Problems of reflection in the system of education 1571817352, 9781571817358

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Problems of Reflection in the System of Education

by

Niklas Luhmann and Karl-Eberhard Schorr

translated by Rebecca A. Neuwirth

Waxmann Munster/ New York

European Studies in Education Europaische Studien zur Erziehung und Bildung Etudes Europrennes en Science de L'Education

Christoph Wulf (Ed.)

Volume 13

Waxrnann Munster I New York Mtinchen / Berlin

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitstitelaufnahme Niklas Luhmann and Karl-Eberhard Schorr: Problems of Reflection in the System of Education Miinster; New York: Waxmann 2000 ISBN 3-89325-890-6 ISBN 3-89325-890-6

ISSN 0946-6767

© Waxmann Verlag GmbH 2000; Postfach 8603, D-48046 Miinster, F.R.G.

Waxmann Putilishing Co., P.O. Box 1318, New York, NY 10028, USA Alie Rechte vorbehalten. Printed in Germany

Table of Contents Note from the Translator Introduction Part 1: Contingency and Autonomy I. Pedagogy and societal theory II. Functional differentiation III. Inclusion IV. Function, performance, reflection V. Circular structures VI. The formulation of system references VII. Autonomy VIII. Overlapping domains IX. The development of contingency formulas X. Humane perfection XI. All-around education (Bi/dung) XII. The ability to learn XIII. The curriculum: towards the re-specification of the contingency formula XIV. Reflection's development of form XV. Reflection of autonomy Part 2: Pedagogy between Technique and Reflection I. Pedagogy in the midst of self-created instructional problems II. The double problem of instruction technology III. Organization and science IV. Technicians and technologists: on Philanthropy's and Critical Philosophy's take on the problem V. Pedagogy headed towards the ,,absolute method"? VI. The theory of all-around education (Bi/dung) as Pedagogy's ,,take-off' as a science VII. Pedagogy in the context of a new consciousness of temporality geared to the future and past

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11

23 23 29 35 41 45

49 53 60 66 71 81

94 105 114 121 127 127 131 13 7 143 147 153 165

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VIII. Pedagogical science caught between idealism and organization IX. Pedagogy's orientation on human beings X. Theory and praxis XI. Didactics and method XII. Instructional research XIII. Organizational differentiation XIV. Unity of the variety: On the reflection of temporal complexity

Part 3: Equality and Social Selection I. Equality as a symbol of the society

180 193 204 216 231 237 245

Stratification Natural selection Societal selection and pedagogical selection Education and selection as a contradiction Organizational differentiation and selective mobility Selection for equality A look back at society Careers Scarcity and uncertainty Tests Conditioning and selection of behavior Symbolic generalization: medium of selection XIV. The reflection of selection XV. Resultant problems XVI. Conditions for rationality

253 253 257 263 271 274 280 284 297 300 306 311 318 325 339 345 353

Part 4: Reflection in the Establishment I. Theory in a system II. On the pedagogical establishment's own momentum III. System reflection: difference and unity IV. Nineteen hundred seventy nine

365 365 370 377 386

Afterword 1988

393

II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. XIII.

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Note from the Translator Before an English speaking reader plunges into the following book, there are a few basic issues regarding Systems Theory, the German system of education, and German-English translation that need to be clarified. After all, the historical and philosophical references, the language connotations, and the style of academic work all link onto (or have connectivity with a key term in this book) a tradition stenuning from the other side of a channel, if not an ocean. The comments below should help the reader gain footing at the outset. In part, these notes are repeated at appropriate points within the text itself in the form of starred footnotes. A better approach, however, is to keep them in mind from the very start, and for the reader who intends to skip around in the book, these clarifications are vital. (l) Ausdifferenzierung is a very important concept in Systems Theory explaining the formation of systems. A system is differentiated from everything that is around it in the process of Ausdifferenzierung. In the process, the system comes into being and everything that is around it (including other systems) becomes that system's environment. For the observer, many functionally-based systems were differentiated (in this sense) during the process of functional differentiation. The following book is in large part about the differentiation - once again, in this sense - of the system of education. The question of how to translate this concept, however, is very difficult, because the English word ,,differentiation" means first and foremost that something differentiates within itself. The system of education also differentiates (i!l this sense) when a function-based subsystem for organization, for example, is created within it. In order to distinguish between these two different types of differentiation (of a system or something else and within a system or something else), I have indicated the former one by putting it in the following phrase - some of which is ·sometimes in parentheses : differentiation of a system/something else from others/other systems/other things. Thus, an .,ausdifferenziertes System" appears in my ·text as a system that has been differentiated from other systems; the ,,Ausdifferenzierung eines Syste~s" as the differentiation of a system from others; etc .. Unfortunately, this is not a perfect solution, be7

cause the system is not only differentiated (in this sense) from other systems, but also from everything else around it that is not a system (what later, but not before or during the process, becomes its environment). The very first system to be differentiated, one can imagine, was indeed differentiated from no other systems at all, since none other existed. Nevertheless, the distinction is an important one and the solution is, I believe, the best possible. (2) The academic subject that is called Education in the United States of America generally goes under the name Educational Science (Erziehungswissenschaft) in Germany -- a title that implies stricter attention to careful ,,scientific" methodology. In addition, in Germany, ,,science (Wissenschaft)" is used to denote academic subjects or disciplines that use methodology (with some stringency); thus the title ,,Educational Science" places this department in the larger scientific academic community. (3) The word ,,education", in German Erziehung, is used in this book to mean formal education as well as upbringing. (4) For the most part, I have translated the German word Bi/dung as allaround education. The word suggests both formal and informal education in the same sense that education does when one speaks of an educated (implying all-around educated) person. It does not mean upbringing. (5) The German word ,,praxis" comes straight from Latin and means ,,practice" in the sense of ,,putting into practice," but not in the more everyday sense of what one does (which is really ,,poiesis"). In order to indicate this particular meaning, I have simply left the word in Latin/German and italicized it whenever it is used in the original text. (6) The German word Sinn has been translated into English from one of Niklas Luhmann's most important work, Soziale Systeme (Frankfurt a.M. 1984) or Social Systems (California 1995) as ,,meaning". Itcan also be translated as ,,sense", especially appropriate because Sinn and its plural Sinne also means the senses (as in the five human senses), but for the sake of consistency;, I have followed the lead of Social Systems translators John Bednarz, Jr. and Dirk Baecker. Luhmann and Schorr's use of Sinn leans on Husserl's, also translated with ,,meaning" in English - not as in the definition of a wor~ (i.e. as in semantics), but instead as in having value. 8

(7) The German Gymnasium (plural - Gymnasien) encompasses approximately the same grades as the American High School, plus an additional 13th grade. However, whereas High School is the only option for secondary school in America, the German systems offers several others, all of which are less ,,academic" than the Gymnasium - in order of difficulty levels: Realschule (which goes up to 10th grade) and Hauptschule (which goes up to 9th or 10th grade). The newer Gesamtschule (translated as ,,comprehensive school") houses all of these options under one roof, and was intended to decrease the ,pressure of early selections. At the conclusion of Gymnasium comes the maturity tests, called Abitur, which is the requirement for entrance into university; hence, the Gymnasium is the university track or the college preparatory school. Requirements for Gymnasium entrance differ historically and geographically, but is loosely based on previous performance. Rebecca A. Neuwirth

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Introduction This book deals with problems of reflection in the system of education. From what position does it do this? And why? Can one reflect upon reflection problems? And how? These questions should be posed at the very start and should be used to introduce the intention and the conceptual instruments of the following investigations. At first - and with good reason - one considers the field of Pedagogy to be responsible for carrying out reflection within and for the system of education. This holds true in particular within the German tradition in which Pedagogy claims to be Educational Science (Erziehungswissenschaft)" and not merely an an arts doctrine (Kunstlehre). The position and standing (?f Educational Science, however, has remained ambiguous. On the one hand, it is clear that scientific work that takes educating as its subject matter does indeed go on. On the other hand, Pedagogy is confronted with the particular requirement of communicating to educators how situations should be understood and even of giving them guidance in handling situations. As a science, it takes part in the issues of the scientific academic establishment and has to become comfortable with theoretical scientific grounds of certainty. But the Theory of Science in its present form is not well suited to coming up with grounds for the interpretation of praxis• or with the situation-specific knowledge and ability needed in praxis. And even an hierarchical progression from the Theory .of Science, past Educational Science and pedagogical .arts doctrine, to instructional

•

•

Note from the translator: in Germany, the academic subject that is called Education in the United States of America generally goes under the name Educational Science (Erziehung.nvissenschaft), a title that implies stricter attention to careful ,.scientific" methodology. In addition, in Germany, ,,science (Wissenschaft)" is used to denqte academic subjects or disciplines that use methodology .(with some stringency); thus the title ,.Educational Science" places this department in the larger scientific academic community. ·Note from the translator: the German word ,,praxis" comes straight from Latin and means ,,practice" in the sense of putting ideas into practice, but not in the more everyday sense ofwhat one does (which is really ,.poiesis") In order to indicate this particular meaning, I have simply left the word in Latin/German and italicized it whenever it is used in the original text.

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praxis would not be a continuum, but would instead involve very significant jumps from one area to the other. In view of this situation, it seems to us that there is little point in searching for the solution to the system of education's reflection problem in the domain of the Theory of Science and in starting up a discussion about the scientific nature of pedagogy yet again. The position of the sciences in relation to areas of societal life and lifeworlds is not one of providing a superior, stronger fundamental cause upon which the entire weight of innovation could rest. In addition, the sciences do not offer the possibility of condition-less cognition which is based exclusively on the thing. In the meantime, the Theory of Science has demanded itself such expectations be replaced by the notion that all gains in cognition are in, surmountably relative. Pressure is then felt to switch over to other, less hierarchical, less a priori-based theoretical models. Within the framework of a theoretical societal approach, we are starting with historical facts which we refer by using the concepts functional differentiation and self-reference. For ,,Educational Science," functional differentiation meant that different social systems for scientific research and for education were differentiated. That is the socio-structural reason for the problems that Pedagogy has in regards to its scientific nature. 'fhe humanities-oriented Pedagogy had tried one last time to overcome· this socio-structurally established system difference by inflating the concept of science. 1 Rather than following this path, it appears to us that it makes more sense and, more im~ portantly, is more realistic to begin with the assumption of separation between the scientific system and the system of education and then to inquire about interdependencies between them. We suspect that very high interdependencies exist, especially in the domain of reflection processes. If we make the reflection problems in the system of education into the topic of the following investigations in the system of science, then these investigations can gain a broad relevance for political ideas which goes further than their meaning within the sciences if it is true that the system of education is dependent on reflection and that it is in this sense particularly sensitive to science. Land mines which are manufactured in the sys-

a

See Wilhelm Flitner with his philosophical-henneneutic-pragmatic structure model (a continuation of the argument against a resolution made by the so-called close circle of Gennan philosophy - a resolution which had once again questioned the independence of Educational Scienc~ within the philosophical departments); in Das Selbstverstiindnis der Erziehungswissenschaft in der Gegenwart, 2nd ed., Heidelberg 1958.

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tern of science can explode in the system of education, and it may well be a task of science once again to gage the pressure. Thus, the system differentiation model does not contain any preliminary determination regarding how close or distant Pedagogy is to science. It does assume, however, that the unity of the system and thus the reference of all reflection in the system of education is not science - just as, for its part, education does not play that role in the scientifksystem. This will become more clear when we take the second guiding idea, self-reference, into consideration .. To start with, self-reference simply means that a system's operations always refer to other operations in the same system through the meaning of their content, whether they intend such connecting operations or not, whether they are directed towards the inside or the outside. A self-refential system continuously operates in the form of self-contact. It takes up effects that are in the environment and. puts effects into the environment in the form of activities that are each fitted internally and in this respect always demonstrate structurally controlled selectivity. A teacher may explain something to a pupil in a particular instructional situation and in this way, he may alter the environment - but only in the sense that he assumes in advance the level of knowledge and the situation of the class, the limits of possibilities of school instruction, the time budget of this particular system, its basis of legitimacy, etc. It is precisely this self-reference in a system that has been differentiated which aids that system in attaining highly specialized sensitivity to various matters which ' . could not have been established without the differentiation of the system. Basal self-reference in this sense is the system's Wliversal modus of operation that stands above all differences such as useful and hindering action, successful and unsuccessful action, conforming and deviating action, formal and infomial action. Reflection, as opposed to that, is a special case of selfieference which requires particular resources and perhaps even particular specialists and which is only updated from time to time. Through reflection processes, the system makes· itself into• the focus of discussion. In this case, the self-reference does not selectively take up some of its own operations (as opposed to operations of the environment); instead it aims at the identity of the system, at the unity of that which appears in everyday operations as the given complexity and as complexity, which forces selection. But how does it come to reflection? Does every self-referential system produce reflection, as the classical model of the self-referential consciousness - the model of the ,,subject" - seems to suggest? . . This notion does not necessarily follow logically. Especially in regard to social systems (we will leave the question of whether this can be gener13

alized open), it seems that a certain narrowing of system problems down to a few fundamental problems is an important precondition for reflection.2 For the science system, the basic problem of the unity in the difference between cognition and subject matter, which classical epistemology brought up for reflection, was most likely the fundamental problem. The newer development added to this factual problem, the social problem of intersubjectivity and the temporal problem of evolutionary self-steering while building up knowledge. In doing this, it spread the, fundamental principles of scientific-theoretical reflection. In the system of education, a similar trio seems predisposed to provide themes for reflection - namely the question of the factual particularity and autonomy of educating, the question of a technology for effects that are temporally distant, and the question ofthe education process's responsibility for social selectivity. These are reflection themes that have a long tradition, but that nevertheless must be posed anew. Autonomy becomes a theme that promises not only independence, but also burdens. One will not be able to say of Educational Science that it closed itself to this context: ,,Educational Science is thinking from the position of the responsible educator.''3 But will Educational Science also be able to bear the responsibility if the field takes on the form of only and continually asking how that which is pedagogical is pedagogically relevant - in other words, if it only follows high ambitions and big questions without being able to adjust to changes 'in the societal environment? 4 The urgency of this solution to the autonomy problem, then, was not the issue of whether one could to persevere against an hostile environment or other external limitations, but rather whether one could take such an environment. The societal changes, however, were just too big for the humanities form of ,,confirming knowledge" to be in the position to continue to offer sufficient points of reference - holding points, for instance, for dealing with the effectiveness problem of education (and instruction). The emana2

3

4

14

Similar ideas about certain technical passes being a condition for the creation of the fundamentals of higher level decisions can be seen in cybernetic system theory. Cf. Salomon Klaczko-Ryndziun, Systemanalyse der Selbstrejlexion: Eine inhaltliche Vorstudie zu einer Computersimulation, Basel/Stuttgart 1975, p. I 88ff. Flitner, Das Selbstversttindnis der Erziehungswissenschaft in der Gegenwart, p. 18. (Translated from the original: .,Die Erziehungswissenschaft ist ein Denken vom Standart verantwortlicher Erzieher aus.") Because .,in der sittlich-gesellschaftlichen Welt ist das Element inuner auch das Ganze, und die Isolierung beruht auf einer Abstraktion, die nicht inuner hilfreich, oft sogar unstatthaft,ist." Ibid, p. 12.

tion of pedagogical thinking 5 layed open the complexity of what went on in instruction: the technology problem of the education function could not be sufficiently understood in the form of the technology verdict. In view of heightened demands on the system's education performance, th_e position of the humanities in regard to its own demands become deflationary in that it could now only activate a few motives for accepting its statements. Yet, empirical coverage for the now independent problem of the effect of pedagogical praxis was nowhere in sight. The ,,realistic tum" (1962) 6 could not carry on the 4ebt-ridden remains of humanities Pedagogy fittingly, not to mention formulating it as a theory anew. Quite the opposite: the characterization of the education and instruction problem as having the one-sided goal of making the precise effects of various efforts certain resulted in a further intensification of reflection problems in the system of education which then led the system of education into contradictory thinking which sought stability in changing the system. Because in the present, one only finds out what one wants to change by examining the current criticism, the intention to change contains a moment of selfprovocation: had one considered the preconditions thoroughly enough? In a society that no longer accepts class-based duties and that, in principle, has taken over the pedagogical responsibility to motivate all individuals, there is no idealism that can ignore the following experience: pedagogical criteria cannot be realized without selection. If one does not know all of the effects, then one needs to select according to whether certain effects have already come into being or not. When giving out marks, -determining whether to promote pupils, and performing similar tasks, the teacher is actually preparing for such social selection; and he birids himself through elementary acts such as praise and criticism which occur in public and therefore must remain consistent. Yet, this motivational connection between education and selection is characterized today as 'a 'contradiction and thus left for reflection to handle. Reflection, how5

·6.

Significant for this is the story told by the title of the contribution of Theodor Litt, which was decisive for the humanities solution to the problem of pedagogical thinking: ,,Die Methodik des plldagogischen Denkens," Kantstudien 26, 1921, pp. 17-51. Around the 1930s, this was differentiated to ,,Wesen des padagogischen Denkens" (cf. the section reprinted with authorization of the author, ,,um die letzten Absatze gekOrzt, an denen ich heute nicht mehr festhalten kann" in Erziehung und Erziehungswirk/ichkeit, ed. Hermann R6hrs, Frankfurt a.M. 1967, pp. 58-82). Thus called in the title of Heinrich Roth's ,,Antrittsvorlesung" printed in Heinrich Roth, Erziehungs:wissenschaft, Erzieungsfeld und lehrerbildung, Hannover 1967, pp. 113-126.

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ever, cannot do anything with such a problem if it wants to retain contact to reality, because the problem certainly cannot be solved by avoiding selection. There is no chance for a return to the humanities position of reflection - to ;;the middle of that, which can be called pedagogical science in the strict sense" 7• The ,,unwanted" side-effects have miscredited this pedagogical reflection position too seriously. Research taught the field of education in this regard that one should use an approach that is more adequate to complexity. But ifresearch above all produces more demand for research, then to what fundaments of certainty can Educational Science appeal? We are starting out by taking the reflection concept seriously again in so far as processes of reflection always have to be about tracing variety back to its point of unity. Therefore, autonomy, technology, and selection, when they are taken up as themes of reflection, cannot be handled in isolation. They refer to one another to such an extent that the tendency today to proclaim autonomy while rejecting technology and selection gives a truly unbalanced impression. This tendency amounts to a complete avoidance of reflection with regard to the temporal and social. The reverse relationship holds as well: a concept of the unity of the system, at least today, is only accessible through attempts at reflection that include these three areas of focus and relates them to each other. If this can be shown and that is our aim - then at the same time it will become plausible that the differentiation of a function system for education (from other systems) uses meaning as a sensor for finding problems and, that it develops various sensitivities to problems in the three directions of all meaning - namely, with regard to the factual, temporal, and social - sensitivities which are then set as interdependent by reflection processes and are related back to the unity of the system. We will come back to this derivation of the original problem, which we will handle in more detail in the first, second, and third parts of this book, in part l, chapter 1. The intention here is simply to make it clear that the Theory of Science turns up as one of the subject matters of this sort of system theoretical approach, which itself claims to be scientific, namely, it turns up as re7

16

.,Diese Reflexion am Standort der Verantwortung des Denkenden ... Sie faBt alle Erziehungslehren zusammen, welche in einem Kreis gemeinsamen Lebe.ns, von den Praktikem als wahr erkannt werden. Sie vereinigt sie, ordnet sie einem universalen padagogischen Grundgedankengang ein, prOfi sie, verbindet diesen Grundgedanken mit der wissenschaftlichen Reflexion in ihrer Gesamtheit, kritisiert die Erziehungslehren von da aus, reinigt sie von lrrtilmem und Beengtheiten und klart den Standort auf, an dem sie praktiziert werden." According to Wilhelm Flitner, Das Se/bstverstandnis der Erzie"liungswissenschaft in der Gegenwart, p. 18.

flection theory of the science system. The Theory of Science thus appears to be in a position that is parallel to that of the reflection theories of other function systems - not as the setter of nonns, but possibly as an instructive model. The question of which semantic resources and which historical development the system of education uses to achieve its reflection, however, can be pursued independently and can conceptually allow for comparisons with other function systems, but otherwise ignore them. We are going to proceed in this manner and finally, at the end, return to the problem that comes up when systems contain a theory about themselves as part of the system (cf. part I, chapter IV). These simple assumptions about connections. between societal differentiation of function domains, the self-referential creation of systems, the condensing of problems, and reflection already make it possible for a testable hypotheses to be developed. According to this view, the system of education's history of reflection develops parallel to this system's history of differentiation (from other systems). The pedagogical semantic correlates to social structures. They influence each other mutually, and we see the differentiation itself as the key process in making such relationships possible and making them dynamic. The facts are correspondingly complex. To start with, there is a separate way of determining changes both within the framework of the semantic tradition as well as in the social structures of the education process, because no development can be conceived of independently of the preconditions that are specific to it - neither the development ·of semantics nor of the social structure. As the.· move towards differentiation (of systems), with which we are concerning ourselves, began in the second half of the 18th century, it was possible to quote Quintilian, Comenius, Locke, etc. and experiences with fathers, mothers, wet nurses, private tutors, and schools had already been made. Literature and organization existed, so that it was possible to react to literature with literature and to structural deficiencies with organization. Starting in the second half of the 18th century, however, such connecting developments are intensified and quickened in a manner that cannot be explained by the starting position alone. One becomes more conscious of theory and 'more sensitive to it within the pedagogical semantic. One registers structural shortcomings in -the domain of families and schools more critically, more comprehensively, and with a greater willingness to change than existed previ,ousJy, A sort of .. not-quite-contingency" becomes the dominant mode o( e'xp~rience anµ having effect. With that, each specific starting positiorl,becomes relevant

1.ll

to changes, but only with the help of a reverted interpretation that judges the existing body of thought as mistaken or used-up or trivial or that makes the existing structures appear as insufficient. One can certainly only improve theory through theory and organization only through organization and therefore, strands of self-substituting attempts at reform can be made out that always mobilize ever new reasons for innovation within their historical situation. But this does not yet explain why the past that is consolidated as the present becomes a change motif in this sense, or why one views experience and action thematically from the point of view of deficiency. This activation is. for its part a correlate to the differentiation of a system with a function against which the actual circumstances can be measured as being abstracted from all of the involved interferences ~ interferences which could make it possible to leave the world the way it is and to consider it good as such. The differentiation of the system thus explains the impulse to pedagogical reflection. Thus, it has already been hinted that we are not satisfied with re-telling the history of the system of education's reflection as a mere history of concepts in order to eventually allow it to conclude when reaching themes that are now topical. In that case, the reflection history would ,,only be historically relevant" as a prehistory of the discussion today, in other words,, it would have no topical theory content and· none that could be made topical. One could simply ignore it when investigating possibilities of reflection today. The concept of societal system differentiation-should help us to get over this mutual blocking between discussion of theory and history of theory. 8 The following should be explained with the help of the (sociological) assumption of a functional· differentiation of a subsystem for education in modem society: ( l) the activation of this subsystem along a functional perspective; (2) the way this subsystem thus becomes historical, namely the dependence of each of its present possibilities on the reflection of its historical situation including past and future perspectives; 8

18

The starting problem in the relationships between theory and history of theory (or science and history of science, reflection and history reflection) has only been focused upon since the 1960s: Attempts to solve the problem via the Theory of-Society have hardly emerged. Cf. on different varieties: Michel Fichant, ;,L'idee.d'une histoire des sciences" in Michel Pecheux and Michel Fichant, Sur /.'histoire des sciences, Paris 1969; Beilriige zur diachronischen Wissenschaftstheorie, ed. Werner Diederich, Frankfurt a.M. 1974.

of

(3) dependent on this historical nature is the diverging of a) semantic developments in pedagogical thinking and b) socio-structural developments in the system of education, primarily in the domain of the state-dependent organizations of schools and universities; and finally (4) the intercorrelation of these two developments within one system-:an intercorrelation which actually increases as processes that react to semantic or socio-structural shortcomings become increasingly independent. This concept can be applied to itself. If it is correct, it has to locate itself historically with respect to its starting conditions in the history of theory as well as in the history of structure. In other words, it also has to test itself in the form of self-situating. It fakes as its starting point a current situation in which the historical situatidn of the system of education appears to be forming .itself anew - that is, the system appears to insist upon a new integration of the presently relevant past and future. That results in the demand that insights in the system history be theoretically relevant, especially insights that are part of the reflection history. Today, after the differentiation of the system has taken place and the right of education's special function perspective has become self-evident, the orientation on values no longer suffices as the basis of reflection. It no lbiiger says anything new, it no longer mobilizes any hope; taken for itself, it ,only expresses· dissatisfaction. Instead of this, one finds oneself confronted. with the problems resulting from differentiation (of systems) and, iii' addition, with the problems resulting from· the accompanying value stance. A system of immense size and incalculable complexity has been created - a system, which translates every stimulus to change into growth. A sort· of factory-idealism is· institutionalized that is supposedly ,vithout consequences. In the establishment of this system, even the constant appeal to change has become an institution. Both idealism and charige find themselves pulled together in the call for reforms. And moreover, the system then reacts once again to this very situation. Where the unity of such a complex lies - a complex that calls itself contingent - can hardly' be recognized in reality. As 'has always been the case, the devaluation of that which exists through the di~tant perspective of what does ,,not yet" exist serves as a surrogate unity. Thus, similar to what happens 'in po'litical,programs, the value perspective is maintained as the fast certain orientation and is nourished anew by the social'sciences - as, for instance, "'.ith the issue of equality of opportunity. But when reforms 19

go awry or are not even attempted anymore, one cannot untiringly continue to demand more and better. for education and then leave it at that. The situation requires that the unity of the system of education be determined anew, and in just this sense, it demands reflection. This diagnosis, then, suggests that the analysis of reflection possibilities be focused on the previously established connection between pedagogical semantics and social structure. This connection itself is not yet the relationship between education and society - a claim that older ideologycritique analyses made; 9 but it does negotiate that connection. As a social structure, far more complex facts than the mere assertion of rising or falling classes must be established through systems analysis .. Most importantly, system references must be distinguished - in·other words, what are social structures of the societal system and what are social structures of the system of education (with changing relevance for stratification playing a role in both cases) must be distinguished. Only in this way can one hope to find a ,,partner" which has been analyzed with sufficient depth to use for correlations with altering semantic traditions. Along with the thesis that relationships between semantics and social structure correlate - that means, that they do no vary randomly - the postulate that society has ,,double access" to education automatically follows: access via the system of education's own, ideas and access via the system of education's social structures.,-- primarily its organizations. One has to assume that history can first be truly conceived of if one sees that this structure of relations varies, and that its variations depend upon the process of differentiation and its results. For semantics as well as for social structure, differentiation means an increase in indifference .to random happenings in the environment and a sensitivity to particular happenings. Through its differentiation (from other systems), the system of education becomes more dependent on ideas and more dependent on organization than it previously was in regard to areas that it has chosen as being sensitive and their relation to the societal environment; at the same time, it becomes much more independent in regards to much of what happens _otherwise. Do these considerations about the systems theoretical construction of self-refer~nce and about correlations between social structure and seman9

20

in regards to the thesis of a connection iii cognitive sociology between philanthropy or all-around education idealism (Bildungsidealismus) and the rising middle-class.see Hans Weil, Die Entstehung des deutschen Bildungsprinzips, Bonn 1930; Helmut K5nig, Zur Geschichte der Nationa/erziehung in Deutsch/and im /etzten Dritte/ def 18. Jahrhunderts, Berlin 1960; Ralph Fiedler, Die k/assische deutsche Bildungsidee: lhre soziologischen. Wurze/n und piidagogischen Folgen, Weinheim 1972.

tics overtax the possibilities of reflection that the system of education is capable of? The humanities branch of Pedagogy managed to dress up some of the themes that have come up here - for instance, the selfreference and historical nature of all acts of establishment - in forms that it hoped would achieve direct pedagogical relevance. With the more complicated thought figures that are demanded and that are also possible today, this no longer seems to be possible. Because of this, an analysis of reflection problems in the system of education must frrst settle itself within the system of science. Accordingly, without placing too much worth on being identifiable as belonging to a departmental subject, for the most part, we are using theoretical tools taken from sociology. This choice of positions has benefits in so far as it provides access to concepts and theory syndromes that have interdisciplinary connectivity [they can lead to interdisciplinary connection - trans.]. It forces the articulation of selfteference, because, among all theory-producing subjects, sociology is the least able to ignore that it ·and all of its premises are themselves part of the reality that they examine. Not least of all, this classification fits into an epochal trend of exploring social life increasingly as a sociological construction of reality which tries to ascertain what stands furn by the conceptual disbanding and recombining of primary experiences. Translated back into and reflected within our own concepts, that means that the reflection of the system of education must take place within the system of education, and that this presupposes complex processes of opinion formation and of idea testing within - we will call it - the establishment. The results of these processes cannot be prognosticated by science with its current resources. But that does not rule out that reflection problems in the system of education are accessible to scientific analysis; in fact, science and, in particular, sociology can allow for higher contingency than the system of education itself and can also express that contingency conceptually because in doing so, they are dealing with a subject matter and not with their own system reflection. Not least of all, functional differentiation also has the effect of heightening contingency: the function systems confront each other with contingencies that they could not have produced for themselves. Thus, it remains a question of inter-system relationships as to whether and to what extent lhe individual function systems can handle an increase in possibilities that comes about in such a way or how they protect themselves against these possibilities. In any case, the society - in so far as it differentiates science (from other systems) - allows for perspectives that make that which is 21

impossible for other systems appear to be possible and thus create uncertainty. But precisely that could act as an impetus to reflection: the fact that even in a state of uncertainty, structures can be recognized.

22

Part 1: Contingency and Autonomy I. Pedagogy and societal theory Today, pedagogues widely recognize and accept that their actions and thoughts are related to society. It is very clear that education· is a process that takes place within society. Today, no one would even deny that a work of art or a scientific theory has a relation to society. The societal relation is evident in the case of education because education requires social interaction. Yet, in spite of this, there are distinct concerns and reservations regarding the thesis of societal relevance. Erich Weniger, for example, claims that all-around education• is not merely a function of the society, but, in fact, has often managed to assert itself against the society and has then been able to develop the forms that were resting within it. 10 Herwig Blankertz states, for instance: ,,No matter how strongly it is believed, in single cases, that pedagogical decisions are sociologically determined, it should be emphasized that a unique factor comes into play in the critical reflection of reality and of the possibility of education." 11 It later becomes clear that what is meant by reflection is the contemplation of the content of a particular tradition's actual message. This particular use of the concept ,,reflection" corresponds to a widespread deterioration of the word's usage. This use, however, also conceals a specific theoretical meaning, which we want to reveal by going back to an earlier definition or the concept and then, by applying that concept to social systems, which we want to alter. 12 We will concentrate on the con* *

10 JI 12

Note from the translator: the word ,,education," in German ,, Erziehung," is used in this book to mean formal education as well as upbringing. Note from the translator: for the most part, I have translated the German word Bi/dung as all-around education. The word suggests both formal and informal education in the same sense that education does when one speaks of an educated (implying all-around educated) person. It does not mean upbringing. Erich Weniger, Didaktik a/s Bildungslehre, part I, 9th ed., Weinheim 1971, p. 39. Herwig Blankertz, Benifsbildung und Utilitarismus, DUsseldorf 1963, p. 12. On the subject of societal systems, also refer to Niklas Luhmann, ,,SelbstThematisierungen des Gesellschaftssystems," in Niklas Luhmann, Soziologische Aujkltirung, vol. 2, Opladen 1975, pp. 72-102; Luhmann, ,,Identilatsgebrauch in

23

cept of .,reflection" (and in the second part on the concept of ,,didactic"), because it is with this name that claims of autonomy and supposed reserves against ,,societal determination" are asserted. In doing such, we are not interested in disproving the independence of the subject of education, but rather in justifying its independence. First, however, it is necessary to take a profoundly different theoretical approach. Pedagogy's impressive ambition in the recent decade to be ,,critical of society" - which we can now look back upon almost as we would on a fateful history - offers little which could be helpful for our project. Pedagogy had expressed the relationship between education and society insufficiently in some ways and without a doubt was not operating with a sufficient theoretical societal base. The idea of a mature, emancipated human subject, compared with which all societal reality is insufficient, cannot be considered a theory of society. As a principle of critical reflection, it can only create a directionless oscillation between protest and resignation. The similarly widespread criticism of private control of capital is precisely the opposite in that its goal is much too specific for it to be an enlightening force in reference to the subject of education. At the very least, one can say that there is no clear vision of how to solve pedagogical problems by nationalizing banks, increasing progressive taxing, making investments subject to approval, nationalizing factories, or making legally binding prices. There is no ,,socially critical" orientation with a theoretical structure that could suffice to convince the pedagogue that he can no longer reflect within the framework of his tradition or that he is actually veiling the power relationships of the society by practicing rational didactics.13 Just as bad, however, is the current tendency to brush over such attempts at interpretation with a shrug or to ghettoize them as a peculiarity of left wing sects. Such a response neither solves factual problems nor brings them up to an adequate theoretical level. Rather than following this course, it seems advisable to look at basic questions about the relationship of education and society anew using existing theoretical tools. This can happen within the general framework of promising theory syntheses from many different perspectives, which we will only touch upon now by mentioning concepts such as system, communication, evolution, and self-

13

24

selbstsubstitutiven Ordnungen, besonders Gesellschaften," in Jdentiltit, ed. Odo Marguard and Karheinz Stierle, Munich 1979, pp. 315-45. According to Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Les Heriliers, Part I, Paris 1964 (Die Jllusion der Chancengleichheit: Untersuchungen zur Soziologie des Bildungswesens am Besipiel Frankreichs, German translation, Stuttgart 1971 ).

reference. The guiding theme of the following investigations is a narrow question, and the investigations will expand to more general theoretical issues, such as societal theory, only in so far as is necessary to follow up on this initial question. Thus, the investigations are also not based on a fully worked-out theory of society, but instead on single perspectives that can be localized with little error. A critique first satisfies sociological requirements when even its expectations, which it allows to guide it, are controlled according to sociological theory. It is not sufficient to use normative ideas, a priori-isms or idealizations as a premise (no matter how they are projected or explained), because these all set the reality as deficient. It is then easy to conclude that something is lacking in the existing institutions or behavior patterns, but this remains a conclusion without any connectivity value [upon which nothing further can be built trans.]. It cannot be used to explain reality nor to change it. In order to avoid this difficulty, we will suppose from here on that the societal reality is selfcritical. The material which sociological theory takes up always produces expectations in relation to itself and, ever since the 18th century, these expectations have happily taken on the form of theoretically grounded criticism. 14 The principles on which this criticism orients itself alone, such as the ideas of freedom, equality, and emancipation, or ideas of a technically smooth carry-out or optimal rationality, however, are not recurring themes in sociological analysis. The sociology that is oriented towards societal theory has the task of understanding such ideas as products and components of the social systems themselves. l11e ,,semantic difference" between idea and reality, norms and facts, reflection and realization, is in itself a structure of reality. Therefore, sociological analysis must take the standards of its criticism from the societal system's overall reality, and the analysis relates its criticism to the ways and means by which the society or its subsystems normalizes, idealizes, and reflects upon itself. 15 To sum it up, we are replacing concepts of confrontation with a basic critical tint by using the concept of the self-referential social system, and we are doing this for every system reference: for the societal system in its entirety (which we will only occasionally touch upon in the following considerations) and for the system of education inside its inner-societal environment. This general concept of a self-referential social system can be broken down further when one considers that every self-reference in social sys14 15

See Reinhart Kosel!eck, Kritik und Krise: Ein Beitrag zur Pathogenese der burgerlichen Welt, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1959. Cf. summary in part 4, chapter I on ,,Theory in a system."

25

terns is bound up with a general form of meaning*. That means that every self-reference assumes that there is a surplus of referrals to other thi.ngs that it selectively updates. With every allocation of meaning, possibilities of articulation are opened up in three dimensions: the meaning can be looked at from a factual, temporal, or social perspective. If one considers the system of education's history of reflection from the last two hundred years, it appears, in fact, that three areas of reflection emphasis have developed which correspond to these dimensions: ( 1) In one problem field, the point is to grasp the substance of the particular task and the actual independence of the system of education in light of greater contingency, more extreme societal change, more open possibilities of interpretation, and the system's more varied necessity to delineate itself, especially from religion, economics, and politics. The substance which one should aim at when educating is no longer clearly given; it is experienced instead as something that remains to be determined. On the level of reflection of self-referential processes - the unity of the system has to be protected through the question of how and through whom this something will be determined. We will consider this factual problem from the perspective of contingency and autonomy. The thesis regarding this issue is that self-idealizing contingency formulas develop, because autonomy from society can only be claimed for a function domain if its particular meaning can be explained. (2) The system of education does not only demand autonomy, it also demands time - and this in a phase of societal development that is beginning to feel and to reflect on change, revolution, acceleration, and the increase in dynamism in all relationships. An education that is not differentiated (from other systems ) and that tags along the side of life can take place on occasion - it can cling to situations and motifs and exhaust all resources thanks to their elasticity in regards to time. 16 In schools, how-

*

16

26

Note from the translator: the Gennan word Sinn has been translated into English from one of Niklas Luhmann's most important work, Soziale Systeme (Frankfurt a.M. 1984) or Social Systems (California 1995) as ,,meaning." It can also be translated as ,,sense," especially appropriate because Sinn and its plural Sinne also means the senses (as in the five human senses), but for the sake of consistency, I have followed the lead of Social Systems translators John Bednarz, Jr. and Dirk Baecker. Luhmann's use of Sinn leans on Husserl's, also translated with ,,meaning" in English. After the effect of schools are clear to see and to contrast to this, this model will still be followed for a while as the ideal one - suitable for the education of princes. Jean de Silhon, De la certitude des connoissances humaines, Paris 1661, p. 157, demands,

ever, the education procedure must be sequenced and must therefore create its basis of effectiveness, motifs, and themes at the appropriate time. The level of effort involved and the decisions about timing become a problem. The responsibility for time can be taken over when the effects of time can be seen and, if need be, its effects in the distant future. That is only possible with the help of a technology. The second theme of reflection therefore becomes: whether, how, or why the system of education cannot develop a technology? (3) The social dimension , like all the dimensions, is implied in every discussion of meaning, because meaning is also always meaning for others. It becomes explosive as a theme of reflection when a consensus is blocked due to the system structure. That holds for the domain of social selection, because the promotion of one means the non-promotion of others or even their being set-back. Thus, as our third major theme, we will have to concern ourselves with the reflection on social selection within the system of education. One cannot say - and we had to break off an attempt to check this hypothesis without having reached definite conclusions - that factual, temporal and social dimensions are actually formulated as such in the system of education's reflection themes. The general dimensions of meaning are too general for that, they are not relevant enough to specific functions. They too are subject to historical change, and their semantic also varies with changes in the structure of society. It is, to put it in other words, no accident that the factual relation (,,realitas"), the temporal structures, and the conception of sociality are being altered - especially in the transformation to modernity - in such a way that single dimensions of meaning are developing a greater ability to break apart, an immanent reflexivity, and a stronger mutual independence from one another. But these transformations in basic semantics are corollaries to overall societal development and, in particular, to the change in the form of societal differentiation. The transformations do not spring primarily from the schools and the new pedagogy of the 18th century. Parallel to increasing differentiation of the system of education (from other systems), they change the semantic dictates with which a specific pedagogical consciousness can be developed. As long as the differentiation of the system of education (from other for instance, of the education of princes: ,,qu'elle se fasse en tout temps et a toute heure: qu'elle naisse de toute sorte de suiets et de toute sorte de rencontre. Par ce moyen elle ne sera importun au Prince."

27

systems) increases the functional differentiation within society, the system of education is involved as a subsystem of the society in the genesis of new factual concepts, new temporal concepts, and more intense expectations in relation to sociality. As a system that is on its own in an innersocietal environment, the system of education is only able to accept these semantic transformations; it simply needs to conform to the transformations, which is done by allowing the function specific problems, which were just outlined above, to come more strongly to the fore against a backdrop of changing demands regarding meaning. Depending on the system reference of the reflection - or, to put it in another way, depending on whether the reflection in the system of education focuses on the society or on education as a system - different degrees of participation in structural and semantic transformations will result. From this theoretical introduction on reflection themes it follows that - and we will make this clear once again - the themes will not be deduced from theoretical axioms. We will not proceed in a deductive manner, but rather in an inductive manner that is guided by theory. The distinction between dimensions of meaning only formulates dimensions of sensitivity to problems which are burdened by the differentiation of a particular system of education (from other systems) and thus become relevant for reflection. The theme of reflection is based on a narrowing of consciousness, because it is only in this way that the problem of a system's own identity emerges. The theme of reflection shortens and simplifies. It does not take up everything in every meaningful experience and action in the system that is implied factually, temporally, and socially. Reflection proceeds as one activity among many in the system - selectively - and it selects for the most part problems in the system of education in which the dimensions of meaning become problematic in and of themselves as well as in their relevance for society. At that point, reflection claims that this is all right: that ( 1) that which is contingent can be handled as necessary and that which is not determined can be handled as already determined; that (2) time can be used for desired effects that must still be carried out, even when the success is not certain in advance; and that (3) social effects can be produced without a consensus or that innocence can be protected in this way. Thus, the preoccupation with these themes is produced by the societal problems that result from the differentiation of a system of education in the society. The identity of the system is the last point of reference on which to bind the cause and the resolution of problems resulting from differentiation (of systems in society). And

28

therefore, reflection - as the focusing on oneself - is the form of dealing with problems that is necessary here. We begin the analyses with the problem area of the fact dimension. We first want to attempt to grasp the relationship of education and society (and similarly: of Pedagogy and the Theory of Society) on the point at which Pedagogy claims its independence and attempts to carry out its ,,own contribution" of critical reflection. The subject matter considered in the first part, therefore, is the dependence of the independence and the forms in which that independence is reflected. In doing so, we are not so much interested in revealing the supposed independence to be, in truth (and that means: according to social analysis), dependence -- that is a theory that almost necessarily leads to falsely placed attributions and that fails as a result. We are far more interested in the sociological conditions of autonomy. And for that reason, we will not view autonomy as a right that is defensively or aggressively pushed; instead, we see in it as a necessity that has been forced, almost as a crisis situation, that attempts to approach the system of education with reflection that changes historically and with more fight than right.

II. Functional differentiation We are assuming that societies can be understood as social systems and that they are distinguished first and foremost through the form in which they are differentiated in subsystems. System differentiation means the formation of subsystems. This happens in the following way: within a societal system, further social systems are differentiated - systems that operate under particular conditions and for which the rest of the society is environment. We will use a definition of ,,society's internal environment" that derives from the one used in the field of biology. The seemingly paradoxical concept of internal environment is a reminder that many system references must be observed at the same time. We take the concept of differentiation (of something from something it was part oj) very generally (and here in particular: for societal subsystems) to be the acceptance of structural constraints, which has the result that whatever it is that is differentiated (from whatever else) will become independent of random processes and, in turn, dependent on particular processes in its environment. Therefore, independence and dependence both (and not in the sense of one at the cost of the other) come about with

29

differentiation (of a system from others). One can also say that a structures are built that change the threshold value of sensitivity - in the case of random processes by decreasing the amount of attention and in the case of particular processes by increasing the amount of attention. Whether and for how long benefits and risks can remain balanced on a scale is decided through evolution. Differentiation, as a result of evolution, is a moment of historical creation.17 As with the completion of a puzzle, the pieces that have already been differentiated (from the others) have a suggestive influence on what can possibly and must necessarily be connected to them. But, unlike with a puzzle, it is not certain from the outset that a complete picture will be produced or that it will be understandable as a whole. Thus, the differentiation of a system of education for the larger population, which occurred in the 18th century, corresponds to the state of requirements and the possibilities of support that were in place at the time due to the intersection of class-based differentiation and functional differentiation. Together, an increasing economizing of the class structure and the existence of a state organization in the form of a political system structured a variety of possibilities which enabled education to be differentiated from religion and removed from the authority of the church. Processes of social system differentiation can lead towards forms that fall into a few basic patterns. Accordingly, there are only a few basic forms of societal differentiation. To the degree that one of these differentiation forn1s proves itself to be predominant, it is possible to distinguish typical societal forms. There are - and this corresponds to an evolutionary sequence - societies that are differentiated according to segments, stratification (or layered (by classes -trans.]), and functionality. 18 Along with the various forms of differentiation - and this is the claim of our theory - not only does the way in which subsystems are created in the society differ, but also the form of attributing environment to systems. The process of differentiation ( of systems in the society), in other words, always relates to the unity of ,,system and environment." That is why sub17

18

30

Cf. for one Neil J. Smelser, Social Change in the Industrial Revolution: An Application of Theory to the Lancashire Cotton Industry 1770-1840, London 1959. Also related is the theoretically precise formulation of Talcott Parsons, ,,Comparative Studies and Evolutionary Change," in Comparative Methods in Sociology: Essays on Trends and Applications, ed. Ivan Vallier, Berkeley 1971, pp. 97-139 (see in particular p. I OOf.). For a closer discussion of this issue see Niklas Luhmann, ,,Differentiation of Society," Canadian Journal of Sociology 2, 1977, pp. 29-53.

systems in stratified societies (ones with social classes) count other environments as being internal to society than do subsystems in functionally differentiated societies. A switch in the form of primary societal differentiation leads to changes in the way in which subsystems relate to environments that are internal to society; such a switch changes the conditions necessary for autonomy and reflection in the subsystems. If these general thoughts hit the mark, then our theme has hit upon a problem resulting from societal differentiation. Autonomy and reflection, which are structures and processes of societal subsystems, are not a privation of ,,societalness"; they do not lead the subsystem out of the society, but rather are themselves constituted by the society, constituted, to be more precise, by the form of differentiation. The transition to functional differentiation has far-reaching implications for processes of socialization and education. The main implication is that education for other systems will now take place within one special system. A young person grows up in his own family without problem and has barely any transition when he enters life in the society in the same degree that his radius of action and his circle of friends expand. By being forced to attend school, however, he is confronted for the first time and suddenly with a society that is no longer negotiated by the family. But the school, being a special institution of a function system, is not a representative sample of societal life; it socializes for the school, not the society. The fact that the first contact with society apart from the family takes on precisely this form - one can think of it as a concentration of people of the same age in a relatively big interaction system - rather than another form, must have deep-reaching repercussions on the cognitive and motivational resources of societal life. And it is clearly impossible to level out this socialization-related imbalance through school curricula, social studies, sexual education, etc. This problem, which exceeds all possibilities of self-correction, apparently overtaxes the ability of the system of education to reflect upon itself. Aside from desperate suggestions that veer towards eliminating schools altogether, very few attempts to resolve the problem by putting it in context of a more expansive theory of society exist. Hegel's ,,High School Speech" (Gymnasialrede) in 1811 was such an attempt; Robert Dreebens ,,On What is Learned in School" (1968) was another. 19 Hegel claimed that 19

One could also read Talcott Parsons and Gerald M. Platt, ,,Age, Social Structure and Socialization in Higher Education," Sociology of Education 43, 1970, pp. 1-37 in connection to this.

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school negotiates between the family and the actual world - and that it does this fully within the framework of its intentions to assign meaning. Dreeben considers the demands on behavior within school classes to be representative of the demands of life in modern societies - not on the level of the curriculum and its goals, but rather on the level of latent structures within a universalistic, affect-neutral, and performance-related modernity. Neither attempt at starting up reflection was taken up in the field of Pedagogy, and both men must have asked themselves, whether they had not assumed too much harmony on the level of the societal system. A convincing and direct answer to the question that is thus posed, still does not exist. It could be attained, in any case, only through widespread empirical research about the long term effects of selective socialization through school attendance. We cannot anticipate the results of such a study here. We are limiting the analysis of the results of functional differentiation to what it means for the system of education itself, and we are leaving the question unanswered of how and with what repercussions and counter movements the system of education's societal environment can handle the socialization and the education in schools. Our theme is further limited by the fact that it deals with reflection problems of the system of education. In so doing, it once again assumes that a system of education is differentiated from the perspective of this function. This condition, historically seen, is only fulfilled in functionally differentiated societies. During the whole of societal evolution, education has never taken the lead in structural transformations; instead, it has always followed them. 20 Stratified societies couple their institutions for education onto structurally based problems of communication in the upper classes. For this reason, they specialize themselves for upper classes, and, on the content side, they specialize in problems of communication that is able to overcome differences. 21 They communicate a highly selective pattern of orientation and behavior which is at the same time supposed to be representative of all [the whole of society -trans.]. According to texts and to intentions, education and the society can hardly be distinguished. 22 20

21 22

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On the subject of stratified societies see Yehudi A. Cohen, ,,Schools and Civilizational States," in The Social Sciences and the Comparative Study of Educational Systems, ed. Joseph Fischer, Scranton, Pa. 1970, pp. 55-147. Cohen, ,,Schools and Civilizational States," speaks about preparing for communication in ,,borderline roles" rather than in contexts which are more locally or familially bound. Cf. Howard S. Galt, A History of Chinese Educational Institutions, vol. I, London 1951; Werner Jager, Paideia: Die Fornnmg des griechischen Menschen, 3 vols., 2nd

For that reason, there is no significant motivation in the field of educational activities to strive for autonomy or anti-societal (,,critical") reflection. Such attempts certainly exist, but within this type of society, they are limited to the domain of religion. At this point, even the educational work of the Jesuits, with all its intention of being modem, fits entirely in this context. Education that veers towards ,,sapiens et eloquens pietas" is oriented to the functions of the upper classes, even when it admits children from the lower classes. The impressive, fully articulated increase in experience refers to methodological, housekeeping, organizational questions. The theory, however, is taken from ancient texts (Cicero, Quintilian). 23 It is only after other subsystems of the society, namely systems for politics, economics, religion, and, in part, also for science, were differentiated (from each other and other systems) to a greater degree according to their specific functions - or, to put it another way, it is only after the larger society had accepted functional differentiation for its most important function domains - that the prospects for education begin around the middle of the 18th century to change. It is now that education's relation to society shifts to the foreground of the discussion for the first time, 24 and the concept ,,education" expands accordingly to encompass all of the influences that arm people for a life in the society. 25 It is now that education becomes relevant as a universal special function for the first time - not education to become a citizen, but education

23

24

25

or 3rd ed., Belrin 1954/55; Eugenio Garin, Geschichte und Dokumente der abendlandischen Padagogik, 3 vols., Reinbek 1964-1967. Cf. on all of this: Andre Schimberg, L 'education morale dans !es colleges de la Compagnie de Jesus en France sous l'ancien regime (XV!fe, XVIIfe, XVJIIfe siecles), Paris 1913; Jean-Baptiste Herman, La pedagogie des Jesuites au XV!fe siecle: Ses sources ses characteristiques, Louvain 1914; Josef Schroeteler, Die Erziehung in den Jesuiteninternaten des 16. Jahrhunderts: Dargestellt aufgrund ungedruckter und gedruckter Quellen, Freiburg 1940; Frarn;:ois de Dainville, Lanaissance de l 'humanisme moderne, Paris 1940, reprinted Genf 1969. ,,Am wichtigsten in all diesen unzahligen Schriften iiber die Erziehung" claims Eugenio Garin about the 18th century, ,,ist die Yerlagerung der Diskussion von den Einzelfragen der Methoden, der Lehrplane, der Institute und der Schulen auf die Gesellschaft" (Garin, Geschichte und Dokumente der abendlandischen Padagogik, vol. 11I, p. 70). See Jean Ehrard, L "idee de Nature en France dans la premiere moitie du XV!llfe siecle, Paris 1963, pp. 753 ff. under the heading ,,Naissance d'un mythe: !'Education." Cf. for a sense of the many different perspectives (even including medicine), with which the article entitled ,,Education" in Diderot's Encyclopedie is introduced, or which is dealt with in the one by De Bonneval, ,,Les elements et Progres de !'education," 2nd ed., Paris 1751.

