Probing the Enigma of Franco 1527513343, 9781527513341

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Probing the Enigma of Franco

Probing the Enigma of Franco By

Andrew Sangster

Probing the Enigma of Franco By Andrew Sangster This book first published 2018 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2018 by Andrew Sangster All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-1334-3 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-1334-1

In Gratitude to my wife Carol

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ........................................................................................................ xi Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Historical Bias........................................................................................ 1 Historians and Franco ............................................................................ 3 Biographies ............................................................................................ 8 Germans and Italian Diarists .................................................................. 9 Journalists and Writers ......................................................................... 12 The Question of Taboo ........................................................................ 12 The Politics of Francoism .................................................................... 14 The Plan ............................................................................................... 16 Part One: Spanish Background History Chapter One ............................................................................................... 20 The Nineteenth Century Turn of the Nineteenth Century ........................................................... 20 The First Spanish Republic 1873-74 .................................................... 22 The Restoration 1874-1930.................................................................. 23 Spanish American War 1898 ............................................................... 24 The Political Alternatives .................................................................... 25 Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 28 1900-1936 1914-18 Spain Remains Neutral .......................................................... 28 Rif War in Morocco 1920-26 ............................................................... 29 Primo de Rivera 1923-30 ..................................................................... 30 1931 Elections...................................................................................... 33 Second Spanish Republic ..................................................................... 35 Towards Civil War............................................................................... 39

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Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 44 Civil Strife The Civil War ...................................................................................... 44 Year by Year Survey............................................................................ 46 Overview.............................................................................................. 50 The Barbarity of the Civil War ............................................................ 55 Part Two: Franco Chapter One ............................................................................................... 60 His Early Life His Family and Youth .......................................................................... 61 Morocco ............................................................................................... 64 The Spanish Legion ............................................................................. 67 The Academy General ......................................................................... 73 Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 80 Franco and the Political Scene Franco in Limbo................................................................................... 80 Balearics to Chief of General Staff ...................................................... 83 Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 90 The Caudillo Franco and the Civil War 1936 ............................................................ 90 Generalísimo ........................................................................................ 98 Franco’s Struggles 1937 .................................................................... 108 Towards Final Victory 1938 .............................................................. 119 1939 and Victory ............................................................................... 123 Part Three: The Second World War Chapter One ............................................................................................. 132 Power Play 1939 General Observations ................................................................ 132 Spain’s Economy ............................................................................... 133 Franco ................................................................................................ 135

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Chapter Two ............................................................................................ 138 1940 The Ideological Fascist International Spain ............................................................................. 138 Political Spain .................................................................................... 153 Chapter Three .......................................................................................... 156 1941 At War Against Russia Chapter Four ............................................................................................ 165 1942 Franco’s Two-War Thesis Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 172 1943 Doubts Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 178 1944 Holding the Balance Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 182 1945 Franco the Pariah End of War Comments....................................................................... 184 Part Four: Spain under Franco Chapter One ............................................................................................. 188 Postwar Problems Immediate Post War Years 1945-1946 .............................................. 188 1947-50 .............................................................................................. 193 Chapter Two ............................................................................................ 200 The Way Forward 1950-1955 Introduction ........................................................................................ 200 The USA and Spain ........................................................................... 203 Britain and France .............................................................................. 209 Spanish Economics ............................................................................ 209 The Monarchists ................................................................................ 211 The Church ........................................................................................ 213

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Chapter Three .......................................................................................... 216 Need for Change 1956-39 Introduction ........................................................................................ 216 Morocco ............................................................................................. 217 Political and Economic Problems ...................................................... 220 Chapter Four ............................................................................................ 232 The Last Years 1960-1975 Introduction ........................................................................................ 232 Economics.......................................................................................... 234 America.............................................................................................. 239 The Vatican ........................................................................................ 241 Monarchy and the Succession Issue................................................... 243 Franco 1960-1975 .............................................................................. 248 Final Reflections ................................................................................ 259 Bibliography ............................................................................................ 266 Endnotes .................................................................................................. 268 Index ........................................................................................................ 283

PREFACE

This exploration started in a Spanish bar on a sunny beach with a mixture of some Spanish, British and American history students talking about Spain’s past, especially the Civil War, the man Franco, and Spain’s allegiances during the Second World War. The young Spanish did most of the talking until the wine and tapas took away some of the hitherto guarded caution of the Anglo-Saxons. Perhaps the most pleasant aspect was that at no time, despite contrary opinions, did anything but goodwill prevail, although one elderly Spanish visitor listening in from the other side of the bar reminded us that fifty or sixty years ago such a conversation and debate would have been dangerous, and would have led to outright hostility. He then joined us and shared his carafe of wine which was a relief. No voting took place, no apparent camps developed, and there was no consensus of opinion. The discussion ranged from why the Civil War had started, with some opinions that it could be traced back over the previous century. There was considerable humour over Franco’s myth that he was the “Sentinel of the West,” his love of soccer and doing the pools. There was less humour over his early economic policies and a sense of sadness and bitterness over the conduct of the Civil War, and more so over the subsequent repression which some argued lasted his entire lifetime. These were history students and they often quoted various authorities, national and international historians, biographers and journalists who, as with the students, all seemed to have a kaleidoscopic range of opinions. By the end of the evening there was one area of total agreement that Franco was still an enigma; thus this study’s title.

INTRODUCTION

Historical Bias It is not the task of an historian to pass moral judgements on the past, but there is an inevitability this will happen for a variety of reasons; national, religious or political beliefs can influence the most objective of historians. Some writers have argued that particular attitudes or actions happened at a point in history because that was the nature of the times. Sometimes the events of the past are so despicable or extreme that merely writing about a subject such as the Holocaust leaves moral judgement as self-evident and demanding little comment. It must also be apparent that later generations have their own foibles, weaknesses and bigotry, and passing judgement from the safety of a warm study is all too easy. In the various debates that have raged around the figure of Franco there are now fewer elements that are prepared to see him as a national saint, but there have been a few critics who have seen Paul Preston’s biography for example as too critical, with a need to have a more balanced view.* The well-known biographer Paul Preston often intimates that in the months preceding the Civil War the cunning Franco was playing a cat and mouse game waiting for the most viable chance to join a military coup which might work. On the other hand the 2014 biographers Payne and Palacios wrote that “the apolitical general understood his country’s political dynamics much better than the highly political president,” and although their study is perceptive in places, and they rightly emphasise the barbarity of the Left-wing, they paint a slightly kinder picture of Franco during the Civil War.1 This complex question of interpretation of events is difficult to resolve, and to a certain extent depends on both the reader’s and the writer’s personal political stance. To put the reader of this book on warning this writer has his own inbuilt bias. As an historian with a doctorate in modern * “The most extensive biographies are strongly polarised between extreme positive and negative portraits…the chief expression of the latter is the thousand-page work by Paul Preston” See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.xi; though this writer hold serious doubts about this sentiment concerning Preston.

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Introduction

European history and four degrees in this subject he has also been a priest for nearly fifty years and a tendency to be at home in the Socialist ambit. Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to be as objective as possible bearing in mind the importance of past events touching upon life today. Frederic Nietzsche wrote “the knowledge of the past is only desirable if it is useful for the future and the present not if it weakens the present or destroys a vital future.” This attitude finds little favour with most historians but may explain why there is sometimes a corporate amnesia in some national histories, and may also explain why myths are constructed intentionally, or more often through rose-tinted oral tradition. A classic example was that for many years after the Second World War as West Germany recovered and became of importance in the Cold War, the Nazi regime was placed on a remote shelf and the notion of the Wehrmacht fighting a “clean war” was constructed. In order to cope with a crushing guilt many Germans developed a version of history which enabled them to move forward. They became the victims of an aberration in their history of the daemonic monster Hitler; they were the victims of insufferable and unnecessary terror bombing, and the very few who committed such crimes were only the SS. Modern German historians such as Wette et al have had the courage to challenge much of this, pointing out amongst other things that the SS, small in numbers and as fanatical as they were, had become the national scapegoat. The Wehrmacht had always denied any involvement in the Jewish problem for nearly fifty years until an exposé was produced in Germany by means of a photographic exhibition. This initiated some considerable debate about the role of the Wehrmacht in crimes against humanity. This photographic exhibition in the late 1990s “entitled War of Extermination: The Crimes of the Wehrmacht, 1941-1944 opened up a difficult yet productive debate on the role of ordinary Germans in the murder of innocent civilians,” and the German historian Wette demolished any argument that the Wehrmacht always fought a clean war.2 Walter Ulbricht, as early as 31st December 1945 had said “what unspeakable suffering has been brought upon our German homeland by Nazism.”* This idea developed rapidly, and “Germans now perceived themselves as victims of the Nazis," now stylized as a fanatical minority.3 After the German photographic exhibition was shown in 1995 there were *

Ulbricht was a leading figure in the Weimar era as a communist leader, and later a prominent leader in East Germany. His views were not just those of East Germany, but were widely held throughout that country. Quoted text is: Ulbricht Walter, Whither Germany, Speeches and Essays (Dresden: Zeit im Bild, 1960) p.127.

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near riots. It could be argued that German historians of any integrity have the painful task of facing facts head on; perhaps a lesson for all historians. Every country tries to reconstruct its history one way or the other. In France de Gaulle built the myth that the French freed themselves, in Britain it tended to be that they won the war, as in America when in reality it was a Russian victory which may not have worked without American aid and Royal Navy support in convoys. In postwar Spain Franco built the myth that he cunningly kept the Germans at bay and by so doing helped the Allied victory. When Nietzsche wrote “the knowledge of the past is only desirable if it is useful for the future” there was an element of truth because after Franco’s death a corporate silence descended on Spain as it became democratic. All political parties and the vast majority recognised the need to heal the past divisions by not emphasising the sheer brutality of the Civil War and the subsequent retribution. When Lord Acton wrote “if the past has been an obstacle and a burden, knowledge of the past is the safest and surest emancipation” he was closer to the historian’s task. However unpalatable a past may have been, however disastrous the consequences, it is only if the truth is known and understood that it can serve humanity’s future. The historian’s task is to seek the truth as accurately as possible and without becoming overly judgmental allowing the reader to adjudicate. It took decades for the Holocaust to be explored adequately, but despite this since 1945 there have been many examples of genocide and crimes against humanity. The Second World War revealed the dangers of nationalism, racism, extreme political bigotry, military blunder, and myriad other forms of appalling human behaviour. Historians have written libraries on these lessons, and the tragedy is that we do not learn from the past. Nevertheless, the job of the historian remains one of exploring the past however delicate the issues, and perhaps more than many others the study of Franco reveals the delicate nature of a political and economic past which still dominates today’s perceptions.

Historians and Franco Many general histories of World War Two which dominated the twentieth century give little time to Spain or Franco, because Spain was not totally involved in the military aspect of 1939-45 which dominated world global history. This war experienced a death rate of catastrophic proportions somewhere in the region of fifty million people plus killed; populations shifted; and a refugee problem of millions. The expression

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Introduction

crimes against humanity took on greater meaning, and the word genocide was devised for legal clarification. This war gave birth to the Cold War which dominated the world for another forty years with its proxy wars and nuclear tensions. Spain’s apparent inactivity did not seem to warrant more than a few pages which explains the near absence of Spain from many text books. When Spain is mentioned it is usually a passing reference which tends in earlier studies to favour Franco as the person who valiantly held the Nazi war-machine at bay, or pictured Franco as a man whose sole purpose was to preserve Spain. The fact that Franco was a pro-Nazi whose only interest was the retention of retaining his personal power, and who was prepared to kill thousands of his own countrymen to this purpose is rarely mentioned. When the military historian Liddell Hart wrote his major history of the war in 1970 he made only four passing references to Franco.4 He regarded the victory of Franco in the Civil War as a potential threat to Europe because of the Franco-Spanish border, and also the sea-communication lanes as “the spectre of an additional menace.”5 Liddell Hart had been a well-known military expert before World War Two and had often spoken on this danger after 1938 when a nationalist victory appeared imminent. As will be noted later the Germans were always reluctant about sending troops through Spain with its poor roads and lack of food, but Liddell Hart was more inclined to interpret it as Franco’s decision. He noted that doubts entered the situation writing “General Franco was more disinclined to welcome the entry of German forces into Spain” after Torch.6 In his third and final reference to Franco Liddell Hart wrote that fortunately Franco was content to stay quiet as a non-belligerent ally of the Axis, and the more contentedly because the Americans were buying Spanish products and allowing him to obtain oil from the Caribbean. Although Liddell Hart is accurate in his three references to Franco it is easy to gain the impression he was not fully cognisant of Franco and his policies. In reality, and unpopular with some, it could be argued that Franco’s neutrality was self-centred in so far that he stayed “out of the war out of concern over his future.”7 Martin Gilbert wrote a highly detailed and factually based history of the Second World War in 1989 some twenty years after Liddell Hart, and followed a similar route and regarded Franco as making a bold stand, noting that “Mussolini had been equally unsuccessful in persuading General Franco to reconsider his neutral stance” in 1941.8 In his reference to the Hitler-Franco meeting at Hendaye Gilbert portrayed Franco as avoiding any allegiance to Germany despite “Hitler’s urgings.”9 The

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implications of the nuances in this interpretation of events would have been music to the ears of postwar Franco who later tried to construct the myth that his neutrality arose as a matter of principle, rather than the disabling economic circumstances and his desire to cling to power. The fact is that Hitler initially needed Spain to be quiescent supplying possible economic support, but Spain could only offer limited natural resources. For Hitler a neutral Spain was desirable at this juncture because “a belligerent Spain would raise more problems than it would solve.”10 Despite the fact that some Americans at the time, and some historians since have believed Churchill to have been somewhat soft on his approach to Franco, this was mainly because he was looking to the political future. When Churchill wrote his famous history on the War in 1949, Franco was seemingly entrenched as the dictator for the foreseeable future, and by the end of the 1940s and early 1950s he remained a matter of geopolitical caution. Churchill was perceptive through his sources and innate political ability to read international situations, writing that despite Franco’s adulation of Hitler in reality Franco “disliked and feared Hitler but liked and did not fear Mussolini” and that Franco’s “policy throughout the war was entirely selfish and cold-blooded. He thought only of Spain and Spanish interests.”11 Later research into Franco might have persuaded Churchill that Franco was more interested in holding his own position in power; Churchill also recognised that Franco “used every device of exasperating delay and exorbitant demands” to foil Hitler and “thus by subtlety and trickery and blandishments of all kind Franco succeed in tiding things over and keeping Spain out of the war.”12 Later research indicated that Franco wanted to join the Axis powers but his economic plight and fear for his own position always made him move with extreme caution. At the end part of the war Churchill’s personal political stance in his history emerges with greater clarity. His Foreign Secretary Eden had written a long letter to Franco outlining British grievances about Franco’s behaviour during the war years, and in a note to his Foreign Secretary Churchill agreed with him in principle but wrote: “therefore I should like to see the passages reduced…a little alteration in the wording would be compatible with justice and consistency” and that he would like Stalin to see a copy “to clear away any doubts that may have been engendered by de Gaulle during his visit that we have desired to build up a Western bloc against Russia.”13 Churchill had met with criticism in the House of Commons for being too complacent concerning his opinions about Franco, and when the American press picked this criticism up Churchill felt obliged to explain to

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Introduction

Roosevelt that “I do not care about Franco, but I do not wish to have the Iberian Peninsula hostile to the British after the war, I do not know I can depend on a de Gaullist France,” (4th June 1944).14 Churchill was a very readable historian and his insights at times are backed by inside knowledge and contacts, but he was always primarily a dedicated politician. A close study of the man Franco through his more objective biographers tends to paint a picture of the man which is at slight variance with some even highly respected historians. This exploration is not suggesting such historians have misread the situation, or that they are relying on general themes, and sometimes the differences of view are minimal, but they serve to illustrate the enigmatic and perplexing figure Franco presented on the stage of recent history. Norman Davies, in his reference to Hitler’s desire to take Gibraltar wrote of Franco that “to his credit Franco said ‘No;’” he appeared to overlook the reason why Franco said no: it is clear from those who studied Franco as a person that it was self-interest and a fear of British retaliation.15 He did not want to hazard losing the Canary Islands; he did not think the Spanish could risk it alone; he had internal problems revolving around his personal grip on power which had become more unsettled, and it did not take the German logistical experts long to realise that passing through geographical Spain in its state of economic decline and ruin would be hazardous. His stalling of Hitler was at the best safe-guarding, but probably had more to do with personal self-preservation. Later in his text Davies confirmed that Franco was a fascist, a member of the Anti-Comintern Pact, was financially and politically in debt to Hitler and Mussolini, “yet his ideology owed more to the conservative Catholic nationalism than to the rabble-rousing radicalism in Berlin and Rome.”16 Of course Davies is correct but he omits to note that at heart Franco was pro-Axis, an admirer of Mussolini and initially held Hitler in high respect, and disliked the power of the British and their Royal Navy, and the French for their colonial hold in Morocco. When Franco sent his Blue Division to fight Russia it was initially to show Hitler he was in support, and he concocted his two-war theory mentioned later to explain his actions to the outraged Allies, not as Davies suggested that this was his belief from the start.17 These are slight but curious divergences from scholars such as Paul Preston and Enrique Moradiellos. When in his major scholarly work on the history of Europe Norman Davies refers to Franco holding off Hitler as the “wily Franco” the current writer would have preferred the word “devious” which may well reflect that simmering through historical observations persist deep rumblings of the historian’s own political leanings and attitudes towards Franco the man.

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There are occasions when the detailed biographers of Franco clash directly with the views of historians. There is no doubt from the various biographers that in the early part of the global war Franco was not only pro-Axis, but was utterly convinced that Hitler would win. Even as the tide turned against the Nazi regime Franco still retained a belief to the virtual end that the Germans would “pull something out of the bag,” if only wonder-weapons, and that Hitler would not be defeated. His habitual attacks on the failing democracies were not always done just to please his Axis partners; he genuinely opposed democracy. This aspect clashes with the well-known historian Richard Evans who wrote that Franco had thanked Hitler for his help in the Civil War and claimed “he would come into the war on Germany’s side when it suited him. In his view the war was still undecided, and he poured scorn upon the German belief that Britain would soon be defeated:” according to all academic biographers Franco was convinced both publicly and privately that Britain would be defeated.18 All these historians are scholars and the best historians, and even the most recent, give only passing reference to Franco when writing on World War Two because Spain was not a major issue in this conflict. Hastings offers in his book of some seven hundred pages three to four passages on Franco and is accurate in his observations, pointing out that “from 1939 onwards Spain was no neutral and belligerent in waiting: Spanish foreign minister Serrano Suñer, in particular, was whole heartedly committed to joining the Axis cause.”19 From the point of view of understanding the man Franco, Hastings manages to highlight the critical features, pointing out Franco’s annoyance that Hitler would not let him interfere in French North African colonies, that the Germans would not provide weapons to Franco to take Gibraltar, and that Franco started to look to his own future after Allied success in North Africa.20 The French historian Henri Michel writing in 1975 typifies this approach of keeping Franco and Spain to a bare mention, in a magnificent volume of some eight-hundred pages Franco is mentioned only seven times.21 It is similar in Weinberg’s massive one-thousand page volume written in 1994 where there are seven to eight passages devoted to Spain; this lack of space reflects quite rightly Franco’s diminutive importance in the world affairs despite his selfevaluation of his own importance.22 Overall it appears that Franco was of minimal importance on the international scene, especially during the World War, and attracts little attention and occasionally inaccurate observations.

8

Introduction

Biographies During Franco’s lifetime there were published a considerable number of hagiographical works on Franco, all constructed around an adoration type of propaganda. The first biography by the journalist Joaquín Arrarás Iribarren was well received with no less than eight editions before the Second World War.23 This particular version claims that Franco never suffered from ambition with the same brazenness that Franco himself frequently deployed. This was followed in 1956 by the work of another journalist which was a slightly less hagiographical, but omitted any reference to Franco’s association with fascist Germany or Italy, and made no reference to his anti-democratic attacks and his anti-Semitism.* The title of the book in English is Sentinel of the West which encapsulated the type of history or myth that Franco tried to propagate. Franco was still alive and just before he died (1975) there appeared in 1972 another history written by Ricardo de la Cierva which contained a degree of objectivity, but the favourable version of Franco still shines forth. At his death other books were published but still they stood far from genuine historical objectivity, and tended to veer towards apologia more than reality. In the 1960s other books appeared, not least the work of Luis Ramírez which was more historical, but it was written from the Republican point of view. The author of this particular work was forced to hide behind a pseudonym and the book was published abroad. There followed a general tendency to write accounts of Franco and his times but clearly from the old divisive political viewpoints. Eventually in Britain Harper Collins published in 1993 the work of Paul Preston which was the result of years of study by a highly professional historian. It is a huge academic book and only a few have ever doubted its quality with its translations into many languages. Some of this current study is heavily dependent on Paul Preston’s work, but reinforced by other objective historians such as Moradiellos the Professor of Modern Spanish and European History at the University of Extremadura, and a recent American publication by Payne and Palacios. Preston’s work opened the gates for many others, some better than others, but these new accounts generally managed to destroy some of the myths from the past, especially that Franco was the crusader who freed Spain from communism, that he preserved Spanish neutrality during the 19391945 conflict, and he saved postwar Spain through his modernisation and *

Even a recent 2014 study plays down Franco’s anti-Semitism, see Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.280

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economic ability. Moradiellos states that Franco “was not as great as his apologists claimed, nor as little as detractors argue,” but trying to find a fair and well balanced account of Franco remains difficult; he remains something of an enigma.24

German and Italian Diarists Diarists in places of importance and near the seat of decision-making often gave instructive insight into matters happening overseas. They cannot be treated as utterly objective, but they frequently reflected the views of those in command. Göbbels and Ciano, for example, clearly indicated that behind all the diplomatic language, that very early on during the war years the two major Axis powers had become somewhat cynical and irritated with Franco. Despite Göbbels’ self-belief that he was close to Hitler and at the centre of German affairs (this was far from the truth) his diaries give an interesting backdrop as to how Göbbels and others in the regime viewed the Spanish scene and Franco in particular. Göbbels wrote his diaries at first from personal self-love, but later continued them in a less personal way because he believed they would act as a foundation base for the history of a Nazi Europe. They were written in his usual acerbic style and the sarcasm is often caustic. His continuous vexation at the length of time Franco took to finish the Civil War reflected the frustration both of the Germans and Italians. Neither of these fascist powers ever understood Franco’s personal belief in a prolonged war for cleansing the country from its enemies. In his February 3rd entry he noted the “position is good. Franco hopes to bring the war to an end within a few weeks. I am not yet prepared to believe it will happen.”25 He was quick to acknowledge that Franco’s radio broadcast which had been an attack on England and the Jews was good, noting that this was “something, at least, for our money, our aircraft, and our blood.”26 This entry in early1940 indicates the sense of growing frustration many were feeling about Franco’s lack of commitment. As far as Göbbels and Hitler were concerned Franco was just a potential tool to be utilised as and when necessary. When he heard the news that Franco was meeting Hitler, Göbbels noted that “these will not be a pleasant few days for Churchill” and reported the next day writing that “Spain is firmly ours. Churchill is in for a bad time.”27 For Göbbels Franco was just a possible part of German propaganda. It was fortunate that Franco was unaware of Göbbels’ diary because whereas Franco appeared to admire the Nazi regime (and especially Mussolini) it was abundantly clear the feelings were not mutual. Göbbels

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Introduction

wrote as early as November 1940 that: “the Führer’s opinion of Spain and Franco is not high. A lot of noise, but very little action. No substance. In any case, quite unprepared for war. Grandees of an empire that no longer exists.”28 Göbbels was also reasonably astute and read the various reports on Spain from Germans working there and noted that “the country is restless, wracked by internal spasms. Symptoms of senility in a former world empire.”29 The very next day Göbbels was remarking on the fact that Serrano Suñer was unpopular, Franco weak and the Falange was irrelevant, and the Clerical influence too strong.* On November the 5th Göbbels was back on the same theme commenting on the problems of the economy and that there was “a lot of grandiose posturing but nothing behind it.”30 At this stage Göbbels noted that the Germans had not played the “Spanish card,” and the following month he was angry that Gibraltar remained in British control. Throughout his early war diaries Göbbels becomes more and more acerbic about Franco personally, calling him a “jumped-up sergeantmajor,” “a totally conceited loud-mouth,” an “empty headed peacock,” a “clown, conceited arrogant and stupid,” and thought Serrano Suñer was “a Jesuit” and the real “fly in the ointment.”31 Göbbels when informed of the near starvation of Spain was not surprised at the potential chaos, and that it was no wonder that “the people looked back nostalgically to the monarchy.”32 There was a certain historical irony in this statement because Göbbels’ propaganda and Himmler’s repression stopped any German popular reaction as to the current state of affairs, and it was the same in Spain where Franco was executing the opposition on a daily basis. Göbbels diaries are on the whole the meanderings of a warped but intelligent mind, at times totally mendacious other times informative and can be entertaining, but when he refers to Franco he appears to be disclosing the thinking of the inner sanctum of the Nazi regime. Göbbels’ diaries are vastly different from Ulrich von Hassell who had his particular insights. Von Hassell was a diplomat, part of the resistance against Nazism, and his interest in Spain tended to be the question of Gibraltar.† Nevertheless even he picked up Hitler’s view that Franco had only become head of state “by accident” and Hitler called Suñer “the worse kind of business politician” and von Hassell thought for once Hitler was possibly correct.33

* †

Falange in short was a fascist and national syndicalist party founded in 1934. Von Hassell was executed later for his involvement in the July 20th plot.

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There was a warmer but cautious approach between the Italians and Franco, and this comes through in the diary of Ciano (son-in-law of Mussolini and his Foreign Minister) who was less acerbic than Göbbels, but in places just as cynical and at times almost amusing. He refers, for example to the young Germans who accompanied Ribbentrop on a visit as “not the usual wooden and somewhat boring Germans; they are likable young men, who speak foreign languages well, and who in a drawing room are able to forget all their heel-clicking when addressing a lady.”34 However, from the very first Franco reference in Ciano’s diary, it revealed the way Mussolini viewed Franco: “the Duce was very appreciative of the message [from Franco] and also praised it for the manner in which it was conveyed, defining it as the report of a subordinate.”35 This was the way Mussolini regarded his relationship with Franco, always proffering advice for his foreign policy, concerns about the monarchy and especially the conduct of the Civil War. From Mussolini’s point of view he had spent considerable valuable national resources supporting Franco and believed this placed him in the role of the guiding mentor. It was Mussolini who warned Franco against restoring the monarchy and had suggested the Serrano Suñer became the Foreign Secretary.36 Franco sometimes listened when it suited him, and as with his attitude towards Hitler he always held Mussolini in high esteem. However, as will be noted, in his relationship with Ribbentrop and Hitler, Serrano Suñer could quickly become hostile as he did when Mussolini suggested that better relationships with France could be useful.37 As the Second World War started to take shape relationships remained good, but the Italians as with the Germans were becoming more sceptical about Franco, Ciano noting in 1940 that “Franco sends a colourless message to the Duce, in which he confirms the absolute and unavoidable neutrality of a Spain preparing to bind up her wounds.”38 Later the Germans when they needed Spain, if only in terms of Gibraltar, asked Italy to be persuasive which Ciano referred to as “bringing back the Spanish Prodigal Son,” but he also blamed the Germans for not understanding the Latin temperament.39 By 1942 Mussolini wanted to dominate the Mediterranean, and receiving a realistic appraisal of the Spanish situation decided not to try and motivate Spain, and according to Ciano did “not intend to move a finger to accelerate Spain’s intervention in the war, because it would be more a hindrance than a help.”40 Mussolini may have reflected that this was the way Hitler felt about him after his failure in the Balkans. In 1943 Mussolini provided Göring with a gold sword for his fiftieth birthday, a present originally meant for Franco, but as Ciano noted “times have changed.”41

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Introduction

Journalists and Writers Many references are made to Henry Buckley in the first part of this study because he “saw more of the Civil War than any foreign correspondent of any country and reported it with a scrupulous adherence to the truth that won the respect even of those who sometimes might have preferred the truth to remain uncovered.”42 However, in understanding any national history it is also essential to look at histories and biographies mentioned above which have had due time to look at what happened from a distance of decades, and with as much scrupulous objectivity as possible. There are plenty of personal records referred to, not least George Orwell and Hemingway, and a plethora of individual accounts from those who travelled to Spain to fight for one side or the other. Franco almost expunged from his history his reliance on overseas support, and the many thousands who died on both sides of the divide, but these personal histories are imbued with their own ideology and bias and must be treated with a degree of care as with this writer’s point of view.

The Question of Taboo As Hitler was known as the Führer and Mussolini as the Duce, the memory of Franco for many is the Caudillo. It is the word Caudillo which dominated Spanish thinking throughout this period. The question of the name Caudillo started as the need to concentrate everything in a single power in order to win the Civil War. The “decisive occasion that verified the judicial and political status of Franco as Caudillo came with the proclamation of the Ley de Sucesión en la Jefatura del Esatado of 26th July 1936, approved by the Cortes and put to a national referendum” purporting to give France 82 per cent.43 The word Caudillo was in circulation from October 1936 mainly by press and propaganda machinations. The biographers Payne and Palacios arrived at eight conclusions as to why the term Caudillo was applied to Franco. His reputation as a young officer in Morocco; his rise to pre-eminence in 1936; the Nationalistic propaganda machine; his self-assurance; his consolidation of the new culture of nationalist Spain; his continued victories; and finally his bringing together the old traditional Spain with the demands and advances of the twentieth century.44 Perhaps the most important element was the propaganda. Franco held many titles ranging from generalissimo to homo missus a Deo (the man sent by God). His head appeared on coins and stamps and as the English coins carried the monarchical title “Defender of the Faith”

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Franco’s carried the inscription “By the Grace of God;” the Divine Right of the ruler acknowledged on the coins of the realm. His image appeared in classrooms to the right of the crucifix and in all government agencies, and on October 1st there was a national holiday for the Exaltation of the Caudillo. During the postwar period the Civil War was a dangerous subject and “during the years of dictatorship, the defeated in Spain had no public right to historical memory, living as they did in a kind of internal exile.”45 Today the Caudillo, the “former head of state seems to be missing, unknown, silenced or forgotten by general public opinion in the country, especially among the younger generations born after his death and after the restoration of democracy.”46 In his recent study the Spanish historian Enrique Moradiellos refers to many surveys conducted about the current memory of the past regarding Franco and the Civil War.47 They tend to show a great deal of indifference, (especially among the young) and a suggestion that many have developed a dedicated amnesia to the problems in Spain during the first half of the twentieth century. A journalist in the British Sunday Times recently produced an article on Franco’s wayward grandchildren and in writing of the past noted that “until now a taboo on the subject has existed and although a Jose Luis Rodriguez brought in a historic memory law in 2007 which resulted in the removal of Franco Statues from public squares, and one Spanish historian wrote I think that Spain might be able to come to terms with Franco’s inglorious times, but perhaps in the 22nd Century.”48 Given the circumstances of that history none of this is surprising, and the recent resurgence of Catalonia’s demand for regional government with Catalan leaders seeking refuge in Belgium may for many be an unpleasant memory of the Civil War. The threat of twenty to thirty years’ imprisonment for such politicians is reflective of the brutality of the past. On the whole since 1975 (the death of Franco) “Spanish citizens have maintained a predominantly negative view of Franco and his regime, albeit with many nuances and significant divisions of opinion.”49 Most democratic countries have a Right to Left-wing difference, sometimes sharply polarised, but in Spain this traditional conflict led to such a grotesque war and its aftermath that there is almost a restrained and self-imposed corporate silence on the past. It could be argued that the Spanish reticence is not so much a matter of political expediency but a necessary reality. However ghastly a past, the reality is that it nevertheless pays for a current society to understand and learn from the pitfalls of its history. As previously mentioned it took a few decades in Europe before the Holocaust was studied, and the implications of crimes against humanity and genocide became terms of total revulsion. Since

14

Introduction

1945 there had been many reoccurrences of mass ethnic murder and man’s failure to learn from the past should not preclude the necessity of trying to understand what precisely happened, if only to avoid a repetition. However, from the Spanish point of view by forgetting the divided and vicious past it helped Spain make the transition from Dictatorship to democracy possible. As noted earlier Franco’s statues are disappearing, and his well-known horse statues some weighing up to six tons started to disappear from prominent places as early as 1986. Such was the sensitivity of the past, the immense suffering and powerful divisions nothing could be done at speed in case it resurrected past conflict. The slightest friction could cause dissent which Spain’s past indicates could result in violence. It was noted that many street names had been changed to Franco and his supporters, but very few to prominent Republicans; such sensitivities have to be monitored with care even to this day. Generally Franco is now considered as some sort of ghostly spectre belonging to the forgotten past, but as mentioned Lord Acton wrote “if the past has been an obstacle and a burden, knowledge of the past is the safest and surest emancipation.” This is true of all history, but it is understandable that in Spain even today with Catalonia’s demands in the background that a high degree of sensitivity is needed to safeguard the future. Only in this century are the ramifications of the Civil War and its subsequent brutality being openly exposed. The writer Jeremy Treglown in his book refers to his viewing the opening of old mass graves: “For several years, all Spain has been searching for its disappeared. They are everywhere, in every region, in every kind of terrain. Families who stayed silent for decades have been urged, often by the victims’ grandchildren or great-grandchildren, to say what they suspect, or know, or saw.”50

The Politics of Francoism Franco’s regime was a complex dictatorship; it had some affinities with other dictatorships in Germany, Italy, Hungary and Poland; Franco’s regime had something in common with all of them but no absolute identity with any single blueprint. There are emerging patterns of the type of regime Franco led, but not long-lasting configurations and not always easily identifiable. The phrase Francoism clearly identifies a particular system linked to one historical figure and one, who unlike all other European examples, survived four decades of rule. This is not a study of the science of politics but it is worth noting that in understanding Franco the need to understand the length of his reign demands attention, as does the man himself, and the status of his political

Probing the Enigma of Franco

15

regime. Some have argued that it was a typical conservative military dictatorship such as Piásudski in Poland and Horthy in Hungary, others argue that Franco’s regime was a new if not uniquely Spanish form of fascism somewhat like the early Mussolini period. During the Civil War there were distinctive signs of German and Italian fascism enough to warrant concern by British observers who had hitherto had a degree of sympathy for the Franco cause. It soon became popular to regard Francoism as a Spanish form of fascism. Much of the current historiography understandably classes the regime simply as a military dictatorship, but it never remained a simple praetorian dictatorship although it roots were in the military. It originated as a collegiate military dictatorship until September 1936 when Franco became the Generalissimo and Head of the Spanish State, a matter of total personal authority. During the Civil War and the World War Franco appeared to accept the fascist style of leadership, and copied many of their policies, not least the formation of a single-party system, or better known as a “state party.” This form of dictatorship exceeded that of Primo de Rivera and many started to describe Franco’s regime as more like that of Bonaparte; Franco had become the central feature of the political system. Again this was a difficult thesis to maintain and it was argued that the regime was simply totalitarian with all the hallmarks of such a system, namely: a central charismatic leader (although Franco was not charismatic in personality), a single party system, total control, control of the population, systematic police repression of opposition, and a centralised economic system as in autarky. In the mid-1960s when economic progress was being made and there was a slight degree of opening up an alternative definition surfaced called “authoritarianism.” Its critics saw this argument more as a form of acquittal almost viewing the regime as benevolent. Following this another suggestion was proposed that the regime was more like a form of modern despotism which in modern thinking is not that different from totalitarianism or fascism even if it appears benevolent. It could be argued that fascism was a necessary asset for Franco to win the Civil War and survive the following global conflict with his fascist neighbours, but it was not the ideological central feature, and postwar was watered down as the regime transformed to an authoritarian base. Certainly during the Civil War it was a military dictatorship and which became dependent on fascist support. The debate over the nature of the Francoist regime has not finished, and the only adequate defining feature is Franco himself, the lifetime ruler “under God” and to the bitter end. He was the single common denominator from 1936 to 1975 and it was he who

16

Introduction

dictated the way Spain would be governed and the nature of that government. His political machinations, his intentions and motives, and his acts and decisions need to be studied as a person in the context of his world; this was all part of the enigma of Franco’s dictatorship.

The Plan Franco had a long life and his system dubbed Francoism lasted longer than any other form of dictatorship, and had more changes than most of the non-Marxist dictatorships. In the study of history it is critical to establish a chronology to understand the evolutionary changes in human behaviour and conduct. It is a matter of “periodisation,” of understanding the stages of development in order to understand the nature of the changes, and the influences that helped these changes and their consequences. In terms of Francoism some historians divide this history in two clear periods, the first up to 1959; a binary division with 1959 marking the period when the economic recovery was seen as a significant milestone. A few argue for 1957 with the new government which started the process, and a few for 1960 when the tangible efforts came to some fruition. Prior to 1959 it was a period of economic stagnation and slow recovery making a sharp contrast with the mid-1960s onwards. From the political point of view it could be divided into four sections; 1936-1945 the new state with a semi-fascist phase; 1945-57 the period of Catholic hegemony and the subjugation of the fascist element; 1957-69 the authoritarian state of technocrats with social change, and 1969-75 the final period of crisis. Francoist experts would perhaps phrase this differently or may change some of the dates slightly or want more refinement, but this seems a fair overview of the regime dubbed Francoism. In terms of the man Franco this study intends to look at the Spanish hinterland of Spanish history first, and then study Franco phase by phase. In trying to understand what happened in Spain and the nature of Franco it is essential to try and understand what exactly led to the longest dictatorship in Europe at a time when Dictators were becoming common place, but in Spain exceptionally coming to an end in 1975. Part One will study, albeit briefly, the Spanish political background, the form of so-called constitutional monarchy, its collapse and restoration, its politics and the powers of the military, the Church and the landowners, and the many who demanded change. Franco was not the first dictator in Spain, but he was the first who ruled without a monarchy and almost as a self-ordained usurping monarch in the medieval style. This part will also explore the Rif War with Spain’s desperate bid to hold substantial colonies

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in North Africa following the loss of Cuba and the Philippines, and will examine the collapse of the Second Republic which gave rise to the Civil War. The reason for Part One’s brief recent history of Spain is because it clearly indicated that the lack of constancy and economic progress made Spain one of the less advanced European countries and unstable. Spain was also a deeply fragmented society which rapidly polarised into two distinctive groups which gave rise to the Civil War. This is not a book about the Civil War, but it is critical that an overview of the war is given by a brief year by year basis. Part Two is a biographical sketch of the man Franco from his early life to and through the Civil War. This involves his background, family, Church affiliation and his love of the military. It will illustrate his meteoric rise through the ranks in Morocco as a young officer, and the vast publicity he received which brought him close to the throne and ignited his political ambitions. This is followed by his ascendency as a young general, and the embryo of “caudillo” to “The Caudillo” can be traced through the protracted Civil War ending just before the outbreak of World War II. He was a man of his particular Spanish military class, and it is possible to perceive the nature of Franco the dictator emerging in his youth with his desire for promotion, and his obsessional observation of rules to be obeyed or punished, as well as his exploitation of the Church. Part Three is the critical time relating to the World War years; it is also a perplexing time for understanding this enigmatic dictator. The question of whether he was pro-Axis, pro-Allies, genuinely neutral, or playing for time will be explored. Although Franco the man would have denied it the fact is that during the World War and its aftermath he had to respond to the vast variety of international pressures, over which he made many prognostications in which few were correct, until the postwar period when he foresaw the Cold War. During this time Franco had to ensure he stayed in power, and his clever manipulation of people and his cunning exploitation of situations are explored. Part Four studies in brief the postwar years as Franco solidified his personal grasp on total power, faced a hostile world, and used his traditional wily or perhaps devious machinations to become moderately acceptable to the West. He foresaw the Cold War and the benefits Spain could reap from this situation, and then sat back as his new appointees changed Spain from one of the poorest countries in Europe to a place of rapid economic growth. This period ends with the problems of change anticipating Franco’s slow descent to the grave. Part Four will conclude with an appraisal of the man and his legacy.

PART ONE: SPANISH BACKGROUND HISTORY

CHAPTER ONE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Turn of the Nineteenth Century The question must first be asked first as to what was happening in Spain which gave rise to the bitter Civil War in that country in 1936, and which concluded with a long-standing dictatorship to 1975. The roots of this acrimonious divide go back a long time in Spanish history. Referring to a debate in the Cortes in 1936 the historian Hugh Thomas wrote: “This debate in the Cortes was the culmination of the several passionate quarrels as to how Spain should be governed which had continued since 1808.”51 As the twentieth century approached Spain still retained a monarchy which was not constitutional in the British sense of the word. In England Queen Victoria interfered in politics and held strident views, but her power was limited by Parliament, whereas in Spain although there were a variety of political parties the monarch dominated the political scene. There were efforts to shape the country into a liberal parliamentary system, and “down to 1923, the country lived for more years under systems of parliamentary liberalism than did France.”52 However, the journalist Henry Buckley later made reference to the ABC of Spain, (the ABC was also the name of a conservative newspaper) namely the Army, Bishops and the Crown when writing about the next century, and this description travelled deep into Spanish history. Buckley wrote: “The ABC of Spanish politics still remained Army, Bishops and Crown. The middle-class had no strength. It ran Spain politically but with little vigour and always hemmed in by the ABC which prevented new solutions without having anything to offer suitable for twentieth-century acceptation.”53 As the twentieth century appeared on history’s horizon Spain was still a deeply feudalistic society with unambiguous power bases; the military, the Church and major landowners dominated the political landscape while the vast majority of the population laboured under the most appalling poverty-struck circumstances. Nevertheless there were growing signs that many people in the middleclass were developing different ideas about how Spain should be governed. It was a case of a deeply traditional feudalistic society trying to

The Nineteenth Century

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find its way into a modern economic world at the time that many of its European neighbours were not only in gathering conflicts amongst themselves, but over their own form of governance and industrial development. Spain’s problems had started in the middle of the nineteenth century when Western Europe was enriching itself and becoming socially divisive during the industrial revolution. In 1868 Queen Isabella had been driven into exile; “her personal reputation had been besmirched by a series of high profile financial and sexual scandals.”54 She had consistently interfered in politics and gave too much favour to her favourite reactionary generals, statesmen, and to the Church with its multitude of religious orders. Isabella was once described in an older history of Spain as “the depraved daughter of a depraved mother.”55 She ruled from 1843 until 1868 during which time there was continuous political unrest, riots, and her government was always dominated by military-politicians especially General Ramón Maria Narváez and General Leopoldo O’Donnell. In England the Duke of Wellington could have been given this description as a military-politician, but it would have been minimal compared to his Spanish counterparts.* Queen Victoria was not always popular, but there was a sharp contrast with the Victorian constitutional monarchy and the Spanish version.

Isabella II in Exile in Paris *

There was a common joke in England that when the Duke of Wellington was asked by his wife how his first day as Prime Minister (1834) went he replied that when he had given the standing orders “they wanted to discuss them.”

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Queen Isabella had lived apart from her husband and rumours abounded about her sexual activities, but it was her continuous political interference which damaged the monarchical cause. Isabella was in a weakened position when O’Donnell (a general and Prime Minister) died in 1867 and Narváez (also a general and Prime Minister) died the following year. The political revolt which followed was known as the “Glorious Revolution” and ushered in the First Spanish Republic. Isabella was replaced by King Amadeo I, the second son of Victor Emmanuel II of Italy. (Isabella was eventually obliged to abdicate in Paris in June 1870 in favour of her son Alfonso XII, and eventually she died in the French capital in 1904.)

The First Spanish Republic 1873-74 The revolt had been organised by General Juan Prim (hero of the Mexican campaign of 1859-60) which led to what is often called the Six Revolutionary Years. It was Prim who suggested that Amadeo take the throne, but the very day Amadeo arrived in Spain Prim was assassinated by extreme Republicans, or so it was rumoured. The First Republic was proclaimed. Amadeo was an imported monarch and the assassination of his supporter Prim did not augur well, nor did the fact he was also the subject of an attempted assassination; his reign was fraught with rebellions, army mutinies, anti-clerical protests, and the Cuban independence movement. Amadeo had claimed that Spain had been ungovernable and abdicated the throne when a government of Republicans and radicals declared Spain a Republic. Thereafter Amadeo was known as the Duke of Aosta. He was to be the only monarch of Spain who came from the House of Savoy. Amadeo was like much of Spain, living in a world that was facing political change in which monarchy was not going to flourish as it had done hitherto; it was not to last long and was under immediate siege and attack. The First Republic was to be short lived and only existed from February 1873 until the 29th December 1874 when General Arsenio Martínez-Campos announced the restoration of the Bourbon throne.* The whole of the First Republic was defined by political and social instability and was not helped by having four presidents.56 During this short period there were no less than three overlapping civil disturbances, namely the Carlists, the Cantonal Revolution and the Petroleum Revolution in Alcoy. *

Following the death of the last Habsburg monarch of Spain in 1700 the Spanish throne was wide open between the various dynasties of Europe.

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23

The Restoration 1874-1930 In the January of 1874 General Manuel Pavía overthrew the government of the day and established what is best described as a conservative republic but military based as it was under a General Serrano. In the December of the same year a Brigadier General Arsenio Martínez-Campos restored the Bourbon monarchy under Alfonso XII who was crowned on the 28th December 1874, and was accepted by the people who needed stability even if under the old Bourbon monarchy. This action was taken to neutralise the Carlists who had always been in revolt in support of this royal lineage, and there were even some signs of economic progress.* This was commonly known as the Restoration System and the first Prime Minister was a Liberal Unionist called Antonio Cánovas del Castillo. He immediately sought some form of stability by looking towards replicating the British system of a two party system, in which the existence of the monarchy was accepted by both sides of the political divide. The intentions were well meant and lasted until 1923. A new constitution was formulated in 1876 which was based on a joint sovereignty between the monarch and the Cortes.† The system gave the King considerable powers of political influence even the right to veto proposed and accepted laws. One effect was the system successfully for a time blocked military interference though attempts were made by the military in 1883 and 1886. The Liberals were able to introduce new freedoms such as trial by jury, some religious liberty, free association and expression, and a belated abolition of slavery in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Nevertheless, the feudal background was forever dominant since both parties consisted of wealthy landed gentry. The vast majority of the working-class and middle-class had little to add to the government of Spain, and this continued to ferment the various tensions which would simmer for years before exploding in the 1930s. There was a lack of popular support by the masses for the system, which they recognised as a flawed democracy still operating under the feudal system. As in all feudal systems there was a dependency on the *

Carlists, or Carlism from the Spanish Carlismo was a Spanish political movement and was deeply traditional. It originated in the 1820s and is best described as a form of paramilitary Royalist Volunteers. There had been a Carlist War in 1833-39 over a disputed succession. Around 1960 most Carlists accepted Don Juan the son of Alfonso XIII, a severe critic of Franco, but after Franco’s death in 1975 his son Juan Carlos became king having been named by Franco. † The Cortes was the legislative system in Spain but with the Monarchy formally signing legislation, and with his reserved powers and the right to sack the Prime Minister and appointing new Senators.

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Part One Chapter One

military, especially the army, whose presence in Spain’s system of government was an ongoing serious problem.

Spanish American War 1898 In 1878 the Spanish government had made a vague agreement to grant autonomy to Cuba, a form of a peace settlement, but they failed to keep their promise. This led to a major disaster in 1895 when there was a Cuban revolt and the leading elements in Spain, as well as the Spanish in Cuba demanded a tough reaction, and Cánovas promised to react accordingly. The Spanish were more than aware that the Americans had strong political and commercial interests in Cuba, and were keen to rid their part of the western hemisphere of Spanish influence. Cánovas was assassinated in 1897, and Sagasta who took over the premiership was concerned to be seen as strong in opposing the growing and formidable USA; to have done otherwise might well have led to a revolt on the home front: it was all a matter of Spanish honour. The crisis was not helped by a similar revolt against Spanish colonial rule which had broken out in the Philippines in 1896. American public fervour was stirred by the mysterious sinking of the American warship Maine in Havana Harbour on the 15th February1898, followed by inflammatory articles from the powerful American newspaper proprietors such as Hearst and Pulitzer who blamed the Spanish. Whether it was the Spanish or not remains a mystery, but the general thinking tends to be that the Maine suffered internal fire-problems. A court of inquiry rendered the decision as an external cause but a historian writing as early as 1906 remained uncertain.57 It may not have been the cause of the war but was a distinct catalyst. The war did not last long (barely ten weeks) in the Caribbean and the Pacific. When American troops landed in Cuba many of the Spanish soldiers were suffering from yellow fever. Two antiquated Spanish squadrons were rapidly sunk in Santiago de Cuba and Manila Bay, and the third was recalled home to protect Spain. There was little the Spanish could do but accept defeat and sign the Treaty of Paris in December 1898 surrendering Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam leaving Cuba as a virtual protectorate of America. When the following year Spain sold her archipelagos in the Pacific to Germany it was the end of her distant colonies overseas. The war was a national humiliation and left an estimated 60,000 Spanish dead.58 The military and the politicians were blamed and Spain appeared suddenly weak and lame in a Europe which was still grasping

The Nineteenth Century

25

land and consolidating in colonial terms. There were emerging various groups only too happy to blame this national disaster on Spain’s atrophied political system with its disintegration of social and religious loyalties. This criticism would ferment for decades. There were also calls for the modernisation of Spain politically and commercially. Amongst the myriads of suggestions was the demand for a benevolent military dictator to take charge, while others attacked the feudal system. There were a variety of views, criticisms, and suggestions which, with the benefit of hindsight, tended to make Spain internally divided and somewhat unstable.

The Political Alternatives Whatever history books are studied it is clear that Spain’s form of government was always fermenting, at times unstable, and open to constant internal criticism and often with revolts and disturbances. The Church remained powerful but was under continuous attack, the military overgrown with the officer class was always lurking ominously in the shadows, and the feudal style of life continued to dominate. For a time the Republican element seemed to gain a foothold; a newspaper editor called Lerroux had given some stimulus to a revolutionary movement in Barcelona. This looked to a future which hoped to unite the working-classes and challenge the feudal dynasties. Lerroux made the mistake of turning to the army for support which alienated many of his supporters forcing him to change direction. He looked to the central ground when he founded the Radical Republican party. However, the working-class had not been impressed by Lerroux who lived an extravagant life style compared to most working Spanish people. In 1912 a rival party called the Reformist Republican Party was formed actively seeking a way to modernise Spain. The Republican parties although full of the best intentions somehow never managed to appeal to those living outside the urban areas. Further strife was in the air as Catalonia started to raise the old concept of the regional nationalist sentiment which had been stirring since the 1830s. This strife was still ripe in 2017 when Madrid imprisoned “separation politicians” while others fled for sanctuary to Belgium. The undercurrent of conflict between Madrid and Catalonia persists to this day, and at the time of writing, in January 2018, three Separatist Parties are still trying to unite to their common purpose, and Madrid is still threatening to imprison the fugitive Catalonian leader should he return. (At the time of writing the leader, Carles Puigdemont is fighting extradition papers in Germany to avoid a long prison sentence. It was noted that “officials in Schleswig

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Part One Chapter One

Holstein will not let Spain give medals to the police who arrested Carles Puigdemont under the European warrant.”59) Catalonians had felt the economic crisis brought about by the Cuban war more than any other region. At the beginning of the nineteenth century during this period, a Regionalist League had been established to secure local self-rule, and this led to serious riots in 1905, mainly caused by some military officers. The Liberal government, always struggling to maintain control, was obliged to allow the “Law of Jurisdictions” which gave the army the right to try in their own military courts anyone who defamed their reputation. This action in any modern democracy is almost inconceivable, but was not limited to Spain. It understandably led to open revolt, and to disastrous results for the government in the 1907 elections. It was not just Catalonia seeking regional governance, but the well-known Basque region was stirring. Although Spain was behind much of Europe in industrial development the second half of the 19th century had seen considerable growth, and the development of an industrial working-class. To this group of workers as well as many rural workers the Anarchist movement was of some interest. Their aims were clear cut and appealing in their demands for social justice, land reform, and the destruction of the capitalist classes which, for the rural worker, meant an attack on feudalism. It often resulted in violence and brutal police retaliation. In 1910 the National Labour Confederation was formed, in places marked by Marxist ideology and as such tried to make headway with strikes. The Marxist theme was more adhered to by another party called the Spanish Socialist Party which put greater emphasis on the worker’s living conditions and rewards. By the very nature of these parties they tended to flourish in the industrial areas, but often failed to attract a wider membership which in time obligated them to seek alliances with the Republicans. Spanish politics vacillated wildly between Republican parties, the Anarchists, and various shades of Socialist Parties, the shades being somewhat dictated by individual adherence to Marxism. No single party was strong enough to dominate the political scene, but these parties generally managed to make enough waves to cause concern amongst the land-owners, the men of money, the Church, and the traditionally conservative army. The Roman Church had held considerable power in Spain from the earliest periods, was influential within the feudal system, and was also a major landowner. During the 19th century the Church came under attack, and there was a decline in the clergy. During the Restoration period the Spanish Church launched its own counter-offensive in an attempt to draw

The Nineteenth Century

27

people back to the Church in what was described as Social Catholicism, which was resented by the liberal left.60 Spain remained divided on the Church because those who feared any form of reaction from the workingclasses believed that the Church represented a sense of stability of the past, but popular riots against the church still persisted. The writer Henry Buckley writing in the 1930s amusingly wrote that riots in France tended to be aimed at politicians, in Germany they were anti-Semitic, in England they were over food, but always in Spain they were over the Church. The same writer pointed out that “the excuse that Spain was officially a Catholic nation may be proffered but anybody who knew the Spain of 1915 knew the strong anti-clerical feeling among the working-classes and among quite a sector of the middle-class.”61 Spain was continuously divided and although the Cuban war shook the Restoration style of government it staggered on. There were efforts at reform but total agreement was never reached. When in July 1909 reservists were needed to defend the Spanish part of Morocco there was a violent uprising in Barcelona which soon degenerated into a riot against the Church and its buildings. It was known as “the Tragic Week and was sparked off by the distribution of crosses by devout Catholic ladies to conscripts embarking for the war in Morocco.”62 This all led to “an outburst of working-class anti-clericalism against the Church of the Rich stirred up by Republican demagogues and anarchists;” twelves churches and forty convents were burned or destroyed.63 The army suppressed the riot but with considerable bloodshed which for many left the need for change even more convincing. No single party could gain political dominance, even the Liberals were divided and the Restoration system was for many people looking more and more anachronistic. For some it must have appeared that the politics of democracy were failing; for others it was the only way forward.

CHAPTER TWO 1900-1936

1914-18 Spain Remains Neutral During the European conflagration of World War One Spain managed to remain entirely neutral, and for a time her economic situation improved because of the increased supply of industrial and natural resources to the Allies. From the political viewpoint the workers came together more solidly than hitherto as their own powers increased. The warring parties in Europe regarded Spain’s neutrality as critical and Spain as the most significant of the neutral countries. There was no direct military involvement although German forces were interned in Spanish Guinea at the end of 1915. In 1914 the conservative Spanish Prime Minister Eduardo Dato had declared neutrality by Royal Decree and this was applauded in the Cortes, although opinion was of course divided. It has been claimed with some justification that the Church, the Spanish Army, and the traditional elite tended to favour the German side, and others preferred the Allies not least because in 1907 there had been a pact signed with Britain and France to avoid further German colonialism. The Great War certainly aroused the passions “by giving rise to a bitter debate involving senior generals about whether Spain should intervene. Given the country’s near bankruptcy and the parlous state of the Army, neutrality was inevitable, much to the chagrin of many officers.”64 Not surprisingly the independently minded Catalans produced many volunteers for the French Foreign Legion, possible as many as two thousand. In 1917 another political crisis hit Spain when junior army officers staged their own protest over their pay, and demanded a new form of government. This was paralleled by yet another insurgency in Catalonia demanding regional government. In addition to these serious rumblings of discontent the workers also wanted more pay and started to organise strike action. Eventually the riots and protests were quelled but the divisions in Spain were of alarming proportions. The Cortes was frequently suspended, and a large variety of coalition governments came and went with astonishing

1900-1936

29

rapidity. At the end of the war the news of Russia’s revolution encouraged hope in some but fear in others. The Anarchists felt inspired to create some advantage by riot and mayhem which led to violence in Barcelona, and also in the rural areas where strikes and riots were becoming common place. It was an all-encompassing muddle fraught with lack of direction and highlighted by Dato’s assassination in 1921 by an anarchist. The cleft between those who wanted a democratic government and those who demanded the old system of quasi-feudalism widened, and it was not helped by the growth of the anarchists. In the postwar years it appeared that the low turnout in elections indicated that many were losing heart in the hope for any actual progress.* The army had remained relatively dormant, but was now showing signs of political interest, especially with the fear of communist expansion lurking in the background. The army “now saw itself as the protector of national unity and the traditional social order of the land.”65 The attitude of the army was also coloured by problems overseas in Morocco. The military officer-class had always been deeply prominent in Spain and was to remain so for many decades.

Rif War in Morocco 1920-26 Before the Great War France and Spain in 1912-1913 had divided Morocco into two Protectorates; the Spanish area was relatively small, and was mainly in the north with a coastal strip including Tangier.† The area was circled by a largely dry mountainous area called the Rif. It had always been an area difficult to control and there were constant efforts to pacify the local tribes. Technically the area was governed by a series of everweakening Sultans which had encouraged European interest. The Sultan Abdelhafid, with considerable reluctance, had allowed the partition between the French and the Spanish, but the countryside tended to be ruled by the tribesmen who resented the European incursion. The war was almost continuous and poorly conducted by the Spanish. “The Spanish army was a stagnant place which gave promotions on time served rather than merit; the only area where individual action could *

The Anarchist problem took time to disappear and as late as 1964 the Security Services were still stopping plots to kill Franco. See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.371 † Tangier was made an international zone in 1923 under the joint administration of France, Spain and Britain. The convention was registered in the League of Nations Treaty Series on the 13th September 1924 and later amended in 1928.

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lead to advancement was Morocco, where the Spanish authorities were fighting a guerrilla war against rebellious tribesmen. Officers were said to earn one of two things from there time there: le caja o la faja (the coffin or the general’s sash).”66 There seems little doubt that the Spanish army was in a poor state and was “inefficient, weighed down by bureaucracy and inadequately supplied with obsolete equipment…its eighty thousand men were commanded by more than twenty-four thousand officer of whom 471 were generals.”67 This colonial war was mainly fought in the first half of the 1920s first by Spain but later alongside France. The main enemy were the Berber tribes in the Rif mountain area. The Rif tribesmen used what was for them the well-established guerrilla tactics, and were led by Abd el-Krim fighting with captured modern weapons.* He was only overcome much later in 1927 when planes and tanks were used, and Abd el-Krim surrendered to the French and was exiled.† From the point of view of Spanish politics their troops suffered a catastrophic defeat at Annual forcing them to retire permitting Abd elKrim to create an independent state, the Republic of Rif.‡ Such was this defeat and so deep the outrage in Spain it proved the final death knell for the so-called Restoration government, and in September 1923 General Miguel Primo de Rivera staged a military coup d'état (pronunciamiento is the Spanish term) in Barcelona, and King Alfonso XIII dissolved the Cortes and made Primo de Rivera head of a military directorate. “The army ascribed the military debacle to the inability and weakness of the civilian governments. The charge was ‘Treason on the Homefront;’ it was a Spanish version of the German ‘stab in the back theory.’”68

Primo de Rivera 1923-30 During the reign of Alfonso XIII General Primo de Rivera ruled for seven years as a dictator with the support of the monarchy, and in the early stages of his dictatorship there were some economic improvements. Spain, as part of the European stage was in a state of constant turmoil as was the rest of Europe, and struggled with different types of government. In Russia *

An English journalist found his way into Abd-el-Krim’s company and found he had a sense of grandeur, that he was humorous, and likeable. See Vincent Sheean in An Anthology, Decade 1931-41 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1941) p.389 † This revolt stayed deep in Spanish national memory and many historians believe it served as a precursor to the Algerian War of Independence some thirty years later. ‡ At this battle some 14,000 Spanish soldiers were killed or taken prisoner.

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the Bolshevik form of Communism ruled, in Italy and Germany the stirrings of fascism were emerging, and in Spain a military dictatorship had developed. Britain maintained a two party government under a tightly controlled constitutional monarchy, and in France democracy held sway, but its governments chopped and changed like musical chairs. Across Europe there was a fear of the rising aspirations of the working-class, and democracy had a looming question mark over its existence as a viable form of government.

Primo de Rivera

Primo de Rivera used this background as his excuse; he was saving Spain from the stupidity and muddle of professional politicians. Naturally the Right-wing, namely the Church, land-owners, capitalists of industry and the army welcomed this change, mainly because they feared a Bolshevik takeover. Primo de Rivera was often seen as the iron man who would take charge and save Spain from these perceived perils. There followed all too typically a curbing of the press, an end to trial by jury, and the 1876 Constitution was suspended. He was helped by the problems in the Rif War mentioned above. Initially he considered withdrawing from Morocco, but once Abd el-Krim attacked the French the two European nations were able to crush the problem in 1927 and Primo de Rivera received the anticipated adulation; his style of government had appeared to

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work. Central political parties were not proscribed, but they were virtually isolated from any influence. The Catalonian regional government was once again abolished, and the political power was centred in Madrid. In economic terms Primo de Rivera proposed the policy of autarky in an effort to make Spain self-sufficient. He also developed a programme of public investment in infra-structure, and state monopolies were created in oil and petrol resources as well as the telephone system. “Even the foundations of the national tourist industry were laid” which would really only benefit Spain some fifty years later.69 Primo de Rivera had foreseen the coming financial crisis and took the Spanish State into the oil business; it made money but he made enemies. The oil kings may have brought about his downfall but the journalist Buckley wrote: “the answer, I think, lies in the fact that although feudalism had been dying for some centuries it still remained at the bottom the only economic system in Spain.”70 One of his main problems was trying to maintain an over-valued peseta. He introduced some forms of social care looking to social (or subsidised housing), medical benefits, and studied the ways and means of resolving strikes and industrial unrest. In many ways it gave the appearance of a benevolent despotism and appeared to be working. “At this critical moment very few people had much idea as to what the working masses were thinking,” and Primo de Rivera tried to make workers better off, but outside the towns “he ran up against the opposition of the landed families and had to drop the matter.”71 He had less success in the political world which he failed to engage because he had tried to put them outside the ambit of influence. He made a serious error of judgment when he tried to govern the regions through military appointments which were not well received, especially in Catalonia. Many of the old-fashioned Liberal politicians still standing in the wings were soon demanding a return to democracy through the ballot box. When undergraduates started to protest in public the universities of Madrid and Barcelona were closed, and Primo de Rivera lost some of his military support. Alfonso XIII also became concerned because the growing resentment appeared to destabilise the monarchy. There were some minor military uprisings which came to nothing but were an indicator of the emerging problems. The economic issues escalated not least after the Wall Street Crash of 1929 followed by the general recession when Spain was brought to its economic knees, and led to Primo de Rivera’s resignation in January 1930. The central problem was that Primo de Rivera had become too independent from the feudal system of the crown, church and army.

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Primo de Rivera was a dictator in style but he was not a Mussolini or Hitler. The journalist Henry Buckley who spent most of the 1930s in Spain arrived just as Primo de Rivera’s time was finishing, and wrote that “one night while strolling down the broad Calle de Alcalá, a friend drew my attention to a cloaked figure strolling past, leaning somewhat on his cane, a tired but still debonair man around his sixties. It was Primo de Rivera…it pleased me to see a Dictator who could stroll alone along the main street like a normal human being. I suppose he was duly shadowed but there was no obvious protective force and it was pleasant to see that he did not need to be surrounded by myriads of hulking, gun-swinging bodyguards as in the case with most of Europe’s ‘strong men’ when they venture out in public.”72 Although a dictatorship it was not the type of fascist dictatorship which was developing elsewhere in Europe, and in fact it has been suggested that “Primo de Rivera presided over the most humane dictatorship in twentieth-century Europe.”73 He has often been depicted as an inept leader who lacked ideas and he failed to create any sensible support or power base. He was an elitist and relied upon the privileged for support. His main basis, for what he declared would only be a ninety day rule, was “Country, Church and Monarchy.” His desire was to improve Spain’s economics through regeneration, and as noted, he tried some social reforms and made an effort to reduce unemployment; some of this was accomplished by putting higher taxes on the rich which was deeply resented. He was a military man and not an economist or politician, and some historians believed this period was one of the causes of the portending Civil War. His son José Antonio Primo de Rivera would one day become a significant fascist leader.

1931 Elections After Primo de Rivera’s resignation it was clear that the Republican and anti-clerical votes were challenging the status quo and Alfonso XIII would soon flee the country.* Primo de Rivera’s immediate successor had been General Dámaso Berenguer who promised a return to a constitutional form of government. Following this brief period of dictatorship Spanish party-politics were rapidly re-emerging but with a distinct tide in favour or Republicanism. In the August of 1930 the Republicans, Socialists and some radical Catalan groups came together as an alliance against any form *

“The monarchy under Alfonso XIII was a classic socio-political liberal system similar to those prevailing in the rest of Europe.” Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.28

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of monarchy.* There were some minor outbreaks of protest but it was soon clear that the Military Command was not prepared to back the monarchy by force. Many outside observers had wondered whether Alfonso would survive the end of Primo de Rivera, and these realists were proved right because Alfonso was obliged to flee to Italy. King Alfonso XIII had never been popular. Buckley recorded watching him seemingly at prayer by Primo de Rivera’s coffin (he had died in Paris). It was a moment Buckley thought right for emotion, but “Alfonso showed none. His was a mask; the face of a man trained to hide what he thinks; showing cleverness, cunning perhaps, but not intelligence.”74 The King had not been astute and had not sought advice, he simply had appointed General Dámaso Berenguer (who had been the Head of his Military Household) to take Primo de Rivera’s place and the Cabinet was filled with friends, indicating to the world that Alfonso intended to rule.75 Alfonso had made a critical error in abandoning the dictatorship without engaging the politicians; it can only be speculation but he may have survived if at the end of Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship he had given control back to the politicians and submitted to election results. It had not been a successful period for the monarchy. During the Rif War a General Silvestre, who had once been Head of the King’s Military Household, had led ten thousand men into a death trap and rumours circulated that the king had sent a telegram encouraging him. The problem for Alfonso was that his only solid base was feudalism and he clung blindly to this to the bitter end. (The Spanish monarchy has never yet achieved the British system of keeping a discreet distance from politics. King Juan Carlos was obliged to abdicate in 2014 and King Felipe “has been thrust back into the centre of the Catalan independent crisis by a book which has revealed that he personally chose to address the nation after the region’s illegal referendum on secession.”76) In order to test the waters the electoral system was reversed, and the Municipal elections were held first when it became abundantly clear that there was a major surge towards Republicanism. This was a natural reaction after Alfonso and his military dictator Primo de Rivera. “By Republicanism the man in the street meant the disappearance of feudalism; the disappearance of the hegemony of the Church, the landed proprietors, the Army, the Civil Guard and the Crown.”77 There followed the inevitable riots and attacks upon churches. An extensive number of churches, chapels and monasteries were destroyed. The Spanish Church had become too deeply embroiled in the fabric of feudalism with Right*

It was known as the San Sebastián Pact

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wing attitudes and wide-spread financial involvement. Feudalism was still prevailing but only the crown had disappeared.

