Privatizing Peace: How Commerce Can Reduce Conflict in Space [1 ed.] 0367336243, 9780367336240

Citation preview

PRIVATIZING PEACE

This book explores the privatization of space and its global impact on the future of commerce, peace, and conflict. As space becomes more congested, contested, and competitive in the government and the private arenas, the talk around space research moves past NASA’s monopoly on academic and cultural imaginations to discuss how Elon Musk’s SpaceX and Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin is making space “cool” again. This volume addresses the new rhetoric of space race and weaponization, with a focus on how the costs of potential conflict in space would discourage open conflict and enable global cooperation. It highlights the increasing dependence of the global economy on space research, its democratization, plunging costs of access, and growing economic potential of space-based assets. Thoughtful, nuanced, well-documented, this book is a must read for scholars and researchers of science and technology studies, space studies, political studies, sociology, environmental studies, and political economy. It will also be of much interest to policymakers, bureaucrats, think tanks, as well as the interested general reader looking for fresh perspectives on the future of space. Wendy N. Whitman Cobb is Associate Professor of Strategy and Security Studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), USA. Dr Whitman Cobb received a BA and MA from the University of Central Florida, USA, in Political Science, and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Florida, USA. Her research focuses on the political and institutional dynamics of space policy and public opinion of space exploration. She has published research in Space Policy, Congress and the Presidency, and the Journal of Political Science Education. Her recent publications include Unbroken Government: Success and the Illusion of Failure in Policymaking (2013); The Politics of Cancer: Malignant Indifference (2017); The CQ Press Career Guide for Political Science Students (2017); and Political Science Today (2019). Prior to arriving at SAASS, Dr Whitman Cobb was Associate Professor of Political Science at Cameron University in Lawton, Oklahoma, USA (2013–2019).

“Optimism amid talk of war in space is the theme of Professor Whitman Cobb’s thoughtful analysis of ongoing space politics; an analysis grounded in realism rather than idealism.” —Roger Handberg, Professor of Political Science, University of Central Florida, USA

PRIVATIZING PEACE How Commerce Can Reduce Conflict in Space

Wendy N. Whitman Cobb

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Wendy N. Whitman Cobb The right of Wendy N. Whitman Cobb to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-0-367-33624-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-33783-4 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-32191-7 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Apex CoVantage, LLC

For Mom

CONTENTS

Prefaceviii 1 A new space craze

1

2 The space environment

20

3 Logics of peace

37

4 The commercial space peace

56

5 Is it a trap? Arms races in space

77

6 The rise of private actors

97

7 Racing into the future

119

Index134

PREFACE

I was four years old when my mom first pointed out the contrail of a space shuttle launch to me from our home in South Florida. Though we were about 200 miles to the south of Kennedy Space Center, the white clouds quickly forming through the sky were hard to miss. Growing up in Florida all but guarantees some exposure to the US space program but it does not at all mean that people find it interesting. Perhaps I happened to be born at the right time to be exposed, not just to an active space program but to pop culture moments that lauded it—mid- to late-1990s movies and television heralded the heroes of Apollo 13, played up the underdogs of Armageddon, and reminded Americans of the heady days of the space race in the miniseries From the Earth to the Moon. Though old enough to be alive when Challenger happened, it was the Columbia disaster that impacted me most. February 1, 2003 was a Saturday, which meant working at my part-time job. I waited for the double sonic booms that would accompany a space shuttle landing, booms that would never come. When my manager informed us that there had been some sort of accident, I cried. I’m still not sure why I did, but the loss stung me deeply. Already interested in both space and politics, perhaps it was more than coincidence that I ended up at a university that featured classes in both space history and space policy though I had not intended on majoring in either political science or history. Plans change and as I worked through an undergraduate and then graduate political science program, taking each of those courses, I found myself increasingly thinking about space-related issues. As the space shuttle program wound its way to a close, I attended as many of the launches as I could, savoring the feel of the ground shaking and the fires of the engine visible during a night launch. Little did I know that space policy would come to be the field in which I have spent much of my professional career. Given that space policy is a rather small field, my graduate advisors encouraged me to study a broad range of topics in political science. This has certainly benefited me: I have been able to teach a wide variety of classes to my

Preface  ix

own students, but I have also been exposed to ideas and concepts that I have been able to bring to bear on space. For example, while I have examined presidential and congressional influence on space policy in the past, here, I utilize work from the field of international relations to discuss the benefits of space commercialization. Political science as a field is often too Balkanized; my exposure to many different perspectives has been helpful in finding connections that might otherwise have been missed. The argument I advance here springs from a surge of political science research in the mid- to late-1990s on the role of democracy and commerce in encouraging more peaceful relations between states. Popularized by Thomas Friedman as the “Golden Arches Theory” or the McDonald’s theory, the idea is that two countries with a McDonald’s have never gone to war with one another. More specifically, “when a country reaches a certain level of economic development, when it has a middle class big enough to support a McDonald’s, it becomes a McDonald’s country, and people in McDonald’s countries don’t like to fight wars; they like to wait in line for burgers.”1 As I say to my students when I introduce this idea, it’s not the golden fries or the Big Mac sauce that necessarily cause peace—it’s the level of economic development that a new McDonald’s represents. Friedman’s thesis, followed up on in his book The Lexus and the Olive Tree, has been far more extensively tested and refined in the pages of political science journals where debates over the democratic peace were raging. The phenomenon that democratic states do not go to war with other democratic states needed explaining and scholars, as Chapter 3 will detail, proposed all sorts of answers. Out of this research came further findings supporting the role of shared economics and commerce in reducing conflict, the starting point of the present project. As I observed the space program and global space activities in my earlier professional career, it was not entirely clear that commercial space enterprises could succeed. Until recently, the only actors that could marshal the necessary resources for an expensive space program were states, and, even then, just three states had been able to launch humans into space: the US, Russia, and China. If space were easy, everyone would be doing it and since they weren’t, space was clearly a hard thing to do. If states couldn’t do it, what gave entrepreneurs like Richard Branson and Elon Musk the idea that they could? Even when Musk’s SpaceX began to successfully launch its family of Falcon rockets in the early 2010s, I was still not convinced that what these companies were attempting was possible. To be able to manufacture and launch a rocket for less than $100 million seemed inconceivable, but time has proven me wrong. The costs of launch have come down significantly, thereby enabling access to space for smaller states, a broader range of companies, and even private individuals. SpaceX and Boeing are poised to launch crewed spacecraft for NASA to the International Space Station in addition to space tourists. The global economy has grown ever more dependent on space-based assets, without which our daily lives would be greatly altered. We and the global economy are dependent on space and commercial companies are in a place to further that dependence. Dependence has not come without danger. Just as the global economy has grown to rely on space, so have militaries across the globe. As will be discussed

x Preface

throughout this book, the Cold War space race might have had peaceful intentions on the surface, but underneath, it was sustained by national security fears and military imperatives. The military uses of space have been apparent far longer than the commercial ones. As is generally dictated by military planning, when a state comes to depend on a particular resource for national security, other states, looking to threaten them, focus on those things which are the most vulnerable, space being one them. Though space has always been militarized, it has yet to be weaponized and the debate over whether it should be continues to percolate through policy circles. While this is out of the scope of this project, the fear of many is that once one state utilizes space for the deployment of active weaponry, conflict will be all but inevitable. That conflict, because of the uniqueness of the space environment, represents a threat to all who use space either for human spaceflight, scientific purposes, or commercial enterprises. And with the global economy increasingly tied to space systems, the harmful effects of conflict will not remain located in one or two countries but spread throughout the world. In other words, space attacks perpetuated by one actor will threaten all, including the original instigator. If economic ties and commercial involvement can stem the spread of conflict on earth, I argue, it can do so in space. The extension of this idea to space is a new one that is only possible with the success of commercial actors like SpaceX. Further, given the ways in which space is used to support the global economy, the commercial space peace theory as developed here is not predicated on connections between states as the traditional economic peace literature tends to focus on but rather the systemic economic dependence on space-based assets. In brief, the more dependent the global economy is on space and the more dependent a state is dependent on the global economy, the higher the costs of engaging in conflict in space are and therefore states should not behave in a manner which threatens their own economic well-being. If policymakers wish to create conditions that lessen the chances for conflict, further commercialization of space and encouragement of private space actors should be pursued. While ideas might strike suddenly, the seeds of them are planted long before they flower. As such, appreciation is due to several individuals. Roger Handberg, my graduate advisor at the University of Central Florida, first introduced me to many of the principles of space policy. He patiently worked with a very eager young graduate student who wanted to do it all in no time flat and has continued to be an important influence in my work and kindly reviewed an earlier draft of this book. My husband, Josh, a fellow space geek, has indulged my debates and discussions for more than a decade now. He is usually my first sounding board and proofreader; my debates and discussions with him have been essential to my work. I began this book while at Cameron University in Lawton, Oklahoma—I am forever indebted to my colleagues there for their support and friendship. In the course of writing, I took up a new position with the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, the faculty of which has graciously welcomed me to their fold. As such, the views presented here are solely my own and do not

Preface  xi

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US government, Department of Defense, US Air Force, or Air University. This book is dedicated to my mom, who was the first to point out that space shuttle to me. While I don’t think she knew what that would start, she has continued to hold me to high standards even when I didn’t think I was capable of meeting them. As always, any remaining errors are my own.

Note 1 Thomas L. Friedman, “Foreign Affairs Big Mac I,” New York Times, published December 8, 1996, accessed February 9, 2019 at .

1 A NEW SPACE CRAZE

For those of us too young to have lived through the space craze of the late 1950s and early 1960s, recent years have been full of space-related adventures, cultural kitsch, and excitement in space. Movies and television shows are regularly set against a space backdrop—Star Wars and Star Trek have been revitalized for a new generation and films like The Martian and Gravity have stimulated interest in the real-life engineering challenges of space exploration. The logo of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), commonly known as “the meatball,” has been appropriated by the fashion world and used on everything from t-shirts to luxury handbags. LEGOs have put out space-themed sets including the Saturn V, the Apollo lunar module, the International Space Station (ISS), and a set featuring the women of NASA. In 2019, McDonald’s even released a series of Happy Meal toys featuring the comic strip character Snoopy in space. Some of this nostalgia is no doubt due to the 50th anniversary of the Apollo 11 landings in 2019, but the excitement is also due to a renewed energy in space exploration. Instead of government organizations like NASA leading the way, however, it is private companies and entrepreneurs like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos that are making space cool again. While the public has been fed visions of life in space since the mid-twentieth century, these two men, and others, are working to make that dream a reality, reducing the costs of launches and making near-earth space more accessible to actors beyond the government sphere. The reverence once given to rocket launches is now directed at the landings of launch boosters by Musk’s company, SpaceX. In the near future Bezos’ Blue Origin and Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic will offer ordinary citizens the opportunity to take a suborbital launch to space. Where once many people dreamed of being an astronaut, the actual opportunity to be one is finally coming true. Viscerally, the space excitement seems to be building once more, but there is reason to question both the level of public enthusiasm and the relative safety in

2  A new space craze

which new space activities will be carried out. To the first question, the General Social Survey, a biannual survey of Americans undertaken by NORC at the University of Chicago, has asked respondents about their interest in space since 2008. Though the number is ticking upwards, Figure 1.1 shows that the percentage of individuals who responded “very interested” is the lowest among the three options. In 2018, just over a quarter of respondents expressed that they were very interested. On the other hand, those who reported they were moderately interested actually fell from 52% in 2010 (when the shuttle was still launching) to 43.9% just two years later. More importantly, there is fairly little variation in this data from year to year; although there are hopeful signs, a significant chunk of the American public does not express much interest, if at all, in space. At the same time, the revolutions that Musk and Bezos are spurring to make space more accessible are also decreasing the cost for governments to operate in space. With militaries and governments around the world becoming more dependent on space, space-based assets are also becoming more vulnerable and a target for potential aggressors. Though the militarized nature of space has been present since before the launch of Sputnik, the hostile rhetoric never proved to be more than bluster, even during the Cold War. Where some people predicted the inevitable breakout of hostilities in space between the US and the Soviet Union, open conflict never did occur. Today, however, the aggressive language regarding space is once again rising and includes new players like China and India. Leaders of countries including the US, China, and Russia have argued that a new space race is breaking out. The US has gone so far as to stand up a new military service, the Space Force, with the mission to deter attacks against US assets and defend against them should they occur. China and Russia are investing heavily in space technology and weaponry that could be deployed at any time.

60

50 40

30 20

10 0

2008

2010

Very interested FIGURE 1.1 Interest

2012

2014

2016

Moderately interested

in space exploration by percent, 2008–2018

2018

Not at all interested

A new space craze  3

Space is a harsh enough environment—open military conflict in space will make operating there even more difficult for governments and commercial companies alike. Should it occur, it will also put at risk the state of the global economy which is largely dependent on space-based systems for its functioning. This presents a dilemma for space states that are at once dependent on space and see it as a future battleground—there is a need for stability to promote commerce and other missions, but space powers like the US, China, and Russia do not find it in their interest to create a more stable regime that could potentially limit the military uses of space. Some analysts have argued that because of this, states, particularly the United States, should deploy weapons and dominate space before other countries have the chance to.1 Others believe concerted action can and should be taken to avoid such an outcome.2 While both sides of this debate have valid arguments, this book is an attempt to bring the economic and military aspects of space together to argue that the economic and commercial benefits of space should act as a restraint on potential conflict in space. Drawing on the findings of scholars about the pacific benefits of trade and commerce, I show how this argument can be extended and applied to space through the global economy’s dependence on space systems. Before previewing these arguments, however, this chapter details the current space environment and the relationship between space development and its military uses.

The new space era The 2011 US National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) describes the new space environment as congested, contested, and competitive.3 Its description of the space environment remains just as applicable, though this policy document has now been replaced by the Trump administration. First, space is congested in the sense that there are far more objects in orbit than ever before. Although the potential of space seems unlimited, humans are mostly concerned with the resources available in the space immediately surrounding the earth including low earth orbit and geostationary orbit (discussed further in the following chapter). As of September 2019, there were 2,218 satellites in orbit with 1,468 in low earth orbit and 562 in geostationary orbit.4 These numbers have already grown and will continue to do so as SpaceX intends to launch a constellation of satellites to provide global internet access. While the number in geostationary orbit is rather low, a significant amount of physical distance is required between each satellite so that radio interference is minimized. In addition to the congestion created by more users and satellites, space debris is an increasing challenge. Because objects in space are traveling at thousands of miles an hour, collisions between items in space can have disastrous effects—spacecraft hit with a piece of debris just a few centimeters in size can have their missions ended if they are not destroyed first. Though debris has been deposited since the first space launches, more aggressive actions in space also create a hazard. For example, in 2007, China conducted its first anti-satellite (ASAT) test. ASATs can be launched in various ways including from under the wing of an aircraft or from the ground like a

4  A new space craze

missile. In either case, their mission is to intercept a satellite in orbit with the intent to destroy it. In geopolitical terms, ASAT tests are important in demonstrating to other actors that a state has the capability to deny others access to space by targeting a satellite. However, the effects of China’s ASAT test were larger than making a military statement: The explosion produced 900 trackable objects over 10cm immediately, a 10% increase in total orbital debris, but with the prediction that the total number may come to several tens of thousands between 200 and 3800 km [in altitude]. The altitude of the interception was so high that the debris would take thousands of years to fall back to earth.5 These figures are striking, but any piece of debris, whether from the Chinese ASAT test (or others previously conducted by the US and Russia and now India), used launch vehicles, or malfunctioning satellites, can create debris which is not easily removed and can significantly threaten the space environment. That the physical space around earth has become so congested naturally leads to the idea that it is also more contested than ever before. Since the space frontier opened in the 1950s, access to space has been dominated by two main states: the United States and the former Soviet Union. During the Cold War, in addition to the US and the Soviet Union, France, Japan, China, the United Kingdom, India, and Israel developed independent launch systems, though not all were used consistently. More frequently, states used launch systems built by either the United States (or companies in the United States) and Russia to launch national satellite systems. Because access to space has historically been quite expensive, only states with the resources to devote to it and states with the willingness to divert money to it could participate. This cost has significantly limited the number of states willing to undertake such programs on their own. While some states have taken advantage of the launch services provided by others, others have created cooperative relationships to share the costs of expensive space programs as in the case of the European Space Agency (ESA). This eliminates the need to develop homegrown launch systems which have proven the most expensive element to develop, build, and operate. Focusing solely on states that have independent access to space, however, minimizes the actual number of countries that operate there. In reality, more than 80 states have launched satellites and even more utilize the systems that reside in orbit like the Global Positioning System (GPS). Space is also more competitive as barriers to entry have been lowered. This competition is apparent not just in access to technology, specific orbits, or ability to launch but in competition for power in space and on earth. This type of competition harkens back to the Cold War space race when the US and Soviet Union sought to prove which country was not only more technologically more capable but more dominant. With relations between Moscow and Washington on the decline in recent years, some analysts have speculated about the prospects of a second Cold War with others arguing that the Cold War never really ended.6 The

A new space craze  5

degradation of relations has led to an increased focus on military capabilities in both countries, with each developing new weapons systems. Though tensions between the US and Russia are high, China also represents a rising influence. In terms of its relation to the US, China poses not only a military threat but an economic one. In space, China has quickly established themselves as a growing space power despite their late start. China’s official space program dates to the 1950s but has a long and tumultuous history; political instability like the Cultural Revolution stymied, not just the resources available for space development, but the willingness to commit to it.7 What China did accomplish, they did so mostly on their own; following a fall out with Moscow in the late 1950s, Chinese scientists had limited contact with the outside world. Even so, by 1970, they launched their first rocket and satellite and by the 1980s, they were marketing their rockets to the rest of the world. While focusing primarily on military uses of space, a new human spaceflight program came about in the early 1990s and what has followed has been a series of human space missions culminating in their own homegrown space station, increased rocket capacity, and a series of science-based lunar probes and landers. Chinese military space capabilities have continued to advance beyond kinetic anti-satellite weapons, moving into lasers, satellite jammers, hypersonic missiles, and other non-kinetic satellite weapons.8 Some see the rise of China as a potential catalyst for a new space race. Chinese entry into the space launch market in the 1980s worried many in the United States that China’s subsidization of the rockets would undercut the launch market and destroy US space companies.9 As a result, the United States forced China to enter into a restrictive agreement that limited the number of launches they could offer for sale and at what prices. Although the Chinese have repeatedly sought cooperation with other countries in space, the United States has generally refused, especially regarding the ISS. In fact, in 2011, Representative Frank Wolf inserted a provision in a spending bill that prohibited NASA from cooperating with China in any scientific capacity.10 Wolf accused China of stealing technology and information from NASA and other American agencies and businesses. Though NASA can now communicate with China after notifying Congress, the ban, as well as fears of Chinese espionage, persist. It is just this type of fear and suspicion that could lead to a competitive space race between China and the United States. Despite the attention paid to the activities of Russia and China in space, other states are actively looking to advance their space technologies as well including India and Brazil. More troublesome are countries like Iran and North Korea whose space launch programs often serve as cover for ballistic missile development. In January of 2019, American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said as much, warning Iran not to undertake a planned space launch as the vehicle had “virtually [the] same technology as ICBMs.”11 Despite the failure of Iran‘s launch, the fear remains given that both North Korea and Iran have based their launch vehicles on Soviet missile designs.12 While the Trump administration has shown a willingness to work with North Korea, the same cannot be said of Iran, which is viewed as a major Middle Eastern threat. Though neither country’s space technology is on

6  A new space craze

par with the United States’ (or even Russia’s or China’s for that matter), ongoing space development could lead to a scenario where future space powers must decide whether to allow such launches and, if not, how to stop them from accessing space. Space has also become more competitive in an economic sense. Klaus Knorr, writing on the implications of space in 1960, significantly discounted the economic potential of space, writing, The greatest economic advantages from advancing outer space activities may eventually be derived from the facilitation of scientific breakthroughs which lead to vastly cheaper energy. But even if gross energy were virtually costless, it is hard to see how the economic results the world over could be revolutionary.13 Despite this pessimism at the dawn of the space age, the US moved quickly to capitalize on its potential. The 1962 launch of Telstar 1, the first communications satellite, was commercially sponsored but was launched by NASA on a Thor-Delta rocket, a military derived and built system. Similarly, the US founded the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) in 1963 to develop communications systems which led to the creation of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) in 1964. While the development of a commercial space sector has taken time to develop, both US and Soviet policy changes in the 1980s contributed to its growth.14 By the late 1980s, launch services could be procured from the US, the Soviet Union, and China, newly emerging in the market. In 1990, Orbital Sciences launched the first privately designed and built rocket, the Pegasus. Since then, the global space economy has greatly expanded: in 2016, it was worth over $344 billion with less than a quarter of that coming from government spending.15 SpaceX and Blue Origin are just two of the private companies seeking profit in space. Boeing has also developed a crew capsule and launch system that can service low earth orbit. Orbital ATK, the United Launch Alliance (a joint venture of Boeing and Lockheed Martin) and Rocket Lab also provide space launch services in the US. However, even with the entry of these companies, launch services only accounted for 2% of the space economy in 2017.16 In addition to the drastic reduction in launch costs, the cost to develop satellites has also fallen. Cubesats, small, prefabricated satellites, can cost as little as $295,000, including the launch.17 These types of satellites are not only cheaper, but companies can afford a greater number of them which can be easily replaced should one fail. As a sign of how ubiquitous these satellites have become, in 2018, SpaceX launched a Falcon 9 payload consisting solely of cubesats and small sats, a slightly larger version of a cubesat. The 64 small sats represented 34 organizations in 17 different countries.18 SpaceX is developing a small sat based communications system called Starlink which could eventually consist of 12,000 satellites designed to provide low-cost internet services to those in underserved areas.19 SpaceX’s example shows that companies can utilize the lower costs of both launch services and satellites in such a way as to expand economic opportunities on the ground.

A new space craze  7

The global economy has also come to depend on these space-based assets. James Clay Moltz notes that “the real money to be made in space is from transmitting information.”20 Communications, financial transactions, remote imaging—all are forms of information services that rely directly and heavily on satellite infrastructure. The failure of one communications satellite in 1998 led to problems with telephone and pager communications, television broadcasting, weather and radar data, and even gas station credit card transactions.21 Today, the loss of one satellite might not be as significant because of redundancies provided through additional satellites, but this does not mean that satellites are any less vulnerable to attack. Crucially, these attacks, or even disruptions from space weather, need not be physical any longer as techniques such as spoofing, hacking, or interfering with radio signals could also be just as troublesome. Taken together, the description that space is more congested, contested, and competitive paints a picture of heightening tensions in near-earth space. More people than ever before are operating in an environment that is increasingly constrained but also increasingly important in the global economy and our day-to-day lives. With more opportunities through which to encounter each other comes a higher risk of those encounters turning dangerous.

Militarization and weaponization of space As space becomes more congested, contested, and competitive, fears have risen about new conflicts in space or even a new space race. These conflicts have obvious military overtones but the military’s role in space has been instrumental since before the launch of Sputnik 1 by the Soviet Union in 1957. At this point, it is important to emphasize the distinction between weaponization and militarization of space. The Cold War space race pushed each country to demonstrate advanced space capabilities including launch systems, scientific exploration, space applications, and, most importantly, the ability to launch humans into space for ever increasing lengths of time and distance. Underlying all of this was a military edge; like the rest of the Cold War, the space race was about establishing the dominance militarily, politically, and economically of one system or the other. Rockets, pointed skywards, can take humans and equipment to outer space, but pointed in a different direction, they can deliver nuclear weapons to the other side of the globe. This highlights one of the most enduring features of space assets and capabilities: the dual-use nature of technology. To refer to something as dual-use means that the same hardware can be used for both military and civilian (peaceful) purposes. Rockets can double as missiles and communications satellites can provide services to both civilians and the military. Remote sensing satellites can send images of the earth back to the ground to assist farmers as they plan their crops, but those images can also be used to spy on other countries. GPS provides location and direction services to millions of consumers today, but it originated as a military program to locate ships at sea. Space is already militarized in the sense that space systems already serve military purposes. It has not

8  A new space craze

yet, however, been weaponized. Calls to ban the weaponization of space present a thorny problem both in deciding what qualifies as a weapon in space (an otherwise innocuous satellite could be maneuvered in such a way that causes it to collide with another) as well as in distinguishing a system’s civilian and military purposes. Further, as Michael Krepon, Theresa Hitchens, and Michael Katz-Hyman highlight, there are significant gray areas in the use of non-kinetic weapons like lasers and jamming that complicate the line between weaponization and militarization.22 The Cold War space race mirrored the Cold War itself in having an outwardly peaceful face (human exploration) with military undertones. Recognizing this duality, President Dwight Eisenhower purposefully sought to place distance between the military and civilian aspects of the early American space program by designating NASA, a civilian organization, as lead on human spaceflight and other space activities. Although the various military branches continued to explore how best to utilize space as an asset, NASA became the peaceful face through which the competition took place. Ever more powerful launch systems became the proxy through which each country could demonstrate the power of its missiles and their ability to reach across the globe. While the dynamics of the Cold War space race will be further discussed in Chapter 5, suffice it to say here that the early space race was a competition for primacy in technology with a civilian face but military undertones. Despite this hard edge to the Cold War space race, it is perhaps heartening that, like the Cold War itself, actual conflict in space has yet to emerge. From the beginning, both the Soviet Union and the United States sought ways to limit weapons in space, albeit for purposes that benefited themselves at the time. In the early 1960s, The loss of seven satellites because of the electromagnetic pulse generated by space-based nuclear tests in 1962, mutual fear of radiation threats to astronauts, and the risks of nuclear war highlighted by the October Cuban Missile Crisis pushed the two sides to accept military restraint in space out of self-interest.23 In 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty banned nuclear tests in orbit, at sea, and in the atmosphere as a way to limit threats from nuclear weapons in space. This breakthrough in weapons negotiations between the Soviet Union and the US helped lead to the creation and adoption of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) in 1967. The OST established several important principles including a ban on weapons testing and military operations on celestial bodies, the avoidance of harmful contamination of space, the responsibility of states for damage caused by their objects and activities in space, and importantly that The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.24

A new space craze  9

Several other documents expanded on aspects of the OST (for example the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects), but the OST remains the single most important legal framework for international activities in space. As can be expected, the debate over whether to weaponize space is heated. Moltz identifies four schools of thought on the prospects of weaponization of space and eventual conflict. From the most to the least conflictual, he calls them space nationalism, technological determinism, social interactionism, and global institutionalism.25 In brief, space nationalism adopts many of the tenets of the realist school of international relations, particularly that the global system is anarchic and that states cannot be expected to cooperate with one another. As such, the weaponization of space is all but inevitable and countries, specifically the United States, should adopt the types of systems needed to protect themselves in space. A more extreme version of this nationalist school is a line of thinking advanced by Everett C. Dolman who argues that given this inevitability, the United States should adopt a more hegemonic position and move to fully exert control over near-earth space.26 Not only would this ensure continued American dominance in space, but, according to Dolman, the US would also enforce treaty obligations and protect near-earth space for commercial activities.27 Accepting this, however, requires one to accept that conflict in space is inevitable; despite fears that the US and the Soviet Union would come to blows in space even as late as the 1980s, it never occurred. This line of argument will be further considered in Chapter 5. Technological determinism emphasizes the role of technology and its development in shaping the bargaining environment available to players in the space environment. While Moltz’s concern is to trace the development of these ideas over time, for our purposes, the most recent iteration of technological determinism is the most important: “Management arrangements [for space] may be possible but will rely on favorable structural conditions, communications, and political bargaining.”28 The state of space technology, what is and what is not impossible and at what costs, are important to consider in thinking about the weaponization of space. If the technology simply does not exist to support such developments, there is no need to worry. On the other hand, if the technology is possible and costs are feasible, it may be very difficult to stop. This is where the third school becomes important, social interactionism. Social interactionists rejected the notion of the inevitability of space weapons, given the availability of policy tools among space-faring states to interact with one another, bargain, and prevent the deployment of harmful weapons, which could damage other priorities they have in space.29 In other words, understanding the current global environment, the actors involved, and the political possibilities, interested states (and outside actors) can work together to create rules of the road, if not formal treaties, which would be harder to achieve politically.

10  A new space craze

At the opposite end of the conflict spectrum from nationalism is global institutionalism. Just as the space nationalist school adopted the principles of realism, global space institutionalists accept many of the arguments of the liberal foreign policy perspective. These include the possibilities of cooperation among states, a significant role for treaties and international law, and a belief in the effectiveness of international organizations. In terms of weaponization of space, advocates believe that it is by no means inevitable and can be easily headed off through the completion of new international treaties and perhaps the creation of a new international organization to oversee space. This position also assumes, however, that space should be a sanctuary in that it should not be used for aggressive, non-peaceful purposes and should not be weaponized. Conflict is not inevitable and can be stopped through cooperative, international means. One of the key differences between the space nationalists and global institutionalists is whether conflict is inevitable. In this way, the debate reflects theoretical differences between liberal international relations theory which believes states are capable of cooperating and working together and realist theory which presumes that power-seeking states do not rationally cooperate. If this debate boils down to versions of these two theories, then it is also to international relations theory that we can look to solve a seemingly intractable dilemma.

A space economic peace In 1996, Thomas Friedman proposed an idea that has long historical roots. His version: “No two countries that both have a McDonald’s have ever fought a war against each other.”30 It’s not the fries or the Big Mac that cause a lack of conflict; instead, Friedman argues, it is the level of economic development represented by having a McDonald’s in a country: when a country reaches a certain level of economic development, when it has a middle class big enough to support a McDonald’s country, it becomes a McDonald’s country, and people in McDonald’s countries don’t like to fight wars; they like to wait in line for burgers. Friedman’s Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention highlights a much older line of thought regarding the causes of peace. In his 1795 essay, “Perpetual Peace,” Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant discusses several principles which he believed would lead to the end of all conflict. Later scholars have boiled these down to what is called the Kantian triangle: democratic governments, the utilization of international organizations, and a greater degree of economic interdependence will reduce global conflict and create a state of peace. Generations of scholars since have sought to identify not only whether this theory (or versions of it) hold true but exactly what the underlying causal mechanisms are. By the end of the twentieth century, scholars zeroed in on the democratic peace theory which attempts to explain why democracies do not go to war with other

A new space craze  11

democracies and why, in some analyses, they seem to be more prone to peace in general than non-democracies. Similar to the golden arches, what is it about democracy that seems to induce such peacefulness? Academics have proposed everything from the nature of mediating institutions to the restraint of public opinion, to trade relations. While these variations will be explored further in Chapter 3, of interest here are the versions that focus explicitly on trade, commercial ties, and capitalism. Along these lines, Erik Gartzke argues, “peace ensues when states lack differences worthy of costly conflict.”31 If the costs of conflict are too high, then states should be more unlikely to engage in it. To this end, economic globalization can provide the means through which costs are raised. “The integration of world markets not only facilitates commerce, but also creates new interests inimical to war. Financial interdependence ensures that damage inflicted on one economy travels through the global system, afflicting even aggressors.”32 Focusing his analysis primarily on the influence of capitalism, Gartzke’s findings suggest that states with markets more closely tied to the global economy are far less likely to experience a militarized dispute.33 In thinking about the space environment today, there are obvious principles of capitalism at work. However, China, a major spacefaring state that has been making capitalist reforms, arguably remains far from a true capitalist country. This is especially true in their space industry which is heavily subsidized by the state and almost wholly integrated with China’s military.34 Many other states continue to subsidize space activities heavily as well. A better approach through which to examine conflict in space is presented by an offshoot of the capitalist peace which is termed the commercial peace. The commercial peace thesis emphasizes the role of trade and the connections made through it to explain a lack of conflict. Han Dorussen and Hugh Ward write: Trade is important not only because it creates an economic interest in peace but also because trade generates ‘connections’ between people that promote communication and understanding. . . . Based on these ideas, the flow of goods between countries creates a network of ties and communication links. If two countries are more embedded in this network, their relations should be more peaceful.35 Given the interconnectedness of the global economy to space-based assets, a version of the commercial peace thesis can be used to argue that the chance of conflict in space is less than is commonly understood or recognized precisely because of the extent to which the global economy has become dependent on space-based assets. To understand this argument, consider a scenario in which Russia, in preparation for a new assault on Eastern Europe, attacks a key US military satellite with the purpose of disrupting and disabling military communications in Europe. This action would conceivably enable the Russians to undertake their attack under more favorable conditions and prevent a quicker response from America and its allies. However, if the satellite was attacked via an ASAT that kinetically destroyed the

12  A new space craze

US satellite, the debris cloud created from the attack could have disastrous consequences beyond military communications. Much like the movie Gravity, the debris cloud could cause a chain reaction, hitting and disabling other satellites that would in turn disrupt civilian communications, business transactions, and perhaps even Russian military satellites. The economic effects of lost satellites would not be restricted to one country alone; the global economic consequences in terms of lost property (satellites), lost transactions, and financial havoc would echo throughout the world, including in Russia itself. Finally, the attack on one satellite could even ultimately endanger the ISS and its inhabitants, several of which are Russians. Destruction of the ISS would negate billions of dollars in investment from not just Russia, but other countries that have participated in it including Japan, Italy, and Canada. Therefore, an attack on a US military satellite would not just be an attack on one but an attack on all. While the previous scenario highlights several reasons why it would not be in Russia’s best interest to attack a US satellite, this book argues that the economic argument is both the strongest and the most restraining especially as space becomes more congested, competitive, contested, and commercialized. The emergence of private space companies enhances this argument. “In the commercial sector, companies need reliability and legal enforcement mechanisms if they are going to operate profitably in a shared environment.”36 In order to foster the growing area of space commercialization, companies must be assured that the activities they undertake in space will be protected in some way or, at a minimum, allowed to proceed to the extent where they can reap the profit. This could be done through international organizations that would provide some sort of space traffic control, but the likelihood of a major international breakthrough on rules regarding space is unlikely in the near term. Therefore, actors must rely on the protections afforded them by an increasingly globalized economy that is ever more dependent on space-based assets. Admittedly, there is a significant objection to this argument: The attacking of assets in space does not actually need to be carried out physically in orbit. There are alternative means of denying access to space including the use of groundbased lasers to interfere with a satellite’s operations, the jamming of satellite-based signals, cyber-based hacking of satellites, and even attacks on ground controllers and tracking stations. These would reduce the physical consequences of damage to the space economy’s infrastructure and minimize the chances of harm to other “innocent” satellites or human life. While this objection will be taken up in greater detail in later chapters, I argue that these means of attacking space assets represent other means of conflict (traditional, cyber, and/or electronic) and would therefore not be considered a space-based conflict. For example, hacking into an enemy’s satellite signals and “spoofing” them (providing interrupting a true signal and replacing it with a false one) are better considered an element of cyber and electronic warfare, not space warfare. Even though the attack would appear to be on the satellite, the attack is really on the information the satellite is providing. The difference is subtle but important because it is not a physical attack on the source of the signal itself.

A new space craze  13

This argument obviously depends on several assumptions including the rationality of space actors, the emphasis on states rather than non-state actors in space, and the degree to which the economy is globalized and space dependent. These arguments will be fleshed out in the coming chapters, however, I argue that the commercial peace thesis as applied to space is an alternative way to reconcile realist and liberal arguments regarding conflict by increasing the economic costs of conflict to the extent that power-seeking countries no longer find it in their best interest to undertake such actions. Thus, conflict is not inevitable and states should not seek to disrupt the space environment through the deployment of weapons. While this might fit under the rubric of Moltz’s global institutionalism described previously, it notably does not include a specific mandate for additional international agreements or even the creation of organizations dedicated to overseeing space. Instead, it argues that the natural costs imposed by increasing commercialization will necessarily limit and restrain conflict.

Constructive competition Though the major argument detailed here is that the potential economic costs of conflict in space significantly reduce the chance of militarized conflict in space, an additional argument is that not all space races are created equal. While the term “space race” has a certain negative connotation to it, that does not have to be the case. Yet another aspect of international relations theory can assist in this analysis: constructivism. In an influential 1992 article, Alexander Wendt, in explicating a theory of constructivism, wrote that “Anarchy is what states make of it.”37 The overall argument Wendt advocates is that ideas and identities in international politics are not fixed and firm; instead we can change the meaning of important concepts simply by changing the way we think about them. The same can be true of space races. A number of space scholars have advocated the idea not that the space race was necessarily a good or bad thing, but that it significantly and positively contributed to the growth of technology and scientific understanding.38 Without the competition spurred on by the space race, these benefits would either not exist or would have come along at a far slower pace. Therefore, without competition among states (or other space actors), the motivation to undertake significant programs that have the potential to unleash new knowledge and technology may be lacking and such innovations may not be made at all. In this sense, space races are a good thing in creating an atmosphere where innovation is fostered and rapid advances in technology are made. Certainly, the original space race led to a slew of important and influential discoveries. Advances in the miniaturization of computers and integrated circuits were desperately needed for early space programs so as to reduce the weight of crewed capsules that were being launched.39 This electronics revolution directly contributed to the electronics of today, allowing us to carry around ever smaller computers and cell phones. Communications satellites, GPS and satellite radio, and television

14  A new space craze

would not be possible as they are today without the quickened pace of space development during the space race.40 In addition to technological benefits, the space race contributed to our understanding of science, the universe, and medicine. The science that took place on the moon and the rocks brought back from those missions have led to new discoveries about how the moon was created. Early space race discoveries included the identification of the Van Allen radiation belts and their role in protecting the earth’s atmosphere from solar wind. Later scientific missions like the Hubble Space Telescope and the Kepler Space Telescope have given us the best looks yet at the early universe and identified hundreds of exoplanets (planets orbiting other stars in the galaxy). Perhaps most importantly, competition itself has provided a means toward cooperation with erstwhile antagonists. This perspective is reflected in Dorussen and Ward’s argument regarding the benefits of trade itself. The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act which established NASA, set as one of the agency’s objectives “Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations . . . and in the peaceful applications of the results.”41 Although most of NASA’s early activities were undertaken alone, by the fall of 1963, President John F. Kennedy, in a speech at the United Nations, called for a joint US-Soviet Union moon program. Even prior to this, Kennedy directed parts of his administration to seek ways in which the US could cooperate with the Soviet Union in areas including weather prediction, life sciences, and oceanography.42 Historians have long debated the motivations behind the cooperative overtures which could have included cooperation as a way to reduce the costs of space exploration, a means through which to better US technology in a period where many saw the US as lagging behind, and as a way to expose the secrecy of the Soviet space program to draw a comparison between the competing ideological systems.43 Although the Soviets did not take Kennedy up on his offer, in pursuing a policy of détente with the Soviet Union, Richard Nixon agreed to the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) in 1972 that would find an Apollo capsule docking with a Soviet Soyuz capsule in 1975. To facilitate this mission, not only did astronauts and cosmonauts undergo collaborative training, but Soviet and American scientists had to design a docking module which would allow the two spacecraft to successfully rendezvous and link up in low earth orbit. Though the ASTP was limited in duration, it demonstrates that even in the midst of intense international conflict, cooperation is indeed possible. Cooperation in space has continued to be used as a tool of foreign policy and a major theme of American actions in space.44 For example, what today is known as the ISS began as a Ronald Reagan approved program in the mid-1980s called Space Station Freedom. With NASA reeling from the Challenger disaster post-1986 and massive budgetary pressures, the space station program suffered from budget cuts, design issues, and significant delays.45 In the early 1990s, the space station program was nearly ended in the House of Representatives on several occasions only later to be reprieved. When Bill Clinton entered the White House, NASA Administrator Dan Goldin persuaded the new administration to invite Russia to participate in the space station not just as a way of shoring up the station but as a

A new space craze  15

way to keep Russian scientists and engineers employed during a period of transition and with an eye towards arms control.46 With Russian participation, the first module of the ISS was launched in 1998 and construction completed in 2011. While this focus on the cooperation between the US and the former Soviet Union belies the amount of ongoing cooperation the US has engaged in with allies and other countries, the point is instructive. Space not only provides the means through which countries compete but can also provide a means through which they can cooperate. Nothing is free of politics, but cooperation in the areas of space and science is easier than cooperation in military affairs, economic policy, or trade policy precisely because it lacks many political overtones. The language and tools of science are non-partisan and non-ideological. Scientists regardless of race, religion, creed, or nationality can all participate in joint efforts knowing that their work is based on evidence and fact discovered through the scientific method. Cooperation in science and space activities can help lead to cooperation in other areas by allowing countries to build a base of reciprocity and trust. As interactions are repeated and the parties come to trust one another, cooperation can be expanded into other areas. This argument, that space races are not necessarily undesirable, represents the second major argument of this book. In many ways, the two arguments, that cooperation can be based on economic connections and competition can lead to cooperation, are somewhat related. Capitalism itself is based on the idea of competition; as merchants seek to provide the best product at the lowest cost to attract the most consumers, products are improved, technology is advanced, and consumers benefit. Thus, competition leads to benefits for the economy as a whole allowing it to improve and expand. While economic competition has certainly turned hostile and fierce in the past (for example, in designating parts of the Middle East and Africa as the province of certain European nations, dangerous trade wars, or nationalistic backlashes against economic globalization), today’s global economy continually reminds us of how interconnected we all are. Those interconnections have been fostered by the space-based capabilities on which today’s economy depends. With a greater appreciation for both, I argue that conflict is minimized and cooperation enhanced.