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to become a human being, in the words of Rousseau. 26 Accordingly, a development is started up that, at its conclusion, involves the larger population in the education process in two ways: every individual is raised and educated in a system of education that is differentiated (from other systems) himself, and every individual can assume in his contact with everyone else, that they too were raised and educated in such a system. Because of this, everyone is in the position to choose social contacts according to stipulations based on acquired premises -- stipulations, whichderive partially from acquired premises that he can assume to exist within himself and/or within others. We have chosen this somewhat complicated formulation 27 in order to make it clear that the social function of education cannot simply be understood as the production of traits or characteristics (knowledge, abilities, etc.) of people. Its function is far more to make premises for otherwise unlikely social contact possible - and to make them possible for contacts that would normally lay outside of the system of education. At the same time, this makes it clear that through the differentiation of this special function, the education process's larger societal interdependencies do not decrease, but instead increase. We will eventually come back in greater detail to this thesis, which, for all of its statements about autonomy and reflection, still stands on shaky ground. For now, we are only trying to relate our theme to the societal system's fom1 of differentiation. Reflection problems come up in the system of education initially as problems resulting from jimctional differentiation in the societal system as it first becomes apparent. Historically, that means that such problems have only existed since the middle of the 18th century and that their development depends in part on society's transformation to functional differentiation and the resulting problems. Theoretically, that means that we must analyze the structural consequences of functional differentiation in order to be able to take from it the necessary conditions for autonomy and reflection in the system of education. That should happen in the next chapters. In chapter III, we will show that functional differentiation requires a new type of role-negotiated inclu26

27

34

On the relation of this formula to differentiation of religion and politics, see Robert Spaemann, ,,Naturliche Existenz und politische Existenz bei Rousseau," in Collegium Phi/osophicum. Festschrift. Joachim Riller, Basel 1965, pp. 373-388. The theoretical model that this thesis uses is that of double contingency in all social relations: ,.that each actor is both acting agent and object of orientation both to himself and to others." (Talcott Parsons, ,.Interaction: Social Interaction," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 7, New York l 968, p. 436, 429-440.

sion of the larger population in every function domain. A second structural correlate of functional differentiation (chapters IV and V) is that it multiplies and pulls apart system references which are internal to society. That leads to problems of autonomy (V). Chapter VI is about how functional differentiation on the organizational level cannot be carried out cleanly in every case, but instead remains in a partial state in overlapping domains. With these analyses, we will get a grasp on the peripheral structural conditions of inner-societal processes, which function as the condition for the possibility of reflection in the system of education and, at the same time, as a constraint on such reflection.

III. Inclusion Functional differentiation changes and intensifies the problem of social order - and it does this through the very process of differentiating ( one system from others). Differentiation of roles had been possible in stratified societies as well. There were political and spiritual officers, there was a varied assortment of manual labour jobs, there were soldiers and salespeople - but all of them were bound to assignment within the status-based structure of society, and also determined by them. Within this framework -- assigned to temples, or cloisters, or courts, or with a state-licence to work privately - there were also teachers who gave instruction. A complementary behavior had developed through role differentiation: 28 just as one can only buy or sell in a relationship to a salesman, one only learn in a relationship to a teacher and only be healed in a relationship to a doctor. The uniqueness of the social type of this behavior originated from the role differentiation and did not need any further reflection. If a need for regulation came up, then the moral codex would be broken down according to roles - for instance, through a particular piece of literature about the office and duties of the prince, through a particular ethic of knightly conduct, or through the norms of behavior imposed by the guilds and brotherhoods. The older pedagogical literature, such as Quintilian, should also be understood in this way. The addressee was in every case the performance role that had been differentiated (from other roles) (and thus, in general, the higher classes); it was not, in contrast, the behavior of those in the 28

Cf. Siegfried F. Nadel, The Theory of Social Struc/ure, Glencoe, 111. 1957, in particular p. 50ff. and most importantly p. 76, about separating an anonymous public full of other people by isolating special groups for the performance of specific roles.

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complementary role. For this form of intervention,. a morality that was actually religiously grounded sufficed as the basis of regulations, and the control over adherence to those regulations was the responsibility of classspecific processes of co-operation or conflict resolution, or, additionally, the organized powers of discipline that churches, holy orders, and brotherhoods had. In the course of the building of modem, mostly function-oriented societal differentiation, this order fell apart. The differentiation of functional subsystems of the societal system (from other systems) starts with newly established complementary relationships between roles and then uses these asymmetrical social relationships as catalysts for the creation of functionally relevant social systems. In this way, economic relationships are developed that can no longer be regulated with roles (brotherhoods), but now can only be regulated through (national and, increasingly, international) markets. The relationship between ruler and subject becomes generalized to one of (passive and active) citizenship. The distinction between the Vita comtemplativa and the Vita activa, and along with it, the distinction between clergy and layman, is now withdrawn in favor of a more general form of more modem, more practical for life, internalized Pietas, and finally, its religious relevance is given up altogether (which did not make its organizational maintenance and its re-mystification in the Catholic Church impossible). The family bonds are loosened and everyone independent of his background - is given the chance to found his own, new, second family through marriage. All of this does not get rid of the asymmetries in function-specific role relationships; instead, it sets the asymmetries free in their own dynamic. The results of this development touch the entire structure of modem society, and it is impossible to come close to summarizing them here. Using the name ,,inclusion," which was introduced by Talcott Parsons, we will take up only one important consequence that had diverse further effects.29 In the transition to functional differentiation, not only will the achievement roles be differentiated on the one hand, but also their complementary roles: as a citizen, one is not locked into a particular religion, 29

36

Cf. in particular Talcott Parsons, The System of Modern Societies, Englewood Cliffs 1971, pp. 27, 87 ff. On the subject of the system of education, also Parsons, ,,Some Considerations on the Comparative Sociology," in The Social Sciences and the Comparative Study of Educational Systems., ed. Joseph Fischer, Scranton, Pa. 1970, p. 209 ff., 201-220. On the application to universities, see the brief mention in Talcott Parsons and Gerald M. Platt, The American University, Cambridge, Mass. 1973, p. 38lf

nor a particular role in the economic system, such as a particular occupation. Similarly, one does not take part in religious or political life according to an economic role or a position in a family system (being family father, for instance). The larger population is, on the one hand, differentiated in these sorts of complementary roles, which are independent from one another. In individual cases, it is no longer possible to draw conclusions from one that are valid in the other. On the other hand, precisely because of this, access for the larger population to the complementary roles of all function systems of the society must be opened - that is what we mean by ,,inclusion."30 Inclusion cannot extend to performance roles - only to their complementary roles: not everyone can become a doctor, but everyone can become a patient; not everyone can become a teacher, but everyone can become a pupil. For precisely this reason, it is not the differentiation of performance roles (from each other), but rather the differentiation within the larger population according to stipulations of function-specific complementary roles that is the key occurrence which breaks apart the class order and makes it impossible for anyone to be classified in one and only one subsystem of the society. Thus, inclusion does not mean membership in the society; instead it means that, as the mode of full membership, anyone has the ability to enter any function system. In the system of education, the focus on inclusion begins with Comenius' demand (which, however, even Rousseau did not take seriously at this point), that all children should be raised and educated in schools. The attempts to realize this required the introduction of a general school attendance mandate - a process which dragged on from the first declaration of princely good intention in the 17th century until well into the 19th century. 31 At the same time, it becomes especially clear that schools which admit the larger population also have to serve the larger 30 3I

In contrast to Parsons, who means in a more narrow sense inclusion in the integrating ,,societal community" - similar to what Durkheim means by ,,solidarity." For a discussion on school instruction in the 18th century, see a short overview by George Snyders, Die gro/Je Wende der Piidagogik: Die Entdeckung des Kindes und die Revolution der Erziehung im 17. und 18. Jahrhunder/ in Frankreich, German trans., Paderbom 1971, p. 293 ff., and for a more characteristic single case, see JeanPierre Crousaz, Traite de ! 'education des en/ans, the Hague I 722, vol. I on the marginalia .. necessite de J'etude presque pour tout le monde" (p. 338). The practical difficulties become clear in Ferdinand Vollmer, Friedrich Wilhelm I. und die Volksschule, Gtittingen 1909; Vollmer, Die preu/Jische Volksschulpolitik unter Friedrich dem Gro/Jen, Berlin 1918.

37

population. Even the higher level schools should not merely produce learned people to serve in those schools again; they should not merely reproduce a particular state of affairs. 32 Schools exist for the community, for the state, the nation, the society. Diderot finally defines the university precisely through inclusion: inclusion of all children of the nation who are prepared and of all subjects. 33 According to this idea, all special restrictions on education that cannot be attributed to education itself are inapplicable. ,,You do not need to focus on any particular point of view; the only goal is to make it possible for the human being to make use all of his abilities," cries Mirabeau to the representatives of the National Assembly. 34 The French reform literature between the years 1760 and 1790 - entirely fascinated by the task of carrying through a planned and thematically expanded public education for once and enlisting the state as its bearer - skips over questions with pedagogical content. That considerable problems of educational conduct will arise in schools - and the Jesuits had experience with this - could apparently not be dealt with at the same time. But the contemplative pedagogical literature, which was 32

33

According to Louis-Rene de Caradeuc de la Chatolais (with, however, exaggerated criticism of collegues from the order), Essay d'education national 011 plan d'etudes pour la jeunesse, o.0. 1762, p. If.: ,,Nous avians une education qui n'etoit propre tout au plus qu'a former des Sujets pour !'Ecole. Le bien public, l'honneur de la nation (he refers to Giittingen for a comparison!] demandent qu'on y substitue une education civile qui prepare chaque generation naissante a remplir avec succi:s !es differents professions de J'Etat." The same in more detail, but still within the framework of a status-specific definition of citizen: Friedrich Gabriel Resewitz, Die Erziehung des Burgers zum Gebrauch des gesunden Verstandes zmd wr gemeinnutzigen Geschtiftigkeit, 2nd ed., Copenhagen 1776. Soon afterwards, national education will also become a topic in Germany. As it says in Plan d'une Universite pour le gouvernement de Russie (written 1775/76 and quoted in CEuvres completes, vol. Ill, Paris I 875, p. 433, 429-534): ,,Une universite est une ecole dont la porte est ouverte indistinctement taus Jes enfants d'une nation et o·u des maitres stipendies par J'Etat les initient a la connaissance elementaire de toutes !es sciences." And: ,,Je dis indistinctement, parce qu'il serait aussi cruel qu'absurde de condamner a ('ignorance les conditions subaltemes de la societe." That is then justified by a calculation of the likelihood of the distribution of talent. In the same year, Mably writes, ,,que la republique ne formera jamais d'excelens citoyens, tant que !'education ne sera pas publique et generale." (In De la legislation ou principes des lois, 1776, quoted in CEuvres completes, vol. IX, Paris 1792, p. 309.) On the other hand, until the French Revolution, even suggestions for reform tended to exclude entire parts of the population. Abbe Coyer, Plan d'education publique, Paris 1770, p. 334f. (farmers), or Mirabeau, Travail sur l'educalion publique, ed. P. J. G. Cabanis, Paris 1791, p. 35ff. (women). Mirabeau, Travail sur 1'education publique, p. 10.

a

34

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being written on the side, also owes a lot - at least indirectly - to the strengthening principle of inclusion. While the new large scale issues and planning demands were being addressed to the state, the new assessment of function asymmetries and the fact that they were being established more securely led in the domain of care-giving and education led to the heavily discussed ,,discovery of the child. " 35 At the completion of a process of step by step re-definition, the child is no longer viewed as an incomplete adult who lives in the same world as adults do, who grows into an adult, and who therefore can be educated(= made whole) by adults, but who does not necessarily need to be educated in a demanding way in order to become a human. Instead, the child is now held to be a particular sort of human being in a particular sort of world, who advances towards education on its own (by, for instance, moving itself spontaneously, being sensitive and curious), but, on the other hand, who also makes education particularly difficult because it lacks guidance through reasoning, has weaknesses, and is at the mercy of the environment. 36 In other words, the new child is full of chances and difficult and, most importantly, it is not to be influenced with the same means as adults -- that is, after all, what explains Pedagogy's independent technique and reflection. And not least of all, by using the example of the child, the universal inclusion of the larger population in the process of education becomes explainable; because, after all, everyone comes into the world be35

Cf. Philippe Aries, l 'enfant et la vie familiale sous I 'ancien regime, Paris l 960, and on the discussion that followed, see among others: John Demos, .,Developmental Perspectives in the History of Childhood," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 2, 1972, pp. 315-327; The History of Childhood, ed. L. DeMause, New York 1974; Wolfgang Gichler and Kurt Liischer, ,,Die Soziologie des Kindes in historischer Sicht," Neue Sammlung 15, I 975, pp. 442-463. The exact time point of the .,discovery" is debated. We tend to hold the 18th century as the decisive period along with Roger Mercier, L 'en/ant dans la societe du XV/fife siecle (avant I 'Emile), Dakar 196 l and Snyders, Die grojJe Wende der

Padagogik: Die Entdeckung des Kindes und die Revolution der Erziehung im 17. und I 8. Jahrhundert in Frankreich.

36

For the ,.development logic" that will guide us as we go on, it is telling that the new assessment of the child is not due only to pedagogues (not to speak of school pedagogues), but rather, is that it is expressed in medical and business employment subjects as well as throughout the entire society in a sort of sensitivity. The notion that a child is not only an incomplete adult, but rather an individual type of person, had to be that wide spread to get Pedagogy to begin methodological considerations. Cf. from the contemporary literature Morelly, Essai sur le caeur humain, ou principes naturels de I 'education, Paris l 745, reprinted Genf l 970, p. 33ff.

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ing helpless, everybody grows up as a child, everybody is somehow educated through his environment, and _the only question is: how well? It is only being consistent, then, to declare the object of education, the child, as being the subject of education - in other words, to use the formula of inclusion that is in general use here. The ,,theory of all-around education (Bi/dung)" concludes this process of re-determination, which had begun with Rousseau. We will come back to it later. That this change - most importantly this ingraining of the pedagogical relationship between educator and pupil in its intersubjectivity - will necessarily intensify the problem of education teclmology is easy to see. Less clear is whether methodical innovations really come about. The critique of ,,mechanical" memorization, the insistence on taking the child seriously and winning over its active participation, the suggestion that examples should be used 37 - all of those are honorable themes within the tradition. The only thing that needs to be explained is why they appear as new. The newness is a result of the extent to which these themes are consciously experienced and proclaimed - it is in no way a result of corresponding progress in the education or instruction teclmology; it results from the changes in context and the estimations of need on which these changes are based. The methods are new, because they have to be implemented on a system of education that is more starkly differentiated (from other systems) and striving for universal inclusion. The innovation is not where one seeks it; it is on the level of the reflection of the method. In connection with this initial state, one will later distinguish methodology from didactic. The transformation to functional differentiation takes socio-structural supports away from the education process and places the education process under pressure to reflect. What appears to be progress - indeed, the top achievement of human reason - is triggered off, if not forced, by socio-structural developments. In order to understand oneself in the new situation and to be able to communicate within it in a plausible manner, one must go - with old or new thoughts - to the level of reflection. This neither promises successes, nor does it even ensure them; but the freedom that one claims is a necessary one. That can also be shown by looking at 37

40

For continuities in these questions see, for example, Joseph Albert Mosher, The Exemplum in the Early Religious and Didactic Literature of England, New York 1911; Gunther Buck, Lemen und Erfahrung: Zurn Begrijf der didaktischen Jnduktion, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 1969, p. 83ff; Das exemplarische Prinzip: Beitriige zur Didaktik der Gegemvart, ed. Berthold Gerner, Darmstadt 1963.

the problem of autonomy, which results from a new sort of system reference differentiation into function, performance, and reflection.

IV. Function, performance, reflection Every system differentiation leads to - indeed, it consists of - system references multiplying within the system. System reference means the relations to a system and its environment. Three such types of system references result from every subsystem: the relation to the larger system, the relation to other subsystems, and the relation to itself - and all of these with different environments. This differentiation, seen purely logically, is independent of the form in which subsystems are created; but the differentiation increases to the extent that the creation of subsystems relies on points of view of inequality and, thus, differentiates the systems (from others) as being dissimilar to each other and individualizes them. In this way, integration problems are created at the same time. In stratified societies, it is possible to imagine religious, ,,cosmopolitan," and conceptual forms that still suffice to express some sort of coherence - for instance, the concept of the unity of order and rule in the old European tradition. 38 With the transition to a fully formed, functionally differentiated societal order, this possibility loses its plausibility - if only because the religious and political authorities that used to guarantee order and rule have been, for their part, differentiated as function-specific subsystems (from other subsystems) and must now, for their part, deal with the society as environment.39 As this type of differentiation is being carried through, the state of consciousness in the larger society changes. An important structure that latently steers this change in consciousness is the necessity of dividing system references more sharply and of finding conceptual solutions to 38

39

Cf. in regards to the late phase of this tradition W.H. Greenleaf, Order, Empirism and Politics: Two Traditions of English Political Thought I 500-1700, London 1964; David Little, Religion, Order, and Law: A Study in Pre-Revolutionary Eng/and,New York 1969. For politics, the ordering of these new relations is a task of the ,.constitutional state." See Niklas Luhmann, .,Politische Verfassungen im Kontext des Gesellschaftssystems," Der Staal 12, 1973, pp. 1-22, 165-182. The problems that resulted for religion, which remained largely unsolved and were therefore viewed negatively, are discussed under the term .,secularization." See Niklas Luhmann, Funk/ion der Religion, Frankfurt a.M. 1977, p. 225ff.

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their non-identity. We will apply the concepts of function, performance, and reflection to explain the solution of this problem. In functionally differentiated societies, the function of a subsystem expresses its relation to the societal system as a whole. To be exact, one actually has to say: its relation to its own environment, if and as far as that is the larger societal system. Numerous functions have to be fulfilled for societal coexistence, all of which are necessary depending on the society's state of development and therefore, all of which are equally important. This equal worth among functions cannot be given up on the level of the larger societal system, even if inner-societal performances of reflection attempt to define the society as a religious, political, or economic community. 40 The problem of orientation that results, however, can be shifted into the society and then taken on through functional differentiation. Subsystems of the society can give one societal function, for instance education, the primary position and then use it in large part for their orientation. 41 By doing this, they take on the form in which they exist according to the larger society and in which they can be addressed. The function thus becomes the subsystems' ,,leitmotif," it becomes a way of approaching a problem that ,,catalyses" contact and growth processes; but that does not mean that it could ever be the only basis of the subsystem's existence or a principle of deducing predictions or explanations of behavior. It remains one fom1 or one aspect of environmental relations among many. Along with the function orientation, it is always the case that relationships between the subsystems of society also exist, for which we want to reserve the concept of performance. Thus, we are arguing with the nonidentity of function and performance. Mixing up these two aspects rests on a mixing up of system references within differentiated systems and it must be avoided by carefully formulating concepts. The production of collectively binding decisions (the fulfilling of the political function) as such is not yet a political performance. The production of true or untrue fixed propositions (the fulfillment of the function of science) is as such not yet a scientific performance. The ensuring of satisfaction of future demands (the 40

On this in particular, see Niklas Luhmann, ,,Selbst-Thematisierungen .des Gesellschaftssystems," in Luhmann, Soziologische Aujkldrung, vol. 2, Opladen 1975, pp.

41

A central theorem of Parson's theory of action systems goes even further by saying that in spite of positioning functions in a primary place, all funtions on every system level must be filled anew. That corresponds with the attempt to gain a completed function list by using general premises of the theory of action. We do not agree with this condition.

72-102.

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function of the economy) is as such not yet an economic performance - it is not, for example, the production of useful goods. There is no doubt that function and performance cannot be realized independently of one another and, even more, they cannot be increased/intensified independently of one another. But a performance switch, which has often been described with System Theory using input/output models, 42 requires paying attention to the state of demand, norms, and habits of other subsystems of the society, which can be in opposition to the subsystem's own function and to its subcodes. If political performance in the sense of consensus-building programming is expected and accomplished, then it may endanger the very acts of deciding that bind the function and overcome opposition, and viceversa. The third system reference that is possible in differentiated systems is the relation to oneself. Picking up on a traditional concept, we will call it reflection. Yet, due to the complexity of real systems, reflection can never get a handle on the entire reality of all system structures and processes. Instead, the system uses its identity as a point of reference for processes that it directs towards itself; it can think out its own identity, it can represent it with names or symbols, it can determine it by examining how it is different from the environment, and it can leave all details to those who share in that identity. As is always the case with intentions that refer to meaning, the direct corollary is a distant horizon full of further possibilities of experiencing and acting that is only hinted at. Initially, it is only that which is hinted at, which then, in turn, can be represented and labelled with concepts in a manner that is either selective or encompassing - but the latter only if it be summed up and estimated frrst. Collected in concepts such as ,,world" or ,,I" or ,,Kingdom" or ,,Nation" or ,,Party," this can then become fit for reference; and if this possibility exists, it then can be left as as something that is merely hinted at and that always comes along as accompaniment, but is never (or only on occasion) focused upon - similar to the way that one, when taking part in a committee sitting, always has the committee itself and its meaning in mind in spite of all the points on the agenda. In contrast to the tradition and the linguistic usage that is influenced by it, we will expand the concept of reflection to include social systems. It will refer not to processes of consciousness (which always know that they 42

On the domain of schools in the system of education, see for example Robert E. Herriott and Benjamin J. Hodgkins, The Environment of Schooling: Formal Education as an Open Social System, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1973.

43

are processes of consciousness) but to processes of communication (in which, along with other issues, it is always also communicated that communication is taking place). Communication requires natural awareness; on top of that, it requires meaningful contents that suit themselves to becoming themes. Themes are abstractions that can safeguard identity and continuity, even if different participants contribute different things to the theme at different times. Themes even retain their identity when they are partially or entirely negated and in this way, they allow for the directed and socially beneficial use of negation. In this respect, focusing on themes increases the risks of negation in social systems. In spite of all this, simply being able to focus on identity (as a theme) is a necessary condition of reflection in social systems. That does not go without saying. In older societies, it was initially relatives, the household ( oikos ), and the city (polis) that provided assistance in focusing (on such themes) - and the themes meant then were in no way function specific subsystems of the society. 43 In addition to such concrete issues, the necessity of collective action, as far as it went, may have offered reasons for focusing on the self. That sufficed for societies differentiated along class lines, which were able to bring the actions and the representations of the societal system among the higher classes together. It was the adjustment to functional differentiation that first lead to the generalization of the requirements for reflection and extended these requirements to all subsystems that had been differentiated (from other systems) - whether these subsystems had to act collectively in a unified mam1er, such as the political system in its modern forn1, the state, or not. We conclude from these analyses that the education system first became capable of reflection and able to focus on itself as something that was not identical to the existing society as the transition to a functionally differentiated societal order was underway - historically speaking, in the 18th century. This approach also suggests that the non-identity of function and performance will become grounds for reflection. We will come back to these two theses in the historical analyses (part VI). But before this can happen, we have to add further perspectives to the theoretical framework of the analysis.

43

44

This also goes for the Greek understanding of politics. See Ludwig Landgrebe, Der Streit um die philosophischen Grundlagen der Gesellschaflstheorie, Opladen 1975, p. 32f.; Christian Meier, ,,Entstehung und Besonderheit der griechischen Demokratie," Zeitschriftfiir Politik 25, 1978, pp. l-31.

V. Circular structures As systems of meaning, personal and social systems are attached to their environments in a circular way. That means that their experience and actions can reverse every intention regarding the environment back at the system, just as the reverse is tnie, that the environment is accessible through every relation to oneself. This fundamental condition cannot be resolved, it can only be worked out according to the specific meaning of the system/environment relations. The Cybernetic Systems Theory can be characterized as the theory of the rational form of such system/environment relationships and their technical realization - it is, therefore, not a general theory of self-referential systems. 44 For that reason, we are starting with structures of meaning that are more deeply seated - structures which make Cybernetics possible in the first place. With this approach, we can clarify the consequences that functional system differentiation has for breaking apart circular system/environment interdependencies. When it comes to a separation of system references for function, performance, and reflection, then the basal circularity that binds system and environment will be broken apart accordingly. That also means that it will no longer be possible to build hierarchical-linear structures in the sense of all-encompassing relations according to rank, importance, or other justifications. The self-referentiality of reflection is not suited to justifying selfreferential function or performance (in particular, cognitive performance) relations, as the classical subject-theory assumed it to be. 45 Instead, one has to think in terms of mutual limiting, which come into play when one of the circular structures specifies itself by introducing interruptions in the interdependency. By referring to a function of the societal system to which a subsystem belongs, that subsystem makes itself contingent. In order to be able to fulfill the function - and this holds especially true when putting things 44

45

Unless one considers reality itself to be rational in exactly this sense or one thinks that the rationality of reality is a necessary condition of cognition. See Werner Loh, Kritik der Theorieproduktion von Nik/as Luhmann und Ansiitze fur eine kybernelische Alternative, Frankfurt a.M. 1972. We support this argument with the experience that the theory of the transcendental subject did not sufficiently manage to relate its a priori assumptions to reality - sufficently being based on the material knowledge that actually exists today in the sciences. On that cf. Willi Oelmuller, ,,Zu einer nichttranszendentalphilosophischen Deutung des Menschen," Philosophisches Jahrbuch 82, I 975, pp. I 03-128.

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into operation is involved - the subsystem has to be able to imagine what would happen if it did not fulfill th~ function. If contingency is put into a relation in this manner just one time, then the direction of the question can be reversed: one can use the reference problem to formulate demands on the society - for example, demands for adequate education performance; and one can also do just the opposite by taking the perspective of the function system and projecting its primary function back on the society and then demanding from the society that it vary its structures in order to make better education possible. We will come back to this when we handle the contingency fommla of the system of education. Performance can only be carried out, if it is expected and taken up by systems in the environment that are capable of communication. Such expectations adjust to performance capabilities that exist or that are suspected to exist. In this manner, the performance capability creates a demand which it then meets; it inserts itself into the very structures that enable it to fulfill performance expectations as if they were expectations of the system's environment. The result of this is, to quote Claus Offe, a logical deficit in the prognosis: ,,In order to be successful as 'plans for adapting', it [the education planning] would have had to base its orientation on data that it does not know, not only due to the lack of empirical knowledge for making prognosis, but because it would have to generate that data itself according to rules which it cannot anticipate." 46 Plans for performance, therefore, can either set an assumed demand or their own ,,selling intention" as their starting date, and in the long run, it must vary such settings. In other words, in the domain of performance, a system must be able to deal fluidly with the setting of invariance in order to be able to neutralize the long-term risk of that setting. The fact that reflection also occurs in a circular manner has always been recognized. The special problem here is that the process of reflection 46

Claus Offe, ,,Bildungssystem, Beschliftigungssystem und Bildungspolitik - Anslitze zu einer gesamtgesellschaftlichen Funktionsbestimmung des Bildungswesens" in

Bildungsforschung: Probleme - Perspektiven - Priorittilen. Tei[ I. Gutachten und Studien der Bildungskommission des Deutschen Bildungsrates, eds. Heinrich Roth and Dagmar Friedrich, vol. 50, Stuttgart 1975, p. 230, 217-255. A theory of decisions was developed for the field of business enterprises for structually analogous reasons which gives the circumstances responsibility for the fact that the market does not speak in a clear language and that large companies do not speak in a language that is independent of the system. For that reason, the necessary establishment of invariance and reductions must be done as decision processes that are internal to the system. Cf. most importantly Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in Social Selling, New York 1957.

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itself belongs to the system, which means that when it aims at its own system, it also aims at itself - that it also must aim at its own intention, etc. 47 It can never stop on its own, because every step challenges it again; it does not have a natural end, it is not a teleological process (one that has the ability to end itself), it goes further into an open future and can only be interrupted by something extra. If one observes the iterative structure of the reflection process alone, it becomes boring after iterating two times. The reflection of reflection has a purpose as a self-characterization of the system - infinite further repetition is possible, but unfruitful. 48 But iterating two times suffices to go beyond merely focusing on the self and to consider - on the third and last level of meaning - that the reflection itself only selects one system reference among many and that it must remain compatible with functional and performance-oriented environmental relations. If one looks at these system references for function, performance, and reflection, which are each circularly arranged within themselves, all together, then one can rule out linear or serial arrangements as being the form of the system or of the theory. That is why we cannot accept the notion of a sequential process for the determination (Bestimmung) of that which is undetermined (Unbestimmten) or the notion of a progression from the abstract to the concrete. Instead, we are starting with the concept that what already exists is not simply something empty and undetermined (in the sense of a mere lack of determination), but instead a self-referential circles, which can be brought to self-specification (re-specification) through the introduction of interruptions in the interdependencies. This corresponds to a concept of specification that is historic and contingent. It makes sense to assume (even if the theory does not force this deduction) that in functionally differentiated societies, the process of specification starts up in performance relations, and that function and reflection are then put under pressure to be compatible. 49 This assumption seems rea47 48

49

Cf. part 4, chapter I: .,l11eory in a system." This is a matter of general opinion. Cf. for example Gaston Bachelard, La dialectique de la duree, Paris 2nd ed. 1950, reprinted 1972, p. IOOf.; Hermann Ulrich Asemissen, ,,Egologische Reflexion," Kant Studien 50, 1959, p. 268f, 262-272. Less recognized is the consequence that this bars reflection as a form of justification - unless one accepts boredom as a final justification. See for more about this the observation of Walter Schulz, Das Problem der absoluten Reflexion, Frankfurt a.M. 1963, p. 14, that it was only possible to break the endless iteration of the reflection process in the period of German idealism by relation to the world (Weltbezug) - hence inconsequently(?). The reference to functionally differentiated societies makes this hypothesis historically relative. There is another distribution of emphases in layered [class-based trans.) societies. Here (if the difference is altogether less relevant), it would tend to be

47

sonable, because subsystems in functionally differentiated societies that expect or produce performance are able to articulate their interests through organizations and speakers, whereas in the larger society, the higher classes take over the task of representation. It is therefore in the domain of performance that the logical circularity can best be re-specified through interaction. Politics and economics - as subsystems that can be organized well - have become negotiation centers for such interactions; whereas the system of education first had to build up a sort of political representation of the profession's interests without being able to support itself on the organizations (schools and universities) that were needed for function and performance. 50 All of this does not entitle us to characterize our society structurally we have not yet touched upon the motivational problems - as being dominated by the principle of performance. We are saying this and only this: that all circularly arranged system references have to overcome their self-referential undetermined-ness and be re-specified; that respecification of one domain has consequences for the possibilities of respecification of the others; and that among the performance relations, respecification can be accomplished most easily and most quickly, because it is in this process that the inner societal environment provides complementary speakers, whereas for function orientation and reflection, there are no so-called partners in the environment. That means dominance at most in the sense that the people or points of view that are normally at an advantage are those that can put their goals into operation most effectively. 51

50

51

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ns.] societies. Here (if the difference is altogether less relevant), it would tend to be the reflection process, which would guarantee possibilities of specification by turning back to the traditions that allow it to identify a system. The problematic consequences of this state of matters were discussed for the most part in the United States. Cf. for example Ronald G. Corwin, Education in Crisis: A Sociological Analysis of Schools and Universities in Transition, New York 1974, p. 226ff.; Dan C. Lortie, Schoolteacher: A Sociological Study, Chicago 1975, p. 216ff. Perhaps even more true on the European than on the American stage is that on the level of organized representation of the profession's interests, the socio-structural differences between function, performance, and reflection are lumped together. Cf. the suggestion of a ,,Gresham's Law" of planning in James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations, New York 1968, p. 185 and the case study used in Herbert A. Simon, ,,Birth of an Organization: The Economic Cooperation Administration," Public Administration Review 13, 1953, pp. 227-236.

VI. The formulation of system references There is no pedagogical theory that would have tried to take the point of view of the system of education and present the system references for function (society), performance (other function systems), and reflection (self-reference) as a unity. As long· as the system of education was not viewed as being a social system and a function system of the society, there was also no reason to pose the problem of unity in this form and to involve it in reflection. It holds true for the 18th century in general that the willingness to reflect is bound up with anthropological* premises and in that way preformed. At the same time, that takes the burden from rash glances behind the scenes of societal transformation, which is already underway. No societal concept exists with which one could have spoken of subsystems that differentiated themselves (from other subsystems). One speaks of societies using old distinctions - domestic societies, civil societies, religious societies, etc. - and the general society, as the domain of the most farreaching contacts, is only something for people who also can perceive such contacts. Children belong to it just as little as personnel or other dependants do. According to this, education is preparation for the transition into the society, not a process that happens within the society. Neither is there a concept for inclusion. The function position that this concept takes is anthropologically defined as well - through the concept of happiness. Happiness is set explicitly against stratification as ,,accessible to all and the same for all (accessible a taus et le meme pour tous)." 52 In this manner, the happiness concept is detached from the outside products of happiness, which might well be unfairly distributed, and the concept is self-referentiality related to on its own perfection. By no means can one find any analytic account of system references for function, performance, and reflection. This place is also occupied by a formulation that is related to humans - the division of the moral duties of human beings

52

Note from the translator: the German use of ,.anthropology" or .,anthropological" is different from the American one in that it refers to the study of a universal human ,,nature." The German Anthropologie is more philosophical (also philosophically controversial in its speculative assumptions). It has little to do with field studies in the social sciences, which is par and parcel with the American ,,Anthropology." I have translated the word directly into English, because the German comes from the same root and because there is no better word for it to my knowledge. Nevertheless, I urge the reader to take note of the particular implications here. In the words of Robert Mauzi, l 'idee du bonheur dans la lillerature et la pensee fram;aise au XVl!Ife siecle, Paris 1960, p. 232.

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between those related to God, those related to other people, and those related to oneself. 53 One can see that the semantic field is so influenced by anthropology that the analysis cannot be put into terms of social system references - which is the only possible way that social changes could have been tracked. In relation to social change, one accordingly uses the discontinuity of the state of nature and the civil state (which is held together through anthropological constants) for orientation. It is the French Revolution that first puts an end to this way of thinking - not least of all because it cannot succeed in presenting the now realized discontinuity as Robespierres' intention can be understood - as a return to the state of nature and as the building up of a new civil society. It is for this reason that the reflection possibilities for the early Pedagogy are not drawn from social contingencies either, but instead from an orientation on human beings. One does not start with the social system of education, but rather from the human beings who are to be educated ,and one explicates the goals of education on human beings. That corresponds to an historical situation that exists at the beginning of a new kind of differentiation process (of systems from other systems) - it is a situation, which has no experiences to fall back on with the function system that must first be developed and that therefore tends to formulate problems in an anthropology-centered way in order to be able to claim that the strivedfor system structure can be integrated. 54 On the other hand, this semantic basis does not suffice to formulate the problem adequately for Systems Theory. We want to briefly introduce what we believe to be the theoretical attempt most worthy of note. One can see from this attempt how far one comes when one poses the problem from the human perspective in the framework of an empirical anthropology. It can be found in Ernst Christian Trapp's Versuch einer Padagogik (Attempt at a Pedagogy). 55 In the framework of his instruction theory, Trapp distinguishes between knowledge, habits, and skills that are useful in general, useful for 53

54

55

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Until the late 18th century, this division scheme is the one generally used. See for example Samuel Pufendorf, De officio hominis el civisjuxla legem naturalem, Book 1, chapter lll-VI, quoted from the edition Cambridge 1735, cf. in particular p. 78; Claude Buffier, Traile de la sociele civile: Et du moyen de se rendre heureux en conlribuant au bonheur des personnes avec qui on vii, Paris 1726, p. 25ff.; Abbe Joannet, De la connoissance de I 'homme, dans son etre et dans ses rapports, Paris 1775, vol. II, p. I 51 ff. On this theme in the general context of the historical-social semantics of bourgeois society see Niklas Luhmann manuscript: ,.Fruhneuzeitliche Anthropologie: Theorietechnische Losungen for ein Evolutionsproblem der Gesellschaft," 1977. Ernst Christian Trapp, Versuch einer Padagogik, Berlin 1780. We are quoting from the edition Leipzig ! 9 I 3, p. l 56ff.

the community, and useful for the individual. The distinction is thought of as being linear, declining from the general to the concrete. It differentiates what is necessary and useful for a human being as a human being, from what is necessary and useful for a human being in particular roles in parties, classes, confessions, and age groups, and finally, from what is necessary and useful for a human being considering his special talents and situation as an individual. 56 The unity of the correlation is guaranteed two times: through its subject, the human being, and through the linear form of the increasing specification of characteristics. One could easily have reinterpreted and said: what is generally useful is what characterizes the human being as a social being per se; what is useful for the community is what makes it possible for him to take his role in societal relationships of performance; and what is individually useful is what uses him in relation to himself. But the distinction was not meant that way. It is formulated as a distinction between characteristics (the production of which is the task of teaching) and not as a distinction between system references. Incidentally, this distinction will be developed along with the general education doctrine, which is guided by considerations of completeness and bliss, and wants only to deal only with the knowledge and abilities that are gained through instruction. Its theoretical anchoring remains uncertain (Trapp does not quite know, whether he is following a small devil). 57 It will not be taken up in further theory developments 58 and, with its intended constraint on knowledge and abilities, it will be overtaken at the very latest by the demand for a truly ,,educating instruction." This formula breaks down Trapp's plan: in the idea of all-around human education (Menschenbildung), the general will be attributed to the individual, and what should have been called useful for the community, will be pushed out altogether and relegated to the mere trade schools. A parallel development can be found in the domain of educational goals. The handed-down formula of humane perfection, under which 56

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Stuve also adds a third reference to the ones to general human nature and society: the reference to one's own individuality. Cf. ,,Allgemeine Grundsiitze der Erziehung, hergeleitet aus einer richtigen Kenntnis des Menschen," in Al/gemeine Revision des gesam/en Schul- und Erziehungswesens van einer Gesel/schaft praktischer Erzieher, ed. Joachim Heinrich Campe, Hamburg 1785, vol. I, p. 325: .,Man lasse die Anlagen und Krafte des Menschen seiner allgemeinen menschlichen Natur, seiner Individualitat und seiner Lage in der Gesellschaft gema8 sich entwickeln." Ibid., p. 170. Cf. also Kurt Grube, Die !dee und Struktur einer rein-menschlichen Bi/dung: £in Beilrag zum Philanthropismus und Neuhumanismus, Halle 1934, p. 76ff.

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premises the education doctrine had previously operated, is eliminated59 and replaced by a differentiated scheme that once again corresponds exactly to the three system references. Completeness (Vollkommenheit) is retained as a guiding concept and is interpreted to mean the harmonious training of all talents and strengths in people. Alongside it, the different societal demands on human beings (what we call performance) are taken into account in the concept of usefulness. This difference forces the final goal of education to shift back to self-reference - to the feelings that someone has who experiences himself as being complete and useful. This feeling - because the person loves himself - makes him blissfully happy. In this way, blissful happiness becomes the principle of reflection that holds the other perspectives together by incorporating them and bringing them, in their delightedness, to reflection. The rather superficial critique of the Kantians, which sets in immediately, will hardly do justice to the refinement of this theory construction. 60 It holds the new, critical moral philosophy to be a securely established truth and from that standpoint out, it lectures that blissful happiness is not the issue, but only whether one is worthy of it. On the other hand, the construction of philanthropy did not break apart immediately at the first bit of pressure for no reason. As an anthropology of self-love, its basis had been too weak. This anthropology had never been able to solve its own induction problem - namely, how it is able to start with numerous feelings and arrive at a unity of the self. On account of that, ever since the middle of the 18th century, it had gone in for an increase in the directions ,,disquietude, apprehension, disturbance (inquietude, angoisse, ennui)"61 and was already overhauled in some respects when Philanthropy tried it once again with optimism. From that point, one could not defend oneself against a philosophy that had just attempted to react to the empirical unsolvability of the induction problem. The more deep-seated problem, however -- whether relating the system references to human beings instead ofto the social system, whose differentiation (from other systems) in 59 60

61

We will have to come back to this point in greater detail. See chapter X below. Cf. Jonathan Schuderoff, Briefe iiber moralische Erziehung in Hinsicht auf die neueste Philosophie, Leipzig 1792, p. 43ff.; Johann Christoph Greiling, Ober den

End:::weck der Erziehung und iiber den ersten Grundsatz einer Wissenschaft derselben, Schneeberg 1793, p. 11 ff.; Johann Heinrich Gottlieb Heusinger, Beytrag zur Berichligung einiger Begriffe iiber Erziehung und Erziehungskunst, Halle 1794, p. 31 ff. See Jean A. Perkins, The Concept of the Self in the French Enlightenment, Genf 1969.

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the society had created the new situation, could be justified in the first place - remained hidden for a long time. We will leave it at this one case - a case that shows how far away the system of education is from conceptualizing system references in a language that is pedagogically meaningful. This has very far-reaching consequences, because it means that there can be no system reflection that reflects itself, which means that there can be no system reflection that locates itself as one system reference among others and that negotiates itself as such. In addition, under these conditions, there can be no concept of autonomy for the system of education that would have anything more to offer than a mere hypostatization of its own function. Even the autonomy of the system of education will then become merely anthropo-centric namely, it will only be justified by the fact that the pedagogue works in a special way for the human beings in human beings. 62 But autonomy is a freedom that is structurally forced due to the differentiation of system references - a sort of emergency state caused by under-determination to which one does not do justice by pointing to the importance of one's own task.

VII. Autonomy The negotiation of function, performance, and reflection must take place within the function systems themselves. The society cannot take the task away from the subsystems, nor can it dictate it to them. The society's differentiation form only stipulates that, unlike function, performance and reflection mutually determine each other. The solution of this on-going problem varies from system to system, even from situation to situation. It is for this purpose that function systems need autonomy. Indeed, in the historical process of transformation to functional differentiation, new demands for autonomy emerge on the subsystems level that are fundamentally different from the older types of rights and freedoms. For instance, the political system demands and achieves ,,sovereignty" for itself - no longer in the medieval sense of independence from political supremacy, 63 but rather in the sense of a territorially extensive, function62 63

Cf. Georg Geissler, Die Autonomie der Piidagogik, Berlin/Leipzig 1929. On the medieval perspective and, in particular, on the emergence of the formula ,,superiorem non recognoscens" see Sergio Machi Onory, Fonli canonistische dell 'idea moderna de/lo Stato (!mperium spiriluale - iurisdiclio divisa - sovranila),

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based independence of politics from religious, estate-based (familial), and legal interferences. One function system after the other presents itself in its relationship to the environment in this form of self-assertion and protection against interventions. The causes for this are historically determined, such as, for example, the emancipation of the economy from state monopolies and mercantilistic care, which first occurred through legal decisions and then through economic politics. This development influences the choice of themes within which the autonomy problems will become acute and it places the anti-systems in the inner-societal environment that are especially relevant for this in relief. Postulates of autonomy are always at first rudimentary forms of system reflection. They emerge spontaneously and without conceptual and theoretical apparatus as soon as a system begins to communicate about its own function as being a task that is endless (endlessly difficult), that includes the entire population, and that cannot be fulfilled anywhere else. ,,For that, which one must go about doing with care," writes Trapp (1780) 64 ,,one must also prepare for well; one must be knowledgeable about its principles and have learned about their use both theoretically as well as practically. That means in other words: education must be practiced as its own art by its own people." Parallel to this and with the same unreflected reflection, resentments develop when and if the autonomy demanded is not recognized or not recognized to the desired extent. Thus, the autonomy concept in its spontaneous first formulation easily turns into a concept of resentment in which the unfulfilled and perhaps unfulfillable expectations and hopes are collected, turned into contra-factual form, and held onto in this form as a substitute for fulfillment. One can observe this striving for autonomy on two levels particularly well in the domain of the system of education: on the level of teaching and on the level of the doctrine of teaching - Pedagogy. Viewed historically, it is in the second half of the 18th century, as the system of education is differentiated from the system of religion, that autonomy is demanded at first for instruction, the professional praxis of teaching. 65 Education's

64

65

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Milan 1951, p. 27lff.; Brian Tierney, ,,Some Recent Works on the Political Theories of the Medieval Canonists," Tradilia 10, 1954, p. 612ff., 594-625. On the general theme see Helmut Quaritsch, Staal und Sauverdnilat, vol. I, Frankfurt a.M. 1970. Ernst Christian Trapp, Versuch einer Padagagik, reprinted Leipzig 1913, p. 8. Cf also the text of his teacher, Martin Ehlers, Gedanken van den zur Verbesserung der Sclwlen nathwendigen Erfordernissen, Altona/Lubeck 1766. See for example Ehlers, Gedanken van den zur Verbesserung der Schulen nathwendigen Erfardernissen, p. 2I3ff. (against regimentation and very modem in

separation from the system of religion allows it to find - in the political system of the ,,state" - a partner, in regard to which it can realize greater dependence and greater independence at the same time. School law, school administration, and school regulation is built up, 66 but at the same time, in spite of the focus on ,,national education," interference in political and pedagogical action is reduced. (That is possible precisely because politics is not yet organized in an entirely democratic-self-referential manner; rather, it can promote parts of the society without having to be too cautious about ,,domestic costs.") This autonomy can be politically defended for the profession, however, only if it can be shown how it should be used. In any case, with the differentiation of the system of education (from other systems) and the development of the role of teacher to a full profession, the problem of teacher training becomes acute. For that reason, the problem of autonomy repeats itself very quickly on a second level on the level of Pedagogy. This concept is formulated for the first time and this is symptomatic - in the 70s of the 18th century. 67 Shortly afterwards - at least in Ge1many - it is linked to a ,,theory of all-around education (Bi/dung)," which is given the task of justifying the ,,relative independence of that which is fundamental and unique to Pedagogy." 68 That occurs with a claim at being scientific and through the ranking of Pedagogy within a differentiation of disciplines, which starts up during the execution of the differentiation of the system of science (from other systems). 69

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his interest in the pleasure that teachers get from their work), or Condorcet, ,,Bericht Uber die allgemeine Organisation des offentlichen Untenichtswesens," in Erziehungsprogramme der Franzosischen Revolution, ed. Robert Alt, Berlin/Leipzig I 949, pp. 61-117 (p. 11 J: ,,Die Unabhil.ngigkeit des Untenichts gehort irgendwie zu den Menschenrechten"). On the leading developments - in this sense - in Prussia, see Manfred Heinemann,

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Schule tm Vo,jeld der Venvaltung: Die Entwicklung der preuj]ischen Unterrichtsvenvaltung von 1771-1800, Gottingen 1974; Karl-Ernst Jeismann, Das preuj]tsche Gymnasium in Staal und Gesel/schaft: Die Entstehung des Gymnasiums als Schule des Staates und der Gebildeten, 1787-1817, Stuttgart 1974. Cf. Wilhelm Rossler, ,,Padogogik," in Geschicht/iche Grundbegrijfe, vol. 4, Stuttgart

68

69

I 978, p. 626f., 623-647. Quote from Herman Noh!, Die padagogische Beivegung in Deutsch/and und ihre Theorie, 7th ed., Frankfurt a.M. 1970, p. 124. On this, see Wolfgang Klafki, ,,Erziehungswissenschaft als kritisch-konstruktive Theorie: Hermeneutik - Empirie ldeologiekritik," Zeitsclzrift fur Padagogik 17, l 971, p. 358ff., 351-385; and further, as a comprehensive presentation, which works closely with the sources, Gertrud Schiess, Die Diskussion uber die Autonomie der Ptidagogik, Weinheim 1973. On this unique constellation cf. Rudolf Stichweh, Ausdifferenzierung der Wissenschaft - eine Analyse am deulschen Beispiel, Thesis paper (Diplomarbeit), Bielefeld 1977.

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As soon as the formulated concept ,,autonomy of Pedagogy" is available, 70 it can no longer be defended unreservedly. It disciplines the overenthusiasm of the pedagogical attempts to improve its circumstances by making reference to the fact that other domains of culture also want independence and autonomy. 71 As a result of this, a retreat to a ,,relative" or ,,limited" autonomy takes place, the contours of which remain controversial and dependent upon the concepts used to express the independence of the pedagogical task and its responsibilities. It is now for the first time that Pedagogy accepts the contingency formula ,,all-around education (Bildung)" so that it is able to sing its own part in the choir of autonomous domains of culture. As far as ,,relative autonomy" is concerned: it ends up not leading beyond endless controversies regarding emphasis, in which the opponent is always purported to demand absolute autonomy. During its high points in the 20s and again in the 50s and 60s, which did not accidentally coincide with legislative and other political reform activities, the autonomy discussion focused less on the concept of autonomy itself. It primarily concerned itself with establishing the independence of Pedagogy as science. This independence was justified on one of its own topics - the pedagogical relationship. No one could see (or wanted to) that this argument led to a dead end. Generally, disciplines do not justify their independence through topics, but rather through perspectives or particular problems which make it possible to focus on all topics as long as they are relevant in the view of the discipline. Every anomaly led Pedagogy straight to a fringe position, in which it was unable to explain its relationship to psychology and sociology and, most importantly, in which participation in the major interdisciplinary theory movements of the last decades of the century became difficult if not impossible. Pedagogy's own 70

71

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According to Geissler, Die Autonomie der Padagogik, p. 69, and first said by K. A. J. Lattmann, Uber die Frage der Konzentration in den a/lgemeinen Schulen, namentlich im Gymnasium, Gottingen 1860, p. 252 - which is relatively late. Cf., to name some, Theodor Litt, Moglichkeiten und Grenzen der Pddagogik, Leipzig 1926, reprinted in Litt, Padagogik und Kultur, Bad Heilbrunn 1965, pp. 58-98; further, Ernst Lichtenstein, .,Gibt es eine padagogische Autonomie?," Schule und Leben 26, 195 I, pp. 193-199. The difficulty that Pedagogy then had in taking note of this can be seen in the polemic of Geissler, Die Autonomie der Padagogik, p. 89ff. If one goes along with Geissler and justifies the autonomy of Pedagogy with its responsibility for human beings, then it is truly difficult to accept limits. Erich Weniger, Die Eigenstandigkeit der Erziehung in Theorie und Praxis, Weinheim (no year), p. 74, also emphasizes that the limits of the autonomy of Pedagogy cannot be determined theoretically; instead, they need to be tested out concretely in the given historical situation and accepted. That means- the experience of resistance instead of reflection!

interest in autonomy was clear to everyone, 72 but it could not be adequately reflected. In the increasingly aggressive tone of the internal discussion, 73 one can see that the available concepts did not suffice to handle the problem adequately, that the fringe position of Pedagogy would become noticeable with regard to the Theory of Science or the Sociology of Science, and similarly, that the reflection deficit would not be decreased through reflection. 74 With the distance of an additional decade and when looked at in the manner of sociological research, one cannot fail to recognize today that this focus on autonomy marks, at best, the beginning of a reflection process. It commits itself initially to the notion of contrast, refuses intervention, and thus characterizes what it is not or does not want to be - but only negatively. That goes for both levels: for the teacher in the school and for Pedagogy as science. Thus, the teacher generally sees his teaching activity as a task that only he himself can carry through and for which he alone is responsible - and that is confirmed by his experience in the classroom everyday. ,,Meddling" - whether by the culture bureaucracy, by the local public, or by the parents - seems ,,irrelevant" to him. Today, even ,,curriculum reforms" seem to fall into this protective zone, into the glacis of professional autonomy. On the other hand, this sort of defensive autonomy suggests a world that is far too simple. It enjoys wide recognition as an element of professional culture, but it cannot be kept up consistently as a practice. 75 Even the aversion against ,,bureaucracy" and against 72

73 74

75

For just one case, see Bernhard Schwenk, ,,Padagogik in den philosophischen Fakultaten: Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der 'geisteswissenschaftlichen' Padagogik in Deutschland," Jahrbuchfur Erziehungswissenschaft 2, 1977/78, pp. 103-157. Ever since Helmut Seiffert, Mufi die Pddagogik eigenstdndig sein?, Essen 1964 In so far as comments such as the one by Klafki (,,one cannot claim that the problem was not reflected" [English translation] quoted in Schiess, Die Diskussion iiber die Autonomie der Pddagogik, p. 158) are concerned: we of course know that people thought and wrote about the problem, but thinking and writing is not necessarily reflection. Cf. Howard S. Becker, ,.The Teacher in the Authority System of the Public School," Journal of Educational Sociology 27, 1953, pp. 128-141; Neal Gross and Robert E. Herriott, Staff Leadership in Public Schools, New York 1965; Dan C. Lortie, ,,The Balance of Control and Autonomy in Elementary School Teaching," in The SemiProfessions and Their Organization: Teachers, Nurses, Social Workers, ed. Amitai Etzioni, New York 1969, pp. 1-55; Donald E. Edgar and Richard Warren, ,,Power and Autonomy in Teacher Socialization," Sociology of Education 42, 1969, pp. 386-399; Hermann Holstein, Die Schute als Institution: Zur Bedeutung von Schulorganisation und Schulvenvaltung, Ratingen 1972, in particular pp. 96ff., 187ff.