Alfonso XIII

Second Spanish Republic “The Proclamation of the Second Republic on 14th April 1931 was greeted with jubilation in the streets and squares of Spain. The new regime ushered in the first genuine democracy of Spain.”78 The Republican democracy evolved through several phases during its short duration. The first phase was a reformist two year period (1931-3), next came a rightest to moderate stage (1934-5) and finally the government of the Popular Front in the first half of 1936. “In essence, over these years, the sociopolitical dynamics were determined by a triangular struggle between mutually exclusive models which reproduced on a small scale the existing Europe-wide struggle; crude competition between democratic reformism, authoritarian reaction and social revolution to take power and reshape society.”79 The problem for Spain was that it had reached a state of deadly stalemate.

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According to Buckley “the men who took control of Spain when King Alfonso XIII left his throne were on the while capable and honest men. They were all, or nearly all, soaked in the Liberal doctrines of the nineteenth century.”80 The Second Republic was declared on the 14th April 1931 and in Spain and elsewhere there was a hope that a new democracy was born and a new age had started. Technically Alfonso XIII left Spain but did not abdicate, probably in the hope he would be asked to return. The task of the Republic was to convert a country still holding to the essentials of a feudal regime, and in a state of political collapse, into a progressive twentieth century nation. On the Left-wing were ranged those who anticipated that the old feudal system would be broken up, and the holds of the elite, the Church and the Army would be destroyed. To complicate matters in Catalonia there was a renewed hope for a regional government. Generally these were vague hopes and desires but no definitive plan could be agreed upon by the various factions. The Provisional Government was entirely dependent on expedient coalitions, mainly Republicans of varying shades to the Left including various brands of Socialists. However, Niceto Alcalá Zamora the Prime Minister and Miguel Maura (Minister for the Interior) were lawyers, Catholic, and conservative and they were not revolutionaries. The election was overwhelmingly in favour for those parties which united under the Republican-Socialist coalition. The hopes for the immediate future appeared somewhat bleak because this return to democracy was hindered by the global economic depression, and the government was also faced by a serious budget deficit from the years of Primo de Rivera. Although the traditional privileged class was in disarray the politicians formulating the future were little better. They had the almost impossible task of steering a course between the huge popular demand for reform and the powers of the feudal elite. A lawyer Don Angel Ossorioy Gallardo was given the task of drawing up a new constitution, but many felt it simply reflected the old Monarchist Constitution of 1876 and that the effort was hardly worthwhile. The Socialists insisted that women should be given the vote, but this was opposed by many Republicans who believed women were by nature reactionary. However a unicameral (one chamber) parliament was established and the government tried to ease some of the many problems plaguing the working-classes. Wages were raised, rents were frozen, and an eight-hour day was implemented. The government also looked to land reform which, among other things looked to the possibility of a fairer redistribution of land; needless to add this sent a serious panic warning amongst the landed elite. It was the possibility of land and agrarian reform which constituted the greatest anxiety amongst the wealthy.

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More disturbances arose among the Right-wing elements when the government took an interest in army reform. Buckley made the wellknown observation that the Spanish army was over-officered, but this surplus was not so much a danger to the Republic as “the character of the officers themselves.”81 The Minister of War Manuel Azaña (according to the journalist Henry Buckley, Azaña reminded him in looks of Mr Pickwick) attempted to modernise the army by streamlining. He attempted this reform by retiring some 8,000 officers on full pay and closing the Military Academy at Zaragoza which was regarded as potentially too reactionary. He rightly abolished the military judicial rights over ordinary citizens, and cleverly ensured the army took an oath of allegiance to the Republic. “These measures made a portion of the military feel belittled and humiliated. The result was, as in the case of the Church, opposition to the Republic.”82

Manuel Azaña

The Spanish Roman Catholic Church had dominated Spain for a long period of time, but had come under prolonged attack from the discontented masses during this period. In May 1931 there were a series of ferocious attacks on churches especially in Madrid. The Jesuits were dissolved but they were not expelled, and cleverly hid their money and possessions into private hands, some international.83 As from December 1932 the government payment to the clergy was stopped. Religious freedom was

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proclaimed, and by the tradition of the Spanish Church this was regarded as a major setback, especially when they were denied access to the classrooms and all crucifixes had to be removed. The Church had been a major holder of interests in shipping companies, railways, and newspapers but they were clever and managed to survive many of the proposed reforms. The anti-clericalism did nothing to heal divisions and alienated some of the more moderates which led to the resignations of Zamora the Prime Minister and Miguel Maura; the new Prime Minister was Azaña. The situation was unstable and the elite of the land and the industrialists now spoke openly of the dangers of communism. The Church from the Papacy down was more sensitive to the dangers of Bolshevism than Fascism. The historian Simon Barton pointed out that the Right-wing thought the “disintegration of the nation was nigh” and indicated that the Right-wing adopted two broad defensive strategies.84 First there were the “accidentalists” of whom the most prominent was José Robles leader of the Popular Action Party. His main belief was that they should use legal means to stop the reforms being passed in the Cortes to protect Spain from self-destruction. Secondly were the “catastrophists” who included monarchists, Carlists and various fascist groups. This second grouping believed that only a violent revolution would resolve the situation. The government was faced by extremes within the Right-wing and some strong Left-wing extremists including Anarchists. In addition to this the continuous demands for regional government in Catalonia and the Basque region were stirring once again.

General Sanjurjo

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There were once again riots, uprisings and more bloodshed. In August 1932 Henry Buckley was woken by gunfire as a General Sanjurjo and the General the Marquess of Cavalcanti tried to stage their own coup d’état. The government quelled this uprising swiftly, but one result was the creation of a force of police named Guardias de Asalto, the Shock Police who were created by the first Republican police chief called Don Angel Galarza. This gave the impression the Republic was taking control, and they continued to push through their land reforms. It appeared they were about to seize huge swathes of land from the elite, an estimated 1,200,000 acres. Some areas were seized by the workers but it all proved to be something of a “flash in the pan.” The government was again rocked when in January 1933 the AnarchoSyndicalist (CNT) provoked an uprising in the little village of Casa Viejas (near Cádiz) where the Civil Guards barracks were surrounded and a guard shot dead, and two were seriously wounded; accounts differ slightly. The anarchists had convinced the villagers they were starting the revolution. The government used too much zeal and sent in the Civil Guard under the command of a Captain Rojas. There followed unnecessary bloodshed and it is generally believed that some twenty-four died, women and children among them, many were executed. The Anarchists used it as an example of the brutal anti-proletarian attitude of the Republic, but it weakened the cause of the revolutionary Left, and no one has yet found viable evidence that the government had given such brutal orders. Some Socialists started to withdraw their support and the next election did not go well. It has been suggested by a few that this was possibly the incident which inspired Franco to turn against the government, but there is no substantive evidence for this view.

1933 Towards Civil War “There was an air of gloom and depression in this sad year of 1933,” and this year and its successor were often called the Black Years because of the consequences.85 It was at this juncture that the Right-wing had formed itself into a consolidated position under the flag of CEDA (The Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rightist Parties-Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas) which was founded by José Robles, mentioned earlier, who was looking for a traditional conservative Catholic Spain. He took some of his inspiration from Mussolini and Hitler which caused those on the Left-wing to fear for the survival of democracy. Spain was once again teetering on the edge of internal conflict and despite reforms the conditions for the working people remained poor.

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Other European nations in Western Europe had their slums and hovels, but the life of the rural Spanish peasant noted by George Orwell almost defied belief. Henry Buckley wrote about the idyllic Spanish village: “but they are not nice places to live in. I am speaking here of the average village perched draughtily and waterless on some hill-top or merging into the rolling uplands of this or that region.”86 He had experienced the cold, the mud floors in the cottage, having to walk for water, and the sanitary conditions made it sound less than medieval; he also added that the Spanish workers had insufficient to eat nor had a level of life for them to be able purchase products from the industrial centres. The Spanish elite were at the opposite end of the wealth-spectrum and this, coupled with unstable government, did not auger well. It was this year of 1933 that crisis points occurred which indicated the fragility of governing Spain. As the election process started in the autumn of 1933 Spain was polarised down the centre and with fragmented parties, and no one party in November was able to gain an overall majority. Women were allowed to vote and the Bishops even allowed Nuns out of their convents for this election, but “in Madrid they [the nuns] were roundly hissed and booed” which demonstrated the strength of anti-Church feeling.87 The main victories were between Lerroux’s Radicals and the Rightwing CEDA. There had been a massive effort to avoid the typical fragmentation of parties and it had worked in favour of those able to form coalitions.88 This meant that the Socialists, although winning a substantial number of votes, won fewer seats because they had tried to go alone. The Centre Right-wing had more shrewdly closed ranks which meant CEDA won 115 seats and the Republican Radicals 104. The fascist elements were becoming more prominent, and Primo de Rivera’s son José Antonio Primo de Rivera had founded the Falange Española which, according to the journalist Buckley, even had hints of anti-clericalism. The Falange were fascist nationalists and at first neither the population nor Franco took them seriously. The Spanish were not especially anti-Semitic, they had no expectations of Spain being seen as a great power, and there was no demobilised army to be wooed as in Germany; in fact the Falangists “in the 1936 election won only 0.7% of the vote.”89 Given these results and knowing the CEDA attitude towards the Republic the President Zamora asked the more central Radicals under Lerroux to form a government. The year 1933 had started badly and this election deepened the political problems. Some of the previous reforms were immediately undone, including the anti-clerical legislation. The recently created Municipal Boundaries were scrapped which gave landowners greater access to cheap labour. There was an immediate

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backlash with an Anarchist uprising at the end of the year in December 1933, and a general strike which was crushed brutally. As the historian Simon Barton pertinently indicated Spain was following much of Europe which was dividing into two distinct groups of the extreme Left and Rightwings. José Robles was forcing the path for CEDA to take a more prominent role in government, and President Zamora relented and CEDA was given three major components in Lerroux’s government. Mainly as a consequence of this another general strike was called in October 1934 in anticipation that it would bring the government down. The response was to call for the support of the army and Catalonia tried yet again for regional government. José Robles was a staunch Right-winger but he believed in a form of democracy and the journalist Henry Buckley heard him announce at a press conference that “there shall be no Dictatorship in Spain! We Clericals will not permit the overthrowing of the Parliamentary regime!”90 There was a serious rebellion in the coal-mining region of Asturias. The miners organised themselves into a Workers’ Alliance and for a time they held their area, and took control of Oviedo with some 90,000 inhabitants. The government response was tough and they sent in hardened troops from Morocco and the Spanish Foreign Legion guided from the War Ministry by a general whose name which would soon dominate Spain, General Franco. Thousands were wounded and an estimated 1,300 were killed; this was a serious confrontation even by Spanish standards. The barbarous activity of the Spanish imported troops “in taking Oviedo gave rise to much scandal afterwards,” and some groups fled to the mountains; it was claimed they would be well-treated if they surrendered which was not true.91 Some regarded this as a desperate attempt to defend the principle of the Republic, those on the Right saw in this action the potential for revolution and the growing pervasive fear of Communism. The government did not end the matter with the final crushing of the Asturias rebellion, but with a gathering momentum arrested thousands of potential dissidents; this included imprisoning many prominent political leaders. Previous reforms at a social level continued to be undone, and the situation for the workingclass started to return to the standards of the feudal system to the benefit of the elite. This sharp government reaction also allowed CEDA to take more of a leading role; in the May of 1935 CEDA held five cabinet portfolios. Robles also made the point of purging the army of any Republican supporters. The key Generals of the Right namely Franco, Fanjul and Goded were given critical posts. Such was his accumulated power it was anticipated by Robles that the President would give him the reins of

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power. However, President Zamora correctly suspected Robles as too antiRepublican so he called new elections. Even at this stage Robles called upon the army for support, but was informed it was not the right time for such action. However the parties on the Left-wing recognised the dangers and started to form the necessary coalitions. As a consequence the Popular Front was formed which was a wide-ranging association of the Republican Left, two major Communist components, and the Socialists, and as a new party they went to the polls in February 1936 with an agenda which focused on the dangers of the Right-wing. The Right-wing, which was financially well supported in their campaign had warned the voters of the dangers of the Bolsheviks and accused the Left-wing of being directed from Moscow. The election was too close and although the Left just succeeded the Right-wing refused to accept the result wanting a state of war, and trying to convince the acting Prime Minister Portela to agree. Since 1934 there had always been a fear of a Right-wing coup d’état but there was no strong middle-class support, and although France and Britain were suspicious of the Republic, they refused to interfere at any level. Buckley suggested that Franco went to Portela stating that he should stay in power but backed by a military coup.92 Portela eventually and courageously refused to overturn the elections and President Zamora offered the post to Anzaña in February 1936. Anzaña did his best to be conciliatory by attempts at unifying and even looked back to some reforms from earlier, and released some political prisoners. His efforts caused problems with both extremes and he had to form a government made up from the middle-class Republican Left. Once again the occurrence of strikes and protests swiftly followed both in the urban and country areas. The delicacy of the political situation shuddered more when Zamora was obliged to step down from the Presidency and Azaña took his place, and Casares Quiroga became Prime Minister. It was a dangerous period because fascist youths clashed with their opposite Socialist numbers which result in mayhem with murders and shootings on the public streets. The journalist Buckley described having to duck and weave his way down the various streets avoiding bullets during this fraught period. A major uprising was always in the air, and the extreme Right-wing having failed to reverse the election results now started to look at crushing the Republic with military arms. When the “new centre-left government committed to change was elected under the banner of the Popular Front alliance in February 1936, disaffected army leaders began to plan in earnest.”93 The Republican government was well aware of the situation by ordering the well-known Right-wing generals to distant parts;

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Franco was sent to the Canary Islands, Mola was transferred to distant Navarre and Goded to the Balearics. The Right-wing elements in the army had always been strong and the election results hardened the army attitude. Robles, with his CEDA party, who had wanted to make the changes through legal means faded into the background with the emergence of José Calvo Sotelo of the catastrophic element mentioned earlier.* He formed a reactionary monarchist type group called Renovación Española (Spanish Renewal) and chatter about bringing down the Republic was widely heard, but when Sotelo was killed by a Republican policeman this gave the rebels the impetus to strike against a ruminating and bewildered government. There was riot and rebellion in some areas and general unrest; the fascists had received little support but were proactive in the violence. The Government reacted and arrested Primo de Rivera’s son and suspended the fascist party. The situation was made more sensitive by the Communists becoming more proactive, and it was not helped in Málaga when an Anarchist shot a Communist. The situation was unstable. Five days after Sotelo’s death General Franco raised his flag of rebellion in Morocco on the 17th July 1936. “The Civil War was the most destructive experience in modern Spanish history, rivalled only by the Napoleonic invasion of 1808.”94

*

Robles made “a formal statement committing the Clerical Party to ‘submit to the verdict of the country.’” Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.196

CHAPTER THREE CIVIL STRIFE

The Civil War As can been seen from the previous chapters “civil strife had been festering in Spain for at least twenty years. The Spaniards met added misfortune by unleashing a civil war at a juncture when communist-fascist rivalry was moving to its peak throughout Europe…the roots of the conflict lay deep in Spain’s unstable history, in a polarized society and in an intractable land problem.”95 This “pent-up conflict over economic affairs finally came to a head during the Republic, and formed a significant factor in the outbreak of the Civil War.”96 The country was poor with barely one per cent of the population owning half the land, and “the five years of constitutional government from 1931 to 1936 brought mayhem out of chaos,” and for Spain “the Civil War was a tragic lesson in the fruits of fratricidal hatred.”97 In many ways the Spanish Civil War revealed telling insights into the political situation in Europe. Dictatorships were the “dynamos of change” and even Franco’s hated Stalin was a dictator rather than a genuine Communist.98 Orwell wrote that “it would be quite impossible to write about the Spanish war from a purely military angle. It was above all things a political war.”99 The Spanish Civil War (naturally known in Spain simply as the Civil War) must be understood from the background history which had led to its outbreak as a military clash between the democratic Republican Left, who formed alliances with Communists and Anarchists, against the more conservative Right-wing traditionalists. The insurgents, or Nationalists as they called themselves, were made up of the old feudal grandees, the main bulk of the army (but not the air force or navy), the Church and all the traditional aristocratic elements. They had in addition to their number the support of the Fascists and the Carlists, (who as noted were a party continually in support of the Bourbon monarchy and re-emerged in the 1930s and Civil War period). Because of the developing European conflict the Civil War has sometimes been viewed as a conflict between fascism and democracy, but as the previous chapters indicate it was a more clash

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between a Left-wing revolution and a Right-wing counter-revolution. Too often the war is depicted as a clash between Fascism and Communism; as in all historical matters it is rarely black and white. Henry Buckley wrote: “In my opinion it was not correct to describe Franco Spain as ‘Fascist’ or Republican Spain as ‘Communist,’ even though one had a huge party with a totalitarian programme and saluted with the outstretched arm and the other had most of its factories, and even whole branches of industry, controlled by workers’ committees. The revolt of 1936 was not a Fascist revolt. Falange was a very small party prior to July 1936.”100 Buckley was in Spain before and for the duration of the war and even he found it difficult at times to delineate definitive interests. Even so it was clear that Spain’s various factions “in common with much of Europe at this time, was steadily polarizing into two hostile camps.”101 In Spain it was easy to gain the impression there were two Spains, the one of tradition and order, the other of progress and change. However, it was more complex because both sides of the warring elements had their own complexities. On the Left-wing the Anarchists were proclaiming a social revolution and the Communists a war against Fascism. In his book based on his experiences George Orwell spent a considerable time relating that when on a rest-time in Barcelona he was caught up in a fight for several days around the telephone exchange, and nobody was certain what it was all about or who was involved. He wrote in an appendix “it is a horrible thing to have to enter into the details of inter-party polemics; it is like diving into a cesspool.”102 The Church, as noted, was a constituent part of the Rightwing traditional side and consequently bore the brunt of considerable violence both in property and life. Later in 1937 the Archbishop of Toledo Cardinal Gomá secured the backing of the Vatican which in turn tended to echo its support around the international Catholic world. The Church and the army were to be Franco’s main stays of support. The ChurchNationalist discourse during and after the Civil war appeared to be profoundly reactionary, and “this was due, first and foremost, to the allpervasive influence of the Catholic Church, which provided the most important component of Francoist social thought.”103 For many, especially Franco, there was a belief in the re-Christianisation of Spain and the word “crusade” became part of Franco’s regular vocabulary. It was part of Franco’s supportive machinery, but not all his supporters were necessarily adherents of the Church, and there was the well-known saying that “every Spaniard follows the Church with either a candle or a club.” The outbreak of hostilities started with a prounciamiento which was a form of coup d’état in so far that the military formally declared their opposition to a Republican Government. It was General José Sanjurjo who

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had been exiled in Portugal who made the declaration, but he was killed in a plane accident returning to Spain, and eventually General Franco emerged as the leader. The best way to understand the unfolding of the events is to take the picture year by year.

Year by Year Survey 1936 The command of the Insurgents fell between Mola in the north and Franco in the south, but as noted Franco eventually emerged as the primeleader. From the very beginning of the conflict there was bloodshed and brutality by both sides. Franco had flown from his exile in the Canary Islands to Spanish Morocco where he was blocked from mainland Spain by the navy, but organised an air lift for his experienced troops to Seville in South-West Spain. As early as July 21st the Insurgents, from now referred to as the Nationalists, captured the important Spanish naval base in Ferrol, Galicia. In the north General Mola’s forces captured Gipuzkoa which completely isolated the Republican provinces in the north, and then after a battle at Irún effectively closed the French border to the Republicans. San Sebastian in the north and close by the French border had been occupied by anarchists and Basque nationalists, and was soon completely overrun by the Nationalists. It was immediately clear that the Republic appeared on the back-foot and too reliant on untrained and inexperienced militia. In July 1936 a National Defence Committee was set up in Burgos and Franco soon emerged as the leader.* The government was in confusion and in the same month (July) three different cabinets were formed in one day. Many ordinary people were infuriated with the rebellion and demanded arms to fight the insurgents, but the Madrid government was without focus, and Catalonia yet again looked to self-government. As Orwell pointed out in his book and Buckley in his journals many of these ordinary civilians were willing enough, but had never had weapontraining or any military experience.104 The Republican government was itself seriously shaken and Prime Minister Giral resigned in September and was replaced by Francisco Largo Caballero who made a determined effort *

As noted General Sanjurjo died in a plane accident, (as did Mola later); Goded and Fanjul were executed by the Republicans, and José Primo de Rivera followed the same way after a spell in prison.

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to unify the central command.* It was the same month that Franco was selected and became known as the Generalísimo. Franco had confirmed his leadership by winning a victory at the siege of the Alcázar in Toldeo where thousands of Republicans had surrounded a Nationalist stronghold. It was here Franco declared himself as Caudillo, Chieftain, which was a Spanish equivalent of the German Führer and the Italian Duce. Apart from self-prominence it helped him bring together the various elements in his command such as the fascists, royalists and many other parties to his side of the fray. Naturally the Toledo victory was promulgated, but it was a diversion which many claimed gave Madrid time to prepare its defences, although Buckley, who was there, did not think this to be the case because Franco had too few men.105 Franco was declared Head of State and the following month in October his besieged troops in Oviedo (northern Spain) were relieved. During the same month Nationalist troops started moving towards Madrid forcing the government to move to Valencia. Franco had Italian tanks and German aircraft at his disposal. The Italians provided much but it is often claimed that “without Germany’s massive intervention in the Civil War, the coup would have likely been put down in short order.”106 On the other hand the Republican government had failed to build defences in case it “would upset the people and have a defeatist effect.”107 Much of the international press assumed that Madrid would fall, but Buckley watched long files of civilians: “They had no uniforms. Just ordinary suits and a rifle slung over the shoulder…they were men called up by the trade unions…many of them did not know how to handle a rifle…believe me, these were the men who saved Madrid.”108 The attack eventually failed because of some bitter fighting and also the growing number of foreign volunteers, the International Brigades. It is estimated that some 3,000 foreigners fought in this battle. Franco finding his forces thwarted bombed Madrid from the air and over the next two years there were several serious aerial offences; it was to be a three-year siege.

1937 Italian troops had now joined Franco and with his experienced troops from Morocco Franco made another attempt to take Madrid but failed. On *

Earlier Caballero had been imprisoned for his political views. He had been visited by Buckley who found it obnoxious that politicians should be in prison with murderers because of their views. See Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.179

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the other hand the Battle for Málaga in the south-east which started in mid-January was a disaster for the Republicans. The attempt to cross the River Jarama to cut a supply route to Madrid led to heavy casualties for both sides. The Nationalists gained some territory but no victory, and lost at the well-known Battle of Guadalajara which was the only major and widely publicised Republican victory. Some have blamed Franco, a few the Italian contributions, and a few accept the Republicans were stronger at this stage. The German observers rightly pointed out the necessity to attack vulnerable areas first. The failure at Guadalajara has been a note of historical interest ever since. As the Italian military historian Battistelli wrote “the notorious failure at Guadalajara, the first Italian defeat which soon created an international echo casting doubts on the Italian fighting skills after years” of rule by Mussolini.109 Buckley quite rightly pointed out that it was in his opinion mainly based on a “complete misunderstanding of the state of affairs by the Italian officers in command of the expeditionary force.”110 It was hailed as the first victory against Fascism and one of the often neglected reasons for the failure was the complete lack of co-ordination between Italian and Spanish officers. From March onwards the Basques suffered from air attacks, and in April the German Condor Legion bombed Guernica; this caused a significant impact on world opinion, but the Basques had little opportunity except to retreat.* There was disarray among the Republicans in Catalonia during May, which naturally pleased the Nationalists but they did little to take advantage of this scenario. However, the Republicans started a great effort to fight back and in July made an intensive effort to recapture Segovia which obliged Franco to delay an advance on the Bilbao front. It failed eventually as did a similar Republican attack known as the Huesca Offensive. In June, as happened to General Sanjurjo, General Juro was also killed in a plane accident on the 3rd June.† In July the Republicans launched a counter-offensive to the west of Madrid known as the Battle of Brunete which transpired to be a significant defeat for the government who lost a large number of their better troops. It was clear that the Republican government was lacking military success especially when their offensive against Zaragoza failed despite having the advantage on the land and in the air. In August Franco successfully invaded Aragón and captured Santander in Cantabria. Near the end of the year the Republican army in the Basque *

It was a routine operation using twenty-two German and three Italian bombers with fifteen fighter planes. † It has never been verified as to why or how this accident happened; rumours abounded.

Spain in midd-1938: Republlican (blue) and d Nationalist (piink) areas of occcupation

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region surrendered and also Gijón in the Asturias Offensive. Franco virtually controlled the north of Spain and moved towards Valencia which meant the government had to move again, this time to Barcelona.

1938 In the January of this year there was a significant battle at Teruel a city which had been in Nationalist hands but fell to the Republicans. Franco retrieved the loss but was mainly dependent on German and Italian air support. In March the Nationalists launched the Aragon Offensive and by April had cut the Republican area of Spain into two distinctive portions, (See Map insert). The smaller portion in the north-west of Spain was an area encompassing Catalonia including Barcelona and Tarragona. The larger area was in the south-west of Spain, a circle stretching from the coast (from Almeria to Valencia) with Madrid desperately surviving. The situation was so irredeemable the Republican government sought peace terms, but Franco demanded unconditional surrender. In July the Nationalists pressed south from Teruel towards Valencia but were halted by prepared lines of defences. In a desperate attempt the Republicans launched an all-out campaign to reconnect their territory in a battle of the Ebro which lasted from late July until the end of November, but they were unsuccessful. There was also a high degree of nervous anxiety amongst the Republicans as news came through of the Munich Agreement; an anti-fascist union in Europe looked unlikely. As the year drew to a close Franco started a massive attack upon Catalonia.

1939 During the first two months of 1939 Franco’s troops overwhelmed Catalonia, Tarragona fell in mid-January then Barcelona on January 26th, and a month later on the 27th February Britain and France recognised the Franco regime. Franco declared that the war was finished but there were still remnants of Republican resistance. Among the few Republican areas stood Madrid where the Prime Minister Juan Negrín found himself opposed by a Republican Colonel Segismundo Casado who then formed the National Defence Council to negotiate peace, but Franco would only accept the policy of total surrender. Juan Negrín fled, and the communists rose against the junta but were defeated by Colonel Segismundo Casado; it was civil war within a civil war. It was not until March 26th that the Nationalists took Madrid and Franco declared final victory.

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Overview Most of the war’s barbarity had taken place amongst civilians and soldiers but also from planes bombing military and civilian targets. At sea the problem was complex with the question of the non-intervention policy of other countries with their maritime enforcement. The German battleship Deutschland had been lying in the Ibiza waters not far from the quay when it was attacked by Republican bombers, quite understandably according to Buckley.111 As an act of retaliation the Admiral Scheer shelled Almeria. The French were supposed to have patrolled the Ibiza area under their nonintervention agreement, but it would have been a major international incident to tackle a major German battleship. At times it was a cautious game of chess, but there were many ships sunk with a considerable loss of life. The dead from the Deutschland were buried at Gibraltar in the presence of the Governor, General Sir Charles Harington. When the war was over there followed some harsh reprisals, thousands were executed, thousands imprisoned and forced labour was enforced. Many fled to France but were interned in camps which in turn became infamous. When Pétain became the leader of Vichy France refugee Republicans became political prisoners, and many were sent to the Drancy camp to be shipped east to Nazi concentration camps. It has been estimated that in the French concentration camps “some 4,700 are supposed to have died.”112 Time and time again the journalist Henry Buckley castigated the neutrality of the neighbouring democracies. He had noted that the embassies shut their doors against refugees stating that “the British Government was rigid in the extreme on this point.”113 Buckley was convinced that it was the non-interventionist policy which brought disaster to the Republican cause, and endangered the British Empire sea-routes thereby; not least the whole of Spain was virtually at starvation point. In Spain a few fought on in a form of guerrilla war, and even though this persisted into the 1950s there was no hope of success. In terms of the numbers killed there is no certainty and figures range from a quarter of million to well over a million. The historian Hugh Thomas estimated that it “may be supposed to have lost nearly 800,000 in the Civil War, including the flower of the new generation.”114 It is a controversial issue and there is reluctance in Spain to investigate, and even their best scholars tend to refrain from precise details. Figures are often offered then changed and the problem of categorisation and methodology confuse the issue further. What can be stated with some surety is that it was a brutal and bitter conflict as is too often the nature of a civil war.

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There were appalling massacres by both sides though most historians have agreed the Nationalists were probably the most brutal. In terms of foreign involvement the so-called International Brigades came to the support of the Republic, volunteers from across the world and also many to support Franco’s Nationalists. “Over two thousand volunteers from other nations joined the Nationalist insurgents, few knowing or caring much about Spain. Peter Kemp, Oxford graduate and Law student, believed ‘that Christian values, law and order…would be threatened by a Republican victory.’”115 Spain had become a cauldron of conflicting principles and sucked in young idealistic men for a variety of reasons, including “Right-wingers from across Europe and beyond, and gave them a chance to fight their battles on someone else’s soil.”116 Many more came to fight for the Republicans including George Orwell mentioned earlier. Once again precise figures are unavailable, but at a conservative estimate there were probably in the region of some 45,000 to 50,000 volunteers though not all were involved at the same time. Many of them were of the Left-wing inclination seeing it as a war against fascism. The Third French Republic provided the majority with somewhere in the region of 10,000; they also came from Nazi Germany, Austria, Britain and Russia. Others percolated into the conflict from Eastern Europe, Canada and America. Despite or because of Mussolini many Italians volunteered to fight as Republicans. The Civil War caught the interest of other nations not least because of the political divides across Europe. The Right-wing nations and to a certain extent the Catholic Church saw it as a necessary moment because the spread of Bolshevism had to be halted, whereas others saw democracy in danger and the rise of fascism. There were those who worried that the war could escalate into a Second World War, and there are some who maintain the point of view that Spain was a contributory factor when this war started in 1939. Britain and France led an alliance of some twenty-seven nations in a policy of non-intervention, and an embargo on all arms being supplied to Spain. America did not join this pact but unofficially followed the same line. How far the embargo worked is open to question, and evidence tends to indicate that many nations turned a political or capitalistic blind eye. The League of Nations was also influenced by the fear of Communism and formed a Non-Intervention Committee but it was ineffective. Germany now under Hitler’s control became involved with the Nationalists as early as July 1936. Hitler’s motives for many were selfevident. He wanted a fascist neighbour, and if France were surrounded by fascist Germany, Mussolini’s Italy as well as Spain it augured well for his

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long-term policy of domination, not least because Spain stood at the gateway of the Mediterranean, and could help block Britain’s way to her empire. In the 1930s Henry Buckley made this observation and noted that the Germans were already infiltrating Spanish life with new airline routes and tourist information.117 It was too soon for Hitler to follow his expansionist plans, and he limited the German contribution, but also influenced Mussolini. Hitler sent in a Luftwaffe component the notorious Condor Legion and some army units.* The Condor Legion apart from gaining valuable battle experience also proved effective for the Nationalists. It also gave Hitler the opportunity to test new weapons such as the Stuka and Ju-52 transport planes. The Germans provided tanks, and as with their air power developed new tactics and training.† The Germans also trained many of the Nationalists. It has been estimated that perhaps as many as 15,000-16,000 Germans served in Spain at various times. The valuable contribution of some six-hundred aircraft and two-hundred tanks bolstered the Nationalist cause considerably. As mentioned Hitler had persuaded Mussolini to assist Franco who was feeling confident after his incursion into Ethiopia, and who was also hopeful to control the Mediterranean. The Italian Navy, the Regia Marina was able with some ease to supply Spain with a variety of weapons, aircraft and a Corp Truppe Volontarie (CTV) with an estimated 50,000 men. The Italian navy was also able to break the Republican Navy’s blockade against the Nationalists, and they were even able to shell Republican areas such as Málaga, Valencia and Barcelona. The Italians gave Franco considerable military support at considerable expense. The Italian historian Pier-Paolo Battistelli noting in a book on the financial expense to Italy that “there are other costs which have to be taken into account, especially those of the Italian involvement in the Spanish Civil War. In this case the figures are noticeably incomplete; an estimate of overall expenses claimed account for a total expenditure of some 8 billion Lire between 1936 and 1939, which is about 9.4% of the Italian military expenditure during this period.”118 There is no question that in his support for Franco, Mussolini dug too deeply into the limited resources of the Italian budget.

*

Franco’s intelligence branch even tried to secure enigma machines from the Germans. † The military supplies to Franco were given on credit and the Italians supplied loans. This was to create considerable tension and bad-will later when it came to “pay-back time.” Stalin’s offerings to the Republicans were also financially demanding.

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Spain’s Iberian neighbour Portugal under their Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar offered discreet help to Franco in terms of small arms, some logistical help, and a small volunteer force of an estimated 15,00020,000 men. Perhaps the most important element for Franco was the knowledge that his closest neighbour was in support of the Nationalists. Stalin as the General Secretary had signed the Non-Intervention Agreement and contravened it almost immediately in support of the Republicans. Soviet Russia was the major resource for military supplies to the Republican government, and Stalin tried to do this in a clandestine fashion. They supplied huge amounts of material over which different estimates vary. Stalin even created a special “Section X” to deal with the logistics of supply. Compared to the German contribution many of the Russian supplies were not so modern. The Russian ships were disguised and carried a variety of flags to fool any observers. The Russians demanded and received Spanish government gold resources, but also sent military advisers. The USSR also encouraged communist volunteers to join the International Brigades on a world-wide basis. The NKVD (later KGB) also became involved in the intrigues and machinations on the Iberian Peninsula. As the 1930s drew to a close Stalin was watching the German threat with care, and started withdrawing support from the Republicans as he believed it necessary to keep Hitler onside. Unlike many nations Mexico gave unswerving supporting to the Republican cause refusing to sign the Anglo-French non-intervention proposal. They sent not only money but rifles and ammunition, offered diplomatic help and sanctuary for Republican refugees. It has been estimated that there were soon 50,000 refugees in Mexico. Apart from Portugal Spain’s next major border was with France. The French Prime Minister was Léon Blum who headed the Left-wing Popular Front. He was one of the more principled politicians, and although sympathetic to the Spanish Republican cause he was also nervous about sparking a war in his own country, which was also in the midst of political unease with governments coming and going all too rapidly. Blum was equally concerned with the growth of fascism in Germany and Italy, and concerned about France becoming enveloped by hostile neighbours. The powerful Right-wing elements in France argued against any support as did the British, and although Blum was virtually obliged to agree he still made the point that he reserved the right to help, but would desist in order to discourage arms being sent to Franco. Blum found himself under attack from his own Left-wing for not supporting the Republican cause. Behind all this was a sinister threat issued by German diplomats that Germany would be unhappy if Blum supported the Russian communists in Spain.

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This did not stop France secretly supplying some aircraft and even some pilots. During the international bluster Franco was constantly warned by the Germans about a possible intervention by the French military even as late as 1938. Although some 4,000 British volunteers appeared mainly in support of the Republicans they were technically breaking British law because the government had reached the decision of total neutrality.* Volunteers came from a wide variety of countries not all in support of the Republicans. From Romania a group of the Iron Guard led by Ion MoĠa aligned themselves with the Nationalists as did the Irish Brigade under Eoin O’Duffy.† On the other hand many Irishmen fought for the Republicans and some five-hundred Romanians fought against Franco. The British reaction was mixed at the highest levels; there was a seeming support for the Nationalists probably induced by an inordinate fear of Communists, Anarchists and the extreme left. Earlier the journalist Buckley noted that when he had spoken to members of the British Embassy before the war had broken out “I found them very complaisantly disposed towards the Spanish Right. They looked upon them as a guarantee against Bolshevism, much preferable to have them in power then either Socialists or Republicans for this reason, and they would gently pooh-pooh any suggestion that the Spanish Right might one day side with Germany and Italy and we might find out Empire routes in danger.”119 Given the time Buckley wrote this it indicated a percipient view for a journalist writing at the time. As the Civil War had broken out Buckley again talked to British officials and discovered to his horror that “British officialdom was recognising the Insurgents on an equal level with the Republicans.”120 For many overseas they perceived it as a war of principle. For some it was an attack on Bolshevism, or support of the Church, and others it was a fight against fascism on behalf of democracy. Many paid with their lives. As for Franco in his first years of his rule “he acted more violently, autocratically, and repressively than Mussolini did in his early years. After the beginning of the Civil War he used the language of ‘totalitarianism’ and took over the role of the charismatic leader, in order to develop his new authoritarian system with his own partido único.”121 Franco decided *

Britain, France and the USA stuck rigidly to neutrality though Blum in France wanted to assist but “the USA and financial circles in other western states indirectly supported France.” See Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.187 † Eoin O’Duffy was fanatically anti-communist.

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to abandon all modern political ideas, beliefs in democracy, and secularization because he considered this alien to a traditional Spain. He demanded old Spanish values which meant conservative-Catholic and military tradition. He wanted a paternalistic state with himself instead of a monarch.

The Barbarity of the Civil War It was a time in history that Spain would rather forget, a past when Spaniard killed Spaniard without justice or mercy. The French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian civil war of 1917 all indicated that such wars are marked by venomous cruelty. Various arguments have been presented to indicate that one side or another was the most brutal. Generally speaking there is a distinct possibility that the final victors were the more brutal because of their puritanical political zeal to rid Spain of Leftists. It was sometimes referred to as limpieza, a cleansing which too often happened once an area had been occupied. These killings were often carried out by the military, the paramilitary Civil Guard, and the Falange all in the name of the regime, and “almost all of the continuing extra-judicial killings went unrecorded, and in any case the regime did not seek to advertise the scale of its activities.”122 Sometimes schoolteachers were selected because they were seen by the Right-wingers as supporters of the Republic, because they had usurped the clergy from their rightful place in the classroom. The Nationalists were in total favour of the Catholic Church and its restoration in Spain. By the same policy they also executed anyone with the slightest relationship with the government or the Republican cause. There were many downright massacres, some well-known and many forgotten. In Seville some 8,000 people were killed, and similar events took place in Cordoba, Granada and Málaga. The journalist and writer Koestler stayed in Málaga with an elderly British resident in the hope that “two neutral observers would have a restraining influence on the behaviour of the insurgents” but there was no hope.123 Koestler was imprisoned and later released in a prisoner exchange, and the British resident was rescued by the captain of a passing British destroyer. The numbers who were killed in direct massacres, bombing, or on the field of combat will probably never be known. In Bilbao hundreds of people were killed amongst their number were many priests because they had allegedly acted as chaplains to the Republican forces. There were few Protestants in Spain but those who were discovered were captured and often killed because Franco regarded them as a heresy. According to Basque tradition

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their inhabitants were murdered in great numbers even after the Civil War to eradicate the problem of the Basque desire for independence. The Nationalists with the assistance of the German and Italian air forces bombed many towns, the most notorious or widely publicised was Guernica, though in their recent study Payne and Palacios claim there were few “terror raids.”124 On the other hand the Nationalists claimed that over 50,000 of their people had been killed in Republican territories. These figures cannot be trusted any more than others which have been projected from time to time. It would be an almost impossible task even for an objective forensic team with access to all archives to arrive at a concrete non-controversial figure. The Republicans were anticlerical, and not only were religious buildings, statues and sites desecrated, but hundreds of priests, religious order members and Bishops were killed. Various authorities in the Church have tried to come up with figures, and a Spanish Archbishop Antonio Montero Moreno arrived at a figure of 6,832 in 1961.* Perhaps one of the more reliable insights into figures is given by a modern Spanish historian in which he noted: “the immediate legacy would also have a lasting impact: a suffering population with at least 300,000 killed in military combat, another 200,000 dead in repressive activities, around 300,000 permanent exiles, more than 270,000 political prisoners (officially counted in 1940) and a death toll from disease or starvation that would add more than 330,000 during the war and subsequent years.”125 As the Nationalists killed suspected Republicans, so the Republicans killed suspected Falangists, and when news of massacres came through there were retaliatory massacres in revenge. The barbarity increased as the Nationalist cause looked to be gaining ground. Sometimes Communist and sometimes Anarchists established councils or tribunals to kill suspected enemies. George Orwell described a purge in Barcelona in 1937. Henry Buckley in Madrid wrote that “I can see that the fact that sometimes several hundred people were being shot in one week in Madrid alone without having had a proper trial, prejudiced people abroad. People were being arrested by Socialist, Communist or Anarchist groups of selfconstituted police and being tried summarily in secret tribunals.”126 In Ronda Andalusia some five-hundred Nationalists were executed, and although men like Azaña tried to intervene the dogs of war had been unleashed; all wars at the frontline can be brutal and reach the lowest levels of conduct, but time and time again Civil Wars often provide the *

This rare book was republished: Moreno Antonio Montero, Historia de la persecucíon religiosa en España, 1936-39 (Spain: Biblioteca De Autores Cristianos, 2004)

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most appalling examples. In Spain there had been indicators of the depth of feeling as even before the war during the elections there were some twenty-five hundred deaths.127 To this day figures are challenged much depending on the political stance of the commentator, and the truth as noted remains elusive. It is generally agreed that while the government “authorities tried to prevent attacks in Republican regions, repression became increasingly institutionalised in the Nationalist zone.”128 There is little doubt that the policies of execution, long imprisonment and labour-battalions were used as a means of instilling fear into one another’s enemies. Queipo de Llano the Nationalist General fighting in the south frequently gave broadcasts trying to terrify the Republicans into submission by warning them of the dire consequences, and Franco often did the same.* Into this cauldron of hatred were the hundreds who were killed by mistake, by personal denunciation or vendetta, and both sides later tried to conceal the vast extent of the killing. The Church reaction was mixed but generally it was horrified by the extent of the deaths. Cardinal Gomá had protested to Franco about the killing of some Basque priests. Franco ordered this to stop in his desire to keep the Church on side, but it cannot go unobserved that Gomá appeared more concerned about his priests than thousands of others suffering from this fate. Even the Italians who watched such events were horrified (in Italy during the rise of Mussolini there had been no major civil war and nothing like the barbarity in Spain), and at times the Italians had been reluctant to hand their prisoners over to the Nationalists. In February 1939 the Law of Political Responsibilities was issued which was retroactive and defined various political and military activities which would be prosecuted; it was couched in such a way as to allow a high degree of interpretation; even those in masonic orders were in danger. By the official end of the war in the March of 1939 when Madrid fell to the Nationalists, Spain was exhausted emotionally and economically. It had left Spain weakened and it would take years for any recovery, not just economically, but also for the need to forget. In six months the rest of Europe was to erupt into a major conflict which would evolve into a global conflict, and leave Spain wondering how to react to these dangerous external events. The end-result came as a shock to many that an established Republican Government, unstable and based on years of instability, should fall to a group of Right-wing insurgents led by one military General. Franco was *

Many of the military leaders were independent in their zones and ran their own zones and Queipo de Llano was a typical example.

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noted to have changed as “a result of a systematic policy of adulation and exaltation, the Caudillo’s character had become markedly colder, imperturbable, calculating and reserved” and he was now the dictator of all of Spain.129

PART TWO: FRANCO

CHAPTER ONE HIS EARLY LIFE

Franco

Franco appears as a somewhat enigmatic character in European history and only a few biographers have been able to come close to the man’s true nature objectively. To use a recent modern simile he was like the “marmite man” loved or hated. Salvador Dalí claimed he was a saint, Franco liked to compare himself to El Cid, but there were many others who thought him intellectually pedestrian if not dull, and many more would have preferred him as a corpse. Nevertheless, the fact remains he rose rapidly through the ranks to claim victory in the Civil War and remained relatively successful and the only European dictator to survive to 1975. In this brief synopsis of

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his life intricate details of the Civil War sketched out in Part One are only touched upon when it throws light on the nature of his character and his political ascendancy.

His Family and Youth Franco was born on the 4th December 1892 in the small naval port of El Ferrol in north-west Galicia. Both his grandfather and father had been in the Navy Administration in a Spanish version of the Pays Corps. “Both sides of the family were members of Spain’s large hidalgo, or the petty aristocrats’ stratum, and his mother’s side had a connection to the titled Galician aristocracy.”130 His full baptism name was Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo, the first three names arising from family members and the last from a saint’s festival. His father was Nicolás Franco SalgadoAraujo and his mother a younger Mariá del Pilar Bahamonde y Pardo de Andrade. In many Spanish texts he is known as Francisco Franco Bahamonde, the tradition being that Franco represented his paternal lineage and Bahamonde the maternal side. This exploration will stay with the common usage of Franco. There have been claims that Franco had a Jewish background, but a genetic study of Spanish people recently indicated twenty per cent carry Jewish genes, and this may well be true in many other European countries and it is totally insignificant both historically and morally. It had proved an unhappy marriage since the father enjoyed the “good life” while the mother was deeply religious and pious. Franco was one of five children; he had an older brother called Nicolás, then Franco who was followed by Paz, Pilar and Ramón. Franco grew up under “the influence of his conservative and pious mother and distanced from a freethinking and womanising father.”131 It has been suggested that of all their children Franco was the least regarded by his father, and as he grew the feeling remained mutual and lasted until his father’s death. Franco was the one child of the family who did not stay in touch with his father. He was a small child and often known as Paco or Paquito. Because of the family background it was anticipated by all including Franco, that he would enter the Navy, and both his primary schools trained their pupils for this destination. His older brother was successful but financial cuts in the navy caused by the Cuban War, and perhaps Franco’s own limitations prevented him entering the navy, and the army would eventually be his destination. Franco found there was no pleasing his father who was soon noted for his long absences and who was turning his back on his wife in re-living his wayward youth. The biographer Preston suggested that it was

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probably at this stage that Franco seemed to turn in on himself and become something of a lonely child.132 His brothers Nicolás and Ramón were extroverted characters whereas Franco was almost introverted. Franco’s two brothers both appeared to follow their father in terms of lifestyle, and Franco was closer to his mother and always attended her religious observances. Franco identified with his mother more than her other children; she was deeply religious and to all apparent knowledge was a good wife despite her husband’s deviant behaviour, and always tried to adhere to her beliefs. His father eventually turned his back on his family to live a new live in Madrid, and his mother suffered quietly and with dignity which Franco undoubtedly noticed and valued. His mother’s influence in terms of her quiet conduct and religious obedience must have had a lasting impression on Franco who always looked to the Catholic Church, and later he was to have his own chaplain for many decades; though this may have been political expediency. Her quiet acceptance of a miscreant husband may also have influenced Franco because he often appeared to suppress his own emotions. The father had another effect on Franco in so far that he avoided gambling wine women and song probably as a reaction to a father he distrusted. He somehow never managed to please his father who was more interested in his other sons, and when he eventually died in 1942 Franco ensured he had a ceremonial funeral and re-invented the character of his father for his own purpose. As a youngster he would have been aware of the 1898 Cuban failure and the disasters happening in Morocco, and when he later entered the army these national failures were very much a point of depression and discussion. These colonial affairs also intensified the distrust of politicians who were blamed for these disasters by an army who wished to wipe away the ignominy of defeat. There can be little doubt that Franco’s distrust of democratic politicians had its roots even in his early youth. As a youngster he was small and this was noted by his school friends, but he always careful in the way he dressed, and he could be obstinate and astute; these were all traits of the man to be. “Photos of his childhood and adolescence reveal a small, slight child (leading classmates to occasionally call him cerillita (little matchstick), timid and uncertain in appearance, with unusually prominent ears.”133 Even as young man he was on the short-side at five feet four inches and almost too thin. When the Navy refused him entry he was sent to the Academia Militar de Infantería in Toledo in 1907, the very year his father eventually left home for good; his last fatherly gesture was taking him to the college. Franco never forgave his father unlike his siblings who would continue to stay in touch with him.134 In his army training he quickly acclimatised himself to the new demands to

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which he gave all his energy. It was during his training that he gave himself, body and soul to the military, always described himself as a soldier, and took on the military code and applied it to every walk of life as if it were the standard by which to live; to him it was a religious observance. It was probably at this stage the roots of nationalism and later political Right-Wing ideology found their growth. As at school he was noted for his short size and given a similar nickname of Franquito or Little Franco. He was always trim, but years later as he climbed the ranks of promotion he took on a typical middle-aged tummy expansion. The Army School took youngsters early in their youth, and they were not necessarily trained up to good educational or even military standards. Because of his size he was somewhat bullied by his contemporaries which it is claimed coloured his views of army training when he would one day take charge.135 In his training too much emphasis was placed on military history or rather military victories, discipline, honour and loyalty. Franco would have been given to understand that the army was not so much the servant of the State, but the guardian, which implied that if the politicians failed then the army had a duty to stand in. This was to be significant. When he was training Franco would have been aware of the sense of instability in Spain. The Tragic Week in Barcelona mentioned above would have drawn his interest as much as the failures in Morocco, the latter mainly due to the appalling training given to Spanish soldiers in matters of basic field-craft. It is easy to understand the way a basically Right-wing officer corps influenced men in training to be highly suspicious of those of the Left-wing. It was during his training years that a widening divide developed again between the civil-side of life and the army. He finished at the Military School in June 1910 passing out as 251 of the 312 surviving cadets as a Second Lieutenant. Like many others he desperately wanted to be posted to Morocco where promotion could be rapid, but Second Lieutenants who had passed out nearer the bottom than the top were not acceptable. Instead he was posted back to his home town of El Ferrol which was humdrum existence of straightforward duties.* At least he was near his mother and frequently attended her at mass and the many religious festivals.† He was still desperate to serve in Morocco and was very aware of the popular demand by the Left-wing to stop this colonial war. He remained in El Ferrol from August 1910 unto February *

He was posted to the Regimiento de Zamora no 8. During this period he confirmed his religious convictions by joining the Adoración Nocturna, which was a Catholic lay society for nightly devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary. †

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1912, when he and two others were eventually posted to Morocco and arrived there in mid-February 1912 at a time when Spain was experiencing yet more military disasters. Here he had to learn field-craft very quickly, and to fight a guerrilla war which had not been touched upon in his Spanish training; a war backed by non-existent tactics, little strategy, and poor logistics. He had arrived in Morocco and would spend over ten of his next fourteen years in that alien landscape; it was a vicious and tough war and ten per cent of Franco’s classmates were to die there.

Morocco* In June 1913 Franco was confirmed as a full Lieutenant and was soon making his mark as a competent and brave young officer and catching the eye of his contemporaries and senior officers. Whether he was by nature courageous, or driven by ambition, or a natural soldier will always be open to speculation because later in life he enhanced his own reputation by selfconceit and propaganda. There is little doubt that during his long years in North Africa he developed “a determined authoritarian and anti-liberal mind-set, blaming that liberal ideology, the parliament and the party system for the prolonged decline suffered by Spain.”136 In Morocco the Spanish Army was poorly trained, badly equipped and the officers were often self-serving and corrupt and ill-equipped for guerrilla warfare.137 Whatever opinions are held about Franco he was clearly an efficient officer, tough on discipline, courageous, cared about logistics and maps, and led from the front causing some of his Muslim soldiers to believe that Allah looked after him. It may have been the origin of Franco’s self-belief that providence cared for him very much in the same way Hitler thought about himself having survived assassination attempts. He also had his first effort at relating to a female who was the daughter of the High Commissioner. Her name was Sofía Subirán (she never married and died three years after Franco in 1978 and shared Franco’s hundreds of postcards with journalists much later) and socially it appeared to most that Franco was stretching his prodigious efforts at romance beyond his social strata.138 She was not interested and although he barraged her with letters she soon made it abundantly clear he was of no interest to her. Franco gave the impression of a man in a hurry and looking for more action when he joined the Regulares Indígenas who were a newly formed *

Morocco was divided between Spain and France; Spain held the northern part, just about five per cent of the country.

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group of native police, and meant to be more active in the frontline action; they were best described as Moorish mercenaries. Some have suggested he deliberately turned to front-line action because he had been repulsed in love, but it is more likely that Franco knew promotion in the Spanish Army came more quickly to those in combat than those residing in Spanish barracks at home. By 1913 he had found his much coveted action and was awarded the Military Merit Cross for bravery. There was no major front line in this desert war, but defending towns and defence posts across the dangerous and arid landscape gave him plenty of time for demonstrating his military prowess. After action at Tetuán (Northern Morocco) in 1914 he was promoted to Captain because of his bravery, a Spanish tradition which never went down well with those officers situated in Spain where longevity of service was the usual means for promotion. This was known as méritos de guerra mentioned above, which at the age of twenty-two made Franco the youngest captain in the Spanish Army. There seems little doubt that given his traditional Spanish military training Franco was now learning more about the nature and reality of war in terms of logistics, security, and field-craft. He also developed a reputation for being cool under fire, and this time in Morocco “contributed largely to the hardening of his character,” and from his inter-reaction with the Moroccan rebels he learned the policy of divide and rule which he would one day apply ruthlessly in his political machinations.139 However, in 1916 he was nearly killed when leading an advance he was shot in the stomach, and had it not been for a competent medical officer who insisted he was not moved until signs of recovery were seen, he may not have survived such a wound. Later his daughter claimed he ordered a Moroccan soldier to force his exit at the point of a rifle, but this sounds more like a later embellishment.* He was lucky that the bullet took the precise trajectory it did leaving his organs intact. Not many men in those conditions in that day and age survived such a wound which increased Franco’s overwhelming belief that he was protected by providence. As a consequence of this incident and survival it was recommended that Franco be promoted to the rank of Major, and awarded the Gran Cruz Laureada de San Fernando, the highest award, possibly on the grounds that he would not survive the wound, but it was turned down by the military at home because of his youth. Franco was clearly ambitious and challenged the decision even going so far as to appeal to King Alfonso III who granted his appeal in February 1917, but not the medal. *

For the daughter’s account see Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.28

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The curious system of Spanish military tradition meant Franco had to return to Spain since Morocco had sufficient number of majors. He was given command of a battalion of the Regimiento de Infantería del Principe in Oviedo. He may have been regarded as unusual at this stage by homebased military because of his rank and age, but his small size also ensured that his nicknames pursued him, and this time he was often referred to as el comandantín, the little major. However, despite his youth and size he was recognised as an up-and-coming fighter from Africa. He made essential contacts with other officers but still very much with the tendency to keep himself to himself. Some people no doubt would have viewed him as an ambitious career climber, but the army at this time was more instilled with their hatred of the Left-wing, the behaviour of politicians, and the need for the army to look after the interests of Spain. Especially galling for young soldiers like Franco was the persistent attack by the Left-wing on the Spanish war in Morocco. None of this was helped by a downturn in the economy, the discontent of Catalonian and Basque industrialists demanding more, discontent of the working-classes, and even army officers were complaining of poor salaries. The Prime Minister Eduardo Dato conceded to the economic demands of the army officers, but called upon them to help quell some industrial strikes in Valencia. In Asturias there were protests about the living conditions, but the army quelled it with a high degree of brutality, and amongst the leading officers was Franco. It should be noted that in their biography Payne and Palacios write about the “subsequent myth that Franco first engaged in brutal repression of workers in Asturias is completely fallacious…it was the garrison commander in Oviedo, General Ricardo Burguete.”140 They may be right but this runs somewhat counter to the views of others. Payne and Palacios also wrote that Franco “later” said that this strike had opened his eyes to the condition under which working people lived, but admitted he was a strict disciplinarian and handed down prison sentences to miners. Reliable archival sources are rare, facts are somewhat mutated by propaganda, and family sources are not always trustworthy. It was a time of growing discontent and despite responding to the politicians’ pleas for assistance there was still a high degree of criticism against them for the way they were conducting the Moroccan war. While in Oviedo and during the summer of 1917 Franco fell in love with María del Carmen Polo y Martínez Valdes, a local girl from a rich landed family. It was not well received by her family as Franco was not well-off and lived a potentially dangerous life. He persisted in his attentions despite the fact that the widowed father and aunty opposed such a relationship. She was

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sent to a convent where most of her friends took the veil which might have made Franco reflect that she was somewhat like his religious mother. Again he barraged his would be wife with letters and attention and eventually she showed a powerful determination in overcoming her family’s opposition. Franco’s conduct “continued to be strictly honourable…he sought to make a good marriage of the sort that would complement his career and a stable family.”141

The Spanish Legion

José Millán Astray as a young officer

In 1918 while on a training course Franco met a fellow Major José Millán Astray who was older than Franco, but of a similar mind and keen that the Spanish followed the nature of the French Foreign Legion, and have their own Spanish version.* Millán Astray was granted permission to look at the possibility, but it was not until 1920 when he met Franco in Madrid, that he offered him the post of second in charge of the Spanish Legion, eventually given the name of Tercio de Extranjeros. Soon Franco was named commander of the first battalion; Franco and Astray more often than not simply used the term Legion. As with the French Legion it attracted veterans unable to adapt to civilian life and to criminals on the

*

José Millán Astray was to become important in Franco’s life.

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run. Franco was busy and his fiancé had to show her usual fortitude during his long absences. The Legion, based on the French concept of hardened and ruthless fighters, was to flourish and eventually turned Franco into a public figure if not a hero. The recruits as mentioned were men who were almost social outcasts and Franco followed Millán Astray’s doctrine of informing his men that this was their form of redemption, even if it meant fighting to their deaths, he even called them the “bridegrooms of death.” Franco with his men arrived in Morocco during a difficult period. The general plan was to ensure that the Spanish part of Morocco was entirely under Spanish control. General Berenguer appeared to have been making progress having captured the near-sacred town of Xauen (also known as Chaouen), but the usual problems of the so-called rebels holding the intervening tracts of countryside still dominated the Spanish dilemma. This meant a continuation of military policing which was always dangerous in a terrain which the rebels knew well as it was their natural habitat. As Franco settled in he made it clear that despite his youth and size he would not brook disciplinary problems, and had men executed for any form of protest on their parts. When one volunteer in a protest threw his rations on the ground splattering an officer “Franco calmly had him executed virtually on the spot and then ordered the entire battalion to march past the cadaver.”142 He also established a farm, better barracks, and ensured the logistics for his units were good and their maps were up to date. When his men raided villages it was marked by brutality and decapitating those captured. He became known for his reign of terror. “That notoriety was itself a useful weapon in keeping down the colonial population and its efficacy taught Franco much about the exemplary function of terror…there can be little doubt that the years of early manhood spent amidst the inhuman savagery of the legion contributed to the dehumanising of Franco.”143 It was understandable that the locals feared and hated Franco and even his own men although admiring his military leadership and personal courage had much to feel apprehensive about in his presence. The Spanish suffered, as noted in Part One, a serious military defeat at Annual where General Silvestre had taken his army somewhat recklessly into a trap set by Abd el-Krim the new and aggressive leader.* The Spanish *

Abd el-Krim had been a sub-tribal judge with previously good relationships with the Spanish; he was well-educated and had hoped that a Spanish protectorate would be better than the French version. See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.39

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effort to gain territory collapsed and a series of horrific massacres followed. This massacre at Annual underlined the severe deficiencies of the Spanish Army, “perhaps most telling of all the facts that in the disaster only ninety Spanish officers were killed. Many others were either not with their units at all or simply fled, though a considerable number were taken prisoner, since they could be held for ransom.”144 The town of Melilla was virtually undefended by the time Franco and his men arrived in late July 1921. Franco immediately restructured the town’s defence and his ability soon became news in Spain as his efforts turned him into something of a celebrity hero. His experience in Africa had taught him new field crafts and his military ability was noted. There occurred barbaric behaviour on both sides, and it is easy to gain the impression that for the young Franco this was the nature of war, a war with no mercy, a war of revenge, a war with no holds barred; it was the type of war he was always to understand. On one occasion he chose a dozen men to rescue an isolated fort-house and returned with his enemy heads as trophies. When Franco visited Spain he was feted and when questioned by reporters and others he always played down his role as a humble soldier merely doing his country’s service. He was at least able to meet Carmen Polo on such visits and was even granted an audience by Alfonso XIII. He may have played his role down but it was part of the public image he wished to portray. In the June of 1922 he suffered a setback as he would have seen the situation. General Sanjurjo had recommended Franco for promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel for recapturing Nador (coastal city and provincial-capital of north-eastern Rif), but it was put aside as there were still government investigations into the disaster of Annual; he received only the medal. Moreover, his commander Millán Astray who had just been promoted was removed from top command because of his criticisms of those above him. Franco was expecting to be elevated but the post was given to another, and a bitterly disappointed Franco requested a mainland appointment, which was granted and he returned to Oviedo. He returned to a country in conflict over the Morocco Rif War. A General Picasso had been appointed to investigate the disaster at Annual where it was, as noted earlier, suspected that King Alfonso had actively encouraged Silvestre in his foolhardy plans. The whole unhappy business had created a sense of hostility with the Left-wing, especially the Socialists calling for the closure of the Military Academies. The Crown and the army were for many becoming unpopular. Some objected to the conscription, some to the loss of money, some to the disgrace or lack of honour, and some on the principle that this form of rampant colonialism

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was simply wrong. As a result of the investigation, known as the “Responsibilities Commission” Berenguer was replaced by a General Burguete who decided it was best to pacify the tribes in the west and to help crush Abd el-Krim in the east. Franco as a “man of Africa” watched with horror the government reactions. He was pleased he had left the Legion and was now feted as a hero, and in 1923 was given a medal and nominated a gentilhombre de cámara an elite group of military courtiers. Franco was written about, photographed and generally feted, and all the time conscious of his public image he tried to appear as just a humble public servant of the country. In Oviedo he was wined and dined by the rich and socially high strata of society, and in El Ferrol the same happened as he waited for the King’s permission to marry Carmen. While they were awaiting the monarch’s permission Franco’s successor in the legion had been killed.* This occurred when Abd el-Krim had launched another attack close to the Melilla defence lines. It was decided that Franco be promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel and put in charge of the Legion; more publicity arose for the dashing young hero. The surrounding public admiration and reverence paid to him must have had an effect on the way he saw himself, as it does on any person whose ego becomes over-inflated by sudden popularity. Franco was back in his beloved area and with two battalions of the Legion he broke a major rebel siege at Tifaruin close to Melilla. This success did not dampen the hostile criticism of the war amongst the politicians in the mainland. As a consequence there was talk of a military coup under General Miguel Primo de Rivera. He launched the coup on the 13th September and possibly with the support, though not proven, with the help of the King. To all appearances it seemed that Franco was not that enthusiastic about the military coup which was met only with minimal resistance. It could simply be that Franco was more concerned about his success in Morocco and still hoping to marry, or possibly at this stage was somewhat disinterested in politics. He eventually married Carmen Oviedo on the 22nd September 1923 and the King was his best man but by proxy. It was the wedding of the year and attracted wide publicity. One journal called him the warrior leader which in Spanish is caudillo and this may have been the first time this title was used about Franco.145 Before he returned to Morocco the King arranged for him to dine with the new dictator Primo de Rivera, where it was claimed much of the conversation dwelt on the subject of *

Lieutenant-Colonel Valenzuela

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Morocco, the most fraught and politically delicate matter of the day. Franco projected a long discussed proposal to win the war by a sea-landing for the Alhucemas; this had been under discussion for some time but later Franco would claim it as his own strategy.*

Franco and his wife in 1941

When Franco and Carmen returned to Morocco affairs seemed reasonably peaceful, but by 1924 Abd el-Krim had grown in power and was challenging the rights of the Sultan, forging the support of the Berber tribes under the title of the Emir of the Rif.† The Spanish for their part held a few key towns but not the hinterland, and had little control in the vast country areas; little had changed and it is easy to comprehend the cynicism of the Left-wing politicians as to the value of the war. There were rumours that Primo de Rivera was considering withdrawing from North Africa for economic reasons as well as political peace, and he decided to visit *

Alhucemas is a Spanish reference to the Moroccan city of Al Hoceima and a series of islands one of which is Peñón de Alhucemas. † Berbers were an “illiterate people accustomed to a harsh and meagre life but also rebellious and warlike in the extreme…blood feuds were almost constant and the dominant male ideal was that of the warrior.” Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.18

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Morocco. Primo de Rivera had “a reputation as an abondonista regarding the protectorate” which would not have pleased Franco.146 Primo de Rivera had speculated on the possibility of exchanging Gibraltar for the North African coast, but London was not interested in such an arrangement. General Sanjurjo was put in charge of Melilla, and Abd elKrim possibly aware of Spanish uncertainty launched yet another attack. Franco dined with Primo de Rivera and it is claimed once again spoke of the necessity of total control and sea-landings to catch the Rif rebels by surprise. Primo de Rivera nevertheless decided to close down hundreds of fort-block houses and although Franco had threatened to resign he remained quiescent and in post, though it was later rumoured that Franco had been involved in discussions about another military coup. The town of Xauen was besieged and after a long and difficult time the Spanish managed to bring out their own people to the relative safety of Tetuan with Franco’s forces acting as a rear guard. It was a difficult position for the army to have to abandon Xauen, but Franco was awarded another medal and promoted to full Colonel, and despite his superior rank was permitted to stay in charge of the Legion; Primo de Rivera also decided that Morocco was not to be abandoned. The war remained bitter and limited amounts of poisonous gas had been dropped by plane; by “1924 Spain had become the first state to drop mustard gas bombs from the air, something not done during World War One.”147

Abd el-Krim in 1925 Time Magazine

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The tide changed because Abd el-Krim decided to challenge the Sultan who was a French appointment, and this immediately involved the French militarily. Abd el-Krim had some initial success against the French and Primo de Rivera joined with the French under Pétain as a joint force. Franco’s wish for a landing at Alhucemas took place and it was not as easy as he had anticipated. Franco’s forces not only found the landing in deep water with shoals difficult, but troops were left stranded for a time as years later the Anglo-Americans would discover at Salerno and Anzio. Franco’s Legion forces reacted with the expected courage and fortitude and forged onwards despite superior commands from above. Franco later explained this action by referring “to military regulations which granted officers a degree of initiative under fire.”148 Taking on the French was too much for Abd el-Krim and he surrendered to the French on the 26th May 1926 and the Rif rebellion collapsed.* After the war the Spanish actually kept some of Abd el-Krim’s reforms, became less harsh and ruled by the “carrot-andstick system.”149

The Academy General In February 1926 Franco was promoted to Brigadier General which at thirty-three years of age made him the youngest of this position in Europe, but because of his senior rank he lost command of the Legion. It was at this stage that Franco changed from the ruthless daring young officer taking risks to a cautious man looking to his rank and future. It was also at this time that, as mentioned earlier, he started to put weight on. He was given command of two prestigious aristocratic regiments in Madrid. On returning to Spain Franco had acquired considerable political and emotional baggage, including a distrust of politicians, a belief in colonialism as if by right, and many paternalistic attitudes learned in Morocco which he later reproduced in Spanish domestic politics.150 Significantly he regarded the Left-wing as dangerous and soon developed a life-long fanatical hatred of Communism. Franco started “to receive and devour the anti-communist and authoritarian literature sent by the Entente Internationale contre la Troisième Internationale, an organisation formed *

Given the Spanish hatred felt towards him Abd el-Krim was fortunate or sensible enough to fall into French hands; he was exiled in some comfort on a French island in the Indian Ocean from 1926 to 1947. Abd el-Krim had become something of an interest internationally and elicited the support of the Vatican and League of Nations. Afterwards he was allowed to live in the south of France and eventually was given asylum in Egypt where he presided over the Liberation Committee of the Arab West; he died in 1963.