Plan of the book In addition to stimulating a new generation’s excitement about space, SpaceX’s pursuit of reusable launch technology has proven quite profitable: in 2019, it was valued at $33.3 billion, making it one of the highest valued private startups globally.47 SpaceX not only expects to continue providing launch services for the US military, NASA, and other global customers but intends to move into the area of space tourism. In February of 2020, the company announced it had teamed with Space Adventures to offer would-be astronauts trips to space as early as 2021.48 Though the prospect of space tourism is enticing, it adds another dangerous element to a contested, congested, and competitive space environment. If ordinary

16  A new space craze

people become an ordinary occurrence (aside from trained astronauts, cosmonauts, and taikonauts), the dangers posed by a conflict in space become exponentially greater than loss of property. If humans are harmed, it would become about loss of life. If that were to occur, the burgeoning interest in space among the general public would be likely cut short. To further explore the application of the commercial peace theory to space, this book proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 briefly summarizes key features of the nearearth space environment, the extensive commercial uses of space, and the problem posed by space debris. The message in this chapter is that the global economy has become so thoroughly intertwined with and dependent on space-based assets that the threats to infrastructure represent a cost that states will be unwilling to pay in starting a space conflict. These concepts are key in that they underlie the major arguments presented in the rest of the book. Chapter 3 explores the logics of the democratic and capitalist peace theories and their varieties. Scholars have proposed any number of underlying causal mechanism to explain lack of conflict but not all are, or would be, applicable to space. After a discussion of these theories and confronting their critiques, Chapter 4 details the commercial space peace theory. The major implication of the theory is that as the global economy becomes more dependent on space-based assets, the cost of space conflict for all parties is increased. The effects of physical attacks on satellites cannot be restricted solely to military assets; the threat of debris is so great that a cascade of collisions may be unavoidable, sending shockwaves through the global economy. While commercial interests may prevent conflict in space today, we cannot neglect the fact that despite the heavily militarized nature of the space race and ensuing space development, no open conflict has yet to emerge. Chapter 5 briefly explores arms races, the Cold War space race, and restraints that serve to limit conflict. Despite periods throughout the Cold War where conflict in space seemed inevitable, both the US and Soviet Union realized that placing weapons in space would disrupt their own ability to act freely in space. As a result, they utilized various means of cooperative restraint to tamp down on tensions. Though economic concerns were not prominent during the Cold War, the underlying logic that the costs of conflict are greater than the benefits is still applicable today. Chapter 6 takes up the role of non-state and state actors in space, beginning with a question: What keeps Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos from using their launch systems in an offensive manner? This intriguing question has parallels with the role of non-state actors on earth who seek to acquire weapons to use for their own purposes. Chapter 6 argues that states remain central to the equation because commercial space activities are largely regulated in the states in which they take place and because the Outer Space Treaty places responsibility for objects in space on the countries in which they originated. The final chapter assesses the chances of a new space race given today’s space environment. It returns to the argument that space races do not necessarily have negative consequences and that the relationships established through global trade and commerce enhance the relationships that are made through scientific

A new space craze  17

exchange. In time, these connections might lead to enhanced international organizations, coordination mechanisms, or increased cooperation among states in space endeavors, but, in the short run, economic priorities will keep conflict from expanding into the stars. In that, this book presents, if not an entirely hopeful picture of the future of space, then one based in realistic assumptions about global priorities and needs.

Notes 1 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, Frank Cass Publishers, New York, 2002. 2 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens, Routledge, New York, 2017. 3 Director of National Intelligence, “National Security Space Strategy,” published January 3, 2011, accessed February 10, 2019 at . 4 “UCS Satellite Database,” Union of Concerned Scientists, accessed February 19, 2020 at . 5 Brian Harvey, China in Space: The Great Leap Forward, Springer, New York, 2013, p. 177. 6 As but one example, see Richard Sakwa, “ ‘New Cold War’ or Twenty Years’ Crisis? Russia and International Politics,” International Affairs, 84(2), 2008: pp. 241–267. 7 For excellent discussions on the history of China’s space program, see Harvey, China in Space; Roger Handberg and Zhen Li, Chinese Space Policy: A Study in Domestic and International Politics, Routledge, New York, 2007; Joan Johnson-Freese, The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within a Maze, Krieger Publishing Company, Malabar, FL, 1998. 8 R. Lincoln Hines, “Is China Catching Up to the United States in Space?” Washington Post Monkey Cage, published April 24, 2019, accessed May 13, 2019 at . 9 Harvey, China in Space; Handberg and Li, Chinese Space Policy. 10 Alex Stuckey,“Why Chinese Astronauts are Banned from the International Space Station, NASA Activities,” Houston Chronicle, published February 22, 2018, accessed February 4, 2019 at . 11 David Schmerler,“Iran’s Space Launch: ICBM or Space Program Development?” Foreign Policy Research Institute, published January 22, 2019, accessed February 4, 2019 at . 12 Ibid. 13 Klaus Knorr, “On the International Implications of Outer Space,” World Politics, 12(4), 1960: p. 570. 14 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests, 3rd ed., Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2019. 15 Federal Aviation Administration, “The Annual Compendium of Commercial Space Transportation: 2018,” published January 2018, accessed February 1, 2019 at . 16 Ibid. 17 “Price Schedule,” Spaceflight, accessed February 4, 2019 at . 18 Caleb Henry, “SpaceX Launches All-SmallSat Falcon 9 Mission,” Space News, published December 3, 2018, accessed February 4, 2019 at .

18  A new space craze

19 Alan Boyle, “Report: SpaceX Raising $500M to Get Starlink Satellite Service Off the Ground,” GeekWire, published December 18, 2018, accessed February 4, 2019 at . 20 James Clay Moltz, Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space, Columbia University Press, New York, 2014, p. 92. 21 David Usborne, “Satellite’s Failure Leaves Millions Speechless in US,” Independent, published May 21, 1998, accessed February 9, 2019 at . 22 Michael Krepon, Therea Hitchens, and Michael Katz-Hyman, “Preserving Freedom of Action in Space: Realizing the Potential and Limits of US Spacepower,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, eds. Charles D. Lutes, Peter Hays, Vincent A Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011: pp. 391–405. 23 Moltz, Crowded Orbits, p. 39. 24 For a discussion regarding the phrasing of the Outer Space Treaty in this fashion, see Dolman, Astropolitik. 25 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, p. 23. 26 Dolman, Astropolitik. 27 Everett C. Dolman, “New Frontiers, Old Realities,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 6(1), 2012: pp. 78–96. 28 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, pp. 36–37. 29 Ibid., p. 37. 30 Thomas L. Friedman, “Foreign Affairs Big Mac I,” New York Times, published December 8, 1996, accessed February 9, 2019 at . 31 Erik Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” American Journal of Political Science, 51(1), 2007: p. 166, emphasis added. 32 Ibid., p. 170. 33 An obvious counterargument to this line of thinking is World War I. This argument, and a rebuttal to it, is further discussed in Chapter 3. 34 Harvey, China in Space. 35 Hans Dorussen Hugh Ward, “Trade Networks and the Kantian Peace,” Journal of Peace Research, 47(1), 2010: p. 29, emphasis in the original. 36 Moltz, Crowded Orbits, p. 154. 37 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, 46(2), 1992: p. 395, emphasis in the original. 38 For example, see Dolman, Astropolitik; Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Imperative of Space Cooperation in an Environment of Distrust: Working with China,” High Frontier, 6(2), 2010: pp. 19–22. 39 David A. Mindell, Digital Apollo: Human and Machine in Spaceflight, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2008. 40 The key phrase is “as they are today.” An argument could certainly be made that space development would have occurred regardless of the space race or great power competition and that argument is plausible. However, the space race hurried the pace at which that development happened, directly contributing to the state of technology today. If we accept that space development would have happened regardless, we would also need to accept that the technological spin offs would have also happened at a slower pace. 41 Steven J. Dick, “The Birth of NASA,” NASA, published March 28, 2008, accessed February 8, 2019 at . 42 W.D. Kay, “John F. Kennedy and the Two Faces of the US Space Program, 1961–63,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 28(3), 1998: pp. 573–586. 43 Ibid. 44 Dora Holland and Jack O. Burns, “The American Space Exploration Narrative from the Cold War Through the Obama Administration,” Space Policy, 46, 2018: pp. 9–17.

A new space craze  19

45 W. Henry Lambright, “Administrative Leadership and Long-Term Technology: NASA and the International Space Station,” Space Policy, 47(1), 2019: pp. 85–93. 46 Ibid. 47 Jackie Wattles, “SpaceX, One of the World’s Most Valuable Private Companies, Just Got More Valuable,” CNN Business, published January 3, 2019, accessed February 9, 2019 at . 48 Jackie Wattles, “SpaceX Teams Up with Space Tourism Agency to Sell Rides Aboard Its Spacecraft,” CNN Business, published February 18, 2020, accessed February 21, 2020 at .

2 THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT

The 1979 Ridley Scott film Alien featured the promotional tagline, “In space, no one can hear you scream.” The eerie statement stands in stark contrast to the wide use of sound effects in other contemporary movies like Star Wars where battles in space are full of explosions and the sounds of weapons firing. Similarly, battle scenes in Star Wars regularly portray winged vehicles like TIE fighters and X-wings “flying” through space with flight dynamics like those that are experienced on earth but would be totally unnecessary for flight through space. While both of these science fiction movies are just that, fiction, Alien’s perspective is the more accurate one—with no atmosphere to carry the vibrations that make up sound, there would not just be an absence of screams, but an absence of sound altogether. Perhaps the tendency of science fiction movies and television shows in general to provide such a soundtrack contribute to the perpetuation of the idea that the space environment is not all that dissimilar from what we see and experience on the ground. It is not just the movies that would like us to see space and earth in similar ways. In the early days of the space race, as American officials debated an official response, President Dwight Eisenhower decided to separate the civilian, nonaggressive (peaceful) elements of space from military uses of space by creating the civilian agency, NASA. Though many were satisfied with this decision (or at least, not bothered by it), some military officials, particularly those in the Air Force, were not happy being sidelined. Space historian John Logsdon writes, Its [the Air Force’s] chief of staff, General Thomas White, argued that “there is no division, per se, between air and space. Air and space are an indivisible field of operations.” To make this point, the Air Force in early 1958 coined the word “aerospace.” The implication was that the service was the natural choice for the space role. The Air Force also rapidly developed ambitious

The space environment  21

plans for its space efforts, including putting a man into orbit as soon as possible and eventually sending humans to the moon.1 The other implication of the term aerospace is that the environment of the atmosphere and space is similar allowing for a continuum of air operations. With little known about the upper reaches of the atmosphere or space in the late 1950s, perhaps this conclusion can be excused. However, we know today that the vacuum of space presents unique opportunities and challenges to operations there which are not conducive to traditional style airframes and engine systems. We need look no further than two distinguishing characteristics of the space environment that make operations in it different from those on earth: gravity (and the relative absence of it) and the lack of an atmosphere. Gravity is not just one body of mass pulling a smaller mass towards it, rather, it changes the fabric of space itself. Imagine a tarp that is stretched tight and place a bowling ball on top of it. Instead of looking at the ball from overhead, look at the ball and tarp from the side. What you see is that the weight of ball creates a dip in the tarp; in this example, the bowling ball is the earth and the tarp is the fabric of space-time. The warping of space-time caused by large masses creates the phenomenon of gravity. At a largescale level, escaping the confines of gravity requires launch vehicles to attain and maintain high levels of velocity. The escape velocity of earth, the speed at which something must be going to completely escape earth’s gravity is 11.2 kilometers a second or 40,270 kilometers an hour. However, to simply enter earth’s orbit, rockets must attain 7.8 kilometers a second or 28,080 kilometers an hour. In terms of our bowling ball and tarp, if an object wants to get away from the bowling ball completely, it must have more velocity than something that just wants to get an inch or two away from the ball. In order to operate in space, vehicles must be able to maintain high speeds requiring immense amounts of energy and thrust. The lack of an atmosphere is also important. The earth’s atmosphere consists of layers of gases that are denser the closer one is to earth’s surface. The farther away from the surface one gets, the less dense the atmosphere is. Atmospheric density contributes to a number of things including weather, but for our purposes, it can be thought of as drag: the denser the atmosphere is, the harder it is for something like a rocket or plane to move through it. The characteristic of being aerodynamic means that a plane or other vehicle is shaped in such a way as to allow air to flow easily and quickly over it; with no atmosphere in space, the same aerodynamic principles are not needed. The Apollo lunar lander, for example, was not by any means aerodynamic; its spindly legs led to its nickname, “Spider.” In space, operations are quite different from those on earth, differences that are glossed over by simply referring to it as “aerospace.” Operations in the space environment bring with it their own pros and cons. Satellites thousands of miles above the earth can easily facilitate the widespread transfer of information and communications providing information on things from weather to weapons movements. However, there is no easy way to hide these satellites and their orbits can be predicted. Maneuvering can be difficult and requires fuel which may be in short

22  The space environment

supply. Near-earth space is limited in size; competition exists for valuable orbital slots and communications frequencies. Kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons are relatively easy to create. Thus, the uniqueness of space that makes it attractive to military, civil, and commercial activities also makes it vulnerable to accidents or outright attacks. To understand how this environment plays a role in promoting global economic development and how conflict in space can be dangerous to such development, this chapter outlines some of the more salient features of near-earth space.2 I begin with a brief discussion of the boundaries of space and near-earth space along with a description of the types of orbits that are commonly used. I argue that the space environment presents distinct challenges that are not faced in other environments. It is because of these challenges that weaponization of space is far more dangerous than some argue. These dangers threaten the economic uses of space and in turn the global economy as it becomes more dependent on space-based assets. Following this, I discuss the various uses of space for economic purposes, primarily in the fields of communications, remote sensing, and positioning and navigation. The chapter then turns to a discussion of space junk including its proliferation, possible modes of remediation, and political, legal, and technical hurdles to doing so, highlighting the economic consequences of debris and potential commercially based solutions.

Near-earth space Given the vastness of space, the description of space as congested seems misplaced. While space writ large is relatively open, near-earth space, the area in which most human-derived activities take place, is not infinite. The number of active satellites in orbit around the earth has increased dramatically from six in 1960 to more than 2,000 today, with significant increases in the future. This number does not include old, non-functioning or failed satellites that remain in orbit let alone the thousands of pieces of space junk that also remain. To put this congestion in context, consider what is meant first by the term space as well as the various orbital possibilities. There is actually a heated debate on the precise point at which “space” begins and the earth’s atmosphere ends; there is no clear demarcation line as the atmosphere gradually thins out until it is practically nonexistent. One of the most widely accepted definitions is the Karman line at 100 kilometers in altitude (about 62 miles, though often rounded down to 60).3 The line is named for Theodore von Karman who determined that it was at 100 kilometers where traditional aeronautic principles no longer work because of the lack of an atmosphere.4 However, the US awards astronaut wings to anyone who has flown above 50 miles in altitude.5 More recently, astronomer Jonathan McDowell argues that the Karman principle, that space begins when atmospheric dynamics disappear, is the more appropriate boundary, but instead of the line being at 100 kilometers, it is actually closer to 80 kilometers. Defining the boundaries of space are important politically and legally, if not philosophically. McDowell notes that “There have been objections (particularly in the United States) to defining any legal boundary of space on the grounds that it

The space environment  23

could cause disputes about airspace violations below the boundary, or that too high a boundary could inhibit future space activities.”6 In other words, if a formal boundary to space is agreed upon, the fear is that any activities below that line could be objected to as violations of national air space. This would obviously impede certain military activities that take place at high altitude but do not reach into space. The difficulty, then, in defining the beginning of space is reflective of the general unwillingness to adopt international standards that may limit national security activities. Like the debate about where space begins, there is also some fuzziness in what near-earth space is. Everett C. Dolman argues that earth space extends from the Karman line to geosynchronous orbit (approximately 36,000 kilometers, discussed further in what follows).7 Dolman terms the area between 36,000 kilometers and the moon’s orbit as lunar space though this can just as easily be termed near-earth space as well. For our purposes here, we will adopt the idea that near-earth space comprises the area spanning from the Karman line to lunar orbit. An objection to this definition may be that the moon is too far to be considered “near” earth. However, with both states and private companies planning expansive missions to the moon in the near future, activities on the moon and within lunar orbit will likely expand and become more common. As humans move to exploit that area of space, it too becomes a bit nearer to earth. Given this book’s focus on these types of commercial activities, adopting this definition for near-earth space is appropriate. Two final points of discussion are also appropriate. Within earth orbit, scholars recognize three general types of orbits, low earth orbit (LEO), medium earth orbit (MEO), and geosynchronous orbit (GEO). LEO is defined as being between the Karman line and 2,000 kilometers above the earth’s surface. It is the most populated orbit with more than half of satellites operating at this level which allows them to circle the globe almost a dozen times a day.8 MEO begins at 2,000 kilometers and extends to 42,000 kilometers where GEO begins. Although MEO is a useful orbit, operations at this altitude can be hampered by the van Allen radiation belts, areas of intense radiation that assist the earth in retaining its atmosphere. Satellites must be hardened to withstand the radiation making them slightly more expensive. GEO is a unique position where the satellite, while indeed moving and orbiting the earth, is moving at the same speed at which the earth is rotating making it appear as if it is fixed in one position. This allows the satellite to give continuous coverage to whatever area it is directed towards and is highly useful in commercial activities including communications and television and radio broadcasting. GEO orbits are the most limited since satellites operating there require a buffer zone to avoid radio interference from other satellites. As such, these slots are regulated by the International Telecommunications Union at an international level with individual states allocating slots nationally.

The physics of a space battlefield One of the arguments put forward by space nationalists who would like the US to dominate the space arena is that the land, sea, and air are already militarized and

24  The space environment

weaponized to great benefit (outside of actual conflict), therefore weaponizing space can and should be done, particularly to protect commercial interests. For example, Dolman and Henry F. Cooper, Jr. write that the argument that space should not be weaponized because of its dangers to commerce and human spaceflight is: “an emotional appeal that has no basis in fact.”9 There are several objections to this argument but the primary one is that the physics of a space battlefield are different from the physics of a battlefield at sea, on land, or in the air. If a ship is attacked and heavily damaged during a battle, that ship can be towed to port, or in the worst-case scenario, will sink. Battlefield debris can be cleared away. Planes, when disabled in the air, will fall from the air. In these scenarios, the debris created by combat and conflict can be moved—this is decidedly not the case in space. Physical attacks on satellites will cause debris. Even passive attacks on satellites which cause them to malfunction or shut down create junk in the form of an unworking satellite that cannot be removed from its orbit. Satellites and debris may reenter the atmosphere at some point in the future, but until then, they remain a danger to other space-based assets and take up orbital positions that could be better used by functioning assets. If in the course of asserting dominance over space, the US precipitates an armed conflict, it is not nearly as consequence-free as Dolman and Cooper argue precisely because the space environment is a unique one bound with different physical laws. Two other subsidiary counterarguments are also apparent. For one, in the air and sea, there are agreed upon international laws, treaties, and protocols that are far more extensive than what currently exists for space. International laws protect the operations of states in air and on the seas and delineate procedures for operating in those domains. With no similar framework for space, there are conflicting attitudes about proper behavior and utilization that might lead to open conflict. If the US were to exert dominance in space absent international law, it is more likely to be challenged. Related to this is a second objection that, on earth, borders are recognized internationally. This is not the case in space where no territorial boundaries are established or might ever be established given the principles of current international law. This idea is explicit in both the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty, though this treaty is not in effect. Complete control of space by one state who claims it as their own is unacceptable under international law and custom given the inability to recognize borders and state territory. The very characteristics that make space valuable for military (among other) purposes also make it very dangerous to conduct physical attacks in. This has only grown to be more apparent as near-earth space has been developed and the global economy grown dependent on space-based assets. The argument that space is like any other domain simply does not hold water; what makes space different for military use also makes it dangerous to conduct combat in.

Space economics One of the main arguments of this book is that what happens in space has a direct impact on the global economy because the global economy has grown dependent

The space environment  25

on space-based assets for its smooth functioning. Disruptions in any of the space infrastructure that supports global economic transactions and communications have the capability of filtering through the globalized economy slowing, stalling, or even stopping transactions altogether. As a means of supporting this aspect of the commercial space peace theory, this section outlines three general areas in which assets in space contribute to the global economy: communications, remote sensing, and positioning, navigation, and timing.

Communications satellites Utilizing satellites to communicate was one of the first areas in which commercial actors entered the space arena. Arthur C. Clarke first provided a description of what a communications system in GEO would look like and its basic operations in an essay in 1945.10 In addition to radio and television communications, Clarke suggested that satellites could also be used for research, meteorological, and traffic purposes. Although he believed that the technology to build such a system would not appear in the near future, some telecommunications companies began work on such an idea in the late 1940s. Developments in rocketry and technology advanced that timeline further and, following the launch of Sputnik, the US made significant advances in communications satellites leading to the launch of Telstar in 1962.11 Telstar was designed and built by AT&T and was capable of relaying a television signal. By 1969, global coverage by communications satellite was completed though still rather rudimentary.12 Communications satellites still dominate the commercial elements of nearearth space. Here, the term “communications” is used to denote those satellites which gather and relay information including radio, television, phone, and weather (remote imaging or sensing could also be considered in this category, but, because of its unique features, is discussed separately in what follows). According to the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), television satellites make up $97.7 billion of the overall worth of the space economy with satellite radio adding an additional $5 billion.13 This number does not even include the building and launching of communications satellites, merely the economic impact of their continued operation. Two emerging trends in communications satellites appear poised to further advance the economic importance of this area of space. The first is the growing use of small sats and cubesats which James Clay Moltz sees as one of the fastest emerging sectors in space.14 Similar in nature, cubesats and small sats have important technical differences: NASA defines small sats as spacecraft with a mass less than 180 kilograms and cubesats as a spacecraft that are specifically standardized in size beginning at 10x10x10 centimeters and expanding to sizes such as 15x15x15, 20x20x20, or even 120x120x120 centimeters.15 These types of satellites take advantage of the continuing miniaturization of technology to produce greater numbers of satellites in far higher numbers. The reductions in size and cost have allowed universities, research labs, and some high schools to purchase not just a satellite. Militaries have

26  The space environment

also expressed interest in small sats as a means of defense and redundancy; not only are large satellites larger targets, should one of their primary satellites malfunction or be attacked, small sats are available to pick up the slack. In fact, General John Hyten, as commander of US Strategic Command in 2017, stated, “I won’t support the development any further of large, big, fat, juicy targets,” referring to the idea that large satellites make for easy marks.16 The second trend in communications satellites is an again burgeoning interest in providing broadband internet access. In the late 1990s as the internet bubble grew, so did demand for internet access. As a result, systems like Globalstar and Iridium were envisioned as a means of providing global internet access. Microsoft cofounder Bill Gates even invested significant funds into a venture called Teledesic, which proposed a constellation of 840 satellites to provide internet service. However, when the dot-com bubble burst, Teledesic folded, and Globalstar and Iridium both filed for bankruptcy and restructured their operations.17 Today, companies are once again making bold promises of global internet access using arrays of satellites operating in LEO. Foremost among them is SpaceX’s Starlink, whose “eventual goal is to create a constellation of 12,000 satellites, about two-thirds orbiting 500 kilometers up and the rest about 1,200 kilometers up in low-Earth orbit.”18 With a standardized design and weighing in at 500 pounds each, the Starlink satellites are designed to deorbit themselves after their operational lifetime. SpaceX has competition in this area from Jeff Bezos’ Amazon, which is planning Project Kuiper with a constellation of 3,236 satellites, but deployment will have to wait until Blue Origin’s New Glenn rocket is available.19 The growth of communications satellites is poised to continue well into the 2020s. If SpaceX and/or Amazon is successful in their deployment of internet satellites, global connectivity, not to mention global economic activity and dependence on space-based assets, will only continue to grow. These satellites will be able to provide internet and other communications services to areas in which wired communications is impossible. While provision of such services may have some negative consequences (for example, Facebook’s internet service in Malaysia greatly contributed to the genocide of Rohingya Muslims),20 in terms of economics, the constellations will generate significant profits for their companies and increase the economic potential of those receiving the connections.

Remote sensing As noted previously, remote sensing can also be considered a form of communication in that information is being derived from space-based assets and transmitted to the earth. In this category, however, it is not just data and information that is being sent but pictures and images. Very early on, both the United States and the Soviet Union understood the potential consequences that such monitoring had—no longer would either country be able to undertake covert operations (at least very easily) without someone seeing. Although the United States used the U-2 to surveil Russia and other parts of the world, the ability to do so through

The space environment  27

satellites was quite appealing given the recognition of overflight rights in space and the reduced chances of human casualties. Early programs like Corona used a satellite platform to take physical pictures with the film reentering the atmosphere and captured midair before being developed. Today’s remote sensing satellites take not only pictures (transmitted to data stations rather than through the atmosphere) but utilize sensors and other imaging tools to see not just what is visible but also what cannot be seen like chemical emissions or radiation. Remote sensing today has expanded from simple spy operations. Increasingly accurate optical-imaging satellites, hyperspectral sensors, and radar-derived products are becoming more widely available for agriculture, meteorology, disaster monitoring, forestry, military purposes, and traditional commercial uses, such as for real estate and urban planning.21 Given the obvious national security implications, there were significant concerns about the proliferation of this technology from the military and security fields to civilian use during the 1980s and 1990s. Mariel Borowitz highlights four of these worries: possible disclosure of classified information; increased incentives for adversaries to develop means of thwarting remote sensing advantages; loss of flexibility in terms of policy making due to differing interpretations of data; and loss of soft power and influence.22 While these concerns are great, it is important to note that the ability of states to monitor one another has contributed to increasing stability in national security around the world. In particular, Borowitz notes, “When civil and commercial entitles are involved, or when government organizations begin to share their data, this increases the effect.”23 The global stability and reduction in uncertainty has in turn supported global economic growth. Remote sensing has a large economic impact. Images from space can illuminate potential resources, document changes in climate and development, help find archeological areas of interest, and assist scholars in measuring economic development itself. The FAA reports that direct spending on remote sensing satellites and systems contributes $2 billion to the space economy but spin off benefits are much greater.24 In one study from the US Geological Survey, looking only at one agricultural region in northeastern Iowa, remote sensing images from the Landsat satellite were found to have a value of $858 million per year and a $38.1 billion impact over time.25 The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) reported that the cumulative economic impact to just the member states of the European Union of the EUMETSAT Polar System weather satellite could amount to 61 billion euros a year.26 In addition to these examples, Henry R. Hertzfeld and Ray A. Williamson suggest additional uses of remote sensing imagery including preparing for and responding to hurricanes, improved weather and climate information, managing water resources, improved military and civil planning, improved industrial planning, and reducing uncertainty.27 Given the wide array of uses and potential uses, estimating overall economic impact is difficult. After suggesting some possible means of estimating the economic impact

28  The space environment

of these activities, Hertzfeld and Williamson conclude that “it is apparent that we cannot develop a reliable overall estimate of what we know intuitively must be true—that the benefits from Earth observations from space have had a huge and significant impact on the economy.”28 Like the other elements of the space economy, remote sensing has exploded in its potential uses from spying on other states to contributing to higher agricultural yields, monitoring development in Africa, and providing early warning of severe weather events. Not only does its use contribute to a stable global security environment through monitoring of state actions but it is an economic contributor in its own right. Losing such remote sensing abilities would significantly impede economic development and exchange, the effects of which would ripple across the global economy.

Positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) The final category of space activities which contribute to the global economy are systems which provide position, navigation, and timing (PNT) services. These capabilities are provided in the US and many other countries by the Global Positioning System (GPS), a US-military developed and operated system. While a full description of the system and its history can be found elsewhere, in brief, the current GPS system consists of a constellation of 24 satellites in MEO which provide global coverage.29 When ground-based receivers receive signals from at least two of these satellites, the user’s position on earth can be determined. Designed primarily for military use, the satellites give off different types of signals: the precision or P-code was designed for military and other authorized users while the Coarse/ Acquisition or C/A-code was designed for civilian use but also to provide a less accurate position than the P-code through a means known as selective availability (SA). Despite the purposeful degrading of the civilian signal, methods of adjusting to the signal were developed and sales of GPS units went from $20 million in 1989 to $121 million in 1992.30 With military GPS receivers in short supply during the 1990 Gulf War, the Department of Defense turned to civilian GPS sets necessitating the removal of SA. SA was turned back on following the conflict, but President Bill Clinton set in motion a permanent disabling of it in 2000. With SA disabled, US policymakers feared that hostile countries might use their own military systems against them in combat. As a result, a new generation of GPS satellites were developed with a new M-code system that allow the civilian signal to be jammed in hostile territory without impacting the military’s ability to receive GPS signals.31 GPS and other global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) provide an additional service that is foundational to the global economy: timing. Though this may seem like a mere add-on, GPS transmits ultra-precise times calculated by several atomic clocks on each satellite. Companies around the world utilize these signals to synchronize their activities, including economic transactions and emergency services. The GPS website lists a number of applications where this timing is critical including the reporting of hazardous weather for the FAA, seismic monitoring,

The space environment  29

transmission and distribution of power and electric utilities, movie and television studios, and cellular networks.32 When this timing signal is interrupted, everything from bank transactions to power grids can be affected resulting in a significant economic disruption. The economic impact of GPS and other global navigation satellite systems is enormous: one study commissioned by the US government found that in 2013 alone, GPS had a $68.7 billion impact.33 A study by the American National Institutes of Standards and Technology in 2019 found from the time GPS became available for commercial use in 1984 until 2017, it has generated $1.4 trillion in economic benefits with 90% of that being generated since 2010. The same study found that a GPS outage would cost $1 billion a day with the costs only increasing the longer the outage persists.34 The extent to which the global economy is dependent on GPS and thus the United States has been a concern to other states. Fearing that the civilian signal could be disrupted or disabled entirely, economies which have come to rely heavily on GPS would be greatly harmed. As a result, several other PNT systems have been developed and are being deployed, including Europe’s Galileo, which is interoperable with the American GPS, China’s Beidou, and Russia’s GLONASS. The European development of Galileo is similar in motivation to France’s development of the Ariane launcher in the 1970s and Israel’s deployment of remote sensing satellites (discussed further in Chapter 6): fear of being dependent on the US, which could choose when and where to allow access to US capabilities. Disruptions to PNT systems can occur in a number of ways. Space weather such as a solar flare erupting from the sun that sends highly charged particles towards the earth would devastate PNT and other satellites. Countries like Russia are extensively “spoofing” the GPS signal, interrupting not just military exercises but all users of GPS with signals that appear authentic but are actually incorrect.35 Errors can be introduced inadvertently into the systems that disrupt timing signals by mere milliseconds. PNT satellites can malfunction or be taken offline—in the summer of 2019, Europe’s Galileo was offline for nearly a week following complications from a system upgrade.36 Regardless of the source of the GPS jamming, general, commercial, and passenger aviation could all be severely impacted with significant economic consequences.

Summary Satellites provide basic and now intrinsic services that most of us have come to take for granted. Communications, remote sensing, and PNT services are commonplace for those in the developed world as we likely use all of them at some point or another during a normal day. The economic costs of disruption of any one of those systems would be significant if not disastrous. While conflict in space may not be directed at a specific civilian and/or commercial satellite, the danger is in the debris created from such conflict which could then inadvertently impact these global systems. Therefore, as more of the world and the world’s economy becomes

30  The space environment

dependent on space-based assets, the imperative grows to protect them from potential interference or attack.

The space junkyard Perhaps under the assumption that near-earth space is practically endless, early space efforts did not purposefully consider the consequences of leaving discarded pieces of spacecraft or malfunctioning satellites in orbit. It was not long before the problem of space debris was broached. Despite understanding the risks of small pieces of debris flying around the earth at hundreds of miles an hour, it has only been in the past few decades where standards for mitigating debris have been established and are starting to be enforced. For all the understanding of and attempts to reduce the risks, debris remains, perhaps, the single biggest threat to space assets. In this sense, it is not necessarily conflict in space that can have dangerous economic consequences but the harmful debris caused by it. Even with more than 300,000 pieces of space debris large enough to destroy a satellite, the chances of an actual collision are fairly low.37 Andrew M. Bradley and Lawrence M. Wein estimate that the chances of a satellite being impacted by a piece of space junk are below 1 in 1,000, assuming mitigation guidelines developed by NASA continue to be observed.38 Further, if there is a possibility of collision with a tracked piece of debris, satellites can be maneuvered out of the way, further reducing the chances of impact. However, this only applies to those pieces of debris that are large enough to be tracked (10 centimeters). Debris that is smaller than 10 centimeters but larger than 1 centimeter (which satellites should be able to withstand) represents the real danger to satellites.39 Even then, debris is eventually removed from orbit as it increases atmospheric drag which causes the debris to slow down enough so that it reenters the earth’s atmosphere and harmless burns up. While the chances of a single impact are low, that one, does not mean they do not exist, and two, does not mean that a debris cascade will not occur. First postulated in the 1970s, the “Kessler syndrome,” named for one of the scientists who developed the idea, describes a runaway debris collision in which a piece of debris strikes a satellite whose debris in turn strikes another and so on until the orbital plane is so obstructed with junk that it would be rendered unusable.40 Donald J. Kessler and later co-authors Nicholas L. Johnson, J.C. Liou, and Mark Matney note that “collisional cascading is a slow process,” the chances of it occurring depend very much “on the population density and size of the objects in orbit.”41 Even if all launches into space end completely, the theory predicts that debris will still increase due to the naturally occurring chances for collisions that already exist.42 According to some models, as early as the 2060s, a “runaway growth in the number of collisions and debris in LEO” will take place.43 Kessler and his co-authors conclude that the syndrome itself is a “significant source” of debris and that compliance with mitigation guidelines will need to be near 100% in order to avoid a collisional cascade.44 On the other hand, by removing just a few pieces of debris that are predicted to be the most likely inducers of collisions, the chances of

The space environment  31

dangerous debris cascades can be greatly reduced. In fact, some studies have concluded that removing just five of the most dangerous pieces of debris a year would lead to a far more manageable situation in near-earth space.45 Clearly, debris collisions, let alone the Kessler syndrome, can have disastrous consequences economically. One estimate from 2012 of the cost of a satellite collision puts the losses at $30 million initially with an additional $200 million in damages to other space assets.46 Those costs, however, are associated just with the loss of hardware and do not include the overall economic impact that a loss of satellite services entails. As described previously, losing a communications satellite, remote sensing satellite, or PNT satellite would result in the billions of dollars in lost economic activity. Those costs would ripple throughout the global economic system particularly if the satellite was an important part of the space-based infrastructure. The threat from attacks in space, particularly ASATs is quite acute. “Any action in space has an impact on assets of all states. Another ASAT test by any state would add more debris, leaving all LEO satellites in a more vulnerable state” as well as increase the chances of the Kessler syndrome accelerating.47 While American scientists and defense officials realized by the mid-1960s that debris in space posed a considerable threat, mitigation guidelines have only been adopted fairly recently.48 NASA developed the first set of debris guidelines in 1995 and the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) developed guidelines that were subsequently adopted by both the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 2008 and 2007, respectively.49 Today, in order to receive a license allowing for a commercial launch in the US, companies must show that they are adhering to debris control guidelines and that all new satellites have the ability to deorbit themselves or move to a parking orbit (an orbit specially designed for defunct satellites) once they have been decommissioned. It is unclear, though, whose responsibility it is to enforce debris mitigation plans upon licensing. In late 2018, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) questioned whether it was even in their purview to enforce debris guidelines when satellite operators apply for a radio frequency spectrum license.50 Jurisdictional issues aside, this is only half of the battle. Studies show that the debris currently in orbit will likely need to be reduced at some point and to some degree in order to avoid the possibility of cascading collisions. Several proposals have been made in terms of the means by which debris can be removed from earth orbit. In their review of active space debris removal methods, C. Priyant Mark and Surekha Kamath discuss proposals including lasers, tethers, satellites, ion beams, sails, as well as disrupting the orbits of debris to reduce their altitude and thus induce atmospheric drag.51 While their review concludes that many of these methods are still conceptual and experimental in nature, they find promising results from tether-based and dynamical systems modeling. In 2018, the first satellite designed to remove debris was tested after being deployed from the International Space Station. The system contained several possible remediation methods including a net, a harpoon, and a sail.52 Other passive remediation techniques include a satellite containing a foam-like material which can absorb

32  The space environment

space debris safely and then deorbit itself. Alternatively, Alexander Salter examines some economic actions that can be considered to encourage firms to reduce debris including the imposition of taxes on launches and satellites, adapting property rights for orbital access and orbits themselves, and other legal rules placing the burden on satellite owners and launch operators.53 Despite the boon in designing debris remediation tools, there remain significant challenges. As several authors have noted, near-earth orbit has the characteristics of being a common pool resource wherein “no party can prevent other parties from enjoying the benefits of those goods” and “no party has an incentive to practice responsible stewardship.”54 The resulting tragedy of the commons means that no one necessarily has an incentive to engage in debris removal. One the major challenges, then, is determining whose responsibility it is to clean up near-earth space. Some argue that given that the main space polluters have been the US, Russia, and China that they should be the ones to undertake such a mission. However, those states might pose a rebuttal that any efforts they make would benefit other states as well, therefore they should not carry the burden entirely. And that burden might be great—with remediation methods still experimental, it is not clear what the actually cost of reducing debris might be. At the very least, there will be a cost to launch equipment into orbit and while launch costs are declining, the sum will still be considerable. Even taking cost and responsibility into consideration, an argument could still be made that both states and commercial entities have an incentive to reduce debris in that it reduces the chances that their own satellites, military, civilian, and otherwise will be struck. Remediation is likely to cost less than destruction of satellites and the ensuing economic effects. If we accept this premise, challenges still remain. For one, the Outer Space Treaty states that nations retain jurisdiction over objects launched into space “and of their component parts.” In other words, space debris belongs to the countries who launched it or the countries from wherein it was launched. Further, it is not always clear what the original source of a piece of debris was making it even harder to adjudicate ownership. Even if a public, private, or public-private entity were to remediate debris, they would first need to get the permission of the owner state. States might hesitate to give permission either because they do not see their debris as a problem (or even debris to begin with) or because there is significant value in the debris currently in orbit. A second challenge relates to the use of remediation technology as potentially offensive weaponry. As Megan Ansdell notes, “any system that can remove a useless object from orbit can also remove a useful one.”55 With the precise definition of what constitutes a space weapon still elusive, developing means of reducing debris could also be interpreted as a stealth ASAT program. If, as we assumed previously, states like the US accept that debris is a threat to their space-based assets, Bleddyn Bowen asks whether the US will “trigger a political backlash against such a dualuse system as active debris removal?”56 This is not out of the question—during the 1970s, the Soviets perceived the space shuttle to be a potential ASAT despite US assurances to the contrary. Viewing debris removal technology as potentially offensive is not a difficult leap to make. Ansdell suggests that in order to avoid this conclusion, anti-debris techniques should be developed in open and transparent

The space environment  33

ways whereas Bowen argues for a more restricted definition of space security that would not consider debris a national security threat while still recognizing it to be a serious problem. With many remediation techniques still to be tested, what is definite is that debris will continue to be a concern if not outright problem in the foreseeable future. Space combat, whether active or passive, will only add to the burden increasing the chances of economically impactful collisions. The unique conditions of space make it so that debris is difficult to remove and only slowly degrades in orbit, if it degrades at all. And although space junk remains in orbit or is added to nearearth space, it remains a threat to other satellites and the entire global economy.

Conclusion The advantages of space which have revealed themselves over the past 60 years have greatly benefited many facets of life on earth, but these benefits are threatened by the space environment as well. As launch costs have fallen, more entities are able to access space more cheaply than ever before. This has allowed an expansion of space-based infrastructure which has supported a growing global economy as well as greater military uses. However, the very act of taking advantage of those resources has contributed to the congested space environment today with growing counts of space debris that are just as dangerous to military, civilian, commercial, and scientific uses of space. Conflict in space will only add to those dangers, regardless of arguments about the “inevitable” weaponization of it. The Kessler syndrome was used to great dramatic effect in the movie Gravity, where cascading collisions threatened astronauts on the International Space Station and eventually a Chinese space station. As space tourism and an expansion of crewed spaceflight emerges, debris will pose an equal challenge to states and businesses wishing to undertake it. Just as President John F. Kennedy realized that further high altitude nuclear testing posed an unacceptable risk to the young American human spaceflight program, global leaders must recognize the risk posed by debris not just to a growing community of astronauts, cosmonauts, and taikonauts, but to the global economy that has become increasingly dependent on spacebased assets. Before turning more fully to the commercial space peace argument, the next chapter outlines the various logics by which peace might be attained or maintained through economic relations on earth. While the application to the different domains is different, the main idea is the same: threats to economic health can be inducements to peace or, at least, more peaceful relations.