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work that is not directly relevant to Pedagogy remains ambivalent in this sense. 76 Therefore, it had to come to a reflection on reflection. One could guess that that is what Pedagogy has to do. Its autonomy, however, faces exactly the same problem. On the one hand, Pedagogy claims its independence as science and documents this with all of the peripheral distinctions of science: university positions and departments, literature and congresses. On the other side, it lives off of imports, attaches itself to philosophical notions and, more and more today, to sociological and psychological research, and, thus, remains dependent on external motivation without acknowledging the guidance of those primary fields. Often, its ,,relation to praxis" is referred to as an indication of its independence; but that does not differentiate it, because psychology and sociology also claim that they are relevant in making decisions about actions. It seems, then, that the only thing that exists is basically a duplication of the problem, which can be used in arguments as tactical manoeuvres to shift and evade: Pedagogy bases its autonomy on the necessary independence of the praxis of instruction; the teacher bases the autonomy of his role on the specific cognitive rationality that is imparted on him by a pedagogical education and, besides that, by the ,,subject" that he represents. We will see correspondences to this duplication once again in the widespread distinction between methodical and didactic points ofview. 77 The fact that autonomy is claimed both by the educational relationship and by Pedagogy and that it is justified by each side with reference to the other side, is a revealing phenomena in itself. It seems that the only thing reflected here is that within the system of education, a differentiation ( from other systems) of an establishment that does not instruct itself (or at least, does not train teachers itself) has taken place. Ever since then there have been teaching and non-teaching roles, which pass autonomy justifications back and forth. Inner differentiation in one form or another is certainly an important condition for autonomy. Just as with the interest in autonomy, it must in any case be included in the reflection process. But, given all of this, the meaning of autonomy and its relation to the unity of the complex system is not yet clarified. In general, this point in the discussion does not encourage one to stop the reflection processes in the system of education with the claim of 76

77

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See Gerald H. Moeller and W.W. Charters, ,,Relation of Bureaucratization to Sense of Power Among Teachers," Administrative Science Quarterly I 0, 1966, pp. 444-465; Gerald Moeller, ,,Bureacracy and Teacher's Sense of Power," in The Sociology of Education: A Sourcebook, ed. Robert R. Bell and Holger R. Stub, 2nd edition, Homewood, Ill. 1968, pp. 230, 236-250. For a more detailed discussion on this see part 2, chapter XI.

autonomy and with a return, which has thus been made safe, to its own ideals. In order to get further, we first must clarify the characteristics that are implied in the concept of autonomy. It is does not suffice for this to define autonomy only from the internal perspective of a system as the absence of external controls or constraints. 78 Rather, the concept of autonomy means, as its literal definition suggests: independence in selfregulation. Autonomy assumes among other things, that dependencies and independencies can coexist in the relationship to the environment - otherwise there would not be a regulation problem. It follows that an increase in autonomy cannot be thought of as a reduction in dependence and an increase in independence - as if the relations to the environment are set at a constant sum. Instead, an increase in autonomy presupposes combination-based levels, from which it is possible to reach both more dependencies and more independencies. Gaining autonomy, then, does not necessarily happen at the cost of those environmental systems upon which one depends; but it can require an exchange of those environmental systems upon which one prefers to depend - we just showed that using the example of the system of education's relations to the system of religion and the political system. The internal system correlation to autonomy is a structural differentiation of several process levels. 79 Such a structure makes uncoupling possible on the one hand and, on the other, it makes aggregate control by the higher levels of horizontal processes on lower levels, such as instruction possible. In classical anthropology, one had assumed this sort of system construction when one took freedom to refer - not to freedom of action or non-action - but to freedom of the choice of motives, through which one's own actions and the actions of others were exposed. Reflection processes, however, are structured in a precisely analogous way if they themselves become reflective, if they include themselves in reflection. Thus, one could consider autonomy's straight-forward demand to be a first step in reflection for continuous instruction processes - a step which will, in turn, be tracked on the second and last step. Finally, then, the system can learn to accept that the mere contrasting of dependence and independence leads to a position that is just as difficult to hold up as the one that comes from contrasting education and society. However, such a realization only comes about and can only be held up if it is actually formulated. This goes for processes of consciousness and it 78 79

See, for example, Fred Katz, Autonomy and Organization: The Limit of External Control, New York 1968, pp. 4,14,18 (,,absence of external constraint"). Cf. contributions from a Systems Theory viewpoint in Hierarchy Theory: The Challenge of Complex Systems, ed. Howard H. Pattee, New York 1973.

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goes by all means for processes of communication. With that, we find ourselves faced with the question of which conceptual and theoretical context makes such a formulation possible. We have to hold onto this question for the moment in order to tum to yet a second set of considerations, which relates to how far the system of education can be differentiated (from other systems).

VIII. Overlapping domains The question of structural constraints remained open in the analysis of the relationship between autonomy and reflection. Autonomy is not to be understood as the absence of constraints, but rather as a form of dealing with constraints. The reflection on the conditions of autonomy also shows that autonomy does not develop in a vacuum, but rather that structural constraints are counted among the very conditions of autonomy. This general statement, however, does not prepare us sufficiently for the historical analysis of reflection problems in the system of education that we intend to do. The terrain is covered as far as concepts are concerned, but there have to be more points to use as themes of reflection than just autonomy as such; otherwise it will remain as a defensive autonomy without possibilities of self-limitation. The distinction of system references for function, performance, and reflection offer us one point of departure. From this distinction as well as the analysis of circular interdependencies within the individual system references, we infer the hypothesis that in its self-reference, reflection must not only concern itself with itself, but also with its relationship to the system's function and performance. The conditions for function and performance become - precisely in their non-identity - themes of reflection for systems that are functionally differentiated (from other systems). Thus, when the system of education reflects its position in the society, it has to take a good look at the fact that it does not even have the option to fulfill its societal function optimally and that the best education of all is not seen by all as being a useful performance. We can and will follow this theme starting with the second half of the 18th century. Alongside it, there is a second problem domain that generates reflection themes which we want to address now. It results from

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structural constraints on the ability of the system of education to differentiate (from other systems) . . It is in no way a given that for every societal function, certain action systems can be differentiated (from other systems) without problem so that the function will be fulfilled within the function system and only within that system. It is, for instance, not possible to actually bring all politically relevant powers under the control of the political system. For the domain of education, differentiation (from other systems) requires in the first place that the socialization process that always goes on is recognized and that it is influenced through its themes and theme sequences. Through the differentiation of particular types of situations (from other types), particular roles (from other roles), and even particular social systems for education (from other systems), it is possible that in this domain, the function of socialization - or education - wins primacy and begins to control the selection of themes instead of remaining an accompanying side effect. In so far as this is possible, the function is then be filled by an intentional teaching/learning process - and one that is generally in the form of school-like instruction - which makes it possible to appoint teachers in a rational way, which means - for a number of pupils at the same time. Education becomes organizable in this form - a feature that was achieved in a big way in the 19th century. The spectacular success of education organized in schools, however, should not disguise the fact that there are other important domains of education for which it is not possible, at least not yet, to chose this form of differentiation (from other systems). That goes for education in the family, in companies, and in universities. We want to call these ,,overlapping domains." Within them, the process of education remains bound to the fulfillment - even to the primacy - of another function. In spite of all the individual differences, it is important to work out the major cause for these function symbioses, because only by doing this will it become clear that we are dealing with comparable phenomena. Unlike school instruction, which is characterized by its interaction form, family education, company education, and university education take place in function systems of the society that were differentiated (from other systems) through the relation of communication processes to symbolically generalized media, which means: through special codes that

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regulate a contingent acceptance of communication performances. 80 Since the 18th century,fami/y life developed normatively (and in large part, also factually) towards a primacy of the orientation on love. 81 Within this, the partners in a marriage owe each other love in a different sense than parents and children. The integration of the execution of these two codes - and that means, not least of all, preventing each of the domains from pushing the problem onto the other - is what makes the inner form and the success of the family life and what makes the family able to accept different and fluctuating environments. It is telling in regards to the economy of modem society that all economically relevant factors, including property and work, are understood through monetary mechanisms - that they become ,,wares" - and are thus subjugated to a variable (!) principle of the constancy of sums that replaces older, morality-dependent notions of scarcity. 82 With that, the societal categorization of the orientation on scarcity in individual companies no longer works via morals, but via money - something that Hegel is known to have registered by ranking the concept of society on a lower perfection level of his theory. In the domain of science, trnth is concentrated to a greater extent on increasing its ability to break apart and recombine, on gaining knowledge that is improbable in the life world, on the defiguration of facts, 83 and on the destruction of evidence. With this, the practice of starting from obvious or handed-down certainties of the world is replaced by a technique of negating negations: withstanding of criticism. In the age of criticism, every ,, a priori" becomes a theory problem, science is forced to become autonomous with regard to all rules, and by reorganizing the universities - in other words, based on the requirements of the system of education - the 19th century creates the organizational infrastructure. The divergence of these domains of media, their becoming autonomous, and the increase in expectations regarding love, money, and truth to the point of improbability, makes these media problematic as the basis of 80

81

82 83

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See Niklas Luhmann, ,,EinfUhrende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie symbolisch generalisierter Kommunkationsmedien," in Luhmann, Soziologische Aujkliirung, vol. 2, Op laden 197 5, pp. 170-192. On the much discussed change in family structures under these demands cf. Hartmann Tyrell, ,,Probleme einer Theorie der gesellschaftlichen Ausdifferenzierung der privatisierten modernen Kernfarnilie," Zeilschriftfiir Soziologie 5, 1976, pp. 393-417. On this subject: George M. Foster, ,,Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good," American Anlhropologist 67, 1965, pp. 293-315. According to a formulation by Diderot in ,,Reve de d' Alembert," quoted in CEuvres completes, ed. de la Pleiade, Paris 1951, p. 961.

socialization and education processes; on the one side, these media remain in part indispensable for education, and on the other side, they cannot be made to submit to this function with their own logic. In the core domain of differentiated education (differentiated from other systems) - the school - the ordering function of such media is replaced by the age difference between teachers and pupils and through the interaction form. Where media-codes are still indispensable for the education process, education must take place in modern society outside of the school system and in the overlapping domains; because it is neither possible nor is it sensible to duplicate the media codes just for school purposes - to create a specialcode for school-love, school-money, or school-truth - in order to regulate the teaching/learning behavior. It is precisely the high demands on orientation under specific media codes, that prevent school instruction from instituting person-related love, monetary rationality, or truth that can be critically evaluated methodologically and theoretically, as its own educational instruments. Such media are convincing only in the context of operations, which have been differentiated (from other operations) especially for them. The school, for its part, continues to rely on a situation in which people love, earn, and research somewhere else and in which the school can selectively take over the results of such operations. The general condition of form necessary for functional societal differentiation makes such overlapping domains with two function circles each problematic. On one hand, they have to satisfy the increasing demands of both of their own media-codes - for instance, one overlapping domain has to express love in a personalized and intimate sense or another has to be economically rational with regard to the entire domain of comparison included in the monetary mechanism (particularly with regard to the use of its own work force). On the other hand, they have to satisfy the differentiation of the system of education (from other systems) and the pedagogical consciousness that is a reflection of the school; they cannot simply remain socialization processes without any intentional steering and control, because they have an effect on the school process - or they connect to where it leaves off. The combined level of functional requirements is raised. Whether solutions can be found for the problems that thus emerge and what those solutions might be, is a question that we cannot foIIow up in a satisfactory manner here. Its answer depends on the structural conditions of the individual function domains. In accordance with our thematic framework, we are limiting ourselves to the reflection problems that result 63

from these structural conditions for the periphery of the system of education's pedagogical self-steering (Selbststeuerung). Every since the second half of the 18th century, Pedagogy has allowed itself to become School Pedagogy in accordance with the basic direction of the differentiation of the system of education (from other systems). It was because of this, however, that the overlapping domains became a problem for Pedagogy, which it could neither ignore, nor simply handle as an environmental condition, but instead had to build into its self-understanding. Additionally, it should be noted that the relevance of these overlapping domains to pedagogical goals does not remain constant, but instead varies as the functional differentiation advances. As the function systems gain their own marks, shared institutions become problematic - the distance between notions of rationality and optimality increase on both sides, even when there are no alternate solutions in sight. In the same degree that the pedagogical yield of overlapping domains becomes questionable, but still cannot be given up, the core domain of the system of education, and the school-oriented Pedagogy in particular, are forced to compensatory measures and negotiation. One such a development can be seen in two major themes of the contemporary discussion in Educational Science. These themes address family and science. The inadequacy of familial socialization and education as a pre- and concomitant condition of school success leads to the demand for compensatory education. The inadequacy of scientific research as a form of producing themes that can be used in instruction leads to the demand for a subject-based didactic and, in particular, a university didactic. 84 In both cases, a sensitivity to poor ,,matching" develops, 85 which is very different content-wise, but has a structure that is exactly analogous. What family and science do for the education process not longer seems useful per se today; instead, it needs to be processed once again within the system. It confuses the sociologist that problems are posed and followed up with a lot of care and effort, even though they are technically unsolvable. Only reflection on the state of the system of education in the context of its inner societal environment may be able to prevent resignation in the long run 84

85

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In this context, it is interesting to mention that historians of science regard the pedagogism of scientific concept formation as a phase in the process of freeing scientific research from ties to the life-world; according to Gaston Bachelard, Le malerialisme rationnel, 3rd ed., Paris 1972, pp. 27f., 30f., 117f. On this concept in a principally Systems Theoretical perspective see Uriel G. Foa, Terence R. Mitchell, and Fred E. Fiedler, ,,Differentiation Matching," Behavioral Science 16, 1971, pp. 130-142.

and to pose the question of whether it is not worth it anyway. We will come back to this at a later point (see the end of chapter XIV). Before we go into the history of reflection in the system of education in greater depth, we have to round off the discussion of overlapping domains negatively. That requires, first and foremost, a clarification of their relationship to the code of political power. No special overlapping domain, no function symbiosis, had been able to develop in relation to politics. The execution of political power apparently does not allow itself to be affixed to any regular education process. Naturally, processes of socialization of the new generation take place within political organizations; but there is no political education in the political system that corresponds to the concept of democracy (that is correspondingly universal). The inclusion of the larger population in processes of political action is too marginal for pedagogical analysis - which does not mean that their structural importance for politics should be underestimated. At best, a sort of specialized school instruction can prepare for the political side of life - but this is a makeshift measure, which is clearly inadequate in its distant relevance to the real business and, which is also inconsistent with the type of problem solving that had been started up on the other system borders of the differentiated (from other systems) system of education. It is therefore understandable that the system of education is occasionally confronted with the temptation of considering the education process to be political action, of denying differentiation, and of attempting to morally regenerate politics through education. 86 It must be truly impossible beyond the society's media-specific function systems to create further overlapping domains anew according to pedagogical needs. The notion that all of life needs to have a pedagogical side, remains a pedagogical notion. Even the usual constraint to local (village and city) ,,conununities" 87 does not help in its realization. These are all environmental projections of the system of education, which underestimate the degree of differentiation in the society and its function logic. For this reason, they do not deliver - unlike the overlapping domains that are actually instituted - any stimulating constraints for pedagogical reflection. 86 87

On this, see Gi.inther C. Behrmann, Soziales System und politische Sozialisation: Eine Krilik der politischen Padagogik, Stuttgart 1972. Cf. for example Fred W. Newman and Donald W. Oliver, ,,Education and Community," Harvard Educational Review 37, 1967, pp. 61-106; Monis Janowitz, Institution Building in Urban Education, Hartford, Conn. 1969.

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IX. The development of contingency formulas According to an old sociological thought pattern, every differentiation of function systems (from other systems) leads to an intensification of problems in the symbol structures that integrate a society. On one side, they (the symbol structures) have to be formulated more generally on the larger societal level and more abstractly on the subsystems level; on the other side, they should not lose their reference to meaningful features of daily life and must remain re-specifiable on both levels (possibly in different ways). Among the symbolic structures that handle the negotiations necessary here are institutions, which we want to call contingency formulas. The problem of reference, which these formulas serve, comes from the differentiation of functions (from other function/systems). It occurs, therefore, in all function systems - thus, also in the system of education. Through orientation on functions, a sort of general hypothesis or background hypothesis of contingency is arrived at. The contents of experience - the intended reference points (themes) of experiencing and acting in addition to the abstractions necessary to interpret them - seem ,,also to be possible otherwise." An awareness of contingency, which accepts ,,this or also that" for a given condition, is a form of generalization and for that reason necessitates a re-specification; because one cannot live with the notion of the equal possibility of anything and everything. 88 This sort of indefinite contingency initially produces an empty horizon of compatibility - the normal expectation that this as well as other things ,,go"; but such projections must be made manageable through meaning and they must be made precise through determinations. That which is not determined must be turned into determined or at least determinable contingency. That was initially the function of religion and remained so even after its differentiation (from other functions). 89 Religion's contingency formula lies, as our tradition has it, in the concept of God, through which various possibilities are limited. (The difficulties are apparent not least of all in the specifically modem question of theodicy.) In the pre-modem pedagogical literature and praxis, one can only find precursors to contingency formulas - namely, central orientations around which that, which was also neces88 89

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In sociological tradition, one speaks about ,,Anomie" - with reference to Durkheim - when narrowing this problem down to normative points ofreference. For more about this, see Niklas Luhmann, Funk/ion der Religion, Frankfurt a.M. 1977.

sary and useful, was organized. Thus, education that was oriented around religious texts did not refuse the addition of further knowledge such as medicine, astrology, and engineering; 90 and the ,,vir bonus dicendi peritus"91 of the Roman rhetoric schooling needed, of course, to have a corresponding knowledge of the subject in order to be able to speak about it successfully. That much was easy to make plausible without further reflection. As of yet, one cannot speak of a contingency formula in a more exact sense. Only with increasing differentiation (of systems from other systems) in the society and with increasing differentiation via-a-vis the system of religion, do other function systems besides that of religion get into a situation, in which they must interpret the contingency background of their specific function - in politics it is the particular contours of public welfare; in science, the relation between identity and non-identity in relation to subject matter and knowledge (Gegenstand und Erkenntnis). The 18th century appears to us as the starting phase of new attempts at formulations, which - to stay with these two examples - are eventually transferred into the formalism of the constitutional state and transcendental epistemology, and finally, the dialectic. Contingency formulas are not shaped by just anything. The conditions for successful formulations are drawn from the functions themselves. They have to restrict the not determined-ness of other possibilities - for example, by evaluating or through plausible structures of alternatives. While functional societal differentiation is being carried out, this process begins to be based more and more on the specific function of the system (which, of course, must be distinguished from the function of the contingency formula itself). In the course of separating from fundamental religious definitions and carrying through new sorts of system autonomies, the reflection of function becomes a principle of formulation and thus, it becomes necessary to determine the relationship between function, performance, and reflection. In other words, contingency formulas are performances of reflection that refer to the function and that, in order to do so, must control the relationship between function, performance, and reflec90

91

Cf. for example S. J. Tambiah, World Conquerer and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand Against a Historical Background, Cambridge, Engl. 1976, p. 207ff. Using this definition from Cato, Marcus Fabius Quintilianus summed up what is probably the most influential lesson of education that has ever been written. Jnstitutionis Oratoriae Libri; XII, 1.1 is quoted here from the edition edited by Helmut Rahn, Darmstadt 1975, p. 684.

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tion, and that, therefore, require reflection on the reflection, or two-step reflection. Thus, on the one side, there are restricting the conditions for the possibility of meaningful, convincing contingency formulas; but on the other side, there is some leeway (Spielraum) for historical development based on available plausibility structures. In the I 8th century, for example, it became increasingly plausible to imagine the future as being open to the influence of progress and, therefore, to think of that it is possible to improve upon or even eliminate the things that exists in the present. 92 Thus, considering the temporal horizon of the times, it seemed quite natural to depict contingency formulas in a quasi-teleological way as principles of intensification, as the indication of a direction, in which more or better or, for negatively formulated contingency formulas (for example scarcity) - in which less should be expected. In its final consequence for education, that necessarily meant that differentiations could only occur in a linear manner, in a temporal one-after-the-other, according to the stipulation of ,,the intensification of the concept"93 - a notion that could not have been realized under any contingency formula. 94 Also characteristic for this formative period, which still affects us as tradition today, is the fact that the intensification idea is related to the contingency formula uniformly, as if to a value, and thus, it is not differentiated between the system references for function, performance, and reflection. Among the conceptions that were thus made possible, is the idea of the increasing/intensification of performance through reflection - a notion that has been shown implausible today, but that has not been sufficiently replaced. Starting with this general theory approach, which refers to larger societal developments, it is to be expected that we will discover corresponding symbol developments in the system of education as well developments connected to its differentiation (from other systems) in the society and with its differentiation vis-a-vis the system ofreligion. For this special case, one can ascertain a few special features, which do not hold for other function systems. Besides the special features of the function of education, the most important are three particularities, which are deter92

93 94

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Cf. Reinhart Koselleck, ,,Vergangene Zukunft der friihen Neuzeit," in Epirrhosis: Festgabe fur Carl Schmit/, Berlin 1968, pp. 551-556; Niklas Luhman, ,,The Future Cannot Begin: Temporal Structures in Modem Society," Social Research 43, 1976, pp. 130-152. According to Christian Wilhelm Harnisch, Deutsche Volksschulen mil besonderer Riicksicht auf die Pestalozzischen Grundsatze, Berlin 1812, p. 41, note 19. Cf. the middle of chapter XI.

mined in part by the reflection processes in the system of education, namely: (1) an unusually quick, abrupt process of differentiation (from other systems), which changed facts and states of consciousness in just a few decades starting in the middle of the 18th century ; (2) an immense increase in possible themes of instruction, which is triggered, for one, by the quick developments in economics and science and is also triggered by the fact that the system of education itself must now be open to all societally relevant themes - beyond catechisms (the lower class) and Latin eloquence (the upper class); and (3) a continuously high functional relevance of overlapping domains domains that elude full differentiation (from other systems), but still perform educational tasks and are effected and changed by differentiation processes (of systems from other systems), which are organizationally carried by schools. Under such conditions, reflection cannot rely on the system's previous institutional experiences with it; it is set free suddenly and prior to a reality that has yet to be created. It is incumbent upon reflection to meet the danger of superficiality, which comes about due to the colorful variety of new instruction themes, by firmly establishing the selection principle. And it finds an important counter-weight for all of this in the overlapping domains, which it still has to supervise in spite of the fact that they are increasingly related to school. These preconditions make it understandable that the system of education does not set down its contingency formula for good immediately, but that it instead has reformulated it many times in the course of the last two hundred years. The contingency formula is initially humane perfection, then all-around education (Bi/dung), then the ability to learn. One aspect that is constant throughout the changes in these contingency formulas is the maintenance of a level of reflection on which it is possible to devalue the simple learning and acquisition of mere knowledge. In this manner, education is justified as a selective procedure. In the context of perfection, the appeal to reason (raison) serves this purpose; in the context of allaround education (Bi/dung), it is the idea of the general as opposed to the particular (which only can be learned); and in the context of the ability to 69

learn, it is the ability to learn itself, which means that it is the ensuing possibilities of learning, which are what finally matters in all learning. On the other hand, notable changes also take place due to the lasting continuity of the level of reflection. Many tendencies can be recognized by looking at the process. In the first place, it approaches the specific function of the system of education gradually; it increasingly seeks guiding formulas that fit the function. In addition, it changes the dependence on overlapping domains. Whereas humane perfection is a formula that encompasses both family and school education, the formula of all-around education (Bi/dung) gains its specific content from the premise that science has a particular value for education. Finally, the ability to learn formulates a condition that primarily looks to later use in working life and that says that education, whatever else it may give one, must lead first and foremost to the learning of the ability to learn [one must learn how to learn -trans.] so that one is armed for every life situation that is possible later. Along with this change in main support concepts, a process of increasing detachment from the overlapping domains takes place. In the perfection formula, family education still holds the same rights as school education and is considered to be an alternative to it. The all-around education concept (Bildungsbegrifj) gears the process of school education on the university - which is also separate from education - as the single culmination point. Finally, the ability to learn formula barely includes any recognizable special relations to one of the environmental domains; although with the quickly increasing differentiation, specialization, and fluctuation of work requirements in the economy, it is in fact most relevant there. The series: humane perfection - all-around education (Bi/dung) ability to learn, is meant in the sense of formulations of main points, not mutually exclusive points. The all-around education idea (Bildungsidee) - the concept of all-around education (Bi/dung) has been around since the middle of the 18th century - reformulates the notion of perfection with the help of transcendental philosophy; with its emphasis on learning methods, it anticipates the learning for future learning. Without taking into consideration the leaps ahead and the reversions to the past, which make a continuing development possible and a theoretical (inner pedagogical) delimitation difficult, the formulas are distinct enough to justify the thesis of a development in the reflection themes of the system of education. We will analyze this development in the three chapters that follow as a formulation of the autonomy of the system of education and, when seen as a

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process, as a relatively autonomous (self-steered) reaction of the system of education to its own differentiation (from other systems) in the society.

X. Humane perfection Perfection is an old concept to characterize the results of natural and technical processes, including beings of all kinds, excluding God. 95 First of all, the idea of perfection is an answer to the experience of contingency and negativity by the assertion of forms which, upon achieving them, allow a being to be perfect (at first simply: finished). In the context of a hierarchy of states of beings, in which everything that ,,is" participates, the idea is assumed to be capable of intensification (steigerbar), so that every being is able to achieve its perfection through transcending his state of being (or as the Thomists would say: through the cooperation between nature and mercy). Only God, as ,,ens perfectissimum," is self-centered perfection. In response to this background tradition, the 16117th century is able to apply the notion of self-centered perfection to human beings and insert it into a newly created anthropology - but it can only do this because selfcentered perfection is now understood as negativity. 96 It is in the 18th century that a processual, even historic-temporal understanding of perfection becomes dominant for the first time. The individual human being is still conceived of as being simple (and in theological terms, that means indestructible), but already as a reality that is capable of being intensified. 97 In connection with this, the nature of perfection is shifted to perfectibility, primarily due to Rousseau. 98 Self-love is now 95

96

97

98

On the history of this problem and the concept, see Martin Foss, The Idea of Perfection in the Western World, Princeton 1946. On the relation to negativity, see Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in logology, Boston 1961, in particular p. 283ff. Cf. Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea, Cambridge, Mass. 1936 (reprinted 1950, p. 94ff. with a reference to Robert Fludd). A typical example: Pierre Nicole, .,De la charite et de !'amour propre," in Nicole, CEuvres philosophiques et morales, Paris 1845, reprinted Hildesheim 1970, pp. 179-208. See the attempt to combine these two perspectives by Abbe Joanne!, De la connoissance de l'homme, dans son etre et dans ses rapports, Paris 1775, in particular vol. I, p. 96ff. Reinhard Koselleck, ,,Fortschritt," in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutsch/and, vol. II, Stuttgart 1975, p. 375ff., 351-423 proves that there are older sources for ,,perfectibilis," but also dates the concept change described here from the 18th century.

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related to perfectability, thus falling into the temporal perspective of development and reaching beyond the shortcomings in any given being. 99 Thus, education only helps with what the human being loves about himself anyway. Perfectibility is the concept of perfection that derives from the loss of original sin. The ,,realitas sive perfectio" forms of being are abstracted into conditions of possibility (first and foremost: sensitivity and self-reference) and into laws of process - both initially as ,,nature." Accordingly, the anthropology focuses on self-centered perfectibility, which is understood for its part as negativity that is to be negated, as natural negativity that is naturally to be negated. 100 The nature of the human being is reinterpreted from being a broken (deprived) positivity into being an original negativity. As a result, the human being must be de-natured through education, 101 which also can happen in a natural manner. Nature is negativity and negation of negativity at the same time. Nature is something that is not determined, ,,and this negative distinction is the source of all other completeness. "102 With these rearrangements, the blocking differential (Sperrdifferential) of real perfection loses the function of limiting change. The needed limitations must and can be gained anew now based on particular reference problems and functions. Against this background, the perfection or completion of human beings can be proclaimed as a guiding formula for the differentiation of the system of education (from other systems). Completeness means, at least among philanthropists: proportional development of all talents of the human being. It is a principle that means blissful happiness on earth and forever. Bliss is the state in which completeness be99

Jean Blonde], Des hommes tels qu 'ifs son/ el doivenl etre, London/Paris 1758, p. 166 calls this, under the heading ,,Developpement": ,,C'est l'amour propre qui, en avertissant l'homme de sa perfectibilite, a donne, pour ainsi dire, une nouvelle vie I'univers." At least according to Rousseau. Cf. Jean Mosconi, ,,Analyse et genese: regards sur la theorie du devenir de l'entendement," Cahiers pour /'analyse no. 4, 1966, p. 62, 4782. ,,Les bonnes institutions sociales" says Rousseau in Emile, ,,sont celles qui savent le mieux denaturer I' homme" (quoted from CEuvres completes, ed. de la Pleiade, Paris 1969, p. 249). For Rousseau himself, even reflection is developed as a negation of negativity- ,j'ose presque assurer, que l'etat de reflexion est un etat contre nature et que l'homme qui medite est un animal deprave" (,,Discours sur l'origine de l'inegalite ... ," in CEuvres completes, ed. de la Pleiade, vol. III, Paris 1964, p. 138)a thesis that found much opposition in his time. According to Trapp, Versuch einer Ptidagogik.

a

I 00

IOI

102

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comes a pleasure in itself, in which it has become a ,,comfortable feeling," and education is the business that brings it about. No other one can be more important. 103 In this way, the perfection formula hypostatizes education as the business of developing human beings - and it does this because it does not yet designate a structure that is differentiated (from other structures) and that is sensitized to specific things, but otherwise indifferent. The progression of the completion of the human race remains a general formula relating to the larger society and all of its institutions, but it is also a formula that strongly suggests using educational institutions and methods in this pursuit. 104 With this formula, the system of education gains the meaning of its own contribution and its relevance to the society. Yet, neither in the concept ,,perfection" nor in the concept ,,society" was there anything that caused them to focus on the question of whether the perfection of people causes the perfection of society or vice versa. 105 The differentiation (from other systems), which is aimed for, first appears only in the delimitations of the contingency formula - for example, in the thesis that the goal of instruction is not truth (and it certainly is not: redemption from original sin), but rather bliss. 106 The formula itself still lies fully on the level of an achievable end. Probably not the next, but the third or fourth generation could become blissful through education. It is Kant who will first to make the needed distinction available between operative ends and regulative ideas, 107 and corresponding to that is an expansion of the future horizon I 03

I 04

I 05

I 06 107

Paraphrased from Trapp, Ver such einer Padagogik, pp. 3ff., 7f. Cf. also Karl Schrader, Die Erziehungstheorie des Philanthropismus (Versuch eines Systems), Langensalza 1928, in particular p. 1Off. Cf. for example Condorcet, ,,Bericht Ober die allgemeine Organisation des offentlichen Unterrichtswesens," in Erziehungsprogramme der Franzosischen Revolution, ed. Robert Alt, Berlin/Leipzig 1949, pp. 61-117, in particular 63. Also see Kathe Rau hut, Die padagogischen Theorien der Franzosischen Revolution, Halle 1934. The exception is Rousseau, who can be considered atypical in this matter. More typical is a sentence such as: ,,There is no truer and more sublime thought than that the world is the most complete whole, in which the greatest possible completion and bliss of every individual member creates the greatest completion of the whole." Stuve, ,,Allgemeine Grundsatze der Erziehung, hergeleitet aus einer richtigen Kenntnis des Mense hen," p. 323, 233-382. Trapp, Ver such einer Padagogik, p. 141 f. To our knowledge, the first person to take over the differentiation between ends and final ends in pedagogy was Johann Christoph Greiling, Ober den Endzweck der Erziehung und iiber den ersten Grundsatz einer Wissenschaft derselben, Schneeberg 1793. Also see Johann H. G. Heusinger, Versuch eines lehrbuchs der Erziehung-

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and a critique by pedagogues who argue in a Kantian manner of the immediately hopeful ,,improvement craziness (Verbesserungswahn)." 108 The methods appear to be accordingly overtaxed. First attempts at an instruction technology are made. 109 Most importantly, however, that which is specifically pedagogical about the proceedings, in so far as it is even investigated theoretically, is understood as (either a passive-assisting or active-instrumentalizing) taking advantage of self-love for higher ends. Because the natural egoism alone does not lead to moral completion, Pedagogy has to help it out. That requires preparation, and for that reason, ,,education [must be] practiced as its own art by its own people.''1 10 At the same time, this insufficiency of natural self-education explains the societal need for education, which the pedagogue can refer to when he makes demands or when he has to justify himself. But it is unclear as to how this notion could be applied in instruction. 111 The contingency formula ,,perfection" neither requires, nor can deal with, a technically problematic awareness of method; such an awareness would destroy it. Every time one speaks about perfection or completion (Vo/lendung or Vervollkommnung), these concepts will always transport aspects of the tradition, no matter how well established a new foundation is. The beginning of pedagogical reflection does not require a transition-less new start. If that which is new should want to lead to a universal inclusion of all in one function system, then it must always include that which is old. In spite of the increasing rejection of spirituality as the carrier of the education process, a rejection that went as far as the Jesuit ban, the relevance of religion (at least for the education of the under classes) is acknowledged. Perfection cannot be attained through education alone, concedes Morelly, skunst: £in leitfaden zu akademischen Vorlesungen, Leipzig 1795, p. VI: ,.The end or the destiny of human beings cannot be recognized from experience, but a priori." In place of bliss as a natural end comes the ,,aspiration for the worthiness of being blissful." Cf. also on the larger context of Kant reception, Max Jahn, Der EinjlujJ der

l 08 109 110 111

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kantischen Psychologie auf die Padagogik als Wissenschaft: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der neueren philosophischen Ptidagogik, Leipzig 1885. See Heusinger, Versuch eines lehrbuchs der Erziehungskunst: £in leitfaden zu akademischen Vorlesungen, p. X!Vf. Cf. below the first pages of part II, chapter IV. Trapp, Ver such einer Pddagogik, p. 8. One cannot even see it, when this method is formulated in a context of education policy, such as in Friedrich Gabriel Resewitz, Die Erziehung des Burgers zum Gebrauch des gesunden Verslandes und zur gemeinmilzigen Geschtiftigkeil, 2nd ed., Copenhagen I 776, in particular p. 37ff.

it is, in the last analysis, an issue ofreligion. 112 ,,The instruction in religion remains the most important part of school," claims Friedrich Samuel Bock in 1780. 113 Authors of the Revision Work 114 see the educator as a ,,colleague of God" and consider his effects to hold etemally. 115 That is more than an occasional mention of the ,,bonte de Dieu" that is unnecessary to the construction. The perfection formula does not exclude religion - it includes it, and not only as one subject among others, but rather in the very place where one today would say: the society cannot be changed through education alone. In the second half of the 18th century, however, along with the conceptual adjustment from perfection to perfectibility, comes the formulation of the impossibility of reaching an end and an opening for continuously new ways of perfecting. 116 With that, religion disappears quickly from the list of means of perfecting. 117 That, which perfection claims as the harmony of its unity, now appears not to be determined; 118 and finally, perfection itself disappears (because the concept cannot specify its relation to reality). 119 The only final point remaining is I I2 I 13 114 I 15

116

117

118 119

Morelly, Essai sur le cCEur lwmain, ou principes naturels de /'education, Paris 1745, reprinted Genf 1970, pp. 29, 4 If. Friedrich Samuel Bock, Lehrbuch der Erziehungskunst zum Gebrauchfiir christliche Eltern und kiinftige Junglehrer, Konigsberg/Leipzig 1780, p. 182. Allgemeine Revision, vols. I-XVI, 1785-1792. Trapp, Versuch einer Padagogik, p. 5, postulates, for example, that the following is an insight with which every rational person would agree: ,,the more educated and completed we are here, the more happy we will be in eternity." See the explicit contrasting by William Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness, London 1793, Book I, chapter 5, quoted from the abridged version Oxford 1971, p. 58f.: ,,The term perfectible ... not only does not imply the capacity of being brought to perfection, but stands in express opposition to it. If we could arrive at perfection, there would be an end to our improvement. There is however one thing of great importance that it does imply: every perfection or excellence that human beings are competent to conceive, human beings, unless in cases that are palpably and unequivocally excluded by the structure of their frame, are competent to attain." William Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness, Book l, Chapter IV., London 1793, limits himself to the suggestions of literature (in the sense of oral and written discussion), education, and political acceptance of truth and morals. Greiling, for example, claims this: Ober den Endzweck der Erziehung und iiber den ersten Grundsatz einer Wissenschaft derselben, p. 26f. Cf. Hegel's critique of Anselm's proof of God (and at the same time, the answer that Spinoza found: realitas sive perfectio) in the ,,Vorlesungen ilber die Philosophie der Religion," part II, in Werke, Frankfurt a.M. 1969, p. 216.

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blissfulness: in the observance and enjoyment of its own perfection. The perfection is completed as the reflection of the self in the subject. Similar to religion, family education retains its importance in the perfection formula. Reflection follows differentiation (of the system from others) in this way as well. Until after the middle of the 18th century, almost all literature about family education is moralizing literature, which condemns gallantry and pedantry, coddling and unnecessary harshness, but does not come up with positive suggestions. 120 This, at any rate, opens up paths for Pedagogy and increases receptivity. It is only after school education (that is differentiated from other systems) moves into the center of attention as the focus of all progress, that family education can be rethought in reference to school. The guiding concepts of this movement must also be comprehensive concepts. That is no surprise in a society in which a quarter of all children in the upper classes are still educated in the house by a house teacher (or tutor) and in which school is considered worthy of disdain in comparison to the parental home. 121 In the view of the day, family and school education should be handled as two equal possibilities; at first as alternatives and then, starting in the middle of the century, increasingly as successive phases in the education process, both of which were to be supervised by Pedagogy. 122 It follows that all education educates educators; because not all those who are educated will become teachers, but most will become fathers or mothers. Seen like this, educating to educate is a universal reflexive process. Every education forms educators. It is for this reason alone that one could believe that the society could realize increasingly high forms of humanity through the education of educators (whereas today, the reverse is believed: family socialization is dealt with as more of a restriction and limitation to perfecting humans due to its dependence on class). If humane perfection remains bound to religion, then the reflexivity of the education process remains bound to the family. The religion system and the family system are the ,,domains of origin" of the differentiation of 120

121 122

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Cf. Curt Gebauer, .,Studien zur Geschichte der biirgerlichen Sittenreform des 18. Jahrhunderts: Die Reform der hauslichen Erziehung," Archiv fur Kulturgeschichte 20, 1930, pp. 36-57. Cf. references by Gustav Stephan, Die hiiusliche Erziehung in Deutsch/and wiihrend des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, Wiesbaden 1891, p. 152ff. Representative of this view: Friedrich Samuel Bock, Lehrbuch der Erziehungskunst zum Gebrauchfiir christliche £/tern und kiinftige Jung/ehrer, 1780; August Hermann Niemeyer, Griindsiitze der Erzeihung und des Unterrichts, Halle 1796.

an autonomous system of education (from other systems); the ties to them cannot be broken abruptly if the differentiation ( of that system from others) gears itself to the function and strives to attain universal validity throughout the society for that function and include the larger population in it. The internal reason of perfection does not need to be contrasted to familial or religious values, nor to nature and morals, to reveal itself. The logic of perfection does not have its counterpart in imperfection either, which suggests itself, but rather in the logic of scarcity. The fact that resources cannot be increased (no matter how relative and short-termed), which is the condition for all rational calculation with constant sums, is its principle opponent. Roughly parallel to the developments described above, however, scarcity becomes the contingency formula of economics, and, as scarcity of money, it wins function-specific universality. 123 The fact that Pedagogy symbolizes its ,,take-off' with the idea of humane perfection, is what places it in sharp contrast to economics. A consensus is growing today that industrial development, particularly in England, started up in large part independent of the new preliminary work of the system of education. 124 The ,,industrial revolution" did not require the school revolution; instead it pulled it after itself. Without paying attention to the issue of whether pressure was exerted from the side of the economy, 125 Pedagogy, or at least school planning, reflects that there is such a need. 126 That brings it - specifically, the system's own assessment of the environment - into conflict with its own contingency formula. With that, the system of education's orientations on function and on performance begin to diverge. Whereas the function is conceived of 123 124

125

Part of this syndrom ·-- but we cannot go into this in more detail here - is that no other system except economics can manage to gain a genuine understanding of scarcity. See Sidney Pollard, ,.Die Bildung und Ausbildung der industriellen Klassen Britanniens im 18. Jahrhundert," in Gesellschaft in der industriellen Revolution, ed. Rudolf Braun et al., Cologne 1973, pp. 147-16[. For this issue handled in an early time period and within regional borders, see William Boyd, Education in Ayrshire Through Seven Centuries, London 1961, p. 74ff.; also Alexander Law, Education in Edinburgh in the Eighteenth Century, London 1965; Donald Withrington, ,.Education and Society in the Eighteenth Century," in

Scotland in the Age of Improvement: Essays in Scottish History .in the Eighteenth Century, ed. N. T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchinson, Edinburgh 1970, pp. 169-

126

199. The investigations in Scotland are especially revealing for our question because it lacks a mercantalist economic policy, which distorts the orientation through central political negotiation, and because the system of education was being built up energetically, very much as it was in England. Cf. August Gans, Das okonomische Motiv in der preufiischen Piidagogik des /8. Jahrhunderts, Halle 1930.

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through the contingency formula of humane perfection, it is thought that the economic society's performance expectations are governed by division of labor and by scarcity. One has to work - and in an economy determined by the money mechanism, one has to work independent of demand, one has to work always and eagerly and rationally, because money is scarce independent of need. Philanthropy sees the ,,natural education process" in the money economy, in comparison to which the differentiated (from other systems) education in schools is full of problems and disadvantages.127 Under the given conditions of an economic system with divided labor and class-based differentiation, however, work does not lead to the completion of human beings, and we can confidently add today: not-working (= unemployment) does not either. To the degree that the economy gains its rational ability to perform in system-like differentiation (from other systems), it also gives up on the goal - pinned on it from outside - of the self-realization of human beings. The Pedagogy of the time reacts to the problem situation that results on both of the levels of reflection. The problem is dealt with directly through the industry school movement. Schools are founded, which do not only teach how to do work, but also do work at the same time, and which support themselves economically or even attempt to earn money_l2 8 The hope thereby is to be able to bring the benefits of ,,natural education" back into educational institutions that are differentiated (from other institutions). In the language of Systems Theory, that meant locating the overlapping domain, in which one learns and produces at the same time, within organizations of the system of education and not the economic system. The attempt failed. 129 The ability of the economic motif to mould behavior (maybe one can also say: the lead that economics had in getting things to work for it) 127

128

129

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Cf. Trapp, Versuch einer Padagogik, p. 151 f.: ,,Die Grundverfassung der natiirlichen Erziehung besteht darin, daB der Zogling sich seinen Unterhalt selbst verdiene. Solange dies nicht geschieht, scheint mir eine Quelle unzahliger Obel in den Erziehungsanstalten und im menschlichen Leben nicht verstopft und viele Schwierigkeiten bei der Erziehung nicht behoben werden zu kbnnen." Cf. Kurt lven, Die lndustrie-Padagogik des 18. Jahrhunderts: Eine Untersuchung uber die Bedeutung des wirtschaftlichen Verha/Jens fur die Erziehung, Berlin 1929; Bruno Bendokat, Jndustriepadagogik bei den Phi/anthropen and bei Pesta/ozzi, Halle 1934; Achim Leschinsky and Peter Martin Roeder, Schute im hislorischen Proze/3: Zum Wechselverhti/tnis von institulione//er Erziehung und gesellschaft/icher Enhvicklung, Stuttgart 1976, p. 283ff. The criticism already swells up in the 1890s. See Christian Daniel Vosz, Versuch iiber die Erziehung fur den Staal, als Bedurfnif] unsrer Zeil, zur Beforderung des Bargeni•ohls und der Regenten-Sicherheit, Halle 1799, vol. [, p. 280ff., vol. ll, p. 364ff.

proved itself to be stronger. After this experience, it was more likely to entrust economics with educational performance than to allow school to be degenerated into a factory. In addition to this attempt to take pedagogical responsibility for performance in the system of education that barely corresponds to the reflection of its function, there is also the reflection of precisely this problem. It becomes clear very quickly that the performance-motivated respecification of the contingency formula comes into conflict with itself. The problem is understood as the contradiction between the completeness and the usefulness of human beings. 130 With that, the concept ,,completeness" loses its place as the number one principle; because completeness must still be negotiated with usefulness and, besides that, in order for it to become blissfulness, it has to be felt and reflected. 131 A disintegration of the contingency formula, in which function (completeness), performance (usefulness), and reflection (blissfulness) go separate ways, so that it is 130

131

See Peter Villaume, ,.Ob und inwiefem bei der Erziehung die Vollkommenheit des einzelnen Menschen seiner Brauchbarkeit aufzuopfem sey," in Allgemeine Revision, vol. Ill, 1785, pp. 435-616. Soon after, it becomes common to distinguish between education of human beings as human beings and education of human beings as citizens (in other words, human beings in particular societal circumstances) - see for example Johann Christoph Greiling, Ueber den Endziveck der Erziehung, und uber den erslen Grundsalz einer Wissenschafl derselben, Schneeberg 1793, p. 44ff.; Heinrich Stephani, Grundri)J der S/aatserzeihungswissenschafl, Weil3enfels/Leipzig 1797, p. 99ff.; Friedrich Wilhelm Lehne, Handbuch der Padagogik nach einem systematischen Entwurfe, vol. I, Gottingen 1799, pp. 38ff., 54f. That happens, however, among authors who appeal to Kant, and it happens in a way that no longer does ,Justice to the system" and is justly criticised - see Johann Heinrich Gottlieb Heusinger, Bey/rag zur Berichligung einiger BegriJJe uber Erziehung und Erziehungskunsl, Halle 1794, p. 19f. According to the new philosophy, the relation to society must be resolved in moral improvement - that means that it has to be left out as a particular educational goal. In spite of this, the distinction between human being and citizen does not disappear. Heinrich Stephani, System der offentlichen Erziehung, Berlin 1805, p. 95ff., uses this distinction, in spite of all the criticism, if only (played down) for the purpose of dividing and more closely determining the material to be used in educational (p. 96, note). Similarly toned down: the education to become a citizen is a simple extension of the education to become a human being - Karl Heinrich Ludwig Politz, Die Erziehungswissenschafl, aus dem Zwecke der Menschheit und des Staates practisch dargestellt, Leipzig 1806, part I, pp. 7, 307ff. Further, Herwig Blankerz, Berufsbildzmg und Utilitarismus, Dusseldorf 1963, p. 46ff. To this limitation, which became popular in the period ofphilanthropism and is then held up anew in the new humantistic concept for all-around education (Bildungsbegrif/}, see Kurt Grube, Die ]dee und S/ruktur einer rein-menschlichen Bi/dung: £in Beitrag zum Philanthropismus und Neuhumanismus, Halle 1934, p. 72ff.

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only possible to formulate their connection by using relations, necessitates in theory and in practice a new formulation of Pedagogy. Theoretical solutions are not in sight at first. Authors of all shades are confronted with the problem completeness/usefulness or human being/citizen - a sign that what has come up is a structure problem, which can no longer be ignored. Suggestions for practical solutions can be found in the Revision Work in two different forms: through sequencing and through selection. One can clear up the contradiction through a succession, namely: first concern oneself with human completeness and then, when time presses, stop that and concentrate on usefulness. 132 Selection, on the other hand, is understood to be a way of picking who will rise in the society, in the assumption that one has better chances of reaching human completeness when one is of a higher estate. 133 On one hand, it is the unsolved theory problems that bring the ,,pragmatism" and the salvation-through-bliss of the enlightenment-based Pedagogy into disrepute. In the meantime, the re-specification problem shifts itself without attracting much attention. The formula ,,humane perfection" had been created in the belief that it was possible to use nature and morals in a given way. Humane perfection was supposed to be a moral completion of human nature. Both nature and morals symbolize structures that hold society-wide and, in this way, as working symbols they correlate with the differentiation of function systems (from other systems), which has an even longer way to go. The postulate of ,,natural all-around education (Bi/dung)," however, becomes questionable in the face of an increasing specification of pedagogical endeavors and interests. 134 With advancing differentiation (from other systems) and functional specification in the system of education's schools, the re-specification shifts to focus instead on the perspective of performance. With the selection of a subject canon 132

133

134

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This is similar to: first general all-around education (Bitdung), then special all-around education (Bitdung) - Heinrich Stephani, System der ojfentlichen Erziehung, Berlin 1805, p. 354. For a contemporary critique cf. Blankertz, Berufsbitdung und Utlitarismus, p. 115; Gunther Dahmen, Bitdung und Schute: Die Entstehung des deutschen Bildungsbegriffs und die Entwicktung seines Verhattnisses zur Schute, vol. II, Weinheim 1965, p. 162f. Vi11aume, ,,Ob und inwiefem bei der Erziehung die Vo11kommenheit des einzelnen Menschen seiner Brauchbarkeit aufzuopfem sey," p. 526, says for example: ,,Er [that means: the educator] mul'J seinen Zogling nicht vollkommener machen, als es sein Stand erlaubt; aul'Jer, wenn er sieht, da/3 dessen Krlifte ihn offenbar zu einem anderen Stancle bestimmen." See Dohmen, Bitdung und Schute: Die Enlstehung des deutschen Bitdungsbegriffs und die Entwicktung seines Verhattnisses zur Schute, vol. II, p. 146ff.

and the establishment of learning goals and curriculi, it becomes necessary to make decisions that can best be articulated by anticipating a need. 135 In relation to the function and reflection of education, education's performance with regard to other subsystems of society would then have to take over the re-specification function. Statements about function and reflection remain too general and they overwhelm every hermeneutic, which interprets them. On the other hand, for obvious reasons, it seems at first foreign to Pedagogy to qualify itself against economics, occupation, and work. 136 For this reason, Pedagogy does not seek the solution to the problem in a different balancing of the system references of function, performance, and reflection, but rather, it looks to another contingency formula, all-around education (Bi/dung), and also in dependence on another overlapping domain, economics. The problem of division of labor is ignored at first, as is the problem of scarcity. It was one century later that Emile Durkheim 137 points out that there is no path to completeness that avoids the division of labor and reformulates the problem of morals as one that results from the problem of solidarity. But this is already the field of sociology.