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in Geneva by anti-Bolshevik Russian and far-right Swiss forces in order to alert leaders across Europe to the danger of the universal Communist conspiracy.”151 His hatred for Communism was almost paranoid and lasted a life-time. During this period he developed an obsessive hatred of Jews and Freemasons seeing them as a united conspiracy with Communism.* His experience had taught him that total control as exercised by his old Rif enemies had been based on the divide and rule theory, a strategy also carefully employed by Hitler and Stalin. It would appear that it was at this stage that politics was becoming important to Franco, though some recent biographers have suggested that although “he had become a supporter of the ultra-right, however, if for no other reason than that he remained a professional officer who sought to stay out of politics.”152 The current writer finds this viewpoint possible but difficult to accept. He was very much in the centre of Madrid’s social life and seen as the dashing soldier serving his country. He had to endure similar praise directed towards his more wayward brother Ramón, who with a fellow pilot was crossing the South Atlantic by plane, and reported to be the new Columbus. Franco was always close to his family, with the exception of his father, and appeared genuinely pleased with his brother’s success. The civil authorities in El Ferrol were overjoyed at such fame from two of their youngsters, plaques and parades were set up, and religious observances were celebrated including the singing of the Te Deum. He even accompanied the King and Queen on a visit to Morocco where new colours were presented to the Legion. To add to his joy on the 14th September Carman gave birth to their only child María del Carmen.† There has been considerable speculation about Franco’s marriage and the birth of his daughter. Some believed his brother was the father, some claiming they never saw her pregnant, some claiming his wound had made him sexually deficient. It was all speculation with no evidence and easily explained by the rumours that always circulate around contentious or popular figures. It is of no consequence and Franco in the meantime was enjoying being feted and even indulged much more in social life than he had done hitherto. He seemed to enjoy the cinema and on one occasion even took part in a film with his old colleague and friend Millán Astray.‡ It was clear that Franco had gained Primo de Rivera’s confidence and he was also beginning to admire the way the Dictator was running the country where, for a time, there seemed to be some economic benefits. *

To his distress his brother Ramón later became a Freemason. She was often known as Carmencita to distinguish her from her mother, and was often called by her nickname Nenuca. ‡ The film was called La Malcasada. †

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However, Primo de Rivera clashed with the military in the ongoing quarrel between the Artillery and the Infantry. As Franco knew from personal experience battlefield bravery or competence could earn rapid promotion, otherwise it was dependent on longevity of service. Artillery men were rarely in the sort of position where such military prowess could be displayed. In 1917 many had joined what was called the Juntas de Defensa whereby it was decided not to accept promotions given on battlefield standards but by seniority. Franco had once played with this idea but probably only to ingratiate himself with others, and he became the youngest of generals because of battlefield promotion. Many believed Primo de Rivera to be ready to oppose battlefield promotion, but either he was persuaded otherwise or he changed his own mind; it was probably as a result of his visit to Morocco during the fraught war years. Those who argued for rank by seniority saw field-promotion as a ruse for favouritism and they may well have been right. There was nearly a rebellion by the Juntas de Defensa in June 1926 known as the Sanjuanada Coup but it was quelled and Franco kept a discreet distance, not least since he was where he was in the ranking positions because of battlefield promotion. This was to have some long-lasting consequences because battle-field promotions, (mainly earned in Morocco and hence they were dubbed as Africanistas) were now committed to the dictatorship and would oppose the ensuing Republic, and the others tended to follow the Republic. No reliable statistics are available but this seems a sound sweep of the brush of generalisation. The reforms had further ramifications especially for Franco. Primo de Rivera decided that instead of the four different Military Academies they should be united in the one.* The Dictator sent Franco to the French military training area called the École Militair de St Cyr run by Pétain. (Franco visited the German military school at Dresden in 1929. He was impressed by what he saw as he was with the German struggle to free themselves from the Versailles restrictions.)† Following the visit to the École Militair de St Cy King Alfonso XIII suggested a single academy and Franco sat on the preparation committee. It was eventually established at Zaragoza and Franco was appointed as the first director. This was a complete change of direction for Franco who was now teaching war rather than personally involved in any fighting. He continued to change in other ways beginning to enjoy his wider range of social contacts which came his *

The Infantry were trained in Toledo, the Artillery in Segovia, the Cavalry in Valladolid, and the Engineers in Guadalajara. † It has been suggested with some probability that his respect for the German military stemmed from this visit.

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way easily because of his status and his new position. He arrived in Zaragoza in 1927 to supervise the building and the doors were opened for business before it was completed. He ensured that it was more practical than previous Spanish military education and based on his own war experiences. Unlike his own early experience and probably because of that time he insisted that cadets should be older than he had been; late and not early teenagers. He insisted that the instructors (mainly infantry) were all men who had seen action. The cadets were taught field-craft, weapon care, use of maps, and text books were avoided. He also insisted on sensible conduct and made sure that all his men on leave should have a contraceptive; he had noted as in most armies the problems of venereal disease as Montgomery did later. He made a point during his farewell speech in 1931 of pointing out that he had cleansed the problem. He also ensured the young men were taught the ruthless nature of war and its reality. He continued his strong sense of military discipline and remained something of a martinet. “The academy stressed above all moral values, courage, and determination, and to that extent resembled the Japanese military culture of the 1920s than it did innovative European military thinking.”153 His time at the Military Academy was seen as a victory for the fighters from Africa (Africanistas) and for those of a Right-wing inclination. Conversely the Left-wing and Liberals saw the Academy as a threat. They were right to be concerned because many of the staff and those they trained later became fascists, and most fought on the side of the Nationalists; probably as high as 90-95 per cent. It was during his time in Zaragoza that Franco increased his distaste of Communism into a matter of fervent if not paranoid opposition. “It also played its part in the transition of Franco from the adventurous soldier of the 1920s to the suspicious and conservative general of the 1930s.”154 It was in Zaragoza that Franco first had a street named after him in 1929. Primo de Rivera fell from power in January 1930 having estranged most elements of Spanish society, not least part of the army. As noted in Part One King Alfonso made a serious political blunder in ignoring the political unrest and sensitivities of the day, and simply replaced Primo de Rivera with General Berenguer who was still tainted with the disaster of Annual. To all appearances Franco’s only concern was that there should be no rift in the Academy between the Artillery men still referred to as the junteros, and the Afrianistas by forbidding political discussion. As if to embed this command King Alfonso visited the Academy, and a few days later the cadets performed a ceremonial march in Madrid to receive new colours; Franco stood on the balcony with the King.

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Ramón, Franco’s difficult brother

It was during this time that Franco experienced serious problems with his brother Ramón. His brother had to be rescued by the British Royal Navy when supposedly flying a plane over the North Atlantic. The plane ditched and it transpired to be a German model which was all part of a huge financial deal.* This was not the only embarrassment because it soon became clear that Ramón was sympathetic to the Republican cause which was anti-Royalty. Ramón was watched and spied upon; at one time he threatened to bomb the palace from a plane, but escaped to Portugal and eventually after a brief spell in prison fled the country. Despite his rigid political views Franco stood by his brother, sent him money and remonstrated with him to stay loyal to the family, and to the crown and country which Franco perceived to be the only right course. Ramón undoubtedly was grateful but he was critical of Franco’s views about the future, and told him without mixing his words.† It has been suggested that Ramón “may have been clinically bipolar” but this can only be mere * It was a Dornier hydro-plane made from German parts and not made in Spain with Italian components. † Ramón was very different from his brother in many ways but despite this the two remained close. He became a skilled pilot and later flew Franco over enemy lines so he could understand the terrain, see Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.43 and p.48

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conjecture.155 For a time Franco’s relationship with his brother became a relationship of letters. Franco was known as a man who could order an execution with a nod of his head, but he remained utterly sensitive to members of his family. While at the Academy Franco had been visited by the famous Frenchman André Maginot and presented with the Légion d’Honneur for his sea landings in Morocco. He was even visited by Lerroux (mentioned in Part One) a staunch and wily Republican, but at this stage Franco made it clear that he stood apart from politics; it was also clear that he had no idea that the monarchy was in danger. Whether a man like Franco with such strong Right-wing traditional views, a staunch Catholic and Monarchist was standing above the fray or was simply biding his time in his own interests is open to all types of speculation; but it must remain conjecture. There is little doubt that he stood on the side-lines watching what was happening, observing the Jaca rebellion of Galán and García Hernández and certainly not seeing them as martyrs as so many others did.* Berenguer was quickly replaced by Admiral Juan Bautista Aznar, and in the Municipal elections Franco voted for the Monarchist candidate in Zaragoza, but it was clear that the Republican cause was gaining a strong foothold. There are no indications that at this time the idea of revolt was crossing Franco’s mind. At the same time as the Republican movement was gathering momentum a Ramón Serrano Suñer married Carmen’s sister Zita, and his best man was José Primo de Rivera, the last dictator’s son who founded the Falange (in 1934). It created a close relationship between men who would one day operate on the Right-wing of the Spanish insurgency. Serrano Suñer, “the so called Cuñadísimo (supreme brotherin-law) would soon become a dominant figure” and Franco and Serrano Suñer would one day forge the Caudillo’s National-Syndicalist State.156 When the election results were becoming clear Franco was concerned especially when there was obvious rejoicing amongst his artillery men. The national politics for Franco had suddenly become fragile, and when he heard that General Sanjurjo had warned the King that he could not guarantee the King’s safety with the Civil Guard he was at first nonplussed until he had a phone call from Millán Astray. During this phone call it became clear that the Civil Guard would be too powerful to oppose with cadets, and Franco eventually agreed that the King had little choice. Selfevidently Franco was unhappy about the new political situation but he was cautious and careful and announced to his Academy the establishment of *

This was a plot to bring the Republicans to power and Ramón was probably implicated.

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the Republic and insisted on total discipline. It will always be a point of contention because some biographers and scholars feel that Franco was the true professional soldier keeping his distance from the political arena: this period “indicated that Franco was not absolutely averse to democratic reform, provide it was legal and orderly and preferably accomplished under the monarchy.”157 Others believe that Franco was keeping a low profile to protect his career curve, but either way it was now apparent that Franco’s interest in politics was much more focused than some suggest, though impossible to verify with certainty. The election results caused him concern; the monarchy had gone and Franco could not understand why the army with its close links to the crown had not supported Alfonso. The Republicans and Socialists had gained a slight advantage, but it was more a “cluster” of parties with more extreme elements oscillating in the background. The Spanish Socialists Workers Party was traditional Marxist, and there was the element of “organised anarchists” (CNT) all of which would have caused Franco deep apprehension.

CHAPTER TWO FRANCO AND THE POLITICAL SCENE

Franco in Limbo The new political scene was not going to be a mere continuation of preceding years, and the Academy with much of the local area still flew the monarchist flag even though the Republic demanded that the new tricolour Republican flag be raised. Franco stuck faithfully to his guns insisting that a change of flag needed written orders which he duly obeyed once these orders arrived on paper. This single action however sent another signal of where Franco stood; everyone who knew Franco recognised him as a Right-wing Monarchist, an ardent Catholic, and a believer in Spanish tradition; the reluctance to lower the King’s flag would have confirmed this for his critics. The frequently made claim that Franco stood apart from politics stands in stark contrast to the fact that during this period Franco was always under suspicion as a Right-wing monarchist and deeply traditional. However, Franco expected to survive because he trod with care to maintain his career in one piece. At one stage it was rumoured that Franco might be sent to Morocco as High Commissioner which was regarded as a highly ranked post. Instead it went to Sanjurjo who still maintained his oversight of the Civil Guard.* This was undoubtedly to keep Sanjurjo on side, but this move was probably driven by the same idea with considering Franco. Franco was furious but at the same time he tried to let the Republicans know that he was faithful to whoever governed Spain. He was always pragmatic with an eye to his future, or, according to some he was a professional soldier keeping a safe distance. Some biographers claimed this was a position he would “maintain for some time, not abandoning it completely until just for days before the Civil War began;” others, possibly more correctly saw him as a chess-player biding his time and watching the developing situation.158 *

Sanjurjo was given this position because of his refusal to come to the aid of Alfonso, but Franco had suggested but there was a question over his loyalty to the new regime.

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The new Minister for War Azaña decided to tackle the huge expense incurred by the Spanish Army, a decision which was probably highly justified, but potentially politically risky. It was not only a matter of economics but also a belated attempt to keep the military out of politics. He was equally aware that the Artillery men and junteros had favoured the Republic which concerned the Africanistas, mainly the infantry. The rumour soon spread that the new Republic was making the army and the Church a target for repression. An order was sent out for the army to take an oath to the Republic; Franco stuck to his career and not his probable inner convictions. Azaña offered retirement to officers on full pay as long as they retired within a certain period of the offer; this was sometimes known as the “Azaña Law.”* When Franco was consulted he, always pragmatic, kept all doors open stating that the army served whoever governed Spain. Franco was however fuming at the treatment of Berenguer under judicial scrutiny for events in Morocco, and the threat that battlefield promotion could be reversed, (which meant Franco might be reduced to the rank of Colonel) and those elements of the army which had supported the Republic would benefit. Franco was further infuriated when Azaña decided to abolish the eight Military Regions of Spain which would mean they would no longer have jurisdiction or any legal control over civilians; a common sense move to any adherent of a democratic system.† He was also becoming highly disturbed by the growing attacks upon Churches and clergy. For Franco the army and the Church were connected in a deeply significant way, but it was Azaña’s next move that made him Franco’s lifelong enemy when he closed his beloved Academy. Azaña had serious doubts about the way the Academy was training future soldiers, not least in the nature of Franco’s indoctrination. On the 14th July Franco gave a vitriolic farewell speech which Azaña read and formally reprimanded Franco for some of his pronouncements. Azaña was not only critical of the nature of the traditional training under Franco, but undoubtedly recognised the intrinsic political bias as well as the military technical developments taking place elsewhere in the world which were lacking in Spain. The pragmatic survival instincts in Franco surfaced again as he tried to do a repair job by suggesting he had been misunderstood. Franco must have realised that damage to his personal career could be *

Some forty per cent of officers chose retirement and between fourteen to twenty thousand NCOs chose retirement. See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.72 † These regions were known as Capitanías Generales.

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immense; he had not only been demoted and now reprimanded, but his career was on a shelf. Azaña recognised that the popular Franco had been “the wonder-boy” of the monarchical period, and was probably bringing him into line and keeping a sharp eye on him as a possible opponent. Franco was without an appointment for nearly two-thirds of a year and on a heavily reduced income which increased his rancour against the new regime, and everyone on the Left-wing. He was not the only army officer and their discontent led to clandestine meetings of which the government were aware, and a few generals were placed under house arrest. Franco himself was occasionally watched especially when he was in Madrid. The new Republic’s intentions in breaking the stranglehold of the Church and army and bringing in social reform caused some division in their own ranks in case it stirred up too much trouble. The extreme Leftwing members were moving too rapidly, and there was a change of personnel at the top as mentioned in Part One, which was why Azaña had become the Prime Minister. Franco was enraged at the way some army officers benefitted whilst others like him were placed on a shelf and their promotions were scrutinised. His erstwhile brother Ramón was back in favour as Director of the Spanish Air Force, but fell in disgrace when he plotted with the Anarchists, and he only avoided prison by being elected as a parliamentary deputy for Barcelona. Franco appeared as a witness for those involved in the trial of those executed for the Jaca revolt. He was forthright but cautious, pointing out that he was a supporter of parliamentary sovereignty, yet maintained that the army had the judicial right under military law to deal with its own disciplinary matters. This argument was robust and kept him safe from demotion or even dismissal. The politics of the day were now playing a major role in Franco’s life and “Franco gradually became more closed and reticent…and as he moved into middle age his personality gradually assumed the characteristics that would remain dominant for the rest of his life.”159 Franco was considered efficient by his political enemies and he remained popular with many, and eventually Azaña appointed him as the Commander of the XV Brigada de Infantería which placed him nearer to his beloved mother. This was just in time because the Commission which had been studying battlefield promotions had questioned his placement, but not his status as a general, and it located him lower in the rankings. Had the appointment been a trifle later he would have been retired as falling outside the required time-period. This must have made Franco

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somewhat nervous, and it was possible that Azaña bided his time in order to bring Franco into line. Franco never forgave Azaña for the way he was treated though in later days he always regarded Azaña as the more intelligent of “the bunch.” Politically it was a hazardous period with revolts in Castilblanco and later Arnedo which all involved the Civil Guard in bloody reprisals. This was not only destructive for the country but divided the Left-wing. Those on the extreme Left-wing were naturally angry and wanted Sanjurjo removed from his position as head of the Civil Guard, to which Azaña eventually acquiesced. This brought Sanjurjo back into favour with the extreme Right-wing and they forgave him the error of not supporting the monarchy in 1931. There was once again fear of a coup but the pragmatic Franco comfortable in his new position kept a discreet distance. When there was an attempted coup in August 1932 Franco made sure he was not under suspicion.* He was aware of the plot but with his well-known political manoeuvrability left both the plotters and the government uncertain as to his personal position. Later he would claim, and probably correctly, that he never joined because the coup was inadequately planned and without sufficient resources. Franco knew that the formidable Civil Guard had to be in agreement with any revolt, and was not surprised when the proposed coup was easily dismantled. Azaña had checked that Franco was at his post during the attempted overthrow, and believed that at long last he had brought Franco onside.

Balearics, to Chief of General Staff In 1933 Azaña had Franco posted to the safe distance of the Balearic Islands possibly as a reward for not being involved in the coup, but Franco was far from happy with this move.† According to Preston it was for Franco just a matter of where he stood in the promotional rankings. The Balearic Islands needed coastal defences established because there was a fear that Mussolini’s ambitions might stretch that far, and Franco immediately set about the task with his usual efficiency and administrative control. He asked the French military for help and two officers were given information about sea-defences and Franco sent reports back to Madrid. *

This was known as the sanjurjada (Sanjurjo Revolt) for which Sanjurjo was sentenced to death but it was changed to life. † The Prime Minister wrote in his diary that it was probably safer to have Franco well away from Madrid, quoted in Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.82

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Franco was also concerned because the new government was not using the army much, and Franco was soon taking extensive holidays back on the mainland. Back in Spain Azaña and his political ambitions were beginning to falter. There was a degree of internal discontent from the Left-wing at the speed of reform, but also the growing Right-wing was hindering any possibility of substantial progress. Throughout November there was social agitation during the election campaigns, and Franco even talked of leaving the Military and entering politics which attracted the attention of the Catholic Authoritarian Party, but Franco deferred. The Left-wing, as noted in Part One were divided, and the Right-wing created alliances between the Radicals and CEDA won the majority which “would see Franco come in from the cold, as he perceived his comfortable exile in the Balearics, and much nearer to the centre of political preferment.”160 Franco had voted for CEDA “as he identified with its Catholic and conservative ideology and its pragmatic political strategy that sought to reform the Republic from within.”161 As noted in Part One the years 1934-1936 were regarded as the two black years.* For Franco his distrust of Communists grew (though Communism was never that strong in Spain), his hatred of Freemasons became paranoiac, and having spent time reading books on economics, of which he would never be an expert, he was developing a sharp distaste for what he called international finance capitalism; none of this was helpful because during this time the Great Depression was taking a grip.† It was a time when the Right-wing saw the opportunity not just to put the brakes on reform, but to reverse such legislation. The President Alcalá Zamora did not ask Robles to form a new government even though CEDA had the largest number of votes because he feared an authoritarian regime. The army and many Right-wingers believed such a regime was the only solution to Spanish difficulties. The election did not resolve any problems and soon there were strikes and localised riots often involving the dreaded Civil Guard which increased the Right-wing’s belief that the Republic had to be overcome. *

bienio negro Franco’s hatred of Freemasons was to last a life-time. The Catholic Church opposed it (as did Himmler in Germany) and yet it crossed all political boundaries. However, it has been stated that “Masons had played a major role in leftist and liberal movements ever since the early nineteenth century and many of the left Republican deputies elected in 1931 were Masons.” See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.82 †

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It was a better time for Franco when he met the new Minister of War Hidalgo who proposed Franco should be promoted to Major-General. Hidalgo visited Franco in the Balearics and it was evident that not only did Hidalgo trust and like Franco, but that Franco once again could become the darling of the establishment when that establishment consisted of Radicals. The Radicals were busy reversing the previous reforms by breaking the Unions, which they tried to accomplish on a systematic basis earning the respect of Franco. The extreme Right-wing which was made up of the Carlists and the Falange were determined to destroy the Republic by catastrophic means rather than through legal procedure. Their representatives even met Mussolini in Italy to raise money for their revolt. Franco again distanced himself even though it was apparent he agreed with the vast majority of their views. He was especially wary of the fascists as warnings of their type of activities were already emerging from German and Italy. Franco was not involved in the rabid politics except in his cogitating, because at this time he was more caught up in the death of his mother who died in February 1934 while preparing to go on a pilgrimage to Rome. He was profoundly troubled by his mother’s death and for a time he and Carmen looked for domestic stability, and pursued their love of cinema. As he lost himself in pleasure pursuits the political temperature was rising rapidly as the Left-wing called for strikes, and the Right-wing battered the Unions. The attack by the Right on the reforms of the past was now sharply dividing Spain between Left and Right-wings in a strongly acrimonious fashion; Spain was polarising. There were those on the Right who anticipated that they could provoke the Left-wing into open revolt giving the Right-wing an opportunity to crush them once and for all. Hidalgo on his visit to the Balearics had invited Franco to join him as a technical adviser on the annual large-scale military manoeuvres which was unusual, and Franco’s first biographer suggested it was all a ruse to make sure Franco was on the mainland during the anticipated difficult days.162 There is no question that Hidalgo and Franco trusted one another, and when the Falangist José Primo de Rivera tried to make contact with Franco he was ignored. Robles announced that CEDA could no longer support a minority government, and in order to avoid problems Lerroux included three CEDA members into a new cabinet. There were protests and strikes and Catalonia started to proclaim independence again. The government moved swiftly and the protests were suppressed without difficulty with the exception of the miners in the Asturias region. When news of the Asturias revolt came through Hidalgo wanted to send Franco in person, but Alcalá-Zamora demanded a more liberal

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officer, so Franco organised the operation from the War Office. As the situation deteriorated control was given to the military commander in Oviedo, a Colonel Navarro who declared martial law. Again it was thought best to send Franco but there was a degree of tension amongst the politicians as to whether it was safe to send Franco to Asturias; it was based on the knowledge that Franco knew the region well, but his anticipated ruthlessness was feared by some and desired by others. Nevertheless, Hidalgo left Franco in charge of the overall operations. For Franco the mixture of military and politics took him back to the years of the military dictatorship under Primo de Rivera and “all in all, it was to be a profoundly formative experience for him, deepening his messianic conviction that he was born to rule.”163 Franco treated the strikers as if they were the enemy based on his premise that they were all working for the Communists and inspired from Moscow. He gave instructions for the shelling from naval vessels, and when there were doubts about Spanish soldiers firing on civilians he had flown in his Moroccan troops with amazing speed. To the horror of the more liberal-minded politicians, some army officers, and the foreign press he shelled and bombed the workers’ homes. The Moroccan troops were as ruthless as if dealing with mountain tribesmen, and a large but unverifiable number of executions were carried out by drumhead courts or simply by the nod of a head. After the collapse of the strike a Civil Guard Major called Lisardo Doval brutally took control and more reprisals followed to an appalling extent, giving widespread poor publicity. Naturally the Right-wing press projected Franco as the saviour, but others noted the brutality he was prepared to deploy, which was to be a feature of his time during the Civil War. This crisis “provided an already clearly ambitious Franco with his first, satisfying taste, of quasi-omnipotent state power. For about fifteen days, following the declaration of a state of war and the delegation of governmental functions, Franco was a genuine emergency dictator, controlling all the military and police forces in what he perceived to be a struggle against the Revolution planned by Moscow, and executed by its undercover agents and Spanish traitors.”164 There was considerable brutality by both sides, and in reading the various accounts, histories and biographies the major blame is placed on the Left or the Right-wing depending as always on personal political viewpoints. The conflict in Asturias was significant in so far that the Left-wing resentment at the way the revolt was handled bit deep into their corporate psyche, and the Right-wing were equally unhappy about what had happened since it did not augur well for the Spain to which they aspired. As far as the Right-wing factions were concerned Franco had emerged as

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the person who could guarantee the future the way they deemed it should be, yet his treatment of Asturias was severe. The Asturian miners’ strike had a variety of causations, but a major component had been because of the invitation for CEDA to join the Cabinet, but it was crushed by the Spanish Navy and Army and the use of hard-bitten troops from Morocco.165 Although not on the front line Franco had controlled the whole situation later claiming “this war is a frontier war and its fronts are Socialism, Communism and whatever attacks civilisation in order to replace it with barbarism;” in this statement he outlined his political views with his usual bluntness.166 In Franco’s mind, as in the ardent Right-wing press, the Asturian strikers were described in xenophobic and anti-Semitic terms as the instruments of a foreign Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy.167 Pragmatic as always Franco kept a discreet distance between himself and another projected coup. This time it involved the possibility that Sanjurjo would be able to influence the army to co-operate, but Franco foresaw that it was again a case of being weakly prepared, and he was now sitting more comfortably in terms of his own career. When Hidalgo fell from grace the Prime Minister Lerroux took over his position and gave Franco the Gran Cruz de Mérito Militar and kept him as a ministerial adviser. It all seemed to be going Franco’s way again. There was a possibility that Franco could be made High Commissioner for Morocco, but the existing civilian Republican was kept in place and Franco was made Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish forces in Morocco. As soon as Franco arrived he consolidated his position in the Moroccan Army, and made excellent relations with the Republican High Commissioner who needed someone with Franco’s knowledge of the African colony. On the mainland CEDA attempted to placate the situation with promises of reform, but the prisons were full of political prisoners to the disgust of the journalist Henry Buckley, and Catalonia’s aspirations were closed down yet again. The more moderate Right-wing found their efforts frequently blocked by the extremes. It was at this point that Franco was recalled from Morocco to become Chief of General Staff; this was against the advice of President Zamora, and also General Goded who was jealous. There was probably no thought in Franco’s mind of overthrowing the Republic at this time probably because he was satisfied with the way his career was once again moving forward. He worked hard and his new post allowed him to change some of Azaña’s military reforms. Mola was made a general and brought to Madrid by Robles as well as Franco, possibly in Franco’s case to study the possible use of Moroccan troops in the mainland in case of further unrest.168 In this new position he also made contact with German arms suppliers, but also with the Unión Militar

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Española (UME) which was the extreme Right-wing conspiracy, probably to be aware of any plans and more likely to adjudicate whether they were sufficiently prepared. He was also convinced that extreme Left-wingers were gaining strength and demanding a revolution. Azaña, Franco’s old adversary had been busy bringing the Left-wing factions together, and Franco was convinced this was a dangerous and viable threat. The general party came under the name of the Popular Front, the same nomenclature used by the French Left-wing, and according to some writers just possibly suggested by Comintern. José Robles was intent on breaking up the opposition in the sure and certain hope that Zamora would ask him to form a government. The President was suspicious of Robles and declined. Robles had created instability but he was not to be the proposed answer. It was now that Robles possibly started to think along the lines of preventing an election or looking for a coup to hold the Right-wing in power. Some generals considered the possibility of bringing the army onto the streets, but once again they had to be sure the Civil Guard would be supportive. Franco was consulted and also pointed out that if the police and Civil Guard failed to co-operate it could lead to a disaster. Franco also made it clear that the working-class was highly substantial in numbers, and so they would have to be fully prepared. José Robles was obliged to resign the Ministry of War to Franco’s horror. José Primo de Rivera made contact with Franco, but although the young fascist wanted a rapid military surgical solution Franco was not impressed with him as a person. (Later Franco would make little or no effort to save José Primo de Rivera when he was executed by the Republicans, and would soon have to pretend he revered his name and was his natural successor to gain the support of the Falange; “his cult of personality lives even to this day” and his tomb is before the altar and Franco’s behind the same altar in the memorial Franco organised later.)169 Franco was left as Chief of Staff and was aware that the coup would only take place if the population wanted such a change. Nevertheless it was the closest he had become involved in such dramatic discussions. Franco told his political masters the army would not intervene, but with the ominous clause that the situation might change if there were a threat of a Communist take-over; some historians interpret this as an honest statement by Franco, others as a warning. The elections were due to take place in February of 1936 and Franco steered away from them; he was busy with travelling to England to attend the funeral of King George V. The elections were marked by bitterness and fighting, and although the Right-wing had expensive propaganda Franco was convinced that the Left were financially supported by

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Moscow. He was totally convinced that the Popular Front was Moscow’s way of taking over Spain, referring to it as “Moscow’s Trojan Horse.” As the election results came through it started to become clear that the Left held the dominant position especially in seats in the Cortes. There was an immediate fear primarily stoked by Robles that the country was on the verge of a revolution provoked by extreme Left-wing and Anarchists, and therefore the need for martial law. Franco was drawn to these machinations and sent warnings to the UME officers to be prepared, and started to go beyond his official remit anticipating a martial law which he would control. The politicians were confused but eventually stood firm and Franco’s efforts diminished. Later when Franco saw the Prime Minister Portela he tried to convince him he was not involved in any conspiracy, but he also realised that the army was still unprepared, and he was pragmatic enough to want to hold on to his career. It was a close thing for Franco, but he just managed to step clear of direct implications in plotting; once again some interpret this as a mark of Franco’s honesty, others as part of his devious cunning and survival instincts. Portela did not last long and Azaña was once again Prime Minister. It was only a matter of days before Franco heard that General Goded had been posted to the Balearic Islands, Mola to Pamplona and Franco to the Canary Islands. All the wellknown Right-wing generals were placed in safety cupboards as far as the politicians were concerned; Alcalá-Zamora always believed that Franco was “a crypto-Monarchist.”170

CHAPTER THREE THE CAUDILLO

Franco and the Civil War 1936 “Beware of my partisanship, my mistakes of fact and the distortion inevitably caused by my having seen only one corner of events. And beware of exactly the same things when you read any other book on this period of the Spanish War.”171 —George Orwell

In many ways Franco was fortunate not to be put on the pension list or even imprisoned because his views were widely known, and subsequently he was a potential menace to the government. Azaña was more than aware of Franco’s views towards him and his reforms, and military oversight of the Canary Islands was a good post when alternatives were reviewed. It may well be that Azaña wanted to keep Franco onside but out of the way, and he could have had him dismissed. Franco was simply angry because his career ambitions were again thwarted and he regarded himself as being put out of sight. He referred to this move as a destierro, banishment. For Franco “it was a very considerable professional and political setback and affected him deeply.”172 He naturally protested to Azaña and Zamora but to no effect, and he was more than aware that wherever he went on the mainland or in the Islands he was watched and often his telephone line was tapped.* His main protest was that he was a simple soldier who wanted to protect the homeland from an attack by communists; some historians accept this as truthful. While Franco worried about his career curve the Right-wing was now in a determined mind-set to bring down the Republic one way or another. Their only frustration was trying to make certain that Franco signed onto their cause because of his highly regarded reputation. It was generally agreed there had to be a coup and that Sanjurjo would be the natural figurehead and head of that enterprise. The main hope would be the anticipation that the Popular Front would want to *

This was done by the Dirección General de Seguridad.

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dismantle the Civil Guard, and as such would bring the Civil Guard on the side of rebellion. As Franco’s journey to his new post took place he was shocked by the number of Left-wing adherents who greeted him with boos of derision, but he was more shocked by the attacks on the Churches and the clergy. This was a time of deep unrest and polarisation in Spanish society. Some historians on studying the feelings of the day blamed the unrest on the Left-wing, others on the danger of a military coup, and others, perhaps with more understanding, emphasised the discontent of the appalling conditions under which the masses laboured, compared to the wealth and privileges of the few. Franco had always been a fervent Catholic and the attack on the Church was a clear signal for him that the Left was under the dominance of the atheistic Bolshevik. He was approached time and time again by the conspirators, but he was concerned about the lack of preparation, the likelihood of success and, as always, his own security. Despite Franco’s insistence that he was not politically motivated the Socialist leader Prieto “referred to him publicly as the kind of general who could be most effective in organising a revolt” though he never implied he would.173 There is no question that although he perceived himself as a born leader and a man of destiny he was always cautious about his own safety and career. He settled in the Canary Islands, looked at their defences, and began to play golf, learn English, and enjoyed the social life. In gatherings of a diplomatic nature he made it abundantly clear that he admired Mussolini, and the British were not slow in listening, and he even hinted that the British and their fleet were easy prey.174 Franco had expressed an interest in taking part in elections as a member of CEDA, but this desire clashed with José Primo de Rivera who wanted to run on the same list.* Franco was asked to step down and José Primo de Rivera eventually won a seat against a divided Left-wing.† Quite what Franco’s intentions were are difficult to fathom; his later personal observations cannot be trusted, and it only produces intricate speculation. As it happened the political machinations of those in leadership were almost disastrous in provoking the Civil War. The President Zamora was regarded as too conservative, and in the political power play of the day Zamora was stepped down and Azaña took his place, and a rather weak Prieto became Prime Minister. Azaña had been a good Prime Minister but *

José Primo de Rivera had developed a serious distrust for Franco and considered him devious, calculating and untrustworthy. † It was a minority government and Caballero refused to let the extreme Socialist strand join the coalition.

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treated the Presidency almost as a sinecure. Caballero was too strong for Prieto and his successor Quiroga was a man in serious ill-health. The workers were expecting much from their politicians, but unemployment was rising and the landowners were terrified of what was happening. It was a disaster brewing at all levels of Spanish society. In the meantime General Mola was developing his plans for the coup with as much secrecy as possible. Mola had been placed by the government in a safe backwater, but it was a miscalculation because Pamplona contained for Mola a supportive background with its ultraconservative atmosphere and Carlists.175 His overall scheme or strategy was to attack the Republican government from the outside in towards Madrid. Mola was situated in distant Pamplona which was an ideal area for planning the starting point for the insurgency. He was aware that Morocco would be supportive and knew that he was dependent on civilian back-up as well as the military. Franco was kept informed but irritatingly for the plotters maintained his usual careful stance of keeping his distance. This was a source of serious frustration for those working towards a coup, and Franco’s lack of drive and commitment at this critical stage was obfuscated in later writings about the hero. Franco’s reluctance annoyed Robles and concerned his Africanista friends. “The clear implication was that he was more concerned with covering his personal retreat in the event of failure,” or according to some trying to be apolitical.176 Later in life Franco pretended he was involved in the plot as from March 1936, but there is no real evidence of this, quite the contrary with the obvious frustration of the other plotters at his dithering. The CEDA party’s constant demand to do everything using legal means brought about the sudden rise of the Falange Party started by José Primo de Rivera. As noted this was an extreme Right-wing fascist-type group of single-minded people with its own youth wing (known as the JAP) all too prepared to use violence. They were the natural opponents to the Socialist Caballero, dubbed unhelpfully by Moscow as the Spanish Lenin. As the conspirators attempted to encourage Franco to show his hand the government wandered through these critical months almost aimlessly and seemingly unaware of the impending disaster, even though there was growing violence on the streets. The government tried to discover if there were an imminent rebellion amongst the military and mild warning shots were fired. In the summer of 1936 Franco wrote an extraordinary letter to Prime Minister Quiroga which warned him the army was hostile to many of the government actions, but would be less so if they were treated better. He warned of the governmental habit of displacing generals from their rightful

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and natural habitat, and no doubt he had his own situation in mind. As the biographer Preston pointed out it was a masterpiece of ambiguity. It almost implied that if he put Franco in the appropriate post he would be able to quell the problem. Later pro-Franco apologists suggested that Franco was simply trying to put the government agencies off his scent. From a more cynical and realistic point of view it is easy to gain the impression he was looking after his own career; pragmatic as ever. The Prime Minister never replied and Franco, who felt he was the “number one man,” still kept a discreet distance from the conspirators. Some of those who so desperately needed his allegiance started to scorn his position because they knew that once he joined others would follow; Generals Sanjurjo and Mola were especially angry at his perceived dithering. The conspirators were busy planning ahead even ensuring that they had civilian financial backing from the powerful and wealthy. They even went so far as to assume that Franco would join them once the fire was started, and quietly arranged to hire a plane from Croydon in England to fly Franco to Morocco where he was highly respected. Even at this stage Franco was not fully with the conspirators feeling their plans were insufficient. It has been suggested that the government described by most as lost in what to do, was almost provoking a military revolt in order to quell the military problem once and for all, or trying to placate the revolutionaries, but “falling between the two stools was unable to or unwilling to move resolutely in any direction.”177 This seems somewhat sophisticated, but the gathering violence clearly indicated problems, and those trying to hold the government together were not astute enough to perceive what was unravelling before them. It was almost a pre-revolutionary situation at times, but both sides, the Left and Right-wings were themselves divided and uncertain. Even in the summer of that year Franco sent the coded message to Mola of “limited visibility” which indicated that he still felt the time was not right. It has been rightly suggested that it was a piece of street violence that shook Franco out from his uncertainty. A Falangist youth had shot a known Left-wing officer of the Republican Assault Guards, and the proposed revenge was intended for Robles, but he was busy sunning himself in the south of France. The alternative target was Calvo Sotelo who was kidnapped and executed. It has been suggested that this was a turning point for Franco, but it certainly enraged the Right-wing who now felt justified in claiming that military intervention was essential for the safety of Spain. The culprits disappeared and a couple of hundred others were arrested in a sense of panic, but this incident was the spark to a fuse which had been decreasing in length during the previous months.

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Franco decided to take the offered plane to Morocco but it was not a simple matter of stepping on board. The plane was based in Gran Canaria and Franco in those days of total distrust needed permission to travel. A funeral of a close friend enabled this to happen.* The rebellion broke out in the Canary Islands and after leaving a few commands he left the problems in the hands of his subordinates, mainly a monarchist called General Orgaz who took only a few days to accomplish the task, but not without considerable bloodshed. Franco ensured his family were safely on board the German liner Waldi (heading for the safety of Le Havre) and took his flight to Africa.† There has been considerable speculation about these interim days, his disguises, shaving off his characteristic moustache, and carrying a letter to the Prime Minister pretending he was going to the aid of the Republic. It must all remain speculation interesting as it sounds. It is true the moustache was shaved off which “gave rise to Queipo de Llano’s later jibe that the only thing that Franco ever sacrificed for Spain was his moustache.”178 Franco did send an emissary to Italy for outside help which was in time to bear fruit and illustrated that he had a better view of the overall situation than some of the other conspirators. Franco was now back in his element which was commanding a frontline situation in which he had previously excelled, not least because he was able to inspire men to follow his commands and fight. Later “as supreme commander Franco showed none of the recklessness for which he had been known as a young man in Morocco,” but he would demonstrate his ruthlessness learned in Morocco.179 As soon as he arrived in Africa he drew up a document to inspire fellow rebels in Africa and Spain to join the rebel cause; he also knew that failure in their venture would mean undoubted execution. He had the total support of his military subordinate Yagüe and increased the pay of the Legionaries. His initial efforts were focused on ensuring the total support in Morocco, both the Spanish and the resident Moors. He had authorised the use of Moroccan troops in Asturias with devastating effect. The Moor had long been the enemy of Spain and the recent Rif War had enhanced the fear of this desert warrior. The fact *

The funeral was of General Balmes who had reportedly shot himself while reloading a pistol. The popular rumour was that he was not pro-rebellion and his death not only provided Franco with a reasonable excuse to attend the funeral but Balmes would possibly have opposed the rebellion. It remains a conspiracy theory as up to this point in time nothing can be proved. † To achieve this Franco had to leave his wife and daughter on a Spanish gunboat for a brief time and he was lucky that it was one of the few boats not to be taken over by Left-wing sailors as happened in much of the Spanish fleet leaving the navy mainly in the hands of the Republicans.

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that he was prepared to use them against Spaniards on the mainland indicated that for Franco this was a matter of “no holds barred,” and that in repressing Communism (as he saw the threat) he would use the more barbaric colonial methods. From his days in Morocco and quelling the rebellion in Asturias Franco revealed he had a clear understanding of the use and threat of terror; a theme he would carry throughout the Civil War and beyond. Amongst his early broadcasts was the unveiled threat that those who opposed would be shown no mercy either in the battle or afterwards. He would often refer to “exemplary punishment.” He revealed this early on in his arrival in Morocco when he approved the execution of his first cousin (a Republican) a major Ricardo de la Puente Bahamonde.* Mola had been successful in Pamplona where he had civilian support and now Morocco was in Franco’s hands. However, it was not as successful as anticipated since many of the major urban complexes stayed Republican, and it was self-evident this was not going to be another Primo de Rivera taking control in a matter of days. General Goded (a potential rival for Franco) was captured in Barcelona having arrived from the Balearics only to find the area in Republican hands. Franco was proved right because where the Civil Guard and Assault Guards remained loyal to the government they succeeded. A few days into the rebellion the insurgents held about a third of Spain, mainly the agricultural areas whilst the Republic held the industrial areas. The government was in a state of shock at unfolding events, and the Prime Minister Quiroga resigned and Azaña tried to form a coalition looking for an agreement with the rebels, but there was now no room for compromise. Mola refused an offered post in government and warned the government there was no room for conciliation. There was governmental discussion about arming the people, meaning the organised Left-wing groups willing to fight; Quiroga and Barrio opposed the idea but others realised they could no longer count on the army. The workers were authorised to take up military weapons and this eventually, and with some speed, meant that the defence of the Republic was now in the hands of the Left-wing groups, the very thing that Franco had long feared he had now helped precipitate. It has been suggested that this arming of the Left-wing “would guarantee both full-scale civil war and violent revolution, the twin catastrophes that would plague Spain for the next three years.”180 However, it was the army generals such as Mola, *

Although it has been suggested that “Franco blanched” at having to countenance this execution; see Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.133

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Franco and Sanjurjo who had initiated a rebellion against the government.* Either way this led to immediate atrocities by both sides as revenge and counter-revenge followed at an alarming rate. Franco blamed it all on the Communists, but of all the factions they tended to be the ones who attempted to seek a form of control as it appeared that Spain could descend into violent anarchy. The conspirators undoubtedly were beginning to wonder about the future; they had lost Fanjul executed in Madrid, and Goded in Barcelona, and now they faced a large armed working-class. Then the news came through that Sanjurjo had died in a plane crash as he was leaving Portugal.† The effect of these men disappearing from the scene was significant simply because it left Mola and Franco as the only two remaining candidates likely to be the leading man or dictator. José Primo de Rivera was in prison in Alicante and would soon be executed. The Falangists at this stage were limited but growing and without direct leadership, leading the German ambassador to note a little later that “Franco is a leader without a party, the Falange a party without a leader.”181 On July 23rd Mola formed the National Defence Council (Junta de defensa Nacional) consisting of himself and seven other principal commanders. Out of the fifty-one main peninsula garrisons rebellions were attempted in forty-four; of the top eleven regional commanders only three joined the revolt, and only six of the twenty-four major generals. Spain was divided and both divisions had their factions. The Army and the Civil Guard were split in loyalty and the Left-wing was a mixture of Socialists, Communists and Anarchists. For his part Franco was held up in Morocco or rather more “holed up” because the Spanish Navy was mainly Republican. The sailors had revolted against their officers consequently Franco could not transport his battle-experienced and highly feared troops to Spain with any speed. He was fortunate and clever. He was fortunate in so far that Gibraltar would have nothing to do with the war including not allowing Republican warships to dock. Franco also found he had the *

Franco and Mola despite the fact they often clashed had similar bigoted views and like Franco “Mola over-estimated the menace of the miniscule Spanish Communist Party, which he viewed as the tool of sinister Jewish-Masonic machinations.” See Preston Paul, The Spanish Holocaust (London: Harper Press, 2012) p.39 † The playboy air-ace Juan Ansaldo had arrived in a small bi-plane but the Portuguese authorities were nervous and Ansaldo was obliged to pick Sanjurjo up from a race track where he clipped some trees on take-off possibly because of Sanjurjo’s excessive baggage. There was a conspiracy theory about a bomb but it was unlikely.

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backing of General Alfredo Kindelán of the Spanish Air Force. This gave him the possibility of flying troops to Spain, but the Spanish air force was somewhat limited for such a massive exercise. Franco used his wile and cunning to invoke the help of Mussolini and Hitler. It was not easy because Mussolini was nervous and at first declined any involvement. Franco had sent an emissary but the future looked bleak so Franco tracked down Italian officials in Africa, and Ciano, just recently created Foreign Minister showed more interest than his father-in-law Mussolini. Ciano persuaded Mussolini that Franco could well win and undoubtedly would be in their debt. There is little doubt that the hesitant Mussolini eventually decided “to make a major commitment seeing the outcome of the Spanish war as vital to the future of Italian policy in the Mediterranean.”182 Franco then turned his attention to Germany; again there was initial reluctance but Hitler eventually granted an audience along with Göring, and instead of the requested ten planes he sent twenty.* Hitler called it the Unternehmen Feuerzauber (Operation Magic Fire) probably because that evening he had attended a performance of Siegfried in which this music is named. This was a brilliant move by Franco, not just to relieve his current predicament of having isolated troops, but it established the support of two fascist neighbours who probably realised the importance of having another fascist-style state indebted to them. It also established Franco’s importance because he had made these initial contacts; “it was Franco who had been recognised as the de facto insurgent leader by Hitler and Mussolini, despite the formal existence of the Junta de Defensa Nacional; established in Burgos on 24th July.”183 Taking the initiative in looking for international support was a major boost for others recognising his importance, but it also appears that Mola had some influence on Mussolini.184 In addition to this, and against all advice, Franco decided to risk a sea journey on the grounds that the Republican naval ratings without the aid of officers would be lost in how to react. The venture was now helped by having aerial support. Just before the crossing was made Franco flew to Seville to ensure that all plans were in place. The German aid was to be critical, and Hitler asked Canaris (who had spent time in Spain as a secret agent in the Great War and spoke Spanish) to act as the liaison officer. While Mola struggled in the north Franco had already started the process of gaining major international support. Had Hitler not helped the insurgency may well have failed, but his interference turned the following years into a long bloody Civil war. When news that *

By the end of August Franco had fifteen Ju-52 transport planes, six old Henschel fighters, nine Italian medium bombers, twelve Fiat CR.32 fighters and supplies.

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the Moroccan troops had arrived in mainland Spain it sent shock waves through the Republic because their appalling conduct was infamous; it was well-known they had killed off-hand, plundered, raped and tortured and that Franco accepted this behaviour as his means of controlling through terror. The stage was already being set: it goes without saying as in most wars, especially civil wars that there was brutality on both sides. Spain was polarised and there was a deep sense of hatred between the two sides. The insurgents tended to have some middle-class backing especially from the Catholic and conservative strata. The western democracies were alarmed when faced with dictatorships on the one hand, but the opposition appeared to be an out-of-control revolutionary Left-wing, and to all appearances the government could not rely on its own army.

Generalísimo Political tact was highly sensitive during even these fraught times. When King Alfonso’s son Don Juan de Borbón turned up offering to fight, Mola turned him back which troubled many of the monarchists fighting for the insurgents, and lost Mola some support from the royal supporters. Franco would do the same later but with the better excuse that the monarch had to survive in order to govern the whole of Spain. In Seville Franco installed himself into a magnificent palace and surrounded his office with what looked like a general staff. Hitler also had dealings with General Queipo de Llano the local man who was not to Franco’s political tastes and the feeling was mutual. Although Franco treated Queipo de Llano with care he was uneasy with this senior commander which would later lead to open clashes. Acting with some speed Franco sent out three column attacks under Yagüe on the old Roman town of Mérida. It was successful and with the hope that the two halves of nationalist Spain would eventually be united. Even at this early stage the brutality was appalling and thousands of prisoners were executed on a mere shadow of a doubt that they might be Republicans. Women and children were shot and a sense of terror was initiated from the very onset of the invading African troops. Franco made no objection; it satisfied his soldiers and inflamed their passions, rid him of all suspected Left-wing opponents, and created a sense of terror. The Junta was technically in control but the two leading battlefield figures were Franco and Mola, and the next few months would see Franco dominating the scene and allowed to do so by Mola. The critical relationship with Italy and especially Germany were in the hands of Franco since he had projected himself as the leader soon to be in charge of

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Spain. Mola readily accepted this even though some of his staff expressed doubts, eschewing that this would give the greater prominence to Franco.

Queipo de Llano

The ultimate goal was to be Madrid and Mola and Franco held this strategy in common, but for a variety of historically disputed reasons it never happened with the anticipated speed. Franco turned his attention to Badajoz which many suggest gave Madrid time to prepare their defences. There is no question that this was Franco’s decision and his motivations remain obscure. When Badajoz fell the usual systematic brutal and indiscriminate killings took place centred on the town’s bull-ring. In Seville in the August of 1936 Franco caught the Junta by surprise by suddenly announcing that the red-yellow and red monarchist flag should be flown. In this single and perhaps cunning act Franco drew the extreme Right-wing monarchists to his side. There is little doubt that he was carefully looking to his own future. The Germans had decided that all their aid should be directed through Franco, and Mola continued to accept this situation and seemingly appeared to be in good relations with Franco, whose troops were also proving the most successful because of their barbarity and experience. Mola was aware of the esteem with which Franco was held as was the Junta de Burgos; they were aware that some Portuguese newspapers were already referring to Franco as the Commander-in-Chief.

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In early August Franco had given a series of confusing messages in an interview to a Portuguese journalist stating one moment that “Spain is Republican and will continue to be so,” and later that “Spain will be governed by a corporative system similar to those installed in Portugal, Italy and Germany,” and a few days later he spoke of the necessity of a short-term military dictatorship.185 It seems that at this stage Franco was still fermenting his own ideas about Spain’s future and his own role. At first the gathering conflict was seen in simple terms as a battle between the “Reds and the Fascists,” but soon the terms Republicans and Nationalists became the adopted nomenclature. In late August Franco moved his headquarters to another palatial building in Caceres not least to rid himself of the presence of Queipo de Llano. The battle at this stage raged around Talavera where, such was the fear engendered by the African troops, many militiamen simply fled the scene. Franco was also concerned about relieving the situation in Toledo apparently diverting troops from the critical capture of Madrid; his motivations again are obscure and obfuscated by postwar propaganda. The siege in the Alcázar de Toledo was being viewed at the time as a Nationalistic symbol and received wide publicity. It was argued at the time and since that by doing this Franco failed to take Madrid which was vulnerable at that point in time, but the facts are elusive. In the meantime his family had returned from their sojourn in France, but Franco was too busy to give them much time. Franco was aware of the growing ramifications from overseas, the Soviet Union supplying the Republicans, and the German demand that Franco be declared the Head of State; they were investing in the Civil War so that Franco could be their man. Franco, although always pretending otherwise, always had his eye on his own political future. He had already presented himself to the Germans and Italians as the one man who could unify the country after the conflict. The Germans went further and wanted Franco to declare himself as Head of State immediately, but being a cautious man he pretended he was beyond politics. His caution did not please his closest supporters and they with his brother Nicolás tried to apply pressure on him to be more decisive. Eventually the somewhat reluctant Junta de Defensa Nacional were called to resolve the issue. This meeting was called on the 21st September 1936 in an airfield close to Salamanca.* The Chairman was Cabanellas who had once lost popularity for being involved in rebelling against Primo de Rivera, and had been *

In the Chair was General Cabanellas, with Franco, Mola, Queipo de Llano, Dávila, Saliquet, and Colonels Montaner, Moreno Calderón and three other generals.

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associated with the Republicans. Queipo de Llano had opposed Alfonso XIII, and Mola had not performed as well as Franco in the battlefield, and was tainted by some for the fashion in which he had rejected Alfonso’s son when he offered to fight. Mola conceded that Franco had a better reputation than he did, was nationally better known, and his overseas contacts in Germany and Italy were vital. Franco with his usual caution and careful humility seemed to be uninterested but to him it was a chess game. By the time of this meeting Toledo and its relief by Franco’s troops was seen as a great victory for Franco, and many have been tempted to suggest that this was intentional, even though it meant that Madrid was given time to draw breath. It was a major turning point for Franco and was probably “part of his campaign to promote himself as undisputed leader of the Nationalists.”186 It left Franco on a personal high making his appointment as Generalísimo seem natural. Whether planned or not Toledo gave Franco’s ambitions a boost, but caused considerable harm to the Nationalist cause. “By permitting Madrid to organise defences, the diversion was to swing the advantage back to the Republic almost as starkly as the crossing of the Straits had given it to the military rebels.”187 As noted in Part One Henry Buckley the journalist did not share this view, and may possibly have been wrong on this occasion. Traditional military does not work easily in the political war that Spain suffered, but the failure to take Madrid has many possible sound reasons. Franco was pre-occupied with the political machinations of the moment, his advanced troops were meeting a more tenacious and organised resistance, his military intelligence was weak, he was ignorant at this time of the technically advanced Russian tanks in use for the Republicans, as well as the advice given by Soviet personnel. Franco could not bolster the Madrid troops because he had other battlefronts, he chose the uphill route (against Yagüe’s advice) and the Republicans had captured a copy of his plans.* After the brutal and ferocious crushing of the Republicans at Toledo the normal foreign correspondents found themselves forbidden entrance; much was made of the Toledo victory at home and on news-screens abroad. Franco was feted as the victor. Meanwhile, the Air Chief Kindelán was busy drawing up the Junta’s agenda that Franco should not only be the Commander in Chief but also the Head of State; the word Generalísimo took on more ramifications than some members of the Junta had anticipated. The members had at first seen it as just a military appointment for the duration of the conflict, not as a major political appointment. It was *

The heavy Soviet T-26 tanks out-classed the lighter vehicles given by Italy and Germany, and the Soviet advisers had taught the Republicans the use of the Molotov cocktail developed during the Finnish war by Finnish troops.

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not long before “the generals who had not supported full power for him had no precise alternative plan of their own and ended up giving in.”188 Kindelán was forceful, and a reluctant Junta eventually agreed, though some members were justified in feeling nervous. Legal documents were drawn up, but once Franco was total dictator of the military and of the civil sector he simply took the powers he needed. He had received the support of the royalists but he would never allow a king to share his power, but he skilfully managed to keep them on side. The Church under Pius XI gave him a formidable boost at this time by referring to the war as a crusade, and even differentiating between the necessary heroism of the Nationalists, and the barbaric behaviour of the Republicans. Franco had always been Catholic, but now he realised that religion “even more than nationalism, must become the principal moral support of the National movement, and decided that he must give Catholicism much more than respect.”189 There were those elements in the Church which jumped with pleasure at this policy. Hemingway pointed to this inexplicable behaviour of the Church in those days when he said “it’s not very Catholic or Christian to kill the wounded in hospital in Toledo with hand-grenades or to bomb the working quarter of Madrid for no military reason except to kill poor people, whose politics are only the politics of desperation. I know they have shot priests and bishops but why was the Church in politics on the side of the oppressors?”190 The message of the Church that it was a crusade also gave Franco the self-image enhancement he needed. It even attracted the attention of some conservative British MPs who saw Franco has defending Christendom. His propagandists built up this image of the Christian crusader to ridiculous levels, and Franco made sure people knew he started the day at Mass and had his own personal Chaplain.* His wife certainly tried to convince him he led a religious crusade. There is no doubt that given his Catholic background the Blessing of the Church was important to him not only politically but possibly at a personal level. He even took to the habit of entering Churches under a canopy which was the old tradition of royalty; this said much about his self-perceptions. In December 1936 Franco and Archbishop Isidro Gomá, the primate of Spain, reached an agreement on the complete freedom of Church activities and the Marian cult, and all the traditional symbols were returned to schools, and Corpus Christi was again declared a national holiday. There were elements of the Spanish Church who were more cautious and some in the Vatican who * His Chaplain was Father José María Bulart who stayed with him from 1936 until his death

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watched with nervousness what was happening in Germany and Italy.* Franco took a very different approach to the Church from Hitler’s Nazi approach. Hitler and his cohorts such as Göbbels and Himmler despised the Church and would have happily closed it down, but “Göbbels advised the various Gauleiters that during the war criticism of the Church should have a low profile. There were too many adherents of the Church amongst the soldiers; and the Church was a problem which could be solved after the war.”191 The Nazi regime trod with care and Mussolini could not afford to clash with the Vatican. On the other hand Franco actively sought the support of the ecclesiastical edifice and with considerable success. He had even taken over the Episcopal Palace at Salamanca, old friends and military colleagues soon found he had elevated himself and visitors were expected to wear formal morning suits. The place was guarded by the Moorish Guard. “The military chieftains who had elevated Franco to supreme power may initially have thought of their leader as a sort of primus inter pares, but this notion did not accord with Franco’s ideas.”192 There had been no challenging opposition and “Franco emerged as leader out this power vacuum.”193 Franco’s investiture took place on October 1st 1936 with the necessary pomp and ceremony, and Cabanellas handed over the authority of the Junta to one man. Robles instructed the large number of CEDA members to submit themselves to the military membership, but the Falangist and Carlists tried to maintain their autonomous roles. However, when the Carlists tried to open their own military school Franco closed it at once and sent their leader Manuel Fal Conde into exile. The Falangists were a little more successful but only because they were growing in size by the day; they were in fact the largest political party in Spanish history but without a leader. The old Junta de Burgos was instantly dissolved and replaced by the Junta Técnica which was completely subservient to Franco, and remained in Burgos whilst Franco moved to Salamanca near Madrid, not too far from Portugal. Congratulations arrived from Germany and Italy and Franco was content with the title Caudillo as for him it meant the same as Führer and Duce. Despite the acclamations Franco was not going to gain the easy military victory as so many of his supporters had anticipated. The growth of the International Brigades in support of the Republic had increased, and Russian weaponry was beginning to arrive in numbers. However, “Franco’s army was better organised than that of his enemies. Political unity gave him unity of command.”194 On the other hand as “political unity helped to Nationalist victory so much, division *

It was not until 1953 that an official concordat was finally signed.

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amongst Republicans was a prime cause of their defeat,” but the war was far from over.195 Like many men in power Franco often made the wrong sort of appointments, old friends, family and sycophants. His brother Nicolás was reckless and enjoyed the good life, but nobody could object because Franco was his brother. His other brother Ramón known by all as a Republican and something of an anarchist returned to Franco once he held total power, and was immediately given the post of Lieutenant Colonel in charge of nationalist forces in Mallorca (Majorca).* This led to muted protests including one from his great supporter Kindelán; Franco ignored him (and dropped him after the war). “Franco had taken to the prerogatives of his power with the skill and arbitrariness of a Borgia.”196 Millán Astray as head of the Press and Propaganda was nothing short of a disaster. Millán chose Bolín as Press Chief who on his boss’s advice threatened foreign correspondents with execution, and eventually illtreated Arthur Koestler which created an international reaction and led to one of Koestler’s popular publications which exposed the truth.† Another press chief called Gonzalo de Aguilera created yet more international scandal claiming that after the war the new sewers should be destroyed because infectious living standards kept the proletariat under some form of birth-control. Perhaps even more revealing about Franco was his treatment of José Primo de Rivera. The head of the Falange was still in prison in Alicante, and there was considerable talk and action about having him released. There was the possibility of exchange or bribery, and even the Germans thought about simply breaking him out using their navy just off the coast. As far as Franco was concerned José Primo de Rivera was one his outspoken critics, but Franco also needed the support of the massive Falange group which had the support of the Germans. Whenever there was a possibility of his release Franco found some reason not to give it the go ahead or obfuscated and confused everyone as to what should happen. José Primo de Rivera was shot in Alicante on the 20th November 1936 yet it was deliberately rumoured this had not happened, and Franco was happy for the cult of the “the absent one” to be built up simply because he could be seen as standing in for him. Franco had become a dangerous man to *

Ramón met with a degree of hostility from fellow officer but soon earned their respect because of the high number of combat missions he undertook and for criticising Italian pilots for being too timid, see Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.167 † Koestler was later to be interned by the French and wrote a similar exposé.

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disagree with on any point. He gave the appearance of wanting to save José Primo de Rivera and this was emphasised later in the propaganda about the incident.

José Primo de Rivera

The war continued but not the way Franco had anticipated. Some historians have speculated that Franco did not mind a long war because it would give him the opportunity to eradicate all his enemies. In early October 1936 he announced the march on Madrid would begin which Mola started with his two-part strategy of coming at the city from different angles. With the arrival of modern weaponry gone were the days of the old colonial type war of field-craft and surprise. The Spanish military had not developed at the same pace as in other European countries, and both the Nationalists and the Republicans were ill-prepared for a modern war. The Nationalists had some advantage with their trained troops and Italian contingents, but as General José Solchaga, “one of Franco’s veteran commanders observed in his diary, ‘Lucky for us that the Reds are worse!’”197 Madrid became a two front war with the use of modern and sometimes sophisticated weapons. Mola was convinced he could redeem himself from

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his earlier failure to take Madrid, but he was now facing a force of tanks and planes. Both sides found the nature of the war changing and there was a degree of hesitation amongst the Nationalists as Franco consulted with the Italians and Germans; Mola and Yagüe disagreed over their respective approaches to Madrid. There was, however, a high degree of confidence amongst the Nationalists that success was imminent, but Russian aircraft piloted by Russians were now part of the scene. The Germans expressed concern over the lack of progress and many historians have commented on the fact that the Spanish War brought the Italians and Germans closer together. This would certainly have been in the interests of Hitler with his long-term plans. The well-known Condor Legion was dispatched with great alacrity from Germany under General Sperrle, and the Germans started to insist that their soldiers came under the command of German officers. This was the beginning of a problem for Franco who welcomed and knew he needed outside help, but he wanted foreign volunteers to boost his army and not to have any control. As noted in Part One the Republican government believed the Nationalists would be successful and fled to Valencia leaving the defence in the hands of a confused Junta led by a weak José Miaja, but who had the support of a more determined Lieutenant Colonel Rojo. The Nationalist confidence was so widespread that some journalists wrote accounts of victory parades in Madrid to the bemusement of Henry Buckley mentioned earlier. Some of the plans for the Nationalist advance were discovered inside an abandoned tank and were found to be revealing and useful. There was understandably a deep fear of facing the African troops with their barbaric reputation, but this time Franco’s colonial troops were not fighting over their traditional scrubland, but in the suburbs which somewhat levelled the fighting skills for the Republican militiamen. The German aircraft heavily bombed some areas giving the clear impression that Franco was prepared to do anything to win. The resistance of the Republican forces came as a surprise, and in his usual fashion Franco demanded the university area which had been taken be held at any cost. In this attitude to defeats Hitler was to have the same approach to his army’s detriment. This halt in the anticipated capture of Madrid gave the Republicans a renewed sense of determination, and many began to think Franco would not be able to win without German and Italian help. For their part the Italians were becoming somewhat sceptical not only about Franco’s military ability, but that the Nationalists lacked the necessary offensive spirit. It was believed, probably with some truth that the Nationalists were fighting as if it were a colonial war. Franco’s most experienced troops were well versed in country warfare and it had served

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them well in Morocco as well as the mainland countryside of small towns and villages, but it was becoming an urban conflict with modern weapons and a growing determined resistance. Mussolini had reached a point, as with the Germans, that he now felt able to apply his own pressures before granting more aid. Mussolini gave General Roatta control of Italian forces, and General Faupel representing the German forces insisted on the same condition for the German contingents. Franco was becoming more dependent on the Falangists and the extreme Royalists both of which had their own agendas, and in his paranoid way of retaining his personal power, as with most dictators, it became a cause of concern for him. It was at this critical stage he cleverly ensured Alfonso’s son did not join in the fighting as mentioned earlier; he managed to do this with more tact and without alienating the Royalists as Mola had once done. In the meantime Madrid had frozen into a static situation with the occasional bout of bitter and brutal fighting. At the end of 1936 Franco accepted the formal offer of Italian help including contingents of some 3,000 Black Shirts. Franco was worried about ultimate victory after Madrid, but was also irritated if not angry about the way the Germans and especially the Italians were beginning to dictate events, and the perpetual fear that they would be revealed as the victors and not him. If he were going to rule Spain he would be in a tenuous situation if the population noted that the war was won by foreign mercenaries. Franco’s one bright light at the end of 1936 was that the Church officially partially recognised Franco’s Spain as the State by appointing a confidential Chargé d’affaires. In the following year Franco was given the relic of St Teresa’s hand which the Church permitted him to keep. His Christian faith appears for many to have been somewhat bizarre, overly superstitious, and his conduct certainly clashed with the teachings of Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, the Spanish Church had sided with Franco and the military. “As reported privately to the Vatican at the beginning of August 1936 by Cardinal Gomá: ‘it can be said that it is a fight between Spain and Anti-Spain, religion and atheism, Christian civilisation and barbarism.’ Only a month later the Bishop of Salamanca would openly apply the Augustinian image of the ‘two cities’ to defend the cause of Franco the ‘celestial city; for the ‘love of God,’ facing a Republic of ‘an earthly city’ in contempt of God.”198 The Spanish episcopacy soon blessed Franco as homo missus a Deo cui nomen erat Franciscus, the man sent by God whose name is Francisco. It almost elevated him to the status of a prophet or even John the Baptist.

