea. This is partly due to the fact that there are no independent high religions, such as the world ones; there was no technical creativity, science, etc. Confessional regionalism is closely connected with civilizational, but it is hardly necessary to draw direct parallels between them. In modern Africa, the majority of believers in many countries outside the Arab civilizational space (Chad, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Gambia, Burundi, etc.) profess Islam, but this fact cannot yet serve as a reliable basis for classifying these states as Muslim civilization. An in-depth analysis of African cultures reveals a great variety of regional (and intraregional) deviations from the civilizational “mainstream”. We are talking about subcultures, different regional (or socially oriented) systems of values, traditions, demeanor,

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language and clothing. Most often they were formed on an ethnic basis, but sometimes they are social, professional and, especially, youth. 5.3 “Macroformatted” Regionalism This regionalism is well illustrated by the example of Western Europe, which in a sense can be classified as a result of regionalism. As noted above, in international relations, regionalism is an expression of a common sense of identity and purpose, combined with the creation of institutions that express a particular identity and shape collective action in a geographical region. The first agreed regional initiatives of the middle of the last century that led to the creation of the European economic community (EEC) can be called “old”, purely economic regionalism. A new round of regional integration (“new” regionalism), which began in the 80s of the last century, led to the gradual formation of political identity. As for Africa, the most common (though, unfortunately, ineffective) type of such interstate regionalism in it is economic integration. It would seem that it has an indirect relationship to the ethno-cultural, civilizational aspects of development, but this is not so. As a rule, integration associations arise within the centers of related cultures, in the territories of traditional macroregions. The creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (even before the completion of the decolonization process) predetermined the good goals of integration: the formation of a free trade zone on the continent, the introduction of a single external tariff, the creation of a common fund for the stabilization of commodity prices, etc. The insurmountable difficulties encountered in the implementation of these goals (weak economies, monocultural specialization, narrowness of national markets, low solvency of the population, etc.) led the UN Economic Commission for Africa to develop a plan for the gradual development of regional cooperation, according to which the entire continent was divided into several geographical zones - Northern, Western, East, Central and South Africa. Such differentiation, though vaguely, but, all the same, reminiscent of the civilizational past of the continent. The specifics of the integration process in the second half of the twentieth century was that the creation of integration associations took place on the basis of the former Frenchspeaking and English-speaking colonies, which more corresponded to the interests of the metropolis, and not always the civilizational “roots” of the territories. Even in cases where the historical past, it would seem, could have a stimulating effect on integration, numerous disintegrating factors arose. Thus, the idea of creating one of the oldest integration groups - the pan-Arab organization “Union of the Arab Maghreb” (consisting of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) appeared in 1958, when the Unification Congress of the Maghreb countries gathered in Tangier. The real step in the creation of the Union was 1964, when the Committee of permanent representatives of the region was closely concerned with the problems of economic integration. Unfortunately, several decades of cooperation due to many centrifugal factors (weakly diversified economies and exports, narrow domestic markets, differences in levels of development, etc.) did not lead to the true integration of

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the Maghreb. Political conflicts in recent decades between Morocco and Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco, Libya and its neighbors, etc., have had a very negative impact on the development of cooperation. The most rich post-colonial history of the creation of integration associations (mainly French-speaking countries in river basins) in West Africa, whose fate was sad. Special hopes were placed on the treaty of 1975 on the establishment of the West African Economic Community (ECOWAS) consisting of 16 French-speaking and English-speaking states (including Nigeria as the “locomotive” of the region). Then it was about the abolition of mutual customs duties in trade; the abolition of obstacles to the movement of services, capital and labor; preparation of joint schemes for the development of transport, communications, energy and other infrastructure projects; harmonization of economic and industrial policies of member countries and even the elimination of differences in levels of development. Part of the ECOWAS countries today form the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which has a common monetary unit of the CFA franc, which was first rigidly tied to the French franc, and since 1999 is tied to the euro. Alas, neither in the transition period (15 years) nor later, when the updated ECOWAS treaty was adopted (1995), the countries participating in the integration Union have not been able to make significant progress in the implementation of the goals due to insurmountable difficulties. The latter are due to the poverty of countries and their differences in approaches to solving problems, disharmony of legislation. As noted above, the level of civilization “connectivity” of local societies in North Africa is higher than in Black Africa, however, the priority in the creation of the first integration union belongs to East Africa, where in the 20-ies of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda were united by the English administration with the formation of the common market and the introduction of the common currency. In subsequent years, the community has repeatedly disintegrated and revived again (already in an expanded composition, including Burundi, Rwanda and South Sudan) due to the lack of common political interests and ethnic “complementarity”, as well as excessive disparities between countries in terms of GDP, inflation, balance of payments deficit, etc. Also affected the parallel participation of countries in other integration unions (Kenya and Uganda are now part of COMESA and The Intergovernmental Authority on Development of Eastern Africa (IGAD), and Tanzania - in Southern African Development Community (SADC). Among the currently existing regional associations, the Central African Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC) is a rather high degree of economic interdependence among the member countries, formed on the basis of the administrativeeconomic and economic-legal relations that emerged during the formation of the French colonial possessions. (This experience of economic integration, despite standard difficulties, has already brought concrete results: refineries in Gabon provide the participating countries with gasoline, the cement plant in Cameroon with cement, etc.). The processes of economic regionalism turned out to be more effective in South Africa, thanks to the paternalistic role of South Africa, a state with a developed market economy. Based on the strategic documents of Conference on coordination of development of the countries of Southern Africa (1980), in 1992 the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was created here. A distinctive feature of this organization is

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the implementation of concrete projects, the real expansion of transit links, the reduction of barriers to the movement of labor and capital. 5.4 Local Regionalism By local regionalism, the authors understand regional processes primarily at the level of individual states and, much less often, local transregional processes at the interstate level. Most often they are associated with the movement of ethnic groups for political, economic and natural resources, against social discrimination. Sensual self-determination in Africa through ethnicity is not the fate of past epochs: the life of Africans is too far from being completely conditioned by the extra-ethnic characteristics of social existence. Their belonging to a particular culture, compliance with tribal “standards” play a more significant role than anywhere else [16]. For most Africans (especially those living South of the Sahara), the tribe is now more important than the state community of people. The reason for this lies on the surface the borders of modern states are perceived by many as artificial, and the current peoples of Africa have emerged with these borders. At the same time, some of them were on different sides of the borders. Therefore, many people, for example, Nigeria (where they speak about 250 different languages) feel not Nigerians, but representatives of the tribe Yoruba or Ibo. Tribal laws and customs, which are considered the best, cover all areas of human life from birth to death. A person belonging to a tribe is provided with the security of his tribe rather than the state. It is no coincidence that no tribe wants representatives of another tribe to dominate the government of the country. Tribal allegiances prevent the confident movement of dozens of new independent countries towards stable statehood. Tribal conflicts, leading to tribal clashes and civil wars, are still emerging in many countries. At the heart of such processes is the phenomenon of tribalism (from eng. tribe), as a form of tribal isolation, often accompanied by hostility towards ethnic groups. One of the most striking examples of intraregional “frustration” of the twentieth century in Africa is associated with violent inter-ethnic strife of an intra-state nature in Rwanda. Here, in 1994, there was a mass murder of the tutsi population, carried out by the authorities representing the hutu. Tutsi and hutu, belonging to the same language group, lived “side by side” for several centuries, but hutu - autochthonous farmers, tutsi - mostly pastoralists, nomads, penetrated into the territory of modern Rwanda from the North in the XVI century. Over time, the tutsi, as owners of large herds of cattle, became Rwandan aristocracy, which largely caused social conflicts. According to various estimates, the victims of the genocide were between 500,000 and 1 million people, including Tutsi up to 70%, the rest - moderate Hutu, who expressed dissatisfaction with the government and repression. And although the killings were committed by the gendarmerie, the interahamwe and impuzamugambi military groups, the inter-ethnic intra-regional split in the country was “mothballed” for many years. (Moreover, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and the DRC were more or less involved in the conflict) (Fig. 1).

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Most diverse countries: •

DR Congo: Population 72m; more than 250 ethnic groups • Nigeria: 170m people, more than 250 groups • Tanzania: 47m people; 130 groups • Chad: 11m people, more than 100 languages • Ethiopia: 91m people, 77 groups • Kenya: 42m people; • more than 70 groups Most homogenous countries: • Lesotho: 2m people; 99.7% Sotho • Somalia: 10m; 85% Somali (divided into clans) • Burundi: 11m people; 85% Hutu; 14% Tutsi • Rwanda: 12m people; 84% Hutu; 15% Tutsi • Swaziland: 1m people; 84% Swazi • Botswana: 2m people; 79% Tswana

Fig. 1. Ethnic fragmentation of Africa, stimulating processes of regionalism [17, pocket inside back cover of the book]

The conflicts on an ethnic basis are often accompanied by processes of political regionalism. Its specific example is shown, for example, by one of the poorest countries of the continent Islamic Republic of Mauritania, which after the conflict of Senegal, Gambia and Nigeria with Iran (because of Iran weapon support of opposition in these countries) turned into a strong point of the Iranian expansion. Not only political, but also economic isolation of the country was promoted by diplomatic crisis in the relations with the neighboring Morocco. Its essence lies in the fact that many residents of the kingdom consider the neighboring country unfairly rejected by the Moroccan province [18]. Not accidentally, the Iranian expansion in Mauritania had the investigation severance of diplomatic relations of Morocco with Iran. But in Mauritania itself, as in many other countries of Africa, the “markers” of internal regionalism are clearly visible. So, there is still the possibility of conflicts between the moors (the main population) and those living in the lower reaches of the r. Senegal tribes tukuler, soninke and wolof, as well as the “white” and “black” moors. According to

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E.Ya. Satanovsky, the “root of evil” is hidden in the relationship of patriarchal slavery, still lingering between people [18]. It is precisely remaining tribalism that is one of the greatest obstacles to the unity of African nations. Today, the task of democracy in Africa is not the spread of ethnic diversity, but the use of identity politics to overcome narrow tribal interests. In fairness, we note that the influence of tribes, tribal beliefs and tribal leaders gradually decreases, and the clan identity is replaced by the loyalty of the nation, but only in a few countries (primarily in North Africa). Therefore, the transition from tribalism and colonial status to national independence and representative government will inevitably be intermittent and difficult.

6 Points for Discussion The theme of regionalism is broad and interdisciplinary. In the works of many authors it appears as a complex phenomenon, considered at various levels - from political to socio-cultural, macro-, meso- and micro levels [19–22]. At the same time, attempts are made to contrast “old” and “new” regionalism [23–25]. While the former is usually associated with theories describing the problems of European regional integration in the post-war period, the latter is connected with the problems of globalization, including ideology. Such a contrast in the conditions of Africa is difficult to perceive, because it occupies a special position in the system of world coordinates. The extremely rich, diverse and sophisticated past of Africa gives reason to speak about the specifics of African civilizational centers and their elements, which are the common denominator for the cultures and peoples living in this part of the world. The current African space is represented by Islamic, Negro-African civilizations, as well as individual centers of Western European culture. Despite the active involvement of individual countries in political and world economic relations, there is clearly dominated by “old” forms of regionalism, manifested primarily in the processes of tribalism, often accompanied by acute clashes. The most common “macro-format” (interstate) kind of regionalism in modern Africa are economic-integration groups.

7 Conclusion The term “regionalism” usually hides very diverse processes: the movement for ethnic rights, separatism, the decentralization of government, transnational cooperation, regional integration, etc. Therefore, we can say that regionalism is intrinsic to all types of modern societies, regardless of their size, level of development, features of political structures, etc. In Africa, almost all forms of modern regionalism have spread. However, tribalism remains a specific feature of regionalism in Africa. It is known that for many Africans the tribe is more important than the country in which a person lives. This is largely due to the fact that many tribes as a result of colonization and decolonization were divided, living in different countries. In other cases (for example, in Rwanda), various tribes were united in one country. No tribe wants another tribe to

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form a government. As a result, the elections are often won not by professionals, but by incompetent people from their tribe. Today, countries and regions of the continent continue to exist mainly through the acquisition of geosphere rent and still remain the world “pole of backwardness.” Of particular concern is the growing threat to food security. The solution to these and other problems of the continent largely depends on regional policy, which is closely correlated with the processes of regionalism.

References 1. Africa in the context of global food security, Moscow (2015) 2. American Geography. Inventory and Prospect, Syracuse, NY (1954) 3. Gladkiy, Y.N., Sukhorukov, V.D.: Economic and Social Geography of Foreign Countries, Moscow (2016) 4. Gladkiy, Y.N., Chistobaev, A.I.: Regional Studies, Moscow, pp. 197–198 (2017) 5. Kissinger, G.: World Order, Moscow (2016) 6. Satanovskiy, E.Y.: Boiler with Troubles: the Middle East for “Dummies”, Moscow (2016) 7. Dugin, A.G.: Noomahia: the war of the mind. Logos of Europe: Mediterranean Civilization in Time and Space, Moscow (2014) 8. Hegel, G.: Phenomenology of spirit. Philosophy of History, Moscow (2007) 9. History of Africa, Moscow (1979) 10. Davidson, B. New discovery of ancient Africa, Moscow (1962) 11. Velgus, V.A.: News about the countries and peoples of Africa and Maritime relations in the Pacific and Indian oceans: China, sources earlier XI century, Moscow (1978) 12. Dugin, A.G.: Noomahia: the war of the mind. Across the West. China, Japan, Africa, Oceania, Moscow (2014) 13. Kozlov, D.V.: Modern socio-economic development of Russia as a methodological problem (regional aspect), Irkutsk, pp. 69–99 (2001) 14. Kissinger, G.: World Order, Moscow, pp. 135–136 (2016). (in Russian) 15. Kaplan, R.: The Revenge of Geography, Moscow (2015). (in Russian) 16. James, P.: Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism: Brining Theory Back in, London (2006) 17. Murdock, G.P.: Africa: its peoples and their culture history, New York (1959) 18. Satanovsky, E.Y.: The Cauldron of Trouble: The Middle East for “Dummies”, Moscow (2016) 19. Hettne, B.: Theorizing the rise of regionness. New Polit. Econ. 5(3), 457–473 (2000) 20. Mansfield, E., Milner, H.: The new wave of regionalism. Int. Organ. 53(3), 589–627 (1999) 21. Preusse, H.: Developmental Regionalism the New American Regionalism, Eberhard-Karls University, Tuebingen, Germany. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (2004) 22. Sakui, D., Opoku, E.: Regionalism and economic integration in Africa: a conceptual and theoretical perspective. Occasional Paper, 22 (2014) 23. Hettne, B.: Beyond the “new” regionalism. New Polit. Econ. 10(4), 543–571 (2006) 24. Hettne, B., Innotai, A., Sunkel, O.: Globalism and the New Regionalism, London, pp. 3–24 (1999) 25. Hettne, B., Soderbaum, F.: The new regionalism approach. Politeia 17(3), 6–21 (1998)

Islamic Regionalism in Latin America: Background and Current Status Konstantin Eidemiller1 , Iuriy Gladky2 , Daria Petrenko3 , Regina-Elizaveta Kudriavtceva4(B) , and Maxim Gabrielyan1 1 Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected], [email protected] 2 Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected] 3 Saint Petersburg State University of Economics, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected] 4 Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected]

Abstract. The attention to the considering problem is caused by both the incompleteness of its’ research and the dynamism of Muslim communities in Latin America. On the one hand, Muslims in this region do not represent the same large confessional group as, for example, in Asia, Africa or Europe. On the other hand, the representatives of this religion are beginning to play an increasingly prominent role in the politics, economy and culture of the countries of the region. The authors distinguish four migratory “waves” of Muslims. It is noted that modern Muslim communities in the region are associated, mainly, with the Arab diaspora, the basis of which was formed by the migrations from the late 19th to mid 20th century. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire initiated the flow of migrants from modern Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. Most of them were originally represented by Arab Christians. Nevertheless, in recent decades, migrants from the Middle East have begun to represent various Muslim denominations. It is emphasized that at the beginning of the 21st century, Muslims became an integrated part of Brazilian, Argentine, Colombian and other Latin American societies. At the same time, there is a global connection between Arab migrant communities, which makes the study of the diffusion of Muslim communities in Ibero-America relevant. Keywords: Islamic regionalism · Muslim communities · Latin America

1 Introduction The research of the history of the Islamic component in Latin America is complicated due to the inconsistency of the initial data on the first traces of Muslims in this region. Sometimes their history is associated with Columbus (XV century), who prepared the way for slaves from West Africa, the bearers of Islam. But this idea meets the statement that the first

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 104–118, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_9

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were Moricos, the forcibly baptized Muslims of Spain and Portugal [19]. Literally transor Moriscos are “little Moors”. Their number, social status lated from Arabic and culture are different and in contrast to Castile, in the Aragonian kingdom they were called simply Moors, in Valencia and Catalonia - Saracens. As their baptism was mostly against their will, among the “new Christians” (as they were called in Spain) there were many people who continued to practice Islam in secret. Considering this, the rulers of Spain enacted discriminatory laws, which were supposed to help limit the opportunities for Muslims, led to the violent assimilation of the Muslim population. Among such laws there was a law banning the migration of Moriscos to the Spanish colonies in America. There were at least two reasons for this law implementation. Firstly, with the complex history of interaction between Christians and Muslims the authorities in Spain rightly regarded Muslims and their descendants as the most disloyal social group [22]. Their potential mass migration across the Atlantic could contribute to the grouping of Moriscos into whole communities, which would prevent their assimilation and, as a result, create a threat of potential separatism based on a different religious identity and conflict history with Spain. Secondly, according to the historian A.F. Kofman, one of the main goals of the Conquesta (the conquest of America by Spaniards) was “evangelization of the Indians”, in other words the policy of purposeful treatment of the autochthonous population of America in Catholicism and their gradual integration into the Spanish Empire [17]. In order to convert the Indians to Catholicism more effectively, it was desirable to do it without serious competitors that the Moriscos were for the Spaniards. They feared that, following the relocation of the Moriscos to the New World, the spread of Islam among the Indians might begin, which posed a potential threat to Spain (such fears were caused by active Islamization of the aboriginal population in Southeast Asia). Therefore, the Spanish authorities did all their best to prevent Muslims from entering the New World. For these reasons, it is hard to trace the migration of the first Muslims to Latin America, which creates great difficulty in research. The data that can be referenced do not rely on official statistics, although resettlement has taken place. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the XXI century Islam for South America was not an alien religion. Today, Muslims as an integrated part of Brazilian, Argentine, Colombian and other Latin American societies, have become a link between South America and the Islamic world. The policy of multiculturalism allows Muslims to build an effective mechanism of relations with representatives of other religions and communities.

2 First Muslim Migration Wave In the first half of the XVI century. The Canary Islands have become a “transit” center for the Moriscos’ migration to the New World. Entering this archipelago, the Spaniards secretly used Muslims to “squeeze out” the aboriginal inhabitants - the Guanches. Gradually, on the Canary Islands, an increase in the number of Moriscos began to be observed, on some islands they even turned into a relative ethno-confessional majority. There was a threat of potential separatism in the future, so the local authorities tacitly allowed Moriscos to migrate to the New World. When conquering and developing new lands, people, qualified specialists in various fields were needed. At the end of the Reconquista there were many educated cadres among the Moriscos (for this reason, at the beginning

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of the 17th century, during deportations of Moriscos from Spain, France and some cities of Northern Italy tried to attract them), that could help in the development of the New World. Therefore, there were cases when, as experts in various cases, the Moriscos could legitimately move to America with Spanish colonialists. It was a relatively small proportion among the immigrants. However, it was the first wave of Muslims’ migration to Latin America. The Spanish inquisition in the American colonies was not as tough as in the metropolis, so the priesthood did not react to the manifestations of Islam as sharply as in Spain. It was affected by an isolation from the center, as well as by the need for people for the development of lands. However, the history knows several documented cases of the trial of the people who openly followed and spread Islam. There are many private examples of loud trials of Muslims and their sympathizers in Ibero-America. Local authorities sometimes deliberately created administrative barriers for presumptive Muslims (mainly in the field of civil service). However, an isolation from the rest of the Islamic world and the difficulties in creating joint communities to preserve their culture did their job. Moriscos, who secretly confessed Islam, gradually lost their Islamic religiosity and were Christianized. Moreover, among the “new Christians” who went to the New World there were many people who were truly devoted to Spain and sincerely professed Catholicism. Furthermore, the specifics of the development of new lands led to the fact that the Mariscos began to merge into a single white population of Latin America and became more and more “European” inhabitants. Despite the existence of the concept of the “hidden conquest” of the New World by the Moriscos, advanced by the Argentine researcher M. E. Sagarsas (who has devoted a very large part of her activity to the search of Moriscos’ trails in Latin America, and studied in detail with the example of Argentina), Moriscos in America assimilated [26]. In the art of many Latin American countries “Oriental motifs” could be seen (mainly in music and literature). It is a good example of the Moriscos heritage. For example, researcher M. McCain found many different parallels between Mexicans and Andalusian Moriscos: from the ritual practices of clergy to similarities in speech and furniture [20]. Thus, although the Moriscos almost completely “dissolved” in the Creole population of Ibero-America, they influenced the development of the region and, of course, are the first example of the penetration of Islam into Latin America.

3 Second Muslim Migration Wave It was no longer connected with Spain, but with Portugal. It was a rather specific experience of the contact of the Islamic world with Ibero-America, which, although it did not acquire a mass character, but left its unusual imprint in the history of Latin America [32]. Portugal, as one of the main “pioneers” of the era of great geographical discoveries, starting from the XV century, explored the African coast, in terms of its prospects as a transportation and trading point on the way to India. As a result, after the discovery of America by the Spaniards led by H. Columbus, Portugal preferred the Afro-Asian vector of its colonial policy (enshrined by the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, according to which Spain ceded this vector to Portugal in favor of American acquisitions). As a result, the Portuguese much better “mastered” the African continent, which gave them an advantage over the Spaniards in one resource - the resource of … slaves.

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The Portuguese quickly began to pursue this business. In 1444 in the Portuguese city of Lagos, the first auction for the sale of slaves was held, and in 1512, King Manuel I Happy declared Lisbon as the only city in the European part of the country where slaves could be brought in from Guinea (where an absolute majority of the population were Sunni Muslim). At first, for reasons of transport convenience and the development of technology, the Portuguese settled on the Atlantic coast of Africa, from where they mostly brought slaves to America. Mostly the Muslim population lived on the coast became the first victims of the Portuguese. Same as in the case of the Moriscos, it is difficult to calculate how many Muslims from Africa were sent to Latin America. Slaves were automatically baptized when entering the Spanish and Portuguese ports, and therefore accurate statistics were not kept. Despite this, the Portuguese gradually abandoned the practice of bringing in Muslim slaves for a number of reasons. Most of the slaves, confessing Islam, came to the Portuguese colony in America Brazil. Basically their main settlement was in the same region where African slaves were mainly accommodated. It was the Northeast of Brazil, where the plantation economy was traditionally very developed. Unlike the Moriscos, among whom there were many Christians or “Westernized” Muslims, among African Muslim slaves remained a commitment to faith and a desire to preserve it. This improved their position. Slaves were taken out in groups, and it was easier to preserve identity, especially if it is based on religion. Further their groups settled in Brazil, and for a long time they lived in isolation from the rest of the country. This allowed many Muslim slaves not to forget fluent Arabic, to read the Quran and pass on knowledge to descendants. Many slaves even managed to preserve knowledge of some African languages. The Afro-Brazilian Islamic tradition was saved (although in a very modified form) far from the mainstream Islamic cultures, but it slowly became eroded and did not disappear so quickly. The narrow focus on the approval of Islam in Brazil is caused by the fact that this particular country played a leading role in the trade of African slaves, followers of this religion.

4 Third Muslim Migration Wave The longest migration wave, which had the most visible impact on the current state of the Muslim Ummah in Latin America, associated with the migration of Arabs in the XIX-XXI centuries from the territories of the Ottoman Caliphate and till the European Migration Crisis of 2015 [1]. The intensive migration of the inhabitants of the Middle East (mainly from Syria, Lebanon and Palestine) to Latin America began in the 19th century. According to various estimates, the total number of arrivals varied from 8 to 11 million people, but Muslims were a minority. The reasons for the migration of the Arabs that period were different. The main ones are the discriminatory policy of the Ottoman Empire against the Arabs (especially the Christian Arabs), as well as the general economic decline of Ottoman Empire at that time and the need to seek a new refuge. Since many Latin American countries at that time were pursuing the most favored policies for migration (especially Argentina with its extremely flexible migration law of 1876), many Arabs directed there. Due to

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the ignorance of the Spanish or Portuguese languages by the Arabs, at first they had serious language difficulties in communicating with the local population. Therefore, for example, in Mexico, some Arabs are still called Turks [15], as Arab migrants could only explain that they are from the Turkish Empire. Latin America seemed to be a region with great prospects because of the shortage of population [9]. The Arabs in the New World were also greatly attracted by the idea of this region as a cultural relative and successor to the Arab world (in the view of the Arabic past of Spain), the continuity of the Spanish and Latin American cultures, as well as the presence of the waves of Islamic resettlement mentioned above. The main directions of migration were mainly large port cities of Ibero-America: Veracruz, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro. One of the most controversial issues in this context is the issue of adaptation and integration of Arabs in Latin American communities. How successful was this process? On the one hand, many Arabs quickly entered the trade sphere, actively participated in the development of trade relations both within the countries of the region and in foreign trade. The Arabs actively penetrated the cotton trade, the construction and health sectors. Moreover, many Arabs were qualified specialists, it allowed them to find job in new countries. Therefore, many Arabs (both Christians and Muslims) gained the middle-class stratum, which allowed them to occupy a fairly good position in the social hierarchy of Latin American countries. Interestingly, Orientalist study was revived among the Arab diaspora in Latin America, and there it acquired more unusual and bizarre forms [11, 13, 24]. For example, many Arabs developed two concepts of Latin American orientalism: the first one regarded the Arab migration to Latin America as a sign of the distant kinship of Arabs and Latin AmericansthroughSpanishrootsandtheIberianPeninsula.Thesecondonewasmoreintegratedand“loyalist”.Accordingtothisconcept,theArabsofIbero-Americawereregarded as exotic sub-ethnic groups of Latin American ethnic groups. Gradually, the migration of Arabs to the countries of Latin America began to depend on their country of origin, which had a great influence on their preferences during resettlement. For example, in Argentina, there are a lot of descendants of Syrian Muslims, in Chile there are mostly Palestinians (there is even a problem of systemic anti-Semitism in the country); in Brazil there are Lebanese. Insensibly, Arabs partially assimilated in Latin American communities. However, Latin Americans had certain prejudices against Muslims that created some barriers to integration. This is not surprising as a large part of Latin America is a fragment of the Spanish Empire, where the criterion of belonging to the Spaniards was more served not by race or ethnicity, but by the religion. Nevertheless, the formation of an ethno-confessional Muslim group in Latin America did not cause a social discontent or any kind of public crisis (largely due to its small size). This fact has become important for media (especially those belonging to Muslims themselves) which are striving to fight the “dehumanization” of Muslims and present them in a more positive view. For them, Latin America is an example of how Muslims can be integrated into communities where the vast majority of the population are Christians (especially Catholics). And at the same time, Latin America have not become a region with sharp controversies based on confessional issues and people of different religions have got along peacefully.

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The special attention should be paid to Suriname. In this relatively small (in terms of both the size of the territory and the size of the population) state, the proportion of people practicing Islam is 19.6% of the total number of inhabitants, and their number continues to increase. Similar dynamics of the increase in the Muslim population is also observed in the countries neighboring Suriname - in French Guiana (5–10%) and in the Cooperative Republic of Guyana (7.2%). However, it is necessary to emphasize that in this context, Suriname is a Latin American phenomenon [27]. In this state, Muslim communities live in peace with other religious communities. It can be a positive example for other states. Proportionally in Suriname there are more Muslims than, for example, in Russia or France, but there is no jihad there. Despite the fact that the region’s society is a palette of ethnic mixtures of religious cults and beliefs, peace and harmony prevail in relations between ethnic groups and communities of this state. Among the problems relating to the Muslim communities of Latin America, the so-called “Islamic triangle” on the border of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil is often mentioned. According to some estimates, up to 4 million Muslims are concentrated there. This region is “famous” for criminality in which Muslim communities are often implicated (especially in the drug trade). There are also suggestions that significant donations for activities of various organizations of the Islamist kind go from these places. Moreover, the support of organizations depends on the country of origin and residence of Muslims. For example, the US government accused the Muslims of Argentina and Paraguay of supporting the Islamist cells of Pakistan and the Brazilian Muslims of supporting the Lebanese-Iranian Hezbollah [8]. This migration period is the one that marks the formation of “islamic” regions of Latin America (Fig. 1).

5 Fourth Muslim Migration Wave The migration crisis that has started in the autumn of 2015 due to the consequences of the “Arab Spring”, and which arose due to the repeated increase in the flow of refugees and illegal immigrants to the European Union (EU) [6], affected not only Europe. The main “suppliers” of migrants and refugees from the Muslim world to Latin America, as well as to Europe, are so-called “countries and regions of the Muslim world”. In the majority, they are the states of North Africa-Maghreb, Sahel-Sudan, Middle East and South Asia. Under these conditions, the Latin American countries face a security issue: unfortunately, the threat of international terrorism for Latin America has never been “ephemeral” [25]. In Argentina, the terrorist attacks of 1992 and 1994 at the Israeli embassy and the Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires are still remembered. In the first case, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the attack [16], while in the second, Argentine security services spoke of Hezbollah’s involvement. In contrast to the lack of statistics on the migration of Syrian citizens, the data on Libya is more reliable. Thus, in 2016, 6 million people lived in Lebanon, while the Lebanese diaspora in the world numbers from 15 to 22 million. Half of them live in Latin America: there are from 7 to 10 million people (from 3.7 to 5% of the total population of the country) in Brazil, 1.5 million people (3.5%) in Argentina, 700 thousand people (2.3%) in Colombia, 400 thousand people in Mexico and about 340 thousand people in Venezuela. Of course, not all of them confess Islam, but it is important to

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Fig. 1. Distribution of Muslim Population in the Americas

emphasize that the Muslim communities whose origin comes from Lebanon have passed the most successful process of adaptation and integration in the countries of the Latin American world. The relocation of the Muslim part of the Lebanese ethnos to the states of Latin America was also partly missionary. Although the Lebanese were not the first who massively bring Islam to the Latin American continent, they were the ones who “discovered” it for the absolute majority of the local population. Despite the distance from the home regions, migrants and refugees from countries affected by conflicts and civil strife still arrive in Latin America. Almost all countries in the region agreed to host the refugees. Thus, the head of Argentina’s Cabinet of Ministers, Anibal Fernandez, stated that the country was ready to host more refugees from Syria [11] and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro even named a specific figure, announcing that the country would accept 20 thousand Syrian refugees, as a gesture of

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goodwill. But for now, it all remains, if not populism, then a good wish (Latin American statistics show that, for example, Venezuela is not attractive even for its’ own citizens). In addition, there is another anxious fact: Latin American countries became the “second homeland” for many Nazi criminals, whose ideas were exploited, systematically putting into practice. According to the latest data, Argentina has launched a special program to support Syrian-Iraqi refugees who are not only in Syria and Iraq, but also in Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan (arrival of refugees occurred for various reasons, including those caused by the drought that hit the region from 2006 to 2009). According to the program, to obtain Argentine citizenship, refugees must live in the country for at least three years. In the framework of the program, several hundred Syrian families have already moved to Argentina. Brazil, Chile and Paraguay also decided to host Syrian refugees. The experts estimate at 6 thousand Syrian refugees in South America. In addition, the issue of receiving refugees from Syria is being discussed in Peru and Mexico. However, it should be recognized that this process is accompanied by social conflicts. Therefore, in Uruguay, several Syrian families expressed a desire to leave the country, because it was too expensive for them to be in Uruguay. After that, in protest, about 30 Syrians came to the square in Montevideo to say: “fled from the war not to die here from hunger”. Accordingly, it can be stated that Muslim communities in Latin American countries do not play any significant role. However, due to the acceptance on their territory of refugees from Muslim states, they represent a significant factor in the internal political discourse of the leading countries of the region. The principal difference of the Latin American region from all other migration directions is both its farness from the regions of outcome, and its insignificant attractiveness among potential migrants, who more often choose the USA or Canada.

6 Conclusions The analysis above allows making for the following conclusions. The considered problem is still requiring additional research, especially taking into account the migration realities of the last decades [4]. The tragic events of September 11, 2001, played a certain role in the study of the history and life of Muslim communities in both North and South America [28]. The Latin American experience of interaction with Islam is quite specific and has its own unique history, which is also explored in the US military educational institutions [5]. At the same time, the participation of Muslims (or, at least, people with Muslim roots) in Latin American politics has been growing rapidly. Islam in Latin America has already become a distinctive part of the global Islamic culture, an integral part of its heritage [7]. Although the share of Muslims in Latin America is not increasing as rapidly as in some other regions of the world, local Muslim communities have their own history dating back several centuries. It is one of the examples of the successful adaptation of representatives of this religion in a region that is remote from the historical center of Islam and has its own distinctive culture. It is important to emphasize that the Arab community is not only well integrated, but also retains a specific ethnic identity.

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Four migration “waves” of Islam carriers in the New World can be identified: 1) XVI century: arrival of Moriscos; 2) XV - XIX centuries: bringing slaves from Africa who confessed Islam; 3) XIX - beginning XXI century: the period connected with active migration of people from the Middle East; 4) The migration crisis that emerged in the fall of 2015 due to the consequences of the “Arab Spring”. The contemporary Muslim “diaspora” in Latin America consists mostly of Arabs and is obliged mainly to migration from the end of the 19th to the middle of the 20th centuries. Most of migrants came from modern Lebanon, Palestine and Syria, which until the end of the First World War were a part of the Ottoman Empire. Syrians and Lebanese mostly migrated to Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, while Palestinians settled in Chile and the countries of Central America, where most of their descendants still live [3]. Calculating the exact number of Muslims in modern Latin America is difficult. According to our estimates, their share exceeds 4.5 million people and can reach 6 million. There are different points of view regarding the dynamics of growth in the number of Muslims in the region. Most of them live in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela [18]. It is believed that their number will increase, but due to the fertility rate (which is enough only to maintain the current population and to grow slowly), as well as not too high migration from Islamic countries, their share will grow by 2050, but no more than by 20% [23]. Therefore, Muslims there are likely to stay an ethno-confessional minority. There are different aspects of the research on this topic. Thus, in the works devoted to the Lebanese and Syrian diasporas, the focus is on economic and cultural issues [21]. Often these aspects are considered in order to build connections between the New World and the Middle East (especially Saudi Arabia) in order to attract investment in countries. As for the works that cover the life of the Palestinian diaspora, they are usually concentrated on political dimensions [2] and religion [33]. Some Latin American leaders use Islam as a tool of foreign policy and even as a method of “soft power” in Latin America. Recently the participation of Muslims in Latin American politics has been growing. Many politicians either have Muslim roots or are themselves associated with Islam. For example, the former president of Argentina, Carlos Saul Menem, was a Muslim till his 16. Elected in 2019, the new president of Salvador, Nayib Bukele, is the son of the chief imam of the Salvadoran Muslims and, supposedly, he himself secretly confesses Islam. A few days after his victory in the presidential election, photos of Bukele were posted in the Internet, where he prays in a mosque in Mexico City. This fact caused a wide public reaction in El Salvador and, according to some estimates, it could lead to a political crisis. According to the Pew Research Center, the Muslim population in all regions of the world, without exceptions, will grow, and Muslim communities, respectively, will only become larger [30]. The following tables present the result of the work of the American researcher and engineer Hussein Kettani and show the growth dynamics of Muslim communities in North and South America from 1950 to 2020 (see Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 [14]). It confirms the fact that the topic of Muslim communities will become more and more relevant.

Islamic Regionalism in Latin America: Background and Current Status

113

Table 1. Estimate of the Muslim population in the Americas from 1950 to 2020

Americas

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Population

338,886,187

423,934,980

517,716,215

616,702,439

724,937,938

839,803,665

940,248,735

1,053,848,972

Muslims %

0.13

0.14

0.34

0.63

0.73

0.81

0.93

0.94

Muslims

448,741

9,931,812

CAPGR % MAPGR %

World

573,048

1,745,264

3,900,006

5,309,972

6,794,905

8,743,857

2.264

2.019

1.765

1.630

1.482

1.136

2020

2.475

11.781

8.373

3.134

2.497

2.554

Mus. Ratio%

0.10

0.11

0.25

0.43

0.45

0.47

0.51

Population

2,537,241,236

3,034,626,491

3,700,897,698

4,456,005,072

5,311,251,139

6,137,637,624

6,932,088,715

7,881,482,130

Muslims %

17.06

17.77

19.02

20.45

22.07

23.65

24.86

26.01

Muslims

432,961,301

2,050,085,347

539,240,373

703,760,495

911,165,259

1,171,946,661

1,451,537,157

1,723,607,136

WAPGR %

1.806

2.005

1.874

1.771

1.457

1.225

MAPGR %

2.219

2.699

2.617

2.549

2.163

1.733

0.48

Table 2. Estimate of the Muslim population in North America from 1950 to 2020

Bermuda

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Population

37,403

42,640

58,525

54,000

58,460

62,131

64,448

66,851

Muslims %

0.73

0.73

0.73

0.73

0.84

0.97

0.97

0.97

Muslims

273

648

APGR %

311

427

394

491

603

625

1.319

3.217

−0.801

0.797

0.611

0.367

[UN](2000)

Reference Canada

[UN88](1980)

[UN93](1991)

Population

13,736,997

17,909,009

21,716,855

24,516,277

27,700,854

30,686,824

33,889,747

37,426,974

Muslims %

0.01

0.03

0.16

0.40

0.93

1.96

1.96

1.96

Muslims

1,374

733,569

APGR %

Saint Pierre & Miquelon

5,373

34,747

98,065

257,618

601,462

664,239

2.688

1.947

1.220

1.229

1.029

0.998

Reference

[CA02](1951)

[CA02](1961)

[CA02](1971)

[CA02](1981)

[UN93](1991)

[UN](2001)

Population

4,354

4,822

5,186

5,840

6,000

7,000

6,036

5,204

Muslims %

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.20

Muslims

0

0

1

1

12

14

12

10

1.026

0.730

1.195

0.271

1.553

−1.472

APGR % Reference United States of America

[KET]

[PEW]

Population

157,813,040

186,326,215

209,463,865

229,468,823

254,865,217

287,842,178

317,641,087

350,524,933

Muslims %

0.13

0.13

0.49

1.30

1.57

1.74

2.20

2.28

Muslims

205,157

7,991,968

APGR %

Total

2020

242,224

1,026,373

2,983,095

4,001,384

5,008,454

6,988,104

1.675

1.177

0.916

1.055

1.224

0.990

Reference

[KET]

[KET]

[KET]

Population

171,591,794

204,282,686

231,244,431

254,044,940

282,630,531

318,598,133

351,601,317

388,023,961

Muslims %

0.12

0.12

0.46

1.21

1.51

1.76

2.18

2.25

Muslims

206,804

8,726,196

APGR %

[US]

247,909

1,061,548

3,081,555

4,259,505

5,610,532

7,652,980

1.759

1.247

0.945

1.072

1.205

0.991

114

K. Eidemiller et al. Table 3. Estimate of the Muslim population in lower South America from 1950 to 2020

Argentina

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Population

17,150,335

20,684,913

24,002,708

28,153,804

32,497,507

36,938,728

40,665,732

44,768,779

Muslims %

0.12

0.12

1.30

1.35

2.16

2.16

1.62

1.62

Muslims

20,580

725,254

APGR %

Chile

380,076

701,946

797,877

658,785

1.608

1.445

1.289

0.966

[DOS01]

[DOS]

[UN56](1947)

[KET]

[KET]

Population

6,081,931

7,646,896

9,574,336

11,181,360

13,190,515

15,418,704

17,134,708

19,041,692

Muslims %

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.02

Muslims

1,216

3,808

1,529

1,915

2,236

2,638

3,084

3,427

2.316

2.273

1.564

1.666

1.573

1.061

Reference

[UN56](1952)

Population

2,230

2,172

1,957

2,000

2,000

2,883

3,004

3,130

Muslims %

0.01

0.30

0.30

0.30

0.30

0.30

0.30

0.30

Muslims

0

9

APGR %

Paraguay

312,035 1.499

Reference

APGR %

Falkland Islands

24,822 1.892

[UN79](1970)

7

6

6

6

9

9

−0.263

−1.037

0.218

0.000

3.725

0.412

[GB01](1901)

Population

1,473,245

1,907,042

2,484,739

3,198,837

4,249,734

5,350,235

[FK](2006) 6,459,727

7,799,297

Muslims %

0.04

0.04

0.04

0.04

0.04

0.02

0.02

0.02

Muslims

589

763

994

1,280

1,700

1,070

1,292

1,560

2.614

2.681

2.558

2.881

2.330

1.902

[UN](1991)

[UN](2002)

Reference

[KET]

Population

2,238,506

2,538,808

2,810,013

2,915,754

3,109,992

3,320,980

3,372,222

3,424,255

Muslims %

0.04

0.04

0.04

0.04

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

Muslims

895

342

APGR %

1,016

1,124

1,166

311

332

337

1.267

1.020

0.370

0.647

0.659

0.153

Reference Total

[CL](2002)

Reference

APGR %

Uruguay

2020

[KET]

[DOS]

Population

26,946,247

32,779,831

38,873,753

45,451,755

53,049,748

61,031,530

67,635,393

75,037,154

Muslims %

0.09

0.09

0.81

0.85

1.33

1.31

0.98

0.97

Muslims

23,282

730,974

APGR %

28,136

316,074

384,764

706,601

802,371

663,850

1.979

1.720

1.576

1.558

1.411

1.033

Table 4. Estimate of the Muslim population in upper South America from 1950 to 2020

Bolivia

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Population

2,713,630

3,351,626

4,211,986

5,356,019

6,670,556

8,317,371

10,030,832

12,097,283

Muslims %

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

Muslims

271

335

421

536

667

832

1,003

1,210

2.134

2.311

2.432

2.219

2.231

1.891

APGR % Reference Brazil

[KET]

[DOS]

Population

53,974,725

72,743,915

95,991,361

121,618,369

149,570,485

174,174,447

195,423,252

219,264,353

Muslims %

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.02

Muslims

5,397

43,853

APGR %

Columbia

2020

7,274

9,599

12,162

29,914

34,835

39,085

3.029

2.812

2.395

2.090

1.535

1.158

Reference

[UN56](1950)

Population

11,999,600

16,006,393

21,332,516

26,890,687

33,203,846

39,772,905

46,300,196

53,898,707

Muslims %

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.02

Muslims

6,000

10,780

APGR %

[BR](2000)

8,003

10,666

13,445

6,641

7,955

9,260

2.923

2.914

2.342

2.131

1.822

1.531

(continued)

Islamic Regionalism in Latin America: Background and Current Status

115

Table 4. (continued) 1950 Reference Ecuador

1960

1970

[KET] 4,439,714

5,972,190

7,964,335

10,278,486

12,310,314

13,774,909

15,413,751

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.02

Muslims

339

444

597

796

2,056

2,462

2,755

3,083

2.742

3.010

2.920

2.584

1.820

1.130

[KET]

[PEW]

Population

25,479

32,472

48,025

68,272

116,371

165,164

231,313

323,955

Muslims %

7.80

7.80

8.20

8.20

0.90

0.90

0.90

0.90

Muslims

1,987

2,916

2,533

3,938

5,598

1,047

1,486

2,082

2.455

3.991

3.580

5.478

3.564

3.426

Reference

[KET]

Population

422,900

568,500

[KET] 709,379

776,078

749,188

756,259

[PEW] 761,442

766,661

Muslims %

8.72

8.72

8.72

8.72

7.97

7.19

7.19

7.19

Muslims

36,877

55,123

49,573

61,858

67,674

59,710

54,375

54,748

3.003

2.239

0.903

−0.352

0.094

0.068

[GY](2002)

Reference

[UN88](1980)

[GY](1991)

Population

7,632,461

9,931,527

13,194,522

17,328,481

21,776,063

26,004,162

29,496,120

33,456,994

Muslims %

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

Muslims

763

993

1,319

1,733

2,178

2,600

2,950

3,346

2.668

2.882

2.763

2.311

1.790

1.268

APGR % Reference

[KET] 214,999

290,000

372,297

365,749

406,734

467,162

524,345

588,527

Muslims %

19.64

19.64

19.64

19.64

13.45

13.45

13.45

13.45

Muslims

42,226

79,157

Reference

56,956

73,119

71,833

54,706

62,833

70,524

3.038

2.530

−0.177

1.068

1.395

1.161

[UN71](1964)

[SR](2004)

Population

5,093,708

7,580,295

10,724,379

15,096,499

19,740,837

24,407,686

29,043,555

34,559,937

Muslims %

0.39

0.39

0.28

0.28

0.35

0.35

0.35

0.35

Muslims

19,865

120,960

APGR %

Total

[PEW]

Population

APGR %

Venezuela

2020

3,387,357

APGR %

Suriname

2010 [DOS]

0.01

APGR %

Peru

2000

Population

Reference

Guyana

1990

Muslims %

APGR %

French Guiana

1980

[KET]

29,563

30,028

42,270

69,093

85,427

101,652

4.056

3.531

3.479

2.719

2.145

1.754

Reference

[KET]

Population

85,464,859

114,944,442

152,556,655

195,464,489

242,512,566

286,375,470

325,585,964

370,370,168

Muslims %

0.13

0.14

0.13

0.11

0.09

0.09

0.09

0.09

Muslims

113,726

320,426

APGR %

[KET]

[DOS]

155,675

191,547

216,048

226,012

252,805

284,059

3.008

2.871

2.509

2.180

1.676

1.291

Table 5. Estimate of the Muslim population in Central America from 1950 to 2020

Belize

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Population

68,918

92,817

122,665

143,796

189,822

251,516

312,928

389,335

Muslims %

0.08

0.08

0.08

0.08

0.09

0.10

0.10

0.10

Muslims

55

389

APGR %

74

98

115

171

252

313

3.022

2.828

1.602

2.816

2.854

2.209

[UN](2000)

Reference Costa Rica

2020

[UN88](1980)

[UN](1991)

Population

966,015

1,334,049

1,822,114

2,348,634

3,078,289

3,930,863

4,639,827

5,476,659

Muslims %

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

Muslims

97

133

182

235

308

393

464

548

3.281

3.167

2.571

2.742

2.475

1.672

APGR %

(continued)

116

K. Eidemiller et al. Table 5. (continued) 1950

1960

Reference El Salvador

2,773,759

3,741,724

4,662,518

5,329,703

5,945,317

6,194,126

6,453,348

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.02

Muslims

220

277

374

466

1,066

1,189

1,239

1,291

2.345

3.039

2.224

1.346

1.099

0.411

[KET]

[SV]

Population

3,146,073

4,140,640

5,420,427

7,015,704

8,910,121

11,230,704

14,376,881

18,404,430

Muslims %

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

Muslims

315

414

542

702

891

1,123

1,438

1,840

2.785

2.730

2.613

2.419

2.342

2.500

[KET]

[GT]

Population

1,487,235

2,002,943

2,690,903

3,634,481

4,901,203

6,229,981

7,615,584

9,309,357

Muslims %

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.03

0.03

0.03

0.03

Muslims

149

200

269

363

1,470

1,869

2,285

2,793

3.022

2.997

3.052

3.035

2.428

2.029

Reference

[UN56](1945)

Population

27,740,700

37,910,243

51,910,162

68,872,210

83,403,974

99,530,617

110,645,154

123,000,846

Muslims %

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

Muslims

55,481

12,300

APGR %

[KET]

[DOS]

75,820

103,820

137,744

8,340

9,953

11,065

3.172

3.193

2.868

1.933

1.783

1.064

Reference

[KET]

[MX](2000)

Population

1,294,993

1,774,576

2,399,680

3,250,477

4,137,774

5,100,914

5,822,265

6,645,627

Muslims %

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

Muslims

129

177

240

325

414

510

582

665

3.201

3.064

3.081

2.443

2.115

1.331

APGR % Reference

[KET]

[NI](2005)

Population

860,092

1,126,599

1,507,052

1,950,586

2,412,554

2,950,801

3,508,475

4,171,544

Muslims %

0.03

0.03

0.03

0.03

0.17

0.17

0.30

0.30

Muslims

258

338

452

585

4,101

5,016

10,525

12,515

2.736

2.952

2.613

2.148

2.034

1.746

[DOS02]

[DOS]

APGR % Reference Total

2020

2,199,897

APGR %

Panama

2010 [CR]

0.01

Reference

Nicaragua

2000

Population

APGR %

Mexico

1990

Muslims %

Reference

Honduras

1980

[KET]

APGR %

Guatemala

1970

[KET]

Population

37,763,923

51,155,626

69,614,727

91,878,406

112,363,440

135,170,713

153,115,240

173,851,145

Muslims %

0.15

0.15

0.15

0.15

0.01

0.02

0.02

0.02

Muslims

56,704

32,340

APGR %

77,435

105,978

140,536

16,761

20,305

27,910

3.082

3.129

2.814

2.033

1.865

1.254

Analyzing the main demographic trends in the world based on the original population growth projections, the Pew Research Center provided information that over the next fifty years the Islam will replace the long dominance of Christianity as the most extensive religious group [29]. Among the major world religions, Muslims have the lowest average age of the population (24 years, while for Christians it is 30 years (which corresponds to the world average)) and the highest fertility rate, which is expected to double the number of adherents of this religion from 2015 to 2060. Thus, in the second half of the 21st century, Islam is supposed to become the largest world religion [12]. While the total population of the world will grow by 32% in the coming decades, the number of Muslims is projected to increase by 70%: from 1.6 billion people in 2015 to 2.2 billion by 2030, and up to 3 billion by 2060. According to general estimates, in 2015 the number of Muslims was 24% of the world population, and over the next 45 years it is expected to

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increase to 31% [12]. Another study by the Pew Research Center showed how divided the Islamic world is, how significant are regional differences on fundamental issues, such as attitudes toward Sharia and its implementation at the state level, Islamic law and morality, democracy, attitudes toward radical trends and the rights of women – all of these factors vary considerably depending on the region of the world where the Muslim population lives [31]. Such issues have a direct relation to the countries of Latin America as the region is the most dynamically developing part of the New World. At the same time, the world is predominantly Catholic with the positive dynamics of the growth of the Christian population. However, the Muslim population is growing in much more noticeable proportions. The problem of Islamic regionalism in Latin America is one of the most interesting, promising and least studied regional social phenomena. It includes both vertical and regional links between the region and the Muslim world of the Western hemisphere which affect the broadest areas of transcontinental interaction as well as the influence of the Muslim world on the regional political, economic and social agenda (for example, the interaction between the regime of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Islamic Republic of Iran). Study of sources and literature on this issue shows that quite a few studies have been done outside the Latin American region specifically on the issue of Islamic regionalism. In this work, we have analyzed existed studies and almost all of them emphasize and explore certain aspects of this interaction without an approach to its comprehensive consideration. The format of this work also does not allow us to reveal all aspects of this interaction in detail and fully but only to describe its main phases and actors. However, we are very happy to present this study because it is one of the first made outside the region and dedicated to the problems of Islamic regionalism based on the methods and experience of research and study of Islamic regionalism in Europe and Russia.

References 1. Akmir, A.: Los árabes en América Latina: historia de una emigración, Madrid (2009) 2. Baeza, C.: Palestinians in Latin America: between assimilation and long-distance nationalism. J. Palestine Stud. 43(2), 59–72 (2014) 3. Boos, T.: The Arab Diaspora in Latin America. Oxford University Press, New York (2017) 4. Chitwood, K.: The study of Islam and Muslim communities in Latin America the Caribbean and the Americas the state of the field. Int. J. Lat. Am. Relig. 1(1), 57–76 (2017). https://link. springer.com/article/10.1007/s41603-017-0008-3 5. Connell, C.C.: Understanding Islam and Its Impact on Latin America. USAF A Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows, CADRE/AR in Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements Maxwell Air Force Base (2004). https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a42 5868.pdf 6. Eidemiller, K.Y., Samylovskaya, E.A., Kudryavtseva, R.-E.A.: Islamic diffusion of Nordic countries: Sweden. In: IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science, p. 180 (2018). https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/180/1/012005/pdf 7. El Hareir, I., M’Baye, E.H.R.: The different aspects of Islamic culture, p. 949 (2012). https:// unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000215298 8. Garrett, A.: Santiago an Examination of the Nature of Hezbollah’s evolving presence in latin america. Thesis in the Field of Government for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies, p. 68 (2017)

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9. Gildas, B.: Syriens et libanais d’amérique du sud (1918–1945), p. 317 (2008) 10. Glade, W.: The Levantines in Latin America. Am. Econ. Rev. 73(2), 118–122 (1983) 11. Goncharova, T., Stetsenko, I., Shemyakin, I.: Latin America: Universal values and civilizational specificity of Latin America, p. 168 (1995). (in Russian) 12. Hackett, C., Lipka, M.: The demographic factors that make Islam the world’s fastest-growing major religious group. https://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/ 04/07092755/FULL-REPORT-WITH-APPENDIXES-A-AND-B-APRIL-3.pdffile:///C:/ Users/%D0%A1%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%8F/Downloads/70064-Article%20Text-896331-10-20180403.pdf 13. History of Latin American Civilization: Sources and Interpretations, Boston (1973) 14. Houssain, K.: Muslim population in the Americas: 1950–2020. Int. J. Environ. Sci. Dev. 1(2), 127 (2010). http://www.ijesd.org/papers/26-D435.pdf 15. Ignacio, K., Lesser, J.: Introduction: ‘Turco’ immigrants in Latin America. Americas 53(1), 1–14 (1996) 16. Karmon, E.: Iran and its Proxy Hezbollah: strategic penetration in Latin America. International Terrorism Working Paper Elcano Royal Institute, p. 32 (2009). https://biblioteca.ribei.org/ 1786/1/WP-18-2009.pdf 17. Kofman, A.F.: Under the protection of Santiago. Spanish conquest of America and the fate of the famous conquistadors, p. 1032 (2017). (in Russian) 18. Kusumo, F.I.: Islam en América Latina (2), p. 166 (2013) 19. Landa, R.G.: The fate of the Moriscos, p. 399 (2013). (in Russian) 20. May, S.: Islam in Costa Rica. https://www.prolades.com/profiles/islam_eng.pdf 21. Morales, H.D.: Latino and Muslim in America: race, religion, and the making of a new minority, p. 272. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2018) 22. Nadia, B.: The Islamic influence in pre-colonial and early America. A Historico-Legal Snapshot Seattle J. Soc. Justice 13(3), 913 (2014). https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/vie wcontent.cgi?article=1715&context=sjsj 23. PorquéAmérica Latina es la únicaregión del mundodonde no crecerá el islam. https://www. bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-39439257 24. Ribeiro, D.: Las Americas y la civilizacion, p. 494 (1992) 25. Saavedra, B.: Confronting Terrorism in Latin America: Latin America and United States Policy Implications, p. 220. Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (2003) 26. Sagarzazu, M.E.: El exilio de la gacela. Buenos Aire, p. 254 (1993) 27. Samylovskaya, E.A., Eidemiller, K.I.: The Muslim community in Latin America. Russ. Glob. World 7(30), 559–565 (2015). (in Russian) 28. Sills, M.D., Bagget, K.: Islam in Latin America. South. Baptist J. Theol. Arch. 15(2), 28–41 (2011) 29. The Changing Global Religious Landscape. Pew Research Center. https://assets.pewres earch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/04/07092755/FULL-REPORT-WITH-APP ENDIXES-A-AND-B-APRIL-3.pdf 30. The Future Global Muslim Population. Pew Research Center. https://assets.pewresearch.org/ wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2011/01/FutureGlobalMuslimPopulation-WebPDF-Feb10.pdf 31. The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society. Pew Research Center. https://assets. pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2013/04/worlds-muslims-religion-politics-soc iety-full-report.pdf 32. Usarski, F.: Judaism and Islam in Latin America and among Latin-American immigrants. Int. J. Lat. Am. Relig. 3, 1–4 (2019). https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41603-019-000 82-2 33. Usarski, F.: Editorial: the international journal of Latin American religions – a response to the academic demands of a dynamic. Int. J. Lat. Am. Relig. 1(1), 1–4 (2017). https://link.spr inger.com/article/10.1007/s41603-017-0009-2

The Political Status of Greenland in the 21st Century: The Path from the Colony of the Kingdom of Denmark to the Possible 51st State of the USA Konstantin Eidemiller1 , Anton Geht2 , Anni Nikulina3 , and Regina-Elizaveta Kudriavtceva4(B) 1 Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected] 2 Bonch-Bruevich Saint-Petersburg State University of Telecommunications,

Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected] 3 Saint Petersburg Mining University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected] 4 Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected]

Abstract. The political map of the modern world is not static and tends to change its familiar appearance. There are a number of noticeable examples of regional irredentist separatism on the map of Europe, like Catalonia, Scotland, Wallonia. It seems that in the countries of Northern Europe, traditionally identified by calm and moderation in their political life, it is difficult to imagine the presence of such sentiments. However, there is a potentially new country on the political map of the world that is, nowadays, a part of the Kingdom of Denmark. It is currently an autonomous province of Denmark, Greenland. Greenland is the largest island in the world with an area of 2 166 086 km2 , which makes Denmark the largest state in the EU. However, Greenland, even by the standards of the Northern European states, is an area with an extremely low population density. It has a population of 55,877 (1st of January 2018 Estimate), which recently has been decreasing. Nowadays, Greenland has the lowest population density worldwide (0.027 people per square kilometer). Thus, Greenland is 50 times larger than Denmark, but Denmark has 100 times as many people. According to some experts, China’s investment activity in Greenland has gone so far that without decisive steps to reintegrate Greenland’s economy into the EU, this strategic de jure Danish territory may eventually turn out to be a de facto Chinese province. As authors, we hope that this article will set in motion a series of research papers dedicated to the struggle for the North. Keywords: Greenland · Denmark · Autonomy · Arctic · Human resources

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 119–132, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_10

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1 Introduction The appearance of the Paleo-Eskimos on the territory of Greenland is traditionally considered to be the beginning of its history. These groups migrated from the Arctic islands of North America and adapted to an extremely uncongenial climate, practically unsuitable for life [20]. Eventually, the Eskimos left the island when the conditions of existence in Greenland became critical due to significant climate changes. Viking colonists led by Erik the Red settled on the uninhabited island in the 10th century AD. Over the course of time, the Scandinavians managed to form several settlements that eventually disappeared in the 15th century. There are several reasons for this fact: firstly, there was climate deterioration yet again; secondly, they had hostile relations with their neighbors; and thirdly, they could not adapt to the changing living conditions due to the climatic cooling. The ancestors of modern Inuit began the gradual settlement of the accessible southern territory immediately after the Scandinavians had left. Since the 15th century, there had been only various short-term expeditions from Iceland, Denmark and Portugal visiting Greenland. Finally, the Europeans, namely the Danes, returned to Greenland only in the 18th century. Significant changes, which noticeably affected the lifestyle of the local population, began to occur in the political structure of the island with the onset of the 19th century. Gradually, the process of empowerment of the local communities started; the first local self-government bodies were developed. A sufficient contribution was made to the development of old sectors and to the creation of new sectors of the economy of Greenland during this period of time. Especially, these changes were centered on the trade industry: its income had become stable by the middle of the 19th century. A significant part of this income was used for the needs of the island, therefore, allowing increasing purchase prices and diversifying product range [31], which at the same time considerably tied Greenland to its metropole. The 20th century brought the next climate change to Greenland. As a result, the temperature began to rise sharply, and the Eskimos had to switch from hunting to fishing, which required even more financial support from Denmark. Moreover, indigenous communities of the island were in need of the proper cultural education, since working with new tools of trade, fishing and hunting, as well, as their maintenance seemed difficult for them. Soon Greenland started its rapid development. And climate changes were replaced by the changes in the administrative structure of the territory. For instance, the part of the island that remained suitable for life and possible further settlement was divided into East (Tunu) and West (Kitaa) parts, and later the Northern (Avannaata/Thule district) part was added to them [4]. The next step was to establish the relations between the island and the outside world. It was supposed to lead not only to establishing the position of openness of the island, but to the active development of its commercial economy. It is important to remember that the economy of Greenland was left to its own devices during critical historical moments. For example, the government of the Kingdom of Denmark was immersed in solving the internal problems of the country, such as managing the consequences of the global economic crisis. This is especially noted during the interwar periods. In general, the Greenland started to acquire substantial economic and strategic importance from the 1930s with the development of air and sea transport [31]. Therefore,

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Greenland became a fairly promising object for close contacts and even for integration of the island into other countries like the USA, Canada and Norway. Norway explained their claims exclusively by historical moments associated with Erik the Red, and even filed a lawsuit in order to recover the once lost territory. Ultimately, the conflict was settled in favor of Denmark by a decision of the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 1933 [24]. Denmark, starting from the time of trial and the verdict, began to be more attentive to its distant possessions, focusing on the development of the health care and economy of Greenland. Greenland awaited another major change with the onset of World War II, when Denmark was occupied by Nazi Germany. Greenland actually gained expanded independence from that moment on. Moreover, it remained fully assigned to Denmark on the basis of official agreements thanks to the efforts of Danish diplomats. The United States and Canada received the right to build their military and air facilities on the territory of Greenland as a result of the signing of one of these documents. This fact facilitated the establishment of an air bridge with Great Britain to help maintain contact with the Allies. At the same time, the foundation was laid for certain ties between Greenland and the USA. During these times, the island both received the necessary supplies and increased the number of exported goods, among which was the rare mineral – cryolite, that was in demand for the military and other industries [31]. The Kingdom again publicly recognized Greenland as its territory with the end of the war and, as a consequence, the liberation of Denmark from the occupation. Nevertheless, the Danish government raised the issue of canceling colonial relationship with Greenland by the middle of the 20th century due to the large-scale demographic “explosion” as well as the awareness of the population of Greenland of their political importance during the past war. The position of the Danish leadership on the abolition of the colonial relationship was supported by the active part of Greenland population. This fact ultimately led to a national referendum and further amendments to the constitution of the Kingdom based on its results. The Eskimos themselves expressed a clear position on this issue, wishing to introduce local self-government. In particular, this sentiments has been noted and is still being noted (only in a more precise form) in the program of the Social Democratic Party “Forward” [27]. Finally, a referendum on Greenland self-government was held in Copenhagen in 1979. More than 70% of the voters agreed to so-call open the path to the complete independence of the territory. Greenland officially acquired its new status from that moment – the status of autonomy with partial independence, which gave the island an opportunity to independently resolve its pressing issues on the basis of the formed sovereignty without Danish support.

2 Peculiarities of the Position of Greenland in the International Scene and as Part of Denmark After Recognition of Its Autonomous Status The territory of Greenland was officially designated as the state of Inuit people after the establishment of its autonomy. Formally, the island remained to be the administrative part of Denmark; however, its constitution does not contain special provisions that govern

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the status of autonomous entities and their relations with the central Danish authorities. Instead, there is a special act of 2009 among the agreements executed between the Kingdom and its overseas territory. This act is somewhat of an equivalent to the missing constitutional clauses. The act not only regulates the special public-law status of Greenland but also emphasizes the possibility of the island to gain full independence under certain conditions [1]. The local population has started to actively participate in such areas of state functioning as politics, economics, social and cultural development since the 1980s. Moreover, most Inuit supported the idea of the independent management of their mineral and food resources. Greenland joined a number of regional organizations and established close contacts with Iceland, the Faroe Islands, the Eskimo communities of Canada, and officially adopted its own flag in 1985. Since Denmark had lost its prerogative power in the recent years of the 20th century, the authorities of the Danish Autonomous Territory were concentrated on its foreign affairs and the development of the Arctic region. The famous Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic was signed in 1993 in the capital of Greenland, the city of Nuuk [26]. This declaration contributed to the institutionalization of international environmental cooperation in the region. Greenland was one of the founders of the Arctic Council – an international forum on environmental protection of the unique nature of the northern polar zone. It was formally established in 1996. The ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council was held in Nuuk in 2011, where the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic was signed. The total loss of mass of the ice sheet of the island doubled in the early 2000s. This fact became known from the results of the studies conducted by the Danish Metrological Institute: for instance, the three largest glaciers of the autonomy: Helheim, Kangerlussuaq and Jacobshaun Isbre, – have decreased in size by more than 300 km and still continue to lose their mass daily, which leads to an increase in sea level [25]. The leading Social Democratic Party of Greenland, “Forward”, which advocates for expanding the rights of the island’s population, arranged another referendum in 2008. This referendum was supposed to ensure the expansion of the autonomy rights of Greenland and reduce its dependence on Denmark. As a result of the national referendum, 75% of the voters supported the initiative of the party. The Parliament of the Kingdom of Denmark, Folketing, passed a corresponding law that proclaimed the independence of Danish autonomy in 30 sectors of its functioning and reduced the allocation of royal subsidies for any of its expenses [12]. The expanded autonomy was officially declared on the island’s territory a year later, on June 21, 2009, on the day of the 30th anniversary of the consolidation of autonomous status of Greenland. This led to the further changes in the functioning of the local selfgovernment as well as allowed the population of Greenland to become a separate nation in accordance with the International Law. Absolutely, Danish autonomy is not able to fully support its existence at that stage, since it still depends heavily on fishing, tourism and annual grants from the Kingdom. However it is facing significant changes, especially in its economic sphere. Nevertheless, circumstances are changing substantially: for example, there is an oil offshore production, or the Parliament of Greenland, Landsthing, lifted the ban on the extraction of

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radioactive minerals on the island in 2013. According to the Parliament, this way the region would be able to attract foreign investors interested in the development of its resources and receive a new way of self-financing from them. At the same time, the authorities of Greenland and Denmark officially filed a claim with the United Nations for the acquisition of 62,000 km2 of seabed northeast of Greenland. This territory would allow both parts of the Kingdom to freely develop mineral resources from their vast underwater possessions. The response to this claim should be given no earlier than 2019 according to official sources. At the same time, the UN itself is openly waiting for the similar actions from Russia and Canada [5]. Active transformations were carried out in relation to the environment of Greenland. The government of the autonomy asked the Danish authorities in 2016 to help them clean some territory of the island from the American military facilities installed there during the Cold War and, as a result, left without further use. Therefore, Greenland showed the Kingdom and the world at large how seriously they take the issue of environmental pollution [13]. However, the autonomy was also harmed by the same thing it tried to protect itself from due to the global climate changes. For example, at the end of 2017, the western coast of the island was damaged by an earthquake and the tsunami that ensued. Moreover, there were a record number of peat fires in large areas of Greenland in the summer of the same year. Inuit had to ask Denmark and the American continent for support to deal with these fires.

3 The Response of International Communities to the Possibility of Separatism in Greenland As it was mentioned above, one of the foundations for secessionist sentiments of the public of Greenland was the active development of mining processes. The local population seeks to manage the resources independently, and refuses support from the Danish authorities. Moreover, Greenland would be able to significantly increase its zone of influence in the Arctic if it gained the independence. Consequently, this would not have a very positive result on the activities of other states interested in this region. Therefore, the topic of possible separatism in Greenland automatically acquires the attention of international communities since the island has a strategic importance and a value for its mineral resources both for the Arctic region and for the planet as a whole [22]. The issue of the changing of the political status of Greenland significantly affects the interests of several countries. The implementation of these countries’ intentions will be practically impossible if the island changes its autonomous status to full independence. At the same time, some international communities are either positive or indifferent to the situation in the considered region. Moreover, they actively cooperate with the authorities of Greenland on issues in fields of economic and political functioning of the autonomous territory. One of the communities, which closely interacts with Greenland as a fairly independent part of the Kingdom of Denmark, is the United Nations. The delegation from the Kingdom of Denmark, which participates in the meetings of General Assembly of the UN, includes two representatives of Greenland defending its position during all such diplomatic missions since 1992 [6].

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The United Nations has not reacted in any way since the island gained some independence, and even today does not react to secessionist sentiments among the public of Greenland. Moreover, the UN has received several documents from Greenland in recent years that to some extent characterize the situation within the territory. As it is noted above, joint delegation of Denmark and Greenland submitted to the United Nation Commission of the Limits of the Continental Shelf the application to expand the sea-bed territory of the Kingdom beyond the 200-mile economic zone in 2013. A year later, in 2014, the authorities of Denmark and Greenland were the first of the possible candidates to claim the North Pole. According to the document, they claimed 900,000 km2 to the north of the autonomy of the Kingdom [7]. Furthermore, the United Nations actively assists the Danish autonomy in solving domestic and general geopolitical problems despite the indifferent position regarding the possible independence of Greenland. This fact may contribute to acceleration of the process of separatism. Another international community, or rather, an international association, that is inextricably intertwined with Greenland, is the European Union. The Kingdom of Denmark is a member of this association without its autonomy. The government of the Inuit nation left the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of the EU, after gaining independence and holding another referendum. This was regularized in 1985 by the Treaty on amendments in relation to Greenland under the Treaty establishing the European Community [14]. Moreover, Danish autonomy was included in the list of non-European associations with a limited territorial sphere of influence of the current legislation of the Union. Therefore, it has received the status of an associated foreign country with customs privileges, and has initiated a number of key agreements with the Union [15]. Taking into consideration everything mentioned above, the conclusion can be made that the EU is neutral and even partially positive on the issue of full independence of Greenland. It is worth noting that there are publications in the European media that compare the exit from the EU of the Danish autonomy and Brexit. Greenland is a vivid example for Great Britain according to the opinion of a number of journalists and political scientists. It is a model that shows Great Britain the future of the state after leaving the integration association. However, the path of the United Kingdom is going to be much simpler due to the fact that it does not need external finances, unlike the autonomy of Denmark, and, as a result, it is not going to be influenced by similar exit conditions that were relevant to the Inuit people [3]. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a comparison of the opportunity of Scotland gaining sovereignty seems much more justified. The factor of spatial diffusion that comes from outside and expands its influence on all countries of Northern Europe is another viewpoint of the issue of sovereignty. If the Northern European states are considered, including the aforementioned Great Britain, the factor of Muslim migration from the Islamic world [8] is one of the reasons for the UK to exit from the European Union. In the case of Greenland, it is safe to talk about fairly aggressive economic expansionist policy of China that is going to be discussed below. There is another international community that is historically associated with Greenland. It is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. Nowadays, the Alliance is

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formed by 29 countries, including the mentioned Denmark and Greenland. The affiliation of Greenland with NATO was an important strategic step on the path of transforming its political status. Historically, the USA has its own vision of the future of modern Danish autonomy. The American leadership set up its military facilities in Greenland during the Second World War and the Cold War, ensuring the operation of airfields and weather stations [21]. Greenland was able to feel the negative consequences of the usage of its territory, despite the fact that all the actions taken by the Americans were of relevant importance and were of a mixed scientific and military nature. For example, a plane crash occurred near the military base in Thule in 1968 that was followed by radioactive contamination of the area [28]. Nowadays, Greenland certainly still has its strategic importance to the United States. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the interest of NASA in Greenland. The leadership of NASA has not made any official judgments with respect to possible separatism of Greenland. However, NASA is very interested in all the transformations of nature occurring in the territory of Danish autonomy. It should be noted that the organization has issued more than 50 publications about the changes occurring with glaciers in Greenland on its official website over the past 10 years. According to these publications, the melting of these glaciers can change the unique natural conditions of the island that resemble the surface of the moon and other space objects outside of Earth [16].

4 Prospects for Independence of Greenland in the Near Future As for the factors that currently obstruct the secession of Greenland from Denmark, it is worth mentioning the shared interest of this small Scandinavian country in the Arctic region and its participation in so-called “Arctic race”, which is mainly possible if Greenland is a part of Denmark. Nowadays, the international legal status of the Arctic territories is a matter of dispute between 7 states. If Denmark expands its territorial borders in the region in question, it will become a truly leading Arctic power and gain access to potentially cost-effective sea routes for commercial vehicles, to rich deposits of oil, gas and other mineral resources, and to untouched fish resources. The authorities of Denmark do not seek to enshrine the territory of Greenland in appropriate law despite the fact that the government understands both the importance of access to the Arctic and Arctic Ocean, as well as economic rationale for separatism in Greenland. It is appropriate to assume that the leadership in Copenhagen acts on the basis of the idea that full economic independence of Danish autonomy is not yet feasible, since Danish subsidies account about 30% of the island’s GDP [17]. Subsidies for the Arctic territories are widely used in many countries of the Arctic Council to support and develop economic relations of the region [2]. However, Greenland continues to rely on an annual subsidy of 3.68 billion kroner (586–620 million dollars) from Denmark, which helps its economy to stay afloat. The world’s first economy, China, has a different prospective on the sovereignty of Greenland. Several Chinese scientists have commented on the geostrategic importance of Greenland and advocate that China considers the possibility of the independence of Greenland over the next ten years. According to these scientists, China needs to make

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right economic and strategic investments in a potentially new partner in the Arctic. In particular, Chinese analytics believe that the Arctic Five has a committed position that excludes non-Arctic states from participating in Arctic affairs. This also applies to Russia despite the fact that Russia is an important partner in the Arctic diplomacy of China. However, the Chinese government is trying not to give the impression of supporting the independence of Greenland, not least because of the fact that it is against the independence of Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan. China is committed to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs when similar problems of independence arise in other countries. However, in terms of economics, China and Chinese companies have already settled in Greenland. An important factor that makes the independence of Greenland improbable in the near future is a bad state of quantitative and qualitative aspects of the human capital of Danish autonomy. The issue is that there is a severe lack of essential human and material resources. In particular, a lack of qualified personnel for the state and local governments, the judiciary, police and army structures, research institutions, diplomatic and other missions abroad [30]. Nowadays, these fields are predominantly represented by the national minority of Greenland, ethnic Danes, while Inuit, mostly, are at the stage of adopting experience. They will be able to independently fulfill the important fields of their state functioning and ensure the stable performance of all structures in Greenland only after a certain period of time. Moreover, there is a lack of modern industry in Danish autonomy, the skilled labor force required for it, and the technical capabilities to develop and process natural resources and minerals that are in demand on the market. All of these factors again restrain the region from becoming independent, and also reduce the level of investment attractiveness of the island due to the high costs of development of mineral resources that raise doubts among foreign companies ready to financially support the territory [30]. When considering the prospects for independence of Greenland in the near future, emphasis should be placed on such an aspect as fishing. Greenland takes one of the first places in the world in terms of the development of marine resources per capita, from 25 to 50% of the working population is employed in fishing. About 65% of the fish products, which mainly consist of halibuts and shrimps, are exported to Denmark and the United States. At the same time, this makes up for 90% of the total export of Greenland [18]. It is worth noting that Danish biologists express their uncertainty about the sustainability of this industry due to the actively changing environment of the Arctic. Therefore, the degree of reliability of this source of income in the future remains controversial.

5 Results of Research A referendum on the expansion of the autonomy of the province of Greenland from Denmark was held in Greenland on November 25, 2008. The expanded autonomy was officially declared on the island’s territory a year later, on June 21, 2009, on the day of the 30th anniversary of the consolidation of autonomous status of Greenland. This led to the further changes in the functioning of the local self-government as well as allowed the population of Greenland to become a separate nation in accordance with the International Law.

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Greenland, even by the standards of the Northern European states, is an area with an extremely low population density. It has a population of 55,877 (1st of January 2018 Estimate), which recently has been decreasing. Nowadays, Greenland has the lowest population density worldwide (0.027 people per square kilometer). Thus, Greenland is 50 times larger than Denmark, but Denmark has 100 times as many people. It is worth mentioning that there are proven oil reserves in the adjacent waters of Greenland that are twice as large as the reserves in the neighboring North Sea. And although the profitability of these reserves is not high today due to the climate warming and melting of the glaciers, the issue of commercial production is going to be solved in the near future. According to some experts [32], China’s investment activity in Greenland has gone so far that without decisive steps to reintegrate Greenland’s economy into the EU, this strategic de jure Danish territory may eventually turn out to be a de facto Chinese province [11]. The authorities of Nuuk and Beijing have already reached an agreement on the renovation of the three most important airports in Greenland by the Chinese side: Nuuk, Ililissat, Kakortok. Moreover, they agreed on the development of uranium in the Kvanefjeld field, which volumes are estimated at 200 thousand tons. The intentions of China regarding the Arctic are clearly stated in the official document “China’s Arctic Policy” published in January 2018. It states that China is a major “stakeholder” in Arctic affairs, and it intends to play a “key role” in development of shipping routes in the Arctic and contribute to the economic and social development of coastal states. Therefore, the interest of Chinese companies in the resources and infrastructure of Greenland is consistent with the policies of the Chinese government set out in the official “White Paper”. Chinese companies are going to receive an even greater diplomatic and financial support from Chinese government entities in the future due to their policies in the Arctic [9, 10, 29]. Perhaps it was precisely the excessive activity of China in the Arctic in general, and in relation to Greenland in particular, that the Wall Street Journal wrote about the US intention, represented by its president Donald Trump, to buy Greenland that is a part of Denmark. American leaders have made similar proposals in the past. President of the USA, Harry Truman, offered Denmark 100 million dollars (it is 1.3 billion dollars in today’s money) for Greenland in 1946. The deal did not take place then. However, the US Air Force Base “Thule” was set up in the north of the island according to the bilateral agreement on security cooperation. However, it was the limit to which the government of the Kingdom of Denmark had been ready to go to. The government of the Kingdom changed the status of Greenland in a way that the island became a regular integral part of Denmark and not its colony in 1953 in order to prevent any further proposals for the sale of Greenland. Moreover, the proposal to purchase Greenland had been already raised in the US Congress in the 1867 following the example of the purchase of Alaska from the Russian Empire. However, it is worth noting that the first initiator of the deal to sell Alaska was the Russian side represented by the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia N. N. Muravyov-Amursky in 1853. The scandal erupted when it turned out that the idea to purchase Greenland was not a joke at all, but a well-developed plan. Both the Left and the Right, in very harsh terms, accused Donald Trump of insulting the Danes and the

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population of Greenland and even Queen Margrethe II personally. Moreover, according to the chronology of the development of the United States and its territorial expansion, it turns out that the USA acquired most of its territory for money including some territories of Denmark. Denmark has already sold its territories to America. Washington settled an agreement with the Danish government to purchase the current US Virgin Islands for 7.5 million dollars in the aforementioned 1867. However, a devastating hurricane had struck the islands shortly before the ratification of the purchase was carried out. The senators refused the deal due to these circumstances. Then, the USA again raised the question of buying the islands (this time a better price of 5 million dollars was offered) in 1900; the Danish Parliament refused the deal. Finally, the deal was completed in 1917: the Danes voted to sell the Danish West Indies, the colonies on parts of the Antilles in the Caribbean, at a referendum. The United States bought the islands for 25 million dollars. The territory that was bought then was renamed as the US Virgin Islands. Some experts see the strategic logic in the Trump’s idea despite the fact that most people in the United States are joking about the current reports. The purchase of Greenland can only be considered in the context of an impressive and disturbing economic expansion of China on the island and its access to the Northern Sea Route. Nowadays, Greenland, formally, is a member of NATO. Greenland together with Alaska allow the US to keep the entire Northern Sea Route under control not so much with the use of strategic forces, but with the use of short-range and intermediate-range forces. The distance Between Greenland and Moscow via the North Pole is only 3.5–4 thousand km, while via the NSR this distance is halved. It is possible that the withdrawal of the US from the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles in 1987 has this purpose as well. Therefore, Greenland became the next step in the foreign policy of the USA after withdrawal from the previous system of international treaties.

6 Conclusion Taking into consideration everything mentioned above, it can be seen that Greenland currently is Danish autonomy, which is rapidly becoming a Chinese economic and resource province. And the President of the US, Donald Trump, proposed in his declaration that Greenland might become the 51 state of the USA in the future, so that it does not become one of the Chinese operation centers in the Arctic. The Free Associated State of Puerto Rico has pursued the idea to become the 51 state of the USA for more than 120 years, by the way. In our opinion, these actions can definitely change the balance of power in the Arctic region, as well as completely change the lifestyle of the population of Greenland. Nowadays, there is a very alarming and depressing situation with pronounced depopulation of the territory. Greenland has the highest suicide rate – 83 suicides per 100 thousand people a year, where up to 50% of the total number is young people. Moreover, there are about 800 abortions annually for every 700 children born.

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The main strategic goal is to attract human capital, which is the main resource to Greenland. The population of Greenland is 55,877 people as of January 1, 2018, and this is 2 thousand people less than it was in 2016 (57,728 people (July 2016)) [19]. About 90% of the population is Greenlanders (Inuit Eskimos) and about 10% is Europeans, mostly Danes. The personnel of the US Air Force Base “Thule” in the north of the island is not included in this calculations (up to 2–5 thousand people). Neither development, nor retention of a clear plan for stable and sustainable development of the region, especially in such extreme environmental conditions even for the Arctic zone as in Greenland, is possible without a population. A clear example of this fact is the third local government reform of Greenland in the last 10 years (Figs. 1 [23] and 2).

Fig. 1. Population of municipalities in Greenland

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Fig. 2. Administrative divisions of Greenland since January 1, 2018

Acknowledgements. The research was carried out as a part of the scientific project “Social and economic mechanism for mobilizing human resources in Arctic region of Russian Federation” with financial support from the Russian Science Foundation (project No. 17-78-20145).

References 1. Act of Greenland Self-Government (2019). https://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/ Attached%20Files/Engelske-tekster/Act%20on%20Greenland.pdf 2. Agarkov, S.A., Kozlov, A.V., Fedoseev, S.V., Teslya, A.B.: Major trends in efficiency upgrading of the economic activity in the Arctic Zone of Russian Federation. Zapiski Gornogo Instituta, 209–216 (2018). https://doi.org/10.25515/PMI.2018.2.209 3. Balzer, S.: Wie der Gröxit zum Erfolgsmodell wurde. Series in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2017) 4. Berthelsen, C.: Grønlands Hjemmestyre. Grønland Atlas. Nuuk, pp. 44–45 (1989)

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5. Danmark og Grønland vil udvide kongeriget. NORDJYSKE Stiftstidende. https://nordjyske. dk/nyheder/danmark-og-groenland-vil-udvide-kongeriget/35f17163-5c70-484f-8dae-545 f5cfa3a20 6. Danmarks Riges Grundlov (2019). www.grundloven.dk 7. Denmark was the first country to claim the North Pole. Interfax. (in Russian). https://www. interfax.ru/business/413134 8. Eidemiller, K.Y., Krasnozhenova, E.E., Samylovskaya, E.A., Kudryavtseva, R.-E.A.: Spatial analysis of Muslim communities’ convergence in the Nordic European region Scandinavian countries. IOP Conf. Ser. Earth Environ. Sci. (2019). https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10. 1088/1755-1315/302/1/012073 9. Eidemiller, K.Y., Samylovskaya, E.A., Kudryavtseva, R.-E.A.: Islamic diffusion of Nordic countries: Sweden. IOP Conf. Ser. Earth Environ. Sci. 180 (2018). https://iopscience.iop.org/ article/10.1088/1755-1315/180/1/012005/pdf 10. Eidemiller, K.Y., Samylovskaya, E.A., Kudryavtseva, R.-E.A., Alakshin, A.E.: Social and Islamic diffusion in the Nordic countries with the example of Sweden by year 2050. IOP Conf. Ser. Earth Environ. Sci. (2019). https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/ 302/1/012071 11. Gad, U.P., Graugaard, N.G., Holgersen, A., Jacobsen, M., Lave, N., Schriver, N.: Imagining China on Greenland’s road to independence. Arct. Yearb. (2018). https://arcticyearbook.com/ images/yearbook/2018/China-and-the-Arctic/1_AY2018_Gad.pdf 12. Greenland is moving towards complete independence. The Future is Now. (in Russian) 13. Greenland has called Denmark for clearing the island from “American garbage". RIA Novosti. (in Russian). https://ria.ru/world/20161126/1482244081.html 14. Greenland Treaty. https://eulaw.ru/files/greenland_treaty.pdf 15. Greenland and the European Union: a history of development. The law of the European Union. https://eulaw.ru/greenland 16. Greenland National Aeronautics and Space Administration. NasaSearch. https://nasasearch. nasa.gov/search?affiliate=nasa&page=1&query=greenland&utf8=%E2%9C%93 17. Grønlands økonomi. Rapport fra Grønlands økonomiske råd (2017). https://naalakkersuisut. gl//~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Finans/DK/Oekonomisk%20raad/GØR%202 017%20rapport%20DK.pdf 18. Grønland udfordret trods stærkt fiskeri. Danmarks Nationalbank Analyse. https://www.nat ionalbanken.dk/da/publikationer/Documents/2017/08/Analyse_Grønland%20udfordret% 20trods%20stærkt%20fiskeri.pdf#search=grønlands%20økonomi 19. Grønlands Statistik. https://www.stat.gl/dialog/topmain.asp?lang=en&subject=Population& sc=BE#chart-wrapper 20. Gulløv, H.C.: Grønlands forhistorie (2004). https://books.google.gl/books?id=aSaxAnPvg qIC&pg=PA358&lpg=PA358&dq=palæoeskimoiske+kulturer+grønland&source=bl&ots= iIpr4yJVbl&sig=VCE6DWPFvhk_pQ37xz5bbDTzQv4&hl=da&sa=X&ei=2-R0T82YK8b b0QHo2oWqDQ#v=onepage&q=palæoeskimoiske%20kulturer%20grønland&f=false 21. Hasanova, D.: USA, Denmark and Greenland: the unequal triangle of NATO Federal electronic newspaper “The Main Tribune of Russia” (2017). (in Russian). https://www.grtribune. ru/home/politicreview/9844-2017-02-18-09-07-25.html 22. Independent Greenland: for whom and for what? REGNUM news agency. (in Russian). https:// regnum.ru/news/2251246.html 23. Johanna, R.: Municipalities in Greenland Nordregio (2016). https://archive.nordregio.se/en/ Maps/08-Urban-and-regional-divisions/Municipalities-in-Greenland/index.html 24. Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland. Permanent court of international justice. General List 52 and 53. https://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1933.04. 05_greenland.htm

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25. Murray, T., Selmes, N.: Extensive retreat of Greenland tidewater glaciers. BioOne Complete (2015). https://www.bioone.org/doi/abs/10.1657/AAAR0014-049 26. Nuuk Declaration on the Environment and Development in the Arctic. Consultant Plus. https:// base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=INT;n=16071 27. Partiip siunertaa. Velkommen til Siumut (2017). https://siumut.gl/home/parti/ 28. Salkova, A.: The incident in Tula: how the US lost thermonuclear bombs. Gazeta.ru news agency (2018). (in Russian). https://www.gazeta.ru/science/2018/01/21_a_11620106.shtml 29. Travkina, E.V., Ilyasov, R.M., Samylovskaya, E.A., Kudryavtseva, R.-E.A.: Northern sea route: formation of Russian transport policy in the Arctic. IOP Conf. Ser. Earth Environ. Sci. (2019). https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/302/1/012088/meta 30. Voronkov, L.S.: Will Greenland become an independent state? Russian Council on International Affairs. (in Russian). https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/sta net-li-grenlandiya-nezavisimym-gosudarstvom/ 31. Vozgrin, V.E.: Greenland and Greenlanders (1984). (in Russian) 32. Yang, J.: China in Greenland Companies, Governments, and Hidden Intentions? https://www. diis.dk/en/research/china-in-greenland

History and Symbolics of the Catalan Sovereignism in the Context of Geopolitics Vadim Atnashev1,2 and Alexey Tsyb3,4(B) 1 Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected] 2 North West Institute of Management, RANEPA, Saint Petersburg, Russia 3 Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected] 4 Sociological Institute of FCTAS RAS, Saint Petersburg, Russia

Abstract. In the paper, historical and ideological aspects of independence movement in Catalonia are covered. In particular, it is about concepts of national identity, linguistic and political rhetoric of the independence movement. In long history of this movement the myths and facts, geopolitics and philosophy are closely bound. In paper the ideology and terminology of the Catalan nationalism, the political ideas and the economic party of the independence movement are analysed. Stages of political process as it is defined by Catalan, Spanish, English, American and Russian historians and political scientists are discussed. The relevance of the discussed problems is caused by Catalan events of the last years. Therefore, special attention is paid to symbolical support of the movement, a festive ritual and symbolics of manifestation during the annual celebration of National Day of Catalonia on September 11. It also considers estimates of the movement in the centralist and Catalan mass media, and its qualification as one of the latest “color revolutions". The authors analyse the Spanish information resources and reports of news media on events of the National Independence Day of Catalonia (Diada). Keywords: Spain · Catalonia · Spain constitution · Movement for independence of Catalonia · National identity · Catalan Renaissance · Catalan nationalism · Secessionism

1 Introduction There are different groundwork and reasons why separatist sentiments in Catalonia have reached such scales during the last few decades. However, it is worth to recognize that throughout its history, the region has waged a continuous struggle for recognition and autonomy. By evaluating and studying the history of the Catalan region, one can understand the origin of the very idea of the Catalan nation’s identity and their common past. In the modern history of the process, one of the key moments was adoption of the Constitution of 1978, designed to strengthen the upcoming democratic changes in Spain © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 133–142, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_11

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after the death of General F. Franco. Among many democratic institutions fixed in the new Constitution, Article 2 is one of determining rules for the regions of Spain. The Article 2 states: “The Constitution is based on the unbreakable unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible Fatherland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy for nationalities and the regions that make it up, and solidarity between them” [9]. According to this article, Spain was divided into 17 autonomous regions - “comunidades autonomas”, which literally mean “autonomous communities” that gained a relative and, needless to say, limited independence from the center. The “center-periphery” type of relations between Catalonia and Spain during the transition to democracy is most noticeable in politics. When the newly formed government of Spain was entrusted with drafting a Constitution to reflect the needs of a new democratic state, all the major political parties of that time took part in it. These included such parties as CDC (Democratic Convergence of Catalonia, founded in 1974, and since July 2016 - Partit Demòcrata/PD under the leadership of C. Puigdemont) and ERC (Esquerra Republica de Catalunya, founded in 1931), who along with some Basque parties, insisted on paying special attention to the issue of decentralization” [8: 81]. In addition, these parties expressed great interest in embedding a list of civil rights and freedoms in the Constitution, in elaboration of which all regions would take part. The participation of Catalonia in drafting of the Constitution, in the subsequent creation of autonomous communities and the recognition of “nationalities” paved the way for the Catalan region to further strive for greater autonomy, and as a result, to subsequent desire for independence. Obviously, the political identity of Catalonia played a large role in shaping the feeling of a unique identity among the Catalan population and in granting of the right to demand independence to the region [8: 80–81].