XI. All-around education (Bi/dung) Around 1800, one could not yet seek the solution to the refection problems, which had been opened up, in a social theory. The place that such a theory would have taken was already occupied with the reflection of mor135

136

I 37

It must, of course, be mentioned that there was an attempt at the same time to search for alternatives in the ,,new humanistic" tum to the ancient world. But, in a period that thought historically, the price was too high: the apodictic and unprovable claim of the worth of education in antiquity. The state of affairs was different during ancient times. Under the premise of a stratisfied society (see part I, the middle of chapter II above), the question remained controversial as to whether knowledge as ,,philosophy" had an intrinsic worth for education or whether rhetoric, which sought practical successes, earned to be prefered. Cf. for example Aubrey Gwynn, Roman Education from Cicero lo Quintilian, reprinted New York I 964, p. 46ff. The new humanistic critique of philanthropy supports this at first in order to free itself from every orientation on occupational and performance. See Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, Der Streit des Philanthropinismus und Humanismus in der Theorie des Erziehungsunterric/1/s unserer Zeil, Jena 1808, for example p. 25. Emile Durkheim, De la division du travail social, reprinted Paris 1973, in particular p. 4f., and in regards to general all-around education (Allgemeinbildung), which he thinks is only possible in a superficial way, p. 364f.

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als. For the newly fonning societal system, an economic conception came up to re_lieve the political one - it was not able to replace the political, but could exist by its side. That leads to the formula ,,state and society," which, as a final formula for what was socially relevant, did not give special recognition to education. 138 Even the ,,criticism of political economy" does not criticize this double paradigm as such, but instead strengthens it through criticism until it becomes a part of the tradition, the effects of which can still be felt today. In this situation, the system of education does not find any way to link up with a social theory, but it does find an increasingly effective organization potential within the state, with whose help it is possible to move along the process of differentiating the school and university domains (from other domains). That creates incentives to short-circuit reflection and organization, philosophy and administration - incentives, which gains plausibility as academics are recruited into administrative positions. These new formations are expressed and find legitimacy in the concept ,,allaround education (Bi/dung). " But is the new meaning, which fills a concept that has been used since the middle of the 18th century, merely caused by the altered situation, or does the new meaning also manage to change the semantic content or even offer a more plausible answer to the unsolved reflection problem? The continuities cannot to be ignored. Focusing on the human being as self-referential subject, contrasting the inside and outside, the concept of form and the understanding of education as the fashioning of ,,inner form" - all of that had already been formulated before as material for explaining humane perfection. 139 Taken together, self-reference and form had forced the insight that ,,educational instruction" should foster the ,,selfoccupation" (,, Selbsttdtigkeit ') of those to be educated, 140 that it is there138

139

140

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Cf. Adalbert von Unruh, Dogmenhistorische Untersuchung uber den Gegensalz von Staal und Gese/lschaft vor Hegel, Leipzig 1928; Erich Angermann, ,,Das Auseinandertreten von Staat und Gesellschaft im Denken des_ 18. Jahrhunderts," Zeilschrift fur Politik 10, 1963, pp. 89-101; Manfred Riedel, ,,Gesellschaft, burgerliche," in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutsch/and, vol. II, Stuttgart 1975, pp. 719-800. Cf. on this subject in great detail. Dohmen,.Bildung und Schule: Die Entstehung.des deutschen Bildungsbegriffs und die Entwicklung seines Verhtiltnisses zur Schu/e. For a shorter overview cf. also Clemens Menze, ,,Bildung," in Handbuch ptidagogischer Grundbegrijfe, vol. I, Munich 1970, pp. 134-184; Rudolf Vierhaus, ,,Bildung," in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches lexikon zur po/itisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutsch/and, vol. I, Stuttgart 1972, pp. 508-551. See Stuve, ,,Allgemeine Grundsatze der Erziehung, hergeleitet aus einer richtigen Kenntnis des Menschen," p. 347ff.

fore dependent on the cooperation of those who are educating themselves, and that the pedagogical business is all about stimulating this cooperation. Accordingly, inner form is a result of the collaboration of external and internal powers. With these assumptions, one can easily construct the idea of all-around education (Bi/dung) as a form of the inner relationship to the world. Nevertheless, primarily in connection with Kantian philosophy, 141 a major change in the fundamental relationship between education and morals takes place. The theory that morality rests on education is replaced with the theory that education rests on morality. 142 The Kantian a priori morals seem to offer a secure basis for a reformulation of the ends (purpose) of education - a basis, which abstracts from all self-interest, all pleasant feelings, and all calculations of consequences and which therefore also gives up blissfulness as a principle of reflection. 143 This reversal demands the creation of a new, non-empirical, philosophical theory of allaround education (Bi/dung), which at first - and we will go into this in the second part of our investigations - leads away from the alreadyformulated problems of affecting effects in the educational process in a way that can be technologically controlled. Also new, when considered formally, is that the transcending of the level of reachable (and thus also potentially non-reachable) ends by giving regulative ideas a priori status. With that, humanism is brought out of the dangerous zone of the refutable, in which it had slipped due to the breaking apart of theological fundamentals. What is also new in regards to the content is the intensification of various concepts, an effect, which derives from the formula-construction itself or is made possible through its help The intensification affects the individuality and scientific character of allaround education (Bi/dung). In the ,,theory of all-around education," which Humboldt aims at, two tendencies come together: one that leads towards a science of science, which would bind together the quickly diversifying knowledge and subjects (and in this way could form the basis of a ,,university"), and the other 141 142

143

Cf. on the Kant reception footnote 98. On the parallel development in the revolutionary understanding of perfectibility, see footnote 107. On this topic in particular: Jonathan Schuderoff, Briefe iiber Mora/ische Erzeihung in Hinsicht auf die neueste Phi/osophie, Leipzig 1792, in particular p. 73ff.; Johann Christoph Greiling, Ober den Endzweck der Erziehung und iiber den ers/en Grundsatz einer Wissenschaft derselben, Schneeberg 1793, p. 11 ff.; Anonymous, ,,Ober moralische Erziehung," Arch iv der Erziehungskunde far Deutsch/and 4, 1794, pp. 1-38. See above, a few pages into chapter X for further comments.

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that heads towards the subject status of the object of education. The individual human being, in so far as he educates himself, is thus declared to be precisely the point of view, from which the theory of education (Theorie der Bildung) claims to be a science of science - this is an alternative to transcendental-philosophical reflection and not primarily Pedagogy. The way in which individuality and science is understood, forces the refommlation of the contingency formula onto a level of greater generalization. One now assumes that human beings are born as individuals (no longer as beings that are naturally indifferent), and one sees that it is possible to explain the educatibility of human beings precisely through that assumption (and not through an abstract, unchanging ,,nature"). As a result, education is no longer understood as the constitution of individuality, but rather as the idealization of it: as leading to a function for that representation of that which is general. Besides, from the perspective of the education process, there is no sensible way of deciding whether the relation to science should entail the human sciences or the real sciences and of awarding one science more value for all-around education (Bildungswert) than the other. Therefore, a science concept must be postulated that overcomes this disagreement and makes education independent of the scheme of subject differentiation within the sciences. That is possible through a reformulation of the idea of the university - which is not definitive for the theory of science, but sufficient to model the relation to everything that is known (as a cultural good) on the relation to human beings - in other words, to model it on understanding. The individual as well as science are seen in this ,,theory of general education" as the carriers of a relationship to the world, which justify themselves in the reflection of this very relationship. That makes it possible to apply a formula relating to the world - namely ,,harmony" - to the individual. 144 The notion of harmony is perfectly suited to be a contingency formula, because it resolves the contingency of a totality by negating the contingencies of the totality. The non-necessity of the whole is balanced through inner necessity. 145 This notion, which is derived from 144

145

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It should be admitted that were also earlier formulations. The idea does not appear for the first time among new humanistic authors, nor in connection with an internalized concept of world; instead it is developed independent of that as a stabilization formula for self-enjoyment. See Abbe Joanne!, De la connoissance de /'homme, dans son etre et dans ses rapports, Paris 1775, vol. I, p. LIVf. Cf. Husserl's sketch ,.Ober die Moglichkeit der Nichtexistenz der Welt" - supplement XI to: Erste Philosophie, vol. 2, Husserliana, vol. VIII, the Hague I 959, p.

artwork and tried out in the world, is applied to the individual, thus continuing and pushing even farther the earlier call for the proportional development of all talents. The idea of science is reformulated accordingly: from knowledge that was ensured through collecting, examining, and ordering, comes a system of knowledge that can be justified through a principle. 146 Individuality and that which is scientific both converge in the idea of all-around education (Bi/dung). All-around education (now secured as a concept (Bi/dung)) makes attributions possible in two directions: allaround education is ascribed to the individual, the scientific is ascribed to all-around education. The contingency formula is replaced as mediator between attribution processes, which bring individuality and the scientific together. 147 In this, individuality is thought of as being able to accumulate processes of cognition of world. It develops itself in relation to that which is general. Thus, it is no longer possible to base the categorization of those to be educated within the estate structure on a reference to individuality (in the sense of individual fate!). 148 According to the [concept of] individual, the world is open to the human being. According to science, he can

146

147

I 48

391 f. Husserl examines the possibility of the non-existence (contingence) of the world in (I) the possibility that the harmonious structure of the perception of the world disintegrates, and (2) the possibility that this world, and any world at all, is a ,,nothing." The correlation between both allows one to conclude that there are pressures to continue in one's experience of world and thus, to conclude that there is limitationality; but Husserl does not understood it as a rule sor substituting necessities for contingencies. On the application of the idea of harmony from the individual to science, see Wilhelm von Humboldt, ,,Formulierung im litauischen Schulplan," in Werke, vol IV, p. 190: ,,Denn im Gemilth und in der Wissenschaft (die nur sein von alien Seiten vollstiindig gedachtes Object ist) steht jeder einzelne Punkt mit alien vorigen und kilnftigen in Contact, ist kein Anfang und kein Ende, ist alles Mittel und Zweck zugleich ... " The place, which the concept of division of labor takes on as mediator between individuality and society in the writings of Durkheim, can be considered parallel to this, Emile Durkheim, De la division du travail social, Paris 1893. Also see Durkheim, le9ons de Sociologie: Physique des mC£urs et du droit, Paris I 950, p. 68ff., see in particular the criticism of the idea that individuality something that comes from the individual's own reflection. If individuality no longer depends on all-around education (Bi/dung), but rather on division of labor, then it becomes possible to think of it as something independent of class and to analyze the pedagogical tradition around it sociologically. According to Stuve, ,,Allgemeine Grundsatze der Erziehung, hergeleitet aus einer richtigen Kenntnis des Menschen," p. 261.

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realize this relation to world. The role that school or university plays in this conclusion can be regulated by emphasizing either individuality or that which is scientific in the execution of the concept - and doing this without forgetting the larger connection, in which the concept functions as a contingency formula. But can one learn to be an individual? And can one learn that which is general? How does the contingency formula relate to the process of learning and to the technique and didactic of instruction? These are the questions that the formula ,,all-around education (Bi/dung)" uses to respecify itself. 149 Schelling writes with regard to a learning process that was entirely determined by doctrine (at the universities): ,, ... only that which is particular can be learned, and [inherent] in the quality of having learned, everything is only a particular." 150 (That sounds, by the way, like mourning over the fact that a requirement of the production process is that capital be invested and no longer be liquid.) But the consequence drawn by Schelling does not approach a reflexive learning about learning, 151 but instead is summed up in a selection rule meant for the individual (!): ,,Learn so that you can work yourself." 152 With this sort of a formulation of the contingency problem, it is possible to focus on the domain of performance as being the life of the individual in the world - in Schleiermacher's pedagogical lectures, for instance, the domain of performance is life that has the fundamental condition of an opposition between rule and freedom. 153 The primary gain in this is a new distance to the problem of the usefulness of education. Usefulness does not need to be understood as being in contradiction to all-around education (Bi/dung), and it certainly does not need to be denied as a goal; for an educated individual who knows how to cope with the world, it goes with149 150 151 152 153

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This is worked through in the relationist concept of Johann Jakob Wagner, Philosophie der Erzielnmgskunst, Leipzig 1803. F. W. J. Schelling, Vorlesungen iiber die Methode des akademischen S1udiums, Hamburg 1974, p. 37. Although this thought does tum up among his contemporaries. Cf. references in footnote 167. Ibid., p. 35. The process of education, then, is understood in the lectures as a procedure that leads this opposilion into a next to one another and with one anolher of freedom-related views and rule-related skills. See ,,Theorie der Erziehung" in Friedrich E. D. Schleiermacher, Ar,sgewah/Je padagogische Schriften, ed. Ernst Lichtenstein, 2nd ed., Paderbom 1964, pp. 36-243. This is an attempt to respecify the function of education, but its handling of performance is hardly adequate.

out saying. 154 With a concept such as ,,world," the relation of education to reality and, above all to society, becomes highly aggregated. The abstractness and, if one can call it such, the social transcendentalism of the concepts ,,world" and ,,individual" make further reflection superfluous and also certify the non-productivity of such reflection; because on the basis of individuality, the relationships to the world exist in an infinite number of variations and it is precisely that, which individualizes the individual. A further aspect of this semantic transformation is the acceptance of work as the ,,self-occupation" (,,Selbstttitigkeit") within the subject. That breaks apart the old opposition between all-around education (Bi/dung) (as leisure) and work (although this is nol yet quite clear for Humboldt). A new opposition is created in its place, namely the one between all-around education (Bi/dung) and alienation. It contrasts various chances of selfactualization existent in the relationship between the individual and the world. Soon hereafter, Marx will break this circle through an analysis of society and with the concept ,,alienation from the self," and that makes it possible to think that those who are educated and those who are alienated have a different, even an opposite, relationship to society - one that corresponds to an opposite class situation in a two class system. It is only after all this was said, that Pedagogy takes up the idea of allaround education (Bi/dung) in a sort of second and more widespread reception. But, what is the basis of the secure trust in ,,escape formulas" such as world and individuality, which transcend every social issue and even every structure that can be negated? The ,,political-economic criticism" of the all-around education tradition (Bildungstradition) had to give the answer: on the ownership of capital anq (perhaps more indirectly) on the political rule of the bourgeoisie. This explanation remains burdened with the difficulty of justifying the particular relevance of the economic and political complexes for our problem. It would also have had to explain why this contingency formula ,,all-around education (Bi/dung)" was developed in Prussia rather than in England. Without meaning to dispute the interdependencies in the framework of the general processes of functional societal differentiation - and that holds especially for the training of a strongly generalized trust in specific media codes such as political power, money, love, and truth - we 154

We are not considering the extreme position of Humboldt here, who wanted to reserve the preparation for life for the ,,special schools" (., speciellen Schulen "), and who sees that as mere ,,training" (.,Abrichtung"), which ruins the heads of those who are meant for all-around education (Bi/dung). (Quotes taken from the ,,Kiinigsberger Schulplan.")

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see our special problem in a more narrow context. The semantic of allaround education (Bi/dung) itself refers to science. For that reason, we suspect that change of contingency formulas from perfection to allaround education (Bi/dung) is connected to a substitution of overlapping domains, upon which the Pedagogy's acts of reflection are primarily dependent. While the Pedagogy that was steered by the notion of perfection emerged from a literature that assumed the existence of family education, that turned to the fathers as the responsible figures, and that discussed the relationship between home and school education on this model, 155 the allaround education Pedagogy (Bildungspadagogik) is based on a literature which looks towards the pedagogues themselves (and that looks towards the state regarding questions of resources) and that seeks its mode of realization in the school. 156 The school pedagogue, who lacks the parents' natural, diffuse basis of authority, 157 finds a substitution for it in professional competence and in the quality of truth within the themes of instruction. He depends on cognitive topics in structuring the instruction in the class, the accuracy of which must be ascertained in advance. Precisely because pedagogical reflection of school instruction is no longer only concerned with ,,mechanical learning" of knowledge and abilities, but rather with educational instruction, truth becomes the guarantee that learning leads to insightful understanding. Hegel expresses this replacement of the family and the relation of the all-around education idea to instruction(Bildungsidee) clearly, particularly in his High School Speech (Gymnasialrede) in 1811. 158 All-around educa155

156

157

158

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Just see John Locke, Some Thoughts concerning Education, 1690 quoted according to Works, London 1823, reprint Aalen 1963, vol. IX, pp. 1-205; Jean-Pierre de Crousaz, Traite de /'education des enfans, the Hague 1722; or (this intensive critique of the Latin school, where fathers send off their children, is somewhat of a borderline case) Nicolas Gedoyn, ,,De !'education des enfans," in (Iuvres diverses, Paris 1745, pp. 1-52. Heusinger still differs from the Kantian fundamentals in that he still associates allaround education (Bildung) with instruction as mere means of communicating knowledge and emphasizes the education gained from parents instead. See Johann H. G. Heusinger, Beytrag zur Berichtigung einiger Begriffe ziber Erziehung und Erziehungskunst, Halle 1794, and Heusinger, Verusch eines Lehrbuchs der Erziehungskunsl: £in Leitfaden zu akademischen Vorlesungen, Leipzig 1795. Martin Ehlers, Gedanken van den zur Verbesserung der Schulen nolhwendigen Erfordernissen, Altona/Uibeck 1766, p. l 65ff., specifically handles the authority and trust problems that result from this, particularly in respect to how teachers' mistakes stand out more and are less easily excused than those of parents. See Werke, vol. IV, Frankfurt a.M. 1970, p. 344ff. The institutional relation to school is also worked out here in what is almost a sociological analysis. In contrast, the dis-

tion (Bi/dung) can only be achieved through school instruction, because it is this instruction that first manages to break the immediacy of family life and - analogous to work - to establish a state of alienation, which is the condition for establishing a relationship to oneself. 159 With this alienation, cognitive themes gain meaning. By holding onto such themes, the alienated person can find his way back to himself. In this version, the ends of instruction and the focus of the theory is what happens in the heads of each person, and the idea of all-around education (Bi/dung) covers up the socio-structural problems of the interaction system ,,instruction." It suits the structurally-determined needs of the differentiated (from other systems) school institution to model the learning process on the process of cognition. Around 1800, that can only mean: gearing the learning process on the process of scientific research as the prototype of modem cognition. With that, the university, where one learns in the process of research or in its immediate vicinity, becomes the true place of education. The resistance, with which the object world reacts to the research, becomes a trigger of learning - it triggers the insight that cognition is not a random relation to the object, but a separate and unique one. One can, of course, have exactly the same experience when one trades under the condition of scarcity, because scarcity also communicates an experience of structure with a contingent choice as to one's own realization. But school Pedagogy decides on science, not on business, because science provides a better support for instruction. In Schleiermacher's lectures, this situation is described in the form of a distinction between three parts or periods of the educational process. 160 The first period is education within the family. The second combines the influence of the larger community and the development of the individual to greater independence. This takes place in schools and universities and represents the central part of the pedagogical endeavor. The third period happens after the career decision. ,,It is during this last period of education, in which actual pedagogy activity plays only a small part, that the pedagogical relationship finally ceases to exist." 161 We want to emphasize that the peripheral domains of family and job education are already mar-

159

160 16 I

cussion in the Phanomeno/ogie des Geis/es is more closely fitted into the entire theory and do not reveal very much about the social context out of which they come. The sociological version of this - although it simply leaves out the relationship to itself and deals only with the society - is Robert Dreeben, On What is learned in School, Reading, Mass. 1968. Cf. Schleiermacher, ,,Theorie der Erziehung," p. I 94ff. Ibid., p. I 95.

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ginalized, and that science occupies a special place as a ,,preparatory" presence within the school's own educational goals and a realization of this presence within the university. Science has the highest place in allaround education (Bi/dung), and it is also its subject matter. 162 It is not marginalized as an overlapping domain, as the other domains are, but instead it is identified with the route to self-reliance. The consequences are initially drawn via organizations. The schools that ,,educate all-around" {,, a!lgemeinbildenden ") gain their meaning in preparing for university study. At least, it is this function that determines their ranking in the system of education. A second connection can be seen in the politics of personnel. The university education becomes preparation for a teaching career, and the philosophical faculties receive special support as instruments for realizing this concept. Both of these mean in principle: ,,constructing back" from the adult to the child. In contrast to the family-oriented considerations about education in the 18th century, this starting point is at first disconcerting for ,,ped"agogy. Besides, from the all-around education movement special perspective of the (Bildungsbewegung), the elementary schools are shifted to the periphery even though it is especially important for them to have a pedagogical rather than a scientific-topic orientation. In opposition to the contingency formula's unity, which would require a linear sequencing of all school careers according to the ,,intensity of the concept" at each given level, 163 Humboldt splits the school system into elementary instruction and school instruction. 164 Since then, Gymnasien· have affiliated more and more with 162 163 164

*

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Ibid., p. 169. Cf. middle of chapter IX above. Wilhelm von Humboldt, ,.Konigsberger Schulplan," in Werke, vol. IV, 2nd ed., Darmstadt 1969, pp. 168-187, with the notable courage to promise everyone, even the poorest, a complete education even so (p. 175). Note from the translator: the German Gymnasium (plural - Gymnasien) encompasses approximately the same grades as the American High School, plus an additional 13th grade. However, whereas High School is the only option for secondary school in America, the German systems offers several others, all of which are less ,,academic" than the Gymnasium - in order of difficulty levels: Realschule (which goes up to 10th grade) and Hauptschule (which goes up to 9th or 10th grade). The newer Gesamtschule (translated as ,,comprehensive school") houses all of these options under one roof, and was intended to decrease the pressure of early selections. At the conclusion of Gymnasium comes the maturity tests, called Abilur, which is the requirement for entrance into university; hence, the Gymnasium is the university track or the college preparatory school. Requirements for Gymnasium entrance differ historically and geographically, but is loosely based on previous performance.

their own elementary instruction (pre-school classes). Not least of all, the problem of how to work Pedagogy into the departmental divisions of the university and into the subject majors leading to school has not been solved. Similar to the perfection concept, the idea of all-around human education (Menschenbildung) was not a principle limited to school education. The general individual is the intellect who educates himself. The school remains extrinsic for him. The integration within a speculation about the metaphysical subject (no matter how it is constructed) brings along with it the unity of science and all-around education (Bi/dung). It is the abrupt collapse of this speculation that first forces the specification of system functions. The collapse leaves Pedagogy with the idea of all-around education (Bi/dung) metaphysically deserted as a concept that is not covered, and it is only in the last third of the 19th century that all-around education (Bi/dung) wins back a spot of central importance. Nevertheless, the concentration on the individual continues to have a leading place, and, at first, it is considered pedagogically plausible; but the question of the sociologist at this point would be: whether starting from this point it is possible that reflection problems of the social system for education be turned into the focus of discussion and if so, how does this happen. If in a system of education that is now differentiated (from other systems) even more clearly and that is steered by Pedagogy, one holds onto the thesis that the genesis of individuality (or even of humanity) occurs through all-around education (Bi/dung), requires all-around education (Bi/dung), and would fail without all-around education (Bi/dung), then this contingency fornmla functions as the hypostatization of a single function of the society as the basis of all functions. Calling itself the ,,all-around education system" (,,Bildungssystem "), the system of education hypostatizes the society for itself165 (in so far as one does not only use the word ,,all-around education" (,,Bi/dung") in everyday speech, but even thinks about the concept while using it). At the same time, however, there are other competing theories that explain the genesis of individuality, such as Emile Durkheim's sociological theory of division of labor and role differentiation. With that, all-around education (Bi/dung) becomes recognizable 165

Otto Willmann, Didaktik als Bildungslehre - nach ihren Beziehungen zur Socialforschung und zur Geschichte der Bildung, Braunschweig 1882-1889. In the words of Willmann, there does need to be a separation between both disciplines (pedagogy and didactic!), but it has not come to that yet. (Taken from the 5th ed., Braunschweig 1923, p. 49; cf. also Berthold Gerner, Otto Willmann im Alter, Ratingen 1968, p. 266f.)

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as a formula that is specific to the function system, as the perspective of a subsystem, as an ideology that is dependent on a function. That, however, means that this contingency formula is no longer satisfying on the level of reflection of the reflection. It makes the exaggerated nature of its own demands apparent and as well as making its historical distance clear. The simple reflection, but not the reflection of the reflection, can fortify itself in the tradition. Because in this tradition - and this is what protects it - it is impossible to reflect on the reflection. The contingency formula ,,all-around education (Bi/dung)" tried to solve the problems of reflection and autonomy, which came up as the system of education was differentiated (from other systems), by incorporating both into the concept of all-around education (Bi/dung). The self-reference, which guides the education process, is transferred inside the individual. Educated subjects are made autonomous through their reflection of their relation to the world. The education process leads them to this state. It can only do this, however, if it is autonomous itself and if it reflects on its all-around education goals (Bildungsziele). But the result of doing this is only an autonomy that is derived from the individual and not to a reflection of the system of education itself. The performance relations of the system of education are removed from the discussion, and, along with that, the difference between function and performance (previously: between completion and usefulness) also stops being a theme of system reflection. The possibility of distinguishing between all-around education (Bi/dung) and training in the sense of the function and performance of education 166 cannot be realized. In the description of an individual subject, all-around education (Bi/dung) cannot be referred to with the help of a negation of training or vice versa; 167 the separation of all-around education (Bi/dung) and training would contradict the way that the concept of all-around education (Bi/dung) had solved the I 66

167

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See the distinction between both kinds of all-around educations (Bildungen) -- the general and the special one in the Lithuanian School Plan, .,litauischen Schulplan" (Wilhelm von Humboldt, Werke, vol. IV, pp. 187-195) - both educations are not connected by any of the same basic concepts, but are named all-around educations (Bildungen) anyway. Cf. Theodor Litt, Technisches Denken und menschliche Bi/dung, Heidelberg 1957. The fact that the difference between the humanities and natural sciences or technology also plays a role in this question shows once again the dependence of the formula of all-around education (Bi/dung) on science and at the same time, the necessity of freeing pedagogical refleclion from it. The assignment of pedagogy to the humanities departments cannot in itself lead to a simple denial of the educative value of natural science and technology.

reflection problem through its reference to the subject, and for that reason, the separation is given up. The movement comes to an end in a concept of emancipation that is only negative, whose pedagogical sterility needs to be replaced by socially critical politicization. If one pays attention to the fact that ,,individual" and ,,world" are really only used to relate inner and outer endlessness, then one stands yet again before the question of re-specification. Where do limitations come from and how do they succeed? The philosophers say that the individual only learns how it should act towards itself from the world. The relation to the world is considered a guarantee for the notion that self-cultivation fills the concept ,,humanity" with content. 168 But does this path to the all-around education (Bi/dung) of the individual via self-reference not also mean that the individual learns from the world only how it should act towards itself? Does the re-specification lay in this shifting of ,,only"? If so, it would be understandable for the all-around education (Bi/dung) principle to fall very quickly into a socio-political scrapheap. The non-negatable point of reference that limits its contingency then appears as a ,,societally extraterritorial personality," 169 from which no more ,,political education" information can be attained. This emptying, however, also makes further usage possible. The allaround education (Bi/dung) concept itself is first saved through extension and generalization. The relation to spheres of career-related work, which was not included at first, is belatedly subsumed within the concept. 170 At that point, the all-around education (Bi/dung) formula loses the particular contours of its relation to world, science, and individuality in general. Tradition is eventually substituted for definition. At the conclusion of this, all-around education (Bi/dung) is merely a substitute expression for education (Erziehung) - a substitute that apparently is only used when it is possible to cover up a lack of orientation with an appeal to something that 168

I 69

170

Wilhelm von Humboldt says: .,Die letzte Aufgabe unseres Daseyns: dem Begriff (sic) der Menschheit in unsrer Person ... einen so gro13en In halt, als moglich, zu verschaffen, diese Aufgabe lost sich allein durch die Verkniipfung unsres lchs mit der Welt zu der allgemeinsten, regesten und freiesten Wechselwirkung" (,,Theorie der Bildung des Menschens," in Werke, vol. I, 2nd ed., Darmstadt I 969, p. 235f., 234-240.). According to a formulation by Strzelewicz in Willy Strzelewicz, Hans-Dietrich Raapke, and Wolfgang Schulenberg, Bi/dung und gesellschaft/iches BewufJtsein: Eine mehrsrujige soziologische Untersuchung in Westdeutschland, Stuttgart l 966, p. 11. (Translated from Jhe original: ,,gesellschaftlich exterritoriale Pers6nalitat," der keine ,,bildungspolitischen" Informationen .... ") Herwig Blankertz describes and approves of this development, Berufsbildung und Utilitarismus: Problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen, Diisseldorf 1963.

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has value. The proliferation of words' such as Bildungsforschung (educational research), Bildungsplanung ( educational planning), Bildungsdefizit (educational deficit), Bildungsrat (education counsel), Bildungskommission (education commission), Bildungseinrichtungen (educational institutions), Bildungswert (educational value), and Bildungssystem ( educational system) converge in a semantics of cluelessness. Thematic usage of the concept of all-around education (Bi/dung) lose all conceptual strictness. 171 The contingency formula of all-around education (Bi/dung) dissolves into precisely the non-determinedness, the determining of which was supposed to have been its function.

XII. The ability to learn The contingency formula of all-around education (Bi/dung) was not well enough fitted to the function of education (Erziehung) and therefore and this is only paradoxical at first glance - it was could not say enough about the performance and the reflection of the system of education. In addition, it was not well-suited to the emerging inclusion of the larger population in the process of differentiated (from other systems) school education. 172 This criticism does not only aim at the often harped upon esoteric and class dependence of the idea. 173 It also makes one consider what individuality as the goal of education can actually mean under the *

171 172

173

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Note from the translator: because ,,all-around education" is in America not nearly as common a tenn as Bi/dung is in Gennan, the semantic development of the concept is likely to be more difficult to follow. The following words are all examples of how the tenn Bi/dung is still commonly used, although, as Luhmann says, without transport· ing the content that the tenn once transported. In English, however, these words do not contain the tenn ,,all-around education." Therefore, the semantics of cluelessness, which Luhmann talks of here, does not go for the English; for this reason, I have listed all of the Gennan tenns as well, where the issue is clear to see. Cf. as a characteristic example Leonhard Froese, ,,Der Bedeutungswandel des Bildungsbegriffs," Zeitschriftfiir Padagogik 8, I 962, pp. 119-142. Humboldt no longer wanted to exclude particular population groups, but rather to exclude special needs (which would then necessarily affect population groups differently). Thus it reads in the Lithuanian School Plan ,,litauischen Schulplan" (Wilhelm von Humboldt, Werke, vol. IV, p. 188): ,,Aile Schulen aber, deren sich nicht ein einzelner Stand, sondem die ganze Nation, oder der Staat for diese annimmt, miissen nur allgemeine Menschenbildung bezwecken." This is again the case in Ralph Fiedler, Die klassische deutsche Bildungsidee: lhre sozio/ogischen Wurzeln und pddagogischen Fa/gen, Weinheim 1972.

condition of compulsory school attendance for all. For this reason, the substitute formula must offer an .orientation that is more universal and more specific at the same time - that is relevant to every type of instruction and, at the same time, indicates a specification that can only be achieved through instruction. There is, even today, no clear profile of the state of transition. One the one ·hand, it comes to mere comparisons again - now it is the contrast between all-around education (Bi/dung) (self-realization) and performance ( conforming to societal demands). 174 That is no progress compared to what had already been accomplished in the 18th century with the comparison between completeness and usefulness. On the other hand, the pedagogical relevance is often seen as having a ,,critical" stance in regard to performance demands that come from the society, as saying: one should check them over, before one accepts them. 175 But ,,criticism" is - one knows this through experience in the meantime - not independent criticism: it makes itself dependent on ideological precepts, without which it would not even be possible. In addition, the principle of criticism still lacks pedagogical specification, which can be reached only with the help of a translation back into the ability to distinguish and to learn. The contingency formula, which is adequate today, cannot stop at mere criticism - it must go on to assert how one can learn. The participation in instruction leads to the learning of behaviors that are proper in learning-specific interaction systems - if successful, it leads to learning how to learn and with that, it develops an ability to learn that can be applied generally. With learning how to learn, the education process ends itself by making learning permanent. It is not the self-reference of the person in his relationship to the world, but the self-reference of the function process, which makes out the intensification affect that is reachable by differentiating the education process (from other systems). We want to call the contingency formulas that are thus formed simply: the ability to learn. Just as the concepts which led up to all-around education (Bi/dung) were already prepared as explanatory material in the context of humane perfection, the substitute formula for all-around education (Bi/dung) already existed within this idea. Humboldt, for instance, says about a pupil who is being prepared in school to attend university: ,,He is busy in two 174 175

Cf. for example Wolfgang-P. Teschner, .,Studie zum Leistungsbegriff in der Padagogik," Neue Sammlung 9, 1969, pp. 427-443, who takes up von Hentig's position. Cf. Carl-Ludwig Furck, Das piidagogische Problem der Leislung, Weinheim 1961.

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ways: one with learning itself and also with learning how to learn." 176 Precisely this concept, tailored to fit school instruction, loses its importance for the self-propelled, research-oriented all-around education (Bi/dung) in universities. That, which can be considered preparation in hindsight from the perspective of the university, however, becomes a central principle when considering the school Pedagogy. One can also ask why learning how to learn is only supposed to be. preparation for studying and not for life. The ability to learn is not a new concept, but at the same time, one breaks with the tradition of the all-around education (Bi/dung) idea when one considers learning how to learn as the central issue around which everything else gravitates. It is self-evident that the ability to learn and learning itself are considered necessary and are assessed. What this concept allows to slip in along with the function of a contingency formula, however, is not merely this assessment, but rather a not so self-evident characteristic: for the domain of the specific function of educating, the formula symbolizes selfreference and thus being closed. 177 What is meant by this is that all learning depends not on the accumulation of correct knowledge or useful abilities as such, but rather on the ability that it learned in the process to use that which is learned as a basis of further learning. That, which is correct and useful, is precisely the knowledge and ability which makes it possible to learn successfully in future situations. That of course does not mean the ,,studendum vero semper et ubique" of Quintilian 178 , that mere repetitive exercise at any given chance of a once-learned verbal ability; rather, to 176

177

178

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Wilhelm von Humboldt, ,.Konigsberger Schulplan," p. 170. One interesting version can be found in Schleiermacher's review of Zollner's ,,Ideen Ober Nationalerziehung" (quoted from Schleiermacher, Ausgewiihlte piidagogische Schriflen, ed. Lichtenstein, pp. 13-17): The moral difficulties and the responsibility of the educator are too big ifhe is supposed to see in advance that which is special in the substance of each pupil and educate the pupil towards that substance. For this reason it depends on ,,der allgemeinen Yorbereitung die grol3tmogliche Grtindlichkeit und Ausdehnung zu geben, um die besondere, wenn sich auch der Beruf erst mit Entwicklung bestimmter Anlagen und Neigungen entschiede, desto schneller vollenden zu konnen. Dadurch wird nun das Lemen des Lemens und die Fertigkeit, Fertigkeiten zu erlangen, der Mittelpunkt alien Unterrichts" (p. 16). Cf. also stopping education at ,,flexibility" (,,Geschmeidigkeit") and further peifectibility as the goals of education in Kajetan Weiller, Versuch eines Lehrgebiiudes der Erziehungskunde, vol. 2, Munich 1805, in particular pp. I 50f., I ?Of. An early sociological interpretation had come up with this necessary immanence of education based on the ruination of the all-around education (Bildung) idea: Theodor Geiger, ,,Erziehung als Gegenstand der Soziologie," Die Erziehung 5, 1930, pp. 405427. Quintilian, fnstitutionis Oratoriae Libri; X, 7, 27, vol. 2, p. 540.

learn is to be permanently prepared to deal with the new by changing learned patterns of expectations. There are - and for this reason we can feel reasonably certain in this judgement - exact parallels in other function systems of the society. In the scientific system, the establishment of knowledge has since the 18th century been based not on the simultaneous creation of knowledge and subject matter, but rather on epistemology. In the economic system, the ,,natural" scarcity of goods and services are related to a currency that is kept artificially scarce - a scarcity that regulates itself with regard to the the economic system or that allows itself to be regulated. The political system steers itself through trials, which are in a position to politicize themes. The legal system regulates ,,constitutions" legally - it regulates how law should be made and upheld. This form of self-steering does not mean that there have to be processes of reflexive self-regulation in addition to other processes. The reflexive mechanisms do not simply take the place of the ,,maior et sanior pars" in the model of hierarchical control. They change the overall quality of the system even when notions of values, norms, or customs remain identical. The necessary condition of the unity of the variety is no longer the relation to a highest principle, but rather in the relation to reflexivity, and every process of the system exists under this condition of self-reference. On the level of processual self-steering (for instance: the education of the educator), it was already possible in the 18th century to formulate reflexive models, depending on the operative necessity. The corresponding relinquishment of an a priori guarantee for the contingency formula, however, is difficult and requires much effort on the part of reflection. For the system of education in the context of the all-around education (Bi/dung) tradition, this problem was not solvable. The ability to learn, however, is a concept with formal universality and functional specification that was able to stimulate a consciousness that was adequate to solve the problem. The concept of being able to learn how to learn fits into a functionally differentiated societal order. It can be understood as a corollary of evolutionary changes in the societal system in that greater complexity, which forces selective behavior, requires a greater ability to adjust on the level of social systems as well as on the level of personal systems. 179 The formula 179

Using a combination of Parson's concepts and ones taken from neo-Darwinism: Michael Fullan and Jan L. Loubser, ,,Education and Adaptive Capacity," Sociology of Education 45, 1972, pp. 271-287.

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,,ability to learn" does not refer to a universal virtue, it does not offer a substitute for justice as the fundamental virtue of political society, nor for religiousity (pietas) as the fundamental virtue of religious societies. Instead, it is about a special competence that is to be applied intensively on occasion and must therefore be ready permanently. Learning potential is called upon by constellations, which are singly unknown and must be worked into the premises of further experience or action. It may have to do with unexpected or expected surprises, with surprises that are pushed upon one or that one seeks out. In each case, the willingness to learn means - and this is the risk, which one first must learn to take on - that expectations are placed at one's disposal and then restructured in the situation. Therefore, the ability to learn depends upon whether the expecting is done cognitively rather than normatively, with a willingness to change rather than with a willingness to carry through no matter what. 180 Education is only possible when the ability to learn can be assumed. 181 The contingency formula formulates the education process as the ability of its own premises to become more intense - as an intensification of itself. Thus, the ability to learn is not simply the ,,output," not only the performance of the system of education that is first finished at the end; instead, it is the premise of operation, which is developed via constant utilization. In this way, the function is not a present that will be in effect in the future, but future that is always present. Learning learns itself. The only question is: under which conditions does this happen, in response to what learning triggers, and what are the dimensions of improbability? Instructional requirements and technology address this aspect of intensification. It is only through instruction that learning is detached from accident and practiced with sufficient intensity. It is only with reference to instruction that the learning themes can be selected and distributed at various situations according to a predetermined plan. It is only by planing themes for instruction that certain themes - which lead more to learning how to learn than to learning information - can be encouraged. All of that can be summarized in the thesis that this contingency formula is calculated for instruction-related re-specification. If the contingency formula ,,ability to learn" is used as a symbol for the function of education, the result is that other subsystems of the society 180 181

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On the distinction between these types of expectations see Nik las Luhmann, Rechlssoziologie, Reinbek 1972, vol. I, p. 40ff. In the tradition, this premise was focused upon as learning's dependence on experience; in this fonn, it assumed a correspondence between the ability to know and reality. Cf. Gunther Buck, Lemen und Erfahrung: Zum Begriff der didaklischen Jnduklion, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 1969.

alter their perspective on education's performance. Its performance is no longer only excluded - as it had been at the time of the classical allaround education formula (Bildungsformel) - as ,,special" preparation for life, and then reincorporated again through a second, inconsequential usage of a general and special all-around education (Bi/dung) concept that encompasses the other all-around education Bi/dung). If one agrees on the ability to learn, then the relationship between function and performance can be reconstructed as the relationship between learning and general ability. From the point of view of the function, knowledge and the other abilities are interesting because they are suited to serve as a starting point for adjustment processes. From the point of view of performance, the adjustment processes are interesting in so far as they can be called upon when using skills and are useful then. The ability to learn can only be practiced on material or on types of behavior. On the other hand, the ability to learn is added to a person's general ability itself as an adaptive capacity, which will be called upon when knowledge of abilities are sought. One cannot forget, however, that simple learning also demands a tribute and that it always brings along with it limitations on further learning possibilities. One cannot hold to future open forever, and one has to be convinced of the importance of that, which one learns, while learning it. Just as economic investments generally can only be liquidated - that means, turned back into money - at a loss, the path to performance in the system of education is burdened with the sacrifice of liquidation. That is simply a more specific expression of the theory, which was just formulated: function and performance represent different system references, and performance cannot be encompassed by functionality. Similarly, there is no mutually exclusive relationship or compromising compromise between the learning of the ability to learn (function) and the learning of a usable general ability (performance); instead, the relationship is one of mutual conditionality that can be expressed in many different ways. This is also the reason why the system of education cannot be differentiated along the lines of a distinction between all-around education (Bildung) and training (Ausbildung) or function and performance. Which problems remain open? Aside from all of the individual questions of detailing and the combining learning and general ability, an overall linear sequencing along the lines of an ,,intensification of the concept" does not work here either. Of course, one can imagine difficulty steps and relationships according to rank according to which learning ability requirements increase in ,,higher" education. That holds, for instance, when

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tasks require a decision about the choice of methods - in other words, when they _assuqie a sort of pre-learning that includes a knowledge of methods, but also goes beyond it. But at the same time, one's career in school cannot be made linear so that the learning process is able to increase - step by step and without stop - the learning of the ability to learn while focusing on the learning of general abilities - the structural requirements of learning are too heterogeneous for that. Whereas the idea of all-around education (Bi/dung) cannot limit itself immanently through the reference point world or through the reference point individuality, it is precisely this self-limitation that is required for the ability to learn. The ability to learn combines uncertainty in relation to environment with certainty in relation to itself - namely, in relation to its own receiving position. This certainty can only be strengthened in the experience of learning itself. The build-up of such a combination of uncertainty and certainty, however, can be limited with a view towards which uncertainties the relevant environment will actually produce. 182 And it must be limited, because preparation for all possibilities could only be attained through indoctrination of stricter, more generally endurable outlooks. The formula ,,ability to learn" depends on self-limitation and thus on internal diversification; it cannot be thought of as able to be intensified in linear order, as parallel to the hierarchical build-up of elementary, middle, higher, and highest schools. This technical requirement of self-limitation as a condition for the effectiveness of the ability to learn corresponds to requirements of reflection. As the contingency formula, the ability to learn is not automatically a technically reachable goal; instead, it is at first an expression of reflection on the function of the system of education. The reflection only fulfils its own function when it manages to set down limits on intensification - and 182

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Career training is in this sense preparation for the ,,relevant uncertainties" of a career through the certainty of being able to do something appropriate. Cf. for example Renee Fox, ,,Training for Uncertainty," in The Student-Physician: Introductory Studies in the Sociology of Medical Education, ed. Robert K. Merton, Cambridge, Mass. 1957, pp. 207-241.; John H. McNamara, ,,Uncertainties in Police Work: The Relevance of Police Recruits' Backgrounds and Training," in The Police: Six Sociological Essays, ed. David J. Bordua, New York 1967, pp. 163-252, or on ,,preparation for contingencies" in the behaviour of teachers and in teacher training, see Louis M. Smith and William Geoffrey, The Complexities of an Urban Classroom: An Analysis toward a General Theory of Teaching, New York 1968, p. I OOff. The question remains open of how much the attained certainty rests on the ability to persist or on the ability to learn, whether it communicates only rigidity or also an elastic willingness to face changes in the environment.

to do this with relation to the system in its envirorunent. One can imagine, on the one hand, that the ability to learn can be intensified infinitely, because every situation leaves the possibility open - between surprises and unknown horizons - of learning more and learning better. On the other hand, limitless willingness to learn leans towards an unrestrained willingness for conform. No society, no social system, no person can define every one of its structures in advance as one that can be changed through learning. That would mean a sacrifice of normativity, a sacrifice of conscience, 183 a sacrifice of law, and of many further bases of conviction in communication within the domains of religion, morals, politic, love, etc. If one makes the ability to learn an absolute, then rigidity becomes necessary on the technical level and the ability to conform to everything becomes necessary on the level of reflection. There is no reflection on the technology of the system of education that can be developed with this contradiction in place, and the learning process itself can only be understood by looking at its impossibility. How does the learning process, then, find and reflect on its own limits without sacrificing the ability to learn in advance and perhaps too rashly? One answer to this question can be fowid in the analysis of autonomy, or more precisely: in the analysis of systems that reflect themselves as being self-referential. We have already noted: a system that can choose its dependencies from the envirorunent is autonomous. That assumes a differentiation of levels within the system so that the operative envirorunental dependency can be distinguished from the reflected envirorunental dependency. In the same sense, one can say: a system that chooses the respects, in which it wants to anticipate in a manner that is normative or full of a will to learn, and that can also program this choice if necessary in a manner that is also normative or full of a will to learn - that system is autonomous. The basic figure here is also that for the completion of selfreferential processes, an operative level is available as well as a level that reflects those processes (and is thus, for its part, also operative 184 ). Now, however, we only have the form that solves the reflection problem. The contents, which stop the learning process or the reflection proc183

184

On the interpretation, which is assumed here, of the phenomena of conscience, see Niklas Luhmann, ,,Das Phlinomen des Gewissens und die normative Selbstbestimmung der Personlichkeit," in Naturrecht in der Kritik, eds. Franz Bockle and ErnstWolfgang Bockenf6rde, Mainz 1973, pp. 223-243. Similar conclusion are often made in reference to operative bases of all reflection in philosophy. See for example Eugen Fink, ,,Operative Begriffe in Husserls Phanomenologie," Zeitschriftfar philosophische Forschung l l, 1957, pp. 321-337.

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ess, remain historical. Since the beginning of reverse self-experience with functional differentiation, one had attempted to justify the validity of contents by referring to a priori validities - but to no avail. The interest in .. a priori" is itself an historical interest. Only the system form can guarantee the continuous catalysis - the continuous regeneration - of plausible stop rules. If the system of education enacts yet another change in the contingency formula and switches from all-around education (Bi/dung) to ability to learn, it must accept this consequence. Because this sort of final problems discussed above cannot be solved within the sciences, and because one knows this today, or at least can know this, if one chooses; the overlapping domain of science loses its previously dominant place with the transition to the formula ,,ability to learn." It delivers more material about knowledge than every before, but no answer to the reflection problems of the system of education. The universities cannot be reformed in the way Humboldt had reformed them any longer; 185 instead, they become integrated into what Humboldt had called school instruction and had earmarked for learning how to learn. To what does the guiding orientation then shift? Kerschensteiner and Spranger had already shifted their primary orientation to work and career within the ,,theory of all-around education (Bi/dung)," which was still continued on a semantically and in a generalized way. 186 Still under the aegis of ,,all-around education (Bildung)," the replacement of the reference to science by the reference to economics is introduced - ,,career training lies at the gate to all- around human education (Menschenbildung)" 181 - and the formula ,,ability to learn" merely takes over what was already practically accepted as given. In any case, we have to take into account a double, mutually-aiding development. On the one hand, with the function specific contingency formula ,,ability to learn," the system of education wins the greatest distance yet to the overlapping domains. The ability to learn can be conceived of and developed 185

186

187

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Cf. on this, see Helmut Schelsky's development from: Einsamkeil und Freiheit: /dee und Gestalt der deutschen Universitdl, Reinbek 1963, to: Abschied von der Hochschulpolitik oder Die Universitdt im Fadenkreuz des Versagens, Bielefeld 1969. See Georg Kerschensteiner, Theorie der Bi/dung, Leipzig/Berlin 1926; Kerschensteiner, Ausgewahlte pddagogische Schriflen, 2 vols., Paderbom 1966 and 1968; Eduard Spranger, Berufsbildung und Allgemeinbildung, 1929, reprinted in Die Bildungsfrage in der modernen Arbeilswelt, ed. Hermann Rohrs, Frankfurt a.M. 1963, pp. 17-34. Cf. on this as well, Rohrs, Ibid., also Udo Miillges, Bildung und Berufsbildung: Die theoretische Grundlegung des Berufserziehungsproblems durch Kerschensfeiner, Spranger, Fischer und Liu, Ratingen 1967. Kerschensteiner, Theorie der Bi/dung., p. 94.

within other systems without a simultaneous performance relation. On the other hand, there is one place of learning in which one really learns how to learn with the help of those who are learned : the so-called ,.praxis. " The ,,praxis" becomes the ,,final judgement" in which one learnedly disposes over what one has learned - whether due to a learned ability to learn or whether it be improvised and ad hoc. Numerous experience reports and investigations, which are collected under the term ,,reality shock," have shown that with all the career orientation of job training, the entrance into the career often forces one to dispose over what one has learned in a drastic and disappointing new way. 188 In contrast to that, the transition into working life among those with a lack of job training or a low level of job training is relatively free of problems.189 As the demands of the job training increase, so do the discrepancies in the actual behavior demands of the job; the job training does not decrease this discrepancy, instead it increases it. It would be entirely wrong to seek the fault in the ,,overly theoretical" or ,,overly academic" character of the job training, which is what generally happens. With all the potential criticism of curriculums and learning goals, it is precisely abstraction and theoretical content, book knowledge and the condensed experience of other, which cannot be eliminated without causing the job training to fall apart as job training. Therefore, (in case a basic, sociologically non-prognosticatible revolution of all curriculums for ,.praxis" relevance does not work), one has to assume that increasing demands on job training and quality in the system of education correlate to increasing selectivity of what is to be used in the career praxis. Because and in so far as the old continuity of ,,learning in the praxis" had to be given up, there is a ,,reality shock" in the transition to praxis. This creates, on the one side, a situation that is favorable for learning precisely because what was learned then fails or must be newly evaluated and de-dogmatized. In this way, the system of education uses its differ188

189

Cf. for example Ronald G. Corwin, ,,The Professional Employee: A Study of Conflicts in Nursing Roles," The American Journal of Sociology 66, 1961, pp. 604-615; Friedrich Furstenberg, ,,Normenkonflikte beim Eintritt in das Berufsleben," in Schute 11nd Beruf als Sozialisalionsfaktoren, ed. Theodor Scharmann, Stuttgart 1966, pp. 194-204; Wayne K. Hoy, ,,The Influence of Experience on the Beginning Teacher," School Review 76, 1968, pp. 312-323; M. T. Whiteside, G. Bembaum, and G. Noble, ,,.Aspirations, Reality Shock and Entry into Teaching," Sociological Review 17, 1969, pp. 399-414; Roger Mansfield, ,,The Initiation of Graduates in Industry," Human Relations 25, 1972, pp. 77-86. See, for instance, Michael P. Carter, Home, School and Work: A Study of the Education and Employment of Young People in Britain, Oxford 1962, pp. 195, 207ff.