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Franco’s Struggles 1937 Later Franco would gloss over the international assistance he was given, but he knew at the time it was essential. He was unhappy but had no choice but to accept an Italian and German general staff and was obliged to listen to their advice. They arrived at three possible plans, first a massive assault from Teruel to Valencia, secondly a march from Sigüenza to Guadalajara to tighten the grip on Madrid, and finally to capture Málaga and its essential ports. It was an unhappy time for Franco because he had to acknowledge the Italian help was essential, but at the same time he resented their incursions because it detracted from his own self-perceived and widely published brilliance. This was further complicated by Franco’s personal need to settle matters in the all-important capital of Madrid. In early February the Italians and the Nationalists had reached Málaga which given the aerial and naval bombardment was not difficult to achieve. The Republican government cut off in Valencia could do little. The barbarity mainly associated with the African colonial troops happened again, and along with the Italian and Nationalist troops even attacked the long refugee columns trying to seek safety. Franco appeared to show little interest in the Málaga victory probably because of his fear of losing Madrid, and his irritation at what he perceived to be the Italian take-over of command; this was not helped when a delighted Mussolini promoted Roatta to Major General. Also in early February a large army under General Orgaz (the General whom he had left in charge of the insurrection in the Canary Islands) backed by the Condor Legion attacked through the Jarama Valley towards the Madrid-Valencia highway; this attracted Franco more because of his obsession with Madrid. Franco’s prestige was at stake and he wanted to cleanse all areas of Republicans and Left-wing influence whether they were pro-active or not. As it happened the Jarama Valley was strongly defended by the Republicans at a high cost to their international brigades. Franco clashed badly with the Italians, but was eventually forced to accept their decisions because he realised he could not win without them, and he accepted their idea of an attack on Guadalajara which was forty miles north-east of Madrid. Franco changed tactics and decided to attack the weakest areas and slowly surround Madrid, and take “advantage of the fact that Republicans’ lack of sufficient reserves of men and material to feed and fight,” was a serious disadvantage.199 Franco was not going to oblige his German and Italian supporters for seeking a quick victory, but he wanted the total removal of any form of enemy; he considered his Spanish opponents as despicable as the rebel mountain men in Morocco. It became

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for Franco a matter of purification, cleansing and possible redemption for the condemned. It was about this time that the Vatican started to suggest some form of compromise peace and discussions took place in the early part of 1937 when Franco made it abundantly clear he was only interested in total surrender. As far as Franco was concerned the Basque question of regional autonomy had to be crushed once and for all for the sake of the nation. It was evident as always that Franco wanted the Republicans crushed, and his mopping up exercises demonstrated his thought patterns. The Italians expressed a degree of horror the way prisoners were treated after the fighting stopped. When the Italian Emissary Cantaloupe was informed of the barbarity he requested instructions from Rome. Ciano rightly saw the whole issue as damaging in terms of international publicity and Cantaloupe had a meeting with Franco to discuss the problem. Franco, like some Nazis leaders much later, pretended it was out of his control and overplayed. He promised to check what was happening, but it continued at a horrific rate, especially in the recently overrun Málaga. When the Church complained about priests being killed in the Basque area Franco responded more positively than he had done with the Italians. The protests rose and received widespread news coverage overseas so Franco was obliged to have all sentences confirmed by him, and he looked through the lists faster than a menu and simply signed them away. He pretended that the condemned all received a fair trial and had their own lawyers; these claims were outright lies, and postwar it was all brushed under the proverbial carpet. Even his brother-in-law Serrano Suñer tried to persuade him to be more judicious, but as mentioned before Franco was intent on wiping out not only the enemy but all potential opposition.* He was to be the one in charge and no one was able to challenge his authority; when Mussolini suggested a Prince of Savoy be put on the Spanish throne it was rejected at once. He did however take to the idea of a fascist style National Party which was no surprise. His obsession with taking Madrid continued as did his annoyance with the Italians. Regarding the Germans he desperately needed their help for any military success, but was angry at their dictates. After lengthy debates and continuous ambiguity from Franco the Italian Roatta at last thought he had the go ahead to advance on Guadalajara. In theory the Italian flanks were watched by Spanish brigades and the movement of the Spanish *

Serrano had escaped Madrid having witnessed the execution of his two brothers, leaving him distraught and ill and he fled to Franco having disguised himself as a woman. See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.156

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forces from Jarama. The date was set for March 8th but once again Franco blurred the timing with his deliberately vague way of answering Roatta’s communication. It was to be a disaster for a number of reasons long discussed by historians. The Black Shirts were ill-clad in light colonial uniforms for the appalling weather, and were surprised by the dedicated onslaught of the prepared Republicans. The nationalist aircraft were “bogged” down in mud while the Republicans had proper runways. The Italians complained about the ponderous movement of the Spanish troops, especially from the south, and when Roatta complained to Franco he blamed his generals whom he later replaced, but only after promoting them. The Republicans were well-equipped with modern weapons and fought tenaciously. For a vast number of reasons the Italians were defeated, but Franco’s role raised many questions. It was clear that Franco had probably not authorised the troops to move from the south possibly thinking them irrelevant, or at a more sinister level he wanted the Italians to receive a bloody nose at a battle he did not think too critical. “Franco was either culpably deficient in hard information or else maliciously determined to use the Italians as pawns in his preferred tactic of attrition.”200 Roatta went to see Franco and during his absence his troops suffered a serious onslaught from the Republicans, mainly because Roatta had left without giving instructions for defensive measures. Franco did not want his victory won by Italians volunteers, (though from captured prisoners it was soon established that the Italians were regular soldiers) who were not under his command. He wrote another highly ambiguous letter to Mussolini explaining what had happened. Mussolini was furious that his army had failed and Franco was delighted when he was told that the Duce had decided that Italian forces would be dispersed among Spanish troops and come under Spanish command. Franco was militarily behind the times of the 1930s. He was caught in the colonial warfare of the 1920s in Africa with medieval beliefs in honour, loyalty and strength with which he had imbued his Legion. The modern world of planes and tanks were essential and despite his distaste for the Italians he still needed them, and especially German expertise. However, the disaster of Guadalajara helped change his reluctant mind from capturing Madrid. He started to conscript new troops and having consulted with Mola and the German Sperrle of the German Luftwaffe decided that the Basque region had to be brought under control. He considered that the capturing of the Basque region would be easy. Sperrle was convinced that ground advance supported by air-support would win the day. This was to be the way the Germans so easily crushed unprepared Poland and later France in what was in time dubbed blitzkrieg

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war. This form of attack must have appealed to Franco because part of its basis was the fear it created. When Durango was bombed, which Franco denied, it had a devastating effect not only on those killed, wounded and made homeless, but on the region as a whole as the news spread. There was a dispute between Sperrle and Mola because the latter wanted the Basque region’s industrial sites eliminated; Sperrle could not see the sense because they could be utilised later. When Franco was consulted he equivocated again, but one thing was clear he cared little for the death and destruction the bombing raids caused. As it was the Basque fighters put up a greater resistance than anticipated in defence sites they had previously prepared. Mola and Sperrle although disagreeing over the places to be bombed eventually focused on Guernica, ostensibly because it was a crossroads for the retreating enemy. However, whatever the excuse “it was target of dubious strategic value but one whose destruction was a devastating blow to the morale of the Basques.”201 As is well-known the town was central to the Basque region, its ancient capital and a major market town; it was bombed by the Condor Legion with the Italian planes taking part to devastating effect. Guernica was all but annihilated in one day, and although the number of dead remains uncertain most tend to agree it was at least 1500 dead. Guernica had become the symbol of the brutality of the Civil War and was widely condemned by the shocked international community. It soon became public knowledge because there were foreign reporters present, and major articles soon appeared in The London and New York Times.* There was an immediate backtracking by the Nationalists who tried to claim the Basque rebels had perpetrated this deed with dynamite to give their enemy a bad reputation. A ridiculous form of cover-up started immediately, and even the Luftwaffe sent men in to clear away any signs of a bombing attack. It will always remain a curiosity to know if the German High Command in Berlin had been made aware beforehand, or whether this was just Sperrle obliging his Spanish masters. It would appear that Franco may have told Sperrle to tell lies to his German control, and this heavily underlined the possibility that Franco had full knowledge of the attack beforehand. Later the excuse was deployed that it was to attack a small arms factory, but the massive use of *

The critical journalist was George L Steer and his article helped fuel the fear of bombing civilian areas; a subject much discussed in Britain during this uneasy international period. It has also been suggested that the bombing of Guernica “had the effect of heightening concern about the destructiveness of the Luftwaffe, a fear that encouraged appeasement of Germany,” (Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.182)

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incendiary bombs clearly demonstrated that it was a terror attack of mass destruction. Picasso made the incident immortal with his painting, and with the foreign correspondents put the lie to the Nationalist excuses, and exposed the barbarity behind Franco’s policies. It certainly sent a sense of fear throughout the population, and the Republican resistance. One thing is certain Franco and the Nationalists handled the situation poorly, illustrating that for all the efforts being made in propaganda there were serious weaknesses. Of greater concern to Franco than the international criticisms about Guernica was his personal grip on power. He was forever conscious as with most ascending dictators of internal threats against his leadership. This is the usual paranoid feeling which even democratic politicians suffer, but in the case of dictators of any shape or origin the paranoia is often intense. Nevertheless Franco was growing in confidence; ever since his days as a young officer he had started to believe that providence was guiding and caring for him. By 1938 “he was convinced that he was an instrument of divine providence, endowed with special powers” but amongst his fears remained the Carlists with their long history of fierce monarchical support and the sudden rise of the Falangists.202 He was conscious that his distrusted colleague Queipo de Llano in the south was controlling large areas of Andalusia with political ambitions, and even Mola was looking for some form of political future.* The war was far from finished but already the power play for position in postwar Spain started to rumble in Franco’s mind. Franco had joyfully accepted the Mussolini suggestion of a single-party led by a single leader and perceived himself as the national saviour of Spain. This left little space for even the mildest of threats. The Falangists and Carlists undoubtedly anticipated they had earned the right to have some influence. In many ways Franco had several advantages, not least the end of José Primo de Rivera whom, by sheer passivity, he had allowed to have executed by the Republicans. Calvo Sotelo’s death had been advantageous and Franco made a point of treating his old political ally Robles very coldly. Robles recognised what was happening and believed that Franco had started a whispering campaign against him as being the person whose weakness allowed the Republic to blossom in the first place. Robles had supported Franco initially, but he knew he was regarded as a threat to the future, and Robles knew this was evolving from an earlier time. *

Queipo de Llano and Franco were colleagues only because of the war and actually despised one another, Queipo de Llano sometimes referred to Franco as Paca la culona (like fat-fanny Frankie).

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The main fear for Franco was that although he saw himself as the sole leader others were beginning to talk about the possibility and need of a political structure; as far as Franco was concerned he was the political structure, L’état c’est moi, as with Louis XIV. At this stage some generals were wondering about the future, but nearly all who reflected on this nevertheless “saw the need to toe the line in the final stages of military assault against an isolated, weakened and harassed Republic.”203 A key component for Franco was his brother-in-law Serrano Suñer who had seen his family’s suffering at the beginning of the war, which had turned him vehemently against democracy. He then found refuge with Franco and gave Franco the intellectual support he needed. Unlike Franco, Serrano Suñer was a gifted intellectual and a legal expert. He was the quiet and sometimes not so quiet driving force behind Franco’s immediate future and replaced Nicolás Franco who was too wayward in his behaviour, and lacked any sense of serious administration or planning. It was Serrano Suñer who prompted Franco to look ahead to his future role. The Falange problem was possibly the most serious. They had their own problems of leadership between the old family cabal of Primo de Rivera and Manuel Hedilla, who was robust but not clever, and was building up a group of his own followers within the movement. If Franco were to keep Queipo de Llano and Mola under control the support of the Falange was critical. Hedilla was a loose cannon and when he became too familiar with the Germans and was reported to have spoken somewhat derisorily about Franco to the Italians, Franco became wary of him. Hedilla made a bid for the leadership of the Falange in April 1937 but was trumped by a triumvirate who immediately toadied up to Franco. The Falange “had swollen enormously from no more than ten thousand numbers to several hundred thousand, growing even more than the Communist Party in the Republican zone” and Franco needed their support, but remained cautious with them because of their potential power.204 In reality both sides were being played by Franco’s men while Franco pretended he did not know what was happening. Hedilla fought back against the triumvirate and for a time he appeared successful, but he fell into Franco’s trap of appearing on the balcony of the palace alongside Franco believing Franco was acknowledging him as leader of the Falange, when in reality Franco was preparing the crowd for his own leadership. In mid-April 1937 Franco unified the Falangists with the Carlists under the ridiculously long name of the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista often simply penned as FET y de

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las JONS.* The main point was the new organisation came under his direct leadership; “this established the Spanish Traditional Phalanx as the new state party…arbitrarily fusing the Falangists and Carlists.”205 FET soon established formal structures in the regime and gathered forces in support. Despite FET’s efforts later “it was the military and monarchists who held the lion’s share of posts, as well as dominating the most important ministerial appointments.”206 Hedilla was reduced to a mere subordinate. Once Hedilla realised his own political decapitation was portending he tried to fight back ordering his subordinates only to obey Franco if the orders came through Hedilla’s central office. It was a brief time before he was arrested for breaking military law, and his trial was a straightforward farce which condemned him to death. Cardinal Gomá with Serrano Suñer and many others tried to urge caution on Franco who unusually eventually agreed. Hedilla went to prison and was not pardoned until the May of 1947. In the words of the historian Paul Preston “the Falange had been castrated,” and the choice was clear: loyalty to “Franco and access to the privileges or power or opposition to Franco and unemployment, prison and maybe even execution.”207 Franco was able to invent many myths; one of many he constructed was that he was the natural successor of José Primo de Rivera. It certainly helped the Axis powers stay with him. Franco was cunning and while he pretended anti-clericalism with the Nazis he always pandered to the Church for their good opinion. The Vatican had become somewhat nervous about world affairs, publishing in short time an encyclical against Nazi Racism, and another condemning Communism.† At times Franco denied he was a fascist but (under Serrano Suñer’s influence) his language became more and more fascist.208 The bombing of Guernica had made the Church and many Catholics concerned, but Franco needed the Church’s international support if only to stop the democracies supplying the Republic. Cardinal Pacelli, the future Pope had already drafted a letter for Cardinal Gomá alluding to the co-operation of Basque Catholic priests with the hated Communists. This helped Franco a great deal but historically raised a few question marks over the Vatican interference. Franco also wanted the Church to give him full acknowledgment as Head of State as he developed his self-perceived regal status. Either way he had unified his Right-wing components, many out of fear, but now it was time to annihilate his Left-wing enemies. *

Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS usually shortened to FET was later dubbed the National Movement (Movimiento Nacional) † The first was Mit brennender Sorge and the next Divini Redemptoris.

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Efforts were made or rather suggestions proposed that the war should be brought to an end; the excessive barbarity was causing concern both nationally and internationally and within the Church. Outside Guernica the rebels had regathered and were fighting for every kilometre of ground between there and Bilbao. It seemed as if Franco were happy with a prolonged war which, it is often plausibly claimed was because Franco wanted to ensure every single potential enemy was eliminated. There could have been a second strand of thought in Franco’s warped mind in so far that it was easier to consolidate his power during the violence of war than in peace. The end of Hedilla was more easily accomplished and forgotten in the heat of war than had it been during a time of easy peace.

Mola

Mola was his one remaining problem, Franco having never forgiven him for his pretensions in the early days. Franco was aware that Mola wanted the war to finish and not the slow movement that Franco was dictating. Franco was also aware that Mola would expect some political position as a reward. The problem was solved when Mola’s plane crashed in June 1937 prompting considerable and understandable speculation that

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it was deliberate. It can only be speculation because the cause was never discovered. It could have been an enemy plane or even his own side because he was flying in a captured plane with English markings, or simply an accident. Recent biographers have written with assurance that it was simply “engine failure.”209 The German ambassador reported that he gained the sense that Franco was relieved at the disappearance of Mola, and probably because Mola would have been seen as an alternative to Franco. Franco’s comrades often referred to Franco’s Baraka (good fortune) but Franco would have seen it as providence preparing him for the right direction. Mola had agreed with some of the Republican reforms, had been critical of the moves towards a total dictatorship, and the danger of an open rift with Franco was only avoided by Mola’s death.210 Franco appeared undisturbed by the news, erected a monument to Mola, showed no emotion and was undoubtedly satisfied about this incident; another possible contender for his throne was dead and buried. The curious note is that after this Franco travelled by car and not plane. He appointed a General Fidel Dávila in place of Mola and the advance on Bilbao started again. The threats of reprisal and the bombing of Guernica had understandably taken the wind out of the rebels’ sails, and Bilbao was taken unopposed on June 19th. The industries were taken intact (which pleased the Germans) and although the atrocities in the south were not repeated, up to a thousand Basques were executed and many more imprisoned. Franco was now certain of victory and moved his residence to the Palacio Muguiro in Burgos. There followed more bitter fighting on the outskirts of Madrid, and the nationalists won the battle of Brunete at the end of July on the feast day of St James (patron Saint of Spain) which prompted Franco to claim this was the saint’s gift to him. Turning back from Madrid Franco now ordered an advance on Santander which fell a month later on August 26th. Franco was still taking his time to make sure his enemies were dead or imprisoned, and broadcasting and propagating himself as the leader of Spain’s destiny. The capture of Santander caused serious problems between the Italians and Franco. Mussolini had been made fully aware of the atrocities which inevitably followed Franco’s victories, and had suggested that he tried to negotiate a peaceful surrender of the Basques. Franco and the Italian forces were now overwhelming, and the Basques eventually agreed to surrender to the Italians on the 26th to the east of Santander once Nicolás Franco had given the go-ahead. The prisoners embarked on two British ships under Italian command but were blocked by a Spanish warship, and Dávila demanded the prisoners be handed over. For a few days the Italians resisted, but eventually Franco demanded that Bastico obey and the so-

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called trials started at once with the customary reprisals. The Italians had been appalled at the behaviour of the Nationalists towards their prisoners, but now they were flabbergasted by Franco’s lies and deceit. The ploy of the surrender was useful for Franco because the victory was gained at little cost to his resources, but he revealed his true colours overseas and made an enemy of the Basques for the rest of his natural life. Mussolini had no choice but to accept Franco’s decision and made the most of the event by boasting of an Italian victory to cover his perceived shame of Guadalajara. The Germans had replaced their representative Faupel with Baron von Stohrer, and were ardent to gain easy access to the mineral wealth and industry of that part of Spain.* Göring was taking a hand in the German economic programme and was not only keen on the autarky policy but was, as he would demonstrate later, a great believer in the right of plunder. He was looking for a favourable trade agreement with Spain with rights to the various rich Spanish mines. The Spanish were immediately under pressure to accept what was called the Montana Project, as the Germans demanded some form of payback for their support over the years. Franco at first was resistant but nevertheless agreed to many of the German demands. By the end of October he then renounced all agreements even believing that Germany and Italy owed him a debt for fighting for the fascist cause. This created a high degree of consternation in Berlin where there was an impression that Franco was beginning to distant Spain from the German-Italian unwritten alliance. It was especially noted when the Spanish press was ordered to put the brakes on their traditional onslaught on British democracy. In reneging on the Italians over the Basque prisoners, and the Germans on their trade preferential deals Franco was exposing himself as a person who simply could not be trusted. In his characteristic way he wrote long ambiguous letters to both his allies, but the point was now reached when they were not fooled by his explanations. Britain was happier and appointed Sir Robert Hodgson as the British agent to Nationalist Spain.† *

There were two trading corporations, HISMA which provided arms shipments, and a German State corporation ROWAK in charge of imports from Spain. ROWAK created over ten companies of its own in Spain. Franco was aware of the economic hold but had to give in because of his needs for German military supplies. In the end only about 18 per cent of the cost of German supplies was ever repaid. † When he met with Hodgson in early 1938 he hinted that the Spanish system would have some characteristics of the English system which was a downright lie, but also suggested somewhat ominously that he could not forget the support given to him by the Germans and Italians.

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Franco’s attention was drawn to a sudden attack by the Republicans on a small town of Belchite south-east of Zaragoza. The Nationalists were now much stronger in conscripted men and overseas’ weaponry and the attack was unsuccessful. Franco ordered his men to start mopping up the northern regions of Spain, and they were greatly assisted as the Germans gave air-cover and continued to develop their new military tactics of airto-ground support. Franco soon had all the northern ports in his control, the northern industries and thousands of prisoners of war as cheap labour. His propagandists ensured he was seen as the liberator of the crusade that was freeing Spain from the tyranny of communism and the disease of the Left-wing. He was making sure he was seen in the same light under the same kind of authority that Hitler had organised as the Führer. Democracy was condemned as a weakness and a thing of the past. Serrano Suñer was ensuring that the machinery for Franco to be an outright Dictator was being set in place; there had to be a fabric giving the pretence of good government. In October 1937 there was the first Consejo Nacional of the unified FET y de las JONS mentioned above and which was modelled on Mussolini’s model; it had some fifty members and Serrano Suñer ensured they were all pro-Franco. It was inaugurated with all the pomp and ceremony normally associated with a ruling royalty. This was expected because Franco was entirely despotic. When Alfonso XIII wrote about the re-establishment of the monarchy he was given short-shrift by Franco who made it clear he was the only ruler. Franco was becoming more open in his intentions, and even treated his German and Italian allies who had been the major impetus behind his victory with a degree of coldness. Franco with an increased army turned his attention back towards Guadalajara with the hope of encircling Madrid. The Republicans under Vicente Rojo foresaw his plans (which were obsessive for Franco) and turned their attention to Teruel to divert his attention.* Franco’s German and Italian military advisers and many of his own men attempted to convince Franco that Teruel was a side-diversion, and to push on against Madrid. He could not be persuaded on the grounds that he wanted this war of attrition to decimate the enemy, and he wanted no victories on their part. Franco was often accused of being little better than a battalion commander because he had been made a general too young, but it was argued by some that he was sound militarily because he always planned

* General Vicente Rojo was the Republican Chief of Staff; he was a capable planner and always seeking a means of breaking through the Nationalist lines.

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with caution; either way it was a bitter and life-damaging battle fought in temperatures below twenty degrees centigrade.

Towards Final Victory 1938 In early January 1938 the Republicans managed to enter Teruel where the Nationalist leader, even though he and his men fought bravely he was denounced as traitorous. At terrible costs to both sides the Nationalist pushed on in the most appalling of circumstances and eventually retook Teruel in early February. Once again, as in other recent battles, it was becoming clear that Franco had the most weapons, aircraft and forces at his disposal compared to the Republicans whose hopes were diminishing. It has been estimated that Franco had a twenty per cent advantage.211 Franco was now being importuned by Mussolini to end the war with a great victory which Mussolini anticipated would cast much glory on his Italian troops. Despite Mussolini wanting a rapid victory and Göbbels recording in his diary the slowness of Franco, it has been stated that Hitler was keen for the war to go on as long as possible on the grounds that “he sought to exploit a large measure as a distraction which served his purposes well.”212 In his gathering power and self-conceit Franco ignored Mussolini until the Italian Duce angrily stated he would withdraw Italian military support. Franco wrote his usual long-winded ambiguous letter to maintain his own course and thereby bring Mussolini back onside. “The balance of power between Franco and Mussolini had changed decisively since the eve of the battle for Málaga.”213 Franco was also consolidating his power at home and at the end of January the first regular cabinet was formed. It was filled with men who belonged to Franco: Serrano Suñer the most dominant figure became Minister of the Interior; Queipo de Llano was ignored; General Jordana was Minister for Foreign Affairs; General Dávila Minister of Defence and General Anido (aged 75) the Minister of Public Order. Franco made sure he remained minister responsible for executions, punishments and all forms of repression. He behaved like Göring in Germany and made appointments based on friends, family and those who depended on him, sycophants who were too often useless in their various appointments. Once again like Göring in Germany Franco chose for his economic strategy that of the autarky principle knowing little of economics which was going to be a long-term disaster for the country; “autarky was part of the policy of fortress Spain.”214 His control over his cabinet and Junta demonstrated Franco was “coming to resemble an oriental despot, calculating and duplicitous…with the tendency to an icy regal hauteur which would increase dramatically.”215

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After Teruel Franco saw victory in sight and started to plan a massive push down the valley of the River Ebro under the general command of Dávila. It started in Aragón on March 9th and created fear amongst the Republicans because success would mean that their zone would be cut in two. The advance made head way and was backed by the Condor Legion which bombed Barcelona in an effort to break the morale of the population. It was a heavy and controversial attack because it did not target military or industrial areas but residences. Franco claimed to be unhappy because it would strengthen Catalan determination, and some of the bombed homes belonged to Nationalists; he was probably angrier because the Italians had not informed him of the action. The Vatican representative had asked Franco to stop the slaughter and in Italy the British Ambassador approached Ciano. Mendacious excuses became the order of the day; the Spanish blamed the Italians, and the Germans and Italians pointed out that Franco had the last word. Franco visited the battle lines regularly and took an active interest in the progress. The Republicans had weakened and had anticipated that Franco would concentrate on Madrid. The Republican army crumbled and Yagüe captured Lérida on the 4th of April. The Germans could see that an immediate advance into Catalonia would bring the war to an early conclusion and close the borders with France. Franco was suddenly aware of the international ramifications happening elsewhere. News of the Anschluss with Austria on March 11th caused Franco to wonder whether this might just awaken France to the dangers of fascism, and he was concerned they might intervene on the side of the Republic. Blum had certainly contemplated the possibility, but in the end he opened the frontier and sent weapons, not the French Army; even this gesture gave some Republicans a degree of hope. Instead, against all advice, Franco turned towards Valencia. This sent Yagüe, a brutal and determined commander into a bout of criticism, so he was stood down by Franco who resented any form of criticism. Yagüe because of his apologising, old friendships and military ability was soon restored. The Nationalist forces eventually reached the Mediterranean which effectively isolated Catalonia. Nevertheless, there was determined resistance and the national advance slowed down. Franco had considered the possibility that he could ask the German and Italian forces to withdraw, but the Republican stubbornness changed his mind, and to encourage the Germans he opened up the possibility of mining rights once again. He was further encouraged when Blum and his Popular Front in France lost power;

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Daladier was the new Prime Minister and closed the French border.* The Italians sent more troops if only to make Franco move more swiftly, and for Mussolini to be proud of his military arm; the move towards Valencia was costly in life and equipment. Because the Republican zone was now in two parts their only communication was via the shipping lanes, and Franco asked the Germans and Italian aircraft to bomb the necessary ships, many of which transpired to be British. It was embarrassing for Chamberlain and Halifax who in their way supported the Nationalist cause. Hodgson the British agent was asked to speak to Franco in the hope that such attacks could be restrained. At first Franco declined completely, but there were fears in the Axis capitals and indeed with Franco that the friendly and appeasement-minded Chamberlain should not be endangered in his post as Prime Minister. Franco was aware that many Right-wingers in Britain saw his war as a crusade against the enemies of Christianity, and he did not want to lose their support or the hated anti-fascist Anthony Eden return as Foreign Secretary. There was also pressure from Rome and Berlin based on the same thinking, and so finally Franco withdrew his orders against British shipping, having already caused serious damage. In the July of 1938 to celebrate the second anniversary of the military uprising the so-called national government gave Franco the title of Captain-General which was normally only used by the monarch; he also took to appearing in the uniform of the Admiral of the fleet. In his speech he denounced the Republicans for using foreigners in their fight which almost beggars belief since he had his own contingent of foreign fighters, and would only win because of Italian and German military incursion. By the end of July the Nationalist forces were closing in on Valencia, but at the same time the Republicans fought back by secretly crossing in great numbers the River Ebro. Their Popular Army managed to inflict considerable damage on Yagüe’s troops, and by the 1st of August had covered some thirty miles from their point of arrival. Such was the incursion and again against all advice Franco halted the march on Valencia to deal with the Ebro problem. It took some four months and during this time there occurred the bitterest of fighting with considerable losses to both sides. However, Franco “with nearly one million men now under arms, could afford to be careless of their lives.”216 It also suited his overall policy of eliminating all resistance so he would never face any opposition in the future. Franco and his generals were in disagreement because they *

During the international crisis over Czechoslovakia Darlan, Head of the French Navy had suggested limited interference in Spain if only to deter Hitler. This was rejected by the French government but Franco remained uncertain about the possibility that the French might change their minds.

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believed the Republicans could be hemmed in while Valencia was taken; Franco wanted as much of his opposition dead as soon as possible. When the Republican Prime Minister Negrín asked about a compromise peace there was no hope in the request. Both Franco and the Republicans observed the wider European scene with rising hopes and fears, and when the Czechoslovakian crisis passed by with British acceptance this was the worst fear for the Republicans. They had conjectured a war between the democracies and fascists. On the other hand Franco had been concerned about the possibility of a French incursion. Franco had intended to let the democracies know he would be neutral while at the same time placating his fascist neighbours; he was treading a delicate line because foremost in his mind was not the European situation, but the opportunity to win his own war in Spain. Back on the Ebro the Nationalists opened some dams in the Pyrenees and using water trapped the Republican forces. In their small area the Republicans were shelled and bombed remorselessly, and yet managed to hang on with stubborn resistance. Franco had to seek additional German help and opened up the mining rights situation again; it worked and the Nationalist began their thrust once again at the Ebro on the 30th October 1938. The results were the highest casualties of the war, but this is precisely what Franco always wanted; the death of his opponents. The British sent out Field Marshal Sir Philp Cherwode to try and negotiate a prisoner exchange; it worked to a limited degree between British and Italian POWs, but he was shocked by the behaviour and brutality of Franco. It was this time that Franco’s brother Ramón was killed on a flying mission. Franco was noted for exhibiting no emotion and his brother Nicolás attended the funeral on Franco’s behalf; Franco later said his brother had redeemed himself by being killed doing his duty. Franco kept his distance from Ramón’s widow and child because she was his second wife, and although happy to sign death warrants all the time, he was something of a religious prude in matters of sex. The Republicans had less support from the outside as Stalin was rapidly drawing back to cosy up with Hitler, the French borders were closed, and the only aspect that kept them fighting was the fear of Franco’s policy of retribution and revenge. The alarm at reprisals had worked in Franco’s favour and no one would trust themselves to an honourable surrender. Following the battle at the Ebro, Franco was persuaded to turn towards Catalonia. In late November he eventually gave the necessary orders. Delay followed delay and the impatient Italian commander General Gambara needed a date which was eventually given as December 23rd. Many of Franco’s own supporters were often critical about the speed at

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which he moved with the constant delays. “A noted Italian journalist would later write that it seemed to them as though Franco’s strategy was founded on the principle that ‘the last soldier standing wins the war’”217 As these critical policies and dates were being worked out Franco took time off to go to his home province of La Coruña to receive the gift of a house and to be applauded. This behaviour was to become an expectation for him in the near future. The Italian advance was successful which concerned the French so much they re-opened the borders for supplies to enter. The Italians warned that if the French Army came into conflict with the Italians it would be a matter of war which the French did not want, and the French reduced the amount of aid to Catalonia. The year ended with Catalonia under severe pressure and terror reigning throughout the region.

1939 and Victory When Tarragona fell on the 15th January 1939 the road to Barcelona was left wide open. The Republican government fled to Gerona in the north, and Franco demanded the pace of advance be speeded up and ordered that no mercy was to be shown. The Republicans held their last meeting at Figueras close to the French border, and Azaña the President went into exile. The Prime Minister Negrín and General Rojo swiftly followed. It was at this point that Britain and Spain formally recognised the National Government. Franco published in February “Franco’s Laws of Responsibilities” which declared anyone with the slightest affiliation with the Left-wing would be treated as a criminal. “As Franco had demonstrated by the nature of his war effort and made explicit in interviews private and public, he was engaged in an investment in terror.”218 Among the desperate remnants of the remaining Republican territory an anti-Negrín Junta was formed in the desperate hope that some form of agreement could be reached with Franco. Franco’s new law had been proclaimed and his previous behaviour clearly indicated he meant to carry out his threat of retribution and revenge, and their hopes were doleful. This new attempt at a Junta has often been seen as a civil war within a civil war on the Republican front, but the fact was that the Republicans were virtually leaderless. The Republicans had always suffered a high degree of conflict within their ranks as witnessed by George Orwell in his last days in Barcelona.219 Communists and Anarchists and other myriad segments were constantly at war with one another, but consolidated once facing the Nationalists, but by this stage no leadership on the Left was able to overcome Franco’s accumulated power.

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Franco just sat back and gloried in his image of the warrior leader who had saved Spain as with the heroes of the past. He received the adulation of many and made sure everywhere he went was prepared with the necessary pomp and ceremony. The Church was quick to applaud him and Cardinal Gomá informed him that the new Pope XII (Cardinal Pacelli) had sent his Apostolic Blessing. Franco had seen it as a war against Communists, but he also turned his attention to destroying the Freemasons he had always hated. The same theme of anti-Freemasons was operating in Nazi German where they were ruthlessly pursued by Himmler using an index system to track them down, destroy them and set up a museum about them as if they were just part of an unpleasant history. Franco did the same employing a priest called Juan Tusquets to seek them out; Himmler used the Gestapo but Franco used the Church. The question is often asked as to how far Franco was responsible for the final victory. It is often claimed that he would not have won without the considerable support from fascist Italy and Germany (which he had been swift to utilise), but this has been called a myth by some historians and biographers, as much as the Right-wing claim that the war stemmed from a Stalin controlled Communist revolution. Both sides had foreign aid and support, and even with the passage of time this question would be difficult to answer with any certainty. Franco’s personal leadership with his seemingly calm approach at all the twists and turns even won the praise of his critic Queipo de Llano that with a different leader the Nationalists would not have won.220 Franco was not a great strategist but he was astute with logistics and always methodical. It was Franco who recognised the need for military equipment support from the two fascist dictators, and he had been well organised. Franco was faced by a government uncertain which way to turn and seriously divided with its various divisive factions, and the Republicans did not have the military expertise that Franco was able to muster. His part of the navy was more efficient than that which stayed loyal to the Republicans, and although the Spanish air force was small it was soon bolstered by German and Italian planes which for a critical time allowed him to dominate the skies. This was an important factor, especially with aerial support of ground forces, which makes the claim that overseas military help was something of a myth appear somewhat dubious. “His forces made use of more than sixteen hundred planes of all types, the Republicans altogether employing a hundred or so less.”221 In addition to this the German planes from 1936-7 onwards tended to be the later models. In terms of bombing raids on civilian targets, known as strategic bombing there were some, especially Guernica, but the heavy raids on

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Barcelona appear to have been authorised by Mussolini. However, when the recent biographers Payne and Palacios wrote that “Franco’s policy on bombing was restricted to military and supply targets and was more humane than that of either Britain or the United States in World War II;” this somehow raises the eyebrows because it was a civil war, but nevertheless contains an element of unpleasant truth. As mentioned many times the Spanish population was deeply polarised, and some elements of the extreme Left-wing had not helped the Republican cause both within Spain and internationally. The Soviets had supplied the better tanks but the mountainous landscape of much of Spain meant they could not be used to their full effect. It is often noted the Germans were able to develop their blitzkrieg in Spain which is questionable, but the superior air force mainly supplied by the Luftwaffe developed the power of air-to-ground support. There seems little doubt that conditions and circumstances were on the side of the Nationalists, and that from their point of view Franco was the right man in the right place in terms of leadership in terms of winning this type of war. Whether his politics, his cold and ruthless attitude towards the opposition, his use of the Catholic Church, his duplicity both with his Fascist neighbours as well as other on-looking countries was justified or not is another question, and must be viewed as objectively as possible. It could be argued that any leader under the circumstances of a major war has to resort to the old maxim that the “end justifies the means.” In the world war brewing in the year Franco claimed final victory this dictum would be severely tested by all countries across the globe. On the international scene Franco saw himself at the same level of importance as Hitler and Mussolini. He had always despised the British but was somewhat wary about them because of their colonial power, an ambition he harboured for Spain with her lost overseas possessions. He felt the same about France with the additional vitriol that they shared a border through which the Republic had occasionally benefitted. He believed that his natural partners were the Axis powers, and although he dithered as usual he eventually signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in late March. His brother Nicolás, now the Spanish Ambassador in Portugal, told Oliveira Salazar this was their political confession of faith. Ciano noted that Franco wished his signing of the Pact to be kept a secret until total victory which Ciano was happy with because “it gives us the egg today and the chicken tomorrow.”222 On the other hand Jordana played down the signing of the Pact to the British Ambassador; for Franco it was a matter of chess, but one which could be more dangerous than a board game. The Italians were delighted because with Spain seemingly onside it

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was an additional threat to France, and the British control at Gibraltar might be brought into question.* Ciano also believed that “a neutral Spain would in any event be destined to a future of poverty and humiliation” a factor also recognised by the Allies as they later conducted an economic bargaining war with Spain.223 Alfonso XIII was brushed aside as Franco made sure that the ex-King understood there was going to be no restoration. Alfonso was furious but Franco was now assuming himself as king and all the pomp, ceremony and titles he collected clearly indicated his passion for power. From his youth he had always sought promotion, and he had always been cautious in his movements in case it hindered his progress through the ranks. His bravery on the battlefield as a young man was unquestionable, but even here he had his focus on battlefield promotion, and he had pandered to all in authority especially Alfonso XIII when he had once held authority. His power pretensions were still growing, and as he brushed the monarchy aside he was now looking for greater glory on the international scene which would eventually evade him. He demobilised half his army but kept just over a million men in service; by today’s standards it was colossal, but Spain was exhausted and Franco was not ready to join the “big boys” in their playground. He flexed his muscles in so far that he put men on the French border and around Gibraltar. The soon to be Vichy French leader Pétain had been sent to Spain as Ambassador because of French concerns, but although he was received with pleasant words Franco and his cohorts cold-shouldered him most of the time. In emulation of the Axis powers Franco withdrew Spain from the League of Nations as it became clear that he was intending an authoritative system of government. Payne and Palacios wrote “that the regime was dictatorial was not surprising, for democracy had been abandoned by both sides in 1936, [that the Republicans had to abandon democracy was not strictly true but as in Britain in 1939-1945 the military circumstances put normal political principles into suspension] but the system under construction by Franco was harsh and exclusionary. The repression followed its own logic.”224 These two recent authors in an attempt to moderate the views of Paul Preston and others are forced to admit that that Franco was harsh, and serious repression was the result. “The repressive judicial system applied after 1st April 1939 used both the administrative machinery and the pseudo-legal framework developed throughout the war.”225 The wave of detentions was simply massive involving in excess of over two*

Since the British took Gibraltar in 1704 it was and still remains a contentious issue with the Spanish.

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hundred and fifty thousand. Death sentences for the Civil War continued into the later 1940s and it has been suggested even further. The bitterness of the war was deep but the retribution carried on far too long and Payne and Palacios noted that “it began with great severity but grew progressively milder with each passing year,” but those passing years extended past the end of World War Two.226 In early May 1939 Göring was invited to Spain. The trip did not go well and Göring always had little time for Franco after Göring was not given the adulation he, like Franco, had come to anticipate. In the meantime victory parades were held, bonfires lit on the highest hills, and there was a sixteen mile victory parade. Franco and his wife travelled everywhere in a procession of cars because of his fear of planes following the deaths of Mola and Sanjurjo. It was a clear indication that Franco saw himself in the same light as the Führer and the Duce.* He gave a speech in which he made the ominous reminder to remain alert “against the Jewish spirit which permitted the alliance of big capital with Marxism.”227

Cardinal Goma (Pascual Marín Collection)

Throughout the proceedings a joyful Church was involved and Franco presented the sword of victory to Cardinal Gomá who had it put on display

*

Later Hitler would give Franco an armoured plated Mercedes, the same as he used.

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in Toledo Cathedral with other holy and historical relics.* The pomp, ceremonies, and victory parades continued and emulated the May Day parades in Moscow. There were also mutual visits between Italy and Spain, and Serrano Suñer was ever present, growing in influence and regarded by the Italians as the important connection for the fascist link. Serrano Suñer appealed to the Italians because of his serious Anglophobia which may have had its roots in the time his family were denied entry to the British Embassy when fleeing for their lives, and he blamed the British for not preventing the death of his two brothers. Serrano Suñer and the Italians agreed that Gibraltar was critical as was the retention of North Africa because of parallel French interests in that region. Serrano Suñer was not to have the same impact on the Germans. Although he was a good friend of the German Stohrer the Catholic allegiance of Franco, and therefore his cohorts made the Nazi regime suspicious. As the summer of 1939 progressed there was rumour and counterrumour and considerable speculation as to which side Spain would align itself with in terms of a European war. Pétain had not been treated with due respect and Serrano Suñer’s press was clearly anti-French. The Germans had hoped that a belligerent Spain would divert French troops to that area, but at the time the occupation of France was an unlikely nightmare. Franco made a point of stating that his troops were ready in the north and even in the south with Gibraltar, but he still had internal problems which were something of an embarrassment. In the Asturian region miners were still fighting, and indeed some fought on until the early 1950s. His old adversary Queipo de Llano was stepping out of line, making derogatory comments about Franco, and flying to Berlin without seeking Franco’s permission. Franco had to be cautious with this man, and having had him brought to his presence dressed him down and packed him off to Italy as head of a military mission. He went without protest and others watched and kept their heads down. Ciano had previously noted in his diary that Serrano Suñer had called Queipo de Llano “crazy,” and that it “was his intention to kick him upstairs by sending him the golden exile of an embassy.”228 Promoting people was often used by Franco to rid himself of potential enemies when it would be too politically sensitive to execute them. Mussolini continued to provide Franco with advice and to Franco’s delight Mussolini suggested no monarchy, and to be careful of the old French and Spanish monarchies looking for a throne. Franco also took the * Cardinal Gomá was a strong supporter of Franco going so far as to support Franco’s repression of any form of opposition.

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opportunity of this exchange to warn his Axis partners that Spain needed a period of economic stability and more military hardware before being ready for war. However, Franco continued to increase his powers in Spain and in early August1939 the Ley de la Jefatura del Estado gave him powers to make legislation and laws without reference or consultation with the cabinet. Franco now held the powers of an oriental despot or a medieval king. When he was warned by Ciano in August of the likelihood of war he immediately started the fortification of the French border. Pétain was unhappy about this development and when informed that it was only for defensive purposes Pétain rightly pointed out that such work could be used for defence and attack. Franco also changed some of his cabinet in view of what he had been told by Ciano. Jordana was considered something of an Anglophile and was removed from the Foreign Office and replaced by Colonel Beigbeder a one-time Falangist. He moved Yagüe from the army where he was too powerful, and into the Air Force thus been able to side-line the one-time kingmaker Kindelán, removing him from the cabinet. Franco thus behaved like a medieval king ensuring he was surrounded by sycophants and all vaguely potential opposition was shelved. Kindelán had always been a monarchist and so he was sent off to be in charge of the Balearic Islands as had once happened to Franco. Kindelán as an ardent monarchist had become an ongoing problem, and on a visit to Rome Serrano Suñer had asked Ciano to ask the Italian secret police to keep an eye on him.229 “The leaders of the new Spanish state were firmly convinced that they stood in the vanguard of history” forming a new if not unique style of government which was not just modern but forward looking.230 It was a form of extreme nationalism which too often meant not just self-aggrandisement at home, but internationally as Franco still looked to colonial expansion. He was careful with the way he produced his new government, though the word government seems somewhat misplaced. Franco was the government and ensured that those he chose reflected his thinking and were subservient to him in all matters. Some called his new establishment the Falangist Government, but during this first period of Franco’s rule military men held 45.9 per cent of ministerial posts, 36.8 per cent top governmental posts, while the Falangists held 37.9 per cent of ministry appointments and 30 per cent of government posts.231 Franco ensured that “his men” were in place and in total support. When the Nazi-Soviet Pact was announced at the end of August there were protests outside the German embassy and Franco was startled, but as the pressure built up he remained convinced the British would not support

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Poland, and if anything ask Poland to acquiesce to German demands. It was clear that Franco understood the cynical motives behind the GermanSoviet Pact, but he was convinced the French Army was strong and wondered whether the war would lead to a Communist ruled Europe. The French Army was the largest in Europe and the German High Command were also concerned; it was not therefore surprising that Franco was concerned about its capability. The Germans used their propaganda expertise to make sure that the Spanish readers were well informed of the German viewpoint which suited Franco. If anything disturbed Franco in the month preceding the outbreak of war it was the economic situation in Spain, and Cardinal Gomá suddenly calling for peace and social justice; these were matters which Franco did not understand and resented.

PART THREE: THE SECOND WORLD WAR

CHAPTER ONE POWER PLAY

1939 General Observations When the war started in September 1939 Mussolini, anxious, short of money and adequate military hardware (he had expended a great deal in Spain) declared it was too soon to participate. This was deeply frustrating for Hitler but gave Franco breathing space in his cries of loyalty because the Spanish situation was far worse than that of Italy. There is no doubt that Franco wanted a German victory, not so much in Poland which, although an authoritarian Catholic country, Franco cared little for, but he and Serrano Suñer both had a deep loathing of Britain and France, and a fear of a Communist insurgence across Europe. Franco blamed the Polish for not accepting German demands. The French and British ambassadors had called on Franco to give assurances that they would respect Spain’s neutrality, but they were treated with a cold indifference. However, Spain in 1939 was virtually obliged to remain neutral. The State was in a serious economic collapse especially in food and fuel supplies, and on the northern borders stood France with a powerful army and the British to the south. These two democracies held the sea power around Spain’s coastline. Franco resented the French because of their colony in Morocco and the British for their flagrant hold of Spanish territory in Gibraltar. The situation for Franco was made clear by a confidential report submitted as early as 1938: “one only need open an atlas for any doubt to disappear. In a war against Franco-British forces, one can safely say, without the slightest exaggeration, that we would be totally surrounded by enemies. From the word go we would find them on every perimeter of our territory, on all coasts and all borders. We could hold them back in the Pyrenees; but it seems little short of impossible to prevent an invasion at the same time along the Portuguese border…Germany and Italy could only lend us help that would be insufficient for the defence of a weak Spain, and nothing they may offer us could compensate for the risk involved in fighting by their side.”232 In 1939 Spanish neutrality was in place by sheer necessity, and most observers recognised this to be the case. Nevertheless,

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although Franco remained circumspect under the circumstances “caution in no way affected his appetite” so he tempered his restraint with bravado, but war could only be taken on board “if there was greater loot to be had.”233 Many of his senior men were themselves divided and confused about entering the war. The strident Falangists were more than ready but the “Latifundists, [major landowners] the finance oligarchy, and the military were all against the war” though there were exceptions.234 Serrano Suñer and the Falange wanted to fight alongside Germany, the monarchists wanted an alliance with Britain, and Franco was aware of the cliques behind his power, including the military, Falangists, and the conservative clique of Catholics.235 He sat tight offering his services to the Pro-Axis when it was clear to him they would win, only changing his attitude as late as 1944.

Spain’s Economy On the subject of economics Franco was a complete novice with no training or experience in the subject; just general reading. As Stalin had a Five Year plan and Hitler and Göring had their Four Year plans, Franco had a Ten Year plan for revitalising the Spanish economy, the draft for which he completed in early October. In December Franco drew up a list of priorities which included public order, medical care, homes, employment, education, all demanding money but not at the expense of the military. It was a hard task because postwar recovery was going to prove difficult. Spain had lost its gold reserve, was seriously in debt, and the country and its people totally impoverished. “In 1939 total industrial production was 31 per cent less than in 1935, agricultural production had declined by 21 per cent and the labour force declined by nearly half a million.”236 Throughout the 1940s wages plummeted and women were forced out of paid work “in line with the regime’s policy of putting them back into the home.”237 New machinery, fertilisers and draught animals were all in very short supply due to the regime’s import restrictions, and autarky caused all kind of restrictions and encouraged the black market with its inevitable corruption. The role of women in Franco’s new society had reverted to the last century as in the 1889 Civil Code; men could punish women for adultery but not vice versa, homosexuality was an offence but lesbianism did not happen, women were encouraged to stay at home and breed; this was not repealed until 1958. Franco’s overall plan was to follow the suggested economy of Germany and Spain on the simple idea of self-reliance based on the policy of autarky, and without the need for foreign investment. Franco told a

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foreign journalist that self-reliance was good for Spain because Spain did not need imports; in reality it would be a matter of months before Spain could only survive by imports.* It was not long before it was realised that “a generation of economic development and materials well-being was sacrificed during the 1940s under the regime’s forlorn attempts at selfsufficiency and half-baked interventions.”238 It was so much amateur “pie-in-the-sky,” and at a time of serious food, clothing and fuel supplies. It was a desperate situation for most Spanish people, and Franco’s insistence in not seeking foreign credits and his policy to cut imports only made an appalling situation worse. The policy was based on state direction and it would take some twenty years of economic decline before the truth of the policy would be understood and redirected by professional economists. Autarky demanded self-reliance and so the Spanish leaders refused to make any serious effort to secure foreign loans or investment, only looking to minor trade agreements. The historian Preston pointed out that some would argue this was forced on Franco by circumstances, but in the 1980s Franco’s personal plans came to light.239 Spain was weakened by the war, a devastated market, lack of medical care, and Franco’s economic plans made the situation far worse. Franco was completely naïve when it came to economics and he was easily fooled by those who recognised this failure. He was told and believed that Spain had huge gold deposits which would relieve Spain’s financial problems. He went to the possible sites and broadcast the hope of finding gold in his New Year speech; none was ever found. In early 1940 a fraudster convinced him that he could make engine fuel out of water and plants, and convinced Franco that Spain would soon have all the fuel he needed. The fraudster was a von Filek who was granted land and convinced Franco his lorries were powered by the new fuel. When the enterprise was revealed as a mere ruse von Filek and Franco’s chauffeur who was involved went to prison; they were lucky not to have been executed. Typically of agrarian countries trying to industrialise too rapidly, the problem of agriculture which had been Spain’s main economic sustenance, almost reached a point of collapse. Any country needs to find as much of its own food supplies as possible, and the later U-boat war against Britain made this point as the island needed food from overseas despite a massive home effort. The Spanish food produce had dropped by a staggering twenty-five per cent and it was announced that austerity and self-sacrifice *

Later in 1941 Serrano Suñer would publicly express the opinion that the much vaunted autarky would be European and provoke the downfall of the North American economy.

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were part of the policy, and the need for redemption; it was even suggested that it was a spiritual judgment imposed by God. The off-shoot was the typical growth of the black market which even executions and imprisonment could not stop. It had been anticipated that the new economic plans would bring the country together in a unified fashion but the lack of food did not help. The military made their continuous demands on the fraught budget, and plans were made for extending the air force and increasing the navy dramatically. It was anticipated that with new battleships and cruisers the Spanish navy would be a potent force on the international scene, and “it would break the equilibrium between the Axis and its enemies, making Spain the key to the situation, the arbiter between the two blocs.”240 This was unconvincing at this stage. Franco was certain that Germany would be victorious, but it seems more likely that Franco and his cohorts were all too well aware of the formidable British Royal Navy and their ability to blockade the peninsula. “The Pyrenees made Spain and Portugal more an island than a peninsula.”241 Franco was equally aware that while the Royal Navy held Gibraltar they held the key to the Mediterranean and access to North Africa where Franco continued to hold colonial hopes. There was some discussion about retaking Gibraltar, but it was shelved when it appeared that the Rock was too well defended by the British.

Franco In October Franco celebrated the third anniversary of his elevation to Head of State, and on the 18th October transferred his headquarters from Burgos to the capital. His initial thought was to take over the Royal Palace, but Serrano Suñer eventually prevailed upon him to avoid making too public his self-evident aggrandisement. He and his wife chose instead the Palace of El Pardo on the La Coruña road outside Madrid built as a hunting lodge by Carlos I; this was opportune for Franco because hunting, as it was for Göring, was a personal obsession.* It would take a year and more to bring this site up to Franco’s standards so he and his wife moved into the Castle of Viñuelas as a temporary measure. He also spent time organising his massive salary which was set at 700,000 pesetas, which given the state of the Spanish economy and the appalling poverty of the average citizen was almost immoral. By taking such grand residences it

*

El Pardo took time to restructure to Franco’s needs; during the war it had been occupied by Communists and regular troops.

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was self-evident that he regarded himself as the monarch, and insisted his wife be addressed as La Señora which was classically aristocratic. On September 26th Franco gave a speech in Burgos to the Falange about making heroic decisions, and that Britain and France would soon be put in their places. The Falange element always wanted action, and their strong fascist propensity encouraged them always to draw closer to Germany. The army leaders who were experienced after years of war were more aware of their deficiencies and clashed with the Falange leadership. Kindelán was particularly concerned that the Falange element would draw Spain into an international conflict it could not win. “The Falangist sectors led by Serrano Suñer were fervent supporters of the Axis, willing to risk a clash with the Allies.”242 There were objections from some Church leaders because a few anti-Nazi Bishops had become concerned about the Nazi attitude towards the Church. Their main fear was the Nazi-Soviet Pact as there was a profound distrust of Communism in the Vatican. On November 20th José Primo de Rivera’s corpse was exhumed in Alicante and taken on a four hundred mile torch-lit procession of nearly ten days to be reburied at El Escorial, the normal resting place of Spain’s kings and queens.* Everyone took part, the army, the Falangists and the Church, but it fanned many of the flames still smouldering from the Civil War. Such was the deference paid to the dead Falangist leader many in the army wondered why their heroes such as Sanjurjo and Mola had been paid so little homage. There were outbreaks of violence and many Republican prisoners suffered or were killed. Franco gave a New Year broadcast on December 31st attacking Britain and France riddled with a tone of anti-Semitism, and astonishingly attacked countries for their attempted extermination of Communist parties. He did it to please Germany, but it was such a hypocritical statement that many Spaniards must have caught their breath, not that anyone would dare say anything, not even as a joke. As in Germany Göbbels had closed cabarets if they indulged in political jokes, as had been their long-time tradition, so in Spain jokes about Franco were made illegal. Hitler was momentarily pleased with Franco because U-boats were now operating out of Spanish ports, giving them a wide range of potential operations. By early 1941 the British realised that U-boats were being refuelled in the Canary Islands and in other Spanish ports, restocked, and their crews were allowed to cross Spain as reserve crews arrived. The torpedoes were transported through Spain from Germany. At first Franco *

El Escorial was north-west of Madrid and had been built by Philip II as pantheon for Spanish monarchs.

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decided against it and changed his mind twice before fully co-operating. It has been suggested that later Franco would extend U-boat facilities in an effort “to keep the Germans from becoming so angry as to invade Spain;” however, Franco had offered this type of support when he thought Hitler would win, and Franco and Spain would benefit.243 The Spanish diplomatic offices overseas were also feeding information about England, France and other countries to the German secret services. Franco and Spain remained in financial debt to the Axis powers. Mussolini had written off about third of the debts, but Hitler expected full repayments. Plans were made to repay the debts over a period of twentyfive years. Franco’s fear of the Communists arose again when the Russians invaded Finland, and he even offered Spanish manpower to help the resistance; it is possible that he recalled that the Finns sent more volunteers to assist the Nationalist cause in the Civil War than any other country.

CHAPTER TWO 1940 THE IDEOLOGICAL FASCIST

International Spain In the April of 1940 Franco informed the Portuguese ambassador that the Luftwaffe was about to sink the British Royal Navy; his enthusiasm for the Axis powers seemed to know no bounds. However he received a warning shot about becoming too eager about Spanish abilities when his Chief of General Staff, General Martínez Campos sent him a report on military strength which clearly indicated the shortage of material, especially in military mechanisation and lack of aircraft. Italy and in particular Spain stood on the side-lines of Germany’s war, and were illprepared to join in the affray. It was Franco’s hope to receive more help from Mussolini, and both Mussolini and Franco were awe-struck at the German success in taking Denmark and Norway. The enthusiasm for picking up booty from a war inflamed both Franco and Serrano Suñer who were excited about the capture of Gibraltar and even Tangier. These were only aspirations because the economic reality in Spain was simply appalling. Nevertheless, in this time of international turmoil a strong emphasis on nationalism encouraged many countries to think in terms of expansion. Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin were engrossed with this desire, and even Hungary and Romania had entertained such hopes. Franco was no different as a dictator saturated with his brand of Spanish nationalism. He had his eyes on his old romantic stamping ground of Morocco where the French held ninety plus per cent of that country. This would later become a serious stumbling block when Hitler and Franco met. The Falangists were especially passionate about the idea believing that Germany was setting a new world order to which Spain now belonged. On April 30th Franco wrote to Ciano pointing out that Spain was not yet ready to enter the war because the country was exhausted. He mentioned that Spain might be able to make a last minute entry very much as Mussolini intended once he was sure France had been beaten. He was playing the same game as Mussolini with the anticipation that a token gesture at the last moment may have left him an opening at the negotiation

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table where the spoils of war would be decided. As it was Hitler would not even allow Mussolini to be present at the signing of the Treaty later in 1940. In the meantime Franco and his cohort Beigbeder told lies to the Western powers without any embarrassment of their intention to stay neutral. Franco knew his military was not capable of entering a major war without aid so he played both sides with immoral cunning. After the defeat of France in late May Franco wrote a note of congratulations to Hitler. It was at this point the Western powers became seriously concerned about Franco’s intentions. The British ambassador Peterson was replaced by Sir Samuel Hoare who as an appeaser had lost his cabinet position under Churchill, who had wisely sent him to Spain to keep an eye on Franco. Appeaser or not Hoare had a sound intellect and was a loyal diplomat. Churchill was all too conscious of the importance of Gibraltar and the Atlantic ports; Britain needed to buy time after the collapse of France and Hoare was the right man. He was not too disconcerted when crowds of Falangists gather outside the embassy calling for the return of Gibraltar. Hoare used the intelligence agencies and through his men applied bribery to find out what was happening behind the scenes. Franco, as noted was concerned by the French Army, and its defeat encouraged his own ambitions. He was sure Britain would seek peace, and now his ambitions started to take on a colonial dimension. Franco sent a letter with Vigón to Hitler in Berlin seeking a place at the peace table which indicated how highly he thought of himself; Hitler was not interested. Passing on necessary information gleaned from diplomats was important to Franco, but it was a diminutive contribution as far as Hitler was concerned. Despite this Germany was ardent for Spain’s participation and Britain was equally keen to keep Spain neutral. The British had the threat of the Royal Navy which could block Spain’s essential imports, and could also offer credit which Spain desperately needed. The British and French embassies were frequently under siege, and Yagüe had allowed Italian bombers to refuel in Spain and the U-boats to build up their resources in Spanish ports. Franco even gave permission for German reconnaissance planes to carry Spanish markings. After the Second World War the United Nations Security Council investigated and discovered that German aircraft had used Spanish airfields to attack shipping, that German planes had been repaired there, and that Western aircraft obliged to land in Spain had been examined by German experts. There was also clear evidence that shipping movements observed from Spanish coastlines had been monitored and

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passed onto the Germans. It was clear at this stage which side was favoured by Franco. For Britain another worrying development was when Franco followed Ciano’s advice and changed Spain’s status from neutral to nonbelligerence.* In diplomatic terms this sounded more like aggression waiting in the wings. Franco was certainly keen on re-taking Gibraltar and spreading Spanish power in North Africa, but decided he should hold back until he had German support. It struck Hoare when he met Franco that the man had no real understanding of British strength in its colonies or its friendship with America. Franco seemed more interested in his monument and his obsession with hunting while Europe went up in flames and the Spanish population starved; Hoare was astute and clever. When on June 14th the Germans marched into Paris Franco’s troops occupied Tangier on the mendacious excuse they were guaranteeing the city’s security. The Spanish explained this act by pointing out that Tangier was an international zone and therefore Spain needed to take control as the only neutral country. “These terms were accepted by London, Vichy, and Rome as long as the war lasted;” it was more likely that these governments had more pressing matters on hand.244 Beigbeder told the Italians the truth but nobody was fooled and it was clear that Franco and Serrano Suñer were looking towards enlarging their African colonies. The Falangists were delighted at this act of aggression and Franco sent his man Vigón to meet Hitler as he travelled through Belgium. The idea behind this was that Franco wanted Hitler’s permission to take over the whole of Morocco. Vigón returned with the news that Hitler had accepted Tangier but was silent on the subject of Morocco. Hitler never welcomed any initiative taken by his fellow dictators in case they clashed with his own plans and intentions. The French government had fled to Bordeaux where there were discussions ranging between two major points of view. The first was to seek an armistice and the second was to retire to North Africa and continue the fight from there. It was at this stage that the French made an appeal to Franco to act as an intermediary between themselves and Hitler. The reason was given that Franco was held in high esteem, especially by Pétain. In reality the French now recognised the danger of Franco and the *

Non-belligerence is a term which does not exist in international law; it was coined by Mussolini as the Italian policy which whilst staying neutral somehow aligned Italy with Germany. It has been argued that by adopting this nomenclature it would put Franco in a better position when negotiating with foreign powers. Spain retained this position until there grew the suspicion that Germany might not win.

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possibility it might open up another front against them. This action might just put the brakes on such an intention; the French had long realised before this point of national disaster that Franco was just a nominal subordinate of Hitler. Franco’s response was all too typical in so far that he descended into a bartering mode. He claimed he would help if the French gave Spain some critical territory in Morocco, an area which would self-evidently make the occupation of French Morocco that much easier. It was all a matter of sheer exploitation at the expense of a neighbour, and whilst Franco had informed his Italian friends of his colonial hopes the French knew of his anticipations. His feeble excuse given to the French was that it was better to concede territory to a neighbour, and that Spain’s real interest was keeping the local tribes in Morocco in order. Had it not been such appalling attitude towards a defeated neighbour it would almost have been laughable. Franco, and any French politician prepared to listen had to confront a French General Noguès who immediately announced his hostility and threatened to confront any such incursions. Once again Franco used Vigón to convey to Hitler that Franco was prepared to join the Axis powers in return for war material and the right to expand in North Africa. Time and time again Franco and Suñer with the help of the military would compile long shopping lists for the Germans, and the historian Weinberg, based on evidence from the Hoare papers, suggested it was “clearly a stalling one,” a method of keeping the Germans at bay.245 Had the Germans co-operated it would have been an interesting twist on the many interpretations hovering over Franco’s behaviour, but as Weinberg also noted it was the Germans holding back more than the Spanish. Franco was convinced Germany would win a conclusive war and he even turned down in his arrogant fashion American economic aid in return for neutrality. There was talk that the British would also give Gibraltar back to Spain after the war (though Churchill pointed out that if Germany lost there would be no need, and if they won it was of little consequence), but Franco became arrogant and self-assured and cold-shouldered such approaches even to the point of downright rudeness. The Americans and British were aware that oil-imports into Spain were a potential danger and discovered that much of this was coming through the Texas Oil Company, arranged by a Thorkild Riebr who had supported Franco during the Civil War. This source of supply was quickly curtailed or at least seriously restricted which made Franco dependent on Germany. Hitler did not respond warmly to Franco’s offer of joining the fray because Hitler himself had plans for North Africa, and he had little need for a “limp partner” at this stage.

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In late June the question of the Duke of Windsor arose. The Duke was fleeing from the south of France towards Lisbon and was at this time passing through Madrid. Beigbeder suggested he be detained in case the Germans needed him. Nicolás Franco and others asked the Duke to stay and percolated the rumour to the Duke that the British intended to assassinate him. Much of this was melodrama but several historians make the point that the Duke seriously considered working with the Germans, and “in fact remained in contact with them for some time after going to the Bahamas” but Churchill virtually sent the “Duke into the equivalent of exile.”246 Meanwhile Hoare was criticised for appeasing Franco by offering economic aid because Spain was still starving; it was an unfair criticism because Hoare was doing his best to persuade Franco to stay neutral. Once again the vexed question of Gibraltar was raised. From the German perspective Franco had been told that Hitler was not happy about his North African ideas for fear it might prompt a landing by the British. Canaris visited Franco in an effort to keep Spain onside, and to remind him not to meddle in German European plans. Franco was desperate to expand, a form of his early aggrandisement through promotion but now at an international level. The Falangists were equally as keen and there was even chatter about taking over Portugal; Franco had always been a predator by nature and he was confirming this on the world stage. Serrano Suñer was especially interested in “taking the initiative to try and place Portugal under Spanish hegemony, informing Pereira, the Portuguese ambassador that Hitler would not permit the continued existence of an independent and neutral ally of Britain on the continent.”247 It came to nothing more than an agreement between the two countries to consult should there be any foreign interference. However, despite his grandiose ideas Spain was suffering from a virtually crippled economy and Germany was not responding. Franco had little choice but sign an agreement on July 24th with Britain and Portugal for an exchange of goods through sterling. It was also becoming clear to Germany and Spain that Britain was resisting and was not about to sue for peace. This prompted the Germans to look again at Spain becoming involved, and the “pros and cons” of the argument were studied in detail. One of the fears was that the British would seize one or all of the Canary Islands, possibly the Balearics, Tangiers and even extend the size of Gibraltar. Franco was right to be concerned over the Canary Islands because Churchill later wrote that such was the concern over Gibraltar “that for nearly two years we kept five thousand men and their ships ready

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to seize the Canary Islands.”248 Stohrer also arrived at the conclusion it was too early for Spain and might even expose Germany to some risk. The military arrived at the same conclusion because Spanish border defences were weak and their military supplies extremely limited. However, in July Canaris visited the hinterland of Gibraltar to prepare plans for an attack on the British territory. It was clear that Franco would not attempt to take the British port without German help, and at this stage he was almost desperate to join Hitler claiming that for Spain not to enter the war “would be to alienate herself from European history, especially the history of the future, which the two victorious Axis powers will determine.”249 Canaris who had a good understanding of Spain and Franco noted that Spain’s condition in terms of fuel and food was appalling, and that Franco would only relax once Britain was crushed because he feared their power. Canaris also indicated that not all his generals agreed with Franco and there was now some opposition from the Church.* Göring expressed concerned about expending valuable material on Spain, even minimal amounts he considered unnecessary. The only assistance Spain had received was booty from churches destroyed in Poland and sent to Spain to help her rebuild her damaged churches from the Civil War. Despite the German High Command’s attitude the plans for Spain’s entry into the conflict were still studied at surface level. Franco was given the Grand Cross of Gold of the Order of the German Eagle, and there was an everdeepening sense of fascist brotherhood established, if only in Franco’s mind. Plans were made for Serrano Suñer to visit Berlin and take matters further, and complaints were made to Vichy France about the state of disorder in their part of Morocco. On September 14th it was rumoured that if the Spanish moved in Morocco the British might move in first; it was a huge game of chess with threat and counter-threat. Nor was Hitler keen on Franco’s desires in Morocco because with Britain showing sturdier resistance than he had anticipated he needed to keep Vichy France onside, and to Franco’s dismay he sent armoured cars to assist the French. It was Franco’s hope that Serrano Suñer’s visit would bring Spain closer to Germany, but in the meantime Spain, as noted by Canaris, was *

Canaris reported that “Franco’s policy from the start was not to come in until Britain was defeated, for he is afraid of her might (ports, food situation, etc.). Spain has a very bad internal situation. They are short of food and have no coal, the generals and the clergy are against Franco. His only support is Suñer, who is more pro-Italian than pro-German…the consequences of having this unpredictable nation as a partner cannot be calculated. We shall get an ally who will cost us dearly.” Quoted in Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.55

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starving and fuel was dangerously low. Franco had to swallow his pride and turn to the USA for aid. There was serious doubt on the American side when they considered the distinct possibility that Franco could not be trusted to repay any debts. The President of the American Red Cross came up with the concept of using a special relief budget in the hope it would keep Spain neutral.