2 Historical Factor As rightly noted Fonseca de Jesús in her Ph.D. thesis, the main historical construct of the ideology of separatism is “tradition of an “ancient sovereign nation” that needs independence” [17: 122], which goes back to the period of the invasions of Frankish kings, Charlemagne (in 778) and Louis the Pious (in 800–812). They invaded the northwestern part of Spain dominated by Muslims, where the county of Barcelona was the most significant in the Hispanic Marches. During the reign of Count Wilfred I the Hairy (870–897), the political separation of these territories began, and after 988 Count of Barcelona Borrell II refused the oath to the Frankish king and adopted the protectorate of the Muslim emirate of Lleida. These events are associated with the beginning of the Catalonia’s independence. A famous legend about the origin of the flag of Catalonia is linked to that period of independence. The coat of arms with four bloody stripes on the yellow background was established by the Frankish king himself (Charles the Bald): responding to the request of Count Borrell to grant him a coat of arms, the king dipped fingers of Borrell into his wound received in a battle, and slid them over the Count’s shield. During the periods of Resistance and Reconquista (the main events of which took place till the end of 13th century), in the Confederation of Counties of Catalonia the general legal collection “Usatges” was adopted in 1058. In general, the culture of these

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territories were historically attracted to the French Occitan and Provence, and later to Italy [2: 399–404, 479–492], and afterwards the “Frontación Castellano - Catalana” [22: 125–128] accompanied throughout the new and contemporary history of Spain. In the XII century, following the dynastic marriage between Barcelona Counts and kings of Aragon and the abdication of Ramiro II, Aragon king (in 1137), the Count of Barcelona was considered the sovereign of the united state. In the Middle Ages, this united kingdom turned into a powerful maritime and commercial power [2: 386– 399], pursuing an aggressive foreign policy not only within Spain, but also in France, the Balearic Islands, Italy and Greece. In the 13th–15th centuries, a legend of the Catalan-Aragonese warriors almogávares, Pyrenees highlanders, appeared. They were well-trained, lightly armed infantry performing special assault functions in the military operations of Aragon kings [7, 25]. The battle cry of that warriors “Desperta Ferres!/Wake up, iron!” was taken into symbolic armament by modern Catalan successors. The political and legal independence of the Catalan-Aragonian monarchy remained until 1714, the year of accession to the throne of Philip V, king of Spain. The modern Catalan political science also refers to 1640–1652 (Sublevación de Cataluña/Mutiny in Catalonia) [11], 1873 (Proclamación del Estado Catalán) and 1931–1934 (República Catalana) that can be evaluated as episodes of independence of Catalonia [37]. This “historically established self-identification of the Catalans as non-Spaniards” [17: 124] is, in general opinion, the most important cause of Catalan separatism, the reverse side of which is rightly considered as “simultaneous rejection of those really existing traditions” that combine this region with Spain [17: 122].

3 Language Factor The linguistic argumentation is an essential ideological pillar of the self-identification. Obviously, as E. Roller notes, it was the linguistic policy in Catalonia that played a significant role in strengthening the Catalan nationalist movement [32: 276]. In particular, it was a tool used by Catalan political parties to reveal strong presence of a culture different from Spanish, but also to receive support for the further Catalan agenda in the process of economic, political and social self-determination. The linguistic originality of Catalan culture also revealed itself at the High Middle Ages and the Renaissance. In the sight of Russian experts, in Spain of that time, self-determination of literary traditions took place with Catalan, Castilian and Galician language dominants [28: 51–89]. In Catalonia, it is a juglar/troubadour - chivalry poetry (Guillem de Cabestany, Guilhem de Berguedan, Raimon Vidal de Bezaudun, Guillem de Servera) created in the XII-XIII centuries and developed under the so-called “Provençal school” of the 14th century. Of course, it was also the largest and most diverse representative of the Catalan culture Ramon Llull (Raymond Lullius, 1235–1316) and chroniclers of the 13th–14th centuries.[28: 67–78]. The Catalan medieval autumn and the Renaissance gave birth to the famous chivalric novels “Curial e Güelfa”, “Tirant lo Blanc” by Joanot Martorell et al. (1413–1468) [28: 145–154]. However, the overall picture of that period also includes the Spanish-Arab and Spanish-Judaic cultural and historical traditions. The next revival of Catalan culture was closely connected with the democratic processes of the first Republic era and the Restoration at the last third of the 19th–early

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20th centuries after the so-called Catalan Renaissance (Renaixença) at the second part of the 9th century. In the framework of the pan-Spanish literary and ideological movement of Novecentismo (New Century), ideas of cultural elitism, intellectualism, cosmopolitanism and Europeanization developed against «actitudes decimonónicas» (letters. “Worldview of the XIX century”) and “casticism” (Spanish originality, traditions), “cacicism” (local patriarchal-oligarchic government) [30], as well as against «pesimismo noventayochista» (“pessimism of the generation of 1898”), including also conception “castellano céntrica de España” (idea of Castilian Spanish-centrism), whose fosterer was young José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955). In Catalonia, a variant of Noucentisme developed under the direction of politician, publicist and theorist Enric Prat de la Riba (1870–1917) and writer, significant philosopher and literary critic Eugeni d’Ors (1881–1954). In 1906, the former founded a nationalist party, Solidaritat Catalana (Catalan Solidarity) and the program manifesto La nacionalitat catalana [10]. It was the time of forming of all the main political concepts of independence were formed: “Catalan nationalism”, “Catalanism”, “Pensamiento político catalán” (Angel Osorio) [23], “advocates of autonomy” and “pancatalonism” (José Pijoán Soteras [27: 1–2]). The next stage of the Catalan culture’s revival was closely connected with the language policy of the Catalan period after F. Franco. In response to the Castilian language gaining “official status” in the Constitution of 1978, Catalonia took advantage of its right to use its own language on its territory, as stated in the Spanish Constitution. The “Catalan Language Normalization Law” of 1983 [20] came into force with the aim of encouraging the use of Catalan as well as expanding its use in public administration, the media and education, by providing subsidies to make popularization more likely [15: 314]. Teaching in Catalan was an important step towards introducing its use as a result of the policy. Adopted next, “Ley 1/1998, de 7 de enero, de política lingüística” (“Law … on Language Policy”) [21] consistently approved the concept of “llengua propia” (“own language”). It implied, according to analyst Giovanni Poggeschi, the right to receive a reply in his/her own language at a state institution, but private enterprises or individual entrepreneurs are under no obligations [29: 85–102]. Obviously, the language policy was extremely important in post-Franco Catalonia and it strengthened the use and presence of Catalan in the region. At the same time, the idea of independent Catalonia began to be “nurtured” in the minds of new generations using pedagogical and educational technologies in the educational environment from preschool kindergarten to university, almost in all areas of education. There were public playgrounds and amusement parks, children’s football schools, incredibly popular in Spain [16: 218–296], or the Cavalcade festival of the magician kings, which is probably the main part of the New Year celebrations in Spain [16: 281]. On the eve of the Cavalcade, museums open exhibitions dedicated to this gospel episode, and there are many parents lining up with children to introduce them to this Catholic culture-forming phenomenon. A detailed sociological review “Instrumentalización nacionalista del sistema educativo en Cataluña: el caso del 1 de octubre 2018”/“Nationalist tools of the educational system of Catalonia by October 1, 2018” [16: 248] that was published, for some reason, without indication of authorship, gives a thorough assessment to this aspect of the process.

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4 Economic Factor The economy of Catalonia is significant for the further development and globalization of Spain, so during the modernization period it became the basis for extremely frequent allegations of its success as a reason for the nationalism strengthening [3, p. 125]. Catalonia currently accounts for about 20% of Spain’s GDP, and its population is about 15% of the population of Spain [34: 14]. In her report on the impact of decentralization upon ethnic conflicts and separatism, Dawn Brancati points out that in many countries separatism was motivated by the belief that a particular region works better economically as an independent state [5: 670]. This statement may be applicable to Catalonia. The state collects a significant percentage of Catalonia’s GDP through taxes, which are later used to provide services for Catalonia, as well as for other autonomous regions that are not as successful as Catalonia [12: 85–106]. There is no doubt that the economy of Catalonia is a powerful force. And it is of great importance for the further process of development and globalization of Spain. Catalonia took first place among the autonomous regions of Spain in terms of foreign investments received, which amounted to one-third of the total amount of foreign capital invested in Spanish companies. Barcelona serves as the headquarters for many companies and attracts consumers through tourism that makes it a vital part of the Spanish economy and other areas of society [36: 4]. Therefore, it is worth noting that the main sources of the separatist movement in Catalonia are its huge economic potential and increased funding for the autonomous region by the European Union. With regard to the social aspect, the answers to questions about whether Catalan society has strong internal integration and whether identity is developed on a territorial basis are very ambiguous. One should listen to the opinion, for example, of our Russian leading specialist A.N. Kozhanovsky, according to which sociological “data do not allow qualifying all Catalan-speaking residents of different regions of Spain as a single” ethnic people, “and the problem of identity at the moment comes mainly to the so-called “Local regional self-consciousness, which practically does not carry an ethnic content”, i.e. saturated, rather, with economic and ideological meanings [18: 28]. Meanwhile, the political sources of separatism are institutional model of Catalan autonomy, party system that is separate from the rest of Spain, and the growing number of parties supporting separatism. As noted in the dissertation by F. N. de Jesús, in this part of the movement, “the reason for the popularity and strong position of separatist ideas in the region is the crisis of political leadership in this country while strengthening the position of regional elites in their places” [17: 25].

5 The Situation over the Last years Let’s have a look at the main events within the process in the last six years considering the most massive political event on the National Day of Catalonia (Día Nacional de Cataluña), or simply Diada. It is commemorated on September 11 as the day of the Barcelona’s fall under the pressure of the combined Franco-Spanish troops of Philip V, the future king of Spain, in the War of the Spanish Succession on September 11, 1714 and is also considered as the day of suppression of the autonomy movement [26].

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2012. The demonstration on September 11, 2012, was carried out, according to a Catalan analyst chronicle, “por su carácter familia”, that is practically in a family setting (bearing in mind its extremely non-aggressive character), despite the fact that the city authorities noted the participation of 600,000 people (according to government observers) up to 1,5 million. Main slogans (banderas) were “Autodeterminación y la independencia de Catalunya” /«Self-determination and the independence of Catalunya»/, “Confederación de Catalunya y España, en vista del éxito” /«Confederation of Catalonia and Spain with confidence in success»/, together with the call for “a symbolic measure of eventual/possible referendum” (“un acto simbólico de un eventual referendum”). The latter would have continued in the discussion by the international community with a perspective of transforming Catalonia into an independent state [26]. In 2012, the manifestation began from the intersection of Passeig de Gràcia with Gran Vía, and descended along Vía Laietana to Ciutadella Park, creating the letter “Z”. Symbols of that year were banderas esteladas - flags with red-and-yellow bars and a five-pointed star in a blue triangle at the hoist [16: 248]. 2013. In 2013, 1,6 million people, according to the Generalitat, and 400 thousand according to the central government took part in Via Catalana (Catalan March) [19]. The political rally of the Independence Day is more and more acquiring the character of a “fundamental manifestation” of the independence idea, but also the features of a fiesta and carnival. For example, sports clubs participate in the march (such as the Roller Hockey Club, and other non-political organisations), and its main event is prepared by non-governmental organizations, the National Assembly of Catalonia (Asamblea Nacional Catalana, civil association, operating since 2012) and the Ómnium Cultural Association. Besides, for a “human chain” (cadena humana) which is deployed from the top to the bottom of the Catalan coastline with a length of more than 400 km [1], the organizers sell a set of symbols worth 12 euros (zurrón de la cadena), including a fabric backpack, Canigó water bottle, carbonated Catalan cola, energy drink under the brand “Desperta Ferro” (“Awakening of Steel”) that goes back to the motto and battle cry of medieval Catalan almogavars-warriors (see above) and is intended for “conscious national youth”. They sell also chestnuts, almond cakes from Lerida, biscuits, juices and lollipops with the shape of the Catalan flag. 2014. According to estimates of the Autonomous Police of Catalonia in Barcelona (Mozos de Escuadra), about 1,8 million people participated in the Freedom March (Via de Libertad), though according to government observers there was approximately 500 thousand. Also, about 7,000 protesters took part in the rally against the escalation of independence in Tarrragona [35]. The local name of the 2014 festival was Diada de la V: The procession was formed in the shape of the letter “V”, painted in the banner colors. The letter symbolized a call to vote (votación) stretched from the Diagonal Avenue to Via Grande, with its top point on the Plaza de las Glorias. In the same 2014, two months later, the first referendum 9-N (Consulta del 9-N) on the political future of Catalonia was held [31]. The set of symbols included a yellow or red T-shirt (of one’s choice) with a cloth backpack. 2015. The March of Freedom (Via Lliure) took place in Barcelona and stretched for more than five kilometers, from Ciutadella Park to Rosselo-Porsel Street along Avenida Meridian. The procession was symbolically divided into 135 segments by the number of

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deputies’ seats in Parliament, decorated with mosaic flowers with central white and various outgoing arrows [31]. The movement is organized by the platform Ahora es la hora (“The Hour Has Come”), with requirements of justice and public welfare, democracy, diversity of life models, solidarity, territorial compromise, sustainable development, culture and education, innovation and openness to the world. In addition to the T-shirt, which is always a common attribute in the “independentist kit” of each Diada, the package for Via Lliure 2016 included special materials for participating in the mosaic (chapas and flechas), an explanatory booklet and banderola-box, as well as a children’s T-shirt at price 8 euros. 2016. The manifestation of Independence Day presented a “deliberately decentralized movement” (marcha descentralizada) of five simultaneous performances in five different cities, symbolizing the “pillars” of the planned Catalan republic: freedom in Barcelona, progress in Tarragona, territorial balance in Leida, public justice in Salta and the culture in Berg, each of which was also divided into sections. The “Independentist’s package”, recommended for purchase by the National Assembly of Catalonia (ANC) with the aim of additionally financing the rally, comprised a flag, T-shirt, backpack, fan and felt-tip pen to write one’s name on the T-shirt. 2017. The demonstrators’ movement formed the Giant Cross, “symbol of unity” before the referendum announced by the President of the Generalitat Carles Puigdemont and fixed for October 1. A celebration according to the labor law was planned at the intersection of Paseo de Gracia and Aragón streets in Barcelona under the motto “La Fiesta del sí” (Holiday of YES). According to the ANC, as early as September 11, 400,000 people subscribed, filling out twenty of the 49 sites [13]. At 17:14 all demonstrators raised white sheets with a yellow dot in the center, as a sign that they “were on the verge/put a dot” [6]. Yellow bows tied around the neck symbolized the “repression” of the state against separatist politicians [16: 248]. 2018. “The first Diada after the failed attempt of the republic, which ex-president Carles Puigdemont aroused by a referendum of self-determination” [4] brought to Barcelona streets about 2 million people after the appeal of Quim Torra, the 131st President of Catalonia. It promised to be “the most politicized” Diada, because Pedro Sanchez, Chairman of the government, entered into dialogue with the separatists. Slogans (banderas) and the rhetoric of the manifestation were following: accusations against the Spanish government of political persecution of free thought (Ada Colau, mayor of Barcelona), regret for the failed first Diada of an independent Republic (Carles Riera, party leader, Candidacy for National Unity), mottos “Femla Republica Catalana”, “Hagamos la república” (“Create the Catalan Republic”) [14], “Directos a la cima” (“Forward, to the end”/“Climb to the very top”). The symbolism of the manifestation was expressed by coral-colour T-shirts that match the colour of the ballot box seals used during the referendum on October 1, 2017 [3]. Fiesta colors of Diada [14] allowed centralists to talk about the next conspiracy of an “open society” (obviously, according to counter-narrative logic - a conspiracy against a “closed society”), “wearing the face of George Soros”, placed on the background of burning cars, about the “Sorosian keys of the Catalan secessionism/separatism”, about

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“24 Spanish deputies in the sphere of Sorosian influence” [24]. According to the supporters of independence, ex-president Carles Puigdemont was ostracized but declared from Waterloo in Belgium: “We will persist until they are all free” [3].

6 Findings Today, we can still agree with the statement made in 2010 by F. de Jesús on the Catalan situation: it is not possible “to solve the problem of Catalan regionalism by means of a political agreement” [17: 132]. This problem requires extensive dialogue on all aspects of the relations between the region and the centre, which would lead to a result that would suit both sides. The Esquire blog magazine on this occasion ironically assures: the Catalans know that wars are forbidden in modern Europe, “that we live not only in the era of safe sex, but also of safe separatism” [33]. The basis for any form of nationalism is nationalist ideology, while the Catalan one is rather moderate and liberal. For territorial separatism (secessionism), the main aim is independence or wide autonomy. It is ideology that implies such significant notions as “motherland”, “nation”, and “glorious past” to make nationalism attractive for the masses. Besides, the nationalist ideology revives or constructs different myths and symbols which are translated by traditional means: arts, songs and dances, mass media, national holidays etc. Nowadays the Independence Day in Catalonia is such a traditional event, necessary for the ethnic mobilization. It seems to be a true symbol of the desired independence and freedom. However, it cannot be compared with “orange revolutions” and linked to the interference of any foreign state because of its geopolitical interests. Thus, the Catalan separatism is internal affair of Spain or in the last resort of the EU. It is gratifying that like in 2016–2018, it has been obvious that “If the metropolis cannot keep the separatists by peaceful means, then nobody allows to do this by military ones” [33].

References 1. Abades, D.: Diada. El Confidencial, 11 de septiembre de 2013. https://www.elconfidencial. com/espana/2013-09-11/diada-11-de-septiembre-de-2013_27148/. Accessed 23 May 2019 2. Altamira-y-Crevea, R.: Historia de España y de la civilización española. Herederos de Juan Gili, Editores, Barcelona, vol. I, p. 672 (1909) 3. Artusa, M.: Diada: Cataluña festeja su día nacional con una masiva marcha y la independencia como bandera Clarín. Mundo (2018). https://www.clarin.com/mundo/diada-cataluna-fes teja-dia-nacional-masiva-marcha-independencia-bandera_0_H1msTXBOX.html. Accessed 11 Sept 2018 4. Artusa, M.: La Fiesta de nacional Cataluna marca por el reclamo separatista Pressreader (2018). https://www.pressreader.com/. Accessed 20 May 2019 5. Brancati, D.: Decentralization: fueling the fire or dampening the flames of ethnic conflict and secessionism? Int. Organ. 60(3), 651–685 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1017/S00208183 0606019X 6. Camps, C.: Cinco grandes manifestaciones en cinco imágenes que han dado la vuelta al mundo. Barcelona. Lunes. El Nacional.cat, 11 de septiembre de 2017. https://www.elnaci onal.cat/es/politica/manifestaciones-independentistas-diada_190245_102.html. Accessed 24 May 2019

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7. Chusé, L.B.R.: Almugávares. Via Sus! p. 520. ARA Cultural, Zaragoza (2010) 8. Colomer, J.M.: Game Theory and the Transition to Democracy: The Spanish Model, p. 75. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Aldershot (1995) 9. Constitución Española, p. 51. Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado, Madrid (1978) 10. Costa, J.: Oligarquía y caciquismo como la forma actual de gobierno en España: modo de cambiarla Clásicos de Historia. https://clasicoshistoria.blogspot.com/search?q=Joaqu%C3% ADn+Costa+Oligarqu%C3%ADa+y+caciquismo+como+la+forma+actual+de+gobierno+ en+Espa%C3%B1a%3A+modo+de+cambiarla. Accessed 04 Mar 2019 11. De Melo, F.M.: Historia de los movimientos y separación de Cataluña y de la guerra entre la majestad católica de Don Felipe El IV Rey de Castilla y de Aragón, y la diputación general de aquel principado, p. 116. Biblioteca selecta de clásicos españoles de la Real Academia Española, Madrid (1912) 12. Desquens, J.: Europe’s stateless nations in the era of globalization: the case for Catalonia’s secession. Bologna Cent. J. Int. Aff. 6, 85–106 (2003) 13. Diada: ¿Cómo será la manifestación el 11 de septiembre en Cataluña? 2017 El Pais. https:// elpais.com/ccaa/2017/09/11/catalunya/1505119463_111062.html. Accessed 24 May 2019 14. Diada de Catalunya 2018: La manifestación en directo streaming. Video 2018. La Vanguardia Política. https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20180911/451767501604/diada-barcelonamanifestacion-2018-en-directo-streaming-hoy-video-seo-lv.html. Accessed 20 Mar 2019 15. Earl, L.R.: Spain’s linguistic normalization laws: the Catalan controversy. Hispania 79(2), 313–321 (1996). https://doi.org/10.2307/344927 16. Instrumentalización nacionalista del sistema educativo en Cataluña: el caso del 1 de octubre 2018, p. 335. Societat Civil Catalana, Barcelona. https://www.aebcatalunya.org/images/inf orme-ensenanza.pdf. Accessed 04 Mar 2019 17. Jesús, F.N.: Features of separatism in Spain at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, Voronezch, p. 177 (2017). (in Russian) 18. Kozhanovskiy, A.N.: Cultural and language variety of the population of Spain: theory and reality: abstract of the Thesis, p. 28. IEA, Moscow (2013). (in Russian) 19. La Diada de Catalunya, en directo 2014. El diario.es. https://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/ Diada-Catalunya-11-S-Via_Catalana_13_301799820_3224.html. Accessed 10 May 2019 20. Ley 7/1983, de 18 de abril, de normalización lingüística en Cataluña, DOGC 322, pp. 892–894 (1983) 21. Ley 1/1998, de 7 de enero, de política lingüística. Generalitat de Catalunia, Bacelona, p. 19 (1998) 22. Morales-Moya, A., Fusi Aizpurúa, J.P., Blas Guerrero, A.: Historia de la nación y del nacionalismo español, p. 1518. Edición de María Cifuentes, Barcelona (2013) 23. Ossorio-y-Gallardo, A.: Historia del pensamiento político catalán durante la Guerra de España con la República Francesa (1793–1795), p. 310. Villanueva y Geltrú, Madrid, Barcelona (1913) 24. Pappalardo, D.: El movimiento separatista “catalán” lleva la cara de George Soros Geopolitika.ru (2017). https://www.geopolitica.ru/es/article/el-movimiento-separatistacatalan-lleva-la-cara-de-george-soros. Accessed 22 May 2019 25. Pascot, J.: Aventuriers de l’Histoire, les Almugavares, p. 236. Elsevier, Paris (1971) 26. Pi, J.: Masiva manifestación por la independencia de Catalunya. La Vanguardia. Politica (2012). https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20120911/54349943522/diada-manifesta cion-independencia-catalunya.html. Accessed 10 May 2019 27. Pijoán-Soteras, J.: Pancatalanismo Traducción por Javier Martínez Política y cultura, antología, ed. J Castellanos, pp. 17–19. La Malgrana, Barcelona (1990) 28. Plavskin, Z.I.: The Spanish Literature from Origin to the Present, vol. I, p. 510. Filologicheskii fakul’tet SpbGU Publ, St.-Petersburg (2005). (in Russian)

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29. Poggeschi, G.: Linguistic Rights in Spain Minority Rights in Europe. In: Trifunovska, S., de Varennes, F. (eds.) European Minorities and Languages, pp. 85–102. T.M.C. Asser Press, Hague (2001) 30. Prat de la Riba, E.: La Nacionalidad Catalana. Traducción de José Javier Martínez, vol. 76, p. 45. Clásicos de Historia, Barcelona (1906) 31. ¿Qué se celebra en la Diada de Cataluña cada 11 de septiembre? El Confidencial (2017). https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/cataluna/2017-09-11/diada-cataluna11s-11septiembre-historia-que-se-celebra_1441573/. Accessed 10 May 2019 32. Roller, E.: When does language become exclusivist? Linguist. Polit. Catalonia J. Natl. Identities 4(3), 273–289 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1080/1460894022000026132 33. Safe separatism: from Catalonia to Donbass 2016 Esquire (El recurso electrónico). https:// esquire.ru/separatism-126. Accessed 20 Mar 2019 34. Vernikov, V.L.: Two whales of the Spanish economy, p. 176. Ves’ MirPubl, Moscow (2010). (in Russian) 35. Villarreal, R.: Miles de manifestantes claman en Tarragona contra la consulta del 9-N. El Mundo (2014). https://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2014/09/11/5411dac5ca47414b708b458e. html. Accessed 24 May 2019 36. White, A., Brun-Aguerre, R.: Catalan Challenge Asks Real Questions of Europe Economic Research: Global Data Watch, p. 5. JPMorgan Chase, London (2012). https://www.vilaweb. cat/media/attach/vwedts/docs/jpmorgancatalunya.pdf. Accessed 10 Apr 2019 37. Zamorano, A.: ¿Ha sido Cataluña independiente alguna vez en la historia? BBC Mundo, 9 noviembre 2014. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2014/11/141009_espana_catalunya_ independencia_az. Accessed 20 Apr 2019

Ideology and Geography of Foreign Policy of Philip II the Prudent Considering Philosophical and Political Discourse of the Era Nikita Ivannikov1 , Julia Pshenova1 , and Alexey Tsyb1,2(B) 1 Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected], [email protected] 2 Sociological Institute of FCTAS RAS, Saint Petersburg, Russia

Abstract. The means of ideological influence accompanying foreign policy activity of the Monarch of Spain Philip II Habsburg (1527–1598) are analysed by authors in this Article. “The doctrinal climate” and the main concepts of political ideologies of the Golden Age of Spain is investigated the Renaissance Pragmatical Machiavellianism and political Platonism, the Reformation Humanity and Catholic Counter-Reformation, the “Catholic Imperialism” and national political Idea of Spain. The area of the review included separate, most known episodes of foreign policy activity of the King of Spain Philip II and socio-political doctrines of the Spanish Theorists of the XVI century. Major methods of foreign policy of Philip II were not only inquisition, Spanish warfare and dynastical marriages but powerful ideological work and propaganda as well. During the first 20 years of his reign, Philip II sought to maintain peace with European neighbors while the main problem was the activity of the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean. Another important objective was completion of the Italian Wars with France. Main rival of Spanish Empire in both Europe and America was England. Mutual resentment of the monarchs was empowered by difference in religious beliefs, led to a military conflict, which resulted in loss of Spanish naval supremacy and its fleet, “The Spanish Armada”. This was a major strike on Spanish economy and political influence. The article focuses on directions of foreign policy of Spanish emperor and political ideologies alongside them. Keywords: History of Spain · Spanish empire · Foreign policy of Philip II Habsburg · Indigenism · Gothicism · Romanism · Messianic providentialism · Catholic empire · National idea of Spain

1 Introduction Foreign policy activities of Philip II (1527–1598), second representative of Habsburg dynasty on the throne of Spain were various and complex. Elder son of Holy Roman Empire monarch, Charles V (who was also ruler of both European and overseas Spanish territories) was really up to the task. Gaining numerous lands in 1556, 29-year old king

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 143–155, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_12

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of Spain succeeded in fulfilling his duties; 40-year rule of Philip the Prudent concluded Golden Age of Spanish Empire. However, the fact still that this was the beginning of “the first global Empire downfall” [19]. Reasons for that naturally predefined process mostly stem from principles and methods of the foreign policy of the monarch. They were deeply analyzed and well defined in earlier studies but we shall more concentrate on regarding them considering contemporary to Philip II political studies. This shall be done in order to consider possibility of evading disastrous consequences of some unfledged and rash actions of the Philip the Prudent. Such nonofficial titles usually held important metaphorical meaning pointing on some specific and distinctive trait manifested in activities of the monarch (including satirical, sarcastic and negative meanings). Political ambitions of the king of Spain Philip II were always dependent on the array of issues: religious beliefs (which were constantly intermingled with state and political interests) and dynasty priorities and interests. Like his father, Charles V, Philip II regarded main objectives of his rule as creating global Habsburg monarchy and restoration of ideological hegemony of the Catholic Church all over Europe. In order to achieve these goals Spanish King used every possible mean, available for a monarch: enhancement of bureaucratic system and military power of the state, official and secret diplomacy, peace arrangements and war campaigns, dynastic marriages, managing duties and responsibilities, using special managing style without concerns to correlate it with traditional judicial norms, activities of secret agents, political terror and contract murders – so every possible mean from Renaissance Machiavellism arsenal. Bureaucratization, enlargement of government, demonstrative struggle with local corruption and authoritarianism, unification of state law – altogether with specific personal traits of Philip II (“king, supporting the image of pathologically responsible fanatic” and even more, diagnosed by modern psychopathologists as obsessive compulsory disorder in the way of being possessed by any idea and perfectionism in “symptoms of unhealthy thoroughness and suspiciousness, fear of letting anyone else to finish the deal, tardiness, grumpiness, mercilessness and coldness” [2] created the phenomenon of power, fostered by “time of shaping new model of Spanish monarch” [2: 38].

2 Objective of the Research Goal of this historic research is to analyze peculiarities of ideological instruments, used together with methods of foreign policy activities of Philip II, according to “doctrinal climate” and main “conceptos de España” (concepts of political ideologies) of the era. These are pragmatic Machiavellism and political Platonism, Reformation humanism and Catholic counter reformistic approach, “Catholic imperialism” and national political idea of Spain. Some specific, most renowned episodes of his foreign policy activities.

3 Statement of the Problem Though the strength of impact on actions of King Philip II by political doctrines of contemporary scientists is still a discussable issue, we tend to focus on the precedents themselves. It is clear that these doctrines affected his activities; the birth and rise of

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the Empire fostered unprecedented drive of Spanish scholars of the XVI century to engage into doctrinal sociopolitical activities. Though doctrinal climate was largely affected by common European trends (Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, Reformation Humanism and Renaissance Machiavellism), it still ceased to have very specific Spanish traits.

4 Research Issues Firstly, the very idea of “doctrinal climate” which is capable of influencing political conscious of the Spanish monarch should be taken into consideration and discussed. The philosophical pillars of Spanish late medieval and Renaissance mentality are the following: 1) traditional Spanish “Senequismo” with its Christian transformation of ideas on fate, recurrence of historical experience, reflected in political ideas regarding Tacitism, or appealing to historical experience of Roman Republic as for material explaining contemporary history (“el conocimiento de la historia y la experiencia”) [8]; 253]; 2) Medieval Aristotelianism, which at this time was concentrated in ideologies of influential orders of St. Dominic and Jesus and explicated by them into the idea of providential history (events of which are stated in the plan drafted by Divine intelligence in the moment of Creation) and fostered by “Policy” of Aristotle in the political area, describing supremacy of autocratic monarchy over any other type of state [3: 457]. It also was represented by pragmatic political science of N. Machiavelli; 3) Medieval Platonism, which entered Catholicism through the St. Augustin (therefore, practiced by St. Augustin order ideologists) and represented in the concepts of “Civitas Dei and Terrestris” [1: 1245–1360] and of the monarch as deputy of the Lord on Earth in His absence [15: 46, 6: 67–86]. 4) Renaissance Platonism appealing to studies of Plato about “art of politics as knowledge”, “art of herd cultivation” in the area of political concept [15: 25], advantages of competent authoritarian rule as “wagoner with reins of state governance”, [15: 15] and different types of monarchies, like “tyranny and rule of the king” [15: 45]. Applied political climate of researched time («concepto de España» en los siglos XVI y XVII) is defined by many researchers as complex of the following ideologies: Gothicism, Romanism, catholic imperialism, indigenism and new indigenism, catholic Messianism, creation of French enemy image, regarding downfall as a problem for Spain (“goticismo”, “romanismo”, “imperialismo catòlico”, “indigenismo y nuevo indigenismo”, “providencialismo mesiánico”, “construcción del enemigo: el vecino francés and “conciencia de la decadencia como problema de España” respectively [11: 95–125]). From this position, we shall review some of Philip II foreign policy directions: Relationship with Habsburgs. Division of the empire conducted by Charles V started rivalry within the family, which did not erupt in open confrontation because it suggested the option of unification f territories on dynasty basis. The situation provided the background for the imperial ideology of Gothicism and Romanism for foreign policy. The

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first one had vague geopolitical argumentation, which stemmed from the idea of common origin for gothic (German) peoples. Gothicism was clearly demonstrated in the study “The crown of Gothica, Castile and Austria” by Diego Saavedra Fajardo (1584–1648) [16]. Under the words of Spanish historian Jose J. Sanmartin, Saavedra was “radical idealist, who did seek to achieve imperial and Christian dream of Spanish Austrians”. This dream was about creating Neogothic Empire with Spain, Austria and Sweden [17: 208]. Spanish historian also claimed that “the book of Saavedra seeks both legal peculiarities which will unite Spaniards, Swedes and Austrians and open way for Germanic states to join common venture which is the essence of balance in continental Europe”, that will also serve the cause of compensating “threatening of too powerful French kingdom existence, with its ambitions for warfare and political hegemony. At the same time “sphere of Swedish influence will not face neither directly nor at any other way with interests of Spanish monarchy” [17: 210]. The second one regarded historical experience of Ancient Rome and tradition of holding the Holy Roman Emperor or the Hispanic emperor title [16: 110, 10]. In the beginning of XVI century control over Benelux region countries were granted to Habsburgs and these countries started to be the part of Holy Roman Empire altogether with Germany, Spain, Italy and the New World. Due to warfare and financial needs of the time Charles V, emperor of Holy Roman Empire sought to centralize Habsburg reign over other European and North-African states. He expanded territories with a series of war campaigns. When the Emperor resigned, he decided that the Empire is too big to be governed singlehandedly. Therefore, he divided the Empire among his brother and son: governance over Spain, the New World and Benelux countries was handed over to Philip II; German and others territories were granted to Ferdinand the I, granting him the title of The Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Relations with the Austrian Habsburgs were of great importance for the foreign policy of Philip II. It should be emphasized that regardless of the misconceptions and argues brought to life by different aspects of policy towards Italy and Germany, Spain and Austria tended to cooperate rather than to become war adversaries. To uphold ties with Austrian lineage of Habsburgs king Philip raised two sons of Maximilian II (Ernest and future emperor Rudolph II) from 1564 up to 1571. Family ties with Austrians helper Spanish king in fight with the Ottoman Empire. Emperor Maximilian signed peace treaty with Turks and Danube turned out to be territories of common interests. But for Philip Muslims were a threat, particularly for his Italian lands. French Direction. Philip II inherited the throne of Spain in 1555, when Spain was engaged in war with France and on the edge of financial collapse due to ambitions of Charles V. As the result of war, Spain announced its bankruptcy in 1557 for the first time. Nevertheless, war itself was ended up wis the victory of Spain in the battle of St. Quentin leading to Cateau-Cambresis peace treaty of 1559. Historians regard the end of the inherited conflict as the true start of the reign of Philip II. The following neighborhood relations with France were enforced by marriage with Isabelle de Valois and undermined with intervening in the domestic fight between Catholics and Huguenots under the Holy League activities. External policy in this case was alongside with ideologies of catholic

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messianism («providencialismo mesiánico») and creation of French neighbor enemy image («construcción del enemigo: el vecino francés»), which was relevant until the Bourbons started its rule in Spain [11: 95–125]. Relations of France and Spain for a long time were all about warfare. It was caused by longevity – more than 50 years - of Italian wars (1494–1559). These were series of armed conflicts between Spain, France and Holy Roman Empire. Italian wars were started be Charles V, who inculcated his son with the idea of hegemony of Spain in Europe. This was the armed conflict for having Italian cities in domain and hegemony in Europe and Mediterranean and apart from mentioned-above France, Spain and Holy Roman Empire involved England, Scotland, Switzerland, Venice, Papal States and other Italian city-states. In fact, it had started as dynastic argument for the throne of Kingdom of Naples, but later outgrew in pan-European adversary of Habsburgs and France for being hegemon it Western Europe. In order to ensure peace and guarantees within FranceSpain relations the third marriage of Philip II with Elisabeth of Valois, daughter of the king Henry II of France. King Philip put efforts to enforce diplomatic ties with Catherine of Medici. Religious anxiety about spread of Huguenots ideology in France in short time became common issue for the discussion of the European monarchs. Philip devoted funds to the fight with Huguenots in France. However, the situation got more complicated with Catherine de’ Medici switched her positions otherwise, marrying Henry IV of France, protestant. This was followed by St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre on August 24th, 1572, when around 2000 of protestants were killed in Paris and 3000 all over France. The king sent his armies to France in 1590 with the purpose of all Huguenots’ extermination in the Brittany, Languedoc and other provinces. Local settled garrison was dispatched in Paris in 1591, which main objective was to support and uphold interests of Catholic Church. The real goal of Philip II was marriage of his daughter with one of the catholic heirs for the throne of France. But as the matter of fact the reign of protestant king Henry IV was set up in Paris in 1594. Regarding this circumstances, Spanish king were even more desperate to interfere civil-religious clashes of French people. Meanwhile resources of the Spanish treasury were at low ebb and at last were totally exhausted which inevitably led to the only one possible outcome: King Philip had nothing to do but sign a peace treaty with Henry IV and acknowledge entirety and sovereignty of France. Relations between Spain and France during the reign of Philip II were greatly dependent on religious and territorial disputes between the monarchs. Overall, it can be stated that Spaniard tried to use policy of peaceful diplomacy, as he understood possibility of Anglo-French alliance in case of the open conflict. The armed forces of these two countries combined were powerful more than enough to put an end to potency of Spanish king in Europe. His religious beliefs and harsh methods of fighting heresies were pushing French authorities to pursue various activities in the Netherlands in order to distract attention of Philip and as the consequence allow France to be able to complete its own major political actions. Relationship of three major European monarchs – heads of England, France and Spain - cannot be estimated as warm or even friendly. In fact, its complicated structure reminded of “the eternal triangle” with different monarch on

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each apex trying to balance between his own interests and avoiding the posing threat of possible alliance of two other kings. English Direction. Philip became a widower in 1558 for the second time. His departed wife from this beneficial dynasty marriage was Mary Tudor, daughter of Henry VIII. Form that time England began its turning into rival state as the new queen of England, Elisabeth I was deliberately distancing from Catholicism in order to adopt Protestantism. That was against Spanish king’s political course at the moment, the last may be described as Imperial Catholicism in order to keep up with the principles of “aggressive catholic demands” («reivindicación del catolicismo militante») [20: 81–119], he consistently acted against the Queen of England. He led secret campaign in favor of Maria Stuart and continuation of catholic influence in the country. Spanish campaign did not succeed ending up with catastrophe of Spanish Armada in 1588. Relations of Spain and England during the reign of Philip II may be divided in two alternative periods – in the times of Mary Tudor and during the reign of Elisabeth I. Mary Tudor was crowned as the queen of England in 1553. Since that day protestant movements tried several times to overthrow her in favor of Elisabeth, who was protestant. In order to protect her power and throne Mary Tudor made decision to become allies with the catholic dynasty of Spain. That resulted as well in the rebellion headed by Tomas Wyatt, who were deeply dissatisfied with the decision of Mary to improve relations with Spain by this way. However, this rebellion was crushed and queen of England married Philip II. After spouse of Philip had died (being last heir to the Tudor dynasty), Elisabeth I ascended the throne of England. She was protestant and did not have any interest in supporting Spanish ambitions of its hegemony and interests of Catholic Church. King Philip attempted to marry Elisabeth in order to try to bring England into the fold of Catholic Church. This attempt was strongly rejected by the English queen. This reject was the end of the idea of having alliance of Spain and England as catholic states. Queen Elisabeth and England became bitter rival and main adversary of Spain. England also regarded Spain as the main competitor in the issue of expanding and governing colonies in Western hemisphere. Moreover, English support for the independence of Northern provinces of the Netherlands caused even greater enmity of the Spanish monarch. Therefore, rivalry between Spain and England started from the personal conflict of their rulers and worsened because of both different strategic interests for colonial territories and religious beliefs, which affected foreign policy of the states. Queen Elisabeth had no will to be inferior to Roman Catholic Church leader and thus, she abjured Catholicism. Her foreign policy main direction was to compete leader status of Spain as metropolestate and to excel it. In order to achieve this goal queen of England gave a permission for English corsairs that granted them with opportunity to attack and rob Spanish boats headed to Spain from America. Significant event happened in 1569, when Spanish boats had hided from pirates in English harbors, while carrying money for Duke of Alba. Queen Elisabeth ordered its takeover by corsairs and rejected all further demands of Spanish crown to return looted spoils. Spanish ambassador in England failed to achieve success during the negotiations and advised introducing embargo for English property in County of Flanders as a countermeasure. In response for that, Queen Elisabeth did the same towards Spanish properties in England. Another important decision was to

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create naval blockade around cities of Northern Spain. That limited harshly access of merchants to the market and created deficit of goods and products in this region. These political actions of the English monarch pushed Spain towards open armed conflict with England. It has to be mentioned that Philip tried to avoid armed conflict as long as it was possible because he understood the possible danger of Anglo-French union, which will be of a great damage to Spain. The war with two major powers of the European continent would be very sophisticated and dangerous path to tread. Spanish monarch supported new conspiracy against Maria Stuart brought by Elisabeth in 1570. Participants – Spanish ambassador in London amongst them – had plans on murdering the queen of England and sending armies after that in order to support claim of Mary Stuart. Royal council of Spain approved the plan but the conspiracy was exposed at the moment. Spanish ambassador was sent away from London in March of 1572, which undermined diplomatic relations between countries and resulted in 7-year pause in it. During that period, England actively supported the uprising in the Netherlands and English naval forces systematically robbed and destroyed Spanish boats sailing from the New World. While that break of diplomatic relations between England and Spain lasted, ties within Habsburg dynasty strengthened. This happened with the help of Spanish agent in London, scholar and merchant Antonio de Guaras who had tight liaisons with stepbrother of Philip, John of Austria. Both “parts” of the Habsburg dynasty had plans on the issue of invading England but it was not possible to fully cooperate because both of monarchs had own political ambitions and plans for future actions. That is why Philip refused to participate in the plan of his Austrian brother about open invasion to England, but secretly supported two armed expeditions to Ireland. These were aimed to cause uprising in order to undermine English power and exhaust its resources. Both attempts were unsuccessful and only inspired even more English will to help people of the Netherlands and the County of Flanders. Another point was that Elisabeth renewed talks with France about uniting their forces to fight against Spain in the Netherlands. Diplomatic relations were restored when new Spanish ambassador in England was appointed – don Bernardino de Mendoza. Soon he launched talks with Mary Stuart, establishing greater relationship between Philip and her. Finally in 1580 Philip decided that he will support her claims for the throne and started to create grand plan altogether with Scottish Catholics and Society of Jesus. This plan involved religious propaganda in Scotland, making Mary Stuart the next queen of England, arresting her son (he was under suspicion of being a protestant) and his following transfer to Spain, landing of Spanish armed forces and organizing an uprising in Northern England, where Catholics were especially powerful. But members of Society of Jesus were not careful enough and plans of the Spanish king leaked to France. That forced Philip to reject realization of his plans. Even more, when Mary tried to restore her powers with help of France, Philip refused to help her efforts. Marquise de Santa Cruz convinced Philip II to create new plan of invading England. The idea was not new, as it was suggested several times before. But king did not approve it both times, until the year 1583.

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Spanish ambassador Mendoza was sent away from England because he was under suspicion of organizing a plot for killing queen Elisabeth. This was the precedent for breaking official diplomatic ties and for start of waging a war, though the last wasn’t officially declared. So the main reasons of conflict between England and Spain during the reign of Philip II were: • Protestant faith of Elisabeth I; • Execution of Mary Stuart, queen of Scotland, in 1587, as a result of her attempt to organize a plot against protestant queen of England in order to claim the throne for herself; • Personal mutual contempt between king of Spain and Queen of England and rejected proposal of marriage. Moreover, Queen Elisabeth endorsed actions of corsairs – pirates, whose authorities were granted by patron-state. They robbed trade boats and coastal cities of hostile countries and rivals with support of their patron. Under command of notorious Francis Drake some Spanish boats loaded with gold and silver were captured near the coastline of the New World. They even attacked city of Cadiz – main harbor of Spain in 1587. King Philip, inspired by Spanish armed forces, especially naval fleet, had great hopes and aspirations for war with England. Main idea of the plan was to destroy English fleet with one heavy strike and then in case of successful war campaign conquer all England. Spain, which had already expanded to Portugal to that moment (that granted access to Portuguese treasury and complementary profits of West-Indian colonies) accumulated significant amount of resources, which was more than enough for a full-scale war with Britain. As it was mentioned above, war intervention was not the only plan – Philip also had the idea of overthrowing Elisabeth I from the throne in favor to Catholic Mary Stuart. But regarding the fact this plot was uncovered, Mary was decapitated and English naval fleet received an order to destroy Spanish one. Clash between England and Spain was all about naval fleets face-off. Philip II created “Spanish Armada” to fight with Britain. It consisted of 131 galleons carrying 17000 well-armed soldiers and 180 Catholic priests. Predominantly fleet was sent to Dunkirk, France, where Armada should pick 16000 more Spanish soldiers. “Spanish Armada” sailed from La Coruna to England. On August 6, fleet was at anchor in Calais harbor. Englishmen filled eight old ships with inflammables, set them on fire and set them sail towards Spanish fleet. Emergency retreat of Armada led to a disaster. Among all of the rush, they were sailing out by one and became easy prey for prepared English ships, armed with long-ranged cannons. Spanish captains tried to traverse for evading English fire and land troops on British boats but failed regarding greater mobility of English ships allowing them to keep distance from Spaniards. Many Spanish galleons sank during the bombardment, all that remained headed North. English ships did not pursue them as they went out of gunpowder and could not use their victorious tactics. As all that was left from “Spanish Armada” bypassed Scotland and headed south, they were heavily hit by storm. Many of ships were casted on Irish rocks, many of Spanish soldiers died there. These ones who were still alive

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and succeeded in reaching the land were killed by English soldiers, located in coastal settlements. Less than 10000 soldiers were left from 25000 of Armada garrison. Later, in Battle for Gravelines “Spanish Armada” was overrun by England. That resulted in severe damage for Spanish global naval superiority. Portuguese Direction. Portugal and its overseas territories became the part of Spain in 1580. Dynastic marriage was a reason for the transition of inheritance of Portugal to Philip II after death of Sebastian I the Desired in 1578 and Enrique I (the last childless representative of House of Aviz) in 1580. Regardless of that, Philip still had to use warfare and bribing of Portuguese nobility to support his claim for the throne of Portugal. Spanish king promised autonomy, respect of Portuguese historical rights and privilege of the people to the Cortes. He also promised to call in them, appoint only Portuguese on local positions and to create the Council of Portugal. Nevertheless, in the future, all of his promises were broken and interests of Portuguese people were neglected in favor for Spanish. Natural counteractions of Portuguese population (which included, apart from all mystical movement of nobility “Sebastianism” with its goal to wait for the return of the “sleeping king” [14: 55], were suppressed by Spanish propaganda. One of its leaders was professor of Coimbra University Jerónimo Osorio (1506–1580), represented in the world history as “humanist with international reputation, close to the first Jesuits, led by Ignatius of Loyola” [5: 87] and “counterreformational machiavellist” [5: 83], one of the first “grandes figures de l’humanisme Portugais” [5: 84]. He studied Civil law and Antic classic in Salamanca, Aristotle in Paris and Plato in Bologna and Venice, where he experienced influence of the Eastern fathers’ platonic traditions, St. Augustin and Areopagite. His doctrine of “catholic transnational empire” was conveyed in the study of Jerónimo Osorio “De Nobilitate Civili and De Nobilitate Christiana” [12]. País Baios Direction. Philip II felt nothing but contempt for this “heresy-ridden” and its political privileges. Nevertheless, this 17 economically developed regions – Flandria, Brabant, Hainaut, Artois, Namur, Luxembourg, Mechelen, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Frisia, Geldern, Groningen, Overijsell, Drenthe, Ommelanden, and Limburg – were a great tax recourse for the crown. Empire used force methods of Machiavellism on these lands, strictly following ideas of theoretician from Florence: permanent dislocation of Armada garrisons, catholic terror and well-planned murder of the leader of political opposition. But main recommendations of Machiavelli for “states, added to inherited states by conquest….which belong to different nations and using different languages….and in which it is enough to eradicate the house of former prince” [9], p. 6–11], were not fulfilled. Among them were “three main ways to hold the power – the first is to destroy, the second is to move there and live, third one is to let citizens live by their law” and using cruelty “when it is swift and caused by security needs, not persistent and used for the good of the subjects” [9: 24, 46–47]. These simple decisions were suppressed by dominating foreign policy doctrines of “providencialismo mesiánico” [11: 111–114] and “imperialismo católico” [20: 109], qualified by contemporary historians as “antimachiavellism” [20], p. 81–119]. It ended up with exhausting for Spanish economy war for the Netherlands independence. Within the reign of Philip II tensions between Dutch bourgeoisie (and its supporters) and absolutism strengthened. During first years of his reign, King lived in Brussels,

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accompanied by a great Spanish army in the Netherlands. These armies conducted attacks on France and in fact occupied southern provinces the Netherlands. Upkeep of Spanish armies were a heavy burden for the population of these provinces. Philip II was even more tough that Charles V while implementing orders against protestants. Catholic Church of the Netherlands obtained extra amount of bishops and new lands which before were the domain of the Dutch nobility. Philip left for Spain in 1559 leaving his sister Margaret of Parma as a governor and old Hapsburgs’ political leader cardinal Granvell, and withdrawing Spanish armies only in 1561. Philip had a strong feeling of contempt towards this “heresy-ridden” country, its political privileges. His opinion on the Netherlands as a tax reservoir was even more tough than his father’s. However, if Charles tried to contribute and help Dutch bourgeoisie in its foreign trade operations to some extent, Philip did nothing at all to ease its existence. He favored Spanish merchants to the Dutch ones, closing access of the latter to Seville and other Pyrenean significant trade posts. Extra taxes on Spanish wool, which was of great interest to the Dutch manufacturers led to significant reduction in its import – that resulted in severe damage on the economy of the Netherlands. Rise of tensions within Anglo-Spanish relations was another strike for the Dutch trade operations as reduction in Anglo-Dutch trade resulted in many cases of bankruptcy for the merchants and manufacturers in the Netherlands. Huge unemployment within people who were working in export-oriented production sphere was another consequence of the foreign policy of Philip the Prudent. Discontent of both bourgeoisie and working class of the Netherlands with Spanish absolutism started it transformation not only to its acute form but also may be regarded as social pattern of nationalist character. This social movement demonstrated growth both in numbers and in intentions. Calvinist bourgeoisie had created a union of their own, “Merchants’ compromise” as nobility did before. Calvinism did spread fast across these lands. In fact, local government did not dare to repress Calvinists. Soon mentioned-above social movement involved not only bourgeoisie and workers of export-oriented sphere but villagers and urban residents as well – this was the start of the revolution. While being wary of national movements, government made temporary secessions. Inquisition and other special judicial institutions officially stopped their activity, and Calvinism was approved and allowed as a religion. Due to suppress protests Philip II points the new ruler of the Netherlands, duke of the Spanish city of Alba, Fernando Alvarez de Toledo. The new ruler settled up with the bloody and violent dictatorship in his domain. He had all rights to fight with condemned heretics and sentence people with death penalty and confiscation of property. The latter became the main reason for the nobility to be displeased and wealthy people. Some of them were even in need to flee to save their lives without any concern given to the property. Direction of Western Indias. Spain became one of the most powerful and influential European states with the help of American resources in the beginning of Habsburg rule. The crown of Castile and Aragon turned into first colonial monarchy in Europe. This resource direction was the origin of “new indigenism” (“Nuevo indigenismo”, from Latin “indiges” for “native ethnic”) as the ideology for foreign policy, a doctrine of integration of natives of Western Indias in the Empire. This doctrine is interesting because of adopting two controversial options for natives, between “barbarian and slave

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are definitions equal by themselves” by Aristotle [3: 377] and formula of “new citizens of the empire”, including “sovereignty of natural human” and “happy barbarian”, restoring Stoic concepts of “life alongside with nature” freed from historical excrescences, having genuine humanistic approach. First part is supported by humanist Juan de Sepúlveda, tutor of Philip II, interpreter of Aristotle’s “Politics” [4: 160], author of the doctrine of just war for empire and legitimization of American Indians’ slavery as the natural state for natives of America [18]. The second one is brought by his opponent, Antonio de Guevara, councilor for Charles V, bishop and inquisitor in “No rústica plática del rústico”, considering problems with violent abruption of less civilized territories and having “rhetoric worthy a Roman senator” [7: 295–302]. It was also brought by Antonio Montesino and Bartolomé de la Casas of Dominican order [13: 148–162].

5 Methods of the Research This research touches upon only some aspects of foreign policy of Philip II, which may be definitely be linked to some of the political doctrines of this era. This was done in order to define any specific doctrine that may be core principle of Spanish foreign policy in that time. Regarding all mentioned above it is possible to say, that political doctrine of “Catholic empire” dominated among others and was key political ideology defining foreign policy of Philip II. The other Issue is consistency of such approach, taking into consideration tendency personal traits of Philip the Prudent.

6 Results It is needed to admit that though imperial Catholicism held supremacy over other political ideologies, king was not holding on to it. This imperative, adopted by Charlemagne and Otto I was widely counteracted while being implied by Charles V and Philip II. Forces of Reformation Humanism and Renaissance pragmatism, new economic milieu – they all contributed to failure of consistent imperial Catholicism. Character of the Spanish empire faced the problem of eclectical usage of methods for its saving and new eclectical logistics of foreign policy courses requiring flexible implementation of different political methods in its different regions.

7 Conclusion Global plans of Spanish monarch were doomed to failure. Permanent involvement in different armed conflicts with European states led to the loss of warfare domination by Spain, particularly on sea. Territorial losses were also substantial – the Netherlands got its independence, part of colonies also changed their allegiance. The greatest among all were financial losses in the result of many wars exhausting the treasury and subsequent economic crisis. Overall results of the rule of Philip the Prudent may be divided in two categories: 1) Financial losses, economic crises, loss of territories, catastrophe of Spanish Armada.

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2) Win over Osman offensive, unification of Iberian Peninsula (started by Ferdinand and Isabella), involvement into success of Catholic Church activities (stopped spreading heresies in Spain and imposed Henry of Navarra to adopt Catholicism). Ideological support for external policy practices was holistic. “Conceptos de España”, united by idea of catholic empire included apart from gothic and romantic components adopted such important ideological approach of Spain as “Guerra sagrada”, consolidating Catholic world against Muslims of Osman Empire and North-Western Africa. Concentrated character of the king should positively affect this consolidation, but at the same time perfectionism, totalitarianism and alignment of methods cause myopic failures in foreign policy. They were also caused by unwillingness to deal with new European reality, inflexible usage of Italian experience (while the last was well-known in Spain and compatible with Spanish national character).

References 1. Agustín, St.: La Ciudad de Dios. In: Moran, P.Fr.J. (eds.) Obras de San Agustín, tomo XVII, pp. 1245–1360. Biblioteca de autores cristianos, Madrid (MCMLVIII) (1958) 2. Antonova, N.V., Zaytsev, A.A., Kapustina, E.V.: Character of Philip II of Spain in estimation of contemporary hispanists of Europe and America. In: Historical, Philosophical, Political Science and Law, Culturology and Art Science. Gramota, Issues of Theory and Practice, vol. 5, no. 67, pp. 37–40 (2016). (in Russian) 3. Aristotle: Politics. Ed. W. D. Ross. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1957). https://www.perseus. tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0057%3Abook%3D1%3Asect ion%3D1252a 4. Bejarano, M.M.: Historia de la filosofía en España hasta el siglo XX, p. 563. Renacimiento, Madrid (1927) 5. Briesemeister, D.: L’honneur comme forme de vie le Traité de Gloria de Jérôme Osório (1992). https://www.uc.pt/fluc/eclassicos/publicacoes/ficheiros/humanitas43-44/05_ Briesemeister.pdf 6. Chaparro, S.: Mito y razón: religión y política en una historia del mundo del siglo XVI. Foro Interno 3, 67–86 (2003) 7. de Guevara, A.: Reloj de Príncipes libro III. In: Blanco, E. (ed.) Capítulo III. Fundación José Antonio de Castro, Madrid (1994). https://www.filosofia.org/cla/gue/guerp.htm 8. Hernán, E.G.: Escritores Políticos palentinos del Siglo de Oro. PTITM 73, 245–273 (2002) 9. Maquiavelo, N.: El Principe. elaleph.com. https://ocw.uca.es/pluginfile.php/1491/mod_res ource/content/1/El_principe_Maquiavelo.pdf 10. de Mariana, J.: Del Rey y Institucion de la dignidad Real, p. 462. Impreta de la sosiedad literaria y tipografica, Madrid (1845). https://fama2.us.es/fde/delRey.pdf 11. Morales, M.A., Fusi Aizpurúa, J.P., de Blas Guerrero, A.: Historia de la nación y del nacionalismo español. Ed. M. Cifuentes, p. 1465. Galaxia Gutenberg, Madrid (2013) 12. Osorio, J.: La nobleza civil. Revista Hidalguía, vols. V 21, 25, 27, VI 31 (1957, 1958) 13. Paniotova, T.S.: Meeting of cultures: dispute on conquista, just wars and “natural slavery.” Cult. Civiliz. 6, 148–162 (2015). (in Russian) 14. Plasencia, J.L.R.: Los reyes de Portugal y sus alias. Alcántara 86, 49–60 (2017) 15. Plato: Statesman. Platonis Opera. Ed. J. Burnet. University Press, Oxford (1903). https:// www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text.jsp?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0171%3Atext% 3DStat.%3Asection%3D311c

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16. Saavedra, F.D.: Corona gothica, castellana y austriaca. Jean Baptiste, Verdussen (1678) 17. Sanmartín, J.J.: Saavedra y el goticismo. Res Publica 17, 201–221 (2007) 18. Sepúlveda, J.G.: Tratado sobre las justas causas de la guerra contra los indios, p. 175. Fondo de la Cultura Economica, México (1941) 19. Sutherland, N.M.: The grand strategy of Philip II. Hist. J. 43(1), 309–316 (2000) 20. Vilar, M. P.: La reivindicación del catolicismo militante en el antimaquiavelismo ibérico del siglo XVI. El De nobilitate christiana (1542) de Jerónimo de Osorio. RIRA 2(1), 81–119 (2017)

The Psychological Aspects in Political Ideas of the Cambridge Platonists as an Alternative to 17th Century Global Thinking Olga Bachvalova1 , Nadezhda Golik1 , Alexander Semenov1 , and Alexey Tsyb1,2(B) 1 Sociological Institute of FCTAS RAS, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] 2 Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

Abstract. Political aspects in Cambridge XVII century are viewed through presenting some of the ideas typical of the Cambridge Platonists. These aspects are taken into consideration to reveal some core psychological principles the Cambridge Platonists defended in ideological clashes and debates. These principles are typical of the Cambridge Platonists and some other platinizing philosophers. To reveal these principles the researchers’ position should be viewed through somewhat psychological optics, which leads to internalists’ approach that might cause the use of some other kind of notions and of logic. It would be apt to trace some battle for gaining access to these psychological structures by taking into consideration not only some modern political situation but some historically defined and even partly forgotten debates between the representatives of the old church views and the representatives of the new scientific approach in Europe taking into consideration some thinkers in the XVII century England clashing in political but first of all philosophical debates concerning the human nature and the ways it should be treated both theoretically and practically. The defended principles should be regarded as modern ones, despite the fact the XVIIth century theological debates concerning political aspects are deemed obsolete. The political level is a necessary measuring device to test metaphysical and scientific ideas of the Cambridge divines. Keywords: Platonism · Politics · The Cambridge Platonists · Henry More · Ralph Cudworth · Thomas Hobbes · Emotions · Higher and lower emotional planes · Innatism · Empiricism · Geography of unknown · Liberalism · Latitudinarianism

1 Introduction The political aspects of life are covered and are to be covered as they influence and regulate our state and well-being. Politics may be treated in many ways but it is definitely not a new notion so the researchers and politicians have to revise the political background both historically and philosophically. It is necessary and it should be done © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 156–167, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_13

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from time to time for the sake of improving the methods and goals of political theory entwined in current political processes. Strictly speaking, practical politicians do not need any theoretical background, neither they need any recurrence to historical events as they rely mostly on the personal scope or instincts which allows us regard politics as one of the arts rather than one of the sciences but personalizing politics, reducing it to some volitional sum total of its adherents would be not correct and sufficient. It is evident to every “naked eye” nowadays that political issues are being monitored and calculated with mathematical precision which would otherwise be impossible if the modern politicians could not guarantee the results predicted beforehand, moving successfully along the path of political technologies. The art of the politician is just being switched into some other level. Not denying the value of personal volition and intellect, we could rely also on the power of technical analysis that the political practitioners use to both leveling and distorting the political landscapes, moving the situation towards desired outcome. These analysts mostly act critically, by revising the actual political events and the political ideas of the past. As some of these ideas prove to carry nothing but historical curiosity, others deserve much more attention and analysis to be carried out possessing some intellectual potential, the modern politicians could make use of. Mostly though we see the personal impact of the politicians are substituted by various analytical methods employed not by some certain persons but by special analytical groups supporting political figure we could see publicly. In such a situation even a powerful politician charged with personal charisma loses the clout and becomes nothing but the political puppet unable to deploy personal capabilities at the political battlefield. His personal charge in this case is lost in vane and the situation is again unpredictable and discouraging. Both sides, the politician and the people are again in the state of chaotic imbalance, provoking another political problem to be solved. Thus, the political process is nothing but the sequence of political turmoil with no hope to overcome these difficulties even in distant future. The imbalance is not so harsh to live with if it is controlled, but when it comes to some serious problems, politicians have to search some solid ground to step on otherwise the warfare with difficulties is totally lost. To our mind such ground politicians find or try to find in the nature of human beings in their inner self being [6] treated differently depending on the political views of the politicians in charge of the current political situation. That struggle for the human souls could be vested in various political disguise but it aims mostly at the same soft spots all the time no matter the historical period or the stage of development. These soft spots are both intellectual and volitional dimensions of human beings. The psychological profiling by practical politicians touch specific clusters of psychological states that can be characterized as lower and higher emotional levels accessible practically by political manipulators and seem to be as some kind of psychological constants to gain access to. It would be apt to trace some battle for gaining access to these psychological structures by taking into consideration not only some modern political situation but some historically defined and even partly forgotten debates between the representatives of the old church views and the representatives of the new scientific approach in Europe taking into consideration some thinkers in the xvii century England clashing in political but first of all philosophical debates concerning the human nature and the ways it should be treated both theoretically and practically. We shall be able to see the drastic significance of the human being soul treated by one

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political side as a priceless asset and by some other sides as something to worth fighting for. We also could find in the theories of these parties the characteristic vestiges of the above-mentioned high and low emotional levels in human psychology that can be viewed as some kind of triggers or pressing points that were used effectively to influence the political through the psychological. Political shades of historical events and everyday life is impossible to trace without some procedure of mapping the sequence of politically grounded decisions that could partly guarantee the penetration to this “geography of unknown” in this devastating political realm.

2 Problem Statement We could limit here the problem field to some specific matter pertaining mostly to psychology or rather to the matters in politics having the counterparts in the human being inner world. We could not state in here that suchlike aspects are treated by politicians and by politologists. This could be put to the fact that the aspects are employed only if we try to improve the human nature as a whole, not concentrating on some compartmentalizing or dissecting human psychoprofile. This all through approach cannot guarantee the fulfillment of most political programs as it entails multiaspect allocation of the efforts both actual politicians and political theoreticians. For these reasons, most politicians restrict themselves to solving more particular rather than general problems. They consider the human being nature to be too complicated to deal with integrally, so limiting the efforts mostly causes volitional aspects of the law-making process to be sufficient and effective but not efficient. Nevertheless, we can see some other types of thinkers who make it possible for themselves to ponder the problems within the ever-greater scope wishing to gain access to some hidden vast human potential we possess without applying it to our unsuccessful life. Some of such thinkers being purely utopians offer no decision whatsoever. Others, we are interested in, being well versed in the hidden treasures of human psychological geography, produce methods to find those evasive truths in ourselves that can really guarantee positive results. Though mostly such thinkers may be erroneous in juxtaposing their ideas with harsh reality, we can surely do them credit as they not only produce theories but are actually in the midst of the political events of their epochs. Such inclusion allows to classify them as unsuccessful but quite possible law-makers failed only due to the fact of immense complexity they had put to the array of the tasks they tried to cope. Returning to psychology we can see that volitional type of governing tends to harsh drastic measures causing political extremism and theological bigotry, limiting human happiness to the boundaries of necessitating proximity. On the other hand, integral approach is aimed at development of the human being not only within these certain tasks but what is more important beyond these problems solving vicious circling. Thus, the human being is able to set goals not only inside “war against everybody” situations but break the limits of dull and tedious provocative reality we have to live in. Not all of such thinkers are powerful enough intellectually to discuss them in this paper but some of them ignited massive debates trying to attract the supporters by disseminating their ideas and aspires. A case in point is the Cambridge Platonists of the XVIIth century.

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3 Research Questions To understand the situation with the Cambridge Platonists and their vision of liberalism we do not have to concentrate on the historical events solely. Rather we should penetrate under the shell of their theological works to reveal the common denominator of their views in politics as being first of all theological one or, strictly speaking, ethical one. The ethics of the Cambridge Platonists asks for a certain type of the human being, not similar to the types defended by the teachings of Hobbes, Descartes or even other liberal thinkers of that time. No matter how many aspects of the necessary human being type the Cambridge Platonists took into consideration, they concentrated on the deified individual, freed from the bondage of limitations imposed either by external force or by own weakness. What is more, the Cambridge Platonists considered this as something quite possible, trying to present some kind of mental technology to discover and reinforce creative factors in the human being psychology. Therefore, the research questions would be the possibility of what was suggested and its stability in real political life for real political purposes. The article intends to reveal the core psychological profile set against the theological ideas typical of the Cambridge Platonists and demonstrate the way some of the psychological traits could influence on the development of liberal political philosophy in the XVIIth century. The aim of this paper is to elucidate some important aspects of political ideas dwelling within the Cambridge Platonism. It is only some conventional wisdom to consider the representatives of the Cambridge Platonism as nothing more than sublime thinkers paying attention to metaphysics and abstract matters ignoring down- to- earth problems [1, 2, 12]. The above stated position of the Cambridge Platonists may be well explained by the fact that the Cambridge people “did not take sides with any existing parties”, thus posing themselves as not active political figures [15]. Nevertheless, political activity was not foreign to the Cambridge Platonists and it was based on their special ideas about the essence of human nature that caused their criticism as these theologians asked for deification both in theology and in politics. Like many platonically oriented thinkers, the Cambridge Platonists held it that philosophers should be kings and with the Christian Fathers they held that “the philosopher separates soul from body more than other men” [14]. It is interesting to stress in here that Cambridge Platonists “display few characteristics which separate them from the Moderates of the previous period”. When these early period moderates focused on the virtue of moderation only, Cambridge people were at war with passive detachment of noninterfering position. They proclaimed the war should be waged only to gain some specific state in your soul and no external clashes are necessary. This specific radicalism creates some doubts about the liberal mainstream, but only if we forget the aim of such a war and that is self-development with later inner liberation [8]. Being also moderate in many ways, Platonists tried to preserve the unity of the nation during those social upheavals such as the Civil War. The most attractive is their belief in the nature of man as possessing high attributes of the divine. Unnatural inhumanity of the war did not break their beliefs in human good nature. We may naturally wonder why the Cambridge scholars paid so much attention to human beings as such disregarding at times what any politician could not afford to, that

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is, the structure of the state and the actual political processes. Though in here we could claim their abstract lofty idealism, preventing their logically impeccable treatment of the political matters, we could say that their war was not localized historically and concerned more of perpetual struggle of people for their souls stay intact after the ferocities of real life warfare. The purification of human nature they were struggling for was the utmost goal as only by achieving such elevated states of high intensity, people could hope for some stable peaceful life in future after the war has been over. Through these ideas, the Cambridge Platonists act as peacemakers. The passions provoking sectarianism and cruelty should be put to the test of reason and consequently put aside for the sake of much more tempered reason based approach and practice of every day and political life. Here indeed, we find in the Cambridge Platonists more of Christianity rather than Platonism [8: 96]. We try to demonstrate the importance of the Cambridge Platonists School for the development of liberalism in England. As the key concept is liberty, we should state in here that this concept was held as something close to a moral virtue. That definitely gives an idea of liberalism as some ethical rather than political matter. Even the primary attempts to define or classify the notion of liberty give us some duality, as liberty can be regarded as either release from captivity or slavery or as exemption from arbitrary, despotic or autocratic rule. The philosophers treat such aspects as the so-called negative liberty (“freedom from”). This notion would be enough to describe the systems akin to those of Hobbes’s or Locke’s but absolutely insufficient to characterize the political ideas of the Cambridge Platonists which are a powerful critique of contemporary theological and political ideas. As we try to demonstrate later, the negative liberty for the Cambridge Platonists is only a starting point for their criticism and creating the ideas within the scope of the so-called positive liberty. The positive liberty necessitates freedom from passions that should guarantee the central all sufficient intellect capable of efficient functionality and diminishing imperfection of human nature and, later on “being able to fulfill oneself in other, higher ways”. It is possible to trace this concept as far back as Plato’s time, which stresses the integral character of Plato’s teaching concerning political realm [10]. Therefore, in this aspect, the Cambridge Platonists are also oppressive as they tend to treat the possibility of development as moral duty. Without striving to develop themselves, people inevitably fall into the passivity of lower emotional states losing the possibility to expand horizons. To achieve higher emotional states people should be alert as if tiptoed. Hence, the principle of activity so much spoken about by Ralph Cudworth and indirectly mentioned by other Cambridge divines [3]. To guarantee the absence of arbitration and oppression Henry More held it would be necessary to strive the goodness practically and to cherish mutual tolerance, which required reason in the actions of the parties (or individuals) involved [13: 204]. The Cambridge Platonists have worked to establish or find some grounds of certitude trying to rearrange the mode of thinking and faith so that these could guarantee the accession of people as a whole and some certain Congregationalists in particular. To do that for the Cambridge Platonists was to struggle against anything mechanistic and mechanical both in metaphysics and in other matters of more practical bent. The mechanization of the world picture and human nature at the cost of lack of integral character of human and heavenly nature of the world was totally inappropriate for the Cambridge

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Platonism. That is why they worked out similar matters and like many thinkers of the New Modern Era strove to establish veritable grounds in the reality they studied, but they took quite a different mapping method and applied it differently to the “geography of unknown”.

4 Purpose of the Study The massive of facts accumulated by the researchers of the Cambridge Platonists does allow to treat these facts not as mere set of opinions, but as some logical sequence of the ideas, perhaps, not properly formulated to sound as easy to grasp and easy to follow. Nevertheless, their form of presenting ideas should not preclude our acquaintance with their heritage. First, we should doubt the fact that the ideas of the Cambridge Platonists were less political than metaphysical. It is true that metaphysics prevailed but it is not true to state that it prevailed theoretically not practically. Being preachers and watching the situation with the congregation, the Cambridge Divines searched the ways to attract people and divert them from the hazards of atheism or atheistically oriented forms of worshipping. Therefore, this position cannot be the position of some cool observer detached from the challenges of the real life. They defend political as some expression of the higher reality through which people could attain integrity and truth. Unlike Calvin, the Cambridge men believed in total inclusion of people into the divine reality. To them the reality was true not only in divine sphere but also in mundane everyday actions. The revelation made to all men was democratic in character as it was represented by reason and reflected actively back to reality. The only valid unity of this process is the individual who must make the most of his God-given potential. This very potential possesses intellectual components rather than volitional ones and what is more, these components really enable the unity with God presenting in everyday actions. So the legitimacy and efficacy of such a society are sanctified by eternity unlike some transit nature typical of the sovereign leadership making exercised by pure volitional acts. The self-determining power in individual nature should be cherished and maintained through specially organized forms of conduct in everyday personal life and at some later stages in everyday political life. “Cudworth’s political ideas are underpinned by two central ideas. The first is that intellectual origin should prevail as voluntarists aspects of political issues leave much to be desired if taken separately. The second is the Trinity and Christ as its second person representing himself in active life supporting divine deeds” [4: 2–3]. Cudworth’s political ideas stem from his notions of intellectual as possessing enough ethical potential to create an ethical person and to develop ethical origin both within people and within the mind of the divine. The establishing a reliable bond between the minds of people and the divine is the following consequence of actions: 1. As the access to absolute truths is guaranteed to each member of community the member himself should not forget about this possibility and do his best to attain these universal truths. 2. When a person attained these truths he should develop subtle abilities to discern good and bad in typical and complex life situations.

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3. The above-mentioned steps should lead to the awareness and acknowledgment of the human equality based upon reason. Moreover, this equality must be shared politically so that a real ethical community could be created. Cudworth’s conception of political society or ethical community cannot be found in a single work. Only reading as many of his works as possible, we could have the scope of his political ideas [4: 222]. Mostly in his works, we find his ideas concerning the active character of reason as the only necessary to realize the true nature of reason. This point in here is extremely important as only active reason is ethical in character and its active nature can tie man to the divine. Cudworth does not divide reason into practical and pure components but tends to view reason not as something human but as something divine accessible to human beings. The Immutable Morality should be viewed through Christian Platonic Trinity optics, as it is the only way to understand fully the above-mentioned principle of reason activity. Only cultivating understanding of these divine laws human beings perceive the justice of the divine intellect in the world. The correct understanding is the only necessity to understand ethical and political in life. Cudworth does not accept Ethical legalism as it is. He highly regards goodness and holds duty inferior to it. Duty and obedience should not prevail without ethical context. Cudwoth’s First Sermon draws attention to the dangers of “self-love” [4]. What is typical of Cudworth it is his efforts to disregard the views of those XVII century thinkers who tried to divorce politics and theology. To him, reality is represented both at theological and political levels. Politics is and should be some manifestation of reality. Only one kind of manifestation, that is incomplete. It is The Trinity that held by Platonists in general and by Cudworth in particular as the integral unity. To a human being this is truly the higher level of reality that could be attained practically by mastering and exercising free will transforming baser emotions into something that technically could be designated as higher emotions. This very level of emotional contents is somewhat paradoxical as being technically lower than the highest intellectual ability, the highest emotions both start up intellect and serve as ethical validity. From this starting point, we may begin as possessing the liberty of the divine. Politics for Cudworth is not a blind force trying to find the position of temporary balance in between some enigmatic factors but a purely practical way for a man to come to know the correct ethically virtuous path to take in life. That is, Cudworth stresses the necessity for personal development first a moral personal self–determination is nothing without social ethics exercised politically. At this stage, the greater good of the wider community prevails. This stage is not a superficial one. Neither it is purely hypocritical as this kind of society built as an ethical community enables for a Christian virtually good life [16]. The happiness of such a life guarantees, as Cudworth holds, the absence of any kind of coercion and oppression as divinely liberal people free from baser emotional burden, would personally regard any forms of oppression as the invitation to lower life horizons which is inappropriate for any Christian. The matter of conscience is of paramount importance as to the attempts to codify it politically. Again the dimensions of the internal and the external both personally and socially come to the first positions as in codified reality the innermost phenomenon of conscience can eradicate the most gross moral mistakes and create some striking

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effects within any personality intended to be freed and transformed in a Christian way. We also can see that rational interpretation of Christianity is, so to say, the most logical and simple from the point of view of the highest emotions that act only after they have been achieved within the human being psychological profile. The only problem in here would be the weakness of the highest emotional states and losing the controlled usage of them but once achieved these states could be presumed as a reliable anchor for any Christian practitioner. Here we could compare the ideas of both Hobbes and Cudworth. The Cambridge divine holds that political views of Hobbes diminish the political powers of the individual. As Hobbes is focused on the obligational aspects of the political, he insists on the double sword responsibility (the individual obeys the magistrate and the magistrate should protect the individual). This double self-restriction does not allow either the individual or the state to evolve in right direction towards the development of both parties. What is more, Hobbes relied on the naked power, disregarding the fact that power as it is not stable enough to create the model of sustainable (or stable) development. Here Cudworth criticizes the personal aspect of power as not all of the people possess rationally verifiable principles of justice. To Cudworth justice cannot be either created or achieved by power alone, resting solely on some arbitrary principles. The will of the sovereign is only some limited self-restricted manifestation of power within human soul. It is mostly devised to be linked with baser emotional plane and never rises beyond. Only the pure intellectual sphere dwelling somewhere between the human and the divine can build up some doubt but merely as instrument for selfimprovement (hence the willpower) and later use this instrument as if backwards exercise the domination over matter. The problem is that this instrument may start dominating in its turn, suppressing the intellectual sphere. Here we may have a formidable trap to get into, as exercising will we are totally lost for the good of the intellectual powers thus being neglected. Thus, we should never forget about the highest for the sake of the lowest. This is not a theoretical problem but a practical one at that. Having in mind that most people do not penetrate inside their inner selves Cudworth prescribe some kind of intentional soul purification through temporary switching off personal volitional impulses connected with the intellect at the lower level. However, many researchers stress in Cudworth writings the position of reason, in reality Cudworth, no matter knowingly or unknowingly advocates a deeper level of human soul. It might be characterized as the level with no “self” or some harmonizing level, after “visiting” which the human being rejects transitional, cast it off and turns to eternal vast arrays of human possibilities that in normal, purely volitional states are impossible to reach. Now we could say that Cudworth strove for the limitless sheer blissful states of mind where emotions do not distort human personality while being suppressed but formed the steps for achieving ecstatically colored states (not purely ecstasies as in sects of numerous enthusiasts). All the possibilities are achieved better, partly individually and partly through community. Some moral truth better understood by the collective mind but the community should be psychologically leveled by placing aside their lower desires. This causes real difficulties as the varieties in the human psychology may prevent reaching common ecstatically colored states. It would be apt to dwell slightly the problem of British empiricism as this form of knowledge and all the psychological states typical of empirically oriented mind are not in

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line with platonical strivings of the Cambridge divines [5]. The Cambridge Companion to Empiricism is deeply rooted in sensualism. In fact, they are interconnected and this very moment is very complicated within the discussion we are trying to do in this article. The difficult moment is that the Cambridge Platonists are also could be regarded as sensualists unless we take senses and intellect separately. That analytical approach is fine when we concentrate on the objects separately. This is convenient when we dissect the dead body, presenting it to be dead at the outset. As we know, this approach is valid if we design some mechanism having in mind its possible improvement and even perfecting its functions according to our desires in future. In other words, we produce a slave machine and then we produce the same situation politically. However, our convenience here is not the integrity the Cambridge Platonists tried to disseminate. They defended the most possible range of states that definitely should be assumed. At this level a separate intellectual or a sensual side would be insufficient, as penetrating each other these phenomena may change themselves and could be treated differently. Due to this fact, the ideas of the Cambridge Platonists were criticized for the so called occultism. However, that only was made by those who could not understand their striving to stability of another kind, the stability of harmonized origins within human soul. This state produces higher emotions that make it possible for a human being to attain direct intuitive knowledge of the reality. We should discuss some forms of knowledge, as some of these forms have been neglected or forgotten. One of such forms is sensualism, which is capable of producing nothing but gross incomplete evaluation but nearly true. This form of knowledge is indispensable for operating effectively within transient problems requiring quick decisions. As any other form of knowledge, it can be developed and perfected. It is in the XVII century British empiricism this form of knowledge is employed and formed new notions in mathematics, physics and the whole new world picture. That new world picture was the result of mechanically dominated science supported and validated by instrumental approach. This new task cannot be grasped only within empiricism notions as the premises of British empiricism create some incoherent picture. Not only Hobbes or Bacon can be viewed as “founding fathers” of empiricism in Britain. The novelty could be not only reevaluating empiricisms by Hobbes or by Bacon but also restoring some other notions from mechanics or even Metaethics. This “new science” is regarded not just statically but in its coming to be. Therefore, it would be apt to refer not only to Hobbes or Bacon but also to their opponents or supporters who naturally were theologians. This situation could be called natural as new thinking wave of Hobbes by undermining ecclesiastical order transformed the world picture which, sad to say, was not coherent and in some points unknown. The whole period makes us think about some incessantly shifting political positions. So not a few politicians and thinkers borrowed the notions from empiricism and sensualism. As modern philosophizing cannot be effective by focusing efforts on a single thinker only, but takes the reality in its most complexity and variety, we should not compare philosophers to one another by mere juxtaposing paying attention to other intellectual trends. One of such trends was Cambridge Platonism.

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5 Research Methods Only vaguely can we approach to the understanding of the Cambridge Platonists heritage. It is noted by not one scholar that the ideas they presented in their works are obscured by unclear metaphorical language and by their adherence to vitalistic ideas now completely forgotten [7, 9]. Nevertheless, we cannot pass by the ideas clearly defined and forming some logically arranged unities, presenting some instruction to follow. We cannot ignore the fact these ideas are presented in such a manner they could be treated and used practically to exercise psychological steps to be able to understand and master your inner world. Therefore, the first method to follow would be just typical psychological introspection that can guarantee the meeting with your inner world. The next step would be realizing the presence within your inner geography some zones that could be approximately estimated as “stable”. Working with these zones in relaxed states urges the contact with higher emotional states and later inducing and reinforcing them, to find the proper position for the emotional states of the lower nature. And the final moment the Cambridge Platonists insist on is the realization the fact that these higher emotions excel the pure intellect and their loss would be ruinous as it switch the human being in the passive emotional states making people just intellectual animals – cold and cynical.

6 Findings As for positive trends revealed by this article, we may certainly focus on the following ones: it is still apt to search various methods to improve various aspects of the human being psychological potential, especially those pertaining to the highest levels of the emotional plane. At the same time we should not ignore the possible dangers on the way of practical achieving of such states, that is, the initial phase of this process should be total purification of our emotional life and drives so that the remnants of the lower emotions could not fuse the higher ones thus marring the purity achieved. Self-limitation must not be the aim of the process but just a step to the final goal that is the integrity of the human being and of the society. Liberal approach is not a political convenience but a necessary condition for both personal development and the development of social institutions. The subtlety of the inner world provokes constant loss of guiding lines both as to personal development and to social mechanisms to be attended. We also can mention the negative trends: pure theological approach could be not valid if limits itself to punitive aspects ignoring positive in human beings. Searching the elevated states does not guarantee the absence of limiting factors, preventing the all-round development. At times it is even worse when limitations are imposed so to say “from above”. The striking examples are the occult and the false illumination claimed by various enthusiasts. As purification and elevation are time-consuming, the practitioners must possess self-discipline strong enough to achieve the results for further development. Unstable political situations provoke “operative”, “watchful” states of mind, preventing the inner blissfulness, the Cambridge Platonists tried to evoke and fix, making the type of development they defended possible only within the monastery walls.

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7 Conclusion After such a brief review it would be incorrect to state the actual situation concerning the influence of the XVIIth century Cambridge Platonists on the current political situation but we could conclude that theological background of the political matters deserves further investigation to reveal some hidden mechanisms of human psychology either taken as such or being applied to some certain political issues [11]. Positive representation of the human being typical of the Cambridge Platonists is a little bit “odd one out” as it contradicts both to classical theological ideas of human sins that should be suppressed and to “new political” teachings such as one of the Hobbes extremely cynical and harsh. The “liberal wave” of that period was only at the stage of formation. Nevertheless, some powerful thinkers opposed the pressing of religious dogma and defended somewhat vaguely articulated yet clearly sensed ideas of personal freedom. The struggle for this freedom was actually typical of nearly every prominent thinker of that time irrespective his theological preferences. Nevertheless, every such thinker vested his ideas in various metaphysical and ethical shell trying to achieve the completely new type of human being modifying human nature with every possible means. Any political party tried to form different kind of personality by aiming at various soft spots levered psychologically. Nevertheless, the difference in approaches was striking. If non-liberal theologians of the old school just tried to stick to some old style position and the “new philosophy” representatives strove to expand horizons both disregarding human nature, liberally minded theologians and thinkers stressed the importance of vast human potential to ponder, to cherish, to maintain. Though being positive at the outset, this liberal platform outlined in the works by the Cambridge Platonists lacks some protection to be fulfilled in real political storms. In view of possible political improvement, we may speculate that the Cambridge Platonists presented some valid ideological platform for effective personal growth technologies we cannot yet achieve and accomplished being immersed in incessant hysterically biased political circus chase. This is not only with some vague hope but with a sound certitude we may state that once the state of psychological serenity is achieved all the darkened matters become clearly realized and everything is possible and the only fixed points in the “geography of unknown” would be the notions “goodness” and “happiness”. To finish we would like to cite the aphorism 686 of the Cambridge Platonism originator Benjamin Whichcote: “Liberty is not a Deformity, but a Perfection” [17]. Acknowledgments. The reported study was funded by RFBR according to the research project № 20-011-00845.

References 1. Carter, B.H.: Politics, theology, and Cambridge Platonism: the Trinity and ethical community in the thought of Ralph Cudworth. Ph.D. thesis, Middlesex University, London (2004). https:// eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/13445. Accessed 10 May 2019 2. Cassirer, E.: Die platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge. B.G. Teubner, Leipzig (1932)

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3. Crocker, R.: Henry More, 1614–1687: a biography of the Cambridge Platonist archives. In: Dibont, P., Popkin, R.H. (eds.) International Archives of the History of Ideas, vol. 185. Springer, Dordrecht (2003) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0217-1 4. Cudworth, R.: Cudworth’s Sermon Preached Before the Honble House of Commons, at Westminster, March 31st, 1647. J.T. Wheeler, Cambridge (1852) 5. Darwall, S.: The foundations of morality: virtue, law, and obligation. In: Rutherford, D. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, Chap. 7, pp. 221–249. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2006). https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521822424.009 6. Hutton, S.: Henry More’s moral philosophy: self-determination and its limits. Studii z Historii Filozofii 8(3), 11–24 (2017). https://doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2017.029 7. Janet, P.A.R.: Essai sur le médiateur plastique de Cudworth. Ladrange, Paris (1860) 8. Jordan, W.K.: The development of Religious Toleration in England. Attainment of the theory and accommodations in thought and institutions (1640–1660). Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1940) 9. Passmore, J.A.: Ralph Cudworth, an Interpretation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1951) 10. Rogers, G.A.J.: More, Locke and the issue of liberty. In: Hutton, S. (ed.) Henry More (1614– 1687) Tercentenary Studies. ARCH, vol. 127, pp. 189–199. Kluwer, Academic Publishers (1990) 11. Rogers, G.A.J.: Introduction Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context. In: Rogers, G.A.J., Vienne, J.M., Zarka, Y.C. (eds.) Politics, Metaphysics and Religion, pp. 1–3. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht (1997) 12. Rogers, G.A.J.: The other-worldly philosophers and the real world: the Cambridge Platonists, theology and politics. In: Rogers, G.A.J., Vienne, J.M., Zarka, Y.C. (eds.) Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context: Politics, Metaphysics and Religion, pp. 3–15. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht (1997) 13. Simonutti, L.: Reason and toleration: Henry More and Philip van Limbborch. In: Hutton, S. (ed.) Henry More (1614–1687) Tercentenary Studies. ARCH, vol. 127, pp. 201–218. Kluwer, Academic Publishers (1990) 14. Shorey, P.: Platonism Ancient and Modern. University of California Press, Berkeley (1938) 15. Sorley, W.R.: A History of English Philosophy. University Press, Cambridge (1937) 16. Susan, J.: The passions and the good life. In: Rutherford, D. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, Chap. 7, pp. 198–220. University Press, Cambridge (2006). https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521822424.008 17. Whichcote, B.: Moral and Religious Aphorisms. E. Mathews & Marrot, London (1930)

Historical Knowledge as a Tool for Predicting the Prospects of Political Geography (On the Example of New Serbia) Anastasiia Zotova1(B) and Sergei Poltorak2 1 Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected] 2 Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected]

Abstract. The relevance of the article is that it addresses the issue of preserving the original culture of the Ukrainian population, whose ancestors in the XVIII century arrived in Ukraine from Central Europe. The scientific novelty lies in a comprehensive study of military settlements in New Serbia within the framework of political geography. The article analyzes the publications of researchers from different countries about New Serbia. The conclusion is that the authors did not study the history of New Serbia in the context of the current state of the territories included in the modern Kirovograd region. The article deals with the current state of culture and, in particular, the language in the villages founded by the migrants from Central Europe. The authors hypothesize that in the conditions of rapprochement with the EU countries and contradictions between the national policies of the EU and Ukraine in the territory of the former New Serbia (Central Ukraine), separatist sentiments may arise in the future. Keywords: Serbia · New Serbia · Novomirgorod · Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth · Ottoman Empire

1 Introduction New Serbia is a historical region, the formation of which began in 1751. Currently, it is mainly the northern part of the Kirovograd region of Ukraine. The history of New Serbia attracts the attention of scientists from different countries. The source base of this scientific problem is well developed. On this basis, researchers examine various facets of a common problem. For example, researcher R. Raspopovich published an article in the Ukrainian edition, which he devoted to studying the causes and process of resettlement in Montenegrins to New Serbia [2]. Canadian historian H.L. Dyck studied the history of the resettlement of Europeans in New Serbia as a result of fundamental changes in the life of the Habsburg monarchy [3]. Russian historians have also contributed to the study of the problem. A.S. Amelichev highlighted in his publication the contribution of the Serbs to the strengthening of the borders of the © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 168–178, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_14

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Russian Empire [4]. Yu.V. Kostyashov, like his predecessor A.I. Kirpichenok, turned to the study of personalities. He paid special attention to the initiator of the resettlement and the military leader of New Serbia, I. Khorvat, who became General in the Russian service [5]. Certain historical aspects are being investigated in these scientific works. But they have shortages. The problem is not considered from the point of view of political geography. The state of the territory of the former New Serbia has not been studied.