Notes 1 John Logsdon, John F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010, p. 19. 2 For greater discussions of the physics and dynamics of the space environment, see Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, Frank Cass Publishers, New York, 2002; John J. Klein, Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles, and Policy, Routledge, New York, 2006.

34  The space environment

3 Jonathan C. McDowell, “The Edge of Space: Revisiting the Karman Line,” Acta Astronautica, 151, 2018: pp. 668–677. 4 Stefanie Waldek, “Where Does Outer Space Start?” Popular Science, published June 1, 2018, accessed June 6, 2019 at . 5 “Where, Exactly, Is the Edge of Space? It Depends on Who You Ask,” National Geographic, published December 20, 2018, accessed June 6, 2019 at . 6 McDowell, “The Edge of Space,” p. 2. 7 Dolman, Astropolitik. 8 James Clay Moltz, Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space, Columbia University Press, New York, 2014, p. 20. 9 Everett C. Dolman and Henry F. Cooper, Jr., “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, eds. Charles D. Lutes, Peter Hays, Vincent A. Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011: p. 381. 10 Arthur C. Clarke, “The Space-Station: Its Radio Applications,” reprinted in Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the US Civil Space Program Volume IIII, eds. John M. Logsdon with Roger D. Launius, David H. Onkst, and Stephen J. Garber, accessed November 12, 2019 at . 11 Joseph N. Pelton, “The History of Satellite Communications,” in Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the US Civil Space Program Volume IIII, eds. John M. Logsdon with Roger D. Launius, David H. Onkst, and Stephen J. Garber, accessed November 12, 2019 at . 12 Ibid. 13 Federal Aviation Administration, “The Annual Compendium of Commercial Space Transportation: 2018,” published January 2018, accessed June 12, 2019 at . 14 Moltz, Crowded Orbits, p. 103. 15 “What Are SmallSats and CubeSats,” NASA, published February 26, 2015, accessed June 11, 2019 at . 16 Aaron Gregg, “Defense Giants Bet Big on Small Satellites,” The Washington Post, published September 16, 2018, accessed June 11, 2019 at . 17 Joseph Fuller, Jr., Jeffrey Foust, Chad Frappier, Dustin Kaiser, and David Vaccaro, “The Commercial Space Industry: A Critical Spacepower Consideration,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, eds. Charles D. Lutes, Peter Hays, Vincent A. Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011: pp. 104–126. 18 Jamie Carter, “What Is Starlink? Watch Live as SpaceX Gets Head Start on Amazon with Landmark Launch on Thursday,” Forbes, published May 14, 2019, accessed June 11, 2019 at . 19 Ibid. 20 See, for example, Paul Mozur,“A Genocide Incited on Facebook, with Posts from Myanmar’s Military,” New York Times, published October 15, 2018, accessed February 19, 2020 at and UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar,” United Nations, published September 17, 2018, accessed February 19, 2020 at . 21 Moltz, Crowded Orbits, p. 103. 22 Mariel Borowitz,“Strategic Implications of the Proliferation of Space Situational Awareness Technology and Information: Lessons Learned from the Remote Sensing Sector,” Space Policy, 47, 2019: p. 21.

The space environment  35

2 3 Ibid., p. 22. 24 FAA, “The Annual Compendium of Commercial Space Transportation: 2018.” 25 William Forney, Ronald P. Raunikar, Richard L. Bernkopf, and Shruti K. Mishra, “An Economic Value of Remote-Sensing Information—Application to Agricultural Production and Maintaining Groundwater Quality,” US Geological Survey Professional Paper 1796, published 2012, accessed November 12, 2019 at . 26 Molly E. Brown and Charles Wooldridge, “Identifying and Quantifying Benefits of Meteorological Satellites,” American Meteorological Society, February 2016: pp. 182–185. 27 Henry R. Hertzfeld and Ray A. Williamson, “The Social and Economic Impact of Earth Observing Satellites,” in Societal Impact of Spaceflight, eds. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius, NASA SP-2007–4801, accessed November 12, 2019 at . 28 Ibid., p. 262. 29 A minimum of 24 satellites are required for global coverage; several other satellites are also operational as backups. For further discussion of GPS, see Richard D. Easton and Eric F. Frazier, GPS Declassified: From Smart Bombs to Smartphones, Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE, 2013; Irving Lachow, “The GPS Dilemma: Balancing Military Risks and Economic Benefits,” International Security, 20(1), 1995: pp. 126–148. 30 Lachow, “The GPS Dilemma.” 31 Michael Jones, “The Promises of M-code and Quantum,” GPS World, published December 13, 2017, accessed June 11, 2019 at . 32 “Timing Applications,” GPS.gov, published March 8, 2018, accessed June 11, 2019 at . 33 Irv Leveson, “The Economic Value of GPS: Preliminary Assessment,” presented at National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Advisory Board Meeting, June 11, 2015, accessed June 11, 2019 at . 34 Eric Berger, “Study Finds That a GPS Outage Would Cost $1 Billion Per Day,” Ars Technica, published June 14, 2019, accessed June 26, 2019 at . 35 “Study Maps ‘Extensive Russian GPS Spoofing,’ ” BBC News, published April 2, 2019, accessed June 12, 2019 at . 36 Kieren McCarthy, “One Man’s Mistake, Missing Backups and Complete Reboot: The Tale of Europe’s Galileo Satellites Going Dark,” The Register, November 8, 2019, accessed November 12, 2019 at . 37 Megan Ansdell, “Active Space Debris Removal: Needs, Implications, and Recommendations for Today’s Geopolitical Environment,” Journal of Public and International Affairs, 7, 2010: pp. 8–22. 38 Andrew M. Bradley and Lawrence M. Wein,“Space Debris: Assessing Risk and Responsibility,” Advances in Space Research, 43(9), 2009: pp. 1372–1390. 39 Ansdell, “Active Space Debris Removal.” 40 Donald J. Kessler and B.G. Cour-Palais, “Collisional Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt,” Journal of Geophysical Research, 83( June), 1978: pp. 2637–2646. 41 Donald J. Kessler, Nicholas L. Johnson, J.-C. Liou, and Mark Matney, “The Kessler Syndrome: Implications to Future Space Operations,” American Astronomical Society 33rd Annual Guidance and Control Conference, published February 2010, accessed November 12, 2019 at . 42 Bleddyn E. Bowen, “Cascading Crises: Orbital Debris and the Widening of Space Security,” Astropolitics, 12(1), 2014: pp. 46–68. 43 Ibid., p. 4.

36  The space environment

4 4 Kessler et al., “The Kessler Syndrome,” p. 14. 45 Mike Wall, “Space Junk Janitors Should Sweep Up 5 Dead Satellites a Year, Experts Say,” Space.com, published February 24, 2012, accessed June 12, 2019 at . 46 Eugene M. Levin and Joseph A. Carroll, “Future Collisions in LEO,” Star Technology and Research and Tether Applications, published February 28, 2012, available at . 47 Mian Zahid Hussain and Raja Qaiser Ahmed, “Space Programs of India and Pakistan: Military and Strategic Installations in Outer Space and Precarious Regional Strategic Stability,” Space Policy, 47, 2019: p. 72. 48 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests, 3rd ed., Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2019. 49 Ansdell, “Active Space Debris Removal.” 50 Theresa Hitchens, “FCC Debates Space Debris Rules,” Breaking Defense, published May 13, 2019, accessed June 13, 2019 at . 51 C. Priyant Mark and Surekha Kamath, “Review of Active Space Debris Removal Methods,” Space Policy, 47, 2019: pp. 194–206. 52 Tereza Pultarova, “1st Satellite Built to Harpoon Space Junk for Disposal Begins Test Flight,” Space.com, published June 22, 2018, accessed June 12, 2019 at . 53 Alexander William Salter, “Space Debris: A Law and Economics Analysis of the Orbital Commons,” Stanford Technology Law Review, 19, 2016: pp. 221–238. 54 Ibid., pp. 227–228. 55 Ansdell, “Active Space Debris Removal,” p. 16. 56 Bowen, “Cascading Crises,” p. 1.

3 LOGICS OF PEACE

On March 27, 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the successful test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon making India the fourth country (following the United States, Russia, and China) to perform such a feat. In his announcement, Prime Minister Modi stated, “India has made an unprecedented achievement today. India registered its name as a space power.”1 Modi’s claim to space power is an interesting one. Many space scholars argue that the achievement of human spaceflight represents the top rungs of space hierarchy, something the Indians have not yet achieved though plans are ongoing.2 By this measure, India does not rank among the space powers of the United States, Russia, and China. On the other hand, the ability to target and destroy a satellite in earth orbit is a significant accomplishment, one which could easily threaten not just India’s adversaries, but all those who utilize space-based assets. The test, occurring approximately 300 kilometers in orbit around the earth, created a cloud of debris most of which, because of the relatively low altitude of the test, will eventually burn up in the earth’s atmosphere. However, more than 400 pieces of debris were subsequently identified by NASA with 60 large enough to be tracked. Of those 60, according to NASA Administrator James Bridenstine, 24 were high enough in altitude to threaten the International Space Station (ISS), significantly increasing the chances of the ISS needing to maneuver out of the way of oncoming debris.3 As the space around the earth becomes more crowded and perhaps occupied by humans, the chances of orbital debris impacting valuable spacebased infrastructure, or even a crewed mission, will only increase. Given the extent to which the global economy is dependent on such infrastructure, the destruction of satellites, even if accidental, will likely have such a global and significant impact that it might dissuade countries from engaging in such activities to begin with.4 The timing of the Indian test was also interesting, coming on the heels of an increase in tension between India and Pakistan in February of 2019. Following

38  Logics of peace

a suicide attack by a Pakistan-based terrorist organization in Kashmir that killed 40 Indian security personnel, India launched air strikes against Pakistan.5 Though diplomacy prevailed, the provocation in the long simmering dispute over Kashmir heightened fears that the two nuclear powers might engage in further militarized conflict. While there are no indications that the ASAT test was directly intended as a display of power in the wake of the incident (indeed, India attempted an ASAT launch earlier in February which failed), the test and Modi’s assertion of space power can only serve as a warning, not just to Pakistan, but also to India’s other regional rival, China. India, like its fellow democratic country the United States, is an example of a somewhat paradoxical finding in international relations scholarship. Scholars have noted that democracies tend not to go to war with other democracies though they are just as likely to engage in conflict as non-democracies. The so-called democratic peace is empirically accepted though its causal mechanisms remain in dispute (to be discussed further in this chapter). Some policymakers have seized on the argument and used it to support the expansion of democracy even via military means. In this sense, Erich Weede writes that, “Legitimating current wars by hopes for regime change and future pacific benefits is dangerous.”6 As an alternative, Weede argues that a capitalist peace is far less dangerous than regime change and far more pacifying. Like the democratic peace, proponents of the capitalist peace argue that as countries become more capitalistic and more connected through trade relations and interdependent economies, the cost of conflict to the shared economy between two countries becomes so great that there is no incentive to engage in militarized battle. Given that not all space powers are democracies or capitalists, the various paths to peace that the democratic and capitalist peace theories offer are not applicable to the space environment. Another economically-based argument, however, is. This chapter briefly reviews the evolution of theories of peace that fall largely under the umbrella of the Kantian peace. As described in Chapter 1, Kant argued that states could attain “perpetual peace” through a combination of democracy, economic involvement, and the usage of international organizations. Following the realization that democracies do not go to war with other democracies, international relations scholars returned to this notion to try to understand causes of peace in the modern world. It is out of this literature that the capitalist, commercial, and economically interdependent peace arguments (some argue the three are distinct, but the terms have been used interchangeably to a point) emerge. While this chapter discusses this research, it is important to make clear what the chapter is not—it is not a full review of the democratic, capitalist, or commercial peace literature nor is it a critique of it. This chapter focuses mostly on the causal mechanisms that scholars have proposed to explain the lack of conflict between certain types of states to build a causal story regarding economic dependence on space-based assets and how that can reduce conflict in space. As I will develop in the following chapter, the commercial space peace theory is built on and derived from research regarding the economic peace in particular. The end of this chapter discusses some of the

Logics of peace  39

methodological challenges highlighted by this research that must be confronted in explicating such a theory.

The democratic peace Though Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers argued for the pacific power of democracy centuries ago, the democratic peace, as well as international organizations and economics, received renewed interest by the end of the Cold War.7 While scholars focused largely on the democratic peace, findings regarding the role of trade and the economy led others to more heavily focus on the role of economic connections. Even though the democratic peace does not play a large role in a theory regarding conflict in space, it is important to the extent that it fostered a more extensive development of economic and commercial peace theories. In a review of democratic peace research in 2014, Havard Hegre, a prominent scholar in the area, notes that, despite various findings regarding the causes of democratic peace, there is wide agreement that the absence of conflict among democracies is about as close to an empirical law in international relations as can be found.8 It is on the point of causal mechanisms that scholars have strongly disagreed, proposing theories that range from how leaders are selected, the legislative constraints on state leadership, and public opinion, to more normative arguments regarding the nature of democracy itself. One early theory was that the political institutions of a democracy somehow constrain its leaders from going to war. Though there has been some supportive evidence in this vein, if true, these constraints should also prevent democracies from going to war with non-democracies which has not been empirically demonstrated. Given this failing, scholars like Bruce Russett proposed a normative based explanation. Because democracies (generally) resolve internal disputes through non-violent political means, democracies should be able to externalize the peaceful means of conflict resolution, particularly in their dealings with other democratic states. In other words, democracies share a “norm of conduct” which governs their behavior with one another.9 In building on this hypothesis, Erik Gartzke suggests that democracies share similar interests which reduces the chances for conflict among them.10 Despite the appeal of common beliefs, this line of research fell victim to methodological concerns regarding measurement of key variables, the inclusion or exclusion of control variables, and the proper level at which the theory should be tested (at the state level or the dyadic level).11 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors suggest a variation of the institutional theory but focused on the selection of leadership and how leaders can satisfy their “selectorate,” the subset of the electorate that forms a winning coalition which an incumbent leader must continue to satisfy in order to remain in office.12 The leader can use the provision of resources to “pay off ” the selectorate and help ensure their reelection. Democratic leaders must “pursue policies oriented toward public goods rather than private goods, because a larger portion of the society participates in the electoral process.”13 As a result, democratic leaders are often more concerned about policy failure which they seek to reduce; in the case of conflict,

40  Logics of peace

they are more likely to expend a greater amount of resources than autocratic leaders in order to ensure a victory. While at first glance this may appear to predict more conflict-prone relationships among democracies, “leaders of democratic regimes know about the resolve and resources that another democratic leader is willing to commit to victory, serving as a deterrent to escalation” between two democratic states.14 Later work provided substantial empirical support,15 however, like much of the work on the democratic peace, selectorate theory has also received its share of methodological critiques.16 Ungerer notes that later research focusing on the consequences of losing for autocratic and democratic leaders, an important implication, introduces more wrinkles for selectorate theory which have increased empirical doubt on the idea.17 Yet another concern about the democracy-peace relationship arose in considering whether there was a variable that was inducing democracy to begin with, suggesting that democracy might be an intermediate variable rather than the ultimate cause of peace. Elaborated by Michael Mousseau, economic norms theory proposes that social norms are influenced by economic norms. In those states that develop contract intensive economies, individuals in developed market economies tend to share the social and political values of exchange-based cooperation, individual choice and free will, negotiation and compromise, universal equity among individuals, and universal trust in the sanctity of contract.18 If, in turn, these economic values are institutionalized in a society, “then it follows that market values favor democratic institutionalization.”19 Democracies, developed in this way, would share common values and outlooks which should lead to more peaceful relations. Mousseau’s empirical analysis finds support for this thesis and in particular finds that democratic peace is stronger in countries that have a greater level of economic development. Mousseau, in a later article, does not mince words: There is no justification for inferring or implying any evidence herein, direct or indirect, as corroborating the causation from democracy to peace. . . . [T]here is little correlational evidence of democracy causing peace, whether we gauge peace with wars, fatal and nonfatal militarized interstate conflicts, or interstate crises.20 Though Mousseau takes a strong stance on the lack of a role for democracy, several other analyses, including his own, suggest a more interactive relationship between trade, economics, and democracy.21 The democratic peace thesis is not without its critiques, many of them methodological in terms of measuring key elements like conflict and democracy.22 While this is not the place to fully discuss them or the policy consequences arising from the belief that democracy reduces conflict, for the purposes of the analysis here, the democratic peace theory does not offer a viable path to explaining lack of conflict

Logics of peace  41

in space. Of the major space powers (Russia, China, and the United States), only the United States is considered democratic and several other non-democratic states are also involved in space activities (these states and their activities will be taken up further in Chapter 6). To date, there has been no actual instances of conflict in space, and while counterfactuals are notoriously difficult to prove, democracy does not appear to be a primary cause leading to the lack of it. Again, what is important to take from this discussion is that renewed interest in the pacific effects of economics has been an important offshoot of this research program.

The economic peace Space is integral to the global economy. Today, it is used to transmit information across the globe in seconds, enabling economic transactions, stock markets, and real-time communications for companies with multiple locations around the world. Weather data and forecasting, enabled by space-based monitoring, are cornerstones of economic activities including agriculture, resource development, fishing, and tourism. Given the extent to which the global economy is dependent on space-based infrastructure, economic theories of peace provide far more promise in explaining a lack of conflict in space. What I have termed the “economic peace” has been discussed under a variety of names including the capitalist peace, the commercial peace, or the trade peace depending on the causal mechanism at play. Even among scholars, identification of the capitalist peace, commercial peace, or globalization peace has been quite varied and are usually overlapping. For example, Gerald Schneider and Nils Petter Gleditsch describe the capitalist peace as “various facets of capitalism, ranging from increased development to free trade and foreign investment, are positively related to peace.”23 Weede, in an article about peace through globalization, appears to connect capitalism to globalization itself.24 Other scholars, however, have focused more closely on a commercial peace which involves interdependent and extensive trade relations, just a small part of the capitalist peace described by Schneider and Gleditsch. It is beyond the scope of the book to fully explain these differences; what is important to note is that, like the democratic peace, there are various explanations for how economics translates into peace. This brief review looks at just a few including capitalism, integration with global markets and trade, signaling, and bargaining costs. The larger capitalist peace literature is a convenient jumping off point to explore arguments regarding the economic peace. However, a definition of it is hard to pin down. As Mousseau points out, the definitions of capitalism are quite diverse and the way in which scholars have tested the idea that capitalism creates less conflict have differed.25 Scholars have used various measures of capitalism including free trade, trade interdependence, the openness of markets, and market norms, none of which automatically equate with capitalism. Even in a symposium on the capitalist peace in the journal International Interactions, three different empirical analyses use three different measures of capitalism.26 The capitalist peace literature suffers from

42  Logics of peace

other shortcomings beyond lack of consensus about the definition and operationalization of capitalism. John Mueller argues that the acceptance of capitalism on its own is not enough to lead to peace.27 In addition to capitalistic markets, states also need to accept that economic prosperity and development are worthy goals, see peace as a better motor for economic development, and believe that trade will get them further than conquest. Despite Weede’s assertion that capitalism is more pacifying than democracy, Russett cautions that the democratic peace still holds significant explanatory power and that adequate causal mechanisms that integrate the two are difficult to establish.28 Finally, Richard Rosecrance warns that capitalism, far from promoting peace, may actually cause conflict by heightening inequalities among populations and stimulating nationalist attitudes.29 Indeed, despite hopes at the turn of the twentieth century that economic relations could stem conflict, World War I serves as a significant counterargument that will be discussed further in what follows. Like democracy, not all states that engage in space activities are capitalist. Instead, it may be more profitable to focus on specific aspects of markets that might reduce the chances of conflict like peace through trade. Solomon Polachek hypothesizes, for instance, that among pairs of countries, mutual trade should reduce conflict because the more countries are dependent on one another, the more likely it is that conflict will disrupt those valuable trade relations.30 Polachek writes, “Ceteris paribus, the greater the amount of trade, the higher the price of conflict, and the less the amount of conflict that is demanded.”31 Conflict is discouraged because of the potential for damage to each country’s economic health. Polachek finds empirical support for the hypothesis and he is far from alone in the finding.32 Other scholars have proposed that it is actually a state’s interdependence with and integration in the global market that explains lack of conflict.33 For them, trade is only one part of an interdependent relationship that can also consist of foreign direct investment and movement of capital. In this variation, the meaning of interdependence is important with much of this literature building on work done by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye beginning in the 1970s. In Power and Interdependence, Keohane and Nye define interdependence as “mutual dependence” and identify two dimensions of it, sensitivity and vulnerability.34 “Sensitivity involves degree of responsiveness within a policy framework—how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects?”35 On the other hand, “The vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face.”36 Interdependence is distinct from interconnectedness in this account specifically in terms of how costly the effects of exchange are: “Where there are reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions, there is interdependence. Where interactions do not have significant costly effects, there is simply interconnectedness.”37 For Keohane and Nye, then, a country’s interdependence with one another and the global economy is measured in terms of degree; some countries can be more interdependent than others and the more interdependence there is, the greater the chance for peace.38

Logics of peace  43

While the findings regarding trade interdependence and peace are supportive, there are a number of ways the relationship has been hypothesized to work. One is that trade and increased economic value represent an opportunity cost that is foregone when conflict is pursued; therefore as opportunity costs increase, states should be less willing to go to war. For William Reed, economic interdependence reduces uncertainty and lowers information costs for states that may be contemplating armed conflict.39 From this bargaining perspective, conflict can emerge between two states who are unsure of each other’s resolve in settling disputes with war being one way of demonstrating resolve, albeit a costly way. Recognizing that conflict is likely to harm a country’s economy, a country can demonstrate how far it is willing to go to settle a dispute by the amount of harm the country is willing to absorb economically. In comparing the effect of the opportunity cost and signaling argument, Nam Kyu Kim finds stronger empirical support for signaling as the underlying causal mechanism.40 However, in a comparative case study looking for specific examples where states are actively using economic signaling in the lead up to a conflict, Allan Dafoe and Nina Kelsey find evidence to support the argument only in larger cases of conflict.41 A final strain of economic peace theory specifically speaks to globalization. There is an extensive literature on the effects of globalization in general and, again, it is not my intent for this discussion to have a comprehensive review of it. Instead, I will focus solely on the argument that globalization can have a moderating effect on conflict. Like capitalism, globalization has many definitions.42 Common usage of the term seems to infer globalization as a growing set of connections among countries, their citizens, and their economies that are all serving to “shrink” the globe in some way. No matter the definition of globalization, the hypothesis is that the increased connections made through globalization serve to reduce conflict. For example, in a study comparing the effects of trade and democracy on military expenditures of India and Pakistan, Syed Mansoob Murshed and Dawood Mamoon find that while both globalization and bilateral trade reduce military spending, it is a country’s degree of openness to the world, not bilateral trade, that is the dominant economic factor.43 Further, for some like Seung-Whai Choi, both the positive and negative effects of globalization can help to explain the conflicting findings about the role of trade in reducing conflict.44 Choi writes, [A]lthough some features of multiple global forces may appear to be mutually incompatible and conflicting, their overall consequences nevertheless converge into a benign force facilitating common peaceful disposition among national leaders who are then likely to prefer peace to war in times of crisis.45 Choi’s analysis, which covers 1970–2001, finds that when globalization is compared to the effects of democracy, trade, and involvement in international organizations (the traditional Kantian triangle), “globalization in its totality . . . promotes peace over and above what researchers have come to expect from the three Kantian perspectives.”46

44  Logics of peace

Gartzke, focusing on globalization as integration of markets, argues that market integration can serve as mechanisms not only through which states reveal information about their resolve but also as a means through which states can coerce each other. “An economically integrated target can be coerced by the threat of losing valuable exchange, but a nonintegrated initiator cannot make its threats credible or informative.”47 His analysis shows that dyads, or pairs of states, with the least integrated markets are about five times as likely to experience a militarized dispute than those with more integrated markets. Further developing the line of argument that globalization can provide a means of signaling, Gartzke and Li assert that “Globalization facilitates costly signaling by making leaders’ talk costly and thus reducing the incentives to bluff.”48 If leaders can bluff and threaten without cost, there is no way to know whether it is simply a feign or a real threat. However, if there is a market consequence to a threat that draws capital and investment away from that leader, the individual assumes a particular cost. If they are willing to accept that cost, it reveals something about the resolve of the leader. If they are not willing to accept the cost, it also shows a lack of resolve. Finally, from a different perspective, Brooks finds that increased globalization reduces the benefits of conquest to such an extent that states should no longer find the benefits of conflict outweigh the costs.49 On the other hand, Christina L. Davis and Sophie Meunier argue that globalization has proceeded to such a point that sunk costs so high that there is no incentive to reduce trade in the case of conflict. Sunk costs for export firms include information about market conditions for successful product selection and development of distribution, sales, and servicing networks. Once firms have established exports to a particular market, they do not quickly change their trading patterns.50 Instead of globalization as a means to transmit resolve and bargaining information, globalization is absorbing the shocks of the potential threats. Though Davis and Meunier focus only the United States and Japan between 1990 and 2006, they find that trade flows do not decrease following negative events. Additionally, Katherine Barbieri and Jack S. Levy, expecting to find that trade is impacted during periods of crisis between two states, instead find that conflict does not systematically reduce trade, casting doubt on its peaceful consequences to begin with.51 The various arguments that economic connections, whether they be trade, the flow of capital, foreign investment, or globalization hold significant promise for their application to space. While trade is not necessarily taking place in space (states are not physically exchanging goods), the space-based infrastructure serves as vital connections in the global economy that facilitate such exchange. Though conflict in space may arise because of a militaristic or defensive concern, policymakers cannot separate that from the economic consequences a militarized conflict in space will have. Thus, globalization serves to connect not just states and economies, but it creates linkages among policy areas that cannot be ignored.

Logics of peace  45

Before pursuing this line of thought further, however, there are several significant critiques of the various economic peace arguments. First, Paul Krugman notes that states themselves do not engage in trade, firms do.52 Given this, scholars must identify the links between private trade activity and government actions (or inactions) in order to fully develop this type of model. All too often in the economic peace literature, these linkages are taken for granted or not dealt with explicitly, but among those scholars who have taken this deficit seriously, several relationships between private entities and state governments have been supposed. David H. Bearce and Sawa Omori have advanced three potential causal models: One, the presence of commercial institutions increases the opportunity costs for states to engage in war. Two, some commercial institutions provide information on the military status of competing states thereby easing bargaining and information costs. And three, commercial institutions have the capability of bringing states and their leaders together on a regular basis which can promote trust and cooperation, ties which can be important in the lead up to war.53 In both Bearce and Omori’s empirical work and Bearce’s comparative case study, only the third mechanism, increased ties between leaders, is supported. By no means, though, are these three linkages between states and economic actors the only possible ones. As McDonald notes, governments have a significant role in organizing a state’s economy; they set monetary and fiscal policy, provide subsidies to different industries (for example, agriculture or oil), set tariffs, and can take any number of other actions to encourage or discourage economic behavior on the parts of individuals and corporations.54 But why do states engage in such behaviors? At least in the American context, scholars have long recognized the importance of the overall state of the economy to the election hopes of public officials: if the economy is doing well or has improved, leaders are more likely to ensure their own reelection.55 If leaders want to ensure their reelection, then improving a state’s economy is one way to do so.56 This reelection incentive is one very powerful link between a state’s actions and trade relations. If a conflict could threaten a state’s economy or trading relations with another country and if politicians are sensitive to economic arguments, they may be less likely to engage in conflict with that state out of selfish electoral reasons. Katja B. Kleinberg and Benjamin O. Fordham provide support for this argument by finding that members of the US House of Representatives appear to be influenced by the export orientation and import sensitivity of their districts when voting on issues related to China.57 This line of reasoning shares similarities with Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s selectorate theory as well: leaders, wishing to please their selectorate, pursue policies that will benefit their voters. When times are good economically, the selectorate benefits. The economy-election hypothesis is a strong one with a long history of empirical support across global contexts. While this does not discount the mechanisms proposed by Bearce and Omori, election offers a powerful and parsimonious explanation for why states are interested in and concerned about trade relations. Of course, this does not guarantee that states will always act with their economic best interests at heart nor that the economy will be the sole concern. Often, states may

46  Logics of peace

undertake actions that harm their own economy because they have a stronger noneconomic rationale for doing so. On the other hand, thinking in terms of economic interests could also produce conflict of the type it has been theorized to prevent. This leads to the second serious critique of the economic peace hypotheses. Prior to World War I, Norman Angell proposed in The Great Illusion the idea that has been discussed here—that economic ties and trade interdependence would make conflict irrational for states to pursue.58 Of course, just two years after Angell’s book was published, Europe found itself in the midst of the Great War. Although this put a damper on economically based theories of peace, it did not stop them altogether. In fact, just a year after the end of World War I, seeking to absolve capitalism from blame for the conflict, Joseph Schumpeter detailed a new version of this theory based on industrialization. Schumpeter proposed a two-stage movement wherein a shift to an industrial mode of production changes society and causes it to become “inevitably democratized, individualized, and rationalized.”59 This in turn influences a state’s leadership to become economically oriented, focusing on profit seeking behaviors as well as anti-imperialist in policy. Finally, these new attitudes are filtered to the mass public who become consumed with the new means of production leaving little time and energy for the activities of war.60 Some modern scholars have tested Schumpeter’s theory that industrialization has induced peace with success. J. Tyson Chatagnier and Emanuele Castelli expand on Schumpeter’s basic thesis by distinguishing between countries with more advanced, industrial systems (those that are heavy in manufacturing and industry) versus countries that are resource rich. In finding that states with larger industrial sectors are less prone to conflict, they argue that the industrialization hypothesis provides an advantage in that the ownership of the means of production becomes irrelevant. In other words, a theory of peace based on industrialization need not depend on whether a country has a free market or a centrally planned economy.61 While Schumpter tries to place the blame for World War I elsewhere, later writers have argued that World War I was either an aberration that should not automatically invalidate trading theories or have interpreted it through a different lens. Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu, for example, doubt the conventional wisdom that “World War I constituted a failure of economic integration to maintain peace” by making three points.62 One, the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed a series of crises among interdependent states in Western Europe which did not result in open conflict. Two, World War I actually began among the less interdependent powers of Austria-Hungary and Serbia. And three, “during the same period in which the highly interdependent European powers were generally able to resolve their crises without resorting to war, the less interdependent powers were typically unable to do so.”63 While not denying that World War I did occur and conflict did break out between interdependent states, Gartzke and Lupu argue that the role of trade has been misunderstood. Similarly, McDonald, who has found that free trade discourages conflict more than trade in general, believes that it was the lack of free trade in the run up to World War I that helps to explain conflict even among trade interdependent countries.64

Logics of peace  47

Though World War I may not necessarily invalidate economic claims to peace, a more general objection is that trade asymmetries can induce conflict through a variety of means. This critique of the economic peace is based on realist international relations theory and the search, by states, for power. Realists have argued that, “Symmetrical ties may promote peace, but asymmetrical dependence creates tensions that may manifest themselves in conflict.”65 In short, if state A is more dependent on trade with state B than state B is dependent on state A, state B holds more power in the relationship. This could influence state A to try to reassert power in the relationship or gain more power, enhancing the chance for conflict. Keohane and Nye, in their study of interdependence, add power to this perspective, arguing that asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of power for the state that is less dependent.66 Further, the more interdependent or connected states are with one another, the more opportunities there will be for states to come into conflict with one another; according to the realist school, conflict is just as likely to emerge from these encounters as cooperation, particularly given their perspective on the nature of states.67 Some research has supported the argument that asymmetrical dependence can increase conflict. James Morrow argues that trade asymmetry might lead to conflict if one state valued the trade more than the other; even if an asymmetry exists, the weaker state in the relationship might not value it as highly as another.68 As such, his analysis finds the effect of trade on conflict to be rather indeterminate. Interestingly, Hans Dorussen, in developing a model of the effects of trade, argues that trade does reduce conflict but the effect actually diminishes as more countries are involved in a trading network.69 Though the model is not tested, his analysis implies that as more countries become interconnected, trade disruptions due to conflict could be made up elsewhere. Gartzke and Li’s findings support this with empirical results that show asymmetry does not contribute to a greater chance of conflict.70 Dale C. Copeland attempts to reconcile both of these objections, the occurrence of World War I and realist international relations principles, with economic interdependence through his trade expectations theory.71 Beginning from a realist perspective, Copeland introduces a key moderating variable: a state’s expectations regarding future trade with another state. If a state who is dependent on another state for crucial resources expects that trade to continue in the future, they have no reason to upset the apple cart by engaging in hostilities. On the other hand, if they fear the trade will be curtailed, “the greater the likelihood that it will choose hard-line policies or all-out war.”72 States, however, operate under imperfect information about both the future and another state’s trade intentions; given this, a trade-security dilemma can arise that is similar to an arms race spiral. If a state fears that their trade will be cut off, Copeland argues their best option is to project military strength into the region to “signal not only one’s determination to protect one’s economic access but also one’s military ability to do so.”73 The other state is likely to see this as an aggressive move and take actions to restrict or cut off trade with the first state or respond militarily. Both Copeland’s theory and realist work on state power are rooted in the assumption that states seek to protect and enlarge their own power. However, there

48  Logics of peace

is reason to believe that the assumption itself is incorrect. Not only are there plenty of examples in history where states have cooperated with one another, James Wood Forsyth, Jr. argues that cooperation is possible even in a world that accepts this Hobbesian view of behavior.74 While Forsyth’s work examines great power cooperation in cyberspace, his argument is still plausible in general and, in particular, for space. He writes: As each new power grows, its dependencies upon the global commons—sea, air, space, and cyber—will intensify. As dependencies intensify, oligopolistic behaviors will result, where the actions of one great power will have a noticeable effect on the rest. Since the great powers share in and are dependent upon the resources of the commons, the security of each great power will be tightly coupled to the security of the commons. Thus the great powers—for no other reason than survival—will inevitably cooperate and share the costs of providing security even if they might prefer not to.75 Certainly, Forsyth is not talking about trade in general, but he does suggest that the rush to assume that states act to protect interests can be overcome in certain circumstances. While it is not my intent here to engage in a debate regarding realist assumptions of international relations, suffice it to say that there is (and likely will continue to be) ongoing debates about the appropriateness of theoretical assumptions. A final objection to economic peace also contends that trade interdependence and asymmetries can cause conflict but not through an imbalance of power. Rather, increasing reliance on other states and a growing interdependence of economies can cause both internal and external conflict by stoking latent attitudes of nationalism, economic protectionism, and inequality. The recent wave of nationalist and authoritarian beliefs around the globe are instructive, particularly moves by the United Kingdom to leave the European Union (EU). Peter Hall, writing on the origins of Brexit, argues that its roots can be partially tied to the expansion of the EU in 2004 to include eight east-central European states. At the time, the benefits to the UK appeared substantial: a larger free trade zone within Europe provided more markets for UK products. However, it also allowed the movement of more migrants into the UK.76 While the flows of goods and migrants have provided significant economic benefits to Britain, they also stimulated a backlash. “The referendum vote was won on a wave of public anger sweeping through northern cities and countryside left out of the prosperity that integration into a global economy brought to London.”77 Feeling left out of the economic good times and resentful of immigrants to the country, nationalistic attitudes resulted in a vote to leave the EU with the results still uncertain today. Similar attitudes have been expressed by nationalist-oriented leaders in the United States, Hungary, Brazil, and the Philippines. It is impossible to deny that globalization has had negative effects. The question is whether they can be overcome or even whether the benefits of globalization outweigh the costs. The larger normative questions regarding the nature and scope of globalization are beyond the scope of this book. The point, however, should

Logics of peace  49

be that caution is necessary when considering globalization. Though it may have significant benefits, its side effects can be costly especially when those side effects increase the chances of conflict both inside a state and between states. Taken as a whole, the economic peace hypotheses suggest that increased linkages, whether they be in the form of trade, globalized capital flows, foreign investment, capital markets, or even globalization, have a peaceful influence on the relationships between states. Though states themselves do not engage in trade, they have an incentive to see that their own economies are healthy; because of that, according to this perspective, they avoid potentially dangerous and damaging conflict which could hurt their economy through disrupted trade patterns and flight of investment and capital. In short, the economic costs borne by war are greater than the benefits of war causing rational states to seek peaceful solutions to conflict.

Methodological lessons and challenges for a theory on conflict in space The economic peace, more so than the democratic peace, is a fruitful starting point in elaborating a theory regarding space-based dependence and conflict. However, it remains a fact that space is a different environment than terrestrial relations as discussed in the previous chapter. Though it is still dominated by the actions of states, the potential hazards of conflict in space are quite different as is the usage of space and the types of connections that states form through it. Therefore, we cannot simply apply one to one an economically based theory of peace to the domain of space without modification. While this new theory will be developed in the next chapter, the research into the democratic and economic peace theories provides lessons, as well as potential challenges, for a space bound application. First, most democratic and economic peace research has occurred at either the monadic or dyadic levels; that is, scholars have studied whether certain states are more peaceful than others or whether pairs of states are more peaceful than others. Barbieri and Schneider note that, at least as regards the trade-conflict relationship, little empirical work has been done at the systemic level.78 In specifying a space application for one of these theories, then, it is important to specify at what level of analysis the theory is supposed to work. Is it that relationships among states make individual states less conflict prone in space? Is it that state-state relationships are less conflict prone? Or is it that the system itself, the network of relations among states and private actors, is more peaceful? Since one state’s actions in space can have significant effects across multiple domains (not just as potential dangers to satellites but as disruptors of military, domestic, or economic behaviors on the ground), the theory advanced here is necessarily systematic. It hypothesizes that given increasing dependence of the global economy on space and increasing economic ties between countries, the system of relationships itself will be less conflict prone in the domain of space. This does not mean that the global system will be less conflict prone on earth. Instead, it treats space as a special area whose connections are far more valuable and vulnerable than

50  Logics of peace

terrestrial connections lessening the chances for militarized conflict in space. As a system level theory, it also does not distinguish between regime types or market types; democracies and authoritarian states and capitalist and state-run economies alike are theorized to be equally influenced by these connections. Where there might be variation that influences a state’s behavior, it would come in the form of asymmetrical dependence on the global economy and/or space. The second challenge for a commercial space peace theory is to specifically link state actions to economic influences. While the attempts of scholars to link these two were discussed previously, I argue that space is a unique domain that enhances the relationship of states and private actors in addition to the mechanisms described earlier. In brief, space is unique for two reasons. One, states like the US, even if they could provide their own independent access to space through governmental agencies, typically contract out and procure both the satellite systems and means of transportation. This gives private space actors leverage with states and an ability to potentially influence a state’s actions and policies. Even if the government is directly providing the launch service, as is the case in China and India, among others, they can still be made to feel the economic pressure. For example, in response to the Indian ASAT test, Brian Weeden, a space analyst with the Secure World Foundation, suggested that companies should boycott India’s space launchers in order to register their objections to the test.79 While there is no indication of such boycotts occurring (at least on a large scale), this type of action is consistent with the economic peace hypotheses discussed previously wherein conflictual type action leads to economic penalties that are greater than the benefits of the action. In addition to withdrawing their business from state actors, private space actors in the future could simply refuse to submit proposals for government contracts or limit the types of launches they are willing to undertake. These possibilities only strengthen the connection between private actors and state behaviors. The second way in which states and business are linked in space is through government support of technology development, particularly in regard to space. In the United States, investment in space activities, whether it be through NASA or the military, has not been undertaken without political motivations. In the early 1960s, following the establishment of NASA and at the height of the space race, NASA invested a significant amount of money and resources in states and congressional districts whose representatives were powerful in Congress. It just so happened that these members hailed predominantly from the South. As a result, NASA centers sprung to life in Florida, Alabama, Texas, and Louisiana. NASA continues to spend billions of dollars a year at these centers which can amount to a significant economic impact, an economic impact which is not lost on members of Congress representing those areas. In many ways, funding of space activities has become a type of distributive or pork barrel policy, dollars which members of Congress pursue to benefit their district. This relationship is important for our purposes for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that state actors are sensitive to economic concerns, particularly when it impacts major industries. For example, John Logsdon argues that one of the

Logics of peace  51

primary reasons then-President Richard Nixon approved the space shuttle was because of its impact on the spaceflight industry of California, a state whose electoral votes he needed to win reelection.80 This helps to reinforce the electoral connection discussed earlier, especially as it relates to states. Second, space-related industries and corporations are likely to have a far greater impact in political decisions than the public. Public opinion polls have routinely found little salience for space in the United States and often, large majorities express the opinion that too much is spent on space exploration in general.81 As a result, Martin Machay and Alan Steinberg find that, in the case of space, industry influence has a much stronger influence on legislative decisions than public opinion.82 Given these extensive connections, the question ultimately becomes whether private actors should be given preeminence in a theory of space-based dependence. I argue that states remain the leading actors in outer space and therefore worthy of focus. My point here is to demonstrate that a link between the state and economic activity is easily made, specifically with regards to space. A final lesson from this discussion regards a means of testing the theory. Theories of the democratic and economic peace are subject to rigorous empirical testing precisely because there is variation on the dependent variable: conflict, economic, and otherwise. There is no such variation in terms of space. To date, no actual militarized conflict has taken place in outer space. Testing the theory then, would require the explanation of an event that has yet to take place. Timothy J. Junio and Thomas G. Mahnken call such scenarios future counterfactuals and argue that they are necessary to deal with “high consequence, low probability events” much like a conflict in space.83 Counterfactual accounts usually consist of what if questions, particularly about past cases or circumstances but future counterfactuals, according to Junio and Mahnken, are what if statements about the future. Counterfactuals in general have been “woefully underutilized” in political science.84 James D. Fearon explains this absence as caused by a general feeling that “empirical political science must deal only with actual cases.”85 However, when there are no actual cases of conflict, statistical analysis or even small-N research is not possible. In a survey of uses of counterfactuals and scenarios, Junio and Mahnken find that, when they were used, future counterfactuals consisted of narratives about future warfare—exactly the type of event under consideration here. They further find future counterfactuals to be useful in theory building and development especially for what they call “data poor” research topics.86 While the future counterfactual will be used here to think about the ramifications of conflict in space, it is important to make clear that, unlike tests of the democratic and economic peace hypotheses which are quite voluminous, it is not possible to test this theory in the same manner or to the same degree. While this chapter has explored the democratic and, importantly, economic peace hypotheses, these ideas only lay the groundwork for the commercial space peace theory. The following chapter will more clearly define key concepts, lay out main assumptions, and detail the main propositions of the theory. Following this, the remaining chapters will take up key elements of the theory including implications and the possible benefits stemming from competition in space.