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ence to the environment to insure that whatever is not achieved at first, is achieved eventually. This learning effect, then, should also be attributed to the system of education. This last means, however, is also the worst: what one learns when one is shocked, remains tied to the situation, it happens to a great extent without conceptual control and cannot be transferred to new situations. This results in abrupt learning, generally with a permanence, but not in a continuous ability to learn. Praxis people lay emphasis on the worth of experience - by that, they mean their own experience. The great discontinuity between training and experience can hardly be weakened; but that does not necessarily mean discounting moments of continuity and of preparation for the typical uncertainties of precisely these transitional situations. This problem places the formula ,,ability to learn" in a new light. The transition to career requires without a doubt a lot of adaptive flexibility, and the question is: how is the system of education armed for that? Through class-based certainty of Being and the impression one makes? through pride at having gotten through school? -through the feeling of somehow being prepared for the relevant uncertainties of the job? --or through cognitive-based abilities to learn, which can be recalled while practicing a career? The formula ,,ability to learn" refers to the last case and, it means it within this framework: a transition to career which is devoid of problems. In a certain sense, the formula's model is the apprentice, who learns in the career so that a discrepancy does not even have the chance to come about. The formula attempts to deal with problems which accrue by themselves by making detours with more ambitious goals. The overlapping domain of company education is neither a basis, as the family is, nor an ideal, as the all-around education university (Bildungsuniversitdt) is. But it does deliver the model upon which the light and shadow of an intensified - and, for just that reason, a as of yet insufficient - ability to learn first appear. For the anthropology of humane perfection, the class structure of society was still assumed to be self-evident; that was why it was called perfection according to the stipulations of the estate. 190 The all-around education ideal (Bildungsideal) interpreted the guiding orientation as being an ideal culmination point, which allowed differences in all-around education (Bi/dung) and differences in classes in the ,,educated ranks" to converge.191 The formula ,,ability to learn," however, belongs to a function190 191

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Hints to that effect in Vierhaus, ,,Bildung," p. 5 I 2ff. On this, see Hans Weil, Die Entstehung des deutschen Bildungsprinzips, 2nd ed., Bonn 1967, p. 84ff.

ally differentiated society, which can see its own consequences and which is busy with attempts to get the problems that result from high risk structure decisions at least partially under control. The apprentice does not become the ideal, the company education does not become the absolute focus of education - the function is by now too differentiated (from other functions of other systems) for that to be the case. And yet, this overlapping domain determines the problem orientation and the function orientation, because under more complicated and challenging circwnstances, what was so easy here, will be - in spite of all efforts - impossible to achieve again.

XIII. The curriculum: towards the re-specification of the contingency formula The function systems' autonomy is not completed with the abstraction of formulas for unity. The conditions of re-specification cannot be derived from the unity formula. That is precisely its function - to make independence possible in spite of dependencies - but the question remains: how should reflection proceed so that what is contingent can be dealt with as necessary, and what is not defined as defined? 192 Since olden days, the institution of the curriculum has taken on that responsibility, 193 in so far as the curriculum is articulated with the world. Curriculums are concerned with the codifying of materials. Materials do not mean goals of learning: they are not potential states, in which people can find themselves. Materials are the means used in learning processes, and they have traditionalforming effects, which cannot be measured by looking at how much material actually stays in the heads of the pupils. Beyond this attempt to get material into pupils' heads, another perspective becomes an issue: the function of the form, in which material can be accessed. Material must find a form within the curriculum, which is set up in such a way that teaching and learning processes cannot be combined in just any way. These few remarks are sufficient to make it clear that this institution requires a functional specification of the ,,teaching structure" as a prerequisite.194 As long as education holds itself to the epic narrative context of Homeric texts, the curriculum was not the most central aspect. It is the 192 193 194

See part 1, chapter 1: ,,Pedagogy and societal theory." Cf. Josef Dolch, Lehrplan des Abendlandes, 3rd ed., Ratingen 1971. Cf. Friedrich W. Dorpfeld, Grundlinien einer Theorie des Lehrplans, zuniichst fur Volks- und Millelschulen, 3rd ed., Giitersloh 1910; also Erich Weniger, Didaktik als Bildungslehre, part 1, p. 21 ff.

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revolutionizing of Greek Pedagogy by Greek philosophy that first pushed this institution into a central position by taking materials, which were now freed from local, multi-functional, ascriptive ties, and relating them to themes in reference to which, statements could be judged as true or false. 195 Materials are subject to particular conditions when they are used in processes of education and instruction - conditions, which concern the function specific context of pedagogical praxis as well as the articulation with the world. Thus, the curriculum is an institution that, on the one hand, takes external factors in and, on the other hand, participates in the internal fate (of the system). With the differentiation of the system of education (from other systems), the curriculum loses its direct relation to world. The curriculum is not longer a social structure in which societal constructions of reality are expressed; instead, it is a structure of the system of education, which only needs to be compatible with societal conditions. As such, the curriculum presents the reality as an independent representation of the fact dimension in the system of education. As a result, the curriculum cannot be seen as merely being a means of achieving intended results in pupils; because as far as the curriculum is concerned, the system of education also has the function of reproducing culture within its offspring, regardless of who precisely receives what material. If the materials that are used in have their own connection to meaning in an of themselves, then their realization is not independent of the question of social transference and the time it takes for pedagogical success. The curriculum goes about its business, which is the mobilization of the resources it has in ,,materials," within the framework of possibilities marked out by the contingency formula. If the curriculum is, in this sense, the structure of the system of education, then it refers to the great size of the system of education, within which it is possible to create relations for any one item - for instance, a person or a theme. The differentiation (of the system from others) creates possibilities of relations in the system that are dependent on the great size, which, for their part, allow further extensions of the system, if the structural problems of mobilization can be solved. Thus, the curriculum is both dependent on the societal development and it refers to it; it triggers reflection of a particular sort in order to fulfill the conditions of autonomy: ,,Are the German curricula still right?" 196 It is a general characteristic of functional differentiation on the level of the societal system that it cannot occur in a way that is specific to func195 196

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On this: Eric Havelock, Preface to Plato, Cambridge, Mass. 1963. Asks Heinrich Roth in Curriculumrevision, eds. Frank Achtenhagen and Hilbert L. Meyer, 3rd. ed., Munich 1971, p. 47, 47-56.

tion. That is. an aspect of the centrality of functions. There is no content that per se must be non-political, that could not become the subject matter for scientific investigation, or that is per se non-economic. It follows that one should shift the argumentation to a higher level of abstraction and ask oneself how such non-specification can be dealt with as specification. Our first answer is the contingency formulas, which symbolize the limitations of what is possible. This chapter looks at how the contingency formulas are handled in view of the curriculum; our thesis is that, as natural and normative references fade and as the contingency formula develops towards ability to learn, increasingly large demands are placed on the implementation of autonomy - or in other words, on the planing of the curriculum under specific pedagogical perspectives planing the curriculum under specific pedagogical perspectives - and that this happens because the task of limiting what is possible is shifted from the largest to the smallest subsystems. In this way, the level-specific emphases of reflection are made denser, and these emphases, in turn, specify the conditions of the possibility of the curriculum function. As long as the curriculum only supports ,,occasional activities" of a stratified society, the internal fate of the codified material itself does not need to be reflected on its own. Stratification as the pre-selector of specific communication chances offers sufficient certainty that educational goods will be transferred. 197 It is the postulate for inclusion that first brings demands into the game - demands, which can only be dealt with by considering the level of the program, which now articulates the curriculum. If all children are to be brought up in schools, the reliance on function specific role abilities is no longer sufficient to guarantee that the material actually is received into the heads of the children. It is the program level, then, that makes it possible to formulate society-wide conditions for correct behavior; and the curriculum becomes the component of education programs that sets limits on the dominance of the social dimension in ,,pedagogical relations." What does reflection do in order to contribute in this sense to ,,materials" in order to mobilize system of education's resources? While reflecting on the contingency formula, we have analyzed structural limits to the possibility of differentiation of the system of education (from other systems) with the term overlapping domains. During the fairly abrupt process of differentiation (of the system from others), however, the overlapping domains do not just function as limitations, but also as conditions for making specific interests in intensifying educational performance possible. 197

Cf. Dolch on ,,enkyklios paideia," lehrp/an des Abend/andes, p. 24ff.

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If children, who have never been schooled before, are to be ushered into the education process, then there are first a few capabilities that they should have, which would also imparted through family education. Thus, Pestalozzi's reflections very clearly emphasize the living room character of the elementary method. Societally relevant school education and family education are thus reflected with a view towards their similarities; 198 although the family education - as an environmental condition of the system of education - does not give the curriculum its own chance within the system of education yet. Of course, that does not mean that the issue of materials has not been given any attention up until this point; but the point of the discussion about instruction-related materials had not yet been the mobilization of resources of the education function, instead, it had very generally been the question of representation in the framework of a given construction of reality. Thus, the 17th-century discussions about taking realities into consideration within the predominant languages did not intend to create new possibilities for relationships within the system of education; and even the discussions about the ,,ancient" languages at the end of the 18th century do not yet reflect the need for intensification in the curriculum function; 199 because the differentiation (of the system from others) first became relevant on the level of the education processes. It is with the build up of the school organization as a necessary condition for increasing performance in the domain of the education function, that the curriculum function first took on a role appropriate to the size of the system of education. It is not without a sidelong glance at the formal tendencies of Pestalozzi that Schleiermacher and Herbart emphasize the meaning of contents for the education process (without sufficiently reflecting along with it the organizational dependence of their reflection). The organization takes over the structural protection of the curriculum function. With the curriculum in view, one can inquire about how many different relations between materials it is possible to realize in one period of time. And this is precisely what is needed to plan the curriculum using points of view that are specifically pedagogical. If a set arrangement 198 199

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We will come back to that in more detail in part II, chapter V: ,,Pedagogy headed towards the 'absolute method'?" The philanthropic-new humanistic discussions reflected instead defensive conditions of the system of education, which is beginning to free itself from the limitations of family education in order to attain professional-political prestige based on the degree of difficulty of the contents of instruction. Cf. Ernst Christian Trapp, ,,Ober das Studium der alten classischen Schriftsteller und ihrer Sprachen, in padagogischer Hinsicht," in Allgemeine Revision, vol. VII, pp. 309-533.

perhaps under the perspective of what is important - already existed in the environment of the system of education, then there would be neither the possibility nor a necessity for the system of education to plan a curriculum. This performance of autonomy works at first primarily via the organization; and it is political regulations and interventions for the most part that fix the relations here: 200 one quickly sees, however, that the correct selection of subject matters in instruction and the set limitations on them creates a particular sort of problem. It is a problem, which various external interests are concerned about, but which cannot be taken from the hands of the system of education without endangering the schooling all children - in other words, without endangering a growth of the system of education that is appropriate to the society. Thus, the one-sidedness of the Prussian emphasis that exists in the ,,concentration" of teaching materials, soon becomes a disadvantage; political disagreements and pedagogical infiltration of the political administration alone no longer suffice; the responsible establishment begins to cover up the internal conditions and dependencies with a theory that abstracts the ,,basic guidelines" for programming the education organization - a function, which had belonged to the the increasingly unrecognizable and, more importantly, uncontrollable internal structure of the system of education. 201 When Dorpfeld has to generalize the advice given to the political administration, he refers to the scientific version of the curriculum question. Pedagogical thinking happens in the domain of science once again in order to generate a semantic for pedagogical thinking 202 so that the curriculum of elementary and middle schools can continue to include factbased subjects: ,,The curriculum must be qualitatively complete. It follows that: there must be three fact-based subjects. Why not more? Because 200

201 202

The well-known section of the so-called ,,Stiehlschen Regulative" from 1854 intended to bring elementary education back to its proper status and its Christian basis: ,,Es ist daher an der Zeit, das Unberechtigte, Oberflussige, lrrefohrende auszuscheiden und an seiner Stelle dasjenige nunmehr auch amtlich zur Befolgung vorzuschreiben, was von denen, welche die BedUrfnisse einer wahrhaft christlichen Volksbildung kennen und wUrdigen, seit lange als notwendig gefl.ihlt, von treuen und erfahrenen Schulmannem als dem Volke wahrhaft frommend und als ausfUhrbar erprobt worden ist." Quoted from Gerhardt Giese, Quellen zur deutschen Schulgeschichte seit 1800, Gottingen 196 l, p. 15 I. See here Dorpfeld, Grundlinien einer Theorie des lehrplans, zundchst fiir Vo/ks- und Mittelschulen - emphasized by Dorpfeld as ,,Novum." Dorpfeld's theory thus links onto the political decision about curriculum: the teaching order from October 15, I 872 as a result of the school conference (cf. Giese, Que lien zur deutschen Schulgeschichte seit I 800, p. I 68ff.)

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there are no other. Why not fewer? Because an institution of education, which is supposed to be an all-around education institution (Bildungsanstalt) rather than a technical school, such as an elementary school cannot afford to spare one of them." 203 Pedagogy does not only find itself in a discussion with itself concerning a generalized understanding of the allaround education formula (Bildungsformel), but it also finds itself in discussion with the scientific system: the scientific structure of discipline is called upon to legitimize the necessity of the (political) decision that has already been made. 204 In this way, the decision can be connected to scientific research; but the school cannot make itself dependent upon research either: ,,How can that be possible - in a school that has 80 to 90 to 100 children?"205 In this manner, the sciences end up triggering reflection that increases self-legitimation: ,, ... the curriculums of various all-around education institutions (Bildungsanstalten) relate to one another like figures, which have (qualitatively) similar forms, but are very different in their (quantitative) size. This is the cardinal truth of Pedagogy, the highest in the theory of curriculum. "206 Important here are not only the requirements necessary for preparing further themes fit for instruction, but also the questions about how to structure the courses themselves; 207 but - not only from this course-perspective, but also from a more materials-related perspective - pedagogical reflections follow political decisions in the organization domain of the system of education, which is in the overlapping domain of science. Willmann's thoughts, for example, on the allaround educational content (Bildungsgehalt) of the sciences follow on the tail of legislation regarding the Reichsvolksschu!gesetz (National Elementary School Law) of May 14, 1869, which - in spite of Willmann's attempts - manages through the doctrine of goods to help legitimize the transformation of the curriculum to one that is based on separate school subjects. But what results when scientifically motivated curriculum considerations cannot be brought into line with course considerations that still focus on the principle of concentration? 208 An emanation of curriculum 203

D6rpfeld, Grund/inien einer Theorie des Lehrp/ans, zunachstfur Volks- und Mittelschulen, p. 9.

204

namely the division: Natural Science, Human Life (in the present and past), and Religion, Ibid, p. I. Ibid, p. 61 f. Ibid, p. 162. For Dorpfeld, it is the question ,,ob der Lehrgang in konzentrischen Kreisen fortschreiten so11, oder aber. .. nach sog. kulturhistorischen Stufen," Ibid, p. 179. Also see Schwenk, ,,Padagogik in den philosophischen Fakultaten: Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der 'geisteswissenschaftlichen' Padagogik in Deutschland," p. 62.

205 206 207 208

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considerations in the disguise of organic metaphors. In any case, the pedagogical semantics of the curriculum structure falls to pieces. Questions of school organization and course considerations take control of the system of education's curriculum considerations. It is the Prussian Richtlinien (Guideline) of 1925 that first triggers a new boom of pedagogical considerations about the curriculum question. Dorpfeld had at one point referred to future relationships as the legitimation of the curriculum, but finally decided: ,,The necessity comes ... from the concept of all-around education (Bildung)." 209 After the transition from ,,theory of all-around education (Bildung)" to a primary orientation on work and career, this sort of self-evidence could no longer offer a sufficient orientation for reflections in the system of education. If the elementary school was really supposed to handle all children and when as a consequence, higher demands are made on the materials' function of mobilization, then normative conditions, as they are formulated in the concept of all-around education (Bi/dung), can no longer be maintained. And yet, a replacement of the all-around education (Bi/dung) concept does not seem to be in sight, because in the midst of the scientific enterprise, with which one is now quite involved, the concept seems to promise independence. In this precarious reflection situation, pedagogical considerations about curriculum, in so far as they have not wandered into the domain of ,,eternal" values, do not extend beyond subject-related ,,fundamentals."210 The same all-around education (Bi/dung) for all - in the sense of what material is covered - is no longer considered possible. The selection of material becomes the task of the teacher. That is a position, from which contents cannot be deduced. The question of how autonomy can be further filled poses itself. 211

209 210

211

To Willmann: ,,Die folgenreichste Verstandigung aber, welche die wissenschaftliche Didaktik zu stiften vennag, ist die zwischen der geistlichen und weltlichen Lehrerschaft, eine wesentliche Bedingung der einheitlichen und sittlichen Wirkung des Unterrichts. Eine rationalistische Padagogik wirkt hier trennend ... ," Ibid., p. 57. Dorpfeld, Grund/inien einer Theorie des Lehrplans, zuntichst fur Vo/ks- und Miltelschulen, p. 21. Cf. Erich Weniger, Die Grundlagen des Geschichtsunterrichts: Untersuchungen zur geisteswissenscha/1/ichen Didaktik, Leipzig 1926; Weniger, Didaktik als Bildungslehre, part I: Theorie der Bildungsinhalte und des Lehrplans. Weniger's curriculum theory - as a reconstruction of a complex model of curriculum classes and conditions against the background of a decision process of ,.objective powers" - leaves precisely the place of the function of pedagogical semantics open, if one does not already consider pedagogical responsibility and well-intended hope regarding a normative concept of state to be adequate guarantees. Also see Herwig

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TI1e dilenuna lies, to formulate it abstractly, in tlle relations between the fact dimension and tlle social dimension under the conditions of increasing size, increasing complexity, and functional specification. The selection of materials and the composition of the curriculum become a problem. On one hand, one cannot decide on them from a didactic perspective alone and one cannot only take the social conditions of instructional success into consideration. From all of tlle materials that can be used, the instruction automatically selects those which reach pupils and stick. But one cannot make this sort of anticipation of conditions and limits of didactic ability into a guiding principle for selecting material in advance. On the other hand, there is a lack of criteria for what is important that are inunanent to the material. The curriculum cannot be determined using questions such as: -What is worthwhile to hand down? -What must be protected and communicated without a doubt? -What will be used in the future based on an immanent logic of relevance? And even if it was possible to proceed in this manner, the basis for it would be so uncertain that the question would have to be asked, whether the pedagogues have a right to make such far-reaching decisions, and if so, why. The more general ability they attribute to themselves, the more problematic their legitimation becomes. If no one has the competence to creating curriculums, however, the selection is left [indirectly -trans.] up to whatever fails in the pursuit of universal ambitions, and one would have to be satisfied with adjusting expectations belatedly according to what has already happened. In another way than that which Weniger imagined, 212 it would then have come to a selection through ,,existential concentration" and the curriculum planning would have had to write the memoirs of the system. In this situation, in which pedagogical semantics - recognizing that the all-around education formula (Bildungsformel) no longer sufficiently symbolizes the limitations on what is possible - accepts its so-called selfrelease from pedagogical care of the curriculum structure, both the organization and science prove themselves still to be dependable ( external) factors that push the system of education onwards when pedagogical orienta-

212

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Blankerz's criticism of Weniger (Theorien und Mode/le der Didaktik, 2nd ed., Munich 1969, p. 116ff.) with the interesting consequence of holding onto - in spite of this - a ,,nur noch formal umschreibbaren Bildungsbegriff' (p. 121 ). Weniger, Didaktik als Bildungslehre, Tei/ 1: Theorie der Bi/dungsinhalte und des Lehrplans, p. 95ff.

tion is in a slump. After the school system, which developed under the occupying powers in the wake of a lost war, became a ,,school chaos," the ,,Deutsche AusschuJ3 ftir das Erziehungs- und Bildungswesen" (,,German Committee for the system of education and all-around education") was founded in 1953 with the task of ,,observing the development of the German system of education and all-around education (Bi/dungswesen) and supporting them with advice and suggestions."213 Without wanting to acknowledge every contribution and suggestion of this committee here, one can say: in the reflection on the curriculum structure, the attempt was made to show that a certain standardization in creating schools proved that the contingency and complexity of the possible instructional contents could be handled. 214 However one judges the suggestions, their partial realization, and the resulting effects - they are focused on the organizational domain; for this reason, they were also ovenun by a world-wide development, which distinguishes itself as a curricular movement from the work of the ,,Deutscher AusschuJ3" not only by its attempt at totality, but also - in connection with the ,,scientification" of the notion of world through its world-wide scientific vigor in dealing with reality. In such boom times, it is apparently unnecessary to have a semantic geared to being conclusive in the system of education; it is certainly not necessary as long as reflection in the system of education is entirely caught up with the triggered renewals. It is only when consequences became clear, when the question of how the actual selection of materials should be made according to the scientific orientation was posed against the background of an all-around education formula (Bildungsforme/), which had lost its contours - it is only when all this had happened that the autonomy question becomes (once again) virulent. If the issue of internal perspectives for selection is brought up, then the institutions, which up until then had carried the main burden of this reduction - the various subjects - become precarious.215 The subjects must then be stabilized once again. The curriculum213

214 215

From paragraph 1 of the committee's assignment. The committee finished its work on July 1, 1965. See Hans Bohnenkamp, Walter Dirks, and Doris Knab, Empfehlungen 11nd Gutachten des De11tschen A11sschusses far das Erzieh11ngs- 11nd Bild11ngswesen I 953-1965, Stuttgart 1966. Fiir 11nd wider den Rahmenplan, ed. Alfons 0. Schorb, Stuttgart 1960. See Herwig Blankertz, Fachdidaktische C11rricu/11mforsch11ng: Strokturanstitze Jar Geschichte, Deutsch, Biologie, Essen 1973; Frank Achtenhagen and Peter Menck, ,,Langfristige Curriculumentwicklung und mittelfristige Curriculumforschung," in C11rricu/11mrevision, eds. Achtenhagen and Meyer.

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movement ends up in a new consciousness regarding the handling and selection of material, which relies on abstracter patterns and is subjectrelated. 216 The current problem appears to be dealing with what has, due to the lack of internal perspectives for selection, become an overwhelming problem of the selection of material on the social dimension by a superior and more effective performance of reduction. Either one agrees on the selection of material, or one allows the pupil to select from a given offering. 217 The question of how adequate these attempts are in the sense of a guiding formula of contingency seems to have been forgotten, although the characteristics of ,,ability to learn" are fulfilled to a great extent. The patterns that order the material cannot be deciphered. 218 Sociologically seen, that is precisely the function of such patterns: because they symbolize a notion of unity, the universality of which requires no normative conditions in the system of education as long as it specifies the education function - in other words, as long as the pattern of unique representation of reality adjusts to the world on the one hand, and, on the other hand, connects its premisses to the contingency formula. 219 With that, one level of reflection would be in place, which could be understood as a collection of perspectives that maintains the ,,middle" both when faced with effectivity perspectives as well as with the ,,pedagogical relationship."

XIV. Reflection's development of form The row of symbolically generalized formulas, which the system of education brings into use in order to structure the contingencies resulting from functional differentiation (of the system from others), offers Pedagogy issues for interpretive re-specification. These formulas restrict the system 216

217 218

219

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To show it in one formula: instead of didactic principles (for example Hans Scheuer], Die exemplarische Lehre, 3rd ed., Tiibingen 1969), structure grids or theory of science. A larger number of didactic, subject-related publications follow this scheme. Cf. the extensive pedagogical literature listed under the key phrase: ,,open curriculum." We can hardly imagine that the authors themselves understand the ,,theoretical scientific justifications" for didactic preparation in the subject, which are often only mentioned in brief introductions, as serious, science-related considerations. Interest in what is right; illusiveness of reality; relativity of understanding; and others. See the promising works by Klaus Giel and Gotthilf G. Hiller on a ,,multiperspective instruction" for the domain of elementary school (factual instruction), cf. Klaus Giel and others, Stucke zu einem mehr-perspeklivischen Unterricht, Stuttgart 1974.

so little that the system not only can, but must claim autonomy for its business. Without cutting possibilities short here, however, one can also see the row as a row and analyze it from the standpoint of noncoincidence. That is what we will touch upon here within the context of a theory of socio-structural evolution. For all evolutionary structure changes, the problem of explaining the extent and the pace of innovations, which are in and of themselves unlikely, presents itself. 220 If one considers all systems' continual dependence on the environment and, at the same time, the difficulties of fitting structural changes into a complex larger arrangement, then one has to explain the factually given pace of evolution by identifying particular accelerators, or, one must assume that provable structural traits of given systems accommodate further evolution particularly well. We can not handle the problems of the theory of socio-cultural evolution, with which this is bound up, here; but we do want to place the history of reflection in the system of education in this context. Our thesis is: symbolic structures of the societal system cannot explain or control its evolution, but they do act as vital accelerators of the process. TI1ey accelerate and they make critical gains in time possible through the way in which they provisionally negotiate that which is old and new. In the process (however it is triggered) of functional differentiation of the system of education (from other systems), a specific sorts of reflection problems present themselves. To the degree in which changes are visible, one assumes a contrast between old and new, but one cannot simply put the new in the place of the old. 221 The restructuring of the societal system in the direction of functional differentiation is completed in processes of self-substitution. There is pressure on this restructuring to connect up to 220

221

A well-known starting point for criticism of the original version of Darwin's evolution theory. See, for instance, Jack Lester King and Thomas H. Jukes, ,,NonDarwinian Evolution," Science 164, 1969, pp. 788-798. This statement must be modified for the special domain of art and, in particular, for the changes of style, because due to the closedness of the individual works of art, it is possible to have new developments which have relatively few connections. The greater freedom of new art in dealing with old art was, particularly in the 17th and 18th centuries - one thinks of the ,,querelle des anciens et des modemes" - a factor that went beyond art. In the 18th century, there were other ways as well in which the newly formed pedagogy was influenced by the (not yet merely ,,aesthetic") art doctrine - as with the form concept, the concept of all-around education (Bildungsbegriff), and the notion of education as art. That makes the issue an historically complicated one, as can be shown in the following.

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old structures, as the society cannot simply be given up and then started from scratch again. 222 With increasing system differentiation, and especially with the transition to a new form of societal differentiation, this problem of connecting up becomes very real. The differentiation of special functions and function systems (from other systems) can only succeed if a new form of function fulfillment - for instance, public schools - is made available for every case. If, along with this, universalistic forms of problem solving take the place of particular - namely group or class-specific - ways of solving problems, then it is precisely this universalism that demands the incorporation of old institutions and the population groups that support them within the new order. Transition to democracy can not mean that the classes that lead politics up until then will be left with no say - for instance, that the right to vote will be kept from the aristocracy. Increasing differentiation, writes Parsons, ,,cannot be merely 'separation', but must be capable of continuing 'inclusion' in the same system, hence have a sufficient compatibility with the older system from which it has differentiated to remain within the same more complex and assume a certain complementarity to the reshaped older elements."223 This insight can be formulated in a sharper and more abstract way as follows: a function system which differentiates itself (from other systems) is indeed able to negate positions in the society that reject it, but it cannot negate the society in its entirety or its single function systems; otherwise, it would invariably have to take on the society's counter-negation. The negation that leads to structural renewal must, in other words, remain asymmetric and incorporated in a context that can still be interpreted in the function system and its societal environment. 224 For these reasons, it is clear that the movement that introduced the differentiation of a system of education (from other systems) for the larger population in the 18th century cannot simply disavow the existing carriers of the education process, namely the family and the system of religion. One limits oneself to criticizing the form, in which educational tasks have 222 223

224

l 16

Also see Niklas Luhmann, .,Identitatsgebrauch in selbstsubstitutiven Ordnungen, besonders Gesellschaften." Talcott Parson, ,,Some Considerations on the Comparative Sociology," in The Social Sciences and the Comparative Study of Educational Systems, ed. Joseph Fischer, Scranton, Pa. I 970, p. 204, 201-220. On symmetrical and asymmetrical negating in this sense, see Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, manuscript: Ober gegen-kulturelle Funktionen der literatur im hohen und spiiten Millelalter, Bielefeld 1977.

been fulfilled up until now -- for instance, criticizing the habit, which was common in the higher classes, of entrusting the education of children to the personnel. 225 But that means that on the level of reflection, syntheses must be found for the relationship between family, religion, and education, which avoid mutual obstruction and are able to place the connection between family, religion, and education in the service of functional differentiation. In general, one can say that the anthropological influence on philosophy and the moralization of religion, as well as the later ,,economizing" of the citizen and the society, all prepared suitable transition concepts. In particular for the system of education, we have considered the shift to humane perfection to be a continuation that made discontinuation possible. The fm1her development through all-around education (Bi/dung) and to the ability to learn, in spite of all of the continuations in semantic contents and conceptual traditions, finally gets rid of these conditions of plausibility of the transition period. The differentiated (from other systems) system of education, which exists as an enormous organization system in schools and universities, makes itself plausible; because who would want to deny that institutions of this sort must exist in our society! This result of development changed the structural conditions for reflection in the system of education. Following the completion of differentiation (of the system from others) and its safeguarding through organizations, the borders of further progress and, even more, the resulting problems of functional societal differentiation that is carried far become visible. Similar changes come to light in other function systems of the society so that one must count on a deep-reaching change in the assumptions and conditions of plausible communication through the society. Thus, for instance, the question arises as to how far the negating apparatus of criticism of bourgeois society, such as the works of Rousseau, Hegel, or Marx, must be dragged along. Certainly, one does find sufficient ammunition leftovers from past wars; but as a business of reflection, criticism runs 225

Cf. the texts listed above in footnote 146. See also Roger Mercier, L 'en/ant dans la societe du XVll!fe siec/e (avant I 'Emile), Dakar 1961. The quick wave of criticism of the educational practice of the Jesuit Order at the start of the 18th century, which finally resulted in stopping it, had a similar limiting function: The Order was a target point - and only that explains the intensity and the success of the criticim - on which one could complete the detachment of the system of religion without having to negate the function of religion and its meaning for the people yet to be educated.

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empty today, because it is too seldom clear how existing problems can be solved by negating negativity. 226 The changes that can be seen in this manner on the level of the society's structure, can also be seen in the semantic of contingency formulas, which runs parallel. Their transformation goes, as shown, from perfection to all-around education (Bi/dung) to ability to learn. In the course of this change, societal ability to determine in advance is removed from the formulas and open contingency is inserted into them. The societally justified, estate-specific perfection, with which the society itself - as a stratified system - had to grasp onto contingency and transform it into order, is at first replaced by the harmony principle of all-around education (Bi/dung), which is different in every individual and in this sense contingent, but which also must be realized as an inner necessity on the basis of individuality. This solution is once again overcome in that the individual begins to be educated towards the goals of internal contingency, namely, his ability to learn is supposed to be increased. With that, the notion of holding the contingency open for whatever comes becomes the direction principle, and the society itself once again becomes envirorunent, which produces that which is to be learned; although now, it is an open envirorunent with an uncertain future. While this line of development works the contingency problem into the contingency formula, thus tailoring the contingency formula to its function, it simultaneously causes education to approach its specific function. The formula becomes more closely tailored to the particular problems of the system of education. In the course of the semantic work on reformulations, this need for function exactness and exclusivity comes to a fore. Kajetan Weiller, for instance, rejects the formulas ,,blissful happiness" and ,,completeness" because they encompass all hwnan striving and not only education227 and they do not sufficiently differentiate education from other art forms. Similar reservations, however, can also be seen in response to the overly ,,philosophical" theory of all-around education (Bi/dung). It is the specialization on ability to learn that first appears to 226

227

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We are also thinking here of relatively strict forms of ,,Jdeologiekritik" (criticism of ideology), namely about criticism of theory that is dependent on theory, which attempts to prove with its own theory that opponents of the theory have to think the way that they do. To what extent this form of criticism can be normalized as a moment in sociological theory development remains to be seen. Kajetan Weiller, Versuch eines Lehrgebaudes der Erziehungskunde, vol. l, Munich 1802, pp. 65ff, 78f.

indicate a function that is demanded all over in the society, but on which no other function system can set its primary focus. Such structural and semantic changes also touch and change the reflection style that the system of education uses when it focuses on itself, and on its special perspective in the society, in discussion. The fust phase of a self-asserting reflection, which sought new syntheses and, in the process, geared itself to human beings as human beings - that phase ended with the build-up of a school system, the start-up of pedagogical research, and the differentiation (from other systems) of a pedagogical establishment (which did not do instruction directly). This was followed by a reform reflection, with which precisely this establislunent attempted to voice its objection to having not achieved various goals. Reform reflections make themselves dependent on the historical situation, in which they exist. They start with a knowledge of the circumstances and aim to replace situations, which have known drawbacks, with situations, which have unknown drawbacks. In other words, they use the time difference between known and unknown situations as their impulse to action. 228 Relative to the overall state of knowledge, it suffices for these theories to be greatly simplified and with ideological coverings. The shift of chance equity from being a premise into being a demand on reality from an input value to an output value - belongs in this context, for example. 229 But the reform enthusiasm, as a mere amelioration, as something in pursuit of a mere intention to increase/intensify, remains unreflected. It does not care to accept any limits to what is reachable and, therefore, it cannot assess that which is achieved as anything but deficient. Precisely the connect between immanent self-limitation and structural diversification, however, is a technical connection and thus a reflection 228

229

Older authors offer the notion of a difference in knowledge when formulating the same problem of reform. At the beginning of the first book of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity by Richard Hooker (1593, quoted from the edition by the Everyman's Library, vol. I, London 1954, p. 148) it is written, for instance: ,,He that goth about to persuade a multitude, that they are not so well governed as they ought to be, shall never want attentive and favourable hearers; because they know the manifold defects whereunto every kind of regiment is subject, but the secret lets and difficulties, which in public proceedings are innumerable and inevitable, they have not ordinarily the judgment to consider." This leads to an elite conservatism, whereas according to our concept, reform movements are a product of the pace and depth of changes. Cf. on this change, James S. Coleman, ,,The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity," Harvard Educational Review 38, 1968, pp. 7-22. Cf. also part 3, chapter VII.

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demand of the ability to learn. 230 With the option of this formula, therefore, the state of reflection in the system of education would change again. The reform reflection, which only measures the state of fulfillment of urueachable ideal goals, can be transformed into a relativizing reflection, which registers the results of functional differentiation of the society and, on hand from these results, can also question the principle on which it relies itself. It is a consequence of functional differentiation of the system of education (from other systems), for example, that there is no longer a regulating scarcity for Pedagogy itself - no longer any moral of humility. Instead, scarcities are experienced as being externally imposed, as issues of money or its derivatives, such as buildings or positions. Similarly, pedagogical goals are externalized in the state in so far as they require decisions that bind the collective. The high resilience of democratically structured politics to handle demands for decisions creates a barrier here, for which there are no meaningful correlates in pedagogical thinking. That ,,reforms" fail in the decision phase (rather than in the realization) is turned into a reproach against politics. A similar case would be to say that families educate in a way that makes ,,compensating" intervention necessary; and, structurally analogous - the system of education believes that due to its relationship with the sciences, it is necessary to prepare science's production of themes in a ,,subject-based didactic" manner. In the process of function-specific improvements, the functional differentiation of the society led to border phenomena in all of these directions, which every function system had to work out for itself. The question is whether the system of education and, within it, Pedagogy, can react to all of these increasing border problems with adequate reflection forms, or if it can only react with a trend-based oscillation between demands, reproaches, and resignation. Relativizing reflection is a concept suited to this situation. It relates the demand for the ability to learn not only to the human being, who is to be educated, but also to profession of educator, 231 and even to the system of education as a whole. Opportunities for learning appear in the system of education as a result of its differentiation (from other systems), they are structurally determined, and they come up over and over, primarily in the border relations to other function systems. Including them in system re230 231

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See above, the middle of part I, chapter XII. See Niklas Luhmann and Karl Eberhard Schorr, ,,Ausbildung fur Professionen: Oberlegungen zum Cuniculum fur Lehrerausbildung," Jahrbuch fur Erziehungswissenschaft 1976, pp. 247-277.

flection means that the system must see its own autonomy as a variable that is dependent on differentiation, and it must attribute the principle, on which it is based, to the structurally determined state of problems, in which it finds itself. Thus, autonomy - in the system itself as well as in its societal environment - becomes a handicap, which can be gotten rid of through learning. One can, then, no longer deny that a relativizing reflection might question the conditions of its own possibility - the basis of its system. It is this last form of reflection that has the capability to want itself in spite of this and - prepared to learn - to limit itself.

XV. Reflection of autonomy Functionally differentiated societal systems make their subsystems autonomous - they force subsystem autonomy as a correlate to higher complexity in the society. They do this in large part without paying attention to what technical competence the subsystems have, which could enable them to handle their own autonomy. What the pedagogues see as a hard-won area of freedom and as a value is at the same time a structurally imposed compulsion - namely, a necessary condition for the differentiation of specific function systems (from other systems) and for the unburdening of other function systems from tasks that they can no longer connect to through operations. On the one hand, from the perspective of Pedagogy, a field of activity is laid claim to for an anticipated ability; on the other hand, and this is the perspective of societal theory, a function domain is pegged out and then it is asked, whether it can be filled technologically. We will concern ourselves with societal theory's view of technology problems in the system of education in the second part of this book. We want to conclude the first part with the question of how autonomy can be reflected within the system of education itself under these conditions. We will start once again from previous attempts at reflection. 232 It is common to handle the problem in a hierarchical form, in which Pedagogy itself - in so far as it is science - appears to be the culmination point and the actual location of autonomy. Gerhard Kropp, 233 for example, distinguishes three levels: the actual educational happenings within the 232 233

Cf. above chapter VII. Gerhard Kropp, ,,Das Problem der Autonomie der Piidagogik," Bi/dung und Erziehung 19, 1966, pp. 163-173. Also see the similar distinction in Erich Weniger, Die Eigenstandigkeit der Erziehung, p. 75.

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framework of the school organization, the pedagogical thinking and wishing of the individual teachers, and Pedagogy itself as the science of education. These levels are at the same time steps of increasing autonomy or decreasing societal dependencies. According to this, the actual guarantee of autonomy is Pedagogy itself. Pedagogy wins its autonomy as science by setting up an exchange of ideas in an interdisciplinary context and accepting influences, but at the same time ensuring its independence in regards to its own subject matter. This means that the lower levels only control a derivative autonomy, namely, in so far as they are educated in Pedagogy, as in the case of teachers, or are planned in a pedagogical manner, as with schools. Every reflection focuses selectively on the system to which it belongs. That is a necessary procedure and cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, the specific options which underlie a particular reflection can be uncovered and questioned. For the case at hand, we think that three aspects are worthy of note: (1) Autonomy is not claimed for the system of education as a whole; in-

stead, it is claimed above all for a domain that can at can be a subsystem in the system of education (and at the same time can be a subsystem in the scientific system): pedagogical research and doctrine. Actual educational goings-on are considered to be only the ,,subject matter" of Pedagogy. (2) The autonomy is not based on the characteristics of a technology (as it is with every doctor, who has a definite grasp on a technique of diagnosis and therapy and therefore can tell his patient: if you do not follow my advice, it is your funeral). (3) Instead, the basis of autonomy is sought within the scientific character of Pedagogy - that means, in a structure that is not specific to education; one could also say: it is sought in and made dependent on science. This option corresponds to an unusual in-between state in the process of functional differentiation, which we also saw in the contingency formula of all-around education (Bi/dung). The problem of autonomy has already been stated, but it has not yet been solved autonomously. Pedagogy no longer understands itself (and independent from that: it no longer understands the system of education) as an annex of religion or as a means for the specialized ends of the economy or politics. But this distance is caused 122

because Pedagogy has taken on the form of science, in particular - the basic relation between cognition and subject matter. According to this, education does not guarantee the autonomy of the function system because it is education, but rather, because it is the subject matter of a cognition which for its part has to obey the criteria of science and thus becomes externally directed. If one accepts this, then one must discuss the relationship between ,,theory and praxis," one must face the demands of applied sciences, one finds oneself confronted with inner-scientific problems of definition and is led to conceptualization strategies, language forms, and decisions that - and this becomes more and more clear today - raise difficult questions about its ,,relationship to praxis." As science, Pedagogy can always retreat to the usual distance to the subject matter, to the hypothetical, to provisions, to being merely analytically relevant, and to problems of complexity in theory and subject matter. As a subsystem of the scientific system, Pedagogy could not be taught as such. As is true for all subjects, a particular subject didactic of general didactics would have to mediate Pedagogy's own didactic, until finally, the suspicion would arise that the guarantee of autonomy only holds for what appears to outsiders to be this science's inextricable complex of thought processes. At the very latest, one would then have to consider whether one could reach simplifications that would pay off by uncoupling heterogeneous functions. The field of education could conduct and intensify research about education according to these rules in the context of the scientific system; that this happens and how this happens, however, would no longer serve as an argument for the autonomy of the system of education, not to mention as a guarantee of this autonomy. In this respect as well, the reliance of the system borders' on science and on the overlapping domain of education/research must be given up. Just as the theory of science today considers the ,,pedagogisme" of its concepts and theories as a transition phase in its own development from life world conditions to differentiation (from other theories), 234 the system of education's reflections must also be able to separate themselves from ,,scientisms" when they focus on themselves and in the praxis of education (if, indeed, they are ever forced into this realm). 1bis does not make an orientation on the results of genuine scientific research impossible; to the contrary, it is what makes such an orientation possible in the first place. If it comes to this caesura, then the problem of the autonomy of the system of education would have to be posed anew. One could use neither 234

According to Gaston Bachelard, le malerialisme ralionnel, 3rd ed., Paris 1972, pp. 27f, 30.

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the scientific character of all-around education (Bi/dung), which is asserted,235 nor the scientific character of Pedagogy to justify autonomy. In the place of directly referring to its own scientific character - the place of the taking-oneself-for-science-and-therefore-for-autonomous-stance there would have to be an orientation on theory-led scientific research, which would take up the problem of autonomy of the system of education and focus on it. Scientific theories would retain their specific subjectrelated meaning in the context of the scientific system. Within that system, they would have to pay attention to ,,methodological justice," to connectivity, and to comparability. It would not be adequate for a sociological theory, for instance, to conceptualize autonomy and reflection in the system of education through terms that are principally different (because they are dealing with education) than those used to conceptualize autonomy and reflection in religion, politics, economics, and science. For the system of education, then, scientific theories would function as custom-made suggestions for reflection, which could be used to relate experiences accumulated daily to their system context, to give them a more general meaning, and eventually, to equip them with possibilities for variation. These thoughts have consequences for the conceptual fommlation of the problem of autonomy in the system of education as well as for its justification. The analyses, which we are carrying out here, try to do justice to this problem. Due to socio-structural reasons, the system of education is autonomous (and not merely because it realizes a singular idea and must clear room for that idea to develop). Autonomy can be explained by the fact that societal differentiation (of the system from others), allows the system of education to be contingent and to be aware of contingency. Contingency means both that something ,,is also possible otherwise" and therefore ,,can be influenced" or ,,is dependent." Within the system, contingency refers factually to the curricula; temporally to the sequencing of teaching and learning, which is not sufficiently set by the curricula; and socially to the relationships between educator and pupil, which can be arranged in various possible ways. All of this is set in motion without there being any one single point - for instance, the curriculum or the ,,pedagogical relationship" - from which everything else can be determined. In this way, contingency becomes the mode of the system. The 18th century still concerned itself with ,,nature" in hopes of winning a stable basis. The 19th century believed it was in the position - not least 235

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Cf. above a page into chapter XI, particularly the discussion of the ,.theory of allaround education (Bi/dung)."

of all due to a new trust in organization - to do without this certainty or to put it again in abstractions that need to be interpreted. Contingency then becomes the reflection concept that is most general and that is necessary to system, and autonomy becomes a symbol for the notion that that which is necessary is also wanted. Thus, the problem of autonomy does not lie in justifying an idea of purpose, but rather in filling up the extra room that was created through differentiation (of the system from others). The reflection of autonomy cannot satisfy itself by propagating the idea, for which independence and university chairs are demanded; it must establish the relation to contingency. That is the reason why we have interpreted the guiding ideas of the system of education as contingency formulas. Their function does not lie in the mere proclamation of what has achieved completion, but rather in the limitation of that which is possible - upon which the system constitutes itself. Such an orientation alone, however, does not manage to fill up the extra room. It gives a form to the contingency, but it does not eliminate the experience that everything could also be different - it only structures that experience. It does not end the process of reflection; it merely gives that process a framework for further themes. Most significantly, through this return to contingency, the technology problem gains importance for reflection. Because, when considering highly contingent relationships, the question of whether the technology of education in schools and universities is sufficient to set-up a self-regulated, function-oriented praxis becomes central. It is not so much the defense against intervention that is a question, but rather the system's own general ability. It is obvious that the interaction in institutions of the system of education that have been differentiated (from other systems) influences pupils and students. There is no doubt that it makes a difference whether one attends school or not; therefore, there is an indisputable causality of instruction. The reflection of autonomy first starts up when one asks whether the system of education influences its own procedures and how it does so - in other words, how it adjusts itself to the environment or to successes and failures by changing its premises. One can (or should) speak of technology only when a behavior is so transparent in its relational structure that it lies opens to intervention. In this way, the concepts ,,autonomy" and ,,technology" correspond to each other, and clarifying the system's technology becomes a vital task of a reflection of autonomy. Because, it is only when the relational structure of the effects of actions is 125

sufficiently transparent that one can make meaningful decisions about interventions in the process; and it is only when this is possible, that the system can steer itself. A functioning technology does not ensure successes - it does not necessarily mean an improvement in education performance - because it has in no way been claimed that all of the relevant causes can be controlled. But it is a necessary condition for filtering out characteristics of situations and problems that can be relevant on higher levels and can be left up to aggregated decision. Technology is thus a precondition of creating a hierarchy, 236 and only hierarchical systems can update autonomy through decisions about decisions. Thus, technology or instructional technology is in no way ,,only a technical problem" in the sense of merely instrumentalizing given goals. The concept indicates far more the processual basis of system rationality. Adequate technology, historically seen, is not a precondition for processes of differentiation (of systems from other systems), nor one for autonomy and for reflection. These are results of a predisposition that came about through societal evolution. But they also only indicate the framework needed for possible rationality · - what remains is the question of how it should be filled out. We are under the impression that ever since talk of ,,educational instruction" began, there has been a hidden dominance of the theme of technology in reflection. But, because the technology does not correspond to this postulate, it itself was not considered worthy of reflection; the system does not identify itself with its technology, but rather with its ideals - and the reflection is diverted in that direction. In the second part of our analysis, we will introduce in more detail the conceptual provisions that initially, when the technology was not secured, had to take on the burden of reflection, until finally, after the differentiation of the system of education (from other systems) had become selfevident, the relationship benveen ability to learn and the technology deficiency begins to determine more and more the way functionally differentiated (as a system from others) education reflects on its identity.

236

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That also goes, mutatis mulandis, for organic systems. On this comparison in the framework of a general theoty of hierarchical system differentiation, see Hierarchy Theory: The Challenge of Complex Sys/ems, ed. Howard H. Pattee, New York 1973.

Part 2: Pedagogy between Technique and Reflection I.

Pedagogy in the midst of self-created instructional problems

Instruction is a form of intensifying education performance that has been known since earlier times. It requires the institution and the chain-like repetition of particular interaction systems with complementary roles for teachers and pupils - usually one teacher and several pupils. With this in place, functional specification is already realized on the level of interaction systems, and without this condition - without this proof of institutional possibilities - the societal-wide differentiation of a function system for education (from other systems), which included all people, could not have been sta1ted. If instruction serves in this way as catalyst for a differentiation process that affects the entire society, then this differentiation process must, for its part, also change expectations in regards to instruction. The old concepts ,,educatio, institutio, instructio" are discarded and, towards the end of the 18th century, the hybrid formula ,,educational instruction" emerges. 237 While Diderot is still clearly seeing and saying that plans for an ,,state 237

One can assume that the certainty of basics, which was necessary for this, came about due to the widespread Kant reception at German universities in the 90s. But the Kantian Johann Heinrich Gottlieb Heusinger still distinguishes sharply between education and instruction (Beytrag zur Berichtigung einiger Begriffe uber Erziehung und Erziehungskunst, Halle 1794, pp. 67ff, in particular p. I 09f.; Ver such eines lehrbuchs der Erziehungskunst, Leipzig 1795, pp. XIV, 90ff.). Not long after, Karl Heinrich Ludwig Politz, Die Erziehungswissenschaft, aus dem Zwecke der Menschheit und des Staates practisch dargestelll, Leipzig 1806, vol. II, p. 323, rejects this distinction as overstated and with that, makes room for an understanding of the matter that is fundamentally different. Max Jahn considers Karl Gunther's Kurze Theorie der Unterrichtskunst nach den Grundsdtzen der kritischen Philosophie, Zullichau 1796, to be the first theory of educational instruction that is fully worked out (see: Der Einflu/3 der

kantischen Psychologie au/ die Ptidagogik als Wissenschaft: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der neueren philosophischen Ptidagogik, Leipzig 1885, p. 33f.). But it is still possible in 1798 for someone in practice (B.M. Snethlage, Ober den gegenwdrtigen Zustand der niedern Schu/en und ihre zweckmdjJigere Einrichtung, Munster 1798, p. 17) to say: ,.Thoricht war' es freilich, von den Schulen mehr zu erwarten, als sie ihrer Natur nach zu leisten im Stande sind: sie konnen nicht erziehen, d.h. den Menschen nach richtigen Grundslitzen zu handeln gewohnen; sie konnen nur unterrichten, die Fiihigkeiten entwickeln, und den Geist mit nutzlichen Kenntnissen bereichem."

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school system (enseignement public)" have to take place at the cost of individuality, 238 precisely that notion is denied as Pedagogy begins to form itself so as to penetrate into the schools. That which is evident disappears. The formula ,,educational instruction" registers changed expectations that will be applied as postulates for reform having to do with technical aspects of instruction and even organization. 239 Through instruction, the ends and structure of education become more of a problem than they were earlier. People become critical, but also optimistic in regards to the combination or even the unification of education and instruction. 240 The Philanthropists still see instruction as a partial step in the larger complex of education and as a step that specializes on the formation knowledge. Even with all the emphasis on the interdependence of educators and teachers, the function of each is still clearly distinguished. 241 Around the turn of the century, however, the school shifts into such a central place in all considerations about education and reforms that Pedagogy concentrates more and more on school instruction and even demands the perfo1mance of education by schools. But the technology of instruction does not follow along. In correspondence with socio-structural changes, the room that education has for its function enlarges and deepens itself to an endlessly open inner horizon in which nothing has to be set in any one place. In the second half of the 18th century, a literature written by school men for school men comes into being in an amount and with a speed in appearance and reception that had never been seen before. This literature finds its most important orientation in the new critical philosophy. The process of the acquisition and reception of this philosophy - which for its own part had 238

239 240 241

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,,Mais des lois propres a la generalite des esprits ne peuvent etre des lois particulieres; utiles au grand nombre, il faut necessairement que quelques individus en soient leses," and: ,,La maniere d'elever cent etudiants dans une ecole est precisement !'inverse de la maniere d'en enseigner un seul a cote de soi," it goes in Plan d'une universite pour le gouvernement de Russie (quoted from: CEuvres completes, vol. lll, Paris 1875, p. 434, 429-534). De Bonneval judges similarly, Reflexions sur le premier age de /'homme, Paris 1751, p. 25: what is useful to the fatherland goes before individual justice. For example in E. G. Graff, Die fiir die Einfiihrung eines erziehenden Unterrichts nolhwendige Umwandlung der Schulen, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1818. Cf. for example Joseph Schram, Die Verbesserung der Schulen in moralischpolitischer, piidagogischer und polizeilicher Hinsichl, Dortmund 1803. Cf. for example Karl Schrader, Die Erziehungstheorie des Phi/anthropismus (Versuch eines Systems), Langensalza 1928, p. 78ff.

features that was in part thoroughly speculative, hypothetical, and with specialized thought techniques - strengthens the feeling of there being a certainty at the basis. 242 But even if pedagogues had managed to write a fourth Critique: the certainty of a point of view that is a priori valid could not have replaced practical regulations for the behavior of pedagogues. Whatever holds a priori may, like a stopper, be able to prevent the waters of speculation from draining out so that one is left on dry ground. But is it possible to swim - and how and where? Pedagogy thus faces the question of how it can handle the demands for regulations, which come from the far too uncertain, but still demanding situation. Should it go about doing this, for instance, as a science with the help of truth guarantees from its own scientific character? 243 Or by a translation into organization forms that help the new goals to be realized? The ,,theory of all-around education [Bi/dung]" suggested by Humboldt simply reformulates the problem and puts it into the hands of the individual, whom Pedagogy, the school, and the instruction should merely help in his education of himself. In this society, the individual, world, and science must definitely be understood as endlessly open horizons of selfdetermination. 244 But that alone does not help Pedagogy in a way that is specific enough to the problem. Instead, it is more that Pedagogy is called upon in this historical-societal situation to create its own limitationality. In a period that makes new general formulas and collective-singulars all over245 in order to reformulate the expansion of orientation, which was 242

243

244

245

Cf. Jonathan Schuderoff, Briefe iiber moralische Erziehung in Hinsicht auf die ne11este Philosophie, Leipzig 1792; Johann Christoph Greiling, Ober den Endzweck der Erzieh11ng und uber den ersten Grundsatz einer Wissenschaft derselben, Schneeberg 1793; Johann Heinrich Heusinger, Beytrag zur Berichtigung einiger Begriffe uber Erzieh11ng und Erziehungskunst, Halle 1794; Heusinger, Versuch eines Lehrbuchs der Erziehungskunsl, Leipzig 1795. The scientific nature of the new basis (!) is highly praised, but seldom analyzed critically. An exception: Ritter, ,,Kritik der Padagogik zum Beweis der Nothwendigkeit einer allgemeinen Erziehungs-Wissenschaft," Philosophisches Journal 8, 1798, pp. 47-85. On the corresponding transformations of the concept of world cf. Ingetrud Pape, ,,Von den 'moglichen Welten' zur 'Welt des Moglichen': Leibniz im modemen Verstandnis," S1udia Leibnitiana Supplemenla I, files from the International Leibniz Congress in Hannover 1966, vol. I, Wiesbaden 1968, pp. 266-287. On this and on the creation of ideologies that was triggered by it, see the introduction written by Reinhart Koselleck to the Worterbuch Geschichlliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur polilisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutsch/and, vol. I, Stuttgart 1972, in particular p. XVIlf.