2 Methods of Research The research methodology is grounded on the following: methods of analysis, deduction, induction, synthesis and comparison. The historical methods applied are historical and systematic, historical and typological, comparative historical and retrospective methods, as well as the method of historical periodization.

3 Results of Research In the middle of the XVIII century, the territory, which in the near future was to become New Serbia, was a complex political and geographical node on the map of Eastern Europe. In this place converged borders of the Russian and Ottoman empires, the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth and the Cossack Hetmanate. Each of these states sought, on the one hand, to strengthen their economies at the expense of the “trophies” obtained as a result of the raids into the border areas, and on the other, did everything to strengthen their own borders. On the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which bordered on the Russian Empire, there was a difficult situation. It was explained by the constant nationalreligious differences between Orthodox Ukrainians and Poles, who overwhelmingly professed Catholicism. This internal political situation at that time served as a cause for constant armed clashes. Gaydamak gangs often attacked the settlements of Poles and Jews, plundered them and returned to the territory of the Russian Empire with trophies. As a result, political relations between the Russian Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were becoming more complicated. As “trophies”, the inhabitants of the region acquired, first of all, women, children, domestic animals, weapons and tools. This particular way of life over the centuries has made life in the region extremely unstable. The situation did not allow the border states on this territory to create large settlements that could successfully engage in various types of production, primarily agriculture and cattle breeding. The situation that developed in Central Europe in the middle of the XVIII century influenced the change of borders. For example, due to integration processes, some territories in Austria have lost the need to protect the old borders. Many officers and soldiers lost their jobs. This situation became the problem of the state and the personal problem of many thousands of people. In some parts of Austria, social tensions arose that needed to be resolved. Former military personnel of different nationalities began to look for work in the armies of other states. At that time, the Russian Empire was a large labor market for military personnel. The servicemen became the first large social group that

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became ready for a massive move to Russia. Among them were Serbs, Hungarians, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, Moldovans and representatives of many other European nations. Among the people who sought fortune abroad were even Turkish military personnel. The southern border of the Russian Empire at that time was practically open. Armed formations from the Crimean Khanate and, more rarely, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth constantly penetrated its territory. As a result, there were no large and stable developing settlements on the territory of the modern Kirovograd region of Ukraine. The steppe, rich in black soil, was not used for the development of agriculture. Empress Elizaveta Petrovna in the 1740s–1750s implemented a strategy to protect the southern borders of her state from the raids of armed nomads. In particular, along the left bank of the Bolshaya Vys River (a tributary of the Sinyukha River, which was a tributary of the Southern Bug), it was decided to organize military settlements. On the initiative of the lieutenant colonel of the Austrian army I. Horvat, the resettlement of numerous inhabitants of Central Europe to the coast of the river Bolshaya Vys began. The overwhelming majority of immigrants were officers, junior commanders and ordinary soldiers of the Austrian army, most of whom were Serbs and Hungarians by nationality. The demand for these soldiers was not accidental. In their military training, all of them were cavalrymen, most often—hussars, that is, representatives of light cavalry. All European armies needed light cavalry. This circumstance pushed the Balkan peoples to an important place in European history. Warriors—representatives of the Balkan peoples began to enter the service in the army of many European countries. They were good professionals and expected a modest salary. A significant part of their income was land, which they received when they entered the civil service in different countries. In Russia, obtaining land plots was very attractive. The mild climate of the south of the Russian Empire, black soil were guaranteed high yields. It was economically advantageous to accept foreign military personnel to serve the Russian Empire. Employees of the Foreign Affairs College calculated that the preparation of one Russian recruit cost 200 guilders. Payment for the relocation of an already trained foreign soldier to his place of service in Russia cost the Russian treasury only 60 guilders [1]. Thus, Russia saved 140 guilders on every foreign soldier. There was a special need for the Russian army in light cavalry. Heavy cavalry was less mobile and could not cope with the requirements of the time. In the middle of the XVIII century, Austrian light cavalry and, in particular, hussars were probably the best in Europe. Their involvement in the border service in the south of the Russian Empire seemed to be promising to the military-political leadership of the country. They could become reliable defenders of the border and ensure the possibility of mass peasant colonization of these places. The government bodies of the Russian Empire planned not only to settle this vast region with peasants. They saw this as a springboard for preparing future offensive actions by the army to conquer the Crimea and liquidate the Crimean Khanate—the vassal of the Ottoman Empire. On January 11, 1752, was issued a decree of Empress Elizaveta Petrovna. In accordance with the decree, a network of military settlements was established on the southern border of the Russian Empire [6]. In those settlements, mostly people from Serbia had to live. Most of them were Serbs and Hungarians. There were also Vlachs, Bulgarians, Ukrainians. Sometimes Poles and even Turks were taken to military settlements. In one of the military settlements—in the suburb of Zlynka—dissenters from Poland lived

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and served. Elizaveta Petrovna called this colony New Serbia. In the west, the colony bordered on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the south were the territory of the Ottoman Empire. In the east there was a relatively independent territory—the Hetmanate. There lived Zaporizhzhya Cossacks. The geographical location of New Serbia, surrounded by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean Khanate and the Hetmanate are shown on the map. The geographical location of New Serbia in 1760.

The capital of New Serbia became a settlement, which received the name New Mirgorod. Over time, it was transformed into the name Novomirgorod. The headquarters of all military settlements of New Serbia was located in Novomirgorod. The 1st Company of the Hussar Regiment was also located there. The commander of the garrison was Major General Ivan Horvat of the Russian Army. Three regiments were deployed on the territory of New Serbia: Hussar, Pandursky and Novokozachy. The first two regiments had 20 companies in each. Each company was located in a separate settlement-sconce. Novokazachy regiment consisted of 26 military settlements, the center of which was the fortress of St. Elizabeth—the future city of Elisavetgrad (subsequently—Kirovograd, now—Krapivnitsky). Novomirgorod was divided with the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by the Bolshaya Vys River. On the opposite bank was the town of Zlatopol, in which mainly Poles and Jews lived. After the third division of Poland, Zlatopol and the adjacent territories became part of the Russian Empire. In 1959, Zlatopol became part of the regional center of the city of Novomirgorod. The locals still call the “Polish” part of modern Novomirgorod Zlatopol. Zlatopol retains some independence. There is an Orthodox church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Weekly on weekends, there is a bazaar in the city, which, in addition to local agricultural products, sells numerous consumer goods from Turkey. Turkish textiles predominantly dominate over Chinese and Ukrainian. For

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many decades, the central street Novomirgorod bore the name of Lenin and crossed the city from east to west. Geographic curiosity—the territories of previously different states in modern conditions are not only united by a common city line, but also have a common main highway. The settlement of these previously vacant lands on the outskirts of the Russian Empire began in the spring of 1752. The defensive fortifications (“sconces”) in accordance with a previously prepared plan were installed along the border strictly at a distance of 6 versts in the Pandursky regiment and at a distance of 8 versts in the Hussars. In the Hussar Regiment, as already noted, there were 20 companies, which were placed in the following sconces: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

1st company—Novomirgorod; 2nd company—Pechka; 3rd company – Petroostrov; 4th company—Nadlak; 5th company—Keniblash; 6th company—Zemlyk; 7th company—Novo-Arkhangelsky; 8th company—Martonosh; 9th company—Panchev; 10th company—Kanizh; 11th company—Zenta; 12th company—Vukovar; 13th company—Fedwar; 14th company—Subotica; 15th company—Tsibuliev; 16th company—Morashin; 17th company—Dmitrovka; 18th company—Sombor; 19th company—Glinsk; 20th company—Bershats.

The fate of these sconces was different. Some of them have disappeared from the map. Others have become cities of regional importance or villages. In these settlements live the descendants of immigrants from Serbia, assimilated with the local population. According to their identity, language, life, they are Ukrainians. The adaptation process is so deep that the current local population is almost indistinguishable from Ukrainians from other regions of Ukraine. However, the locals do not know the history of their origin. It is important to note that the names of the former sconces are mainly Serbian, Hungarian, Croatian and Romanian. Only a few of them have names derived from Ukrainian and Russian words. There is no doubt that many settlements of New Serbia received their names in honor of those settlements that the future colonists of New Serbia left. The sconce Pechka (2nd company) has a town with the same name in Romania [7]. The Nadlac sconce was also Romanian in origin (4th company) [8]. There is a settlement

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with the same name in Romania. The name has Hungarian and Slovak roots [9]. This testifies to the complex formation of a common history of different European nations. The sconce Vukovar (12th company) is named after a settlement in Croatia. The sconces Martonosh (8th company), Panchev (9th company), Kanizh (10th company), Zenta [10] (11th company), Fedwar [11] (13th company), Subotica [12] (14th company), Tsibuliev (15th company), Sombor [13] (18th company) were inhabited by immigrants from Serbia. But this did not mean that ethnic Serbs served there. This is evident in the example of the sconce Martonosh. On the modern map of Serbia there is the village of Martonosh, located 5 km from the border with Hungary. The overwhelming majority of this village is Hungarians. They make up 87% of the village’s population. Other residents include Serbs, Gypsies, Albanians, Croats, Bunevs, Slovaks, Germans, Montenegrins, Slovenes, Macedonians [14]. Martonosh is located 10 km from the center of the community—Kanizh. Over time, the name Martonosh transformed into more convenient for the Ukrainian population—Martonosha. The current population of Martonosha is markedly different from other neighboring villages, where overwhelmingly ethnic Ukrainians live. The inhabitants of Martonosha do not differ in appearance from their neighbors. In their daily culture, it is difficult to find any features that would differ from the culture of other localities of the modern Kirovograd region. Only two details attract attention, which are most likely linguistic in nature. Firstly, the residents of Martonosha speak Russian practically with no accent. This is difficult to explain since the inhabitants of the village studied Russian only in a small amount as part of the school curriculum before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Probably, the linguistic “predisposition” of local residents is having an effect. They consider the Moldovan language of their native language. There are cases when graduates of Martonosha secondary school, feeling themselves Moldovans, left to take entrance examinations to universities in Chisinau. To their surprise, they learned that their “Moldovan” language has nothing to do with the literary Moldavian language. Martonosha is one of the few villages in the former New Serbia, inhabitants of which in the middle of the XVIII century were the Hungarians. Over the past 267 years, the Hungarian language, whose speakers were the first colonists, has adapted to local conditions, having mastered the “logic” of the development of the Ukrainian language. Also they preserved Hungarian language base. The language in which local people speak in other localities of the former New Serbia has also retained its specificity. Features of everyday culture are preserved. But so far they have not become the object of special research. The move of Serbians to the southern outskirts of the Russian empire in the middle of the XVIII century, on the one hand, was explained by qualitative political and economic changes in various parts of Serbia, and on the other, by the attractiveness of serving the Russian throne. Each migrant to New Serbia received a considerable amount of land, the size of which depended on the military rank and the position of a settler. The captain received a plot of 100 quarters of land, which corresponded to 55 ha. The lieutenant was given 80 quarters of land (44 ha). The second Lieutenant had 70 quarters of land (38.5 ha). The ensign received two times less than the captain, that is, 50 quarters of the land (27.5 ha). Ordinary hussars-immigrants received allotment depending on the

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characteristics of the service, skill level, years of service and personal merit. The plots they received were in the amount of 20 to 30 quarters (11–16.5 ha) [6]. Although by the middle of the XVIII century, the territories of the south of the Russian Empire were considered almost uninhabited, such information is inaccurate. Small (mostly Cossack) settlements in the territory of the future New Serbia by the middle of that century already existed. However, from an economic point of view, they were not effective. They allowed surviving the local population. Often not due to the development of agriculture and cattle breeding, but due to the seizure of property and livestock in adjacent territories. An important example. There were 20 settlements of the Hussar regiment in New Serbia. 13 of them were created on the site of having already existed settlements [15]. Their former names were replaced by more “harmonious” to the migrants. The only exception was Novomirgorod, the capital of New Serbia. Its name reflected historical continuity. The city of Mirgorod (now the district center of the Poltava region) from the XI century was the center of negotiations on the peace of the warring tribes [16]. Probably, a similar political task was assigned to the New Mirgorod (Novomyrgorod). Being essentially the center of military settlements, the city assumed the functions of political stabilization in the border region, where the borders of the Russian Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire, and the Hetmanate crossed. Later, after the liquidation of New Serbia as an independent colony, subordinated directly to the Senate of the Russian Empire, some of the names of the settlements were abolished. Villages began to be called as before. The Pechka became Korobchino village again, Kalniblat became Ganivka village, Bershats—Nesterovka village [17]. The Pandursky Infantry Regiment was stationed on the right flank of the military settlement of New Serbia. It defended the border of the Russian Empire and the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth to the right bank of the Dnieper. The Pandursky Infantry Regiment, as well as the Hussar Regiment, consisted of 20 companies. They were located in the following settlements: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

1st company—Krylov; 2nd company—Taburishe; 3rd company – Kryukiv; 4th company—Kamenka; 5th company—Zymun; 6th company—Chanad; 7th company—Pilazhnitsa; 8th company—Koven; 9th company—Blagovat; 10th company—Slankamen; 11th company—Becha; 12th company—Varagin; 13th company—Glagovac; 14th company—Yaniv; 15th company—Shalmosh; 16th company—Chongrad; 17th company—Pavlish;

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• 18th company—Mandorlak; • 19th company—Santomash; • 20th company—Vilagosh. The companies of the regiment were formed in the same way as the companies of the Hussar Regiment. Their national composition was similar to the national composition of cavalrymen. The settlers gave their sconces the names of cities and villages from which they moved to the Russian Empire: Vukovar, Sombor, Chongrad, Pavlish, Santomash etc. The Cossack regiment consisted of 26 companies: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

1st company—Fortress of St. Elizabeth; 2nd company—Slobodka Dobryanka; 3rd company – Adjamka; 4th company—Vershino-Kamenka; 5th company—Murzinka; 6th company—Beshka; 7th company—Ovnyanka; 8th company—Verblyuzhka; 9th company—Zelenaya; 10th company—Omelnik; 11th company—Vorontsovo; 12th company—Mushurin Rog; 13th company—Buyansk; 14th company—Kamenka; 15th company—Kaluzhina; 16th company—Borodayevka; 17th company—Domoshkan; 18th company—Pushkarevka; 19th company—Ingulskaya; 20th company—Komissarovka; 21st company—Gruzskoe; 22nd company—Viska; 23rd company—Pletenyy Tashlyk; 24th company—Krasnoe; 25th company—Olshanka; 26th company—Zlynka.

Representatives of different nationalities served in each company of New Serbia. The dominant nationalities of each company are highlighted below in the Table 1.

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Table 1. The resettlement of military personnel and their families in companies in accordance with their nationality Settlers Nationality The Hussar Regiment (companies)

The Pandursky Infantry Regiment (companies)

The Cossack regiment (companies)

Serbs

Novomirgorod, Panchev, Petroostrov, Kanizh, Zenta, Fedwar, Subotica, Tsibuliev, Sombor, Zemlyk, Novo-Arkhangelsky, Morashin, Bershats, Dmitrovka

Krylov, Taburishe, Kamenka, Zymun, Pilazhnitsa, Koven, Slankamen, Glagovac, Becha, Pavlish, Mandorlak

Fortress of St. Elizabeth, Slobodka Dobryanka, Adjamka, Vershino-Kamenka, Murzinka, Beshka, Vorontsovo, Ovnyanka, Verblyuzhka, Zelenaya, Omelnik, Mushurin Rog, Buyansk, Kamenka, Borodayevka, Pushkarevka, Ingulskaya, Komissarovka, Kaluzhina, Gruzskoe, Viska, Krasnoe, Olshanka, Zlynka

Hungarians

Keniblash, Martonosh

Chanad, Varagin, Chongrad, Shalmosh, Santomash, Vilagosh

Croats

Vukovar

Blagovat

Poles

Yaniv

Romanians

Pechka, Nadlak

Bulgarians

Glinsk

Domoshkan, Pletenyy Tashlyk Kryukiv

On the territory of New Serbia by the autumn of 1752 there were only 350 people. But in December 1754 there were already 3919 colonists (257 Serbs, 124 Macedonians, 57 Bulgarians, 1676 Vlachs, 32 Germans, 79 Hungarians, as well as representatives of the local Ukrainian population). By the spring of 1761, 13,844 people already lived in New Serbia [18].

4 Conclusions Currently, the territory of the former New Serbia is located in Central Ukraine. All 46 settlements of the former New Serbia now exist. The regional center, the city of Krapivnitsky (the fortress of St. Elizabeth), the modern regional center Novomyrgorod and other regional centers have already lost traces of the stay of foreign colonists of the

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mid-18th century. Until now, in the city of Krapivnitsky, the overwhelming majority of residents in everyday life speak Russian, residents of regional centers speak Ukrainian. Most of the former military settlements of New Serbia are villages. They have traces of national identity. The inhabitants of these villages do not identify themselves with their foreign ancestors—Serbs, Hungarians, Romanians, and representatives of other peoples. This is due to the ignorance of the local population of the history of their small homeland. At the same time, in all the villages where colonists have lived since the middle of the XVIII century, in parallel with the Ukrainian language, there is also a substantially changed language of the ancestors, which the inhabitants perceive as their native language. The uniqueness of the situation is that “local languages” exist only on the territory of the villages of the former New Serbia. The peculiar language of the inhabitants of each village is unique. Unfortunately, the modern language of the descendants of former immigrants from Serbia and other regions of Europe has not yet been studied by linguists. This significantly impoverishes scientists’ perception of many aspects of history, ethnography, linguistics and other sciences. It is especially important that this knowledge did not become the basis for the development of information in the field of political geography. The way and the process of migration of foreigners in the middle of the XVIII century to the territory of New Serbia would make an important contribution to the history of international relations. The authors of the article come up with two possible forecasts for the development of further events. Forecast 1. Under the law adopted by the Ukrainian Rada on April 25, 2019 “On ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as a state”, there is a danger that native languages, in which in modern conditions thousands of rural residents of Central Ukraine communicate with each other, may disappear. This will mean the destruction of an important element of the culture of the Ukrainian people. Forecast 2. In recent years, the arrival of delegations from EU countries (mainly from Serbia, Hungary, and Romania), whose ancestors came to these places more than 270 years ago, has increased in the villages of the former New Serbia. Meetings with their countrymen, and often relatives, contribute to the formation of a national identity (Serbian, Hungarian, Romanian) among residents of the former New Serbia. European Union and Ukraine have a different view on the policy concerning national minorities. Modern Ukrainian authorities are seeking to ukrainize the entire population of the country. The policy of the EU is aimed to support the development of national minorities. Thereby the authors draw the inference that eventually in the region may arise the idea of national autonomy.

References 1. Kostyahov, Yu.V.: Serbs in the Austrian Monarchy, p. 45. Kaliningrad State University Publ., Kaliningrad (1997) 2. Raspopovich, R.: Prince-bishop Vasilije III Petrovi´c and the project of migration of the Montenegrin to the Russian empire in the second half of the XVIII. Ukrainskiy Istorichnyi J. 1(502), 67–78 (2012) 3. Dyck, H.L.: New Serbia and the origins of the Eastern question, 1751–55—a Habsburg perspective. Russ. Rev. 40, 1–19 (1981)

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4. Amelichev, A.S.: Serbs at the court of Russian emperors and their influence on the development of New Russia. Istoriya v pobrobnostyakh 6(60), 22–29 (2015) 5. Kostyahov, Yu.V.: General Ivan Horvat—a Serbian adventurer in the Russian service (second half of the 18th century). Slavyanovedeniye 2, 34–41 (2012) 6. Kirpichenok, A.I.: Serbian settlements in Ukraine in the middle of the 18th century, p. 92. St. Petersburg, Nestor (2007) 7. Kipfer, B.A.: Encyclopedic Dictionary of Archaeology, p. 428. Springer, New York (2000) 8. Nadlak. https://our-travels.info/ost/Goroda/Ukraine/Kirovograd/Novoarh-ns.php 9. Nadlak. https://web.archive.org/web/20080215071118/http://www.nadlak.wz.sk/?page=nad lak&theme=all 10. Novitsky, V.F.: Zenta Military Encyclopedia. I D Sytin Publ., Moscow (1911) 11. Bácsföldvár. https://vajdasag.rs/B%C3%A1csf%C3%B6ldv%C3%A1r 12. Vukmirovich, D.: Comparative Overview of the Number of Population in 1948, 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2002 and 2011, p. 48. Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia Publ., Belgrade (2014) 13. Municipalitie of Serbia: Statistical Office of Serbia 28 November 2010 (2006) 14. Population, national or ethnic origin, population data. Republican Statistical Office, 1 February 2003 15. Milchev V., Posun’ko O.: Office of the Novoserbsk Corps. Dzherela z istori| Pivdenno| Ukra|ni 7 (2005). 442 p. (in Ukrainian) 16. History of Mirgorod. Cities and regions of Ukraine. https://ukrainian.su/istoriya-poltavskoyoblasti/istoriya-mirgoroda.html 17. Nesterivka. https://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/z7503/A005?rdat1=27.08.2011&rf7571=38126 18. Kirpichenok, A.I.: Serbian Settlements in Ukraine in the Middle of the 18th Century, p. 96. Nestor Publ., St. Petersburg (2007)

Geographic Distribution of Foreign Businesses in Russia in the 10th–17th Centuries Olga Pavlova(B) and Anna Ryabova Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint-Petersburg, Russia [email protected], [email protected]

Abstract. This article discusses how private businesses spread in Russia in the 10th–17th centuries at different stages of its historical and economic development. The most influential regions and their businesses in the sphere of Russian economic relations are identified. The main areas of foreign economic cooperation as well as the geography of international economic relations of the given period is discussed. Keywords: Economic geography · International trade · East-West commercial relations · Foreign private businesses · Foreign entrepreneurship

1 Introduction Under conditions of contemporary globalization with world’s largest economies taking the lead, it is necessary to examine the geographic and historical context in which international relations developed, paying special attention to economic cooperation, the aspects of how geography affected international relations as well as traditions and trends of the 10th –17th centuries. The experience gained in history can become a support for the modern development of economic geography. Problem Statement. This article aims at providing historical analysis of the geographic distribution of foreign businesses in Russia. It is essential to determine how private businesses spread in Russia in the 15th –17th centuries - the period when Russia’s most significant East-West economic relations were developed. Business geography contributes valuable information for the analysis of basic phases of international cooperation, presents data for identification of the most influential region in the sphere of Russia’s economic relations at different stages of historical development. Therefore, it is important to determine how private businesses spread in Russia, identify the steps of their economic cooperation, geographic location of Russia’s most influential trading partners at that period and specify the characteristics of foreign private businesses which operated in Russia.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 179–192, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_15

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2 Historiography The information about the geographic distribution of foreign businesses in Russia is gleaned from scientific papers which discuss general issues as well as the problem of Russian entrepreneurship as a whole. The history of trade and economic life of Western Europe is thoroughly analyzed in the book by I. M. Kulisher, which was written in 1909 and translated into many languages [1]. The history of entrepreneurship in Russia has been studied by many generations of economists and historians. Here belong the works by A. V. Semenov and his group [2], who undertook a comprehensive study of this matter as well as more contemporary works by Yu. I. Golovko [3] and the article by E. Z. Grachev and A.V. Martynenko, in which the importance of the Volga Region within the system of Russian and Middle Eastern trade and economic sphere of 17th –18th is discussed [4]. E. Yu. Sheptunova analyses the problem of foreign merchantry in Russia in the first half of the 19th century, providing the examples of competition with Moscow traders [5, pp. 199–203]. The problem of international entrepreneurship is discussed by S. V. Indeeva, who studies foreign trade projects in Russia [6, pp. 150–157]. The research by A. L. Gryaznov is dedicated to the foreign trade companies which operated in Vologda in the 17th century. The researcher gleaned the information from Vologda customs books [7, pp. 76–85]. The problem of civil status of foreign citizens in Russia is discussed by I. V. Potkina [8, pp. 166–172], whereas particular business fields were analysed by E. R. Skvajers. She examines the Hanseatic ties, its activities, the branches in Veliky Novgorod and Pskov since the middle of the 12th century [9, pp. 272–280]. The studies of particular nationalities in the article by M. B. Bessudnova, dealing with German Yard correspondence [10], can contribute valuable information toward the analysis of foreign business distribution in Russia. The comprehensive research is done by A. F. Vilgelm and K. A. Vilgelm on German presence in Russia and its role in economic and political life of the country [11]. O. M. Yamblonskaya discusses the problem of London merchantry [12, pp. 35–41]. Her work is dedicated to the business activities of foreign traders in Russia and contains interesting detail. The life and career of A.D. Vinius, the Dutch enterpreneur, who left his mark on the history of Russia, is examined by D.V. Liseitsev and S. M. Shamin [13, pp. 984–994]. Various aspects of international trade and its history are considered by foreign experts: W. Burpts, K. E. Corcoran, S. Pfaff. The impact of the Reformation on the trade relations in Europe is analysed [14]. I. Félicité, discusses Peter the Great’s official foreign visit to northern Germany and the role of formal contacts which were established [15]. M. R. Munzinger studies the importance of merchant involvement in the Crusades [16]. Filip Dollinger contributed valuable information toward understanding the history of the Hanse [17].

3 Methodology This research was done basing upon general and specific methods. The descriptive and comparative-historical methods, referring to the first category, allow us to study and

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accentuate the importance of the most influential countries, their role in Russian economy and international relations, etc. The history and geography of foreign businesses in Russia are discussed with a look at other problems and achievements. The historical method allows us to determine the geographic location of foreign businesses at different stages of historical development. Historic typological method is used to systematize the location of foreign businesses in Russia. System and history-based method enables us to study the events and phenomena which were conducive to the development of private businesses in Russia. Basic patterns and typical characteristics of these processes are examined, the geography of international cooperation is identified. By using problem-chronological method we can analyze the events related to the foreign business development in Russia in their chronological order from the medieval to the Modern Age. Periodization method was implemented to identify the stages in the development of foreign businesses in Russia.

4 Discussion In order to analyze how the foreign businesses spread in Russia, it is essential to define the notion of ‘a foreigner’, which is assumed to have existed since the beginning of the written word. Initially, it had a geographic connotation and denoted ‘an outlander’, ‘a person from a different land’ [18, p. 3]. In the Russian Empire foreigners were ‘all foreign subjects who did not obtain Russian citizenship according to the established procedures’ [19, p. 990]. The notion of ‘an entrepreneur’ which has numerous definitions and its own history, in this research denotes an individual who runs a business enjoying most of the rewards. International trade has a rich history, our first entrepreneurs were traders and merchants. The development of foreign businesses in Russia can theoretically be divided into several periods. The first stage refers to the establishment of Rus’ state. In the Early Middle Ages, the Slavs liaised with their oriental counterparts. The Syrians, Germans, Jews and Arabs played an important role in commercial relations of that period. The Arabs were famous for exporting items from India, China and Caliphate to Constantinople, which at that time was a center of international trade. The Mediterranean Sea was the center of maritime trade. The role of the North Sea, which in the 6th –10th centuries was called the Frisian Sea, continued to increase in importance. The Khazar Khaganate, which magnificently spread from the lower reaches of the Volga to the Caucasus, was the trade center of the 6th century. Later it lost its control over some of its territories due to the Arab-Khazar wars but the Khazars the Khazars established a monopoly on the Eastern part of the Crimea, on the Transnistrian Slavs: the Northerners, Radimichs and Vyatichs on the one side and the Bulgars on the other side resided. Volga Bulgaria’s advantageous geographic position. Its territory included the mouth of the Volga, Ural, Kuban, two seas and was adjacent to the rich Asia. Trade united heterogeneous multilingual tribes on the territories subjected to the Khazars. Among these tribes, there was a tribe of Russ - pagans at that time. According to I. M. Kulisher, the growth of trade in the 9th –10th century in the Mediterranean Sea is associated with the Crusades. “Since that time the Mediterranean

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Sea trade between the European - Romance - Christian and the Arab-Mohammedan worlds changes its nature from sporadic to permanent” [1, p. 282]. The Mediterranean Sea in the 12th –15th centuries was the trade link connecting the coastal cities of Italy, the East, Asia Minor, Byzantium and some parts of North Africa. Venice and Genova, competing for leadership, were the leading trading centers. In the Middle Ages, a significant role was played by the trade routes that passed through the northern seas - the German and the Baltic. They linked Kievan Rus’, Poland and Scandinavia with England, Flanders, the territory of the modern Netherlands and Belgium. The eastern Slavs developed commercial relations with the Normans, the Baltic Slavs and with Varangians from Gotland. Various Arab coins found by the archeologists in North Eastern Europe bear testimony to those trade relations. On the Russian territory, on the shores of the Lovat, in the regions of Velikiye Luki, Kiev, Murom, Vyatka and Moscow Governorate a significant number of Arab coins were found as well. There were various waterways and landways, both internal and external trade routes. In the 8th–10th centuries, trade went along the Volga and the Caspian Sea with the extensive Arab Caliphate, directly with the capital, Baghdad. The historian S. I. Smetanina notes, “The flow of Arab dirhams went along the Volga route. Treasures are still found here, whereas in Central Asia and Iraq they have not been found for a long time. However, the largest number of coins are found on the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea. Gotland was the point where the flows of eastern and western goods met” [20, p. 23]. The famous trade route “from the Varangians to the Greeks” extended from the Neva, Lake Ladoga, the Lovat and Dnieper to the Varagian Sea (the Baltic Sea) connecting it with the Russian Sea (the Black Sea). The waterway route which bridged the coast of the Baltic sea with the South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor existed up to the middle of the 13th century. Along that route, the Russian state was formed and developed. International trade was conducive to both economic and political activity surplus, resulting in Kiev’s - the capital of the state - becoming the center of international trade in Eastern Europe. The merchants from Central and Northern Europe were frequent visitors to the Russian capital. B. A. Rybakov notes, “Kiev remained a significant trading center up to the Crusades” [21, pp. 315–342, 376]. The closest trade contacts the Old Russian state had with Byzantium. The successful campaigns of princes Oleg and Igor provided for Russian merchants favorable conditions for trade and stay in the territory of Byzantium. Armed caravans left for Byzantium every year and the regular trade relations were established, according to the agreements of the years 907, 911 and 944. The agreements were concluded by Byzantium on behalf of the Emperor, and on the Russian side on behalf of the Grand Duke of Kiev and on behalf of his vassals. These documents consolidated gains of the Russian armor and made possible peace trade negotiating. For example, in the year 907, after the victorious campaign of Prince Oleg, the Byzantines undertook to create conditions, that is, to provide Russian merchants with food and wine for six months of the annual stay of the caravan on the territory of Byzantium. Russian merchants could use bath-houses, had the sole right for tax-free trade and the Byzantines committed to arrange anchors, sails and supplies. In 907, only the Russians enjoyed the right of duty-free trade.

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International contracts regulated the relations between the merchants, yet they were often breached. Thus, conflicts among Russian merchants, as well as with and among Byzantine counterparts would arise. The agreements of the years 911 and 944 contained a wide range of legal articles, related to property and criminal law. Military campaigns and trade military relations were established in the era of Kievan Rus’ formation. Apart from the Byzantine merchants, traders from the Upper Danube, Scandinavia and the Southern coast of the Baltic Sea would often come to Kievan Rus’. In the “Tale of Bygone Years” the names of the ambassadors who participated in the negotiations with Prince Igor regarding the preparation of the treaty of 944 are indicated. They are: Merchant Adun, Adulb, Iggivlad, Oleb, Frutan, Gomol, Kuzi, Emig, Turbid, Frusten, Brudy, Roald, Gunastr, Frasten, Igeld, Turben, Mony, Ruald, Sven, Stir, and others [22, pp. 46–47]. It is obvious that among the eastern names there are the names of Scandinavian origin. The customs regulations of the 10th century of the city of Raffelstetten (Germany) testify to the regulation of the trade of German and Slavic merchants. Thus, at the beginning of its formation and further development, Kievan Rus’ had trade relations with both the East and the West. Goods came from Germany (Regensburg, Lübeck), from Czechia (Prague), from Poland (Krakow), from Sweden (Sigtuna), Byzantium, and through Transcaucasia and Central Asia from Arab countries. Kievan Rus’ boasted the yards of merchants from various countries, foreign businesses spread widely over the territory of the state. However, I. M. Kulisher expresses concerns, saying, “one should not exaggerate the importance and role of trade and the size of trade turnover before the 8th century as well as in the 9th –11th centuries” [1, p. 125]. Nevertheless, foreign trade relations in Kievan Rus during the phase of its strengthening and prosperity (the 9th - the first quarter of the 13th century, before foreign conquests) successfully developed. Foreign merchants had their strongholds, trading yards in the largest centers of foreign trade. Merchants from Gotland established relations with Ladoga, reaching it through the Gulf of Finland, The Neva and Volkhov Lake. German merchants permanently resided there having their church, several lands (fields) and even “Varangian Street” [23, p. 88]. German presence was also significant in Novgorod. The church of St. Olav, the cemetery, and later the catholic church of St. Peter were built there. In the late 12th century there were two yards - Gotland with the church of St. Olav and German with the church of St. Peter. Foreign merchants came from Gotland twice a year. “Summer guests” would come in spring and stay for the summer, the rest would arrive in autumn – “bring in the winter” and, thus, were called “the winter guests”. Having settled in Novgorod, German merchants would elect the administration - the alderman of the court and the alderman of the church of St. Peter. The alderman of the court had administrative and judicial power, presented the yard in face of Novgorod authorities, and banded together the German merchantry. The aldermen of St. Peter administered collecting taxes and fines, managed the household and the church. They appointed four deputies among merchants and created committee which governed the German yard in Novgorod.

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German cities in the period of the classical Middle Ages were the centers of European trade. The expansion of trade contributed to the growth of competition. The trading business was profitable but dangerous. The caravans were often attacked by the pirates. Due to the international nature of this problem, economic and safety reasons, merchants created leagues, corporations and caravans. The strive for unity derived from their desire to economize, high administrative taxes as well as serious obstructions, created by the church, impeding individual trade. One of the first European trade unions was formed between Lübeck and Hamburg in 1241. It aimed at protection of trade ways connecting the Baltic and the North Sea. Then the union of cities situated along the coasts, comprising Lübeck, Hamburg, Rostock, Lunenburg and Wismar expanded. In 1267 Lübeck as the most advanced and prominent trade city became the center of the Hanseatic league, linking Hamburg, Cologne, Bremen, etc. The league boasted advantageous geographic position on the border of the sea and river ways. Coastal lands were traversed by big navigable rivers. The Baltic sea, with its numerous bays and islands allowed for the development of navigation and creation of links between the nearby lands: Prussia, Germany, Russia, Poland, Sweden and Denmark. The harbors convenient for trade were constructed on the seashores and soon became the trade centers for the North and North-Eastern Europe. They were visited by the Swedes, Danes, Franks, Slavs, later Russian and even Greek traders. Visby, situated on the coast of Gotland in the Baltic sea, became the major harbor, where traders from Hamburg, Lübeck and Bremen did business. It is known that it had commercial relations with Kievan Rus’ in the 11th –12th centuries [24, pp. 10–11]. A. L Khoroshevich highlights that the Hanseans were very well-organized traders, “These leaders of the league had various trade and political talents and would often openly or indirectly make the neighboring cities yield or let them join the union” [25, p. 72]. Hanseatic growth can be traced due to the large number of new cities joining the league, namely: Kiel, Amsterdam, Hannover, Berlin, Stockholm, Narva and the kontors which were opened in Novgorod, London, Venice, Poland and other cities and countries. The league won a monopoly of intermediary trade between Europe and the Mediterranean which was conducive to its commercial power. This huge organization was based upon strict rules, their violation was inflictive and could result in expulsion. The Hanse rested on the common interest. Its major aim was seen as the creation of intermediary trade between the North, West, the Eastern Europe along the Baltic and the North Seas. The Hanse represented an alliance of cities and lands, created for profitable business. Based upon the principles of Roman law, it neither possessed the status of a legal body, nor had legal responsibility for the activities of its members. Throughout its existence, the requirements to define its functions and exact number of its members were given. However, the replies of the league were often purposefully vague and non-exhaustive. Nevertheless, the membership was honorable. Hanseatic members were, as a rule, powerful and influential merchants who could gain access to the information about commercial operations, market conditions, the turnover of their competitors, bonuses and perks offered by various cities. At that time the Hanse monitored the compliance with its trade rules and behavior, its ethics. Thus, the league did not only provide its members with favorable commercial conditions but it also had its own code of conduct.

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The long existence and success of the League is due to the provision of cheap wholesale transportation, the construction of new convenient and safe trade routes. The Hanseatic long flourishing period resulted from its successful operation, thus, by the 14th –15th century the Hanseatic Republic had been established. This period was the heyday of the Hansa. Its position was similar in some respects to European monarchies. It had armaments which consisted of the navy and army of different cities. This was necessary for the protection of its trade industries, on occasion it was used for the trade blockades. The power in the league belonged to the patriciate. In condition of divergence of interests, the Court of Appeal was convened. The Hanse was a confederation based on the common interest which was able to act only in conditions of convergence of interests of separate cities and citizens [26]. However, they did not only divert but also contradicted each other, showing the institutional weakness and inability to consistently implement the principles of confederalism [27]. With the foundation of Lübeck in 1159, a new stage began in the history of North German commerce. It had an advantageous geographical location at the mouth of the river Trave, flowing into the Baltic sea, and this defined the inevitability of competition with the seamen from Gotland. However, in 1161 the trade agreement was signed, in such a way the peace between Gotlanders and the Germans was reached. Thus, the merchants from Lübeck gained access to the trade relations of the island, with Novgorod, in particular. The German merchants that lived on Gotland created an association. One of their main achievements was gaining recognition and becoming trade partners with Novgorod Princes. By 1205 they had already opened their kontor in Novgorod (Peterhof). Regular traffic between the German merchants from Novgorod and northern Germany created flourishing trade with Western Europe, including shipments of salt and textiles and Russian furs and timber. The trade books of merchants from Hamburg, Gdansk, Lübeck, Bruges and other cities can contribute valuable information for the study of geography and trade. One of the first books of the Hanseatic merchants who traded with the Eastern Baltic region, dates back to the middle of the 14th century. Hermann and Johann Wittenborg mention the Eastern Baltic region where they exchanged goods for furs and wax. The information gleaned from these sources is scarce but it brings to light that they bought silver in Lübeck and sent it with their assistants to the East. It also sheds light on their travel expenditures, wax and furs which their commissioners bought in Novgorod and they sold in Lübeck and Brugge [25, pp. 25–26]. “The Charters of Veliky Novgorod and Pskov” is the main remaining document, containing information on the development of trade relations between Veliky Novgorod and the Hanseatic League. It comprises valuable documents of the 14th –15th centuries with the only exception of the contract of 1376. The contracts were signed by the merchants of the Hanseatic League and the representatives of Novgorod administration. The content of the contracts is divided into two parts: the first relates to the trade itself, and the second deals with the legal status of Russian and German merchants [25, pp. 30–31]. By the late 13th –early 15th centuries the Hanseatic merchants had been dominating in trade relations with England and Scandinavia. Up to the second half of the 14th century

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the Hanse continued to successfully pursue its economic policy. In the first half of the 14th century, the Hansa took an active part in trade supplying the market with the goods from Eastern Europe. The Hanseatic cities facilitated the growth in trade exchange of Flemish goods for fur and lumber from the East, its merchants controlled most of the trade of Scandinavian herring and cod, and also contributed to the development of coal deposits and other minerals in Central Sweden. Despite the feudal disunity in Kievan Rus’, foreign trade relations continued to exist there throughout the 13th –15th centuries. Moreover, in the early 15th century cooperation with the Hanse, which had its representatives in Veliky Novgorod and Pskov, enhanced. In Pskov, German merchants lived on the bank of the river, where they rented houses of tradesmen. As already mentioned above, there were two yards in Novgorod - German and Gothic. The German yard dealt predominantly with wholesaling. According to V. I. Bovykin, “All foreign merchants were from the Hanse: Hamburg, Lübeck, later, a large number of merchants arrived from Southern Germany, Saxony and Prussia” [28, p. 375]. By the 15th century the league had already been declining. Ivan III subordinated the Novgorod lands to the centralized state, and liquidated the yards of German merchants. Thus, the second period of activity of foreign entrepreneurs in the territory of the Russian state, from the 13th to the 15th century, was largely associated with the Hanseatic League. Thus, the second period of activity of foreign entrepreneurs in the territory of the Russian state, from the 13th to the 15th century, was largely associated with the Hanseatic League. Predominantly German merchants traded with Novgorod and Pskov, thus, penetrating deep into the country. The Hanseatic League created conditions for English - Russian trade. This route, traversing the northern part of the European continent from Scotland and England to Novgorod was used to supply textiles and woolens from western Europe as well as high-quality cloth, articles of luxury, jewelry, spices and wines [29, pp. 242– 244, 254]. E. R. Skvairs mentions various interesting facts, paying special attention to the importance of wine and beer trade [9, pp. 273–2770]. Scandinavian merchants from Skania and Bergen - the cities which were members of the league - traded in Kievan Rus’ through the Hanse. In the 14th century, the merchants from Genova and Venice developed their trade relations with Rus’ through their colonies, situated on the southern coast of the Crimea. Their centers were in Caffa (modern Feodosia) and Syrozh (Sudak). The trade with Byzantine merchants was carried out through the Crimea, the yards of Russian traders were situated near the harbor of the Golden Horn, the Byzantine merchants also had their strongholds in Russia. Gradually with Moscow’s turning into the capital of the Russian tsardom, it also became a strategic crossroad of the routes from Northwestern Europe to Crimea. Along this way, for example, Flanders and English cloths were supplied from Europe. Eastern and Western merchants traded with many cities of the emerging centralized state. For instance, Lithuanian merchants visited Smolensk, Vyazma, Kiev and Vitebsk. The development of international trade relations declined in the era of foreign conquests and invasions. The situation changed, when the Russian state gained independence

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from the Horde and recovered Bryansk and Smolensk lands. The boost of foreign relations development, economic in particular, resumed with Ivan III, especially after he had married Zoe Palaiologina. The rise and development of Moscow draw the attention of foreign merchants and entrepreneurs. It was frequently visited by the merchants from Italy, Germany, Livonia, Poland, Georgia, Iran and other lands. It can be assumed that this was the beginning of a new era in the development of both political and trade relations. This process intensified when Ivan conquered the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, creating favorable conditions for the development of the Volga trade route, thus, enhancing trade relations in the region of the Caspian Sea. The route had linked the Russian state with the Horde, Iran and Middle Asia. The merchants from The Golden Horde, Bukhara, Khoresm, Armenia and Iran loved visiting rich and prosperous Nizhny Novgorod. Weapons, jewelry, expensive textiles and other goods were brought from the East. The revival of this trade route was mutually profitable for the foreign entrepreneurs and their Moscow counterparts. In the era of Tsardom of Muscovy, trade relations with the countries of Asia, notably Bukhara, Persia, Crimean Tataria and the Khanate of Khiva developed. International contracts were signed: with Bukhara in 1569; later in 1689, the first treaty with China (The treaty of Nerchinsk). Thus, as a centralized state under the leadership of Moscow enhanced, foreign businessmen from Europe, Asia, East and West took an interest in it. The third period of foreign business development in Russia begins in the late 16th - the early 17th century. The activities of foreign businessmen in Russia became more systematic. The territory of economic interaction expands and now its exact location is better determined, new companies are created. So, for example, in the early 17th century, French tradesmen would often arrive in Kholmogory with goods and currency, having more money to buy Russian goods then all their items cost. [30, pp. 22, 24, 31– 34]. The Italian company Lussio, which arrived in Kholmogory from the Netherlands, acting under the help of Boris Godunov, traded both in the North and in the Baltics [31, pp. 48–53]. Well known are the names of Florentine merchants Guasconi, who were living in Moscow for a long time, as well as the name of D. Zefo, the merchant, who traded in Arkhangelsk. It is assumed that Italy supplied its goods to Russia through European intermediaries. The Danish merchants, who usually traded in harbors but did not penetrate deep into the country, did business in the northern regions. Nevertheless, the penetration of foreign businessmen into different regions of Russia was a characteristic feature of the 17th century. Along with trade missions, industrial enterprises appeared. Customs books are important documents which bring to light the geography of foreign businesses in Russia. The study of customs books from Arkhangelsk and Vologda shows the trading activity of foreigners in these cities and the surrounding areas. An excerpt from Vologda customs book of the years 1662–1663, studied by A. L. Gryaznov, makes it possible to assume that there were made twenty-seven international transactions in which thirty-seven businessmen participated, fourteen of them were foreigners whose nationality was indicated. They were representatives of the Netherlands, Hamburg, an Englishman, and “Moscow foreigners” [7, p. 77]. It should be noted that these documents prove that more and more foreigners came to stay with their families for more than one season. In case of a breadwinner loss, wives or

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elder sons continued their entrepreneurial business [32, p. 139]. A. N. Guslistova states that in Vologda foreigners settled in their Yards in Lower Posad. She assumes that the data for the analysis of German Quarter is the census book of the years 1711 and 1712. It provides an opportunity to chronologically trace and present the condition of real estate which belonged to foreigners in Novinki [33, pp. 87–88]. The surnames of international traders who temporarily or permanently worked and lived in Russia in the 16th –17th centuries are known. Among then was, for instance, Vinant Luden, a Danish subject, who was mentioned among the Norwegian merchants, had a number of Yards in Moscow and traded with Arkhangelsk and Yaroslavl. In the 17th century the trade between Russia and Sweden successfully developed, going through Arkhangelsk, or more often through the territories of the Baltics which belonged to the Swedes. The peace treaty of Stolbovo, signed in 1617, created favorable conditions for Russia-Sweden relations. Swedish entrepreneurs strived to establish their Yards in different cities - Moscow, Novgorod and Pskov. A. V. Demkin gives a significant list of dozens of merchants who did business in Russia on a regular basis [34, p. 193]. They provided varied goods from metal (iron and copper), brass pots, food (herring, wines), and luxury items. In addition to trading, Swedish entrepreneurs engaged in credit operations. By the end of the 15th century entrepreneurial activities had become very diverse. The most successful merchants bought industries in Russia. The Swedish subject A. Minter was a co-owner of glass manufacture of Coets, established in the first half of the 17th century. The foreign policy of Michael and Alexei Romanov contributed to the foreign relations’ stability. As soon as The Treaty of Stolbovo and the Truce of Deulino were signed (1618), trade relations with the Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth began to evolve, having main trade centers in Vyazma and Putivl. Yet, the instability of foreign relations and frequent armed conflicts undermined economic relations. English merchants had a wide range of rights in Muscovy. Among the privileges granted by the tsar Michael to the English merchants were: the right of duty-free trade both in Russia and in transit trade with the East, the right to open yards and kontors, the right to freely use the Dvina harbors. In Novgorod, Pskov and Moscow, the use of English coins was permitted. These significant privileges for the English could be explained by mediatory policy of England in making peace treaties with the Swedes and Polish. From the middle of the 17th century, Holland came out on top in trade relations with Russia. The Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich gave equal rights to the English and Dutch, though the latter had more privileges. There was always a competition with varied results between the English and the Dutch for the leadership in trade relations with Russia. In the early 18th century, Peter the Great let the English recover their leading positions in trade. Russian merchants used English ships to trade, as they did not have any vessels. Moreover, English businessmen also participated in giving loans to Russian trade and industrial enterprises. However, according to the New Trade Regulations, signed by Tsar Alexey in the framework of protectionist policy in 1667, English businessmen as well as other foreigners could not participate in retailing and exchange goods or trade with foreign countries. Trade relations did not go smooth, there were mutual claims between the merchants,

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which led to the agreement between Russia and England with the 15-year period of validity “About Friendship, Mutual Commerce and Navigation”. It was signed in 1734. Traditionally, since the time of trade and economic relations with Byzantium, Greek merchants in Russia enjoyed the patronage of the Russian tsars. It is believed that it stemmed from their common religion, not the tradition alone. The Greek, selling expensive oriental items, had their yards in Moscow and traded in the southern region of the country. It is assumed that the reason for the religious convergence was the protective attitude of the State to Armenian merchants. Despite being Persian subjects, the Armenian merchants, would have a big yard in Astrakhan and supplied goods to Moscow. This right of Armenian merchants was authorized by the State in the charter which they were granted in 1667. They had the advantage in trade, for instance, selling silk, not only in Moscow but also in other cities and they could even transit. In the 17th century, trade and economic relations of Russia continued to develop in the eastern direction. Persian merchants had large yards in Moscow and Astrakhan. They sold silk, exported textiles, jewelry and sweets. In Persia they played important political and economic role, accompanying the embassy of the Shah of Persia to Moscow. Apart from Persian merchants, Indian tradesmen also had their Yard in Astrakhan. The researchers note that the turnover of the Indians was quite high. According to the previously established tradition, trade relations continued with the states of Central Asia: with Bukhara, Khiva, Urgench. The key feature of these trade activities was penetration into the depth of the country. However, the main point of trade with Central Asia remained the same - eastern shores of the Caspian Sea, Siberian cities and Astrakhan. The trading interests of Asian merchants stretched to Tyumen and Tobolsk, which enjoyed special interest. Mainly Chinese goods were delivered to Siberia. As noted above, the Treaty of Nerchinsk between Russia and China contributed to the expansion of direct trade and economic relations between the two countries [35, pp. 333–337].

5 Conclusion Summing up, it is necessary to say that the geographic distribution of foreign businesses in Russia has its long history. Merchants pioneered this field. Trade relations, more precisely, commodity exchange took place even among the Eastern Slavs before the formation of the state. The main partners of the Eastern Slavs at that time were Byzantium, rich and prosperous, it acted as a center of trade and as a transit state through which contacts with the Middle East and Arab countries were maintained. The famous trade route “from the Varangians to the Greeks”, which connected the Baltic coast, Northern Europe and South East, went across this country. The European, Scandinavian and Eastern merchants took part in commercial relations. Russian trade developed under their influence. Across the route the new Russian cities were built. The capital of the state, Kiev flourished. The important role was played by the Khazar Khaganate which controlled the whole Volga territory. The state, formed by the 10th century, continued to enhance and maintain economic relations which had already spread by that time. Consolidation of the Kievan state, the period of feudal disunity, as well as

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the changes on the political and geographic world map, had direct and indirect impact on the business sphere in Russia. The route “from the Varangians to the Greeks” dies away, the trade centers are moved to Europe. The state undergoes the period of feudal disunity, which influences the geography of international businesses, for political conditions do not contribute to the development of commercial relations. Yet, the relations do not cease to exist. At this stage each principality, particularly those bordering Europe, continue to develop their trade relations. The Hanse gained importance as well as the cities and countries which were related to it. The league controls the trade in Europe. Veliky Novgorod and Pskov mediate between the League and Kievan Rus’. Foreign conquests and feudal disunity had a devastating effect on the international trade in the country but the previous connections with the Byzantine Empire, Middle East and Bulgaria still existed, though they were very poor. The third stage of the development of foreign entrepreneurship of the already established centralized state covers the period of the 16th –17th centuries. The geography of foreign entrepreneurship becomes wider. The economic relations with England and Sweden, other European and Scandinavian countries, Persia and the countries of Middle East improve. The nature of business activities changes, the merchants begin to participate in the sphere of industry and credit operations. These stages of collaboration indicate the breadth of economic geography, various priority areas of trade and industrial entrepreneurship of foreigners in Russia. The accumulated experience shows that taking into account mutual interests, mutual respect for the traditions of the state, equality of rights, regardless of territorial or religious affiliation, serves to develop economic, political relations, strengthen cultural ties, which favorably affected and benefited all participants in commercial and industrial operations.

References 1. Kulischer, I.M.: History of Economic Life in Western Europe, 10th edn. Sotsium, Chelyabinsk (2008). (in Russian) 2. The history of Russian entrepreneurship. Book 1, Moscow (2000). (in Russian) 3. Golovko, Yu.I.: The Projects of development of the Black Sea commerce (the last quarter of 18th—beginning of 19th century). In: Proceedings of the Faculty of History, St. Petersburg University, vol. 17, pp. 83–107 (2014) 4. Gracheva, E.Z., Martynenko, A.V.: The Volga region in the system of trade and economic relations of Russia and the Middle East in the 17th–18th centuries. Econ. Hist. 14(2), 179–187 (2018). (in Russian) 5. Sheptunova, Ye.Yu.: Russian and foreign merchants: the nature and form of economic competition (based on materials of the Moscow merchant society). In: Nagornaya, O.S. (ed.) Topical Issues of Modern Science: A View of the Young: Collected Papers of the 6th Russian Scientific and Practical Conference of Students, Graduate Students and Young Scientists. South Ural Institute of Management Economy, Chelyabinsk (2017). (in Russian) 6. Indeeva, S.V.: Foreign projects of development of the Russian Trade. In: Bulletin of Tver State University. History Series, vol. 4, no. 37 (2013). (in Russian)

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7. Gryaznov, A.L.: Representative offices of Western European trading companies in Vologda in 1663. In: Readings on the 80th Anniversary of the Birth of Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Yu.N. Nekrasov 1935–2006. Materials of the Russian Scientific Conference with International Participation, Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. Vologda State University (2016). (in Russian) 8. Potkina, I.V.: Foreign businessmen and their civil status in Russian Empire. Russ. Hist. 4 (2014). (in Russian) 9. Skvajers, E.R.: Wine and beer in the mirror of trade diplomatic relations of the Hanse: Veliky Novgorod and London. Traditional culture in the modern world. Food history and food traditions of the peoples of the world. In: Pavlovsky, I.V., Rutsinskaya, I.I., Smirnova, G.Ye., Shtulberg, A.M. (eds.) Materials of the 1st International Symposium. Center for the Study of Interaction Between Cultures, Moscow (2015). (in Russian) 10. Bessudnova, M.B.: Correspondence of Novgorod German Yard from Tallinn City Archives of 1346–1521. Yaroslav the Wise Novgorod State University, Veliky Novgorod (2017). (in Russian) 11. Wilhelm, A.F., Wilhelm, K.A.: Germans in history of Russia: people and events, vol. 2. Spectr, Barnaul (2012). (in Russian) 12. Yablonskaya, O.V.: Commercial advance of London merchants in the 14th century. New Univ. Ser. Top. Issues Humanit. Soc. Sci. 10, 31 (2013). (in Russian) 13. Liseitsev, D.V., Shamin, S.M.: “Years of Hardship” of the first Russian manufacturer Andrei Denisovich Vinius. Quaestio Rossica 6(4), 984–994 (2018). https://doi.org/10.15826/qr.2018. 4.341 14. Wurpts, B., Corcoran, K.E., Pfaff, S.: The diffusion of protestantism in Northern Europe: historical embeddedness and complex contagions in the adoption of the reformation. Soc. Sci. Hist. 42(2), 213–244 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2017.49 15. Félicité, I.: Between Mars and Venus: Peter the Great in Northern German cities and duchies in 1716. Quaestio Rossica 6(3), 643–657 (2018). https://doi.org/10.15826/qr.2018.3.318 16. Munzinger, M.R.: The profits of the cross: merchant involvement in the Baltic Crusade (c. 1180–1230). In: The North-Eastern Frontiers of Medieval Europe: The Expansion of Latin Christendom in the Baltic Lands, pp. 329–352 (2017) 17. Dollinger, P.: The German Hansa. MacMillan and Co., London (1970) 18. Basik, V.P. Categories of Foreigners in Russia. Publishing House of Moscow University (2003) 19. Code of Laws of the Russian Empire of 1876, vol. 9 20. Smetanina, S.I.: The History of Entrepreneurship in Russia, Moscow (2004). (in Russian) 21. Rybakov, B.A.: Kievan Rus’ and the Russian Principalities of the 12–13th Centuries. Nauka, Moscow (1993). (in Russian) 22. The Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles, Moscow, vol. 1 (1997). (in Russian) 23. Berezhkov, M.N.: On the Trade of Russia with the Hanse Till the End of the 15th Century, 2nd edn. Lenand, Moscow (2016). (in Russian) 24. Doctor Raushnik: History of the German Hansa, Moscow (1842). 25. Khoroshevich, A. L.: The trade of Veliky Novgorod with the Baltic States and Western Europe in the 14th–15th centuries, Moscow (1963). (in Russian) 26. Postel, R.: The Hanseatic League and Its Decline. ORB: The Reference Book for Medieval Studies, 15 March 2005. Electronic data (1 file). https://www.hartford-hwp.archives/60/039. html 27. Pavlova, O.K.: Organization of medieval commerce on the example of the Hanseatic League. In: International Relations and Dialogue of Cultures, 5, St. Petersburg, Russia (2016). (in Russian) 28. Bovykin, V.I.: Foreign Entrepreneurship in Russia. History of Entrepreneurship in Russia. Book 2. Moscow (2000). (in Russian)

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National Policies and International Politics

Democracy Culture in the Central Asian Republics After the Independence: The Impacts of Socio-economic and Political Transformation Ebulfez Süleymanli(B) Uskudar University, Istanbul, Turkey [email protected]

Abstract. The concept of democracy culture is explained in terms of the extent to which the prominent understanding of democracy is accepted in a country. In other words, it refers to the level of internalization of democracy’s fundamental elements by social and political circles. Social factors are among the most important constituents influencing democracy culture. Within the 30-year process following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Central Asian Republics have moved on with the desire to be democratized and integrated into the liberal capitalist world system. However, the steps taken have not yet brought about a properly democratic system. At this current moment, what is seen in these countries is rather a sort of pluralist democracy. Indeed, this situation is not surprising, considering that democracy is a process and culture, and it cannot suddenly come into existence. Besides, the fact that these new republics, which have recently gained independence after hundred years of systematic Soviet politics, are obliged to struggle with chronic problems is among the obstacles in front of the formation of a democracy culture. Keywords: Democracy culture · Central Asian Republics · Socio-economic transformation · Political transformation

1 Introduction It is seen that democracy, having the potential of providing suitable solutions that politically and administratively vary for the expectations of societies since Ancient Greek, appears to be accepted as an ideal regime by several segments of societies in the world. Equality before the law, freedoms related to the social and political realm, freedom of speech, freedom of religion and conscience, and right to earn and consume are determined as the prominent features of democracy that distinguish and render it compared to other regimes [26]. Democracy is influenced by social conditions and depends on them more than any other regime because speaking of a democratic regime requires the fulfillment of certain social, economic, and cultural circumstances. A strong middle-class, urban and secular

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 195–203, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_16

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life, mass higher education, a culture of tolerance, multi-party-political system, and freedom environment consist of a democratic regime’s fundamental socio-economic conditions. Besides, embracing democracy necessitates a democratic way of life with democratic institutions and rules. Democratic institutions and rules can only be permanent in an environment where democratic relations, values, and attitudes sustain. For the strength of democracy is commensurable with the degree of acceptance of democracy at the individual and societal level. Democracy culture is as necessary as the rules for democracy to be sustained because the culture and value judgments are necessary for democracy too. Individuals’ acceptance and respect for each other is among the untouchable elements of the culture of democracy. Accordingly, the democratization of society is what is fundamental and prior [22]. Democratic political culture provides such an environment [17]. Indeed, it appears that the formation process of democracy culture is prominent as one of the main principles of the functioning of democracy within society. This process developed in the West with the Renaissance in the spheres of science, art, and culture, the Enlightenment that laid the foundations of the secular thought, the Industrial Revolution that radically transformed the values of the traditional society, and the French Bourgeois Revolution that brought democracy to the agenda has progressed in a unique historical evolution in which a new human type took shape that has never been witnessed before [26]. However, non-Western societies have tried to carry out a state-owned social transformation in pursuit of reaching the long-term modernization movement of the West in a short time and this process continues for some societies. Central Asian Republics, which have recently gained independence, are among these societies. Democracy in these countries has been in an institutionalization process under the influence of multi-sided developments for thirty years since 1991 when they gained independence. The development of democracy in these countries has had various difficulties because they have faced the need to establish new institutions due to the independence, along with the liberal discourse shaped within a conjuncture where institutions and rules have become a global wave, and the pressure to make the reforms anticipated by the international system. Concordantly, the political change and the settlement of democracy culture experienced by the Central Asian Republics after gaining independence require the re-interpretation of the former analytical frameworks. In this study, which focuses on the culture of democracy in the Central Asian Republics, a relevant framework will be formed at first, and then the problematic areas and socio-cultural dynamics of democracy culture in these countries will be elaborated.

2 Democracy Culture Although it is hard to speak of an agreed definition of the democracy culture, this concept generally refers to the degree of acknowledgment and acceptance of the fundamental democratic values by the society in a country. In this direction, R. Dahl considers the presence of democratic beliefs and culture to be vital conditions for democracy [5]. According to Dahl, citizens and leaders must support democratic thought, values, and implementations for democracy to be consistent in a country. The reinforcement for

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democracy is provided by embedding these beliefs and tendencies to a country’s culture and transmitting them to the next generations. Touraine, stating that democracy cannot be reduced to the acts of resisting and putting defense against authoritarian power, defines the culture of democracy to be immune toward inequalities and discriminations, distant from a non-political liberalism, and a way of rebuilding the world and people’s personalities by supporting different cultures to meet and become integrated [24]. The notions of democracy and democratic culture nurture each other. The degree and quality of the presence of democratic elements in a country improve the democracy culture shared among the citizens and, at the same time, the development of democracy culture allows the components of democracy to be operated more healthily and functionally [9]. Political participation is the first and foremost elements in this sense. Political participation is both an important component of the democratic process and a part of democracy culture. Indeed, political participation is a significant issue on which democratic countries lay emphasis and put efforts to develop it. Political participation can be defined as the different forms of implementation of pressure by the citizens on the government and political power through local and political activities and their efforts to be influential by directly taking part in the political process [7]. Individuals become gradually estranged to themselves and society unless they participate in the making of decisions that are directly or indirectly related to their lives. In this sense, political participation appears to be necessary for coexisting as a society. Another important aspect of political participation is that it is an activity and a process that cultivates individuals in terms of democracy culture. Because, as Mill states, individuals, by participating in public affairs, assess the interests outside themselves, accept the guidance of a rule other than private favoritism in the face of conflicting claims, and apply the principles and wisdom of which the reason of existence is general interest [25]. That is why to ensure that the citizens are involved in decision-making processes in all spheres of social life is one of the fundamental concerns of democracy. Ersin Kalaycıo˘glu, analyzing the relationship between democracy and the political culture, emphasizes that democracy can only develop in “a private political culture” and counts tolerance as the first fundamental cultural element of democracy. Kalaycıo˘glu makes the following assessment about the cultural elements of democracy. Another cultural element that is as important as tolerance is the ability to act together with others. The first requirement of working with different people for a common goal is to trust the others. Democratic organizations cannot function if the trust is not present. It is also necessary that people should trust the institutions, rules, and agencies of democracy. In a democracy, citizens need to have the sense that they have an impact on political decisions. If the sense of political activity is missing, if a citizen cannot believe that they would fail to change a political decision assumed to be mistaken, then it would be difficult to establish political participation [10]. In the contemporary world, it is observed in societies with an established democracy culture that the living standards and the level of welfare are higher. It is known that the culture of democracy contributes not only to the social and political life but also to individual development. In countries with no democracy culture, democracy can

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be frequently suspended and the seemingly democratic systems can easily turn into autocracies. Social factors are one of the most significant elements that affect the culture of democracy. Societies’ ways of living, traditions and customs, educational levels, and the social environment are internal components shaping the behaviors of individuals. Agencies and institutions with an external influence such as the media, civil society organizations, and non-governmental organizations can orient and change social movements [2]. First of all, a democracy culture needs not only competent citizens but the appropriate political and legal structure to support their competence to be used. Because the institutional structures and procedures and the opportunities for active interaction that is presented or withheld by them play the role as important activators or blockers within the democratic and intercultural initiatives of citizens. The citizens in a country influence political life via elections in the first place. However, political participation can be realized in other ways as well. Besides elections, the most fundamental factor is the freedom of organization that provides the society’s political participation. Organizing should be in the form of parties, associations, trade unions or civil society organizations. These sort of organizations and institutions that are outside the politics provide an environment for citizens in which they can discuss and resolve the problems related to them. Moreover, associations, trade unions, and civil society organizations transfer the desires and needs of the society to the state in the form of organized pressure. Thereby, these organized structures with the support of the society improve democracy culture by consolidating the consciousness of responsibility and participation and monitoring the decisions and actions of the state [9]. Furthermore, the freedom of thought and the freedom of expression bear particular importance concerning the culture of democracy. Indeed, thoughts produce impact when they are expressed, and hereby the public opinion is formed. Therefore, citizens in democratic countries are given greater freedom of expression/speech. A democratic country needs citizens who can express their ideas without any hesitation, are sensitive toward the rights of other people around them, honest, just, brave, and responsible. The presence of such a citizen type necessitates a free environment of thinking and discussion. Dahl, too, draws attention to the freedom of expression as a democratic principle. According to Dahl, the freedom of expression is crucial for citizens to be able to participate in the political life effectively, obtain a clearer understanding about the potential actions and policies of the government, and influence the decisions of the government. Silent citizens may be perfect for an authoritarian ruler, but they would be a great disaster for democracy [5].

3 The Problems of Democracy Culture in the Central Asian Republics Within the Context of Political Institutionalization Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Republics happened to gain independence with the disintegration of the Soviet Union on October 1991. In the process started with the independence in 1991, these states began to build themselves by completely leaving the Leninist doctrine and appropriating a liberal democratic political structure and, at the same time, constituted the policy of rebuilding their identities [19].

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The transition toward a new political system by all the new states emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been discussed based on “democratization” and “democratic transition” [13]. Along with the waves of democratization in these countries, the general purpose was the liberalization and partial/gradual democratization of the political system. There are three prominent features in terms of political institutionalization. These are the increase in the power of the executive authority compared to the legislation and jurisdiction within state powers at the constitutional level, especially the removal of legislation from being a balancing force in the face of executive power, and the presence of a president-centered authoritarian structure within the executive authority [16]. Moreover, one of the primary features in terms of political institutionalization is that the system in these countries is structured based on the separation of soft-operational powers and under a unitary model. Therefore, it is stated by the researchers that the institutional foundation for the formation of a balancing legislative power relying on the separation of hard powers is absent, which is a condition of operating the presidential regime under a democratic model. To this regard, rather than being a transition to democracy, the transformation after the Soviet Union refers to a sort of hybrid-mixed political regime in which authoritarian and democratic institutions take part in the political system and operate in the functioning of the regime together [3]. On the other hand, these countries have important disadvantages sourced from the historical process in terms of democratic institutionalization. This disadvantage can be seen as a common problem among many third world countries that were emancipated from colonialization within the last century. Because these countries enter the process called “the transition period” in the political science literature upon gaining their independence. According to Huntington, high inflation, low level of development, weakness of the state of institutions, and many other similar reasons have decelerated the democratization process [8]. Mariya Omelicheva from Kansas University tackles the current status of democracy in Central Asian Republics with various dimensions in her book “Democracy in Central Asia: Competing Perspectives and Alternative Strategies”. Omelicheva answers the question why the desired goals could not be achieved on the way to democracy despite all kinds of supports and efforts of the Western countries by stating that especially the externally imposed experience of democracy lacks the cultural background and it could not find sufficient response among the people of the region due to the low level of support [15]. Nevertheless, the way, pace, and character of the transitions have depended on the international conditions as much as the national, historical, economic, social, and cultural properties of these different countries. Concordantly, each country has distinct historical, economic, cultural, and social experiences and the political developments are influenced by these distinguishing factors [11].

4 Democratization in the Central Asian Republics and Social Problem Areas Democracy is a system innate to the social and cultural structure. It becomes functional in a structure where individuality is apparent in the cultural pattern. The Turkish world has

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largely been based on an authoritarian imperial balance. Phenomena like individuality, free will, civil society, democracy are values that appear in their peculiarity within Soviet societies. In fact, it is considered to be one of the most important reasons why democratic tendencies have been inadequate in not only USSR countries but also Republics that there was a totalitarian regime grounded on the state ownership of the means of production, exclusion of every kind of pluralism, prohibition of the opposition and opposite CSOs, and imposition of the Communist Party’s ideas to the people during the period of the USSR when everything was under the rule and supervision of a single party [1]. On the other hand, as it is known, democracy cannot penetrate the societies where community relations are strong. That is why, considering the communitarian character of Turkish societies, the problem of democracy gains concrete visibility [27]. In this context, a major problem in front of the democratization of the independent Republics is the undeniable significance of the regional clans and family alliances. These alliances formed in parallel with the regional relations developed before the Soviet Union continued to be important in the Soviet Era and Moscow benefited from the competition and differences among those groups [3]. Regionalism, which started to manifest itself within social life along with the state, especially after gaining independence, has turned into the major factor in the political level. Regionalism, penetrating all spheres of the state, has been one of the fundamental principles in the determination of promotions and appointments. In Republics, regional factions did not have a social basis but were qualified as purely device factions. However, with regionalism, the fact that the political elite coming from abroad were imposed in this way has strengthened the centrifugal tendencies [14]. In determining whether democracy is established in a country, these criteria bear significance that the authority and responsibilities are institution-oriented instead of being person-oriented, the rule of law principle is valid for everyone in every case, political parties and CSOs are well-developed and adequate in number, and the media is free and independent. The notion of civil society is important in this process regarding the transition from individual rights to democracy, the formation of a democratic society, and transference of state-society-individual relations to a democratic level. While the concept of civil society was used for the transition from totalitarian regimes to democracy in the former Soviet Union Bloc countries, it was used in the developed Western countries referring to the aim of transitioning from representative democracy to participatory democracy to overcome the crises of the nation-state with the development of postmodernity [4]. Indeed, according to Tosun, despite increase of the historical weight of the first in the competition of liberal and socialist state models in the late 1980s, the fact that both went through a crisis in terms of finding solutions for political and economic problems has brought about the discussions about the restructuring of the state in a narrow sense and the relations between the state and the civil society in a wider sense [23]. To put differently, the efficacy of civil society was highlighted in the process of rearranging the state and the market in pursuit of finding an alternative model for the social state or the welfare state. Therefore, the recurrence of the notion of civil society on the agenda has been for the transformation of the state, instead of emphasizing individual rights and freedoms, from the aspect of both the socialist and liberal regimes.

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An increase has recently been observed in the number of the organizations called Non-governmental Organization (NGO) in these aforementioned countries. Nevertheless, it is seen that the majority of these organizations get into act to benefit from the grants and support of foreign and domestic funds, instead of favoring the public interest, reproducing the democratic gains, forming the channels for political participation, setting the social demands, and pressing the governments for these demands, which are the functions necessary for a civil society organization to have. Another important factor that allows the culture of democratic political participation to be efficient and permanent is social trust. The feelings of trust generally manifesting themselves in three categories that are the trust among the individuals, the trust for the various institutions of the democratic system (political trust), and the trust among the elite shape the social and political relationships of a society to a great extent [6]. Turkic Republics take the lead among the countries with a low level of generalized trust, among which the World Values Survey is conducted that is one of the most important survey databases in the world. This situation damages the trust of the society for the state in Republics, weakens the commitment to democracy in these societies, and, at the same time, it appears to be a severe obstacle in front of the formation of consciousness of being a nation in the Central Asian Republics, which have recently gained their independence. The reasons for this phenomenon can be broadly analyzed with a couple of groups. These mainly involve the painful transformation sourced from the inclination toward the market economy, the change in the social infrastructure and the differentiation in the ideological premises of the state, developments related to the institutions in these states, corruption, cultural degeneration, slowdown of the functioning of justice by the bureaucracy, social segregation and sharpening caused by the socio-economic problems, which undermined the trust of the society toward social institutions and that of among the institutions [20]. Other than the ones mentioned, the educational level of the people and their level of interest in the country’s problems matter as well. Democracy is not a system that can be imposed on a society like the touch of a magic wand. Democratization requires a certain accumulation and experience. Looking at the history of democracy in the Central Asian Republics, it is impossible to speak of the traces of a democratic development except for several short-term initiatives during the period of autarchy in the 19th and the 20th century, such as Azerbaijan People’s Republic founded between the years 1918–1920.

5 Conclusion As a result of this analysis, it is seen that the Central Asian Republics, almost in their thirteenth year after the independence, have been proceeding with an aspiration to be democratized and integrated. However, the steps taken have not yet created a proper democratic system. For the time being, Republics seem to have a pluralist democracy in the formal sense. Considering that democracy is a process, a culture, and cannot exist suddenly, this situation is not very surprising. On the other hand, the fact that all the new Republics that gained independence following systematic policies of the Soviet Union are subjected to struggle with chronic problems is a severe obstacle for the establishment of democracy culture. The intercultural competition occurred within this process is a non-negligible dimension of the power struggle in Central Asia [12].

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Another important dimension in terms of the necessary conditions for the establishment of democracy culture refers to the level of internalization of democratic personality traits by the individuals and the organizational-structural features of civil society organizations. It is anticipated that democratic attitudes, traditions, and, most importantly, the democratic awareness in the society would gradually flourish in these countries, which are just at the beginning of their democratic transition. The inclusion of democratic principles in the constitutions made in these countries and the progress in the sphere of basic rights and freedoms, even though slow, are considered to be positive developments. It is possible to deem that these developments will be meaningful in terms of the establishment of a democratic political culture in time. For the democratization of political culture, the provision of continuity in democratic processes bears great significance above all. It is also necessary that the faith in democracy should be increased for that purpose. Indeed, if people become aware of the graces and the returns of democracy, democracy settles, and the culture of democracy can be developed [18]. To realize this in Republics, it would be an important factor for the power to respect the critiques of the opposition (moderation) and for the opposition to approach the power more positively(constructiveness) [21]. Republics have several advantages as well as important disadvantages on this path. The first is that these countries have a considerable amount of literate population. The literacy rate in Republics 99% for women and 96% for men, indeed. Considering that democracy is not a regime of heroes or leaders but ordinary citizens, it can be understood that a high literacy rate is a significant element that would influence the democratic future of a country. The second reason is that Republics have become members of many international institutions after independence. Especially with the initiatives like UN, CSCE, becoming a member of the European Council, partnership and co-operation agreement with the EU, Republics would cease to be self-enclosed countries and, most of the time would allow the detection of anti-democratic implementations. Another recommendation for Republics on their way to a democratic political culture can be mentioned as the purpose of inclining toward the policies that would render democracy and human rights an important component of the socialization of individuals through the institution of education.

References 1. A˘gir, O., Baharçiçek, A.: Rusya’nın ba¸sarısız demokratikle¸sme tarihi. Birey ve Toplum (2012) 2. Akçali, Y.: 12 Eylül’den günümüze Türkiye’de demokrasi kültürü: Toplumsal ve siyasal dönü¸sümün etkileri. Yüksek Lisans Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Kamu Yönetimi Anabilim Dalı (2007) 3. Alkan, H.: Türk cumhuriyetlerinde siyasal kurumsalla¸sma süreci: Geçen yirmi yılın bir bilançosu. Bilig, 61, 1–31 (2012) 4. Aslan, S.: Sivil toplum ve demokrasi. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi ˙Iktisadi ve ˙Idari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 15, 362 (2010) 5. Dahl, A.: Demokrasi üstüne. Phoenix Yayınları, Ankara (2001)

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6. Ercins, G.: Türkiye’nin demokratikle¸smesinde toplumsal sorun alanları Gazi Üniversitesi ˙Iktisadi ve ˙Idari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 14, 79–102 (2012) 7. Güldiken, N.: Toplumbilimsel boyutuyla siyasal katılım. Sivas, Dilek Ofset Matbaacılık, p. 31 (1996) 8. Huntington, S.: Üçüncü dalga. TDV Yayınları, Ankara (1993) 9. I¸sıkçı, Y.M.: Demokratik kültür ve milletvekili seçilme yeterlili˘gi: Türkiye on sekiz ya¸sındaki milletvekillerine hazır mı? Sosyal Bilimler Ara¸stırmalar Dergisi, p. 529 (2016) 10. Kalaycıo˘glu, E., Köker, L., Özbudun, E.: Türkiye’de demokratik siyasal kültür. Ankara: Türk Demokrasi Vakfı Yayınları, p. 47 (1995) 11. Kelkitli, F.: Rusya’nın egemen demokrasi modelinin Orta Asya devletleri üzerindeki etkisinin analizi. Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi 6, 63 (2018) 12. Kuru, A.T.: Devlet politikaları ve kültürler arası rekabet ı¸sı˘gında Orta Asya’da milletle¸sme sürecine bir örnek: Türkmenistan. ˙Istanbul: Gündo˘gan Yayınları, p. 75 (2003) 13. Mecidov, C.: Azerbaycan’da demokratikle¸sme süreci ve siyasi partiler: Çok partili hayata geçi¸s Yayınlanmamı¸s Doktora Tezi Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, p. 231 (2008) 14. Roy, O.: Yeni Orta Asya ya da ulusların imal edili¸si. ˙Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, pp. 164–165 (2005) 15. Omelicheva, M.Y.: Democracy in Central Asia: Competing perspectives and alternative strategies. Asia in the new millennium. University Press of Kentucky (2015) 16. Özgi¸si, T.: Orta Asya Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Azerbaycan’ın parlamento yapılarının kar¸sıla¸stırmalı analizi. Türkiyat Mecmuası 22, 98 (2012) 17. Özpolat, A.: Bir toplumsal de˘gi¸sme paradigması olarak demokrasinin e˘gitime yansımaları: Demokratik e˘gitim Millî E˘gitim Dergisi 185, 366 (2010) 18. Sütel, D.: Demokrasi kültürü. E˘giti¸sim Dergisi, 25, 3 (2010) 19. Süleymanov, A.: Kültürler arası rekabet ve milletle¸sme süreci ba˘glamında Türk cumhuriyetlerinin temel meseleleri TESAM III. Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Kongresi “Yerelden Küresele: Türkiye – Türk Dünyası ˙Ili¸skilerinin Dünü, Bugünü ve Yarını” Kongresi Tam Metin Bildiri Kitabı, Istanbul, Tesam Yayınları, p. 17 (2018) 20. Suleymanov, A.: Ça˘gda¸s Türk devletlerinde toplumsal güvensizlik sorunu VI. Uluslararası Türk Dünyası Sosyologlar Birli˘gi Kongresi (2015) 21. Sahin, ¸ K.: Azerbaycan’a yönelik demokrasi eksenli bir analiz. Akademik Bakı¸s Dergisi, 38, 51–63 (2013) 22. Ta¸skesen, A.: Demokrasi ve demokrasi kültürü, vatanda¸slık bilgisi. ˙Istanbul: Lisans Yayıncılık, p. 111 (2005) 23. Tosun, A., Erdo˘gan, G.: Birle¸stirici Demokrasi Devlet-Sivil Toplum ˙Ili¸skisinin Yeniden ˙ Bir Analiz Aracı Olabilir mi? ˙Istanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, p. 23 (2005) Yapılandırılması Için 24. Touraine, A.: Demokrasi nedir. ˙Istanbul, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, p. 286 (2011) 25. Tunçay, M.: Batıda siyasi dü¸sünceler tarihi seçilmi¸s yazılar Yakın Ça˘g. ˙Istanbul: ˙Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, p. 85 (2008) 26. Uluç A.V.: Birey ve sivil toplum ili¸skisi çerçevesinde Türkiye’de demokrasi sorunu. Mukaddime, 6, 1–78 (2012) 27. Vurucu, ˙I.: Türk dünyasında demokrasiyi anlamaya giri¸s, Kazakistan merkezli bir çözümleme. Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Ara¸stırmaları Enstitüsü, Türkiyat Ara¸stırmaları 8, 391 (2008)

Alternative Models of Political Participation of Population in Developed and Developing Countries: Cases of Switzerland, Germany, Brazil and Uruguay Yuri Kovalev, Alexander Burnasov(B) , Anatoly Stepanov, and Maria Ilyushkina Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg, Russia [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Abstract. The present research is focused on the problems of modern representative democracy in developed and developing countries. The loss of public trust in government requires the opening of political systems and the integration of citizens into political decision-making process. Mass political participation based on direct and deliberative democracy enhances stability and effectiveness of the political system. The analysis of the implementation of direct and deliberative democracy has shown their growth in the world since the 1990s and their geographical differences. In Switzerland, Germany, Uruguay and Brazil, there are special models of new political participation. The characteristics and comparative analysis of these models allow us to determine the mechanisms and ways of political participation, their impact on the state of national political and social systems. Keywords: Participation · Direct democracy · Deliberative democracy · Public space · Developed and developing countries · Switzerland · Brazil · Germany · Uruguay

1 Introduction Discussions on the “political participation” of the population are raised within the European, American, partly Russian scientific and political discourse. They are directly related to the crisis of the existing model of representative democracy in the developed and developing countries of the world. The core of these discussions is the assumption of the loss of public trust in the existing political institutions due to the oligarchy of the power and its merging with the capital, social inefficiency and wrong authorities’ decisions, which are often at odds with the desires and needs of the population. Distrust of political institutions and processes is reflected in low turnout of citizens in the elections, decline in the membership in the leading parties, the increase in the number of political demonstrations against the political establishment, demands for reform and change. The concept of “Post-democracy”, which was coined by the British political © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 204–216, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_17

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scientist C. Crouch, refers to the impossibility of the open democratic process in contemporary Western societies. According to C. Crouch, a democratic society is a society with mass involvement of citizens in the political process. Political decisions should be made with the active participation of the majority of the population, interested in the political process and possessing political knowledge [6: 8]. Criticism of the modern political system, which can be described as “party democracy”, comes not only from formal and non-formal political groups, but also from authoritative scientists, members of government commissions and parliamentarians. In this regard, professor R. Sussmuth, President of the Bundestag (1988–1998) says that the need for reform of the political system in Germany exists, and its current state does not meet the challenges of the day. To do this, it needs to be “open” to various forms of mass political participation [31: 6]. C. Offe insists on the “democratization” of democracy [25: 5]. Political empowerment of the population is an integral part of the programmes presented by the left parties and social movements. The crisis of modern representative democracy has stimulated the development of alternative forms of political participation in the world. According to B. Kaufman, the number of people’s legislative initiatives, referenda, plebiscites, discussions and other forms of participation in the world has recently increased dramatically [16]. Along with the common features, new participation models have some regional and national features. The aim of this article is to study the alternative models of political participation in some developed and developing countries and their impact on the political system of these countries.

2 Methodology and Data The proposed research on the forms and models of mass political participation in the developed and developing countries of the world is based on the theory of communicative interaction in the public space (H. Arendt, J. Habermas, Imhoff, Scott, Zutter). The research involved collecting data, empirical cases and a comparative analysis of figures demonstrating public participation in four countries mainly. According to H. Arendt, policy is carried out not in a vacuum, but in a space with a certain social characteristic. H. Arendt calls this “space” the “public” space [1: 41]. J. Habermas, one of the main theoreticians of the “public space”, supposes that is has two sides with clear boundaries. These are the “real world” and the political sphere. In his opinion, the public space is based on the communication network [15]. The German researcher E. Klaus believes that publicity is a continuous communication process in which members of a society decide how they want to live [17: 22]. According to his statements, this communication space is an area of three interacting but differentiated levels, which vary in functions and degree of complexity in communication exchange. The more complex communication is, the fewer actors are involved in the process of communication [17: 22]. The first level of public space (called the “simple” level) consists of the ordinary personal and interpersonal information that provides communicators with everyday experience, event and entertainment information. The medium level of public space is represented by organized social groups with a high level of internal specialized information exchange, pursuing various social and political goals. At this level network, horizontal (non-hierarchical)

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information exchange prevails. This level often contains ideas of alternative social, economic and political discourse, thereby, having an ideological “pressure” on the upper “floor” of public space, the level of integrated communication. Here the information exchange is strictly hierarchical and hegemonic, with a clear selection of information, communication, and its content is often closed from the first and second level of public space. This level is represented by the dominant political system, which includes not only parties, government and parliament, but also lobbying structures and the media sphere. Based on the characteristics of communication in the public space, we mark the first level as a simple social level, the second level is the level of a civil society, and the third one is the level of an institutionalized political system (see Fig. 1).

Social influence, power

complex

Political system

simple medium

Civil society Society

Number of communication forums Fig. 1. The pyramid of levels of public space Source: [17]

The levels of public space are exchanging information intensively. The political system, that has concentrated the power in a public sphere, has the least degree of openness. Its semi-closed character is determined by the elitist position of its actors and the desire to retain power in the hands of the elite minority. The public discourse, which is formed by the political system, emphasizes the importance of the sphere professionalization, the high importance of the selected “competent minority” (experts, specialists) in social problem solving. Therefore, the population is pointed to the “borders” of public sphere democratization, to its passive political role, which is narrowed to participation in the elections of the “competent minority”. However, the social history shows that the shift of the political system towards domination of the elite does not remove, but instead accentuates internal and external political divisions. At some historic moments the debates are so heated that new groups from the lower social strata are involved in the political sphere, building new political relations in the country. Such political upheaval can lead to a complete destruction of the

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entire social system. To avoid this, the political system should be more open to different types of participation in the public space. This realization encourages the search for new communication forms between public space levels. In many developed and developing countries nowadays there are integration processes of a civil society, various social groups in the country’s political system. These «hybrid» forms are aimed at political processes optimization and legitimacy. Political participation (lat. Participatio) refers to the level of a person’s involvement in political relations and power structures existing in a social and political community. The forms of political participation vary enormously. They can be identified according to two essential criteria – traditional and new, laid down in the constitutions of States or unconstitutional. Voting at the elections of the political elite that takes place every few years is the worldwide prevailing form of a political participation. Today, we can see that this model of a political participation does not meet modern challenges. New forms of participation can belong to two major groups: those seeking to replace the existing political system, which is fundamentally different from it, and those, hoping to reform the system of a representative democracy, complementing it with deliberative and direct democratic instruments. Today, the dominant idea is that democracy with legal capacity is the right combination of all participation forms [13: 19] (Fig. 2).

New models of political participation

Direct involvement models

Deliberative models

Fig. 2. New models of political participation Source: compiled by authors

Deliberative forms of a political participation have been widely disseminated in political systems all over the world. The terms refer to the «exchange of semantic positions and arguments during political disputes which result in collective decision-making» [18: 88]. Its intention is to find consensus between the discourse participants. Through the consensus and dialogue-oriented discussions of political issues in Internet forums and at public meetings goals are achieved. Firstly, the contradictions between different social groups are being reduced, and the society is being consolidated. Secondly, the population gets a growing sense of involvement in the political process as well as credibility of governance. Thirdly, the decision-making quality is being improved, because the “collective wisdom” plays a huge role here. Learning processes and generating knowledge are becoming important political innovations in national, regional and local structures. In addition to divisive forms of the political participation and to the formation of special “hybrid” forms of communication between the state and social organizations, the methods of direct influence on political decisions are also being expanded. In such models of political participation citizens directly initiate, accept and implement political acts at various levels of the territorial organization of the society. At the same time, the organization of the political process initiation and organization of referenda are regulated

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by existing legislative acts. Procedural legislation of representative structures may be restricted or corrected directly by democratic decisions. The study of new political participation models of the population in different countries worldwide is based on the statistical sources, expert reports and scientific publications on the subject. Comparative analysis of different states models allows determining the dominant one of the new political participation models and its impact on the functions of the political system in general.