52  Logics of peace

Notes 1 Associated Press, “Indian PM Modi Boasts Success of Anti-satellite Missile Launch Ahead of Election,” NBC News, published March 27, 2019, accessed April 6, 2019 at . 2 Roger Handberg and Zhen Li, Chinese Space Policy: A Study in Domestic and International Politics, Routledge, New York, 2007. 3 Sean Gallagher, “India ASAT Test Debris Poses Danger to International Space Station, NASA says,” Ars Technica, published April 2, 2019, accessed April 6, 2019 at . 4 Admittedly, this danger might also lead to countries focusing on debris remediation and mitigation rather than avoiding conflict altogether. Satellites destroyed by debris impacts would need to be replaced, development costs to ensure a hardened satellite would be still higher, and finally launch costs would also need to be factored in. Further, though some organizations are testing debris removal methods, the techniques are far from proven and also present legal challenges. 5 Niha Masih, “India and Pakistan Hold Talks After Nearly Going to War,” The Washington Post, published March 14, 2019, accessed April 6, 2019 at . 6 Erich Weede, “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Hegemony by Economic Interdependence,” International Interactions, 36, 2010: p. 210. 7 Though not covered here, for explication of the international organization element of Kantian peace, see John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992,” World Politics, 52(1), 1999: pp. 1–37; Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom, “Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?” World Politics, 57(1), 2004: pp. 1–38; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Power Positions: International Organizations, Social Networks, and Conflict,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(1), 2006: pp. 3–27. 8 Harvard Hegre, “Democracy and Armed Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, 51(2), 2014: pp. 159–172. 9 Jameson Lee Ungerer, “Assessing the Progress of the Democratic Peace Research Program,” International Studies Review, 14(1), 2012: p. 17. 10 Erik Gartzke, “Kant We All Just get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace,” American Journal of Political Science, 42(1), 1998: pp. 1–27; Erik Gartzke, “Preferences and the Democratic Peace,” International Studies Quarterly, 44(2), 2000: pp. 191–212. 11 Ungerer, “Assessing the Progress of the Democratic Peace Research Program”; Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, “Common Interests or Common Polities? Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace,” The Journal of Politics, 59(2), 1997: pp. 393–417; Paul R. Hensel, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl, “The Democratic Peace and Rivalries,” The Journal of Politics, 62(4), 2000: pp. 1173–1188. 12 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” The American Political Science Review, 93(4), 1999: pp. 791–807. 13 Ungerer, “Assessing the Progress of the Democratic Peace Research Program,” p. 20. 14 Ibid., pp. 20–21. 15 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, “Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War,” World Politics, 56(3), 2004: pp. 363–388; Sally Anderson and Mark Souva, “The Accountability Effects of Political Institutions and Capitalism on Interstate Conflict,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(4), 2010: pp. 543–565.

Logics of peace  53

16 Kevin A. Clarke and Randall W. Stone, “Democracy and the Logic of Political Survival,” The American Political Science Review, 102(3), 2008: pp. 387–392. 17 Ungerer, “Assessing the Progress of the Democratic Peace Research Program,” p. 21. 18 Michael Mousseau, “Market Prosperity, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Peace,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(4), 2000: p. 478. 19 Ibid., p. 479. 20 Michael Mousseau, “The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the Economy,” International Studies Quarterly, 57(1), 2013: pp. 194–195. 21 Mousseau, “Market Prosperity, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Peace,” p. 500; Oneal and Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992,” pp. 1–37; John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, “Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, 36(4), 1999: pp. 423–442; Havard Hegre, John R. Oneal, and Bruce Russett, “Trade Does Promote Peace: New Simultaneous Estimates of the Reciprocal Effects of Trade and Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, 47(6), 2010: pp. 763–774. 22 By way of example, see Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” The American Political Science Review, 97(4), 2003: pp. 585–602. 23 Gerald Schneider and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “The Capitalist Peace: The Origins and Prospects of a Liberal Idea,” International Interactions, 36, 2010: pp. 107–108. 24 Erich Weede, “The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace by Globalization,” The Independent Review, 9(2), 2004: pp. 165–186. 25 Michael Mousseau, “Coming to Terms with the Capitalist Peace,” International Interactions, 36, 2010: pp. 185–213. 26 Erik Gartzke and J. Joseph Hewitt, “International Crises and the Capitalist Peace,” International Interactions, 36, 2010: pp. 115–145; Patrick J. McDonald, “Capitalism, Commitment, and Peace,” International Interactions, 36, 2010: pp. 146–168. 27 John Mueller, “Capitalism, Peace, and the Historical Movement of Ideas,” International Interactions, 36, 2010: pp. 169–184. 28 Bruce Russett, “Capitalism or Democracy? Not So Fast,” International Interactions, 36, 2010: pp. 185–213. 29 Richard Rosecrance, “Capitalist Influences and Peace,” International Interactions, 36, 2010: pp. 185–213. 30 Solomon William Polachek, “Conflict and Trade,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(1), 1980: pp. 55–78. 31 Ibid., p. 61, emphasis in the original. 32 Patrick J. McDonald, “Peace Through Trade or Free Trade?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(4), 2004: pp. 547–572; Solomon W. Polachek, John Robst, and Yuan-Ching Chang, “Liberalism and Interdependence: Extending the Trade-Conflict Model,” Journal of Peace Research, 36(4), 1999: pp. 405–422; Oneal and Russett, “Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict,” pp. 423–442; Han Dorussen, “Balance of Power Revisited: A Multi-Country Model of Trade and Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, 36(4), 1999: p. 443–462; Hegre, Oneal, and Russett, “Trade Does Promote Peace.” 33 For a review of this literature, see Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, “The Study of Interdependence and Conflict: Recent Advances, Open Questions, and Directions for Future Research,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(6), 2001: pp. 834–859. 34 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence, 4th ed., Longman, Boston, 2012. 35 Ibid., p. 10. 36 Ibid., p. 11. 37 Ibid., p. 8. 38 Susan M. McMillan, “Interdependence and Conflict,” Mershon International Studies Review, 41(1), 1997: pp. 33–58.

54  Logics of peace

39 William Reed, “Information and Economic Interdependence,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47(1), 2003: pp. 54–71. 40 Nam Kyu Kim, “Testing Two Explanations of the Liberal Peace: The Opportunity Cost and Signaling Arguments,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(5), 2014: pp. 894–919. 41 Allan Dafoe and Nina Kelsey, “Observing the Capitalist Peace: Examining MarketMediated Signaling and Other Mechanisms,” Journal of Peace Research, 51(5), 2014: pp. 619–633. 42 Lester C. Thurow, “Globalization: The Product of a Knowledge-Based Economy,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 570, 2000: pp. 19–31; Stephen G. Brooks, “The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43(5), 1999: p. 647; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 225. 43 Syed Mansoob Murshed and Dawood Mamoon, “Not Loving Thy Neighbour as Thyself: Trade, Democracy, and Military Expenditure,” Journal of Peace Research, 47(4), 2010: pp. 463–476. 44 Seung-Whan Choi, “Beyond Kantian Liberalism: Peace Through Globalization?” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 27(3), 2010: pp. 272–295. 45 Ibid., p. 273. 46 Ibid., p. 289. 47 Erik Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” American Journal of Political Science, 51(1), 2007: p. 173. 48 Erik Gartzke and Quan Li, “War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization,” International Studies Quarterly, 47(4), 2003: p. 568. 49 Brooks, “The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest.” 50 Christina L. Davis and Sophie Meunier, “Business as Usual? Economic Responses to Political Tensions,” American Journal of Political Science, 55(3), 2011: p. 631. 51 Katherine Barbieri and Jack S. Levy, “Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade,” Journal of Peace Research, 36(4), 1999: pp. 463–479. 52 Paul Krugman, Pop Internationalism, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996. 53 David H. Bearce and Sawa Omori, “How Do Commercial Institutions Promote Peace?” Journal of Peace Research, 42(6), 2005: pp. 659–678; David H. Bearce, “Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace,” International Studies Quarterly, 47(3), 2003: pp. 347–370. 54 Patrick J. McDonald, “The Purse Strings of Peace,” American Journal of Political Science, 51(3), 2007: pp. 569–582. 55 Thad A. Brown and Arthur A. Stein, “Review: The Political Economy of National Elections,” Comparative Politics, 14(4), 1982: pp. 479–497; Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen, “The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics,” Journal of Political Economy, 89(4), 1981: pp. 642–664. 56 David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1974. 57 Katja B. Kleinberg and Benjamin O. Fordham, “The Domestic Politics of Trade and Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly, 57(3), 2013: pp. 605–619. 58 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantages, Heinemann, London, 1912. 59 Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes: Two Essays by Joseph Schumpeter, Meridian Books, Cleveland, OH, 1955 (1919). 60 J. Tyson Chatagnier and Emanuele Castelli, “A Modern Peace? Schumpeter, the Decline of Conflict, and the Investment-War Trade-Off,” Political Research Quarterly, 69(4), 2016: pp. 852–864. 61 Ibid., p. 855. 62 Erik Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu, “Trading on Preconceptions: Why World War I Was Not a Failure of Economic Interdependence,” International Security, 36(4), 2012: pp. 115. 63 Ibid., p. 116. 64 McDonald, “Peace Through Trade or Free Trade?” pp. 547–572.

Logics of peace  55

65 Katherine Barbieri and Gerald Schneider,“Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, 36(4), 1999: p. 390. 66 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence. 67 For a summary of the realist objections to the economic peace hypotheses, see McMillan, “Interdependence and Conflict.” 68 James D. Morrow, “How Could Trade Affect Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research, 36(4), 1999: pp. 481–489. 69 Dorussen, “Balance of Power Revisited: A Multi-Country Model of Trade and Conflict,” pp. 443–462. 70 Gartzke and Li, “War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand.” 71 Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2015. 72 Ibid., p. 36. 73 Ibid., p. 10. 74 James Wood Forsyth, Jr., “What Great Powers Make It: International Order and the Logic of Cooperation in Cyberspace,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 7(1), 2013: pp. 93–113. 75 Ibid., p. 98. 76 Peter Hall, “The Roots of Brexit: 1992, 2004, and European Union Expansion,” Foreign Affairs, published June 28, 2016, accessed April 10, 2019 at . 77 Ibid. 78 Barbieri and Schneider, “Globalization and Peace.” 79 Debra Werner, “Boycott Indian Launchers? Industry Reacts to India’s Anti-satellite Weapon Test,” Space News, published March 27, 2019, accessed April 10, 2019 at . 80 John M. Logsdon, After Apollo? Richard Nixon and the American Space Program, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2015. 81 Wendy N. Whitman Cobb, “Who’s Supporting Space Activities? An ‘Issue Public’ for US Space Policy,” Space Policy, 27, 2011: pp. 234–239. 82 Martin Machay and Alan Steinberg, “Influence of Industry on Legislative Behavior Toward NASA,” Astropolitics, 13, 2015: pp. 205–222. 83 Timothy J. Junio and Thomas G. Mahnken, “Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations,” International Studies Review, 15(3), 2013: pp. 374. 84 Ibid., p. 375. 85 James D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics, 43(2), 1991: p. 173. 86 Junio and Mahnken, “Conceiving of Future War,” p. 387.

4 THE COMMERCIAL SPACE PEACE

Space is often referred to as a global commons which suggests that space is a resource which all actors have access to and can benefit from, also known as a common pool resource or CPR global commons.1 It also means that it is subject to abuse by states whose overuse of it can ruin the common for everyone else. Although describing cyberspace, James Wood Forsyth, Jr.’s description of the problem associated with the commons can also be applied to space: [C]yberspace is a common property resource—which is to say, no one can be excluded from it. When exclusion is not an option, states have little incentive to pay for a good. Instead, they prefer to be free riders, enjoying the benefits of a good without paying for it. In such a world, overexploitation is the problem.2 Space is experiencing a similar situation. More states and private actors than ever before are utilizing it, there is a growing threat of dangerous debris, and policy coordination is severely lacking. “As a result,” writes Laura Grego, “challenges to stability and security are growing, with ever more satellites and few restrictions on behavior, increasing the risks of costly accidents and of misunderstanding that could lead to conflicts on the ground.”3 This understanding of space as a global commons is derived from work on the tragedy of the commons. The tragedy of the commons, developed by Garrett Hardin in 1968, describes a scenario in which a common resource is depleted over time because of excessive individual use. Hardin uses the metaphor of a common herding area where individuals bring their animals to graze. If the commons can support 100 head of cattle, then ten individuals can each have ten cows. However, one (or more) of the herders may find it entirely rational to add just one additional cow to their herd in order to gain a competitive advantage over the others. If every

The commercial space peace  57

herder did the same, the resources of the commons would be quickly lost due to overuse. In terms of space, the physical area around the earth is finite. Space is not only a resource that is held in common, no state or entity can claim sovereignty under current space law, but it is also one that can be easily depleted. While this might not have been a major challenge when only a small number of states could access space, the explosion of users of space has complicated matters significantly. Though there is a debate to be had about whether space qualifies as a commons, assume for the moment that it is. The problem confronting us, then, is how to induce cooperation among actors so that no one actor or set of actors spoils the commons for everyone else. Both political scientists and economists have long recognized the issues surrounding the commons and this type of collective action. Elinor Ostrom, a Nobel Prize winner for her work in this area, examines why some groups do form to solve collective action problems and succeed whereas others do not. Ostrom contends that previous answers to these types of problems ignore the transaction and information costs that can be quite substantial for potential participants and could mitigate any collective action on their part. In turn, she proposes eight principles that contribute to cooperative arrangements to solve collective action problems, including defining clear group boundaries, ensuring those that are affected by the rules participate in modifying them, and providing easy means for dispute resolution, among others.4 These principles suggest that collective action is possible if the members of the group are empowered to create the system in which they are expected to work, can modify the institution as needed, and if the cost of obtaining information and monitoring the common resource is kept low. Joan Johnson-Freese and Brian Weeden have specifically examined whether some of these principles would be applicable in the management of space as a common pool resource.5 Drawing on Ostrom’s ideas, their “mixed conclusions” are that there are significant caveats, inefficiencies, and disagreements on all sides. They suggest that a tiered system of space users (spacefaring states, space-capable states, and space users) that does not operate based on consensus as the most workable outcome. However, this solution, no matter its format, rules, or procedures, presumes that users of space, whether they are states or private actors, are willing and able to cooperate. Recent history has shown that not to be the case. For example, various countries and non-governmental organizations have proposed new treaty agreements or codes of conduct, but states including the United States have been hesitant to engage on these issues. In 2016, the US withdrew from negotiations on a non-binding International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities because of a desire to include a reference to “the inherent right of self-defense in space.”6 Another proposal by China and Russia through the United Nations Committee on Disarmament to ban the placement of weapons in space has faced resistance from Australia, Canada, France, and the United States because of a lack of verification mechanism.7 There does not seem to be high hopes for a formal, or informal, update to the Outer Space Treaty in the near future, but I argue that such an agreement is not necessary to limit the potential for open conflict in space. Instead, all of the

58  The commercial space peace

mechanisms through which restraint can be found are already present: multiple users, both state and non-state; significant and increasing dependence on space for economic transactions; monitoring; and the danger of cascading effects should conflict emerge are just as capable of reducing, if not preventing, conflict in space. This chapter draws on the findings of the economic peace literature to develop just such a theory. Before outlining its premises, this chapter first discusses key definitions including what is meant by conflict in space. It then lays out the basic assumptions including states as the key actors and rational behavior, common assumptions across various theories of international relations. Then, I make five theoretical claims which constitute the body of the theory. Finally, I explore some of the initial implications that will be taken up in the remainder of the book.

Key concepts When the term conflict is used, it can be used to define various stages of tension between actors ranging from mild disputes or disagreements to outright war. Part of the methodological tension in the democratic and economic peace literature has arisen from disagreements on the precise meanings and measurements of conflict. If a scholar has a lower bar for what can be termed “conflict,” then there will likely be more of it across the data set. However, if another sets a higher bar, the variation in the amount of conflict will likely be less. While there are no actual cases of conflict yet in space, the meaning of this term for the purposes of this argument is important. Conflict, “a sharp disagreement or collision in interests between two or more actors,” occurs quite often between states involved in space activities.8 Many countries have strongly objected to the Chinese, American, and Indian ASAT tests and there is certainly conflict among states over possible new treaties, agreements, and codes of conduct for space. This does not mean there is a militarized dispute or that conflict will ultimately result in one. Conflict happens. This theory does not argue that increased economic ties to space and increased state ties to the global economy will reduce conflict overall. Instead, the dependent variable of interest here is militarized conflict in space. The qualification that the conflict occur in space is important; space is a unique domain with its own set of physical rules as detailed in Chapter 2. These differences make space a particularly harsh and unforgiving environment for both people and conflict.9 The environment also increases the costs of engaging in militarized conflict in space. In other words, the costs and benefits of engaging in militarized action on earth are quite different than the costs and benefits of engaging in militarized action in space. A second reason why the addendum of in space is important is because conflict over space issues or space-based assets could be borne out on earth rather than in space. It is easy to imagine a scenario where one space power, concerned about how another state may utilize space or assets in orbit, might attack one or more of these terrestrial facilities. Spoofing, jamming, and hacking of the signals moving between the earth and various satellites has already happened and will likely happen

The commercial space peace  59

again. However, should this occur, it would not fall under the rubric of this theory because states would be considering a different set of costs and benefits than if they were carrying out an attack in the environment of space.10 This discussion highlights another distinction, noted in Chapter 1, that should be reiterated here. Weaponization of space is different than the militarization of space. Because of the dual-use nature of space, space has already been militarized. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) travel through the lower reaches of space to reach their targets. Interceptor missiles designed to protect from ICBMs do as well. GPS systems are used to locate hostile targets and guide missiles to their intended targets. There is an argument to be made that the use of such space systems is not peaceful thereby breaking the Outer Space Treaty which preserves space for peaceful uses only. However, the uses of space noted previously are passive rather than active. The systems themselves are not weapons but are used to assist military services. This coincides with the US’s historical understanding of “peaceful” in the OST to mean “non-aggressive.11 In engaging in active conflict in the space environment, a line would be crossed from the militarization of space to the weaponization of space or the use of active, aggressive weaponry in space. More importantly, it does not necessarily matter, at least for the purposes of this theory, whether such use is offensive or defensive. Defensive militarized action is still militarized action that will come with the same consequences as offensive action, at least as regards debris and the potential for damaging cascades of it. One final concept requires clarification before examining the theory and that is the idea of dependence. As will be shortly argued, to the extent that countries are dependent or interdependent on the global economy and the global economy is dependent on space, the risk of conflict should be lessened. But what does it mean to be dependent? Interdependence, according to Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, is state of mutual dependence.12 Although the utilization of space to its fullest is somewhat dependent on the economy (good economic times means more spending and more innovation), we cannot say that space itself is completely dependent on the economy. Therefore, the term dependence is more appropriate in talking about the relationship between space and the economy. Interdependence is the more appropriate term in terms of the relationship between states and the global economy. As discussed in the previous chapter, interdependence has two faces, vulnerability and sensitivity. While I will discuss the interdependence of states and the global economy in what follows, suffice it to say at this point that the concept of interdependence, as defined by Keohane and Nye, will be used to describe relationships between states and the economy.

Assumptions There are two main assumptions to the theory: one, that states are the central players and two, that they are rational actors. Since these are often taken for granted in the international relations literature, it hardly seems necessary to lay them out here. However, space is a significantly different environment with a growing number of

60  The commercial space peace

non-state actors. Given the activities of companies like SpaceX or Blue Origin, can it still properly be said that states are the central players? This question mirrors similar ones about the role of the state in both a system of growing globalization as well as in a related domain, cyberspace. In terms of the impact of globalization, the argument is that as state economies are increasingly subsumed by the international economy, states will have less power to determine, at a minimum, economic outcomes. Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson summarize this argument: Nation states in this new perspective have become the local authorities of the global system. They can no longer independently affect the level of economic activity or employment within their territories; rather, that is dictated by the choices of internationally mobile capital.13 Lester C. Thurow even makes the bold prediction that many countries will not exist several decades from now because in a world where “countries need corporations more than corporations need countries, the relative bargaining power of governments and multinational corporations is shifting in favor of corporations.”14 Lindy Newlove-Eriksson and Johan Eriksson make the direct argument that space is increasingly “characterized by strong indicators of globalization” and that private authorities are growing in preeminence and power.15 Despite the predictions, however, states are still the main players on the international stage and fully in charge of their economic futures. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, some research shows the globalization and increases in trading relationships can have backlash effects that cause conflict rather than reduce it. As states begin to be tied to one another, internally, those who have been left out of the economic benefits create rising tides of nationalism contributing to political pressure that limits international involvement and acts to implement protectionist policies. The rise of conservative populist leaders in the United States, Europe, and South America is just one example of this phenomenon.16 Such actions only serve to reinforce the role of the state. Another line of argument regarding the place of the state has been made in terms of cyberspace where the cost of entry is far lower and access more widely available. As information becomes a major source of power, some theorists have argued that increasing internationalization and privatization in the realm of cyber diminishes the importance of the state.17 Daniel Drezner argues that even in such a situation, “States, particularly the great powers, remain the primary actors for handling the social and political externalities created by globalization and the Internet.”18 Similarly, although there has been a proliferation of non-state actors in cyberspace, Hamoud Salhi notes that states still have the “sole ownership of the legitimate use of force.”19 Drezner, too, recognizes a growing role for both peripheral state powers and non-state actors in cyberspace but finds that their influence is mostly marginal.20 In terms of actual conflict in cyberspace or cyberwar, Erik Gartzke argues that the influence of states is actually reinforced—while non-state actors may be able to disrupt, temporarily, the actions of states in cyberspace, unless those attacks

The commercial space peace  61

are backed up by terrestrial force, they are likely to be merely temporary distractions that states will soon overcome.21 All of these arguments about the centrality of states to cyberspace can also be applied to space. States, having the sole legitimate use of power and far more resources than private companies, have the capability of regulating space activity, particularly launches as well as pressing any military advantages that space may offer. Private actors may engage in hostilities in space, but states can prevent potentially lethal systems from launching in the first place and unless the private actor has a way to take advantage of a space attack through ground attacks, they likely receive no benefit. Further, under international law, states are held responsible for the actions of their nationals in outer space. Henry R. Hertzfeld writes, “it will be difficult, if not impossible, for a company to operate in space without supervision” and, as a result, “unless the major legal tenets of space activity change, commercial interests will be subservient to national interest in space.”22 Therefore, though the number of private players is growing and they play a significant role in preserving peace in space, it is still appropriate to treat states as the main actors in the space domain. The second assumption is that states behave as rational actors in the global sphere, that is, they make decisions that are consistent with what they believe to be in their national interest. Often glossed over, the assumption that states act rationally is itself based on the assumption that states have correctly identified their own selfinterest and can correctly identify the best means by which that can be achieved. This implies a world of perfect information; without it, misperceptions can run rampant.23 This also assumes that states act in a coherent manner and yet, there are many actors within a state, each of which may have different ideas about the national interest and how it is best achieved. These caveats add a certain number of wrinkles to the idea that states are both unitary and rational actors, but theories must necessarily include simplified abstractions such as these to achieve parsimonious explanation. All of this is to say that states may, and indeed do, make miscalculations as to the national interest, thereby straining the bounds of rationality. It is my argument that states behaving rationally will not see benefit in engaging in conflict in outer space because of its potential costs. It does not rule out that rogue states might take the opposite tact.

Theoretical premises This section introduces five theoretical premises on which a space economic peace is built. They are: 1 2 3 4

States are interested in promoting economic success. The global economy is increasingly dependent on space. State economic success is increasingly dependent on space to the extent that a state’s economy is integrated with the larger, global economy. The more dependent on space the economy is, the greater economic costs of conflict in space.

62  The commercial space peace

5 In considering conflict in space, states have to consider danger to space-based assets and possible economic costs. The benefits of attacking a satellite or other asset have to be greater than the economic consequences that could possibly arise. The theory suggests that the more dependent the global economy is on space, the chances of conflict are decreased because the economic costs of engaging in conflict are simply too high. The unique nature of space adds to these high costs, amplifying the peaceful effects that increased commercial ties have on the ground. To decrease the chances of conflict in space, increased economic and commercial ties between space and the terrestrial economy should be pursued. With an understanding of the critique often leveled in economic peace research regarding linkages between the state and private economic activity, the first premise is that states are interested in promoting overall economic success. To the extent that a state’s economy is integrated with global markets, then states also have an interest in ensuring that the global economy thrives as well. It is not entirely necessary to specify the specific mechanisms through which this interest works (at least for the purposes of this argument), but it is important to establish that it is plausible that states are interested in a good economy. The previous chapter suggested several causal mechanisms from the economic peace literature that link the economy to the state including the reelection motivation for elected leaders and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s and his colleagues’ selectorate theory. In addition to these ideas, there is a long history of government protection of commerce, whether through protection of trading routes (either over land, in the air, or on the sea) or the imposition of tariffs to protect domestic economies. The state would not engage in such costly activities if it was not concerned with economic matters. Purchases of government debt by another country only add another layer to this. For example, as of early 2020, China held $1.1 trillion in US debt, more than a quarter of the American debt held by foreign countries.24 Not only does China influence the US economy through these purchases, it also increases the amount of danger to the Chinese economy (and government) should the US economy decline. The unique environment of space adds substantial backing to this premise. States that utilize private actors to build their space infrastructure and launch it are dependent on the success of these private actors which, in turn, is partially predicated on the state of the economy overall. Second, heavy state investment in the development of space technologies not only benefits certain states and congressional districts (adding to the weight of the reelection hypothesis) but technological advancement can stimulate the economy directly. Eli Ginzburg, James W. Kuhn, Jerome Schnee, and Boris Yavitz detail several early studies on the economic impact of NASA, including one that found that with each dollar spent on research and development, returned “slightly more than $7.00 in gross national product over the eighteen year period following the expenditure” and that the “$25 billion (in 1958 dollars) spent on civilian space research and development during the 1959–69 period returned $52 billion through 1970 and will continue to produce payoff through 1987, at which time the total gain will have been $181 billion.”25

The commercial space peace  63

A 2013 report finds that the agency develops 1,600 new technologies per year, all of which are transferred to industry and for “every dollar NASA spends on employees, businesses, universities, and others generates $2.60 of output in the economy, as compared to the federal non-military average of $2.30 and the federal military average of $2.00.”26 Admittedly, demonstrating that government investment in space technology impacts the general economy is not the same as demonstrating the government has an interest directly in the economy. However, spending on space is routinely justified by government officials precisely because it is a net positive to the economy.27 In the United States, this justification began early. In April 1963, in response to a request from President John F. Kennedy to review NASA’s budget, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson justified the spending on space largely in economic terms, writing, It cannot be questioned that billions of dollars directed into research and development in an orderly and thoughtful manner will have significant effect upon our national economy. No formula has been found which attributes specific dollar values to each of these areas of anticipated developments, however, the “multiplier” of space research and development will augment our economic strength, our peaceful posture, and our standard of living.28 More recently, in a March 2019 announcement tasking NASA to return to the moon by 2024, Vice President Mike Pence invoked economic rationales several times to justify the project: The United States must remain first in space, in this century as in the last, not just to propel our economy and secure our nation, but above all because the rules and values of space, like every great frontier, will be written by those who have the courage to get there first and the commitment to stay.29 This justification of space development in terms of its economic potential is not limited to the United States. Both Russia and China have concerned themselves with the economic and commercial potentials of their space programs.30 The Chinese government in particular has emphasized the commercial applications of its launch systems since it entered the global launch market in the 1980s. For China, space development is not just a means of enhancing their economy but also of connecting their disparate population centers with outlying areas and of further supporting space development.31 If politicians are supporting space funding, even in part, because they believe it benefits the economy, then this first premise, that states are interested in a successful economy, is more than plausible. The second premise of a space economic peace is that the global economy is increasingly dependent on space. Chapter 2 outlined some of the many ways in which space-based instruments contribute directly to economic activities including satellite television, radio, and communications, imaging, weather forecasting, satellite imagery, and location services. Satellites also serve as a means of transmitting

64  The commercial space peace

economic data and information and facilitating exchange and economic transactions. Given the wide use of space-based assets, there is little agreement on measures of economic impact and even fewer of the extent to which the global economy relies on space. That being said, at the end of 2018, the global space economy was worth approximately $400 billion, 80% of which was commercial activity.32 To my knowledge, the only comprehensive study addressing this question economically was undertaken in 2018 by the European Commission. In assessing this question, the Commission differentiated between direct dependence, indirect dependence, and peripheral dependence on space-based assets and its findings are stunning. In terms of direct dependence, [T]he size of the European downstream market is estimated to be in the order of EUR 40.7 billion of revenues per year, yielding a G[ross] V[alue] A[dded] in the order of EUR 21.1 billion. This represents around 0.16% of the total European GDP. Although this may seem low, the sector is actually more than three times as large as the fishing and aquaculture sector in economic terms and comparable to the passenger rail transport or forestry and logging sectors. In the event of a loss of space assets, the complete dependence of this sector would lead to a total loss of revenues for European companies involved in this market. A complete loss of assets would also impact the 200 000 jobs in the European space downstream sector.33 Further, the report identifies 11 macro-sectors that are indirectly dependent on space whose space dependent activities represent 786.9 billion euros of annual gross value added.34 For context, that approximates just over $887 billion. When considering the full impact of a loss of space assets on the European economy, between 300 and 800,000 jobs would be at risk with significant losses both socially and strategically as well. The report concludes that such dependence can only be expected to grow.35 It is clear from this report that the EU’s economy is significantly dependent on space-based assets. Assume for the moment that, in the event of a major loss of space infrastructure, only the EU was affected. While this is certainly implausible, even if the EU were the only ones affected, the consequences would no doubt ripple through the global economy quite quickly. Further, even if some states are less dependent on space assets than the EU, the United States, or other major powers, they would likely still experience economic interruptions depending on how integrated they are into the global market. One specific area of space dependence that has direct economic impact is the Global Positioning System or GPS. Though some backups exist, if GPS were disrupted, many economic and financial transactions would be immediately disrupted.36 We can consider the global economy’s dependence on GPS through Keohane and Nye’s two facets of interdependence, vulnerability and sensitivity. “Sensitivity is the extent to which one country is affected by the actions of another, whereas vulnerability is the extent to which a country can insulate itself from the

The commercial space peace  65

costly effects of events that occur elsewhere.”37 In terms of sensitivity, we can ask how quickly would disruptions in GPS affect the economy and at what cost? In January of 2016, the US Air Force, as it was taking one of the 31 GPS satellites offline, introduced a tiny error of 13 millionths of a second into the timing system. The error immediately disrupted GPS-based systems around the world for more than 12 hours. “In parts of the US and Canada, police, fire, and EMS radio equipment stopped functioning. BBC digital radio was out for two days in many areas, and the anomaly was even detected in electrical power grids.”38 The error was eventually fixed, but it took no time at all for its consequences to be felt. And that was a situation in which there was no loss of an actual satellite or satellites. As for vulnerability, we may consider whether there are alternatives/options to GPS that can quickly take over in the event of a change in space. Though the EU is completing its Galileo system and Russia has its GLONASS system, neither are as dependable or widely available as GPS.39 It is fairly safe to accept the premise that the global economy is dependent on GPS specifically and space more generally. And that dependence is only growing. The third premise of the commercial space peace theory is that state economic success is increasingly dependent on space to the extent that a state is enmeshed in the global economy. Because a state’s economy is, at a minimum, interconnected and at maximum, highly interdependent with the global economy and because the global economy depends on space, then a state’s economy is dependent on space too. It is well known from empirical findings that state economies are increasingly enmeshed in the global economy. Globalization has been variously measured in studies via levels of trade, foreign direct investment, and foreign portfolio investment. Given that it is a multidimensional concept, Axel Dreher introduced a composite index of globalization, the KOF, in 2006 that has now become the most widely used globalization measure when studying economic globalization.40 The KOF index looks at what the authors call de facto and de jure globalization: “While de facto globalization measures actual international flows and activities, de jure globalization measures policies and conditions that, in principle, enable, facilitate and foster flows and activities.”41 Figure 4.1 displays the global KOF de jure and de facto indices from 1970 to 2017. There is no mistaking a rapid increase in both types, particularly following the end of the Cold War, though it has leveled off some in recent years. To be sure, globalization, particularly in relationship to space, is not inevitable and comes with significant costs. Hertzfeld notes that regulatory limits put in place by states to prevent unfriendly states from acquiring certain types of technology (for example the International Traffic in Arms Regulations enforced by the United States) limit the degree of international trade.42 Further, if security and defense issues continue to increase in importance, it could “easily lead to a decline in market-based commercial space applications as government demands and regulations supplant the development of private markets.”43 Other negative externalities associated with globalization might also play a role in restricting its growth, including internal conflict spurred on by economic losses in some segments, a backlash

66  The commercial space peace

65 60

55 50 45

40

FIGURE 4.1 KOF

2016

2014

2012

2008

2010

2006

2004

2002

2000

1996

De facto

1998

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

1978

1976

1974

1972

1970

35

De jure

globalization index, 1970–2017

to international trade, and an increase in general trade barriers. However, global dependence on space does not appear to be ebbing any time soon and Hertzfeld even acknowledges that such trends are unlikely to be deterred. Thus, we should expect to see the global market increase its dependence on space for the foreseeable future. The fourth premise proposes that the more dependent on space the economy (global or state-based) is, the greater the economic costs of conflict in space. To understand why this might be the case, consider a scenario where only a state’s military space assets are targeted with no collateral damage. Even though scholars and military analysts recognize the immense dependence of many military forces on space resources, assume also that militaries have redundancies and workarounds so that destruction of one asset does not cripple their capabilities. In that case, the costs of conflict are not sufficiently high so as to dissuade the countries from engagement. However, even if only a military target was engaged, there is no way to ensure that the debris created in the attack will have no further threat to other assets, military or otherwise. Uncontrolled debris could easily impact with other satellites on which economic activities depend initiating a Kessler syndrome-type cascade. And unlike the military, the global economy does not have sufficient backups and workarounds to compensate for the loss of a satellite or satellites. Roger Handberg, in examining the assumptions of space war writes: “Globalization has been fostered through satellite technologies. Their disruption can be devastating for all parties, regardless of who is the winner or the loser.”44 The implications of this are catastrophic. No satellite or space-based asset would be protected, and the resulting debris field could make usage of particular earth orbits impossible for both public and military uses. Attacking another country’s satellite comes with the possibility of harming your own.

The commercial space peace  67

Closely related to this premise is the final one which states that as countries contemplate militarized conflict in space, they must consider the possible economic costs of their actions. States should only engage in conflict where the potential benefits outweigh the costs. As the cost of conflict in space rises, states should be less likely to find the attack to their benefit. And the more the economy is dependent on space, the higher the costs are likely to be. Handberg puts the situation quite bluntly: “What may occur is the graveyard of the modern economic system. No potential space participants would be immune to the damage, regardless of whether or not they were participants in the actual conflict.”45 This idea is nothing different than what is argued in the trading variant of the economic peace literature: the benefits of conflict have to be greater than potential economic costs. What is different here is the causal mechanism—rather than conflict mediation through the trading relationships between states, it is the network of relationships between space, the economy, and states that increase costs beyond the potential benefits. One objection to this argument is similar to the critique that states do not engage in economic activity: perhaps economic costs are not factored into military planning. Some analysts may argue that if a state’s security is at risk, economics be damned; the state should pursue all avenues to increase its power and security. However, economic power not only influences other states but serves as the foundation for military capabilities. For example, Alfred Mahan, who significantly influenced theories on maritime power with his writings in the late nineteenth century, argued, “a nation that could protect its own maritime commerce while disrupting that of its opponent could shift the balance of national resources decisively in its favor.”46 The US military’s Joint Planning doctrine published in 2017 explicitly recognizes a discussion of costs and benefits when planning operational activities. Joint planning identifies military options the President can integrate with other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, informational) to achieve those national objectives. In the process, joint planning identifies likely benefits, costs, and risks associated with proposed military options.47 If attacks in space harm the economy, these costs and risks, according to US military doctrine, will be, at a minimum, considered; it is the argument here that they will likely outweigh the benefits of such a course of action. Thus, for states that are heavily dependent on space, whether directly or indirectly through their ties to the global economy, the potential economic costs of engaging in a militarized conflict in space should be high enough to dissuade them from pursuing such courses of action. Like the empirical findings on trade, another similar counterargument can be made against the pacific effects of trade and increased dependence on space: asymmetrical dependence could be just as likely to increase the chances of conflict.48 The states that are heavily dependent on space are also major powers like the US, Russia, China, and India, all of whom have demonstrated the capability of using anti-satellite weapons. Given each of those states’ reliance on space and the global economy, the benefits of conflict should be less than the potential costs of conflict.

68  The commercial space peace

But what about states who are less dependent on space, either directly or indirectly? It is possible that they see this decision calculus differently and believe that the benefits of conflict are greater than the costs. These states are also likely to be weaker militarily to begin with. Like Erik Gartzke notes in terms of attacks on cyber space, an attack, whether it be in space or in cyberspace, would not be meaningful unless paired with a terrestrial attack as well.49 Whatever advantage a less space-dependent state gains from an attack on a space asset is likely to be minimal, temporary, and lead to no further advantage in the long term. To illustrate the point, imagine a scenario where a less space-dependent state like North Korea, Iran, or even a terrorist organization manages to launch a physical attack on a key American military satellite. While there are most likely ways for the US military to work around such an attack (transmissions could be sent through another satellite or uncrewed aerial vehicles), the US would also likely strike back. If the attacking state is really less dependent on space, there will be fewer spacebased assets on which a retaliatory strike could take place. Given the lack of space assets to attack, the US might consider one of two options: a land-based attack or a space-based attack on a state that supports the original instigator. For example, in the case of North Korea, the US might consider an attack on a Chinese space asset while for Iran, it could be Russia. If the US chose the first option, again, North Korea or Iran would have to be aware that they would be quickly overwhelmed. If the US chose the second option, they would need to consider the potential for collateral damage that could end up harming the United States to a far greater extent economically rather than just militarily as well as the costs of dangerous escalation among space powers. Finally, given the involvement of an ever-larger number of private actors in space, states also need to consider the lost opportunity costs if private actors choose to forego research, development, and deployment of new technologies because the danger in space is too high. As space becomes more commercialized, these private actors can exert pressure on states to behave peacefully in order to promote further economic development. Gartzke and Quan Li argue that this can happen through the movement of capital from conflict-prone states or areas to non-conflictual states.50 This is not necessarily applicable to space because there is no area in space which is formally protected, but commercial space actors may choose not to engage in new economic investment which can in turn affect a state’s economic performance. To date, the size of the space sector is comparatively small, so, arguably, the potential economic loss would not be that great. Where the harm comes from is state reliance on private actors for military and national security space services. As states contract out space services to a greater extent, private actors exert an even greater influence over the state by having a capability they do not. Why might private companies want a more conflict-free space? If there is weaponized conflict in space, they could potentially benefit through new launches to send up replacement satellites; this is similar to an argument that war can actually be beneficial to an economy because companies are needed to create materiel and weapons.51 But, in a debris filled environment, sending replacements is more

The commercial space peace  69

difficult and dangerous. Some private companies want to engage in human spaceflight; a conflictual or more dangerous orbital environment would likely prevent those activities or increase their costs to such an extent that it becomes economically infeasible. James Clay Moltz argues specifically that “the growing presence of space tourists in low-Earth orbit would greatly increase the incentives for restraint in any future [ASAT] test programs.”52 Those foregone development costs and commercial activities can have a similar cost to states simply by discouraging private actors from participating in the market.