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triggered by evolution, it is also an obvious course for Pedagogy to cover its own need with the help of symbolic generalizations - to put forth, if not ideals, than at least general ends, which education was to serve. 246 With that, the problem is pushed into the realm of the normative, where it remains correct when and precisely when the reality does not suffice or does not yet suffice. More than anything else, the concept of ends which was proved wrong for so long in the fight against ,,final causes" that it can now be resuscitated - offers the possibility of a connection between theory and praxis. The end, however, is no longer a tangible rule of perfection, which one could hold onto when the education was finished, whether it was successful or not; rather, the end - as the ,,final end" incorporates moments of the ideal within it and, in doing this, produces a constant consciousness of the distance with which Pedagogy identifies itself. Lingering in the domain between technique and reflection, Pedagogy can affirm and decorate its ends, it can relate them to the basis of the theoretical transcendental, newly founded practical phiiosophy, and it can scientifically work them into quantities of empirical orientation. But there is no logically necessary path that goes from final ends to means. For this reason, the rationality of this new pedagogical movement cannot establish itself as a simple ends-based rationality of means. Something will be overlooked, some opposition will not be adequately conceptualized. In spite of all the emphasis on ,,educational instruction," the technology of education does not get sufficient attention on this level or at least it does not get attention that is in the sort of forms that could become relevant for the reflection problems. Precisely the distinction between ends and means pierces the close connection between reflection and technology in a way that is inadequate from both perspectives.

246

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Thus, the Revision Text is introduced with a contribution called ,,Ober den Zweck der Erziehung" by Bahrdt, in which, however, the systematic reference to pedagogy is forgotten for long stretches. Cf. Allgemeine Revision, vol. I, pp. 1-124. For the Kantians, morality is considered the final end due to reasons which are accepted a priori, although it is not entirely clear how the shifts in the end of the educator from being the morality of the educator to being the morality of the pupil occurs.

II. The double problem of instruction technology With the term ,,technology" we do not mean a particular type of science or the science of the application of scientific knowledge. 247 Instead, we are removing the reference to science from the make-up of the concept altogether (because we are in the process of considering that concept in the case of Pedagogy, and therefore do not want to decide about it in advance). Rather than do this, we are taking on a language usage that is common in organizational and profession sociology. Technology is referred to in this area of research with special theoretical intentions. The concept refers to the operative level of a system - the level on which the subject matter of its activity is altered through ordered work processes in the direction of a goal. The technology of a system is the entirety of the rules, according to which this process of alteration occurs - for example, pupils learn what they are taught. Hypotheses that work with this concept postulate a connection between the technology and other variables of the system. 248 The research that has been done up until now, however, does not paint a clear and consistent picture. 249 The reason for this is not least of all that 247

248 249

See Hans Albert, ,,Probleme der Theoriebildung," in Albert, Theorie und Reali/al: Ausgewahlte Aufstilze zur Wissenschaftslehre der Sozialwissenschajlen, Tiibingen 1964, pp. 3-70. In connection with that, for example, Herbert Stachowiak, ,,Gedanken zu einer Wissenschaftstheorie der Bildungstechnologie," in Forlschrille und Ergebnisse der Bildungstechnologie 2, ed. Brigitte Rollett and Klaus Wellner, Munich 1973, pp. 45-57, p. 48: ,,Technologie ist aufTechnik bezogene Aktionswissenschaft." Principally: Charles Perrow, ,,A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Organizations," American Sociological Review 32, 1967, pp. 194-208. Cf. for example Joan Woodward, Indus/rial Organization: Theory and Practice, London 1965 (with a concept of technology that is too narrowly focused on industrial production for our purposes), and, on the other hand, David J. Hickson et al., ,,Operations Technology and Organization Structure: An Empirical Reappraisal," Administrative Science Quarterly 14, 1969, pp. 378-397; Lawrence B. Mohr, ,,Organizational Technology and Organizational Structure," Administrative Science Quarterly 16, 1971, pp. 444-459; John Child and Roger Mansfield, ,,Technology, Size and Organization Structure," Sociology 6, 1972, pp. 369-393; Pradip N. Khandwalla, ,,Mass Output Orientation of Operations Technology and Organizational Structure," Administrative Science Quarterly 19, 1974, pp. 74-97. For investigations especially in the domain of ,,people processing" cf. Jerald Hage and Michael Aiken, ,,Routine Technology, Social Structure, and Organizational Goals," Administrative Science Quarterly 14, 1969, pp. 366-376; Donald E. Comstock and W. Richard Scott, ,,Technology and the Structure of Subunits: Distinguishing Individual and Workgroup Effects," Administrative Science Quarterly 22, 1977, pp. 177-202; Peggy Overton et al.,

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the concept ,,technology" is understood, broken down, and correlated in different ways - in other words, that there has been inadequate agreement in research, which could have been prevented. 250 Nevertheless, from the problem orientations and the common reference points in the previous research, one can learn in which ways technologies can differ so as to have consequences for other variables in the system. What remains in the foreground throughout is the extent to which the work can be routinized, the extent of the predictability of events, the extent to which rules play a determining role - and just the opposite is true of the extent of uncertainty, instability, and variability of circumstances that determine the course of work. Why this particular aspect? Our thesis is that, on this dimension, the technology of a system predetermines the possibilities of recognizing the system's work process from other levels and of steering it through decisions about premises of decisions. Technology seems to be the key to the question of whether, and in what forms, a system ,,becomes hierarchical" - which means, how the system is separated in several levels and is reintegrated via cognition and decision processes. The more the operations can be controlled in a routinized manner, are foreseeable, and can be diagnosed quickly in the event of interferences - the easier problems of cognition, structural change, or interference-avoidance can be centralized; the more uncertain, situation-dependent, and opaque the conditions for operation and making connections in the work process are - the more this process must rely on help and the less it can be helped ,,from above." It the newest research - the sociology-inspired research about instruction in schools - that first speaks about a ,,technology deficit" in this sense. 251 With that term, it means structural problems and shortcomings,

250

251

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,.An Empirical Study of the Technology of Nursing Units," Administrative Science Quarterly 22, 1977, pp. 203-218. On the critique of past research praxis, cf. among others Beverly P. Lynch, ,,An Empirical Assessments of Perrow's Technology Construct," Adminstrative Science Quarterly 19, I 974, pp. 338-356; Gary G. Stanfield, ,.Technology and Organizaton Structure as Theoretical Categories," Administrative Science Quarterly 21, 1976, pp. 489-493. In particular Robert Dreeben, The Nature of Teaching: Schools and the Work of Teachers, Glenview, Ill 1970. Cf. further Philip W. Jackson, Life in Classrooms, New York 1968; Louis M. Smith and William Geoffrey, The Complexities of an Urban Classroom: An Analysis Toward a General Theory of Teaching, New York 1968; Dan C. Lortie, Schoolteacher: A Sociological Study, Chicago 1975.

which are not only present in the moment, but must be dealt with in the short-term, or even the long-term. Thus, technology problems are not only focused upon with a view towards technical improvements that are to be realized. As opposed to a content-based, goal-oriented criticism, ,,technology deficit" does not mean that matters of education are being dealt with in an incorrect or amateur way. It is entirely possible that the technology deficit is more than made up for by the intuition or experience of teachers. What is of interest are the structural conditions and the structural consequences of an insufficient technology. Most interesting among these is that an uncertainty exists, which cannot be corrected on a meta-level, as to whether things have been handled correctly or incorrectly. One general premise of rational technologies - namely an ability to be sufficiently isolated from causal factors - is more or less responsible for all professional difficulties. In the case of school education, this problem is particularly acute because the non-isolation ( of the child in the school class) is a necessary condition of all possible technologies. The attempt to reach learning goals, therefore, does not only encounter psychologically individualized, cognitive, or motivational resistance ,,in the heads of the pupils," and the technology of instruction is therefore not simply the conditioning of difficult learning processes. The behavior of the teacher also becomes a problem - for one, because it cannot be instrumentalized in just any way; secondly, because the teacher cannot know (or cannot think through and decide quickly enough) which behavior will be successful. For this reason, teachers and pupils have to behave in such a manner, that they attribute contingency of action to one another - in other words, they assume that the other one could also act differently. The instructional situation is like every social situation - a situation with double contingency, which is recognized as such by both sides: both know, that both know, that one could also act differently. 252 252

Cf. a corresponding formulation by Talcott Parsons, ,,Interaction: Social Interaction," International Encyclopedia of lhe Social Sciences, vol. 7, New York 1968, p. 436, 429-441. On the problem of double contingency in general, also see Toward a General Theory of Ac/ion, Cambridge, Mass. 1951, ed. Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, p. 16; Niklas Luhmann, ,,Generalized Media and the Problem of Contingency," in Exp/oralions in General Theory in Social Science: Essays in Honor of Talco/I Parsons, ed. Jan J. Loubser et al., New York 1976, pp. 507-532. Aside from this specific sociological literature, it can also be shown on a more general systems theoretical level that issues that cannot be determined (indeterminacies) come about when complex systems communicate with one another, and with them, the need for order of a higher order. Cf. for example Donald M. Mackay, ,,On the Logical Indeterminacy of a Free Choice," Mind 69, 1960, pp. 31-40; Mackay, Freedom of Action in a Mecha-

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This base condition, this ,,condicio socialis," means that in communicative contact, every action must be interpreted as a selection. That means that via the selections' reciprocal reference to meaning, social systems come into being, which cannot be identical with the psychic [as in psychological -trans.] processes, not to mention with the concrete people involved. Thus, the social system ,,instruction" is not the concrete entirety (group) of teachers and pupils present in the class, but rather, it is a selective set ofrelations, which always reduces the non-overseeable complexity of all of the possible relations and which can only exist in this reduced way. This social system is a variable that necessarily intervenes if the point is to influence psychic processes in pupils. And in every communication - whatever it sets free psychically and whatever is psychically effected by it - this social system always also relates itself to itself. An interactive social system of this sort, in which the time horizons, expectations, and memories of those involved reach above each other, cannot be rationally taken apart [this will be referred to from now on as being de-composed or de-composition -trans.]. That means: it cannot be broken up in parts or partial steps, between which no interdepende1:cies (or practically none) exist. 253 That makes planning and step-by-step progression difficult254 and excludes direct technical measures (ones that can be applied without reflection) on the side of the pupils from a determination (a self- or other-determination) how teacher behavior affects learn processes. All techniques have to check themselves in their application against the present situation of the social system of instruction, the system's immediate past, and the future prospects that are implicated or can successfully be suggested in the moment. All creating of recipes must consider this refraction through the self-reference of the social system. All technology is either applicable or not applicable in the situation, even though this decision could not be traced back to a list of testable conditions and then later checked against this list. Instruction technology is not pronounced in advance as impossible due to this, but it is dealing unavoidably with a double system reference under these conditions: it always refers itself - whether or not this is included in the plan - both to per-

253 254

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nislic Universe, Cambridge, Engl. 1967; John R. Platt, Programme fur den For/schritl, Munich I 971, in particular p. 172. On the benefits of ,,near decomposability" see a simple introduction by Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial, Cambridge, Mass. 1969, p. 99ff. Naturally, it should not be overlooked that there are substitutes for this, which suggest a sort of linear progress for the entire system, especially texts which one ,,goes through."

sonal systems and to a social system. The common notion that instruction is a relationship between teacher and pupil - whether one means people or roles - covers up this fact. That holds especially for stylizations of such a two-person relationships as being a pedagogical relationship or a pedagogical reference. Theory developments that examine such twoperson relationships, therefore, cannot possible come up with an adequate teclmology, because they have already misjudged the complexity of the situation in advance. And that cannot be compensated for by idealism, nor by the claim of being near to praxis, nor by demonstrating good will, nor by a polemic against mechanical teclmiques. But we are stepping ahead of ourselves. Before we go into more detail about shortcuts for the view of the problem and about simplifying maneuvers for the theory, the problem of instructional teclmology's double problem must be more clearly worked out. It is not actually new - it was also seen by older authors, 255 but it is in the newest research that it first 255

Symptomatic for the .,mood" of this older consciousness of the problem is Ernst Christian Trapp, Versuch einer Pddagogik, Berlin 1780, quoted from the reprint, Leipzig I 913, p. 10: Immer wird der Erzieher das Problem aufzul6sen haben: Wie bearbeitest Du den rohen Geist der Jugend am besten? Welches ist die natUrlichste Folge der ldeen, Kenntnisse und Beschaftigungen? Auf we\che Art gehst Du am besten vom Leichteren zum Schwereren fort? Wie machst Du aus einem jeden Kopf und Herzen, was daraus werden kann? Wie spomst Du den Tragen? Wie zaumst Du den Yoreiligen? Wie erweckst, nahrst, lei test Du die Empfindungen? Wie richtest Du die n6tigen Gew6hnungen am zweckma.Bigsten ein? Wie erhaltst Du die Kinder gesund? Und besonders, wie hast Du dies a/les anzufangen bei einem Hau/en Kinder, deren Anlagen, Fdhigkeiten, Fertigkeiten, Neigungen, Bestimmungen verschieden sind, die aber doch in einer und eben derse/ben Stunde var Dir erzogen werden sollen?" Further on p. 96: .,Weil bei einem Haufen Kinder, die zugleich erzogen und unterrichtet werden sollen, unm6glich auf eines jeden besondere, noch weniger auf eines jeden augenblickliche Disposition Rucksicht genommen werden kann, sondern ein ungefahrer Durchschnitt gemacht werden mu8; weil aber die Kinder sich nach ihren besonderen und jedesmaligen Dispositionen und nach den in ihnen rege werdenden ldeen und Empfindungen verhalten, folglich den mit diesen Dispositionen nicht harmonierenden Unterricht nicht Eingang finden !assen (we\ches Obel, wenn es sich in dem ersten Augenblick nur bei einem oder bei einigen findet, sich in den folgenden Augenblicken leicht dem ganzen Haufen mitteilt, weil die Au!3erungen und Wirkungen eines Knaben immer wegen der homogenen Dispositionen die namlichen bei seinen Nachbarn veranlassen, und weil zur Vergr6!3erung des Obeis auch die Ideenverbindung und der magnetische Zug der Kinder zueinandermitwirkt), so mu/3 Reiz und Zwang gebracht werden, um zum vorgesetzten Ziel zu ge/angen." (Italics added.) As the long quotes show, the author is considering the problem of simultaneously handling many different individuals and even the pecularity of the social system of instruction, which in part increases these difficulties, and in part also simplifies them.

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takes on a weight that justifies the question of whether and how instruction technology is possible at all under these conditions. With all of the teachers' intentional actions that aim at certain effects, a contradiction can set in between the orientation on single pupils and the orientation on ,,the class." The instruction must go on, even if single pupils fall behind, and the instruction is often unable to follow those, who have the ability to learn more. Discipline problems cannot be ignored if they are due to the class's attention span, even if in single cases, skipping over or ignoring them would be pedagogically useful. The amount of time spent working with individual pupils must be limited if one agrees that the others should not be expected to put up with endless waiting, while distraction and boredom confront them from every comer. The presentation of the learning success of one pupil as a demonstration for the class may manage to instil better behavior, just as, on the other hand, failures may depress and de-motivate if they become the subject of class attention. Whether such discrepancies, known to every teacher, tum up, depends on the way in which those involved in the direct situational events gear themselves to the interaction system ,,instruction." For this reason, it is hardly possible to react to such incidents according to a plan made in advance or according to leamable ,,recipes." This problem of there being many system references within one situation is intensified to the degree that the intention encompasses more than the direct effect - working through a lesson, holding attention, stopping developing disturbances and loss of discipline - and attempts to control longer chains of effects. With every expansion and with increasing depth on the time horizon, the probability of discrepancies increases. Nevertheless, one does not want to argue about the possibility of behavior techniques that seek for the short term to influence the production, the problem-reduction, and the continuous reproduction of the social system of instruction for the better. 256 But in all cases, these techniques serve to provide an environment that is favorable to learning for pupils and can hardly serve as technologies for a teaching and learning process. 257

256 257

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But the teacher still stands outside of the social system of instruction and directs it from outside through lures and force. Cf. in particular the attempt at forming types by Smith and Geoffrey, The Complexities of an Urban Classroom: An Analysis Toward a General Theory of Teaching. An early witness of this, before the introduction of the formula .,educational instruction," is in an anonymous article ,,Ober die Erziehung," Schleswigsches Journal 1793, issue 3, pp. 1-66: The only purpose that education in instruction could have is

If we now re-introduce the concept of technology, which we had laid down at the end of the last part in reference to problems of autonomy (self-steering), then the question comes up: how can a hierarchy of deciding about decision premises be established on this foundation of an interaction system ,,instruction." In other words, how is it possible to filter out decision problems and to compress them up in such a way that one hits upon decisive behavior premises. Technologies should make it possible to aim for important effects with few decisions. The barriers to this are the difficulties of rational de-composition and the doubling of all problem orientations in personal and social system references: the lower level of the system of education, the level at which actual instruction is carried out, becomes in a strange way autonomous in this manner - it remains dependent on situational self-steering. Neither the system of education, as a sub-system with responsibility to the larger society, nor Pedagogy, in so far as it articulates this responsibility and translates it into praxis-related knowledge, can content itself with this situation. What can happen? And what did happen?

III. Organization and science Development first becomes distant. Since the beginning of the 19th century, one has seen two possibilities for arriving at behavior premises about how to carry out instructional effects: organization and science. This double orientation, for its part, absorbs developing skepticism and makes it possible to continue to be optimistic in regards to possibilities - an optimism, which the system of education needs in order to drive its functional differentiation (from other systems) forward. One can compensate, for instance, any doubt about the possibilities of organization through trust in science and vice-versa. One can cover a polemic against the dominance of state organizations with the concept of Pedagogy as science (Herbart), just as, the other way around, one can try to implement the all-around education idea (Bildungsidee) directly through organization, without thinking with any great intensity about the child or the teacher or the pedagogical reference (Humboldt). A sufficiently in-depth analysis of the technology problem does not occur. (In the following chapters, we will show with what means of thought such an analysis is avoided.) Because of this, it to educate children for instruction - in other words, to keep order amongst them so that they can be instructed and do not perform mischief.

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does not become clear that organization and science, understood from the perspective that interests us here, are merely variations of the same problem displacement, and that they cannot mutually unburden each other if there is a lack of preconditions, which both accept. The shared precondition, systems theoretically formulated, is the existence of multilevel structures or of hierarchization as the condition for processes of self-abstraction or self-simplification in systems. 258 Hierarchization is the structure form, with which a system reacts to societal differentiation (from other systems) and to autonomy that is expected of it in other words, to developments that are socio-structurally forced upon it, as we described in part I. Decisions about behavior that is relevant to the environment, then, need no longer to happen on one level or even in one place; their randomness can be limited again within the system (and thus, autonomously). In systems with functioning divisions and connections of several process levels, the lower levels limit the reality domain of the higher ones. The processes on the higher levels, for their part, can cause specific changes on the lower levels and, can steer the system in this way by selective intervention. 259 To connect levels requires a gathering of information or ,,records," which can be controlled on higher levels as if they were units. 260 The correlate to that in behavior theory is the ability to isolate behavior premises - namely of information or points of view - which are used in behavior to reduce the complexity of what is possible. 261 Under this condition, behavior premises can also become the subject matter of particular operations, which one cannot sensibly demand that they technically and 258

259

260 261

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On this in general: Hierarchical Structures, ed. Lancelot L. Whyte, Albert G. Wilson, and Donna Wilson, New York 1969; M. D. Mesarovic', D. Macko, and Y. Takahara, Theory of Hierarchical, Multilevel Systems, New York 1970; Hierarchy Theory: The Challenge of Complex Systems, ed. Howard H. Pattee, New York 1973. On this in particular: Donald T. Campbell, ,,'Downward Causation' in Hierarchically Organized Biological Systems," in Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems, ed. Francisco Jose Ayala and Theodosius Dobzhansky, London 1974, pp. 179-186. Cf. Howard H. Pattee, ,,Physical Conditions fOr Primitive Functional Hierarchies," in Hierarchical Structures, p. 166ff., 161-171. Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, Public Administration, New York 1950, p. 57, define this concept (which began its career here) in reference to organization systems, as follows: ,,Important in the explanation of organization behavior are the premises upon which employees behave - that is, the criteria or guides they use in narrowing down the multitude of possibilities to the single actuality."

directly guarantee successes on the effect level - in other words, education successes. Whatever one may want the possibilities of science or of organization to be in general and in particular historical states of the societal system: their contribution to the self-steering of the system of education is based on the possibility of hierarchical controls - in other words, the possibility of being able to determine many selections with only a few selections. As science, Pedagogy concerns itself with the recognition of those behavior premises that, when they are set or changed, influence the education process in a given direction. No matter how the concepts may be made polished or made plausible, that assumes a significant degree of abstraction. Organizing, on the other hand, has to do with deciding about decision premises, whether or not this deciding is covered by knowledge. 262 The ,,fundamentals of certainty" of the abstraction processes diverge: in the case of science, they rest on truth (however that is guaranteed), while in the case of organization, they rest on political power or power gained from the consensus of members. This difference makes it sensible for science and organization to function with each other, to mutually supplement each other by orientation on various symbolic codes and by tapping into various sources of certainty. But this difference rests on possibilities of selecting premises, which make continuous intervention in behavior via knowledge or decisions possible. Neither science nor organization can handle being confronted with the concrete totality of the actual behavior that goes on in the system of education. If one deals with science and organization as levels of a multilevel differentiated system in this sense, then it is possible to say in more detail what the consequences of an insufficient technology must be. It goes without saying that successes in technical effects cannot be directly aimed for or made certain of on the level of science and organization. 263 On the operative level, it can happen that matters are overlooked, that things from the outside intervene, or that directives are striked down intentionally. That cannot prevent a technology. Besides, every state of knowledge is incomplete in itself and every organizational decision is threatened by its 262

263

On this see Niklas Luhmann, ,,Allgemeine Theorie organisierter Sozialsysteme," in Luhmann, Sozio/ogische Aujkldrung, vol. 2, Opladen 1975, pp. 39-50; Luhmann, Organisation und Entscheidung, Opladen 1978. It is only if that was claimed, then it would make sense to talk about a technocracy or to raise accusations to this effect. Basically, however, these are simplifications that no one who is tuned into the state of research can support and that, for that reason, are only claimed in regards to others.

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own source of mistakes. One cannot blame this on a ,,technology deficit" either. The only thing that the lack of a technology anchored in knowledge and organization says - but this is decisive - is that it is not possible to determine, which source of mistakes is to blame for failures ( or better: levels of performance that can still be improved). That does not stand out as long as the system of education is not differentiated (from other systems) and autonomized, as long as no particular level for dealing with behavior premises already plainly exists. When, however, this is the case, then a technology deficit creates a contradiction between claim and reality: the sources of mistakes can be differentiated, but it is not possible to attribute the mistakes. In addition to the primary uncertainty - whether one is acting correctly - a secondary uncertainty emerges in regards to whether the occurrence of failures or of the inability to reach a given performance level again is due to the state of knowledge, the form of organization, or on one's own behavior. Protected by this secondary uncertainty, the primary uncertainty is stabilized: it becomes bearable on the one hand and, on the other hand, it becomes permanent, because no one tell anyone else with absolute certainty, how it could be done better. Under such conditions, it is to be expected that science and organization, as indispensable levels of the larger structure, adjust themselves to precisely this type of uncertainty, that they establish themselves within it, live with it, and find appropriate legitimation formulas for it. We will try to show this in detail. At the beginning of the 19th century, at the start of a process of differentiation ( of systems from other systems), which puts science and organization in its service, one naturally finds no structurally anchored skepticism. Kant had chosen to use a concept of organization that was formulated in a highly modem and, simultaneously, ,,education-related" way, which was able to inspire the Prussian reformers without resulting in a conflict with morals. 264 Established in the shared domain of causality and teleology, organization is self-organization for Kant due to causalities that are not singly transparent. Self-organization, which is distinguished from machines, means that the parts create themselves in a reciprocal process. The hierarchization (without using this term) is presented in a means/ends scheme and placed within the parts, so that everything is a means and ends for itself and for others. (Small wonder that one must assume causality, 264

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Cf. ,,Kritik der Urteilskraft," paragraphs 65-66, Werke, vol. V, p. 483 ff., quoted from the edition put out by Wilhelm Weischedel, 7 vols., Darmstadt 1956ff.

but must abstain from an analysis of it!) This ,,principle of inner usefulness [or of internal determination of ends -trans.]" says, then: ,, ... an organized product of nature is that, in which everything is ends and, reciprocally, also means. Nothing within it is in vain, without purpose, or to be attributed to a blind mechanism ofnature." 265 With quickly increasing doubt as to whether it is possible to deduce the system of Pedagogy that stemmed from an ethical a priori a la Kant, one need not break with this concept of organization. One can assume that it is praxis and then prepare to bring this praxis to its point as a moral event. The possibilities of relating what had already exists as praxis to theory and then organizing it in a way that allowed access, had not yet been tested. They are simply assumed. The problem is seen in the choice of forms for instance, in the concept schematics that Herbart and Schleiermacher use to comprehend the singularity of the education process and then want to apply on the process again. It is not about the question of whether an abstraction comes sufficiently close to the reality of education, whether it is ordered in a way that is sufficiently self-abstracting. It suffices to emphasize that the theory (is not random speculation, but rather) relates itself to praxis and is therefore theory. It is only in the last few years, only through the glance back to the very extensive research and organization experiences, that a turning point seems to have come. It is true that the literature does not offer a unified picture and is without large perspectives, but there are many symptomatic details. In so far as research on instruction that uses the procedures of empirical social research is concerned: overviews arrive at the conclusion that, in spite of immense efforts, there is barely any certain knowledge about correlations (not to mention causal relations) between teacher behavior or teacher methodology and successes or failures. 266 If one takes a further organizational context into consideration (for instance, in the form of comparative studies of entire school systems), it is just as difficult to isolate single variables for successful intervention. 267 Generally, the best predictor for output in this research is knowing the input. The organiza265 266

267

Ibid, p. 488. Cf. only Donald M. Medley and Harold E. Mitzel, .,Measuring Classroom Behavior by Systemic Observation," in Handbook of Research on Teaching, ed. N. L. Gage, Chicago 1963, pp. 247-328; Sarane S. Boocock, An Introduction to the Sociology of Learning, Boston 1972, p. 129ff. Critics of this direction in research refer to research on instruction again - as does Stephan Richer, ,,School Effects: The Case for Grounded Theory," Sociology of Education 48, 1975, pp. 383-399.

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tional research that is oriented to decision-theory faces similar problems and has to ask itself today, whether organizational intervention in instruction is even possible, and if so, how. From this perspective, instruction appears to be a non-arbitrary mess of decisions, which cannot be understood through normal statistical processes, nor through control of individual decision premises. 268 Therefore, it becomes understandable - to bring in one of many details - that in a study of school principals, the willingness to actively support measures that promise to improve the quality of instruction decreases with the length of training, the length of teaching experience, and the length of administrative experience. 269 Thus, knowledge and experience appear to lead one to disregard a sort of responsibility for work and success and to respect the impenetrability of the instructional goings-on in the class. If one searches for a unified formula for all of these single discoveries, then it seems a good idea to tum to the general systems theoretical connection of technology and multilevel structures. What we have been calling ,,technology deficit" does not necessarily refer to incorrect or wrong action; what it does do is endanger the ability of the system to become hierarchical: the separation and selective connecting of the majority of description and steering levels. With that, the possibility of envisaging higher system levels when understanding or controlling a system and, in contrast, the possibility of envisaging lower levels when describing or realizing a system, disappear or are at least made more difficult. 270 The link is not certain enough to make such a separation possible and, as a result, one can never be certain whether one understands what one describes or steers (controls) what one realizes. Thus, compared to instruction, which bears the system function, operations in the domain of science or of the organization of the system of education retain a sort of independ268

269

270

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Cf. for example Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, ,,A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," Administrative Science Quarterly I 7, 1972, pp. 1-25; Michael D. Cohen and James G. March, Leadership and Ambiguity, New York 1974; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, Bergen 1976; Karl E. Weick, ,,Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems," Administrative Science Quarterly 21, 1976, pp. 1-19. Thus Neal Gross and Robert E. Herriott, Staff Leadership in Public Schools, New York 1965, p. 64ff. Without paying attention to this warning, the authors - based upon other correlations - support on a political-organizational level, the strengthening of leadership qualities. On this advantage of well hierarchized systems cf. M. D. Mesarovic' and D. Macko, ,,Foundations for a Science of Hierarchical Systems," in Hierarchical Structures, p. 33ff, 29-50.

ence, which does not rest on processes of selective abstraction, or does so only in part. Because of that, neither research nor organization becomes meaningless. But they are additionally burdened with the problem of a reaction to the technology deficit. This reaction can be handled in different ways. Constantly renewing the search for technological improvements (or, constantly giving the appearance of renewal) is one of the possibilities. The adjustment of Pedagogy from compensation for the technology deficit to reflection on it would be another.

IV. Technicians and technologists: on Philanthropy's and Critical Philosophy's take on the problem Fundamental for all the the resulting endeavors is the insight into the narrow limits which the instruction situation creates in a practical way for the teacher and educator. It becomes the subject matter of literature in the context of praxis-focused philanthropic endeavors regarding education and instruction. The teacher himself is, as one clearly sees and clearly formulates, never in the position to make the realizations that would be necessary for a subject-based instruction, not to speak of a reform of the educational system. His potential of attention is too small for that: ,,The teacher quite properly cannot notice much of anything which goes on around him until it becomes so extreme that it bothers hirn." 271 And he is lucky that this is the case. Because: ,,If he could notice everything, then his frustration would be much greater; because as it is, he can only change a small bit of what he sees, at best he can slow it down to a few moments; what would happen, if he saw everything that happens!" 272 When one considers this state of the teacher role, then one cannot expect reforms on this level. ,,Whoever has spent a whole day tiredly lecturing and fighting with and punishing youth, he thanks God when he can quietly sit down and wipe off the sweat and take in fresh air and free himself from thinking entirely. If he has to think, then about the lessons for the following day. How can he involve himself with thoughts about the improvement of the school system?"273 Therefore, it all depends on differentiating the work on 271 272 273

Ernst Christian Trapp, Versuch einer Pddagogik, Berlin 1780, reprint Leipzig 1913, p. 38. Ibid., p. 99f. Ibid., p. 11.

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the scientific basis of the system of education - on its planing, leadership, and improvement - from the execution of instruction. Both cannot happen at the same time on one level. The differentiation of the system of education (from other systems) therefore requires the differentiation of at least two levels as an internal structure - namely the level of technical execution of instruction-related operations and that of higher aggregated research and plan-like guidance of those operations. ,,Educational scientists [or scientists i.e. academics in the field of education -trans.] are the technologists of education. The teachers are mere technicians." 274 This is a clear explanation, which is never revoked, for the necessity of hierarchical set-up for relief and aggregation - at first one that is entirely independent of its organizational construction and of competence and directive questions. The relationship between technique and technology must be seen and reflected upon from the point of view of this difference in levels. The execution of instruction needs technique in the sense of a relief from unnecessary attention; in the sense of concentration on that, which will probably bring success; and in the sense of planability and repeatability that is not bound to the moment. All of that must be worked out on the level of aggregated data, statistical probability, and proven premises for making decisions, and in this sense, it becomes technology. By working out such a technology, one would find the basis of reality in the data from the execution of instruction, and this reality basis would guarantee that provisions about realizations and decision premises could really act upon and influence instruction. How could that be possible? The Philanthropists, who are generally not at all skeptical, now resign due to the data problem of instructional research. 275 The trust in a scientific basis to overcome the level difference for the realization [understanding -trans.] and the guidance of the system contrasts in a strange way to the data. In the domain of theory, one believes - independent of all instructional research - that a science of people is possible and could be evaluated. It can already be seen at this point, that Pedagogy wants merely to be a secondary science. In the domain of method, one puts trust in a sort of synchronization of psychology and logic. One should take up the conditions for cognitive or motivational receptivity in the pupil by pulling out obvious aspects of the instruction material or by analytically de-composing it. That is - and we will come back to it shortly - the 274 275

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This formulation is by Karl Schrader, Der Erziehungstheorie des Phi/anthropismus (Versuch eines Systems), Langensalza 1928, p. I 04. ,,!ch weill wohl, dall es nie geschehen wird, aber lacherlich kann ich's doch nicht finden," says Trapp, Versuch einer Ptidagogik, p. 40.

quintessence of the elementary method. But who or what guarantees the psychological affinity of a logically analyzed de-composition? How can the affinity be carried through or reproduced in ,,elementary gear"? And what, considering our double problem of all instruction technology, guarantees its ability to be carried out in instruction? Until these questions can be answered, the solution to the multilevel problem cannot be seriously characterized as being technological. The problem remains open - and in the beginning, one certainly has the right to live with the anticipation that it will be solved (and not with the reflection that it cannot be solved). But as long as the technology is not secured, one will not allow science to characterize the praxis, to which it refers, as technique. As opposed to that, Herbart offers the concept ,,taktes" - and submerges the problem of limited attention in the notion of an intuitive grasping of the correct way of acting in complex situations. It was possible to overlook or trivialize such problems of specific educational complexity in the beginning. It is not because of them that the attempt to ground Pedagogy in a science of people or in an empirical antlu·opology and thus to bring it into gear as a science faltered. The attempt is begun at the time of a deeply reaching, epistemological crisis in science, which was triggered through the criticism of induction conclusions and of the possibility of even being able to arrive at certain empirical knowledge. All difficulties which this attempt runs into can be read in this situation as proof of wrongly placed ambitions. 276 That gives any critical philosophy that claims to be able to avoid this problem and to be able to justify pure as well as practical reason from itself, its chance. The endeavors regarding Pedagogy as a science, which now only set the direction, are recorded onto the Kantian philosophy LP and reproduced many times and in many different ways. The Kantian theory provision required seeing the problem of technology as a problem of self-reference of the individual subject. Selfreference, in turn, means: indeterminability of social relations and, in this sense, freedom. With that, a problem was posed that had many consequences and that made it possible to ask about Pedagogy as a scientific discipline. Now, the guiding problem had to be: how is education possible? Or more precisely: how is the education of a subject that is free and that determines itself self-referentially, possible? 277 It is seldom so clear to 276

277

Thus Jonathan Schuderoff, who explicitly looks back to the problem of inductive generalization, Briefe uber Moralische Erziehung in Hinsicht auf die neueste Philosophie, Leipzig 1792, p. 85f. For explicit formulations see: Ritter, ,,Kritik der Padagogik zum Beweis der Nothwendigkeit einer allgemeinen Erziehungs-Wissenschaft," p. 71; Karl Salomo

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see that it is the posing of a problem (and not, for instance, an ,,ends,") that constitutes the unity of a scientific discipline. But this theory format was chosen several sizes too large. The form of the problem as the type of a question about the conditions of the possibility suggested escapes, which remain under the quality of a question - namely, the escape of merely creating metaphors, 278 or further, the escape of destroying the freedom of the child, 279 or finally, (denying the theory-producing point of such a question,) the point that education has always taken place practically and needs only to be recognized. 280 None of these answers offer sufficient points for the analysis of the technology problem. The question of causation is dealt with through a naive belief in the superiority in technical effectiveness of morality itself. 281 One reads that the educator should not see himself as an effective cause, and then, a few pages further in the same book, one finds in answer to the question - ,,what can he do then?" causal-analytic explanations. 282 It comes as no surprise, then, that the composition of the answers, which are given in methodological recommendations, falls back on things long known. 283 It was through this that the habit later developed of solving the technology problem through a technology verdict: the mechanical bringing about of effects is inadequate for dealing with people; if one cannot do something, then one does not really want to be able to do it - and one finds reasons for all of that, once again, in the Kantian moral theory. We will come back to that later. One can see it as the fortune or the misfortune of Pedagogy that it attempted to become a science and to find the autonomy that the society

278

279 280 28 I

282 283

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Zachariae, Ober die Erzielnmg des Menschengeschlechts durch den Staal, Leipzig 1802, pp. 21, 98ff.; Johann Jakob Wagner, Philosophie der Erziehungskunst, Leipzig 1803, p. 50f. Thus Wagner, Philosophie der Erziehungskunst, with the information that education is ,.Erregungskunst (the art of producing excitement in the sense of interest)." Others limited education to something that offers, that suggests. Thus Fichte in the ,.Reden an die deutsche Nation," 2nd lecture, quoted from: Ausgewdhlte Werke, vol. V, Darmstadt 1962, p. 392f. Cf. below a few pages into chapter X. Thus it is written, for example, in the (anonymous) essay, ,.Ober moralische Erziehung," Archiv der Erziehungskunde fur Deutsch/and 4, 1794, pp. 1-38: ,,Die moralische Gewa!t ilber die Gemilther ist weit gr6/3er, als die physische." And that is used to justify the notion that an education, even one that fully respects the freedom of the pupil, can reach its goal. As in (anonymous), Original-ldeen uber die Kunst der Erziehung und besonders der Bi/dung zur Silllichkeit, Leipzig 1804, p. 64ff. See, for instance, Wagner, Philosophie der Erziehungskunst, on the Socratic method. (The critical comments about Wagner should not take away from the fact that his is one of the few existing attempts at theory that can still be taken seriously today.)

demanded of it, during an abstraction-laden crisis of science. In any case, the path to an empirical-technological science orientation was initially closed from this point; but instead, the path to a quick, wide-spread effect - even further than that of the literature that school men write for school men - was opened.

V. Pedagogy headed towards the ,,absolute method"? Parallel to the idealistic tum, which leads the Pedagogy of all-around human education (Menschenbildung) to the heights of a meta-inductive, meta-technological abstraction, attempts at autonomization also develop in the domain of education praxis itself. The concept of elementary, which education books had allowed to swell up as a sign of ,,love of human beings," 284 is focused on as a problem: ,,I attempt to do human instruction according to psychology; I attempt to bring it in harmony with the nature of my mind and with that of my situation and my circumstances."285 That leads to the development of a genuine pedagogical awareness of methods, which at first appears itself in the language of a technique. 286 All of the insistence on original beginnings, all of the persistence regarding elementary structures of knowledge and ability, all of that serves to introduce (and for this reason, the persistence!) a process of highlighting the self, which can increasingly refer to its own acquisitions, to that which it has already learned, and can become independent to the extent that it can bring the self-relationship into play. 284

285

286

,,Wirklich sind die neuesten Erziehungsbiicher so voll von Vorschriften, was alles, und in welchem bunten Stundenwechsel, und durch wie unzahlig viele Kunstgriffe es gelehrt werden so lie ... " Johann Friedrich Herbart, ,,Ideen zu einern padagogischen Lehrplan fur ho here Schul en (I 801 )," in Samtliche Werke, vol. I, ed. Karl Kehrbach, Langensalza 1887, p. 130. Pestalozzi, Samtliche Werke, ed. Artur Buchenau, Eduard Spranger, and Hans Stettbach, Berlin and Leipzig 1927ff., vol. XIII, p. 105. We are quoting the ,,Kritischen Ausgabe" (KA) also called the Seyffarthian edition (pp. I-XII), Pestalozzis Samtliche Werke, ed. L. W. Seyffarth, 12 vols., 2nd ed., I 899-1902. (If we stay with Pestalozzi for a while, than we do this in accordance with the noted factual perspective. That means that we primarily limit ourselves to using the methodological writings.) Characteristic of endeavors at a ,,post-idealization": Christian Wilhelm Harnisch,

Deutsche Vo/ksschulen mil besonderer Riicksicht au/ die Pestalozzischen Grundsatze, Berlin 1812.

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It may well be that the fact of Pestalozzi's own educational experience were of particular importance to him287 - from the standpoint of the explicit understanding of the problem, the problems of the actual instruction were seen in a new manner: Pestalozzi views instruction as a process that has become independent of its beginnings and that can be structured pedagogically for just that reason. Instruction, therefore, entails more than merely getting across certain knowledge and abilities, and education entails more than merely assisting with a natural process. With its perfection fommla, Philanthropy had already gone beyond nature; it had even related education explicitly to aptitudes in human nature that do not develop alone. 288 Nature, of course, remained the basis and condition of the possibilities of going beyond oneself. For Pestalozzi, the reason for not leaving education to nature any longer lies less in the high-spun goals of blissfulness than in the starting conditions. The method, therefore, must first create its own conditions of operation by abstracting what it can use from nature. And while the goals of blissfulness, even the eagerness for completion, quickly pass on - humanisms are only too easy to refute - tlJe problems of the starting conditions remain a continual pressure to abstract methods. What finally forces abstraction is in the end, then, not the ideal character of the goal, but rather the improbability of successes (however small) under given conditions. 289 Pestalozzi refers to nature, but its function is qualified: with the child, it has become clear how difficult it is to engage people in communication systems when they live in very different worlds; with the progress of sciences and the arts, an awareness is awakened to the possibility of improv287

288

289

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It is well-known that Pestalozzi himself started with experiences of neglect and begging: ,,Ich lebte jahrelang im Kreise von mehr als fonfzig Bettlerkindern," PestaIozzi, KA XIII, pp. I 83f.; 187. Cf. Ernst Christian Trapp, Versuch einer Ptidagogik, Berlin 1780, reprint Leipzig 1913, p. 8: ,,Es gibt Anlagen in der menschlichen Natur, die sich selbst nicht entwickeln, die aber, sobald sie gehorig entwickelt werden, die Menschen sowohl einen jeden fur sich, als alle, die miteinander in Gesellschaft leben, glucklicher machen, als sie es sonst gewesen sein wurden. Diese Entwicklung ist Erziehung." It is the same with observations that need lo have ,,correct" observations of individuality as the autonomizing condition of pedagogical striving: ,,Folglich mussen wir, um einen Menschen genau und richtig zu kennen, ihn in Momenten und Augenblicken handeln sehen, wo seine Anlagen in einer auffallenden Verbindung seines ganzen Totalcharakters hervorstechend erscheinen ... " (,,Brief v. 24.4.1782 (Letter from April 24, 1782)" quoted according to Karl-Ernst Nipkow, Die lndividualitiit a/s pddagogisches Problem bei Pesta/ozzi, Humboldt und Schleiermacher, Weinheirn 1960, p. 31 ).

ing the state of humanity through the art of education. Education can therefore no longer be thought of as synchronous with nature. 29 Following substantial inertia at the start, education builds increasingly upon selfgenerated fundamentals; it autonomizes itself methodologically. According to this, the subject matter of education and instruction will be the human being, himself the ,,middle point." 291 ,,Nature and art should be deeply unified." 292 What sort of premises are supposed to make such (an ambitious) project of making instruction processes into pedagogical methods possible? Pestalozzi starts with a ,,threefold source": ( 1) the ,,source of nature itself," (2) the sensuousness of human nature, and (3) the individual state of the human being. 293 In order to work out the methods, ,,the nature itself, which is capable of lifting our minds up from dark notions to clear concepts," in other words, the ,,notion" is taken into consideration first. 294 Its de-composition, however, will be methodologically relevant only in so far as it is conforms ,,psychologically." Because of this, one must be certain of the agreement between the general and the individual. The sensuality of human nature is responsible for that, but only in so far as the individual is ,,stimulated" according to his individual situation. For that reason, the methodical steps must be appropriate. The process wins its future, however, because (firstly), every step is taken for the clarity of the child (because ,,his experiences have nothing more to contribute to him"), and they are steps, with which ,,the sequence of the strengths and abilities that are to be developed [will] finally be opened up"; it is (secondly) a sequence that contains the sequence of the subject matter (which must be followed) and that contains (thirdly) the moment of already having leamed. 295 According to this concept, Pestalozzi - making constant reference to actual instruction processes - abstracted the five human senses into three ,,original means": the form, the number, and the sound. ,,I then judged:

°

290 291

292 293 294 295

For example, Comenius' ,,naturgema13e (according to nature)" methods, with which he does not come clear. So that he can ,,im ganzen Umfange des Wortes als Mensch fiihlen (feel himself to be a human being in the entirety of the word)": Elementarbildung als Voraussetzung von Jndividualitatsbildung, S Ill, p. 381. ,,Natur und Kunst im Volksunterricht so innig zu vereinigen, als sie jetzt gewaltsam in demselben getrennt sind 1," Pestalozzi, KA Xlll, p. l 99ff. Pestalozzi, KA XIII, p. 294ff. ,, ... in der Anerkennung der Anschauung als dem absoluten Fundament all er Erkenntnis ... ," Pestalozzi, KA Xlll, p. 305. A summary of ,,dieses Gangs der Natur in der Entwicklung unsers Geschlechts (this path of nature in the development of our race)," Ibid., p. 321.

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number, form, and language are together the elementary means of instruction .... Art, therefore, must make it into the unchangeable law of its formation, and it must start out from these three fundamentals and to aim at affecting them. " 296 But how does one arrive at a method, when only basic relations have been abstracted from the ,,original means," while the ,,sequence" has not yet been constructed? ,,It all depends on the most precise knowledge of this original form. For this reason, I looked again and again at the starting points from which this is abstracted." 297 Because the steps of the lesson must ,,hold exact step with the child's strengths" 298 so that it is possible to continue to work productively. Without getting into all of Pestalozzi's turns and wrong turns: the problem with this construction of method does not only lie in ,,discovering" ,,sta11ing points" of the instruction that ,,most inspire the receptivity [of the human mind. "299 The problem also lies in being able to handle these starting points as elements of the instruction because they indicate ,,one single correct sequence"300 is indicated by them, and to do this in a way that the entire method ,,becomes a game for anyone as soon as he gets hold of the thread of the starting points. " 301 ,,With that, a new principle is introduced." 302 How is it possible - in spite of the fact that the instruction process is subjectified methodically, in that it must ,,hold step with the (individual) child's strengths" - for ,,that 296

297 298 299

300

301 302

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Ibid, p. 256: Pestalozzi refers to the empirical path that led him (to the ABC of his notion): because ,,den Grundsatz angenommen: sagte ich [in den Rapports], die Anschauung ist das Fundament aller Kenntnisse, folgt unwidersprechlich: die Richtigkeit der Anschauung ist das eigentliche Fundament des richtigsten Urteils. Offenbar aber ist in Riicksicht auf Kunstbildung die vollendete Richtigkeit der Anschauung eine Folge der Ausmessung des zu beurteilenden Gegenstandes, oder einer so weit gebildeten Kraft des Verhaltnisgefiihls, welche die Ausmessung der Gegenstande iiberfliissig macht" (p. 283). [bid, p. 253f. [bid, p. 195. So that the mechanism of teaching (with which ,,the learning" is attempted) can be constructed: ,,Die Kunst, diejenigen Forrnen aufzufinden, die seine [menschlicher Geist] Empfiinglichkeit am meisten reitzen, ist der Mechanismus der Lehrart ... ," Ibid, p. 208. For more detail about difficulties in carrying this out see Wolfgang Klafki, Das

padagogische Problem des Elementaren und die Theorie der kategorialen Bi/dung, 3/4 ed., Weinheim 1964, p. 48ff. Pestalozzi, KA XIII, p. 239f. According to Klafki, Das pt'idagogische Problem des Elementaren und die Theorie der kategorialen Bi/dung, p. 50.

which subjectifies" and ,,that which objectifies" to merge in such a way that this process gains a future? Regarding this method, it is first of all notable (as a psychological ,,mystery") that it holds on to the ,,simple starting point"; 303 but that it does this in order to make itself independent of the start (,,nature") so that the instruction can eventually build up on self-made premises. 304 The basic intention of the elementary method is a temporal sequencing; and neither nature, nor the school material determine education's time flow, but instead what has already been learned. But how can the instructional feasibility be certain if it is dependent on individual progress in learning? Pestalozzi was thinking about the child, who was already ,,educated. "305 Having already learned takes the place of natural premises (such as tendency or talent). Insisting upon the fundamentals at the start is necessary for precisely this reason. In this way, the method has a point of access in the (individual) ability to learn. One thinks of observing individuality for this. 306 But, because the function of such observation refers to 307 the ,,unity of the training of human nature in its entirety" (solidarity, humanity, strength) 308 , and therefore assumes the equality of qualifications, the present child is only seen as the past. 309 What, then, are the causes of individual successes or failures lie and where do the corresponding possibilities for correction lie? Due to the necessary (methodical) connection of ,,the starting points of any one subject of knowledge with its completed contour" 310 , these problems of actual instruction can only be understood as a deviation from the normality, and the fact of their handling can only be understood as a re-adjustment or normalization. Questions spurned by turning instruction into method break apart the associated correlations between ,,elementary and natural," between ,,ele303 304 305 306 307 308 309

310

Pestalozzi, KA XVI, p. 57. This method is then also the basis of the production of elementary books (,,Buch fur Mutter"). Pestalozzi, KA XIII, p. 259ff. The school children were already educated, even if they were educated ,,outside of the method," KA XIII, p. 201. Pestalozzi, KA I, pp. 1 l 5ff.; l 76ff. In the form of pedagogical influences such as support, cheering up, punishing, etc. Pestalozzi, S X, p. 358. ,, ... und so wie ich die Anfange des Untenichts bis auf ihre auBersten Punkte verfolgte, suchte ich jetzt auch die Anfangszeit des untenichteten Kindes bis auf seinen ersten Punkt zu erforschen und ward bald Oberzeugt: die erste Stunde seines Untenichts ist die Stunde seiner Geburt." Pestalozzi, KA XIII, p. 196. Pestalozzi, KA Xlll, p. 189. Cf. also Klafki, Das piidagogische Problem des Elementaren und die Theorie der kategorialen Bi/dung, p. 50.