3 Results and Discussion. Participation Models in Developed and Developing Countries The crisis of modern representative democracy has stimulated the quantitative and qualitative growth of tools and forms of political participation in the world. For the period from 1990 to 2010 only the number of referenda held in the world has increased substantially compared to previous years (see Table 1). The deliberative methods of participation are widely being introduced into different political systems. Along with the general trends, the models of political participation have a striking national specificity. For instance, in the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark the main model of the expanded political participation is the presentation-deliberative model. In other countries, forms of direct democracy are combined with representative and deliberative ones. These countries include Switzerland, Canada, Brazil, New Zealand, Lithuania, Slovenia and Uruguay. In the Scandinavian countries, the process of authority’s “post-democratization” is resisted by increasing the information exchange between the levels in the public space, expanding communication channels with social groups of a civil society. Representatives of the legislative or executive authorities in these countries are integrated into local or regional deliberative networks, and the dialogue processes in order to restore confidence in the political system lost in previous years and arouses public interest in the political process. Studies conducted in Denmark, Sweden and Norway emphasize the growth of the effectiveness of the political system and public confidence in it if the political system included the elements of deliberative participation [10: 301]. This was reflected in the improved communication of local, regional management structures with the society, and thus more effective management of the territory (New Public Management), as well as greater transparency in the activities of administrations. In Great Britain, on the contrary, apart from the referendum on the country’s withdrawal from the EU (Brexit), no other new forms of political participation were introduced at the national level. The spatial analysis of models and instruments of political participation demonstrates the disparity in their development among countries and regions of the world. By the number of referenda and polls of the population since 1793 European countries have occupied the leading position. This region accounted for 61% of all direct democratic events in the world (Table 1). The shares of Asia, America, Africa and Oceania were 11.2%, 10.7%, 10% and 6.7%, respectively. Among the nations of the globe, the implementation of the direct democratic forms emanating directly from the population (bottom up) at the national level is observed in a small number of small countries. Most

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Table 1. The number of referenda held on the macro regions of the world for the period 1793 to 2010 Reference: [16, 208] Period

Europe Asia America Africa Oceania Total

1793–1900

58

0

3

0

0

61

1901–1930

71

1

5

0

15

92

1931–1960 114

15

13

9

23

174

1961–1990 289

102

24

75

28

518

1991–2010 402

54

120

70

37

683

172

165

154

103

1528

Total

934

of the world’s voting on “national” projects for the period 1990 to 2013 is in Switzerland (48%), Slovenia (7%), Ireland (7%), New Zealand (6.5%), Slovakia (4.6%) and Uruguay (3.2%), respectively [10, 306]. These nations formed the center of direct democracy of the world (76% of this type of participation). An even greater number of direct political participation of the population is stated at the regional and local level of the countries. In Germany, for instance, at the federal state level (regional level), 419 votes and several thousand at the local level [23: 57] were conducted from 1990 to 2017. In such countries as Brazil and Canada, deliberative participation models prevail. Consider the features of participation models in Switzerland, Uruguay, Brazil and Germany in more detail. Switzerland is the world leader in the diversity of forms, and the impact of the direct political participation of the population on the country’s political system. In Switzerland, for centuries, there has been a wide practice of involving the population in political issues. In terms of the quantity and quality of tools, the possibilities for citizens to influence state policy at the national, regional (cantons) and local levels (communities, cities), the country has no analogues in the world. As the researcher Kost notes, “no democracy in the world gives its people such a range of powers of control and participation as Switzerland” [20]. Three types of direct democratic political participation in the form of a mandatory referendum, an optional referendum, and a popular initiative to change the constitution are widely used by its citizens. At the same time, the number of nationwide polls has dramatically increased over the past decades. Thus, 69 referenda and initiatives were held in the country from 1950 to 1970, in 1971–1990-145, in 1990–2010-185, from 2011 to 2019 - 73 events [4]. Along with the tools of political participation at the federal level, there are differences in the system of direct democracy at the level of the Swiss cantons. As a rule, German-speaking cantons have a lower threshold for holding popular votes than the Roman-speaking ones. Also, in cantons with a high level of urbanization and with strong “green” or “left-wing” parties, popular votes are held more often than in rural and conservative-party cantons [8]. Switzerland is also referred to as a “deliberative island” [32: 426]. The deliberative character of the democratic process is based, firstly, on the concordance context of the country’s democratic institutions. Secondly, it is based on bicameralism and weak party discipline [2]. The process of a political dialogue and exchange of opinions takes place on the threshold of a referendum or as a result of a discussion of the laws passed by

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parliament. The state pays great attention to the information security of the political decision under discussion, the organization of public debate in the media, the Internet and the real space, debates in local institutions as well as informal organizations. Numerous studies of the effects of direct, deliberative democracy in Switzerland on various aspects of political, social and economic life in the country show its prevailing positive effect. The works of Stutzer, Frey (2000) summarizing the surveys of the country’s population, state that more satisfaction with the life situation of the population in those cantons, where there are more opportunities for direct political participation, compared to those cantons, where there are fewer tools to influence politics [24]. Studies by Freytag M. show a strong positive impact of direct democracy on the social capital of the territory [11]. According to their views, direct democracy strengthens a civil society, stimulates the activity of citizens and the creation of dense social networks [11]. In the regions the level of trust in the authorities rises, civic responsibility grows, and the moral aspects of the person are strengthened. Brazil is the country with a developed system of diverse political participation of the population. Its constitution (Article 14) provides, along with participation in elections, also direct forms of public participation in the political process (referenda, popular initiatives, plebiscites). However, due to the high permissible threshold for the organization of referenda and popular initiatives at the national level (at least 2 million signatures must be collected), this form of participation was used in Brazil only twice - in 1993 and 2005 [27: 330]. At the same time, in Brazil, a special form of deliberative democracy — civil city councils — received wide response. They form the basis of a new national model of political participation. This model consists of processes of intensive communication, exchange of views and the development of a common, unified strategy on currently important issues of local, regional and national development based on a dialogue between the government and a civil society (between the political and social systems of public space). Appeared in 1989 in Porto Alegre, this form of participation was soon introduced into hundreds of large and small cities in Brazil. Since 2003, civil councils have been an integral part of regional and national policies. Since that time, the population of Brazil has the opportunity to directly influence the political, social and economic development of the country. Several times a year, the so-called National Public Policy Conferences (Confere“ncias Nacionais de Pol´lticas Pùblicas) are organized, in which representatives of civil society (delegated from city and regional civil councils) discuss public issues with the representatives of the national government, outline goals and priorities for the national development. From 2003 to 2011 about 82 national conferences took place in Brazil. More than 7 million people took part in them [28: 331]. This suggests that this model of political participation has become an integral part of the country’s political system (Fig. 3). The political process coming from the lower levels of public space (bottom up) implies that the political problems of the local and lower social levels will be heard at the highest levels of the political system. The topics discussed at national conferences can be differentiated into 6 discussion streams: 1) Health and healthcare, 2) Minorities and their rights, 3) Environment, 4) States, economy and development, 5) Education, culture, society and sport 6) Human rights. It is worth noting that during the reign of

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Community conferences (Approx. 5, 6 thousand cities) Regional conferences (26 states) National conferences (City of Brasilia) Fig. 3. “Pool” of issues under discussion Source: [27]

the President S. de Lula the number of issues discussed, as well as the quality and level of conferences held, have increased by an order of magnitude compared to previous governments [24]. The intermediate results of the impact of the Brazilian model of political participation on the social and political development of the country are given in the study by the professor T. Pogrebinshi. In general, the author notes a very positive impact of the deliberative participation on the development of the country [27: 342]. In Brazil, between 2003 and 2010, the population had the opportunity to directly influence public life in the country. More than 51% of the participants of the conferences, where the topics of the upcoming discussions are formed, are women. Among them, 26% have only primary education. This suggests that even the poorest and least educated segments of the population are given the opportunity to share their opinions. In general, in the period of 2003–2010 the growth of public confidence in the authorities was indicated, as well as the poverty reduction and raising living standards [27: 343]. Against the background of the political crisis in the country in 2016–2018 and the coming to the power of the right, neoliberal President J. Bolsonaro, the further development, and maybe the very existence of a national model of a dialogue between politics and a civil society is under real threat. Uruguay demonstrates strengthening of population participation in the developing countries. This country is the most progressive in Latin America from the point of various forms of development of the mechanisms in political participation. The models of the direct democracy are the most valuable in the country. They were firstly implemented at the beginning of the XX century during the reign of the President José Pablo Torcuato Batlle y Ordóñez (1903–1907). His main principles of the political system were based on the experience of the national democracy in Switzerland. In the constitution of the year 1934 the regulations of two ways in the direct democracy were pointed out including legislative initiative and required referendum. Since 1967 the mechanisms of optional referendum have been introduced. On its index of the direct democracy the country occupies the 10th place in Latin America. Nevertheless, it is only on the third place according to the number of initiated bottom up drafts from the population in the region [24: 129]. In comparison with other countries on the subcontinent, the direct bottom up

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democracy prevails in Uruguay, where people initiate lawmaking. Referendum initiating from the President‘s side is prohibited by the law here [25]. During the period of 1917–2017 In Uruguay 32 popular polls were organized, 13 out of them were held within last 20 years (1 poll in 2 years on average). The peak of all the polls was for national legislative initiatives (8), for required referendum only 2 and 3 polls for the optional referendum. The majority voted for the nominated objectives (54%), but 6 of the drafts were rejected [25]. As in other countries of Latin America the drafts, initiated by the people, concerned Constitutional amendments and reforms in the political system of the country. Overall, legal instruments of the direct democracy in Uruguay typical of its original model of political participation of the population are the following: 1. 10% of votes are needed to form national lawmaking model in the country (20% for Switzerland). The preparation period for voting is unlimited. The law is passed with 35% positive votes (Article 335, Constitution of Uruguay). 2. Required referendum is for amendments in the articles of the Constitution and is initiated by the majority of Parliament members. For accepting the amendments 35% of votes is required (Article 331). 3. Optional referendum is carried out on the basis of declining or accepting new laws in the parliament by the population. To initiate the referendum 25% of votes from the electors are needed within one year. Tax drafts and government issues (international contracts) are not negotiated during the referendum (Article 79) [25: 4]. According to the Argentinean researcher Alicia Lissidini, the models of the direct democracy (Bottom up Democracy) in Uruguay, as well as in other countries of Latin America, are being changed for the better. They broaden the scope of social rights of the population and the defence mechanisms of these rights with the government support [24: 132]. All these acts are improving the life conditions and form mass satisfaction in the political system. The modern political system of Germany is also demonstrating the development of new forms of participation of the population, as well as the increasing importance of existing forms of direct democracy. However, there are no legal provisions in the German Constitution that legitimize the use of forms of direct democracy or deliberative participation at the national level (with the exception of articles 29 and 146 of the German Constitution, which provide for popular votes to include new territories in the Republic or change the Constitution). The negative historical experience of the Weimar Republic and the post-war situation (the Cold War) determined the strict orientation of the political system to a multi- party, representative democracy. The unification of Germany in 1990 did not change the situation. The coalition agreement of the new government of the country (in February 2018), signed by the Chairmen of the ruling parties, indicates only the creation of a Commission to develop “elements of political participation of citizens and direct democracy that can complement our time-tested parliamentary-representative democracy” [19: 163]. At the same time, there is a wide range of direct democratic forms and participation of citizens in the country at the level of the federal lands and communes. Since the

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unification of Germany, one can observe a quantitative and qualitative leap in the development of a direct democracy. Thus, if for the period up to 1990 only 47 direct political companies were initiated in the country at the level of the federal lands, in the period 1990–2018 their number exceeded 446 (Tenfold growth) [33: 15]. The growth of this type of political participation was associated, firstly, with changes in the constitutions of a number of German lands and the inclusion of provisions in direct democracy. Until 1990, only 7 federal lands could use the tools of a direct democracy, then after 1990, all 16 got this opportunity [33: 16]. Secondly, some lands have been reduced the thresholds of the quorum for the conduct of referenda and popular initiatives. Thirdly, the political emancipation of the German society (especially since 2010), the creation of a network of social structures that tend to actively influence the political processes at the land and communal level can be clearly seen (Fig. 4).

200 150 100 50 0 1946-1990

1990-2000

2000-2010

2010-2018

Fig. 4. Dynamics of initiated measures within direct democracy at the federal states level for the period from 1946 to 2018 Source: [33]

Hamburg and Berlin lead the number of popular legislative initiatives (35% of all initiatives). Such areas as Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden Württemberg account for just 17% of direct democracy procedures [33: 17]. This distinction is connected with the specific features of federal states’ legal framework. Thus, in Hamburg, 5% of voters signatures must be collected just within 21 days to initiate a referendum. In Brandenburg and Schleswig-Holstein the ratio does not exceed 3.5%, and signature collection period is limited to six months. Conversely, in Bavaria and BadenWürttemburg popular legislative initiatives encounter legal obstacles in their implementation. In Bavaria the threshold of referendum initiation is set at 10% of signatures collected in two weeks, in Baden-Württemburg – 10% (3 months) [33: 12]. With sufficient signature collection on the initiation of a referendum, the vote on its holding among electors serves as another obstacle. In all federal states of the German Federal Republic the referendum can be held only under the condition that no less than 20% (municipal level) or 25% (state level) of all potential electors. Therefore, out of nearly 350 direct democracy procedures initiated in the post-war history of the FRG only 24 had resulted in referenda [33: 15]. Major changes are also noted within country’s deliberative political participation. Population-based surveys conducted in early 2010 revealed that the FRG citizens had become more politically proactive. Thus, 51% of respondents stated that they participated

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in the signing of political petition, 41% participated in discussions at political forums, 33% - in political demonstrations, 27% - in civic initiatives and 9% stated that they held the posts or leadership positions in political organizations [33: 248]. Berlin stands out among all federal states for its highest level of deliberative political participation of the population. The average level of participation is noted in Hesse, Hamburg and Bremen. The most politically passive population with a low level of political participation resides in Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland [33: 249]. Like in Switzerland, Uruguay and Brazil, the strengthening of political participation of the German population is assessed by the authors as generally positive. Although they emphasize the complex and ambiguous nature of influence that direct democracy and deliberative forms of participation have on political development, the quality of the decisions made by authorities and reverse impact of these forms of participation on the political mood of the population, they still state that with time confidence in the political institutions of the state, political competences of the citizens and their satisfaction with the democracy expand [13].

4 Conclusions Our regional and country analysis of new (unconventional) forms and models of political participation in the world supports the thesis about further evolution of the democracy as a form of government. The evolution of democratic institutions is expressed in the forms of expansion of «political» in public space, interpenetration, mixing and creating new «hybrid» forms on the borderlines between political systems and a civil society. Integration of the population in political system (or the politics into civic life) is implemented with the instruments of direct democracy and deliberative models. The number of direct democratic political events held in various countries of the world is constantly growing. To be more precise, since the early 2000s there has been a quantitative leap in the conduct of referenda, plebescites and popular votes. The forms of the deliberative integration of the population into the political process are also expanding. Alternative forms of political participation of the population are considered as additional elements to the existing model of representative democracy in the vast majority of countries. The combinations of a representative democracy with direct forms, as well as with deliberative instruments, aims at functional improvement of existing management models, and also at strengthening confidence in the political system of the state, enhancing local, regional and national identity. Comparison of instruments and forms of political participation in Switzerland, Brazil and the FRG shows great differences between these countries (see Table 2). Switzerland is a homeland of direct and deliberative democracy. It represents the whole spectrum of deliberative and direct democratic instruments, stating that the population is deeply satisfied with the political system. Uruguay demonstrates one of the highest levels of the development of the direct democracy “from the bottom” as well. Referenda on public legislative initiatives are carried out in the country regularly, which influences the quality of life and level of satisfaction with the existing political system by the population. In Brazil, the instruments of a direct democracy remain at a rudimentary stage. A referendum is possible only in a form of a plebescite and must be initiated by

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Table 2. Political Participation Models in Switzerland, Uruguay, Germany and Brazil Source: compiled by authors Instruments Instruments of direct democracy

Deliberative instruments

National level

Regional and municipal level

Switzerland

Germany

Brazil

Uruguay

Switzerland

Germany

Brazil

Uruguay

Mandatory referendum

+

+

+

+

+

+

–

–

Optional referendum

+

–

–

+

+

+

–

–

Popular initiative

+

–

–

+

+

+

–

–

Petitions

+

–

–

+

+

+

–

–

Civic forums, + councils, public hearings, etc.

–

+

–

+

+

+

–

the government. Since 2003, deliberative models of participation in the form of civil councils of various territorial levels have been developed in the country. In the FRG, the tools of direct and deliberative democracy are represented only at the municipal and regional levels. Among the federal states of the Federal Republic of Germany there are deep legislative differences in the regulation of a direct democracy. In general, the impact of new forms and instruments of political participation in the political system and society in these countries is evaluated as favourable.

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11. Freitag, M., Schniewind, A.: Direktdemokratie und Sozialkapital: Der Einfluss der Volksrechte auf das Vereinsengagement. Direkte Demokratie. Bestandaufnahme und Wirkungen im internationalen Vergleich. Münster, pp. 251–276 (2007) 12. Fox, S.: Is it time to update the definition of political participation? Political participation in Britain: The decline and revival of civic culture. Parliamentary Affairs 67, 495–505 (2013) 13. Geißel, B.: Partizipation und Demokratie im Wandel. Wie verändert sich unsere Demokratie durch neue Kombinationen repräsentative, deliberativer und direktdemokratischer Elemente? Partizipation im Wandel. Gütersloh, pp. 11–43 (2014) 14. Hameleers, M., Bos, L., Claes, H.: “They Did It”. The effects of emotionalized blame attribution in populist communication. Commun. Res. 44, 870–900 (2016) 15. Habermas, J.: Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Suhrkamp, Frankfutrt (1990) 16. Kaufmann, B., Büchi, R., Braun, N.: Guidebook to direct democracy in Switzerland and beyond. Amsterdam (2010) 17. Klaus, E.: Öffentlichkeit als gesellschaftlicher Selbstverständigungsprozess und das Drei-Ebene-Model von Öffentlichkeit/Öffentlichkeiten und gesellschaftliche Aushandlungsprozesse. Theoretische Perspektiven und empirische Befunde, Bielefeld (2017) 18. Dieter, N., Florian, G.: Kleines Lexikon der Politik. München (2015) 19. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD 19. Legislaturperiode. (https://www.bundes regierung.de/breg-de/themen/koalitionsvertrag-zwischen-cdu-csu-und-spd-195906) 20. Kost, A.: Direkte Demokratie. Wiesbaden (2013) 21. Limongi, F., Cheibub, J.A., Figueiredo, A.: Political Participation in Brazil Paths of Inequality in Brazil. Springer, Cham (2019) 22. Lissidini, A: Direkte Demokratie in Lateinamerika. Die Legitimitaet direkter Demokratie. Wie demokratisch sind Volksabstimmung? Wiesbaden, pp. 121–155 (2017) 23. Moeckli, S.: So funktioniert direkte Demokratie. München (2018) 24. National Public Policy Conferences (Brazil) (https://participedia.net/en/cases/national-pub lic-policy-conferences-brazil) 25. Offe, C.: Demokratisierung der Demokratie. Diagnosen und Reformschläge, Frankfurt (2003) 26. Pires, J.M.: A invenção da lista aberta: o processo de implantação da representação proporcional no Brasil. Biblioteca digital da Câmara dos Deputados (2009) 27. Pogrebinschi, T.: 2014 Partizipation in Brasilien. Partizipation im Wandel. Gütersloh, pp. 327– 355 (2014) 28. Roth, R.: Potenziale und Entwicklungstendenzen deliberative Partizipation. Partizipation im Wandel. Gütersloh, pp. 233–297 (2014) 29. Schuldt, L.: Volksabstimmungen in Uruguay. Eine Übersicht (https://www.mehr-demokratie. de/fileadmin/pdf/volksabstimmungen_in_uruguay.pdf) 30. Stutzer, A., Frey, B.: Stärkere Volksrechte- Zufriedene Bürger: eine mikroökonometrische Untersuchung für die Schweiz. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaf 6, 1–29 (2000) 31. Süssmuth, R.: Demokratie: Mangelt es an Offenheit und Bürgerbeteiligung? Demokratie und Beteiligung. APuZ 44–45, 3–7 (2011) 32. Vatter, A: Partizipation in der Schweiz. Partizipation im Wandel. Gütersloh, pp. 414–454 (2013) 33. Volksbegeherensbericht 2019. Direkte Demokratie in den deutschen Bundesländern 1946 bis 2018 (2019) 34. Zulianello, M.: Anti-system parties revisited: concept formation and guidelines for empirical research. Government and opposition 53 (2017)

The Migration Organization and Policies in the Turkish Public Administration: An Overview Mustafa Altunok and Türkan Özkan(B) Bolu Abant Izzet Baysal University, Bolu, Turkey [email protected]

Abstract. Migration has gained a global concern and is no longer a local or regional problem only. Despite its expanding global dimension, some regions have a central role or inevitably remain at the heart of the migration policy since they are much more exposed to migration waves. The Middle East and the Turkish territories have been among the major regions which have not been able to remain unaffected by the fact of migration. The countries of the region, which are amid great wars and conflicts, manifest themselves as immigrant-accepting, immigrant-sending and sometimes immigrant-transferring countries. While considering the recent conflict environment experienced in the Middle East, Turkey’s migration policy, organization and migration process operating mechanisms have aroused interest since its multifaceted position as a migration sending, accepting and transmitting country. Considering the significance underlined, the present study makes an overview regarding the migration organization and functioning in Turkey. Based on the development and current state of the General Directorate of Migration Administration as the official migration body of Turkey, the present study aims to reveal a picture of the migration policy and functioning in Turkey and provide some implications. Keywords: Public policy · Public law · Labor market · Illegal migration · IOM · OSCE · Middle East

1 Introduction The phenomenon of migration may be considered from many viewpoints. The most common one is based on making a distinction between the internal migration and the external migration. According to that distinction, internal migration means the mobility of the population within the borders of the country, which has generally arisen due to economic and social reasons with its specific situation of internally displaced people [19]. The external migration is an extra territorial form of mobility whose causes are mostly diversified. According to maybe the most simplified definition, which also includes a taxonomy, an external or international migrant is “any person who changes his or her country of usual residence” [21]. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 217–227, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_19

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In most external migration cases, immigrants come generally from the neighboring countries, regional countries or countries that share common history, language and culture. Migration theories settle with the assumption that migration networks and requests, which connect countries and represent opportunity structures, facilitate migration [6]. When considered from the point of the world migration routes, it may be viewed that one or two reasons are being decisive. These may range from economic, political or based on security concerns to cultural or religious reasons, depending on the particularity of the region. When it comes to Turkey and the region she is located, it may be said that the reasons and the intensity of the migration waves are so diverse that it is hardly comparable to other migration areas [2]. Therefore, the migration in this region as a research issue and as a matter of administrative policy has become one of the most complex cases among the migration routes in the world. In accordance with this complexity, the perspectives as to the migration developed in this geography should be differentiated and customized. In brief, it may be said that Turkey is experiencing both an internal migration and an external migration process accompanied by an out-sourced internal migration. In addition, Turkey is a specific migration case from both qualitative and quantitative points of view in terms of both statistical data and a budgetary cost since she has the characteristics of a migration-receiving, sending and transmitting country.

2 Materials and Methods Although there is some debate about who used the concept of migration management firstly and about what the exact meaning is, it is recently one of the most frequently used concepts and it is possible to sketch out an outline framework. In this regard, the concept of ‘migration management’ is the idea of a new regime based on a global policy agenda, which was first formulated by Bimal Ghosh in 1993 and further developed in 1996 [5]. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) uses the migration management in the meaning of the national system and state institutions established in order to administrate the international migration in a regular and humanitarian way [11]. Two authors, Demir and Kurt, propose to examine the migration management in three main headings which are the management of the immigration mechanism, the migration security management and the management of the harmonization process [3]. It is possible to diversify this proposal by adding new subtitles, including but not limited to: – The security-based approach and management of immigration mechanism, – Management of the labor market with a focus on migration and economic development, – Ensuring the coherence of immigrants and resident citizens, – Management of the basic bureaucratic procedures and public services aimed at immigration activities and the migration process. Besides these subtitles, the subject of migration management may be also classified according to the types of institutionalization, migration processes, the subject matter being general or specific and finally, whether the management process is planned or not.

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In this research, after touching upon some crucial definitions and concepts, the main actors and major tendencies relating to migration studies are set. This forms the theoretical part of the given research which underpins the operative part. It may be called operative since it tackles the case study of migration management of the Turkish public administration. The operative part consists of a legislative review of the migration management system on one hand, and the results of its configuration and functioning. Thus, the methodological basis of this research is an institutional analysis, focusing on the Turkish public administration and its migration management policies. For the theoretical part of the research, the major international actors’ statutes and reports were reviewed. Also, the main works of Turkish and international academicians leading in their field were examined. As for the operative part of the research, in order to understand the formation of the migration management system, the relevant legislation was reviewed. Also, the functioning and the development of that system was examined through the statistical data relating to the sources distribution.

3 Problem Statement Aside from the conflict and violence cases, when studying migration, it is seen that sociological or economic dimension is usually in the foreground. It is not surprising that the studies conducted on the migration as a field of social phenomenon or the social effects of migration focus on these two issues, since the migration process brings economic costs along with the problems of social cohesion and integration [20]. However, when mentioning the migration, there is such a central area that is left untouched and has not received enough attention until recently, which is the public administrative dimension of the migration. The migration process and its possible effects need to be managed or administered. Besides, migration is a political field because many governments, even states, have a long-term migration policy. There is a need for a chain of legal regulations depending on what will be done in this field called ‘migration policy’ and what the main priorities are, so migration takes place in the field of public law and international law. On the other hand, migration is closely related to the safety and security of societies and states, so it is placed also in the area of public order. The migration process has a cost and it requires the use of public resources, which makes it related with the field of public economy and finance. All these activities have to be carried out systematically under an organization, which in turn requires the public organization. Public organizations need qualified specialist personnel, which falls within the field of public personnel management. Moreover, there is a need for public service provision for the needs of migrants such as health, education and adaptation to host country. To put it briefly, the migration is a subject and field of study of the public administration from every respect. As a result, the public administration should take place at the center of the migration issue both in the disciplinary and organizational sense. This central position has the dimensions of policy, security, service, organization and legislation. These dimensions can be examined with the help of the Fig. 1:

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Fig. 1. Relation of Migration and Public Administration

Be it internal or external, the migration has been one of the main areas of research where both theoreticians have conducted important researches and states have had to develop policies. Depending on the size of the immigrating population, the receiving countries may have to make changes in all economic, political and administrative mechanisms.

4 Research Questions Overviewing the relevant migration organization and functioning in Turkey, the present study aims to reveal a picture of the migration policy and functioning in Turkey and provide some implications for other countries. Based on the development and current state of the General Directorate of Migration Administration as the official migration body of Turkey, an institutional analysis is made in order to show the close but not so examined relationship between the public administration and migration. Consequently, at the general level the migration policy is situated at the domain of the public policy and administration. Then the main domestic and international actors regarding migration are introduced. Finally, the national migration policy of Turkey with its actors and their composition and strategies is tackled.

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4.1 The Migration Management and the Public Policy Recently, public policy has become one of the most important fields of the public administration. As one of the important names in public policy, Dye defines the public policy as ‘what government or relevant public organizations (including states as the total of institutions) choose to do or not to do’ [7]. Based on this definition, public policy may be described as the implementation of the political choices that are intended to influence or concern a significant part of the society purposefully either by acting or remaining passive, made by the decision-making actors who have the authority to determine the social needs and solve the public matters. As to the migration policy, it can be handled as a sub-section of the public policy’s examination field. Accordingly, the migration policy is the conscious and purposeful configuration of political choices by states or governments as of decision-makers, set up in face of a population mobility that may arise from within or outside the country. In case that this policy intersects the area of more than one state, international migration policy and international actors may also be involved. The relationship between the immigrant and the resident population constitutes an important dimension of migration policies. In this context, generally, one of the political strategies such as integration, assimilation, acculturation, segregation or separation policy is adopted [8]. 4.2 The Main Actors of the Migration Policy The policy actors are one of the most important issues for the migration policy. While governments, the bureaucracy, non-governmental organizations, the media, the immigrants and migrant organizations may be viewed as the main actors in the context of internal migration policy; in case of external migration some other states and governments, international organizations, international media and even some multinational corporations and opinion leaders may added to these actors. Since in our day the international or external migration has become an urgent case and so, gained more importance for states and societies than internal migration, it has become an issue that cannot be solved based on only the national legislation, organizations and functioning. The international nature of the migration necessitates a mobility of the population involving at least two countries [1]. As it concerns more than one country, there is a need for national administration mechanisms and policy instruments on the one hand and international legal and administrative mechanisms on the other hand. The concept of international migration management is now used extensively by the International Organization for Migration, the International Center for Migration Policy Development, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and other international organizations [14]. The most important international actor in emigrational issues is the United Nations which is the highest-level organization in the matter of interstate relations. In addition to the UN, organizations such as the European Union and the OECD are known to be influential by the means of their studies or reports on immigration and migration issues, as well as many other international issues. The international organizations (IOs) authorized by the states to carry out emigrational activities, ensure coordination and

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solve problems are of special importance. The most significant of these are the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Center for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). 4.3 The National Migration Policy of Turkey: Main Actors and Strategies When considered in terms of the national migration policy of Turkey, the decisive actors may be divided into general and private actors. General actors such as the Government, Parliament, Bureaucracy and NGOs are those who shape and execute the internal policies. The private actors are the more operational actors who are the direct counterparts of these policies. By the same token, it is possible to distinguish between the national policy texts as general legal regulations and special policy regulations. After the adoption of a presidential government system in Turkey, the president of the Turkish Republic has become the highest authority responsible for the migration policy and management. Thereby, the president holds both the coordination and executive powers. In particular, the Presidency coordinates the activities of the relevant ministries in relation to the service, security and protection measures of the migration management. Also, it is the highest-level policy-making unit in the country and can actively participate in migration management by issuing direct orders, instructions and decrees. The General Directorate of Migration Management (GDMM), which is the most concrete institutional counterpart of migration organization, is structured as an affiliate of the Ministry of Interior. In addition, the fact that the ministry oversees the security forces as the ministry responsible for internal security is another dimension that makes it the most decisive ministry. The migration management is related with the working of many other ministries whose scope exceeds the limits of this study. So, instead of handling that huge working, in the remaining part of the study it will be focused on the General Directorate of Migration Management, its affiliated institutions and the General Directorate of International Labor which are specified organizations and have more concrete command on the migration management process. Thereafter, with the aid of some statistical data, the structure and characteristics of the migration management in Turkey will be revealed. Although Turkey has experienced some massive influx of migration for many times, it is only recently that a migration organization meeting the international standards was established. As of May 18, 2015, the General Directorate of Migration Management completed the physical infrastructure, hardware, personnel employment and training, sub-legislation studies and works such as GÖÇ-NET software system and realized its organization in 81 provinces simultaneously. Thus, after its establishment all the proceedings and services relating to foreigners have been carried out by the Provincial Directorates of Migration Management which are its affiliated institutions [16]. Today, the GDMM has been authorized to establish an organization abroad in accordance with the Presidential Decree no. 4 (article 163), but it has not been finalized yet [17]. This Directorate with its personnel around 11.000, is composed of tripartite organization which includes the central organization, the provincial organizations in 81 provinces and the organization abroad. While structures such as the International Protection Evaluation Commission and the Coordination Board for Combating Irregular Migration have

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been constituted during the migration organization process [4], it is still early to make predictions about their effectiveness. The GDMM has prepared a four-year strategic plan which has determined the main objectives and goals and drew a roadmap between the years of 2019–2023. Accordingly, the strategic goals and objectives are set relating to regular and irregular migration. Regarding legal (regular) migration, the strategic goal of the GDMM is to execute fast and efficiently the proceedings and services for the foreigners within its scope. Illegal (irregular) migration on the other hand is aimed to be dealt with a form of proactive migration management that respects basic human rights and freedoms, complies with international standards and constantly reviews all elements related to migration management. More particular objectives on regular migration set in the Strategic Plan are increasing the efficiency of and speeding up the entry into the country, visa, residence permit and settlement procedures. As to irregular migration, the main objectives may be summarized as: – Increasing the effectiveness by coordinating the relevant stakeholders in order to operationalize the anti-irregular migration and deportation mechanism, – Execution of all proceedings and services which are within the scope of re-admission agreements in accordance with the international law and human rights norms, – Establishing a system that can ensure the voluntary and safe return of irregular migrants within the framework of national and international law. It is possible to conclude that the strategic plan has set targets within the framework of concepts such as efficiency, productivity, speed, coordination and international legal norms. Another internal relevant actor is the Migration Board which has been established on September 13th, 2018 with the Presidential Decree No. 17. It consists of the representatives of the ministries, institutions and organizations which will be determined by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and it will meet upon the call of the Minister of Interior, who is the head of the board. The main aim of the board is to determine the migration strategies of Turkey, to follow up the coordination and implementation of them. Yet another relevant actor as to migration management in Turkey is the General Directorate of International Labor (GDIL). The International Labor Law No. 6735 enacted in 2016, entered into force after it was published in the Official Gazette on 13.8.2016. According to Article 27 of this Law, the General Directorate of International Labor was established as the main service unit of the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services. According to reports of GDIL, the number of registered foreigners, which was 17,466 in 2011, has increased steadily every year and reached 87,182 by the year of 2017, multiplying 5 times within this period. Another statistic on this issue is based on the gender of the foreigners who have obtained a work permit. From this point of view, the balance changes from year to year, but as of 2017, 57% of the immigrants are men and 43% are women. Also, it is observed that among the foreigners who have work permits, the number of high school graduates and those with a university and higher education degree are close to each other with a ratio of 35%; while 13–14% have an under-high-school education and the education level of 16% is unknown [9].

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5 Results of Research Firstly, as a new organization, the GDMM has a rapidly growing structure with both financial and human resources. In terms of human resources, it will be useful to look at and compare the following two figures, where it is possible to comprehend the fastorganizational transformation. Table 1. Distribution of Personnel of General Directorate of Migration Management according to 2016 Annual Report Full staff Personnel distribution of GDMM in year 2016

Central 237 organization

Temporary Contracted Payroll Service Final staff staff staff procurement total 163

–

–

83

483

Provincial 1.267 681 organization

–

–

1.085

3.033

Total

–

–

1.168

3.516

1.504 844

Table 2. Distribution of Personnel of General Directorate of Migration Management according to 2018 Annual Report Full Staff Personnel Distribution of GDMM in Year 2018

Central 284 Organization

Temporary Contracted Payroll Service Final Staff Staff Staff Procurement Total 76

81

Provincial 1.366 869 Organization

208

7.523

250

10.216

Total

289

7616

296

10.796

1650

643

93

46

580

According to the 2016 data given in Table 1, the number of personnel working in the central organization of the General Directorate is 483 and the number of personnel working in the provinces is 3,033. 844 of these were registered as temporary personnel and 1,168 were registered as service procurement. However, when the following Table 2 is examined, the central and provincial staff distributions of the GDMM will be seen. Accordingly, the central organization has 580 personnel and the provincial organization has 10,216 personnel. Although the organization of the General Directorate was also allowed to organize abroad, its statistics are not included in the reports since this process has not been completed yet. Despite the newly established structure, the General Directorate has a high level of education. According to 2018 data, 383 out of 580 personnel working in the central organization have a bachelor’s degree, while 21 have a master’s and 2 have a doctoral degree. One of the strengths of the organization is its human

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resources structure [18]. When the two tables are compared, it can be seen how fast the staff empowerment is made in the period of only two years. Accordingly, the total number of employees in the central organization increased from 483 to 580, resulting in an increase of approximately 20%. In this increase, staffing and contracted personnel as two separate items played an important role, while the provision of personnel based on service procurement decreased by almost half and decreased from 83 to 46. However, the significant difference between the two tables is manifested in the provincial organization, according to which the total number of personnel in the provincial organization was 3,033 in 2016 and by the time of 2018, it increased by 3.5 times and reached the number of 10,216. This change is undoubtedly an important transformation in terms of meeting the increasing need and the institutional capacity, but it should also be remembered that it has a serious economic cost. Since the migration policies have to meet both the needs of the society and the expectations of the public, the perception of the economic cost by the resident society has to be taken into account. Unless, it is prone to raise unrest towards these policies. A study in this context reveals the recent uneasiness relating to the economic perception of the Syrian migration in Turkey. Approximately 60% of the respondents think that the economy has deteriorated, or unemployment has increased due to Syrian refugees. This rate reaches 70% or more among voters other than the ruling party, Justice and Development Party (AKP) [13]. Consequently, it may be said that the public opinion has a negative perception on the recent migration in anticipation of its overall economic cost to the Turkish economy and labor market. The promotion policy needs to be reviewed or improved. According to the relevant minister’s statements in 2014, the cost of the Syrian migration to Turkey has been around 4 billion dollars [15]. Today, it is estimated that it exceeds $40 billion. Briefly, recent migration has an alarming cost in economic terms. On the other hand, some studies indicate that despite the short-term negative impact, in the medium and long run the impact of the migrants on public finance might be positive [10, 11]. There are many aspects of the economic cost of migration. However, one of the most concrete indicators in this regard is the financial expenses of the respective migration organization. Table 3 is indicative of the financial outlook of the GDMM, the authority responsible for the migration management in Turkey, whose personnel expenses for years from 2016, 2018 to 2019 are included. Accordingly, the personnel expenses increased by 430% from 2018 to 2019. When compared with the 2016 data, it is clearly seen that they increased approximately 9 times in three years. The table also shows that in the period of 2018–2019 alone, personnel expenses of the institution increased by 430% and social security support contribution expenses increased by 707%. The increase in the current expenditures, which increased more than 16 times in one year and reached 1,578,755,000 TL is exceptionally striking. Lastly, the capital expenditures and expenses for purchase of goods and services decreased proportionally.

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Table 3. The Expenditures for the General Directorate of Migration Management (According to Annual Reports) Explanation

2016

2018

2019

Annual Rate of Increase for 2018–2019

Personnel Expenses

54.759.000

88.672.000

470.772.000

430,9(%)

Social Security Support 7.155.000 Contribution Expenses (SSSCS)

11.483.000

92.709.000

707,3(%)

Expenses for Purchase of Goods and Services

90.156.000

158.169.000 118.287.000

Current Expenditures

44.610.000

92.310.000

1.578.755.000 1610,2(%)

Capital Expenditures

74.340.000

79.692.000

45.018.000

Total

271.020.000 430.326.000 2.307.541.000 436,2(%)

−25,2(%)

−41,0(%)

6 Conclusion The phenomenon of migration occupies the attention of the social scientists so much in recent years. It is not surprising that such a complex issue has economic, sociological, political and, of course, international dimensions. But it is obvious that all these areas have a public administrative dimension which is their common point and it often involves all of them. Public administration has a multidisciplinary identity in terms of a scientific field and a driving mechanism for public activities. Public administration should not be understood only as the functioning of public organizations, but it signifies the institutional, theoretical and financial aspects of the operating system. It has also financial, human and legal dimensions with its supplementary dimensions of services, policy, organization and authority. As a result of these features, the public administration has become one of the main study disciplines that deal with migration in theory and practice all over the world. But at theoretical or research level, there is much way to be gone. A country’s migration policy is inherently a multi-actor and multi-factor policy area. However, sometimes national priorities and international expectations may not be matched. When arranging this policy area, both national priorities and international bindings must be considered together. Turkey on her part, has taken the responsibility to make the necessary regulations in order to deal with the pressing migration wave coming from her neighbors, especially Syria. These regulations are accorded with their international counterparts and established some public organizations in the field of migration management. The expenditure data and reports of these organizations highlight that the investment made to the migration management organizations constantly and incrementally increases. In the meantime, high-level expenditures cause discontent among the residents which may spark off hostility and violent acts against the migrants and foreigners. In order to prevent a possible turmoil and change the so-called perception of highlevel cost, one of the main priorities for Turkey should be to find ways to influence the

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relevant international actors to share the burden. Besides, the migration responsibilities must be balanced with the internal priorities. At the practical level these should also be the concerns for other countries struggling with migration issues. So, the Turkish case may be handled on one hand as a guiding one in order to better overcome the migration management issues and on the other hand it may be also tackled as a needing hand, especially urgent at the regional level.

References 1. Alaku¸s, E.: Türkiye’de göç yönetimi ve uygulaması. Unpublished MA thesis at BA˙IBÜ Soc. Sci. Inst. (Bolu), pp. 37–44 (2018). [in Turkish] 2. Altunok, M.: Türkiye’nin göç gerçekli˘gi ve örgütlenmesi üzerine bir tartı¸sma. Mehmet Akif Ersoy Üniv. Sos. Bil. Enst. Derg. 22(9), 308–310 (2017). [in Turkish] 3. Demir, F., Kurt, M.: Göç Politikası. In: Babao˘glu, C., Akman Kamu, E. (eds.) Politikası Analizi Türkiye Uygulamaları (Ankara: Gazi Yay) (2018). [in Turkish] 4. Demirhan, Y., Aslan, S.: Türkiye’nin sınır ötesi göç politikaları ve yönetimi. Birey ve Topl. Derg. 5(9), 50–51 (2015). [in Turkish] 5. Dupeyron, B.: Secluding North America’s migration outcasts: notes on the international organization for migration’s compassionate mercenary business. In: Zaiotti, R. (ed.) Externalizing Migration Management. Routledge, London (2016) 6. Duvell, F.: International relations and migration management: the case of Turkey. Insight Turkey 16 (2014) 7. Dye, T.: Understanding Public Policy. Prentice Hall Int, London (1987) 8. Erat, V.: Çok kültürlülük ve ayrımcılık arasında: Avrupa ülkelerinin entegrasyon politikalarında e˘gitim alanı. Mukaddime, 9, 79–94 (2018). [in Turkish] 9. General Directorate Labor, Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services 2017 Working life statistics. Ankara 10. Gür, N.: Ülke deneyimleri ı¸sı˘gında uluslararası göç ekonomisi. SETA, Ankara (2017). [in Turkish] 11. IOM Publ. No. 34, Glossary on Migration 137-8 (2019) 12. Kancs, A., Lecca, P.: Long-term social, economic and fiscal effects of immigration into the EU: the role of the integration policy. EERI Research Paper Series 08/2016 (2016) 13. KONDA Barometer 2016. Syrian refugees overview. Report 14. The Politics of International Migration Management. In: Geiger, M., Pécoud, A. (eds.) Palgrave Macmillan, London (2010) 15. The statement of minister Fikri I¸sık: Göçün Türkiye’ye maliyeti 4 milyar dolar Dünya 23.10.2014. [in Turkish] 16. Turkish Republic Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Migration Management (2016) 17. Turkish Republic Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Migration Management (2017) 18. Turkish Republic Ministry of Interior 2018 Annual Report (Ankara) 19. UN DESA 1998 Recommendations on statistics on international migration 20. UN OCHA 1998 Guiding principles on internal displacement 21. Who needs migrant workers? Labour shortages, immigration and public policy. In: Ruhs, M., Anderson, B. (eds.) Oxford University Press, (2010)

Changes in Swedish Foreign Policy After 2018 General Elections Elena Boldyreva1(B) and Yekaterina Duisembina2 1 Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected] 2 Saint - Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected]

Abstract. The article is aimed at exploring theoretical side of communicative strategies as well as its real-life application. The article attempts to trace the connection and prove the connection between practical implementation of presented theory and methodology and the success of Swedish Democrats (political party) in the recent election in Sweden that took place in September of 2018. In order to establish this connection, the authors of the article present the main aspects of communication theory and communicative strategies. The way of Swedish foreign policy transformation after 2018 elections are analyzed. Moreover, the vital information about the political life in Sweden, its main political parties and their history and current position are presented. These points serve as theoretical and practical parts of the article, which leads to uncovering an easier way to finding the connection between communicative strategies and political success and emphasizing its importance. Keywords: Election · Sweden · Communicative strategies · Election campaigns · Political parties

1 Introduction Communicative strategies are often overlooked as an unnecessary component of both election campaigns and political practice in general. Nevertheless, recent election in Sweden showed the importance of implementing different elements of communication theory into the party’s agenda. Skillful use of communicative strategies has now proven its ability to have a serious impact on the political sphere to the extent of completely changing the balance of powers in a country. Therefore, the relevance and importance of studying this topic is evident. This work involves research methods such as observation, constructive and empirical research.

2 Background In the modern era, when globalization processes are encompassing the world, transboundary and transregional cooperation is intensifying, and international connections © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 228–235, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_20

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are being strengthened, the need to study political, cultural, economic and other features of different countries gains increasing importance. In this regard, the analysis of Swedish general election that were held on 9 September 2018 to elect members of the Riksdag appears to be relevant, as well as interesting. In all European monarchies “the monarch reigns but does not rule,” but in Sweden the power of the mon-arch is curtailed to the greatest extent. More precisely, the responsibilities of the king in Sweden include the following: visits to other countries and reception of representatives of various countries in Sweden, being the head of the Foreign Policy Advisory Council and holding the opening speech in the Riksdag. Sweden is a constitutional (parliamentary) monarchy. At the same time, an interesting feature characterizing this country is the absence of a constitution as a single document. Instead, a set of Basic Laws of Sweden constitutes as the foundation of the kingdom and regulates the political system of the country. They are the Instrument of Government, the Freedom of the Press Act, the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression and the Act of Succession. The Swedish government is in charge of the executive system. The number of ministries and ministers does not coincide; several ministers can lead one ministry, each of whom is responsible for his or her area of expertise. In Sweden, the parliamentarism is at work. A party or a coalition of parties that won the election forms the government and asserts the responsibilities to later answer to the parliament. The judicial system in Sweden has a particular hierarchy. The Supreme Court is the main instance of general courts situated in the head of juridical system, the courts of the second instance are the courts of appeal and at the grass-roots level, and there are district courts (or tingsrätt). The Riksdag plays the main role in the political system of Sweden. It is comprised of 349 members; each of them serves a four-year term. At the head of the Riksdag is its chairperson - talman. The authorities and the structure of the Swedish parliament are standard for European unicameral parliaments. For general election, the territory of the country is divided into constituencies. There are 310 Riksdag mandates assigned to constituencies and 39 equalizing mandates. During this kind of election, citizens can vote for the party, but they also have an opportunity to vote separately for a specific person. The distribution of the seats in parliament takes place according to the proportional system (Sainte-Laguë method). The mandates assigned to constituencies are distributed between constituencies in such a way that they correspond to the ratio between the number of citizens with voting rights in each electoral district and the number of citizens who possesses voting rights in the entire country. The distribution of mandates happens on fixed four-year terms (as amended by the Act 1994:1469). According to the current electoral system of Sweden, only the party that received at least four percent of the votes in the entire state has the right to participate in the distribution of mandates. However, the party that received a smaller number of votes participates in the distribution of the mandates assigned to the constituencies in the constituency where it collected at least twelve percent of the votes. In Sweden, the state subsidizes parties in accordance with their expenses, but only those that were represented in the Riksdag of the first convocation, as well as those

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who received at least 2.5% of the votes. The state covers the costs of printing out the ballot papers that exceeds the number of voters fivefold (paragraph 5 of Chapter 6 of the Election Law) [1]. There is no doubt that parties play a huge role in the political systems of various countries [2]. Nevertheless, it is obvious that today political parties are less and less reminiscent of their predecessors of the late 19th - early 20th century. A concept of “party” that has always been understood as an organization representing the interests of some particular strata of the society is losing its former meaning. In addition, if previously any party could easily be placed on the left-right scale, the end of the 20th century brought to life the “parties of the new wave”, which did not fit well with this scale: green (environmental), feminist, etc. [17]. The emergence of pirate parties, advocating for freedom of dissemination of information on the Internet is the latest party trend. The “new wave” parties that include but are not limited to newly emerged parties such as the Spanish Podemos or the Greek Syriza, are distinguished by their flexibility of ideological attitudes, the original style of behavior and political agitation, a less formalized structure. P. Taaggert calls such parties “non-populist” and says that for non-populist parties the main category is freedom, understood as the minimum state intervention in human life [3].

3 Theoretical Framework M. Duverger singled out the internal and external methods of forming parties [4] where the internal method (electoral and parliamentary) is associated with the emergence of parliamentary associations and electoral committees. A sign indicating the external origin of the party is showing that the emergence of the party was influenced by the activities of its preceding institutions that function outside of the parliament. More recently, a number of political scientists (S. Lipset, S. Rokkan, K. Janda) concluded that the peculiarity of national party systems is largely determined by the presence of problematic positions that divide citizens into rival groups [5]. These problematic positions include, for example, ignoring environmental issues during the post-war industrial boom, as well as the beginning of the widespread use of atomic energy, which gave rise to the emergence of ecological “green” parties.

4 Results of Research In Sweden, one of such problematic positions is the issue of immigration and the problems arising that are connected to it. As of 2018, 18% of Swedish residents are immigrants. According to the results of the last parliamentary election in Sweden that was held on 9 September 2018, eight parties are represented in the Swedish parliament. In order to understand the functioning of the party system in Sweden more clearly, it makes sense to look closer at the programs of these parties. The main political parties in Sweden are divided into two blocs: 1) the Alliance for Sweden (the Alliance) (40.3% of the votes in the 2018 elections, 143 seats), which includes Moderate Party, Center Party, Liberals and Christian Democrats; and 2) the red-green coalition (40.7%. 144 seats), consisting of Swedish Social Democratic Party,

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Green Party and Left Party. In addition, the nationalist party Swedish Democrats took 17.5% of the votes, or 62 seats, not being a part of any coalition [15]. Moderate Party (Moderata samlingspartiet or Moderaterna) [7] was formed in 1904. By 1912, the organizational unity of the moderates was finally formed, hence the name. The ideology of the party contains elements of both liberalism and conservatism. The party puts issues of law and order, free enterprise, strong national defense and the preservation of Swedish cultural values in the forefront. The party actively advocated for the entry of Sweden into the EU, speaking, nevertheless, against the restriction of the free market by the EU. In recent years, the party has predominantly based its policy on a commitment to cut down taxes. Liberals (Liberalerna) [9] history starts as far as 1895. The party justifies its name by adhering to traditional liberal views. The party receives the main portion of support from the voters of middle class. The issues of medical care, education and social assistance have always been and remain central to the party’s policies, as well as the issues of immigration, strengthening equality and deepening European integration. Liberals are in favor of improving the educational system, open but tough immigration policies, joining NATO and expanding the use of atomic energy. The party promotes “feminism without socialism”, seeking to ensure equal opportunities, investing in those sectors of the labor market that are dominated by women, and encouraging men to share childcare responsibilities with women. Center Party (Centerpartiet) [8] was formed in 1922 and has roots stemming from the Swedish Farmers League, which was established more than a hundred years ago. Therefore, agricultural and environmental issues constitute the core of the party’s program, along with giving local communities the right to make their own decisions. In addition, the party has recently been trying to attract urban voters, promising assistance to small businesses and criticizing the tough rules of work permits for foreigners. Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) [10], the party was formed in 1964 to counteract the well-known phenomenon of Swedish life, promoted by the global sexual revolution. At the present stage, the party is struggling to gain popularity. Christian Democrats are trying to move away from their religious roots and gain broader support, although their hardline approach towards immigration has cost the party the support of some of its voters who adhere to traditional Christian values. Party policies focus on the welfare of the elderly and strict rules against extremism. Each person is unique, but at the same time, everyone needs a community to develop in. In this context, an important role belongs to the family institute. The party has a positive attitude towards cooperation with the EU, and in its time spoke in favor of Sweden joining the European Monetary Union. Thus, in the election of 2018, the parties of the Alliance parties received 40.3% of the votes, which gave them 143 seats in the Riksdag. Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti or Socialdemokraterna) [12], formed in 1889, is one of the oldest and most influential political forces in Sweden. The goal of the party were first stated by the SDPPS program in its 1920 version, formed under the influence of Marxism. Over time, the party departed from Marxism, and is currently upholding the principles of social governance in conjunction with market economy. The party defends the rights of workers. It has

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also contributed greatly to the creation of modern Swedish welfare state, paid for with the help of progressive taxation. Some of the most controversial policies of the party today include the recognition of Palestine, which has contributed to the deterioration of relations with Israel and the introduction of temporary border controls. The party’s desire for a feminist foreign policy led to a serious cooling of relations with Saudi Arabia in 2015, as a result of that Sweden canceled the agreement on military cooperation with this country. Green Party (Miljöpartiet de Gröna) [13]. The global movement to combat pollution in Sweden resulted in the creation of a “green” party in 1981. The referendum of 1980 on the national program for the development of nuclear energy became a direct incentive to consolidate the environmental movement in the country. Central to the policy of Green Party are the issues of environmental protection and creation of ecologically sustainable society, as well as the issue of developing democratic mechanisms of the grassroots level. The party focuses on combating climate change and promotes policies to protect and preserve the planet for future generations. Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) [14] grew out of the Swedish Social Democratic Left Party, founded in 1917. This Marxist group turned into a Communist Party of Sweden in 1921, and after the latter split in 1967, it became the LP. The present name - the Left Party - was adopted in 1990. The party receives the support of workers in the largest cities of the country and the poorest segments of the rural population in the Northern provinces. The left party was never a part of the government. Nevertheless, it usually supports the government comprised of Social Democrats, although they criticize them on many issues. The party opposes the privatization of state-owned companies and supports raising taxes to finance the welfare state in Sweden. The party puts the questions of socialism, feminism, environmental protection and international solidarity in the forefront of its program. Despite this, it opposes the cooperation within the EU. Thus, in the election of 2018, the parties of the red-green coalition received 40.7% of the votes, which gave them 144 seats in the Riksdag. Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) [11] - nationalist party, which was founded in February 1988. In recent years, the party has sought to soften its image of a racist and extremist group. However, reducing immigration rates remains the main goal of the party [18], and it does not support dual citizenship, with the exception of citizens of northern countries. The third largest party in Sweden after the 2014 elections, the Swedish Democrats contributed to the emergence of a government crisis when they helped block the budget proposal of the center-left coalition [6]. An unprecedented deal between the government of the Green-Social Democrats and the center-right opposition put an end to the crisis and disarmed the Swedish Democrats for some time. However, after the elections of 2018, in which they received 17.5% of the votes and 62 seats in parliament, their position would have to be taken seriously. On October 2, 2018, together with the parties of the Alliance, they voted against the candidacy of the leader of the Social Democrats S. Löfven and the government failed to form from the first attempt. If after four attempts to form a government does not succeed, then new parliamentary election will be called. Traditionally after the election in Sweden, the outgoing parliamentary speaker consults with party leaders to nominate a prime minister who is tasked with forming a government.

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Parliament votes on the choice of the speaker, and can reject his proposal four times, after which new elections should be called. Sweden has not held early elections since 1958. Thus, the Swedish Democrats destroyed the de facto bipartisanship or “bloc politics” in Sweden, and now not one of the blocs is capable of gaining the necessary 50% of the votes of the deputies to conduct their own decisions. Previously (until 2014) in Sweden, this process was simple, since the parties were grouped together quite precisely and predictably. In addition, the Alliance is also divided because of the question of how to treat the Swedish Democrats. Some members of the Alliance believe that maintaining isolation and distancing strategies is not negotiable. For others, some interaction with the SD can be possible. A possible, but unlikely, option is one in which the Social Democrats and Moderates can forget about their traditional blocs and unite, in a kind of “big coalition”. One thing is certain: Sweden is entering a period of uncertainty, with a weak minority government and economic difficulties predicted by analysts for the next 4 years. Moreover, the government of Löfven will be in this case a greater evil than the government of the Moderates leader U. Kristersson, since the Swedish Democrats promised to overthrow the left minority government, during, for example, a vote on the autumn budget. If the two previous scenarios fail, the Social Democrats can invite the Liberal Party and the Center Party to the negotiating table. Although Löfven insisted that he wanted to continue working in the government with the Greens, he did not rule out such a possibility. Such cooperation would mark the end of the center-right alliance, which also seems unlikely. It is possible that Sweden will get a rather extreme form of a minority government with a party that has only a quarter or even a tenth of the seats in parliament. This is a recipe for slow, painstaking legislative negotiations on all issues. This is obviously not what Sweden really needs. The government formed from the parties of the Alliance, relying on the support of the SD, is the most likely scenario. The leader of the conservative Moderate Party, U. Kristersson, intends to overthrow Löfven. The question of what Swedish Democrats will want to receive in exchange for their support remains. Thus, the communicative electoral strategy of the SD party can be considered the most successful among all Swedish parties in the elections of 2018. Most briefly, it was reflected in the documentary film “100 days in the Riksdag”, which was created by Swedish central channel “SVT”. It shows the attitudes of parties towards the SD, as well as presents the information about the SD as a party. Jimmie Åkesson said in an interview that his party entered the Riksdag to fight the other parties, as they lead Sweden along the “wrong” road. Because of the policies of the current political groups, Sweden is falling apart. The party puts immigrants and Swedes on the opposite sides of the political narrative, which is unacceptable in the eyes of other parties that have more traditional values, apply new communication strategies poorly and keep losing voters.

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On November 14, 2018, the first of four attempts to invite parliamentarians to vote for the prime minister’s candidacy was made by the Riksdag’s talman. However, Ulf Kristersson was not elected, receiving 195 votes against his candidacy. All of his coalition allies voted against him as well, for the exception Christian Democrats. Thus, the situation with the formation of the government in Sweden has become even more complicated. Several options for possible changes in the foreign policy of Sweden seem the most likely to be implemented. The position of the left-wing parties led by the Social Democrats is easy to follow, examining the 2015 and 2017 government declaration [16] and the 2016 security report. The main points of these documents are as follows: Europe must do more to help the refugees; refugees must be divided between the EU countries and no country should avoid this responsibility. Sweden should play a more active role on the global scene; Russian aggression and destabilization of Ukraine are the most serious challenges for European security since the end of the Cold War; the annexation of Crimea is a violation of international law; the climate threat requires serious attention; Sweden also must continue to help Palestine. The main three points of the security policy in Sweden are military non-alignment, strengthening national defense and deepening cooperation; NATO membership is not worth discussing, it does not eliminate the shortcomings in the defense system of Sweden. Instead, it is better to develop military cooperation with Finland and to pay attention to the country’s cybersecurity.

5 Conclusions The fact that the coalition of the left will remain ruling is unlikely for the reasons described above. Therefore, it makes sense to analyze the foreign policy positions of the Alliance parties of Sweden briefly, Swedish foreign policy and strategy for the future will be formulated depending on the party composition of the future government. Nevertheless, there are significant differences on the right political flank. Moderats, Center Party, Christian Democrats and Liberals speak in favor of NATO membership. At the same time, Swedish Democrats, who are ready to support the rightwing government, are against the membership in the Alliance. This is, perhaps, one of the main points on which the support of the latter will depend. As for the restriction of the flow of refugees, all the right-wing parties are quite decisive, the differences here are rather technical in nature, and only Swedish democrats believe that the changes had to be implemented a long time ago and that it was necessary to act more resolutely. In addition, the parties of the right spectrum do not consider it necessary to support Palestine (Palestine was granted recognition during the government of Löfven in 2014) and its government, especially since this causes discontent among Israel and the United States. Thus, the adjustment of Swedish foreign policy line in the case of the formation of the government from the parties of the right spectrum will occur in the direction of rapprochement with NATO (the pace of rapprochement will depend on whether the SD party enters the government or not, with the second option being more likely), Palestinian Authority Aid. Other areas of the country’s foreign policy are unlikely to undergo significant changes.

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References 1. Mogunova, M.A.: Sweden: Constitution and Laws, Moscow, p. 61 (1983) 2. Boldyreva, E., Grishina, N.: Political system transformation in Iceland under the Internet influence. In: Proceedings of the International Conference IMS-2017, pp. 225–229 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1145/3143699.3143710 3. Taaggart, P.: New populist parties in Western Europe. West Eur. Polit. 18(1), 34–51 (1995) 4. Duverger, M.: Political parties, Moscow, pp. 30–33 (2000) 5. Podkolzina, I.V.: Shaping parliamentary parties in Russia. Ph.D. dissertation, SaintPetersburg, p. 4 (2004) 6. Debates about Swedish Democrates 2018 Debatt om Sverigedemokraterna och deras framtid. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8GvKMN22zw 7. Moderaterna: Official party site. https://moderaterna.se/ 8. Centerpartiet: Official party site. https://www.centerpartiet.se/ 9. Liberalerna: Official party site. https://www.liberalerna.se/ 10. Kristdemokraterna: Official party site. https://kristdemokraterna.se/ 11. Sverigedemokraterna: Official party site. https://sd.se/ 12. Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti: Official party site. https://www.socialdemokrate rna.se/ 13. Miljöpartiet de gröna: Official party site. https://www.mp.se/ 14. Vänsterpartiet: Official party site. https://www.vansterpartiet.se/ 15. Valmyndigheten: 2018 election in Sweden. https://data.val.se/val/val2018/slutresultat/R/rike/ index.html 16. Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, 15 February (2017). https://www.government.se/491943/contentassets/95eb19229943483cab9989fc 5ff239f0/utrikesdeklarationen-2017-engelska.pdf 17. Zemlinskaya, T.Ye., Fersman, N.G., Novak-Kalyayeva, L.: Improvement of public administration based on human rights: theoretical approaches and practical implementation. In: Proceedings of the 30th International Business Information Management Association Conference, IBIMA 2017 - Vision 2020: Sustainable Economic development, Innovation Management, and Global Growth, pp. 945–952 (2017) 18. Eidemiller, K., Samylovskaya, E.A., Kudryavtseva, R.-E.A.: Islamic diffusion of Nordic countries: Sweden. IOP Conf. Ser. Earth Environ. Sci. 180(1), 012005 (2018)

Geography of Oil and Gas of the Russian Federation in the World Markets Vatanyar Yag’ya1 and Talie Yagya2(B) 1 Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected] 2 Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected]

Abstract. The paper is devoted to the geography of oil and gas of Russia in the world markets. It discusses performance of Russia’s reserves, production, export of fuel and raw materials. In this paper there are named not only reasons for the state of affair for Russia in the world oil and gas markets, but also the reasons for the decline in oil production, as well as factors affecting the reduction in the volume of oil exports from the Russian Federation. The paper deals with new directions of gas export and successful development of the gas industry as well. A certain dependence of the country on gas and oil exports requires changing the structure of the economy, raising its level, which will strengthen the country’s position in the world markets of gas and oil and expand its geography. Keywords: Geography of oil and gas · Gross domestic product · World exports · World imports · World oil market · World gas market · Production · Reserves · Consumption

1 Introduction The geography of oil and gas in Russia is considerable. Oil reserves (“black gold”) are located in the regions where oil extraction has a long history, such as Volga region, Northern Caucasus and West Siberia. It is worth mentioning that 70% of Russian highquality oil is extracted in West Siberia. New oil fields are situated in the North of European Russia (Timano-Pechersky region), in the Russian Far East and East Siberia. Oil production leaders of 2018 were Rosneft (194.21 mln tons), LUKOIL (82.1 mln tons), Surgutneftegas (60.89 mln tons), Gazprom Neft (39.49 mln tons), TATNEFT (29.53 mln tons) and others [1]. It is important that significance of new oil fields increases with the decrease in oil in the previous oil fields. Thus, oil extraction in East Siberia is a longterm task for the Russian Federation. In Russia, as well as in the whole world, there is a tendency for depletion of oil resources. As regards Russia, this situation can be explained predominantly by the depletion of old large oil deposits, a low level of technology in the industry, etc.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 236–243, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_21

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As for geography of natural gas reserves, they are located in the following regions: the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, Orenburg Region, Astrakhan Region, Irkutsk Region, YamaloNenets Autonomous District and Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous District, regions where natural gas is extracted. The biggest natural gas producers of 2018 were NK Rosneft – 45.3 bln cub.m, LUKOIL – 21.05 bln cub.m, Gasprom Neft – 17.75 bln cub.m, Surgutneftegas – 9.67 bln cub.m, RussNeft – 2.51 bln cub.m, Tatneft – 963.32 mln cub.m, Slavneft – 935.92 mln cub.m, Bashneft – 650.93 mln cub.m [2].

2 Russia’s Economy Overview Possessing a considerable amount of natural resources, such as oil and gas, at present, Russia sells them at the highest possible profit, which allows the country to develop its economy. It should be mentioned that the successful development of the oil and gas sector guarantees Russia stability of its external balance sheet, helps to accumulate investment resources and enables maintaining a certain exchange rate of the national currency to some extent. However, this process is hindered by sanctions introduced by the USA and some European countries. Therefore, it can be claimed that energy commodities trade based on oil and natural gas serves as the main source of income both for the state and its citizens. Russia is rich in various resources: natural resources, human resources and material resources, it has substantial science and technology infrastructure, and it is also a market leader in the sphere of producing and exporting energy commodities and raw materials. Nonetheless, today it is not possible for the Russian Federation to make an economic breakthrough due to unresolved internal problems. This controversial situation is primarily connected with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Russia inherited only 70% of the external economic relations of the USSR), which has weakened Russia’s position on the global arena diminishing the opportunities for the mutually-beneficial cooperation with the global community. In our view, these factors have contributed to the modest position of Russia in the world. The Russian Federation used to be one of the top ten countries by its GDP. The figures provided by the International Monetary Fund testify to the fact that in 2017 Russia was ranked 11 ($1.527 tn) following the USA ($19.391 tn), China ($12.015 tn), Japan ($4.872 tn), Germany ($3.685 tn), Great Britain ($2.625 tn), India ($2.611 tn), France ($2.584 tn), Brazil ($2.055 tn), Italy ($1.938 tn) and Canada ($1.652 tn) [3]. Taking into account the statistics, one can confer that there is a considerable gap between Russia and the leading countries (in 2017 Russian GDP was 12.7 times lower than that of the USA and 7.9 times lower than Chinese GDP). According to the World Bank, Russian GDP amounted to $1.578 tn in 2018. The leader in this case is still the USA ($19.391 tn), followed by China ($12.238 tn), Japan ($4.872 tn), Germany ($3.677 tn), Great Britain ($2.622 tn), India ($2.601 tn), France ($2.583 tn), Brazil ($2.056 tn), Italy ($1.935 tn), Canada ($1.653 tn). It is clear that Russia is ranked 11, as it was in 2017, and the gap between the leading countries has slightly decreased. The GDP of the Russian Federation is 12.3 times lower than the GDP of the USA and 7.8 times lower than the Chinese GDP [4]. It should be mentioned that in 2018 Russia’s share in the world export constituted 1.17% ($223.640.74 billion), and the share of the USA was 12.83% ($2,461.620.68

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billion), of China – 9.79% ($1,877.526.16 billion). Therefore, Russia’s share in the world imports of goods amounted to 2.30% ($448.161.62 billion), China – 13.6% ($2,631.564.72 billion), the USA – 8.43% ($1,636.188.41 billion) [5]. At the present moment this data confirms the modest position of Russia in the world economy. It is important that plummeting oil prices, the world economic crisis and sanctions have a negative impact on the Russian economy and its position on the global arena. Therefore, it can’t help influencing Russia’s share in different industries in the global market. Nowadays oil and gas are dominating in the world market of energy commodities. One can say that, unlike other energy sources, these natural resources have an impact on the political situation in the world, international relations and strategies of development of different countries. It is a fact that Russia possesses roughly 14% of all proven oil reserves and 34% of natural gas reserves, which means that Russia can play an active role in the world market both currently and in the future. However, the annual primary energy production in Russia constitutes 12% of the general world production [6].

3 Russia’s Positions on the Global Oil Market Oil production in Russia tends to decrease, which is connected with the political situation in the world. Nonetheless, in recent years oil production has slightly grown – in 2017 it was 546.8 mln tons (together with gas condensate) [7], and in 2018 it decreased by 1.6% amounting to 555.84 mln tons [8]. It should be emphasized that such countries as Russia, Saudi Arabia, the USA, China and Canada accounted for approximately half of world oil production from 2017 to 2018. Russia has all the opportunities for increasing oil extraction. The share of the largest oil producers in the world in 2018 was as follows: Russia – 13.92%; Saudi Arabia – 13.23%; the USA – 11.8%; China – 5.71%; Canada – 4.54%, etc. [9]. In 2018 Russia was ranked the first in terms of oil production extracting 11.36 mln barrels per day, Saudi Arabia being ranked the second with 10 mln barrels per day, and the USA being ranked the third with 9 mln barrels per day. On the whole, these three countries are leading oil producers supplying 39% of oil to the world market. These countries are followed by China and Canada [9]. As it is understood, the Russian economy is oriented towards the export of oil. In 2015 the daily export of Saudi Arabia was 8.86 mln barrels and that of Russia was 7.6 mln barrels. Thus, in the same year the third largest exporter was the UAE (2.6 mln barrels per day), the fourth one was Kuwait (2.5 mln barrels), the fifth – Iraq (2.2–2.4 mln barrels) [10]. In 2018 Saudi Arabia exported 7.178 mln barrels per day and Russia – 5.567 mln barrels respectively. Iraq was exporting country number three (3.796 mln barrels per day), Canada – number four (3.481 mln barrels), the UAE – number five (2.524 mln barrels), Kuwait – number six (2.040 mln barrels) [11]. Statistics show that both in 2015 and 2018 Russia’s oil export was lower than that of Saudi Arabia. In addition, Russia’s daily export decreased 1.4 times from 2015 to 2018, in Saudi Arabia the decrease was 1.2 times, in the UAE – 1.03 times, in Kuwait – 1.04 times, and, by contrast, Iraq’s export increased 1.6 times. We suppose that this volatility demonstrates the dependence of oil exporting countries on the economic and political situation in the world.

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In 2017 the total oil exports from Russia increased by 26.6% amounting to $93.306 bln for the total volume of 257 mln tons. The biggest amount of oil was exported to the non-CIS countries (239 mln tons), while the whole volume of oil intended for the former Soviet Union countries was in fact supplied to Belarus, being equal to 18 mln tons. In 2018 the situation practically did not change. Thus, export of oil from Russia amounted to 257.67 mln tons, which exceeded the level of 2017 by 0.3%. Export to nonCIS countries was 239.6 mln tons in 2018 (a 0.3% growth), and to the former Soviet Union countries – 18 mln tons (a 0.2% decrease) [11]. In general, it can be said that a certain decline in the Russian oil export can be explained by such factors as the entry into force of the new OPEC+ agreement to cut oil production aimed at stabilizing the world market prices; expansion of oil processing capacities; refocusing on the Asia-Pacific region and primarily on China; the demonstration to the European Union of its dependence on Russian oil. Sadly, as of 2017 Russia occupies the fifth place in the world in terms of oil consumption. Russia consumes annually (more than 183 mln tons) a fifth as much of oil consumed in the USA, which is the largest oil consumer (985 mln tons) and approximately a third as much as China (656 mln tons). It is important that the USA remained the leading oil consumer in 2017. Only 8% of the whole annual volume of oil in the world is produced in the USA, while 985 mln tons are consumed every year. This means that a lot of attention was paid and is paid now to the development of high-technology industries in the USA. As for oil consumption, China is ranked the second position (656 mln tons), India – the third (231 mln tons), Brazil – the forth (152 mln tons) and Russia – the fifth (183 mln tons) [12]. The level of development of high-technology industries depends on oil consumption. That is why, as far as we are concerned, oil consumption might be decreasing in the coming years but its volume will be quite different, which will be determined by the economic goals of the countries. Oil is a vital energy resource accounting for about a third of energy consumption in the world. It should be mentioned that the economic situation of countries and, consequently, the well-being of their citizens depends on oil prices. For Russia the price of this crucial export commodity is rather volatile, as there have been periods of dramatic decreases and increases. In recent years the situation in the world market has been changing, which is determined by a sharp decline in raw materials prices, the growing supply of raw materials from non-traditional sources, resumed oil production in Iran and Libya, and the decreased demand in the EU and Ukraine. The current situation is bound to produce a certain effect on the Russian economy and, besides, and economic sanctions imposed by the USA and other Western countries have aggravated the initially challenging economic situation inside the country. Thus, in 2014 Russian oil export decreased approximately by 6% in comparison with the previous year [13]. Oil is a marketable product for Russia, and the fall of oil prices in the global market has led to a substantial dollar deficiency and growth of its exchange rate, which has resulted in a more complicated process of purchasing goods abroad, even impossible at times. The fall of global oil prices is caused by a number of factors, including declining oil reserves in the developed countries, a certain slowdown in the world economic growth, growing oil production in large countries, shale boom, diminishing demand on the global market, etc. From our point of view, a significant factor contributing to the reduction of

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oil prices is the political agenda. Thus, from 2014 there was a more than double reduction in the oil price - from $110 to $50 per barrel, and by 2016 oil cost $30.38 per barrel, which produced a negative effect on the economic development of the country and its industries and, as a result, led to the federal budget deficit and weakened ruble. It should be taken into account that the price of the major oil brands (WTI, Brent) defines the price for all grades of oil, including the Russian ones (Urals, Sokol, etc.). Having overcome crises before, Russia is gradually moving towards greater stability of its economic situation this time as well. At the present moment oil costs about 71 dollars per barrel. On the whole, it is important that the fall of global oil prices has led to devaluation of the ruble, a rapid growth in prices for imported goods and services, falling living standards of Russian people on the one hand, but on the other – this situation has stimulated industrial production and has made it necessary to implement import substitution programs. We believe that in the nearest future Russia will have to enter new markets and start oil processing, which will enable a further increase in the share of petrochemicals in energy exports. Moreover, it is crucial that the sales proceedings should be allocated for the creation of modern high-technology industry and infrastructure. This will help to ensure a high quality of life and further development for the future generation.

4 Russia’s Positions on the Global Gas Market Natural gas is different from oil and coal in terms of its greater environmental friendliness. Its role in the world economy is constantly growing owing to its great energy efficiency for both power and manufacturing industry. Nowadays Russia is the world leader in terms of natural gas reserves. In 2018 Russia occupied the first place by proven reserves (despite a certain decline from 2014) – 35.0 tn cub.m (18.1% of the world reserves), then came Iran – 33.2 tn cub.m (17.2%), Qatar – 24.9 tn cub.m (12.9%), Turkmenistan – 19.5 tn cub.m (9.1%), the USA – 8.7 tn cub.m (4.5%), Saudi Arabia – 8.0 tn cub.m (4.2%), Venezuela – 6.4 tn cub.m (3.3%), the UAE – 5.9 tn cub. m (2.8%). Significantly, proven gas reserves have been diminishing since 2014, which means that this source of energy is non-renewable. Nevertheless, gas reserves are still substantial. At present gas reserves are predominantly located in the following areas: the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Guinea, the Barents Sea, Central Asia and the Caspian Depression, the north of West Siberia and the south of the USA, South-East Asia and Australia. The Russian Federation occupies the second place in the world in terms of natural gas production and consumption and it accounts for 20% of gas world trade. In 2016 the USA was the leading gas producer - 51.063 bln cub.m per year, Russia was number two – 642.242 bln cub.m According to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Russia’s share in the world natural gas production constituted 16.2% and that of the USA – 21.5%. Together Russia and the USA produce more than 37% of natural gas in the world. The leaders of the top ten are the following: Iran (5.7%), Qatar (5.1%), Canada (4.3%), China (3.9%), Norway (3.3%), Saudi Arabia (3.1%), Algeria (2.6%), the Netherlands (1.1%) [15]. It should be noted that in 2018 natural gas production in Russia grew by 4.9% in comparison with 2017, amounting to 725.17 bln cub.m [2]. It can be claimed that Russia and the USA are the two leading gas-producing countries in the world. However, both of them are facing certain difficulties concerning further

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development of gas production. As regards the USA, their natural gas reserves are to some extent lower than those in Russia. That is why there is a possibility that traditional gas production will be declining and the growth will be contributed to by shale gas production. Sadly, Russia is experiencing a lack of investment in developing new gas fields, including those on the continental shelf, which can be explained by high production cost and poor cost-effectiveness. Nonetheless, taking into account the considerable gas reserves in Russia, it can be said that gas production will probably be growing at a slow pace in the future. In recent decades gas production in the world has been increasing (an average 3–4% growth per year), which is likely to continue further on. The expansion of the world market of natural gas will take place due to its increasing production and export from Africa and Middle East. It is a fact that these regions have substantial natural gas reserves and low production cost. In addition, they are situated in the vicinity of the distribution area. Possessing considerable natural gas reserves, Russia exports natural gas primarily to the non-CIS countries and CIS countries as well. It should be noted that in 2018 Russian export of natural gas increased by 20 bln cub.m in comparison with 2017, amounting to 225 bln cub.m [16]. As regards natural gas exports through pipelines, in 2018 they constituted 220.6 bln cub.m (a 3.7% growth or 7.8 bln cub.m in comparison with 2017), i.e. there is a significant growth of exports. In 2018 natural gas was mainly exported through pipelines to Germany (55.8 bln cub.m), Turkey (24 bln cub.m), Belarus (20.03 bln cub.m), Italy (18.1 bln cub.m), etc. The exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) amounted to 16.44 mln tons in 2018 (a 50% growth or plus 5.47 mln tons in comparison with 2017). This LNG was mainly supplied to Japan (7.84 mln tons), Taiwan (2.74 mln tons), the Republic of Korea (2.15 mln tons) and China (0.68 mln tons). Before this year LNG had not been supplied to Europe, and this year 3.01 mln tons of Russian LNG were supplied there [17]. The total exports of natural gas from Russia in 2018 were 243 bln cub.m, i.e. 1/3 of all the natural gas produced in the country. This means that at present Russia is the leading natural gas exporter, being ahead of Qatar and Norway, whose total natural gas exports amount to 120–130 bln cub.m. Interestingly, although Russia did not export LNG before, nowadays it has managed to become a number six LNG exporter in the world, leaving Indonesia and Algeria behind, but following the USA [17]. Thus, the total volume of Russian natural gas exports has amounted to $49 bln, which is $11 bln more than in 2017 [18]. It seems likely that in the future gas industry will be growing faster than oil and coal industry, which is related first of all to its environmental friendliness. The launch of such projects as Arctic LNG 2 and Baltic LNG, as well as the expansion of LNG production in the Russian Far East.

5 Conclusion Now the Russian policy concerning the oil and gas industry lies in a gradual increase of oil and natural gas production. In order to maintain stability and simultaneously strengthen the position in these markets the country should attract substantial foreign investment. Besides, there are some issues that need solving in the nearest future. This

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concerns finding new deposits of natural resources and introducing new technologies of extraction and production in order to minimize costs and losses on all stages of production. Being an international actor, Russia is willing to contribute to the stable development of the oil and gas sector of the economy, which will enable it to play an active role in the global market further on. In our view, despite certain instability in the global oil and gas market, Russia should continue the policy of increasing oil and gas production in order to increase their consumption inside the country. The increased consumption of these resources will enable developing high-technology industries, and, as a result, it will lead to a high level of development of these industries, as well as of the economy as a whole. It is worth mentioning that the revenues received from the oil and gas industry are most considerable today, owing to which the country can solve the most important issues of its national economy. In the structure of the oil and gas industry 65% of all the revenues is constituted by the proceeds from oil and gas resources exports, which demonstrates a certain dependence of the country on oil and gas exports. That is why this situation should be changed. It comes to effective distribution of these revenues, which should be allocated for the creation of modern production and other industries to change the structure of the economy and ensure the economic growth. In their turn, these measures will strengthen the position of the country in the global oil and gas market and expand its geography.

References 1. The National Priorities of Russian Fuel and Energy Complex. https://neftrossii.ru/content/ nacionalnye-prioritety-rossiyskogo-tek 2. Gas Production in Russia in 2018. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/644896 3. International Monetary Fund: Report for Selected Countries and Subjects. https://ur-l.ru/X35 4. Encyclopedia of Humanities: Research. centre for humanitarian technologies, 2006–2019. https://gtmarket.ru/ratings/rating-countries-gdp/rating-countries-gdp-info 5. International Monetary Fund: Exports, FOB to Partner Countries. http://data.imf.org/regular. aspx?key=61013712 6. Russia in the Global Oil Market: The economy of Russia: 21st Century 7, pp. 1–24 (2007) 7. Oil and Gas Production in Russia in 1985–2017. https://genby.livejournal.com/754102.html 8. How much Oil was Produced in Russia in 2018. https://zagopod.com/blog/43222028739/Sko lko-nefti-dobyili-v-Rossii-v-2018-godu 9. Korolyev, A.: The ranking of countries by oil production in 2018. https://365info.kz/2019/ 02/stanet-li-2019-j-godom-rosta-mirovogo-sprosa-na-neft-prognozy 10. The Ranking of Leading Oil Exporters. https://www.offbank.ru/blog/771-osnovnie-strani-eks portyori-i-importyori-nefti.html 11. Novak, A.V.: Oil production in Russia in 2018. TASS (2018). https://tass.ru/ekonomika/597 1425 12. Oil-2017: Results, tendencies, forecasts analytics and forecasts. http://www.ngv.ru/upload/ iblock/939/93972e1f25fa9b33508ca6c348e8614b.pdf 13. The Table of the Volume of Crude Oil Exports in Russia for the Period of 2000–2016. http:// total-rating.ru/1674-eksport-nefti-v-rossii-za-2000-2016-god.html 14. World Reserves of Natural Gas. http://global-finances.ru/mirovyie-zapasyi-gaza/ 15. OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2017. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/ media/downloads/publications/ASB2017_13062017.pdf

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16. Exports of Natural Gas from Russia Grew by 20 Billion Cubic Meters in 2018. RIA Novosti. https://ria.ru/20190110/1549188222.html 17. Achievements in Exports of the Fuel and Energy Complex in 2018: Oil, Gas and coal Records. http://www.rukivnogi.com/articles/spisok-stran-po-dobyche-gaza-v-mire 18. Exports and Imports of Russia - 2019. Volumes, Structure, Goods. https://www.kubdeneg.ru/ eksport-import-rf-2019-obemy-struktura-tovary/

Geopolitical, Geo-Economic Risks and National Security of Russia Irina Ignatyeva1(B) , Boris Isaev2 , and Konstantin Losev2 1 Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, St. Petersburg, Russia

[email protected] 2 St. Petersburg State University of Aerospace Instrumentation, St. Petersburg, Russia

[email protected], [email protected]

Abstract. The article discusses the geopolitical position of Russia and its national security from the perspective of the risk society concept. Several types of risks are analyzed: global risks, geo-economical risks. The essay identifies the concept and nature of political and geopolitical risks. The paper considers the role and place of modern Russia in the changing world, its geopolitics, national and international security. For this purpose, a variety of factors are analyzed, divided into external and internal ones, with a sufficient degree of conditionality. The geopolitical position of modern Russia in the global geopolitical environment (land, sea, air and space) is characterized by the following parameters: in relation to the Eurasian continent, in relation to the World Ocean, in relation to the world air and near-the-earth space. It was concluded that, in military terms, Russia is a typical land power where the main military tools are the Land Forces and the Air Force. Russia, since the time of the USSR, has lost much in terms of its advantageous geopolitical position or what is called “living space” in geopolitics. The main areas of concern are differentiated in terms of international security risks: relations with NATO, agreements on strategic offensive weapons (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START) and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the correlation between the conventional weapons and the armed forces. Two ways of geopolitical development of Russia have been identified: on the one hand, peaceful and industrial/commercial cooperation, mutually beneficial participation in the international division of labour and international trade, on the other hand - construction of a new autarkic military-imperial power surrounded by satellites and opposing the other power bloc, and the growing arms race. Regretfully, the Western countries, curtailing cooperation, introducing progressively new sanctions and shifting the borders of NATO to the east, incentivize Russia towards the second path. Taking into account the undulant historical development of Russia, it has been suggested that after the recess of the geopolitical development in the 1990s which ended in collapse of the USSR, another upward wave may be expected, stimulated by the reforms and the accelerated post-reform development of the 2000s. This wave can be still ongoing in the 2010–2020s. The struggle for its continuation is the core of the modern geopolitics and the national security of Russia.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 244–255, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_22

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Keywords: Geopolitic · Risk society · Political risks · Geopolitical risks · Geo-economic risks

1 Introduction The modern society in the scholarly literature is often viewed as a risk society. In this article, we shall consider the geopolitical position of Russia and its national security in terms of the of risk society concept.

2 Political and Geopolitical Risks Political risks are interpreted in the scholarly literature as a probability of undesirable consequences of possible political and other decisions connected with political events [1]. The concept and substance of political and geopolitical risks differ in their manifestations: the first - at the national, the second at the international level. Political risks are manifested through various structural elements of the society: in different spheres and subfields, within elite, managerial and social groups, in different political institutions. Political institutions in all countries of the world with developed democracy face various threats. The population suffers political risks in the form of terrorist attacks, threats of transnational armed conflicts, pressure on the part of corrupt officials or violence on the part of criminal elements. These risks were discussed in the reports of the International Economic Forum 2018 [2]. Political risks manifested in economy acquire the character of political/economic risks, in particular, in the investment domain. The substance of political and economic risk in this area manifests itself as a probability that investment income may be affected as a result of undesirable influence of politics of a particular state on the economic sphere. :Political risk is the risk an investment’s returns could suffer as a result of political changes or instability in a country. Instability affecting investment returns could stem from a change in government, legislative bodies, other foreign policy makers or military control. Political risk is also known as “geopolitical risk,” and becomes more of a factor as the time horizon of an investment gets longer” [3]. Geopolitical risks, in contrast to political ones that, as a rule, manifest themselves at the national level, are more severe at the international level. They are constantly changing, depending on the factual geopolitical situation in the world. The geopolitical environment has become especially dangerous in recent decades. The most serious geopolitical risks are cyber-confrontation between the USA and Russia, the war with Iran, the integration in Europe, the tangible trade war between the USA and China. “World leaders are so busy 2019 is the year “bad seeds” are being planted that will eventually meet the global order. Examples? The European Union, the G20, the World Trade Organization, the United States of America, the Transatlantic Alliance, the United States of America…” [4]. Geopolitical risks are especially dangerous in the field of economics [5, 6]. As Sven Behrendt and Khanna Parag point out in their article: “In this context, geopolitical risk has a clear meaning for business: It is the potential for international political conflict to threaten the financial and operational stability of companies around the world” [7].

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The world of international corporations lacks models and tools to keep their vision of geopolitical tendencies, political and social changes and respective risks threatening business activity throughout the world. “Just as economic globalization has forced political leaders to adjust to the rigors of a nonstop marketplace, the pace of political events around the world requires that corporate executives take the initiative to confront the consequences of the links between geopolitics and business performance. Whereas the global surge of multinational corporate activity in the 1990s brought down national borders, the next era of geopolitical change will be less certain, which will make deeper assessments of and adjustments to geopolitical risk essential for continuing business success” [7]. Geopolitical risk also remains the focus of investors. Their fears are increasingly growing [7]. When analyzing these processes, the term “geo-economical risks” is also used. “Geoeconomic risks. Increasing geopolitical fluidity and intensifying strong-state policies increase the risks associated with economic interactions between states. States have always used tools of economic policy and diplomacy to pursue their geopolitical goals” [8]. An important geopolitical concept is the definition of “global risks”, which refers to geopolitical and geo-economical risks that have become global in nature, that threaten virtually all countries with new conflicts, new global problems, new economic and financial crises to which national governments cannot but respond. The world has entered a new, less predictable and more alarming geopolitical phase, generating numerous risks between the changing international relations and the internal political conditions of countries [9].

3 Risk Society The increased geopolitical uncertainty begins with the concept of globalization as a process that has turned risk into the endemic reality [7]. Since the 1990s, much has been written in the scholarly literature about the “risk society”. Changing the society towards increasing risks and threats to security, both domestically and internationally, was noted to have gained prominence through the works of sociologist Ulrich Beck who introduced the concept of “Risk Society” [10, 11]. The risk paradigm challenges many commonly used concepts in international relations (IR), such as the established forms of cooperation and the use of force. Since this security research programme inspired by Beck’s work is being actively developed, many authors consider the problems set by the Risk society paradigm to IR. An issue has been raised addressing the need to revise the concepts of use of force, cooperation in the field of security and international law in the light of security threats and challenges that the West is facing today. Williams M.J. notes: “At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the overwhelming challenge that confronts Western policy-makers is the management of diverse, amorphous and qualitative security risks, rather than the fixed, quantifiable threats of yesteryear. As such, policy-makers have had to move from a reactive to a more proactive mindset, which ultimately challenges established international institutions and norms of action” [12].