Implications While the theory described previously is based on the economic peace literature, it is not the economic relationships among states that lead to peace in space, rather, it is the global economy’s dependence on space that does. This idea is not as farfetched as it may seem. Following the immense amount of debris generated by China’s ASAT test in 2007, there has been a growing acceptance that such tests should be avoided in the future precisely because the increase in debris makes operations in space, both peaceful and militarized, more difficult. Shortly after India’s March 2019 test, US Air Force General John Hyten warned a Senate committee that there is increasing danger from space junk, saying, If we keep creating debris in space, eventually we are going to get to the point where it’s very difficult to find a place to launch, very difficult to find a place to put a satellite, to operate a satellite without having to maneuver it all the time to keep it away from debris.53 While Gen. Hyten was speaking specifically in reference to military needs, the same restrictions would also apply to commercial space assets. Thus, the major implication of this theory is that the more dependent a state is on space, whether economically or militarily, the lower the chances of that state initiating or becoming involved in a military conflict in space. Granted, the theory does not address military dependence specifically, but that too, is increasing. As early as the mid-1990s, Jeffrey Caton described the US military’s dependence on space and wrote that, An attack on our space assets could impact every element of national power— political, diplomatic, economic, and military. . . . An enemy has much to gain by exploiting the dependency link between our terrestrial forces and forceenhancing space systems.54 The point, however, is that space is not just used for military purposes—if it was, the chances of conflict are likely far higher. The fact that there is a significant economic use for space restricts choices in space militarily because of the economic impact of the conflict.

70  The commercial space peace

This theory also does not rule out the weaponization of space or the deployment of weapons whether offensive or defensive in nature. It does argue, however, that they should not be used. The danger, of course, is that any sort of weaponization of space could increase tension and contribute to a growing arms race in space, something that will be discussed further in the next chapter. Writing on the attitudes of the Americans and Soviets at the high point of the Cold War, Steer argues that “the unique nature of the environment meant that weaponization could endanger each state’s own sovereign interests as much as any adversaries.”55 In analyzing today’s strategic environment, Johnson-Freese echoes the argument: [W]hile space weapons might offer the United States a short-term advantage, in the long term they would actually weaken US security by instigating an arms race that cannot be won, by anyone. Further, space weapons could potentially provoke a first strike by an adversary, create a “use it or lose it” mentality among US forces, and risk rapid and dangerous—perhaps even nuclear—escalation.56 Weaponization will likely stimulate a space arms race but to the extent that a state is rational and interested in reducing and mitigating potential economic, weaponization should still be avoided. This theory also does not rule out other motivations for reducing conflict in space, including the limitation of a potential opponents use of space through diplomatic means. This would follow a pattern established during the Cold War where Following a series of arms tests in space, both the United States and the USSR realized that if they wanted to continue to have access to space for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance purposes, they would need to come to some compromises as to its use.57 The resulting diplomatic outburst produced not just the Outer Space Treaty, which banned the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit, but the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. In other words, economic concerns can serve to restrict military conflict in space with other concerns, including diplomatic, reinforcing the effect, further reducing the chances of conflict. As described at the beginning of this chapter, while work on codes of conduct for space or new international agreements is ongoing, to this point, there does not appear to be any momentum to conclude any such talks. It is possible that major space states could suddenly realize the impact of their own actions in space and work to reduce tension like the US and Soviet Union did in the late 1960s. However, should that not be the case, this theory suggests that an international regulatory framework or code of conduct is not absolutely necessary to restrain state behavior. Instead, as commercial and economic dependence on space grows

The commercial space peace  71

and the space market is encouraged to expand, economic restraints can fill the void until such time that an international agreement becomes feasible. Moltz argues that this option of “muddling through,” or engaging in a piecemeal fashion, could continue, but that it has several significant drawbacks.58 These include a failure to include considerations of national and military power and lack of enforcement against those who violate norms. However, in viewing conflict in space through the theory presented here, the economic realm does not have to take into consideration military concerns as long as economic costs are considered in military planning. And as long as states behave in a rational way, we can assume that they will. States have a strong, rational interest not only in protecting the economic wellbeing of their states but also in increasing their economic standing. As detailed earlier in this chapter, economic considerations are already rooted in American military doctrine. In terms of sanctions for violating norms, they could be carried out through loss of economic activity as the economic peace literature proposes. States who violate acceptable standards of behavior may find space commerce fleeing from their country and a lack of partners who may want to work with them. While “muddling through” might not be the optimal strategy, it is one that has worked to this point.

The value of competition As noted in the first chapter, a subsidiary argument offered here is that, even if a space race should break out, military or civilian in nature, competition is not necessarily a bad thing. Much of the technological development noted previously that arose from space investment came at the height of the space race as both the US and the USSR were pouring billions of dollars into a race to the moon. The race itself had a civilian face with a military undertone, but its benefits were on the whole, positive. No overt military conflict arose, there was a significant investment in research, development, and technology, and the two space powers realized that they needed some sort of international framework to preserve their ability to operate in space. Both of these elements continue to be present today. First, the increased threat of conflict in space could, coming as it does with an increased number of public and private actors and a greater economic threat, impress upon space participants the need to reign in dangerous actions and rhetoric. While it took an atmospheric nuclear test on the part of the Soviets to encourage both the US and USSR to come to the table in the 1960s, increasing awareness of economic and military dependence and the consequences arising from conflict in space could increase the enthusiasm to pursue new international agreements. For its part, the US military increasingly recognizes the dangers and the need to mitigate them, however, mitigation efforts have largely concentrated on offensive rather than defensive capabilities.59 A focus on offensive weapons can only aggravate the situation and there are still significant technological hurdles in developing on-orbit offensive weapons. As such, a move away from such rhetoric, like Johnson-Freese argues for, is necessary.

72  The commercial space peace

Competition can also increase technological capabilities and those technological capabilities can in turn enable cooperation.60 China is a case in point. In the 1990s and early 2000s when they were beginning to restart a human spaceflight program, Chinese officials often stated their desire to work with other powers in space, particularly the United States. China did in fact forge ties with other countries via space, in particular Brazil. However, as Chinese spaceflight technology advanced, the rhetoric of cooperation was pulled back some over a desire to enter into a partnership on equal footing. Once the Chinese could establish their abilities in space, they would be able to cooperate with potential partners as an equal, rather than junior, partner.61 As more countries develop space technologies, the ability to help one another out also increases. The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts obligates signatories to “take all possible steps to rescue and assist astronauts in distress and promptly return them to the launching state.”62 More states with the ability to conduct crewed operations in space will only facilitate this type of help and cooperation. While fictional, this is just the type of scenario that played out in the book (and later movie) The Martian. When a supply rocket blows up on launch, NASA turns to China for a replacement that enables a Mars crew to return to Mars to rescue a stranded astronaut. These types of cooperative activities can in turn foster greater cooperation in areas other than space and science. In fact, one of the causal mechanisms through which the economic peace is hypothesized to act is via increased connections between people and private actors which can foster communication and mutual trust.63 Similarly, sociological liberalism embraces the importance of links among people to create more peaceful global relations.64 As greater cooperation emerges in space, it can spill over into other areas of interstate relations. To return to the discussion of space as a global commons, the increased competition and potentially increased cooperation could lead to the type of situation that Ostrom finds powerful in fostering collective action. Increased ties, diplomatically and/or economically, can reduce the costs of engaging in collective action. Historically, space itself has been used to monitor and verify international agreements, thereby lowering the information costs for participants. The openness of space and the vulnerability of space infrastructure makes it an arena that is easily monitored; it takes a fairly low level of technology to track satellites in their orbits. States can provide the means through which private actors are coordinated and norms enforced. Private actors, given their increasing role in the commercial and military aspects of space can also be empowered and lend considerable weight to the discussions. Thus, while the commercial space peace theory presented here may seem rather pessimistic about the possibility of cooperation among states, it can also be seen as an optimistic vision where increased economic ties between space and among actors, state and non-state alike, bring countries to the negotiating table and create the conditions needed to ensure collective action. The remainder of this book will take up various aspects related to this argument. The next chapter examines military and geopolitical considerations in space conflict while Chapter 6 discusses the various actors involved. Chapter 6, in particular,

The commercial space peace  73

focuses on the new non-state actors that are driving significant change in earth’s relationship to space. Finally, Chapter 7 looks at the possibility of space races in the future given this new space environment with its proliferation of players. It ends with several policy suggestions that could be pursued to reduce the level of tension among space powers and create a scenario that recognizes both the dangers and promises of space.

Notes 1 Cassandra Steer, “Global Commons, Cosmic Commons: Implications of Military and Security Uses of Outer Space,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 28(2), 2017: pp. 9–16; Joan Johnson-Freese and Brian Weeden, “Application of Ostrom’s Principles for Sustainable Governance of Common-Pool Resources to Near-Earth Orbit,” Global Policy, 3(1), 2012: pp. 72–81.   Johnson-Freese and Weeden also note that the usage of common pool resource or global commons specifically to space is not without controversy, as it can link it specifically to the terminology of “Common Heritage of Mankind” used in international law. Perhaps as a response to this controversy and to clarify the US’s position on it, in April of 2020, the Trump administration released an executive order stating that “the United States does not view it [space] as a global commons.” See Mike Wall, “Trump Signs Executive Order to Support Moon Mining, Tap Asteroid Resources,” Space.com, published April 6, 2020, accessed April 8, 2020 at . 2 James Wood Forsyth, Jr., “What Great Powers Make It: International Order and the Logic of Cooperation in Cyberspace,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 7(1), 2013: p. 95. 3 Laura Grego, “Security in Space: What Is at Stake and How Do We Move Forward?” Asian Perspective, 35, 2011: p. 504. 4 Jay Walljasper, “Elinor Ostrom’s 8 Principles for Managing a Commons,” On the Commons, published October 2, 2011, accessed February 8, 2019 at . 5 Johnson-Freese and Weeden, “Application of Ostrom’s Principles for Sustainable Governance of Common-Pool Resources to Near-Earth Orbit.” 6 Steer, “Global Commons, Cosmic Commons,” p. 14. 7 Ibid. 8 Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 15(2), 1996: p. 168. 9 For a larger discussion of the unique characteristics of space and their potential influence on actions in space, see Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, Frank Cass Publishers, New York, 2002. 10 Co-orbital weapons, that is, satellites that are launched to orbit to rendezvous and operate in close proximity to another satellite, could be used by some countries to spoof, jam, hack, or lase the satellites which they are targeting. Co-orbital weapons present a particular difficulty here because the attack is coming from space and it is necessarily militarized in nature therefore coming under the purview of the definition of space conflict adopted here. If the co-orbital weapon causes permanent and physical damage to a space asset, it will create the same damages and consequences of kinetic ASAT tests—even if the satellite is not destroyed, the satellite itself becomes a piece of debris, unable to be moved and taking a valuable orbital slot. If, however, the co-orbital weapon temporarily jams or hacks the target satellite, that is much more akin to the types of attacks that take place terrestrially, the only difference being that it is occurring in space. 11 Walter D. Reed and Robert W. Norris, “Military Uses of the Space Shuttle,” Akron Law Review, 13(4), 1980: pp. 665–688.

74  The commercial space peace

12 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence, 4th ed., Longman, Boston, 2012. 13 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, “Globalization and the Future of the Nation State,” Economy and Society, 24(3), 1995: p. 414. 14 Lester C. Thurow, “Globalization: The Product of a Knowledge-Based Economy,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 570, 2000: p. 22. 15 Lindy Newlove-Eriksson and Johan Eriksson, “Governance Beyond the Global: Who Controls the Extraterrestrial?” Globalizations, 10(2), 2013: p. 278. 16 Jonathan Haidt, “When and Why Nationalism Beats Globalism,” Policy, 32(3), 2016: pp. 46–53. 17 Johan Erikkson, Giampiero Giacomello, Hamoud Salhi, Myriam Dunn Cavelty, J.P. Singh, and M.I. Franklin, “Who Controls the Internet? Beyond the Obstinancy or Obsolescence of the State,” International Studies Review, 11(1), 2009: pp. 205–230. 18 Daniel W. Drezner, “The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State Back In,” Political Science Quarterly, 119(3), 2004: p. 478. 19 Erikkson et al., “Who Controls the Internet? Beyond the Obstinancy or Obsolescence of the State,” p. 211. 20 Drezner, “The Global Governance of the Internet.” 21 Erik Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth,” International Security, 38(2), 2013: pp. 41–73. 22 Henry R. Hertzfeld, “Commercial Space and Spacepower,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, eds. Charles D. Lutes, Peter Hays, Vincent A. Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011: p. 85. 23 Arthur A. Stein, “When Misperception Matters,” World Politics, 34(4), 1982: pp. 505–526. 24 Investopedia Staff, “How Much US Debt Does China Own?” Investopedia, published January 15, 2020, accessed February 20, 2020 at . 25 Eli Ginzburg, James W. Kuhn, Jerome Schnee, and Boris Yavitz, Economic Impact of Large Public Programs: The NASA Experience, Olympus Publishing Company, Salt Lake City, 1976, p. 29. 26 The Tauri Group, “NASA Socio-Economic Impacts,” NASA, published April 2013, accessed April 13, 2019 at , p. 10. 27 Jeff Foust, “Space Economies and Economics,” The Space Review, published September 24, 2007, accessed April 13, 2019 at . 28 Douglas Brinkley, American Moonshot: John F. Kennedy and the Great Space Race, Harper Collins, New York, 2019: pp. 400–401. 29 Mike Pence, “Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Fifth Meeting of the National Space Council, Huntsville, AL,” White House, published March 26, 2019, accessed April 13, 2019 at . Emphasis added. 30 Alexei Arbatov, “Russian Perspectives on Spacepower,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, eds. Charles D. Lutes, Peter Hays, Vincent A Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011: p. 441; Dean Cheng, “Spacepower in China,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, eds. Charles D. Lutes, Peter Hays, Vincent A. Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011: p. 450.   For a larger discussion of Chinese motivations in space, particularly in terms of commerce, see Roger Handberg and Zhen Li, Chinese Space Policy: A Study in Domestic and International Politics, Routledge, New York, 2007. 31 Stacey Solomone, China’s Strategy in Space, Springer, New York, 2013: p. 35. 32 Kevin O’Connell, “Remarks on the Trillion Dollar Space Economy,” Office of Space Commerce, published November 27, 2018, accessed April 13, 2019 at . 33 European Commission, “Dependence of the European Economy on Space Infrastructures,” Publications Office of the European Union, published February 8, 2018, accessed

The commercial space peace  75

April 13, 2019 at : p. 142. 34 Ibid., p. 144. 35 Ibid., p. 147. 36 Kiet Do and Molly McCrea, “GPS System Vulnerable to Hacking Attach That Could Cripple Bay Area Economy,” KPIX 5 CBS, published January 15, 2018, accessed April 13, 2019 at . 37 Susan M. McMillan, “Interdependence and Conflict,” Mershon International Studies Review, 41(1), 1997: p. 34. 38 Dan Glass, “What Happens If GPS Fails?” The Atlantic, published June 13, 2016, accessed April 13, 2019 at . 39 Ibid. 40 Axel Dreher, “Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a New Index of Globalization,” Applied Economics, 38(10), 2006: pp. 1091–1110; Savina Gygli, Florian Haelg, Niklas Potrafke, and Jan-Egbert Strum, “The KOF Globalisation Index- Revisited,” The Review of International Organizations, published online January 28, 2019, accessed April 13, 2019 at . 41 Ibid. 42 Hertzfeld, “Commercial Space and Spacepower.” 43 Ibid., p. 87. 44 Roger Handberg, “Is Space War Imminent? Exploring the Possibility,” Comparative Strategy, 36(5), 2017: p. 420. 45 Ibid. 46 Jon Sumida, “Old Thoughts, New Problems: Mahan and the Consideration of Spacepower,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, eds. Charles D. Lutes, Peter Hays, Vincent A Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011: p. 6. 47 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5–0: Joint Planning, June 16, 2017: p. 33. 48 Katherine Barbieri and Gerald Schneider, “Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, 36(4), 1999: pp. 387–404; Han Dorussen, “Balance of Power Revisited: A Multi-Country Model of Trade and Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, 36(4), 1999: pp. 443–462; James D. Morrow, “How Could Trade Affect Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research, 36(4), 1999: pp. 481–489. 49 Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar.” 50 Erik Gartzke and Quan Li, “War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization,” International Studies Quarterly, 47(4), 2003: pp. 561–586. 51 Patrick J. McDonald, “Peace Through Trade or Free Trade?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(4), 2004: pp. 547–572. 52 James Clay Moltz, Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space, Columbia University Press, New York, 2014: pp. 187. 53 Amanda Macias, “Top US Military Officer Responsible for Space Warns of an Urgent Danger: Junk,” CNBC, published April 11, 2019, accessed April 15, 2019 at . 54 Jeffrey L. Caton,“Joint Warfare and Military Dependence on Space,” Joint Force Quarterly, Winter, 1995–96: p. 52. 55 Steer, “Global Commons, Cosmic Commons,” p. 10. 56 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens, Routledge, New York, 2017, p. 60. 57 Steer, “Global Commons, Cosmic Commons,” p. 10.

76  The commercial space peace

5 8 Moltz, Crowded Orbits, p. 181. 59 Ibid.; John J. Klein, Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles, and Policy, Routledge, New York, 2006. 60 Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Imperative of Space Cooperation in an Environment of Distrust: Working with China,” High Frontier, 6(2), 2010: pp. 19–22. 61 Handberg and Li, Chinese Space Policy. 62 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Rescue Agreement,” United Nations, n.d., accessed April 15, 2019 at . 63 Han Dorussen and Hugh Ward, “Intergovernmental Organizations and the Kantian Peace: A Network Perspective,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(2), 2008: pp. 189– 212; Han Dorussen and Hugh Ward, “Trade Networks and the Kantian Peace,” Journal of Peace Research, 47(1), 2010: pp. 29–42. 64 McMillan, “Interdependence and Conflict.”

5 IS IT A TRAP? ARMS RACES IN SPACE

This competition has already begun in space, and the United States must decide now what its space policy will be in the face of a clear and present danger. Because the Soviets have assuredly decided to compete in a determined way, we cannot afford the consequences of muddling through in a struggle that could spell disaster.1 The coming war with China will be fought for control of outer space. . . . [T]he unavoidable conclusion is that the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are on a collision course for war.2

Though written nearly three decades apart, the authors of these passages believe both that a coming war is inevitable and that the United States must begin to prepare for it militarily in space. In the first case, written in 1981, the authors, Dino A. Lorenzini and Charles L. Fox, warn of imminent conflict with the Soviet Union, a conflict we now know never occurred. In the second passage, Everett C. Dolman warns in 2012 that conflict with China is not only unavoidable but possibly already underway. Dolman recognizes that “Inevitability is a crass and unsubtle divination,” but he also argues that “The past foreshadows the future—and the calculation of probability over time, combined with risk, is more persuasive than platitudes.”3 If past is prologue, however, what does the fact that the “inevitable” space war with the Soviet Union never occurred tell us about warnings of an inevitable space war with China? The weight of history may not be on the side of conflict, instead it may be on the side of cooperation and stabilization. In fact, this is the very argument advanced by Cameron Hunter who, in analyzing American archival national security documents, argues that the Chinese space program was seen as a threat at the dawn of the space race by American officials. That this “threat” could be overcome demonstrates that today’s supposed threat from China is instead “politically contingent.”4

78  Is it a trap? Arms races in space

While Dolman may be incorrect in his prediction of conflict with China in space, he is certainly correct that history has much to teach us. In the case of space, there have been several periods where analysts and military strategists have believed conflict to be imminent and yet, in each of those periods, space powers have chosen to step back from the breech and discover that cooperative restraint, if not outright cooperation, provides a better path for themselves and for all. The argument that conflict is inevitable demonstrates a sort of fatalistic attitude. Space states have a choice in whether to pursue weaponization of and conflict in space and have chosen not to for reasons of self-interest; to call conflict inevitable is to assume that states do not have a choice and therefore have no power. As will be discussed in what follows, as both the Soviet Union and the United States realized the security advantages that passive space systems for reconnaissance and monitoring granted them, they each became concerned with protecting their ability to operate freely in space. Though doing so out of pure, rational, self-interest, the decisions by the Soviet Union and the US in the mid- to late-1960s protected space from conflict. Since then, not only have states recognized the military advantages that space systems offer, they, and the rest of the world, have recognized and come to rely on the economic advantages of space. Today, as we contemplate yet another period in history where space conflict may appear inevitable, the motivating rational self-interest is not just in the military and security spheres but in the economic. If we are in a new space race today, as some, including Dolman, have argued, then considering the space race of the past is appropriate. It is not my intention here to review the history of the space race or to even provide a broader historical examination; excellent studies on this topic are available elsewhere.5 What is important for our purposes is understanding what prevented the space race from erupting into conflict in the first place and the lessons that may have for preventing conflict today. My argument here is that although economic consequences did not play a significant role in constraining space-based conflict in the 1960s, the space states of the time, the US and USSR, did consider the costs and benefits of conflict for their own national security strategies. At that time, they came to the conclusion that any open hostility in space had the possibility of inhibiting their own spacebased operations. Today, the basic conclusion remains the same for all states: any open conflict in space has the potential of negatively affecting all states through the global economy. Thus, while the conclusion and the self-interested rationale have not changed, the basis on which the conclusion is drawn has. Before examining the original space race, this chapter first briefly explores the logic of arms races. To call the space race a “race,” implies a state of competition between entities. This language clearly draws on the concept of arms racing; Lorenzini and Fox and Dolman both explicitly accept that an arms race is ongoing in their respective time periods, whether the US realizes it or not. To say that we are engaged in a space race, then, does not connote just a competition but also one that has a militarized underpinning in the seeking of weaponry or advantages in weaponry. With just one previous space race, it is dangerous to draw generalizable conclusions. Fortunately, general arms races have occurred more frequently and the

Is it a trap? Arms races in space  79

study of them provides important context for considering a space race. As such, following a brief discussion of arms races in general, this chapter examines restraint in the original space race. Finally, I will consider the possibility of a new space race today. Though a civilian space race does not seem to be developing, there is evidence of a new push to develop military space systems that could be radically destabilizing. However, just as the US and USSR came to believe their actions in the 1960s were destructive of their own ends, space actors and states today can come to the same conclusion and utilize similar strategies to walk back from the brink.

The logic of arms races The concept of an arms race is an old one. The Greek historian Thucydides recognized the dynamic in the wars between Athens and Sparta: as one powerful nation-state is challenged by a rising one, the established state feels threatened and consequently builds its military force. The emerging state sees this and furthers its capabilities, resulting in the war that was feared. This so-called Thucydides’ trap predicts that the rise of an emerging power necessarily leads to war has also come to be known as an arms race or security dilemma. Colin Gray, writing in 1971, defines an arms race as the following: [T]here should be two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behavior of the other parties.6 In other words, as country A builds up its arms, whether out of defensive or offensive motivations, country B feels threatened and feels the need to do the same. Country A, seeing the actions of country B, sees continued purpose in their endeavor and the rush to acquire weapons soon leads to out and out conflict. Despite the attention given to the quantity of armaments, Samuel Huntington proposed in the late 1950s a dichotomy between qualitative and quantitative arms races. Quantitative arms races focus only on the numerical acquisition of arms and qualitative arms races on improvements in military technologies that make a weapons system more advanced than an opponent’s or improve upon the manufacturing techniques used in producing them. Qualitative arms races, in this sense, are just as destabilizing as quantitative—a country’s investment in a revolutionary new weapon that, if even just one was purchased and used, could make all others obsolete, is considered a revolutionary, not evolutionary, military advancement. An example of such a qualitative arms race is the race to understand, design, and build nuclear weaponry during World War II. The race that followed, that concentrated on the number of nuclear weapons, is a quantitative arms race. With the rise of tensions in the Cold War, understanding the dynamics of arms races became a significant topic for academics in the mid-twentieth century. These

80  Is it a trap? Arms races in space

scholars moved away from definition to an analysis of motivations and causes. In 1960, Lewis F. Richardson built a mathematical model of this process based on three underlying motivations for an arms race: revenge or hostility, fear, and a tendency to reduce armaments so that they are more economical.7 Far from leading to a state of mutual deterrence based on equal amounts of power, his equations postulated a spiraling tendency to arms races that inevitably lead to war. Coming as it did in the midst of an actual arms race, many scholars found this argument not only credible but persuasive. Michael Wallace, in seeking to quantify the frequency of conflict with arms races finds that arms races escalated to war in 23 out of the 28 cases of war he studied.8 However, in the ensuing academic debate, little evidence was found to support the notion that arms races were early indicators of coming war. At the same time scholars were testing mathematical models of arms races, game theoretic models were created using the form of the prisoner’s dilemma. These specifically included uncertainty about the actions of an opponent in contributing to arms races. If two states had perfect information about one another—their motivations and capabilities—an arms race is not rational. But in the case of uncertainty, defection (in the form of an arms race) is rational. Andrew Kydd, more recently, hypothesizes that arms races develop when there is uncertainty specifically in regard to the economic ability of the other state to bear the costs of a buildup.9 In this manner, arms races reduce uncertainty about the costs a state is willing to bear along with their military capabilities. Toby J. Rider concurs with the idea but focuses more acutely on uncertainty over the policy positions of a state’s leadership. He finds that arms races are more likely early in a state leader’s tenure, when global uncertainty about them is highest.10 Additional motivations for states to undertake arms races go beyond deterrence and uncertainty. Gray summarizes seven of these including: deterrence, defense, diplomacy, functional threats, vested interests, reputation, or technology development.11 While defense and deterrence are implicit in the previous descriptions, diplomatic motivations find states increasing their arms in order to have a stronger hand at the bargaining table. If other countries believe or perceive a country to have certain capabilities, they may be more willing to engage and conciliate than otherwise apt to. In addition to these external factors, some arms races may be motivated by more domestic and state-based variables. Functional threats have a close relationship to bureaucratic politics in that “domestic institutions seeking to maintain or enlarge their budgetary and influence bases need to enlist or harness the functional hostility of an external rival.”12 In other words, bureaucrats, seeking more money, emphasize the risk or threat from another country in order to pad their budgets and resources. Similarly, vested interests in the form of a country’s defense industry could also push the storyline that the state is threatened in order to increase their bottom line. Joan Johnson-Freese identifies these two dynamics as contributing to the drumbeat for further space weapons development in the United States currently. In Space Warfare in the 21st Century, she writes: These companies [military-industrial companies including Raytheon, General Dynamics, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin] inherently have a vested

Is it a trap? Arms races in space  81

interest in maintaining and expanding systems, including weapons systems, which absent clear and direct external threats, may have limited political justification. Additionally, government counterparts to these for-profit companies have concurrently grown—some might say, ‘become bloated’—and in many cases, a codependent relationship has developed between them.13 Thus, bureaucrats working with industry both have an incentive to stoke fears of an adversary so that they benefit from increased budgets and a purpose of mission. Finally, states may engage in arms races to protect their reputation or for technological gains. Technological improvements, according to Gray, can stimulate arms racing for fear that better technology abroad will make a state’s current technological capacity obsolete. Though it might seem out of place given the previous list of motivations, prestige and reputation can also be a significant motivator to invest in arms. A race for reputation is certainly applicable to the early space race where the launch of Sputnik 1 created a public relations nightmare for the United States. Gabriel Almond, in analyzing the effect the Soviet launch had on global public opinion in 1960, found that America’s reputation was significantly damaged and the “belief in the scientific and technological superiority of the United States rudely shaken.”14 Most, if not all, space historians acknowledge the role that prestige and reputation had in the creation and sustainment of the space race. Even today, the Chinese space program is predicated on the idea that its space successes bring them global credit, recognition, and respect thus sustaining the idea that space races are, at the very least, undergirded by the motivation of prestige. One might argue at this point that the motivations of an arms race matter little if the end result is war or if they do not lead to conflict as some scholars have argued.15 To this, there are (at least) two answers: One, the underlying causes could lead to different types of races with different outcomes and two, the causes have much to do with possible outcomes. In the first instance, races carried out for prestige purposes or deterrence may not lead to war. In the second, if an arms race occurs in the context of enduring and preestablished rivalry, that pair of states could already be heading for conflict, regardless of an arms race. Charles Glaser argues that scholars must first consider why states undertake arms races and then determine whether it is rational for them to do so.16 If a state’s international security environment is so threatening that an arms race is a rational response, then the arms race did not cause any eventual conflict, the security environment did. If a state undertakes an arms race irrationally, that is in response to a non-threatening security environment, “they make war unnecessarily likely.”17 While more recent research suggests a modest increase in the chance of war as a result of an arms race, it is also clear that arms races are still not associated with most wars.18 Since the space race did not end in a space war, how arms races end is also of interest here. George M. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson contend that the majority of arms races that have ended in cooperation have done so not because one side adopted a particular cooperative strategy, but because the

82  Is it a trap? Arms races in space

basic character of the race was altered by events that were not directly connected with it.19 These outside events can include larger changes in the balance of power, the unilateral behavior of another power, or changes in economic circumstances. The economic cost of an arms race can be a powerful limiting factor. Gray writes that when the economic costs of pursuing a military exploitable strategy are so high that they are prohibitive in cost, those arms races can become dampened or “nonself-aggravating.”20 Similarly, John C. Lambelet argues that unstable arms races can in fact be limited by economic capacity.21 The Soviet Union in the 1980s found that it simply did not have the economic ability to match American investment in space as a result of Reagan’s Space Defense Initiative (SDI) and so pursued more cooperative, diplomatic strategies.22 That economic limits can place a ceiling on arms races is important given the commercial imperative advanced in this book. The research cited in Chapter 2 focuses mostly on economic effects on conflict in general, but some studies have looked at the relationship between trade and arms races specifically. Rafael Reuveny and John Maxwell find that trade may not always dampen an arms race.23 Some states may choose to direct the profits of commercial trade towards investment in arms races; in that case, the competition is not resolved. Reuveny and Maxwell argue that the only means through which free trade can reduce or end arms races is if a state can be persuaded that it will receive greater utility from investing their profits in a non-military sector than using them to purchase more arms. On the other hand, Syed Mansoob Murshed and Dawood Mamoon find a conflictreducing effect of trade in their analysis of relations between India and Pakistan.24 Though their study focuses only on one pair of states, their findings are instructive. Bilateral trade has an effect of reducing military expenditures, but the more significant influence was each country’s degree of openness to the global economy. In sum, states may engage in arms races for a number of reasons including defense, deterrence, prestige, and domestic factors. While arms racing can contribute some to the chances of open conflict, war is far from inevitable. The more likely result is for arms races to be ended by some outside factor that either solves the underlying political conflict or turns a country’s attention away from the dispute. Arms races can be stabilizing to a degree and in turn can be stabilized by technological and economic limits. Thus, arms races do not create inevitable spirals of action and reaction leading to war in general, and, specifically, in terms of space.

The Cold War space race Many of the dynamics discussed previously are apparent in the Cold War space race, including a competition for prestige, an economic limit to the potential for competition, and pressure from internal factions to increase arms. Before Sputnik was even launched in 1957, there was an ongoing arms race between the two countries. While it was not yet totally focused on missiles and missile technology, the

Is it a trap? Arms races in space  83

massive buildup in terms of nuclear weapons was already well underway. Though the number of Soviet nuclear weapons never approached the quantity of the United States, the US’s fleet of B-52 bombers, a proportion of which were always in the air, gave the US a strategic advantage in terms of their use.25 Given their startling disadvantages, the Soviets emphasized missile technology as a means of delivering a nuclear punch. The early development of rocketry and its relationship to missile technology is discussed elsewhere; for our purposes, the importance of the start of the Cold War space race is that it inaugurated a new, non-militarized arena in which the US and Soviet Union compete.26 Because of the close linkage of missiles with rockets, the space race is often considered either in tandem or implicitly with the missile race of the late 1950s. In the public’s mind, particularly at the time, the two issues were often conflated. The launch of Sputnik initiated something of a panic in many Americans, if not in their top political leadership. Despite concerns among citizens about the apparent gap in Soviet and American technology following Sputnik’s launch, they were reinforced by the lack of a response from the Eisenhower administration. Walter A. McDougall makes two points about Eisenhower’s rather muted reaction. First, Eisenhower and his administration possibly preferred that the Soviets launch a satellite first in order to establish the flyover right of satellites (though this has been doubted by other space historians). Second, most in the president’s leadership team knew that no missile gap existed; while this finding and the evidence for it could not be released to the public, Eisenhower believed the public outcry over Sputnik was unfounded.27 This supposed missile gap stoked fears among the American public and caused political leaders, particularly in Congress, to push for new initiatives. Eisenhower, fearing an enlargement of the budget, remained steadfast in his opposition not only to a missile gap but to significant increases in funding which he believed were unnecessary. The Soviet rocket that launched Sputnik was a technological revolution, but it was quite unsuited as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).28 The rocket, which was liquid fueled, required hours of preparation time before launch; in the event of a nuclear war, it would be near impossible to fuel the missile and launch it before any attack took place. Further, the administration had evidence via U-2 overflights that construction of launch pads, a prerequisite to an ICBM capability, had not fully started.29 However, critics of Eisenhower in Congress used the opportunity to push not just for more funds but also for additional missiles to close the supposed gap. The public pressure grew. “Although Eisenhower opposed the concept of racing in space,” Moltz writes, “officials in the administration could no longer deny that something needed to be done to address this crisis of credibility in regard to US space capability, particularly in the highly visible civilian area.”30 It was out of this debate in 1957–1958 that Eisenhower made the decision to split responsibility for space between a civilian agency, the new National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the military. Between 1958 and 1960, Eisenhower walked a middle ground, at once both trying to restrain the competitive urge brewing in the United States and appearing

84  Is it a trap? Arms races in space

responsive to public and congressional concerns. Budgets for the Department of Defense rose, NASA was created, and the National Defense Education Act was passed providing funds for education in science, mathematics, and languages. Despite this, there was still a great deal of frustration with Eisenhower’s response. During the 1960 presidential campaign, candidate John F. Kennedy used fears of a missile gap to criticize the administration and Vice President Richard Nixon, Kennedy’s opponent. Nixon, knowing the missile gap did not, in fact, exist, attempted to downplay the threat and emphasize an American lead in technology. However, “With Kennedy’s victory, a cautious military-led program that had rejected racing was replaced by a daring, expensive, and highly competitive program with the unabashed goal of establishing the United States as the leading space power.”31 Further setbacks in regard to the Communist threat early in Kennedy’s administration (the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion and Yuri Gagarin’s launch among them) pushed Kennedy to consider potential American responses that demonstrated resolve and ability to the rest of the world. The need to reestablish American prestige and respect contributed to Kennedy’s call in May 1961 for an American mission to the moon by the end of the decade. The search for prestige and respect played a role from the beginning in establishing the purposes of the space race. In a National Security Council policy document released in August of 1958 and approved by Eisenhower, “the NSC judged that continued Soviet superiority in space might undermine US prestige and security.”32 By January of 1960, the administration fully recognized the psychological impacts of space achievements and their ability to influence American prestige. “Hence, US policy was to demonstrate an overall superiority in outer space, stress projects which offer the promise of obtaining a demonstrably effective advantage, and proceed with manned spaceflight ‘at the earliest practicable time.’ ”33 The space race continued into the 1960s on two different tracks, one that was civilian focused, premised on prestige and a second in terms of developing military capabilities in space. While the full implications of space were not yet clear by 1960, the United States got off to an early lead in developing passive systems for reconnaissance and communications. The Soviet Union attempted to protest such missions for fear of spying, but they soon developed similar capabilities and realized advantages in these areas as well. The growth of ICBMs and improvements in their technologies also caused both states to consider anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM) with launch sites on the ground and potentially in space. However, James Andrew Lewis argues that the development of these systems was incremental and fragmented, a pattern “indicative of early attitudes about the military utility of space.”34 To Lewis, this fragmentation demonstrates that military planners of the time saw space systems as tools and accessories and not a military capability. The scattershot approach to the military purposes of space soon began to interact with the civilian space race in ways that highlight the nature of the space environment and limit potentially destructive activity. In the early 1960s, as both states began to engage in human spaceflight and conduct high altitude nuclear tests, participants began to notice the effects that

Is it a trap? Arms races in space  85

radiation and electromagnetic pulses generated by the explosions were having on the space environment. Though there seemed to be a growing recognition that further weapons testing was harmful to both sides, the scientific and military momentum on each side propelled further development. In 1962, Kennedy pressed his advisors for limits on US nuclear testing. Failures in several American nuclear tests as well as their effect on satellites “caused the president to change his mind about nuclear testing in space” in the summer of 1962.35 As a result, Kennedy set new limits on nuclear testing in space, something which went against the desires of air force officials at the time.36 These concerns, coupled with the impact of the Cuban missile crisis, led both sides to reconsider hostile actions in space because of the possible danger to the space environment. Out of this, a period of “cooperative restraint” emerged that found both the Soviet Union and the United States engaging in renewed diplomatic efforts as well as rolling back potentially dangerous military applications of space including the Air Force’s sought after Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL). Cooperative restraint set the stage for increased cooperative relations between the two space programs, all culminating with the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in 1975. While this is a rough sketch of the events of the early space race, it is instructive in considering what pulled these two countries back from the brink. Clearly, both were interested in space for military purposes and plans were being made to exploit space-based advantages. However, as both sides realized their actions in terms of nuclear tests and debris were harming the space environment in ways that limited their freedom of operations, moves to weaponize space were curbed.37 Moltz calls this idea “environmental interdependence”—states interested in space are interdependent on the space environment (in this case for the purposes of national security) and must act accordingly. To this, I would add that the civilian side of the space race, the race to launch humans into orbit and eventually to the moon, reinforced the concept of environmental interdependence. Part of the reasoning behind Kennedy’s decision to limit high altitude nuclear tests was over concern about their impact on upcoming American spaceflights. In order to continue racing on the civilian track, it was necessary to curb competition on the military track to limit the dangers that astronauts and cosmonauts faced in near-earth orbit. This notion is not at all inconsistent with the commercial space peace theory proposed in this book. During the early space race period, the economic impacts of space were not yet clear or exploitable, thus economic impacts could not serve to restrain conflict. What did put a damper on the danger of conflict was the recognition that weaponization of space would detrimentally affect other activities that states wished to undertake. By the early 1960s, EMPs set off by a nuclear test disabled several Soviet and American satellites and there was growing evidence that debris posed a dangerous problem in near-earth orbit. The logic of conflict avoidance was the same: the interdependence of states with the space environment constrained conflict. In the 1960s, it was on the basis of national security; today, in addition to national security concerns are economic concerns that involve far more states, commercial entities, and individual people than ever before.