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mentary and necessary start. " 311 The differentiation between ,,particular means of yielding" and ,,general means of yielding" becomes evident. 312 As a possible contribution to pedagogical technology, this differentiation, which is referred to as the ,,living-room problem," does not need to be discussed, because it emphasizes a persuasive technique which seduces into routine and motivates a reduction in the personal aspects of communication. 313 Pestalozzi celebrated the elementarization (resolution) of this ,,greater problem" became elementary as well, 314 but by doing this, he again covered up precisely the individual preconditions for instruction, which had broken away from the ,,elementary method." The requirements for (individual) ability to learn as a precondition for turning instruction into method -- and from now on, this is the problem that all pedagogical endeavors face - can, in any case, not be understood as a sequence. Can the problems of instruction still be pulled together on one level? ,,Absolute" method appears to promote this. Its absolute-ness, however, is understood in two, or even three, different ways, and it is not quite clear, how its unity can be secured in the course of instruction. In the first place, the method is absolute in that it cffers relief from starting conditions, because it creates its own qualifications itself, 315 because it means production from its own products and in this sense: because it is repro311

3I2 313

314

315

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,,Doch ich sehe mich bey den Anfangspunkten eines weit gr68eren Problems, als dasjenige ist, welches ich aufgelfist zu haben glaube; ich sehe mich bey den Anfangspunkten des Problems: Wie kann das Kind, wiewohl in Absicht auf das Wesen seiner Bestimmung als in Absicht des Wandelbaren seiner Lage und seiner Verhaltnisse also gebildet werden, da!J ihn das, was im Laufe seines Lebens Not und Pflicht von ihm fordem werden, leicht und womoglich zur andem Natur wird?" Pestalozzi, KA Xlll, p. 340. Pestalozzi, KA XIII, p. I 09f. ,,Dieses Habituellmachen durch taglich wiederholtes Tun ist entscheidend wichtig." Klafki comments in this way on the ,,Funktion sittlicher Bildung (function of moral all-around education)," Das pddagogische Problem des Elementaren und die Theorie der kategorialen Bi/dung, p. 57ff. ,,Eben die Gesetze des physischen Mechanismus, die die sinnlichen Fundamente der Weisheit in mir entwickeln, entwickeln auch die sinnlichen Erleichterungsmittel meiner Tugend," Pestalozzi, KA XIII, p. 340. What in this period can easily mean: criticism of parental education (prior to school) as a preparation for school education. See, for example, Christian Danie\ Yosz, Versuch iiber die Erziehung fur den Staal, als BediirfnijJ unsrer Zeit, zur Beforderung des Biirgenvoh/s und der Regenten-Sicherheit, Halle 1799, vol. I, p. 147ff. In this way, absolute method is always also a method that claims the unity of home and school education for itself and that no longer sees in it - in the old manner (Quintillian, lnsritutionis Oratoriae, I, 2) - the father's right to have a say.

duction. 316 But it is also absolute in a second sense, namely, in that it fully includes the concrete individuality with all its characteristics, and in that it leaves it, so to speak, no chance to assert itself against education with any untapped reserves of strength. This second sense has a social version, which is expressed by the formulation: the method is the concretion of the individual teacher/pupil relationship itself. 317 When all of this comes together, there is truly nothing more that could lead to or explain a failure. Absolute method is the hypostatization of the system of education's differentiation (from other systems) in temporal, factual, and social respects; but it does not take into consideration that such differentiation ( of a system from others) does not do away with environmental dependencies, but instead multiplies them.

VI. The theory of all-around education (Bi/dung) as Pedagogy's ,,take-ofr' as a science In view of the worries and problems that instruction raised, the 18th century started with a sort of subsuming technology: with ,,education laws" which had to be used in the .,praxis, "although there was no definite attribution of laws to practical cases, but instead, this was left to the judgement and experience of the one who is practicing. 318 One therefore cannot say that the technology problem of the awareness of a distance between theory and praxis is new. 319 It is the emergence of a new feeling of safety, which the Kant reception brings with it, that first brings some movement into the understanding of technology that has been largely passed down through the tradition (for example, through the perspective of a division of labor between teacher and educator). With the German all-around education concept (Bildungsbegrijj), which relates itself to science around 1800, notions of pedagogical autonomy become notably more ingrained. Even though the 18th century saw it as a problem of education that personal 316 317 318

319

Wagner formulates this is in several theoretical reconstructions, Philosophie der Erziehungskunst, starting in particular with p. 48. Cf. the contribution ,,Was ist Methode? ," in Dokumente des Neuhumanismus, ed. Rudolf Joerden, vol. I, Weinheim 1962, pp. 116-131. This is still said by Greiling, Ober den Endzweck der Erziehung und uber den ersten Grimdsatz einer Wissenschaft derselben, p.91ff (paragraph 22: ,,Unterschied der Erziehungswissenschaft von der Erziehungskunst"). We will take up the relationship between theory and praxis again in chapter X.

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achv1hes were communicated with social conditions, 320 it is the epistemological attack on natural limitationality that first puts Pedagogy in a situation of justifying itself. 321 From this point on, pedagogical reflection is not just concerned with making the instruction process as such into the subject matter of operations: for instance, seeing to it that schools are set up, that rules are established for the instruction process, that educators are educated. A new (second) step is arrived at, in which such processes are turned into the subject matter of pedagogical reflection. On this path, new ways of looking at problems become decisive for Pedagogy. ,,It could not have been my purpose with all of these investigations and discussions to determine, whether one will educate according to the idea of morality, and to what extent one could educate according to it in circumstances that were limited or favorable. It appeared to me as if I had to start from a principle, which, as soon as it is shown and recognized as being the highest, as being necessarily and generally justified; ... "322 This reversal of the foundational relationship, which can be summed up with the formula: morality is not based on education, rather education is based on morality, 323 requires an entirely new form of pedagogical theory. If morality is something that is necessary by principle, something that is connected a priori with being human, then all education rests on exposing this principle to the world: the person has to fill this concept of humanity with content through self-cultivation (all-around education (Bil dung) as self-education). 324 If it is incumbent upon education to generate this principle, then Pedagogy takes on the form of an a priori science. Even authors who only make loose reference to Kant or none at all sud320

321

322 323

324

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Although the question remains open of the actual conditions under which education operates. Cf. Lester E. Crocker, An Age of Crisis, Baltimore 1959, p. 174. This happens through Kant's thoughts in the area of epistemology when confronted with the question of how it is possible to think of an identity as the condition of cognition in spite of the non-identity between cognition and subject-matter. Jonathan Schuderoff, Briefe iiber moralische Erziehung in Hinsicht auf die neueste Philosophie, p. IX. And this is accompanied by the polemic against the Philanthropy (and in general against the earlier education theory): a prominent example is Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, Der Streit des Philanthropinismus und Humanismus in der Theorie des Erziehungs-Unterrichts unserer Zeit, Jena 1808. Cf. Wilhelm von Humboldt, ,,Theorie der Bildung des Menschen 1793," in Werke, vol. I, 2nd ed., Darmstadt 1969, pp. 234-240.

denly prescribe such a science program for themselves. 325 Because after one generation of endeavors on the level of practical methods, there is no tangible success, the expectation of salvation is shifted to the fundamentals. It is this form that remains fundamentally preserved as the basis of the new pedagogical trust in science for the dissemination and diversification of a new understanding of education. 326 The renewal made possible by the theory of all-around education (Bildung) does not only affect the individuality of the individual. It had always been known, of course, that pupils are individuals and that their individuality must be respected as far as possible when being educated. Until Philanthropy, however, one had understood the individuality of each person as being the final and most concrete description in a series of considerations - considerations that started at the most general genus characteristics of every living being, went onto the general human, then onto particularities of civic life, estate, local and familial characteristics, until they reached the concrete single person, each time inserting characteristics that could not be considered as being generally valid on a higher level of abstraction. In this sort of thinking, the individual was the end of a list of increasingly concrete descriptions according to the logic of gemes, but that did not mean that the individual was representative for what should be achieved as a human being and as a citizen through education. 327 According to a logic of gemes, in other words, the individual was the border case of what could still be taken into consideration as a task of education, or one could also say, the inescapable concrete incarnation of that, which made it possible in the first place to exist as a human being and as a citizen. Therefore, all generalizations were applied to external relationships, to uses of education - whether they were for the good of humanity per se or for the good of certain societies or types of work within them. With such a perspective, it was only consistent to consider the ends of education as being its use - making the individual ,,blissful" if he experiences himself in such a way. And for that reason, determination of estate had to be 325

326 327

Cf. only Friedrich Wilhelm Lehne, Handbuch der Pddagogik nach einem systematischen Entwurfe, vol. I, Giittingen 1799, p. 11 ff; Kajetan Weiller, Ver such eines Lehrgebdudes der Erziehungskunde, vol. I, Munich 1802, p. 23ff. Even if this trust in science is challenged in various ways and substituted to some extent in the following period. See the distinctions between knowledge that is generally useful, communally useful, and individually useful in Trapp, Versuch einer Padagogik, p. 156ff. Similar is Johann Stuve, ,,Allgemeine Grundslitze der Erziehung, hergeleitet aus einer richtigen Kenntnis des Menschen," in Allgemeine Revision, vol. I, p. 325, 233-382.

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thought of as a natural characteristic of individuality, as a design of human genus that opens up the possibility of individuality. The theory of all-around education (Bi/dung) relinquishes this concept. 328 It, so to speak, short-circuits the series ,,human being - citizen individual" by claiming that what is general in the human being is precisely his individuality, or, more exactly: it is the ability to go beyond the animalistic single existence and to individualize via the mind. 329 That is what is meant by the ,,absolute method. "330 Individualizing now means seeing the general relation to world in the single case, and in this way, because this can only occur among human beings, but is also accessible to every human being - it means fulfilling as much humanity within itself as is possible. Therefore, one can no longer arrive at the collective by going the simple path of leaving out all individual peculiarities, or by forming a ,,general will (volonte generate). " But how can it be managed otherwise? ,,Without a unified, melted-together wanting, there is no society," points out Herbart 331 , and: ,,This desire exists in everyone only in so far as he assumes that it also exists in everyone else." A community is not formed by disregarding oneself and renouncing self-interests, but rather by the fulfillment of these interests in the individual himself and the presumption that this also takes place in others. Education therefore takes on this vital meaning: the realization of the general in the particular, namely, turning the way in which the individual acts towards himself into a relationship to the world. Even discipline problems in school instruction are now understood as problems of individual dealings with single pupils. 332 328

329

330 331

332

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This is only the case in Germany. Since then, the semantic traditions that are connected to the concept of individuality (and consequently, with notions of collectivity, state, and society) develop in Germany separated from their development in Western Europe, and there is no other place (besides Germany) where a ,,humanities pedagogy" exists. Cf. Louis Dumont, ,,Religion, Politics, and Society in the Individualistic Universe," Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 1970, pp. 31-41. This argument explains the curious attacks of the New Humanists on the ,,bestial" education of the Philanthropists. Cf. Niethammer, Der Streit des Philanthropinismus und Humanismus in der Theorie des Erziehungs-Unterrichts unserer Zeit, or August Evers, Ober die Schulbildung zur Bestialitdt, Aarau 1807, reprinted in Dokumente des Neuhumanismus, ed. Rudolf Joerden, vol. I, Weinheim 1962. Cf. the previous chapter. Joh. Fr. Herbart, ,,Allgemeine practische Philosophie (1808)," in Samtliche Werke, vol. II, ed. Karl Kehrbach, Langensalza 1887, p. 424. We quote Herbart from this edition, 19 vols., Langensalza 1887-1912, chapters I-XIX. See, for example, Karl Heinrich Ludwig Politz, Die Erziehungswissenschaft, aus dem Zwecke der Menschheit und des Staates practisch dargestellt, Leipzig 1806, part 1, p. 275ff.

Whatever theory problems this may solve, it is also the case that if all individuality determines itself through self-referential processes and can only educate itself to humanity in this way, then any consideration of technology becomes impossible or is relegated to the subordinate role of assisting in teaching and learning. The argument, which makes this clear, sets the then-contemporary interpretation of technique and technology within the framework of the means/ends scheme. Technology is understood as assistance in choosing which means should be used to achieve a given end. 333 If the pupil experiences and acts self-referentially without exception, and if he individualizes himself in this way alone, then every pedagogical influence assumes the cooperation of the pupil; but in this case, one may never start with given ends - in other words, never follow a technology, because that would inevitably mean going against the categorical imperative and using the pupil, even if only in activities related to himself, merely as means to an end. This complicated conceptual and theoretical preliminary decisions, which enter into this argument, are seldom expressed; but the incompatibility of technology and humanity in general, and in education in particular, are considered certain from this point on. 334 If the individual is (newly) conceived in this way, then Pedagogy needs a new concept of science, because a Pedagogy that gears itself towards individuality (in this sense of the word) does not only feel itself robbed of rationality of action, but also of a scientific fundament. 335 In any case, this is not attained in Pedagogy through the usual Kantian transfer. One realizes quickly that the previous deduction of the unity of the education concept was not successful. A practical law cannot be a theoretical principle. It is in no way definite, that the teacher can actually do what he should want to do according to the morality laws. The problem is, how 333

334

335

It is understood as such into this century. See, for example, Willy Moog, ,,Yorn Wesen des padagogischen Akles," Zeitschrift f11r padagogische Psychologie 26, 1925,pp. l-12. The application of this argument in a merely ideological, profession-supporting manner is very noticeable here. It is only used to justify the technology verdict. Otherwise, pedagogues rarely consider whether assuming learning goals in instruction goes against the categorical imperative. What is not thought of, and what pedagoges have to be told by economists today, is that the principle of free choice of ends, when put in a social context, makes rationality impossible. Cf. for example G. L. S. Shakle, ,,Time, Nature, and Decision," in Money, Growth, and Methodology and Other Essays in Honor ofJohan Akerman, Lund 1961, p. 299f, 299-310. In as far as this fundament has been attained according to the causal category, and the notion of being able to ascertain effects is based upon this premise.

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can one educate in spite of freedom and how one can be certain that the pupil will act correctly in spite of freedom. 336 The Kantian philosophy insists that Pedagogy understand one problem that is required of it as a science: if technology cannot be had, then science will be needed even more. Zachariae outright refuses to begin his considerations with an explanation of the word ,,education": ,,Instead, we will pose ourselves a problem that we will call the problem of educational studies (Erziehungswissenschafl) at the end; and without concerning ourselves about whether this task corresponds entirely to the usual meaning of the word ,,education," we are satisfied if the reality of this task can be confirmed through reason or experience."337 As a theoretical problem, this does not lead (for now, in any case338) to the goal. That is why Zachariae considers a practical solution. Whereas the theory can justify the removal of obstacles by using the concept of freedom - in other words, it can justify a negative influence on the morality of the pupil; a ,,second instance," which would go beyond that, can be justified only in a practical way: ,,The second instance, in which an education in the nanower sense would be permitted, would be if practical reason itself would make such an education - in spite of its inconceivability - into a duty."339 ,,The individual human being [must be understood] as the subject matter of duty." 340 The educator is thus morally obliged to do something that he cannot comprehend; to consider something as possible even though he cannot understand the conditions of possibility. In this way, Pedagogy becomes a science that - while it does start from Kant's justification of morals 341 - no longer deals directly with the Kantian concept of morals itself. 342 336 337 338 339 340

341

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Thus Ritter, ,,Kritik der Padagogik zum Beweis der Nothwendigkeit einer allgemeinen Erziehungs-Wissenschaft," Philosophisches Journal 8, 1798, pp. 47-85. Karl Salomo Zachariae, Ober die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts durch den Staal, Leipzig I 802, p. 2 I. Herbart promises (I 806) a ,,zweyte Halfte der Padagogik ... , in welcher die Moglichkeit der Erziehung theoretisch erkliirl. .. wiirde" for the future: K II, p. I 0. Zachariae, Ober die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts durch den Staal, p. 108. Herbart, K II, p. 441 - also noticed by Josef L. Blasz, Padagogische Theoriebildung bei Johann Friedrich Herbart, Meisenheim am Gian I 972, p. 216 as being vital for the ,,Proze(I der padagogischen Theoriebildung (process of pedagogical theory formation)." ,,Moralitat, als hochster Zweck des Menschen und folglich der Erziehung, ist allgemein anerkannt. Wer dies leugnete, miiBte wohl nicht eigentlich wissen, was Moralitat ist; wenigstens hiitle er kein Recht, hier mitzusprechen." And: ,,[die] aber nicht die mindeste Einmengung der idealistischen (duldet]. Kein leisester Wind von transzendentaler Freiheit darf in das Gebiet des Erziehers durch irgendein Ritzchen hi-

A far-reaching re-orientation of Pedagogy comes along with this option: the problem is now seen as having to do with the teacher or the educator instead of with the student or pupil. This is a result of the Kantian version of our technology deficit concept. The problem of education is explicated on the teacher's orientation and no longer on the pupil's: ,,Pedagogy is the science that the educator needs." 343 With this shift in the education problem onto the position of the educator, an arrangement is introduced that is not only obligated to the new nnderstanding of the individual (who can only educate himself through self-referential processes), but that is also determined to pursue the problem of technology deficit from the perspective of the theory of all-around education (Bildung). Science's dependence on technology can be reversed, and the most precise expressions of science can be used to break down the technology problem and to aid in its solution, piece by piece. Realism is appealed to for this new start of Pedagogy. Herbart emphasizes the ,,realistic view" of education, 344 the necessity of contemplating the given concept of education with which Pedagogy ,,was to become the center of a research circle," 345 although the a priori nature of the Kantian moral concept was to continue to be the support behind the formation of pedagogical theory. But this support no longer holds back the process of forming pedagogical theory. On the contrary: if through the shift in the problem, the attempts to build a theoretical edifice for Pedagogy are brought to a second level of reflection, then the function process, which

342 343 344

345

neinblasen." Herbart, ,,Ober die asthetische Darstellung der Welt, als das Hauptgeschaft der Erziehung (!804)," KI, pp. 259,261, 259-274. One should note the variance in basic pedagogical concepts that starts up here, for instance in Herbart. Herbart, ,,Allgemeine Padagogik (l 806)," K II, p. 10. ,,[R]ealistic view" (.,rea/istische Ansicht") is not an appeal to empiricism (quite the opposite, an appeal to idealism), rather is stands for conceptual work that abstracts given concepts (for the field of General Pedagogy: many-sidedness, interest, character, morality) into process laws: ,.[enes Sondem und Zusammenschmelzen der Begriffe hat hier eine ganz andere Bedeutung, der man bisher schwerlich genug nachgedacht haben mochte; wenigstens ist hier gerade der Punkt, von wo aus ich mich genotigt geglaubt habe, die bisher gebahnten Wege zu verlassen und einen eigenen zu suchen." Herbart, ,,Ober philosophisches Wissen und philosophisches Studium (I 798)," K I, p. 88. Cf. also ,,Hauptpuncte der Metaphysik (l 808)," K II, p. 175-226. On this reorientation in concept formation also see Blasz, ,,Systemtechnik und padagogisches Denken bei Johann Friedrich Herbart," in Johann Friedrich Herbart: Leben und Werk in den Widerspriichen seiner Zeit. Neun Analysen, eds. Friedrich W. Busch and Hans-Dietrich Raapke, Oldenburg 1976, pp. 67-78. Herbart, K 11, p. 8.

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had been deposited within the individual, can be retrieved because we are now dealing with reflection on relations between reflecting beings. 346 It is now possible to think of the task of reflection as being the recognition and determination 347 of what happens when instruction takes its course. That presumes the existence of situations or roles or ,,sciences" that can distance themselves from the direct execution of happenings. The detour via the second reflection level, however, does not only yield new possibilities for dealing with problems - it also complicates the problem of application: how are these sorts of reflection positions transferred into the underworld of ,,praxis"? The problem is seen as deriving from the selection of form, 348 because not all forms are suitable. Science is taken into consideration as a form of accessing the education problem: ,,practical concepts," since a theoretical solution is not yet in sight. Of what sort are the premises for choosing a form? Herbart had called upon science for those people who want to educate through instruction. ,,What one wants to achieve through educating and demanding education depends upon the field of vision that one brings to the matter. " 349 The conditions for the choice are conceptual arrangements. A scientific presentation of the education process that suits ,,education··• is promised. Along with the choice of forms comes a decision about a conceptual model, which - in view of the technology verdict or technology deficit - provides for the course of the entire education process. Thus, the choice of form is tied up with a problem of double reflection:350 the form not only has to capture the specificity of the education process, it must also - in doing that - make its application possible. Along with the choice of form, therefore, a decision about very different possibilities for usage (which, moreover, are mutually dependent) is made. And, in order to avoid poor application notions in the first place, the presentation form of General Pedagogy is limited. 351 That is the reason for the 346

347

348 349 350

351

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Herbart writes in the .,Einleitung zur Allgemeinen Padagogik (1806)": ,,Erheben wir uns ins Allgemeine! Denken wir uns die Odyssee als den Anknilpfungspunkt einer Gemeinschaft zwischen Zogling und dem Lehrer .... ," K II, p. 15. The determination of pedagogy as being a science is a matter for philosophy (Ibid., p. 143): .,Bei ihr ist das Abstrahieren nur Nebensache; sie soil erklaren und beweisen." Herbart, KI, p. 87f. See above, a few pages into chapter Ill. These are the opening words in Herbart, ,,Allgemein Padagogik," K II, p. 5. Blasz, Padagogische Theoriebildung bei Johann Friedrich Herbart, p. 80ff., also reacts to this problem of .,doubled reflection" which is required in the study (!) of General Pedagogy. ,,Die allgemeine Padagogik darf sich ins specielle nicht so einlassen, dal3 der Oberblick sich vom ganzen aufirgend einen Theil besonders hinzoge." Herbart, K II, p. 58.

concept of pedagogical tact, ,,the greatest gem of the pedagogical art. " 352 A form is taken into consideration in order to show the educator the ,,entire problem" of education clearly. While ,,conventional education" 353 has to figure on all smts of consequences, because ,,everyone [speaks] according to his experience"; 354 the form ,,general concepts and their general connections" is supposed to show the processes required in ,,character formation." If the form acquires importance and a function as a representation of reality, then, not only does the question of the certainty basis come up, but also the question of compensation for the technology deficit - the way that the problem of means and ends will be solved on the level of science; and what also comes up is the question of whether or in which respect the inherited understanding of technology is altered and new points of view have a chance due to the perspectives that are taken up.355 ,,How can the human being, who is not that which he should be as he enters the world, be brought to become that which he should become through outer causes?"356 Using a more precise definition of the concept of education, this outer cause is the educator who concerns himself explicitly with the child's education. This qualification makes it possible to apply the Kantian concept of morals to the educator, thus determining the type of education. If the problem of education can be explicated with the orientation of the educator (the teacher), then - under the spell of the new understanding of individuality - the wish to be certain of effects collides with the characterization of the problem (that is: how one can be educated in spite of freedom) and with the object of education. The attempt to determine education sees itself confronted with ,,split considerations" (Her352 353 354 355

Ibid., pp. 14, 39; KI, p. 286: ,,der unmittelbare Regent der Praxis." ,,[D]ic jetzigen Obel zu verlangem [sucht]": writes Herbart, K II, p. 7. Ibid, p. 7. In our context, we are not pursing the scientific-systematic aspects of this question in particular, but we are also not pursuing the question's scientific-historical aspects with respect to a single author - aspects that are oriented on Herbart for a good rea• son and have, in the meantime, produced a challenging pedagogical literature which is generally exegetic: Josef L. Blasz, Herbarts piidagogische Den/eform, Wuppertal 1969; Blasz, Piidagogische Theoriebildung bei Johann Friedrich Herbart; Wolfgang Klafki, ,,Der zweifache Ansatz Herbarts zur Begrilndung der Padagogik als Wissenschaft," in Piidagogische Blatter (Fes/schrift Heinrich Dopp-Vorwald), Ratingen 1967, pp. 76-102; Bernhard Schwenk, Das Herbartverstiindnis der Herbarlianer, Weinheim 1963. 356 Karl Salomo Zachariae, Ober die Erziehung des Menschengesch/echts durch den Staal, p. 21 f.

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bart). 357 It is clear that abstracting the education process in general concepts has not taken care of everything. 358 But what else can be done? Thanks to the Kantian distinction between operative ends and regulative ideas, 359 the problem can be posed as it was in formula for ends, ,,conventional education,"360 which allows it to be worked with from one point of view in the form of ,,links between the sensual and the supersensory."361 If the ,,practical solution" does not promise any theoretical justification either, then the presentation of ,,practical concepts" (a sort of ,,map") for the entire education process implicates the unity of a justification. That means that the existing problem should be dealt with through theoretical considerations of relations. 362 Considered from the point of view of Kant and the notion of the individual who takes the world inside of himself, the duality of all-around education (Bi/dung) (that is: instruction) and education (Erziehung) (that is: discipline) appears in sharper relief on the level of the inner-pedagogical orientation of the ends: ,,It is in the nature of the matter that a unity of pedagogical ends cannot be found." And Herbart delivers simultaneously a justification and a ,,solution" with the following: ,, ... precisely because everything must begin with the One Idea: the educator represents the future man for boys; and it follows that the educator must direct his endeavors towards the ends that the pupil will direct himself towards as an adult; the educator has to prepare him for innerlightness in advance. " 363 If the duality has become clear through reflection about the shift of the problem from the pupil to the educator, then the question of the unity of pedagogical ends will become a method problem. 364 357

358

359

360 361 362 363 364

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For this reason, Ritter also wants to know that dualities are thought of as a unity; but it remains something that he wants, ,,Kritik der Padagogik zum Beweis der Nothwendigkeit einer allgemeinen Erziehungs-Wissenschaft." ,,Damit ist aber nicht gesagt, da/3 nicht das Viele der Erziehung sich leicht Einem oder wenigen formalen Hauptbegriffen unterordnen lasse." Herbart, K II, p. 27f. Cf. the distinctions which the Critique of Judgement made using the terms ,,Zweckma/3igkeit der Natur (force of nature)" as the ,,Mittelglied (link)" to show the causality of nature and freedom. Kant, Werke, vol. V, p. 248ff. For instance, August Hermann Niemeyer, Grundsatze der Erziehung und des Unterrichts, Halle 1796. Herbart, K X, p. 6. See fundamental explanations on theoretical intention in regards to this in Johann Jakob Wagner, Philosophie der Erziehungskunst, Leipzig 1803. Herbart, K II, p. 27. For more details, see Blasz, Herbarts padagogische Denkjorm; Blasz, Padagogische Theoriebi/dung bei Johann Friedrich Herbart.

It is scientific endeavors, then, which - in pursual of the new perspectives365 - create pressure to break apart and recombine, which finally ,,synthetically" waters down what had been understood under ,,individual." But, at first it is merely about abstracting the totality of the person into his ,,wanting"366 so that - - in connection with the Kantian distinction - the inner pedagogical orientation of ends can begin with the notion that the final end of education does not concern a particular future capacity, but instead, it merely concerns an ability to put this capacity selfreferentially into use. With this, the concept of morality can be related to a ,,wanting that can be assumed," 367 which negates and qualifies as selfcentered perfectibility; 368 in short, it is turned into forms that categorize the course of general education. Let us assume such a model, with which the problem of instruction and discipline could be worked out ,,in order to combine in one view that which must be thought through and simultaneously done ... ": 369 what would be gained through such a ,,field of vision" (considering that the problem of what the effect is, is still open)? The interpretation refers to ,,Fundorten (places where finds are)" (Volkmann), to ,,padagogischen Topen (pedagogical types)" (Blasz), and ,,Such- und Rahrnenformeln (formulas for searching and framing)" (Lausberg); the tradition refers to a ,,Begriffslabyrinth (concept labyrinth)" (Rein); and Herbart himself flirts with an ,,offentlichen Geheimnis (open secret)," using metaphors such as ,,pointing," ,,map," and ,,field of vision." And how else should one say it differently, if Pedagogy is pedagogically relevant, if it reappears (as theory) in its own domain of objects? The question of existing connections between things helps us here further. We can first tum to Herbart's perspective (on the problem of effect): to the state of the categorization of ,,instruction," which is related to 365

For Herbart in the context of the .,praktische Losung (practical solution)": .,Lassen wir alien Disput! Es fragt sich ja for uns blol3: Konnen wir Zwecke des kunftigen Mannes voraus wissen, welche fruhzeitig statt seiner ergriffen und in ihm selber verfolgt zu haben, er uns einst danken wird? Alsdann brauchts keiner weitem Grunde." . K II, p. 26. 366 Herbart, K II, p. 28. 367 Herbart, .,Ober die asthetische Darstellung der Welt, ... (1804)," KI, p 261. 368 On the limitationality of the possibility of negating the real basis of the self: Herbart, ,,Hauptpuncte der Metaphysik (1808)," K II, p. l 75ff.; cf. also K IV, p. 234. 369 Herbart, K II, p. 58.

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the ,,material of instruction"370 , to the categorization of ,,discipline" that ,,affects the mind directly." 371 When considering such unequal ,,brothers" (classes of causes), the question presents itself of how, and under which conditions, it is possible to establish a relationship between such different causes, 372 if indeed more is intended by General Pedagogy than merely a ,,presentation that inspires praxis."373 If it is about a problem of knowledge, so that one can act knowledgeably, then one cannot stop at the (respective) present state of elaboration, because the theory of all-around education (Bi/dung) calls for increasing rigidity in the categorization of instruction. 374 Considering the experiences already made (with limits in the ability to make a picture), how else is one supposed to promise the presentation of the ,,entire problem" of education? Thus, it is the perspective of ,,unity" that draws out further analyses about mutual categorization. 375 Wherever the starting point is the ,,mutual relationship" between instruction and discipline, wherever it is about producing interdependencies, that reality - no matter how it is communicated through truth - must be able to be questioned. What we are asking about here is the compensation for the technology deficit. Through the formulation of ,,native" concepts, a ,,horizon" is established for Pedagogy that manages to keep further reflection open. This occurs through concepts that, as part of the normatively charged ,,practical concepts," can be thought to indicate a conceptual sensitizing of everyday behavior, even if an official connection between action and effects does not exist. 376 But this reflection on the reflection position does not yet lead 370 371 372

373 374

375 376

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,,Seim Unterricht gibt es allemal etwas Drittes: womit Lehrer und Lehrling zugleich beschaftigt sind." Herbart, K II, p. 11 Of. Ibid., p. 111. The ,,wirkliche Aufgabe der Zuehl [besteht darin], wahrend des ganzen Fortgangs der Erziehung (das Verhaltnis zwischen Bildung und Charakter Oberhaupt und Bildung zur Sittlichkeit] zu beobachten und zu berichtigen. - Aber wie soil man es anfangen, Regeln zu geben zur Beobachtung und Berichtigung eines so wichtigen Verhaltnisses?" Ibid., p. 133. Herbart, ,,Uber die dunkle Seite der Padagogik (1812)," K !II, p. 153. This is a ,,contradiction" in Herbart's General Pedagogy, which further encourages the ,,outlining" of theory endeavors, a combined way of presentation, so that experiences can be related to one another more suitably, because: ,,Die Padagogik darf jedoch auch keine unbegriinzte Bildsamkeit voraussetzen." Herbart, K X, p. 70. This ends up in a restructuring of the theoretical edifice. For instance, in the case of the theory of attention. Herbart, K X, p. 146ff. ,,Denn was mit Plan, das geschieht nach Begriffen; und Begriffe sind es auch allein, die mit Sicherheit in Worte gefa[lt, zu bestirnrnten Vorschriften ausgepragt, und als

us to the ,,contradiction" that causes Pedagogy to go further than ,,that which is pedagogical" and to head in the direction of psychology; in other words, to head in the direction of a problem of effect, which is so complex as to remain quite clearly illusive to the ,,native concepts" form. This is why we are inquiring into the formality of the form that is chosen for concepts used to solve the means/ends problem. If one abstracts using the form ,,simultaneity," then no interdependencies or causalities can be created - in a period of a growing consciousness of temporality, this could symbolize the flight from reality, because with this form of presentation (General Pedagogy), ,,complete clarity [cannot be reached] in Pedagogy."377

VII. Pedagogy in the context of a new consciousness of temporality geared to the future and past ,,The most important thing that remains to be done is getting an overview of where the things belong, including their artificial and natural foundations, in a longer framework of tirne," 378 since for boys, the educator represents the future man; he presents the individual (the ,,boy") his own future. Herbart defines the temporal dimension of the education process by using the educator: it is the difference between future and past. This version of the problem comes about with an eye towards scientific treatment. How is it prepared? How does it help compensate the technology deficit (the technology verdict) and how does it aid in understanding the problem of effect? Pedagogy adapts itself to the notion of an education problem in (and with) the temporal dimension starting with Rousseau. It reacts to the preconditions of actual education, which from now cannot be neglected attention since it is an aspect of concept differentiation. If the Pedagogy of the 17th century, corresponding to the general understanding of nature at that time, had pushed the actual differentiation of pedagogical theory (from other theories) onwards: 379 then with the ,,discovery of the child" as

377 378 379

solche vom Lehrer an den Schuler iiberliefert werden konnen." Herbart, ,.Pestalozzis !dee eines ABC der Anschauung (1802)," KI, p. 162. Herbart on the problem of the form of presentation, Pddagogische Schriflen, ed. Walter Asmus, Diisseldorf and Munich 1966, vol. 3, p. 158. Herbart, (outline 1835/41 ), K Ill, p. 166. And it also negotiated the social integration that is a condition of the education function, via an .,ordered movement," a regular series of events, series rerum - in

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a type of person with his own perspectives and forms of dealing with experiences, it became clear that the problem of education cannot be dumped onto actual processes. Education (and instruction) had always been involved with specific problematic aspects of social integration. This aspect affects a fairly prominent change in the terminology, which from now on relates to ,,sensations" and ,,feelings."38 Finally, however, even this differentiation proves inadequate, because the education problems pose themselves to Pedagogy in the context of a new temporal consciousness that is geared to the future and past: reality is rethought from the viewpoint of perfection to that of perfectibility. Along with that, Comenius' notion of the importance of early childhood for education comes back into play for Pedagogy with a new, expanded way: the education of young children is supposed to mean that one must interfere before the results of a mistake-ridden development are visible on the child and those mistakes become irreparable. That means that one should not only react to situations and visible problems; rather, one should act in anticipation and plan accordingly. 381 But how? If experiences that are not related to basic societal notions come up not only in the factual, but also in the social and temporal dimensions, then practical pedagogical effects on society must, so to speak, create its own limitationality first, and only under this condition will it become a reflected undertaking. The solution to this autonomy problem is (as of yet, still) worked on with the concept of nature. The form of the education novel (Erziehungsroman) is chosen for this. 382 The educator finds his opportunity to intervene in the perfectibility of the pupil. Nature is understood as perfectibility, although the concept of nature also functions as a place holder for a future concept that is not available yet. For that reason, the concept is vague: ,,we know nothing about childhood: ... they always search for the adult in the child, without considering what the child is before he is adult." 383 But what is meant by ,,before (avant) "? Rousseau speaks about ,,origine" and ,,naissance."

°

380 381 382 383

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other words, via actual contents. Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, ,,Padagogik: Geschichte und Grundlinien des Systems," in Gesamme//e Schriften, vol. IX, Stuttgart/Gottingen 1960/61,p.169. In the course of a ,,basic pedagogical consideration," Wilhelm Flitner registers this change as linguistic ,,shift": Allgemeine Piidagogik, 12th ed., Stuttgart 1968, p. 142. Cf. Jean Pierre de Crousaz, Traile de /'Education des en/ans, the Haag 1722, p. 9ff. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile ou de I 'education, in CEuvres completes, ed. de la Pleiade, vol. IV, Paris 1969. Ibid., p. 241f. ,,On ne connait point l'enfance: ... Ils cherchent toujours l'homme dans l'enfant, sans penser ace qu'il est avent que d'etre homme."

Those are indeed concepts that relate to the past, but they are not meant historically, because the ,,dispositions primitives" are understood as the problem state of childhood - being open to moulding and educational measures, which should be made possible by feelings of complying with the educator. And the path of the feelings would then be the path from an unfinished state to a finished one, the overcoming of a temporal distance with help of the educator. But that would be an inadmissible statement, because the child is finished as a child, as a child he is already in the right. Thus, the child must be seen as simultaneously finished and unfinished: as finished in his childlike perfectibility and as unfinished in reaching that which perfectibility makes possible. That is the point of shifting the perfection concept into a modal concept (into perfectibility). How did Rousseau deal with this ,,simultaneity"? Education is presented as the succession of phases that can be dated. Time is thought to have the task of indicating what is necessary for education in the form of the development of the child. This version of events corresponds to the form of the chronological novel. The child, however, is not only ,,unfinished" in reaching that which perfectibility makes possible, he is also a ,,finished" being: he is (also) a ,,sensitive" being that ,,is to himself everything (est tout pour lui)." 384 The child in his way, then, is a finished being who organizes the world around him in the manner that is necessary for him. He, however, corrupts himself while doing this, because he is a being in need of help (in a social respect) - a fact that makes hin1 sensitive to (educational) outside influences and to dependency on external conditions. Thus, the original nature of the child is also seen by the educator as an ,,unfinished" nature who must be brought to decisions via social mechanisms and can only be brought to decisions in this way. 385 After cognitive structures and morals no longer seem able to produce absolute certainty, Rousseau turns to feelings. Feelings individualize more than knowledge, which is objectified and the same for everyone. In the case of differences of opinion, the opinions themselves are either correct or incorrect. In the domain of feelings, however, one does not immediately think of equality as being the relation between individuals, but instead, of a complementary relation. One loves someone else, because he is someone else. The greater complexity of social relations, which goes beyond the equality and inequality 384 385

Rousseau, Emile ou de /'education, in CEuvres comp/e/es, ed. de la Pleiade, vol. IV, p. 249. One may remember the I 8th century's fascination for wolf children and similar figures.

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between people, is expressed in this way. What does this gain in perspective do for the understanding of education; what does it do for the pedagogical conception? Inspired by Rousseau, the social dimension of education is examined, but it is not established as (an independent) basis of certainty because it is only possible due to the ,,unfinished" nature of the child. It loses its potential in the course of time - a dismantling - because time itself is understood as merely holding up completion. 386 If the time dimension is tied up conceptually with the social dimension, then the social dimension does not get what it deserves either, so to speak. It is true that it is recognized and cultivated on the child as the object of the educational practice, but it can only be accessed by ordering the education process into a sequence, which comes to be presented as the irreversibility of time. When the child's present state is used entirely as a means for the moulding the future in this way, 387 then it becomes understandable why this is considered problematic: ,,One fear always remains with me that has to do with the extreme difficulty of a such an education - that it, namely, is only good in its entirety .. .if one does not continue to the end, then it was a great injustice to have started in the first place." 388 Can this conceptualization of the time dimension of Pedagogy serve as the basis of its practical effect? No matter how high one estimates the protection through built-in ,,cases" (that is: phases) to be, this linear understanding of time, even when it is associated with feelings, functions as a representation of reality only with great difficulty. 389 Considering this 386

387 388

389

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,.Oserai-je exposer ici la plus grande, la plus importante, la plus utile regle de toute ]'education? C n'est pas de gagner du temps, c'est d'en perdre," Rousseau, Emile ou de /'education, in CEuvres completes, ed. de la Pleiade, vol. IV, p. 323. According to Martin Rang, ,.Introduction," in Emile oder Ober die Erziehung, trans. Sckommondau and Rang, ed. Martin Rang, Stuttgart 1970, p. 84. Correspondance Generale de 1-J. Rousseau, ed. Theophile Dufour, 20 vols., 1924-34, vol. X, p. 253. ,,II ne me reste qu'une seule inquietude, c'est que vous n'ayez entrepris cette grande !ache sans en prevoir toutes les difficultes, et qu' en s'offrant de jour en jour elles ne vous rebutent.. .. mais un soin continue] accable a la fin; et Jes meilleures resolutions, qui dependent de la perseverance, sont rarement a l'epreuve du temps." (Note from the translator: English translation based on the German translation that is included in the original text: ,,Mir bleibt immer eine Angst, die ihren Grund in der extremen Schwierigkeit einer solchen Erziehung hat, daB sie namlich nur als ganze gut ist. .. geht man nicht bis zum Ende, so ist es ein groBes Unrecht, iiberhaupt begonnen zu haben"; quoted from Emile oder Ober die Erziehung, trans. Sckommodau and Rang, p. 957). In spite of the fact that - with the emerging consciousness of temporality, which starts from seeing the present as a series of points - this is what is demanded of time. Cf. Georges Poulet, Etudes sur le temps humain, Paris 1950.

state of conceptualization, it is understandable that Rousseau refers specifically to the existence of ,,external" controls - controls that (also) relate to the room that education has to function, without being dependent upon it: the role of the educator, which is not defined sufficiently through the complementary character of the role, but rather assumes the existence of societal consensus guarantees in the form of role requirements for specific problem situations in the system of education. It is precisely this that is demanded in [social -trans.] contract-thinking: if the need for education requires concrete interaction, which means that education always has to proceed communicatively in this demanding manner, then the the use of contract-thinking stipulates that this thought can no longer only relate to the existing laws of the rulers, but rather that it link up with political ideas that are compatible with the problematic situation of the education process discussed here. Thus the (self-autonomizing) pedagogical conception of education is, in a quick unification between pedagogical and political ideas, sent along on its way. And it is precisely this that - historically is the reason for its fascination, but also for its transitional character. Initially, there is a widespread socio-political impact without any particular focus on the time problem. Time is dealt with at first simply as a dimension of the pupil's development. Nevertheless, one can see at the latest in Philanthropy how an open future which is designed to be improvable ends up ,,historicizing" the societal situation and, in this sense, temporalizing it. The richer on possibilities and ,,more tempting" future perspectives are, the more restrictively and more responsibly the choice of means and methods must be dealt with, the more depends upon proceeding correctly, and the more critical the judgement of existing relations is. Precisely because so much is possible, only particular things are conect, and the present loses out in the comparison to this. But the present, as status quo, is the only starting point for a better future - one must therefore criticize, create polemics, reform, and revolutionize. This constellation of orientations historicizes the consciousness, though not to the extent of conjuring up the ,, Zeitgeist (the spirit of the times)" in order to be able to recommend a specific direction for education. 390 The Philanthropists begin calculating witl1 time - the time available to education: if the limits of early education have become obvious, 391 then 390

391

Thus writes Christian Daniel Vosz, Versuch uber die Erziehungfar den Staal, a/s Bedurfnif3 unsrer Zeil, zur Befordenmg des Burgerwohls und der Regenten-Sicherheit, 2 vols., Halle 1799: education for the state as a political alternative to the French Revolution. Joachim Heinrich Campe, .,Ober die grol3e Schadlichkeit einer allzufruhen Ausbildung der Kinder," in Allgemeine Revision, vol. VI, pp. 1-160.

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one must concern oneself with what lies on the future horizon of time. ,,How long may we go about with the education of our children in accordance with nature?" 392 and still be able to deal with the demands of ,,forming a citizen"? ,,One considers first and foremost what the pupil's destiny is, and then one calculates the probable time that is necessary to prepare him for this destiny in civil society; then one subtracts from this time from the number of years meant for the entire human and bourgeois education, and one dedicates whatever remains with comfort to education by nature." 393 Not least of all, education is thus made dependent upon accelerating itself and choosing its themes and methods with regard to the aspect of time. And where only a little time is available for education namely, among the lower classes - one must rely on the quickest education: the religious one. 394 While such calculations may seem simplistic to us, they show that Pedagogy now reacts to reflection problems that are created within the education system as well. It becomes clear through the subtraction that the time is no longer only thought of as the past horizon of present objects, but also as their future horizon (in order to differentiate the education process). In addition, the form of this structuring betrays that the thinking that goes on is dependent on present representations of organizational schemes. Rousseau's ,,wishful thinking" about the present-ness of the present (ignoring every future and past) have become superfluous. Pedagogy reckons on the availability of time, because time is reflected upon as being the ,,every time" when pedagogical means can be applied (or the ,,every time" when one can begin): ,,We will never succeed in making instruction as interesting as is necessary ... , if we do not stick to the rule of starting with that which is present." 395 However insufficiently time is understood -- - as the past or the future horizon of present objects - it finds, in this linear and instrumental form, entrance into pedagogical reflections, bringing the cultivation of pedagogical techniques further: ,,To 392 393

394

395

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Ibid_, p. 70. Ibid., p. 71. Similar is Ernst Christian Trapp's calculation on the question: ,,Wieviel Zeit einem guten Kopf vergonnt wird, sich mit den Alten zu beschaftigen." Ernst Christian Trapp, ,,Ober das Studium der alten classischen Schriftsteller und ihre Sprachen, in padagogischer Absicht," in Allgemeine Revision, vol. VII, p. 385. Thus writes Jacques Necker, De !'importance des opinions religieuses, London Lyon 1788, quoted in CEuvres completes, vol. XII, Paris 1821, p. 39f. The religious moral is ,,par son action rapide" the only one that can convince quickly enough, ,,avec celerite," because it moves the heart while enlightening. Ernst Christian Trapp, ,,Ober den Unterricht Gberhaupt," in Allgemeine Revision, vol. VIII, P- 163.

this end, one must have all subject matters of instruction - each broken down into its parts - laid out in front of one, so that each one of this pieces can be allotted the necessary amount of time and so that the order in which they must follow one another can be determined. "396 However, around the end of the 18th century, such ideas of a temporal sequencing in the sense of a process of movement or a development increasingly collide with a sort of inner reflexivity of time - namely, with the similarly well-tended idea of the transitoriness of every present: that the present update its own time horizon and can only be integrated with future and past present moments when it is beyond its own time horizon. This problem develops against a background of a semantic tradition in which the human being is distinguished from the animal in that he can connect the past and future within his own present and is therefore not at the complete mercy of his present. 397 The power responsible for this was celebrated as ,,prudentia." Hobbes, however, had already broken this topology apart with two comments: namely, that animals often have more ,,prudence" than children398 and that the extension of the time horizon frightens human beings. 399 One can already see here how it is possible for arguments referring to children and those referring to political society to converge in the problem of time. The connection is not registered. But it apparently does make it possible in the second half of the 18th century to think in a more complex way about the macro-time of the society as well as the micro-time of the child and to relate them to the respective present. The notion that the human genus having the characteristic of ,,prudentia" no longer seems satisfying. The society seeks new ways of ordering time in politics secured by a constitution and in business that is set on accumulating capital; ever since Herder, 400 Pedagogy has been analyzing first and 396

397

398

Ibid., p. 184. Pedagogy understands immediately that the path of youth must be ,,durch viele Zwischenziele verkiirz[t] und angenehm [ge]mach[t]" and that this should be focused upon as the reason for rewards as well as for further effort. Typically, Circero serves as a reference, de officiis I, c. IV 11. For the continuation of this topos in the 18th century cf. Georges Louis Le Sage, ,,Le mecanisme de !'esprit," reprinted as an appendix to: Cours abrege de Philosophie par aphorismes, Genf 1718, p. 346; Claude Buffier, Traite de la societe civile, Et du moyen de se rendre heureux, en contribuant au bonheur des personnes avec qui /'on vii, Paris 1726, p. 20ff.; Abbe de Mably, Principes de Morale, Paris 1784, in particular p. 150f. Hobbes, Leviathan I, chapter 3, London 1953 (the edition by Everyman's Library), p. 11.

399 400

Ibid., chapter 12, p. 54f. Johann Gottfried Herder, ,,Abhandlung ilber den Ursprung der Sprache (I 722)," in Herders Samtliche Werke, ed. Bernhard Suphan, Berlin 1891, vol. 5, pp. 1-147. Klaus

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foremost language as a structure that is independent of the present and has selective control over time horizons .401 If, due the complexity of time relations and, more importantly, due to the inner reflexivity of time horizons in time, one must break with simple models of process, then the existing notion of technology also breaks down. One can, then, no longer think of education as a process of movement in which one state leads to the next in that the former is replaced by the latter; in which every step leads to a point where it is possible to take the next step, and one only needs rules or ends (a purpose) to be able to maintain the same direction. Instead of this, the time horizons give every present its own right. The past that is present right now dominates; the future that is being imagined seizes hold of the situation; but whether this objectively continues the presents that are already past and whether this appropriately equips for the presents that are yet to come, can certainly not be determined from the time horizons of the present that is present now. All action, but in particular pedagogical action, is in fact able to use its time horizons in the present that is present, but it cannot reach the basis of past or future presents from that point. The future that is present is not identical with the series of future presents, and when one tracks down this difference or even reflects on it conceptually, a problem of indeterminability arises from the time structure - a problem that one must react to with a higher level of reflection. On a very general level, it is possible to say that all answers that the new humanistic Pedagogy seeks, first and foremost its insistence on selfreference, are connected to this time problem. It becomes very clear that concepts for a past that affects the present and a future that affects the present are sought - concepts that at the same time introduce a dynamic sense, that aim at change in the present. That does not happen through the introduction ofa new type of terminology, but rather through the emphatic strengthening of terms that are already being used. The past that affects the present, for example, is presented as strength; the future that affects the present is presented as wanting. 401 The strength to want, or the ability

401

402

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Giel remarks - and quite correctly - on the lack of depth in this discussion, ,,Vorbemerkungen zu einer Theorie des Elementarunterrichts," in Giel, Stucke zu einem mehrperspektivischen Unterricht: Aujsdtze zur Konzeption 2, Stuttgart 1975, p. 57. This also suggests that the widespread discussion about the place of old languages in the education plan had more depth than a discussion about the choice of materials and differential usefulness. No matter what enthusiastic reformers or humanists might argue, what is important is the stn1cture of competence regarding the disposal over time. From time to time, ,,talent" is favored over strength. This is the case in Kajetan Weiller, Versuch eines lehrgebdudes der Erziehungskunde, 2 vols., Munich 1802

to exert oneself, is a trait that the educator must assume in advance as well as generate; it therefore becomes the point at which the education process must function self-referentially. 403 One certainly cannot say that the pedagogical literature of the reform period of 1800 was fully prepared in a theoretical and argumentative manner for this problem that confronted it. That makes it all the more worthwhile to look more closely at the forms used to cope with the problem and their limits. Even for Schleiermacher, the question of Pedagogy's reaction and its orientation, had its own problem reference with regard to the developing difficulty in (with) the temporal dimension. The fact that education can no longer be considered in relation to the past (nature; the present child) alone nor only in relation to the future (the Kingdom of God; the intended completed personality) becomes an issue: ,,May one sacrifice the present moment of life to a future one?" 404 The determining effect of whatever goal is in place in a respective time is forgotten in favor of an ,,integrally dialectic negotiation" 405 which relates the problem of the contradiction of time modi to the pupil's self-reference (as something that is determined by circumstances). 406 This dialectical solution aims at ,,unique personal fea-

403

404 405

406

and 1805. Here, pure Aristotelian thinking is presented as a completely new science - a notable indication that there has been a sudden break from traditional connections and for an orientation on the Zeitgeist, which only accepts what is new, but does not always give sufficient strength to think in a new manner. For this reason, both rather conservative and rather progressive ideologies can take off from this point, depending on how much the assuming in advance versus the generating is emphasized. The conservative line is very clearly and impressively argued by Ernst Brandes, Ober einige bisherige Folgen der Franzosischen Revolution in Riicksicht auf Deutsch/and, Hannover 1792: perfectibility cannot be assumed to being general and already widespread. The strength to exert oneself and become educated only exists among a small number of the mass (p. 36f). These could also be promoted through education, and this is the task - or can one say at this point already, the latent function? of Latin instruction (p. 73f). We are also quoting this as proof for the very indirect and unclear form in which the time reference oflanguage is articulated. Friedrich E. D. Schleiermacher, Ausgewiihlte piidagogische Schriften, besorgt von Ernst Lichtenstein, 2nd ed., Paderbom 1964, p. 81. Cf. Ernst Lichtenstein, ,,Schleiermachers Padagogik," Neue Zeitschrift fur Systematische Theologie und Religions-Philosophie I 0, 1968, p. 346 (with further references to texts). Our formulation, our interpretation, Friedrich E. D. Schleiermacher, Padagogische Schriften, eds. Erich Weniger and Theodor Schulze, 2nd ed., Dusseldorf-Munich, vol. I, p. 27: ,,Wenn der Mensch nur als Selbstandiges und Selbsttatiges Gegenstand der Erziehung sein kann, so ist also was in der Entwicklung begriffen, ist auch zu seiner

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tures"407 - at individuality. 408 This also resolves the ends/means problem in the time dimension. The Kantian rule that blocks all technology4° 9 - that the pupil may not be handled as the mere means to an alreadydetermined ends - now goes as follows: one must leave the pupil a bit of the present as an end in itself. In the place of external, time-defined ,,rules about when to stop," ,,the principle of developing different qualities and also recognizing them [when they are developed, must] exist in the education itself." 410 In order to be certain that this ,,principle" is in place, special reflection is necessary - reflection that does not simply repeat the reflection on the educational reality, but rather that sees it as its task to recognize the ,,praxis" (that derives from itself) as the principle of ,,real education." 411 With that, we arrive at a concept of Pedagogy that definitely does not handle the autonomy problem with the notion of a desirable state of nature, but also, no longer handles it with a consciously nonnative approach; but instead, that handles it with the intention to recognize and determine what happens when education processes ,,that derive from themselves"

407 408

409 410

41 \

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Selbsttatigkeit gehorig anzusehen .... " On Schleiennacher's individual arguments about solving the .,Widerstreits in der Erziehung (conflict about education)" see Johannes Schurr, Schleiermachers Theorie der Erziehung, Diisseldorf 1975, pp. 356377: a piece of work that should be congratulated for paying attention to what the meaning of temporality is for Schleierrnacher. Sch\eiennacher, Ausgewdhlte pddagogische Schriften, besorgt van Ernst Lichtenstein, p. 93. The single person becomes the ,,funnel" (., Trichter") of the relation to world: ,,Die Erziehung setzt den Menschen in die Welt, insofem sie die Welt in ihn hineinsetzt; und sie macht ihn die Welt gestalten, insofem sie ihn durch die Welt la13t gestaltet werden." Ibid., p. 35 - as with Nietzsche, education/all-around education (Erziehung/Bi/dung) and art belong together: .,Die Bestimmung des Menschen ist, die Well in sich aufzunehmen und sich in der Welt darzuslellen" (p. 260). All-around education (Bi/dung) as an aesthetic manner of dealing with the world became a favored way of dealing with the problem every since (at the latest) Schiller's Briefe iiber die dsthetische Erziehung des Menschen and Goethe's Wilhelm Meister. Cf. above in the middle of chapter IV. Schleiennacher, Piidagogische Schriften, eds. Weniger and Schulze, vol. I, p. 377. Cf. also Ernst Lichtenstein, ,.Schleiennachers Padagogik," p. 355: ,,Jetzt ist nicht mehr von 'festen Punkten' die Rede, Anfangs- und Endpunkt meint hier nur Denkansatze zur dialektischen Bewaltigung eines zirkelhaften Zusammenhangs, der im Grunde nur aus seiner 'Mitte' heraus zu verstehen ist." Again Lichtenstein, ,,Sch\eiennachers Padagogik," p. 356: ,,Sie [die Padagogik] mu13 auf das zurilckgehen, 'was wirklich gegeben ist' ." We are reformulating this consciousness of the problem as two levels of reflection: not ,,going back," but instead, so to speak, reflection of ,,real education" -- task analysis.

take place in the system of education. In this way, Pedagogy is freed from its exclusive bond with a normative anthropology (,,human nature is always the same") or an ethic (abstract values of duty) and is made independent on its own terrain as a ,,floating" science. Considering this, how can the indetenninability of what actually happens in education be remedied? Which solution was formulated through Schleiermacher's contribution? Schleierrnacher worked out a concept of education using the central notion ,,life": ,,The life occupation (Lebenstdtigkeit) that relates to the future is simultaneously gratification in the present." 412 But this ,,life occupation" is not complete. It is among the ,,ends of education" in so far as it ,,does not conflict with the idea of the good." 413 Pedagogy is only autonomous, therefore, in that it is the ,,test for ethics." 414 As far as establishing Pedagogy on the horizon of the temporal problem is concerned, that means: Pedagogy wins its own footing from the difference between reality (empiricism) and norms (speculation) - in other words, from the time difference between present and future, both of which no longer indicate any ,,rules about when to stop" or ,,set points," 415 because neither the aim of pedagogical action is clear, 416 nor are the anthropological assumptions. 417 The problem with time stretching out into the future and emptying itself can only (!) be dealt with in that very time by having the present - as life and as the place of social and pedagogical communication asserts its importance over its past and future time horizons. Thanks to this engagement on the part of the present, the difficult issue of education - namely, the handling of a pupil and the way this handling subordinates his present to his future as seen in the present - can be reconstructed with the concept of the human relationship: a ,,life occupation," which fundamentally is assumed to be a ,,system of mutual ef412 413

414 415

416

417

Interpreted by Schurr, Schleiermachers Theorie der Erziehung, p. 375. Schleiermacher, Padagogische Schriften, eds. Weniger and Schulze, vol. I, p. 27. Ibid., p. 428. ,,[F]este Punkte" is Schleiermacher's own expression; see Schleiermacher, Ausgewahlte padagogische Schriften, besorgt von Ernst Lichtenstein, pp. 46 and 262. ,,Wir haben schon gesehen, da/3 sich kein bestimmter Grenzpunkt des Endes der nicht gelten ]assen; es htirt zwar, sobald diese eingetreten ist, alle Erziehung auf, allein schon van ihr gibt es wieder partielle Endpunkte, und selbst die Mundigkeit ist kein absolut fester Punkt" (Schleiermacher, Ausgewahlte padagogische Schriften, besorgt von Ernst Lichtenstein, p. 132). l11e end point is no longer temporally defined by Schleiermacher; instead, it is individuality. ,,Das Ende der Erziehung ist die Darstellung einer person lichen Eigentiimlichkeit des einzelnen" (p. 68). ,, ... Unenlschiedenheit der anthropologischen Voraussetzungen" (p. 50; also cf. 90f.).