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Some sociologists absolutize the concept of risk in the modern society, giving it a general philosophical meaning correlating with the concepts of modernity and postmodernity. Youssef Omar, referring to the works of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens [13, 14], addresses the issues of modernity and revival of the risk society, characterizes the ugly side of modernity and its consequences. “The present epoch is not a modern epoch, but rather another fashion characteristic of risk society. This “pursuit of modernity” clearly arose because of a global radical change in society, both from within and in international relations. We are moving towards a society in which the consequences of modernity are becoming more radical and universal than before. Currently we live in the second modernity, and the emergence of a risk society is a direct consequence of modernity. Modern modernization poses a threat to the most important characteristics of modern times, such as the state system of a nation or the structure of a state. The second modernity is different from the “modern” modernity in that it not only deconstructs the subject, but also reconstructs it” [15]. Moises Naim, editor of Foreign Policy magazine, writes: “Thanks to the changes spurred by globalization over the last decade … nation-states have benefited from the information revolution, stronger political and economic linkages, and the shrinking importance of geographic distance. Regretfully, criminal networks have benefited even more” [16]. The social hopes for more stable geopolitical relationships by the end of the Cold War did not materialize. Global risks and hazards increased significantly. “Global Hazards. The Cold War’s conclusion was met by a tremendous expansion of global business, as corporations found themselves newly able to expand into transition economies and emerging markets. The dogma of the 1990s held that free market enterprise and a liberal economic agenda would lead to more stable geopolitical relations. The decline of interstate warfare during this period also provided a geopolitical environment that enabled heavy consolidation across industries, resulting in the emergence of massive conglomerates with worldwide reach” [7]. John Urry writes about the global imbalance, global catastrophism, complexity and stratification in the modern society. The author explores coincidences and relationships between the physical and social worlds, turning sociology truly into “social physics” [17]. The United States are viewed as an attractor that determines the course of modern politics. Many authors consider the problems of risks through the aspect of climate change and the relationship of the natural and the social [18, 19]. Hardt, M. and Negri write about the spider web coverage of the United States that brings forward new characteristics of the country’s imperial sovereignty. Defining the “Counter-Empire” concept and the bounds of imperialism, the authors show the mechanisms of managing the global society, the new political order of globalization. “It is easy to recognize the contemporary economic, cultural, and legal transformations taking place across the globe but difficult to understand”. Hardt and Negri contend that these should be viewed in line with our historical understanding of the Empire as a universal order that accepts no boundaries or limits. Their book shows how this emerging Empire is fundamentally different from the imperialism of European dominance and the capitalist expansion of the previous eras. The today’s Empire, rather, draws on the elements

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of US constitutionalism, with its tradition of hybrid identities and expanding frontiers. The Empire identifies “a radical shift in concepts that form the philosophical basis of modern politics, concepts such as sovereignty, nation, and people” [20].

4 External and Internal Factors of the Russian Geopolitics To comprehend the role and place of Russia in the changing world, its geopolitics, the national and international security, many factors should be taken into account. These factors, with a certain degree of conditionality, may be divided into external and internal ones. The external factors are globally well known, characterizing Russia in its entirety, as an element of the international system, and should include: – – – – – –

– – – – – – – –

the geographical position; the state of the country’s subsoil assets in terms of stock of mineral resources; the condition of its natural environment in terms of economic development; the status of its borders in terms of opportunities for development of international relations and national security; the condition of seas and oceans around the country from the point of view of future development and defence; the state of the economy, in particular, its specific industries having direct impact on the geopolitical situation (heavy industry, machine building, space industry, aircraft construction, shipbuilding etc.); the population in terms of quantity and quality; demographic dynamics; the status of international political, military, economic, trade, cultural, etc. relations; the relations with neighbouring states; the presence (absence) of international conflicts along the perimeter of the country; any political/military alliances of which Russia is a member; any opposing politico-military unions; the geopolitical status.

A number of internal factors that do not always come to light, but are well-known to us, serve as elements of the political, social and economic system called Russia. They include: – the presence or absence of political dissent in the society. The confrontation along the “Democrats - Communists” line in the 1990-ies changed considerably towards milder confrontation along the “Patriots - Westernizers (Liberals)” line with evident predominance of the patriotic sentiment; – the presence or absence of the national strategy. It appears as a national idea (which in fact does not exist in Russia) and as a long-term social development programme (which is formed as a mix of national programmes) which brings together the vast majority of the people;

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– the presence or absence of confessional accord. Approximately 80% of the Russia population are Christians, 12% - Moslems, and 3% - Buddhists, which evidences the religious homogeneity of the society and indicates at possible problems in relations between the representatives of different confessions; – the presence or absence of ethnic problems caused by disparate development of different ethnic groups and leading to ethnic conflicts; – demographic homogeneity or heterogeneity - a significant difference in population density in various regions of the country; – the demographic problems connected with low birth rate, high mortality, increased drug abuse, incidence of incurable diseases like AIDS, etc., leading to depopulation; – the unbalanced development of the economy, especially well developed industries in different regions; – the unbalanced infrastructure in different geographic regions and in different areas of geo-economic development. The solution of the internal problems defines the internal factors of Russia’s development.

5 The Geopolitical Situation of Modern Russia The principal external factors that play an increasingly important role, especially during the periods of aggravated international environment, are the geopolitical situation and the national security of the country. The geopolitical situation of the present-day Russia in the overall geopolitical environment (land, sea, air and cosmic space) can be characterized by the following indicators. – With respect to the Eurasian continent (the dominant continent on the planet) - very good: it reminds a warrior having his back turned to the wall (the Arctic Ocean), who can defend himself from several opponents, using his position. Having a fairly well-developed railway and general-transport network, it is possible to effectively concentrate the army in any direction. On the other hand, the huge space, low population density, uneven settlement on the European and Asian parts of the country, its North and South, the lengthy borders - all this requires permanent efforts and diversion of vast resources for national defence. – In relation to the Global ocean: not quite convenient, as it is difficult to bridge and concentrate the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific fleets and the Caspian flotilla, which enables an opponent to realize the “Anaconda plan” - to besiege Russia with a network of military bases, and, if necessary, to cut off and keep the Russian fleets self-confined in their water areas, just like during the Great Patriotic War. – In relation to the global air space and the middle space: convenient, because it allows for utmost dispersing the airfields and spaceports, to maintain the Air and Military Space forces as proper. It follows from this that militarily Russia represents a typical land power with the main military force represented by Army Field Forces and Aerospace Forces. The Navy

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can not perform an independent mission and has to play a secondary role. At the same time, the submarine nuclear missile fleet and the ground missile ships do not need to make assault crossing of defensive military lines; they can launch strategic and tactical missiles directly from the territorial waters of Russia or from beneath the ice of the Arctic Ocean. The Air and Space forces present as well a very effective tool to deter any aggressor. Russia, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has lost its positions in terms of advantageous geopolitical situation or what is called the “living space” in geopolitics. It used to have, now abandoned, fortified, well-equipped and well guarded borders with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania – now under control of Ukraine. USSR’s borders with Turkey were passed to Armenia and Georgia. The border with Iran is now controlled by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. The border with Afghanistan is controlled by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The border with China is controlled by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Russia not only has diminished geographically (the country’s territory exceeded 22 million sq. km., reduced to 17 million sq. km.), but also has weakened demographically, economically and strategically. From the West, its borders changed due to the Baltic countries leaving the Warsaw Pact and joining NATO - receding 250–400 km; the same on the part of Poland and the former GDR made the territory shrink to another 700–800 km. An exclave - Kaliningrad region appeared In Russia, which is experiencing powerful geopolitical pressure from Poland, Germany and Europe in general. In the south-west, the country’s border got dislocated 600–750 km towards Moscow owing to the recession of Ukraine. Russia lost 200–250 km of geopolitical space in Transcaucasia and more than 1500–2000 km in Central Asia. The population of Russia (146 million people), compared to the population of the USSR (over 260 million people) has decreased almost twice. Numerous plants under the military-industrial complex were left in the countries that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union (this is especially true for Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus). From the geopolitical and geo-economical perspectives, modern Russia is under the interpenetrating influence of six geo-regions: 1. The United States (or, as regarded in geo-economical terms, North America); 2. The European Union countries; 3. The European countries - the former republics of the USSR (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia); 4. The Asian post-Soviet countries - former republics of the USSR (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan); 5. The Asian countries bordering Russia or located near its frontiers (Turkey, Iran, Mongolia, Afghanistan); 6. China. These six geo-directions are today the main determinants of Russia’s geopolitical situation. The other geo-regions less important, that do not affect principally the country’s geopolitical development, should be mentioned as well: Japan, Korea (DPRK and Republic of Korea), Mongolia and India. The present relations between Russia and the United States have almost returned to the relations of the cold war; the difference is that the American geopolitical researchers

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(Z. Brzezinski, S. Huntington, H. Kissinger, etc.) no longer consider Russia as a superpower, and the leading American politicians view and structure the relations between our countries are relations between a superpower (the United States) and a regional power (Russia). Wherever possible, the armed forces of the United States, maintaining their relations with the Baltic States, Uzbekistan, Ukraine or Georgia, not only show the flag, but also strengthen their presence in the immediate proximity to Russia’s borders, realizing a long-known geopolitical “Anaconda plan”. Russia responds to these attacks with counter-offensive; some of them yielded Syria’s - and to a certain extent - Venezuela’s geopolitical success. After the reunification of the Crimea and Russia, the United States and their NATO allies started imposing economic sanctions against Russia and so far continue to exert financial and economic pressure on it. This principally hampers the process of modernization in Russia. It is much easier now for the left and right Russian radical ideologists to present the democratic ideas and market relations to the Russians not as a natural process, but as a pressure of the superpower (the United States) against its geopolitical enemy (Russia), after it has weakened and deceived the country, enticing it towards the path of democracy. In addition, some political decisions of the US Administration, like bombing Serbia, the operations in Iraq, Libya and Syria, have met a new wave of rejection of the US policy designed to force establishment of democracy in the undemocratic countries. The media of the United States and the EU countries criticizing “numerous and serious violations of the practice of fair, open and democratic elections” and the last Duma-election campaign; accusing Russia of interfering in the US presidential election and blaming the Russian security services of “poisoning a former Russian agent Skripal in the UK” raised another wave of resentment on the part of the power elite of Russia and other communities and caused retorting criticism of American geopolitics on the part of numerous media editions, political parties, forming the Russians’ relevant public opinion. The relations between Russia and the EU also are undergoing significant transformation. If their geo-economical component continues to be effective as before, the geopolitical component is in fact a collapse. The decision on admission of thirteen states to the European Union, including three former soviet Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania - formerly constituting a part of the Russian geo-space), is naturally perceived by the Russian geo-consciousness as a breach of the national interests. Now we face a paradoxical situation: all countries and all nations implementing democratic reforms enjoy visible and tangible results in the form of economic growth, improved living standards, expanded living space - by opening the borders, simplifying the frontier crossing regime, etc. Only Russia and some other states (CIS countries, Eastern Europe) have no evident benefits from the introduction of democratic values. Meanwhile the Russians clearly realize that their geo-space is shrinking and that the frontiers of the European “partners” are drawing nearer. Furthermore, whereas in the early 1990-ies the Russians had hope to become members of the integrated Europe sooner or later, it has become clear today that only two geopolitical actors will reign supreme in the North-West of the Eurasian continent in the 21st century: the European

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Union (EU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In view of this, the European policy comprises two poles: – geopolitics as a process that splits off EU and EAEU Europe and Russia, as a process of struggle of interests based on spatial and human resources; – geoeconomics as a process naturally requiring cooperation between the EU and Russia which constitute complementary parts of Europe, although this cooperation, understandably, has a non-equitable nature so far. This is a collaboration of the postindustrial European Union presented with high-tech products on the world market, and the agro-industrial EAEU, a lateral shoot of the world market providing EU countries mostly with raw materials and low-tech goods. In these circumstances, Russia, in terms of geopolitical and geo-economical aspect, has to look more closely at the Eastern neighbouring countries: primarily Turkey, Iran, Mongolia, China, Japan, Korea, as well as the countries of the Asia-Pacific region (APR). The Russian authorities and concerned geopolitics are considering in the first place the possibility of geopolitical alliances with Turkey, Iran, China and - possibly - with India.

6 The Position of Russia in Terms of International Security From the point of view of international security risks, several problem areas may be identified: – the relations with NATO. In 1991, NATO session in Rome adopted a new strategic concept. In accordance with this concept, the armaments were reduced by 1/3 and the armed forces changed their structure [21]. But since then, the Alliance has grown structurally and geographically. NATO’s eastern flank has drawn nearer to Russia. At the same time, the 2010 Strategic Concept of NATO envisages further expansion of the alliance inwards Europe and beyond it [22]. In the situation of proximity of the military-political bloc of NATO to Russia, the latter cannot but respond to the changed configuration of the international security system. The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation states that the strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s force potential, “further expansion of the alliance and the shift of its military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders pose a threat to the national security” [23]; – the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). Significant progress was made in this sphere in the 1990-ies. Whereas in 1990 the Soviet Union and the United States each deployed about 11 thousand warheads on strategic delivery weapons, the signing of START-1 (1991), START-2 (1993) and SORT (2002) treaties resulted in significant reduction of strategic offensive arms. Following the mutual agreements, the total resource of strategic offensive arms of Russia and the United States does not exceed 1700 and 2200 units respectively [24]. But given that the stock of strategic offensive weapons of other nuclear powers Britain, France and particularly China - is constantly growing, the situation in this area of international security has started aggravating. The situation with reduction of

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other mass destruction arms - chemical and biological weapons - is disappointing, primarily due to the policy of the United States. The situation with reduction of anti-missile weapons is even more complicated. In 2006, the United States, as known, withdrew from ABM Treaty and proceeded to development of all-encompassing missile defence system covering North America and Europe, but excluding Russia. The extended US - Russian negotiations on that issue have failed; – the correlation between conventional armaments and armed forces. In 2007, Russia adopted a nine-year rearmament programme making it possible to replace 45% of the existing military equipment. In December 2007, Russia put a moratorium on observance of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE TREATY) - a treaty not ratified and not respected by NATO countries. The United States, naturally, expressed “regret” concerning that decision. At the same time, the correlation of conventional armed forces of Russia and the NATO countries varies significantly: 5 times by the number of combat-ready divisions and brigades (10 divisions and 16 brigades in Russia versus - 50/100 divisions and brigades in NATO), 10 times by the number of military personnel [25].

7 Two Options of Geopolitical Development of Russia It is evident that Russia’s position globally is very unstable and complicated in terms of geopolitics and national security risks, much more difficult than at the soviet period. In addition, the country’s territory has shrunk, as well as the numbers of allies and population; the resources of the military industrial complex have faded - against the increased number of opposing countries (the Baltic States, Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, etc.) and their increased territory and population, not mention the enhanced industrial, military and other resources. The Military Doctrine of Russia adopted in 2014 identifies the following major external military hazards: – buildup of NATO’s power potential; – destabilization of the situation in particular states and regions and disruption of global and regional stability; – deployment (augmentation) of foreign expeditionary forces on the territories of states adjacent to Russia and its allies, with a view to exert political and military pressure; – development and deployment of strategic missile defence systems that undermine global stability and jeopardize the existing balance of forces in the nuclear missile sphere; – realization of the “global strike” concept, the intention to place armaments in space, as well as deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems of precision weapons; – the activities of international armed radical groups; foreign private military campaigns in the areas adjacent to the state border of the Russian Federation and the frontiers of its allies;

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– the use of information and communication technologies for military and political purposes, in order to undertake actions against the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity of states, posing a threat to international peace, security, global and regional stability [26]. Enormous resources have to be diverted to organize reliable defence of Russia. Thus, with regard for the 21st -century risks, Russia is faced with a historical choice: where to apply its resources, to concentrate them, what kind of society to build, how to structure its relations with the world in general and the surrounding countries. Two possible options are possible. On one hand, the present situation is a great opportunity for peaceful industrial and commercial cooperation, mutually beneficial participation in the international division of labour and international trade; on the other hand, Russia may choose to build a new autarkic military imperial power surrounded by satellites and the opposing bloc, with the growing arms race. Regretfully, the Western countries are frustrating the cooperation opportunities by introducing new sanctions and dislodging the boundaries of NATO to the East, thus mobilizing Russia towards the second path. Given the variegated historical development of Russia, we can assume that after the decline of the geopolitical development in the 1990-ies, that culminated in the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country is in for another upsurge triggered by the reforms and the accelerated post-reform development in the 2000-ies [27]. This upsurge may continue in 2010–2020-ies. The struggle for its follow-up is the core of Russia’s present-day geopolitics and national security.

References 1. Political Risk: Essence, Levels: Political risk management. https://knowledge.allbest.ru/pol itical/2c0a65635a2ad68b5c53b88421306c37_0.html. (in Russian) 2. The Global Risks: Report 2018, 13th Edition. World Economic Forum. Insight Report. Committed to Improving the State of the World. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_ Report.pdf 3. Chen, J.: Political risk. Investopedia, July 9 (2018). https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/ politicalrisk.asp 4. Bremmer, B.I.: These are the biggest geopolitical risks of 2019. Signs on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Time.com, December 27 (2018). http://time.com/5495546/ eurasia-geopolitical-risks-2019-ian-bremmer/ 5. Ignatyeva, I.F., Isayev, B.A.: Geoeconomics as a structural element of geopolitics. Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Politologiya 44, 213–223 (2018). https://doi.org/10.17223/1998863x/44/21. (in Russian) 6. Ignatyeva, I., Isaev, B.: Geopolitical leadership in the modern world. In: 2nd International Conference on Social, Economic and Academic Leadership (ICSEAL 2018). https://www.atl antis-press.com/proceedings/icseal-18/25904335. (in Russian) 7. Behrendt, S., Khanna, P.: Risky Business: Geopolitics and the Global Corporation, vol. 32. World View, New Delhi (2003) 8. Segar, M.: Geopolitical power shifts. The Global Risks. Report 2018. 13th Edition. World Economic Forum. Insight Report, pp. 38–41 (2018). http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ GRR18_Report.pdf

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9. The Global Risks Report 2018 - Reports - World Economic Forum. http://reports.weforum. org/global-risks…/geopolitical-powershift/ 10. Beck, U.: World at Risk. Polity Press, Cambridge (2008) 11. Beck, U., Bonss, W., Lau, C.: The theory of reflexive modernization: problematic, hypotheses and research agenda. Theory Cult. Soc. 20(2), 01–33 (2003) 12. Williams, M.J.: (In) security studies, reflexive modernization and the risk society (2008) https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836707086737 13. Giddens, A.: Turbulent and Mighty Continent: What Future for Europe?. Polity Press, Cambridge (2014) 14. Giddens, A.: Living in a post-traditional society. reflexive modernization: politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order. In: Beck, U., Giddens, A., Lash, S. (eds.), p. 106. Polity Press, Cambridge (1994) 15. Omar, Y.: Reflexive modernity and the rise of risk society looking at the other side of modernity through the eyes of Anthony Giddens and Ulrich_Beck (1992). https://www. academia.edu/25732493/Reflexive_Modernity_and_the_Rise_of_Risk_Society_Looking_ at_the_Other_Side_of_Modernity_through_The_Eyes_of_Anthony_Giddens_and_Ulrich_ Beck 16. Moisés, N.: The five wars of globalization. Foreign Policy (January/February 2003). http:// users.clas.ufl.edu/zselden/Course%20Readings/Naim.pdf 17. Urry, J.: The complexities of the global. https://philippepierre.com/website/wp-content/upl oads/2019/03/John-Urry-Complexities-global.pdf 18. Urry, J.: Climate Change and Society. Polity Press, Cambridge (2011). https://doi.org/10. 1111/j.1468-4446.2012.01436_10.x 19. Pierides, D., Woodman, D.: Object-oriented sociology and organizing in the face of emergency: Bruno Latour, Graham Harman and the material turn. Br. J. Sociol. 63(4), 662–679 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2012.01431.x. Social weather 20. Hardt, M., Negri, T.: Empire. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (2000) 21. Kulagin, V.M.: International Security’, pp. 199–207. Aspekt Press, Moscow (2006). (in Russian) 22. Danilov, D.: Putin’s Para bellum. Politicheskiy zhurnal 31, 4–7 (2007). (in Russian) 23. Isayev, B.A.: Geopolitical epochs of the development of the Russian state. Politeks 2, 140–153 (2005). (in Russian)

Special Aspects of Modern Hybrid Warfare on the Internet: Ontological Analysis and Russian Experience Marina Krivko1,2 and Radomir Bolgov3(B) 1 Mikhailovskaya Military Artillery Academy, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected] 2 A.F. Mozhaysky Military-Space Academy, Saint Petersburg, Russia 3 Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected]

Abstract. The article explores the issue of using the Internet for a new form of informational confrontation between states - a hybrid war. The author conceptualizes the term of the “hybrid war”, defining it as a form of influence (authentic to the information society) of one state on another in order to control the socio-cultural, economic, political spheres of society without a direct use of military threats. Virtual social networks in a hybrid confrontation can be considered ontologically as a so called “Internet front” or a scene for the implementation of political manipulations and hybrid attacks. Being essentially a simulacrum of reality, the Internet allows, through virtual reality, to determine the life reality of a modern Internet user, thereby including them in a hybrid confrontation. Keywords: Hybrid war · Non-military actor · Network partisans · Virtual social networks · Simulacrum · Hybrid strike

1 Introduction In the XX–XXI centuries, a colossal transformation of culture and social institutions took place. War, as one of the immanent forms of human activity, has changed along with man himself. Globalization, postmodernism and deconventionalization of ethical standards, weakening of the sovereignty of nation-states, and substitution of politics by the economy have led to the emergence of a new form of warfare called “hybrid warfare”. In the past three years, the phrase “hybrid warfare” has become one of the most frequently used in scientific and journalistic discourse. The number of publications dealing with various aspects of hybrid warfare is growing exponentially, but neither the final conceptualization of this phenomenon nor the creation of an integral theory of hybrid warfare takes place; on the contrary, the term itself is dissolved, numerous interpretations and concepts arise, and research often takes on a journalistic nature. The question of whether hybrid warfare is a product of an exclusively information society or whether it is possible to reveal displays of a hybrid warfare in every period of history, © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 256–267, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_23

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starting from antiquity, is still open. The only indisputable fact is that modern warfare has ontologically undergone a whole series of changes and has gone beyond the boundaries of the space-time continuum into the sphere of cultural and symbolic. In the modern Humanities, there is the problem of using the term “hybrid warfare” and the ontological substantiation of the reason for the correspondence of the quality of “hybridity” to specific historical events and wars. There is an active debate about whether a hybrid war is exclusively a phenomenon of the Internet era or whether any war is inherently hybrid, since military operations directly or indirectly involve a huge number of participants becoming its actors. It is generally accepted that the term “hybrid warfare” in international scientific discourse has been used since the publication of the article “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” by US officers - US Marine Corps Lt. Gen. J. Mattis and US Marine Lt. Col. F. Hoffman in 2005 [1]. This article was published after General Mattis at the Defense Conference read the landmark report released in the fall of 2005 by the US Navy Institute and the US Marine Corps Association, in which the term hybrid warfare was first used publicly. In modern culture, the complex and multifaceted nature of the relationship between a person and an artificially created virtual environment provides its specific ontological function: many active users already spend all their free time in the virtual world and become its “inhabitants”.

2 Key Concepts The term “hybrid war” originally denoted armed conflicts that cannot be attributed to either traditional or irregular conflicts, since they use a variety of forms and methods of conducting armed and unarmed struggle. The main features of the hybrid war are: large-scale information operations, cyber operations, rapid deployment, widespread use of special forces, a combination of regular and rebel forces. After the joining of Crimea with Russia in 2014, it received even wider use. It is this term that is increasingly used by Russia’s opponents in the face of a general deterioration in relations with the West [2, 3]. In Russia, military experts mean by hybrid actions “the complex application of political, economic, information and other non-military measures, implemented with reliance on military force”. This concept is not something fundamentally new for Russian military experts. As synonyms for hybrid methods, the term “asymmetric actions” is used. The assertion about the fundamental novelty of the participation of non-state forces in wars made by some authors (in particular, S. Murdon [4]) cannot be called true, since the phenomenon of guerrilla war has existed for a long time: Napoleon’s troops and even the Ancient Roman legions also encountered it. In the first half of the 20th century, Russian Colonel E.E. Messner used the term “rebellion” (“myatezhevoina”) to describe a war in which there are no norms and patterns where there is no place for classic mass battles. In the “rebellion” Messner notes the crucial importance of the “fourth dimension” - information (in addition to land, water and air). In this war, the strong and the weak are fighting, and the weak is looking for counterweights to the strong in such a struggle [5]. This brings the concepts of “rebellion” and “hybrid warfare” closer together.

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Among historical examples, it is worth noting the activities of the rebels led by Mao Zedong in China, Lawrence on the Arabian Peninsula, Che Guevara in Cuba and others. In 1935, military theorist B. Liddell Hart wrote that the traditional concentration of forces will most likely be replaced by the elusive and ubiquitous distribution of forces capable of exerting pressure everywhere, while remaining invulnerable [6]. Today, riots are occurring more and more often in urban environment, and not just in mountains and forests. The development of the Internet makes the rebellion global. The population, using the Internet and knowing what is happening in other countries, is more likely to support the rebels abroad or to participate in the rebellion in their own country. Thus, thanks to the Internet, rebellion can spread from one country to another, i.e. acquires an avalanche-like character.

3 Ontological Framework A person’s perception of the divide between real life and artificially created reality is leveled so much that often a person ceases to understand where he really is: in the real life or in a virtual world. “Virtuality” acts as a substitute for one type of reality with another. So, although a person is initially aware of the artificial nature of the virtual world, he at the same time often identifies it with reality, and such a substitution is usually accompanied by changes in the person’s worldview. Most philosophers see virtual reality as a set of processes for constructing a new artificial world through technical means. Philosophical studies of virtual reality are based on the theory of L. Wittgenstein about the world’s polyonticity - the absence in the world of a basic, only true reality. The theory of polyonticity allows us to consider all interpretations of the world as equivalent; totalizing the virtual and stating the fact that, due to the mediation by language, all reality is artificial and reality itself is essentially immaterial, but structured from the outside and virtually. From these arguments of L. Wittgenstein it follows that in fact the only problem of philosophy is the problem of interpretations of reality. Hybrid warfare implements the theory of polarity in practice, since information attacks on the Internet are aimed at creating interpretations of reality necessary for the adversary and are also aimed at reducing the ability of an ordinary person to understand the authenticity of the information consumed. The illusory nature allows you to give any meaning to the information broadcasted over the Internet and create multiple realities. If earlier a person was distanced from politics, then with the advent of the Internet he can be included in political processes and conflicts as an active participant: international contradictions “come” to a person’s house through information in publics, videos, photos and posts. Revolutions, regime changes, pogroms in the XXI century always “begin” on the Internet. A person often “learns” about the problems of his country on the Internet and then goes out to solve them on the streets. The classical concepts of culture (justice, solidarity, patriotism) in a hybrid war for mentalities and influence become a field of manipulation by implicit, hidden on the Internet agents of influence from the enemy. The main myth about the Internet, which entered culture as a constant, is the myth of objectivity of information, equality and freedom of opinion.

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The ontology of the Internet as a space with a special kind of virtual reality allows informational attacks to be unpredictable, large-scale and unpunished. Through social networks, it has become possible to create mass emotions, direct them, bring them to the extreme and control the reaction of the masses. A semiotic tradition of the analysis of Internet communication has taken shape in the modern philosophy, since special sign systems encoding messages and ideas are formed on the Internet. The global semiotic unit of Internet communication is the Internet meme. The phenomenon of memes has been widely studied in modern philosophy; advertising and political PR specialists develop meme making techniques; a kind of meme industry has formed in digital culture. The meme has a semiotic nature; by the ability to recognize and read the message of the meme, users are embedded in the “friend/foe” system. The meme sign (external form) is actually always torn off from its original meaning, the meme is a narrative that is read by the user instantly and receives feedback in the form of his emotion. If a meme needs to be deciphered and explained for a long time, it means that the user is not included in the discourse, and with his misunderstanding gives out his “alien” to the information field. In a hybrid war, memes are used as triggers of information attacks: the user recognizes them instantly and quickly distributes them. Memes on the Internet broadcast a certain emotion, position, mood. The main goal of a meme in an information attack is to consolidate a group of users in a virtual space, unite them based on emotions and ideas, and then, through control and regulation, bring people offline. A meme is a latent sign, a command, a secret phrase, with which you can launch an information attack. The ability of a meme as an information unit to influence reality, launch programmed reactions of large groups of people, and provoke real user appearances is based on a phenomenon ironically called the technology of a “Smart Crowd”. This phenomenon was first described by G. Rheingold who proved that using manipulations it is possible to transfer into the online different offline communities (crowds) of people who are not connected by social characteristics, interests, not familiar with each other, but united by a given Internet message [7]. The crowd united in this way begins to coordinate independently and can be used to achieve certain benefits. The enemy attacks on a foreign country’s Internet space in order to form a “smart crowd” of the mass of users and coordinate its actions. The “smart crowd” will not be formed in an instant; in the beginning, numerous viruses are launched for the purpose of reconnaissance, analysis of public reactions (whether users support memes and ideas), searches for a sign that can start the consolidation process. When a user shares a massive Internet emotion (reposts a popular picture or slogan, leaves a comment under a post), he enjoys the feeling of belonging to a virtual team; while not realizing that perhaps he had already become a participant in the information operation against his own country. If misinformation during the war had the function of forming a negative information field around the warring party; then modern hype is based on complex processes of “building up” attention around a phenomenon or a particular politician due to its certain negativity and thereby increase its popularity.

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In hybrid warfare, hype is used directly to attract attention to certain people whose popularity is increasing in order to erect a symbolic figure or indirectly, when due to hype about one event, audience attention is diverted from another. Conducting a network war in the postmodern culture has become more convenient than ever: the possibility of uncontrolled posting of a negative and, importantly, anonymous message that quickly spreads across the network. In the traditional media, it was always possible to identify the author of the defamatory material, as well as to prove, having obtained a rebuttal in court, that the information posted is false. On the Internet, this cannot be done or the process will take an enormous amount of time, which will benefit the enemy in the information war. Thus, the features of a hybrid war on the Internet include: the scale of application and network distribution; anonymity, and multi-directional impact; lack of verification; translation of live communication into multimedia; the ability to instantly reach a huge audience and direct its reaction through a system of comments, fake news, staged videos.

4 Research Design and Results of the Study We make an overview of approaches to the hybrid warfare in the Russian political and expert community. Then we analyze the legal and doctrinal framework in Russia including Doctrine of Information Security, Military Doctrine, a set of federal laws, as well as Cybersecurity Strategy Draft. Also, we need to consider government authorities, security agencies, and so on. The study would be incomplete without the understanding of the enforcement and implementation of the laws and programs in the related field. We analyze the practical activity of actors in Russia, especially in Russian military. Finally, we make the conclusions and design the future work. 4.1 Overview of Hybrid Warfare Studies in Russia The topic of hybrid warfare is of interest in Russia. We have found 1,372 articles on “hybrid warfare” topic in the bibliometric database “Russian Scientific Citation Index”, while the publication activity continues to grow. To clarify the thematic focus of the articles, we analyzed the dynamics of publication activity with breakdown by 2 time periods: 2014–2016 and 2017–2020 years. On average, the number of published articles in the second period is more than 9 times higher than the number of publications prior to 2017, which indicates an increase in the interest of the Russian academic community in this issue. For comparison, we have found only 143 articles on “hybrid warfare” topic in Scopus. At the same time there is no consensus in Russian academic community on key issues of the subject: What is Hybrid Warfare? How Information technology changed the nature of warfare? What is the future of Hybrid Warfare? The research of the Internet impact on the military started in the Russian expert and academic community in the late 1990s. There were objective reasons for that. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia has greatly inferior to the United States in conventional weapons, and the “information superiority”. The concept of “information dominance” implied asymmetric threats to the enemy, where information technology was designed

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as efficiency multiplier. In addition, some authors (e.g., V. Slipchenko) treated these concepts in terms of opportunities to go beyond the conventional battlefield. That is, being behind a potential enemy in conventional weapons, you can negate its superiority through the creation of asymmetric threats, including information threats. In Russia, the discussion of this issues is presented in such journals as “Voennaya mysl’ (Military Thought)” [8], “ Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie (Independent Military Review)” [9], “Problemy natsional’noy strategii (National strategy issues)” [10], Comparative politics [11], in the publications of such think tanks as Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, Academy of Military Science [12], PIR Center [13] and others. Moreover, it is worth mentioning the joint work of Russian and “Western” experts on “hybrid warfare” [14]. A large number of publications on the subject is the characteristic phenomenon for the initial stage of development. Research on this subject can be divided into two large groups. The first group includes works, which recognized the fundamental transformation of the nature of war [9, 15]. The second group consists of the works, which also recognize the certain influence of the Internet and the related changes in the conflict, but the essence of the conflict, its motivations and means are unchangeable [16, 17]. The early period of study of this problem in Russian academic, military and political communities is also characterized by an isolated consideration of the different aspects (cyber-, organizational, psychological, etc.). There are discussions on the following issues related to the hybrid warfare and the Internet: 1) Changing the nature of war; Here, the following issues are raised: Can we consider the war as continuation of politics today? Or politics and war do not correlate anymore? Or do changes affect only certain aspects of military affairs (control of the armed forces, electronic warfare)? It is worth also noting the divergence of opinions on the transformation of the war and organizational changes. Some researchers believe that the old structure of armed forces is ineffective. Others say that the transformation of the nature of war takes place. Still others believe that the organizational changes are not a new phenomenon. 2) The problem of the role and effectiveness of Internet in conflicts. Researchers are trying to answer the following questions: what is the role of Internet in conflicts? How to effectively use it and in what areas? What are the conflicts we consider: only armed conflict or political, social, ideological? And how to assess the effectiveness of Internet in armed conflicts: in terms of increasing the number of casualties and the destruction of the enemy’s infrastructure (cyberattacks), or, on the contrary, from the point of view of “sterilization” of the war, that is to achieve victory provided by new technologies in “bloodless”, “humane” war with the minimum of casualties from the enemy (propaganda)? It should be noted that to answer to this set of questions, we must answer the first group of questions about the transformation of the nature of war. That is, is it correct to consider the hybrid warfare in the framework of traditional military science? Is the Hybrid warfare a war? Is the use of term “hybrid warfare” correct? A negative answer to

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this question is possible in two situations. The first is the nature of war is not changed, that is, use of the term “hybrid warfare” is incorrect, the hybrid warfare is not a war, but rather wordplay. The second is the more interesting situation: it is understood that the nature of war is changing, but the use of the term “hybrid warfare” is still incorrect because it does not reflect a fundamental change in the nature of conflict. Hybrid warfare is not a war in the traditional sense, and we need a new specific conceptual apparatus. A positive answer to the question of the correct use of the term “hybrid warfare” also leads to two situations. First, the term “hybrid warfare” adequately reflects the fundamental transformation of the essence of war. It is not only non-military support of military action, and the opportunity to conduct such a war, apart from the armed conflict. Second situation: the nature of the conflict is not changed, and the use of term “hybrid warfare” is possible, but only on the basis of the traditional military science. This term may be used for informational and psychological support of military actions. 3) Terminological and methodological problems. Here we are dealing with the question: what terms can we adequately study to identify the phenomenon? How justified is borrowing the military terminology from other fields of knowledge, as well as the “crossing” of categories of military science (war, warfare, weapon) with the epithet “hybrid” and “information”? What kind of the methodological basis can be carried out in this area, at the junction of military, political, social sciences? What we consider: the impact on information or impact with information (problem of objects and subjects)? 4) Recognition of the possibility of further changes. If the modern conflict is transformed under the influence of Internet, then how long will continue these changes? Where is the ultimate development of a point (if it exists)? Whether these changes are reversible? Is it possible to return to what it was before? And if changing the nature of war is not recognized, can changes come in the future? The number of scholars agrees that the war ceases to be the continuation of the policy. Some researchers go further and agree that the war is no longer a political tool that would allow us to achieve a victory in the fight between the two states. Thus, Konopatov and Yudin believe that modern war is a substantially new phenomenon. They talk about the need to revise and clarify the concepts, as well as conduct interdisciplinary researches. New wars, according to these authors, have a “velvet”, hidden nature, as they are more violent, more intense and “faster” [18]. However, the large part of the Russian military community does not consider modern warfare as qualitatively new phenomenon. Thus, Kalinovsky says that indeed, today the information component in the military is becoming more significant. Information struggle does not fit within the scope of military terminology, and therefore requires the development of its concepts [19]. However, causes of the Soviet collapse do not lie in information dimension. And the “information war” can not be called a war, because it is not comparable to the “hot” war on the scale of impact on the nation and society. Therefore, a more correct term is “information warfare”. Thus, in addition to the difference in scale, there are also legal differences of “information war” from the “hot” war because

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“information war” is not declared, does not mean the peace treaty, does not require the imposition of martial law. If, however, we focus on the development of cheaper and more fashionable information weapons, we can lose in main components of national security. Gorbachev believes that the new concept of military development (in particular, the concept of Network Centric Warfare - NCW) reflects the new way to control the military, but does not change the system of views on the war (and the war per se) [20]. However, he believes that in the future changes in military organization forms may lead to the transformation of the nature of war as a whole. Information technology itself is unlikely to lead to any changes in the militarypolitical sphere. One can cite the example of the situation during the World War I, when there were also numerous technological innovations (radio, telephone, tank, airplane), but the nature of war was not changed. Obviously, the need for the transformation of the war is not just a technological revolution, but also political, social, cultural and moral change. Belkov believes that war is inseparable from the physical armed violence by the state. Any other meanings of “war” are only a metaphor (“trade war”, “war on corruption”, etc.) [21]. Orlyansky considers unreasonable compound categories of military science (war, warfare, weapons) with the epithet “information.” However, in this case, it seems unreasonable borrowing of terms by the military science. This may further confuse the situation with the terminology. As Orlyansky writes, psychological warfare (i.e. propaganda) should be separated from information warfare. Psychological warfare, unlike information, is directly related to the armed struggle [17]. On the issue of the effectiveness of new information weapon, there are different points of view among Russian researchers. Orlyansky believes that the effectiveness of such weapons is low. Information does not exist without material medium. It still cannot influence on a person as much effective as conventional weapons [17]. 4.2 Legal and Doctrinal Framework Russia has so far not a strategy for hybrid warfare as a policy paper. At the same time, currently, Russia has more than 40 federal laws in the field of information, more than 80 presidential acts, and about 200 acts of the government of the Russian Federation. One of the key papers in this field is the Doctrine of Information Security, the first version of which was adopted in 2000. The new version was adopted in December 2016. The adoption of this doctrine was preceded by a series of events throughout the 1990s. Until the 2000’s in Russia there was practically no clear government attitude to the problem of information security. Unlike the U.S. approach, in the Russian Doctrine, the provision of information security for individual, group and public consciousness is in the forefront. Today, a set of agencies are engaged in the development of the national idea of information warfare, particularly, Ministry of Defense, FSB and Department “K” of Interior Ministry, which is investigating crimes in high-tech field of information technology. At the beginning of the 1990s there was quite a difficult situation with the information security in Russia. On the one hand, the liberal media is constantly criticized the information security per se, using analogy of Orwellian “Big Brother”. On the other hand,

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some politicians and experts began to adhere to the obscurantist positions, believing that ensuring Russia’s national interests in the information space requires the rejection of an open society and participation in globalization. In 2000, the Doctrine of Information Security was approved. It is a set of official views on the goals, objectives, principles and main directions of ensuring information security of the Russian Federation. It serves as a basis for the formation of government policy in the realm of national information security, preparation of proposals to improve the legal, methodological, technical and organizational sides of Russian information security, as well as the development of targeted programs to ensure information security. The information security is considered as the security of national interests in the information sphere, determined by a combination of balanced interests of the individual, society and government. The doctrine spelled out the threats, sources of threats to the interests, methods of maintenance, as well as international cooperation in the field of information security. It allocated 4 types of threats: 1) threats to constitutional order and human rights in the information sphere, 2) threats to information security policy of the government, 3) threats to development of the domestic IT industry and 4) threats to security of information systems and networks. However, since 2000 there are many changes. Appearance of Web 2.0 and social media dramatically changed a national security that was demonstrated by the protests in the Arab countries in 2011 (so-called “Twitter revolutions”). In addition, the appearance of such new phenomena as smart phones, Internet of Things, Smart City, crypto currency and blockchain technology, which are also forced to rethink cybersecurity. Sanctions against Russia led to a policy of “localization of IT industry”. Now the danger of cyber attacks for life-support infrastructure is being increasingly discussed by many experts. There are new policy papers related to the development of information technologies in Russia. The new version of the Doctrine of Information Security adopted in 2016 was an attempt to better reflect the changes that have occurred over the 16 years. The new doctrine paid greater attention to the use of computer technology in order to influence the Russian critical infrastructure. In addition, there is a component associated with the risks of using social media to influence public opinion. We are talking about the risks of not only extremist and criminal content, but in general any content that represents a threat to political and social stability. As for the information warfare, this term was mentioned 2 times in the Doctrine 2000. The Doctrine 2016 does not contain mentioning of the term [22]. In accordance with the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014), among the characteristic features of modern military conflicts among other things mentioned strengthening the role of information warfare without the use of military force to achieve political goals, the transition from a strictly vertical system for automated control on troops and weapons, the massive use of weapons systems and military equipment based on new physical principles. One of the main weapons problems are “the development of forces and means of information warfare … the creation of new high-precision weapons, … C2 information systems, … qualitative improvement of means of information exchange through the use of modern technologies and international standards, as

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well as a joined information field of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation as part of the information domain” [23]. After the military operation in August 2008 in South Ossetia and Georgia we can see time to time media reports about the Defense Ministry’s intentions to create informational troops, whose functions should include all aspects of information warfare: from the psychological operations and propaganda (including the Internet) to security of computer networks and cyber attacks on the enemy’s information systems [24]. In 2013, the Chief of the General Staff V. Gerasimov noted that there was a need to understand the role of the military in the conditions of changed wars, in which both traditional and non-standard forms of confrontation changed. In the article “The value of science in foresight” [25] V. Gerasimov formulated new features of war without using the term “hybrid war”. Later, Western experts derived from these words the “concept of Gerasimov’s hybrid war,” which was allegedly implemented during the crisis in Ukraine.

5 Conclusions and Future Work As for the differences in the approaches of Russia and the West to the Hybrid Warfare, we should consider not only a different level of openness for innovations in such a conservative sphere as the military one. And it is not only focusing of Russian experts on information and psychological aspects, while American experts consider the whole spectrum of this concept including technical aspects. And even more not only what department is a driver of information security (Air Force in the US versus FSB in Russia). An interesting point of view is offered by Israeli author D. Adamsky. He conducts a comparative analysis of the latest military concepts of some of the world’s most powerful militarily (the US, Russia and Israel). The starting point of Adamsky’s theorizing is that cultural factors affect the military capabilities of leading powers. The military and political leaders of each state have its own cultural patterns that determine the views and the policy resulting from them in the field of military technology. Adamsky defines them with the term “cognitive style” [26]. It is determined by a number of factors: geographical, historical, economic and even religious and psychological. It turns out that the military and political leaders of “Protestant America” are more open to innovation in such a conservative sphere as the military one. However, he notes that the pioneers in the sphere of the “military and technical revolution” were nevertheless the Soviet military, led by Marshal N. Ogarkov, and this was due to prevailing technocratic approach in the USSR in the 1960–70 s, including, inter alia, the active engagement of cybernetics into the national economy. Adamsky believes that this concept emerged as a reaction to the development of NATO doctrines of a deep blow to the advancing echelons of the Soviet troops in the case of war in Europe. In practice, not all Ogarkov’s ideas have been implemented in the USSR. Adamsky explains this by the prevalence in Russian culture of a holistic cognitive style aimed at creating a coherent picture, sometimes even at the expense of technical details. In American culture, the logical and analytical cognitive style is dominant, emphasizing certain details and practical activities. Therefore, the development of information systems and high-precision weapons took place in the US already in the 1970–80 s, but original theoretical developments appeared only in the 1990s, i.e. ten years later than in the USSR.

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In this case, there is no need to overemphasize on the cultural differences that affect the information warfare policy. There are a number of common problems for all the countries. Technical aspects of ICT are almost the same everywhere, because the connection of parts in telecommunication networks does not depend on the “cognitive style”. A number of armies have similar mechanisms for circulating information. Therefore, the “cognitive style” can not be unequivocally regarded as something characteristic of the entire national or regional culture.

References 1. Mattis, J.N., Hoffman, F.: Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (2005). http://milnew stbay.pbworks.com/f/MattisFourBlockWarUSNINov2005.pdf 2. Konyshev, V.N., Parfenov, R.V.: Hybrid wars - between myth and reality. World Econ. Int. Relat. 63(12), 56–66 (2019) 3. Koshkin, P.G.: The creation of Russia’s new image in the Western press between 2014 and 2019. Vestn. Saint Petersburg Univ. Int. Relat. 12(4), 477–499 (2019). https://doi.org/10. 21638/11701/spbu06.2019.406. (in Russian) 4. Murden, S.W.: The Problem of Force: Grapping with the Global Battlefield. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London (2009) 5. Messner, E.E.: If You Want Peace Win Myatezhevoina!. Voennyi universitet, Russkii put, Moscow (2005) 6. Liddell Hart, B.H.: Lawrence of Arabia. Da Capo Press, New York (1935) 7. Rheingold, H.: Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution. Perseus Books, Cambridge (2003) 8. Bartosh, A.A.: “Friction” and “Wear” of the hybrid war. Voennaya mysl’ 1, 5–13 (2018) 9. Dugin, A.: The world is in the network war. Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, #44, p. 453 (2005) 10. Konyshev, V.N., Sergunin, A.A.: Discussions about future wars within Russian expert community. Problemy natsional’noy Strategii 4, 100–114 (2013) 11. Bolgov, R., Filatova, O., Yag’ya, V.: The United Nations and Russian initiatives on international information security. In: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, ICCWS 2018, pp. 31–38 (2018) 12. Gerasimov, V.V.: Guideline to defend Russian Federation in the conditions of the use “Traditional” and “Hybrid” methods if warfare. Vestnik Akademii Voyennyh Nauk 2(55), 19–23 (2016) 13. Fedorov, Y.E.: A view of liberal: can you hear jackboots thundered? Index bezopasnosti (Security Index) 2(113), 138–149 (2015) 14. Fridman, O., Kabernik, V., Pearce, J.C. (eds.): Hybrid Conflicts and Information Warfare: New Labels, Old Politics, pp. 129–148. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder (2018) 15. Slipchenko, V.: Wars of the sixth generation. Weapons and military art of the future. Veche, Moscow (2002) 16. Gareev, M.: Some characteristic features of future wars. Voennaya mysl’ 6, 53 (2003) 17. Orlyansky, V.: Information weapons and information warfare: reality and fiction. Voennaya mysl’ 1, 62–70 (2008) 18. Konopatov, S., Yudin, V.: The traditional meaning of the concept of “war” is obsolete. Voennaya mysl’ 1, 53–57 (2001) 19. Kalinovsky, O.: Is Information War a war? Voennaya mysl’ 1, 57–58 (2001) 20. Gorbachev, Y.: Network-centric warfare: Myth or Reality? Voennaya mysl’ 1, 67 (2006) 21. Belkov, O.: Concept of “war” and its aberrations in domestic discourse. Vlast 9, 6–7 (2009)

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22. Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation (2016). https://rg.ru/2016/12/06/ doktrina-infobezobasnost-site-dok.html 23. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014). https://rg.ru/2014/12/30/doktrina-dok. html 24. Tsyganok: the events in South Ossetia have created the need for information troops in the Russian army. Kavkazskiy uzel, 23 June 2009. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/155755 25. Gerasimov, V.V.: The Worth of Science Consists in Prediction. Voenno-Promyshlennyi kur’er, 26 February 2013. https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632 26. Adamsky, D.: The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of the Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel. Stanford University Press, Stanford (2010)

Geopolitical Consequences of the End of the Cold War in the post-Soviet Space: Prerequisites for the Emergence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Tamara Tarakanova1(B) , Sergey Pogodin1 , Anna Matveevskaya2 , and Lidiya Evseeva1 1 Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] 2 Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected]

Abstract. Problems in relations between Russia and China, as well as the states of Central Asia are defined in the article. The work demonstrates that Chinese diplomats held a series of negotiations to resolve issues of regulating border issues with the post-Soviet states bordering on the China. The result was the resolution of issues of demarcation of state border between the former Soviet republics and China during the 90s of XX century. However, an unequivocal assessment does not exist on the issue of the legality of border’s demarcation with China in the public opinion of the post-Soviet states. The Uygur question remains another important issue in relations between the China and the countries of Central Asia. The leadership of modern China, realizing the internal geopolitical danger that is caused by the desire of separatist-minded Uyghur national organizations to achieve the creation of their independent state, pursues a policy to increase the economic level of region’s development. The government is interested in strengthening ties with the border areas of the countries of Central Asia, where representatives of the Uyghur people live. Keywords: Shanghai Cooperation Organization · International relations · Russia countries of Central Asia · Post-Soviet states

1 Introduction At the turn of XX–XXI centuries the balance of power in Eurasia has changed significantly. Fifteen new independent states were formed after the collapse of the USSR in the post-Soviet space. Many of them were at the center of geopolitical interests of the leading world and regional powers (USA, EU countries, China, Turkey, Iran, etc.). The Russian Federation regards the post-Soviet space as a zone of its traditional geopolitical interests [1]. In this regard, the activation of other world actors in this space demanded that Russia find new forms of cooperation with the post-Soviet states in order to preserve the role of a leading Eurasian power. China is a state that for a long time had the longest © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 268–277, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_24

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border with one state - the USSR, but after its collapse, a new geopolitical situation arose on the borders of the PRC. Today, China borders not only with Russia, but also with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, which means that it is necessary to solve border problems with several states inherited from Soviet-Chinese interstate relations [2]. Different periods of relations between the two states have been since the founding of the PRC (1949). However, the last Soviet leader, M. Gorbachev proceeded from the fact that “avoiding a chronic conflict” with the largest socialist country after the USSR would serve the interests of “world socialism” [3]. In addition, the end of the 80s in the USSR was marked by beginning of the “perestroika” process, and therefore the Soviet leadership sought to learn more about the Chinese economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping to use them as an example [4]. It is important to note that the policy of M. Gorbachev contributed to the elimination of the so-called “three major obstacles” to establishment of bilateral relations between the USSR and the PRC: - reduction of military presence on the border with China; - withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia and Afghanistan; - cessation of support for the pro-Vietnamese regime in Kampuchea [5]. Thus, the new political course of the Soviet leadership contributed to the gradual alignment of a positive foreign policy strategy with respect to the PRC. The normalization of bilateral relations between states was reinforced by official visits of leaders. So, in 1989, the Chinese side accepted the Soviet delegation led by the President of the USSR, and the following year, Premier of the People’s Republic of China, Li Peng, held interstate talks in Moscow. One of the central themes of the negotiations concerned the issue of resolving border question [6]. As a result of successful consultations, in April 1990, the “Agreement on Guidelines for the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and the Building of Trust in the Military Field on the Soviet-Chinese Border” was concluded. It is important to note that the document emphasizes the need to “carry out mutual reductions of armed forces in the border area”, identifying specific types of armed forces and armaments to be reduced during subsequent negotiations [7]. In May 1991 (just six months before the collapse of the USSR), the “Agreement on the Soviet Chinese State Border” was signed. Here, the focus was on the eastern part of the Soviet-Chinese border. This was especially important, since it was the most controversial area, negotiations on which were conducted with varying success since 1964. And in September 1994, the Russian Federation and the PRC finally agreed on the documents regulating the western part of the Russian-Chinese state border. After the collapse of the USSR, border cooperation issues were resolved within the framework of the regional structures created at that time in new geopolitical conditions. First, we are talking about the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which has become the most representative association of the post-Soviet republics from the point of view of international law. That is why in March 1992 the CIS member states signed the “Agreement on the Protection of State Borders and Maritime Economic Zones of the Commonwealth States” [8], and in October of the same year the “Agreement on Cooperation of the Commonwealth States to Ensure Stable Situation at Their External Borders” signed [9]. Note regional agreements in Central Asia. In December 1993, the heads of state of Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on the protection of external state borders. The document noted that “in the conditions of open borders between the signatory states, the protection of their external borders is their

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common cause and should be carried out by concerted joint efforts” [10]. In 2001, the heads of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China signed the “Treaty of Good-Neighborhood, Friendship and Cooperation”. The fact of the absence of mutual territorial claims in accordance with generally accepted international legal norms of inviolability of state borders is emphasized in the text. In his speech (2003), Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said: “Russia and China have no controversial sections of the Russian-Chinese border. As for the two uncoordinated sections of the border, constituting less than 2% of its total length, both sides are aimed at developing an optimal, mutually acceptable option of differentiation in these areas”. The following year (2004) the visit of the head of the Russian Federation V. Putin took place in China, during which the signing of an additional agreement on the Russian-Chinese border in its eastern segment took place. According to PRC leader Hu Jintao, “this means the final settlement of border issues between the two countries”. In turn, V. Putin commented on the situation as follows: “The most important political step has been taken: the border issue between our states has been put to an end” [11].

2 Materials and Methods The theoretical and methodological foundations of the study were both general theoretical and general methodological levels of scientific research. General scientific and political science research methods have formed the methodological basis of the research: document analysis, retrospective analysis, comparison method. The empirical base of the research consists of the following groups of documents: Official documents of states and international organizations (SCO Charter, Shanghai Cooperation Organization Development Strategy until 2025, RF Foreign Policy Concept of February 12, 2013, and a number of others); Bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements (Treaty on GoodNeighborhood, Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, 2001; Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation of May 25, 1992; Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and Republic of Uzbekistan, June 16, 2004; Agreement “On the Databank of the Regional Antiterrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” of June 17, 2004, etc.). The border problem with the post-Soviet republics for China has not been fully resolved. Therefore, Chinese diplomats held a series of negotiations (1994, 1997–1998), as a result of which all disputed border issues between the PRC and Kazakhstan were finally resolved. The result is the signing of the “Protocol on the demarcation of the border” (2002), while it was noted that the approved protocol establishes “a complete settlement of border problems in the interests of the Chinese and Kazakh peoples”. Border issues between China and Kyrgyzstan were resolved during the negotiations, which took place in two stages: in 1996, the “Agreement on the border” was signed, and in 1999, provisions on the state borders of three countries were added (China, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) [12]. These provisions became the basis of a separate agreement between the neighboring countries. The agreement on the state border between Tajikistan and the PRC was signed in 1999, and in 2000, the Chinese diplomats agreed with their colleagues from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the “Agreement on the point of junction

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of state borders” of these three states. Thus, the demarcation of the state border was resolved between the former Soviet republics and China during the 90s of XX century. However, an unequivocal assessment still does not exist on the question of legitimacy of border’s demarcation with China in the public opinion of the post-Soviet states [13]. The PRC and the countries of Central Asia. Uigurs are a Muslim people who inhabited the region of East Turkestan, which today partly became part of the PRC as the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and became part of modern Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. About 8 million Uigurs are a Turkic minority in multinational China. About a million more Uighurs settled in the neighboring countries of Central Asia, as well as large diasporas live in Europe and America. Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is in northwestern China. Its area is about one sixth of the territory of China and is the largest inland region of the country. It borders in the south-west with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, in the west with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and in the northeast with Mongolia. The leadership of modern China is aware of the internal geopolitical danger, due to the desire of separatist-minded Uygur national organizations to achieve separation from China and the creation of their independent state. The result of this is the constant outbursts of violence and terrorist acts, so the Chinese leadership is pursuing a policy to increase the economic level of the region’s development and is interested in strengthening ties with those border areas of Central Asia where Uighur people live compactly. The decision to create a regional organization was made in order to resolve the problematic issues that have arisen in the republics of Central Asia in connection with the current geopolitical situation. China initiated the creation of a regional structure, which later became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (hereinafter the SCO).

3 Results The participants of the “Shanghai Five” at the first stage resolved issues that directly continued the tendencies that had formed during the existence of the USSR, after which they continued their cooperation. Realizing the need to expand cooperation, they formed a new regional organization - the SCO. This is understandable, the states of the region have other common interests. Gradually, the members of the new international organization moved from solving border problems to jointly examining a wide range of security, economic and cultural cooperation issues, that is, they found a sphere of common interest that goes far beyond the original five objectives. Uzbekistan, not bordering with China, joined the SCO in June 2001, which is a clear confirmation of the expansion of the interests of states. Initially, the format of the future organization was determined by the so-called “Shanghai Five”, which was established in 1996 in Shanghai. The rapprochement of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was dictated, first of all, by the exacerbation of the threat of terrorism in the Central Asian region and the violation of the security of the border areas of the Shanghai Five countries from the main source of instability - Afghanistan [14]. In 2001, the format of the Shanghai Five Forum was transformed into a full-fledged organization of multidisciplinary cooperation - the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [15]. The states took this initiative to expand their powers, since the status of the forum did not provide for active, decisive and large-scale

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actions to eliminate the threat of terrorism. In the same year, Uzbekistan, which declared its interest in the new structure, was accepted into the organization. In 2005, four countries - India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan - received observer status in the SCO. The next 6 years were not marked by any new initiatives in this direction. Such an expansion of participants was the only one until 2015. The main opponent of the expansion of the SCO was China. The country did not support the position of India in the Organization, due to the tension of bilateral relations between the two states. In turn, the Central Asian states of the SCO were also skeptical about the new potential bidders due to fears of reducing their influence within the SCO. Therefore, for a long time Russia was the main initiator and supporter of expansion. The country actively put forward various initiatives and proposals. For example, at the Dushanbe summit in 2008, Russia initiated the creation of a special group of SCO experts on the expansion of the organization. The preparation of draft documents on the rules for new members was the result of this group’s activities [16]. It was Russia that once supported the candidacy of India. The beginning of the second decade of the XXI century was the next important stage in the aspect of the expansion of the SCO. For example, the SCO summit in 2010 demonstrated a set of common criteria that a candidate country should meet for full membership in the SCO. For example, it was stated that a country applying for participation in the work of the SCO should be geographically located in Eurasia. In addition, it is welcome that the applicant country should already have observer status, or at least a SCO partner. An important criterion of SCO membership is also the presence of close diplomatic ties and active cooperation in various fields with all current members of the SCO. In addition, the most important condition was determined by compliance with UN norms (no sanctions regime imposed against the country) and no conflict with any other party [17]. The provision on the procedure for admitting new members to the SCO was approved by the SCO Council of Heads of State (CHS) in 2010 in Tashkent, and the Memorandum of Commitments was formally approved at a summit in Astana in June 2011. However, no new member was subsequently approved even by these criteria. Contrary to the experts’ expectations, in 2011, during the tenth meeting of the SCO Prime Ministers held in St. Petersburg, it was not announced that new full members would join the organization. However, it is important to emphasize that it was at this meeting that the process of developing the procedure for accepting new members began in perspective. Moreover, those who wish at that time were already enough. Nevertheless, the main argument against the expansion of its membership among the SCO permanent members was that “they need more time to establish rules and procedures for managing new members” [18]. However, according to experts, the reason for this policy lies in the existing disagreements between the SCO members on the issue of expansion prospects, as well as the concerns of a number of participants, “that the expansion of the organization will weaken it rather than strengthen” [19]. An important outcome of the 2011 summit is that the SCO has gradually officially begun to introduce new formats of participation in the SCO activities: external associations, formal observers, “guests” changing according to the principle of rotation of the chair countries at the annual summits of the SCO leadership and the so-called “partners” on dialogue”. So, back in 2009, a new status

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appeared at the Yekaterinburg summit. This status meant a “dialogue partner”, which was received by two states - Sri Lanka and Belarus, and at the summit in Astana in 2012, Turkey joined them. It was during this period that Iran, Pakistan and India expressed their interest in full participation in the work of the SCO and, accordingly, applied. But the approval process for these applications took almost 5 years. The reasons for the differences between the permanent members of the SCO on this issue are as follows: – strengthening the differences of member countries on such criteria as population density, geographic size, economic potential, military strength and geopolitical orientation, which may further complicate interaction within the SCO; – some concerns about the possible expansion of the SCO as to the question of the nuclear potential of the applicant states (in particular, Pakistan and India, which did not join the NPT, unlike other SCO nuclear powers - Russia and China); – concerns about Pakistan are related to its close connection with the problem of international terrorism and the actual absence of the border with Afghanistan, as the center of terrorism and transnational crime; as for Iran, until 2015, this country was under UN sanctions, and therefore formally did not meet the criteria for membership in the SCO. The summit of heads of state in Ufa in 2015 has become historically significant in the development of the SCO. The active stage of expansion of the SCO participants began for the first time. Such large states of southern Eurasia as India and Pakistan have begun to implement the procedure of registration of membership in the SCO. The accession of these two countries was the result of a compromise between China and Russia, since China is a strategic partner of Pakistan, and Russia is India. The stabilization of inter-state relations between Pakistan and India can be a possible positive result of the accession of these two countries to the SCO on the problem of borders, because the statutory documents of the SCO strictly regulate the absence of border conflicts of member countries. In addition, many experts see India’s entry into the SCO in economic terms as a breakthrough in the regional integration of the north-eastern regions of Eurasia and the south. In this context, the countries of Central Asia are the “link” of India and China, since both countries have significant interests and numerous investment projects in these countries. However, from a geopolitical point of view, the most important consequence is the entry of not only India, but also Pakistan into the SCO will strengthen the Organization’s position as one of the centers of a multipolar world: “its accession will mark a new step in the consolidation of the non-Western world, the main players of which - largely because of the desire to avoid the domination of the West - are even towards each other, despite the existing contradictions” [20]. Iran’s accession to the SCO will be particularly interesting politically and economically, which is likely to happen quite quickly in current conditions (in 2015, sanctions were lifted from Iran). This dynamically developing country, becoming a member of the SCO, can complete the process of creating the largest non-Western union of the states of Greater Eurasia.

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According to the final Ufa Declaration of the SCO member states, “the member states are convinced that the admission of new members and the further deepening of cooperation with observer states and dialogue partners is crucial for the development of the Organization, enhancing its potential” [21]. In addition, at the summit in Ufa, the decision to grant the status of a dialogue partner of the SCO to the Azerbaijan Republic, the Republic of Armenia, the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal was taken. All this testifies to the growing interest of the Eurasian states in the work of the SCO, despite the changed geopolitical conditions in the region and skepticism of several experts regarding the future of the Organization.

4 Discussion The integration attractiveness of the SCO at this stage is undoubtedly due. The expansion of the Organization’s agenda is recorded in the SCO Development Strategy until 2025, also adopted in Ufa in 2015. According to the text of the Strategy, “the member states confirm the need to take joint measures in order to ensure sustainable socio-economic growth, intensify trade, economic and investment activities [22], develop cooperation in high-tech industries, modernize various industries, improve transport and logistics, information and communication and other infrastructure, improving economic competitiveness, the level and quality of life of the population the SCO Member States” [23]. Thus, the SCO is entering a new stage of its development, the last meeting of the SCO Heads of Government Council in China in December 2015 confirms this. During the talks, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev proposed to start consultations of the SCO with such regional structures as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and with the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the formation of possible economic partnerships on the principle of equal rights and interests. [24]. In other words, the SCO intends to expand not only the internal composition of the participants, but also to reach the level of close trade and economic ties with international economic structures in Greater Eurasia. Not only Russia, but also China began to actively pursue the idea of expanding the SCO in various formats. At the same meeting, representatives of the PRC came out in favor of creating a free trade area within the framework of the SCO [25]. According to the Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Li Keqiang, “the participants agreed that they would instruct the ministers of trade and economy to work out specific measures to create a free trade area within the SCO in order to create more favorable conditions for the development of trade relations” [26]. The goal of this PRC initiative is, undoubtedly, to promote the Chinese infrastructure megaproject “One Belt, One Way”, which will create the necessary conditions for the free movement of goods, capital, services and technologies in the region [27]. In turn, the third largest Eurasian state, Kazakhstan, is called upon to switch to national currencies when trading in the SCO in order to avoid dependence on external financial factors [28]. It should be noted that today the issue of the future integration development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is on the agenda, which is associated with the development of various integration forms in modern Eurasia (the emergence of the EAEU

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and “one belt, one path”). In the new geopolitical conditions, the SCO needs to adapt to the new requirements and develop a new development strategy. Under new conditions, the expansion of the organization and the integration of new members becomes the only opportunity for the SCO not to lose its influence and significance in the region and not to turn into a series of ineffective summits. It is obvious that since the founding of the SCO, the issue of accepting new members has become one of the principals in the context of the prospects of the SCO. In turn, the SCO format has become attractive to many states of Eurasia, which is reflected in various forms of cooperation with the SCO. Undoubtedly, the SCO summit in Ufa has become historic, as evidenced by the expert community: from a little-known regional structure, the SCO is turning into one of the centers of a multipolar, non-Western world. In many ways, this was made possible thanks to the participation of such growing giants as India and Pakistan.

5 Conclusion The geopolitical consequences of the collapse of the USSR in the relations between China, Russia and the new independent states of Central Asia were reflected primarily in solving border problems. It is important to note that the border problems, which often led to acute conflict situations in Soviet-Chinese interstate relations, were resolved exclusively by peaceful diplomatic means. In addition, the Chinese leadership, realizing the full range of security issues (Uygur separatism, Islamic extremism and terrorism) in the Central Asian border region, made every effort to consider with the Russian Federation the possibility of regional cooperation with Central Asian countries on a wide range of security, economic and cultural cooperation. The outcome of this initiative of China was originally a forum of five states (the Shanghai Five), and then a full-format international organization - the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Today on the agenda of the SCO is the question of the future integration development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is associated with the emergence of various integration forms in modern Eurasia (the emergence of the EAEU and “One Belt, One Way”). It is obvious that since the founding of the SCO, the issue of accepting new members has been one of the principals in the context of the prospects of the SCO. In turn, the format of the Organization has become attractive for many states of Eurasia, which is reflected in various forms of cooperation with the SCO.

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5. Samatov, O.: The international legal foundations of the SCO as a tool for stability and development in the Central Asian region of the CIS. http://www.centerbereg.ru/o5485.html 6. Tarakanova, T., Pogodin, S.: Russia and China in Shanghai Cooperation Organization: the problems of political and economic interaction, p. 144 (2018). (in Russian) 7. Agreement on the guiding principles of mutual reduction of the armed forces and the strengthening of confidence in the military field in the area of the Soviet-Chinese border. Collection of Russian-Chinese Treaties, p. 81 (1949–1999). (in Russian) 8. Agreement on the Protection of State Borders and Maritime Economic Zones of the Commonwealth States, Bulletin of International Treaties, pp. 40–42, 20 March 1992. (in Russian) 9. Agreement on Cooperation of the States Members of the Commonwealth to ensure a stable situation at their external borders. Diplomatic Bulletin, pp. 6–8, 9 October 1992. (in Russian) 10. Memorandum of Cooperation on the Protection of External State Borders, Diplomatic Messenger, p. 37, 24 December 1993. (in Russian) 11. The Official Website of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Transcripts of the discussion of Bill No. 142318-3. http://api.duma.gov.ru/api/transcript/142318-3. (in Russian) 12. Trostinskaya, I., Tarakanova, T.: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Activity for the Purpose of Regional Security 4th International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences and Arts SGEM, pp. 991–998 (2017). https://doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocia l2017/hb11/s12.122 13. Smolensky, V.: What Celestial Empire They Need (2006). http://www.profile.ru/politics/item/ 49760-items_18380 14. Matthew, H.: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Partner for Stabilizing Afghanistan? (2009) 15. Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO. http://russian.china.org.cn/archive2006/txt/ 2002-09/20/content_2043327.htm. (in Russian) 16. Lukin, A.: Eurasian alternative to the West. Document of the day: SCO in search of a new role. (2015). http://lenta.ru/articles/2015/07/10/shanghaiorg/ 17. On the question of expanding the SCO. http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy 18. Weitz, R.: The SCO’s Expansion Dilemma. World Politics Review (2011). http://www.wor ldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10668/global-insights-the-scos-expansiondilemma 19. Ufa Declaration of the Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 10 July 2015. http://www.sco-russia.ru/load/1013640909. (in Russian) 20. Alimov, R.: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: its role and place in the development of Eurasia. J. Eurasian Stud. 9(2), 114–124 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2018.08.001 21. Yussupzhanovich, R., Tulkunova, Z.: Role of SCO in the Eurasian continent. India Q. 75(1), 43–55 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928418821487 22. Sorhun, E.: What kind of trade integration would the SCO’s further FTA be? Globalization and Governance in the International Political Economy, pp. 63–73 (2013). https://doi.org/10. 4018/978-1-4666-4639-1.ch005 23. Strategy of development of the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation till 2025. http://www. sco-russia.ru/load/1013640805. (in Russian) 24. Russia proposed to start negotiations between the SCO and the EAEU with ASEAN on possible partnerships. http://lenta.ru/news/2015/12/15/medvedev. (in Russian) 25. Kashin, V., Lukin, A.: Russian-Chinese security cooperation in Asia. Asian Polit. Policy 10(4), 614–632 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1111/asp.12423 26. China advocated the creation of a free trade zone within the framework of the SCO. http:// lenta.ru/news/2015/12/15/china

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27. Kazakhstan called for a switch to national currencies when trading in the SCO. http://lenta. ru/news/2014/12/15/scokz 28. Tarakanova, T., Pogodin, S.: The development of the partnership relations between Russia and the countries of Central Asia. Mezhdunarodnie otnosheniya I dialog kul’tur 6, 92–106 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1870/HUM/2304-9480.6.08. (in Russian)

Russia’s New Eastward Policy and Transnational Development Cooperation in the Far East Sunyoung Park(B) International Division, Sejong University, Seoul, Korea [email protected]

Abstract. The Far East is a transfrontier area where Russia, China, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula meet. As a geographical and strategic factor, the Far East is a cradle of conflict and a symbol of cooperation. From the end of the 19th century until the 20th century, the Far East experienced many conflicts and wars. However, in the 21st century, efforts of East Asian countries are being made to write a new history of cooperation in the Far East. Especially Russia’s New Eastward Policy stimulate the transnational development cooperation in the Far East in some sense. Therefore, mutual cooperation in the Far East, where everyone is profitable, requires mutual consideration to make good use of the network paradigm and to be a useful foundation for practicing global interests. Keywords: New Eastward Policy · Transnational development · Cooperation · Far East · Transfrontier · Glocal area

1 Preface The Far East of Russia and Manchuria area is a transfrontier area where Russia, China, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula meet. As a geographical and strategic factor, this area is a cradle of conflict and a symbol of cooperation. From the end of the 19th century until the 20th century, the Far East experienced many conflicts and wars. However, in the 21st century, efforts are being made to write a new history of cooperation in the Far East. What factors would make people pay attention to the Far East and become interested in transnational development? Previous research was focused on territorial problems of the Far East and Manchuria, population formation and geopolitical spatial structure, political and economic relations, cultural exchange and cooperation, and the life and conflict of immigrants in the Far East. According to P. Sunyoung, understanding the Far East and Manchuria as a glocal area especially in Manchuria based on history and geography. Motrich and L. Kishuk’s research focus on the Far East’s demographic and geopolitical spatial structures, giving implications for how the Far East’s geopolitical position plays a role in the growth and development of transnational cooperation. [1–3] H. Richard and Z. Qingyi analyzed on cultural exchange and cooperation in the Far East. The Far East as a forum for © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 278–291, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_25

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cultural exchange between Eurasia and the Americas and emphasized the experience of cultural exchange and cooperation between China and Russia. [4, 5] A. Tsuneo examined Russia’s relations with Asia, and Izotov and Demyanenko pointed out the problems of economic policy in the Far East, paying attention to the economic development and security cooperation in the Far East, as well as the relationship between North and Russia and between China and Russia. [6–8] Those studies also analyzed the population and economic growth of the Far East region, the trade relations between the two countries, and the economic relations between Russia and China in the Far East. In terms of economic cooperation in the Far East, even C. Jangho and J. Yeocheon focus on this subject there are still to research of systematic studies linking the discussions on the establishment of infrastructures and systems between Russia and China, and the recent discussions on the conditions and direction of economic cooperation with Northeast Asian countries. [9, 10] There are need to strengthening and sharpening of analysis as to what transnational border development is being pursued by Russia’s New Eastward Policy. Considering the efforts that are being made in each country: Russia, China, Japan and the Korean peninsula, it is necessary to analyze the development of transcontinental borders in the Far East in a manner that can be meaningfully explained. To clarify this, the method used in this paper mainly examines the historical background and analyzes systematically the phenomena revealed by using various documents. There are various theories to explain about international relations such as Kenneth Waltz’s partial interactions or Robert Keohane and Joseop Nye’s complex interdependence. But in this paper attempts to use the network theory. Alexander Wendt present that structure and actors work independently and interact with each other. He proposed an alternative structuration theory, suggesting that actors and structures are constitutive, ontologically independent units, and co-determined [11, 12]. In this paper, I will analyze the background of Russia’s New Eastward Policy to see why the Far East is attracting attention again. I will also discuss what kind of development and cooperation the East Asian countries have in the Far East as well as what practical limitations they have.

2 Russia’s New Eastward Policy and the Far East Russia intends to demonstrate its ‘strong Russia’ leadership through strengthening the state power, restoring the social order, reinforcing the reform measures, improving the laws and institutions, and developing the economy. After announcing Russia’s presence in the world through the Russia-Georgian War in August 2008, Russia joined Crimea in 2014 and showed Russia’s global power. Economically, it has created the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), which is aiming for an economic partnership that plays a central role among post-Soviet nations. The Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC or EurAsEC) has established five international partnerships in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia to ensure the free movement of visas among member nations and mutual recognition of the degrees. The CSTO (the Collective Security Treaty Organization) has been established both in the military and in the security field, and has been striving to stabilize the region and reinforce Russia’s dominance by blocking external influence. The former Soviet military alliance, CSTO, was founded in

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2002 in Russia against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is headed by the United States and Europe. Currently, six countries, including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia, are member states. On the other hand, Russia, which has experienced a rapid decline in its status and loss of influence in Northeast Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, is trying to restore its authority. In addition to maintaining its strategic partnership with China, it is also interested in the Far East and is improving relations with Japan, North Korea and South Korea. At the end of 2006, Putin recognized that the underdeveloped conditions and demographic decline in Far East Russia had reached a level that threatened Russian national security. Far East Russia is an important strategic outpost facing the Pacific and Russia’s eastern gateway, and is spurring Far East development around Vladivostok, one of the world’s most solid coastal fortifications [13]. Russia has historically been interested in the Far East. Russia, which first entered Siberia in the latter half of the 16th century, expanded its forces from the middle of the 17th century toward the Heilongjiang, was constantly in conflict with the Qing Dynasty (China), and signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, opening the way for both Koreas to freely trade. Immediately after the end of the Sino-Japanese War, along with Germany and France, Russia led the Triple Intervention and played a role in the recovery of the Liaodong Peninsula from Japan. After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia secured the North Manchurian Railway, and Japan secured the South Manchurian Railway, securing the Imperialist power in Manchuria. Russia built the Chinese Eastern Railway with the intention of conquering China, and Nicolay II believed that after the completion of the railroad, China would fall into the hands of Russia like a ripe fruit. Russia’s advance into the Far East has played an important role in bringing many events to Manchuria, leading to its international status in the modern era. In 2012, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit was held in Vladivostok to seek the development of the Russian state by attempting to strengthen the Far East development and exchanges with Northeast Asian countries. In this way, Russia has been restructuring its national interests multilaterally, while externally promoting its status in Northeast Asia and internally strengthening the development of East Siberia and the Far East. Through this, Russia has secured a bridge to expand to the region beyond Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region and secured new channels for influencing Northeast Asia. Russia wanted to develop the Far East and enter into the Northeast Asian economy. Russia was especially interested in the development of the northeastern part of North Korea because Russia was expecting regional cooperation in various fields such as fossil energy, electricity, railroad, and food. However, recently, China has actively entered the North Korean region, and Russia has shown great interest in promoting the Great Tumen Initiative in its effort to improve the North Korea-Russia relationship. Russia is waiting for multilateral cooperation among the Northeast Asian nations and does not give up its efforts on bilateral relations with South Korea and the South-North KoreaRussia cooperation to prevent China from losing its pre-emptive rights to North Korean regional development and resources [14]. What are the political, economic, and military backgrounds that Russia is turning to in the Asia-Pacific region and strongly promoting the New East Policy? Russia has

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traditionally had a civilized identity of ‘Eurasianism’, so it considers cooperation with China to be more advantageous than in reality. In addition, since two-thirds of Russian territory is on the Asian side due to the Soviet disintegration, profits in Asia have become very important to Russia. [15] Khrushchev emphasized active participation, saying that the Asia-Pacific region plays a major role in the world, and the lack of economic participation in the region does not match its status as a great power [16]. 1. Since 2011, the US Obama administration has turned its attention to Asia, and its pivot has moved to Asia (Pivot to Asia). In addition, as Asia-centered policies such as division and the rapid expansion of China were detected, Russia tried to expand its cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region by pursuing the New Eastward Policy to cope with changes in the situation. It is also linked to Russia’s Asia-Pacific strategy and global strategy [17]. 2. Due to the economic recession in Europe, Russia intends to expand and diversify the energy export market to the Asia-Pacific region by changing the demand for energy resources [15]. 3. Development of the relatively undeveloped Far East and Siberia promotes the balanced development of the country and expands exchanges with the Asia-Pacific region. [18] In particular, Russia intends to expand its presence by acting as a kind of balancer in the US-China rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region (including Northeast Asia). Therefore, it is necessary to actively secure the security system by strengthening the diplomatic ties, improving relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and strengthening economic diplomacy and expanding economic cooperation with the Asia-Pacific countries. The New Eastward policy is being implemented in energy, electricity, transportation, and development in the Russian Far East. Energy and electricity goes to the Asia-Pacific region, including Far East Russia, Korea, China, and Japan. In December 2012, the East Siberia-Pacific pipeline (ESPO) was completed to supply oil and gas networks to the Heilongjiang province in China, Vladivostok and Sakhalin. The Sakhalin Far East Gas Pipeline (SKV line) is a gas pipeline business linking Sakhalin, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok and was completed in 2011. [19] Economic reform and cooperation in the Far East can serve as a driving force in leading the Russian economy, and it is hoped that such a relationship will serve to balance the international community both militarily and politically.

3 East Asian Cooperation in the Far Looking at Northeast Asia, including Russia, China, Japan and the Korean peninsula, the Far East and Manchuria have important geopolitical and strategic implications. It is an area to which all the nations in Northeast Asia can expand as they continue to develop. Some examples include North Korea’s Rajin-Sonbong Economic Special Zone, China’s Tumen River Area Development Plan, and Russia’s Vladivostok Mega-City Construction. [20–24] These various projects have taken into consideration the status of Manchuria and the Pacific Ocean simultaneously in the Pacific era.

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Manchuria is the most developed place in China since the Second World War. This is related to the fact that Japan constructed the Manchukuo and conducted various modern experiments. However, since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the development of Manchuria has fallen behind that of big cities such as Beijing. After this reform, the development strategy focused on the Southeast coastal area, resulting in Manchuria being unable to escape the backward economic structure centered on stateowned enterprises. Therefore, new projects such as the ‘Northeast promotion strategy’ were needed to develop the economy of the poor Manchurian region. As a Land Bridge connecting the Eurasian continent and the Asia-Pacific region, Manchuria, since 2003, has emerged as a new growth base for the ‘Northeast Promotion Strategy,’ a key strategy for China’s balanced national development; it has become a major target area for new northern economic cooperation. The recently implemented strategy of ‘One Belt One Road’ has helped Manchuria become a window to access the north. [25] Since the development of the Tumen River area can be an important engine for creating a common interest by actively promoting economic trade in Northeast Asia, it is necessary to include the One Belt One Road in the strategy to cross the border between the East and West and open the sea and land by connecting them. In particular, the Hunchun area, located downstream of the Tumen River and near the East Sea and Pacific Ocean, was an important area in Northeast Asia from ancient times. Hunchun is not only a region in China that shares a border with China, Russia, and North Korea, thus acting as a gateway, but it is also a hub that connects to five countries—South Korea, North Korea, China, Russia, and Japan—through the waterways. [26] Therefore, since it was an important link of the Northeast Asian Silk Road from ancient times, Manchuria, which encompasses this region, must be a north gate of One Belt One Road. [27] China is interested in the development of Manchuria and the Tumen River area because they are shortcuts to the Pacific Ocean. Since 2003, China has pursued a Northeast Promotion strategy to revitalize the regional economy of the three northeastern provinces. In April 2004, China emphasized the importance of opening the country through the notification of the key points of promoting the old industrial base in the Northeast region, strengthening economic cooperation with neighboring countries, and promoting change in trade (Notice No. 39 on Printing and Distributing the Main Points of the Work of Old Industrial Bases in Northeast China in 2004). In June 2005, China expressed its opinion on expanding the opening of the Northeast Old Industrial Base to foreign countries and stated that opening the door to foreign countries is a major part and main means of promoting the Manchurian region (Implementation Opinions of the General Office of the State Council on Promoting the Further Expansion of the Old Industrial Bases in Northeast China) (Article 36). With regard to development policy in Manchuria China said, “We promote the integration of roads, ports, and districts in North Korea and the construction of large-scale Russian roads, ports and customs unification, as well as carry out external cooperation projects. The policy will be allocated to basic infrastructure construction projects such as transportation, airport, port, etc. which are linked with customs offices in the Manchuria, primarily in foreign aid.” In other words, the plan to promote trans-border cooperation with the border region countries, such as the project to unify the land, port and zone

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with North Korea and the project to integrate land, port and customs with Russia will be closely linked with China’s promotion strategy. Furthermore, since the ‘Northeast Promotion Plan,’ which is a comprehensive blueprint for the Manchuria promotion strategy, was established in 2007, state level projects such as the Liaoning Province’s Coastal Economy Belt Plan in 2009 and the Jilin Province’s Changjitu Advanced Development Zone Plan have been developed as a cross-border project with North Korea and Russia, which are in contact with Manchuria. The development of the Changchun, Jilin, and Tumenjiang regions is not only strategically linked to the Yanbian, Longjing and Tumenjiang economic zones, [28] but also includes the Korean peninsula, Japan, and Russia into the influence of Manchuria. The so-called Changjitu and Yanlongtu economic integration strategies are part of China’s policy to promote a new foreign opening policy by linking the development strategy of Northeast China’s industrial base and the Tumen River watershed cooperation development. China is interested in Changjitu because it is the closest region from China to the East Sea and is geographically centered in Northeast Asia. Therefore, on August 30, 2009, the State Council presented the “Compulsory Development Plan for the Tumen River Area in China” to energize China’s Manchurian development policy. Based on this, China intends to make it an important channel for economic development in Northeast Asia as a modern agricultural demonstration base, a new industrial base, a science and technology innovation base, a Northeast Asian international business base, and a modern logistics base in 2020 [29]. In August 2012, China made the plan ‘Northeast China’s Open Plan for the Northeast Asia Region (2012–2020)’ and developed a code of conduct to strengthen cooperation with Manchuria and Northeast Asian countries. In 2013, China announced the ‘Policy of Opening and Developing the Northeastern Frontier Area in Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia’; it set the goal of becoming an important economic development area by positioning Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia as an important bridgehead and core area for accessing Russia and Northeast Asia until 2020. China has been carrying out various economic development projects to advance Manchuria internally. However, it is also simultaneously proceeding with cross-border projects for the border regions of North Korea, Russia, and Mongolia in accordance with the multicultural and international characteristics of the Manchurian region. Of course, expanding the interactions between Manchuria and other countries and cooperating in the development of the cross-border project are a few of the main means of advancing the Northeast promotion strategy. Therefore, in order to strengthen the international economic and technological cooperation, China will take measures for industrial cooperation—such as constructing the frontier economic cooperation zone, the export center, and the border industrial zone—in the main frontier customs city and invest in the construction of foundation infrastructure and an international logistics transportation route with neighboring countries. Consequently, China is trying to raise its status as “Manchuria of China” by conducting various projects both inside and outside of Manchuria, which has a strategic position in East Asia. Through projects such as these, China attempts to promote Manchuria as a new growth base of the Chinese economy by innovating the system and mechanism, adjusting the relationship between the market function and the government role, and

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implementing the new industrialization strategy to become a major base for economic integration in Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, in line with North Korea’s ‘10-Year Strategic Plan for National Economic Development,’ China has launched a joint development plan for the ‘Raseon Economic and Trade Zone and Hwanggumpyong Island Economy Zone’ Development cooperation. Through this, China has improved the second-class roads from North Korea’s Wonjeong-ri coast to Rajin port, opened a trade line connecting Hunchun-RajinShanghai (Ningbo) port, and developed highly efficient agricultural demonstration areas [30]. On the other hand, Russia and North Korea, which are bordered by 16.9 km of the Tumen River, are cooperating with delivery network, power grid, transportation network, and energy. Russia recognizes that “the Korean peninsula is historically and geopolitically included in Russia’s national interests” [31] and visited North Korea in a joint declaration to secure influence in the Far East, strengthening military cooperation, opposing unilateral hegemony, respecting mutual sovereignty, voluntary reunification of the Korean peninsula, and promote mutual cooperation. The railway opening ceremony, in 2013, was held between Hassan in Russia’s Far East and the Rajin Port in North Korea, which is regarded as a milestone in the development of the relationship between North Korea and Russia. In 2014, the Rajin port No. 3 dock terminal modernization was completed. Russia’s potential for energy, power, agriculture and logistics not only controls China’s leadership in the border region of Northeast Asia, but also balances cooperation and competition between North Korea, China and Russia. In 2015, North Korea announced its comprehensive economic and trade zone development plan to actively develop nine industrial zones and ten tourist destinations. This reflects the intention to actively utilize North Korea in accordance with the development situation in Hunchun, China [32]. By the 21st century, Eurasia or the European-Pacific country Russia is pursuing a trans-border project involving the Manchurian region in order to develop the Far East and advance into the Asia-Pacific region. For the first time in 2007, the “Far East and Zabaikal socio economic federation development plan (2007–2013)” was established. [33–35] In May 2012, Putin announced ‘a plan for the realization of Russia’s foreign policy’ and embodied the New Eastward policy. In September 2012, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit was held at Vladivostok, where it declared its strong commitment to the New Eastward policy. On September 23, 2009, President Hu Jintao of China and President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia met during the G-20 summit in New York, and signed a ‘coercion plan for cooperation in the northeast region of China, the Russian Far East and East Siberia (2009–2018)’. This is designed to be compatible with China’s ‘Northeast Regional Promotion Plan’ and Russia’s ‘pre-2013 Transbaikalia Region Special Economic and Social Development Plan’ [36]. The two countries are implementing a total of 202 projects that they have agreed to cooperate on and develop together, wherein Russia has initiated 91 projects and China has initiated 111 projects. The two countries were interested in ➀ the construction and renovation of customs and frontier regions, ➁ transportation logistics cooperation, ➂ development of cooperation complexes, ➃ strengthening labor cooperation, ➄ tourism

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cooperation, ➅ implement project cooperation, ➆ humanities cooperation, and ➇ environmental protection cooperation. This is related to the Russian ‘Far East and Baikal Socio-Economic Development Plan’ and is to promote developmental cooperation in the border region between China and Russia. Russia continues to develop the Far East through plans, such as ‘Economic and Social Development Guidelines for the Far East and the Baikal Region from 1996 to 2005’, ‘Economic and Social Development Principles for the Far East and the Baikal Region from 1996 to 2005 and 2010,’ ‘Guidelines for Economic and Social Development in the Far East and the Baikal Region, and the Far East Development Plan,’ ‘Strategy for Economic Development in the Far East and the Baikal Region in 2025,’ and ‘The Economic Development Principles in the Far East and the Baikal Region’ [37]. In May 2014, Russia’s leader met with China’s Xi Jinping and signed a $400 billion Russian-Chinese gas cooperation agreement. This confirms that Russia aims to develop the Far East region socially and economically, quantitatively, qualitatively, and swiftly. Russia is trying to create meaningful effects by connecting not only national capital but also private capital. Russia is planning to cooperate with China, Mongolia, South Korea, North Korea and Japan in terms of economics and trade, among which energy policy is very important. [38] In relation to energy policy, Russia has mainly dealt with Europe, but, since 2008, it has strategically focused on expanding diplomatic relations in Northeast Asia. [39] By 2020, Russia plans to expand its trade in Northeast Asia by 30%. [40] The reason for this is that as interest in the world economy has shifted to the Asia-Pacific region and the development of the Far East has become linked to the destiny of Russia’s economic development, Russia has become interested in various laws and preferential policies and projects to develop the Far East. In fact, trade in the Far East and the Baikal region was $41.557 billion in 2013, an increase of 11% compared to 2012, and with exports at 14.5% and imports at 9.6%, there were more exports. The number of trading partners increased from 145 in 2012 to 162 in 2013. [41, 42] In 2013, exports to the Far East and Baikal region were mainly commodities. Of these, oil and petroleum products accounted for 42% of the exports, natural gas accounted for 19%, gemstones and precious metals accounted for 14%, fish and seafood accounted for 8%, and wood and wood products and equipment accounted for 4% [43]. Russia will establish the Far East Development Department and launch the ‘Program to Socially and Economically Develop the Far East Baikal Region by 2025,’ which aims to invest US $330 billion in domestic and overseas investments (Rajin-Hassan Railway Connection) and seeks organic economic cooperation and expanded diplomatic relations with Mongolia and CIS countries [44]. In November 2013, Putin met with Korean President Park Geunhye and discussed the Rajin-Hassan logistics partnership. The Tumen River area, including Hunchun, which is an important link between Manchuria and the Far East Russia, is a part of the ‘New Economic Plan for the Korean Peninsula’ that Moon Jaein is promoting. Moon Jaein has selected the implementation of a ‘new northern policy’ as a national task and, through economic cooperation with the Northeast Asia Eurasian countries and with North Korea, is promoting Northern economic cooperation. He is seeking economic cooperation with

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northern countries such as China, Russia, and Mongolia in order to secure a base of peace in Northeast Asia and to improve the inter-Korean relations, which are deadlocked, and to create a peaceful atmosphere in Northeast Asia [45]. Table 1. Northeast development plans in the Far East [21] Category

Level

The Far East

International Great Tumen Initiative (2005-) Manchuria · Far East and East Siberia cooperation plan (2009–2018) One Belt One Road policy (2015) China · Mongolia · Russia economic corridor construction plan (2016)

China, Manchuria

State

Russia, The Far East Area

State

Area development policy

Northeast promotion plan (2003-) Changjitu development plan (2009–2020) Hunchun international cooperation model zone (2012-) Heilongjiang province and inner mongolia frontier development and open plan (2013) Liaoning province costal cities economy belt development plan (2009)-> master plan for free trade port (2017) Harbin · Daqing · Qiqihar development plan (2006) Liangning Province 13.5 plan (2016–2020) Jilin Province 13.5 plan (2016–2020) Heilongjiang Province 13.5 plan (2016–2020) The Far East and Zabaikal socio economic federation development plan (2007–2013) The Far East and Zabaikal socio economic development plan 2025 (New Eastward Policy 2013) Advanced development zone (2015) Vladivostok free port (2015) Khabarovsk and primorsky free port (2016)

Since 2013, Russia and the Abe government in Japan have maintained economic cooperation, including energy cooperation, and strategic dialogue with each other. Because Japan has been cooperating at both the government and private levels in the Far East and Siberian development projects since the Soviet era, the New Eastward policy will act as a medium to promote cooperation between Russia and Japan. The two countries are cooperating on a practical level, although there are still some disputes, such as territorial disputes. [21] Table 1 summarizes the cooperation of Northeast Asian countries around the Far East, both internationally and locally. As we have seen, Russia, which is raising its interest in the Far East, is trying to create for itself opportunities to find its position in the new era. Russia is expanding its political and economic influences in the Far East and is making efforts to create a ‘strong Russia’ by regaining its past power worldwide. In order to expand their interests, Russia and other East Asian countries are taking an interest in the development of the

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Far East as transnational cooperation between East Asian countries is proceeding. These efforts are expected to expand to some extent in line with the current situation of the Asia-Pacific era.