86  Is it a trap? Arms races in space

Under the umbrella of cooperative restraint and the stability it encouraged, major states engaged in renewed diplomatic exchanges and economic development of space began. The United States created the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) in 1963 which led to the founding of the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT) to foster the development of communications satellites. By the early 1980s, the Reagan administration introduced new policy directives designed to support a private space industry in the United States.38 However, by that point, tension in space between the two powers was once again increasing. Lorenzini and Fox, discussed at the beginning of this chapter, leveled their warning of coming conflict in 1981. Richard L. Garwin, instrumental in the creation of the hydrogen bomb, also expressed concern of a new arms race in space in 1981, using the opportunity to push for new bilateral arms control agreements.39 Both of these warnings occurred before Ronald Reagan’s announcement of SDI in 1983 which represented a new push for the potential weaponization of space. SDI, with its proposed significant increases in research and development for a space-based ballistic missile shield, threatened the stability of space competition with the possible introduction of ABM launchers in outer space, contrary to the Anti-­Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. Though the budget for the Department of Defense and space research and development increased, the plan faced stiff resistance among the public, Democratic majorities in Congress, and some in the DOD who recognized the dangers inherent with SDI. Congress in particular was concerned not just with the large price tag but with the potential for violating the ABM Treaty and the technical feasibility of the program.40 Added to that, new ASAT development and testing occurring outside of the SDI at this time revived concern about the possibility of troublesome debris in earth orbit. The Soviets responded to these developments by calling for greater arms control negotiations, particularly given major setbacks in their civilian spaceflight program and the inadequacies of their military space programs.41 Soviet leadership changes also greatly affected Soviet responses. Mikhail Gorbachev, having come to power in the mid-1980s, not only “moved to break the stranglehold of the military on the space program” so that the US would be assured of their non-aggressive motives in space but also sought to use space technology commercially on the global market.42 Soviet ambitions economically would be greatly harmed by conflict stimulated on the part of SDI. Thus, by the mid-1980s, a less hostile position on the part of Reagan following his reelection and Soviet efforts at transparency and openness in terms of space cooled the fever of increased competition. Like the 1960s, recognitions of interdependence also served to restrain possible conflict in space in the 1980s. Interestingly, in addition to concerns about the possibility for debris in earth orbit, the Soviets now added an economic motive to curbing competition. This demonstrates not just a “relearning” process as Moltz argues but the incorporation of new bases for decisions as the economic importance of space began to increase. Ironically, the economic concern came on the part of the Soviet Union, a communist state with a heretofore state-controlled economy. This is important not only because it demonstrates that space-based economic concerns

Is it a trap? Arms races in space  87

can influence and even constrain state actions in space but also that states organized along similar lines to the Soviet Union can be affected by economic motivations. Though China’s economy today is not as controlled as it once was, the state is still heavily involved, particularly in space. That there is historical evidence of economic concerns influencing the actions the Soviet Union in space speaks to the fact that China could be just as easily impacted today especially since economic dependence on space and economic globalization has increased dramatically since the 1980s. The Cold War, as we know today, did not lead to the inevitable conflict predicted by analysts throughout the period. The more general arms race between the Soviet Union and the US was, to an extent, stabilizing. The race for prestige in space presented a contest that could be pursued through less militarized means, thereby providing an outlet for competitive tendencies.43 Internally, bureaucratic agencies pushed for new investments in space technology, but cost concerns often limited them as was the case in both the US and Soviet Union in the 1980s. And finally, as the economic dimension of space came to be understood, an additional constraint was introduced into the calculations of the two superpowers.

A new space race? Lessons in a period increased tensions Today, we find ourselves in a situation where tensions in space are once again increasing. India’s ASAT test in March of 2019, China’s increased military activities with regards to space, and calls for the United States to create a new Space Force are just some of the indicators of growing risk. The withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty by George W. Bush in 2001 opened the doors to development of ABM systems that could be partially (or even fully) located in outer space. While the US has encountered significant difficulties in developing even ground-based systems, the fact that the US moved to develop them was seen as threatening particularly by an emerging China. As reported by Moltz, in 2005, China’s ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament “argued that spacebased defenses would ‘undermine international security,’ damage the current arms control environment, and trigger a ‘new arms race.’ ”44 Despite their public statements of concern, China’s ASAT test in 2007 also upped the ante. A pull back from more aggressive actions in space with the Barack Obama administration was ended as the inauguration of Donald Trump as president has brought with it an increased focus on strong defense capabilities and protection of US capabilities in space, consistent with the idea of space nationalism. This situation has led some to believe there is a new space race. When announcing new American plans to return to the moon by 2024, Vice President Mike Pence stated, “Make no mistake about it—we’re in a space race today, just as we were in the 1960s, and the stakes are even higher.”45 Citing the successful Chinese landing of its Chang’e-4 lunar probe on the far side of the moon in January 2019, the vice president argued that it “revealed [China’s] ambition to seize the lunar strategic high ground and become the world’s pre-eminent spacefaring nation.”46 While Pence argues there is an ongoing race, neither Russia nor China seem to be

88  Is it a trap? Arms races in space

engaging in it, at least from a civilian spaceflight perspective. China has continued on a slow, steady pace in their program with no apparent moves to speed up the process. Russia’s space program is experiencing severe economic restraints that has led them to actively consider working with the Chinese on their upcoming space station project.47 Pence’s invocation of a global competition based on an obvious military rationale (seizing the lunar high ground) is reminiscent of the original space race motivations of reclaiming prestige based on a seemingly strategic goal. In terms of civilian spaceflight, at least, the hoped-for competition that might spur greater support for crewed missions to the moon does not appear to be emerging. There is perhaps more evidence to support an increasing military space race focused not just on passive space systems but weapons as well. Vice President Pence, who has been at the forefront of space issues for the Trump administration, wrote in an op-ed for The Washington Post in February 2019 that “China and Russia are aggressively developing and deploying capabilities—including anti-satellite weapons, airborne lasers, menacing ‘on-orbit’ capabilities and evasive hypersonic missiles—that have transformed space into a warfighting domain.”48 Russia, for its part, conducted a test of a new anti-satellite weapon in late 2018 and a new space-based interceptor designed for use by 2022 and launched from a Russian MiG-31was photographed as well.49 More generally, a declassified US government report, “Competing in Space,” from the National Air and Space Intelligence Center claims that “[a] number of foreign countries are believed to be testing on-orbit, space-based anti-satellite technologies and concepts” and that because of reduced costs, more actors will seek to integrate military capabilities with space-based systems in the coming years.50 Thus, while there does not appear to be any pressure to quicken the pace of civilian spaceflight, there is increasing interest in space for both militarized and weaponized purposes. The tension in space suggests that space leaders have once again “unlearned” the lessons of the 1960s and 1980s. Despite some similarities to those periods in terms of the space environment, the differences are quite significant and serve to heighten the importance of avoiding conflict. For one, debris concerns, present since the 1960s, are exponentially greater today. The US Joint Space Operations Center currently tracks more than 23,000 larger than 4 inches but there is an estimated 500,000 pieces of debris between 0.4 and 4 inches that are not actively tracked.51 The problem is only getting worse. US Air Force General John Hyten, testifying before Congress shortly after the Indian ASAT test, reiterated his concerns about debris that he believes will endanger future missions and the use of space.52 Combined with the increasing number of actors, both government and private, involved in space, and the significant economic and military reliance on space, the stakes have never been higher. Given this, past lessons can help contribute to new learning about these risks in order to mitigate them. In the 1960s, the US and Soviet governments had to learn for the first time about these dangers by experiencing early consequences. In the 1980s, changes in leadership and attitude toward the Soviets pushed a more aggressive stance which was restrained by an institutionalized memory regarding

Is it a trap? Arms races in space  89

the necessity of debris avoidance as well as an institutional dedication to the norms and agreements. In the Soviet Union, new recognition of the economic potential of space technology taught a new generation of leaders that to foster their own economic goals, they had to restrict behavior in the military realm. Today, leaders who are themselves reflective of more nationalistic feelings in their own countries are once again pushing the boundaries. There is evidence, however, that institutional memory is still present. In the US, military leaders continue to express concern about the problems of space junk which is often reflected by Chinese leaders as well. Commercial actors with profits at stake also clearly understand the risk posed by debris. In the past, it took significant incidents in space to reinforce the lessons: in the 1960s, EMPs had to disrupt Soviet and American satellites. In the 1980s, the Soviets experienced significant setbacks in their civilian and military space programs including the destruction of a nuclear-powered satellite over the Atlantic Ocean.53 One argument might be, then, that it will take some sort of dramatic incident for leaders in space states to pay attention to these concerns as this is often the case for public policy problems in general. In this instance, there is little evidence to support it. The Chinese ASAT test in 2007, the collision of an inactive Russian communication satellite and an active US-based communications satellite in 2009, and the more recent 2019 Indian ASAT test, all dramatically increased the amount of debris in near-earth orbit and yet the hostile rhetoric in space has continued. Another reason for conflict avoidance particularly in the 1960s was that it posed a risk to the civilian space race which was a political priority for both the USSR and US. With the renewed push in civilian space exploration by both the United States and China today, this could be one way to siphon off more aggressive instincts in space. Other countries and private corporations are also planning for human spaceflight: India has plans to send its first crewed spacecraft into orbit by 2022 while Virgin Galactic could be sending paid passengers on suborbital trips in the very near future. As more people seek to explore space for themselves, the imperative to protect life in an environment that is already incredible hostile to it can once again reassert itself to restrain conflictual behavior. Though this is possible, there are still significant hurdles for both private companies and government organizations to overcome in their human spaceflight plans including funding and successful demonstrations of their technology and capabilities. Finally, diplomatic efforts engaged in by the two Cold War superpowers in the mid- to late-1960s helped to cement the cool off in space and institutionalize norms of behavior. Diplomatic engagement could also provide a solution today, but given American actions over the past 20 years, formal diplomatic efforts are likely to face significant hurdles if not outright failure. The Bush administration’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2001 removed one of the significant restraints on the development of weapons in space, opening the doors not just to research and development on the part of the US but for Russia as well. While the Obama administration was more open to diplomatic efforts, the political conditions at home were not suitable; in order for the United States to formally join a treaty, it must be approved by the US Senate. With an almost even split between Democrats and Republicans,

90  Is it a trap? Arms races in space

the administration would likely have found a difficult bargaining environment as it did with the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Paris Climate Accords, agreements that were deeply unpopular with the Congress in general. The Trump administration has been even more openly hostile to international agreements, withdrawing the US from both the TPP and Paris Agreement upon taking office. More recently, Trump also withdrew the US from the Arms Trade Treaty, initially signed by Barack Obama in 2013 but never ratified by the Senate. In doing so, he stated, “Under my Administration, we will never surrender American sovereignty to anyone.”54 Although the treaty was unlikely to be approved by the Senate (reinforcing the idea that diplomatic negotiations likely had little chance under Obama anyway), the statement reflects the more nationalistic tone of the Trump administration. Learning and relearning the dangers of conflict, redirection of attention to civilian spaceflight, and diplomacy have all helped in the past to reduce the chances of conflict in periods where some saw war as just about inevitable. In fact, these solutions might be more applicable today than previously particularly as the threat of debris grows and more actors require greater international coordination. Kai-Uwe Schrogl, head of the Strategy Development Department for the European Space Agency, wrote in a reflection on the OST that maintaining the “situational structure [of space] is probably more influential than any attempt to prevent an arms race in outer space by negotiating a treaty.”55 But just because they are more applicable does not mean they are more likely. In each instance, there is clear evidence that in the recent past, the danger of debris, a political commitment to human spaceflight, and diplomatic efforts have all failed at reducing the threat of conflict in space. If the tensions cannot be stopped, the chances of a renewed arms race in space, particularly in terms of military space between the major powers, are even more real.56 If this is the case, we can consider for a moment the policy prescription that analysts like Lorenzini and Fox and Dolman have proposed. If weaponization of space is inevitable, then the US should make reasonable preparations to be the one to do so and exert control over the space environment. Dolman writes, To be sure, China’s increasing space emphasis and its cultural antipathy to military transparency suggest a serious attempt at seizing control of space is in the works. A lingering fear is the sudden introduction of an unknown capability (call it Technology X) that would allow a hostile state to place multiple weapons into orbit quickly and cheaply. The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any other state, while the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to America’s already space-dependent military forces could usher in a significant reordering of the international system. The longer the United States dithers on its military responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-Earth orbit before it is able to respond.57 Though Dolman acknowledges that such moves are likely to result in “severe condemnation and increased competition in peripheral areas,” he does not believe it

Is it a trap? Arms races in space  91

heralds an arms race.58 On the contrary, it can actually prevent one by allowing the US to focus on space weapons systems that would replace ground-based systems and troops stationed around the world. By reducing ground armaments and relying on space-based instruments of power, other states would seemingly feel less threatened by US moves. Matthew Burris responds directly to Dolman’s argument and more generally to the arguments pursued by space nationalists.59 He argues that conflict with China is not inevitable especially because of the global environment we now find ourselves in that employs a variety of cooperative organizations like the UN, recognizes international norms and laws, and finds itself deeply intertwined economically. While a Thucydides’ trap might have been hard to avoid in the past, the context in which a power is rising has significantly changed so that it may be avoidable today. Further, Burris argues that other states will not let US development of means of control in space go unanswered: “Are we to assume,” he asks, “they are patiently awaiting the completion of an ‘unstoppable’ constellation of space weapons?”60 Burris concludes that utilizing Dolman’s own “power politics thesis,” he is precipitating the very arms race he seeks to avoid by encouraging US domination in space.61 He points out that US reliance on space weapons over ground-based weapons would be its Achilles’ heel. “A space hegemony strategy, pursued at the expense of combined arms, would represent a potential single point of failure for the national security of the United States.”62 The logic of space hegemony or space nationalism in order to avoid conflict or even an arms race is not, on the whole, persuasive. This is not to say that a new space race is avoidable or unavoidable, simply that the solution of US domination of space (or really, domination of space by any state) is not feasible nor is it strategically sound. We are left in a situation, then, of increasing space tensions where responses on both ends of the spectrum, complete internationalization of space control and complete state domination, are unlikely to occur. Past solutions also seem unlikely at this point, but there are additional actions that might help introduce a new détente. Downs, Rocke, and Siverson, in their analysis of arms races, discuss four types of unilateral strategies that can reduce the intensity of arms races.63 First, states can focus on defensive rather than offensive weapons technology. Though they find little historical evidence of such actions actually reducing the heat in an arms race, in terms of space, this strategy might be helpful. John Klein has noted that far more attention has been paid to offensive space weapons as opposed to defensive despite the argument that defensive weapons may be stronger and more important.64 ASATs are, by their very nature, offensive in nature. The recent focus on them by states including the US, Russia, China, and India can only heighten tension. A second strategy is defensive alliances, however, this, like defensive weapons, finds little support in Downs, Rocke, and Siverson’s analysis. Countries could try to extend their current alliances, for example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), into the space realm.65 For instance, if a member of NATO had a satellite destroyed by a non-member, it is unclear whether article 5, the collective security

92  Is it a trap? Arms races in space

clause, could be invoked precisely because the rules of war in space are unclear. For example, an ASAT that destroys a NATO-member’s satellite might be considered an act of war because the OST prohibits “non-peaceful” activities in space. The US has interpreted “non-peaceful” to mean “non-aggressive”; an attack by a kinetic ASAT would certainly be considered non-peaceful and quite aggressive. However, if a state’s satellite were disabled by a laser or some other close means, would that be considered an attack? The attacking country could claim that they disabled the satellite out of a defensive purpose and argue their action was therefore “peaceful” since defensive operations are allowed under international law. The lack of clarity on an issue such as this would likely prevent NATO, or any defensive alliance, from agreeing on whether to invoke the premise of collective security unless space was specifically protected under the alliance agreement. On the other hand, defensive alliances could create a cascade of war as they did with World War I, making their extensive use unlikely. Downs, Rocke, and Siverson’s third unilateral strategy is the creation of buffer states but that is not applicable to a region such as space. However, the fourth unilateral strategy is that of “acquisition and surrender of intelligence information.”66 States may be motivated to reveal information and preferences so as to convince others of their intentions and purposes of action. However, such information and cooperation can come about in other ways as well. During the Cold War space race, collaborative efforts between the Soviet Union and the US helped not only to smooth tension between the two but cooperation also gave them a chance to exchange information. Granted, the information exchanged was often not very technical or militarized in nature; it usually consisted of scientific exchanges or, at times, cooperative spaceflight efforts. Regardless, lower level technical and scientific cooperation and exchange can be important. Steven J. Majeski argues that in arms races in general, cooperation can slow the ramping up effects of technological innovation.67 In terms of space specifically, a number of analysts have argued that cooperation with China today can reduce hostile competition and mitigate dangerous outcomes.68 Cooperation, even beginning at a low level, can be an important step to building trust and paving the way for further work in the future. The logic of cooperation is powerful and beneficial. Cooperation becomes even more important as the number of actors grows, the common resource (in this case, space) dwindles, and the environmental and economic interdependence of space grows. While cooperation between the US and China, the US and Russia, or even Russia and China can contribute to reduced tension militarily, in order to truly secure the space environment for all interested parties, all space users must be prepared to cooperate. As the number of users grows, the potential for free riders, those who take advantage of the actions of others, grows as well. Tension in space is no longer predicated along bilateral lines, it is now globalized, requiring cooperation from all to achieve a common good. In this sense, the solutions of the past may simply not be applicable to today’s space operating environment. What is applicable and what is of concern to most, if not all, space users are the economics of space. Whether a state or private actor, access to space and space

Is it a trap? Arms races in space  93

systems costs money; the easier it is to access space and operate there, the lower the costs will be. Even for state governments, the costs of a system are a limitation. Congress was concerned by the cost of Reagan’s SDI in the 1980s. China placed an emphasis on the commercial aspects of their launch technology before they started their current human spaceflight program. The Soviet Union, now Russia, has been perpetually beset by economic concerns in their spaceflight programs and industry. Thus, one thing that all space actors have in common, regardless of their intentions or whether they are public, private, commercial, or scientific, is a concern with cost. Those actions which increase the costs of space hurt everyone and must be restrained. The costs of space are on top of the costs to global economy if space-systems and/or access to space were interrupted. Given the one-two economic punch a state would receive if conflict were to occur in space, they have all the more reason to take actions that do not contribute to such a scenario to create a more secure space environment. Short of international negotiations to create a space code of conduct or more formal international agreements, the least states can and should do is make prudent policy choices that do not inflame tensions or create scenarios where conflict is likely to occur. This chapter has argued that even during the original space race, the US and Soviet Union recognized the impact that each other’s actions could have on freedom of movement in space. That interdependence has evolved over time to include more and more extensive dimensions of interdependence, more states, more actors, and more problems. While the means of dissolving space-based tension that were used in the space race remain real and palpable today, the current space environment has created a condition where economic concerns can play a far larger role in constraining conflict. While much of this chapter has focused on state actors like the US, Russia, China, and India, commercial and private actors are playing an increasingly important role in space. Not only are they developing means of launching space systems, but some even plan on extensive solar system exploration. Because of this, they are likely to be concerned about the economic costs of space, but they are also in a position to influence government actions on this front as well. The next chapter discusses these “new space” actors, their motivations, and their capability, and willingness, for action.

Notes 1 Dino A. Lorenzini and Charles L. Fox, “2001: A US Space Force,” Naval War College Review, 34(2), 1981: pp. 48–49. 2 Everett C. Dolman, “New Frontiers, Old Realities,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 6(1), 2012: p. 78. 3 Ibid., p. 79. 4 Cameron Hunter, “The Forgotten First Iteration of the ‘Chinese Space Threat’ to US National Security,” Space Policy, 47, 2019: p. 158. 5 For example, see William Burrows, This New Ocean: The Story of the First Space Age, Modern Library, New York, 1999 or more recently Douglas Brinkley, American Moonshot: John F. Kennedy and the Great Space Race, Harper Collins, New York, 2019.

94  Is it a trap? Arms races in space

6 Colin S. Gray, “The Arms Race Phenomenon,” World Politics, 24(1), 1971: p. 40. 7 Stephen J. Majeski and David L. Jones, “Arms Race Modeling: Causality Analysis and Model Specification,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25(2), 1981: pp. 259–288. 8 Michael D. Wallace, “Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 23(1), 1979: pp. 3–16. 9 Andrew Kydd, “Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective,” American Journal of Political Science, 44(2), 2000: pp. 228–244. 10 Toby J. Rider,“Uncertainty, Salient Stakes, and the Causes of Conventional Arms Races,” International Studies Quarterly, 57(3), 2013: pp. 580–591. 11 Colin S. Gray, “The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing,” World Politics, 26(2), 1974: pp. 207–233. 12 Ibid., p. 216. 13 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens, Routledge, New York, 2017, p. 105. 14 Gabriel Almond, “Public Opinion and the Development of Space Technology,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 24(4), 1960: p. 558. 15 Paul F. Diehl and Jean Kingston, “Messenger or Message? Military Buildups and the Initiation of Conflict,” The Journal of Politics, 49(3), 1987: pp. 801–813. John C. Lambelet, “Do Arms Races Lead to War?” Journal of Peace Research, 12(2), 1975: pp. 123–128. Paul F. Diehl, “Armaments Without War: An Analysis of Some Underlying Effects,” Journal of Peace Research, 22(3), 1985: pp. 249–259. 16 Charles L. Glaser, “When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational Versus Suboptimal Arming,” International Security, 28(4), 2004: pp. 44–84. 17 Ibid., p. 45. 18 Rider, “Uncertainty, Salient Stakes, and the Causes of Conventional Arms Races”; Douglas M. Gibler, Toby J. Rider, and Marc L. Hutchison, “Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races during Periods of Rivalry,” Journal of Peace Research, 42(2), 2005: pp. 131–147.   There are obviously significant cases of arms races contributing to war in the twentieth century, including World War I. However, analyses undertaken by the sources cited here consider cases of arms races and conflict going back to the nineteenth century. In other words, while the biggest cases take up most of our attention, they are still outliers and the weight of the evidence supports the idea that arms races may contribute slightly to the chances of conflict but conflict as a result of arms races is not inevitable. 19 George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph Siverson, “Arms Races and Cooperation,” World Politics, 38(1), 1985: p. 119. 20 Gray, “The Arms Race Phenomenon.” 21 Lambelet, “Do Arms Races Lead to War?” 22 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2019. 23 Rafael Reuveny and John Maxwell, “Free Trade and Arms Races,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(6), 1998: pp. 771–803. 24 Syed Mansoob Murshed and Dawood Mamoon, “Not Loving Thy Neighbour as Thyself: Trade, Democracy, and Military Expenditure,” Journal of Peace Research, 47(4), 2010: pp. 463–476. 25 Max Rosner and Mohamed Nagdy, “Nuclear Weapons,” Our World in Data, published 2019, accessed November 12, 2019 at . 26 For excellent histories, see Walter A. McDougall, . . . The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1985 and Burrows, This New Ocean. In terms of space security in particular, this discussion draws heavily on Moltz, The Politics of Space Security. 27 McDougall, . . . The Heavens and the Earth. 28 Matthew Brzezinski, Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries That Ignited the Space Age, Times Books, New York, 2007.

Is it a trap? Arms races in space  95

29 James C. Dick, “The Strategic Arms Race, 1957–61: Who Opened a Missile Gap?” The Journal of Politics, 34(4), 1972: pp. 1062–1110. 30 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, p. 94. 31 Ibid., p. 106, emphasis in original. 32 Walter A. McDougall,“Sputnik, the Space Race, and the Cold War,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1985: p. 22. 33 Ibid., p. 24. 34 James Andrew Lewis, “Neither Mahan nor Mitchell: National Security Space and Spacepower, 1945–2000,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, eds. Charles D. Lutes, Peter Hays, Vincent A Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011: pp. 281. 35 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, p. 131. 36 Brinkley, American Moonshot, p. 352. 37 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, p. 131. 38 Ibid. 39 Richard L. Garwin, “Are We on the Verge of an Arms Race in Space?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1981: pp. 48–53. 40 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., p. 205. 43 John Logsdon, John F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010, p. 238. 44 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, p. 281. 45 Mike Wall, “US Is in a New Space Race with China and Russia, VP Pence Says,” Space. com, published March 27, 2019, accessed November 12, 2019 at . 46 Ibid. 47 Anatoly Zak,“Russia’s Space Agency Might Break Up With the US To Get with China,” Popular Mechanics, published March 7, 2018, accessed November 12, 2019 at . 48 Wall, “US Is in a New Space Race with China and Russia, VP Pence Says.” 49 Amanda Macias, “Top US Military Officer Responsible for Space Warns of an Urgent Danger: Junk,” CNBC, published April 11, 2019, accessed November 12, 2019 at . 50 National Air and Space Intelligence Center,“Competing in Space,” published December 2018, accessed November 12, 2019 at . 51 Maya Wei-Haas, “Space Junk Is a Huge Problem—and It’s Only Getting Bigger,” National Geographic, published April 25, 2019, accessed November 12, 2019 at . 52 Macias, “Top US Military Officer Responsible for Space Warns of an Urgent Danger: Junk.” 53 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security. 54 “Donald Trump to Withdraw US from Arms Trade Treaty,” BBC News, published April 27, 2019, accessed November 12, 2019 at . 55 Peter Martinez, Peter Jankowitsch, Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Simonetta Di Pippo, and Yukiko Okumura, “Reflections on the 50th Anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty, UNISPACE+50, and Prospects for the Future of Global Space Governance,” Space Policy, 47, 2019: p. 32. 56 Though covered in more depth in the next chapter, some argue that there is already a regional space arms race in Asia involving not just China and India but Pakistan as well. See Mian Zahid Hussain and Raja Qaiser Ahmed, “Space Programs of India and

96  Is it a trap? Arms races in space

Pakistan: Military and Strategic Installations in Outer Space and Precarious Regional Strategic Stability,” Space Policy, 47, 2019: pp. 63–75; Miqdad Mehdi and Junyuan Su, “Pakistan Space Programme and International Cooperation: History and Prospects,” Space Policy, 47, 2019: pp. 175–180. 57 Dolman, “New Frontiers, Old Realities,” p. 93. 58 Ibid. 59 Matthew Burris, “Astroimpolitic: Organizing Outer Space by the Sword,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 7(3), 2013: pp. 108–129. 60 Ibid., p. 118. 61 Ibid., p. 119. 62 Ibid., p. 122. 63 Downs, Rocke, and Siverson, “Arms Races and Cooperation.” 64 John Klein, Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles, and Policy, Routledge, New York, 2012. 65 While alliance obligations in space have not yet been made clear, NATO declared space a warfighting domain in December 2019. 66 Downs, Rocke, and Siverson, “Arms Races and Cooperation,” p. 125. 67 Stephen J. Majeski, “Technological Innovation and Cooperation in Arms Races,” International Studies Quarterly, 30(2), 1986: pp. 175–191. 68 For example, see Eric D. Little, “US-China Space Cooperation: A Partnership Long Overdue,” U.S. Army War College Master’s Thesis, 2015; Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Imperative of Space Cooperation in an Environment of Distrust: Working with China,” High Frontier, 6(2), 2010: pp. 19–22; Peter Loftus, “Counter and Cooperate: How Space Can Be Used to Advance US-China Cooperation While Curbing Beijing’s Terrestrial Excesses,” Air and Space Power Journal, 33(1), 2019: pp. 70–77.

6 THE RISE OF PRIVATE ACTORS

While there are several commercial space entities today, the two that have received the most attention are Elon Musk’s SpaceX and Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin. Though Blue Origin was established two years before SpaceX, SpaceX has advanced far more quickly with far more publicity than Blue. Each internet billionaire is interested in expanding access to space and reducing costs, but they have different motivations for doing so: Musk believes that in order to survive, humans must colonize the solar system, specifically Mars, whereas Bezos believes Earth should not be abandoned; rather industry can be moved into space to improve and preserve Earth for humankind. Despite their differing motives and methods, there is a rivalry between the two companies.1 Rivalry and competition are good, driving competitors to ever higher achievements, but imagine if this rivalry went bad. What if, despite their idealistic motives, one or both of these billionaires decide to use the technology they have developed for less than idealistic purposes? In other words, what keeps Elon Musk or Jeff Bezos from “breaking bad”? While neither may actively develop space weaponry, their rockets could be launched in such a way as to collide with satellites in space they want to disrupt. Kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons such as these require relatively low levels of launch technology which contributes to the fear that rogue states with minimal missile and rocket technology could be disruptive on a global scale. Just as space states can use space for both peaceful and militarized purposes, private space actors can as well. There does not appear to be a tendency on the part of either Musk or Bezos to act in such a way, however, that does not mean that other private space entities will never behave badly. These questions highlight the increasingly significant role that commercial companies play in space. Lindy Newlove-Eriksson and Johan Eriksson highlight the irony that despite the rise of private authority in space, the space literature has

98  The rise of private actors

remained strongly “state-centric.”2 They attribute the rise of private actors to several factors including increasing costs of space exploration; a series of failed and in some case disastrous governmental space programs; tightened agency budgets; shifts in political ideology favoring private management models and initiatives for public purposes; and advancements in dual-use technology.3 Despite this, states retain a primary role in governing space, as discussed in Chapter 4. Thus, even if Musk or Bezos decide to actively weaponize space, the United States would be held responsible for their actions; the government then has a strong interest in overseeing the space activities of private companies. However, the power of private companies is growing. They provide launch services and design and build space systems and infrastructure. The proliferation of launch providers has reduced the cost of access to space for states and other interested groups. And states, recognizing that they now depend wholly or in large part on such private actors, often provide subsidies to these companies to support them or otherwise grant contracts which provide stable sources of revenue. With reduced launch costs and new findings of water on the moon, private companies like Planetary Resources, Deep Space Industries, and even Blue Origin are seeking ways of taking advantage of such resources. Private companies are now pivotal not just in providing access to space, but in driving development of space, something that scholars like Everett Dolman argue would be even greater if restrictions on space resources in the Outer Space Treaty were removed altogether.4 In fact, the rapid growth of space companies has fueled concerns of a potential bubble specifically in terms of launch services. Moon J. Kim argues that this growth has outstripped the potential demand, something that has happened before.5 In the early 2000s, collapse of demand for communications satellites led to the creation of the United Launch Alliance (discussed further in what follows) which held a monopoly on US launch services for several years. Though companies project increased demand for their services based on reductions in costs, if that demand does not emerge, another collapse of the launch industry will harm not just the launch industry but government access to space. This argument is suggestive of the current state of the space industry overall: with the number of private actors growing in size and influence, states are still important in setting the ground rules, shaping the regulatory environment, and providing appropriate support. This chapter explores both public and private actors in space specifically in regard to their potential to both initiate conflict and be influenced by the economic costs of possible conflict. Governments and private actors in space clearly have different motivations in their actions, but this analysis makes clear that they both have a substantial interest in a non-conflictual environment both from a strategic and economic perspective. The fact that governments now depend on private companies to provide key services only enhances the economic argument for restricting conflict in space.

The rise of private actors  99

State actors In discussing states in particular, a full discussion of each participant’s program and objectives are out of scope of this book.6 To consider the potential not just for conflict in space but of economic factors to constrain it, we need to understand what states are doing in space and what they need the space environment for. Only then can we answer the question of how economic considerations influence state behavior in space. Rather than discuss each space state individually, we can consider groups of states based on their space capabilities. Roger Handberg and Zhen Li present a categorization scheme based on the extent of a state’s technological ability in space which is shown in Table 6.1.7 Level 1 includes those states with independent launch capabilities and is further refined into three sublevels: crewed spaceflight, spaceflight, and newly emergent. Level 1A countries are those which have accomplished the feat of sending individuals into space and includes Russia, the United States, and China. Level 1B “refers to states operating at all levels of space launch below crewed spaceflight, while newly emergent refers to states working on or having just attained LEO [low earth orbit] capability.”8 As opposed to those countries which have developed and sustained an independent launch capability, Level 2 states are committed to engaging in space activities but depend on another entity for launch access. Selective space participants, Level 3, include those states who pick and choose where to become involved in space activities, including Australia and Canada. Finally, Level 4 countries include those who become involved in space “due to some national physical feature, usually involving location. Space activity in principle is beyond their present capabilities so their involvement becomes indirect through the activities of more sophisticated participants.”9 Two important points regarding conflict and constraint are relevant given this classification. One, Level 4 states are the least economically constrained in space; that is, their economies are typically the least integrated globally and are therefore among the least dependent states on space-based assets. That does not mean that these states do not benefit from space in important ways. For states across Africa who might legitimately fall under Level 4, remote sensing is used to monitor TABLE 6.1 Hierarchy of space participation

Level

Type of participation

Example states

Level 1 A B C Level 2 Level 3 Level 4

Spacefaring participants Crewed spaceflight Spaceflight Newly emergent General space participants Selective space participants Passive space participants

Russia, US, China Japan, Europe, India Israel, Brazil Germany, UK, France, Italy Belgium, Norway, Canada Tonga, Kazakhstan

Source: Compiled from Handberg and Li, Chinese Space Policy, pg. 53

100  The rise of private actors

weather and agriculture and facilitate communication. In these activities, however, they are passive in the sense that they are utilizing the space assets of others by purchasing access to information rather than actively acquiring satellite systems, launching them, and operating them. On the other hand, economies in Level 1–3 states all rely in some part on space-based infrastructure. In the Level 3 example states specified by Handberg and Li, Belgium, Norway, and Canada are all economically advanced with globally integrated economies. Severe economic consequences would be incurred for those states as much as Level 1 states in the event of space-based conflict. Two, while most space states would be impacted economically by conflict, not all space states have the ability to initiate conflict. Given that active conflict in space is the present concern of this argument (ignoring ground-based methods of satellite interference), at a minimum, states need to have some sort of independent launch capability to either place a weapon in earth orbit or to utilize the launch vehicle as an ASAT. Based on this, Level 1 states are the most capable, even if unlikely, of engaging in space-based conflict. It is important to note that based on Handberg and Li’s definitions, states like North Korea and Iran would fall under Level 1C, newly emergent. These sorts of states should be considered special cases in the sense that they might not be as greatly harmed economically by conflict in space whereas other states in Levels 1–3 would be. Given the asymmetric dependence on space-based assets, North Korea and Iran could arguably be the most likely to opt for space-based conflict. There are two key questions to address for states at each level: One, do states at a given level have the ability to initiate space-based conflict? And two, would those states be affected by economic consequences of that conflict and therefore be influenced by the high costs? In other words, is there some evidence that they might be susceptible to the space commercial peace propositions? To answer these, this discussion will focus generally on the three types of Level 1 countries and then briefly discuss the rogue states and other states that might play a key role in this balance in the future.

Level 1A: Russia, US, and China Level 1A states are those that engage in the most difficult type of spaceflight, human spaceflight. Because of the need to ensure crews can survive the hostile environment of space, crewed spaceflight requires life support systems, redundant and backup equipment, and a nearly 100% reliability rating. Because this is so technically challenging and therefore costly, for most of space history, just two countries have been able to achieve it, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. While China only entered this realm in 2003, they have developed a progressively more advanced crew program and are seeking a newer and larger version of their space station, Tiangong. These states have generally undertaken human spaceflight for prestige and global reputation purposes while using space extensively for other purposes. Their ability to undertake crewed spaceflight demonstrates a high level of

The rise of private actors  101

technical ability and knowledge which allows for more advanced uses of space in general. In focusing just on military uses of space, far and away, China, the United States, and Russia have the most military satellites of any state in the world by several orders of magnitude. As of late 2019, the US had 152 military satellites in orbit, Russia had 98, and China, 84. France comes in fourth in terms of military satellites, but has only 11.10 Even more importantly, space-based resources have become important force multipliers for each country, allowing countries to project their military force or influence across the globe something which has ratcheted up tensions between the three at different points. Aside from military uses and human spaceflight, each country came to realize in the 1980s the potential commercial impact of space. In the United States, Henry R. Hertzfeld notes, on both the domestic and foreign fronts, commercial companies that had been solely government contractors for space equipment were branching into independent offerings of space components and systems. The industry was beginning to mature and, at the same time, the United States was entering an era of overall policy shifts toward economic deregulation of all industry.11 As a result, the Reagan administration began to more strongly encourage private development of the space industry in their policy statements and regulatory actions. In the Soviet Union, a commercial space agency, Glavkosmos, was created in 1985 as a means of marketing Soviet space technology and capabilities.12 James Clay Moltz writes that these policy moves were not just a reflection of greater Russian openness of their space capabilities but of the need for hard currency which could be gained from such sales.13 Thus, a declining economy and a declining budget for space activities led the Soviets to embrace more commercial aspects of space which could be leveraged to increase revenues. In a similar way, China, too, realized that the global launch industry represented a means of commercial benefit and placed their Long March rocket on the global market. Perhaps as a reflection of the growing economic importance of the space launch industry, this move attracted the ire of the US—the Long March, being heavily subsidized by the Chinese government, was offered at a lower cost, which American officials believed could undercut the entire global launch market and American launch companies. As a result, the Chinese were forced to enter into an agreement limiting the number of rockets it could sell and setting a fair market value for them.14 A full discussion of how these states utilize space today is not in the scope of this chapter, but suffice it to say that Russia, the US, and China all utilize space for multiple purposes including military, economic, scientific, and civilian. All three are capable of engaging in space-based conflict with demonstrated ASAT weapons but they also continue to develop new space-based systems for their militaries which include advanced ASATs, lasers, and non-kinetic means of satellite disruption. However, commercial and economic concerns remain central in each; both Alexei Arbatov in the case of Russia and Dean Cheng in the case of China argue

102  The rise of private actors

that each country is largely dependent on the revenues their programs receive from foreign sales.15 The US has also continued to encourage commercial development in the space industry by carefully crafting regulatory regimes and passing new legislation designed to advance commercial endeavors in space. No matter their use for space, these three not only have the most capabilities to wage war in space, they also have the most to lose.16 All of this results in a situation where the states that are most able to initiate conflict (as distinct from most likely) are also the states that should be the most constrained by the consequences of it. Nothing has changed in the space situational environment since the Soviet Union and the United States realized in the 1960s and 1980s that conflict in space would damage their interests more than advance them.17 In fact, the dangers have only increased as debris has proliferated, more states have entered space, and commercial entities have expanded their operations in earth orbit. The costs of advancing a more aggressive posture in space clearly outweigh the potential benefits of doing so as the space commercial peace thesis argues.18

Level 1B: Japan, India, ESA Because the costs of engaging in human spaceflight are so high, some countries have chosen to forego independent human spaceflight, preferring instead to work with Level 1A countries in that area while preserving an independent launch capability. Today, in addition to Japan and India, the European Space Agency (ESA) has inherited the Ariane family of rockets, first proposed and developed by France in the 1970s and operated by Arianespace. These countries (or coalitions of countries) have pursued space for a variety of reasons though national security still remains a primary motivator. Europe, despite falling under an American security umbrella, feared being totally dependent on them for their safety. “In the 1960s European space policy decision-makers decided Europe must have independent space capabilities as a prerequisite for cooperation with the US as an equal partner.”19 France developed the Ariane rocket in the 1970s to avoid strategic dependence on the United States for national security and intelligence.20 More recently, wariness about dependency on the US Global Positioning System (GPS) and fears that its usage could be restricted led the European Union (EU) to develop its Galileo positioning system.21 Regional power competition has also influenced the development of launchers in Japan and India. Though India’s space program has roots in the 1950s with the purposes of bettering society through science and technology, it “now considers space militarization an essential need to establish a robust defense mechanism” given regional competition with China and Pakistan.22 For Japan, launch system development was first predicated on Japanese autonomy in space and to support international cooperation.23 Japan has also sought out space technology for prestige purposes, similar to those of Level 1A countries, as it competes for regional influence with China.24 Given the increasing threat from North Korea, Japan passed the Basic Space Law in 2008 which acknowledges the role of space in providing security rather than just peaceful purposes, repositioning its space program towards a more defensive posture.25

The rise of private actors  103

From this brief description, one theme is apparent: states like Japan and India and broadly European powers, seek security independence from major space states through development of independent launch technology. While this purpose might not be as overtly militarized as the postures of China, Russia, and the US, these countries have or could possibly have the capability of initiating conflict in space as well. Just as Elon Musk could use his Falcon launch vehicle as a kinetic ASAT, the ESA and Japan could use their rockets as well. Further, India and Japan in particular are party to significant regional instability; India and China battle for dominance just as Japan and China do. Tension between Pakistan and India contributes to the regional competition for power and influence. The 2007 Chinese ASAT test and the development of a similar Indian capability have the potential to destabilize South Asian relations even further. Mian Zahid Hussain and Raja Qaiser Ahmed argue that although India “maintains a strategic narrative that is nuclear and space programs are not Pakistan centric but focused on China,” Pakistan “feels more insecure under India’s LEO satellites and dominant surveillance and espionage capabilities.”26 As a result of India’s ASAT test, Pakistan is likely to feel even more threatened and pressured to further develop its missile and space technology resulting in less security in space (and on earth) rather than more. A regional arms race in terms of missiles and space, which some authors have concluded is already occurring, could have dangerous consequences for regional and global security.27 It is important to recall from Chapter 5, however, that just because an arms race develops does not mean that war is guaranteed or inevitable. With relations between Level 1A states relatively stable, regional instability among 1B states is a greater inducement to conflict. However, Level 1B states are similar to 1A states in their integration into the global economy and the likelihood of economic consequences should conflict arise. Chapters 2 and 4 already highlighted the economic consequences of destruction of satellites, a cost that could easily find its way into the billions of dollars. India’s economy is the fastest growing in the world, growing even faster than China’s since 2014.28 Both India and Japan are highly integrated in the global economy: on the KOF index discussed in Chapter 4, India scored 61.18 in 2016 and Japan 78.37 (the global average in 2016 was 64.2).29 Though regional instability might be greater in Level 1B countries leading to a greater chance of space-based conflict, economic growth and development would be significantly harmed. With India also pursuing human spaceflight, conflict that results in increased debris would greatly endanger any future human endeavors in earth orbit. While there is always the chance of miscalculating costs and benefits or developing and deploying weapons, particularly space-based weapons, economic costs are still an important restraint for Level 1B space participants.