Serrano Suñer arrived in Berlin

Serrano Suñer arrived in Berlin on the 16th of September accompanied by a party of Falangists. Serrano Suñer’s reputation went ahead of him as many regarded him at this stage as “the strong man of the regime.”250 Serrano Suñer had given an interview to the official German newspaper (Völkische Beobachter) in which he stated that we hold the thesis that our war was the first phase of the present war, thus trying to align Spain with Germany. Most thinking Germans knew this was just diplomatic chitterchatter designed to make the relationship between Hitler and Spain comfortable. The French were annoyed in the fashion Serrano Suñer travelled through their country as if he were the victor. As he arrived in Berlin it was the precise time that Hitler had decided the plan Sea Lion for the Invasion of Britain would be postponed; this information was kept from Serrano Suñer. The whole meeting was one of lies and bargaining on both sides. The Germans expressed surprise when they heard their supplies had not reached Spain when they knew they had never been sent in the first

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place. Portugal was discussed as a country which should not exist, and North Africa was seen as Spain’s version of lebensraum. Ribbentrop in his overbearing and characteristic way annoyed Serrano Suñer so much he virtually alienated his visitor from the German cause by suggesting Spain give Germany ports in the Canary Islands. Ribbentrop was ignorant of Spanish history and probably saw these islands as simply Spain’s old colonies. Ribbentrop made the point that if Gibraltar were taken the British would respond by taking the Canary Islands. Therefore, he persisted, the Führer thought it best that Spain should grant a Canary Island to Germany, and provide bases at Agadir and Mogador, and then he demanded heavy economic concessions as part of the Spanish debt for their contribution to the Civil War. The truth was that Hitler had become somewhat interested in Spanish ports, coastlines, their islands and North Africa “as he looked forward to naval war with the United States.”251 Serrano Suñer did not appreciate the manner he and Spain were being treated by Ribbentrop, and these approaches “were significantly to alter his attitude to the Third Reich and the question of Spain entering the war.”252 Serrano Suñer’s attitude and doubts were confirmed when following this discourse with Ribbentrop he had to seek shelter from an RAF bombing raid. Later when Serrano Suñer met Hitler the Canary Island gift was only mentioned in passing, and Serrano Suñer promised that once Spain had the necessary foodstuffs and materials they would be ready for war. Hitler also suggested meeting Franco on the French border. When Serrano Suñer had his next meeting with Ribbentrop the same issues were raised in Ribbentrop’s characteristic bombastic way. On September the 18th Hitler wrote to Franco saying Spain could enter the war by taking Gibraltar, and suggested that a squadron of German planes used a Canary Island because the British were bound to go there after Gibraltar had fallen. It was quite clear that Hitler had decided an invasion of Britain would not work. It dawned on Serrano Suñer that as far as Hitler was concerned Spain was not going to be regarded as a partner, but that of “a minor agrarian satellite” and for him Spanish islands and territories were simply staging posts. It took much longer for Franco to understand what Serrano Suñer had started to suspect after meeting Ribbentrop. For his part Ribbentrop was convinced that Spain would declare war, but Mussolini put some complications into Ribbentrop’s mind because of his own ambitions in North Africa. Franco still retained a deep almost adulatory respect for Hitler and when speaking to Serrano Suñer brushed aside Ribbentrop as a mere underling. For his part Serrano Suñer although impressed by German might had been made acutely aware by the RAF attacks that the war would not be short, and his

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distaste for Ribbentrop had fermented in his mind throwing doubt on Spanish-German relationships. The British had not been slow and in mid-September Churchill had let it be known that postwar he would be sympathetic to Franco’s claims in Morocco, especially as the British Prime Minister was not enthralled by the way Vichy France was pandering towards the Nazi regime. The suggested Tripartite Agreement was loosely agreed but not to be announced until Spain entered the war. When Serrano Suñer left Berlin he had witnessed this Tripartite Agreement but only as a witness. For the Spanish it was critical that they were given food and fuel, war materials and be allowed to take over African territory. Spain was virtually starving, they had no fuel, and the generals knew that they had next to nothing in war equipment for a major war and were exhausted, but Franco was pathologically obsessed with Morocco. This preoccupation was a controlling factor in his mind and undoubtedly stretched back to his glory days as a young officer. It was pure colonial greed which indicated he never contemplated his country’s serious economic needs, or the immoral demeaning dismissal of the French, and his inability to understand Hitler’s long-term plans. For Serrano Suñer the German demands for bases, the Canary Islands and the risky demands of Gibraltar were always underpinned by the ominous German reminder of the heavy financial debts the Spanish owed Germany from the Civil War. Franco nevertheless remained convinced during this latter part of 1940 of Hitler’s goodwill and of their mutual friendship. He believed the rumours that German bombing would destroy Britain, and failed to understand the nature of what was happening. It is easy to gain the impression he was like a greedy teenager trying to find his way amongst adults. He wrote another long ambiguous letter to Hitler and was certain that he would gain all that he was asking. As the war later turned against Germany myths started to accumulate that the brave Franco was holding the Nazi hordes at bay by the sheer power of his personality. This was all arrant nonsense as these critical months clearly demonstrated that he was desperate to join what he saw as the victorious Axis powers, and thereby secure for Spain rich pickings. He would not listen to those who dared point out that the Royal Navy was not beaten, that Britain would fight on, and he ignored the potential power of Britain’s supportive colonies. He also ignored his military who were constantly pointing out their own deficiencies for a major war. He was only interested in colonial expansion in the deserts of North Africa, and it took time and a meeting with Hitler to cast doubts in his mind. However, Franco made it clear that he could only enter the war if Spain were paid in advance and totally

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supported, and this was part of the so-called secret protocol between Spain, Germany and Italy. It was becoming clear by late September that both the German and Spanish side were disappointed at the possible outcome. A meeting was arranged with Mussolini which although warmer than that with the Germans, was edged with caution as Mussolini warned Serrano Suñer and Franco that Italy was no longer capable of giving more aid, and Franco started to question whether Mussolini wanted to be Hitler’s number one comrade. Another development in Europe which eluded Franco was the position of Vichy France. Although it was eventually to come to nothing during these months Pétain, Laval and others in the French political scene were making suggestions that Vichy France may become a partner of Germany in the new Europe. During the Armistice Hitler and left the French with their colonies if only to ensure they remained collaborative and subservient to his plans. Hitler was aware that the Vichy French had fought off a combined attack by de Gaulle and the British at Dakar, and there was a possibility that France and her colonies could be useful, and Hitler did not want Franco unsettling these possibilities by his incessant demands. Hitler was aware that Mussolini was looking at the Balkans and Hitler was thinking of a major assault on Russia (Barbarossa) and could do without these diversions, especially Franco’s. It was at this stage that Hitler decided to do a personal reconnaissance tour of his would-be partners to find out for himself any potential or warnings. His plan was to talk to Mussolini, the Vichy French, and Franco. On October 4th he met Mussolini at the Brenner Pass. In these discussions he made it clear that the taking of Gibraltar was the only significant enterprise Franco could accomplish, and he did not want Franco unsettling the French by attacks on their colonies. He needed Vichy France in one piece, supported by the colonies and onside, and certainly not giving the British an excuse to invade any colonies because of Franco. Mussolini suggested that the Spanish project should be delayed which would have surprised Franco to hear his so-called friend suggesting such a view, but one thing is abundantly clear was that Franco was naïve in international power-play. In early October Mussolini conferred the Collar of the Order of the Annunziata on Franco; this was just the sort of honour that Franco enjoyed. In Franco’s team his Foreign Minister Beigbeder was not towing the same line and the Americans and British were beginning to wonder whether Beigbeder was something of an Anglophile. The Americans had been wondering whether to send food support to Spain in the light of the Axis talks. They were confused between the views of the seemingly pro-

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Axis Serrano Suñer, and the possible Anglophile Beigbeder. Such was the seriousness of the starvation level in Spain Franco accepted the American terms (October 8th) that they would distribute the food, and it would be halted the minute Spain stopped being neutral. A week later the AngloAmericans would have been disturbed when Franco suddenly, and with next to no warning changed two of his cabinet members to more pro-Axis men which led to the dismissal of Beigbeder. This also initiated a further promotion of Serrano Suñer who became Foreign Minister but still retained considerable influence over the Ministry of the Interior. This sent a clear signal to Mussolini and Hitler that the pro-Axis influence in Spain was dominant.

Wolff, Himmler, Franco, Serrano Suñer 1940

On October 20th Heinrich Himmler visited Spain with all the usual pomp and ceremony which Himmler would have relished; he even attended a bullfight held in his honour. Arrangements were made for police interaction and Himmler’s men were given the custody of some unfortunate people who thought they had fled the Nazis. According to the historian Paul Preston Himmler was horrified at the way Franco continued to eliminate his old enemies (it was during Himmler’s visit that a substantial trial took place of ex-Republicans who had fled to France and then been handed back to Franco by the Gestapo; most were executed after Franco glanced at the forms) rather than incorporate them into the new order.253 This was unbelievably hypocritical coming from a man who ruthlessly murdered Jews, Gypsies, Freemasons, Jehovah Witnesses, Slavs

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and Russians in the millions, and who would one day become one of the most wanted war criminals. Eventually on October 23rd Franco travelled in the old royal train to meet Hitler at Hendaye.* Franco’s train was a few minutes late and hagiographers claimed this was Franco’s way of snubbing the Nazi leader; this was pure myth and arrant nonsense. In reality Franco sacked the officer responsible and the train was simply leaky and out of order; it was more a signal of Spain’s poverty. Franco was excited and anticipated that on meeting the Führer he would be able to convince him of Spanish demands for entering the war. Franco wanted to gain as much as he could from what he perceived to be the end of the decadent democracies. For Hitler this was just to be a personal reconnaissance because he knew his top advisers were against bringing Spain into the war, and he was more concerned about the necessary balancing act he required between Vichy France, Italy and Spain in view of his long-term aims against Russia. He had already been told by others that Gibraltar, although attractive, was not worth the risk because the British would simply seize the Canary Islands; in short as far as Hitler was concerned Spain was not worth the risk. Apart from interpreters the meeting consisted of Hitler, Franco, Ribbentrop and Suñer. Those who knew both leaders well, such as Canaris realised it would not be a happy meeting. Hitler was accustomed to delivering monologues and expected no interruption, and Franco was of the same habit. It became a matter of the two men irritating one another with their extended discourses. Hitler surveyed the situation as he saw it emphasising the power at his disposal, and once again went through the problems he foresaw if there were a colonial clash between Spain and Vichy France. It did not take long for Franco, who had raised expectations and an adulatory attitude towards the German Führer, to realise his colonial ambitions were being brushed aside. He persisted with almost a plea for German aid so he could enter the war, and claimed the Spanish would make an immediate start by recovering Gibraltar. He then irritated Hitler by expressing the view that Britain would fight on from Canada and America which caused Hitler to lose his temper, but the fraught conference continued. Afterwards Ribbentrop and Serrano Suñer met to draw up the necessary protocol which was now a matter of mere paper. Franco could not understand Hitler’s placatory attitude towards Pétain and Vichy France, especially when Franco asked to take over the French part of Catalonia. Despite the *

In 1808 Carlos IV and the crown prince had travelled to a place nearby Hendaye and had been kidnapped. It has been suggested that Franco feared the same (see Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014 p.239) but this seems unlikely.

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debate and disillusionment Franco still appeared to be pledged to the Axis powers, prepared to commit, but at a date which would be agreed upon. Later, as circumstance changed Serrano Suñer and others would pretend they had skilfully held the Nazi leader at bay, when in reality they had almost been on their knees asking to join the war, if only for colonial expansion and any other rich pickings. The final text underlined that Spain would only join the war when Germany needed them or thought it necessary. The Protocol was vague but it constituted an agreement which committed a willing Spain to war when called upon. Mussolini “accurately described the significance of [the secret protocol] document in his meeting with Hitler on 28th October: ‘that protocol represents the secret accession of Spain to the Tripartite Pact.’”254 Many historians have regarded the meeting at Hendaye as Franco skilfully warding off Hitler when in reality it was simply two tyrants seeking to utilise one another, and Franco never obtained what he wanted. Hitler and Franco certainly gathered personal insights into one another, and Churchill in an amusing broadcast said “each one hopes that if he feeds the crocodile enough, the crocodile will eat him last. All of them hope that the storm will pass before their time comes to be devoured.”255 Later it was claimed that Hitler told Mussolini that he would rather have three teeth extracted than meet Franco again, and that the man was a Jesuit swine. These statements are often noted to try and show that Franco could be tough even with Hitler. In reality it was Hitler’s annoyance at Franco’s personal demands for colonial expansion and always expecting support when he already had substantial war debts from the Civil War; in addition Hitler found Franco tedious. It took time but eventually Franco started to realise that his colonial ambitions were of no interest to Hitler, and unwanted for political reasons. All his efforts and extended monologues to Hitler on the train were wasted. Franco had outlined all his perceived reasons for the Führer to comply, but unlike Franco’s own people he chose to ignore the Spanish dictator. When it came to megalomaniacal monologues the pair had matched one another. Although Serrano Suñer and Franco had been rejected by Hitler it was the loss of colonial expansion that caused the most rancour and they continued to warn Vichy France of their belligerent views regarding Morocco. Although Hitler never had any good views of other leaders apart from the early Mussolini he had found Pétain “more switched on” than Franco. Time and time again during these months and the ensuing years the growing problem as observed by most visitors was that the Spanish population was near to starvation level. The well to do had access to the black market and there was a serious danger of revolt.

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At first Franco appeared impervious to this problem and at the end of October was again writing letters to both Mussolini and Hitler explaining his viewpoint, promised to keep to their verbal agreement and then announced that the international administration in Tangier had been changed as it was incorporated into Spanish Morocco. Typically Hitler was excited by Franco’s belligerent action in Tangier and started to think the time had arrived for Spanish action. On November 9th the secret protocols between the three fascist countries arrived in Madrid and they were signed by Suñer. Hitler was becoming less certain because of Italian set-backs and the British victory over the Italian fleet at Taranto. He was concerned about oil supplies, and suddenly the Mediterranean was taking on greater military significance. The two keys to the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and Gibraltar were becoming critical, and two days after the Protocol papers were signed Serrano Suñer was invited back to Berlin. Franco agreed but he was now becoming nervous not just at British success, but the danger of a Royal Navy blockade, especially as the food crisis was becoming dangerously severe. In one jest it was proposed that Spain was up for sale because the starvation levels were so serious that the country desperately needed outside resources. Franco was now being warned of the unrest on the streets as dustbins were searched for peelings to keep a person alive. Franco’s suggestion that the Spanish could take Gibraltar was not received with any enthusiasm by Franco’s own military. The Germans had been planning such a move for some time; an operation called Felix was being planned in the landscape of Besançon similar to that surrounding Gibraltar. The idea was to enter Spain in early January, but Canaris and others pointed out that travelling from the north to Gibraltar would be hazardous because the communication links by train were dubious, the roads were not always ready for traffic, and the journey involved steep mountainous passes. The economy was so bad there was no fuel and living off the land would prove to be impossible. Some histories have hinted that the Germans may have entered without Spanish permission, but for a variety of reasons this was unlikely, not least that even with Spanish assistance the journey for a significant military force through the whole of Spain’s terrain at that time was highly hazardous. As the Germans procrastinated over the worth of the venture Franco was aware the Sea Lion had been indefinitely postponed. Franco had wanted England subdued, but more to the point the economic food state of Spain was nearly catastrophic, and there is a possibility that even the megalomaniacal Franco was worrying about his power with a starving population. Serrano Suñer had been somewhat aloof and off-hand with the American Weddell placing on the table Spain’s relationship with Germany

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and Italy, only to be reminded by the American that food support would only continue so long as Spain remained neutral. The grain situation was so bad that by November 5th Franco and his advisers were obliged to agree in giving publicity to the American offer, but Franco’s behaviour in Tangier had caused serious doubts in the West. The British under advice from Hoare remained convinced that food supplies could resolve the problem. Franco ducked and weaved in his usual mendacious fashion implying that he could not declare neutrality for fear of German reprisals. On November 19th Serrano Suñer met Hitler again and there followed the usual claims, counterclaims and prevarications. Serrano Suñer pointed out that they needed English food supplies, and Hitler countered they could have German supplies once they declared war. Hitler had certainly changed his mind in so far that he wanted Spanish action immediately, but it was only because the Mediterranean had become an area of critical military interest. When Hitler offered planes for the Canary Islands to stop the British, Serrano Suñer claimed they already had sufficient defences. They did not have good defences against the Royal Navy not least because their air force was in a shambles and Hitler knew this; it was also clear the Spanish were understandably jealous of their property. Serrano Suñer suggested that once they had gained time and foreign grain they could then look to military preparations. Ribbentrop had been convinced Spain would jump at the opportunity and applied his usual bad-mannered arguments with a stubborn Serrano Suñer, so Hitler decided to ask Mussolini to persuade Franco. Within a month of having decided that Franco should not become a belligerent Hitler was now demanding the opposite. The British through their spy system were well aware of Serrano Suñer’s visit to Berlin and were concerned. In late November Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that the effort to keep Spain neutral was essential otherwise the enemy would not only have Gibraltar, but the coast opposite effectually closing off the sea routes. In Germany Hitler was not responsive and although a matter of conjecture it seems highly likely that if German food had arrived Franco would have started the necessary military preparation; he was still only too happy to join with the Axis powers convinced they would win. Because of a letter from Stohrer there was a belief in Germany that Franco had started the preparation for his military, but this was a misunderstanding which was probably based on the devious ways Franco and Serrano Suñer ducked and weaved. All Franco did was ask for some German military advisers, and suggested the Axis should launch an attack on the Suez end of the Mediterranean which kept the action far from Spain.

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As the Germans were discussing Franco’s assurances Franco was talking to the American Weddell and denying that Spain had ever signed the Tripartite Agreement, and referred to the dangers Spain faced with the Wehrmacht just across the border. Franco had no problem with being a bare-faced liar. At the beginning of December the British agreed to import essential grain to Spain. The Spanish still managed to convince some Germans, especially Stohrer that the arrangement with the British was only to give them time to keep their freedom of action. In fact Hitler wanted to take his troops into Spain on the 10th January and discussed this with his Command and asked Mussolini to ensure Franco co-operated. Canaris arrived in Spain to test the waters and found Franco in a different frame of mind. Franco was aware of the Italian military set-backs, and that Britain’s RAF had maintained aerial superiority. He never mentioned this but told Canaris that Spain was so short of food, which was true, they could not act as hosts to the Germans even in transit. It was all a matter of deadlines and Franco expressed concern for the Canary Islands if Gibraltar fell, but all encompassed with the sentiment of his love for the Führer and not wanting to burden Nazi success. Canaris applied no pressure probably because he understood Spain’s economic situation. For Hitler it was a matter of taking Gibraltar by the Spanish, for Franco it was risking war with Britain. The Germans soon learned that Franco would not co-operate without supplies and a defeated England. An angry Führer called off Operation Felix which clearly indicated Hitler had no intention of entering Spain without Franco’s invitation. Hitler turned his attention to the east and central zones of the Mediterranean. Kindelán explained to Hoare that most of the Spanish had opposed Hitler, and Serrano Suñer was the one to blame. Stohrer was convinced, and probably rightly that the real cause of events was the food crisis and Franco’s vast shopping lists of demands.

Political Spain In Spain it was not all plain sailing for Franco and his irritation levels surfaced when on a planned trip through Andalusia the Cardinal Archbishop Pedro Segura refused to join him. The cardinal had objected to the nationalist insignia painted on the side of the cathedral and when summoned by Franco he simply refused to attend. He also preached sermons and wrote tracts denouncing Franco for cosying up to Hitler. Franco was furious but had to tread with care with his beloved Catholic Church. He wanted at first to have Segura recalled by the Vatican but was dissuaded from doing so in fear of alienating the Vatican. Wherever Segura went he was followed by armed Falangists. The tensions between

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the Church and the Falange were echoed by similar difficulties between the army and the Falange. It was Segura who worried Franco the most when his spies told him that his beloved title Caudillo was, according to Segura, a synonym for devil, and its origin was derived from a captain of a band of thieves. Franco wanted the outspoken cardinal expelled from Spain, but Serrano Suñer managed to convince him it was not worth alienating the Church for one obnoxious man. As Franco was trying to arrange some form of agreement with Hitler to join the war for Spanish benefit, he was made aware that his old supporter Yagüe was becoming critical of Franco’s continuous vengeful attitude towards his Civil War opponents. There were even rumours that there was a plot to remove Franco and replace him with General Muñoz Grandes. Once this was rumoured Yagüe was summoned, sacked, and sent into isolation to the town where he had been born. During the Civil War victory parade there was continuous reference to taking Gibraltar back, and it was noticed that Hoare and his wife left the diplomatic stand in protest. Franco took the opportunity to rage against the corrupt and decadent democracies to the delight of the Falangists. During the food crisis of late 1940 Franco, as always nervous of opposition, had the Falangist Civil Governor of Málaga, a José Luis Arrese brought before him. Instead of imprisoning him as anticipated Franco was somewhat impressed by the man’s suggestions for feeding and housing. Later Arrese became an important figure in the Franco hold on power when he was made Minister-Secretary General of FET y de las JONS. Franco lived off his Civil War victory continuously and after a major official banquet he took his guests to Cuelgamuros near El Escorial and announced that he intended to build a monument to the fallen to be known as the Vale de los Caídos (Valley of the Fallen). He announced this on April 1st and that it was to be the largest and most impressive monument in Spain. He had searched for the site and took a major interest in its construction. He was undoubtedly interested in his own place in history and even then many must have seen his self-interest as grotesque. The building was to be done by POWs which amounted to slave labour.* Those fortunate enough not to be executed found themselves working in labour *

“It was constructed by the slave labour of ex-POWs branded with the letter ‘T’ for trabajador or worker, who toiled for two decades between the work-site, the quarries, and compulsory church services in the nearby Escorial, They were officially employed by the ‘Board for the Redemption of Penalties through Labour’-a name reminiscent of Nazi slogans.” Davies Norman, Europe A History (London: Pimlico, 1997) p.985

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battalions not just on his monument, but roads, bridges tunnels where many were worked to death or into total ill-health.

CHAPTER THREE 1941 AT WAR AGAINST RUSSIA

The year 1941 started with Franco asking the Anglo-Americans for food supplies because during 1940 the situation had deteriorated to a lifethreatening level. Stohrer understood the situation and passed the information onto his German masters, and Serrano Suñer let the Italians know that Spain had become a subject of blackmail as far as the British were concerned. However, Spanish internal politics appeared to be changing and there were rumours that Serrano Suñer was making a bid for more power. Some of Franco’s senior generals and even the Church were indicating that they were unhappy about joining the Nazis. The Falangist Minister Gamero del Castillo went so far as wanting the Germans to intervene and have Serrano Suñer placed in charge. Hitler was completely disenchanted with Franco, and suggested that he was the leader by mistake, but he asked Mussolini to take a hand and interfere. Serrano Suñer having returned from Berlin expressed Hitler’s views to Franco and pointed out that there was no point in Spain entering the war after the defeat of Britain, because that would already be too late. Franco denied having ever said he would have to wait until England’s defeat, but he knew that the food crisis would bring Spain down if the Anglo-Americans did not help, or if the Royal Navy blockaded Spain. He once again promised to help, but would need to be given time to consider all the factors. Franco was almost behaving like a spoilt teenager and in all this national and international chaos he unbelievably found the time to dictate a novel. It was entitled Raza (Race) which was based on his own selfperceived autobiography with adjustments to suit his self-image. He had it polished by literary experts and made into a film which he constantly watched. It was quite clear from the script that he favoured Nazism. As Franco turned himself into a figure of literature Ribbentrop replied in his usual brazen way to Franco’s standpoint as conveyed to him by Stohrer. Franco was furious as usual and Serrano Suñer took the line that Spain would have co-operated had Germany kept to its promises of supplying aid. Ribbentrop persisted in pointing out that only by entering the war when requested would Spain ever be able to claim any strategic

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value in the European war. Franco and Serrano Suñer’s reply was somewhat placatory pointing out that Spain’s starvation level had demanded their course of action, and Spain’s adherence to the Axis had not changed. When Stohrer was instructed to inform Franco he had yet to declare a date for declaration of war, all Franco promised was that it would eventually happen. Those Germans like Stohrer and Canaris who were familiar with Spain had a degree of understanding about Franco’s position, which Ribbentrop failed to comprehend. The New Year remained as complex as the previous, but the food and fuel shortage was now so serious the Allies worried that Franco would rush headlong into the war. Some of Franco’s generals were decidedly unhappy and there was a distinct possibility that riot and mayhem might flood the streets for lack of food. Some wanted what they perceived as the pro-Nazi Serrano Suñer out of the way, and the German Stohrer was convinced that Franco’s indecisiveness was caused by Serrano Suñer and a divided cabinet. Hitler wrote a letter to Franco outlining the problem from his point of view which Franco appeared to accept. Franco was conscious of the major defeat of Italian troops at Bengazi by the British, and for a time he may have pondered the immediate future. Stohrer was given a shopping list of Spain’s military requirements which was unacceptably immense and which the Germans understandably took to be utterly impossible, and interpreted it as Franco’s way of keeping his distance from any commitment. Mussolini in agreement with Hitler asked to meet Franco at Bordighera, and although Franco was hesitant they met, but Franco believed it was more important to Mussolini as a public relations exercise, and he simply reiterated his demands which he had made to Germany.* Franco was well aware that there was growing unrest in Spain about joining the war and even more about lack of food. Nevertheless, Franco still seemed to believe in an Axis victory and blamed the German lack of supplies for not coming to the party; according to Franco it depended on Germany and not Spain. Mussolini recognised Spain’s elemental problem of food and “he said to his own staff ‘how can you push into a war a nation with bread reserves for one day?’”256 Later Mussolini would pass on the results of the meeting, but Hitler was now preoccupied with coming to Mussolini’s rescue in the Balkans, and secretly preparing his attack on Russia. Hitler was too engrossed with his own political ambitions in Europe and regarded Spain as of little importance despite his irritation. *

Franco made his way to the meeting by a complex route through the south of France because of his fear of flying.

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The food problem in Spain was colossal and was probably the major factor which kept Spain from declaring war on the side of the Axis powers; it was not Franco’s principles. As Serrano Suñer and Franco returned from their Italian meeting they met Pétain and the New Prime Minister Admiral Darlan. This new Prime Minister was a strong Anglophobe and had ambitions about co-operating with Germany as a partner. Nevertheless, the somewhat pompous and arrogant Franco lost little time in talking of Spanish military strength, and in the next breath the problem of Morocco. The French were well aware of the Falangist element constantly pushing for an aggressive attack, especially in the Colonies. Such was Franco’s arrogance he eventually replied to Hitler extending his shopping list and announcing that Spain needed the Suez Canal closed down. Given his usual temperament Hitler was unbelievably passive about Franco’s demands, but the invasion of Russia was pre-occupying his mind, and Spain for Hitler would be as it had proved to be so far, a waste of time. Because the Luftwaffe was now ensconced in North Africa the Suez Canal route was already dangerous for shipping, and British ships were passing around South Africa making Gibraltar for a time less critical. In Germany there were some signs of anger at Franco’s recalcitrance, and a demand was made for the repayment of the Spanish Civil War debt which was just short of a staggering four hundred million Reichsmarks. There was a possibility of Operation Isabella which planned on German troops entering Spain to counter a British invasion which was being rumoured. The one placatory note for the Germans was that Franco gave back the German consulate in Tangier which they were then able to use for their secret services and information gathering. The Allies were well aware of Franco’s movements, his meetings, his attitudes, and America sent William Donovan in late February as the President’s special envoy. He was ill-received, denied access to Franco as Serrano Suñer explained to him that they believed in a German victory. However, Franco’s main concern at this time was not his desire to be one of the Axis partners if they met his demands, but he was becoming sharply aware of tensions at home between the army and the Falangists, and the ever growing power of his brother-in-law Serrano Suñer as well as Suñer’s unpopularity. There were vague rumours abroad that Spain was looking to take over its neighbour Portugal, and the Falangists were all too excited by the prospect. The Portuguese knew about the Falangist rhetoric and their wall scribblings, but probably not how far this possibility had crept up the political command-chain. The Germans were told in the Spanish method of whispers that there would have been an immense

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interest in having a vast Atlantic coastline in such a critical area. The Americans agreed to a huge financial credit being given by the British to Spain, but once again Franco was fluctuating wildly as he again perceived that the Axis powers were gaining the upper hand. It was a matter of Franco keeping both parties on the side-lines while he worked out the best course. The situation of Serrano Suñer was by the spring beginning to heat up as the army and the Falangists started to clash. There were rumours that the army might go so far as a coup simply to rid the country of Suñer; there was sufficient evidence that at this stage Serrano Suñer was generally disliked and far from trusted. Franco was aware of the issues but in April he was ebullient at the German victories in North Africa, and said so in a speech on April 17th which left no doubt that he was clearly on the Axis side whatever else was conveyed to the Anglo-Americans. Franco knew he had to gather as many supplies from the Americans and British as he could manage in this game of deceit and double deceit. The Serrano Suñer problem would not go away, and in late April early May Vigón let Franco know that unless Serrano Suñer’s powers were reduced, the military ministers might resign all at the same time. The British had been only too happy to agitate this matter with substantial bribes.257 The main issue tended to revolve around the Ministry of the Interior which Serrano Suñer once held, and which was technically under Franco’s indolent control, but still in effect under Serrano Suñer’s influence because of his lackey José Sanz. During these months Franco’s awareness of Serrano Suñer’s power became more focused, and was given more impetus when a new book suggested that Serrano Suñer was José Primo de Rivera’s natural successor. Franco the family man had to move with caution as Serrano Suñer was a relation, albeit only a brother-in-law. Serrano Suñer compounded matters by permitting a decree in May 1941 which freed the Falangist press from censorship regulations. Serrano Suñer then made a speech condemning Britain and called for the fascist Falangists to have more power which delighted Mussolini, who could see the development of a fascist party similar to the Nazis. Vigón craftily hinted to the ever wary Franco that the growth of Serrano Suñer’s power reduced Franco’s influence. This prompted Franco to act with typical cunning and he made one of his adherents Glarza an anti-Falangist, Minister of the Interior, and Kindelán was named captain general of Catalonia.* Serrano Suñer was given no warning of these changes, and nor was José Sanz (Suñer’s lackey) who *

The country was divided into military districts headed by a captain general.

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was promptly replaced. Other notable and telling changes were made and the Falangist press was again subject to censorship. There were challenges in the press from the Falangist and a small degree of violence between the fascist police and army. The conflict enlarged with pro-German propaganda in the press, and many in the army were becoming angry at the Falangist bid for power. Serrano Suñer tried one more bid in the face of Franco’s opposition and threatened to resign. Franco was crafty and brought into his service several senior Falangists and offered these people major posts, including Arrese who knew how to flatter Franco, and with his whispering campaigns would later bring Serrano Suñer down. Serrano Suñer had expected others to resign, but found he was on his own and so withdrew his resignation. Franco had played an old political game of using bait to bring would be enemies onside. He had surrounded himself with close supporters including Arrese already mentioned, and Admiral Carrero Blanco.* Serrano Suñer’s health was not good and this episode did not help. After the fall of Crete Franco and Serrano Suñer were convinced that Britain was finished, and they kept both the American and British contacts at bay; Franco was always unavailable. Later Franco simply told lies making up excuses like a naughty schoolboy and pretending that he had been holding the Germans and Italians away. When the Germans suddenly invaded Russia on 22nd June Franco was overjoyed and even more convinced that the Nazis would win. Serrano Suñer was of the same inclination and suggested to Franco that volunteers be asked (or ordered) to go and fight alongside the Germans against the hated Communists. Serrano Suñer renewed his attacks on the British and a group of Falangists attacked the British embassy, but were fought off by a few troops and some escaping POWs. The Falangists being totally committed fascists were keen to show their support of the Nazi cause. Stohrer suggested Spain might declare war on Russia, but Serrano Suñer stalled on the grounds that they needed to evade a Royal Navy blockade. The effort was made to send what was called the Blue Division (named blue because of the colour of the Falangist uniform) of the Falangists to fight with the Germans in Russia.† Some American visits were spurned as *

Admiral Carrero Blanco would become an influential adviser to Franco and would remain his closest collaborator until his assassination in 1973. † The Blue Division was trained by the Germans and nearly 5,000 were killed and up to 9,000 wounded. Many more were captured and only about 280 returned to Spain in 1954 through the offices of the Red Cross. The Blue Division was not withdrawn until February 1944; a total of 47,000 Spaniards fought with the

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Serrano Suñer regarded this development of the Blue Division, as he perceived the situation, to be a triumph. At the same time this increased the hostility between the army and the Falangists, and Serrano Suñer’s attitudes intensified the issue. Franco would claim to the West there was nothing he could do about the Blue Division because they were volunteers. The Germans had to feed and equip them, and thereby he hoped to avoid the dreaded blockade against his diminishing imports. “It was a high-risk strategy based on the confident assumption of eventual Germany victory.”258 When Hoare remonstrated with Franco concerning the Blue Division project Franco replied that there were two wars, one involving the British and the other against Russia. The Spanish contingents were mainly Falangists and it has been stated they “were the most celebrated division of any army in all of World War II” which seems an unrealistic claim.259 Not all Franco’s men were happy with the Blue Division in Russia, and one of his main supporters Varela expressed his objections. A variety of reasons have been argued as to why Franco decided to ignore Valera and others. It is thought by some that Franco was relieving some of the German pressure which had been applied in the preceding months; the need for repayment by blood for Germans lost in the Civil War; to show that although Spain was slow entering the war it was still willing, and the most likely that Franco was assuming a quick victory and he would be associated with the victors and ready for the spoils. Franco was so ebullient about the invasion of Russia that on the July 17th anniversary of the Civil War he spoke loudly and vehemently against Germany’s enemies, and for many it sounded as if he were emulating Hitler in the way he delivered his impassioned speech.* Blanco had provided much of the material for Franco’s speech, but even the pro-Nazi Serrano Suñer was aware that Franco might have damaged relationships with the Anglo-Americans by stirring up the Falangist groups with his rhetoric. Serrano Suñer’s excuse for such sudden objectivity was to impress the Germans and to remind Franco they needed food. As it was German Army in Russia and approximately 10 per cent lost their lives. See Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.59 * In this speech he said “at this moment, when the German armies lead the battle for which Europe and Christianity have for so many years longed, and in which the blood of our youth goes to join that our comrades of the Axis as a warm expression of our solidarity, let us renew our faith in the destinies of our country under the watchful protection of our closely united army and the Falange.” Quoted in Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.60

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there were plans prepared by the British in case they needed to attack the Canary Islands. Such was the intensity of feeling that Hoare requested Eden to tread gently over the Franco issue. The Franco response to Barbarossa was so appalling from the Anglo-American aspect that imports dwindled to an unsustainable level. Franco’s own generals were aware of this complex situation and anger about the Blue Division was rapidly organised into protest. There was also some consternation that in Germany the Blue Division had to swear an oath of allegiance to Hitler. These volunteers were all Spanish Nationalists and mainly from the Falange; they would have been somewhat disturbed themselves when they arrived, as they were met by a Luftwaffe band that greeted them not with their national anthem, but that of the Republicans they had just fought in their Civil War.260 Many times Franco had offered troops, but a French historian rightly noted that “such grandiloquence made no positive contribution towards collaboration that was of a sentimental rather than an effective nature;” nevertheless they were sent and were not always volunteers.261 Franco was now under more pressure from his generals not only to stay out of the war and avoid belligerent pro-Nazi speeches, but also to rid himself of Serrano Suñer. Franco was a cautious man and agreed with them in principle, but did nothing. Franco was all too aware of his family relationship with Serrano Suñer which was now a diminishing factor with his need to keep a balance in the power play of the Falangists and the Army. His inactivity led to General Aranda being asked to speak to him again in mid-August, and there was even talk about a coup, but the press still continued their campaign against the Anglo-Americans, and Franco remained determinedly pro-Germany. In his almost child-like fantasy world Franco was trying to appeal to the Axis powers on the one hand while maintaining trade relations with his Anglo-American suppliers. The British were keen on letting him play the game so long as he remained neutral, but the Americans were not fooled, and objected strongly at the way their representatives in Spain were treated. Franco eventually heard of this and eventually granted the American Weddell a delayed interview on the 6th of October. Weddell confronted Franco with his statements, but Franco denied them or said he was holding the Germans at bay, and Serrano Suñer occasionally interrupted with insinuations that the American often misunderstood what was being said. It was not just a matter of food and fuel but Spanish industry was coming to a halt for lack of necessary supplies of basic ingredients such as rubber, copper and so forth. Franco’s balancing act was one of trying to be friends with both sides in an atmosphere of total distrust caused by Franco

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himself. Germany had even considered re-thinking Operation Felix to take Gibraltar, and bring men from the Eastern Front, but eventually the High Command decided against reviving the old plan. The Germans considered the situation but they realised the usefulness of Spain’s ports and the continuation of Spain secretly sending materials to Germany despite Spain’s own poverty. The Serrano Suñer problem of the previous May re-emerged again in the summer of 1941 when his unpopularity reached new proportions. The generals were now thinking that the Anglo-Americans could well win the war, while Serrano Suñer appeared oblivious to the forces ranged against him, and Franco was trying to tame the Falangists by bringing key members within his fold. His attention was being drawn away from grandiose ideas of colonialism to self-preservation of his personal power. The first reverses to the Germans in Russia were happening and this did not seem to blight Franco’s belief in Germany, but it gave him pause for thought. In November 1941 the Anti-Comintern Pact met in Berlin with Ciano, Ribbentrop, Serrano Suñer and Hitler. Serrano Suñer mentioned some of Franco’s internal problems, and commented on the war in a way which displeased Hitler. While he was in Berlin Serrano Suñer gave a speech in which he attacked the Russians and Americans for which Weddell challenged him on his return to Spain. The Americans were now putting major restrictions on Spanish trade including the demand that they supervised fuel distribution which was understandable, but not by Franco, who had to acquiesce otherwise there would be no supplies. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbour an official telegram of congratulations was sent from Madrid to Tokyo to the delight of the Falangists. Quite how the Americans coped with this two-faced lying is difficult to comprehend. The Falangists were delighted with the Japanese attack, but there were reservations later when Japan’s imperial designs started to stretch towards the Philippines. Britain was proving successful in North Africa, and Russia was not going to be an easy victory even against the mighty Wehrmacht, and Franco eventually decided that more caution was necessary. Kindelán attacked Franco in public over government incompetence, and Franco knew Kindelán had the backing of the Army so he sat back and reflected, and seemed to take the issue on board; for the time being. Kindelán also had the courage to raise the fact that executions were taking place every week from the Civil War, and too many were in prison. He repeated his claims in writing and in a speech made the bold suggestion that Franco needed to look to the future, to an heir or the restoration of the monarchy. Because of the factions Franco had to tread with care and often

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used the excuse that international relationships were important at that time and called for greater unity. The Spanish historian Enrique Moradiellos made the suggestion that after America’s entry into the war, along with the Italian defeats in Libya, and German difficulties in Russia all this “gradually eroded Franco’s belief in a final Axis victory.”262 Moradiellos may have had a point that these momentous events gave Franco pause for thought, but his declarations, public and private, along with his actions clearly indicated that nearly to the bitter end that Franco, now in need of Falangist support, still anticipated an Axis victory, and it would take severe economic pressure from the Anglo-Americans, and almost indisputable evidence that Germany was losing before he truly understood what was happening on the world stage. “In fact, the Spanish regime was doing almost everything else that it could to be of service to Germany, short of entry into the war.”263 It has been argued that the Spanish contribution to the German effort was minimal, but the U-boat supply itself was extremely dangerous to Britain, and eventually the necessity of Britain’s survival was critical on the global stage in order to act as a launch pad for American troops. It was because of the appalling state that Spain found herself in as a result of the Civil War that Franco could not be of more help to the Axis which was self-evidently his long-term wish. As Serrano Suñer frequently pointed out to the Germans Spain was all too willing once her supply problems were resolved. It was fortunate for Franco that the latter part of 1941 was a quiet period for Franco on the international front (not least because Hitler was pre-occupied elsewhere) because he needed time for his home politics and keeping the various factions in line with his leadership.

CHAPTER FOUR 1942 FRANCO’S TWO-WAR THESIS

At the beginning of 1942 Franco was not only worried about the Russian campaign and the British refusal to capitulate, but he was aware that Serrano Suñer was unpopular and that Kindelán was attacking Franco’s policies. The Americans were being ultra-cautious as to how far they were prepared to assist Spain, but Churchill, worried about Gibraltar, wrote to Roosevelt in early January 1942 “please will you very kindly consider giving a few carrots to the Dons to stave off trouble at Gibraltar.”264 Churchill and Roosevelt were planning the Torch Landing in North Africa and knew that the Gibraltar Straits were critical for success.* Serrano Suñer recognised that he was under scrutiny and was aware of his gathering opponents in the military; he was also attacked by newspaper articles and editorials, and both he and Kindelán had been placed in Franco’s bad books. Franco had taken a “pomp and ceremony” visit to Catalonia and appealed for Spanish unity pointing out that Spain needed a single command, a single discipline and single obedience; everyone knew what and who he meant. Despite these internal political troubles and some concern about German progress in Russia, Franco allowed Wolfram (the ore from which tungsten is derived) to be sent to Germany even though Germany sent nothing back in return. It was clear he still believed in an Axis victory and explained this to an incredulous Salazar on a visit to Portugal. The British failure at Singapore continued to boost this belief. However, when the refinery had to be closed at Tenerife in February 1942 Franco was obliged to accept the American demand that if they supplied fuel it would be on the understanding that they organised its distribution. That same month his father died. Franco had never forgiven him for the way he treated his mother, and the way he had spoken out against *

In early 1942 an Abwehr operation known as Unternehmen Bodden had been suggested. In brief it was a matter of sonic devices on the floor bed across the Gibraltar Straits to monitor passing ships. The British put considerable pressure on Franco who desisted until after the Torch Operation when he asked Canaris to take it out of operation.

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Franco when drunk in bars.* Nevertheless, Franco had a special funeral arranged but only attended the funeral procession part of the way. In March General Espinosa openly attacked Serrano Suñer for which he was promptly sacked, a reaction which enraged Kindelán and others. This internal dissent would not go away. In the meantime the British had become aware of the transport of wolfram to Germany, and in November they suggested the Anglo-Americans purchased it all; this was part of their economic warfare against Nazi Germany. Weddell who knew most of Spanish day-to-day affairs had to resign from ill-health and was replaced by a Willard Beaulac, and in May 1942 a new American ambassador was appointed. His name was Carlton Hayes and he had supported Franco and the Nationalists during the Civil War, and was consequently made more welcome than the British man Hoare.† Hoare knew that Franco was proAxis and kept it partially hidden for expediency reasons; Hayes came to the conclusion Franco was pro-Allies. It would appear that Hayes was well and truly “taken in” by Franco’s lies and clever ambivalence. On the other hand Hayes may have played an important part in trying to convince Franco that America’s overwhelming industrial power clearly indicated ultimate victory for the West. None of this stopped Serrano Suñer from consistently proclaiming pro-Nazi sentiments and his belief they would win. Most of 1942 would be taken up with two major concerns for Franco and Spain. The first would be the growing dissent between the Army and the Falange resulting in the question of Franco’s own hold on power. The second would be the war drawing uncomfortably close to Spain with first Operation Torch, and consequently Hitler’s occupation of Vichy France. The Germans would soon be next door in the north of Spain and the Allies south over a short stretch of water; this situation left Franco having to juggle promises and pedalling lies as he walked a dangerous tightrope. The Spanish army was probably at its weakest during the war years because they had no imported war material as in the Civil War, they were deficient in technical training, “and if at any point in World War II the Spanish military had been pitted against any of the powers in the conflict, it would have found itself in dreadful circumstances.”265 The Americans went so far as to burgle the Spanish Embassy in Washington during the summer of 1942 simply to try and nail down *

His father Don Nicolás had the good sense to see Hitler’s evil in wanting to destroy and occupy, and criticised his son for his attack on Jews and Freemasons. † Hayes was not a career diplomat but a university professor and expert on European history; he was also a Catholic convert which may have also prompted Roosevelt to choose him for this mission.

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exactly where Franco stood in terms of his promises to the Allies and to the Axis. The main concern for the Allies was Torch which was their first large scale amphibious landing, and were understandably concerned about Spanish interference. Serrano Suñer had taken a holiday in Italy despite his growing unpopularity and the knowledge that Franco was becoming somewhat distrustful of him. In addition to this there was the growing tension that it was rumoured that Serrano Suñer was having an affair which Franco would have found highly objectionable. During this period of the summer there arose what is often called the Begoña affair when the Falangists clashed with the military and the Carlists (pro-monarchy) at a violent level. There had been a service and ceremony at Begoña (near Bilbao) to commemorate the fallen from the Carlists during the Civil War. There was violence and a bomb was thrown by a Juan Domínguez which injured nearly a hundred people and fighting broke out.* The press were silenced, but Franco realised that the situation was serious, almost open warfare within his own ranks. Franco as always tried to calm matters down and hoped the situation would go away. However, General Varela, who had been presiding at the Begoña service, was furious and demanded prosecution as he rightly perceived that Franco was not taking action against the fanatics of the Falange. Varela offered his resignation and Franco realised that his administration was on the point of unravelling which would leave him in a parlous state. Other major figures backed Varela, and Franco understood that if they had their own way he would have a cabinet dominated by monarchists.† Since the end of the Civil War and throughout his life Franco would have problems with how to deal with the monarchists; Ciano had thought that Franco would “act with the harshest energy” but in reality he employed diplomatic cunning.266 Finally Franco took the risk of accepting Varela’s resignation and others decided not to follow because they claimed Varela had made the point sufficiently. In the meantime Arrese had been suggesting to Franco that Serrano Suñer was involved in the Begoña debacle. It was the last straw and Franco dismissed his brother-in-law as Foreign Secretary *

The Falangist who threw the bomb had just recently been awarded a medal by Hitler for his work in the Blue Division; he was still arrested and executed. † Alfonso XIII had died in Rome in February 1941 and was succeeded by his son Don Juan whom Franco had politely kept out of fighting in the war. The Monarchists at first leaned towards the Axis powers not knowing that Hitler regarded them as “monarchist filth” and it was only towards the end of 1942 they tended to look towards the allies. See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.251

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and replaced him with General Jordana, and Franco assumed the presidency of the Junta Política. Even Ciano knew that Jordana appeared to favour the Allies and wondered whether Serrano Suñer would be sent to Rome which he did not relish.267 Serrano Suñer had persistently argued that Spain should enter the war on the side of the Axis, but “Jordana was determined to keep Spain out of the war, and his appointment in September was a great relief to the Allies.”268 Jordana was a monarchist and this adroit move by Franco alleviated concerns that Serrano Suñer was running the country which pleased the Monarchists. Franco had resolved the problem to a degree by clever political manoeuvring and men like Kindelán lost some ground. Franco surrounded himself with sycophants and people who were dependant on his good will. He already had the faithful Carrero Blanco and he now added to his collection a lawyer called Blas Pérez González who was also to become of his loyal adherents. He had learned the lesson of not becoming reliant on one man as he had with Serrano Suñer.* Hitler had been ruminating on provoking his own coup in Spain and had been considering the leader of the Blue Division General Muñoz Grandes who had been promoting himself as being pro-German, but Franco’s immediate reactions to the crisis made it clear to Hitler that Franco was still in control. Franco would not desist from his concept that two different wars were being fought; the one between Germany and the democracies, and the second war against Bolshevist Russia; nor did he stop admiring Hitler and the certainty of an eventual Axis victory. The Allies had struggled with economics, promises, and threats to keep Franco’s neutrality, but the Allied cause for concern rose exponentially as the deadline for Torch drew near. Gibraltar was simply crammed with allied men and material and later it would be claimed Franco’s benevolence allowed this to happen. However, Paul Preston in his biography appropriately points out that “neither Franco nor any of his ministers had any real inkling of what specifically was being prepared,” especially since they were just recovering from the summer bout of in-fighting.269 The non-interference was later interpreted by many as a sign of Franco’s quiet goodwill, which given his political propensity was sheer nonsense. He was more worried about an attack on the Canary Islands, and the American press called for a diplomatic break with Spain which caused Franco and Jordana to be more concerned about an attack on Spanish territory. Franco continued to lie *

Serrano Suñer retired from public life in 1947 and lived to 102 years of age dying in Madrid in 2003.

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outright about the sanctuary given to U-boats but the Allies, fully aware of the situation decided that it was essential that Franco be informed through diplomatic channels that Spain was not under attack. Hoare using his diplomatic skills spoke to Franco and explained that Spain was not threatened, and then raised the U-boat question which Franco all but ignored. Franco was more concerned about relayed German information which had suggested the Allies were going to occupy French Morocco. The Germans undoubtedly fed Franco this possibility in the hope that it would trigger Franco into declaring war. Stohrer had suggested that Franco should make a pre-emptive strike and take French Morocco first. Franco and Jordana both perceived the reasons for the German promptings. In the April of this year Stohrer had dispatched “a long report to Berlin, observing that Spain suffered from disastrous leadership, profound internal division, and near famine conditions, with Franco increasingly isolated.”270 In many ways the report was true but he underestimated Franco’s ability at political survival. Franco would always move with caution, keeping the Fascists on side, manipulating his military leaders and making promises to the monarchists. It was a game of bluff and counter-bluff but the stakes were serious.

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When Operation Torch started on the 8th November Hoare and Hayes met Franco to assure him that Spain was safe and not under attack. Franco seemed unperturbed and the Allies were relieved that Spain stayed neutral. Franco had more trouble with his own men as Kindelán re-appeared on November 11th questioning Franco’s commitment and suggested the restoration of the monarchy. Franco, unquestionably inwardly furious listened calmly and denied he had ever made a formal agreement with the Axis powers, and playing for time claimed he was only in the post for “the duration,” and he would be looking towards Don Juan as his successor. Such was Kindelán’s support Franco had to play his cards with care; he waited for some three months and then replaced Kindelán with a proFalangist. He also re-promoted Yagüe which seemed somewhat inopportune as Yagüe remained firmly pro-Axis and believed they would win. On the same day that Kindelán had made his attack on Franco’s policies, November 11th, Hitler had occupied the whole of Vichy France as a defensive reaction to what was happening in North Africa. The Allies were somewhat concerned that Hitler could march troops through Spain, but the Germans only maintained light troops on the French-Spanish border. After Torch Franco was angry because the Allies were now in French Morocco and Algeria which he had long coveted, but he was beginning to realise he had to tread with care. Operation Torch “had pierced the myth of German omnipotence” and Franco saw “the writing on the wall.”271 It was a warning for Franco but he persisted in his belief of an eventual German victory or a state of non-defeat, a stalemate. His duplicity knew no bounds with promises and assurances of a contradictory nature being made first to the Germans and then to the Allies almost in a cyclic fashion. Having just promised allegiance to Germany Franco turned down their request to use planes from the Balearics to search for downed pilots on the grounds he could not risk food and fuel supplies from the Allies. He then turned to the Allies and told them he was under pressure to ward off the Axis; it is not surprising that Hitler and his cohorts did not like him, and the Allies were constantly distrustful. In a speech as late as December he publicly affirmed his belief in the Axis cause, that the democracies had reached the end of their days, and it took a single leader to make sure the country survived. He was trying to explain in his usual long-winded fashion that his form of government was the best, and that if the Allies won they would still need him. It was the most incredible bluster but “the Caudillo was now, in the aftermath of Torch, seriously beginning to look for insurance.”272 The historian Zeiler made the point that Franco refused the Germans entry to Spain and “he let the Allies sail safely through the Straits.”273 This comment was too sweeping;

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the Germans had decided against negotiating an army through Spain, and Franco’s air force and Navy was inadequate to take on the Allies; even if Franco considered this possible he realised it would constitute an act of aggression against two dangerous opponents. He did not let them sweep through the Straits; even Franco knew he had no choice. Men like Jordana and Carrero Blanco realised before Franco that there were distinctive signs that the tide was turning against the Axis powers. Blanco sent a memorandum to Franco stating that the war “had become a struggle between the powers of evil embodied in the Anglo-Saxon-Soviet coalition directed by the Jews against a German-Japanese alliance that, though powerful, was certainly not guided by the principles of Catholic Christianity. This created a war of duration difficult to determine, but certainly lengthy.”274 Blanco was still like Franco looking to the Germans but the seeds of doubt may have been sown, and Franco may at this stage have toyed with the idea of being the arbiter of the future which he sometimes talked about. Franco with his public announcements and speeches managed not only to confuse his overseas observers but infuriated them, sometimes both sides within a week. On the first anniversary of Pearl Harbour he addressed his national party the FET with the words that “we are witnessing the end of one era and the beginning of another. The liberal world is going under, a victim of the cancer produced by its own errors and its collapsing commercial imperialism.”275 He would pontificate one way or another as if he understood all that was happening, and he was more often than not wrong in his predictions.

CHAPTER FIVE 1943 DOUBTS

The Year 1943 revolved around Franco’s continued fight to stave off criticism at home in order to maintain his power, and his mendacious efforts to convince Germany and then the Allies he was on their side. In reality he still maintained confidence in the Axis, and like so many was persuaded by Hitler’s rhetoric about wonder weapons; nevertheless by the end of the year reality was dawning on him, and he was making the best of a problematic international situation for himself. It had been said that “the invasion of Sicily and the fall of Mussolini in July 1943 hastened Spain’s return to neutrality,” and there is a high degree of truth in this as 1943 unfolded, but although Franco started to take out insurances for the future there remained that element in his thinking that the Allies could not achieve total victory.276 Near the end of the previous year he had visited Salazar in Portugal and signed the Bloque Iberíco Treaty as he tried to repair some of the past and insure for the future. It was not quite as straightforward on the more immediate internal issues, and Yagüe and Muñoz Grandes made their proNazi affiliations known, while Hitler’s current concern was that Franco would not be able to fight off an Allied invasion of Spain. Grandes’ association with Hitler was especially worrying and Franco ingeniously promoted him to such a high rank he could not be in charge of fighting soldiers. Franco’s main problem tended to be with the Americans; the British maintained their policy of a soft approach to the Franco problem. The American ambassador Hayes had developed a degree of faith in Franco, but the American administration at home tended to think otherwise. They had noted that Spanish troops were heavy on the Moroccan borders and possibly a threat, whereas there were only a few troops on the SpanishFrench border. It was about this time that the “western diplomatic analysts had realised Franco’s desire for political survival at any price.”277 Franco had persisted in asking Germany for material and Hitler somewhat more fraught had promised to look at the shopping list. On Franco’s part it was nothing short of pure greed as he took from the Allies and demanded from

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Germany what he could. There was a huge rise in trade figures between Germany and Spain; food and raw materials from Spain and machinery from Germany. Hitler was curious about Franco’s long-term ambitions and sent Canaris to find out as much as he could, while Franco was obliged to listen to Yagüe, Grandes and Asensio asking him to side with the Axis. As he listened quietly to some of his generals, knowing that not all his generals were of the same mind, he was also becoming more cordial with Hoare as he sought Allied support. It was, as Paul Preston suggested, a huge smoke-screen that Franco was deploying.278 For Franco the situation was in flux and there were significant changes; not least Torch was proving successful, Serrano Suñer had gone, Ciano was soon to be dismissed in Italy, Stohrer had been replaced by Hans Adolf von Moltke mainly because Ribbentrop had grown suspicious of Stohrer. Moltke was not so well-versed in Spanish affairs nor spoke Spanish as Stohrer, and in January nearly provoked a calamity when he was hoodwinked into thinking that Franco had flown to Lisbon to meet Churchill. Moltke did however organise a secret protocol between Berlin and Madrid outlining the trade agreements. Jordana was not pleased with this move which clearly indicated that Franco was behind these devious machinations. Moltke was pleased to be so cordially welcomed by Franco, and the American ambassador Hayes was confident that Franco was onside; there is no question that Franco was sly and devious. Only a few aircraft arrived from Germany and little else, and although another protocol was signed in February little happened. Franco was playing a dangerous game and Hitler was in no position in 1943 to be benevolent with German material. Franco still supported the Axis in speeches and in inclination, and simply told bare-faced lies to the Allies. The Falangists as usual wanted to fight alongside the Nazis, and even when Stalingrad fell to the Russians Franco considered it a mere interruption for the Nazi warmachine. Arrese and some Falangists visited Berlin at the beginning of the year in an effort to re-ignite permission for Spanish colonial expansion in North Africa. As the Nazi regime struggled over the Stalingrad disaster their interest in Spanish Africa would have been minimal apart from the possibility that it might draw Spain into open conflict with the Allies. It was the usual tour de force of lunch with Ribbentrop and tea with Hitler, but the news of this visit did not take long to come to the attention of the Allies, and Jordana was furious because of his attempted policy of neutrality. Franco was content because if the war went against the Axis Arrese could be dismissed in dishonour and the same for Jordana if the Allies lost; Franco would have his personal insurance with either outcome.

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Although Franco was personally convinced the Axis would triumph such was his egotistical self-importance he saw himself as the mediator if the two warring sides came to a stalemate. In March Franco sent an envoy to Berlin to negotiate his shopping list and to try and estimate the state of Germany in the wake of Stalingrad. The Germans were amenable but at this stage incapable of being generous given the pressures they were under. Franco knew exactly what was going on with Arrese, and he also knew the Germans had been defeated at Stalingrad and in North Africa, yet he persisted in supporting the Axis in the belief they would still win. In a series of ceremonial tours he started to speak about Spanish policy which was as confusing at home as it was abroad. He started to develop the theme that Spanish policy was based on Christian principles which must have caused some wry smiles from theologians to humble Christians; the nature of Franco’s belief in the message and life of Christ would make an interesting book. The man who had a personal chaplain, attended daily mass and then signed execution papers without much more than a preliminary glance cannot be dismissed by the argument “such were the times.” He also spent considerable time extoling the style of the new Spanish way of government, dwelling on the nature of the Falangist insisting it was, he maintained, the superior way to govern, especially when compared to the failing democracies and the evil of Communism. He linked the Spanish cause with the Nationalistic side in the Civil War as if this justified his arguments. He also suggested that the global war could not be won and there should be a unification of the warring sides to take on Communism. He was so proud of his views he had them published creating anger in Berlin that he thought the Nazis might not win. He was soon having to back-peddle with the Germans and the Allies with his egotistical views. The German Ambassador Moltke had suddenly died in Madrid and was replaced by a Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff who was warmly welcomed by Franco while he was also busy courting the Americans. When Dieckhoff confronted Franco with his so-called mediation offer Franco brushed it aside with the idea that he was merely looking at the psychology of peace which might be useful for Germany. More pertinently, as far as Franco was concerned, was the return of the internal problem of the monarchists, who were rapidly coming to the conclusion that the Allies could win and Spain would only be able to redeem itself by a return to the monarchy. This was placed before Franco by no less than twenty-seven parliamentary deputies (the Cortes remained a show piece generally, what Franco sometimes described as his organic democracy); it was done with great respect on the grounds that the restoration would avoid Allied retribution. Needless to write Franco was

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beside himself with rage even if he remained calm on the surface, and he had the Marqués de Eliseda who had collected the signatures arrested. He dismissed the others and ensured that the majority of his generals stood by him. Franco had the unbelievable nerve to ask the Allies to provide weapons for fear of a German attack. His two-faced Janus approach defied belief and exposed his naïve understanding of the world outside Spain; his ignorance of the Allied and Nazi secret services defies belief. Their dexterous information gathering resources should have warned him that both sides must have known what he was doing. The Allied code-breakers had read about all the help that Franco had offered the Germans and Japanese in terms of intelligence. The sudden attack by the monarchists convinced Franco that the Allies were behind the plot as he would have seen this matter. In June the Axis powers were back in his favour, and the monarchist plot also persuaded Franco to gather around him more Falangists who, like Franco detested Communism. Franco, although aware that the Allies had just started to invade Sicily grouped his Falangists around on their common basis of anticommunism if only to keep the monarchists at bay, and Hoare and Hayes were both snubbed for the same reason. In July, and assisted by Blanco, Franco allowed the rumour that there was a masonic plot to drive a wedge between the Army and the Caudillo. It was an entirely mendacious fabrication to ensure Franco had his generals under his wing. A few weeks later on the 25th of July the news arrived from Italy about the no-confidence vote in Mussolini. This terrified both the Falangists and Franco; the former started to make the suggestion that there was a sharp difference between the Italian fascists and the Falangists, and Franco wept tears for Mussolini but was really more concerned about his own position. If this could happen to Mussolini the all-powerful Duce, Franco realised he could be confronted by the same situation. Hayes challenged Franco concerning his pro-Nazi support and used what was happening in Italy to point towards an anticipated Allied victory. Franco lied as usual and claimed he had always expected an Allied victory. Hayes also raised the question of the Blue Division but Franco tried to obfuscate the issue with his two war theory. Hayes pertinently pointed out that Franco did not seem to have a problem with Communism in the days of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. This was an apt point as Franco had often referred to Moscow as the “Anti-Christ.”279 Hayes had an effect on Franco, not that he showed it at the time, but the press was ordered to be less robust in their approach to the Allies, and the process of withdrawing the Blue Division was mooted. At that time there was still a

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Blue Division recruitment programme in progress, and eventually a way was found round the issue by quietly withdrawing it but allowing members to stay voluntarily, which many did by joining the infamous SS, to the horror of Jordana. The fall of Mussolini raised the monarchy problem once again when a letter arrived from the would-be king Don Juan. In early August Franco eventually replied in his usual cunning way. He informed the king that Spain was safe thanks to Franco keeping her out of the war, and demanding his silence rather than unsettle the country. Franco fought back with pomp and ceremony celebrations on the anniversary of the foundation of Castile, during which he used the collapse of Italian fascism to underscore the success of the Spanish system, and ensured he always looked confident in himself and the future. There was a rumour of revolt among the generals who demanded stark neutrality; they had postponed the idea of a monarchy until after the war, but Franco was aware what was going on with important figures like Varela, Kindelán and others who had signed a letter demanding change. Franco was confident he had surrounded himself with other generals who were his chosen men, prominent were Vigón, Jordana, Grandes, Yagüe and others who had been bullied, bribed, over-promoted or persuaded to remain faithful. It was at this juncture in September, despite the dramatic rescue of Mussolini and the Germans fighting back tenaciously in Italy, that Franco made a placatory gesture to the Allies, (but mainly to influence some of his generals) that he pressed the button for the withdrawal of the Blue Division as mentioned earlier. In a speech he delivered in early October Franco gave praise to himself and his governance by talking about his wisdom in managing to keep Spain out of a world conflict. He was beginning to regard himself as an international statesman, but also took the opportunity to attack exRepublicans for still trying to bring down the new Spanish State. He pointed out that Spain’s system of government was far superior to Communism or democracy, and for the first time it was noted by observers that he used the term “neutrality” without any qualifications. This bluster was more about home politics than the international scene, and he soon increased the power of his supporting generals and started to build up his admiration group of younger Falangists. He was using the weapon which was so often deployed by Hitler of “divide and rule” among his cohorts. For those who still remained pro-Nazi he gave them the hope that Hitler’s wonder weapons would win the day. This was not the work of an international statesman but that of a medieval despot ensuring he stayed in power; his only real concern was himself. He now had sufficient generals

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and new men onside to stop worrying too much about the need for a restoration of monarchy. The Allies were not fooled by Franco and his bluster, and Hayes on behalf of the American administration reproached him for his pro-Axis chatter and actions, although the British continued to apply the softlysoftly approach to avoid a crisis. Nevertheless the British Army command was unhappy about the number of Spanish troops on the border of Morocco and their concerns over the straits of Gibraltar, and started to demand that more Spanish troops should be deployed on the French/German-Spanish border. The Americans were more inclined to take a harsher route with Franco than the British, and they were especially aggrieved at the wolfram transactions, and knew the Germans were still trying to buy up the mining rights. There was also the question of Italian warships locked into Spanish waters. Nevertheless, while the North African situation was not entirely stabilised they continued to move with a degree of caution. Matters were not helped by what has been dubbed the Laurel Incident. In October Jordana sent a letter of congratulations to José Paurel the new Japanese puppet governor of the Philippines which Tokyo relished. It caused uproar and outrage in America, and many influential men and power sectors demanded a stern reaction to the Spanish response. Hayes was instructed to see Franco and demand an instant end to the wolfram trade with Germany, and that the German agents should be removed from Tangier. Franco’s reaction was once again to veer towards Germany causing Hoare to write to London admitting that Franco was fundamentally hostile towards the Allies, although still urging caution with the way the Allies responded. Hoare continued to apply pressure but was fearful the wrong move might just topple Franco into the enemy camp. Franco was seemingly unperturbed and was more concerned with Don Juan and the royalists. The letter to José Paurel the new Japanese puppet almost beggars belief. In allowing it to be transmitted Franco revealed a naivety in international affairs by sending a completely unnecessary letter to a non-entity which caused him serious problems with the all-powerful Americans.