4 Implications and Limitations of Transnational Cooperation Various transnational projects in the Far East have important implications for the joint development of East Asia. This kind of transnational cooperation is significant in that it overcomes historical conflicts and promotes a developmental relationship that is mutually beneficial. Nevertheless, there are a lot of mountains to overcome in order to promote transnational development in the Far East. These countries vary not only in their economic development but also in their political systems. Korea and Japan are mature market economies with advanced countries that have joined the OECD, but China, Mongolia and Russia are transition countries to market economies. Socialist countries like North Korea also coexist. This diversity has a lot of opportunities for mutual complementarity and cooperation, but, in the case of the Far East region, it is also an obstacle to the establishment of an institutional cooperation system [46]. There is still a mutual distrust because the opposition due to differences in the political system experienced during the Cold War era has not been completely cleared. South Korea and Japan also have to address and solve the fact that their relationship with North Korea is not smooth. There are still territorial problems left between Japan and Russia and between Japan and China. In addition, resolving the competition in the initiatives of Northeast Asian countries is also a task. Japan, which wants to show its economic superiority; China, which wants to show its presence as a great nation; and Russia, which is trying to regain its status in the Far East, can be obstacles. The geopolitical situation and geographical characteristics of the Far East greatly affect economic relations and activities, both nationally and internationally. During the 1990s and 2000s, economic downturn and population decline across the Far East, as well as North Korea’s nuclear tests and missile launches, had an effect. Additionally, KoreanChinese relations due to the THAAD installation by the United States in Korea and economic sanctions against North Korea and Russia by the UN can affect relationships in the Far East. In addition, the motions to maximize the individual interests of each country can expose the limitations on transnational cooperation. For example, in the case of Russia and China’s economic cooperation, Russia warns that Chinese companies and goods dominate their markets. While Russia wants to build an industrial base that can receive raw materials from China and rework them, China is generally concerned with securing labor-intensive commodity and raw material export markets. The reason why China does not pay much attention to mineral development projects in the Russian Far East is because infrastructure and electricity are insufficient. [19] However, it is noteworthy that China recently took a stake in a profitable gold mine development and energy companies. It is also necessary to balance the interests of both Russia and China as they compete to influence North Korea. Although China is taking a stable interest in the development of the Shinuiju area in North Korea, it is competing with Russia over the development

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of the Rajin Port. China’s Eastern policy and Russia’s Southern policy are clashing in North Korea’s Raseon region. This affects the future of North Korea’s Raseon region and the future of North-South-Russia border cooperation [47]. In the case of Korea, it seems that the Korean companies that have invested in the Russian Far East region for the past 20 years have not had success, but if the pilot project is successful in agriculture and fish processing, it will have a positive effect on the entry of late-comers. [48] Presently, the multinational cooperation between South Korea, North Korea, and Russia, and South Korea, North Korea, and China centered around the Rajin Port, has been suspended due to the North Korean economic sanctions, causing the Chinese Northeast region and the Russian Far East region to take a hit. However, since the recent summit talks between North and South Korea and the North and USA, South and North Korea-Russia economic cooperation have begun to be discussed in the fields of railway, gas and electric power supply [21]. Although it is hoped that Northeast Asian countries will expand their cooperation centered around the Far East, the future train link between North Korea and Russia, that is, the connection between TSR and TKR, including political change on the Korean Peninsula, will take a long time. Additionally, Northeast Asia is closely cooperating with Russia for its supply of natural gas, but, just as there was an interruption in Ukraine’s supply of natural gas due to the issues on the Crimean peninsula, there were also many concerns that the Far East could be a similar source of national conflict. [49] In order to expand the cooperative relationship in Northeast Asia, it is necessary to resolve such worries.

5 Conclusion As an area where the interests of the world’s great powers intersect, the Far East is a region within the Eurasian continental interior that actively responds to the trends of the New Continent. There is the likelihood of the Far East region growing into an AsiaPacific economic hub, or even a towing area, in the 21st century. There is a clear reason for Russia to focus on the Far East, including East and West Siberia. The region has abundant natural resources, which can be supplied to a large population, contribute to the economic revival of East Asia, and not only meet the needs industries but also of everyday life. Because Russia is bordered by East Asian countries along the coasts of the long Amur River, it is very convenient for Russia to cooperate with them [50]. These various conditions are the basic requirements make the Far East of interest. China, which wants to secure a shortcut to the Pacific, has developed Manchuria and used cross-exchange relations in the Far East, such as China-Russia, China-South Korea-North Korea, and China-Japan relations, to try to lead East Asia in the 21st century. The Far East and Manchuria are the places where Northeast Asian countries can maximize their own interests by interacting with each other. Networks are regarded as structural factors that promote cooperation because they reinforce interdependence, but in some cases conflicts and disputes can be exacerbated by the network. As it has become a place where mutual interests are sharply concentration, it has become indispensable to maintain transnational cooperation while doing business. The cooperation of the East Asian countries in the Far East is immensely meaningful not only

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for the economic development of East Asia but also for resolving long-term historical conflicts. Despite this, conflicts can be reproduced at any time if the ultimate interests pursued by each country are not aligned or if certain countries are overbearing. The differences in political system of each country, imbalances in economic development, and the divergence of the interests each country pursues make it difficult for the Far East to adjust and develop harmoniously. Therefore, mutual cooperation in the Far East, where everyone is profitable, requires mutual consideration to make good use of the network paradigm and to be a useful foundation for practicing global interests.

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China’s Infrastructural Expansion in Southeast Asia Ksenia Muratshina(B) and Aireen Grace Andal Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg, Russia [email protected], [email protected]

Abstract. This paper is aimed at the analysis of contemporary China’s policy of realisation of large-scale infrastructure projects in the region of Southeast Asia. In the recent years, the People’s Republic of China has intensified the promotion of such projects, insisting on the faster development of “One Belt, One Road” initiative. As a neighbouring region for China, Southeast Asia is subject to this policy, and many states, either driven by the desire of some profit, or not used to the format of this cooperation and its probable consequences, or unable to dismiss the initiatives of a powerful neighbour, have already agreed to allow the wider participation of the PRC in the construction of highways, railroads and other infrastructure in their territories. The construction is carried out on the basis of tied loans, with bids and offers going primarily to Chinese contractors, and with the use of Chinese workforce. As a result, typically after the completion of such projects, one side – the PRC – receives considerable margins and strengthens its impact in the region or in the economy of a partner state, while the other one – the recipient – acquires infrastructure, but for the price of financial dependence, additional expenses (any loan has to be paid back with the interest rate) and, in many cases, negative environmental impact and social tensions. This paper displays these common features of China-led infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia and, in addition, analyses the reaction of the regional political elites and societies to this situation. Moreover, it is discussed, how China’s infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia become an example of the interplay between soft and hard power, wherein soft power can serve as a leverage to hard power. Keywords: International relations · China · Southeast Asia · One Belt · One Road · Soft power

1 Introduction At the current state of international relations, when global connectivity has already become a basic factor of interaction, and the analysis of the international system has come to a conclusion that the control over the global supply chains provides a great deal of control over how the world is run [32], it is essential to study the development of infrastructure (railroads, highways and other facilities) in the regions of the world, and who controls it, especially in the regions of the Global South, where emerging economies, prospective markets and huge resources for economic growth are concentrated. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 292–302, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_26

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This paper employs a qualitative methodological analysis of the current state of external activity in the field of infrastructure, carried out by one of the leading powers of the world – the People’s Republic of China – in its neighbouring region of Southeast Asia, which is crucial for global trade and transport systems, due to its geographic position, high rates of economic growth and population density. Basically, this paper gathers secondary data from official news and reports about China’s infrastructural investment in SEA to discuss the realization of China’s strategy and the current and potential results of the cooperation, based on the analysis of available bank reports and diplomatic documents, and a variety of timely media sources. Data and analysis are presented in four main parts: First, this paper documents recent infrastructural projects of China in SEA; second, there is an analysis of China’s financial strategies for its investment in the previously mentioned infrastructure objects in SEA; third, this paper examines how SEA countries generally responded to these investments; and finally, to provide theoretical grounding, this paper uses John Nye’s [42] concept of soft power and hard power to analyze the political implications of China’s strategy.

2 The Variety of Projects Realized The range of major infrastructure projects in the region, either already carried out or proposed by China, is rather impressive. The largest, the most ambitious and the most controversial one is the Kra Canal project in Thailand, which represents the plan of construction of a channel, that would connect the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea, creating a new marine route between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, alternative to the Malacca Strait. The most attractive aspect of this project for China, besides providing a significant number of jobs and contracts for its companies, is the prospective escape from the monopoly of Singapore and Malaysia in controlling the shipments on one of the most busy trade routes in the world [15]. The project has been intensely discussed for the last four years, with China insisting on its realization, however, crucial environmental risks and the innumerable costs of the construction outweigh all other points [38]. So far, Thailand has not agreed to such proposal. At the same time, China has already successfully started realization of another ambitious project – the construction of Kunming – Vientiane – Bangkok railway, the continental part of the Silk Road routes in this region, involving the territories of Thailand and Laos. For China, the idea of this project was to create the trade route, alternative to the South China Sea. The railway is planned to be used for shipment of Chinese export goods and for passenger transportation as well. The segments of the railway are being constructed since 2015 [51]. Remarkably, China participates in the construction of all segments on the project, including the Thailand – Laos segment. The project is scheduled to be finished in 2023 [29]. Another major project is the East Coast Rail Link in Malaysia. In 2017, China started in this country the 7-year construction of a 668 km railway between Klang port in Malacca Strait and the central region of the country. However, in August 2018, after the election of a new government in Malaysia, the project was suspended. Malaysia accused China of not employing the local workforce, overpricing of the project, and, consequently, overrating of the loans, given to Kuala Lumpur [22]. Later, Malaysian

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officials announced the termination of the contract [23] and search for new contract holder, instead of China Communications Construction Co [21]. However, the Chinese side, according to the words of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, “does not want to stop this project, as it is of a very large scale. I think, it is profitable for their business. On the other hand, we do not want to borrow such a big loan, so we started negotiations. If they want to continue the project, the price must be acceptable for us” [30]. After several months of negotiations, Malaysia and China signed a new contract in April 2019, with the price of the project 5 billion USD, 10 times lower than the originally conditioned one [25]. The list of projects of smaller scale, realized in particular countries, is also considerable. In Indonesia, China signed in 2016 a 50-year contract for design, construction and future exploitation of Jakarta – Bandung railroad. It was the first project of this type – a complete set of tasks on the construction of a major infrastructure object abroad, with full control and governance in future [48]. In Laos, China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) [3] in April 2019 approved a loan for the improvement and maintenance of a major national road, accounting for 40 million USD [10]. Earlier, AIIB credited the slum upgrading project in Indonesia (216,5 million USD) [8], the work of Indonesian Infrastructure Development Fund (100 million USD) [9], modernization of dams in Indonesia (125 million USD) [6], construction of flood management system in Manila metro in the Philippines (207,6 million USD) [11], construction of Bhola power plant in Bangladesh (60 million USD) [4], upgrade and expansion of the power transmission system in the Chittagong region in Bangladesh [5], and the Mandalika urban and tourism infrastructure project in Indonesia [7]. In Thailand, consortiums with Chinese companies won several bids for the construction of segments of an expressway linking Rama III Road, Dao Khanong and the Western Bangkok outer ring road [22]. Furthermore, Beijing has already announced its interest in participation in the construction of roads between major airports of Thailand [28] and in the construction of a new prospective Belt and Road corridor in Myanmar [57]. In the Philippines, China has a long-term experience of contract agreements and investments [39]. One of the latest is the reservation of Chinese funds for President Duterte’s proposed 75 infrastructure projects as part of his $180 billion “Build, Build, Build” economic strategy [13]. On the whole, it is designed to integrate the Philippines into China’s Belt and Road Initiative [17]. Smaller countries of the region have also been involved in a number of projects, or are planned to be included in them. Brunei is planned by the Chinese side to be integrated to the maximum extent into the Belt and Road initiative. This was fixed in China-Brunei joint statement, signed during the visit of Xi Jinping to this Southeast Asian country in November 2018. In particular, the two states agreed to “promote the Brunei-Guangxi Economic Corridor” [59]. In addition, Xi also put forward the initiative of “synergy” between Brunei’s national strategy of development “Wawasan 2035” and the Belt and Road Initiative, with special emphasis on the perspectives of cooperation in trade, energy and infrastructure [56]. A similar proposal of synergy of development strategies was made by Beijing to Cambodia [24]. This step will obviously open a path for a broader participation of Chinese companies in different spheres of economy of this

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Southeast Asian country, including infrastructure. Earlier China had already constructed in Cambodia seven hydropower plants [19]. In East Timor, China “donated” to the Timorese state three pieces of infrastructure: foreign ministry building, presidential office building and the ministry of defence building [12]. This sounds like a paradox, because hardly ever independent state can trust to external partners the construction of such strategic facilities. Anyway, the case can be regarded as China’s claim for further involvement in the affairs of the small island state, taking into account the flow of loans for it, which has also already started [12]. The only Southeast Asian country, which had not been involved in a large number of major infrastructure projects, carried out by China, for a long time, was Vietnam. This can be explained with the continuing tensions between the two countries in their territorial conflict in South China sea [40]. However, recently Vietnam agreed to negotiations with Chinese companies on the project of construction of a new high-speed railroad between Hanoi and Vietnam-China border, mainly in order to promote bilateral trade [34]. Another completely different and distinctive example is Singapore, which, thanks to possessing a powerful economy, participates in infrastructure projects with China not as a guided side, but as a co-leader. This country takes the initiative, establishing joint ventures with China (e.g., China-Singapore airport management company) [58] and announcing its willingness to invest in China’s Belt and Road projects abroad [52]. Talking about China’s motivation for the above-mentioned projects, the first aspect that we can witness is the geographic factor. In terms of geography, Beijing in many cases provides itself with secured and alternative ways of transportation, which will be later controllable for China. The second is the resource factor, as the PRC is interested in the large amounts of natural resources of Southeast Asian countries [2]. The new corridors and routes are designed to allow Beijing to increase its resource import and reduce the time of transportation. However, the most important factor is, probably, the third – the financial one, that will be discussed further in the following section of this paper.

3 The Policy of Loans While evaluating the above-mentioned data on China’s infrastructure projects with different countries of Southeast Asia, we can note two main aspects. On the one hand, the need for infrastructure development in the countries of the Global South, with their emerging economies and high density of population, is quite obvious. On the other hand, such projects, taking into account their scale and longitude, should generally be realized only if they are affordable and not too enduring, in terms of resources and financing, for these emerging economies. Typically, the financing can either be provided by the state itself, or by national businesses, or from abroad, or there can be a combination of these sources. And, generally, to a great deal, it can make sense, whether a project is financed with local of foreign direct investment (including field investment), or with loans. Any loan, even low-rated one, usually has definite conditions and must be returned sooner or later, together with the interest rate. Basically, in principle, foreign loans are a sensitive issue for any economy, as they result in, to various extents, rising leverage, financial dependence and additional risks of not paying the loan back in future. Consequently, as

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Rheinhart (2015) from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government puts it, the risks, cumulated by the countries of Global South due to being over-loaned, can lead to major economic crises [46]. At current stage, China’s infrastructure projects abroad, and, in this case, in Southeast Asia, are all united with one key feature – credit financing, instead of direct investment. In addition, the parameters of loans can be characterized as not transparent enough, as the interest rate and the conditions of project realization, e.g., competition for bids and offers for construction, are not public. Typically, in the realization of such projects in different regions of the world, including Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, there have been noticed the massive use of Chinese workforce, the definite preference for Chinese companies in equipment supplies and construction services, along with violation of environmental regulations and labour rights [33, 45, 49, 50]. In fact, the credit financing, in this way, represents usually such type of loans, as the tied loans.

4 The Local Response In Southeast Asia, there have already occurred negative effects of China’s unilateral initiatives, loans and infrastructure projects, and concern regarding them. The case of Malaysia-China cooperation was mentioned earlier in this paper. Moreover, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has officially warned Malaysia’s close partner – the Philippines – from getting in a debt trap and migration crisis in case of infrastructure cooperation with China [25]. Afterwards, Philippine Chair of Senate Committee on Social Justice, Welfare and Rural Development Lila de Lima called for President Duterte’s careful weighing of Philippine “dealings with China that could unfavourably affect our country’s [Philippines] future, both in the aspects of financial and territorial security. We [Filipinos] need to learn from the unfortunate fate of others who borrowed before us” [14]. In addition, China has been reported to allegedly pressurizing the investigators of the case over misapplication of assets in Malaysian State Investment Fund. According to the media, the aim of this pressure was to clear former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and the top managers of the Fund of suspicion in money laundering, in an exchange for the government’s support for Chinese companies in winning bids for construction of East Coast Rail Link and other infrastructure in perspective [18]. Researchers express concerns that all infrastructure projects, designed by China, are a “debt-trap” and mostly benefit Beijing. “China provides high-rate loans and asks for employment of Chinese laborers, as well as use of Chinese technology to carry out the projects,” says Vietnamese legal expert Hoang Viet, citing the example of a country in the neighbouring South Asia region, Sri Lanka. Its Hambatota Port was leased to China in December 2017 for 99 years after the country fell into heavy debt to Beijing and failed to pay the already existing loans back. “Not only do these projects impact a nation’s economic and strategic security, they also affect society based on how Chinese companies run their operations and what Beijing’s goals are”, mentions Vietnamese expert. And a multi-authored report for the Vietnamese government, expressing Vietnamese experts’ and non-governmental organisations’ concerns with Chinese participation in major infrastructure projects in the country, claims that China’s “trick is to bid with low prices but then delay in building, before cooperating with corrupt officials to increase

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the costs”; “in fact, most of the Chinese projects are of bad quality, don’t adhere to safety standards, and create environmental pollution”; “the bidding process has to be transparent so people are made aware, but they typically announce a winner before the bid is even opened. This is totally unacceptable”; and “to find the best solution for the project, stop using Chinese contractors and stop borrowing money from China” [44]. Indonesia has already witnessed negative consequences of Chinese contractors’ actions, so the country’s government has officially promised to announce firm environmental standards while discussing any infrastructure project with Chinese side in future, as well as the demand for the use of the local work force instead of Chinese one, and for the participation of Indonesian enterprises in construction projects [29]. Myanmar opposed to China’s project of a hydropower plant construction in its northern region. The project was dismissed because of environmental risks, primarily the seismic hazard, and the protests of local citizens, who otherwise would have been forced to move away, while the power would be supplied mostly to China instead of local needs [36]. The rise of external debt can be dramatic. For example, a 2016 report of the International Monetary Fund shows that Cambodia’s external debt reached 1.6 billion USD, and 80% of it is owned by China [53]. This can create risks of losing the control over infrastructure and the terrific increase of dependence on a powerful neighbour. One of responses of Southeast Asian economies to China’s infrastructural expansion is now the increase in the intra-state financing of major infrastructure projects. For example, Indonesia has already announced a series of such initiatives with its own state financing. During the upcoming decade, the country will increase the length of Transjakarta Rapid Bus System from 1100 to 2100 km, the length of light-rail metro from 5 to 130 km, and the length of the subway from 16 to 112 km), with the total amount of 41 billion USD of state investments [20]. Another Southeast Asian country, Thailand, announced the decision of the government to build before 2027 three railroad carriage manufacturing plants in the north-east regions, with the planned production output of 900 carriages per year. This decision was made in order to solve the problem of Thailand’s growing dependence on the import of railroad carriages from China and other states. Further, Thai government is planning to increase the state investment in new infrastructure construction and to establish a research institute specializing in railroad-related technologies, together with a new state agency, responsible for the regulation of railways exploitation [27].

5 Soft Power to Hard Power? Taking into account the above-mentioned facts, we can argue that China’s policy of infrastructure-related loans and construction projects in Southeast Asia is an example of the interplay between soft and hard power. The former refers to the ability to influence others to get the results one wants by appeal rather than coercion, and the latter refers to the opposite [2]. China’s efforts to invest in this region are a part of Xi Jinping’s aim to “increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s message to the world” [1]. China’s loans to Southeast Asian countries are a strategic use of soft power to enter smoothly the economies of these states as it fits in

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the “ASEAN way of diplomacy”, that hinges on non-interference [41]. This is offered as alternative to the Western aid models, which oblige the compliance performance indicators to deserve funding. At first, China created an image of an economic rescue that offered alternative economic buffer for developing economies in Southeast Asia, especially after the global economic recession that began in the United States [54]. And indeed, the PRC has partly succeeded in using soft power to lessen the “China threat” perception [60], so that “Southeast Asian countries now view China more as an opportunity than as a threat” [31], and at the same time to entice the regional political elites to pursue stronger bilateral agreements with Beijing. Yet the implications of China’s initiative do not end in having a friendly atmosphere with Southeast Asian nations. There is a good reason when Yagci claimed that the “Chinese state actively pursues a soft power-oriented economic diplomacy for Belt and Road Initiative and relies on hard power resources for its effectiveness” [60]. China’s financing starts to serve as a leverage to legitimize its interests and ambitions. This can create conditions of dependency of ASEAN on China. China’s loan system can be observed as a form of “debt traps” and “debt colonialism” [37]. This soft power can be later transformed into hard power, serving as a “leverage to eventually expand its military footprint” [16]. For instance, China’s investment in the Philippines comes with military aid as well, which leads to “China’s growing security role in the Philippines” [43]. Moreover, China has already held a trilateral military activity with Malaysia and Thailand named ‘Peace and Friendship 2018’ in Port Dickson and Port Klang [62]. Massive infrastructure construction and credit financing became a basis for the increase of China’s influence in Pakistan in the neighbouring region of South Asia, and for Beijing’s demands to Pakistani government about the establishment of a military base there [46]. Soft power can easily be an instrument, so that the debt-fuelled economic development strategy serves as a stepping stone to rise the basis of the creditor’s influence and gradually let him build hard power in the region. However, as it has been already mentioned, ASEAN states are concerned with China’s approach, that is, they “may have been ‘charmed’ by China’s more sophisticated diplomacy towards the region, but they certainly have not been hypnotized” [35]. This is displayed by the developments we discussed in Sect. 4 of this paper, and also observed by Morada (2009) research on earlier cases of China – Southeast Asia cooperation in saying that “[i]ronically, the more China pushes in deepening its relations with ASEAN, the more ASEAN may feel that it needs a strong relationship with other extra-regional powers to keep the balance” [39].

6 Conclusion Taking into account the scale of China’s infrastructural activity in Southeast Asia, we can characterize this activity as expansion, carried out with a clear strategy and synergy between Chinese state and business, aimed at maximizing profit and boosting the country’s influence in the region. This expansion is driven by a number of factors. By means of realizing its policy, China can establish new and alternative transport corridors, secure its supply chains and export routes, provide its companies with bids and offers abroad, and receive considerable margins when tied loans, used to finance the construction, are paid back with the interest rates.

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Beijing’s actions are initiative, assertive and powerful, having well-established communication with the political elites of the majority of the countries of the region, and leading negotiations to agreements with conditions, favourable for China. The process of decision-making here, to a great deal, is not transparent and can result in negative consequences, if a particular credited country, the recipient of both the loan and the infrastructure project, had not established its own conditions and standards in terms of environmental regulations and labour rights earlier. Moreover, turning to external loans and services in infrastructure construction can almost inevitably form the constant financial and technological dependence on the creditor, in this case on China. So, another negative consequence for credited Southeast Asian states is financial dependence and the increase in state debt. The mechanisms of projects promotion and realization include bilateral contacts and the activity of China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. At the same time, not all Southeast Asian countries are equally subjected to this policy. To large extent, it depends on the current state of political ties on bilateral level, territorial tensions and the level of sustainable self-sufficiency of states, by which we mean the ability to realize major infrastructure projects without turning to credit financing, use of workforce and technologies from abroad. Finally, the use of soft power and converting it later to hard power can be beneficial for China especially in the cooperation with Southeast Asian countries which have expressed resentment towards China’s growing presence. Capitalizing on “being Asian”, as opposed to the West-centric collaboration, makes the image of China’s infrastructural diplomacy successful. It could be argued that China’s loans in this region may be viewed as a counter-balance of soft power, especially against the United States, if one assumes that Chinese leaders have strong interests in building China’s influence to be a global leader. Furthermore, these soft power developments either already are or can be used as a basis for expanding hard power. It could also be argued that this is a risk that China faces, because it is dealing with countries which are closely associated with each other. Once China spoils a connection among these countries, it could affect its relations to other Southeast Asian nations. Moreover, the growing level of awareness and concern among Southeast Asian countries with projects, designed by Beijing, gives the impetus to the elaboration of their own strategies of development and the increase in intrastate financing of large-scale infrastructure projects and industrialization, in order to foster their economies, pursue national interests and overcome the trend towards the strengthening of China’s unilateral ambitions. Acknowledgements. This research was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (grant № 18-18-00236).

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Development of BRICS Cooperation Mechanism in New Geopolitical Conditions Jingcheng Li(B) Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, St. Petersburg, Russia [email protected]

Abstract. The BRICS countries are represented by major political and economic powers on different continents of the world. Initially, the BRICS concept of cooperation was intended for financial and investment activities, but after more than a decade, it has become one of the popular international platforms for multilateral cooperation. The BRICS Summit is an effective and important cooperation mechanism for developing and emerging countries. Since the first Summit, this annual event has played an important role in today’s world as a stable platform for multilateral dialogue among developing countries and international organisation. The article reviews the main outcomes of each BRICS summit and its dynamics in the development of BRICS. In addition, other platforms, such as the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which were organized to implement the principles of the BRICS Summits, are also analysed. The purpose of this paper is to discuss existing multilateral models of cooperation within the BRICS framework, to highlight challenges and potential for platform development. It explores new ideas, ways and principles for improving multilateral meetings in the new geopolitical conditions. Keywords: BRICS · BRICS Summit · New Development Bank · BRICS+ · BRICS cooperation

1 Introduction Since the beginning of the 21st century, the international political and economic situation has been constantly changing. The good economic performance of emerging and developing countries has attracted the attention of the international community. The economic growth rates of these countries tend to be higher than the world average, and the market scale and prospects are enormous. In this context, Jim O’Neill, an economist at Goldman Sachs, first proposed the term BRIC in 2001 [1], arguing that Brazil, Russia, India and China have huge economic potential and are considered the most attractive countries for future investments. Since then, the BRIC countries have represented the development and cooperation potential of emerging economies, laying the foundation for a future BRICS cooperation system. For the first time the BRIC Ministers of Foreign Affairs met at the UN General Assembly on September 20, 2006 and officially declared their interest in this concept on © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 303–312, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_27

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the initiative of the delegation of the Russian Federation. The BRIC countries have moved from an economic concept to concrete actions. After the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, the BRIC countries realized the importance of strengthening global political and economic cooperation. G20 held two summits in Washington (2008) and London (2009), highlighting the growing role of developing countries in the world economy. In 2009 the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India and China held their first summit in Ekaterinburg. The meeting resulted in a joint statement calling on countries and organizations to ensure the international financial order. Since then, the BRIC(S) Summit has been held once a year, which marks the official establishment of the BRIC(S) cooperation mechanism. In 2010, the BRIC countries agreed that South Africa would officially become the fifth member of BRICS. This expansion has made the BRICS a more geographically representative mechanism for international cooperation. To date, 10 BRICS Summits have been held by the end of 2018. The emerging economies represented by the BRICS countries have received wide attention and support from the international community around the world. The BRICS countries, located in Asia, Europe, Africa and the Americas, account for about one fifth of the world’s territory and account for 40% of the total world population. All five countries are members of the G20, and their international status is growing (Table 1). Table 1. Overview of BRICS countries (2017) [2]. Country

Land area (sq. km)

Mid-year population

Population density (per sq. km)

GDP

GDP per capita

Brazil

8.5 M

207.7 M

24.4

$2055.3B

$9897

Russia

17.1 M

146.8 M

8.6

$1577.8B

$10745

India

3.2 M

1283.6 M

390.6

$2274.0B

$1751

China

9.6 M

1386.4 M

144.4

$12250.0B

$8836

South Africa

1.2 M

56.5 M

46.2

$3494.0B

$6182

The aim of the studies is to determine that the BRICS countries are transforming from an investment concept of the capital market into an emerging strategic force in international politics and are evolving from economic dialogue forums to a comprehensive mechanism of political and economic cooperation; to identify the value of BRICS cooperation platforms consisting of sovereign states that cooperate based on mutual consultation and voluntary conduct. Long-term transformations of the international systems, high level of coherence of macro political and strategic interests of BRICS countries determine the values and prospects of BRICS cooperation. The balance of policy and power between the BRICS countries and other counterparties characterizes each BRICS achievement.

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2 Methods of Research The research methodology is based on comparative studies of the political, economic, social situation and prospects for cooperation of the BRICS countries by analyzing the existing working formats: BRICS Summit, New Development Bank, Contingent Reserve Arrangement. The main purpose of the BRICS cooperation mechanism is to promote reforms of the international economic system, encourage emerging and developing countries to participate in them, and promote these countries to obtain more voting rights. Currently, the most important international economic organizations in the world are promoted by and under the leadership of developed countries. A comprehensive system of global economic governance has already been formulated. In addition, some traditional economic powers tend to have more participation and voting rights in international organizations than developing countries. At the same time, the international influence of emerging and developing countries is growing. Rapid economic development and improved living conditions also lead to increased claims: developing countries are gradually turning to international economic governance to give them more votes to build a more representative and more equitable international society. The following objectives were set to achieve the research goal: First, to consider the BRICS cooperation mechanism as an international comprehensive partnership. Over the past decade, the BRICS countries have made significant efforts to improve the mechanism of cooperation and have established such types of interaction as dialogues between relevant authorities on foreign affairs, trade, economy, finance, agriculture, science, education, culture, health, etc. Second, to emphasize that BRICS cooperation is not only about developing political relations and economic exchanges, but also extensive exchanges and cooperation in humanitarian fields such as education, science and technology, culture, health, sports, media, tourism, youth exchanges and women’s exchanges [3]. Third, to note the continuous development of the BRICS cooperation mechanism has not only contributed to the economic and trade development of the five countries, but also helped transform the international economic system into a more transparent, comprehensive and mutually beneficial direction. With a view to minimizing the unfair distribution structure to enhance the participation and status of the BRICS countries in international economic affairs.

3 Results of Research 3.1 BRICS Summits The annual BRICS Summit, as the main platform of the BRICS cooperation mechanism, plays an important role in strengthening the influence of these countries on cooperation and providing an important opportunity to exchange and coordinate the participation of emerging economies in discussions of major international issues. On the one hand, it supports a pragmatic cooperation mechanism of the BRICS countries, on the other hand, it strengthens the discussion capacity of the BRICS cooperation mechanism in the world arena and represents the BRICS cooperation mechanism to protect the interests of

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developing countries and emerging economies [4]. Looking at the situation at previous summits of leaders, it will help to understand the process of forming mechanisms of cooperation and the trajectory of its development. In June 2009, the first summit of the BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China, was held in Ekaterinburg (Russia), which adopted a Joint Statement calling for a more diversified monetary system and attracting representatives of new economies to the international arena. It is aimed at ensuring the right to equal opportunities to participate in the work of financial organizations; promoting the reform of international financial institutions to adapt them to the new conditions of the world economy. The meeting was the final stage in the formation of the BRIC cooperation mechanism. The second BRIC Summit was held in Brazil in April 2010. Four countries expressed their willingness to develop cooperation and coordination among the BRIC countries. During the Summit, consensus was reached on the importance of the annual meeting of the BRIC leaders. In December of the same year, South Africa was accepted as a new member of BRIC. After that, this mechanism was renamed into BRICS. In April 2011, the third BRICS Summit was held in Sanya, China under the theme “Broad Vision, Shared Prosperity”. The Sanya Declaration was adopted, and the Framework Agreement on Financial Cooperation within the BRICS Inter-bank Cooperation Mechanism was signed. The agreement for the first time promotes the use of national currencies of BRICS countries in trade. The Summit developed a plan for future BRICS cooperation in several critical areas such as finance, industry and trade, science, technology and energy. In March 2012, the fourth BRICS Summit was held in New Delhi, India, under the slogan “BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity”, which adopted the Delhi Declaration and Action Plan affirming the increased voice and representation of developing countries in the international financial system. In March 2013, the fifth BRICS Summit was held in Durban, South Africa. The theme of the meeting was “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialization”. The meeting resulted in the adoption of the eThekwini Declaration. It was decided to establish a New Development Bank, Contingent Reserve Arrangement. It was also announced that BRICS Business Council and Think Tank Council will be established. The partnership between BRICS and African countries continued to develop. The mechanism of dialogues between the leaders of African countries and BRICS increases the productivity of cooperation. In July 2014, “Inclusive Growth: Sustainable Solutions” was the main theme of the sixth annual meeting of BRICS leaders held in Fortaleza, Brazil. During the meeting, a number of documents were signed: The Fortaleza Declaration, which defines further integration of economic and cultural exchanges, the Agreement on the New Development Bank and the Treaty for the Establishment of the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (with an initial amount of $100 billion). In addition, the Summit created a new platform for dialogue between the leaders of BRICS countries and South America. In July 2015, the seventh meeting of the BRICS leaders was held in Ufa, Russian Federation, on the theme “BRICS Partnership - a Powerful Factor of Global Development”. The Ufa Declaration and The Strategy for the BRICS Economic Partnership confirmed the readiness to further strengthen the overall role of BRICS in international relations

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and cooperation in the field of electronic commerce. In the same year, in China, the New Development Bank was officially opened, providing BRICS and other developing countries with an integrated international platform for financial cooperation, marking the status of emerging economies in the world financial order. In October 2016, the eighth BRICS Leaders’ Meeting on “Building Responsible, Inclusive and Collective Solution” was held in Goa, India, during which the Goa Declaration was published, and the Goa Action Plan approved. The Summit highlighted the role of the BRICS strategic partnership, based on common interests and key priorities, in the face of global security challenges. In September 2017, the ninth meeting of BRICS leaders was held in Xiamen (China). The theme of the summit was “BRICS: Stronger Partnership for a Brighter Future”. The five countries adopted the Xiamen Declaration by consensus and for the first time endorsed the “BRICS+” model of cooperation, which has become an important basis for the BRICS countries to strengthen international cooperation. On July 26, 2018, another BRICS Summit was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, hosted by President Cyril Ramaphosa. The theme of the summit was “BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution”. The Summit followed the “BRICS+” model adopted at the Xiamen Summit and invited a number of African countries, as well as leaders of developing countries from other regions, such as Argentina and Turkey, to participate in discussion on AfricaBRICS cooperation and the promotion of a new model of South-South cooperation. The main results of the Summit [5, 6]: 1. There was support for preserving multilateralism while countering unilateralism and trade protectionism. The settlement of disputes and disagreements confirming the status of conservation of the World Trade Organization was emphasized. 2. An invitation to other developing countries to participate through the BRICS mechanism was proposed, and the idea of expanding the content and impact of the BRICS platforms and strengthening cooperation between Africa, the BRICS countries and other developing countries was discussed. 3. It was proposed to create a new industrial-revolutionary partnership, bringing to the fore the idea of cooperation in the field of digitalization, industrialization, innovation, integration, investment, etc. The aim of the partnership was to develop Internet technologies and implement plans to combat and reduce poverty. 3.2 New Development Bank In 2013, during the fifth BRICS Summit, the BRICS countries decided to establish the BRICS Development Bank to strengthen financial ties between the BRICS countries. At the sixth BRICS Summit in 2014, this bank was officially named the New Development Bank (NDB) with a start-up capital of $50 billion and an increase of $100 billion in the future, which were evenly distributed among the countries. Headquartered in Shanghai, China, the president has a five-year term of office and is rotated by countries. The functions of the Bank are similar to those of the Asian Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which provide loans for infrastructure development.

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On July 7, 2015, the Board of Governors held its first meeting in Ufa, Russia, prior to the BRICS Summit, during which the President, four Vice-Presidents and the Board of Directors were appointed. Mr. K.V. Kamath is President of the NDB and India’s representative to the NDB’s Senior Management Department. This was followed by the official opening of the NDB in Shanghai on July 21. The NDB is playing an active role in changing existing financial systems. It is led by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The NDB has managed to reach a consensus: when a country applies for a loan from the Bank, the Bank analyses the country’s financial situation, but does not interfere in its economic and financial affairs. Based on these characteristics, the NDB may complement existing international financial systems in a beneficial way. For the first time, developing countries and emerging economies, such as the BRICS countries, have established an international multilateral financial institution to ensure stable economic development, which has had a significant impact on current international financial institutions. This has revealed the determination and commitment of the BRICS countries to contribute to the reform of the international financial order. The New Development Bank is a mechanism that works not only for BRICS countries, but also for other developing countries. In addition, the NDB is an open new international financial mechanism [7]. Developing countries can apply to join it or provide investment projects. As the NDB develops continuously, it will inevitably compete with the current international financial system. As a result, it will promote multi-polar development of the world economy. 3.3 Contingent Reserve Arrangement Following the global financial crisis of 2008, the economies of developing countries were severely affected by the sharp fluctuations in the global financial market. Many emerging economies, including the BRICS countries, have been affected by currency depreciation, declining exports and even inflation. In 2014, the 6th BRICS Summit established a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with initial capital of $100 billion. The CRA aims to prevent a recurrence of the financial crisis and to provide short-term liquidity for BRICS financing in order to address potential major financial risks and strengthen global financial security. In 2015, the BRICS countries signed an Inter-Central Bank Agreement, which defines the technical parameters of operations within the CRA [8]. The total size of the fund is $100 billion. China contributed $41 billion, Brazil, Russia and India each contributed $18 billion, and South Africa contributed $5 billion. CRA marks the further strengthening of cooperation between the BRICS countries in the economic and financial spheres and provides significant support to financial security and market confidence of the BRICS countries.

4 Discussion 4.1 BRICS Development Challenges Even though historical and cultural specifics of the BRICS countries are different, and the model of socio-economic development is quite different, the BRICS countries still hold

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as similar views as possible on many important international issues, considering their own goals in economic development. However, given their geopolitical and economic conditions, competition between countries will be based on close requirements, which is inevitable. Therefore, within the framework of the cooperation mechanism between the BRICS countries, they could strengthen the coordination of domestic and foreign policies, coordinate the common interests of the BRICS countries through annual summits, communication channels at all levels, especially to show the ideas of common development in the international arena. In response to the changing international situation, many countries have formulated economic policies consistent with their own development models. In 2013, China proposed the construction of The Belt and Road Initiative, namely the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, as the main direction of China’s foreign policy and international economic cooperation. The Belt and Road Initiative is broad, covering Europe, Asia and Africa and connected to other continents through waterways. In 2014, India proposed to Project Mausam to establish a cooperative mechanism with India’s leadership in the Indian Ocean region, including East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian Peninsula and the India-China Peninsula in Southeast Asia [9]. In 2015, Russia has developed the Eurasian Economic Union, in which Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan participate. Moldova is an observer country. The organization, formerly the Eurasian Economic Community, emerged from the Customs Union of some members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) [10: 139–140]. Brazil also has long-term regional integration in the South American continent and is actively involved in economic integration projects such as MERCOSUR to promote commodity exports [11]. Similarly, South Africa is also committed to promoting regional economic integration. However, in recent years, the economic situations of Brazil and South Africa have been severely affected by internal and external factors, including changes in political power, a lack of new impetus for economic growth and stagnation in industrial reforms. The economic structures of the BRICS countries are not the same and development priorities do not always coincide. For example, China is a traditional manufacturing country, since its Reform and Opening, it has accumulated a large amount of capital and labour but lacks energy and mineral resources. The Russian economy is mainly led by the energy sector, such as oil and natural gas. The country has a strong defense industry and natural resources. Import substitution has been encouraged in recent years, and domestic production is gradually recovering. However, due to international sanctions, the pace of development is still slow. India’s information technology industry, represented by computers and software, accounts for more than half of the total economic volume. The country basically has poorly built hardware, infrastructure needs to be upgraded and popularized, and development between industries is uneven. Brazil is the largest country in South America, rich in natural resources and abundant in minerals and agricultural resources. However, the country’s political instability is long-term, and social stratification is severe, leading to problems such as economic downturn. South Africa is the largest economy on the African continent. It is a major provider of financial services and telecommunications in Africa. South Africa has abundant resources for international cooperation. However, social distribution is uneven,

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the imbalances between rich and poor are very serious, and challenges such as high unemployment affect South Africa’s sustainable development. The cooperation mechanism of the BRICS countries is still being improved. Apart from regular meetings of heads of state, BRICS has neither its own secretariat nor permanent coordinating and consultative bodies. There are still many uncertainties regarding whether the BRICS countries will become a unified international actor in the future. International recognition of the BRICS has not yet reached a high level. In the short term, it is difficult to change the international financial system and Western-led global governance. Emerging economies thus find it difficult to establish their own fully fledged system for competition (Table 2). Table 2. 2008-2017 BRICS GDP Growth Rate (%) [2]. Country

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Brazil

5.1

−0.1

7.5

3.9

1.9

3.0

0.1

−3.8

−3.6

1.0

Russia

5.2

−7.8

4.5

India

3.9

8.5

10.3

4.3

3.7

1.8

0.7

−2.5

−0.2

5.5

6.4

7.4

8.2

7.1

China

9.7

9.4

10.6

9.5

7.9

7.8

7.3

6.9

6.7

6.9

South Africa

3.2

−1.5

3.0

3.3

2.2

2.5

1.8

1.3

0.6

1.3

…

1.5 …

However, as the world economy grows, the external environment for economic development improves. In addition, the BRICS countries have accelerated the process of domestic reforms, faced a slowdown in global economic development and achieved some results: Brazil had benefited from the Olympic Games and the economy had begun to show signs of recovery, including better conditions for exports and imports and lower inflation. Since 2016, the Russian economy has continued to recover, as reflected in improved conditions of employment and energy exports. Growth in India remains strong, non-agricultural trends are evident, trade deficits are narrowing, and inflation rates are falling. China’s economic structure has been optimized and improved, including stable growth rates, continuous optimization of the industrial structure and continuous improvement in living standards [12]. The South African economy is also showing a positive trend. Overall, the BRICS economies continue to have good prospects for development. 4.2 Proposals to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism Firstly, the development of national economic strategies for cooperation in key areas within BRICS should be intensified. BRICS countries need to manage competition among themselves, avoid conflict and confrontation, maximize mutual benefits and promote market development [13]. In key areas of cooperation among BRICS countries, an effective communication mechanism should be maintained to facilitate trade and investment, processing industry, energy, agriculture, technology and innovation,

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finance, connectivity, information and communication technologies as envisaged in The Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership. Secondly, it is important to further promote the open development of the BRICS cooperation platform. Even though BRICS countries have only five member states, in fact, BRICS cooperation partners already cover all continents of the world. This is because the BRICS concept represents emerging economies and developing countries [14]. Nevertheless, it is important to cooperate with developed countries, especially after the financial crisis of 2008, when the world economic situation has changed profoundly. On the other hand, the BRICS countries are constantly establishing dialogue with international and regional organizations, such as meetings with the leaders of Africa, South America, Europe and Asia, as well as the United Nations and the World Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, ASEAN, etc. Thirdly, research on the BRICS countries should be strengthened and risks of cooperation should be reduced. Countries should strengthen each other’s research and understanding in various areas of cooperation, including economics, trade, politics, industry, culture, society and the environment. All collaborative activities at the international level should be consistent with local laws to minimize unpredictable risks. The principle of coordinating the interests of all parties within the BRICS countries, especially in multilateral cooperation around the world, is an issue that deserves long-term attention [15].

5 Conclusion In conclusion it should be noted that cooperation between BRICS countries is a new phenomenon in modern international society and is still at the primary level of development. During the previous summits, the BRICS countries have reached a significant consensus and contributed to the management of the international financial environment. However, the realities of each BRICS country and its development path are quite different. The improvement of the BRICS cooperation mechanism will be a long process and requires a cautious approach between countries. At the same time, the BRICS countries will continue to advocate for the development of multilateralism, elimination of the negative consequences of unilateralism and trade protectionism, call for reform of the existing system of international financial governance, and pay more attention to relations with developing countries. In the economic sphere, BRICS countries share common interests and complementarities and seek to create a more equitable international order. At the same time, the BRICS countries have good experience of cooperation among themselves. For more than ten years, in the economic aspect, BRICS countries have enjoyed fruitful cooperation in such areas as finance, trade, investment, energy, agriculture, telecommunications, technology and others. From a political point of view, the BRICS countries are committed to building a more democratic and more just multipolar world, adhere to the peaceful settlement of international disputes and promote coordination and cooperation in multilateral diplomacy. Outstanding achievements and good results of cooperation of BRICS countries have laid a solid foundation for deepening cooperation, strengthened trust and recognition of further cooperation between them.

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In organizing the BRICS cooperation mechanism, all parties can benefit. Therefore, while the BRICS countries defend their own goals, they may also adhere to an open and inclusive concept of cooperation, respect and consider the needs of other countries and organizations, contribute to the continuous development of global governance in new geopolitical conditions.

References 1. O’Neill J.: Building Better Global Economic BRICs. Global Economic Paper. 66. Goldman Sachs, New York (2001) 2. National Bureau of Statistics of China: BRICS Joint Statistical Publication. China Statistics Press, Beijing (2018). (in Chinese) 3. Zeleneva, I.V., Matveevskaya, A.S., Ermolina, M.A.: Dialogue of civilizations - new model of world politics. In: European Proceedings of Social and Behavioural Sciences. L, pp. 829–836 (2017) 4. Chen, X.: Changes and features of BRICS Summits cooperation and development. Int. Econ. Cooper. 8, 40–43 (2018). (in Chinese) 5. Lyu, P.: Analyzing BRICS cooperation from the johannesburg summit: the perspective of Russia. J. Latin Am. Stud. 40(6), 46–65 (2018). (in Chinese) 6. Ignatov, A.A.: BRICS summit in johannesburg: more instruments and fewer decisions. Vestnik RUDN. Int. Relat. 19(1), 89–99 (2019). (in Russian) 7. Shelepov, A., Andronova, I.: Engagement between the new development bank and other development banks: a formal basis for future cooperation. Int. Organ. Res. J. 13(1), 99–113 (2018). (in Russian) 8. Biziwick, M., Cattaneo, N., Fryer, D.: The rationale for and potential role of the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement. South Afr. J. Int. Affairs 22(3), 1–18 (2015) 9. Pillalamarri, A.: Project Mausam. The Diplomat. September 18 (2014) 10. Vasilyeva, N., Lagutina, M.: The Russian Project of Eurasian Integration. Geopolitical Prospects. 226 p. Lexington Books (2016) 11. Bonilla Bolaño, A.G.: External Vulnerabilities and Economic Integration - Is the Union of South American Nations a Promising Project? GATE-Groupe d’ Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon-St Étienne. Working Paper 1238 (2014) 12. Li, J., Pogodin, S.: “Made in China 2025”: China experience in Industry 4.0. IOP Conf. Ser.: Mater. Sci. Eng. 497, 012079 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1088/1757-899x/497/1/012079 13. Khurana, G.S.: China, India and “Maritime Silk Road”: seeking a confluence maritime affairs. J. Natl. Maritime Found. India 11(1), 19–29 (2015) 14. Becard, D.S.R., Barros-Platiau A.F., Lessa A.C.: Brazil in the BRICS after ten years The International Political Economy of the BRICS, pp. 135–149. Routledge, London, New York (2019) 15. Carmody, P.: South Africa in the Global Political Economy: The BRICS Connection. In: The Geography of South Africa, pp. 223–227. Springer, Cham. (2019)

International Legal Problems of Fighting Corruption in the Context of Geopolitical Integration Vladimir Demidov, Dmitry Mokhorov, Anna Mokhorova(B) , and Zohidzhon Askarov Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Abstract. Corruption creates a significant array of legal problems due to the fact that it is inherent in the development of modern society. A significant negative impact has the fact that, until now, leading experts in the field of law have not formulated the generally accepted concept of corruption. Since humankind at the junction of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is characterized by the problems of globalization of all aspects of activity, corruption manifestations have an increasingly negative impact on various aspects of human life, which inevitably entails the need for more effective regulation of those aspects of a socio-economic nature that are subject to the influence of corruption. Given that corruption has become global in nature, modern society needs to develop effective regulatory measures that meet this challenge. Within the framework of the activities of leading international organizations, the problem of creating a system of regulatory acts that can eradicate corruption is very acute. In this regard, the article discusses various regulatory options designed to effectively influence the spread of corruption on an international scale. In this section we study the methodological foundations of legal approaches to countering the phenomenon of corruption. At the same time, the most significant features of a set of techniques and methods designed to limit corruption in inter-state relations are highlighted. Concepts of a legal nature, implemented in the international arena, proposed by authoritative scientific organizations dealing with the problems of corruption within various national legal systems are explored. Keywords: Corruption · System of regulatory acts · A system of measures to combat corruption

1 Introduction For the modern world, the processes of geopolitical integration of various countries and peoples into a single integrated systemic education are of great importance. This phenomenon can be understood as an objectively expressed complex interaction of all facets of the social existence of states and nations, due to the expanding and all-penetrating

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 313–326, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_28

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influence of similar developmental laws on individual subjects of international relations. The integrational influence of international phenomena on various aspects of everyday reality is very large and manifests itself in the most unexpected aspects. The interconnection of a large number of states in the field of politics, economics, culture, and ecology objectively leads to the fact that problems that were previously characteristic of individual countries and state formations arise and become more acute [1–4]. In connection with the integration phenomena of modern international reality, geopolitical processes, corruption extends beyond the borders of individual countries and acquires a new quality as a complex international legal phenomenon. Corruption not only threatens international and national security, but also generates negative consequences for the state in the form of social inequality of citizens, causes public mistrust of government and its institutions, primarily because of its high level in state bodies of various countries [5, 6]. It follows the growing interconnection in the sphere of the economic and political life of the peoples of the countries of the globe [7]. The political geography of corruption requires adequate legal approaches that must be developed by a community of states in order to effectively counter this problem, which acquires an interstate character and poses a significant danger to the normal functioning of government institutions in many countries. Therefore, in the modern world, the creation of a developed legal framework capable of regulating various aspects of such a multifaceted phenomenon as corruption is becoming increasingly relevant [8]. However, the problem of legal regulation of countering corruption is complicated by the fact that different researchers do not have unity in approaches to understanding this complex phenomenon. A similar situation develops in the creation of a legal assessment of corruption in view of the ambiguity of the criteria formulated in various regulatory acts. Because of it, this article attempts to formulate the concept of “corruption” on the basis of the provisions of existing international legal acts and theoretical studies of leading scientists in this field; to analyze international documents regulating the fight against corruption in order to create a system of legal measures to combat corruption. In the framework of this work, the goal is to determine the range of problems that arise in the absence of a clear legal regulation of countering corruption processes both at the state level and at the interstate level; determine the possibility and need in the international geopolitical space of the development of effective legal instruments that impede unambiguously pronounced corruption manifestations of a national nature; proposal of a system of measures to combat corruption.

2 Methodology Assessing corruption as a very complex phenomenon, it is possible to apply various methodological approaches that have developed within the framework of the development of various scientific disciplines, which makes it possible to form a clear list of criteria that determine the most significant features of corruption. Thus, objective prerequisites are created for the development of legal acts that take into account the historical, economic, political, cultural, and national aspects of the development of corruption, both within a single state and in an increasingly globalizing world.

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In the study of the problems in this article, the general scientific methods of analysis, synthesis, deduction and induction, comparisons were used to compare the state of legal regulation of countering corruption at the international level and to identify problem points. The following methods were used: historical, systemic to define the concept of “international corruption” and identify its main properties. For the present period of development of social sciences, interdisciplinarity is characteristic, which allows the use of a wide range of elements of private-scientific methods inherent in various disciplines. For this period, the development of social sciences interdisciplinary characteristic that allows the use of a wide range of elements of private-scientific methods inherent in the various disciplines. This article uses comparative legal, formal legal, intersectoral, and logical-theoretical methods in order to identify the most important problems of regulating anti-corruption activities at the international level.

3 Results Historically, in ancient Greece, researchers assessed corruption as a socially unacceptable phenomenon. Their ideas were perceived by the leaders of the Enlightenment, in particular S. Montesquieu, T. Gobbs. Later on, within the framework of this direction, corruption was considered “as behavior deviating from the norms prevailing in the political sphere and conditioned by the motivation to receive personal gain at public expense” [9]. The development of a system of ideas about corruption allowed us to identify some other important features that characterize this phenomenon from the standpoint of the neoclassical approach. Its representatives in the framework of the above direction proposed to define corruption as a deviation of political elites that has a negative impact on the development of the whole society [10]. It should be said that the development of researchers on corruption has gradually moved from the plane of moral evaluation to the plane of legal approaches to understanding corruption. Given the complexity and ambiguity of the problems of corruption in the political, economic, social life of the state, scientific theories have been developed, reflecting views on corruption processes within the framework of the functional approach. Corruption is an indispensable attribute of state power that has an impact on the development of society, in the long run its impact on the life of society is negative. An institutional approach is important for studying corruption. Its representatives believe that “corruption is a natural phenomenon that manifests itself in the transitional periods of society’s development, with a change in its functioning and lack of consensus in it, as well as a kind of intermediary uniting the emerging privileged and rejected strata of a changing society” [11, p. 23]. The multidimensionality of corruption objectively entails a variety of approaches to its definition. It is possible to single out such a direction to the assessment of corruption processes as an economic one, within which corruption is considered as a tool for rationalizing economic activity, a natural desire to extract the maximum possible profit (this applies to both government and individuals). For example, S. Rose-Ackerman believes that “the economy is an effective tool for analyzing corruption” [12, p. 9].

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As a special direction in scientific views on the subject of corruption, a group of researchers is singled out who associate corruption with ethical issues. They indicate that this phenomenon is characteristic of states where there is an objectively expressed absence of any ethical rules in the sphere of activity of commercial structures that are coupled with the interests of state bodies. It also draws attention to the fact that ethical assessments by the population of a particular country of corruption-related processes do not have a pronounced negative attitude of members of society towards corruption as a negative phenomenon. This can be manifested in the fact that, in particular, criminal structures that have a significant economic impact on the processes of public administration enjoy great confidence from ordinary citizens. This situation is characteristic of countries that are not in the group of developed countries and are not fully legal democratic states. This phenomenon can be massively observed in such states as Mexico, Brazil, Turkey [13–15]. You can pay attention to the next aspect of corruption processes - their manifestation in the framework of the activities of international organizations that unite a large number of states in solving problems of regional or global importance. The danger of corruption at the above level is related to the fact that international corruption conglomerates are being created, which have a significant impact on all aspects of the organization of interstate cooperation, which negatively affects the development of relations between countries in the field of economics, politics, environmental protection, culture and art. In particular, it is worth noting authors such as A.D. Bogaturov and M.M. Lebedeva [16, 17], who consider the phenomenon of corruption in various aspects of international relations. International corruption includes as subjects a wide variety of organizations, both state and non-state. Very often, corrupt practices are objectively present in the activities of transnational corporations, as their enterprises are scattered in dozens of countries, especially where there is little government influence on economic processes, which allows these monopolistic formations to avoid taxation provided for by national legislation by bribing numerous government officials. This phenomenon is very characteristic in the countries of the African continent, Latin America and Southeast Asia. The processes of globalization, covering the economic, political, social, cultural aspects of the vital activity of dozens of states around the globe, objectively extend the advantages of multifaceted connections between various representatives of the world community. At the same time, they give rise to such consequences as the ever-widening differences in the level of socio-economic development of the advanced powers and those countries that are used as raw materials appendages and sources of cheap labor. It is no secret that the leading world concerns seek to locate their enterprises in those regions of the world where they can receive additional multibillion-dollar profits due to a significant difference in the wages of the local population compared to the salaries of hired workers in developed countries of the world with the release of the same products. In an effort to achieve additional financial income to the accounts of large corporations, these economic agents place environmentally hazardous and harmful industries in third world countries, where their representatives, providing illegal payments to unscrupulous persons from state authorities, receive permits for the construction of factories and plants. Thereby supporting the processes of corruption of an international character.

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The expansion of the political geography of corruption processes leads to the fact that countries lagging behind in their development from the advanced states of the world are becoming increasingly dependent on decisions made in the offices of major international corporations, which in the pursuit of profit completely ignore economic, social, political and cultural interests of the populations of developing countries and thus have a deforming effect on the creation of national legal systems that reflect the aspirations of the emerging civil society in these subjects of international relations. The manifestation of corruption at the international level adversely affects the system of legal norms that would express the interests of society in third world countries [18]. Within the framework of this approach, the phenomenon of corruption can be investigated on the basis of the diverse positions of specific branches of science, thereby isolating the most important aspects of the corruption processes inherent in modern society in the 21st century [19, 20]. Researchers of international problems in the fight against corruption adhere to a wide range of views on the definition of this multi-valued phenomenon. In particular, according to A. Heidenheimer, “the concept of “corruption” is the subject of a scientific dispute” [21, p. 13]. In this connection, the positions of representatives of various scientific trends on the problems of corruption may differ significantly. This circumstance is expressed in the fact that, if we analyze the stated wording of the definition of corruption, we can note their significant difference from each other. This is due to the fact that scientists representing different schools and directions attach significant importance to those or faces that are characteristic features of corruption. In particular, M. Johnston defines corruption as “the abuse of official authority and power resources for the purpose of personal gain” [22, p. 12]. L. Geveling contributed to the study of the sociological aspects of corruption. According to his ideas, “corruption is a system of social relations that is destructive in relation to social norms and dominant morality in a given territory, which are characterized by the use of official powers for material and (or) non-material benefits” [23, p. 10]. They do not clarify the definition of corruption and international documents aimed at combating it. Thus, the UN Convention against Corruption, adopted in 2003 by the UN General Assembly, does not give a clear definition of corruption. Variants of corrupt practices are cited, such as “bribing national officials, bribing foreign officials and officials of public international organizations, mercenary influence, unlawful enrichment, etc.” [24]. Also, a unified approach to the definition of the concept of corruption in the InterAmerican Convention on Combating it is not formulated, but it also lists the types of this negative phenomenon that are subject to criminalization [25]. A similar situation arises in the articles of the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption [26]. In contrast to this document, the Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability for Corruption [27] proposes defining corruption as a request, offer, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any other improper advantage or promise of such, which distorts the normal fulfillment of any obligation or conduct demanded from the recipient of a bribe, improper advantage or promise per se, but with the proviso: “for the purposes of this Convention”.

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In the Convention for the Suppression of Bribery of Foreign Officials during International Business Operations [28] it is provided that if individuals or legal entities take targeted actions to bribe persons holding a responsible position in the management apparatus of foreign states to obtain advantages in the economic sphere. They are different types of liability under international law for the suppression of corruption in International Business Transactions. It should be noted that in the specified normative act there is no legal definition of corruption, which is a significant drawback that affects the effectiveness of its practical application. The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime is essential for the fight against corruption [29], which provides for separate articles that disclose the criminal law characteristics of acts related to corruption and at the same time offer counter measures to the serious offenses. However, this Convention does not contain an exhaustive definite concept of corruption, limiting itself to listing intentional acts, while leaving this list open, establishing that other forms of corruption can be recognized by law (Articles 8, 9). The UN Declaration on the Fight against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Organizations [30] is of no small importance for countering corruption processes in the international arena. This document reflects the most common approaches to combating corruption in the framework of the activities of international commercial organizations. This declaration is a framework in nature, however, it distinguishes between the concepts of bribery and corruption, which is important for practical activities to combat these negative phenomena. The Resolution of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe “On the Twenty Principles of the Fight against Corruption” [31] defines the most important directions for counteracting corruption on the European continent, which is significant for the EU member states. In addition to the listed regulatory legal acts, there are other documents, including those of a regional nature, for example, the Model Law “Fundamentals of the Law on Anti-Corruption Policy [32], which are important for the fight against international corruption. But a significant drawback of these acts is the fuzzy definition of the term “corruption”. The ambiguity of approaches to understanding the phenomenon of corruption leads to a variety of model development of legal acts in various countries of the world, as well as in leading international organizations, which so far does not create an objectively expressed basis for developing unified legal requirements reflecting the multidimensionality of corruption in the international arena. Based on the analysis of various theoretical studies and definitions presented in international legal acts, it can be determined that corruption is a socially dangerous criminal act in the sphere of economic, political, social activity of state authorities and officials, as well as private organizations and their employees, manifested in the use by them of the rights and powers granted in order to obtain unjustified privileges. From the point of view of this definition, corruption can be viewed in a broad sense, which will allow a clearer response to any corruption manifestations in interstate relations occurring within the framework of geopolitical processes.

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Given the above, the following significant problems in the fight against corruption processes can be distinguished. Government bodies, commercial structures, public organizations representing different segments of the population are taking a wide range of measures to counter this negative phenomenon. Anti-corruption cannot lead to any one-time state or public campaign, as it penetrates into different segments of the political, economic, social life of society. This problem is to some extent exacerbated in various states in connection with the solution of priority issues arising in specific historical conditions. The complexity and ambiguity of corruption manifestations aggravates questions of the development of clear criteria for uniform approaches to the legal assessment of corruption, which greatly complicates the development of a sufficiently effective regulatory framework in this area. If we compare the legal acts regulating the activities to combat the corruption of different legal systems in the modern world, the breadth of the legal aspects of the formulation of the most characteristic features inherent in corruption is immediately apparent. This circumstance emphasizes the complexity of the problem of combating this. It is necessary to take into account that within the framework of the legal regulation of social relations in the field of unlawful acts. For example, corruption in accordance with the provisions of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000 can exist only in the field of relations of a public nature. At the same time, in the 1996 UN Declaration on the Fight against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Operations, “corruption” is considered through the concept of “bribery”, which is an unjustified narrowing of the terminological meaning of this phenomenon. The Civil Law Convention on Corruption of 1999 enshrines the definition of corruption exclusively for the purposes of the Convention, and it is presented as an action related exclusively to bribery of officials. Corruption, as a multidimensional phenomenon, often penetrates into areas of human activity that, at first glance, cannot be objectively compared. That is, the complexity of the legal regulation of corruption-related processes lies in the fact that in regulatory legal acts within clearly formalized concepts, it is necessary to take into account a very wide list of features and faces characteristic of corruption. In this connection, the legislators of the states belonging to different legal families should summarize the most effective approaches to creating anti-corruption methods that would have the greatest possible effect on corruption in the sphere of economic, political, social and cultural nature. It seems necessary to have a broad discussion by experts from various states involved in the fight against corruption, to develop model regulatory legal acts that would serve as the basis for creating quite clear national legislative provisions defining the most important characteristics of corruption manifestations peculiar to them in the most diverse socio-political systems. At first glance, it is very difficult. However, given the trend of universal globalization, covering as political, social, economic aspects of the life of public and state structures, the development of these model regulatory legal acts becomes relevant and possible. In such international legal documents, all positive achievements in the field of anti-corruption activities of both international organizations and the most developed national legal systems should be consolidated.

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For example, in the 1996 Inter-American Convention against Corruption [25], member countries of the Organization of American States provided for a number of comprehensive measures to join forces in order to combat corruption. Particular attention was paid to a detailed list of actions related to corruption, which greatly facilitated the activities of law enforcement agencies in North and Latin America in this area. In the CIS Model Law “On Combating Corruption”, the main direction in the fight against corruption is the cooperation of states in the post-Soviet space with the aim of uniting the efforts of their legislative and law enforcement bodies. In 2003, the African Union adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption [33], which was signed by most countries of this continent. The specified legal act of a regional nature defines measures to bring to criminal and administrative responsibility the employees of the state apparatus, as well as officials engaged in private entrepreneurship. Unfortunately, in these international legal documents there is no unity of approaches to counteract corruption and, therefore, this circumstance significantly complicates the effectiveness of the anti-corruption fight. It should be noted that up to the present time period there has not been a system of clear and objective criteria for describe corruption, which would have a certain empirical character. This circumstance significantly negatively affects the development of effective measures to curb corruption. Unfortunately, in these international legal documents there is no unity of approaches to counteract corruption and, therefore, this circumstance significantly complicates the effectiveness of the anti-corruption fight. It is possible that the development of legal criteria in relation to corruption will be the impetus for creating sufficiently necessary legal acts that would allow separating corruption processes from the processes characteristic of the economic activities of legal entities with different forms of ownership under commercial risk, because often new technologies, the creation of new types of products is associated with a high probability that production corporations may suffer significant losses. Such a situation objectively indicates that it is impossible to approach corruption issues at the intergovernmental level from a formal point of view. It is likely that the corruption manifestations, being introduced into the fabric of economic activity, will lead to the emergence of negative synergistic effects that significantly affect the normal functioning of the totality of all subjects in the field of commerce. The impact of corruption on everyday economic life distorts the main provisions on which the effectiveness of natural, technological, scientific and technical resources used by human society is based in order to further improve the socio-economic indicators directly affecting the welfare of specific groups, strata and classes of the population in certain public entities. Corruption processes distort the pragmatic aspirations of a significant number of actors in the field of production, aimed at achieving acceptable results when using techniques and methods developed both within individual large corporate formations and new forms of production and technological activities created by small private companies, which largely determine the pace of progressive changes in production and are one of the significant factors consistent post persistent movement of both individual states and the whole human civilization. It is often found that in everyday economic reality corruption

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approaches become a significant barrier to the production of new necessary products in various areas of production, which negatively affects the main trends in technological renewal of various aspects of public life, which are largely associated with expanding diversity. goods, works and services offered to the public. For example, according to estimates of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, the damage from abuses in the allocation of budgetary resources amounted to 280 billion rubles. In the public procurement system, the volume of bribes is about 1 trillion rubles. According to various estimates, the damage from corruption in Russia is almost 300 billion rubles a year [34]. In this regard, it can be stated that corruption, adversely affecting economic processes, creates a socio-economic environment in which incentives for further progressive development in the production of goods and meeting the demand of members of society for a diverse list of jobs and services lose their importance. This phenomenon leads to stagnation of the production activity of the population both in a single country and on a global scale within the framework of human civilization. Corruption processes, being present in the environment of interaction of state management structures with various economic entities, contribute to a sharp, unequivocally pronounced division in the field of economic activity of all participants in the production cycle to those who have the opportunity to achieve a positive attitude from the controlling and supervisory bodies to the results of their work, and those economic structures which do not belong to the specified group, by virtue of which they experience significant restrictive actions on the part of the state apparatus on the most important aspects of industrial character. This situation has a very negative impact on the formation of a healthy economic environment, which reduces the effectiveness of competitive approaches inherent in the development of manufacturing industries within a market economy. For example, in a number of European countries, according to the World Bank, there are serious problems in the production of industrial goods associated with corruption in the use of credit resources and energy sources, which was noted by about a third of the heads of private companies and corporations [35]. Quite often, this aspect is manifested in the field of international trade relations and economic ties between dozens of states in various segments of the world market. As an example, events and processes that are currently objectively manifested around the construction of the largest gas pipeline from Russia to the countries of the European continent. “Nord Stream - 2” project, which is objectively necessary for all the major economies of Western Europe, is faced with fierce resistance from the United States, who are trying in every way to impose on European consumer’s large volumes of liquefied gas produced by the North American energy corporations [36]. The fact that this raw material produced in the United States is much more expensive than the natural gas supplied from the Russian Federation to European markets does not bother US government agencies at all. They use all sorts of instruments of a political, economic, ideological nature in order to prevent the construction and entry of a gas transmission line from Russia to Europe. It should be said that according to estimates of all international expert organizations working in the field of energy supply, the cost of liquefied gas supplied from the North American continent to Europe exceeds the cost of natural raw materials transported through pipelines from the Russian Federation by about thirty percent. However, representatives of the US administration are focused primarily on achieving

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this task, because many of them at the highest state level are directly connected with the US gas producing corporations and are trying in every way to promote their products to a very large European market. As a result, the interests of economic entities of European countries are completely ignored, as well as, first of all, the lack of interest of the population of European countries to pay for much more expensive gas [37]. In addition, US government agencies, by imposing more expensive liquefied gas on European production associations, achieve a solution to another important task - increasing the cost of products created at European factories and plants in order to eliminate the competitive advantages of European manufacturers in the widest range of products supplied to North American markets. That is, the government management structures of the leading countries of the world directly intervene in the processes of international economic nature, trying to create unreasonable advantages for large American production structures and, thereby, oust European competitors from a very large segment of the international market. It is no secret that before the appointment of these positions to the heads of many US ministries and departments, they worked as high-ranking employees of leading American concerns, including energy, and the practice of the political life of this state is based on the fact that after the end of the term of office of leaders and leading experts US administration, they, in the subsequent, occupy high-paid positions in certain corporations. This fact vividly illustrates the manifestation of corruption at the state level, which at the same time significantly affects the objectivity of the processes of economic interaction between different countries within the framework of the trends of universal globalization observed in the modern era. It is essential to have a well-established criteria by which to assess the level of corruption in the State. Denoting this problem, it should be noted that various representatives of the scientific and legal community have repeatedly attempted to create a number of evaluation mechanisms of corruption processes in order to be able to calculate and provide for the grounds that would allow to develop uniform approaches to the fight against corruption, especially at the international level. In 1995, foreign researchers proposed a corruption perception index. The index was based on the evaluation of independent experts in international finance and human rights experts on a ten-point scale (from 2012 on a 100-point scale) [11, p. 250]. In 1999, an index of bribe givers was compiled, which represents the rating of the most economically developed countries depending on the prevalence of corrupt practices in the activities of companies in these countries [38]. Since 2003, TI has begun a study called the Global Corruption Barometer [39]. In addition, the World Bank experts D. Kaufman, A. Kray and M. Mastruzzi paid considerable attention to the problems of methods of studying corruption. They proposed a comprehensive rating of the public administration score, based on several interrelated indicators. These included, among other things, such an indicator as consideration of public opinion in the sphere of state bodies’ activities, as well as control over the work of government bodies, political stability and ensuring citizens’ safety, results of government bodies’ activities, legal characteristics of legislative acts, rule of law, and anticorruption. This approach objectively showed the relationship between the effectiveness of government bodies and the level of the fight against corruption [40, 41]. Having analyzed the international legal acts in the field of the fight against corruption and the practice of applying legal measures to regulate phenomena of a corrupt nature,

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a number of effective provisions can be proposed that will create the prerequisites for improving the effectiveness of international anti-corruption policies. Including: – create a model international legal document at the United Nations level, establishing the legal status of a specialized anti-corruption body based on the experience of Singapore and a number of European states; – develop common international standards for the ethical conduct of public servants; – provide for anti-corruption expertise at the international level with the aim of detailing the legal provisions of national legislation to use various approaches in this area; – to develop uniform requirements for the legal status of civil servants and officials that impede their involvement in corruption activities; – establish legal opportunities to strengthen public control in the field of preventing corruption at all levels of state and municipal government; – increase the level of legal culture of the population and pay special attention to issues of legal education.

4 Conclusions Considering the international legal aspects of the fight against corruption, we can come to the conclusion that at present there is not a sufficiently effective system to combat corruption phenomena in the field of international relations; therefore, the tasks of developing fairly universal legal acts that are active in political and economic social sphere of the modern world. To solve this problem, an objective necessity is the creation of a universally recognized conceptual apparatus that defines the concept of “corruption” and its main features, enshrined in a special international document adopted by the UN. It should be said that in 2003 the United Nations adopted the Convention against Corruption within the international community. It can serve as a good basis for the subsequent development of legal acts covering all aspects of the prevention of corruption phenomena of an interstate nature. However, a significant drawback of this legal act is that, firstly, it lacks unambiguous approaches to the scientifically based designation of the most significant features of corruption as an element inherent in the modern stage of development of society. The ambiguity of legal formulations describing the processes of corrupt behavior hinders the establishment of legal relationships between government bodies of various countries in creating the foundations for a system of international prevention of corruption. The difference in the approaches of legal regulation in the field of corruption inherent in national legal systems does not allow creating an effective anti-corruption system, which requires the unification of national legislation both at the regional level and in general. The problems of the imperfection of international legal mechanisms for combating corruption are manifested in the fact that in the Conventions and other international legal acts, until now there is no genuinely systematic approach to the analysis of the essential features of corruption. The geopolitical space of human civilization is so diverse that this factor unambiguously hinders the development of a unified concept in the field of combating corruption, which negatively affects the creation of a single international body that coordinates all states in the fight against corruption.

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In the framework of combating corruption in the international arena, a set of effective legal levers should be developed based on the experience of individual countries successfully combating corruption. In the context of combating corruption as a complex socio-economic phenomenon, the use of agreements between individual states should be more widely used in order to overcome the most characteristic types of corruption in these countries. The international community needs to create expert groups, with the inclusion of leading experts in the fight against corruption, which will allow us to develop truly uniform approaches to solving legal problems in regulating corruption processes. At the same time, the formation of expert groups should occur under the most authoritative international organizations, which will significantly increase the organization of legal interaction in the field of overcoming corruption. The basis for the successful struggle of international associations against corruption is the gradual increase in the level of legal culture of the general population by introducing into the mass consciousness the unacceptability of unlawful behavior in the sphere of everyday life. Paying particular attention to the formation of a negative attitude to all manifestations of corruption. Combining legal pressure at the international level in countering corruption of modern civilization leads to the improvement of integration processes and the formation of a healthy civil society not only in the developed countries of the world, but also in those countries that have recently become subjects of international legal relations. Globalization at the same time carries positive and negative aspects, manifested in various aspects of the socio-economic development of many states and nations in the modern period of human development. The processes of international corruption that have a negative impact on all aspects of public life are woven into it, which objectively entails the development of effective legal measures aimed at creating protective mechanisms to combat corruption. However, given the significant difference in the level of development of the economic, social, political, cultural spheres of life of individual states, as well as the variety of legal systems inherent in different regions of the globe, it is very difficult to offer unambiguously defined ways to solve the problems of combating corruption. In addition, the legal mentality of various nations and nationalities does not equally assess the danger of certain phenomena and considers them to be corrupt, which largely affects the effectiveness of unified approaches to counteract this negative phenomenon. These factors do not allow to create a single effective legal framework that really allows you to successfully resist the development of corruption.

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Revisiting International Law’s Discussion on the Moral Status of the Fetus Aireen Grace Andal(B) Ural Federal University, Lenina 51, Yekaterinburg, Russia [email protected]

Abstract. This study examines what hinders international law in establishing a binding guideline for abortion. This work seeks to discuss how debates in international affairs take the subject of the moral status of fetuses. As such, international organizations use the argument of “differences” in ethical standards among countries and world regions as a reason not to have binding abortion rights. This work argues, however, that this reason has invalid premises and is not sufficient to dismiss a binding international abortion law. While the moral status of the fetus is a matter to be further contested, this work argues that a provisional conclusion in the international law is urgent in situations where the unresolved abortion issues render women (pregnant or not) vulnerability, depriving them of a policy protection. Finally, this work concludes that establishing an international abortion law does not necessarily preclude political agents from keeping it under discussion, which keeps law accountable to ethics. Keywords: Unborn · Political philosophy · Deontology · Consequentialism · International law · Moral status

1 The Unborn Child in the International Community While there is a general ambiguity in how international law deals with the legal status of fetuses, some international rights treaties expressly mention a right to terminate a pregnancy1 . Some international and regional treaties are much more explicit in their position about fetal rights such as i.e. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)2 , Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)3 , The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 1 See generally Rhonda Copelon et al., 2005 Human Rights Begin at Birth: International Law and

the Claim of Fetal Rights, 13 Reproductive Health Matters 13: 120, 122. 2 Article 6(1); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79

Add. 76, Para. 24; Add. 92. Para. 11.; Add. 120. Para 8(b); Ass 82, Para. 12; Add 110, Para. 11. 3 Article 16(e0) states “the same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing

of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights”. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 327–338, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_29

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Fundamental Freedom (ECHR)4 , The Inter-American Human Rights Agreements5 and African Charter on Human People’s Rights6 . Another particular interest is that while the debate on the rights of the unborn is not new, its relevance to international affairs has gained fresh prominence in light of the UN Human Rights Committee’s reinterpretation of the ‘right to life’ which excludes the unborn child in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)7 . In this context, this paper asks the question: what is the interest of international law and social justice to the legal status of the unborn? This work argues that the interest of international law to fetal rights can be anchored on the intensifying globalization and how the concept of “rights” becomes hyped as a way to account for the vision of a diversified voices. Of particular interest are issues on the consistency of fetal rights as discussed in the international field [11]. The lack of a definitive character, at least in the Convention on the Rights of the Child reveals that the “legal understanding of when the right to life begins is fairly ambiguous” [18]. Alston [1] analyzed the actual provisions of the final draft of the CRC from the perspective of international law and concludes that there was a “compromise” in the decision regarding the rights of the unborn child. Case studies have also examined individual states’ discretion on fetal rights. However, there are limits to how far the idea of the rights of the unborn can be taken. This circumstance surrounding the fetus challenges policy-making to reconsider if fetal rights are part of the survival rights of children among the four main rights, which presupposes that society should assume responsibility for life outside one’s discretion.

2 Double-Edged Dictum in International Law: Best Interest of the Child Fetushood is a necessary phase to birth and it shares a common characteristic with living human beings who do not have the ability to be responsible and make decisions in their “lives” [7]. At any given point in time, the fetal survival status is largely determined by the “living others” and the circumstances that preexisted them. On this basis, most moral theories ask about external agents accountable for those who cannot decide for their own outcomes [2, 16]. These theories see a fetus in a distinct position since it is under a period when it is not yet human being and it faces a range of inherent risks to both itself and the maternal organism [8]. 4 Article 2(1) interpretation is that the fetus is not a human being entitled to the “right to life”.

Furthermore, Paragraph 19 states that “[t]he life of the fetus is intimately connected with, and it cannot be regarded in isolation, of the life of the pregnant woman.” 5 Interpreted Ch. 1 Art 1. of the American Convention of Human Rights that “[t]he addition of the phrase, “‘in general, from the moment of conception’ does not mean that the drafters of the Convention intended to modify the concept of the right to life that prevailed…” (Para 30). 6 1999 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child Art 5(1): “Every child has an inherent right to life” and this does not extend to prenatal life. African Charter in Human and People’s Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5 (1981) (entered into force 21 October 1986). 7 Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Draft General Comment No. 36 on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights retrieved from: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRB odies/CCPR/GCArticle6/GCArticle6_EN.pdf.

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One of the most used justifications for deciding on a child’s case is the Best Interest Principle8 . International law provisions sit in a web of moral, legal, medical or social policies about duties and consequences to people who cannot make decisions for themselves, including policies about abuse and neglect, custody determinations, children’s rights, parental obligations, professional duties, practice guidelines, legal precedents, and acceptable thresholds of care. The Best Interests principle unites under one principle different meanings and uses about how to make good decisions for those lacking decision-making capacity [8]. It is sometimes employed to express goals about what is ideal and sometimes to make practical judgments about what is reasonable given the circumstances. In the same manner, the Best Interest Principle9 glues the deontology and consequentialism, and thus blurs their seeming distinction. Under the Best Interest Principle, deontological orientations seldom disregard consequences entirely. For instance, if two equally moral acts have different consequences, even a deontologist may take outcomes into account. Similarly, consequentialism may also overlap with deontological views [5, 9]. Motivations for an act or decision aims to gain some protection of the interests of the child lacking decision-making capacity independent of the wishes of their guardians. In its theoretical implications, it does not require that actions be consistently about either duty or consequences entirely but both orientations operate as complimentary to provide “the best” for the child.

3 Discussions in International Politics: The Narrative of the Fetus International law narratives of the unborn child are characterized by shapelessness. These ambiguous narratives and the tenuous independence between duty and consequences advance two implications. First, the narrative of the unborn yields a particular discourse around or a particular understanding of the unborn. This imagined unborn child reveal the difficulty in dealing with an obscured subject that derive legitimacy, in part, through being concrete. Second, the ambiguity of the narrative reveals so much about the distinction between duty and consequence, which limit and render suspect, if not invisible, the particular meanings and interests of the unborn child for justice. The difficulty in aligning international law with the interests of the unborn lies in the impossibility for the unborn to become the focal point around which the values and forms of universal law revolve. The unborn child is not so much invoked as it is vividly described in terms of being unknown. The uncertain nature of the unborn is depicted as struggling to fit in the current policies (especially in women’s rights). This shapeless narrative of the unborn has no assurance that the policies as implemented by different 8 Art.3 ch.1. 9 While the Best Interest principle sounds consequentialist, it does so only if “best interest” is

expressed as an ideal or goal. This usage is limited insofar as practical decisions are concerned, where it may be impossible to provide what is ideal. Rather, “best interest” involves reasonable application of both a duty to act and consequence to imagine. For instance, it might be “best” for a child to have a certain organ transplant, but depending on the organ, it may or may not be reasonable to have another person’s organ be donated. Practical decisions using the Best Interests Principle should be informed by appropriate contexts and reasonable options, which are often less than perfect.

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states is synonymous with the interests that the unborn can seek and deserve. In short, the imagined unborn child is not instrumental for appeal to practicality. Because of the ambiguity of its narrative, the unborn cannot become a symbolic target of the aspirations to universal morality. This inhibits any call upon moral urgency, both to deontology and consequentialism, to respond on the unborn’s behalf as a member of humanity as though the imagined injuries to the unborn were our own.

4 Pinch Point: The Awkward Disjuncture The political discussions provided a narrative of the unborn that is discursively-charged with an ambiguous personhood. However, in the philosophical level, ascribing a moral status to fetus by virtue of its potency is not necessarily incompatible with women’s rights and abortion. Fetal moral status does not supersede its precondition as an inherent risk, which warrants self-defense for the woman. There is an important nuance to the kind of ambiguity that the international law gives to the fetus.. Saying that the fetus “stopped being morally irrelevant”, it carries a meaning of neutrality, that there is no enough standards to argue for or against its moral status; but it does not grant the fetus any moral relevance. On the other hand, when the fetus “started to be morally relevant”, it suggests a stronger position towards the moral status of the fetus; it connotes a shift in status from being merely neutral to taking an equal spot among the morally relevant beings. The difference between the two terms denote differences in the minimum requirement of their arguments. The minimum requirement for “stopping to be morally irrelevant” is merely a reformat–a suspension of any disregard of the fetal moral status towards the level of neutrality. On the other hand, the minimum requirement for “starting to be morally relevant” is an overwrite–a shift of attitude from a neutral base towards a more positive side. Stopping to be morally irrelevant creates a nuance of meaning that would not be present in simply saying being having moral relevance. To illustrate, “not disagreeing” of fetal moral relevance is not the same as “agreeing” with it. The former suggests having some reservations about the argument while the latter implies being convinced by the argument. “Stopping to be morally irrelevant” suggests that someone may not be fully convinced that the fetus is morally relevant but “not unappreciative” of the argument; meanwhile, “starting to be morally relevant” is tantamount to saying that someone is “appreciative” that the fetus is morally relevant. It is important to note that being morally relevant creates a sort of moral obligation towards the fetus i.e. legal protection or rights. On the other hand, being not morally irrelevant only affirms that there is less and less basis for excluding the fetus from having a moral status, and that there is weaker reason for thinking otherwise. This does not in any way oblige any agent to act in favor of the fetus. Not being morally irrelevant at all only means that there is deficit or lack of proof that a fetus may not be a moral being in good standing, or that there are no insufficient problems that keep the fetuses from possessing a moral status. The absence of a concrete international abortion law suggests a neutral position only for the reason that there are no enough standards to argue for or against it. This demonstrates that the fetus is not at all incompetent for a moral status, modestly emphasizing

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its potential and dismissing total ineptitude for moral status. On the other hand, philosophical debates advance that there can be sufficient argument to grant or dismiss moral status for a fetus. Requirements may be or may not be met may, in which case having a moral status meant that the fetus was able to meet specific requirements and not just that there is not enough reason to argue that it does not possess as moral status.

5 Fetus and Women’s Rights The uncertain image of the fetus is the crux that reveals a less straightforward binary between deontology and consequentialism. The dividing line duty and consequence becomes slippery without a clear subject and danger. This bleeds to treating the fetus and the “future child” as one entity and operates under the logic that granting rights to the fetus conflicts with women’s rights because it is women’s rights vs child’s rights. This is hierarchical understanding of the moral status of the fetus blurs the line between deontology and consequentialism. The fetus’ future self (not its current state) is weighed against the pregnant woman. In deontological terms, women are ends in their own terms (deontological) in so far as they have a specific position in international law. Because of this simultaneity of motives, the basis of a decision, to be assessed as moral, is blurred whether it is deontological or consequentialist. The ambiguity in the connection between the imagined unborn child and the demands of being granted rights, while imperfect, captures the difficulty in the way in which deontology and consequentialism can advance the discussion. It is in the process of becoming tellingly obscured–with interests unsure of any connection with the existing international policies–that the segregation between duty and consequences surface. This substantiates the disharmony between the interest of the imagined unborn child and the international community. In making visible the ambiguous narrative, a confusion in decisions emerges. The unclear prioritization of duty and consequence hinders the unborn child the possibility of being considered as worthy of rights. The fetus can be seen as an entity that is otherwise value-less unless seen in relation to women, which implies that the position of women in international law ought to be taken into consideration as well.

6 The Crux of It All: The “Why” of the “Why” What then is the merit of examining the discrepancy between philosophical and political discussions concerning the moral status of the fetus? If decisions are assessed by virtue of their normative property, then these actions “should be analyzable in terms of reasons” [15]. Differences in reasons, may have greater implications in future decisions and actions. Therefore, the kind of reason is just as important as knowing the reason itself [3]. From the standpoint of policy, as it appears, the state-based policy on abortion has been built in the spirit of escapism rather than of self-revision. While states can independently10 interpret this decision, they might do so in the spirit of convenience 10 For instance, a deontological justification would relate the rejection to an act of duty, doubting if

society by and large has a duty to an unborn child. A consequentialist justification on the other hand would look at how rejecting the rights to life of the unborn is a means beneficial for the society.