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fect." 418 Human relationships are based on knowledge of human beings and understanding. Thus, the educator can only educate to the extent that he has a knowledge of human beings. But the opposite is true as well: the pupil only educates himself through his own knowledge of human beings, which he forms in the relationship to his educator. Knowledge of human beings allows mutual understanding in the sense of a self-alignment with the other, it is an inner enrichment because one can experience in the way that another experiences. For this reason, Schleiermacher speaks about how ,,the development of the will should be held within the spell of love, so that one educates to love via love."419 Knowledge of human beings is directly built into the dynamic of the education process in this concept so that every sort of mechanization (technization) is unfitting, because it would have to mean that a human being is not doing justice to another human being. 420 This sort of knowledge about human beings does not yet mean that every thought of technology is eliminated from ,,real education." But the placement has already been decided upon - if one goes via ,,human relations" to ethical limitations on the freedom of the will and self-occupation, then the only thing left is the art of education in a sense that is barely varies from the tradition of ,,artes." The notion of limitationality as being something ethical diverts attention away from the problem of technology and focuses it back on the notion of education as an art: support and counteraction/prevention, play and practice, rule and freedom in relation to state of mind and the state of being finished, individual and universal, domestic and public education - all of that exists under the pedagogical maxim: ,,All preparation must be immediate gratification at the same time 418

419 420

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Schleiennacher, Ptidagogische Schriften, eds. Weniger and Schulze, vol. I, p. I 00. There are references to Schleiennacher's ,,ethics" (,, Sittenlehre "), where one can find conceptual distinctions to the ,,entire life" (p. 428). Here, we can only note the meaning and function of the debate with Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy (the friendship doctrine!) on Schleiennacher's theory of education (clear to see in Schleiennacher, Ausgewtihlte ptidagogische Schriften, besorgt von Ernst Lichtenstein, p. 346f.). Similar to the reflection problem of the system of education (or Pedagogy), however, the problem of ,,real education" refers to the two-person relationship between educator and pupil. Ibid., p. 221. On this, see Schleiennacher's polemic against Pestalozzi: where everything depends upon .,[the] Frische, Freie, Lebendigc, Unmittelbare (that which is fresh, free, full of life, direct)," ,.das Mechanische ... [ist], das Tote (that which is mechanical is dead)." Schleiennacher, Ausgewahlte ptidagogische Schriften, besorgt von Ernst Lichtenstein, pp. IO I, 22 I.

and all gratification must also be preparation," whereas ,,life itself. .. should be left to decide about what should be done at the present moment. "42 I, 422 Is this appeal to ;,life itself" a consequence of Pedagogy's orientation on human beings - revealed in a new (social) way through Schleiermacher - or a consequence of the theoretical position that was taken up? As far as the possibilities of formulating theories around the (already introduced) central concepts ,,life" and ,,human relations" are concerned: this body of thought, which is not specific to Pedagogy, works counter to the manner and concepts with which the technology problem was formulated. When considering the technology deficit, the question arises of how adequate these general ideas are - ideas that had once denoted society and that still denoted sociability for Schleiermacher -for grasping the problem of the differentiation of actual instruction (from other systems). Initially, that holds true for grasping actual instruction originating from the two-person relationship. It should be made clear that the conceptual handling of the educational situation as being a human relation that is not to contradict the moral law (the idea of the good), shades from its approach alone further possibilities for theoretical positions regarding instructional analysis, although at the same time, the moral law aids in the preparation of the problem of interpersonal relations. If the task of leading to the re-specification of problems is left to life (praxis), then to which circumstances can the theory refer? ,,Even if it could be assumed that the idea of the good is fully known, this formula - when put to use - would still need to be spelled out more closely with respect to the specific circumstances which the educated should enter. In other words, a factual basis has to exist here as well."423 Considering this version of human (social) relations, the only thing the educator is left with is ,,the duty of assuming [self-reference as a trait]" 424 in order to begin. But it is not actually 421

422

423 424

Ibid., p. 268; cf. also p. 84 : ,,Die Lebenstatigkeit, die ihre Beziehung auf die Zukunft hat, mu13 zugleich auch ihre Befriedigung in der Gegenwart haben, so mul3 auch jeder padagogische Moment, der als solcher seine Beziehung auf die Zukunft hat, zugleich auch Befriedigung sein fur den Menschen, wie er gerade ist." Also see p. 92. According to Schleiermacher, Ausgewdhlte pddagogische Schriften, besorgt van Ernst Lichtenstein, p. 353: ,,iiberschreitet Schleiermachers Padagogik ... noch (diesen) hermeneutischen Horizont (Schleiermacher's Pedagogy goes beyond this hermeneutic horizon)." Schleiermacher, Padagogische Schriften, eds. Weniger and Schulze, vol. I, p. 22. Ibid., p. 27. This also holds true if the relations are seen entirely from the perspective of freedom. Dealing with abnormal behaviour would be a test of the concept of human relations.

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the a priori form of this theory formation (which sets the limits of how much analysis suffices to formulate concepts) that disappoints - so to speak - the pedagogical concepts. Instead, it is its problem reduction to a two person relationship. That allows the double problem of technology to be skipped entirely. And it is this reduction to the level of basic concepts that holds this variety of pedagogical theory formation back from accessing the reflection problems of the self-organizing system of education. 425 If the means/ends problem is eliminated in this way, then the theoretical position that has developed will find itself at a loss to explain the conditions and burdens that make ,,time" necessary for constituting education processes. 426 Herbart's theoretical position is also based on a conceptual version of the use of ,,time" in education processes. In any case, the open future of pedagogical attempts can be seen here as well: time as an open horizon in the future; and yet, the human being is depicted as a personality whose completion is the first priority. Considering that, how can Pedagogy be possible? To answer this question, we will take up the approach to the problem that has just been explained one more time so that we can direct it explicitly to the issue of dealings in and with temporality. The problem of education is made explicit in the orientation of the educator. It is the unique problematic relation of temporality in education: the contradiction of time-modi intensified through the temporalizing of everyday life that gives the theory of all-around education (Theorie der Bi/dung) the chance to substitute the a priori nature of the concept of morality for the problem of uncertainty, all of which enables the problem to be reformulated as a difference concept regarding the educator. Because now, it is possible to reach for concepts guaranteed by their a priori nature when seeking an orientation for the educator - concepts that taken on their own do not have a particular temporal place (such as an empirical purpose) in the larger education process and instead can be taken up at any point. That corresponds, then, to an elimination of focusing on empirical ends for the future. This takes place because the future of the pupil is no longer characterized as a particular state, but instead as the self-reference of the de425 426

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Although it very clearly refers to the institution as the given relationship between the individual and the entirety. This is true except if very global temporal structures are included. The child should be educated largely through games at first - in other words, through an activity that is meaningful in the present; and later he should be educated more and more through practice - in other words, through activities that are only meaningful when considered in respect to the future.

termination of states: as wanting. 427 It is also possible now for the time difference as a temporalization of the technology problem to be reinterpreted as the difference between various sorts of action: ,,instruction" and ,,discipline." And in connection with this, it is possible to postulate relations for this difference; 428 but it is always concepts of difference that make the unity of knowledge possible: from the ,,complete separation" between ,,random ends" and the necessary ends of morality, to the difference as seen in the educator (who are for boys the representatives of the men they will become), Pedagogy is constructed as a unique level of time in the ,,middle" that is above differences, because it is only possible for the problem of effect to be steered as something that is connected to reality, but also has theoretical content in this way! With that comes the final question: what does this compensation for the technology problem contribute to the problem of effect? Firstly, it neutralizes - in fact, altogether negates - its relevance. Within the framework of formal conceptual scheme, which is used to abstract time into simultaneity, there is no place for causal relationships. But one can still inquire as to the relationship between conceptuality and temporality: how is the conceptuality itself practiced? By taking up time and claiming causality? And when starting from the reflection positions, how can precisely those things that these positions focus on a problems be applied to them? The following categorizations aim to render the relational structure of instructional processes transparent to different sorts of intervention (such as discipline), 429 for instance, with the attempt - however successful - at making all-around education processes (Bildungsprozesse) mathematical: ,,The function of orientation-assistance becomes clear."430 But can one stop at conceptual schemes when one seeks orientation for actual instruction or when one wants to diagnose what actually goes on during it? One would have to realize that what we are dealing with at this point are approaches to a task analysis, with program for research. The a priori type of pedagogical constructions that exist under the spell of the 427 428

429 430

Herbart, K II, p. 28; KI, p. 261 (Freedom as the freedom of self-choice). Cf. the tabular presentation of discipline which is created in analogy and symmetry to the presentation of instruction, but is then not taken up after all in the field of General Pedagogy: the readers ,,werden mich entschuldigen, dal3 ich hier nicht noch einrnal eine immer undeutliche Skizze der Verflechtung jener Begriffe versuche" Herbart, K II, p. 129. On this and the history of interpretation attempts cf. Blasz, Herbarts pddagogische Den/eform, p. 57f. Cf. attachment in Blasz, Herbarts pddagogische Den/eform, p. I 63ff. In this respect, we agree with Blasz, Herbarts pddagogische Den/eform, p. 176.

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theory of all-around education (Theorie der Bi/dung) are an obstacle in this realization. As a consequence, the organization, which was in the process of developing itself, took the riper theory elements from the theoretical edifice and used them to de-compose the technology problem in order to make a solution easier.

VIII. Pedagogical science caught between idealism and organization The new Pedagogy saw in Kantian philosophy for the most part the possibility of being able to give order to the empirical confusion of previous endeavors through one principle. 431 Order was to take the place of accident, and the final end was to be the order principle, which was understood as a regulative idea. This conception creates difficulties to the extent that Pedagogy and organization part ways from one another. The number of schooled children increases rapidly in the first third of the 19th century, 432 which ,,led to great jumble and bumble in daily instruction." 433 Organization differentiates itself from science by introducing its own grades and requirements. More than the mere expansion of schools is meant by this - an administration apparatus responsible for business and oversight, which was growing constantly more complex, was being created and extended. 434 All of this occurs without the possibility of referring to a sufficient extent to past experiences. In any case, new experiences can no longer be dealt with according to the unified Kantian concept. ,,Concentration" becomes the substitute concept - a concept that tries to work more closely with the 431

432 433

434

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This is clearly stated in education literature that applies Kant: Greiling, Ober den Endzweck der Erziehung und iiber den erslen Grundsatz einer Wissenschaft derse/ben, 1793; Heusinger, Beytrag zur Berichligung einiger Begriffe uber Erziehung und Erziehungskunsl, 1794. More exact numbers for Berlin can be found in Detlef K. MOiier, Sozia/struktur und Schulsystem, Gi:ittingen 1977, pp. 346, 347ff. Karl Ferdinand Schnell, Die Centralisation des al/gemeinen Schulunterrichts, 1850 (quoted from Bernhard Schwenk, Unterrichl zwischen Aujk/arung und Jndoktrination, Frankfurt 1974, p. 29). Cf. Gerhardt Giese, Que lien zur deu/schen Schu/geschichte, Gi:ittingen 1961; Manfred Heinemann, Schu/e im Vorfe/d der Verwa/tung: Die Entwick/ung der preu/Jischen Unterrichlsverwa/tung von 1771-1800, Gi:ittingen 1974; Karl-Ernst Jeismann, Das preujJische Gymnasium in Staal und Gese//schaft: Die Enlstehung des Gymnasiums als Schu/e des Staales und der Ge bi/de Jen, I 787-1817, Stuttgart 1974.

means of the recently established organization and that hopes to be able to handle Pedagogy, which is in the process of being formed, in this way. The concept ,,concentration" dates back to when Massow's reform plans were being discussed in Prussia. Following the Wollner era, 435 which focused exclusively on state-controlled school politics, the question of how to apply the state's organizational means to instruction in a clear way was posed all the more emphatically. If national education's close connection to the state is taken into account, then the fact that the school system has started breaking apart must be ordered to a halt. According to von Massow's notion, this entails regulations that ,,are useful to all members of the state." 436 The ,,future destiny" of those affected is included within this notion of the ends of national education. The class-orientation, however, is not yet eliminated, but interest in the state of the entire instructional set-up is already programmed. Accordingly, Massow's reform plans envision support for elementary schools, which were previously disadvantaged in the financing they received. Academic and civil school planning go separate ways in their relation to occupation. The consequence of this turn towards pre-professionality, 437 however, also causes attention to focus on the transitions between different types of schools which, finally, increases the chance of getting organizational means from the state - a connection which then also expands to include the ,,academic school." If the notion of this connection and concentration of various types of schools is made fruitful for the school system in this manner, then the pedagogues are also called upon to act appropriately to their expertise. It is during this period of time that the pedagogical use of the concept ,,concentration" begins. August Hermann Niemeyer4 38 does not only recommend that the ,,Gymnasium" curriculum be concentrated, but also a concentration of job training programs. ,,The number of people who are to be tested at the university cannot be minimized enough. The general consen435

436 437

See Jeismann, Das preufJische Gymnasium in Staal und Gese/lschaft: Die Entstehung des Gymnasiums als Schute des Staates und der Gebildeten, 1787-1817, p. l l 9ff. (127), on the Wollner era. Quoted in Ibid, p. 178. Also cf. Christian Daniel Vosz, Versuch uber die Erziehung for den Staal, ats

BedurfnifJ unsrer Zeit, zur Beforderung des Burgenvohls und der RegentenSicherheit, Halle 1799. 438

A foreign member of the secondary school colloquium who was asked for a report on the improvements that had been put into effect in instruction. Further details in Jeismann, Das preuj]ische Gymnasium in Staal und Gesellschaft: Die Entslehung des Gymnasiums als Schute des Staates und der Gebildeten, /787-1817, p. 205.

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sus is that the exams given here are all much easier than tests in school." 439 ,,Concentration". is applied in order to negotiate bonds to the organization, because only that which is ,,concentrated upon" can be tested in a concentrated manner. But ,,concentration" is also dependent on the organization in the sense that Pedagogy aims at a standardization - if that was not the case, then a testing system would be meaningless because it would produce results that could not be compared with one another. All this happens without terminological intention as of yet. It is the new world of experience that has become visible in the actual organization that first forces a terminological decision to be made. ,,Concentration [becomes a] key word that is as characteristic for the second third of the century as 'general' and 'all-around' education was for the first third."440 ,,Unification" is no longer thought of in relation to morality; ,,concentration" itself is the formula for the ,,con-ect connection between the many and the one," 441 although organization is now thought of along with it as a real phenomena. How was that possible? What sort of re-positioning had to have been made for it to be possible to place pedagogical science in the service of the instrument of organization? Before we concern ourselves further with the promise is made with ,,concentration," we first want to make sure of the fundamental close relationship between Pedagogy and organization, which we have just postulated in light of the experiences made with organization. To start with, the connection between idealism and organization, which helped introduce the developments of the 19th century, is meaningful for the examination of the close relationships between organization and Pedagogy. The reason-based ideal, which one attempts to approach, appears to be the first and most important condition for organization. This connection originates in Kant's draft of a system in The Critique of Judgement. 442 After organization and ends are dealt with in reference to 439

440

441 442

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Quoted in Jeismann, Das preuj3ische Gymnasium in Staal und Gesellschaft: Die Entstehung des Gymnasiums als Schute des Staates und der Gebildeten, 1787-/ 8/ 7, p. 206: Organization is also meant as an organizational intervention in selection that works through tests. See part 3, chapter XI for more on this. Writes Friedrich Paulsen, Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts, Berlin und Leipzig 1921, vol. 2, p. 389. Further references to history in Schwenk, Unterricht zwischen Aujkliirung und lndoktrination, pp. 28-32, 138-142. Basis text in Encyk/opiidisches Handbuch der Piidagogik, ed. v. W. Rein, vol. 5, 2nd ed., Langensalza 1906, pp. 7785 (by Rud. Schubert); pp. 85-101 (by Jos. Loos). Schubert, Ibid., p. 77. See Kant, Critique of Judgement, paragraph 65; Kritik der Urteilskraft, p. 483ff.

natural things (things as natural ends are organized entities) - and this takes place in the organization's reflexive structure, which is analogue to reflection itself (an ,,entity that organizes itself') - Kant remarks on the application of this concept on the non-natural or societal domain: ,,In a recently attempted re-forming of a great people into one state, the word organization was often used very cleverly for institutions of magistrates etc. and even the entire body of the state. Because every member should certainly not be mere means in such a whole, but rather ends at the same time; and, on the other hand, in so far as every element plays a part in the possibility of the whole, its place and function should be detennined through the idea of the whole."443 Considered with this concept in mind, organization is a necessary precondition for the realization of reason-based ideas, just as vice-versa, the idea guarantees the plan-like unity of organization. The concept of an ,,end," then, serves as a negotiating concept in that it can distribute and instruct single actions. In anticipation of a notyet-existent organization, all of this is not only formulated with an idealistic tone, 444 but is also presented as a necessary condition in order to justify the demand for such an organization. 445 In the chain ,,reason-based scheme - ends - - organization," it is not difficult for Pedagogy to interpret education back through ends to organization. The result is analogous to the Kantian thought figure: ,,Educational instruction's concentration is no accident, but rather one of its primary characteristics; it is not a random addition to instruction, but rather a logical consequence of the ends of instruction and of natural psychological development. " 446 In ,,concentration" - as the ,,correct connection between the many and the one" - a few things happen: (1) against a background of inner-pedagogical determination of ends, the many-sidedness is unified, or one could also say that the unification is guaranteed its manysidedness.447 (2) Pedagogy searches in this unification for a guarantee 443 444 445

446

447

Ibid., p. 487 note. For instance in Johann Gottlieb Fichte, ,.Reden an die deutsche Nation," 14th lecture, p. 228ff. Cf. Heinrich Stephani, Grundrif3 der Staatserziehungswissenschaft, Wei13enfeld and Leipzig 1797: ,,weil nach einem ewigen Naturgesetze jede Kraft zu ihrer Wirksamkeit Organe ncithig hat, durch welche sie sich zweckma13ig au13em kann" (p. 43). M. Engel, ,,Konzentration des Unterrichts," Alig. Deutsche Schulzeitung, 1883, N. 8 and 9, quoted in Encyklopadisches Handbuch der Padagogik, ed. v. W. Rein, vol. 5, 2nd ed., Langensalza 1906, p. 79, 77-85 (by Rud. Schubert). ,,Wahrhaftige Vielseitigkeit einer Individualitat erfordert allemal Konzentration": Ibid., p. 79.

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regarding the connection between didactics and method448 (in Ziller4 49) as the ,,starting point for the special methodology" and, in this way, Pedagogy is able to (3) get to the point of even having an organization. (1) What sort of organizational problems did the pedagogues see as they went about in the 19th century applying ,,concentration" to organization? Mandatory school attendance was being realized in leaps and bounds in the first third of the 19th century. It was not unusual for the number of children in individual classes to reach a Comenian degree. The differentiation of the system of classes and the founding of additional school units always happened too late; the children were in attendance in far too great a number to be actually instructed. ,,[H]ow one occupies them [is not] unimportant.. .. Everything that [instruction] offers should in the end work together, which is why the order and the sequence is of primary importance. "450 If instruction is most important when one considers the ,,ills that should be countered," 451 then all those involved in instruction ,,are threatened" by excessive demands. 452 In the face of organizational problems that are appearing, the concept of concentration is responsible for Pedagogy having a good conscience due to the term's inner-pedagogical interpretation. The goal of instruction, which reaches its high point in the religious/ethical doctrine-grounded, normative definition of ends as being the ,,moral-religious personality" (,,inspired cornmunity"), 453 is presented as a 448

449

450 451

452 453

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Such as, following Karl Mager, in the form of school sciences. Further notes on this in Schwenk, Das Herbartverstandnis der Herbarlianer, pp. 40, 148. For more on the view of the problem and semantic of the relationship between didactic and method see chapter XI. If we gear ourselves in the following towards Tuiskon Ziller, then it is because the organizational thinking (in Pedagogy) that was established through him is representative for Pedagogy beyond the I 9th century. On this also see Schwenk, Das Herbartverstandnis der Herbarlianer, pp. 33ff., 142ff. Tuiskon Ziller, Grundlegung zur Lehre vom erziehenden Unterricht (1864), ed. Theodor Vogt, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1884, p. 291. ,,Seitdem der Jugendunterricht seine jetzige Ausdehnung erhalten hat; denn hiennit ist for eine Beurteilung nach Gr613enbegriffen noch mehr Veranlassung gegeben als fruher, und das Obel betrachtlich angewachsen." Ibid, p. 423. Ziller uses a pedagogical phrase: ,,Verderbnis der Gesinnung," Ibid., p. 423. ,,Ideal der Personlichkeit (ideal of the personality)" which - as opposed to the final end of education according to Herbart - is now contrasted to milder (contemporary) reality: ,,Das ist die Gestalt, die der zu Erziehende annehmen soll und die sich allerdings nicht sicher aus der Erfahrung entnehmen Jal3t." Tuiskon Ziller, Allgemeine Padagogik (/876), ed. Karl Just, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1884, p. 22. The

well-proportioned ,,training of the entire person." 454 This ,,higher sort of all-around education (Bildung)," through which ,,the pupil is [supposed] to be made human in the fust place," 455 aims to train a ,,constant many-sided interest," namely, varied unity or, one can also say, unified variety. 456 Thanks to the concept of concentration, these classical topoi of Pedagogy take on a new meaning: problems of summing up all operations are always the issue, 457 because these problems have become the program for an entire school system rather than merely the goal of the actions of individual pedagogues. For that reason, one can ,,[only] educate through instruction when it.. .[is] done according to plan.'"' 58 The concentration concept (also) allows Pedagogy to have a good conscience when taking measures in regards to the individual, 459 and that means a ,,scientific conscience" - it can now relate its scientific requirements (the understanding of general human education as a psychological question) to instructional demands. That allows matters that come up in instruction (organizational matters) to be looked at in a ,,scientific manner," without setting off a strong counter-reaction. (2) But Ziller does not stop at this inner-pedagogical interpretation of the idea of concentration; instead, he makes this interpretation into the ,,starti'ng point for the special methodology." 460 Thus, the range of material, its selection, the sequence, and the connection between parts are all understood under ,,concentration" - and this is the case so that the variety of

454 455 456 .457

458 459 460

question of how this can be communicated poses itself: ,,Es isl ein Ideal der Gesinnung, des Willens, das zuerst in der christlichen Lehre ausgebildet. .. " (Ibid.). Religious doctrine takes on the function of a ,,Vermittlungstheologie (negotiating theology)" here for the programming of the school organization. On lines of connection to Ferdinand Stiehl and the ,,Regulativen (those who acted as counterbalances)" see references in Hugo G. 810th, ,,Neuere Diesterweg-Forschung," Zeitschriftfur Padagogik 20, 1974, p. 122, l 17-127. Ziller, Grundlegung zur Lehre vom erziehenden Unterricht (1864), p. 27. Ibid., p. 27. Ziller, Allgemeine Padagogik (1876), p. 242ff. For example: ,, ... durch Verschmelzung des !ch in der Gemeinschaft mil anderen ... " (!), Ziller, Grundlegung zur Lehre vom erziehenden Unterricht (1864), p. 423. Ibid., p. 187. Psychology as .,a more precise determination of the ends of instruction," Ibid., p. 3 I 6ff.; because ,,the pupil lacks of concentration" as well (p. 439). ,, ... because the idea of concentration must guide at the same time." Ziller, Allgemeine Pddagogik (1876), p. 292.

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,,materials" that find their way into the schools can be brought together at a ,,middle point." 461 But even in the key word ,,methodology" does not designate organizational matters alone; instead, the word is qualified in a pedagogicalscientific way to the same extent that it is necessary for methodology to legitimize itself scientifically. 462 This becomes especially precarious for Ziller as didactics begins to develop into an all-around education doctrine (Bildungslehre) and he sets himself with all his energy to the task of countering the resulting deficit in steering: ,,If one ... denies the pedagogical instructional methods, then one denies the scientific nature of Pedagogy and didactics in particular. "463 Because of this, he goes on, it is irresponsible that one has begun ,,in recent times - ... to look at science's attempts to create an instructional methodology with disdain or indifference and to view the instructional methods themselves as a show and an illusion, as empty creations or fantasy, as pedantries or affectations that spoil more than they help." 464 But even Ziller is influenced or becomes influenced again by a Pedagogy that has turned anything from skeptical to resigned due to experiences with human beings who refuse to be steered in a direction. He too knows that ,,there [can be] no method book, according to which the pupil can be precisely and exactly instructed."465 For that reason, tact must spring in as a sort of undetermined, pedagogical sensitivity to support the instruction through psychological affinities (,,natural development paths"). Nevertheless: Ziller opposes the repression of organization requirements that articulate themselves in instructional methods. (3) If by looking at Ziller, one can see how Pedagogy attempts to cope with a new phenomena, then the organization problem finally becomes important for Pedagogy at precisely the point where it has no leeway: in the relationship between government, instruction, and discipline. 466 This 461 462

463 464 465 466

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As the programming basis for the organization, this is referred to under the key word .,Gesinning (attitude)." Cf. Ziller, Allgemeine Piidagogik (1876), p. 189ff. ., ... die Methoden selbst sind nichts anderes als konkrete Forrnen fiir die unwandelbaren Gesetze des menschlichen Geistes, und werden durch diese Gesetze vorgezeichnet." Ziller, Grundlegung zur Lehre vom erziehenden Unterricht (1864), p. 186. An argument that works on the ground of the .,opponent"! Ibid., p. 187. Ibid., p. l 79f. Ibid., p. l 83. Cf. Tuiskon Ziller, Die Regierung der Kinder, Leipzig 1857; Ziller, Grundlegung zur Lehre vom erziehenden Unterricht (1864), p. lff. (paragraph I on ,,Regierung und Unterricht"); Ziller, Allgemeine Piidagogik (1876), pp. 106-133.

started up to a certain extent with the ,,realist" Herbart: schools as ,,emergency help." 467 Thus, Herbart's ,,general pedagogy" (,,Allgemeine Padagogik) is set on its course in the shadow of developing structural conditions.468 Because of this, it ascribes to the notion that it has a special concern in defending the human being as an individual against objectivities and objectifying. In the course of thus abbreviating the perspective on the problem, organization becomes a ,,meaningful word ... with questionable worth" for the pedagogue. 469 After working out the organization, Pedagogy can no longer skip ,,organization" as a structural condition: ,,government" becomes a necessary condition of instruction (the ,,fundament of the educational edifice"), because without it, ,,the instruction does not get going: because education has to begin with something that does not educate and does not train ... " 470 This insight, however, remains ambivalent (even for Ziller), because government can be just as easily denounced as a ,,habit that conditions" in a way that is opposite from the pedagogical business, or, to put it less sharply, the government can be made reduced through tact and finally ,,made unnecessary by education itself." 471 Under the pressure of direct experiences with organization - which, however, are not brought into the discussion as additional circumstances - the conceptual character of ,,educational instruction" loses much of its peda467

468

469

470 471

Herbart in thought ,,Ueber Erziehung unter offentlicher Mitwirkung": ,,Weit milder in jeder Hinsicht fallt also das Resultat aus, wenn wir die Padagogik, wie sichs ohnehin gebuhrt, auf ihre eigenen FuBe stellen; wenn wir sie ansehn als die Wohlthaterin der Einzelnen, deren jeder ihrer Hulfe bedarf, um das zu werden, was er einmal wunschen wird, geworden zu seyn. Alsdann aber verschwinden uns sogleich die Schulen ... ," K III, p. 77. General Pedagogy starts with the assumption that the children are structurally integrated: ,,Diese Dinge mussen uberall vorher abgemacht werden, ehe man bilden kann. Die Knaben in der Schule mussen still sitzen, ehe sie dem Lehrer zuhoren (Regierung der Kinder)." But if the unity of the education processes is guaranteed only in relation to that, then which purpose can be identified in order to demonstrate the connection between ,,Unterricht und Zucht (instruction and discipline)"? ,,Man frage nun nicht nach einer positiven Definition, welche den Zweck der Regierung der Kinder feststelle: Bildung und Nicht-Bildung, das ist der contradictorische Gegensatz, welcher die eigentliche Erziehung von der Regierung scheidet." Herbart, ,,Herbarts Replik gegen Jachmanns Recension," K ll, p. 166. Friedrich Adolph Wilhelm Diesterweg, ,,Zur Revue Ober einige Reformvorschlage fur die Volksschule," in Samt/iche Werke, ed. Heinrich Deiters et al., Berlin l 956ff., vol. XI, p. 217; and it is well-known that this does not only hold true for the 19th century: cf. Hermann Holstein, Die Schute als Institution, Ratingen 1972, p. l l 9ff. Ziller, Allgemeine Padagogik (1876), pp. 12, 107. Ibid., p. 110.

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gogical bite. A tendency to tum unclear contexts of pedagogical action (or action that educates) into concepts increases: ,,Discipline agrees ... entirely with instruction in its goals. It also attempts ... to give the pupil a higher all-around education (Bi/dung) and thus to create an absolute value for him ... , to tum his behavior and his mind in the direction of virtue and belief." 472 Because Pedagogy as a science demands centrality, it has to push the accompanying circumstances (organization) into the place of a mere context in this situation. In spite of all the uncertainty regarding the judgement of government, in spite of all the ambivalence about things of an organizational character, organization does not only assert itself, it also forces Pedagogy to modify its understanding of its problems. If education can be traced back through its ends to organization, then the concept of concentration contains the promise of being able to guarantee unity in the organization via Pedagogy. For this reason, the question now poses itself as to how this promise is applied in the schools. 473 The world of schools: it no longer only represents a Pedagogy that has been emancipated from ,,religion" and ,,state"; instead, it is a special world of specific experiences that neither the scientific Pedagogy nor the political system can ignore. This can be seen at first in the state's intention to check the expertise of important school men; 474 but it can also be seen in the school administration itself. 475 If organizational structures are set before Pedagogy in this manner, Pedagogy does not only feel obliged to concern itself with resulting problems more seriously, but reflection chances also open up for it in which the actual build-up of organization 472

473

474

475

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Ziller, Grundlegung zur Lehre vom erziehenden Unterricht (1864), p. 150; with this, elaborations of concepts, which lose their function in regards to centering the experience in the organization, are marginalized, for example ,.Zuehl oder Charakterbildung (discipline or character formation)," cf. Ziller, Allgemeine Piidagogik (1876), p. 393ff. On the ,.two sides" of the concentration concept, though without fully considering its dependency on organization, cf. also Schwenk, Das Herbartverstiindnis der Herbartianer, pp. 38, 60, 147. On this see Karl-Ernst Jeismann, ,,Die 'Stiehlschen Regulativ' ," in Dauer und Wandel der Geschichte: Aspekte europiiischer Vergangenheil (Festschrift Kurt v. Raumer), Mlinster I 966, pp. 423-447; Schwenk, Das Herbartverstiindnis der Herbartianer, p. 23ff. Which now uses the political control of the developing schools to trigger off reflection in the system of education through regulations and decrees. Giese, Quellen zur deutschen Schulgeschichte, Gottingen 1961.

takes over the re-specification of the problem areas - at fust in the form of internal differentiation according to types of schools as a result of growth and the pressure to select. 476 Pedagogy begins to follow the differentiation. This in turn alleviates the reorientation on pedagogical ends, which is made possible by a formalization of instructional goings-on: namely, focusing on pedagogical functions in the form of organizational functions. 477 Thanks to this change in leadership, organization can now be used to compensate the technology deficit or, in other words, to minimize it. Herbart had already worked in a similar way with the abstraction of several series of concepts in the sense that these series do no have a particular time value (such as with empirical ends) within the process of instruction, but instead can be taken up at any point: so that preparing the path for the regulation of the education process that can be technologically interpreted ,,only" requires the incorporation of a time scheme 478 . The basis of this new understanding of technology is no longer forms of cognition and comprehension; instead they are time schemes that are presented and guaranteed through organization. With this, the basis of certainty behind Herbart's ,,general pedagogy" is altered. Pedagogy adjusted itself to the representation of reality that was transported through the structures laid out by organization by focusing what happened in instruction as being under this condition and in structural analogy to it. Reference to concepts and to organization become integrated - if not in reality, then certainly in pedagogical semantics. If the conditions for making decisions about the correctness of the behavior of those involved are set in this manner, then the only (!) task Pedagogy has is to recall in instruction the de-compositions that organization has performed at the proper assignment or, in other words, with an eye towards solving the effect problem. How can the application of this ,,technology promise" be controlled pedagogically? As far as the ability to intervene (in the ability to learn) is concerned - the Herbartian series of concepts are understood as premisses for deci476

477

478

Which also leads to the loss of contour for the ideal of general education - something that results in the ,,loss" of the Gymnasium's ,,comprehensive school character." For more, see Muller, Sozialstruktur und Schulsystem, in particular p. 173ff. (Muller assigns this another value, however.) The so-called: ,,Theorie der formalen Stufen des Untenichts (theory of formal instructional steps)" as a general instruction methodology: Ziller, Allgemeine Pddagogik (I 876), p. 259ff. First, however, a ,,spezieller Regierungsmallregeln fur den Schulunterricht (special government rule for school instruction)" is necessary in order to make it possible to decompose its complexity: ,,feststehender Sitten (set morals)," a series of spaces, a series of times, etc., Ziller, Allgemeine Pddagogik (1876), p. l 25ff.

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sions because they relate to a context that regulates such interventions and guarantees them. 479 This is the case, namely, because a time scheme is being used that varies the role of the teacher in regards to an opposite role and thus presupposes 480 that in the next moment, the conditioning and the influencing will tum in an opposite direction. In view of this semantic context, it becomes possible to require that the means/ends-based rationality be adjusted to learning ability: according to the rules of organization, the continuation of the instructional process depends upon determining whether or not the effect has kicked in. Success is first controlled when operations have come to an end (which is indicated by technology). That is an important limitation on setting objectives: the goals cannot be formulated in such a way that they are expected to take effect long after operations are concluded. This condition compels an education technology to take the form of a serial production. The ,,materials" have to be sufficiently de-composed for the requirement in order to fulfill the requirement that factors (on which the effect can be observed) must be able to be isolated: therefore, it has to happen in parts - and what it meant is parts that are appropriate to an ends-directed handling of the material - and also in ,,methodical unities." 481 Education technology, however, is also dependent upon the possibility of attributing results. Is it possible to meet this requirement considering the fact that one of the system conditions of technology is that the role of the pupil is occupied by a variety of people (and that the resulting problems dominate every single communication)? ,,Instruction must always gear itself to the entire class, but at the same time, it must establish the most lively exchange with the single pupil whose particular consciousness it is supposed to penetrate."482 Reacting to the double problem of instruction technology in this way may start out as a ,,government rule," but it is not sufficient to make decisions, which means to attribute decisions, in a 479

480

481

482

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On the question of the re-interpretation of Herbart's ,,Allgemeinen Padagogik (general pedagogy)" into a general instructional method, also see Blasz's reading with its references to Herbart and Ziller, Padagogische Theorie-bildung bei Johann Friedrich Herbart, p. 125ff., which is original in that ii completely ignores the expansion of the range of conditions for education that has occurred between the two authors. On the legitimation of this assumption, we can only make note here of the determination doctrine in Ziller's psychology, which follows in the tracks of Herbart's psychology. For more on this, Schwenk, Das Herbartverstiindnis der Herbar/ianer. ,.Im Fortschritt des Unterrichts ... mufJ sich immer eine methodische Einheit an die andere anschliefJen. So versinkt der Unterricht nicht in blolle Darstellung einzelner Notizen." Ziller, Allgemeine Piidagogik (1876), pp. 263,294. Ibid., p. 12.

pedagogically responsible manner. But one has come further as far as considering the social de-composition of the technology problem is concemed:483 by covering the school with a fine net of organization through fine differentiation. 484 As a result of this, however, more of the pupils' individualizing characteristics are ignored than every before. In the spell of the concentration idea, Pedagogy is considered to be a science of planning; but organization itself had taken over technology's function of de-composing the problems that come up on the level of instruction in such a way that the teacher is able to operate in the class. Thus the technology problem is divided between Pedagogy and organization. That is the secret of the historical success of the theory of formal gradations during a period of great explosion of the school system: the processing of the knowledge about problem solving that Herbart had worked out before 485 as well as of the decision structures that are created and guaranteed by organization. But the concentration idea is not only introduced as a promise in the world of schools for the purpose of creating order on the level of actual instmction; instead, it also has to make it possible to operationalize the function of education - precisely this negotia483

484

485

,,Das zu Lemende isl daher immer zunachst mit nur einem auszuuben, und dabei hi:iren die anderen bloB aufmerksam zu, nur so lemen sie mit. Hi:ichstens darf einer von ihnen, bei dem vorausgesetzt wird, daB er das Einzuubende schon versteht und kann, zum Einhelfen herangezogen werden, wenn alles versucht ist, ob sich der zuerst zum Lemen Herangezogene mittels dessen, was er wirklich weiB und kann, nicht selbst zu helfen vermag. Auch der zum Einhelfen Aufgeforderte darf ihm zunachst nur ni:itigen Falls einen Wink geben durch den Hinweis darauf, worauf es ankommt, was fehlt oder was zu thun ist, und erst wenn dieser Wink nicht genugt, darf er das Geforderte selbst tun. Keineswegs darf ein zweiter zum Einhelfen aufgefordert werden, wenn die erste die Hilfe nicht zu bringen vermag. Sons! wachst die Dunkelheit im BewuBtsein der Klasse vie! zu sehr an, und das Nichtwissen, das wiederholt an den Tag gelegt wird, ubt auf alle einen Druck aus, dem die schwacheren Krafte erliegen. Was daher der erste, der zum Einhelfen aufgefordert warden ist, nicht zu leisten vermag, das muB dann der Lehrer auf der Stelle wirklich leisten, oder es muB mit Hilfe z.B. eines Buches geleistet werden." Ziller, Allgemeine Padagogik (1876), p. 276f. ,,Jedenfalls mus das Ganze in das BewuBtsein jedes einzelnen eindringen und die GewiBheit, das das wirklich erreicht ist, sucht man sich bei jedem gr6Bem Abschnitt zuletzt dadurch zu verschaffen, dalJ man ihn in ganz kleinen Teilen in rascher Aufeinanderfolge von beliebigen einzelnen darstellen laBt..." Ibid., p. 278. Or group instruction: except ,,daB dabei kein System zuruckbleiben darf." Ziller, Grundlegung zur Lehre vom erziehenden Unterricht (/864), p. 455 - we will come back to that in chapter XIII. This remains a sort of synchronization of psychology and logic; though abstracted to a second level of reflection based on a psychological mechanism that is at least worked out. In comparison to this, cf. Philanthropy's understanding of the problem, see above in the middle of chapter JV.

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ganization started being a technology substitute. The ground from under Pedagogy collapsed - it's ability to focus on and operationalize the selfreference in human beings and in the education process realistically. Pedagogy had adjusted itself to the existence of a division of labor - one can also say, of the separation between ideal and reality- and in the framework of this difference, it had held back from focusing on the ideal. With that, the education system - leaving the reality entirely to organization - drifts in the direction of ,,performance." Would it have been possible to oppose this with a reflection of the technology deficit? Pedagogy was not prepared for that by its own history of development. On one hand, it had committed itself to a technology verdict and, on the other hand, it had depended upon organization. It could not negate selfreference in human beings and in the education process, it could not deny humanity, and it also felt itself responsible for offering something to ,,the praxis. " In addition, there was nothing in the situation of science in the last century that would have suggested or even made it possible to look at and to research organizational relationships with sufficient depth as decision-related problems. In order for the technology deficit to be reflected in educational organizations, it would have been necessary to inquire more closely as to how means/ends connections could even be translated into decisions, and also how this could be possible under the situation and interaction conditions of instruction; and finally, how Pedagogy, as a practical science, could preform decisions by teachers and pupils that interlocked in the quick, multisituational, and mood-dependent back and forth of instruction. The distance to organization and to its political availability would have first of all required self-doubt, because it is not very far to the conclusion - that what organization cannot do, Pedagogy cannot do either. Also close at hand is that a Pedagogy that is not sufficiently established in science or academia could not distance itself in this manner. Instead, Pedagogy lends a helping hand to the organizing of schools and reacts to the developing sequences of decisions by ,,fleeing" to aesthetic attempts of dealing with the world or to a politicizing pedagogy. Elements of the movement to flee the world were already contained in Schleiermacher's balancing compensation formula (Ausgleichsformel) for individuality. It was only necessary to link up with this in order to stylize a symbiosis between education/all-around education (Bi/dung) and art that would contribute to the ,,solution" of the autonomy problem with the double aspects - openness and reservation. 192

IX. Pedagogy's orientation on human beings· In spite of all the change, there is one tradition in Pedagogy that is maintained: its reference to human beings. What interests us here is how this reference became important for the development of theory in Pedagogy in relation to the technology deficit in the actual instruction. The starting point for the issues that we are handling is the general reference to knowledge of human behavior that was made by the Philanthropists and their immediate followers. This knowledge of human behavior has to do with a general prerequisite of each of Pedagogy's empirical endeavors: the Philanthropists understand it as a condition for the educator's (teacher's) successful choice of educational (and instructional) means and methods - both empirically and psychologically. At this point, it would have been possible to develop a technology in our sense of the word through the development of concepts of ,,averageness" and throagh insights preserved within the classroom. Instead of this, however, New Humanism breaks with this idea and replaces it with a more deeply internalized conception of knowledge of human behavior as being the condition necessary both for the educator as well as for the pupil to understand.486 We have already discussed this in some detail. In any case, this New Humanistic (and later also the humanities') understanding of the term ,,understanding" is more than merely a particularly complicated procedure of data analysis. But this ,,more" does not go so far as to make it possible to dispose over it on a higher level of aggregation. Nevertheless, this manner is well-suited for symbolizing education's dependence on interaction and, along with it, the limits of organization and the limits of sociostructural intervention. This thought pattern of understanding and the empathy into what other human beings (or cultural facts) are in their own right that is made possi-

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486

Note from the translator: In order to remain consistent with Niklas Luhmann's distinction between ., Mensch" and ., Person" (See Social Systems, chapter ,,Interpenetration"), I have chosen to use the word ,,human" or ,,human being" rather than ,,person" in place of the German .,Mensch." In Luhmann's language, a .,person" is more ofa place-holder in society, whereas ,.human being" evokes the characteristics we associate with an idealized concept of our ,,singular" species. This has been the case throughout the text, but comes up here so clearly that it deserves special note. Cf. Kurt Grube, Die !dee und Struktur einer rein mensch/ichen Bi/dung: £in Beitrag zum Phi/anthropismus und Neuhumanismus, Halle 1934, p. I 59ff.

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ble by it, had a long-term importance 487 as the possibility of making sensitive distinctions within an interaction itself. But perhaps these are no longer accessible on the level of science and organization. If, for that reason, we take up the theme of Pedagogy's compensational theory development and, in this sense, start with the reference to knowledge of human behavior as compensation for the technology deficit, then we do so with the assumption that this inability of science (and of organization) can be used to presuppose or to call for genuine knowledge of human behavior within theory ( or organizationally taking place) and to satisfy oneself with that (Diesterweg) or, in other words, to concern oneself with sabotaging the problem (Nietzsche). According to the tradition that started around 1800, knowledge of human behavior and understanding were bound to a two-person scheme, and the more demands one made, the more urgent they became. The Pedagogy of the time extracted a relationship between educator and pupil or teacher and student in which both could present themselves and understand the other as a human being. With this focus on twosomes, Pedagogy already manages to hide the technology problem; 488 because the problem emerges in part precisely because the typical social situation in education and instruction makes it impossible to completely focus on human beings for each other .489 But apart from this: the sociality of the twosome is not adequately constructed in theory; 490 instead, the responsibility for understanding it is left, so to speak, to those involved themselves. In no way is a plausible concept of asymmetrical sociality worked out. No theory concept that is able to operate and that has connectivity can emerge with such undeveloped conceptual 487

488

489

490

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We are quoting with reservation a position that does not actually make such ,,tracks" seem expected: Georg Kerschensteiner, Das Grundaxiom des Bildungsprozesses, 10th ed., Munich and Stuttgart 1964, in particular p. 65ff. Just as vice versa, by turning down the challenge of proceding technologically, Pedagogy constantly refers back to the human-to-human relationships, which creates the basic model of the pedagogical relationship. See Theodor Litt, ,,Das Wesen des padagogischen Denkens," in Erziehungswissenschaft und Erziehungswirklichkeit, ed. Hermann Rohrs, Frankfurt I 963, p. 73ff. That was, as a matter of fact, well known. See Schleiermacher, ,,Versuch einer Theorie des geselligen Betragens," in Werke. Auswahl in 4 Banden, vol. II, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1927, pp. 1-31. For a point of comparison see the sociological concept of double contingency and the reflexive expectation structures in interactions. For more on this: Toward a General Theory of Action, eds. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, Cambridge, Mass. 1951, p. 8ff; Talcott Parsons, ,,Interaction: Social Interaction," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York 1968, vol. 7, pp. 429-440.

resources: one may just as well pull the entire problem that has been posed together again, skip over the difference between ego and alter, and speak exclusively about ,,human beings." In comparison to all other cultural domains, education does claim itself to be the one that worries about human beings and that gains its own rights, its autonomy through this. New Humanism, with its re-conceptualization of the individual, was responsible for the preliminary work necessary for this. 491 The pedagogical orientation had shifted itself to human beings' inner domain and that domain's worldliness. But that also causes the old totality of human characteristics, which included characteristics that were in part general, in part group-specific, and in part individual, to break down. The individual and the community come apart. Thus, Diesterweg finds two points of intervention within the pedagogical orientation that lack an internal connection to the theory: ,,individuality, subjectivity and character" for the individual;492 and ,,liberal instruction, liberal school education," which are politically connotated, for the ,,whole." 493 This shift effects the perception and solution of the problem of instruction in a manner that is mixed: although Diesterweg sees the technology problem clearly - for instance, in the differentiation of levels between Educational Science (Erziehungswissenschaft) and the Art of Education (Erziehungskunslj that he makes when he says that the former is necessary because of the incompleteness of the latter4 94 - he simultaneously obstructs a realistic reflection by working on the level differentiation 491 492 493 494

On that and on the following, cf. above: part I, the start of chapter XI. and part II, the start of chapter VI. Cf. the essay by Diesterweg, ,,Individualitat, Subjektivitat und Charakter," in Sdmtliche Werke, vol. X, pp. 58-74. Cf. the essay by Diesterweg, ,,Ober liberalen Unterricht, liberale Schulerziehung," in Samt/iche Werke, vol. Yll, pp. 348-357. ,,Mochte es