CHAPTER SIX 1944 HOLDING THE BALANCE

At the beginning of 1944 the Americans, angry about the Laurel Affair, were still demanding an end to the wolfram trade. Following Franco’s instructions Jordana met Hayes and angrily claimed that Spain’s trade was a one-way set of favours to the Americans, and Spain had played its part as an impregnable barrier between the Germans and the Allies. Hayes’ response was pertinent that first all of Spain’s activities were for Spain and not for America or the Allies, and secondly that Spain had recognised the agent representing the German puppet state under Mussolini. At the next diplomatic corps meeting held by Franco he completely ignored Hayes and Hoare which strengthened Hayes’ determination to react because he was “convinced that Franco was still in the hands of the Germans, [and] commented ‘this idiot is digging his own grave.’”280 Inflamed by the wolfram trade, the presence of German agents, the internment of Italian ships, and still some Blue Division activity in Russia, Hayes backed by Hoare recommended the cessation of oil supplies. In late January it was decided to impose the oil embargo which was widely publicised in the Allied press to the concern of Hayes and Hoare in Spain. Franco had started a “scare story” that the British were invading Portugal but this did not deviate from the impact of the loss of oil imports. Franco had wondered whether the episode could not be exploited to cause problems between the British and Americans, and was still, unbelievably convinced that Germany would still be victorious. Such was the fuel dilemma it was not long before Jordana was offering to rid themselves of German agents, the withdrawal of Spanish soldiers from the front, closing down the German consulate in Tangier, but he wanted compensation for the Italian fleet and to negotiate the wolfram trade. Washington remained firm, the wolfram trade had to stop at once, but Franco was right in so far that the British were a trifle more pliable. Franco also used the whole business as a support for himself politically. The reasons for the embargo were not made public and the whole episode was portrayed as Franco bravely resisting all efforts to stop Spain being neutral. He invented a new scenario, a siege which only the

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brave Franco could fight off; he also blamed ex-Republicans for causing the problem. The Americans remained firm with their public sentiment being so anti-Franco, the British a little more compliant, but Franco still thought he could win by playing all sides. In April when Franco held his victory parade there were no tanks and no cars because there was no fuel. Such was the shortage that Franco was obliged to turn down the German request for more wolfram, and the Allies were promised that Spain would only send a useless token amount each month. Hoare appreciated this more than Hayes and the Americans thought the British were too soft; Franco had been right that it had created a minor rift within the Allied ranks. In May an agreement was signed so oil supplies could continue; most of the demands were met and only token supplies of wolfram were sent to Germany. Franco used the whole episode to show his people that Spain was prepared to do anything to uphold peace, and thereby present a picture of strength and moral fortitude. Hitler through Ribbentrop complained, but his arguments were brushed aside and not all the Spanish promises were adhered to, and the Allies also protested at Spanish anti-aircraft guns targeting Allied planes in Morocco which was not resolved until the months of June and July. Franco and his cohorts were rapidly becoming astute in using any event, even detrimental ones, as good propaganda on the home front. They also started to recognise as the pressure was building up against Germany that Spain was under no direct military threat either from the Allies or Germany. Churchill during a session in the House of Commons in May even praised Franco, mainly because he did not want the Normandy landings to have additional problems, but he caused more than a few eyebrows to be raised and especially in America: Franco naturally revelled in such news. Paul Preston pertinently observed that Churchill’s long term policy was for the “purpose of sanitising Franco to be able to use him as a future bulwark of western Mediterranean policy.”281 Although Franco was pleased to be applauded he continued to “hedge his bets” because of his tendency to believe the Germans had wonder weapons, and were deliberately leading the Allies into some huge military trap; in his unsophisticated naivety he continued to believe German propaganda. He was careful to take a path which would maintain him in power, and in July on the eighth anniversary of the uprising he gave a long selfcongratulating speech on his achievements for Spain. He mentioned the looming threat of Communism and called for peace in order to counter this threat. He even went so far as to project the Spanish style of government as superior to the democracies because it was based on the Christian gospels. He tried to keep all possible perspectives alive.

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When Jordana suddenly died in a hunting accident Franco appointed a José Lequerica in his place. Lequerica had been the Spanish ambassador to Vichy and he was an ardent collaborationist wanting to work alongside the Germans. However, Lequerica “understood his task was to transform foreign policy sufficiently to ensure the survival of Franco’s regime” and the relationship with Portugal became more important.282 The messages Franco sent to the outside world were alarmingly mixed, but he was constantly insuring himself against what was happening in the global war. While he still kept many pro-Nazi ministers in post he never replaced Lequerica in Vichy France aware that in late August the Allied forces were freeing Paris. The Germans also recalled their ambassador to Spain and never replaced him; it clearly indicated the changing fortunes in the war and Franco was unbelievably slow in recognising the stark reality. To the bitter end Franco still believed the Germans would come up with a trumpcard. However, he started making frantic efforts to show he had always been on the side of the Allies even making the outrageous suggestion they should be grateful he had not invaded France in her moment of weakness. He blamed his poor reputation on the communists and the dissident Republicans. Franco even went so far to write a message which he asked to be conveyed to Churchill. He suggested an Anglo-Spanish alliance be established in order to act as a form of bulwark against the inevitable influx of Communism because other European nations did not have the strength, and America would retire, or should retire back to her own shores. Franco was also still worried about the Republicans some of whom had been fighting the Germans in the French resistance, and a small group had now re-entered Spain with the anticipation of guerrilla warfare against his regime. As Hoare noted it gave him the excuse once again to be seen as the Spanish champion fighting off the Communists. Churchill was cautious but not dismissive unlike Attlee who was ardent for the destruction of Franco’s dictatorship. When in November 1944 the Foreign Office wanted “to upset Franco’s regime and to incite the USA thereunto” Churchill had responded that his three cardinal tenets were opposition to communism, non-intervention in another country’s affairs, and to stop a country dominating others it needed to rely on a world organisation.283 Churchill had no love for Franco but he was looking to the long-term political future. Franco was now presenting himself as the necessary ally for the future and unashamedly lied at every level. He even demanded a place at the peace talks because of Spain’s dedicated neutrality. He must have known from his diplomatic sources that his request was met with pure hostility

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from nearly every quarter. The Americans were understandably angry as was Eden, but Churchill was as usual somewhat cautious on the grounds he wanted no problems with or in Spain. Churchill was too busy with world-shattering events to give Franco much of his time, but Hoare met Franco for his final interview and was somewhat blunt and criticised Franco for the continuous executions still taking place. Franco promised reform but remained his usual unperturbed self. By the end of the year Franco was concerned about rumours that the Allies might try and change his government simply to rid themselves of him and provide a democracy. At his daughter’s resplendent ball for her coming of age only the best were invited, but Hayes and his family were the only members of the Diplomatic Corps present which indicated for most onlookers that Franco was trying to cosy up to those who might threaten his position.

CHAPTER SEVEN 1945 FRANCO THE PARIAH

At long last Churchill’s letter arrived in Spain in January 1945. The British Prime Minister reminded Franco that he had helped the Germans, he had stated publicly he often wished they would win, and there was no way Franco would be allowed to sit at any peace-conference table, or for that matter join some sort of pact against Communist Russia who remained a valuable ally. Franco brushed aside Churchill’s reply because he was already intent on re-writing the history of the previous few years. Part of his scheme was an increase in anti-communist propaganda if only to indicate this had been Franco’s main concern throughout the war. There continued the unabated execution of imprisoned communists and anyone who was suspected of such an allegiance. Franco’s new course was to court the Americans because that would bolster his position at home, and let his people know he was important on the international stage. Hayes was replaced by Norman Armour who was greeted with the necessary charm to make America feel like a close associate. The Americans, as noted before, were more hostile to Franco than the British, but as with the British had no policy for interfering in Spain, not least because they could not be sure as to what sort of regime would follow if Franco fell. Franco was soon aware that the Yalta Conference (4-11th February) had called for free elections in liberated countries, but Franco knew Stalin would not oblige. Franco was aware that during the Potsdam Conference Stalin proposed the removal of Franco from power. Stalin had also shown an interest in the Italian colonies in North Africa as he tried to extend his area of influence which was a stark warning to the Allies.284 On the 11th day when the Yalta conference was in full swing news of the Japanese massacre in Manila percolated through, and there was some anticipation that Franco might now declare war. Typically he waited a couple of months and made the useless gesture of simply severing diplomatic relations with Tokyo; even this late and nominal act brought out Hitler’s wrath who rightly realised Franco was endeavouring to please

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America.* Roosevelt had written to Franco in much the same vein as Churchill pointing out that his pro-Axis activities and pronouncements and support of the Falange could not be erased by a few twists and turns in Spanish policy. By March the imminent collapse of Nazi Germany was self-evident and when Armour, the new American ambassador met Franco he was still arguing his two-war thesis, and tried to convince a cynical Armour that the Falange was not a political party or force.† Armour also expressed alarm at the number of prisoners Franco still held and executed on a daily basis which Franco tried to shrug off. This attitude from the Allies, and especially the Americans was causing a high degree of alarm amongst some of Franco’s generals. He moved and promoted some, but it reached a crisis level with Kindelán who again with some friends and advisers issued what was dubbed the Lausanne Manifesto in the middle of March. Don Juan, now known by Franco as “the Pretender” suggested the time had arrived for a serious constitutional change back to a democratic monarch-based constitution. Even possible laws were drafted, and while it was never published in Spain the BBC made up for this suppression by broadcasting it in full. Franco neutralised the potential revolt quickly with his usual cunning. At a meeting of the Consejo Superior del Ejército in late March he not only ignored Kindelán, but told lie after lie to impress those gathered. He explained that Spain was now regarded as a well-governed country, and other countries including America would soon adopt the Falangist system, that Britain was finished, and that Churchill had personally told Franco he was a prisoner of the Freemasons.285 Only Kindelán challenged these inane statements, but the majority seemed to accept Franco’s mendacious dialogue. His next step was a formal meeting in April when he established the Consejo del Reino, a Council of the Kingdom which would determine succession once Franco had died, or relinquished power himself. This was intended not only to stop Don Juan and Kindelán in their efforts for restoration, but sent a clear message to the Allies. The monarchist threat at this time was unwelcome to Franco who was already more than aware of the international hostility he had provoked. There followed a Fuero de los Españoles, A Spaniard’s Charter of Rights and also the abolition of death sentences relating to the Civil War; “although in fact there would be an execution on such grounds as late as *

In this massacre some fifty Spanish had been killed when their embassy was attacked. † Franco often argued the three war thesis; the war in the Far East, the conflict with Germany and the third war against Communism.

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1963.”286 The Charter of Rights was a political façade to convince both the outside world and Spaniards there was a rule of law which took human rights as a priority. The whole paper was negated by the clause that warned any opposition to the state was a criminal offence. In the April of this year a circular was sent around Spain to those groups who were most sympathetic to the Germans in which “it stressed that at no time had the Caudillo betrayed Germany but that he had instead worked tirelessly to save Spain and to try to save Europe.” 287 It was a cunning ploy as Franco prepared for a future he had not envisaged. Truman had taken over the Presidency following the death of Roosevelt, and like his predecessor had a deep revulsion for Franco and his Falangist-type regime. Franco still hoped that Hitler might pull something out of the hat at the final moment, and the last German garrison in France was fed by Spanish food. As the news spread of the extermination camps it filled the world with horror but Franco simply dismissed it as one of the consequences of wartime problems. When Hitler fell the Spanish papers even paid tribute to him intimating that he had fallen heroically rather than use his terrible wonder-weapons. Not until Victory Day on May 8th did Franco break off formal diplomatic relationships with the Third Reich. It was now time for Franco to paint himself not only as the hero of the Civil War, but the man sent by God to protect Spain which he did by manfully ensuring she stayed neutral. Spain had only stayed neutral because of the economic war skilfully waged by the Anglo-Americans; her economy was in tatters in 1939 because of the Civil War Franco had fought.

End of War Comments In August 1945 there was a tense meeting between Franco and the new British ambassador who said of Franco “he is certainly a smiling villain,” but in London the Foreign Office added “and I fear he is a shameless liar. The captured German documents in our possession prove that, he has a skin like a rhinoceros.”288 Franco’s reputation was in tatters and he was rapidly trying to remould his image and that of Spain. In May 1946 in a speech to the Cortes he said the regime “was not a mere dictatorship but a Catholic State and organic democracy tailored to the individual character of the Spaniards and their tendency to selfishness, and anarchy as had been shown in the Republic and it was regime that had not entered the war.”289 The remodelling of persona and propaganda to fit that

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image was Franco’s immediate task as it became clear that the Allies were the total victors. The claim that Franco had little choice but co-operate because the Wehrmacht was menacingly sitting on his borders was simply untrue. Hitler had no such serious intentions, first because of his relationship with Franco, but more importantly Hitler was later more concerned about Barbarossa than Spain.290 It has been frequently claimed that Franco was skilfully holding Hitler at bay when in fact he was trying to convince Hitler that he was an ally to be trusted. Much later Churchill thought the exorbitant terms demanded by Franco was his clever way of avoiding Nazi pressure, “writing in the late 1940s, Churchill had come to think more highly of the anti-communist Franco than he had done in in 1941.”291 Churchill was generous by nature, but he always had his eye on the political future. For six years of war Franco had played with threats of going to war, of being at peace, of being neutral or non-belligerent. He had looked to French Morocco, taken over Tangier, had considered Portugal and even part of France as falling into Spanish hegemony; he had tried to play both sides according to the circumstance of the day, namely the state of the Spanish economy and his status. It was best summarised by a telegram from the American Hull. Over the question of the oil embargo Jordana had reportedly said “Spain had done a great service to the Allies by not entering the war,”…as a response “Hull telegrammed Hayes acerbically that it is not usual in the community of nations for a country to assume that it is rendering a great service to its neighbours by not attacking them.”292 The vast majority of the international community at the end of the war had developed a serious distrust of Franco, regarding him as duplicitous, immoral and totally unreliable. This was going to occupy Franco during the immediate postwar years.

PART FOUR: SPAIN UNDER FRANCO

CHAPTER ONE POSTWAR PROBLEMS

Immediate Post War Years 1945-46 At the end of the war Spain under Franco represented the pariah state, taking the place which Communist Russia had occupied during the interbellum years. It was noted by Colville that Franco held a “precarious sway, worried about Republicans gathering behind the Pyrenees, and toying with the idea of restoring the monarchy in order to present an appearance of respectability.”293 Accusations were hurled at Franco, not only based on his devious behaviour during the World War, but there were allegations that Franco was giving shelter to thousands of Nazis (which was true but to a more limited extent than sometimes alleged) and even building an atomic bomb with the help of German scientists.* This was an incredulous claim given that the Spanish military and science was almost backward at this time. The Spanish military was all but impoverished in material, training, technical know-how, and most of his soldiers at this time did not even have boots. The Potsdam Conference had given some hope to overseas Republicans that Franco was finished. “In anticipation of his demise, a government in exile was formed in late August (1945) under the presidency of José Giral.”294 It was to come to nothing, but as mentioned earlier some disaffected Republicans, mainly Communists who had been fighting with the French resistance crossed back into Spain with the hope of toppling Franco by another civil conflict. Once again they were supported by Anarchists; this incursion had started as early as 1944. Franco reacted severely but it was not a great issue because most Spanish people at this time simply wanted peace and economic growth, which after the previous years was quite understandable. The guerrilla activities were spasmodic *

When in 1954 remnants of the Blue Division were returned to Spain amongst the photographs of the celebration was a picture of Léon Degrelle a senior Waffen-SS officer; it was quickly noted, and there were protests as Degrelle had been sentenced to death in absentia in his home country of Belgium.

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but continued until at least 1951. This was a continuing pattern for Franco, fighting for his position of power and having to contend with the international scene. He had to tread with extreme caution, and when on September 7th Franco felt obliged to respond to British demands to withdraw the Spanish forces from Tangier, Franco claimed “it’s not much to lose if we can’t defend it.”295 He was well aware of the changes taking place around the world and the demands made by the victorious powers. As noted earlier he had attempted to make some face-saving political changes in the so-called Spanish Rights Charter, and was more than conscious that in Portugal (which had remained strictly neutral) even Salazar “thought it necessary to introduce nominal reforms, liberalising somewhat his highly restrictive electoral system.”296 The one thing of which Franco was certain was that he would remain dictator telling Kindelán that “I would not be as foolish as Primo de Rivera. I will not resign; from here only to the cemetery.” His major internal problems had been with the monarchists who had become somewhat excited in anticipating Don Juan would be announced king at any moment. To keep the peace Franco pretended it would happen when the situation was right, perhaps in two years. The powerful monarchist Kindelán was always in the background, and therefore sacked as Director of the Escuela Superior del Ejército. In February 1946 a large number of important signatories called for the monarchy to return. Kindelán was suspected as the organiser and Franco wanted him imprisoned, but was persuaded against this action so Kindelán was sent into exile to the Canary Islands. Franco had to hold Don Juan at bay and made it clear that the monarchy could not be just a matter of biology, and one of “his typically blunt private comments was to the effect that one must be careful about ‘whatever comes out of the queen’s womb, to see if it is fit.’”297 He allowed Don Juan to settle in Portugal if only to have him at hand, but he was aware of the monarchist plotting, and as he sacked Kindelán so he later packed off Antonio Aranda for a brief exile in the Balearics. However, it was the Falangists who were also something of a problem following the defeat of the fascist states. Serrano Suñer, who been in political exile for some three years, wrote to him a letter of advice pointing out the self-evident facts that fascism had been defeated, and the democracies now dominated, and as such the Falangist movement should be honourably dissolved.* Although it had taken Franco time to accept the *

Serrano Suñer stayed in exile, but in 1952 there appeared a possibility of reconciliation and there was even a rumour that he might be made ambassador in Paris, but nothing came from this.

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Falangists in the early years he had recognised their growing strength, and still needed them for their support and adulation. They always performed excellent parades or events and Franco was exhilarated by their support. Later the Falange movement was downgraded but not eliminated, if only as a face-saver for the Allies who had always seen the movement as a threat. They were allowed limited publicity and were soon transformed into the nationalist party and gradually referred to as the Movimiento. They now belonged to Franco and he intended to keep them under his wings and undercover. This still did not soften the attitudes of the international scene most of whom knew that Franco’s new government was chosen for his support, and the new laws and a subservient Movimiento movement were mere window dressings. In November 1945 the American Ambassador returned to the USA and was not replaced until 1951. There was only a Chargé d’Affaires in Spain until 1951. It had been the natural time for Ambassador Armour to retire but journalists interpreted it as a rebuke; only giving a Chargé d’affaires to Spain was in sense a signal of distaste. Franco told his men that all the international criticism was Communist inspired, and brushed it aside with his usual sang-froid. Franco worked hard to defend his position establishing himself as the leader of a forward thinking government. He felt a little more secure on the grounds that “the West did not want to see revolution or Communism in Spain, he would pursue his strategy of blunting international criticism with cosmetic changes while awaiting a revaluation of the regime when the West and the Soviet Union eventually fell out.”298 Franco presented his government as one bound by law but he was misleading about it superstructure. He would pretend he was under the law like anyone else when in fact as dictator he could state what would happen, when and where. He would pretend he relied upon the advice given by his government which was itself presided over by a series of organic Catholic institutions, and he further announced he had never been convinced of an Axis victory. He and his supporters worked hard on his public image, and on the 18th July 1946 the newspaper Extremadura featured a portrait of Franco with the bold caption “CAUDILLO OUR LORD” and reviewed all his exceptional qualities.299 The regime had a firm grip on the press, and the personality cult of Franco as the mythologised Caudillo of Spain became a central feature of the Franco propaganda. There was self-evidently a degree of incredulity abroad, and Mexico demanded that other nations ended their relationships with the regime. A few countries ranging from Panama to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia recognised the Republican government in exile, but it was the major

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powers which mainly concerned Franco. Franco felt reasonably comfortable because Churchill and Bevin (in a well-known House of Commons speech) said there should be no interference in Spain, it was over to the Spanish people, and De Gaulle was also hostile to any interference.* The reasons were mixed but not because they were in support of Franco; no one in the postwar period wanted more unsettling wars. There was already a note of caution about Communist power and intentions, and it was thought best that as badly run as Spain was it was necessary to keep it stable and if necessary onside. However, during March Britain, France, and America urged that Spain should be excluded from the United Nations while it was under Franco, and continued to apply pressure during 1946 referring to Franco as a fascist. “According to a section of the United Nations’ General Assembly in December of 1946, the Franco regime ‘arose by violence and the support of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.’ In an analogous declaration they declared that the Franco Regime ‘did not represent the Spanish people, which made their participation on international questions difficult.’”300 The USA and UK expressed their abhorrence at Franco but blocked moves to unseat him. This was supported by Churchill’s belief the Spanish people alone had to do this. Only Argentina, Ireland, Portugal and the Vatican did not withdraw their ambassadors. The Allies also ensured that Spain was not included in the Marshall Plan (the European Recovery Programme), and not allowed to join the talks which led to NATO in April 1949. Franco, as usual appeared unperturbed and passed over the fact that he had withdrawn from the League of Nations on 8th May 1939 in solidarity with the Axis. Franco’s response at his cabinet meeting was to state “that the United Nations was fatally wounded.”301 He then ordered a new coin with his head on it and the words “Caudillo by the Grace of God.” Franco as a pariah leader of an outsider state was not entirely left adrift; “even as Spain was cold-shouldered by the UN, it could rely on the solidarity and support of Perón in Argentina and Salazar in Portugal.”302 Evita Perón made something of a state visit and for a few years Argentina supplied Spain with grain.† Franco continued to window dress and presented Spain as a wellgoverned and modern society. To bolster this image he used the Catholic Church as he had always done. He increased this policy after 1945 as he included the Catholic Church in his government to portray the idea that the *

De Gaulle was dismissed in 1946 and replaced by a Left-wing government. This special protocol collapsed in 1950 and Franco even questioned the number of Jews living in Argentina. †

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government was not fascist, but a Christian government. Guided by Admiral Carrero Blanco a long report on Spain was drawn up that Spain was politically free, independent, and it was noted most especially that the West would not do much for fear of letting Communism flourish. In fact the Church was amongst his strongest supporters though there was a degree of nervousness in the Vatican, and especially amongst some senior clerics who preferred the Church to stand above politics. Critics referred to this as “National Catholicism,” and some clergy were scathing in their criticisms. The Cardinal Archbishop of Seville, always critical of Franco, regarded him as a political tyrant, but other senior clergy were very keen for Franco’s support, especially during the years when he was suffering from being ostracised by the international community. In May 1946 Franco informed the Cortes that “the perfect state for us is the Catholic state.* For a people to be Christian in our view moral precepts alone are not sufficient: laws are necessary to maintain principles and correct abuses.”303 The Church gained or regained some distinct advantages, not least a hand in education, tax exemptions, subsidies, and in return, as Franco planned, the Church gave the state a sense of legitimacy for some people. During 1946 he continued to deny his relationship with the Axis “yet since the closing stages of the war, his regime had been giving succour to many escaped Nazis, fascists and supporters of Vichy France,” although the number as noted was probably exaggerated and cannot be proved one way or the other.304 It was a form of criticism that the Soviet Bloc agitated, and later in November 1947 the Polish delegate Oscar Lange at the United Nations produced evidence that Franco continued to grant asylum to large numbers of war criminals. In addition another painful revelation occurred when “it was calculated by the US Government that the financial holdings of ex-Nazis in Spain amounted to $95,000,000” and during this period captured Nazi documents revealed the extensive use of ports and resources that Franco had given the Germans.305 It was a difficult time for Franco and in January 1946 when de Gaulle resigned as president of the provisional government there was more so-called Left-wing pressure against Franco. Franco had executed some resistance fighters despite protests from the French, subsequently in February the Franco-Spanish border was closed by the French who broke off any prospect for economic relationships. Franco raged and “complained that France was the Quisling of Russia and that President Truman was a rough freemason from the south.”306 Franco worked hard to convince the Spanish they were suffering *

This was all crowned in 1953 with a concordat with the Vatican.

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from an international siege. To change this would need political reform and Franco would have this done, he said. Efforts by the Russian delegate in the Security Council led by Andrei Gromyko to harden the protest against Franco were not successful as Franco started to proclaim he was the bulwark of the western defences. It also reinforced his belief it was all a Communist plot. Whether he believed this or not is interesting. He was paranoid, but he was perceptive this time in foreseeing the Cold War and its ramifications for Spain. In 1946 December Carrero Blanco had attempted to boost Franco’s image with a memo to draw popular support (which had been demonstrated by the Falangist crowds at festivals with their adulation) which suggested Spain was a kingdom, but because of “biological inadequacies of any hereditary monarch could be neutralised by Franco staying as head of state.”307 There was a degree of panic for Franco and his cohorts because Don Juan was still attracting support from the Carlists. The period 1945 to 1946 had seen Spain alienated from the international community and Franco treated as an outcast, but he managed to hold his dictatorship in place and managed to weather the initial storm.

1947-50 Franco used his ostracism by the United Nations to paint a picture of a heroic Spain surrounded by the alien hordes, and had it broadcast that the Freemasons were behind the antipathy at the United Nations, and maintained this nonsense beyond the end of the decade. He may have given the appearance of being unperturbed, but in January 1947 he received a delegation of senior generals worried about the rejection of Spain by the United Nations; “he pacified them by claiming his conviction that the growing Russo-American antagonism guaranteed that he would soon be courted by Washington.”308 He had often made prognostications which had been appallingly wrong, but on this matter he was almost prescient. The Western Powers had hoped that the internal tensions in Spain would topple Franco, and they hoped Spain’s appalling economy and lack of food and fuel would bring Spain to her knees, and thereby into the Western sphere of influence. However, Franco had established an economic lifeline with Salazar’s Portugal and Perón’s Argentina. As noted earlier Eva Perón made her much vaunted visit and “not since the visit of Himmler in October 1940 had the welcome mat been put out for a foreign dignitary.”309 Although this arrangement would only last a few years it came at a time vital to Spain’s survival. Franco had sought some form of ideological relationship with Latin America, but it had not proved

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successful. He had hoped this would be the case with Argentina, but that country was only interested in the economic relationship which eventually collapsed when Spain failed to pay for its imports. There was a great deal of industrial unrest which led to some eruptions in May 1947, but they were mainly in the Basque region, and were quelled at once with Franco’s traditional brutality. There were further strikes and demonstrations in Catalonia, Madrid, and the El Ferrol shipyards. Perhaps the people who economically suffered the most were those working in agriculture, especially in the south. As far as Franco was concerned these were still the rumblings of the Left-wing and they had to be dealt with accordingly; his main concern was not this popular dissent but the international reputation Spain had because of his past behaviour. “As the international context changed, Franco accelerated his plans to camouflage his regime with the trappings of acceptability.”310 He set about making sure the world knew that Spain was properly governed in the traditional Spanish style. Much of it was window dressing, and the more astute observers at home and overseas recognised this feature of Franco’s efforts. In March 1947 a Law of Succession was drafted which confirmed that Franco would be head of State for the rest of his life, but stipulated that institutionally the Spanish State “was henceforth a kingdom and that in the fullness of time Franco would appoint a member of the Spanish royal dynasty as his successor.”311 It disappointed those monarchists who wanted it immediately, and annoyed the Falangists who did not want it at all. The first article of this law stated that “Spain, as a political unit, is a Catholic social and representative state which, in keeping with her tradition, declares herself constituted as a kingdom…the second the Head of State is the Caudillo of Spain and of the Crusade, Generalissimo of the armed Forces Don Francisco Franco Bahamonde”312 In short it stated that Spain was a political unit, a Catholic and a representative state and was constituted as a kingdom. The head of state was Caudillo. The past was to be forgotten and there was now a monarchical façade. The following month on April 7th Don Juan attacked the Law of Succession basically on the premise that Franco was going against all the established laws for the succession of the crown. Undoubtedly Franco would have been annoyed at what he would have seen as undue interference, but was more concerned that it would stir up the many monarchists in the realm; he ignored the would-be king’s letter. To confirm the popularity of this law Franco ordered that a referendum should be held; no doubt pondering on how successful this particular tool

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had been for increasing Hitler’s popularity during his rise and solidification of power. Franco ensured he had the backing of the Church, his propaganda machine was set into full swing, and the whole campaign was inundated with warnings against the Communist threat. Before the vote took place the regulations stipulated “that ration cards would be requested for voter identification and would be stamped at the polling place.”313 Ration cards were highly significant for the bearers of these documents, and this alone carried a veiled threat. Many people did not feel it was a free vote, there was no independent scrutiny, and there were some abstentions in the cities, “nevertheless, for all the pressure, intimidation and falsification, the results showed that Franco now enjoyed considerable popular support.”314 Both in Britain and America there was a high degree of scepticism, but there was growing realisation that Franco was there to stay. Spain had informed the world it was a recognisable kingdom and Franco, the Caudillo was king. In his quasi-royal status he gave posthumous dukedoms to men like Mola; this was normally a Royal prerogative. Franco was as cunning as ever because he used it as test of loyalty. When living people were offered such titles if they deferred they showed their enmity; if they accepted then they betrayed their traditional monarch and demonstrated their support of Franco. He was thus able to put his enemies out of reach, and his supporters in a box and indebted to him. During 1947 Franco was aware that Britain was governed by the Labour Party which he associated with Socialism, which to him was a form of Communism, and the French were no better. He recognised that the Americans were the ascending power and he started to court them rather than sneer, his habit for many years. In October 1947 some American Senators and Congressmen paid him a visit, possibly at his invitation and in a series of lengthy Franco-like dialogues he managed to impress them with his anti-Communism. He was conscious that the Americans were becoming more and more aware of what they perceived as the Soviet threat and the growth of Communism; it could be argued that some Americans were almost paranoid on the subject. The main issue had been that America and the European democracies disliked dictatorships after fighting them for nearly six years, but in the light of the developing Cold War, Franco was beginning to appear more palatable. To fight against Hitler they had swallowed their prejudices and made an alliance with Stalin the Communist and dictator. It was a matter of what may be termed the pragmatic politics of survival. However, Franco was in 1947 representing a problem of the recent past and remained the pariah. In November 1947 Spain and the question of Franco was raised again at the United Nations because of the appalling condition and vast number

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of his prisoners, but there was little support in the effort to apply further economic sanctions. When in March 1948 Congress had approved a plan for Spain to be included in the Marshall Plan, President Truman had blocked it at once. Britain and France remained somewhat hostile towards the man Franco, and the Americans were divided between keeping Britain and France onside, and also wanting to use Spain as part of the so-called western wall; their buffer state between the Soviet Union and America. When there was a Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 which was followed by the Berlin Blockade during 1948 to 1949 the international picture started to change to Franco’s benefit. America moved ahead of Britain to normalise relationships with Spain, and Britain remained concerned that the American attitude would upset European neighbours. As all this was happening on the global front Franco gave the appearance of being above it all and waiting until the rest of the world needed him. Franco sat back and took extensive holidays pursuing his love of fishing. These holidays cost money, but more to the point he often took as company governmental friends, and had a Spanish naval boat at sea keeping guard. Because Franco was the dictator it also meant that little serious governmental work was done. Those working in important positions in administration often had to wait for Franco’s signature or agreement in order to further their daily duties. Franco’s fear that the immediate postwar feelings of animosity might lead to an invasion occupied him at times, but in reality it was extremely unlikely. By the end of 1946 it was clear that there was no such intention and “by 1947 the military budget had been reduced by more than twenty per cent, to little more than thirty-four per cent of state expenditures.”315 The over-officered and expensive Spanish military had long been a drain on the Spanish economy given the fact that food and fuel remained a serious issue, and this concession indicated the urgency of the situation in Spain. There were other surprising efforts, and in April 1948 a decree was issued which ended the state of Martial Law which had been in effect since the end of the Civil War, though political offences of any magnitude would still be prosecuted. Given that the Civil War had started in 1936 and Martial Law was not lifted until 1948 it must have come as something of a relief for the thousands who lived in a state of fear and impoverishment. Nevertheless, this apparent reformative attitude was minimal, because as the years passed long sentences and some executions still occurred, and the prisons remained full and labour battalions continued.

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The international scene was changing and Franco missed few opportunities to air his views, although he desperately needed to be accepted by the outside world. “All the while Franco maintained his obsession with the subversive machinations of Masonry, even though some of the anti-Communist leaders of the West with whom he had to deal were Masons.”316 He even identified the United Nations and the American President as leading the campaign against him, stating that “the whole secret of these campaigns against Spain can be discovered in two words: Masonry and Communism.”317 He managed to form relationships with Arab countries but always found constant alienation with Tel Aviv. Although some writers have tried to play down his anti-Semitism the Jewish community did not forget his attitudes which given the nature of the Nazi Holocaust was not surprising. As critical as he was of the American President his angry vitriol was still directed towards Britain. While the Labour Party remained in power Franco spoke against Britain condemning Socialism in the same breath as Communism. He seemed to have little understanding of the democratic system which he had so often denounced during the war years. Although on the 25th August 1948 the French government ordered the reopening of the Spanish border, Franco was more concerned about the machinations of the monarchist supporters. This problem had been with him since 1936-7 and Franco needed to resolve its tensions once and for all, though he never would in reality. He listened to his closer supporters and eventually met Don Juan on a yacht in the Bay of Biscay. After a lengthy discussion they reached an agreement that Franco would stay in power until he would eventually choose (by which Franco meant his dying days) the young Prince Juan Carlos, who was to be raised by Franco. Juan Carlos was the grandson of Alfonso XIII. Although he eventually agreed “Don Juan was convinced that there would be no restoration against the will of Franco.”318 The young Prince arrived on November 9th but Franco refused him the title of Principe de Asturias normally given to heirs of throne. It was made abundantly clear that the throne was subordinate to the dictator. Franco arranged a special school and Juan Carlos was educated with a few friends from aristocratic stock; the young prince was known as Don Juanito. There were challenges from other members of the Royal Household but nothing would happen without Franco’s agreement; there was some sense of relief amongst some royalists but most of them were realistic enough to know that Franco was to be the monarchical-style dictator for the foreseeable future. By the end of 1948 there were further distinctive stirrings on the international front, which were indicators of the changing times. In

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September 1948 an American military mission visited Franco at his El Pardo residence; the meeting remains somewhat obscure but it was possibly to discuss the Americans having some military bases in Spain. As far as America was concerned they needed to protect the Free World against the Soviet threat, and their air-bases were becoming of paramount importance. Franco remained standing during the meeting and gave a lecture on the weakness of Spain.319 This may have been a successful ploy on his part because on the 8th February 1949 the American military elite were deeply worried about bases, and it was announced that the Chase Manhattan and National City Banks of New York had made a loans of $25,000,000 to the Spanish government.320 This was precisely what Franco needed despite his obsession with the economic policy of autarky. Despite these overtures and gifts it was not plain sailing. During the March 1949 Victory Rally Franco was all too aware that NATO was going ahead without Spain, and he gave a speech full of resentment that they had failed to recognise his massive contribution to the defence of Western civilisation. This was an incredulous statement to make, but without access to Franco’s mind it seems to appear that he really believed this, and being the man he was he expected others to accept his perceived beliefs. In America and the European democracies it would have been treated with a high degree of cynicism, but there was a growing belief that the Iberian Peninsula was of growing strategic importance. There was a degree of reluctance still and when in April 1949 NATO was established Portugal was invited to the party. America was much more sympathetic to Spain for strategic reasons, but the Europeans were against it and America was sensitive to their views for the sake of solidarity. Franco said by leaving Spain out it was like making an omelette without the eggs, and Churchill added that it left a breach in the Western defence. It was a time of tussling with the pragmatic political issues of the day. Approximately at the same time the United Nations voted on normalising relations with Spain; twenty-five countries voted in favour, fifteen opposed and fifteen more abstained. The Americans abstained but there were elements that were beginning to reach the conclusion that Franco would not fall from power, so it was becoming more urgent to be adapted to dealing with him. There was no question that Franco was bitterly disappointed that matters were not moving as rapidly as he anticipated. In May 1949 he was outraged at a remark made at the United Nations by Hector McNeil British Minister of State for Foreign Office, who said that giving arms to Franco was like putting a gun into the hands of a convicted murderer.321

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The spring summer of 1949 may have been a period of frustration for Franco, but by the autumn world events were shaking the Western Powers. Since August 1945 the Americans had been dominant because of their nuclear power and their readiness to use atomic weapons. It was announced on the 23rd September 1949 that the Soviets had exploded an atomic bomb in August; this stunning news intensified the political and military pressure in the Western World, and corroborated for some the need to come to terms with Franco. At this stage such weapons were delivered by bombers and there was a growing need for air-bases strategically placed around Europe. The following month in October 1949 Mao Zedong established the Chinese People’s Republic. Mao Zedong was not subservient to Moscow but to many it seemed as if the world had become Communist. Russia and its new satellites, and now the massive state of China constituted a huge global landmass, and for many Americans and the European democracies, Communism appeared as a greater threat than it had ever been since 1917-20. In November 1949 Churchill mocked the Labour Government for having an ambassador in Moscow but not in Madrid, and there was a growing demand that Spain should no longer be the pariah state but part of the Western defences. Franco would have been sharply aware of the accelerating fear of Communism amongst the democracies, and thought that his opposition to Communism from his earliest days was not only right but justified his position. It would all change for Spain during the 1950s, but as a country it still remained deeply impoverished, people were hungry and there remained a high degree of discontent. By 1947 there was less activity by Guerrilla fighters, but in February 1949 some Communists bombed a train station (Tarragona Province) killing thirty-three people and wounding hundreds. Franco carefully used the Civil Guard and not the military, and made the point of the dangers of Communism. He took to the platform and pontificated on the dangers of Communism and how he had always fought the menace from the 1930s, “with that characteristically seamless combination of naivety and duplicity which enabled him to propound the most outrageous untruths with genuine conviction; he now resurrected that statement as a prophetic and courageous anticipation of the Cold War.”322

CHAPTER TWO THE WAY FORWARD 1950-1955

Introduction The years 1950 to 1955 were significant for Spain and Franco, but mainly for international reasons. There was a gathering suspicion developing between the Soviet Union form of Communism and the West, especially in the United States of America. It was the start of what has been dubbed the Cold War, and as it spread its tentacles in the political climate of the day it helped “forge the survival of the Franco dictatorship in the postwar world.”323 By 1950 Franco’s grip on power at home was tight and rarely questioned, but overseas he was still regarded as one of the dictators and Spain remained a pariah state. As the 1950s developed and the Cold War took shape between the USA and Russia, Spain was seen as a potential bulwark against Communism in south Europe, so “the authoritarian nature of Spain’s political system, which had led the world to ostracize it, was now conveniently overlooked and encouraged at the thawing of relations.”324 The term Iberian “Peninsula” indicated it was a valuable area surrounded by water but with direct access to southern Europe. “The geostrategic interest of the Iberian Peninsula for the defence of Western Europe, accentuated by the first signs of dissension between the Soviet Union and its former allies against Nazism, reinforced the will to preserve the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of third countries and to prevent any danger of political destabilisation in Spain.”325 The Americans during these critical years showed considerable interest in Spain as an off-shore base, and decided it could be ideal for air-bases and ports, despite President Truman’s self-evident distaste for the man Franco, and the reluctance of Britain and France to become embroiled with Franco; the American military had other ideas. Inside Spain itself the political atmosphere in the late 1940s and the early 1950s was oppressive. “The controlled press denigrated foreigners and Spaniards who called for political change as the dupes of Communism and Freemasonry.”326 Franco had developed the theme that Spain was

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under international siege, and used his verbal attacks on Gibraltar to divert tensions as home, but during 1950 it was clear he felt secure in his position as The Caudillo. Franco demonstrated his confidence when in February 1950 “he had a number of prominent monarchists arrested in night-time swoops by the secret police and imprisoned for conspiracy to restore the monarchy. There could be no doubt now that he knew that he had come through.”327 “From the mid-1950s, Franco, firm in his position and recognised as supreme and final arbitrator for the Francoist political ‘families’ (Falangists, Carlists, Catholics, monarchists and the military), lived perhaps the happiest and calmest stage of his long life as Caudillo.”328 He nevertheless always had to maintain a balancing act between these various supporters. He continued to feel aggravated by the monarchists, but because of their strength continued with his cunning negotiations and then placated the Falangists whose support he also needed. Despite these problems 1950-1955 was a time when his position was secure, and because of the Cold War Spain was being rehabilitated into the international community again. He felt confident enough to pursue his sport, golf, hunting, fishing, and films or television, often at huge expense which also meant less time was given to government, not least because many of his sycophantic ministers and others liked to be in attendance. Much of the nature of Franco’s style of rule would change after these five critical years, and this chapter will outline a Franco who felt that he had won at home and abroad. Even his family life took a major uplift when his adored daughter Carmen married what Paul Preston described as a society playboy; his name was Dr Cristóbal Martínez Bordiu soon given the title Marqués de Villaverde. He was a surgeon and Franco’s propaganda painted him as a leading cardiologist, but after he died in 1998 his son claimed he was not exactly the best of doctors.* Either way the marriage changed Franco’s life as his daughter gave him seven grandchildren on whom he indulged an affection which seemed to have

*

Dr Cristóbal Martínez Bordiu spent a good deal of his time not in an operating theatre but promoting the importation of Italian Vespa motor scooters earning himself the cynical nickname of Marqués de Vespaverde the colour of most Vespa scooters in those days. His connection with the medical world tended to be his accumulation of well-paid positions in public hospitals; although he performed the first ever heart transplant in 1968 the patient died a few hours later. His reputation was not high and a popular rumour was that he killed more “in peace” than his father-in-law managed in “war.” Franco was not always happy with his daughter’s choice and later took a dislike to him.

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been missing from his life hitherto.* Carmen and her husband developed a reputation for the good life and wealth and status.329 Franco had made the son-in-law medical inspector of embassies which meant they travelled widely and often, thus engendering the couple’s obsession with touring where and when they could. They used their position to their own advantage and even to this day the newspapers are quick to point out when members of this family do something either wrong or dubious.† Franco was now in a position where he believed he could sit back as a regal-type leader and relax in the proffered adulation. He demanded his closest friends always addressed him as Your Excellency and he expected royal treatment. In June 1950, the American Chargé d’affaires said of Franco that he “leans back with complacency and anticipates the world will come to him on his terms. Franco’s vision stops at the borders of Spain.”330 During these years came the many changes Franco had hoped for, though in his speeches he would let the Spanish people believe it was all down to his plans and foresight. Changes followed very quickly because of American military interest, including the exchange of ambassadors which opened the doors which allowed the process of Spain being admitted to UNESCO in November 1952. He signed a concordat with the Vatican in August 1953, and signed the Pact of Madrid with the USA in September 1953 and was admitted to the UN in Dec 1955. As part of the international rehabilitation scheme the Spanish government entered the World Health Organisation which meant closing legal brothels in Spain. As far as Franco was concerned it was all going his way. In 1954 the crypt at the Valle de los Caídos which had started in 1940 was completed having been constructed by the penal labour battalions.‡ It was a large Imperial type building intended to illustrate to one and all that Franco saw his own historical role as being on equal terms with Philip II. *

Curiously the grandchildren were in the care of a much respected British nanny called Beryl Hibbs. † In May 2018 The Times reported with great relish that Franco’s “seven grandchildren make regular appearances in Spain’s gossip magazines for the marriages, divorces, and brushes with the law.” The article was written around the subject that the King of Spain is facing demands to stop the eldest granddaughter inheriting a royal title. The leader of the United Left Party pointing out that it would be honouring Franco who he “described as having been the head of a corrupt regime, responsible for crimes against humanity.” See Keeley Graham, The Times, 3rd May 2018. ‡ In 2018 April it was agreed that some of those buried in the tomb could be exhumed for reburial by their families; see Keeley G, The Times, 23rd, April 2018.

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In 1954 after the death of Stalin, Spanish prisoners were released from the Gulags and a couple of hundred were returned to Spain. Because this was a reminder of his pro-Hitler days it was not given the usual wide publicity. General Muñoz Grandes met them and there was a local celebration but Franco kept his distance. In the late 1940s he had defied the outside world, but this period of 1950-1955 saw him change course once he realised the international climate was fluctuating. Often his prognostications had been appallingly wrong, but he had somehow forecast the Cold War probably because of his hatred of Communism. He wooed America and the Vatican, and most of his political changes were to demonstrate to the outside world and any internal dissenters he was always right, and he was always in charge. So for example when in July 1951 Franco appointed his new seventh cabinet it was an effort “to reflect an attempt to give a more balanced expression to the connubium between the Catholic Church and the national Movement on which the regime was based.”331 The Church had always been important to Franco because of its support, hoping this would give him an acceptable clean bill of health to the outside world. In the early 1950s Britain and France appeared to Franco’s way of thinking to be Left-wing, Socialist and therefore dangerously close to Communism and so it was to America he turned, a country with a growing fear if not paranoia about the spread of Communism.

The USA and Spain By the beginning of 1950 the USA was beginning to see a military need for Spain and Portugal, and was pressing for Spain to be part of NATO. They did not press too hard because the Americans were worried about Britain and France who objected to Franco because of the war years. For Britain and France, Franco was an unpleasant reminder of the dictators Hitler and Mussolini, and they were also well aware of Franco’s brutal repression in Spain and his pro-Nazi tendencies. This was very much in line with President Truman’s views and he never deviated; he saw Germany, Russia, and Spain as police states, but Truman also believed greater events were about to unfold. Life would be easier with for Franco when Eisenhower took power. In America there was the build-up of the notorious witch-hunting of Senator Joseph McCarthy who was convinced that Communism was the root of all America’s problems, and there were hidden Communists ready to emerge even in Hollywood. The greater events which Truman feared and which further stoked McCarthy’s fire happened on 24th June 1950 when North Korean troops invaded the south. In the light of the war in Korea the General Assembly

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of the United Nations decided to revoke by a large majority the 1946 condemnatory resolution concerning Spain (Britain and France abstained), and Franco believed his repackaging of Spain’s past was now enough. Franco even offered to send troops to Korea. Many felt a Third World War was possible, and Franco belaboured the fear by telling the Washington Evening Star that he had proof that Russia was about to invade Europe.332 This fear also explained why in April 1950 the Truman administration agreed to loan Spain $62,500,000 to re-equip arms, and their fear increased when Chinese troops pushed United Nation troops back into South Korea. This was considered a time for action and on Dec 27th Stanton Griffis was appointed American ambassador in Spain.* Naturally Franco was over-joyed and gave a public speech in which he said he had forecast all these events. He was in an exalted mood having consolidated his power base; he had pretended Spain had been under international siege, tamed the monarchists, crushed guerrilla activity, and ensured the Army and Church backed him. Spain had been seen as a pariah state by many but it was never under siege; this was a theme Franco had frequently used to explain the pariah state of himself to the people, and thus when Spain became of use to America he would state that he had fought the siege off. In 1951 January Franco appointed Lequerica as the Spanish Ambassador in USA, but Truman gave Lequerica’s reception barely a few minutes in order to demonstrate his feelings towards the regime. As noted Lequerica had been ambassador to Vichy France and was one of Franco’s trusted advisers; whether he had been a suitable appointment for the American post was a frequently debated question. Despite this accumulation of goodwill there was little prospect of Spain joining NATO because of general European distrust. Recognising the problem Franco started to seek a bilateral agreement with USA. Franco took the stance that “he had no desire to enter NATO and did not want to be involved in a defensive arrangement with the Leftist governments of Britain and France.”333 European politicians saw the value of Spain but not Franco, so Franco continued the siege argument but omitted the USA, and continued his attack on Britain using Gibraltar as his target, and made August 4th *

Stanton Griffis arrived in January 1951. He was not a trained diplomat but more of a businessman; he had previously been in Poland and Argentina where he had been criticised for praising Perón. He was almost given a royal reception by Franco whereas Balfour the newly appointed British ambassador was cold-shouldered. Balfour was always concerned that Griffis would allow himself to become entangled in Franco’s schemes to alienate the USA and Britain.

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Gibraltar Day with Falangist protests about foreign occupation. He knew the Americans were not enamoured with colonialism and hoped they would side with him over the Gibraltar issue, but they refused. Britain and the Gibraltar naval base remained important to them and Britain could not be offended as far as the Americans were concerned. Because the Americans were all too well aware of the European attitude they tried to keep many of their dealings with Spain as quiet as possible. Nevertheless Franco continued to make Britain nervous by making access to Gibraltar difficult, and he tried to drive a wedge between the USA and Britain by talking of Socialist Britain being close to Communist Moscow; Franco was persistent if nothing else. Truman never changed his mind about Franco but his military men, especially General Omar Bradley were now showing considerable interest in Spain, and this included Eisenhower the NATO Commander-in-Chief.* In June 1951 they made contact with Franco with a view to using Spain as a base. The Americans were continuously aware of the European distaste for Franco “and concluded that military necessity outweighed political sentiment.”334 In July 1951 Franco received some Senators from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and his views impressed them. He put himself across as a benevolent leader of an organic democracy who above all things had foreseen the danger of Communism; this was music to their ears.† Following this preparatory meeting the American military met Franco and explained the need for airbases and ports. Franco was pleased to portray himself as an equal with America. He was also once again in a bargaining role and he had his shopping list from military to food, but was more than happy to clinch a deal. He had tried this bargaining with Hitler giving such an extensive list of requirements and demands that he had failed with his fellow dictator. His list for the Americans was just as disproportionate, but as mentioned earlier he informed the negotiator Sherman that the Americans could start when they wanted.‡ It was not long before American military and other study groups were soon in Spain investigating the situation and the proposals. Franco knew the Americans *

Omar Bradley saw the peninsula as “the last foothold in continental Europe.” See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.311 † Organic democracy was a concession to the democratic climate of postwar years; Franco appeared serious about not considering himself a dictator. ‡ Spain eventually received its first jet aircraft, see Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.317

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wanted him to be more liberal both in economics and politics, and to smooth over this aspect he said he would change his government which he did. However, in the light of Korea and anti-communist panic he felt safe enough to change his cabinet to a more Falangist colour. The Ministry of War went to General Agustín Muñoz Grandes who had led the Blue Division and had been given the Iron Cross by Hitler. Franco’s team were anti-communist, but they were also decidedly anti-Liberal at a time when Franco wanted to align himself with America. Franco demanded too much but cut back on some of his more extreme demands. Lequerica his ambassador in America had informed him that America would do anything to make a pact, but the American negotiators, even though they desperately wanted his cooperation were not gullible. Franco in fact was just as keen as the Americans and in 1953 September Spain made the Military Pact of Madrid with the USA and the country received massive American economic aid, and even without this direct military aid, the payments totalled 1.5 billion dollars by 1963. Franco was overjoyed and declared contentedly “we are the central axis of global politics.” This pact was concentrated on American bases in Spain, both naval and air force, and Franco claimed, probably believing it himself that Spain had not ceded any national sovereignty. There were of course dark areas, one being that in the event of a major war all the USA would do was let Madrid know.* If Spain were attacked by a non-communist country the USA would do nothing. The military equipment given was second-hand material and in reality Franco had subordinated “Spain to wider American defence needs, if not entirely accepted satellite status, Franco showed just how high a price he was prepared to pay to keep himself in power.”335 The pact brought in $226 million in military and technological assistance, but the much desired economic aid was limited to that infrastructure which held military significance from the American point of view. Franco allowed bases to be established which were close to Torrejón near Madrid, Seville, Zaragoza and other populated places. In addition the Americans were exempt from Spanish law and tax. According to Preston, and probably correctly, the Caudillo had bargained away neutrality and sovereignty without distinguishing between the good of Spain and that of Francisco Franco.336 The bases were dangerously close to major cities and the price had been a diminution of sovereignty, and the Pact also encompassed Spain in the possibility of being a target in the event of an atomic war. The Americans had also insisted that the peseta

*

This clause would not be eliminated until 1970.

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had to be revalued at a realistic level.* However, it should be noted that economically it would not be American pressure but the economy which would make Franco give up his treasured policy of autarky. After signing agreements for the bases Franco said “at last I have won the Civil War,” which clearly indicated his narrow perception of what was happening.337 America’s immense diplomatic influence had tilted the balance in their own favour, had given American companies a head start, and “the relationship with the US set the parameters in which all other foreign policy initiatives had to operate.”338 However, Franco must have had a notion that his Pact with the USA would not be universally accepted; he would not have overly worried about the feelings of the general population, but of his political supporters. Consequently demonstrations and parades were organised to demonstrate Franco’s success. He told his people that the “pacts constituted a fullblown alliance between equals when, in fact they were no more than agreements on a specific issue.”339 He was aware that some Falangists might have regarded the American bases as “more Gibraltars,” foreigners with rights on Spanish soil, so he made a point of courting the Movimiento. It was years later that Franco started to worry about how close the American bases were to the major cities and therefore the potential nuclear-war dangers. Nevertheless the Pact was a pinnacle in Franco’s life; he had aligned himself with what was regarded as the most powerful nation on earth equating himself as a co-equal. There were no protests because “the huge investment in State terror made between 1939 and 1945 was paying off in the political apathy of the population.”340 Years of repression had not only created a political apathy but a sense of fear at any form of opposition. Eisenhower and the American military had been the main clue to the Pact. In 1952 the USA Presidential elections had attracted Franco’s intention, and he hoped for the Republicans believing Eisenhower would be easier to deal with than Truman. As soon as Eisenhower was elected Franco donned his General’s uniform and talked of the Iberian Peninsula as being the place of the last resistance against Communism. Eisenhower had changed the American ambassador to James C. Dunn (who was currently in Paris) and who wanted to wrap up the deal with Franco. Franco’s own ambassador Lequerica had led him to believe the Americans were all too keen on a pact, but there was the usual tardiness in reaction

*

Franco had insisted the peseta should be held at a certain value out of a sense of national pride.

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and Franco dropped some of his more extreme demands and accepted the American offer. In October 1954 the Minister of the army Muñoz Grandes visited the USA. The Americans were aware that this man had led the Blue Division on the Eastern Front, and when on dress occasions Grandes wore his Iron Cross it must have been hard to swallow. Despite this “throw-back” from a hated past Grandes was received by Eisenhower, and General Ridgway gave him the Legion of Merit, the highest decoration for a foreign commander which changed the perspective of a hitherto anti-American Spanish general. It also indicated how keen the Americans were to win Spain over for their military needs. There had been many complaints about the decline of the Spanish army under Grandes and “Franco is said to have received more than a few complaints about the growing neglect of Munoz Grandes’ administration, but his primary concern was political loyalty.”341 In October 1954 Franco himself was pleased to accept an invitation from the commander of the US Sixth Fleet to observe manoeuvres in the Mediterranean; he appeared on the American ship in his Spanish Admiral’s uniform feeling that he was America’s closest ally. It was about this time his confidence grew in leaps and bounds, and he took to his hobbies (including painting, which he knew Hitler liked, and Churchill and Eisenhower) and even his confidants and friends who surrounded him had to continue to address him as Your Excellency. He was constantly surrounded by the secret service, making a strange contrast to Buckley’s observation of Primo de Rivera strolling down the street without a bodyguard.342 The Eisenhower administration proved much better for Franco than Truman’s establishment, which Franco had predicted when he had sent Eisenhower his best wishes during the Presidential campaign. The new administration planned visits to Madrid for the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the Vice President Richard Nixon. Foster Dulles arrived in Madrid in November 1955 to discuss Spain’s entry into the United Nations and the independence of Morocco. The possibility of entry into the world society of the UN tamed his response to the Moroccan request which would have annoyed him. Morocco apart from being the place which started his ascendency to power had always represented his powerful desire to be a colonial power, and had been a serious stumbling block with Hitler. The initial vote at the UN was taken on December 13th, and not surprisingly the Soviet Union vetoed it, but even more astonishingly and without explanation the Soviet representative suddenly withdrew the veto the next day.

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Britain and France London and Paris thought that the American dealings with Franco could undermine the moral superiority of the Western block. It was clear that “the European countries could afford to take a more principled line on Francoism than the US,” and they never forgot or forgave Franco’s behaviour during the Second World War.343 Franco was aware of the British and French views and gave an interview condemning Britain and its colonialism which he hoped would appeal to USA. He was particularly annoyed by Britain being ruled by the Left-wing, and he was pleased when the Conservatives were returned to power in October 1951, but especially happy when Anthony Eden once again Foreign Secretary communicated with Franco that they looked forward to correct and friendly relations with Spain. In November 1951 he asked for the return of Gibraltar saying the port could be used by the British. The British were not interested, not least because of the impending problems in the Suez area. During the time of the proposed visit to Gibraltar by Queen Elizabeth II Franco increased the attack on having it returned; he slowed it down once he realised he was not going to get American support upon which he depended. He often raised Gibraltar whenever he wanted to divert public attention away from other issues.

Spanish Economics The Civil War had left Spain devastated and the Second World War had not helped. During the Great War of 1914-18 Spain’s neutrality had assisted her economics, but by hunting with the hounds and running with the fox Franco’s policy between 1939 and 1945 had not improved the well-being of the Spanish economy. His obsession with autarky revealed his economic naivety, and as with most of his appointments during this period he surrounded himself with loyal friends rather than objective experts. “Perhaps the biggest threat to the regime in the 1950s was the considerable economic vulnerability which resulted from a combination of the legacy of the Civil War, bad policy making since 1938, comparative economic backwardness and isolation.”344 The result was that Spain was in an appalling state by 1950. As Preston rightly noted “Spain had paid the economic price for Franco’s survival.”345 National pride had kept the exchange rate for the peseta artificially high which had excluded Spain from the international economy which was expanding rapidly in the postwar years of the 1950s. The Spanish ministers in charge were weak, and agriculture had made next to no

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recovery from the civil war. “By 1960 over a million people had left the countryside, mainly from central Spain but also for the first time from the south, thereby reducing agriculture’s share of employment irreversibly to forty-two per cent.”346 In the past the Spanish agriculture had been a major sustenance component for survival. In the new era the working-class had to rely on the black market and Spain had to import food, but with a dwindling foreign currency. The staple food of bread, potatoes and rice increasingly rose in price, and there were frequent power cuts and wages often lowered. In March 1951 Franco gave a more realistic speech on the problem Spain faced in the sphere of economics admitting that Spain was poor. The day afterwards he delivered this speech there surfaced serious problems in Barcelona. It started with a boycott of public transport because the detested Civil Governor Eduardo Baeza Alegría had raised the cost of tickets without consultation at local level, or talked with the national government. Outraged protestors stoned the trams, and the boycott soon became a general strike. The British embassy observers were of the opinion that even Falangists had joined with the so-called Left, but since economic welfare touches everyone there may have been some truth in this claim. Franco ordered troops to Barcelona via the navy but calmer advice from the army command brought in the Civil Guard. Franco sacked Baeza who was dismissed for losing control of the situation which could have developed into a challenge against Franco. Barcelona and the Catalonia region had always been difficult for Madrid and remains so to this day; it was the last place Franco needed dissension. The other well-known area of possible revolt was the Basque area, and in the following month of April 1951 250,000 men in the shipyards, steelworks and mines in Basque country began a forty-eight hour strike. Franco brushed it aside and announced it as the work of foreign agitators. There was a brutal repression of this minor revolt and many of the suspects were sent to concentration camps near Vitoria. Carrero Blanco blamed British and French freemasons and like Franco tried to ignore the realities of a poor economy. These domestic disturbances led to Don Juan in the July of 1951 writing to Franco and suggesting the monarchy’s reestablishment could help. Franco took months to answer claiming there was no corruption in the administration which Don Juan had implied. Payne and Palacios in their recent biography wrote that the “domestic production began to rise, and by 1951, when the improvement was much more marked, the country finally recovered its per capita income of 1935.”347 The situation in 1935 had not been good and during the 1950s Spain’s economics were in serious disorder, the policy of autarky had not

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worked, and Franco did not like change but something had to be done. He did not like change because “his innate opposition to liberalism still extended to economic liberalism” which he believed would open too many wrong doors.348 During these years “the economic situation was still terrible due to the failure of autarky, a policy he still stubbornly followed.”349 Spain was one of the poorest and most under-developed states in Europe (along with Greece and Portugal); for other countries it was postwar rapid recovery even in those places devastated by the global war. As the early 1950s developed the American loans only papered over the cracks, and Spain’s situation remained one of abject poverty. There were many minor strikes, and food and fuel remained dangerously scarce. Franco rebalanced his Cabinet this time with some old-time Falangists, but also lawyers and economists. It is with some justification claimed that the national economics started to change because the Americans wanted a more liberal based system, and in return for economic help Franco gave up his treasured autarky system. There is no doubt that the assistance given by America helped alleviate the situation, but Franco in giving up his autarky policy was more driven by essential economic needs than American pressure. In the late 1950s Franco stopped appointing his military supporters and realised that experts were required; in that sense it was “the beginning of a growing distance between Franco and his regime.”350

The Monarchists From the start of the Civil War to the end of his life the monarchist supporters and the Bourbon House represented by Don Juan remained a persistent problem for Franco. It was a problem he would never entirely resolve, but during this period as he consolidated his power by manipulation and sheer cunning he managed to put the issue on a shelf. He had to tread with care because the monarchy had considerable support, some for the sake of a traditional monarch, and others in the hope that a monarch might restore democracy. Nevertheless it was with “relative ease with which Franco manipulated the monarchists and was due to a number of fundamental weaknesses in their position;” they were too divided among themselves.351 On July 10th 1951 Don Juan wrote to Franco, as noted in the subchapter above on economics, and suggested the monarchy could help because there was so much corruption. Franco took months to answer

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probably hoping that Don Juan would stay in Portugal and take the hint his silence was necessary. In 1954 Don Juan started to raise his head again under the influence of José Robles. Don Juan as with Robles was always worried about other monarchist candidates such as Don Javier, Don Jaime and others who were lurking in the background hoping for the right opportunity. Don Juan wanted his son to go to the Catholic University at Louvain in Belgium. This request arrived just at the time that Franco was making ready to send Juan Carlos to a military academy in the typical Franco mould. Franco informed Don Juan that those who wished to govern Spain should be educated in Spain. The veiled threat was obvious, and Don Juan backed down and Franco was thrilled that Robles resigned as a consequence. Franco was caught in a persistent balancing act between the Francoist factions, but now a new group was becoming apparent, a mixture of Opus Dei and followers of Don Juan and often called the Third Force–Tercera Fuerza.* At first Franco was unconcerned by Don Juan but in February 1954 some of his generals asked him what would happen after his death. Franco’s concern deepened when Don Juan’s daughter had her “coming out” celebration and there were thousands of applications for passport permission to travel to Portugal for the event; including many high-up officials. The monarchy’s popularity was self-evident and uncomfortable for Franco. In Madrid on 21st November 1954 the first limited municipal elections were held and it looked good for the Tercera Fuerza, so Carrero Blanco and a few others resorted to some electoral cheating. Complaints were made and it soon dawned on Franco that when he had been told it was a success this was far from the truth, especially when General Juan Vigón told Franco that the bulk of the Madrid garrison had voted for the monarchy. It was at this juncture that Franco decided to arrange through his brother to hold a meeting with Don Juan. The Falangists were anachronistic to the outside world, and the monarchists appeared more in tune with the current situation which was a concern for Franco. Such was the friction between his supporters coupled with a poor economy that “before the end of the decade, while his survival would hardly be threatened, he would find himself no longer entirely in control, forced to abandon the Falange and leave the detailed management of economics and, by extension, politics to expert technocrats.”352 *

Opus Dei was a growing and powerful Catholic secular order, an elite conservative branch of various professions. It had the characteristics of a religious order but the ideology was dedicated to spiritual values in the work place.

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In the meantime his meeting with Don Juan in December 1954 was to convince the monarchists of his good faith. This was the second time Don Juan had stepped foot in Spain, the first was when Mola turned him away. As all this was happening Franco’s daughter had given birth to their first son and there were rumours that Franco intended to establish his own monarchical line of succession. At the Don Juan meeting the would-be king or Pretender as Franco called him, had suggested reforms such as the freedom of the press, a free judiciary, Trade Union freedom and political representation which only convinced Franco he was subject to foreign Freemasonry.* Franco pointed out that unless Don Carlos was educated in Spain there would be no succession, and Don Juan knew he was obligated to agree. There was a joint communiqué which implied the hereditary rights to the Bourbon dynasty. This was just a vague communiqué and Franco made no concrete concessions, but he had brought the monarchists back under control. Naturally he then had to placate some of the Falangists, and in June 1955 a report said the Falangists, after Franco’s death, would give their support in upholding the new monarchy, thus giving them a major institutional role. Having done this Franco returned to his hobbies, especially hunting where the political and other sycophants joined him, and he gave less time to day to day governance. “By the end of 1954, he was spending Saturdays, Sundays and Mondays hunting in the season and occasionally weeks at a time.”353

The Church Because of the influence of his mother and later his wife Franco always appeared as an ardent believer in the Catholic version of the Christian faith. It is of course impossible to tell how genuine his faith was, though it has been noted that during his time in Morocco it meant little to him. One thing is certain that in 1936 he realised the importance of the backing of the Catholic Church, and especially the Vatican. The Roman Church carried worldwide support and Franco knew that with Catholic support there was an opportunity of legitimising his efforts in order to win support. In March 1951 the American ambassador Griffis spoke to Franco about Truman’s concern in the way Protestants were treated. Any church which *

Franco could hardly help himself with his consistent condemnation of masons and the first cracks only started to appear after he gained some kind of relationship with America, but even then it remained his explanation for anything running counter to his views.

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was not Roman Catholic Franco and many others considered as heretics, such was the nature of those days. Franco promised the American Ambassador that he would look into it, blamed the clerics, did nothing, and religious intolerance continued. It was serious intolerance because there were often verbal and even physical attacks upon Protestants. In February 1952 Truman wrote to Franco about the liberty of Protestants, and Franco took his time in replying “and when he did so a month later, he sent up his standard smoke screen, devoting most of the missive to common-places about the importance of relations between the two countries” claiming his regime by law never interfered with other cults.354 The very use of the word cult would not have made Truman very happy. In the same month that President Truman wrote he also publicly announced that he was not happy about Franco because of the continued religious intolerance. He believed it stemmed from Franco which was unlikely since he was more preoccupied with other matters, but he could have cooperated had he wanted. Franco’s situation was hardly helped by Cardinal Segura, Archbishop of Seville who said Franco was bargaining away Spanish Catholicism for American dollars. This was the time Franco was seeking the concordat with the Vatican and he wanted to be seen as the upholder of the faith. Eventually it happened and in 1953 Spain concluded a concordat with the Vatican. “The ‘son of God’ (hijo predilecto de Dios) as Franco was called, and his dictatorial system was now also supported by the Pope,” which was the respectability or clean bill of health Franco required so desperately.355 There had been a substantial delay in signing the concordat because the Vatican had harboured doubts about the stability of Spain and its lack of international acceptance. There was also the probability that the “Vatican remained wary of moving too quickly into an official concordat after having its fingers burned by its close relationships with the Nazi and fascist dictatorships.”356 Even so the Vatican was highly respected by many, and for others it was the highest form of human authority, but there were questions marks over the Papal throne regarding many matters not least the silence over the Holocaust: the Vatican also needed to be cautious. Franco needed “the Papal seal of legitimacy for his semimonarchical rule, to justify the coins which were stamped ‘Caudillo by the grace of God’ and his arrogation of royal status in the ecclesiastical sphere.”357 On 21st December 1953 Pius XII granted Franco the highest Vatican order of the Supreme Order of Christ. The concordat also meant the appointment of a Papal Nuncio.