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rather than sovereignty. This does not offer any substantial, even less, virtue on decisionmaking than quick-fix policy making. The concept of potency in terms of harm provides a set-point to create a different brand of understanding of the fetus’ moral status and its relevance to the moral community. The issues concerning exclusion of the fetus from ‘right to life’ is therefore not so much about the question if it is a human being as it is about the legitimacy of reasons to or not to grant it such rights. Moreover, the discrepancy in reasons reveals how much quality of argument both levels of discussion miss. This goes to show the bedrocks of both philosophical discussions and international policy, which hints on the trajectory of discussions each may take. This has a paradoxical character because as the discussions differ in level of talk, the more they reveal how philosophy and politics are connected. It presents the complicated dynamics on discussions that are deemed to be normatively congruent; not to say though that they should be. Rather, they can be seen as extensions of each other. This incongruence displays the unexplored directions both philosophical discussions and political affairs may observe, from which prospective discussions can be made more apparent [14]. This discourse of the fetus enriches discussions in international affairs by foregrounding the versatility of these theoretical perspectives. Both perspectives have a strong civic orientation, such that they appeal to a seemingly indistinguishable interpretation of the moral status of the fetus. Moreover, discussions in philosophy reveal the various degrees of how certain laws are products of their own time. The point of contention of abortion rights in the political affairs relates to the appropriateness of the fetal narratives in the immediate position of children in the society, which has had shifts. This speaks a lot about the position of the concept of potency to ethical boundary work. Here, the norms of any acceptable decision are negotiated along with the complexity of history. Substantively, decisions for or against abortion rights can be appreciated as an extension of the appeals of specific moral standpoints.

7 The Right Kind of “Why”: On Temporary Settling and Long-Term Self-revisionism Scholars may, of course, take issue with the argument that each sphere can learn from each other to arrive at a temporary resolution and conclusion. Critics might argue that the moral status of the fetus is a matter best left unsettled and further contested. Admittedly, proponents of such views have merits but it does not necessarily follow that this issue cannot be resolved, at least temporarily, in order for individuals, especially women, to consider their decisions and actions. It is indeed important to have open-ended moral and ethical debates in public space but if the reason for keeping it open is a lack of solid bases, it may rather be a fall short in the part of policy-making than a decision to maintain debatable issue open to be inclusive. The lack of decision concerning the issue on abortion has been based on a debate whether or not fetuses have “moral status” and not on the validity of reasons where such moral status could be based upon. This work argues that a provisional conclusion on abortion laws matters in situations where unresolved issues, at least temporarily, place women (pregnant or not) in a deadlock situation, depriving them of a policy protection. This is where the international law

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might have fallen short because it is a decision made in the spirit of convenience and immediacy rather than in the spirit of self-revision.

8 Ethics as Space of Accountability The danger in the “relativity” premise of the international law is that it only sees law as dependent upon ethics but it does not see law as accountable to ethics. International law might be missing this part that gives credit to ethics as a space of accountability. Rather it used the argument of “difference” in ethical standards as a reason not to have universal abortion rights. If this “difference” argument remains, would those who argued for it be held liable if any statutory legal system be found questionable in the future? This makes the absence of a concrete international law on abortion seem to be valid yet its premises were unreasonable. This work therefore argues that, given law’s accountability to ethics, international law would be more ethically consistent had the unstated premise been that international communities are international body that “does not exist independently of either the human person or the human society” [4] and therefore shares some ideals that may take effect in the future, not because morality is “relative” but because it holds future accountability to law. Moreover, to say that differences in abortion cultures is beyond the scope of international law is either to say that a universal law of abortion will bring about more harm than good or it is to indulge in meaningless rhetorics. In other words, moral relativism is not a sufficient reason for abstaining from the universality of abortion rights, rather the reason is far deeper. By saying that human knowledge is inadequate and very different from one another is not sufficient to forbear a universal abortion law as it does not destroy human capacity to judge. It can probably be said that the lack decision in international law is “in good faith”. But if this “good faith” brings anything less than accountability to ethics, then it is not a valid justification from holding any universal law on abortion. Indeed, it is unfortunate that potentialities of a decision are sometimes undermined by an unsound reasoning.

9 On Resolutions: The Role of Domestic Legal Systems Abstaining from any universal law only insofar as it is a means to stay accountable to ethics is different from mere lazy relativism. Seeing various ethical perspectives is a productive activity for law to renew its commitment to ethics because in doing so, it can constantly prove that there can be a universally binding conscience amidst the differences in culture and plurality of authority. Maintaining abortion laws under discussion is meritable not in the spirit of “differences” but in the spirit of accountability. Keeping legal discussions open makes law accountable to ethics. This act of keeping the spirit of self-revisionism is a very act of law’s accountability to ethics. The decision to localize abortion rights to the delegate states is suggestive of this issue’s complexity to have a justifiably regulated and universal law. The magnitude of issue the fetal moral status has makes it difficult, if not improbable, to arrive at a collective decision in a single negotiation. If fetal rights is important yet it poses conflict in the international arena, then state is the intermediary to practically deal with an ethical issue that has been going on for however long.

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10 Merits of Compromise What makes the state suitable for such responsibility then? The relative position of the state in the world is that the core elements—the state, public, and private governance— are abstract entities with their own unique local practices. States have the discretion to adopt specific standards for abortion to what best fits their local circumstances. Each state varies from the rule of law to political representation to culture, among others. This grants state some flexibility to have their own legal policies concerning the unborn. For instance, more liberal approach in domestic jurisprudence usually allows abortions under most circumstances while some domestic legal systems totally prohibit any risk to the unborn such as abortion. Some legal systems take a middle-ground by allowing some cases of abortions under certain circumstances and due procedure. As example, standards of abortion laws vary from state to state where abortion is allowed only in certain circumstances11 . Choices are made case-to-case that meet a minimum threshold of acceptable general statutory morality; what is best is usually judged in relation to what is generally regarded to be acceptable inside a given territory. These decisions are made such that they are compatible with moral and legal duties and consequences. This localizes the case of the unborn child should decisions be forced to argue for the particular interests and hold specific parties accountable. This justifies the authority of the state, if it comes to question.

11 Merits of Criticism Statutory discretion can only be desired for so long. The status of fetus as a moral agent is far from closed and hence the issue on abortion rights is best placed for a long-term commitment to conversations, which legitimizes a certain level of ambiguity in this policy. As the International Committee of the Red Cross pointed out, the decision to maintain keep abortion as matter of debate is “wise and will facilitate universal application of the Convention irrespective of local peculiarities”12 . What gives legitimacy to consciously keeping the issue contentious is that it allows for justifiable regulations that are both firm and flexible as long as this ethical problematique remains. Long-term self-revisionism also answers the question of what sort of limits may therefore be placed on the state. It allows for a democratic participation of the non-state agents. Policy-making is often approached with the purpose of consistent preferences based on a portfolio of choices with risk management. As in any other international policy, 11 Examples of legal abortions are: (1) a risk to life and health (physical and/or mental); (2) rape;

and (3) foetal defect (hereby excluding ‘demand’ and ‘social factors’ as possible legal qualification for an abortion. Summary of Abortion Laws Around the World”, http://www.pregnantpause. org/lex/world02.jsp. Similar liberal abortion jurisprudence exists in Albania, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, North Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Vietnam and Yugoslavia (Shaffer 1994). 12 Abby F. Janoff, Note, Rights of the Pregnant Child vs Rights of the Unborn Child Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 22, B.U. Int’l L. J. 163, 164-65 (2004), note 73, at 170 (quoted from the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: a guide to the “travaux pre‘partoires” 58 (Sharon Derick ed., 1992)).

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there are stable sets of informal and formal rules that structure patterned interactions of its member nations. It generally imbues predictability and decrease uncertainty. But it also espouses bias to some priorities, favors certain solutions, and applies exceptions to its policies. As a result, deliberations concerning abortion issues can be seen as elusive, discomfiting and too often a source of anxiety rather than liberation. However, looking at the disadvantages ignores half of the picture. Although rights are often discarded by particular interests set aside by power holders, such rights have over time been revalidated, reclaimed, reinterpreted, and extended to consider emerging issues and include more stakeholders and claimholders. While ambiguity in international law is not a new concern for legal scholars [12], the case of the moral status of the fetus is beyond the issue of intentional ambiguity in international law. Keeping it contentious does not mean abdicating any law-making powers from any institution. It does not destroy any institution a capacity to form policy on the basis of informed, considered, and balanced argument. Rather, what seems to follow is that a long-term commitment to maintaining an open space for interpreting the status of the fetus recognizes (1) the breadth of the issue of fetal moral status and (2) the power of public sphere.

12 The Power of Public Sphere: Commitment to Contested Rationalities Underpinning Fetal Rights As already mentioned, advancement in science combined with the global diffusion of human rights talk takes the language of human rights to the next level. Here, the articulation of moral equality is reconsidered. But to the extent that the international community does this, it altogether complicates the meaning and applicability to justify specific rights claims [13]. This presents the fetus as an ambiguous subject, thereby establishing an unsettled moral position. It is therefore to establish precision in the context of changing meanings moral ground and scientific discovery, let alone allowing space for interpretation. Moreover, suffice it to say that international law’s recognition of the complexity of the issue lends insight into the reasonableness of its decision though it may have less justifiable reasons [6, 17]. The very idea that there is difficulty to reconcile various contested rationalities to arrive at a definite characterization of the fetus makes clear the importance of a long-term commitment to discussions, even to the utterances that may seem incomprehensible, irrelevant, redundant or meaningless as well as utterances that are inappropriate in a communicative situation or fallacies. Re-opening discussions may enrich the content of the international policies as new tools in deliberation provide weighing out both incentives and disincentives to reconsider the attainment of the international goals. Future manifold disputes may illustrate the extent to which the fetal personhood is largely elusive contingent on the procedures by which it is being assessed. Years of deliberation in the international arena have not been, in the instance of fetal rights, a way to settle a question, but an unintended consequence to realize that some policy matters better remain left open for discussion. While it might be a fortuity, the international community’s decision to keep fetal rights open for the interpretation of member states presupposes an active public. It is a move that invites participation in policy-making rather than the presence of passive international

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community unqualified of critical reflection. This practice holds the very principle of a public sphere where contested rationalities underpinning fetal rights are recognized. It also opens up agency wherein member states are not just reproducers of a given rhetoric, but are also consciously responding to the current conditions of their constituencies. This also avoids indifference and leaving fetal rights uncontested. There is no a priori way to set the limits of “life”, a concept that even trained scholars may think is obvious, but is not. Equally important is the notion of context, for any definition of context inevitably excludes as well as includes. Since it is difficult to anticipate how fetal rights will become recontextualized in different states, there is stronger reason not to foreclose what counts as admissible context for interpretation Most importantly, any such ‘universal rule’ about the unborn cannot be assumed to be self-evident, disinterested and uncontested. Keeping it contentious avoids rendering other states and non-state organizations as unworthy to intervene. This is particularly important since states may cling too much on their independence thereby dismissing political forces outside territorial boundaries. In the end, it is still crucial for the international community to yield to the universality of ethics once it delegated power to states. While there is ambiguity inherent in the subject matter (fetus), the policy-making process is still interactively shaped by prevailing ethical standards. Based on consensual moral guidelines, members of the international arena decided and national administrations implement.

13 Conclusion The battle starts in the womb even before we consider that “childhood is a political issue” [10]. The aim of this study has been to illuminate the ways in which the unborn child is perceived and how it is positioned along the lines of deontological and consequential lenses. This thesis has used the case of the unborn child to show that the difference between the deontology and consequentialism discourse is not as clear-cut as one might be tempted to imagine. While policy-making always depends on the context, taking time to interpret the past decisions and how these relate to present conditions can somehow provide guidelines to future directions. This is especially pertinent if the changes are so immense that the cost of tracing complexities of how we see the past in relation to the present is worth it all. The point, in the end, is found much less in merely politicizing the fetus than it is about understanding the practices that gave rise to the existing processes of moralizing the unborn, and it is the rendering of scholarly practice that is offered by this discourse analysis. The case of the rights of the unborn child deserves discussion because rights are not static—they are in a flux of events that evolve. Being such an international concern, fetal rights raises the question of whether it can serve to reinforce new global structures of justice, or whether it could be a space for resistance and change. Indeed, neither the issues related to fetal rights, nor its next directions are easily defined. It is, however, clear that a theoretical gaze is helpful if we want to accurately account for the decisions done in the past, or the complex workings of intersecting contexts. Perhaps theory needs to account for diverging perceptions to a greater extent. A constant inquiry renders service to both theoretical and pragmatic contexts. Therefore, any new or revived discussions

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about rights of the child calls for deep scrutiny. Should there be any new issue, the question does not only end with which principle shall we anchor our decisions but it necessarily extends to taking deeper glance at the dimensionality of these principles that we may otherwise take for granted. This study hopes, if nothing else, to invite discussions and admonish that any good suggestion or analysis for any given situation, whether the aim is to advance, criticize or justify current understandings, must be guided by a careful contemplation of the pathway that a particular conclusion has traveled. As much as the rights of the unborn is controversial in many respects, it also cuts across many layers of nuances. While there is substance to these studies, the critiques may not be in proportion to how theoretical the issue is. Most critiques focus immediately on the moral merits of the decision, which may miss out more the profound dimensions of discourse. The current international policy on the unborn can also be seen as a version of democracy as a work in progress with modesty. Diffident moments open up opportunities to review fixations to normative impositions and assumptions, pose questions to dominant paradigms of thought, and hopefully gain insights for a self-revising policy. This can be seen as a reflection of foreign policy humility as it recognises the weaknesses and potential fallibility of existing consensus.

References 1. Alston, P.: The unborn child and abortion under the draft convention on the rights of the child. Human Rights Q. 12(1), 156–178 (1990). https://doi.org/10.2307/762174 2. Archard, D., Macleod, C.: The Moral and Political Status of Children. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2002) 3. Baker, T., Harel, A., Kugler, T.: The virtues of uncertainty in law: an experimental approach. IOWA Law Review 443, 449–468 (2004) 4. Boldizar, A., Korhonen, O.: Ethics, morals and international law. European J. Int. Law 10(2), 279–311, 280 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/10.2.279 5. Brandt, R.B.: Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights. Cambridge University Press, New York (1992) 6. Condit, C.: Decoding Abortion Rhetoric: Communicating Social Change. University of Illinois Press, Urbana (1990) 7. Finn, S.: The Metaphysics of Surrogacy. In: Boonin, D. (ed.) The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy, pp. 649–659. Springer, Cham (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-319-93907-0_49 8. Haaf, L.: Unborn and future children as new legal subjects: an evaluation of two subjectoriented approaches—the subject of rights and the subject of interests. German Law J. 18(5), 1091–1119 (2017) 9. Harsanyi, J.: Rule utilitarianism and decision theory. Erkenntnis 11, 25–53 (1977). https:// doi.org/10.1007/bf00169843 10. Ignatieff, M.: The attack on human rights. Foreign Affairs 80(6), 102–116 (2001). https://doi. org/10.2307/20050331 11. Maledon, W.J.: Law and the unborn child: the legal and logical inconsistencies. Notre Dame Law Review 46(2), 349–372 (1971) 12. Manninen, B.A.: A kantian defense of abortion rights with respect for intrauterine life. Diametros, 39, 70–92 (2014). https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.39.2014.565 13. Mayall, B.: The sociology of childhood in relation to children’s rights. Int. J. Children’s Rights 8, 243–244 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1163/15718180020494640

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14. Scanlon, T.M.: Reasons, responsibility, and reliance: replies to wallace, dworkin, and deigh. Ethics 112(3), 507–528 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1086/339221 15. Schroeder, M.: Slaves of the Passions, p. 134. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2007) 16. Schultz, J.S., Castan, M.: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - Cases, Materials, and Commentary. Oxford University Press, New York (2000) 17. Shaffer, M.: Foetal rights and the regulation of abortion. McGill Law Journal 39(1), 58–100 (1994) 18. Venzor, T.: Protecting the unborn child: the current state of law concerning the so-called right to abortion and intervention by the holy see. Nebraska Law Review 89(4), 1132–1170 (2011)

Cultural Dimension of International Relations

Humanistic Content of International Cultural Exchanges in the Modern Era Vladimir Fokin(B) Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected]

Abstract. At the beginning of the XXI century the public diplomacy meets new challenges. In the past, conversation between nations was related to the search for answers on the most acute problems facing humanity. Public dialogue, cultural exchange between nations helped to improve the international climate and had a positive impact on international politics, as well as to find promising path for human civilization. In our days, despite of the severity of problems facing the humanity, public dialogue has lost its intellectual character. A State has become the subject of public diplomacy, rather than a creative community, partly due to cultural crisis. Public diplomacy meets the narrow objectives of subsequent States. It doesn’t aim at finding global development problems solutions any more. It lacks a humanistic perspective. It is time to revive meaningful public dialogue. Keywords: Humanism of the modern era · Models of global development · Public diplomacy

1 Introduction During the last two centuries, public participation in international relations has steadily increased. By the end of the XIX century the pacifist movement introduced the idea of arbitration in international disputes, but failed to influence politicians to prevent wars. The international socialist movement failed in at-tempts to counteract the outbreak of the World War I. In the 1920–1930s international intellectual cooperation under the auspices of the League of Nations provided broad anti-war movement. It proposed an ideology of appeasement policy, following the path of agreement with the aggressor. The antifascist platform was developed in the framework of dialog between international “left” movement and intellectual circles of Europe and America. But politicians sabotaged the idea. The anti-fascist ideology became a solid foundation for the anti-Hitler coalition of nations in the World War II. The threat of nuclear missile war created a powerful anti-war movement in the world. It persuaded politicians to move from preparing for nuclear war to a policy of deterrence and balance between the great powers. It ensured universal peace, while maintaining local conflicts, throughout the second half of the 20th century. International community made a significant contribution to the struggle against colonialism, racism, © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 341–350, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_30

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apartheid and to mainstreaming of human rights throughout the world. New challenges of the sustainable development of humankind including human rights and environmental security emerged in agenda of international community as global problems in the 1970s. International cultural and scientific exchange has played a major role in the growth of antiwar sentiment and formation of humanistic platform of mass social movements. In the framework of the cultural interaction between nations they were realizing their commonality in the face of global challenges. The cross-cultural relations, international intellectual and cultural cooperation formed the basis for development of humanistic principles within the United Nations. In the form of norms of international law and moral imperatives they were gradually incorporated into the practice of international relations. After the end of the Cold War, they have changed both the system of international relations and the role of the public in the context of globalization. The infrastructure of international communications was growing under the influence of ongoing processes. It contributed to the strengthening of international public opinion and its influence on international relations. Public opinion gained more opportunities to influence on political sphere, and therefore on foreign policy. It led to abandonment of the limited nuclear war in Europe and protracted nuclear war military and political doctrines in the 1980s. In the USSR, the public opinion widely supported Mikhail Gorbachev’s initiatives in the field of foreign policy and contributed to the liberalization of the political system.

2 Problem Statement At the turn of millennium, principal changes took place slowly in the sphere of interaction between countries and international community. Almost every state made decisive efforts to consolidate dominance of elites in shaping of public opinion. It submitted to the ideological and psychological onslaught. This was due to the fact that new trends had emerged in the cultural life of society. Principles of the mass consumption society formed consumer attitude towards art, science and education. These sectors ceased to perform ideological function. Science, education and culture ceased to be a source of humanitarian progress. The instinct of consumption has become to determine human life. Scientific discovery, artistic revelation changed to act only as a way to meet a particular need, instead of being a source of human development, its improvement. Society had been unable to critically assess reality, satisfied with achieved. In the mass conscience, it caused feeling of impossibility and unwillingness to change anything in a person or society on the basis of social ideals. The desire to adapt to the existing state of things prevailed; conformism has become the ground of mass conscience. The idealistic worldview has strengthened the role of religions and the philosophy of postmodernism in the society. This paradoxically reinforced the cynicism in politics. The idea that the world can be changed on the base of ideology has been strengthened. It is just enough to introduce it into the public conscience. The manipulation of public conscience has become the dominant tool in the political struggle. A government acts as a subject of public diplomacy, while the public is just the object. There is no public dialogue in contemporary international practice. The interaction of intellectual forces of nations is under strict governmental control. Any attempt to show independent opinion

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from scientific and creative public is severely suppressed by various measures. Public ideals have become just declarations, hiding selfish interests of certain political and social groups, and narrow governmental interests.

3 Research Question The study analyses documents of government bodies and public authorities that define the approach in public diplomacy to dealing with cultural and information policies in some major countries. The objective of the analysis has been to identify the content of public diplomacy of the states and to assess it in the light of humanistic approach outlined in the United Nations and UNESCO documents referring to prospects for mankind’s development and culture of human civilization. The analysis assumes that, namely, these documents contain the concept of humanism that characterizes the modern era and enjoys the support of the majority of humankind.

4 Literature Review In the last third of the twentieth century, research on the content of the cultural exchange reflected the aspirations to expose the process of development of the culture of society under the influence of scientific and technological progress and forming of the universal civilization on this basis which would resolve the social contradictions [14, 15]. A new wave of exploration gained momentum in the 1990s, after the publication of Samuel Huntington’s book on the clash of civilizations and fundamental importance of this phenomenon. In our century, scientific debates have deviated from the substance of problem and addressed the issues of tools of foreign policy in this area, while evading debates on J. Nye’s assertion of the absolute attractiveness of American values for the world. The problems of effectiveness of the States in this field have come to the forefront [13].

5 Methodology The practice of massive political influence of governments on formation of the international public opinion, however, has not been able to eliminate the struggle of ideas in the modern world. In the second half of the XX century, a promising model of human civilization development was introduced - the golden billion model, which responded in opinion of the financial elites on the challenges of the time. It proposed to limit fertility and reduce population of the world to one billion people, who will be able to use planet’s resources to live following the mass consumption model. The model revived the Malthusian concept from the XIX century under new conditions, modernizing its ideas with the doctrine of “open society” in the interpretation of K. Popper [7]. This model has not received broad international support. In opposite, the intellectuals have formulated the model of sustainable development that was adopted by the UN, and gained support from many countries. The UN Sustainable Development Programme provides genesis

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of technical and humanitarian progress of the human civilization on the basis of respect to nature and rational consumption [10]. Existence of two models has caused controversial use of financial and political potential of the mankind. The struggle between two concepts in the public conscience is far from its end. Today, this struggle ex-presses itself via formation of contemporary world order, as a struggle between the mono-polar and multi-polar view on the world. At the same time, this struggle takes place in minds of every human being: the struggle between consumerism and the reasonable use of natural resources, between base instincts and high ideals of human culture. It is not just about the place of a nation in the system of international relations and future of certain nations of the world, but it is ultimately about the future of humanity as a whole. At the end of the XX century, neoliberal ideology launched a decisive attack on public conscience and almost suppressed alternative points of view. However, the following ‘shock therapy’ has led to severe social casualties, and often to disastrous economic consequences that eventually caused the global economic crisis in 2008–2014. At the same time, the significant economic and social progress of new industrial giants, that have achieved an ‘economic miracle’ based on the Keynesian economy proved to be a very attractive example as an alternative economic model. The mankind faces choice between a ‘free’ market integrated into the global model and subordinated to the global financial center, and a ‘social oriented market economy’ with national features. The choice is either in subordinating the world economy to a global financial center that would ensure the implementation of the ‘golden billion’ model or in subjugating economy to the goals of social development and individual progress in the framework of united human civilization. In spite of the fact that globalization processes are obvious, they have not been able to overcome the existing cultural and social differences between nations, because these differences are caused by long, centuries-old development of societies and human consciousness, they express the diversity of the world and different points of view on it, differences in human psychic and psychology. Many solutions in the human society development of are based on the context of separate national and state building and have not been transferred to global level. Local differences and features of the nation-based state system can’t be overcome completely even in the framework of states within a single civilization. Implementation of any global development model is impossible without broad public support. In the sphere of social and cultural relations, we are talking about public support to contemporary ideas of public and individual morality, relationship between them i.e. semantic part of culture – the system of social ideals. On practice, in the field of international relations it reflects in formation of a whole set of ideas about the nature of relations between civilizations of various cultural and historical types. Relations between countries depend on general on ethnic stereotypes that form the basis of public opinion. Ethnic stereotypes have been formed over decades, sometimes centuries. During the Cold War it was seen as extension of the class struggle into international relations, but after its end it has revealed that behind contradictions of social and political character between two systems: capitalism and socialism, were hidden much more fundamental contradictions of civilization character. After the collapse of bloc system numerous ethnic and cultural contradictions have exacerbated by globalization, showing contradictions

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of civilizations. They had deep, fundamental character, which is manifested over the centuries, passing leitmotif through political and economic conflicts. Contemporary theories offer different character of ideas about interaction of civilizations: some suggest the inevitable struggle and assertion of the only type of civilization as the dominant, others – assume the need for dialectical interaction and synthesis [2, 5]. The rearrangement of the world order at the end of the last century caused growth of local chaos. The idea of a global civilization, which would ensure peace in the world by establishing common ideals for all humans, was prevailing in the West at that time. The idea was developed in the 1930s and assumed the universality to Western values [6]. It would eliminate the root of conflicts - contradictions between cultures and religions of the world. This seemed to be possible because mass culture showed a vivid example of ‘international’ culture. At the same time, diversity of cultures that is the source of human culture development and the basis of social progress itself and corresponds on diversity of nations, individuals and diversity of the world itself, was ignored. The UNESCO has formed an alternative position in a number of declarations of the beginning of the 21st century [11].

6 Findings The liberal bourgeois culture of Western society suffers an acute crisis since the beginning of the XX century. This is evidenced by two world wars, bloody local conflicts, a crisis of Christian morality and its secular alternative, as well as by anti-humanism of fashionable postmodern artistic and aesthetic trends. The liberal model failed to overcome European crisis of multiculturalism within framework of the EU’s migration policy. Finally, the crisis of Western culture is clearly seen in the changing agenda of contemporary public diplomacy. Today, the diplomacy that is commonly called as public is implemented within the framework of various efforts of governmental foreign policy. Implementation of these efforts is controversial. Direct contacts between people from various countries have lost their independent importance in international relations. The subject of the public diplomacy today is not the international community, but governments. They seek to manipulate public opinion for their own advantage and use variety of means to do that. Neoliberal ideology has gradually lost the humanistic meanings of interaction between nations. Alienation and autarchy of cultures, intolerance and conflict, violence and xenophobia are incited and growing in their communications, while unclosed fascism is reviving. On the other hand, religious fundamentalism and terrorism are growing in the East as a reaction on duplicity of neoliberalism. For a long period of time, the public diplomacy of western countries had a strong impact on the world by promoting impressive achievements of the mass consumption society. Western civilization has achieved a high level of industrial development and social progress based on it. This made it possible to declare the Western model of the political system as a democratic ideal. Both these factors had outstanding importance for the West’s victory in the Cold War. Therefore, the natural scenario of reconstruction of the world into monopolar one was the further extension of liberal ideals in the course of the implementation of US public diplomacy. The most complete theoretical generalization

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of this policy can be found in the popular book written by Joseph Nye. [4] The ‘soft power’ term has become fashionable, and every politician or government put their own meaning, promotion of their own ideals in this ‘soft power’. Politicization of cultural, educational, and sports programs became visible, clear enough, in the 1990s, when ideological confrontation between the US and the USSR came to its end and exchange projects were supposed to improve mutual understanding and build bridges between societies. The Cultural Diplomacy, as the U.S. government’s information, culture and education programs have been called in the U.S. government’s documents during the Cold War, was renamed into public diplomacy. It obtained two major changes that transformed its essence. A new strategic imperative has emerged and the target audience has changed. U.S. foreign policy strategy on involvement of governments into democratic reforms made public diplomacy the main tool for the transformation of political systems in the former Soviet empire and East Europe countries. Exchange and training programs previously intended for academic community or to maintain public relations have been used to train politicians, party leaders and non-governmental organizations. Public diplomacy has become a tool to influence on legislation and elections in foreign countries. The most evident examples are U.S. public diplomacy projects in Georgia, Ukraine and Russia. In the 1990s and early 2000s it had several significant tools for political transformation of nations: training of political elite, which created conditions for development of its loyalty to the United States; creation of new and independent media and journalists who interacted with American international broadcasting channels and influenced public opinion to reform education systems after US model. Statistical materials of U.S. exchange programs showed an explosive increase of participants from such audiences as young party leaders, election observers, journalists, etc. during pre-election campaigns in Georgia, Ukraine and Russia respectively in 2003, 2004 and 2009 [8, S. 68–82.]. Elections, the promotion of democracy and public diplomacy proved to be the common U.S. foreign policy tool in the 1990s and early 2000s. Programs of popular or cultural diplomacy and relations at the level of nonpolitical social organizations went to the past. Similar trends can be seen in the more modest programs of the European Union. In practice, the US and its ally’s policy in the post-Soviet space contributed not to development of democratic institutions, but to establishment of corrupted bureaucracy and criminal oligarchs. The clear evidence of this was the US participation in formation of a criminal-corrupt regime by events that took place in Moscow in the fall of 1993 and elections of 1996 in Russia, and support of right-wing nationalists in Ukraine. All of this, of course, has nothing to do with the realization of the ideals of American democracy. The policy of soft power and its main tool – U.S. public diplomacy - did not require establishment of a dialogue between Washington and the target audience, but promoted such sources of US influence as political values, culture and principles of foreign policy that were to get the support from target audience overseas. The principles of the President Obama’s policy were ‘engagement policy’, ‘shifting political barriers through digital diplomacy’ and ensuring “direct dialogue with protest movements in foreign countries, which are proven to be a new strategy for U.S. public diplomacy [9].

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This approach has helped to roll back the dialogue between nations, which historically have been the main objective of cultural or public diplomacy. The ‘soft power’ policy supplemented by the idea of ‘smart power’ implied the use of military interventions and promotion of U.S. values to solve foreign policy problems. [9] The enculturation of foreign societies to U.S. values via the Internet has become the theme of the ‘smart’ force policy and public diplomacy of the President Obama’s Administration. Events of the ‘Arab Spring’ were the crowning glory of this strategy. Mobilization of the active Arab youth, teaching them how to coordinate demonstrations via social media, creation of numerous non-governmental organizations, which were promoting the liberal values in Arabic and English, support for mass demonstrations in the region by the US political establishment by global Internet services - all of these new methods were the result of J. Nye concept implemented by the U.S. digital diplomacy. However, the digital diplomacy has not led to democratization and stabilization, but rather to chaos and civil wars. The situation in Egypt, Syria, Libya and other countries is a good example. Due to political destabilization, religious fundamentalist and tribal forces have arisen to pursue their own goals and ideals. The while raw of such upheavals shows that systems of social ideals are historically determined and cannot be changed without cultural, historical and social development of societies taken into account. Neglect of this factor has led to chaos and negative consequences, which are still difficult to predict and regulate by current policies. Whatever, this is typical consequences of neoliberal policy in general. Therefore, the modern US establishment has refused from further implementation of the ‘soft power’ doctrine and incorporated public diplomacy in their foreign policy as strategic communication. [12] Its peculiarity is to use public diplomacy in conjunction with other traditional U.S. foreign policy tools: force use, the threatening of force use, economic methods of influencing partners. Therefore, U.S. public diplomacy often escalates into a psychological warfare, forcing partners to follow US foreign policy by all available means, without trying to convince them in the need to follow American ideals. Other governments have started to apply the concept of ‘soft power’ on their own. However, each of them put their own understanding in the term. Key target remains unchanged - to establish a dialogue between a state and the public from other countries. There are governments, which do not want to follow the US course, and have necessary opportunities to do so. At the beginning of the XXI century, China is developing its own concept of public diplomacy. China implements its public diplomacy to support its foreign policy, which seeks to provide necessary external conditions for its booming economy and expansion into oversea markets. China offers not just investments to its economic partners, but also an attractive model of the world order, which would over-come natural fears about the state with powerful economy. At the 19th Party Congress, Chinese Secretary General Xi Jinping has announced the idea of the human civilization unity as ‘The community of shared future for mankind’. China’s foreign policy key doctrine is joint discussion, joint construction and joint use. Following this concept, Xi Jinping proposed three principles of diplomacy: ‘Global Partnership’, ‘Global Development’ and ‘Global Governance’. [1] Thus China’s public diplomacy complements China’s traditional policy of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It promotes policy of ‘harmonious development’ from domestic to foreign policy, offering a unified global

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development of the world through partnership, development and governance, including social responsibility in the framework of economic ties. Such approach is fundamentally different from all previous models of world market formation and is particularly attractive to countries, which are facing the challenge of modernizing their societies and are improving their well-being of the population. No doubt, this alternative fits into the UN Sustainable Development Programme and has a serious competitiveness on the world stage. The public diplomacy of European countries encounters difficulties. Traditionally it relies on outstanding achievements of national cultures, but today there is natural contradiction between integration trends and national cultures in the European Union. For example, German foreign cultural policy traditionally pays great attention to promotion of the German national school abroad, which has been popular due to the strengths of the national school in Germany. But Bologna process and formation of the common educational space in the European Union has leveled these national features and this side of Germany’s foreign policy is losing its advantage. At the same time, Germany see its foreign cultural policy as the main channel of influence on international community and as precondition for economic expansion while its economic, military and political capabilities on international stage are limited. Some problems are related to implementation of Francophone’s policy, as French culture is experiencing difficulties outside, as well as within the country. There are considerable differences in the assessment of nature and scope of Russian public diplomacy. The first point of view suggests that Russia is a ‘revanchist power’ that seeks to destroy liberal world order. The second is that Russia is a ‘defensive power’ that works for gradual changes within the existing order. A third view argues that Russia is an ‘aggressive isolationist’ meaning that Putin’s regime is deliberately playing a counterweight role in international Affairs to enhance its domestic legitimacy. But each of these points of view does not have necessary evidence base [3]. Today Russia uses culture as an important tool of its policy and economy, and a factor for development of regions. In the current situation of acute political confrontation with tightening sanctions it is necessary to be very careful and reasonable to search the forms of international cultural cooperation. The format that Russia uses today for building relations with foreign countries is very interesting, effective and helps to solve complex and urgent problems, considering that the country has a significant cultural potential for international cooperation. The problem is that the policy of the Russian government includes an internal contradiction. Simultaneously, it demonstrates a commitment to neoliberal values in domestic social and economic policy, while declares a commitment to traditional values and seeks to protect national interests on the international arena. Modern Russia has nothing to offer to the international community as an idea that could attract international community attention. Russian government offers cooperation in the field of culture to its compatriots, some of who have unexpectedly found themselves outside of the ethnic territory. Moreover, such cooperation is often perfunctory, as there is almost nothing to offer in cultural and social sphere even to Russian citizens.

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7 Conclusion Contemporary public diplomacy of every government has its own agenda. Globalization with all aspects of development which can be dangerous for humanity and every human being has made the problem of human survival more complicated. The synthesis of scientific, technical and humanitarian nature has become extremely relevant today. At the beginning of this century, public diplomacy has appeared neither related to the national culture, which was the traditional field of interaction between nations, international security, which was its content throughout the 20th century, nor to fundamentals prospects of human civilization’s life and survival. Instead, public diplomacy looks like a rather petty instrument of national and social egoism that pales in the face of the global challenges of the time, and endanger life on the planet Earth. The magnitude of these challenges requires a much higher level of policy based on effective models of human civilization and decision making for implementation of these models. In essence, there is a matter of choice to humanity between the two models of development. The first one is proposed by the world financial center and is aimed at muss consumption. While the UN Sustainable Development Programme presents another one. Practice shows that it is impossible to solve this dilemma by contemporary system of international relations. The level of trust between states is at historic low: there is virtually no global negotiating practice on key issues of international security, political, economic and humanitarian cooperation. The parties often demonstrate irreconcilable contradictions in approaches to various problems of civilization development, cultivating autarkical at the level of closed economic, military and political groups. In these circumstances, the role of public dialogue raises dramatically. Such a dialogue can revive a spirit of under-standing. The public must regain the ability to think independent and to form its own position on key issues of the world development free from national and social egoism. The public should become a subject of international relations instead being an object of influence. It is time to revive meaningful public dialogue otherwise the humanity will lose the intellectual battle for its future.

References 1. Xi, J.: Reports at the 15th CPC Congress. http://russian.news.cn/2017-11/03/c_136726299. htm 2. Huntington, S.: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of Word Order. Simon and Schuster, USA (1996) 3. Goetz, E., Camilla-Reno, M.: Russia and the issue of the world order. European Polit. Soc. 20(2), 512–519 (2019) 4. Nye, J.: Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Public Affairs Group, New York (2004) 5. Jaspers, K.: Die geistige Situation der Zeit. Leipzig, Berlin (1932) 6. Toynbee, A.: Study of History. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1934–1961) 7. Popper, K.R.: The Open Society and its Enemies. Vienna (1945) 8. Tsvetkova, N.A., Yarygin, G.O.: U.S. Public Diplomacy’s Participation in Ukraine’s Political Transformation, 1990s–2000s. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Political Sci. Int. Relations, 4, 5 (2015)

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9. Tsvetkova, N.A.: Public diplomacy of the united states: from soft power to propaganda. Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy, 13(4), 8–25 (2015) 10. United Nations Millennium Declaration. Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 55/2 of 8 September 2000. https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/declarations/summitdecl. shtml 11. UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. United Nations General Conference on Education, Science and Culture. 2 November 2001 12. Zaharna, R.S.: Trumping Traditional Public Diplomacy. https://www.uscpublicdiplomati cy.org 13. Public diplomacy: Theory and practice. Ed M Lebedeva. Moscow: Aspect Press (2017) 14. Toffler, A.: The Third Wave: The Classic Study of Tomorrow. William Morrow Company Inc., New York (1980) 15. New York Teams Best Seller List. 28 September 1980. http://www.hawes.com/1980/198009-28.pdf

The Role of Music as a Tool for Cultural Diplomacy During and After the USSR Period in the Development Process of Azerbaijan-Turkey Relations Ecem Tu˘gçe Akbulut(B) ˙Istanbul University, Istanbul, Turkey [email protected]

Abstract. The concept of public diplomacy, which is used as an important instrument in many countries’ foreign policy, generally refers to the provision of the communication activities between the foreign country’s people and institutions and that of the home country. The basis of public diplomacy with all aspects relies on the countries’ use of their soft power. Subjects like the media, culture, arts, science, sports, and education are the tools of soft power. It is known that many countries using public diplomacy particularly conduct musical activities with this purpose. In this regard, culture and art diplomacy became prominent among Turkish groups within the Soviet Union during the USSR Era, when ideological limitations were intense. In this process, the relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey constitute a special example. The concerts that were given by Turkish artists in Azerbaijan and, likewise, the ones given by Azerbaijani artists in Turkey, which had great appeal by the people, were significant activities in terms of public diplomacy. Indeed, the developments in music and arts field gained a new pace in both countries following the convergence between Turkey and Azerbaijan since 1990, when the disintegration process of the Soviet Union accelerated. The increase observed in the number of concerts given by both countries’ artists and joint music albums made a significant contribution to the refreshment of emotional bonds. Keywords: Cultural diplomacy · Music · Turkish world · Azerbaijan · Turkey

1 Introduction The concept of public diplomacy, which is used as an important instrument of foreign policy in many countries, generally refers to the provision of communication activities between the peoples and institutions of foreign countries and their own peoples and institutions. The essence of public diplomacy in all its different dimensions is based on the soft power of countries. The main difference of public diplomacy which is fed by soft power sources, from traditional diplomacy is that it includes not only the activities carried © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 351–356, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_31

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out by governments, but also the interactions of non-governmental organizations and societies. Therefore, public diplomacy means to pursue a communication strategy both from the state to the people and from the people to the people [2]. Although public diplomacy is known as a new form of diplomacy in the literature of international relations, it has actually been carried out by many countries for years in terms of cultural diplomacy. The main objectives of the countries in conducting cultural diplomacy are to introduce their own cultural elements and to build a sustainable network of relations with these different countries through these elements and to build trust and dialogue. Cultural diplomacy establishes lasting relations with peoples, even if governments change. In addition, cultural diplomacy can reach to influential members of foreign societies which cannot be achieved through traditional methods of diplomacy [7]. Cultural diplomacy, which can be defined as a way of expressing one’s self correctly and recognizing the addressee correctly by sharing ideas, thoughts, world views, lifestyles, aesthetic understandings, enjoyments and tastes; is the catalyst of social change and transformation as well as the tool of mutual interaction between societies. With communication and dialogue established through cultural diplomacy, mutual respect and trust among the peoples, as well as the adoption of new ideas and methods are ensured [9]. In this context, cultural diplomacy which was carried out for the Turkic-Muslim peoples of the former Soviet Union who has cultural and historical proximity with Turkey; has been effective in keeping the relationship alive between the local community and Turkey, from the second half of the 20th century, which coincides with the Cold War period. In this study, after a general assessment of the concept of cultural diplomacy, the effective cultural diplomacy conducted by artists from the second half of the 20th century and their contribution to the Turkey-Azerbaijan relations will be tried to be shown.

2 The Concept of Cultural Diplomacy Public diplomacy, in general, is the efforts of governments to inform and influence the internal or external public opinion in the desired direction. The first thing that comes to mind regarding public diplomacy is propaganda because it is determined and implemented by state apparatuses. In its essence, public diplomacy is official, planned and purpose-oriented [1]. Regarding cultural diplomacy, the individual or society comes to mind directly. It is the person who produces, carries and makes culture alive. Therefore, cultural diplomacy is an activity that touches people and is carried out from person to person. The role of the state here is limited to pre-opening and directing. State’s greatest contribution to cultural diplomacy is to provide an identity and a sense of belongingness which they will be honored to carry to their citizens. On the other hand, public and civil society should cooperate for an efficient cultural diplomacy. Cynthia P. Schneider states that the public and private sectors should develop a holistic strategy for cultural exchange and cultural diplomacy, and that cultural diplomacy can be successful if the necessary funds are provided. She gives the British Council a successful example in this respect [11]. American Political Scientist Dr. Milton C. Cummings describes cultural diplomacy as the mutual exchange of ideas, knowledge, values, tradition and culture. Cultural

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diplomacy means any human exchange [4]. Language is the most fundamental element of cultural diplomacy. Language, which is the most important element of culture, is also the most fundamental feature of a nation. The most direct way to recognize a culture, society and person is possible by learning its language. Language is the way of expressing how people perceive themselves and the world. Each language is the common worldview of people belonging to that language, the reading of collective thought [8]. With an idealist approach, it can be argued that, as people who speak the same language are decisive in determining national boundaries, an international society that tries to recognize and understand each other even if they do not speak the same language can be claimed as to make a more holistic structure. In this respect, cultural diplomacy is the key to peace and stability [9].

3 Music as a Tool of Cultural Diplomacy: The Example of Azerbaijan-Turkey Cultural diplomacy is an attempt to achieve practical and rapid results that we can see the effects of soft power in the long run. Topics such as media, culture, art, science, sports and education are the tools of soft power. It is known that most countries using public diplomacy carry out cultural diplomacy and especially music activities for this purpose. Music, in terms of social and cultural aspects, is embodied in the context of social relations and affects sociocultural life as it is influenced by sociocultural life [12]. Music shaped within the social structure provides social integration and identity construction by making sense of the social structure. Music, which is a strong reference in the context of identity and belonging, is also an art that provides social unity. In this regard, when the sociocultural context of music is considered, it is worth noting that the functions of music in the formation, transference and continuity of cultural memory are made more visible. The fact that music is a universal language that extends from person to person, and that it has the power to unite people who have different language and religion within the same melody, gave it a distinct place and a different privilege in the field of cultural diplomacy among other branches of art. In addition to acting as a means of entertainment in daily life, music has also revealed the globalization phenomenon and the interaction of mass culture with national cultures. Particularly in international politics, in the years of 1955–1966, known as the Cold War years, the parties of the war used music as an important cultural diplomacy tool. For example, concerts which were performed by world-famous jazz musicians in Africa, Asia, Middle East, Soviet and Eastern European countries with the sponsorship of the government are important cultural diplomacy practices that serve this purpose [10]. Or, the mutual tours of the Bolshoy and Kirov Ballet groups have contributed to the creation of a certain sympathy and the formation of intercultural recognition. The influence of American rock music in Soviet cultural life did not, of course, lead to the overthrow of the regime, but it was effective in introducing ideas of freedom and democracy to Soviet listeners [5]. On the other hand, the continuation of inter-block competition through

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cultural diplomacy during the Cold War period prevented the emergence of a more destructive new world war [6]. In this context, during the period of USSR, where ideological constraints in relations were intense, culture and art diplomacy has come to the fore in the relationships that exists between the Turkic communities which are located in Turkey and Soviet Union. In this process, the relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey represents a special example. After all, public diplomacy activities were conducted through music artists between the people of Azerbaijan and Turkey who belong to Oghuz tribe and where no difference of language is found. The concerts given by Turkish artists in Azerbaijan, as well as the concerts given by Azerbaijan artists in Turkey which has caused great interest from the public were important activities on behalf of public and cultural diplomacy. Artists and cultural actors as spokespersons of cultural diplomacy came forward as the most effective means of communication between the two peoples during this period. In this context, Azerbaijan’s famous voice artists Rashid Behbudov with violinist Azad Aliyev’s concert held in Ankara and Istanbul, in 1961, and again Azerbaijan’s famous voice artist Zeynep Hanlarova’s concerts held in Istanbul and Ankara in March of 1970, and later on the concerts which was held in different cities of Turkey to the large audience in 1989, were the important examples of cultural diplomacy which was carried out in the context of Azerbaijan-Turkey relations which were very limited due to the restrictions caused by the ideological barriers of the period. International cultural exchange gained momentum, in the context of the Cultural Exchange Program, which was signed during Ecevit’s visit to the USSR, took place in June 1978 and resulted in the signing of various agreements. Names such as ˙Idil Biret, Mete U˘gur, Barı¸s Manço, Suna Kan, Emel Sayın and ensembles such as Presidential Symphony Orchestra gave concerts in Baku, Tashkent and many other cities. These concerts of Turkish artists have led to tremendous enthusiasm in Azerbaijan. The ballet of “Muhabbet Efsanesi” written and composed by Professor Arif Melikov, the People’s Artist of the USSR and Azerbaijan in 1961, based on the tale of “Ferhat and Sirin” ¸ from Nazım Hikmet which has deep philosophical content is adapted to more than 60 theater stage of different countries and it has been the most spectacular and a new gift to world music culture. We should note that the well-known composer Niyazi, premiered and conducted this ballet at the Kirov Theater in 1962 [3]. Later this ballet was staged at Nazım’s homeland, Turkey, in 1981. This successful work became the symbol of the friendship between Azerbaijan and Turkey. The improved concept of cultural diplomacy towards the Turkish Republics in the post-USSR period was realized in the simplest form by exchanging ideas, knowledge, art and other cultural elements in a mutual understanding relationship. Thus, the accelerated process of dissolution of the Soviet since 1990, rapprochement between Turkey and Azerbaijan resulted in developments in the field of music and art in both countries with a new momentum. The apparent increase in the number of concerts by artists from both countries and the joint album work contributed to the strengthening of the emotional ties formed through music. Cultural events that were organized in this period such as festivals, concerts of popular artists, music events on television and radio programs were important factors in keeping these ties alive.

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4 Conclusion Cultural diplomacy, which became a very important and effective form of diplomacy during the Cold War and after the end of the Cold War, has become a soft power element that countries cannot give up on, especially with the rapid expansion of the so-called globalization process. In this context, diplomacy is no longer a work done by diplomats. Through the internet, every citizen can be a diplomacy executive, as well as those who have direct cultural interaction, from academicians to students, artists to opinion leaders. In addition, tourism provides a suitable ground and an important opportunity for humanto-human diplomacy. On the other hand, increasing the capacity of countries to use cultural diplomacy which is defined as soft power, also means that they use less of their hard power consisting of military and economic elements. It seems much more attractive to expand the cultural and political sphere and achieve the objectives without engaging in conflict rather than military and economic options, which are often considered more costly. In this context, soft power gives the opportunity of effect and control, far above the traditional power balance [13]. In this context, that the cultural diplomacy as a tool that has strategic importance of public diplomacy is understood from the examples contained in this study which we examined the art of music through Turkey and Azerbaijan. Cultural diplomacy is associated with the concept of public diplomacy as well as with soft power in many different countries of the world. Cultural changes and interactions are now taking place faster, but they are not happening at once. In order for this change to be observed and evaluated in a healthy way, it is necessary to grasp the history and read the parameters of today well. The new nations, which were trying to keep up with the “new” world order that emerged with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, were trying to develop relations with other countries of the world and started to need different tools to establish international relations. Especially during this period where globalization debates intensified, now there was a consensus that bilateral diplomacy cannot solve the problems of the world alone and that foreign policy had to keep up with this changing situation. It is a fact that traditional diplomatic history will deal with networks of relations between states and will continue to do so through bilateral channels of diplomacy as it exists.

References 1. Akçada˘g, E.A.: Dünya’da ve Türkiye’de kamu diplomasisi (2014). http://www.kamudiplo masisi.org/pdf/emineakcadag.pdf 2. Alagöz, E.A.: Bir kamu diplomasisi örne˘gi olarak Güney Kore (2013) 3. Akçada˘g, E.A.: Bir kamu diplomasisi örne˘gi olarak Güney Kore (2013). http://www.bilgesam. org/incele/124/-bir-kamu-diplomasisi-ornegi-olarak-guney-kore/#.XOKmv6ShmUk 4. Cummings, M.C.: Cultural diplomacy and the United States government: a survey. Center for Arts and Culture (2003) 5. Grincheva, N.: U.S. arts and cultural diplomacy: post-cold war decline and the twenty-first century debate. J. Arts Manag. Law Soc. 40, 169–183 (2010) 6. Gönlübol, M.: Uluslararası politik. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, p. 89 (2000)

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7. Kim, H.: Cultural diplomacy as the means of soft power in an information age. Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, p. 2 (2011). http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/pdf/casestudies/Hwa jung_Kim_Cultural_Diplomacy_as_the_Means_of_Soft_Power_in_the_Information_Age. pdf 8. Kitsou, S.: The power of culture in diplomacy: the case of U.S. cultural diplomacy in France and Germany exchange. J. Public Dipl. 2, 21–39 (2011) 9. Purta¸s, F.: Türk dı¸s politikasının yükselen de˘geri: Kültürel diplomasi. Akademik Bakı¸s 13, 2 (2013) 10. Schneider, C.P.: Cultural diplomacy: hard to define, but you’d know it if you saw it. Brown J. World Aff. 13, 191–203 (2006) 11. Schneider, C.P.: The unrealized potential of cultural diplomacy: “best practices” and what could be, if only…. J. Arts Manag. Law Soc. 39, 260–279 (2009) ˙I.: Dini hayatın ritmi: ritüel ve müzik. Ankara Üniversitesi ˙Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 12. Sahin, ¸ 49, 269–285 (2008) 13. Yılmaz, S.: Güç ve politika. ˙Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları, p. 53 (2008)

Cultural Cooperation Between Russia and Iraq in the Context of the Common National Identity Problem of Iraqi People Irina Kolesnik1(B) and Abu Baker Salih Mahdi Al Shammari2 1 Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected] 2 Saint-Petersburg State University of Industrial Technologies and Design Saint-Petersburg,

Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected]

Abstract. At present with the ongoing political tension in Middle East it is crucial not only to develop constructive diplomatic relations between Russia and Iraq, but also to maintain the dialogue in the sphere of culture. Iraq, whose territorial integrity, on the one hand, and national independence, on the other - are under threat, needs to preserve common national identity. National identity is based primarily on creating the image of a unified state, which symbols include, among others, specimens of art and culture. The efforts of Iraqi diplomats, scientists and intellectuals are aimed at altering the decades-old image of Iraq as a country of incessant slaughter and destruction, as well as preserving their cultural heritage. The cooperation between Russia and Iraq in the sphere of culture and art contributes to the transformation of the image of Iraq as a state on the global arena. Keywords: Russia · Iraq · Art · National identity · International relations · Culture · The State Museum of Oriental Art

1 Introduction Relevance. Modern historians consider Iraq, a major country of Middle East, in the context of repetitive events in the relatively young independent state, which came into being at the beginning of 20th century, i.e. the ever-arising threat to the territorial integrity, on the one hand, and national identity – on the other. This problem is connected with the issue of common national identity of Iraqi people. Building national identity is primarily based on creating, in the first place, the image of a unified state, whose symbols include, among others, specimens of art and culture. One can argue that the modern state Iraq is positioning itself on the global arena as a community of citizens interested in preserving their cultural heritage, as well as destroying the stubborn image of Iraq as an area of slaughter and war, and Iraq also calls for a new perception of the country as an heir, a custodian and a successor of cultural traditions of ancient Mesopotamian civilizations. Thus, culture and civilization are the key terms used by Iraqi diplomats. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 357–367, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_32

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2 Research Question The purpose of the given paper is to analyze the role and significance of the cooperation between Iraq and Russia in the sphere of culture and museum exchange in the context of the current political situation involving a threat to the territorial integrity of Iraq. Objectives: 1. To indicate the main threats to the territorial integrity of Iraq in the recent decade. 2. To demonstrate the importance of the landmark Monument to Revolution for the formation of the national identity of Iraqi people in the middle of the 20th century, as well as for the current political and cultural situation in Iraq. 3. To analyze the historical and political prerequisites for the development of cultural ties between Russia and Iraq. 4. To show the role of the State Museum of Oriental Art in establishing the cultural dialogue between both countries. 5. To provide a brief description of the exhibition of Iraqi art that took place in the Museum of Oriental Art from 13th to 24th February 2018. It should be mentioned that the novelty of the given paper lies in the fact that, firstly, in Russian scientific literature the issues of cultural ties between Russia and Iraq are practically not covered; secondly, the paper provides information about the RussoIraqi event of 2018 held in the State Museum of Oriental Art (Moscow), namely the exhibition From Babylon to Baghdad. Modern Painting of Iraq of 1960–2003; thirdly, new photographic content is presented; fourthly, there is traced the connection between the presentation of the new image of Iraq on the global arena and the issue of preserving the national identity of the people of Iraq.

3 Theoretical and Methodological Framework Theoretical and methodological basis for this research was taken from the works on national identity issues, in particular, the works of V.V. Tishkov, who was the director of N.N. Miklukho-Maklay Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology RAN from 1989 to 2015. The overview of Russian literature on the matter shows that the majority of scientific research concerning Iraqi history and culture was conducted in USSR over the period of 1960–1980 which was caused by improved relationships between two countries and great interest of Soviet scientists to Iraq. It’s worth mentioning the works of B.V. Vejmarn who specialised in the Near and Middle East art and is one of the authors of “The World History of Art”, “The Art of Countries and Peoples of the World” encyclopedia, “The Monuments of the World Art” series. Additionally, the monograph “The Contemporary Art of Iraq” (1982) by A.A. Bogdanov, the Doctor of Arts, should be mentioned. Amongst the contemporary research “The History of Iraq. XX century.” (2016) by N.V. Stepanova. Jabrah Ibrahim Jabrah is the most known author in Russia and worldwide in regards to the matter of the research.

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4 Findings In recent decades Iraq – the homeland of ancient civilizations – has begun to be associated not with the culture of Sumer, Babylon and Assyria, but with endless slaughter. Possessing valuable oil reserves, Iraq has become the apple of discord in the modern political arena. Having gained independence from Great Britain in the middle of 20th century, Iraq was determined not to lose it again and to establish itself in the world. The country is still struggling for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. After the period of the American invasion (2003–2011) Iraq had to face the challenge of ISIS (prohibited in the Russian Federation); the internal religious conflicts between Shia and Sunni became more acute, turning into a civil war; in 2017 there aggravated the conflict with the Kurds, who held a referendum in order to declare independence from Iraq. It can be argued that during the whole post-World War II period the issue of national unity for the purpose of preserving the state itself has always been acute. It has been well understood by not only the political leaders of Iraq, but also the forward-minded intellectuals and cultural figures. Importantly, art has played a significant role in the formation of the national identity of Iraqi people. Thus, one of the current issues, concerning both the position of Iraq on the global arena and its internal policy, is the problem of preserving a unified state. The word “unified” can be understood as the state within its current geographic borders”, Stepanova writes about Iraq [12]. If the main problematic regions of the country are enumerated, including the Kurdistan region of Iraq, the southern Shia part of Iraq, territories bordering on Iran, Mosul and the neighboring towns, which have become a target for ISIS (prohibited in Russia), as centers not only for making profit due to oil production but also for the new Islamic state, to say nothing of a certain lack of independence and the dependence of Iraq on the USA – it becomes clear that there are various threats to the territorial integrity of Iraq: internal religious clashes, ethnic conflicts, terrorism and the interests of powerful states that exert control. According to researchers, “In recent years experts in Middle East affairs have speculated several times on the possible way to resolve the conflict, i.e. the partitioning of Iraq into three ethnic and religious zones – Kurdish, Shia and Sunni. The current situation has become a threat to the very existence of Iraq as a centralized state, created in 1920” [8]. The threat of the partition of Iraq renders it urgent to take a number of measures in order to secure the country from it. To preserve the territorial integrity it is necessary to continue the social and cultural policy, which was initiated in 1920s, aimed at forming the common national identity and creating sustainable symbols of Iraq as an independent state. One of the examples of a cultural symbol of this kind is the famous Iraqi landmark Monument to Revolution by Jawad Salim [3]. The historical events of the middle of the 20th century served as prerequisites for the creation of the monument. The years from 1940 to 1961 were the period of the political and national development of Arab countries, the fight for national liberation. On 14th July 1958 a revolution took place, as a result of which Iraq was proclaimed an independent republic. On 26th July a provisionary constitution was adopted, in which the equality of all citizens before law was declared and democratic freedoms were guaranteed. For the first time in history the women of Iraq received equal rights with men. After the revolution of 1958 new arts and artistic schools started to develop rapidly [1]. In 1956

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there opened the Association of Iraqi Artists (the Society of Iraqi Artists). In 1960 there was established the Academy of Fine Arts (the Academy of Arts) affiliated with the University of Baghdad [5]. At the same time Iraq started implementing a program of city planning and development, which includes artistic design projects for squares and public gardens, as well as erecting sculptural monuments. A new symbol of Iraqi art is the monumental sculptural work Monument to Revolution (1961). The author of the stone postament is Reafat Al Gadri (1926–1961), an artist and architect from Baghdad. The author of the bronze reliefs of the monument is a renowned Iraqi architect Jawad Salim. These reliefs are considered Salim’s most outstanding achievement, the utmost point of his career. This monument has become a symbol of the transition to a new era in Iraqi art. The authors of the monument pay homage to the artistic heritage of Mesopotamia, and they proclaim the advent of the new epoch of the Republic. The Monument to Revolution situated in Tahrir Square in Baghdad is an immense sculptural frieze, 50 m long. It should be noted that the capital of Baghdad stretches along the Tigris River for about 16–20 km and two main roads run across the city: the longitudinal one connects the old and the new city, and the transversal road leads to the railway station and the airport across the Tigris. The architect decided to place the Monument at the intersection of these roads, where Tahrir Square is situated, in which people still like to gather for public rallies. A concrete wall of 50 × 10 m supported by two pillars leaves a passage below, resembling a triumphal arch. Facing the river travertine-coated plane includes bronze reliefs 5–6 m tall. Twelve figures are divided into three groups according to their content: on the right and in the center the struggle for liberation of the country is depicted, while on the left one can see the result – peaceful productive work. Such arrangement of the figures is determined by the principles of write-to-left Arabic writing. In the center of the composition there is a sculpture of a person breaking the window bars of a prison. The powerful movement of a person that has already been released from prison is designed with great artistic merit. It seems that the figures of the lateral side of the frieze are moving following the same rhythm as the central figure. In its left-hand part one can see the hard-working men of Iraq – fellahs – ploughing the soil and harvesting. In the right-hand part there are presented the images of struggle, symbolizing the turbulent history of Iraq, full of bloody confrontations. The sketches and sculptural drafts by Salim illustrate the process of searching for every image of the composition. The bronze figures fixed to the surface of stone slabs stand out against that background. Jawad Salim devoted the last years of his life to designing and creating this monument, it is the result of his contemplation and research, in which he managed to combine the features of Arab-Iraqi art with modern tendencies. Thus, J. Salim himself became a symbol of the new art of the new country. It can be said that the whole new artistic movement of Iraq emerged owing to this artist, who contributed to the amalgamation of tradition and modern ideas and approaches, the amalgamation of Iraqi art with the global artistic tendencies. J. Salim “embraced simultaneously the sculpture of Sumer and Assyria, the illustrations of Yahya ibn Mahmud al-Wasiti, the famous Abbasid bronzeware, and he also contemplated various theories of modern art”. During the second half of the 20th century numerous sculptural compositions and architectural monuments were created in Iraq, which reflect not only the powerful martial

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spirit, heroism and courage of the people of Iraq, but also the values of peaceful life. These monuments help to preserve the national unity of Iraqi people and they can serve as symbols of their national identity and become a new “image” of the country. However, they are hardly known in Russia and the rest of the world. To create a new image of the country on the global arena it is necessary to develop the cultural cooperation between the countries, which has been implemented during the last 80 years by Iraq and the USSR-Russia. Nevertheless, since cultural exchange has always relied heavily on the political agenda, its nature has undergone a few changes due to the unstable political situation. The diplomatic relations between Iraq and the USSR were established on 9th September 1944 implemented by diplomatic missions. In 1955 after Iraq joined the Baghdad Pact the government of Nuri al-Said severed the diplomatic relations with the USSR. During the period of 1955–1958 the contacts were broken off following the establishment of monarchy in Iraq. During the revolution of 1958 the last king of Iraq Faisal II from the dynasty of the Hashemites and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said were assassinated. The epoch of monarchy was over. In 1958 Iraq started to develop independently. In July 1958 Iraq re-established the diplomatic relations with the USSR implemented by embassies and signed several treaties, including those on cultural cooperation. After the re-establishment of the diplomatic relations between both countries “the USSR acquired an exceptional influence in Iraq for a period of many years” [7]. In 1972 Iraq and the USSR signed the crucial Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. As the Ambassador of Iraq in Russia Haidar Mansur Hadi remarked at the press conference that was held in Moscow on 20th February 2018, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed on 9th August 1972 by General Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, the political leader and Prime Minister of Iraq, and Aleksey Kosygin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the USSR, is especially important for the diplomatic relations between our countries, which were established in 1944, and for the whole dialogue between Moscow and Baghdad. The treaty came into effect in the same year and soon after that Abdel Baki Murtada Said, Foreign Minister of the Iraqi Republic, visited Moscow where he signed several mutually advantageous agreements with the Soviet authorities. [7]. Researchers claim that at the time “Iraq was one of the key allies of Moscow in Middle East from the geopolitical point of view”. On the whole, during the period of “1958–1990 more than fifty agreements were signed”. During the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988) Moscow and Baghdad started working closer together. A good example of such cooperation is the following fact, “In the middle of July 1981 the Soviet governmental delegation arrived in Baghdad in order to participate in the ceremony of the Independence Day [6]. These political events may account for the active cooperation of both countries in the sphere of culture and education in 1960–1980. A big number of students who studied at Soviet universities, exhibitions and museum exchange – all this led to the traditions of the Russian artistic school spreading in Iraq. Another result of the normalization of relations between Iraq and the USSR was the organization of several exhibitions in the State Museum of Oriental Art in 1959, 1967, 1971, 1974 and 1977 [9]. Starting from this period, Iraqi artists began to come to the USSR in order to receive education at the universities of Moscow and other cities.

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In 1986 the exhibition Oriental Art Working for Peace and Humanism was inaugurated at the State Museum of Oriental Art, which featured a wide collection of painting, drawing, sculpture and decorative and applied arts of Oriental people, including works of art from Iraq; the exhibition was housed in twenty halls. “The tension of our days, the unprecedented clash between good and evil bring about the major issue for the art community, which is to work for peace…”, said B.S. Ugarov, artist, Professor, President of the Academy of Arts, the USSR, in his introduction to the exhibition overview [10]. Interestingly, in spite of the thirty years that have passed, the title of the project of 1986 has not lost its significance and it is still in sync with the message of the exhibition that took place in 2018. If at that time the importance of fighting for peace and political, cultural and economic independence resulted from World War II, at this moment the wave of terrorism sweeping through the whole world encourages people to stop internal and international conflicts. The words “strengthening friendship between peoples” have been not mere slogans for a long time, but they have become an urgent necessity. The active cooperation in the sphere of museum exchange between Iraq and the USSR in the 1960s–80s was followed by a long gap, since the relations between the USSRRussia and Iraq worsened as a result of the Kuwait Crisis. Historians state that “before the events of 1990–1991 there had been a tremendous improvement in the Soviet-Iraqi relations. Then, in the 1990s, the relations practically shrank to a nullity and remained so during the whole decade”. During the period from the beginning of the 21st century to the American invasion of Iraq the relations between Russia and Iraq were generally estimated as positive by researches; it was mentioned that “2001 was considered both by Iraq and the Russian Federation as a decisive moment for the beginning of a new stage in Russo-Iraqi relations…” Professor Zair-Bek V.A., Academician of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences writes in the introduction to a multi-authored monograph of 2002, “It inspires optimism that there are intensive political contacts between Russia and Iraq, which manifest themselves as constant exchange of visits, the restored work of the intergovernmental commission and strengthened intergovernmental, interdepartmental and inter-parliamentary ties. The multi-level coordination of the political efforts of both countries, aimed at lifting the international sanctions, as well as the position of Russia concerning the actors of aggression against Iraq in the USA and Great Britain enable, together with other factors, having an optimistic view about the future of the bilateral relations” [7]. However, the subsequent events again led to a decline in cooperation. N.V. Stepanova writes in the monograph of 2016, “As nowadays Iraq is practically under American control, it means that the country is severely restricted in its choice of partners for economic cooperation” [12]. Nonetheless, it is obvious that in recent years it is the cooperation in different spheres that has become a priority in various areas, such as the economic, political, military-strategic, as well as culture and education. It can be argued that Russia acts as a political stabilizer in resolving acute conflicts in Middle East” [8]. At the moment the relations between Iraq and Russia should be characterized as friendly. Russian News & Information Agency “RIA Novosti”/Russia Today informs, “In recent years the political dialogue between Russia and Iraq has really got under way. On 21st May 2015 Iraq’s Prime Minister Haidar Abadi visited Russia at the invitation of

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Vladimir Putin, who met him in person. The issues discussed included bilateral cooperation and the international agenda. The intensified cooperation between Iraq and Russia in the sphere of culture was also mentioned” [11]. In 2015 Vladimir Medinsky, the Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation, and Faryad Muhammed Faki Hasan Ravandozi, the Minister of Culture of Iraq, signed the interdepartmental Memorandum of Cooperation between the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Culture of Iraq for 2015–2017. According to the memorandum, both parties are obliged to create favorable conditions for cooperation and exchange in all spheres of culture, including music, theatre, cinematography, visual arts, library and museum services [14]. On 13th February the exhibition of paintings, provided by the Embassy of Iraq, named From Babylon to Baghdad. Modern Iraqi Paining of 1960–2003, was opened at the State Museum of Oriental Art (Moscow) [15]. The exhibition was the first project, after a long gap, which presented in Russia the main stages of the development of modern Iraqi art. This event may be characterized as a significant cultural and political step in building relations between Iraq and other countries. The organization of the exhibition in February 2018 can be considered as one of the first steps towards the renewal of relations between Iraq and Russia in the sphere of culture. At the opening ceremony, supported by the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Russia, the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, the State Museum of Oriental Art and the Commission for the National Cultural Heritage and Ethnocultural Development of the Council for Ethnic Affairs affiliated to Moscow City Administration, a speech was made by Haidar Mansur Hadi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Iraq. In his inaugural address he emphasized that the current stage in the history of Iraq could be compared to the way how the citizens of Leningrad (currently Saint-Petersburg) had survived and had got a new lease of life after the lifting of the siege and the victory over the Nazi Germany; and that in spite of all slaughter in Iraq of the recent decades the culture of the country was reviving, Iraq wants to show to the world that it strives for humanism and cultural ties with other countries. Tatiana Khristoforovna Metaksa, First Deputy General Director of the State Museum of Oriental Art and Aleksandr Fiodorovich Berdnikov, Head of the Commission for the National Cultural Heritage and Ethnocultural Development of the Council for Ethnic Affairs affiliated to Moscow City Administration made speeches at the opening ceremony. A.F. Berdnikov stressed that the exhibition had been prepared on the initiative of the Commission and the Museum of Oriental Art and he thanked the Ambassador of Iraq and his spouse, who had been quick to respond and had helped to rapidly prepare the “superb exhibition”, which could be considered as the first stage in renewing the comprehensive ties between Russia and Iraq in the sphere of culture, and in the area of museum exchange in particular. According to him, the relations that formed in the 1970–80s were frozen for an uncertain period of time due to objective reasons, but now Iraq is becoming more powerful both economically and politically, and its role in the region is growing, including the sphere of culture. “That is why we are sure that this first step, this exhibition will be followed by other steps, which will help to restore full and complete the cooperation that we had, and I think it will augment”, those were the closing remarks made by A.F. Berdnikov. Bashir Galibovich al-Nashi, a well-known public

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figure, made a speech in the Russian and Arab languages. He said that the support from the Embassy of Iraq in Russia and the Museum of Oriental Art granted to prepare the exhibition testified to the fact that the exhibition was just “the first step in establishing friendly relations between the peoples of Iraq and Russia, as those relations have started to strengthen of late, and before that they did not exist, they were dying out. When the idea of the exhibition arose, it was determined by the strengthening ties between our people. Cultural ties reflect the needs of our peoples best of all”. Special gratitude was expressed to Meysam al-Rubai, the spouse of the Ambassador, whose portrait by artist O.B. Arakcheeva was presented at the exhibition. As it was mentioned by the speakers, Meysam al-Rubai acted as a representative of the forward-looking women of Iraq and the culture of modern Iraq; owing to her efforts it was possible to lay the groundwork for the exhibition. The exhibition was welcomed by the audience with great interest and it was widely covered in mass media of both countries. The Embassy of Iraq presented a film in the Russian language that demonstrated the history and modern life of Iraq. The exhibition included the works by famous Iraqi artists who have become internationally recognized, such as Alaa Beshir, Leyla al-Attar, Saadi al-Kaabi, Husein al-Jaman and many others. Most of the works presented at the exhibition were implemented by the graduates of the Academy of Fine Arts, Baghdad, where outstanding painters and sculptors not only from Iraq, but also from other Arab countries traditionally worked. In recent years they have been joined by numerous young artists who studied in the Soviet Union, in Russia, Italy, France, Spain, Egypt, Germany, Poland and Bulgaria, thus representing a variety of forms and methods of visual arts typical for these countries. The role of the Museum of Oriental Art in the development of cultural ties between Iraq and Russia should be emphasized. The Museum of Oriental Art is the one and only museum in Russia, specializing in “collecting, preserving, studying and popularizing Oriental art” [13]. The museum collection comprises about 80 works of Iraqi art. Among them there are paintings by well-known Iraqi artists, such as Jawad Salim, Hasan Faik, Ismail ash-Shihli, Faraj Abbo an-Numan, Shamsaddin Faris, Mahud Ahmed, Mohammed Ali Arif, Nimat Mahmud Hikmat, Fuad Jihad, Valid Shyt, Jabar Majbil, Mohammed Fradi, Ahmed an-Numan [2]. Taking into account the fact that the works by Iraqi artists are not part of the permanent exhibition of the museum, the task of the project is to help visitors to familiarize themselves with the most significant landmarks of Iraqi art, and it has been accomplished. At the exhibition the Embassy of Iraq presented a documentary film, which portrayed a comprehensive image of Iraq as a country bearing a huge potential, both historically and culturally. In the film Iraq is called “the homeland of civilization and hope”. The film claims that Iraq, Mesopotamia is a land that witnessed the prime of human civilization. History speaks for the grandeur of this country, which is deeply rooted in the world culture. Thus, the events aimed at popularizing the art of Iraq in Russia, as well as a genuine interest of mass media of both countries and researchers of modern Iraqi art undoubtedly contribute to the development of the cultural dialogue between the two countries and tension relief, and they also provide an opportunity to study Iraqi art [4]. The state Museum of Oriental Art is a major organization in Russia, where Iraqi-Soviet-Russian

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exhibitions have been held since the middle of the 20th century. Art has always served as antithesis to war; creative activity has always reflected a striving, an aspiration to balance the destructive features of individuals and societies, which was vividly demonstrated at the exhibition From Babylon to Baghdad that took place in February 2018. On the whole, the purpose of the exhibition is to eradicate the image of Iraq as a country of incessant wars and conflicts; to show that despite the extremely harsh living conditions of recent decades, art has not ceased to exist, and that the ordinary citizens of Iraq, as well as high-ranking officials are eager to restore peace and order.

5 Conclusion The issue of preserving the independence of the people of Iraq and its territorial integrity is still acute. Intermittent wars and internal ethnic and religious conflicts are literally tearing the country apart. In the present-day situation of incessant political tension in Middle East it is vital not only to develop the diplomatic relations between Iraq and Russia, but also the cultural dialogue. The efforts of Iraqi diplomats, scientists and intellectuals are aimed at altering the decades-old image of Iraq as a country where slaughter and destruction are unstoppable, as well as at preserving their cultural heritage. In the second half of the 20th century various organizations appeared in Iraq, contributing to the creation of new works of art and cultural artefacts, which serve as a basis for the modern cultural identity of Iraqi people and help to preserve their national identity. However, a lot of them were under threat of destruction after the political regime was changed in 2003. Besides, they remain hardly known in Russia and the rest of the world, which is why studying Iraqi art is a relevant objective in modern science. The monumental architectural and sculptural compositions erected in Iraq in the 20th century are perceived in a new way in the current situation. For instance, in 2013–2017 public rallies were held many times at Tahrir Square, the central square in Baghdad, where Monument to Revolution is situated, which is the main cultural symbol of victory in the struggle for the liberation of Iraq. Thus, one can confer that this work of art is still a symbol of freedom of Iraqi people. After the political regime in Iraq was changed, the monumental architectural landmarks of the previous periods were under threat of demolition. During the war of 2003– 2011 numerous artefacts of the ancient cultures of Babylon, Assyria and Sumer were destroyed. Monuments built in the last 60–70 years were especially damaged. While Saddam Hussein was in office, countless monuments were erected not only in Baghdad, but also in other cities of Iraq. Iraqi scientists and intellectuals are campaigning for the recognition of all works of art, sculpture and architecture as cultural heritage. On balance, the fact that Iraq gained its independence and established contacts with the USSR and European countries in the sphere of culture and education triggered the emergence of various artistic schools in Iraq. The changes in the nature of the diplomatic relations between Iraq and the USSR-Russia in different periods had a direct impact on the cooperation in the area culture and museum exchange. The creative activity of the famous artists and sculptors of Iraq in the second half of the 20th century was determined by the influence of European schools, on the one hand, and searching for national identity – on the other. The biographies of painters reflect the changes that have been happening

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since the middle of the 20th century. It is hard to overestimate the role of the Museum of Oriental Art in the sphere of cooperation and museum exchange between Iraq and Russia: the majority of the exhibitions of Iraqi art in the USSR and Russia were organized by this museum. The aim of the organizers of the exhibition is to create a new image of Iraq as a country with a rich history and culture, striving for peace which can be attained by means of art, among other things.

References 1. Al Shammari, A.B.S.M., Kalashnikova, N.M.: The formation of new art in Iraq (the 20th century). Bull. St.-Petersb. State Univ. Ind. Technol. Des. Ser. 2. Arts Philol. 3, 3–9 (2017). (in Russian) 2. Al Shammari, A.B.S.M., Kolesnik, I.I.: The development of visual arts in Iraq of the 20th century (source – the state museum of oriental art, Moscow). Bull. St.-Petersb. State Univ. Ind. Technol. Des. Ser. 2. Arts Philol. 2(2), 3–10 (2018). (in Russian) 3. Al Shammari, A.B.S.M., Kolesnik, I.I.: The monument by Jawad Salim “monument to revolution” as a symbol of freedom of Iraqi people. In: The Week of Science: Proceedings of the Scientific Conference with International Participation. Institute of Humanities 2018. The Publishing House of Peter the Great Saint-Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, pp. 251–253 (2018). (in Russian) 4. Al Shammari, A.B.S.M., Kolesnik, I.I.: The role and significance of developing cooperation in the sphere of culture and museum exchange between Russia and Iraq in modern times. In: Galiullina, S.D., Oth, (eds.) The world of East and the World of West: Problems and Prospects: A Collection of Scientific Articles of the International Research-to-Practice Conference, 25 April 2018, pp. 54–59. Publishing House of Ufa State Oil Technical University, Ufa (2018). (in Russian) 5. Bogdanov, A.A.: Modern art of Iraq (1900s–1970s). Art, Moscow (1982). (in Russian) 6. Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn’ (International Affairs). https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/17084. (in Russian) 7. Khazanov, A.M., Khamidov, Z.Sh.: Russia and Iraq: the issues of cooperation and foreign policy. The Republic of Iraq in the System of International Relations, Moscow (2002). (in Russian). https://search.rsl.ru/ru/record/01001844138 8. Kolesnik, I.I., Mukbil, M.H., Tutaeva, R.U.: The diplomatic relations between Russia and the countries of Middle East (Syria, Yemen, Iraq). Int. Relat. Dialogue of Cult. Sci. Articl. Sel. 2, 21–36 (2014). https://www.elibrary.ru/contents.asp?id=34036495. (in Russian) 9. Lasikova, G.V.: Modern painting and graphics of Arab countries in the collection of the state museum of oriental art. The State Museum of Oriental Art, Moscow (2009). https://rusneb. ru/catalog/000200_000018_RU_NLR_bibl_1482051/. (in Russian) 10. Oriental Art Working for Peace and Humanism: The ministry of culture of the USSR. The State Museum of Oriental Art. Soviet Artist, Moscow (1986). https://e-catalog.nlb.by/Rec ord/BY-NLB-rr21822140000. (in Russian) 11. Russian News & Information Agency “RIA Novosti”: Russia Today. https://ria.ru/spravka/ 20170723/1498945524.html. (in Russian) 12. Stepanova, N.V.: The history of Iraq. The 20th Century. Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Oriental Studies. IOS RAS, Moscow (2016). https://search.rsl.ru/ru/record/010087 79417. (in Russian) 13. The State Museum of Oriental Art: Guidebook. SMOA, Moscow (2016). https://www.orient museum.ru/store/publishing/gmv_put2012/index.php?lang=en. (in Russian)

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14. Website of the Ministry of Culture, the Russian Federation. https://www.mkrf.ru/press/news/ ministry-kultury-rossii-i-iraka-podpisali-protokol-o-sotrudnichestve-v-sfere-kul201710061 71334/. (in Russian) 15. Website of the State Museum of Oriental Art. http://www.orientmuseum.ru/exhibitions/arc hive/-item=608.aspx. (in Russian)

Culture as the Basis for Shaping a Positive Image of Russia: Potential, Problems, and Solutions Natalia Bogoliubova, Julia Nikolaeva, and Elena Eltc(B) Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to determine the role of culture in the process of shaping a favorable foreign-policy image of Russia in the world. In the context of the modern theories of J. Nye, S. Anholt, P. Bourdieu, E. Galumov, emphasizing the image role of culture in international relations, the authors analyze the potential of Russian culture as a tool of foreign cultural policy and “soft power” of the Russian Federation. The discrepancy between the cultural potential of the country and low image indicators has been revealed on the basis of data from international ratings of “soft power”. The role of the dominant tools of the foreign cultural policy of Russia is being studied. These are represented by: multinational Russian culture and Russian language, cross years of cultures, sports and other various mega-events, the international activities of the Hermitage. The conclusion about the insufficiency of data, bringing only a temporary effect, about the methods and approaches for shaping a stable positive image of Russia in the world has been made. Realization of the high potential of Russian culture, science, sports requires the development of a well-thought image policy and strategy, especially after the “Ukrainian crisis” of 2014. As recommendations, the authors propose to take into account the successful experience of foreign image campaigns, to focus on largescale projects, mega-events that cover a wide audience and provide a quick positive image effect. Keywords: Image of Russia · Foreign cultural policy · “Soft power” · Global rankings · Cultural cooperation

1 Introduction Culture as a Tool for Shaping the Image of the State Contemporary Russia, especially after the “Ukrainian crisis” of 2014, has faced serious image problems, which in many respects complicate its foreign policy and economic cooperation with the United States and a number of European countries. Even despite successfully implemented image projects, such as the 2014 Olympic Winter Games in Sochi, the 2017 FIFA Confederations Cup in St. Petersburg, the 2018 FIFA World Cup, the 2019 Winter Universiade in Krasnoyarsk, our country’s image still needs serious improvement. The image of the State is an intangible asset that has great value. In a certain perspective, it can bring both an economic effect in the form of an investment inflow or an influx © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 368–383, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_33

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of foreign tourists and a reputational effect related to strengthening the international standing. Additional conditions for expanding the cultural influence of the country, promoting its products to world markets are being created. This explains the significant interest of modern States in improving their international image [14]. In shaping a positive image of the State, one of the main roles is played by culture and cultural ties. Modern society is characterized by a high degree of diversity of cultural types and intercultural interaction [10]. Culture is at the center of the theory of “soft power”, which has received considerable distribution both in the world political science and in Russia in recent years. According to J. Nye, the creator of this popular theory, the country’s language and culture play a key role in international relations, influencing directly or indirectly on world politics and business ties, as well as on the country’s image in the world [15]. In developing that idea, Nye has defined “soft power” as the ability to get what one wants through attraction, which arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies, and pointed to its culture, political values, and foreign policies as three primary resources that generate “soft power” [16: 10]. It creates the basis for the “Soft Power 30” vision. A global ranking of “soft power” produced annually by the political consultancy and PR agency “Portland Communications” is intended to identifying and measuring of “soft power” to incorporate it into foreign policy. To measure the growing “soft power” influence is one of the tasks of Elcano Global Presence Index also based on Nye’s theory and initiated to strengthen the country’s impact on the international stage. The index includes three major dimensions: economic, military and soft presence, impacting on current international affairs [18: 19– 22]. In order to take into account the growing importance of “soft power” in modern world affairs, D. Ronfeldt and J. Arquilla have offered a concept of noöpolitik, meaning an approach to diplomacy and strategy for the information age that emphasizes the shaping and sharing of ideas, values, norms, laws, and ethics through “soft power” and calls for redefinition of power, security, strategy, and diplomacy [21]. The success of the practical application of the “soft power” concept is dependent on constant monitoring of its effects and updating approaches to its measuring. The existing literature provides a wealth of data. Nye has elaborated model for conversion of “soft power” into the desired outcome through identifying and activating its available resources and employing certain strategies that lead to certain outputs [17: 94–100]. Modern approaches take into account shaping complex networks of relationships between agents and subjects of “soft power” and forming public perceptions. Quantitative and qualitative methods for evaluating such indicators are specified in J. Pamment’s article, who commends the role of the Nation Brands Index, initiated in 2005 by S. Anholt. The perception-based index measures the reputations of 50 countries in sectors such as tourism, culture, and governance, and produces an overall ranking of the national image [19: 54–57]. Country RepTrak also measures the perception of people about a country and integrates primary data and surveys applied in foreign countries. In 2014 Anholt and R. Govers founded Good Country Index, which stands out by fundamentally ethical and liable features and contributes to a global discussion about balancing country’s duty to its citizens with its responsibility to the wider world [2: 166]. Russian Federation demonstrates a growing interest in promoting its cultural achievements, using culture, that “soft-power” method, as means of building up the country’s

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image and advancing political and economic interests. However, a liberal democratic bias of “soft power” theory and scholarship has dismissed Russia’s potential attractiveness to global audiences, interpreting it in terms of propaganda [13: 25–26]. This has led to restrictions within the Russian “soft power” [12: 5]. In Russia, the term “soft power” was first officially used in 2012 in a programmatic article by President V.V. Putin’s Russia and a Changing World, where it is defined as “a set of tools and methods for achieving foreign-policy goals without using weapons, but through informational and cultural leverages” [20]. At the same time, there is the concept of “foreign cultural policy”, enshrined in the documentation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Rossotrudnichestvo, along with the concept of “soft power” in the Russian political lexicon. The foreign cultural policy is a set of norms, principles, and measures implemented by the State at the foreign-policy level in order to create a positive image and build a favorable international political climate. When it comes to the role of culture in the concept of “soft power”, first of all, it means the spread of cultural influence, which is based on cultural and value attractiveness, achievements of classical and modern culture, as well as on the attractive image of the country. The difference in the foreign cultural policy is that it is designed not only to promote the cultural achievements and values of the nation abroad, but also to ensure access of the citizens of their country to the cultural achievements of other peoples [9]. Thus, propaganda of one’s own culture should be based on the principle of respect for cultural diversity and readiness for cultural dialogue. The dialogue of cultures is the most important principle of modern foreign cultural policy, to which many countries gradually come. In principle, foreign cultural policy and “soft power” have similar tools: literature, theater, cinema, music, dance, painting, architecture, sculpture, tourism, sports, science, education, and the dissemination of language. Mass culture with its diversity of types and forms of manifestation is of great importance. Major cultural and sports mega-events play an equally important role: festivals of jazz, pop, and rock music, the organization of exhibitions, tours, the Olympic Games and world championships in sports. A huge role is played by the dissemination of interest in language learning, the development of contacts between museums, libraries, and archives with different countries of the world. Considerable attention is paid to the activities of cultural institutions, the promotion of exchange programs in the field of science and education. In a digital society, the Internet has great potential as an intermediary in disseminating information about the culture of different countries and as a platform for intercultural communication. The main components of culture as a tool of “soft power” and the foreign cultural policy of States are also spiritual and moral values, cultural and civilizational achievements, and cultural heritage. Thus, culture and cultural ties with the right approach can become an effective tool for the self-presentation of a State on the world stage, a means of shaping its favorable image and advancing political and economic interests. Formation of a positive image of Russia requires examination and elaboration of methodological tools in the light of international experience and trends. The article proposes an integrated methodological framework for the analysis of resource potential of culture and strategies for its use to enhance the State’s image.

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2 Methodology and Discussions The methodological basis of the research includes a set of various methods that allow determining the role of culture in the process of forming a favorable foreign-policy image of the country. Thus, the systematic approach contributed to the disclosure of the essence of the “soft power” and “foreign cultural policy” concepts as an integral set of ideas and practical ways of their implementation. The structural-functional method was necessary to identify cultural tools of “soft power” and foreign policy, as well as to determine their effectiveness in shaping the country’s favorable image. The comparative method made it possible to compare the use of culture in shaping their image by Russia and other countries. Finally, the prognostic method allowed for an assessment of the possible prospects for using culture to improve the image of modern Russia. The views and ideas of outstanding modern scientists—P. Bourdieu, J. Nye, Z. Brzezinski, S. Anholt—have been used as the basic methodological concepts underlying the study. Based on various approaches, these authors investigate in detail the image role of culture in international relations. In the concept of the symbolic capital of the French sociologist P. Bourdieu, culture is given top priority. P. Bourdieu believes that the symbolic capital of culture forms a credit of trust in the society, contributes to the strengthening of reputation and prestige. Culture, according to P. Bourdieu, gives importance to the image of the country, which has real power over the minds of people [4]. Subsequently, in the late 1990s, the British marketer S. Anholt developed these views, incorporating them into his own concept of territorial branding, in a number of his works. S. Anholt believes that culture can become one of the main components of the image of any State, its unique brand and competitive advantage [3]. He draws attention to the use of branding technologies in the foreign policy of modern States in promoting their national interests and national culture. The present study also relies on the ideas of the American political scientist Z. Brzezinski, who outlined four areas of world power in his geopolitical concept: he placed culture on a par with the military sphere, economics, and technology [5]. In the 1990s, American political analyst Joseph Nye incorporated culture into the concept of “soft power” as its fundamental resource and the most important tool of a State influence. It is culture, according to J. Nye, that creates an attractive image of the State and forms an army of its many supporters [16]. In Russian science, the idea of the special role of culture in the foreign policy of States was developed by E.A. Galumov [11] and some other researchers.