Level 1C: Israel and Brazil According to Handberg and Li, Level 1C countries are those who are just about to attain independent launch ability or have recently done so. Both Israel and Brazil see economic and military potential for space, but both have arguably regressed in their independent capabilities. Israel, facing intense geopolitical conflict in the

104  The rise of private actors

1960s, found early use for remote imaging during the Yom Kippur War, something they requested from the Americans but were denied access to.30 As a result, the Israelis began a program of satellite and launcher development with particular emphasis on remote imaging and sensing. Israel debuted its Shavit launcher in the 1980s, however, this system has only been used a handful of times since, with several significant failures justifying their position in Level 1C.31 Today, the budget provided for such activities in Israel is remarkably low, with one source putting it at 26 times less than NASA’s annual budget (currently around $20 billion).32 Brazil finds itself in a similar condition but without assured independent launch capability. Justin Anderson, Walt Conrad, and Sarah Jacobs Gamberini write, “Brazilian leaders have viewed the development of a national space program as an important part of broader efforts to solidify its status as a major geopolitical and economic power” which they see as being intertwined.33 Given its geographical location and major features, Brazil’s topography is challenging to secure and monitor; remote imaging and sensing assist not just in monitoring weather, local conditions, and resource utilization, but protection of Brazil and its natural resources.34 Though Brazil experienced severe failures with their launch vehicle leading it to be shelved, they have partnered with other major countries on satellite development and launch services. Beginning in the late 1980s, Brazil and China entered into a partnership to develop several remote sensing satellites. The resulting China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite (CBERS)-1 “was the first imaging satellite put into orbit by both countries that did not rely on technology or assistance from other space powers.”35 Brazil continues to leverage its space technology as well as its location close to the Equator. In March 2019, Brazil signed an agreement with the US that allows the US to launch from Brazil’s spaceport, Alcantara, as well as a technology safeguards agreement which protects exported American space technology.36 Given the nascent or unproven nature of launch systems of Level 1C countries, it is unlikely (but not improbable) that they would be able to initiate conflict in space. While Brazil, and particularly Israel, recognize the national security elements of space, they are both as, if not more, interested in the economic and commercial potential. What is potentially more dangerous are a special subcategory of Level 1C states that can be added to the Handberg and Li hierarchy, rogue space states.

Rogue countries: Iran and North Korea Despite not being considered explicitly by Handberg and Li, Iran and North Korea can be classed as Level 1C states in that they are advancing independent launch capabilities. North Korea successfully launched its first satellite in 2012 after three failed attempts.37 Similarly, Iran launched its first satellite in 2009, but experienced two launch failures in early 2019. There are many similarities between the programs of both Iran and North Korea including technological: Iran’s Safir rocket is based on North Korean missile technology.38 Additionally, defense analysts believe that in both cases, the rocket program is a cover for the development of more advanced and powerful missiles.39 While neither country appears to be actively developing kinetic

The rise of private actors  105

ASATs, Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Thomas G. Roberts write in a 2018 assessment for the Center for Strategic and International Studies that “crude directascent ASAT[s]” could be constructed in the near term “to launch an unguided warhead within the vicinity of a target satellite.”40 Though they believe it is unlikely for such an ASAT to directly impact a vehicle, it could create a significant debris field. What is more concerning is the use of this technology to launch a nuclear warhead which, when detonated in low earth orbit, would emit an electromagnetic pulse that would disable all satellites in its vicinity. It was precisely this type of event in the 1960s that led to the realization on the part of the Soviet Union and United States that weaponization of space would disrupt its national security potential. In this scenario, Iran and North Korea do not necessarily need the preciseness of a guided missile; simply detonating a nuclear bomb in orbit is enough to cause severe destruction. Further, because these two countries are not as strongly tied to the global economy (Iran had a KOF index score of 54.18 in 2016 and North Korea did not even merit a score), they might be more willing to initiate a space-based attack as a means of asymmetrical warfare. Before deeming this likely, however, we must consider why either state would want to do so. Asymmetric warfare is designed to attack an enemy where they are weakest so that the attacker can leverage their own capabilities. Taking out American (or other countries’) space assets does absolutely nothing for Iran or North Korea unless they are willing to follow up with a more conventional attack that would take advantage of any temporary advantage. Though North Korea’s military is quite large and their nuclear weapons threaten the population center of Seoul and Iran’s position in the Middle East is advantageous, moving military assets and arms into a position where they can quickly follow up on a space attack cannot be easily hidden. It is quite probable that the US (assuming the US is the target of any such attack) would be tipped off to military movements that presage an attack and act in such a way as to disrupt, discourage, or prevent such an action. Given the bluntness of a nuclear space attack, the US would also likely find many affected allies who would be willing to support or cooperate with retaliatory efforts. Even if North Korea or Iran were to undertake a surprise space attack, neither have very many space-based assets; retaliation would be difficult in space but not so on the ground. This infers two further conclusions: one, the harmful effects of a space attack are potentially limited by the inability of retaliation to be carried out in space and two, North Korea and Iran might be further discouraged based on the threat of attacks on their own country. Of all space actors, rogue states are perhaps the most likely to consider initiating conflict in space. However, while it might be more likely, it is still not in their interest to carry out given the likelihood of terrestrial ramifications. Additionally, barring a nuclear ASAT attack, a space attack by a rogue state would likely be less harmful given the impreciseness of their technology and the inability to carry out symmetrical retaliation in space. This does not mean that, in a sign of desperation, either state would not undertake a nuclear detonation in space, but, assuming rationality, it would not be in their interests to do so.

106  The rise of private actors

Other interested countries As is apparent in the number of countries populating the lower levels of Handberg and Li’s hierarchy, most countries have some sort of interest in space activities. Randall R. Correll notes that many of these countries “pursued space initially from commercial and civil interests and more recently have been extending their application to meet security needs.”41 In addition to pursuing space for economic development, states like Turkey and Saudi Arabia which largely procure their space services from others, are intrinsic to the development of a space industry. Countries in Africa are also deeply interested in space services. One of the main missions of South Africa’s space program is that of Earth observation which it believes is vital for national security and human security.42 Nigeria, Algeria, and Chad are also making investments in space in terms of earth observation and communications.43 Moltz predicts that “the center of gravity among critical actors in space is likely to shift southward on the globe as the growing markets of Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia become a more significant part of the ‘demand’ for space services.”44 Luxembourg in particular has made a significant play for space commerce as they have established a legal and regulatory regime favorable to new space ventures including mining, resource development, and communications. Since the start of their Space Resources campaign in 2016, more than 20 companies have set up shop in the tiny European country, which was already home to satellite communications powerhouse, SES.45 As a result, the space industry now represents 2% of Luxembourg’s gross domestic product.46 These types of activities may not attract as much attention as crewed spaceflight or the activities of Level 1A or 1B countries, but there are far more states in Levels 2, 3, and 4 with increasing interest in space for commercial and security reasons. As this number of states grows, they will be able to exert more pressure on space powers to create conditions that protect the stability and safety of the space environment for all actors including commercial ventures.

Private actors The term “new space” (sometimes written as “NewSpace”) has gained popularity with the rise of commercial space actors though its meaning is somewhat amorphous. Deganit Paikowsky, writing in the journal New Space, defines it as an “ecosystem for global and local space activities” which has evolved out of the “Old Space” ecosystem.47 Norbert Frischauf and his co-authors instead define it as a “foundation of new companies with high private capital deployment, the use of new technologies and approaches, and the convergence with the information technology (IT) sector.”48 As is apparent in these two definitions, new space is applied to both the new commercial space companies that have been established over the past two decades as well as the approach to spaceflight that they have pioneered. These new private actors have significantly changed the game not just in reducing launch costs but in technology development and industry disruption.

The rise of private actors  107

Given the rise of companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic, is it possible to categorize them in a way similar to that developed by Handberg and Li for spacefaring states? Table 6.2 presents a scheme adopted for private spaceflight. Like Handberg and Li’s, the levels are based on technological capability and how private actors utilize space. Level 1 contains spacefaring companies, but the sublevels reflect the type of spaceflight that they have achieved. Like the state-based category, Level 1A contains those companies which have achieved crewed spaceflight. As of this writing, no private company has put humans into earth orbit though both SpaceX and Boeing appear on the verge of doing so in the near future. Level 1B has those companies which have the ability to participate in orbital spaceflight, that is, they are able to launch a rocket that is capable of reaching earth orbit or beyond. These companies include SpaceX, United Launch Alliance (a joint venture of Boeing and Lockheed Martin), Rocket Lab, and Northrup Grumman, which acquired Orbital ATK (formerly known as Orbital Sciences) in 2018. Finally, Level 1C represents a suborbital spaceflight capability demonstrated by Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic. These companies have the means of launching suborbital missions but do not reach earth orbit. These rockets (or planes in the case of Virgin Galactic) do not have enough thrust to reach the required speed and therefore represent a lower level of technical ability than orbital spaceflight. In that sense, they are quite similar to the state Level 1C of newly emerging countries. Level 2 in Handberg and Li’s classification includes states that are participating in space but not in the area of launch capability.49 For commercial actors, Level 2 includes companies that engage directly in space-based businesses, i.e., satellite television and radio providers, communications providers, and designers and builders of satellites. This category also includes the subcontractors used by Level 1 or 2 companies to provide elements of their products. The difference between Levels 1 and 2 in both this scheme and Handberg and Li’s is that Level 2 participants do not provide launch services; they must contract with other companies to get their equipment into orbit. Level 3 private actors here are defined as users of data generated from space-based systems, much as the states of Level 3 “more often include purchasers of services rather than providers.”50 In the commercial Level 3, there are TABLE 6.2 Hierarchy of private space actors

Level

Type of participation

Level 1 A B C Level 2

Spacefaring participants Crewed spaceflight Orbital spaceflight Suborbital spaceflight General space participants

Level 3 Level 4

Selective space participants Passive space participants

Actors

SpaceX, ULA, Northrup Grumman, Rocket Lab Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic Iridium Communications, AT&T, SiriusXM, communications, satellite television, radio, satellite builders Scientists, government agencies, meteorologists All people

108  The rise of private actors

a variety of actors who utilize data generated from satellites or remote monitoring/ sensing systems in space. Meteorologists utilize satellite data to monitor and predict weather. Scientists can use data gathered via GPS locators to monitor ground uplift, earthquakes, and volcanoes. Archaeologists have begun using satellite imagery to find previously unseen discoveries. Non-defense-oriented government agencies, in states across the participation spectrum, utilize space-based information for monitoring and decision purposes. Finally, Level 4, passive space actors, include all of us who utilize space-based systems indirectly as we communicate with one another, engage in financial transactions, or watch or listen to satellite television or radio. There are some differences in terms of conflict and ability to influence it between the state-based levels and private space actor categories. Unlike with space states, conflict would harm all levels of commercial space, not just the first three. People, both those in the developed and developing world would be impacted in some way by the loss of space-based assets whether directly or indirectly through a massive global economic downturn. Granted, people in the least developed countries would likely be the least impacted, but even in those countries, governments have begun to utilize space-based assets to aid their citizens. While the impact of space-based conflict would be felt in all four levels here, not all actors have the same capability of influencing state behavior in such a way as to reduce the potential for conflict. For example, for most people in the United States, space is simply not a salient issue and is not considered when making political judgments.51 Similar public opinion data is not available for all countries, but it is not a massive leap to argue that the same can be said of most states. Level 3 actors might have a bit more capability to influence state behavior through their capacity to influence government decisions. Weather and climate data are important to understanding climate change as well as providing advance warning to people in cases of severe weather. Government bureaucrats utilizing remote sensing to monitor land and resource use might also be important in highlighting the use of space-based assets. However, it is difficult to know whether these lower-level bureaucrats actually have a large voice in the setting of government policy and delving further into this is also out of the scope of this project. Understanding that they act with the permission of the state, the key question for private space actors is how can they influence state behavior to foster a less conflictual, more stable space environment? Is there evidence of it happening? Potential for it at least? As was done with space states, the following discussion will consider actors in Levels 1 and 2 given their primary role and influence in new space today. This is not to say that actors in Levels 3 and 4 are not potentially powerful and influential; however, given the lack of salience of space in terms of the public and the intricacies of bureaucratic politics globally, an expanded discussion must be left for another time.

Level 1B: orbital companies: SpaceX, ULA, Northrup Grumman (Orbital ATK), Rocket Lab SpaceX, United Launch Alliance, Rocket Lab, and Northrup Grumman all possess the ability to provide space launch services (a description of their capabilities is in Table 6.3). While ULA and Northrup Grumman represent a more traditional

The rise of private actors  109 TABLE 6.3 Private launch companies

Company

Model

Northrup Antares Grumman Minotaur I Minotaur IV Minotaur V Minotaur C Pegasus XL ULA Atlas V Delta II Delta IV Rocket Lab Electron SpaceX Falcon 9

LEO payload (kg) GTO payload (kg) Cost 6,200–6,600 580 1,600 — 1,278–1,458 450 8,123–18,814 2,036–3,755 9,420–28,790 225 22,800

Falcon Heavy 63,800

— — — 532 — — 2,690–8,900 — 4,210–14,210 — 8,300

26,700

$80–$85 million $40 million $46 million $55 million $40–$50 million $40 million $109–$179 million $137.3 million $164–$400 million $4.9 million $62 million expendable/ $49 million reused $90 million

Source: Federal Aviation Administration, The Annual Compendium of Commercial Space Transportation: 2018

business model, seeking profit through provision of services primarily to government, Rocket Lab and SpaceX are very much new space companies. Frustrated with a lack of progress in space exploration as well as the high cost of rockets, Musk founded SpaceX in 2002 with profits from the sale of PayPal to eBay. Rocket Lab, on the other hand, was founded by another internet billionaire, Peter Beck of New Zealand, to “open access to space to improve life on Earth.”52 Rocket Lab has developed its own rocket, the Electron, and designs and builds satellites for companies, specializing in small sats. While maintaining a reliable revenue stream is important for SpaceX and Rocket Lab, their aspirations are far grander and geared toward what each founder believes will advance human knowledge and civilization. No matter the base motivation, however, all of these providers require a stable and safe space environment to advance their operations as discussed previously. The immediate concern of some of these actors is profit even if their motives are more aspirational. SpaceX has developed and begun to deploy a constellation of low earth orbiting communications satellites geared to provide affordable, low cost internet access globally. While this may seem somewhat random for a company that has sought primarily to reduce launch costs, “The company plans to use revenue from the constellation to develop and build its Starship and Super Heavy rocket, which are designed to take people to and from Mars and other distant destinations.”53 In order for companies like SpaceX to create a profit, a stable space environment is a prerequisite: “companies need reliability and legal enforcement mechanisms if they are going to operate profitably in a shared environment.”54 There is a counterargument to the necessity for stability in space, however, that reflects the argument that conflict can be good for military-oriented companies. Joan Johnson-Freese warns about this danger, writing, “These companies inherently have a vested interest in maintaining and expanding systems, including weapons systems, which absent clear

110  The rise of private actors

and direct external threats, may have limited political justification.”55 In the event of conflict and the destruction of space-based infrastructure, private companies and states would need to build and launch replacements, something that would benefit space companies. Although possible, space-based conflict will make the space environment more difficult, if not completely impossible, to operate in on several levels. For one, the proliferation of debris might eliminate the use of certain orbits or necessitate expensive hardening of new satellites in order to withstand debris impacts. Two, the cost of obtaining insurance for both launches and the satellites would likely increase due to increased risk.56 The increasing costs could put space operations out of reach of all but those with the most resources, likely reversing the current democratizing trends in access to spaceflight and reducing the commercial potential of space. Therefore, it is rational for space companies, especially Level 1 companies, to prefer a stable space environment to an unstable one and have an interest in reducing the potential for conflict. While the need for a stable space environment is not in doubt, other questions remain. Level 1 and Level 2 companies have several means of directly and indirectly influencing government action. These companies tend to have the financial ability to lobby government officials or provide campaign support to elected officials. ULA donated more than $85,000 to various congressional candidates and organizations in the 2018 election cycle alone and spent $1.5 million on lobbying.57 AT&T, a communications company which acquired satellite television provider DirecTV in 2015, contributed over $7.8 million to congressional candidates in 2018 and spent $18.5 million on lobbying.58 Indirectly, Level 1 and 2 private space actors contract with governments to provide launch services and to build space assets. This means those companies could refuse to provide launch services for certain government capabilities or refuse to bid for government launches at all. While there is no evidence that this has been done by any private space actor, it has happened recently in the defense industry with Google. In 2018, Google decided not to seek a renewal of a contract with the Department of Defense worth up to $15 million over objections from employees who were concerned about the uses of their work.59 This is also potentially the case for China who often leases time on satellites built in the US and owned and operated by Asia Satellite Communications, a Hong Kong-based company.60 Partially controlled by the Chinese, the company is also controlled by the American investment bank, Carlyle Group. Given reports about how the Chinese use the satellite time they purchase (to provide cellular communications to disputed territories or during anti-government protests), it is feasible that international pressure could lead to restrictions on such Chinese purchases. Certainly, both the DOD and Chinese government could turn elsewhere for the services they need, this demonstrates that key commercial entities are in a position to refuse their services, something that would be quite damaging if there are few companies up to the task. In terms of basic access to space, the health of the launch industry is of vital concern to governments. In the early 2000s, Lockheed Martin and Boeing were working on upgrading expendable launch vehicles for the US government, but

The rise of private actors  111

costs had grown such that neither company working alone was able to continue. The solution was the creation of ULA in 2006 which allowed the two companies to work together, consolidate development, and ideally reduce costs. While this created a launch monopoly, the US government was forced to approve it to continue to guarantee government access to space.61 Despite having multiple launch providers today, governments could be at quite a disadvantage if private companies refuse defense payloads. To actively work to influence state behavior, however, these companies first face a collective action problem—one working alone probably cannot prevent weaponization of space by denying access precisely because states can turn elsewhere for launch services. In addition to agreeing to cooperate to prevent conflict in space, these companies would also have to agree to turn away business from the very sources they have grown dependent on for revenue. ULA and Northrop Grumman are a part of the American military-industrial complex and thus provide a majority of their services to the government. Rocket Lab has also been the recipient of Defense Department contracts, receiving several technology demonstration awards from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).62 SpaceX has been quite aggressive in seeking government contracts going so far as to protest contract awards they believe were unfairly denied to them as well as suing the American federal government over their lack of ability to bid for government contracts.63 Most recently, SpaceX filed suit over awards provided to Blue Origin, ULA, and Northrup Grumman through the Air Force’s Launch Service Agreement program, awards which SpaceX was excluded from.64 Musk’s forceful pursuit of defense contracts demonstrates the extent to which SpaceX relies on government funding to advance their long-term goals. The dependence of these companies on revenue streams from government agencies like the Air Force and NASA suggest that they are unlikely to withhold their services anytime in the near future. They might not act directly to influence government policy, but the economic activity that they represent and deploy are intrinsically important to increasing the economic costs of space-based conflict. SpaceX has drastically lowered launch costs forcing legacy companies like ULA and Northrop Grumman to develop new, lower cost vehicles (for its part, ULA is developing a partially reusable rocket named Vulcan with a launch planned in 2020). Lower launch costs and reduced satellite development costs (and weight) have opened access to space increasing both the amount and worth of assets in space and the number of actors who have access to it and are using it. As both of these trends continue, the costs of conflict will only increase. Though they may not directly act to reduce conflict in space, by continuing on their present course, orbital companies and their continued success are vital elements restraining state behavior in space.

Level 1C: suborbital companies: Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic Suborbital spaceflight is distinct from orbital because the launch vehicles do not have enough power or thrust to reach the speeds needed to enter earth orbit.

112  The rise of private actors

Though somewhat less technically challenging, the inclusion of humans on any type of launch vehicle significantly ups the ante in terms of achievement. The companies included in Level 1B are advancing the more immediate goal of space tourism but with somewhat different long-term goals. Jeff Bezos founded Blue Origin in 2000; however, for the first half of the decade, the company was more of a think tank than anything else.65 Inspired by Gerard O’Neill’s The High Frontier, Bezos believes that major industry should be moved off-earth to preserve the planet for human life.66 After coming to a similar conclusion as Musk regarding the need to lower launch costs through reusable launch vehicles, Blue Origin went through a far slower and quieter development process. Bezos publicly unveiled an expansive plan in May 2019 to develop near-earth space and undertake a private moon mission with the ultimate goal of making spaceflight routine and accessing valuable space resources.67 In the lead up, Blue plans to offer suborbital tourist launches on its New Sheppard rocket in the near future.68 Blue is also poised to play a major role in NASA’s new moon program, Artemis.69 On the other hand, Virgin Galactic’s long-term plans are a bit more amorphous with its company website touting a more accessible space that supports general exploration and inspiration initiatives.70 Virgin Galactic emerged out of the Ansari X-Prize, a $10 million competition begun in 1996 with the goal of rewarding a private company who could travel suborbitally, safely, twice within two weeks.71 Developed by Burt Rutan and his company Scaled Composites, with backing from Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, SpaceShipOne was based on a model of spaceflight first developed in the X-15 program in the 1950s. The actual suborbital vehicle, SpaceShipOne, launched on the belly of a mothership, named White Knight One. Once it reached 14 kilometers in altitude, SpaceShipOne detached from White Knight One and lit its own rocket engine to allow the vehicle to reach more than 100 kilometers before descending as a glider. Shortly before winning the X-Prize in 2004, Allen sold his interest in the project to entrepreneur Richard Branson, who rebranded it Virgin Galactic.72 Branson announced plans to enlarge the SpaceShipOne system so that it would be able to carry a crew of two and six paying passengers. However, the development of SpaceShipTwo and White Knight Two took far longer than originally expected and encountered significant difficulties leading to the death of a pilot in a crash in 2014.73 Despite the setbacks, Branson moved his operation to the Mojave Spaceport in May 2019 in anticipation of the first commercial launches.74 In both of these cases, tourism is the immediate goal. Bezos, as related by Christian Davenport, sees this as “vital,” “good practice,” and a way to make space more accessible.75 By making suborbital shots routine and safe, the general public has a way to get accustomed to the idea of making spaceflight as normal as a flight across the country. However, for both Bezos and Branson, the safety of human passengers is the number one priority—if they cannot guarantee a safe flight, their ability to monetize the trip and generate revenue disappears. Precisely because Virgin Galactic and Blue Origin are targeting general tourism rather than government-oriented spaceflight (as is the case for SpaceX and Boeing), this is an even greater priority.

The rise of private actors  113

Despite this seemingly greater interest in space safety, much like SpaceX and the other Level 1B companies, Virgin and Blue also pursue government contracts. Blue Origin has been developing its BE-4 engine for use on ULA’s new Vulcan rocket in addition to recent launch contracts received from the US Air Force and NASA. Though late to the game, Virgin has developed a rocket designed to launch small sats that takes off from under the wing of a modified Boeing 747 plane.76 With all of the Level 1 companies dependent on government contracts and lacking a will to overcome the collective action problem, they too suffer from the same problems of directly influencing government policy. However, the mere fact that they are willing to expand their commercial enterprises and enlarge access to space is a powerful influence in the sense of decreasing costs of access to space and increasing economic dependence on it.

Level 2: general space participants Level 2 commercial participants do not provide launch services but design, build, deploy, and operate space assets. In that sense, they are very much akin to Level 2 space states in that they seek launch services elsewhere. Particularly for the communications companies in this category, congestion in space makes it far more difficult for them to operate because, in many cases, their satellites must be placed in a precise orbit and use specified communications frequencies, both of which are regulated by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). If the space environment is disrupted through conflict, these companies are likely to be the ones most immediately impacted through the destruction of their space assets and therefore the destruction of their ability to provide services and receive revenue for doing so. Further, in the case of increased debris fields, desired orbital slots may be more difficult to operate in, requiring more expensive satellite systems with greater ability to maneuver or withstand impact from small pieces of space junk. In the worst-case scenario, the ability to achieve specific orbital locations may be prohibited altogether. Level 2 companies are likely to be the most capable of directly influencing government policy in terms of space for several reasons. First, the immediate and significant impact that conflict in space would have on Level 2 companies makes them more keenly aware of the dangers of weaponization. Second, there are far more companies populating Level 2 than Level 1 and, in the United States, they have already formed powerful lobbying organizations like the Internet and Television Association and CITA demonstrating their ability to act as a collective body. Globally, several major satellite companies have created the Space Data Association as a means of supplementing debris data provided by the US Air Force. Finally, these companies, though they have ties both direct and indirect to government, are far less dependent on government contracts for revenue streams. They also have the ability to pick and choose their launch provider for satellite delivery, which itself can be a powerful motivator. Space analyst Brian Weeden suggested, following the Indian ASAT test, that companies looking for launch services but dismayed about

114  The rise of private actors

moves to weaponize space, could take their business away from India’s launch systems, thereby sending a message regarding India’s actions.77 In the United States, launch services are provided by private companies, but other launch services on the market globally are sponsored by state governments in Russia, China, France, and India. Moving significant business away from these countries as a result of their policies or actions is an opportunity “for companies to pair their own internal commitments to responsible operating practices with efforts to influence responsible action elsewhere in the supply chain.”78 Level 2 space companies are the most exposed to danger from conflict in space. Their satellites and therefore means of operation are in the immediate firing line, vulnerable to debris, disruption, and potential nuclear attacks. Any deterioration of the space environment makes it more difficult to operate, increases costs, and decreases revenue giving them a strong incentive to use whatever influence they have to convince governments to reduce tension in outer space. Level 2 companies thus combine the traits of having “skin in the game” of companies in Level 1, the salience that is lacking in Level 4, and the ability to influence which is deficient in both Levels 1 and 3 to have the potential to be the most influential private actors in space.

Conclusion: potential conflicts between private and public Scott Pace, the current executive secretary of the US National Space Council (a White House office charged with overseeing US space activities), writes in a discussion of commercial spaceflight about the differences between Plato’s merchants and the guardians.79 The guardians are “members of the political class who are responsible for governing and teaching” whereas the merchants are the “group of people whose culture encourages energy and risk taking.”80 “Merchant behavior is found in peaceful competition” while “[t]he role of the Guardians is to protect some larger goal or system.”81 For Pace, both guardians and merchants are necessary to advance society but their relationship is marked by tension when either fails in their own duty or seeks to take on the job of the other. Pace’s argument is that although the merchants and guardians must work together, they must not seek to supplant the other party; merchants cannot and should not be guardians and guardians cannot and should not be merchants. Pace’s point is important—consider the consequences if space companies, taking advantage of the lack of movement by states in establishing safe conditions in space, band together to control access to space and refuse it to “bad” governments. That result is just as unacceptable and dangerous as any one state exerting control over space. The difficulty, of course, is finding the appropriate middle ground. That this has already been done on earth is telling; though we continue to battle over the appropriate balance of government involvement in the terrestrial economy, most will generally agree that a minimum level is necessary, particularly in rectifying the excesses of capitalism. The space environment will also need to find the balance between state and private control that satisfies the merchants and the guardians.

The rise of private actors  115

And, if commerce and trade can pave the way for more peaceful relations on earth, there is no reason that the same cannot be said of space. Today’s space environment is a product of the actions of all relevant space actors, including individual consumers and voters. Space junk, satellite constellations, and secrecy heighten the dangers for all parties seeking to operate beyond earth’s atmosphere. In a place where situational awareness, communication, and cooperation is paramount in preventing conflict, they are the very things that appear to be lacking among the most important space actors. However, the need to coordinate among competing actors in order to avoid the worst consequences can spur important benefits and lead to getting elements of cooperation, a topic taken up further in the final chapter.

Notes 1 For a more detailed discussion of the rivalry and background of the two companies, see Tim Fernholz, Rocket Billionaires: Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and the New Space Race, Mariner Books, Boston, 2018; Christian Davenport, The Space Barons: Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and the Quest to Colonize the Cosmos, Public Affairs, New York, 2018. 2 Lindy Newlove-Eriksson and Johan Eriksson, “Governance Beyond the Global: Who Controls the Extraterrestrial?” Globalizations, 10(2), 2013: p. 277. 3 Ibid., p. 287. 4 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, Frank Cass Publishers, New York, 2002. 5 Moon J. Kim, “The Potential Speculative Bubble in the US Commercial Space Launch Industry and the Implications to the United States,” New Space, 6(2), 2018: pp. 156–183. 6 For a further discussion of space programs across the globe, see James Clay Moltz, Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space, Columbia University Press, New York, 2014. 7 Roger Handberg and Zhen Li, Chinese Space Policy: A Study in Domestic and International Politics, Routledge, New York, 2007. 8 Ibid., p. 54. 9 Ibid., p. 55. 10 “Satellite Database,” Union of Concerned Scientists, updated December 16, 2019, accessed February 20, 2020 at . 11 Henry R. Hertzfeld,“Commercial Space and Spacepower,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, eds. Charles D. Lutes, Peter Hays, Vincent A. Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011: p. 92. 12 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2019. 13 Ibid. 14 Handberg and Li, Chinese Space Policy. 15 Alexei Arbatov, “Russian Perspectives on Spacepower,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, eds. Charles D. Lutes, Peter Hays, Vincent A Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011: pp. 441– 449; Dean Cheng, “Spacepower in China,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, eds. Charles D. Lutes, Peter Hays, Vincent A Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011: pp. 450–475. 16 Bruce M. DeBlois, “The Advent of Space Weapons,” Astropolitics, 1(1), 2003: pp. 29–53. 17 Roger Handberg, “Is Space War Imminent? Exploring the Possibility,” Comparative Strategy, 36(5), 2017: pp. 413–425. 18 DeBlois, “The Advent of Space Weapons”; Bruce M. DeBlois, “Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy,” Airpower Journal, Winter, 1998: pp. 41–57; David C. Hardesty,

116  The rise of private actors

“Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives,” Naval War College Review, 58(2), 2005: pp. 45–68. 19 Michael P. Gleason, “Shaping the Future with a New Space Power: Now Is the Time,” High Frontier, 6(2), 2010: pp. 43–45. 20 Xavier Pasco, “The European ‘Spacepower’? A Multifaceted Concept,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, eds. Charles D. Lutes, Peter Hays, Vincent A. Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011: pp. 476–492. 21 David Braunschvig, Richard L. Garwin, and Jeremy C. Marwell, “Space Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, 82(4), 2003: pp. 156–164. 22 Mian Zahid Hussain and Raja Qaiser Ahmed, “Space Programs of India and Pakistan: Military and Strategic Installations in Outer Space and Precarious Regional Strategic Stability,” Space Policy, 47, 2019: p. 65. 23 Hirotaka Watanabe,“Japanese Space Policy During the 1980s: A Balance Between Autonomy and International Cooperation,” Acta Astronautica, 68(7–8), 2011: pp. 1334–1342. 24 Kazuto Suzuki, “The Contest for Leadership in East Asia: Japanese and Chinese Approaches to Outer Space,” Space Policy, 29(2), 2013: pp. 99–106. 25 Columba Peoples, “A Normal Space Power? Understanding ‘Security’ in Japan’s Space Policy Discourse,” Space Policy, 29(2), 2013: pp. 135–413. 26 Hussain and Ahmed, “Space Programs of India and Pakistan: Military and Strategic Installations in Outer Space and Precarious Regional Strategic Stability,” p. 69. 27 Randall R. Correll, “Emerging Actors,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, eds. Charles D. Lutes, Peter Hays, Vincent A. Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011: pp. 493–519. 28 Nupur Anand, “India’s Lead over China as World’s Fastest-Growing Economy Will Widen in Coming Years,” Quartz India, published May 23, 2019, accessed May 22, 2019 at . (Different dates result of time accessed). 29 KOF Swiss Economic Institute, “KOF Globalisation Index,” accessed May 22, 2019 at . 30 Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee, “Israeli Space Program—The Challenges Ahead,” Indian Council of World Affairs, published October 17, 2016, accessed May 22, 2019 at . 31 “Shavit (-1, -2) (Israel) Launch Vehicle History,” Space Launch Report, accessed May 22, 2019 at . 32 Asaf Ronel,“Jerusalem, We Have a Problem: Why Israel’s NASA Isn’t Taking Off,” Haaretz, published September 15, 2018, accessed May 22, 2019 at . 33 Justin Anderson, Walt Conrad, and Sarah Jacobs Gamberini, “International Space Negotiations, Emerging Space Powers, and US Efforts to Protect the Military Use of Space,” Space and Defense, 7(1), 2014: pp. 6–25. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., p. 15. 36 Jeff Foust, “US-Brazil Agreement Goes Beyond Launch,” Space News, published March 25, 2019, accessed May 22, 2019 at . 37 Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Thomas G. Roberts, “Space Threat Assessment 2018,” CSIS Aerospace Security Project, published April 2018, accessed May 22, 2019 at . 38 Geoff Brumfiel,“Satellite Imagery Suggests 2nd Iranian Space Launch Has Failed,” NPR, published February 6, 2019, accessed May 22, 2019, at . 39 Harrison, Johnson, and Roberts, “Space Threat Assessment 2018.”

The rise of private actors  117

4 0 Ibid., p. 17. 41 Correll, “Emerging Actors,” p. 494. 42 Anderson, Conrad, and Gamberini, “International Space Negotiations, Emerging Space Powers, and US Efforts to Protect the Military Use of Space.” 43 Correll, “Emerging Actors.” 44 Moltz, Crowded Orbits, p. 174. 45 Jeff Foust, “United States and Luxembourg Sign Space Cooperation Agreement,” Space News, published May 10, 2019, accessed May 22, 2019 at . 46 Ibid. 47 Deganit Paikowsky, “What Is New Space? The Changing Ecosystem of Global Space Activity,” New Space, 5(2), 2017: p. 84. 48 Norbert Frischauf, Rainer Horn, Tilo Kauerhoff, Manfred Wittig, Ingo Baumann, Erik Pellander, and Otto Koudelka,“NewSpace: New Business Models at the Interface of Space and Digital Economy: Chances in an Interconnected World,” New Space, 6(2), 2018: p. 135. 49 Handberg and Li, Chinese Space Policy, p. 54. 50 Ibid., p. 55. 51 Wendy N. Whitman Cobb, “Who’s Supporting Space Activities? An ‘Issue Public’ for US Space Policy,” Space Policy, 27(1), 2011: pp. 234–239. 52 “About Us,” Rocket Lab, accessed May 28, 2019 at . 53 Mike Wall, “SpaceX to Launch 60 ‘Starlink’ Internet Satellites Thursday,” Space.com, published May 20, 2019, accessed May 21, 2019, . 54 Moltz, Crowded Orbits, p. 153. 55 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space Warfare in the 21st Century, Routledge, New York, 2017: p. 105. 56 DeBlois, “The Advent of Space Weapons.” 57 Center for Responsive Politics,“United Launch Alliance,” accessed May 21, 2019, . 58 Center for Responsive Politics, “AT&T, Inc.,” accessed May 21, 2019, . 59 Daisuke Wakabayashi and Scott Shane, “Google Will Not Renew Pentagon Contract That Upset Employees,” The New York Times, published June 1, 2018, accessed May 21, 2019 at . 60 “China Using U.S.-Made Satellites for Internal Security, WSJ Reports,” Japan Times, published April 24, 2019, accessed June 5, 2019 at . 61 Fernholz, Rocket Billionaires. 62 “Rocket Lab to Launch Dedicated Electron Mission for DARPA,” Rocket Lab, accessed May 28, 2019 at . 63 “Elon Musk’s SpaceX Sues Government to Protest Military Launch Monopoly,” NBC News, published April 25, 2014, accessed May 28, 2019 at . 64 Loren Grush, “Blue Origin and ULA are Trying to intervene in SpaceX’s Lawsuit Against the Government,” The Verge, published May 22, 2019, accessed May 28, 2019 at . 65 Davenport, The Space Barons. 66 Fernholz, Rocket Billionaires, p. 77. 67 Miriam Kramer, “Bezos Dreams of Our Space Future,” Axios, published May 14, 2019, accessed May 28, 2019 at .

118  The rise of private actors

68 Jackie Wattles, “Jeff Bezos’ Rocket Company Launches Another Test of Its Tourism Spaceship,” CNN, published May 3, 2019, accessed May 28, 2019 at . 69 Eric Berger,“NASA’s Full Artemis Plan Revealed: 37 Launches and a Lunar Outpost,” Ars Technica, published May 20, 2019, accessed May 28, 2019 at . 70 “Purpose,” Virgin Galactic, accessed May 28, 2019 at . 71 “Ansari X-Prize,” XPrize.org, accessed May 28, 2019 at .   For a more in-depth discussion of the Ansari X-Prize and its competition, see Julian Guthrie, How to Make a Spaceship: A Band of Renegades, an Epic Race, and the Birth of Private Spaceflight, Penguin Press, London, 2016. 72 Davenport, The Space Barons. 73 Ibid. 74 Morgan Lee, “Virgin Galactic Moves to New Mexico, Entering ‘Home Stretch’ Toward Commercial Flight,” USA Today, published May 12, 2019, accessed May 28, 2019 at . 75 Davenport, The Space Barons, p. 236. 76 Loren Grush, “Virgin Orbit’s Rocket Flies Strapped to the Wing of an Airplane for the First Time,” The Verge, published November 19, 2018, accessed May 28, 2019 at . 77 Debra Werner, “Boycott Indian launchers? Industry Reacts to India’s Anti-satellite Weapon Test,” Space News, published March 27, 2019, accessed May 28, 2019 at . 78 Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, “Op-ed: India’s ASAT Test Is Wake-up Call for Norms of Behavior in Space,” Space News, published April 8, 2019, accessed May 28, 2019 at . 79 Scott Pace, “Merchant and Guardian Challenges in the Exercise of Spacepower,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, eds. Charles D. Lutes, Peter Hays, Vincent A. Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and M. Elaine Bunn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011: pp. 127–152. 80 Ibid., p. 133. 81 Ibid.

7 RACING INTO THE FUTURE

In late June of 2019, as the 50th anniversary of the Apollo 11 lunar landing approached, a survey of Americans found that 60% believed that the benefits of the Apollo program were worth the costs with only 38% saying it was not. Further, most respondents believed that the US government should play the lead role in space exploration: 60% believed the government should lead whereas only 41% believed that private companies should play a major role. In terms of what Americans want done in space, only 19% believed there should be a military presence whereas 59% of respondents believed the US space program should conduct a wider range of scientific activities and a whopping 68% believed the US should monitor of asteroids, comets, or other events that could impact earth.1 If we take these figures at face value, there appears to be support among the American public for non-military space exploration and development that is led by the government but involves other elements of the global community. Missing from the survey, however, were questions about how important space exploration is in the context of other issues such as taxes, health care, and overall government spending. Despite the support, it is still likely space exploration remains a lower-tier issue for many Americans. As the world reflects on the 50 years since the Apollo lunar missions, the nostalgia for American leadership in space has led to laments of its lack of leadership since. This is nothing new: at the 20th anniversary of the landing in July 1989, then-president George H.W. Bush stood on the steps of the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum with the Apollo 11 astronauts behind him and committed the US to a return to the moon and missions to Mars. The resulting Space Exploration Initiative was a miserable failure with a high price tag and little support from NASA, Congress, or the American people. Thirty years later, people are still asking why humans have not gone to Mars, let alone returned to the moon. The answer is not that it is too difficult but that it is too expensive. The high cost, absent a credible international threat to a state’s superiority a la the Cold War, has meant that

120  Racing into the future

political support is not just low, but practically nonexistent. Further, when threats to national security have caused increased interest in space, spending has not gone to NASA or other civilian space activities but directly to the military.2 As such, the militarization of space has proceeded apace but not necessarily the exploration and development of it. Fifty years after Apollo 11, the developed world and increasingly the developing world are more dependent on space than ever before. Space systems serve as the backbone of the global economy, transmitting information around the world practically instantaneously. The world is smaller because we are able to communicate in more ways than ever before. The information economy is sustained by satellites and many national security systems themselves depend on space-based assets. But space, and the capabilities in it, remain surprisingly fragile and vulnerable, not just to space-related threats like solar weather or collisions with asteroids, but from the very people who depend on them in the first place. This book has argued that the costs of military conflict in space are quite high— too high, in fact, to sustain any rationale for engaging in it in the first place. The primary reason for this is the global economy’s dependence on space-based systems, detailed in Chapter 2, and the dependence of countries around the world on the global economy. Kinetic attacks in space will only add to the immense amount of space junk that already threatens earth orbits. The debris cannot be controlled and many pieces are unable to be tracked. That debris poses threats to all near-earth systems including communications and GPS satellites but also crewed spacecraft like the International Space Station (ISS). The accidental (or not so accidental) destruction of just one GPS satellite would have grave impacts for the entire global economy, the costs of which would reverberate throughout the economy and threaten all states dependent on it for their own economic success. In other words, conflict in space increases the dangers to all states to such an extent that it should be avoided. Implicit in this argument is the idea that further development of space for economic purposes, privatization of the space industry, and commercialization of space itself can help curb possible conflict by further increasing these costs. The more the world has to lose from space conflict, the more willing the world should be to avoid it. Private space companies, therefore, play a large role in this idea, but states, as the only legitimate arbiters of force and key enforcers of international law, continue to play a role in supporting and encouraging space development not just for economic development but security purposes as well. The relationship between private actors and states is complicated, as has been noted throughout. Private actors provide key services to governments and governments provide needed resources to private companies. Further, economic relations among and between states and business are complicated; each side depends on one another, but society depends on both. While this is a succinct summary of the commercial space peace theory, this last chapter takes up three additional points. First, I elaborate on several possible objections to the theory. Second, I come back to the idea of the benefits of competition, particularly in the possibilities of cooperation that it often leads to. Competition,

Racing into the future  121

provided it does not escalate into dangerous and costly arms races or even open conflict, can be a good thing. Finally, I suggest several policy recommendations based on these ideas including the further investment of resources into private space actors, the creation of legal regimes to support them, and integration of private actors into international-level agreements regarding conduct in space.