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Franco would like to have sacked Cardinal Segura but the prelate had his wings trimmed and was constantly followed by the secret police. The following year in 1954 the Vatican recalled the Cardinal, but the “testy old prelate did not go willingly, shutting himself up in the archiepiscopal place, and he finally had to be removed by the police who took him away as though they were carrying out a protestor.”358 The concordat was not just for Franco’s benefit, “it was one of the most advantageous agreements signed by the Church in the past generation, for the Vatican obtained almost everything it had asked for. The Church would not only be exempt from all taxation but would receive state financial support” and much more besides.359 The Church benefited to a great extent but it also elevated Franco not only in his own eyes but that of many others.

CHAPTER THREE NEED FOR CHANGE 1956-39

Introduction During the years 1956 to 1959 there were significant events which initiated substantive changes in Spain and for Franco. Although it was a complex jigsaw of events the two major issues of these years, and which would also dominate the coming years, tended to revolve around the country’s politics and the economy, as well, as the end of Franco’s colonial dreams. The first factor of importance was the undeniable fact that Spain was one of the poorest countries in Europe, and despite American help the future for the ordinary person continued to look bleak. This naturally caused unrest not only among the working-class and others, but unsettled political unrest amongst the new generation of university students who had not experienced the brutality of the Civil War. Naturally there were political ramifications and Franco had to continue his balancing act of ensuring his divided supporters did not erupt. He was secure in his position but these various strands of the monarchists, Falangists, Army, Catholics and their splinter groups always needed some attention, not least the Church which during this latter half of the 1950s was subject to its own internal changes. The politics were driven by two major factors, the appalling state of the economy and Franco’s position as a dictator. During these critical years Franco stopped appointing to his cabinet old loyal friends or safe seats, and under the guidance of his trusted adviser Carrero Blanco appointed experts in their professional fields, mainly economics. This singular action had two effects in the long term. First it was the initiation of Spanish economic recovery, and secondly it allowed Franco time to elevate himself to further quasi-regal status and an indulgent lifestyle of holidays and hobbies, leaving much of the day-to-day running of the country to others. When he appointed his new 1957 cabinet, life for him and Spain started to travel down the road of change. It has been argued that “the worsening economic situation, coupled with the refusal of society to accept it quietly, was behind the important cabinet

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reorganisation in 1957 which heralded a completely new phase of the dictatorship.”360 The second factor of these three years was the transformation in the colonial outlook which had motivated the European powers for so long. America was now the dominant power and had always denounced colonialism, yet persevered in trying to spread its influence on a worldwide basis. After the long period of isolationism in the interbellum years and now faced with the Communist threat American governments after 1945 had tried to bring other countries into her orbit of influence, as the Communists also tried; this development benefited Franco. The Americans had always been suspicious of Churchill and the British Empire which had been obliged to give India and Pakistan their independence, and over the coming years would turn her old colonies into the still functioning British Commonwealth. France persisted in fighting a losing battle in Vietnam and North Africa, but the tide of global political momentum was changing, and Franco had little choice but to relinquish his dreams of colonial expansionism. This was not as important as Spain’s internal problems, but it remained a source of Franco’s motivation for greatness and will be dealt with first.

Morocco Franco had emerged as a well-known leader during the Rif War, and had used the Spanish system of promotion on the battlefield as his means of increasing his military status. This powerful drive to reach the top soon transformed his military advancement into personal political ambition which knew no bounds. Morocco had formed Franco, and although some historians claim it also undid him this was not true as his political survival instincts overcame his resistance to what was a global transformation. He coped because his inherent desire to stay at the top enabled him to recognise these powerful forces at work. He had once clashed with Hitler over his colonial dreams, but this time he realised even more potent forces were at work on a global basis. Those forces were various, but the main factors were indigenous demands by previously subjugated peoples to be free of subservience, and assisted by a world opinion caught up in the vortex of conflicting influences of the Cold War. The best form of alliance was formed by material help and ostensible friendship, which persists to this day, and Franco had benefitted from this beguiling influence in coming to terms with America.

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As early as late 1955 there had been signs of problems emerging in Morocco. The French in a desperate attempt to restore their colonial authority not only in the Far East but in North Africa had started a repression of the Moroccan desire for independence. This was not the new development of building up influence, but the old European traditional system of subjugation by sheer power. The Spanish were as watchful as ever of French activity in Morocco. The Spanish commander in charge of the Moroccan protectorate was the militant General García Valiño, who in agreement with Franco pretended to give a degree of freedom to their part of Morocco, and quietly encouraged the rebellion against the French. Arab nationalism was growing and had been given some stimulus by Nasser in Egypt, as the British were soon to discover. Franco and Valiño were both excited by Franco’s old dream of extending Spain’s North African holdings by anticipating the collapse of French dreams. The fact that Franco had not grasped what was happening in the European colonies world-wide was not surprising given that countries such as Britain and France were equally bewildered. The only difference was whereas Britain and France at this stage were busy trying to keep a grip on their colonies Franco persisted in looking for expansion. By August 1955 the French realised they were under intense pressure in Vietnam and Algeria so they decided to cut their losses and lifted martial law in Morocco, and in the November of that year the Sultan was brought back. Both Valiño and Franco were under the ridiculous illusion that the Moroccan people appreciated the Spanish rule and the Spanish zone would become strong. However, in 1956 Valiño had to inform Franco that it was a now a matter of urgency that conditions in Morocco should be improved at once with major beneficiary public works. It was clear that the Moroccans in the Spanish zone wanted either vast improvements or the freedom the French had felt obliged to give. It was no surprise that when on March 2nd 1956 the French announced Moroccan independence it took only four days before serious violence broke out in the Spanish zone. Franco watched what was happening and later would claim that Valiño was out of control and he had no idea what was happening. On 7th April 1956 Franco had to bury his colonial dreams. The French had given independence to French Morocco and Franco now recognised Mohammed V as a king without conditions, and ceded his colonial hold over Morocco. “The press announced it as an act of Spanish generosity that Franco had long planned, which was not true. Some army officers reacted with anger, and at the academy in Zaragoza two cadets burned a photo of Franco in protest.”361 Consequently Franco turned his venom

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back to Gibraltar, a ploy he often used to detract public attention, but “it was also the end of the dream of African empire for which he had so nearly gone to war on Hitler’s side in 1940.”362 The consistent attacks on Gibraltar also had some justification in so far that it was also part of the British colonial scheme and in the years to come, and to this day, remains a difficult problem to resolve. A year later in November 1957 more colonial problems emerged. A small Spanish colony on the North African coast called Ifni (south of Agadir and opposite Canary Islands) was being demanded by Morocco, which given its natural geographical position was not surprising. Franco as so often (and in the eyes of his critics “too often”) delayed his reaction on the various warnings coming through from the Spanish command which was concerned about the growing incursions by Moroccan guerrilla fighters. Franco fell back on his age-old belief that the Soviet Communists were behind this problem, but he was somewhat hesitant because he was trying to build up a pro-Arab policy, and at this stage had no intention of unsettling the United Nations. The news soon arrived that the main town of Sidi Ifni was under attack by the Moroccans, and Franco felt in his antediluvian way that immediate military action was necessary. He could not use the new American weapons against an American ally, (which Morocco was by agreement), so he used Second World War German planes, and the Moroccans found themselves halted by Messerschmitt Bf109s and Junkers and Heinkel bombers. Even with outdated equipment the planes worked and the incursion was halted.* The incursion was stopped by superior mechanised forces, but the problem was not resolved because the Americans did not want the area to be of interest to the Communists. In December 1957 Dulles had visited Madrid, and later Franco felt obliged to offer a peace settlement which he grudgingly did in June 1958. “Franco was able to maintain the status quo for eleven more years, until he signed an agreement in January 1968 that handed over Ifni and the tiny Cabo Juby (farther south) in return for which the new Moroccan ruler, Hassan II, gave ample rights in Moroccan waters for the Spanish fishing fleet, which had become among the largest in Europe.”363 In the same year of 1968 Franco also granted independence to Equatorial Guinea which then fell into the hands of a genocidal dictator. It may have been devastating for Franco’s earlier dreams of colonial expansion, but whatever personal feelings emerge about Franco he

*

Even to this day some of the old Bf109s which occasionally appear at Duxford flying displays are Spanish in origin.

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recognised the need to obey the American wishes if his international status were not to be further tarnished. As a final note on Morocco this situation vexed Franco virtually to the point of his death when in the mid-1970s Hassan II proved determined to remove the last traces of the Spanish presence from Morocco and there was interference in Spanish Sahara.* The Sahara was somewhat barren, about 80,000 indigenous people and some phosphate mining. Hassan II had the backing of the USA who did not want Soviet interest in the area. The news of these incursions actually caused Franco to have a relapse on his drawn-out death bed.

Political and Economic Problems The major problem besetting Franco’s Spain was, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, the economic plight of Spain. As always this problem was not helped by the political machinations of Franco’s support groups. There was a growing dissent among the working-class at their abject poverty, which was now supported by a new generation growing in Spain (especially among university students) which had not fought in the Civil War, and who now questioned the morality of the Franco regime with a particular distaste for the status and image of the Falangist. In the mid-1950s the Falangist had regained a degree of popularity, but although they had once sparred with the military they now clashed with the Catholic element. This led to a mutiny in Madrid University and underlined that Franco continued to have tensions amongst his followers. The university students in this period, even those of Left-wing persuasion tended to come from middle-class families and were therefore more difficult to repress than the traditional working-class elements. An extreme Falangist militia called the Guardia de Franco had proffered insulting slogans against Prince Juan Carlos, and supposedly called Franco a traitor for consulting with Don Carlos, and although Franco was confident of their support these divisions were not going to be resolved overnight. The monarchist movement remained persistent but a trifle more cautious in its approach recognising Franco’s total grip on power.† *

During the winter of 1975 Spain was confronted with an intensive campaign of territorial demands from Morocco which culminated in what has been called the Green March; after negotiations with Morocco and Mauritania, Spain withdrew its forces and settlers from the territory. † In the Holy Week of 1956 there had been a tragedy in the royal home in Portugal. Juan Carlos had said goodbye to Franco at El Pardo and gone home for Easter with

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Franco knew he had to keep the monarchists at bay but despite Falangist unrest he continued to use them despite their occasional vitriolic outbursts. It was during this period that Franco had to come to terms with this political group which many critics in and out of Spain rightly regarded rightly as fascists. It has been claimed that “the most important change he made was to restore his favourite Falangist José Luis de Arrese, to the post of secretary-general of the movement.”364 It may well have been an important change, but whether it was correct is entirely another matter; Arrese’s ardent approach was to result in several serious predicaments.

José Luis de Arrese

a gift of his own gun from the academy. Don Juan locked it away but his son persuaded his mother to let him have it for practice. Later he killed his younger brother Alfonsito in a boy’s game thinking the gun was unloaded. The news was supressed in the Spanish press and it was believed that Don Carlos would go to a monastery, but two days after the funeral he was back at Zaragoza. Franco was constantly alert to Don Juan’s insistence, but deeply angry when in 1959 the Unión Española was established; this group claimed that the monarch could only be restored by the people and not by a dictator. The unrest persisted throughout Franco’s life but remained under his control until he died.

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It is easy to gain the impression that Franco who enjoyed having the reputation for being unperturbed was in fact too passive. He took neither the Falangist attack or the monarchical threat, or the students very seriously. Even when the Falangist outcries increased Franco simply put it down to Communist or Freemason intrigue. This attitude had been and would endure as his life-long explanation to pass over difficult matters, but it congested his understanding of precisely what was happening among his followers and the population at large. It is also possible that at times he appeared to be slow in arriving at a decision because there were times when “Franco was forced to follow rather than lead developments, and he waited to see which way the wind was blowing before acting.”365 He also had to be cautious in order to forestall any one group holding too much influence. However, when a report was given to Franco which clearly made the point that the modern students held a “widespread dissatisfaction with the stultifying atmosphere of the Francoist university, it implied that students had severe misgivings about the moral standing of the regime and its servants.”366 Franco later read the report privately and especially noted where the report suggested more freedom should be given before Marxism took root. His well-known attitude for being an antiCommunist was obviously used to help focus his attention. His thinking on this matter would have been even more sharply focused when it was followed by another in which “the sociologist José Luis Pinillos made a study of student attitudes and concluded that a large majority regarded the political and military authorities as incompetent and deeply immoral.”367 Franco at this stage was incapable of change or reviewing his own position, and simply sneered at the report calling it the stench of subversion and appealed to the more intelligent components among the students to combat this outbreak. The problem was that it was the young future intelligentsia who had given rise to these critiques. The only echo of Franco’s thoughts could be heard within the ranks of the Falangists, who had a high degree of poor discipline and division within their ranks. In 1956 such tensions rose and there were outbreaks of protests from the Left-wing and Liberals demanding a more open system. The only response came early on 8th February when a group of Falangists tore through the university buildings causing disruption and beating up students; it was a bout of uncontrolled violence. The next day a group of the Guardia de Franco clashed with some progressive students, a shot was fired and a Falangist was killed, and rumours rapidly spread that the

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Falangists were seeking their revenge.* Several of the senior generals were unhappy with the Guardia de Franco and told Franco their views in the hope they would be disbanded. The army had always had problems with the Falange but it appeared they were genuinely concerned about the ramifications of this particular conflict. Franco in his usual fashion of being unperturbed, or pretending to be unperturbed decided the threats would come to nothing, and it would all die down, and so to everyone’s astonishment took himself off on one of his many pleasure seeking hunting trips. However, it gave the appearance that Franco was becoming less dominant and was quite prepared to let things take their course or let others deal with the problems. For others the episode clearly indicated that the Falangist outburst was an effort to stay dominant in the modern world where some Falangists feared they were losing their grip. The Falangists had always wanted a one-party state as in Nazi Germany, but in the modern evolving world they were seriously out of date. Many people in and outside Spain had recognised this as an inherent danger of the movement, but Franco failed to see the danger. He had brought back Arrese in order to direct the Falange to quieten the disturbances down, but Arrese may well have been behind the problem as he was an ardent believer in the Falangist policies. The choice of Arrese and this developing agitation had back-fired in so far that it polarised Spain once again because the other Franco factions were now regarding the Falangists as neo-Nazis. The trouble was that Franco had taken his eye off the ball and placed too much trust in his “old chums;” Franco had trusted Arrese and believed that he would resolve the problem and secure his position. It was at this time that Franco was preoccupied with Morocco and the general rumblings of discontent on the economy, and in society generally, and did not give sufficient intelligent thought to the nature of his more critical appointments. He was content to let Arrese draw up what was termed a fundamental law which was the notion of ensuring that the Falangists took a control under Franco. At this stage it was clear that either Franco trusted the Falange as his form of support or he had misread the situation in the wider context of public feeling. On March 4th 1956 Arrese gave a speech which indicated what he took to be Franco’s views, probably correctly, namely a Falangist monopoly of power. This caused an immediate concern among the monarchists and army and others, including the Church. *

It was later believed that it was a Falangist who had fired the shot which killed his own companion. This seems highly likely because it was observed that the Falangists were firing shots in the air as a warning, and it was unlikely that the students carried arms.

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The fact that he knew he had Franco’s support emerged in some speeches given by Franco especially in Andalusia where it was clear that Franco was thinking along the same lines. They had in their private conversations agreed on the importance of the Falange. Franco pointedly attacked the monarch publicly stating that “we take no notice of the clumsy plotting of several dozen political intriguers nor their kids” which was inferred as a reference to Don Juan.368 It was probably Franco’s annoyance with the monarchist movement, or threats as he perceived it that encouraged Franco to give full support to the Falangist. In May 1956 Franco in another speech to the Falangists attacked his critics again, especially the Communists and Freemasons, and claiming that the Falange could live without a monarchy, but a monarch could not exist without the Falange. It was becoming clear that the Falange movement was to Franco’s way of thinking the answer to the monarchy and his other problems. This strident approach was not the usual Franco who hitherto had always carried out a balancing act between his divided supporters. In Arrese’s new law there was no mention of the monarchy which provoked some generals who were concerned enough about this omission to speak with Franco with a sense of urgency. There had been talk about an all Falangist cabinet, but although Franco was aware of the growing hostility towards Arrese there were no signs of this man losing his influence at El Pardo where Doña Carmen appeared to appreciate him. Franco persisted in making sure the Falangists understood that a monarch would not take Spain back to a form of democracy, and as such Franco appeared to be fully supporting Arrese. Later in a public speech Franco went so far as to praise the Falangist, lauded the Axis power system, and attacked the democracies again; he was self-evidently making a direct appeal to the emotions of the Falangists. This diatribe all took place in the middle 1950s, and was a step too far; the published articles of the speech carefully omitted these references to the past. Arrese was also eager to equate Falangist Spain with Nasser’s nationalism. Franco, either on his own judgment or influenced by Arrese, authorised the sale of weapons to Nasser which undermined his efforts to join NATO. As is well-known America was later to order Britain and France out of Egypt, but the idea of selling weapons to Nasser was a serious blunder, not only upsetting the British and French, but also the Americans who were desperately trying to hold their sphere of influence together. There were some who believed Franco was losing touch with his own military, and some criticism about the Franco family spending money on antiques and the good life during a time of spiralling economic and social problems. To all appearances Franco appeared unconcerned about

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his decreasing popularity, though his inner thinking is difficult to judge because even his closest ministers often complained that they did not know what he was pondering. However, Franco soon became more aware of the problems Arrese was causing when Arrese launched his plans publicly and to full effect. The monarchists, Catholics, Military and the Church raised objections at one level or another. The sector which worried Franco most was the Church. He had depended on their support since 1936 and the concordat had left him, in his view, in a sanitised position and he could not offend this international institution. The Roman Church was powerful but rapidly approaching a time of change which Franco cared little about apart from knowing Vatican support was essential.* Some of the more senior clergy were worried that the Falangist dreams invoked memories of Nazism and fascism in general. Three senior cardinals led by the primate Pla y Deniel “declared Arrese’s project to be in violation of pontifical doctrine. Its proposal of an all-powerful state party ‘resembles National Socialism, Fascism or Peronism, all forms rejected by the Church…Franco realised that he could not afford to ignore such a protest, since for more than a decade he had staked the legitimacy of his rule in accordance with the doctrines of the Church.”369 It was not the opinions from overseas or unpopularity at home which drove Franco to pause and reconsider the Falangist hopes, but the Church. Nor was it the spiritual appeal of Christianity, but his need for ecclesiastical support which caused Franco to ponder. Franco was aware that the Americans had supported him for military reasons, and that the other Western democracies still regarded him as a pariah, consequently he regarded the Church’s support as critical to his status. His early hatred and opposition of Communism had appealed to the Vatican during the 1930s, who shared his paranoiac fear of Marxism, but in the postwar years the full wicked tyranny of Nazism had been universally exposed, and the developing views of the Vatican made it clear that any form or fascism, even the Falangists, had to be opposed. This meeting with the senior officials of the Church stopped him in his tracks. Franco reacted at once and demanded an immediate meeting with Arrese and informed him he was not prepared to confront the Church. Arrese realised this new instruction destroyed his plans for promoting the *

In October 1958 Pope Pius XII died and Pope John XXIII (of Second Vatican Council fame) was intent on liberalising the Church. Spanish priests becoming involved in the Worker Priest Movement, and the Ecumenical relationship with other denominations was taken seriously. It was also clear that in future the Church would not be involved in political survival, whereas Pius XII “had been the Pope of the Crusade,” who had given Franco support on many occasions.

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Falange and undertook Franco’s demand to rewrite his project. It was clear that Franco was prepared to do anything to keep the balance of his power; “it is possible to argue that Arrese’s proposed bill signified the beginning of a general acceptance within Francoism that the monarchy would have to occupy a key role within the state, after the death of Franco.”370 This singular reaction provided essential breathing space for Carrero Blanco who wanted a legislative framework for an authoritarian monarchy to guarantee Francoism. This was an important turning point for Spain and Franco. Carrero Blanco now felt free to recommend not just a change of course, but to suggest senior appointments to Franco which would not only put Spain back on track for the long-term aim of monarchy in a postFranco Spain, but could repair the economic disasters that Spain faced. He suggested to Franco the appointment of experts in economic matters, whom he often called technicians, and who were widely known as “the technocrats.” It is easy to gain the impression that Franco was beginning at this stage not only to take a backseat, but was somewhat bewildered by the problems of the Spanish economy. Carrero Blanco was becoming something of a prime minister to Franco who treated him as his closest and most trusted adviser. The relationship between Franco and Carrero Blanco was reflected in the relationship between Carrero Blanco and his newly appointed Chief of Staff Laureano López Rodó who would look later to a modern economy, and who would soon become a significant figure because of his gathering influence. Rodó was a highly qualified lawyer and a member of Opus Dei, who, like Carrero Blanco looked to post-Franco days and the re-establishment of a monarchy. Rodó’s plans for such a transition were long-term, but others wanted greater speed for innovative developments. A General Bautista Sánchez wanted it sooner and was far too obvious in his machinations; he was also a suspected Freemason and for some time had always been watched by security.* This all came to a head in January 1957 when there was another transport strike in Barcelona, but this time linked with some anti-regime protests in the university. Force as always was used to evacuate the university and rumours circulated that the Captain-General Bautista Sánchez was planning a coup. The Pretender’s phone was constantly tapped by the security forces so Franco was aware of what was happening from Portugal to Catalonia. He authorised Grandes to confront Bautista Sánchez who was found dead on 19th January 1957 a day or two after Grandes’ quarrel. There were a large number of mourners at the funeral *

General Bautista Sánchez was the Captain-General of Barcelona and was generally regarded as the leader of the Don Juan followers in the army after Kindelán had been retired.

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which was disconcerting for Franco who simply expressed his pleasure that he not had to dismiss him. There had been a serious argument if not fracas with Grandes the day before and the rumour spread that Sánchez had been killed, but it was only a rumour with no evidence; “the corpulent Sánchez had suffered from heart trouble for some time.”371 Conspiratorial rumours were natural enough but the evidence tended to point to a natural death.

Laureano López Rodó

Franco knew he needed another Cabinet reshuffle, not just for political reasons but Spain’s economy was in a downward spiral and rapidly falling out of control; “by the end of the 1950s the weakness of the economy came to threaten the survival of Francoism, prompting a turn to a more liberal approach.”372 Carrero Blanco with his own adviser Rodó made the necessary suggestions and in February 1957 action was taken to formulate a highly significant new cabinet. This development was significant and has often been regarded as an important watershed in so far that it opened the way towards Spain’s long and painful road to economic recovery. The precise details were worked through by Franco and Blanco, and “over the next two years it would become clear that the new appointments had meant the abandonment of every economic idea that the Caudillo had ever held dear

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and the uninhibited embrace of modern capitalism.”373 Rodó would soon lead cabinet discussions and all Franco needed was to keep maintaining his political balancing act. These cabinet changes emasculated the Falange influence and there began a cautious distancing of the Falangists as a powerhouse.* Arrese was replaced by a José Solís Ruiz who had no other ambition than pleasing Franco. Arrese stayed in cabinet to keep the Falangists calm, but Grandes who had supported Bautista Sánchez was removed from being Minister for the Army.† More importantly, as mentioned above, the technocrats were appointed to modernise the economy. Finance went to Mariano Navarro Rubio (a member of Opus Dei and lawyer), the Department of Commerce to Alberto Ullastres (University professor and Opus Dei) and given that Rodó was also Opus Dei it was not long before Falangists started the rumour that a secret society was taking over the regime.‡ These three men were all in their various ways highly significant appointments; not least because it was the first time Franco had allowed the appointment of professional experts and not his friends. Rodó did not hold a cabinet rank but he was important and would later have serious repercussions on Franco’s political life. In July 1957 the Cortes ratified a ministerial department called Presidencia del Gobierno, which was “a full-scale prime minister’s office which would initiate, draft and programme legislation.”374 In essence the government would now be more administrative than political which allowed Franco to relax and enjoy his position and many hobbies. However, because of some of the appalling decisions taken in the past and Franco’s obsessive belief in autarky the economic problems did not disappear overnight, and there was a major inflationary rise, and therefore more militant strikes emerged. To the working man both in industry and agriculture life did not improve overnight, and in places the poverty remained appalling. Franco as usual simply blamed it on Communists, Freemasons and foreign agitators, but this time he left it to the experts, and this initiated what could be called the marginalisation of Franco as he stepped back and decided to trust these professionals or technocrats. *

The Falangists would continue to criticise “and to some extent they would become a sort of internal loyal opposition,” Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.355 † Grandes was later promoted to captain-general; only Franco held that rank and in 1958 he was named a head of the Supreme General Staff, ‡ Franco was always fond of Rubio who had ended the Civil War as a three times decorated captain.

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It was not a matter of immediate change because Franco remained suspicious and in November 1957 Rodó had to be cautious because Franco thought his personal powers were being limited by the new cabinet and its so-called technocrats. Carrero Blanco wanted Rodó to emerge with a possible constitution for the monarchy which would be acceptable to the Movimiento, which although distanced somewhat from central power was still a force. There was still unrest especially in the coalmines of Asturias as well as in Catalonia during 1958, but Franco left the problem to his cabinet and contented himself with the occasional speech and giving audiences in his regal manner. Rodó meanwhile was carefully distancing the Falange slowly looking towards a restoration. Don Juan was cautious about these developments with good reason given his history with Franco, but he met Rodó in 1957 in Lisbon on an economic mission and was warned progress would be slow. In the June of 1958 the Spanish foreign exchange reserves were in serious danger of running out and Rubio presented his new policy which was “the basis of the harsh monetary stabilisation programme which was to be the foundation for Spain’s future economic development.”375 Because it was realistic it was exacting and not immediately appreciated, especially by Franco and those whose knowledge of modern economics was archaic. The various factions were still visible and viable but Franco at long last put more of his trust in his cabinet, mainly in Rodó, Rubio and Ullastres. Nevertheless, Franco refused Ullastres permission to accept help from the IMF (International Monetary Fund) because, as he explained, he did not like foreigners. It was no longer a matter of Franco giving his thoughts and feelings and expecting them to be acted on because his new technocrats confronted him with the facts and figures. They explained to him the consequences if Spain, already on the verge of bankruptcy, were to become bankrupt it would necessitate the return to coupons, rations and lack of fuel. As noted earlier Franco could be persuaded by genuine expertise and persuasive argument, and he succumbed to their professionalism. In 1959 Franco had reached a point of personal security that he allowed the monarchists in the cabinet to put forth their ideas for the postFranco succession. He was becoming aware of his advancing age, and this was undoubtedly further prompted by the official opening of the Valle de los Caídos on April 1st 1959. It was opened with the usual pomp and ceremony in the company of the great and good; it was an incredible structure which had cost some £200,000,000 and Franco discussed the possibility he might be buried there. The day before the inauguration the

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Falangists had brought José Primo de Rivera’s body there for re-burial. Later Franco would be interred there.* Meanwhile the anticipated stabilisation process under the IMF was showing fruit and Spain was moving away from the archaic systems of the past to a free-market set-up. Naturally Franco claimed credit for this progress even though he had originally objected to the modern polices, and despite his own self-congratulation he was, as he had always been, totally naïve and amateurish in economics, and not the genius he perceived himself to be. The Spanish growth was also helped by the fact that in the late 1950s to 1960s the world was in a state of growth. Spain under the new economic regime permitted Spanish labourers to work in other European countries which helped bring money back into Spain. It was also the start of the tourist trade which would become a major source of income for Spain, and generally Spain started to experience growth rates comparable to other emerging countries, but with a start line lower than most. Franco’s only contribution arose from his anti-Communist stance and the need to be seen on the international stage of acceptability when he brought American influence in. His eyes were seldom off this international aspect and when he heard President Eisenhower was visiting European centres of importance he issued an invitation to the President. There was some opposition to this visit both in London and especially in the American Congress, making it clear that Franco would never lose the stigma of his tainted past.376 Nevertheless, in 1959 Eisenhower visited Franco which “fostered the development of the mythos of a ‘good dictator’…Franco felt validated and declared, ‘it is so much easier to get along with military people.’”377 At first Eisenhower felt detached if not cold on meeting Franco, but he was impressed by the welcome and the crowds who came out in support of Franco. They discussed communism which was not surprising, but American hackles were raised over the question of the treatment of Protestants. Franco explained it was a Church problem and not even one in a thousand Spaniards was a Protestant. Castiella the Foreign Minister had to intervene and later said the problem was being resolved which was blatantly untrue. Later in his memoirs Eisenhower noted “I was impressed by the fact that there was no discernible mannerism of characteristic that would lead an unknowing visitor to conclude that he was in the presence *

Later the monument would become something of a controversy as it was built by forced labour and was regarded as a crime of Francoism. The biographers Payne and Palacios argue that it was not as bad as some critics pretend. (See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.361)

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of a dictator.”378 Much was made of the visit by Franco and it was given wide publicity, but it is a curious note that in his comprehensive biography of Eisenhower, Stephen Ambrose never mentioned Franco at all, Spain only three times, and there is no reference at all about the President’s visit.379 It could be seen as a mere oversight or simply of little importance in the wider scheme of Eisenhower’s life, and therefore for Ambrose out of the international ambit in which he set his subject’s life. The major feature of the critical years had been the cabinet reshuffle of 1957 which was a decisive moment. Although he still retained supreme command Franco started to distance himself. He left the day to day running of the country to the head of the Presidency of the Government, his trusted right-hand man Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco with the support of Rodó and the other professionals. The various supporting factions remained and “paradoxically, as his rule lost dynamism and direction and they squabbled, they needed him the more as the arbiter who held the system together. Franco, of course, was happy to go on being indispensable.”380 There was no question that Franco was more comfortable on his throne and enjoying life, watching television, speculating on the pools, spectating at football matches, fishing and hunting. He spent most of the 1958 summer fishing and in 1959 told his cousin on one shooting expedition he had shot nearly 5,000 partridges; this was to become his new way of life.381

CHAPTER FOUR THE LAST YEARS 1960-1975

Introduction During these years of 1960 onwards there were distinctive changes in which the politics developed in a de facto fashion as social groups struggled with the state apparatus. It now consisted of more than “simply the internal struggles between insider groups within the authoritarian alliance,” which persisted with a struggle between the technocrats and the Movimiento.382 The term technocrats, as mentioned above, was widely used to describe professional men who were experts in their fields, they tended to have little interest in political motivation apart from a monarchical leaning, and most of them belonged to the Catholic Opus Dei organisation.* The Movimiento as mentioned earlier reflected a mixture of the Falangists and other Right-wing elements determined that a Francoisttype regime should continue after the dictator’s death. The technocrats were largely focused on the modernisation of the economy whereas the Movimiento, led by men such as Munoz Grandes, Vega and others wanted to ensure the Franco regime survived at any cost. Franco had mentally recognised that the expert technocrats were right, and because they were mainly apolitical they were safe, but to the bitter end he leaned emotionally towards the Falangists. The tensions between these two groups would become a major feature of the last fifteen years of Franco’s life. Under the technocrats life in Spain would change dramatically from the point of view of economics, education, and even socially. There were even some social shifts in relation to women. From 1960 more women were employed, from 1963 marriage was no longer a dismissible offence, and in 1975 the role of husband as head of the family was abolished. *

The founder of the Opus-Dei was José Marie Julián Mariano Escrivá de Balaguer y Albás who was beatified in 1992 and canonized in 2002. See Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.192. They were Francoists but knew something had to be done for the country’s economy.

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However, it was not all plain sailing for Franco who found himself still at times a pariah on the international scene, often because of his repression and execution of those whom he considered guilty. He also found himself at odds with the Roman Catholic Church which after the death of Pope Pius XII went through a powerful liberalising process through the work of the well-known Second Vatican Council. His third vexation, apart from losing his colonial aspirations, was his and everyone’s knowledge he was not immortal, and the need for his succession had to be prepared. The Church’s liberalisation, the loss of colonies mentioned in the previous chapter, and his successor were to be nagging problems which occupied him throughout these years. Nevertheless, during the late 1960s another phenomenon emerged with the social protests that would become a characteristic of the opposition: terrorism. Even though the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) had been formed before then, they took the first terrorist measures in 1967. “From 1971 until Franco’s death armed conflicts spread to all the large cities, which led to the deployment of brutal police detachments. Strikes and other protest manifestations caused many people injuries and cost many lives.”383 It can be claimed with some certainty that these later disturbances arose mainly because of Franco’s failing health as many people anticipated a better future. The protests were widespread as a more urban society meant a better informed public, but the emerging opposition from civil society could not be supported by political parties. Such were the changes that by 1970 the only difference between Spain and its European counterparts was its political system which was somewhat antiquated. Between the years 1970-1973 the Spanish government faced challenges it found difficult to cope with: first the high number of strikes, (491 in 1969; 1,595 in 1970) and the reappearance of Trade Unions. Secondly there was the University opposition towards the dictatorship, which was a generation matter but collective. Thirdly there was the continued opposition of the Church, especially when the Second Vatican Council rejected National Catholicism. Franco saw this as stab in the back. Finally there was the appearance of ETA, mainly in the Basque region which spread and led to harsh reprisals.384 It has been cogently argued that ETA and other protest movements sought reprisals because the manner in which the “state responded to challenges from within society intensified the depths of the protests themselves, thereby creating a cycle of protest and repression which was not modified until after the death of Franco.”385 The ETA movement was mainly about freeing the Basque region from

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Spain rather than freeing Spain from Franco, but for many Spaniards it became a rallying point and involved the deaths of hundreds of people.* During these years the Spanish economic recovery was becoming apparent and Franco accepted the reforms “attributing to himself the conscious paternity of the Spanish economic miracle and its benevolent effects on popular consumption.”386 Also, as noted, during these fifteen years the American relationship was frequently debated, the Roman Church was becoming more liberal, and the question of who would take over from Franco frequently dominated the politicians and Franco. These were critical issues for Franco and as such they have their own early subchapters before finishing with Franco the man and the politics of these years before his death.

Economics Different historians and biographers have often indicated completely opposing views on Franco’s impact on the economic improvements in Spain. Payne and Palacios for example point out that “some of Franco’s critics have recognised that Spain’s economic modernisation took place under the general but insist that it took place ‘in spite of Franco’ and against his wishes and that in fact he would have preferred that it had not taken place at all. Such a contention, however, is not merely ingenuous but downright mistaken.”387 To support their argument they referred to the German Spanish historian Walther Bernecker who claimed that the changes under Franco took place in three categories; “1) changes and improvements planned and supported by Franco and his government. 2) Changes that emerged as a by-product of state policies and accepted by Franco. 3) Changes that were neither sought nor accepted but that took place either as an indirect result of, or in conjunction with, other programmes of change and development and that, though not desired and even opposed by the government, could not be reversed.”388 These two recent biographers point out that Franco had always sought a modernisation of the economy; that autarky was the common trend of the 1930s and was modified; heavy industry increased after the war although agriculture and textiles remained depressed; that social care was vastly *

On the 21st April 2018 “the Basque separatist group Eta has apologised for the pain and harm that it caused during the 40-year fight for an independent state and appealed for forgiveness from victims…” see The Times newspaper, 21 April 2018, p.41.

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improved and subsidized housing improved, but admitted Franco believed politics took precedence over economics. They correctly write that over “the last twenty-five years of Franco’s life, from 1950 to 1975 was the time of the greatest and most rapid growth in all Spanish history,”389 but how far Franco was the true source of this growth is a matter disputed by many others. During this period the world economy was experiencing global growth and the tourist trade in Spain by the end of 1970 was attracting twenty-one million visitors a year.* In 1971 Spain was fourth largest shipbuilder in the world. Payne and Palacios also pointed out that in 1970 the Spanish devoted more to education than they did to the military, (though these authors also point out that the Spanish military was third-rate) that the number of universities virtually doubled and the middle-classes grew. These two recent biographers admit there were problems and the system was not liberalised in the fullest sense of the meaning, and there was a degree of corruption. Nevertheless they maintained their thesis that “Spain achieved greater progress than any other country in the world at its level of development between 1950 and 1975,” and that “much of the economic success corresponded with Franco’s plans, but he was powerless to resist the great cultural and social changes that came with it.”390 On the other hand the Spanish historian Moradiellos wrote that Carrero Blanco remarked, that “the Caudillo was suspicious of the new direction in economic policy, which he probably did not understand in all its complexity.”391 Franco was not happy but sheer pragmatism obliged him. The biographer Preston wrote that “in response to economic modernisation, a society was emerging with problems and concerns that meant nothing to a Franco locked into the mental set the Civil War and 1940s…he was increasingly the silent chairman of the cabinet, leaving the detail of government to Carrero Blanco and the technocrats”392 In these conflicting interpretations of Franco perhaps the answer can be found between the two. Franco self-evidently wanted improvement in Spain’s economy, but not if it unsettled his dictatorial grip on power, and although he was a man who believed that his notions, political and economic to be right, he had the saving grace of recognising expertise in others. He would also have eschewed that the technocrats were deeply Catholic coming mainly from the Opus Dei, that they were in essence Francoists, and were apolitical, only interested in economic progress and not personal political power.

*

Figures on tourists differ, and many sources place tourist visits much higher.

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The substantive changes to the economy started at the end of the 1950s when in February 1959 a “Plan for Economic Stabilisation and Liberalisation” was drawn up. Some of the more diehard Francoists were unhappy because it was too liberal and could lead to political dissent. In the early stages the policies did not appear to work, industrial production plummeted and unemployment soared. “Eventually, even the economically illiterate Franco grasped that Spain faced imminent economic collapse due to the balance-of-payments deficit. Reluctantly, the Liberalisation Plan was accepted.”393 Soon investment from the USA and Western Europe arrived, and “between 1959 and 1963 the number of tourists to Spain increased from 4 million to 14 million; by the end of the decade the figure had reached over 20 million.”394 Some figures were even higher and many quiet Spanish fishing villages became large modernised tourist complexes. From the 1960s onwards many Spanish found work in the industrial centres of Europe, and the 1960s started to become an economic miracle. There was still a considerable gap between the rich and poor but “while in 1960, only 4 per cent of Spanish households had a fridge, by 1973 the figure had reached 82 per cent,” and during the same period car ownership rose from 4 per cent to 38 per cent.395 The 1959 plan eventually worked and avoided financial bankruptcy, helped in the recovery of the foreign-exchange reserves, and Spain’s economy started to recover. Soon Spain became industrialised and less agrarian. The process of liberalisation was working, and there were more foreign investments (especially from the USA), substantial revenues from mass tourism and, as noted, many Spaniards worked abroad reducing the unemployment and bringing money back into the country. “In short, during the 1960s, at a time of intense economic development, a society was being created that was increasingly closer to its counterparts in Western Europe in structure, composition, characteristics and degree of development and diversification.”396 However, this was not always the case because in Spain there were more serious growing social divisions which were “sharpened even further by the failure of the regime to develop welfare policies to cope with an industrial society.”397 Franco showed his support for the new technocrats when a row blew up between Navarro Rubio and the Minister for Housing Arrese. Franco met both men and listened and then accepted Arrese’s resignation: this “entire episode not only marked a significant triumph for the technocrats, but also revealed much about Franco. It showed yet again that he never permitted personal loyalty to stand in the way of realistic political

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judgements. He liked Arrese but this action of backing the technocrats indicated a break with the past.”398 When in January 1961 Ullastres complained of Falangist attacks on his modern policies Franco responded with a speech about the value of autarky. However, he generally backed his experts, and his balancing-act kept the old rear-guard in place because they knew his emotions were with them. As the economy grew Franco took credit and the technocrats were happy with this in order to avoid confrontation with Franco as they had no political affiliations. Economic progress was not immediate because of past problems and in 1962 there were large scale strikes across the country, but more driven by economics than politics. The tensions between the professional technocrats and the Franco traditionalists, as noted in the introduction, lasted to the end of Franco’s life. It surfaced early when Franco was on his sick bed from a hunting accident (in 1962) and he accepted Carrero Blanco’s suggestion that Rodó should be head the Commissariat for the Development Plan. Solís told Franco it was an Opus Dei plot, but Rodó stayed and the Falangists started to lose their battle at this time. From then on “López Rodó reported directly to Carrero Blanco and Franco…decreasingly active in the daily tasks of government, Franco would be distanced further from the centre of gravity by Rodó’s elevation.”399 In February1962 the Caudillo agreed with great reluctance to join the European Economic Community, reluctant because he saw them as a bunch of liberals and freemasons which amply illustrated his economic ignorance. He was also aware that other countries thought there had to be some constitutional changes before this could happen so Franco “retreated into civil war rhetoric”400 Once again he thought he was under siege and it was not helped by yet more industrial unrest in April-May 1962 in the Asturian coalmines and the Basque steel works; the Civil Guard were sent in but the problem was resolved with wage increases. The strikes were economic rather than political, but Franco in his habitual way put it down to outside agitators and regarded it as a Civil War issue. A variety of Spanish representatives went to Munich for the IV Congress of the European Movement and there was a call for political evolution in Spain. Franco was furious as he regarded it as an attempt to undermine his regime, and a torrent of abuse was released in the press. (The agitation was not helped by Vatican Council II demanding just wages for workers.) As a consequence Franco launched into a speech which was more a tirade against a Europe during which he managed to undo much of his government’s work. When a working group from the European

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Movement met Franco to explain what was happening and explained that it was only a discussion they were firmly rebuffed in Franco’s individual style. However, despite his defiance Franco realised that his reactions to Munich had been a serious blunder and even his ambassador in America reported on American misgivings, but “his sensitivity to threats to his survival was undiminished.”401 In July 1962 another cabinet reshuffle was organised with more Opus Dei members including such names as Gregorio López Bravo and Fraga. He appointed Grandes as a Vice-President of the Council of Ministers possibly as a prop in case he was ill again, but Grandes was no politician and Carrero still ruled the roost. Bravo and Fraga had youth and energy on their side and made headway. For the first time there was officially a second in command to Franco who continued to balance the various groups or “families” in his regime. In the late summer there was still unrest in Asturias and Catalonia which was put down by police somewhat brutally. Franco used these methods as his means of progress and hoped for growth. At the end of December 1962 Franco gave a more reasonable speech with no mention of freemasons, but not surprisingly it was written by Fraga and Rodó in which Franco promised the problems would go away by economic growth. There was even talk of a minimum wage but it transpired to be nonsense because the minimum wage was ridiculously too low. Carrero Banco still wanted monarchy, but some of the new ones merely sought stability, the new technocrats were less interested in the politics and only wanted economic stability.* Although Franco believed he was knowledgeable about economics he still lived in the past, still hankered after autarky policies, and was now worried about the changes in the Vatican which he believed had become full of freemasons and Communists. The heightened expectation of growth still fuelled unrest in the wider population because it did not happen rapidly enough, and this was always followed by the usual repression. As the period 1960 to 1975 unfolded Franco took more and more of a backseat, he became obsessed with his hobbies of fishing, hunting and watching television, and eventually sunk into a physical decline. He would frequently take credit for Spain’s economic progress, but his only real justification for doing so was his initial confidence and support in the technocrats; the increasing global wealth; his agreements with the USA, and his management of his supporting cliques and allowing the *

Eventually, and as late as 1970 June the Spanish government signed a preferential trade agreement with the European Common Market which opened the way to Spanish exports without touching their protective tariff.

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professional economists to do their work. It could be argued that the importance of economics drove much of the foreign policy. Later Spain even set up Consular relationships in Warsaw Pact countries for economic reasons (not in Russia) and in China, and even sought a relationship with Cuba under its new regime.

America The Cold War had insulated Franco and Spain from being completely isolated and also helped financially. It was always a one-sided affair in so far that America did enough to keep Spain onside, gave attention to Franco, but the supply of weapons meant older material, and although the economic aid was initially useful it was never as much as Franco had demanded. America gave Franco his much needed respectability, and he never ceased to see himself as an essential partner to the most powerful nation in the world. As the last fifteen years of Franco’s life unravelled it was clear that Franco was regarded as something of an anachronism. When Eisenhower was the President of the United States and committed to a defensive antiCommunist policy, Franco had not seemed so out of place. In the world of Kennedy who became President in 1961 there was a change because the new administration was more determined to beat Communism, and held a more aggressive projection of the benefits of capitalism, which meant that “the Caudillo seemed a fossilised survivor.”402 When the time came for the renewal of the American bases Franco opened the question of his shopping list again, which was always regarded as too much, and consequently the Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited him before end of year in an attempt to resolve matters. The international situation in 1963 was still dominated by the Cold War, but the military circumstances were rapidly changing. Franco’s demands grew along with his concerns that Spain, unlike NATO countries, was not under the American nuclear umbrella. The nature of a potential conflict had changed with nuclear weapons being “delivered” from Polaris submarines and ICBMs (Intercontinental ballistic missiles). This situation raised the question over the necessity of land bases. The Kennedy administration was also concerned about the huge expenses involved and there was, unlike the Eisenhower era, a degree of hostility towards the Spanish anachronism. Franco responded in his usual fashion of criticising the American failure at the Bay of Pigs, and not agreeing to meet American visitors because he was away hunting. The tensions gave the impression that the new round of talks would collapse altogether, but other factors on the international scene

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were influencing events. For his part Franco was aware that his main support came from the USA and also from the Vatican. The respectability of these two elements were critical to Franco and with the Vatican’s new liberalising attitude becoming at odds with Franco’s Spain, it was timely for him that the Middle-East was opening up as a problem, and the Americans thought twice about their need for land bases. Finally it was agreed that Polaris submarines could use the base of Rota; that Spain would receive $100 million in military aid, but there was no economic aid except Export-Import Bank loans. As regarding the nuclear umbrella there was a vague promise by the USA, but not the same commitment as given to NATO countries. Franco was also more aware of the nuclear weapons maintained near the Madrid base, as the Cuban crisis had enhanced this problem when it had seemed possible that a major nuclear war could happen at any moment. This anxiety about nuclear weapons was heightened in January 1966 when two planes collided with four atom bombs falling to the ground. One fell in the sea and it took time to recover this weapon, and caused anxiety at all levels, from those swimming off the coast in the tourist trade, to the politicians and military.* After this incident the Americans promised that planes carrying such weapons would not fly over Spain in routine missions in the future, which had been a secret agreement in the Madrid Pact. There was also the question of a Spanish Atomic weapon raised, and in 1965 the possibility of a plutonian bomb was discussed. It happened that Spain had the “second largest deposits of uranium in Europe”403 and Carrero Blanco thought the idea should be progressed, but Franco ruled this possibility out of order to keep America on side. The Spanish later developed nuclear energy resources from their nuclear research, but not weapons. The same problems with the American-Spanish treaty re-emerged in 1968 as the expiry date was reached. The choice was an automatic extension or terminating it once and for all. Castiella made an unsuccessful bid in July 1968 with a shopping list of demands which would have pleased Franco. However, Carrero Blanco was more cautious because above all he wanted to maintain the American relationship. Franco, as usual wanted to bargain even more. As it happened in September 1968 the cabinet after an acrimonious debate decided to terminate the agreement, but Franco had drawn up a document for the renewal of negotiations and *

Three of the four bombs were found on land near the small fishing village of Palomares. In two of these weapons the non-nuclear devices detonated and contaminated two square kilometres with plutonium; the fourth fell in the sea and took nearly three months to recover.

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met Dean Rusk in the November three days after Nixon had been elected President. American interests were global and the Vietnam War made many question whether Spain was necessary at all; America was preoccupied with a bloody and expensive war on the other side of the world. Franco ordered Castiella to drop the price in order that there would be no breakdown in the relationship. Not long after this decision Nixon arrived with Henry Kissinger having visited Tito, another ageing autocrat. The American visit was not just a goodwill tour, because the Middle-East was becoming increasingly unstable and Spain once again was strategically important. The Americans were also concerned that the post-Franco period be transformed peacefully without any shift from the American orbit of influence. During this visit Franco was showing signs of his age and it was apparent that Franco was exhausted and kept falling asleep as Nixon spoke to López Bravo. In 1970 Bravo signed a new Madrid pact with the USA properly updating the original 1953 Pact. In the May of 1975 Franco received his third and final visit from an American President when President Ford arrived on Spanish territory. On this occasion Franco was even more incapacitated than when Nixon visited; in fact Franco was virtually incapable, and the President spent more time with Juan Carlos looking to the future, but mainly it was a matter of tidying up the Madrid Pact. Franco’s longstanding relationship with the Americans had been beneficial, it helped Spain economically, gave a sense of international respectability when many European nations stood at a discreet distance out of distaste for the regime, and enhanced Franco’s sense of importance as he accumulated three Presidential visits. Franco had been astute in foreseeing the Cold War clash, he had managed to sustain the American relationship, but it was not because of Franco but because of American fears of Communism, and as such it was the Cold War which gave some gloss to Franco’s tarnished image.

The Vatican If America had helped Franco to emerge eventually from the post Second World War with a sense of some self-esteem, it was from the Vatican and the Spanish Church he always sought respectability. Since the start of the Civil War in 1936 he had looked to the Church for support, and this had eventuated in his long desire for the concordat which had given him a sense of decency and a seemingly clean bill of health. After the death of Pope Pius XII the Vatican was undergoing significant liberalising

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changes necessitated by some question marks hovering over the Vatican from the World War.* Franco was unhappy about the Second Vatican Council as were his elderly Spanish Bishops who, because of their age and background, could not understand the need for change. Franco was bewildered about the news emanating from the Vatican Council and could not understand what was happening. His Christianity was one of rites and attendance as well as the accompanying pomp and ceremony, and his theology and spirituality, though little known about was probability at a basic minimum. Franco persisted at every opportunity in raising the question as to how much the Vatican owed him for keeping the Church alive in Spain, and simply could not understand why the Church wanted to decouple itself from politics. Castiella and Fraga gave him a draft on proposed religious freedom which annoyed Carrero Blanco who saw it as opening up opportunities for the Left. For Franco and Blanco life was just about politics, but Franco did his usual wait and see policy. Franco was especially annoyed that he would no longer select his bishops, since the Vatican might appoint them according to the needs of their communities. This had been a fundamental agreement in the Concordat and was usually only given to royalty. When in November 1965 the new Minister of Justice informed Franco that the Second Vatican Council had denounced dictatorship, Franco claimed he was not a dictator, but operated on the will of the people; he probably believed this as a fact. The Church wanted to select its own bishops, and in future “Catholic policy would henceforth become increasingly tolerant and even progressive…the Vatican did not seek to annul the concordat but hoped that Franco, in a cooperative manner, would give up that privilege [Bishop Selection], something he had no intention of doing.”404 His quarrel with the Vatican over the right to select bishops increased and Franco still insisted on choosing from a list of three candidates, a royal prerogative. In 1967 there were twelve bishoprics available and Pope Paul VI had long been awaiting an opportunity to change the deeply Spanish conservative Bishops. In April 1968 Pope Paul VI wrote a personal letter to Franco asking him to relinquish the habit of choosing bishops; Franco eventually replied and blamed his negative reply on the Spanish system of the Cortes, and claimed there was nothing he * The Second Vatican Council’s full name was The Second Vatican Council of the Vatican, often referred to as Vatican II. Its main purpose was to address the Catholic Church’s relationship with the developing modern world. It opened on the 11th October 1962 under Pope John XXIII and closed under Pope Paul VI on the 8th December 1965.

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could do. Rome hit back by submitting one name or caretaker bishops, possibly better described as auxiliary bishops who did not need Franco’s stamp. Just as frustrating for Franco was that more priests were becoming involved over the question of worker-rights and regional problems, so he ordered that a prison for priests should be established in Zamora and fifty priests were soon imprisoned. Although Vatican Council II had closed in 1965 its effects were worldwide and ongoing. In 1971 September there was a joint Assembly of Bishops and Priests which was chaired by the Primate, and they objected to Franco’s continuous delineation of Spain being divided between the victors and the vanquished, one of his favourite themes. They also begged forgiveness for the clergy failure to bring about reconciliation by their short-comings during the Civil War which would have raised Franco’s indignation. In 1974 February the Bishop of Bilbao Antonio Añoveros called for a cultural change and freedom for the Basques. This provoked a furious outburst from the regime and Arias Navarro wanted him expelled from Spain despite the fear of excommunication, but Franco halted such drastic action. Given that many people around the world were shocked or over-joyed at the liberalising process of Vatican II, not least in terms of its ecumenical insights and the decoupling of the Church from national politics, it is not surprising that it came as something of a shock to the anachronistic church dinosaur Franco. It is not the place to discuss Franco’s personal beliefs, but it is nevertheless self-evident that his form of Christianity was embedded in the old power-structures of past times. He had used the reputation of the Church to back him in the Civil War, he had granted the Church after that war many of its old privileges, and he did all that was necessary for the concordat in 1953 to give him that aura of respectability. He was now totally confused in the modern Christian world, and fell back on his old theme convinced that the Vatican had been infiltrated with Communists and his old Bêt Noire Masonry.

Monarchy and the Succession Issue Everyone knew that Franco was mortal and by 1960 he was not only ageing but revealing ill health. The nature of what would happen after his death preoccupied the wider world, the Spanish and Franco himself. By 1960 there was no doubt that Franco was there to stay and many remembered his claim that he would not do a Primo de Rivera, but only give up his leadership once in his grave.

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The old rivalries of the past re-emerged but with a trifle more discretion. The monarchists and Carlists clearly had their own ideas, and the old Falangists, the Movimiento and other rear-guard opposed the idea of a monarchy. The Catholic based family had grown with the technocrats of the Opus Dei and they tended to favour the monarchy. These “family” divisions were not straightforward because within each grouping there were divisions and various shades of grey. Many wanted the Francoist regime to continue, including Franco, but two questions dominated these years, what would actually happen and who precisely would fulfil Franco’s role. It was not simply a matter of monarchy restoration, the past failures were too close in the memory, and Franco never trusted the natural heir to the throne Don Juan. As noted above his son Juan Carlos had by Franco’s demand been educated in Spain, and slowly but surely it started to emerge, with the usual hiccups that Juan Carlos would be the natural successor. He would be appointed king by Franco and not by royal rights, and that he would uphold the Francoist regime by upholding the Falangist polices; at least that was the theory. Juan Carlos was different from his father, more astute and “in contrast to his father, Juan Carlos appeared prepared to unite the monarchical tradition with the preservation of authoritarianism.”405 Rumours that Franco had suffered a heart attack in 1960 caused special interest when Franco met with Don Juan in March 1960. Franco had always felt a deep personal contempt for Don Juan, but not with his son Juan Carlos because of his Spanish education arranged by Franco. It was not an easy meeting and Don Juan gave Franco a communique to issue afterwards; Franco took it away and revised it to his liking which caused yet more friction. Nevertheless, Don Juan very soon took on board the advice of his followers and informed Franco that the monarchy would function as a continuation of the regime; this was precisely what Franco needed to hear but he always remained suspicious of Don Juan. It was not a subject that Franco enjoyed dwelling on because it always caused divisions in his own ranks, and understandably he did not appreciate dwelling on his own demise. By 1962 it was clear that Franco had ruled Don Juan out of any future equations, not that Don Juan accepted Franco’s views. In May 1962 Juan Carlos married Princess Sofia of Greece and eventually took up his official residence on the outskirts of Madrid. The marriage in Spain was given little publicity and Franco refused to attend, sending as his representative his Minister for the Navy who arrived in a Civil War battle-cruiser. Later Franco appeared to appreciate Sofia who was rapidly learning Spanish, and this undoubtedly softened his approach toward Juan Carlos.

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According to some accounts Franco warmed towards Juan Carlos but like many medieval monarchs would have kept a wary eye on the young man’s aspirations. As noted earlier there had been a referendum on the Ley de Sucesión (Law of Succession) in July 1947 which stipulated for the revival of the monarchy. This ensured Franco was head of state until his death, and he would appoint his successor or regent to the “Kingdom of Spain” and it was approved by some 95% of the voters, not that a referendum could be trusted. This Ley de Sucesión was dormant for a time but in the 1960s became the question that would not go away throughout 1963-8 when Franco was bombarded with the issue. Even his lifelong friend Vega raised the issue for the sake of the future. When in 1965 there were serious disturbances in Madrid and Barcelona Universities, Carrero Blanco blamed it on the lack of certainty about the future which was untrue, but it was Blanco’s way of trying to direct the problem towards some form of satisfactory resolution. Franco reacted and produced and read his own draft of a revised issue to Blanco on April 1st 1965. Franco assured the cabinet he would refine the details but “despite the apparent promise…within three weeks Franco had retreated into apathy,” or would rather not contemplate his own death.406 During the mid-1960s and onwards there was a growing concern about the future of Spain in the post-Franco era. In January Fraga gave Franco two documents, one relating to the current political situation and calling for reform, and a draft press law for less censorship. This partially placed the problem of succession on the shelf because as Franco listened it was clear he was wary of any liberalising process. On the anniversary for the end of the Civil War Franco gave an interview to the ABC newspaper which made it clear that “for the Caudillo what was being celebrated was twenty-five year of victory rather than of peace.”407 There was a limited amnesty given to some of Spain’s many thousands of political prisoners. There was even a hagiographical film about Franco. He gave a speech giving himself the praise for economic progress, attacked Europe as being full of plotters, and expressed his annoyance at countries such as Holland and Belgium for opposing Spain’s entry to the EEC, and Britain’s occupation of Gibraltar.* These were all deviations from the pressing point of the succession. Even so there was mounting pressure for Franco to promulgate the Ley Orgánica del Estado and name his successor. Progress was not helped in *

Carrero Blanco had suggested to Franco that the ETA was financed by the British in order to take the attention away from Gibraltar.

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the spring of 1964 when there was more unrest in Asturias and Franco was showing first signs of Parkinson’s disease. There followed a savage repression of the strike and many went to prison where they stayed until 1970. Alonso Vega wanted to intensify the oppression but the cabinet persuaded Franco otherwise. In terms of the Ley de Sucesión Franco wanted Juan Carlos to accept the principle of the Movimiento and in May 1964 at the annual Civil War parade he invited Juan Carlos to take the salute with him. This was a significant action in so far that Franco had his possible successor stand next to him at a major military parade. It was at this stage that the supporters of Juan Carlos worked at distancing the young prince from his father, and following their advice Juan Carlos informed Franco he would not be attending a major monarchist assembly in Estoril to honour his father in the March of 1966. Everything seemed to be settling into place and in the 25th November edition of The Times (1965) Fraga gave an interview saying he was convinced Juan Carlos would be Franco’s successor; he would not have done this without Franco’s agreement. However, it was still speculation and during 1966 the question of his succession was raised time and time again. “Franco’s continuing delays about naming a successor derived in part from a reluctance to admit that his rule would never end,”408 but he was also aware that Juan Carlos was in touch with progressive elements and was not against a return to a multi-party system. He certainly resisted Don Juan, and there remained some suspicions in his mind about Juan Carlos. Nevertheless, his gathering age was evident and he gave Carrero Blanco the final draft of his Ley Orgánica del Estado and then presented it to the Cortes on 22nd November 1966. In this Franco justified Francoism and denounced political parties as a threat to Spanish national unity.* He gave a poorly presented speech which indicated his failing health. He spoke on radio and television looking for public support prior to the proposed referendum. Franco and Fraga launched their campaign and voting took place in December 1966, with 88% voting and less than 2% said no. The exercise was self-evidently corrupt, and voting slips were placed in glass urns under the immediate oversight of the police. Juan Carlo and his wife had a son called Felipe who was born in January 1967 and during the family celebrations and baptism Franco refused to meet Don Juan as “with age there was no inclination on Franco’s part to reconciliation with his enemies.”409 *

“Franquismo (Francoism) is a recent word in Spanish contemporary history that denotes a type of political regime.” Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.149

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A year later in June 1968 Juan Carlos was thirty, which was the minimum age to accede to the throne. He told the international press he was willing to accept power directly from Franco as opposed to regarding it as a natural succession for the royal family; as a result Don Juan felt a degree of alienation from his son. The following year in January 1969 Juan Carlos was interviewed by the official news agency and informed them he was in support of monarchical installation rather than restoration which naturally thrilled Franco. He judiciously appeared to give full support to Franco and the Movimiento. Don Juan was making the right noises in the right places and in May 1969 Franco told Carrero Blanco he would announce Juan Carlos as his successor. Franco said nothing to Juan Carlos about this even though he was about to visit his father who later believed that his son had kept it from him thus creating a family rift; Franco was pleased with this family stress. In July 1969 Franco invited Juan Carlos to El Pardo to announce he would be named successor; “a straight yes or no was required by Franco. He had spoken to his father earlier, and quietly hoped he might start the process of transition towards democracy in a legal and peaceful manner.”410 This was an important step forward as “the designation of Juan Carlos in July 1969 resolved the question ‘After Franco who?’ but did not answer the dilemma ‘After Franco what?’”411 Don Juan had explained he would follow Franco’s wishes, but whether he would be held by these restraints when Franco was in his grave remained a matter of speculation. Juan Carlos had after all sworn “fidelity to the principles of the Movimiento having first been privately assured by his counsellor Torcuato Fernández Miranda that his oath would not prevent a future process of democratic reform.”412 The Prince had learned to play his cards close to his chest, a gift bestowed by Franco. In July 1969 Franco proposed this appointment to the Cortes and the vote received 491 affirmatives, 19 negative, 9 abstention and 13 absences.413 Two years later in January 1971 Juan Carlos and his wife visited America where he was interviewed and said he believed the people wanted more freedom. On his return he expected to hear that Franco was angry, but found he was not displeased because he said it out of the country and not in Spain. While he was in the USA he impressed the Americans with his charm, discretion, and openness. Don Juan would certainly have been aware of a survey which indicated 49.4% of the Spanish wanted a republic, 29.8% wanted a continuation and only 20.8% a monarchy.414 He had to tread with care not only with Franco but with popular opinion.

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In March 1972 Franco’s eldest granddaughter married in the eldest son of Don Jaime the first cousin of Juan Carlos. It was a family link with Alfonso XIII, and he and his wife gloried in the royal connection in the family. The new son-in-law hankered after being called Prince, but Don Juan objected and Franco gave him the title of Duque de Cádiz. These requests had made Franco aware of the situation that the young man was endeavouring to replace Juan Carlos, a prospect probably initiated by his wife and especially his son-in-law who was becoming more active as he viewed a situation of a future without the protection of his father-in-law. Carrero Blanco helped Franco be firm because he warned him that Don Alfonso went with Franco’s son-in-law to political meetings with the opposition, some of whom were masonic. However, Franco was also aware of the sycophants beginning to gather around Juan Carlos. Juan Carlos and his wife were invited to spend time with Franco at his home and on his yacht; but they discovered it was not a time for talking because once at home Franco considered himself retired so he rarely spoke, and spent family time after their evening meal watching television. At a time when Franco was seriously ill Juan Carlos assumed the duties of chief of state on July 20th 1974. This caused a degree of nervousness amongst some, especially in the El Pardo family home who applied pressure on Franco who, to everyone’s astonishment, suddenly declared himself fit. Juan Carlos was informed by phone and he later said he felt as if the rug had been pulled out from him. Franco appeared to come back to life but he was self-evidently tired and ill, and on the 12th October 1975 he suffered a series of heart attacks, plus other problems, and on October 30th he ordered the execution of the law transferring his powers to the Prince, who after his last experience was less certain. Everyone knew however much the many attendant medics fought to keep Franco alive the time was a matter of months if not days. The various supporting cliques with their own internal divisions and hopes had to redefine where they stood. This also applied to Franco’s family and by the end of 1975 Franco’s son-in-law and his son-in-law had given up hope and now felt obliged to talk to Juan Carlos about their own future. In 1975 Juan Carlos de Borbön was proclaimed King.

Franco 1960-1975 By the end of the 1960s Franco was ageing, ill, and in a decline which at times he defied, but in the early 1960s he was as energetic as usual, not charismatic but always ensuring he was seen as in charge. His “personal

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tours to various parts of the country continued at a diminishing rate through the 1960s, and the crowds rarely failed to present themselves, whether spontaneously or not.”415 He would more often than not give speeches which sounded self-congratulatory about the Civil War and how he had saved the West during World War Two. He was constant in the one matter of making it clear that nothing should diminish his supreme decision-making power; he even managed this to the point of his death. The greatest tension within the regime for Franco’s final years was the growing distance between the Falangists and the technocrats. Franco was accustomed to managing divisions; these divisions (or families) of support had always been divided. There was even tension between Rodó and Navarro Rubio but the new professionals held sway between 1957 and 1973. Franco took long holiday breaks as he grew older, a habit he had developed in the previous decade, but now his private life was becoming a dominant feature. “In the 1960s Franco became addicted to television and was especially fond of soccer matches, bullfights and boxing.”416 He enjoyed the pools and on at least two occasions found the winning combinations. In the spring of 1960 rumours spread that Franco had suffered from a heart attack, and there had to be an official denial from the household. After this Franco ensured he was seen as fit and able and “from the mid-1960s, implausible efforts were made to present a picture of a superhumanly fit Caudillo” with fishing tales of great catches.417 He still presided at Cabinet meetings which became shorter in duration, but he rarely initiated any business. His habit was to listen, sometimes grill a minister about his views, but mainly he remained totally silent. It was claimed by those closest to him that they never knew what he was thinking. Franco was constant with the assistance of the Movimiento, to make sure that the general public acknowledged him as the acclaimed leader of Spain. It was curiously his fondness for football and the Spanish love of the game which nearly caused a public outcry against him in 1960. During that year many of the Spanish people were in uproar according to Preston because Spain was down to play Russia in the Quarter Finals, and Franco insisted it should be played on a neutral ground and Russia refused. On the other hand it has been pointed out that it was probably because “Khrushchev launched into a tirade against the Spanish regime at the United Nations in October 1st 1960.”418 In 1964 Spain played Russia in the finals and won 2-1, and Franco attended and enjoyed the applause. At a more serious level on 20th November 1960, the twenty-fourth anniversary of Jose Primo de Rivera’s death a ceremony was held in the

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Valle de los Caídos when a young Falangist called out traitor, apparently because of the corruption in the regime. Franco did not look disturbed but had him searched out, and wanted him executed. He was persuaded otherwise in order not to create a martyr, and instead the culprit was given a twelve year sentence to a penal colony in the Sahara desert. On October 13th 1961 a massive rally was held at Valle de los Caídos for excombatants from all over Europe; this gathering included fascists from Germany, Italy and Spain. Franco was careful not to appear, but he sent a message of welcome to those attending. As noted earlier the 1960s was the time that Franco appeared to extract himself increasingly from the front line of activity, but he always needed to be seen as in charge. At times it was as if Franco had withdrawn from all that was happening, and when he sustained a hunting accident on Christmas Eve 1961 (a gun exploded in his hand), and before undergoing the necessary operation he sent for his old friend Vega “to keep an eye on things;” this action raised a few eyebrows about the possibility of a Francoist regency.* It had been rumoured that there had been a confidential agreement that Muñoz Grandes would be regent and chief of state to succeed Franco in the event of sudden death or incapacitated.419 Either way Franco’s mortality was becoming an issue which persisted during this period. There was a cabinet reshuffle in 1962 and Carrero Blanco’s political ascendency grew as Franco’s health declined. Franco tried to impress on his European neighbours that he was of a liberal inclination denying “that his rule was dictatorial, and asserted that in Spain today one governs through the popular will.”420 However the deceitful fabrication was soon exposed in 1963 with the trial and execution of Grimau García. This man had been a senior Communist and the charges were based on Civil War crimes, and despite pleas from Khrushchev, Wily Brandt, Harold Wilson and Queen Elizabeth II he was convicted. He was also badly tortured; Preston said he was thrown out of a police window, but the police at the time and the biographers Payne and Palacios claimed he threw himself out deliberately; the truth will never be known.421 International revulsion was rife and this particular incident exposed Franco’s continuing brutality. Two months later two anarchists were brutally garrotted. Franco blamed it on the monarchists who were, he claimed, trying to open doors to democracy.