3 Problems of Shaping the Contemporary Russia Image Russia has significant cultural potential, but using it as a tool of “soft power” is clearly not enough. This, in particular, is convincingly shown by the data of international ratings, which measure the “soft-power” potential of various States and the degree of their attractiveness. Currently, one of the most famous ranking of country image is The Good Country Index (GCI) which presents the following dimensions: Science and Technology, Culture, International Peace and Security, Planet and Climate, World Order Health and Wellbeing. Russia had been enhancing annually its rate in ranking from 2015 onward,

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despite the difficulties and challenges that it faced after the “Ukrainian crisis”. If in 2015 Russia was in the 95th place, in 2016 it moved to 78th , in 2017 – to 65th , and in 2018 the country has climbed to 41st place. The highest rates were recorded in the next fields: science and technology (in 2018 – 29th place), contribution to peace and international security (26th place in 2018), health and well-being (27th place in 2018). Low rates refer to the criteria culture, planet and climate – 87, contribution to the world order – 91 [27]. These data strongly suggest that the cultural potential of the country is not maximized. At the same time, according to the author of this rating, Anholt, one of the main problems with Russia’s image is that the country is experiencing a “lack of cultural activity”. As a recommendation, the expert advises to “fire up the Russian culture, once one of the strongest in the world”, as well as to rethink its cultural image [25]. The Country RepTrak rating is published annually by the international consulting company Reputation Institute based on an international poll. The image evaluation is carried out among 55 countries on 4 major emotional criteria: admiration, trust, devotion, respect. In assessing the country’s reputation, such parameters as the quality of life, foreign policy, business climate, goods and services, infrastructure, the beauty of nature and tourist attraction are taken into account. After the “Ukrainian crisis”, when Russia’s image sharply fell, the country moved to 65th place in 2016 (the worst indicator), while in 2015 it took 52nd place; in 2017 – 51st and in 2018 – 52nd . The highest rates were noted in the fields of technology, well-known brands, the value of education, and a favorable environment for business. The worst rates were noted in such criteria as lifestyle, safety and friendliness, and hospitality. In the comments to the rating, it is mentioned that at the turn of 2015–2016 Russia made a powerful leap in the accumulation of a positive image. The successful military development of Russian troops in Syria, meaningful negotiations between Russian diplomats on Iran’s nuclear program contributed to this situation [6]. Unfortunately, culture is not among the means that favor the improvement of the perception of Russia. One of the respected international ratings of “soft power” of States is the Global Ranking of Soft Power/The Soft power 30, annually compiled by Portland Communications, the British agency. Portland is an agency that specializes in political consultation and public relations, established in 2001. Beginning in 2015, the agency publishes an annual Soft Power Index, in which 30 countries with the highest rates are represented. The analysis is carried out according to the criteria of the digital sphere, culture, involvement in the solution of world problems, education, entrepreneurship, government, and elections. For the first time, Russia has entered the TOP 30 countries, using “soft power” in 2016, ranking 27th . In 2016, the highest indicators for Russia were, according to the criteria of engagement – 8th place among the 30 countries included in the rating, digital – 11th , culture – 14th , and low rates—according to the criteria of enterprise – 27th , government and polling – 30th [32]. In 2017, among the 30 countries studied, Russia ranked 26th , having risen one position compared to the previous year. At the same time, Russia is one place behind China, which took the 25th place in the ranking, and it is ahead of the Czech Republic (27th ), Hungary (28th ), Brazil (29th ), and Turkey (30th ) [33]. Our country has the

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strongest positions in the 2017 ranking by criteria of engagement – 8th and digital – 10th . Russia has good indicators in sections of culture – 12th and education – 15th . By the way, precisely by the criterion of education, Russia made the most dramatic jump upwards, since in 2016, this figure was 20. Low places were noted by Russia, according to the criteria of government and polling – 29th , and enterprise – 27th . However, unfortunately, in 2018, Russia dropped to 2 positions, taking the 28th place with the best indicators for engagement and digital criteria – 13th , with averages in the areas of education – 18th and culture – 21th , the worst with government and polling – 29th , enterprise – 26th [34]. As can be seen from the comparison of Russia’s indicators in the rankings for 2016, 2017, and 2018, the decline has occurred even in such traditionally “Russian” areas as the digital sphere, culture, and education, despite the significant achievements that have been made. In the comments to the rating, it was noted that the “Skripal case”, the ambiguous policy for the West in Syria, and international sanctions influenced the declining Russia’s image. Also, “the sharp power and isolationist policy of the Russian Federation” and permanent information trolling are recognized as negative factors. At the same time, the experts of the Portland agency claim that Russia possesses rich stocks of cultural influence; Russian culture in the world is represented by many famous Russian writers and artists. The strengths of the Russian “soft power”, undoubtedly, are the cultural values of Russia, the high level of ballet art of the Bolshoi Theater artists, the modern fashion scene and the vibrant film industry, which contributes to the promotion of the traditional Russian values. Furthermore, experts noted the growing popularity of the multimillion Russian social network VKontakte. Separately, the specialists of the Portland agency noted the importance of the 2018 FIFA World Cup, successfully held by Russia and having a positive effect on the country’s image in the world. According to the statements of the country’s leadership, the 2018 FIFA World Cup was supposed to give Russia the opportunity to demonstrate “our traditional cordiality and hospitality” and “show the world a multifaceted and open Russia capable of surprising and inspiring” [1]. Indeed, the Championship has allowed largely allowed to overcome stereotypes associated with Russia and create conditions for a more benevolent attitude to our country abroad. After the 2018 FIFA World Cup, the strong feeling that Russia is a hospitable country for tourists has arisen. A majority of respondents most often pointed to such positive characteristics of Russia as a developed tourism and rich culture. Nevertheless, a number of experts believe that the image of Russia as a whole is worse than the real situation in the country. In this respect, the opinion expressed by Valter Fecherin, the former ambassador of Switzerland in the Russian Federation, is interesting: “I have never been to a country whose image would differ so much with reality. Russia’s reputation is much worse than it actually is” [23]. The main reason for this situation, in our opinion, is the lack of a comprehensive image strategy, interested specialized actors, stable and sufficient funding, and most importantly, a lack of understanding of what it is possible to build an image construction work so that this work is truly effective. Russia’s insignificant use of the potential of “soft power” is evidenced by the data of another international “Global Presence Index” (The Elcano Global Presence Index), compiled by the Royal Institute of Elcano (Spain). The study is conducted among 120

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countries with the highest GDP according to the World Bank. The research is carried out in 3 directions: economy, military power and “soft power”. The criterion of “soft power” includes such parameters as migration, tourism, sports, culture, information, technology, science, education, and development cooperation. After the “Ukrainian crisis”, Russia ranks No. 5 (2016), No. 6 (2015) and No. 7 (2017 and 2018) in the global presence rating, consistently demonstrating the highest performance in the military power section [26]. The “soft power” criterion is the weakest indicator in Russia. The authors of the rating note that Russia stands out in the military dimension; it is the world’s first exporter of gas and the second – of oil. However, the “soft measurement” is less relevant, despite Russia’s success in sports and new information technologies [8: 13]. International ratings, based on the results of analytical studies, opinion polls and media monitoring, allow to contrast the positions of countries in the world, compare their reputation, features of their perception, to see the strong and weak characteristics of their image. These ratings give a picture of the country’s recognition, perception, attractiveness; how effectively the country uses its competitive advantages; and what are the consequences of the country’s policies. Rating results are actively circulated in the media. At the same time, reputation ratings help to understand the problems that a country needs to solve; they can be useful in managing a country’s reputation and in developing a competent image policy. So, an appeal to various ratings makes it clear that the image of Russia is rather contradictory, and the role of culture in its formation is insignificant.

4 The Image-Forming Role of Russian Culture The multinational Russian culture and the Russian language are among the dominant tools of the foreign cultural policy of Russia and its “soft power”. With the global dissemination of new information technologies, the Russian government pays special attention to the development of the Russian-language segment of the Internet and Russian-language social networks. According to the results of research conducted by W3Techs in early 2018, the Russian language became the third most popular on the Internet after English (more than 50%) and German [36], and the Runet audience is about 80.5 million users [24]. In this regard, the Russian-language Internet content is ahead of French, Spanish, and Chinese. The cross years of cultures that Russia annually holds since 2010, when for the first time such a year was organized jointly with France, have a significant image effect. The cross years of cultures is a new phenomenon that reflects the processes of globalization and democratization of international relations. Undoubtedly, these are unique cultural events that unite various areas of cultural ties and are designed to involve the widest audience in the dialogue. The goal of the cross years is the strengthening and development of cultural cooperation, which can become an impetus to the interaction of States not only in the field of culture, but also in other areas of inter-State relations: political, economic, and financial. The cross years of cultures are held for quite a long time both in the central cities of the partner countries and in the regions. The choice of a partner country, as a rule, is determined not only by cultural motives, but also by political ones

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and it testifies to the intentions of the participants to develop the cooperation of various States. At the State level, with the participation of top officials of the country, the circle of participants of the cross years, the geography of particular events, and financing issues are determined. According to their content, these mega-events are peculiar multi-genre festivals, which programs reflect the most striking milestones in the development of cultural ties of the partner countries and vividly illustrate the achievements and successes of the participating States in the field of culture, science, and art. As a rule, the focus of the events is on those areas of national heritage that most clearly demonstrate the country’s success and show its contribution to the treasury of world culture. The cross years of the cultures are also used by the organizers as an opportunity to correct the negative traits that are often present in the country’s image, as well as to update the image and conduct re-branding campaigns. The cross years allow us to study the market of our potential partners so that in the future, it was possible to build contacts taking into account the interests of the target audience. Conducting such projects, such as the Cross Years of Cultures, provides an excellent opportunity to carry out activities that concern issues related to the problems of economics, science, etc. The format of the celebration, its exceptional length in time, contribute to the conclusion of contracts, the discussion of promising events, and the establishment of stronger contacts in various fields. Today, there is a practice of specialization within this format, and, besides the cross years of cultures, the years of national languages, tourism, science, youth, etc. are being held. Since 2010, Russia has successfully conducted a number of Cross Years of Cultures. Its partners were France (2010), Italy and Spain (2011), Germany (2012), the Netherlands (2013), the United Kingdom (2014), Greece (2016), and Japan (2018). In recent years, the cross years of cultures have been greatly enriched by new ideas, methods, and principles for the organization. Thematic cross years began to be devoted to specific areas of cultural cooperation. For example, the Year of Russian and French Literature and Language was held in 2012, the Year of the Russian-Chinese Friendly Youth Exchange took place in 2014–2015. Year 2015 went down in history as the Cross Year of Russian-Spanish Language and Literature. In 2016, a Year of Cross-Exchanges of Russian and Chinese Media was held. The year 2019 is declared the Cross Year of Culture and Tourism in Turkey and Russia. The practice of cross years with several partners is being formed. So, 2017 has been declared the Cross Year of Tourism in Russia with France, Spain, and Austria. Perhaps in the near future, there will be more new forms. Bilateral cultural dialogue, numbering several hundred events, leads to an increase in mutual trips, as evidenced by Rosstat data and information about the volume of visas issued by foreign consulates. The example of France is indicative in this respect. In 2010, when the Cross Year of Russian-French Cultures was held, the number of arrivals from this country to the Russian Federation has increased by about 5% compared to the previous year, and by 4.5% in the Cross Year of Cultural Tourism 2017 [22]. Relationships in the field of culture and their all-round development dispel negative stereotypes, serve to enhance the image of States, and they can improve cooperation in the economic sphere and expand the Russian presence abroad in the scientific, educational, and cultural sectors. The active participation of cultural institutions in carrying out the

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numerous activities envisaged by the cross-year program reinforces the role of these organizations in promoting “soft power”. A striking example is the holding of the Cross Year of Culture of Russia and Japan for 2018–2019. The very idea of holding it was born in December 2016 during V. Putin’s visit to Tokyo and his meeting with Hirokazu Matsuno, the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology of Japan. In addition to a rich cultural program, projects in the educational, economic, and other areas were implemented; in this regard, Japan has changed the visa regime for Russian citizens. As part of the program for the Year of Russia in Japan, an exhibition of masterpieces of Russian painting from the Romantic Russia Collection of the State Tretyakov Gallery has been opened at the Museum of Arts in the Japanese city of Okayama. Prior to this, the exhibition with great success was shown in Tokyo, where more than 110 thousand visitors got acquainted with it. Moreover, the events planned by the joint program are widely reported in the media, which provide a wide audience reach and are an essential tool for the image formation. A huge role in the cultural exchange of Russia is played by the State Hermitage Museum, whose role as an important resource of Russia’s “soft power” is emphasized in the reports of the Portland agency. Being one of the largest art museums in the world, it organizes international exhibitions and has its branches both in Russia and abroad. In 2007, the Hermitage-Italy was opened in Ferrara, which has been located in Venice since 2013. His goal was the implementation of joint scientific work on the study of collections of Italian art and Russian-Italian cultural ties. In 2009, the Hermitage Amsterdam (or in Dutch: Hermitage aan de Amstel) has begun its work as one of the largest European exhibition centers. The opening of the museum offices in China and the project of the Hermitage branch in Barcelona are currently being discussed. Russia’s participation in international sports exchange also contributes to the shaping a positive image of the country in the world. Most sporting mega-events are always accompanied by a cultural program. The richest and most varied program was presented by Russia at the 2014 Olympics in Sochi. These Games have become an important image-forming event. Four years before the start of the Games, the 2014 Sochi Cultural Olympiad was held, bringing together more than 10 thousand performers from all over Russia and from abroad, more than 100 thousand participants, more than 1 million viewers, and more than 1 billion televiewers [7]. In order for everyone to follow the events of the Cultural Olympiad, an official portal, the main task of which was to make the project truly massive and accessible, was opened. Each year of the 2014 Sochi Cultural Olympiad was marked by an independent thematic project: 2010—the Year of the Cinema; 2011 is the Year of the Theater; 2012—the Year of Music; 2013 is the Year of the Museums. In January-March 2014, the best projects of all years were shown. An interesting program was proposed by the organizers of the 2014 Games at the opening and closing ceremonies. A vivid, colorful story about Russia would be based on cultural events and achievements of our country. It included the best examples of the cultural wealth of the Russian Federation: unique Chukchi throat singing, Dagestan lezginka, Kuban Cossack strains, performance of classical musical bands. This unique project, focused on the widest international audience, brought its results, although, unfortunately, the positive image effect of the Olympic Games was short-lived,

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and ideas about the country in the world have acquired a negative connotation after the Ukrainian crisis and doping sports scandals. Other sports mega-events—the 2017 FIFA Confederations Cup and the FIFA World Cup, which was held in 13 cities of Russia in 2018—have brought a significant image effect. A significant image-forming role in modern Russia is played by various mega-events, for example, international Forums, especially the Economic and Cultural ones, which are held annually in St. Petersburg. The Forum program brings together leading politicians, businessmen, cultural figures, and the widest publicity. Business meetings at the Economic Forum are always complemented by an interesting cultural program, which is an independent part of an economic and political event and always surprises participants with new projects and original cultural events. For example, the cultural program of the Economic Forum 2019 included an Indian reception, a musical concert “Russian Seasons” dedicated to the creative ties of Russia and Germany, and much more. The international audience of the St. Petersburg Economic Forum is very large. The program of the Economic Forum 2019 was attended by representatives from 145 countries [30]. Therefore, we can assume that the cultural program, which is attended by foreign guests of the Forum and which is broadcast by the largest broadcasting campaigns, contributes to a better recognition of Russian culture and its popularization. St. Petersburg International Cultural Forum has become one of the largest international cultural events of modern Russia and one of the new brands of the cultural capital of Russia. The image effect of this cultural mega-event is significant. In 2018 alone, the Cultural Forum was attended by 11 thousand participants from 79 countries [29]. The popularity of the St. Petersburg Cultural Forum in the world is very great, as evidenced by a large number of famous Russian and foreign guests representing the pick of modern culture. Over the years, conductor Valery Gergiev, pianist Denis Matsuev, violist Yuri Bashmet; stage directors: Theodoros Terzopoulos, Tadashi Suzuki, Toni Servillo, Valery Fokin, Lev Dodin, Andrei Moguchy; Director General of the State Hermitage Museum Mikhail Piotrovsky; film directors Kiyoshi Kurosawa, Paolo Genovese, Andrei Konchalovsky, Aleksey Uchitel; actress Claudia Cardinale; jazz stars: Patti Austin and Igor Butman; writers: Éric Vuillard, Janusz Wi´sniewski, Yevgeny Vodolazkin, and many others participated in the Forum. Irina Bokova, ex-director of UNESCO, has repeatedly been an honored guest and participant in the Forum. In addition to St. Petersburg, international cultural forums are held in other cities of Russia. Since 2013, the annual international cultural forum in Ulyanovsk receives the auspices of UNESCO, meaning international recognition and public importance of the issues involved. The international forums held today in Russia are a great example of a new form of intercultural communication and cultural cooperation. Forums allow participants to build professional and intercultural communications, enter into economic agreements, and discuss current issues in many areas. Due to their open format, they are able to engage the general public in dialogue and thereby form a more objective view of Russia, which is certainly very important for its modern image. The Scarlet Sails graduate celebration, which has been held annually in St. Petersburg since 2005, has become a true cultural brand of Russia. The holiday takes place in late June, in the midst of white nights, which gives it a special colour. At the festival there

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are graduates of Russian schools and foreign guests. At the same time, according to statistics, the number of foreign tourists in the city increases about 2.5 times during the celebration. The Scarlet Sails celebration can rightfully be called a cultural megaevent, since its audience in Russia and abroad exceeds 3 million people. The appearance of a sailing ship under scarlet sails in the Neva water area, which is accompanied by a colorful pyrotechnic show using the latest multimedia technology, makes a strong impression. The sailing ship moves under the accompaniment of the orchestra, which further enhances the emotional effect. It is not a coincidence that, starting from 2016, the Scarlet Sails celebration is traditionally recognized as the best city celebration in Europe and the best European cultural event. The Scarlet Sails is an important image project that has a positive effect on the image of Russia, which, in particular, is reflected in the positive statistics of tourist arrivals during the celebration. The existing new forms of cultural cooperation reflect the realities of modern international relations and play an important role in shaping the positive image of new Russia. However, it is worth noting that today, these techniques and approaches for the formation of sustainable positive ideas about Russia in the world are not enough and they bring only a temporary effect.

5 Ways to Build a Positive Image of Russia. Russian Potential and International Experience It is clear that the culture of Russia is one of the most effective image-forming tools. The role of Russian culture in the world cultural, artistic, literary heritage is very significant. It is not by chance that Russia takes respectable 9th place in the UNESCO List of Cultural and Natural Heritage (28 monuments), Russian artists, musicians, performers receive prizes at international competitions and festivals, and Russian scientists are laureates of prestigious international awards. Recently, many Russian athletes set world records and are leaders in various sports. Undoubtedly, the successes and achievements of Russian culture, science, sports contribute to the promotion of Russia in the world, the formation of a positive image of the country. Nevertheless, Russian culture acquires a more consistent, deep, and effective image-forming significance only within the framework of well-thought-out political and strategic actions and decisions. The role of culture in shaping a positive international image of the country is noted in the concept of Russia’s Foreign Cultural Policy, which was first published in 2000 and today is represented by a whole body of new documents. In the documents relating to the foreign cultural policy of the Russian Federation, directions, forms, current problems, priorities, and mechanisms for the implementation of the foreign cultural policy of the Russian Federation and international cultural cooperation have been noted [28]. In a word, there are designated guidelines on which to rely in solving the problem of shaping the country’s image in new political realities. However, today the foreign cultural policy of the Russian Federation needs to be updated. The new concept, in our opinion, should take into account the sanctions policy of European countries and the United States against Russia, our new foreign policy partners and urgent tasks. It is worth paying attention to the effectiveness of the work of the foreign cultural centers of the Russian Federation, which are important actors in

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the cultural ties of our country. Such centers have the opportunity to create projects, taking into account local opportunities, focusing on their targeted foreign audience. A successful example of such activity is the Goethe-Institut, representing Germany and its culture abroad, the Confucius Institute, representing the Institute of China, the Cervantes Institute, representing Spanish culture, etc. Under the globalization and democratization of international relations, in our opinion, it is worth betting, first of all, on large-scale projects, mega-events that cover a wide audience and provide a quick positive image effect. Similar results were confirmed by large musical, theatrical, sports competitions held in the Russian Federation, Forums. However, it is worth noting that the positive effect of such events should be constantly confirmed and renewed. Within the framework of foreign cultural policy measures, it is worthwhile to develop image campaigns, the success and effectiveness of which is now evident and proven by foreign countries. For example, branding specialist Wally Olins authored the Cool Britannia campaign (1997), which was aimed at breaking old stereotypes, implanting new values into the traditional cultural environment and promoting the modern image of the country based on the new achievements of British culture. As a slogan, the developers chose the phrase “Cool Britannia”, i.e. “fashionable” or “cool” Britain. Promoting the creativity of contemporary British artists (“brit-art”), musicians (“brit-pop”), and fashion designers became important elements of the campaign. The campaign was supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the British Tourism Office, the British Council, and several other reputable organizations. The Cool Britannia image campaign has become “a symbol of renewal, creativity, and the future”. In our view, the campaign has shown its effectiveness, because allowed Britain to form the image of the center of contemporary culture. The strong position of the United Kingdom as “soft power superpower” is still taking place: in the rating of the Portland agency, it is in the 1st place as the leading country in the use of “soft power”, while in terms of culture—the 2nd place [35]. A large public outcry was caused by the German campaign, timed to coincide with the 2006 FIFA World Cup. In connection with the World Championships, several branding campaigns, targeting internal and external audiences, have been launched. The most interesting was the Land of Ideas campaign, supported by the government of Germany. Its name is a direct quotation from the inaugural speech of the former German President Horst Köhler in 2004. The Land of Ideas campaign was aimed at solving important tasks for the country, which dealt with the issues of updating the political, economic, and cultural image of the country. The Land of Ideas campaign focused on the economic and cultural component. The brand introduced Germany as a successfully developing country, which is the undisputed leader in various sectors of the economy: mechanical engineering, pharmacology, and cosmetology. This position is confirmed by the world famous brands of Germany: BMW, Audi, Mercedes, Porsche, Bayer, Nivea, Boss, etc. In order to promote the brand, worldfamous representatives of modern Germany have been attracted. The famous German model Claudia Schiffer became the face of the campaign. In Tokyo, New York, London, a poster with Schiffer wrapped in a German flag could be seen in various parts of the

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city, at subway stations. The campaign was successful: the country now ranks 3rd in the use of “soft power” in the Portland ranking, and in terms of culture,—in 4th place [31]. Many methods of organizing these successful campaigns can be used in Russia. There are well-known cultural figures, athletes, scientists who could be involved in such campaigns and, relying on their authority and being leaders of opinion, could tell about modern Russia more emotionally, referring to their targeted audience. Certainly, an objective view of a country can be created due to a personal acquaintance with itself, its people, and its achievements. For this, Russia should develop tourist routes, offer new types of tourist trips, and simplify visa procedures for foreign tourists. As the experience of the FIFA World Cup has shown, the effect of visiting Russia was exceptional, and many tourists have decided to return to our country in 2019. During the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia, the entry into the country was made much easier: foreigners could use their e-passport to enter Russia 10 days before the start and leave 10 days after the end of the Championship. They also got the opportunity to return to the country without a visa. In early 2019, President of Russia V.V. Putin instructed the government to work out measures that would make it easier for foreigners to get tourist visas. In particular, we are talking about an electronic visa following the example of a fan’s electronic passport. According to experts, this will contribute to the influx of tourists. Indeed, Russia has quite a lot of image problems today. Many residents of foreign countries are still in captivity of old stereotypes and negative ideas about it. However, now Russia has its advantages. Firstly, the rich experience of Soviet cultural diplomacy, which was highly appreciated by foreign experts in the 20th century. Secondly, the multinationality and multiconfessionalism of Russia allows for each participant in the dialogue to suggest their own language, to prepare their own program, which is close and consonant with its national characteristics and traditions. Thirdly, Russia has glorious victories and civilizational achievements that unite many inhabitants of the planet and allow correcting a negative image. Moreover, Russian culture has always been open, tolerant, focused on universal human values, so Russian music, literature, cinema, filled with humanistic ideas, find their fans and their emotional response in the world today. It is necessary to correctly present all this richest heritage of Russian culture, update the forms and tools of cultural contacts, use modern technologies to expand the range of participants in the cultural dialogue. It is worth paying attention, first of all, to new approaches, original and interesting methods of demonstrating cultural achievements. Russia should develop an image strategy in which the goals and objectives, actors, directions and forms will be clearly defined and financing issues and mechanisms for promoting a positive image of the country in modern conditions would be resolved. This strategy should be regularly updated, and it should indicate both universal approaches to the implementation of this policy, as well as regional peculiarities and priorities. Obviously, the special role of culture and cultural events, which, clearly, are among the most important image-forming means, should be designated in the image strategy. It is necessary to use not only the achieved classical achievements in the field of ballet, music, literature, and other cultural values known to everyone outside our country, but

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also to acquaint the outside world with the best achievements of modern multifaceted and multinational culture of Russia.

6 Conclusions Certainly, modern Russia should strive to ensure that its image corresponds to the significant contribution that our country has made to the treasury of world civilization. The image of Russia should also correspond to the political and economic weight of the State, its capabilities and ambitions. In order to achieve such a result, you can, in our opinion, if you correctly build priorities in the political sphere, clearly formulate tasks, avoid diversification of financial resources, and, of course, provide full support to Russia’s rich, multinational culture. Focusing on a new generation of participants in cultural cooperation, it is necessary to support the development of the best examples of modern culture in the country. Furthermore, the desire to “promote” just modern culture is a peculiar trend in the foreign cultural policy of many States, which the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, and Japan are now trying to follow. Therefore, by developing and supporting contemporary creativity, Russia will be able to speak the same language with its partners in intercultural dialogue. It should also be borne in mind that in the process of positioning Russia and its culture in the world, it is better to focus on the role of our country in shaping universal achievements, values, and ideas that are understandable and meaningful for all of humanity, and not only for Russians. And, of course, the international positive image of Russia depends on our own national awareness of the significance of our achievements, pride in our successes and accomplishments. It is hard to make our merits respect the world community if we, the citizens of Russia, have no pride in our past and present. Russia’s image requires renovation, filling with new positive content. And in this issue, culture and cultural ties can and should play a decisive role.

References 1. 1000 Days Remain Until the 2018 FIFA World Cup Begins: Speech by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on 18th September. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ news/50320. Accessed 15 Apr 2019 2. Ahn, M.J., Wu, H.-C.: The art of nation branding. Public Organ. Rev. 15(1), 157–173 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-013-0255-6 3. Anholt, S.: Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions. Palgrave Macmillan, New York (2003) 4. Bourdieu, P., Coleman, J.M.: Social Theory for a Changing Society. Russell Sage Foundation Cop, New York (1991) 5. Brzezinski, Z.: The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives. Basic Books, New York (2016) 6. CountryRepTrak 2018. https://www.reputationinstitute.com/2018_country_reptrak. Accessed 08 Aug 2019 7. Cultural Olympiad 2010–2014. https://www.culture.sochi2014.com. Accessed 26 May 2019 8. Elcano Global Presence Report 2018. https://mafiadoc.com/elcano-global-presence-report2018-elcano-global-presence-index_5cb55d4c097c47a25b8b45f8.html. Accessed 09 Aug 2019

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9. Fokin, V., et al.: Interaction of cultures and diplomacy of states. Kasetsart J. Soc. Sci. 38(1), 45–49 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.kjss.2016.05.001 10. Fokin, V., et al.: Multiculturalism in the modern world. Int. J. Environ. Sci. Educ. 18(11), 10777–10787 (2018) 11. Galumov, E.: International Image of Russia. Izvestia, Moscow (2003) 12. Keating, V.C., Kaczmarska, K.: Conservative soft power: liberal soft power bias and the ‘hidden’ attraction of Russia. J. Int. Relat. Dev. 22, 1–27 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41 268-017-0100-6 13. Mariutti, F., Tench, R.: How does Brazil measure up? Comparing rankings through the lenses of nation brand indexes. Place Brand. Public Dipl. 12(1), 17–31 (2016). https://doi.org/10. 1057/pb.2015.19 14. Nikolaeva, J., et al.: Cultural mega-events as an international, cultural and political tool. Codrul Cosminului 2(23), 293–306 (2017) 15. Nye, J.: Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. Basic Books, New York (1990) 16. Nye, J.: Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Public Affairs, New York (2004) 17. Nye, J.: The Future of Power. Public Affairs, New York (2011) 18. Olivié, I., Molina, I.: Elcano Global Presence Index. Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid (2011) 19. Pamment, J.: Articulating influence: toward a research agenda for interpreting the evaluation of soft power, public diplomacy and nation brands. Public Relat. Rev. 40(1), 50–59 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2013.11.01954-57 20. Putin, V.: 2012 Russia and a changing world. Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Russian newspaper), 27th February (2012). http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/27/putin-politika.html. Accessed 12 June 2019. (in Russian) 21. Ronfeldt, D., Arquilla, J.: The promise of noöpolitik. First Monday 12(8) (2007). https://doi. org/10.5210/fm.v12i8.1971 22. Russia in Numbers (2009–2019): Federal State Statistics Service. http://www.gks.ru/wps/ wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/publications/catalog/doc_1135075100641. Accessed 23 June 2019 23. Russia’s Global Image Negative amid Crisis in Ukraine: Americans’ and Europeans’ Views Sour Dramatically 2014 9th July Pew Research Center. http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/ 09/russias-global-image-negative-amid-crisis-in-ukraine. Accessed 15 July 2019 24. Russian Internet in iBusiness Numbers 2016. http://ibusiness.ru/blog/money/41967. Accessed 15 July 2019 25. Saimon, A.: Russia’s problem is that it is considered a burden. Snob, 29 December (2012). https://snob.ru/selected/entry/56182/#comment_555669. Accessed 24 Apr 2019. (in Russian) 26. The Elcano Global Presence Index. https://www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/. Accessed 09 Aug 2019 27. The Good Country Index: Russian Federation 2018. https://www.goodcountry.org/index/res ults/#RUS. Accessed 24 Apr 2019 28. The main directions of the policy of the Russian Federation in the field of international cultural and humanitarian cooperation Approved by the President of the Russian Federation on 18th December 2010. https://legalacts.ru/doc/osnovnye-napravlenija-politiki-rossiiskoifederatsii-v-sfere/. Accessed 20 June 2019 29. The Official Website of the St. Petersburg International Cultural Forum. https://culturalforu m.ru. Accessed 26 May 2019 30. The Official Website of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. https://forumspb. com. Accessed 26 May 2019 31. The Soft Power 30 Germany 2018. https://softpower30.com/country/germany/. Accessed 20 June 2019

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Finno-Ugric Cultural Rights in the Context of Sustainable Tourism in North-Western Federal District of Russia Vadim Atnashev1 , Elena Eltc1(B) , and Art Leete2 1 Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

[email protected], [email protected] 2 Tartu Ülikool, Tartu, Estonia [email protected]

Abstract. Cultural rights of ethnic cultural communities are enshrined in national and international law and have been incorporated into concept and policies of multiculturalism. The sustainable tourism, aimed at intercultural dialogue, preservation of historical and cultural monuments, strengthening local identity and existing way of life, engaging the local residents in tourism could serve as a development tool to promote cultural rights. The tourism industry needs to support projects, which take cultural and ethnic characteristics of communities into account, and to ensure that tourists are educated regarding the local culture and respect for nature. Much depends on the active contribution of all levels of public administration, international, national, regional public and private organizations. The protection of the cultural rights lies at the very core of the Finno-Ugric movement which has declared tourism to be a tool for preservation of cultures of Finno-Ugric peoples and put forward a concept of Finno-Ugric tourism at the thematic session of the 7th World Congress entitled “The Finno-Ugric Peoples – Towards Sustainable Development”. Current Russian legislation stresses the rights of indigenous small-numbered peoples. Their rights are contained in the federal law “On guarantees of the rights of indigenous small-numbered peoples in the Russian Federation” and in the “Conception of sustainable development of the indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East of the Russian Federation”. The Conception regards the development of ethnotourism and ecotourism with involvement of representatives of small peoples of the North in their traditional habitat and traditional economic activities as a mechanism for their modernizations and creation of conditions for employment. However, the indigenous groups cannot be prevented from developing their own ethno-tourism businesses, as occurs in some other regions. A general problem is the decline of cross-border cooperation. A vital role in the implementation of cultural rights has been assigned to constituent entities. At the level of federal district and federal subjects, issues relating to the tourism are being incorporated in Socio-Economic development strategies which include plans for strengthening interregional and international cooperation at the European level. The regional development of the tourism depends on various aid programs and is largely project-based. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 384–395, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_34

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The paper illustrates the case of regions of North-Western Federal District which has the advantage in development of international cooperation. In the North of Russia the cross-border cooperation with Finno-Ugric states and Russia’s active partnership in Joint Working Group on Tourism (BEAR) promote the access to best European and best world practices of sustainable tourism, realization and funding cross-border tourism project as well as strengthen Finno-Ugric movement as a cooperation factor between Russia and the European Union. One of the objectives is to provide a cultural and legal analysis of the current situation with cultural rights of Finno-Ugric minorities in the European North of Russia. Keywords: Finno-Ugric minorities · Cultural rights · Sustainable tourism · Indigenous peoples · North-Western Federal District of Russia

1 Introduction The purpose of the present study is to identify the practices of sustainable tourism relating to the realization of cultural rights of Finno-Ugric indigenous peoples in the North-Western Federal District of Russia, using the case study of the Vepsians. More than 26 million people in the world speak Uralic languages and nearly 2.3 million of them live as minorities in the Russian Federation. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination and self-government, to absolute freedom in developing their economic, social and cultural institutions. Since in founding in 2007, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has contributed to achieving the ends of Declaration. A.B. Myasnikova and V.N. Nemechkin have noted that the Finno-Ugric indigenous peoples are organically integrated with UN mechanisms [12]. In 2014 Ex-President of Youth Association of Finno-Ugric peoples, MAFUN, was elected Vice-Chairman of Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [13]. Issues relating to cultural rights in international law and practice are addressed in an extensive literature. B. Robbins and E. Stamatopoulou link the emergence of interest in cultural rights after the end of the Cold War to the movements on behalf of indigenous peoples and minorities. They propose that cultural rights offer a ground for possible resolution of conflicts over indigenous rights [16]. L.S. Vars notes the ILO and UN Human Rights Committee’s emphasis on the importance of traditional livelihoods and other traditional economic activities of indigenous peoples as an important part of their right to enjoy their own culture. She illustrates with an example of the Sami the inseparability of the concept of indigenous peoples’ relationship with their lands, territories and resources from that of their cultural differences and values [24]. S. Wiessner uses the term “cultural rights” to mean all the rights of indigenous peoples, singling them out as a specific minority group since cultural preservation and flourishing are at the root of their claims [26]. A.F. Vrdoljak focuses on Indigenous peoples’ decades-long campaign for effective participation in decisionmaking concerning the protection of their cultural heritage (and related human rights) at the international level [25].

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Russian researchers indicate the similarity between the notions of cultural rights and ethnic rights, their enshrining in UN, UNESCO and ILO international instruments and national legislation and point out that the actual realization of these rights takes place only at the level of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation [11]. The issues of sustainable development were placed on the UN, Council of Europe’s, European parlament’s agendas. Sustainable tourism is regarded as serving a development tool to promote cultural rights. Potential of tourism engaging the local residents and aimed at intercultural dialogue, preservation of historical and cultural monuments, strengthening local identity and existing way of life is among key issues on the agenda of many associations. One of the first systematic studies of ethno-tourism was the dissertation of A.S. Schukin who stresses that successful ethno-tourism development is conditioned upon the existence of small ethnic groups (the Veps, the Votics, the Izhorians, the Setos in North-Western Federal District) and their representatives should be actively involved in process of tourist service [17]. E.Y. Moraleva and N.V. Ledovskih highlight the recent appearance of ecotourism in Russia and the crucial role of international organizations (World Wide Fund for Nature) and projects (TASIS in the Republic of Karelia and in the North of Russia) in supporting its implementation [9]. D.V. Silin points out the great economic prospects for the ecological tourism based on national parks and specially protected natural areas of Russia. The development of infrastructure, information management and creation of new tourism products can contribute to the increasing attractiveness of national parks. Their efforts in developing ethno- and ecotourism should be supported by the Governments of constituent entities and should be integrated into strategies of socio-economic development of regions [7]. D.V. Sevastianov and E.M. Korostelev note the potential importance of the development of ecotourism in north-western Russia in combination with ethnotourism and the digitalization of national parks [18]. Due to reduced requirements to the quality of service from ecotourists, ecotourism can be a true engine of development of the tourism sector of the economy in the interior. With regard to strengthening of cross-border cooperation of North-Western Federal District, a question was raised about its impact on eco- and ethno-tourism. It was revealed the accelerated tourism and recreational development in the border regions (the Murmansk region, Leningrad region. The Republic of Karelia, Saint-Petersburg, Pskov region). Tourism is considered to be one of the areas of cross-border collaboration initiated mostly at the regional and local levels. Among the forms of international, bilateral, triangular and multilateral cooperation the researchers have identified the following: discovering ecotourist routes, preparation of specialists, building the infrastructure, sharing of new methods of organization of ecotours, conducting training seminars and conferences. Special importance is given to environmental management. Tourism is actively integrating into the agenda of Finno-Ugric cooperation and is an actual tool and important factor for ethno-cultural development of Finno-Ugric countries and regions. Finno-Ugric tourism is another important aspect of the study of ethno- and ecotourism, which considered by A.S. Karasev [6], A. Ruukel [22], V.M. Umorina [23], N.O. Kolchina, N. Erkesheva.

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2 Materials and Methods The methodology of the study is based on the following methods and research techniques: • Netnography is the methodology allowing researchers to tap into social media communities and draws insights through systematic analysis of narratives, videos, photos and other forms of text that are generated by users; • Analysis of European standards relating to tourism, support of indigenous peoples; • Content analysis of political messages and normative (international, European and national) legal acts regulating the protection of cultural (ethnic) rights and development of sustainable tourism, document analysis for reviewing and evaluating documents of World Congresses of Finno-Ugric Peoples; • Event analysis used to identify interactions of ethnic minorities (Vepsians) with state institutions and law • Interviews with the activists of the Finno-Ugric movement, representatives of the national-culture associations, the tourist industries, museums of Vepsian culture and way of life and other members of ethnocultural festivals; • Observation (the systematic description of the events, behaviors, and artifacts of a social setting) is used as a method for collecting data about Finno-Ugric peoples processes, and cultures in the Republic of Komi, small indigenous peoples in the Leningrad oblast; • The historical method is particularly significant for identification of the regions with a large proportion of peoples of the Finno-Ugric group; • A set of methods and techniques of geopolitical analysis of features of the development of eco- and ethno tourism.

3 Problem Statement One of the many challenges faced by indigenous peoples in different countries is the denial or restriction of their access to decision-making. In particular, this applies to economic activities in places of traditional residence of indigenous peoples and their rights to ancestral lands. Another common challenge is that the path from the legislative consolidation of the indigenous peoples’ rights to the actual enjoyment of their benefits is very long. The recently committed self-immolation of Dr. Albert Razin, 79 years, an Udmurt activist and scientist, can be considered as an act of despair and protest over the state language policy aimed to further assimilation of minorities Indeed, the number of people who speak the Udmurt language in Russia has decreased from 463,000 in 2002 to 324,000 in 2010 (i.e. 30%) [10]. Pyotr Tultaev, chairman of the Finno-Ugric Peoples Association, commented that “unresolved issues of language and culture are not only among Udmurts, although they cannot be resolved with such extreme measures” [4]. Cultural rights of ethnic cultural communities are enshrined in national and international law and have been incorporated into concept and policies of multiculturalism. The term “cultural rights” is often associated with all the rights of indigenous peoples, identified as a specific minority group, since cultural preservation and flourishing is at the root of their claims.

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4 Research Questions The policy of multiculturalism has two simultaneous and important conditions: 1. Preservation and development of cultural heritage and identity (cultural component); 2. Full and equal participation of all ethnic cultural groups in the activity of dominant society (social component). Constructing a really multicultural society can only be ensured jointly and in harmony. In general, the principle of multiculturalism means that if some individuals and communities have confidence in their own cultural orientation and feel safe in dominant society, it has a positive effect on their relationship with the dominant group. However, if something threatens cultural benchmarks, it leads, on the contrary, to mutual hostility. In general, a strong civic identity usually plays a key role in conflict prevention. Government institutions, especially those dealing with law enforcement, education and health care, must move towards greater openness to the principles and practices of multiculturalism. At the municipal and regional levels, it is necessary to continue (or resume) the work on the intercultural dialogue formation, on the tolerance education, including outreach work with the population. According to J. Berry, pluralistic societies are those where multiple cultural, linguistic and religious communities coexist in the common social space. From his famous model of acculturation, the best strategy for ethnic minorities is multiculturalism (integration), though some states have applied separation to indigenous peoples (the USA, Canada or Australia) [3]. Meanwhile, European institutions try to integrate all minorities. A positive example is Recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) such as No. 1353 (1998) on the access of minorities to higher education. In that document, the Assembly called on governments of countries that had signed the European Cultural Convention to avoid prescribing the exclusive use of the official language and abstain from pursuing policies aimed at the assimilation of national minorities into the majority culture. They “should have access to suitable types and levels of publicly provided education in their mother tongue in order to prepare for higher education, and all citizens should be able to study their own language and culture in general” [21]. Other recommendations proposed European states to use public schools as a mean of minorities’ integration. The Resolution 1171 adopted by PACE in 1998 on endangered Uralic minority cultures is of special interest. Just as in 1998, in the modern Russian Federation those who speak their national language or consider it their mother tongue have been constantly declining as a proportion of the population. The main reasons are urbanisation, modern demographic and migration trends, mixed marriages and a decline in the traditional way of life [19]. Abandonment of national languages has been most rapid among urban dwellers and young people. In order to guarantee a living future for the Uralic minorities (and many others) on the cultural map of Eurasia, the following principles of the CE should be taken into account:

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– Native language schools should be established in towns and cities as well as in rural areas; – For the establishment of schools for ethnic minorities and native-language instruction, teaching aids and learning material have to be provided in those languages; – Newspapers, radio and television programmes and other electronic media in minority languages must be maintained or promoted and contacts between national minorities living in different republics and regions must be ensured; – Exchanges of personnel and students between the Uralic areas and universities, research institutes and state bodies in other countries should be stepped up. Cultural exchanges of performing artists, writers, etc., between different minority peoples likewise reinforce their own identity and create links with a multicultural world. In addition to that, aid should be channelled to various organisations and societies to enable them to work at a local level to revive and protect native languages [15]. One of the reports to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) spoke about the “folklorisation” of minorities in Russia when their linguistic and cultural rights were treated primarily as folklore [14].

5 Findings 5.1 The Conception of Finno-Ugric Tourism The rise of ethnonational movements of Finno-Ugric peoples, building the national, international societies and institutions promoting the cultural and natural heritage of peoples of the Finno-Ugric group, protection of their rights took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s [20]. Strengthening their credibility and effectiveness requires elevating ethnonational movements in the regions to the All-Russian and international level. FinnoUgric movement benefits from effective mechanisms of international cooperation and interaction between European countries.“the Finno-Ugric issue” is in foreign policy agenda of Estonia, Finland, Hungary. The first World Congress of Finno-Ugric Peoples was titled «the forum of the people, not dependent on government and political parties», which expressed concern about the situation of the Finno-Ugric peoples and contributed to cooperation and mutual assistance in the field of law, economics, environment, social issues, information, education, science and culture. The protection of the rights of Finno-Ugric peoples, their various cultures and languages lies at the very core of the Congresses, which have galvanized actors at different levels to develop regional and inter-State cooperation and thereby to increase opportunities for the undertaking of joint activities. This creates Finno-Ugric unified information space and enhances cooperation in culture, education and science, sport and tourism. It was suggested at the Congresses that the national renaissance depended on the survival of the traditional way of life, religious beliefs, stabilization in the environmental situation and there was a need to develop national parks, reservations and local lore museums. The 5th World Congress of the Finno-Ugric peoples emphasized the role of festivities, folk groups, institutions in maintaining the traditions of Finno-Ugric peoples and proposed to promote ethnotourism [1: 9, 74, 82, 87, 90, 91].

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The idea of Finno-Ugric kinship has lead to the joint initiatives, in which participants from Russia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary are involved, such as ethno-futurism [8] that emerged in Estonia (a strategy for the promotion of folk culture in the context of modern cultural activities, emerged as a response to the necessity to create an “own” urban culture for smaller Finno-Ugric peoples to counter the foreign urban culture) and Finno-Ugric Capitals of Culture. The last project for the promotion of small and medium sizes cities or rural areas established in 2013 by the Youth Association of Finno-Ugric Peoples was presented at the thirteenth session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and inspired by the program Cultural Capital of Europe. Obinitsa (Setomaa, Estonia) became the second-ever Finno-Ugric Capital of Culture in 2015. Forum of Finno-Ugric Villages in Obinitsa was initiated in January 2016 and for its participants there was presented the concept of Finno-Ugric tourist network in the report of Aivar Ruukel. The report provides guidance on creating of guide to Finno-Ugric places, exchanging of experience and using Web-based technology, developing event tourism. The innovative concept of Finno-Ugric tourism was put forward for discussion at the thematic session of the 7th World Congress covering the sustainable tourism defined as ethno- and eco-tourism. At the Congress entitled “The Finno-Ugric Peoples – Towards Sustainable Development” the Finno-Ugric community committed itself to the concept of sustainable development and UN sustainable development agenda to 2030. The 7th Congress recommended the adoption of the Larrakia Declaration on the Development of Indigenous Tourism which emphasized the need for protection of indigenous culture, the land and waters on which it is based through well managed tourism practices and the equitable partnerships between the tourism industry and Indigenous people [2]. The need is recognized to enable the indigenous people to authorize any planned tourism activity and to develop multidisciplinary training programmes, combining the teaching of indigenous language, business and tourism economy [5]. The concept of Finno-Ugric tourism is guided by the case studies on the experience of local communities. It was one of the panelists reporting the capacity and established the practice of sustainable tourism, Aivar Ruukel, who defined the doctrine through its characteristics and strategy: 1. Tourism is identified as a tool for the preservation of cultures of Finno-Ugric peoples; 2. Authenticity (to get acquainted with the local way of life); 3. Experiences (tourism as co-creation; not only to take a closer look at local life, but also to be an active participant, to learn, to talk); 4. Place (each place is unique); 5. Local inhabitants (holders of traditional culture); 6. Hosts («leaders» among local residents with language abilities, capable to offer tourist products); 7. Collaboration at all levels (Finno-Ugric network of hosts and places) 8. Training process (Forum of Finno-Ugric Villages in Obinitsa, internet). Drawing on the results of his case-study on Estonian Soomaa National Park Ruukel listed the main ways of engaging the local residents in tourism: accommodations providers, rental operators, guide service in foreign languages and stressed the need to strengthen food production and food service.

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5.2 Tourism Development Strategy in North-Western Federal District Unlike Estonia, where the concept of sustainable tourism is widespread and found in the legislation, the official documents of Russian State organs replaced the concept with that of “Sustainable tourism development”. The terms “ecotourism” and “ethnotourism” are receiving greater articulation in Russia. According the Conception of sustainable development of the indigenous small numbered peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East of the Russian Federation the development of ethnotourism and ecotourism with involvement of representatives of small peoples of the North in their traditional habitat and traditional economic activities is regarded as mechanism for their modernizations and creation of conditions for employment. Federal and regional response to the Conception is its implementation, which includes the development of ethnotourism (the development of areas of Vepsian museum in the Republic of Karelia; ethnotourism product promotion and information support to indigenous people in the Murmansk region (Saami). The development of local self-government served an important role in this process, particularly through municipal economic support programmes and mechanism of the Advisory Councils on Indigenous issues (in the Northwestern Federal District (2013), the Republic of Karelia (2001), the Leningrad region (2018), the Murmansk region (2009)) which bring together the government authorities with the national-culture associations of Finno-Ugric peoples and contribute to the implementation of the recommendations of the World Congresses (Table 1). Table 1. Support at the regional level to small indigenous people, using the example of Leningrad oblast Small indigenous peoples of Leningrad oblast

Traditional habitat, according to the government regulation

Vepsians, 1380 persons Voznesenskoye urban settlement (Podporozhsky District)

Municipal economic support programmes

The state-supported folk festivities

2015–2025

Tourist projects

Improving the resource base and infrastructure development of recreational tourism

Vinnitsa rural settlement (Podporozhsky District)

2015–2025

“The tree of life” (since 1987)

Creation of new Vepsa Folklore Center in 2017–2018, development of recreational areas combined with capacity building of ethnocultural heritage (in Sarozero and Yaroslavichi)

Radogoschinskoye Rural settlement (Boksitogorsky District)

2015–2025

“Cheese day”

The recreational infrastructure facilities

(continued)

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V. Atnashev et al. Table 1. (continued) Alehovschina rural settlement (Lodeinopolskiy district)

2015–2025

«Enarme ma» (since 1993)

Creation of ethnopark “Vepsian village”

Pashozero rural settlement (the Tikhvin district)

–

“Vepsian spring”

Izhorians, 169 persons

–

Vistino rural settlement 2015–2025

“This welcoming country” “Apple Spas” “Marine legends of Izhorian lands”

Creation of ethnocultural center, establishment of the ethnographic village

Votics, 33 persons

–

–

“Luzhitsy potluck”

Establishment of museum and cultural centre in the village Luzhitsy

As shown in the case the example of Vepsians, indigenous small people of FinnoUgric group living in three different administrative regions of North-Western Federal District (the Republic of Karelia (3423 peoples in 2010), and the Leningrad (1380 peoples in 2010) and Vologda (412 peoples in 2010) Oblasts) where some areas are defining for the traditional indigenous habitat, protection programmes for indigenous small peoples combine: 1. Government and foreign backing of various forms of minority memories through special programmes for support to indigenous people (projects within the framework of the Barents cooperation program, financial support of European Union, Finnish and Estonian Kindred Peoples’ Programmes and cross-border cooperation programmes, State programme for assisting small indigenous people) and related ideas of development and support of activities of Ethno-Cultural Centres for FinnoUgric peoples, which combine the functions of museums with functions of folklore and craft centres. 2. Fostering the Vepsians ethnic and cultural renaissance in the form of support of the ethnic festivities with the active participation of museum institutions (the community museums) tending to rapprochement with the budget cultural institutions such as Houses of Culture and libraries). According to L. Siragusa, the festivities instigate untypical language practices where people may reveal attitudes of dissent and reversion of power hierarchy through their bilingual skills in the Vepsian heritage language and Russian with reference to uneven relations of power and considers convivial events as the strategy to reestablish (or reverse) power relations thanks to its potential for liberating one from certain social rules [19]. 3. Development of tools through which civil society/local communities can work with government bodies; 4. Ethno-tourism – as the need for application-oriented supported cultural projects designed to preserve ethnic and cultural diversity.

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Tourism Development Strategy is being drawn up at federal level. At the level of Federal district and the constituent entities, issues relating to the tourism are being incorporated in Socio-Economic Development Strategy. Socio-Economic Development Strategy of North-Western Federal District sets out the certain principles that may shape the development vector of Finno-Ugric tourist network. One of them is the transfer of experience from the centre to the periphery. The example of Local History Corners, Rooms, museums of Finno-Ugric minorities culture and way of life in the Republic of Karelia, Leningrad region, Vologda oblast shows that the effective mechanism for the future development of these museums is coordination with the lead museums of ethnography, cooperation with the other cultural institutions (Houses of Culture, regional Centres for Indigenous Peoples etc.). While the lead museums and regional cultural institutions are involved in the implementation of projects within the framework of the Finnish and Estonian programmes, Peter the Great Museum of Antropology and Ethnography and Russian Ethnographic Museum, the oldest centers of Finno-Ugric studies in Saint-Petersburg, are considered as hubs for conceptual support of ethnotourism in North-Western Russia. In the Strategy the ecotourism is singled out as having the most potential. Though ecotourism is related to specially protected nature territories and national parks, it is the recent high-profile project - Finno-Ugric Ethnopark in Komi Republic, combining ethno and ecotourism, that may start a new trend.

6 Conclusion The multiculturalism is considered as the most efficient strategy of ethnopolitical management in contemporary Europe, the adherents of the multicultural policy have advocated recognition of the collective rights of indigenous peoples affirmed in the emerging international body of law. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People powerful to change world policies towards indigenous peoples is particularly important. As the example of the Larrakia Declaration on the Development of Indigenous Tourism and World Congresses of Finno-Ugric Peoples demonstrated, UN Declaration could be utilized for indigenous tourism development. The sustainable tourism, aimed at intercultural dialogue, preservation of historical and cultural monuments, strengthening local identity and existing way of life, engaging the local residents in tourism could serve as a development tool to promote cultural rights. The protection of the cultural rights lies at the very core of the Finno-Ugric movement. Recently a new initiative was launched to develop ethno- and ecotourism as a tool for preservation of cultures of Finno-Ugric peoples. The recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples is upheld by current Russian legislation, a vital role in the implementation of which has been assigned to constituent entities. The regional development of the tourism depends on various aid programmes being largely project-based. The border regions benefit from the assistance of such Finno-Ugric states as Finland and Estonia and regional organizations such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR), Council of the Baltic Sea States, Arctic Council. The crossborder cooperation and Russia’s active partnership in Joint Working Group on Tourism (BEAR) promote the access to best European and best world practices of sustainable tourism, realization and funding cross-border tourism project and strengthen FinnoUgric movement as cooperation factor between Russia and the European Union.

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References 1. 5th World Congress of the Finno-Ugric Peoples: Compendium of reports and documents 28–30 June 2008. Strogalschikova, Z., et al. (eds.) Printing House of the Republic of Komi, Syktyvkar (2016). (in Russian) 2. 7th World Congress of the Finno-Ugric Peoples: The Finno-Ugric peoples – towards sustainable development. Compendium of reports and documents 15–17 June 2016. http://lahti2 016.fucongress.org/sites/lahti2016.fucongress.org/files/Publication_russian.pdf. Accessed 14 June 2019 3. Berry, J.W.: Social and cultural change. In: Trindis, H.C., Brislin, R. (eds.) Handbook of CrossCultural Psychology, Social, vol. 5, pp. 211–279. Allyn and Bacon, Boston (1980) 4. Chair of Association of Finno-Ugric Peoples Commented on the Situation of Udmurt Language. https://susanin.news/udmurtia/culture/20190910-266000/?utm_source=yxnews& utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fyandex.ru%2Fnews#hcq=0dz wKBr. Accessed 10 Sep 2019 5. Good practices and challenges, including discrimination, in business and in access to financial services by indigenous peoples, in particular indigenous women and indigenous persons with disabilities (Draft study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples). https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IPeoples/EMRIP/Session10/ A.HRC.EMRIP.2017.CRP.1.pdf. Accessed 25 June 2019 6. Karasev, A.S.: Problems and perspectives of tourism development in Finno-Ugric region of Russia. Sovremennye problemy nauki i obrazovanija (Contemp. Probl. Sci. Educ.) 4, 629–637 (2014). (in Russian) 7. Kirichuk, S.M., Silin, D.V.: Ethnographic and ecological tourism in the northern region: significance of the issue. News High. Educ. Inst. Sociol. Econ. Polit. 3, 43–45 (2013). (in Russian) 8. Kolcheva, E.M.: Etnofuturism as a Cultural Phenomenon. Mari State University, Yoshkar-Ola (2008). (in Russian) 9. Ledovskih, E.Yu., et al.: Ecological tourism. An information manual. Fund for the Development of ecotourism “DERSU UZALA”, Volgograd (2012). (in Russian) 10. Man Dies After Self-Immolation Protest Over Language Policies in Russia’s Udmurtia. https:// www.rferl.org/a/man-sets-himself–fire-russia–udmurtia-language-protest-against-languagebill/30156654.html. Accessed 10 Sep 2019 11. Molchanov, B.A., et al.: Indigenous numerically small peoples of the Russian Federation: on some issues of their “ethnic” and “cultural” rights protection. Vestnik Permskogo universiteta (Perm Univ. Newsl.) 4(30), 19–27 (2015). https://doi.org/10.17072/1995-4190-2015-4-19. (in Russian) 12. Myasnikova, A.: Place of Finno-Ugric movement in system of the international relations. Vestnik Chuvashskogo Universiteta (Chuvash Univ. Newsl.) 2, 25–28 (2013). (in Russian) 13. Nemechkin, V.: The mechanisms of United Nations to protect the rights of indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation (on the example of Finno-Ugric peoples). Finno-ugorskij mir (FinnoUgric World) 1, 82–89 (2015). (in Russian) 14. PACE: Situation of Finno-Ugric and Samoyed Peoples. Doc. 11087, 26 October 2006. http:// mariuver.info/eng/scien/topical/Katrin_Saks_Report.html. Accessed 15 June 2019 15. Resolution 1171: Endangered Uralic minority cultures (1998). https://assembly.coe.int/nw/ xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=16655&lang=en. Accessed 15 June 2019 16. Robbins, B., Stamatopoulou, E.: Reflections on culture and cultural rights. South Atl. Q. 103(2/3), 419–434 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-103-2-3-419 17. Schukin, A.I.: Preconditions and determinants of development of ethnic tourism in the northwest of the Russian Federation). Ph.D, Geography, St. Petersburg (2002). (in Russian)

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Geo-Branding as a Tool for Realizing Russia’s Interests in the International Arena Victory Pogodina1 , Sofia Yakovleva2 , Anna Matveevskaya2(B) , and Vladimir Evseev3 1 Saint Petersburg State University of Industrial Technologies

and Design, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected] 2 Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected], [email protected] 3 Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint Petersburg, Russia [email protected]

Abstract. In the modern world, the image of the state is the basic element of its strategic capital. It affects all aspects of the functioning of state as a subject of international relations and as an economic player in the system of global competition. On the experience of many countries of the world it becomes clear that the technology of territorial branding is the leading communicative technology aimed at promoting national interests today. The essence of branding lies in the formation and promotion of the country’s brand as a specific intangible asset that identifies the country, making it recognizable. These tools are necessary because of the interest of the state and business structures in attracting tourists, students, and investments to country. Competition is increasing every year in this area in the international arena. In this article, branding technologies of state promotion in the “international market” are presented. In this regard, the experience of Russian Federation is interesting, as a state that has extensively expanded in recent years to create and develop a national brand, as well as a state seeking to change the perception of tourist destinations within the country by its own citizens. The purpose of this research is to assess the role of tourism sector in forming the image and prestige of country, enhancing state’s reputation, and influencing business community’s perception of use geo-branding as a technology to attract attention to its territory. Keywords: Geo-branding · International relations · Russia’s interests · Tourism · Soft power

1 Introduction The World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) is a special UN tourism agency, establishes that today tourism is a stable type of economic activity. According to this organization, trade in tourism services in the world grew faster than trade in goods from 2013 to 2017. The share of tourism among other exported goods and services was 7%. The total amount of international tourism’s exports amounted to $ 1.4 trillion in 2017 [1]. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 396–407, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0_35

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Asia and Pacific region showed a double-digit increase in the number of international tourist arrivals in a period from January for September 2017. The Republic of Korea (+36%), Vietnam (+26%), Japan (+24%), and Sri Lanka (+15%) became leading countries in the region. In Europe, the situation is different, but also a height was saved here. The number of international tourist arrivals increased by 2% in a period from January for September 2017. The number of international tourist arrivals increased by 4% (September 2017) in the Americas. South (+7%) and Central America (+6%), Caribbean (+4%) and Central America (+4%) are on leading positions [2]. Such dynamics have made tourism as a significant factor in socio-economic progress. The global tourism market has expanded both geographically and on industries. New types of tourism appeared in recent years. There is extreme tourism, industrial, rural tourism, nuclear, medical tourism. This has increased competition among the countries of the world that are seeking to attract more tourists to their territory. Russia has a great potential for receiving foreign travelers. For this purpose, a country has all necessity - a large area, providing various combination of tourist conditions, a rich historical and cultural heritage, and virgin nature in some regions. The diversity of its tourist resources, natural and cultural-historical contrasts are the competitive tourist advantage of Russia [3]. The Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report annually estimates a competitiveness in the field of tourism in 136 countries around the world. Experts analyze various positions related to the reception of tourists. Spain, France, Germany, Japan, Great Britain, Australia, Italy, Canada and Switzerland gained the lead in rating in 2017. Russia is in 43rd place on the index of competitiveness in the field of tourism, occupying a middle position between Turkey and Indonesia [4]. The Russian Federation aims to develop internal and entrance tourism on its territory. According to experts, Russia occupies the strongest positions in the ranking of air transport infrastructure (22nd place), amount of natural resources (39th place) and cultural sights (25th place). Our country ranks 11th place on the competitiveness of prices. Russia is on the 116th place for the quality of tourist infrastructure (hotels, resorts, entertainment facilities). Experts low estimated the openness of the country for international travelers (115th place). Russia ranks only 120th place on the index of visa requirements. Experts rated the priority of tourism for the government in our country by the 95th line of rating. An ecological situation allowed Russia to take the 71st place [5]. Only 1% of the global tourist flow accounts for the proportion of tourists entering Russia. According to the UNWTO forecast, Russia will be able to receive up to 40 million foreign tourists a year with an appropriate level of tourist infrastructure’s development. The most intensive international exchange is observed in Russian Federation with Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Analysts of the National Academy of Tourism establish that in Russia today tourism is developed in less than 20% territory of country. Many areas of cultural, historical and natural value remain unclaimed by Russian and foreign tourists. Greater part of foreign tourists visit St. Petersburg, Moscow, as well as the city of “The Golden Ring of Russia”. Insignificant part of the travelers go on cruises along the Volga.

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2 Materials and Methods Branding is a cumulative customer experience, including its emotional component. Constancy is important in branding, attitude to the client and his established relationships with the business, his experience. On determination of Arpenteva M. geo-branding (territorial branding) is a systematic activity related to strategic management and development of territories. [6] At the same time, there is an obvious terminological confusion. Territorial branding is also called territorial marketing, branding of places, tourism branding, which is probably related to the constantly changing meaning of the concept. According to S. Anholt, territorial branding should be the sum of brand management and public diplomacy along with the promotion of commerce, investments, tourism and export supplies. [7] A clear distinction between territorial and national branding does not exist in professional literature; there is a subtle difference between them. According to Oins and Hildrett, territorial branding is directed in exteriority. National branding is associated with the formation, the creation of a nation and is characterized by an inward look, at least from a political and cultural point of view. [8] National branding is a powerful political instrument, especially for small nations aspiring to strengthen their political positions or even oppose the economic, financial or military influence of superpowers. A difference between territorial and national branding is not great. Both concepts have the same goal, which is to help promote a specific geographic location of the target audience, to make local tourism more attractive. An important task of any state is the promotion of its national interests [9]. The idea of national interest was based on the survival and security of the state, on the preservation and protection of state power and welfare in the early stages of history. Typically, these ideas are concentrated around ensuring the welfare of the nation and maintenance of the desired political course and national lifestyle [10]. Nye marked the difference between hard and soft power. Material and “tangible” economic and military power are associated with “hard power”, when “soft power” is usually interpreted in terms of culture (tourism), institutions (education) and information technologies (mass media). Soft power allows others to achieve results that are beneficial to the state, not through threats and coercion, but through cooperation [11]. Culture, state values, and foreign policy directions are the basis for soft power. The nature of the policy is changing. Messages and images are passed real time, with higher quality than ever before with the advent of new technologies [12]. States can acquire “soft power” through the construction for them character, including through tourism and territorial branding, in order to achieve the desired results for themselves in the international arena. Territorial branding allows not only to improve the external attributes of the state, but also strengthen the loyalty of its own citizens. Tourist brands contain both economic (investment, export, tourism) and political (image, reputation, ideological influence) value for the state. Researchers identify several models that aim to analyze and develop certain mechanisms for the creation, promotion and management of brands territories, which are most widely used in practice. The basis of the brand’s wheel model is the ranking of advantages, brand positioning. A company Bates Worldwide offered this model. Leading global companies such as Whiskey, Smirnoff, Zanussi, IBM used it. In this case, the brand is depicted as a set

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of concentric circles - elements of the brand. The core of the brand is in the center and the brand components are “strung” on it (“personality”, “values”, “benefits/advantages”, “attributes” of the brand) [13]. • The central idea is the core of the brand and its essence. It is offered to the target audience. • Brand identity implies self-presentation and its unique characteristics. • Values of delusions are the emotional result of using the product. • The result that the target audience will receive from the operation of the brand depends on the advantages of the brand. • The attributes of the brand are its external and essential features, its functionality (logo, advertising, participating persons and heroes of the brand, colors, fonts, music, specially selected text and phrases, marketing communications, PR, etc.). The brand wheel model gives an opportunity in detail and systematize the nuances of the brand’s interaction with the target audience. However, this model not always can use for brands of the territory. Nevertheless, this does not exclude some positive examples of using the concept (brand of the city of Perm). The state capital brand model of C. Dinnie. The country’s brand model of C. Dinnie includes a set of internal and external assets of the brand associated with its name and symbols, and together make up the capital of the state’s brand. The internal assets of the brand are divided into “innate”, for example, landscape, culture, iconography, and “acquired”, which can be the support of art and the level of consumer loyalty. External assets are divided into “assets estimated by the experience of other people” (perception of the country’s image, image of the country in foreign mass media), and “dispersed assets” (representatives of the national brand in other countries, diasporas, export products). According to the model of C. Dinnie, the national brand includes three levels [14]. The first of these is the national brand itself; the second is local brands defined by a national brand in certain areas (in tourism, sports, domestic investments, politics and culture, in attracting qualified personnel); and, finally, the third level is independent brands in regions and cities, brands of national goods and services, cultural and educational centers. In this concept, tourism is influenced by the national brand, and it is also its element. At the same time serves as a self-sufficient object of branding. Thus, the structure of territory brand is associated with a national brand. The concept of the brand competitive identity of S. Anholt. The author offers a brand model of the territory in the form of a hexagon, where each corner represents the elements of a modern brand territory - tourism, export brands, politics, business, culture and people. According to the author, the image of the territory does not arise from nowhere, so it does not lend itself to artificial design, but stands on six facets of measured and tangible parameters of the territory’s brand: • tourism demonstrates the degree of interest in visiting the country, as well as the attractiveness of tourist sights;

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• export allows to determine the consumer’s perception of products and services in the country, as well as the desire with which customers are either looking for or avoid purchasing products produced in a given country; • business engages in public opinion research on the level of competence of the government of the country [15], describes the individual ideas of citizens about the government, characterizes the views of the population on global issues; • investments and migration processes allow to determine the degree of attractiveness of a given country in terms of living, working or studying, as well as to realize the population’s perception of the economic and social situation in the country; • culture demonstrates the global perception of the cultural heritage of each country, including the level of the country’s modern culture, including films, music, painting, sports and literature; • the “people” parameter shows the reputation of the population in terms of knowledge, education, friendliness, openness and other qualities, as well as the perception of the level of potential hospitality of citizens or discrimination [16]. S. Anholt in a new way introduced the concept of branding of the country. He noted that the branding of the state (territories) is a systematic process of coordinated actions of the state (territory) to create and promote competitive identity.

3 Results A tourist brand promotes formation of positive, recognizable image of the country or the region and increases competitiveness of the state’s tourism industry in the world market of tourist services. The tourist brand is understood as a well-known single or complex object of natural or cultural heritage, as well as routes that involve visiting these objects, unique events, crafts, services attracting large tourist flows. Technology of formation of the tourist brand assumes the algorithm of actions: formulation of the ideal image of the country in the eyes of the target audience, formation of the brand identity, identification of unique features of the brand by which it differs from competitors, construction of a communication system, and evaluation of branding effectiveness. It is necessary to consider that the brand of the territory is formed based on already stablished stereotypes, study and accounting of which is the obligatory condition for the formation and promotion of the country’s brand [17]. The factors that comprise the tourist image are a good geographical location; capacity and variety of tourist-resource potential, including the abundance of unique natural and cultural attractions; the level of tourist infrastructure development (facilities of accommodation, transport, communications, catering, trade, entertainment, etc.), as well as the level of service and qualification of the staff; stability of the political situation and crime safety; the degree of well-being ecological situation etc. However, we recognize such a basic parameter as fame, popularity. Assessment of tourists’ demand for visiting the object, positive attitude of tourists toward an object, attention of the media and Internet users determines the popularity of the tourist brand [18]. The concept of “tourist brand” is systematic and characterizes strategy of creating competitive advantages of tourist products, the prospects for the development of

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tourism activities, involves the maximum socio-economic effect [19]. Projects on the organization of event tourism and the creation of entertainment centers and complexes are the most modern directions to enhance the brand’s competitiveness. Creation of new and reanimation of old myths are important at creation of tourist brand. Formation of new places, objects, events is the necessary condition of the effective activity aimed at creating a unique tourist-resource potential of the center or region. Tourist brands have classification, being base on different criteria. The following types of tourist brands exist: – region, district, center, locality (for example, North-West, Yaroslavia, Moscow region, Kuban, southern coast of Crimea, etc.); – natural objects (for example, the Volga, the Lena delta, the Baikal, the Valley of Geysers, the Kungur cave, etc.); – natural processes and phenomena (for example, white nights, Northern lights, steppe flowering, bird migration, etc.)); – cultural heritage sites (Livadia Palace, Pashkov House, Cathedral of Christ the Savior, the Diveevo monastery, Snow Maiden’s Tenement, the residence of Santa Claus, etc.); – outstanding historical figures and places associated with their life (Pushkinogorye, Spasskoe-Lutovinovo, Lenin’s mausoleum, the Trinity-Sergius Lavra, etc.); – services and places of their delivery (the Caucasian Mineral Waters, the sanatorium “Elton”, Russian baths, etc.)); – food and beverages (for example, Smelt Festival “Everything will be cool”, gastronomic fair “KhreNovy festival in Russia,” folklore and gastronomic festival “ dumplings at Nicholas Winter” milk festival “Za Okoi pasutsya KO…” etc.); – events, festivals, holidays (Shrovetide celebrations, Sabantuy, Spasskaya tower festival, “Scarlet sails” festival, Window to Europe film festival, etc.)); – brand tourist routes (for example, “Crimean around the world”, “Silver necklace of Russia”, “Golden ring of Altai”, Pearl necklace of Saint-Petersburg, etc.). The Federal target program “Development of internal and entrance tourism in the Russian Federation (2011–2018)” was a set of activities to improve the tourism industry and optimize the conditions of travel and recreation of people in our country. The program provided activities aimed at increasing the efficiency of the national tourism product’s promotion in the internal and international markets. The priority task of Program in this direction consisted in advancement of home tourist product on world and internal tourist markets. Information and propaganda campaigns, networks of information centers and points, interregional, all-Russian and international exhibitions, forums and other events were the solution to this problem. The conducted events had an impact on creation of a positive image of Russia as an attractive tourist destination. The total budget planned for the implementation of these measures amounted to 3,7 billion rubles [20]. The main disadvantages are: – Image of Russia as a country unfavorable for tourism, created by some foreign and domestic mass media;

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– the current procedure for issuing Russian visas to citizens of foreign countries, safe in a migratory relation, which does not always contribute to the growth of inbound tourism in Russian Federation; – undeveloped tourist infrastructure, high moral and physical deterioration of existent material base, a few of hotel accommodation facilities of tourist class (2–3 stars) with a modern level of comfort, unsatisfactory state of many tourist objects of show and some other. The Center for Information Communications “Rating” and the magazine “Rest in Russia” are compilers of the annual National Tourist Rating. In 2017, they conducted a unique study to establish the most attractive brands for tourists in the Russian Federation. This technology is original. It is possible to solve two tasks: to assess the level of recognition of regional tourist brands among Russians and to identify the tourism attractiveness of the brands, that is, the desire to travel to the region where the brand is located. The developers sent requests to the regional ministries and departments of culture and tourism with a request to provide information about the promoted regional tourist brands. Specialists also conducted a survey of experts and collected information from public sources. As a result, the list of 1000 regional tourist brands were formed. All tourist brands were distributed in five categories: “Excursion Objects (sights, recreational facilities, geographical and industrial objects)”, “Tourist routes”, “Activities of Event tourism”, “Gastronomic brands”, “National art crafts”. The final list consisted of 425 items included in the table for interviewing citizens. The survey was conducted from 13 to 19 February 2017. More than a thousand people from all regions of Russia took part in this survey. The final table of the “Top-100 tourist brands of Russia” were received [21]. The data obtained during the research are of interest to professionals involved in the search for ways to develop the tourist sector, both in each individual region and in the country. Some results were unexpected for the experts. So, for example, six objects from the following regions appeared in a rating of Top-100: Vladimir region, Moscow region. Krasnodar region, the Republic of Crimea, St. Petersburg and Tula region have five objects. Four objects represent the Vologda region. The best tourist objects of Kaliningrad region, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kostroma and Rostov region are mentioned three times in the rating list. We will present the first ten objects that led the rating table of Russia’s tourist brands: the Tretyakov Gallery, the Moscow Kremlin, the State Hermitage, the Peterhof Museum-Reserve, the Bolshoi Theater, St. Isaac’s Cathedral, Tula Gingerbread, Red Square, VDNH, Sochi. From the World Natural and Cultural Heritage List located in Russia, the TOP-100 includes the following (the number indicates the location string in the rating) (Table 1): Thus, the objects are not included in the list of TOP-100 tourist brands of the country (the year in which the objects are on the UNESCO list is displayed in brackets): “Church of the Ascension in Kolomenskoye”, “Virgin Komi Forests”, “Ensemble of the Ferapontov Monastery”, “Historical - architectural complex of the Kazan Kremlin”, “Curonian Spit”, “Central Sikhote-Alin”, “Ubsunur Basin”, “Citadel, Old Town and Derbent Fortifications” (2003), “Natural Complex of the Wrangel Island Reserve”, “Ensemble of the Novodevichy Monastery “Struve Geodetic Arc”, “Putorana Plateau”, “Lena Pillars

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Table 1. UNESCO objects as Russia’s tourist brand №

Tourist brand

UNESCO objects

2

Moscow Kremlin

Moscow Kremlin and Red Square

3

State Hermitage

The historical center of St. Petersburg and related groups of monuments

4

Museum Reserve “Peterhof”

The historical center of St. Petersburg and related groups of monuments

6

Saint Isaac’s Cathedral

The historical center of St. Petersburg and related groups of monuments

8

Red Square

Moscow Kremlin and Red Square

14

Drawbridges

The historical center of St. Petersburg and related groups of monuments

15

Lake Baikal

Lake Baikal

17

White monuments of Vladimir and Suzdal

White monuments of Vladimir and Suzdal

21

Kizhsky Gate

The architectural ensemble of the Kizhi Pogost

28

The architectural ensemble of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra in the city of Sergiev Posad

The architectural ensemble of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra

37

Volcanoes of Kamchatka

Volcanoes of Kamchatka

42

Yaroslavl - the capital of the Golden Ring of The historical center of the city of Russia Yaroslavl

51

Historical and cultural complex of the Solovetsky Islands

Historical and cultural complex of the Solovetsky Islands

70

Sophia Cathedral

Historical monuments of Veliky Novgorod and its environs

81

Route “Valley of Geysers”

Volcanoes of Kamchatka

83

Olkhon Island

Lake Baikal

88

Teberdinsky reserve

Western Caucasus

94

Belukha Mountain

Golden Altai Mountains

Natural Park”, “The Ancient City of Chersonese Tauride and Its Chora”, “Historical and Archaeological Complex in Bolgar”, “Assumption Cathedral and Monastery of the Island-Sviyazhsk Island”, “Landscapes of Dauria”.

4 Discussion Russia ranked 28th in the rating of The Soft Power 30 (“Soft Power”), compiled by the Portland PR agency in 2018. Of course, the Russian Federation managed to become a prominent figure in the international arena in 2018. Russian Federation has demonstrated

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strong positions in maintaining the quality work of embassies and permanent missions in multilateral organizations [22]. The authors believe that, given the country’s largescale cultural potential, it is possible to achieve better results if you pay more attention to cultural missions. Some progress in Russia has been noticeable in the tourist market in the past few years. Russian Federation entered the top 10 most visited by tourists, immediately following Germany, Britain and Mexico in 2015–2016. However, as some researchers argue, this growth is based primarily on the devaluation of the Russian ruble, as well as the relative safety of the region compared to countries of North Africa, Turkey and the Middle East. Attention from the authorities exists: it was proposed to extend the Federal Target Program for the development of domestic and inbound tourism in Russia, the main tasks of which are to improve the quality of services provided and promote the Russian tourist product abroad, including additional program provisions on opening 17 clusters in the Russian territory. New concept of the Federal target program “Development of internal and entrance tourism in Russian Federation (2019–2025)” was ratified in May 2018 (order of the Government of Russian Federation of May 5, 2018 № 872-p) (The Federal target program, 2018). According to it, by the end of 2025 the volume of tourist services provided to the population will have to be more than 274 milliards of rubles, and the volume of services provided to the population by hotels and similar accommodation facilities will reach 373 milliards of rubles. Expected that the amount of the organized tourists designing an electronic tour on Russia will attain 6,78 million persons in a year by the end of 2025 [23]. Support of activity will come true for advancement of the Russian tourist product. Authors consider a necessity to develop the internetwork of national marketing center for tourism (“Visit Russia”). In conception it is prescribed that, it is supposed to provide subsidies to tour operators to compensate part of the costs under the agreement on the implementation of the tourist product in the field of internal and entrance tourism, including in order reducing the cost of tourist packages in the low season and for socially vulnerable categories of citizens. The program document approved 15 perspective tourist integrated investment projects on specific priority types of tourism: – within the framework of health tourism (projects “The black Sea coast”, “Volga region”, “Caucasus”, “Caspian Sea”); – within the framework of cultural and educational tourism (projects “The Silver necklace of Russia”, “Central Russia”, “Russian Baltic”, “Ural”); – within the framework of active tourism (project “Siberia”); – within cruise tourism (projects “Primorye”, “Volga way”, “Russian Arctic”, “Amur”, “Kamchatka”); – within the framework of ecological tourism (project “Baikal”). Now, the problem remains. It consists in the absence of a clear organizational policy pursued by the authorities about tourism, and, as a result, inadequate use of economic diplomacy mechanisms. Perhaps Russia has a chance to make a difference in its favor from an economic and geopolitical point of view. Russian Federation has many competitive advantages [24]. The use of these advantages requires the establishment of joint work between the federal and local authorities, the creation of ad hoc advisory bodies

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and groups under the directional committees, the stimulation of the business sector, the fight against corruption, the development of a common foreign policy line of the state regarding tourism. The lack of tangible results of many projects on territorial branding discredits the industry, undermines the level of prices for skilled labor in this area. The public sees branding to launder money from corrupt officials. As a result, officials avoid investing big money in projects in order to avoid unnecessary criticism from the media. However, the need for recognition and self-identification is increasing in Russian cities and regions, including due to international sanctions, Russia is forced to pay attention to internal problems. Domestic tourism is growing steadily, and along with it, interest in the territories, their traditions and way of life increases. Not only well-to-do regions, but also those that are still striving for well-being, want to attract more attention from investors and tourists, but do not always see the solution in territorial branding. Some researchers identify the following levels of territorial branding in Russia. The first one is advertising technology, which helps to increase the popularity and awareness of the territory compared to thousands of other places. The second level is territorial branding as an ideology and an ingrained concept that defines the message and idea sent by the brand through words, actions, events, management practices. The first level is essentially an advertising, surface branding, which is not so difficult to put into practice. And only 10% of Russian cities and regions are close to the second level, where everything starts with the idea of how to make a city or region more attractive to the target audience through branding. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Russia lacks interesting and promising projects in tourism branding. The authors single out the project “Made in Russia”, which was officially presented on May 15, 2014 after two years of research, where more than 100 companies and 50 experts were involved. The project involves the development and promotion of Russian business and culture under the sign of a new national brand. The idea is that the brand “Made in Russia” be perceived as a kind of collecting element of everything that is produced or invented in Russia, including culture, traditions and scientific achievements. A company wishing to become a project participant should be eligible according to the following criteria. First, the company must be created or owned (at least 50%) by a citizen of the Russian Federation. Secondly, the company must pay taxes in Russia. And finally, thirdly, the company must provide jobs in Russia. All project participants receive equal opportunities, which include personal pages in electronic and print catalogs “Made in Russia”, the right to publish expert opinion on the website “Made in Russia”, free participation in the events “Made in Russia”, the opportunity to represent companies at international exhibitions as part of the “Made in Russia” team, free consulting services of the Association of Branding Companies of Russia, etc. The “Made in Russia” catalog and the project logo are the main tools for promoting Russian brands and culture. Companies such as the Hermitage, the Russian State Library, Skolkovo, Ralph Ringer, the Moscow Jewelry Factory, the ROSKOSMOS State Corporation, Renova Group and others have become project partners. The “Made in Russia” logo is a bar-code stylized as birch trees. Birch was chosen as a significant element of Russian industries, culture, literature, music, painting and religion.

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The image of the logo on the products and promotional materials of the company allows the manufacturer to demonstrate their affiliation to the national brand. When buying such products, customers will not only support local producers, but also advertise Russian culture. The “THE WHOLE WORLD WITHIN RUSSIA” project is another initiative that attracts attention. He won the All-Russian Competition “Tourist Brand of Russia”. About 500 logos and 600 slogans participated in the competition. Rosturizm, with the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and the Association of Branding Companies of Russia, has developed thirty concepts of tourist brands in Russia. The jury selected the winner of the three finalists based on a popular vote. Designers of the project have developed a logo in the form of a map consisting of simple geometric shapes, each of which represents different regions and geographical objects of Russia. The idea of the concept is that Russia is a huge and diverse country in all respects. Among other things, the country is a link between the past and the future, uniting different cultures in its spaces, preserving thousands of stories and memories. “Traveling in Russia is more than a journey. This is a lot of discoveries every time!”, Says the project’s slogan [25].

5 Conclusion The image of the state is an essential component of the successful pursuit of its political course in the international arena. The positive characteristics of such an image and the successful use of soft power by the state serve to protect the national interests of the country. Territorial branding is one of the most effective mechanisms for promoting national interests. Branding allows you to highlight the country among the general flow, to attract the attention of investors, tourists and the international community. States can use “soft power” by building an image that is beneficial for them through tourism and territorial branding. The brand allows the state to receive not only economic benefits (increased investment, tourist flows, exports), but also political dividends in the form of international prestige, ideological influence, and credibility in the international arena. Territorial branding has been developed in the Russian Federation not so long ago but has already secured a large-scale interest from public circles and the federal government. Russia is an active participant in the interstate dialogue in tourism industry. So, the 23rd session of the General Assembly of the United Nations World Tourism Organization will be held in 2019 in St. Petersburg.

References 1. UNWTO Tourism Highlights. 2017 Edition. https://www.e-unwto.org/doi/pdf/10.18111/978 9284419029 2. UNWTO World Tourism Barometer. http://cf.cdn.unwto.org/sites/all/files/pdf/unwto_bar om16_06_november_excerpt.pdf 3. Pogodina, V., Matveevskaya, A.: Geography of Tourism of the European Part of Russia. The Geography of Tourism of Central and Eastern European Countries, pp. 375–435 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42205-3 4. The Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report. http://tourism.interfax.ru/ru/news/articles/ 40340

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5. Official website of Russian Federal Agency for Tourism. https://www.russiatourism.ru/. (in Russian) 6. Arpentieva, M.: Geo-branding in tourism industry. Sovremennie problem servisa i turizma, pp. 23–27 (2015). (in Russian) 7. Anholt, S. Places: Identity, Image and Reputation (2009) 8. Olins, W., Hildreth, J.: Nation branding: yesterday, today, and tomorrow. In: Destination Brands: Managing Place Reputation, pp. 55–66 (2011) 9. Pozdeeva, E., Trostinskaya, I., Evseeva, L., Ivanova, R.: Problems of personality type transformation in current conditions of Russian society. Eur. Proc. Soc. Behav. Sci. XXXV, 1092–1099 (2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2018.02.128 10. Tanova, A., Popov, D., Fokina, V., Evseeva, L.: Problems and prospects of information and communication technologies as political communication element. Eur. Proc. Soc. Behav. Sci. XXXV, 1339–1346 (2018). https://doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2018.02.157 11. Nye, J. Soft power: the means to success in world politics (2004) 12. Bolgov, R., Bogdanovich, S., Yag’ya, V., Ermolina, M.: How to measure the digital diplomacy efficiency: problems and constraints. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol. 674, pp. 180–188 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49700-6_18 13. Burceva, T., Kuznecova, T., Vorozhcov, S.: Regional Brand Management Marketing in Russia and abroad (2019). http://www.dis.ru/library/market/archive/2009/1/4778.html 14. Dinnie, C.: City Branding: Theory and Cases (2011) 15. Evseeva, L., Bashkarev, A., Pozdeeva, E., Tarakanova, T.: Technologies of political system modernization in new communicative environments. Eur. Proc. Soc. Behav. Sci. XXXV, 349–356 (2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2018.02.41 16. Shafranskaya, I., Sazhina, A.: Residents’ attitudes towards place marketing: tourism marketing focus. Almatourism – J. Tour. Cult. Territ. Dev. 8(7), 286–297 (2017) 17. Tereshchuk, M.: Policy of touristic country branding as instrument of realization of national interests: the experience of the countries of Central and Eastern (2015). http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/politika-turisticheskogo-brendinga-strany-kak-instru ment-realizatsii-natsionalnyh-interesov-opyt-stran-tsentralno-vostochnoy-evropy 18. Matveevskaya, A., Pogodina, V., Tarakanova, T., Evseev, V., Nesterova, I.: Technologies of tourism in the modern urban environment. Int. J. Civ. Eng. Technol. 9(10), 1566–1574 (2018) 19. Cherevichko, T.: Tourism as a type of economic diplomacy. Aktual’nie probmlemy sovremennih mezhdunarodnih otnosheniy (2014). (in Russian) 20. The Federal target program “Development internal and entrance tourism in Russian Federation (2011–2018)”. https://www.russiatourism.ru/contents/deyatelnost/programmy-i-pro ekty/federalnaya-tselevaya-programma-razvitie-vnutrennego-i-vezdnogo-turizma-v-rossiy skoy-federatsii-2011-2018-gody. (in Russian) 21. National rating of tourist brands. http://matveychev-oleg.livejournal.com/4949779.html. (in Russian) 22. The Soft Power 30 A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017. https://softpower30.com/wp-con tent/uploads/2017/07/The-Soft-Power-30-Report-2017-Web-1.pdf 23. The Federal target program “Development internal and entrance tourism in Russian Federation (2019–2025)”. https://www.russiatourism.ru/contents/deyatelnost/programmy-i-pro ekty/federalnaya-tselevaya-programma-razvitie-vnutrennego-i-vezdnogo-turizma-v-rossiy skoy-federatsii-2019-2025-gody-/. (in Russian) 24. Zeleneva, I., Matveevskaya, A., Ermolina, M.: Dialogue of civilizations - new model of world politics. Eur. Proc. Soc. Behav. Sci. XXXV, 829–836 (2018). https://doi.org/10.15405/epsbs. 2018.02.98 25. The Whole World Within Russia. https://www.behance.net/gallery/64720835/Russia-tou rism-brand

Author Index

A Akbulut, Ecem Tuğçe, 351 Al Shammari, Abu Baker Salih Mahdi, 357 Altunok, Mustafa, 217 Andal, Aireen Grace, 292, 327 Arjona-Pelado, Ivan, 13 Askarov, Zohidzhon, 313 Atnashev, Vadim, 13, 133, 384 B Bachvalova, Olga, 156 Bahturidze, Zeinab, 65 Bogoliubova, Natalia, 368 Boldyreva, Elena, 228 Bolgov, Radomir, 77, 256 Burnasov, Alexander, 204 C Chernov, Igor, 77 D Demidov, Vladimir, 313 Demidova, Elena, 35 Duisembina, Yekaterina, 228 E Eidemiller, Konstantin, 104, 119 Eltc, Elena, 368, 384 Ermolina, Marina, 48 Evseev, Vladimir, 396 Evseeva, Lidiya, 268

F Fokin, Vladimir, 341 G Gabrielyan, Maxim, 104 Geht, Anton, 119 Gladkiy, Yuri, 91 Gladky, Iuriy, 104 Golik, Nadezhda, 156 I Ignatyeva, Irina, 244 Ilyushkina, Maria, 204 Isaev, Boris, 244 Ivannikov, Igor, 77 Ivannikov, Nikita, 23, 143 K Katsy, Dmitry, 77 Kolesnik, Irina, 357 Kornekova, Svetlana, 91 Kovalev, Yuri, 204 Krivko, Marina, 256 Kudriavtceva, Regina-Elizaveta, 104, 119 L Leete, Art, 384 Li, Jingcheng, 303 Losev, Konstantin, 244 M Matveevskaya, Anna, 48, 268, 396 Mokhorov, Dmitry, 313

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Bolgov et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography, SPRINGERGEOGR, pp. 409–410, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58263-0

410 Mokhorova, Anna, 35, 313 Muratshina, Ksenia, 292 N Nikolaeva, Julia, 368 Nikulina, Anni, 119 O Özkan, Türkan, 217

Author Index S Semenov, Alexander, 156 Solovyeva, Valeriya, 48 Stepanov, Anatoly, 204 Sukhorukov, Viacheslav, 91 Süleymanli, Ebulfez, 195 T Tarakanova, Tamara, 268 Tsyb, Alexey, 133, 143, 156

P Park, Sunyoung, 278 Pavlova, Olga, 179 Petrenko, Daria, 104 Pogodin, Sergey, 3, 48, 268 Pogodina, Victory, 396 Poltorak, Sergei, 168 Potapova, Ekaterina, 23 Pshenova, Julia, 143

Y Yag’ya, Vatanyar, 236 Yagya, Talie, 236 Yakovleva, Sofia, 396

R Riabova, Anna, 3 Ryabova, Anna, 179

Z Zotova, Anastasiia, 168

V Vasilieva, Natalia, 65