Counterarguments I have done my best throughout this book to address potential counterarguments to the position advanced here including the occurrence of World War I despite trading relationships among the European powers, conflict created through globalization, and asymmetric threats to space. However, there are three additional objections I wish to address: the role of the Outer Space Treaty in preventing further commercialization of space, the possibility of non-kinetic conflict in space, and the rise of China. The first objection involves a potentially serious roadblock to further commercialization of space. Since the commercial space peace theory proposes that further use of space for commercial and global economic purposes is desirable as a means to prevent conflict, any obstruction to those goals must be looked at. In this case, the concern is the foundation of international space law itself, the Outer Space Treaty (OST). Everett C. Dolman makes the argument: Because the OST stipulates that no state can claim sovereignty over a celestial body and that exploration and use of outer space must be undertaken for the benefits of all mankind, “The treaty may actually have resulted in a collective inaction problem as states failed to invest in the development of space because an important incentive for its development had been eliminated.”3 Further, Having been deprived of the possibility of assuming sovereign possession of new territory discovered and claimable on celestial bodies and in space, states did the same thing that individuals and firms do when domestic law deprives them of the possibility of assuming legal possession of real estate. They rationally choose not to make investments that would lead to its development.4 With no ability to make a legal claim on space resources, neither states nor companies have an incentive to develop the means through which space can be further explored and exploited. Dolman’s solution is for the US to renegotiate or jettison the OST entirely. Recognizing the considerable advantage space states have in claiming space territory compared to smaller, non-space states, Dolman recommends a new space regime that allows for proportional claims of territory on the moon, Mars, and other celestial bodies. Given the unlikelihood of a new space treaty being adopted in the near future, Dolman almost certainly prefers withdrawing from the OST in order to stimulate space development. However, getting rid of one of the only pieces of international space law that exists with little possibility of replacement would be equally unwise.

122  Racing into the future

The OST does not need to be done away with or even renegotiated to allow for further commercial development for several reasons. One, commercial development of space has significantly grown in recent years despite the limitations of the OST. This trend is a significant counter to the idea that the OST inhibits space development. Henry R. Hertzfeld and Frans von der Dunk also make the point that sovereignty is not the real issue here as “Many ways have been used to overcome the lack of property ownership.”5 Two, the US and other states have generally interpreted the provisions of the OST to mean that national appropriation of resources is not allowed but “use of space” is—for example, the mining of resources on the moon.6 Sarah Coffey argues that this idea is “supported by the fact that the treaty explicitly states activities that are forbidden (such as using space for military purposes) and mining or owning natural resources is not one of the forbidden activities.”7 That the Apollo astronauts who visited the moon removed several hundred pounds of rocks from the moon without international legal objection also establishes customary law that such actions are acceptable. Given this, companies and states should feel secure in the idea that, though they cannot claim sovereignty over a celestial body, the resources, the things which they will want to exploit and develop for profit, can be used by anybody. Three, a more favorable reinterpretation of the OST is also possible and has been undertaken previously. Soon after passage of the OST, the United States defined the idea that space should be used for “peaceful” purposes to mean non-aggressive. Though this was not adopted by other signatories at the time, European states and Japan also came to reinterpret the OST in this manner.8 In terms of commercial development, the OST states that space should be utilized and explored “for the purposes of all mankind”—there is a plausible case to make that space development and improvements to the global economy benefit “all mankind.” As long as space is being exploited and developed in such a way that contributes positively to the global economy, space is being used in the purposes described by the OST. Coffey specifically makes this argument in relation to lunar resources, writing, Using lunar resources to create cleaner, more efficiency energy on Earth, or to support exploration and settlement in space could arguably comply with the treaty’s requirement that lunar activities be carried out ‘for the benefit and in the interest of all countries’ even though the benefit is indirect.9 One final response to this counterargument is that, while it might be helpful to revisit and clarify the OST at some point, there is no need to revisit the idea of property rights in space currently. Hertzfeld and von der Dunk argue that “in the reasonably near future, no company operating in space will likely need outright ownership of space territory, including land on the moon.”10 One of the reasons they give to support this position is that, without knowing what form or shape development of the moon or other bodies will take, it will be exceedingly difficult to create an international agreement that deals with all needed issues. That is perhaps the very problem with the OST—it was written so early in the Space Age that it cannot adequately deal with issues that have arisen since then. As such, it is only

Racing into the future  123

prudent to wait to see what is needed and work from a broader base of knowledge to create a comprehensive agreement in the future. In sum, the Outer Space Treaty is not a significant impediment to the development and commercialization of space. It does not need to be rejected wholesale nor does it necessarily depend on imminent negotiations to clarify the legal status of space resources. Commercialization is happening at a rapid pace and, while at some point it may be necessary to revisit the OST, nothing in the current regime stands in the way of using space to support the global economy. The second major counterargument is the use of non-kinetic weapons in space to disable satellites. In Chapter 4, I argued that non-kinetic means of attack including spoofing, jamming, and hacking of space systems did not properly fall under the commercial space peace theory because they are forms of electronic and cyber warfare and not space warfare. Some proponents of space weaponization have argued that space weapons that can disable a satellite or space system non-kinetically, that is, without a direct hit to the vehicle that causes it to break up and thereby create more space debris, are inherently safer. If there is no debris or debris cloud, fears of a Kessler syndrome type cascade are reduced and danger to important global systems is avoided. My primary response to this critique is that such actions fall in the realm of electronic and cyber warfare, not space conflict, especially if their effects are temporary and do not permanently disable the satellite. However, even if one disagrees with this position, the commercial space peace theory might be stretched to account for such actions. If a satellite is permanently disabled through these methods, it becomes a piece of space junk that will be unable to be maneuvered out of orbit; it will continue to occupy an orbital slot that could be used by a functioning satellite system and pose a danger to other satellites through collisions. Consider this scenario: if a satellite is permanently disabled through kinetic or non-kinetic means and is unable to be moved, it could eventually collide with a functioning satellite precisely because the dead satellite cannot be manually moved into a different orbit or inclination. While the idea of two satellites colliding is difficult to imagine, it did happen in 2009 and resulted in over 1,000 pieces of new space debris larger than 10 centimeters. In early 2020, two dead satellites narrowly avoided colliding with one another—only 60 feet separated the two-decades-old craft.11 Thus, there is still a danger that non-kinetically disrupted satellites pose to other satellites and therefore the global systems that depend on them. One other point to this argument: though I have not taken an explicit position in this book about the desirability of weapons in space (I have merely attempted to show why they should not be used), connected with this argument is the idea that conflict in space need not take place at all. If a country or non-state actor wishes to disrupt space activities, they can be disrupted on the ground and in the air at launch, command and control, and even tracking facilities. As David C. Hardesty notes in his argument against the weaponization of space, current American conventional capabilities and forward basing already provide a tremendous relative advantage against hostile space systems—­specifically, against ground-based telemetry, tracking, and commanding support sites,

124  Racing into the future

downlink reception sites, product-delivery communications systems, and launch infrastructure.12 Conflict in space is not necessary when ground and air-based support stations can be readily targeted. One final potential counterargument I will touch on just briefly, since it is not fully within the scope of the book, is the rise of China. Given China’s importance in the global economy, this theory predicts that conflict in space is just as costly, if not more so, to them as anybody else. However, Dolman poses the following: To those who argue that China is as eager to avoid a damaging war in space as any other space-faring state, especially given its increasing integration into the world economy and dependence on foreign trade for its continuing prosperity; do not discount the capacities of its authoritarian leadership. This is the same regime that embraces the deprivations of government-induced cyclical poverty to spare its populace the moral decadence of capitalist luxury.13 Despite ongoing tariff battles between the US and China and China’s steady abuse of human rights, they have consistently placed a premium over the past three decades on both economic development and space as a means of connecting disparate and rural populations and furthering their industrialization.14 In fact, China has often used space technology as a means of information control, particularly in times of crisis.15 While many in the developed world have fundamental problems with this approach, the commercial space peace theory takes no position on how space systems are being used in each country just as it is agnostic towards forms of governments and economies. The fact that China is heavily dependent on space for whatever reason increases the potential cost of conflict and reduces the chances that China would be willing to engage in such. Peter Loftus invokes just this sentiment, writing, It would be advantageous for both sides if private corporations in the US and China pursue space exploration together. . . . Deep US-Chinese economic integration is often cited as one reason war between our two nations is unthinkable. Why would the same logic not extend to space?16

Cooperative ventures An additional version of the rising China argument from space hegemonists is that assuming the Chinese (and others) want to use space for non-peaceful purposes, the US should take full advantage of its power in space and assert control over access to it and activities taking place in it. This would, they argue, protect commerce and keep space a peaceful domain. Since this argument was discussed in previous chapters, I will not repeat it here. One way in which the US has attempted to reduce Chinese capabilities short of deployment of active weaponry has been to largely

Racing into the future  125

deny them access to US technologies and ways in which the Chinese might access it. Especially following the publication of the Cox Report in 1999, which accused the Chinese of stealing propriety information, that has meant restrictive prohibitions on the proliferation of technology deemed to be militarily sensitive and the denial of Chinese efforts to participate in civilian space efforts through NASA. Despite the motivations behind these efforts, denying the Chinese a basic level of cooperation with the US has not meant that the Chinese have not been able to develop space technology. The Chinese space program is largely indigenous to begin with; given enough time and money, it is not a question of if the Chinese will develop technologies that put them on par with America, but when.17 Far from potentially dangerous, cooperation, and even competition, in space brings with it a host of benefits. Consider the technological improvements and spin offs that were generated by competition in the first space race. Many historians have argued that without the competitive element of the Cold War, the US would not have achieved a moon landing when it did. Competition is intrinsic in driving both states and private entities to improve their capabilities, reduce cost, and create efficiencies. Today, competition between the major aerospace contractors such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin and newcomers like SpaceX and Blue Origin have led to improvements in launch capabilities and significant reductions in cost. The rivalry between billionaires Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos is particularly instructive to this point.18 Recent American policy actions to increase the pace of space exploration and potentially weaponization have been supported by arguments that the US is currently in a space race with China. The premise of such arguments is quite similar to that of the space race: the US cannot allow another global power to achieve parity or better with its own forces and so should invest funds in research, development, and deployment. Competition drives innovation. Putting aside concerns whether rhetoric regarding a space race is warranted or whether one is actually occurring, indirect benefits of competition do accrue. For example, as other states advance their space technology, they have the ability to become full partners in a cooperative relationship rather than junior partners relying on a superior technological and economic power. Joan Johnson-Freese writes, “As international programs have matured, other countries advanced on the technology and engineering learning curve, enabling them to contribute more, and cooperative ventures with the US became extended activities rather than one time flights or encounters.”19 This has been the case with many European countries who have gone from launching satellites on American built rockets to providing key elements of the International Space Station. Increased global capabilities provide the means through which more states can cooperate and share information which itself can have security benefits. “Giving other countries a vested interest in protecting space assets—through ownership or dependence on use—leverages global needs rather than trying to quash them.”20 During the Cold War, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye note, national security was the impetus for international cooperation and US involvement worldwide—by tying countries together, the US could project its influence and protect its interests.21 Though there is an increasing

126  Racing into the future

rise in nationalism in the US (and globally), cooperative relations with foreign partners remain just as important. The US’s joint doctrine on Space Operations acknowledges that “Leveraging capabilities of allies and partners provides greater, strength, resiliency, and flexibility to space operations and complicates our adversary’s decision making.”22 The more states and actors can participate in space, the more resources there are to draw from and connect with, enhancing everyone’s space capabilities. In addition to industrialization and economic development, China’s desire to compete globally and attain a high level of international respect and prestige has also driven development of their space technology. The resulting advances have allowed the Chinese to view international cooperation “as an exchange between comparative equals rather than the superior-inferior relationship of its status during European semi-colonialism.”23 While American-Chinese cooperation has often been denied, China has assiduously worked to develop agreements with Europe, Brazil, Nigeria, and others. These actions not only provide the Chinese with the cooperative efforts they desire, they also allow them to enlarge their own power and influence across the globe. Much as the US used early space technology as a means of benefiting allies, China has continued that pattern with their own space program. States that have advanced space technology simply feel better about cooperating because they are confident in their ability to contribute. Cooperation, then, has been enhanced by both the competitive and technological development elements of space. Competition can also be used as a means of signaling intentions as discussed in the economic peace literature highlighted in Chapter 3. For example, Erik Gartzke and Quan Li argue that competition, particularly in an era of globalization, provides the means through which leaders can signal their intentions, albeit in a fairly costly manner.24 If leaders are willing to devote the resources to compete in a particular area, whether it be space or military power, it demonstrates the seriousness of their actions and a willingness to tolerate the potential economic costs. Thus, competition can be beneficial in reducing the need for open conflict if other actors are dissuaded from action because of one actor’s moves towards open competition. Gartzke and Li also note that this type of signaling makes war less likely because of the information that is provided via competition. Non-military competition, such as the space race, can also serve as a means of siphoning off energies that might otherwise be directed to more aggressive confrontations. This was demonstrated during the original space race when President Dwight Eisenhower purposefully separated out military space programs from civilian space programs with the creation of NASA. The trend continued in the Kennedy administration. Douglas Brinkley writes, With Cold War competition running hot over Berlin, Cuba, and Southeast Asia, Kennedy could and did extend the bauble of outer space collegiality and collaboration as a means of ameliorating the very real aggressions that existed between Washington and Moscow.25

Racing into the future  127

James Clay Moltz also advances this argument: “The superpowers didn’t reduce their competitive goals in space, but turned that energy in other, less dangerous directions, like human spaceflight and highly secret military support programs for reconnaissance, communications, and early warning of missile launches.”26 The focus on human spaceflight as the ultimate prize in the prestige race helped contribute to a lessening of military tensions by forcing both the US and Soviet Union to confront the consequences of harmful actions in space such as nuclear testing. As the number of state and private actors in human spaceflight are poised to rise, this type of competition can once again serve as an outlet for more aggressive tendencies and provide a reason to restrict potentially dangerous activity. Admittedly, competition can have dangerous side effects including arms races as discussed in Chapter 5. Another consequence is the increasing cost of major technology programs. As Roger Handberg and Zhen Li write, “pursuing space activities means budgets continually rise unless the program is able to off-lay the costs to some other sector.” As a result, when space activities “become more routine, significant adjustments based on competing political priorities begin to occur—those budget adjustments often lead to funding cuts either in the aggregate or regarding the rate of budget growth.”27 NASA experienced this in the mid-1960s when, before Apollo had even gotten off the ground, the explosive growth in its budget suddenly reversed itself. Some historians have argued that the growing bottom line contributed to efforts late in the Kennedy administration to work cooperatively with the Soviet Union to reach the moon.28 A similar pattern occurred during the development of the International Space Station leading to a greater incorporation of partner countries and eventually, the former Soviet Union. In other words, competition that leads to increased appropriations will soon be faced with cuts— intense short-term competition can lead to cooperation out of a need to cut costs and burden share on intensive development projects. Regardless of the reasons that states consider working with others in space, cooperation in this area can have significant benefits in addition to the economic spin offs and security advantages noted previously. Working together in noncontroversial areas like space science can serve as confidence building measures between states who may otherwise be suspicious of one another. As states get used to working together and learn that each side can be trusted, greater forms of cooperation become possible. Cooperation in space between the US and the Soviet Union in the 1960s began with low level scientific exchanges but the result was the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in 1975. The image of an American astronaut shaking hands with a Soviet cosmonaut in orbit became a very real symbol of the détente that developed between the two countries. Though competition remained, the two superpowers were able to put aside their concerns to undertake a complicated mission and demonstrate the potential of working together. That the two countries could complete the project despite lingering tensions further demonstrates that cooperation can come out of competition and that global competitors can work together. Conflict was certainly not inevitable in this case.

128  Racing into the future

Finally, lack of cooperation can even be harmful in terms of global power and influence in three ways. First, following the Cox Report, the US tightened its restrictions on the export of potentially sensitive technology through the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR). As a result, all space technologies, regardless of military potential, had to get a license in order to be sent to any country. Moltz writes that This change in regulations caused commercial and civil space cooperation with China to grind to a halt. With other countries, it meant that US companies or even federal agencies that wanted to cooperation with foreign space entities need to prove that these actions (or even discussions) would not lead to the provision of militarily relevant know-how or technology, a requirement that created massive red tape and delays even when dealing with allies.29 Allies who typically acquired space technology and systems from US companies limited American purchases altogether shifting economic benefits away from American industry and towards companies in Europe and China who advertised their products as “ITAR-free.” Thus, while trying to protect American ingenuity, the restrictions backfired, seriously harming the US space sector. Two, lack of cooperation can exacerbate tensions. Recall from Chapter 5 that many scholars argue that lack of information contributes to dangerous arms races; cooperation is a means of reducing the information asymmetry and increasing transparency which can soothe inflamed tensions. Cultural differences magnify the difficulties. Numerous authors describe the different approaches that Chinese and American policymakers take toward space and military affairs; cooperation, even low-level efforts, can be a means of bridging the gaps and contributing to enhanced understanding of different perspectives.30 Refusing to cooperate can imply that an actor feels the need to keep their activities secret for whatever reason, causing further fear and apprehension. Three, countries can miss out on the benefits of global leadership through refusal to cooperate. Johnson-Freese argues that the United States can build its own soft power through mustering global efforts particularly in the realm of human spaceflight.31 Choosing real cooperative efforts and providing large-scale leadership in space can increase a country’s global prestige and power leading to real influence in other policy areas. In sum, a healthy level of competition which falls short of a possibly dangerous arms race can be a good thing. It can promote domestic technological advances, provide the means of greater international cooperation, and provide information to other actors about the willingness of a state to devote resources in a particular area. Competition does bring higher costs which in turn can lead states to cooperate out of a need to cut rising budgets. Having more actors with near-par abilities allows all to pool their resources for scientific, civilian, and military benefit. Finally, lack of cooperation can even be harmful in terms of missed opportunities, loss of soft power, and increased tension.

Racing into the future  129

Conclusions and policy recommendations Policymakers who are interested in reducing tension in space and the chances of conflict are left with some possible policy options. First, states should encourage further privatization of space activities and an expansion of space-related commerce. This includes the creation of domestic legal regimes that encourage the development of the space industry and possibly, though not required, an enhanced international agreement specifically integrating commercial interests and legal questions. States may also consider investing more resources into space technology, science, and exploration precisely because of its potential benefits. Casey Lickfold and Michael Jetter argue that states tend to systematically underinvest in space activities because elected officials are more oriented to short-term results whereas benefits of space exploration tend to arise only in the long-term.32 Their conclusion is that policymakers should invest more in space but should do so through the private sector which not only provides the long term economic and scientific benefits we have seen over the past 60 years but further integrates the private sector into space and space into the global economy.33 In order for a private space sector to be successful, domestic laws need to be created to support and further such development. For example, Luxembourg, a country with a population of just over 600,000, has taken bold moves since the 1980s to support a domestic space economy. It provides economic support to space companies and offers research and development grants to encourage new entrants into its market.34 Perhaps more importantly, in 2017, it passed a law allowing companies to own any resources extracted from celestial bodies.35 As a result, Luxembourg has experienced a significant increase in the number of space companies located there, including three American companies in 2018 alone.36 In March 2019, Russia proposed to work with Luxembourg on space mining issues and just two months later, the US announced an agreement with Luxembourg on commercial space issues.37 Any domestic laws should also be done within the context of the existing international law. The American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, which was passed by the House of Representatives in 2018 but never received a vote in the Senate, would have posed just such a challenge to the current international order. The bill was designed to streamline approval and licensing of space launches through the Department of Commerce and to comply with the OST but would have instructed the Department of Commerce to interpret its [the OST’s] provisions in a way that minimize limitations on the freedom of US private entities to explore and use outer space. Furthermore, the Federal Government shall not assume that all obligations of the United States under the Outer Space Treaty are imputable to US nongovernmental entities.38 Both of these instructions violate the OST despite assurances within the text that the bill does conform to it. Though the bill did not ultimately pass, domestic laws

130  Racing into the future

that conflict with international treaty obligations are problematic and could cause additional problems rather than reduce them. In any case, unilaterally implementing favorable, and acceptable, domestic laws can assist further commercial efforts in fields ranging from communications to space mining as more and more states and companies seek to get into the game. In the near term, if commercial efforts are expanded, no new international treaties or codes of conduct may be necessary. The need to provide security and stability in space in order to support commercialization can be enough to restrain potentially dangerous actions. However, it seems likely that additional international agreements (including those that fall short of a treaty) will be needed sometime in the future. In considering this, private actors should be included for two reasons. For one, while states remain front and center, private space actors do and will play a significant role in outer space; international treaties have usually excluded such actors from the negotiating table presuming that they fall under the umbrella of the state in which they operate. It would be wise to include commercial and private actors in the negotiation of treaties and other international agreements because of the global scope of their activities. For example, Rocket Lab was founded in New Zealand but operates in the United States. SES, a satellite communications operator, is based in Luxembourg but does business in multiple countries around the world. Arianespace, a public-private partnership involving France, has an agreement with Russia to launch from French Guiana. These examples demonstrate that in a globalized world, companies increasingly are not restricted to operations in one state or another making legal distinctions blurry. If private companies do set up mining operations on the moon, what state’s jurisdiction they fall under will become increasingly muddied, since no state can claim sovereignty of celestial bodies. One potential drawback to this point, however, is which companies to include during negotiations. Any agreement would likely be written in a general manner that would cover all possible space companies, but who would warrant a place at the negotiations themselves? For instance, would small space ventures who have not “gotten off the ground” be allowed to participate? Clearly, the negotiations should not be a free for all allowing anyone with an interest in space to be heard. One way around this is to invite companies who have reached a certain level of achievement in space technology or have a certain level of investment in space to the discussions. A typology of the sort presented in Chapter 6 might provide a basis of distinguishing among the different actors who might have a legitimate viewpoint that should be considered in space agreements. A second reason to include private actors in future international agreements is that diplomatic efforts among the states themselves appear to be stalled for the time being. Private actors, as discussed in the previous chapter, prefer stability in space and guarantees that allow them to plan knowing that any benefits they derive from space are their own. Without the burden of international geopolitics, private companies could fill the gap, step up, and lead the way in creating codes of conduct for space. Even if only the private companies agreed to abide by such agreements, this

Racing into the future  131

would be a backdoor means of imposing commercial values on recalcitrant states because of state dependence on private space actors. Consider one potential scenario: If major space actors created a code of conduct that forbade the signatories from building or launching offensive space weaponry, who would the United States turn to in order to carry out such a mission? Certainly, the US would see this as a threat to national security as both China and Russia would be able to take such actions since each has control over a launch system. The US military, to counter such a move, would need to design, test, and build their own launch system, which would take billions of dollars and close to a decade. Clearly, it would be in the interest of the US to engage in diplomatic negotiations prior to such an outcome so that it can have a hand in shaping any eventual code of conduct or agreement. Abandoning negotiations all but guarantees outcomes that will likely conflict with America’s goals and needs but participating ensures its views are heard. Thus, bringing private space actors into negotiations not only could allow for the creation of an international code of conduct but bring reluctant states back to the table as well. Space is a dangerous place to begin with; it is not suited to the perpetuation of life (at least as we know it) and comes only to those who are willing to bear a high cost and risk. Anybody acting in a hostile nature in space only adds to those challenges. At the same time, the promise of space as a means of furthering human life off this planet or in expanding our scientific knowledge is great and unknown. We may not have the flying cars that were envisioned in the early- and mid-twentieth century (yet), but we do have technologies that could not be imagined then. Space is boundless and endless and inspires dreamers of every age. Taking advantage of those dreams through commercializing and using space can ensure that it remains a place where such dreams can come true.

Notes 1 “Space Exploration: Attitudes toward the US Space Program,” Associated Press, published June 20, 2019, accessed June 20, 2019 at . 2 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007. 3 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, Frank Cass Publishers, New York, 2002: p. 138. 4 Ibid., p. 139. 5 Henry R. Hertzfeld and Frans von der Dunk, “Bringing Space Law into the Commercial World: Property Rights Without Sovereignty,” Space, Cyber, and Telecommunications Law, 6(1), 2005: p. 97. 6 Phillip R. Harris, “Space Law and Space Resources,” National Space Society, n.d., accessed June 18, 2019 at . 7 Sarah Coffey,“Establishing a Legal Framework for Property Rights to Natural Resources in Outer Space,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 41(1), 2009: p. 126. 8 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset. 9 Coffey, “Establishing a Legal Framework for Property Rights to Natural Resources in Outer Space,” pp. 126–127. 10 Hertzfeld and von der Dunk, “Bringing Space Law into the Commercial World: Property Rights without Sovereignty,” p. 91.

132  Racing into the future

11 Elizabeth Howell, “Avoiding Space Debris Might Require New Legal Framework, US Lawmakers Says,” Space.com, published February 18, 2020, accessed February 22, 2020 at . 12 David C. Hardesty, “Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives,” Naval War College Review, 58(2), 2005: p. 63. 13 Everett C. Dolman,“New Frontiers, Old Realities,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 6(1), 2012: p. 92. 14 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset. 15 “China Using U.S.-Made Satellites for Internal Security, WSJ Reports,” Japan Times, published April 24, 2019, accessed June 5, 2019 at . 16 Peter Loftus, “Counter and Cooperate: How Space Can Be Used to Advance US-China Cooperation While Curbing Beijing’s Terrestrial Excesses,” Air and Space Power Journal, 33(1), 2019: p. 74. 17 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset. 18 Tim Fernholz, Rocket Billionaires: Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and the New Space Race, Mariner Books, Boston, 2018; Christian Davenport, The Space Barons: Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and the Quest to Colonize the Cosmos, Public Affairs, New York, 2018. 19 Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Imperative of Space Cooperation in an Environment of Distrust: Working with China,” High Frontier, 6(2), 2010: p. 19. 20 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, p. 25. 21 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence, 4th ed., Longman, Boston, 2012. 22 “US Joint Publication 3–14: Space Operations,” April 10, 2018, p. I-5. 23 Roger Handberg and Zhen Li, Chinese Space Policy: A Study in Domestic and International Politics, Routledge, New York, 2007: pp. 88–89. 24 Erik Gartzke and Quan Li, “War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization,” International Studies Quarterly, 47(4), 2003: pp. 561–586. 25 Douglas Brinkley, American Moonshot: John F. Kennedy and the Great Space Race, Harper Collins, New York, 2019: p. 279. 26 James Clay Moltz, Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space, Columbia University Press, New York, 2014: p. 39. 27 Handberg and Li, Chinese Space Policy, p. 22. 28 See, for example, Brinkley, American Moonshot. 29 Moltz, Crowded Orbits, p. 101. 30 For example, see Joan Johnson-Freese, The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within a Maze, Krieger, Malabar, FL, 1998; Handberg and Li, Chinese Space Policy; Stacey Solomone, China’s Strategy in Space, Springer, New York, 2013. 31 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset. 32 Casey Lickfold and Michael Jetter, “Systematic Underinvestment in the Global Space Sector: An Explanation and Potential Remedies,” Space Policy, 47, 2019: pp. 34–43. 33 Ibid., p. 42. 34 Kristi J. Bradford, “A Model for Space Sector Growth: A Luxembourg Case Study,” Center for Space Policy and Strategy, published October 2018, accessed June 20, 2019 at . 35 Ibid. 36 Jeff Foust, “Three American Space Startups to Establish Offices in Luxembourg,” Space News, published September 29, 2018, accessed June 20, 2019 at . 37 Vladimir Soldatkin, “Russia Wants to Join Luxembourg in Space Mining,” Reuters, published March 6, 2019, accessed June 20,2019 at .

Racing into the future  133

  Jeff Foust, “United States and Luxembourg Sign Space Cooperation Agreement,” Space News, published May 10, 2019, accessed June 20, 2019 at . 38 Liu Hao and Fabio Tronchetti, “The American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017: The Latest Step in Regulating the Space Resources Utilization Industry or Something More?” Space Policy, 47, 2019: p. 3.

INDEX

Note: Page numbers in italics indicate a figure and page numbers in bold indicate a table on the corresponding page. African space activities 106 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts 70, 72 Alien (film) 20 American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act 129 Angell, Norman 46 Ansari X-Prize 112 anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) 84, 86; ABM Treaty 86 – 87, 89 anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon 3 – 4, 31, 32, 86, 91; attack 11 – 12; capabilities 101; China test 3, 69, 87, 89; effects of 4; India test 37 – 38, 50, 87 – 89, 103, 110; Russia 91; technology 97, 100, 103, 105 Apollo program 119 – 120, 122, 127; ApolloSoyuz Test Project (ASTP) 14, 85, 127; lunar module 1, 21 Ariane 29, 102 Arianespace 102, 130 arms race 78 – 82, 91, 127 – 128; Cold War 79; definition of 79; motivations of 80; qualitative 79; quantitative 79; in space 70 Asia Satellite Communications 110 AT&T 25, 110 Australia 99 Beck, Peter 109 Beidou 29; see also Global Positioning System (GPS); position, navigation, and timing (PNT)

Belgium 100 Bezos, Jeff 1, 26, 97 – 98, 112, 125; see also Blue Origin Blue Origin 26, 97 – 98, 107, 112 – 113, 125; see also New Glenn; New Sheppard Boeing 6, 107, 110 – 111, 125 Branson, Richard 112 Brazil 5, 72, 104 Bridenstine, James 37 bureaucratic politics 80, 108 Bush, George H.W. 120 Bush, George W. 87, 89 Canada 99 – 100 capitalism 11, 15; definitions of 41 – 42 capitalist peace 11, 38, 41; causal mechanisms 42 – 43; see also interdependence China 2, 5, 11, 103, 110, 124; activities in space 4, 87 – 89, 93, 99, 100 – 102; conflict with 77, 90 – 91; economy 62 – 63, 87; history 5; international cooperation 3, 57, 72, 92, 104, 124 – 126; see also anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite (CBERS)-1 104 CITA 113 Clinton, Bill 14, 28 codes of conduct 57, 70 – 71, 93, 130 Cold War 2, 4, 119; space race 8 collective action problem 57, 72, 111

Index  135

commercialization of space 12 – 13, 121, 123 commercial peace 11, 13 commercial space peace theory 38, 85, 121; assumptions 59 – 61; implications 69 – 71; objections to 121 – 124; premises 61 – 69 Committee on Disarmament 57, 87; see also United Nations (UN) common pool resource 32, 56 Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) 6, 86 competition 4, 13, 71, 127; benefits of 125 – 126; cooperation 14; economic 6 conflict: costs of 11, 13, 62, 111, 120; definition of 58; inevitability of 9 – 10, 77 – 78; in space 58, 67, 100, 105, 108, 110, 113 – 114, 123 constructivism 13 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 9, 70 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 70 cooperation 57, 72; among states 48; benefits of 127; with China 72, 92, 125, 126; with Soviet Union 15, 92 cooperative restraint 78, 85 – 86 Corona 27 Cox Report 125, 128 crewed spaceflight 33, 37, 72, 88, 99 – 100, 107, 120; see also human spaceflight Cuban missile crisis 8, 85 cubesats 6, 25 cyberspace 48, 56, 60 – 61, 68 cyber warfare 12, 123 debris 3 – 4, 12, 24, 30, 37, 66, 88 – 89; collisions 30 – 31, 123; consequences 31, 113, 120; mitigation 30, 31, 32; proliferation 102, 110; removal methods 31 – 32; see also Kessler syndrome Deep Space Industries 98 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 11 democratic peace theory 10 – 11, 37, 51; causal mechanism 39 – 40; criticisms of 40 – 41 Department of Defense 84, 110 – 111 dual-use 7 earth’s atmosphere 21 economic norms theory 40 economic peace 41 – 49, 51, 62, 67, 126 economy: dependence on space 7, 63 – 64; global economy 7, 11, 12, 24 – 25, 31, 37, 62, 63; global space 6; see also globalization

Eisenhower, Dwight 8, 20, 83 – 84, 126 environmental interdependence 85 European Commission 64 European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) 27 European Space Agency (ESA) 4, 102 – 103 European Union (EU) 48, 102 Facebook 26 Falcon 9 6, 103 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 27, 28 Federal Communications Commission 31 Friedman, Thomas 10 Gagarin,Yuri 84 Galileo system 65, 102 Gates, Bill 26 geosynchronous orbit see orbits Glavkosmos 101 global commons 56, 72 global institutionalism 9 – 10 globalization 43 – 45, 59, 66 – 67; definitions of 43; economic 11; measures of 65; negative effects of 48 – 49 global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) 28; see also Global Positioning System (GPS); position, navigation, and timing (PNT) Global Positioning System (GPS) 4, 28 – 29, 102, 120; economic impact 29, 64; selective availability 28; see also global navigation satellite systems (GNSS); position, navigation, and timing (PNT) Globalstar 26 GLONASS 29, 65; see also Global Positioning System (GPS); position, navigation, and timing (PNT) Goldin, Dan 14 Google 110 Gorbachev, Mikhail 86 gravity 21 Gravity (film) 33 human spaceflight 37, 89, 100, 127 – 128; Cold War 5, 7 – 8, 84 – 85; see also crewed spaceflight; space tourism Hyten, John 26, 69, 88 India 5, 37 – 38, 102 – 103; human spaceflight 89, 103; see also anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) 31; see also debris

136 Index

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 59, 83, 84 interdependence 42, 47, 59, 64 International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities 57 international law 24, 61, 129 – 130 International Space Station (ISS) 1, 14, 31, 37, 120, 125 International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) 6, 86 International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 23, 113 International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) 65, 128 internet access 26 Internet and Television Association 113 Iran 5, 68, 100, 104 – 105 Iridium 26 Israel 104 jamming 12, 58, 123 Japan 102 – 103 Johnson, Lyndon B. 63 Joint Planning doctrine 67 Kant, Immanuel 10, 38, 39; Kantian triangle 10; see also democratic peace theory Karman line 22 – 23; see also von Karman, Theodore Kennedy, John F. 14, 33, 63, 84 – 85, 126, 127 Kessler, Donald J. 30 Kessler syndrome 30, 33, 66, 123; see also debris KOF index 65 – 66, 103, 105 Landsat 27 launch: commercial 63, 101; cost of 4, 6, 32; services 4, 6, 8, 50, 98 – 99, 102, 110 – 112, 114; technology 93 liberal theory 10 Lockheed Martin 6, 107, 110 – 111, 125 low earth orbit see orbits Luxembourg 106, 129 Mahan, Alfred 67 Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) 85 Martian,The (film) 72 McDonald’s 1, 10 medium earth orbit see orbits militarization of space 7 – 8, 59; see also weaponization of space military: dependence on space 66, 69, 71; role in space 7; satellites 101 missile gap 83 – 84

Modi, Narendra 37 Moon Treaty 24 Musk, Elon 1, 97 – 98, 102, 109, 125; see also SpaceX National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 14 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 8, 50, 84, 104, 111, 112, 119, 126; economic impact 62 nationalism 48, 126 National Security Council 84 near-earth space 21, 23 – 24, 30 New Glenn 26; see also Blue Origin New Sheppard 112; see also Blue Origin new space 106 New Zealand 130 Nixon, Richard 14, 51, 84 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 91 – 92 North Korea 5, 68, 100, 102, 104 – 105 Northrup Grumman 107 – 108, 111 Obama, Barack 87, 89 – 90 Orbital ATK 6, 107 Orbital Sciences 6 orbits 23 Outer Space Treaty 8, 24, 32, 57, 59, 70, 90, 92, 129; objections to 121 – 123 Pace, Scott 114 Pakistan 37 – 38, 102 – 103 Partial Test Ban Treaty 8 Pence, Mike 63, 87 – 88 Planetary Resources 98 Pompeo, Mike 5 position, navigation, and timing (PNT) 28 – 29; see also Galileo system; global navigation satellite systems (GNSS); Global Positioning System (GPS); GLONASS prisoner’s dilemma 80 private companies: capabilities 109; cooperation with 72; debris 32, 110; international law 130 – 131; relation to government 45, 50 – 51, 62, 110 – 111, 120; in space 61, 68 – 69, 89, 97 – 98, 106 – 110 Project Kuiper 26; see also Blue Origin property rights 122 public opinion 2, 51, 81, 108, 119 Reagan, Ronald 14, 86, 101 realism 10, 47 – 48

Index  137

reelection 45, 62 remote sensing 26 – 28, 99 – 100; economic impact 27; proliferation 27; satellites 27 Rocket Lab 6, 107 – 109, 111, 130 Russia 2, 11 – 12; activities in space 29, 65, 87 – 88, 99, 101; Cold War 4, 7 – 8, 14 – 15, 26, 70 – 71, 83 – 87; economy 6, 63, 82, 93, 100; international cooperation 14 – 15, 57, 92, 129; see also anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon Rutan, Burt 112 sanctuary 10 satellites 6, 83, 100; active 3, 21; collisions 89; communications 25 – 26; economic effect 12, 103; failure of 7; see also cubesats; remote sensing; small sats Saturn V 1 Saudi Arabia 106 Scaled Composites 112 Schumpeter, Joseph 46 science fiction 20 selectorate theory 39 – 40, 45, 62; see also democratic peace theory small sats 6, 25 Soviet Union see Russia space access 4, 12, 50, 92 – 93, 98, 110 Space Data Association 113 Space Defense Initiative (SDI) 82, 86, 93 space environment 21, 58, 62, 85, 88; operations in 21; see also gravity; orbits Space Exploration Initiative 119 Space Force 2, 87 space nationalism 9 space race 13; Cold War 78, 82 – 85, 92; contributions of 13; new space race 5, 7, 78, 91 space resources 101, 122 SpaceShipOne 112 space shuttle 32, 51 space tourism 15, 112 space weather 29 SpaceX 1, 15, 97, 107 – 109, 125; government contracts 111; see also Falcon 9; Musk, Elon; Starlink; Starship spoofing 12, 29, 58, 123

Sputnik 2, 81, 83 Starlink 6, 26; see also SpaceX Starship 109; see also SpaceX Star Wars (film) 1, 20 suborbital spaceflight 111 – 112 Telstar 1, 6, 25 Thor-Delta rocket 6 Thucydides’ trap 79, 91 trade asymmetry 47 trade expectations theory 47 traffic control 12 tragedy of the commons 56 Trump, Donald 87 – 88, 90 Turkey 106 U-2 26 UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 31 United Kingdom 48 United Launch Alliance (ULA) 6, 98, 107 – 108, 110 – 111, 133 United Nations (UN) 14, 31, 91 United States (US) 4, 6; activities in space 99, 100 – 102, 131; Cold War 8, 14, 26 – 27, 78, 81 – 87; conflict 77; Congress 5, 50, 83, 86, 90, 119; economy 50 – 51, 63; international cooperation 14 – 15, 57, 87 – 89, 122, 128; relations with China 5, 72; weaponization of space 9, 70 US Air Force 20, 65, 85, 111, 113 US Geological Survey 27 US National Security Space Strategy 3 US National Space Council 114 van Allen radiation belts 23 Virgin Galactic 89, 107, 112 – 113 von Karman, Theodore 22; see also Karman line weaponization of space 7 – 9, 10, 59, 70, 86, 90, 111, 123; private companies 98 Wendt, Alexander 13; see also constructivism Wolf, Frank 5 World War I 46 – 47, 121