* At first it was thought it might be an assassination attempt but it transpired to be an accident of the wrong ammunition being loaded into the gun.

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Carrero Blanco in the 1960s

In July 1965 Franco reshuffled the cabinet again but with a package of selected personnel presented to him by Carrero Blanco. “This cabinet has been described as the last classic cabinet balancing acts of Franco…but was it was pre-packaged by Carrero Blanco.”422 Internationally Franco knew he was often regarded as an unpleasant hangover from the past, and when in April 1967 the coup of the Greek colonels took place in Greece it was followed by some reforms in Spain all of which tended to relieve Franco from his sense of isolation. By 1967 Franco did not function in his usual fashion, and gave the impression of growing slower in his reactions and decision making. “The machinery of government was firmly in the hands of Carrero Blanco and Rodó. There was political jockeying for position but Franco tended to sit back as “the distant patriarch.”423 Although the technocrats held sway at this time there were still clashes between the Movimiento factors and Opus Dei, and during 1968 the government was nearly frozen by this problem. If anything Franco even seemed calmer on international matters; he appeared to lack his usual aggression and even somewhat passive over

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Gibraltar.* In a clash with his Right-wing rear-guard Franco stopped Castiella flying barrage balloons around Gibraltar to cause flying problems. The British held a plebiscite in Gibraltar in 1967 and even then Franco was still adamant not to cause problems, and he avoided proffered Soviet support because it would alienate America. Franco ordered the border to Gibraltar to be closed in 1969 and it remained in this state until his death. All his life Franco had played a balancing act with his own divisive supporting families and tried the same method internationally. This term “families” had always been “a useful shorthand to describe the bases of the post-war regime, but it conceals the degree to which they were not distinct, well-defined political and social interests.”424 Amongst his old rear-guard supporters Franco was becoming somewhat strained in his relationship with Grandes who was also ageing. Grandes had always been the hope of the Falangists in not wanting a monarchy in any shape or form. The technocrats wanted Carrero Blanco as the President of the Council of Ministers, and months later Franco told Blanco that he was to be the vice-president and hoped thereby to find an uninterrupted Francoism. Carrero Blanco supported the idea not so much for a restoration of the monarchy, but a monarchy appointed by Franco which would continue the regime’s Francoist pattern. However, when in November 1967 the new Cortes met, Franco played down Carrero Blanco’s position and mocked those who wanted a liberal democracy.† During the 1960s there were moments of social unrest as groups struggled with the state. It was not simply the struggle of the Francoist support groups, but erupted in the wider Spanish community. This was “the result of a combination of factors: the internal process of reform within the state; and, more importantly, the modernisation of the Spanish economy, which had led to social changes with inevitable consequences for state-society relations.”425 Society was more urban and better informed, and the new politics of protest took different configurations, ranging from labour protests against employers, a degree of regional unrest, student unrest, and even the Catholic Church as it travelled through its own process of change. In 1968 there was more university unrest (as there was in other European countries, especially Paris) this time growing in turmoil. The *

The question of Gibraltar touched upon Spain’s economics in many ways, not least in 1964 when the British government cancelled an important ship-building order. † The Cortes never became a genuine parliament and never had the right to legislate; membership remained oligarchic, but after 1967 it started to feel the right to criticise.

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young mainly middle-class generation who had not experienced the Civil War found the regime’s dictatorial powers both corrupt and morally objectionable as a means of government. Franco once again like an old record denounced the unrest as the work of foreign agitators, but in 1969 the cabinet decided to announce a state of emergency. This struck the modern technocrats as a massive overkill, but such was the general support from many of Franco’s other advisers they felt compelled to support this move of treating rebellious students as a national emergency. The measures were lifted by the March of 1969 as the main instigator Vega had some sense talked into him by Rodó. More threatening was the emergent threat of ETA the Basque revolutionary separatist movement, but Franco was now taking more and more of a backseat, even being somewhat relaxed over the problem of what was called the Matesa scandal. This outrage was based on a textile machinery company which was evidently flouting financial laws and regulations. The Movimiento took this as an opportunity to unleash an attack on the Opus Dei technocrats. This tension was to remain a hallmark of Spanish politics until Franco’s death, namely the struggle for power over the future. Franco tended to sit back and his only concern was the foreign publicity it engendered, especially because it was often the Falangists who had stoked the fire. Carrero Blanco was also furious with Fraga for allowing the press too much freedom since it appeared to ignite the acrimonious fires of debate.* In 1969 there were further cabinet changes made by Carrero Blanco producing a government which was generally known as the monochrome government because the members tended to consist of Opus Dei and the Catholic groups, mainly in favour of Juan Carlos. The Falangist outcry over the Matesa scandal continued and indicated that the factions of the past may have changed, but this time the tensions were between the technocrats and the rear-guard who had differing perceptions about the post-Franco era. Franco sided with the technocrats, his apparent lack of interest indicated he was losing his usual ability at the political balancing act.

*

In January 1964 Fraga had given Franco documents calling for reform, and a draft press law. Franco still struggled with the concept of a free press during 1965 and decided the Church and the Movimiento should be untouchable and editors ran the risk of being closed down; Vega and other traditionalists strongly objected even to the watered-down versions. The press measures were approved by the Cortes in March 1966. It was not a fully free press but opened the doors to more liberalisation.

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The tensions were demonstrated when in 1969 a man committed public suicide in protest at the marginalisation of the Falangist party, but it was of little consequence to Franco and those in power. A law in April 1970 ratified “the definitive abolition of the name Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS in favour National Movement.”426 Falange remained a word now associated with small ultra-Right groups and individuals. The unrest continued at the industrial level, in the universities, and even the clergy continued to be involved, and the repression continued, though Payne and Palacios wrote that the police were “generally restrained,” which was likely when compared to past behaviour.427 The grey technocrats worked for reform while the extreme side of the Movimiento fought back developing what has been dubbed the bunker mentality (of Hitler infamy).* Whispering campaigns and trouble-stirring was the order of the day. Franco appeased the monarchists by having Juan Carlos at parade days, but standing somewhat detached from his presence to appease the Falangists. The fact is that Franco was standing more and more aloof. All he seemed interested in was hunting and fishing, and “such dedication to pleasure suggests that the Caudillo was oblivious to the fact that, within the regime, positions were being taken up for the aftermath of his demise.”428 A few extreme Right-wing generals convinced Franco to have a show trial of sixteen Basque prisoners. The Basque independence movement was regarded with greater urgency than the cultural murmurings of Catalonia. The repercussions were immediate, and while at a sports event in September 1970 a Joseba Elósegi once associated with Guernica, set fire to himself as a protest, Franco remained unperturbed. His brother Nicolás wrote a pleading letter to Franco not to carry out death sentences because of his international reputation, but others called for the suspension of habeas corpus to which Franco agreed; he was now in a state of being manipulated. The trial ended with three being found guilty and they were given two death sentences each. His advisor Bravo tried to make Franco see the ramifications of carrying out these executions, and after considerable discussion Franco acquiesced, but against his natural instincts. Nevertheless, despite the apparent leniency “the Burgos trials were a disaster for the regime in that they dramatically altered the balance of forces in Spain,” and brought Spain under intense and sustained scrutiny at the international level as in the 1940s, and it was not helped that two of the *

Hard-liners were given the name the bunker because they refused to retreat and would not surrender or accept change.

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accused were priests.429 By the end of the decade it was clear that Franco was trapped between the grey technocrats and the bunker Movimiento. In 1970 there developed more cordial relationships with France, and de Gaulle paid Franco a visit now he had resigned as President of France. The following year in October 1971 Franco announced a pardon to those caught up in the Matesa scandal claiming that if he could let ETA people free he could do the same for those striving to make Spain better off. He never seemed to ask himself the question as to why Right-wing terror squads were constantly needed to keep the peace because in the latter part of the 1960s and early seventies the violence was increasing, and the repression matched. This agitation was undoubtedly caused by Franco’s physical decay and was causing major questions about Spain’s future. In 1971 the strikes continued during which time “at least two thousand strikers and oppositionists would be arrested.”430 In 1972 there was yet another major scandal but this time involving his brother Nicolás. It all related to the olive oil industry, missing stocks, and possible embezzlement; Nicolás had been a major shareholder. In the investigation six people met violent deaths in what was a rapid coverup.431 Such scandals happen in even the best ordered societies, but in Spain at this time it was easy to convert these incidents into political gunpowder. Franco kept his usual distance, and during this year he developed fungal problems in his mouth and was having to curtail his hunting expeditions. His Parkinson’s disease was also becoming obvious even to casual visitors. Two years before Franco’s death the violence of protest seemed to be building up, and in 1973 a striker was killed by police near Barcelona. These disturbances started Carrero Blanco down the road of losing confidence in his technocrats and encouraging Right-wing terror squads. In May 1973 a policeman was stabbed to death during a May Day demonstration. There were mass arrests and a high degree of social uncertainty between the population and the State. Franco demanded a new cabinet and he insisted that Carrero Blanco become President of the Council of Ministers. Carrero Blanco was himself elderly and he dropped Bravo, sent Rodó to the Foreign Ministry, and chose Torcuato Fernández Miranda as vice-President.* They were all soon consumed by the industrial unrest in Catalonia, the Basque area and Asturias. Carrero Blanco’s government failed to cope and it was not helped by the lack of decision making because of Franco’s age and illhealth. “One of Franco’s most repetitive self-justifications was that he had *

Torcuato Fernández Miranda had been Juan Carlos’ tutor.

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brought peace to a society at war with itself. If it still had any purchase, this claim was undermined by the increasing social and political agitation of the early 1970s.”432 In December 1973 there was another show trial of ten underground trade union men; the regime was determined to crush Trade Unions. But on 20 Dec 1973 Carrero Blanco was brutally killed by ETA with a bomb.*

Carrero Blanco’s car landed on the fourth floor

Franco could hardly believe the news thinking at first it was an accident, but it became a major crisis for Franco and spread fear in the population. In this action ETA had hoped and anticipated a brutal reaction, but for once the government was cautious. Their reaction indicated the *

The assassin squad tunnelled under the road from rented rooms from a part-time policeman who was suspicious, but the Civil Guard did not investigate because they thought an inconsequential investigation would stir up trouble.

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“political agenda was being shaped by the growing waves of social protest of different kinds, and by a political opposition which was in the process of re-composition.”433 Fernández-Miranda took over for a brief time but he raised too many suspicions on those looking to the post-Franco future. It has been claimed that Blanco’s death was really the end of the Franco regime and the transition period had started, but Fernández-Miranda who was considered too close to the Prince and too pragmatic, brought Franco under pressure to replace him with Carlos Arias Navarro regarded as a hardliner.* Nevertheless, hardliner or not Navarro was given the impossible task of restoring order and taking control of a political situation which appeared to be drifting out of control.434 Carrero Blanco’s death released the forces of the reactionary as well as the progressive, and the El Pardo clique of Franco’s wife and his son-inlaw encouraged Franco down the reactionary road, by claiming they were all in danger. The appointment of Navarro was “Franco’s last major political decision.”435 Although Franco’s wife was not endeared to her son-in-law they came together at this time for what they perceived to be family safety in the post-Franco years. They had supported Franco’s granddaughter who had married into a strand of the royal household (see last sub-chapter on Succession) and so the family wanted to marginalise Juan Carlos with the selection of their own royal family member, but Arias Navarro was not in their pocket. Arias Navarro “was not an impressive choice; he was chosen through a process of elimination rather than on the grounds of the inherent strength of his candidacy”436 The Arias Navarro government was the last to serve under Franco, and fewer than half of Carrero Blanco’s ministers kept their portfolios; it consisted mainly of civilians. Opus Dei lost many members, and although promises were made for the elections of local mayors the government was soon characterised as moving too slowly. In the autumn of 1973 Franco held his last truly festive public occasion celebrating his Golden wedding anniversary, but the problems increased in Spanish society. As mentioned in 1974 worker militancy increased and Franco summoned enough energy to insist on the death of two anarchists in March 1974 who were garrotted; it was a vicious form of death and caused an international outcry. The bunker rear-guard now made an effort to influence the army, and to form a more powerful unit in the post-Franco

*

Navarro had been the military prosecutor during the Málaga repression of 1937, Director of Security from 1957 to1965 and recently Mayor of Madrid

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period which was looming large in the public mind with its uncertain prospects. By June 1974 Franco was in hospital suffering from phlebitis in his leg, probably caused by either fishing or watching too much television. The following month in July the president of the Cortes appeared before Franco to sign the papers of the Ley Orgánica del Estado for Don Carlos to take over (see sub-chapter on Succession). The whispering familyclique at El Pardo made Franco suspicious of Juan Carlos now presiding at cabinet meetings, and who carefully emphasised the arrangement was always provisional. Elements of the El Pardo family pressurised Franco and consequently he decided to resume powers, but by 1974 Franco was showing signs of senility. Incredibly he persisted in hunting parties even though conditions were often freezing, and not surprisingly from the end of 1974 his physical condition rapidly deteriorated. The regime was somewhat shocked on 25th April 1974 when in Portugal Salazar’s successor Caetano fell to a coup by the army. There had been rumours of Spanish intervention that they had been asked for Spanish help, but Franco refused to be involved. By this stage some were “more aware of the patent anachronism of the dictatorship”437 and while it gave hope to some it engendered fear in others, especially Franco’s family. It was a time when his wife and son-inlaw tried to make Franco support the bunker people, not least because of their personal safety; for them like others the future was a foreign land. In the summer of 1974 Franco had fallen ill due to thrombophlebitis and with problems relating to his Parkinson’s disease; his voice had almost gone. The 82 year old was given physiotherapy and made some recovery against the odds. On September 2nd 1974 Franco announced to everyone’s surprise, especially Juan Carlos, he was taking over again. Eleven days later on 13th September 1974 there was a serious ETA bomb attack in Madrid. It was not the easiest of times and “during the years 1973-75 more than sixty-three hundred Basques were arrested, though the majority were soon released.”438 In July 1974 the Communists had formed a coalition in Paris, called the Democratic Council and it must have seemed to Franco that the vultures were rising, to others it was a time of hope. Franco demanded a Cabinet reshuffle which removed most of the reformist elements.* Throughout 1975 Navarro’s government used repressive measures, but the strikes increased, as well as the activities of ETA and *

The new cabinet in 1975 was important because it introduced Fernando Herrero Tejedor (Opus Dei) and his protégé Adolfo Suárez who were later key figures in the transition period.

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FRAP (Revolutionary Anti-Fascist Front) activity.* “Altogether, 1975 was shaping up as the most violent year in Spain since the armed insurgency of the 1940s, with eight policemen killed during the first eight months of the year.”439 In September of 1975 the military courts sentenced to death three ETA and eight FRAP members, including two pregnant women. There was an instant international outcry, including pleas of mercy received from the Vatican and even Queen Elizabeth II. There were worldwide outcries at Spanish embassies and several ambassadors were recalled from Spain. The influence of the ultra-Right was significant, and Franco failed to recognise the repercussions. Spain’s economy was improving but the out-of-date political system was scorned by much of the international community and a growing number of Spain’s population. There had been a survey of Spanish citizens in 1974 about democratic and authoritarian government. Sixty per cent thought democracy was the answer, eighteen per cent wanted a one strong man rule, and twenty-two per cent declined to answer.440 Spain was rife for change and all it needed was Franco’s death. Arias Navarro ordered Operation Morning Star to secure there would be no disorder following Franco’s death. There was a tremendous effort to keep Franco alive, his own medical son-in-law with a vested interest almost came to blows with Vicente Gil, Franco’s long-standing medical man, but Franco died in the early hours of 20th November 1975. Because Franco had executed some of the recent rebels (he commuted six death sentences but executed five) no head of state attended his funeral or his burial apart from the Chilean General Pinochet, Prince Rainier of Monaco, and King Hussein of Jordan. Spanish banks, tourist offices and consulates were assaulted. However, making a point the Duke of Edinburgh, the French President, and the American Vice-President attended the mass to celebrate Don Juan Carlos as King. At the political level in Spain the “Pact of Forgetfulness” started.

Final Reflections For a period of fifty hours Franco’s body lay in state on a dais in the Sala de Columnas of the Palacio de Oriente. The place was open to the public and according to Paul Preston “between 300,000 and 500,000 people filed past his body and not just to reassure themselves that he was dead.”441 He was buried at Valle de los Caídos and Doña Carmen moved *

FRAP was basically a Marxist-Leninist grouping

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to Madrid. The family had various scandals attached to them during the subsequent years, probably because they were too accustomed to living with protective privilege. Their ups and downs can still be found recorded in the papers to this day. The eclipse of the family was quite predictable, and there was an immediate boom in writing about Franco by those who were close to him; “the portrait which they presented inadvertently or otherwise, was of the astonishing personal mediocrity which characterised a ‘sphinx without a secret.’”442 In looking back over the life of Franco it is possible to paint a variety of pictures of him as a person, but always with the usual caveat that the end result will always depend on the political stance of the writer, and also of the moral viewpoint of the observer which can often be deeply subjective. The tendency is to condemn the regime under Franco because of “its long association with the figure of Franco himself and by its origins in the Civil War, an event now part of history for many Spaniards.”443 Some have seen Franco as a possible saint and in a book by a Benedictine monk called Manuel Garrido entitled Francisco Franco: Exemplary Christ which was written in 1985 (its fifth edition appeared in 2003) with the intention of placing Franco “among the ranks of those to be canonized.”444 This is of course at one extreme of the evaluations, and in this writer’s point of view more truth is to be found in the more cynical and realistic view of the biographer Paul Preston, but between these two extremes others have tried to find a middle-ground. No one doubts that the figure of Franco dominated Spain from the Civil War until his death. By the late 1960s it was clear that there had to be a change and this was quietly accepted by many if not most, but it is “impossible to know empirically how much active support the regime commanded and how much its survival in this period was rather a result of passive acceptance,” but the figure of Franco remains central.445 In terms of personality it is possible to write many divergent pictures of the same person. Payne and Palacios who wrote a recent biography of Franco made every effort to find a perspective which puts Franco in a different light from writers such as Preston; these various viewpoints underline the complexity of this somewhat enigmatic figure of recent history. They wrote that “Franco stamped his name on an entire epoch in the history of his country, and even some of his enemies recognised that he had become the most dominant figure in Spain since the time of Philip II.”446 This statement is true enough, but the same could be said of Hitler and the same for Stalin, Mussolini, Mao Zedong and many others. It has also been stated that “Franco has frequently been denounced as the general who led a fascist coup d’état against a democratic republic, but

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this allegation is incorrect in every detail,”447 and in support of this Payne and Palacios claim that elections and democracy had died with the Popular Front. This is a matter of perception and although there were atrocities committed by the Republicans most commentators believe the Republicans were democratic both by inclination and intention. Payne and Palacios argue that Franco’s nationalists were not fascist because the Falangists were a minority, but there was a sudden and mighty surge of membership in the Falange which proved highly influential and they were invaluable to Franco: “in the uncontrolled environment at the start of the war, the [Falange] party rapidly became by far the largest and most influential force in the Nationalist zone.”448 Contrary to the evidence of Franco’s cunning manipulations is has been said that “there is no evidence that Franco conspired to become generalissimo.”449 It is often claimed Franco was not a military dictator but he arose through a military rebellion and because of his balancing acts in time eliminated the influence of the army more and more, prompting Payne and Palacios to claim he “depoliticised the military.”450 In reality he limited the power of the army most probably because of his own safety; it had been Franco and the army which had initiated the rebellion which started the Civil War and Franco knew it could be repeated. For the vast majority of people Franco will forever be associated with the Civil War which although it finished in 1939 “politically the Civil War was never to come to an end. Its simplistic ‘lessons’ that democracy led to subversion and revolution…were to be repeated for decades to come.”451 Franco had kept Spain divided by his attitude of the victors and the vanquished. It has also been claimed that Franco was not in it for money, he held no Swiss bank accounts, and “throughout his life he was scrupulous in his personal finances” and never made money from corruption like many members of his own family.452 He was however extremely well off, always lived in luxury, and spent appalling amounts of money on his hunting and fishing holidays. He was blissfully unaware of the way many of the population existed, and like other dictators he was obsessed with power, making the accumulation of money somewhat superfluous. His “conviction that he was not a dictator was characteristic of his lack of critical self-perception.”453 He often hid behind mythological masks of the warrior, the El Cid, the imperial leader, then defender of the West or commander of the besieged, and later a co-equal partner with the USA. Above all Franco will be remembered for his ruthless conduct of the Civil War, his cunning and unperturbed-self, his stage-management between the factions and as a skilful manipulator of power. The Spanish

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ruling classes had abdicated to Franco as happened in Germany and Italy. He belonged to the age of dictators, Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, and the current Left-wing leader in Spain in May 2018 stated that Franco had also committed crimes against humanity. However, it has been noted that unlike the other dictators he never had a former ally executed, never had tantrums, and “only a limited paranoia,” and unlike the other dictators “he was the only Christian of the lot, however limited his charity and spirituality.”454 It could be countered argued that his obsession with Communists, Masonry, and Liberals was a form of deep paranoia which was almost childish in its simplicity and hatred. His clever balancing acts between the supportive families stemmed from his deep and various suspicions, and his views on the international scene were certainly a matter of paranoia especially when it came to the liberal democracies. The fact is thousands of people died by the nod of his head or a quick signature. His Christianity has already been commented on; he was a man of ritual and rites and looked to the Church not for spiritual sustenance but for backing his political grip on power. Even Payne and Palacio who looked for some good in Franco noted that his religiosity was distinctly of the traditional Spanish kind, formalistic, given to liturgy and ritual, but not overly informed by personal meditation, religious study, or too much practical application of doctrine. He made his confession regularly in his later years “not to his personal chaplain but to a friar especially brought in,” possibly because making confession to someone a person knows well can be highly embarrassing if it is performed with any integrity.455 It has been argued that “he left behind a more successful, more prosperous, and more modern society than the one which he initially took control, and that was more than can said of Stalin.”456 Global growth and the technocrats released Spain from economic disaster, but by the end of the 1960s Spain was in an appalling state of revolt, disarray, social upheaval, and even those on the Right-wing realised that the regime had to change fundamentally. The bare facts of history are open to all forms of interpretation and sometimes the historian does a disservice to his subject with throw-away lines. When it is claimed that “once Mussolini’s fell in the summer of 1943, Franco’s regime moved more directly towards defascistization,” this seems too far-fetched; to the bitter end he still believed the Germans could not be beaten and the Falangists, closest to the fascist mind-set, were growing in numbers and influence.457 The various phases of Franco’s development are of importance in understanding the man. In the first phase he was an ambitious army officer

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whose ambition arose through battlefield promotion which soon translated into political and colonial ambition. The second phase was his leadership in the Civil War when his much vaunted sense of Solomon-like military justice led to extreme barbarity, and indicated his political wiliness as he assumed total power. The Second World War was his third phase of potential imperialism and reliance upon fascist help. It demonstrated his amateur weakness on the international stage, and his paranoia about those who opposed him. During this phase as well as the fourth phase of the immediate postwar situation his rule of repression in order to maintain his leadership role remained a hallmark of his personality which persisted to the bitter end. His one major perception was forecasting the Cold War during which America helped relieve his pariah status. His fifth phase was his political cunning in manipulating the various families of his own supporters, his growing regal status which gave rise to him taking a back seat, appointing the technocrats, abandoning his policy of autarky, and revelling in the economic success of his appointees.* During this phase and despite his ailing health he managed to manipulate his supporters, the Falange first who were then placed on the shelf for the time, the army reducing some of its influence, the growth of the Catholic corporations leading to the final phase of his life which was a state of bureaucratic authoritarianism and his slow descent to death. It was during this phase that his legacy of brutal repression continued to such a level that at his funeral no significant international dignitaries attended, and the country was unsettled, in a state of revolt and the future decidedly indeterminate. According to Payne and Palacios the blackest periods were the repression after the end of Civil War, then his pro-Axis policy and the long repression of his country as a dictator, and they could have added his last few years.458 Franco once said “one is a slave of what one says and a master of what one does not say” which is about as enigmatic as the man himself. He seldom spoke his thoughts and his ministers frequently complained they did not know where they stood with him or what he was thinking. In declaring Spain a kingdom with the exiled monarchy growling in Portugal he saw himself in the regal position, and always expected even his closet friends to address him accordingly. Outside observers were bemused by his handshake because “he held his hand fixedly by the side of his waist, almost as if it were attached to his belt, instead of extending it in the normal manner. This required much taller men to lean over and *

As noted his Autarky policy was ruinous but Franco “grudgingly acquiesced in changes which he did not understand in order to remain in power.” See Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.785

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partially bow in order to grasp it, which is no doubt why Franco adopted this approach.”459 He was a man who loved power, demanded respect, always considered he was right, was cold-blooded in revenge, brutal to the slightest opposition, and above all in the words of Paul Preston “for himself and his supporters, there was no contradiction between the good of Spain and the good of Franco.”460 After his death the Spaniards moved with ease towards a democratic state despite the Caudillo’s efforts when he was alive. Even some of his rear-guard supporters knew this was the only way forward. From mid1976 the new King played a central role in dismantling the Francoist apparatus and in May 1977 Don Juan renounced his rights to the throne to give his son legitimacy. By mid-1977 the Movimiento was dismantled, trade unions legalised, and political parties came back including the Communists. Because of Franco’s legacy the ETA were still active until end of the 1970s. There was an attempted military coup in 1981 led by a Lieutenant of the Guardia Civil, Antoni Tejero. It reflected the dying embers of the diehard bunker at work, but millions of people demonstrated against this acrimonious reminder of Franco and it collapsed immediately.461 Democracy was re-established in Spain. Payne and Palacios suggested it was prepared by Franco in restoring the right candidate to the monarchy, that he had permitted the modernisation of Spanish society and the economy, there were orderly mechanisms in place, education had been expanded, the military were no longer political but they accepted that “Franco was not responsible for the democratisation of Spain”462 In some ways he was responsible for having removed it in the first place because he had demonstrated how ugly and dangerous the alternatives were in reality. By the mid-1960s and certainly by 1970 Franco was just the “military caudillo of a conservative society that in large measure had already ceased to exist even before his own death;” his system was disintegrating in the last ten years of his life and not before time.463 The 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the Civil War in 1986 “came and went without any special resonance within the population,” there was a “Pact of Silence in favour of the transition which was also continually strengthened by the Socialists.”464 From this writer’s point of view it seems fitting to finish with the words of the Spanish historian Salvador de Madariaga who wrote that “Franco’s political strategy was as simple as a spear. There was no action of his that was not directed towards his consolidation in power. Under the appearance of varied and even contradictory tactics (peace, neutrality,

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bellicosity; amnesty, persecution; monarch, regency), the only thing that Franco believed in was Franco himself.”465

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Hassell von Ulrich, The Ulrich von Hassell Diaries, 1938-1944 (London: Frontline Books, 2011 Hastings Max, All Hell Let Loose (London: Harper Press, 2011) Haycock Boyd David, I am Spain (Brecon: Old street Publishing, 2012) Iribarren J. Arrarás, Franco (Valladolid: Santarén, 1939) Keeley Graham, Times, London, Article, 15.01.2018 and 21.04.2018, and 23.04.2018 and 3.05.2018 Liddle Hart B. H, History of the Second World War (London: Book Club Associates, 1973) Madariaga de Salvador, España. Ensayo de historia contemporánea (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1979) Michel Henri, The Second World War (London: Andre Deutsch, 1975) Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) Moreno Antonio Montero, Historia de la persecucíon religiosa en España, 1936-39 (Spain: Biblioteca De Autores Cristianos, 2004 Muggeridge M, (Ed), Ciano’s Diary 1939-43 (London: Heinemann, 1947) Orwell George, Homage to Catalonia (London: Penguin Books, 2000) Othen Christopher, Franco’s International Brigades (London: Reportage Press, 2008) Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) Platt Parmele Mary, A Short History of Spain (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1906) Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) —. The Spanish Holocaust (London: Harper Press, 2012) Roberts Andrew, The Storm of War (London: Allen Lane, 2009) Sangster A and Battistelli P-P, Myths, Amnesia and Reality in Military Conflicts, 1935-1945 (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2016) Sangster A, Göbbels, Himmler, and Göring, The Unholy Trinity (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2018) Taylor F, (Ed), The Göbbels Diaries (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1982) Thomas Hugh, The Spanish Civil War (London: Penguin Books, 2012) Ulbricht Walter, Whither Germany, Speeches and Essays (Dresden: Zeit im Bild, 1960) Weinberg Gerhard, A World at Arms (Cambridge, CUP, 1994) Wette Wolfram, The Wehrmacht History, Myth, Reality (London: Harvard UP, 2007) Zeiler Thomas, Annihilation (Oxford: OUP, 2011)

ENDNOTES

1

Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.92 2 Wette Wolfram, The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality (London: Harvard UP, 2007) p.vii 3 Bartov, Grossmann, Nolan (Eds), Crimes of War “Guilt denied in the 20th Century” (New York: The New Press, 2002) p.136 4 Liddle Hart B. H, History of the Second World War (London: Book Club Associates, 1973) 5 Ibid, p.23 6 Ibid, p.297 7 Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.191 8 Gilbert Martin, Second World War (London: Phoenix, 1997) p.157 9 Ibid, p.134 10 Michel Henri, The Second World War (London: Andre Deutsch, 1975) p.176 11 Churchill, W, The Second World War Vol II (London: Cassell & Co Ltd, 1949) p.459 12 Ibid, p.468 13 Churchill, W, The Second World War Vol VI (London: Cassell & Co Ltd, 1949) p.617 14 Churchill, W, The Second World War Vol V (London: Cassell & Co Ltd, 1949) p.554 15 Davies Norman, No Simple Victory (New York: Viking, 2006) p.84 16 Ibid, pp.286-7 17 See Ibid, p.287 18 Evans J Richard, The Third Reich at War 1939-1945 (London: Allen Books, 2008) p.146 19 Hastings Max, All Hell Let Loose (London: Harper Press, 2011) p.112 20 See Ibid, pp.112-113 21 Michel Henri, The Second World War (London: Andre Deutsch, 1975) 22 Weinberg Gerhard, A World at Arms (Cambridge, CUP, 1994) 23 Iribarren J. Arrarás, Franco (Valladolid: Santarén, 1939) 24 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.22 25 Taylor F, (Ed), The Göbbels Diaries (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1982) p.9 26 Ibid, p.85 27 Ibid, pp.152-53 28 Ibid, p.159

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Ibid, p.160 Ibid, p.164 31 Ibid, p.257, p.323-4, p.356, p.373 32 Ibid, p.292 33 Hassell von Ulrich, The Ulrich von Hassell Diaries, 1938-1944 (London: Frontline Books, 2011) pp.104-105 34 Muggeridge M, (Ed), Ciano’s Diary 1939-43 (London: Heinemann, 1947) p.84 35 Ibid, p.8 36 See Ibid, p.102 37 See Ibid, p.103 38 Ibid, p.243 39 Ibid, p.330 40 Ibid, p.534 41 Ibid, p.542 42 Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) Introduction, p.1 43 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.100 44 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.170 45 Preston Paul, The Spanish Holocaust (London: Harper Press, 2012) p.520 46 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.3 47 See Ibid, pp.4f 48 Campbell Matthew, Franco’s Grandchildren face battle to inherit dictator’s war plunder (Sunday Times, 11.02.2018) 49 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.7 50 Treglown Jeremy, Franco’s Crypt (London: Chatto & Windus, 2013) p.4 51 Thomas Hugh, The Spanish Civil War (London: penguin Books, 2012) p.12 52 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.9 53 See Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.9 54 Barton Simon, A History of Spain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p.205 55 Platt Parmele Mary, A Short History of Spain (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1906) p.67 56 Estanislao Figueras, Pi i Margall, Nicolás Salmerón and Emilio Castelar, 57 See Platt Parmele Mary, A Short History of Spain (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1906) p.70 58 See Barton Simon, A History of Spain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p.211 59 The Times, 28.4.2018 60 See Barton Simon, A History of Spain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p.217 30

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Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) P.58 62 Carr Raymond (Ed), Spain A History (Oxford: OUP, 2000) p.227 63 Ibid, p.227 64 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.22 65 Barton Simon, A History of Spain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p.220 66 Othen Christopher, Franco’s International Brigades (London: Reportage Press, 2008) pp.21-22 67 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.14 68 Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.181 69 Barton Simon, A History of Spain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p.222 70 Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.19 71 Ibid, p.25 72 Ibid, p.17 73 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.62 74 Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.22 75 See Ibid, p.23 76 Keeley Graham, Times, London, Article, 15.01.2018 77 Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.64 78 Balfour Sebastian in Carr Raymond (Ed), Spain A History (Oxford: OUP, 2000) p.243 79 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) pp30-31 80 Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.10 81 Ibid, p.77 82 Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.185 83 See Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) ppp78-9 84 Barton Simon, A History of Spain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p.229 85 Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.98 86 Ibid, p.93 87 Ibid, p.102 88 See Barton Simon, A History of Spain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p.231 89 Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.188

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Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.164 91 See Ibid, pp.157-158 92 See Ibid, p.195 93 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.4 94 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.198 95 Davies Norman, Europe A History (London: Pimlico, 1997) p.979 96 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.105 97 Davies Norman, Europe A History (London: Pimlico, 1997) p.981, & p.985 98 See Zeiler Thomas, Annihilation (Oxford: OUP, 2011) p.26 99 Orwell George, Homage to Catalonia (London: Penguin Books, 2000) p.197 100 Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.343 101 Barton Simon, A History of Spain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p.232 102 Orwell George, Homage to Catalonia (London: Penguin Books, 2000) Appendix II p.222 103 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.128 104 See Orwell George, Homage to Catalonia (London: Penguin Books, 2000) pp.4ff 105 See Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.257 106 Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.187 107 Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.259 108 Ibid, pp.262 and 263 109 Sangster A and Battistelli P-P, Myths, Amnesia and Reality in Military Conflicts, 1935-1945 (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2016) p.60 110 Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.293 111 Ibid, p.322 112 Thomas Hugh, The Spanish Civil War (London: Penguin Books, 2012) p.896 113 Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.276 114 Thomas Hugh, The Spanish Civil War (London: Penguin Books, 2012) p.901 115 Othen Christopher, Franco’s International Brigades (London: Reportage Press, 2008) p.9 116 Ibid, p.10 117 Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p151 and pp.203-204 118 Sangster A and Battistelli P-P, Myths, Amnesia and Reality in Military Conflicts, 1935-1945 (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2016) pp.62-62 119 Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.176

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Ibid, p.209 Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.188 122 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.26 123 Hamilton Iain, Koestler (London: Secker and Warburg, 1982) p.39 124 See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.194 125 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.50 126 Buckley Henry, The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013) p.238 127 See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.201 128 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.12 129 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.50 130 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.4 131 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.22 132 See Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.3 133 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.11 134 See Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.23 135 See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.13 136 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.24 137 See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) pp.18-19 138 See ibid. 139 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.26 140 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.35 141 Ibid, p.31 142 Ibid, p.37 143 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.29 144 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.40 145 See Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.42 146 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.46 147 Ibid, p.48 121

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Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.48 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.49 150 See Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.49 151 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.29 152 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.55 153 Ibid, p.58 154 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.61 155 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.61 156 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.41 157 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.65 158 Ibid, p.71 159 Ibid, p.75 160 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.93 161 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.33 162 See Arrarás Joaquín, Franco (Valladolid, 7 edición, 1939) 163 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.104 164 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.33 165 Balfour Sebastian, Deadly Embrace (Oxford: OUP, 2002) pp. 252-4 166 Farran Carlos and Amago Samuel, Unearthing Franco’s Legacy ( University of Notre Dame Press, 2010) p.62 167 Ealham C, The Splintering of Spain (Cambridge: CUP, 2011) p.54 168 See Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.110 169 Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.187 170 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.96 171 Orwell George, Homage to Catalonia (London: Penguin Books, 2000) p.195 172 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.35 173 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.109 174 See Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) pp.124-5 175 See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.112 176 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.130 177 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.116 149

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Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.142 Thomas Hugh, The Spanish Civil War (London: Penguin Books, 2012) p.905 180 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.126 181 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.42 182 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) pp.176-177 183 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.39 184 See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.130 185 See Ibid, p.135 186 Balfour Sebastian in Carr Raymond (Ed), Spain A History (Oxford: OUP, 2000) p.258 187 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.181 188 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.147 189 Ibid, p.150 190 Quoted in Haycock Boyd David, I am Spain (Brecon: Old street Publishing, 2012) p.3 191 Sangster A, Göbbels, Himmler, and Göring, The Unholy Trinity (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2018) p.94 192 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.152 193 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.5 194 Thomas Hugh, The Spanish Civil War (London: Penguin Books, 2012) p.911 195 Ibid, p.906 196 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.198 197 Quoted in Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.179 198 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.43 199 Ibid, p.44 200 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.232 201 Balfour Sebastian in Carr Raymond (Ed), Spain A History (Oxford: OUP, 2000) p.261 202 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.168 203 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.49 204 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.158 205 Ibid, p.158 206 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.18 179

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Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.270 See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.160 209 See Ibid, p.161 210 See Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.35 211 See Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.294 212 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.188 213 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.295 214 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.29 215 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.295 p.300 216 Ibid, p.311 217 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.190 218 Preston Paul, The Spanish Holocaust (London: Harper Press, 2012) p.471 219 Orwell George, Homage to Catalonia (London: Penguin Books, 2000) pp.150ff 220 See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.193 221 Ibid,p.194 222 Muggeridge M, (Ed), Ciano’s Diary 1939-43 (London: Heinemann, 1947) p.33 223 Ibid, p.100 224 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.208 225 Preston Paul, The Spanish Holocaust (London: Harper Press, 2012) p.472 226 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.211 227 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.330 228 Muggeridge M, (Ed), Ciano’s Diary 1939-43 (London: Heinemann, 1947) p.117 229 See Ibid, p.104 230 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.214 231 See Ibid, p.216 232 Quoted in Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) pp.51-2 233 Weinberg Gerhard, A World at Arms (Cambridge, CUP, 1994) p.133 234 Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.190 235 See Barton Simon, A History of Spain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) pp.250-1 236 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.219 237 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.108 238 Ibid, p.111 239 See Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.345 208

276

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Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.226 241 Thomas Hugh, The Spanish Civil War (London: Penguin Books, 2012) p.910 242 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.52 243 Weinberg Gerhard, A World at Arms (Cambridge, CUP, 1994) p.207 244 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.233 245 Weinberg Gerhard, A World at Arms (Cambridge, CUP, 1994) p.177 246 Ibid, p.144 247 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.244 248 Churchill, W, The Second World War Vol II (London: Cassell & Co Ltd, 1949) p.460 249 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.373 250 Michel Henri, The Second World War (London: Andre Deutsch, 1975) p.69 251 Weinberg Gerhard, A World at Arms (Cambridge, CUP, 1994) p.178 252 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.378 253 See Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.392 254 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.58 255 Roberts Andrew, The Storm of War (London: Allen Lane, 2009) p.113 256 Quoted in Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.423 257 See Ibid, p.431 258 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.439 259 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.255 260 See Evans J Richard, The Third Reich at War 1939-1945 (London: Allen Books, 2008) p.164 261 Michel Henri, The Second World War (London: Andre Deutsch, 1975) p.291 262 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.61 263 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.249 264 Quoted in Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.451 265 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.255 266 Muggeridge M, (Ed), Ciano’s Diary 1939-43 (London: Heinemann, 1947) p.101 267 Ibid, p.501 268 Beevor Antony, The Second World War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2012) p.375 269 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.474 270 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.251

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Zeiler Thomas, Annihilation (Oxford: OUP, 2011) p.216 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.481 273 Zeiler Thomas, Annihilation (Oxford: OUP, 2011) p.216 274 Quoted in Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.261 275 Ibid, p.272 276 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.62 277 Ibid, p.62 278 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.484 279 Michel Henri, The Second World War (London: Andre Deutsch, 1975) p.176 280 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.507 281 Ibid, p.513 282 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.280 283 Colville John, The Fringes of Power, Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985) p.528 284 See Beevor Antony, The Second World War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2012) p.765 285 See Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.528 286 Ibid, p.529 287 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.282 288 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.67 289 Ibid, p.68 290 See Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.361 291 Ibid, p.452 292 Ibid, p.510 293 Colville John, The Fringes of Power, Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985) p.607 294 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.541 295 Ibid, p.544 296 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.288 297 Ibid, p.301 298 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.545 299 See Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.137 300 Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) pp.191-2 301 Quoted in Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.562 302 Barton Simon, A History of Spain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p.252 303 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) pp.299-300 272

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Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.549 Ibid, p.550 306 Ibid, p.554 307 Ibid, p.564 308 Ibid, p.565 309 Ibid, p.571 310 Ibid, p.566 311 Barton Simon, A History of Spain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p.252 312 Quoted in Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.302 313 Ibid, p.303 314 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.572 315 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.305 316 Ibid, p.308 317 Ibid, p.30 318 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.579 319 See Ibid, p.580 320 See Ibid, p.587 321 Ibid, p.588 322 Ibid, p.582 323 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.67 324 Barton Simon, A History of Spain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p.253 325 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.67 326 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.594 327 Ibid, p.593 328 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.73 329 See Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) pp.596-7 330 Quoted in Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.71 331 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.312 332 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.599 333 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.312 334 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.612 335 Ibid, p.623 336 See Ibid, p.624 337 Quoted in Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.72 338 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.176 339 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.626 305

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Ibid, p.627 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.347 342 See chapter on Primo de Rivera in Part One. 343 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.170 344 Ibid, p.48 345 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.607 346 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.113 347 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.314 348 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.392 349 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.73 350 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.615 351 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.43 352 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.635 353 Ibid, p.640 354 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.315 355 See Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.192 356 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.41 357 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.622 358 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.344 359 Ibid, p.316 360 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.64 361 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.349 362 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.654 363 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.359 364 Ibid, p.351 365 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.32 366 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.646 367 Ibid, p.646 368 Ibid, p.656 369 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.354 370 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) pp.61-2 371 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.356 372 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.103 373 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.666 341

280

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Ibid, p.670 Ibid, p.674 376 See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.362 377 Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.193 378 Quoted in Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.363 379 Ambrose Stephen, Eisenhower, Soldier and President (London: Pocket Books, 2003) 380 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.654 381 See Ibid, p.675 382 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.67 383 Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.193 384 See Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.87 385 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.75 386 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.81 387 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.432 388 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.432 389 Ibid, p.438 390 Ibid, p.445 391 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.78 392 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.688 393 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.116 394 Barton Simon, A History of Spain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p.254 395 Ibid, p.255 396 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.80 397 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.121 398 See Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.683 399 Ibid, p.699 400 Ibid, p.701 401 Ibid, p.704 402 See Ibid, p.692 403 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.411 404 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.416 405 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.78 375

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Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.722 Ibid, p.714 408 Ibid, p.726 409 Ibid, p.736 410 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.84 411 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.447 412 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.742 413 See Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.85 414 See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.457 415 Ibid, p.372 416 Ibid, p.373 417 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.723 418 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.395 419 Ibid, p.399 420 Quoted in Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.708 421 See Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.405 422 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.722 423 Ibid, p.731 424 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.30 425 Ibid, p.67 426 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.423 427 See Ibid, p.423 428 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.751 429 Ibid, p.754 430 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.452 431 See Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.756 432 Balfour Sebastian in Carr Raymond (Ed), Spain A History (Oxford: OUP, 2000) p.273 433 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.83 434 See Ibid, p.93 435 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.764 436 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.470 437 Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.91 438 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.480 407

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Ibid, p.489 See Moradiellos Enrique, Franco, Anatomy of a Dictator (London: IB Tauris, 2018) p.93 441 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) pp.779-80 442 Ibid, p.782 443 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.75 444 Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.195 445 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.62 446 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.501 447 Ibid, p.505 448 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.9 449 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.506 450 Ibid, p.518 451 Grugel Jean and Rees Tim, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold, 1997) p.24 452 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) pp.386-7 453 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.784 454 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.502 455 Ibid,p.371 456 Ibid, p.503 457 Ibid, p.509 458 See Ibid, p.514 459 Ibid, p.368 460 Preston Paul, Franco (London: Fontana Press, 1995) p.782 461 Antoni Tejero was released from prison in 1996. 462 Payne Stanley & Jesús Palacios, Franco, A Personal and Political Biography (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014) p.521 463 Ibid, p.523 464 Besier G & Stokáosa K, European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013) p.195 465 Madariaga de Salvador, España. Ensayo de historia contemporánea (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1979) p.511 440

INDEX

Abd el-Krim, 30, 31, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73 accidentalists, 38 Africanistas, 75, 76, 81 Agadir, 145, 219 Alegría, Eduardo Baeza, 210 Alfonso XII, 22, 23 Alfonso XIII, 23, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 69, 75, 76, 79, 98, 101, 107, 118, 126, 167, 197, 248 Algeria, 170, 218 Amadeo I King, 22 Anarchists, 26, 29, 38, 39, 44, 54, 56, 82, 89, 96, 123, 188 Anarcho-Syndicalist (CNT), 39 Anglo-Spanish Alliance, A suggested, 180 Annual, Battle of, 30, 68, 69, 76 Añoveros, Antonio, Bishop, 243 anti-clericalism, 27, 38, 40, 114 Anti-Comintern Pact, 6, 125, 163 Antoni Tejero, 264 Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, 23 Aranda, General, 162, 189 Argentina, 191, 193, 204 Armour, Norman, American Ambassador, 182, 183, 190 Arrese, José Luis, 154, 160, 167, 173, 174, 221, 223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 236, 237 Astray, Major José Millán, 67, 68, 69, 74, 78, 104 Asturias, 41, 49, 66, 85, 86, 94, 229, 238, 246, 255 Autarky, Economic policy, 15, 32, 117, 119, 133, 134, 198, 207, 209, 210, 211, 228, 234, 237, 238, 263

Azaña, 37, 38, 42, 56, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 95, 123 Aznar, Admiral Juan Bautista, 78 Balearic Islands, 83, 89, 129 Barbarossa, 147, 162, 185 Barrio, General, 95 Basque, 26, 38, 46, 48, 55, 57, 66, 109, 110, 111, 114, 117, 194, 210, 233, 234, 237, 253, 254, 255 Bastico, General, 116 Beaulac, Willard, 166 Begoña Affair, 167 Beigbeder, Colonel, 129, 139, 140, 142, 147, 148 Berber Tribes, 30, 71 Berenguer, General Damaso, 33, 34, 68, 70, 76, 78, 81 Beryl Hibbs, 202 Bevin, 191 Black Shirts, 107, 110 Blanco, Admiral Carrero, 160, 161, 168, 171, 175, 192, 193, 210, 212, 216, 226, 227, 229, 231, 235, 237, 240, 242, 245, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 255, 256, 257 Bloque Iberíco, 172 Blue Division, 6, 160, 162, 167, 168, 175, 176, 178, 188, 206, 208 Blum, Léon, 53, 54, 120 Bolín, 104 Bradley, General Omar, 205 Bravo, Gregorio López, 238, 241, 254, 255 British Embassy, Attitude, 54 Brunete, Battle of, 48, 116 Burgos trials, 254 Burguete, General, 66, 70

284 Caballero, 46, 47, 91, 92 Cabanellas, General, 100, 103 Campos, General Martínez, 138 Canaris, 97, 142, 143, 149, 151, 153, 157, 165, 173 Canary Islands, 6, 43, 46, 89, 90, 91, 94, 108, 136, 142, 145, 146, 149, 152, 153, 162, 168, 189, 219 Cantaloupe, Italian Emissary, 109 Carles Puigdemont, 25 Carlists, The, 22, 23, 38, 44, 85, 92, 103, 112, 113, 114, 167, 193, 201, 244 Carmen Franco's wife, 66, 69, 70, 71, 74, 78, 85, 201, 202, 224, 259 Casa Viejas, 39 Casado, Segismundo, 49 Castiella, 230, 240, 242, 252 Castillo, Gamero del, 156 Catalonia, 13, 14, 25, 26, 28, 32, 36, 38, 41, 46, 48, 49, 85, 87, 120, 122, 123, 149, 159, 165, 194, 210, 226, 229, 238, 254, 255, 267 catastrophists, 38 Caudillo, 12, 13, 17, 47, 58, 78, 90, 103, 154, 170, 175, 184, 190, 191, 194, 195, 201, 206, 214, 227, 235, 237, 239, 245, 249, 254, 264 CEDA, 39, 40, 41, 43, 84, 85, 87, 91, 92, 103 Chamberlain, 121 Charter of Rights, 183 Cherwode, Field Marshal Sir Philp, 122 Church In Doubt of Franco, 109, 223, 225, 242, 252 In Support of Franco, 102, 107, 124, 127, 204, 215, 241 Churchill, 5, 9, 139, 141, 142, 146, 150, 152, 165, 173, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 191, 198, 199, 208, 217, 266, 283

Index Ciano, 9, 11, 97, 109, 120, 125, 128, 129, 138, 140, 163, 167, 173, 267 Civil War, estimated losses, 50, 56 CNT, 39, 79 Cold War, 2, 4, 17, 193, 195, 199, 200, 201, 203, 217, 239, 241, 263 Colville, 188, 266 Comintern, 6, 88, 125, 163 Concordat, 103, 192, 202, 214, 215, 225, 241, 242, 243 Condor Legion, 48, 52, 106, 108, 111, 120 Consejo del Reino, 183 Cortes, 12, 20, 23, 28, 30, 38, 89, 174, 184, 192, 228, 242, 246, 247, 252, 253, 258 Cuba, 17, 23, 24, 239 Daladier, 121 Dato, Eduardo, 28, 29, 66 Dávila, 100, 116, 119, 120 de Gaulle, 3, 5, 147, 192, 255 Dean Rusk, 239, 241 Degrelle, Léon, 188 Dieckhoff, Hans Heinrich, German Reprentative, 174 Don Juan, 23, 98, 167, 170, 176, 177, 183, 189, 193, 194, 197, 210, 211, 212, 213, 221, 224, 226, 229, 244, 246, 247, 248, 259, 264 Donovan, William, 158 Doval, Major Lisardo, 86 Duke of Aosta, 22 Duke of Wellington, 21 Duke of Windsor, 142 Dulles, 219 Dunn, James, American Ambassador, 207 Ebro River, Battle, 49, 120, 121, 122 Eden, 5, 121, 162, 181, 209 Eisenhower, 203, 205, 207, 208, 230, 239, 266 El Escorial, The Memorial, 136, 154

Probing the Enigma of Franco El Pardo, 135, 198, 220, 224, 247, 248, 257, 258 Elizabeth II, Queen, 209, 250, 259 Emir of the Rif See Abd-El-Krim, 71 Equatorial Guinea, 219 Escrivá de Balaguer y Albás, Founder of Opus Dei, 232 Espinosa, General, 166 ETA, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, 233, 245, 253, 255, 256, 258, 259, 264 Falange, the, 10, 40, 45, 55, 78, 85, 88, 92, 96, 104, 113, 114, 133, 136, 154, 161, 162, 166, 167, 183, 190, 212, 223, 224, 226, 228, 229, 254, 261, 263 Fanjul, General, 41, 46, 96 Faupel, German Representative, 107, 117 Felix, Operation, 151, 153, 163 FET y de las JONS, 114, 118, 154 Filek von, The Fraudster, 134 First Republic, 22 Foster Dulles, John, 208 Fraga, 238, 242, 245, 246, 253 Franco Ambition and Ascendancy, 47, 57, 65, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 76, 81, 86, 87, 90, 91, 94, 98, 101, 103, 118, 135, 190, 191, 195, 262 And Carlists, 112, 167 And Communism, 73, 76, 86, 87, 88, 95, 96, 182, 193, 199, 224 And Freemasons, 84, 124, 193, 197, 200, 222, 224, 228 And Jews, 73, 87, 136 And Military Commanders, 98, 104, 110, 115, 120, 128, 156, 162, 163, 170, 176, 189, 212 And Role of Women, 133, 233 And the Church, 45, 81, 91, 102, 114, 191, 192, 195, 213, 225, 243, 262

285

And the Falangists, 107, 113, 136, 158, 166, 189, 220, 223, 224, 249 And the Monarchists, 107, 167, 170, 174, 176, 177, 183, 189, 193, 194, 197, 201, 211, 212, 213, 221, 229, 244, 246 And USA, 144, 159, 162, 168, 172, 177, 178, 182, 190, 191, 195, 198, 203, 204, 206, 214, 217, 230, 239, 241 British views on, 184, 191, 196, 203, 209 Character, 1, 68, 73, 76, 78, 82, 86, 91, 92, 94, 98, 106, 109, 112, 115, 116, 117, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 141, 148, 160, 170, 173, 175, 179, 180, 194, 196, 202, 210, 213, 223, 230, 231, 234, 238, 245, 249, 250, 261, 264, 265 Death of, 259 Economic Policy, 117, 133, 134, 146, 165, 198, 209, 211, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 234, 235, 237, 238 Family background, 61, 62 His ascendancy, 67, 73 His Biographers, 8 His Decline, 231, 233, 241, 244, 246, 248, 251, 258 His father's death, 165 His mother's death, 85 His parents, 62 His Pragmatism, 81, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 97, 100, 101, 174, 203, 207, 218, 222 His Various Political Stances, 4, 7, 9, 14, 15, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 88, 90, 100, 172, 180, 184, 185, 190, 224, 252 In Morocco, 64, 70, 87 International Relationship, 167 International Relationships, 125, 126, 132, 136, 139, 141, 142,

286 143, 146, 152, 153, 157, 161, 170, 193, 195, 198, 200, 237 Love Life, 64, 66, 69 Military background, 41, 46, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 72 Nicknames, 61, 62, 63, 66 Opinions on Franco, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 74, 80, 93, 260 Political Ability, 129, 133, 159, 167, 168, 171, 172, 176, 178, 179, 183, 184, 193, 199, 201, 205, 216, 229, 245, 249 Political ambition, 78, 99, 101, 104, 112, 113, 114, 118, 119, 127, 129, 189, 194 Relations with Hitler, 97, 103, 117, 136, 139, 141, 146, 149, 150, 151, 154, 156, 157, 158 Relations with Mussolini, 97, 106, 108, 109, 110, 119, 128, 137, 151, 175 The man, 60, 62 Wife and Family, 201, 244, 246, 248, 257, 260 Francoism, 14, 15, 16, 209, 226, 227, 230, 246, 252 Galán, 78 Galarza, Don Angel, 39 Gallardo, 36 Gambara, General, 122 Gibraltar, 6, 7, 10, 11, 50, 72, 96, 126, 128, 132, 135, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 145, 146, 147, 149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 158, 163, 165, 168, 177, 201, 204, 209, 219, 245, 252 Giral, 46, 188 Glarza, 159 Glorious Revolution, 22 Göbbels, 9, 10, 11, 103, 119, 136, 267 Goded, General, 41, 43, 46, 87, 89, 95, 96 Gomá Cardinal, 45, 57, 102, 107, 114, 124, 127, 128, 130

Index González, Blas Pérez, 168 Gonzalo de Aguilera, 104 Göring, 11, 97, 117, 119, 127, 133, 135, 143, 267 Grandes, General Muñoz, 154, 168, 169, 172, 173, 176, 203, 206, 208, 226, 227, 228, 232, 238, 250, 252 Griffis, Stanton, American Ambassador, 204, 213 Grimau García, 250 Gromyko, 193 Guadalajara, Battle of, 48, 75, 108, 109, 110, 117, 118 Guam, 24 Guardia de Franco, 220, 222 Guardias de Asalto, 39 Guernica, 48, 56, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 124, 254 Halifax, 121 Harington, General Sir Charles, 50 Harold Wilson, 250 Hassan II, 219, 220 Hassell von, 10, 267 Hayes, Carlton, American Ambassador, 166, 170, 172, 173, 175, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182, 185 Hearst, 24 Hector McNeil, 198 Hedilla, 113, 115 Hemingway, 12, 102 Hendaye, 4, 149, 150 Hernández, 78 Hidalgo, 85, 87 Himmler, 10, 84, 103, 124, 148, 193, 267 Hitler, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 33, 39, 51, 52, 53, 64, 74, 97, 98, 103, 106, 118, 119, 121, 122, 125, 127, 132, 133, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 161, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 170, 172, 173, 176, 179,

Probing the Enigma of Franco 182, 184, 185, 195, 203, 205, 208, 217, 219, 254, 260, 262 Hoare, Sir Samuel, British Ambassador, 139, 140, 141, 142, 152, 153, 154, 161, 162, 166, 169, 170, 173, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181 Hodgson, British Representative, 117, 121 Holocaust, 1, 3, 13, 96, 197, 214 Horthy, 15 Huesca Offensive, 48 International Brigades, 47, 51, 53, 103, 267 Irún, Battle of, 46 Isabella Queen, 21, 22, 158 Jaca, 78, 82 Jaca rebellion, 78 Jaime Don, 212, 248 Jarama, Battle of, 48, 108, 110 Javier Don, 212 Jesuits, 37 John XXIII, Pope, 225, 242 Jordana, 119, 125, 129, 168, 171, 173, 176, 177, 178, 180, 185 Jose Luis Rodriguez, 13 José Paurel, 177 José Primo de Rivera, 40, 43 Juan Carlos, 23, 34, 197, 212, 220, 241, 244, 246, 247, 248, 253, 254, 255, 257, 258, 259 Juan Domínguez, 167 Juan Tusquets, 124 Junta de Defensa Nacional, 97, 100 Junta Técnica, 103 Juntas de Defensa, 75 Juro, General, 48 Kennedy, President, 239 Khrushchev, 249, 250 Kindelán, General Alfredo, 97, 101, 102, 104, 129, 136, 153, 159, 163, 165, 166, 168, 170, 176, 183, 189, 226 King Felipe, 34 Koestler, 55, 104, 266 Korea, 203, 204, 206

287

Laurel Affair, 178 Laurel Incident, 177 Lausanne Manifesto, 183 Law of Political Responsibilities, 57 Law of Succession, 194, 245 Laws of Responsibilities, 123 League of Nations, 29, 51, 73, 126, 191 Lequerica, José, 180, 204, 206, 207 Lerroux, 25, 40, 41, 78, 85, 87 Ley de la Jefatura del Estado, 129 Llano, General Queipo de, 57, 94, 98, 99, 100, 101, 112, 113, 119, 124, 128 Lord Acton, 3, 14 Madrid Pact, 240, 241 Madrid, the failure to win Madrid, 101 Maginot, André, 78 Maine an American warship, 24 Málaga, Battle for, 48 Manila Massacre, 24, 182 Manuel Fal Conde, 103 Mao Zedong, 199, 260 María del Carmen Polo, 66 Marqués de Eliseda, 175 Marquess of Cavalcanti, 39 Marshall Plan, 191, 196 Martínez Bordiu, Dr Cristóbal Franco's son-in-law, 22, 23, 66, 138, 201 Martínez-Campos, General Arsenio, 22, 23 Marxism, 26, 127, 222, 225 Matesa Scandal, 253, 255 Maura, 36, 38 McCarthy, Joseph, 203 Mexico, 53, 190 Miaja, José, 106 Miranda, Torcuato Fernández, 247, 255, 257 Mogador, 145 Mola, General, 43, 46, 87, 89, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 105, 106, 107, 110, 111, 112,

288 113, 115, 116, 127, 136, 195, 213 Moltke, Hans Adolf von, German Reprentative, 173, 174 Morocco, Postwar Issues, 217, 218, 219 MoĠa of the Iron Guard, 54 Movimiento, 114, 190, 207, 229, 232, 244, 246, 247, 249, 251, 253, 254, 255, 264 Mussolini, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 15, 33, 39, 48, 51, 52, 54, 57, 83, 85, 91, 97, 103, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 116, 118, 119, 121, 125, 128, 132, 137, 138, 140, 145, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 156, 157, 159, 172, 175, 176, 178, 203, 260, 262 Narváez, 21, 22 Nasser, 218, 224 National Defence Committee, 46 National Labour Confederation, 26 Nationalists, 44, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 76, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106, 108, 111, 117, 118, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 162, 166 NATO, 191, 198, 203, 204, 205, 224, 239, 240 Navarro Colonel, 86 Navarro, Arias, 257, 258, 259 Nazi-Soviet Pact, 129, 136 Negrín, Juan, 49, 122, 123 Nicolás Franco’s brother, 62, 100, 104, 113, 116, 122, 125, 254, 255 Nietzsche, 2, 3 Nixon, President, 208, 241 Noguès, General, 141 Non-belligerence, f/n Definition, 140 O’Donnell, 21, 22 O’Duffy, Eoin of Irish Brigade, 54 Opus Dei, 212, 226, 228, 232, 235, 237, 238, 244, 251, 253, 257, 258

Index Orgaz, General, 94, 108 Orwell, 12, 40, 44, 45, 46, 51, 56, 90, 123, 267 Oscar Lange, 192 Pacelli, Cardinal, 114, 124 Pact of Madrid, See Madrid Pact, 202, 206 Palomares, Aytom Bomb issue, 240 Paul VI, Pope, 242 Pavía, General Manuel, 23 Pearl Harbour, 163, 171 Pereira, Portuguese Ambassador, 142 Periodisation of History, 16 Perón, 191, 193, 204 Pétain, 50, 73, 75, 126, 128, 129, 140, 147, 149, 150, 158 Peterson, British Ambassador, 139 Philippines, 17, 24, 163, 177 Picasso, General, 69 Piásudski, 15 Pinillos, José Luis, 222 Pius XII, Pope, 214, 225, 233, 241 Pla y Deniel, 225 Popular Front, 35, 42, 53, 88, 89, 90, 120, 261 Portela, 42, 89 Portugal, 46, 53, 77, 96, 100, 103, 125, 135, 142, 145, 158, 165, 172, 178, 180, 185, 189, 191, 193, 198, 203, 211, 212, 220, 226, 258, 263 Potsdam, 182, 188 Prieto, 91 Prim, General Juan, 22 Primo de Rivera, 15 His ascendancy, 30, 70 His decline, 32, 76 His policies, 31, 36, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75 The man, 33 Primo de Rivera, José, 78, 85, 88, 91, 92, 96, 104, 112, 114, 136, 230, 249 Principe de Asturias, 197 Puerto Rico, 23, 24

Probing the Enigma of Franco Pulitzer, 24 Quiroga, 42, 92, 95 Ramón Franco’s brother, 62, 74, 77, 82, 104, 122 Raza, Franco's Novel, 156 Reformist Republican Party, 25 Renovación Española, 43 Ribbentrop, 11, 145, 149, 152, 156, 163, 173, 175, 179 Ricardo de la Puente Bahamonde, 95 Rif War, 29 Roatta, General, 107, 108, 109, 110 Robles, 38, 39, 41, 43, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 103, 112, 212 Rodó, Laureano López, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 237, 238, 249, 251, 253, 255 Rojas, Captain, 39 Rojo, Colonel, 106, 118, 123 Roosevelt, 6, 152, 165, 166, 183, 184 Rubio, Mariano Navarro, 228, 229, 236, 249 Ruiz, José Solís, 228 Sagasta, 24 Salazar, 53, 125, 165, 172, 189, 191, 193, 258 Sánchez, General Bautista, 226, 227, 228 Sanjuanada Coup, 75 Sanjurjo, General, 38, 39, 45, 46, 48, 69, 72, 78, 80, 83, 87, 90, 93, 96, 127, 136 Sanz, José, 159 Second Republic, 35 Second Vatican Council, 225, 233, 242 Segura, Archbishop Pedro, 153, 154, 214, 215 Serrano, General, 23 Sherman, 205 Silvestre, General, 34, 68, 69 Sofía Subirán, 64 Solchaga, General José, 105

289

Sotelo, 43, 93, 112 Spanish American War 1898, 24 Sperrle, General, 106, 110, 111 Stalin, 5, 44, 52, 53, 74, 122, 124, 133, 138, 182, 195, 203, 260, 262 Steer, Journalist at Guernica, 111 Stohrer, German Representative, 117, 128, 143, 152, 153, 156, 157, 160, 169, 173 Suárez, Adolfo, 258 Suez Canal, 151, 158 Sultan Abdelhafid, 29 Suñer, 7, 10, 11, 78, 109, 113, 114, 118, 119, 128, 129, 132, 134, 135, 136, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 173, 189 Tangier, 29, 138, 140, 151, 152, 158, 177, 178, 185, 189 Taranto, 151 Tejedor, Fernando Herrero, 258 Tercera Fuerza See Opus Dei, 212 Teruel, Battle of, 49, 108, 118, 119, 120 The Barbarity of the Civil War, 55 The Restoration 1874, 23 Thorkild Riebr, 141 Toledo, siege of, 100, 101 Torch Operation, 4, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 173 Tragic Week, The, 27, 63 Tripartite Agreement, 146, 153 Truman, President, 184, 192, 196, 200, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 213, 214 Two war theory, Franco's, 175 Ulbricht, 2 Ullastres, Alberto, 228, 229, 237 United Nations, 139, 191, 192, 193, 195, 197, 198, 204, 208, 219, 249

290 Vale de los Caídos, 154 Valera, 161 Valiño, General García, 218 Valle de los Caídos, 202, 229, 250, 259 Varela, 161, 167, 176 Vatican Problems with Franco, 192, 225, 233, 237, 240, 242 Relations with Franco, 102, 109, 120, 153, 214, 241 Vatican Council II, 237, 243 Vega, 232, 245, 246, 250, 253 Vicente Gil, 259

Index Victor Emmanuel II, 22 Vietnam, 217, 218, 241 Vigón, 139, 140, 141, 159, 176, 212 Weddell, 151, 153, 162, 163, 166 Wehrmacht, 2, 153, 163, 185, 283 Wily Brandt, 250 Yagüe, 94, 98, 101, 106, 120, 121, 129, 139, 154, 170, 172, 173, 176 Yalta, 182 Zamora, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 63, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 243 Zaragoza Military Academy, 75